Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: A Global Data Analysis 981197862X, 9789811978623

Table of contents :
Contents
Part I Introductory Part: Background and Rationale
1 Introduction: On the Particular Nature of Ideal Types Applied and Moving Science Forward a Bit at a Time
On the Ideal–Typical Representation of Reality
On the Existence of Perfect More-or-Less-Fits
On the Nature of Ideal Types in the Ten Worlds Theory
About Moving Forward
The Way Ahead
On the Ways to Move Along
Good Wine Takes Time
New Conceptual Tools
About This Book
Part II Theory Building: From Empirical Reality for Social Policy Practice
2 On the Methodology Applied
Applying the Method of Theory Building
Applying the Abduction Method
The Methodology of Using Multi-Methods
Using the Multi-Methods and Mixing-Methods Approaches
Developing and Applying the Standardized Relative Performance Index
Learning from Physics and Chemistry: Introducing and Applying the Method of Spectral Data Analysis
The Problem of Bi-Modal Distributions in Global Social Policy Comparison
Focusing on and Developing (Non-Statistical) Meta-Analyses
Pushing Out the Limits of Discipline-Specific Methodology: One Little Step at a Time
3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics
On the Distinction Between Descriptive and Explanatory Theories
Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics
Social Democratic Welfare Regime
Christian Democratic Welfare Regime
Neoliberal Welfare Regime
Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime
Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime
Slightly Universal Welfare Regime
Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime
Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime
Ultra Rudimentary Welfare Regime
Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime
The Overall Picture
4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes
The Dimensions of Povertization and Inequality
Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis
5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global Welfare Regimes
Empirical Data Versus Hijacked Realities of Thought
The Reality and Concept of Dehumanization: Letting the Data Speak
Conclusion
Part III Normative/Concluding Part
6 Back to the Future: Income Polarization, Mass Povertization and Simple Ways out of It
Turning the Clock from the Past to the Future
Universal Basic Income: New Specter or New Opportunity to Eradicate Poverty Once and for All?
Getting out of the Social Policy Comfort Zone: Start Taxing the Super-Rich
7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, Provident Funds and Primarily Taxing the Super-Rich
Integrating Recent and Current Major Criticisms of Social Policy as We Know It
Universal Basic Income: More Than Just the Solution to Poverty, as It is also a Remedy to Intra and Inter Cis-/Trans-Gender Inequality
Acknowledging Micro-Economic and Behavioral Effects: Replacing Blind Universalism with Smart Universalism
Converting Social Insurance Systems Into Provident Fund Systems (Everywhere and All of Them, Except All Accident Insurance Systems)
Assets for the Poor and Near-Poor: A New Social Right
Taxing the Super-Super-Rich
Stop Taxing the Poor and the Near-Poor
The Win-Win-Win Solution of Provident Fund Systems
Decency for All
Epilogue
A Note to Go
References

Citation preview

Christian Aspalter

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism A Global Data Analysis

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism

Christian Aspalter

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism A Global Data Analysis

Christian Aspalter BNU-HKBU United International College Zhuhai, Guangdong, China

ISBN 978-981-19-7862-3 ISBN 978-981-19-7863-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Niemand ist hoffnungsloser versklavt als jene, die fälschlicherweise glauben, frei zu sein. Nadie es más esclavo que aquéls que falsamente creen ser libre. No one is more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe to be free. Personne n’est plus en esclavage que ceux qui croient à tort d’être libres. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832)

Contents

Part I

Introductory Part: Background and Rationale

1 Introduction: On the Particular Nature of Ideal Types Applied and Moving Science Forward a Bit at a Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the Ideal–Typical Representation of Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the Existence of Perfect More-or-Less-Fits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the Nature of Ideal Types in the Ten Worlds Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . About Moving Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Way Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the Ways to Move Along . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Good Wine Takes Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Conceptual Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . About This Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part II

3 3 5 7 8 9 10 12 13 14

Theory Building: From Empirical Reality for Social Policy Practice

2 On the Methodology Applied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Applying the Method of Theory Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Applying the Abduction Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Methodology of Using Multi-Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Using the Multi-Methods and Mixing-Methods Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . Developing and Applying the Standardized Relative Performance Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Learning from Physics and Chemistry: Introducing and Applying the Method of Spectral Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Problem of Bi-Modal Distributions in Global Social Policy Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Focusing on and Developing (Non-statistical) Meta-Analyses . . . . . . . . . . Pushing Out the Limits of Discipline-Specific Methodology: One Little Step at a Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19 19 20 24 25 26 28 29 29 31

vii

viii

Contents

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the Distinction Between Descriptive and Explanatory Theories . . . . . Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics . . . . Social Democratic Welfare Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christian Democratic Welfare Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neoliberal Welfare Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Slightly Universal Welfare Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ultra Rudimentary Welfare Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Overall Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33 37 39 39 40 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 50 51

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Dimensions of Povertization and Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . .

57 57 69

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global Welfare Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Empirical Data Versus Hijacked Realities of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Reality and Concept of Dehumanization: Letting the Data Speak . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

125 134 136 140

Part III Normative/Concluding Part 6 Back to the Future: Income Polarization, Mass Povertization and Simple Ways out of It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Turning the Clock from the Past to the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Universal Basic Income: New Specter or New Opportunity to Eradicate Poverty Once and for All? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Getting out of the Social Policy Comfort Zone: Start Taxing the Super-Rich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, Provident Funds and Primarily Taxing the Super-Rich . . . . . . . . . . . . . Integrating Recent and Current Major Criticisms of Social Policy as We Know It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Universal Basic Income: More Than Just the Solution to Poverty, as It is also a Remedy to Intra and Inter Cis-/Trans-Gender Inequality . . . Acknowledging Micro-Economic and Behavioral Effects: Replacing Blind Universalism with Smart Universalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

143 145 148 149 153 153 156 158

Contents

Converting Social Insurance Systems Into Provident Fund Systems (Everywhere and All of Them, Except All Accident Insurance Systems) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assets for the Poor and Near-Poor: A New Social Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Taxing the Super-Super-Rich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stop Taxing the Poor and the Near-Poor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Win–Win-Win Solution of Provident Fund Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . Decency for All . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

164 167 168 170 170 173

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 A Note to Go . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Part I

Introductory Part: Background and Rationale

Chapter 1

Introduction: On the Particular Nature of Ideal Types Applied and Moving Science Forward a Bit at a Time

With a bit of surprise, the welfare regime debate has shifted rather quickly in last twelve years, and here again particularly in the last six or seven years. It shifted from fervently trying to establish a new welfare regime in the South or East of Europe (Leibfried 1992; Deacon 1992; Ferrera 1996; cf. also Abrahamson 1999a; Arts and Gelissen 2002, 2010; Arcanjo 2006, 2011; Fenger 2007; Powell and Barrientos 2011; Badescu 2019), or before that at the other end of the world in Down Under (Australia and New Zealand) (Castles and Mitchell 1991, 1992, 1993), to realizing and stressing the importance of ideal types in the study of welfare regimes or welfare capitalism— these two terms are hereafter being used synonymously (cf. e.g. Arts and Gelissen 2002, 2010; Jæger 2005; Aspalter 2005, 2006a, 2012a, 2017b, 2020a; Powell and Barrientos 2011; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011; Arts 2020). It had been an almost quiet decade and a half after Arts and Gelissen (1999) first emphasized the distinction between ideal types and real types in the social policy arena (cf. also the influential article of Abrahamson 1999a). Esping-Andersen had caused this confusion, by for sure deliberately dropping the words ideal types from mentioning in his seminal 1990 Three Worlds book. His 1987 book (edited together with Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater), on the other hand did focus on the importance of identifying ideal types (cf. Esping-Andersen 1987a, b). However, at the end of the second decade in this new century, there has been a new awakening, and the distinction between the different methodologies (e.g. using simple typologies, or ideal types where the cases fit more or less, rather than having to fit all of the way) and theories of either ideal types or real types has moved to centerstage in international, and now global, study of welfare state system comparison.

On the Ideal–Typical Representation of Reality Additional confusion was caused by the professional use of the terms “ideal” and “real” in welfare regime theory and comparison. ‘Ideal’ to be sure does not mean © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Aspalter, Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0_1

3

4

1 Introduction: On the Particular Nature of Ideal Types Applied …

ideal in the ordinary sense (common people’s sense) or in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. here ‘ideal’ does not mean ‘perfect’, not at all. ‘Real’ on the other hand also does not mean what people (and many researchers alike) think it means, as they refer to the common dictionary meaning of it, and not the scientific/professional meaning and usage of it. Real types refer to any method and perspective that is void of ideal types, nothing more, nothing less. This professional terminology was first coined and spread by German economist Arthur Spiethoff a long time ago, in the early 1950s (Spiethoff 1953; cf. also Engerman 2000). Now that we have come to focus on the nature and virtues of establishing, identifying and checking against ideal types in the Weberian sense (Aspalter 2020a), we still have to deal with what it really means, and more importantly perhaps what not (Arts 2020, cf. also Van Kersbergen 2019; Van Kersbergen and Vis 2015). Max Weber has in his very prolific lifetime established a great number of ideal types for different purposes in different disciplines of the social sciences. He developed and used this new methodology (within which there are different methods of doing so) to provide new “sociological tools for social and historical research … and illustrated their use in dozens of applications, treating everything from ancient Roman land use practices to workplace behavior in his grandfather’s textile mill” (Sica 2004: 131). This is very important to note and be aware of. Using one of the most famous quotes of Weber, it is often being maintained that ideal types do not exist in real life (again the meaning of real here is often, too often, hijacked). However, he had pure forms of bureaucracy, pure forms of capitalism, and many other things on his mind when he made that famous statement—not welfare regimes. He never talked about welfare regimes. However, when classifying ideal types in the case of sects and churches, Weber clearly did stress that ideal types do exist, perfect replicas of ideal types do exist, or near perfect cases thereof—in some cases they are seldom to be found and come across. Weber when looking at the concepts of ideal types of ‘a church’ and ‘a sect’ stressed that both, for the purpose of classification, “may be broken down into complex characteristics; but, in that case, not only the boundary between the two concepts but also their substantive content will necessarily remain fluid … they cannot or can only rarely be found in [their] completely pure conceptual form” (first emphasis added, Weber 2012: 127). Therefore, it is all down in general (in the general application of ideal types) to the definition of ‘rarely,’ or ‘rather rarely’—’not often’, ‘less often’—and the difference of what ‘completely pure’ means versus just ‘pure’. This of course is and must, by virtue of logic itself, be different from the classification of one type of research subjects (or, one application of a classification) to another—depending on the nature of research subjects under scrutiny.

On the Existence of Perfect More-or-Less-Fits

5

On the Existence of Perfect More-or-Less-Fits To be sure, the Chinese welfare state system is in terms of its institutional set-up a rather perfect (or very close to perfect, depending on one’s preferred usage of the word ‘perfect’) representation of the East Asian Welfare State Regime, the ideal–typical Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime. The Brazilian welfare state system on the other hand is also an almost perfect depiction of the Latin American Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime when one looks at the institutional set-up of its major social security systems. The same can (and must) be said of India, Russia, and (of course) Cuba for the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime, the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime and the Communist/Socialist Welfare Regime respectively (cf. Aspalter 2011, 2017b, 2020d). Germany on the other hand, however, is not a perfect or any near perfect replica of the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime in Continental Europe—not anymore— when one wants to analyze its main institutional components, or when one wants to demonstrate as closely as possible (and that is very easily possible) how a Christian Democratic Welfare Regime looks like in its rather ‘pure’ form (i.e. with the presence of least amount of deviations). In this case, one just would e.g. have to look over the border to Belgium or Luxembourg. These two countries would be much better candidates of resembling the real-life, empirical embodiment of the conceptual ideal type of the ‘old’ Christian Democratic Welfare Regime (cf. e.g. Cantillon et al. 2017). Germany has changed especially after the Hartz IV reforms (that were passed into law in 2003 and took effect in January 2005), as well as before that the Riester Pension reform of 2002, which was not so consequential, not at all, as the former, but still signified a major shift in welfare philosophy along neoliberal lines. On the contrary to Belgium and Luxembourg, yet further to the west, France, for the most part in its modern-day history lacked a strong and influential (and pure) Christian Democratic party and movement (cf. Aspalter 2008; Revauger 2003). When looking at the ‘old, limited group’ Christian Democratic countries, Austria would have too strong universal elements, a very generous universal family/child allowances and universal long-term care system (cf. e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990; Leichsenring 2017). But, as we will see in the following the new additions, ever since Aspalter et al. (2009), to the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime, now also include Croatia (see Chap. 4) that has also a universal basic health care system in place. Both cases of the Slovenian and the Croatian universal basic health care elements reflect the Italian case of universalism in its National Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, SSN). Now having at least four countries within the Christian Democratic Welfare regime pursuing universalism to a greater extent, and even crossing the lines of Northern and Southern, Western and Eastern Europe, is really significant. Croatia here does make a tremendous difference. In addition, the continuous steady path of Slovenia on the course of also building on more generous levels of universalism (in terms of people, medicines ‘and’ services), to some extent, is contributing to and thus consolidating this finding (cf. ISSA 2021; Albrecht et al. 2021; Vonˇcina et al. 2018; Leichsenring 2017; Bertolissi 2015; Aspalter 2012b; Aspalter et al. 2009).

6

1 Introduction: On the Particular Nature of Ideal Types Applied …

The a-bit-longer story short, Germany is not representing the most ‘pure’ system in terms of institutional set up, and in addition it is not the best choice for representing the whole group of Christian Democratic (CD) countries. Would one allow for dual leadership, a team Italy and Germany, would make lots of sense and point to the fact that Continental Europe is not Germany, and Germany, despite of its geographical size and location, despite its political and economic dominance, is not a perfect (or close to perfect) representation of what is going on the Christian Democratic world of welfare capitalism. In terms of welfare outcomes (see below), i.e. welfare regime performance, Germany is the lowest among the old group of CD countries, having been overtaken by Slovenia, Ireland, Slovakia, Italy and Spain, and being more or less on par with countries like Greece, Portugal Cyprus, Czechia and Croatia (in terms of combined overall povertization and inequality outcomes, see Fig. 4.3 in Chap. 4). But then Germany does now not anymore stand in the center of the new extended CD-19 group of countries (with 19 member countries), having moved (relatively speaking) downwards in terms of relative welfare state performance outcomes. The neoliberal politics of the Schröder Government, plus inflationary povertization (poverty through inflation, cold tax progression, and cold social security progression), have left Germany, i.e. its citizens, poorer and in a less well-off situation than ever before, after the postwar development boom. On the other hand, new rising stars in terms of welfare state development were ignored, or simply not on the radar, before. These for sure include now also e.g. Slovenia, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus (see the results of the global data analysis below). Cyprus is also a worldwide leader in healthy aging, right after Singapore (the unquestionable No. 1 here), being followed after a huge gap by Japan and Spain, which also does a very outstanding job in this regard (cf. Chap. 5 in this volume, as well as Aspalter 2020e). When looking at ideal types and ideal type comparison one should never disregard new, and especially significant and/or massive new empirical developments. The above are among these.

The model country status can now, in this ‘new, extended’ group of Christian Democratic Welfare regime members (see below, now there are 19 regime members, from Portugal to Poland, from France to Cyprus) as easily be Belgium, Germany, Austria, Italy, or Slovenia. There is a new—significant, yet infant—center of gravity, a new bloc of countries, one that comprises Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, and Austria, these are Christian Democratic Welfare Regime countries with a mix of universalism, and this group transcends the East-West and North-South boundary of the Europe (that is still lingering also in the heads of many scholars), which cannot be ignored, at least, not any longer. This is certainly good news for the European Union. The East-West border in essence has ceased to exist in terms of welfare state analysis, as a result of the rim of countries (Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia) having joined the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime. In addition, the perceived lagging South of Europe has long caught up with the North in

On the Nature of Ideal Types in the Ten Worlds Theory

7

terms of social development, welfare state system development and of course welfare outcomes. Both developments have been already in the making for some years, since the turn of the millennia (cf. Aspalter et al. 2009; cf. also Fenger 2007; Cerami 2007; Cerami and Vanhuysse 2009; Amitsis 2009). When it comes the Anglo-Saxon Countries, the United Kingdom and the United States are relatively poor cases of any real-life embodiment of neoliberal (or liberal) ideal type of welfare regime. Australia is by far a better candidate, if not near perfect candidate, as its mutual obligation doctrine that grew out of the 1994 Working Nation Program of the Australian Labour Party not only framed and guided the Bill Clinton’s welfare reform of 1996 in the United States, but also that of the UK Labour Party in 1997/1998, the New Labour reforms. Also, Australia is also is much more ‘pure’ a model (in the Weberian ideal–typical sense) by not having strong Bismarckian (occupationally and/or geographically divided) social insurance systems like in the US, or strong universal health insurance in the United Kingdom, or strong universal pension system in New Zealand. Furthermore, the US welfare state system is by far the lowest performing in terms of actual welfare outcomes on the ground within the rim of the Neoliberal Welfare Regime (see data analysis below) (cf. Aspalter 2020d; Kinnear 2003; Howard 2003). With regard to the Social Democratic Welfare Regime, especially Iceland, but also to some extent Finland or Norway, may also make good candidates for representing the whole group of Social Democratic (SD) countries, perhaps even much better than the so-often-cited case of Sweden, as asset/wealth inequality is staggering in Sweden (as well as Denmark) in international comparison (cf. Aspalter 2020d; cf. Table 4.1 in Chap. 4). At least there are choices (which can be discussed, for which arguments can be found for or against) of who best represents each ideal–typical welfare regime, which are important to have, especially when one pursues different goals in one’s concrete study, sub-field, or the topic one is working on.

On the Nature of Ideal Types in the Ten Worlds Theory Regarding what is the lead country, or ‘more or less perfect main representative’, for each ideal typical welfare regime, it is not so important which country is being showcased as the (or a) model country for any respective ideal–typical welfare regime (nevertheless it is very interesting, indeed, in most cases). Most important though is the realization that ideal types do exist in real life, even perfect and near-perfect replicas or representatives with the acknowledgement that there is leeway built into ideal types (that is their nature, their advantage). One also needs to see and realize that ideal types do change over time. Therefore, we shall choose to employ a dynamic perspective, here and in general, and not out of habit (cf. Van Kersbergen 2019) go back to a locked-up 1980 data set, on which the 1990 study of Esping-Andersen had been based on.

8

1 Introduction: On the Particular Nature of Ideal Types Applied … More important yet is to understand that ideal types are not fictions, they are not fictious— they do not come from, or wander, or represent a fictional (what in common people’s language is called ‘theoretical’) world. There are different ways to construct and perceive ideal types (cf. Aspalter 2020c). One always has a choice.

One can choose to have either an abstract version of ideal types, or a (by now) dusty version of ideal types that is static and not dynamic, or, as in our case here with the Ten Worlds Theory, a dynamic, fully empirical-based and fully empirical sensitive version of ideal typical models (Aspalter 2017b). The latter choice needs more work, more empirical analysis and constant observation. Yet a dynamic version of ideal type classification is still much more stable (and hence stronger, i.e. less perceptible to more or less minor system changes and policy changes) than any real-typical classification. In order to be user-friendly (i.e. more useful) and hence fruitful, as well as theoretically and empirically more significant, the world of ideal types has to be standing firmly on empirical grounds. It is a great advantage when ideal types have been built upon and are adapted to, every now and then, the reality of the empirical world.

In this way, they can serve the empirical world of welfare state systems, social security systems on the ground. In other words, the very functioning of ideal types, if we have chosen (a bit) dynamic versions of ideal types, is dependent on serving the real world: the people, the profession and science of social policy (plus related disciplines), as well as the governments and administrators in place. That is, ideal type theory—as we understand it here—is not just conceptual; or even to a greater or lesser degree estranged from reality. On the very contrary, ideal type theory is born (or brought to light) by reality, by real-life empirical findings and serves the practice of social policy (cf. Midgley 2017a), as well as the practice of welfare state comparison (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011), be they descriptive, explanatory or normative studies (Midgley 2002).

About Moving Forward The positive developments of the past several years have been topped by the fast realization that the concept of decommodification in particular is not apt to (even does not try to) capture the realities of welfare and well-being, i.e. social policy and social security, on the ground in Africa, or in Latin America, South Asia, and so forth—that is the very majority of the world’s population and countries (Böger and Öktem 2019; Yörük et al. 2019, etc.). The concept of decommodification was indeed useful, and hence very correct, especially for rich developed countries in Europe and other Anglo-Saxon countries, plus Japan. But, there was a major shortcoming, one that never left the continuous stream of criticism of Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds book, that of completely neglecting

The Way Ahead

9

the welfare of women, their precarious situations, their inequality and their poverty: especially, the formal and informal work divide, gender inequalities in care work provision at home for children and other family members, gender inequalities in housework provision, gender inequalities on the labor market, and so forth (Muñoz Boudet et al. 2021; Roumpakis 2020; Yu et al. 2018; Mathieu 2016; Haberkern et al. 2015; Grown et al. 2010; Mandel and Shalev 2009; Orloff 2009, 1996; Bambra 2004, 2007a; Gornick and Jacobs 1998; Davis Hill and Tigges 1995; Sainsbury 1994, 1999, 2000; O’Connor 1993; Lewis 1992; Pascall 1986; Land 1978). The emphasis, and hence over-emphasis, on decommodification created this blindness on the welfare duality that institutionally discriminates against all women and all care-takers in general. The major problem was to ignore this blindness, and not to solve this blindness of the particular method and theory used. Theories are good, when they are fruitful (cf. Bottomore 1972: 37), i.e. useful and hence bring forth scientific progress, knowledge, understanding, and related critical (i.e. deep) thinking. Esping-Andersen himself in 2000 brought up what he coined the problem of bimodal distribution in global welfare analysis, i.e. one variable or dimension, or concept, might be super useful in one (in our case) welfare regime (or couple of them), but not in the rest of them; or in a couple of others, or not at all in all the others. For that reason, in general, Esping-Andersen was not wrong doing what he did, conceptually, with the dimension of decommodification, on the contrary to Yörük and his colleagues’ suggestion (cf. Yörük et al. 2019). But, in addition, when leaving the Western world of rich developed countries, one also needs to leave this, now not so useful or not useful concept of decommodification behind. Next the gender-blindness, decommodification is also marked by and causes blindness towards well-being and welfare in the Global South. A series of strong research studies by high caliber investigators has put forward this argument in the past: Mkandawire (2007), Cerami (2013), Künzler and Nollert (2017), Böger and Öktem (2019), and of course Yörük and his colleagues (2019).

The Way Ahead Hence, in this book, there are still several key tasks that need yet to be completed, and these are: First, the establishment of new overall concepts—or a replacement and/or recalibration thereof—of the broadly conceptualized (grand) dimensions that characterize welfare regimes in general. That is, we have to replace the dimensions of decommodification and stratification, and then theorize these alternative dimensions. Second, these new-found, more workable or fully workable dimensions need to be broken down into sets of variables and proxy-variables—that work for all people and all parts of the world (cf. Esping-Andersen 2000), for all countries of all stages or levels of development, and all kinds of welfare regime type backgrounds.

10

1 Introduction: On the Particular Nature of Ideal Types Applied … Third, and this may be the most important part of the welfare modelling business (cf. Abrahamson 1999a) perhaps, with this rich and extensive data that is woven into our newly setup grand dimensions, we can for the first time identify regime members of each of the 10 idealtypical welfare regimes in full when also factoring in previous theoretical and empirical knowledge and findings of case study analysis on the one hand and textual-data from e.g. the country profile database of the International Social Security Association. Fourth, it would be very useful (but not entirely super necessary) to identify better (and more) model countries for each regime type, that can serve diverse research purposes on the one hand and that break up the locked-in old habitual practice of always looking at Sweden, Germany, the UK, the US and Japan perhaps (i.e. we need to break up the habit of conducting ‘normal science’, meaning business-as-usual or Fordist conveyer-belt type of welfare state comparison, cf. Van Kersbergen and Vis 2015; Van Kersbergen 2019; Arts 2020). In case of the African welfare regime, the Ultra Rudimentary Welfare Regime, in particular however, this new outcome-based data helps a great deal choosing a set of representative model countries (or a model country), as there are so many countries to choose from, that may qualify otherwise. And, last but not least, and perhaps most useful and important of all, we need to zoom in on the empirical realities—i.e. outcomes in terms of people’s state of well-being, health, education, housing and job situation, etc.—on the ground, in form of key variables (or proxy variables) of the newfound grand (overall) dimensions here and there, to further substantiate and validate the existence and demonstrate the consequences of ideal-typical welfare regime types around the world (cf. also Hempel cited in Arts 2020: 48). For a while now, researchers (cf. e.g. Bambra 2005, 2006, 2007a, b, 2019; Bambra et al. 2009; Kammer et al. 2012) have resorted to analyzing first and foremost welfare regime outcomes (not institutions) to make conclusions about the welfare regimes themselves, among other goals. Mixed approaches, institution- and outcome-based, were also present (cf. e.g. Gornick and Meyers 2006). When Esping-Andersen talked about outcomes in his 1990 book, he talked about institutional outcomes (benefit structures and generosity), not about outcomes in terms of states of well-being or suffering of people themselves.

On the Ways to Move Along The methodology of this study is built on the findings of the extended case study research (Aspalter 2020d: 112–115) from hundreds of case studies from many dozens of research works from around the world in the past decades—as it represents one additional step up on the pyramid of theory building, in a series of research studies that span a quarter of a century, when building this global welfare regime theory. Therefore, this book is not to be read and interpreted in exclusion from the previous studies by the author and instrumental works from other authors that build the fundament of this long-term research project (cf. Box 1.1). Following the need to ‘invest in theory construction’ in comparative social policy (Arts 2020: 51; cf. also Arts and Gelissen 2002, 2010; Powell and Barrientos 2011; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011), this book explores further the conceptual and empirical geography of ideal types in all major parts of the world, saying goodbye once and for all to the any post-Colonial attitudes of ‘only rich developed countries (of the West, plus Japan) count and the rest are to be put under the rug.’

On the Ways to Move Along

11

The study is employing the method of theory building (cf. e.g. Steiner 1988), with the prior use of political-historical reasoning that emphasized the decisive (however not exclusive) role of Colonial history and Colonial governance (not everywhere, but in the very most of places/countries) when it comes to explanatory variables of welfare regime development. This is being done by resorting to earlier historical explanatory meta-analyses of Midgley and Piachaud (2011) and Aspalter (2020d) (cf. Aspalter 2021c; Pierson 2004). The book of James Midgley and David Piachaud (2011) entitled Colonialism and Welfare: Social Policy and the British Imperial Legacy is of particular importance, as it laid out the basic fundament for the explanatory theory for the rest of the Ten Worlds Theory (cf. Aspalter 2020d: 116–122). This book and many other studies that our book here is building on are historical empirical findings (cf. Pierson 2004)— i.e. facts, with multiple vetting by multiple researchers, with sometimes multiple methods (i.e. researcher triangulation plus method triangulation). They are gathered over dozens of years and from around the world. With regard to descriptive variables and proxy variables—to additionally extend the empirical reach of the theory—we will employ the benefits of quantitative social indicator research. Here, we will test yet again empirically the earlier developed Ten Worlds Theory (in addition to hundreds of case studies from around the world and their findings, on which this theory is built on, Aspalter 2017b). In the past, many global (or not so global) quantitative research studies on comparative welfare regime analysis had to avoid “data availability and reliability issues that have plagued quantitatively informed classifications of global welfare regimes” (emphasis added, Hudson and Kühner 2011: 35). The Ten Worlds Theory is not the result of, but the basis for the quantitative data analysis below (cf. Aspalter 2017b). In other words, the Ten Worlds Theory is the basis for the (as much as possible) comprehensive empirical testing and further analysis that is being put forward in the latter part of this book (cf. also Arts 2020: 48; Emmenegger et al. 2015: 6–7). The following Box 1.1 traces past and current key steps of theory development, as theories are not built overnight, or on one day.

Box 1.1: Key Steps in Developing the Ten Worlds Theory 1. Setting up the theory by identifying and substantiating the existence of new and old welfare regimes, i.e. groups of countries resembling each other to a very significant extent, here, in the ideal–typical sense (Aspalter 2006a, 2011, 2017b; Aspalter et al. 2009; cf. also Hui, Aspalter and Lai 2010). 2. Once the first leg of the theory has been developed, the welfare regime characteristics of each welfare regime need to be identified (Aspalter 2017b, 2019b; cf. also Hempel cited in Arts 2020: 48).

12

1 Introduction: On the Particular Nature of Ideal Types Applied …

3. Offering a deep explanation for the methodology used, plus developing and refining the methodology (and methods) being used (Aspalter 2012, 2019a, 2020b, 2020c; i.e. offering ‘positive heuristics’, cf. Arts 2020: 45). 4. Offering a deep explanation of the explanatory historical record for regime building and development (Aspalter 2020d, cf. also Midgley and Piachaud 2011). 5. Working out new effective grand dimensions that characterize the overall fabric of welfare regimes all around the world (this volume). 6. Applying/testing the theory by looking at e.g. numerical (and/or textual) data, by breaking down the new-established dimensions into sets of variables and/or proxy variables (this volume). 7. Based on the theory being constructed, substantiated and empirically tested, one can start to set up hypotheses, and test them (cf. also Arts 2020: 47–48). That is the very purpose of setting up ideal type theories in the first place (they are not meant to be an end in themselves).

Good Wine Takes Time Theories are carefully constructed over a number of years, sometimes ten years (e.g. Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime theory, from the very beginning that is, according to his own comment, cf. Esping-Andersen 1998) and sometimes 20 years and more (e.g. Luhmann’s very own version of a theory of social systems that sees social communication as the atoms of society). The very beginning of the Ten Worlds Theory, seen retrospectively, may lead back to a conference held in Puli (Taiwan) in the summer of 1998, which kicked off a succession of research undertakings aimed at working out the existence, shape, and reasoning of welfare regimes (groups of countries or regions that share existential traits, to a significant extent that is). Of course, this series of events was initiated by the presence, lecture, discussions of and with Gøsta Esping-Andersen (how could it be otherwise, one could ponder). Very important hereby, from the very beginning, was a series of books that collected (and commissioned) research works by many dozens of researchers around the world, to find out more about welfare state systems all over the world, without the help and knowledge provided by these excellent scholars the Ten World Theory would have never come to see the light of day (cf. e.g. Aspalter 2003a, b, c; Aspalter et al. 2008; Singh and Aspalter 2008; Abrahamson and Aspalter 2008; Walker and Aspalter 2008; Aspalter, Uchida and Gauld 2012; Aspalter and Teguh-Pribadi 2017; Aspalter, Teguh-Pribadi and Gauld 2017).

New Conceptual Tools

13

New Conceptual Tools In view of the above, this study then will be testing the theory of Ten Worlds of Welfare Regimes (Aspalter 2017b) with quantitative data, i.e. particular variables and proxy variables for (I) the (grand/far-reaching) dimension of povertization (which allows for a much more differentiated analysis poverty, introducing a somewhat inverse aspect of decommodification: i.e. the interplay of (a) poverty-related policies, including different types of social security and social assistance design, education policy, housing policy and health care policy in particular (cf. e.g. Brady 2009), and (b) poverty outcomes (cf. e.g. Nichols-Casebolt et al. 1994; Tang and Wong 2003; Tang 2006; Midgley and Tang 2009; Hoefer and Midgley 2013; Lee and Koo 2017), and (II) the (grand/far-reaching) dimension of inequality which in general is a wider concept than stratification of larger social classes, and can e.g. be extended to cover all kinds of inequalities, including health inequalities, education inequalities, housing inequalities, gender inequalities, gender role inequalities, inequalities of cultural, social, technological and environmental access and opportunities, etc. in future studies (cf. e.g. Westergaard 1978; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Sainsbury 1996; Kingfisher 2002; Ruda 2007; Stephens and Fitzpatrick 2007; Bambra et al. 2009; Esping-Andersen and Myles 2011; Chuang et al. 2012; Matznetter 2019; Yu et al. 2021). In pursuing these two newly conceptualized dimensions, we advance and round up theoretical, conceptual progress, and thus extend the reach of the findings of the Ten Worlds of Welfare Regime Theory (Aspalter 2017b) yet further—and this around the world, in all major corners of the world, in all countries and regions with all kinds of development contexts. In the following, we understand and hence define povertization as the act of creating the conditions of—as well as the conditions themselves that (together) create, cement and perpetuate—different forms and kinds of poverty. Also, there are many different subdimensions of inequality—different kinds of education and education outcomes, gender cum gender identity arrangements and outcomes, health service access and their outcomes in addition to accumulative lifetime health—and related cultural, social, economic, governmental and natural—conditionings and conditions, etc. As there are different ways of looking at and measuring both of these two wholesome and hence globally relevant dimensions of povertization and inequality, there is ample room (which is very much needed and called for) for the observing and analyzing scientist to extend and/or modify the calibration and alignment of these two conceptual lenses. With the instrument of analyzing these two wholesome dimensions of povertization and inequality across the world, we can include the majority of the world’s population in welfare state analysis. It cannot be that a small minority of rich developed countries are the only subjects of social policy analysis, we need to carry social policy research to all corners of all continents of the world.

14

1 Introduction: On the Particular Nature of Ideal Types Applied …

Old Colonial attitudes—of e.g. the rich countries are the only ones that are worth studying, analyzing, debating, and to be look at—represent nothing else than a certificate of relative poverty of social sciences, and with it social policy, in the countries that used to be Colonial rulers of the world (and with it enforcers of different kinds of slavery, e.g. physical, cultural and economic slavery). Indeed, it is difficult to go out of one’s comfort zone of studying one’s own country, plus one or two neighboring or a dozen or two fellow rich countries. Professionalism and science itself however mandate the extension of welfare state system analysis, social policy analyses of all kinds, to all corners, all cities, and all communities of our world (cf. Dixon 1981, 1987a, b; Dixon and Kim 1985; Dixon and Macarov 1992; Dixon and Scheurell 1995).

The last couple of decades in particular have, however, also witnessed a rising number of new research works by a rising number of researchers that started to shed the spotlight of international social policy analysis on poor countries, the socalled developing world, e.g. Midgley (1997, 2017), Mesa-Lago (1997, 2008, 2013), Holliday (2000), Ramesh (2004), Mkandawire (2007), Midgley and Piachaud (2011, 2013), Cerami (2013, 2015), Künzler and Nollert (2017), Aspalter (2017a), Midgley et al. (2017), as well as Midgley et al. (2019). When it comes to welfare regime analysis, too, there was vast progress in terms of theory making that comprised all countries of the developed and the developing world, particularly e.g. Gough et al. (2004), Wood and Gough (2006), Aspalter (2017b), Abu Sharkh and Gough (2011), Hudson and Kühner (2011), Gough (2013), Böger and Öktem (2019), and Leichsenring (2020).

About This Book This book is not a beginning, neither is it an end. It merely represents a transient moment in science, that is made possible by, and rests on, previous undertakings, previous explorations, greater or lesser successes and defeats. The next chapter (Chap. 2) is reserved and devoted to a range of explanations of what methods and methodologies went into the long-term research project (or quest) that made this book possible, as well as an assembly of methods and their respective approaches that carry this book. In the following (Chap. 3), this book looks at (once again) the key characteristics of the ten ideal–typical worlds of welfare capitalism (or welfare regimes) as outlined earlier (Aspalter, 2017b, 2019b, 2020d). Hence, this book is not the conclusion or the end of the (theoretical) argument (on the contrary to e.g. in Esping-Andersen’s 1990 book). Chapters 4 and 5 then look at the wholesome, grand dimensions of povertization and inequality, as well as the combined super dimension of dehumanization. These new fundamental dimensions enable the analysis and theoretization of welfare state system and welfare regime outcomes, and social policy outcomes in general, in all parts of the world. The key of this book, and these two chapters, is the quantitative

About This Book

15

analysis of social indicators, sets of variables that stand for each of the two grand dimensions put forward. The results yet again further substantiate the existence and outcomes of the ten ideal–typical worlds of welfare capitalism (or welfare regimes), as the existence of particular sets of characteristics (designs/patterns) of ideal–typical welfare regimes themselves and particular degrees (shades) of their welfare regime outcomes has been proven and demonstrated (see Chap. 5). One most outstanding finding demands full explanation—the vast shortcomings in terms of inequality across all worlds of welfare regimes. In order to facilitate that, this book features also a (non-statistical) explanatory multi-theory meta-analysis, which is introduced in Chap. 4 and extended further in Chap. 5. The last part of the book, Chaps. 6 and 7, deals with workable and truly effective solutions to this major rather shocking find that inequality plagues most welfare regimes around the world, to a much greater extent than expected. These two chapters use solely the method of yet another—now a normative (evaluative and prescriptive)—meta-analysis. Using the insights from the earlier established and developed normative theory of Developmental Social Policy (cf. Sherraden 1991, 2005; Midgley 1995, 1999, 2014, 2017a, b; Midgley and Sherraden 1997, 2000; Aspalter 2010, 2014, 2015, 2017e, 2020e; Midgley and Aspalter 2017; Kim and Aspalter 2021). Also, there are a couple of very well-known major welfare state systems, on which most of current welfare state theory and hence social policy theory stands on today, like especially Sweden, Germany and the United States, that reveal relatively very high levels of inequality in comparison with other members of their respective welfare regimes. These countries, hence, are to review and reconceptualize their current ideas and concepts of how good social policy really is in these countries, and what need to be done to approach (or yet again approach) equality. Without reasonable and widespread equality there always will be spreading and worsening of poverty around the world, even in many most developed countries. For this reason, the author takes the opportunity to look at future social security development in all parts of the world, by employing empirical and theoretical earlier findings of especially Midgley and Aspalter (2017), along with Kim and Aspalter (2021) applying normative social policy theory. Hence this last part of this book develops further Developmental Social Policy theory—thus developing universally (i.e. globally) applicable meta-analytical approaches and solutions to end povertization as much as (really) possible by ending inequality and by focusing on microeconomic incentive structures of social security systems (welfare benefits and services), as well as by focusing on financing and facilitating it in a very overseeable timeframe. As for the limitations of this book, no book can (and should) cover every purpose, for every subfield or topic (however important they are) in social policy or related to it. Therefore, a balance between what has been developed, proven and debated in many previous publications of all the key authors on which this book is based (see key references) and what possibly can—due to space limitations—be dealt with again had to be struck.

16

1 Introduction: On the Particular Nature of Ideal Types Applied …

In addition, this book should be seen as and used as a base for further social policy analysis and/or any other social science analysis. It aims to become a starting point, a spring board for future studies and ventures in social policy, or related sciences. It is not an end by itself, never, it merely wants to, and possibly can, help to identify new forks in the road up ahead that lead to new pathways, or give impulses of whatever kind here and there.

Part II

Theory Building: From Empirical Reality for Social Policy Practice

Chapter 2

On the Methodology Applied

Methodology development in social policy science has traditionally, so far, been rather neglected compared to e.g. other social sciences. Every science discipline has to work on not just borrowing or importing methods from other neighboring disciplines, or from far and wide, but also develop discipline-specific methodology, i.e. an array of discipline-specific methods (cf. Aspalter 2021c; for trans-disciplinary learning for the development of discipline-specific methods cf. e.g. Tobi and Kampen 2018; Leblanc 2009). As it turned out, for this book, and in the run up to the book, a number of new specific methods have been (had to be) constructed and/or developed further. It is important to mention them, and to give social policy a chance to form its own consciousness towards setting up social policy-specific methods and methodological approaches, that not only lead to better results, more breakthroughs, but also help to make this world a better place.

Applying the Method of Theory Building One can look at social policy as a science from different perspectives. If one looks from sociology, the state of theory making (given e.g. also the hustle and bustle of Esping-Andersen’s 1990 book and what type of methodology it actually used, cf. e.g. Aspalter 2020b; Van Kersbergen 2019) is perhaps adolescent (Arts 2020). There are indeed impeding factors behind a swift development process of policy theories, of technical and other nature (cf. e.g. Kaufmann 2013; Ebbinghaus 2012; Skocpol 2003; Amenta 2003; Esping-Andersen 2000; as well as Van Kersbergen 2019). When looking at social policy from other sciences, that look might very well be accompanied with awe, as social policy does have a couple of general universal theories, and they themselves do not (public policy, to name just one, cf Hill and Hupe, 2002, 2022). In general, and what is also chiefly the case with social policy science, every social science is (can and should be) borrowing theories from above all sociology theory, and that is purpose of sociology. Be it Foucault (1963, 1969, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Aspalter, Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0_2

19

20

2 On the Methodology Applied

1975, 2009, 2010, 2014; cf. also Lukes 2005; Rabinow 2010), Bourdieu (1973, 1983, 1984, 1986, 2002), Luhmann (1984, 1997; cf. also Leydesdorff 2021), Tilly (1984, 1998, 2000a, b, 2001, 2003a, b), Beck (1986, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2000), Fraser (1990, 2008, 2013, 2019; Fraser and Honneth 2004; Fraser and Jaeggi 2018), or any other world leading theorist, they all have so much to offer. Yet, we, in social policy science, need to step up the game, as the world is speeding up its problems: social crises, medical crises, humanitarian crises, ecological crises, technological crises (as technology replaces people’s jobs and robs them of their livelihood, controls their lives and harvesting their data, etc.), economic crises, political crises, and so forth. A quick look through any day’s news pages (or newspapers), all of them, tells it all. Theories are needed to guide scientists, and scientists are needed to guide politicians and society as a whole. We are, today, fast entering a data world, a data society— or digital society as it is also called. This unprecedented revolution that swipes us off our feet every now and then has already changed every single bit of daily life, and it will change people’s life courses. For some that means a hefty pay increase. For most it means dependence, poverty, unemployment, despair. For this coming data society, even more so, we need the help, guidance and protection given by science, and science cannot work without theories. Gunnar Myrdal, world famous economist and Nobel Prize Winner, has gotten to the heart of the problem, by saying: Facts do not organize themselves into concepts and theories just by being looked at; indeed, except within the framework of concepts and theories, there are no scientific facts but only chaos. (Myrdal 1965: ix–xvi)

Hence, the method of theory building (cf. esp. Steiner 1988; Capaldi and Proctor 2008) is the bedrock of knowledge building. In day-to-day science, the method of theory building has strongly been overlooked, and too much emphasis has been given, and is given, to numbers alone, or statistical correlations (causal ones and specious ones), without looking or understanding the context of the research object, without looking at society itself, how it really fares, what it really plagues, how it really functions, what really functions in social policy making, why and why not (cf. Tilly and Goodin 2006; as well as Mayer and Jencks 1989b; Skocpol 1991; Swigonsky 1996; Lewis 2001; Guerda and Varzi 2002; Böhnke 2008; Brady 2009; Voss 2010; Brady and Burroway 2012; Midgley 2014; Pritchard 2014; Tagarirofa 2017; Midgley and Aspalter 2017; Bambra 2019). Numerical data, textual data, textual-cum-numerical data are all enormously important, but they need theories to work, to be able to be put to work that is.

Applying the Abduction Method Following intuitively from the beginning the footsteps (while avoiding the one or other missteps, cf. Scruggs and Allen 2003, 2006, 2008) of Esping-Andersen, when setting up the East Asian Welfare Model (Aspalter 2005, 2006a), the author knew,

Applying the Abduction Method

21

as Esping-Andersen (1990) knew in advance, how things were more or less on the ground, i.e. in empirical reality (cf. also Esping-Andersen 1989). Esping-Andersen was not surprised, to say the very least, when he found out that Anglo-Saxon countries are different from Continental European countries, and by and large (and not all, at least in his 1990 book) Continental European countries are different from Scandinavian countries. That was the very premise, or puzzle one could say, that started him to get on with his explorative journey trying to rationalize why, and how exactly, all these countries with their similarities and differences can be classified in a uniform (and scientific) way. In retrospective, it all becomes clear. Esping-Andersen did not set up a typologylike, shadowy ideal-type classification (cf. Van Kersbergen 2019; Van Kersbergen and Vis 2015), but wandered a methodologically hitherto unwandered path. He ingeniously (and/or intuitively), in a dynamic back and forth motion, applied the method of abduction (Aspalter 2019a; Kennedy 2018; Paavola 2014, 2004; Lipscomb 2012; cf. also Ragin 2008: 78) in setting up ideal types. Conversely to some scholars (such as e.g. Ebbinghaus 2012) who found in the past that there are only two methods, induction (from data or cases to a theory) and deduction (developing a rationale and theory first, and then try to find it in empirical reality), there is this third way, the method of abduction (cf. also e.g. Kennedy 2018; Pereira Tavares 2017). Ideal types can be set up by using the deductive method (which is mostly used to test theories that already exist, but also for developing theories) where theoretical dimensions and key variables are being defined a priori “that serve as conceptual lenses or as a ‘yardstick’ for empirical analysis” (Ebbinghaus 2012: 2). A second, and very different, way of proceeding is the inductive method where one takes first a set of cases and, after its analysis, creates a posteriori classifications, and hence with it possibly a new theory (Aspalter 2020c: 99). Usually two methods of how to construct ideal-typical welfare regime models are referred to: the deductive method and the inductive method … But, actually there is a third method—the abductive method—by producing theory (or a hypothesis) while doing the empirical testing. That is, in the abductive method larger points of the theory (or common welfare regime characteristics that distinguish in total, that is, when most characteristics are more or less well matched, one welfare regime from other welfare regimes) are rather clear/or slowly getting clearer in an ongoing fashion (over several or more years). To be clear, the abductive method allows for and is built on the premise that the welfare regime theory or common or key identifying welfare regime characteristics is/are being fleshed out until the ideal-typical welfare regime theory stands on firm ground (emphases added, Aspalter 2019a: 80).

With the abductive method the essential words are ‘back and forth’, and this again and again (cf. Paavola 2014, 2004). The scientist knows something (or believes to know something, i.e. he or she is assuming something, being more or less perhaps even convinced of it, depending on experience and the subject matter), and then he or she tries to set up a theory or model of some sort. In his 1987 book, Esping-Andersen was still looking for such a theory or model, and had not found it, yet! Then, and this is a black box for everyone who is not Esping-Andersen himself, something happened. A good speculation would be (cf. e.g. Mishra 2002) that he remembered or came across Titmuss’ writings, the 1974 book for example, or any writing that brought up the very same. We do not know, and never will most likely. Fact is the time has been extremely short between the state of him not having a

22

2 On the Methodology Applied

model (in 1987) or a strong clue of how to proceed (in his 1987 book he only barely thought Sweden would be a representative, or good representative, of the Social Democratic model or Socialist model as he also called it) and the 1989 article that already published the main results of the 1990 book. Esping-Andersen applied a political economy method in his 1989 article, and so he did also in the 1987 articles (Esping-Andersen 1987a, b), while having brought up the idea of setting up ideal types, which, as we know now, he later deemphasized at best, or outright suppressed (to say the very least). He never spoke of the ideal type method anymore in the 1990 book, which is an amazing fact, as in the meanwhile most mainstream scholars come to see the ideal typical nature of his 1990 book and the far-reaching importance and implications thereof (cf. especially Abrahamson 1999a; Arts and Gelissen 1999, 2002, 2010; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011; Powell and Barrientos 2011; Arts 2020). When going back to the year 1985, Esping-Andersen’s book Politics Against Markets, however, does provide a direct clue that his own work, also in the years leading up to this 1985 book, was already forming the founding block of the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism book, as well as the earlier article entitled The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State in the Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology in 1989 (which served as a pre-publication of parts of the 1990 book). His many years long quest for the workings of the welfare state, within the workings of capitalism and the market economy, finally came to fruition and conclusion shortly after the 1987 book, and shortly before the 1989 article. It was in these ten years up to the 1990 book that the back and forth movements began that are so instrumental and typical for the method of abduction: ‘back to theory’ (for example: the focus on Karl Polanyi’s book The Great Transformation, and with it its guiding and key influence on the work of Esping-Andersen; and of course his own book Politics Against Markets), ‘forth to empirical reality’ (for example: the understanding how welfare states are really shaped in Europe, as e.g. analyzed and proclaimed earlier by Richard M. Titmuss in 1974). From the 1985 book Politics Against Markets, retrospectively speaking, to the 1990 book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, there are several straight lines of thought. The whole fundament of the 1990 book clearly was already for the most part present in the 1985 book: (i) the idea of the battle between markets and states (as is the emphasis on markets, states and family which is key for understanding welfare state differences and similarities) as well as, of course, (ii) the understanding of any neo-Marxist (Esping-Andersen was a most famous representative of NeoMarxism in the 1980s and early 1990s, cf. also e.g. his works of 1991 and 1993) that stratification is the main outcome of capitalism and the main problem to be addressed by welfare states. The jumps from The Great Transformation and the Politics Against Markets books to the concepts (and dimensions) of stratification and then to decommodification are short ones indeed. It is only that this interesting methodological uniqueness and the intellectual and scientific quest that led to the allchanging 1990 publication was not explained in the very same, or any time thereafter (it seems, at least in any publication of his).

Applying the Abduction Method

23

Long story short, his 1990 book was a great success, and a great leap forward in terms of perspective. But, in terms of explaining the methodology used (and developed) the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism was very poor, being poor as in being ‘adolescent’ (cf. Arts 2020). Pioneering works have two key characteristics: they often do not work, or they often only work just about. Luckily, for all of us, it did work out, barely and in the end. Today, we know now how important ideal types are, how to use ideal types and what ideal types are, and what not (cf. Aspalter 2020a; as well as Abrahamson 1999a; Arts and Gelissen 2002, 2010; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011; Powell and Barrientos 2011; Van Kersbergen and Vis 2015; Van Kersbergen 2019; Arts 2020). Ideal types are “obtained by means of one-sided accentuation of one or a number of viewpoints and through the synthesis of a great many diffuse and discrete individual phenomena (more present in one place, fewer in another, and occasionally completely absent), which are in conformity with those one-sided, accentuated viewpoints, into an internally consistent mental image” (Weber 2012: 125). Ideal types “are conceptual tools that bring together certain features of historical phenomena in an internally consistent picture … They are based on empirical evidence, but they are not a mere description of reality. They rather involve ‘the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality’ for heuristic reasons” (Trigilia 2002: 34).

Apart from this almost overlooked method of setting up and checking against ideal types (in current-day comparative social policy at least), another great breakthrough in methodology development needs to be credited to Esping-Andersen and his 1990 book, that is, there are more than two rigid ways of setting up ideal types. As mentioned before, there is in fact a third type, one where the researcher (just like Immanuel Kant chose to do in developing his philosophy, cf. Kant 2007 [1781]) goes back and forth, and in this motion discovers new elements of importance, new nuances of truths, learning on the way to collect better or more, and to interprete better or more textual, numerical, and contextual data (history, politics, culture, and all of it). Hence, the method of abduction was born, realized and recognized in the end (Aspalter 2019a). This book, in the following, as did the preceding works in this long-term research project that has now spanned over two and a half decades (cf. Aspalter 2020c), is applying this very method. For those who are not troubled by looking closer, they might see a great deal of difference of how the identifying welfare regime characteristics are set up, in this particular case: i.e. what they comprise, and how detailed, and empirically-based (informed by and designed after empirical facts on the ground, in a dynamic fashion, integrating new developments) they themselves (the theories themselves) are, when compared to other different research works where ideal types were set up following one of the two other methods (such as e.g. the pure deduction method, cf. e.g. Rice 2013, 2015, 2020, to name just one excellent representative here).

24

2 On the Methodology Applied

The Methodology of Using Multi-Methods In the long run up to this book, theory had to be developed step by step. This is what is called the method of theory development (cf. esp. Steiner 1988). How was it done? By using the method of extended case study research (Aspalter 2020d) that drew on hundreds of historical as well as multiple and single case studies (using the method of case study research), by many dozens of scholars from around the world, many of which resulted in e.g. a before-mentioned series of books. The studies applying the extended case study method may span over several or many research studies, they may combine e.g. in-depth historical case studies, a high number of country case studies and/or area (subfields, special topics or issues in social policy) case studies—over a longer or long period of time. (Aspalter 2020d: 112–113)

To learn about the more than 150 welfare state systems out there (in not very small countries alone), as much as possible at least, is not possible in one or two years, not when preparing one quick journal article, or even one longer book. John Dixon was the first that actually attempted and succeeded that task, and he did over the course of several books spread out over many years (Dixon 1981, 1987a, b, cf. also Dixon and Kim 1985; Dixon and Macarov 1992; Dixon and Scheurell 1995). Dixon, thus, is the first pioneer who left long-lasting and consequential footprints in his research quest that led him to many remote, forgotten and for the most part ignored corners of the world, much as did Marco Polo, Charles Darwin, or Alexander von Humboldt before him. Nowadays, this got much easier, with the internet, online research data bases and the like. In general, it is not feasible and advisable at least to try to learn all things that are out there about all these welfare state systems and sub-systems, their governments, their people and their conditions, at least not at once. That is why the method of setting up ideal types (for the purpose of, later on, being checked against in different studies) is so important. It helps and enables learning on a grand scale, as it reduces system complexity and reduces a myriad of system details to general traits that are most significant, and most determining in terms of welfare outcomes (see the data analysis below) (cf. Aspalter 2012, 2020a). Depending on the size of and time available for the particular research work one likes to embark on—and depending on the past research works concluded already, as well as the mission that one has or is about to set out to achieve—one decides what methods and how many methods are being employed. It does not need to, and should not, be a fancy method, one that impresses all kinds of people for whatever reason. However, it should lead to meaningful and steadfast results, nothing else. Science is here for a reason and one reason alone, to extend the boundaries of knowledge and make the unknown known, to analyze and dissect it, compile, reconstruct and mold and fold it into a theory (old or new), and then apply it again in practice (cf. Midgley 2017a), or in further works of theoretical and/or empirical disposition. Due to the dominance of short-term, short-paged scope of research projects in the field, and the motivations and rewards that are attached to the very same (cf.

Using the Multi-Methods and Mixing-Methods Approaches

25

Van Kersbergen 2019; Van Kersbergen and Vis 2015), the approach of using multimethods is seldom applied. But, for clarity, now it helps to point out what it is, in all shortness. The approach of using multi-methods allows and enables the researcher to step back in terms of predetermining everything in terms of methodology, and let the case lead the research to the goal, much like a criminal investigator lets him or her being led by the evidence, and the evidence alone, to the answers and truth that he or she is looking for. That is, the case and the situation and needs, of the research project help or dictate the steering of the direction of methodology in the ongoing investigation. It allows to tackle more complex subject and research matters, but it for the very most part needs repeated follow-ups and a long-term commitment over many life years, which is not a bad thing. If done well, it can lead to very good results (cf. e.g. Roller 2015; Roller and Lavrakas 2015). Multi-method research enables the qualitative researcher to study relatively complex entities or phenomena in a way that is holistic and retains meaning. The purpose is to tackle the research objective from all the methodological sides. Rather than pigeonholing the research into … [one particular method], the multi-method approach frees the researcher into total immersion with the subject matter. Multi-method strategies are particularly relevant in casecentered research such as case studies and narrative research (Roller 2013).

