Talking about God and Talking about Creation: Avicenna's and Thomas Aquinas' positions 9004144773, 9789047415923, 9789004144774

Table of contents :
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Part One: Talking About God
Chapter One Theological Language and Philosophical Assessment
Avicenna’s Theory of Theological Language
We Cannot Know and Name God in Himself
God Is Known through Creation
God Has Negative and Positive Relations to Creation
God Has Perfections in a Different Mode from Creation
Perfections Are Predicated of God and Creation according to Tashkīk
Aquinas’ Theory of Theological Language
We Cannot Know God’s Essence
God Is Known through Creation
God Has Negative and Positive Properties
God Has Perfections in a Different Mode from Creatures
Perfections Are Predicated of God Analogically
The Use of the Negative Element in Aquinas’ Position
Conclusion of Chapter One
Chapter Two Conception of God and Theological Language
Avicenna’s Conception of Divine Formal Features and Divine Knowledge
God Is Simple
God Is Necessary and Immutable
God Is Eternal
God Knows Creatures as well as Himself
Aquinas’ Conception of Divine Formal Features and Divine Knowledge
God Is Simple
God Is Necessary and Immutable
God Is Eternal
God Knows Creatures as well as Himself
Theological Language Revisited: Talking About God in the Light of Divine Formal Features
Conclusion of Chapter Two
Part Two: Talking About Creation
Chapter Three The Nature of Creative Action
Avicenna’s Position: Creation is Voluntary and Necessary
Interpretation of Avicenna’s Position
God Creates by Will not by Nature
God Freely and Necessarily Creates the Universe
Objections Revisited
Aquinas’ Position: Creation is Voluntary and Hypothetically Necessary
God Creates by Will not by Nature
God’s Will Is Simple: God primarily and essentially Wills Himself
God Freely Wills the Universe
God Has Free Choice
Is the Universe Necessary?
Talking About Creation: Necessity or Hypothetical Necessity
Conclusion of Chapter Three
Chapter Four The Beginning of the Universe
Avicenna’s Position
What Is Creation?
Creation Is not a Change
Creation as the Relation between God and the Universe
Causes Necessitate Their Effects
Causes and Their Effects co-Exist
The co-Existence of Causes and Their Effects Does not Require that They Be Equal
The Efficient Cause Is the Cause only of the Existence of Its Effect
Arguments for the Sempiternity of the Universe
The First Argument: Time and Temporal Beginning Are not Applicable to All Things
The Second Argument: Temporal Posteriority Requires a Change in God
The Third Argument: Temporal Beginning Leads to Impossible Conclusions
Aquinas’ Position
What Is Creation?
Creation Is not a Change
Creation as the Relation between God and the Universe
Real Relations of God
How God Is Related to the World
The Sempiternity of the Universe Is Possible but not Necessary
Countering Avicenna’s Arguments for the Sempiternity of the Universe
Countering the First Argument
Countering the Second Argument
Countering the Third Argument
Remarks on Arguments Concerning Sempiternity
Conclusion of Chapter Four
Conclusion
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Secondary Literature
Index of Authors
Index of Topics
Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science

Citation preview

TALKING ABOUT GOD AND TALKING ABOUT CREATION

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE Texts and Studies EDITED BY

H. DAIBER and D. PINGREE

VOLUME LVIII

TALKING ABOUT GOD AND TALKING ABOUT CREATION Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ positions BY

RAHIM ACAR

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2005

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Acar, Rahim. Talking about God and talking about creation : Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ positions / by Rahim Acar. p. cm. — (Islamic philosophy, theology, and science ; v. 58) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 90-04-14477-3 (alk. paper) 1. Avicenna, 980-1037. 2. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274. 3. God— Comparative studies. 4. Creation—Comparative studies. 5. God—History of doctrines. 6. Creation—History of doctrines. I. Title. II. Series. B751.Z7A35 2005 213’.092’2—dc22 2005050724

ISSN 0169-8729 ISBN 90 04 14477 3 © Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ......................................................................

ix

Introduction ................................................................................

1

Part One: Talking About God Chapter One Theological Language and Philosophical Assessment .............................................................................. Avicenna’s Theory of Theological Language ...................... We Cannot Know and Name God in Himself .............. God Is Known through Creation .................................... God Has Negative and Positive Relations to Creation .......................................................................... God Has Perfections in a Different Mode from Creation .......................................................................... Perfections Are Predicated of God and Creation according to Tashkìk ...................................................... Aquinas’ Theory of Theological Language .......................... We Cannot Know God’s Essence .................................... God Is Known through Creation .................................... God Has Negative and Positive Properties ...................... God Has Perfections in a Different Mode from Creatures ........................................................................ Perfections Are Predicated of God Analogically .............. The Use of the Negative Element in Aquinas’ Position .... Conclusion of Chapter One .................................................. Chapter Two Conception of God and Theological Language ................................................................................ Avicenna’s Conception of Divine Formal Features and Divine Knowledge ...................................................... God Is Simple .................................................................... God Is Necessary and Immutable ....................................

25 26 26 28 30 34 36 41 42 44 46 48 50 54 75

79 81 81 86

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contents God Is Eternal .................................................................... God Knows Creatures as well as Himself ...................... Aquinas’ Conception of Divine Formal Features and Divine Knowledge ...................................................... God Is Simple .................................................................... God Is Necessary and Immutable .................................... God Is Eternal .................................................................... God Knows Creatures as well as Himself ...................... Theological Language Revisited: Talking About God in the Light of Divine Formal Features .................. Conclusion of Chapter Two ..................................................

89 93 101 101 105 108 113 119 126

Part Two: Talking About Creation Chapter Three The Nature of Creative Action .................... Avicenna’s Position: Creation is Voluntary and Necessary ............................................................................ Interpretation of Avicenna’s Position ................................ God Creates by Will not by Nature ................................ God Freely and Necessarily Creates the Universe .......... Objections Revisited .......................................................... Aquinas’ Position: Creation is Voluntary and Hypothetically Necessary .................................................... God Creates by Will not by Nature ................................ God’s Will Is Simple: God primarily and essentially Wills Himself .................................................................. God Freely Wills the Universe .......................................... God Has Free Choice ........................................................ Is the Universe Necessary? ................................................ Talking About Creation: Necessity or Hypothetical Necessity .............................................................................. Conclusion of Chapter Three .............................................. Chapter Four The Beginning of the Universe ...................... Avicenna’s Position ................................................................ What Is Creation? .............................................................. Creation Is not a Change ................................................ Creation as the Relation between God and the Universe ..........................................................................

131 132 133 136 140 146 149 150 155 156 159 162 164 167 169 170 170 172 173

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Causes Necessitate Their Effects .................................. Causes and Their Effects co-Exist ................................ The co-Existence of Causes and Their Effects Does not Require that They Be Equal .............................. The Efficient Cause Is the Cause only of the Existence of Its Effect ................................................ Arguments for the Sempiternity of the Universe ............ The First Argument: Time and Temporal Beginning Are not Applicable to All Things ............................ The Second Argument: Temporal Posteriority Requires a Change in God ...................................... The Third Argument: Temporal Beginning Leads to Impossible Conclusions .......................................... Aquinas’ Position .................................................................... What Is Creation? .............................................................. Creation Is not a Change ................................................ Creation as the Relation between God and the Universe .......................................................................... Real Relations of God .................................................. How God Is Related to the World .............................. The Sempiternity of the Universe Is Possible but not Necessary ........................................................................ Countering Avicenna’s Arguments for the Sempiternity of the Universe .................................................................. Countering the First Argument ........................................ Countering the Second Argument .................................... Countering the Third Argument ...................................... Remarks on Arguments Concerning Sempiternity .............. Conclusion of Chapter Four ..................................................

176 177 181 182 185 186 189 193 197 198 200 201 201 204 210 213 213 216 222 225 228

Conclusion .................................................................................. 231 Bibliography ................................................................................ 235 Primary Literature .................................................................. 235 Secondary Literature .............................................................. 236 Index of Authors ........................................................................ 243 Index of Topics .......................................................................... 245

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study has grown out of my doctoral dissertation comparing Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions on creation. Throughout the process I have received support and encouragement from many people. During the dissertation stage, David Burrell’s guidance led me to identify the roots of the apparent differences between Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ understandings of creative action. I appreciated his insights as well as his thoughtful and quick comments on my drafts. Steven Brown’s assistance in the subtle details of medieval Christian philosophy helped clarify my arguments. He gave generously of his time and provided me with constant encouragement. Sarah Coakley’s attention to the finer points of my discussion as well as to its scope and shape was very valuable and her deep interest in the philosophy of religion inspired me, as did her encouragement to contribute to this field. Wolfhart Heinrichs assisted me with the more difficult Arabic translations. Robert Wisnovsky was a constant conversation partner throughout, paying close attention to my arguments and helping me to present a more balanced and hopefully more persuasive discussion. I am grateful to Hans Daiber for encouraging me to revise and publish my dissertation. He read the manuscript and made helpful comments and suggestions to improve it. I would like to also thank to Caner Dagli for copy-editing the manuscript. Without his help the text would be drier and more ambiguous. Among many other professors whose support I greatly appreciate are William A. Graham, Bekir Karliga and Necip Taylan. My friends have provided me with thoughtful conversation and warm companionship. I am grateful to them for their support in different ways and at different stages of this work. Although I would not have finished this work without the contributions of those mentioned here, I bear sole responsibility for its shortcomings. A part of chapter 3, concerning Avicenna’s position regarding the nature of creative action appeared in The Muslim World, 94/1 (2004),

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pp. 65–79. Thanks are due to the editors of The Muslim World for permitting me to include it here with some revision. Finally, my thanks go to Trudy Kamperveen for all the work she has done toward the publication of this study in the IPTS series at Brill.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this book is to study the positions of Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas regarding theological language and creation. When beginning to research this project, my sole intention was to compare their positions concerning (1) the nature of the divine creative action and (2) the eternity vs. temporal beginning of the universe. During the process of research, it became clear that a statement of their positions regarding theological language must precede the discussion of their position regarding creation. Thus the study at hand is divided into two parts. In the first part, which comprises the discussion concerning their position regarding theological language, I tried first to answer the question whether their positions can be philosophically assessed and second to provide a statement of their conceptions of divine attributes insofar as they are related to the discussion of creation. The first issue requires discussion, especially since scholars interested in Thomas Aquinas’ thought have expressed their worries if Aquinas’ theological views should be subject to philosophical assessment. By having such a discussion, I intended to establish that Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions are equally open to philosophical scrutiny. A concise statement of their conceptions of divine attributes is crucial not only for understanding their positions regarding theological language, but also for comparing their positions regarding the nature of creative action and the beginning of the universe. It is crucial for understanding their positions regarding theological language, since their conceptions of divine formal features modify their conception of theological language respectively. At the beginning, it seemed to me that I needed to state their conceptions of divine perfection properties, or attributes, in order trace whether their positions regarding the two question concerning creation can be assessed on the basis of their conceptions of God. That is, if they had a common conception of God, then either Avicenna’s position or Aquinas’ position on these two questions would be more in conformity. Or if they had important differences regarding their conceptions of God, then the difference between their answers to these questions could be traced to the difference between their conceptions of God. However, during

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my work I found that discussion of their conceptions of divine attributes was crucial not simply as a criterion to check the compatibility of their answers to their positions regarding the nature of the creative action and the beginning of the universe. But it also provided an important guideline to understand their statements on these issues.

Introducing Questions concerning Creation Historical Background The questions concerning the nature of creative action and the beginning of the universe had occupied the sharpest minds long before Avicenna and Aquinas. In arguing for their positions regarding those questions, Avicenna and Aquinas continue traditions that were shaped long before them. They share some of the sources, which contributed to the development of their own and opposing positions, although each also has sources which were not available to the other. Among these common sources are Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and Proclus.1 Besides these common sources influencing their discussions of creation—though not necessarily determining their positions—they also had predecessors whose interpretation of the classical sources influenced them. For Avicenna, besides these figures from the ancient and Hellenistic philosophy, al-Fàràbì seems to be a source of influence.2 1 The Book of Causes, which was translated from the Arabic, Kitàb fi al-Khayr alMa˙d, into Latin was attributed to Aristotle. However, it was mostly derived from Proclus’ Elements of Theology. Vincent A. Guagliardo, “Introduction,” in St. Thomas Aquinas: Commentary on the Book of Causes, trans. Vincent A. Guagliardo et alii (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1996), pp. 9–32. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, trans. & comm. E. R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). See also Richard C. Taylor, “Aquinas, the Plotiniana Arabica, and the Metaphysics of Being and Actuality,” Journal of the History of Ideas 59 (1998), pp. 217–239. However, the Book of Causes may indicate indirect connection between Avicenna and Aquinas with regard to their common Neoplatonic sources. The Plotiniana Arabica, which was available to Avicenna, was not translated into Latin. However, the Book of Causes, which was available to and commented on by Aquinas, indicates the debt of its author to the Plotiniana Arabica. The author of the Book of Causes diverges from Proclus, modifies the ideas taken from Proclus’ Elements of Theology in the light of the material contained in the Plotiniana Arabica. Richard Taylor, op. cit., pp. 222–225. 2 See for al-Fàràbì’s refutation of John Philoponus’ criticism of Aristotle concerning the eternity of the universe, Muhsin Mahdi, “Alfarabi against Philoponus,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 26 (1967), pp. 233–260.

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John Philoponus and early Muslim theologians can also be considered among Avicenna’s sources, not in the sense that he followed them but in the sense that he was responding to them in constructing his position.3 For Aquinas, on the other hand, a host of Christian authors, such Augustine, John of Damascus, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Jewish theologian Maimonides must be mentioned among many others. John Philoponus’ arguments were also available to Aquinas, even though his arguments may not have always been traced to his name.4 Avicenna may also be cited among Thomas Aquinas’ sources via Avicenna’s own works and through the presentation of his ideas by others. An important part of Avicenna’s works were available in the West within one hundred years of his death.5 Goichon divides Avicenna’s influence in the medieval West into three periods on the basis of the reaction it received. From the beginning of translations of Avicenna’s works into Latin until 1230, approximately one hundred years, Avicenna’s theories were received with unreserved admiration. The second period begins at 1231 by the pontifical decree authorizing the study of Aristotle’s work and those of his commentators. It lasted almost thirty years, and was characterized as an emotional reaction to the first period. The third period began around 1260 through studies of Avicenna by Albert the Great, and continued in the Thomistic synthesis. Unlike the previous two periods, at this stage Avicenna’s theories were carefully studied and evaluated.6 Beyond Avicenna’s own works, al-Ghazàlì’s works, which were translated by the translator of Avicenna’s works, Gundussalinus, also served

3 For a discussion of the Kalam theories in Avicenna’s thought, whether Avicenna might have been responding to Muslim theologians, see Michael E. Marmura, “Avicenna and the Kalam,” in Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, vol. 7, ed. Fuat Sezgin et alii (Frankfurt am Main: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 1992), pp. 172–206. See also Robert Wisnonsky, “Notes on Avicenna’s Concept of Thingness (shay"iyya),” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10/2 (2000), pp. 181–221. 4 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1983), p. 202; Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (henceforth Proofs) (Oxford & New York: Oxford University, 1987), p. 120. 5 Amélie-Marie Goichon, “L’influence d’Avicenne en occident,” Revue de L’Institute des Belles Lettres Arabes (Tunis) 14 (1951), pp. 374–375. Jacques Forget, “De l’influence de la philosophie arabe sur la philosophie scholastique,” Revue Néo-Scholastique (Louvain) 1 (1894), pp. 403–404. 6 Amélie-Marie Goichon, “L’influence d’Avicenne en occident,” p. 376.

