Ten Years of Bolshevic Domination; a Compilation of Articles

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PATRIOTIC UNION OF RUSSIAN JEWS ABROAD

TEN YEARS OF

BOLSHEVIC DOMINATION A COMPILATION OF ARTICLES EDITED BY

JOSEPH BICKERMANN

1928

COPYRIGHT 1998 BY JOSEPH BICKERMANN, EDITOR, BERLIN-GRUNEWALD, DACHSBERG 18 PRINTED BY SIEGFRIED SCHOLEM, BERLIN -SCHONEBERG

Contents page

Foreword...

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The Old Regime and the Revolution in Russia. Joseph Bickermann .......... ......... .. ............ The Soviet Regime. Gregory Landau . . . . . . . . . . .

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Land Policy and Land Conditions in Soviet Russia. Cyrill Zaitzeff and Prof. Peter Struve, Fellow of the Russian Emp. Academy, Hon. L. L. D., Cambridge..... . . . .

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Economy in Soviet Russia. S. Sherman... . . . . . .. The Russian Proletariat under Communistic Domination. W. H oeffding

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Women and Children in Soviet Russia.

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A. Bunge

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77 114

. . 132

The Condition of the Russian Jews before and after the Revolution. Dr. D. S. Pasmanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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The Russian Schools under the Yoke of the Bolshevics. E. Kovalevsky, Chairman of Committees and Introducing Speaker in matters of public Instruction in the 3rd and 4th Duma

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174

The Russian Church under the Bolshevics. Prof. N. Arsenjew .14 "Proletarian Culture". Prof. J. Eichenwald...... . . 203 S. Melgunow . . . 213

The "Red Terror" in Russia (1917 -927).

The Armed Forces of Soviet Russia. General A. Winogradsky

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228

The Soviet Rulers in, Relation to the Nations of the World. Joseph Bickermann

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to organisation respect Jews and -of inRussian undertakenUnion carried out book is Patriotic by the abroad. But present HE this book is not a party-publication. Our Union is composed of men of different political convictions, but all its members are imbued with the very same conviction, viz., the Bolshevic tyranny in Russia is pernicious for this country, and is an imminent danger for the whole general culture. This same conviction unites all collaborators of this book, the greater part of whom are not members of the above-mentioned Union, and some are not even Jews. These collaborators are open-minded men, who themselves understand from their own personal experience, what Bolshevic despotism means. They are capable of knowing the condition of present Russia in general, and the intentions of the Bolshevics towards the whole world in particular. But there is no need to refer to the testimonies of men, - the facts cited in this book, having been carefully verified and taken from the most reliable sources, establish the truth of the statements. The publication of this book has been long in coming, but perhaps not so long as it may seem. If it had been brought out exactly ten years after the inauguration of the Bolshevic despotism, it would not have had the possibility of including the whole period, as the pre'parations necessary for such a book, - whose authors are dispered over the whole world, - take up many months. On the other hand, there was no need to conclude the account precisely on the day of the Black Jubilee. Wherever it has been possible, the narratives are continued up to the present time, in some cases until September 1928; and hence our book reflects the actual condition of the Bolshevic rule. 5

We know full well, how arduous the task is of finding a hearing in present-day Europe, who has not yet come to her senses since the great convulsion; but the initiators, the editor and the collaborators of this book all hope that they will be heard, because the evil which the book is fighting against, cries to Heaven. The Union of Russian Jews in particular, dares to hope that their fellow-believers in England and all British countries will give their earnest attention to this book. When taking into consideration the shameless speculations of the Bolshevics, the object of which is our unfortunate brethren, who are degenerating physically and morally under the tyranny of the barbarous Bolshevic Government, - the Jewdom of the whole world ought to be informed

of the actual conditions in Russia. September, 1928.

6

The Editor.

The Old Regime and the Revolution in Russia. By Joseph Bickermann. CONTENTS: The Old Regime and the Revolution; The Instability of Society; Society and Power; Russia had not an "Old Regime"; Russian Justice; Local Self-government; Russia a Democratic Monarchy; Russia's National Stability despite of the Variety of its Races; Revolutionary Dispositions in Russia; Duma; War and Revolution; The Revolution was not necessary.

SINCE

I.

the appearance of the famous book by the Marquis de Tocquevile these two ideas - the Old Regime and the Revolution - have become inseparable. If somewhere a revolution takes place, it is, one maintains, because an Old Regime existed in this country previously, whereby the latter is understood not simply as the political structure which was before, but an obsolete structure, a regime which had outlived itself; just such an interpretation of the Old Regime gives the possibility of combining it with the Revolution in the same way, as the cause is combined with the effect. In various cases, and by various people in the same case, a defect or defects of a society which proved unfit to live, are being discovered in different conditions. Either, the dominating nation oppressed nations subordinate to it, which, after having grown and become strenghtened, had cast off the yoke and together with it upset the whole structure of the Empire, or the higher spheres of society had oppressed the lower without consideration, and thereby called forth the explosion. Or the whole policy, i. e., all its juridical forms became obsolete and remained behind life which developed and became more complicated, and which was also compelled by upheavals to create for itself this space, which the vainly awaited reforms did not bring forth. Weighty and important defects were in any case to be found in the old society, and had to be found. These qualitative conceptions are easily transferred into the domain of quantity, and then by the intensity of the explosion and the enormity of destruction, one judges the degree of the worthlessness of the Old Regime. If, as in Russia, the decay is so great as to seem incredible, one takes it as an obvious proof that the policy destroyed by the Revolution, was rotten to the core. Such a conception of revolutions and their origin, satisfies first of all the necessity of causative and, precisely, historical causative explanation of historical events: if the anterior predetermined the posterior, then everything is in order, and there is no need to rack one's brains. This, on the other hand, contains in it the justification and the sanctification of every revolution, where and why it should not take, which certainly 7

represents great conveniences as well. With such im'portant advantages this conception has also an essential defect: it is false, and moreover, obviously, tangibly false. The fundamental error lies therein that the felicitous existence of each given society is accepted, according to this interpretation of history, as being a matter of course, a gift from God, needing no explanations; whereas the shock, the breaking of the thread spun out of itself, as requiring an explanation by circumstances that ruin society. But, he who does not know how society hangs together, will not be able to understand its decay; as a man would stand in wonder before a crumbling wall, in case he does not know that it had been kept standing for a length of time by its own weight. Human society is more comeplicated, and, chiefly, less stable than any wall, than any building, than any complex devised by human hands. Thousands upon thousands of people, families, groups and their combinations, form society. Each individual, in himself, each group, sub-group, group of groups, is or can become the centre of special interests, demands, wishes and powers of attraction. These innumerable powers of attraction can meet, can conjoin and hold mankind together, but can also diverge at various angles and tear society into shreds. Even more important than the actual interests are the imaginary ones. Man is constantly being haunted by phantoms; in prosperity and sufficiency, in the brilliant light of the sun and electric lamps. as well as in poverty and misery, in dark caves in the interior of primeval forests; there is only a change in the aspect of the bad or good genii, who persecute or protect him. If in enlightened times imaginary perpetrators of good and evil are sought and found among human beings themselves, this only renders society less stable. With thousands of actual divergencies, thousands of imaginary ones become associated, the effect of which is, however, absolutely real. The power of decay, of rupture by phantoms, is even more terrible than the actual divergence of society, more especially because its source is phantom-like, non-commensurate with the world of reality, cannot be removed by the means of actual life, and therefore cannot be removed at all. And as the society in question, its given structure, its existing co-relations and connections in it - is only one of the innumerable combinations of which one can think idly, dream idly, rave idly, the probability of stableness of any given society at any given moment is not great, the probability of decay, however, very great indeed. After the decay, or even during the very process of it, the reconstruction will begin, for "man is a sociable being"; but after the reconstruction a decay will again follow, for the real, and especially the imaginary divergence are permanently existing and produce their effect without cessation. Decay - reconstruction decay is therefore a natural process in the life of human societies, an extreme instability is their natural state. 8

If, in spite of the above said complicated social conditions, vast states sometimes exist during centuries without important convulsions, it is on account of the fact that there is a ruling power. The power is a priori of society, its form and the norm of it. Patriachal power, the power of chieftains, of an absolute king, an absolute parliament or a certain combination of different kinds of government. Operating direct through its multitudinous organs - by the policeman in the street, the Judge in Chambers, the army in barracks, and in case of necessity in the squares -, the power exercises indirectly an even still more potent influence on society. The obstacles, presented by law and protected by power, indirectly lead most of the turbulent elements in society, - whatever origin they may have, into channels which at least are conformable with the existence of the State. Possessing immense possibilities, the power exercises as well an effect on the elements of society by positive measures; it governs them, submits problems to them, withdraws them from anti-sociability, from destructiveness. Being the centre of centres, possessing incomparably more strength than any other organisation in the country, having in its hands all the threads, the power, as long as it believes in its task and keeps striving for its fulfilment, can always prevent and cut off any attempts at subverting the existing order, and thus a revolution under such a power is practically impossible. And what is impossible to-day, can in a year or in ten years time lose its fascination, its attraction; for in society various powers are always acting, and acting in different directions: arrested tendencies will make way for other tendencies which did not encounter obstacles, it may be a creating impulse, it may be a new temptation. But the power must have an unceasing vitality and act indefatigably. It is enough for it to lose its elasticity already in one direction, the mechanism of ruling will soon become shattered, the revolution will become possible and therefore unavoidable; for the destructive powers are great, and are always active in society, - by a good policy, as well as by a bad one. Result: the necessary and sufficient conditions for revolutionary upheavals, is the decline of the power at a given time in a given country. An exact representation of a kind of revolution is given by the divine Homer in the tenth canto of the Odyssey. The hero, after many adventures, has arrived at the isle of the god Aeolus, who received him kindly, and in parting gave him the most precious of gifts: a great bladder with wind enclosed in it, which would be invaluable to Ulysses and his companions in case of a calm at sea. But sleep overcame the hero fatigued by incessant steering of the ship; among the men - who now felt no ruling power over them - trouble arose, and it was decided to see what treasures the master carried tied up in the skin. They opened the skin to its fullest extent, the escaping wind smashed the rigging of the ship, and scattered 9

and drowned the sailors. Ulysses, saved by the favour of the gods, after great efforts and suffering, landed once more on the same island from which he had recently departed. So is revolution: the ruling power for some reason or other falls into a slumber; those left without supervision get a craving to discover what is hidden in the secret place of the rulers; a storm arises which shatters, drowns, destroys; - the survivors of the disaster start afresh. Although, certainly, no one will dare to maintain that the storm is always and everywhere absolutely sterile; for indeed, fruitful revolutions do happen, but not always, and not everywhere. II. Where power first took its rise, where its source is, and where the secret of its action lies, all that we need not touch upon here. What concerns us more closely is the question when and under what conditions the power is seized with apathy, indecision and timidity, and betrays itself and its designation. It is sufficient to point out in this connection that the causes of these manifestations can be, and as a matter of fact were most diverse. It does happen too, but much more seldom than one thinks, that a policy which has outlived itself, paralyses the will of the power by its obvious nonconformity with the striking demands of life, shatters the mechanism of government and at the same time encourages the subordinates to disobedience and counteraction, which finally leads to revolution; in this case the revolution appears as a consequence of the "old regime". This, however, is only one of the possibilities, but by no means the only one, as one is in the habit of thinking nowadays. But even in these rare cases, when the decline of the existing order of things can have the significance of the cause of the revolution, the possible is transformed into the actual by very peculiar, very concrete, and in this sense very accidental circumstances: a weak-minded representative of the ruler, a government worthless by reason of the individualities forming it, weighty difficulties of the power in its relations to the outside world, and the like. The French Revolution itself, which actually replaced the outlived order of things, was not an absolute necessity. The policy that preceded the great Russian upheaval, had not only not outlived itself, but did not have time to settle down sufficiently and to display itself. During the last two centuries Russia continuously transformed her state and many times changed the juridical form of her constitution. The reforms of Peter the Great, Catherine II, Alexander I, Alexander II, and Nicholas II brought about serious alterations into the order of the State and society, and did not merely skim over the surface, as foreigners at times maintain, being ignorant of Russian affairs or supercilious and consequently unjust. The Russian Court of Justice stood so high that in this respect Russia did 10

not need in the least be ashamed before her Western neighbours. And in civil, as well as in criminal proceedings incontestable law reigned. The Court at times called forth accusations there, where political passions seethed: in so-called political proceedings; but let the first stone be thrown by that one among the Western democratic States, which in this respect considers itself completely without sin. However, to what extent it was difficult to mould the law in this sphere too, is shown most clearly by the rare, though well-known exceptions, as an instance of which the proceedings against Beilis, that created a great stir all over the world, can be cited. In a country shaken by riot, alarmed by bloodshed which did not yet have time to calm down, a handful of extreme reactionaries, who had accomplices in the spheres of the Government as well, arranged a veritable plot against law and order, calling forth out of the depths of centuries the shadow of a ritualistic murder; all the powers of hell were raised, all means were set to work - the innocent Beilis, however, was acquitted by the judge and jury. - The local self-government in Russia had such great advantages that perchance nothing corresponding to them can be found anywhere in Western Europe. In spite of the purely political combat which it carried on from the very day of its inception, - thereby, of course, calling forth a contra-action, the Russian Semstvo could and did succeed in accomplishing a notable achievement in the domain of public health, public education and agriculture, gradually raising the villages and hamlets scattered over the limitless expanse of Russia, to a higher level of life. - Then also, the Russian railways worked very satisfactorily, in spite of the comparatively sparse population, which surely increased the upkeep as well as the utilisation of the lines; in spite newness of this undertaking creating special great difficulties in a country so deficient in technical forces as Russia was half a century ago, and even up to recent times. - Russian literature took one of the first places in the world; Russian science brought within a short time - if one does not count the great, but isolated Lomonosoff, within one century - not less great treasures into the general human treasury, and kept on bringing them in profusion. In this great and constantly increasing structure and creation all the forces of the nation, all classes of it were able to take part and actually did take part; for after the abolition of serfdom Russia was a democratic monarchy in the real sense of the word, although an autocratic ruler stood at the head of affairs until i9o5. The Russian nobility was not an exclusive body, but was continually complemented by men of the civil service, who in turn were gathered from all classes of the population. Children of peasants and commoners were able to rise to the position of Generals, Ministers of State, Senators, Members of the State Council, Professors, Academicians; and the importance of sons of the priesthood was even still 11

greater than this. The isolation of the upper classes of the nation therefore existed in Russia in an even lesser degree than anywhere else, and if at times Russians themselves lay stress upon this isolation, their words are founded on theories of doubtful value. Russian society suffered from a diametrically opposite vice, viz., it lacked the sense of distance, without which authority, sure guidance, and therefore sufficient stability of society are next to impossible. Neither was this sense proper to the lower classes, because the upper classes - being constantly complemented by arrivals from below, who brought from there their naive notions about people, about State and society, - had not got it either. This is the reverse of undoubtedly great advantages which the open access for people of all stations to all functions and employments, - with only a very few exceptions perhaps, - gave to the State. As there were no exclusive bodies, and no impenetrable divisions between different sections of the Russian population, it seems obvious that from this direction no restriction could be felt, nor could the need for an explosion arise that would set some compressed energy free. We shall come to the same conclusion if we contemplate the population of Russia, not in a vertical, but in a horizontal section. There is nothing more erroneous than to imagine the former Tzarist Russia as resembling the monarchy of Habsburg, now vanished for ever, or the former Turkey, where under one roof several nations were living in open enmity with one another and tearing their common abode to bits. To say that under the Russian sceptre hundreds of tribes were living, would mean really less than nothing: here one must not only count the tribes, but also the people in each particular tribe; one must, moreover, not only count, but weigh them on scales. The Kalmucks in the waterless Caspian steppes, the Votyacks on the lower reaches of the Ob, the Samoyeds in the Polar swamps, the Yakuts and Tungooes in the depths of Siberia, and dozens of other such tribes, did not weigh and could not weigh in the scale of history - absolutely nothing by reason of their smallness in numbers, as well as on account of their extremely low level of culture, not to mention their remoteness. In inner Russia, the Mordva, the Cheremis and some other Ugro-Finnish tribes scattered like islands in the vast Volga basin, had been transformed in the course of centuries by the Great-Russian tribe, and this process was very nearly at its end. It is neither possible nor necessary to enumerate here all the multitudinous tribes populating Russia in order to show the insignificance of their influence and their chances. Every one will understand without explanation that a most important role could be played by the non-Russian races in the West of the Empire. The Letts and Esthonians, for instance, - in spite of their small numbers - could represent a certain danger for the unity of the State, due to their concentrated national 12

conscientiousness and their geographical location on the most important sea-coast. But their forces were engaged in the struggle not with the Russian administration of the State, but with the Germans representing the upper class of that region. This struggle began a long time before the conquest of the Baltic provinces by the Moscovites; and during the last war, when the country was threatened by the danger of being annexed by Germany, the Letts supplied troops voluntarily for the assistance of the Russian army; and only when disturbances broke out, i. e., when the State lost its hold, the century-old struggle here also (as it happened in go5) assumed a keen revolutionary character. Finland was constantly finding herself not so much inside the domains of Russia, as adjacent to them; the Grandduchy, if circumstance,, had been favourable, could have separated itself from the Empire, but this would have called forth in Russia, not a revolution, but an outburst of patriotism, as it happened after the Polish revolt. - Finally, there was Poland. Is there any need to speak about the difficulty of the situation in which the Poles found themselves when divided between three adjoining Empires? Is there any need to prove that this difficulty to a large extent paralysed the forces of the Poles? The Polish problem, although a difficult problem for Russia, could not, for all that, become the source of the general Russian revolution. Only the war which was waged first of all on Polish soil, strained the situation there, and loosened the forces of the Poles; but the cause was the war - not the Old Regime*). There still remain a few words to be said about the condition of the Jews. Here an "Old Regime" actually did exist, i. e., a striking nonconformity between the forms of life and its contents. On another occasion I have proved in detail that, in spite of all their limitations of rights, the Jews in Russia flourished and grew, increased in numbers, reinforced themselves materially and developed spiritually together with the growth of prosperity and culture in the country"). But just the actual growth made *) I make no mention of the Ukrainians because up to the time of the Revolution there was no question concernig the Ukraine as an actual factor in practical policy. How little Ukrainism means even at the present time after ten years of perfidious Bolshevistic propaganda in Russia, the following will go to prove. The Newspaper "The Communist", the central organ of Ukrainian communistic party, published in Kharkow, the capital of the Ukrainian Republic, had an issue of oo,ooo copies while it was printed in Russian language; but when - in 1926 the Russian was replaced by the Ukrainian language, the circulation dropped to 35,ooo, i. e. to i/3rd. A similat transition has taken place with the central organ of the "White Russian" communistic party, "The Star", although no exact figures have been mentioned by the communistic source. ") See "Russia and the Jews", p. article by Dr. Pasmanik in this book.

84/85 (in Russian

and German), and the

13

this network of limitations and exceptions unbearable, opening the door widely to any kind of chicanery and suppression. However, only a mere infant in politics, or a totally blind Jew-hater can maintain that the revolution was created by the Jews; these shopkeepers, artisans, dealers, physicians and lawyers, forming even in the reservations (for Jews) only a small proportion of the population, vanishing entirely in the mass of nonJews in the rest of Russia, having no actual access to the leading centres of the State and of society, and not even dreaming of separating fron Russia. As much as one would try to increase the importance of the role which the Jews played in the revolution after its outbreak, they could not be the main source of it. In spite of all cited here, Russian society in the course of many decades longed for a Revolution. As always and everywhere, thousands of phantoms here too tempted brains and hearts; but these phantoms received a special power under these circumstances because until the beginning of the present century, in one important respect, an "Old Regime" existed after all, for no representation of the people existed. There is no need to discuss here whether or not Parliament is an absolute public-weal; it is enough that, for the wealthy and educated classes of the population, it more and more became on oppressing subjective necessity, almost a mania; not in a lesser degree, the longed-for so-called liberties which generally were inseparable from Parliament: an ideal of much less relative worth. Finding itself in constant intercourse with Western Europe, where, partly in connection with Parliament, social-political life is so noisy and variegated, and life in general so intensively productive, Russia could not even feel and think differently. The danger in this situation lay in this that it created a frame of mind in society, which found its expression in the slogan: - from the "left" no enemies will come. When, however, the Japanese war broke out and Russia suffered a defeat, conditions arose, by which the longed-for revolution could have been accomplished, and it was accomplished; its results were: the representation of the people and the liberties. As is usually the case, neither the ruling power nor society conformed at once to the new conditions, on both sides they were misused or sinned against, what naturally called forth reciprocal irritation. Nevertheless, the revolutionary romanticism, holding in its captivity the Russian consciousness for nearly a whole century, began to abate visibly and generally; this everyone will confirm who during these years lived in Russia and with Russia. Simultaneously, just when the unrest calmed down, an unprecedented revival took place in all spheres of life: in agriculture, in industry, in trade, in public education, in social progress; about this more will be said and more convicingly, in those pages of this book, which are devoted to various 14

phases of Russian life before and after the arrival of Bolshevics. There are two things about which I still wish to say a few words, viz., about land and peasantry. The large private landed-estate decreased rapidly even before the revolution and continued to diminish after it; the property of the peasants, however, continued to grow more and more at its expense; a peaceful revolution of greatest importance was being achieved, and it took its course with an exceptional rapidity for such a process. When Stolipin later on carried through a law in the Duma, which opened up the possibility for the peasant of separating his portion of the land from the Community, the liberation of the peasant from all obsolete and outlived trammels took place speedier than was hoped for by the one side, and feared by the other. Here there was actually no oppression, no obsolete form, no Old Regime which did no longer correspond to the new requirements of life. He who sees an accumulation of revolutionary energy in the peasantry and their needs, as having called forth the great upheaval, speaks from hearsay; these words have long ago become a'sounding metal'even in the mouths of those from whom they are borrowed. Of course, even after all reforms, Russia lagged behind the Western countries in many respects, their historic life having begun almost half a millenary before. But this lagging-behind of the country can just as little be the source of the revolution, as the lagging-behind of the village behind the town can call forth a revolution in the village. For her existence, for her historical phase, Russia has forms sufficiently ample and sufficiently new: the political forms have rather superceded the life. Of course, there was a sufficiency of imperfections and faults: what with the remaining fragments of the past, what with the unsuccessful and abortive efforts. But where and when did not the old intermingle with the new; where and when was society free from faults. And what about Rasputin? The filth and putridity covered by this name is obvious and incontestable; there is no possibility nor necessity to deny it. But two reservations must be made. Illumine with a brilliant ray of light the secret corners, not of a Court, but of any centre of a political party - how much filth and rot will be found there! That's one point. But the main point is, a filth of that kind slobbered over with scandalous gossip and ill-will of the mob, can to a certain extent become, and did become in this case, a weapon of the revolution, as the story about the famous necklace caused such trouble at the time, but can't be its real origin. If at a time the power begins to slip away out of the hands of the rulers, then any unmasking of their human nature is mortally dangerous to them; but any unmasking loses its sting as long as the rulers are faithful to themselves and their mission. 15

III. From where did the revolution really come? In the first place from the war: Russia overstrained herself in a struggle alongside of more powerful allies and against a more powerful enemy. It is necessary to make clear to oneself that the capacity for a military exertion finds itself in close correspondence with the tension of every-day life; especially in present wars, when not armies, but whole nations make war upon one another. Russia always lived less intensively than Western Nations; life here eitended itself over large areas: the population dispersed, the arable ground increased, the tillage, however, did not become intense. In course of time, however, extensiveness certainly gave way more and more to intensity, but as far as the strength of the Western nations are concerned, the intensiveness of Russian life did not nearly reach it: therein just lies her backwardness. And in regard to military matters, Russia during the last centuries rarely had been obliged to concentrate all her forces and to put on them all the strain they could stand. Towards the East the nation extended without finding almost any obstacles, to the West and South, however, it was obliged to contend with countries, which, though powerful in their time, happened to be already in a state of disintegration when Russia approached them (Poland and Turkey of the x7th and 18th century). When, however, Russia collided with Sweden - a Western state in type - although much weakened by the annular disposition of its territory, war waged over a period of 21 years, and only the genius of Peter the Great made it possible for the country to endure this trial and to come unharmed out of it. Everyone will understand that the opinion expressed here does not refer to the Russian army, but to something much more fundamental in itself: the historical and geographical conditions of Russian life. A country with such a past, such habits, such an order of things, had unexpectedly to take a prominent part in the war in which the enemy. as well as the Allies, brought the strength of their forces to such' a level as only a year previous, no human imagination could have conceived as possible. Russia, being obliged to come up to the same level as the enemy and the Allies, massed a huge number of forces on the frontier; and though lacking stores and supplies, subjected her whole existence to the demands of the front. The weight of the burden made itself felt acutely, but the population bore the burden while there were victories. When, however, defeats came, a convulsion contorted the whole country, and here was disclosed the fatal significance of the fact that the new policy in Russia was still new and unassimilated. Where the people are in the habit of thinking that they rule themselves, there disaster very little affects 16

the prestige of power; for the power - "represents the people": everybody and nobody 'is one and the same; there is no recipient, there is no appealing to anyone, there is no one to prosecute; at worst the commanding general will be court-martialled, or, if the price of bread rises, the baker will be strung-up to the lamp-post. In Russia the defeats fell with all their load on the Tzar and on his Government - the defeats together with all the burdens of the war; for one was here in the habit of thinking that everything emanated from the ruling power, and that consequently it was responsible for everything. The psychology, which incited the Chinese Emperors in former times to appeal to their people with a penitential epistle after every calamity, even after any elementary ones, is still rampant among the masses, as well as among the rulers; even the latest history of Europe is full of such instances; it is all the more comprehensible in regard to Russia. In such moments, the attitude of the ruling power (given a feeling of incertitude natural to it under such condition), and that of the upper, the leading ranks of society, has a decisive import. Unfortunately, revolutionary belief, which had been about to die out, again took possession of Russian society at the time we are speaking of. It now assumed the face of patriotism, of a patriotic impulse. "The revolution will call forth an -animation, and will liberate new forces that will bring victories", - such was more or less the idea of the most important persons and groups of Russian society during these fatal months, nay, even years. Such a recurrence of revolutionary romance in Russian society was still more natural because among Russia's Allies this severest of all wars was accompanied by a preaching of Messianic times, unprecedented in its vigour and, at all events, in its clamour: this war was after all to become an expiatory sacrifice for the whole human race. When taking into consideration that the more advanced Western friends were so obsessed by this belief, it is not surprising that Russia accustomed for ages past to expect miracles from upheavals and catastrophes, was incensed by it as well. It was apparently not understood by the Allies that, whereas a power is forged out of a belief of this kind in the West, under Russian conditions, however, a weakness only can arise. Russia sacrificed herself on the altar of -

I should not stay idealism, but -

ideology.

The national representation became the centre-point of this pernicious belief, and the historical power, being overburdened by the whole load of responsibility, remained isolated. Everything at the time depended upon the question whether the bearers of the power in the narrower sense of the word could uphold it and could utilize these huge possibilities which, even under these conditions, remained still at their disposal. Here individuals decided, definite individuals in definite positions. The Tzar, afterwards 2

17

tormented to death by the Bolshevics, was unfortunately not a man of inflexible will and unshaken perseverance; and at the time there was no solitary important personage about the throne, and the fate of Russia was sealed. But, I emphasize again, the concurrence of concrete - and in this sense contingent - circumstances led to it: If the war were to break out, not during the fourth calling together of the Duma, but during the seventh or eighth, society and the Duma itself would already have been different, and the history of Russia would have progressed by less tragic ways. If everything had happened as it did happen and the throne had been occupied by a man more capable of grappling with these circumstances, not even of Peter I's stamp, but at least of Alexander III's calibre, then everything would have progressed differently. If, during the same war, and under the same wielder of the supreme power, a man would appear on the pinnacle of power, of the calibre and cut - let us say - of a Stolipin, then the collapse could still have been averted. Nothing of this kind happened and therefore the upheaval and its consequences became unavoidable. Just because the revolution was absolutely unnecessary, the destructions caused by it are so monstrous; and for this reason is Russia now a desolate ruin on which the savage fanatics are dancing their cannibalistic dance. Whenever a revolution comes as a result of national life in its historical development, then this need exercises a directing action even in case of wild rioting, and finds the good among the bad. Here, however, with the collapse of all the powers and the disintegration of the front, the negative was fulfilled, the positive could only show men with animal appetites and bestial ideals: fire the farm, destroy the cattle kept for breeding purposes, drive the manufacturer and the landholder out of their properties, everybody rob and plunder everything! That is Bolshevism, when in search of power.

When it took possession of the power . . . Let the

more fortunate nations of Europe now looking on Russia with the questioning glance - how then can you endure it! - not judge, not having passed through a similar trial. Judge not, lest you be judged. It seemed to me an absolute necessity to preface these few remarks to the pages of a book in which Russia's "via dolorosa" is described. He who pictures to himself the roads which brought Russia to her present condition, if tinged with political or racial prejudices, will understand very little of the present book, - for him will the book of fate even remain sealed. For the fate of Russia, is the fate of Europe, the fate of our whole civilisation. That will soon be clear to everyone who has eyes to see.

18

The Soviet Regime. By Gregory Landau. CONTENTS: Pre-revolutionary Regime; The Rise of the Bolshevic Regime; The Monopoly of Organising; The Individual and the State; The Organs of the Soviet Power; Conclusion.

Introduction.

UP

justifies is rampant in some circles, which this day the opinion to monstrosities the and crimes of the Soviet regime by pretending that it is but the heirloom of the "Tzaristic" regime; not rarely are the accusations alleged against Bolshevism formulated in saying that it equals "Tzarism" or even exceeds it. All such opinions essentially tend to warp the idea not only of the old regime, but also that of the Bolshevic regime. Bad or good, the old regime remained on the other side of that abyss which separates Bolshevism from modern administration of States.

I. Pre-revolutionary Regime. There is no need to detail the enormity of Russia's territory, her more than i5o million inhabitants, peopling her with an exceedingly variable density; nor to speak of the numerous races, nations and religions constituting within her an incomparable variety of cultural level (from the refined intelligentcia of the Capitals to the Esquimaux, and the Siberian tribes, etc.) among which it is divided; nor of the different periods when various non-Russian territories had been added to the body of Russia. (Among the territories annexed were not only desert country and sparsely inhabited regions, not only of low-culture and half savage, but also highly cultured, densely populated countries such as Poland and the Baltic regions, to whom some of their original organisation and jurisdiction was left). This is well known, though usually forgotten when estimates are being made. Considering the continnity of her geographical and anthropological oneness, Russia represented a consolidated State; but at the same time, she either included within herself, or was immediately extended by territories and peoples, corresponding to the colonies of other States. Russia contained her own colonies within herself, and by this very fact she, on the one side, extended to them the benefits of a general State order, while on the other she got pervaded to a certain extent by "colonial" peculiarities, such as the "riot act", juridical restrictions, etc. It may be stated that in the Greater British Empire, there exist "different rights", innumerable "juridical restrictions", "riot acts", dictatorships of Governor-Generals which may be on a far more extensive scale than in the former Russian Empire. But they are considered to be, and they 2*

19

really are outside of the limits of the British regime; they are not taken into consideration when this regime is examined and estimated, and, in fact, exercise no influence on it. England is fortunate in having her colonies apart from the country itself, in being exempt from the influence of the colonies, which permitted the development in the mother country, the development of an unadulterated system of high civic rights. Russia embracing her own colonies within herself, did not distinctly separate them from the mother country, so that the "colonial peculiarities" made themselves felt with more or less detriment throughout the whole country. This was Russia's misfortune, connected with the benefits of her extended system of State administration. The Government went ahead of the nation during a number of generations, and implanted from above civilisation and culture. The growth was extremely rapid, and while the leaders of culture advanced far attaining the level of the highest achievements of European thought, art and social culture, there were gigantic masses that abode in the lowest depths of illiteracy and primitive husbandry. At the hands of the upper classes the State had to suffer criticism and disapproval that exceeded all bounds, and could not be satisfied by any European State; whereas by the lower classes accusations were levelled against the State for its excessive legislation, and abroad it was criticised with no understanding for the difficulty of the problem that faced Russia. The development being rapid, and the foundation insufficient, the former occurred in separate leaps and bounds. Owing to the influence of the cultivated social-outposts, every historical forward movement reached far; but then the general weight of unpreparednesss of the masses and of society, the very rawness and backwardness, retarded the movement, - and a period of retrogression set in. It might have seemed as if Russia was permanently engaged in reaction; in reality, however, during the long period of retrogression and of political reaction from what had been reached during the latest forward movement, - the enormous masses drew nearer - in regard to civilisation, culture and economies - towards those midway positions to which the Government had retreated, but wither the masses of the people had to advance.

Absolutism existed until 19o5; but absolutism was also a lawful order with its full power delimited and secured to various institutions, and any encroachment was of rare occurrence, and was considered an aggression on the law; the order of administration was essentially lawful. In 1905 a constitution had been obtained, and although neither its primary com-

20

position nor the subsequent amendments introduced by Stolipin, can by any means be called a success, - yet it had nevertheless established a representative order which meant the beginning of a period which the adherents of pure parliamentarism may well call a sham constitutionalism but which, for all that, ingrained itself into the life of the State, and soon began producing its own effectiveness. Matters stood bad in regard to personal security owing to an almost persistent application of the "riot act". But things were different with the press. During the reign of Nicholas II., preliminary censorship was not applied to a number of newspapers in the Capitals, nor to books of more than 20 printed sheets; in fact, censorship was so much lightened that journalism in its greater part was in open opposition to the Government, possessed even Marxist journals, and that one could obtain Marx, Engels and Proudhon, etc. on the book market. And finally the liberation movement (1905) quite freed the press; in spite of the ensuing retrogression, the liberty of the press in Russia was extensive from 1905 to 1917. Almost

the same thing can be said about the freedom of meetings and associations. Even before 1905 free speeches could be heard in a number of gatherings (as for instance, the Pirogoff meetings) and in sessions of scientific societies (such as the Free Economic Society and the Technical Association); but i9o5 there was also a turning point in this respect, for later on meetings and associations obtained an extensive legalised freedom which came into practical use. Local -administration has been introduced into Russia in the sixties. At times it attacked the Government, demanding a constitution; it carried on a prolonged struggle, parrying the attacks of the Government; but in any case, it was an achievement of State culture, the like of which cannot so easily be found in Europe. And by its real and beneficient work, by its education of politicians, i. e. by accumulating experience, it has filled a splendid page in Russian history. The imperfection lay in the system of the "Semstvos" (Ellective Provincial Administrative Assemblies) by not embracing the whole of the country. But this matter also made progress in the reign of Nicholas II.; for projects had been worked out for introducing the "Semstvos" into new gouvernements. To the period of the sixties, Russia is indebted for her excellent judiciary of which she could be proud in the face of all Europe (as well as for her prominent class of lawyers). The refugees, now dispersed throughout different European countries, are convinced, by personal experience of the high standard of the old Russian course of justice. The reaction which had followed this reform, restricted it somewhat; bat in the main, the judiciary retained its same high standard. Trial by jury, which is now being abolished even in democratic European countries, existed in Russia.

21

The criminal law had absorbed all the humane teaching of our time; it might also be useful to call to mind that no capital punishment for criminal offences existed in Russia, in which respect it differed from other European countries. Matters were worse in regard to civil law, for an enormous and important circle of interests of the population (landed property of peasants), in its main part, was excluded from it, and was under the jurisdiction of the "communal order"; the retrograde ideology coincided with the revolutionary in defending this aspect of landed property, which had remained as an inheritance of serfdom. But here too matters had improved of late. Stolipin had begun the emancipation of the peasantry. Another, though a lesser evil, consisted in the legal restrictions concerning limited liability companies, which tended to arrest Russia's economic development. Nevertheless, the fundamental principles of civil rights, the security of property and contracts were solid and firm. The worst aspect of the Russian pre-revolutionary regime consisted in the inequality of rights of citizens. On the one hand, the extraordinary condition of the peasantry, and on the other the restrictions of rights on religious and partly on national principles (especially as concerning the Jews it led to -exceptional consequences, morally and legally ruinous, and economically disfiguring). It must, however, be stated that in the first respect the special juridical condition of the peasants had already long ago begun to evaporate; and that even in the second matter - most backward of all - the liberation movement of 19o5 had brought to the Jews (who remained limited in most important rights), equal political rights. Furthermore it must be mentioned that in one particular domain concerning half the population, the feminine half - the Russian civil law was a long way in advance of the European.

II. The Rise of the Bolshevic Regime. Bolshevism was not the heirloom of "Tzarism". It was the consequence of the old regime breaking down, i. e., of the revolution of February 1g1. The prime evil was the insufficient firmness of the Russian State, reinforced by the not yet disseminated consequences of the liberation movement of 1905 (which had poisoned Court and society, more particularly the political intelligentcia), and it became more acute because of the failures of the extraordinary exertions in connection with the war. The tension having been tremendous, the break-down was bound to be fatal. The collapse of the front on the one hand, the military revolt at the rear on the other; in addition to this, the removal of the ruling head had paralysed all State life. The improvised new government from the very beginning proved impotent in the face of the armed rabble. At first the rabble aspired to nothing but to put an end to the war; but it soon fell under the in22

fluence of the representatives of the socialist parties, who awoke the appetite of the masses. That appropriation of land and property is sacred, that the rulers, hierarchy and discipline are vicious, - and consequently that disobedience is lawful, and revenge (meaning destruction of the bearers of the idea of State and culture) is sacred, - all this suddenly became incontrovertible truths. The new, the provisional Government itself partly sharing similar opinions, in one swoop dismissed the old administration appointing new people instead, without authority, experience or organisative connections. Under similar circumstances any State would have probably collapsed; but perhaps in some other country elements would have turned up among people and society capable of an immediate restoration of the State's cohesion (as was the case in Germany though, of course, under incomparably more favourable conditions). They had not turned up in Russia, which fact amply proved the invaluable importance even of such imperfect forms of State life as pre-revolutionary Russia possessed. Nevertheless the falling to pieces of the social tissue proceeded slower than could be expected; though rapidly yet gradually did the loosening of the bonds of the State and the disorganisation of society advance; this is the period approximately corresponding with the 8 months during which the provisional Government was in office. The Government and its organs neither could nor wished to use force, and therefore hardly tried doing so; consequently nothing was left but persuasion. It was a shocking sight to witness how the greatest part of State work had been reduced to persuasion, - whether to go to the front and fight, or to go to the factories and work, or to go to the offices and write. Million-headed crowds were exposed to persuasion; State administration, as well as economic management of the country turned into perpetual conferences. But, of course, it was only the State-compulsion that ceased to act; individual violence alone prospered. Everyone did whatever he pleased, fearing neither police nor trial, nor loss of position, nor anybody else's disapproval; fearing only some one else's thwarting violence, - took the coats off passers-by in the streets, or left the front, or appropriated landed estates or houses. There existed people who were proud of this ampleness of "freedom" unmatched by any other country. Individual people, especially of the criminal type, with a sufficient amount of initiative, were also able to do a few things; but naturally for important undertakings (such as appropriation of land, harassing factory owners, refusal to obey military orders) the multitude was wanted. Thus multitude and leader - or meeting and committee - became the ruling 23

social and administrative form. The meeting becomes the point of cohesiveness of the mass-licence with the ideology of the intelligentcia. Form of will-expression -

resolution;

form of action -

violence.

In regard to this deluge of gatherings and committees, the ruling organs were helpless. But abreast of them the embryos of a new organisation arose, - out of the actual process of decay, and out of the socialist formula (dear to the intelligentcia), a class-administration should he created independently of the bourgeois State. On this meeting-and-committee principle, an organ was to be created uniting these multitudes in the person of their representatives; this was the Soviet of the workmen's and soldiers' (later also of the peasants, farm hands) deputies with its executive committee, consisting of the representatives of various revolutionary groups, parties, etc., - some of them fictitious, - and simply of eminent revolutionists, who framed their own rights. The Soviet possessed neither a distinct organisation, nor organs, nor statutes, nor competence, but acted en bloc, mixing itself up in everything as far as possible. The Bolshevic motto "all power to the Soviets", expressed the real direction of this movement. The Soviet was a disorderly gathering of delegates not representing the population, but indefinite multitudes and gatherings headed by a self-appointed revolutionary committee. Later, however, it gave birth to all sorts of commissions, departments, "secretariats" with indefinite and unlimited duties; orders, mandates, etc. acquired a magic power, although they were secured by nothing. Orders were contradictory, absurd and incapable of execution. So the inhabitants fulfilled the orders only in part or anyhow; the punishment was meted out to them by mere chance, and quite independently of any disobedience. The first influential Soviet (Council) was naturally that of Petersburg; the rise of other Soviets in other towns called forth the necessity of union. This union took place in the same Sovietic form as that of a session of delegates of the Soviet with a suitable executive committee. An indefinite number of delegates came to these sessions, which, of course, were brief, and therefore had even more the character of informal meetings. The executive committee remained in Petersburg, but, with the exception of its name, had no greater power than all the other committees, so that it often sat and carried resolutions in indefinite common sittings together with them. Neither differentiated organs, nor differentiated functions existed. With such a system, groups won a special importance, Which, though small in numbers were well welded together and ready to act regardless of anything, - to which groups, in the first place, belonged the groups of the Bolshevics. 24

The power of the Bolshevics lay in their slogans, which harmonised with the "moods" of the masses - proclaiming pacifism. i. e., an immediate cessation of the war - and an immediate expropriation by means of personal violence. The method of action consisted of the much recommended anarcho-syndicalistic principle, viz., that each group should manage its own affairs. This was the Soviet idea, which destroyed any kind of State organisation; each company, regiment, factory, town and urbandistrict, decided "their" affairs in their separate Soviet, whether they wers to fight, to work or to seize strange property, etc.; and as a rule they decided not to fight, not to work and to seize strange property. This meant elevating actual disorder to a principle. In this sense did the Bolshevics alone remain congenial with it to the very last; in this consisted their power. Their political slogan: "all power to the Soviets", permitted the completion of this process, and blended into one, the actual happening and the socialist idea. The disintegration of any other organisation carried out by the Bolshevics served their purpose of consolidating their own organisation. There only remained the confirmation of their power, and to this end the suppression of riot. In this manner they brought the process of rioting to final perfection, by taking possession of it and adapting it to their own aims. For the future a new problem faced them, viz., the immediate introduction of Socialism in accordance with their program, and to secure their power in a form brought about by the riot, ana consisting of a Bolshevic party in a Soviet system. However, three and a half years after having come into power (in 1921) they had to give up the attempt of immediately erecting a communistic State, for it menaced them with self-destruction. But they had succeeded in establishing their power, and the problem of the future was, to defend it in the conditions of the new regime. In ten years the Bolshevics had zig-zagged about very much in the attempt at fulfilling this task. Nevertheless they faithfully safe-guarded the foundations of a Soviet system. My object is now to elucidate these foundations. Chapter . The Monopoly of Organising. The Bolshevic-Soviet system, arose from three separate developments: out of a terroristic suppression of boundless riots; out of an attempt to establish by force and in circumstances of disorganisation and misery, a communistic system proclaiming the omnipotence of a collective body over the individual; out of the terroristic destruction of the former high and middle classes, as well as of the inevitably arising strata of bourgeoisie of new formation. This accounts for its character of a terroristic dictator25

ship, for its tendency to enslave and to suppress. The problem of crushing the right, blended itself with that of uprooting a civil system. The "Cheka" (Special commission for combatting counter-revolution, speculation and sabotage) prosecuted alike the former nobles and officials, traders and anarchists, robbers, contractors and "kulaks" (well-off peasants). The Communistic Party, as the Bolshevics called themselves in order to be distinctive from the Socialists; established its power in Russia by force of arms. Engaged in a deadly struggle with all the traditions, all the forces and treasures of the past, and in an inevitable fight with all the elementary developments of the present, it could protect itself by force only. Having obtained the power by means of their thorough organisation, the Communist Party - for the sake of self-preservation - had to remain the only organisation in the country. This is the leading principle of the Bolshevic regime. All parties but the Communists were annihilated, even those of the Socialists. The fact of having belonged to some party or other in the past, be it even a Socialist one, is considered a crime, and must be redressed. One only ruling organisation is admitted, viz., the Communist Party; all the remaining subjugated population receives from this very fact the appellation of -party-less". The existence of any "second" organisation is not tolerated, not even in the form of a "faction" of this very same communistic party; for in this is already seen a menace to its autocratic rule. The well remembered struggle with the opposition of Trotzky, sufficiently testifies to this fact. In "Tzaristic" Russia, from the moment when a constitution had been introduced, the political parties obtained partly legal and partly semi-legal rights of existence. In the same way as it dealt with political organisations, Bolshevism dealt with all non-political social organisations, in fact, destroyed them. A memorable example of this can be found in the establishment of the organisation - with the sanction and under the control of the Bolshevics for combatting famine, which led to the arrest and banishment of all its members. A similar fate befell the few institutions which for a short time vegetated under the Bolshevics, or attempted to organise themselves in the "springtime" of the "NEP". From time to time sessions of scientists take place at which special questions are debated mellowed by Sovietic speeches and Lenin-ideology. This is all that remains of the once abundant and manifold public life of the "Tzaristic" time. Those elements that cannot possibly remain disorganised are either swallowed up by the com-party (Communistic party), or are incorporated into the State mechanism. Such is the fate of the trade and professional unions, and of the co-operative system, their success in any State consisting mainly in their complete independence. The State, however, as we shall see, is entirely under the control of the com-party. 26

There is only one organisation that the Bolshevics could neither annihilate nor incorporate into their atheistic State: the Church. The religions element proved to be the only inflexible thing in Russia. The Bolshevics started a desperate struggle against it, by propaganda, by taking away its means of subsistence, by a system of prohibition and persecution of the believers and the clergy, - this is not the right place for enumerating all those churchmen who have been tortured to death, shot, imprisoned or banished. However, the Bolshevics did not succeed in killing the Church, and so they made an attempt to blow up the Church organisation from within by splitting it up, and by supporting those churches that lent their support to Bolshevism. Such aims were pursued not only in the "State" policy of the Bolshevics, but likewise in their social and economic policy. The problem of an immediate introduction of communism, led to the nationalisation of land, real estate, machinery, enterprises, banks, stocks, - in fact, of all property. Man became an employee, having lost the base for independent activity. By this means, not only all economic work, but also all free social and culture work, which is based on independent disposal of means, became destroyed. Every man under communism was entered on lists under a given heading (according to labour obligations, to mobilisation or to appointment), and had rations allotted to him. There is even no need for the "Cheka" dungeon-cells; it suffices to transfer a man from one category of rationing to another in order to destroy a whole family, - to kill it by starvation. The regulations of housing have a certain influence even on cohabitation. The State, i. e. the ruling power within it, viz. the Bolshevics, bereft every individual of all, even of his breath. The like of such a direct and unlimited dependence on the Government, can only be imagined in a regime of slavedom. Three principles lay at the root of this dependence. Property had been nationalised, or was liable to expropriation in any desired measure; individuals had been made dependent on the Government; the population had to obtain their supplies from the State. All these principles, as well as all decrees were practically trangressed owing to the physical impossibility to fulfil them, or the inability of testing whether they were fulfilled. In this way the spirit of general deceit, fear and lawlessness, of the equitableness of evasion and transgression was introduced. So from all sides the undermining of this regime, and the evading of its demands was going on, and the population in its turn was penalised by punishments quite unrestrained and accidental. This disorderly order struck against an essential limitation in the case of the peasants. Innumerable and widely distributed, they could neither be put on lists, nor on rations. For a long time they remained entirely 27

outside of the BoIshevic control, which was concentrated in towns and along the railway lines, and the peasants only suffered by raids and grainseizing expeditions. The Bolshevics only gradually extended their administrative net-work to the very heart of the country. But even when incorporated into the Bolshevic system, the village remained but little dependent of it; and the Bolshevics had to make up for this in an indiredt way; for instance, by the organisation of an entire army of "village correspondents", as voluntary spies and informers; and chiefly by organising the social struggle of the "paupers", who in their narrow personal interests were set up against the better-off strata of the village population. In the villages the Soviet rulers were obliged to build up their State by means of organising social feuds. However, this policy vacillated. At times the Government permitted a certain amount of economic activity, and the "paupers" were oppressed; at other times the pressure was exercised in the opposite direction. But these sporadic ways do not alter the true aspect of affairs. The feud, whether open or secret, remained the true form of Soviet mastery in the village. At times it manifested itself in mutinies even long after the civil war; at other times, as a reign of terror within the village limits (murder of officials and of village correspondents). The lesser dependence of the peasantry on the Government is, however, not only the result of the dispersal of the peasants, but also due to other causes which were most conspicuous in the early times of Bolshevism. The town inhabitant received his food from the State; the peasant, on the contrary, fed himself and the State. The village with its frugal demands retains the possibility of withdrawing within itself, e. g., within its natural economy. The town folk, deprived of everything, and receiving their food from the Government, fear a change of Government (even if they look upon the new power as a salvation). For they know not how they are to subsist during the period of replacing the Government, - a period which can literally starve them to death; the peasants may fear a new Government (for instance, the possibility of having to surrender the land they themselves had appropriated), but they are not afraid of the time when the change of government actually takes place. The citizens, however, cling to the Soviet Government, and in this way serve as a support to it, even when they hate it and perish by it; whereas the peasants, less dependent on the Government, are more dangerous and capable of dealing it a blow. But on the other hand, being distributed over an immense territory, removed from all important administrative centres and besides being uncultured, they prove - in spite of their number - a very thin layer of the community having very little active power in any political tussle. To obviate their own destruction, with which the general disintegration of the country menaced them, the Bolshevics introduced the NEP, which 28

offered some sort of relief. The slave-like dependence of the individual on the State, - though alleviated to some extent and no longer quite so unlimited - nevertheless continued to subsist, for the greater majority of the town population remained in the service of the State or in nationalised institutions or undertakings without any possibility of exchanging it for any other service; while the private initiative - after having been given some scope by the NEP - was very soon strangled and suppressed by intolerable taxes, requisitions, restrictions and direct administrative persecutions, banishment to the remotest spots of Siberia not being excluded. This explains how in spite of the NEP, the all-embracing dependence of the individual on the State, continued to exist, though under a slightly different and less straightforward aspect. The explanation of the longevity of the Communist Party, so amazing to people not acquainted with Russia, is, that all active organisations not annihilated are subject to the State, which in its turn is again subservient to the com-party.

This all-embracing dependence of the individual on the State, finds a juridical expression in a complete absence of "freedom". In prohibiting any self-organisation of the population, the Communist Party must naturally forbid all means and ways of self-organising, all possibilities of any collusion, of the rising of private centres, of authorities, of public opinions, of propaganda. Thus the Bolshevic regime absolutely excludes all freedom of union, of gatherings, of written and spoken word; having annihilated all parties except the communistic party, it excludes all propaganda, all press utterances except those of its own press. It would be incorrect to say that the Soviet regime has introduced any kind of censorship in Russia, not even of the severest kind. Censorship exists, but it plays a subordinate part in Russia; like spying and informing, which in Russia are alone left to private initiative and have reached an unprecedented development. The fact is, the Soviet regime does not restrict, but simply annihilates the press if it in any way disagrees with the Communistic party. There is simply no room for it in the U. S. R. This applies not only to politics, but also to any ideology, philosophy, aesthetics, oin a word, to any culture. Only the Marxist "ideology" is admitted. All the rest must be uprooted. Freedom of thought is not tolerated; the thought is enslaved from the very outset. The individual is completely bereft of "inalienable rights", of the sacred rights. He is entirely bereft of all rights on principle. The population is without rights, without a voice, dispersed, impotent and oppressed; - thereon is based the power of the Bolshevic organisation. But such a condition of the people inevitably undermines its capability of existence, i. e., it blows up the 29

ground beneath the feet of the Bolshevics themselves, predetermining their final instability and inevitable collapse. The fatal lot of the Bolshevics is to be found in the fact that their ruling power rests on a base which is bound to bring about a collapse of everything (including themselves). If they allow the foundation to recover, they endanger their position, and if they steady it, they endanger the foundation. Already in this does Bolshevism differ from any other regime. In fact, Bolshevism represents the direct antipode of modern democratic society, of which the very essence is freedom of spiritual life, of selforganisation and of individual and collective initiative. The Bolshevic system denies the very basis of any modern society, the formation of which took its rise in the times of the Reformation, of the humanistic movement of the English and French revolution, - for this society relies on the free and independent individual, on his creative power, his activity, his enterprise. Bolshevism disavows any modern form of State, society, economy and therefore, whenever it happens that Bolshevism wants to save itself, and adopts some of their forms, it inevitably disfigures them, merely accepting the outward form but killing the spirit. This elucidates how reactionary the Soviet regime is in comparison to that of pre-revolutionary Russia; for though the latter may have seemed backward in many respects as compared with other European States, yet it was essentially homogeneous to them, moving approximately on the same lines as they did. May be that a return to the past - a retrogression of 3 millionaries - is now considered necessary; but in such a case the Soviet regime ought to be acclaimed not for its "progress", but for its retrogressiveness. In any case, the direction of its development is precisely opposite to pre-revolutionary Russia. Chapter II. The Individual and the State. The Soviet regime people. According to inviolable to a State, absorbed by the State;

nationalised all property; it also nationalised the Soviet legislation, man is deprived of all rights deprived of all individual activity. He is fully let us see what is the place he occupies in it.

In the classic years of Bolshevism, man was abondoned, left at the discretion of the "Cheka", whose power was unlimited either by any particular proceedure, or by laws, or concrete measures of punishment. The courts, in as far as they did act, were likewise untrammelled by any law, - the old code having been annulled, the new not yet having beeA created, the decisions were essentially entrusted to the "revolutionary 30

conscience" of the judge, which really meant, to the discretion of a people intoxicated with revolution; and moreover, the judges were almost completely ignorant of juridical matters. There was even a short time, when trials resembled political meetings, i. e. all those who happened to be present at the trial took part in the deliberations for and against. The "Cheka" (and later on, the G. P. U.) retained its lawless competence, but gradually the lower and higher courts were constituted and extended their 'influence. Codes and commentaries appeared. Nevertheless, it remained characteristic for the Soviet Court of Justice of all periods, that the judges are carefully chosen according to their adherence to revolution and Bolshevism, and that the standard of juridical competence is extremely low, as well as the standard of culture which reaches the bounds of illiteracy; - it suffices therefore to say, that for assuming the responsibility of a judge, no standard of education is necessary or is asked for. The meeting, or stirring-up-performance element remains to this day, although in a somewhat altered shape. The mob no longer adjudicates, but the trial itself is carried out as a show for the mob. For propaganda purposes the so-called "show-trials" are being produced, the object of which is, not to establish the guilt of the accused, but to demonstrate to the crowd, these or other actions or groups are regarded as dangerous to the Soviet State, and to produce the necessary effect by means of exemplary punishment. Furthermore, a fit public is selected (as was the case at the famous Donetz trial, for instance), and each day a different set of spectators have the right of admission in order to demonstrate to as many people as possible, how the Soviet power deals with its class-enemies. At first, no civil law could exist at all; the penal law took the shape of social revenge. In civil judicial respects, there is one general assumption, that the laws are binding only in as far as their observance does not clash with the interests of the Soviet State, and are accomodated accordingly. In penal law, the principle of self-defence of the regime, is omnipotent. The staff of counsels for the defence is admitted to the criminal court; to become a member of the board it is necessary to have the permission of the "Ispolkom" (executive comittee), and the same institution is entitled to exclude any counsel from the staff at any moment without giving any reason. Before the trial the alleged criminal is exposed to inquisitorial methods of inquiry; confessions and denouncements are extorted by the examining magistrate by means of "refined" cruelty (the depositions of the German student Kindermann condemned to capital punishment, and later on handed over to Germany in exchange for Bolshevic criminals), as well as by promises of mitigation of punishment. These compulsory confesssions and semi-confessions, are afterwards exploited by the court, which in its attitude towards non-communistic and non-pro-

31

letarian accused, acts as a second prosecuting organ (in addition to the State Prosecutor). Anyway, in the administration of civil, as well as penal law, the principle of self-defence of the regime is omnipotent. In both cases the State is considered as the organisation of oppression of all classes by one class, and law and court as the instruments of such an oppression. The consequence of this is not only the actual monstrous corruption and servility of the Soviet Court, - a state of affairs which has also had its place in Russia before the reforms of the "sixties" and in Turkey before its emancipation, but also the abolition of the lawful State on principle, and a substitution of a mechanical treatment of man as an object exploited for Bolshevic purposes. The uncontrolled activity of the G. P. U., only emphasises the general character of the whole regime. It is not difficult to perceive that by the abolition of the lawful State, the Soviet regime becomes opposed, not only to the entire modern sense of right, but also to the pre-revolutionary Russian State, - becomes opposed, in fact, even to the medieval system, in a word, to any system of law and order. The absence of rights on principle, the substitution of Soviet selfprotection in place of law are perhaps the most ghastly side of the Soviet regime. The inequality of civil rights in court, does not lead to the creation of different courts or of different laws for separate social circles, as it used to be the case in States divided into various castes and in what was left of such States (such inequalities, however, were gradually disappearing in pre-revolutionary Russia). It is characteristic for the Soviet regime that the the same law is differently applied, and that the same court functions in a different manner for different groups of the population. The fact of belonging to the communistic party, or to the "labouring class", or being a descendant of one belonging to this class, diminishes the measure of punishment, or even means complete acquittal. Indeed if punishment be regarded only as a measure of social defence against the dangerous individual, then every non-communist, every one who is neither a workman nor a peasant, nor a descendant of either of them, is abhorrent, suspected and liable to measures of deterrence or intimidation by reason of his very origin, social condition and opinions. If, moreover, he happens to be under trial, the general assumption of his harmfulness (according to the Soviets - his criminality) is doubled, and the measures to be taken against such individuals must naturally be far more severe than social defence against an individual of the better (i. e. lower) class, well-born and welldisposed. not dangerous to the regime even when having committed a crime.

32

A man of non-proletarian origin, condition or opinion is assumed to be harmful independently of transgression of the law and consequently' any restrictions of his rights, and any economic and administrative oppressions are justified when directed against him: the only means of self-defence against such oppression, is social travesty and deceit. Most characteristic in this connection is the restriction of the franchise. Besides, excluding different categories of individuals (clergymen, expolicemen, etc.) the franchise is taken away from one and all who do not belong to the "working classes", and those who "exploit" the work of others. Under such circumstances the right of franchise is built up on a material principle which can be easily interpreted differently. Being dependent on politics and local inspiration, the circles of voters are now extended, now contracted. It is not difficult to recognise that the reversed census is applied by the Soviet for the purpose of keeping outside the pays Idgal" just the most cultured'and productive portion of the population. To have the right to vote one must belong to the privileged strata. The privileges in courts have been explained above; other privileges may be added to them, as for instance, the admittance into the "committees of the paupers" (the village committees and the house committees in towns). The importance of these committees varied at different periods, but they always retained a certain portion of it. For instance, the "domcombeds" (house committees of the paupers) managed such an important feature of town life as the housing question; or else the village pauper obtained the right to tax the village population for local needs, while the "paupers" themselves were exempt. The fact of belonging to privileged groups also retains its importance in regard to co-operative societies, professional and trade unions, and the labour registry. The admission into high schools also depends on the same privileges of birth, condition or origin. The measure which was applied to the Jews in pre-revolutionary Russia, under the Bolshevics - as in other similar cases - became intensified and applicable to all those who formerly belonged to the higher and middle, i. e., to the cultured classes. By reason of this the sinking of the cultural standard followed in two directions, The younger generation, sufficiently prepared in regard to culture, degenerates by reason of being cut off from a higher education; while the youth, unprepared as regards culture, in most cases prove unable to satisfy the normal educational demands, and in this way bring about a falling off in the latter, while exerting themselves in painful and futile efforts that have a harmful effect on their nervous system and psychic poise. Taxation on a graduated scale exists in capitalistic States. The peculiarity of the Soviet country in this respect, however, not only consists in the enormous disparity in rates of taxation, but also in the application 3

33

of this disparity, according - not to the economic - but to the social standard. High payments are demanded from an individual, not because he is rich, but because he belongs to the unprivileged class. This principle is well illustrated, for instance, by the amount of rent which depends not only on the space occupied by the tenant, but also on his social condition. The absurd consequences of this system are obvious; in a certain sense they are unfavourable even to the privileged ones themselves (whom the house committees try not to admit into the houses they are managing), but they are more especially ruinous to the houses themselves, for they prevent all possibilities of repairs and promote the deterioration of the buildings. In this way the population of Russia is divided into two groups, and in the privileged of the two groups there is an extra privileged and powerful faction, viz., the members of the Communist Party. It hardly would be quite correct to completely identify these three groups (more especially the last one of which we shall speal later on) with social classes. Nevertheless their respective juridical conditions are different; the most characteristic distinction between the two former - and most numerous being the suffrage. The Soviet State is an elective one, but it is least of all democratic. The suffrage is not general, a standard of poverty being required for the right to vote. The restrictions penetrate into the very heart of the country, for instance, affecting the higher strata of the peasantry; the principle on which the "pays Idgal" is based, is indefinite and indistinct, and permits of endless abuses and means of extending and contracting the circles of electors. Secret voting is not tolerated. This alone suffices to make the whole electoral process in the Union illusory; firstly, because a great majority of the town population depends directly on the Government, working or serving in State institutions; secondly, by reason of the omniscience of the G. P. U., which practices an unlimited terrorism. It must also be called to mind that there neither exists a freedom of the press, nor of gatherings, nor parties. Even the communistic opposition possessed no legal press of its own; its meetings took place in secret, and the bare suspicion of having organised a "faction", brought about the severest persecutions. Under these circumstances the electoral process amounts to an indirect appointment of the deputies by the communistic party. However, the communistic party itself introduces into elective organs a certain number of those who belong to no party, i. e. of individuals obedient to it, but not included in its contingents; there simply would not be enough communists to fill all the innumerable Soviet institutions, - for, so many people as would be 34

needed for filling these positions, it would be neither possible nor desirable to admit into the party. This is best illustrated by the fact that the higher the organ is, the more reduced will be the percentage of tbe "party-less" in it. Although the higher organs are elected by the lower, those who belong to no party and constitute the majority among the lower, become more and more reduced in numbers if one takes the ascending scale of these institutions into consideration; so that quite an unimportant number of them remains in the Soviets of the republics and of the Union. The Soviet suffrage is not the same even for those who enjoy the franchise; in fact, the seats are so distributed that a much smaller number of electors in the town are required to return a candidate than is the case in the village. The State suffrage is not direct but goes through many stages. Only the elections of the village and town Soviets are direct. The delegates of the lowest Soviets meet in higher sessions from those of the "Volosts", the districts and gouvernements (or else of provinces, regions and gouvernements) those of separate republics and of the whole Union. Suffrage is restricted by an obligatory standard with an indefinite limit of the "pays ligal"; the right of franchise not being the same for all electors, elections open and going through many stages, - such in the character of the Soviet franchise, anti-democratic in its very idea, and in reality degenerating, as already said, into an indirect appointment of the deputies by the "com-party". Now let us see what the organs are that are produced by such an electoral system. Chapter III. The Organs of the Soviet Power. The smallest country-side unit, and every separate town has its own Soviet; the meetings of representatives of the village Soviets constitute the sessions of the Soviets of the "Volost"; the meetings of their representatives together with those of the corresponding town soviets constitute the district sessions of the soviets; according to the same method the sessions of the soviets of gouvernements, of autonomic regions and of republics are constituted, and also of those fundamental independent Soviet republics (Russia, the Ukraine, White Russia, Further Caucasus, Uzbegs and Turcomans) which form the Federal Union of the Soviet Socialistic Republic, possessing its own highest Union Session of the Soviets. Every Soviet (or session of Soviets) is, so to speak, the highest organ within its bounds; so that the system appears to combine simultaneously and harmoniously a local self-administration with a State organisation and a Federal System. 3*

35

Every Soviet (or session of Soviets) of every stage, elects its executive committee ("Ispolcom"), which again elects its own board, thus also creating a three-storied edifice. In the lowest soviets only, is, the board reduced to one single president, while in the highest one - the session of the Soviets of the Union - the "Ispolcom" becomes even more complicated, and consists of two chambers; one corresponding to a usual "Ispolcom", the other consisting of the representatives of the Federal Republics somewhat resembling the Upper Chamber of the Federal States. The competency of these two chambers differs but little; in case of a disagreement, a consiliatory commission is supposed to meet, or joint-sittings are to be held; in reality they have a tendency of deciding questions altogether in a joint-sitting. The Union of the Soviet Republics, is in principle a federation of republics enjoying equal rights; and each of them being in its turn federal. and includes autonomic republics and regions. A very complicated picture, but in reality it becomes simplified. A number of competential spheres are entrusted to one "all-union" institution, which possesses special organs for their management (the Commissariats of the Exterior, of the Army and Navy, of Foreign Trade, of Roads, Bridges, etc., of Post and Telegraph); for the management of some other departments special commissariats also exist in separate republics, but are dependent on the "All-Union" Commissariats, and finally, some other departments are entirely placed under the control of the separate republics. But the picture becomes even more simplified owing to the fundamental fact of the unity of the communistic party, - the only decisive power in the Soviet regime, which makes the independence of a Federal Republic illusionary in the highest sense of the word. But every republic, built and delimited according to national principles, but in reality oppressed and disappointed in its federal independence promised to it by the Constitution, recuperates itself by fostering centrifugal and separatistic tendencies, and by oppressing the "outlanders" (of different nationality in every republic) within its limits, particularly the Russians and more especially Russian language and culture. If a normal federation unites, affording its members a certain amount of independence, and thus creates a peaceful community, the Soviet Federation artificially divides what used to be united, raises in the divided parts animosity and mutual oppression, implants separatism, and keeps the whole together by violence exercised by the universally abhorred communistic centralisation. Soviet Federation is not a Union of independent systems, but a centralistic violation of artificially implanted separatism.