Using the Multi-Methods and Mixing-Methods Approaches In 1992, Julia Brannen wrote one of the most important books in the development of methodology, that could have (but did not) put an end to the Methodenstreit of the late nineteenth century, the battle of methods, quantitative methods against qualitative methods mainly. In academia, still, this battle is going on, editors and reviewers, often are drawn to the attractions of condemning or ignoring the other form of research methods. Weber was fighting against the Methodenstreit (cf. e.g. Maclachlan 2017; Morrison 2006; Sica 2004; Eliæson 2002), and so doing, he developed social science methodology (the method of ideal types) and rescued theory making (the method of theory building, or what is known merely as the construction of theoretical models in economics or public policy). The very successful book of Brannen (1992) Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research has done an excellent job in highlighting the importance of joint efforts of researchers applying different methods on the one hand and combined application of methods by one and the same researcher on the other, be it in one study, within a set of thematically and focus-linked research studies that pursue the same goal, or on a longer research quest (cf. also Brannen 2005, 2021). In our case, in this book volume in front of us, we are applying the method of setting up and developing further theories (the method of theory development), and in particular we use the abductive (not deductive, not inductive) method of theory building, while e.g. integrating also (non-statistical) explanatory and normative metaanalyses (cf. Aspalter 2021c). We are building an ideal-type theory, using Weberian ideal–typical models, setting them up, developing them, employing them (the method

26

2 On the Methodology Applied

of setting up and checking against ideal types). We have used the extended case study research method, as our analysis here is the continuation of a longstanding effort, composed of, and built on even more, a great number of for the most part qualitative case studies, historical case studies, comparative multi-case studies and single case studies (hence we have used, and are using the fruits of, method of qualitative case study research). This book here then also developed new quantitative methods/techniques, and essentially relied on quantitative methodology along the way (see below). The book here is also written a bit in a back-and-forth mode (cf. e.g. Ragin 2008: 78, and Paavola 2014), the test run of data with only 5 countries maximum for each welfare regime was conducted in the very beginning, as any quantitative method (e.g. surveys), but also some qualitative methods (e.g. in-depth interviews, etc.) should be tested, before fully using it.1 After analyzing the Initial data results, the idea of dimensions for povertization, inequality and dehumanization arose, and the variables changed to fit these exact dimensions. Also, when writing this book, the need for different kinds of metaanalyses (explanatory and normative ones) has been addressed. Hence, the explanatory theories of Foucault and others have been integrated to in a more comprehensive manner being able to explain and discuss the formation and functioning of systemic oppressions across centuries, across generations, and across societies all over the world, as well as in between them (Aspalter 2022a). With the clear and daunting results found of the global data analysis, it became inescapable to also focus on key normative aspects of current and future social policy making, which lead to a new and much extended application (in the later part of the book, see below) of the normative social policy theory of Developmental Social Policy that was used to address the next couple of decades down the path into this very new and very challenging indeed twenty-first century.

Developing and Applying the Standardized Relative Performance Index This method of setting up a Standardized Relative Performance Index (SRP Index) was developed earlier by Aspalter (2006b) for the purpose of working on social development theory building. The quantitative part of this book has employed, to be exact, the wider method of social indicator analysis (cf. also Aspalter 2021e; for research on poverty with social indicator analysis cf. esp. Nolan and Whelan, 2010; Meyers and Garfinkel 1999; Mayer and Jencks 1989a, b, 1988; Smeeding 2001), and 1

Sometimes e.g. variables typed in were not used (such as, birth weight in kg, number of children wasted and severely wasted) as the number of countries not having data was too big, as otherwise we would have lost those countries in our standardization method in comparative social indicator analysis, with the help of which a welfare regime performance index (see SRP Index below, as well as Aspalter 2006b) can be set up for each Welfare Regime, and each variable and dimension.

Developing and Applying the Standardized Relative Performance Index

27

amongst which, the technique of standardization of different indicators of always one and the same group of countries. Consequently, group members are not allowed to vary within the study, and a value for each variable must be present for each country throughout all of the study. Hence, Aspalter (2006b) designed a simple formula for the purpose of being able to better compare the relative performance of different variables (that use different measurement units), and different dimensions thereof, and being able to present the performance of e.g. each country in a more meaningful way, in form of an indicator that either ranges from 0 to 1, or from 0 to 10 as in our case, or 0 to 100, 0 to 1,000 (as one wishes). The value 5 (or 0.5, 50, 500) means that the performance of this value is exactly half-way from the highest to the lowest value in this variable (among this particular group of countries, which cannot vary among dimensions, or variables, in the same study). What is perhaps more important is that Aspalter’s SRP Index can be used to create composite relative performance indexes, for dimensions of variables, and grand dimensions comprising these dimensions themselves (cf e.g. Aspalter 2023b, d). The same formula has also been used by Antonelli and De Bonis (2017), who started to standardize and use also standardized relative performance indexes, same as Aspalter back in 2006. Antonelli and De Bonis’ key source, Caruana (2010), has not standardized his indictors yet, and called his version the ‘distance to reference method’ (where only the maximum value was factored in, and the minimum value was not yet factored out). Hence, Caruana’s indicators were a crude, a limited version of a performance index: the expressiveness of each index was lacking and so was the ability to combine indices into a composite index as first constructed and invented, to my knowledge, back in 2006 by Aspalter—in an article entitled Freedom, Dehumanization and Welfare: An Asian Perspective, published that year in the Journal of Comparative Social Welfare (now renamed Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy issued by Cambridge University Press). Aspalter’s original formula for the Standardized Relative Performance Index (SRP Index) can be applied in any Excel data file, it goes like this: (CV − LV) ∗ 10 (HV − LV) … where CV stands for the current value (that one wants to standardize), LV the lowest value and HV the highest value (of the column of data, variable, that is being standardized). … in words: (curr ent value that one wants to be standar di zed −lowest value among the column that is being standar di zed) (highest value among the column that is being standar di zed −lowest value among the column that is being standar di zed)

… as an Excel formula:

∗ 10

28

2 On the Methodology Applied

    e.g. B2 − B$10 / B$15 − B$10 ∗ 10 … where B$10 is e.g. the lowest value in this particular column, B$15 is e.g. the highest value, B2 is e.g. the value being standardized. In order to reverse the index upside down, or vice versa—so that all values express a positive expression (something good), or the other way around a negative expression (something bad)—one needs to just calculate in the neighboring row “10 - current standardized index.” Each step of the way, one has to run the above formula again, to keep the lowest value among the group of countries, within this one variable, at 0, and the highest value exactly at 10. All data need to be positive data, hence, (the highest) negative values are calculated out by adding e.g. the exact positive value thereof to all values in that column (this is ok, as we only focus on the relative performance and relative performance gaps between values included, for each variable and within each group of objects under scrutiny). If the calculated standardized value/index is a negative value, or (in this case) higher than 10, there was a mistake, and the wrong lowest value position or wrong highest value position has been entered. Two indexes are merged by adding them or making an average, and then being standardized again (i.e. with the above formula being used each time, and new lowest and highest values need to be found again each step of the way). In case for analysis, and regroupings, one can retype the calculated values by hand in the neighboring row, to make sure they stay the same when reshuffling rows, grouping and regrouping rows, etc., and before exporting the data into any Word file (cf. Aspalter 2006b, 2021e, 2023b, c).

Learning from Physics and Chemistry: Introducing and Applying the Method of Spectral Data Analysis In particular, this book is following, when it comes to its quantitative global social indicator analysis, the idea and method of a spectral data analysis in social sciences, i.e. in this case: the determination of the constitution, conditions and/or functioning (in our case: especially welfare regime membership and overall performance) of the research objects (in our case: ideal-typical welfare regimes) by means of determining and analyzing spectra of distinct outcomes and patterns of outcomes they produce.

Looking at the spectral data analysis is never the only angle of analysis, institutional and political economy-based case studies have to be consulted and relied upon in addition in all cases (for all countries, and for all analyses). That is, spectral data analysis here provides an additional fundament for analysis and evaluation. Combining e.g. the method of theory development and the extended case study method, with a quantitative spectral data analysis is just one example of what it can look like when one is resorting to employing the power of the approach of using

Focusing on and Developing (Non-Statistical) Meta-Analyses

29

multi-methods and mixing methods, especially over longer periods of time, but also here just in this book alone (cf. also esp. Brannen 2005, 2021).

The Problem of Bi-Modal Distributions in Global Social Policy Comparison In an article that received least attention, in relative terms, Esping-Andersen (2000) fully realized and spot on identified the largest problem in international comparative social policy analysis: the problem of bimodal distribution, that is, some characteristics are super significant in this or that welfare regime, or region of the world, or type of countries, but not in the rest of them, or most of them. Consequently, we are dealing with time and again unique key characteristics of welfare regimes that may be only found in one or a couple of welfare regimes, or many, but not all welfare regimes. As a direct result of this, the compound set of key characteristics hence is different from one ideal–typical welfare to another. On top, the number of identifying key characteristics as well, as a consequence, is different from case to case (cf. also Aspalter 2017b, 2019b). Each case later on, by and large, has to match the great majority of these welfare regime characteristics, or has been or is moving fast in this very same direction (cf. Aspalter 2020a). For this, it is useful to recall Lewis Coser’s words, who noted that ideal types function as: an analytical construct that serves the investigator as a measuring rod to ascertain similarities as well as deviations in concrete cases. It provides the basic method for comparative study (Coser 1977: 223).

Focusing on and Developing (Non-Statistical) Meta-Analyses Policy sciences, and social policy in particular, are faced with wicked problems of all sorts (cf. Rittel and Webber 1973; Blackman et al. 2006; Valentine 2016; Newman and Head 2017; Temeer et al. 2019), social problems themselves, the hidden and complex and intermingling causalities of them all, the particular versus general meanings of contexts, histories, all sorts of deviant and special cases, as well as unwanted, unforeseen, unwelcomed side-effects that are being either neglected or pulled under a rug. To master more than just a convenient or politically acceptable minimum of problems, or minimal extents and aspects thereof, knowledge itself is being tasked to go beyond itself, to wander out into the unknown, and gather new insights, new data, new findings and conclusions, construct and prove new theses and theories, as well as to spearhead and fashion new methods to make it (knowledge gathering, construction, and applications) all feasible—and that faster, more accurate, more comprehensively meaningful and applicable.

30

2 On the Methodology Applied

All in all, in terms of knowledge needed, social policy is (one could maintain) still in an adolescent stage of knowledge gathering, plus evaluations and best applications (policy implementation) thereof. Science in general is super thirsty, longing desperately for more knowledge at ever-increasing width and depth. Nowadays, the problems social policy has to tackle are mounting, and spiraling out of control: with the Covid-19 Pandemic literally (cf Aspalter 2023c), but also with non-communicable disease pandemics, like diabetes, cancer and arthritis everywhere, plus also new forms and new depths of poverty and inequality in the midst of and among societies everywhere.

To catch up with societal entropy (Aspalter 2020a), social policy methodology needs to extend its arsenal to also include broad historical, broad thematic, broad multi-problem and multi-theory analyses. These are meta-analyses. There are, of course, different kinds of meta-analyses, statistical ones, and non-statistical ones. In policy sciences, such as public policy or social policy (including health policy, education policy, housing policy, plus all the whole lot of it)—on the contrary e.g. to other sciences and professions like psychology or marketing—different versions and different kinds of non-statistical meta-analyses are utterly useful and bitterly needed. Historical and thematic meta-analyses, for instance, are more spread-out and more vital for theory and knowledge creation than commonly or readily acknowledged, not just in policy sciences, but also all across social sciences, and far beyond. Metaanalyses, different kinds and versions of them, can be broadly and extremely productively applied in either descriptive, explanatory or normative social policy studies (cf. Aspalter 2021c), especially also in any trans-disciplinary context, building bridges between islands of knowledge, or different worlds of knowledge. In this book in particular, the major findings of Chaps. 4 and 5 necessitated the inclusion of an explanatory meta-analysis that is build on a multitude of explanatory theories, all tracing and pointing to the root of oppression and inequality, and hence institutional and systemic poverty, across our ten worlds of welfare capitalism and beyond. In the following, having, first and foremost (i.e. by and large), explained the key problem of humanity, which is inequality—and not just economic inequality, but also sexual and gender inequality, health inequality, housing condition inequality and so forth—the last part of the book (Chaps. 6 and 7) has then been dedicated to the solving of this human tragedy, which is absolutely unnecessary, when looked upon with a fresh eye, or the eye of an hypothetical stranger from outer space, or the eye of any open-minded social policy expert. Hence, another—now normative—meta-analysis was added to achieve this very task. Meta-analyses are vital to solve day-do-day research questions and scientific and human problems, but they are also exceptionally crucial to keep the progress of science flowing; thus, propelling knowledge creation, calibration, and application (or challenge the very same in a healthy/positive manner, cf. e.g. Klein and Millar 2007, or Levitt et al. 2017)—a little bit at a time, every step of the way. Seen from the perspective of a century and decades, and not from the perspective of centuries or millennia, as Kuhn (1970a) did before, knowledge creation in social policy seems not linear (so Kuhn is basically right), not at all linear. But, when one looks closer,

Pushing Out the Limits of Discipline-Specific Methodology: One Little …

31

one can also see that there is progress, here and there, to smaller or larger extent, all the way throughout (most) shorter historical timeframes as well.

Pushing Out the Limits of Discipline-Specific Methodology: One Little Step at a Time On the way that led to this book, the methodology used (needed to be used) had to be also developed further: (1) identifying a new method of setting up ideal types (i.e. the abduction method), (2) advancing the interplay of different kinds of theories (descriptive, explanatory, normative theories) in theory development, (3) theorizing methodology, such as (a) the extended case study research method, (b) the method and different types of qualitative non-statistical meta-analysis, (4) introducing a new technique of standardization in the method of social indicator research (developing the SRP Index) and, thus, (5) opening up new perspectives and possibilities in the world of global data analysis, be it textual-cum-numerical data or solely numerical data. In our case, we did use both kinds of data, qualitative and quantitative data. That is, apart from the quantitative spectral data analysis, we also included the findings of earlier and current qualitative findings of scholars and the e.g. the textualcum-numerical data base of the International Social Security Association’s country profiles have also been used to clarify and/or double check regime membership, regime leadership, and so forth (Aspalter 2006b, 2020a, 2021a, b).

Chapter 3

Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

The development of the theory of ten ideal–typical worlds of welfare capitalism, or ideal–typical welfare regimes—that is, groups of welfare state systems that highly resemble each other, not in all, but in most parts—took its time. Step by step, the theory expanded starting of course with the original Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, as developed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) who heavily relied on the preceding tripartite classification of three types of social policies by Richard Titmuss (1974; cf. Mishra 2002). The understanding of the importance of the principle of functional equivalence opened up the opportunity to fully understand existing ideal–typical welfare regimes and to identify new ideal–typical welfare regimes: e.g. especially the otherwise very diverse and otherwise not compatible Neoliberal Welfare Regime in the five AngloSaxon countries (US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), and at the same time new welfare regimes, the Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime in East Asia, and later on the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime in Latin America (Aspalter 2006a, 2011). But all this would have not been possible were there not explicit references to the all-crucial importance of the method of ideal types in comparative welfare state theory development. First of all, Esping-Andersen himself in 1987 (EspingAndersen 1987a, b), pointed out clearly the elemental role of Weberian ideal types for his following endeavor to investigate and identify groups of countries (families of nations, or clusters of welfare state systems) that are different from one another. In addition, others pointed to the presence and importance of ideal types in the world of Esping-Andersen, also in particular in the 1990 book, but with or without a clear understanding and/or a clear distinction of what they were and were not (Abrahamson 1999a; Arts and Gelissen 1999, 2002; Jæger 2005; Aspalter 2005; Arcanjo 2006). For Esping-Andersen, the quest to point to, find, and finally identify his three worlds of welfare regimes took about ten years (Esping-Andersen 1998). After years of in-depth studies on the welfare state in East Asia (Aspalter 2001b, 2002a), Aspalter in 2005 proceeded to identify the East Asian welfare model using the principle

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Aspalter, Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0_3

33

34

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

of functional equivalence and by then also explicitly referring to the nature and importance of working with ideal types in the Weberian sense. The fifth ideal–typical welfare regime, the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime was added in 2011 (Aspalter 2011). One key cornerstone—the key puzzle piece—for the development of it was the study by Malloy (1991), but the works of Mesa-Lago (1997, 2003, 2008), Borzutzky (2002a, b), and Farias (2003) were also quintessential, as well as indirectly also one very interesting work of Abrahamson (2003a). Five more ideal–typical welfare regimes were established, identified and fully substantiated in the years up to 2017 (Aspalter 2017b). The South Asian welfare regime, the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime, rested on research works that spanned over one and half decades (Aspalter 2002b, 2003d, e, 2017c; Ranaweera 2008). The African welfare regime, the Extreme Rudimentary Welfare Regime in nonBritish former colonies of Africa was based to a large extent on insights stemming from Dembele (2012) and Miller (2007)—see also the extremely sharp analysis and executive summary given by Ahadzie et al. (2006). The discovery of the Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime rests for the most part on the work of Rosenhek (2003), and indirectly also its praise by James Midgley (cf also Rosenhek 1999, 2000; Rosenhek and Shalev 2000). Aldosary and his colleagues (2008a, b) and Gal (2017) provided additional necessary cornerstones for the theoretical development of this new ideal–typical welfare regime in rich countries in the Middle East (i.e. oil-exporting countries, plus Israel). The theoretical identification of the ideal–typical welfare regime in most (not all) former Soviet Republics, the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime, (in especially Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus) was made possible by the eyeopening works of Dashkina (2008) and Amagoh (2017)—see also the key studies provided by Verulava and Asatiani (2020), Hort and Zakharov (2019), UKW (2018), and Cook (2007a, b, 2010). Cuba is the only one country left from the Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime. Directly the works of Mesa-Lago et al. (2003) and Mesa-Lago (2017), and indirectly the works of Leung (1994) and Chow and Aspalter (2003), contributed to the reestablishment of this fourth original type of welfare regime, as originally envisioned by Esping-Andersen (1987a) himself. The theoretical identification and formation of key characteristics of ideal–typical models necessitated long-term comparative research with hundreds of colleagues in the field of comparative social policy from all over the world, who for the very most part came together in a large number of edited book volumes, but also journal articles time and again. This kind of work—on a full global level—needs decades, as it takes a very long time to sort through and hence, in a piecemeal manner, and painstakingly so, sort out helpful insights and findings, as well as the fruitful works from the scores of excellent works that there are out there. It is indeed a problem of finding a needle or a couple of needles in each of numerous haystacks. Esping-Andersen was looking for 10 years, and it took close to 20 years for the other seven welfare regimes to be sorted out from the myriad of empirical evidence. It is an art and a science. EspingAndersen though barely having identified the Social Democratic Welfare Regime

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

35

only in his 1987 book (Esping-Andersen 1987b), has miraculously identified all of his three welfare regimes by only two years later (in 1989) in a political economy paper published in the Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, and then republished in his 1990 book. For Esping-Andersen, one work, the guiding work of Richard Titmuss (1974) was certainly the key for unlocking the mystery of clusters or families of welfare states, in at least Western countries (cf. e.g. the comments made by Mishra 2002). Just reading the main works, or most famous works, is not enough. One has to read all the other works, the myriad of works, all the works (literally) that are out there, in order to be able to distinguish and evaluate properly the meaning of this or that principle, this or that feature or detail, or historical or institutional uniqueness here and there. It is for this reason that the Ten Worlds Theory is not based on one or two key works or researchers and their findings, but instead also (and indispensably so) on all the other great works by great scholars that there are out there—and that (if possible, and as much as possible) in all countries and regions of the world (cf. Aspalter 2017b). It is difficult, and it takes a lot of time and a lot of practice, i.e. knowledge and critical thinking, and feel of what are the keys to the castle of comparative welfare state research, the ones that help to unlock the right rooms for this or that purpose. The more one has read, the stronger the theory is, or will be. And if one has read almost or literally everything, then chances are high that new insights come within reach. The longer the list of references, the longer the time invested, and the larger is the number of countries under scrutiny, the higher are the chances of (lasting, fruitful) progress in comparative social policy research (this insight rests on studying the list of references, early on, of a particular book States and Social Revolutions by Theda Skocpol 1979). The Ten Worlds Theory was fully formed in 2017 in the Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems (edited by C. Aspalter), and then subsequently finetuned again in 2019, in the second extended edition of the Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State (edited by Bent Greve). Additional methodological, historical and analytical perspectives have been added in the 2020 book Ideal Types in Comparative Social Policy. This book volume here (Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism) is the continuation of a long series of research works, one could say a long-term research project or research quest, to carry further the task of identifying, formulating, analyzing and checking against ideal types. As a result, this book is (inevitably) the outcome of an immense amount of empirical work (cf. Gough 2013: 206), as well as long-term theoretical development and a number of methodological innovations.

It is important to note and to understand, that this book is not a one-time shot, or singular work. It does not repeat all the other steps, but rather, it does (and need to) point to the long list of previous studies and their underlying studies, for further consultation or consideration for any reader that there is, and wants to double check and dig deeper into the subject matter and/or wants to learn more from the long list

36

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

of experts and their fruitful research studies, be they qualitative (as most of them) or quantitative in nature. Numbers, i.e. numerical data, alone cannot capture everything. They cannot capture all-important contexts in the study of social policy, as well as e.g. the politics and history of it all (cf. e.g. Kaufmann 2013; Tilly and Goodin 2006, as well as e.g. Guerda and Varzi 2002; Awoyemi et al. 2012; Tagarirofa 2017; Murphy 2018). Therefore, qualitative studies, in the past, have managed to contribute a great deal more, but yet there is enough room for a great number more quantitative studies, especially in combination with qualitative studies in their thesis and theory formation (as well as interpretation of their quantitative findings with the help of qualitative findings and the theories that are based on the very same). Here, in this book, we continue with this long series of research works that led to the formation and further development of the Ten Worlds Theory, by using two major methods: (1) the method of theory development, and (2) the method of quantitative social indicator analysis, or more precisely the method of quantitative spectral data analysis. First, we use the method of theory development, by adding the concepts of the wholesome dimensions of povertization and inequality (that take here the place of the concepts of decommodification and stratification, in the 1990 work of EspingAndersen), as now we can theorize welfare state development in all parts of the world, as well as their outcomes, and thus contribute to the understanding and potentially the development of social policy and welfare state systems around the world, for all people of the world. The understanding of povertization and inequality requires powerful theories, even compound theories, that are able to capture and explain the essences and workings of complex, comprehensive institutional setups, cumulative boundaries and limitations of all kinds, long-term processes and multi-faceted phenomena at the same time (cf. e.g. Mhone 2004; Awoyemi et al. 2012). This need for developing far more, and far more capable theories is shared by a great number of sciences. Therefore, in the following, we would like to heel to and perhaps internalize the words of Kurt W. Rothschild who so rightfully said: [w]e need to study and to draw on many theories (2006, cited in King 2014: 25).

In addition to using these two new grand dimensions of povertization and inequality, we will use the benefits of method triangulation to further substantiate the validity and usefulness of the Ten Worlds Theory, i.e. we will add for each dimension a quantitative spectral data analysis, that reveal once more (after the use of many dozens of case studies) the existence and diversified outcomes of these ten ideal-typical welfare regimes. A clear dispersion and hence, clear distinction, between each of different earlier set-up ideal-typical welfare regimes along the lines (grand dimensions) of povertization and inequality has been found. Hence, the unique overall features, and hence unique overall outcomes, of each individual group of ideal-typical welfare regime have come to light—and are now being able to be examined yet further. In addition to these new findings, we could for the first time now identify new collective traits of the composite group of ten ideal-typical welfare regimes. They, as

On the Distinction Between Descriptive and Explanatory Theories

37

well, support by and large the main theoretical positions and prediction to be made from, and having been made by, earlier descriptive social policy theory in particular, as well as normative social policy theory in general. The relative positions of each welfare regime on Figure 5.2 (below) are matching very well the content of earlier established and earlier consolidated descriptive ideal-typical welfare regime theory. In terms of normative social policy science, the global data analysis has demonstrated once again, and this time clearer than ever (cf. Fizsbein and Shady 2009; Horton and Gregory 2010; Horton 2011; Raudava 2013), that universal benefits rule.

That is, welfare regimes with a clear base of or affinity to universalism and/or socialism, are a great deal better off in relative terms as measured by the composite SRP indexes that measure the relative performances of each welfare regime exactly, on a large number of dimensions and sub-dimensions. This quantitative social indicator analysis has been applied for the whole of the ten worlds of welfare regimes, and for all major aspects and sub-fields of social policy—covering different kinds of povertization and inequality in terms of housing, health, gender, and economic income, and so forth.

On the Distinction Between Descriptive and Explanatory Theories It is important to note (and to understand) that welfare regimes, and ideal–typical welfare regimes in particular, are not constructed to explain everything in terms of welfare state system development. Also, they are not formulated and developed to give rankings or all kinds of recommendations for social policy making and/or its outcomes (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990; Goodin et al. 1999; Manow 2004). The original three worlds theory was partially perceived to be both explanatory and normative (evaluative and prescriptive), which was nothing more than a rather empty promise at best. The Social Democratic Welfare Regime in Scandinavia (comprising Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) is not, and not at all, designed by or established at the very beginning by the social democratic parties or any social democratic movement. It was the agrarian liberal party in Sweden that was the first driving force behind the welfare state in Sweden. The principle of universalism was not invented by the social democrats, but by a Royal Commission in 1884, five years before the initiation of the Swedish Social Democratic Workers Party (in 1889). Only since the mid-1930s, the Swedish social democratic started to get involved in national-level policymaking and governance in general. Really influential, and overtly dominant, the social democrats only become in the late 1950s, and particularly in the 1960s and beyond (Aspalter 2001a). Esping-Andersen completely neglected the influence of the Christian Democratic movement and Catholic social parties in the design invention and policy making

38

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

processes of the 1880s and beyond, in most parts of Western Central Europe, such as e.g. in Germany and Austria-Hungary, as well as all of Western Europe, especially in the early decades of the twentieth century and beyond. For this reason, the author has abstained, for historical clarity and correctness, to call the welfare regime in Continental Europe, the corporatist or the conservative welfare regime. The Catholic Center Party of Germany of the late nineteenth century, for example, was the arch enemy of Bismarck, as were the social democrats. Bismarck took social security finances to finance his war efforts, and to fight the social democrats in particular who quickly rose to become super strong, especially in the economic power house of Saxony and politically very vulnerable Berlin, but also in other parts of Germany, like e.g. Baden-Württemberg (ibid.). In the following, the author—in this book—hence abstains from trying to fully explain history, or the politics of social policy, in all of its aspects, in the nineteenth century, the twentieth century or the twenty-first century (for more on that cf. e.g. Aspalter 2020d). The purpose of welfare regime theory is—first and foremost(!)—to describe, to find commonalities and differences, to identify groups of countries, i.e. welfare state systems, that more or less resemble each other, at least in most parts. It is not, and it cannot be, that descriptive theories should be used to explain all kinds of policy developments, and all aspects thereof, or evaluate and give consultations for all kinds of welfare state systems and policy fields either.

There are in total three kinds of theories: descriptive theories, explanatory theories, and normative theories (Aspalter 2012, 2021a; Midgley 2002). One needs to be clear, what one is working on, or dealing with or working with, before randomly using (and abusing thus) e.g. this or that descriptive theory, in this case, descriptive ideal–typical welfare regime theory. The first ideal type that Esping-Andersen was (slowly, carefully) identifying back in the year 1987, was the Scandinavian welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1987b). For the sake of general comprehension, we here would like to continue use the established name of Social Democratic Welfare Regime, knowing that this is not an explanatory theory, and that it merely refers to the all-influencing dominance of social democracy in Sweden, and neighboring Scandinavian countries, from the late 1950s onwards only (cf. Aspalter 2001a). In the following, the explanation of historical developments is used for its descriptive power in the first place. This book does not set out to explain everything, e.g. explain the development of all subfields (gender plus LGBTIQ* policies, housing, social services, family policy, labor market policies and so forth) or any subfield in social policy in any welfare regime, or explain the development of this or that welfare outcome, or the future of this or that welfare regime. This is the job of following studies by other experts, who will then focus on doing exactly that, using this theory and/or other theories, to set up their own hypotheses and test them accordingly (cf. Arts 2020). For the most part, this book is meant to be a descriptive book, and historical and political context has been (in the past) provided particularly in order to understand the

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics

39

genesis and the distinctiveness of welfare regime development in this or that group of welfare state systems (cf. also Tilly and Goodin 2006), especially in the 7 new ideal–typical welfare regimes that have been identified and presented in detail earlier (Aspalter 2017b, 2019b, 2020d), in addition to the original 3 by Esping-Andersen (1990). The final two concluding/normative chapters of this book are for those who wonder how all these wanting degrees and qualities of dehumanization, povertization and inequality can be addressed properly, effectively and promptly. If history (the people at large) decides that this book can be of practical help to spur any policy and/or academic developments, and here and there guide them to the right (fruitful/helpful) directions, then this has already achieved the goal that there can be of any scientific publication (or the goal of science itself).

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics Social Democratic Welfare Regime In the Social Democratic Welfare Regime, the state controls and provides for the well-being of all citizens, by way of (a) heavy taxation, (b) highly redistributive social insurance schemes that not only focus on the poor, but, and this is essential, on the broad middle classes, and (c) government provision of a comprehensive range of social services. Peter Abrahamson has summed it up nicely: the Scandinavian countries differ from each other in some respects, and in some respects they do not distinguish themselves from other North European countries. As we have seen, the magnitude of welfare spending is not significantly bigger in Scandinavia compared to the other North European continental countries. But the structure of spending is different. On the continent the emphasis is on transfers via social insurance programmes, while in Scandinavia there is relatively more emphasis on personal social, and predominantly public, services. Hence, the role of local government in matters of taxation and welfare provision is much more pronounced in Scandinavia than anywhere else. (Abrahamson 1999b: 54)

The market and the family do not, and are not supposed to, play a role in welfare provision. The underlying philosophical and political thought that guides social policy and general public policy making is socialism, to a larger or lesser degree, which exerts itself in terms of being opposed to markets and the family in general, and as a main welfare provider (cf. Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990, 1999). The identifying regime characteristics of this welfare regime: 1. The Social Democratic Welfare Regime is marked by universalism in social security provision, for the most part at least (as significant asset- and means-tested social assistance systems do exist, and now more than ever before, i.e. ever since the mid-1990s). 2. A strong emphasis on individualism and defamilialization is stressed throughout all major parts of the welfare state, welfare administration and legislation.

40

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

3. High levels of income equality are achieved through high redistribution via the social insurance system and the taxation system, while there is a strong difference among welfare state systems that achieve high levels of wealth equality on the one hand and wealth inequality on the other (Finland and Norway are cases of the former, and Sweden and Denmark of the latter) (cf. e.g. Ventura 2018; Credit Suisse 2021). 4. High levels of gender equality are sought after, in theory and as a policy paradigm, but in reality there is still a rather huge gender gap, especially regarding the strong gender segregation on the labor market, in terms of public versus private employment (cf. e.g. Land 1978; Stenmark 2010; Evertsson 2014; Esping-Andersen 2016; Elkjær Sørensen 2019; Soergel 2020; Mustosmäki 2021). The one thing e.g. Sweden has to show for is its preferential employment policy of women particularly in local government jobs or jobs in government owned institutions (hospitals, schools, kindergartens, police, social service institutions, etc.). This is a demonstrative case that works, towards a certain end, and for a certain purpose. But, this kind of policy is a gender-segregating policy, it is not designed to bring about real—i.e. full (‘absolutely equal’)—gender equality. Gender equality has many avenues, be it on the labor market or at home (cf. e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990, 2016; Leira 1993, 2002; Nichols-Casebolt et al. 1994; Eydal and Rostgaard 2015; Eydal et al. 2015; Hakovirta and Eydal 2020; Dørum 2020). 5. There is principal emphasis on public investment in the education and the health care system (i.e. a Scandinavian version of welfare productivism). 6. A strong emphasis on active labor market policies has become the long-term strategy of policy makers. 7. Social service provision is comprehensive, financed and provided by the government (local governments) at the same time. 8. Asset- and means-tested social assistance programs serve in general an auxiliary role in welfare provision. 9. With the maturing of post-industrial and now post-post industrial society (i.e. Second Modernity and Third Modernity respectively, cf. Beck 1992, 1999; Aspalter 2020c) youth unemployment and unemployment of young adults has become systemic, ever since the 1990s (cf. Aspalter 2020c; Hort 2014a, b; Palme 2017; TE 2020).

Christian Democratic Welfare Regime When it comes to the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime, the state controls welfare provision, mainly through regulation, but also provision. Main means for welfare provision is mandatory social insurance with contribution-based entitlements, with subsidiary support of asset- and means-testing. The degree of decommodification is high, higher than expected, due to social insurance regulations (e.g. with the pension benefit formula, but also widow and widower pensions, etc.), as well as redistribution by way of laws (e.g. divorce law, labor law, and legislated social benefits, such

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics

41

as maternity benefits and family allowances for each child). Family is the main unit for redistribution, via social insurance and other state mechanisms, that is, the family status one has is often a main base for getting (or not getting) welfare or social insurance entitlements, and for getting a larger or smaller amount of state redistribution, as well as social insurance redistribution. The principle of subsidiarity in theory is strong, in practice however very much watered down, due to the effects of heavy social insurance system subsidies by the state, as well as heavy overall state redistribution (also within-state and regional redistribution) combined with heavy total taxation levels. There is a strong dualism of especially how, but also how much, benefit entitlements are catered to women, due to (a) the strong adverse effects of social insurance systems for women in general, (b) their disadvantaged position in the labor market in general (and especially in the past), and (c) the stigmatizing and poverty enhancing effects of (meagre, mean and stingy) means-tested social assistance systems that are mostly catered to women’s welfare needs (particularly single mothers) (cf. esp. e.g. Pascall 1986; Sainsbury 1993, 1994, 1999; Scheiwe 1994). On a one-by-one basis, the regime characteristics of this welfare regime: 1. The Christian Democratic Welfare Regime is built around, and functions around, division-based/Bismarckian social insurance systems (cf. also Titmuss 1974), i.e. occupationally and regionally divided social insurance systems that aim to avoid social redistribution among different regions and among different status groups. 2. Paired with this emphasis on mandatory public social insurance, is a strong focus on asset- and means-tested social assistance (AMTs) provision, for those whose problems are not covered by these social insurance programs. These AMTs however create more and prolong poverty, while they are also heightening the severity thereof (Midgley and Aspalter 2017). Hence, a perpetual dual system of social security provision upholds a class society, where the better-off parts of society are covered by good (based on their records and former contributions) social insurance coverage and the rest is dealt with, top down, poverty increasing and cementing social assistance benefits. This is also the main dilemma for women, who find themselves for the very most part on the wrong end of this dichotomy (cf. e.g. Pascall 1986, 2008; Sainsbury 1993, 1994, 1999; Scheiwe 1994; Orloff 1996; Kingfisher 1996, 2002). 3. Family status is being emphasized wherever possible in the welfare state system, particularly in taxation but also with regard to social insurance and social assistance entitlements (cf. Esping-Andersen 1999). 4. This welfare regime does in general not so bad in terms of equality, due to the overall high level of benefits (regardless of how entitlements are obtained). Income equality is rather high, but the results for wealth equality are mixed (cf. e.g. Ventura 2018; Credit Suisse 2021). 5. Also here, we have a strong emphasis on productive social welfare, especially in education, but also health care in terms of government budget provisions. 6. Active labor market policies are also an accompanying element of social policy to keep production and the economy running.

42

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

7. The Catholic social teachings of the past, and the past and current strong involvement of the Church in social service, health care and education provision, have prompted the government to honor the principle of subsidiarity in terms of social service provision, and let NGOs and the Church run and/or be part of this segment of the welfare state provision. 8. Youth unemployment is high, with strong exceptions particularly in the past (in Western Central Europe) (cf. Aspalter 2020c; Gerven-Haanpää 2016; Chevalier and Palier 2017; Bonvin and Dahmen 2017; Guillén and Pavolini 2017; Hinrichs 2017; Clegg 2019; Petmesidou 2019; Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2019; TE 2020).

Neoliberal Welfare Regime In the world of the Neoliberal Welfare Regime, the market dominates everything in welfare provision, with subsidiary support of NGOs and the state—particularly through asset- and means-tested benefits and services. The burden of welfare provision is given to the family and the individual themselves. The principle of subsidiarity is a founding principle of e.g. the United States (cf. Donati 2009), and interpreted and practiced in a much more stringent, extreme (i.e. stingy) manner when it comes to welfare provision by the state. The number one welfare and governance philosophy is based on classical liberal economic thought, and particularly modern neoliberal interpretations thereof, including e.g. the recent invention and fictious idea of “trickledown economics”, i.e. it is good to have many rich people, somehow the wealth will spread to the rest of the population (which of course it will not, but instead continue to concentrate in the hands of the wealthy). In terms of actual benefits and support received and in terms of hardship directly caused by the welfare state system (see e.g. the enforced extreme-low-wage workfare regime), this is the worst welfare regime for women, among the original three welfare regimes identified by Esping-Andersen (cf. esp. e.g. Fraser and Gordon 1994; Bradshaw et al. 1996; Kingfisher 1996, 2002; O’Connor et al. 1999; and esp. Ward 2015). While there are strong differences, the commonalities are yet much stronger in this welfare regime: 1. Incompleteness is the least common denominator of social security systems in the Neoliberal Welfare Regime. Some of their main columns, mostly social insurance systems, are just missing, or have been starved, cut or ill-conceived, or condemned for meaninglessness (good examples here are e.g. the UK pension system or the US health care system). 2. More important yet is the all-dominating focus on asset- and means-testing in social welfare and social service provision, it serves as a main means for oppression of the poor and women alike (cf. e.g. Guerda and Varzi 2002; Kingfisher 1996, 2002; Abramovitz 1985, 1996; Fraser and Gordon 1994). 3. Paired with that is a newly emphasized focus on workfare programs, which all go back to the Australian Working Nation Program in 1994 (cf. Kinnear 2003; Jose and Burgess 2005; Saunders 2005), as it has caused subsequently a chain

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics

4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

9.

43

reaction of extreme-low-wage workfare programs being established around the world. There is generally speaking both large income inequality and large wealth inequality (cf. e.g. Ventura 2018; Credit Suisse 2021). As a result of all this, there are significantly higher rates of poverty than in any other country at this level of economic development. On the contrary to the other two original welfare regimes, the Neoliberal Welfare Regime is deliberately enforcing an absence of public social investment in education and health care (also as a means of oppression of the poor, the working, and the lower middle classes). Of course, this regime is a staunch opponent of active labor market policies. There are lower levels of vertical redistribution due to regressive taxation (cf. Howard 1993, 1999) and/or only partial coverage of the population by Bismarckian social insurance (especially in the US). Private welfare organizations carry the brunt of social welfare services, without large-scale public funding, mostly relying on religious organizations and private donations for their funding (cf. Aspalter 2020c; Deeming 2013; Abrahamson 2017b; Mendes 2017; Taylor and Powell 2017; Bochel 2019; Cox 2019).

Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime In East Asia, in the realm of the Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime, the philosophy of conservative social policy has expressed itself in delaying welfare state extension, and in minimizing financial welfare commitments by the state, or at least limiting financial welfare commitment by the state to productive forms of social investment in education and health care (and here and there housing provision and/or housing financing, especially in Singapore, but also Mainland China and Hong Kong) (Aspalter 2006a; Holiday 2000). Due to rising democratization on the one hand, or rising needs for political support and legitimacy on the other, the minimization of overall welfare commitments failed in practice over time, while the delay of and the implementation of a special economy-friendly design of social welfare provision succeeded in general. The focus on productive welfare is not unique in all of East Asia, in global comparison, but stands out quite a bit within the regional welfare paradigm in terms of relative weight (cf. Aspalter 2023a). The overall institutions in providing occupation-based and/or occupation-financed social security benefits do vary from in general Bismarckian insurance systems on the one hand, to provident fund systems (i.e. individual savings accounts) on the other. While Mainland China, Taiwan and (recently as well) Singapore have both, Malaysia, Hong Kong and (recently also) Macao, focus on the later. But the overall ideology and governance philosophy of conservative and family-oriented social policy are strongly shared across the region. The family still trumps the state in overall welfare provision, but the state is catching up quickly in terms of its welfare commitments and more and more weaves into the fabric of welfare state institutions universal entitlements—as

44

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

a new means of social investment in social harmony in particular, but also social and economic development in general (Aspalter 2006a, 2023a). This fourth world of welfare regime has its own, based on empirical reality, regime characteristics: 1. The Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime across all parts of East Asia (north and south) is marked by work-oriented social security systems with full coverage in terms of risks covered. There are Bismarckian insurance systems, as well as provident fund systems, while universal, and rather universalized, health care systems are also on the rise. 2. In general, in recent decades, there is an increasing importance of universalism in social security provision, including social assistance and social service programs. 3. Yet another key ingredient of social security systems in this region are assetand means-tested social assistance systems, which is a clear expression of conservatism in the region. 4. There is a clear-cut strategy of supporting social development, and with it economic development, by investing in education, health care and (in some cases) housing. That is the government invests in public education provision and financing; public health care provision and/or public health care financing, plus here and there largely strong regulation of, and tax policies for, and sometimes public provision in the housing sector. 5. Direct vertical redistribution is deemphasized, while indirect redistribution (under the umbrella of social investments) is rather flourishing. 6. There is relatively (and sometimes absolutely) high wealth equality (cf. e.g. Ventura 2018; Credit Suisse 2021), while income equality hovers by and large at moderate levels. 7. Governments choose by and large passive labor market policies (except for South Korea). 8. Private providers dominate social service provision (mostly also with a strong prevalence of religious welfare NGOs). 9. Low rates of unemployment are common, in comparison (cf. Aspalter 2020c, 2023a; TE 2020; Teo 2017; Lee 2017; Kim and Hießl 2017; Aspalter and Liu 2017; Ramesh 2000, 2004; Holiday 2000).

Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime While historically Latin America is also home to some of the most-early developed welfare state systems in the world, after having been an integral part of the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime (cf. Aspalter 2020c; Barrientos and Powell 2021), a new era started with the assassination of Chilean socialist President Allende in 1973 (by US-backed/US-led forces, staging it to be a suicide, Vergara and Warren 2011). The United States, in its Cold-War mentality and with its Cold-War political economy, forced upon more and more Latin American countries the ideas of neoliberalism, and with it the Washington Consensus in welfare state system provision (cf. ibid.). The resulting transition created a new welfare regime, the Anti-Welfare

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics

45

Conservative Welfare Regime, that combines (a) by design, not by default, unfinished Bismarckian social security systems, that create regressive welfare distribution, subsidizing e.g. government employee pensions in particular and urban middle class-based social insurance systems in general with general taxation income, with (b) a very complex, but very stingy, asset- and means-tested social assistance system for the masses of the poor—thus creating a dualized social security system. Social security reforms, subsequently, added mandatory private social security elements to the existing social insurance systems, replacing them in many cases to a greater or smaller degree (cf. Mesa-Lago 2003, 2008, 2013; Aspalter 2011). Especially the more or less developed countries up and down in Latin America have evolved in the last couple of decades to become like this: 1. The Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime features a mix of exclusionary Bismarckian social insurance systems that provide only partial population coverage, mandatory and voluntary private insurance system, and especially so-called mandatory individual accounts (cf. e.g. Huber and Bogliaccini 2010; Mesa-Lago 2013; ISSA 2021). 2. A key characteristic of social conservatism here is the extremely high degree of fragmentation (and thus marginalization) of the social assistance and the social service system. 3. In addition, there is a strong emphasis on assets- and means-testing (incl. proxy asset- and means-testing, which has the same poverty increasing and cementing effects), where the state is managing (administering) poverty, not to solve it, but to control the masses of the poor. 4. The above result in the highest net income and net wealth inequalities in the world (apart from Africa, cf. e.g. Ventura 2018; Credit Suisse 2021). 5. Social investment paradigm in education and health care, for the most part, is not emphasized. 6. Passive and not active labor market policies rule. 7. Religious NGOs carry the brunt of catering to needs for social services. 8. There are desolate housing conditions for the poor, made visible particularly by the development of slum areas and backward and depressed parts of the country (cf. e.g. Aspalter 2017d, 2020c; Mesa-Lago 2008, 2013; Hujo and Rulli 2014; Garay 2016; Martínez 2017; Borzutzky and Hyde 2017; Lloyd-Sherlock 2019; Barrientos and Powell 2021).

Slightly Universal Welfare Regime In South Asia, particularly in Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh, a unique welfare regime evolved over time, the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime. The historical faint socialist roots of these three republics in the South of Asia, eventually turned into some sort of universal provision of welfare of different kinds. Sri Lanka was the very first investor in social development, with a relative strong support of its education and health care systems. India, and recently also Bangladesh, followed in pushing for

46

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

more social welfare provision. The systems applied though are highly fragmented across the board. Ever more public finances are going e.g. into the provision of welfare, in a wide spectrum of fields, including: public food distribution systems, three daily school lunches, universal education, universal provision and a universal right to free medicine as well as employment to some very significant extent (cf. e.g. Ranaweera 2008; Aspalter 2017c, 2021b). With rapid developments at the dawn of this new century particularly in India, the by far largest country in the region, one can talk about a new welfare regime at the southern tip of Asia, and elsewhere: 1. The Slightly Universal Rudimentary Welfare Regime in South Asia in general offers only small-scale social security systems in terms of population coverage, as well as benefit entitlements. 2. There are lively developments in the area of ‘unconventional’ universal social security programs, e.g. focusing on basic human needs, such as food security, provision of free-of-charge medicine, and rather universal access to employment. 3. Governments in the region, now to a greater degree (apart from Sri Lanka, which is the early leader in this regard), focus more and more on extending health care provision, as well as developing the education system. 4. There are still extremely high levels income and wealth inequality (cf. e.g. Ventura 2018; Credit Suisse 2021). 5. Paired with extremely high levels of poverty throughout the region (apart from Sri Lanka). 6. In general, mortality rates are still relatively very high, showing however a strong downward trend (WHS 2022). 7. One of the largest problems are appalling housing and sanitary conditions. 8. In addition, we find here a super high fragmentation of social programs, regarding social assistance system as well as social service systems. 9. Social services, for the very most part, are provided by religious NGOs and the local governments (like e.g. the Panchayati Raj in India, etc.), in addition to a wide range of state-wide and country-wide programs that are funded by state governments and/or the central government (cf. Aspalter 2003d, 2017c, 2019a, 2020a; Pellissery and Sasidhar 2019; Singh 2008, 2013; Ranaweera 2008; Sarker 2008; Kumar 2005).

Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime Further to the north, in most parts of the former Soviet Union, particularly e.g. the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus, a new Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime has crystallized in the early 2000s. Limitations of political will paired with limitations of public finances led to the establishment of partial welfare state systems, with a special focus on only certain elected fields of social policy. Good examples of these special, selected focuses that are given clear preferential status are e.g. pensions and child welfare policy in Russia, or health care policy and health care provision in Kazakhstan. The rest of the welfare state

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics

47

system is being starved and purposefully neglected (in practice), especially in terms of financing. While in the early to mid-1990s, neoliberalism was resorted to in welfare politics, the state is slowly and very selectively clamping back its way into welfare state regulation and provision (cf. e.g. Dashkina 2008; Amagoh 2017; Kainu et al. 2017; UKW 2018; Hort and Zakharov 2019; Verulava and Asatiani 2020; Kivinen 2021). The fall of the Soviet Union, with the interlude of a radical neoliberal period in the early 1990s (cf. Deacon 1992; Standing 1996), saw eventually the formation of a new welfare regime (in most parts of the former Soviet Union at least): 1. The Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime is marked by a renewed echo of some socialist ideas with regard to social security systems, especially e.g. solidarity with pensioners. 2. Welfare state system finances are deprived of anything more than an absolute lifeline, i.e. they are held to a minimum. 3. Because of that, a particular welfare modus became dominant, one that selected a few indispensable areas of welfare state provision, e.g. pension or prenatal family policies, and more or less condemned the rest of it to a very meager existence (if not oblivion). 4. Here, what stands out in global comparison, there are (still) in relative terms very low life expectancies (they did improve however significantly in the past). 5. There remain very high levels of poverty, which come together with 6. high levels of income and wealth inequality. 7. The state still serves as the main social service and welfare provider, in the absence of strong NGOs. 8. At last, there is a very positive outcome (of decade-long socialism), that of a very high homeownership rate in global comparison, which is very positive indeed (cf. Aspalter 2019a, 2020a; Verulava and Asatiani 2020; UKW 2020; Hort and Zakharov 2019; Kainu et al. 2017; Amagoh 2017; Cook 2007a, b, 2010; Avdeyeva 2011; Cerami and Vanhuysse 2009; Dashkina 2008).

Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime In the rich countries of the Middle East, the oil- and gas-exporting countries plus Israel, a unique welfare regime developed over the past decades, the Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime. It is one that emphasizes not only citizenship versus residency, but more so also ethnicity of certain groups, and even distinctions among different groups of the same ethnicity (based e.g. on geographic origin). Extremely polarizing multiple welfare benefit entitlements for different—more or less or not privileged (more or less or completely socially excluded)—ethnicities of the population are unique worldwide, as they are in essence inhumane, and unethical, but it seems politically advantageous for the groups in power, i.e. the economic and political elites. From close up these welfare state systems are for sure quite differential, but from an ideal–typical perspective an exclusion-based welfare regime is common to all

48

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

these countries (the six gulf states plus Israel). In addition, a strong emphasis is given to Bismarckian social insurance systems, plus a strong role of public payouts (from national oil and gas income for the privileged ‘local’ population throughout the oil and gas-exporting gulf states ; cf. e.g. Dixon 1987b; Rosenhek 2003; Aldosary et al. 2008a, b; Craven 2015; Abrahamson 2017a; Gal 2017; Jawad and Gal 2019). Hence, there is a special welfare regime built around the distinction of belonging to this or that ethnicity, and having a local residency or permanent citizenship: 1. The Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime centers around the social exclusion of certain parts of the (permanent) population from social welfare entitlements all together, or to a certain degree depending on which group one ‘belongs’ to (i.e. is categorized in). 2. There is a strong focus on highly developed Bismarckian social insurance systems (modelled after the German system in the past for the very most part). 3. Countries throughout this welfare regime have come to rely heavily on a foreign workforce, which in some cases make up the majority of the population (who are generally excluded from the welfare state system in place). 4. One can find also a great deal of gender segregation, which is based on dominant cultural and religious believes and paradigms. 5. On top, even among the ‘privileged’ (so-called ‘local’ or ‘native’) populations, a very high degree of wealth and income inequality is common (Alvaredo et al. 2018). 6. In addition, however, there is strong public interest in investing in education and health care (to maintain or bolster political legitimacy of the ruling regimes or elites). 7. One of the largest problems that countries in this region face is massive youth unemployment (due to cultural peculiarities, as well as social legacies). 8. Welfare and social service provision rests mainly on the shoulders of religious NGOs (cf. Aspalter 2019a, 2020a; Jawad and Gal 2019; Abrahamson 2017a; Gal 2010, 2017; Craven 2015; Aldosary et al. 2008a, b; and especially Rosenhek 2003).

Ultra Rudimentary Welfare Regime In the non-British former colonies of Africa (from the north to the south), the Bismarckian roots of establishing occupationally divided and geographically limited (to mostly the capital city, or major cities) never evolved into any kind of full-fledged welfare state system, and that is on purpose (not by default) (cf. e.g. Dembele 2012; Miller 2007; Ahadzie et al. 2006). This fact saw the development of a unique welfare regime across most parts of Africa, the Ultra Rudimentary Welfare Regime. Based on the outcome-analysis below in particular the richer northern African rim of formerly Continental European Colonies—Cabo Verde, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunesia—can be seen to have left the African Ultra Rudimentary Welfare Regime. As they are moving (i.e. slowly) towards their former mother countries in Europe, also in terms

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics

49

of welfare set-up and outcomes, they are expected to increasingly share traits of their formerly mother countries. In general, all non-British colonies were seen by and large as integral parts of their Colonial mother countries by the French, the German, the Belgium, the Portuguese and the Italian governments. The British territories were not viewed and treated in the same way, resulting in a much more diverse, and hence globally uncoordinated, development of their welfare state systems in place (cf. e.g. esp. Ahadzie et al. 2006). After independence, former British colonies often purposefully set on the road of learning from or turning to other countries for policy and development paradigms, i.e. the purposefully broke away from their own traditional policy paths (Eze 2020, cf. also Josephson 2017; Seekings and Nattrass 2015; Kaseke 2011; Nthomang 2007; HT 2007; Seekings 2006). In the parts of Africa formerly controlled by Continental European countries (plus mostly independent Liberia, plus Haiti on the other side of the Atlantic), the welfare regime is insular, and highly fragmented and extremely rudimentary when it comes to the establishment welfare programs for the general masses, be it the working classes in the cities, or the vast rural population. The situation is worst in most welfare related aspects from a global comparison, that is including, mortality rates, health conditions in general, housing and sanitary conditions, unemployment and underemployment, and particularly also food and water security (cf. e.g. Cerami 2013; Mkandawire 2015). The perhaps most neglected continent in general, but also in comparative social policy in particular, is Africa. It however is home to one of the largest (in terms of territory, in terms of population, too, as well as in terms of number of countries included) welfare regimes in the world: 1. The Ultra-Rudimentary Welfare Regime feature by and large Bismarckian social insurance systems, but only covering a very small segment of society (the urban middle class and public servants). 2. The majority of the population, and especially the informal sector worker and the rural populations, are left out any formal social security system, they are left to fend for themselves (cf. Cerami 2013; Miller 2007; Dixon 1987a). 3. Mortality rates here are typically the highest in the world, that includes infant, child, maternity and overall mortality (WHS 2022). 4. There are also highest levels of wealth and income inequalities to be found in this region (Assouad 2018). 5. Absolute and relative poverty are also the highest in the world (cf. e.g. Ventura 2018; Credit Suisse 2021). 6. And, so are the levels of youth unemployment, underemployment and overall unemployment (Ighobor 2017; Miller 2007). 7. Housing and sanitation conditions, as well, are the worst when compared to other ideal–typical welfare regimes. 8. There is a great degree of fragmentation of social welfare and social service programs, which makes their coordination, as well as their overall effectiveness and efficiency, very difficult if not impossible to achieve.

50

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

9. Social welfare services and other social services are delivered especially by INGOs and IGOs, plus private, religious NGOs (cf. Aspalter 2020a; Abrahamson 2017a; Mkandawire 2015; Cerami 2013; Adésínà 2007; Adésínà et al. 2006; Dixon 1987a; and especially Miller 2007; ISSA 2021).

Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime Originally envisioned by Esping-Andersen as one possible fourth ideal type (EspingAndersen 1987), the Socialist or Communist Welfare Regime for the very most part has not changed ever since the 1980s, apart from the fact that most member countries chose to sidestep and make fundamental changes to their own welfare state systems. This is true with former Soviet republics, as well as China and Vietnam. Cuba is the only country (apart from any failed state, or close-to-failed states) left in the Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime. Despite recent changes in e.g. the newly invented housing market (however being still very tiny), all is as it was. Health care, education and work are given and financed exclusively by the state, and so are all social services. Mortality rates, especially child and U5 mortality rates, are rather—surprisingly perhaps, but for sure very significantly—very low, even lower than that of the United States (WHS 2022). Education system is achieving relatively high standards. All this is remarkable, given the circumstances of the severe economic sanctions imposed by the United States. Housing standards are low, but housing ownership rate is beyond 90% (cf. e.g. Mesa-Lago et al. 2003; Mesa-Lago 2017). Cuba, the last system standing, refers to historically the largest (people-wise and area-wise) welfare regime in the world, which now is a thing of the past. Yet, the welfare regime is also a classical, and high on Esping-Andersen’s mind in 1987 (Esping-Andersen 1987a), where he however decided to sort out any socialist model or country, and instead only focus on capitalist countries exclusively (hence, the wording ‘welfare capitalism’ in his famous 1990s book). Nevertheless, it is very much worth studying this type of welfare regime: 1. 2.

3.

4. 5.

The Socialist/Communist Universal Welfare Regime offers universal employment and universal income security—yet, at extremely low levels of income. Another landmark of this system are its universal health care services featuring a high number of highly trained doctors and nurses. This health care system is however paired with widespread deterioration of the physical health care infrastructure, i.e. buildings and equipment, due to lack of funding and lack of economic strength of the country. As a direct result of this, infant and child mortality rates in Cuba are among the very lowest in the developing world, even outperforming leading industrial countries of the West (i.e. the child mortality rate is 5 in Cuba compared to 7 in the United States). There is free-of-charge universal education, and extremely high net income and wealth equality.

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics

51

6.

Yet, as a direct result of economic sanctions and the workings (i.e. the nonfunctioning) of the communist economy, there is high relative poverty among the entire population. 7. This socialist system features a homeownership rate that is still among the highest in the world (over 90%). 8. Housing conditions on the other hand are generally poor. 9. The unemployment rate, due to the workings of guaranteed employment in any communist system, is among the lowest in the world. 10. Last but not least, social welfare and other social services are well developed and directly provided by the state (cf. Aspalter 2019a, 2020a; WHS 2022; TE 2020; Chepkemoi 2017; Mesa Lago 2017; Mesa Lago et al. 2013).