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as a source to understand Avicenna’s theories.7 Al-Ghazàlì was thought to be a proponent of Avicenna’s philosophy, and his clear and more accessible rendering of Avicenna’s arguments made his work more appealing to people interested in Avicenna’s thought. Avicenna may be considered to be one of the sources of Aquinas in developing his theories regarding various aspects of creation. One may immediately think that Avicenna may be a source for Aquinas on this issue only in negative terms, by helping Aquinas to sharpen his views, since Aquinas mostly criticized Avicenna’s theories, such as those concerning emanation and the necessity of the universe. However, Avicenna also seems to be a positive source for Aquinas regarding his understanding of creation. For example, one may assign a part to Avicenna in Aquinas’ affirmation that the relation between the Creator and the universe is ultimately a relation of being, not a temporal relation. These issues will be discussed in greater detail later. Conception of the Beginning of the Universe The main question regarding the relation between God and the universe concerns what the universe owes to God. What does the universe owe to God? If one stretches the meaning of creation to denote the relation between God and the universe, we may say creation is conceived to be 1) giving order, 2) giving movement, 3) giving existence after non-existence, which includes a prior non-existence, and 4) simply giving existence to the universe irrespective of temporal considerations. Giving order and giving movement are the two alternatives that go back to ancient Greek thought, to Plato,8 and to Aristotle9 respectively. The idea that the universe began to exist after non-existence was not the way ancient philosophers preferred to explain the existence of the universe. That the universe did not have a beginning was supported by the majority of philosophers of the ancient period, including Plato and Aristotle.10 God and the uni7 Étienne Gilson, Les Sources Gréco-Arabes de l’Agustinisme Avicennisant (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), pp. 74–76. 8 Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub., 1997), 28–29a. 9 Aristotle, Physics VIII.1, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1984). 10 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, ch. 15, pp. 232–252.

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verse, for them, seem to exist alongside each other. The doctrine of the ‘creation out of nothing,’ as it is understood today may be seen as having arisen later “as part of the controversy of early Christianity with philosophy.”11 Plato offers what he self-consciously refers to as a likely story of the creation of the physical universe. Plato asks whether the universe has always existed, or whether it began to exist. He teaches that the cosmos and all perceptible things must have begun, and they must have been caused by the Demiurge. The Demiurge reproduces the form and the character of what is changeless, when it creates the world. Plato’s discussion suggests that time and material things with chaotic movements existed before the creation of the cosmos. The creative role he assigns to God is to impose order on things already in existence. This is the first alternative in the quadruple division above, and it turned out to be fruitful. Later efforts at assigning a beginning to the universe either with regard to being and time, or simply with regard to being, may have been inspired by Plato’s account. His account was subject to various interpretations. For example, it could mean that time began with the ordered universe, and there was nothing before. It could also mean that orderly time began with the ordered cosmos, which would still leave disorderly matter, motion and time before God made it a cosmos. A third interpretation is that Plato’s talk of a beginning was simply a metaphor, and he talked about it only for pedagogical purposes.12 That everything is created by God in the sense that everything has a beginning seems to have been an idea that evolved over time. That is, not all Jewish and Christian philosophers, who faced the ancient Greek and Neoplatonic philosophical heritage, understood creation in the third sense mentioned above. Except for a few people in ancient times, philosophers denied that the universe had a beginning. That the cosmos had a temporal beginning was approved by many, who denied that matter itself had a temporal beginning. Although the idea that the material universe had a beginning was defended by many Jews and Christians, they were not unanimous about it. Some of the verses in the Bible, such as Genesis 1 & 2, 11 Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: the Doctrine of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in Early Christian Thought, trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), p. xii. 12 For a discussion of the various interpretations of Plato’s account, see Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 268–276.

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Job 28 and 38 were interpreted in a Platonic spirit to mean that God created the cosmos out of already existing matter. Philo, for example, who lived in the first century C.E., has contradictory statements about the issue, denying a beginning once and approving it at other times. Whether prime matter had also a beginning for Philo is a disputed issue among scholars.13 Some Christians seem to have endorsed the idea that the universe is beginningless or endless, such as Clement (d. 215 C.E.) and Synesius of Cyrene (370/5–413/414 C.E.), a view which can be traced to Platonic influence.14 Instead of interpreting Plato’s story in such a way that the cosmos has a temporal beginning and that God made it begin—as did Speusippus and Crantor (d.c. 290 B.C)—Plotinus (c. 205–269/70 C.E.) argued that matter itself had a beginning but not a temporal beginning.15 This interpretation meant that God was the cause of its existence. Thus, Plato’s presentation of the relation between God and the universe is considered in terms of being, not in terms of time. Even Aristotle’s God, at times, was considered to be the creator and sustainer of the world due in part to works, such as the Theology of Aristotle incorrectly attributed to him. Proclus’ (c. 411–485 C.E.) student Ammonius (c. 435/45–c. 517–26 C.E.) is considered to have initiated the interpretation of Aristotle’s position in this way, and this interpretation was endorsed by later Greek commentators such as Philoponus and Simplicius, thus paving the way for efforts to harmonize Aristotelian philosophy with Christian faith.16 In any case, Plotinus’ conception of emanation seems to be the first comprehensive account of the dependence of the universe on its cause which does not claim that it began after non-existence. Plotinus’ position exemplifies the fourth division mentioned above. Instead of employing Plato’s Demiurge in the Timaeus, Plotinus offers his theory of emanation to explain the existence of the universe. He 13 See for Philo’s position, Philo, De providentia 1 and 2, ed. Mireille Hadas-Lebel (Paris: 1973); Philo, De opificio mundi, trans. & annot. R. Arnaldez (Paris: 1961) 2.7 & 5.21. For a discussion of Philo’s position, see Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 203–209. 14 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 193–196. See also Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: the Doctrine of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in Early Christian Thought, ch. 1, pp. 1–38. 15 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 268–272. 16 Richard Sorabji, “Infinite Power Impressed: the Transformation of Aristotle’s Physics and Theology,” in Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and their Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1990), pp. 181–195.

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replaces Plato’s artisan model for the making of the cosmos—which may not mean the whole universe in the sense of everything other than God—with the nature model. In Plotinus’ universe the Intellect exists as an effect of the contemplation of the One, the Soul as an effect of the contemplation of the Intellect, and so on down to the production of the material world.17 The arguments for the universe not having a beginning in the temporal sense are linked to the explanation of the relationship between the universe and its cause. Most of the arguments contending that the universe cannot have begun after non-existence are traced back to Aristotle, who must have had Plato in mind in his arguments for the beginninglessness of the universe. In fact, Plato’s conception of creation does not conform to the idea of creation in the sense of giving being to all other things, nor does the beginning he talks about cover the whole universe. And since Plato and Aristotle are considered by many Greek commentators and following generations up to modern times to have accepted God as the efficient cause of the universe, as well as a final cause, the dispute over the beginning of the universe turns around Plotinus’ conception of the relationship between God and the universe, and the question of whether the universe must be related to God simply in terms of being or must also be related to God in temporal terms. Philoponus interprets Plato’s story to imply that time began together with the ordered cosmos, and argues clearly that there was nothing before creation. He draws upon the authority of Aristotle for this interpretation. Aristotle maintained that Plato meant that the heavens and the cosmos began to exist, and that time began from there. Philoponus has an important place among those who argue that the universe had begun to exist. Unlike many others who were simply responding to arguments that the universe cannot have begun, Philoponus devised counter-arguments telling why the universe must have begun after not having existed. He presents two sets of arguments: one based on the impossibility of an infinite number, and the other “on the principle that a finite body can contain only finite power.”18 17 Plotinus, Enneads trans. S. MacKenna; third edition revised by B. S. Page (London: 1962), III.8. Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus: an Introduction to Enneads (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp. 70–78. See also John M. Rist, “The One of Plotinus and the God of Aristotle,” in Platonism and its Christian Heritage (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), ch. IX. 18 Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs, p. 86 ff. See also Richard Sorabji, Time Creation

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His arguments have played an important role for the philosophers and theologians of Christian, Jewish as well as Muslim traditions. Does the Universe Have a Temporal Beginning? The arguments that the universe cannot have begun temporally after non-existence may be divided into two groups: 1) arguments based on the nature of the world not the world as a whole but things making up the world; and 2) the perfection properties of the Creator of the world. Each group comprises sub-groups. One may include the arguments from the nature of time within the family of the arguments from the nature of the world.19 However, this may not be adequate, because time is not only associated with matter, but may also be considered in regard to the action of the agent. Furthermore, the arguments based upon the nature of time and motion, on the one hand, and the arguments based on the nature of things which make up the world and the perfections of God, on the other, may not be of the same importance. The latter, as far as Avicenna presents them, are positive arguments designed to show that the universe is sempiternal. Sempiternity, as we shall see, may imply infinite temporal duration, but it itself is not a temporal duration. The arguments based on motion and time, on the contrary, are arguments that aim to reduce the opposite claim to impossibility. Most of Avicenna’s arguments for the sempiternity of the universe, based on the nature of things, are traceable to Aristotle. However, Avicenna does not use all of the arguments that Aristotle offers in this respect, such as the vacuum argument. The arguments from the nature of the physical world include arguments based on the concept of coming to exist, or the concept of generation. Firstly, Aristotle argues that everything that comes to exist needs a substratum. The prime matter of the universe cannot come to exist, since it is the substratum for everything that comes to exist. If matter itself comes to exist, it must come to exist from already existing matter. Hence the assumption that the world began to exist is self-contradictory.20 and the Continuum, p. 198. For Philoponus’ arguments for the beginning of the universe and their repercussion in the Kalam, see Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs, ch. IV and V. 19 Herbert A. Davidson, for example, presents the arguments for the eternity of the world in this way. Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs, pp. 24–27. 20 Aristotle, Physics I.9; Physics IV.7; Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs, pp. 13–14.

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Secondly he argues in the same vein that celestial spheres are not subject to generation and corruption, because the motions of the celestial spheres do not have a contrary. Since they do not begin to exist by generation, they always exist. Aristotle also provides a third argument for the sempiternity of the universe from the concept of possibility. For Aristotle, in order for something to come to exist, it must potentially or possibly exist before it actually exists. This implies that nothing can come to exist out of absolute nothingness.21 Avicenna closely follows Aristotle, when he argues that the possibility of something must be prior to its actuality and the possibility of the material beings resides in matter. A fourth argument is based on the conception of motion arguing that the universe has always been in motion. His argument is that motion is beginningless, since any supposed first motion requires that there be a motion before it.22 Aristotle’s fifth argument is based on the concept of time. He argues that time cannot have a beginning, because there can be no before and after without time. Assuming a beginning for time does not eliminate speaking of time before the beginning of time. Since a “before” can only be in time, then assuming a beginning for time is impossible. His sixth argument concerns the relationship between time and an instant. An instant separates past from future. It is the end of past and the beginning of the future. Assuming a first moment, then, requires assuming a period of time before the assumed first instant.23 The arguments regarding the nature of God can also be traced back to ancient philosophy. One of the arguments questions why God did not create sooner. If the universe began to exist, then God could have created it before. But there is no reason why God should have delayed it. This argument can be traced back to Aristotle.24 Augustine responds to the “why not sooner” argument by saying that there was no time before the universe.25 Hence “why not sooner” argument does not apply to the beginning of the universe. Augustine’s answer goes back to Philo. Many others, as well, discuss this argument.26 The arguments based on God’s immutability, on his 21

Aristotle, De Generatione I.3; Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs, p. 16. Aristotle, Physics VIII.1; H. Davidson, Proofs, pp. 18–20. 23 Aristotle, Physics VIII.1; H. Davidson, Proofs, pp. 24–25. 24 Aristotle, Physics VIII.1; Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, p. 233. 25 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford & New York: Oxford Univeristy, 1991), XI.13. 26 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 232–237. 22

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changeless will, on God’s being a changeless and sufficient cause also have antecedents in the teachings of Greek philosophers and commentators, such as Proclus and Themistius. They are widely discussed by Augustine, Philoponus, as well as Muslim theologians and philosophers.27 The discussion of whether creation resembles a natural or a voluntary action must have arisen after the relation of the universe to God was clarified—that is, after the view that God is the cause of the existence of the universe became a standard account. Plotinus seems to be the main figure who developed an account of the relation between the universe and God in these terms. He replaced Plato’s conception of the artisan model for the production of the universe with the productive contemplation model. The latter turns creative action into a kind of natural action.28 It is countered by arguments attempting to show that the divine creative action is a voluntary action: God creates the world according to a plan by his voluntary action. Arguments in this spirit go back to Augustine.29

Comparative Studies between Avicenna and Aquinas with Regard to the Questions concerning Creation In the West, Avicenna is among the best known medieval Muslim philosophers. Literature devoted to Avicenna’s life and thought is considerable, especially when compared to other intellectual figures of the medieval Muslim world. Western interest in Avicenna can be divided into the medieval and modern periods. In the Middle Ages the works translated from the Muslim-Arab world contributed to the flourishing of intellectual life in the West, particularly at the University of Paris in 13th and 14th centuries. Avicenna’s works were avidly read and discussed and greatly influenced medieval Western philosophers and theologians. In modern times, Western interest in the thought of Avicenna is historical rather than philosophical, and focuses 27 For arguments based on the conception of God, see Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 239–250. For a well articulated construction of arguments based on the conception of God and responses to them, see Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs, pp. 49–85. 28 Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus: an Introduction to Enneads, pp. 70–78. 29 Étienne Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University, 1941), pp. 49–62.