36

The fundamental features of the Soviet system are analogous in all its stages; soviets (or sessions of soviets), "Ispolcoms" and presidential boards. The Soviet organs do not admit any differentiation of functions. In the early times of the Revolution, every organ disposed of all it could, and therefore different organs disposed of one and the same matter. But even after the introduction of some sort of order, the principle remained the same. In the Soviet system there is no difference between the law and the executive power. The all* union session of the soviets controls everything, and so does the session of soviets in each republic. There is no strict distinction between the competence of the soviet (or session of soviets), that of its executive committee and that of the latter's presidential board, and thus the executive committee is not an executive organ of the Soviets (or session of soviets) - their competence is essentially the same. This refers to all grades of the soviet sytem, and is verily a curious feature of the said system. Instead of being distributed among the above mentioned organs, nearly all functions (with few exeptions, introduced of late) belong to all organs alike, every elected organ replaces the elective one in the full measure of its competence, during the time that the latter does not function, and as the elected body functions longer than the elective, the first thrusts out the second. Possibly this makes amends in a way to the confusion arising from the fact of competences not being divided. And confusion there is. The soviets of RSFSR (and this refers also to other sessions), meet once a year for a few days (the session may be postponed); this meeting consists of thousands of people; among these there is no party organisation except the communistic one; this crowd is, moreover, busy with all kinds of official receptions; on the other hand the business programme is extremely long; the result is, plainly, that reports and resolutions are accepted after the shortest of debates. Nothing else is needed, for all propositions come from the only party, the communist one, which enjoys such a powerful majority that even fractional differences of opinion are not possible. Thus the sessions of soviets are really but short meetings, accepting unanimously the decisions proposed to them. Their elective functions are likewise fictitious, for owing to the open system of voting, and the impossibility of forming other decisions than those fixed by the majority, which nominates the candidate beforehand, - the election in the soviet (or session of soviets) is an empty formality. This organisation is a direct descendant of the soviets formed in the first days of the revolution: soviets and sessions are practically demagogical parades and nothing more. It has been noticed for some time that the "Soviet State" gives the soviets but a small part to play. 37

During the absence of the soviets (or sessions of soviets), i. e. always, except for a few days in the year, their power belongs to their respective executive committees. These are in a way representative gatherings that meet several times in a year and elect their presidential board, which acts between the sessions and replacing them constantly in their full competence. Great is the influence of an organ that not only directs another one, but also replaces it, and thus decides its activity in advance. No wonder that the presidential boards have - to a vast extent - pushed the executive committees aside. Soviets and executive committees ("Ispolcoms"), however, are needed for the decorative purposes of propaganda. But the Ispolcoms have yet another and still more important function. The Ispolcoms prove indeed to be executive organs, though it is not the orders of the soviet that they execute. The Ispolcoms have attached to them sections superintending diverse branches of administration: from these the apparatus for governing the State is built up. In regard to the performing of the functions given them by the Constitution, the importance of the Ispolcoms is small, for they are thrust aside by the presidential board, and moreover, their activity is traced out for them by the communistic party. The party may issue orders as much as it likes: only when it surrounds itself with other organs can it have those orders accomplished. Such organs exist - out-and-out communistic - directed by and subordinated to communists, but yet not forming part of the communistic party (for otherwise it would have dissolved completely). These organs are the afore-mentioned sections of the Ispolcoms and other institutions standing close to them (at the top the people's commissariats). Usually members of the Ispolcoms stand at the head of the sections. In other words, the members of the Ispolcoms are functionaries. The institutions that seemed representative, turn out to be bureaucratic. The sections of the Ispolcoms are subordinated to the sections of the higher Ispolcoms and to the Narcoms (Secretaries of State). The higher Ispolcom (or its respective section) controls and watches over the lower one: this or that functionary-deputy may be dismissed or replaced by another. Moreover, the elected functionary may be at any moment called away by his constituents; thus, but a little pressure on the part of the respective communistic "cell" is needed for the dismissal of a functionarydeputy. Hence, - the unparalled bureaucratisation of the whole Soviet system. Socialistic intention itself tends to create a bureaucratic strain, for Statemonopoly over all walks of life (economy, culture), inevitably forces the proprietor, the man of free profession, etc. to be replaced by officials. The idea of a unified plan, of a reckoning of everything and everyone,

38

brings on the formidable growth of activities concerned with accounts and statistics. The flood of official inquiries and the terrific amount of time and labour spent in answering them, is a source of constant complaint and a standing joke, even in the Soviet newspapers. Another reason for this bureaucratic hypertrophy lies in the above mentioned fact of the members of the Ispolcoms turning into functionaries. In an ordinary state, the functionary differs from the deputy or the towncouncillors, from the business man, the merchant, the manufacturer, the journalist, the lawyer, the doctor. But in Soviet-land all are functionaries and, what is still worse, such functions are bureaucratised that lend themselves badly or not at all to official manipulation. But owing to special reasons this miserable state of affairs continues to develop. Bureaucracy implies a cultured hierarchy, competence and strict legality. In any other activity where there is free competition, a man not fit for the job is elbowed out, and a man not acting lawfully, is not trusted by others, - there are certain compensations in the way of competition between persons or institutions. But bureaucracy has power and the monopoly of power; dealings with it are obligatory, its decision does not imply an agreement. Consequently here in complete legality is no more personal unlawfulness, but abuse of State power, and incompetence cannot be redeemed or mended. And it is just the Soviet power that, as a matter of principle does not require of its organs (of its courts even) conformity to the law, but considers the so-called "revolutionary conscience", class benefits and the retention of power, - the only rules to be followed. Thus the conditions of a normally growing bureaucracy falls off. The same may be said of competence. The competence of bureaucracy was greatly injured by the very fact of so many cultured people of the higher and middle class having been physically or socially destroyed or banished. It received the last blow when Bolshevism, according to plan, began pushing up the lower classes, people who owed their career solely to Bolshevism. Certainly, the attitude towards the so-called "specialists" has changed in time, - from persecution to indulgence; but the patronage of the uncultured lower classes has not changed: privileges are extended to them as before, and even the monopoly for leading positions in all offices, the only thing required from them being not competence but an adherence to the communistic party; which on the other hand hardly ever accepts members of the cultured classes, even when the latter seem desirous of enrolling in real earnest. No wonder that in a country where iniquity is sanctioned and the State allowed to do whatever it likes, where there are certain classes outlawed, where morals and culture decay, where public opinion is dumb and misery triumphant - no wonder that in such a country incompetent and uncon-

39

trolled people having suddenly attained power, should try to make money out of it. Hence the orgy of bribery and embezzlement, - a state of affairs that a man not reading Soviet newspapers can hardly realise. Such a state of affairs is not only a direct consequence of the Bolshevic system, which as such is contrary to any kind of culture and statesmanship, and cannot be in it improved, but also it bears no likeness whatever to the "Tzar's regime", which recognised private property, free professions, public opinion, employed competent workers and was based on a legal code; the Soviet system is likewise contrary to Fascism, for instance, which stands up for competent work. There have been periods in the past when bribery flourished (e. g. in Russia before the reforms of the sixties), and of an extremely developed police control. Nevertheless, such a ravenous growth of bureaucracy combined with incompetence on principle, has never before existed, for, however low the level of culture in a given country might have been, never did the incompetent receive such power. It is a monstrosity, the leer of a village idiot, - a thing history has never seen before.

In the Soviet system, the lower soviets (and sessions) elect representative successively to the higher ones; this they perform openly, under the supervision of the communistic party and the G. P. U. The communist majority carries out the plans of the committees of the communistic party. Thus the communist party indirectly elects from above the members of soviets, sessions, ispolcoms, all of which should have been formally elected from below. Moreover, the members of the Ispolcoms turn out to be functionaries depending on higher organs. The organs of the local soviets (Ispolcoms, their sections, the board of presidents) are subordinated to the Ispolcoms (and their sections) of the higher sessions of the soviets, and to the deputies which they are supposed to elect. The elective sytem is complicated, but the dependence on higher organs - straight and simple. Hence, the Soviet system, which makes a pretence of being a representative of the "poorer" classes of the population is in reality - and this has been noted already by political writers - representative of the Soviet bureaucratic class. In all grades of the Soviet system, the local bureaucratic organs, indirectly appointed by the higher ones, choose functionaries indicated by the communistic party, and under the control of the GPU. A curious system of governing the land by a self-contained bureaucracy arises; its elections and appointments only screen the absolute ruling power of the communistic party, which decides both. This explains the following paradox: the absence of self-government in the Soviet system. Superficially it would seem that in Soviet-land there is nothing else but self-government, that the higher power has no local 40

organs, and that local administration is carried out by local soviets and their organs. But as all the elections are carried out according to the demands of the centralised communistic party, and the local organs consist of functionaries depending on higher organs, it is plain that local and self-administration blended together, is carried out by functionaries depending on the higher instance and appointed by way of elections, which are performed by the orders and under the control of the Bolshevic party. Self-government having swallowed up administration, is wholly transformed into the latter. The organs of proletarian self-government turned out to be organs of the communistic party - or more correctly - of communistic despotism. A real local self-government is non-existent in the Union (and only in recent times there has been an attempt made, by giving the right of a certain self-taxation, to endow with limited functions of self-administration certain organs, which are practically subordinated to governmental control). In this respect the Soviet system has not only reverted from the type of a modern State to that of a police state, but incidentally has gone a long step backwards in comparison with pre-revolutionary Russia, which had created high types of local self-government. Thus in the Soviet system of federal republics, - federation is only a secret blend of an oppressive centre and of growing forms of separatism; whereas self-administration is either absent or has reverted to an embryonic condition.

The Ispolcoms with their presidential boards and their sections, are elected by the soviets, and consequently are on principle responsible to them. On the other hand, however, the sections of the Ispolcoms correspond (with a few exceptions) to the Narcomats (the people's ministries), and are subordinated to them. The presidential board is, so to speak, an organ of the government, and in particular of the Narcomat of home affairs, and the sections organs of other corresponding Narcomats. This leads to an impossible position, to a duality of dependence and responsibility: the presidenfial board and the section forms part of the local Ispolcom and is responsible before the local soviet (or session) whose policy it is supposed to carry out. But at the same time it is subordinated to the corresponding section of a higher Ispolcom, and in the long run - to the corresponding Narcomat whose policy it carries out. Such a position makes any kind of activity unthinkable, for there is always the possibility of friction. And if the Soviet Administration still does work, - though very badly, - it is owing to the fact that in reality there is not a duality of dependence (on the local soviet and on the central Narcomat), but only the dependence on the communistic party, which acts through its "cells" and through its 41

central organs. Conflicts can arise only in the limits of the party itself, which therefore insists on eliminating from its midst every kind of opposition, every kind of contrary views. But as work demands a wider scope, the business incapacity of all this apparatus inevitably leaks out. Hence the endless soviet complaints regarding its weakness and insufficiency, and the constant need for the intervention of the local "cells". Hence, also, the necessity for the communistic party to undertake from time to time special "campaigns" within the limits of the Soviet apparatus itself. In other words, notwithstanding the complete dependence of the Soviet apparatus on the communistic party, it is so defective that there are always breakdowns here and there, and that it requires not only a general supervision on the part of the communistic party, but also special interventions.

We come back to the point from which we started. That point was: that the Communist Party has destroyed in Russia every kind of independent organisation, and the very possibility of organisation, as it remains in itself the only organisation in existence. But evidently the party cannot absorb all life and manage it accordingly, for that would mean mingling with the nation and not ruling it. Thus, in destroying all kind of public organisation inasmuch as it did not absorb it, the party attempted to hand it over to the State apparatus - to "nationalise" it; but at the same time it created the State in such a way as to rule it. It's own structure, therefore, gains an immense importance. As has been observed long ago, the Communist Party is certainly not a political organisation; not all persons of one mind can be members of it. It chooses members according to certain canons of reliability. One compares it to an "order", or one sees in it the rule of a certain class. But an "order", and in particular a class, implies certain strata placed below it. The communist party (and in this it resembles Fascism), is an organisation of men, which penetrates all classes of society. Certainly, all its members are endowed with privileges, which sets them apart from the rest of the population and opens the way to the summits of power; still these advantages are not enough to create a class of society. There are among communists, members of the central executive committee and of the people's commissariat, but also members of a village soviet and red guards and factory workers, members of a "cell" - and factory workers promoted to the rank of factory directors, - for the party needs members of all social classes; whilst raising up her different members, without considering their qualification, it must keep or admit new ones from below, - without that, its apparatus would not work. In a word, it appears as an intermediate organisation, which, it is true, works in order to produce a ruling class of 42

society, but which cannot turn into such a class without undergoing a change in its disposition and importance. The structure of the Communist Party, is formally akin to that of the whole Soviet apparatus. The "cells", the successive election of delegates to to the sessions (and to their executive committees) of gradually rising degrees; the higher all-union sessions, which elects its executive organs, its presidential board, its famous Political bureau, its organising office, secretariat, control commission. Here too the higher organs are seemingly linked to the lower ones. But here too - and owing to the same reason, the short and unorganised show-sessions have no real importance, being faced with decisions already mapped out by the leaders. Notwithstanding election from below, the management comes from above. Contrary to the State affairs in democratic systems, the elector coincides with the subordinate. The voting is open, the dependence is in the material sense much more cruel than elsewhere, the risk of repressive measures on the part of the GPU. is enormous, the chances of a career depend upon the leaders of the moment; owing to all this, the elective mechanism is entirely subordinated to the persons or group standing at the head of the whole affair. Things are made still worse by the multi-grade elections. When there is only one such degree (in a plebiscite, for instance) then the unexpected can happen. The elector is subordinate and dependent, - still he might risk rejecting the ruling group; the elected group might attempt entering into its rights, or in any case a coup d'gtat would be necessary to prevent it. But owing to the multi-gradation of the elections, the voter on the lowest degree who .otes against the leaders, may be defeated long before the successive elections attain the dismissal of the ruling organs. A member of the "opposition" elected on some intermediate degree may he eliminated simply by being excluded from the party, or tried, or called away (for the elected is the representative of his electors not till his term expires, but till it is found necessary to call him away). Thus the summits of the party rule over the lower organs. Change may be achieved, not through the medium of election, but only by way of disruption and struggles at the top, - and this is much feared by the Communist Party. Moreover, the ruling organs, by the election of dependent lower organs, predetermine their own structure and this gives rise to a complicated indirect oligarchy. This system is not broken by the fact that there are many higher organs, none of which has a predominating influence; it hangs together chiefly because the more important functions are joined in the hands of the same persons. The organs differ, but the group of persons replacing all the most important offices - remains the same.

43

It should be born in mind that the Communist Party, contrary to European political parties, is not open to everybody, admittance to it may be gained only by satisfying several conditions, - regarding one's origin, fortune, etc., by passing a term of probation, and by being proposed by a certain number of communists (this number varying according to the origin of the person proposed). Thus the whole party is made up by way of cooptation. Alongside of it are organisations which prepare a man from his early years for the participation in the communist party; they train him, they try him, they put him to the test, they coach him, - till he is ripe for the job. Such organisations are the "Communist Union of Young People" (Comsomol), and the "Organisation of Pioneers". Evidently one can never be sure that the boy trained in this way will prove a good communist. Members of the party themselves may now and then "turn rotten" (as it is termed there), or a member may be found simply working in disaccord with the views of the leaders. A "cleaning" is then effected. Periodically the party dismisses unworthy members. The chief organ of this supervision and cleaning is one of the ruling organs of the party - the "Committee of Control". The mere threat of its possible intervention (which takes away a man's advantages, power, means of subsistence) smoothes out the wouldbe offender. This is one of the last among the complicated network of measures, which guarantee and keep secure the power of the government: indirect oligarchy of the communist summit, managing the communist party, which in its turn rules over the apparatus of the State, and does not allow any independent organisation to exist alongside of itself. Conclusion. The answer to two questions may be adduced from what has already been said. These two questions interest alike Russian society in Russia and abroad, as well as foreigners studying Russian affairs. The first question refers to the possibility of an evolution on the part of the Soviet regime; the second concerns the possibility of the Soviet regime being retained after the Communist Party is rejected: the first question is founded on the hope that the State will gradually and painlessly revert to its normal structure; the second is based on the recognition of "good" sides of the Soviets, on the wish to keep them, and on the assumption that the slogan "long live the Soviets, down with the communist party", will help to make an end o& Bolshevism fairly easily. It should be clear from the previous pages that the existence of the Soviet regime without the "dictatorship" of the Communist Party, is an impossible thing. The party supervises, corrects, renews, subordinates, keeps 44

up that regime, and follows it through all its stages; it is the motive power of the Soviet machinery. Take out that screw, and the whole fabric crumbles to pieces, for as it is, it is ready to work badly any moment, and cannot exist without the Communist Party propping it up. But cannot one replace the party by another form of dictatorship, while retaining the Soviet structure? This too cannot be realised, for the party is not something outside the Soviet regime, but on the contrary it penetrates it through and through; in all the important organs it enjoys a majority of responsible members; it has in its hands all the threads of the Soviet system. It can be possible to dismiss the communist party, but that would mean destroying the whole Soviet apparatus; on the other hand it is absurd to imagine that the many-branched, all penetrating communist organisation can be replaced by another of the same combined power and penetration. The Bolshevics would never allow such an organisation to get formed. One can imagine perhaps, the Communist Party changing into another one, with other ideas and intentions. But the communist party has a past, a tradition, a training; it has been working for years and undergoing certain influences. It does not follow that the party connot change its ways. It does change in the hands of its present leaders. But any phase of such a change is painful and not general (owing to the fact that the party must inevitably have its members above and below), and so, when the pressure arises (which does happen now and again) disputes and struggles crop up, and refractory members are replaced by others. Now this process goes on only in the party itself. If it gains in strength, the result will be a terrific fight, and not a peaceful change. And such a struggle would not only unsettle the party itself, but the whole Soviet apparatus, and if strong enough, would bring on a general crisis. Let it give birth to a new dictatorship, it must then, in any case, create a new machinery, and there is no reason to think it will be a copy of the Soviet regime, which grew from out of a soil unique in history. There is only the supposition of evolution left, - of a gradual and wholesale change among communists and of the Soviet system in itself, a change that implies an evolution of their social contents and ideas. By reasons, which exceed the present subject, it must be argued that an evolution of the economic system is impossible. The Bolshevics can neither carry out their ideas (without ruining the country and, consequently, perishing themselves), nor can they, without risk, adopt any others. Thus they ape fated to waver between communism and NEP. Seeing them moving to one point in their oscillations, a superficial observer would deduce evolution; seeing them moving to the other point, he would sorrowfully complain of a "reaction". As a matter of fact both directions are part of one zig-zag movement, and define the very core of Bolshevism.

45

One cannot study a form of state without taking into account its social contents. The social contents of Bolshevism are an attempt to manage - in following a single plan - uncombinable economics; to give privileges to the lower classes and particularly to a certain minority of the lower classes, thus entering into conflict with the usual hierarchic principle of society and the wishes of other lower classes; and to create products on the principle of consumption. I note only some of the deep antinomies of Bolshevism in its struggle against human organisation and human spirit. The result is a structure which contradicts the customs handed down to us by the past, and the healthy social tendencies which inevitably crop up; it is contrary to individual endeavours and to the principles of social structure. Every kind of State implies coercion, but at the same time is based on spiritual, economic and organising tendencies, independent of the State itself. Bolshevism denies these tendencies and therefore is obliged to use constant violence against them. Hence, dictatorship and violence are not chance measures, not things that come and go, but the very essence of Bolshevism. The most softhearted and virtuous communist could not refuse to oppress political and economic liberty. Moreover, violence always tends to become more aggravated. When it goes too far and excess becomes a normal state, there is then no gradual way back. In other words: the GPU., as an organ of detection and execution, will always put its foot down whenever dictatorship seems to weaken, for only when strained to the utmost can Bolshevism hold together its abnormal creation; push it, and it will crumble to pieces. Even incidental liberties are most threatening to the Soviet system, for they make it possible to prepare in its limits the elements of its oNn change. In all probability the Bolshevics themselves long to make the Soviet administrative apparatus more solid. But that also is impossible, for the Soviet apparatus must be weak, must be capable of action only inasmuch as it is penetrated by the communistic party. It must depend entirely on the communist rulers, though retaining the appearance of election from below; it must be managed not by competent, but by faithful persons; it must call its subordinates elected members. In a word - it must remain as it is. Bolshevism cannot permit the strengthening and the normalisation of the Soviet administration, for it would mean creating a rival force. The Soviet apparatus must be unable to function without the Communist Party. The party itself is defined by a certain creed and aim; it cannot hand over its problems to the masses, to elected gatherings, to free meetings. It must remain in the hold of its leaders, as regards the execution and distribution of function etc.; but, one of its articles of faith being the "rule of the proletariat", it must have the organisation seem rising from the lower classes. Thus, even in its own limits, the party contains a contradiction 46

between appearance and essence; this finds its expression in the fictitious sessions, the subordination of the elector to the elected the unlimited control of the leaders, etc. Even here the power is always on the brink of disaster and can never weaken its grasp, can never allow the evolution to selfgovernment or even the evolution to open oligarchy. Immobilised violence and organic lie - here is the law of the communistic party in a nut-shell. The Soviet structure is fundamentally a regime of stationary violence, if it falls, it falls as it is. Flexibility of regime means the capacity. of letting its next edition form within its own midst (thus English parliamentarism always contains the successor to the Government in power); otherwise there cannot be a painless change and there is even a lack of intermediary forms based on compromise. The rigidness of the Soviet regime and its absolute dependence upon the party, fills men with fear of the chaos which would bring the destruction of this single and compact organisation. The Soviet regime, having destroyed all organisations except its own, leaves the only choice between itself and civil war. By its existence it ruins, degrades, weakens Russia; its only possible end is a new revolution. Its essence must result in a revolution, and will define it. And cursed for the revolution in which it was born, it must also be cursed for the possible revolution in which it will die. The alternative is as follows: An incessant oppression that weakens the organism of the country and leads to its decay, - or an acute upheaval which accords a chance to the victory of sound principles. There is no choice between a defective order and the chaos of the disorder, but only between two kinds of chaos: the organic destruction - and the explosion which tends to interrupt this process. Bolshevism itself admits that it is contrary to democracy. It would admit too that it rejects the whole basis of a modern "bourgeois" society; it rejects the idea of a lawful state, of man having personal rights, of justice and personal guarantees; it goes further, it rejects the principles of "praebourgeois" States, i. e., the strict limitation and organisation of functions. The old regime in Russia was partly akin to modern statesmanship; and partly developed in that direction. Thus the Soviet regime compared to "Tzarist" Russia, shows clearly a political and governmental "reaction" on principle. It would be quite a mistake to see in it some sort of progress, or to affirm that it is "no worse than Tzarism", or even to consider that it only continues and exaggerates the negative tendencies of the said "Tzarism". In reality the Soviet regime rejects the principles of all modern States, and so rejects those to which the old regime was coming near. It is correct to note a certain analogy between communism and fascism, but this comparison should not go too far. Both deny political freedom, but

Fascism does not deny other, much deeper-seated liberties in matters of economics and life; may be such a contradiction cannot hope to live long, may be Italy will have to pay for it - but that is a question apart. What really matters is that under Fascism personal liberty is not denied nor uprooted (and that is - by the way - why Italian economics develop, Russian economics decline). Fascism, denying (like the communist party) democracy, builds its State-institutions on a class-professional basis. The Soviet Union does not take such a basis into account, but builds on the basis of class inequality, of class injustice. Under Fascism, business-men, brokers, farmers - do not lack rights; they have the same rights as the workmen. From the political point of view, Fascism is a dictatorship, but this dictatorship does not deny or over-throw social hierarchy; on the contrary it asserts it. Bolshevism denies it on principle, pretending to give the power to the lower classes, and practically destroys the social hierarchy. Hence, in contradiction to Fascism, - the incompetence of Soviet administration (contrary too, to Plato's communism), the triumph of the unqualified and uncultured; the destruction of the summits (cultural and economic), constant persecution of those, who aspire to eminence. Accordingly - an organic falsity of the whole regime; bloodstained oligarchy under the cloak of election, sham appearance of the Soviet organs, which function contrary to their structural purport, contrary to their statutes (a phenomenon which, under Fascism, was seen only temporary in the case of the Italian parliament); moreover, the statute itself (unlike Fascism), is characterised by undivided functions, conflicts and breakdowns. Though one cannot deny a certain resemblance of Bolshevism to Fascism, one must admit that on the whole the regime in Russia is essentially contrary to that in Italy. In summing up the noted particularities of the Soviet regime, one may well conclude that in Russia, the State degenerates. It is justly noted that the Soviet regime moves backwards, is a reaction not only politically, but also historically, a negation of modern statesmanship and society. But the Soviet regime is not a reversion to a distinct - though remote - past, but in different respects shows symptoms of a reversion to different periods, - here, years back, and there, a century or several centuries back. Moreover, this retrogression takes place, while different elements of modern life inevitably are retained (enormous growth of town-population, railroads, telegraph, wireless, aviation and other links with Western Europe), so that the whole aspect of it is extraordinarily monstrous. It is not so much a reversion to a former state, as a social and political "degeneracy". Certainly, a degenerate creature shows in some respects an analogy with childhood or boyhood of different periods, but it is not a return to childhood -

48

to be an idiot.

In the same way the Soviet regime, though resembling in certain respects regimes of different former periods, has much in it which does not relate to any past: the building of a State on the privileges of the lower classes, with the destruction of economic and cultural leadership; the negation of quality; the rule of incompetence; the struggle against creative forces. Under the Soviets, personal and social activities are eliminated (a state of affairs that never reached such a limit, - even in the Eastern despotic States, and only was it so, perhaps, in the Jesuit State of Peru). The State swallowed up all functions and the Communist Party swallowed up the State, without settling the functions of its organs. Such a regime is constantly fated to act against all natural processes of life and of its needs; in order to keep it in existence, it has to resort to oppression and violence. Such is the Soviet regime. The existence of such a monstrosity certainly requires explanation; how could it eventuate, and how can it keep its hold? One may, however, hope that life itself will soon give an exhaustive answer to the second of these two questions, and will prove the impossibility of such a regime by the very fact of its disappearance.

4

49

Land Policy and Land Conditions in Soviet Russia. By Cyrill Za it ze ff and Prof. Peter Struve Fellow of the Russian Emp. Academy, Hon. L. L. D., Cambridge. Bolshevist Agrarian CONTENTS: Former Agrarian Relations; Stolypin's Reform; Revolution; Bolshevist Revolution and Marxism; Bolshevist Agrarian Legislation did not succeed in bringing about an equalizing effect; The attempt of organising the Economical Catastrophe; land-culture on a socialistic basis; Socialistic Serfdom; Refuasl of the Equalizing Principle; Communistic Principles in the New Legislation; Return to the Stolypin Legislation; The "NEP" strengthens the Struggle for Land; Continental Threat with New Universal Repartition; Real Land Conditions in Present Russia; Tendency to Individual Tenure; Hired Labour in Villages; Landless Households; Lease of Land; Statistics of Cereal Production.

1. Some Introductory Rpmarks.

T

differs upon of the land relations in Russia historical HE points development from the European development. But these points of many

difference are not as yet sufficiently clearly grasped and realised both in

Russia and in the West. Generally, the scheme of the development of Russian agrarian relations is represented in the following way: originally there existed a free peasantry possessing and cultivating its own land under some "village-community" regime. Afterwards, as a result of joint efforts of the privileged private owners and of the State, it was subjected to servitude and turned into serfs, private and State, the s. c. "village community" being somehow preserved. In that scheme there are two moments, two assertions. The second assertion - with the exception of the would be "primitive" village-community - is a mere statement of fact. It is true that the originally free peasants, who enjoyed the right to move from one landowner to another, in the Moscow epoch were turned into serfs, i. e. lost the right to move and were gradually tied by bonds of slavery to the privileged landlords as their personal property. State peasants remained bound to the land, but the State, as embodied in the person of the Tzar, gradually began to regard the peasants themselves and their land as, on the whole, an object which the State could dispose of at its will. In the course of such disposal of the peasants and of the land tenanted by them, the peasants dependent on the State and the Tzar became to some extent agricultural slaves of the privileged landlords, until at the beginning of XIXth century all transfer of State lands tenanted by peasants into private hands was stopped. 50

But the first assertion to the effect that Russian peasants had originally been personal or collective owners of the land they cultivated, does not, generally speaking, correspond to the historical reality. With certain exceptions of local and limited meaning Russian free peasants did not own the land they cultivated, but only tenanted it. They were helpless and shorn of capital, and became lease-holders not because they could find no land - there were more than enough free lands but because they had neither food, nor seeds, nor working cattle, and also because they were in need of being guarded by strong men, in order to secure their persons and property. The fact that the Russian peasants began, so to speak, the course of historical agrarian development, not as owners, but as leaseholders, afterwards turned into serfs, whose legal status was very near to slavery, that fact was of greatest consequence for the whole historical development of Russia. In Russia, serfdom and the agrarian regime based upon it became more deeply rooted than in any other country. On the other hand, personal freedom of the peasants who were not bound to privileged private landowners and remained dependent on the State, was not accompanied by personal ownership of land. These lands inhabited by free peasants were owned by the State, and the latter regarded the holdings distributed by it among the peasants and cultivated by them, as a material basis underlying the duties of the peasants towards the State, as an allotment (nadyel). This latter institution represents consequently not primary individual, personal and private peasant-ownership of land, but a collective public right (of larger or smaller groups of "souls") to the land. It derives from, and is subjected to certain obligations towards the State and constitutes a right to nourishment, given by the State. Thus, no peasant ownership of land was created under the regime of serfdom in Russia, either as regards the enslaved private peasants, or the free State peasants. Such is the cardinal fact of Russian development, and it was the main factor of the subsequent agrarian revolution. It would seem that the emancipation of peasants in z861 ought to have laid the foundation of the peasant ownership of land. Huge areas of land were transferred from the possession of the former serf-owners to the peasants' control; the same happened, somewhat later, to the State lands tenanted by free State peasants. But the emancipation of peasants from the power ol landlords and from the control of the State did not imply either the emancipation of the peasant-ownership from the fetters of the serfdom regime - for, I repeat, such ownership had not been previously formed under that regime - or 4*

51

the creation of the peasant ownership anew. The latter task was first undertaken by Stolipin in his land reform. But that colossal reform whose essence and meaning consisted precisely in it being the first attempt ever made in Russia to lay down the firm foundations of the peasant ownership and to create or facilitate the methods of a technically rational exploitation of land by the peasants. It was a process similar to that which was known in Germany as "commassation", ,,Vereinadung", etc. Stolypin's reform implied a change in the State's attitude towards private ownership among the peasants, but this does not mean at all that before the Stolypin's reform of the beginning of the XXth cent. the Russian peasants, having been emancipated in 1861, were deprived of land, nor does it mean that in the Russian rural economy after the emancipation of peasants the main role was played by the big landed property; neither does it mean, at last, as it is often said through ignorance or inaccuracy, that the Russian agrarian relations till the revolution of 1917 bore a feudal stamp. The agricultural area, almost from the moment the act of emancipation was passed, belonged in the greater part to the peasants, although not on personal title, and more and more lands passed into the hands of peasants between 1861 and 1917. From the eighties of the last century the last remnants of what could be, with more or less reason, termed feudal relations between landlords and their peasants, passed away. But the peasants though by and by getting control, through purchase and to some extent leasehold, over greater and greater part of land*), still constituted a world apart. That world ignored both the fact, and the legal notion corresponding to that fact, of a strictly defined individual property. But, as it has already been said above, Stolypin's legislation laid the first foundations of the peasant individual ownership, and a strong and growing class of peasant owners sprang up in the course of economic evolution. These peasants were real "bourgeois" both in standing and in consciousness. That healthy and progressive process of evolution in the course of which the economic foundations of the Russian peasant democracy were being laid down, was interrupted by the Bolshevist revolution which made a terrible havoc in the economic life. The destructions caused by the revolution were twofold in kind and meaning. In the first place, the peasants seized the landlords' estates and divided them between themselves. But the partition of the landlords' *) The Soviet statisticians themselves admit that before the war about go per cent. of all the crops, about 95 per cent. of the cattle and about go per cent. of the entire agricultural production on the present territory of the U. S. S. R. belonged to the peasant farms. In 1927-28, the respective percentage figures were 98.5, 99.5, and g8. (See Vishnevsky, below quoted article in the review "On the agrarian front" 927, p. I3.) Nr. 11-12,

52

estates was in itself a fairly complicated process, for the role and the meaning of the landlords' estates differed greatly according to circumstances. Prior to the Bolshevist revolution, according to the data supplied by another Soviet statistician, in 36 Governments and Provinces of European Russia the non-peasant (so-called "private") ownership of land was expressed in the following figures. Of the total area of 139 mill. desiatin*)

Of the

71 m. desiatin of arable land

Of the 45.5 m. desiatin of sowing area

23.4 mill. desiatin were owned

private landowners 9.5 m. desiatin belonged to private landowners 4 m. desiatin belonged to private landowners

Of the total head of cattle amounting 3.9 mill. belonged to private landowners. In percentage figures this gives: 16.9; 13.3; 7.3; 3.5.

to III.2 million

(F. Halevius in the review "On the agrarian front", No. 11-12, 1927,

p. 93.) Hence it is clear how insignificant was the quantitative meaning of the Bolshevist agrarian revolution as far as the redistribution of land between the social classes was concerned, for - however strange it may seem to an unitiated foreigner - Russia, even before the agrarian revolution, had been a country with a greatly prevalent peasant ownership of land and peasant rural economy. Inasmuch as the peasants seized the lands which they rented from the landlords and cultivated with their own means, the ground rent simply changed hands. But in cases where landlords themselves ran their estates and in Russian conditions did it well, the important fact was not the seizure of land by the peasants, but the seizure of agricultural capital by them. That seizure did not amount to a transfer of that capital from one owner to another, but involved the destruction of that capital and thereby a degradation of the agricultural production in general. But like all destructions of capital, even most terrible, this destruction in itself' but caused if not a momentary, at least a temporary and reparable damage to the agricultural production of the country. Much more lasting and destructive were the immediate effects of the process of partition and equalization of land, inasmuch as it involved the lands and the farms of the peasants themselves. Stolypin's reform, if it did not lay the foundation of, at least gave a strong impetus to, the formation and development of large and middle-sized peasant farms as single *) desiatin

=

2,86 acres.

53

enclosed holdings exempted from general intermixture of fields and compulsory rotation of crops (such holdings were called "khootor"s vest "otroob"s). In so far as the Bolshevist revolution raised its hand against these progressive peasant farms and holdings, destroying them and scattering to the winds their capital, it undermined the very bases of the agricultural evolution of the country. For here the question was not of seizing and partitioning land, nor even of seizing and partitioning agricultural capital, but of changing both the legal foundations and the main technical conditions of the agricultural production of the peasant mass itself. We see, thus, that the immediate effect of the Bolshevist agrarian revolution on the agriculture of Russia was twofold. On the one hand, it simply meant a redistribution of land and a destruction of the agricultural capital, on the other hand it involved regressive changes in the very structure of agricultural production, putting, in the place of free and rounded landholdings, others, technically parcellated and dependent on the community. But perhaps still more profound and pernicious than the immediate and destructive effect of the Bolshevist revolution on the agriculture of Russia, was its indirect effect through the medium of general economic relations. The agrarian revolution represented but one aspect of the Bolshevist revolution; its other aspect was the socialisation or nationalisation of industry. In any country industry and agriculture form a system of interdependent markets: industry is a market for agriculture and vice versa. This is the more true of Russia with her large territory and her economic self-sufficiency. Even for the agriculture of Russia, not speaking of the industry, outside markets always played a subsidiary role. The socialisation or nationalisation of industry in Russia has brought about a curtailment of industrial production, making it more costly and worse in quality*). Thereby it has curtailed the home market for agricultural production, and since all production both for its economic prosperity and for its technical development needs primarily a stable and growing market, the socialisation (= nationalisation, or perhaps it would be best to call it "etatisation") of industry has dealt the most terrible blow to Russian agriculture. To this was added, of course, the "etatisation" of trade and the general attempt at a thorough regulation of the economic life in its entirety. *) Even the most biassed Bolshevist authors have to admit in their economic surveys on the occasion of the ioth anniversary of the October revolution that the prices of industrial commodities constitute the weakest spot of the Soviet economics. Whereas for the agricultural commodities the ratio of actual prices to the pre-war standard is 16o: 1oo, in the industry it is 250: 514

oo.

Thus the accomplishment of the Socialist programme in Russia led to the decay of both industry and agriculture, i. e. to an all-round economic regress. To the Socialist curtailment of industrial production, coupled with an increase of its cost, the agriculture or the villages replied by intensifying the natural economic character of its economic activities, and thus the social, economic and political revolution accomplished by the Bolshevics in Russia appears to us, in its economic aspect, as a regressive metamorphosis of the entire national economy, in the direction of natural economy. A certain incongruence between the agricultural and the industrial side was always a characteristic feature of the Russian national economy. The agricultural development of Russia was, perhaps more clearly than anywhere and at any time, characterised by the growth of population in direct connection with the growth of available food-area, and as that area for the greater part of the country, nearly throughout its history, had been susceptile of extensive and intensive increase, the growth of population went on continuously and was especially pronounced in the rural districts of the country. Thus was created the phenomenon which the present writer characterised as early as 1894 as natural-economic or pre-capitalistic rural overpopulation. The growth of population engaged in agriculture created a surplus of eaters who encumbered the agriculture and found no application in industry, which, in spite of its rapid development, was unable to keep pace with the growth of agricultural population. This pre-capitalistic overpopulation both in quantity and in quality, became particularly acute as a result of the Bolshevist revolution. It was more then natural in the conditions of a sharp discrepancy between the industry and the agriculture which characterises the economics of Soviet Russia. Such overpopulation as exists in present-day Socialist Russia was never known either in Tzarist Russia or in any other country where there had been a steady transformation of natural economy into money economy and on that ground a gradual development of industrial capitalism. What is the relation between the Bolshevist economic revolution which is, in fact, an economic reaction, and the doctrine of Marxism or so-called scientific Socialism? The writer of the present article had been in his past not only a Socialist and a Marxist, but one of the first to formulate, on the basis of the historico-sociological doctrine of Marx and of its evolutionary, or so-called Revisionist interpretation, the large conception of the economic development of Russia in the book, the orthodox Marxian reply to which was the first published work of Lenin. At that time the Marxians were conducting a struggle against the "Populists" (Narodniki) who believed that Russia could, by sticking to the village community, to the rural handicraft industry and to a system of State undertakings, avoid 55

the "private capitalist" stage of development and maintain natural. economy on a large scale This Populist conception took two forms: the evolutionary and the revolutionary. The latter implied an agrarian revolution involving a lorcible requisition of landowners' estates, general partition of lands (so-called "black partition") and compulsory "etatisation" of big industry and commerce. This was the programme and the doctrine of the so-called Social-Revolutionary party. Against it the Marxian Socialists always brought forth a quite different conception, admitting the necessity for the economically backward Russia to pass through the stage of capitalist development, both in industry and in agriculture where the triumph of money economy over natural economy and the transformation of the peasant from a communal tenant, stagnating under natural economic conditions, into a real bourgeois owner producing for the market, was, according to the Marxians, absolutely inevitable and progressive. Socialisation or nationalisation of industry was considered impossible in view of the economic backwardness of Russia. Even the Maximalist section of the Russian SocialDemocratic party, the so-called Bolshevics, who were in majority in that party, were no exception from this general rule. The Great War which put weapons into the hands of the large masses blinded by social hatred, upset all the old conceptions. The Bolshevist wing of the Social-Democrat party, although retaining its Marxian phraseology, in fact borrowed the ideas of its former opponents, the revolutionary Populists, and began to carry out the programme of immediate abolition of Capitalism and introduction of Socialism in the economically backward Russia, though that programme was obviously devoid of any sense from the standpoint of historical ideas of Marxism. This sudden reversion of the attitude of the Russian Marxists was due in the first place to the overwhelming impression produced on the minds of extreme Socialists of the entire world by the world war which appeared to them as a sort of prelude to the world social revolution. The revolutionary energy of the gocial Democrats-Bolshevics was fed by the predatory instincts and aspirations of many millions of peasants and by the revolutionary blindness of the industrial workers. Thus it happened that the Bolshevics who, in the person of Lenin, always considered that, even granted the most propitious circumstances, only a radical political revolution coupled with an agrarian revolution in favour of the economically strong peasants was possible in Russia, have now come to preach and to carry into effect an integral social and Socialist revolution, by means of a dictatorship of the proletariat embodied in the Communist party. The ultimate aims of Marxian Socialism were put in the foreground by the Bolshevics, becoming the immediate task and the practical programme of their action. As we have already seen, this attempt to build up Socialism in an economically backward country has in 56

fact turned to be a deep-rooted "natural-economic" reaction. Thus the destiny of the doctrine of Marx in Russia has been rather strange and paradoxical: the attempt to bring it into life meant a violation of the most fundamental premises of Marxism and therefore obviously could lead to nothing, but a deep rooted economic reaction.

P. Stru v e.

2. The Land-Policy of the Soviet-Government. Among the first rate historical documents published by the Soviet papers on the occasion of the soth anniversary of the October coup d'etat there was a photographic reproduction of the decree of October 26, 1917 - the first "decree about land". This act, promulgated at 2 - a. m., according to

the mention it bears, constitutes the opening chapter of the Soviet agrarian legislation. The first line of this decree, which was drawn up in great haste and pursued purely demagogic aims, ran thus: "Landlords ownership of land is abolished immediately, and without compensation". By this act the spontaneous repartition of large estates, begun already under the Provisional Government, was definitely sanctioned. Soon an attempt was made to import to this repartition the character of a new agrarian regime in the making, embodying the old dreams of the Populists ("Narodniki"). The drafting of the law which came into effect on January 27 (February gth) 1918, and became to be called the "Fundamental Law about land", was entrusted by the Bolshevics to their allies, the Social-Revolutionaries of the Left. The law, itself was the song of triumph of "Narodnichestvo" (the doctrine of the Narodniki). However, this attempt, unique of its kind, to translate the programme of the Social-Revolutionary party into the language of legislation, was merely of a theoretical interest, for the law remained a dead letter. In reality there was no question of any permanent equalising distribution of land between all the labouring members within the network of pyramid-wise superposed agrarian units, from the village community to the superior community of the State itself. There was a single partition confined to the local rural communities and based on the reminiscences and habits of communal equalising partitions. "Practically, says one of the experts on this question, the socialisation was not effected on a national scale. The transformation of Russia into a single community with frequent equalising redistributions of land, of which the Social-Revolutionaries used to dream, could not be carried out. In practice the land was simply appropriated by the local peasants. The cases of migration from provinces with but a little land into those with much land were very rare. Equal distribution of land within a village took place everywhere. Equalisation of holdings between the villages within the same canton ("volost") occurred less frequently. Still more rare were the cases of equalisation on a district 57

scale, not to speak of those on a provincial scale"'). happen in 1918?" -

"What did, then,

asked another specialist, Professor Pershin.

"It was

a universal redistribution of lands which, judging by the large materials worked out by me, is characterised on the whole in the following way: equalisation of the land tenements in the narrow territorial limits of the cantons was actually effected to a considerable extent. The peasants, basing themselves not upon any norms prescribed, or stablished by the raison d'etat, but upon a, simple arithmetic division of the total area in the canton by the number of consumers, measured out for themselves the allotments of land and distributed that land according to that "norm". But it must be said that, inasmuch as a single State-organised direction was lacking, this selfdistribution took place in exceedingly narrow limits, sometimes, and fairly often, within the limits of several neighbouring villages closely adjacent to the nearest estate" 4 ). This distribution of lands, spontaneous and elementary as it was, was effected in forms technically so utterly imperfect that it merely led to further deterioration and disorganisation of land cultivation. "Far from improving, the peasant farming only deteriorated; the result was a desorganisation of agriculture" - emphatically declares Pershin"). Did the peasants at that cost obtain a substantial increase of land? Let us again leave the word to the Soviet specialists. "Already by the autumn of 1918 the aims proclaimed by the fundamental law about land were on the whole accomplished, - says Knipovich. - The peasants seized the land and divided it on the basis of equality. The results of that division were, however, much scantier that it was expected by many. Large tracks of land, when divided between many millions of peasants, produced insignificant results. The special investigation of the Central Land Organisation Department permitted to establish that the increase of area per consumer would amount to insignificant figures, tenths and even hundredths of dessiatins per head. In the large majority of provinces this increase did not exceed half a dessiatin; in a few only it reached one dessiatin. Thus, the positive results of the partition for the peasants with but a little land or with no land at all, were quite insignificant""). However, even at this initial stage of the agrarian revolution things were not confined to the partition of non-peasant lands between the peasants. To a great extent it was so, though, and in this first period of the revolution the equalisation of land tenements between the peasants was not only not achieved, but on the contrary was still more violated, *) B. Knipovitch. Currents and results of the Land policy in 1921, p. 24.

"About Land". P. I. Moscow **) lb., p. Ag. ***)

58

Op. cit., p.

29.

1917-20.

Miscellany

since during the partition of neighbouring lands that went to the pool, unoccupied allotments were for the most part seized by those who were actually able to till them, i. e. by the strongest. However, to a certain degree, already in this period began the inter-peasant equalisation whose acumen was directed in the first place against the so-called "Stolipirn nobles" (i. e. the "Khoutor" or "otroob" holders). If even then the inequality of land allotments was not avoided or even increased, it no longer took the form of preservation of separate holdings to which was attached the title of ownership, but was a result of the communal or quasi-communal redistribution of lands between those who took part in the land equalisation. Very often, we repeat, this led only to the augmentation of the land possessions of those who were practically stronger. No wholesale interpeasant levelling was accomplished during this period of spontaneous redistribution of land; it had only begun. Very soon the Bolshevics broke their alliance with the Social-Revolutionaries of the Left. The populist programme, so hateful to the Marxists, was publicly ridiculed, and the Soviet Government made an attempt to lay firm foundations for the future socialistic organisation of agriculture. On Juni 11(24), 1918, Committees of village paupers were organised everywhere; they obtained the right to dispose not only of all the consumption reserves of the villages, but also of the entire live and dead stock. Apart from this transfer of property from well-to-do farms to paupers' farms, effected under the conditions of the rule of the organised rural proletariat in the villages, vigorous measures were taken to create collective farms (kolkhoses), at the disposal of which were placed important quantities of land and of agricultural stock, and also official Soviet farms (sovkhoses) which appropriated a considerable number of former landlords' estates. A more definite expression to this attempt of socialistic accaparation of agriculture was given in the famous "Law about the Socialist exploitation of land and the measures of transition to Socialist farming" of February 14, 1919, and in the "Instruction" to that law of March rith of the same year. "In order to put an end to all exploitation of man by man, to organise agriculture on the basis of Socialism with the application of all the achievements of science and technique, to bring up the labouring masses in the spirit of Socialism, and to unite the proletariat and the village paupers in their struggle against capital, it is necessary to pass from personal forms of land tenure to collective ones. Large Soviet farms, communes, collective cultivation of land, and other forms of collective land tenure are the best means of achieving this end; all kinds of personal tenure must therefore be looked upon as something transitory and passing away. The tendency to create a single productive economy supplying Soviet Russia with the maximum amount of economic goods at the minimum 59

expense of popular labour must be laid at the basis of land exploitation. In conformity with this, the land tenure embraces the totality of technical measures aimed at the gradual collectivisation of personal farming". So ran the first clauses of the law, but, in fact, its practical importance, if any lay not in the collectivisation of personal farming, but in the equalisation of land holdings between various agricultural units within one canton, or in some cases one district, and to some extent in the equalisation of land holdings between separate farms within those units. All attempts to introduce the principles of Communism in the villages proved, in fact, such a failure, and led to such a reaction on the part of the peasants that in March 1919, at the VIIIth Congress of the Communist party, Lenin proclaimed a new policy tending to abolish forcible mass introduction of Communism in the villages. At the same time the first attempts were made to circumscribe to a certain degree the effects of the peasants' partitions of land, and steps were taken-to assure the stability of the peasants' farming. The stake upon the "paupers" and upon the "commune" was substituted by the stake upon the "middler" ("seredniak"), as it was so clearly announced by Lenin. Nevertheless, the main line of the Soviet policy, viz., the attempt to subordinate the whole of the rural economy to a, single plan, far from changing, on the contrary, received its acutest expression. In 192 I was introduced, as a result of a report of Ossinsky, the forced "State regulation of the peasants' economy". This was equivalent to a peculiar Socialist serfdom. "Under the present regime, said one of the advocates of that reform, the peasantry is a State worker on the State land; it must work according to the instructions of the State, under a single guidance; it must cultivate, according to a single plan, that number of fields which the workers' and peasants State and its local organs will indicate to it, and sow those crops and to that extent which the great labouring all-Russian community will set up through its leading organs." "To hope to reconstruct the villages by means of gradual strenghtening of the sovkhoses and voluntary collective farms adhering to them, means to follow a Utopian path. Socialism can be built up only by the reconstruction of the entire economy, and of all the farms simultaneously, not by implanting co-operative oasis-like factories in the bourgeois desert"*), declares Ossinsky. A series of laws was published in conformity with these principles: General State plan of sowing on the basis of conscription, creation of a single provincial reserve sowing fund with a free of charge redistribution of seeds from the surplus farms to the deficient ones, similar redistribution of live and dead stock, "normalisation" of the cultivation of land, i. e. forced application of the rules of cultivation of land set up by the State *) Quoted in the book of S. Rosenblum "The agrarian law of the R. S. F. S. R. 3.

60

all this, in connetion with the system of "food-tithe", which was a negation of the principle of ownership of the farmer for the produce of his farm, had to turn the whole of peasant Russia into a single colossal plan economy. This attempt to achieve, by means of coercion, the plan regulation of the entire agriculture of Russia was the culminating point of the Socialist achievements in Soviet Russia with regard to land. Then came a sharp turning caused not only by political events (a wave of peasants' risings, and the Kronstadt insurrection), but primarily by the catastrophic consequences which manifested themselves in the village economics. It is enough to say that under the combined influence of the still raging local land partition fever, the incessant interference of the regulating centre and the hated food-tithe affecting every farmer, the area under cultivation in Russia, with the exclusion of the Ukraine, was curtailed from 71 millions dessiatins to 45 millions. At the same time there was a sharp fall off in the crops, and a decrease in the head of cattle, and number of poultry. According to the approximate calculations of the Soviet Government, the national income from agriculture decreased three times as against the pre-war period*). In the face of such obvious degradation of agriculture the Soviet Government capitulated, and on March

21,

192 I, by the decree

abolishing "food-tithe" and substituting for it "food-tax", inaugurated its new economic policy. By that act the possession and enjoyment of his produce was restored to the farmer. The problem of the new land legislation was put forth in its entirety at the All-Russian Land Congress of December 2-7, Ig2I. The first paragraph of its resolution set forth the following principles of that legislation: "a) emancipation of the economic initiative of the thrifty peasantry; b) elimination, of the shortcomings of the peasant land cultivation; c) creation of stable agrarian relations in the villages". These principles were sanctioned by the XIth All-Russian Congress of the Soviets of December 23-28, 1921, while the laws that had been drafted were discussed at the All-Russian Congress of land-organisers and meliorators in the beginning of February 1922. Finally, on May 22, 1922, the Central Executive Committee of the R. S. F. S. R. adopted a draft of the "fundamental law concerning the working land tenure". The law left to each rural community") a free choice of the form of land tenure, admitted the separation of individual farms without an agreement with the community*) in case of general partitions or distributions, and allowed the separation of holdings, without a consent of the community"), to a definite minority *) I. A. Kirillow. Outlines of land organisation during three years of revolution: x918, 1919, 1920. Petrograd 1922, p. IO. **) Here "community" is meant as administrative unit.

61

of farms or to any smaller number of farms, or even to individual farms, if this was technically teasible without any detriment to the community. At the same time the law put an end to the land equalisation between agricultural units: however contradictory might be the actual ownership of land of certain units to the principle of equalising distribution, there could be no hope for a further increase of holdings and no fear of any detractions. The land regulations ("zemleoostroistoo") should henceforward have a technical significance, and be effected only when desired by the population. At the same time the law for the first time settled the question of leases and hired labour, admitting them to a very modest extent. The fundamental law about working land tenure was developed into a general Land Code confirmed by the Central Executive Committee on October 3o, 1922. The Code is in force even now. In it we must underline three co-existing contradictory tendencies: the equalisation tendency (Populist, Social-Revolutionary, communal), the plan. tendency (Socialist, Marxist, Communist), and the individual ownership tendency. The equalising tendency has suffered a severe blow, since, as we saw, any equalisation between agricultural units was formally forbidden. In this direction the land revolution was deemed to be over. However, the egalitarian or equalising idea was preserved in two forms. In the first place the old Social-Revolutionary "right for land" of every worker was proclaimed as a direct outcome of the principle of nationalisation of all land. This right is, however, practically jus nudum, for according to the law it applies only to "land reserves destined for working tenure", and in any case does not apply to that land which is de facto already tenanted by the workers. In other words, the whole of the main land fund is not affected by this right. Practically, the equalising principle continues to exist not in this large application of it, but in the fact that the village community with its periodical shifting of arable land has been preserved. Among various forms of land tenure admitted by the Land Code there is also tenure in common which according to the strict meaning of the Code does not enjoy privileged position, and which the population can freely abandon, choosing another form of land tenure. Thus, according to the strict meaning of the Code, the equalisation in its universal "Populist" sense has been preserved as a mere phase devoid of any significance, and the communal land tenure reduced to one of the forms of land tenure freely chosen by the population. As regards the Communist plan tendency, it manifests itself in the Code also in two forms. On the one hand the Code recognises certain collective forms of land exploitation, viz., agricultural commune, "artel", and corporation with a collective cultivation, of land, without conceding to those forms any special privileges. Apart from these specific manifestations 62

of the Communist principle, the Code admits of rather sharp expressions of State predominance with regard to all land relations in general. All land is nationalised. Even if it is not in the immediate possession of the State, but is tenanted free of charge and without any time limit by the peasants, it is nevertheless subordinated to a fairly marked State control. Positively, this State predominance is expressed in the right of control over all land tenants through the land organs, and the natural channel of this control, responsible for the correct utilisation of land, is the rural community*). Negatively, this State predominance finds its expression in the fact that land is exempted from all civil transactions, both as regards its alienation during the lifetime of the owner, and its transmission by will. From this brief characteristic of the egalitarian and plan tendencies of the Code it may be already gathered that the individual ownership tendency of the Code can be spoken of only as something very precarious and limited. However, the historical significance of the Code lies precisely in the admission and consecration of private land tenure. The Code puts decisively an end to inter-village equalisation. It opens the way to a settlement of intra-village land relations: the village community is free to choose any of the recognised forms of land tenure - community, single holding or "artel". The de facto working land tenure is safeguarded by the Code; the land tenant is entitled to cultivate his holding according to the method he chooses, and to erect necessary buildings, and constructions; in case of violation of his rights, the land tenant has the right of possessory action, in case of expropriation he receives compensation. As a general rule, "the title for land has no term, and may cease only on the grounds referred to in the law". This last, iith article of the Code is, of course, its pivot. It would be, however, wrong to think that what is meant here is essentially individual -ownership, however limited. The Code knows no such, what it means is always only family, or household tenure. The Code revives that family-working collective of the land law ("dvor" - household) which under the old regime had been established by the practice of the Senate and was abolished only on the eve of the revolution, by the Stolipin's legislation in favour of individual or personal ownership. Generally speaking, it is necessary to emphasise that the Soviet Land Code of 1922 represents to a large degree a revival of the land law of the so-called period of reaction under the reign of Alexander III: we find in it the same "dvor" as a primary unit of the peasants' economic life, the same exemption of land from all transactions, the same regulation of family partitions, and land redistributions ... What is new is the free choice of the forms of land tenure, and thereby the opportunity given to the peasants to *) Meant in the administrative sense.

63

liquidate communal tenure, and to adopt the tenure by family holdings. Yet, as we shall see next, this freedom exists only on paper. The New Economic Policy brought no peace to the villages. On the contrary, according to Messiatzev, one of the greatest Soviet authorities on the land question, just with the evolution of the NEP there began in the villages a real struggle for land*). This struggle between the thrifty peasants, and the paupers, aided and abetted by the Soviet legislation and administrative practice, is constantly furthered by the essential duality which since the proclamation of the new economic policy characterizes the Bolshevics' policy with regard to the village. On the one hand, the Soviet Government, yielding to the fact of the catastrophic contraction of the peasant economics, seemed to be inclined to emancipate to some extent the peasantry and its economic forces, and to create a certain stability of the existing possessory relations. We saw above, how clearly these principles were stated in the "Fundamental Law" about land, and with what relative clarity they were maintained in the Land Code. We can even record some further steps towards the legalisation of free economic relations in the villages, after the publication of the Code. In this respect the spring of 1925 when the application of hired labour and the right of lease were considerably extended is very characteristic. Yet, side by side with this tendency, and in bland contradiction to it, there is continuously going on another process which, as opposed to the first, creating favourable conditions for the development of so-called "Kulaki" (rich peasants), who have become in Soviet Russia synonymous with individual economic thriftiness and energy, has been picturesquely nicknamed "dekulakisation". This "dekulakisation" is not only manifesting itself episodically at various moments and in various parts of the huge peasant Russia; it represents, as a general measure, a constant threat of new universal repartition of properties, a certain memento mori addressed on behalf of the Soviet Government to every farmer who begins to prosper. Such threat is not only implied in the very fact of the existence of the Soviet Government, it has, upon many occasions, been uttered by high Soviet officials. "Sometime an end will be put to the inviolability of the kulak farms, and the cattle and stock accumulated by them will serve as a basis for a collective farm to a corresponding group of labourers" declared Larin in I925*). Quite recently this threat was openly repeated by Bukharin in one of his important and responsible political spreeches at the plenary session of the Moscow party organisation. While, however, such threats refer to the future, we see already in the present the peculiar co-existence of the Soviet govern*) P A. Messiatzev. Agrarian and agricultural policy in Russia. Moscow P. 107-

64

1922,

ment which has kept in its hands the entire industry and trade of the country, and of the villages where private ownership prevails; and the process of "dekulakisation" acquires rather definite and active forms. It can be said without reserve that, as regards efficiency, the more delicate method of "stripping" the peasants now applied, is not very far removed from the compulsory "State regulation of the peasant economy", as contemplated by comrades Ossinsky and Teodorovitch. It is true that there is now no coarse and direct coercion in its naked ideological purity, but as a result of the complex interaction of the purely political interference of the Soviet Government in the peasants' life through the Soviets and various village institutions subordinated to Communists, and the economic interference through the policy of taxation and prices, the Soviet Government is able to exercise most decisive influence on the peasant economy and to confiscate its surpluses. As regards the taxation politicy, everything that could be at all taken from the villages, has been already taken. This has been very conclusively shown by the ruling majority of the party in the explanations it gave in the Soviet press, both last and this year, in reply to the opposition's proposal to get new and important resources from the village "kulaki". Alongside with this implacable taxation press, there exists a still more implacable buying and trading mechanism of the Soviet Government which is in almost monopolist possession of the village market. Nearly all the produce of the peasant economy that is marketed, gets into the hands of the official buyers who by means of outward coercion try to become monopolists, and who pay comparatively low fixed prices. Often the very correlation of prices paid by the buyer to the farmer determines certain changes in the peasant economy. Thus, we know that an adverse combination of prices last year led to a sharp decrease in the sowing area of several technical plants! Simultaneously with stripping the peasant (in the legal form of voluntary purchase!) of his produce at arbitrarily low prices, the Soviet Government imposes, as a virtual owner of nearly all the industry, arbitrarily high prices on all goods sold to the peasants. The effect of such a sale of goods indispensable to the peasantry, practically amounts to the alienation from the peasant of the surplus of his produce (in order to buy from the State expensive goods, the peasant has to sell to the State his produce, but at a cheap price!), and thus it differs little from the procedure practised prior to the inauguration of the new economic policy. This is admitted by the Bolshevics themselves. Thus, the well known Communist Milutin in a debate in the Communist Academy declared (on February 26, 1926): "If, in the period of War Communism we involuntarily created a hindrance to the development of agricultural production, and even brought about its decay owing to the tithe, by requisitioning the surplus of produce, in the period s

65

of NEP the impossibility to market the surplus, and to get the equivalent in goods is similarly a hindrance to the development of agricultural production"*). No wonder, therefore, that since the Soviet Government under the new conditions of NEP, using new and more "delicate" methods (Communism in gloves!) was driving the peasants into au economic cul-de-sac, similar phenomena of passive economic self-defence of the peasantry began to manifest themselves anew, both in the way of curtailment of the peasants' production for external market, and in the way of transition to the system of self-supply as regards commodities which the peasants used to buy on the market. In order to realise of what an incredible extent the peasants are being robbed in Soviet Russia under the NEP, it is sufficient to consider the following figures published by a certain K. Rosental in the influential official organ of the Communist party "The Bolshevic""). Pointing out in the first place that, in spite of all efforts and promises, retail prices of goods sold to the villages are continually rising, Rosental at the same tinie shows how, alongside with this rise in selling prices, all the buying prices which the State pays to the farmer are falling. Thus, on December a, 1926 the "Corn Product" ("Khleboproduct") paid for rye 63.4 per cent. only of what it paid on July i, 1925; wheat was paid on December i, 1926, 76.8 per cent., oats, 48.7 per cent.; barley, 84., per cent as against the prices paid on July 1, 1925. Rosental gives further a striking comparison between the distribution of national income before the revolution, in 1913, and during the last four years of the Soviet regime. In 1913 agriculture received 58.1 per cent. of the total national income. In 1923-24 this relation underwent a sharp change: agriculture (that is, practically, the population, for only in agriculture the economic activity of the Russia population is free and unfettered!) was receiving only 29.2 per cent., and the industry (i. e. the Socialist Treasury, for the industry, being nationalised, is in the hands of the Soviet Government) - 44.7 per cent. Later on the share of agriculture underwent a further decrease reaching in 1926-27, 25.7 per cent., whilst the share of industry went on increasing, reaching 51.7 per cent. That is how the peasant is being robbed under the NEP Communism in gloves! Let us now see what are the real land conditions in Russia under the NEP, and under the formal working of the Land Code, as characterised above. In the first place let us dwell on the manifestations of the Communist tendency, and more particularly on the "sovkhos'es" and "kol*) On the agrarian front. 1926. Vol. III, p. io3. **) "The Bolshevic", 1927. No. 5. Article of K. Rosental: "Sore points".

66

khos'es". As to "sovkhos'es", these are bureaucratically run official farms whose indubitable utility lies in the fact that they have saved from partition several large estates, valuable from the point of view of the interests of the national economy. According to the Bolshevics themselves, these farms are stifling in the clutches of "bureaucratic protection". "What is our sovkhos?"

-

asks in a leading article of February 17, 1927 the special

village paper "Biednota". - "In theory it is something very big and advanced, showing the way to Socialism. And in practice the average peasant regards himself entitled to laugh and mock at the sovkhos". But the peasants do not only laugh at the management of sovkhoses which is anecdotically bad, they hate them. It is notorious that during the peasants' risings there was a wholesale destruction of sovkhoses and kolkhoses. The attitude of the peasants towards sovkhoses and kolkhoses is worse than their former attitude towards landlords". "Now I will say about the sovkhoses, collectives and communes - declared, e. g., at the XIth Congress of the Soviets a woman delegate, from the province of Orel Okorokova. - I think these sovkhoses bring no good to the State. They let part of their land in leasehold to the kulaks ... The managers of the sovkhoses have a good time at the expense of our labour, give themselves to luxury, drive good horses, live at the sovkhoses, have servants, live with their families, and eat what landlords and Ministers used to eat at sometime". ("Izvestia", January 13, 1924) "There is no room to let our hens out because of the sovkhos lands. The bailiff of the sovkhos misuses our cattle and treats us like the landlord did" -

complain the peasants ("Biednota", July 24, 1925).

In the centre of the Communist front in the villages stand the so called "kolkhoses" (collective farms). They are carefully guarded, and in every possible way supported by the Government. Every few. months all kinds of new privileges, facilities and exemptions are showered upon them as if from a cornucopia. And yet, these kolkhoses present a miserable sight, and are a laughing stock of the population,. It is true that they at present show a certain numerical growth after a period of utter decay in whicb they had been during the first years of NEP when the new economic policy was being taken more or less in earnest. From 1923 on this "rise" is furthered by repeated new privileges. In order to give an idea of the real position of the kolkhoses we could adduce innumerable examples lavishly supplied by the daily Soviet papers, and by the special literature on the subject. We shall confine ourselves here to some data extracted from a fairly recently published work about kolkhoses by a certain Kindeiev. The first thing which we learn from this work, is that under the name of "kolkhos" (collective farm) are, very often concealed things that have nothing ) M. Kindeiev. Collective farms. Moscow 5*

192 7 .

67

to do with collectivism. There is a current term ,,pseudo-kolkhos" which denotes a private enterprise avowedly disguised as "kolkhos" for the sake of convenience. According to the official data (which it would be natural to suspect rather of under-estimating the real position), the percentage of "pseudo-kolkhoses" by provinces is as follows: province of Tver - 48 per cent., Tartar Republic - 68 per cent., Provinces of Saratov, Tula and Moscow, as well as Siberia and the Ukraine - 3o per cent., province of Tambov - 15 per cent., province of Voronej - 53 per cent. As regards the statute of kolkhoses in general, it is often, says Kindeiev, only a signboard. Yet, io per cent. of the kolkhoses have not even such a signboard, existing without any statute, and inasmuch as there is a statute, it is in 5o cases out of ioo not adhered to. A considerable number of the kolkhoses are "non-organised"; towards the end of 1925 they constituted over one half of the total number. This is important because as a rule, "non-organised" kolkhoses hold the land in individual tenure. In so far as the kolkhoses are real collective farms, they have the following characteristic drawbacks: bad discipline of labour, lack of personal interest, and great "mobility of composing elements". The following fact is often to be observed in the kolkhoses. In the autumn a new member is idmitted into the kolkhos; having fed himself throughout the winter, he goes away in the spring, and finds other work". Conditions of life in the communes are not very encouraging: "an average communard feels that he is in the position of a hired labourer" - he is scared and terrorised. What are the reasons of the formation of kolkhoses? Apart from those which are generally known, viz., the desire to increase one's holding and to obtain all sorts of privileges, Kindeiev points out another reason apt to surprise even one who is accustomed to the surprises the Soviet reality is so full of. The formation of "kolkhoses", as it appears, represents a widely spread means of leaving the village community for independent settlements outside of the communal rule, viz. the "khootors". People form a kolkhos with the special aim of freeing themselves from the fetters of the village community, and immediately afterwards they divide their collective farm into separate holdings. The most convenient form of kolkhos in this respect appears to be the society with collective ploughing of land for according to the statute of such societies the holding of each member may be separated at any given moment on his demand, which is not the case with the communes and artels. And most curiously, comrade Kindeiev recommends the finding of a "correct solution" of the question of providing land for the retiring members of communes and artels as an efficient measure destined to contribute to the further rise and growth of collective forms of farming. In his opinion, this will give to the peasants a new incentive to the formation of collective farms: it is merely necessary to grant to 68

their members the right of separating themselves with their land without the consent of the collective. Thus the Communist principle with regard to land relations has practically assumed these comical forms, covering up, on the one hand, small (though not always small!) and not too scrupulous farmers who are hiding themselves behind the screen of kolkhoses, and on the other hand favouring the parasitic existence of the loafers who contrive to live at the expense of others in the Socialist State. Much more serious and important is the part practically played by the egalitarian principle. Here practice diverges acutely from the law. Far from allowing free choice of land tenure proclaimed in the Code, the Government largely exercises coercive equalisation of land tenure.