The Overall Picture When always keeping in mind that welfare state systems are changing, they are alive (and hence change), we can work with this (above) tenfold classification of welfare regimes that is applying a high-flying bird’s view and perspective (i.e. that of Weberian ideal types). The journey of classifications is not the goal of classifications. The real job is to test and apply, and to set up new hypotheses along the way for further scientific inquiry. As time progresses (Pierson 2004; Bonoli 2007), the theory of ideal typical welfare regimes, as it is conceived and carried out in our case here, needs always be checked against current developments and more abrupt changes here and there, and that in every country or region of the world. This is the picture of ideal–typical welfare regimes across all continents as of the year 2022. Changes will occur, and the usually, for the very most part, occur very slowly (as is the nature and purpose of ideal typical welfare regimes, in contrast to real-typical welfare regimes—that do not apply Weberian ideal types, i.e. the low-flying bird’s analyses). The broad international coverage, and the long historical-oriented perspective, of ideal types in comparative social policy theory, thus, have create advantages, not only for scholars, but even more so for all kinds of studends of social policy and/or welfare state systems around the globe, as well as for all government officers and practicing social policy professionals (policymakers, administrators, consultants, and scholars alike). Table 3.1 had to be built on many dozens of in-depth case studies of dozens of experts around the world. A quick handling of numerical data here or there (e.g. looking only at two or three variables, or a non-thorough cluster analysis) does not do justice to the needs of science, to provide useful and meaningful knowledge (findings, conclusions and, of course, theories). Therefore, the global data analysis below is building on these numerous findings of numerous world-leading experts (as presented in Table 3.1). As noted earlier, the main findings represented in Table 3.1 (of having ten ideal–typical welfare regimes), hence, are not the outcome of numerical data analysis below, but the enabling founding step for analyzing global data in the first place. The tenfold classification here, however, has not only withhold

52

3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

the test of additional quantitative empirical analysis below, but was also strengthened in is clarity, width, depth and robustness. As to the membership of countries in each ideal–typical welfare regime, in Table 3.1, they have been built on the findings of the global data analysis, for those countries that were not determined and/or not included in earlier analyses. Thus, the membership of each welfare regime, have been extended significantly, due to the additional quantitative data analyses, and the power of comparing now welfare state systems on a one-to-one basis (using dozens of variables and a higher number of dimensions) by using the Standardized Relative Performance (SRP) Index (see below). For further expositions of the ten welfare regimes, one can consult the earlier studies of Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: An Ideal–Typical Perspective, in the Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems (Aspalter 2017a), as well as Ten Worlds of Welfare Regimes in Ideal-Types in Comparative Social Policy (Aspalter 2020d). For East Asia, The East Asian Welfare Model may come in handy (Aspalter 2006a), and so is The Development of Ideal–Typical Welfare Regime Theory for Central and South America (Aspalter 2011).

2 The ideal–typical Christian Democratic Welfare Regime Based on Christian democratic principles of subsidiarity and solidarity (developed by Catholic Social Teachings in the 1850s, by the Bishop of Mainz, Freiherr Wilhelm v. Ketteler) and later on Social Democratic support of welfare state extension; mostly division-based/Bismarckian social insurance; social services are provided principally by NGOs (esp. by Church organizations), paired with asset- and means-tested social assistance systems Performative social rights

1

The ideal–typical Social Democratic Welfare Regime

Based on initially social-liberal, later on, social democratic ideas of universal social insurance and universal social services; with special emphasis giving to women employment in the public sector (“soft economy” jobs), social services are provided principally by the state, paired since recently also with assetand means-tested social assistance systems

Universal social rights

Main welfare ideology

Type of social rights

Table 3.1 The Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds of Welfare Regimes (part 1) 3

Clientelistic social rights

A predominant focus on assetand means-tested social assistance and services, paired with limited coverage by mostly social insurance systems (either Bismarckian or Beveridgean); social services are provided principally by NGOs (especially by Church organizations), and by and large an emphasis on punitive social policies

The ideal–typical Neoliberal Welfare Regime

4

Regulative social rights

A welfare model, that is mostly conservative, but anti-welfare in nature. Social insurance systems (mostly Bismarckian) are being used to support the upper and upper middle classes and to shield them from redistribution; also a great degree of privatization of social security institutions (largely private pensions funds and private health insurance systems), paired with non-concerted set of individual welfare programs across the board, especially AMT-based Conditional Cash Transfer systems

The ideal–typical Anti-Welfare conservative Welfare Regime

5

(continued)

Productive social rights

Mostly Conservative parties (or Communist parties pursuing Conservative real politics) reluctantly give in and investing heavily in health care, education and work-based social security systems (mostly social insurance in the north and more provident fund systems in the south), universal systems and universalization of existing systems are on the advance, social services are provided principally by NGOs, but in most cases to a large extent funded by the government

The ideal–typical Pro-Welfare conservative Welfare Regime

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics 53

3

Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia

Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Iceland

Countries/regions United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United Kingdom

Strong

Weak

Strong Weak

Weak

Strong

Family

Individual

Strong

Strong Weak

Strong

Weak

Market

Weak

The ideal–typical Neoliberal Welfare Regime

State

Emphasis on:

2 The ideal–typical Christian Democratic Welfare Regime

1

The ideal–typical Social Democratic Welfare Regime

Table 3.1 (continued) 4

Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Trinidad & Tobago, Surinam

Weak

Strong

Increasing

Decreasing

The ideal–typical Anti-Welfare conservative Welfare Regime

5

(continued)

Mainland China, Macau, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore (Mongolia and Indonesia are promising candidates to fully join this group)

Weak

Strong

Decreasing

Increasing

The ideal–typical Pro-Welfare conservative Welfare Regime

54 3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

Slightly universal social rights

Type of social rights

Countries/regions Bangladesh, Bhutan, Fiji, India, Mauritius, Nepal, Sri Lanka

Slight echo of socialistic ideas being transformed into first national universal social welfare programs (food, medicine, and employment programs), very limited social security provision for a very small group of the population, paired with non-concerted set of individual welfare programs across the board; a strong role is played by NGOs in providing social welfare services and benefits, and a very high degree of fragmentation of social assistance and welfare programs

Main welfare ideology

Russian Federation, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan

Selective rudimentary social rights

Strong echo of socialistic ideas paired with social insurance systems, large home-ownership rate, special attention to selected social policy fields, such as, child and family welfare (prenatal family policies) and welfare to the elder population (esp. pensions) in the Russian Federation or health care in Kazakhstan; and a relatively limited role of NGOs in social service provision

Cuba

Full universal social rights

Free universal provision of public social services to all the population, very high home-ownership rate, relatively high social development outcomes (very low infant and U5 mortality rates, lower than that of the USA), and lowest levels of inequality in terms of net income and wealth distribution in the world

8 The ideal–typical Communist/Socialist Universal Welfare Regime

7

The ideal–typical Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime

6

The ideal–typical Slightly Universal Welfare Regime

Table 3.1 (continued) 9

Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel

Social rights Based on ethnic origins

Mostly free provision of social services and extended systems of social insurance (Bismarckian systems) mostly for only one part of the population, plus marginal or non-existent integration of the socially excluded parts of the society (accounting for the majority of the population in most cases), and as a result, high levels of inequality in terms of net income and wealth distribution among all people (residents) living/working in the country

The ideal–typical Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime

10

(continued)

Mauretania, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Côte D’Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin, Niger, Chad, Central African Rep., Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, DRC, Angola, Namibia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, Comoros Islands, Madagascar

Extremely rudimentary social rights

Extreme rudimentary (mostly Bismarckian) social insurance systems for a very minute part of the population, paired with non-concerted set of individual welfare programs across the board, a very high degree of fragmentation of social assistance and welfare programs, and in general highest inequality in terms of net income and wealth distribution in the world

The ideal–typical Ultra Rudimentary Welfare Regime

Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Their Regime Characteristics 55

Weak

Strong

Strong

Weak

Family

Individual

Strong

Strong

Weak

Weak

9

Weak

Strong

Weak

Strong

The ideal–typical Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime

10

Weak

Strong

Weak

Weak

The ideal–typical Ultra Rudimentary Welfare Regime

Notes WR = welfare regime; findings on the first four ideal–typical welfare regime are based on Esping-Andersen (1987a, b, 1990, 1998a, 1999), Aspalter (2001b, 2003a, b, 2005, 2006a, 2011, 2012, 2017a), Aspalter et al. (2009), Abrahamson (2008, 2017a, b), Weidenholzer and Aspalter (2008), Dashkina (2008), Cerami and Vanhuysse (2009), Aidukaite (2006, 2009), WB (2011), Cook (2007a, b, 2010), Kainu et al. (2017), Malloy (1991), Farias (2003), Mesa-Lago et al. (2003), Mesa-Lago (2003, 2008, 2017), Borzutzky and Hyde (2017), Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2014), Martínez (2017), Jawad and Gal (2019), Gal (2017), Craven (2015), Dixon (2016, 1987a, b), Aldosary et al. (2008a, b), Rosenhek (1999, 2000, 2003), Rosenhek and Shalev (2000), Dembele (2012), Miller (2007), Dostal and Naskoshi (2017), Dixon and Macarov (1992), Amagoh (2017), Hort and Zakharov (2019), Saxonberg and Sirovátka (2019), UKW (2020), Verulava and Asatiani (2020), TE (2020), ISSA (2021)

Medium

Weak

Weak

Weak

Market

Emphasis on:

State

8 The ideal–typical Communist/Socialist Universal Welfare Regime

7

The ideal–typical Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime

6

The ideal–typical Slightly Universal Welfare Regime

Table 3.1 (continued)

56 3 Ten Ideal–Typical Worlds and Their Individual Sets of Key Characteristics

Chapter 4

Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

The Dimensions of Povertization and Inequality Povertization. When people are created (i.e. conceived) and then born into a society, a village, a city, a family, a neighborhood, their chances of having a decent life, living in a decent environment, decent family, in a decent home, and being governed by a decent government with decent institutions of education, health care, and other forms of social security, as well as supporting (and not discriminating) laws, regulations, practices and cultures, are already written in stone by social statistics (cf Assunta Ricci and Scicchitano 2021; García-Fernándeza et al. 2012). Statistics decide from begin on (also during pregnancy already of course) the chances of who can get enough food, and what kind of food (nutrition: minerals, vitamins, polyphenols, etc.), the chances of getting love and care, mothers and fathers communicating with one and educating one, caring for one (also still while in the belly of one’s mother, and especially also in e.g. the first three years of one life after birth), as well as the chances to get enrolled in a good (supportive and trouble-free) kindergarten, school and getting a good first job—and of course the chances of being raised in poverty and experiencing poverty throughout one’s lifetime. This is the matrix that determines poverty of oneself, of one’s family, of one’s neighborhood, and one’s country. Poverty is not a state of being, it is a process. Scientists to better understand, and to be able to understand and handle this concept, can resort to a dynamic (i.e. based on passage through time) approach that factors in and is also based on systemic social, economic, governmental, and cultural problems (cf e.g. Aspalter 2021d; and especially also Tilly 1984, 1999, 2000a, b, 2001, 2003a, b; as well as Galbraith 1973, 1993; Piketty 2020; cf also Laslett 2000). In the same way, being conceived and born, and then in the following, having lived one’s first few years and one’s whole childhood in a society, village or city, neighborhood and family that lies or lives in what kind of welfare regime matters.

And it matters a great deal in which welfare regime one is raised up and/or living in, as the following empirical statistics of each ideal–typical welfare regime characteristic identified earlier (apart from empirical qualitative case studies by the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Aspalter, Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0_4

57

58

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

hundreds from around the world) are telling us, showing us, and proving us. In other words, our chances (not more, not less) of living decent lives, in decent families, neighborhoods, villages, cities, and countries are dependent to a very large extent on the welfare regime type one finds living oneself in. The grand dimension of povertization, as constructed in this analysis, is composed of the following dimensions: (I) access to clean water, (II) the state of hygiene conditions (as they save or destroy lives, when being able to have or not have good hygiene conditions), (III) poverty of health, and (IV) special poverty-creating and povertyexacerbating forces (homicide rate and corruption perception index) (cf e.g. WB 2019; Brady and Burton 2019). The dimension of poverty of health, due to it being so strongly intertwined with poverty and povertization, is divided yet again into three sub-dimensions: (i) poverty of health in general (mortality rates, plus low birth weight), (ii) poverty of health in terms of malnutrition (after birth), and (iii) poverty of health in terms of burden of disease (here with U5 mortality rates and tuberculosis rates representing all kinds of diseases of poverty, for children and for the general population respectively, and non-communicable diseases and mortality representing lack or poor quality of health care institutions, health policies, including health policy strategies) (cf Stevens 2004; Singh and Singh 2008; WHO 2012; Adams and Butterly 2015). Povertization, here, should be understood to stand for: the causation, maintenance, strengthening and perpetuation of indecent human outcomes and conditions in absolute terms— particularly in terms of stolen possibilities to live long, happy decent lives without sickness, pain, misery, instability and insecurity, and without social, cultural and economic institutional oppression.

While the existence of datasets for these (and the following dimensions in the next chapter) were clearly important, this turned out not to be—when looking closely enough and for a long time enough—a problem for the composition of full sets of data for (almost) all countries of all ideal–typical welfare regimes covered (all ten of them). Which for a couple of years was the greatest challenge, to find full data sets for all countries, not being affected by (1) the problem of absence of data, (2) the problem of bimodal distribution (Esping-Andersen 2000), and (3) the problem of meaninglessness in terms of difference, i.e. spread, of values given, for e.g. large parts of the data set or countries included (this is e.g. the case with e.g. youth literacy rates; and this always will be, especially in more developed countries, but also most developing countries, as there virtually all youths can read and write). To solve this problem, there was only one thing to do, to keep looking, to keep thinking. After several years of doing so, the grand dimensions povertization and inequality now have come to light. We have to work with what we have and what can possibly be useful, when we have the things we need for analysis, and for that (if possible) all countries. Social indicator analyses, i.e. outcome analyses, are difficult for the above reasons, but once one proceeds with it, no matter how long it takes, the fruits of labor can (but do not have to) be astonishingly fruitful, and meaningful that is (cf e.g. Bambra 2005, 2006; Eikemo et al. 2008a, b; Bambra et al. 2009; Bambra and Eikemo 2009; Abdul Karim

The Dimensions of Povertization and Inequality

59

et al. 2010; Kammer et al. 2012). Keeping the thought of Tom B. Bottomore (1972: 37) in mind and spinning it a bit further: good theories are fruitful theories, and accordingly, good data are fruitful, meaningful data. For data to be fruitful they have to be able to reject or support a theory or thesis, or create a new one (potentially, at least in the long run). In the following, the results are to a significant extent supporting the underlying theory; and what is more important, they also give plenty of directions and incentives to conduct new research works, be they theoretical, empirical or both. The following results may be used for explanatory purposes in later studies, or for normative purposes, and not just for descriptive purposes (welfare regime membership and change thereof, support or not support the existence of this or that ideal–typical welfare regime, etc.) however important they be, and seem to be, by themselves. Povertization is a yet seldom used term in the study of poverty, be it in sociology, social policy, social work, psychology, medical science or economics. The only key area where it did evolve to great importance was the study of two intersecting and intertwined phenomena: women’s poverty and gender inequalities (cf Folbre 1984; Abramovitz 1985, 1996; Millar and Glendenning 1989; Nichols-Casebolt et al. 1994; Jónasdóttir 1994; Swigonsky 1996; Fitzpatrick and Gomez 1997; Jónasdóttir and Jones 2008; Jónasdóttir and Ferguson 2013). The concept of welfare is used instead, meaning however different things to different people and researchers, and different things in different countries and languages altogether. In general, the connotations that the term social welfare (outside the US) brings with it are: health, prosperity and happiness. Thus, povertization is the lack of health, prosperity and happiness; or the lack of decency, in a nutshell. This now is a good starting point for the development of the concept of povertization for the purpose of this study, i.e. to capture and demonstrate the outcomes, apart from the workings and existence, of ten global ideal–typical welfare regimes, each one of them with their own sets of large meta consequences, that can be expressed and theorized, and observed empirically, in form of different grand dimension of povertization and inequality. These sets of macro-outcomes are qualitatively and quantitatively differently composed throughout the welfare regimes under scrutiny, as we can see later on in the findings of this global data analysis. Each ideal-typical welfare regime leaves behind and maintains different societal footprints, determining a child’s future even long before it is born and has taken its first breaths.

In the study of social welfare, and social policy in particular, we need to focus on the human, the people, the mothers and fathers (cf e.g. Leira 2010), the children, the grandmothers and grandfathers. We need to focus on people themselves, no matter what social class or social group they belong to, no matter what creed or orientations they have and choices they make, no matter where the live, and how they live or choose to live. Many scholars by now have (re)discovered the importance of this, by and large, neglected social policy paradigm. This human-centered paradigm is quintessential for

60

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

being effective and efficient on the one hand as social policy makers and practitioners, and for being attentive and caring, i.e. humane, compassionate and loving, at the same time. Sage (2019) has provided a helpful summary of the issue at hand. We need to refocus all old, established paradigms to fit the need to cater to people’s conditions, their material needs on the one hand and even more so their fears, hopes, despair, and chances of having a better future for themselves and especially their children—because that is even more hurting than the lack of money (cf also Dixon 2010; Mayer and Jencks 1989b). And for that reason, we can consider pushing for greater and more diverse bottom-up approaches in welfare regime analysis (cf CruzMartínez 2020), or integrate a second bottom-up perspective in conjunction with traditional institutional-oriented top-down approaches (see this book volume). As a result, any welfare state system’s purpose is to enable people “to achieve greater happiness, satisfaction, and a peaceful life” (Aspalter and Singh 2008: 2; cf Dixon 2010), but looking at the results of this global analysis below, we see that is entirely not the case. We are so far away from this goal, in most of the welfare regimes around the world. How far? With the comparative Standardized Relative Performance Index applied here, we can measure now exactly and compare exactly the extent of this distance in terms of health, happiness and peace of mind at the same time.

Welfare regime analyses should hence refocus and look at people’s outcomes much more than institutions and methods of sending them money (entitlement methods, kind of rights granted, and the ways money travels from the people to the government and then back to the people, if at all). Of course, a combined approach is always preferrable, looking at both the institutional setups and the whole empirical world as such, i.e. including the now very-to-the-point measurable empirical life outcomes of now virtually the entire earth’s population. Theoretically, we can very well rely on the theories and findings of a long set of well-established scholars from around the world, on what poverty, oppression, social exclusion, exploitative power relations—in sum, dehumanization really is—why it is, and how it works. This book, in applying the multi-method approach, employs the method of theoretical meta-analyses (cf Aspalter 2021c), which is a most important, and highly undervalued so far method, in social sciences, particularly in policy sciences, as e.g. social policy. In the following, we would like to draw onto (and not repeat) the multiple, but coherent and mutually supporting, explanatory theories of a number of great scientists, with extremely useful (and fruitful) theories. They form a compound theory or meta theory that has to be preferred over other rivalling, less powerful and less comprehensive, explanatory theories—the Theory of Super Inequality as it has been dubbed by Aspalter (2022a). When theories are not equivalent, one must be chosen over the other. The criteria for choice are functionality and comprehensiveness. (Steiner 1988: 88).

The meta theory below is an amalgamation of a number of very established and powerful theories. This compound theory here fulfills the criteria set forth by Steiner’s

The Dimensions of Povertization and Inequality

61

mandate of functional equivalence in theory development, which necessitates that one has to choose among two (or more) rivalling theories or groups of theories, when one (a) describes, (b) explains, and (c) gives better evaluation and consultation than the other (Steiner 1988: 88). The following theories form a compound theory (meta theory) that all explains all of social policy globally, and across time—especially even more so, when applied together (en group).

Michel Foucault (1975) called it the (constantly-ongoing and century-old) ‘civil war’ matrix, which is a matrix of power relations and power outcomes, where everyone fights for themselves—especially the powerful and privileged ones—and for their group, and at the same time where everyone—again, here almost exclusively the powerful and the privileged ones—fights to seize, create and horde opportunities, monopolies, one-sided financial privileges (tax exemptions, tax privileges, etc.), and all kinds of normative and executive power concentrations (cf esp. Foucault 1975, 2009, 2010, 2014; as well as Lukes 2005; Rabinow 2010; Aspalter 2022a). The privileges oneself and one’s group (or strata) has sought, created, and meticulously and constantly maintained (cf e.g. Tilly 1998; Murphy 1988; Collins 1975, 1979) also include: party member privileges, professional privileges, occupational and educational hierarchies, as well as exclusionary professional standards, testing and licensing mechanisms, hiring requirements, secret or open dress codes, codes of conduct and behavior, special language and accents used, special sport and cultural preferences, and so forth. The theory of Max Weber (2019) on the role of open and closed relationships that open or close pathways to success, give or take protection from failure. These open or closed relationships are the source of systemic exploitation on the one hand of the ones who find themselves locked outside any powerful, beneficial relationship by the ones inside the open relationships (the insiders, the well-off and powerful). A number of most influential theorists have excelled in analyzing further and spinning further the wheel of explanatory science, and setting up new subsidiary theories supporting the grand theories of Michel Foucault and Max Weber, all working on the very same topic, that is, systemic exploitation, systemic mass exclusion, oppression, alienation, and systemic control and maintenance of the masses of people (all of the working class, plus most of the middle class). These include principally e.g. Randall Collins (1975, 1979), Frank Parkin (1979), Charles Tilly (1984, 1998, 2000a, b, 2001, 2003a, b; cf Tilly and Goodin 2006), Mimi Abramovitz (1985, 1996, 2000; cf also Blau and Abramovitz 2014), Raymond Murphy (1988, 2009, 2018), Anna Jónasdóttir (1994, cf Jónasdóttir and Jones 2008; Jónasdóttir and Ferguson 2013), and Katherine Van Wormer (2004, 2008; cf also Van Wormer and Link 2015; Van Wormer et al. 2014).1 One can e.g. also use yet another very different theory to explain, identify and group different causal factors. One could use e.g. Harvey Leibenstein’s X-Inefficiency Theory, which shows also—if one adapts and is converting Leibenstein’s theory 1

Noteworthy here is also especially the recent empirical work of Thomas Piketty (2014) who is, one more, underlining the above theoretical conclusions with meticulous and rich empirical data.

62

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

(Aspalter 2021d, 2022a, cf Leibenstein 1966), from a company level to a societal level—why societies cannot perform not even close to any of their real potentials, in terms of providing welfare, freedom, health and happiness. This notion of a systemically bounded society goes, thus, far further than most of elaborations of modern-day sociology, economics, and political science alike. It however finds its equals in the teachings of e.g. Herbert Marcuse (1965, 1969) and John Kenneth Galbraith (1975, 1993) on the limited prospects of achieving a good society, sometime in the future. It shows and demonstrates the factors that are at work, all at once (they are cumulative in effect and follow-on consequences), in the constant Foucauldian civil war of the insiders versus the masses (the outsiders) (cf e.g. Piketty 2020; Nicolaisen et al. 2019; Emmenegger et al. 2012; Awoyemi et al. 2012) that cause systemic discrimination, systemic exploitation, systemic abuse and systemic neglect. The outcomes of poverty and inequality (see below) are sufficient proof for the existence of this Foucauldian matrix of highly asymmetric power relations and power institutions— plus there is the most plausible and most convincing logic applied in Foucault’s theory (and that of others). Like in mathematics, theoretical physics or economics, a most convincing logic alone is already enough proof for a theory to be fully and universally endorsed: The measuring rod … [Kurt W. Rothschild, a world-renowned economist,] used in order to assess the quality of alternative theories and doctrines [to neoclassical economic thought] was first and foremost whether they were “realistic” or not … He … relied on the judgement of the well informed observer, possessed of a knowledge of the various dimensions of the problem involved. In this regard he followed in the footsteps of Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes. (emphasis added, Kurz 2014: 95)

There are numerous scientists who apply and demonstrate the workings of these forces as described in the above grand theories of Michel Foucault and Max Weber on systemic oppression and exploitation. One just has to look for, find and read them (e.g. Katz 1986; Mayer and Jencks 1988, 1989; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Rogowski 1995; Swigonsky 1996; Beckett and Western 2001; Pritchard 2014; Schuftan 2018; IR 2019; Piketty 2014, 2015, 2020). To put it in a nutshell, the constant and century-long processes of povertization (Aspalter 2022a) engulf: (i)

property deprivation (incl. taxes, social security financing, administrative fees, fines, legal punishments, as well as comprehensive legal and administrative restrictions that prevent property accumulation), (ii) health care and education deprivation, in terms of access at all, the quality received, and the relative heavy burden in terms of costs they come along with, (iii) heavily fortified and magnified, complete asymmetric (lopsided) Foucauldian power relations, favoring and nurturing insiders at the cost of and with the multi-systemic, institutionally and culturally facilitated financial (and emotional and physical) exploitation of the masses, not just the poor and the weak, but especially them, (iv) the upkeep and increase of punishments of all kinds, financial punishments and incarceration, to keep them locked in worries, fear, despair, and poverty,

The Dimensions of Povertization and Inequality

63

as many of them, as much as possible, as long as possible (cf Piketty 2020; IR 2019; Beckett and Western 2001; Katz 1986; Foucault 1975; Oetinger 1955; and the hideous focus on locking up millions of people for as long as possible throughout the world, when knowing it is inhumane, unethical, and, on top, exacerbates problems many times over), (v) the upkeep and increase of gatekeeper systems and practices for the insider groups (one by one, or for them in general), (vi) financial exploitation of the outsiders by the insiders by means of cold progression of income taxation and cold progression of social security contributions, and especially exclusion from protection against inflation (loss of pension value, loss of income value, consumer price inflation, inflation on the housing rental markets, education inflation, etc.), as well as exclusion of the masses from opportunities of safe and highly profitable investments (e.g. property markets, financial markets, trading, etc.) (cf Weber 2019; Collins 1975, 1979; Murphy 1988; and Tilly 1998), and last but not least (vii) the upkeep and increase of social norms, as well as an ever-greater and evercomplex jungle of rules and laws, administrative requirements, complex, dehumanizing and unjust entitlement conditions, necessary permissions, unnecessary and inflated prices and fees, and so forth (ibid., plus e.g. Rogowski 1995). After this explanatory meta-analytical introductory part—an excursion into the matter of how povertization is generated and sustained—we would like again draw our attention to the main focus of our book here, the building of the descriptive ideal–typical welfare regime theory all around the globe, by way of extending its fully-theoretical-cum-fully-empirical footing. In doing so, we need next to set up our theoretically informed measuring rod of our global data analysis. At first, we will look at the different dimensions (in the sociological/methodological sense) of povertization. Then, in the following, we well do the same with the second grand dimension of inequality, and construct the very same by setting up as well a set of dimensions to measure it across the globe. We need to take note of the problem of bimodal distribution, as pointed out so importantly by Esping-Andersen (2000). That is to say, such sets of dimensions are not (never really) set in stone, of course. Other researchers are invited to change the dimensions, and then triangulate the findings presented here in their very own studies, with their very own grand dimensions, dimensions, sub-dimensions and of course variables and data sets at hand. What is perhaps not often (if not almost never) on the radar, and hence in the focus, of most researchers who (happen to) come from or are being stationed in very developed countries, e.g. in the West, is that water and toilets are fundamental to human decency, and with it welfare. These are essentials for any hardcore meaning of welfare that there can be in a person’s life, in any family, in any community around the world. Hence, our first two very fundamental (among the most important) dimensions of povertization are access to improved water sources and access to improved sanitation facilities (cf Zuev 2020; WB 2019, 2017; WHO/UNICEF 2015).

64

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

On top, understanding that there are many areas of poverty that can be determined and focused on, we here in the following deliberately focus on health, and several of its dimensions, as it is so central to our overall and daily lives, not only in the very rich developed countries and regions of the world, but also of course in the poor, neglected and exploited countries and regions. Nothing else sums up health, and health care, in all its facets that there are as mortality rates (social policy scientists, sociologists and medical scientists have to face it, and learn and work with it) (cf NASEM 2021; Bellazaire and Skinner 2019; Sun et al. 2017; Kujawska 2017; Woolf 2009; Bambra 2006; Bennett et al. 2006; Kumar and Ozdamar 2004). Here, they represent thus, as such, the general aspects of health and health care provision (and access to it, and outcomes thereof) around the world, in a most comparable and straight on fashion. The next dimensions are malnutrition, burden of diseases in general, and diseases of poverty in particular. When it comes to burden of disease, also to deal with the problem of bimodal distributions, but even more so with the nature and extent of non-communicable diseases as these are global pandemics that are causing havoc across the poor countries as much as the rich countries (WHS 2022; Pan et al. 2021; Maanasa 2021; Allen 2017), we solely choose to stick with non-communicable diseases, as they also, to a large extent, universally represent the existence and the inner workings of health care and health care delivery systems, as well as their visible/measurable outcomes that are hence easily comparable on a one-to-one basis. With diseases of poverty, there are always many choices, too, to choose from. The under 5 mortality rates are for insiders, among the very best indicators of diseases of poverty (cf WHO 2021a; Perin et al. 2021; Roser 2019; Van Malderen et al. 2019; Liang et al. 2019; Huntington 2012; Singh and Singh 2008; Masaiganah 2004; Stevens 2004), as they represent very preventable deaths of children, mostly in form of pneumonia, plus other lower respiratory diseases, and diarrheal diseases, which are for the very most part rather very direct outcomes of poverty. An additional variable used for diseases of poverty is tuberculosis incidence, as it affects mostly poor people (TB Alert 2021), with lack of malnutrition, poor housing and work conditions, limited access to health care, existence of pre-existing poor health conditions, chronic diseases and weak immune systems, etc. Having an educational dimension is very desirable for any comparative welfare analysis. But, once one digs in deeper into the subject area, one may soon realize the problem of bimodal distribution when looking at educational variables on a true (and full) world’s scale (cf Jornitz and Parreira do Amaral 2021; Hou et al. 2021; OECD 2020). Not everything that is useful and leads to success in some rich parts of the world, does work or is helpful in most other (the poor) parts of the world, where food and water, and medical care and physical safety beat other general aspects of welfare elsewhere. Not everything that provides decency for oneself, and one’s children and family in rich parts of the world can provide the very same in e.g. a complete different context of extreme poverty where lack of water, lack of food is a matter of daily survival, or not, as well as where there is war, civil war, constant violence and/or acute forms of crime and corruption.

The Dimensions of Povertization and Inequality

65

It is for these reasons that education will be part of the latter grand dimension, that of inequality, and not this one (povertization) for the reason of context, and priority of focus. The purpose of our study here is to find super meaningful representative variables and (available) data sets that, first, do disaggregate to a significant degree between all countries covered and, second, fulfill the theoretical need to be caused by welfare regimes themselves (as we are investigating the outcomes of ideal-typical welfare regimes around the world), as well as, third, may or may not (or to some degree) disaggregate between this or that welfare regime, or most welfare regimes.

Most people in well-off settings and environments cannot imagine, or understand, that what Maslow’s pyramid (Maslow 1943) implies, and means for the billions of poor people on this earth, the problems they suffer from on literally a daily basis, as well as the particular nature, extent and variety of those problems. The problem of bimodal distributions (Esping-Andersen 2000), and what is causes for global comparisons, here also comes fully to effect, and display.

The last two dimensions, crime and corruption, are also mostly not on the radar, especially in international social policy comparison. Nonetheless, they are highly consequential for the existence, as well as persistence and spread, of dire poverty around the world, for the very most of all countries and regions on earth. They are both outcomes and causes (UN 2005; Johnston 2009; Shah 2011; Thelwell 2020; WB 2021), which makes things a bit convoluted in terms of understanding it all (really all of it). But for our purpose to depict outcomes of welfare state regimes, poverty is an outcome, and there is nothing wrong with using an outcome of an outcome (i.e. a follow-on outcome). These two variables are also highly intertwined with governance, hence the inner working of how welfare regimes are set up in the first place and run and developed (or controlled and limited) over time. That is to say, crime and corruption are not only the outcomes of welfare regimes, and its outcomes, but also the outcomes of the reasons and driving forces behind the set-up and development of welfare regimes themselves. Hence, these two last variables (crime and corruption) are greatly valuable for the in front of us laying task, to disaggregate between welfare regimes, and welfare state systems, around the world, and see how it plays out (matches up, or not, and to what degree) with the ideal types of welfare regimes set up earlier (Aspalter 2017a) based on case study analyses of dozens of researchers from around the world.

66

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

Box 4.1: The Grand Dimension of Povertization and Its Composite Dimensions in the Subsequent Social Indicator Analysis THE GRAND DIMENSION OF POVERTIZATION COMPRISES: Dimension 1: Access to Clean Water Variable: Access to Improved Water Sources (% of population)2 Dimension 2: Hygiene Conditions Variable: Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities (% of population)3 Dimension 3: Poverty of Health (I) − General Variable A: Infant Mortality Rate4 Variable B: Maternal Mortality Rate5 Dimension 4: Poverty of Health (II) − Malnutrition Variable: Stunting, Below 5 Year-Olds (in %)6 Dimension 5: Poverty of Health (III) − Burden of Disease Variable A: Non-Communicable Disease (NCD) Incidence of 30–70 YearOlds (in %),7 including cardiovascular diseases, cancer, diabetes, and chronic respiratory diseases Variable B: Total NCD Mortality (of all people), per 100,000, agestandardized8

2

Data from UNICEF-WHO Joint Monitoring Program (2015); a full score of 100 was used for Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Singapore, Sweden, UAE, UK, Uruguray; for Angola and Uzbekistan other sources have been used to fill the data gap (using https://cn.bing.com). 3 Data from UNICEF-WHO Joint Monitoring Program (2015); a full score of 100 was used for Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, New Zealand, USA; for Cote D’Ivoire another source has been used. 4 Data from WHO (2021); for Iceland and Mali other sources used. 5 Data from WHS (2021); for Cote D’Ivoire another source used. 6 Data from WHS (2021); a value of 0 was used for Canada, Croatia, and Cyprus; for Turkey the proxy value of Moldova has been used (based on the similarity of these two countries’ data regarding ‘severe wasting’ and ‘wasting’ incidence). 7 Data from WHS (2021); for Korea (South) and Ukraine other sources used. 8 Data from WHO (2019); for Georgia and Singapore other sources used.

The Dimensions of Povertization and Inequality

67

Dimension 6: Poverty of Health (III) − Diseases of Poverty Variable A: Under 5 Mortality Rate9 (representing diseases of poverty, especially pneumonia, plus other lower respiratory diseases, and diarrhoeal diseases) Variable B: Tuberculosis Incidence (a disease of poverty), per 100,000 population10 Dimension 7: Crime Variable: Homicide Rate, per 100,000 population, (representing crime in general)11 Dimension 8: Corruption Variable: Corruption Perception Index (representing actual corruption)12 Inequality. The concept of povertization is an absolute concept, more than a relative concept. Death and disease, for example, are absolute events, they are not relative. On the contrary to that, the concept of inequality is more relative than absolute in nature. The fact that there is a gap or not, is determined by other people’s conditions (be they better or worse) rather than one’s own conditions, for the most part. The world one lives in, meaning the society one lives in, determines by and large if there is gap to others, i.e. if there is inequality, and how bad it is, how rampant, how widespread, and how consequential. Now, with Esping-Andersen (1989, 1990) having had introduced to us the concept of welfare regimes, and their in general strong effect on society and all people’s lives that live in a society belonging to this or that ideal-typical welfare regime, we can see that welfare regimes determine societies.

They determine how societies are set up, i.e. how their systems are set up, how their systems function, how their cultures and traditions (i.e. mores: practices, habits and customs) are set up, molded and remolded by (formal) media, social media, social experiences and communication on larger and very small (intimate) levels (cf Luhmann 1984, 1997; Aspalter 2021d; cf also Freud, 1921; Vygotsky, 1978). Of course, welfare regimes are the product of societies, but they are also driving forces behind societies, including governance, culture and communication (cf e.g. also London 2018; Esping-Andersen 2016). When welfare regimes are chiefly (while not exclusively, not by far) responsible for determining how societies, and its institutions (systems), are set up, maintained and developed 9

Data from WHO (2021); for Iceland and Mali other sources used. Data from WHS (2021); for Namibia and UAE other sources used. 11 Data from WHS (2021); for Brazil and Japan other sources used. 12 Data from Transparency International for 2020, from the website of Nations Online (2021) https:// www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/corruption-part-II.htm; for Fiji tradingeconomics.com’s data has been used. 10

68

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes over time, they are also responsible for systemic problems, such as, and very much so, inequality, and many different kinds of systemic inequalities specifically. In a few words, welfare regimes are the systems that form the systems that form inequalities.

For this reason, if we want to embrace this fact (truth) and holistic logic, the decisive role that inequalities play, we need to look at inequalities not only as outcomes of welfare regimes (or welfare, and especially the lack of it, but also the wrong kind of welfare, cf Aspalter and Teguh-Pribadi 2017a), but also and foremost as driving forces within the inner workings of welfare regime themselves—by way of entitlements, duties, lack of return on investment on retirement funds, cold progression of income taxation and social security contributions, etc. These need to be acknowledged, studied and taken care of. That is, these inequalities need to be changed and prevented by means of change that is brought upon by normative social policy. For deeper theoretical explanatory insights one can pore over the compound set of theories of Max Weber (2019), Michel Foucault (1975), Collins (1975, 1979), Frank Parkin (1979), Raymond Murphy (1988), and Charles Tilly (1998, 2000a, b, 2001, 2003a, b). Around the world, empirical studies reveal more and more the fundamental causal effect of also in particular the welfare state systems in place, on inequality and poverty at the same time, including how things are done, and what is not done (cf the investigative empirical studies of e.g. Nthomang 2007; Van der Berg, Siebrits and Lekezwa 2010; Ferreira and Robalino 2010; Kohli 2012; Reis 2012; Blunt et al. 2012; Lu et al. 2013; Laferrère 2013; Cook 2013; Esping-Andersen 2016; Du Toit 2017; London 2018; Teo 2018; Muñoz Boudet et al. 2021). Awoyemi, Oluwatayo and Oluwakemi provide very clear and commanding empirical evidence of the impact of the Colonial past, the impact of institutions and policies (and the lack thereof), the driving dehumanizing force of elites, and the neglect of the rural populations in particular: There are … reasons why inequality could have been socially embedded in Nigeria, one being the vestiges of past defective colonial economic policy. This relates to the concentration of socio-economic and other development programmes in the urban centers, where white administrators and their allies —the Nigerian elites—were found, while the rural areas, where the majority of the Nigerians lived, were neglected. Thus, the pivotal development advantages, which the urban centers and city dwellers enjoyed in terms of education, employment opportunities and health facilities (to mention a few), set the skewed structure of development. In other words, the dichotomy between the urban and rural areas with respect to poverty distribution, income inequality, unemployment and level of education in part becomes explainable. (Awoyemi et al. 2012: 4)

That is why, and let us be perfectly clear here, inequality is not a separate entity from poverty, inequality makes poverty possible, and it is—from the beginning to the end of time—the very essence of povertization. Inequality is the driving force that creates and sustains poverty.

Therefore, social policy (together with other sciences) needs to uncover the ugly truths of inequality, and with it povertization, wherever possible, whenever possible.

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis

69

There should be special full-fledged courses on undergraduate, as well graduate level that focus on one thing at a time, inequality and then povertization. We need to look for innovative ways to end once and for all the appalling inequality of billionaires hording billions on the one side, and on other side children dying of diseases of poverty, because of lack of clean drinking water and lack of enough and lack of healthy food, and mothers dying in childbirth, because they are poor—and the powerful or super-rich (as a group) do not care to actually (effectively and lastingly) change this situation.

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis Within the scope of this study, we do focus on both inequality and povertization, and that is why this is so important. Lofty abstract notions, or fantastic buzz words, do not help us understand the status quo. They will not lead us to any solutions, and through the implementation of these solutions. Rather, we need the abovementioned hands-on theories and the hands-on real-life social indicators, while knowing what life suffering, despair and pain they really express (and each number and digit of it!). The study of poverty, povertization and perhaps first and foremost inequality in all its facets— with all its hidden pathways and mechanisms, long-term and intergenerational outcomes, and follow-on outcomes—needs to move to centerstage of society (cf e.g. Piketty 2000; Corak 2013; Therborn, 2013; Behrman et al. 2017; Christophers 2018).

What we really need are dozens of Marienthal Studies, Beveridge Reports, Henderson Reports and the likes of them (Lazarsfeld et al. 1933; Beveridge 1942; Henderson 1975), these kind of studies and reports that unshackle old, deep-seated habits, stereotypes, and ways of thinking. And we need them all around the world, with broad and lasting effects (cf e.g. the in-depth works of Anne Laferrère 2013, and You Yenn Teo 2018, for two excellent and powerful contemporary examples). We need to change institutions, welfare state institutions and social policies altogether. That is our job anyway, is it not? We need to change the design and financing of social insurance/social security systems and social assistance systems—their incentive structures. We need to take away entirely any form of taxation of the poor and near-poor, and take away the burden of financing social security entirely from the poor and the near-poor—and at the same time tax much more all larger transactions and profits on capital markets, all large land-owners and land-holding firms, tax all larger international currency transactions, tax artificial intelligence and online businesses in each country, and so forth.

Then, one day in the future, a couple of months after we do all of the above, poverty in rich and medium rich countries will be a thing of the past, and sooner or later some people will start to ask “what was that?” and “how was it?” And, there will be enough money, and hopefully enough political will—and even much more importantly public will—to stamp out corruption and crime in poor countries, and to set up enough hospitals with enough doctors and nurses in all corners of the earth. Beyond a shadow of a doubt,

70

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes inequality, corruption and crime are the unheeded long-term viruses that plague humanity, our societies and our economies at the same time, and that already for thousands of years.

As the last part of this book targets normative subject matter already, it is imperative here to stick again more to descriptive analysis, descriptive theory development and the empirical testing thereof. We need to take into account that this is the second round of empirical testing of the Ten Worlds of Welfare Regime Theory. This quantitative social indicator analysis provides further proof for the validity of earlier theoretical conclusions and constructs that are themselves developed as a result of earlier qualitative empirical case studies (many dozens of times, over many years, cf Aspalter 2020c). The global data analysis here represents one next step in a series of research studies that employ the method of abduction, i.e. moving back and forth (sometimes numerous times) between theory development and empirical analysis (be it qualitative and/or quantitative in nature). Induction and deduction, thus are only partial, and repeated, elements of the method of abduction (cf e.g. Aspalter 2019a). Hence, we take with us from the above meta-analysis that inequality causes povertization, and inequality, on top, also determines the course of welfare state system development itself. Therefore, welfare state systems are both the product of inequality—and of course the causes (also by way of inaction, and wrong actions) that drive inequality—both at the same time. Inequality, here, should be understood to stand for: the state and outcomes of gaps between different groups of humans—people of different gender or different sexual orientations, different ages, different ethnic, social, economic, cultural/religious and geographic backgrounds—in terms of practical rights and opportunities, rewards, duties and punishments (incl. taxation, financing and benefits of social security systems) in general; as well as global and domestic relative poverty, inequality of wealth, inequality of (different kinds of) income in particular.

In general, inequalities all across the world are determined by gigantic historical-cum-institutional asymmetries in (Foucauldian) power relations (including economic, social, political, cultural and communicational power relations), plus asymmetrical access to and distribution of practical knowledge. The grand dimension of inequality, as constructed here, is formed by a number of underlying dimensions: (I) the global right to live gap dimension (measured in the distance of life expectancies to the leader of this group of 155 countries), (II) the gender gap dimension (which focuses on all kinds of gender inequality, in all directions), (III) wealth inequality dimension, and (IV) income inequality dimension. The latter three dimensions themselves have sub-dimensions, as they are again split up. The gender gap dimension is split up into a health and education dimension. The latter two, the wealth inequality and income inequality dimensions are both separated into a global-cum-domestic and into a purely domestic sub-dimension. Due to the overall importance of these latter six sub-dimensions, they are in the following, statistically, treated as independent dimensions, to increase their weight and thus pay tribute to their overall importance for and in people’s lives (within the context of, and for the purpose of, this particular welfare regime comparison that we

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis

71

conduct in this particular book). That is, statistically they are treated independently from one another—they are given equal weight in the overall SRP Index of the grand dimension of inequality (cf Box 4.2). A very equal society, can be just very poor, equally poor that is, which is not a good thing, not at all. That is why, we need to correct this imperfection of Gini indexes of income and wealth distributions (Osberg 2016; Clementi et al. 2019; Chitiga and Sekyere 2021), by adding a global (qualifying) dimension (perspective), by adding the relative performance in terms of GDP per capita (compared globally) when it comes to income distributions, and relative performance in terms of median wealth (also compared globally) when it comes to wealth distributions. This is necessary to correct the respective Gini Indexes, which in general would/could otherwise lead to wrong conclusions and narratives here and there (e.g. when comparing Moldova, Kazakhstan or East Timor with Sweden, or Mauretania with Switzerland, in terms of Gini Indexes of income distribution, cf below). In adding the global-cum-domestic wealth inequality and income inequality, we ensure exactly that. Box 4.2: The Grand Dimension of Inequality and Its Composite Dimensions in the Subsequent Social Indicator Analysis THE GRAND DIMENSION OF INEQUALITY COMPRISES: Dimension 1: The Global Right to Live Gap Variable A: Gap Between Life Expectancy (LE) at Birth13 and Highest Value in the World14 Variable B: Gap Between Healthy Life Expectancy (HLE) at Birth15 and Highest Value in the World16

13

Calculated from WHO (2021), Global Health Observatory data; data is standardized respective to the male and female data sets, to balance out strong gender imbalances in countries like China, India, and Viet Nam; using the formula of: ((highest value of female LE in the world − current value of female LE) + (highest value of male LE in the world − current value of male LE))/2; where LE = life exptancancy at birth. 14 Among larger countries (i.e. over 500,000 population; plus Iceland). 15 Calculated from WHS data (2021); data is standardized respective to the male and female data sets, to balance out strong gender imbalances in countries like China, India, and Viet Nam; using the formula of: ((highest value of female HLE in the world – current value of female HLE) + (highest value of male HLE in the world – current value of male HLE))/2; where HLE = healthy life exptancancy at birth. 16 Among larger countries (i.e. over 500,000 population; plus Iceland).

72

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

Dimension 2: Gender Gap (I) − Health Variable: Gender Gap Between Female and Male Life Expectancy at Birth17 (number of years) Dimension 3: Gender Gap (II) − Education Variable A: Gender Gap Between Female and Male School Net Enrolments Rates (primary education), (gap to gender equality in %)18 Variable B: Gender Gap Between Female and Male School Net Enrolments Rates (secondary education), (gap to gender equality in %)19 Dimension 4: Wealth Inequality (I) − Domestic-cum-Global Wealth Gap Variable: Ratio of Mean to Median Wealth, Adjusted for Median Wealth (in US$) per Population of Each Country, in Global Comparison (domestic-cum-global comparison of wealth distribution)20

17

Calculated from WHO (2021), Global Health Observatory data; by deducting male from female life expectancy at birth, and then converting any negative values to positive values, in order to being able to measure any gender (for which data has been provided) imbalances in either direction. 18 Calculated from Our World In Data (2021); in order to measure gender gaps in any direction the following formula has been applied: the positive value of (50 − female rate of primary school net enrollment). 19 Calculated from Our World In Data (2021); in order to measure gender gaps in any direction the following formula has been applied: the positive value of (50 − female rate of secondary school net enrollment). 20 Calculated based on Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook (2021).

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis

73

Dimension 5: Wealth Inequality (II) − Domestic Wealth Gap Variable: Wealth Gini Index21 (domestic comparison, i.e. relative inequality of wealth without considering level of wealth) Dimension 6: Income Inequality (I) − Domestic-cum-Global Income Gap Variable: Income Gini Index22 Adjusted for GDP per capita in PPP23 (domestic-cum-global comparison of income distribution)

21

Data from the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook (2021); for South Sudan the ‘proxy data’ of Sudan has been used, for Uzbekistan the ‘proxy data’ of Turkmenistan, for North Macedonia that of Serbia, for the Dominican Republic that of Colombia, for Cabo Verde that of Guyana Bissau (see historical and ethnic ties), for Honduras that of Nicaragua, for Guatemala that of El Salvador, for Bhutan that of Mongolia, for Cote D’Ivoire that of Ghana, for Eswatini that of South Africa, and for Cuba that of Slovakia (which is the lowest value in the dataset at hand); for this for the most part the respective GDP per capita values—as well as geographical, cultural, and historical, etc. closeness— have been used to decide the best option available for the usage of ‘proxy data.’ These ‘proxy data’ can be used when there is a ‘high number’ of dimensions with a ‘high number’ of variables that are being used in tandem, and only when they make up an ‘extremely small’ percentage of overall data (like e.g. once or twice in the whole data set for each country that includes dozens of data at a time), depending also on the subject of investigation (a single dimension of a single country, a single country, a single continent, or many sub-dimensions and dimensions of 150 + countries in the world). One needs to keep in mind that the main research objects of this study are not the variables or dimensions of any one particular country themselves! It are the welfare state regimes, and welfare state systems; the overall performance of which are being measured by looking at dozens of indicators at the same time. If ‘one’ data value is left empty, the country, when applying the SRP index, would have to be otherwise thrown out of the data analysis (which then would be left to be highly incapacitated indeed, when dozens of key countries around the world would as a consequence be missing from the global data analysis). Therefore, the usage of ‘proxy’ data—only when extremely carefully and extremely scarcely applied(!)—is the only way here to safeguard the execution of a global data analysis, when dozens of indicators and 155 countries are involved. 22 World Bank data from Handwiki (2021) were being used; for Cuba the same value as Slovenia was being used (as it is the lowest value in the group of all countries used, Cuba is a communist country and arguably has more equal income distribution than Slovenia, but for our purpose and research goal this is nevertheless used as a proxy value; there is only one country in the Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime anyway, and its difference in being most equal, when compared to other welfare regimes, is not doubted); Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman due to lack of individual data values, here, share all the same value (their closeness in this regard, as well as their welfare regime distinctness and membership, is not doubted either, plus this is only one out of many subdimensions and dimensions being measured here); for Cambodia, New Zealand, Qatar and Singapore, other sources have been used to fill the data gap. 23 i.e. GDP per capita (PPP current international dollar); World Bank data were being used (2021), from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD; for Cuba, Gambia, Guatemala, South Africa, Syria, other sources have been used.

74

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

Dimension 7: Income Inequality (II) − Domestic Income Gap Variable: Income Gini Index24 (domestic comparison, i.e. relative inequality of income without considering level of income) In studying and evaluating the following series of data and data outcomes, one needs to be aware that while these are truly irreplaceable additional findings in terms of welfare state system analysis, and welfare regime analysis especially, we still need in-depth case studies (Morra and Friedlander 1998; Yin 2002; Pal 2005; Mares and Carnes 2009; Kuhlmann and ten Brink 2021). In fact, this empirical global data analysis only can be conducted with the strong guiding and formative help of ideal–typical welfare regime theory. This work itself is firmly built on (in this case) strong empirical case study analyses from dozens of scholars from literally around the world. The theory of ten worlds of ideal–typical welfare regimes has been built over a quarter of a century now (when going back to its very beginnings). Hence, the findings below have to be seen in this light, as an addition, an additional source for decision making, not only how welfare regimes perform in comparison to one another, but also in terms of which countries are members of which welfare regimes, which needs to be placed on and within the context of the above-mentioned sets of key characteristics of each individual ideal–typical welfare regime (cf Chap. 3). The differential criteria that separate ideal–typical welfare regime classifications from e.g. simple typologies (cf Van Kersbergen 2019; Arts 2020) are (i) that there are near-hits (i.e. more-or-less-fits), (ii) that welfare state systems are changing and/or moving seen over longer periods of time (they certainly as a whole do not stand still), and (iii) that there are a number of countries are on purpose not included at all in any membership group of any ideal–typical welfare regime (they are located or wander outside of any particular welfare regime, while the might be moving away or towards to any welfare regime, or not). Over time, things need to be adapted to empirical changes on the ground, and everything needs to be analyzed further in terms of e.g. in-depth case study, historical and political economy case study, etc. analysis—and of course further quantitative data or other, textual data analyses.

24

World Bank data from Handwiki (2021) were being used; for Cuba the same value as Slovenia was being used (as it is the lowest value in the group of all countries used, Cuba is a communist country and arguably has more equal income distribution than Slovenia, but for our purpose and research goal this is nevertheless used as a proxy value; there is only one country in the Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime anyway, and its difference in being most equal, when compared to other welfare regimes, is not doubted); Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman due to lack of individual data values, here, share all the same value (their closeness in this regard, as well as their welfare regime distinctness and membership, is not doubted either, plus this is only one out of many subdimensions and dimensions being measured here); for Cambodia, New Zealand, Qatar and Singapore, other sources used.

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis

75

In addition, each sub-field of social policy, be it gender policy, education policy, health care policy, long-term care policy, employment policy, social work policy, and so forth needs to conduct also, on its own, its own global data analysis.

It is important to understand that when one measures and evaluates welfare state systems, the scientific subject under scrutiny is different from e.g. gender policy systems, LGBTIQ* policy systems, education policy systems, or social work service or policy systems (cf Aspalter 2014: 1). While one can (and should) learn from overall welfare state system institutional features and outcomes, one also needs to understand that each policy sub-field may or may not be different from the overall parent system, the welfare state system itself (cf Leichsenring 2020). Every policy sub-field is different from one another. [S]ub-level policy systems are more sensitive to different conditions: for example, more sensitive to particular pieces of legislation, or even a small number of experts and their level of organization or political/societal influence, their educational background and preferences. (Aspalter 2014: 2)

Having paid attention to the problem of what is actually laying under the microscope (what is the research subject and object under scrutiny, and what not, and why this fundamentally matters), here, we can move on to the actual number crunching, the global spectral data analysis. This outcome-based analysis of welfare state systems follows the idea and method of spectral data analysis within the context of social sciences (see Chaps. 2 and 5). When looking at the Standardized Relative Performance (SRP) Indexes (see Chap. 2) of each welfare state system in the ideal–typical Social Democratic Welfare Regime (Fig. 4.1), one first finds that although Sweden has the nose ahead in front of Finland, Denmark and Sweden in terms of povertization performance (the lack of povertization, that is). However, it also at the same time is by far the worst performer in terms of inequality among the Social Democratic Welfare Regime. Inequality in Finland is marked by health inequality between men and women in particular, but also partly a result of its lower GDP per capita and lower overall wealth per population, which affects its global-cum-domestic wealth and income inequality performances. Iceland, on the other hand, due to the lower performance in the corruption perception dimension, also is a bit behind in the overall grand dimension of povertization, but in terms of inequality and overall dehumanization it not only leads the pack of welfare state systems in the Social Democratic Welfare Regime, but is also the global leader—among the group of countries included in this study, which is most inclusive. This study was merely excluding countries below 500,000 inhabitants, with the exception of Iceland, which is hence an exception of the exception, due to its North European and global significance. Also, countries where important data was missing were not be included either in this global data analysis (e.g. North Korea, Libya, and so forth). In the Neoliberal world of welfare capitalism (or welfare regime) (Fig. 4.2), we witness the great impact of the principle of functional equivalence in social policy making, and comparative social policy here in particular. While when looking at the great differences institutional setup and feature of welfare state systems in the AngloSaxon world, that only can justify a classification as a common group of welfare state

76

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Iceland

average SDWR Povertization

Norway

Denmark

Inequality

Finland

Sweden

Dehumanization

Fig. 4.1 Povertization, inequality and dehumanization performance within the Social Democratic Welfare Regime. Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

systems if an ideal–typical welfare regime perspective is applied, we also see that in this group of countries is markedly coherent, apart from the performance of the United States in both the povertization and inequality grand dimensions. 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 Australia

New Zealand

Povertization

UK

Canada

Inequality

average NLWR

US

Dehumanization

Fig. 4.2 Povertization, inequality and dehumanization performance within the Neoliberal Welfare Regime. Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis

77

Thus, both Sweden and the United States have proven to be not good examples of their respective ideal–typical welfare regimes, the Social Democratic and the Neoliberal Welfare Regime (Figs. 4.1 and 4.2). The following further analysis of global welfare state system outcomes, in addition, sheds light on these two rather unrepresentative cases, which many have thought thus far, and may still think and feel to represent perfectly their respective welfare regimes. But, this is clearly not the case, when—and that is imperative to point out—one focuses on inequality, particularly wealth inequality (Tables 4.1 and 4.2), which is many times over more important than income inequality, as the super-rich and the rich do not rely on salaried income for their living and consumption expenditures. Especially in times of increased polarization of total incomes and net wealth (Esteban and Ray 1994; Duclos et al. 2004; Deutsch and Silber 2010), wealth creation (i.e. asset accumulation)—particularly housing ownership, but also investments in e.g. form of provident fund systems or private savings—of the average citizen and particularly also the poor (and near-poor) becomes a most crucial pillar of people’s financial and economic well-being and security. The suggestion of Michael Sherraden and his colleagues (Sherraden 1991, 2005; Loke and Sherraden 2019; Sherraden et al. 2019; Huang et al. 2021), to enforce asset building for the poor, nearpoor, and the middle classes alike, are central to address this issues, and resolve this problem. Within the other ideal–typical welfare regimes, the data also reveal interesting findings about so-called lead countries, especially the extremely and very bad relative performance in terms of wealth inequality of Germany and Russia respectively, as well as extremely bad relative performance with regard to both wealth and income inequality in Brazil, are worth mentioning here among the group of their respective welfare regimes—when it comes to intra-welfare-regime comparison. Hence, the global data analyzes does reveal new facets of the truth about the outcomes and performances of leading welfare state systems in the world, and help do away with perceptions, also academic and believed-to-be-evidence-based ideas and convictions that are not, or not at all, supported by empirical—and here particularly quantitative empirical— evidence.