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primarily on the impact of his philosophy on medieval Western thinkers such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In this respect it is worth mentioning Étienne Gilson’s call to Western medievalists and historians of philosophy to unearth Avicenna’s thought through attention to “Avicenna Latinus.”30 Gilson’s call received responses from many scholars, so that we now have new editions of the Latin translations of many of Avicenna’s works, as well as a considerable scholarship devoted either to comparative studies or explorations of some of his theories.31 Despite all this scholarship, relatively little effort has been made in analyzing Avicenna’s theory of creation and comparing it to Aquinas’ theory of creation. In many works, one may come across statements of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions on aspects of creation. At times the difference between their positions with regard to creation is traced back to their conception of God. Nevertheless, with the exception of one article by Beatrice Zedler,32 whose article 30 Étienne Gilson states that without studying the Muslim-Arab philosophical heritage, one cannot obtain a correct understanding of medieval Western philosophers. Thus he urges scholars to reedit the Latin translations of the works of Muslim-Arab philosophers in general and those of Avicenna in particular. É. Gilson, “L’étude de philosophes arabes et son role dans l’interprétation de la scolastique,” Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy (1927), p. 596, mentioned in G. C. Anawati, “St. Thomas et la Metaphysique d’Avicenne,” in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies, eds. A. Maurer et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974), pp. 450–451. 31 E.g., É. Gilson, “Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot,” Archives d’Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge II (1927), pp. 89–149; Stephen Brown, “Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being,” Franciscan Studies 25/3 (1965), pp. 117–150; G. C. Anawati, “A Comparative-Study of the Psychologies of Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas,” Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 29/1–4 (1981), pp. 13–32; P. Lee, “Saint Thomas and Avicenna on the Agent Intellect,” Thomist 45/1 (1981), pp. 41–61; Michael Marmura, “Avicenna’s Flying-Man in Context,” Monist, 69/3 (1986), pp. 383–395; E. M. Macierowski, “Does God Have a Quiddity according to Avicenna,” Thomist 52/1 (1988), pp. 79–87; A. M. Goichon, “Un Chapitre de l’Influence d’Ibn Sìnà en Occident: Le de Ente et Essentia de Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” in Le Livre du Millenaire d’Avicenna v. 4 (conference proceedings) (Téhéran: 1956), pp. 118–131; Rolland-Gosselin, Le ‘De ente et essentia’ de S. Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: 1948). 32 Beatrice Zedler, “Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the ‘De Potentia Dei,’” Traditio 6 (1948), pp. 105–159. David Burrell’s work has an important place among comparative studies between Avicenna and Aquinas. Burrell explores how philosophers belonging to different Abrahamic religions contributed to the development of a theistic conception of God and creation, that grew increasingly articulate and more consistent with the theistic idea of a free creator. He does not primarily focus on Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s positions on the issues I intend to discuss. What is more, Burrell’s work does not analyze their arguments for their respective positions, but takes them at face value. Beside his other works see especially David Burrell, Freedom

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is primarily concerned with the nature of the divine creative action, there is almost no in-depth modern discussion comparing Avicenna’s position to that of Aquinas on creation.

and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1993); Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sìnà, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1986). Georges Anawati is one of the most respected scholars in Avicenna studies. He has devoted a considerable amount of effort to comparing Avicenna and Aquinas, and to tracing historical conditions of translation of Avicenna’s works into Latin. He wrote an almost book-length introduction to his translation of the Ilàhiyyàt (Metaphysics) of al-Shifà" (The Healing), La Métaphysique du Shifà" (Paris, 1978–1985). In the introduction, he discusses various Arabic editions of the Shifà", the Medieval Latin translations, and compares his own French translation to Max Horten’s turn-of-the-century German translation (Max Horten’s translation is: Die Metaphysik Avicennas: das Buch der Genesung der Seele, Leipzig: 1907). He also discusses the reaction to Avicenna’s thought among Muslim thinkers such as al-Ghazàlì and the 17th century Iranian philosopher Mulla Sadra (1571–1640), and among Western philosophers such as William of Auvergne (c. 1180–1249 C.E.) and Roger Bacon (c. 1214–after 1292). He speaks at some length about the relationship of Avicenna’s thought to that of Aquinas. This part of Anawati’s introduction presents almost the same view as his article, “St. Thomas d’Aquin et la métaphysique d’Avicenne,” in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies, pp. 449–465. Anawati examines the reception of Avicenna’s work in the West in general, and in the thought of Aquinas in particular. He discusses the translations of Avicenna’s works, as well as earlier treatments of the issue of Avicenna’s influence on Aquinas. He also talks about how Thomas frequently cited Avicenna as an authority, considered him to be a philosophical master, and maintained that Avicenna’s doctrines were in general agreement with the Christian faith (p. 454). Finally Anawati gives two lists. The first is of Avicenna’s theories that were endorsed by Aquinas; the second is of Avicenna’s theories that were refuted by Aquinas. Only in this section Anawati mentions that Aquinas rejected Avicenna’s positions on various aspects of the issue of creation (pp. 461–462). But Anawati does not treat this topic in a detailed way, let alone offer a philosophical analysis of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions. A.-M. Goichon’s The Philosophy of Avicenna and Its Influence on Medieval Europe (trans. M. S. Khan, Delhi, [1969]), gives a general picture of the translation of Avicenna’s works into Latin, of the historical periods into which one could divide Avicenna’s influence on medieval Western philosophers, and of the major issues in which one can detect Avicenna’s influence. She talks about Avicennan theories that were accepted though with certain modifications, such as the fact that his distinction between essence and existence was viewed not only as a conceptual but as a real distinction (pp. 80–81, 83, 96). However she does not talk about Avicenna’s theory of creation on the ground that his position regarding this issue was generally rejected, except for the attempt of Dominicus Gundissalinus, which was not followed by others, to relate his cosmogony to Christian doctrine (pp. 79–80). Gerard Verbeke wrote the doctrinal introduction to the critical edition of the Latin translations of Avicenna’s Metaphysics (Liber de philosophia prima, sive, scientia divina, ed. S. van Riet, 3 vols. Louvain: Peeters & Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977–1983). In this introduction, Verbeke gives a general outline of the Metaphysics of Avicenna. He traces different Medieval Latin translations, or editions of the Metaphysics of the Shifà", and summarizes Avicenna’s major theories, such as the essence-existence distinction, substance and accidents, and the relationship between cause and effect. However, he does not talk about specific issues such as creation, let alone compare them to those of Aquinas.

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In her long and well-constructed article comparing Avicenna’s position to that of Thomas Aquinas, “Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the ‘De potentia Dei,’”33 Beatrice Zedler compares Avicenna’s conception of the act of creation to that of Aquinas. Beside discussing some other aspects of creation, especially cosmogony, she insists upon the difference between Avicenna’s position and that of Aquinas with regard to the nature of the creative action of God. Whereas for Avicenna the universe is necessary, for Aquinas God has the free will to create and the freedom to choose what to create. As will be discussed in chapter 3, at times she over-interprets Avicenna’s passages to support her argument. But more importantly, in her comparison, Zedler takes the texts of both authors at face value. She does not attempt to identify the background of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions. Louis Gardet devotes a chapter to this issue in his book La pensée religieuse d’Avicenne.34 He first tries to situate Avicenna in relation to the Muslim theologians (mutakallimùn) in order to trace Avicenna’s debt to them. Then he describes Avicenna’s conception of creation as a kind of eternal act in which God creates the world by the necessity of His nature or His essence, and not by His will. Thus the relationship between God and the universe is not, according to Avicenna, one of temporal priority and posteriority but a relationship of essential or logical priority and posteriority. Next, Gardet explains how Avicenna’s emanationist cosmology serves as the framework for such a theory of creation. Finally, he tries to identify terms that are crucial to Avicenna’s theory of creation, i.e., i˙dàth (origination), ibdà' (innovation), khalq (creation), takwìn (generation), and examines their relationship to Qur"ànic usage. Gardet does make reference to Aquinas’ reaction to certain positions of Avicenna’s, but such references are brief and superficial, and by his own admission Gardet does not deal with the details of arguments but offers an overall survey.35 Hence Gardet neither analyzes Avicenna’s theory of creation, nor does he compare it to that of Aquinas. What he does is giving a general idea of Avicenna’s position, situating it within its historical context.36 33

Beatrice Zedler, op. cit. Louis Gardet, La pensée religieuse d’Avicenne (Ibn Sìnà) (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), Ch. II: “L’explication du monde: l’être nécéssaire et l’être possible,” pp. 33–68. 35 Louis Gardet, La pensée religieuse d’Avicenne (Ibn Sìnà), p. 44. 36 In another article, “Saint Thomas et ses prédécesseurs arabes,” Gardet’s main concern is to identify the degree to which Aquinas was acquainted with the Islamic 34

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introduction Methodological Concerns

The study at hand is partly historical and partly philosophical. I do not attempt to situate Avicenna’s views, or those of Aquinas, in their historical context, nor trace how much they owe to their predecessors. I will also not address whether Aquinas was influenced by Avicenna on some issue through the translations of Avicenna’s works into Latin. Although at times I refer to the correspondence between Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ terms, this is not meant to trace the historical connections between them but rather the philosophical ones. This study is a historical one in the sense that I attempt to state and compare the position of two historical figures on creation. Such a comparison is worthy in itself because of the lack of serious attention to it so far, despite the wealth of references. As mentioned above, there are not many detailed studies comparing Avicenna’s position to that of Aquinas with regard to their conception of creation. Moreover, their positions on various other related issues need to be carefully investigated, rather than being passed over superficially. In this sense this study aims at contributing to the scholarship of medieval intellectual history. On the philosophical side, I attempt to give an analytically clear and reasonable statement of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions, though I do not attempt to give a full philosophical assessment of the validity of their arguments on every topic that I explore. My main objective is to compare their positions with regard to the questions mentioned above, and to identify to what extent they agree or diverge. I attempt to assess the philosophical value of their positions only when they have divergent views. For example, I do not attempt to provide a justification of divine simplicity, or divine eternity, since they do not have substantially different positions on these questions, but I do discuss, for example, whether the model of voluntary agent

intellectual heritage and in particular whether he clearly knew different theological schools and philosophical trends. He does not relate Aquinas to Avicenna exclusively, nor does he pay special attention to the problem of creation. Gardet agrees with Gilson that Aquinas used Avicenna’s thoughts in metaphysics and Averroes’s thoughts in physics (pp. 421–422). But Gardet’s is a general account intended to give an overall idea of Aquinas’ acquaintance with the Muslim philosophers and theologians, and it does not deal with the issue of creation at all. Louis Gardet, “Saint Thomas et ses prédécesseurs arabes,” in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274 –1974: Commemorative Studies, pp. 419–448.

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can be applied to God without problems, because this is an issue on which Avicenna and Aquinas disagree. Furthermore, the fact that Avicenna appears to deny intention to God while Aquinas asserts it of God is not of primary importance. But what is of primary importance in this context is whether there is a substantial difference between Avicenna and Aquinas resulting from the fact that one denies intention to God whereas the other attributes it to God. By no means am I suggesting that discussion of differences between Avicenna and Aquinas, with regard to specific features of their theories—such as terminology, context, or organization, all of which reveals the way they individually look at theological problems—is unimportant. These differences should be traced as well. For example, one will find Aquinas’ articulation of his positions, his organization of the topics discussed to be more detailed, better organized, and less obscure than those of Avicenna. However, I am only interested in their articulation of their theories inasmuch as it concerns a substantial similarity or dissimilarity between their positions. This study remains general with regard to the issues it explores because it covers a wider area of discussion, and is intended to cover the positions of Avicenna and Aquinas regarding theological language on the one hand, and their positions regarding the nature of divine creative action and the beginning of the universe on the other. In the same vein, while discussing these matters, I did not attempt to construct possible diverging interpretations of the texts I use. Nor do I look, through the texts of these two philosophers, for passages that might not be as supportive of my interpretation of them as the passages that I use. In any case, entering into more detailed analysis and interpretation would require having a firm ground on the basis of which detailed analyses make sense. If I aimed at providing detailed analysis and interpretation of peripheral topics, then it would be more difficult to make my rather general remarks, which are at times contrary to widely accepted views relating Avicenna’s theories to that of Aquinas. Besides being general, the discussion of secondary literature is limited to essential works, either those I clearly disagree with or those from which I get fundamental support. Given these aspects of this study, I do not claim to provide a conclusive assessment of theories of Avicenna and Aquinas, though I believe that I have covered the representative texts of these authors. It is hoped that this general discussion will provide a springboard for further studies. I believe I have presented a clear statement of

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their positions and enough discussion to prove my claims, and have shown that they have similar positions on a numbers of issues. I would be more than happy if my study encourages others to generate challenging interpretations. Another point that needs to be explained concerns the conceptual tools I use to state the positions of these two philosophers, or criteria on which I compare their positions. When comparing Avicenna’s position and Aquinas’ position on a certain issue, I could take Avicenna’s position as the paradigm and evaluate Aquinas’ views on this paradigm. However, instead of attempting to suppress what Aquinas offers—since he knew Avicenna and the problems his views generated, he is definitely more attentive to issues that to which Avicenna might have been inattentive—I usually tend to take into account Aquinas’ position, and examine whether or not Avicenna’s position fits to what Aquinas maintains. Nevertheless, I am careful not to attribute to Avicenna something more than his texts allow. For example, even though I argue that Avicenna’s conception of tashkìk is similar to Aquinas’ conception of analogical predication, I clearly state that, in Avicenna’s thought, tashkìk does not play the part that analogical predication plays in Aquinas’ thought. I do not attempt to reference all of their works in order to identify the development of their position on a certain issue. Since I am interested in stating and comparing their mature views, rather than in the evolution of their views over time, I consult the works that are representative of their later positions. In formulating Avicenna’s position my primary source is the Metaphysics section of The Healing (al-Shifà"). However, at times Avicenna’s other works provide some valuable details guiding how to interpret the texts in the Metaphysics of The Healing. Despite my preference for this particular work, I use his other works either to support my interpretation of a passage in the Metaphysics, or to supply a direct and clear statement of his argument on a certain issue. For similar reasons, I do not consult all of Aquinas’ works. I mostly use his later works, i.e., Summa contra Gentiles, Summa Theologiae, and the de potentia Dei. Although I may indicate a certain variation in his positions here and there, this is not an essential part of this study. In regard to the way I read and translate Avicenna’s texts, I must state that I do not attempt to render Avicenna’s Arabic terms in English in a one-to-one correspondence with English philosophical terms. Besides the difficulties of trying to be this consistent, I do not

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think that Avicenna was always so consistent in his choice of terms. Furthermore, I do not think that all technical philosophical terms have one definite meaning valid in all contexts. I have tried to provide the Arabic transliteration as much as possible.

Brief Outline In the first chapter, I discuss Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions concerning theological language. I first state their conception of human knowledge about God. I argue that Avicenna and Aquinas have similar positions as far as the divine perfections and human knowledge of the divine perfections are concerned. However, Avicenna’s position is not as clearly articulated as Aquinas’ position, whose theory of analogical predication sets him apart from many of his medieval contemporaries. I also examine ‘the negative element’ in Aquinas’ conception of theological language and attempt to show that the negative element in Aquinas’ conception of theological language is not meant to free his teachings from philosophical assessment. After arguing in chapter one that Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ statements concerning God are equally liable to philosophical examination, in chapter two I investigate their conceptions of the divine perfections insofar as they relate to comparing their conceptions of the nature of the divine creative action and the beginning of the universe. Since Avicenna and Aquinas are usually considered to have different positions concerning the nature of the divine creative action, and since they do in fact have different positions concerning the beginning of the world, stating the similarities or differences between their conceptions of divine perfections serves as a benchmark. That is, it helps us to examine whether or not the difference between their positions on these two questions is something traceable to their conceptions of God. I argue that they agree on fundamental points concerning the divine formal features, such as simplicity and necessity. They also agree on the character of the divine knowledge and its relation to the existence of things in re. After showing the similarity in their conception of God through examining divine formal features and divine knowledge, I revisit the issue of theological language in the light of the divine formal features, and examine how these features affect their understanding of theological language. Considering their conceptions of divine formal

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features, or formal properties, in relation to theological language shows us that Avicenna adopts what I call a reductive strategy and Aquinas an appreciative one in regard to theological language.37 This is another point that underlines the importance of analogical predication in Aquinas’ thought. In chapter three, I compare Avicenna’s conception of the divine creative action to that of Aquinas. Contrary to the usual interpretation of Avicenna’s position, I argue that Avicenna and Aquinas have similar positions on this issue. I argue that for Avicenna God has no natural action at all. He conceives creation as a voluntary action, just as Aquinas does. For Aquinas God has both natural and voluntary action. Still, I argue that the difference between Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions is not fundamental. Aquinas’ conception of theological language amplifies the difference between their positions. While Aquinas comes up with answers to both philosophical expectations and religious concerns, Avicenna’s theory may satisfy us only philosophically. In chapter four, I discuss the issue of whether the universe has a temporal beginning. While Avicenna argues that the universe can be related to its cause only in terms of being, not in terms of time, Aquinas takes an agnostic philosophical position in regard to creation in time. I examine whether Aquinas’ responses to the arguments that the universe does not or cannot have a temporal beginning are satisfactory, and conclude that Aquinas’ answers do not satisfactorily refute Avicenna’s arguments. Even though they argue for different positions concerning the beginning of the universe, their positions are consistent with their common conception of God, i.e., as simple, eternal, necessary and immutable. I find Avicenna’s position more consistent not with their common conception of God but with their common Aristotelian and Neoplatonic heritage.