This

last tendency is relying upon a rather artificial interpretation of certain clauses of the Code which permitted, in direct contradiction with the principle of purely technical land regulations (zemleoostroistoo) proclaimed by the "fundamental law about working land tenure", to regard land regulations as an act revising land relations in the sense of general equalising repartition. If you want to effect land regulation, i. e. to give a certain definite shape to land relations and limits - you must accept preliminary equalisation of land holdings. Such a principle, inasmuch as it is brought into life, leads to the systematic egalitarian redistribution of land parallel to the land-regulating activities. It is difficult to say to what extent this principle is really carried out in practice, but in any case there are several concrete indications in monographic researches referring to various parts of Russia as to the existence there of such practice aiming at equalisation under the mask of technical land reglatuions. Apart from this maximum programme of equalisation, it is necessary to emphasise once more that the right of land tenants to choose freely the form of land tenure was practically abolished by the governmental instructions as to the undesirability of forming separate enclosed holdings, as well as by privileges granted to collective land tenure. This does not imply, of course, that personal forms of farming are practically non-extant or that the pace of their growth has been greatly retarded. It means merely that as a result of these prohibitions and privileges numerous ways of defrauding and evading the regulations have been discovered, enabling personal ownership of land in Soviet Russia to take shape irresistibly. One striking example of it we have seen above in the shape of agricultural communes, artels and societies with collective tilling of land. Similar *) Cp. M. Y. Phenomenov. Modern village. 2 parts. Moscow 1926. K. Vorobiev. Land sketches of the Rybinsk region. On the agrarian front. 1926. N. Silvestrov. Conditions of land tenure in the Karachaevo-Tcherkassky Autonomous Region. Ibid.

69

examples could be easily multiplied. We shall here only point out a very popular form of disguised separation of holdings, viz. so-called "fivefamily holding" which is still greatly favoured by the Government. To illustrate the widespread individualistic disintegration of villages, we shall give here the evidence taken from the two, perhaps, most popular Soviet books about villages. Thus, Yakovlev in his book "Village as it is", dealing with the Province of Kursk, tells about the "kulak bud" formed by a formerly well-to-do peasant who was deprived of everything by the revolution, but has recovered his position. "I have gathered a group of 20 households and we are separating our holdings" - declares this peasant in the book of Yakoylev. And here is a dialogue from another book which has produced great sensation and aroused a real storm in the Communist camp by its alleged denunciations; I mean the book of Bourov: "Village at the crossways": "Once I asked Jmurkin*): Tell me, Jmurkin, why is the village thus going all to pieces? There is hardly any village where the peasants have, not separated, or are not trying to separate, their holdings. - This is quite simple, replied Jmurkin. It is now very difficult for us to live in the village in the old way, the main cause being our dissensions. The father is quarrelling with his son; the son is suing his father. That is why they separate. A peasant who wants to run his farm in a new way cannot do it in the old village where society is ruling. Suppose everybody agrees as to some ,economic improvement, and only two or three people persist, often out of obstinacy, self-consciousness or ignorance, and there is nothing to be done with them ... And then there is the intermixture of fields, and the remoteness of holdings. From this point too, it is much more convenient to separate one's holding. Take me, for instance: I have now all my land next to me, in my own holding. And here all my land, the whole of my farm is put together in one place and can be seen as if on the palm of a hand. That is why everything is going to pieces and breaking up . . . For economic reasons. These two examples illustrate very well the marked tendency of the peasants towards personal tenure. This tendency, however, is vigorously opposed by the Soviet Government which, though Marxian in its origin and label, is carrying out at present with extraordinary persistence a purely populist, communal-equalising policy. The quarrel between the advocates of vital individulistic principles in the village who screen up their defence with the shield of Marxism and Leninism, on one hand and the egalitarian "populist" doctrine on the other, broke up in the higher spheres of the *) Jmurkin book.

70

a "cultural worker", ohne of the main personages in Bourov's

Soviet bureaucracy in a striking fashion in connection with the attempt to formulate general principles of land law for the whole of the U. S. S. R. The point is, the existing legislation with regard to land had been codified for separate republics; the specific legislation which we have discussed above refers to the R. S. F. S. R. (Great Russia), but it has been reproduced without any considerable alterations in other parts of the U. S. S. R. Considering that the Constitution of the U. S. S. R. provides for the establishment of "general principles" of land law for the Union as a whole, drafts of such general law had been worked out more than a year ago. And these drafts provoked a controversy which has not yet subsided*) and the kernel whereof constituted the same fundamental problem: Personal ownership, or community with egalitarian redistributions? Of course, the principle of personal ownership was here advocated under all sorts of assumed names, and sometimes this defense took very curious forms. Thus, e. g., one of the militant arguments was as follows: cooperation is a way to Socialism; statistics show that there is an infinitely greater percentage of "khootor"-settlers, than of communal holders, in the cooperative movement; ergo, by admitting free formation of khootor-holdings the way to Socialism is shortened. And such a proposition was seriously debated in the Communist Academy, and is advocated e. g., in one of the last numbers of the "Bolshevic", the official organ of the Communist party"). Yet, however enticing such arguments may be, the policy of the Soviet Government has not abandoned its Populist tendency. The just published leading instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party go back to the seemingly forgotten question of single land legislation and announce a whole programm of restrictions of personal farming, parallel with the strengthening of equalising tendencies. Considering the struggle which the living forces of the village are leading against the constantly renewed equalising partitions of land, and the legislation which frobids all free transactions with land, the actual land relations must of necessity be essentially different from what their legal appearance is. In the first place, according to the unanimous evidence of the Soviet specialists, various disguised forms of hired labour and lease of lands are widely spread. Seeing that such transactions are formally forbidden and at all events disadvantageous from the point of view of relations with the authorities, they escape any statistical estimation, and this is well realised by the Soviet economists themselves. Yet it is precisely *) This most curious discussion fills the pages of the review "On the agrarian front". **) "Bolshevic", October 3z, 1927, No. 19-20, article of M. Ustinov: "To the question of the forms of land tenure. Crisis of the Populist defence of the community".

71

in these forms that finds its expression in the rapid and cruel differentiation of the village into those who have land and stock and who already form the class of big farmers or even small landlords, and those who may he regarded as landless village proletarians. The land was divided according to some rules, but the agricultural stock in spite of the attempts to divide it equally too, has retained its economic importance only in the hands of real farmers, and in the conditions of almost apocalyptic impoverishment prevailing in Soviet Russia has made those farmers of outstanding social importance and economic power. Farmers possessing stock, deprived though they are of all political rights, have proved to be economic and social potentates, to whom one could do harm and whom one could revenge using one's close relations with the Communists, but whom the population, considering the remoteness of the villages from the centre had to take into account as an unavoidable factor. Gradually and very quickly the economically strong peasant ("kulaks") have turned to be a kind of magnet attracting vague, nondescript village property, and then began a new redistribution of goods, this time not in the sense of equalisation, but just in the opposite direction, resulting in most flagrant inequality. These new relations in the villages assume most fantastic legal forms. As remarks Kritzman, one of the leading Soviet specialists on the question of class differentiation in the village, there is to be observed an extraordinary "irony of things": hired labour, "the best class characteristic" is being "dialectically turned into its opposite"*). How does it happen? Let Kritzman speak for himself: "The main variety of capitalistic economy in the Soviet village, and one whose importance is apparently still progressing is a capitalistic (chiefly small capitalistic) economy based on the lease of working cattle and agricultural stock; under this economy the hidden capitalist acts in the shape of worker labouring on another man's farm with his own cattle and stock, and the hidden proletarian appears in the shape of farmer without cattle and stock (or with insufficient quantity of both) who has to hire the owner of those indispensable means of production""). If we accept Larin's classification, we can divide various capitalistia undertakings in villages into three large groups: i) openly employing hired labour, 2) camouflaging the hire of labourers by the lease of cattle and stock, and 3) rural pseudo-cooperative societies. The last two varieties, of course, escape from any statistical estimation. But if we dwell on the first variety only, we will see that of the total number of hired labourers which *) L. Kritzman. The question of class differentiation in modern villages..

"On

the Agrarian Front", 1925, No. 7-8.

**) Kritzman. Class differentiation of modern village. Published by the Communist Academy. Moscow 1926, p. l6i.

72

amounts to 3,6oo,ooo, only 1,000,000 are employed by sovkhoses, by village

communities, by forestries, by cooperative societies, and by craft industries; the remaining 21/4 millionms of labourers were employed in 1926 on individual peasant farms. As regards the disguised hiring of piece-work labourers, according to Larin's calculations about 20 per cent. of households are subjected to such "capitalistic exploitation". This accounts for the fact that 5/6 of the households possessing no working cattle - which constitute 3o per cent. of the total number of households in R. S. F. S. R. - are recorded as tilling their land. "And for this purpose - says Larin - exists the "hire of piece-work labourers", or to be simpler, the cultivation by the superior group with the aid of its cattle of the lands of horseless paupers who sometimes have even to perform labourers' duties"*). The percentage of actually landless households indicated by Larin seems enormous. Yet it is rather underestimated, than exaggerated. At least the monographic data concerning separate regions are still more terrifying. Thus a certain Bricks in his research about West-Siberian villages (On the Agrarian Front, 1927, No. 6) gives the following data about "fictitious farms" in Kamenetzky district. In

1920

there were altogether

10.4

per cent. of uncultivated farms,

in 1924 their number diminished by io times falling to

i.i per cent. But

parallel with this the number of farms without stock increased from 17 to 27.8 per cent. Thus over 1/4 of all the farms are "fictitious farms". "The peasants of the lower cultivating groups are farmers (owners) only in the legal, but not in the economic sense of the word. They own their labour, or hands, and not means of production; in other words they are practically the labourers of the well-to-do peasantry", quotes Bricks on this occasion from Kritzman. It is significant that the process of proletarisation of the peasantry in the later years after 1924, instead of slackening, has been going on at an accelerated pace. In 1924 the number of farms without stock was 27.8 per cent.; in 1925, 29.1 per cent.; in

1926 39.9 per

cent.; "in 1926 4o per cent. of farms in the black soil producing region of Kamensk had no ploughs", concludes Bricks, and he gives an information of the Siberian Statistical Department from which it follows that the same state of things is characteristic of the whole of Western Siberia. It appears that in the Barnaoul region there are 42.2 per cent. of stockless farms, *) G. Larin. Private Capital in U. S. S. R. P. III: Private Capital in Agriculture 1927-

According to information supplied also by Larin, the number of households that are annually liquidated and abandoned amounts to 2.4 per cent. of the total number in the consuming regions, about 3.2 per cent. in the producing regions, and about 2.8 per cent. in the Ukraine!

73

in the Roubtzov district, 48.2 per cent.; in Novosibirsk district, 31.9; in the Province of Altai, 45.9 per cent. (1925). Alongside with this widely spread form of letting land on lease accompanied by hiring oneself as a labourer, there exists also a simple lease. It is characteristic of the Soviet conditions that, as a general rule, it is the poor who let the land to the well-to-do, and not vice versa. Various observers have recorded for various districts of Russia the fact that the highest percentage of farms letting their land on lease is to be come across in uncultivated or lower cultivating groups, and also the fact of a gradual increase of the number of poor peasants letting their land on lease. To what extent this is directly due to the equalising distribution of land, we can gather from a general remark made by Azizian, one of the Soviet specialists who studied the question of leasehold. Emphasising the fact that the poor peasants for the most part let their land on lease, he makes an exception for "non-organised" districts where there had been since the October coup d'Etat no redistribution of land and where the poor peasants as often as not have no land; and he adds that "when the land-organisation will have taken place the poor peasant who had obtained land will let on lease a portion of his allotment, instead of leasing it as he does now" (Economic Review, September 1927). The Soviet economist does not even consider the possibility of the poor peasant himself cultivating his land: he will get his plot only in order to let it to a "kulak". It is difficult to say with certainty what is the numerical extent of such simple lease of land, for no statistics can cover these carefully concealed facts. If by socalled "budget descriptions" we can establish the approximate percentage of farm renting land [this percentage according to the data supplied by A. Gaister ("On the Agrarian Front", No. 6, 1926) was in 1925: in the province of Smolensk, 35 per cent., in the province of Yaroslay, 35.7, in the province of Kaluga, 5o, in the province of Moscow, 22.2, in the province of Tambov, 4o.7, in the province of Kursk, 34.5, in the Northern Caucasus, 24.8, in the steppe regions of the Ukraine, 36.4, in the wood-steppe regions of the Ukraine, 20.4, in the province of Novosibirsk, 19.4], for the farms that let their land on lease we can obtain no figures corresponding to the reality. Gaister asserts that the farms that rent land are, by the head of cattle and the number and value of agricultural implements; superior to those that rent no land, and that the lease is a means of "rectification" of the land "equalisations". The budget data, as Gaister says, bear out only one thing, namely that the farms that lease their land are small farms. And this entitles him to make the following general statement: "The great majority of the tiniest farms resort to 74

letting their land on lease". "The terms on which the land is let on lease have grown considerably worse as compared with the pre-revolutionary times", melancholically quotes comrade Gaister on this occasion from a Cyrill Zaitzef f. newspaper article. 3. Conclusion. In conclusion we must dwell on the question of the actual development of agricultural production in Russia after the Bolshevist revolution. Very often the advocates of Bolshevism try to produce the impression that the agricultural production of Russia has now reached its pre-war level. This impression is entirely wrong. On the whole, agricultural production, if we take the territory of the U.S.S.R. and the area under cereals, is by 7.5 per cent behind the pre-war level, whereas the population during the same period of time has increased by 7.2 per cent. This means that the production has been lagging behind the pre-war standard practically to the same extent to which the number of eaters or consumers has increased. In particular, the main cereal crops in 1927 gave the following figures in percentage to the acreage of 1913:

Rye Wheat Oats Barley

99.5 83.3 92.9

57.3

These data given by Oganovsky ("Economicheskaja Jisn" of January 13, 1928) do not quite coincide with the data given by Vishnevsky ("On the agrarian front", p. 129), but they are fairly close to them. These figures illustrate the decay of market production of cereals in Russia in connection with the revolution. Whenever we hear of an increase of the area under cultivation, we must bear in mind that this increase is not only a partial phenomenon, but that it means a revival of natural economy in the so-called "consuming" regions of Russia whose population, being occupied in industry and elsewhere outside farming, used to consume corn brought over from other parts of the country. Now these parts of Russia have to produce, to a much larger extent than before, their own food and their own raw materials for home industry needs*). On the other hand, a considerable part of the producing region, namely "the entire zone of the black-soil wheat-producing steppes to the East of the Volga has been to a great extent laid waste". Besides, in 1927, "the area under spring corn ') Thus, the growth of maize and sunflower crops which occupy, absolutely speaking, small areas, is also a fact implying a return to natural economics, or, as Vishnevsky puts it in the article quoted hereafter, "a predominance of the farms of semi-consuming type" (op. cit., p. 13o).

75

and barley was further curtailed in the Steppe Ukraine, in the Middle and Lower Volga regions and in the Northern Caucasus". In estimating the sowing area the Soviet statisticians make some rather arbitrary allowances to the statistical figures on hand, or, to be more exact, an addition of 25 per cent, and for the regions where the amount of tax is determined by the sowing area, up to 4o per cent. Yet the same statisticians, when dealing with the period before the war and the revolution, make an allowance of 1o per cent only. With those qualifications, the Soviet statisticians give the following figures for the sowing area of the whole "Union": Percentage to 1914

Percentage to

loo

.

.

.

.

1917

.

.

.

.

93

1920

.

.

.

.

84

1921

.

.

.

.

75

1922

.

.

.

.

65

100

1925

.

.

.

.

87

I34

1926

.

.

.

.

93

143

1927

.

.

.

.

95.3

146

914

1922

The above mentioned allowances lead to an arbitrary increase of the sowing areas in the Bolshevist period as compared with the pre-revolutionary times*). The conditions of agricultural production now -observed in Russia remind one in a striking way of the phenomena of war economics. The economic regime which the Bolshevics have established in Russia is a perpetuation of the conditions of war- economics as they existed in Russia between 1914 and 917, the revolution having only rendered them more acute. During the war, the industry which had to satisfy war demand and was deprived through the war of its man-power, was not in a position to supply commodities to the agricultural producer, and the latter began to produce and to market less of his goods. This situation was aggravated by the paper money inflation of the war time. Now, under peace-time conditions, and with the currency being seemingly stabilised, the cleavage between the towns and the villages, created by the Soviet economic system, has reproduced and consolidated the abnormal conditions of the war economics. It will not be possible to improve Russian agriculture and to create conditions enabling the rural population of Russia to prosper, until the deadening influence of the Socialist regulation on the economic life of the country has been done away with. PeterStru v e. ') (See Vishnevsky: "Agriculture of the U. S. S. R. during the to years of revolution" in the review "On the agrarian front", No. 11-12 for zg97, p. 127.)

76

Economy in Soviet Russia. By S. Sherman. CONTENTS:

General Particulars; The Home Trade; The Industry; Trade; The Currency.

The Foreign

General Particulars. was policy of economics, 1917/21, of the Bolshevic first bystage HE carrying into effect the principles of socialistic consistently marked organisation of the national economy. This process is again divided into

T

two distinct periods:

the first period, 1917-Igig, had, as its chief task,

the suppression of private economic activity with the assistance of a consistent nationalisation of the banks (decree of Feb. 2, 1918), by the nationalisation of single branches of the industry, then also of the total industry (decree of July 23, 1918), by the nationalisation of trade (decree of November 21, 1918), as well as the suppression of the then customary attempts of the workers and employees of getting certain enterprises and assets of properties into their own hands, by declaring them as State property. The second period,

1919-1921,

consists in the attempt of the Bol-

shevistic power to -exploit the seized branches of economics by bureaucratic means. The Chief Economic Council, with the assistance of the chief management of the separate industrial branches, was to serve as the central organ for the direction of the whole economy of the country; later on, however, it only controlled the production department of the big industrial and smaller industrial concerns; the smallest industrial enterprises in the provinces were directed by the economic councillors of the gouvernements by means of their numerous special departments. The process of distribution in regard to foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods, were assigned to the people's commissariat, which, with the assistance of its departments in gouvernements and districts, supplied the population.

The paper money printed in unlimited quantities and, without even being entered or registered, was distributed by the accounting department of the people's commissary for finances (Narkomfin). As a result of the first period of the communist government the production and the commercial activity came to a complete standstill. That part of the population that did not till the soil was nominally engaged in the economic apparatus of the State in doing compulsory, but absolutely unproductive work. The remuneration or pay for this work was adjusted in the form of apportioning provisions, which were distributed on a basis of class distinction. There were various standards of distribution for the workers, employees 77

and the ordinary "inhabitants". Proportions that corresponded more or less to the necessary minimum for every-day subsistence, were only distributed to the army and the workers employed in the war-industry. A higher standard of provisioning was applied to Communists, and also, since the beginning of 192 1, to higher officials and to the so-called "specials" (specialists in the domain of economics and technics). As a result of that, the town population was obliged to seek an additional income for their subsistence, an employment which would be independent from the utilisation of their power of working for the Government. The source of such an additional income, is principally to be found by the population in various kinds of abuses of the employment. Such an abuse of employment was carefully secreted as a matter of course; but at times it was also carried out with the consent of the controlling organs of the Government. However, as under this fixed regime, there were no other possibilities of existence alongside of these abuses, this system of abuses became a sort of standard: the officials who had to issue orders for raw materials for tradesmen, as well as orders for clothing and foodstuffs, received bribes, and shared them with their fellow-workers; the workers employed at the factories - which being three-parts at a standstill - are active in their own interests by making small articles of utility for peasants, such as cigarette-lighters and the like; and also by selling the driving-belts, brass parts of the machines, etc. The employees of the people's commissariat for provisioning, sell foodstuffs which they have purloined. The workers and employees of the railways rob the consignments, which have officially been declared as State property, etc. In order to get the return from agriculture also into their hands, a military organisation was created under the direction of the people's commissariat for provisioning, which took away the foodstuffs from the peasants by virtue of a "plan for distributing foodstuffs", i. e., a regulation carried out according to the bureaucratic discretion, by means of which contributions of provisions were to be levied in the various districts. The expropriation was carried out in such a way that only a minimum, absolutely necessary for the feeding of the family and the cattle (livestock), as well as for sowing the fields, was left to the peasants. A complete realisation of the policy of 1919/21 had failed, for the town population threatened by starvation, in its struggle against permanent hunger, kept up by diverse means a certain contact with the country, and by this means succeeded in continuing a primitive exchange of goods. As a result of the government's stubborn fight lasting for two years, for carrying out the principles of putting all economic organisations under socialistic State-control, a retrogressive movement of the whole economic condition of the country to primitive economic forms took place, in the

78

course of which, the entire level of the Russian economic life was depressed to a minimum unbearable for the population. Thereupon followed: the rising at Kronstadt (March 1921), the labour riots (Petrograd - February 192 i), the peasant-riots in different parts of Russia (in the gouvernements

Tambow, Woronesh, Poltava, Pensa, Novgorod, etc.). The State organisation having an enormous capital at its disposal which it had seized at the moment of nationalising the banks, the industry and the large private possessions, had already spent these funds during the first years of its existence; even to the most fanatic representatives of the new order of things it became obvious that a further existence on the basis of a decadent economy bereft of all productivity, was impossible. In Spring 1921, the Communists consequently turned away from the system of collective organisation of the entire economics, to which the whole country had already been sacrificed, and decided - to liberate, in part, the private economic forces, and to reconstruct the capitalistic exchange of goods although in a somewhat disfigured form. This reaction shows its outward manifestation in the following facts: i) The above mentioned "plan for distributing foodstuffs" is abolished, and is replaced by "a taxation in foodstuffs" (which is carried out by deliveries in kind). 2) Private trading is permitted. 3) A comparative freedom is extended to the retail trade, to handicrafts and to home-work. 4) The duty of performing enforced work and of enforced transport service, is gradually done away with. 5) A commercial re-organisation of trade and of large industries is inaugurated, ("Khosrastchot", i. e., economic calculation), which, however, is to remain in the hands of the State, and to operate with nationalised capital. 6) The State finances are separated from the economic branches which have been transferred to economic calculations, and the attempt is made to build up a State budget. 7) The personnel of the administration of the State is partly reduced, and attempts are made for the adjustment of its organisation. The governmental power has retained as points of support: a) The nationalised industry, b) The foreign trade monopoly, c) The monopoly of the big home trade. These organs have been officially designated as the "pinnacles of command" of the communist party. The first period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), is characterised by a rapid growth of the individual economic activity of the population, a gradual coalescence of the home trade, a growth in the private retail trade, and of the home industry, and by an accumulation of private property at first rapidly, but then slowly - among the most active and most enterprising of the town population. During the first years of the new economic policy, these elements tried to get into contact - and with considerable success too - by round about ways with the producing elements 79

of the village, as well as with the home-workers and tradesmen. In to trade, and then also in respect to finance, a certain dependence State industry on private trade capital and financial capital arises the years 1921/24, which then leads to a part-redivision of the expropriated during 1918/20,

respect of the during values

among the holders of the power and the

enterprising elements. The nationalised industry, united into so-called "trusts" by accidental characteristics, increases its productivity up to 25 o/o of pre-war time, improves slightly its inner organisation, in part re-establishes discipline in the process of production, and absorbs within itself many of the old technical forces and administrative elements at the beginning of this period. The first period of the new economic policy has therefore created the illusionary impression, as if the communistic power had turned to purely capitalistic principles, as if it had turned in the direction of reconstructing the free economic systems, only hampered by the belated opposition of the expiring radical elements of the communist party. During this period of a still undisturbed development of the new economic policy, the State industry and the transport system of the State, were working at a great loss; firstly because, the capacity of production - coupled with enormous working expenses and charges -, after all, did not reach more than a i/4 of the capacity of production of pre-war time; and further, the working capital having become diminished by plundering and squandering, the industry was compelled to have recourse to dotations from the State exchequer, or to pay enormous interest for moneys supplied by semi-governmental com-

panies as loans on reciprocal security. Secondly, the industrial concerns, lacking appropriate economic leadership, and being quite dependent on departments of the State perfectly incapable and ignorant in the domain of industrial activity, became a booty of the covetous endeavours of the so-called "Red Directors" and of their surroundings. And finally, in the most liberal period of the new economic policy, the Government was nevertheless compelled - for mere political reasons - to raise the wages to the amount of pre-war time (nominally), and in addition to this, to write off large amounts of the funds of industrial concerns for social guarantees. The second period of the new economic policy begins, in trade and industry, in 7924. Its characteristic feature is the increasing pressure of the State power on the small enterprises in the industry, in trade and in the home-work, as well as the attempt to subordinate the country to the town by diverse means. At the outset the chief instrument for realising this policy, was the system of taxation, which, in perfectly arbritary forms, was directed at extorting means from rural and small urban economic undertakings. The

80

entirely abritrary taxation levied on business enterprises in towns - the "transport-tax", the tax on current cash levied in every household, the tax for municipal administration, the single impost on reconstruction work. etc. - all led to the circumstance that in Moscow and in large towns, 65 o/o of trade enterprises, as well as business agencies and small trade undertakings were closed in the autumn of 1924, which had originated in the early stages of the new economic policy. To this time also belongs the final formation of the credit system still in existence at the present time. The credit system of the country consists of a State bank with a number of branches, of a bank for foreign trade, of a State bank at Moscow, of a Central Co-operative bank, of the Co-operative bank of the Union, of the Commercial and Industrial bank, of the bank for granting loans to agriculture, and of the Electro bank. Of all these banks, the following are at present of essential importance: The State Bank, the Industrial Bank and the Co-operative Bank of the Union. There were still a whole series of companies granting reciprocal credits and a few large private banking concerns, as well as a foreign commercial bank in which the Soviet Government was interested with capital. All these credit institutions, however, are now closed. The State bank, the Industrial bank and the Co-operative bank have received their capital from the Government, principally out of the balances of the nationalised values. Among their staff they have a certain number of experienced bank officials and leading personalities, whom the Government chose and selected with care, when it was preparing its monetary reform. The Commercial Exchange and the Stock Exchange, which originated during the first period of the new economic policy, degenerate later on into purely statistical boards of registration. The State industry continued to work at a loss, and experienced during this time, the pressure of the central power which insisted upon a reduction of demands made on the State budget: the Government attempted to build up a sort of State budget and began to reduce the subsidies paid to the industry; the trusts, on their part, begin to compensate themselves for the dotations from the State, by increasing their prices. In consequence of the pressure of the taxation screw and of the foreign trade monopoly, an irresistable decline in prices for agricultural products begins at the same time. Already from the beginning of 1923 arises a strongly marked disparity of prices between the urban and rural economy, - a new breach between town and country, - in this instance, in favour of the town. This is the so-called "price-shears" about the development of which, a detailed analysis will be given later when speaking about the present state of the Russian 81

industry and trade. During this time the Government itself also begins to recognise the threatening depreciation of the capital stock of the industry. The installations of factories and works which, moreover, in technical respects were in a very bad state, lose nearly 60 o/o of their productive capability during the time of the revolution. In addition to this, agriculture - being compelled to support the Communist State, the State industry and the transport system of the State, - begins to feel the impossibility of reconstructing the exhausted powers of production. The Curreoncy has passed through a special development. Under point 15 of the economic programme of the Communist party, it is stated: ... "As long as the communistic production and distribution of the products is not completely organised, the abolition of money appears impossible. The Russian communist party relies on the nationalisation of the banks and endeavours to carry out a number of measures which are to extend the range of settling accounts without ready money, and to prepare for the abolition of money. . ." According to the programme, it was resolved to let the rouble die a natural death, but at the same time paper-money was being issued in perfectly unlimited quantities. A condition of affairs appeared, which a leading co-worker of communism characterised by the expression: "division of the issuing cauldron" (= distribution of food from the soupkitchen). At the same time a.project for a substitute for money by means of "working-tickets" was worked out, by which the hours devoted to "work of general utility" could be fixed. At the beginning of the new economic policy in 1921, the enormous quantity of paper-money circulating in the country expressed in genuine roubles representing the equivalent in goods, amounted to 44 millions of roubles. This state of affairs was described as a catastrophe, even among the ranks of the communists themselves, which actually injured the still remaining possibilities of production at its very roots. The rouble was actually in a dying state, and it was not possible to replace it by "working-tickets" or by "settlement of accounts without cash", but only by the system of currency which existed before the revolution. The monetary reform proved to be the most difficult, and as the least stable of all reforms following on the new economic policy. At the beginning an attempt was made to create a doubtful circulation of money: at the commencement of 1923, the relatively secured "Cherwonez" was created for the industry, especially for the settlements between the various trusts, as well as for meeting the necessities of the party; but for the country, the persistently falling "Sowsnak" (Soviet paper-money) was left. However, this state of affairs could not last for long. At the beginning of 5924, L. Kamenev has proclaimed the unavoidable necessity of passing on to a stabilised monetary value: "We cannot support ourselves any longer by the Soviet paper-money, no, not for a month, - not even for 82

a week. . . The peasants refuse to sell anything whatsoever for the Soviet rouble. Every peasant and worker knows now that we shall have to burn this Soviet rouble.

.

." ("Pravda", March

2,

1924). The reform by Kutler,

Urovsky and Sokolnikov has at first produced a fairly respectable monetary value, but after all, it did not possess the elements of stability which are necessary for a really stable monetary standard, viz., in creating an increase in the national income, a budget without a deficit, a security based on a gold standard - even if only partially secured, yet having an unmistakeable guarantee, - and also having a connection with the international money market. The ephemeral character of the stability of the Cherwonez in connection with the existing organisation of the national economy, showed itself at first in 1925. In the chapter about the Currency, this matter is treated in a more exhaustive manner. For the first time after the proclamation of the new economic policy, foreign capital was again admitted into the country. The formal possibility of coming to an agreement with Western European Powers for mutual economic co-operation, was proclaimed on October 28, Ig2i (Chicherin's note). The penetration of foreign capital into Russia, happened first through such business men as had come into prominence by post-war speculation. Only in ig2, accredited and well-established firms began to approach the Soviet Government with proposals on the basis of concessions for working the mineral resources of the country. It was presumed that a written agreement with the Government would be amply sufficient in order to establish favourable conditions for the work in Russia. The glaring differences of legal and social conditions in Soviet Russia compared with the rest of the world, and the important practical significance of these differences soon became clear to those seeking for concessions, but, nevertheless, not before the actual inception of the work. Even for the exploitation of the least difficult licensed undertakings (working of timber materials, export of manganese-ore), even these at once showed in practice, the absolute impossibility of carrying on the enterprises with profit while such specific economic and legal conditions prevailed in the country. Even the attempts of foreign capital to organise trade with Russia, produced no important results. The Soviet Government permitted the socalled "Mixed Companies", in which it had a share and exercised the control. However, the development of these companies was soon checked by the inability of conferring direct with the purchaser, and hampered by the lack of a safe system of extending credit, and by finding their work confined to supplying purely State undertakings and so-called co-operative enterprises with goods. The warehousing of goods for agricultural purposes (agricultural small implements) was ineffective, in spite of the active demand for these articles; the peasant is too poor to buy foreign implements for 6*

83

cash; and even if he had the necessary means, he would hide them carefully lest he should fall under the influence of the fiscal officers. But to extend credit to a peasant would be too risky as he has no property to offer as security, - for, according to the law, the soil belongs to the State. The Home Trade. When every commercial activity was completely prohibited, and the open market was done away with for the whole of Russia, the capitalistic economic order of things - in the opinion of the Soviet economists - was destroyed from that moment in its very foundations; and instead of the "market chaos" the "plan system" was introduced, the State taking over in their entirety all complicated functions of commerce in respect to supplying the industries with raw materials, in respect to transport of products, in distributing the finished goods to the population, in subdividing agricultural surplus productions among separate districts, etc. Such a bold reform the world had never yet seen. Even if, for the purpose of socialising the soil its far-removed typification could be traced in the Russian rural community, the question of an equivalent for market and trade, on the other hand, was only indicated in the remote distance by a uniform plan of purveying, as voiced in the agitatorial pamphlets. The serious socialistic literature, had always preferred to critisize the existing state of affairs rather than to work out positively the forms of order for the future. Only the authors of social Utopias and novels, wherein 'the action did not really take place until "roo years after", were in this respect much more courageous; but even their power of imagination did not reach the terrible phantasm through which Russia has been obliged to live within the course of 21/2 years. At the present time this period is depicted - especially for the benefit of the foreign reader - as a form of "war-communism", which, as is stated, was enforced by the circumstances of the civil war. However, the whole of the vast literature belonging to this period actually goes to prove that it was an attempt, - which in itself was quite independent of the surrounding circumstances, - of turning Russia into a socialistic trial State, and by this means to make Russia into a base of social revolution for the rest of the world. The supreme power left no stone unturned in order to realise this idea, and the attainment of this end in view was made considerably easier by the fact that the historical conditions had not furnished the commercial status of Russia with any social stability, tradition or power of resistance; this "status", however, sacrificed its position, allowed its property to be taken away, and perished almost without offering any kind of resistance, whereas the market, as a standard of values and as a form of exchange, proved

84

itself as immortal. All attempts at destroying the market were without any success; it was elastic and indistructable, for - as already the first year of communistic management had gone to show - its actual and total abolishment would have meant the destruction of dozens of millions of urban population. The market was tranferred to subterranean secret passages, and continued to exist for the exchange of goods secreted or stolen from the State, in exchange for grain from the country destricts. In this manner it came about that a modification of a trading class was called into existence; the former trades people being entirely unsuited for the "criminalistic" exchange of goods, purloined from the State, in exchange for grain prohibited on an illegal market. It thus came to a perfectly elementary mobilisation of large numbers of new elements in the service of trade. The components of these elements were chiefly recruited from sailors who had withdrawn from the Soviet service, from among small dealers out of the villages, from among young peasants of the consuming governments, from inhabitants of urban settlements, especially from among citizens of small urban settlements, who, in this way first of all strove to feed their own families, and then were dragged into the phantastic life of the armed merchant of the former middle ages. From out of these elements the "economists" later on were partly formed, i. e., the employees of the economic enterprises of the State, and partly the "private capitalists" with whom the Soviet power is fighting so persistently at present. By the decree of 21. March, 1921 concerning "the substitution for the uniform division of foodstuffs and raw materials, by the surrender of foodstuffs", the market had become - to a considerable extent - once more free. The Soviet power, which was compelled to beat a retreat "to the economic front", had itself at first not formed a clear conception what concrete forms this retreat would assume, and to what extremes it would advance. In this endeavour alone was the Soviet power completely conscious, viz., to hinder the circulation of goods from private enterprise, and to hinder industrial activity by all means at its disposal, when it threatened to extend beyond a certain limit which was in reality not dangerous to the existence of the Soviet economic system. Already at the beginning of 1923, at the XII. congress of the communistic party, did Trotzki proclaim the fight against the NEP (New Economic Policy), which only barely two years before had been pronounced by Lenin as being "an earnest and endurable measure". "It would be careless and criminal to close ones eyes to the revival of economic activity among the smaller burghers as the possible basis for another development aimed directly at us, as a nutritive power of the private capitalistic process... and I therefore look upon it is necessary to proclaim it now openly ... the concerted 85

action 'of trade capital, which is beginning to assume rather far-reaching influence in conjunction with the home-working "kulak", who will then gradually subdue the weaker home-worker, - this concerted action might possibly create with us for the second time, a genuine Russian landed property capitalism." (L. Trotzki: "The Fundamental Question of the Industry", report of the XII. Congress of the Communistic Party, Moscow 1923,

p. 51).

For the combat against trade, in place of requisitions and contributions, the taxing apparatus of the commissariat of finance, and the administrative department for real-estate was employed in this instance. The former raised the taxes to such an enormous extent that those engaged in any enterprise, were forced to abandon the enterprise, and the administration of real-estate increased the rate of rent so enormously that the payment of it, far exceeded the means of the trade undertakings. This was the important period during which the destruction of the illusion took place in the heart of Russia,, viz., that the economic development of the Soviet power could possibly move in the direction of developing private economic initiative. This illusion continued to exist for a much longer period of time abroad. On the x. January, 1923, no less than 28,151 trade concerns were counted in Moscow, but on the i. April, of the same year (1923), the

number of trading concerns had already fallen to 12,288 immediately after the "action" of the administration of taxes of the finance commissariat. which had been dictated from above, had been put into execution. ("Ek. Shisn", i. e. "The Economic Life", 1923, 15. May). Of even more vital effect was the "action" of the ruling power in the provinces. In May 1923, the number of trading concerns amounted, on a percentage basis with the number in January 1923, to: In the Government Smolensk 56 o/o, in the Government Orel

52

0/0,

in the Government

Kiev 29 o/o,

in

the

Government Witebsk 33 0/o etc. From the time of the Break-up, the participation of private trade in the aggregate amount of the turnover of the country has never risen again, on the contrary, it has become continually less. According to the report of the trade commissariat of the Union of the S. S. R. the aggregate turnover of the activity of commercial adjustment during recent years was divided as follows (in percentage to the total amount =

zoo).

In x923/24

State Trade Co-operative Trade Private Trade .

1924/25

86

.

.

27.7

. . . 32.4

1925/26

.

.

x926/27

.

.

. .

.

.

.

.

2

7

.- 4

.

. . . . 39.8

3I.6

.

31.9

.

.

.

.

44.9

. . . 27-8

.

.

43.6

.

.

.

.

5o.6

.

,

.

.

24.8

.

18,5,

In comparison with 1925/26, not only a diminution of the comparative importance of private trade is to be recorded in the last economic year (1926/27), but its turnover has also absolutely fallen by 9.9 o/o, whereas the returns from State trade have risen by 17.8 0/n, and those of co-operative trade by 4o.3 0/o. A similar tendency in the diminution of the specific importance of private trade is also to be gathered from the reports issued by the taxation administration of the finance commissariat of the U. S. S. R. According to these particulars, the total number of patents which have been issued with a right to trade with them, have declined in 1926/27, in comparison with the previous year, by 16.5 o/o. During the same time the number of State enterprises have declined by 2.2 0/a, the co-operative enterprises by 12.6 0/a, and the private enterprises by 18.2 O/o ("Economic Bulletin of the Conjuncture Institute", No. 11/12, 1927). To every objective investigator of State trade and co-operative trade in present time Russia, the uncommonly large number of crises which continually accompany this trade, is very striking. This state of affairs, which is very characteristic for the U. S. S. R., can easily be illustrated by a simple enumeration of the crises such as have been officially recognised as serious ones. At the beginning of 1923/24, a severe crisis took place in the disposal or sale of industrial goods, which was officially explained by the divergence of prices of manufactures on the one hand, and agricultural products on the other. In Spring 1924 (March and April) another severe crisis was officially again made known, and was explained as being caused by the carrying out of the monetary reform. In the Winter of 1924/25, the press devoted a number of articles to the crisis which was

explained as being due to the lack of manufactured goods; for this crisis had assumed a ravenous demand for goods. The monetary and credit policy was completely changed at the time, and the crisis was alleviated by this means. During the economic year 1926/27, the ravenous demand for goods once more occurred, but at the end of the quarter an acute crisis of a "glut of goods", i. e., an over-supply of goods, was proclaimed. And finally, at the end of the second quarter of 1926/27 another crisis began owing to the inferior quality of the goods, due to an absence of a suitable assorment of goods. Three distinct manifestations form the essential foundation of all these crises: i) The disparity between the prices for industrial goods and agricultural products (the so-called "price-shears"). 2) The excessive costs of the apparatus for transmission and distribution of goods. 3) The inferior quality of goods.

87

The State appears as Monopolist in the domain of the production of goods, in the wholesale disposal of goods, and in the import of goods from abroad. In its capacity (as monopolist), the State is interested in a high market business. However, the prices for the goods manufactured in the factories of the State, are so excessively high, that they are quite beyond the reach of the population. At the same time, the identical State appears as purchaser of the agricultural goods produced by the individual farms; and just this identical State is also the only middle-man between the peasantry and the foreign market. The taxation-screw compels the peasants to sell their grain to the only purchaser, the State, which fixes definite prices for this grain. This social-economic combination, the ideal of all socialists has called forth a drop in the prices of agricultural products, which, in this startling form, is quite unknown in other countries, while at the same time the prices for industrial goods reach a considerable height. The leading Soviet economist and old communist Smilga has formulated the substance of this singular economic condition in the periodical "Bolchevic", No. 6, 15. March 1927, as follows: "By reason of the low prices received for grain, and by the extension of 'the shears', the purchasing power of the village (the rural population) is reduced, in connection with which this reduction hits the less poor and the poor peasant most of all. Simultaneously with the increase of retail prices, the wages of workmen and employees drop. Brandy acts in the same direction, for, from the sale of it, the returns increase considerably from month to month" (page 7o). One can obtain some sort of an idea in regard to the development of the "price-shears" from the following table, which was given in the anniversary book of the journal, "Economic Review", (Oekonomitscheskoje Obosrenije, No. 10, 1927). The peasant has paid by means of one pound (Russian lb. = to abo-ut 15 oz.) of rye-meal: In For one arschin zits (cotton cloth) .

(an arschin = to about

281/2 .

For one pound of sugar For one pound of flax

.

In

1913

5.5 lbs. rye-meal

.

lbs. meal

9.2

.

7.2

.

5.o3 ,,

in.)

.

.

.

5.3

,,

,,

,,

.

.

.

4.63

,,

,,

,,

.

This economic tendency, which theoretically favours only manufacturer of goods, and the only exporter, is development by the refusal of the peasantry to purchase and by the transition of the village population to provisioning on a natural economic basis. It is for

88

1927

.

,, ,,

the State as the delimited in its industrial goods, a primitive selfthis reason that

occasional attempts are being made at combatting the "price-shears", and from this cause arises the endeavour to diminish the amplitude of price divergence. Hitherto this has been accomplished by artificial means: - the fall of prices for industrial goods has not cried a halt before sales at a loss, and has covered the deficit out of funds from the State exchequer; (the second method is) the cheapening of the goods at the expense of the quality. Both methods have abundantly shown in the course of the last two years, their absolute insufficiency. In the first case it means an overtaxing of the budget of the State industry, whereby the necessity of covering the deficit by means of a new issue is called forth, by which the monetary system ultimately becomes disorganised; and in the second instance, a strong dissatisfaction in the quality of the goods is brought about, which is the cause for the crisis on the market in each case. In the paper "Oek. Shisn" (Economic Life) of 29 May and i3 May 1928, as well as in the "Torgovo-Promyschlennaja Gazeta" (Commercial and Industrial Paper) of 23 May 1928, endless complaints of consumers are published relating to the quality of the goods: "The quality of the goods is getting worse and worse", ... "The worst goods get into the interior of the country and into the border districts",... "This evil has a strong influence on the rural population, which is changing to a selfprovisioning system on a natural economic basis",... "they receive sound material, but the footgear out of the material is of the very worst kind it will pass, no doubt!" etc. etc. The decree of x6. February 1927 has reduced the prices of industrial goods; its effect, however, was - as is shown in the following - merely to call forth new issues of Cherwonezs, but no other essential results were achieved; innumerable attempts were also made to reduce the expenses and trade costs, and on these endeavours much care has been bestowed of late years. The fundamental organic defects of the system, however, - which ultimately lead to this result - are absolutely ineradicable. In no domain of human activity does an immense bureaucratic apparatus act so exceedingly hampering to effective work, as just in particular in the domain of trade, which always needs the highest limit of elasticity and freedom of action. In the domain of the grain trade this has shown itself with particular clearness. In a book dealing with the inspection of workers and peasants (Control department) of the North Caucasus district, A. Z. Kasizkij gives a very valuable comparison of grain-loading in pre-war time and in 1924/25 at the same spot of the North Caucasus district. This rare table is very instructive. 89

Detailed items Up-keep of the plant Rental and repairs to granaries Patents . .

. . .

.

.

1924/25

9,550 Rbl.

S.

1,720

.

5,o7i Rbl. .

150

Office, Past and Telegr ah . expenses . . . Sundry expenses . . Cleaning and reloading . Loss of weight . . . S Transport to the works . Commission to re-seller 5 Total . . .

.

.

.

4,o81 515

.

,

1,874

,.

i,6oo 8,ooo

,,

1,000

,

27,54o Rbl.

28.3 0/0

.

203.7 0/0

,.

88.o

0/6

3,520

..

ioo

,,

.

3,200

,,

.

.

4o.o

.

. 20,031

Rbl.

.

.

72.7 0/0

.

,.

237.3 0/o

. 343.3 o/o

60.o 920 4,ooo

The second column in percent comparison with ist column 53.x o/o .

Loading during the harvest

Loading in pre-war time

.

100.0 0/0 0/

would receive Any one reading this table without some small annotation, cheaper the impression that in 1924/25 the gathering of grain had become of amount this that stated is it end the at but than in pre-war time; over 13i,ooo cwt., expenses (27,540 Rbl.) in pre-war time was spread in

1924/25,

26,000 cwt., however, the expenses of 20,031 Rbl. fell on only

of grain amounted i. e., in the first case the expenses for loading one cwt. kopecks*), to 21 kopecks, whereas in the second case they amunted to 76 in Expenses "The (both tables are taken from the book of A. M. Obuchow, 1928, the Grain Trade". Edition of the Trade Commissariat, Moscow, pp. 69, 73). in As far as the trade expenses of the industrial goods are concerned, to according reduction their for spite of all decrees, and after the struggle department planning the of the particulars given by the State commission 11/12), they amounted to (Bulletin of the Economic Institute, 1927, Nos. 0/o in 1926/27, of the 37.0 46.6 O/o in the economic year 1925/26, and to

hardly differ from gross sale-price. The expenses of the co-operative trade operations those of the State trade. The degree of profitableness of the to the of the Zentrosojus, is in many cases only a nominal one, as according Zentrosojus, its particulars given by the finance department of the amounts: following the reaches indebtedness to the State exchequer On

the

i

October

1926

57,2

Mill.

Rbl.;

on

the

i

April

1927

the i October 5g.x Mill. Rbl.; on the i July 1927 55.5 Mill. Rbl.; on 1927 44.8 Mill. Rbl. bears in mind that in 1925 *) i. e. the increase amounts to 270 o/o. Even if one its nominal one, still the than the real value of the Soviet rouble was already lower increase of expenses is startling.

90

The established profit for the first six months 1926/27 amounting to about 57 Mill. Rbl., is in this way almost completely smothered by indebtedness. (Vide: "The Co-operative Society in the U. S. S. R. during the first six months 1926/27", Moscow, published by the Zentrosojus, 1927, pp. 29/32). The trade agency's turn-over of the U. S. S. R. during the last two years in absolute figures, amounts to: In Million Roubles: The total returns from trade agencies

For

23,304.2

.

Including agricultural goods . . . . . . 8,064.7 Including industrial goods . . . . . . 15,239.5

.

.

For 1926/27

1925/26

.

.

28,148.0

9,498.0 .

18,65o.o

To objective particulars of the Soviet trade go to prove irrefutably that the high level of the price of goods not only absolutely exceeds the pre-war prices, but also surpasses the relative increase in prices noticeable in the West. And besides, in spite of all efforts to bring them down, the prices of industrial goods diverge from the prices of agricultural products, in connection with which, the latter fact is due to reasons that are to be found in the structure itself on which the economic system is built up. The rate of development of the foreign trade is outdistanced by the home trade, a fact that cannot be without influence on the productive forces of the country. This backwardness, however, is only brought about artificially in conjunction with the existence of the foreign trade monopoly. The raw material market has gone down considerably in respect to quantity; and lastly, a diminution in the marketableness of agricultural products in the country is to be noticed, as well as a tendency of storing up the grain in its natural state. Editor's Note. The abnormity and absurdity of the Soviet economy cannot be illustrated by any table of prices. In order to give the reader at least a vague idea what the Soviet trade in every-day life means, and as an addition to what has been said above we shall state some facts mentioned in the book of an authoritive Soviet 'economist (J. Larin, The private capital in the U. S. S. R., State's edition, 1927) issued about the time of the Jubilee. Already in Spring 1927, Larin read three reports at the Communistic Academy, in which reports he stated 12 methods of the "criminal accumulation" in Soviet Russia. In his book these methods are reduced to the number of io, besides some of the methods the author finds already outlived, but of the others, on the contrary, speaks as being still in force. Of the new methods of circumventing the absurd Soviet laws he will inform us, it is supposed, in his next book. 91

Thus, one of the methods of the "criminal" accumulation is the system of "buying up". Out of the quantity of merchandise intended for direct use, prepared by the State industry, 15 o/o were delivered to private merchants in 1925/26, and the population bought of this merchandise on the private markets 35 O/o of the whole manufactured production. Whence the difference of 20 /o? The merchants bought up almost the whole lot of the merchandise from the so-called co-operatives and State trade institutions through bribed persons (page 32). Referring to a communistic source, the author relates: "On one of these days in Moscow, the "queue" that had formed at one of the Soviet manufacturing shops was suddenly surrounded and controlled; the control showed that only one person was a genuine buyer, whereas the remaining 49 were agents for buying up goods, engaged by private capital." Thus, the goods bought up by fictious consumers are afterwards sold by the merchants to the real consumers. But this is by no means the longest way merchandise travels. This particular business is handled on such a large scale, that goods collected by bits in an illegal way, enables the merchants to carry on a wholesale trade, within a very large circle of action. Thus, "in Odessa almost every private cloth-merchant buys his goods in small lots in Moscow, Leningrad and even in Turkestan and Siberia. Even such great distances do not stop the merchants!" How very absurd and painful the Bolshevic system of furnishing the population with necessary goods must be, if a trade can exist in which two contrary processes obtain: the goods are dispersed, and collected in order to be dispersed once more! Or from the point of view of the transport: the goods are forwarded to the east and then returned again to the west! And besides, all this being done illegally with a grave risk for the merchant of losing his whole fortune, freedom and even life at any time. It is clear that under such prevailing conditions, State institutions cannot avoid not being drawn into the illegal trade; and thus the economic actions become still more ruinous. Here is an example: "A representative of the KIaluga Gostorg (State Trade) gets 2,000 puds of rice (about 33 tons) from Moscow, and this same lot of rice returns again to Moscow, as the Kaluga Gostorg had resold it to a private wholesale merchant at Moscow. The same thing happens with thread, galoshes, dye and other wares." (Page 35.) However, such promenades of the merchandise often happen in Soviet Russia quite independent of the merchants efforts to circurovent the criminal Bolshevic laws. We shall state as examples some of the routes taken by the merchandise there and back, which are chronicled in a single issue of the leading paper -of the communistic party (Pravda of the 28th April, 1927).

At the beginning of February, 3 trucks of engine-iron and brass wire were despatched from Moscow to the factory "Revtrud" (Revolutionary Labour) in Tambow; the goods were not accepted and were returned to Moscow; at the beginning of March the same trucks were again forwarded from Moscow to Tambow. From the station Wolchovo of the "October" 92

line, a truck of china was sent to the "Raisojouse" in Belij of the Smolensk gouvernement; in ten days time the china was already travelling back as "there was no demand for it". 25 trucks of buckwheat came from Novosibirsk, i8 of them were sent back, as "they proved to be extra". A pendulum-like journey was made by another truck loaded with hemp, circulating between two stations. And here is another example. "Oats from the Woenprodsklad (The war alimentary stock) often stray via Orel, of the M1loscow-Kursk line". All this is printed in the above-mentioned communistic paper in very small print, and rightly so, for the Soviet people are not very particular in the matter of transport. The average haul of the load was gradually diminishing before the revolution, and formed 458 versts in 1912, that means that the transport was becoming rationalized. But since the time when the Nikolaewskaja line was named the "October" line, and Novonikolaevsk became Novosibirsk and factories with such sonorous names as "Revtrud" (Revolutionary Labour) appeared, the average haul of the load became always longer and in 1924/25 amounted to 532 versts, 1925/26 to 566 versts and in the current year (i. e., 1927), "shows a further increase". The official paper of the Soviet Government (The Economical Jisn, middle of April, - the date has unfortunately not been noted down by me) from which these facts are taken, gives a right explanation of the fact: monopoly of the economy. - "The economical organisations are ready to bear any transport expenses, passing them over on to the consumer, for the transport is only interested in the gross-receipts, ignoring the rationality of the transportation." The gross receipts will undoubtedly increase, if the goods go on travelling backwards and forwards more oftener. Such is the harmony in the country which has introduced a socialistic plan economy in place of the "bourgeois chaos". And to people who thus manage their business, blind Europe gives credit - in goods and in politics! The Industry. Lenin has characterised the substance of the present economic system in Russia as "monopolistic capitalism". By it he meant that particular position which the Soviet power has assumed "provisionally", after the purely communistic regime had broken down. The chieftain of the Bolshevics has a predilection for terms employed by Western economic science; however, his "State monopolistic capitalism" corresponded as little to the idea of "state capitalism" - as the term is commonly used in science, as a Soviet-"syndicate" or a "Soviet-trust" of the present day corresponds to that what is understood by this word in Western Europe or America. In the form which the Soviet regime has adopted in the eleventh year after the revolution, its real character can be epitomised as a system of State monopolies, which have seized upon the most important branches of political economy. It is the task of these monopolies to tolerate in industry 93

and banking business no sort of wholesale foreign trade or home trade, and no initiative emenating from private enterprise, and in their place to set up an economic plan, by reason of which the peoples or the nations income is distributed according to the command of the ruling party. This singular economic structure, which has not been provided for either by theorists on capitalism, or by teachers of socialism, raised its head above an ocean of small peasants' homes, who supply grain and raw materials, and buy the goods manufactured by the monopoly concerns of the State. The State industry, however, in addition to following up the task of a purely economic function, also pursues problems of a social-political character. It forms the basis for the "industry-proletariat", in whose name the communistic party rules the country. Without the industry it would be impossible not only not to feed that class which is recognised as the ruling one, but also the whole existence of this class can only become feasible when backed up by a strong industry. This second task gives the Russian industry a feudal appearance, being a supported by the ruling class from which the party is recuperated and the governmental power is built up. If one investigates the Russian industry not only as a whole, but also as to its separate industrial branches and even its individual enterprises, one is compelled to add to the commonly applied estimation, the above remark about the absolutely political reasons in the Soviet economy. At the Soviet congress in 1924, for instance, the demand for peripherical republics was accepted, viz., to transfer a part of the industries of the central districts into these republics, and not for reasons of any economic considerations, but in order to create there an original stock of industrial proletariats. Viewed from without, the conditions under which the State industry in Russia works, appear conspicuously favourable; the impenetrable wall of the foreign trade monopoly protects her from the competition of the industrially more developed countries; the monopoly of the home trade provides her with the possibility of being able to dictate the prices to the market. In addition to this, there are the resources amassed by the whole of the population: the State budget distributes this income of the people in favour of the industry by supporting it by subsidies, loans and the like. Yet in spite of this, the industry is in a condition of a permanent crisis which makes itself felt with particular morbidness in the domain of redemption of loans and in the restoration of the original capital stock. The hope of the first days of the revolution that all losses would be compensated by the "surplus values" which would remain in the hands of the State, as well as by receipts flowing formerly into the coffers of the real estate owners, - this hope has proved to be fallacious. The "surplus values", as well as the incomes of the former owners, and the high wages 94

of the officials - all had vanished into the unknown, without leaving a trace behind. Recently a German socialistic organ wrote about it, as if it were an economic miracle: there are no owners, who were formerly in the habit of receiving much greater profits from Russian factories and works, the surplus value, however, now remains in the hands of the proletariat government, the relation of prices between industrial goods and agricultural products has changed with a sharp turn in the interests of industrial goods - and in spite of it all, the industry as a whole is a deficit-undertaking and only manages to exist by the assistance from the State exchequer. This enigmatical apparition - at all events for the present moment no longer so mysterious when one investigates the substance of the internal is structure of the present day Russian industry, and above all things, its original capital stock. G. Tanner-Tannenbaum (in the periodical "Planovoje Choziaistvo", i. e., The Plan Economy, Moscow 1927, No. 3, from the article: "The Rationalisation of Economic Power-Industry"), has fixed the total amount of power of all primary power-motors (steam-piston machines, steam turbines, Diesel motors) at 2,500,000 kilowatt, and further, the heating

surface of all steam-boilers at 3,5oo,ooo square meter. According to the expert opinion of the author of the said article, the statistic investigations of the chief economic council have resulted in the following percentage for wear and tear: (i. e., the following number of machines whose length of service exceed the normally permissible customary use of 25 years): for steam engines 25 o/o; for combustion motors 33 o/o; on an average for all motors... 28 0o. Of the total steam-boiler heating surface 35 0/o of all mounted boilers in actual use, have exceeded the permissible length of service (25 years).

According to the calculations of Tanner-Tannenbaum, 5o o/o of existing industrial installations worked by heat-power motors, and 53 o/o of all boilers, will exceed the normal length of service in ig3o. In addition to the actual wear, the so-called "moral deterioration", i. e. the technical deficiency, is also of great importance. The standards for "moral deterioration" ruling in the West, are 3o 0/a. Such is the condition of the installations at present, or, at all events, was so a short time ago; the Bolshevics, however, did not take over the installations in this condition. What are the losses of the Russian Industry since the revolution? In Soviet Russia there is a fairly voluminous literature devoted to this question. The results of the investigations, however, show a chequered difference, in spite of the frequently occurring conscientious endeavours of the investigators to get at the actual figures, so necessary for the cal95

culation of the reconstruction process. S. Kon (in "Russkij Oekonomitscheskij Sbornik" i. e., "Russian Economic Archives", 1928, No. 12), has made a very successful, and in statistical respects, exemplary attempt at analysing all these literary records; he has striven to find their methodistical defects and to make corresponding corrections. The table constructed by him, and which, without doubt approaches nearest to the truth, gives the following picture:

1918 .

stock in its condition in

Real value of original. capital deduction of deterioration: 1923/24

In

1923/24 loss

Loss

.5,526

in 1913 1918

inflicted

by

.

war

.

0,300

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

700

4,o66

7,725

2,787

5,295

2,442

4,64o

1,624

3,o85

the

consideration

taking into

.

3,ooo

.

without loss inflicted by war ..

.

1918 to

of value during the years

1923/24

.

stock after in

In

capital

the original

of

Initial assessment

million Cherwonez-roubles (according to index 1. 9.)

mIn

n In millhon pre-war roubles

..........

......

The same, in percentage calculation to the actual

value of

stocks

in

.

1918

.

.

4o.o0/o

The same, in percentage calculation of initial assessment of stocks in 1918 .

.

.

.

294

o

Total loss of value in comparison to initial assessment

.

.

.

.

.

.

. .

3,o84

The same, in percentage calculation of the initial

assessment

0

/ .55,8 .

Thus the losses of industrial installations in comparison to pre-war time, amount to 55.8 0/o of their original value; to the share of the revolution fall 29.4 0/0 in proportion to the original value, and 40 0/o in comparison

of the value to the same standing at the beginning of the revolution. For the reconstruction of the original capital stock of the industry, including the German credits as well, close on a milliard Cherwonez roubles were employed, i. e., in consideration of the losses in 1918 to 1923/24, according to the table, amounting to three milliard roubles, so far no more than 1/3 of the losses sustained during the time of the revolution have been recovered. In addition to the injunctions for the reconstruction of the original capital stock of the industry, the extension of the capital for circulation absorbs a large quantity of resources; the same applies to the covering of deficits, etc.

96

According to the calculations of A. Segall ("Vestnik Finansov", i. e., Financial News, Moscow 1928, No. 4, The Finances of the State Industries), the investments of the State exchequer in the State industries at the beginning of 1927/28, amounted to: (In mill. Rbl.) Industry:

1923/24

1924/25

116

225

38o

27

5o

5o

143

275

43o

1922/23

Electrification: Total

1925/26 8zi

1926/27

1927/28

1,090

1,240

19

200

270

930

1,290

1,510

In the couise of six years, industry has absorbed 3,862 mill. Rbl.; electrification 716 mill. Rbl., making a total of 4,578 mill. Rbl. According to the calculations also made by Segall, 85 O/o of the budgetary financings fall on the heavy industry. The State budget, however, does not form the only source of financing; during 1925/26 and 1926/27 important amounts in the form of long-dated loans have been placed at the disposal "by reason of the loan for the reconstruction of the economy"; even from the sources of the local budgets a financing of the industry has taken place: in the form of allowances for house construction (from the fund for improving the condition of the workers), in the form of "issues of premiums for deficit-export", and lastly also for liquidation of arrears in taxes (For instance, the arrears of taxes of the sugar-trust amounting to 53 mill. Rbl., were liquidated in 1926/27). To this item must be added that amount which the industry has received from the State exchequer as compensation solely for price-depreciation in 1926/27 amounting to 200 mill. Rbl. In spite of these sacrifices so prejudicial to the State, the industry was compelled to sell its goods at very high market prices. On the strength of pre-war calculations and calculating material of the chief economic council, the institute for surplus products 'in Moscow (vide Bulletin for 1927, Nos. 11/12) furnishes particulars of the movement of primecost prices of a unit of industrial production (at a percentage comparison with

1913).

Mining Industry:

1924/25

1925/26

.

.

.

207.6

.

.

.

.

i12.5

.

.

.

.

.

202.3

.

.

215.0

. . . . . . . .

.

.

179.8

.

. .

.

.

169.5

.

.

.

.

92.7

.

Heavy Industry: . . . . . . . . 184.7 Cement

.

.

.

.

Iron-ore extraction .

.

Sulphurinc acid production

. . . . . . . . 198.6 Cast-iron . . . . . 175.5 Siemens bar-iron Assorted iron . . . . . . ..203.4 7

.

. . .

1926/27

174.5

.

Coal output

.

.

.

. .

.

i80.i

.

229.5

.

13.g

221.0

209.8

192.0

198.1

202.3

197-7

97

Articles of consumption: yarn

Cotton

Raw wool

.

.

Linen yarn .

.

.

or caster

Powdered

Salt

.

(cloth)

.

.

.

.

.

.

sugar .

.

8o.5 .294.4

.

.

175.0

.

.

.

203.2

.

225.8

.

192.1

.

.

.

.

258.8

.

192.9

.

199-7

.

202.7

.

176.1

.

254.1 185.0 215.2

. .

2[5.2

In igi3 the self-costs of x,ooo bricks were 9,2 roubles, in 1927 28,56 r. (The Economie Review. 1928, No. 6. Article by M. Moltschanoff). According to the article of the same author the self-costs of a box of halfwhite glass were at the same factory 19,92 r. in Igl3 and 41,31 r. in 1927. In comparison with the foreign prices the self-costs of the chemical industry were in present Russia generally four times higher; of the production of building materials three times; and of the production of yarn higher by 8o 0/o etc. (see Moltschanoff, Self-costs of the industry in U. S. S. R. Moscow, Edition of the Superior Council of Economy). The reasons for the increase of the prime-cost of goods, are to be found: a) in the high charges; b) in the low utilisation of the working day; c) in the disparity between the productiveness of the work and the increase in wages; d) in the high deductions from the wages for purposes of social insurance, which are requisitioned direct from the funds of the employer. Although the calculations have been based on lines that are as optimistic as possible, the amount of expenses amount to 16.i9 o/o of the prime costs, without allowing for the "additions" to the wages. ("Material for the quinquennial plan for the development of the industry by the chief economic council of the U. S. S.R.", Moscow, 1927. p. 65o.) According to the Conjuncture Institute in Moscow, the co-effecient of the actual utilisation of the working day does not amount to more than 6o o/o; more especially in the textile industry, this co-efficient does not rise above 4o to 50 o/o, (A. Ginsburg, The Economy of the Industry, part II, p. 207). In Germany the co-efficient of utilising the working day, amounts to about go o/o. The figures in regard to the proportionate conditions between the increase of productiveness of the work done and the increase of wages, are also very instructive. According to the particulars furnished by the Conjuncture Institute in Moscow, the increase of wages amounted to 29 O/o in 1925/26, whereas the increase in the productiveness of the work to ii o/o. The abnormal state of these conditions was taken into account when the plan for 1926/27 was fixed upon. The result of the statistical examination for the current year is already available. According to the plan, an increase of wages by 9.9 o/o was provided for, and at the same time the productiveness of work was to be increased by 12.6 o/o. This plan, however, experienced 98

the fate of all Bolshevistic plans; wages proved to be increased by

I.9 0/o,

The wages of workers

but the productiveness of work rose only by 11.7 o/o.

and employees on the whole, in proportion to the prime-costs of the products, (according to particulars of the Institute for Surplus Production in Moscow, Bulletin for 1927, Nos. 11/12) amounted: in 1925/26 to 26.48 o/o; in 1926/27 to 26.89 o/o. According to the same information, the deductions (or increases) in

1925/26;

of the wages amounted to 33.9 o/o in 1924/25; to 32.0 0/o in

to 32.180/

1926/27-

The costs of production in agricultural industries are also not lower. I. Shirkovitsch gives the following figures for the cost of production in pre-war time and in the present time for the chief branches of the agricultural industry (Bulletin of the Conjuncture

No. 12).

Table in Index of Kopecks: Costs of pro- increase in duction at the costs of propressent time duction (in 1926/27)

Costs of productioninprewar time (without costs of raw materials)

of product:

Title

Institute 1927,

Caster or powdered sugar (per cwt.)...... Syrup

(per

456.oo

...

cwt.) . . .

. . . . . . 244.20

Spirits (Wedro of 4o0/o) (Wedro = to 12.3 litre)

31.6

. . .

. . . .

831.00

.

.

.

742.90

. . . .

304

.

.

.

92.96

. . . .

293

. . . 183

Export butter (per cwt.) . . . . . 962.15 . . . . 1,942.OO . . . . 202

The wholesale price of goods in Russia at the place of origin in comparison to the prices in England and Germany, amounted to: In

England

Germany

Russia

I3

.

.

100.o

.

1924

.

.

.

146.3

.

143.o

.

205.7

1925

.

.

.

154.4

.

135.8

.

192.7

1926

.

.

.

I46.4

.

125.2

.

1927

.

.

.

14o.5

.

130.2

.

.

.

.

.

10o.o 00.0

202.6 .

197.2

In the eleventh year of the revolution the gross production of the industry has almost reached the pre-war production. According to the particulars L. Kafenhaus brings in the Jubilee volume of the Economic Review (Ekonomicheskoe Obosrenie, vol. X, 1927), the number of workers and the increase of the gross production (in thousands of Tscherwonez roubles), is characterised by the following figures: In Number of workers Value of production 1921/22

.

.

1922/23 1923/24 7*

.

I,273,802

.

I,4Io,3i3

.

1,524,o76

1,567,875

.

x,959,886

.

.

I,o88,583

99

.

Value of production . 3,149,336 . . 4,580,201

.

.

Number of workers

In 1924/25

.

1,852,722

.

.

2,334,808

.

.

2,69,071

.

1925/26 1926/27

.

.

.

.

.

5,401,7j1

.

These figures of the gross production have been reached at the expense of a strong deterioration of the quality and of an increased wear of the technical installations already much worn, as well as by an extraordinary burden inflicted on the State budget. In percentage comparison with 1913,

the gross production of the State industry amounted to: (According to figures given by the Gosplan State Commission for Plan-economy, from the book, "The Industry of the U. S. S. R. in the course of ten years", published by the Chief Council of Political Economy, Moscow 1927. of the

Gross production with

State Industry

in percentage

comparison

1913:

1926/27

1925/26

1924/25 .

.

.

.

55.3

.

.

.

84.x

.

Naphtha

.

.

.

.

.

.

89.8

.

.

.

.

76.1 3o.6

.

.

.

52.4

.

.

.

.

39.6

.

.

.

64.x

.

Cotton goods

.

Coal

Cast-iron

Metals

.

.

67.0

Galoshes

.

.

.

65.o

Salt

.

.

.

68.o

.

.

.

.

107.2

.

109.7 70.5

.

91.0

.

.

.

76.3 io5.6

.

.

91.0

.

.

.

109.6

.

.

8o.o

.