The case of wealth inequality in Sweden on the one hand is particularly unravelling, but so is also the extremely positive overall case of Iceland, which demands much greater international attention in social policy circles and within international comparative analyses. When investigating the actual performance of welfare state systems in the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime (Fig. 4.3), Switzerland stands out at the best performer in terms of its population not having to suffer from povertization. In fact, Switzerland is not only the best performer among the group of Christian Democratic welfare state systems, but also worldwide, among all countries covered in this global data analysis. However, there is a great inequality problem in Switzerland especially in terms of wealth inequality. A yet bigger problem of this sort, can be seen in Germany, as well as Cyprus. Portugal is following closely the bad performance of Switzerland in form of the extent of its inequality problem. On the other hand,

SRP index

0.00

0.00

Finland

Iceland

0.11

0.22

0.00

0.00

Denmark

0.11

0.22

0.00

0.00

Sweden

Norway

0.00

0.02

0.11

0.02

0.03

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Countries in the Social Democratic Welfare Regime

SRP index

SRP index

SRP index

Unit

4

0.57

0.86

1.08

0.50

0.51

SRP index

5

0.00

0.02

0.09

0.01

0.04

SRP index

6

0.12

0.12

0.11

0.05

0.11

SRP index

7

3

1

No

2

Homicide rate

U5MR & TBI

IMR & MMR

Variables

(% of NCD stunting, M below 5-year-olds)

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Dimensions

Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

1.71

0.39

0.00

0.53

0.39

SRP index

8

Corruption perception index

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

(1–8)

2.51

1.63

1.39

1.33

1.19

0.28

0.12

0.08

0.07

0.04

Sum of SRP index SRP (Average of indexes SRP indexes restandardized)

1+2 +3+ 4+5 +6+ 7+8

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

0.00

1.12

0.77

0.87

1.37

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Table 4.1 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Social Democratic Welfare Regime, the Neoliberal Welfare Regime and their performance regarding povertization

78 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

0.00

0.17

UK

US

0.32

0.15

0.26

0.10

0.17 0.36

0.56

0.00

0.00 1.84

0.94

0.68

0.41

0.82

0.21

0.14

0.15

0.10

0.16

0.66

0.13

0.17

0.09

0.12

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

2.76

1.45

1.45

1.45

0.00

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

6.52

2.92

2.71

2.51

1.27

0.98

0.35

0.31

0.28

0.06

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

0.00

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Australia

Canada

0.00

New Zealand 0.00 0.00

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Countries in the Neoliberal Welfare Regime

Dimensions

Table 4.1 (continued)

2.86

1.21

1.23

0.89

0.97

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 79

LE ab, gap to best globally + HLE ab, gap to best globally

9

SRP index SRP index

Variables:

No

Unit

SRP index

11

Gap to gender equality in primary and secondary school enrollment rates (any gender gap)

Gap to gender equality in education

2.98

2.58

0.94

0.66

Denmark

Norway

2.59

0.62

Iceland

1.28

1.03

1.01

Countries in the Social Democratic Welfare Regime

10

LE ab (any gender gap)

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

3.710

2.592

0.527

SRP index

12

Ratio mean to median wealth per adult adjusted for median wealth (USD) per Pop’n

7.287

6.021

0.155

SRP index

13

Wealth Gini index

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

1.631

2.046

2.016

SRP index

14

Income Gini index adjusted for GDP per cap. PPP

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

0.722

1.160

0.670

SRP index

15

Income Gini index

Income gap (domestic)

17.87

16.77

7.59

Sum of SRP indexes

9 + 10 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15

2.55

2.40

1.08

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

(9–15)

Standardized again

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

0.87

0.77

0.00

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1 to 15)

Table 4.2 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Social Democratic Welfare Regime, the Neoliberal Welfare Regime and their performance regarding inequality

80 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

1.00

4.54

2.67

0.89

0.61

Finland

Sweden

1.01

0.72

2.19

Canada

US

0.90

0.99

0.75

0.82

2.12 2.361

9.105

3.815

3.277 8.966

5.581

5.530

5.065

3.953

9.535

5.872 0.993

6.124

4.515

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

3.893

3.497

3.821

4.077

3.360

2.367

2.327

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

4.433

2.474

2.732

3.093

2.629

1.186

0.825

Income gap (domestic)

33.57

20.30

19.86

19.04

16.89

23.25

20.22

4.80

2.90

2.84

2.72

2.41

3.32

2.89

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

4.08

3.22

2.69

2.74

New Zealand 0.93

3.15

0.68

UK

Australia

Countries in the Neoliberal Welfare Regime

1.01

Gap to gender equality in education

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.2 (continued)

2.86

1.23

1.21

0.97

0.89

1.37

1.12

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1 to 15)

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 81

82

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

Luxembourg, which turns out to be the best overall performer in terms of the dehumanization matrix (avoiding dehumanization as much as possible), has only a relative very low inequality problem. This is interesting for a very rich country indeed, and thus to be evaluated in a very positive light. In the following, Belgium, Slovakia, and Slovenia can also look at a relative positive record and situation in terms of in comparative terms relatively low levels of inequality, covering health care inequality, gender inequality, wealth inequality and income inequality (as measured by the here integrated variables and dimensions of inequality) (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). With the comparative tool of Standardized Relative Performance (SRP) Indexes, we can look at each welfare regime’s internal composition in terms of outcomes and performances of their particular institutional and policy mixes and traditions. This spectral analysis does not cover all aspects than can possibly be compared, not at all (far from it). But, it offers new and additional ways of looking at and analyzing welfare state systems themselves, as well as—what is particularly interesting and useful here— ideal–typical welfare regimes; rather than just looking at institutional compositions and developments, or spending levels of all sorts, which still represents the majority of comparative welfare state systems analyses. 4.50 4.00 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50

Povertization

Inequality

Hungary

Poland

Croatia

Czech Rep.

Cyprus

Portugal

Germany

Greece

average CDWR

Spain

Italy

Slovakia

Ireland

Austria

France

Slovenia

Switzerland

Netherlands

Belgium

Luxembourg

0.00

Dehumanization

Fig. 4.3 Povertization, inequality and dehumanization performance within the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime. Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

SRP index

0.00

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Austria

Germany

Belgium

0.11

0.22

0.22

Luxembourg 0.00

0.00

0.00

Netherlands

Switzerland

0.08

0.12

0.09

0.13

0.05

0.13

0.40

0.28

0.00

0.28

0.00

0.00

Countries in the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime

SRP index

SRP index

SRP index

Unit

4

0.92

1.19

0.95

0.88

0.71

0.27

SRP index

5

0.11

0.10

0.09

0.11

0.08

0.11

SRP index

6

0.13

0.08

0.04

0.05

0.04

0.04

SRP index

7

3

1

No

2

Homicide rate

U5MR & TBI

IMR & MMR

Variables

(% of NCD stunting, M below 5-year-olds)

Sp. poverty creating/ exacerbating forces

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Dimensions

Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

1.58

1.05

1.58

0.79

1.05

0.39

SRP index

8

Corruption perception index

Sp. poverty creating/ exacerbating forces

3.33

2.93

2.75

2.46

2.15

0.94

Sum of SRP indexes

0.42

0.35

0.32

0.27

0.21

0.00

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

1 + 2 + (1–8) 3+4+ 5+6+ 7+8

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

0.52

1.92

1.33

0.94

0.35

1.20

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Table 4.3 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP indexes) for comparison: The Christian Democratic Welfare Regime and its performance regarding povertization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 83

Spain

0.32

0.32

0.33

0.00

0.00

Poland

Croatia

Hungary

0.11

0.13

0.18

0.13

0.20

0.06

0.11

0.11

0.06

0.02

0.03

0.09

0.07

0.16

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.00

0.43

0.38

0.57

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

3.85

2.39

2.51

2.30

1.99

1.25

0.97

0.53

1.15

0.39

0.84

0.57

0.76

0.10

0.17

0.21

0.19

0.06

0.09

0.21

0.08

0.01

0.02

0.08

0.10

0.16

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

0.14

0.11

0.07

0.11

0.05

0.09

0.08

0.06

0.08

0.13

0.07

0.05

0.07

Sp. poverty creating/ exacerbating forces

5.79

5.39

4.21

5.13

4.47

5.00

3.55

4.61

3.68

4.08

2.11

3.42

2.50

Sp. poverty creating/ exacerbating forces

0.43

0.43

0.00

0.17

Montenegro

Serbia

0.23

0.04 0.92

1.41 4.10

4.15 0.25

0.11

0.12

0.31

6.58

5.66

Countries not part of the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime (but nearby and/or moving towards it)

0.22

0.11

0.00

0.00

Czech Rep

0.11

Slovakia

0.00

Greece

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Italy

0.11

0.00

Slovenia

Portugal

1.08

0.00

0.33

0.00

Ireland

Cyprus

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.00

France

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Dimensions

Table 4.3 (continued)

3.76

12.80

12.11

10.23

8.56

8.18

8.04

7.17

7.03

5.49

5.34

5.05

4.65

4.60

4.21

2.08

1.96

1.63

1.34

1.27

1.25

1.09

1.07

0.80

0.77

0.72

0.65

0.64

0.57

0.50

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

2.88

3.01

2.39

2.10

2.38

1.39

2.04

1.88

1.91

1.50

1.26

1.95

1.38

1.50

1.32

(continued)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

84 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

2.26

0.75

0.50

0.33

0.26

0.29

0.25

1.67

1.68

0.71

1.11

1.58

4.15

3.70

4.93

4.50

3.35

0.48

0.78

0.27

0.38

0.39

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

0.40

0.13

0.15

0.12

0.15

Sp. poverty creating/ exacerbating forces

6.84

5.79

6.97

5.79

6.97

Sp. poverty creating/ exacerbating forces

15.62

14.67

14.43

13.87

13.23

2.58

2.41

2.37

2.27

2.16

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

0.00

0.83

Romania

Albania

0.97

1.51

0.17

0.17

Bulgaria

N. Macedonia

0.54

0.00

Bosnia & Herz

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Dimensions

Table 4.3 (continued)

2.90

3.24

3.19

3.36

2.69

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 85

LE ab, gap to best globally + HLE ab, gap to best globally

9

SRP index SRP index

Variables:

No

Unit

SRP index

11

Gap to gender equality in primary and secondary school enrollment rates (any gender gap)

Gap to gender equality in education

SRP index

12

Ratio mean to median wealth per adult adjusted for median wealth (USD) per Pop’n

3.14

3.83

6.38

0.69

1.01

1.83

Belgium

Slovakia

Luxembourg

1.01

1.21

0.73 4.199

0.452

0.000 0.000

2.584

4.315

SRP index

13

Wealth Gini index

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

Countries in the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime

10

LE ab (any gender gap)

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

2.984

2.281

0.000

SRP index

14

Income Gini index adjusted for GDP per cap. PPP

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

0.258

0.825

2.758

SRP index

15

Income Gini index

Income gap (domestic)

16.66

12.19

11.63

Sum of SRP indexes

9 + 10 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15

2.38

1.74

1.66

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

(9–15)

Standardized again

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

1.39

0.52

0.35

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Table 4.4 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Christian Democratic Welfare Regime and its performance regarding inequality

86 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

5.02

3.58

0.60

France

4.59

0.49

0.37

0.97

Spain

Switzerland

Greece

1.82

0.87

Poland

Germany

1.81

1.58

1.27

0.98

1.18

1.46

0.94

0.72

1.61

1.44

1.01

1.46

7.027

6.229

7.518

5.491

4.794

6.698

4.985

4.309

5.536

3.648

5.089

3.177

3.309

4.583

4.040

3.783

7.132

5.271

7.855

4.186

5.220

7.080

4.703

3.979

7.183

4.884

5.995

4.186

5.090

7.674

4.341

6.460

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

2.903

3.565

3.620

3.774

4.207

2.419

3.982

4.617

2.108

4.148

2.482

4.155

3.245

0.960

2.420

2.076

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

1.985

1.418

1.856

1.649

2.474

0.180

1.598

2.629

2.191

2.706

1.418

3.015

1.907

2.216

0.000

1.108

Income gap (domestic)

Albania

1.76

3.23

2.33

5.426

4.625

5.192

2.320

Countries not part of the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime (but nearby and/or moving towards it)

5.79

7.24

6.28

3.59

2.35

0.41

Hungary

5.57

0.91

Portugal

Cyprus

5.80

5.34

1.77

1.60

Croatia

Czech Rep

2.88

4.67

3.96

0.53

0.89

Italy

Austria

0.95

0.79

1.22

5.17

2.82

1.02

0.86

Slovenia

1.00

2.25

0.78

Netherlands

Ireland

Gap to gender equality in education

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.4 (continued)

3.55

3.90

27.29 24.88

3.83

3.69

3.56

3.52

3.47

3.37

3.24

3.10

3.08

3.04

2.92

2.87

2.84

2.60

2.49

26.81

25.83

24.91

24.64

24.26

23.56

22.70

21.71

21.56

21.29

20.45

20.12

19.90

18.21

17.46

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

2.90

1.92

2.38

1.95

2.39

1.91

2.04

2.10

1.88

1.20

1.50

1.33

1.50

1.32

1.38

1.26

0.94

(continued)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 87

5.20

6.76

2.21

2.50

2.74

2.54

2.42

2.62

Bosnia & Herz

Serbia

N. Macedonia

Romania

Montenegro

Bulgaria

1.50

2.54

1.39

1.47

1.17

1.00

Gap to gender equality in education

5.488

5.089

5.384

8.225

5.638

5.429

5.116

4.677

5.116

5.245

5.245

4.729

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

5.780

5.758

4.688

5.188

5.384

5.067

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

4.175

3.814

3.041

2.577

3.093

2.268

Income gap (domestic)

31.44

29.50

29.31

29.08

27.50

25.06

4.49

4.21

4.19

4.15

3.93

3.58

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

7.15

3.63

4.47

4.36

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.4 (continued)

3.36

3.01

3.24

3.19

2.88

2.69

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

88 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis

89

In East Asia, within the Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime (Fig. 4.4), Singapore performs more or less in the same way as Switzerland in within the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime, with the notable exception of there is even more inequality in Singapore than in Switzerland. The vast majority of the members of the East Asian Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime are very in line with respect to their inequality versus povertization gap, meaning they are rather strongly coherent in their effects, i.e. welfare state system outcomes. Indonesia and Mongolia, both on the low end in terms of performance, however reveal both equal results in terms of the grand dimensions of povertization and inequality alike. Each dimension in the grand dimension of povertization, in addition, is able to put the spotlight on to particular social development issues of each welfare state system in case. People in Mongolia, e.g., suffer greatly, in general, from lack of improved water sources and lack of improved sanitation facilities, as well as general poverty of health, but also diseases of poverty. Indonesia, on the other hand, has strong malnutrition issues to battle with, plus poverty of health (plus diseases of poverty), as well as problems with sanitation in general. Malaysia and Vietnam have both to yet deal with their relative lack of nutrition security and general poverty of health issues. China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Mongolia all have, on top of that, strong problems with strong prevalence of corruption (Table 4.5). As regards inequality, based on the data used, almost all countries in the ProWelfare Conservative Welfare Regime have strong wealth inequality problems, plus 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00

Povertization

Inequality

Dehumanization

Fig. 4.4 Povertization, inequality and dehumanization performance within the Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime. Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

SRP index

0.33

0.83

Malaysia

China

2.58

0.43

0.00

0.00

Korea (S.)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Singapore

Japan

0.44

0.48

0.11

0.02

0.05

0.82

3.63

0.38

0.95

0.49

Countries in the Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime

SRP index

SRP index

SRP index

Unit

4

2.63

3.03

0.00

0.13

0.30

SRP index

5

0.76

1.09

0.54

0.10

0.35

SRP index

6

0.07

0.29

0.07

0.00

0.01

SRP index

7

3

1

No

2

Homicide rate

U5MR & TBI

IMR & MMR

Variables

(% of NCD stunting, M below 5-year-olds)

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

6.05

4.87

3.55

1.84

0.39

SRP index

8

Corruption perception index

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

(1–8)

14.18

14.15

4.65

3.04

1.59

2.33

2.32

0.65

0.37

0.11

Sum of SRP index SRP (Average of indexes SRP indexes restandardized)

1+2 +3+ 4+5 +6+ 7+8

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

3.37

3.55

1.52

1.13

1.77

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Table 4.5 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP indexes) for comparison: The Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime and its performance regarding povertization

90 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

0.75

2.37

4.19

4.30

0.33

0.33

2.17

6.00

Thailand

Vietnam

Indonesia

Mongolia

0.94

1.96

1.09

0.54

1.23

5.52

3.87

2.14

7.81

4.83

3.81

1.60

3.12

4.00

Laos

Cambodia

2.80

8.71

P.N.G

1.80

2.81

2.94

2.05

3.02

3.27

4.98

8.40

8.47

5.19

5.24

4.38

5.08

7.39

3.63

4.45

5.33

4.91

6.03

5.84

6.38

3.68

3.46

4.87

1.27

0.53

0.22

0.75

0.44

1.59

0.70

0.48

0.20

0.48

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

8.03

6.32

8.82

7.76

7.89

7.11

6.97

6.71

6.84

6.84

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

14.30

52.45

39.28

34.65

32.68

31.08

30.72

32.31

29.62

20.89

9.05

6.74

5.92

5.58

5.30

5.23

5.51

5.04

3.51

2.35

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

10.00

6.24

6.34

4.00

Timor-Leste 4.67

2.15

1.33

3.17

Philippines

Myanmar

4.36

3.76

2.38

1.62

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Countries not part of the Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Table 4.5 (continued)

8.06

5.03

5.78

5.82

4.76

5.99

5.38

5.06

4.59

3.48

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 91

92

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

domestic-cum-global income inequality (i.e. local income to global income gap). Seen from global comparison, life expectancy is a significantly greater problem for Mongolia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia that the rest of this group of countries. There is a huge gender gap in life expectancy domestically in Mongolia and Vietnam in particular, while most countries in the Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime also suffer from this health-cum-social problem (Table 4.6). The spectral data analysis of the ideal–typical Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime (Fig. 4.5) across South and Central America, including the Caribbean, shows a remarkable resemblance of most welfare state systems’ inequality to povertization performance ratio to the overall performance ratio. There is, however, among the rather large group of 20 countries, one relative a bit outstanding case, that of Bolivia. All in all, the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime has an extremely big problem with inequality. This can be seen and demonstrated by looking at and pointing out the huge inequality versus povertization gap in the case of Brazil, Suriname, on the lower end of the overall performance spectrum, as well as Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia, and so forth (in a rather neat line of procession). The data for the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime reveals a particularly relative negative record of gender health inequality, as well as overall (domestic, plus domestic-cum-global) wealth inequality and income inequality (Tables 4.7 and 4.8). In overall global comparison, the Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime in Cuba (Fig. 4.6) has, given and taking notice of the poor economic situation and economic sanctions and isolation in place, performed a great deal. Cuba is a rather outstanding and super positive relative performance of its welfare state system, that is based on universalism. And, hence, this relative performance provides a strong empirical support for universalism in particular and categorical social welfare benefits and services in general (cf. e.g. also Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Horton and Gregory 2009, 2010; Horton 2011; Raudava 2013, Kwon and Kim 2014). The lesser performance, in direct comparison to the world’s best performing welfare state systems in Europe, is partially due to the stronger prevalence on non-communicable diseases in Cuba (resembling a bit that of neighboring Mexico), but especially, even greater so, due to the strong prevalence of corruption in Cuba (of course, if e.g. compared directly to Europe) (Tables 4.9 and 4.10). The Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime that covers most countries of the former Soviet Union (Fig. 4.6), with the exception of the three Baltic states, reveals within this spectral analysis a differentiation between countries with no inequalitycum-povertization gap on the one side, e.g. Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and countries with a high income versus poverty gap on the other, Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia. In this ideal–typical Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime, the dimensions that lack positive performance are health in terms of non-communicable diseases, as well as high levels of corruption (which is mirroring the experience of Cuba) (Tables 4.9 and 4.10). The particular trait of the Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime (Fig. 4.7) that stands out from the rest of the world, and from its surrounding neighboring welfare state systems, is the combination of relatively well-endowed welfare state systems with

LE ab, gap to best globally + HLE ab, gap to best globally

9

SRP index SRP index

Variables:

No

Unit

SRP index

11

Gap to Gender equality in primary and secondary school enrollment rates (any gender gap)

Gap to gender equality in education

SRP index

12

Ratio mean to median wealth per adult adjusted for median wealth (USD) per Pop’n

5.49

4.02

0.32

0.23

Korea (S.)

Singapore

5.15

0.00

Japan

1.03

1.56

1.00 5.897

4.184

3.153 7.235

4.470

3.643

SRP index

13

Wealth Gini index

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

Countries in the Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime

10

LE ab (any gender gap)

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

2.857

3.407

3.662

SRP index

14

Income Gini index adjusted for GDP per cap. PPP

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

5.722

1.907

2.242

SRP index

15

Income Gini index

Income gap (domestic)

26.99

21.34

18.85

Sum of SRP indexes

9 + 10 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15

3.86

3.05

2.69

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(9–15)

Standardized again

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

1.77

1.52

1.13

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Table 4.6 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime and its performance regarding inequality

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 93

4.64

3.06

Mongolia

Vietnam

8.48

8.89

3.49

1.45

2.24

0.70

1.43

0.61

6.894

6.254

7.669

7.188

6.882

6.184

7.726

6.227

7.080

8.424

6.925

5.194

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

3.04

3.55

5.95

5.66

4.06

P.N.G

Philippines

1.18

1.29

4.74

1.83

2.52

1.39

5.514

8.918

7.701

8.647

6.737

5.757

3.178

9.457

8.786

9.716

7.339

4.315

7.249

7.066

5.990

6.427

5.268

5.026

5.858

5.203

6.201

5.692

5.468

5.849

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

5.206

4.562

3.144

3.531

1.675

1.160

2.964

2.191

3.814

4.330

3.144

3.686

Income gap (domestic)

42.13

42.07

38.34

36.00

28.91

23.45

37.22

34.11

33.45

33.08

32.24

31.19

6.02

6.01

5.48

5.14

4.13

3.35

5.32

4.87

4.78

4.73

4.61

4.46

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

5.23

4.41

4.22

4.60

Cambodia

6.05

Laos

4.35

4.45

Timor-Leste

Myanmar

Countries not part of the Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime

3.77

Indonesia

4.10

6.47

1.90

2.74

Thailand

2.89

5.48

1.91

China

Malaysia

Gap to gender equality in education

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.6 (continued)

5.99

8.06

5.82

5.78

4.76

5.03

4.59

5.38

5.06

3.55

3.48

3.37

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

94 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis

95

9.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00

Povertization

Inequality

Dehumanization

Fig. 4.5 Povertization, inequality and dehumanization performance within the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime

exclusion-based rules. When it comes to foreign population working and living in these countries, they in general do not appear in local statistics, as they cater to the domestic populations only. But, here too, there are differences, as e.g. in Israel, among different groups of the population in term of systemic social exclusion. The overall look that our global spectral data analysis can provide is a steady distribution of inequality across the board of the seven member countries of this ideal–typical welfare regime. While Qatar leads the group, Israel follows, before UAE which ranks in third place in terms of overall povertization and inequality scores that are combined in the final dehumanization score (Tables 4.11 and 4.12). The global data analysis had the particular advantage here to consider more than the usual membership countries for the ideal–typical welfare regime centering around India and Sri Lanka—the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime (Fig. 4.8). Given that geography itself is not, and is never, a determining variable (independent variable) in welfare state system outcomes and welfare regime analysis (even though often resorted to in a reflex-like rather than reflective manner in the past), it makes great sense for Mauritius and Fiji to be included in this welfare regime, both having considerable populations of Indian descent. The levels of inequality measured across all now seven member countries of the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime are remarkably equal. With regard to povertization and absolute poverty in general, Mauritius and Sri Lanka have expectedly lower levels of poverty (due to higher and earlier developed

SRP index

0.43

1.18

0.17

0.33

0.33

Argentina

Paraguay

Brazil

0.43

1.83

0.54

0.00

0.33

Uruguay

0.11

0.17

Costa Rica

Chile

0.94

1.32

0.58

0.48

0.35

0.32

1.06

0.80

1.35

1.49

1.13

0.28

Countries in the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime

SRP index

SRP index

SRP index

Unit

4

2.20

2.40

2.29

0.71

2.46

0.89

SRP index

5

0.95

1.22

0.57

0.38

0.52

0.37

SRP index

6

3.82

0.92

0.70

1.46

0.98

0.44

SRP index

7

3

1

No

2

Homicide rate

U5MR & TBI

IMR & MMR

Variables

(% of NCD stunting, M below 5-year-olds)

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

6.58

7.89

6.05

4.08

2.24

2.76

SRP index

8

Corruption perception index

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

17.71

16.06

12.14

9.47

8.11

5.34

Sum of SRP indexes

2.95

2.66

1.97

1.50

1.26

0.77

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

1 + 2 + (1–8) 3+4+ 5+6+ 7+8

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

5.14

4.15

3.49

3.19

3.00

2.68

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Table 4.7 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime and its performance regarding povertization

96 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

3.44

1.72

5.38

2.69

1.83

3.87

2.50

2.17

0.33

1.67

1.50

Nicaragua

Guyana

Bolivia

El Salvador 1.00

1.17

Dominican R

Honduras

Guatemala

2.26

1.63

1.09

0.82

1.92

2.19

1.23

1.80

1.01

1.44

0.81

1.18

0.91

0.93

0.93

7.43

3.45

1.94

2.20

1.56

2.45

1.02

2.00

1.39

2.10

1.51

4.01

1.88

2.55

2.74

3.70

1.34

3.42

6.22

2.85

3.16

0.83

4.55

2.44

2.51

1.23

0.70

1.02

1.30

0.96

1.03

2.07

2.00

1.06

1.61

0.85

1.34

0.76

0.89

0.96

1.55

0.92

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

2.94

7.87

10.00

1.10

2.89

1.08

2.08

4.49

0.66

2.97

4.62

0.80

1.70

2.00

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

8.29

8.42

6.84

7.50

6.18

8.68

7.89

6.45

6.58

7.50

6.32

6.45

6.58

6.97

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

17.91

29.37

28.82

25.66

25.26

23.09

22.96

21.78

19.17

19.05

18.86

18.72

18.14

18.09

5.00

4.90

4.34

4.27

3.89

3.87

3.66

3.20

3.18

3.15

3.12

3.02

3.01

2.98

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

1.72

2.04

0.83

1.50

Suriname

1.61

0.67

Mexico

Colombia

1.61

0.86

2.17

0.83

Ecuador

T. & T

2.58

2.69

0.83

2.17

Panama

Peru

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Table 4.7 (continued)

5.63

5.41

4.99

4.57

4.85

4.87

4.78

4.50

5.39

4.26

4.09

3.96

3.71

4.24

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 97

LE ab, gap to best globally + HLE ab, gap to best globally

9

SRP index SRP index

Variables:

No

Unit

SRP index

11

Gap to gender equality in primary and secondary school enrollment rates (any gender gap)

Gap to gender equality in education

SRP index

12

Ratio mean to median wealth per adult adjusted for median wealth (USD) per Pop’n

1.43

4.84

3.65

1.20

Bolivia

Chile

2.39

1.40

Peru

1.08

1.08

0.82 6.550

7.079

6.923 7.597

7.933

7.700

SRP index

13

Wealth Gini index

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

Countries in the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime

10

LE ab (any gender gap)

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

6.378

6.902

6.813

SRP index

14

Income Gini index adjusted for GDP per cap. PPP

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

5.206

4.639

4.794

SRP index

15

Income Gini index

Income gap (domestic)

32.85

32.71

30.84

Sum of SRP indexes

9 + 10 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15

4.69

4.67

4.41

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

(9–15)

Standardized again

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

2.68

4.57

3.71

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Table 4.8 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime and its performance regarding inequality

98 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

5.49

1.65

2.91

2.66

Panama

El Salvador

Paraguay

5.73

5.84

6.75

5.88

3.84

2.75

3.82

Guatemala

Brazil

Suriname

0.38

2.55

1.24

1.63

1.85

1.33

1.19

1.38

0.40

1.20

1.19

1.01

0.82

0.66

1.15

0.53

8.197

9.379

6.894

6.882

7.176

7.341

7.176

6.405

7.140

6.674

7.038

6.756

7.237

6.374

6.623

6.957

6.179

9.509

10.000

7.442

8.372

7.933

8.372

7.933

6.770

8.088

7.442

8.320

7.804

7.984

7.158

7.649

7.881

6.951

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

8.888

8.416

7.842

6.639

7.681

7.876

8.623

6.690

7.292

6.325

7.048

6.862

6.127

5.730

7.158

7.276

5.752

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

8.608

7.655

6.211

5.026

5.670

6.753

7.191

5.258

5.670

3.711

6.443

5.464

4.433

4.149

6.134

5.464

3.995

Income gap (domestic)

47.45

46.19

39.70

38.33

38.18

38.05

37.95

37.77

37.54

36.73

36.62

35.81

34.50

34.23

34.07

33.43

33.44

6.78

6.60

5.67

5.48

5.45

5.44

5.42

5.40

5.36

5.25

5.23

5.12

4.93

4.89

4.87

4.78

4.78

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

5.59

6.20

Nicaragua

2.80

4.86

1.66

Colombia

Dominican R 3.36

6.75

1.97

5.50

3.68

Guyana

Honduras

8.48

5.11

5.45

2.33

2.65

Argentina

7.22

Mexico

2.45

T. & T

4.81

3.69

1.78

1.17

Ecuador

1.50

6.90

2.16

Uruguay

Costa Rica

Gap to gender equality in education

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.8 (continued)

5.39

5.14

5.63

4.78

4.87

4.50

5.41

4.85

4.15

4.99

4.24

4.26

3.49

4.09

3.19

3.96

3.00

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 99

100

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00

Povertization

Inequality

Dehumanization

Fig. 4.6 Povertization, inequality and dehumanization performance within Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime and the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime

the

welfare state system and social investments strategies in place), while Bangladesh, Nepal and India are characterized by higher levels of poverty, with Bhutan and Fiji ranging neatly in the middle of the group (Tables 4.11 and 4.12). Due to the new acquisition of overseas countries, Mauritius and Fiji, and the addition of Bhutan and Nepal, the name of this welfare regime had to be changed slightly (dropping the word rudimentary, cf Aspalter 2017a) to reflect the overall nature of welfare state systems in this now much larger group of countries (seven instead of three). While Mauritius has gained a greater reputation than perhaps the performance of the institutional mix applied would suggest (cf Martínez Franzoni, and SánchezAncochea 2016; Phaahla 2017, 2018; Peeroo 2020), Sri Lanka for long has been either forgotten, neglected or highly underestimated in international comparative social policy analysis (cf a rare exception to this rule, Ranaweera 2008). Universalism is on the rise, it first got good hold of the welfare state system in Sri Lanka, and then in Mauritius. Ever since the beginning of this new century India has made great strides towards greater universalism across an impressive spectrum of new social rights, including universal education, universal right to work, universal right to freeof-charge medicines, and a universal right to affordable food through the now much changed, i.e. much improved, public distribution system (cf Aspalter 2021, 2017c). Bhutan and Nepal have also have developed and added further universal features to their welfare state systems. Universal pensions and medical benefits in the case of Bhutan, and universal medical benefits in Nepal (Köhler 2006; ISSA 2021). Fiji

SRP index

0.83

0.75

0.29

1.22

1.51

0.22

0.00

Armenia

Georgia

Kazakhstan 1.17

0.65

1.18

0.00

0.00

Belarus

0.52

0.54

0.67

0.05

1.16

0.99

1.58

0.68

Countries in the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime

Cuba

Country of the Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime

SRP index

SRP index

SRP index

Unit

4

4.27

5.03

3.38

4.39

2.39

SRP index

5

0.97

0.98

0.67

0.28

0.17

SRP index

6

0.58

0.25

0.42

0.29

0.58

SRP index

7

3

1

No

2

Homicide rate

U5MR & TBI

IMR & MMR

Variables

(% of NCD stunting, M below 5-year-olds)

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

6.58

4.21

5.13

5.38

5.39

SRP index

8

Corruption perception index

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

15.47

13.51

13.03

11.72

11.62

Sum of SRP indexes

2.55

2.21

2.12

1.89

1.88

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

1 + 2 + (1–8) 3+4+ 5+6+ 7+8

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

3.29

3.98

3.28

2.80

1.88

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Table 4.9 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime, the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime and their performance regarding povertization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 101

2.00

2.17

4.33

Moldova

Azerbaijan

Tajikistan

1.85

1.16

0.76

1.19

1.01

0.43

0.27

2.66

2.83

0.85

1.98

1.72

2.76

0.00

6.52

6.16

4.60

3.79

4.97

4.86

4.51

2.25

1.40

1.27

1.73

1.31

0.95

0.58

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

0.19

0.27

0.46

0.52

0.15

0.72

0.90

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

8.29

7.63

6.97

7.50

8.16

7.24

7.63

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

17.40

26.63

22.80

19.49

19.13

18.99

18.06

0.17

Latvia

0.32

1.29

0.86

0.04

0.16

0.11

0.21 0.00

0.00

2.13 3.81

3.29

0.10 0.27

0.41

0.22 0.57

0.54

1.71 4.08

3.68

4.73 10.35

9.39

1.65

1.48

0.67

4.51

3.84

3.26

3.20

3.17

3.01

2.89

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

0.00

0.50

Estonia

Lithuania

Countries that left the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime (now moving towards the Neoliberal Welfare Regime)

0.54

1.18

2.58

0.00

0.75

1.67

1.67

Uzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan

3.01

0.43

0.50

0.67

Russia

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Ukraine

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Table 4.9 (continued)

3.23

2.95

2.04

4.47

3.87

3.51

3.61

3.71

4.28

4.66

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

102 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

SRP index

SRP index

Unit

1.96

4.54

1.63

Countries in the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime

Cuba

Country of the Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime

SRP index

11

10

9

No

6.623

SRP index

14

0.000

3.391

0.000

SRP index

15

Income Income Gini index Gini index adjusted for GDP per cap. PPP

Income gap Income gap (domestic- (domestic) cumglobal)

SRP index SRP index

13

Ratio mean Wealth to median Gini index wealth per adult adjusted for median wealth (USD) per Pop’n

Gap to gender equality in primary and secondary school enrollment rates (any gender gap)

LE ab, LE ab (any gender gap to gap) best globally + HLE ab, gap to best globally

Variables:

12

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cumglobal)

Dimensions: Right to Gender Gap to gender equality live health in education global gap gap

18.14

2.59

Sum of SRP index SRP (Average of indexes SRP Indexes restandardized)

9 + 10 (9–15) + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15

Standardized again

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

1.88 (continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP Indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Table 4.10 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime, the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime and their performance regarding inequality

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 103

8.93

9.84

3.23

3.26

Georgia

Russia

6.46

1.17

2.08

1.03

2.62

2.06

1.35

0.82

0.92

2.52

1.32

1.36

9.035

7.198

9.296

6.017

6.153

7.348

6.424

6.391

6.079

5.400

5.642

9.690

8.010

8.811

5.866

5.891

5.245

6.744

6.563

5.788

4.238

4.935

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cumglobal)

5.121

5.644

4.108

5.410

5.839

5.861

3.616

4.783

4.115

3.592

4.048

3.428

3.144

0.490

2.629

2.526

2.861

0.851

0.902

0.619

0.258

0.387

Income gap Income gap (domestic- (domestic) cumglobal)

41.54

38.24

36.85

31.43

30.23

29.94

29.10

28.76

27.79

27.67

27.35

2.69

Latvia

1.23 1.08

1.34

4.939 5.144

5.291

6.072 7.907

5.349

3.465 4.621

4.539

1.598 2.938

3.376

26.75 33.62

31.58

4.80

4.51

3.82

5.93

5.46

5.26

4.49

4.32

4.28

4.16

4.11

3.97

3.95

3.91

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

9.24

7.78

9.17

1.67

2.51

Estonia

Lithuania

Countries that left the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime (now moving towards the Neoliberal Welfare Regime)

9.83

2.43

3.28

3.56

Armenia

4.20

Tajikistan

4.08

7.49

6.34

Ukraine

3.15

3.19

Kazakhstan

Uzbekistan

2.86

Kyrgyzstan

5.00

10.00

2.86

3.67

Belarus

7.74

3.24

Azerbaijan

Moldova

Dimensions: Right to Gender Gap to gender equality live health in education global gap gap

Table 4.10 (continued)

3.23

2.95

2.04

4.66

3.98

4.28

3.28

4.47

3.71

3.29

3.61

3.87

2.80

3.51

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

104 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis

105

7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 Qatar

Israel

UAE

Povertization

average Kuwait Saudi Bahrain EBWR Arabia Inequality

Oman

Dehumanization

Fig. 4.7 Povertization, inequality and dehumanization performance within the Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime

is focusing to a greater extent on universal access to education and health services (Narayan 2011; ADB 2021). When looking at different welfare regimes through the lens of this global spectral analysis of welfare state outcomes on the ground, it becomes highly and regularly visible that: different ideal-typical welfare regimes are marked by the particular spreads and combinations of their welfare state outcomes, especially in terms of the here investigated grand dimensions of povertization (absolute poverty) and inequality (also including relative poverty, as well as social and global injustice).

The Extreme Rudimentary Welfare Regime includes for the very most part former non-British colonies of Africa, plus Liberia (which adopted a welfare state system of its neighboring countries, being formerly independent and under American influence) and important here Haiti. Haiti was treated by the French the same way, by and large, as were its other colonies across the Atlantic, in Africa. Geography per se, within the realm of international or global ideal–typical welfare regime analysis, is not important, i.e. it is not an independent variable at all (even often it is treated as one, or assumed to be one, for whatever reason, convenience or other than that). However, time—and particularly time relative to development status or the comparative development level achieved—as an explanatory factor is a very decisive one, that is, it is an additional independent factor. Therefore, in larger ideal– typical welfare regimes like the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime in Central and South America (plus the Caribbean), the spread of countries’ performances is reflecting their overall development status. Paul Pierson and Giuliano Bonoli’s key argument that time is a most-important variable that is by and large neglected so far in the study welfare state system development cannot be anything else but fully supported (Pierson 2000, 2004; Bonoli 2007). And this not only from an explanatory

SRP index

0.17

0.50

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

0.00

0.00

0.22

0.22

0.00

0.00

UAE

0.00

0.00

Qatar

Israel

0.32

0.37

0.28

0.31

0.09

0.68

1.04

0.80

0.00

0.00

Countries in the Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime

SRP index

SRP index

SRP index

Unit

4

3.70

1.13

2.77

3.20

0.48

SRP index

5

0.28

0.45

0.49

0.24

0.07

SRP index

6

0.20

0.19

0.04

0.06

0.12

SRP index

7

3

1

No

2

Homicide rate

U5MR & TBI

IMR & MMR

Variables

(% of NCD stunting, M below 5-year-olds)

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

4.61

6.05

3.29

2.24

3.68

SRP index

8

Corruption perception index

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

10.29

9.40

7.89

6.27

4.44

Sum of SRP indexes

1.64

1.49

1.22

0.94

0.62

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

1 + 2 + (1–8) 3+4+ 5+6+ 7+8

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

3.52

3.19

1.35

2.45

1.77

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Table 4.11 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime, the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime and their performance regarding povertization

106 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

0.11

0.00

1.17

Bahrain

Oman

0.59

0.32 2.12

0.89

0.97

4.19

6.45

0.00

0.67

Bangladesh 2.17

1.00

1.33

Bhutan

Fiji

India

Nepal

0.75

Sri Lanka

1.06

2.34

2.33

2.28

1.42

2.22

0.43

1.51

5.28

5.36

5.24

1.30

3.89

2.78

1.50

3.87

4.06

6.37

4.16

5.99

4.04

3.85

2.95

8.11

3.30

2.11

0.31

5.47

3.46

3.24

3.31

1.71

2.71

0.77

0.76

0.50

0.68

0.27

0.42

0.31

0.24

0.26

0.25

0.25

0.06

0.01

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

7.50

7.24

6.32

8.16

6.32

2.63

6.58

4.61

4.47

6.05

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

11.19

35.44

29.77

28.97

28.61

20.74

20.39

14.13

13.10

13.72

6.06

5.07

4.93

4.86

3.48

3.42

2.32

2.14

2.25

1.80

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

Pakistan

Country not part of the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime

5.81

5.38

0.54

0.00

0.67

Mauritius

4.49

3.50

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Countries in the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime

0.32

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Table 4.11 (continued)

5.58

4.73

5.07

4.29

4.13

3.68

3.46

3.09

3.65

3.53

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 107

LE ab, gap to best globally + HLE ab, gap to best globally

9

SRP index SRP index

Variables:

No

Unit

SRP index

11

Gap to gender equality in primary and secondary school enrollment rates (any gender gap)

Gap to gender equality in education

3.13

2.86

0.50

2.45

Israel

UAE

0.80

2.28

Qatar

0.90

0.88

0.88

Countries in the Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime

10

LE ab (any gender gap)

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

9.059

5.298

3.596

SRP index

12

Ratio mean to median wealth per adult adjusted for median wealth (USD) per Pop’n

9.948

5.969

2.016

SRP index

13

Wealth Gini index

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

2.148

4.645

2.466

SRP index

14

Income Gini index adjusted for GDP per cap. PPP

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

2.139

3.814

4.356

SRP index

15

Income Gini index

Income gap (domestic)

29.50

24.24

16.39

Sum of SRP indexes

9 + 10 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15

4.21

3.46

2.34

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(9–15)

Standardized again

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

2.45

1.77

1.35

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Table 4.12 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime, the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime and their performance regarding inequality

108 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

0.61

4.35

1.76

1.43

2.56

0.98

3.02

2.65

Kuwait

Oman

Bahrain

Saudi Arabia 3.11

2.15

4.34

India

0.76

1.12

1.31

0.59

0.64

0.22

0.79

8.479

6.474

6.389

6.657

5.544

6.474

6.330

8.213

10.000

7.801

8.039

5.62

1.59

5.65

6.174

5.917

5.707

6.305

5.862

6.268

5.641

5.411

5.978

5.521

5.482

5.669

6.438

5.210

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

2.397

3.505

3.222

4.021

2.216

3.247

3.402

2.113

5.593

5.593

5.593

5.593

Income gap (domestic)

33.06

34.17

32.59

32.15

29.89

29.38

28.19

26.46

36.65

35.92

34.58

34.14

4.72

4.88

4.66

4.59

4.27

4.20

4.03

3.78

5.24

5.13

4.94

4.88

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

Pakistan

8.269

7.003

6.848

7.183

5.633

6.227

6.434

9.406

9.974

9.406

9.354

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

Country not part of the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime

2.15

5.75

3.97

2.28

4.75

Sri Lanka

3.45

6.14

1.83

Fiji

3.18

4.10

Mauritius

Nepal

3.15

3.49

Bangladesh

Bhutan

Countries in the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime

2.29

0.60

0.56

Gap to gender equality in education

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.12 (continued)

5.58

5.07

4.13

3.46

4.73

3.09

3.68

4.29

3.52

3.53

3.65

3.19

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 109

110

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00

Povertization

Inequality

Dehumanization

Fig. 4.8 Povertization, inequality and dehumanization performance within the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime

theory standpoint, but it also needs to be extended to the realm of descriptive theory, including welfare regime theory. The unique difference of the Extremely Rudimentary Welfare Regime in Africa (plus Haiti) is that the grand dimension of povertization (absolute poverty) is contributing in relative terms much more to the negative record of dehumanization in this group of countries (Fig. 5.1). This finding is very stable and strong across this rather large group of countries, with now 27 member countries. Only Namibia is standing out, as it is marked by a reverse, rather normal in global comparison, situation where inequality trumps povertization in terms of causing dehumanization across the social development spectrum (Tables 4.13 and 4.14). In terms of welfare regime development, and social development in general (including economic development), Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Cabo Verde are far ahead the rest of Africa. Even sharing the Colonial past in general with most of Continental-European-ruled Colonies in Africa, these four countries were treated differently, there were in the backyard, so to speak of their respective Colonial mother countries, Cabo Verde for Portugal, and the other three for France. Migrational ties, and cultural and economic ties, are much stronger in these four countries to their European former mother country than anywhere else in Africa. Tables 4.15 and 4.16 reveal the relative outstanding performance in terms of almost all major dimensions measured in this global data analysis. This case here, among other cases, lends strong support for not only focusing on institutional and political economy-based welfare regime case studies, but also on e.g. data comparisons that measure welfare regime outcomes and performances on the ground.

SRP index

6.24

1.17

1.67

Gabon

Comoros I

6.88

7.10

1.50

Namibia

4.09

5.59

4.00

3.50

Rwanda

Senegal

4.17

2.99

2.71

3.36

2.66

3.92

2.50

3.19

2.99

5.66

Countries in the Extremely Rudimentary Welfare Regime

SRP index

SRP index

SRP index

Unit

4

3.77

4.07

4.33

3.47

3.72

SRP index

5

3.27

6.50

6.19

3.12

2.05

SRP index

6

0.85

0.98

2.10

0.87

0.48

SRP index

7

3

1

No

2

Homicide rate

U5MR & TBI

IMR & MMR

Variables

(% of NCD stunting, M below 5-year-olds)

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Dimensions

Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

8.82

7.63

4.87

5.66

4.47

SRP index

8

Corruption perception index

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

(1–8)

33.35

32.08

31.99

28.56

27.13

5.69

5.47

5.46

4.85

4.60

Sum of SRP index SRP (Average of indexes SRP indexes restandardized)

1+2 +3+ 4+5 +6+ 7+8

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

5.84

5.60

6.99

5.06

5.19

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Table 4.13 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP Indexes) for comparison: The Extremely Rudimentary Welfare Regime and its performance regarding povertization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 111

9.14

8.06

4.00

Congo

8.60

5.59

8.92

4.00

Burundi

5.16

8.50

Angola

7.00

8.00

Madagascar

9.46

8.49

7.74

Guinea-Bissau 3.50

Haiti

8.60

4.00

3.83

Liberia

Guinea

9.46

3.83

6.17

Mali

Togo

6.45

3.67

7.00

Benin

7.74

7.17

Ethiopia

Mauretania

8.39

5.81

3.00

4.00

Cote D’Ivoire

Cameroon

8.60

5.70

1.67

3.00

Djibouti

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Burkina Faso

Dimensions

Table 4.13 (continued)

3.69

5.08

6.17

4.15

6.50

6.77

4.85

4.56

6.21

3.78

6.47

5.41

3.99

5.42

6.35

4.74

4.07

6.98

3.54

4.86

6.55

5.10

4.86

10.00

4.13

4.46

3.13

4.20

5.43

6.13

4.72

3.09

4.43

5.90

5.02

6.72

4.90

4.24

4.84

2.98

4.80

4.64

4.20

4.42

2.57

4.37

2.91

4.70

4.15

4.63

4.15

4.39

4.44

6.88

6.61

6.27

6.72

3.58

3.44

4.96

5.47

3.84

4.80

3.59

5.11

4.97

4.59

4.74

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

0.74

2.42

1.04

1.06

1.01

1.12

0.75

1.03

1.24

1.16

1.26

0.71

0.83

0.73

1.33

1.11

0.75

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

8.29

9.21

9.08

8.03

7.89

7.89

9.08

7.76

7.63

9.08

7.76

6.18

6.58

8.29

6.84

6.32

8.03

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

35.01

46.57

46.15

44.92

44.30

44.04

43.26

42.65

41.19

40.59

40.18

39.55

39.17

38.94

38.78

38.12

37.42

8.02

7.94

7.73

7.62

7.57

7.44

7.33

7.07

6.97

6.90

6.78

6.72

6.68

6.65

6.53

6.41

5.99

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

6.73

7.02

7.79

7.66

6.94

6.40

6.32

7.14

6.07

6.72

5.34

6.82

5.65

6.76

6.55

5.96

6.11

(continued)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

112 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

5.33

Cent. Afr. R

8.72

9.33

6.20

4.66

5.12

6.96

6.08

7.08

6.56

8.11

7.80

4.34

4.67

6.30

3.95

10.00

6.72

6.48

6.67

4.56

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

2.49

1.04

1.49

0.41

1.11

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

8.16

8.82

9.21

8.29

7.37

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

46.79

57.85

53.96

50.76

49.55

10.00

9.32

8.75

8.54

8.06

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

8.39

7.63

9.46

8.00

8.17

D.R.C

Chad

8.49

9.57

7.00

8.17

Niger

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Mozambique

Dimensions

Table 4.13 (continued)

10.00

8.67

7.93

8.32

6.82

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 113

LE ab, gap to best globally + HLE ab, gap to best globally

9

SRP index

Variables:

No

Unit

SRP index

10

LE ab (any gender gap)

SRP index

11

Gap to gender equality in primary and secondary school enrollment rates (any gender gap)

Gender Gap to health gender gap equality in education

SRP index

12

3.19

0.59

4.66

6.47

Ethiopia

Mali

0.00

4.79

Mauretania

4.31

2.11

0.75 6.632

6.089

6.514 7.054

5.375

6.718

SRP index

13

Ratio mean Wealth to median Gini index wealth per adult adjusted for median wealth (USD) per pop’n

Income gap (domestic)

5.760

6.073

5.545

SRP index

14

2.268

2.784

2.165

SRP index

15

Income Gini Income index Gini index adjusted for GDP per cap. PPP

Wealth gap Wealth gap Income gap (domestic- (domestic) (domesticcum-global) cum-global)

Countries in the Extremely Rudimentary Welfare Regime

Right to live global gap

Dimensions:

33.08

30.28

26.48

Sum of SRP indexes

4.73

4.33

3.78

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

9 + 10 + (9–15) 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15

Standardized again

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

6.07

5.65

5.34

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Table 4.14 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP indexes) for comparison: The Extremely Rudimentary Welfare Regime and its performance regarding inequality

114 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

5.90

Togo

5.43

4.10

4.47

6.21

6.61

Benin

3.82

6.53

Cameroon

D.R.C

1.23

4.97

5.93

6.41

Congo

3.25

5.41

Djibouti

Cote D’Ivoire

2.48

2.27

5.03

6.93

Comoros I

0.83

3.98

5.89

4.85

Guinea

4.61

6.03

Rwanda

Haiti

5.39

Gabon

1.98

6.23

6.49

Niger

Burkina Faso

2.86

4.78

Senegal

1.29

1.98

6.19

5.59

Liberia

Madagascar

4.23

6.15

Burundi

5.07

3.52

3.95

2.92

3.56

1.92

3.60

6.34

0.70

2.24

0.83

1.69

1.32

4.93

1.47

0.08

2.70

0.00

Gender Gap to health gender gap equality in education

Right to live global gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.14 (continued)

7.068

7.424

6.727

7.132

7.176

7.717

6.738

7.023

7.632

7.980

7.212

6.725

6.537

6.441

6.855

6.811

6.909

6.414

7.984

8.501

7.209

8.088

7.028

8.889

7.364

7.881

8.915

9.018

8.165

7.494

6.848

6.537

7.597

7.494

7.700

6.408

7.365

7.263

8.042

7.838

6.943

8.209

7.417

5.846

7.656

7.012

7.461

5.881

6.128

6.022

6.856

7.319

6.172

6.728

Wealth gap Wealth gap Income gap (domestic- (domestic) (domesticcum-global) cum-global)

4.871

4.613

6.082

5.773

4.459

6.366

5.258

2.448

5.438

4.356

5.026

3.557

2.861

2.603

4.149

4.742

2.861

3.711

Income gap (domestic)

43.69

42.40

42.32

42.10

40.55

40.26

39.04

38.74

37.85

37.47

37.28

36.63

35.03

34.74

34.57

34.02

33.82

33.64

6.24

6.06

6.05

6.01

5.79

5.75

5.58

5.53

5.41

5.35

5.33

5.23

5.00

4.96

4.94

4.86

4.83

4.81

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

7.14

7.93

6.82

6.76

6.55

6.72

6.11

6.94

5.84

7.02

5.19

5.60

5.96

6.82

5.06

6.73

6.40

6.32

(continued)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 115

7.10

7.75

7.36

7.84

5.96

9.32

Mozambique

Namibia

Cent. Afr. R

5.17

6.93

1.51

1.66

9.44

7.967

8.139

6.772

7.043

6.565

7.003

9.199

9.380

7.442

7.829

7.054

7.829

9.504

9.525

9.139

7.429

8.583

8.438

Wealth gap Wealth gap Income gap (domestic- (domestic) (domesticcum-global) cum-global)

8.247

8.995

7.680

4.923

6.830

6.985

Income gap (domestic)

56.96

51.26

47.63

46.96

46.73

45.99

8.14

7.32

6.80

6.71

6.68

6.57

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

5.79

5.33

2.94

Guinea-Bissau 7.20

Chad

4.47

6.34

Angola

4.92

Gender Gap to health gender gap equality in education

Right to live global gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.14 (continued)

10.00

6.99

8.32

8.67

7.79

7.66

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

116 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

SRP index

4

SRP index

5

SRP index

6

U5MR & TBI

SRP index

7

Homicide rate

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

SRP index

8

Corruption perception index

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

(1–8)

Sum of SRP index SRP (Average of indexes SRP indexes restandardized)

1+2 +3+ 4+5 +6+ 7+8

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

1.29

2.67

2.50

Algeria

Morocco

1.00

1.36

1.65

0.96

1.49

2.24

1.61

1.68

Other countries in the Middle East (plus Egypt)

2.47

0.86

3.01

0.33

Tunisia

Cabo Verde 1.33 4.63

2.09

2.96

2.44

1.76

1.54

1.00

1.00

0.18

0.18

1.56

0.39

6.32

6.84

3.95

5.79

21.46

17.87

16.45

13.30

3.61

2.97

2.73

2.17

Countries that left the Extreme Rudimentary Welfare Regime a long time ago (now moving towards the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime)

SRP index

SRP index

Unit

SRP index

3

2

1

No

(% of NCD stunting, M below 5-year-olds)

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

IMR & MMR

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Variables

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

4.36

3.16

4.63

3.07

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(1–15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Table 4.15 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP indexes) for comparison: Other non-classified countries and their performance regarding povertization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 117

1.51

0.43

2.17

1.67

Iraq

Syria

1.16

1.63

1.15

0.40

0.72

0.94

0.51

5.14

2.01

3.87

1.81

1.09

1.27

0.85

3.66

6.34

1.17

South Africa

4.41

7.53

8.71

1.67

6.17

3.50

Malawi

Kenya

Uganda

9.14

1.67

1.83

Gambia

Ghana

3.98

0.67

Botswana

3.68

3.43

3.40

2.17

3.41

4.81

2.58

4.84

3.37

6.42

4.03

2.47

2.80

3.96

0.50

3.94

3.83

3.88

4.12

4.49

4.26

3.87

4.32

3.19

6.92

3.40

3.79

4.12

1.09

4.29 5.51

1.50

0.97

0.33

0.67

0.68

4.36

5.68

3.39

2.22

2.26

2.28

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Other countries in Africa (former British Colonies)