37 By ‘reductive strategy,’ I want to express the fact that for Avicenna divine perfection properties are taken into account only insofar as they are modified by divine formal features, such as eternity and necessity. In contrast to Avicenna, Aquinas holds that they can be considered without being modified by divine formal features and as modified by them.

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Contribution of this Study This study generally supports David B. Burrell’s contention that there has been a collaboration among the followers of three Abrahamic religions to found a philosophical basis for theistic beliefs,38 despite the fact that I have criticized him in a few instances by arguing that the distance between Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions on certain issues is smaller than what he maintains. This study also confirms Albert Judy’s thesis that Aquinas did not substantially change his interpretation of and position towards Avicenna.39 Some scholars hold that while Aquinas had closer ties to Avicenna’s thought in his earlier works, he later distanced himself from Avicenna’s thought to a significant extent. While Avicenna’s name appears more frequently in Aquinas’ earlier works, in his later works Avicenna’s name appears less, and usually in a context where Aquinas is about to criticize a certain theory of Avicenna.40 Through examining their positions concerning the divine attributes and the nature of the divine creative act, I hope to show that Aquinas agrees with Avicenna with regard to important issues, even when he wrote the de potentia. I attempt to show that for Avicenna God has attributes, even though he wavers as far as the theological language concerning these attributes is concerned. I argue, contrary to the interpretation of some scholars, that for Avicenna God’s knowledge is related to the universe in the manner of the knowledge of an artisan to his artwork. This shows that Avicenna and Aquinas have similar positions in this regard. In chapter three, I have attempted to show that creation, for Avicenna, is like a voluntary action. This again runs contrary to the widespread interpretation of his position.

38 David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sìnà, Maimonides, Aquinas, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1986), pp. 1–4. 39 Albert Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles,” Angelicum 52 (1975), pp. 340–384, 541–586; 53 (1976), pp. 184–226. Judy compares passages from Avicenna’s Metaphysics VIII.4 to Aquinas’ ScG I 22, 26 and 25. He argues that in these chapters of the ScG I Aquinas produces a Thomistic version of Avicenna’s discussion concerning the divine simplicity and negative corollaries of the divine simplicity. Thus Albert Judy’s work and the study at hand support a common thesis through examining different topics. 40 For a discussion of Aquinas’ attitude toward Avicenna’s theories, see Albert Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles,” Angelicum 52 (1975), pp. 376–380.

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Another important point, in a sense deriving from the preceding considerations, is that evaluating Avicenna’s positions based on the Latin material, more specifically based on how Aquinas seems to think, may not always lead to sound conclusions. For example, if we take Aquinas’ contention that creation is not a natural action but a voluntary one as a criticism directed at Avicenna, we may not get an adequate interpretation of Avicenna’s position. Even if Aquinas intended to criticize Avicenna, his criticism applies only to the image of Avicenna as represented in the Latin. The image of Avicenna in the Latin may not always give an adequate presentation of Avicenna’s views, however.41 The importance of Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication is given new valence through comparing Aquinas’ conception of the divine attributes to that of Avicenna. Aquinas distinguishes between the divine perfections and the mode of signifying them. While perfection properties are found in God and creatures, human language cannot signify divine perfections in the manner they are found in God. Based on this distinction Aquinas was able to underline the contingency of creation as well as to hold that it is necessary in a different sense, which is discussed in chapter three. Thus pressing exclusively on the negative aspect of analogical predication is not warranted. One indirect result of this study concerns how to interpret the theistic conception of God, or more properly the conception of God more or less common to Abrahamic religions. To distinguish the theistic conception of God from the Neoplatonic or pagan conception of God, some pairs of opposites are employed, such as necessary emanation versus creation, eternal versus created universe, or God as natural agent versus God as free creator.42 Arguing that 41 Avicenna was known in the medieval Western world not only through the translations of his own works but also through the translations of Averroes’ works and as well as the translation of al-Ghazàlì’s (Algazel) Maqàßid al-Falàsifa (Intentiones philosophorum). For a modern edition of the medieval translation of al-Ghazàlì’s Maqàßid, see C. S. B. Muckle (ed.), Algazel’s Metaphysics, a Medieval Translation (Toronto: The Institute of Medieval Studies, 1933). Al-Ghazàlì was out to criticize Avicenna, and Averroes may not have had an adequate knowledge of Avicenna’s theories. For a discussion of Averroes’ criticism of Avicenna and its problems, see Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs, pp. 311–335. 42 For these assumptions see, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas on Creation: Writings on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, Question 1, trans. Steven E. Baldner & William E. Carroll (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1997), “Introduction” by translators; Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs, p. 1n.

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Avicenna’s position and Aquinas’ position have more similarities than one might initially think calls into question such broad distinctions between theistic and Neoplatonic conceptions of God and creation.43

A Note on References I refer to the Metaphysics part of Avicenna’s The Healing simply as ‘Avicenna Metaphysics.’ For example, ‘Avicenna Metaphysics IV.2, p. 165.2–4’ stands for ‘Avicenna, The Healing, Metaphysics book 4, chapter 2, page 165, lines 2–4.’ I refer to Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae simply as ST. Unless further specified, the reference is to the body of the article in question. For example, ‘ST Ia. 13, 3’ refers to ‘Summa Theologiae, prima pars, question 13 and body of article 3.’ Similarly, I refer to the De potentia without writing Aquinas’ name. For example, ‘De potentia III, 15, ad 7’ indicates De potentia, book 3, article 15, reply to objection 7.’ Unless further specified, my references to Summa Theologiae and De potentia go to the body of the respective article. I refer to Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles as ScG, and indicate the paragraph numbers in accord with the translation published by the University of Notre Dame Press. For example, ‘ScG I, 14 [4]’ refers to ‘Summa contra Gentiles, book I, chapter 14, paragraph 4.’

43 Andrew Louth develops a similar position in his study on the development of the Christian mystical theology. He underlines the affinity of Greek Fathers to Neoplatonic thought. Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981).

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PART ONE

TALKING ABOUT GOD

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CHAPTER ONE

THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT

The negative element in Aquinas’ theology poses a disturbing challenge to scholars: should one demand that Aquinas conform to philosophical expectations or should leave his definitions and the implications of his theories unscrutinized, given that as a theologian he maintains that God is ultimately unknowable, and given that his theory of analogical predication leaves the divine perfections seemingly indeterminate? If one grants exemption to Aquinas’ theories, should one also grant such an exemption to Avicenna’s theories on the basis of his position regarding human knowledge and discourse about God? In order to come up with an answer to these questions, I am going to discus Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions regarding the basis, extent and nature of human knowledge and discourse about God. Whether their theological views are suitable to philosophical examination will be judged on the basis of their conception of theological language. Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ theories about God are philosophically valuable, and both can be philosophically assessed. Their positions regarding human knowledge of God and theological language are to a considerable extent similar, in that both argue, (1) we cannot know God in himself, (2) God is known through creation, (3) God has positive and negative properties, (4) God has all perfections in a different manner from creation, and (5) perfections are predicated of God and creation on the basis of a causal order. Secondly, I argue that the negative element in Aquinas’ theory is not designed to exempt his theories from philosophical assessment. With the negative element in his theory of theological language Aquinas intends that two things be granted in our discussion of God: (1) Things that imply a creaturely mode of existence cannot be predicated of God univocally, but can be predicated only analogically; and (2) one should not expect human discourse about God to express God in himself or his eminent perfections. Aquinas does not argue that one should not talk about God. He does not maintain that his, or anyone’s theories about God, should not be required to have

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philosophical rigor. For him theological statements contain or aim to contain knowledge. What Aquinas intends is not that theological statements should be left out of philosophical scrutiny, but that they must be considered in the light of these two guiding rules. This does not contradict Aquinas’ purposes in emphasizing the unknowability of God’s essence.

Avicenna’s Theory of Theological Language There is no doubt that Avicenna does not have as elaborate a theory of theological language as Aquinas does, and there are several questions to which one might find answers in Aquinas’ texts but not in those of Avicenna. However, Avicenna provides enough material that helps us find answers to essential questions with regard to theological language. Avicenna acknowledges that we cannot know God in himself, though he is known through creation. The attributes that are predicated of God are based on God’s negative and positive relations to creatures. God has perfections in a manner different from creatures. These perfections are predicated of God and creatures according to tashkìk, i.e., according to priority and posteriority. Avicenna’s position on human knowledge and speech about God conforms to Aquinas’ position in general. The major difference between Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions arises between Avicenna’s theory of predication according to tashkìk and Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication. We Cannot Know and Name God in Himself Avicenna’s position regarding the subject-matter of metaphysics implies that God in himself falls beyond the scope of human knowledge. In the first chapter of his Metaphysics of the Healing (al-Shifà"), Avicenna discusses whether God is the subject-matter of metaphysics. He distinguishes between the subject-matter and the objective of sciences ('ulùm). Each science takes the existence of its subject-matter to be proven from another science. It investigates what it is but it does not try to establish that it is. On these principles, if establishing God’s existence is the goal of metaphysical investigation, then it is not its subject-matter, and therefore God is not the subject-matter of meta-

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physics.1 However, because metaphysics occupies the highest and ultimate place among sciences which are available to human mind, Avicenna is indicating that God, in himself, falls beyond human knowledge. In his commentary on the Qur’anic chapter al-Ikhlàß,2 Avicenna clearly states that we cannot know and name God as he is in himself. He constantly reminds us of God’s majesty and the inexpressibility of what God is. He argues that “God’s essence (dhàt) is that he exists.”3 Besides sheer existence, there is nothing to be added to God. God’s mode of existence—specific to himself and excluding all the modes of existence assumed by other beings—is such that it has no name. It cannot be expressed or explained (shar˙) except through concomitants that necessarily follow from his being (lawàzim).4 Although Avicenna does not elaborate here, it seems that he assumes that a true name could give us the essence, or definition of the thing that is named. For example, when we call a certain existing thing ‘a man’, through this name we understand certain things about him, such as his being intelligent, having a soul, eating and drinking— no matter whether we observe this person displaying any of these actions. However, with respect to God, we cannot come up with a name expressing what he is, such that it would enable us to look directly at God and expect him to be in such and such a way. But why cannot ‘what God is’ be put into words ( yu'bar 'anhu)? Is it because of a defect in our language, or simply because of the low degree of our comprehension? This is because God’s majesty and sublimity cannot be captured by us. Consequently, we cannot talk about God as he is. The imperfection in human thought and language cannot bridge the insurmountable distance between human and divine being. What we can say properly about God ultimately is that ‘he is he’ (huwa huwa).5 This Arabic phrase, ‘huwa huwa,’ can 1 Avicenna, al-Shifà", al-Ilàhiyyàt (henceforth Metaphysics), eds. al-Ab Qanawàti and Sa'ìd Zàyid (Cairo, 1960–[1963]), I.1, p. 5.5–6 and 16–19; p. 6.1–2 and 14–16. See also, op. cit., I.2, p. 14.14–17. 2 Avicenna, Al-Tafsìr al-Qur"ànì wa Lughat al-Sùfiyya fì Falsafat Ibn Sìnà (henceforth Tafsìr), ed. Óasan 'Àßì (Beirut: 1983). 3 Avicenna, Tafsìr, p. 106.12–13. 4 Avicenna, Tafsìr, p. 107.16–18. 5 Avicenna, Tafsìr, p. 107.3–7. This reminds the biblical expression ‘I am who I am,’ which is also underlined by Aquinas. I shall bring in Aquinas’ discussion below in this chapter.

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also be translated in this context, as ‘he is whatever he is,’ or ‘he is identical to himself.’ If we cannot know God in himself, then does God really have those properties that we predicate of him or not? Taking Avicenna’s emphasis to the extreme, some authors even argued that for Avicenna God’s attributes may be reduced to negations.6 However, Avicenna’s emphasis on God’s transcendence and majesty should not lead us to think that for Avicenna God is devoid of perfections, or that the properties we attribute to God are mere words saying nothing about God. Such an interpretation cannot be justified, given that Avicenna talks at length about God, and frequently affirms that God has perfections. He unequivocally states that God has complete being, because he does not lack any perfection, but he does not have the perfections (kamàlàt) by way of participating. Moreover, God is pure good. Good is either the being towards which everything strives, or is the perfection of being. God as pure being is pure good and pure perfection (kamàl ).7 For him, the perfections found in creation belong first and foremost to the First, and secondarily to creation, because whatever found in creation is acquired from God.8 God Is Known through Creation Although Avicenna argues that God, as he is in himself, can neither be named nor talked about other than to acknowledge that he is whatever he is, he still attributes many properties to God. The 6 I agree with John Rosheger in his critical stance against Ian R. Netton and J. G. Flynn ascribing to Avicenna a position similar to that of Plotinus. Ian R. Netton argues that for Avicenna God should be described in negative terms, and the positive terms attributed to God simply reflect an idea in the thought of the one who attributes it, but not something in the divine essence. Ian R. Netton, Allah Transcendent: Studies in the Structure and Semiotics of Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Cosmology (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 1989), p. 155. J. G. Flynn argues that on Avicenna’s rendering God might be the cause of perfections, but may not be identified with perfections. J. G. Flynn, “St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of God,” Abr-Nahrain 14 (1973–74), pp. 60–62. As Rosheger points out this is only half of the story. John P. Rosheger, “A Note on Avicenna and the Divine Attributes,” The Modern Schoolman 87 (2000), pp. 169–177. 7 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.6–14. See also, Avicenna, al-Ishàràt wa alTanbìhàt (henceforth Ishàràt), ed. J. Forget (Leyde: E. J. Brill, 1892) VI, p. 158. 8 Avicenna, Al-Risàla al-'Arshiyya (henceforth Risàla 'Arshiyya) (Haydarabad: 1353 A.H.), p. 13.15–16. “Thus all perfection, beauty and being that belong to things other than the Truth (Óaqq) belong at first to the First Turth. They are acquired from him (mustafàd ), they do not [indeed] belong to anything other than him ('adàhu).”