102.0

The particular domain of industry belonging to electrification must be subjected to a special consideration. Electrification was proclaimed by Lenin for the first time at the VIII. Soviet congress in 1920. At that time electrification was regarded as being the only way by which the real socialism would be able to be introduced into Russia. According to Lenin's opinion, by carrying out a scheme of electrification, not only would a centralisation of the whole industry be brought about, and the possibility of an easy system of governing be achieved, but also

by its introduction the individualistic work in the country would be destroyed root and branch. The peasants being obliged to use the electric energy supplied by the town, would thereby get into a close dependency of the town, and they could then be compelled without any great difficulty to build up agricultural products according to the fixed plan designed for the whole of the country. Definite periods of time for the gradual electrification of Russia were fixed up-on, and fairly large means were set apart for this purpose. But in place of dozens of planned stations only the power station "Krassnuj Oktjabr" (The Red October) with peat fuel consumption and 3o,000 kilowatt capacity, and the hydro-electric station Wolchowstroj, also with 3o,ooo kilowatt capacity have been put into action in the North-West

100

district during the eight years that have elapsed. Within the range of Moscow the Schatura Station (with peat fuel) and with 40,ooo kilowatt capacity, and the Kaschira Station (with brown coal fuel) and of 12,000 kilowatt capacity, have been put into work. In the South the erection of a hydro-electric station on the Dnepr (Dneprostroj) has been commenced. At the congress for "energetics" held in May of the current year, the exceedingly poor results of the productivity of the new station were very clearly shown. The demonstrator reported that during the past year the station used - on an average - 7.5 thousand calories of the respective fuel for one kilowatt hour, whereas an American station erected in the same year used only about one half of this quantity, viz., 3.8 thousand calories. At the congress, Prof. Graftio, the builder of Wolchowstroj, reported that it had only now become possible to fix the costs of the erection of this station with some finality. It has cost 92.5 mill. roubles, i. e., almost three times as much as the original project was estimated to cost - and 140/o (of this sum) are appropriated for expenses of organisation and management. The actual costs of building for each kilowatt of energy (without adding the costs for constructing sluices and locks in the bed of the river), accordingly amounted to 990 roubles, whereas in the United States the highest building costs per each kilowatt, - allowing for a big margin of profit for the builders, -

amount to 2lo roubles.

It was unanimously agreed upon at the Congress that not a single electric station in the U. S. S. R. was either erected, or repaired or supplied with new installation for the amount provided for by the original project and by the preliminary estimates - all stations required the greatest additional costs. A lively debate was created at the Congress over the project to erect a combination of works for manufacturing own (home made) installations for electric stations, which at present had to be imported from abroad. The State is prepared to put 45 mill. roubles aside for this purpose. In the deliberations in connection with this scheme, the engineers have not failed to point to the absolute hopelessness of the attempt to build new works. According to the expression of the engineer Wlados, the transformers constructed in Russia are at present "so bad that they will be useless in a very short time; the winding of the generators is also good for nothing..." All attempts to cure the ailments from which the Russian industry is suffering, produce no essential results, and are only palliatives. The Russian industry of the present day is afflicted with organic defects, and before a change in its entire structure takes place, there will be no way out of the permanent crises.

101

The Foreign Trade. According to the admission of the Soviet economists, foreign tiade is at present the most backward branch of the U. S. S. R.'s political economy. One can agree with this assertion especially if one compares the foreign trade of the present day with the foreign trade of pre-war time. In a conversion of Russia's foreign trade of 1913 to the territory occupied by Russia at the present time, the export would amount to i,3oo mill. Rbl. The total export of the U. S. S. R., on the other hand, in a conversion of it to pre-war prices, has reached 28.4 o/o of the pre-war time in 1923/24, 28.1 0/o of the pre-war export in 1924/25, 35.7 0/0 in 1925/26, and 42.9 0/0 in 1926/27.

By applying a similar conversion to the import, one can fix the amount of imports of pre-war time for the present territory of the U. S. S. R., at 1.175 mill. Rbl. The level of the reopening import will then amount to 19.9 0/0 in 1923/24, to 35.o o/o in 1924/25, to 39.5 0/0 in 1925/26, and to 42.3 o/o in 1926/27. (The particulars of export and import for the last

few years have been taken from the article by the trade commissary H. Mikojan: "More attention for our export", "Pravda", i. e. The Truth, No. 252, 1927). The characteristic of the Russian foreign trade in exact figures is given in the following table: Foreign Trade of the U. S. S. R. beyond the European and Asiatic borders: (in mill. Roubles). Export according to present prices

1923/24

1924/25

1925/26

1926/27

558.6 365.2

676.6 4707

770.5

756.4 465.1

712.7

Export according to pre-war prices

.

522.6 36 9 .2

Import according to present prices . Import according to pre-war prices Balance according to present prices

.

439.4

723.5

.

233.5

415.5

.

.

+

83.2 -

164.9

-

79.8

558.o 497.4

+

57.8

The decline in export of grain during the last year, is of the greatest importance. In the second half-year of the economic year 1926/27, the grain export reached 455,ooo tons (at a price of 52.4 mill. Rbl.) instead of 991,000

tons (at 90.6 mill. Rbl.)

during the second

half-year

of the

previous year. In the first six months of the economic year 1927/28, the export of grain reached a very inconsiderable amount, and at present has given way to an increased import. The export during the first quarter of the economic year 1927/28, amounted to 194.8 mill. Rbl., whereas the import amounted to 195.7 mill. Rbl., making a debit balance of 0.9 mill. Rouble. In the second quarter of 1927/28, the export reached 173.3 mill. Rouble, the import 224.2 mill. Rbl., the balance amounting to a debit of 50.9 mill. Rbl.

At the end of September 1928, it became self-evident that not a single pood of grain would be exported during the current year. Already in April the offer of grain had fallen considerably at all Russian grain

102

centres. In comparison with the same month of the previous year, the wheat production for export was 32 0/o less. Even more instructive is the somewhat veiled admission by the Soviet people that the main cause of this failure is due to the "exclusion of the small trade", i. e., the small private trade not recognised in the turnover estimates of the plan system. The suppression of this trade has forced the State to burden itself with the provisioning of those towns in districts with a plentiful supply of bread. The contest with the private dealer has brought about the result that every vestige of bread supply has disappeared from these towns, leaving the State authorities, however, quite helpless in the matter. According to the statement of the later cited Perwushin, the price of a pood of rye-flour has soared up to 8 roubles. Under these conditions it is a matter of course that the Soviet trade cannot have any grain for export. The condition of affairs is still further aggravated by the fact that the State industry has no goods for the peasant. The latter, however. naturally has no inclination to exchange the fruits of his arduous labour for persistently sinking Cherwonezes. And so the Soviet Government resorts to "purely communistic" measures, viz., to employ force. But even just now the President of the WZIK (the All-Russian Central Committee) has publicly admitted that these measures have only resulted in the greater resistance of the peasants. The failure of the crops in the Ukraine will in all probability compel the Soviet Government to make also further purchases of grain abroad. The monopoly of the foreign trade is looked upon as a corner stone of the system of "One Country Socialism"; it is for this reason that the Soviet economists critisize the foreign trade operations with special caution in order not to raise the suspicion that they are attacking the foreign trade monopoly as a system. Despite of this, very interesting material has been published within the last two years which goes to prove that even in those circles from whence political economy is directed in Russia, the conviction is clearly gaining ground that the foreign trade monopoly is exercising a baneful influence on the productive capabilities of the country. The chief argument in favour of the foreign trade monopoly holds that by this monopoly, import and export is systematically carried out - a fact so very essential for the adjustment of the trade balance and for the consolidation of the monetary system - this argument, however, is not justified by actual facts. Thus we read in the statement of accounts of the workers and peasants inspection (Control department): "At the meeting of the council of the peoples commissariats of the workers and peasants inspection, it was established that the development of foreign trade of the U. S. S. R. falls short of the general growth of the country ... The general causes of this circumstance are the following: The slow process of restoring the marketable

103

surplus products of agriculture, the increase of consumption in agriculture, the insufficient currency invested in foreign trade, the irregularities in the organisatory structure of the whole apparatus, and the inadequate direction given by the leading organs... The non-fulfilment of the plan is called forth: i) by the lack of proper distribution of the contingents among the exporters; 2) by the lack of a fixed plan for collecting grain; 3) by the lack of control in how far the individual organisations carry out the plan, etc.... The export for 1925/26 in regard to the principal classes of goods, was unprofitable on the whole, the export of some of the goods being affected by a deficit. The losses in the disposal of grain products amounted to a total of 13.9 mill. Rbl. The unprofitableness and the deficit are due to many causes: a) excessive additional costs (charges); b) the high expenses for foreign financing; c) inadequacy in skilful manoeuvering and lack of uniformity in the action of the exporting organisations; d) the unfavourable reciprocal conditions of the indexes on the home market, so harmful to export." For the first time in ten years since the inception of the Soviet power, an official control department admits the prejudicial character of its export business. Every plan that had been set up for the following economic year, was not only remodelled in the course of its execution, but every year, without exception, the so-called "errors in, calculation" also made their appearance. These "errors in calculation" which appeared again in each year, consisted in the incorrect estimates in reference to the surplus agricultural productions which were subject to purchase and export. Apparently it is absolutely impossible to be guided by statistical figures which the commissariat for foreign trade receives for the formation of his export plan. In the periodical "Vneschnjaja Torgovlja" (The Foreign Trade), A. Potjajev has written (January 1926): . .. "on account of the peculiarities

of our foreign trade, we must not only reckon with the passiveness of our trade balance in the past, but also with the circumstance that the obligations undertaken by us by reason of the licences already granted, will cause a passivity of the trade balance for the coming year as well".... The Soviet statistic itself gives the following prices on the home and foreign markets of the pre-war and present time: In pre-war time: Grain: On the home market. Rye. ..... Wheat......... .

Barley Oats.

104

.

...... .....

On the foreign market.

87 kop. . . . . . . . IIO

....

,.....

..

79

,.

.

72

,,........98

.

.......

.

99 kop. 128 98

Accordingly the difference in prices in pre-war time for rye was kop., for wheat 18 kop., for barley 19 kop., but for oats 26 kopecks. This difference not only covered the charges, but also produced a profit for the exporters. At present the difference in prices for the separate months according to the particulars given in the journal "Sowjetskaja Torgovija" (Soviet Trade, No. 5, p. 7), is as follows: 12

Months: July

Wheat

Wheat

Barley.

Months: January

.

38 kop.

February

.

6r

.

66 kop.

.

.

71

kop.

.

62

,,

.

.

67

,,

September

49

,,

.

41

,,

March

.

October

51

,,

.

55

,,

April

.

.

.

August

.

.48,,

November December

.

.

75

,,

.

55,,

.

57

,,

.

Barley. .

.

5o kop.

45

,,

45

,,

.

42

59

,,

.

37

May..

67,,.

June

93

59,, ,,

.

69

As will be seen from this table, the difference of prices on the home market and the foreign market was almost twice as great as in prerwar time for all months even in the most unfavourable ones, and yet the export has not only produced no profit, but on the contrary has in many cases shown a loss. In the journal "Sowjetskaja Torgovlja" (The Foreign Trade, No. io), D. Gurevitsch gives particulars about charges for collecting and exporting the following raw products: For flax

the charges amounted to . . . . . . 4o o/o

butter

,,.

eggs

,,.

sugar

,,

,,

,,

,.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

. 70 0/0

36 0/0

of the

3go to 4o o/o

..

readiness

naphtha a

products furriery

costs

of placing in

,,.

.

.

.

.

.

60/0

)

"The charges", writes Gurevitsch, "for flax, butter and eggs - in regard to their absolute height - are not only above those of pre-war time, but also exceed them relatively speaking, by more than twice." In reality the difference between home and foreign prices in pre-war time amount to: for flax 24 o/o, for butter ro o/o, for eggs 66 0/0. This difference has not only covered the charges for these goods, but has also provided the exporter with his total profit. In the article by M. Kaufmann, "Export and Political Economy" (in 1, 1927, p. 29), a very interesting attempt has been made to fix the marketable surplus products of agriculture, i. e., to determine what quantity of their pro"Voprosy Torgovli", i. e., "Questions of Trade", No.

105

ducts the peasants can put by at present in order to sell them on the markets of the district towns. Surplus products of agriculture in percentage calculation to the gross harvest. In 1926/27. In pre-war time. Grain

.

.

.

Flax

Oil-seed

31.x

.

.

62.6

Eggs .

75.0

.

.

.

53.2

16.5

37.3 .

.

42.7 .

57.1

The rapid decline of the marketable surplus products of agriculture from the rural market, is the very surest indication of the economic decline of an agrarian country. When studying the allotment of Russia's export and import over individual countries, one comes - above all things - to the conclusion that neither the existence nor the purport of commercial treaties exercises an important influence on the returns from foreign trade. In the existence of a foreign trade monopoly the idea of "most favoured" loses all significance. The foreign trade organisation (Vneshtorg) - as sole exporter and importer can stop the sale or purchase on the market of a country completely without in any way infringing the trade agreement. The United States of America, which do not recognise the Soviet government, and obstinately refuse all proposals for the conclusion of a trade agreement, have never in their trade with Russia occupied a less important position than third place. In the last settlements for the economic year 1926/27, the largest share of returns falls to Germany with 24.7 0/o exports and 25.3 o/o imports. In respect to the returns, England takes second place,

and the United States third place. The rupture of diplomatic and commercial relationship between the U. S. S. R. and England, has only brought about a certain limitation in the import from England (about i8.6 o/o). The extent of export to England in 1926/27, on the other hand, in comparison with 1925/26 has increased in actual figures (from 187.1 mill. Rbl. to 197.5 mill. Rbl.). The export to England of the chief articles -

timber

products and naphtha products - continues at present. In spite of the fact of being the first country to acknowledge Russia's foreign trade monopoly and to conclude a very favourable commercial treaty with Russia, Italy's share in her trade has dropped in the last two years from 3.4 O/o to o.5 0/o in imports. The hopes which were fixed by Italy on Russia as a likely outlet for export goods, have proved as absolutely unjustifiable. Italy occupies a place much lower than the United States, which have neither commercial treaties nor agreements with the U. S. S. R. 106

For the current year 1927/28, an Export-Import plan has also been

formulated. In drafting it, the strict order was issued that in view of the difficulties experienced in monetary exchange, all possible measures were to be employed to, bring the balance under all circumstances into an active state. It was resolved not even to, stop at prohibiting the import of the most necessary goods. Nevertheless, according to figures just published, the balance shows liabilities amounting to 5o mill. Rbl. In these liabilities, however, the extensive grain purchases are not even included, such as are at present being effected under the most unfavourable circumstances by the representatives of the foreign trade organisation (Vneshtorg), in foreign sea-ports. In treating with foreign trade, one cannot avoid speaking of the endless revisions and re-groupings which befall every commercial representation abroad, at least three times a year. The disclosed abuses by no means afford a guarantee for the good conduct in this particular domain at the revision which is next due. A private importer or exporter, who had supplied goods excessive in price or inferior in quality, who had missed the proper season of sale, who had over-paid freight charges, etc., would have to suffer for it by his own ruin. In a bureaucratic department, however, as represented by the "Vneshtorg", the degree of responsibility is fixed by a hierarchy of connections (as in the case of Kwiatkowski), or by proletarian descent, or by services rendered to the party (as in the case of Chwessin). On the other hand, the supplying firms are compelled - outside of their open competition - to seek for connections with influential personages, and not to deal direct with the consumer, but with officials as intermediaries. The Currency. The changes which have occurred in Russia's monetary system from to the present time, can be divided into four distinct periods. The first one, following upon the monetary reform, lasted from the Spring of 1924

1924 until the Summer of

1925.

During this period the whole country

is eagerly absorbing the new paper-money, at first for the purpose of exchange, but later also for purposes of saving. The complete depreciation of the Soviet paper currency (Sowsnak), had produced an artificial vacuum on the money market. This first period is thus characterised by an extensive issuing activity, the objects of which are employed in the commercial turnovers of the country. The second period lasted from the Summer of 1925 to the Winter of 1926; during this period the currency of legal tender in circulation among 107

the people receives an enormous addition: months, from

during the course of seven

i June 1925 to i January 1926, the deposits at the five

leading Banks having increased 21.6 o/o, while paper-money in actual circulation rose by 6o.3 0/o, whereas the deposits of the commissariats of the people increased by 79 o/o. Among other circumstances this was also due to the so-called "breaking-up of the grain front". This "breaking-up" is to a great extent characteristic of the structure of the whole economic condition of present-day Russia. The year 1925 had a comparatively good harvest. Those organs that are responsible for the plans for the development of the whole of the economics of the country, found that this particular year would be exceptionally favourable for the reconstruction of the countrys industry. It was planned to make fairly large purchases of machinery on the markets of foreign countries, and to cover the outlay by the export of harvest products. All organs of the State in connection with the grain supply, were instructed to force the purchase of grain to the very utmost. The peasant who, had sold his grain the year previous at a rather low figure, was for the first time since the revolution afforded a certain opportunity for manceuvering on the grain market; he paid his taxes, and was not put to the necessity of having to sell his grain to the very last pood; this holding-back on the part of the peasant at once became self-evident in the prices. And moreover, the purely bureaucratic organisations for purchasing grain, forced the prices upwards in competing with one another to such an enormous extent, that export became entirely unremunerative. It thus became necessary to make a sudden alteration in the plan, just at a time when the grain compaign was at its height; by this a confusion was created in the grain-collecting, without in the least effecting a reduction in the prices. On the contrary, during this period there was not only an increased rise in prices for grain noticeable, but also an increase in the additional expenses. In the meantime the importing operations continued; the purchases abroad had been accomplished; payments on account had been made, and further instalments on account of these orders had to be met. The increase in the price of grain on the home market, led to the raising of prices for the necessities of life, and caused a corresponding necessary increase in wages. The enormous sums of money placed at the disposal of the organisations for holding grain in readiness, spread all over the country and called forth a latent inflation. Up to the present the Soviet economists have denied the existence of an inflation at this period. Only in very recent times has it been officially acknowledged (M. Bronsky: "The Financial Policy of the Union of Socialistic Soviet Republics", Leningrad 1928). According to the statement of Bronsky, the purchasing power of the Cherwonez in October 1925 reached only 57 o/o in comparison with the purchasing power it had at the time of the execution

108

of the financial reforms. Among others he (Bronsky) mentions the following table in reference to the alteration in the purchasing power of the rouble in subsequent times. In In In In In

January 1927 February 1927.. March 1927 . April 1927 May

54 kopecks .. .

.

.

52,,

.

. . . . .

.

.

50

.

1927

51 51

According to the Index of detailed Trade of the Central Statistic Department. iApril 1928 ......

i May

1928

.

i June

1928 ....

i July

1928 ...

5i,4 roubles

. . . . . . .

i October 1927

............ .

. . . . .

.

.......... ............

49,0 . .

...

46,I 49,3 48,4

,

The unrest caused by the latent inflation had also created a panic on the exchange market and the commercial market. The peasantry that had already begun to use the Cherwonez as a means of investment, hastened again to convert it into current money or into goods. The so-called "black exchange" responded to this action by an acute rise in value of the tenrouble gold pieces, as well as for foreign mediums of exchange. At the same time the State Bank, exchanged foreign currency at par, but only in very reduced quantities. The third period is characterised by the attempts to stem the tide of inflation at any price. The Bolshevics, who have not the possibility of undertaking some radical measure, - to withdraw a portion of the issue from circulation, or at all events, to hold back with new issues, - at times take refuge in measures of' administrative action. Banishment for sale or purchase of currency bonds begins, the difficulties of transferring Cherwonzes abroad are increased, and furthermore - under various pretexts, - the exchange of Tscherwonzes for the currency of foreign monetary values on the local market are curtailed or finally completely inhibited. During this period it has, however, been accomplished partly to retard the rate -of issuing money for circulation. From the beginning of the Winter of i1926 to the Summer of 1927, the issue of currency in comparison to the general circulation, amounts to 6 to 7 0/o. The deposits in the banks effected by State organs increased by 24 0/o. The wave of inflation was stemmed up to a certain degree, but at the beginning of the Summer of 1927, a reaction in business again began in a direction unfavourable to 109

circulation of money.

The State budget, above all things, showed an

excessive tension in 1926/1927.

The onus of

financing

the industry of

the country, trade and transport departments is, of course, relegated to the State budget in Soviet Russia, and is carried out either by the assistance of that particular department of the State Bank or by other Banks, which in their form are mere branches of the State Bank. In 1926/1927 the assistance of trade and industry required specially large means. The following table which is very instructive, and published by the Conjuncture Institute at Moscow (in No. 11/12 of the bulletin of the Institute for the year 1927), gives a clear idea of this process which had a very depressing effect on the currency: in Mill. Rbl. According to the budget for

Income from State property and State enterprise

Expenditure for financing the same

256.3

.

406.7

1925/26

438.2

.

536.5

1926/27

553.7

.

go.3

1924/25

Increase in

1926/27

.

II5.5

364.8

Balance

. .

-

15o.4

-

98.3

-347.6 249.3

The fourth period began with the struggle against private trade carried on in conjunction with the fight against the opposition. In order to drive the private agent out of town, as well as out of the village, the network of State and "co-operative" trading organisation had to be artificially extended, and at a quick rate. For this purpose the extension of credit for the central departments which managed the State trade and the co-operative trade became necessary, and was carried out with an increased speed that far exceeded the ordinary course of business. And in addition, during this period (the third quarter of the economic year 1926/27) an increase of wages (which were, comparatively speaking, fairly high), also took place. The State Bank granted credits during this' quarter amounting to 310.7 mill. Rbl., as compared with 3o.i mill. Rbl. in the corresponding quarter of the previous year. As a parallel measure in the fight against the same "opposition", it was resolved to, lower the price of goods at one stroke, as the price had become absolutely beyond the reach of the rural population. An "ukas" was issued dealing with the lowering of the price of goods (decree of the Council of Labour and Defence of the Country, 16 February 1927). The lowering of the prices could only be accomplished at the expense of a State subsidy accorded to the industry which was working at a loss. And this subsidy was accomplished in itself by an increased issue of currency. 110

The quantity of money in circulation underwent a change to the following extent (in mill Rbl.): 627.0

i October 1924 1

,,

1925

1,12.9 n.

I 1

,,

1926

I,343.

,

1927

on i June

I,670.8

1928

1,577.0

.

(These figures are taken:

up to i October 1927 from the Bulletin issued by the Conjuncture Institute in Moscow 1927, Nos, 11/12; and for i June 1928 from the "Ekonomicheskoe Obosrenie", i. e., Economic Review, No. 6, 1928 F. Radezky, The Currency in 1927/28). For the separate months the increase in the quantity of money in a percentage comparison with the total amount, figures out at: In January

.

9.3 o/o

February 1927

.

March

.

8.8 o/o II.8 0/0 Io.8 0/o

April

1927

1927

1927

.

.

In May 1927 ,,

June

1927

,,

July

1927

,,

August

19.5 0/0 22.0 0/0

1927

September

1927

.

20.6 0/0

.

21.8 0/0 24.4 0/0

Altogether 344.3 mill. Rbl. were issued by i October 1927 (in the 1. e. 200 mill. Rbl. more than in the second half year of 1925/26. second half of the year 1926/27),

The fourth and last period has clearly shown the abnormal condition of affairs, viz., that the State Bank makes advances to industry, trade, to transport business and to agriculture, in order to extend the production and to carry out capital investment work (reconstruction work), whereas in countries with an economic condition built up on private economic initiative, the function appertaining to banks of issue consists in the regulation of currency and in the supply of trade and industry with short-dated loans in exchange for mortage bonds; and thus the clients' money in course of circulation is replenished, and only already manufactured goods, merely waiting to be disposed of, are accepted as security for any sums advanced. In the U. S. S. R., however, the tendency has carried the day, viz., to stay the decline at any copt and once more to build up the industry, further, it is necessary in the Union - for political reasons - to maintain the nominal wage on a comparatively high level. So it has now become obligatory to reduce the prices of the expensive goods produced under these special conditions, by all possible means - or else the peasant is not in a position to buy them. The lowering of prices is accomplished on purely administrative lines, and at the expense of increasing the deficit of the State enterprises. All

III

these expenditures could not possibly be covered by an increase of the income of the people. Purely technical methods of covering deficits by new issues are therefore unavoidable and lead to a disarrangement of the monetary system. In the U. S. S. R., one is beginning to realise the reasons for the loss of purchasing power of the Cherwonez-rouble. But since the radical removal of these reasons is only feasible in a complete reconstruction of the principles and foundations of the U. S. S. R.'s political economy (which would be tantamount to the complete removal of the "Socialism in a country"), it was prohibited - up to very recent times - to write about the above elucidated facts which caused the destruction of the Cherwonez. The periodical "Bulletin of the Conjuncture Institute in Moscow", which made the attempt to call the attention of the Government to the cause of the danger that threatened the currency, was prohibited at the beginning of 1928 just for this reason. In spite of this fact, the reviewer in the latest book, the "Economic Review" (June 1928), is compelled to come to the same conclusion in regard to the first half of 1927/28, when he says: "The purchasing power of the monetary unit is diminishing." (No. 6, p.

127,

1928).

The following official figures published ("Ekonomitsheskoje Obosrenije". No. 8) in September 1928 by Prof. Perwushin, go to show the latest state of the Soviet currency in comparison with the previous year. The third quarter of the economic year. (April, May, June.) The Increase of Currency

1926/27

135.7 mill. roubl.

.

.

1927/28

182.8

.

,,

In order to estimate the figures correctly, it must be added that. according to the plan, the issue during the third quarter was not to exceed 125 mill. roubles. The Covering for the Bank-notes

1926/27

.

1927/28

The Reserves

1926/27

1927/28

.

.

30.7 0/o 26.4 102.7

Oo

71.8

The above mentioned Professor finds that the cause for the persistent in addition to the failure in downard tendency of the Cherwonez difficult condition" of the textile to the "very grain is due export of industry. This, however, also applies to the whole industry. The constantly increasing, badly organised and costly building activity has called forth a demand for money, not provided for by the plans, more especially as the

112

purchasing power of the currency is continuously decreasing. "The budget", writes the official recorder (the above mentioned periodical, No. 8. p. io8), "can be characterised as strained". In order to cope with this "strain", the industrial loan amounting to 4oo mill. roubles has been issued. This loan, however, is in reality nothing more or less than a masked support of the industry by the State exchequer, for the whole loan, which realised far less than 4oo millions, has been solely and exclusively signed by the institutes of the State. It is no wonder then that, according to private information received, 3 Cherwonez were being paid for a golden 10 rouble piece at illegal exchanges in Petersburg and Moscow during the month of August.

113

The Russian Proletariat under Communistic Domination. By W.

Hoeffding.

CONTENTS: Preliminary Notices; Wages; Working time; Housing conditions; Accidents and protection of labour; Unemployment and provision for the Unemployed; Coalition rights of the Soviet workmen.

T

"dictatorship was carried out under the flag Revolution Bolshevic HE Although the new State structure was afterwards proletariat". of the named "the workers' and peasants' republic", nevertheless according to the idea of the Bolshevic leaders, precisely the worker's class (forming less than 1/6 of the whole population of Russia) was to be the chief promoter of the revolution and the class that would most profit by it. In the first years of the revolution the Bolshevics had captivated the masses much more by promising them material goods and advantages than by their promises of power. In particular, abolishing the "capitalistic exploitation" of the workmen, communism was to improve essentially the material conditions of the workmen compared with former conditions not only in Russia but also with the conditions of the workmen in the rest of the world. One is inclined to think that the first problem ought to have caused Aery little trouble to the new communistic rulers, for in spite of the fact that Russian industry had been rapidly developing during the last io to 15 years before the war, and therefore the conditions of labour, the wages of the workmen and their general welfare had been improving respectively, - still this state of affairs was less favourable than that of the workmen in Western countries, a fact, which is to be set down to the low productivity of labour of the Russian workmen. Nevertheless, it is precisely the consequent and severe execution of the communistic principles (i. e. an experiment that the Bolshevics named, after it had failed, "Military Communism" quite wrongly attributing its failure to the civil war) that made wages drop right down, producing a famine, unexperienced in any other "capitalistic" country, even in former Russia.

In

January-March

1921

wages were on the average equal to 13

'o

of the pre-war wages (3 roubles 36 cop. a month, in the so-called budget roubles, out of which 23 cop. were paid in money and the rest - in kind*). Still greater, if that were possible at all, was the decline in the productivity of labour. This was due to the fact of a complete separation, in strictconformity with the communistic principles, of the question of the labour ') See Kovalevsky, nomy".

114

1926.

io years of economic policy of the proletariat, "Plan-Eco-

X, p. 27.

remuneration from that of the productivity of labour. It found its utmost expression in the fact of a complete abolition of wages for piecework, which all socialistic systems considered to be the most condemnable form of capitalistic exploitation. The result of the consequent introduction of communism was a terrible economic catastrophe unprecedented in the world's history and a complete paralysis of industry which compelled the Bolshevics to repudiate, in order to retain the power, some communistic principles in the labour question and in certain others. This became apparent in the following i) Wages were relations of the Bolshevist rulers to the workmen: to increase, henceforward, only conformably to the growth in productivity of labour; in connection with this, wages for piece-work were to be introduced wherever it was technically possible. 2) Every interference of the workmen in the technical and commercial management of the enterprise was to be repealed. 3) A strict labour discipline within the walls of the enterprise was gradually to be re-established. As far as the communistic experiments of the first years of the Bolshevic reign were being liquidated, the productivity of labour grew and the situation of the workmen improved. The following summary data, taken exclusively from official Soviet sources, are to show how far this situation has improved or grown worse in comparison with that of the pre-war period with regard to the following main factors: wages, working time, housing conditions, unemployment and accidents. Wages. After their unprecedented fall during the years of consequent Communism, wages begin to rise gradually owing to the declaration of the NEP (New Economic Policy) and to the abandonment of socialistic principles within the Bolshevist enterprises. Soviet statistics give the following data of this growth of wages compared with the average pre-war wages of the industrial workman and taking into consideration the purchasing power of the Chervonetz-rouble (real wages)*). Wages (monthly) in

1913

. . . . . . .

1922/23

.

1923/24.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

. half year) .

.

..

.

.

.

.

.

1925/26

.

.

.

.

.

1926/27

(I

/e to the year 1913.

100.0 49.2

67.1

.......

1924/25

0

82.6 93.7 Too.o

*) Rabinovitch: Movement of wages and productivity of labour. Jisn. No. x7g, August 9 th, 1927. s*

Economicheskaja

115

The People's Commissary of Labour, A. Schmidt, says in one of his last articles*) that the average wages in the State industry during the fourth quarter of the year 1926/1927 (July-September 1927) formed already The exactitude of this figure was justly I io O/o of the pre-war real wages.

doubted, in particular by the communistic opposition. The computation of the real wages was based on the Soviet co-operative (regulated) prices. But as goods in the Soviet co-operatives are often missing, the workman is impelled to get them from private merchants at higher prices. According to Schmidt, the average wages of Soviet workmen amounted in March 1927 to the sum of 66 roubles 20 cop. (in the terms of the present-day Chervonetz-roubles). Considering the low purchasing power of the Chervonetz-rouble, the above sum will hardly exceed £3. or £3.io a month. Thus, if we are to believe data furnished by Soviet statistics - which io years as we shall note further, often require essential corrections had to pass before the Bolshevics succeeded in attaining that wage level of the Russian workmen at which it stood during the period of the "most violent exploitation" (from the Bolshevics point of view) of workmen by the private capitalistic industry. It is necessary to bear in mind that although, according to their statistics, the Bolshevics had reached on the average after a period of io years reign, the "capitalistic" level of the workmens' wages - this average often fluctuates. First of all, the communistic opposition says in its "counterthesis" to the 5 years plan of development of national economy that "wages and material condition of the workmen in Moscow and Leningrad are considerably higher than the average level is"). Evidently, the industrial proletariat in these towns, from political considerations, enjoys a priviledged position. And at the same time, wages of some categories of workmen, as for instance those employed in the metallurgic industry in South Russia, have not yet attained the pre-war level. Secondly, it would be a mistake to think that the Soviet rulers are striving, at any cost, towards the levelling of wages in separate categories of workmen and employees. An attempt of setting an equal level for the remuneration of every category of labour beginning with the manager of the factory and ending with an unskilled workman, actually took place in the first years of communism. But when it became evident that this attempt to realize the idea of equality with regard to the remuneration of labour was one of the main causes of the catastrophic fall in productivity *) A. Schmidt. The policy of the party in the labour question. November

Pravda, Nr. 27 I;

26th, 1927.

") See Pravda No. 263 of November I 7 th, 1927. (Discussion leaf Nr. 5.)

116

of labour, the Bolshervics gave it up and fell into the other extreme: none other, non-socialistic, country had ever experienced such a wide difference between the remuneration of the highest category of labour and that of the lowest, as Soviet Russia did in the year 1926. At the meeting of the board of the General Council of Trade Unions (S. C. C.T. U.) in August 1926, Tomsky pointed out that the Soviet rulers were at first of the opinion that the ratio between the highest and lowest wages in different categories of workmen were not to exceed 1: 13/4 and at present, according to Tomsky, one comes in practice across such ratio, as i: 6 and even I: 9. That means that the trained workers are paid about 6 to 9 times higher than the low categories of unskilled workers. In the same speech Tomsky admitted that delegations of foreign workers, who visited Russia, expressed their surprise as to the wide difference existing between remuneration of the skilled and unskilled workmen in Russia, a state of affairs unknown in other countries*). This leads to the conclusion that unskilled workmen must earn considerably less than they did before the revolution. During this last year Bolshevics tried to level this difference. Nevertheless, data quoted by the People's Commissary of Labour, Shmidt, in his article which has been already mentioned"), the margin between the highest and lowest wages continues to be great. Thirdly, in all comparisons of the real wage, one has also to take into account the innumerable deductions, "voluntary" in form only, to which the Soviet worker has constantly to submit, in spite of his poor remuneration. In the first instance, it is a matter of deductions in favour of the "Aviachims", an extensive organisation with a large budget which is devoted to the development of the Air Fleet, as well as to the methods of "chemical" warfare; and further, it is a question of the "International Red Help" (Mechrabprom), and of separate collections of funds in favour of workers on strike in foreign countries (the English coal strike!). Although the exact amount of these collections is not known, there is no doubt at all that in some months the Soviet worker has to surrender, "voluntarily", a considerable percentage of his earnings for these objects. When dwelling on the question of the increase of the real wages, of which one is informed by the data of the Soviet statistics, the following very essential circumstance must be taken into consideration: The increase of the average real wages up to the level of the pre-revolution period was only possible owing to the fact that workmen pay almost nothing for lodgings in the houses which were nationalized without their owners being compensated. According to the results of a special examination undertaken ) See Troud of August 1926. ") See Pravda No. 271, November 26th,

1927.

117

by the Central Bureau of Labour Statistics*), expenses connected with the lodging-rent, form on the average about 4 o/o of the total budget of the Soviet workmen: i. e. an absolutely insignificant amount. The rent fixed for the workmen living in confiscated houses is so low that there cannot be any question of amortization or of a normal repair of houses as this rent does not even cover the current expenses for maintenance etc. Consequently, houses in which the workmen are obliged to live are gradually crumbling to pieces. Were the Soviet rulers to collect from the workmen sums necessary for the support and maintenance of the houses, these sums would probably form at least 15 to 20 O/o of all expenses of the workmen. The real wages would therefore decrease correspondingly compared with the pre-revolution period. In other words - even the present not very high level of the real wages is only possible by using up capital represented by confiscated houses. Moreover, as in recent years the real wages began to approach the prewar level, it became still more evident that wages which were bearable for the former private Russian industry, are economically above the means of the communistic industry. Hence, the usual talk that the growth of wages exceeds the increase in the productivity of labour and that accordingly the present level of wages exceeds already the financial possibilities of the Soviet industry"). Working Time. The Bolshevics pretend that they alone in the whole world have actually realized the 8 hours working day for all categories of workmen without any exception. Data of the official statistics of labour state even that the average working day in the industry of U. S. S. R. in the year 1927 was 9, 6 hours. Finally, by a manifesto issued on October i5th 1927, (the 1o years Jubilee of the Soviet Republic) the nation was informed of the introduction of the 7 hours day. This would lead, according to the communists, to a new era in the sphere of the social legislation and at the same time would draw a sharp line between legislation in U. S. S. R. and that of all capitalistic countries. As to the above mentioned average norm of 7,6 working hours a day, it only proves, as any other average figure does, that one lot of workmen must have worked above this norm and the other less. Taking into con*) Pravda No. 178, 7 th August, 1927. ") See the interesting remarks made on this subject in the report of the President of the Supreme Council of the National Economy-Kouibishew: "About the development of the cost of production in 'industry" read at the second plenary meeting of the S. C. N. E. of U. S. S. R., August z3th, 1927. Published in the Commercial and Industrial Gazette No. 184, xi4th August 1927.

118

sideration that to the latter belong adolescent workers, who work 4 and 6 hours a day, and the miners who have a shorter working day, it is not difficult to guess that other categories of workmen must therefore work on the whole not any less than 8 hours a day. But this average does not comprise the over-time work of which the Soviet industry makes a wide use, thus, overlooking, the 8 hours norm. This was openly admitted by Kaploun') in his report read at the 4th plenary meeting of the S. C. C. T. U. in which he gave the following information as regards the application of over-time work in the Ukraine in the year 1926: "In the Ukraine, 3o o/o of workmen of all branches of production worked over-time; in March 1926, 28 hours of the over-time work falling per month on every workman.

In the metallurgic industry 7o

/o, of all

workmen worked over-time and on every workman fell 4o hours of the over-time work. The situation is obviously unsatisfactory." Of the wide use of the over-time work in the mining-industry we get to know from the journal issued by the S. C. C. T. U."); special attention may be drawn to that part of information in the journal where it is said that besides the "official" over-time work, application of the "unofficial" over-time work, which is not registered by any statistics, is widely practised in the Soviet factories. "This masked over-time is not registered by any statistics and is the worst kind of over-time of all. Therefore the figures above must be considered as reduced". But it is not only through a systematical application of "official" and "unofficial" over-time work that the 8-hours working day is infringed. From time to time in the Soviet press appear informations about whole categories of workmen who even now work more than 8 hours a day. For instance, the "Komsomol Pravda", of January 5th, 1928, points out that in the "Stalin" metallurgic works in the Donetz Basin (these works are better known under the name of their founder, the Englishman Hughes) about i.ooo auxiliary workmen of the weighing department, i. e. employed on heavy loading, work more than I2 hours a day, from year to year. The Communistic paper says at this point: "The whole country is looking forward to a 7 hours working day; even the essential promise of the October revolution - the 8-hours working day - has not been fulfilled at all these last 7 years". The question of this or other infringement of the 8-hours working day is now of secondary importance, as the whole attention is drawn to the transition to the 7 -hours working day announced by the October manifesto. *) The Report of this meeting is published in the Troud No. 1926. **) See "Questions of Labour", March 1927, p. 86-88.

132,

June Ioth,

119

The corresponding paragraph in the manifesto says as follows: "With regard to the workmen engaged in production itself, a transition from the 8-hours working day to the 7 hours working day, without curtailment of wages, must be secured in the course of the next few years, for which purpose the presidium of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union S. S. R. is bound to enter, not any later than in a year's time, upon the gradual realization of this decree with regard to the separate branches of industry, in accordance with the reconstruction and rationalization of the factories and works and to the growth in the productivity of labour". If one is to remember all that has been said and written this last year by the leaders of Soviet industry about the productivity of labour not keeping pace with the growth of wages*) and if one is to take into consideration the highly strained financial situation of the Soviet industry this proclamation of the transition to the 7-hours working day, if even made in rather indefinite terms, is quite unexpected, especially as it is not accompanied by a simultaneous increase in wages. Therefore, the first thought that comes across one's mind is that by this proclamation Bolshevics pursued first of all political aims, aims of propaganda - at home and abroad. Precisely this point of view was shared in Russia by the communistic opposition consisting of Trotzky, Sinoview and Kamenew, who launched against the reigning group of Stalin-Boucharin a charge of irresponsible demagogy. The present majority in the party gave foundation to such a charge in so far, as only a year before Bucharin in his speech, made at the meeting of the XV Conference of the Communistic party on the 2nd November 1926, quoted the slogan of the 7 hours working day as an extreme example of the worst kind of demagogy. And as the actual economic conditions had not changed in the course of the past year to such an extent as to enable an easy introduction of the 7 hours working day, then described as absurd, the present opposition comes to the conclusion that "the situation has, in fact, changed acutely - only not in the economic, but in the political respect: the awakening of the proletarian van-guard and the growth of the opposition have compelled Stalin's group to complete the policy of repression by a policy of irresponsible demagogy"").

It is also worth noting the statement made by the leaders of the opposition that every time in the course of the last two years they brought forth the demand for a wage-increase of the industrial workmen *) See Kouibishew's report, mentioned in a note to page io. ")

120

Counter-theses of the opposition.

Pravda No. 263, November 17 th, 1927.

the ruling fraction answered it by a question: "where is the money for such an increase to come from"? In connection with this, the opposition, in the document already mentioned, asks Stalin's fraction: "And were is one to take the money from for the realization of the 7 hours working day? If it is to be carried out without a reduction of the workmen's wages, it would cost the industry and transport about 55o millions roubles yearly. If we are able to get these sums, it would be better to ask the workmen themselves for what purpose the money is to be used first: for an increase in wages, building of new lodgings or for the realization of the 7 hours working day"*). The Soviet Government admits that the introduction of the 7 -hours working day is not possible without great financial sacrifices on the part of the industry and the State. Thus, in, his report read in Moscow on the ist of December 1927, Kraval protested only against the figure - 5oo mill. roubles, indicated by the opposition, and maintained that this expense would not exceed 18o mill. roubles. At the same meeting the Chairman-communist Mantzew emphasised once more that the decree on the introduction of the 7 -hours working day is of the great importance for the propaganda abroad: "The 7 -hours working day is first of all a slogan in the struggle of the workmen class. Being realized by us in, practice it evokes great sympathies among the proletariat of the West; it is the sharp limit which separates Socialistic Society from the capitalistic one, being a stage in the change of the economic form of the whole world. But the practical realization of the problem of the 7 -hours working day meets naturally with great difficulties." In his speech made in Kharkov at the Ukraine Conference of the communistic party"), Rykow touched upon the sorest point of the workers question in Soviet Russia -

the unemployment which exceeded 2.000.000

people in the year 1927. We shall later return to this topic. Speaking of the plan of development of the national economy worked out by the Soviet government for the period of the next five years, Rykow said: -

"I did not think it right to present to the party for discussion the five years plan, i. e. such a plan of development of the economy, according to which unemployment would continue to increase in the course of the next years ... In the struggle with the unemployment and with the over-population of the rural districts, together with all other measures, a considerable part will be played by the 7-hours working day". ) Counter-theses of the opposition. ")

See Economicheskaja

Jisn No.

Pravda No. 263, I 7 th November,

270, November

26th,

1927.

1927.

12f

This speech of Rykow's, in connection with other declarations of the Bolshevic leaders, shows clearly that the introduction of the 7 -hours working day, which was meant to produce in Europe the effect of a complete victory of the working class in Russia, is in reality a forced measure of "short-time" labour, practiced also in capitalistic enterprises in order to employ all their workmen during a crisis. In this case it is also a secret way of providing for the unemployed, whose number is growing with alarming rapidity. However, a short experience lasting about 2 months had sufficiently proved that these expectations of the Bolshevic government were not realized either. On January 16th, 1928, transition to the 7 -hours working day took place in 22 of the best equipped textile factories of the Moscow district. It was announced further that, immediately after this first experiment, the -- hours working day would be introduced in a number of other enterprises. But the result of this experiment was that already on the 4th day of this transition to the 7 -hours working day, the People's Commissary of Labour declared in an interview, published in the "Troud" (of January 2 1st) that. "In the current year we have to content ourselves with the experiment in these few enterprises". It proved that "the preparatory work was far from thorough" and that "numerous obstacles are already experienced with regard to an adequate supply of skilled workmen". The thing is that although the number of unemployed amounts in the towns of the Soviet Russia to 2.000.000

people,

the unemployed

are in most

cases

unskilled workmen, pauperized peasants rejected by the village. Whereas, a great lack of skilled workers, is felt the professional training of the young being, as the Bolshevics themselves admit, very unsatisfactory. Thus, the result of the first experiment is that the realization of the so solemnly announced 7 -hours working day, the introduction of which was by the October manifesto, is to be put off for at least a year. Housing Conditions. We have already mentioned briefly above, when speaking of the workmen's expenses for the lodging rent, that this rent being so low there could be no question of restoring houses, as it did not even suffice for current repairs which the nationalised houses needed badly; the consequent result was that these houses were gradually falling to pieces. This led to a diminution, from year to year of the housing area calculated per workman as well as per every inhabitant in Soviet Russia. It must be noted that the Bolshevics themselves admit that this diminution threatens to continue in the years to follow.

122

Although the Soviet minimum norm of the housing area, admitted from the sanitary point of view, is 8 square metres per head, the actual average dimension of the housing area formed 6,8 sq. m. in the year 1923 -

and

was reduced to 6. sp. m. in the year 1924 and to 5,6 sp. m. in the year 1926. In some districts and towns the housing area allowed per workman is much less than the average above. Particularly bad are the housing conditions in the mining industrial region of the Donetz Basin in the South of Russia. When reading in Soviet papers characteristics of the housing condition prevailing in Russia, one comes across such terms as "coffin norm". It is true that of late large sums are being assigned by the Soviet Government - in tens and hundreds of millions - for the sake of providing the workmen with new lodgings. But, firstly, these sums are relatively insignificant considering the dreadful state of the nationalized houses, secondly, these sums are usually spent most irrationally and the building of new houses is uncommonly high. How hard the solution of this problem is for the Soviet Government can be seen from the following estimate. According to the calculations of the Supreme Council of National Economy no less than 4.5oo-5.ooo millions roubles would have to be spent in the course of the next 5 years in order to be able to retain the present housing norm amounting to about 6 sq. m. per person. Whereas judging even from the rather optimistic 5 years plan of development of the national economy, which we have already mentioned, only 2.290 millions roubl. could be assigned for this purpose. The Moscow paper "Isvestija" from which we quote these data, comes to a very pessimistic but correct conclusion: "It is evident that a further diminution of the actual housing norm fixed per head awaits us in the coming years." In order to obtain a better idea, of the workmen's housing conditions, one should turn not to statistics but to different descriptions which appear occasionally in the Soviet press. Thus, the communistic trade union paper "Troud"

(of January

19,

1928) states that in some workmen-settlements

in the district of the Ural works about 17-18 workmen manage to live on an area of 2 sq. sagenes (about 5 sq. in.). "This trick" - says the paper - is explained by the system of the "three shifts", i. e. - the same bed is used by 3 workmen in the course of 24 hours. A twenty-four hours working day for one bed! Another description published in the same paper "Troud" (of January 20, 1928) applies to the new large glass factory in the Caucasus "Fire of Dagestan" built by the Soviet Government. It says the following about the workmen's lodgings: "Terribly crowded lodgings, only 3,9 sq. m.

123

of the floor are allowed per lodger, instead of the normal 9 sq. m. 95 o/o of all the dwellings are overcrowded... 59 o/o of the house are in dreadful insanitary conditions... The administration of the factory is to be blamed for it ... How can one speak of any cleanliness, if the floors in all the barracks have not been washed since summer (this description applies to January) ... 58 o/o of the lodgings are damp. . .. 76 o/o of the lodgings are cold"... Bolshevics like to pretend that these ill-conditioned lodgings of the workmen are "inherited" from the capitalistic industry. Therefore the following remark with which the communistic paper concludes this description, is essential: "Such are the inhuman, dreadful, conditions in which the workmen of the factory "Fire of Dagestan" live, - a factory equipped by the last word of technics". Both these descriptions apply to the conditions in the provinces. To complete the picture, - we shall quote a description published in the "Comsomol Pravda" (of January I4, 1928) of a home for girl-workers in the very centre of Leningrad ("a few steps from the Nevsky", as the author says). The author gives his article the title: "Catacombs": "The horror of catacombs of the first christian epoch dwells in the cold dark corridors, arched ceiling, frameless windows... there are living at present 3o girls, factory workers... I never saw a sight more appalling than this nude wretchedness. Life in such conditions will never encourage people to strive towards new, honest, lucid labour and human joy. In dark besmirched burrows, with smoking, stinking, tiny lamps, in awful filth the factory girls live here. In one of the rooms, on the ruins of a berth, on a heap of ragged rubbish, under a filthy caparison - there lies Anna Ivanova. For three months already she has been laid up with some illness and eats "whatever is given her", and slowly dies in the sight of everybody." Accidents and the protection of labour. Accidents occurring in the industry are a sad, but to a certain degree an unavoidable result of present-day technics; however, Socialists and Communists of all countries are apt to attribute them to the capitalist's tendency to extract the greatest profit, in view of which, he does not take proper measures in order to diminish the number of accidents and to protect the workmen. Socialists pretend that the handing over of industry to a proletarian government would strongly reduce the number of accidents, if it did not do away with them altogether. In view of this assertion, it will be particularly interesting to note the experience made at the issue of the jo years of the Bolshevic regime. It shows that: 1 24

s) The number of accidents occurring in the industry is considerably higher than it was in pre-revolution times. 2) This number is growing year after year in a threatening way, in the old factories and works, as well as in those built by the Soviet government. In order to illustrate the statement of the first paragraph we shall quote one of the last informations of the Soviet press, published in the journal "Bolshevic" (1927 No. 17, page 87 "Questions of the labour protection" etc. by Marcus.) According to this article a careful study of the accident questions made by specialists in 9 largest textile factories of Moscow proved that, in comparison with the pre-war time, the number of accidents has increased from 23,9 per oo workmen in the year 1912 to 48 cases in the year 1926, i. e. has grown more than twice as great. The author of this article does not conceal that there is no hope whatever for the situation improving in the nearest future: "Accidents occur very often, their number is growing continually - and moreover in spite of the increase of the sums assigned for safety of labour, it is hardly to be expected that a decrease in this number of accidents will take place within the next year." The acute increase of the number of accidents that occured in the very recent time in shown in the official Soviet statistic of labour for the 2nd quarter (January-March) of the year 1926/1927.

In the whole industry

the number of accidents formed 52,1 per roo.ooo working days, or by 3o o/o more compared with the same period of the preceding year. In the coal-mining industry the increase of the number of accidents forms in 1926 78 0/o, and in the leather industry - 83 o/o. ("Fundamental indices of the labour and the social conjuncture". 1927. 4th issue, page 3o). Although, occasionally, means are allotted on paper for the sake of improving the technique for the struggle with accidents, however, as experience shows, communistic factory managers prefer to spend the money for other purposes or not spend it all. Thus, out of 294.000 roubles assigned in the year 1926 for the Ural works for the amelioration of technical safety only i1.000 roubles have been spent. "The rest of the money is lying without application at the time when the number of accidents is growing" ("Troud", January 7 th, 1928). We shall quote besides a very definite remark published in the "Questions of Labour" - a journal of the Central Council of Trade Unions (December 1927, page 7) in order to prove that the present situation has nothing to do with the "capitalistic inheritance": "even in those factories which have been built by the Bolshevic government and where all the questions of technical safety could have been taken into consideration, - even there the protection of labour and the technical safety are not sufficiently provided for." 125

Unemployment and provisions for the Unemployed. We have described briefly the material situation of the Russian workmen and conditions of labour at an issue of the io years regime of the Bolshevics. If, on the one hand (working time) conditions of labour seem perhaps to have improved compared with those of the former times, on the other hand (wages) io years of communism after terrible sacrifices and several years of famine, had not given the Russian workmen even that much which they had under the regime of the "capitalistic exploitation". And finally, in some respects (as: housing conditions, safety of labour) the situation of workmen has become decidedly worse. All this applies, however, only to the workmen who are employed. Whereas, the workmen's real plague under the Soviet regime is the great unemployment, which has assumed already a chronical character. In the pre-revolution time in Russia, when the development of the industry was progressing very rapidly, the normal increase of the urban population, as well as the excess population of the village migrating into towns, were absorbed without any effort by the industry; unemployment as a common phenomenon, was unknown in Russia under the former conditions. Marxism and other socialistic theories consider the unemployed, "the reserve army of the proletariat" as a normal and necessary attribute of private economy, a result of the anarchic character of the production under the capitalistic regime. One is inclined to think that no room is left for unemployment since the economy of the country is being developed according to the plans worked out for every year and for a longer period of time (5 and I5 years) and since the State owns all the large and medium-sized industrial enterprises, transport, banks and almost the whole of the trade's apparatus, giving the Government the necessary means of control over the execution of the plans. And yet it must be stated that Soviet Russia possesses a big army of 2.000.000 unemployed.

Data of Soviet statistics as regards the exact number of the unemployed often differ. Nevertheless, the following figures enable one to judge of the greatness of this calamity. In the period from October Ist, 1926 till May Ist, 1927 the number of the unemployed had risen from 1.070.000 up till 1.428.ooo*). On the other hand, according to the data quoted in the "counter-theses" of the opposition, the number of the unemployed ) Gindin. "State of unemployment and measures for coping with it". Pravda, June

126

7

th, 1927.

was 2.275.000 towards the beginning of 1927*). If towards autumn in 1927 the number of unemployed had decreased a little, it is only due to "some limitations in the registration of those who are looking for the first time for a job" t ), introduced since spring 1927, in order to limit the influx of a new lot of unemployed from the village. Taking into consideration that the total number of workmen employed in 1926/27 in the Soviet industry (including the seasonal works) and the transport was 6,4 millions of people*) the number of the unemployed towards the beginning of the yearc 1927 (2,2 million) would form then more than 1/3 of the number of the employed workmen. Bolshevics have no illusions as regards a possibility of a struggle with this calamity in the nearest future. Rykow expects unemployment to diminish (by 3o0o/o) towards the end of the next five years only on the condition thalt the 7-hours working day is introduced, as it would make it possible to employ in the industry several hundred thousands of workmen, in consequence of the transition from one shift to 2 shifts and from 2 shifts to 3 - in some branches of production. And the "counter-theses" of the opposition say: "in order to keep at least the present level of the unemployment in towns and in the villages, a much more intense development of the industry than that of all the plans of the 5 years periods. is

necessary"L.

Soviet economists on the whole set a correct diagnosis of the illness. The main lot of the unemployed consists of unskilled workmen, migrating into towns from villages - where the greatest part of the rural population cannot find application of their labour owing to the general decline in the rural economy and to the pauperization of the poor peasantry, aggravated in spite of the agrarian revolution (and partly perhaps even owing to it). On the other hand, the state industry cannot develop its production with sufficient speed, owing to its great expenses and the shortage of capital and therefore cannot absorb rapidly enough the influx of the pauperized peasantry. But if the Russian workmen under Soviet rule suffer from the so-called "plague of the capitalistic regime" - an expression often met in socialistic pamphlets - so perhaps the Soviet government provides for its unemployed better than this was done in post-war times in almost every capitalistic country? At the International Economic Conference, which took place in ) Pravda, November I 7 th, 1927. ") Gindin. "The plan of the struggle with unemployment for the years 1927/28". Pravda, October 23th, 1927.

*) Larin. "The social structure in U. S. S. R. towards the zo years Jubilee of the October Revolution". Pravda No. 255, November 6/ 7 th, 1927. t) Pravda No. 263, November i 7 th, 1927.

127

May 1927 in Geneva, Ossinsky, first delegate of U. S. S. R. demanded, of the capitalistic countries (in his "ii points" of his program the realization of which would in his opinion weaken the world's economic crisis) that they should introduce a "real provision for the unemployed". Does this "real provision" actually exist in the Soviet Republic? Only a smaller number of unemployed receive a dole. The number of those receiving the dole is estimated by different sources to be between 4oo.ooo*) and 6oo.ooo people"), i. e. out of 4 unemployed only one gets the dole. Further even for this minority of the unemployed, the dole does not by far reach their normal earnings. In the beginning of the year 1927 the unemployed were divided into 3 categories. I category receiving 33 o/o of the average earnings, II - 25 0/o and III - 20 0/o. The average norm of the dole, counting in Chernowez-roubles, makes 18 roubles monthly - for the first category, and 12 roubles for the second. According to, the data quoted in one of the last articles of Schmidt the people's commissary of Labour") the average amount of the monthly dole formed in the last three years: 1925/26 ii roubles and in 1926/27

-

in 1924/25 IS roubles.

8 roubles;

in

The opposition in its famous document describes the real state of the problem of providing for the unemployed in U. S. S. R. in the following way! - "The provision for the unemployed by the insurance organizations evokes just reproaches among the latter, for the average amount of the dole is equal approximately to 5 pre-war roubles (a month). This help is only granted to about 20 0/o of the unemployed members of trade-unions." Coalition Rights of the Soviet workmen. In order to complete the picture one should perhaps dwell on the question: to what extent is the Russian workman able to defend his rights and interests in Soviet Russia through the workmen's Trade Unions. But as this question has been investigated already in a thorough and brilliant way by the International Bureau of Labourt), we shall content ourselves with a few general remarks on this subject. The number of workmen and employees organized into Soviet professional unions, counting the whole army of the Soviet officials, the *) Apiest. The Struggle with unemployment Isvestija 2nd April 1927. ") Gindin. The State of unemployment and measures for coping with it. Pravda, June 7 th, 1927. *) Schmidt. The policy of the party in the workmen question. Pravda, 2th November,

f)

Soviets.

128

1927.

Bureau International du Travail. Le mouvement syndical dans la Russie des Gensve 1927.

rural economy, etc., exceeded 9.ooo.ooo people in 1926. In the main branches of the industry the percentage of those organized forms 90-96 o/o o/o -

a percentage unprecedented in other countries.

This high

percentage is not, however, due to to the highly-developed "class conscience" of workmen in U. S. S. R. but is due to the circumstance that the belonging of the workman to the trade-union, although formally free (by law), is in reality a compulsory measure. First of all, the Soviet workman wishing to become a member of a trade union has no right and possibility of choosing this or that organization which in his opinion is able to defend his interests in the best way. No other unions than the communistic unions, forming a part of the whole Soviet system, are admitted. Secondly, the membership is so far a compulsory one, as the workmen who are not members of Unions risk at any time to lose their job and have no chance whatever of finding a new one. As to the Soviet Trade Unions themselves, they differ in principle from the analogical unions of workmen in other countries. They are not free unions defending the interests of workmen against their employers, if even in this case the latter is the State, - they are only a special kind of administrative body. Besides, the communistic party occupies in the trade unions a position just as much a monopoly as it does in the State organizations. Consequently, in case of a conflict, the trade unions side always with the State economical -organizations, directors of the State industry and what is still more important - even workmen themselves do not look upon them as on organizations which are there to defend their interests, but consider them to be a special organization of the State. The result is that "break" of the workers masses from the communistic trade unions which was widely discussed at one time in the Soviet press. This fact was by the way, openly acknowledged in the resolution of the 14th Conference of trade Unions, which took place in December 1925, in which it was stated that: "A most unnatural 'block' had been created as between the Trade Unions and the administrative bodies." And the resolution continues: "As a result of this situation, the representatives of the Unions defend in every case, and without critizising them, all the measures taken or proposed by the economic administrative officials. In this way the Trade Unions gradually degenerate into political sections of the State economic organs, and show a tendency to forget their original destination of representing the interests of the workmen." According to the report made by Tomsky at the XV Conference of the communistic party in October 1926 this situation was very little changed. 9

129

In cases when the workmen's interests collided with those of the State industry, the trade Unions, although not siding openly with the latter, opposed passively the workmen in their claims.

Nomadic iMovements of Soviet Workers. Thus, Russian Communism neither in its preliminary hard and consequent variation nor in the later relaxed state after the introduction of the NEP was able to give the Russian workmen the promised welfare. As regards the material situation, conditions of labour and the rights he enjoyes, the Russian workman has to look with envy on his European and American colleague, who is "suppressed" and "exploited" by rapacious capitalism. That the Russian workmen are not satisfied with the conditions of labour prevailing in the factories and works is proved by one phenomenon which is assuming greater dimensions from year to year. It would be natural to think that with the abolishment of the "capitalistic exploitation" relations of the Soviet workman to the undertaking in which he is working ought to have become more stable than they were before in Russia and are at present in the capitalistic "bourgeois" countries. In reality we see the reverse: - the workmen's personnel changes in separate undertakings with a rapidity of which no other industry in any other country has an idea. The present-day workmen literally runs from one factory to another in vain hope of finding better conditions of labour and chiefly - more tolerable housing conditions. The following informations from different districts of Russia show how great this calamity has become, turning the Russian workmen into a kind of industrial nomad. In some factories in the Donetz Basin (South of Russia) the personnel of workmen was renewed three times in the course of one year (Econom. Jisn, August 26, 1927). In some metallurgic works the personnel changed three times within 5 months (Commercial and Industrial Gazette, August 27, 1927). But it is not only in some regions that this phenomenon took place, as data applying to the whole of the Soviet Russia show. In the course of the last 6 years, the "heavy" industry was able to absorb i.3oo.ooo new workmen (compared with the epoch of the complete paralysis of the industry). It should, however, be noted that during this period 12.OOO.OOO workmen have been engaged and 10.700.000

were discharged.

The total

number of workmen employed in the industry being about 2 millions, every workmen had changed the place of his work on an average 6 times during this period. The Soviet press gives a definite answer with regard to the cause of this chronical movement of the working masses: workmen seek better conditions of labour and do not find them. 130

wages and bad housing conditions are the causes compelling the to leave the enterprise." ("Troud", January 15, 1928) "Chief the voluntary leave are: dissatisfaction with wages, conditions and the housing crisis" ("Troud", 19 th January 1928). Thus, we have in these figures a peculiar "plehescite" of the politically voiceless and rightless working masses, millions of whom express in this only possible way their dissatisfaction with conditions of labour prevailing in the communistic paradise of the U. S. S. R. As end result, when studying the present-day situation of the workers class in Russia one must bear in mind the following two important circum"Low workmen causes of of labour

stances: -

First of all, even if one is to admit that wages of the Soviet workman had attained, after io years of communistic domination and owing to the Bolshevics partial repudiation of the communism, its former "capitalistic" level - still, in view of the general impoverishment and decline of the cultural level, the workman is not able to get that, what he got for the same money before (if not in regard to price, in any case-in regard quality) or what a workman can get in other countries. It goes without saying that the workman cannot enjoy in Soviet Russia any of those rights which are accessible to him not as to a workman but as to a citizen in any other cultured country, such as well-organised schools, parks, well-lit streets, bath-houses etc. In Soviet Russia all this in damaged, mutilated, soiled; the workman has nothing besides that little that he is able to buy for his scanty money. Secondly, the situation which the Soviet Government was able to secure for the workmen after to years of revolution, is still a privileged one compared with those of other classes of the Russian people. This level was attained only at the cost of a dreadful economic exploitation of the class which forms the majority of the Russian people - the Russian peasantry. The peasantry pays a heavy tribute in order to enable the Government to provide for the workmen on these modest lines on which the workmen are provided for at present. But in this exploitation of the peasantry in favour of the urban industrial proletariat, the Communistic Government, as many had anticipated, went too far. The consequence was - the great economical difficulties which the Soviet Government began to experience to-wards the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928. These difficulties will unavoidatly evoke the question, whether the Government will be able to retain, in providing for the Russian workmen, that minimum which was attained with such great effort and strain towards the end of the ioth year of the communistic dictatorship.

9*

131

Women and Children in Soviet Russia. By A. Bunge. CONTENTS: Introduction; Struggle against the family; Marriage legislation; Divorce; Slavery of women; Homeless children; Their life; Criminality among them; Their state of health; Their social origin; Measures taken by the Soviet Government; Children's homes; Distribution of children amongst artisans and tradesmen; Foreigners' opinion in regard to the homeless children.

Bolshevic the most alarming result of the certainly tragic mostare HE children. The streets and the squares of the the and homeless regime large towns are overwhelmed by them, the Soviet press discusses widely their problem and in the Russian literature of the present day they play a leading part. This problem of the "homeless children" the greatness of the disaster, is perhaps the severest condemnation of the Bolshevic regime, the sharpest conviction of it, so much the more as the Bolshevics proclaimed in the very first days of their coming to power, that one of their chief tasks was to be the care of the children. Until now the Bolshevics assert, that Soviet Russia is the paradise of the children. Not so long ago Comintern issued a proclamation in connection with the organization of the "international child's week" in which the conditions of life of the children in capitalist countries were described in the very worst light and then followed the statement that "the only country existing, in which the conditions of life of the children are improving from day to day, is the proletarian Russia. The Soviet government is continually organizing new schools, homes and hospitals for the children, the children have their own clubs, the number of instructive cinematographs for the children grows daily. The homeless children are brought up by experienced pedagogues and grow to striving and hardworking people. With a decisive step advances the 2 millionary army of the young Soviet pioneers supporting the adult workmen in their courageous struggle for liberation of the workers class in the whole world." Such declarations find a vivid echo in the European press - many still believe the Bolshevics! In spite of the Bolshevist boast and spite of the delusion of many Europeans, the horrible fate of the homeless children is clear enough for everyone who wants to see, and therefore it is not a question of establishing the truth of this fact, but of producing evidence of the fact that this evil is a consequence of the Bolshevic conditions. The homelessness of the children in the Communistic State is due to the defencelessness of the personality in general and to the defencelessness of the woman in particular. Right from the very beginning of their gaining the power, the Bolshevics began to fight against the family, which in their eyes is the stronghold of

T

132

every kind of prejudice and outlived conceptions, the seat of stagnation and reaction. "The former family must be replaced by a new family structure" wrote Trotzky in his book "Questions of everyday life". The struggle against the family began simultaneously

on all lines.