2.04

0.54

0.17

0.17

1.08

Lebanon

0.67

Iran

0.11

0.54

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Egypt

0.00

1.00

Turkey

Jordan

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Table 4.15 (continued)

1.62

0.64

0.24

4.21

0.70

0.96

1.97

0.28

1.67

0.46

0.47

0.34

0.29

0.54

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

8.03

7.50

7.63

5.79

5.92

6.71

3.68

9.74

8.82

7.24

8.29

8.29

5.13

6.32

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

11.54

38.08

36.84

33.01

32.44

31.13

29.09

26.47

23.80

23.67

20.08

16.90

15.08

11.68

6.53

6.31

5.64

5.54

5.30

4.95

4.49

4.02

3.99

3.36

2.80

2.48

1.89

1.86

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

6.53

6.13

6.14

6.98

5.56

5.33

6.11

4.20

4.32

3.85

3.52

3.40

2.51

3.24

(continued)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

118 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

9.35

10.00

7.53

6.17

6.83

3.00

Sierra Leone

South Sudan

Lesotho

5.57

6.63

1.00

1.94

1.00

1.48

5.31

4.65

6.13

5.56

5.56

4.90

2.56

10.00

2.70

4.51

2.98

2.87

5.75

7.72

5.81

0.58

9.82

6.59

7.28

7.56

4.41

4.29

5.46

5.11

1.66

0.91

1.06

0.93

1.52

2.16

0.74

5.91

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

5.79

6.18

10.00

7.24

8.29

6.58

8.42

7.24

7.24

Sp. poverty creating/ Exacerbating forces

39.68

20.26

53.84

52.04

50.11

47.49

41.21

40.50

39.73

3.39

9.30

8.98

8.64

8.18

7.08

6.95

6.82

6.81

Average SRP index of all dimensions of povertization

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

Jamaica

5.61 3.92

8.95

10.00

8.67

4.50

4.36

4.28

3.53

Poverty Poverty of Poverty Diseases of health of of health malnutrition health poverty care services

Other country (former British Colony)

9.03

7.63

7.33

5.17

6.77

Tanzania

3.83

Zimbabwe

4.62

6.02

Access to improved sanitation facilities (%, pop’n)

Nigeria

5.83

4.33

Zambia

Eswatini

Dimensions Access to improved water sources (%, pop’n)

Table 4.15 (continued)

4.26

9.02

8.49

6.91

7.16

6.12

6.77

7.83

7.81

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 119

LE ab, gap to best globally + HLE ab, gap to best globally

9

SRP index SRP index

Variables:

No

Unit

SRP index

11

Gap to gender equality in primary and secondary school enrollment rates (any gender gap)

Gap to gender equality in education

SRP index

12

Ratio mean to median wealth per adult adjusted for median wealth (USD) per Pop’n

SRP index

13

Wealth Gini index

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

SRP index

14

Income Gini index adjusted for GDP per cap. PPP

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

SRP index

15

Income Gini index

Income gap (domestic)

Sum of SRP indexes

9 + 10 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(9 to 15)

Standardized again

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

1.33

3.93

2.12

2.31

2.25

3.35

Tunesia

Morocco

Algeria

2.83

1.50

1.24 7.348

6.587

6.186 8.165

7.106

8.915

6.530

5.314

4.438

3.943

2.216

0.876

34.29

28.90

25.30

4.90

4.13

3.61

4.36

3.07

3.16

(continued)

SRP index (Average of SRP indexes restandardized)

(1 to 15)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Countries that left the Extreme Rudimentary Welfare Regime a long time ago (now moving towards the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime)

10

LE ab (any gender gap)

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.16 Results of the global spectral data analysis—using standardized relative performance indexes (SRP indexes) for comparison: Other non-classified countries and their performance regarding inequality

120 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

1.84

3.13

Cabo Verde

2.95

4.71

2.28

3.60

1.77

Iran

Iraq

Turkey

2.61

0.64

1.16

5.85

0.70

1.28

1.48

1.35

7.06

Zimbabwe

5.85

2.41

6.66

6.49

5.30

Nigeria

4.39

5.48

Kenya

Uganda

3.84

5.20

5.64

5.26

Gambia

5.12

Ghana

1.77

3.48

Sierra Leone 7.03

Tanzania

0.33

1.58

2.36

0.91

0.84

1.36

0.62

1.00

Other countries in Africa (former British Colonies)

3.84

4.18

3.64

3.69

Syria

Egypt

1.19

4.80

2.03

2.48

Jordan

Lebanon

Other countries in the Middle East (plus Egypt)

7.93

Gap to gender equality in education

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.16 (continued)

6.881

6.971

8.420

7.218

6.611

7.777

6.348

6.525

7.224

5.969

6.649

6.867

6.553

6.812

6.275

8.479

7.623

7.778

9.173

8.243

7.028

8.941

6.253

6.822

8.140

5.349

7.313

7.468

6.951

7.597

6.615

7.054

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

7.520

7.314

5.943

6.884

7.252

6.222

6.924

6.219

5.822

4.818

6.432

4.986

6.059

5.051

5.452

7.797

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

5.180

4.794

2.809

4.278

4.974

3.015

4.201

2.964

4.562

1.366

4.278

1.881

2.990

1.959

2.448

5.928

Income gap (domestic)

40.44

40.40

37.61

37.40

37.17

36.80

32.95

32.33

32.52

31.66

30.60

30.35

30.28

30.05

24.65

42.16

5.78

5.77

5.37

5.34

5.31

5.26

4.71

4.62

4.65

4.52

4.37

4.34

4.33

4.29

3.52

6.02

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

6.77

6.53

7.16

6.13

5.56

5.33

6.12

6.91

3.24

4.32

3.40

3.85

4.20

3.52

2.51

4.63

(continued)

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis 121

7.82

Eswatini

10.00

1.40

3.84

0.93

2.72

1.15

2.48

2.86

1.08

6.954

6.894

8.494

8.489

8.737

8.225

6.441

7.297

8.191

9.742

9.664

9.742

9.897

9.561

6.615

8.295

Wealth gap Wealth gap (domestic- (domestic) cum-global)

7.379

8.840

9.517

10.000

7.641

8.212

7.924

7.653

Income gap (domesticcum-global)

5.490

7.835

8.479

10.000

5.335

7.500

5.696

5.284

Income gap (domestic)

34.43

52.37

52.15

50.77

50.69

47.58

46.92

41.36

4.92

7.48

7.45

7.25

7.24

6.80

6.70

5.91

Average SRP index of all dimensions of inequality (9–15)

Note SPR Index values (0 stand for the best performance in all compared countries, 10 for the worst performance in all compared countries)

Jamaica

Other country (former British Colony)

9.84

5.84

5.56

6.60

10.00

Lesotho

South Africa 5.77

6.36

6.64

Zambia

3.61

6.29

South Sudan 6.63

0.79

6.41

5.63

Malawi

Botswana

Gap to gender equality in education

Right to Gender live global health gap gap

Dimensions:

Table 4.16 (continued)

4.26

7.83

7.81

6.98

9.02

6.11

8.49

6.14

Average SRP index of all dimensions of dehumanization (1–15)

122 4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

Looking at the Empirical Data: The Spectral Data Analysis

123

Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and Iraq do not qualify as a welfare regime member based on the key distinguishing welfare regime characteristics and outcomes of the Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime. Turkey does not either. Nor, does Turkey fit the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime. Some in the past have suggested that Turkey is similar to other Mediterranean countries, e.g. Grütjen (2006). This was also suggested to be the case with Israel, by Gal (2010). Yet, the particular design of the Turkish pension system (a mandatory private pension system) makes this impossible, in terms of thorough, systematic and scientific, reasoning. As regards social exclusion based on ethnic lines, the same is true with Israel (cf esp. Rosenhek 1999, 2000, 2003; Rosenhek and Shalev 2000). There is some movement of the Turkish welfare state system in terms of social assistance development (see Yörük 2022). Yet, from an overall institutional perspective, the situation of women’s welfare in Turkey is au contraire to e.g. that of Italy (cf e.g. Elveren and Agartan 2017; Kocamaner 2018; cf also Maino 2003; Ascoli and Pavolini 2015; Sacchi 2018). The welfare state system in Turkey is changing—yet it still resembles a kaleidoscope of different welfare regimes itself, revealing e.g. also traits the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime (its pension system!), plus some Asian elements as well (cf Bu˘gra and Keyder 2006; Bozça˘ga 2013; Elveren and Agartan 2017; Kocamaner 2018; Canetkin et al. 2021; Yörük 2022, cf also Chow 2004). For the purpose of following the scientific principle of parsimony, and the lack of a clearly identifying welfare regime characteristic in these cases, they for now, theoretically speaking, are somewhere in between welfare regimes. And it is up to many forthcoming researchers and research works, to determine where they are drifting to, or what can or could bring them together, and what tells them apart. More, much more research needs to be conducted also for all the former British colonies of Africa and Jamaica (Tables 4.15 and 4.16), which are all very interesting and diverse cases in general. Here, one can only encourage strong comparative case study analyses and data analyses that help build and check against old and new theories, with regard to especially descriptive theories, plus perhaps also explanatory (e.g. historical or political-economy-based) theories (Fig. 4.9).

124

4 Welfare Regimes and Their Povertization and Inequality Outcomes

12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00

Senegal Rwanda Mauretania Gabon Ethiopia Comoros I. Burkina Faso Mali Djibouti Burundi Liberia Cote D’Ivoire Congo Madagascar average ERWR Cameroon Benin Niger Guinea Namibia Haiti Togo Angola Guinea-Bissau D.R.C. Mozambique Chad Cent. Afr. R.

0.00

Povertization

Inequality

Dehumanization

Fig. 4.9 Povertization, inequality and dehumanization performance within the Extremely Rudimentary Welfare Regime

Chapter 5

Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global Welfare Regimes

As noted early on in this book, we have further developed the theory of Ten Worlds of Welfare Regimes by using the method of theory development (cf Steiner, 1988). And, we have set up two new grand dimensions (that each combine their very own set of variables): The dimensions of povertization and inequality. These were found to be apt to capture welfare regime reality, and welfare state system reality, in every corner of the globe. The Neo-Marxist concept of decommodification does work, but merely in the European context of rich, and more or less social democratic welfare regimes. Here, it is worth pointing out that the welfare states in Continental Europe, though the shape is Christian Democratic in design, were for the most part built by Social Democrats, whom Esping-Andersen never gave their well-earned credit for doing so (cf e.g. Pelinka, 1998; Aspalter, 2001a; Seeleib-Kaiser, Van Dyk and Roggenkamp, 2008). Hence, in this book, we would like to introduce, pursue and apply the concept of povertization, as it—on the contrary to decommodification—has the power to address directly the misery, dilemmas and sufferings of children, women, and families in all part of the world, and not just a rather tiny fraction of it (and especially not just, in essence, the suffering of the average male industrial worker!). On a global scale, it does not make sense to talk, look for and try to analyze decommodification, as most people in the world do not live in any form of social democratically oriented or influenced welfare state systems, most people in the world are not part of the formal labor market, most people in the world live in the remote, rural areas far from cities or in slums within or surrounding those cities. They are not part of high-benefit-and-high-security-bearing social security systems, they do not benefit from social protection, social laws, and high social standards, as people do in Europe (cf esp. e.g. Sumarto, 2017; Barrientos, 2010; Tang, 2009). Other parts of the world are intrinsically different from Europe, in Africa for example about 85 percent of people work in the informal economy, in Asia about two thirds, and in Latin America, about 40 percent. Here, women are overpresented in the workforce of the informal sector (ILO, 2018; Canagarajah and Sethuraman, 2001).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Aspalter, Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0_5

125

126

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

In contrast to the concept of decommodification, the concept of povertization can and does address poverty of women, children and families. Hence, a grand dimension (in comparative analysis) of povertization avoids an overtly great focus on poverty of a standard male production worker who is part of the formal economy, which has been the major criticism of Esping-Andersen’s theory and classification (cf Orloff, 2009, 1996; Bambra, 2007a, 2004; Sainsbury, 2000, 1999, 1994; O’Connor, 1993). The concept of stratification can be applied all over the world, but is not sharp (i.e. well-defined) enough, i.e. it looks at society at a too large a focus, it is operating on a too-high-up perspective. When having ten or so welfare regimes, it makes no sense to classify them all according to how strong the working classes or poor classes are, or how large they are in relative size. Thus, a new more precise and much wider concept hence needs to take its place instead: The wider and more flexibly applicable concept of inequality that is applicable to different kinds of inequality, such as, housing inequality, health inequality, health care inequality, gender LGBTIQ* inequality, employment inequality, and so forth (as one wishes, or needs to do so). When entering upon, and developing yet further, our explanatory multi-theory meta-analysis, we at a glance can see that: each, povertization and inequality, is driven by the same machinery, the same institutionalcum-cultural setup. The institutional setup (or the institutional complex, cf London, 2018) is comprised of institutional outcomes, actions and non-actions that are the product of government policies and non-policies. The corresponding cultural setup is produced, and reproduced day by day a new, by these government institutions themselves, the public media, the social media, and by all sorts of social communications that either oppose or strengthen (support or be neutral to) dominant opinions, attitudes, modes of argumentations, usage of affronting or belittling keywords, as well as any in their effect (not necessarily intention) oppressive theory or thought concept or notion, and so forth.

Together the institutional and the cultural setups of any country (or special region thereof, especially all the ones use their own languages or dialects) drive the building, maintaining, rebuilding, as well as the attacks on and resistance against, welfare state systems and their subsystems, and their features. The institutional-cum-cultural setup of each society is also driving the support of and, at the same time (and even more so), the lack of a united front against: (a) Elitism (their wealth priveleges, financial priveleges, tax priveleges, educational priveleges, and so forth), (b) The slow and multi-faceted, generation-spanning, social exclusion of the masses (including most parts of the middle classes without their knowledge, i.e. conscious realization thereof), (c) Consumerism and capitalism (the devotion of ever-new products and ever-new technologies included), (d) Militarism and dictatorship, plus (e) Practical day-to-day dogmatism (cf e.g. the specific ongoing recent and current corona debates) and/or any kind of long-term dogmatism (be they e.g. religious or political of nature).

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

127

After long and recurrent thoughts, one is inclined to fully support Michel Foucault’s proven historical thesis (Foucault, 1975, 2010) that there is a constant ‘civil war’—and here this does not mean a civil war, in the dictionary or common people’s sense. That is to say, as Foucault has pointed out and demonstrated very clearly, there is a civil war going on of the elites (the have-it-alls) against the broad masses (the have-parts, the have-bits and the have-nothings) (cf e.g. esp. IR, 2019; Schuftan, 2018; Kohli, 2012, Reis, 2012; Francis, 2006; Reis and Moore, 2005; Beckett and Western, 2001; Katz, 1986). It is more a ‘constant struggle’, more or less organized, based on common understandings, common interests and profitsharing, organized inside and outside elite clubs (some of them secret, some not), of e.g. simply golf clubs, at events of high-profile charity organizations, elite business conferences (e.g. Davos, etc.), and the like. Sometimes being friends (friendship economy) and building relationships (guanxi) already goes most of the way in the struggle of the rich and those that are in power (the comparatively less rich, but also very powerful, in the government and parties in charge, judges, corporate managers, corporate lawyers, etc.) to rig the game of what supposed to be fair play, and to foster the perpetuate image of the existence of such (e.g. the American Dream, etc.), or simply make excuses all along (EP, 2018; SCPI, 2016; Spry, 2016; Woods, 2011; Weidenholzer and Aspalter, 2008). One just needs to look at the (past) corona situation around the world being used to strip people of their wealth (through low wages, wage and work cuts, unemployment, consumer inflation, cold tax progression, cold progression in social security contributions, etc.) and freedom (movement, expression, etc.), and to make them feel small and helpless, and to eventually if not immediately wear them down and let them succumb eventually—in the end—to despair, to poverty and inequality (cf Aspalter 2022b, 2023b). A main column of the power base of the elites is that they are able to rely and depend on the workings of the left-and-right political spectrum, to play the middle class, to trick them choosing either side (cf e.g. Korpi and Palme, 1998).

In this way, the game of the left versus the right helps to provide and secure majorities for the elites, who both control the right and the left governments, as the top elites (the super-rich, and hence super powerful) are the people behind that control those governments. Thus, in reality, based on hard-fact material interests and benefits, there is but one dichotomy: The elites versus the non-elites. This ‘silent and constant top-down (and seldom down-up) civil war’ (in Foucauldian theory) or ‘constant struggle by the elites and privileged’ needs to be more understood like a “deep society”—as in deep state, but now spread farther in all important parts of society, too. And it is this deep society that is constantly working to manipulate and influence (change the key messages of the day, etc.) communication through media (and indirectly through the government and their media actions, or media-worthy actions), the making of laws and rules (through professional and private lobbying, friendship economy, and meddling of all sorts), and so forth.

This “deep society” is binding society and social progress in a very antihumanitarian sense. Thus, the therefrom-resulting “bound society” is the product

128

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

of an elite-based cum class-based struggle of the top against all else (for the notion of binding, see the idea and behavioral economics theory of bound rationality by Nobel Prize Winner Herbert Simon, 1955, 1957). There are many forms of institutions, social actors and social actions that produce many different shapes and qualities of bound societies, also many different designs and sizes of welfare state systems—and with it, different designs and performances of welfare regimes. These particular welfare state institutions and policy settings are created by distinct atmospheres: the matrixes of povertization and inequality. These particular institutional and policy environments—or matrixes—that bring about different shades and forms of povertization and inequalities of all sorts are, most of the time, more or less unique to each ideal-typical welfare regime. There may be a range of difference in between welfare state systems of each ideal-typical welfare regime, in some cases also a rather wide range of difference. But, these ranges of difference are then all within the measure of being “more or less fits”—as this is what ideal types do, and are supposed to do, i.e. how they function, and are able to function as analytical tools (cf e.g. Arts, 2020).

In the above, the special sets of special regime characteristics and bandwidth of regime outcomes have been analyzed in greater detail. These make up the distinctiveness of each ideal–typical welfare regime. When applying the perspective of an extremely high-flying bird (applying e.g. a satellite’s perspective), in the following, we see that each ideal–typical welfare regime in global comparison also possesses its very own “overall/collective welfare regime characteristics that only can be seen within—and in comparison with—the group of ten welfare regimes altogether.” This can only be seen when applying a truly global perspective, and in this case a truly global data analysis (see Figs. 5.1 and 5.2). These grand welfare regime characteristics or macro-regime characteristics, as we may call them, are in fact special overall characteristic that set apart this or that ideal-typical welfare regime from all (or most) of the rest of ideal-typical welfare regimes around the globe that there have been identified.

To be sure, there are—and there ought to be—welfare state systems that are located outside an ideal–typical welfare regime, alone travelling or group travelling welfare state systems, or simply lone-star type of welfare state systems. Some are in a state of change, or transition, from one welfare regime to another. The one or other fails to decide which way to go, and marks hereby its own path or position within the universe of welfare regimes. The two grand dimensions introduced in this study, and the set of variables that are representing (in one way, certainly not the only way) each grand dimension, are helping to unveil the curtain that for the most part, and in general, hides the inner workings of each welfare regime and its matrix of specific mixes of policies, institutions and outcomes. Together this two grand dimensions embody and reveal ill-guided and ill-applied social policies and its institutions and their unintended consequences.

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

129

8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00

INEQUALITY

POVERTIZATION

Fig. 5.1 Results of the global spectral data analysis for the ten ideal–typical welfare regimes: Revealing the global inequality gap

THE DEHUMANIZATION MATRIX (of the two grand dimension of povertization and inequality, SRP indexes) 8.00 ERWR

7.00

6.00

5.00

SUWR

4.00

AWCWR

3.00

SRWR

PWCWR

2.00 S/CWR

EBWR

1.00

CDWR NLWR

SDWR

0.00 0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

Fig. 5.2 The ten ideal–typical welfare regimes and the Dehumanization Matrix—The two grand dimension of povertization and inequality (SRP indexes; X axis = inequality, Y axis = povertization)

130

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

Dehumanization, here, should be understood to stand for: The workings and the outcomes of historical-cum-institutional indecency of human conditions, including manifestations, upkeep, and continuous endurance thereof .

The purpose of the two grand dimensions of povertization and inequality is to refract the light of each welfare regime in a way that the distinct shades and patterns of dehumanization become visible (cf in part Resnick et al., 2018). Looking at the kaleidoscope (conspicuous patterns that are slowly shifting over time) of outcomes (or ‘emissions’) of each welfare regime, we look at the essence, at the larger differences of this or that welfare regime to other ideal–typical welfare regimes (groups welfare state systems) (cf Kalberg, 2012: 123). Another way to identify the applied method is to compare it with e.g. different kinds of spectral analyses. The idea of spectral analysis has already taken hold of in e.g. time/space-domain data analysis regarding e.g. business cycles and a sheer endless multitude of other applications (see Fourier spectral analysis, e.g. Iacobucci, 2003). In social sciences, as it is pursued in this book, the method of spectral data analysis is similar to that of its e.g. physics counterpart (which is measuring far-away objects by the data that they emit by way of light, radio or gamma waves, e.g. by analyzing their composition and wave lengths, cf e.g. NASA, 2013).

Nonetheless, the context of the research object and the handing of data is different, as we (in social science) are inside, or we can look from the inside onto—in this case— welfare state systems, or welfare regimes, and we are overloaded with available data, but yet the first-choice data we would like to have in the first place are not available (or not yet, at least) in a very direct manner, at least not all of them, and especially not in all countries around the earth, in every single one of them. The problem in social sciences is to plan the spectral data analysis and apply theory, since everything in social science is more complex and there is a greater number of theories than physics is working with (cf Max Planck’s comment cited in King, 2014: 25).

In social sciences, we deal with the selection of sets of dimensions and sets of variables that are then in the following being constructed, analyzed and interpreted— while in e.g. physics the data e.g. obtained from a distant black hole, is decomposed into its components, and then analyzed and interpreted (or as in Fourier analysis, the data is decomposed and transformed, and then re-expressed in a standard way, cf e.g. Percival, 2021). What is same however is using data to trace and retrace the existence of objects and their key substances they are made of .

In our case these are e.g. key policy paradigms or e.g. different types of social security systems, and different levels of security provided, at different costs, and with different side effects here and there. The effects and follow-on effects of—i.e. the outcomes of—the research objects under scrutiny become visible through the application of complex and/or innovative data analysis.

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

131

By analyzing the outcomes (or ‘emissions’) one can now analyze the research objects themselves.

To begin with we had the same problem constellation at hand, in physics and in social sciences (here, social policy), we could not travel to (get close to) and measure directly a black hole in a distant galaxy (or in our galaxy), and we could not get all the data we wished for from all countries (over 150 countries) on gender inequality regarding informal work arrangements (child-raising, unpaid domestic work, providing long-term care, etc.), inequality in the quality of education, inequalities caused by different tax regimes and social security regimes, inequalities caused by different housing and land-ownership regimes and histories thereof, the direct and detailed effects of more or less set-up (different coverage in terms of population, risks, benefits, and time) and differently set-up division-based (Bismarckian) social insurance, as well as the direct and detailed effects of (in many cases) a myriad of asset- and means-tested social assistance and social services systems, and so forth (cf e.g. Aspalter, 2021, 2014; Roumpakis, 2020; Altiraifi, 2020; Midgley and Aspalter, 2017; Ferrara, 2014; Bloomberg, 2013; Landy, 2013; Brady, 2009; Howard, 2003; Laffer, 1984). By composing different grand dimensions of e.g. povertization and inequality out of numerous dimensions and sub-dimensions (and their underlying variables), we have found ways—with the employment of the Standardized Relative Performance (SRP) Index method—to measure and compare the exact distances of performances within given groups of countries (with static membership of countries in this group of e.g. 155 countries) in each of these constructed sub-dimensions, dimensions, grand dimensions and super dimensions. Together, these allow us now to measure ideal–typical welfare regimes across all of the 155 countries included in this global data analysis, and hereby: (i)

To determine the relative performances among all countries within each welfare regime, (ii) To determine the relative performance of each of them in relation to other countries outside their welfare regimes, and (iii) To determine the relative performance of each welfare regime (or group of countries) in relation to other welfare regimes (or other group of countries). With these two new grand dimensions, we can now for the first time determine ideal–typical regime membership on a global scale to full extent (i.e. which countries in full belong to this or that welfare regime), using the method of checking against constructed ideal types (in the Weberian sense), as we now can measure performances exactly (when using the method of comparison and SRP Indexes). Hence, the difference is this, whereas in physics (and chemistry, etc.) data is being decomposed from the compound data obtained, in social sciences we construct our compound data out of the data we have (more or less) readily available. That is to say, in social science data is being constructed—not decomposed (or mathematically reconstructed thereafter) as in the natural sciences, that is, the workflow is generally a different one.

132

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

Nevertheless, both (social sciences and natural sciences) are following the same goal: To measure exactly the existence, the substances, the attributes and the effects of the research objects under scrutiny.

In the very near future, the fast-evolving field of data science, for sure, will drive new developments in global (and universal) data analysis. Automated textualcum-numerical data analysis is the next level of research enterprise, and so are the application of artificial intelligence and digitalized data analysis solutions on the way. The application of two separate grand dimensions, as conducted above, allows us to look at the inner workings and systemic outcomes of ideal–typical welfare regimes from a two-dimensional space. Instead of a one-dimensional ladder, we have a twodimensional football field (cf Aspalter, 2006b), where welfare regimes can be exactly placed, and the exact location of each welfare regime on this football field is a precise representation of its relative total (composite) performance (see Fig. 5.2 below); and their relative movements can now, in later studies, also be determined and analyzed. The greatest findings of using this global spectral data analysis, among the possible collection of findings, is that inequality is a global menace! Most welfare regimes are daunted by the sheer discrepancy between relative poverty and relative inequality. Also, economically more advanced countries, here and there, suffer from relative very weak performances marked by high levels of inequality, among which are Germany, the United States and Sweden. Theoretically, after employing logic and global empirical observations, it can be concluded that inequality is generally the precursor of poverty and the outcomes of povertization (cf also especially Mendes, 2015; Casas Herrera, 2017). For the matter of retesting the earlier established Ten Worlds of Ideal-Typical Welfare Regimes Theory, the global spectral data analysis yet again strengthened its propositions and predictions, that each of them occupies a different position on the Dehumanization Matrix (the football field, that is the result of placing welfare regime outcomes, that of the grand dimension of povertization and inequality on two different axis). More importantly, each position of these welfare regimes in the Dehumanization Matrix corresponds rather perfectly (in the ideal-typical, Weberian sense) to the predicted, theoretical outcomes of the earlier constructed ten world of welfare regime theory. This e.g. can be clearly seen in the positive impact of universalism on welfare regimes as a whole (in terms of outcomes), to different to-be-expected degrees, across the group of ten welfare regimes. In addition, the generally expected levels of povertization and inequality also strongly confirm (and not contradict) the general previous findings of earlier studies by the author, as well as also dozens of additional studies by a multitude of other authors who specialized in respective welfare state systems under scrutiny (cf e.g. Aspalter, 2017a, 2020a). As a result, we are dealing here with unique overall (welfare regime) features, and unique overall (welfare regime) outcomes, of each ideal-typical welfare regime. That is to say, apart from having a set of ‘individual’ welfare regime traits for each idealtypical welfare regime (see Chap. 3 above), we now also have ‘collective’ traits of each

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

133

ideal-typical welfare regime within the overall accumulation of ten ideal-typical welfare regimes (cf Figs. 5.1 and 5.2).

To be clear, universal benefits have been found to have a lasting global impact on well-being of citizens ruled by universal or partially-universal-benefits-and-servicesbased welfare regimes. The Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime suffers—apart from the worst-outcome prone Extremely Rudimentary Welfare Regime across Africa (plus Haiti)—the least relative problem of inequality (as it lays close to the 45-degree line in Fig. 5.2 below). Also, the former socialist welfare regimes, now identified and embodying the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime, is still marked by a-bit-stronger outcomes in terms of equality across the board. Also, matching the theoretical prediction of universalism having good effects on relative overall equality performances of ideal-typical welfare regimes, the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime, now being extended significantly in terms of membership is located rather close to the 45-degree axis in Fig. 5.2, confirming general theoretical predictions and the previous body of conclusion that universalism is on the rise in South Asia, plus Mauritius and Fiji, which also belong to the group of Slightly Universal Welfare Regime, apart from Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Nepal, India and Bangladesh. The Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime throughout East Asia (including Southeast Asia) is although being conservative in terms of political welfare doctrines pro-welfare oriented (as they are pragmatic and want to win elections and/or want to stay in power). Here, governments are concentrating welfare state expenditure more on social investment-oriented purposes, especially health care, education and (here and there) housing. Universalism is on the rise in this part of the world (Aspalter, 2006a). Hence, the group of East Asian welfare state systems, even being conservative, is performing rather well in terms of overall welfare outcomes (which is being pulled down quite a bit by the poor performances of Indonesia and Mongolia, which are also marked by substantial progress, fast and relative progress respectively). The Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime in most of Central and South America is found to live up to its name, as inequality is rampant throughout the continent, depending on the earlier identified inner workings of welfare state systems in this part of the world. Brazil, as evidence is pointing out clearly, is a very low performer in this group; which is opposes the (non-empirical) finding of e.g. Huber (1996) that Brazil would be some sort of social democratic welfare regime. Aspalter (2017a, 2020a) and the data below make unmistakably clear, that this is not the case. While institutionally speaking, Brazil is a very satisfactorily pure example of an Anti-Welfare Conservative welfare state system, the data gathered here however show an even darker picture of how severe inequality is hampering human well-being in Brazil, one of the largest countries on earth. The same is true of Russia, also within the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime, the data, here too, suggest a deterioration of overall welfare/well-being outcomes in relative terms to the rest of the group of countries in the same ideal-typical welfare regime, i.e. even well before the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine(!). Apart from

134

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

that, the member countries of the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime reveal a strong group coherence in general, across the board, for most variables (of course while applying a high-flying bird’s view, an ideal-typical perspective in welfare state system comparison). The overall position of the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime in the Dehumanization Matrix still reflects decades of socialist policies of the past, as can be and should be expected from the mainstream theoretical analysis. The data of the Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime do not fully show the nature of this particular welfare regime, as per definition of its main characteristic—i.e. being strongly exclusionary in terms of the populations (especially large foreign workforce, plus other parts of the domestic population). This welfare regime’s data only represents domestic populations, and not e.g. the majority workforce of e.g. the United Arab Emirates that is mostly coming from South Asian countries. Hence, the overall inequality, or total inequality, of all people living and working in these countries is not represented to full extent, and more data and more investigations (as well as many more in-depth case studies) into this subject matter are strongly needed.

Empirical Data Versus Hijacked Realities of Thought The global spectral data analysis, on top, also revealed the relative weak (relative poor) performances of the United States, Germany, and Sweden, among their respective group of welfare regime, especially in terms of inequality. Among the three ‘original’ welfare regimes (of Esping-Andersen, 1990), overall, the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime is a bit better in terms of achieving more equality than the overall Neoliberal Welfare Regime, on average that is. But due to the new acquisitions in terms of extended membership also to Eastern Central and Southeast of Europe, the povertization record of the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime, is expectedly lower in terms of performance than the small group of very rich Anglo-Saxon countries in the Neoliberal Welfare Regime. The original three welfare regimes, if seen from an ideal-typical perspective, are to be kept in place not only theoretically, but also are being kept in place (and supported that is) by empirical data of this rather comprehensive spectral data analysis. The purpose of theories is not be theoretical, to be different from the empirical. Quite to the contrary, theories are there—they are made and serve—to guide practice, to help societies (i.e. to help scientists, politicians, and experts to help societies).

The thing with Kuhn’s (1970a) general theory of paradigms, or corridors of thought (or generously loose straitjackets of thought), is that they can also, and very neatly so, be applied in the history, even contemporary history, of any given field of science, such as e.g. social policy here. As our above, empirical quantitative data analysis revealed very demonstratively, facts that run counter to strongly established thought or ideas are often pushed aside and ignored, especially when it seems rather or very inconvenient to explain, or

Empirical Data Versus Hijacked Realities of Thought

135

when it would mandate to change current dominant thought, dominant ideas, i.e. mainstream theories as well as general perceptions. Sweden, Germany, or the United States are known to serve as textbook examples of what is a welfare state, and/or what this or that welfare regime is looking alike. But, the realities on the ground, when the spotlight is thrown onto empirical reality itself, is rather different. Especially, this is the case when time or imagination are slowly or rather abruptly hijacking theoretical realities that are miles apart from empirical realities. For this reason, throughout the making of the Ten Worlds Theory, the theory itself has been and needs to, continuously, be matched to and checked against empirical realities on the ground, all over the world, as much often as possible, by as many researchers as possible, from as many angles and perspectives as possible, and with as many methods as possible. During the above global spectral analysis, it came to light once more, and in even more clarity as before, that e.g. Sweden has the worst degree of domestic wealth inequality among all countries of these three welfare regimes (also including the numerous new members in the Christian Democratic welfare regime), to be followed by the United States, and then by Cyprus, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, Germany and Czechia (as per Credit Suisse data, see Tables 3 and 5). Hence, it is vital—and highly rewarding scientifically and theoretically speaking—to conduct more empirical data analysis and to focus more on, and integrate more, their latest findings.

As these new findings that came to light here suggest, scientists are often too content with the dominant conclusions (and elaborations/opinions, etc.), i.e. the perceived state-of-the-art in academic discourse. They thus get pulled away here and there from reality by quoting one another (hundreds and thousands of times), or over-emphasizing “thought-to-be-realities”, or e.g. adding perhaps a bit of additional (non-true) ‘thought-to-be-truth’ each time—resulting thus in ‘wandering’ degrees of thought-to-be-realities. This can also happen e.g. with traditional versions of ideal types of welfare regimes à la Esping-Andersen, or any deductively-composed or deductively-understood ideal types in general; as Giuliano Bonoli has importantly pointed out recently (2021). This is particularly the case with Sweden, when we talk about actual/factual gender equality on the ground (cf e.g. especially Esping-Andersen, 2016), or equality in general in Sweden (see the detailed data analysis above, Table 3). On top, to give another example here, there are cases where scientific observers can get carried away by overstressing and/or misinterpreting parts of reality. For example, mixing up the talk of politicians, their party affiliations, party names with their policy actions, policy contents and policy outcomes, i.e. with welfare state realities on the ground, as the case of Brazil especially (cf Huber’s social democratic model in Latin America thesis, cf Aspalter, 2020d; Huber, 1996) is just one case of how thoughts and theoretical believes can hijack—and are hijacking—themselves and with it science, in the long run science as a whole, and possibly transform into Kuhnian normal science on the way (Kuhn, 1970a,b; cf also Van Kersbergen, 2019).

136

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

The Reality and Concept of Dehumanization: Letting the Data Speak After we have descended deeper into each of these two dimensions of povertization and inequality in the previous chapter, one can come to understand that there needs to be, and there is, an overarching theoretical construct that connects and transcends the two. Going back to an earlier work of Aspalter (2006b), the dimensions of dehumanization and freedom would offer themselves for the task ahead of us to capture the reality, the inner workings and the outcomes of welfare regimes around the world, in all parts of the world, as they are (cf also Mohan, 1984, 1985, 1992, 1993, 2007, 2011; Mohan and Sharma, 1985). These concepts and social indicator dimensions, as it happens were also used in (developed for) a quantitative social indicator analysis (Aspalter, 2006b), which at that time was coupled with the attempt to develop social development theory, i.e. to replace a one-dimensional space (of e.g. the Human Development Index) with a two-dimensional space of social development, where one can capture and demonstrate historical and international changes of different development strategies at the same time. While the concept of freedom is individually-cum-culturally speaking more flexible (and necessarily so, to adhere to the principles of self-determination, on personal as well as societal level), the concept and (super)dimension of dehumanization is of particular usefulness in the task that concerns us here. On the other hand, having only a one-dimensional space (or spectrum) of dehumanization e.g. would, and is, too small a space to spread out possibly ten, or so, welfare regimes, but it has the advantage, later on, in normative perspective, to help to better understand the dehumanizing degree and/or dehumanizing aspects of each welfare regime under scrutiny, or of all of them in comparison. Then again, this is for further future studies up to decide, and pursue. A little taste of the usefulness of this super dimension of dehumanization is given in the following, to entice perhaps further studies and elaborations on the effects of welfare states systems on the decency and humanity in different welfare regimes, or in general, around the world. For better understanding of the historical and political forces behind this super dimension of dehumanization, we make a little excursion from the more or less pure descriptive path and overall goal of the book, in order to substantiate the existence and justification of the aggregate super dimension of dehumanization, which can—if one likes and finds it useful—be split up into two grand dimensions of povertization and inequality, nothing less, nothing more. That is to say, we now entering a bit the normative world of evaluating social policy outcomes of ideal–typical welfare regimes. Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) was not holding back when showing strong support or strong distain for this or that ideal type of welfare capitalism (or welfare regime). The Scandinavian model, being a NeoMarxist and a Dane, was his clear favorite, while the Continental European model was not, and got criticized (cf also Manow, 2004). In real life the two (the original members of these two welfare regimes, as of 1990), however, in terms of social

The Reality and Concept of Dehumanization: Letting the Data Speak

137

welfare outcomes are very close to one another, due to the fact that when levels of welfare benefits are very high, and coverage (time and type of costs, etc.) are high, and the range of programs offered are really comprehensive (sheer all-including). In our new, and vastly extended, group of 19 Christian Democratic Welfare Regime countries, the range is different from the original small group of a handful of Western European countries (on the far north-western corner of the European Continent) plus Italy in the 1990 study of Esping-Andersen. The numerical size of countries in each group does have an impact on the overall spread of ideal–typical welfare regimes, in general (see particular the case of the Extreme Rudimentary Welfare Regime across Africa). This needs to be accounted for and recognized when looking at and evaluating the results in Tables 4.1 to 4.16 above. When comparing the Social Democratic and the Christian Democratic Welfare Regimes directly one to another, on top, it is important to note that it does not matter so much how the benefit entitlements are granted or how the money travels, as long as there is plenty of it. The high decommodification scores (however troublesome they turned out to be, cf Scruggs and Allan, 2003, 2006) for the Netherlands and Austria in Esping-Andersen’s 1990 book are also proof of that. But then again, it is not a secret at all, that life is—generally, i.e. by and large—relatively good and welfare is relatively good in countries belonging to the original (or now the north-western part of the current) Christian Democratic Welfare Regime. That is especially the case in the far north-western corner of Continental Europe, but certainly not only, see e.g. in recent times very much improved good welfare performance of welfare state systems in Slovenia, Slovakia, Italy and Spain. This is true, despite the connotations of Esping-Andersen’s work that the original Christian Democratic Welfare Regime would be a very undesirable kind (Manow, 2004) within the three welfare regimes identified. Here, hence, we have chosen a more scientific approach (than in general discussions of the good, the bad and the ugly; cf Manow, 2004), that is, to let the data, the empirical evidence do the job of evaluating, for the purpose not of finger pointing (not at all), but for the purpose of better analytical understanding of how the outcomes and the inner workings of welfare regimes are around the world, in all parts of the world. It is important to understand what they do, and more important what they do not do. Looking at Fig. 5.3, we can see the reality of how humanity fares, with and through its forms of welfare capitalism, i.e. welfare regimes, that are different and form and control societies in complex, but yet in the end very visible ways (due to realities on the ground, as well as the spectral data analysis e.g. conducted in this book). Those realities are now being able to be measured and compared exactly, to one another, as the method of Standardized Relative Performance Indexes is enabling just that. All in all, the overall outcome of povertization and inequality of numerous separate dimensions, sub-dimensions, and variables applied puts the Social Democratic Welfare Regime, as a whole, clearly ahead of the other two original welfare regimes (of Esping-Andersen in 1990). While the overall performance of the Neoliberal Welfare Regime in terms of the inequality grand dimension has been worsened a

138

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

The Performance of Each Ideal-Typical Welfare Regime 8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00

POVERTIZATION

INEQUALITY

DEHUMANIZATION

Fig. 5.3 Measuring Dehumanization: Letting the Data Be the Judge of Ideal–Typical Welfare Regime Performances (SPR Indexes of povertization, inequality, and the combined super-dimension of dehumanization)

great deal by the performance of the United States alone, the overall performance of these five rather very rich countries still (barely) beats the overall performance of the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime. This is so because in the past the membership circle of the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime has been extended already to include some Eastern Central European welfare state systems, most notably Poland, Czechia, Hungary, and Slovenia (Aspalter, Kim and Park, 2009). But, even more so, as now other countries, like Slovakia and Croatia have joined, as well as Greece and Cyprus, in the very southeast of Europe. Time, in terms of a country’s development path, does matter. Hence, many of those countries still deal with poverty issues due to late economic development, or yet lesser economic development—especially more severe health problems and high levels of corruption problems in particular, also combined with general wealth inequality problems. Interesting is that the average of welfare regime performance of the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime is being pulled down by Germany, as it finds itself in the middle of below average performers. The East of the Christian Democratic Welfare Regime has merged with the West; and the North and the South have also merged—i.e. approached each other from both directions each.

The Reality and Concept of Dehumanization: Letting the Data Speak

139

Yet, another revealing finding (i.e. true revelation really) is the positive performance of the Cuban welfare state system, i.e. the Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime. For health care insiders, this does not come as a surprise, though, as Cuba is well known for quality human health care skills, reflecting both good health care services (especially when considering the economic bare minimum, in terms of finances available, and the economic sanctions still imposed by the United States). Now we have three spheres in the ten worlds of welfare regimes in terms of humanization (lack of dehumanization) outcomes. The first four ideal–typical welfare regimes (the Social Democratic, the Neoliberal, the Christian Democratic, and the Socialist/Communist welfare regimes) are now forming the “First Sphere” of welfare regimes. The “Second Sphere” of welfare regimes comprises the Exclusion-Based Welfare Regime of rich oil-exporting countries in the Middle East, plus Israel; the Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regimes in East Asia, the Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime in most former Soviet Union republics, the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime in South Asia, plus Mauritius and Fiji; and the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime across Central and South America. The last sphere is sadly occupied by the Extremely Rudimentary Welfare Regime that covers most former Continental European Colonies in Africa, plus Liberia and Haiti. The positions of each welfare regime, from a dynamic point of view, of the Second Sphere of welfare regimes are changing. Their relative positions already reflect this perfectly (‘relative perfectly’ is ‘perfectly’ in ideal–typical sense). The very rich countries, where the excluded populations (due to the very nature of these systems themselves) are not covered by the national data provided by IGOs and other sources, are performing on the very upper end. For the Pro-Welfare-Conservative Welfare Regime, the recent data (by Credit Suisse, 2021) is revealing a deterioration of wealth inequalities across the board as countries are getting richer—which is contradicting and proofing wrong the Kuznets curve (Jayasuriya, 2017; Alvaredo et al., 2013; Piketty, 2006; Kuznets, 1955), while vindicating the findings of Piketty (2014). In addition, the yet poor povertization performances of two countries in particular, poor and population-dense Indonesia, as well as poor and climate-prone Mongolia, have been pulling down the overall group’s performance. Their positive direction in terms of welfare state system construction (in the case of Indonesia) and the overall relative social spending levels (in case of Mongolia) are making them still, though being strong outlayers (having more-or-less-fits are the main purpose of ideal types), members of this group of Pro-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime. The Selective Rudimentary Welfare Regime is ranging right in the middle of this Second Sphere of welfare regimes. As certain welfare areas have been selected politically to be maintained and nurtured, while the rest are being neglected (for various different reasons, across different countries in this larger group). The past—i.e. the history of socialism, and the history of the Socialist/Communist Welfare Regime in these countries—is still being echoed in the relative not so bad performances (relatively speaking) across the board. Men’s health problems, and strong corruption problems, are at the forefront of dehumanization outcomes within this group of

140

5 Distinct Shades and Patterns of Dehumanization: Mapping Global …

welfare state systems. The lead position of Belarus is worth noting, and worth investigating further, with a series of studies; as is the worst (and yet worsening due to the war) performance of Russia among this group of countries, and particularly where in Russia (West of the Ural, Siberia, or the Far East, and where exactly) poverty and inequality—and hence dehumanization—are being allowed to reign. Due to the positive effects of the new group memberships of especially Mauritius, but also Bhutan and Fiji, within the rim of the Slightly Universal Welfare Regime, this welfare regime’s overall performance has outperformed a bit that of the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime. Also, the new extended welfare regime membership of the Anti-Welfare Conservative Welfare Regime—now comprising many new, and many much poorer, countries—has also pulled it down, now to the lowest position with this Second Sphere of welfare regimes. The very larger number of group members, necessarily, also increased the spread of country performances. This outcome is common also to the Extremely Rudimentary Welfare Regime. Nevertheless, this is counted for in an ideal-type theory, as not only averages rule, but more so institutional coherence (especially e.g. the design and workings of social security institutions, etc.), while coherent political and welfare ideologies are also important, and hence factored in accordingly. The overall last position of the Extremely Rudimentary Welfare Regime in Africa (plus Haiti) is predicted, as is the relative similarity of the severity of both the grand dimension of povertization and the second grand dimension of inequality. This is due to the incomplete nature of e.g. Gini indexes, as they do not distinguish equality among worst levels of poverty from equality among well-off or rich populations.

Conclusion From the results of the global spectral data analysis it follows that the theoretical predictions of the earlier set up Ten Worlds Theory are from an ideal-typical point of view fully (i.e. “fully enough” or “rather perfectly”) in line with the empirical results of this global quantitative data analysis. For this reason, the Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism Theory is further consolidated and substantiated by this comprehensive and most-inclusive (in terms of welfare state systems) global data analysis (cf also Aspalter, 2020d). Apart from strong and comprehensive data findings, this and the previous chapter have also set up and developed again further an explanatory meta theory centering upon Michel Foucault’s constant civil oppression thesis by governing and dominating elites (or “civil war” thesis) that explains why there is so much inequality in the world, across the world—and with it, why there is so much poverty and lack of proper social policies especially in the poor and non-rich parts of the world, but also in the hearts of otherwise very rich societies.

Part III

Normative/Concluding Part

Chapter 6

Back to the Future: Income Polarization, Mass Povertization and Simple Ways out of It

This beginning of the last part of the book (Chaps. 6 and 7) brings us to yet a very distinct world of theory development, that of normative (i.e. evaluative and prescriptive) theory development. There are, to note, different ways to perceive normative theory. Over the last decade, a rising number of studies (cf. Aspalter 2010, 2014; Walker and Aspalter 2015; Midgley 2013, 2017; Aspalter and Teguh-Pribadi 2017; Aspalter et al. 2017; Kim and Aspalter 2021; cf. also Lister 2010) have spearheaded accounting-style/business-consulting-style normative theory development. It roots go back to, and it is backed by, the development of normative theory of Developmental Social Policy, which centers around the works of Sherraden (1991, 2005), Midgley (1995, 2013), Midgley and Sherraden (1997), Midgley and Aspalter (2017), as well as Huang et al. (2021). This new rising, paradigmatic normative theory in Steiner’s terms provides a perfect “developmental bridge” between theory and practice (Steiner 1988: 4), as it is not only built on, shaped by and developed according to the empirical world, but also chiefly functions to inform, guide and change social policy practice all along the way. Developmental Social Policy theory, hence, is covering (a) universal policy imperatives, (b) social policy lessons, (c) technical and policy-specific guidance, as well as (d) improved social policy solutions (that includes health policy, education policy, employment policy, housing policy, and so forth).

In the following, we will draw heavily upon (as it is proving to be useful, comprehensive and powerful at the same time, for the purpose in question) the findings and paradigmatic imperatives of Developmental Social Policy theory. In developing normative theory yet further, this chapter provides the rational and imperative for large-scale and lasting social policy changes and the next chapter is going deeper into the subject matter, and gives broader, feasible and effective answers to the global inequality and povertization dilemma. Again, in doing so, we are here now applying a (non-statistical) meta-analysis: a normative theory-developing meta-analysis. In general, it is one thing to study and analyze the past and the present state of welfare regimes around the world, and their real life-and-death-determining outcomes. However, it is an entirely different thing altogether, when one looks © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Aspalter, Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0_6

143

144

6 Back to the Future: Income Polarization, Mass Povertization and Simple …

towards the future. In old-age income maintenance policy one needs to look up to 40 years into the future to be able to react and change or build a new pension or any other old-age income security system, and to let it fully mature in the meanwhile. In labor market and population policy, it takes about on average 20 years to be able to have a future generation of workforce that e.g. can counteract the forces of too fast and/or a too high degree of societal aging. With health policy, it will take many years to fight back the onslaught of Covid crisis around the world, as it takes many years to fight back the other pandemics that are circling the globe. Diabetes (and its follow-on diseases, esp. cardiovascular diseases, etc.), cancer and arthritis are the most notorious, most deadly, the most debilitating and/or most pain-inflicting of them all; especially when looking at domino-like causal linkages among them, and countless follow-on and accompanying diseases (WHO 2021c; CDC 2021; Martínez et al. 2020; AF 2019; SD 2017; Huang et al. 2016). With climate change, with its world poverty causing and world inequality causing effects, things are going to get much worse down the road further into this century. Every year anew, weather extremes and weather calamities are dishing out misery, causing deaths, injuries, fright and despair. That there are new deadly, dehumanizing, poverty-magnifying and poverty-intensifying effects is not a surprise for any common person around the world. Surprising however are only the particularities, intensities and of course the non-discriminating localities, timings and frequencies thereof. To be clear, climate change is already globally on massive scales and in regularly frequent schedules devastating the lives of millions—hundreds, or tens or hundreds of thousands here and there through tornadoes, storms, floods, etc. and millions everywhere through heat waves, draughts, typhoons, hurricanes, medicanes, etc. (Burggraf 2021; WHO 2021b; WMO 2021; Borunda 2021; UN 2020; Geruso and Spears 2018). These new phenomena are causing life-long poverty on ever-more massive and in essence (personally and socially) unpredictable scale. With this book it would be not necessary to talk about normative aspects of social policy making today and in the years and decades ahead, as one could leave it to other books to analyze, debate and remedy the very same. But the experience with the 1990 book of Esping-Andersen has taught many that most people—especially also researchers—are looking for more answers and solutions than the scope of any book could (and should perhaps) ever provide. To go a bit along that way, and since it really makes sense when looking into the immediate future, not only for scientists, social policy makers, practicing professionals and administrators, but also the general public alike, we shall throw a meta-analytical spotlight on the normative world of social policy science, without repeating everything that has been concluded or elaborated before (for a summary of general normative social policy theories and their findings, see e.g. Aspalter and Teguh-Pribadi 2017; Aspalter 2021a; Kim and Aspalter 2021).

Turning the Clock from the Past to the Future

145

Turning the Clock from the Past to the Future Past and current experiences, present analyses thereof, paired with the analysis of ongoing developments and their future projectories, are essential for trying to look into the future, be it a couple of years, or a couple of decades. It takes not a scientist to predict climate change to get much worse (not in the year 2022), or that societal aging will change every fabric of life, social, economic, political and cultural if the number of children born today is close to half, or in some cases much less than half, to a normal, sustainable replacement level. Nowadays, conversations with everyday citizens can reflect that when they pay into their social insurance systems, they do not expect now to get back (a large share of) those payments, anything close to it, a couple of decades later. This all has become common sense, in that the knowledge is based on logic, experience and simple arithmetic. It is yet up to the experts and scientists to describe exactly what is and will be going on with social insurance institutions and the interplay with ever-more eminent social assistance systems that crowd out any possible meaningful existence of social insurance, especially when faced with ever more income polarity, i.e. mass povertization combined with mass inequality (cf. esp. Kim and Aspalter 2021). Thus, in this way, this last meta-analytical normative part of this book, Chapters 6 and 7, can be seen as, and is, really a continuation of thought, that is fully based on the findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

According to the leading social insurance expert in Korea, Kim Jinsoo of Yonsei University, the biggest road block for a financially sustainable future of social insurance systems is increasing and recently heightened income polarity (cf. Kim 2009; Kim and Aspalter 2021). This new global phenomenon of income polarization has been spurred by urbanization (cf. Socorro et al. 2013) and the rescinding manufacturing sectors that accompany any process of post-industralization. These most powerful economic-cum-social forces are greater in their negative effects of society’s well-being than any new positive effect that there is, also and especially in a cumulative way (cf. the principle of cumulative causation of Gunnar Myrdal 1957). The loss of manufacturing sectors (Kaldor 1966; Thirlwall 1983), i.e. their relative and absolute proportions, is leading to loss in the overall return on investment, or profits, as well as much-declining growth rates of the gross domestic product (GDP). Urbanization forces people to put almost all their money into expensive (mostly high-rise) housing units, which makes the super-rich housing developers and superrich landowners again ever much more—and progressively so—super-rich. The rest of the money, for the very most part, in general goes into the purchase and maintenance of cars, insurance thereof and gasoline to run them. China is a good example, here, but the same effects of modernization (and in particular second modernity and third modernity, cf. Aspalter 2020f) play out and are felt all across the world, to greater or lesser degrees in both, the so-called developed and the so-called developing countries. Economic globalization of investment (that equates to massive job relocations, as well as domestic income losses that amount a couple of times the value of the

146

6 Back to the Future: Income Polarization, Mass Povertization and Simple …

outward investment flows themselves) and globalization of trade (that equates to even more job and income losses) hollow out traditional strongholds of industrial development, without it more and more societies are being denied their foundations of economic growth and prosperity. On top of that, digital globalization combined with super digitalization and universal applications of artificial intelligence into dailylife and general production apparels and software development, are—each of their own—decimating human jobs, month after month, year after year. Social insurance administrations are left with no employers on the one hand (as there have moved online, across international borders, and are hard to identify and virtually impossible to get hold of, cf. Kim and Aspalter 2021), and on the other hand with no contributing members, i.e. the workforce has either moved its online work abroad (e.g. blogging, influencing, writing reports, writing scripts, online project management, online project programming, etc.), or is not working (in formal work arrangements) at all anymore. In addition, new forms of income for the broad masses (inheritance, rent income and other forms of capital income, plus online income) have replaced and are replacing salaried income of the working and the middle classes. This is an additional deathblow to traditional payas-you-go social insurance systems around the world (Kim 2009; Kim and Lee 2010; Kim and Aspalter 2021).

Those who are lucky enough to draw alternative (other than salaried) incomes do not wish to join the formal labor market to full extent, or not at all (hence they try to avoid it, and vote for other solutions, e.g. non-contributory universal basic income schemes). On the other side, there are hundreds of millions of people in each major region of the world that cannot afford to pay into pay-as-you-go pension and other social insurance systems, as their real net incomes are shrinking by the month, as inflation is on the rise, more steadily increasing at times, and swiftly at other times. Hence, even with, and because of(!), their mandatory membership in (coverage of) social insurance systems, such as pension, health and long-term care insurance systems their lifetime savings are either dwindling or vanishing into thin air. Cold progression of income taxation and cold progression of social insurance taxation on top of consumer inflation and real estate inflation (for those not having inherited a house or a flat, or two or more of those) are driving the working and the middle classes into poverty. Below-replacement fertility rates across most of countries in the developed countries, as well as many so-called developing countries already, are adding to the mix of unfortunate and life-support-cancelling trends/events for mandatory non-funded social insurance systems all over the world.

Mass povertization is going on all over the world, and is also highly visible in terms of inequality. To be sure, inequality sooner or later equates to more poverty, as it is the main engine of poverty and povertization across the world and across generations, i.e. time. It is for these reasons that provident fund systems and housing ownership are so imperative and decisive when it comes to the stratification problem in general and the problem of impoverishing societies as a whole. In other words, the works of e.g. Michael Sherraden and his colleagues (Sherraden 1991, 1996, 2000, 2005; Midgley

Turning the Clock from the Past to the Future

147

and Sherraden 1997, 2000; Loke and Sherraden 2019; Sherraden et al. 2019; Huang et al. 2021; Huang et al. 2021) are essential for having a very realistic and/or sure chance of winning this battle against inhuman poverty and systemic povertization all across the world (cf. e.g. WPR 2021; Deen 2020), which is facilitated and sustained by multi-layered and multi-structured systemic inequality. Here, income polarity is understood and defined as a widening of the spread of income, with a relative lessening of middle incomes and heightened concentrations on either end of the spectrum (cf. Deutsch and Silber 2010; as well as Duclos et al. 2004; Esteban and Ray 1994).