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basis on which we are allowed to predicate properties of God is creation, because (1) creation is a concomitant (làzim) of God, and (2) God has both negative and positive relations (i∂àfa) to creatures. The fact that creatures are concomitants of God serves to explain how we come to know God. Although because of the simplicity of God in every respect only one thing emanates from God immediately, all creatures to the very bottom of things are necessary concomitants of (lawàzim) God. Avicenna states that these concomitants of God make God known (ta'rìf ), showing something of their cause. However, there is a gradation among these concomitants in showing God. The closer to the origin a concomitant is in the hierarchy of being the better it makes the origin known or reflected.9 There is a correlation between divine perfections and creaturely ones. Perfections that are found in the world are the effects of God’s properties. Since God is the origin, which gives being to all things that come to exist, things that come to exist do so in accordance with the goodness and the perfection of their source. Avicenna clearly states that not only do things that come to exist follow the divine being and perfections, but that the manner of their existence also follows the divine goodness and perfection. Thus the perfections that creatures display are the reflection of the divine goodness and perfection.10 Based on the idea that creatures reflect God’s perfections, and hence bear a certain similarity to God, Avicenna establishes some of God’s perfections by examining the order and perfections of creation. Creation shows that the creator has perfections, because creation has a perfect, strong and enduring order. When Avicenna talks about the will of God, for example, he emphasizes the order, harmony and richness of creation. What he concludes is that such a perfect, regular and lasting order can only be brought about by a cause that has perfect being and the perfections necessary for this perfect order to happen in the world. Thus creation indicates that the cause of such and such things must have will.11

9

Avicenna, Tafsìr, p. 107.17–21. Avicenna, Kitàb al-Najàh fì al-Óikmah al-Man†iqiyyah wa-al-ˇabì'iyyah wa-al-Ilà˙iyyah (henceforth Najàt), ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut: 1985), p. 286. 11 Avicenna, Risàla 'Arshiyya, p. 10.12–22. 10

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God Has Negative and Positive Relations to Creation For Avicenna, the fact that God is unlike creatures does not mean that God is utterly different from creatures, for indeed there are signs of God in creatures. God has positive as well as negative relations (i∂àfàt) to creation. He reminds us of God’s being unique (wa˙dàniyy), i.e., unlike anything existing, his being unmixed (ßirf ) and pure (ma˙∂ ) real (˙aqq). Such properties may be thought, on the one hand, to make God inclusive of, or identical to, all other beings, in a sense making him like a substratum to specific existents. On the other hand, they may also be thought as separating God from all other things, making him absolutely different from them. Avicenna denies the inclusion of all kinds of being (wujùdàt) in God. He denies that God can be the substratum on which all other beings (wujùdàt) subsist, or that he can be the being common to and inclusive of all creatures.12 However, Avicenna also rejects the idea that God does not have any relation (i∂àfa)13 to other kinds of being (wujùdàt). In this regard, Avicenna’s rule of thumb is this: while some aspects (anhà") of existence are negated of every being, every being has a certain relation (i∂àfa) and connection (nisba) to other beings. This holds for God more appropriately, as God is the origin of everything. Since God is the origin—the creator of things—creaturely aspects of being must be negated of God, as God is not included among the things in the world. But again, since God is the creator of things, God has some relation (i∂àfa) to his creatures. Know that when we say that or explain how ‘the necessary being does not become multiple in any way, and he (dhàtuhu) is unique (wa˙dàniyy)

12

Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 344.1–5. The term ‘i∂àfa’ is one of the crucial terms in Avicenna’s theory concerning God’s properties and human talk about God. Harry Austryn Wolfson constantly translates ‘i∂àfa’ as ‘relation.’ See H. A. Wolfson, “Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes on Divine Attributes,” in Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, I, eds. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1973), pp. 143–169 (originally published in Homenaje a Millas-Vallicrosa 22 (Barcelona, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1956), pp. 545–571). In his translation of Risàla 'Arshiyya, Arthur Arberry translates ‘í∂àfa’ as ‘positive.’ See Risàla 'Arshiyya, p. 7.16–17. Arthur J. Arberry, Avicenna on Theology (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1979), p. 32. Wolfson translates a similar occurrence in Najàt (p. 287.10–12) as ‘relation.’ Wolfson, “Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes on Divine Attributes,” p. 151. 13

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intact (ßirf ) pure real one (ma˙dun ˙aqqun), we do not mean by doing this that no aspect (an˙à") of existence (wujùdàt) is negated of him, nor do we mean that he does not have any relation (i∂àfa) to other aspects of existence (wujùdàt). This is impossible. This is because many different aspects (an˙à") of existence are negated of every (kullu) being. Moreover, every being (mawjùd ) has a relation (i∂àfa) and certain connection (nisba) to other beings. This is especially true in the case of the one from whom all being (wujùd ) emanates. However, when we say that he is unique in himself (dhat), and he does not multiply, we mean that he is as such [i.e., unique] in himself ( fi dhàtihi ). In addition, if this [i.e., statement about the unity of God] is followed by many positive (ìjàbiyya) and negative (salbiyya) relations (i∂àfàt) these are the necessary concomitants of (lawàzim) of the being (dhàt) [i.e., God’s being] and the effects of the being (dhàt). They follow the existence of the being (dhàt) [i.e., God’s being]. They are neither constituents (muqawwimatun) of the being (dhàt) [i.e., God’s being], nor parts of it.14

Thus the statement that ‘God is unique,’ and ‘does not become multiple’ etc. . . . refers to God in himself (dhàt), but does not prevent predicating various attributes of God. Besides the reference to God in himself (dhàt), many positive (ìjàbiyya) and negative (salbiyya) relations (i∂àfàt) are predicated of God. However, things that we attribute to or negate of God are not to be thought of as either constituents (muqawwima), or parts (ajza") of God. They are necessary concomitants (lawàzim) and effects (ma'lùlàt) of the being (dhàt), they follow (tùjad ba'd ) the being (wujùd ) of God.15 God’s positive and negative relations to creatures imply similarity as well as dissimilarity between God and creation. They also provide the basis upon which some properties are affirmed of God and some others are denied of him. Although Avicenna argues that God has both negative and positive relations (i∂àfa) to creatures, which follow the essence (dhàt) of God and are its effects, he does not go beyond this. If God has positive and negative relations to creatures, this implies at least that some properties are negated of God in comparison to creation, while some other properties are affirmed of God in comparison to creation. For example, ‘being omnipotent’ is affirmed of God16 with regard to creatures. That is, one assumes that creatures are made by God. Furthermore, one may consider the fact

14 15 16

Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 343.16 – p. 344.1–5. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 344.1–5. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 368.2–3.

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that any effect is the result of the power of an agent. If the agent does not have power, in a broad sense, to cause the effect, the effect would not exist. Since the existence of creatures is traced to God, then one affirms that God must have the power to create. Thus one may say that God is omnipotent in the sense that God has the power to make all things. However, even though attributing power to God says something about God, it still does not indicate much about what God’s power is. These properties (ßifàt) are attributed to God on the basis of creation. Whereas negative properties are attributed to God with reference to (i∂àfa) his other-ness from creatures, positive properties are attributed to God with reference to (i∂àfa) the reflection of God in creation, as creatures are God’s effects. As such they indicate something of what God is—as well as what God is not—but they do not give comprehensive knowledge of God. The properties attributed to God in positive or negative relation to creatures indicate God only partially and indirectly. Based on God’s exclusion of other modes of being and God’s relation (i∂àfa) to creatures, Avicenna accepts that God has both negative and positive properties. Avicenna has a triple division in this regard. Besides purely negative and purely positive properties, there are also properties combining both negative and positive aspects. That is, we have three different sorts of names expressing the positive and negative relations between God and creation: (1) those that only express God’s otherness, (2) those that only express creature’s similarity to its cause, and (3) those that include different senses to express both God’s otherness from creation and creation’s similarity to God. Know that since it has been established that he is the necessary being, and that he is one in all respects, and that he is free from having causes, and that he does not have any cause at all, and that his properties are not additional to his essence (dhàt), and that he has glorification and perfection properties (sifà† al-mad˙ wa al-kamàl ), it is apt to talk about his being a knower, being alive, having will, power, speech, sight, hearing and other beautiful properties. It must be known that his properties are reduced to (turja' ) either negation (salb), relation (i∂àfa), or combination of both of these. If his properties have such a character [either negation, or relation, or their combination], then even if they are multiple they do not destroy the unity [of God], and they do not contradict the necessity of [God’s] being. As for the negation, take for example, eternality (qidam). First, (1) it is reduced (turja' ) to

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the negation of non-being of him, secondly (2) to the negation of beingcaused and having something prior (awwal ).17

Avicenna emphasizes the negative properties of God. For him a negative property does not have to be expressed negatively. The negativity depends on God’s otherness from creatures, no matter whether its expression has a negative or a positive wording. Some of the divine properties have both negative and positive connotations, although they have simply positive meaning in other contexts. For example, God as the ‘necessary being’ (wàjib al-wujùd ) indicates, for Avicenna, (1) that God does not have a cause, and (2) that God is the cause of other things. But such statements may be interpreted to show that God is not similar to creatures in terms of the mode of being. Whereas creatures have their being from God, God does not owe his being to anything else, that is, his being is not something received. In this sense it shows how God is not like creatures. Hence the attribution of ‘necessity of being’ to God partly indicates the negative relation (i∂àfa) between God and creation. But in itself, the property ‘necessary being’ does not have to be a negative property. Thus, God’s otherness from creatures does not have to be expressed negatively; it simply concerns the negative ‘i∂àfa’ of God to the world, i.e., his difference from creatures.18 The terms ‘God’ and ‘Íamad ’ are among the properties that combine positive and negative aspects. Avicenna expands upon these examples in his commentary on the chapter al-Ikhlàß. The ‘divinity’ comprises in it two properties, which are the strongest properties in making God known to us. These are (1) that he has the necessity of being first and foremost (aqdam) in himself, and (2) that he is the origin of all other beings.19 Beside this double connotation of the Avicenna, Risàla 'Arshiyya, p. 7.13–19. Avicenna, Risàla 'Arshiyya, p. 7.20–21. H. Wolfson, in his article “St Thomas on Divine Attributes,” states that some philosophers, including Avicenna, interpreted even positive terms negatively, and he argues that St. Thomas follows St. Augustine in interpreting positive terms positively. In a sense what Wolfson says is true, but positive terms are interpreted, by Avicenna at least, negatively on the basis of God’s otherness—his difference from creation. For example, ‘good’ expresses both negative and positive properties, when it is applied to God. See Najàt, p. 287.25–26. The negation expresses only God’s otherness from creation, but not God’s being devoid of goodness. Avicenna’s negative interpretation does not amount to an absolute negation but to emphasizing God’s difference from creatures. 19 Avicenna, Tafsìr, p. 108.4–11. 17 18

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properties of God, elsewhere Avicenna states that ‘divinity’ consists of God’s lack of need for anything whatsoever and the needfulness of everything else for God.20 This conception of divinity, or the property ‘God,’ has a negative meaning, since it denotes God’s needlessness in regard to anything else. It has also a positive meaning, since all things are needful of him. In denoting God, Avicenna seems to accept a gradation among God’s properties. For example, the property, or the name, ‘God,’ for Avicenna, is the most powerful of the divine properties, because it describes God better than all other properties. That is why God chose this term when he let himself become known to us in the chapter al-Ikhlàß. If we remember the dual meaning of the property ‘God,’ i.e., (1) that he has necessity of being first and foremost (aqdam) in himself, and (2) that he is the origin of all other beings,21 it will remind us of two things. This property ‘God’ (1) denotes both the negative and the positive relationship between God and creation at the same time, and (2) it refers to God’s creative act, giving existence to creatures, the foremost perfection with regard to creation. Thus the property ‘God’ is the strongest property making God known in relation to creation. God Has Perfections in a Different Mode from Creation God has perfections in a different mode from creation. God’s mode of having perfections, as opposed to the creaturely mode of having perfections, is characterized by simplicity, necessity, fullness and purity. These are called formal properties, in contradistinction to divine perfection properties, such as knowledge and will. In chapter 2, I will have more to say regarding the distinction between divine formal features and non-formal features. God has his attributes simply and necessarily, whereas creatures have them in a composite, accidental, and limited manner. In presenting Avicenna’s position on this issue, I am going to consider simplicity, necessity and eminence to underline the difference between the way creatures have properties and the way God has them. As we shall see, Avicenna and Aquinas have similar positions regarding the difference between God’s manner of having perfections and creation’s manner of having their perfections. 20 21

Avicenna, Tafsìr, p. 113.5–6. Avicenna, Tafsìr, p. 108.4–11.

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God has his properties in a simple manner. For Avicenna God’s unity is not merely numerical, but concerns separation of God from everything else. In this context, he considers unity and simplicity to mean the same thing. He explains God’s unity in terms of simplicity. God is one in three respects: (1) He cannot have constitutive elements from which he is composed (tajtami' ), (2) he cannot have countable parts, (3) he cannot have parts like that of definition (ajzà" al-˙add ) nor a statement (qawl ), neither as the parts in a matter-form combination or in any other way, such as the parts of an utterance (qawl ) which explain the meaning of his name. Each of these denotes something which exists separately from other parts. Simply put, the expressions we use for God cannot be understood as referring to parts or aspects of God which exist in a distinct manner from each other, such as the parts of the human body being distinct from other parts and occupying a different part of space. Although all attributes we predicate of God have different meanings, it does not mean that the attributes we express with different names exist in God in a distinct manner, separate from each other.22 The properties are not constituents or parts of the essence of God. God simply has all the properties he has by being what he is. They are not additional to the divine being.23 God has his perfections necessarily since he is necessary in all respects. If he were not necessary in all respects, he would depend on other causes and would not be absolutely necessary in himself. There is nothing which can happen in or to the necessary being; he necessarily has everything possible for him to have. Thus he has no new will which can come to be, no new nature to gain, no knowledge to be attained, and no new property to have.24 Although for Avicenna what actually exists is necessary, the necessity God has and the necessity creatures have are different. Since God is necessary by himself, he does not owe his being and perfections to anything else. All creatures, however, owe their being and perfection to their cause, ultimately to God. Furthermore, things that are subject to generation and corruption are in a process of gaining and loosing their

22 Avicenna, p. 108.20 – p. 23 Avicenna, Risàla 'Arshiyya, 24 Avicenna,

Najàt, p. 264.8–12; see also, Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1.4–11; Tafsìr, 109.1–5. Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 344.2–5; see also ibid., p. 345.6–11; Avicenna, p. 5.22–24. Najàt, p. 265.3–11.

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perfections. Contrary to creaturely manner of having properties, God has all his properties necessarily. God has his properties eminently. Although Avicenna does not argue that God has properties eminently, his argument for God’s being pure being and pure perfection supports such an interpretation. Avicenna argues that God, as the necessary being, is pure good and pure perfection (kamàl ). God, as the pure being, lacks no perfection, is always in act (bi’l-fi'l ), and is pure good.25 Contingent beings, however, are not pure good, are vulnerable to non-existence, hence also to evil. Since contingent beings do not have being on their own, they are lacking in their being and hence in the perfection of their properties.26 At first sight it may be difficult to see the connection Avicenna makes between having being on its own and being abundantly perfect or pure act. Although he does not develop this topic very much, the quiddity (màhiyya) and existence (wujùd ) distinction may be helpful to make the contrast. Avicenna constantly rejects that God has a quiddity (màhiyya), and argues that God is necessary being. Quiddity (màhiyya), in Avicenna’s philosophy, applies to many members of a genus or species. It also functions as a limitation of the individual members under certain forms, excluding other kinds or ways of existing. However, God has no quiddity limiting his existence.27 Hence God has his perfection properties eminently in the sense that his perfections are unlimited. Perfections Are Predicated of God and Creation according to Tashkìk Although Avicenna argues that God has a positive relation to the world as he is the cause of its being, hence laying the ground to describe God with perfections that are found in creation, he does not systematically treat the issue of predicating perfections of God and creation. However, in a scattered manner, he talks about some perfection properties, and states that these are not found in God and creation in the same degree. Hence they are not said of God and creation univocally.