First of all an absolute freedom of sexual intercourse was proclaimed as a protest against the "tyrannic ties" of the former matrimony. Then began the propaganda of the famous theory "glass of water" according to which satisfaction of sexual want must be in a communistic state a thing as simple and natural as drinking a glass of water. "This theory of glass of water has baffled our youth and has ruined many a boy and girl" wrote later on Lenin to Clara Zetkin. In comformity with this simplified theory the whole marriage legislation was changed afterwards. According to the marriage code, issued on the ist of January 1927 much later than Lenin's penitent confession and in spite of this confession the simple fact of cohabitation of two people of different sex is sufficient to consider the couple as married. Registration of such a marriage is desirable but not obligatory. Formalities connected with the marriage are brought to a minimum, only the following points must be observed: the contracting parties must be psychically sane, have reached a certain age (18 years of age the bridegroom and x6 - the bride) there must not be a certain relationship between them (marriages between parents and children, brothers and sisters are forbidden) and finally they must not be already married to another person. And at the same time polygamy is not considered to be a capital crime, as well as incest is not prosecuted by criminal code and does not render the case more serious if other sexual crimes are prevailing. In 1926 some one made in Samara an intercession for registration of his marriage with his daughter with whom he had already 3 children. He met with the refusal and at the same time the question was raised, whether his action was a subject for punishment. The Supreme Court, having been appealed to decide upon the question, requested a conclusion of the Narkomsdrav (Peoples Commissariat of the Health Protection) and the latter answered that from the point of view of the social hygiene, sexual intercourse between father and daughter is less unwholesome than the sexual intercourse between two people not related to each other but afflicted with tuberculosis. Upon this consideration the question of punishment in a case of an incest was decided negatively. Registration of a marriage is not absolutely necessary (as we have mentioned already) from the point of view of a juridical conception of a marriage. Sexual intercourse is equal to a registered marriage if both sides consider it as a lasting state or a state of a certain duration. In other words the marriage "de facto" is equal to the juridical marriage and lays 133

upon the husband the same obligations of supporting his wife and children. The Bolshevic legislation does not in the least care whether the marriage is solid or whether it is of a long duration. It only takes care that the sexual intercourse and its consequences have a material reward. Divorce has become extremely easy, it suffices for one of the sides to declare its wish to divorce - that it should take place. This led naturally to great abuses. As a vivid illustration of such an abuse can be mentioned the case of a certain Sigoff, a communist from Odessa. After many unsuccessful attempts to seduce a girl who pleased him, Sigoff proposed to her and got the consent of the girl's parents. At 3 o'clock in the noon their marriage was registered at the Commissariat. A wedding-feast took place in the house of the bride's parents, after the feast the young couple left for their home and at 7 o'clock in the evening Sigoff, having actualized his conjugal rights, declared to his wife that he was hurrying to some important party conference and that she was to return to her parents, as he came to the conclusion that they did not suit each other and he therefore did not want her any more. Having given her io copecks for her tramfare and bade her good-bye he forwarded a petition for a divorce. The parents of the wife made a complaint against Sigoff at the Court, but were told that Sigoff's action could not be regarded as condemnable for the law has no indications as to the duration of a marriage and a petition for a divorce can be therefore put up at any time. Since divorce has been rendered so easy, the number of people divorcing grew enormously. The "Red Gazette" makes the following statement: in the first half of 1926 in St. Peterburg on every ioo marriages fell 26 cases of divorce, where as in the first half of 1927, after the promulgation of the new marriage code, on every 100 marriages fell 76 cases of divorce. i. e. the number of the latter grew three-fold. It is worth while mentioning another curious thing with which we meet in the marriage code of the Ukraine (every autonomic Soviet republic has its own marriage code) according to which a marriage is even possible without the knowledge of one of the contracting parties. It suffices that a man or a woman make a declaration at the Commissariat of his or her "intimate relations" with this or other person; the latter gets a notice of this declaration and if no protest on his part is made during the period of one month - the Commissariat carries out a judgment by default to marry the two in question and to register their marriage. "The old saying: "I was married without my knowing it" seems to be right" said the president of the German Volga Republic Kurtz at the discussion of this question by the Supreme Central Executive Committee "Yes indeed, it seems so" answered upon a slight meditation Kursky - the Commissary of justice in those days, and at present Ambassador in Rome. 134

If even the so-called marriage in the Bolshevist State protects the woman very insufficiently, setting aside the very problematic right of claiming alimonies, the general slavish dependency of all people on all those, who are in authority, has converted the woman into a very slave. All those, w,ho don't live directly by farming, depend upon the good-will of the authorities, the State allowances. Therefore it depends only upon the discretion of the persons in power to guide the existence of thousands and other thousands of women, upon those, who have influence with these authorities, who themselves can become authorities, that is to say, upon all members of the Communist party and upon all young Communists. If one takes this into consideration and if one remembers the theory of "the glass for water", so much appreciated by the Communists of all ages, one may conceive, how coarse the hankering after the honour of woman are and how helpless the women are. We want to show some examples from the rich materials of this kind: Setting aside all the numerous cases of rape, done by men in particular and by whole crowds, to which the Bolshevist newspapers refer daily, we want to show some examples of compulsion, done by superiors. These cases take place every day, and the newspapers write there-about more in a pleasant manner, as if they were trifles. The "Pravda" of November 1927 writes, that on the door of the member of the Commissarship of Finances of Aserbeidshan, Affengalow, there was a notice: "No admittance without notification". "The admittance was prohibited, as this Affengalow ravished in his office those women, who applied for an appointment." At Smolensk the president of the districts Committee ravished the bookkeeperlady. In the Don-district were 'admitted for appointments only those women, who assented to live with the directors of the factory. At KamenetzPodolsk the inspector of the district ravished the teacher ("Trud", February 1928). Another teacher was expelled, who did not consent to the wishes of the inspector of the schools, her goods and chattels were forwarded to the frontier of the district and there she was left ("Komsomolskaja Pravda", January 1928). The "Workers' Newspaper" writes from Siberia, that many lady-teachers were removed for not having consented to the wishes of the authorities in this sense. Eighteen of them could furnish proofs of the fact, that they had been removed because they did not consent to the carnal lusts of their inspectors, and these governesses were reinstated. If in Siberia, sparsely populated, 18 governesses could furnish these proofs, of having become the victims of Bolshevistic lust, we may picture to ourselves the numerous victims in the European Union of the S. S. R., who dare not make complaints or whose complaints remain without success. 135

The situation of the women of the governing class, i. e. the female workers, is by no means any better. The official newspaper of the Bolshevist Government, the "Isvestia" of the 22d May, 1928, writes the following: At the general assembly of the gouvernement's Committee and the Controlling Commission one of the present persons said: "At our factory, the 'Katuschka', (Gouvernement Smolensk) some masters and workmen, and also the president of the professional union, being all members of the Communist party, are accused of misdeeds by abusing their positions. They compelled the women to sacrifice themselves by agreeing to their lusts, and they removed those, who did not consent". The same speech contained many other interesting materials, but we want only to talk about the matters in question. The secretary of one of the districts committees changed his wives five times during a year, and the secretary of another committee ravished a woman and was transferred to another district to a higher position. In Sotchy (Caucasus), a communist, comrade Zarapoff, called women (KOMSOMOLKI), through his secretary, "for secret night-work", some coworkers being disobedient and obstinate, - writes the newspaper "Pravda", April i8th, 1928 - were dismissed from their service. Being broken by misery and forced by that reason to accept his "courting", the unemployed persons received employment in consequence". Just at the same time, in Archangel, at the other end of Russia, the circumstance of "Group-forcing" took place, which was committed by responsible "court-labourers", by the examining magistrate, Comrade Kazakoff, by the court executor Comrade Medjeditzki, and others. ("Pravda", March 5th, 1928.) In Rostoff on the Don, the member of the "Provincial Committee" of the "WKP", Artemoff, "profiting by his position, forced women to be his paramours". ("Isviestia".) At the factory called Swerdloff (the first president of the Union of Communistic Republics) in the district Kowrow, Gouvernement Vladimir, President of the factory committee, did exactly the same thing as was done by Artemoff in Rostoff on the Don; he forced the delegated women (it seems to mean the representatives of workers in the committee. A. B.) to sexual intercourse. In Charkoff the Tram-Manager Aleksejeff, "using his high-service position, tried to force the working women of the tram service to sexual intercourse". ("Isviestia", April 12, 1928.) In Leningrad the manager of the labour section of the Labour Registry Office, Jacob Zavrazny, forced unemployed women to sexual intercourse in return for sending them out of their turn to work. ("Pravda".) The Bolshevists, as "feudal lords", have even restored the "jus prirme noctis". In a factory in Turkestan, the manager Communist Petrakowski, called the watchman, an Uzbeck, who had the intention of marrying, and told him: "so you intend to marry, ... well that is a good job, but only,

136

one agreement must be kept - the first night must belong to me! If you don't want to agree to it, the fault will be yours. I never forget him who has done me some good, but I also never forget who has done me some wrong." 'After a short inward struggle' - writes the "Pravda", April 25, 1928 - the Uzbek agreed to fulfil the will of his master. It was much more difficult to obtain the consent of the bride, but at last, she too gave her consent." The result of this legitimized desintegration of the family, of sexual profligacy, of quantitive and qualificative declassification of large social groups, provocation of the class enmity and hatred, abolition of principles of traditional morals, the uncertainty of existence under the Soviet conditions, the dreadful lodging exigencies was the terrible phenomenon of the homeless children (a phenomenon unexperienced one can say since the days of the 3o years' war) of the special social class, forming an inevitable attribute of the Soviet every day life. At first the Bolshevics asserted that these children were an inheritance from the Tzaristic and capitalistic regime and called them cynically "outlays of the Social Revolution", or "those splinters which fall when the forest is being cut down." But the greatness of this calamity began little by little to frighten even the unabashed Soviet rulers. In the course of many years the city and provincial papers are full of articles discussing this problem. Even the titles of these articles speak of the acuteness of this question, as for instance: "Aid the children." "7 millions of the homeless children are perishing", "The dark spot in our life", "the homeless children - a menace of social life", etc. All these articles draw a very sad picture of the life of these children. The number of the homeless children according to the unanimous statement of all who studied this problem is great. Nadejda Krupskaja, the widow of Lenin, writes in the Moscow "Pravda" of the 2 Ist November 1924. "We have registered 7 millions of homeless children. There are about 8oo,ooo children in the homes and similar institutions, and where is the rest? We don't sufficiently dwell on this problem and do still less to liquidate it! Are we really so thickheaded as not to find another way out than exclaiming 'Of with you to the parents or to the homes' - words that sound like a mockery, for those children have neither one nor the other." Other investigators of this question state a smaller number of the homeless children as, for instance, Dr. Wassilievski in his "Golgatha of the child" speaks of 2,000,000 of orphans and of 4,000,ooo of children having one of the parents living. Others speak of 5, 4 and 3 millions of homeless children. This variety of the data is first of all due to the general inexactness of all Bolshevic statistics (although in no other country so much is spoken of statistics as in Soviet Russia) and secondly owing to the 137

fact that different government institutions and private authors have their own conception of the term "Homeless children". Some consider only orphans as homeless children, the others all those children who for this or other reason are deprived of the care of the parents. No matter what the exact number of these unhappy children is - it is in any case great and no wonder that the terms "waifs", "Homeless children" have become an inevitable attribute of the every day language in Soviet Russia and that this problem occupies the Soviet press. We shall state some extracts from descriptions of the waif's life. "Hungry, ragged, trembling from cold, the waifs wander about in the streets of our towns"; they spend their nights in cellars, cess-pools, in, the garrets and under the waggons. They are beaten, chased away from every where. Their faces are searred through scurvy and lupus, their bodies are covered with wounds and boils. Many of the waifs are so weak that they are even past the stage of begging ("The Charkow Communist", 18. 5. 1926). "The waifs are a real danger in the streets of our towns. When hunger becomes unbearable and the waifs don't get alms - they begin to cheat, to steal and rob. To be able to succeed better in their aims - the waifs unite into gangs and become gradually real criminals" ("Pravda", 21. 5. 27).

For the winter months the waifs move towards the south, -

to

the Crimea and the Caucasus, saving themselves from the cold. They move in crowds and like locusts they alight on the footboards, buffers and roofs on the trucks of the trains. The well known Orientalist Posdejeff writes in the "Red Panorama" of the 27. 10. 27. of his impressions and observations in this questions the following: "Here in the Caucasus, at the coast of the Black Sea, - in Tuapse, I was able to study the phenomenon of the "homeless children" in its whole dreadful reality. The hot sun, a mild climate and easy conditions of life entice whole crowds of waifs in the autumn. Tuapse is crowded by them at this time of the year. They live together, uniting into different gangs with their own definite organisations, have their chiefs, their own language formed from separate words of different Caucasian idioms, a language absolutely incomprehensible to strangers. The waifs have their own morals, their own unwritten laws, so for instance it is forbidden to occupy, for the sake of night asylum or for meetings, places occupied already by another gang. All the empty buildings, barracks and caves are occupied by such bands. They spend their nights there, play at cards, dice and domino. The town is full of rumors and tales of the crimes committed by the waifs and of their life and customs. The waifs often marry among themselves and one can often meet I2, 13 year old girls and boys married. Many of the girls are prostitutes. I once met a girl about so-ix years of age sitting on on a bench in a town-garden smoking a cigarette. On my question what she 138

was doing there, she answered calmly: "I am waiting for a man." Many of the waifs are skilled smugglers. Thanks to their vagabond life they know to perfection all the foot-ways, paths and passes in the mountains. Many of them have been killed in the mountains by wolves and bears. These young smugglers turn gradually into real medieval bandits and become dangerous. I was told that many children are attracted by the life of the waifs and get influenced by them. I heard of a whole number of cases where children ran away from the parents and were found, after long searches in this or that gang. Being brought home, many of them ran away for the second time returning to their gangs and this time the parents did not even attempt to search for them - for life with the waifs in the gangs turned them into rude and disobedient children, inclined to steal and lead a dissolute life." The Bolshevic papers often state cases when the waifs whilst begging in the populous streets of Moscow fortified their request with the menace "if you don't give me something. I shall bite you and I am a syphilitic." Or - holding in their hands a small jar with insects they theaten the passers-bye to let out the "typhoid lice" in case they don't get alms. The papers are also full of descriptions of the waifs attacking the hawkers' trays containing goods, and stealing from them. A Communistic authoress Vera Imber draws a very sad picture of the waifs' life in cellars and garrets of Moscow houses in her story "Rats". Another Communist Lydia Seifulina relates in her book "The golden Childhood" how the waifs who were "playing peacefully at "Cheka" and execution" were surrounded and caught by the militia men who got the order to clear the streets of the Waifs for the io years Jubilee of the Soviet Republic. These waifs were brought to the militia office; upon examination almost everyone of them proved to be a repeated old offender, thief, burglar and sharper. Criminality amongst the waifs is strongly developed. "Banditism amongst the waifs is great" (Circular of the People's Commissariat of Justice, Nr. 36). The journal "Psychiatry and Neurology" states that criminality amongst the children in Petersburg has increased tenfold in comparison with pre-war time. The state of health of the waifs is extremely bad." The great majority of them are ill, says the same journal, and have contagious illnesses, such as tuberculosis, itch, and venereal diseases. The Moscow "Pravda" writes in No. 46. "It is sufficient to cast a look at the reports of the Committee that deals with the children's question to be quite convinced that syphilis, gonorrhea, cocainism, alcoholism and abnormal vices with all their consequences are very much spread among the waifs." Dr. Salomanovitch defines the number of cocainists of being about 4o-6o o/o of the whole lot of the waifs. 139

So far the Soviet government has not succeeded, inspite of all its efforts, to clear the streets of large towns from the waifs, not even the streets of Moscow. Kalinina, the wife of the President of U. S. S. R., writes in the "Pravda" of the 20. 5.

27.

"How often already have the streets been

cleared of the waifs, but the latter are still there, at every corner. It is a real disaster. The number of gangs is growing continually" "The homeless children" are one of the characteristic features of towns in Soviet Russia. It is a real nomadic Russia" ("Trud" 22. 4. 1927). The "Trud" (a Soviet paper) gives an idea to which social groups the waifs belong. According to the "Trud's" data published in its No. x16 about 75 0/0 of all the waifs in U. S. S. R. in this workmen's and peasant's Republic - are the children of workmen and peasants. The percentage of workmen's homeless children increased. In 1925 it was 29.3 o/o and in 1926 it had risen already to 37.4 o/o. The waifs orphans formed in all 67 0/0, waifs having one of the parents still living

those having parents -

-

27.5

0/O.

3.5 o/o.

By age, the waifs could be classed in the following way: between 3 and 7 years of age 15 o/o, from 8 to 13 57.1 o/o, between 14 and x6 years of age 20.9 O/o and above this age - about 6-7 0/o. These dates of age are very instructive. The first group in absolute figures about one million waifs - is the gift of the Bolshevic regime, of their new family structure: These children were born when the civil war was already a thing of the past, when the communists were already able to carry out their ideas without any hinderance. The second and the third groups include about 4/5 of the whole number of waifs, of whom the eldest were about 6 years old when the Bolshevics came to power and the youngest were born when the Bolshevics fought for their power, killing thousands, hundreds of thousands of people, filling all the prisons, cellars and pits with hostages starving the people to death, etc. These unfortunate children are "the expenses of the revolution" one of the terrible tributes that the Russian people had to pay to the Bolshevistic conqueror. Let us now see what measures were taken by the Soviet government in order to be able to struggle with this calamity. At first the Soviet rulers took up zealously the solution of this problem and were, as ever, full of optimistic hopes. "There is no more room for the waifs in Soviet Russia, the children of the street must not exist any longer" says the journal "Socialistic building" No. 8 and 9 of the year 919, "every child in Soviet Russia has the right to develop itself in the conditions of creative power and free labour". Bolshevics were at that time captivated by the idea of giving a full privilege to the State over the family in the question of the bringing up of the children. 140

The German Law of Children's Protection says: "The social aid must be applied to the child inasmuch as this bringing up is not carried out by its own family." The Bolshevics wanted to turn this clause inside out. The chief inspirer of the Bolshevic family rights - Goichbarg - writes in his book "The marriage and family rights in Soviet Russia", issued in the year 1922, as follows: "The family is obliged to take care of the small children if the children are not protected by an organized Society in the shape of the State." Realization of this task was put upon the "Department of the Social Protection of the under-aged" with subdepartments in the district and country towns. This task was a "protection of the non-adult in the broadest sense of the word". But after 7 years of existence of this institution Nadejda Krupskaja writes in the "Pravda" No. 55, 1926 about the question of the childrens protection as of a task that must first be realized. "It is absolutely necessary that some-body should see to the children of the village and of the town poor, that they should not perish from want of food, that they should not catch cold and that they are able to be in the fresh air. Some kind of a State control over the health of all children is necessary. The children must be protected against cruel treatment, against being made drunk and exploitation. We must bring up carefully the young generation but so far this task has been neglected by us." In a word - great plans and intentions remained, as everything in Soviet Russia, on paper. According to the dates furnished by the second congress of the workers for childrens' protection, which took place in 1925, the "Department of the Social Protection of the under-aged" has been very active and founded a whole number of childrens' homes, colonies, quarantine station, etc. All in all there were at that time 5411 of such institutions which housed about 6oo,ooo children, whereas in the year 1913 only 29,600 children were in similar institutions. These gains of the Bolshevics will appear to us less favourable if we were to consider the number of those children having no home whatever, in former Russia and their number in Soviet Russia of our days. The Bolshevics considered childrens homes as an essential part in their struggle with the phenomenon of the waifs. Special expectations were put in these homes. They were to prove that "Social care of the children gives greater results than the private, individual, irrational care of "loving" but ignorant parents not possessing the strength, the means, the methods of an organized Society" writes Goichbarg in his book mentioned above. The children who are brought up in these homes these "States children" as Lunatsharsky, Minister of Education, calls them, were to become models of the "new communistic man". But it appears that "in the Children's homes live bandits, married rascals, lazy and ill-behaved 141

children" as Nadejda Krupskaja writes in the "Moscow Pravda" No. 275 of 1925.

"Narkompross" (The People's Commissariat of Education) gives the following statement of conditions in the children's homes: - "Our children's homes are in a pitiful state. Teaching, as far as it can be mentioned at all, is very unsatisfactory, the practical instruction - is still worse. Out of the whole number of waifs at the age of between 14 to I6 only 3o 0/0 are learning to work. 7o 0/o of the waifs are left absolutely without practical instruction. Although great sums are spent yearly on maintaining these homes the greater number of them, with a small exception (which obviously are demonstrated to the visitors from abroad. A. B.) are in a very bad condition. The food is almost everywhere unsatisfactory, a great need in dress and clothes is felt acutely. For every 20 children there is one pair of boots, one overcoat for every 10 children, one bed for 2-3 of them, The result of these insanitary conditions are epidemic illnesses amongst the children" (Report of the People's Commissary of Education for the year 1925,

page 25-27).

In his speech pronounced at the Congress of the

Soviets on April 14th, 1927 Lunatsharsky declared that many years will have to pass before the problem of the homeless children will be solved. "In the homes many children have reached the age of 17 and 18, and we were at a loss what was to be done with them. They were left on our hands and it was to be expected that they would begin to marry each other and produce a new generation - a certain original population in the children's homes." (The same speech of Lunatsharsky.) This time Lunatsharsky was quite right. The "Komsomol Pravda" of the 16th January 1928 states that two children were born in the Preobrajensky children's home. "What kind of people will these homes produce? Striving and dilligent workers or parasites?" asks the "Komsomol Pravda" The same paper gives the following description of life in these children's homes: - "the same dull monotonous life during the course of many years, without work, without study, without aim. The days are spent in bed with a cigarette in the mouth, the nights pass in a whirl of foxtrotts." In the same paper of January 22nd, 1928, we read a description of the riot of the State's children in the settlement "The Labour Life". This settlement was founded in the year 1926 in the historical estate of the Count Uvaroff, Poretshj6, in the neighbourhood of Moscow. About 5oo children were interned in this colony. A detailed description of this riot which took place in January 3rd, 1928, gives a clear idea of this comparatively well organized institution. In the course of the last 11/2 years three managers succeeded one another, writes the "Komsomol Pravda". Neither of the three possessed pedagogical knowledge and experience. The last manager "organized" the children with 142

the help of his fist, spanks and arrests. Such pedagogical methods led to a formation of a gang in the home under the name of "Alla verdi" with the catchword "Away with the manager brute" with the device "beat, steal and amuse yourself". The material conditions of the children's life were dreadful. Only towards the 7 th of November - the io years Jubilee of the Soviet Republic - it was somehow managed to have the children dressed. Two hostile camps were formed in the children's settlement - that of the teachers and that of the children. The children were absolutely neglected; they did not believe anyone any longer, for they were cheated too often. Their wrath grew. And all at once the revolt broke out, a sound of breaking glass was heard in the pink palace of the Count Uvaroff. The signal was understood too well, the children ran into the yard and the general destruction began. 58o broken window panes, demolition of the library containing 5ooo volumes and of the cabinet for physical experiments - an inheritance of the Count - were the first results of this "first intensive work of the State's children". In order to characterize Soviet madness, we shall state that in the very same number of the "Komsomol Pravda" where this riot is described a leading article makes the following declaration: - "The proletarian State takes great care of the children, giving them utmost attention, showing the warmest care. The poor "homeless children", this "State's children" see much love and tenderness". The unsuccessful experience with the children's homes compelled the Bolshevics to reduce the number of homes. Dr. Epstein speaks of 1852 homes with 160,250 children interned in them, towards January ist, 19287 But life in these homes, according to Dr. Epstein, has not in the least improved (articles published in the "Komsomol Pravda" of 22nd and 24th of January 1928). Another radical measure was to be introduced in place of that of homes: - the homeless children were to be distributed amongst artisans and tradesmen for training them. Thus the Bolshevics acknowledged officially a complete insolvency of their theory of a new man and of the communistic bringing-up being a superior one. But this new measure had not either justified expectations of the Bolshevics and quite recently Nadejda Krupskaja wrote: - "No sooner was the measure introduced, the children sent into the "volosts" (a district including several villages), where they were to be distributed among the tradesmen, when papers began to speak of law-court cases in connection with ill-treatment of these children. Without organizing a control, without classifying the children according to their strength and their inclinations, we were only aiming at one thing: to relieve the children's homes."

(Pravda No. 275.)

We presume that it is clearly seen from the above said that no results were attained in the Bolshevics struggle with the disaster of homeless 143

children. Perhaps even more convincing than the figures are the statement of such people like Krupskaja, Kalinina, Dr. Boguslawsky, who take an active part in this struggle. "Iswestija" of the 25th January 1928 writes: "local organization were able to take off the streets many of the waifs and have thus diminished the number of these vagabonds, but still the problem of the waifs is very acute, the waifs are still a mass phenomenon which requires energetic measures for its liquidation". Dr. Boguslawsky one of the chief leaders in this struggle makes the following statement: - "The characteristic feature in the waifs question is the stability of this disaster, which has as a natural consequence a continual formation of new lot of waifs" - a full acknowledgement of own helplessnessl All that has been said above is only a very insignificant part of all informations prevailing in the question of the waifs and of their life in U. S. S. R. A correspondent of a foreign paper who got acquainted with this subject said that he could not understand how one could go on living knowing all this, and why silence is kept on the part of those of whom one could expect that they would raise their voice in the whole of the world. Foreigners who had the opportunity of seeing these crowds of waifs, dwell on the terrible question - what will become with those wild children, - what is to be done with them, and come to different conclusions. Thus one of the French authors inquires whether the Comintern does not intend to create in future an army of those millions of homeless children, creating that "red wave" which is to sweep off the face of the earth the old culture and civilization. A German author comes to the conclusion that only exile, machine-gun or poison would lead to a full liquidation of this calamity. But these declarations do not seem to check the European "6lite" in their admiration for the builders of the new world. Do not these blind people represent the same danger in Europe, a danger for our whole culture, as the poor homeless children do in U. S. S. R.?

144

The Condition of the Russian Jews before and after the Revolution. By Dr. D. S. Pasmanik. CONTENTS: Under the Tzar: Demography; Juridical and political rights; Economic Condition; Spiritual Condition. Under the Bolshevics: emancipation and pogroms; Economic Condition; The small Towns; Colonisation; Rights; Antisemitism; Spiritual Condition. Conclusion.

IN

the Jewish, as well as in the non-Jewish world, there are numerous legends in circulation about the condition of the Jews in Russia under the Tzar and under the Bolshevics. These legends are only partly the result of ignorance and ill-will. They are created, more than by anything else, by the indolence of human thought, which generalises individual events, raising them to general principles in order to facilitate for itself the way to truth. Our object is to rehabilitate the truth, so that Jews, as well as non-Jews, be freed from giving credence to legends harmful to all. In our analysis we shall rely exclusively on strictly verified facts.

I. Russian Jews under the Tzar. The Census of 1897 shows the number of Jews living in Russian at that time as 5,200,000.

But according to the investigations of B. Gold-

berg, the number of Jews in Russia exceeded 6millions already in 1912. There is no doubt that under the old regime, the Russian Jews increased in numbers quite normally, which is a sign of national well-being. The Jewish family was consolidated at the time; Malthusianism manifested itself

on a very insignificant scale among the few members of the wealthiest section of the bourgeoisie. Abortions and sexual diseases were very rare*). *) In present Russia the situation is unhappily quite different. The German review ,,Der Morgen", June, 1928 p. 193, publishes a report of Mrs. Berta Pappenheim about the Jewish colonies created by the Bolshevics (in gov. Kherson) which will be mentioned in that particular article further on. The author, as many German Jews, is well disposed to that Bolshevic enterprise. And even this well-disposed author communicates the following about the question which in terests us here: "It seems to me, that a great danger threatens the Jewish lifeit is the Soviet-Russian s e x u a I m o r a lit y, which permits of a free sexual intercourse, whose ontcome are further annihilated undevelopped with a great harm to women. A Jewish lady doctor who worked in a Jewish colony, told me the following facts: In May 1926, as she refused to make abortions which she did not consider indispensible from a medical standpoint, she had to deal with 5 confinements and one abortion. As the women have found the possibility of fulfilling their desires in other ways, she had in June 26 to deal with 7 confinements and 5 abortions, and in July 26 even only with one confinement and ii abortions." Such a state of morals can produce good labourers, indeed! Editor.

10

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Child mortality among the Jews was not great in comparison with that of the general Russian population. If among the Jews, as among typical towninhabitants, there was a greater number of weak and physically delicate people than among the Russian population which was closely connected with the village, yet, as a counterpoise, the Jews were better adapted for combatting such mortal diseases as tuberculosis for instance. While the Jewish population constantly increased in pre-revolutionary Russia, at the same time a constant emigration to other countries was taking place, especially to the United States, up till 194. On the average about 100,000 people emigrated annually, most of whom, of course, were young and best fitted to increase the population. We emphasize these statements, because they throw a bright light on the condition of the Jews in Tzaristic Russia. A genuine town population like the Jewish, receiving no influx from the villages (where there were almost no Jews), increases only then in numbers, when it lives in more or less normal economic conditions. Let us now undertake a description of the political, economic and spiritual condition of the Russian Jews in former Russia. A. Juridical and political rights. Europeans, utterly ignorant of the conditions of Jews in Russia, however, knew that much: the Russian Jews are without rights. But only very few had a correct notion of this lack of civil rights, the matter itself being complicated and full of contradiction. The most important feature of our lack of rights in Tzaristic Russia, was the Reservation (Pale of Settlement). It consisted in the Jews not having the right of living in all parts of Russia, but only in certain gouvernements of West and South-West Russia, viz., in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, where Jews had already lived before these regions were annexed by Russia. But even inside this ghetto, a new ghetto had been created in 1882, the Jews having been deprived of the right of domiciling in villages, thus being compelled to huddle together in cities and small towns. They had no right to live anywhere else in Russia. An exception had been made for artisans, who personally practised their handicraft, for those who had completed their education at some high school, for the descendants of the so-called Nicholas soldiers (soldiers of Tzar Nicholas I who had served for a full term of 25 years), and finally for some catagories of merchants of the first guild. According to the new enactment of Alexander II. relating to the military service, the Jews who had served as soldiers, and even Jewish soldiers who had taken part in the war, in spite of having been wounded, did not enjoy the right of living where they liked in Russia. This fact excited the strongest indignation among the Jews during the last 146

war: a wounded Jew is sent to some hospital, say, in Moscow; when convalescent, however, - having become an invalid through the loss of a leg or an arm, - this same Jew is sent out of Moscow to his native home even if he has found a living in Moscow. The reservation had - as we shall see - an enormous influence on the economic condition of the Jews, but was not so strongly resented by the masses, as the innumerable pinpricks to honour and dignity connected with it which provoked a general indignation. A famous Jewish writer, for instance could only live in Petrogard, by being officially inscribed as the butler of a Jewish banker. This lack of rights gave rise to the enormous practice of bribes among the police, who, for a regularly paid reward, closed their eyes and allowed unauthorised Jews to reside temporarily in the capitals and elsewhere outside of the reservation. Psychologically, the Reservation did not so much oppress by its massive foundation, as by its sharp angles, which caused sharp pain, and provoked as sharp exasperation. The Reservation was one of the chief causes of the revolutionary mood of an important part of the Jewish intelligentzia; and as to its purpose this remained unattained. In spite of all obstacles, there existed before the revolution in the capitals and in some of the chief towns of Greater Russia, of the Caucasus and 'of the Don region, Jewish communities sufficiently large and well supplied and equipped in every way. In 1,913 the Jewish community in Petrograd numbered more than 6o,ooo people, the one in Moscow was not much smaller. A very numerous community existed in Rostov-on-Don. The number of Jews in Kiev was: in

1792.....

in

x917

.

.

.

.

.

.

73 .

87,246')

The second fundamental restriction consisted in the exclusion of the Jews from the State Service. It was only during the reign of Alecander II. that a few Jews were permitted to enter the Civil Service of the State, but since 1881, not one single Jew has been admitted either as a civil servant or as an officer. A Jew could not become a Professor at a University or even a schoolmaster. But precisely this aspect of restriction, was the least oppresive for the Russian Jews. As a rule, Jews did not aspire to State Service. Let us mention, by the way, that also in Constitutional Germany, Jews had no access to the State $ervice, nor even up to recent times in such a democratic country as Switzerland, where a Jewish civil servant or an officer was of an extreme rarity. The third form of restriction was much more momentous and was much more sorely resented: the number of Jews admitted to schools, *) Jacob Lestschinsky. ,,Blatter fir Demographie, Statistik und Wirtschaftskunde der Juden", 1925, No. 5, p. 49. to*

147

Universities and Technical Schools was limited to 3-5-io o/o, a number of high schools in the capitals remaining entirely closed to the Jews. This form of restriction irritated the widest circles of the Jewish population, and revolutionized even the very conservative strata of the Russian Jews. Minister Stolipin, not long before his tragic death, and at a time when Russia already possessed a constitution, - brought it about that the norm of percentage should also be applied to the "external" scholar. In this way the scheme of cutting the Russian Jews adrift from the middle and higher education was carried out, an absurd scheme, since in spite of all restrictions the Russian Jews possessed during the first years of our present century a numerous and important intelligentzia, which produced eminent representatives in the realms of culture and art. Another restriction, connected with on astounding contradiction, is as follows. From the time of Alexander III., the Jews were deprived of their right to vote for the self-governing institutions (town Dumas and provincial institutions). In towns with an important Jewish population, - and in many towns in the West, the majority of the population consisted of Jews bureaucracy attempted to appoint Jewish representatives according to its own judgement, but very often those so appointed, declined the honour that had been thrust upon them. And yet at the same time the Jews were permitted to record their vote and stand for election in the highest assembly of the State, - in the State Duma and in the State Council. The Jews had no right to buy landed property outside of the town communities. This prevented the appearance, not only of landed proprietors, but also of land-tilling owners among the Jews. But how strong is the reality of life! Even this severe law was evaded by the Jews. Very many Jews bought even large estates, especially forest properties, by merely concluding a contract of purchase in the name of some christians with whom they concluded separate treaties, so as to secure for themselves such landed properties. An authentic fact which occurred under my own eyes: on the very day when for the first time we were all obliged to evacuate the Crimea (in the Spring of 1919), a treaty had been concluded at a solicitor's for the sale of a Grandduke's vast forest estate to a well-known Jewish forest industrial. Unhappily the forest was seized by the Bolshevics. The Jewish lack of rights would have been simply unbearable, if it had not been tempered firstly by the bribes readily accepted by the police and by officials in general, and secondly by the good-naturedness of the Russian people. This latter circumstance resulted in some anti-semitic Russian conducting his affairs with the help of the Jews. I knew a Grandduke, who used to let his sugar factories only to Jews. The same individual 148

would undertake the trouble of making negotiations for his Jewish friend, whenever the latter came to Petersburg, a town prohibited to him. Owing to the restricted condition of the Jews, many ignorant people in Europe permitted themselves to look upon Russia as a country of mere barbarians. This opinion was supported by a very tragic circumstance, which it is difficult to describe. The lack of rights made the Jews a sort of scape-goat whenever some kind of public disturbance occurred in the country. At the most critical moment, the Government - in order to divert the attention of the population from the real evil - would produce the socalled "Jewish danger", and its representatives would deliberately set the rabble against the Jews. Hence the much talked of Jewish "pogroms", which for the first time took on a general character after the murder of Alexander II., i. e., in the beginning of the reign of Alexander III. (in i88i-i883). In x9o5, in the blaze of the revolution, the pogroms acquired a general and brutal character. Let us, however, point out at once that these pogroms cannot be compared to those which took place after the fall of the Tzar's power. If the Tzar-pogroms claimed thousands of Jewish victims, the post-revolutionary pogroms cost many scores of thousands of Jewish lives. B. Economic Condition. Towards the end of the 19 th century, the Russian Jews lived chiefly by handicrafts and commerce: 38 o/o of the whole Jewish population were engaged in commerce, and 37 o/o in handicrafts. Only 3 c/o were engaged in agriculture. The members of other professions, including those who provided for the religious needs of the Jews, constituted io 0/o of the population. In the heavy industry - as factory owners and workmen only 3 0/o were engaged. io 0/o of the Jewish population were outside of all professions, i. e., they were either individuals living on private means or beggars. There is no doubt that those who lived on private means were very few, whereas the beggars were very many. Some portion of the io percent profession less people subsisted on the dollars sent them by their relatives who had emigrated to the United States. Entire centres in the West, lived in this way. Another part consisted of "Luftmenschen", i. e., of people subsisting on occasional unforeseen gains. This high percentage of paupers among the Russian Jews towards the end of the 19 th century, had two causes: one historic, the other juridical. The historic one, of which the Russian government was guiltless, consisted in the structure of the Jewish economic life being not conformable with the economic constitution of the country: - in such an agricultural country as Russia only 3 o/o of the Jewish population were engaged in agriculture. The agrarian class being almost non-existent, there were practically only

two professions left for the Jews: handicraft and commerce. But Jews, as already elucidated, being deprived of the right of living where they pleased, were crowded together within the limits of the "Reservation", so that there unavoidably arose an excess of tailors, shoemakers, tinkers and shopkeepers. A mass-emigration to America, whither in a comparatively short space of time about i1/2 million of Jews emigrated, somewhat ameliorated the condition of those who had remained behind, but had not done away with the evil. Thus the economic condition of the Jews towards the end of the i 9 th century was by no means brilliant, although the welfare of a goodish half of Russian Jews noticeably grew. But we see a different picture in the years 1900-1917:

during this time the Jewish welfare in Russia grows

steadfastly and rather rapidly, together with the growth of the wealth of the country, and in particularly of the necessities and possibilities of the peasantry, which formed the fundamental bulk of the population. At the same time, as I have explained elsewhere, the following thing happened: the number of Jewish merchants grew during this period, and not only at the cost of the former beggars, but also of the craftsman. The tailor became owner of a shop of ready-made clothes. During the same period there is an important increase in the group of wealthy bourgeoisie, although the latter was but feebly represented among the heavy industry. Almost all saw-mills and an important proportion of the sugar works, were in the hands of Jews. In former Russian Poland and in the neighbouring gouvernements, Jews were owners of a number of weaving and spinning mills. But in the whole of the Russian industry only an unimportant part belonged to the Jews. On the other hand, however, they held the first place in the finances, in the banking world, as well as in higher spheres of commerce. During the war the economic condition of the Jews became even better. Mendicancy disappeared entirely, of which I personally convinced myself in the years i95 and 1916 in gouvernements such as Vilno, Minsk, Grodno and Volyn. Even those Jews who had been banished from the fighting zone to inner gouverneiments, after some months of privation found some sort of living, and many of them even a very good one. Of this I also had an opportunity of convincing myself personally in Samara, whither mans Jews exiled from the Kurland gouvernement, had drifted. And without any exaggeration it can be said that in spite of the lack of rights (in which, however, during this same war considerable breeches had been made), the economic condition of the Russian Jews before the revolution was not only satisfactory, but good. Any further development of the "economic regime of the bourgeoisie" in Russia, could only have brought forth a further advance of the Jewish welfare. 150

C.

Spiritual Condition.

This was the domain in which the Russian Government interfered least of all. Although the struggle between the old strictly orthodox and self-contained Judaism on one side, and the Judaism aspiring to assimilate European culture on the other, still went on, but there was no longer any doubt as to who would be the victor. The European culture had penetrated not only into cities but also into the most isolated small town Jewish communities. But only a very unimportant number of Jews had been completely assimilated by the Russian population proper, i. e. by renouncing its Jewish nationality and culture. If the purely religious factor of the Jewish isolation waned, its national factor had grown in power. This found its support in Zionism, which had taken firm root in Jewish life. At one time Zionism had been officially recognised by the Government, and an all-Russian Zionist Congress took place at Minsk. Later on, simultaneously with the appearance of socialistic factions among the Zionists, the Government altered its attitude towards it. In 19o6-i9o7, the Central

Committee of the Zionist Organisation functioned quite openly in Vilno, sending propagandists everywhere, and almost daily posting its circulars in thousands of copies. Later on the Central Committee had been tranferred to Petrograd, where it acted semi-officially, but quite openly published its official weekly "Rassvet" (The Dawn), which was being sold in 15,ooo copies. Not one Zionist had ever suffered administrative banishment; and at this time the Zionists developed a very extensive activity: they founded their schools, their libraries, they took part in the State Douma elections by putting forward their own list of candidates. But a no less energetic activity was also developed by other spiritual movements among the Russian Jews. "The Society for the Propagation of Education among Jews" created a widely ramified network of Jewish schools, in which the tuition was chiefly carried out in "Jiddish". But Russian and Hebrew were also taught in these schools. Religion enjoyed complete freedom under the Tzar's government. Jewish religious communities enjoyed a wide autonomy. Religious schools ("Heders") could be freely opened everywhere. It is curious thai the government prohibited the Russian language from being taught in them; this being a remnant of the old assimilation policy of Nicholas I., who endeavoured to make Jewish children visit Russian schools. It must be mentioned that the orthodox Jews also objected to the Russian language being taught in "Heders". But detailed facts are of no importance. It is the geral survey that matters; and it is best characterized by the creative culture manifested by the Russian Jews in the last decades. Its profoundness and its scope make it

151

worthy of a comparison with the renaissance of the Spanish Jews in the x2th and 13th century. The productions by Jewish authors were prolific, and appeared in three languages: Russian, Hebrew and Jiddish. Especially intense and original was the creative production in the two national languages. The ancient Hebrew language, which had seemed dead, revived. The brilliant constellation of the eminent poets Bialik, Chernikhovsky and Shneeur proved to the Jews and the world that the language of the prophets not only had not died, but was capable of being adapted to the demands of our time. At the same time as these poets, there worked in the language of the Bible some most original journalists, one of whom, Akhad-Haam, has been translated into different languages. Of course, the Russian Jews possessed a press for all of these three languages, publishing houses, which among other things undertook the translation of the classic authors of different countries into both Jewish languages. One must understand what it all meant: the whole Russian Jewish population was involved in this spiritual life; it became the spiritual centre for the Jews all over the world. At the same time the share of the Jews in the general Russian culture, especially in the Russian press, journalism and literary critiscism, was very considerable. This fact also testfies of the spiritual growth of the Russian Jews under the regime of the Tzar. We have briefly mentioned all the important facts characteristic of the conditions of the Jews in Imperial Russia. On the one side the dark shadow of restriction, on the other the bright light of creative culture which accompanied the fortification of the economic position of the Jews in a country with a constantly growing welfare. At the same time the hope grew that the restrictions would be abolished, for this would logically correspond with the lines of the historic development. During the war large breaches were made in the system of restrictions. The Tzars regime disappeared. The Russian Jews obtained their full rights of citizenship. Did they meet with peace and happiness? Is their normal development guaranteed for the future? II. The Russian Jews under the Bolshevics. First of all one must get rid of one legend: not the BoIshevics upset the Tzars power, and not they proclaimed emancipation of the Jews. Unfortunately not only the adherents of Bolshevism, but also the humanitarian philistines up to this day do not wish to acknowledge that the Bolshevics upset a democratic republic which had been founded in Russia by others than themselves. The Jewish emancipation had been proclaimed 152

by a decree of the Provisional Government under the Presidency of Prince Lvoff, and with the closest colaboration of the Minister of Justice Kerenski. The drafting of this decree had been carried out by members of the "C.-D." (Constitutional Democratic Party) especially by Kokoshkin, who was later brutally murdered by the BoIshevics. Only blind faith in the good of any revolution could have hidden from the eyes of very many Jews, what we could expect from Bolshevism. The nation that traditionally served as the scape-goat in every crisis, was of course bound to be the first to suffer in a civil war raised by the Bolshevics. In the circumstances of this war, Jewish pogroms were inevitable. The French Revolution had also known pogroms in Alsace, though on a small scale; in our country the pogroms were made by the followers of Petlura, the Haidamaks, by Machnobands, by the White Army, as well, us by red guardians and red sailors*). But the pogroms became only possible in the course of the civil war and of the mass-bestiality shown by the Bolshevics from the very first moment of their appearance, before the White Army had even been organised. Thus the prime reason of the terrific pogroms was the Bolshevic rising: had it not occurred, there would have been no pogroms. But the crux of the evil lies not in this, but in the whole system of communism. 8o O/o of Russian Jews belonged economically to the high, middle and most of all, to the lower bourgeoisie. At any. rate, a good half of the Jews lived by commerce and brokerage. And Bolshevism proclaimed it as its essential principle to destroy by violence all forms: of "bourgeoisie", and to monopolise all commerce. They proclaimed it and in fact carried it out with unprecedented cruelty: in one night the Russian Jews were turned into a mass of beggars, deprived of all means of existence. The situation was so tragic that in 119g, the official Bolshevic "Polpred" (Ambassador) in Berlin - the Jew Kopp - in an interview simply proclaimed that "the Russian Jews will have to disappear". If, however, they have not disappeared, it is merely because of their life-energy and adaptability being so great.

I shall only demonstrate by one example, what good the Bolshevia reforms brought to the Jews indirectly. The so-called agrarian reform, by abolishing the large landed estates which mostly worked for export, and by handing over land to the peasants, brought about, in the first place, an important decrease in cereal production, i. e. a marked shrinkage in its export. And in the cereal trade in Russia 19o,ooo Jews were interested. It is therefore easy to imagine what the sudden disappearance of this branch of commerce alone meant. And now, here are some facts and figures of the export in general. *) See "Russia and the Jews", pages 63-64 (Russian and German edition).

153

Before the war the profit from export of cereals in Russia was 4 roubles per head, from the total export - 8 roubles, and if the Ukraine is considered separately, this profit amounted to 20 roubles per head. Under the Bolshevics this profit was: in

1921

.

0.01 kopecks*)

.

o.13

1922 1923 1924

. .

.

79.80

.

...

74.50

.

It must be mentioned that in the last two years, the harvest was a particularly good one. With such miserable profits the peasants could not buy the goods produced by Jewish craftsmen, even if the latter had not been ruined by the whole insane Bolshevic system. Even more convincing are the following figures as demonstrating the average income of a Russian. 1900

.

r913 1921

.

63.oo roubles

.

.

1923-1924

. .

ox.35

.

. .

38.6o

.

.

.

47.30

.

And the result was that, on an average, a Russian inhabitant expended on clothes, shoes, piece goods, and petty goods such as needles, pins, buttons, in 1913 .9.31 roubles 1921 1923-1924

.

. .

.

.

.

i.6o

.

3.5o

,

This means that the purchasing power - not only of the village but also that of the town - had manifestly diminished, and that not only the Jewish dealer in cereals and flax had lost his living, but also the Jewish craftsman chiefly engaged in the production of clothing, linen, shoes and caps. Destined to starvation, Jews organised an extensive and illegal system of underhand dealing and smuggling on the whole of the Western frontier - to their own profit and to that of the population - besides no end of various speculations on the home market; and for these trangressions against the Bolshevic system, they paid with imprisonment, banishment to remote desolate spots, with confiscation, with their lives. The "NEP" (New Economic policy) brought some relief to these unfortunates. But there soon began the persecutions of the "NEP"-people, i. e. the persecution of private tradesmen by means of piratic taxes, administrative punishments, even in the form of banishment to the concentration camp at Solovki*). Again another black day had come for the Jew. ) J. Lestschinsky, 1. c. p. 84. ")

154

Former cloister on an island in the White-Sea near the Polar Circle.

Another section of the Jews sought salvation by entering the Soviet service. At one time - at the outset - they were very numerous; but within the last 3 to, 4 years, owing to an extreme increase of anti-semitic movements, not only among the masses but also in the communistic party itself, the weeding out of Jewish Soviet officials began, - first of all in the Ukraine, and then in all parts of Russia. Again, scores of thousands of Jews are destined to starvation. Such is the general picture drawn by a man by no means blindly anatgonistic to the Bolshevists: "The Jewish trade, the Jewish handicraft and small industries in their overwhelming majority, are utterly annihilated", states Dr. Singalowsky*). And further on: "During my last journey through Russia, I had the opportunity of coming into closer contact with the reality concealed behind dead figures...

Everywhere in large, -

and especially -

in small towns,

I observed a ghastly state of poverty. In White Russia, for instance, where 3o o/o of the Jewish population is officially registered as "professionless", an enormous majority of the Jewish population lives in dire poverty. Only an unimportant percentage of the trading class is able to bear the burden of the enormous taxation-screw and the competition of the co-operative societies. The rest starve! The future threatens them with complete extinction. Out of almost 3 million Jews living in Soviet Russia, 36o,ooo belong to wage-earners (this includes: servants, all free professions and all those who are in the service of the Soviet), and 200,000 are craftsmen. If to this the members of their families and I70,000 Jewish tillers of the soil be added, we shall have 5o o/o of the Jewish population engaged in productive professions (but we must bear in mind that a part of the wage-earners are unemployed and are obliged to live on various subsedies). Out of the remaining 5o 0/o we have io 0/o of the wealthier merchants who have adapted themselves to the regime of the "NEP", a further io 0/o are merchants with a precarious income, who merely vegetate under the cruel pressure of taxation and various restrictions, and who cannot compete with the co-operative organisations. The remaining 3o 0/o are without any earnings whatsoever, and need assistance." This depressing condition increases continually. The discharged Soviet officials swell the number of the unemployed by thousands. But the main thing is the pitifull condition of the Jewish handicraft in consequence of the precipitous fall of the purchasing power of town and village, and of the insane policy of the Soviets endeavouring to augment by violence their platitudinous "socialistic sector". *) Dr. A. Singalowsky: Zum Problem des jtidischen Wirtschaftslebens in OstEuropa. Der Morgen, 927, Heft 4.

155

Here we must clear up a social question: Have the Jews begun being boiled down in the factory cauldron, after which they needs must arrive straight away at the Socialist-Paradise? Let us quote the statistics*) of the distribution of Jews in the various professions in the Ukraine and White Russia, where almost 4/5th of the Jewish population of the whole of present Russia (1924) is living. P

iThe f P rosSfe 30 f

Ukraine absolute figures 0/0

S

White Russia absolute figures

0/0

327,000

20,1

84,ooo

8,8

109,000

6,7

28,000

6,

xr6,ooo

7,2

.8,5oo

4,1

115,000 4. Free professions . ... 5. Agriculture.............8o,ooo

7,1

15,000

3,4

4,9

30,000

6,7

x. Handicrafts

.

......

2. Wage-earners

3. Servants of the Soviet

.

6. Commerce and uncertain professions

. . . . . . . . . . 878,ooo

Total

1,625,000

54,o 1oo00/0

272,500

60,7

448,ooo

roo 0/o

Just in the Ukraine and White Russia did the Jews formerly also play an improtaint part in the local industry. Judging by traditions one could have 'expected that precisely here the Jews would have more easily found access to factories and industrial works. But what do we see? In the Ukraine, Jewish factory hands amount to only 6.7 0/o, and in White Rassia to even less, viz., 6.3 0/5. In a word: the dream of the Jewish ideologists of a prnlitariat, has not been realised. As a matter of fact, just as before Jewish workmen could only find employment at Jewish factories, but owing to the nationalisation of industries, such factories do not now exist. Private enterprises are only permitted, if they are of a very small, home-working type, and within them a Jewish workman also finds an asylum. In the realm of Bolshevism, i. e., of integral socialism, Jewish workmen, in order to have work, have not only to renounce all class struggle, but have also to take up the defence of the employers against the beastly claws of the Soviets. In the above quoted article it is stated that: "The fear of losing their work puts the workmen engaged in private undertakings under the obligation, not only to renounce all further struggle for the amelioration of the conditions of labour, but even to abandon all achievements already obtained in this respect. The whole of the JewishCommunistic press is filled with speculations about the topic that: 'it is necessary as soon as possible to ease the condition of the employers, in order that they should stop closing their works and throwing the workmen out'." *) J. Lestschinsky, ibid. p. 9s.

156

"In the Jewish Communistic press", states the Socialist Lestschinsky, "there is far more talk about how to improve the condition of the employers than of the struggle for the improvement of the conditions of labour." The same author writes: "not only the number of Jewish workmen has decreased, but its cohesion has diminished. The Jewish workman - before the war as well - belonged chiefly to the handicraft-proletariat, but the capitalisation of handicrafts went very far and the number of large works grew. Simultaneously, slowly but continually, did the process of introducing Jewish workmen into factories (Jewish factories D. P.) develop itself. Not only have these processes come to a standstill, but we have been, practically speaking, thrown back many decades. The conquered positions are mostly lost... One is seized by fear when observing how the Jewish works are being broken up, and how widely the sweating-system has set in again among the Jews*)". The socialist bewails the fate of Jewish workmen who constitute only 6 to 7 o/o -of the Jewish population in present day Russia. But the awfulness consists in the fact that fully go O/o of the present day Russian Jews live in barbaric conditions and are not sure of the coming day. "The supply of tools and implements to the out-classed Jews, whose number in present day Russia amounts to One Million, acquires special importance", declared Mr. Moshkovitch in Berlin after having visited Russia"). The information about the number of Jews in Soviet Russia varies between

2,500,000

and 2,700,000.

Of these

1,000,ooo, i. e., 38-4o /o, are

outclassedI III. The most out-spoken foreign bourgeois, in spite of his hate of his home-communism, receives somewhat sceptically what we emigrants tell him about the Russian Bolshevics. He suspects us of prejudice, he is inclined to believe in the good sense of the usurpers of power in Russia, and together with Lloyd George he believes in their talents, and together with all the European humanitarian prattlers, he is sure of their coming evolution in the direction towards reason and order. Let us further quote some information from a book published in 1926 by the State publishing office in Moscow and Leningrad, i. e., Petrograd, under the title of: "Jewish small towns under the Revolution", edited by Prof. V. G. Tan-Bogoras. In a word - an official Bolshevic document. Small Town Sirotino. In the beginning of the 20th century, there lived in it 38o Jewish families. Now there are only 18i families left, although ') J. Lestschinsky, ibid. p. g5. ") Mitteilungen ,,Ort", 1928, No. I3, p. 6.

157

the town experienced no pogrom. Out of the Jewish families that have remained, 32 are engaged in handicrafts and home-production, and as many in other trades. The remaining 117 families (i. e., 64 O/o), form an "Airtrust". - What does this obviously specific Bolshevic term mean? Listen! "But, I say, what do you live on? I am simply a member of the 'Air-trust'. We cultivate air and harvest wind. You understand - the soul cannot be spat out of the body; and even if this were possible, no one would pick it up, - to whom is it of any use? We seize upon everything, even hot stones. But nothing comes of it. Nothing from which to earn even a half-penny. The peasants, as you see, are poor. They sell because they must. They need cash. And cash is not in my possession, but probably in some one elses. Well, I had come to some arrangement with another man, the same as myself, to go and visit the villages. In fact, he has got a nag. I thought something at least might come of it; but when it came to the test, he too proved to have a hole in his pocket. It all happened according to the proverb: 'Two corpses went to dance together'." Then follow complaints about the high rate of interest one had to pay for borrowed money: "15 kopecks a day for every Chervonetz (io roubles)" (540 0/0 per annum).

And what comes after, runs as follows: "Here, by the way, also begins the taxation business. Go and explain to the "Finagent" (Financial agent), how and on what you subsist. If you tell him you are working for a more song, he wont believe you - you can run your head against the wall as much as you like. 'No fear, - had there been no profit you would not have traded at all. And he will cheer you up by taxing you to the amount of some 2o roubles. And additionally he will palm off on you 2 to 3 obligations for every half year. (This is how the Bolshevics place their internal loans!). One would prefer to sell oneself there and then body and soul to pay the "Finagent", but there is no one to buy my old skin." We draw the readers special attention to the following excerpt: "I have become a useless old horse, I who used to be formerly the deepest of chaps about our town. Do you know what? Provide for me, and I shall be - you may be sure - the most perfect of Bolshevics. Shall serve you honestly and devote myself body and soul to Bolshevism. Send me wherever you please. I shall go through fire and water for you, provided I am sure of my food for the coming day. However, I am not going to speak of myself, - I am already 55. But what am I to do about the kids? One of my sons is 19, the other 16... The older one aims at becoming a 'Comsomoletz' (Member of the Communistic Youths Association). Perhaps then he might sooner be accepted as a workman. But

158

see, - they dont admit him into the 'Comsomol', for he is a sinner, he is "tref" his father is a bourgeois. - I took the other son to Vitebsk. Wanted to apprentice him. But nobody would accept him. They are afraid of labour laws. Provide him with a room. Pay his insurance for him. Give him a holiday-rest. And - how do I know what else? So we returned with empty hands. And to they both loave about the streets, and when they come home - give them to eat, and there's an end to it. What will become of them? How do I know? They will become thieves, horse-stealers. A fine consolation for my old age*)." And here is type number 2. Of the same small town; not a member of the "air-trust", but a craftsman. "Look here, I am a tailor, but, of course, I have no work. Were I a member of the Union, then I might have found employment to go and work in the city. All the time I remained in Sirotino, and thought about nothing. And now, no one even wants to speak to you unless you are a member of the Union. True enough, even Union members happen to be unemployed nowadays. In former times, in fact up to 1923, we small-town tailors were well-off, even better than those in the cities. We sewed for the peasants. Our work was paid by corn; and for corn one could get anything. Now everything has turned into air. No one orders anything ... Of late, do you see, everybody has learnt to sew, especially the peasants. And that is why we are broke. For months nothing earned - and there is nothing to live on... And on the top of it all, the 'Fininspector' comes and tells me to take out a patent for home-production. Now try and wriggle out of these circumstances." Type number 3. "I am a wool-comber. Right through the winter and spring we - the whole family - worked from morning till night. By our work we accumulated together almost a hundred poods of corn. It all looked well enough, but proved very bad indeed. Dunning letters from the "Finotdel" (Financial department) began to pour down on me: 'Pay in money, no grain is being accepted'. I sold the whole of the grain, but it was not sufficient. People advised me to enter the Home Producers Union. I went, was admitted, and thought: This at least ought to help me. And do you know what happened? I pay a monthly subscription for membership, and have a members card - and, nothing more. For 5 roubles a week I am willing to carry out the roughest work. But no one wants me. Don't know how to live." May be shopkeepers are in a better position? Listen to what the Bolshevic document reports in regard to this question. *) "Jewish small towns under the Revolution", Moscow 1926, p. IX2/zz3.

159

"A shop. All the goods that are in it are worth 8o to 85 roubles. Money due and cash - some 3o roubles. But the shopkeeper himself owes some 35 roubles. Total: 8o roubles as assets. Out of this wealth, the rent of the shop 24 roubles, taxes and obligations 74 roubles, house-taxes and miscellaneous payments 15 roubles, have to be met. And besides this, a family of 6 must exist*)." You will ask, how is it possible then that people do exist, do not die of starvation? Some sort of an answer can be obtained from the source already quoted. "For vegetable gardens all the yards and even unfrequented lanes have been turned over. The importance of a cow is even greater than that of a vegetable garden. Actually one half of the Jewish households keep a cow, and the other half buy milk from them. In this way is the budget of Sirotino being balanced. Some have sold their goods and chattels in order to buy a cow. When one has a cow, one can sell milk or even butter. Does a Sirotino inhabitant want much to exist? The food-budget of a Sirotino inhabitant is estimated at 21/2 roubles a month per head")." Trade does not feed one; neither does handicraft, and what is to be done with the rising generation? One should take into account the ghastly tragedy 'of that which, quoted from the same Bolshevic document, is set forth below: "Worst of all is the lot of the Jewish youth. The old people only think of living their life to a finish in some way or other, while the young exert themselves in trying to find a way out. Of late, everyone has come to hate trade. Trade doesn't feed one. They long for physical work, be it ever so rough. But work - they find nowhere. An impecunious father strives at least to support his children; therefore he is irritable and grumbles at lads of 20, who are still unemployed and are a burden to him. Thus it comes about that antagonism between generations has an economic basis. The religious discrepancies are of no great importance in this poverty*')." How do you like this "economic basis" of which the communistic investigator speaks so triumphantly! To complete this "economic basis", one more example: "The worst part of it is that the whole of the home-production has come to a standstill. Home producers under no consideration accept either apprentices or journeymen, - or if they do it at all, they do it illegally, the troubles with the law about apprentices are far too greatt)." *) Ibid., p. xx5. ") Page I16. ) Page 117.

t) Page im8. 160

P.

let us move to another part - to a small town of the gouvernement which was very prosperous in the past. This small town of Chabno well-to-do before the revolution. And this is what has become of the Bolshevics. "But then came 1924, and brought to the town new perturbations of quite a different kind. Economic usages centuries old, rotten long ago (?), having always been unsteady (2), began to crumble and to decay.... It is necessary to find a new foundation for one's existence. Otherwise death is as certain as from a robber's hand; death for one's self and for one's family." 1924 was the year of crisis of the "NEP"*), and of this time even the streets of the town and especially its market place give glaring evidence. One can see a large open and entirely empty square. Many closed shops, and those that are open, lack customers. If one peeps into the last rows of houses on the market place, one sees two complete rows of closed shops. On your left in the corner you can see a bent figure silently fumbling with a candle: it is a militiaman affixing the seals to a shop for unpaid taxes. On the opposite side some stakes of the broken Synagogue fence are sticking out, and to the left, the Synagogue windows gape in darkness. Many tumbled down porches and broken down fences, as well as rotten roofs, are to be seen. Further on - the Jewish cemetery. There is no fence to it, and the pigs roam freely over the graves, made level with the surface")." What can be added to this frightful picture of complete destruction and decay? The description of towns, ruined by the vandals would have to be alluded to in order to find an analogy to what is being dolue by the Bolshevics all over Russia, and especially in the large and small towns with a prevailing Jewish population. But let us return to our authority. "1923, the year of the flourishing state of the "NEP", brings also along with it most troublesome symptoms. The taxes reach such a height that the very existence of trading undertakings is being seriously threatened. There occurs a very characteristic phenomenon. The mass of low bourgeoisie individualised, and competing among themselves, is compelled to seek union or co-operation, by reason of the sharp whip of taxation. 'Trusts' begin to arise, mostly consisting of only four to six members, but at times, of more. In 1924 the trusts begin to burst up. The taxes had crushed them completely*)". What brought about this collapse? The Bolshevic investigator points to three causes: a bad harvest, the development of co-operation, and the taxes. But listen! "The true cause of the collapse lies in the taxes and in Now of Kiev, was very it under

) ") **)

211

Pages 52-54. Page 59.

See "Economy in Soviet-Russia", in this book p. 86.

161

their satellites - the fines*)." And further: "the ruin of the peddlars progresses as fast as that of the shopkeepers. The sale of samovars, furniture and other utensils to pay taxes which have been doubled and trebled as a fine, is of every day occurrence .. . It is clear therefore that all the thoughts and cares of the tradesman, all the expectations and hopes of the home-producer and of the craftsman,

-

who from the start of

1924

begin

also to be eaten up by taxes, how to meet the taxes")." Let us now leave the small towns and pass on to the larger ones. Our Bolshevic authority furnishes some information about an important Jewish town - Gomel - which before the revolution consisted almost exclusively of a well-to-do, and partly even rich population. And what became of it after the revolution under the Bolshevics? How, in the first place, does it stand with the workmen? It appears that on the railways and in the railway workshops, almost exclusively Russians supply the service as before, while in other works, now become reduced, there are Jewish workmen. 11Why? To this the Bolshevic gives you an interesting explanation: "Almost all the private factories and works belonged (before the revolution) to Jews, and Jewish workmen, as a matter of course (!), easily found employment there. This is why in these undertakings, many Jewish workmen are to be found* ."" As you see: as it has been, so it has remained. The Jewish workman has not succeeded in mpking his way into the great State industries. He has only secured his hold in the position formerly prepared for him by the Jewish bourgeoisie. turns around the one and only thought:

What happened to the Jewish trade and handicraft? The general number of one-man factories and trading establishments (2969) in the town, is divided into craftsmen and home-workers (1876 or 13.16 0/o), and one-man trading establishments (io93 families, or 7.66 /o). If to this be added 320 tradesmen employing hired hands, we shall have a total of 1413 families living on trade, or 9.90 o/o.

How many Jews are there among them?

"In

comparison to the pre-revolutionary time, there are very few"t), - the investigator promptly adds. In other words: the Jews have lost one of their principle economic positions. And the condition of home-workers and craftsmen? Observe, - that in the Gomel home-workmen's union, Jews constitute 98.39 o/o. And this is what is said of their condition: "Their economic condition is ever getting worse, they are being pushed off the

) Page 6z. ") Pages 62-63. ) Page 154. t) Page 161.

162

market*)." Of tradesmen it is also reported: "the material condition of the tradesman becomes continually worse" 4 ). The tragic condition of the Jews finds its full characteristics in the already quoted sentence: "death threatens them no less certain than from a robber's hand, death for themselves and for their families." And it is clear why: the Bolshevic is as good as a robber. And in spite of this Tan-Bogoras, a Jewish Bolshevic (nolens volens?) dares to write: "Jews became every day more and more attached to the Soviets. The Jewish people are for the Soviets through and through"*)." What impatience: In the course of one page the Jewish mass is sometime becoming (but has not yet become) attached to the Soviets, and on another it is already "for the Soviets through and through". What a shameless lie! The Jew from Sirotino has said why he is ready to become a Bolshevic: for the sake of a wage of so roubles a month, so as not to die of starvation... When the Jewish mass found itself face to face with the terrible phantom of death by starvation, it began on its own initiative to strive for getting on the land. This movement took its rise in the Ukraine in 1922. During this year, IS new settlements had been founded by the Jews between Balta and

Odessa, consisting of 775 families in possession of 841o dessiatina of land. The Bolshevics at once saw that profit might be drawn out of this movement for purposes of advertisement - of self-advertisement of course - and with a fuss, in the making of which they are such masters, they proclaimed to the world at large: we are turning the Russian Jews into agriculturists. This beneficent news, in fact, made many friends for the Bolshevics among the Jews of Europe and America. And what came of it? According to the information of the glorifiers of this colonisation, i7o new Jewish colonies ) ")

Page

66.

Page

o70.

The situation of the small-town Jews, that means a considerable part of the Jewish population in Russia, has since that time not inproved, but became much worse. The Jewish communist Sudarski who made the observation of Jews in the Tultschin and in the Wolyn-Districts, came to the conclusion that about 8o o/o of workmen have no work, in connection with the absolute absence of raw-materials. (The Tribune of the Jewish Soviet Social Corporation, May Ist, 1928.) The General Meeting of the Jewish section of the Ukraine, which took place on 24./25. February, 1928, has adopted the following resolution: "The condition of the poorest Jewish populatin is getting worse and worse during the last months. The process of throwing out of the Jewish dealer and agents, by the cooperation and the Government Commerce, is getting stronger than ever. The absence of labour between the home manufacturers and the artisans, is getting larger.... The present crisis of the little-town-economic, is deep and serious." The Jewish newspaper in Charkoff ,,Der Stern" ("The Star") on March ist, 1928. Both quotations taken from the subsequently cited article of B.Bruzkus.

Editor. *4)

11*

Page 23.

163

were established: about 12,000 families were settled on 220,000 dessiatina of land. During 1925 and 1926 approximately ro million roubles have been spent on Jewish colonisation, two of which were contributed by the settlers themselves, the State handed over by way of a loan 31/2 million roubles, while the remaining 41/2 millions were given by Jewish benevolent institutions, mainly by the Jewish American Agro-Joint and the EKO. During the same two years (1925-1926),

55,ooo families expressed

the wish to settle on land. But in Soviet Russia, from wishes and intentions to their fulfilment the distance is much greater than anywhere else. The great scheme proclaimed with an enormous din - theatrical din, of course - has already proved a most pitiful failure. The latest disclosure by the Bolshevic power is: that there is no more land available for Jews in European Russia; but an entire region can be put at their disposal in the depth of Siberia, - the district of Biro-Bidshan, gooo km far from the actual settlements of the Jews; from there to the next railway station it is a distance of six days on almost impassable roads, a district, in which as well informed people say, the vegetation period takes a time of only about 21/2 months, and which especially abounds in inconveniences, presented by uncultivated places in rough country. And such a district is set aside for the purpose of planting people, who lived during a long range of generations only in towns! The district is almost deserted: on about 3,ooo,ooo hectars of land there are living approximately 27,000 men, chiefly Kosaks of the Amur, whose ancestors were settled here forcibly. This is the real appearance of the Bolshevics blessing, advertised in the whole world with such a great noise. That could not have been otherwise, as we prophesied at the time. [After the manifesto of the Bolshevics, by which they gave to the Jews some land, which they knew very well was of no use, quite a number of people, who were formerly in favour of colonisation, changed their mind. As for instance, the well-known agronom, B. Bruzkus, who in 1925, being in the service of the Organisation "ORT", which, in the first instance, made propaganda for colonisation, very energetically promulgated the project of making agriculturalists of the Jews, and in his last article regarding the condition of the Jews in Russia writes as follows in reference to colonisation, i. e., about the idea itself, and about its success: "The reason of the extraordinary interest suddenly shown by the Soviet Government towards Jewish colonisation, was certainly political. The Soviet Government in hunting after foreign credits, is very anxious to secure the sympathies of the foreign Jewish bourgeoisie. The fact that with the coming and strengthening of the Soviet Regime the Jewish "pogroms" ceased, has favourably impressed the Jews abroad ...... But the reports of the desperate economic condition of the Jewish population under the

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Communistic regime, revealed to the foreign Jews the real state of that regime.... The declaration of the Jewish colonisation on a large scale seems to have been a suitable means for the Soviet Government to rekindle the sympathy for it in different circles of Jewish public opinion abroad.... This slogan was also very convenient for the leaders of the Jewish benevolence. The American Jews have collected large sums (more than 50 million dollars) under the influence of the catastrophes which befell EastEuropean Jews, and especially under the impressions of the sanguinary pogroms during 1921/1922. But the interest for Europe diminished, the offerings ceased to arrive, and the leading organ of Jewish-American beneficence, the 'JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE', was obliged to liquidate its work in Europe....