The function of social insurance is to provide security for (a) unforeseeable risks, e.g. getting very old (much older than perhaps expected), (b) having to face extended periods of unemployment or underemployment in one’s worklife, (c) having to deal with surprise accidents , diseases and incapacitations that bust one’s current financial capabilities (and/or future capabilities), and so forth. If one already knows that one is and will be poor the rest of one’s life, or sick and poor, and therefore does not have any hope of ever leaving the fate of any working poor and any underclass, one will not support costly institutions of social insurance that are taking away one’s own finances to other generations, and/or other segments of society, or getting them returned with no (or no meaningful) return on investment (ROI), being eaten up for the most part or entirely by inflation and fertility decline. While more and more mid-aged people are wanting to leave the ship, others, the young adults, are trying to never get on board on that ship, called social insurance. If precarious jobs, low and too-low paying jobs dominate one’s future working-life prospects, one can opt to rather prepare for a life on (free-of-charge) social assistance. Social assistance, including asset- and means-tested other benefits and services, as e.g. food stamps and so forth, are slowly, but chronically infringing upon century-old institutions of social insurance. Social assistance now, rather than social insurance, are taking care more and more of the financial life-support of former upper working and lower middle classes (as these are dwindling), as these segments of society are slipping into spreading poverty and are exposed to intensifying inequality. The reason for this is income inequality paired with impoverization of the more and more out-of-work population, as well as, and that is new now, the working population. At the same time, one can opt to work on the internet, where employers—and a fast-rising number and variety of contracting companies, organizations, or individuals—are not visible, and in most cases not possible to get hold of for social insurance institutions. That is to say, work and formal work arrangements become invisible and out of reach. Bloggers, influencers, online programmers, online project managers, etc., are all off the radar and out of the reachable sphere of social insurance administrations (Kim and Aspalter 2021). Again, others can opt to live on rent income of their parents’ or their own apartments or houses (Kim 2009), live on stock market income or trust funds their parents have set up for them. And if everything for oneself largely stays the same, as it is right now, and one rides out social insurance until one’s retirement, and realizes that others who seldom,

148

6 Back to the Future: Income Polarization, Mass Povertization and Simple …

or very little, or never paid into the social insurance funds, now get similar level of social support in form of social assistance benefits—in e.g. about five, ten or twenty years from now—and then comes to realize that all was for nothing, the resentment must be understandably big, if not unmeasurable. If one—as a social policy expert—does not want to live in the past (the practice of social insurance institutions is over 200 years old), one needs to look for all the possible (existing and perceivable) alternatives that there are out there. One then can see also better (and best possible) solutions to provide real social security (with real proper and appropriate security in it) that protect from and not just administrate poverty. After all, what good is a car mechanic who cannot fix the ailing or broken car—and this now, not in hundred, two hundred years down the road?

Universal Basic Income: New Specter or New Opportunity to Eradicate Poverty Once and for All? With every year, and with every month now, the support for universal basic income (UBI) systems across the world, particularly starting in so-called very developed countries, continues to mount. Wherever there are democratic systems in place people will (and should) vote for what is in their best interest, despite all the efforts—from rich power elites, and those within their immediate sphere of influence, politician, experts and the media—to deny (i) this is happening, (ii) this being possible at all, and to maintain that (iii) this is (would be) a ‘so-called’ really bad idea. Again, a yes-or-no question is being pushed for and everyone is being pressed to answer this very yes-or-no question. However, yes or no is not the question. If universal basic income is too high, e.g. 2,000 Euros or US dollars per person (including each child) per month, that would arguably interrupt (as of now) how things are going on in the economy from ground up. On the other hand, if universal income would be e.g. 200 Euros or US dollars per person (including each child, including each child in the womb of her mother) per month that arguably is even too low to have any larger social and economic effects, while poverty might be largely pushed back to some extent already. What people in general easily forget is that any universal basic income will replace other already existing welfare programs, and that to a large extent.

This universal basic income, further must be completely tax-free and socialsecurity-contribution-free, no no-whatsoever administrative hurdles and must be transferred automatically (with no applications, and no registrations). Politicians, like—Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez—in the US, have already fully understood that money that is given by means of universal transfers to the rich can easily be taken back by increasing taxes or reducing tax exemptions and tax reductions, for the very same (e.g. Jacobson 2019). The true optimal level of any universal basic income is to be determined case by case in each country and/or region, it shall be of course automatically made

Getting out of the Social Policy Comfort Zone: Start Taxing the Super-Rich

149

inflation-proof (i.e. being adjusted for real consumer inflation, e.g. inflation for food and housing in particular). It will however range most likely somewhere in between 2,000 dollars per each (and really each) person and 200 dollars per person in the case of most countries or regions. Such a scheme will rewrite welfare state history more than economic history (if at all) as current systems of social assistance will be phased out or abolished (for the most part).

Getting out of the Social Policy Comfort Zone: Start Taxing the Super-Rich At the same time, there needs to be greater taxation of wealth and income of the super-rich (cf. e.g. Kaldor 1956; Piketty 2014, 2015; OXFAM 2018a, b; Pearce 2019). Different strategies can be applied there. A strategy that splits up the rich, or any possible opponent, in their support or non-support of such a scheme is best (such a strategy in social security reform has been applied already across the world, cf. Mesa-Lago 2003, 2008; Aspalter 2005). The super-rich (cf. Feiner 2019) are, here and there, in favor of massive wealth taxes (on top of massive income taxes). Wealth inequality is the biggest culprit of all in determining dehumanization, inequality and povertization (cf. Schuftan 2018). Therefore, not all the rich think and behave the same, and always have the same interests. And for this very reason, it may be advised to only additionally tax the super-rich, and not the (normal) rich. As the former are smaller in number, and have most of the wealth anyway. In this way the strong opposition of the rich in total to such a scheme, is greatly torn into pieces, or lessened a great deal to say the least, as many people who own a downtown real estate do not have to worry to be taxed heavily as their house alone is already worth millions. Any such massive tax (or haircut) is of course understood to be a marginal tax (or marginal haircut), that is, the additional tax is only imposed for the amount of wealth that exceeds a certain (very high) limit. But, after a relative high level of accumulated wealth (e.g. 100 million Euros or US dollars per person), and income accrued (5 million Euros or US dollars per person per year), then the one-time marginal tax rate on wealth can and should be that high that is allows human dignity for all, i.e. in the range of e.g. 78, 88, or 98%; the marginal tax rate for income can be 50, 60, or 70% at most (cf. Laffer 1974); not higher than that, as it would destroy incentives to work. Recently, a similar (but less strong) proposal of a tax on unrealized capital gains has been made by Senator Ron Wyden of the Democratic Party in the United States (Conley 2021). These high tax rates only apply for extremely wealthy people, and extremely high-income earners only, and these tax rates are only marginal tax rates (they are not total or general tax rates). That is, nothing is to be paid—in addition to existing

150

6 Back to the Future: Income Polarization, Mass Povertization and Simple …

taxes—for those amounts of individual net wealth that are below a certain, and very high threshold. These rates only apply and come to effect for those parts of wealth and income only that exceed these very high thresholds—this cannot be stressed strongly enough(!). For the anti-poverty wealth tax for the super-rich, it must be a one-time tax only (a one-time ‘haircut taxation’), and not yearly1 (that would then kill incentives to move forward, to open new factories, invest in new inventions, etc.), and to avoid rich people leaving the country (cf. OECD 2018).

As long as, the anti-poverty wealth tax for the super-rich is a one-time tax based on past wealth, it will and cannot impede any incentives to work and invest and create in the future—one needs to make sure it is well communicated that this is only a one-time haircut, and will not repeat in any person’s lifetime. In contrast, an anti-poverty income tax would be an annual tax (and for this reason cannot exceed e.g. 70%, to keep incentives to work and innovate up and running) (cf. Laffer 1974). Whereas 30% of 1,000 Euros is not much, 30% of a billion Euros are still 300 million Euros that still can buy one small island, one of the largest yachts, or one nice villa in Monaco. So, incentives are fully intact, especially when the super-rich are still earning many billions (or hundreds of millions) of Euros (or US dollars) every year. The tax on wealth must be instituted not forward in time, but e.g. instead levied e.g. on last year’s wealth (i.e. at a time before the law has been put into place, to avoid evasions and relocations of individuals, etc.). Tax on income, on the other hand, e.g. can also (i.e. additionally) be taxed forward (for the next ten years, and being phased out over this period) for people who want to leave (otherwise or still) the country to avoid these taxes (see e.g. the example of France, KPMG 2020); so even when they leave, they still have to pay taxes for the next ten years to their original home country. From this time onwards, i.e. after the implementation of one kind of one-time marginal haircut wealth tax, children all over the world do not need to die because of poverty, many thousands of children every day can be saved from death and years of pain, simply by making the super-super-rich just super-rich (while leaving them enough possibilities to increase their wealth and income even further in the future). Billions of women are dependent on their family status now, but once an effectual universal basic income scheme is in place they will be freed to a very large extent from being tied to their family status, for their economic and personal (including health and education) well-being. The problem of unpaid domestic work for all parents (whoever they are, however they identify themselves or not sexually or gender-wise) will be heavily mitigated (depending on the level of UBIs implemented). Hundreds of millions of families will not be thrown into and kept under poverty in many cases due to surprisingly long lives of their own and their spouses/partners and their parents, or due to rare and demeaning diseases and health conditions of all kinds, and other kinds of bad fortune all the way in their lives.

1

Cf e.g. Piketty’s yearly tax rate on wealth of only 0.1–2% (Piketty 2014: 528).

Getting out of the Social Policy Comfort Zone: Start Taxing the Super-Rich

151

It is as John Kenneth Galbraith in his super foresightful and theoretically consequential 1993 book ‘The Culture of Contentment’ has summed it up, all human poverty and dehumanization is but a problem of human contentment, plus some degree of information and explanation. It is not an economic problem, and not a political problem per se!.

Ordinary people, experts, newspapers journalists, local politicians, bartenders, football players, nurses, bus drivers, bakery shop owners, and farmers eventually need to understand that this—dire poverty and inequality, all of it—is not acceptable and more importantly, that this is not necessary and very easily avertable and remedied, by simply taxing the (and this is most important) wealth, and yes also the income (cf. the insights on super-rich managers by Piketty 2014, 2015), of the super-rich. At the same time, the just normal rich—those who have two houses, two cars and rich retirement savings—do not need to worry about their family savings and income, or family business or the a bit larger farm of theirs. Social policy making is always about getting out of the policy comfort zone. Until it does, poverty, inequality and human suffering never gets tackled and solved.

Social policy is more often than not a system-maintaining force (cf. e.g. Gordon 1988; Orloff 1996; Abramovitz 1996), rather than a force for change for good. Policy making indeed is about making compromises, skilled negotiators and skilled strategists often find win–win solutions that are practical (solving and/or preventing the problem) and fully realistic, i.e. politically-cum-financially feasible, at the same time. Will it be easy? Certainly not. Will it work? Certainly yes. Is it feasible? Yes, of course. The above one-time and marginal (only over 100 million Euros or US dollars) tax on individual net wealth (property minus liabilities) is such a compromise, one that politically works, since only less than 1% of the population, the super-super-rich, are being taxed one time (and only for wealth that is exceeding a certain very high limit). That is, they have to learn how to be just super-rich for a while, and increase further their wealth from there, if they like.

Chapter 7

Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, Provident Funds and Primarily Taxing the Super-Rich

If a doctor would tell a patient who just has come into the hospital with a broken leg that there is not much or nothing that can be done to cure or amend the situation once and for all, then this might lead to the doctor doubting his/her/etc. profession and science, his/her/etc. job and career choice, as how good is the medical profession or any doctor, if broken legs cannot be cured, or just treated with warm hot towels, instead of a proper plaster cast that would fix the problem once and for all. Universal basic income is just one such (plaster cast) solution. There are in fact more such solutions out there, especially when applied in combination—that is, not every solution cures every ‘ailment’, every ‘disease’ and every ‘fatal condition’, but in combination those solutions can address and help prevent mass povertization that is caused by massive inequality between the super-rich and the rest of the society, and with it any major form of demeaning dehumanization.

Integrating Recent and Current Major Criticisms of Social Policy as We Know It The 1990 book (for those wondering which one it could be, it is Esping-Andersen’s book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism—and it is amazing to have one book having had transformed a whole discipline, and it did just that) set off a couple of positive avalanches of research undertakings, especially in terms of comparative research per se (on real-typical and later on ideal–typical welfare regimes), and on what is the core of social policy altogether (cf Orloff 1996, 2009) by changing the focus on social security provision to focus on gender policy and family policy, as the mainstay arena of social policy, from a feminist and new mainstream perspective (cf also Ferragina 2019). With it, extremely positive insights and paradigms have emerged and changed the face of social policy, as it was known before (the way people, and social policy scientists, looked at it before, including in the 1990 book). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Aspalter, Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0_7

153

154

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

The key word of the 1990s was defamilialization, i.e. taking family out of the equation when it comes to determining welfare entitlements (not as an ideology attacking all family institutions and family-related ideas, which is nothing more than pure hatredism and such an ideology therefore cannot be sustained, cf e.g. Ward 2015). The 1999 book of Esping-Andersen was his answer to strong criticism received by the 1990 book. In 1999, Esping-Andersen opted to call out familialization of social policy and of the welfare state, identifying it as a big problem, which it clearly is. The family status of whomever has nothing to do with any kind of entitlement or duty (e.g. in income taxation), but sadly it was one of the main driving forces of social insurance-based social policy of the 20th and early 21st century, plus a strong —and extremely negatively consequential —column of tax policy practice that was and is based on the family unit and thus people’s status within the family. The new magic terms yet are demotherization (Mathieu 2016) and degenderization (Saxonberg 2013). The first term (demotherization) denotes to “deemphasizing the role of mothers in social policy entitlements” (that does not mean deemphasizing the role of mother per se, not at all!)—and one cannot overemphasize that here this is merely a technical term in social policy entitlement determination, and this is not meant and does not in any way represent an ideology of any kind. The second term (degenderization) is rather misfortunate, for a number of reasons. That is to say, both terminologies highlighted e.g. that yet again a new beginning is on the horizon, a new paradigm of how to see things, and how to do things (and how not). It is not a specter, but rather an upgrading of understanding of how things can, should and must, be done better in social policy, and in shaping and forming the welfare state design as such. Defamilialization, as a technical approach and guiding paradigm, was and is (for some time still) an utterly necessary thing to do, in all aspects of social policy. This enlightenment we have to fully thank, among many other important things, the gendering the welfare state discussion that was kicked off in the mid-1980s, but really got ahead full speed after the publication of the 1990 book (Esping-Andersen’s) (cf Lewis 1992; O’Connor 1993; Sainsbury 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2000; Davis Hill and Tigges 1995; Orloff 1996, 2009). In a world after 2015 (cf TGEU 2015), where the rights of LGBTIQ* have been rising and still are rising to the forefront of not only every newspaper or magazine, or news broadcast, but now also making their long-awaited (and yet slow) breakthrough into mainstream social policy discussion, and gender policy discussion alike, things have to change. The status quo of the late 1990s, the discussion on defamilialization, is not the state of the art, not anymore, that is sure. We need to take ‘family status’ completely out of the equation when it comes to taxable income in taxation policy, entitlements (and duties) in social policies and especially also social security and family policy, as well as entitlements and duties in all kinds of legal policy, but we also have to take out one’s ‘binary sex’ or ‘binary gender’ identification and ‘all kinds of sex and gender identification or classification’ in all (cf West and Zimmermann 1987; Van Der Ros 2013, 2014, 2015). That is the right thing to do, the only way to do, and there is no way around it (and should not be anyway). This means a lot of work to rewrite pension laws, family

Integrating Recent and Current Major Criticisms of Social Policy as We …

155

laws, gender protection laws, all of it (introducing new wordings and concepts). But, such work is never a problem—as long as experts and administrators, and politicians alike, are getting paid to do their job, and—as long as experts and administrators, and politicians work for all people, no matter how diverse society is, no matter how big any minorities are. The way we handle, and also in the speed (and quality) we handle, this new task that is in front of us will tell about our professionality, our ethics, or philosophy for a long time to come. In 1970, the famous book by Richard M. Titmuss The Gift Relationship looked at blood donations, and how societies, how social policy, is dealing with this most important issue (that determines over life and death of so many), and this actually is measure of how good a society is. Now, one may wonder how good really (in a wholesome perspective) a society is when looking at the way we treat as professionals, as the government, as society, the needs and rights of trans people (cf TGEU 2015, 2021; GM 2019). The new locus of the welfare state is indeed parental policy (or family policy in the widest sense, including especially the right and duty to take care of one’s children, to 50 percent each, for each parent, for any remaining time to age 18 for any child). We need, in addition, to “demotherize and defatherize all kinds of social security policies and regulations, as well as all kinds of social policies” (e.g. pension formulas, as well as all divorce laws, rules and practices; and undo all past wrong doings). We need to “enparentize and enpartnerize social policy,” to make the welfare state and social policy LGBTIQ*ized. In other words—for the decency of our profession, science and society—we need to LGBTIQ*ize the welfare state systems, as well as our entire welfare regimes (cf e.g. Koning 2018), and here the key focus apart from general social security coverage (survivor’s pensions, and coverage of social security altogether, etc.) is also family policy, child custody policy, and many more core issues for the human rights of all parents and all partners, and especially all trans people, no matter how big their numbers (in terms of overall population) are, no matter how they feel or identify sexually and/or gender-wise. And this 100 percent, right away and all the way. Social policy as of today, which was invented in the 19th century, is deeply gender-blind, deeply gender-unjust, and so it is deeply trans-people-blind, and trans-people-unjust.

The number one institution behind this great injustice is social insurance, as it sees women as dependent spouses (for the most part), and does not see trans people at all. Social insurance creates in terms of social security provision better-off fulltime earners, and with the immediate effect also creates worse-off homemakers (be they of whatever gender or sexual identification, if any). This duality is the gist of the dilemma the gendering-the-welfare-state debate tries to tackle. Another one, one that is not yet fully thematized, is the unstudied, unwanted, or simply neglected or denied side-effects of one-sided gendered divorce laws, regulations and practices have on genders themselves, and on the institution of marriage (cf Lewis 2001), as well as furthermore on society and the economy in general. The unpaid carework dilemma that is also caused and spurred by these laws, regulations and practices has not been remedied yet. It just has gotten written in

156

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

stone—instead of fighting inequality with equality, and instead of fighting injustice with justice. On the other hand, the new paradigm to trans-people-ize social policy making also forces social policy to become people-ized in general, which offers a great breakthrough in intra- and inter- cisgender and transgender equality and justice ‘and’ general people equality and people justice. Any parent, especially those fathers that until now were or are still denied their role as fathers, their role as caretakers of their own children, needs to be equal, with equal rights and duties especially when it comes to raising children and taking care of unpaid housework—in front of the law and in practice of the law, and any government regulation, or professional service provision. When fathers, or any parents, are denied their full equal role as caretakers, then mothers—or any partner of that parent—are de facto denied the possibility to fully join the formal labor market and make a career for themselves, and for their families (cf Leira 2010). Unequal practices only create and foster unequal outcomes. Conversely, equality really can bring about people/gender equality. It is important to grant and encourage all kinds of parents and all kinds of partners to become equal caretakers with de facto equal rights and duties, no matter their assigned or not assigned cis-gender or trans-gender, or their sexual orientations or choices (all of these by the way can never, must never be assumed by others).

There is a lot to do in social policy in the years ahead. There is no doubt about it. At the beginning of the third decade of this twenty-first century, we certainly are once again upgrading our understanding and practices of equality and justice, now also integrating real principles of equality for all people, also trans people and that all the way. Social policy is certainly more than just providing social insurance and social assistance. This formerly recognized core of the welfare state (or any welfare state system) is causing more problems, and much deeper-rooted problems as envisioned just 10 or 20 years ago in both the so-called mainstream social policy and the gender policy arenas (while these dilemmas were completely off the radar in the year 1990). The second core of the welfare state is in fact a regulatory core, one that regulates and punishes and rewards different groups of people, thus dividing them, causing inequality among them (cf Foucault’s monumental book in 1975, see Chaps. 4 and 5; as well as e.g. Orloff 1996, and many others).

Universal Basic Income: More Than Just the Solution to Poverty, as It is also a Remedy to Intra and Inter Cis-/Trans-Gender Inequality Doing away with all kinds of inequalities and injustices is the first important step: this applies to all social security legislations and regulations, to all social and family legislation and administration, and to all social policy and social service practices. But

Universal Basic Income: More Than Just the Solution to Poverty, as It …

157

capitalism (which is a good thing by and large, and we very much need it, that is sure, but we should not be obsessed with it or possessed by it) has its ways to disfavor all kinds of informal caregivers, and excessively favoring and promoting childless people and childless families as the new standard for all of society (as did the social security systems themselves). Interesting here are earlier predictions of childless societies due to the impact of ongoing capitalism, and capitalist development in general. For the disintegration and with it childlessness of the bourgeois family see particularly Joseph Alois Schumpeter’s 1942 book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, as well as Ulrich Beck’s 1992 book Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Both Schumpeter and Beck, hence, have predicted the coming of childless or near-childless societies as a main outcome of capitalism(!). It cannot be that, in the year 2021, modern-day soldiers are carrying babies and flying out women from one country to their own country in military airplanes to in a way solve a problem that is caused by capitalism and social security systems of one’s own country (cf e.g. Brown 2021; Haidari 2021). It is also a direct expression of institutional privilege on world societal level and the existence and exploitation of a global ‘class system of societies’, i.e. a global class system that is made out of societies—with upper-class societies (where privileged societies themselves form the upper global class) on the one side, and lower-class societies (where oppressed societies themselves form the lower global class) on the other (cf O’Hearn and Ciccantell 2021; Wallerstein 1980, 1979). Two millennia ago, the Romans did steal systematically children, babies and young women from whole border territories next to the Rhine to make more soldiers for their Empire (especially in later antiquity), fighting off and fighting back the very peoples they were stolen from (cf e.g. UNRV 2022; ROAR 2022; IG 2022: Simkin 2020; FEE 2016). Nowadays, this systematic use and abuse of migration and migration pressures shows how inapt capitalism is today (and always in general) to deal with societal problems and institutional problems. Of course, this is the task of public policy, social policy, and all kinds of societal policy (cf e.g. Jones 1997; Hardy 2009; O’Hearn and Ciccantell 2021). If we take care of the economic disadvantages created by the external costs of social reproduction by way of universal basic income schemes that are at least equipped with moderately high monthly livelihood sustenance payments to all people, to all parents, to the same degree, we take the wind of out the sails of the capitalist inequality machine that ignores the external costs of social reproduction, as otherwise the super-rich get even more rich if they do not have to help stem the costs of social reproduction, as this is what is—in large (yet fully unrecognized) parts—sustaining their sky-high wealth gains and profits. The problem that women in general face under capitalism, under Bismarckian or Beveridgean social insurance systems, are the problems of any caretaker of their children and family members alike. Capitalism does not acknowledge the productive and imperative role of caretaking of the next generation of workers and consumers (Sevgur 2021; Ferragina 2019; Bhattacharaya 2017; Fraser 2017; Delgado-Wise 2017; Katz 2002).

The ones that lead capitalism from the very top (the wealth elites) are aware of the sufferings of single mothers, single parents of all kinds. They are aware of the sufferings of working-poor families raising their kids and desperately trying

158

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

to compete with upper middle class and upper-class kids’ parents in getting ahead within the class-based (rigged) education system. They are benefiting from it, as the system is favoring families and their kids that can pay for high-priced and (on purpose) prohibitively expensive private higher educational institutions, while the rest are believing in the very most part unattainable dream of progressing one’s position or at least that of one’s kids up the societal ladder some indefinite time later (not realizing that the game is heavily rigged and heavily disfavoring them from the beginning). Far from being just a tool or instrument to achieve poverty reducation, the introduction of universal basic income (instead of asset- and means-tested welfare programs, to a large or full extent) is also a solution to an array of other social and societal problems, such as the problem of unvalued societal fertility by capitalism itself and thus (due to their non action) also by the governments on top of that. But there is more. Universal basic income schemes can also help enable trans people the same family happiness and self-fulfillment of parenting as every other cis-gender parent, by fighting and warding off their relative disadvantages and their absolute (financial, health and other) vulnerabilities.

Acknowledging Micro-Economic and Behavioral Effects: Replacing Blind Universalism with Smart Universalism In the (real) scientific universe of 21st century, there is no left, no right, in terms of political spectrum. These attributes that have largely lost their meaning, as they are now by and large only randomly and artificially assigned by political activists or other politically motivated persons. Yet, there are every now and then different left-and-right spectra for each issue at hand: for each problem constellation, for each solution, for each time of the day, as they vary and must vary across a person’s life and lifetime interests, as well as across complex compositions of daily work and family etc. issues. To be sure, there are gay and lesbian conservatives, there are economic-thinking socialists and social economists, there are feminists on all sides of the political spectrum, and there are trans people and trans people supporters on all sides of the very same political spectrum as well. To be sensitive to and highly supportive of very ‘social’ issues, like poverty and people equality, does not make and should not make one blind or unreceptive towards microeconomic and other behavioral realities, especially incentives to work and save, and incentives to take care of one’s health and ability to care for oneself and one’s family far into high age.

This book is about scientific, societal and economic realities, the truths that determine our lives, our health, happiness, as well as our wealth, or lack of poverty and any other dehumanizing conditions. The first part looked at the world, every corner of the world, and how results of welfare regimes have determined and are determining the lives of people, no matter how rich or developed a country is, or is deemed to be.

Acknowledging Micro-Economic and Behavioral Effects: Replacing …

159

This last part of the book delves into normative social policy, and as such, must also draw on to the latest findings of normative social policy. The normative theory of Developmental Social Policy (as developed by James Midgley at UC Berkeley in the first place, cf Midgley 1995, 2013) has been developed in recent years to include also ever more forms and degrees of universalism, especially working out the paradigm of smart universalism (Aspalter 2015, 2017e, 2020e, as well as Midgley and Aspalter 2017). Some key lessons from and cornerstones of Developmental Social Policy that underlie the principle of smart universalism: 1. “The economic and societal (and in most cases political) costs of not having social policies are too high … Civil unrest, crime, violence, addiction, neglect will destroy the fruits of economic activities, including labor, investment, entrepreneurship and international trade. Social policy protects economic development …” (Aspalter 2015: 39) 2. “Economic development is a process that starts with the birth of children and the economic activities it causes and leads to in the course of a lifetime. Social policies [have to] make sure that all the way there will be proper incentives and proper support for young families and their children, elderly people, the weak, the disadvantaged and the vulnerable.” (Aspalter 2015: 38) 3. “Healthy and happy people are the best resources an economy can have. As long as social reproduction is secured in a sustainable (that is, intergenerationally sustainable) manner there will be more babies who need milk and diapers, more children who need kindergarten and school places, more children reading books and playing with toys, more children studying at and graduating from high schools and universities, more entrepreneurs, more technology, more trade and investment.” (Aspalter 2015: 38) 4. “Redistribution is meaningless if it proves to be ineffective or even harmful, if it proves to have negative side-effects or outcomes. Therefore, we should not right away discuss the issue of how much redistribution is appropriate, if we don’t know what kind of redistribution we are talking about, and how it affects reallife situations and real-life families and societies.” (emphases added, Aspalter 2015: 35) There is a great deal of, and a very wide spectrum of, possibilities to apply— free-of-charge and universally automatically receivable—smart universal benefits and services (smart UBSs), to avoid and reduce as much as (technically) possible poverty, and with it inequality and dehumanization. As a professional, as a scientist, one cannot close one’s eyes to and/or pay no heed to any and all negative effects, side-effects and follow-on effects of certain kinds of universal provision of benefits or services. The well-being of societies, of all of us, depends on it. Good intentions do not necessarily lead to good social policy outcomes (often they do not). In addition, one needs to examine all policy options first that are in play and that are on the table, and those that are perceivable (but not yet on the table), before one can side with (opt for) this or that social policy option, or social security system design or strategy. For these two reasons, we look first at assets- and means-tests (AMTs) and their effects on poverty, before we move on to the question

160

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

of how to design smart universal policies and programs, that help to prevent and clear out systemic poverty, systemic inequality, i.e. systemic injustice and oppression (cf WPR 2021; Deen 2020). Asset- and means-tested social assistance and social services, as well as asset- and means-tested public housing provision, are among the most non-understood public policies that there are. Instead of reducing and working against poverty, the effects of the poverty line that are established through asset- and means-testing is to trap people in poverty, to increase the severity of their poverty and to cement their status in poverty, i.e. turning temporary events into chronic and inescapable (and even intergenerational) conditions.

Why, how to explain all this? In economics this problem is called negative marginal income. When people are getting over the poverty line, even just by a dollar, they are losing money, they are losing money in form of lost asset- and means-tested benefits and services across the board (i.e., provided across different government departments, with each of them cutting their support, benefit or service, due to the overstepping of the poverty line). Not only do asset- and means-tested benefits and services, in a cumulative fashion, crowd out and make additional income for poor people de facto being punished, multiple times by multiple government institutions at the same time (poverty trap in the narrow sense), they also lead to the punishment of additional savings (savings trap), as well as they punish the return to the labor market, or the pick-up of additional jobs on the labor market (unemployment trap and underemployment trap). Altogether these individual poverty traps can be called as the poverty trap in the wider sense, while each of its components are working independently from one another, they have the common cause behind them: any form of asset- and means-tests (including proxy asset- and means-tests). The solution to this biggest drama in the history of social policy is simple: to cut any kind of asset- and means-tests, all of them.

There is only one exemption, which is a very peculiar case and is mostly only of theoretical importance: only when an asset- and means-test is applied ‘one time’ only and the test is testing ‘past’ (i.e. dated backward in time) wealth and/or income, then there are no negative side effects. These two conditions emphasized here cannot be overstressed. They are absolutely necessary, both of them, to be present, otherwise the full spectrum of negative consequences of asset- and means-tests are back into play (cf one positive case of this very special application of asset- and means-tests for the poor and near-poor in Taiwan, see James Hsueh 2015). Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are for the most part paired with either assetand means-tests, or proxy asset- and means-tests (with e.g. self-reported incomes), but there are super important exceptions. Therefore, there are in fact two kinds of CCT programs, good CCTs and bad CCTs. Any CCT program with an element of asset- or means-testing (incl. proxy tests) is a bad CCT program. Bolivia and in some special cases Mexico and El Salvador have miraculously (in a way) decided not to implement asset- and means-tests, and thereby created good CCTs with no horrible side-effects, really helping to fight, reduce and keep avoiding poverty (Aspalter 2017f: 101).

Acknowledging Micro-Economic and Behavioral Effects: Replacing …

161

Apart from non-economic targeting by CCTs, that is using socio-demographic and/or personal behavioral variables and conditions for targeting the poor (or nearpoor, etc.), there is the method of smart universalism. Theda Skocpol (1991) may have been the first person to have referred to this most important method in social policy making, as targeting within universalism. However, internationally this has not been catching on in terms of academic discussion and/or the development and implementation of practical social policy solutions (for an exception see e.g. Cantillon, De Graeve and Van Mechelen 2017). Independently from Skocpol, Aspalter developed smart universalism over the years from 2015 to 2020, for general social policy and particularly for health policy as well (cf Skocpol 1991; Aspalter 2015, 2017e, f, 2020e). When it comes to health care provision, there are also unforeseen and unwanted side-effects, as they lead to negative health outcomes, and premature diseases, premature debilitating conditions, and premature deaths. The simple advice of following the money is of great importance in understanding diverse health outcomes, and even major differences in life-expectancies and, what is super important too, healthy life-expectancies. Provident fund systems, which are individual savings accounts, as a main social security system design outperform all other major system designs, in terms of health outcomes (cf Fig. 7.1). There is but one conclusion in relative terms: social insurance in comparison is in general related to lower healthy life expectancy and a higher number of healthy years of life lost. Universalism per se does not help either, as universalism mainly means the administration of e.g. health insurance is unified—hence, it is cheaper. Thus, there is more money left for redistribution to the poor and the general public. This does not mean that universalism ‘maximizes’ health outcomes to full extent—not at all.

Figure 7.1 shows the positive effects of provident fund systems on healthy aging outcomes, in particular, the extremely positive outstanding case of Singapore; and the (relative) negative effects of social insurance systems in general on health aging outcomes. This findings are most crucial, and demand a rethinking of social security system design and strategies. The four cases highlighted in Fig. 7.1. are all most peculiar and deserve greater attention by social policy and health policy researchers. For one, Cyprus is particularly interesting, performing as a super strong second in a comparison of 183 countries (Fig. 7.1), as well as a separate comparison among 38 countries (all with a life-expectancy of over 78 years, for more salient comparison) (Table 7.1). In a nutshell, the local circumstances of Cyprus and its health care system are key for its relative success in healthy aging outcomes: e.g. a high share of out-ofpocket payments (which has similar behavioral effects as provident fund systems), a focus on non-communicable diseases in the health care system, its very generous pension system for people 50 and above (so they in general do not suffer from poverty, and hence diseases of poverty), its non- and small-urban population structure, and relatively laid-back culture (like Sardinia, and Okinawa, who have generally highest life-expectancies in global comparison), and of course the high quality of its health care system (cf e.g. Amitsis 2009; Theodorou 2014; ISSA 2021)—in health care spending often does not lead to success (see Table 7.1), for industrial countries in particular, but quality and focus, and other helpful factors are.

162

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

COUNTRY COMPARISON OF HEALTHY AGING: LONG LIVES WITH LESS HEALTHY YEARS OF LIFE LOST (HYLL) 11.0

Spain (4th best country)

10.0 9.0

Japan

Cyprus

8.0

(3rd best country)

(2nd best country)

7.0

Singapore

6.0 5.0 60.0

(best country)

65.0

70.0

75.0

80.0

85.0

90.0

Fig. 7.1 Comparing healthy years of life lost since birth and life expectancy at birth: a comparison of 38 countries. Note Vertical axis shows the number of healthy years of life lost since birth (HYLL), and the horizontal axis life expectancy at birth. Source calculated based on the World Health Survey in 2019

In Japan, the system is uniquely and exceptionally focusing on health screening and early diagnosis of life debilitating and other deadly diseases (cf e.g. Uchida 2012). Japan has an urbanization degree, with very densely populated and very large cities, of over 90 percent and Singapore 100 percent. Both are rather very stressful societies emphasizing long working hours. But, the exceptional performance of Singapore, its unparalleled global leadership, in terms of healthy aging, is only to be explained by its peculiar social security system, focusing on provident fund system exclusively in the past many decades. Social policy design and social security systems designs are, in short, highly related to welfare and health outcomes of the population. Hence, our above global spectral data analysis in the main part of this book (Chaps. 4 and 5) is really necessary, and there are still plenty of untapped potentials for empirical learning and further theoretical insights. For smart universal health policy, one could focus on free health-checks, free health tests (frequent and any type of tests), and health monitoring (voluntary of course) of either smaller parts or larger segments of the population. Further, children’s health care, the health care of senior citizens’ over e.g. 70, 75 or 80 years of age, as well as all related expenditures to rare, demeaning and heavily debilitating diseases (all of them) shall be free of charge, all of it. The wealth is there in society, in the very most of countries, so-called developed and developing and even the so-called non-developed countries. It is just unequally distributed in the hands of a few, and this is the same story all over the world. When it comes to poverty prevention and eradication, smart universal benefits are super effective, as they can be targeted in a very cheap (i.e. very cost-effective) and

Acknowledging Micro-Economic and Behavioral Effects: Replacing …

163

Table 7.1 The relative healthy aging performance of 38 countries with a life-expectancy of over 78 years (using the SRP Index method) Rank

Country

Relative healthy aging performance

Rank

Country

Relative healthy aging performance

1

Singapore

10.00

20

Denmark

3.98

2

Cyprus

7.76

21

South Korea

3.95

3

Japan

5.12

22

Netherlands

3.93

4

Spain

4.90

23

Germany

3.90

5

Costa Rica

4.76

24

Portugal

3.89

6

Maldives

4.50

25

U.K

3.86

7

Iceland

4.44

26

Cuba

3.73

8

France

4.43

27

Luxembourg

3.64

9

Israel

4.40

28

Australia

3.63

10

Greece

4.38

29

Belgium

3.58

11

N. Zealand

4.36

30

Finland

3.46

12

Panama

4.35

31

Sweden

3.24

13

Malta

4.29

32

Croatia

3.07

14

Norway

4.27

33

Qatar

2.60

15

Canada

4.19

34

Chile

2.53

16

Italy

4.19

35

U.S

2.40

17

Ireland

4.09

36

Czechia

2.22

18

Austria

4.05

37

Slovenia

1.87

19

Switzerland

3.98

38

Bahrain

0.00

Note calculated based on WHO 2019; Life Expectancy (LE) rates have been standardized (using the SRP Index method); Healthy Years of Life Lost (HYLL) have been calculated and then standardized and reversed, both have been added and standardized again (so that highest value is 10, and lowest value is 0). The distance between countries performance is exactly relative to the performance in real life, in terms of LE and HYLL (among the group of 38 countries included, which are all for better comparison countries with a LE of 78 years and above). The performance in terms of LE and HYLL is weighted equally

rather sharp manner. There are plenty of possibilities of setting up smart universal benefits, or smartly targeted, but yet universal, welfare benefits, social services and public services alike: free local buses (some major cities in China, like for example Zhuhai, have already cut down all bus fares, to a symbolic 1 RMB), free sport centers (all day and all year around), free national parks (open all the year), free hiking paths, free swimming areas at lakes and beaches, plus free public swimming pools, free camping sites, and this list can go on for quite a bit. The best way to do health care policy, as well as long-term care policy, is by preventing the need for it.

It is just like in accident insurance, when the main insurance administration of in Austria (the AUVA, Allgemeine Unfallversicherungsanstalt) early on, being the

164

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

pioneer and world leader (in the literal sense), realized it needed to prevent accidents, provide seminars, security equipment, other security systems in place, rather than to pay e.g. a very young widow, or widower, a lifetime of income support. This made the AUVA also the world pioneer and world leader in behavioral social policy, and behavioral social security provision in particular (cf Dressler and Pils 2015; AUVA 2021). The health care system and the long-term care system is best when it is not needed, but it is there when needed, for those people who have those needs, or still have those needs and their needs could not—in comparative terms—been prevented (through e.g. specific information distribution, i.e. health marketing campaigns, education campaigns with e.g. company or community lectures; as well as early diagnosis of e.g. pre-diabetes, weight and food screening, etc.). There is here a whole new array (a full spectrum) of behavioral social policy that needs to come into play and help replace monetary-based and insurance-based (other than accident insurance, which is irreplaceable) social policies and social security institutions. Designed to help professionals and scientists, the theory of Developmental Social Policy has developed for many years now already a wide range of behavior-based social policy paradigms, and importantly behavior-based and behavior-informed social policy solutions (Aspalter 2014, 2015, 2018, 2020e, 2021a; Aspalter and Teguh-Pribadi 2017; Midgley 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2014, 2017; Midgley et al. 2017; Midgley et al. 2019; as well as Midgley and Sherraden 1997; Midgley and Tang 2009).

Converting Social Insurance Systems Into Provident Fund Systems (Everywhere and All of Them, Except All Accident Insurance Systems) Mandatory social insurance systems are en route to drive over a couple of cliffs. The lack of new generations makes it impossible to have sustainable finance for the decades to come, when old-age dependency ratios are exploding or growing vastly out of proportions. The problem is not the ratio of older citizens to the ones that are of working age. The problems are the lack of healthy aging and the lack of being financially prepared. Governments have not saved up for the historical mega event of societal aging, in those countries where it will happen, to a very full degree and/or very fast. People themselves have not prepared in putting assets or savings aside to prepare for their older age, and hence prevent their relative and/or absolute poverty during the very same. Most governments and the very most people have not focused on changing life-time behaviors, combatting decade-long sedentary lifestyles and lack of physical exercise, long-time over-consumption of red meats, long-time overconsumption of simple refined carbohydrates (white rice, white noodles and white bread), and long-time over-consumption of very unhealthy (diabetes-, cancer- and Alzheimer’s-causing) hydrogenated vegetable oils, and so forth.

Converting Social Insurance Systems Into Provident Fund Systems …

165

The false security that so many rely on —people themselves, but also social security departments and ministries of governments, too —that social insurance systems make people safe is a fiction. The microeconomic side-effects of mandatory social insurance systems, on the contrary, are pushing for and rewarding negative lifetime behaviors, while discriminating and punishing positive lifetime behaviors.

That would include, for example, eating much less meat, eating mostly vegetables, complex carbohydrates instead of white rice, white noodles, or white bread; using olive oil or flaxseed oil instead of corn oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, etc.; exercising daily or frequently and regularly; avoiding tobacco and most of alcohol consumption, etc. Things got out of hand. Aging is not the problem, here—and never ever at all a problem. But, the wrong reliance on cross-subsidizing from the healthily living people to the not healthily living people, from the general taxpayers to the unhealthily living people, as well as cross-subsidizing from the families, parents and the future income of their children to those individuals who by and large (when looking at millions of people, i.e. national averages) choose not have children and hence save a great deal of time, freedom and most of all money, is. People who abstain from having and raising children are winners; parents and their children who have to carry the brunt of today’s social insurance expenditures (by way of future government taxation, and current-day government depts) are the great losers. This is great injustice, it is non-sense, and it is non-pragmatic and nonresponsible for governments to silently endorse and to continuously subscribe to this system. Social insurance, with the lack of healthy lifestyles (of all generations, not just the older ones) and with the lack of future generations (children!), are prone to run off cliffs, in more than one way.

People are disappointed and sad, they feel ripped off, when they see and realize that their decade-long social insurance contributions will in the end account to nothing more than a bit of extra money at the beginning of each month, when compared to those who live on minimum income support, social assistance (having worked all their lives as caretakers, or as informal workers), or those who have just entered the country in whatever way and hence joined the welfare state system. The time has come to say goodbye to social insurance systems (apart from accident insurance systems) and the time has come to convert them into provident fund systems (overnight, in a simple and painless manner, run by the very same administrations that run social insurance systems before).

Provident fund systems, on the contrary to social insurance systems, do not cause societal infertility on a large scale (cf e.g. the long-awaited empirical proof provided by Shen, Zhen, and Yang, 2020), and support healthy lifestyles and lifelong savings and asset accumulation (from low levels at the beginning to higher, much higher, and significantly high levels at one’s later stages in life).

166

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

As this were not enough, social insurance systems also are helplessly (to the very most part) facing super digitalization and the onset of artificial intelligence (Kim and Aspalter, 2021). There are great many reports (from system admirers, system minders, and system enforcers) that there will be so many, and in fact many millions of new jobs, due to heightened forms of digitalization and the new arrival and spread in daily technical applications of artificial intelligence. This is true. But, also true is that many hundreds of millions of people are losing their jobs, and their potential jobs are vanishing like in a bad movie, on perhaps not the last human on earth, but perhaps the last human jobs on earth(!) (cf e.g. Yan 2017; Ward 2017; Schulze 2018; Lardieri 2019; Petersen 2019; Reisinger 2019; McLelland 2020; Galeon 2022). Banks, supermarkets, border crossings, retail shops are losing jobs left and right, day by day. Pharmacists (and soon perhaps doctors in general), lawyers, accountants, finance experts, banking employees, administrators, sales personnel, truck and taxi drivers, production workers, teachers, interpretors/translators, fast-food employees, etc. are already becoming fast a thing of the past if one is looking forward in steps of ten or twenty years into the future. That is, they are soon to be, or are already, on track to become a thing of the past—the very most of them, not all of them, starting in the most developed (most expensive) countries first. Some will stay and oversee the digitalization of work processes or serve as lead experts, and some will oversee and take over the programming and reconfiguration of AI, the internet of things, and so forth. This trend has just gotten started, and is rather progressive in nature(!). If mandatory social insurance systems are now already up to one third financed by general government tax income that this is greatly unjust for women who are neglected, rather barely included in this system, or excluded for the most part; also any parent who decides to invest in the society’s and the economy’s future by working themselves and worrying themselves to their bones, to raise their child. Now, as the part of social insurance financing that comes from general taxation is even set to increase (in a manner that is, on top, out of control really), this unjust system become even more of an unjust system, a menace for mothers especially, and all parents, who invested their lives, to support other people’s old age income, other people’s health care, and other people’s long-term care services, especially those who never had cared for their children and raised them, and never had financed such a financially devastating lifetime project of having and raising kids. Provident fund systems, contrary to social insurance systems, do not cause this kind of injustices as they do not draw on great amounts, and great shares, of national budgets and of course, hence, general tax income of the government to get by, one year after the other. Provident fund systems, however, need and should be supported by e.g. universal basic income schemes and/or numerous smart universal benefits and services programs, which can (and are designed to) cater to redistributional justice, and equality and social harmony of societies today.

And this is yet much more important for tomorrow’s societies, given the onset of super-digitalization and artificial intelligence applications that eat up jobs on new unseen massive scales, and given the onset of societal super aging, and of course the

Assets for the Poor and Near-Poor: A New Social Right

167

devastating and poverty-exacerbating effects of climate change and frequent extreme weather phenomena on grand, even on world-regional scale. Provident fund systems have an array of advantages over social insurance systems, when they do come in pairs with lots of smart universal benefits and services. Provident fund systems also solve the long-time povertization problem of the people at large, as they for the first time ever can inflation-proof their lifetime savings and lifetime social security contributions. In addition, as every economist knows, or should know, provident fund systems systemically, through their inbuilt incentive systems, increase the propensity of the workforce to work, and to save more for times of unemployment, underemployment, old age, ill health, health and mobility limitations, and other incapacitations (that cause the need for long-term care services). At the same time, provident fund systems decrease the propensity of lifetime needs for health care services and long-term care services (cf also Fig. 7.1 above). These lifetime needs for health care services and long-term care services alike are being minimized by positive behavior-changing effects of provident fund systems themselves. Provident fund systems let people more often, seen over millions of people, make the right decisions in life, especially with regard to daily and repetitive behavioral choices and lifetime habits: e.g. going hiking on the weekends and running and/or biking during the week instead of playing on the phone or computer all day long and all week long, going for a walk in the evenings instead of hanging out on the couch, choosing and trying hard to eat more and much more vegetables instead of meat, and/or cutting out oily French Fries from their daily or weekly menu choices and replacing them with lots of salad, etc. Seemingly banal, negative daily behavioral choices cost economies many percentage points of their GDP annually, and perpetually so. These choices cost not only many trillions of Euros and US dollars every year, but also many tens of millions of lives that end in for sure preventable early deaths and decades of lifetime sufferings.

Assets for the Poor and Near-Poor: A New Social Right People for the most part have the wrong idea of what is wealth. Many, perhaps a sound majority, think of GDP as representing or actually embodying wealth. GDP however is nothing more than the accumulative (fictive, and hence highly estimated by the government) sum of all invoices (or receipts) and all salaries and transfer payments of one year (or month) of one area. What GDP really is: the sum of transfers, of money circulation—not money creation, not wealth, not wealth creation. In order to realize what wealth really is one needs to think like an accountant. The house you own, minus the debt you owe, that is net wealth. Not the salary you got and then you spend on medical treatment or overpriced rent to your (what a telling word indeed) ‘landlord’. When you stay home and cook dinner every day for your family, or start to drink instant coffee (a good brand hopefully) and replace hereby

168

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

numerous visits to your favorite or nearby coffee shop every day (or so), you will get richer by many hundred thousand Euros (or dollars) by the end of your working life or half way through your post-retirement life. But, this will actually decrease transfers, and hence decrease GDP. Even though one is saving money and getting richer (i.e. wealthier) all along. Social assistance transfers, as well as universal basic income, increase GDP, as they all are income, and with one of the highest turnover rates (h), as poor people spend all their money almost right away, in the same month, etc., for food, rent, medical expenses, etc. and that domestically—which is super positive for GDP development, as: GDP = M*h (M stands for money supply, h for turnover rate). Thus, it is super important to explain all people that universal basic income (UBI) increases automatically the GDP of any country if the net transfers (UBI minus other transfer payments that get cancelled and/or reduced because of new UBI payments) are higher than before. Money is not lost, but rather transferred, and its turnover rate (h) is being improved at the same time. It is super important to understand and fully grasp that wealth and GDP are two very separate and very different things: When the Asian tsunami hit Southeast Asia and parts of South Asia in 2004 at least 225,000 people were killed, many cities and villages have been levelled (EB 2021). In the Sichuan earthquake of 2008 destroyed (collapsed or severely destroyed) 11.4 million housing units, killed about 90,000 people and left about 375,000 people heavily injured (Pletcher 2021; CQ 2008). These two events, both, increased local GDP in that area, as lives lost, people maimed, houses destroyed, does register positively with the number that is presented as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the following months and years, as people had to be buried, people had to be hospitalized, debris cleared, new houses built—these events led to an increase in local GDP in the following periods. Hence, GDP is not wealth, just transactions between people (consumption, salaried income, capital income, and social transfers, i.e. social assistance and social security benefits, alike) and that includes universal basic income transfers.

Taxing the Super-Super-Rich Income is rather meaningless for the super-rich, and so are all the taxes that tax income, that includes social security taxation. Mandatory social security contributions are in fact nothing else than taxes: there is just a different name calling, the automatic method of deduction from one’s salary is the same, one has no choice, that is also the same. Bill Gates tried to help AOC (Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez) when pointing out, for the super-rich a very obvious fact (but for the rest of us a for the most part totally forgotten truth) that you do not need income to be super wealthy (Feiner 2019). Rich people do not ask one another, what is your salary?. They ask one another (at

Assets for the Poor and Near-Poor: A New Social Right

169

birthday parties, neighbor gatherings, weddings, etc.) how was your last quarter?, meaning, how did your net worth (i.e. accumulated worth of assets minus debts and obligations) increase in the last quarter. This is important to explain people, in order to take away the fear of one’s hardearned income may be taxed e.g. by a new tax for the super-super-rich, while one is just a hardworking head nurse, hardworking diner or coffee shop owner, a hardworking higher-level engineer or high-skilled construction worker. Even one would have a house, one additional house in the country side, and one house for investment purposes for own’s own old age or to pass on to one’s child or children, one is not super-rich, just well off. Remedies need to be found for: (i) gender-cum-trans-people injustice, i.e. social reproduction injustice, which is the problem of external costs for the poor and middle classes, and especially female and other caretakers, to raise kids, while this social reproduction boosts the wealth accumulation of the super-rich, and drains the means of the poor and working classes at the same time, and (ii) economic injustice of undervalued income for essential and hardworking, and even dangerous, jobs and professions, etc., versus overvalued return on investments on capital wealth, e.g. real estates, stocks, etc. And a one-time marginal wealth taxation (a one-time haircut) of only the superrich, of their wealth over e.g. 100 million Euros (or US dollars) net worth per person (that can or cannot include children, e.g. proportional to their age to 18 ratio, this is up for policy makers to decide and negotiate) is exactly such a remedy. Everything less that 100 million Euros (or US dollars) per person will not be taxed additionally, but just they way it was taxed before, if at all. Poverty, inequality, injustices are time-sensitive phenomena. Past poverty, inequality and injustices are always accumulative in their effect, and this is how systemic poverty, systemic inequality, and systemic injustices are getting and sustaining their massive and devastating power over the lives of the poor, the less fortunate, and the systemically discriminated (by life chances, economic remuneration or non-remuneration of their work, etc.) people.

That is why, in short, a major one-time marginal haircut taxation is needed for long-term accumulated wealth that is accumulated over generations and centuries, and thus based on all historical injustices of long gone centuries, all their injustices and transgressions, including the sheer endless horrors of slavery, genocide, exploitative and oppressive wars, and oppressions of many kinds, including silent (hidden) and outright (visible) oppressions by aristocrats and autocrats over many centuries—and not for income in the first place. This one-time marginal haircut wealth tax can then be used to finance universal basic income and/or support—i.e. in terms of additional start-up or top-up subsidies—provident fund systems that are enabling asset (wealth) development by the poor, to enable their way out of poverty, sustainably, once and for all (cf Huang et al. 2021, 2020; Midgley and Aspalter 2017; Midgley and Sherraden 1997, 2000; Sherraden 1991).

The above-mentioned marginal wealth tax is a great option, it is certainly not the only way to stop the exclusion of the poor and the poor working classes from decent ways and decent levels of life.

170

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

Stop Taxing the Poor and the Near-Poor One other, for sure additional (or substitutive), way to avoid the continuous mass povertization of millions and billions of people and many generations thereof is to avoid taxing the poor and the near-poor—which would be a no-brainer, if an alien would visit us on earth and look at poverty among humankind, and then would advise us on the first step how to get rid of it (one always can conduct such a thought experiment). Taxing, of course, also includes the practice of social security taxation (contributions, in the language of the ruling elites) (Peters 2021; Romig 2016; Coughlin 1982). These also would (and do) need to go, in their entirety—that is, they must not be paid by the poor and the near-poor themselves, but by large capital (the Großkapital) and large capital income earners (the super-rich and the super-super-rich) instead. Providing the poor, the near-poor, the working and the middle classes with opportunities to take care of themselves is an optimal start for a better future.

Therefore, for sure, it is not utopian or dystopian to implement universal basic income and/or non-taxation for the poor and near-poor—instead of heavy multitaxation and the double burden of providing tax and social security financing, on top of being ripped off by cold progression, as a form of purposeful institutional oppression of the poor by the ruling elites and large capital itself. Of course, we also need to do away with the notion of insurance is being beneficial to the poor, or the middle classes. It is a weight that they have to carry and shoulder all their lives, and it sucks out all their—otherwise savable (and profitably so)—financial means. These means then in the following are missing for any substantial (i.e. meaningful) asset development for the poor and the near-poor, and the middle classes. Quite the opposite, mandatory social insurance (apart from accident insurance) as it is practiced around the world comes with lowest levels of income returns (i.e. return on investment, or ‘interest rates’ on capital provided) that are shifted from one generation to another, that is in addition financing (in terms of results) low fertility of the current-day generation and even higher profit margins for large capital.

The Win-Win-Win Solution of Provident Fund Systems The thing is there is an alternative: provident funds. Provident funds are individual savings accounts, which can have base fundings or top-up fundings provided by the government (and hopefully paid for, financed, by the super-rich, and not the members of the provident fund schemes, the poor, the working and the middle classes themselves) (Aspalter 2017g, 2002a, 2001b; Low and Aspalter 2003; Low and Aw 1997). In short, provident funds are win-win-win solutions. The stock market will be happy if there are provident funds (as they provident fund savings will be invested in the stock market, to a considerable part, or a majority of it). The government finance ministries will be happy, since now they do not have to jump in and provide the major share of pensions, health care, and long-term care

Assets for the Poor and Near-Poor: A New Social Right

171

finances—that are paid (in the current form) by consumers, and the salaried working and middle classes themselves anyway (not the super-rich, not by large capital), through general taxation and their social security contribution (taxation). Hence, with provident fund systems in place, governments do not have do worry about lack of overall (national) fertility, as well as strong levels of societal aging, and the lack of social security funding that comes with the reliance on pay-as-you-go and non-funded social security systems in form of social insurance systems. And, the people (most important of all) will be happy, too, as they now are having real savings, under one’s name and as a property owned by oneself—rather than a ‘promise’ by any social insurance institution to be fulfilled a couple of decades down the road, or not, or mostly not, that for sure. This is so because general taxation (one yet has to pay and one’s children yet have to pay) is used to fill the vast shortfalls in social insurance financing while there is an additional decline of overall fertility far below the natural societal replacement level (in most developed countries in the world, apart from the US, France and Sweden, most notably). As of now, in most countries of the world, general taxation is mostly—the very most part of it—financed by personal taxes and consumption taxes alone; and the contributions (to overall total tax income) of capital taxes and corporate taxes in general are super small, dwindling and rather (and criminally so, in humanitarian sense) insignificant! With provident fund systems, one can now, on top, with normal return on investment (ROI) levels, save for one’s retirement, older and high age, without having to worry about getting poor, being programmed for poverty, in fact locked up in poverty, during one’s old and high age.