25 26 27

Avicenna, Najàt, p. 265.13–17; Avicenna, Risàla 'Arshiyya, p. 5.16–17. Avicenna, Najàt, p. 265.17–21. See for example, Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, pp. 344–345.

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Avicenna’s discussion of priority and posteriority explains the difference between the way things have their properties and God has them as well as how this difference is observed in language. In the Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna talks about ‘priority’ (taqaddum) and ‘posteriority’ (ta"akhkhur). He states that things are said to be prior or posterior to other things in many ways. However, all the different respects that priority and posteriority have in their applications amount to one modality of predication: predicating bi’l-tashkìk.28 Something is prior in having a certain property over those which are posterior, inasmuch as it has the property at such a degree, that the posterior thing does not have it in that way. Moreover, there is nothing of this property that is had by the posterior thing that is not had by the prior thing.29 Predications according to tashkìk may be different depending on the peculiarities of each case in which something is prior to another. But what is required is that there be a certain measure, or a definite

28 The term ‘tashkìk,’ or ‘bi’l-tashkìk,’ is rendered sometimes as ‘analogy’ and ‘analogical,’ and sometimes as ‘ambiguous.’ Wolfson translates it as ‘ambiguous.’ Harry Austryn Wolfson, “Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes on Divine Attributes,” in Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion v.1, ed. edited by Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Harvard, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973), pp. 154–156 passim. Wolfson, in another article, renders mushakkak as ‘ambiguous’ and ‘amphibolous.’ He argues that the Arabic and Hebrew terms for ambiguous were rendered in Latin as analogical. And Aquinas’ use of analogy “has absorbed what in Arabic philosophy is called ‘ambiguous’.” H. A. Wolfson, “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides” in Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion vol. 1, p. 477. A. M. Goichon renders it as ‘analogy.’ A. M. Goichon, Lexique de la Langue Philosophique d’Ibn Sina (Paris, 1938), p. 162. John Rosheger explains Avicenna’s use of the term ‘tashkìk’ and its relatives referring both to Avicenna’s own texts and the scholarship on it. John P. Rosheger, “A Note on Avicenna and the Divine Attributes,” The Modern Schoolman 87 (2000), p. 174. I prefer to render Avicenna’s term tashkìk, in this context, as analogy rather than as ambiguous or ambiguity, despite the fact that the predication according to tashkìk is not on a par with analogical predication as it shall be clear. As will be explained, for Avicenna predication according to tashkìk is based on an order. This order, as Avicenna presents it, is such that the one that primarily has the property, has all that the one that secondarily has it, without being limited to it. In this way, we may consider the perfections as they are found in creatures and God. God, as having existence primarily, does not lack being, or any perfection as they are found in creatures, but he has more than what creatures have of them. Analogical predication may not be limited to ‘having a property primarily and secondarily because of the cause and effect relationship between two things. However, it is one sort of analogical predication. Thus I prefer to render the expression, ‘bi’l-tashkìk’ as analogical predication, in this context, instead of rendering it as, for example, ‘priority-based ambiguous predication.’ 29 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.1, p. 163.7–9.

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principle to start with. One can then predicate the same property of different things according to priority and posteriority depending on the distance between the thing in question and the measure or principle. For example, in the case of a certain perfection, something which has the perfection more than other things and which lacks nothing of this perfection is prior to other things with respect to this perfection. The prior thing has this perfection primarily and others have it secondarily.30 The term “being” is a good example to illustrate how perfections are found and predicated according to tashkìk. Being is predicated both of a cause and its effect. However, the cause and the effect are not of equal degrees with respect to having existence. The being of the cause is independent of its effect. However, the being of the effect depends on the cause. For Avicenna, this relationship of priority and posteriority between cause and effect with regard to having being is so important that it can never be eliminated. The cause and its effect may exist together in time or in sempiternity or in some other respect, but they can never be of the same degree with respect to having being. Thus being is said of the cause and of its effect analogically (bi’l-tashkìk), and the cause is prior to its effect with respect to being.31 Although Avicenna does not elaborate on this issue and does not state clearly that being is applied to God and creation bi’l-tashkìk, his conception of the relationship between God and the world justifies our saying that being is said between God and the world bi’l-tashkìk. In the passages where he discusses predication based on priority and posteriority Avicenna does not mention God, but the entire discussion regarding priority with respect to being hinges on the cause that is the giver of being, not any random cause. Sharpening his position, he mentions that there may not be a temporal priority between the cause and its effect, but there is an existential priority of the cause to its effect. Since God is prior to everything as the cause which gives them being, Avicenna’s discussion regarding how things are predicated on the basis of priority and posteriority applies primarily to the relationship between God and the world. Thus,

30 31

Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.1, p. 164.1–11 passim. Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.1, p. 167.1–5. Also see pp. 164–166 passim.

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based upon Avicenna’s larger discussion, ‘being’ is predicated of God and creatures bi’l-tashkìk, according to priority and posteriority.32 Avicenna’s discussion of the predication of the term “one” may be pointed to as another example relevant to the predication of properties of God and creatures. In his commentary on the chapter alIkhlàß, Avicenna states that the term “one” is predicated of things analogically (bi’l-tashkìk). Things have different degrees of unity, depending on whether they are divisible only in the mind or according to genus, or are divisible actually or potentially.33 God however cannot be divided in any way. That is why, in the chapter Iklàß of the Qur"àn, ‘a˙ad ’ is predicated of God. ‘A˙ad ’, as Avicenna explains, denotes the utmost degree of unity or being one, that is, of simplicity.34 Although as a generic term ‘unity’ (wa˙da) is predicated of everything analogically, as the specific form of unity ‘a˙ad ’ is predicated of God exclusively. Avicenna’s conception of predication according to tashkìk is to some extent similar to Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication, which I am going to discuss in the next section of this chapter. The discussion of how one predicate is said of several things—not simply homonymously—goes back to Aristotle,35 whose works are among the common sources between Avicenna and Aquinas. Aristotle uses the example how the term ‘healthy’ is predicated of many things, some of which denote causing health, like food, while others denote being signs of it, like a good complexion. He also explains that substance is the primary reference as far as the predication of ‘being’ is concerned, whereas accidents have being as accidents of substance. In his example of health, substance is one reference point in all its various predications. (This health example is also picked up 32 Fazlur Rahman states that Ibn Sina “firmly held to the univocality of existence.” Fazlur Rahman, “Ibn Sina’s Theory of the God-World Relationship,” in God and Creation, eds. David Burrell and Bernard McGinn (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame, 1990), p. 38. Throughout the article, Fazlur Rahman explains how Avicenna held that God is a necessary being and creation is a contingent being. However, he does not make any further explanation how the statement about ‘the univocality of existence’ is consistent with the distinction between necessary being and contingent being, the former belonging solely to God and the latter belonging solely to creatures. 33 Avicenna, Tafsìr, p. 109.13–17. See also, Avicenna, Metaphysics III.2, p. 97.1–5, p. 103.1–9. 34 Avicenna, Tafsìr, p. 110.1–6. 35 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Christopher Kirwan (Oxford, 1971), IV.2, 1003a33– 1003b11.

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by Aquinas). Avicenna’s use of ‘tashkìk’ conforms to Aristotle’s explanation. That is, there is one referent of which something is said primarily; others have it secondarily. Rendering the term tashkìk as ‘analogy’ may be justified in relation to Aquinas’ use of the term. As we shall see in the next section, for Aquinas, analogical predication is justified because of the causal order that holds between God and the universe. In Avicenna’s writings, we find predication according to priority and posteriority. We also find that there is a causal order between God and the universe. God, as the cause and source of all being, is the giver of the being and the perfections of other things. The example of ‘being’ as a predication of God and of creatures according to priority and posteriority shows that predication bi’l-tashkìk and analogical predication are to some extent similar. Despite these parallels, Avicenna’s conception of tashkìk should not be taken as equivalent to Aquinas’ conception of analogical predication. One must not underestimate the differences between predication according to tashkìk and analogical predication. Although Avicenna has this conception of analogy, he does not have an explicit account of how analogical predication holds between God and creation with regard to perfections. Predication by way of tashkìk and analogy are similar in the sense that they are based on a causal order and gradation among the different subjects of which they are applicable, and which can be applied to God and creatures insofar as they are considered analogues. However, Avicenna’s conception of tashkìk seems to be employed to distinguish between God and creation so as to remind us that they are not equivalent, although we are obliged to use some common terms. He does not identify the extent and conditions of similarity and difference between predications of perfection properties when they are predicated of God and of creatures. Thus Avicenna’s conception of predication bi’l-tashkìk and Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication are not equivalent. Consequently, Avicenna’s theory of predication bi’l-tashkìk—as will be shown—does not have an important part in shaping his own position regarding theological language, while Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication plays a crucial role in this regard. To sum up, according to Avicenna we cannot know God’s essence and cannot name him in himself, because God is too sublime and too majestic to be comprehended by us. We know God through creation because he is the origin of everything; creation itself is the concomitant of God’s being. As an effect it reflects its cause. Hence,

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the perfections therein, starting with ‘being,’ are given by God, and are indicative of God’s perfections. However, God is different from creation as well, inasmuch as God is the cause and origin of it. Thus for Avicenna, there is not only a relationship of similarity between God and creation, but one of dissimilarity as well. Creation is similar to God inasmuch as it is God’s effect and reveals God’s perfections. God is known to us through positive and negative attributes on the basis of the dual relationship between God and creation. But perfections are not found in God and in creation in the same manner and to the same degree. Since God is the origin and true owner of perfections, he has them primarily while creatures have them secondarily. In other words perfections are predicated of God and creatures bi’l-tashkìk, according to the order of priority and posteriority.

Aquinas’ Theory of Theological Language Aquinas presents his position regarding human knowledge of God and his doctrine of predicating properties of God in a more elaborate fashion than Avicenna. My presentation of Aquinas’ conception of God’s properties will follow a similar pattern to my presentation of Avicenna’s conception, and will enable us to see the similarities between Avicenna and Aquinas. Since Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication plays a crucial role in determining how to consider theological statements with respect to philosophical assessment, I put more emphasis on his theory of analogical predication. After a brief statement of his position, I will discuss reactions to and interpretations of Aquinas’ position in present-day scholarship. One line of thought emphasizes the negative aspect with approval; another emphasizes it but considers his position less satisfactory in explaining human speech about God. I will argue that Aquinas’ position secures human speech about God more reliably than some scholars think. The negative element in Aquinas’ theology in general and his position regarding theological language in particular function as a guideline in speaking about God. Instead of diminishing the force of human speech about God, the negative element indicates the limits and rules for our speaking about God. Consequently, Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication does not devalue theological statements, but defines their limits. As long as one takes these specific conditions into account, one is justified in assessing theological statements—statements that

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are made by fellow human beings—philosophically. If one does not take the specific conditions of theological statements into account, then one will be unjust in one’s criticism of theological language by expecting more than the nature of theological statements allows. We Cannot Know God’s Essence Aquinas contends throughout his works that we cannot know God’s essence in purely positive terms: we cannot know what he is in himself, but we can know what he is not. Aquinas’ frequent reminders of God’s unknowability in himself taken together with his teaching that some of our terms apply to God not metaphorically but literally have received different interpretations from scholars. Even though the assessment of the scope of the negative aspect of Aquinas’ theology varies from one scholar to another, it is certain that Aquinas does not categorically deny the human mind all knowledge of God.36 In ST question 12, Aquinas exclusively discusses the problem of our knowledge of God’s essence. There he makes a distinction between seeing God and comprehending God. Whereas he denies the comprehension of God to any creature forever,37 he argues that the human mind can know something about God’s essence. In article 1, he argues that the created mind can see God’s essence, not only on the grounds of faith but also on philosophical grounds. Nevertheless, he clarifies that this kind of knowledge of God, namely seeing God’s essence, is not possible for human beings in this life, because human knowledge depends on the manner in which human beings have existence. In this life the human soul has its being in union with corporeal matter. It knows material forms and other things insofar as they can be known through them. Since God’s essence is not a material form and the knowledge of God attained through the created likeness is not of the divine essence in itself, the human mind cannot know God’s essence in itself in this life.38 This is a subtle but crucial aspect of Thomistic philosophy which I will take up in more detail below. Having a quidditative knowledge of God, or knowing God’s essence in itself, is different from knowing God through a created likeness. 36 37 38

Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), p. 41. ST Ia. 12, 7. ST Ia. 12, 11. See also ST Ia. 12, 2 and 4.

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When Aquinas argues that in this life we cannot see God’s essence, what he is denying to the human intellect is a quidditative knowledge of God equivalent to human knowledge of other things according to their definitions or their causes. Yet he does not deny that the human mind can have some positive knowledge of God. In his commentary on Boethius’ De trinitate, Aquinas states that something is known either through the form that is proper to a thing, or through the form of something similar. In the case of God we do not know God through the form that is proper to himself, but we know him through the likeness that created things have to him.39 In the De veritate, we find a more decisive statement of Aquinas’ position. He argues that we know what something is when we can define it. As John F. Wippel puts it, the intellect is said to know something “when it conceives a form which corresponds in every way to that thing itself. Whatever our intellect may conceive about God, this cannot perfectly represent him.”40 It does, however, as we will see, somewhat represent him. 39 De trinitate, q.1, a.2. English translation of Aquinas’ commentary on Boethius’ De trinitate: Thomas Aquinas, Faith, Reason, and Theology: Questions I–IV of his Commentary on the De trinitate of Boethius, trans. & ed. Armand Maurer (Toronto & Ontario: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987), pp. 21–22. It is interesting that in the De trinitate, Aquinas argues that through creation we can only know that God is and when it comes to what God is we know by transcendence, negation and causality. In ST Ia 12, 12, he states that through creation we know that God exists and also “that he has whatever must belong to the first cause of all things.” This shows, in a sense, that Aquinas clarifies or develops his position in his ST, and gives more value to the knowledge of God that we attain through creatures. This is also in agreement with Wippel’s argument that Aquinas adds precision in his later works in his theory of analogical predication against agnostic positions such as that of Maimonides. John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1984), p. 286. Lawrence Moonan has similar interpretation of Aquinas’ position. He argues that with regard to our knowledge of God Aquinas’ position evolves from a more reserved to a less reserved one. Lawrence Moonan, Divine Power (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 231–235. 40 J. F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on What Philosophers Can Know about God,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 66/3 (1992), p. 283. On p. 286, Wippel maintains, “In my view, in here defending our ability to apply some names to God substantially, Thomas has now developed his position somewhat. He continues to insist, however, that this does not mean that we can comprehend or define the divine essence, or know what it is. It also means that, against the position of the medieval Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides, he clearly defends some kind of positive or affirmative knowledge of God.” What Wippel says here for the de potentia is applicable to ST as well. Hence, it would not be wrong to say that Aquinas’ position in this regard gradually evolves to one in which he acknowledges a broader scope, or a more rationally grounded admission in regard to human knowledge of God.