In order to collect further large sums,

it became necessary to create a considerable 'boom', as the Americans say; and the Jewish benevolence has created this 'boom' by the slogan 'colonisation'.". . So much the author has said about the idea of colonisation; about the success of the colonisation itself, the same author says: "For the first 3 years, not quite 12,000 families of new colonists began to settle down.... The colonists on reaching their destination are obliged to shake down in poorly constructed barracks, and even tents, at the same time working the land and building permanent dwellings. During the winter season a considerable number of colonists were obliged to come back to villages, owing to the scarcity of dwellings. The majority of the above mentioned i2,000 families are far removed from being established: a large number of them have no dwellings, and all of them have not yet sufficient implements. The poor condition of the water supply in the Crimean steppes, causes no end of difficulties. Many years will have to pass before the colonists will have the possibility of standing on their own feet, consequently the plan of colonising four thousand families yearly can in no way be carried out ..... If the Jewish colonists have succeeded in attaining more or less satisfactory results in South Russia, the fate of the Jewish colonists in Biro-Birdshan, is very doubtful." ("Annales Contemporaines" (Russian) Paris, 1928, XXXVI.)

All this is not far removed from what we have timely said about the Bolshevist benefits for the Jews under their rule. It is to be hoped that the most stubborn defenders of Bolshevistic colonisation, will soon have to admit that they have not only chased after a spectre, but also a exceedingly dangerous spectre*). Editor.] *) See ,,Die jfidische Kolonisation in Rufland", published by the Patriotic Union of Russian Jews abroad. Berlin, 1926.

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IV. And what did the Bolshevics give the Jews in the way of juridical rights and creative culture? In Russia, and more especially abroad, it was persistently said that Jews were monopolizing the power in Russia; that they were the masters of the whole country in fact. In spite of the fact that there is now not one single Jew among the peoples commissaries, that Trotzki and Radek are in remote exiles, - such opinions can still be heard. The reality is absolutely different: It must not be forgotten that there exists in Russia now - even in theory - only one fully enfranchised class: viz., the proletariat. And the Jews - as can also be seen from what has been elucidated above - to 8o o/o consisted of the representatives of the bourgeoisie, even if of the lowest. With a crude single-class policy of the Bolshevics, it suffices that the Jews should now still remain in the position of second rate citizens. In regard to entering schools and high schools, there no longer exists a norm of percentage for the Jews; but it is the children of the workmen and the poorer peasants that are now admitted in the first place, and the Jewish children, branded by their origin as bourgeois, find admittance only if any vacancies happen to be free. When some time ago, a general weedingout of the "VUS"-es (high schools) was undertaken, it was principally the Jewish students (male and female) that suffered. Why is it better, than the norm of percentage*)? In the Tzar's time, however, it was the most gifted one that came out on top whoever he may have been. And now the dull son of a worikman will find admittance to the University, while a gifted youth whose father is now nearly dying of starvation, but has the misfortune of having formerly been a factory owner or a merchant, will be left out. The true meaning of all this is that, the terrible restrictions by which the Bolshevics - in their thirst for revenge - punished entire classes of the Russian population, have hit the Jews the hardest of all, the majority of them having formerly belonged to the bourgeoisie. And the real horror lies in the fact that under the Tzar's regime, the restrictions in the rights of the Jews provoked general protestations, while now no protestations are to be heard. Even to the Jews of Europe and America, one still has to prove that the Bolshevics are no benefactors. And the Bolshevic restrictions are worse than the former ones. A Jewish bourgeois, even if he be only a simple craftsman - not to speak of a former tradesman - will not be *) See "The Russian School under the yoke of Bolshevism" in this book, p.

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184.

admitted into Trade Unions, and consequently will find no employment. His son won't be accepted as a member of the "Consomol", which would also be a privilege. And so it is the same in every walk of life. Of course, these is an unimportant number of Jews, who, having tacked themselves on to the NEP and made their fortune through speculations acquire certain rights by bribes paid in cash, of which the Bolshevic officials are far fonder than those of the old regime. The Jewish "NEP-men" become conspicuous to everbody in Moscow, especially to the foreign travellers. In this connection, one is apt to forget that the NEP-men constitute only I to 2 0/o of the Jewish population.

And, to boot, their fate is not

an enviable one: all of a sudden there begins to blow a wind from the "left", and they are hounded, arrested, their property confiscated and they themselves are sent to remote exile, or even w'put to the wall". In a word, a real emancipation of the Jews that could be brought into actual life, does not exist in Soviet Russia, and cannot possibly exist among the savage licence which is in the first place directed against the strata of the population to which the Jews belong almost in a body. If the Jews have not received equal rights even under the slavery of the commune, on the other hand the animosity against the Jews has acquired monstrous dimensions. I am not speaking of anti-semitism among foreigners, which has grown, because partly owing to short-sightedness and partly from lack of judgement, they have made Bolshevism synonymous with Judaism. Nor do I speak of the anti-semitism of some strata of the Russian emigrants, who already formerly preached it, and who are even more embittered now by the severe blows of fate. I am speaking of the anti-semitism in Russia, in Bolshevic Russia. Compared with Imperial Russia an enormous retrogression has taken place. At that time, in the first instance, anti-semitism had a bureaucratic and governmental character. All cultured society was ashamed of anti-semitism as a sign of barbarism. Even those representatives of the Russian intelligentzia, whose true feelings were anti-semitic, did not manifest these feelings. Wholesale anti-semitism existed in the Ukraine only, and it was there that pogroms occurred from time to time, when the Government permitted them to occur. In Greater Russia an animosity towards Jews was really non-existent. Anyway, the democratic elements saw in anti-semitism the manifestations of the darkest retrogression. All this is changed now, as I already prophesied in 'g1; but at the time the Jews did not want to believe me, interpreting my view as a mere embitterment against the Bolshevics. But already in 1922 everything became apparent. The socialist S. Ivanovitch published at that time the following statement ("The Jewish Tribune", No. 133, 27. July, 1922): "A weeding-out is being carried on in the Soviet institutions according to

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nationalities. And the fact has already been reported that a placard 'Jews will not be accepted' has been hung up in a Bolshevic institution." In the same year the paper, "The Jewish Times", reported: "Moscow. A new workmen's communistic party has been formed in Soviet Russia, which has a purely anti-semitic character. This party demands that all Jewish commissaries and high officials be dismissed*)". At the same time the Russian socialist Masloff, escaping with his life from Russia after having experienced four years of Bolshevic hell, wrote as follows: "Anti-semitism is one of the most distinct features of present day Russia. May be it is the most distinct one of all. Anti-semitism is to be found everywhere - in the North, South, East and West. Neither the level of mental development is a guarantee against it, nor any particular party, nor the race, nor the age." Judging from his private observation, a "socialist-menshevic, a socialistrevolutionary, a scientist who belonged to the socialistic party for 15 years, the communists themselves, the members of the 'Revcom' (Revolutionary Committee), all of them have now become anti-semitists, not only in a mental sense, but also in a realistic pogrom-sense")". The same was reported by the socialist Mrs. Kouskoff in Paris in 1923. According to her there was born in Russia a "Zoological" anti-semitism. The same thing is reported by Prof. Sorokin in his book. Moreover, Gorky himself - the adherent of "Lenin's planetarian revolution" - ascertained it at the time in his highly notorious interview. He declared that the Jewish Bolshevics themselves contributed to the growth of anti-semitism by their own tactlessness. Years have passed; there are no longer any Jewish commissaries, Russia is being governed by the Georgian Jugoshvili-Stalin with the assistance of the Georgian or Armenian Mikoian, the Georgian Rudzutak, - but anti-semitism has not only not diminished but has increased, which is now no longer denied even by the Bolshevic press or the Bolshevic Government. A whole book could be filled with communications taken from the Soviet press in regard to the manifestations of a rough and cruel antisemitism at the factories and workshops, in schools and universities, in towns and villages, in houses and in the streets. What strikes one as really terrible is the fact that the present day anti-semitism according to Masloff's observation, is characterised by "soft-hearted and responsive" Russian people, young men "with a tender smile and shy of speech" dreaming of slaughtering all Jews. The spread of anti-semitism is terrible, and has

) See my book: "The Russian Revolution and the Jews". Paris and Berlin, 1923. Chapt. XIV. ") S. S. Masloff. "Russia after four years of Revolution". Bk. II, p. 44/45, Paris.

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now pervaded Greater Russia especially in the Volga region, where formerly there was no vestige of it'). How did the Bolshevic influence tell on the spiritual condition of the Jews? I wrote in my book already alluded to above: "to me it was clear from the very first day that the silent pogrom to which Bolshevism was sure to expose all Jews, would be far more terrible than all those pogroms which up till now had ever taken place in Russia". I shall still make the following quotations from the honoured Jewish historian, S. Dubnoff, who wrote in 1922 ("The Jewish Tribune", No. 34, 9. Sept. 1922): "to write of the present day Jewish culture in Russia would mean writing of miserable wrecks drawing a picture of decay, and reporting the exploits of obscure savages, who are destroying the very last remnants of a past culture. I confess that my mind instinctively turns away from this Sodom: I fear to look back to the abandoned ash-heap". Since i 922, things became more terrible, -

far more sol

The horror of the situation is increased by the bitter consciousness that in the ghastly destruction of Jewish culture, the Jewish communists are more guilty - anyway not less guilty - than the non-Jewish communists. The assault on all that was sacred to Jews, is being conducted by no other than by Jews themselves. Synagogues in great numbers were confiscated and turned into workmen's clubs, theatres or cinemas. The persecution of Rabbis, as supposed fomenters of counter-revolutions, is a general fact. The ruined religious communities could not pay to their Rabbis even the least stipend; and they were compelled to look for some other activity in order to be able to live, adapting themselves to the con*) The following is a testimony of the Bolshevists concerning the increasing of anti-semitism, taken in the literal sense of the word accidentally from their newspapers of recent time: "During the revolution we never saw such a crowding of anti-semitism into the party (the communist party there exist no other parties) and into the communist youths" (Sosnowsky, of the Pravda, September 1927). "Whenever the paper brings an article concerning anti-semitism, the editor receives a multitude of letters, apprising him of sinister facts and horrible events, evoked by anti-semitism" (Komsomolskaja Pravda, September 8th, 1927). In the issue of the Pravda of Moscow, April 2 9 th, 1928, a certain PopoffDukhowskoj attests the fact, that "the anti-semitism has increased during the recent time for many reasons and is bound to permeate the masses of the people". The author of this article himself strives hard in assisting the anti-semitism "to permeate" the masses, by producing evidence, that the Jewish bourgeoisie is criminal, as each bourgeoisie, and the "Jews showed their manners and customs, their habits and practices which appear to the Russian or Ukrainian workman and peasant as being odd, queer and repugnant". A similar article has appeared in the paper "The Atheist on the Machine". And many,

many others . . .

Editor.

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ditions of life under the Bolshevios. In conformity to the general communistic legislation, religion and everything appertaining to it, is being hounded: the sacramental ceremony over new-born boys, the ritual celebration of the wedding, - all this has been thrown over-board. As a consequence, an unheard of degeneracy in family life has set in. People marry easily, are divorced even more easily, and without the least hesitation the masses practice abortion*). Holy-days no longer bring to a Jewish family poetical patriarchal charm: for the use of passover-bread at Passover-time people are being persecuted in various places, whereas its use is simply forbidden to Jewish communists. A very graphic description of this decay is given by Tan in the Bolshevic book: "The Jewish small towns under the Revolution", which we have already quoted more than once (page 25). "In every small town there is a distinctive variation of heresy, - each one more astounding than the other. In Rogatchoff, the grandfathers are Talmudists, the sons are communists, and their children are "treif" (the opposite to "kosher"), i. e., they are not sanctified by Jewish circumcision. And the grandfather smuggles such an uncircumcised child into, the Synagogue and seats it on the table next to the old folios in leather bindings that smell of mice and decay. "What are you going to be, Berka?" and Berka replies with a grave and important air: "first of all, I'm not Berka, but Lentrozin (the first syllables of Lenin-Trotzki-Zinnovieff), and I'm going to be a "Cheka. agent". A Jewish boy dreaming of becoming a "Cheka"-agent, an executioner! The study of the Hebrew language, of prayers and of the Bible, is strictly forbidden. With enormous risks, hiding themselves in cellars and in rooms surrounded by sentinels, some "Melameds" (Jewish teachers), still teach Jewish children the Bible. I quote the following description from the same book (page 24):

"Two last 'Melameds' go from house to house and secretly teach the boys Hebrew. The wife of the Melamed remains outside on guard against the militia. And if any shrewish boy but hints that he is going to inform the militia, the Melamed immediately takes to a graceful flight, together with his wife and his books. And the urchins are endeavouring to become 'pioneers' in surroundings, where those that learn religion are not accepted." Quite like in the times of the Spanish inquisition! And this Bolshevic Jew, this Professor, describes this derision of Jews and of all that is sacred to them, in a tone of raillery just as if it were, some merry event! *) See Note page, 145. 170

A generation is growing up that is alien to our centuries-old Jewish culture, for it is ignorant of it. Therein is concealed the greatest danger. A generation is growing up without tradition, antecedents or family ties. Nor is it being assimilated by the native population: the surrounding antisemitism preventing it. Whereas any attempt of national organisation, is being most cruelly persecuted. Hundreds of Zionists fill the Bolshevic prisons; other hundreds are exiled in far-off Siberia and in the camp of Solovki; and only exceptionally lucky ones get off with expulsion to foreign countries. All Jewish cultural institutions have been destroyed; their activity has ceased entirely. The whole of the national intelligentzia is being terrorised. This loss of culture has upset and crippled the individual souls. The Bolshevic Jew does not even feel all the horror when reporting the following incident: "A little ruffian of about 12 approached the author of this narrative, and proposed to him with the air of a conspirator: 'Come let us nail a cross on the door of the Synagogue; it will make the old men furious!'*)" This is the most salient point: to do evil, to cause suffering to some one. *) Frau Pappenheim, who, as has already been mentioned, is not an enemy of Soviet enterprises, states following concerning the tolerance of the Soviets in religious matters: In the colonies "at the beginning of the undertaking, it had been laid down as a condition that it was necessary to conform to the strong demands of the Soviet Government, which believed itself obliged to put down, and even to persecute all religious formations. Nowadays the evolution seems to proceed in the direction that the religious life of the individual is not subjected to a strong control, and that in the families and in the colonies, religious traditions may be observed both in hallowing of the Sabbath and the other Commandments as well; as far as I am aware, the colonists don't work on Saturdays. ... It is to be hoped that, apparently beginning with a more tolerant view taken by the Government in religious matters, the offices of the Agrojoint and their workshops will soon shift the 'free day' insisted upon by the Government, from Tuesday or Sunday on to the Sabbath, in spite of the fact that the closing of shops for articles of daily necessity is strictly prohibited throughout the whole country. Just as in the matter of educating children, the tendency of irreligion still remains as a strong demand." (Pages igo-gr.) As many others, the authoress of the quoted article hopes , but the hopes of the honourable lady are deceived as well as the hopes of many other people: According to the latest informations, the religious persecutions in Soviet Russia have set in again, and now especially against the Jewish religion'. many Synagogues are closed, etc. The story goes that the chief instigation of such persecutions emanates from Jewish communists. If it is true, it is even worse for us. However, the last Communistic Congress which took place in July/August of this year at Moscow, proclaimed the inconsiderate and radical extermination of everything religious as the most important task of the party; consequently also of the Bolshevic Government. Hence, a new onslaught must also be expected likewise against the non-Jewish religions, then will the Jew possess "equal rights" with the non-Jews. Editor.

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Never has there been such an enormous amount of criminality among Jews, as there is at the present time, i. e., among Jews drugged by Bolshevism. The Russian Jews as a nation are threatened by spiritual death. Is not this more terrible than a pogrom? V. If among the Russian Jews an entirely unbiased plebiscite could be taken concerning the question whether they wished to remain in their present condition or return to the pre-war state with its comparative inequality of political rights, but with its freedom in economic and cultural development, 8o o/o of Russian Jews would express themselves for the second alternative. There cannot be any doubt about it whatsoever. It is not the fallen regime as such that frightens the Jew; it is the transition period between the fall of the Bolshevics and the establishment of a new regime. This transition period is coupled in everybodies mind with inevitable cruel pogroms. There is doubtless some truth in this. The most retrogressive elements of the Russian emigrants are chiefly responsible for the fact that the Jews fear this, for the former continue to merge the resuscitation of Russia with Jewish pogroms. But are the Jews doing right when they preach a passive expectant policy? Therein lies the crux of the problem! One must be perfectly blind not to see the reality. Whatever may come to pass in Russia itself, whatever may be undertaken by other Powers, the Soviets will inevitably fall. We can neither foresee exactly when, or how they will be overthrown, but their end is inevitable. The Soviet regime by its very nature is incapable of evolution. The Bolshevics with their Marxist traditions cannot co-ordinate the interests of the factory proletariat with the exigencies of the agricultural country side population. This was best illustrated by the struggle between Stalin and Trotzki. Stalin's victory primarily signified the victory of village over town. But it all ended in a new pressure on the village population, in a new period of terrible persecutions of the so-called "Kulaks", which means the more well-to-do peasants. This clash between town and village will eventually kill the regime of the Soviets. It is fatal. Is it possible for the Jews merely to take the part of indifferent spectators of what is passing? This would mean remaining unprepared for the very moment of the crisis. This would mean exposing the whole of the Jewish population of Russia to the terrible risk of the stormy time of transition. 172

Salvation lies in action; salvation is to he found in the timely participation, not only of the Russian but also of the international Jews in the struggle against Russian Bolshevism as the enemy of all contemporaneous culture and of Jewish culture in particular. The Jewish republican, the old revolutionary Ju. Delevsky, was quite right when he wrote ("The Jewish Tribune", No. 140, 19. Sept. 1922): "only an active participation of the Jews in the struggle for the dissolution of Bolshevism guarantees their welfare in resuscitated Russia. The best policy is that of the broad ideas and of the great principles of liberation." Caveant Consules! There is no more time to lose. Let the leaders of the Jews at last begin to realise the responsibility that rests upon them!

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The Russian Schools under the Yoke of the Bolshevics.*) By E. Kovalevsky, Chairman of Committees and Introducing Speaker in matters of public Instruction in the 3rd and 4th Duma. CONTENTS: Pre-revolutionary times; The School in present-day Russia; Abolition of Local Self-Government; Condition of the teachers; The ruined schools; The increase of illiteracy; The decrease of schools and pupils; The education - a Monopoly Dalton plan, of the State; Programs and methods of the Bolshevist schools Complex method; The results of these Systems; Education in Bolshevist schools "What we need is hatred"; Awakening of sex instincts; Struggle against religion; Communistic propaganda and party organisations in the schools; Children are obliged to spy. I.

IN

Pre-revolutionary Times.

no other sphere have more high-flown and exhaustive promises been made by the Bolshevics than in the realm of education. Figures have been most shamelessly faked; things have been twisted so as to give them the desired appearance in order to bluff credulous foreigners, little versed in this question. At the same time there is nothing in the activity of the Bolshevics which has brought as much harm to the Russian people as their school policy and system of public education. Perhaps this will be the most difficult and painful problem which future Russia will have to solve. We have also every reason to insist that this question concerns Western Europe very intimately. The policy of the Bolshevics tends to establish in all countries organizations for implanting among pupils of all ages ideas that are to pave the way for the triumph of Communism. This is no secret for anyone; and yet no one struggles against it; no one even seems conscious how grave the danger is. It is high time to try and clear up two false and very harmful conceptions. Unfortunately they are upheld not only by foreigners who are quite indifferent to Russian history and culture; but also by some Russian emigrants. The first mistake is the idea that before the Revolution nothing, or very little had been done for the people's education in Russia; the second is that the Bolshevics have, in a certain *) Much has been written regarding this question. I have generally made use of the data found in Bolshevist sources, such as the official programs (translated into French), circular letters, decrees, anthologies of political instruction, text books, pedagogical books and journals, etc. However, there also exist some very valuable articles among the Russian publications edited abroad, such as "The Russian School Abroad", and the articles published by the Russian Pedagogical Bureau in Prague (Articles of Prof. I. Hessen, of A. Boeme, and of others).

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sense, begun something quite "new" in pedagogical matters, that they have shown much creative activity in the sphere of the people's education. The inheritance which the Bolshevics had received from the imperial regime was very great indeed. Not only was it very considerable, but it contained the possibility of very wide development. Already the second half of the r 9 th century different types of schools had been definitely worked out and their relative importance in the scheme of Russian culture had grown very clear. We shall however, speak of 20th century, at the beginning of which there arose the conviction that illiteracy had to be vanquished as soon as possible. These decades were characterised in this respect by the friendly collaboration of the Government, of the local selfelected organizations (The Zemstvo, the City Organizations), and of private initiative. The idea of introducing universal schooling had been generated long ago; at the time when the serfs were first libertaed, i. e. in 1861-62. E. P. Kovalevsky was then Minister of Education. The project of introducing universal schooling was presented by him, but had to be set aside, because of insufficient funds. The latest project of systematically introducing universal instruction was suggested by the Government and elaborated by the 3rd Duma. This project proposed to spread a network of schools over the whole country, and it was so well adapted to existing conditions, so adequate, that it was put into practice even before the new law had been passed. The aim which this project set before itself was to found so many schools that every child of 8 to i i years old should be able to go to ja school situated not farther than 3 versts from its home. The teachers in these schools were all to be professionally qualified. In 1907 there were i4 million children of the school age. This number of children would have needed 250,000 schools, i. e. a yearly expenditure of ioo million gold roubles by the State. This project was to be realized in the course of ten years. The number of schools actually existing at that time was 7o,000 with an attendance of 5 mill. children. Therefore not less than x8,ooo new schools had to be founded yearly. But taking into consideration the yearly increase of the population of 11/2 O/o, or of 15 O/o in the course of 10 years, this number had to be correspondingly increased.

As it is better that schools should be opened in buildings specially adapted to their needs, i. e. well-built and well-heated, it was deemed necessary to set a6ide an additional sum of 3oo million gold roubles for building purposes. The number of pedagogical institutions for the preparation of well-qualified teachers had also to be proportionately increased. The Government was not frightened by such a considerable outlay and the legislative organs hit upon the most adequate and acceptable manner

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of carrying out this gigantic program. The condition sine qua non was that instruction should be given cost free and that the children of all nationalities and all religious denominations should be accepted. The minimum term of the school course was to be not less than four years. Doubtless, certain modifications were admitted, according to local peculiarities and requirements. Beginning from 1908 the assignments for primary education went on increasing from year to year, till at last io mill. additional gold roubles were assigned yearly. A fund named "The Fund of Peter the Great" was instituted for building purposes. Each year the sums set aside for the fund were increasing till they reached the yearly figure of io million. All local institutions were only too eager to meet the plans of the Government half-way. In 1910 only 15 out of the 36o district Zemstvas did not possess such a network of schools and financial programs for their further development. In 1911, 9 districts and 8 towns had carried out the complete program of universal instruction. And notwithstanding all the increasing difficulties of the last years (war, the ever growing cost of living, etc.) the whole program would have been carried out fully by 922, if the revolution had not broken out. Besides the primary schools there existed also the so-called Double Class Schools in which the period of instruction lasted from 5 to 6 years, and also the "Superior People's Schools" with a course of 4 years; thus giving together with the primary school a period of a full 8 years schoolcourse in the first-grade schools. The number of Superior Primary Schools was over i200. The number of Teacher's Seminaries and Teacher's Courses, and also of the Superior Pedagogical Teaching Institutions (Pedagogical Institutes) was ever increasing, in response to the demand for qualified teachers. It was as far back as the end of the I 9 th century that the Ministry of Education raised the question regarding first grade industrial and technical instruction. At the moment when war was declared the Ministry of Trade and Industry had opened about 5oo special technical and industrial first grade schools for 40,ooo students. And the Ministry of Agriculture had opened 3oo first grade agricultural schools. When the revolution broke out the total number of first-grade schools in the Russian Empire was about 120,000 (of different types) and the attendance 8,ooo,ooo. According to the questionaire made by the Soviets in 1920, 86 0/o (in the cities 91 o/o) of children aged from 12 to 16, (i. e. of children who had been taught in schools founded before the revolution) could read and write. In Russia (in pre-Bolshevist time) as well as in the whole of Europe the education received in first-grade and in second-grade schools was not

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a continuation one of the other. They were two different types of schooling. It is true that during the last years there was a strong tendency to establish a certain coherence between these two systems. The variety of types of schools which existed in pre-revolutionary times in Russia was a great asset from the pedagogical stand-point. Thanks to it, children of different social and mental standards, possessing different talents and inclinations, were not obliged to be pressed into the limits of one and the same program. The parents had the possibility of choosing between schools of different programs and systems for the education of their children. In 1914 there were i8oo standard second-grade schools (with an attendance of half a million children) standing under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Besides these state high-schools there existed a great number of private high-schools, giving the same rights as the state schools and, moreover, every Ministry had its own second-grade schools, which, besides pursuing special aims were capable of giving a full second-grade education to an additional 200,000 children, boys and girls. This type of instruction was a preparation for the University. The development of these second-grade schools was worked out according to a systematic program. The Ministry of Education alone founded 60 new second-grade schools yearly. Even during the World-War, in 1915, some new schools were founded, notwithstanding the difficulty of coping at that period with such great expenses. The programs of these schools had been much modified during the last years. Count Ignatieff was Minister at that time, and his idea was that the second-grade school program should not only be a preparation for a University education, but should in itself be a complete education. The best type of this kind of education was the "Commercial School"; also the second-grade special technical schools of which we have already spoken. The cost of schooling was not above 4o to 6o roubles per year (about 4 to 6 pounds). Children of all classes were admitted. There was only one small group of privileged institutions, specially set apart for the children of civil servants or for the children of military officers. Great attention was constantly paid to the perfection and improvement of the educational system. This was done both by the State institutions and by the social institutions. These systems did not present something stereotyped and unchangeable; they were constantly being modified and elaborated to suit the demands of the times. During the last 20 years the Committee, whose business it was to go into these questions, worked unintermittenly. In this respect both the legislative institutions and the Government strove to meet the expectations of public opinion, expressed in the press and in the activity of the so-called "Parents Committees". The 12

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protection given by the State to private initiative, gave private schools the possibility of trying different kinds of innovations, and thus the adaptability of the latter could be proved before they were introduced as obligatory into State schools. It is only now when the Russians have lost their own fatherland and are forced to educate their children in foreign schools that they have understood how superficial their criticism of the former Russian school was. It has now grown quite evident that many of the defects with which it used to be reproached are in reality inherent to every European school, even to the best among them.

II. The School in present-day Russia. Beginning with the first days of the revolution, even before the Bolshevics had established their ascendency, the very basis of the school in Russia was shattered. It was obvious, (as no definite program of reconstruction had been prepared), that it would be easier to begin by destroying that which existed; and as soon as the unstable "Provisional Government", which was incapable of any creative activity, was routed by the Bolshevics, this destruction began immediately. To get a clear picture of what has been done to the Russian school during ten years, it is necessary to subdivide this period into two parts. The first was the period of "Military Communism"; the second of "The New Economic Policy". The first years of the dominion of the Bolshevics were accompanied by a terrible boom. They proclahned a new era, a new path; they promised not only universal primary education, but universal high-school and even universal University education. This was to be, given cost free and was to be accessible to all, all, all, i. e. to I5o million Russians; and that in the shortest possible period of time. Parallel with this, the process of destruction was carried on along the wholy line. This was done: i) in a direct manner by means of decrees, prohibitions; by closing existing institutions, by eliminating from the programs a series of subjects; 2) It was also done in an indirect way - by encouraging the most daring experiments both in the methods and in the proigrams, which undermined the discipline of systematic instruction; 3) and finally, it was done by refusing to supply the schools with school equipment, by ceasing to subsidize them. By these measures the rich heritage of culture received by the Bolshevics was so-on scattered to the winds. The first to suffer from the policy of the Bolshevics were the first-grade primary schools, though it would have seemed, that these ought to have been of the greatest interest to them. 178

By abolishing at one stroke all the local self-governing institutions the Bolshevics were undermining the very system that was implanting and spreading primary education in the country. And nothing was organized in place of what had been demolished: Local grants were not replaced by those of the State. The financial and economic disorder reigning everywhere at that time caused all systematic pecuniary help to be taken away from the schools. And yet, as the Soviet Government had concluded peace and refused paying all the State debts, one had the right to expect that the credits granted for public instruction should be larger than before, and therefore that universal instruction should be possible in a shorter period. But the activity of the Commissariat of Education consisted only of all kinds of declarations; of fixing imaginary premature terms for "universal instruction". It founded Children's Homes (which were to replace family education); it organized so-called "liquidation circles", to do away with illiteracy. The declaration issued in 1918 proclaimed that the aim of the school was to develop "free personality" and to give a well grounded political education. Instead of being the "slave of capitalism" the child was supposed to become the "Conqueror of Nature". And yet while all these fine sentences were expounded the teachers would receive no salaries for a whole twelve month; and during the period of 1922-1924 no less than 22 thousand schools were closed. The remaining schools were completely disorganized, due to a total absence of all care or help given to them. A decree of 192 I ordered all these schools to be subsidized out of "local funds"; and yet the Commissary of Education himself owned that no such funds whatever existed. This general destruction of the schools was greatly accelerated by such national calamities as famine, epidemics, the devastation of whole regions. Masses of schildren would wander away from such regions. Krupskaya, the widow of Lenin, who was the leader and guide of the people's education in Soviet Russia, was horrified to see that the schools were "in a most threatening condition"; that they presented a picture of "night mare-horror". And in her report during the XIII Congress of the Communistic Party she speaks of facts which would seem quite incredible to anyone who knew the pre-revolution any condition of the people's education and the schools of that time: buildings crumbling to pieces; classes not heated; windows with wooden boards instead of window panes; all the children crowded together in the room of the school-mistress. She herself dressed in rags. No black-bQoards; the teacher obliged to write on the wall; no benches, so the children sit on the floor. They have neither paper nor ink, nor books. "And all this," says Krupskaya in her report, "is not an exception. On the contrary, a good school is a rare exception in contemporary Russia." The attendance at school has also fallen off in a terrific 12*

179

manner. In a school founded for 35 pupils we find only his speeches (Izvestia No. 231, 1924) Lunatcharsky says:

ro. In one of "The population

does not respect the school at all, because the conditions in which the children are taught are such that no one believes they can learn anything there. Often the children do not attend school simply because they have no boots and because the classes are not heated in winter." The Trade Union dep'utation when writing of Russia (1924) says that "the peasants are very' opposed to the school system of the Bolshevics", but is does not add what the reason of this hostility is. In former times we were accustomed to see an intense and sincere longing for education among these same peasants. Two years later the Commissary of Education depicts the condition of the school in still darker colours (Izvestia, No. 224, 1926). According to him "the children are huddled together in hovels, or in buildings in which the ceiling is in danger -of falling in. Instead of the required minimum of 5 square arshins per child the actual space allotted is 11/2 square arshins, i. e. about the size of a coffin". And this was written at a time when civil war, and the blockade, and the famine had long become things of the past, so that there were no, "national calamities" to excuse these horrors. What then could the teachers do in these circumstances? In another place Lunatcharsky writes again: "There are terrible cases of beggary, premature death, suicide among our teachers; the rate of illnesses is terrific. It can astonish no one that many have run away from their posts and that there is no one to replace them, because the salary received by the teachers is lower than in any other profession". At one time it was as low as 4 roubles a month and only now it has been raised to 10-12 roubles (this is announced with great pride). Yet even this miserable pittance is often received 2 to 3 months in arrears (Report of Krupskaya). Of course this terrible and revolting truth was made known only for "home use", it was not to be "exported". During his visit to Paris, in 1924. Lunatcharsky throws a veil over it, exclaiming: "But just think what a unity there exists between the mass of the workmen and the teachers, what general enthhsiasm," this statement is obviously quite contrary to the statement we have j'ust quoted, namely, that the schools are half empty and that the teachers circumstances are perfectly tragic. This tragedy lies not only in the material conditions to which the few remaining teachers have had to submit. "We are slaves, slaves of all who surround us, of all who are in authority", writes one of the teachers from the Poltava province (in the "Biednota"). "We are worn out, unnerved, we despise ourselves". "Yes, those that are in authority love high-flown words: "Down with illiteracy", "Proletarian Culture", etc. But in actual

180

life the last resources of the teaching staff are used only to produce little parrots", writes another ,lady-teacher. This seems to be very far from then enthusiasm of which Lunatcharsky speaks. V. Rosenberg writes very justly about the conditions of the Soviet school during the first 5 years of its existence. His book is a very complete investigation of this question. He says: "In reality the people's education has gone back several decades as compared with its state in pre-revolutionary times". Even the official newspaper "Pravda" proclaimed (though of course foreigners were not to know of this) that "the measures taken to abolish illiteracy had only increased it". Till now we have been speaking only of the destruction of the primary schools. The same process was going on in the second-grade schools. These schools were either simply closed, or they were destroyed by a barbaric reform. Schools were looked upon as an experimental field upon which all kinds of new tentative methods could be tried. Even in boarding-schools it became compulsory to have only mixed schools, i. e. for boys and girls together; every school was declared to be a "self-governing unit" in which the children themselves and the servants formed part of the administration; the children were allowed to choose the subjects "they wanted to learn"; independence was supposed to be encouraged by abolishing every vestige of a systematical program and of outward discipline; "Pupil Committees" were organized, whose business it was to spy on the teachers and control their activity, etc. In 1918 it was officially proclaimed that only one type of school should exist, instead of all the former types: A "Labour School" subdivided into ist and 2nd grade schools (5 or 4 years course). This school had to bring conformity into the instruction of the primary and secondary schools. In reality this resulted only in all the higher classes of secondary schools being closed and named "Second grade Schools". The "labour" principle had to be carried out according to a rather complicated system which generally was either not carried out at all, or which resulted in a senseloss loss of time most harmful for the studies of the children. The year 1923 must be looked upon as the turning point in the school policy of the Bolshevies. The epoch of high-flown proclamations was passed, nothing had remained to be destroyed; the time had come to make the schools serve their direct aim - Communism. Towards 1923-24 it seemed that circumstances were favourable for the development of the schools in Soviet Russia. The wars were at an end, the blockade had been raised, the famine, after having carried away millions of victims, did not repeat itself; the new economic policy had partly regenerated the economic life of the country: the financial administration had some ressources placed at its

181

disposal and was thus able to dispose of ceartain funds. supposed that the plan of introducing universal instruction applied. So much had been written and proclaimed regarding of illiteracy! And a decree was actually issued stating that should be the last limit in which universal education was to

It was to be would now be the liquidation the year 193.4 be introduced.

According to statistical data there were 66 thousand schools in 1923 with an attendance of 41/2 million children. The figures given by Soviet statistics must be accepted only after careful sifting. But even if we accept the statistical figures given by the Commissariat, we see that the decrease of schools and pupils has been about 50 o/o, as compared with those existing in 1917! As regards the decree of universal instruction, it is very obvious that there are not sufficient funds, either locally or in the central administration to carry it out; therefore there is no hope of returning to pre-revolutionary conditions. Even as late as 1926 Lunatcharsky owns that there is a great need of school equipment and of books; that many of the building are falling to pieces; that the teachers salary is a mere pittance*). Those who have visited noit only Moscow, but also some out-of-the-way provinces, and who have returned abroad, relate that even during the summer of 1927 they saw many teachers whose salary was not sufficient to keep them in decent boots and clothes. They lived in peasant huts, as there was no place for them in the school-buildings. The remnants of the former school equipment was all they had, to carry on instruction; for there was no money to buy a new one; indeed, it was difficult to buy anything in that line. Neither is it considered at all necessary that the schools should be in good sanitary repair. The only thing demanded of the teachers is that they should advance the interests of the Communistic Party. They are obliged to pay the party subscription fee out of their pitiful salary. But no one asks them what or how they teach, and whether they achieve good results. Even at present the number of teachers is insufficient. And it is quite beyond the means of the S. S. S. R. to prepare the 13o.ooo teachers actually necessary for universal instruction. According to Rykoff's statement: "Russia has been transformed into a country with increasing illiteracy." In the villages only 4o o/o of children *) In

1927

the salary of the teachers was raised to 37 roubles a month. But as

the rate of exchange of the "Chervonetz" has fallen considerably the actual worth of the salary is only 18 to 20 roubles. On pre-revolutionary times it varied from 3o to 6o roubles. The desiderata of the teachers is that their salary should attain the prewar standard. (The Teacher's Paper, No. 12, 1927.) Lunatcharsky stated openly during the XIII. Congress, that the salary of the teachers was only 4o o/o of the prewar one. (Min. of Educ. No. 5, 1927.)

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of the school age can attend school. The schools are of the poorest, and many of the children must be dressed, shod, and fed before they can attend it*). Such has been the "creative work" in primary education. Let us now see what has been done for second-grade schools. Our former "Double Class" and "Superior" primary schools have been registered by Soviet authorities as second-grade schools. This is simply statistical dishonesty. They only schools which, up to a certain degree, correspond to the former secondary type of schools are the "Nine Year Schools". There are 750 such schools with an attendance of 4oo,ooo. If we are to believe the figures of Bolshevist statistics (though they are actually greatly exaggerated) we see clearly that it is impossible for the mass of children finishing the primary schools to continue their education in second-grade schools. In 1918 it had been solemnly promised that secondary education should be accessible to every child, yet there exists only one second-grade school to every ioo primary schools. Besides this, all the vacancies in the upper classes of the secondary schools are nearly quite filled up by pupils who have taken the whole course of instruction in the school itself and therefore there are very few vacancies left for any other children who want to enter them.

A decree of 31.

8. 1925 has

forbidden second-grade schools to be opened in districts in which the number of first-grade schools was insufficient. On the other hand private schools are not allowed to be opened, because the State enjoys the monopoly of the people's education.

It is true that so-called "Workmen Faculties" (Rabfaki) have been opened for certain categories of the population. The pupils can enter these Rabfaki after they have graduated from the primary schools. The Rabfaki have a course of three years and their aim is to prepare the "proletariat" for University instruction.

They are strictly "Party" institutions destined

to accept only Communists. The educational standard in them is so low that they cannot compete with a normal secondary school. It is even lower than the former sub-high-schools (pro-gymnazia) which had a course of only four years. These Rabfaki are beginning to die out, as their complete inadequacy has grown obvious. In 1923 there were 113 Rabfaki. When it was decided that an examination had to be passed before entering the Universities and when most of the students of the Rabfaki failed in these examinations, the number of the Rabfaki began to dwindle. The year 1923 was the turning point in the fate of Russian schools. The aim of education was then clearly defined. There was no more talk of showering the benefits of education over all the population. The aim *) The Russian School Abroad, Prague, 1926, No. 23.

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grew to be much more narrow and limited: Education had to prepare first of all specialized workers to step into the shoes of the cultured workers of the old regime who were dying off; secondly it had to prepare Communists, who were to fill the dwindling ranks of the Party. To attain this it is not necessary to have many schools. On the contrary, a superabundance of both these classes of workers is undesirable and dangerous. Therefore the schools had to make a severe selection; they were no more to be accessible to all; they must be privileged class schools. It was established that only a certain percentage of the children of the former "bourgeoisie" should be accepted into the schools; that they should be quite deprived of access to the University schools; that the registration for entering schools should be cut down; that certain schools should exist only for the proletariat; that instruction should no more be given cost-free, but should be paid for - all this has created a very definite system of party and class education, to the detriment of the principle of universal education. As there are not sufficient funds for all, the great majority of schools are allowed to crumble away, and all the attention and interest are centred on a small number of institutions "useful" for the aims of the Communist Party. III. Programs and methods of the Bolshevist School. The communist pedagogues borrowed some ideas from the Swiss, Belgian, German and English pedagogues of the end of the 19 th and beginning of the 2oth century. These ideas had never before been sufficiently practically tested. The Communist pedagogues not only borrowed these ideas, but proclaimed themselves to be their authors and immediately began to carry them out everywhere without taking into consideration either the existing conditions and possibilities, or the qualification of the teachers. It remains somewhat obscure why these new methods were supposed to be the best means of eradicating old prejudices and instilling new ideas. These new methods consist first of all in the so-called Dalton Plan; secondly in the "Complex Method" of instruction. This methods is being applied Kat least in as far as Central Authority finds it possible to exercise its control) both in the first and in the second grade education. Both these methods exclude all systematic instruction, and systematic development of the subject. They are superficially attractive, promising great liberty and variety in the choice of the subjects taught. But in reality they only accustom the children to be talkative in a high-flown manner, repeating sentences they have heard from others and, at the same time, leave them overwhelmingly ignorant of fundamental facts. 184

We shall try to explain as briefly as possible wherein the essence of these methods consists and in what manner Soviet authority has tried to make use of them, so as to educate perfect Communists. The Dalton Plan is a method which admits of individual, independent study of separate questions or of certain parts of a subject without any systematic preparation, unconnected with the general program of the secondary school. The aim of this method (an aim which can be attained only if a certain level of intelligence exists) is to communicate no knowledge, but to accustom the student to acquire knowledge independently in any sphere he desires: to teach him to extract it by himself from books and other sources. This method ought never to be applied in the case of young children; older ones can use it only when a certain fundamental amount of knowledge has already been acquired. In a very interesting book by a Soviet author, "The Diary" of a certain Kostia Riabtzeff (he is a pupil of a second grade school) we find the following words: "The Dalton Plan is being introduced into our school. This is a system thanks to which the teachers will have nothing "to do, and the pupils will have to find out everything by themselves. Our school desks will be replaced by long tables, the classrooms will be named "laboratories"." And a little farther he goes on to say: "The Dalton Plan is worth nothing. We all, both the teachers and the pupils, understand nothing. All the fellows say that Dalton must have been a Lord, one of the bourgeois, that it was he who invented this plan. During one month we must read a whole heap of books, write ten reports, and draw the outlines of 8 diagrams; and besides that we must be able to speak about all we have read and written." The only practical result of this plan, which has been applied only as an experiment in England and in U. S. A., has been in the U. S. S. R. to overburden the children with tasks they can neither understand nor fulfil, and to muddle definitely the brains of teachers who were quite unprepared for this kind of work. The Complex Method was and is being introduced with great insistence and obstinacy. The Bolshevic pedagogues love to demonstrate it to their European guests. They maintain that it is the "new word" in pedagogical science which they have proclaimed*). According to the definition of the Soviet Authors the complex system is the study of all concrete phenomena taken from actual life and grouped *) There is in reality nothing new in this system: it \has often been applied both in Russia and in Europe in so-called "object lessons" and in the teaching of foreign languages.

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round one particular central idea or theme*), in other words: "The Complex Method not only demands that the children should systematize all they are taught round some general theme, but also insists that all this work in ,school should be founded on the strictly defined principles of a communistic education." Three themes must be taken as the basis of a communistic education: Nature, Labour and Society. During the four years of the primary course the following sciences must be taken in review: Zoology, botany, mineralogy, physics, chemistry, geography, the anatomy of man, hygiene, astronomy, agriculture, including gardening, cattle raising, apiculture, vegetable culture; technical knowledge concerning certain industries must also be taught. All this material is to be taught by grouping it round the above named themes. During the first three years of study the teacher should study local material and facts. During the fourth year he passes over to the study of the "Universe". One must keep in mind that all this is to be done with children of 8 to I2 years old. The children must be taught, not by tales out of a book, but by direct observation of animals and of men; they must be shown the physiological structure and fruitfulness of the local plants. During the 4th year (when the child is ii years old) it is taught meteorology and astronomy and during this teaching a materialistic view of the world must be inculcated. This program does not contain a single independent subject: neither the Russian language, nor arithmetic, nor geography. "The native tongue must be taught only in as far as it is connected with the "complexes" of which we have spoken. It must be taught only together with the other subjects; and yet it is taken for granted that at the end of the first trimester of the first year, the children will know how to read, write and be able to add, substract, multiply and divide all figures under 20. It is also insisted upon that the child is not to be taught to read and write before it understands the use of these accomplishments. Grammar, and the art of reading and speaking well are also to be taught according to the complex method." During the fourth year the pupil must be able (the child is only xi years old) to write "the most difficult and complicated letter, to give a report, to keep the minutes of a meeting, to compose a petition, to report on the work done, to keep account-books. Arithmetic must teach him to measure existing objects. Thus, for instance, if in the section of the lesson marked "Nature" you happen to be speaking of domestic animals, it will *) A. Boehm. The Russian school abroad, book No. 23, The Impressions of the Chief Social Instructor Einstein in one of the Moscow schools.

186

be very well that the arithmetical exercise should consist in "measuring the tail of the cat". Metrical measures are recommended so that the "children should forget as soon as possible the old Russian measures", etc. etc. All this and many things besides must the little city and village children learn to know during the conversations on the theme "Nature". The other theme: "Society" introduces first of all the system of the communistic local and central administration; great stress is, of course, laid on the benefits of the October Revolution; the question of the family is but slightly touched upon. But it is especially during the discussions on the theme "Labour" that the most incredible things are demanded of the children (at least they are set down on the program). The pupils are made to perform all the different tasks about which they are learning. They must work in the flower and vegetable garden, in the field, in the cowshed and pig-sty; they must make their own boots, clothes, they must store fodder and food-stuffs; they must draw placards for processions; they must study the statistical data of local economic life and of trade. Experimental work in the laboratories and countless excursions also fill out the program. At the same time it is not taken into consideration whether the schools, which are actually huddled together into mud huts and tumble down cottages, because many of the remaining former school buildings have been taken up by administrative or party organisations, have vegetable or other gardens, or experimental fields, or laboratories. No one takes into consideration the physical impossibility of certain demands; the age of the children; the time and strength of the teacher. The following picture is an illustration of the actual results of this system. A travelling lecturer and pedagogue is speaking with the teacher of a village school: "At first the teacher answered timidly, as if he felt a little ashamed of speaking about his school. 'Our school is a very ordinary one ... I work very slowly.. .' But as soon as it grew clear to him that all schools were more or less in the same condition he began to speak in quite another tone: 'I have succeeded in collecting some kind of data during the last years. Please, notice the methods which we apply in organizing our "Labour School". At first we introduced the method of selfhelp: All was done to make the children to help themselves. .. .' "And how was general instruction given?" 'Well, to speak the truth, no instruction was imparted at all ... The children were too tired to learn'." After that another method was introduced: the "Discussion Method"; then it was abandoned for the "Active Labour and Laboratory Method", a Method which is closely connected with the "Excursion Method". Then it was the turn of the "Concentration Method". However we did not stop for 187

a long time at the "Complex Method", we passed over to the "Dalton Plan"... and had nearly put it into practice, but here the peasants intervened and demanded "that the children should be really taught something". At present I try to "pluralize" all these methods; the children grow more developed, they discusss about all kinds of subjects... but unfortunately with all these methods they do not learn to read or write.... But I dare not teach them in the old manner, and nothing comes out of the new methods. When the inspector visits our school he sees that there are neither books, nor paper, nor pencils; and yet he asks: "Do you teach according to the Complex Method? Do you organize excursions?" We have heard the same complaints from the lady-teachers of Petrograd. All of them are over-burdened and worn out by orders that cannot be carried out, and no time is left to teach the children to read and to write. Both the physical and mental standard of the children is much lower than it used to be before the Revolution. In the second-grade schools we find the same "Complex Method", still more high-flown themes, and quite accidental scraps of information. Not a single normal subject, such as languages, mathematics, history, or geography. Everything is a hopeless jumble of separate scraps of information, quite artificially tacked on the theme. For example: the theme is "Lenin"; the geography of Switzerland and the description of the economic life of Simbirsk are passed in review. The connection between these subjects is that Lenin lived in Switzerland when he was an emigrant and that he was born in Simbirsk. History is taught without any dates being given (because we begin our chronology from the year one - Anno Domini) and the whole of it is really reduced to the history of revolutionary movements. The "labour" element is totally absent from these schools; no manual occupation whatever is taught. But countless compositions are given on all themes connected with the ideology of Marx. We shall give the scheme according to which the "Complex Method" is applied in the 3rd years course of a second-grade school, so that our readers can judge for themselves what kind of instruction has replaced the former normal programs. Nature

Labour

Society

The structure of the Universe. Astronomic information and the corres-

The chaos which existed in the social organization of labour during the capitalistic regime.

The development of capitalism. The markets of the world. Imperialism. The Imperialistic war of 191.

ponding

chapters

of

physics and chemistry. 188

The central place in the scheme of education is occupied by a sort of commercial and industrial geography, political economy and "political alphabet". In autumn of 1926 and 1927, many pupils graduating from the second-

grade school had to pass an examination before entering the University. And then it was fully proved that the new methods and programs were quite inadequate. The official organ of the Commissariat of Education testifies to the fact that the education given in the secondary schools is most unsatisfactory; that the reading and writing of the pupils was below the most -elementary demands; that general information in natural science, geography, physics, and mathematics was vague and had not been intelligently understood. It has been necessary altogether to exclude some subjects from the list of examinations, because the students had absolutely no idea of them*). The examining professors demanded only a minimum of knowledge; but even this minimum had to he lowered during the examinations for the Technical University school in Petrograd: otherwise all the candidates would have failed. (The Red Newspaper, No. 1215). During the competition examination for the Mining Institute the candidates failed, because they did not know decimal fractions. The total number of unsuccessful candidates was 15,ooo; i. e. 2/3 of all those that had presented themselves for the examinations"). After this Soviet authority, which has lately adopted a very utilitarian view on schools, was obliged to give up many of its theories. However it has done this without changing its communistic slogans. At present a new program is being worked out in which a strong tendency to return to the usual methods of instruction is visible. Separate subjects of instruction are again being introduced. Before closing this short sketch concerning instruction in Soviet Russia, I should like to give due honour to the self-sacrificing and steadfast labour of the few old pedagogues who have remained at their posts. During all the communistic experiments they have stood up for and saved the small remnants of Russian culture in the schools. Thanks to them some little scraps of it still exist and some groups of children are acquainted with the past history of their fatherland, with its great authors; they have learnt to value the wealth of Russian culture. ) People's Education, No. 1, 1926; No. 2, 1927. ") In the examinations of this autume (1928), candidates was also exceedingly large;

the number of unsuccessful

exact figures, however, have not yet reached us,

189

IV. Education in the Bolshevist School. Though the harm done by BoIshevic methods of teaching was bad enough, the results of Bolshevic education war still worse. Of course it was to be foreseen that we should find nothing about relegious education in the programs of

1918

and 1923, but there is also nothing about that

moral education which is introduced in to the programs of all those countries in which the Church has been separated from the State (ethical teaching). This in no wise means that the communists are not interested in the direction in which the youth will be brought up. On the contrary, all the teaching, the whole system of school organization, all the different groupings of school-children - all tend, directly and most adequately, to re-educate the boys and girls in the spirit of the Communistic Party; to imbue them with "class moriality" - which is the only morality that they accept. What are we to understand by the words "Class Morality"? Firstly, its fundamental principle is not love of our neighbour, but hatred, an undying hatred of all who do not belong to our class and our party. "Down with love towards our neighbour. What we- need is hatred", exclaimed Lunatcharsky during the Teacher's Conference. According to the program one of the aims of the school is to develop hatred towards the capitalistic regime and towards the "bourgeoisie". This is the main spring of all the themes. From its very first year in school a child, aged eight, is taught not only the principle of class struggle; he is also taught not to love and respect his parents; he is told to spy upon them; he is taught to compare the material conditions of his neighbours, i. e. to envy them, if they are richer. During the second year the children are supposed to hate and condemn, not only their neighbours, but also the "rich"! "the priest" and the profiteer. The field for his hatred grows ever wider. He is taught to hate the historical past of his country; all the representatives of former authority, all the former statesmen and social leaders. Next to be hated are the foreign capitalists, "the school, the press, and the religion" of "bourgeois countries", for they have all been created to "dupe proletarians"; whole countries are to be hated; also the leaders of foreign governments, and so on, and so on, without end. It is characteristic that in the very favourable reviews of a Bolshevistic anthology (Leonoff's Anthology) the "Teacher's Newspaper" remarks that the last tale "is saturated with mutual, deadly, superhuman hatred"*). *) Teacher's Newspaper, Moscow, No. 24, 1926.

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The central authority itself, as represented by Lunatcharsky, has, during the XIII Congress of the Soviets, pronounced that the greatest part of students and pupils are enemies and political adversaries, whom he considers it would be well to expel from all educational institutions; or, at best, one might allow them to enter Universities, but only through a loophole "as small as a needle's eye". Such is the predominant atmosphere in schools. Is it surprising that such a soil breeds all varieties of hooligans? Hatred is easily vented on anybody who is not of your opinion: on the lady-teacher*), on a surgeon, on a stranger, on any one belonging to another religion"). The second factor which demoralizes our youth is the premature awakening of sex instincts. The subjects taught do much to awaken these instincts. All this is done in a pseudo-scientific manner, in connection with the study of anatomy and physiology; it is done at an age when children are not at all interested in questions of sex-relations. Questionaires, which are quite incredible by their immodesty, are sent out among the schoolchildren; "free love" is openly applauded, and unnatural, monstrous relationships are encouraged among the children of the school. According to the questionaires sent out among the Leningrad schools 88 O/o of the girls had had sexual relations. In the children's homes and asyl'ums, in which boys and girls live together, the moral atmosphere of their environment leads to such outrageous looseness of conduct that literally all the children are infected with venereal diseases. The third and chief reason of the children's demoralization is the fact that not only all religious feeling has been taken out of education, but that a bitter struggle against it is being waged in the school. "From the very kindergarten the child must be surrounded by unbelievers" (XIII Congress). "You must know how to profit by each doubt arising in the heart of a child when his demands have not been answered by God". The teacher is officially bound: a) To abstain personally from all observances of religious rites; b) to organize a "scientific" anti-religious group and to take part in such a group; c) to help and organize an "anti-religious corner" in the local reading-room; d) to hold anti-religious lectures, etc. ) If a lady-teacher has reprimanded a pupil she can never be sure that a stone or a stick will not be hurled at her from behind a fence. The teachers are all well used to be spoken to in a rude and dastardly manner. "Give me back my book", calls out a boy whom the lady-teacher has punished him by taking away a book. "Give it back or I shall kill you". Labour, No. ii4, 1926. *) The pedagogical literature notes with anxiety the growing spirit of antisemitism in Soviet schools and the painful cases when Jewish children were severely persecuted in Russian schools. ("On the Way" - Na Putiack, No. g, 1926.) 191

A teacher is valued or not according to the energy he displays in antireligious education. He receives rewards, if he is successful in eradicating all traces of religious feeling from the heart of a child. A fourth and very important factor of the moral perversion of our boys and girls are the party organizations, which act parallel to the school. The children are invited to take part in these organizations. (They are called "October Offsprings - Octiabriata"). The innocent, feeble child's soul is thus drawn into the vortex of active political struggle; the children are poisoned for all their lives by the tactics of this struggle. The older boys are grouped into. "pioneers" - somewhat like the boy scouts. When 16 years old, the school boy or girl can become a member of the "Comsomol" which is the direct path to become member of the Communistic party. The Comsomol is a complicated political organization, possessing its own strict status and very definite aims both in its work within the schools and outside them. It is of immense, fatal importance for the future not only of Russia, but of all European States. The position of the teacher in the school is extremely difficult and degrading: the work is insufferably hard, they are constantly ordered to do things that insult them and run counter to their inward convictions. But still more unbearable does it grow, because there exists in every school a committee of pupils which not only has the right to interfere in the system of instruction, but can even exercise control over the behaviour of the teachers. These committees generally consist of "Comsomoltzy" or are directed by them. Every member who enters this organization is obliged to work for the party, i. e. he must observe and report to authorities regarding the political fidelity of his comrades, teachers, parents, and acquaintances; thus every deviation from loyalty to the Soviet regime will be denounced*). It is easy to imagine what a chasm between comrades, between the teachers and the pupils, between the parents and the children, such an educational system produces. How morally degrading must this systematic spying and treason be for the children and for the youth. Besides this, the political *) In the tale of Marianna Jachontoff "Waija Chabarowa", printed in No. 6 of April 1928 of the journal "The Young Guards", a communistic news-paper, as all others in Russia, there is glorified the heroic exploit of a i4-years aged girl Walja Chabarowa. She knows from a chat of her mother with a friend of her late father, that this friend is an adversary of the Bolshevist Government and that he is pursued by the Bolshevics. Walja immediately denounces him to the "Cheka" and conducts the Chekists herself to the home of her mother, where she shows them all places, where the friend of her late father can hide himself, and so she helped them to take him into custody. The author is delighted with this deed of the girl, and qualifies it as the limit of the "remodelling of the human material", wishing that "all boys and girls of the U. S. S. R. may take a leaf out of the book of this girl and emulate her". Editor.

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organizations take up nearly all the time of the children. They have no time left for their school exercises; yet they are sure that this will be overlooked and pardoned, and that they will be allowed to graduate from the school successfully whatever their knowledge may be. One thing more helps to demoralize the children still further: it is the consciousness of the power that has been given them; the certainty that they will remain unpunished. This manifests itself in acts of wild violence between the comrades themselves; in insolvence towards their elders, and hooligan behaviour towards outsiders. All criteria of moral values have been lost; they have been replaced by a consciousness of evil party solidarity. What will the present generation be like after having passed through ten years of Soviet instruction, Soviet training, and Soviet education? We can answer the question without hesitation: "What has the Bolshevistic regime achieved in the realm of the people's education during these ten years?" It has destroyed the schools; the education of the country has been set back for many decades; culture and the moral standards have been lowered; the spiritual life of a whole generation has been vitiated.

13

193

The Russian Church under the Bolshevics By Prof. N. Arsenjew. CONTENTS: The Church has proved its power of resistance; The terrible persecution of the Church and the Priests; Letters from deported Priests; Self-organisation of Believers; The hunt of the Bolshevics after the soul of the Child; The Church triumphs.

IT

is extremely difficult to depict the present state of the Church in Russia*). Statistics are -of no help in this respect, for one is dealing with the spiritual source of a people's life, and spiritual matters cannot be gauged in that way. This does not imply that things spiritual have such hazy -outlines that they are apt to shift with the point of view of the individual observer. They have, on the contrary, their distinct place in life, they rule over life and are apparent in manifestations of the spirit and of the power. Therefore we must not expect tables of figures to give us a correct description of the condition of the Church; we should turn to the thing itself, to the life of the Church; it is something throbbing and growing in the secret places of the heart, and something, at the same time, burning visibly, like a sacred lamp; it is an inner force that bears fruit,

and the fruit of the spirit are love, gladness, peace, patience, charity, faithfulness. One must bear this in mind when speaking of the Church in presentday Russia, for these things are the truest expressions of its life. Do they stand in any connection to this historical background, and have we the right to speak of the "fruit of the spirit", when trying to picture the action of the Bolshevic yoke on all the Russian nations life? The answer is in the affirmative; we are bound to speak of the high exploits of the Church, if we want to study our subject in full. People are always ready to bow to success, to strength. That is why numerous Governments are trying hard to get into the good graces of the Bolshevics, whom they consider to be - at least for the time being conquerors in view of their having retained their power for ten years. There is something very light and superficial in such opinions, but the very ')Referring to Soviet persecution of the Church see, for instance, that collection of documents - "The Assault of Heaven" (1924, London), R. Wallau "Zur Lage der orthodoxen Kirche in Ruffland", in "Una Sancta", 192;, Heft 2, Richard J. Cooke (Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church), Religion in Russia under the Soviets, New York-Cincinnati, 1925, Prince Greg. N. Trubctzkoi "Das Schisma in Sowjet-Rufl1and" in "Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift", Bern 1927, Heft 1-3, "La l6gislation sovietique contre la religion". Traduction des documents officiels ("Orientalia Christiana", vol. V, i, (No. 18), Octobri, 1925, Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Roma), N. S. Timasheff "Mnogolikost Sov. Tserkoyn. Prava" (Messenger of the Russian Students Christian Movement. Paris, October, 927).

194

fact of bowing to success (if only it is not an opportunistic policy based on lack of principle) may mean that a tribute is paid to what is held to be a force of power. Now in the most important field of the nations life. in matters regarding its faith, its Church, the Bolshevics have already been defeated. An if one is obliged to bow one's head before real strength; this we must do when speaking of the life of the Church in Russia; it is a force that keeps growing, that has vanquished the Bolshevics on numerous points of the "spiritual front" and continues its victorious march -into the very depths of the Communist Party, wrenching from its grip soul after soul; we bow our heads to a success that becomes more and more distinct and brillant: it is the triumph of faith. It is most important to show that the Bolshevics are already beaten on the battlefield of the spirit, for by studying the victors and the vanquished in a ten years long struggle where pure accident could play no part, we come to understand the forces prompting them, - the powerful, but defeated force of Bolshevism and the oppressed, but victorious force of the Church. This study will also reveal the real features of Bolshevism and will decide whether it is still powerful or already rotting at the root. The story of the Church under the Soviets is the story about an incredible event - the victory of the Church. It is the central event in the long line of happenings during ten years of Bolshevism - for it decides the fate of Bolshevism itself. He, who dies gladly under torture, defeats his tormentor. Neither oppression nor persecution, neither hunger nor nakedness, neither danger nor deatth, can destroy faith. "For Thy sake they kill us daily, they take us for sheep doomed to perish under the knife. But He who loves us, gives us the strength to bear it." Many believers in Soviet Russia feel that these words of St. Paul refer to them. Thus the death of the Metropolitan Bishop Benjamin of St. Petersburg, executed by shooting on the night of August I2th, 1922, was the

heroic death of a martyr*). The Archimandrite Sergius Shein, executed together with him, prayed: "Forgive them, for they know not what they are doing""). The monk Telegin, executed at Moscow in the Spring of I922, awaited his death with an eagerness that reminds one of the first martyrs. "I long to meet my Saviour", said he to a priest imprisoned with him'). We also know details of the last days of Bishop Platon, *) See, for instance, his wonderful letter written before death, first published in the Helsingfors Russian paper "Russkia Vesti" (Sept. 6th, 1922). A detailed account of his trial and death will be found in "The Assault of Heaven", London, 1927. ") "The Assault of Heaven" *) "The Assault of Heaven" 1s*

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executed by shooting in Uriev'). Such facts of radiant martyrdom are numerous. It is difficult to fix the general number of priests and monks executed in the first years of Bolshevism. Here are some approximate figures: Priests Monks

2,691 persons 1,962

Nuns and novitiates

3,447 8,ioo persons

(The figures were given in 1924, by the Bishop of the "New Church", Nicholas Solovei.) At present executions of members of the Church have certainly become rarer. But how many of them languish in prisons or in banishment. It is reckoned that 117 bishops were in prisons in the Summer of 1927, but it is an incomplete list. The general number of bishops imprisoned and banished to the extreme North of Russia amounted in that summer to 14o to i5o. During one year (1927) from Moscow alone, 35 bishops (kept at first in Moscow prisons) were sent to their place of banishment; i4 bishops were banished from Kiev. Letters coming from there are eagerly read by religious people. Here are two letters (sent from Soviet Russia via Finland), one of which refers to recent years; the other one is of still more recent date. "On Tuesday, Easter week, these bishops were expelled from our town; one of them was an invalid. They were expelled surreptiously, and were not even allowed to take leave of their relatives and the parish. Notwithstanding the mystery surrounding their departure, a good number of people gathered at the station to see them off; a Red Guard detachment was sent for. One was forbidden, to approach the carriage, the windows of which were purposely dimmed with soot. When the train started, the bishops blessed their flock by the help of a candle, - otherwise nothing could be seen through the sooty panes. These letters tell us that they were jeered at during the journey. On their arrival at N., they were led to the governor of the town, who said in their presenoe that the prison was full-up, and that he would not allow "these quacks to loaf about the town". He ordered them to be sent further on, to Irkutsk. The bishops were brought back to the same carriage, which was now crammed with convicts. The latter attacked the priests, the guards being unable to stop the criminals. Bishop J., suffers from blows. God knows what new hardships are in store for them." Here is a letter of a bishop from his place of banishment in the North of Russia: *) Baltisches M.rtyrerbuch, Berlin 1926, Furche Verlag, p. 84.

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"On my arrival at K., on awful life began. We were drilled like soldiers, and made to salute and shout at the top of our voices for hours at a time; our instructors were two wild young communists. They could not say a word, without following it up by the worst and most blasphemous oaths. I was placed into a wooden hut crammed with prisoners. So narrow was the space allotted to me that I could only lie on my side. My companions were very miserable and very filthy thieves and murderers. We lacked water, as it had to be brought by train from the nearest town. For whole weeks we were refused boiling water for making tea. The worst prison would seem a palace in comparison to our dwelling place. Vermin attacked me in swarms, and never gave me a minute of peace. About three times a day I had to shake the lice out of my shirt. My whole body bleeds from scratching. Once we were led to a bath-house, but we were given there a small pail of bitter sea-water, owing to which, my hair got all glued up. At six o'clock in the morning work begins, - and what work! - the hardest and dirtiest imaginable. My companion was Bishop Raphael from S., a middle-aged man in the second stage of phtisis; there was no room for him in the hospital, - so he had to suffer and die in these appalling surroundings." Let us also mention another letter which has already become known to Russian Christendom. It depicts the conditions of life, which fell to the lot of a bishop, banished to the remote North of Siberia (30 to the North of the Polar Circle). He was given a half-ruined hut. (There were already two other fishermen's huts in the neighbourhood, were the rest of the prisoners lodged). He was obliged to make repairs himself, but without special tools, without warm clothes; and he had to work breast deep in snow, in icy weather. But, although the Church is being violently broken up, it remains organically whole. Priests are torn away from their flocks, but the religious unity is far from dying out, it becomes still deeper and triumphs over space and the walls of prisons (as it triumphs also in linking those in Heaven with those on earth). A bishop writes from his place of exile in the far North. "I derive great consolation from the fact of my being able to perform the sacred service in my hut, together with S. I am praying for all the people, for all the world. And when I make the sign of the cross in four directions, I have before my spiritual eyes all my flock, all my dear ones, all the world." The state of the "flock" may be shown by the following remarkable letter, received at the beginning of 1927 from South Russia, and published by Father Theodorovitch in the Warsaw periodical "Sunday Reading" (Voskresnoe Chtenie) No.

iii,

March

13th,

1927.