This is happening even as one has paid decades of mandatory social insurance contributions, due to ‘low’ return or ‘no’ returns and/or ‘negative’ real (inflationneutral) returns on investment. This is in part also due to the fact that benefit catalogues of pay-as-you-go systems are being stripped of benefits and pension formulars are ‘amended’ with below-0 multipliers, which of course all lead to lower benefits as years progress, again and again, all the way until the time one’s own retirement, old and high age comes along. Why Change? Apart from old-age poverty and massive youth unemployment, income polarization (Kim 2009; Kim and Aspalter 2021; cf also Socorro et al. 2013; Hwang and Lim 2016; Alichi et al. 2016; Ravallion and Chen 2021)—despite and because of the workings and outcomes of mandatory social insurance systems, plus the dire external costs dilemma of fertility and unpaid work for raising children—is the main reason why we need: 1. to implement universal basic income (which is not too high and not too low!), 2. to conduct a one-time marginal haircut wealth tax, 3. to convert all social insurance systems (except accident insurance systems) into provident fund systems—using actuarial mathematics to convert cumulative social insurance entitlements into actual savings per person, of the formerly insured and now members of the new provident fund account system. This transition can go over night. The same authorities taking care of social insurance

172

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

administration, also overnight, will be also converted into provident fund organizations. Possibly, if politically advantageous, this transition can also be made in steps, i.e. it can also be split up into different segments of society, hence being e.g. mandatory for the younger generations, and voluntary for the older generations, and giving a choice for those in between. 4. to introduce a full-fledged, wide and fully adequate, net of smart universal benefits and services, to cover all needs and poverty issues, but in a way that does not cause any microeconomic, behavioral side-effects, such as: poverty trap, savings trap, unemployment trap, increase in obesity, lack of exercise, lack of healthy and too much unhealthy nutritional intake, etc. Very importantly, the introduction of universal basic income makes most of poverty-increasing and poverty-exacerbating asset- and means-tested social assistance (also called ‘welfare’) benefits superfluous. Hence, the total cost of transition to universal basic incomes is in case of a strong presence of asset- and means-tested benefits and services, and in case of a lower to moderate level of universal basic income levels much lower than one would think when imagining it at first glance. It is conceivable that the transition costs are actually negative(!), that is to say, the transition (the switch from the current system to universal basic income) saves more money for the government than is costs—depending on the reduction of the pre-existing social assistance (welfare) and services programs and, of course, the level of benefits being introduced for any new universal basic income (UBI) scheme.

That is why, one needs to carefully calibrate the level of universal basic income for every person that it is not too low(!), and not too high(!). Also, there should be universal basic income also for all children, also those still in the wombs of their mothers/parents. So, pregnant women/parents get double universal basic income (see the unsolved problems of parental poverty e.g. across all developed countries; Tai and Treas 2009). This is absolutely necessary (i) to avoid parental poverty and (ii) to compensate for fertility services provided by parents for the economy, which hence keeps (iii) the capitalist enterprise afloat, (iv) consumption machine running, and (v) workforce generation replacement possible. (1) Universal basic income, (2) tax-free (including social security tax-free) salaried income for the lower segments of society, which is of course to be phased out the higher the income rises relative to median income level (the starting and cut off points of which are to be determined politically and/or by experts panels case by case), and last but not least (3) the establishment of personal savings accounts for social security provision that is secure and sustainable throughout the whole of one’s and one’s children’s lifetime are making asset development for the poor possible—and, with it, the abolition of general poverty and systemic povertization of millions and billions really possible. Then, general poverty and systemic povertization become a thing of the past: a what-was-that(?) kind of thing. Just to introduce provident fund systems alone would not work, to fight all of poverty and inequality—that is not their institutional design and purpose. Provident fund systems, hence, need to be accompanied, introduced together with, other/poverty-fighting systems and programs, such as numerous smart universal

Decency for All

173

benefits and services (or non-means-tested conditional cash transfer systems), and full-fledged (wide and comprehensive) supply-side-based public investments in health care and education, and housing (or affordable housing financing). Universal basic income, stop taxing the poor (and near-poor) in combination with strong provident fund systems is a good starting point to put an end to poverty, and human suffereing on large global and large historical scales.

Decency for All Have we done our job? Have we abolished once and for all poverty, inequality, exploitation, abuse, neglect and oppression? We can ask ourselves, and seen on a global scale we must say we utterly failed. That is not because we really tried, or because we really tried all the things that are in the toolkit of social policy, or that are perceivable (cf Aristotle cited in Bauböck 2008: 41). Complacency is to be blamed, at the one hand, general public contentment with how things are (along the line of: that is it, that is all we can do); but even more so professional and scientific contentment with the state of how the profession of social policy and the science of social policy is handling its task (its job) of eradicating poverty, making injustice on massive scale a thing of the past (cf e.g. Abel-Smith and Townsend 1965; Weale 1990; Caster 2017; Theoharis 2020). Or are we the victims of the rigidity of Kuhnian paradigms that give us virtually or seemingly no room for extra thought (cf Kuhn 1970a, b; Van Kersbergen and Vis 2015), more critical thought—that is, no room for additional compassion, as well as a professional and scientific drive to unravel the systemically (and continuously ever more and ever anew) rigged game of institutional and policy constellations, along with cultural and communicational (e.g. semantic) shackles of the past? Resorting to yet another thought experiment, if we would (or could) directly compare the successful achievement one profession’s goals—the goal attainment of the profession of social policy—with that of another profession, let’s say marketing, how would social policy fare? In marketing the job of a marketing professional is to provide instructions of how to (basically) achieve e.g. global market coverage and global market leadership. In social policy that would mean to describe, analyze and amend social policy in all of the world, in every corner, including the smallest countries and remotest corners of earth. Social policy and health policy (cf Woolf 2009; Schuftan 2018), for example, for the very most time still talk about Europe and other Anglo-Saxon countries, the “West” (cf e.g. Cash-Gibson et al. 2018). Fortresses of thought, fortresses of habit, are preventing a full-fledged account of social policy around the world, as well as a full-fledged understanding and full-fledged normative handling of the problems of poverty and inequality, that is, oppression and injustice. These fortresses, as explained by the theories of Foucault, Bourdieu, Weber, Luhmann, Collins, Murphy, Tilly, and Galbraith above, are being maintained constantly by the super-rich and the super powerful that are allies of the super-rich (the financial, economic, political and

174

7 Decency for All: Universal Basic Income, Smart Universalism, …

military elites) (cf also Navarro 2009; Schuftan 2018; WB 2018; IR 2019; OXFAM 2021a, b; Beckett and Western 2001). The job of social policy is incomplete, for as long as at least all truly feasible and effective tools at hand—and all (better and best) tools perceivable—are not being formed and not applied in every corner of the world (and then reevaluated, improved and applied again). Poverty, inequality, and social policies all around the world, in any corner of the world (wherever people live, whoever they are, no matter how many and how powerful or how rich they are) need to be constantly compared, and theories need to be constructed, tested, contested, and adapted along the way, sometimes overthrown or reinvented. Up-to-date numerical, textual and contextual datasets need to be constructed, maintained and used in form of comparative analysis of all kinds. Professionals and scientists in social policy need to become globally locally capable, fighting poverty and inequality on a case-by-case basis or in general where ever it can be found. If marketing of global brands e.g. McDonald’s or Coca Cola would have shared the fate of social policy, these two brands and companies would have not been a global success—it would not have happened yet. McDonald’s and Coca Cola would still be primarily a world-regional phenomenon. In terms of actual professional marketing, these two brands however have achieved the possible, the difficult, perhaps the unlikely; their global reach and global goal attainment has been in fact become part of history. On the other hand, full-fledged, full-grown and full effective social policy is still a dream more than a reality on a global scale, and in most parts of the world. The difference is that global elite systems and their system ideologies (cf also Piketty 2020) heavily supported the consumption and global spread of McDonald’s and Coca Cola, but strongly and continuously prohibited, hindered and slowed the spread and development of social policy, solidarity and decency for all of humanity.

Epilogue

Bringing decency to all humanity, this is really what social policy is all about, i.e. real decency, to all human beings whoever they are, whatever they think, however they choose to live their lives, and in all parts and corners of the earth, rich or poor, famous or forgotten, or simply neglected along the way, every day and every year. This book started out to be a follow-up publication, in the shoes of Gøsta EspingAndersen’s phenomenal 1990 book, extending the very same logic of pointing out and fleshing out the theory of ideal-typical models now for the first time really around the world, on every continent of the world, in the very most of countries (i.e. 155 countries), covering for the first time most of humanity and their respective welfare state systems. Yet, one finding hunted the other, and the super finding of rampant inequality being a world plague, and that across all ten welfare regimes (to greater and lesser degree), and across almost the entirety of welfare state systems around the world, needed to be explained theoretically (by explanatory theories) and thoroughly addressed (i.e. solved) by normative social policy. As a result, the book was fitted with two meta-analytical parts, one explanatory in nature, the other normative (evaluative and prescriptive). For the normative part, an up-to-date assembly of new and rather new normative social policy strategies and recipes have been compiled, all of which are workable and fully effective. The methods put to use in this book span across the social policy arsenal, adding new methods here and there, leading to a true multi-method methodology employed throughout the book. All this was done to chase the big questions of our time (at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century), how is social policy around the world, how in particular are the ten worlds of welfare capitalism faring by themselves and in comparison to one another, and how can that be explained by and large, and what can be done to remedy the current-day situation, and historical legacy, of world hunger, world poverty, as well as complex, cunning and obscure systems of sometimes blatant, sometimes below-the-radar-types of oppressions?

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Aspalter, Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0

175

176

Epilogue

The answer among all the answers found that answers these questions is clear: inequality leads to and makes possible poverty and oppression. The forces that cause oppression, inequality and poverty are also preventing and working—systemically and ceaselessly, over centuries, in many complex multitudes of ways, institutionally and culturally—against any remedy and all remedies for the world disease that is called world inequality (cf e.g. Beckett and Western 2001; Therborn 2013; Navarro 2009; Olorunshola 2016; Schuftan 2018; TBP 2018; IR 2019; Ravallion 2017; UN 2020; Francis et al. 2020; Credit Suisse 2021). Solutions are there, fully workable, fully effective (fully reliable), but the major obstacle in the way is contentment with the current status quo, apart from excuses made and misinformation spread. And, this contentment is also engineered by the same elite forces that prevent what social policy actually can do for the decency of humankind across the globe. There is a choice, everyone has a choice, and this book, too, is a choice, to stand up and call for the right answers, the right solutions and to put finally an end to all the misery, suffering, deaths, illness, precariousness, and fragility of human lives, here and there, everywhere on this planet, which is truly a planet of unnecessary misery. Christian Aspalter.

A Note to Go

Oppression and dehumanization is lack of love, as neglect, indifference and ignorance are also key foundations of any oppressive and dehumanizing system. Without respect, without care, without attention, there is no love. There shall be respect for, care for and attention given to all people, their poverty, their misery, wherever they are, whoever they are.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Aspalter, Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0

177

References

Abdul Karim, Syahirah, Terje A. Eikemo, and Clare Bambra. 2010. Welfare state regimes and population health: Integrating the East Asian welfare states. Health Policy 94(1): 45–53. Abel-Smith, Brian, and Peter Townsend. 1965. The Poor and the Poorest. G. Bell & Sons: London. Abrahamson, Peter. 1999. The welfare modeling business. Social Policy and Administration 33 (4): 394–415. Abrahamson, Peter. 1999b. The Scandinavian model of welfare: Comparing social welfare systems in Nordic Europe and France. Rencontres et Recherches, 4, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/149 03596.pdf. Abrahamson, Peter. 2003a. The Danish Welfare State. In Welfare Capitalism Around the World, ed. C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Abrahamson, Peter. 2003b. The end of the Scandinavian Model? Welfare reform in the Nordic Countries. Journal of Societal and Social Policy 2 (2): 19–36. Abrahamson, Peter. 2008. The Danish Welfare State: A social rights perspective. In Understanding European Social Policy, ed. P. Abrahamson and C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Abrahamson, Peter. 2017b. The American Welfare State system: With special reference to asset- and means-tested social assistance programs. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter Routledge: Oxon. Abrahamson, Peter. 2017a. Future welfare: An uneven race to the top and/or a polarized world? In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Abrahamson, Peter, and Christian Aspalter (eds.). 2008. Understanding European Social Policy. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Abramovitz, Mimi. 1985. The family ethic: The female pauper and public aid. Social Service Review 59 (1): 121–135. Abramovitz, Mimi. 1996. Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present. Bell Hooks: South End Press. Abramovitz, Mimi. 2000. Under Attack, Fighting Back: Women and Welfare in the United States. New York: Monthly Review Press. Abu Sharkh, Miriam and Ian Gough. 2010. Global welfare regimes: A cluster analysis. Global Social Policy 10 (1): 27–58. Adams, Lisa V., and John R. Butterly. 2015. Diseases of Poverty: Epidemiology, Infectious Diseases, and Modern Plagues. Chicago: Dartmouth College Press. ADB, Asian Development Bank. 2021. Poverty Data: Fiji. https://www.adb.org/countries/fiji/pov erty. Adésínà, Jimi O. (ed.). 2007. Social Policy in Sub-Saharan African Context: In Search of Inclusive Development, Palgrave: Basingstoke. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Aspalter, Ten Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7863-0

179

180

References

Adésínà, Jimi O., et al. (eds.). 2006. Africa and Development Challenges in the New Millenium. London: ZED. AF, Arthritis Foundation. 2019. Website. https://www.arthritis.org/Documents/Sections/About-Art hritis/arthritis-facts-stats-figures.pdf. Ahadzie, William, Francie Lund, Stephen Devereux, and Ian Macauslan. 2006. Social Protection in Africa. Paper presented at a workshop, Centre for Social Protection, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, November 23–25, https://www.ids.ac.uk. Aidukaite, Jolanta. 2006. The formation of social insurance institutions of the Baltic States in the post-socialist era. Journal of European Social Policy 16 (3): 259–270. Aidukaite, Jolanta. 2009. The transformation of welfare systems in the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. A. Cerami and P. Vanhuysse. Palgrave Macmillan: New York. Albrecht, Tit, Katherine Polin, Radivoje Pribakovi´c Brinovec, Marjeta Kuhar, Mircha Poldrugovac, Petra Ogrin Rehberger, Valentina Prevolnik Rupel, and Pia Vracko. 2021. Slovenia: Health Systems Review. European Observatory for Health Systems and Policies, WHO Regional Office for Europe: Copenhagen. Aldosary, Adel S., Syed M. Rahman, and Syed Munawer. 2008a. Affordable housing in Saudi Arabia. In The State of Social Welfare in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter, A. Dashkina, A.S. Aldosary, and S. Singh. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Aldosary, Adel S., Syed M. Rahman, and Mir Shahid. 2008b. Alleviating unemployment in Saudi Arabia. In: The State of Social Welfare in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter, A. Dashkina, A.S. Aldosary, and S. Singh. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Alichi, Ali, Kory Kantenga, and Juan Sole. 2016. Income polarization in the United States. Working Paper, No. 16/121, International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Iss ues/2016/12/31. Alkire, Sabina, and James Foster. 2011. Counting and multidimensional poverty measurement. Journal of Public Economics 95 (7): 476–487. Allen, Luke. 2017. Are we facing a noncommunicable disease pandemic? Journal of Epidemiology and Global Health 7 (1): 5–9. Alvaredo, Facundo, Lydia Assouad, Thomas Piketty. 2018. Measuring inequality in the Middle East 1990–2016: The World’s most unequal region? https://wid.world/document/alvaredoassouadpik etty-middleeast-widworldwp201715. Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez. 2013. The top 1 percent in international and historical perspective. Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (3): 3–20. Amagoh, Francis. 2017. Health care system in Kazakhstan. In Health Care Systems in Developing Countries in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter, K. Teguh-Pribadi, and R. Gauld. Routledge: Oxon. Amenta, Edwin. 2003. What we know about the development of social policy: Comparative and historical research in comparative and historical perspective. In Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Amitsis, Gabriel. 2009. The impact of E.U. social inclusion strategies on Mediterranean welfare regimes: Challenges for Greece and Cyprus. Paper presented at the 7th ESPAnet Conference, University of Urbino, Urbino, September 17–19. Amitsis, Gabriel. 2015. Challenges to combat extreme poverty in Europe: The paradigm of the Greek national social inclusion strategy. Paper presented at ASAP Austria Conference on Absolute Poverty in Europe, Salzburg, August, 27–28. Antonelli, Maria Alessandra, and Valeria De Bonis. 2017. Social spending, welfare and redistribution: A comparative analysis of 22 European countries. Modern Economy 8 (11): 1291–1313. Arcanjo, Manuela. 2006. Ideal (and Real) types of welfare state. Working paper, No. 6, Department of Economics, Technical University of Lisbon, Lisbon. Arcanjo, Manuela. 2011. Welfare state regimes and reforms: A classification of ten European countries between 1990 and 2006. Social Policy and Society 10 (2): 139–150.

References

181

Arts, Wil. 2020. The welfare regime debate revisited: Some epistemological and methodological observations. In Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front: Essays in Honour of Wim van Oorschot, ed. T. Laenen, B. Meuleman, A. Otto, F. Roosma, and W. Van Lancker. Centre for Sociological Research, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven: Leuven. Arts, Wil, and Gelissen John. 1999. Verzorgingsstaten in Soorten: Op Zoek naar Ideaalen Reële Typen. Mens & Maatschappij 74 (2): 143–165. Arts, Wil, and John Gelissen. 2002. Three worlds of welfare capitalism or more? Journal of European Social Policy 12 (2): 137–158. Arts, Wil, and John Gelissen. 2010. Models of the welfare state. The Oxford Handbook to the Welfare State, ed. F.G. Castles, S. Leibfried, J. Lewis, H. Obinger, and C. Pierson. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Ascoli, Ugo, and Emmanuele Pavolini. 2015. The Italian Welfare State in a European Perspective: A Comparative Analysis. Bristol: Bristol University Press/Policy Press. Aspalter, Christian. 2001a. Importance of Christian and Social Democratic Movements in Welfare Politics: With Special Reference to Germany. New York: Austria and Sweden, Nova Science. Aspalter, Christian. 2001b. Conservative Welfare State Systems in East Asia. Westport: Praeger. Aspalter, Christian, ed. 2002a. Discovering the Welfare State in East Asia. Westport: Praeger. Aspalter, Christian. 2002b. Population policy in India. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 22 (11): 48–72. Aspalter, Christian (ed.). 2003a. Welfare Capitalism Around the World. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Aspalter, Christian (ed.). 2003b. Neoliberalism and the Australian Welfare State. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Aspalter, Christian (ed.). 2003c. The Welfare State in Emerging-Market Economies: Case Studies from Latin America, Eastern-Central Europe, and Asia. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Aspalter, Christian. 2003d. The welfare state system in India. In The Welfare State in Emerging Market Economies: With Case Studies from Latin America, Eastern-Central Europe and Asia, ed. C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Aspalter, Christian. 2003b. State and the making of the welfare system in India. Journal of National Development 3 (1): 149–179. Aspalter, Christian. 2005. The welfare state in East Asia: An ideal-typical welfare regime. Journal of Societal and Social Policy 4 (1): 1–20. Aspalter, Christian. 2006a. The East Asian welfare model. International Journal of Social Welfare 15 (4): 290–301. Aspalter, Christian. 2006b. Freedom, dehumanization and welfare: An Asian perspective. Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 1 (2): 95–114. Aspalter, Christian. 2008. The welfare state in cross-cultural perspectives. International Social Work 51 (6): 777–789. Aspalter, Christian. 2010. Towards “Human Capital Solidarity”: Emphasizing justice in the distribution of physical, mental, social and cultural capabilities—A normative study in social policy. ISSA International Social Security Association/Geneva, Global Research Conference, Luxembourg, Sept. 30. Aspalter, Christian. 2011. Developing ideal-typical welfare regime theory. International Social Work 54 (2): 735–750. Aspalter, Christian. 2012a. Real-typical and ideal-typical methods in comparative social policy. In Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, 1st edn. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2012b. Health care system in Italy. In Health Care Systems in Europe and Asia, ed. C. Aspalter, Y. Uchida, and R. Gauld. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2014a. Introduction. In Social Work in East Asia, ed. C. Aspalter. Ashgate: Surrey. Aspalter, Christian. 2014b. Social work services and developmental social policy. In Social Work in East Asia, ed. C. Aspalter. Ashgate: Surrey.

182

References

Aspalter, Christian. 2015. New perspectives for active aging: The normative approach of developmental social policy. In: The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. A. Walker, and C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian, ed. 2017a. The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems. Oxon: Routledge. Aspalter, Christian. 2017b. Ten worlds of welfare capitalism: An ideal-typical perspective. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2017c. The Indian welfare state system: With special reference to social policy and the burden of disease. In Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2017d. The Brazilian welfare state system: With special reference to the outcomes and performance of the welfare state system. In Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2017e. Saving lives through health care policy: A developmental social policy perspective. In Health Care Systems in Developing Countries in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter, K. TeguhPribadi, and R. Gauld. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2017f. Evaluating conditional cash transfer systems: The case of Latin America and the Caribbean. In Development and Social Policy: The Win-Win Strategies of Developmental Social Policy, ed. C. Aspalter, and K. Teguh-Pribadi. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2017g. Evaluating the performance of provident fund systems: The case of Singapore. In Development and Social Policy: The Win-Win Strategies of Developmental Social Policy, ed. C. Aspalter, and K. Teguh-Pribadi. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2018. Engineering the pursuit of happiness: How social policy can influence behavior to reduce mortality rates due to non-communicable diseases (or Modern Mass Diseases). https://papers.ssrn.com. Aspalter, Christian. 2019a. Welfare regime analysis: 30 years in the making. International Social Work 62 (1): 76–88. Aspalter, Christian. 2019b. Ten ideal-typical worlds of welfare regimes and their regime characteristics. In Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, 2nd edn, ed. B. Greve. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian, ed. 2020a. Ideal Types in Comparative Social Policy. Oxon: Routledge. Aspalter, Christian. 2020b. The importance of distinguishing between ideal-typical and real-typical models. In Ideal Types in Comparative Social Policy, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2020c. Back to the origins: The ideal-type methodology in social sciences as developed by Max Weber. In Ideal Types in Comparative Social Policy, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2020d. Ten worlds of welfare regimes. In Ideal Types in Comparative Social Policy, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2020e. Healthy aging. In: Encyclopedia of Gerontology and Population Aging, ed. D. Gu, and M.E. Dupre. Springer: New York. Aspalter, Christian. 2020f. Third Modernity and Social Policy. https://papers.ssrn.com. Aspalter, Christian. 2021a. A Pas de Trois in social policy theory: Understanding the financing of welfare state systems. In Financing Welfare State Systems in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2021b. Financing the welfare state system in India. In Financing Welfare State Systems in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian. 2021d. Understanding systemic social problems: Moving beyond the limits of Leibenstein’s X-efficiency theory—An essay in theoretical behavioral social policy. https://pap ers.ssrn.com. Aspalter, Christian. 2021e. Social development and welfare state systems in developing countries in East Asia: A comparative study. https://papers.ssrn.com. Aspalter, Christian. 2021c. Classifying different types of meta analyses and meta syntheses— Developing methodology in social policy and public policy research. https://papers.ssrn.com.

References

183

Aspalter, Christian. 2022a. Super inequality: A general theory of mass poverty. Social Development Issues 44 (2), 1–19. Aspalter, Christian. 2023a. Welfare state administration and the East Asian welfare regime. In The Oxford International Handbook of Governance and Management for Social Policy, ed. K. Baehler et al. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Aspalter, Christian. (ed.). 2023b. The Covid-19 Pandemic: Problems arising in health and social policy, Springer: Singapore. Aspalter, Christian. 2023c. The human face of the pandemic. In Covid-19 Pandemic: Problems arising in health and social policy. ed. C. Aspalter. Springer: Singapore. Aspalter, Christian. 2023d. Evaluating and Measuring Exactly the Distances Between Aggregate Health Performances: A Global Health Data and Welfare Regime Analysis. Social Development Issues 45 (1): 1–36. Aspalter, Christian, and Hubert Liu. 2017. The Japanese welfare state system: With special reference to financing health care, pensions and long-term care in a super-aged society. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Aspalter, Christian, and Surendra Singh. 2008. Debating social development: An introduction. In Debating Social Development, ed. C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Aspalter, Christian, and Kenny Teguh-Pripadi, eds. 2017. Development and Social Policy: The Win-Win Strategies of Developmental Social Policy. Oxon: Routledge. Aspalter, Christian, Antonina Dashkina, Adel S. Aldosary, and Surendra Singh. 2008. The State of Social Welfare in Asia. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Aspalter, Christian, Kim Jinsoo, and Sojeung Park. 2009. The welfare states in Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia: An ideal-typical perspective. Social Policy and Administration 43 (2): 170–185. Aspalter, Christian, Kenny Teguh-Pribadi, and Robin Gauld, eds. 2017. Health Care Systems in Developing Countries in Asia. Oxon: Routledge. Aspalter, Christian, Yasuo Uchida, and Robin Gauld, eds. 2012. Health Care Systems in Europe and Asia. Oxon: Routledge. Assouad, Lydia. 2018. Is the Middle East the world’s most unequal region? https://theforum.erf. org.eg/2018/03/27/middle-east-worlds-unequal-region. Assunta Ricci, Chiara, and Sergio Scicchitano. 2021. Decomposing changes in income polarization by population group: What happened during the crisis? Economia Politica 38 (1): 235–259. AUVA, Allgemeine Unfallversicherungsanstalt, Austria. 2021. Website. https://www.auva.at. Avdeyeva, Olga A. 2011. Policy experiment in Russia: Cash-for-babies and fertility change. Social Politics 18 (3): 361–386. Awoyemi, Taiwo Timothy, Isaac B. Oluwatayo, and Obayelu Oluwakemi. 2010. Inequality, Polarization and Poverty in Nigeria. https://papers.ssrn.com. Badescu, Ciprian. 2019. Central and Eastern European welfare state regimes: State-of-the-field review. https://www.researchgate.net/publication. Bambra, Clare, and Terje A. Eikemo. 2009. Welfare state regimes, unemployment and health: A comparative study of the relationship between unemployment and self-reported health in 23 European countries. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 63 (2): 92–98. Bambra, Clare. 2004. The worlds of welfare: Illusory and gender blind? Social Policy and Society 3 (3): 201–211. Bambra, Clare. 2005. Worlds of welfare and the health care discrepancy. Social Policy and Society 4 (1): 31–41. Bambra, Clare. 2006. Health status and the worlds of welfare. Social Policy and Society 5: 53–62. Bambra, Clare. 2007a. Going beyond The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 61 (12): 1098–1102. Bambra, Clare. 2007b. Sifting the wheat from the chaff. Social Policy and Administration 41 (1): 1–28. Bambra, Clare, ed. 2019. Health in Hard Times: Austerity and Health Inequalities. Bristol: Policy Press.

184

References

Bambra, Clare, Daniel Pope, Viren Swami, Debbi Stanistreet, Albert Jan Roskam, Anton E. Kunst, and Alex Scott-Samuel. 2009, Gender, Health inequalities and welfare state regimes: A crossnational study of 13 European countries. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health 63 (1): 38–44. Barrientos, Armando. 2010. Social protection and poverty. Social Policy and Development Programme Paper, No. 42 UNRISD, Geneva. Barrientos, Armando, and Martin Powell. 2021. How ‘Liberal’ are Latin American welfare regimes? In Latin American Social Policy Developments in the Twenty-First Century, ed. N. Sátyro, E. del Pino, and C. Midaglia. Palgrave Macmillan: London. Bauböck, Rainer. 2008. Normative political theory and empirical research. In Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences, ed. D. Porta, and M. Keating. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Beck, Ulrich. 1986. Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M. Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity. Sage: London. Beck, Ulrich. 1997. The Reinvention of Politics. Polity: Cambridge. Beck, Ulrich. 1999. World Risk Society. Oxford: Blackwell. Beck, Ulrich. 2000. Brave New World of Work. Polity: Cambridge. Beckett, Katherine, and Bruce Western. 2001. Governing social marginality: Welfare, incarceration, and the transformation of state policy. Punishment and Society 3 (1): 43–59. Behrman, Jere R., Whitney Schott, Subha Man, Benjamin T. Crookston, Kirk Dearden, Le Thuc Duc, Lia C.H. Fernald, and Aryeh D. Stein. 2017. Intergenerational transmission of poverty and inequality: Parental resources and schooling attainment and children’s human capital in Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam. Economic Development and Cultural Change 65 (4): 657–697. Bellazaire, Amber, and Erik Skinner. 2019. Preventing Infant and Maternal Mortality: State Policy Options. https://www.ncsl.org/research/health. Bennett, Kathleen, Zubair Kabir, Belgin Unal, Emer Shelley, Julia Critchley, Ivan Perry, John Feely, and Simon Capewell. 2006. Explaining the recent decrease in coronary heart disease mortality rates in Ireland. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 60: 322–327. Bertolissi, Giacomo. 2015. The Italian welfare state in a time of crisis: A focus on Italian health care illustrating differences and similarities between Italy and the U.S. Rutgers Law Record 42: 277–299. Beveridge, William. 1942. Social Insurance and Allied Services. London: HMSO. Bhattacharaya, Tithi. 2017. How not to skip class: Social reproduction of labor and the global working class. In Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression, ed. T. Bhattacharaya. Pluto Press: London. Bimpong, Kweku, Katie Thomson, Courtney L. McNamara, Mirza Balaj, Nasima Akhter, Clare Bambra, and Adam Todd. 2021. The Gender Pain Gap: Gender Inequalities in Pain Across 19 European Countries. https://doi.org/10.1177/1403494820987466. Blackman, Tim, Eva Ellitot, Alexandra Greene, Barbara Harrington, David J. Hunter, Linda Marks, Lorna McKee, and Gareth Williams. 2006. Performance assessments and wicked problems: The case of health inequalities. Public Policy and Administration 21 (2): 66–80. Blau, Joel, and Mimi Abramovitz. 2014. The Dynamics of Social Welfare Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. Bloomberg. 2013. Means Tests Are Poverty Traps, March 27. https://www.bloomberg.com. Blunt, Peter, Mark Turner, and Hendrik Lindroth. 2012. Patronage’s progress in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Public Administration and Development 32 (1): 64–81. Bochel, Hugh. 2019. Liberal welfare states. In Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, 2nd ed., ed. B. Greve. Routledge: Oxon. Böger, Tobias, and Kerem Gabriel Öktem. 2019. Levels or worlds of welfare? Assessing social rights and social stratification in Northern and Southern Countries. Social Policy and Administration 53 (1): 63–77.

References

185

Böhnke, Petra. 2008. Are the poor socially integrated? The link between poverty and social support in different welfare regimes. Journal of European Social Policy 18 (2): 133–150. Bonoli, Giuliano. 2007. Time matters: Postindustrialization, new social risks, and welfare state adaptation in advanced industrial democracies. Comparative Political Studies 40 (5): 495–520. Bonoli, Giuliano. 2021. Blurb. https://www.routledge.com/Ideal-Types-in-Comparative-Social-Pol icy/Aspalter/p/book/9780367279769. Bonvin, Jean-Michel, and Stephan Dahmen. 2017. The Swiss welfare state system: With special reference to education policy. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Borunda, Alejandra. 2021. Heat Waves Kill People—and Climate Change Is Making It Much, Much Worse. National Geographic. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article. Borzutsky, Silvia. 2002a. Vital Connections: Politics, Social Security, and Inequality in Chile. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Borzutsky, Silvia. 2002b. Chile’s fully funded system: An analysis of its impact on the state and the society. Paper presented at an international conference at Seoul National University, October 11–13. Borzutsky, Silvia, and Mark Hyde. 2017. The Chilean welfare state system: With special reference to social security privatization. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Bottomore, Tom B. 1972. Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature. New York: Vintage. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1973. Cultural reproduction and social reproduction. In Knowledge, Education, and Social Change, ed. R. Brown. Tavistock: London. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1983. Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital. In Soziale Ungleichheiten, ed. R. Kreckel. Otto Schwartz: Göttingen. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. London: Routledge. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. The forms of capital. In Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. J.G. Richardson. Greenwood: Westport. Bourdieu, Pierre. 2002. Cultural power. In Cultural Sociology, ed. L. Spillman. Blackwell: Oxford. Bozça˘ga, Tu.˘gba. 2013. Women and the welfare state regime of Turkey. Turkish Policy Quarterly 11 (4): 177–188. Bradshaw, Johnathan, Steven Kennedy, Majella Kilkey, Sandra Hutton, Anne Corden, Tony Eeardley, Hilary Holmes, and Joanna Neale. 1996. The Employment of Lone Parents: A Comparison of Policy in 20 Countries. Family Policy Studies Centre/Joseph Rowntree Foundation: London/York. Brady, David. 2009. Rich Democracies, Poor People. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brady, David, and Rebekah Burroway. 2012. Targeting, universalism, and single-mother poverty: A multilevel analysis across 18 affluent democracies. Demography 49 (2): 719–746. Brady, David, and Linda M. Burton, eds. 2019. The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brannen, Julia. 1992. Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research. Avebury: Aldershot. Brannen, Julia. 2005. Mixing methods: The entry of qualitative and quantitative approaches into the research process. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 8 (3): 173–184. Brannen, Julia. 2021. Mixed methods research: A discussion paper. http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/89/1/ MethodsReviewPaperNCRM-005.pdf. Brown, Faye. 2021. Desperate Afghan Mums Throw Babies Over Barbed Wire Fences and Beg Soldiers to Take Them. https://metro.co.uk/2021/08/19. Bu˘gra, Ay.¸se, and Ça.˘glar Keyder. 2006. Turkish welfare regime in transformation. Journal of European Social Policy 16 (3): 211–228. Burggraf, Gabe. 2021. Health and Hurricans: Experts Examine Climate Change’s Impact on Public Health, October 25. https://www.thelantern.com/2021/10. Campbell, John L., and John A. Hall. 2021. What Capitalism Needs: Forgotten Lessons of Great Economists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

186

References

Canagarajah, Sudharshan, and S.V. Sethuraman. 2001. Social protection and the informal sector in developing countries: Challenges and opportunities. Social Protection Discussion Paper, No. 130, World Bank, Washington D.C. Canetkin, Kerem, Adem Yavuz Elveren, and Ceyhun Elgin. 2021. Financing the welfare state system in Turkey. In Fincancing Welfare State Systems in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Cantillon, Bea, Diana De Graeve, and Natascha Van Mechelen. 2017. The Belgian welfare state system: With special reference to “Targeting Within Universalism”. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Capaldi, E.J., and Robert W. Proctor. 2008. Are theories to be evaluated in isolation or relative to alternatives? An abductive view. The American Journal of Psychology 121 (4): 617–641. Caruana, Clyde. 2010. Measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the welfare state: A comparative study of the EU-27 member states. Bank of Valletta Review 42: 75–106. Casas Herrera, Julián Augusto. 2017. Inequality as determinant of the persistence of poverty. In Poverty, Inequality and Policy, ed. G. Staicu. IntechOpen: London. Cash-Gibson, Lucinda, Diego F. Rojas-Gualdrón, Juan M. Pericàs, and Joan Benach. 2018. Inequalities in global health inequalities research: A 50-year bibliometric analysis (1966–2015). PLoS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191901. Castles, Francis G., and Deborah Mitchell. 1991. Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or Four? Discussion Paper, No. 21, Public Policy Program. Australian National University: Canberra. Castles, Francis G., and Deborah Mitchell. 1992. Identifying welfare state regimes: The links between politics, instruments and outcomes. Governance 5: 1–26. Castles, Francis G., and Deborah Mitchell. 1993. Worlds of welfare and families of nations. In Family of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies, ed. F.G. Castles. Dartmouth: Aldershot. Caster, Andrew. 2017. Making Poverty a Thing of the Past: How It Will Happen. https://www.all peers.com. CDC, United States. 2021. National Statistics. https://www.cdc.gov/arthritis/data_statistics/nat ional-statistics.html. Cerami, Alfio. 2007. Social change and welfare state developments in CEE and Russia. Paper. Science Po, Paris. Cerami, Alfio. 2013. Permanent Emergency Welfare Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Exclusive Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Cerami, Alfio. 2015. Social protection and the politics of anger in the Middle East and North Africa. Politiche Sociali 1: 115–135. Cerami, Alfio, and Pieter Vanhuysse, eds. 2009. Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chepkemoi, Joyce. 2017. Countries with the highest home ownership rates. https://www.worlda tlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-highest-home-ownership-rates.html. Chevalier, Tom, Bruno Palier. 2017. The French welfare state system: With special reference to youth unemployment. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Chitiga, Margaret, and Emmanuel Sekyere. 2021. Income Inequality and Limitations of the Gini Index: The Case of South Africa. http://hsrc.ac.za/en/review/hsrc-review-november-2014. Chow, Nelson. 2004. Asian value and aged care. Geriatrics and Gerontology International 4 (S1): S21–S25. Chow, Nelson W.S., and Christian Aspalter. 2003. The welfare state system in China. In Welfare State Systems in Emerging Market Economies: With Case Studies from Latin America, Central Europe, and Asia, ed. C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Christophers, Brett. 2018. Intergenerational inequality? Labour, capital, and housing through the ages. Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography 50 (1): 101–121. Chuang, Ying-Chih, Kun-Yang Chuang, You-Rong Chen, Bo-Wen Shi, and Tzu-Hsuan Yang. 2012. Welfare state regimes, infant mortality and life expectancy: Integrating evidence from East Asia.

References

187

Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health 66 (7): e23. https://jech.bmj.com/content/66/ 7/e23. Clegg, Daniel. 2019. Central European welfare states. In Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, 2nd ed., ed. B. Greve. Routledge: Oxon. Clementi, Fabio, Mauro Gallegati, Lisa Gianmoena, Simone Landini, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2019. Mis-measurement of inequality: A critical reflection and new insights. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 14 (4). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-019-00257-2. Collins, Randall. 1975. Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science. New York: Academic Press. Collins, Randall. 1979. The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification. New York: Academic Press. Conley, Julia. 2021. Democrats Urged to Seize ‘Historic Chance’ on Billionaire Wealth Tax. https:// www.commondreams.org/news/2021/10/26. Cook, Linda J. 2007a. Negotiating welfare in postcommunist states. Comparative Politics 40 (1): 41–62. Cook, Linda J. 2007b. Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Cook, Linda J. 2010. Eastern Europe and Russia. In The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, ed. F.G. Castles, S. Leibfried, J. Lewis, H. Obinger, and C. Pierson. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Cook, Sarah. 2013. Rescuing social protection from the poverty trap: New programmes and historical lessons. In Social Protection in Developing Countries: Reforming Systems, ed. K. Bender, M. Kaltenborn, and C. Pfleiderer. Routledge: London. Corak, Miles. 2013. Inequality from generation to generation: The United States in comparison. In The Economics of Inequality, Poverty, and Discrimination in the 21st Century, ed. R. Rycroft. Praeger: Santa Barbara. Coser, Lewis A. 1977. Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social Context. New York: Harcourt. Coughlin, Richard M. 1982. Payroll taxes for social security in the United States: The future of fiscal and social policy illusions. Journal of Economic Psychology 2 (3): 165–185. Cox, Robert Henry. 2019. Welfare states in North America: Social citizenship in the United States, Canada and Mexico. In Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, 2nd ed., ed. B. Greve. Routledge: Oxon. Craven, Benedict. 2015. Low oil prices and new departures in Saudi Arabian social policy: A promising sign for development? UNRISD, Geneva, April 25. http://www.unrisd.org. CQ, The China Quarterly. 2008. China: Focus—The Sichuan earthquake. https://reliefweb.int/rep ort/china/china-focus-sichuan-earthquake. Credit Suisse. 2021. Global Wealth Data Book. Credit Suisse Research Institute: Zürich. Cruz-Martínez, Gibrán. 2020. A bottom-up picture of intra-national welfare regimes: The case of marginalised communities in Puerto Rico. Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 36 (2): 175–199. Dashkina, Antonina. 2008. The development of social services in Russia. In The State of Social Welfare in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter, A. Dashkina, A.S. Aldosary, and S. Singh. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Hill, Davis, Dana Carol, and Leann M. Tigges. 1995. Gendering welfare state theory: A crossnational study of women’s public pension quality. Gender and Society 9 (1): 99–119. De Swaan, Abram. 1988. In Care of the State: Health Care, Education and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era. Polity Press: Cambridge. Deacon, Bob. 1992. The future of social policy in Eastern Europe. In The New Eastern Europe, ed. B. Deacon et al. Sage: London. Deeming, Christopher. 2013. The working class and welfare: Francis G. Castles on the political development of the welfare state in Australia and New Zealand thirty years on. Social Policy and Administration 47 (6): 668–691. Deen, Thalif. 2020. Global poverty soars—As incomes of world’s billionaires hit new highs. Global Issues. https://www.globalissues.org/news/2020/10/15/26930.

188

References

Delgado-Wise, Raúl. 2017. Capitalism. Migration and Development. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG. 2.2.22097.53602. Dembele, Moussa. 2012. Discussions with, Zhuhai, March-June. Deutsch, Joseph, and Jacques Silber. 2010. Income polarization: Measurement, determinants, and implications. Review of Income and Wealth 56 (1): 1–6. Dixon, John. 1981. The Chinese Welfare System, 1949–1979. New York: Praeger. Dixon, John. 1987a. Social Welfare in Africa. Beckenham: Croom Helm. Dixon, John. 1987b. Social Welfare in the Middle East. Beckenham: Croom Helm. Dixon, John. 2010. Comparative social welfare: The existential humanist perspective and challenge. Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 26 (2–3): 177–187. Dixon, John, and Hyung Shik Kim, eds. 1985. Social Welfare in Asia. Beckenham: Croom Helm. Dixon, John, and David Macarov. 1992. Social Welfare in Socialist Countries. London: Routledge. Dixon, John, and Robert P. Scheurell (eds.). Social Security Programs: A Cross-Cultural Comparative Perspective. Greenwood Press: Westport. Donati, Pierpaolo. 2009. What does “Subsidiarity” mean? The relational perspective. Journal of Markets & Morality 12 (2): 211–243. Dørum, Knut. 2020. Nordic Gender Equality Policy in a Europeanisation Perspective. Oxon: Routledge. Dostal, Jörg-Michael, and Gemati Ekacita Naskoshi. 2017. The Indonesian welfare state system: With special reference to social security extension in the context of development. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Dressler, Dominique, and Peter Pils. 2015. Presentation, at the International Conference for the Development of Social Security. Department of Social Welfare, Yonsei University, Seoul, November 27. Du Toit, Andries. 2017. Explaining the persistence of rural poverty in South Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd. Duclos, Jean-Yves., Joan-Maria. Esteban, and Debraj Ray. 2004. Polarization: Concepts, measurement, estimation. Econometrica 72 (6): 1737–1772. EB, Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2021. Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. https://www.britannica.com/ event/Indian-Ocean-tsunami-of-2004. Ebbinghaus, Bernhard. 2012. Comparing welfare state regimes: Are typologies a ideal or realistic strategy? Paper presented at European Social Policy Analysis Network, ESPAnet Conference, Edinburgh, September 6–8. Eikemo, T.A., C. Bambra, K. Joyce, and E. Dahl. 2008a. Welfare state regimes and income-related health inequalities: A comparison of 23 European countries. European Journal of Public Health 18 (6): 593–599. Eikemo, T.A., M. Huisman, C. Bambra, and A.E. Kunst. 2008b. Health inequalities according to educational level in different welfare regimes: A comparison of 23 European countries. Sociology of Health and Illness 30 (4): 565–582. Eliæson, Sven. 2002. Max Weber’s Methodologies: Interpretation and Critique. Polity: Cambridge. Elkjær Sørensen, Astrid. 2019. Gender Segregation in the Nordic Labour Market, Aarhus University. https://nordics.info/show/artikel. Elveren, Adem Yavuz, and Tuba I. Agartan. 2017. The Turkish welfare state system: With special reference to human capital development. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Emmenegger, Patrick, Silja Häusermann, Bruno Palier, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser. 2012. The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Emmenegger, Patrick, Jon Kvist, Paul Marx, and Klaus Petersen. 2015. Three worlds of welfare capitalism: The making of a classic. Journal of European Social Policy 25 (1): 3–13. Engerman, Stanley L. 2000. Max Weber as economist and economic historian. In The Cambridge Companion to Weber, ed. S. Turner. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

References

189

EP, European Parliament. 2018. Social Protection in the EU: State of Play, Challenges and Options. Briefing, European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1985. Politics Against Markets. Princeton University Press: Princeton. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1987a. The comparison of policy regimes: An introduction. In Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy: The Rise and Fall of Policy Regimes, ed. M. Rein, G. EspingAndersen, and L. Rainwater. M.E. Sharpe: New York. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1987b. Citizenship and socialism: De-commodification and solidarity in the welfare state. In Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy: The Rise and Fall of Policy Regimes, ed. M. Rein, G. Esping-Andersen, and L. Rainwater. M.E. Sharpe: New York. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1989. The three political economies of the welfare state. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 26 (1): 10–36. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Polity: Cambridge. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1991. Strutturi di classe post-industriali: Un confronto tra Germania, Svezia e Stati Uniti. Stato e Mercato, No. 32. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1993. Changing Classes: Stratification and Mobility in Post-Industrial Societies. London: Sage. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1998. Discussions with, Puli, Taiwan, April. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1999. Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 2000. Social indicators and welfare monitoring. Social Policy and Development, Paper No. 2, UNRISD: Geneva. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 2016. Families in the 21st Century. SNS Förlag: Stockholm. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, and John Myles. 2011. Economic inequality and the welfare state. In The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality, ed. B. Nolan, W. Salverda, and T.M. Smeeding. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Esteban, Joan-Maria., and Debraj Ray. 1994. On the measurement of polarization. Econometrica 62 (4): 819–851. Evertsson, Marie. 2014. Gender ideology and the sharing of housework and child care in Sweden. Journal of Family Issues 35 (7): 927–949. Eydal, Guðn.ý Björk., and Tine Rostgaard, eds. 2015. Fatherhood in the Nordic Welfare States: Comparing Care Policies and Practice. Bristol: Policy Press. Eydal, Guðný Björk, Ingólfur V. Gíslason, Tine Rostgaard, and Berit Brandth. 2015. Trends in parental leave in the Nordic Countries: Has the forward march of gender equality halted? Community Work & Family 18 (2): 1–15. Eze, Uchenna. 2020. Discussion with, Conghua, China, December. Farias, Pedro Cesar Lima de. 2003. The welfare state in Brazil: Evolution, problems, and trends of social policy. In Welfare States in Emerging-Market Economies: Case Studies from Latin America, Central Europe and Asia, ed. C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. FEE, Foundation for Economic Education. 2016. The Fall of Rome Began with the Abuse of Refugees. https://fee.org/articles. Feiner, Lauren. 2019. Bill Gates: Taxing the rich is fine, but ‘Extreme’ politicians like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez are missing the point by focusing on income. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/12. Fenger, H.J. Menno. 2007. Welfare regimes in central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating postcommunist countries in a welfare regime typology. Contemporary Issues and Ideas in Social Sciences 3 (2): 1–30. Ferragina, Emanuele. 2019. The political economy of family policy expansion fostering neoliberal capitalism or promoting gender equality supporting social reproduction? Review of International Political Economy 26 (6): 1238–1265. Ferragina, Emanuele, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser. 2011. Thematic review: Welfare regime debate: Past, present, futures? Policy and Politics 39 (4): 583–611. Ferreira, Francisco H.G., and David Robalino. 2010. Social protection in Latin America: Achievements and limitations. Policy Research Working Paper, No. 5304, World Bank: Washington D.C.

190

References

Ferrera, Maurizio. 1996. The southern model of welfare in social Europe. Journal of European Social Policy 6 (1): 17–37. Ferrera, Maurizio. 1997. The four social Europe’s: Between universalism selectivity. In A New Social Contract? Charting the Future of European Welfare, ed. Y. Mény, and M. Rhodes. Macmillan: London. Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty. World Bank: Washington D.C. Fitzpatrick, Jacki A., and Todd R. Gomez. 1997. Still caught in a trap: The continued povertization of women. Affilia 12 (3): 318–341. Folbre, Nancy. 1984. The pauperization of motherhood: Patriarchy and public policy in the United States. Review of Radical Political Economics 16 (4): 72–88. Foucault, Michel. 1963. Naissance de la clinique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Foucault, Michel. 1969. L’archéologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard. Foucault, Michel. 1975. Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison. Paris: Gallimard. Foucault, Michel. 2010. The Government of Self and Others. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Foucault, Michel. 2014. Wrong-Doing and Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice, ed. by F. Brion, and B.E. Harcourt. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. Foucault, Michel. 2009. Security, Territory, Population, ed. by M. Senellart. Palgrave Macmillan: London. Francis, David, Imraan Valodia, and Edward Webster, eds. 2020. Inequality Studies from the Global South. Oxon: Routledge. Francis, Elizabeth. 2006. Poverty: Causes, responses and consequences in rural South Africa. PRC Working paper, No. 60, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, London School of Economics: London. Fraser, Nancy. 1990. Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory. Cambridge: Polity. Fraser, Nancy. 2008. Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World. Polity: Cambridge. Fraser, Nancy. 2013. Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis. London: Verso. Fraser, Nancy. 2017. Crisis of care? On the social-reproductive contradictions of contemporary capitalism. In Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression, ed. T. Bhattacharaya. Pluto Press: London. Fraser, Nancy. 2019. The Old Is Dying and the New Cannot Be Born. London: Verso. Fraser, Nancy, and Linda Gordon. 1994. A genealogy of dependency: Tracing a keyword of the U.S. welfare state. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 19 (2): 309–366. Fraser, Nancy, and Axel Honneth. 2004. Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange. London: Verso. Fraser, Nancy, Rahel Jaeggi. 2018. Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory. Polity: Cambridge. Freud, Sigmund. 1921. Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse. Psychoanalytischer Verlag: Leipzig. Gal, John. 2010. Is there an extended family of Mediterranean welfare states? Journal of European Social Policy 20 (4): 283–300. Gal, John. 2017. The Isreali welfare state system: With special reference to social inclusion. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1973. Economics and the Public Purpose. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1975. The Affluent Society. London: Penguin. Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1993. The Culture of Contentment. London: Penguin. Galeon, Dom. 2022. 80% of IT Jobs Can Be Replaced by Automation, and It’s ‘Exciting’. https:// futurism.com. Garay, Candelaria, ed. 2016. Social Policy Expansion in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.

References

191

García-Fernándeza, Rosa María, Daniel Gottlieb, and Frederico Palacios-González. 2012. Polarization, growth and social policy in the case of Israel, 1997–2008. Economics Discussion Papers, No. 55, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel. Geruso, Michael, and Dean Spears. 2018. Climate Change and Infant Mortality. https://voxdev.org/ topic/energy-environment. Gerven-Haanpää, Minna M.-L. van. 2016. Beyond the Dutch miracle? Challenges to and responses of the Dutch welfare system. In Challenges to European Welfare Systems, ed. K. Schubert, P. Villota, and J. Kuhlmann. Springer: Berlin. Gitari, Eric. 2015. Equality of LGBTIQ persons in Africa, Heinrich Böll Stiftung. https://www. boell.de/en/person/eric-gitari?dimension1=ds_lgbtiafrika. GM, Government of Malta. 2019. LGBTIQ Equality Strategy & Action Plan 2018–2022: Annual Report 2018–2019. Human Rights and Integration Directorate, Ministry of European Affairs and Equality, Government of Malta, Paola, Malta. Goodin, Robert E., Bruce Headey, Ruud Muffels, and Henk-Jan. Dirven. 1999. The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gough, Ian. 2013. Social policy regimes in the developing world. In A Handbook of Comparative Social Policy, ed. P. Kennett. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. Gough, Ian, Geof Wood, Armando Barrientos, Philipa Bevan, Peer Davis, and Graham Room. 2004. Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gordon, Linda. 1988. What does welfare regulate? Social Research 55: 609–630. Gornick, Janet C., and Jerry A. Jacobs. 1998. Gender, the welfare state, and public employment: A comparative study of seven industrialized countries. American Sociological Review 63 (5): 688–710. Gornick, Janet C., and Marcia K. Meyers. 2006. Welfare regimes in relation to paid work and care: A view from the United States on social protection in the European Countries. Revue Française Des Affaires Sociales 1 (5): 187–212. Grown, Caren, Maria S. Floro, and Diane Elson (eds.). 2010. Unpaid work, time use, poverty and public policy. Feminist Economics 16 (3). Grütjen, Daniel. 2006. The Turkish Welfare Regime: An Example of the Southern European Model? The Role of the State, Market and Family in Welfare Provision. https://www.researchgate.net. Guerda, Nicolas, and Jean-Baptiste Varzi. 2002. Experiences of women on public assistance. Journal of Social Issues 57 (2): 299–309. Guillén, Ana M., and Emmanuele Pavolini. 2017. Spain and Italy: Regaining the confidence and legitimacy to advance social policy. In After Austerity: Welfare State Transformation in Europe After the Great Recession, ed. P. Taylor-Gooby, B. Leruth, and H. Chung. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Haberkern, Klaus, Tina Schmid, and Marc Szydlik. 2015. Gender differences in intergenerational care in European Welfare States. Ageing and Society 35: 298–320. Haidari, Omar. 2021. The Only Way Out, August 21. https://www.reuters.com. Hakovirta, Mia, and Guðn.ý Björk. Eydal. 2020. Shared care and child maintenance policies in Nordic Countries. International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 34 (1): 43–59. Hall, Anthony, and James Midgley. 2004. Social Policy for Development. London: Sage. Hardy, Jane. 2009. Migration, Migrant Workers and Capitalism. http://isj.org.uk. Henderson, Ronald F. 1975. Poverty in Australia. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. Hill, Michael J., and Peter L. Hupe. 2022. Implementing public policy: An introduction to the study of operational governance. Sage: London. Hill, Michael J., and Peter L. Hupe. 2002. Implementing public policy: Governance in theory and practice. Sage: London. Hinrichs, Karl. 2017. The German welfare state system: With special reference to the old-age pension system. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon.

192

References

Hoefer, Richard, and James Midgley, eds. 2013. Poverty, Income and Social Protection. New York: Routledge. Holliday, Ian. 2000. Productivist welfare capitalism: Social policy in East Asia. Political Studies 48 (4): 706–723. Hort, Sven E. 2014a. Social Policy, Welfare State, and Civil Society in Sweden: History, Policies, and Institutions 1884–1988, vol. 1. Lund: Arkiv Academic Press. Hort, Sven E. 2014b. Social Policy, Welfare State, and Civil Society in Sweden: The Lost World of Social Democracy 1988–2015, vol. 2. Lund: Arkiv Academic Press. Hort, Sven E., and Nikolay Zakharov. 2019. An Authoritarian populist welfare state? Reassessing the ‘Belarusian Model’ in comparative perspective. In Globalizing Welfare: An Evolving AsianEuropean Dialogue, ed. S. Kuhnle, P. Selle, and S. Hort. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. Horton, Tim. 2011. The fight for universalism: Cuts, targeting and the future of welfare. Public Policy Research 18 (2): 105–114. Horton, Tim, and James Gregory. 2009. The Solidarity Society: Why We Can Afford to End Poverty, and How to Do It With Public Support. London: The Fabian Society. Horton, Tim, and James Gregory. 2010. Whose middle is it anyway? Why universal welfare matters. Public Policy Research 16 (4): 218–225. Hou, Angela Yung-Chi, Tung-Liang Chiang, and Sheng-Ju Chan (eds.). 2021. Higher Education in Taiwan: Global, Political and Social Challenges and Future Trends. Springer: Cham. Howard, Christopher. 1993. The hidden size of the American welfare state. Political Science Quarterly 108 (3): 403–436. Howard, Christopher. 1999. The hidden welfare state: Tax expenditures and social policy in the United States. Princeton University Press: Princeton. Howard, Cosmo. 2003. The promise and performance of mutual obligation. In Neoliberalism and the Australian Welfare State, ed. C. Aspalter Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Hsueh, James Cherng-Tay. 2015. Combating social risks during Global Financial Crisis: Social policies in Taiwan. Paper presented at the Cross-Strait Conference on Social Quality and Policy, BNU-HKBU United International College, Zhuhai, China, March 30. HT, Hakijamii Trust. 2007. The Right to Social Security in Kenya: The Gap Between International Human Rights and Domestic Law and Policy. Hakijamii Trust: Nairobi. Huang, Jin, Margaret S. Sherraden, and Michael Sherraden. (2021a). Toward finance as a public good. CSD Working paper, No. 21–03, Center for Social Development, Washington University. https://doi.org/10.7936/p8dd-p256. Huang, Jin, Michael Sherraden, and Margaret S. Sherraden. (2021b). We have clean water and clean air: Why not clean finance, too? A vision for inclusion and equity. In The Future of Building Wealth: Brief Essays on the Best Ideas to Build Wealth—For Everyone, ed. R. Boshara, and A. Rademcher. Federal Reserve Bank and Aspen Institute. https://futureofwealth.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021b/09/Sec-2.pdf. Huang, Jin, Li Zou, and Michael Sherraden (eds.). 2020. Inclusive Child Development Accounts: Toward Universality and Progressivity. Routledge: Oxon. Huang, Yuli, Xiaoyan Cai, Weiyi Mai, Meijun Li, and Yunzhao Hu. 2016. Association between prediabetes and risk of cardiovascular disease and all cause mortality: Systematic review and meta-analysis. British Medical Journal 355: i5953. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i5953. Huber, Evelyne. 1996. Options for social policy in Latin America: Neoliberal versus social democratic models. In Welfare States in Transition, ed. G. Esping-Andersen. Sage: London. Huber, Evelyne, and Juan Bogliaccini. 2010. Latin America. In The Oxford Handbook to the Welfare State, ed. F.G. Castles, S. Leibfried, J. Lewis, H. Obinger, and C. Pierson. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Hudson, John, and Stefan Kühner. 2011. Analyzing the productive and protective dimensions of welfare: Looking beyond the OECD. Social Policy & Administration 46 (1): 35–60. Hui, Samuel, Christian Aspalter, and Dicky Lai. 2012. Social welfare in Macau—Between East and West: A comparative, analytical welfare regime perspective. https://papers.ssrn.com.