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In ScG I, 14, where Aquinas argues that we cannot know what God is positively but can through negation, he states the parallel between giving definitions of created things and negating things of God.41 The activity of negating more and more things of God is similar to defining things by first giving the genus of a certain thing and adding its differentiae from other things. Of course, giving the definition of created things aims at a positive knowledge of them, while negating things of God does not presume to provide a positive knowledge of God. For Aquinas, since we cannot know God in himself, the most appropriate name for God is the least determinate name. In an interesting passage in the Summa theologiae Ia. 13, 11, Aquinas treats the question of whether “HE WHO IS is the Most Appropriate Name for God.”42 He argues that ‘he who is’ is the most appropriate name for God for three reasons. The first reason is the meaning of the name in itself. This name expresses only existence. Since God’s essence is being, and only God’s essence is being, this name is the most appropriate name. The second reason is the universality or broadness of the scope of this name. In this life we cannot grasp what God’s essence is, and however we think of him we fail to have full understanding of him. Thus, since this name is unrestricted, indeed since it is less determinate and simpler, it is the most appropriate name for God. The third reason is that the wording of ‘He who is’ is in the present tense. For God, to whom past and future are not applicable at all, this name is the most appropriate name, even though the present is also not applicable to God inasmuch as it implies being in time.43 God Is Known through Creation We do not have a quidditative knowledge of God in this world, because the manner in which we have being in this world limits the 41

ScG I, 14 [2] and [3]. ST Ia. 13, 11, and ad 1. A similar discussion also occurs in Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei in Quaestiones disputatae, volumen II. editio X. Taurini. Ed. P. Bazzi, [et al.] (Rome: 1965). English translation, On the Power of God (Quaestiones de potentia Dei ), trans. English Dominican Fathers (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1932–1934) (Henceforth De potentia) VII, 5. The answer to this question reminds us of Avicenna’s contention that the most appropriate thing we can say about God is that ‘he is’ or ‘he is whatever he is,’ since God cannot be expressed, cannot be talked about, as he is in himself. 43 ST Ia. 13, 1 ad 3. 42

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reach of our knowledge. But we can attain a certain kind of knowledge of God through the creatures that are in fact within the limits of our reach. The human knowledge of God in this life is through creatures, because creatures, as the effects of God, reflect God, and are similar to him. Although human knowledge concerning God is limited, human beings can know that God has perfection properties in addition to knowing God’s existence. As part of his discussions regarding the unknowability of God’s essence by human beings in this life, Aquinas underscores the limited character of human knowledge. In this life, the knowledge that corresponds to the capabilities of the human soul originates from the senses. Starting with sense-perceptual knowledge, the human soul reaches the forms of realities. This knowledge is not trivial, even if it does not include the quidditative knowledge of God. It leads us to know not only that God exists but also that he must have certain perfections: The knowledge that is natural to us has its source in the senses and extends just so far as it can be led by sensible things; from these, however, our understanding cannot reach to the divine essence. Sensible creatures are effects of God which are less than typical of the power of their cause, so knowing them does not lead us to understand the whole power of God and thus we do not see his essence. They are nevertheless effects depending from a cause, and so we can at least be led from them to know of God that he exists and that he has whatever must belong to the first cause of all things which is beyond all that is caused.44

In ST Ia. 13, 1, Aquinas refers back to ST Ia. 12, 12 confirming that in this world our knowledge of God is through our knowledge of creatures. Based on our knowledge of creatures, we know that God is the cause of them; he surpasses them, and he lacks anything creaturely. We are, despite the last two points, also able to make predications of God because of our knowledge of creatures as his effects.45 The similarity of creatures to their cause can be traced through the principle that every agent does something similar to itself.46 In ScG I, 29, Aquinas sets the stage to discuss how we ascend to the 44

ST Ia. 12, 12. ST Ia. 13, 1. 46 ScG I, 29 [2]; De potentia VII, 5. John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America, 2000), pp. 517–518. 45

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knowledge of God through the knowledge that we attain from creatures. Since what we know directly comes from creatures, there must be a ground to justify our talking about God based on our knowledge gained from creatures. The justification of how we can know something of God in positive terms on the basis of our knowledge of creatures is the similarity between God as cause and creatures as his effects. Aquinas argues that since God has given all the perfections that creatures possess, these perfections must somehow be found in God. God Has Negative and Positive Properties The similarity and the dissimilarity between God and creatures determine whether properties are negated or affirmed of God. It is the similarity of God’s effects to their cause that guarantees for us at least some knowledge of God. This similarity of creatures to God is again the basis upon which some properties are either negated or affirmed of God. Affirming similarity of two things implies their dissimilarity, because it amounts to not only denying absolute dissimilarity, but also denying identity of the two things in question. To the extent that creatures are not similar to God, the properties we find in creatures should be negated of God. In turn, to the extent that creatures are similar to God, the properties we find in creatures should be affirmed of God, although not absolutely, that is, not in precisely the same way. Since God is different from his creatures, God has negative attributes. Pursuing God’s otherness from creatures increases our knowledge of God, even if it is expressed in negative terms. In ST, immediately after arguing for the existence of God, Aquinas undertakes the task of clarifying “the ways in which God does not exist.”47 From question 3 through question 11, Aquinas explains how God is not, such as being composite, changeable, material. In ScG I, 14, Aquinas explains why we need to use negation in order to know God. He states that we cannot know God in himself, because he surpasses our understanding. We cannot know God in a purely positive way, but we can come closer in our knowledge of God by nega47 ST Ia. prologue (prooemium) to question 3. Here Aquinas, at the end of question 2 gives his plan for the rest of his investigation into questions concerning God in himself.

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tions.48 Things are known not only directly but also through their distinction from other things. Since we do not know what God is in himself, we must frame the distinction between God and creation in negative terms. Although these negative distinctions do not show what God is, they show at least what God is not. After setting the stage for using negations in order to know something of God, Aquinas devotes 14 chapters to explaining what are the things that need to be negated of God. The basic idea behind all these negations is the polarity between God and creation. All these negations emphasize God’s otherness from creatures.49 Since creatures are similar to God, God has positive attributes. Perhaps it is Aquinas’ bold assertion regarding the positive properties of God that puts him in a distinctive place among medieval philosophers. For Aquinas, pure perfections, such as being, goodness and wisdom, are properly predicated of God: they say something about what God is, even if they do so inadequately.50 Aquinas argues that the perfections that we see in creatures are found in God without reducing them solely to God’s actions. That is, saying that God has pure perfections does not mean that God causes them but does not himself possess them in any manner. Aquinas consistently argues that not all the perfections we find in creatures are limited to creatures. They are found in God, though not in the way they are found in creatures. If God did not have these perfections in some way, then all that we could say about God would be limited to pure negations or declarations that he caused something but is in no way like what he caused. In fact, the divine perfections are interpreted in both ways by Aquinas’ predecessors. After a brief survey of other philosophers such as Maimonides, and Muslim thinkers, most likely 48

Aquinas, ScG I, 14 [2]. Norman Kretzmann gives a detailed list of properties that Aquinas, in ScG I, 15–28, negates from God: “(A) anything that begins or ceases to exist, (B) temporal, (C) dependent for its existence on anything other than itself, (D) anything that has any passive potentialities, (E) matter, or anything material, (F) the universal material cause (prime matter), (G) composite in any way, (H) subject to anything unnatural, violent, or coercive, (I) corporeal, whether a body or a power in a body, ( J) other than its own essential nature, (K) anything whose being is other than its nature, (L) anything that has any accidental characteristics, (M) specified by differentiae, (N) classified within any genus or category, (O) defined, (P) the subject of an a priori demonstration, (Q ) a universal formal cause, (R) the form of any particular thing, (S) imperfect.” Norman Kertzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), p. 118. 50 ST Ia. 13, 2. 49

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including Avicenna,51 Aquinas argues for a stronger position. For him, some of these names say something of what God is. Even though we first know the perfections in creatures, these perfections are also predicated of God in a substantial or formal way. The basis of such predications is the fact that the perfections found in creatures represent God’s perfections.52 God Has Perfections in a Different Mode from Creatures Aquinas has concerns similar to those of Avicenna regarding the manner in which God has perfection properties. Like Avicenna, Aquinas maintains that God has perfections in a manner different from creation. The manner in which God has perfections is characterized by the manner in which God is. Since God is simple, immutable, infinite, necessary, eternal etc., perfections are found in God simply, necessarily, immutably. In contrast to those who reduce God’s properties either to pure negations of properties in creatures or to declaring that God caused them but in no way is like them, Aquinas argues that some properties are predicated of God in a substantial or formal way. They say something about what God is. If, then, they are found in such a way in God, then one must explain how the attribution of these perfections to God does not violate the believer’s conception of God as a transcendent being. Arguing that the manner in which God has perfection properties is determined by divine formal features, such as simplicity and infinity, Aquinas

51

In ST Ia. 13, 2, after stating that Maimonides interprets affirmative statements about God as negations, Aquinas—referring to the interpretation of the perfections attributed to God as merely caused by him—says that “Others said that such sentences were used to signify the relation of God to creatures, so that when we say ‘God is good’ we mean that God is the cause of goodness in things, and likewise in other such propositions.” The reference of the expression “others” may be Muslim philosophers, including Avicenna. See H. A. Wolfson, “St. Thomas on Divine Attributes,” in Studies in Maimonides and St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Jacob I. Dienstag, (Ktav Publishing, 1975), pp. 8–9/680–681. 52 ST Ia. 13, 2, De potentia VII, 5. Through his emphasis that perfections are found in God, and predicated of God in the category of substance, Aquinas argues for a stronger position. He diverges not only from Maimonides and Avicenna, but also from Pseudo-Dionysius, whom he considers as an authority. Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 261–265. For a detailed discussion of Aquinas’ inheritance and modification of the Pseudo-Dionysian theology, see Fran O’rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1992).

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clearly sets the manner in which God has perfections apart from the way creation has them. Unlike creatures, God has perfections in accord with his simplicity. In creatures perfection properties denote (1) something different from other perfection properties, (2) something different from the creature’s essence. Aquinas gives the example of wisdom. If it is predicated, for example, of a man, then it signifies something different from his power, his will, as well as something distinct from his essence. In this sense each perfection property indicates something distinct from other perfection properties, and it is limited to a certain aspect of the person who is wise. However, in the case of God, perfections are not something extraneous to his essence. They do not have a distinct existence from each other, indicating a certain limited aspect of God. What a perfection property signifies when it is predicated of God “is not confined by the meaning of our word but goes beyond it.”53 In brief, God is not wise accidentally. He is wise essentially. His being is to be wise. Although all the divine names, or perfection properties, signify one and the same thing because of God’s simplicity, they are not synonymous. Despite the belief that God is simple, we attribute to him many perfection properties. Consequently, in our way of speaking he is considered in the way composite things are. Aquinas argues that since we know these perfections as they are found in creatures, we understand God’s perfections through the concepts that are appropriate to the perfections as they are found in creatures. But, in fact, perfections are found in God in a simple and unified manner. Hence it is because of the perfection of God’s unity or simplicity that the perfections found in creatures in a divided way are found in him in a simple and unified way.54 Although the perfections we attribute to God are not distinct from each other in God, the names we use to denote these perfections have different meanings, that is, they are not synonyms. God’s being infinite and unlimited may be given as another example to indicate that God has perfections in a different manner from creation. God has perfections eminently, whereas creatures have their 53 ST Ia. 13, 5. [4] Aquinas states he considers them 54 ST Ia. 13, 4,

See also ScG I, 32 [2], [4], [7], De potentia VII, 7. In ScG I, 32 that perfections are not predicated of God as properties, since to be in the category of accident. and ad 3 and 5; ScG I, 31, [4].

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perfections in a limited manner. The perfections creatures have primarily belong to God. Creatures have these perfections because, as God’s effects, they reflect God’s perfections. However, since they do not reflect God fully, they fall short of representing God’s full power. These perfections are not found in created things in a manner similar to the manner that they are found in God.55 Given that we know those perfections as they are found in creatures, and that they fall short of representing the way they are found in God, from a human point of view they are said to be found in God eminently.56 In ScG I, 30, Aquinas presents a further clarification of what the eminence, or supereminence, of perfections means. He suggests a hierarchy in speaking of perfections. Perfections as they are known from creatures are given the names they have as they are in creatures. But since such perfections are not restricted to creatures—to the contrary, God has them primarily and since God surpasses creaturely limits—they are considered to be found in God eminently. More precisely, then, God is eminently good, or the highest good. Aquinas then talks about the mode of eminence, or ‘supereminence’ of these perfections. How then do we express it? He states that their mode of supereminence can be signified either through negations, such as eternal, i.e., not temporal, infinite, or through positive proportions such as the highest good, the first cause.57 I do not intend to discuss all divine formal features in this context. However, one can safely assume that a similar paradigm is applicable with regard to other divine formal features such as necessity, eternity, and immutability. That is, in the same manner as the divine simplicity, they modify the divine perfections. That is, God’s knowledge and will, for example, are necessary and immutable as much as they are simple. Perfections Are Predicated of God Analogically For Aquinas perfections are predicated of God and creatures neither univocally nor equivocally. They cannot be predicated of God univocally, because God is utterly different from creatures, being simple, eternal and infinite. Perfection properties cannot be predicated 55 56 57

ScG I, 29; ST Ia. 13, 2 and 3, De potentia VII, 5. ScG I, 30 [2]; ST Ia. 13, 2 ad 2; ST Ia. 13, 3; ST Ia. 13, 7. ScG I, 30 [2] and [4].

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of God and creatures equivocally. Otherwise we would not know anything about what they mean when they are predicated of God. Aquinas proposes a way in between: analogical predication of pure perfection terms. Analogical predication would allow affirmations of what God is, and would eliminate the fallacy of equivocation in our language about God.58 Aquinas argues that perfections are predicated of God and creatures according to the analogy of one to another in almost all his works, though he is hesitant in the De veritate.59 In ST, Aquinas states, “words are used of God and creatures in an analogical way, that is, in accordance with a certain order between them.” He mentions two modes of analogical predication, and gives the health example. In one mode, a term is predicated analogically of two things, because these two things have a certain relationship to a third thing. Health is said of ‘a diet’ and a ‘complexion,’ because of the relation of the latter two to the health in man—diet being the cause and complexion being the sign of health. In the second mode, a term is predicated of two things because of a relation between these two things. Health is predicated of ‘diet’ and ‘man’ because the diet is the cause of health in man.60 58

Aquinas argues that if these perfections are predicated of God and creatures equivocally, then all speech about God would be meaningless, and philosophers who try to prove that God exists, or who speak about God’s being such and such would be committing the fallacy of equivocation. ST Ia. 13, 5. See also ScG I, 33 [6] and De potentia VII, 7. There is a parallel between the structure of being and the use of language in Aquinas. That is, since (1) there is a similarity between God and creatures, perfection terms are not predicated of God and creatures equivocally, (2) God and creatures have different modes of being, perfection terms are not predicated of them univocally, (3) perfections are found in God and creatures but in different modes, they are predicated of God and creatures analogically. To see such a parallel between the structure of being and the use of language implies that Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication is not simply a theory about the use of language. For discussions concerning whether Aquinas simply offers a theory regarding the use of terms, or whether his theory of analogical predications has implications regarding the conception of God see: Neil A. Stubbens, “Naming God: Moses Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas,” Thomist 54 (April 1990), p. 267. 59 J. F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on What Philosophers Can Know about God,” pp. 293–295. Wippel provides a survey of Aquinas’ position regarding the analogical predication throughout Aquinas’ works. 60 ST Ia. 13, 5. In the De potentia he cites two kinds of analogy, (1) a property is predicated of two things because of their relation to a third thing, such as being is said of quality and quantity on the basis of their relation to substance, and (2) a property is predicated of two things because of the relation of the one to the other, as being is said of substance and quantity. In the first kind of analogy, there must be something prior to the things of which something is predicated analogically.