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"The people are permeated by the sense of the historical importance of the moment, and in matters of faith show a high degree of conservative instinct. Their part in the life of our Church is predominating. The soul of the people is steady and pure. Bolshevic church reforms do not stain it. While openly taking part in the life of the State, the people are at the same time jealously secretive in matters regarding their faith (which has now acquired a special reality). The good clergyman is rewarded for being spat on and jeered at, by the tender respect of his flock, which procures for him all necessaries of life, down to linen and galoshes. The fate of the Church is in good hands. You should not worry about religious differences and misunderstandings; they happen only on the surface and make us cling together more closely. Though there is no central administration in our midst, and any -one may call himself a metropolitan bishop, no disturbances arise, the life .of the parish flows on in a harmonious and orderly way. And not only the parish, but the whole mass of the orthodox people cling to one another and are deeply versed in all religious matters. Reputations are firmly made without the need of official approbation. In the remotest places of Russia there live 'praying men' to whom people flock." These two statements - the letter from a bishop torn away from his flock, together with the one just cited - prove conclusively the unity of the Church; it is not only an institution or an organisation, - it is a great organism whose members are firmly joined together by the sense of unity of the Church. We may even go further and declare that religion in Russia is beginning its triumphal march. "Life is still harder than it was 3 or 4 years ago, but we are no weaker", - so said Russian priests and parishioners to a foreign friend of the Russian Church, who visited Russia last Summer. "We number 20 millions of persons who are active'workers of the Church (not of the so-called "Living Church", which is dying out!), whereas we counted only 6 millions three or four years ago." This difference is explained not only by the growth of religious life, but also by the fact of people being much better informed about one another than they were before. Workmen are beginning to take the side of the Church more and more often. Thus the Sormov workmen had the Metropolitan Bishop Sergius delivered from prison. In Ivanovo-Vosnesensk workmen out of their own humble savings had two churches built in place of those which communists had used for "cultural" aims, i. e., turning them into clubs and cinemas. Workmen from the Prokhorov Works, took a great part in the funeral procession at the burial of the Patriarch Tikhon; whom they had received with extraordinary pomp when, already sick, in the last year of his life,

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he came to their factory. He performed religious services in a number of such factories at the eager request of the workers. Many examples of this kind may be noted. The "Communistic Truth" published (October 3o, 1927) several interesting letters from the Ural: "In the Ural, among the working masses, churchmen and sectarians have come to life. Some time ago, at Vereshchagino, district of Perm, the churchmen were about to close the church, owing to the lack of churchgoers; whereas now the corporation, "The Locksmith" has collected 15oo roubles for entirely repairing the church building." At many factory centres of the Ural, churches are becoming more and more frequented. "At Lisiev the workers of the Mechanical Works refused to work on Sundays, saying they wished to pray. At the village Motovilikhin, most of the churchgoers are workers," etc. The newspaper "Comsomolskaia Pravda" notes in December 1927, that workmen have made monetary contributions towards the building of new churches at the factories "Communistic Vanguard" (Gouvernement of Vladimir) and "Red October" (Gouvernement of Penz and of Kursk); also at the Duliev factory (Gouvernement of Kursk), and at the Jartzev factory, etc. The paper adds that this list is far from being complete, but has not at its disposal exhaustive information about the new churches. In Moscow itself (at Cherkizov), "the building of a church is being happily brought to an end. At Orekhevo-Zuev workers have collected 2000 roubles for repairing the church. In the Buzuluks district the peasants have lighted the Archangel Michael Church by electricity, collecting funds for the building of a new church. The Pavlovsk soviet of workers has decided to finish building the church which was founded this Spring. The churches are full, - this is the report of all those who now visit Russia. The atheistic propaganda makes superhuman efforts ('1493 different antireligious books and pamphlets, in many millions of copies have been issued during the last few years), but the results are less than might have been expected. Its strength is dwindling. There are frequent cases of communists turning religious. An enormous number of active parishioners are peasants and workers. This in unanimously claimed by the Soviet papers (as quoted in the "Vosrojdenic",

Dec. 31,

1927).

A priest writes from

Soviet Russia to a correspondent abroad (Shalfeev): "the masses are on our side. Our parishes, though lacking juridical rights, are upheld by the free will of the people" (quoted by the "Voskresnoe Chtenic", Warsaw, 4th of December, 1927). The "Communistic Truth", (December 25th, 1927) gives the following data: 4o,ooo orthodox parishes and up to 5oo,ooo priests of different religion have been regist~red in the U. S. S. R. 199

-of 2,025,000 of Moscow inhabitants 7600 are members of the society "The Godless". Out of 700,000 Moscow workers and employees. only 3ooo belong to this society. About ioo Moscow factories do not have any "Godless" clubs at all. Bits of paper on the doors of Moscow churches give the information:

Out

"Mass singing with the participation of opera singers" . . . "Talks on religious and moral themes" . . . "Lectures". ..

"Religious propaganda goes on incessantly, - in churches, in families, in public, in the streets. Steady work is being accomplished under an experienced and organised direction." In another recent issue of the same paper (quoted by the "Vosrojdenic",

December 2 9 th, 1927), we find the

following: "All over the land priests have become active, and especially so, among the youth." Special unions exist. "The Union of Young Christians", "The Union of Young Believers", "The Union of Young Baptists", etc. In Petrograd and Moscow 3o o/o of religious persons are young people, and among them up to 75 o/o are girls. In the Melitopol district go 0/o of the youth belong to the Union of Young Baptists. In the provinces it ofizen happens that members of the Union of Young Communists pass into religious organisations. In these - the percentage of young girls predominates. Members are forbidden to drink, to smoke and to swear. This makes such organisations especially attractive to girls. Religious organisations have created their own co-operatives; working communities, corporations, help in the form of free meals, etc., lessons in singing, etc. Musical circles are organised, plays are staged, even mass processions with music and singing are arranged. The priests have learned a lesson from us in these matters, and have found a way of attracting people." (Quoted by the "Vosrojdenie", December 15th, 1927). Jarslavsky in the Jubilee issue of the "Antireligious Magazine" (October 1927) writes: "It would mean deceiving oneself of one were to assume that the proletariat has become !entirely atheistic, and that the church has lost its grip.... One should peep into the workers' lodgings, in order to get a plimpse of the numerous ikons and sacred lamps shining in the corners. True one may often notice alongside of a religious emblem the protraits of Marx and Lenin"... The same writer, in the "Pravda" (Nov. 22nd, 1927) is indignant that "the decision of the XIII session of the party was understood by many organisations as implying an effort on the part of communists to put a stop to antireligious propaganda. The result was that a number of such organisations forbade meetings of the "Godless" to take place on their premises. In somrre districts the "Unions of the Godless" even became illegal organisations." The "Comsomol Pravda" (December 1927) gives the

200

following data: "At the Ustinov Works in Moscow, a meeting of factory girls could not take place owing to church service being held at the same time. In Moscow, at the Prokhorov factory, antireligious lectures were hooted at (four such cases). Workers clubs in Moscow do not subscribe to antireligious papers and periodicals, do not arrange lectures, do not permit antireligious meetings to take place within their walls, and do not allow antireligious films to be shown. Out of the many of thousands of Moscow small manufacturers working at home, only nine men are members of the antireligious association." There is, however, one very grave danger - the corruption of children and youths, the forced growth among them of practical and theoretical atheism. The world is already well aware of this fact. Still we may add some more instances. Here is the tale told by two boys aged io and 12 respectively, who arrived from Soviet Russia were they lived in a communistic "home for children" (one of the best in Soviet Russia): "We were daily told terrible things about God and the Virgin, we were not allowed to pray, otur crosses (worn around the neck) were taken away from us and thrown into the gutter. We were frightened, - but there were among us children who laughed at God altogether with the teachers, though afterwards, in bed, they shuddered and made the sign of the cross." (Quoted by L. Mikhailov in his article "Children 'there' and 'here"', published in the "Messenger of the Russian Students Christian Movement", June 1927). But others grew accustomed. Thus the antireligious "Lenin organisation" of 9 and to years old children, comprised in 1925 11/2 million of members. ("Izvestia", No. 1657, 18 Sept., 1925.) The world knows too, of the enormous percentage of venereal diseases among Russian children (52 0/0 of all the children in the Petrograd schools), of illegal operations performed on 14 year old girls, of x4 to 15 year old mothers, (a most common occurrence), of numberless little vagabonds of a low moral standard in the Soviet High Schools, where the students home is a nondescript place of dissipation. An Englishman (see the periodical "Asia", Nov., 1927), who has travelled a good deal over Russia, speaks of widespread atheism among children in the remotest hamlets. This is a great danger for the souls of the Russian people. One would like to shriek it into the ears of the whole world. But those are deaf, who, in trafficking with the Bolshevics, hope to reap benefits. The spiritual force of the Church is, however, growing and Bolshevism is already defeated in its essential sphere of activity - in its struggle against God. The persecutors, although as eager as before, are now no more certain of victory, and this appears distinctly in their eloquent and numerous admissions. If the store of spiritual energy, alive

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in the Russian Church, does not weaken, if the example of martyrs continues to uphold it, if it remains faithful to the emblem of its God, if during days of suffering and persecution it keeps feeling the Saviour's strength, - then we may be assured of the Russian nations future welfare. In this spiritual struggle the general fate of the nation is being settled. Spiritual, mystic force proved itself as a thing more real than the instruments of torture. The breath of early Christianity has passed over Soviet Russia. "Children! You are of God and have conquered them; for the One, who is in you is greater than the one, who is in the world." The struggle continues, but the victory is already known. And moreover, religion is the only power that can quieten and cure wounded Russia. It helped numerous martyrs (the late Tzar among them) as it helped Our Saviour when He prayed for his persecutors: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they are doing." How can one dream of checking such a conquering, surging force?

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"Proletarian Culture." By Prof. J. Eichenwald. CONTENTS: The Decay of Culture; The Red Poison; Sacrilege; NEP in Culture; Manufacturing Intelligentsia; Growing Superstition and Intemperance; The Bolshevics are startled by their own Stupidity; The Proletarian Culture is wavering between Communistic Stupidity and Common Sense.

IT

should be now clear to all that the red mountain has given birth to a grey mouse; grey, dim miserable and vapid is life in present-time Russia. The terrific experiment has not worked. The country gradually recovers while Lenin's communism gradually dies out; but as usual, the illness had marched with giant strides, whereas it is slow to go away, and as the very same madmen and criminals are in power, the process of recovery may be stopped every minute giving way to a new outburst of the evil disease. The political and social hyperboles of Bolshevism have crumbled, leaving only bloodstained dust and misery and terror and cannibalism; most daring ideas, giant hopes have degenerated into the vulgar outlook of commonplace souls, and dwarf plants have been the outcome of the dreamplantations that theory in cosmic exuberance foresaw. Both mind and matter have suffered. A poor little withered flower is all that remains of the great Russian culture. This culture, we repeat, recovers inasmuch as Bolshevism disavows its own creed. As its red dawn first glimmered, Bolshevism destroyed among other things, school education: children were just guinea pigs for the red experimentalist. When Lunacharsky "the commissary of public education" was beginning his evil task of teaching children atheism and trashy materialism, he complained to certain journalists who interviewd him that "former teachers, men of the old mettle had poisoned schools with political propaganda and continued to corrupt youth with their noxious notions". Good is harmful to the harmful; and what is harmful to Lunacharsky is good for the children and vice-versa. He inflicted some crashing blows on the defenceless Russian schools. This enligtened gentleman first of all declared that there would be a re-election of school teachers everywhere and that "the lists of desirable candidates for school-posts would be composed of the obligatory participation of the pupils themselves", after which these lists would be sent for approval to the highest authorities -, the local soviet, - an institution having little in common with the Academy of Science. Hence, numerous school workers, who had themselves given heart, soul and nerves to the education of children, were driven out of the schools and left destitute without the possibility of earning a living. It was then easy to take revenge on these poor people, to spy on them and denounce them. A "red" schoolmaster appeared. The chasm between teacher and

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pupil, parent and child yawned wider and wider and up till now it has not yet been bridged over. As a specimen of the kind of spiritual food administered by Bolshevism to children at school and at home, we may point out two series of books. "The Pioneer's Pocket-Library" (The "pioneer" being a sort of boy scout on communistic lines) and "The Communistic Youths' Pocket-Library". In the first of these series much pink paint is spent on Lenin. He practically wallows in syrup; he and his little followers and adorers, chubby communistic cherubs, are quite nauseating. The "soupy" note, however, is sometimes replaced by a manlier one as in this verse: "we've served in the same battalion, we've hacked the bourgeois to hits". As regards the second series, the Russian boys and girls are given a generous helping of fruity "pornography". Such passages as where the hero of a poem begs the young nuns, the "fascinating females" to be sensible and forget God, or where he "seizes by the waist and squeezes hard" one of these nuns ("her tight cassock showing the shape of her bosom") such passages are, we admit, only an aspect of anti-religious propaganda, a way of "drowning the sound of church-bells with village music and driving-out the nuns from their cloisters'. There is no such excuse, however, for describing (to boys and girls in their teens) "harlots with rouged lips" and such things as: "Ania was so sweet in her girlhood and afterwards during their honey moon, but now she is unfortunately with child, ah, me! how hard it is to bear these voluptuous summer nights . . ." Boys and girls will read in these series about "sweet

passion", "kisses at dawn" and suchlike meretricious piffle. In one story a certain official makes love to the girl Vera in the following way: "They drew closer to each other, ... their shoulders touched . . . intoxicating air ... and ah! how languorous! ... And Vera answered: "I shall be

yours ... but only give me your word to pay for the upbringing of our child, without my having to bring the matter to court." Another girl in the same story: "Feels, at the merest thought of a lover, the throbbing of passion under her left breast and then in her arms and legs. . .... and her lips whisper: one kiss, only one kiss ... The he-man in the story is a well-built fellow and any such fellow makes a girl smack her lips, and she was a fiery, full blooded girl." But when this fiery female was embraced by the same temperamental official in "whose clutches she panted and melted in the flame of a kiss and was near swooning," even while all this was happening, she forced "the clutching hands to loosen their grip" by whispering the magical words: "You must pay for the food of my child, you must pay. The Bolshevics are good fellows, no use railing at them, -they do not let any one bully you. You must pay." And so on, in the same most pedagogical strain. One of the books in this series is called "Red Poison". How very apt!

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The Soviet Government goes on zealously with its anti-religious propaganda; it publishes a magazine called "The Godless"; blasphemes, sneers at religious ceremonies, insults the faith of others, arranges on Christmas and Easter mock processions which drag in the mire the symbols of christianity - in a word, tries with all its might to rid Russia of religion; and similar things are done on Jewish holidays by young Jewish communists. In the first years of their reign the Bolshevics used still more drastic measures in their anti-religious campaign. Countless are the numbers of priests shot; among them were metropolitan bishops as well as little greybearded village priests in faded cassocks; and here is a curious detail: the Moscow Cheka, before shooting a priest, had his beard shaven off and his hair cut short, so that the executioner might not guess who his victim was. In connection with this of anti-religious propaganda and the murder of priests, the Bolshevics found it necessary - and that was sound logic to take off from the front of the Moscow University (first among Russian Universities) the legend "The light of Christ enlightens all" Instead of which they nailed on this other: "Science is for the workers." A graduate of that university sadly remarks: "All around the new inscription there are bullet holes, which one has not yet thought of plastering up." Traces of revolutionary shots, - that seems symbolical. Bullets have riddled the former inscription, bullets have written in letters of blood the words of this new one, - which the above-mentioned Scholar terms in his quaint way "narrow and prejudicial". Bullets have played havoc all over the land; very natural indeed, for is such is the way with bullets. They achieved their aim completely: Russia is maimed. But that phrase "Science is for the workers", - what a fatuous motto! For does not science mean work? It is the fruit of work and they must work, who wish to acquire it. To teach and to learn- both verbs mean "to work". Why then this elementary inscription on the University? What need has the University of such ABC platitudes. Has there every been a University that was not a place for work? But, may be, the Bolshevic legend means by "workers" only men who do some kind of physical work. Why, - in that case such a legend on the front of a University is a burning contradiction: for how can one on the very walls of the citadel of mental work, express one's disdain of mental work? University versus mind; that could be called a paradox if it were not merely the utterance of a thick headed and reckless demagogue, who means to give everything to one class of people and nothing to the other. The dullard it is who lords it in the Soviet school system, inasmuch as this system does not return to former principles of pedagogy and does not keep clear of the notions of Bolshevic novelty mongers. One could gather an amazing bouquet of the flowers of ignorance, which blossom

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so richly in the field of public education under the Soviets. This refers to public schools as well as to Universities. Village schools are in a complete state of decay and the teachers are so hard up that they prefer giving up their job and looking for work elsewhere - a fact found even in official statements. Moreover, an enormous number of children do not go to school at all; hundreds of thousands of homeless children roam in Russian towns - a phenomena unheard of in any other country and one of the most tragic "achievements of the Revolution". The reason why Russian schools, as well as everything Russian, have fallen so miserably low, lies in the fact that the Bolshevics from the very first have been hauling down, consciously and steadily, the general standard of thought and culture. Their idea was to "Bolshevise" education. In order to teach science to the blind masses, they blinded science. Science was brought down to the level of the mob, instead of the contrary process taking place. They banished the aristocracy of the spirit and made much of the semi-educated: On and on they went striving to make knowledge not popular, but vulgar. They abolished in the Universities the section for history and philology, as well as most of the philosophy formerly taught there and started instead special tame courses for young workmen and peasants, whom they inveigled into the Universities by promising financial subsidies. What university knowledge could they master, these untrained illiterate young people? What could the University give them? But the Bolshevics at least derived immense satisfaction from the fact that their students were of proletarian stock; for in general, an era of new "proletarian culture" was proclaimed and in order to clear the way for it, "bourgeois" culture was dismissed. Ignorance over-flooded the country - that experimental field of the shameless and crazy. Only very recently did one realize the fact that before entering the University an important preparatory training is necessary. In this too, former methods, - methods adopted everywhere - were gradually revived. The return to the derided alphabet of common sense is slow and painful. This process is evident in all things in present-time Russia. Thus, not only the old political economy - under the pseudonym of "NEP" (New political economy) was restored to its rights, but the general former type of culture returns by degrees, after having sustained such terrific blows from the Bolshevics. This culture will take a long time patching itself up after the fall of the Soviet system. The next thing for Russia to do is to become wiser. For indeed, as one censiders the state of general culture under the Bolshevics, one cannod help coming to the sad conclusion that Russia has been knocked silly. The articles in Soviet periodicals, where communistic thought finds its best expression, seem to have been written by schoolboys. The predominant note is one of complacent ignorance. One is astounded

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at the narrow outlook, the primitive coarseness of thought and word. Among other things, Russia suffers from mental slackness. All the subtle achievements of Russian thought prior to the Revolution have vanished like a puff of smoke. There is a cheap, gross quality about Russian thought as if the country had relapsed into illiteracy. The official and semi-official Soviet thinkers (others do not exist, others are dumb) have come clattering down to a plane of barbarous materialism and primitive utilitarism. The wake of revolution has swept away our philosophical culture and the gathered treasures of the Russian spirit. Russia has grown sillier and coarser. Zinoviev, referring to the banishment of professors and writers, made a remark very much to the point, when he exclaimed in one of his speeches: "We do not need highbrows?" There is a revolutionary song in Russia where one finds the following verse: "let us renounce the former world", - and that means the whole world, for it cannot be divided into new and old; the world is whole. But all this, the churlish Soviet dictators, these mental proletarians, cannot understand. Bukharin, their chief theorician and backer of communistic thought, forbids biology to expound vitalism, crosses out "idealism smacking of Kant" and solemnly declares that "what we need is that the intelligentsia be trained to think in a specific manner; yes, we shall mould them from one pattern, as we do with wares in our factdries." That bright thinker would surely pooh-pooh the suggestion that if his method were followed, we should have instead of an educated people a long row of artificial idiots. And this method of fabricating minds is being followed table results.

with inevi-

Volumes, bitter volumes might be written about the real consequences of Bolshevic principles and about, "proletarian culture", that cult of blockheads. We shall content ourselves with some extracts from an article by Victor Fink (III volume of the review "Russian Contemporary") in which the author decribes Russian provincial life - that deep provincialism, which is now the soul of Russia. We find therein many curious things and many horrible ones (by the way, to which of these categories does the following sentence belong, which the author attributes to Kamenev: "If the Soviet Government wished it, the priests would sing the 'Red Flag"'?) Mr. Fink notes that the persecution of the clergy and the preaching of atheism have born fruit; a part of the clergy has shown "unexampled submissian". But even that did not save "the doomed cupolas". The Bolshevic press keeps on uttering its shrill war cry, a shibboleth of Russias present day: "down with the cupolas!" And down they go. Churches and monasteries are turned preferably not into schools and hospitals, but into

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cinemas and prisons. "I have recently seen at Kostroma a chapel turned into a hairdresser's shop and another into a public house." Mr. Fink waxing reminiscent, recalls the day when Rus (ancient Russia) was baptised: "the kind and meek Slavs celebrated the dismissal of their Perun (god of Thunder) by publicly drowning in the Dniepr the said Perun tied to the tail of a stallion. So is the cry "down with the cupolas" a thoughtless and reckless whoop at the over-turned past." Such behaviour towards the past forbodes little good. When the "enlightened" communist village-girl Sarubina asks the local judge to throw out of their house her father because "his presence prevents her from developping freely on communistic lines" such a fact does not uplift at all Russian village life from the whirlpool of cruelty, wildness and ignorance, in which it sinks, no matter how hard certain literary enthusiasts try to create the figure of a new "red moujik", a figure which in their works seems made of wood and paint. In reality the red moujik's mind is dark, Anti-religious propaganda has but deepened that darkness. He is still more superstitious than formerly. In order to put an end to a long spell of dry weather he digs a hole in the grave of a man who had hanged himself and laboriously pours into that grave forty barrels of water. On the other hand he lets his village burn. "He uses water for bringing on rain; he does not waste it against fire." "What does the village want" in the long run? Its chief want, it appears, is "home brewed vodka and plenty of it; young and old women and children, - all drink, spending on drink hundreds of poods of corn." And though in a certain God-forsaken village progress is so swift that for the first time a civil marriage took place and an enlightened peasant got married without the help of a priest; still it all ended in the young couple and relatives and guests being dead drunk. So much for Soviet culture in villages. Indeed, vodka is now being sold by the State, the Bolshevics having restored the reign of vodka banished by the Tsar. So let Trotsky proudly mix his metaphors: "the liquidation of public drunkenness has been entered in the iron books of the Revolution." Thus Russian culture has been cut down by Russian Bolshevics. At first they opened a number of mock universities, but then had them closed again. In the year 1924 they drove out of the old real Universities thousands of young men and women and not only first year students, but students who were in the full swing of their university career. These young people where sent out of Moscow and Petersburg to their respective home towns; and such was the blow that shattered their lives, that many did not survive it. Numerous suicides, such was the consequence of this new insult to humanity and common sense; new victims were sacrified to the god of absurdity and crime. But the logic of life demanded from the Bolshevics

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a return to old methods, in economics as well as in general culture. Victorious stupidity had to give way. An institution that had nothing to do with art, namely the central committee of the communist party, helped and petted "proletarian writers" whereas common sense tells us that no such writers exist, for there is only one acceptable way of classing writers i. e. writers good and bad, gifted and devoid of talent; any other classification is false and absurd. In the brighter times of our social development, minds brighter, than communistic ones, never hinted at the fact that it were possible to judge authors not by their genius, but by their social origin. Such a deviation of conception became possible owing to Bolshevism alone, for it produced a parody of life, a tragic and grotesque reflection in a distorted glass. This could happen only when a single political party ruled over the land. History, in that respect, seems to have borrowed from literary theories that rhetorical figure called pars pro toto. In literature this is quite inoffensive and there arises no misunderstanding whatever when, for instance the word "head" is used in a sentence instead of "man" or "beast". But in politics, especially when politicians are "men" who do not use their "heads" much, this pars pro toto results in a catastrophe. The "pars" flourishes, but the "totum" suffers. In Russia this rhetorical figure appears in flesh and blood, a monstrous cripple. A part, a party cannot with impunity stand for the whole, - for the whole country. Life and mind rebel against such an arithmetical paradox, against pars the pretender. Moreover, it seems logically to follow that if there exists one party there should exist some other party or parties; the whole being divided, there must be at least two parts. But what other parties do exist in Russia? None. The communistic party has the monopoly, it reigns alone; a fraction has not only replaced the whole, it has also devoured all other fractions and it is now devouring its own self. The same central committee of the communistic party, which took for itself the best place, had to arrive at last at the happy decision, that the "party" alone by itself is helpless. It now accepts the notion of "collaborating with the bourgeoisie" which it has been up till now murdering, ruining and humiliating. It has at last come to the conclusion that one must "struggle against the superficial and disdainful attitude towards the fruits of the old culture". This novel note of respect sounds otherwise, does it not, than the official note of "let us renounce the former world". Quite recently they were burying the "old culture" they proudly refused to touch its fruits; now they label such a negative attitude "communistic bragging" and are willing to make use of the inheritance of the past. Just as Lenin, - communism incarnate, - arrived at last by bloody and sinuous ways to the conclusion, that one must learn to trade (and that stale discovery was hailed as a marvel of wisdom) just so his disciples after a 14

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good deal of strenuous thinking, in which they were helped by others, came to the conclusion that the proletariat has not yet created its literature, its style, its expression in art ( i. e. has not created its multiplication table) and that "great carefulness and tact is required in dealing with those literary layers that might and will walk together with the proletariat." The construction is not brilliant, "layers" can hardly be expected to "walk"; still, Bolshevics preaching tact and tolerancy - what a wonderful and touching vision! And as such writers that could not voice the interests of the proletariat simply do not exist (for proletarians are human beings like we, and books are writted not for a class of people but for all mankind) it results that the Bolshevics accept now, not just a particular brand of literature and culture, but all literature, all culture. The fraction yields to the whole. But certainly, boys will be boys and it could hardly be expected that 'our brainy Bolshevics would stop insisting, that in a "class society" art cannot and should not be free of "class conscience". This they repeat in the resolution proclaiming their new attitude towards the old culture. If however, this little bow to Karl Marx be not taken seriously, we are left to assume that their resolution is a capitulation; and it is between capitulation and Marx's capital that Russian thought is at present precariously poised. Thus the Bolshevics after havings turned their backs on the old culture, promised at first with demiurgical boldness to built a new world and that, in revolutionary record time, i. e. in much less time than the Creator took when he tackled his little job. But the destruction of spiritial treasures made matters worse for the destructors themselves. There lingered a sense of emptiness and dullness, where devastating communism had passed sweeping away all that the spirit cherished. But the spirit cannot do without its needs and treasures; it puts materialism to shame and proves by its own radiant indestructible life that materialism cannot satisfy the human soul. One of those who did the most harm in Russia, Trotzky, proclaims conservative truths instead of former revolutionary ones. "Man lives not only on politics" says ho and after having conceded this, goes on to explain his point. He does not hide the fact that he is "fed up with the solemn articles of communistic moralists, with there official platitudes, with such phrases as: "bourgeoisie is bourgeoisie and proletariat is proletariat" or references to the "bourgeois mind of the bourgeois". Trotzky admits that culture is necessary and turns away with contempt from his "comrades who think they can create proletarian culture by laboratory methods", thus divulging there "childish belief in black magic". The former chief of the revolutionary Red Army is apparently convinced that culture is created by degrees, staidly and steadily; the fiery revolutionary speaks up for evolution, for a long and slow process. It is most instructive to hear from such a

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man that "local life is terribly conservative" that its conservatism is "artistic", that "the psychology of the people is conservative". Bolshevism having as it were realised the value of conservatism, now smuggles in and includes in its collection of revolutionary achievements, strange property treasures bequeathed by the old culture; for Bolshevism is not content with usurping and stealing real solid things, it need turn to spiritual piracy too. "We build anew," says Trotzky, "as yet chiefly using old material, but we arrange it in a new fashion." As yet .. . In order to seize the power the proletariat has shattered "the old apparatus of class absolutism... so decisively as nowhere else in the world", but it becomes evident now that "for the construction of a new apparatus we have to make use in a certain, rather considerable measure, of old parts." In bold type Trotzky prints the following: "We do not reject what the past has left us. The revolution itself was made first of all, in order that we could seize this bequest." Disrespectful Trotzky respects the past. In its eleventh year, Bolshevism, after causing so many deaths, begins to understand that "the productive apparatus of capitalistic anarchy may be reconstructed only by degrees". The dashing revolutionary has turned into a staid evolutionist. He speaks, with a touch of sadness, "of huge stores of knowledge and skill acquired by mankind during its long life". Impossible in that case to renounce the old world, for the latter has created (among other things), as declares our revolutionary turned conservative: "a brilliant school of classic bourgeois economics." A. B. C. truths are spoken by Trotzky who no more spouts fountains of demagogical lies, but quietly remarks that Marx's dialectic and materialism cannot always act sesame-wise on the gates of knowledge and that "the purification of bourgeois science supposes a command of bourgeois science, whereas nothing can be reached by dismissing the whole matter with a flick of unsound criticism." "In science," sagely continues the now exiled Trotzky, "generalisations are arrived at only gradually." While defending in science the experimental method our faded Bolshevic finds that "we have neither the grounds nor the right to forbid any other even a less sound-method trying to foresee the deductions, which the experimental way is but very slow in reaching." Wonderful is the science of the old world, wonderful is its art: "it (art) has enriched in every way" human psychology and this enriching is an "invaluable gift of culture". "We should at once grow poorer in spirit were we to reject in a lump the art of yesterday." The proletariat should in particular "study the Russian classics". He answers in the affirmative to the question of whether trade is included in the proletarian and socialistic culture, and he considers that bourgeois habits and morals are inevitably penetrated by the traditions of "honest trade". u4*

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Thus, not the spirit of revolution, but that of evolution or even counterrevolution appears in the latest ideas of recent revolutionaries. They sound the retreat. At first Trotzky and his comrades arranged a terrific railway smash, but now they are eager to replace the wrecked train on its former rails, with the paradoxical view, however, of having it driven by communistic steam, which surely would exclude motion. The train lies wrecked and up till now has not resumed its course. The work of the Bolshevics has brought Russia so much grief and evil and untruth and cruelty that the very air she breaths is contaminated. The traces of crimes and vices remain; bloodthirsty bestiality, the coarsest contempt for the life of another, cynical depravity and ignorance - these are the results of the attempt to build a new world. Holy things are trampled into dust, man and God are insulted, good is mocked at. Nihilism has come into its rights. The Russian people must make a heroic effort indeed, in order to return to their old life, to a life worthy of man and worthy of a former great nation.

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The "Red Terror" in Russia (1917-1927). By

S.

Melgunow.

CONTENTS: The "Red Terror", an Official Title; The Founding of the Cheka; Declaration of the "Red Terror"; The Power of the Cheka; Cheka Cynicism; Non-class Character of the Terror; Statistics of the Terror; "Quiet Terror" under G. P. U.

K

RASNYI TERROR (the Red Terror) is an official title which has been used more than once by the Communist rdgime in Russia even

in its administrative documents. The declaration of the Red Terror, appearing at that time or at other times during the past decade, was an indication of the ruthless and lawless methods used by the Bolshevist power to settle its accounts with its political enemies; it meant, to quote the words of an official document of 1918, "the annihilation of the idealists and leaders of the enemies of the proletariat"). As a principle, the question was somewhat wider in scope.

"We are not making war on individuals", wrote

Latsis, one of the chief practical creators of this Red Terror; "we are exterminating the bourgeoisie, as a class""). This principle originated on the "idea" (if one may speak of ideas in this respect) on which terror was founded, and which Trotzky formulated in his answer to Kautsky's book "Terrorism and Communism". The root of the matter lay in two blunt utterances: a) the enemy should be made harmless and consequently destroyed in the struggle; 2) terror is a powerful weapon of policy; only a lukewarm hypocrite would refuse to understand it. Another communist leader, Bukharin, considers terror to be an educational measure for it is "in all its forms a method of creating communistic man out of the human material of the capitalistic age". The ideologists or theoreticians of Communism, however, showed no logic or consistency in justifying the resolution to adopt the system of governmental terrorism. More than once the Communist leaders tried subsequently to depict the Red Terror as an inevitable consequence of the excitement of the popular masses due to the attacks made upon the representatives of the Soviet power by the so-called "counter-revolutionaries", the sabotage of the intelligentsia in the first year following the seizure of power by the Bolshevici and the armed struggle carried on against them. The Soviet power was forced to resort to the jTerror, as it claimed, by pressure of the workers. This was asserted by Dzerzhinsky, the real leader of the Terror, in 1922, in a letter handed to the Soviet of Peoples Commissaries, and which read as follows: "Assuming that the age-old hatred

) "All-Russian Cheka Weekly", No. x, Ist Nov. 1918. ") "The Red Sword" (organ of the All Ukrainian Ch. K.).

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of the revolutionary proletariat for their former masters would involuntarily degenerate into a series of unsystematic, bloody episodes"

. .

. He en-

deavoured to carry through a systematization of the punitive apparatus of the revolutionary power. Thus the official Terror was nothing but "the reasoned and deliberate policy of the chastening hand of the revolutionary proletariat". "Our Terror was necessary", said Kamenev, repeating this same argument. "The Terror was forced on us by ihe Entente", said Lenin, alluding to "intervention" in the period of the civil war, thus further widening the question, at the seventh meeting of the Soviets in

1919.

The Founding of the Cheka. The facts, however, always speak for themselves. The plan of the AllRussian Extraordinary Commission, to create the Red Terror was drawn up by Dzerzhinsky on the basis given by Lenin personally (his own letter, handwritten, has been preserved) on Dec. 7,

1917)*),

that is, before the

calling and the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly, when no attacks on the life of the representatives of the Soviet power had yet been made, and when the civil war, in the precise sense of the word, had not yet begun. In February and March, 1918, the Red Terror, officially not declared as such, actually was in operation on the territory covered by the Soviet power. We have the full right to, make this assertion, for even in Izvestiya, the official organ of the Government (numbers 27, 3o), reports of the Cheka (Extraordinary Commission) were published at that time regarding fugitives to the south, who had been caught, arrested and shot on the spot for their intention to join the counter-revolutionary forces, and for "counterrevolutionary agitation"). There is no possibility of drawing up even approximate statistics of the executions by shooting in the first months of the Extraordinary Commission's activity and that of its organs. The Government found itself still in a chaotic condition. All Russia was still in the throes of revolution; besides the official organs of the Government there arose everywhere all kinds -of self-elected "revolutionary committees", whose activities where legalized by the Central Government. Mereover, the Government sometimes directly incited the population to take the law into its own hands. For instance, Krylenko himself, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, one of the leaders subcequently of the administration of Soviet justice and the ') Allusions to the need of an organ of the type of the "Cheka" may be already found in the minutes of the Military Revolutionary Committee in October. ") In my book, "The Red Terror in Russia" (Dent, London), the facts are represented and discussed, and official documents are cited, irrefutably confirming this statement. 214

guardian "of revolutionary law" in the Soviet State, on Jan. 22, Igi8, declared: "I recommend to the peasants of the Mogilev Gaberniya (Administrative Department) to take the law into their own hands." I am able categorically to refute the assertion of the official historian of the Cheka, Latsis (in his work, Two Years of Struggle on the Inner Front), that in the first six months of existence of the Extraordinary Commission only twenty-two men were shot. How far that is from the truth may be seen from the fact that while I was in Moscow, with opportunity to obtain only occassional data appearing in print*), I had to enter in my card record of bloody statistics some 884 executions by shooting. One can only mildly wonder at the shameless way in which the Chekists Peters, Moros and with them Pokrovsky affirm in cold print, in the Jubilee days of the Cheka, that before July 1918 not a single "counterrevolutionary" had been shot. Latsis intended the estimate of twenty-two executions to show the Government's humanity. "And this", he wrote, "would have continued had it not been for the great wave of conspiracy and unheard of terrorism launched by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie." But we must keep in view the fact that the first individual terroristic attack on the representatives of the Soviet Government occurred on Aug. 17, 1918, when Uritzky, Chairman of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission, was killed by the Socialist, Kanegiser. On Aug. 28 followed the celebrated attack on Lenin, made by the Socialist-Revolutionary Kaplan. I have dwelt in detail on the real origin of the "Red Terror", because it seems to me to throw an exceptionally brilliant light on the essential part of that policy. Terror was not forced on, by political events, for it began with the very moment of the communists coming to power, in those days already when Lunatcharsky at a session of the Moscow Council of Worker Deputies remarked: "We do not want terror yet, we are against death penalty on the scaffold." The period of time from March to the end of August 1918 is termed even by the first commissary of Justice himself (Steinberg) "a period of real, though unofficial terror". Only in an atmosphere of real terror could such speeches be pronounced as those made in February 1918 in Odessa by the Bolshevic commander of troops, Muraviev. When demanding contribution he threatened with severe punishment those who would neglect to back with their money the cause of the revolution: "Woe to you if you do not pay. I shall drown you with a stone around your neck, and your families will be ') The newspapers were suspended by the Government in July 1gx8. After that only the official organs of the Communistic party remained.

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butchered." Not always did this amount to mere words, not always did threats of shooting for not paying in the contribution, figure only in orders issued in regard to confiscation, requisition and so forth, - very often the thing itself was accomplished. Declaration of "Red Terror". The terroristic acts of August, i9i8, called forth from the Bolshevist authorities an official declaration of the so-called Red Terror, which spread all over Russia like a great wave (twenty "gouvernements" over which the new power spread). Wholesale arrests were made of the most diverse classes of the population. Thousands of those arrested were declared hostages and shot. We have no possibility whatever of counting the number of those who perished in those terrible days. Hostages were taken and shot without discrimination. In the majority of cases their number was not published. Pokrovsky lied glibly when asserting that after the attempt on Lenin's life, "the general sum of executions by shooting did certainly not rise above six hundred". The Bolshevic Government has forgotten by now that there was a time when it admitted itself that the Petrograd Cheka alone shot five hundred hostages (Communication of October 20th, in the Cheka Weekly, No. 5). In reality the number of executions in Petrograd alone was above 13oo. And what about Kronstadt where during one night four hundred persons were shot? Hundreds perished also in Moscow, though Peters was not ashamed to declare that Moscow avenged Lenin "by shooting several former ministers of the Tzar". At the same time, however, in the "Weekly" (No. 6) there were published the names of go victims, among whom figure not only former ministers, but also employees in co-operative institutions, students, priests, etc. So was it everywhere. The Nishni-Ntvgorod Workers' and Peasants' paper mentions, for instance, 7oo hostages. In Ivanov-Vosnesensk there were 184 hostages, etc. etc. This "anti-virus innoculation" (a happy term coined by the author of the Marshansky Cheka reports) was performed, on the same scale, all over Russia. The character of the Terror in the days of September is revealed with remarkable clearness by the official statements of at least provincial Extraordinary Commissions, which are marked by their frankness of expression: "For the head and life of one of our leaders, we must cut off the heads of hundreds of the bourgeoisie and their adherents" (Town of Torzhok). Such statements could be cited by tens and hundreds. The declarations of the press were even more bloodthirsty; the lives of thousands of hostages, "tens of thousands of these parasites and torrents of blood" were demanded.

216

The official historians of the Cheka, wisely do not refer in their articles to the former bloodthirsty demands of the press, or to communist decrees of the same order. They only mention telegrams signed by "thousands of workers", who demanded after the attempt on Lenin, "the execution of ten bourgeois". It is, however, easy enough to prove that such falsified resolutions were taken under the pressure of the Cheka. At times, they were merely pure inventions. The Central Government, as a matter of fact, directed the whole movement. In the name of the "working class", the Moscow War Commissary, for example, declared (Sept. 3) that "for every drop of proletariat blood. .. there will be shed a stream of the blood of those who. .. oppose the Soviets and the proletarian leaders". He spoke of the pitiless mass Terror. Even the All-Russian Central Executive Committee at its sitting of Sept. 2 gave "a solemn warning to all slavish followers ef the Russian and allied bourgeoisie to the effect that for 'every attack on the active leaders of the Soviet Government all counter-revolutionaries will be held resp-onsible"'. The Peoples Commissary for the Interior, Petrovsky, sent at one time to all Soviets a telegraphic order "concerning hostages". "Laxness and softness must be immediately brought to an end", he wrote, declaring that "mass execution by shooting should be inexorably dealt out" to these hostages. And the All-Russian Cheka Weekly, an organ which was to work out methods of struggle for the Extraordinary Commissions, in its issue said: "Let us abandon all long, fruitless and futile speeches about the Red Terror. The time has come, not by words but by deeds, to carry on the most pitiless, sternly organised mass terror." Taking into account all such official declarations, it becomes absolutely impossible to agree with the Soviet publicist Radek, who wrote in Izvestiya that the measures taken by the Government prevented a "mass pogrom of the bourgeoisie". It is necessary to come to exactly the opposite conclusion. The Government itself not only organised the terror, but actively backed it. It is easy to. imagine what forms it was bound to take when prompted by class hatred, in an atmosphere of bestiality, approved by demagogic rulers. The Power of the Cheka. The whole country was covered with a network of "Extraordinary Commissions for the Battle Against Counter-Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation", as they were officially designated. There was no city, no volost (administrative division of the uyezd, or county) in which there did not appear a branch of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, which became the nerve centrie of the Government. The official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow, Pravda, wrote on 217

Oct. s8 that the battle-cry, "The whole power to the Soviets", will be transformed now into "The whole power to the Extraordinary Commission". The Cheka was declared to be the organ which stood, as it were, "on guard" over the Revolution. It was not an organ of justice, but an organ functioning outside the courts - an organ for the "pitiless settlement of accounts with our enemies". It was to be guided not by the "dead code" of law but only by its "revolutionary experience" and by its "revolutionary conscience". In such a situation everything depended on the personnel of the Extraordinary Commission. The punitive apparatus "of the revolutionary power", wrote Dzerzhinsky in the statement quoted, "must represent a crystal-clear organisation of people's revolutionary judges and prosecutors, invested with extraordinary power". "The collaborators of the Cheka", declared the head of that organisation, "were chosen carefully from the members of the party and consisted of individuals devoted to the cause and of unimpeachable record in the past, for only by acquiring employees of such predominatingly high grade was the Cheka in a position to fulfil the duties... imposed upon it". What was the result of this careful selection of incorruptibles? The Cheka was bound inevitably to attract to itself all insane and sadistic elements of the community. Only a madman could eulogize the Cheka in verse and find no greater "joy" or better music than "the crackling of lives and bones", as was done by one of the Cheka officials in Tiflis (Georgia) in a collection of verse called The Smiles of the Cheka. The reader should peruse the corresponding pages of my book to form an idea of this pathological condition of society; there will pass before his eyes a long line of active leaders, whom doctors would certainly pack away into the nearest lunatic asylum. Even Latsis had to admit the need of constantly changing the personnel of the Cheka, for "no matter how honest a man may be... the work of the Cheka, carried on under conditions inevitably acting on the nervous system and blunting the ethic sensibilities, makes itself felt", "works degeneratively on many young Communists of weak character". Inevitably the activity of the Cheka was bound, on the other hand, to attract all outcast elements, drawn by greed and the possibility of wielding power, the penetration into the Cheka of this jailbird material of "criminal" elements even Krylenko had to admit. At first the conscience of individual Communist workers, not yet accustomed to horrors, was overcome by the Cheka's activity. No wonder that even one of the old Bolshevics, Olyminsky, openly canie out on Feb. 3, 1919, with a protest against the drastic acts of the Cheka. He wrote: "We may all have different opinions about the Red Terror, but what is going on now in the province is not all a Red Terror, but a capital crime." 218

I will not dwell on the picture of the excesses of the Terror, which fill the record of Russian life at that time. He who wishes to find confirmation in concrete facts may turn to my book, where hundreds of thesye facts are given, taken from the most varied sources. We encounter here recorded facts of wholesale drownings on ships, of medieval torture-chambers of the most cynical forms, of wholesale shooting, compared with which the bloody battles recorded by history grow pale; of the erotic orgies of local kinglets, small despots, who, supported by their "revolutionary conscience", set themselves up as supreme rulers over the lives and destinies of those arrested and held as hostages. For in, the name of attaining revolutionary aims, everything was permitted, as the Krasnyi Mech, the organ of the Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission declared, repeating Lenin's words. Under the conditions of civil war, incited by class hatred, the "Red Terror" made grim and monstrous fun of human beings. It is enough to mention such facts, as when the so-called "bourgeois" were made to clean neglected water-closets with bare hands, or when women-prisoners were forced to wash cells where executions had just taken place. The Central Power was essentially powerless to oppose those who may be called the abusers of the Terror. It could not find other agents. It was forced to cover these abuses with the cloak of its own authority, to protect and justify the activity of the Chekisti (members of the Cheka). "We must all be agents of the Cheka", declared Bucharin. "The Cheka is the beauty and pride of the Communist Party", said Zinoviev. "The Extraordinary Commission is the best that the Soviet organ can give us", wrote Latsis, the Cheka historian, and one of its most zealous leaders as the Chairman of the Central Commission in the Ukraine. While some of the Bolshevist members raised their voice in indignant protest against what was being done under the banner of the "revolutionary conscience", against the transformation of provincial branches into bandit and marauding organisations, according to the expression of the first Bolshevist Commissar of Justice, other authoritative voices spoke in defence of the Cheka. In the same Cheka Weekly, already cited, there was published an attack on the charges brought by "soft-bodied", "weak-nerved" intelligentsia, by certain strong-nerved authorities, such as one of the most prominent Chekisti, Peters, who said: "There is nothing to faint over... New people are not used to judicial wisdom.... It is absurd to limit by a judicial framework the activity of the Cheka." In No. 5 of the Weekly in reply to the accusations, there even appeared an article which embodied an original argument in defence of the penetration into the Cheka of criminal elements: "It means that we are strong, for rogues are practical people who do not go together with the weak." The penetration of these elements into the Cheka organisation tended to demoralise the Cheka organisation all the more, because of the fact that 219

in every respect it transformed itself into a specially privileged institution, not only in the fulness of its power, but also in the conditions of material existence. It was a kind of go'vernment within a government. Requisitions, goods and food-products went for the needs of the Chekisti. In the days of famine which the population lived through, from 1918 to 1920, the Chekisti had special rations. Service in the Cheka was often a way of getting rich; it meant the possibility of living well and on a lavish scale. as the commissions engaged not only in the struggle against counter-revolution, but also against speculation. Hence those innumerable abusers of power above referred to. Wholesale search and arrest furnished the Cheka agents a means of providing themselves with what they needed. Plunder, forgery, bribery mark the history of an institution which was to "stand on guard over the revolution", and to draw to itself Communists devoted to the cause. It is clear that a former circus clown, a former keeper of a house of ill-fame, former criminals with a definitely criminal record who penetrated into the Cheka remained under the Communist toga what they were in reality. Cheka Cynicism. All the background of the Red Terror was bound to exercise a degenerative influence on the active workers of the Cheka. Human life became utterly worthless in the eyes of these men. Before me lie original protocols of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission. History will keep them for future generations. These original documents were left behind by the Chekists when in 1919 they fled from Kiev. In reading them one is always surprised by the extreme simplicity of the forms of the "Legal Proceedings". The "revolutionary conscience" allows, for instance, at one session, consideration of fifty-nine cases, and in twenty-five cases the decree of execution by shooting. In the protocols are contained death sentences over the signature of Latsis himself, without even the date being given when they were issued. It is unnecessary in order to learn the actual activity of the Extraordinary Commission to penetrate into far-off provincial regions, where the most hideous forms of abuse of power could be met with especially often, where the Cheka could absorb more easily elements which we call criminal, for even in the centre of events one is surprised by the ignoring of questions which the human conscience and morale ask those who put into practice the right of the revolution to commit murder. The last names only were published with unusual carelessness; people were shot "by mistake", people of the same name were shot, people without names were shot, with a brief comment: "Counter-revolutionary by conviction", "a counter-revolutionary hard to catch", and so on, or simply, under the circumstances of the Red Terror such and such a number were shot. "We

220

do not need evidence or cross-examinations or suspicion to justify shooting. We find it useful, and we shoot", declared with great cynicism one of the active Chekists (in Kungur). And here again an enormous number of facts, countless instances confirming what has been said above, may be found in my book, which the Bolshevics naturally called "slanderous". But it suffices to read the description of "revolutionary justice" given by the Soviet journalist Koltov in his Jubilee article, in the Pravda, to be persuaded that numerous facts collected in my book, are facts indeed. Here are certain, sentences that should be remembered: "The chairman of a provincial Cheka, a worker, would sit down on a broken chair and in the vehemence of his 'class conscience' scrawl (using for this purpose a pencil and a bit of paper) the following order: "Order to shoot Melnichenko, him (sic) being vermin of the world-bourgeoisie, and seven others in the same cell." We have already noted that similar verdicts were also issued in Kiev and were signed by Latsis himself in the luxurious appartments of former bourgeois houses turned into Cheks offices. The aim of the Cheka was not only to destroy the enemy but also to intimidate him; in the words of Latsis, to kill in, him every desire to "sabotage" the Government. Naturally enough the Cheka, the "beauty and pride" of the communist party became a subject of hatred in the eyes of the Russian people. Aiming to. affect the soul, a whole system of terrorisation was built up, going so far as wholesale arrests of hundreds and thousands, night trials, terrible conditions of prison life, a room with cork (soundproof) walls, feigned shootings and shootings "for every case". It was most likely with the aim of intimidation that in the 3rd issue of that official organ of the Extraordinary Commission, already more than once referred to, there was printed that significant appeal to obtain evidence by torture. This really historical document, under the title "Why Do You Take Mild Measures!" written by the representative of one of the provincial commissions, was published in connection with the well-known case of the British Consul Lockhardt. "Tell us," said the article, "why you did not subject this man Lockhardt to the most refined tortures in order to obtain information. Tell us why, instead of subjecting him to such tortures as would send a cold chill over the courter-revolutionaries at the mere recital of it, you allowed him to leave the Cheka. Enough of sentimentalism! Catch a dangerous scoundrel. Get all the information you can from him and send him to the heavenly kingdom". Is it necessary to point out how such appeals from the Centre must have spurred on the Cheka agents to action? I may point out that at the 6th Session of the Soviets, the representative of the Cheka officially declared that the Cheka must be "ruthless towards all that rabble" (the bourgeoisie and its hangers-on). 221

Non - class Character of the Terror. The principle, "Poison for the bourgeoisie, comradely exhortation for workmen and peasant", was only the expression of a demagogic principle. Only with a demagogic object did the "proletarian origin" sometimes admit extenuating circumstances. Kautsky called the Terror "fraternal murder, committed exclusively, because of the will to power", and he was more than right. During the "Red Terror", a phenomenon repeated itself, which Louis Blanc noted in the French Revolution. Of the 2755 persons guilliotined in France, more than 20 0/o fell on the well-to-do classes (The same deductions were drawn later on by Taine in his statistics),. Owing to the manner in which the executions were published by the Bolshevics, it is almost impossible to determine the social position of those executed. But it is characteristic that occasional data show a minimum percentage of bourgeoisie. My card-record of

1918 to

19g

showed the largest percentage to be

of the intelligentsia - i. e., "the servants of the bourgeoisie", to use the terminology of the Bolshevist classification - and of the peasants, representing the petit bourgeois interests. If we take the later data of the year 1923, we find more than 4o per cent of the workman-peasant group. Wholesale shooting carried out by the Cheka by all possible punitive expeditions, as a matter of fact, affected the masses, viz., the workmen and peasants. We might note the decrees of wholesale murder of "well-to-do" peasants. When, during the repression of the peasant disorders in the villages (especially in the Tambov guberniya, in the year 1921), the Bolshevici shot "every eleventh" and even "every third", as the official document states, it is hardly necessary to, take into account the qualification of ,,well-to-do". The "pitiless punishment" at the order of Trotzky of the Astrakhan workmen in March gig, marked a hecatomb of the proletariat in the real sense of the word. Statistics of the Terror. Such was the Red Terror in its first period, within which we include the years 1918 to 1921. This was a time when an active civil war was going on, when two armies faced each other, but after the Soviet power in one way or another issued victorious - in the South after the fall of the rule of General Denikin, in the Crimea after the evacuation of General Wrangel, in Siberia after the r6gime of Admiral Kolchak, in the North everywhere the same picture may be observed; the act of vengeance on the defeated enemy is carried out, the annihilation of the future enemy, the enemy in spe. Not caught with guns in their hands, but remaining on the territory which had fallen under the Soviets control, those who participated in the civil war (especially the officers) were subjected to wholesale destruction. 222

Tens of thousands were arrested after the issue of orders declaring the indispensability of registration and tens of thousands were shot. A bloody butchery, in the literal sense of the word. It is enough to refer to at least the official publications, keeping in view that they always understated. For example, in the "News of the Provisional Revkom (Revolutionary Commission) of Sebastopol", on Nov. 28, 1920, the estimate of 1,634 executions was published, and two days later another of 1,202. In the little town of Kertch the local Izvestiya gives an estimate of 8oo. The Odessa Cheka itself fixes the figure of shootings in 1920 to 1921 at x,4I8 men. In the Crimea where Bela Kun held sway, the number of those shot in that liquidation of 1920/21 was estimated ad more than ioo,od'o. Wholesale shootings became so serious that they even called forth an investigation by Moscow, undertaken mostly, it is true, to influence public opinion. The Red Terror in this period of liquidation was carried on despite the official admission that open civil war had virtually ceased and that the "revolutionary proletariat" was able to "lay aside the weapon of terror", to which "the Government of Workmen and Peasants had been obliged to resort". Thus read the declaration of the All-Russian Cheka over the signature of Dzerzhinsky, published on Jan. 20, 1920, in the Izvestiya, and ordering all organs of the Cheka to discontinue the application of the most -extreme forms of punishment. It was impossible, however, to attribute any great significance to this decree of the Cheka, confirmed somewhat later by a decree of the Soviet of Peoples Commissaries and the V. Ts. I. K. (the Central Executive Committee), for a whole year before that it had also been solemnly proclaimed that "the proletariat . .. turns away from the weapon of Terrorism, making law and justice its weapon". An indisputable fact: the night before the issue of the decree abolishing the death penalty, in the Cheka sentences became a "night of blood", in the words of one of the horrifying inscriptions traced on the walls of the cell of the condemned men in the Cheka prison in Moscow. And in Moscow and Petrograd and everywhere in the province there occurred intensive shootings in those days of the formal abolition of the death penalty. Within a month there was introduced by a secret circular a formal reservation destroying the intention of the Cheka's previous prohibition of independent shootings. "In view of the discontinuance of the death penalty", the Cheka circular sent to the local Cheka organisations read, "it is ordered to, send all persons now subject to the extreme penalty to the zone of military operations as a place to which the decree of discontinuance of the death penalty does not extend". The shootings continued. In May, in connection with the PolishRussian war, the death penalty was officially revived all over Russia. To 223

what extent it was openly applied in the so-called revolutionary military tribunals organically linked with the Cheka, even official figures published in the Soviet newspapers show. For instance, in July/August there was published in the Izvestiya the figure of 1,183 deaths; in August/September, 1206. The shootings were carried out on every pretext, as is seen in the published reports; for counter-revolution, for rebellion, for having arms, even for disorderly conduct in a state of drunkenness. It seems clear enough from what has been said above that there is no possibility whatever of estimating the real number of the victims of the Red Terror. One thing is certain: that this number surpasses anything that a bloodthirsty imagination could invent about pre-revolutionary Russia. "Quiet Terror" under G. P. U. A person accustomed -to normal forms of state governmentship can hardly realise the atmosphere created by the Red Terror. Its essential meaning ,gas been correctly described by the first Sovietic Minister of Justice, Steinberg (one of those "social-revolutionists" who worked together with the communists in 1917/18 and who,, in consequence, are also responsible for the creation of the Red Terror). A few quotations may be of interest: "Terror, writes Steinberg, is a justified way of wholesale intimidation, compulsion and destruction on the part of the Government... The political minority in power reckons new individuals, groups, classes as her enemies from day to day ... The forms terror takes, are many and various . .. A feature of terror is that all over the country in the most critical stage of its development, the freedom of speech is throttled.... Terror consists of a narrow network of political supervision, which the Government stretches over all groups of society; in the formation of a political police which follows one's every step .. .; in cunning methods of espionage and provocation.. .. Terror consists in the off-hand, mocking, torturing ways in which suspected persons are questioned, in exquisite forms of moral and physical torture... ; prisons in the reign of terror are crammed, prisoners die of hunger, death sentences are delivered anyhow, in a haphazard way, depending on minute changes of the Government's temper, on the waverings of officials, who pursue their own political aims heedless of how many lives they take.... Terror banishes and confiscates as it pleases; and though to all appearances the fat bourgeois are made to pay, it is really the hungry and tired who suffer.... But the worst of it is - blood, torrents of blood, ruthless and senseless bloodshed... Terror means shooting men for their not having paid the income tax, the "natural" or "extraordinary" taxes, for their leaving the army, for abstaining to enrol, and for street robbery, high treason., daring enterprise, crimes of the same order as that committed in Galsworthy's "Justice", speculation on a 224

small scale, cunning counter-revolutionary plotting, light-hearted lise majesM. Terror means that executions form part of every day life, that the weak may be prosecuted at will, that human beings rank with inanimate things, and that bestial instincts know no restraint. Terror means that the will is paralysed, the strong are made to; tremble and to grovel at the feet of the man with the gun. Terror means wholesale executions of innocent hostages, of chance prisoners. Terror is not only an active force; it works also when it is but a constant threat." There is no exageration in these words of one of the repentent creators of the Red Terror. And things do not seem to change. There reigns an unprecedented tyranny, under whose rule the commonest and most elementary rights of man are abolished. The whole land is turned into a prison, under the keen supervision of the G. P. U. For tactical reasons in 1922 the name of the Cheka was changed to the Government Political Office. But the substance and form of the Cheka organisation, and even its personal activities remained unchanged. And the G. P. U., as it ,as called, bore the same reputation as the Cheka. The new period of the Red Terror was called the period of the "Quiet Terror", for throughout the country under the weight of the Terror all vestiges of political life disappeared. The people, psychologically depressed and physically exhausted, showed no political activity. And nevertheless the Terror in all its various forms continued to rule the land. Unquestionably it could not, in these last years, retain the nightmare aspect which it had at the outset. No Government could find executioners enough to continue such massacres, as for instance, took place in 1918 to 1920, when people were tortured and cynically mutilated, when hundreds used to perish in the course of one night. Such moments history does not repeat at short intervals. They are always connected with a certain revolutionary state of mind. That psychic phase has now passed. And, on the other hand, the Government could no more find pretexts for wholesale butchery in a country which it had driven into a state of terrorised submission. The forms in which the Quiet Terror were carried out were marked by more "revolutionary justice" than the bloodthirsty orgies of the period of military Communism and civil war. This "revolutionary justice" is expressed therein, that the unlimited functions of the former Cheka are limited, and certain of them are given over to the courts. "Inevitably", wrote Lenin, the infallible Communist authority, in 1918, "in the measure that the original aim of the (Bolshevic) power becomes not military repression, but government, the typical manifestation of repression and condemnation will be not shooting down on the spot, 1s5

225

but trial in court". But the court should not in any way be different "from such an organ as the Cheka", declares Krylenko in his book Court and Law in U. S. S. R. (Soviet Russia), published in 1927. Krylenko again refers to the testament of Lenin, recalls the words uttered by him in the first period of the New Economic Policy: "The revolutionary courts must decree execution by shooting when it is proved that the accused is a Menshevic"*). Fully forty-three articles of the Criminal Code give the revolutionary courts the possibility to sentence the accused to death in the Soviet Republic. The power of the G. P. U. extends as before to the lives of those arrested, and when the G. P. U. considers it useful, it arbitrarily finishes off its victim (the Cheka's right of shooting in special circumstances was again revived in 1924). Universal espionage, penetrating into private homes, into individual apartments, into individual families, tracks down the appearance of an, anti-Soviet spirit among the various classes of the population. As of old, the prisons were filled with political prisoners. Wholesale arrests and wholesale deportations, decreed by the courts and by the orders of the Administration, to remote, forgotten, depopulated and climatically most undesirable places in Siberia, Turkestan and the Solovets Islands, took place daily. In itself Soviet deportation is an awful thing. It is enough to read the stratling diary of Malsagow (who, in 1925, escaped from the Solovets concentration camp) to realise the plight of the prisoners. Matters have not changed since 1922. People are fated to die a slow death. They have no human rights, they endure hunger, they are beaten, tortured and sneered at; now and then they are shot. It would seem verily that the inventive power of the Soviets is especially keen no finding the most refined methods of degradation. The punishments they invent have never yet before existed in the annals of deportation and hard labour. Nay, the "stone bags" which they now use were known, - in the reign of John the Terrible, in monastic prisons. The prisoner is thrust into a hole, so narrow that he has to be literally screwed in, and he remains there for a week, for a fortnight. Another punishment consists in placing the naked prisoner on a mosquitoinfected spot, or - as a winter variation - on boards' covered with ice. Thus the "victors" treat the "victims". No wonder prisoners go on "hungerstrike" or commit suicide. But all those repressions are not "Red Terror" in the sense in which it is depicted by the communist theoricians. It is only "revolutionary justice". It happens, however, now and then that "Quiet Terror" suddenly flares up and takes the monstrous form of *) A

"Menshevic"

is

an

orthodox social-democrat,

different mind than the Bolshevics.

226

who, however,

is of a

"execution on the spot". Then the Government in order to brutally terorise the inhabitants publishes the acts committed under the flag of official "Red Terror". In 1922, Lenin, addressing his political foes and naming them "counter-revolutionary bourgeois", said: "You have provoked us to a most desperate fight in October; the result was our bringing forth terror, intense terror; only a few hysterical intellectuals doubt its necessity. If it becomes necessary, we will bring it forth again." It became necessary in the summer months of 1927, when, quite unexpectedly for most people there occurred a number of terroristic acts in Russia, directed against the communist party and the representatives of the G. P. U. This "individual terror" was an answer to the governmental terror. The Government replied by new arrests of hostages and shootings on a wholesale scale. It is incontestable that the breaking out every now and then of flashes of the "hysterical Terror" (an expression of one of the notorious leaders of the Cheka - Peters) does not have at the present time and cannot have the character of that really medieval nightmare, which it had in the first years following the seizure of the Government by the Bolshevici. The Governmental Terror has been so habitual a phenomenon that people have become accustomed to it and it has ceased to frighten. The psychical depression of the terrorised population is gradually passing; the people are awakening to revolutionary activity and protest against the despotic group of political leaders standing at the head of the Government. The Governmental Terror is giving birth to the Terror of the discontented aimed at the agents of the Government and the representatives of the G. P. U. A new generation is appearing on the scene of history. It is alien to the moods and the reasoning in the atmosphere of which the Red Terror was born and existed. The policy of Terror resulting at the end of ten years in the Government surrounded by enemies. There are two camps in the country, - the victors and the defeated. The troops of special commission and those of the G. P. U. remain up till now faithful to the Government. But protest gradually rears its head, the lower classes become boisterous, and it is not an institution of the G. P. U. sort that can stop this growing discontent of an invisible crowd numbering many millions. "Political Banditism" (an official Soviet expression) is the chief method of struggle. That means a ruthless settlement of accounts with the governmental agents every time it appears possible. Every communist is, in the eyes of villagers, such an agent and therefore loathsome. The "Red Terror" has led the communist party into a blind alley. Surrounded by enemies its power will perish; history will write down its murderous and senseless deeds and the flaming inscription: "Red Terror" will remain as an eternal "memento mori". 1s*

.227

The Armed Forces of Soviet Russia. By General A. Winogradsky. CONTENTS: The Imperial Army; General formation of the Soviet Army; Social and Political Standing of the Soviet Army; Its Racial Composition; Organisation; Commanding Officers; Military Schools; The Food Supply; Military Industries; Conclusion.

T

but had at times been heavily defeated, - which Army known HE hadImperial nevertheless the greatest victories in having conquered Charles XII, Frederick and Napoleon - ceased to exist in the Spring of 1917.

It is true that the Manchurian campaign, and some of the periods of the Great War proved a failure for us, the reason, however, must be sought in those extraordinary conditions in which the troops had been placed. In Manchuria the army fought at a distance of ten thousand versts from its base, connected only with it by the insufficient tie of the Siberian railway, while the Russian country remained almost entirely indifferent to the war. During the sad year 1915 the army lacked munition, and throughout the whole war it was inferior to the enemy in the matter of technical equipment and means, and as it soon became evident found insufficient moral and material support in its rear. Owing to a number of factors, which it would not do to dwell on here in detail, Russia, as a whole proved unable of developing as full a "potency" of war (to use a current expression) as did her enemies and her Allies. Now let us try to furnish a short characteristic sketch of the old valiant Imperial Army. It was formed on the principle of universal military service, which, however, did not extend to the whole population as an abnormal number of privileges were conceded for family and economic reasons; and moreover, some of the non-Russians were exempt from compulsory military service. Nevertheless, the army of i 5oo 000 men represented a solid contingent, partly weakened, however, by the addition of reserves and by the formation of "second turn" infantry divisions when a general mobilisation became necessary. Thanks to a comparatively long service term, and to the experience which had been acquired in two centuries in training and education, the latter qualification being pervaded by psychological ideas (the bequest of a long succession of generals beginning with Peter the Great and Suvoroff) thanks to all these circumstances, our permanent army was of a high standard of efficiency. Its backbone, the officers corps, was eager to give its life for Tzar and country, and was bound by those invisible, spiritual ties to the rank and file, which alone can weld a detachment into a cohesive unit. If, in the old Russian army there were defects of a purely military nature, they were redeemed by enormous merits. To sum up; as regards 228

morals and tactical preparedness, the Russian army stood on a high level of efficiency, which can be said neither of the general way the many-sided problem of State defence was solved nor of the technical equipment of the armed forces; in particular: we had too little artillery, too few cartridges and shells, and our air-force was rudimentary... Other important drawbacks were: i. the inability of replacing in time, losses of men by trained reserves, and 2. the general unpreparedness of the Empire for waging a war, which the Government and society regarded as the business of the military man only, forgetting that now, when the whole armed nation is obliged to fight, the country must achieve the maximum of exertion in all the branches of activities of the State, and is furthermore called upon to support the army morally and materially. The most acute question was how to repair the loss of officers; for partly on account of the indifference of educated people to military matters, and partly because of our general backwardness, the State had no numerous class of sufficiently educated and consciously patriotic young men at its disposal wherefrom to take human material for rapidly training war-time officers, as was the case, for instance, in France and Germany. Nevertheless the army held out for 21/2 years of war under exceedingly difficult conditions, and in February 197 was not hopelessly demoralised, as is asserted by precisely those people who so successfully disorganised it in an atmosphere of revolutionary frenzy. Its sores were only external, and had not yet eaten deeply into its healthy organism. To close this brief sketch of the old Imperial Army and to afford some starting point for comparing the armed forces of Soviet Russia with it, we shall give some data in figures: In peace-time the Russian army numbered 8o infantry divisions, 6 sharp-shooter brigades, £7 cavalry divisions, 2 special brigades, numerous Cossack troops, with more than 6oo batteries (about 5ooo guns), and a corresponding juantity of engineer and auxiliary troops and a very inferior air-force. Toward the autumn of 1917, the old Russian army had become completely disorganised under the influence of the Revolution, and had lost all its military importance. The very first Bolshevic decrees finished it up, and in the beginning of 1918, the Bolshevics had no armed forces. The red troops fighting at that time against the volunteer army (white army), which was just in course of formation, bore purely a partisan character with all its defects; their organisation and general command differed greatly from the elementary exigencies of military art. The Moscow Government was aware of it, and after having made enormous efforts to introduce the Tzar's old contingent of generals and officers into the army, proceeded under their guidance to reproduce an army, and tried as much as possible to reconcile the principles of military exigencies with the new political and social conditions. 229

The fight against the white army in 1919 and partly in 5920, and the war with Poland, demanded a great exertion: during this time the ruling powers in Moscow had put more than 5 million men under arms. When the campaign was over on all fronts, the figure gradually fell to 562 000. The creation of a new regular army, the consolidation of its contingents, was carried forward with haste, so that in 1925 it became possible to publish a definite law on military service. This law'), with supplementary instructions, fixes the manner of completing the armed forces of the Soviet Republic, and the terms of service; and is endowed with a general State importance analogous to the one belonging formerly to the law of i. January 1874, which was the first to introduce compulsory military service into our country. General Formation. The essential principle on which the above mentioned law of 1925 is constructed, are: a) the compulsory military service for everyone, b) the mixed territorial-contingent system, and c) the concentration of the administration of all affairs of the army under "the Peoples Commissariat for Army and Navy". The Red Army in spite of the general compulsion of service, however, had - as we shall see later - a distinctly outlined class-character. Its specific feature is the extremely developed military-political apparatus that penetrates the army to its very core, and serves to direct it in accordance with the views of the lCentral Government. And further, its organisation is mainly adapted to the conditions of the East-European war theatre, which permits of war operations with a weaker technical equipment than it is possible in Western Europe. The old law of 1874, though being based on the same principle of general service, was far from reaching the full development of this principle in consequence of such an abundance of exemptions for family, economic and educational reasons, which could not be found in any other great country, and also on account of the exemptions of the population in certain parts of the Empire from military service. The present Soviet law took yet another big stride, and after having curtailed all sorts of privileges, made the rules for their application more explicit and circumscribed. Moreover, it partly extended military service to some tribes and that strata of the population, which formerly had been exempt from it (as for instance, the clergy and village-school teachers). As for privileges for family reasons, the absolute exemption from service for these reasons has been abolished, and only some means of facilitating the service remained, their application being limited by important clauses. All priveleges for educated people are also annihilated, and the law is constructed with a view of making use of educated young men on commanding posts with the greatest possible profit for the army. ') The law of 18. September 5925 concerning "compulsory military service".