References

193

Hujo, Katja, and Mariana Rulli. 2014. The political economy of pension re-reform in Chile and Argentina toward more inclusive protection. Research Paper, No. 1, April, UNRISD, Geneva. Huntington, Dale. 2012. Health systems perspectives—Infectious diseases of poverty. Infectious Diseases of Poverty 1 (12). https://doi.org/10.1186/2049-9957-1-12. Hwang, Suk-Man, and Hyun-Chin Lim. 2016. Legacy of developmental state: Globalization, income polarization and welfare spending in Korea. Paper presented at the conference Moral Economies, Economic Moralities, UC Berkeley, June 24–26. Iacobucci, Alessandra. 2003. Spectral analysis for economic time series. https://www.researchg ate.net. IG, Infogalactic. 2022. Germanic Peoples. https://infogalactic.com/info. Ighobor, Kingsley. 2017. Africa’s Jobless Youth Cast a Shadow Over Economic Growth. https:// www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine. ILO. 2018. More Than 60 Percent of the World’s Employed Population Are in the Informal Economy. https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news. IR, Ivory Research. 2019. The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison. https://www.ivoryrese arch.com/samples. ISSA, International Social Security Association. 2021. Social Security Around the World: Country Profiles. https://ww1.issa.int/country-profiles. Jacobson, Louis. 2019. Explaining Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s 70 percent marginal tax rate idea. https://www.politifact.com/article/2019/jan/08. Jæger, Mads Meier. 2005. Welfare state regimes and attitudes towards redistribution in 15 Western European countries: Is it really true that institutional regimes do not matter? Social Policy and Welfare Working Paper, No. 4, The Danish National Institute of Social Research: Copenhagen. Jawad, Rana, and John Gal. 2019. The Middle East. In Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, 2nd ed., ed. B. Greve. Routledge: Oxon. Jayasuriya, Sisira. 2017. The End of the Kuznets Curve: Explaining Piketty’s Argument. https://imp act.monash.edu/economy. Johnston, Michael. 2009. Poverty and corruption. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/2009/01/22. Jónasdóttir, Anne G. 1994. Why Women Are Oppressed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Jónasdóttir, Anne G., and Ann Ferguson. 2013. Love: A Question for Feminism in the Twenty-First Century. Oxon: Routledge. Jónasdóttir, Anne G., and Katheen B. Jones. 2008. The Political Interests of Gender Revisited: Redoing Theory and Research With a Feminist Face. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Jones, Gavin W. 1997. An Australian population policy. Research Paper, No. 17, Parliament of Australia, Canberra. Jornitz, Sieglinde, and Marcelo Parreira do Amaral. 2021. The Education Systems of the Americas. Springer: Cham. Jose, Jim, and John Burgess. 2005. Working nation, the ethos of competition and the transformation of public policy. Journal of Economic and Social Policy 9 (2). http://epubs.scu.edu.au/jesp/vol9/ iss2/2. Josephson, Bruce. 2017. The Nigerian welfare state system: With special reference to the challenges of developing a social security system. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Kainu, Markus, Meri Kulmala, Jouko Nikula, and Markku Kivinen. 2017. The Russian welfare state system: With special reference to regional inequality. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Kalberg, Stephen. 2012. Max Weber’s Comparative-Historical Sociology Today: Major Themes, Modes of Causal Analysis, and Applications. Surrey: Ashgate. Kaldor, Nicholas. 1956. Indian Tax Reform, Ministry of Finance, Government of India: New Delhi. Kaldor, Nicholas. 1966. Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth of the United Kingdom. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kammer, Andreas, Judith Niehues, and Andreas Peichl. 2012. Welfare regimes and welfare state outcomes in Europe. Journal of European Social Policy 22 (5): 455–471.

194

References

Kant, Immanuel. 2007. [1781]. Critique of Pure Reason, Penguin Classics: London. Kaseke, Edwell. 2011. The poor laws, colonialism and social welfare: Social assistance in Zimbabwe. In Colonialism and Welfare: Social Policy and the British Imperial Legacy, ed. J. Midgley and D. Piachaud. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. Katz, Cindi. 2002. Vagabond Capitalism and the Necessity of Social Reproduction. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/1467-8330.00207. Katz, Michael B. 1986. In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America. New York: Basic Books. Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver. 2013. Variations of the Welfare State: Great Britain, Sweden, France and Germany: Between Capitalism and Socialism. Heidelberg: Springer. Kennedy, Brianna L. 2018. Deduction, induction, and abduction. In The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Data Collection, ed. U. Flick. Sage: London. Kim, Jinsoo. 2009. Discussions with, Seoul, April. Kim, Jinsoo, and Christian Aspalter. 2021. Income polarity and the end of social insurance. In Financing Welfare State Systems in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Kim, Jinsoo, and Christina Hießl. 2017. The South Korean welfare state system. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. King, John E. 2014. Remembering Kurt Rothschild. In Economics as a Multi-Paradigmatic Science: In Honour of Kurt W. Rothschild,(1914–2010), ed. W. Altzinger, A. Guger, P. Mooslechner, and E. Nowotny. Österreichische Nationalbank: Vienna. Kingfisher, Catherine. 1996. Women in the American Welfare Trap. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Kingfisher, Catherine, ed. 2002. Western Welfare in Decline, Globalization and Women’s Poverty. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Kinnear, Pamela. 2003. The idea of “Mutual Obligation” in Australian Social Security Policy. In Neoliberalism and the Australian Welfare State, ed. C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Kivinen, Markku. 2021. Financing the welfare state system in Russia. In Financing Welfare State Systems in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Klein, Rudolf, and Jane Millar. 2007. Do-it-yourself social policy: Searching for a new paradigm? Social Policy & Administration 29 (4): 303–316. Kocamaner, Hikmet. 2018. The politics of family values in Erdogan’s New Turkey. Middle East Research and Information Project, No. 288. https://merip.org/2018/12/the-politics-of-family-val ues-in-erdogans-new-turkey/. Köhler, Gabriele. 2006. Paradox of the Southasian Welfare State. Himal. https://sangam.org/taraki/ articles. Kohli, Atul. 2012. Poverty Amid Plenty in the New India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Koning, Sammi. 2018. The state of welfare for lesbian, gay and bisexual citizens: Comparing European welfare regimes. Thesis, Leiden University, Leiden Korpi, Walter, and Joakim Palme. 1998. The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality: Welfare state institutions, inequality, and poverty in Western Countries. American Sociological Review 63: 661–687. KPMG. 2020. France: Income Tax. https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2011/12/france-inc ome-tax.html. Kuhlmann, Johanna, and Tobias ten Brink. 2021. Causal mechanisms in the analysis of transnational social policy dynamics: Evidence from the global south. Social Policy and Administration 55: 1009–1020. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970a. [1962]. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970b. Logic of discovery or psychology of research? In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. I. Lakatos, and A. Musgrave. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Kujawska, Justyna. 2017. The efficiency of post-communist countries’ health systems. In Advances in Health Management, ed. U. Comite. IntechOpen: London.

References

195

Kumar, Anand. 2005. The welfare state system in India. In Welfare States and the Future, ed. B. Vivekanandan, and N. Kurian. Palgrave Macmillan: London. Kumar, Arun, and Linet Ozdamar. 2004. International comparison of health care systems. International Journal of the Computer, the Internet and Management 12 (3): 81–95. Künzler, Daniel, and Michael Nollert. 2017. Varieties and drivers of social welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: A critical assessment of current research. Article No. 2.1. Sozialpolitik.ch. https://doi.org/ 10.18753/2297-8224-94. Kurz, Heinz D. 2014. Heterodox economics in Austria: The case of Kurt W. Rothschild. In Economics as a Multi-Paradigmatic Science: In Honour of Kurt W. Rothschild (1914–2010), ed. W. Altzinger, A. Guger, P. Mooslechner, and E. Nowotny. Österreichische Nationalbank: Vienna Kuznets, Simon. 1955. Economic growth and income inequality. The American Economic Review 45: 1–28. Kwon, Huck-Ju, and Hyo-Jung Kim. 2014. Searching for normative grounds for the universal welfare state. Presented at the conference National Development, Social Inclusion and Smart Governance, GSPA, Seoul National University, Seoul, November 20–22. Laferrère, Anne. 2013. Pauperization and polarization of French social housing. Revue Économique 64 (5): 805–832. Laffer, Arthur B. 1974. Laffer Curve Napkin. https://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/obj ect/nmah_1439217. Land, Hilary. 1978. Who cares for the family? Journal of Social Policy 7: 257–284. Lardieri, Alexa. 2019. Robots will replace 20 million jobs by 2030. Oxford Report Finds. https:// www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2019-06-26. Laslett, Barbara. 2000. The poverty of (Monocausal) theory: A comment on Charles Tilly’s durable inequality. Comparative Studies in Society and History 42 (2): 475–481. Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Marie Jahoda, and Hans Zeisel. 1933. Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal: Ein soziographischer Versuch über die Wirkungen von langdauernder Arbeitslosigkeit. Verlag von S. Hirzel: Leipzig. Leblanc, Tatjana. 2009. Transdisciplinary design approach: An experimental model to projectbased teaching and creative problem solving. In Creativity and HCI: From Experience to Design in Education, P. Kotzé, W. Wong, J. Jorge, A. Dix, and P.A. Silva. Springer: Boston. Lee, Carmel K.M. 2017. The Chinese welfare state system: With special reference to aging of society and social policy. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Lee, Cheol-Sung, and In-Hoe Koo. 2017. The welfare states and poverty. In The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Poverty, ed. D. Brady, and L.M. Burton. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Leibenstein, Harvey. 1966. Allocative efficiency vs. X-efficiency. The American Economic Review 56 (3): 392–415. Leibfried, Stephan. 1992. Towards a European welfare state? In Social Policy in Changing Europe, ed. Z. Ferge, and J.E. Kolberg. Campus: Frankfurt a.M. Leichsenring, Kai. 2017. The Austrian welfare state system: With special reference to the long-term care system. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Leichsenring, Kai. 2020. Applying ideal types in long-term care analysis. In Ideal Types in Comparative Social Policy, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Leira, Arnlaug. 1993. The “Women-Friendly Welfare State”?: The case of Norway and Sweden. In Women and Social Policies in Europe: Work, Family and the State, ed. Jane Lewis. Ewdard Elgar: Aldershot. Leira, Arnlaug. 2002. Udpating the “Gender Contract”? childcare reforms in the Nordic Countries in the 1990s. Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research 10 (2): 81–89. Leira, Arnlaug. 2010. Working Parents and the Welfare State: Family Change and Policy Reform in Scandinavia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

196

References

Leung, Joe C.B.. 1994. Dismantling the iron rice bowl: Welfare reform in the PRC. Journal of Social Policy 23 (3): 341–361. Levitt, Peggy, Jocelyn Viterna, Armin Mueller, and Charlotte Lloyd. 2017. Transnational social protection: Setting the agenda. Oxford Development Studies 45 (1): 2–19. Lewis, Jane. 1992. Gender and the development of welfare regimes. Journal of European Social Policy 2 (3): 195–211. Lewis, Jane. 2001. The End of Marriage? Individualism and Intimate Relations. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Leydesdorff, Loet. 2021. The evolutionary dynamics of discursive knowledge: communicationtheoretical perspectives on an empirical philosophy of science. In Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Scientific and Scholarly Communication, ed. W. Glänzel, and A. Schubert. Springer Nature: Cham. Liang, Siyuan, James Macinko, Dahai Yue, and Qingyue Meng. 2019. The impact of the health care workforce on under-five mortality in rural China. Human Resources for Health, 17 (21). https:// doi.org/10.1186/s12960-019-0357-5. Lipscomb, Martin. 2012. Abductive reasoning and qualitative research. Nursing Philosophy: An International Journal for Health Care Professionals 13 (4): 244–256. Lister, Ruth. 2010. Understanding Theories and Concepts in Social Policy. Bristol: Policy Press. Lloyd-Sherlock, Peter. 2019. Inequality, social spending and the state in Latin America. In Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, 2nd ed., ed. B. Greve. Routledge: Oxon. Loke, Vernon, and Michael Sherraden. 2019. Building assets from birth: Singapore’s policies. Asia Pacific Journal of Social Work and Development 29 (1): 6–19. London, Johnathan Daniel. 2018. Welfare and Inequality in Marketizing East Asia. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Lu, Shuang, Yi-Ting Lin, Juliann H. Vikse, and Chien-Chung Huang. 2013. Effectiveness of social welfare programs on poverty reduction and income inequality in China. Journal of Asian Public Policy 6 (3): 227–291. Luhmann, Niklas. 1984. Soziale Systeme. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Luhmann, Niklas. 1997. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Lukes, Steven. 2005. Power: A Radical View. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Maanasa, R. 2021. Critical nexus of non-communicable diseases and Covid-19: Pandemic lessons. Biomedical Research 32 (6): 141–142. Maclachlan, Fiona. 2017. Weber within the Methodenstreit. Cambridge Journal of Economics 41 (4): 1161–1175. Maino, Franca. 2003. The welfare state in Italy. In Welfare Capitalism Around the World, ed. C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Malloy, James M. 1991. Statecraft, social policy and governance in Latin America, University of Notre Dame. Working paper, No. 151, February. Mandel, Hadas, and Michael Shalev. 2009. How welfare state shape the gender pay gap: A theoretical and comparative analysis. Social Forces 87 (4): 1873–1912. Manow, Philip. 2004. “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly”—Esping-Andersen’s regime typology and the religious roots of the Western Welfare State. MPIfG working paper 2004, No. 3, September. Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press. Marcuse, Herbert. 1969. Repressive tolerance. In A Critique of Pure Tolerance, ed. R.P. Wolff, B. Moore, and H. Marcuse. Beacon Press: Boston. Mares, Isabela, and Matthew E. Carnes. 2009. Social policy in developing countries. Annual Review of Political Science 12: 93–113. Martínez, Gabriel. 2017. The Mexican welfare state system: With special reference to conditional cash transfer systems. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Martínez Franzoni, Juliana, and Diego Sánchez-Ancochea. 2016. The Quest for Universal Social Policy in the South: Actors, Ideas and Architectures. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

References

197

Martínez, Ramon, Peter Lloyd-Sherlock, Patricia Soliz, Shah Ebrahim, Enrique Vega, Pedro Ordunez, and Martin McKee. 2020. Trends in premature avertable mortality from noncommunicable diseases for 195 countries and territories, 1990–2017: a population-based study. Lancet Global Health 8: e511–e523. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(20)30035-8. Marx, Ive, Brian Nolan, and Javier Olivera. 2015. The welfare state and antipoverty policy in rich countries. In Handbook of Income Distribution, vol. 2, ed. A.B. Atkinson, and F. Bourguignon. North Holland: New York. Masaiganah, Mwajuma Saiddy. 2004. Primary health care for the people: Health policy in Tanzania. Development 47: 136–139. Maslow, Abraham H. 1943. A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review 50 (4): 370–396. Mathieu, Sophie. 2016. From the defamilialization to the “Demotherization” of care work, social politics: International studies in gender. State & Society 23 (4): 576–591. Matsaganis, Manos. 2011. The welfare state and the crisis: The case of Greece. Journal of European Social Policy 21 (5): 501–512. Matznetter, Walter. 2019. Welfare regimes, varieties of capitalism, and urban housing regimes. https://mri.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/10/P2-Matznetter-MRI30.pdf. Mayer, Susan, and Christopher Jencks. 1988. Poverty and the distribution of material hardship. Journal of Human Resources 24: 88–113. Mayer, Susan, and Christopher Jencks. 1989a. Growing up in poor neighborhoods: How much does it matter? Science 243 (4897): 1441–1445. Mayer, Susan, and Christopher Jencks. 1989b. Poverty and the distribution of material hardship. Journal of Human Resources 24 (1): 88–114. McLelland, Calum. 2020. The impact of artificial intelligence—Widespread job losses. https:// www.iotforall.com. Mendes, Marcos. 2015. Inequality, Democracy, and Growth in Brazil: A Country at the Crossroads of Economic Development. Cambridge: Academic Press. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 1997. Social welfare reform in the context of economic-political liberalization: Latin American cases. World Development 25 (4): 497–517. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 2003. The welfare state in eight Latin American countries. In Welfare Capitalism Around the World, ed. C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 2008. Reassembling Social Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 2013. Social Protection Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean: Cuba. ECLAC, United Nations: Santiago. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 2017. The Cuban welfare state system: With special reference to universalism. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, Alberto Arenas de Mesa, Ivan Brenes, Verónica Montecinos, and Mark Samara (eds.). 2003. Market, Socialist, and Mixed Economies: Comparative Policy and Performance: Chile, Cuba, and Costa Rica. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. Meyers, Marcia K., and Irwin Garfinkel. 1999. Social indicators and the study of inequality. Economic Policy Review 5 (3). Federal Reserve Bank of New York. https://papers.ssrn.com. Mhone, Guy. 2004. Historical trajectories of social policy in Post-Colonial Africa: The case of Zambia. In Social Policy in Development Context, ed. T. Mkandawire. Palgrave Macmillan: London. Midgley, James. 1995. Social Development: The Developmental Perspective in Social Welfare. London: Sage. Midgley, James. 1996. Toward a developmental model of social policy: Relevance of the third world experience. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 23 (1): 59–74. Midgley, James. 1997. Social Welfare in Global Context. London: Sage. Midgley, James. 1999. Growth, redistribution and welfare: Towards social investment. Social Service Review 77 (1): 3–21. Midgley, James. 2002. Discussion, at an international symposium at the School of Social Welfare, The University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, December 11–13.

198

References

Midgley, James. 2014. Social Development: Theory and Practice. London: Sage. Midgley, James. 2017a. Social Welfare in the Global Era: International Perspectives on Policy and Practice. London: Sage. Midgley, James. 2017b. Social investment: Concept, uses and theoretical perspectives. In Social Investment and Social Welfare: International and Critical Perspectives, ed. J. Midgley, E. Dahl, and A. Conley Wright. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. Midgley, James, and Christian Aspalter. 2017. Developmental social policy: Theory and implementation. In Development and Social Policy: The Win-Win Strategies of Developmental Social Policy, ed. C. Aspalter, and K. Teguh-Pribadi. Routledge: Oxon. Midgley, James, and David Piachaud, eds. 2011. Colonialism and Welfare: Social Policy and the British Imperial Legacy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Midgley, James, and David Piachaud (eds.). 2013. Social Protection, Economic Growth and Social Change: Goals, Issues and Trajectories in China, India, Brazil and South Africa. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. Midgley, James, and Michael Sherraden. 2000. The social development perspective in social policy. In The Handbook of Social Policy, ed. J. Midgley, M.B. Tracy, and M. Livermore. London: Sage. Midgley, James, and Michael Sherraden (eds.). 1997. Alternatives to Social Security: An International Inquiry. Auburn House: Westport. Midgley, James, and Kwong-Leung. Tang, eds. 2009. Social Policy and Poverty in East Asia: The Role of Social Security. London: Routledge. Midgley, James, Espen Dahl, and Amy Conley Wright. 2017. Social Investment and Social Welfare: International and Critical Perspectives. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham Midgley, James, Rebecca Surender, and Laura Alfers, eds. 2019. Handbook of Social Policy and Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Milanovic, Branko. 2012. Global income inequality by the numbers: In history and now. Policy Research Working Paper, No. 6259, World Bank, Washington. Millar, Jane, and Caroline Glendenning. 1989. Gender and poverty. Journal of Social Policy 18 (3): 363–381. Miller, Candace. 2007. Social welfare in Africa: Meeting the needs of households caring for orphans and affected by AIDS. In Social Protection Initiatives for Children, Women and Families, ed. A. Minujin, and E. Delamonica. New School University and UNICEF: New York. Mishra, Ramesh. 2002. Richard Titmuss and social policy. Journal of Social Policy 31 (4): 747–752. Mkandawire, Thandika. 2007. Transformative social policy and innovation in developing countries. The European Journal of Development Research 19 (1): 13–29. Mkandawire, Thandika. 2015. Africa: Beyond Recovery. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers. Mkandawire, Thandika. 2021 [2007]. Transformative Social Policy and the Developmental State. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/sites/default/files/global/docs/Mkandawire.pdf. Mohan, Brij, ed. 1984. New Horizons of Social Welfare and Policy. Cambridge: Schenkman. Mohan, Brij. 1985. Toward Comparative Social Welfare. Cambridge: Schenkman. Mohan, Brij. 1992. Global Development: Post-Material Values and Social Praxis. New York: Praeger. Mohan, Brij. 1993. Eclipse of Freedom: The World of Oppression. New York: Praeger. Mohan, Brij. 2007. Fallacies of Development: Crises of Human and Social Development. Atlantic: New Delhi. Mohan, Brij. 2011. Development, Poverty of Culture, and Social Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mohan, Brij, and Prem Sharma. 1985. On human oppression and social development. Social Development Issues 9 (1): 12–24. Morra, Linda G., and Amy Friedlander. 1998. Case Study Evaluations. World Bank. https://ieg.wor ldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/oed_wp1.pdf. Morrison, Ken. 2006. Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought. London: Sage.

References

199

Mosse, David. 2010. A relational approach to durable poverty, inequality and power. The Journal of Development Studies 46 (7): 1156–1178. Muñoz Boudet, Ana María, Antra Bhatt, Ginette Azcona, Jaine Yoo, and Kathleen Beegle. 2021. A global view of poverty. Gender, and Household Composition, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 9553. World Bank, Washington D.C. Murphy, Raymond. 1988. Social Closure: The Theory of Monopolization and Exclusion. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Murphy, Raymond. 2009. Leadership in Disaster: Learning for a Future with Global Climate Change. McGill-Queen’s University Press: Montreal. Murphy, Raymond. 2018. Sociology and Nature: Social Action in Context. Oxon: Routledge. Mustosmäki, Armi, Liza Reisel, Tiina Sihto, and Mari Teigen. 2021. Gendered labor market (Dis)advantages in Nordic welfare states. Nordic Journal of Working Life Studies 11 (S7). https:// doi.org/10.18291/njwls.129190. Myrdal, Gunnar. 1957. Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions. London: Methuen. Myrdal, Gunnar. 1965. The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Narayan, Paresh Kumar. 2011. Social Policies in Fiji. UNRISD. https://www.unrisd.org. NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 2013. Spectra and what they can tell us. https://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/science/toolbox/spectra1.html. NASEM, National Academy of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2021. High and Rising Mortality Rates Among Working-Age Adults. National Academic Press: Washington D.C. Navarro, Vincente. 2009. What we mean by social determinants of health. International Journal of Health Services 39 (3): 423–441. Newman, Joshua, and Brian W. Head. 2017. Wicked tendencies in policy problems: Rethinking the distinction between social and technical problems. Policy and Society 36 (3): 414–442. Nichols-Casebolt, Ann, Judy Krysik, and Ria Hermann-Currie. 1994. The povertization of women: A global phenomenon. Affilia 9 (1): 9–29. Nicolaisen, Heidi, Hanne Cecilie Kavli, and Ragnhild Steen Jensen. 2019. Dualisation of Part-Time Work. Policy Press: Bristol. Nolan, Brian, and Christopher T. Whelan. 2010. Using non-monetary deprivation indicators to analyze poverty and social exclusion: Lessons from Europe? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 29 (2): 305–325. Nthomang, Keitseope. 2007. Provision of Services and Poverty Reduction: The Case of Botswana. Geneva: UNRISD. O’Connor, Julia. 1993. Gender, class and citizenship in the comparative analysis of welfare state regimes: Theoretical and methodological issues. The British Journal of Sociology 44 (3): 501–518. O’Connor, Julia S., Ann Shola Orloff, and Sheila Shaver. 1999. States, Markets, Families: Gender, Liberalism, and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Hearn, Denis, and Paul Ciccantell (eds.). 2021. Migration, Racism and Labor Exploitation in the World-System. Routledge: Oxon. OECD. 2018. The Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes in the OECD. Paris: OECD. OECD. 2020. Education in Saudi Arabia. Paris: OECD. Olorunshola, Yosola. 2016. 7 Shocking Facts About Gender Inequality Around the World, Global Citizen. https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content. Orloff, Ann Shola. 1996. Gender and the welfare state, Institute for Research on Poverty. Discussion Paper, No. 1082–96. https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp108296.pdf. Orloff, Ann Shola. 2009. Gendering the comparative analysis of welfare states: An unfinished agenda. Sociological Theory 27 (3): 317–343. Osberg, Lars. 2016. On the Limitations of Some Current Usages of the Gini Index. Economics Department, Dalhousie University. https://cdn.dal.ca/content/dam/dalhousie/pdf/faculty/science/ economics/researcharchives.

200

References

OXFAM. 2018a. Richest 1 Percent Bagged 82 Percent of Wealth Created Last Rear—Poorest Half of Humanity Got Nothing. Press release. https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases. OXFAM. 2018b. Reward Work, Not Wealth: To End the Inequality Crisis, We Must Build an Economy for Ordinary Working People, Not the Rich and Powerful. Briefing paper. https://policy-practice. oxfam.org/resources. OXFAM. 2021a. 5 Shocking Facts About Extreme Global Inequality and How to Even It Up. https:// www.oxfam.org/en/5-shocking-facts-about-extreme-global-inequality-and-how-even-it. OXFAM. 2021b. Brazil: Extreme Inequality in Numbers. https://www.oxfam.org/en/brazil-extremeinequality-numbers. Paavola, Sami. 2004. Abduction as a logic and methodology of discovery: The importance of strategies. Foundations of Science 9 (3): 267–283. Paavola, Sami. 2014. From steps and phases to dynamically evolving abduction. Commens Working Papers, No. 5, Pub. 140828-1417a, http://www.commens.org/papers. Pal, Leslie A. 2005. Case study method and policy analysis. In Thinking Like a Policy Analyst, ed. I. Geva-May. Palgrave Macmillan: London. Palme, Joakim. 2017. The Swedish welfare state system: With special reference to inequality and the redistribution paradox. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Pan, Xiong-Fei, Juan Yang, Ying Wen, Naishi Li, Simiao Chen, and An Pan. 2021. Noncommunicable diseases during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond. Engineering (Beijing) 7 (7), 899–902. Parkin, Frank. 1979. Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique. Columbia University Press. Pascall, Gillian. 1986. Social Policy: A Feminist Analysis. London: Tavistock. Pascall, Gillian. 2008. Gender models and European social policy. In Understanding European Social Policy, ed. P. Abrahamson, and C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Pearce, Oliver. 2019. Why taxing wealth more effectively can help to reduce inequality and poverty. https://views-voices.oxfam.org.uk/2019/08. Peeroo, Shameema. 2020. The Welfare State of Mauritius: Between “Incompetency” and “Failure”, Au Fait. https://aufait.media/2020/10/27. Pelinka, Anton. 1998. Austria: Out of the Shadow of the Past. Westview: Boulder. Percival, Don. 2021. Introduction to spectral analysis. https://faculty.washington.edu/dbp/PDF FILES/GHS-AP-Stat-talk.pdf. Pereira Tavares, Aida Isabel. 2017. European health system typologies: Last 30 years under review. In Advances in Health Management, ed. U. Comite. IntechOpen: London. Perin, Jamie, Amy Mulick, Diana Yeung, Francisco Villavicencio, Gerard Lopez, Kathleen L.Strong, David Prieto-Merino, Simon Cousens, Robert E. Black, and Li Liu. 2021. Global, regional, and national causes of under-5 mortality in 2000-19: An updated systematic analysis with implications for the sustainable development goals. The Lancet: Child and Adolescent Health. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2352-4642(21)00311-4. Peters, Katelyn. 2021. What Is the Social Security Tax? https://www.investopedia.com. Petersen, Thieß. 2019. Robots Taking Over Jobs: Are Robots and Al Taking Our Jobs Away? https:// ged-project.de/digitization-and-innovation/robots-taking-over-jobs. Petmesidou, Maria. 2019. Southern Europe. In Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, 2nd ed., ed. B. Greve. Routledge: Oxon. Phaahla, Letuku Elias. 2017. Social forces, state pensions, and welfare state-building in South Africa and Mauritius. Thesis, Stellenbosch University. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/37438734.pdf. Phaahla, Letuku Elias. 2018. The welfare state of Mauritius: A critical appraisal. igd.org.za/jdownloads/Global Insight/mauritius_policy_brief.pdf Pierson, Paul. 2000. Path dependence, increasing returns, and the study of politics. American Political Science Review 94 (2): 251–267. Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton University Press: Princeton.

References

201

Piketty, Thomas. 2000. Theories of persistent inequality and intergenerational mobility. In Handbook of Income Distribution, vol. 1, ed. A.B. Atkinson, and F. Bourguignon. North Holland: New York. Piketty, Thomas. 2006. The Kuznets curve yesterday and tomorrow. In Understanding Poverty, ed. A.V. Banerjee, R. Benabou, and D. Mookherjee. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Piketty, Thomas. 2014 [2013]. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge. Piketty, Thomas. 2015. The Economics of Inequality. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Piketty, Thomas. 2020. Capital and Ideology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pletcher, Kenneth. 2021. Sichuan earthquake of 2008. https://www.britannica.com. Polanyi, Karl. 1957. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon. Powell, Martin, and Armando Barrientos. 2011. An audit of the welfare modelling business. Social Policy & Administration 45 (1): 69–84. Pritchard, David. 2014. Unrest and inequalities: Comparing welfare states. In Riot, Unrest and Protest on the Global Stage, ed. D. Pritchard, and F. Pakes. Palgrave Macmillan: London. Rabinow, Paul, ed. 2010. Michel Foucault: The Foucault Reader. New York: Vintage. Ragin, Charles C. 2008. Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ramesh, M. 2004. Social Policy in East and Southeast Asia. London: Routledge. Ramesh, M., et al. 2000. Welfare Capitalism in Southeast Asia. London: Macmillan. Ranaweera, Amarawansa. 2008. Poverty alleviation programs in Sri Lanka. In The State of Social Welfare in Asia, ed. C. Aspalter, A. Dashkina, A.S. Aldosary, and S. Singh. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Raudava, Raike. 2013. Discover USSR welfare model in the context of European social model. International Journal of Research in Social Sciences 2 (3): 1–11. Ravallion, Martin. 2017. Global inequality when unequal countries create unequal people. NBER Working Paper, No. 24177. https://www.nber.org. Ravallion, Martin, and Shaohua Chen. 2021. Fleshing out the olive? On income polarization in China. NBER Working Paper, No. 29383. https://www.nber.org. Rein, Martin, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, and Lee Rainwater (eds.). 1987. Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy. M.E. Sharpe: New York. Reis, Elisa P. 2012. Poverty in the eyes of Brazilian Elites. In The Role of Elites in Economic Development, ed. A.H. Amsden, A. DiCaprio, and J.A. Robinson. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Reis, Elisa P., and Mick Moore, eds. 2005. Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality. London: Zed Books. Reisinger, Don. 2019. A.I. Expert Says Automation Could Replace 40% of Jobs in 15 Years. https:// fortune.com/2019/01/10. Resnick, Danielle, Steven Haggblade, Suresh Babu, Sheryl L. Hendricks, and David Mather. 2018. The Kaleidoscope model of policy change: Applications to food security policy in Zambia. World Development 109: 101–120. Revauger, Jean-Paul. 2003. The welfare state in France. In Welfare Capitalism Around the World, ed. C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Rice, Deborah. 2013. Beyond welfare regimes: From empirical typology to conceptual ideal types. Social Policy and Administration 47 (1): 93–110. Rice, Deborah. 2015. Applying welfare regime ideal types in empirical analysis: The example of activation. In Social Policy Review 27: Analysis and Debate in Social Policy, ed. Z. Irving, M. Fenger, J. Hudson. Policy Press: Bristol. Rice, Deborah. 2020. Applying ideal types in employment policy comparison: The example of employer services. In Ideal Types in Comparative Social Policy, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Rittel, Horst W., and Melvin M. Webber. 1973. Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences 4 (2): 155–169.

202

References

ROAR, Republic of Amsterdam Radio. 2022. Website. https://www.republicofamsterdamradio.com/ episodes/historyofthenetherlands/episode-2-what-have-the-romans-ever-done-for-us. Rogowski, Ralf. 1995. German corporate lawyers: Social closure in autopoietic perspective. In Professional Competition and the Social Construction of Markets, ed. Y. Dezalay, and D. Sugarman. Routledge: London. Roller, Margaret R. 2013. Multi-Method & Case-Centered Research: When the Whole Is Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts. https://researchdesignreview.com/2013/08/19. Roller, Margaret R., and Paul J. Lavrakas. 2015. Applied Qualitative Research Design. New York: Guilford Press. Romig, Kathleen. 2016. Increasing Payroll Taxes Would Strengthen Social Security. https://www. cbpp.org/research/social-security. Rosenhek, Zeev. 2003. The welfare state in Israel. In Welfare Capitalism Around the World, ed. C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Rosenhek, Zeev. 1999. The exclusionary logic of the welfare state: Palestinian citizens in the Israeli welfare state. International Sociology 4 (2): 195–215. Rosenhek, Zeev. 2000. Migration regimes, intra-state conflicts and the politics of exclusion and inclusion: Migrant workers in the Israeli welfare state. Social Problems 47 (1): 49–67. Rosenhek, Zeev and Michael Shalev. 2000. The contradictions of Palestinian citizenship in Israel: Inclusion and exclusion in the Israeli welfare state, In Citizenship and the state in the Middle East: Approaches and applications, ed. by N.A. Butenschon, U. Davis, and M. Hassassian. Syracuse University Press: Syracuse. Roser, Max. 2019. Child Mortality Is an Everyday Tragedy of Enormous Scale That Rarely Makes the Headlines. https://ourworldindata.org. Roumpakis, Antonios. 2020. Revisiting global welfare regimes: Gender, (In)formal employment and care. Social Policy and Society 19 (4): 677–689. Ruda, Nita. 2007. Welfare states in developing countries: Unique or universal? The Journal of Politics 69 (2): 378–396. Sacchi, Stefano. 2018. The Italian welfare state in the crisis: Learning to adjust? South European Society and Politics 23 (1): 29–46. Sage, Daniel. 2019. Well-being and the welfare state. In The Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, ed. B. Greve. Routledge: Oxon. Sainsbury, Diane. 1993. Dual welfare and sex segregation of access to social benefits: Income maintenance policies in the UK, the US, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Journal of Social Policy 22 (1): 69–98. Sainsbury, Diane. 1994. Women’s and men’s social rights: Gendering dimensions of welfare states. In Gendering Welfare States, ed. D. Sainsbury. Sage: London. Sainsbury, Diane. 1996. Gender Equality and Welfare States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sainsbury, Diane. 1999. Gender, policy regimes, and politics. In Gender and Welfare State Regimes, ed. D. Sainsbury. Sage: London. Sainsbury, Diane, ed. 2000. Gender and Welfare State Regimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sarker, Profulla. 2008. Social development in Bangladesh. In Debating Social Development, ed. S. Singh, and C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Saunders, Peter, ed. 2005. Welfare to Work in Practice: Social Security and Participation in Economic and Social Life. Aldershot: Ashgate. Saxonberg, Steven. 2013. From defamilialization to degenderization: Toward a new welfare typology. Social Policy & Administration 47 (1): 26–49. Saxonberg, Steven, and Tomáš Sirovátka. 2019. Central and Eastern Europe. In Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, 2nd ed., ed. B. Greve. Routledge: Oxon. Scheiwe, Kirsten. 1994. Labour market, welfare state and family institutions: The links to mother’s poverty risks: A comparison between Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom. Journal of European Social Policy 4 (3): 201–224.

References

203

Schuftan, Claudio. 2018. There Is No Such Thing as ‘Diseases of Poverty’ There Are ‘Diseases of Wealth With Inequality’. https://www.socialmedicine.org/2018/06/10/human-rights/no-thing-dis eases-poverty-diseases-wealth-inequality. Schumpeter, Joseph Alois. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper. SCPI, The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality. 2016. The Fading American Dream. https:// inequality.stanford.edu/news-events/center-news. Scruggs, Lyle, and James P. Allan. 2003. Trends in welfare state decommodification in eighteen advanced industrial democracies. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 27–31. Scruggs, Lyle, and James P. Allan. 2006. Welfare state decommodification in 18 OECD countries. Journal of European Social Policy 16 (1): 55–72. Scruggs, Lyle, and James P. Allan. 2008. Social stratification and welfare regimes for the twenty-first century. World Politics 60 (4): 642–664. SD, Science Direct. 2017. High Prevalence of Diabetes, Prediabetes in China. https://www.scienc edaily.com. Seekings, Jeremy. 2006. Employment guarantee or minimum income? Workfare and welfare in developing countries, University of Cape Town/Yale University. https://usbig.net/papers/151Seekings-workfare-welfare.pdf. Seekings, Jeremy, and Nicoli Nattrass. 2015. Policy, Politics and Poverty in South Africa. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin, Silke Van Dyk, and Martin Roggenkamp. 2008. Party Politics and Social Welfare: Comparing Christian and Social Democracy in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. Sevgur, Serperi Beliz. 2021. Transnational dimensions of social reproduction: Georgian migrant women in Turkey. Dissertation, Dalhousie University, Halifax. Shah, Anup. 2011. Corruption. https://www.globalissues.org/article/590/corruption. Shaver, Sheila. 1990. Gender, social policy regimes, and the welfare state. Social Policy Research Centre Discussion Papers, No. 26, University of New South Wales, Sydney. Shen, Zheng, Xiaodong Zheng, and Hualei Yang. 2020. The fertility effects of public pension: Evidence from the new rural pension scheme in China. PLoS ONE 15 (6): e0234657. https://doi. org/10.1371/journal.pone.0234657. Sherraden, Michael. 1991. Assets and the Poor: A New American Welfare Policy. Sharpe: Armonk. Sherraden, Michael. 1996. Social security in the 21st century. CSD Policy Report, No. 96–05, Center for Social Development Washington University, St. Louis. Sherraden, Michael. 2000. Asset building policy and programs for the poor. CSD Policy Report, No. 00–32, Center for Social Development Washington University, St. Louis. Sherraden, Michael, ed. 2005. Inclusion in the American Dream: Assets, Poverty, and Public Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. Sherraden, Michael, Jin Huang, and Li Zou. 2019. Toward universal, progressive, and lifelong asset building: Introduction to the special issue. Asia Pacific Journal of Social Work and Development 29 (1), 1–5. Sica, Alan. 2004. Max Weber in the New Century. New Brunswick: Transaction. Simkin, John. 2020. Slavery in the Roman Empire. https://spartacus-educational.com/ROMslaves. htm. Simon, Herbert A. 1955. A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1): 99–118. Simon, Herbert A. 1957. Models of Man. New York: John Wiley. Singh, Ajai R., and Shauntala A. Singh. 2008. Diseases of poverty and lifestyle, well-being and human development. Mens Sana Monographs 6 (1): 187–225. Singh, Surendra. 2008. Social development in India: A critique. In Debating Social Development, ed. S. Singh, and C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan Singh, Surendra, and Christian Aspalter (eds.). 2008. Debating Social Development. Casa Verde: Taoyuan.

204

References

Singh, Zile. 2013. Universal health coverage for India by 2022: A Utopia or reality? Indian Journal of Community Medicine 38 (2): 70–73. Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skocpol, Theda. 1991. Targeting within universalism: Politically viable policies to Combat poverty in the United States. In The Urban Underclass, ed. C. Jencks, and P.E. Peterson. The Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C. Skocpol, Theda. 2003. Doubly engaged social science: The promise of comparative historical analysis. In Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. J. Mahoney, and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Smeeding, Timothy M. 2001. Poverty (Sociology of). In International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, ed. Neil J. Smelser, and Paul B. Baltes. Pergamon: Oxford. Socorro, Maria, Carlos C. Bautista, Dalisay S. Maligalig, and Noli R. Sotocinal. 2013. Income polarization in Asia. Asian Economic Papers 12 (2): 101–136. Soergel, Andrew. 2020. Minding the Nordic inequality gap. U.S. News. https://www.usnews.com/ news/best-countries/articles/2020-01-1. Spiethoff, Arthur. 1953. Pure theory and economic Gestalt theory: Ideal types and real types. In Enterprise and Secular Change: Readings in Economic History, ed. F.C. Lane, and J.C. Riemersma. R.D. Irwin: Homewood. Spry, Mike. 2016. Poverty on Television: “Shameless” and the American Dream. Flood Magazine. https://floodmagazine.com/42253. Standing, Guy. 1996. Social protection in Central and Eastern Europe. In Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies, ed. G. Esping-Andersen. Sage: London. Steiner, Elizabeth. 1988. Methodology of Theory Building. Sydney: Educology Research Associates. Stenmark, Hedvig. 2010. Gender segregation in the Swedish Labour Market: Historical, sociological and rational choice institutionalism as tools for understanding inequality and why it still exists. Thesis, Linköping University, Linköping Stephens, Mark, and Suzanne Fitzpatrick. 2007. Welfare regimes, housing systems and homelessness: How are they linked? European Journal of Homelessness 1. https://www.feantsaresea rch.org. Stevens, Philip. 2004. Diseases of Poverty and the 10/90 Gap. London: International Policy Network. Sumarto, Mulyadi. 2017. Welfare regime change in developing countries: Evidence from Indonesia. Social Policy and Administration 51 (6): 940–959. Sun, Daxin, Haksoon Ahn, Tomas Lievens, and Wu Zeng. 2017. Evaluation of the performance of national health systems in 2004–2011: An analysis of 173 countries. PLOS ONE 12 (3): e0173346. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0173346. Sun, Sicong, Jin Huang, Darrell L. Hudson, and Michael Sherraden. 2021. Cash transfers and health. Annual Review of Public Health 42. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-090419-102442. Swigonski, Mary E. 1996. Women, poverty, and welfare reform: A challenge to social workers. Affilia 11 (1): 95–110. Tagarirofa, Jacob. 2017. Modernization theory and third world development: An exegesis of theoretical sarcasm. International Journal of Politics and Good Governance 8 (2). http://onlineresear chjournals.com/ijopagg/art/238.pdf. Tai, Tsui-o, and Judith Treas. 2009. Does household composition explain welfare regime poverty risks for older adults and other household members? The Journals of Gerontology: Series B 64B (6): 777–787. Tang, Kwong Leung. 2009. Models of Welfare for Developing Countries: A Case for Indigenisation. Tata Institute of Social Sciences, https://ijsw.tiss.edu. Tang, Kwong-Leung. 2006. Asset building and its determinants: Lessons from social security reform in China and Hong Kong. Social Development Issues 28 (2): 40–56. Tang, Kwong-Leung., and Chack-Kie. Wong, eds. 2003. Poverty Monitoring and Alleviation in East Asia. New York: Nova Science.

References

205

Taylor, Paul, and Jason L. Powell. 2017. The UK welfare state system: With special reference to the mental health care system. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. TB Alert. 2021. Website. https://www.tbalert.org/about-tb/global-tb-challenges/tb-poverty. TBP, The Borgen Project. 2018. 10 Important Examples of Gender Inequality Happening Today. https://borgenproject.org/examples-of-gender-inequality. TE, Trading Economics. 2020. Website. https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/unemploymentrate. Temeer, Catrien J.A.M.., Art Dewulf, and Robbert Biesbroeck. 2019. A critical assessment of the wicked problem concept: Relevance and usefulness for policy science and practice. Policy and Society 38 (2): 167–179. Teo, You Yenn. 2017. The welfare state system in Singapore: With special reference to public housing and the central provident fund. In The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems, ed. C. Aspalter. Routledge: Oxon. Teo, You Yenn. 2018. This Is What Inequality Looks Like. Singapore: Ethos Books. TGEU, Transgender Europe. 2015. Malta adopts ground-breaking trans and intersex law. TGEU Press Release, April 1. https://tgeu.org/malta-adopts-ground-breaking-trans-intersex-law. TGEU, Transgender Europe. 2021. Website. https://tgeu.org. Thelwell, Kim. 2020. Why the United States Should Help Fight Corruption in India. https://borgen project.org/tag/poverty-and-corruption. Theoharis, Liz. 2020. We can make poverty a thing of the past—if we stop catering to the rich. https://www.alternet.org/2020/07. Thirlwall, Anthony P. 1983. A plain man’s guide to Kaldor’s growth laws. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 7: 345–358. Theodorou, Mamas. 2014. Healthcare services in Cyprus: In transition to a national health system. Health Management 14 (1). https://healthmanagement.org. Tilly, Charles. 1984. Demographic origins of the European Proletariat. In Proletarianization and Family Life, ed. D. Levine. Academic: Orlando. Tilly, Charles. 1998. Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press. Tilly, Charles. 2000a. Errors, durable and otherwise. Comparative Studies in Society and History 42 (2): 487–493. Tilly, Charles. 2000b. Relational studies of inequality. Contemporary Sociology 29 (6): 782–785. Tilly, Charles. 2001. Relational origins of inequality. Anthropological Theory 1 (3): 355–372. Tilly, Charles. 2003a. Changing forms of inequality. Sociological Theory 21 (1): 31–36. Tilly, Charles. 2003b. Inequality, democratization, and de-democratization. Sociological Theory 21 (1): 37–43. Tilly, Charles, and Robert E. Goodin. 2006. It depends. In The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, ed. R.E. Goodin, and C. Tilly. Oxford University Press: New York. Titmuss, Richard M. 1970. The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. London: Allen and Unwin. Titmuss, Richard M. 1974. Social Policy: An Introduction. London: Allen and Unwin. Tobi, Hilde, and Jarl K. Kampen. 2018. Research design: The methodology for interdisciplinary research framework. Quality & Quantity 52: 1209–1225. Trigilia, Carlo. 2002. Economic Sociology: State, Market and Society in Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Uchida, Yasuo. 2012. The health care system in Japan. In Health Care Systems in Europe and Asia, ed. C. Aspalter, Y. Uchida, and R. Gauld. Routledge: London. UKW, Ukraine World. 2018. From Soviet Union to Europe: Could Ukraine Still Become a Welfare State? https://ukraineworld.org/articles/russian-aggression/soviet-union-europe-couldukraine-still-become-welfare-state. UN, United Nations. 2005. Crime Is Both Cause and Consequence of Poverty. https://www.un.org/ press/en/2005/gashc3817.doc.htm.

206

References

UN, United Nations. 2020. World Social Report: Inequality in a Rapidly Changing World. https:// www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2020/02/World-Social-Rep ort2020-FullReport.pdf. UNRV. 2022. Roman Slavery. https://www.unrv.com/slavery.php. Valentine, Kylie. 2016. Complex needs and wicked problems: How social disadvantage became multiple. Social Policy and Society 15 (2): 237–249. Van der Berg, Servaas. 2014. Inequality, poverty and prospects for redistribution. Development Southern Africa 31 (2): 197–218. Van der Berg, Servaas, Krige Siebrits, and Bongisa Lekezwa. 2010. Efficiency and equity effects of social grants in South Africa. Stellenbosch Economic Working Paper, No. 15/10. Department of Economics and Bureau for Economic Research, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch. Van Der Ros, Janneke. 2013. Transgendered Citizenship in the Norwegian Welfare State: The NonRecognition of Diversities, or Gender Equality for All Kinds of Gender? https://www.researchg ate.net. Van Der Ros, Janneke. 2014. The Role of the Welfare State in Creating Trans (E)Quality of Life: Recognizing Differences and Distributing Differently. https://www.researchgate.net. Van Der Ros, Janneke. 2015. Equality Is Not Enough, and Where Is Trans*Gender in the Equation? The Case of Norway. https://www.researchgate.net. Van Kersbergen, Kees. 2019. What are welfare state typologies and how are they useful, if at all? In The Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, ed. B. Greve. Routledge: Oxon. Van Kersbergen, Kees, and Barbara Vis. 2015. Three worlds’ typology: Moving beyond normal science? Journal of European Social Policy 25 (1): 111–123. Van Malderen, Carine, Agbessi Amouzou, Aluisio J.D. Barros, Bruno Masquelier, Herman Van Oyen, and Niko Speybroeck. 2019. Socioeconomic factors contributing to under-five mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa: A decomposition analysis. BMC Public Health 19 (760). https://doi.org/ 10.1186/s12889-019-7111-8. Van Wormer, Katherine (ed.). 2008. Restorative Justice Across the East and the West. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Van Wormer, Katherine (ed.). 2014. Restoring Justice from Policy Analysis to Social Action. Council on Social Work Education: Alexandria. Van Wormer, Katherine, and Rosemary J. Link. 2015. Social Welfare Policy for a Sustainable Future: The U.S. in Global Context. Sage: London. Van Wormer, Katherine, Laura Kaplan, and Cindy Juby. 2014. Confronting Oppression, Restoring Justice: From Policy Analysis to Social Action. Council on Social Work Education: Alexandria. Ventura, Luca. 2018. Wealth distribution and income inequality by country 2018. Global Finance Magazine, November 26. https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/wealth-distribut ion-income-inequality. Vergara, Eva, and Michael Warren. 2011. Chile TV: Secret Report Suggests Allende Murdered. http://archive.boston.com/news/science/article. Verulava, Tengiz, and Magda Asatiani. 2020. Georgian Welfare State: Preliminary Study Based on Esping-Andersen’s Typology. https://www.academia.edu/35565851. Vonˇcina, Luka, Aneesa Arur, Fedor Dorˇci´c, and Dubravka Pezelj-Duliba. 2018. Universal Health coverage in Croatia: Reforms to revitalize primary health care. Universal Health Coverage Studies Series, No. 29, World Bank, Washington D.C. Vygotsky, Lev S. 1978. Mind in society: Development of higher psychological processes. Harvard University Press: Cambridge. Voss, Kim. 2010. Enduring legacy? Charles Tilly and durable inequality. The American Sociologist 41 (4): 368–374. Walker, Alan, and Christian Aspalter (eds.). 2008. Securing the Future for Old Age in Europe. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. The Capitalist World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

References

207

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1980. The future of the world economy. In Processes of the World System, ed. T.K. Hopkins, and I. Wallerstein. Sage: Beverly Hills. Ward, Helen. 2015. Defamilialisation: An Ideology That Shapes Our Lives. https://mercatornet. com/defamilialisation-an-ideology-that-shapes-our-lives. Ward, Marguerite. 2017. AI and Robots Could Threaten Your Career Within 5 Years, https://www. cnbc.com/2017/10/05. Watkins, Kevin, and Devi Sridhar. 2018. Pneumonia: A global cause without champions. The Lancet 392 (10149): 718–719. WB, World Bank. 2017. Reducing Inequalities in Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene in the Era of the Sustainable Development Goals. World Bank: Washington D.C. WB, World Bank. 2018. Nearly Half the World Lives on Less than $5.50 a Day. World Bank. https:// www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/10/17. WB, World Bank. 2019. Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Poverty Diagnostic Initiative. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water/publication/wash-poverty-diagnostic. WB, World Bank. 2021. Combating Corruption. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/ brief/anti-corruption. Weale, Albert. 1990. Equality, social solidarity, and the welfare state. Ethics 100 (3): 473–488. Weber, Max. 1978 [1922]. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. University of California Press: Berkeley. Weber, Max. 2012. The “Objectivity” of knowledge in social science and social policy. In Max Weber, ed. H.H. Bruun, and S. Whimster. Routledge: London. Weber, Max. 2013a. Economy and Society, vol. 1. Berkeley: University of California Press. Weber, Max. 2013b. Economy and Society, vol. 2. Berkeley: University of California Press. Weber, Max. 2019. Open and closed relationships. In Social Stratification, ed. D.B. Grusky. Routledge: New York. Weidenholzer, Josef, and Christian Aspalter. 2008. The contrast of welfare regimes: American Penal Policy versus European Social Policy. In Understanding the European Welfare State, ed. P. Abrahamson, and C. Aspalter. Casa Verde: Taoyuan. West, Candace, and Don U. Zimmerman. 1987. Doing gender. Gender and Society 1 (2): 125–151. Westergaard, John. 1978. Social policy and class inequality: Some notes on welfare state limits. In The Socialist Register 1978, ed. R. Miliband, and J. Saville. Merlin Press: London. WHO. 2012. Global Report for Research on Infectious Diseases of Poverty. Geneva: WHO. WHO. 2021a. Children: Improving Survival and Well-Being. https://www.who.int/news-room/factsheets/detail/children-reducing-mortality. WHO. 2021b. Climate Change and Health. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail. WHO. 2021c. Cancer. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail. WHO/UNICEF. 2015. Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation: 2015 Update and MDG Assessment. WHO/UNICEF: Geneva. WHS, World Health Statistics. 2022. World Health Statistics. https://www.who.int. WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 2021. Climate Change Triggers Mounting Food Insecurity, Poverty and Displacement in Africa, October. https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-rel ease. Wood, Geof, and Ian Gough. 2006. A comparative welfare regime approach to global social policy. World Development 34 (10): 1696–1712. Woods, Leslie G. 2011. American Dream, American Nightmare: Poverty today. Reflections. Spring. https://reflections.yale.edu/article/womens-journeys-progress-and-peril. Woolf, Stephen H. 2009. Social policy as health policy. Journal of the American Medical Association 301 (11): 1166–1169. WPR, World Population Review. 2021. Poverty Rate by Country 2021. https://worldpopulationrev iew.com/country-rankings/poverty-rate-by-country. Wright, Erik Olin. 1999. Metatheoretical Foundations of Charles Tilly’s Durable Inequality. https:// ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Tilly.pdf.

208

References

Yan, Sophia. 2017. Artificial Intelligence Will Replace Half of All Jobs in the Next Decade, Says Widely Followed Technologist. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/27. Yin, Robert K. 2002. Case Study Research Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Yörük, Erdem. 2022. The Politics of the Welfare State in Turkey: How Social Movements and Elite Competition Created a Welfare State. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Yörük, Erdem, ˙Ibrahim Öker, Kerem Yıldırım, and Burcu Yakut-Çakar. 2019. The variable selection problem in the three worlds of welfare literature. Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement 144 (2): 625–646. Yu, Sam Wai-Kam, Ruby Chui-Man Chau, and Stefan Kühner. 2018. Defamilisation and familisation risks, adult worker models, and pro-employment/decommodification measures for women: The case of Hong Kong. Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 35 (2): 194–210. Yu, Sam Wai-Kam, Chau Ruby Chui-Man, Sze-Man Li, and Anna Mei-Yin Lee. 2021. The Government’s response to incompatibility challenges to women: The case studies of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 37 (1): 50–61. Zuev, Alexandr. 2020. Facts About Poverty in the World. Food For Life. https://ffl.org/15168/pov erty-facts.