230

However, all this exists merely on paper, and practically speaking, compulsory military service is not actually carried out on account of the difficulty experienced in letting the whole of the population pass through the existing contingent, the responsibility of this fact lying not in the law of 1925 itself, but in "the regime" which has created conditions impossible for any successful work in this domain, as was the case in all others. It must be added that the law of 1925 contains a divergence from the old one in regard to the physical fitness of the population. During recent years, the physical development of the population of Russia has gone back so rapidly that it naturally awakens anxiety in governmental circles, but of course, no legislation is capable of arresting this process under the present regime, and there only remains the possibility of inventing measures to smooth over the consequences of these conditions. To this purpose the law raised the ages of the recruits by one year, and has established - as used to be formerly the case in Germany - supplementary classes of recruits according to their physical condition, viz.; those suitable "for service in war time", and those "conditionally fit", by which means the number of rejections is reduced. The second principle, that of the territorial-contingent system, introduced into the organisation of the Red Army an important difference, as well from that of the armed forces of other States, as of the former Russian army. In fact, the Red Army consists of contingent troops of the normal type and of the militia (in case of mobilisation the contingent troops obtain reserves amounting to one-fifth of their number). The latter are called territorial troops, they are formed according to a strictly territorial system, and in time of peace are comprised of two categories, the permanent contingent and the reserve, the latter being called in for short terms of drill in order to be given a military training. Besides these troops, other formations on the national principle exist in the Red Army. As to the military formation of these two categories, contingent and territorial, the first contains 90 0/o of the total cavalry and technical troops, approximately half of the infantry, the whole of the navy and air-forces, and the heavy artillery. The territorial troops include all the remaining armed forces, i. e., the other half of the infantry and light artillery, and an unimportant percentage of cavalry and heavy artillery. The territorial-contingent system is the result of the desire to train in good time, and as large a number of raw recruits as possible so as to prepare the whole population for war in time of peace, thus avoiding the disorder of the army and rear by untrained masses of men (as was the case during the great war), and keeping pace with the necessity of an utmost exertion on the part of the whole of the population. When taking Russia's enormous human material (population 1do million people, general 231

number of recruits 1,200,000) into consideration, it might seem sufficient to allow only a part of the population to pass through the army; but then many men of the old service terms would get into the complete army after the mobilisation as it occurred in 194, which is a great drawback. Whereas. by means of combining contingent troops with territorials, the task of giving a military training to the whole of the youth can be accomplished to some extent, while to maintain a contingent army of sufficient strength for this purpose, Soviet Russia - to use Frunses expression - "for the moment" cannot do for financial reasons*). However, there is reason to believe that the Red Army does not solve the problem set for it of giving a military training to the whole of its 1,200,000 annual recruits, the number of the existing contingent and territorial troops being insufficient for embracing the whole mass of the population. There is, however, a palliative - as we shall see later - in the form of a training outside of the army, but it exists more in theory than in practice. The age of enlistment for all working men is fixed at 21, and its order is as follows: a) from 19 to 21 - preparatory training consisting of military, military-political and physical training of the youths for one month in each year, special attention being paid to the training of each individual combatant, more particularly as riflemen. This training is carried out by instructors, who are appointed from among the contingents, as well as from the reserves. b) The general term of actual military service beginning at the age of 21 lasts for 5 years, but does not elapse for everyone under the same conditions, depending on, - where they have to serve: in the contingents - in the militia, or are trained outside of the army. In point of fact, citizens who have been enrolled in the permanent army, serve for 2 years in contingents and spend the other 3 years on a long-term leave. In the militia they are enrolled for 5 years in the contingent troops, during which time they undergo a call to arms alternating with periods spent outside of the army. In the first year a 3 months course of training takes place apart from the call to arms of the old service term; in the second year the Red armymen continue to be trained separately, and then for another month they remain in the general strength of the alternate troops, and during the remaining 3 years they are called in for i month each year to do duty in the general corps of all the alternates. So that, as a matter of fact, the latter are drilled for 8 months only out of the 5 years; however, the contingent of the territorials serve, on general principles, as the other contingent troops do. Finally, the service order of those trained outside of the army consists in the recruits of this class being called in at various intervals totalling 5 months. *) A territorial division passes through its ranks twice as many recruits as a contingent one, and the up-keep of both is the same.

232

As a result, it may be surmised that a number of men is being passed through the militia two or three times superior to those of the contingent. But even though the alternates do not receive a full training, they nevertheless learn something, so that in the final result a far larger part of the population is embraced by military service than it would have been the case had there existed a permanent army only, though, of course, the latter receives a much better training. As regards the training outside of the army, it is known that up till now it exists more on paper than in reality. Soviet Russia does not possess the proper means, i. e. a sufficient number of instructors, etc. to bring life into the system, and therefore it remains in a rudimentary state. Going over the figures, we obtain the following results: - The population of Soviet Russia amounts to 14o millions, out of which, deducting those non-Russians who are exempt from military service, 125 ooo ooo are liable The general number of recruits is about i 200 000 men, out of which only 85o 000 prove physically fit; the number of all armed forces is 562 000 men. In other words, it would never have been possible to pass to serve.

all the recruits through the army with a two years service term, had not the above elucidated system of formation been applied, which, however, does not embrace the whole of the population either, but only Go to 7o per cent. The territorial troops ("ter-troops") now constitute not less than half the army, and they owe their name to the fact that the recruits are called in according to regional conditions, i. e., into troops stationed within the limits of the particular "gouvernement" or region in which they live. Together with the advantageous side of the Soviet formation system of armed forces, its disadvantages must also be mentioned, viz., that for the troops of the militia an adequate training of men in command is not provided for, who - as is the case with specialists - will be wanted in large numbers in case of mobilisation. We believe the development of this mixed system in Soviet Russia has reached, or at least approached, its limit, for in case of a further deployment, the permanent army would become too small in numbers in proportion to the whole mass of troops, s) for supplying a sufficient number of trained officers, 2) for protecting the State during mobilisation and strategic disposition. In addition to the territorial troops, the navy and air-force, the Red Army also comprises armed forces of special denominations; a) tropps of the

G. P. U. (State Political Administration), b) the convoy of the U. S. R., and c) "CHON" (troops of special denomination) totalling 200 000 men in all.

As can be seen from their names, they are kept for interior needs, to fight for the Soviet Power and against Russia herself; their capability of fighting, however, is doubtful, we shall therefore not refer to them again. 233

The ardent longing for securing a military training for the whole of the population - a so-called "inilitarisation" - has not abated in Soviet Russia up to the present day; and all sorts of auxiliary means are used for this purpose, one of which is - according to the views of the Heads of the Red Army - the introduction of some of the branches of military training into the school programme. These measures, to a certain extent, must go to improve the standard of training of the territorials, which troops, in fact, are meant to prepare combatants of the rank and file, while the contingents are entrusted with the preparation of the non-commissioned officers. To this end some of the Red Authorities suggest establishing: a) in schools of the first grade, an adequate physical culture and some knowledge of the Red Army and its history; b) in schools of the second grade, a training passing from games to, the simplest military exercises and the study of the art of warfare and of the Red Army formation; c) in higher schools, to prepare officers who would afterwards conclude and consolidate their education while on actual military service. Into the programme of these schools, theoretical lessons and two months camp-drill, have already been actually included. Apart from all this, special efforts are also being made to attract the interest of the population to the Red Army, and to propagate military knowledge by way of creating various associations of a military nature, as for instance, the "Aviokhim" (Avio-chemical Association), the Association of Radio-friends, etc., which are partly supported by the Government, and whose task consists in "militarising the intellects" - if one can say so - of the Soviet citizens, and to propagate among them military knowledge both in theory and practice. Not a small part is being played in this connection by the correspondingly influenced press and literature, which is copiously distributed even in villages. Finally, let us mention one suggestion, that has been made in this connection, as an interesting psychological mark of the general tendency, viz., that of "standardising" vehicles, harness and even household utensils throughout the whole country with the view of utilising them for military purposes in order that, - should specific models of these objects be produced - they might come in handy in case of emergency. II. Now let us see what the army consists of in regard to its social and political standing. According to the last census taken in the Winter of 1926-1927, the workmen constituted 15.2 0/0, the peasants 77,3 o/o and the "rest" 7.5 o/o. The number of illiterate gradually fell during the last years till it amounted to 3.75 O/o, but apparently a great number of the illiterates has been included in the number of literate, which makes a vast difference in the official appreciation of public welfare. From the same 234

source comes the information that in 1927 over

oo ooo youths have been

educated in military schools, and that the general figure of young men with the military training of an officer, is more than 13 o/o in the Red Army. The number of members of the communist party and the "Comsomol" (Communist youths' Association) was increasing in recent years, and towards the end of 1927, had almost reached a figure amounting to one-third (29 0/o) of the whole numbers of the Red Army. In regard to the staff of commanders, it consisted (in social respects) of 20 0/o of workmen, 53.3 o/o of peasants and 26.7 o/o of the "rest"; the percentage of this "rest" having considerably diminished in recent years. Of communists there are in the staff of commanders 49-72 0/0, and of

members of the "Comsomol" 3.74 /o, which means that more than half of the Staff of Commanders consisted of Communists (an increase of zo 010 since April

1925).

Thus, notwithstanding the extension of the compulsory military service law, the army itself is purely of a class-nature. Let us mention by the way that, according to the Military-Revolutionary Council, women have also been recently included in the training outside of the army. In case of war they are on equal footing with men under 2 1 to take part in the defence of the State, - in other words the Government endeavours by all possible means to bring it about that the number of Soviet citizens obtaining at least some sort of military training, is augmented. Recial Composition. Of Greater Russians there were 64 0/o recruits, -

Little Russians - 22 0/0, White Russians - 4 /o, and of other nationalities o O/o. The military budget of Soviet Russia increased from 337 million roubles in 1924 to 657 million in the Financial Year 1926-1927, the

greater part of these burdens becoming a charge on the General Central Treasury, and the smaller amount was levied on the means of the Separate Republics 'entering the Soviet Federation. There is good reason to believe that the expenditures on Army and Navy considerably exceeded the cited figures, for with the trade-monopoly now existing in Russia, an important part of the imported products and machinery, though shown in the general list of imports, were really used for the special needs of the military department, and for the equipment of factories working for the defence of the State. To complete the picture, let us also point out the importance attached to the tribal formations. Their aim is twofold: i) the Bolshevics look upon it as the first step towards drawing into military service all those nonRussians, who according to the old law were exempt from it up till 1925, and 2) they aspire to create centres of national movements so as to have ready contingents in case of military or political complications on the frontiers where people of the same stock live on the opposite side in a 235

neighbouring state. The scheme of drawing into military service those tribes which had formerly been exempt from it, is calculated for 5 years, beginning with 1925, special attention being paid to the national formation of Turkestan with a view of extending the Soviet influence in Asia as far as possible. Organisation. As it has already been said, the particular feature of the organisation of armed forces in Soviet Russia, is being permeated by a military-political apparatus, the problem of which consists in the control of political opinions of each individual, as well as in educating the army and through it the whole population in a certain political and moral direction. This apparatus is closely connected with all the organising centres of all grades of the hierarchy, beginning with the Central Administration and ending with the lowest sections. At the head of this Central Administration - in other words - of the Military Department, there stands a Commissary for Military and Naval Affairs. The latter, according to his position, presides over the Collegial Institution attending on it, viz., "the Revolutionary War Council of the U. S. R.", which enjoys great rights, and the problem of which consists in working out the war reforms and measures, and in finding the most adequate means of achieving the military ends arising from the general State policy as far as the creation and use of the armed forces of the Republic are concerned. This activity is not limited to being of an advisory nature only, - it is broader, and at its disposal stand: i) the staff of the "Army of Workmen and Peasants" (R. K. K. A.) with the functions of the "General Staff" with the Inspector Corps called upon to fulfil the manifold technical controls of the troops of different denomination; 2) the General Administration of the R. K. K. A. superintending the formation, the order of service, etc.; 3) the Administration of the Naval Forces; 4) the Administration of the Air-force; 5) the General Administration of Supplies, which includes the general, artillery, engineering, military building and military financial administrations; 6) the Political Administration (Pur), directing the military-political apparatus of the army; 7) the sanitary and veterinary departments of the army; 8) the Administration of Military educational establishment; 9) the Military Board - the High Tribunal with military prosecutors. The next grade of organisation comprises the military circuits which are 7 in number (the circuits of Leningrad, the West, of Moscow, of the Ukraine, of North Caucasus, of the Volga and of Siberia). Together with one separate army - that of the Caucasus, and one separate front that of Turkestan - they comprise the whole of Soviet Russia. At the head of a circuit is a Commander of the troops, with a Circuit Revolutionary War Council attending on him. Into the administration of every separate circuit enter the staff, the administration of supplies, 236

the control of the air-force, the inspection of different kinds of troops, of the military educational establishments and of the political administration. The calling-in of the recruits, the mobilisation and the training outside of the army, are in charge of a special apparatus - of the local military management, subdivided into districts under the name of District Military Commissariat. The latter are united in each cicuit and are subordinated to the commanders of the corps and divisions stationed in a given circuit. The corps in the Red Army are subdivided into sharpshooter and cavalry corps. The first consist of 2-3 sharpshooter (infantry) divisions, of a sapper battalion of one company of intelligence-service, and of one detachment of heavy artillery consisting of batteries of 107 mm (4.2 in.) guns, and of one howitzer battery of 155 mm (6 in.) guns, which up till recently consisted of 4 guns each and now apparently consist of three. In war-time a scouting air-detachment of o-I2 aeroplanes is added to a "corps". Some of the corps consist -exclusively of contingent divisions, others of territorials only; and finally there are also contingent-territorial corps. Every cavalry corps consists of two cavalry divisions. The entire number of corps in the Red Army is: 23 sharpshooter and four cavalry corps. The total number of sharpshooter (infantry) divisions amounts to 67, of which no less than 35 are territorial; of cavalry corps there are 12, and besides these there are 9 separate cavalry brigades. Every sharpshooter division consists of the administration of 3 regiments having 3 battalions each, and of one artillery regiment divided into 3 sections: in two of these sections there are 3 light-gun batteries, each battery having 3 guns of 76 mm (3 in. guns of the type 1902), and the third, the howitzer section, of 4 gun batteries each armed with 3 light field-howitzers of 122 IM (4.8 in. guns, type 1909-10), the full complement being 3o guns in each

division. According to other information the batteries are of 4 guns each, or at least can be developed into such at the time of mobilisation, and the sections (are then mixed, i. e., they consist of both light and howitzer batteries; but in any case, these differences have no influence on the general conclusion that the quantity of artillery in an infantry division in not large. In every infantry regiment, moreover, there is a section of infantryartillery with two batteries (8 or 6 guns), armed with light 3 in. or mountain guns. There is a military-political commissary in every regiment superintending the political activity in it. To the regimental administration are attached: the economic departments, the Regimental-Political Club, a machine-gun instructor, instructors in general education, detachments: of machine-guns (6 machine-guns) of the intelligence service, of the mounted scouts, and finally a regimental school for training the "lower commanders" (non-commissioned officers). 237

A battalion consists of 3 sharpshooter companies, administering some guns of 37 mm and some light mortars of the "battalion artillery". In every company the first 3 platoons are sharpshooters, and the fourth is a machine-gun platoon; the sharpshooter platoons include sharpshooter and machine-gun departments, so that in one platoon there are 8 machineguns (2 mounted and 6 unmounted); altogether there are in a regiment 78 machine guns (24 mounted and 54 unmounted). The addition to the regiments of a special infantry-artillery of their own, and of a mounted scouts detachment, is quite expedient more especially for the East-European war-theatres with their presumably extensive fronts. In a cavalry regiment there are 5 squadrons, one machine-gun squadron (16 mounted on the so-called "tachanka" - small, light four-horse peasants' carts that proved useful under local conditions in the Civil war and the Polish war), and 4 squadrons armed with swords, lances, hand machineguns and rifles. The administration of the divisions resembles that of the sharpshooters; the divisions themselves apparently consist, some of them of 6 regiments and some of 4, the 8 divisions being organised into 4 corps. Each cavalry division includes one light horse-artillery section of 3 batteries; besides this, according to some information it is planned to add to each cavalry corps one howitzer section with 3 batteries, armed with light I4 mm howitzers. The breed of horses is extremely inferior: a consequence of the ruinous destruction of the once numerous Russian studs during the time of the Revolution, and especially under the Bolshevic reign. Neither the infantry nor cavalry divisions include: a) the air-force consisting according to official information of r5oo aeroplanes and 13 air-detachments with observation ballons*), b) the armoured-troops: a couple of scores of Tanks (mostly old English and French ones), about as many armoured automobiles and some 6o armoured trains; c) railway troops - 14 separate railway regiments and 3 separate railway battalions; d) troops -of the intelligence service - 15 separate regiments, 5 separate battalions and 17 separate wire-less battelions; e) troops of engineers of special denominations - 67 pontoon-battalions, and electro-technical and mine-battalions; f) the artillery of special denomination, consisting of: i) some sections of the anti-air craft artillery (zenith artillery); 2) trenchartillery (mine-mortars) and 3) heavy artillery of special denomination (T. A. 0. N.). The latter numbers 7 gun and howitzer sections, each of them divided into 2-3 batteries of which everyone is capable of being developed into a section in time of mobilisation, which would bring the general number of the T. A. 0. N. up to 60-7o batteries. In *) There is reason to believe that in case of war, the Soviet military aviation will have some thousands of civil-aviation 'planes put at its disposal.

238

the T. A. 0. N. predominate 6 in guns, and finally guns of larger calibre, all of them of obsolete types. The characteristic features of this organisation, in a purely military sense, are: the important numbers of the territorial troops, a comparatively enormous quantity of cavalry (in comparison with other armies), the organisation of infantry adapted for field-warfare, a weak artillery which is even now of already obsolete type, and a small air-force, and the rudimentary state of the tank defence force, so that as a result the Red Army is a long way behind the West-European Armies in regard to technical equipment. Commanding Officers. The rank of generals and officers and of noncommissioned officers no longer exists and has been replaced by certain appellations of the class of commanders. In the denomination of "Commanding Staff", all men in command are included, with: i) the commanding staff strictly speaking (Generals and Officers), subdivided into superior commanding staff (Generals), the higher staff (Staff Officers), and middle staff (Officiers), 2) the lower commanding staff (non-commissioned officers), 3) the political commanding staff (military commissaries), 4) administrative staff (military state-officials), 5) the commanding staff of instructors (heads of instructors, Club secretaries, etc.), 6) the juridical-political staff (military-court department), and ') the medical and veterinary staff. By means of a rigorous selection of the commanding staff during a number of "proletarianising" years, an important number of former contingent officers of the old Russian army, by whose efforts - out of its dismembered remains, the present Red Army has been created, are no longer in its ranks. The main mass (greater part) of the commanding staff consists of men who have been trained in the Bolshevic military school, or during the Civil war. In some of the positions some of the former officers of the Old Army can still be seen, especially those of the General Staff, but they are in the minority. 90 o/o of the staff of commanders have been trained in Soviet schools, and have never had anything to do with the old Russian Army. From the social point of view, the commanding staff differs materially from the general army, there being only 56 0/o instead of 84.7 O/o of peasants, 12.3 o/o instead of ii o/o of workmen, and

23.7

0/0 instead of 5.3 o/o

of the "rest", which is only natural since the commanding staff must needs be completed by representatives of the better educated strata, i. e., of the "rest". However, the higher the service-rank of a certain catagory may be, the greater is the number of communists ("party-men") in it, their percentage of commanders of circuits and corps amounting to 69

239

and 85 o/o respectively, and dropping among commanders of companies and platoons (non-commissioned officers) to 36 and 27 0/0.

Until 1925 the principle of Sole-Command was not observed, and out of political considerations two powers were in command - the military commander and a political commissary, who had the same rights, formed decisions together and carried them out, the second often acting as political controller of the first, and having more influence than he. At the present time it has been possible to abolish this state of affairs, and to concentrate all the military and economic functions in the hands of the commander, and to "release" the commissaries of this control. They have been left the duty of signing together with the commanders certain categories of documents (for instance, political, mobilisation and operative orders), but they have lost the right of arresting the fulfilment of the commanders' orders, and can only raise complaints against them. The full functions of the commissary have been preserved in the navy and the national army-formations only, Experiments have also been made for vesting the duties of the commissaries in the commanders, but the military men proved insufficiently prepared in a political sense. Measures have now been undertaken for filling up this insufficiency, and it has been resolved to introduce the principle of Sole-Command at all costs. The introduction of the principle of Sole-Command increases the military value of the army; but it was unwillingly accepted by many of the commanders, some of them having lost, and others having never acquired the habit of manifesting a will of their own or personal initiative and responsibility. At any rate, the new order of things has up to now not decreased the weight of the military political apparatus which is necessary to the Soviet Government for propaganda work, control and a tight grip on the army, but it has only changed the relations between the commanders and the commissaxies wherever the latter still exist. Among others the military prosecutors, in consequence of the distorted application of the principle 'of controlling the loyalty of the commanders' actions, and because of the universally established system of espial and denunciation, very often check the work of the commanders by unnecessarily interfering with their activity beforehand. An age-limit has een established for the Commanders much lower than that ruling in other armies. This regulation, though unsatisfactory under the complicated social conditions of a modern war, is partly explained by the political apprehension of the Government, lest a wise and capable chief should acquire too great an influence were he suffered to occupy his high position too long. The technical training of the staff of commanders is extremely unsatisfactory, especially in the reserves. The reasons for this fact are the 240

following: i) the military schools do not afford knowledge sufficiently extensive and profound for the making of modern officers; 2) Owing to a artificial "proletarianisation" of the army, the staff of commanders is augmented by individuals belonging to the least cultured strata of the population; 3) the constant political guardianship in the shape of a severe control held over them by a military-political apparatus for safeguarding the interiests of the communistic party, - deprive the commanders of the freedom of action in purely technical matters, which they should have possessed undier normal conditions; and this state of affairs does not help to strengthen their character and will, for a commander lacking the latter, will never reach an appropriate efficiency. The Government endeavours to improve the military education of the men in colmmand by obliging them to go through various repetitive courses; but this is obviously not sufficient. It is the commanders in the reserve that suffer moist by this state of affairs, for their position makes it most difficult for them to keep pace with the progress in military art. The government, on the other hand, feeling for obvious reasons as if it were in a conquered land, can by no means either grant the staff of commanders full rights or renounce the "proletarianisation" of the army. Military Schools. The military schools are divided according to their programme and their aims, into three groups: the higher (military acadeinies), the normal Soviet schools preparing the middle commanding staff, and continuative courses for the commanding staff. There are seven schools of the first group: The Military Academy of the R. K. K. A. (of the general staff), and the academies for artillery, for military engineering and electro-technics, for the air-force, for the marines, for military-medical training, and the military politechnical institute in memory of Tolmatcheff. The academy of the general staff, besides educating the officers of the general staff as well as the superior commanders, has also a department for the East (i. e., to prepare specialists in Eastern warfare), a course for military supply specialists, and special high courses for perfecting the superior commanders beginning with brigade commanders. The object of the other academies can be recognised by their names; and the "Courses in memory of Tolmatcheff" serve to train the higher political staff of the R. K. K. A. In the academies the work is rather thorough, but much time is being devoted to political training, and in order to give the students manifold information in this particular domain, they are in reality overtaxed in this respect, and can hardly acquire a profound fundamental knowledge of military art. 16

241

Of "normal" schools (military schools) there are 6o, -

25 of them

being infantry schools, 7 cavalry, 5 artillery, 3 -engineering, 2 intelligence service, 6 aviation and ii general schools. In the infantry and cavalry schools the course of training lasts for 3 years, r year being devoted to elementary work and 2 years to military training, whereas the remaining schools have a 4 years course of which i year is also devoted to elementary work. For entering the schools a most rudimentary knowledge is required. It is therefore evident that under such circumstances one year spent in the elementary-training class cannot furnish a pupil with a store of knowledge sufficient for beginning an earnest and productive study of military science. The third group of military schools, the courses for perfecting the commanders, are divided into those for the middle commanding staff, and those for the higher staff, embracing the necessary special branches (Shooting, cavalry and artillery practice, aviation, chemical war, etc.), and their standard of work is superior to that of the "normal" schools. Finally there also exist military-political schools for military-political training purposes. The food supply for the Army is apparently satisfactory in regard to the number of calories (however, only half the quantity of meat is distributed in comparison with the old Russian Army); but the salary of the commanders is a miserable one. (A commander of a circuit receives only 170 roubles a month).

Military Industry. Owing to, the economic structure of Soviet Russia, her industry works under a complete control, not to say guidance, of the Government; the latter thus seeming to be easily able to fulfil the demands of the military department in a satisfactory manner, but even here many difficulties have to be overcome. The problem of satisfying the demands, is dealt with by a special organ, called the Council of Labour and Defence (Sto), which co-ordinates the activity of all the governmental institutions dealing with State defence; besides this, special representatives of the military department are attached to the Council of General Administration of the military industry for the purpose of intelligence-service and assistance. The activity of this* particular branch of industry, as far as one can judge, is much more virile than that of the other branqhes, and according to some information its production amounts to 75-80 0/o of the pre-war time production. But its worst drawback consists in the complete depreciation of the factory equipments, which is due to the general economic decay of Soviet Russia. Of factories working for military requirements there are altogether: factories of arms - 6; of cartridges - 5; of cases - 6; cannons - 4; repair-works - 5; percussion-caps - 4; gun-powder - 7; shells 4; aeroplanes 16; chemicals ii. There are also 3 optical factories,

242

x for military-medical supplies and i for side-arms. The figures of their porduction, when taking into consideration the time required for bringing out certain manufactures as compared with the model factories of some other countries, tend to show that the technical backwardness of the Soviet military industry is no longer as great as is usually assumed. The weakest part of this industry is the automobile manufactory, and the building of some parts of aeroplanes; the construction of the aeroplanes themselves is, however, in a greater state of perfection, though, in comparison with other great countries, the Soviet aviation is still rather weak. In order to convey some idea of the Governments aspirations and of its opinion of the comparative importance of the different branches of the various industries, we might point to the military chemical and aviation industries, where strenuous work is being done. In chemistry, the work is naturally carried out unobtrusively and does not attract general attention; but the great progress of the "Dobrochim" (association of the friends of chemical defence), headed by eminent specialists of pre-war time, is in itself a significant augury. The above mentioned figures showing the number of aeroplane factories and of the 'planes already in existence in the Red Army, when compared with the respective figures from the time of the Great War, go to show that in Russia the same as in other countries, feverish work is being done to make amends for the enormous deficiencies still existing in the air-force. III. In summarising the above elucidated description of the Red Army, one comes to the conclusion that it has a finished and harmonious organisation on paper, but it is doubtful whether all that which is undertaken, is fully accomplished, and whether all the conditions indispensable from a military point of view are observed. As has already been pointed out, the staff of commanders is weak; much time, instead of being devoted to military training, is spent on instructing the troops politically, and it is evident that the training of the army suffers under these conditions. The Government is aware of the present state of affairs, and is trying to round off the edges as far as possible completing the training of the troops by spreading military knowledge among the population by means of the press, and by founding different circles for self-education and military associations, etc., but these palliatives can evidently not rejplace the military training. If to this the low condition of technical equipment in the Army is added, we shall have to acknowledge that on the whole the military preparedness of the Red Army is not of a high standard, and at all events much inferior to that of the armies of Russia's western neighbours. 16*

243

As to the moral level of the Red Army, the general moral corruption which has spread all over Russia under Bolshevic reign, cannot but affect the Army, cannot but undermine the ideals of a true soldier among the masses, ideals, which in their very nature clash with the Soviet spirit, the very substance of which is corruption itself*). And moreover, the value of armed forces, their capacity of fulfilling the tasks set them by politics, cannot be appreciated by itself without fully taking into consideration all the other factors which go to influence the defensive capability of a State. The times when the army used to gain the frontier in order to perform some professional duty there while the whole country continued to live its own independent life, those times are a thing of the past. Nowadays, a struggle is carried out by the whole population in all such manifestations as affect the State and private life, in the material as well as in the moral sense; and it is this that furnishes the military potency of a country, and it is just here where a whole series of defects of Soviet Russia are agglomerated in her disorganisation too well-known for it to be necessary to enumerate its component parts here. These defects must needs annihilate the greatest part of Soviet Russia's military efficiency. And now as to the general conclusion. Of all the undertakings of the Soviets the reconstruction of an armed force is the most successful. And no wonder that it is so. The shipwreck of all the devices brought forward by Soviet rulers, finds its explanation in the very system of communisn, in the suppression of personal initiative, in the mania for nationalising everything and -everybody. This mania was naturally not absolutely bound to exercise a destructive effect on the creation of an army, as the army, as a matter of fact, had already been "nationalized" before, - in Russia, as elsewhere. And moreover, the Soviet Government has always devoted, and continues to do so now, - more attention to the armed forces than to any other sphere of life. After having promised peace to the whole world and most particularly "peace to the huts", the Communist Government squeezes !all the marrow out of the population for the army in the first instance, and has thrust almost the whole weight of the military burden upon these very petasant huts. That the Soviet Government had the possibility of retaching such success, was only due to the compulsory assistance of the officers of the Imperial Army has already been mentioned. And even so, the Red Army - 'although the best achievement of the Soviet World-Recreators - both in its warfare standard as in its actual strength, is undoubtedly far inferior to any other European Army. *) In estimating the moral standing of the Red Army, one must not forget the fact that the Army is being flooded more and more by a sea of the most primitive of spirits. Criminal offences in a drunken state, both of ordinary soldiers, Editor. as well as among those in Command has become an every-day occurrence. 244

The Soviet Rulers in Relation to the Nations of the World. By Joseph Bickermann. CONTENTS: The Bolshevics' Endeavours at World-Rule; Their Corrupting Influence; Propaganda is indispensable for the Bolshevics; They live on the former Greatness of Russia; Russian Bolshevism cannot exist without World-Bolshevism; The World will recover from Bolshevism, - Russia's Recovery will follow; Europe dare not fail to participate in Russia's Struggle for Liberation.

THE

I.

position of the Moscow Rulers among the Governments of other countries presents an unprecedented and, at first sight, an enigmatical phenomenon. Never before did a government so frankly claim a world-

mastery; never has any one yet made so brutal an attempt on a people's right to live a life it had worked out for itself through centuries; never had that yet been so defiantly rejected what centuries and thousands of years had created, from frontiers and laws, to. faith and innermost emotions of a man's or a people's soul. The Moscow rulers acknowledge but one end and aim to which all people on earth without exception should aspire: viz., Communism, and but one all-saving order: that of the Soviets. To replace the various national flags by their own red one, which should

be the only one for the whole of our planet, -

this is the direct problem

the Bolshevics have set themselves to solve; this is what they are longing for, and in their present condition cannot do but long for. Nevertheless the peoples of Europe, and for the matter of that, of the whole world suffer

them, nay, more than suffer, -

in one way or the other, to this or that

extent, - they support them; only a few turn away from the Bolshevics, and not one takes action against them. Of all the constitutions existing now or having ever existed, only that of the Soviets lovingly opens its arms to "all! all", plotting in anticipation

of annexing to the Soviet Union any country made system; the frontiers of the Soviet Empire are open are to close only then, when the entire humanity will the Bolshevic burden. But, as no one has ever been

happy by the Soviet to one and all, and be languishing under known to place his

neck under the yoke voluntarily, the Soviet rulers do not wait to be looked

for. Wherever there is bloodshed, or wherever it may occur; wherever a revolt is raging, or may be aroused;

decay, -

wherever

there is rottenness and

there the black hand of the Soviet is at work. In China and

Morocco, in Mexico and on the Balkan Staates, in Hamburg, Sofia, Vienna or Java and in India, in the coal districts of Great Britain, - everywhere

the fire has been kindled and blown high by Moscow's emissaries. Europe 17

245

is not yet conquered, but the Moscow rulers, nevertheless, even now keep their garrisons in all the capitals, in all the seaports, in all the industrial centres. No matter that their garrisons exist under the name of communistic "cells" and communistic youth associations, this fact only intensifies their destructive effect. Unlike a normal garrison, these hired bands paid by money squeezed out of the oppressed Russian people, are acting uninterruptedly by all imaginable means: by means of malicious and debauching words, by bribery, by forgery, by pistols, by disease-bacillus. They act, being certain of remaining unpunished; for, let the local powers but lay their hands on one of them when caught red-handed, - their protectors and employers in Moscow will ostensibly put any citizen of the respective countries who should happen to he about, under lock and key, and the bargaining for an exchange will begin. The descendants of the present Europeans will be amazed to read that even such barbaric usages as taking hostages was tolerated by their enlightened ancestors. Through the communistic "cells" - these inflamed and inflammatory centres - the influence of the Moscow chiefs is spread in wide and ever widening circles, in the first instance - among the workmen. The sense of reality fostered among them by the leading circles of European people as well as by their own leaders during long years of strenuous efforts, is noticeably abating everywhere although the degree of its decrease varies from country to country. He who closely follows contemporaneous politics will himself be able to point out those countries where the working classes are continually moving towards the "left", which means that they evermore enstrange themselves from the concrete reality. And the leaders themselves are obliged to yield and to promote this process, under the pressure of the Bolshevic agents who promise anything in order to get possession of everything. Even in Great Britain, with her doubltlessly maturest of working class, where labour organisations energetically decline to permit the Bolshevic hand to touch their own affairs, in general politics, even there the worker lent its support to Moscow: the fouled-nest has become a trumpcard in the inner-political struggle, and that is not the case in England only. But the corruptive Bolshevic influence reaches far beyond the circles of the working classes, and even further than political matters. Wherever there are luckless beings, wherever people long for changes, whether from want or from over-feeding, wherever idle thoughts and superficiality abide, - there the Bolshevies possess true faithful friends. The imagination is continually incited by the very fact that in a huge country the last have become the first, the scum, the dregs of society, the jaiilbirds, have risen to the surface and are feasting their fill for already ten years, - they destroy - they seem even to construct, - they throw out a challenge to the whole world and plan to conquer it. Thousands upon thousands of 246

people wealthy, enlightened and in a position to command, are sighing for the promised land of Bolshevism. In our time there are people paid by the government of some country or another - professors, scientists, tutors of the young - who, when the condition of a people's life under Bolshevic rule is pointed out to them, reply: Wait, there will be a new life there in 3oo years. What daring imagination 3oo years ago could have fancied the present-day Europe! And, behold! - all these riches already acquired and growing with every hour, riches in every sense of the word, - the culture that created it all and still continues to create it, - all this, such people are ready to betray and to sell without wavering or hesitation for the mere shadow of an unknown welfare which is to arise in times unknown; they are ready to, do so although on the road they propose to travel, they see only an abomination of desolation; they see in the great destruction the pledge of a greater creation. There is enough in this to cause everyone who prizes our culture, and in whom the sense of responsibility for the values entrusted to us by our fathers has not died, to think seriously about the matter. So is the existence of a power in the hands of the very worst in itself a constant source of pernicious poison, corrupting morally and physically. The Bolshevics, however, do all men can possibly do in order to spread it wider and make it penetrate deeper, and - as already mentioned - have no alternative but to do so. Only he who does not know the Bolshewics and their circumstances can give credence to the thought that by an explicit and rigid treaty they can be made to, abandon their impudent and Jewd propaganda. It is not only their absolute dishonesty which they have raised to a principle that is of importance, but also their woeful impotence in anything except verbal debauch. Perched on the cinders of the house burnt by their own hands, these herlpless beggars, ignorant and unskilled, branded with the mark of Cain, rotting alive, - what do they signify, what can they signify in this great mighty and growing world! 'What do they signify in spite of their mastery over an enormous country with its many millions of population?! Only after they had covered Europe and all the globe with a net-work of communistic "cells", did the Bolshevics become an omni-present force, in a position to undermine and to root about everywhere. Will any benefit arise out of it for them? Do they not precipitate their own end? How could they think of it, or even give a thought to it they have no time to consider! They protect themselves as well as they can, and by whatever means they know. The bull fights with his horns, a wellknown little animal with its evil-smelling jet, and the Bolshevic with his evil-smelling propaganda. To renounce the latter, even for a short time, would mean destroying the whole complicated system of secret bonds which 247

it might prove impossible to restore later, and which in fact, were only so easy to create in the days of bloody gambols and golden dreams. No one would venture to renounce this propaganda, nor can the Bolshevics risk doing it. And not only their position in the world, but also their condition in the subdued country induces them to make propaganda in the first placei! The time, when the Bolshevics impetuously, merrily, rapturously broke and destroyed and trampled under foot everything they got hold of, when each one of them felt as an unrestrained master over people and their property, over man and his work, - this time has passed away long ago. By unspeakable sacrifices, by torrents of blood, by hunger and murrain, the many millions of peasants have refuted the open impudent importunate violence; though almost daily stifled anew the small private commerce has revived itself and still perseveres; handicrafts have resuscitated to some extent or other. Thus the field for immediate Bolshevic activity has shrunk considerably. Also in regard to the intensity left for their activity, there too the former freedom of action no longer exists: the old robber-like swashery raids that were normal in the first years of the revolution when the Bolshevics were appropriating everything - taking stock of everything, sealing-up, transporting, scattering, plundering, - are now no longer possible. State economy and State money needs to be counted as carefully as bourgeois money and bourgeois economy; the only difference being that the Bolshevic economy is hopelessly unprofitable, does not hold its own, in fact,

falls to bits. So there is no reason for any rapture about it; and even if an occasional theft does succeed, it brings but small comfort. The more so, since the Bolshevic, in spite of retaining the command, owing to his profound ignorance is obliged to trust himself into the hands of hired men, who, in this monstrous -economy, fulfil a sort of serf-work, but are possessed of knowledge and education. The result is - a dull existence, boredom, distress. Life in present-day Russia is colourless, faded, tedious. The Bolshevic experiences it in his own way, and his sentiment has already found its reflection in Soviet literature. Only yesterday he drank warm alive blood, to-day he devours carrion; from an, eagle he degenerated into a vulture. This state of affairs is pregnant with disasters to the Communistic Olympus, and to the whole Bolshevic regime. And the only remedy for it is the mirage of a world revolution. Behold! - the Southern army in China, armed and trained by Moscow, is pressing northwards; one more effort, and all these Chang-Tso-Lins, Japanese, English, Americans will be swept off the face of the earth: hurrah! - we have prevailed! Behold! - in America they are about to carry out the death-sentence on two robbers and murderers, - let us arouse the mob throughout the whole world, raise the dust and show the bourgeoisie our strengh! Without this hashish the 248

Soviet chiefs would find it difficult at present to hold their bands in hand. flow could the Bolshevics then be possibly expected to destroy their widely ramified propaganda-organisation under these conditions? While the propaganda and the preparation for a world-upheaval are thus both inseparable features of the Soviet State management, the revolution itself remains to this day the fervent aim and object of the Soviet men, in spite of all the failures they have experienced up till now: a worid-cataclism is not only a narcotic, it is also the object of ardent desire. All these people's claims for the acknowledgement of their "scientific" attitude towards the history they are creating, are but common charlatanisms based on treble deceit: that Marxism is a science, while it is only a tasteless concoction of soientific thought and quackery; that they, the Soviet men, are Marxists, and that life can he at all constructed according to any particular dogma. The historic conception of the Bolshevics is in reality very primitive indeed: if it has succeeded once, why should it not succeed again and again? Yesterday in Petersburg, to-day in Shanghai, to-morrow - in London. On these hopes the Bolshevics subsist; and repudiate them, they cannot. They cannot do so because their numbed members could only be warmed by a universal funeral-pile. It is not only that their economic organisation consumes itself, that the Soviet existence - as already mentioned - is tedious to the utmost limit, but it is that the Soviet system, owing to its very nature, cannot exist without robbery, roistering and violence, for this is its true foundation. This system is the absolutism of ruffianism consistent to the end. Amidst the tumult and roar of revolt, in barracks, at the factories, wherever it happens, a disorderly crowd with noise and yells "selects" representatives who mix up with numberless imposters, meritricious rebels, and people who have but recently joined the rebellion, - they all in a lump emit laws, and all their decrees have but one purpose: everything belongs to us, everybody is under our domination; - this is the Soviet system. The great advantage of this system lies in the fact that it furnishes immediate tasks for the mob - the thousands, scores of thousands and hundreds of thousands of incidental, ignorant, vicious but active and impudent folk. And it can afford to do so, since by the very next task, consisting of suppression, expropriation, plunder, - the problems of the government became in a moment unlimited and interminable, while the quality of State management grew indifferent. Such immediate and direct action unites and welds together. The feeling of unlimited power, of sudden and unexpected omnipotence intoxicates, the common cause and the common, guilt rivet together. This debauch continued in Russia for months and years, merely altering its form. In this heyday of Bolshevism, it was the rulers that were lacking; there was more 249

work than workers. This picture changes, however, at the moment the destruction is fulfilled and the necessity arises for putting things into order somehow. In spite of the great pretensions, and of all the absurd complications of the Soviet administrative methods, there are not enough positions now in Russia to supply with offices all the amateurs of power palpable and clear to the most primitive mind; - now the offer exceeds the demand: for not everybody succeeds in finding a place in the Cheka, in the "political bureau" and in such like omnipotent administrative institutions. Unemployment among the former rulers, which had affected numbers of people in the higher as well as in the lower strata of the communistic party in Russia, is the true reason for that ever growing disorganisation which bears the name of struggle of ceatre against opposition: there isn't enough for every one. And what a miraculous change would take place should the bloody Bolshevic flag be hoisted, say, above the palace of the Chinese Emperors in the inner city -of Pekin I What an enormous field, what scope for activity would reveal itself! It is the scope the Bolshevics never cease to crave for. To possess themselves of this, is a question of life and death for them. What is there to be accomplished in such a state of affairs by persuasion, exhortation and treaties? The generation that has seen with its own eyes during those October days the destruction of a Great Empire under the onslaught of a lewd mob, would have to die even to the last man, before the idea would dawn on the Moscow rulers that the world was not made for them. And how many generations would need to pass away ere this idea would become a restraining forcel While rooting below ground, the Bolshevics are also prepared at any moment to fall upon their neighbours in open war, in the hope of setting the whole world on fire: that is why they dig at the roots of our civilisation, - at a propitious moment they will exert all their strength in attempting to overthrow it. Of course, one cannot tell when and in what direction the Bolshevics will make an, onslaught, whether it will be directed to the East, the West or the South-West, - they do not know it themselves; but the bloody storm, which practically raised them from the bottom to the crest -of the wave, never oeases to fascinate their imagination. And there is no good in trying to soothe ones apprehension by saying the Bolshevics are to prudent or too cowardly for it. They are even more lascivious than cowardly, and as to their prudenoe, it vanishes whenever there is a chance for madness: a reckless gamble is the very essence of Bolshevism. That the force of the Bolshevics is not great, that their very chance of success is problematic, that is true; but in this fact is little comfort: the great danger lies already in the attempt. For who can tell what dangers threaten the world still unsettled after the great shock, should peace at 250

any time be disturbed in one of its corners! And a disturbance of peace does threaten, in the first place, there where the fate of a great people is directed by men who, owing to their hopeless ignorance and to the doctrine they espouse, consider themselves having been called upon to rule the whole world. This ought to be clear to every one. These lines had not yet been printed when time brought with it new material which is sure to convince those who still believe in the evolution of the Bolshevics. Read the account of the session of the VI Congress of the 3rd International which took place in Moscow during the second half of July, 1928, and later. Read the speech of Bucharin, of this great Soviet authority, who is at the same time a member of the "political bureau" which actually rules Russia at present. Very expressive are even the headings of different paragraphs of this extensive speech. "Contradictions of We shall mention some of the headings: Capitalism are developing themselves in the acutest way", that means in Marx's idiom that explosion of the capitalistic world is near. Another heading: "Under the flag of preparation for the war". Third: "Questions of the revolution in colonies and semi-colonies." Fourth: "New processes in India." Fifth: "Our essential problems and defects." What do you suppose these defects axe? It appears that internationality is not sufficiently intensive enough in the 3rd International! "When the military problem becomes a central one, chief attention must be drawn to the question of the international education. . . we no doubt have obtained rather significant results in the Bolshevisation of the communistic party, we have made rather important conquests, we can state the growth of our influence, we have ideologically gained new territories for communism. Nevertheless, the intensity of the internationality of the communistic party is still too small when compared with the tasks of the Communistic international and its sections." Examples of this insufficiency are also mentioned: - "During the strike in England many parties (i. e. the communistic party in many countries. J. B.) had not rendered a sufficient help to the English workmen with exception of a few parties with R. C. P. (Russian communistic party) at the head, all others had not sufficiently supported the English proletariat." And another transgression: "such events as the attack of U. S. A. of Nicaragua had not evoked a sufficient reaction on the part of the American party", i. e. the communistic party in America. Sixth heading: "Tactics of a common front - only from below", and that means the following: "The last conclusion of this tactical line is a course towards the explosion of the bourgeois state government, a course towards the revolution." Seventh: "The work in the trade-unions a very important problem", not in the Russian trade-unions, natu251

rally, - those are held in the Bolshevics fist, - but in those of the rest of the world. Eighth: "The problem of the youth - one of the chief problems". Why this problem is so important is also explained as follows: "take as an example the French organisation of the youth during the war with Marocco". Ninth: "More attention must be drawn to the peasant's question", and in the text we read: "this is the angle from which we are to view this problem of helping the Peasants' International to become an active organisation"; the anxious communistic congress thinks of everybody. And finally the ioth Commandment, the goal of everything: "To bring in accord the legal work with the illegal". What does it mean? This is the explanation: "As to the illegal work, we have developed it well in many countries. Thus we have made good experience in Poland, in the Balkan States, in Italy and at present in Japan, and finally a great experience was made in China, etc." What should be and is the character of the illegal work is also said: "No doubt in case of a declaration of war, immediately before, or even for some time before it, a whole number of exceptional laws will fall on our party. This must be foreseen. And therefore it is necessary to put a foundation to our illegal organisations, especially in the fleet, the army etc." That no doubt should be left as to these words not being only meant in theory, the eminent speaker adds: "You will understand why I can't dwell on this subject, give directions and advice. But the problem is of great importance and must be always brought forward". Truly, - it is clear enough without any details. All these revelations can be read in the chief paper of the communistic party, in the Moscow paper "Pravda" of the 22nd of July of the current year. And in the same paper of the 4th August we read: "Manifesto of the sixth congress of the Communistic International to the workmen and peasants of all countries, to the oppressed people in the whole world, to all the communistic parties", a manifesto written in the spirit of Bucharin's instructions, as it can already be seen from the heading of the manifesto. And all this at the time when the Bolshevics do their utmost to get into the midst of the representatives of the Great Powers, by whom the treaty against war, proposed by the Government of U. S. A., will be signed! II. In spite of the obviousness of this evil, Europes attitude towards it is more than tolerant. Negotiations are being entered into with the Bolshevics, treaties are being concluded with them; credits are being extended to them, and goods are very nearly thrust upon them; they are invited to highlysolemn international conferences by which new possibilities are opened up for their propaganda. It is true the Bolshevics are universally despised, but 252

not abhorred; on the contrary, they are being courted. How is one to explain this playing with the three-headed hound, this embrace open to the leper? Is it greediness, is it lack of markets? These are the most unimportant reasons. Although, of course, as long as the Bolshevic rabble rules one sixth of the globe and the world suffers it, the industrial, the merchant who is never loath to sell, will feel inclined to trade with the Bolshevics, - and even more inclined to obtain some concessions, - lucrative at least in appearance*). As long as the Bolshevic corruption is deliberately tolerated by European peoples, the workers are likely, here and there, to insist upon trade with Moscow proclaiming it as a sure remedy against unemployment in spite of the obvious untenableness of this argument. But all this is tolerated for the time being ... Although it is more than evident that one cannot become rich by trading with a beggar; that nothing could be more ruinous, more extravagant than leaving an enormous and rich tract of country situated so close to Europe at the mercy of wicked, licentious and squandering barbarians. Endless efforts are being spent in the attempt to affiliate to economic culture one or the other dominions in Central Africa, whereas Eastern Europe with the adjoining Siberia, endowed with all possible riches, possessing practically unlimited markets, is left to the Bolshevics! On the basis of economic calculations alone, wise Europe ought to follow quite a different course. After driving out the Bolshevics, she ought to appropriate the great plain and the people living on it, - thus bringing them back to economic productivity; or assist them by all possible means to liberate themselves from the heavy disaster that has befallen them, and to lead them again into channels of productive work in which they had moved but so recently. The first solution being out of question - for it is impossible to turn into a colony an area of over 14 millions of square miles occupied by i.5o million of people who still remember their recent greatness - there seems consequently no other alternative but to turn to the latter solution. It is therefore not in economic calculation that Europe's scandalous toleration of her grave-diggers is to be found, but must be sought elsewhere. Where then? The answer will be given by circumstances of time and place. While taking an important part during the last two centuries in the creative development of culture carried out by the European peoples, Russia, nevertheless, always remained outside, never became a part of Europe. Her enormous proportions, the comparative remoteness from the chief *) But, as it is in reality with the concessions, can be best seen - to speak of the latest example - from the notorious manganese concession of the well-known large industrial Harriman. After much trouble, this influential man has at last got rid of it, but in connection with it, has also left behind 31/2 million dollars, and thus he has become undoubtedly against his will a creditor of the Communistic Government.

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centres of the West, and, last not least, her isolated existence during almost a thousand years in the past, - all this made of Russia a world by itself, getting gradually more and more into touch with the European world, but for all that remaining in the minds of the European people in the beyond, the exotic. The great war might have put an end to this state of affairs, had Russia, the old Russia, outlived it. The struggle between a certain superior strata of Russian society against the historical rulers which lasted a whole century, has in its turn greatly contributed to this alienation. Russian liberty lovers of all shades have for so long repeated that something unseen and unheard of was happening in Russia, that finally the European mind got accustomed to look upon the inhuman, the brutal, the beastly, as a normal product of Russian soil, and as the becoming condition of the Russian. And this is the exact way in which an indifferent onlooker in Europe views what is happening in Russia even now: formerly it was the Tzar's knout that lashed the Russian back, - now it is the Bolshevics. The convenience of such a conception is obvious. In the first place it enables the conscience to sleep soundly and securely; there were deformities before, there are some now; the evil is habitual, there is no reason for disquietude. In such a frame of mind there is also no reason for being anxious for oneself: Bolshevism is in Russia and for Russia. It is an endemic disease; so one may trade with Bolshevics, one may look with curiosity and even with sympathy from one's own cosy comfort at them while they are creating a new world of their own over there, this disease is far removed from us, it wont infect us, - thanks to thee, oh Lord, who hast fashioned us differently. In this photographically exact reproduction of an average European, the greatest menace to all contemporaneous culture is hidden. I should be the last to deny that the man of the West greatly differs from the Russian; history has created in the European peoples more sobriety, perspicuity, consistency and perseverance in the pursuit of a chosen aim. But just this makes the fiasco of the attitude of Europe towards the Russian disaster all the more evident. For reason and conscience must fall asleep; the world must be screened from a man's view by party, ideological, racial or some other sort of rubbish to make it possible for him to identify former Russia, which indefatigably built her national, her State life, with the international Bolshevic mob, the like of which cannot be found anywhere over the whole extent of the world's history even during epochs of gravest disturbances. Europe does not observe in Bolshevism its singularity, she does not recognise in it her own self, her own reverse: her own doctrine of class antagonism, her own reckless struggle of parties, her own attempts at saving the world, her own greed, her own consistency leading to cruelty. This complacency forcibly reminds one of the ancient saying: Whom the gods want to destroy, they rob of their reason. 254

All these the whole arguments of Europe, the whole of her reason and conscience? No, the tolerance shown for the Bolshevics, which merges into sympathy, is also nourished by the political disposition of Europe. Russia was great, powerful and menacing in her might and power; she oppressed the European consciousness by the very fact of her enormous proportions, by the numbers of her inhabitants and by her general opulence; and this oppression became greater when Russia gradually mastered European technics, when the national self-consciousness of the Russian people grew: in the latter sense the establishment of a parliament was an important step, and this step did not pass unnoticed by Europe. And all of a sudden this expansive, uncouth and single-minded neighbour in the East, after having bled heavily in a cruel war for a matter in which she was least concerned, fell under the pitiless rule of fanatics, under whose heavy heel she will never be able to resume her old place in the assembly of nations. A sigh of relief escaped from the bosom of European people - irrespective whether enemies or allies of Russia: a load fell from their backs! The Bolshevics are loved in their capacity of blood-suckers, of corrupters, of exhausting parasites on anothers body: they live on the old greatness of Russia. But is this political judgement, is it not rather political impotence? For over a hundred years Russia lived peaceably side by side with GermanPrussia and Austria, but she only then made war on them when everything in the world became entangled, when all Europe and with it all the other parts of the world got into a state of topsy-turvydom. For a hundred years the English statesmen dreaded the invasion of India by the Russian legions, but when the English world-interests brought her into collision with the most powerful Empire of our part of the world, and the Indian frontier might have remained unprotected, in this terrific war of the nations Russia turned out to be on the side of England and shed a real ocean of Russian blood in this fight. Russia had made war on France only when Napoleon I moved towards Moscow, and only when Napoleon III landed French troops together with the English and the Austrians on Russian soil. More than any country Russia was all-sufficient in herself. The sands of East Prussia could not tempt her; with her enormous population and inexhaustible riches she had nothing to seek for in India; she was in no need for colonies with which she was amply supplied within her own limits for a long row of generations; she was but little interested in markets, her own market having unlimited powers of absorption. No one is going to deny that, notwithstanding all this, there existed real and apparent differences of interest between her and other great nations: a living man among other living people is always likely to elbow some one, else, or to be elbowed by others. But it can also happen that, either by his character or by his 255

position, a man cannot help jostling the other, cannot help being quarrelsome. Less than any one else did Russia belong to the number of those who were doomed to be peace-disturbers; she could live self-contained within herself. When restored, she won't be able to live except within herself, - and for a long time to come. She is so encumbered with ruins, so much has been destroyed, so much has been left undone that not for a long time to come will the Russian people find in themselves sufficient strength or means for anything except for the building up of their country. At the same time an alive Russia, by the very fact of her existence, by the very potency of her mass, will be able to restore to Europe, now reduced to a narrow ramified protrusion of a continent, its former proportions and conformable importance. During the last half century the world has grown tremendously, and it increases and becomes more complicated every year; with every year it becomes more difficult for Europe to maintain its hegemony. And at such a time Europe seems to think it wise deliberately to abandon a great part of itself to desolation, and to condemn that part to a state of non-existence. No less than 6o generations have toiled in pushing the frontiers of Europe from the Alps, from the Rhine and the Danube, from the Ele, from the Vistula in the direction of the Volga and the Ural. And now, amid a world that has grown so much, apparently in some sort of a delusion, Europe shrinks together again as if thinking that the narrower its base, the steadier its poise. And furthermore, to speculate on the putrifying power of the Bolshevics - is phantastic! Russia will not remain subdued for ever. Unless Bolshevism succeeds in corrupting the whole of Europe, the whole of our culture, Russia will also, sooner or later, free herself from her yoke; this is warranted by the experience of centuries and of thousands of years, the guarantee for it lies in the very history of Russia, who already more than once fell - and recovered. But can the European nations remain indifferent to the fact whether Russia recovers in spite of them or partly owing to them? They cannot remain indifferent to it! Some irresponsible politician, some boisterous journalist, some clever parliamentarian, even entire parliaments might allow themselves the luxury of proclaiming vociferously: we cannot break with the Bolshevics, since the Russian people has shed its blood for us. But all this is only ephemeral, it is the policy of the day or of the moment. Nations and their mutual relations are of more permanent duration, and the reason and conscience of nations are not to be reduced to the adaptability and resourcefulness of one or the other professional in politics - or at least, should not be reduced to that state! The contemporaneous man is sufficiently free from superstitions not to fear the verdict of historians, but the nations cannot fail to remember that a tribunal actually exists, the tribunal of history, that the facts have their 256

consequences, that no friendliness grows where hate has been sown with lavish hands. For fully two centuries Russia has aspired to the West; six generations have kept repeating: Ex occidente lax. And at last she has reached oneness with it; not only by reason, but also by blood: she mixed her own blood with its blood. And now the long-suffering people see what light from the West penetrates the darkness of their prison. While a devastating blast of human madness is sweeping over our plains, while our children are being corrupted from the very moment of their birth, while our sons are taken from us to be slaughtered and our daughters to serve as amusement to brutes, - the enlightened Europe washes its hands in sight of everybody, and secretly rubs them in glee. These dark thoughts become more and more confirmed in the minds of millions upon millions of people, who live - live in spite of everything - on the area between the mouth of the Neva and that of the Amur. Are the 3o silver coins which Europe gained in the trade with the Bolshevics worth it? Is it reasonable to make friends with accidental and doubtlessly doomed usurpers, who even now are scheming against those with whom they are treating, out of mere apprehension that the people - whom these usurpers are oppressing now might some day in the dim future getting rid of them, meet with you and perhaps get into collision with you? Can this be a reasonable calculation, if this distant and dim future cannot be prevented by any human effort? It is this last question, - the question whether men of the present day may or may not dispose of the fate of continents and races for centuries in advance, - wherein the crux of the whole problem lies. III. There might bave been wars and revolutions, mistakes and misdeeds might have been permitted to occur, but the Bolshevics would not have ascended the throne of the Tzars if there had not been this war; if Bolshevism had not three years before been triumphed in the whole world it would not have triumphed in Russia: only in a congenial epoch could this phantom have grown into such a terrific force. The evil of the world is concentrated in this or that fetish; to destroy it, is to destroy all evil; so let us destroy it even if we have to innundate all the earth with blood, and fill all the oceans with corpses, - such is the Bolshevic spirit. But was not that the spirit of the war we have just passed through? Was it not meant to liberate humanity from its everlasting evils, and was it not therefore considered that sacrifices need not be counted, and that to weigh the consequences was a sin? The fact that those who made the war saw evil elsewhere than the Bolshevics do, can have but little weight in the scales of history. The only important fact is that all Europe, all the world in fact, raved at the time about world-redemption. In such a world 257

only could the Bolshevics have triumphed. In such a world only can Bolshevism hold its own. When after long efforts, Germany was at last subdued and disarmed, the purpose of the war seemed to have been accomplished, and Russia's disintegration, and her becoming subjugated, appeared to be an additional stroke of luck: the world became still smaller and still easier to rule and to organise. In these months of delight in what had been achieved and in the wide out-look which seemingly revealed itself - faith was apparently easy in Europe. At the same time a great weariness made itself felt, and there was therefore no great keenness for further difficult enterprises. It is from out of this faith in one's proper omnipotence and from actual impotence that, on the spur of the moment, this decision concerning Russia had its rise in Europe: leave her to her own fate, and make use of the Bolshevics for proper ends. Then, or shortly afterwards, one of the world's rulers an chief leader of the policy of the British World Empire, found it possible to throw the mutual relations between Europe and Russia, martyrised by the Bolshevics, into the following formula: trade is possible even with cannibals; at least it is to this man to whom this formula is attributed. At that time everything looked simple. But gradually the world becomes complicated again, or rather people begin to realise that they had only imagined it had become simple, while in reality it always remained complicated, and has become even more so now. When have there ever existed so many insecure frontiers, so many unsolved questions, so many weak or sore spots, so many contradictions even between those who, in tradition and spirit, are most closely allied? Whereas, on the contrary, the abyss between the victors and the vanquished is daily being bridged over. Germany's power, which to break was the purpose and the most important result of the war, is being created anew, and not to a small degree do the victors - America, England and even France - contribute towards it. Of course, not the military power. But what reasonable man in Europe would venture to declare that Germany, who even now has considerably recovered, will not be able to fight in some forty or fifty years in spite of her present-day defencelessness? And would anyone on the contrary venture to assert that Germany would have had the strength and the energy for a new war ten or twenty years after the recent sanguinary exertions, if this last war and the peace that ensued, had been quite free from world-redeeming tendencies, and free from absolute problems and solutions? What has been said, of course, does not dispose of the whole significance and importance of the stormy years which Europe has just experienced; it is even clearer that in the above the past is not being estimated nor any one judged. The important thing is that we should know - what is, and what can be, where we are, and whither we are going. The answer to 258

this question is: we are still in the same old world; it was not crushed by the avalanches of dynamite and steel which fell on it; it was not created anew or even given a new face neither by the light-winged illusions nor by high-sounding words. And our way leads to the aim of settling down once more in this very same world as comfortably as possible, - so as to make life tolerable and dignified. After the violent outburst, the nations returned to the consciousness that eternity cannot be subdued, and that there is no escape from to-morrow. Primum vivere, and within the limits of life, within the limits of the perceptible, within the results of thousands of years work, - lies the care of the future, the foresight obligatory to those who rule or reign. May be that in a distant, still undefinable future, Germany will again become dangerous and menacing; what can be done against such a contingency now. we shall not fail to provide for, but we cannot help allowing her to live and to get strong once more, for otherwise the deep chasm in the centre of Europe will swallow us all; an economic vacuum -or social -whirl-pool might easily absorb our own possessions and our welfare, - a local catastrophe might become general. Such is the import of what is happening now in the most significant spot of Europe and the world. This attitude of the victors against the defeated reveals the reasonable sobriety which has been restored to its rights, and which says that for a thorough re-arrangement the contemporanian world is too large, too bulky and too weighty, reveals the strength returning to the wearied nations and which prevents one from becoming paralised with terror at the thought that sometime or other new complications might arise somewhere or other. It is not by chance that the most active part in the reconstruction of Germany is taken by the powerful American Republic and by the equally powerful British Empire, nor is it by chance that precisely Germany, being the most weakened, should make the most of the Bolshevic fanthom. The strength and the intelligence of Europe is growing afresh, and Russias salvation will also come out of these two factors inasmuch as the non-Russian world can, and must take part in this action. When the last remains of Bolshevism will have vanished from the world, it will also disappear from Russia, and she will be saved then, not in spite of Europe, but partly because of it. Sooner or later Europe will realise that an open abyss in the East of Europe is no less dangerous than the one which threatened to appear in its centre, and then the rare paladins who say so now, won't be the only ones to say: do not tempt us with Bolshevic trade, we are not for sale ourselves, and we do not trade in our historical destinies, - this will be unanimously proclaimed, and this call will bring down the walls of the Bolshevic Jericho. This is not a prophecy, it is only the process which has already ostensibly made itself conspicuous when 259

extended logically into the future. Against Russia, and therefore with the Bolshevics, - such was at first Europe's attitude towards the Russian disaster; the thought of dividing the sphere of influence in Eastern Europe simmered at that time in sone minds, and of all the world only the United States of America held aloof from these temptations, as she remains alien to the Bolshevics up to this day. Against the Bolshevics and against Russia, this might be the right formula for the second stage; - the next and last will be: against the Bolshevics and for Russia. The banishment of the Bolshevics from England might possibly furnish a limit between the second and the third stage; the still possible vicissitudes depending on the interior policy of England, however, can bring but little difference to it. It is clear to me, as to everyone else that a great many questions which are not easy to solve, are connected with the liberation and resuscitation of Russia. But there is reason to hope that the time is no longer distant, when Europe will feel sufficiently strong not to shun difficult problems, and will be sane enough not to resist the inevitable. For the sake, not only of Russia, but of all the nations of the world it is desirable that this time should come as soon as possible. Of course, no one can say how close it already is. But from the mere fact alone that the process has been slow up till now, it cannot be surmised that it must be the same in the future: a fruit ripens on the tree for many months, but once it is ripe, one moment is enough for it to fall. What will happen when this wished for time comes? Will Europe then organise a crusade against the Boishevics, and set Russia free by force of arms from her enslavers? I have merely put this question in order to say that, for the moment, there is no sense in either putting or answering it. All these broils about intervention and its acceptability, and -the attitude which the subjugated population of Russia will assume towards it, present a pastime devoid of all sense. It all depends on the circumstances of time and place, on the manner in which Russia herself will be fighting for her freedom during the decisive months, on the fact, who will wish and be able to assist her and in what way, and also on the general state of affairs and the mental condition in Europe in general. The most actual intervention and assistance of Russia by force of arms is conceivable and acceptable; the liberation of Russia, - her self-liberation - without such assistance, but with Europe lending her some other sort of support, is also conceivable. This is, however, not the point for the moment; the point is that, there should be made an end to the intervention in favour of the Bolshevics, that the world should cease feeding them with Russia's blood and with -its own property. The point is now, not the mobilisation of armies, but the mobilisation of conscience, of that innermost conscience by whose light nations distinctly see, what really is and what they must do.

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