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Aquinas distinguishes between the signified perfections (res significata) and the manner of signifying (modus significandi ), and argues that the res significata are predicated of God and creatures because of the “order that creatures have to God as to their source and cause in which all the perfections of things pre-exist transcendently.”61 Whereas in univocal predication perfections are predicated of different subjects with one meaning or conception (una ratio), in analogical predication perfections indicate different connotations of the subjects to this one thing. Aquinas gives the health example again: the predications of health in regard to diet (“this is health food”) and to complexion (“you look healthy”) indicates different relations to health, one as a cause of health and the other as a sign of it.62 Even though in analogical predication res significatae have different foundations (rationes) in their different instances of predication, the situation between God and his creatures is not exactly the same as that provided by the health example. In order to see the difference, we must keep in mind that (1) perfection properties are predicated of God and creatures because of the order of things to God as their cause, and 2) perfection properties that we know from creatures and which are predicated of God do not simply show God’s causal activity but something found in God eminently.63 In the health example, the form ‘health’ is found only in the healthy man. But the diet is not the form of health, or does not have health formally. It is the cause of health in a healthy man. Likewise, complexion is not formally health; it is simply a sign showing that a man is formally healthy. However, as opposed to predication of health both of diet and complexion, some forms of perfections are found both in God and in creatures. Since perfections are predicated of God and creatures analogically, i.e., with different rationes of the same res significata, the question that arises is this: what is the thing that makes their rationes different in their predication of God and creatures? The answer to this question is found in the mode of existence of perfections. The Since, Aquinas argues, there can be nothing prior to God, the analogy of many to one is not the analogy that applies between God and creatures in predicating perfections. Only the second kind of analogy applies between God and creatures. De potentia VII, 7. 61 ST Ia. 13, 5. 62 ST Ia. 13, 5. 63 ST Ia. 13, 2.

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rationes of perfections are different when they are predicated of God and creatures on account of the modes of existence that belong to God and to creatures respectively.64 As I have mentioned in the previous section, whereas God has these perfections simply, eternally, infinitely, eminently, creatures have them in their composite mode of being—in a compounded manner, temporally and finitely. A further question: What is the thing that the mode of existence corresponds to in human knowledge and in the expression of these perfections? In order to answer this question I should mention Aquinas’ distinction between the res significata and the modus significandi of perfection terms. In ST Ia 13, 3, Aquinas argues that these names are affirmed of God on the basis of their res significata, but they are denied of God on the basis of their modus significandi. The modus significandi is the way we signify things in a precise way when we affirm these perfections. Aquinas states that as far as the res significata of these perfections is concerned, they are literally predicated of God, and their attribution to God is more appropriate than to creatures. But as far as their mode of signifying is concerned, their predication of God is inappropriate, because their mode of signification is creaturely.65 Hence it is the modus significandi in human language that corresponds to, but which cannot properly express, the mode of existence of perfections. Aquinas explains how our mode of signifying is appropriate for creatures but not appropriate for God through highlighting the failure of human language to express simplicity and concreteness together. He states that we use concrete nouns to indicate completeness and subsistence, but concrete nouns always indicate composite things. Our human expressions, if they are meant to signify simple forms, however, are abstract and do not signify subsistence and completeness along with simplicity. For example God is not simply wise, but is also wisdom itself. The abstract noun wisdom, however, does not signify something subsistent. Because God is both subsistent and simple, the perfection terms signify God inadequately.66 64 Since God is the equivocal cause—this is why univocal predication is not possible between him and creatures—God’s being the cause or source of the perfections does not seem to constitute a difficulty. For God’s being the equivocal cause, see ScG I, 29 [2]. 65 ST Ia. 13, 3. 66 In ST Ia. 13, 1, ad 2 and ad 3.

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Still, Aquinas does not see this imperfection as something that should prevent us from predicating pure perfections of God. Even though they are not suitable for God in their creaturely signification, this does not mean that we cannot form true or valid propositions about God. In his discussion concerning the validity of our statements about God Aquinas emphasizes the difference between the structure of our statements about things and things as they exist in reality. Aquinas argues that the structure of our statements does not match things as they exist, whether they be material objects or simple beings such as God. Thus, the fact that God is simple and we human beings use propositions that are not simple—since they contain at least a subject and predicate—do not make our propositions about God less valuable than our propositions about material things.67 Our propositions about created things and about God are valid because “the intellect does not attribute its mode of understanding to the things that it understands; for example it does not attribute immateriality to a stone even though it knows the stone immaterially.”68 Hence, if for Aquinas the inadequacy of the signification of statements we make about God does not make them invalid or devoid of knowledge, why cannot we assume the same thing for the mode of signification of our perfection terms when we speak of God?

The Use of the Negative Element in Aquinas’ Position There is an apparent difficulty in understanding Aquinas’ position regarding our knowledge of God and the expression of this knowledge. Aquinas maintains that we do not know how God is in himself in purely positive terms. We can know God more adequately only through negations of perfections as they are found in creatures.69 Throughout his writings Aquinas also reminds us that human mind cannot comprehend God (ST Ia. 12, 7). However, he also maintains that perfection terms are predicated of God analogically, i.e., literally not metaphorically, and that those perfections belong primarily to God and secondarily to creatures. There is a tendency among Aquinas scholars to interpret Aquinas’ position in such a way that 67 68 69

ST Ia. 13, 12, and ad 3. ScG I, 36 [2]. ScG I, 14.

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strips the force from Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication. Through the theory of analogical predication Aquinas allows that we know God in some sense and our positive predications of God are not metaphorical inasmuch as they concern perfection terms. As a result of the emphasis on Aquinas’ frequent reminders about the unknowability of God, one can become confused about how to understand analogical predication and how to assess Aquinas’ statements about God’s perfections. If we do not know how God is in any way, then can we talk about God, or how can we understand the statements about God? Can one argue that since Aquinas is a theologian, one should not expect him to meet philosophical standards, such as coherence and implication? In fact the ambiguity in Aquinas’ position has received different interpretations from scholars of different backgrounds. For some of them, the fact that Aquinas has a negative element in his theology is something praiseworthy. It is something that justifies why one should not attempt to push Aquinas’ accounts of God and God’s perfections to their logical conclusions, or why one should not draw unpleasant implications. For others, Aquinas’ qualifications regarding our knowledge of God’s perfections amount to an ambiguity that makes his theology less informative and not as explanatory as one might initially expect.70 I would like to consider the interpretations of Josef Pieper and Harm Goris, who hold the negative dimension in Aquinas’ philosophy in high esteem, and William P. Alston, who presents the position held by philosophers critical towards Aquinas’ negative element. Both sides agree that in Aquinas’ view we do not have determinate knowledge of God in himself. Pieper emphasizes that we do not have 70 Among many different interpretations of Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication, David Burrell developed an interesting approach. He argued in his earlier works, such as Aquinas: God and Action, that through his theory of analogical predication, Aquinas offers not a theory explaining how perfections denoting God are predicated, but rather emphasizing the transcendence of God. For Aquinas analogy is not a method to describe God but an “intellectual therapy,” which relieves us from our need for theories about God. See David Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action, p. 118. For a critical examination of Burrell’s earlier position, see Philip A. Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities (Atlanta: Scholars, 1993). In his later work, Burrell acknowledges more credibility to analogical predication in attributing perfections to God and creatures. David B. Burrell, “From Analogy of “Being” to the Analogy of Being,” in Recovering Nature: Essays in Natural Philosophy, Ethics, and Metaphysics in Honor of Ralph McInerny, ed. Thomas Hibbs and John O’Callaghan (Indiana, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University, 1999), pp. 253–266.

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quidditative knowledge of God, but only have the hope of know God. Goris argues that we should not assess Aquinas’ teaching in purely philosophical terms. Alston contends that Aquinas’ theory of analogy leaves the meaning of perfection terms indeterminate, and that perfection terms according to Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication are not adequate for philosophical discussion. Against Aquinas’ theory regarding theological language, he argues that perfections can be predicated of God and of creatures univocally. Since his presentation of the problem is more direct and articulate, I mainly rely on Alston’s discussion to state my position. I will argue that contrary to Alston’s interpretation, Aquinas’ theory of analogy does not leave us with indeterminate conceptions of the divine perfections. The unfavorable interpretations of Aquinas’ position result from the error of expecting that analogical predication should teach us the ratio propria of the divine perfections. The fact that we do not know the ratio propria of the divine perfections shows only that our knowledge of God is limited, not that our knowledge of God is indeterminate such that we cannot make philosophical assertions about divine perfections or criticize those assertions. There is no compelling reason, based on Aquinas’ theory of analogy, to consider statements concerning God as indeterminate, and hence not suitable for philosophical assessment. Josef Pieper In The Silence of St. Thomas,71 Josef Pieper emphasizes the unknowability of things and of God in Aquinas’ thought and the apophathic character of his theology. He does not conclude that what we say about God has no philosophical rigor, but his emphasis on the ultimate unknowability of God weakens the hope of evaluating Aquinas’ teachings in philosophical terms. Pieper argues that since we do not know the relationship between God—who gives things their truth— and things, we cannot know things. Since we cannot know the ‘truth’ of things, we cannot know God—except imperfectly—because he is only imperfectly reflected through creatures, i.e., in as much as they imitate their source. Hence Pieper maintains that, for Aquinas, God’s

71 Josef Pieper, The Silence of St. Thomas, trans. S. J. Murray and Daniel O’Connor (New York: 1957).

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knowledge is beyond our reach. We may only hope to attain this knowledge. Pieper discusses the concepts of the truth of things and truth of knowledge in order to clarify what the truth of human knowledge consists of. He states that, according to Aquinas, ‘being true is being thought either by God, hence being created, or by other subjects.’72 God’s thought, or knowledge, is the creative knowledge giving everything its truth, measuring everything but itself is not measured. It is God’s creative knowledge that makes things understandable to human beings. Created things in turn are measured by God’s knowledge on the one hand, and measure human knowledge on the other. The human mind, however, is measured but does not measure as far as natural beings are concerned. The truth of human knowledge depends on its conformity to the truth of creation.73 Thus things are related (1) to God, and (2) to the human mind. Although we know things as they are related to the human mind, we cannot know things as they are related to God. As Pieper states, we cannot know “the relation between natural reality and the archetypal creative thought of God.”74 Pieper points to a vicious circle in Aquinas’ thought regarding human knowledge of God. Because we cannot properly grasp “the correspondence between the original pattern in God and the created copy, in which formally and primarily the truth of things consists,”75 we cannot know the ‘truth of things’ perfectly. This is because ultimately it is the divine knowledge of things that constitutes the truth of things, and we cannot properly know what God is. We do not know what God is, because our knowledge of God through creation is imperfect or defective. Our knowledge of God through creation is defective because (1) creation can represent God only imperfectly, and (2) even this imperfect representation or reflection of God is too much for the human mind to fully understand.76 If we cannot know God without knowing creatures, and if we cannot know the truth of creatures without knowing God, then what option is left for us as far as the knowledge of God is concerned? 72

Pieper, Pieper, 74 Pieper, 75 Pieper, 76 Pieper, Disputatae de 73

op. cit., p. 50. op. cit., pp. 51–57. op. cit., pp. 58–59. op. cit., p. 62. op. cit., pp. 66–67. See also Pieper’s reference to Aquinas, Quaestiones Veritate V, 2 ad 11.

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In Pieper’s own words, “St. Thomas’s doctrine means that hope is the condition of man’s existence as a knowing subject, a condition that by its very nature cannot be fixed: it is neither comprehension and possession nor simply non-possession, but ‘not-yet-possession’.”77 Pieper’s discussion does not directly concern the problem of analogical predication, which is the topic of my discussion here. Nevertheless it is related to this discussion. Since we name God through creation, and we do not know things perfectly, but only hope that we will know them perfectly, then we cannot properly name God through creation, but only hope that we can later properly name God through creation. What can we make out of this riddle? Do Thomas’ teachings as presented by Pieper mean that what Thomas or anyone says about God should not be taken seriously? What would ‘hoping to have knowledge’ mean, if it means to exclude the claim of knowledge? I do not think Aquinas’ writings are meant to contain no knowledge of God, being mere instrumental statements put forward with the hope of reaching knowledge of God eventually—a hope that won’t be fulfilled in the present life. As Pieper himself notes, despite his reminders of the unknowability of God and things, Aquinas does not adhere to agnosticism.78 One may take Pieper’s conclusion in a broader sense to mean that Aquinas’ constant reminder of the unknowability of God shows that he considers human knowledge qualified and limited. Human knowledge is conditioned by our humanity whether it concerns God or things. This would be acceptable, but the fact that human knowledge is not absolute—that is, not the knowledge the Creator has of his creation—does not mean that human knowledge is not reliable or offers only hope but not any kind of knowledge whatsoever. This would be a self-contradiction. There is no reason to take Aquinas’ reminders regarding the unknowability of things and God to mean that he is arguing that we cannot and do not know things and God at all. To do so would render Aquinas’ life-long occupation as a grand effort to create an illusion. Pieper must mean something more—but he does not express it.

77 78

Pieper, op. cit., p. 69. Pieper, op. cit., pp. 68–69.

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Harm Goris Harm Goris discusses Aquinas’ approach to theological statements in his Free Creatures of an Eternal God.79 Goris argues that although the negative element in Aquinas’ theology does not exclude all affirmative theology, it “qualifies all affirmative God-talk in a very radical way.”80 Goris first states Aquinas’ position regarding predicating names of God, explaining how perfection terms are predicated of God not metaphorically but properly or literally. Analogically predicated perfection terms are predicated of God primarily and of creatures secondarily. Goris states that although Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication expresses “confidence in the appropriateness and truthfulness of human language to talk about God” there is a “negative stroke” “interwoven with all positive affirmations.”81 Based on the imperfection of human language about God, Goris distinguishes two aspects of this imperfection: (1) imperfection on “the grammaticalsyntactical” level, and (2) imperfection on “the logical-semantic” level. The imperfection in human speech about God resulting from the grammatical structure of human language consists of the fact that when an attribute is predicated of something it does not show that the subject and the predicate are identical, i.e., are one and the same thing. For example, when we say ‘A is wise’ it signifies that the property ‘wise’ inheres in the subject A, or is possessed by A, but it does not mean that the subject and the predicate are identical. Goris states that Aquinas considers this deficiency of human language in expressing divine perfections to be due to God’s simplicity. Since in God there is no distinction between his essence and his attributes, the statement, “God is wise,” though true and proper, falls short of expressing how God is wise. To complement this deficiency one should also say that ‘God is wisdom itself.’ However, being an abstract name, ‘wisdom’ does not signify a subsistent being, like God. Thus, the way we signify God is again deficient. This deficiency resulting from the structure of human language applies to all human discourse about God using concrete or abstract nouns, adjectives, pronouns and tensed verbs.82 79 Harm J. M. J. Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will (Leuven: Peeters, [1996?]). 80 Goris, op. cit., p. 14. 81 Goris, op. cit., p. 15. 82 Goris, op. cit., p. 16.

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The second type of imperfection, resulting the mode of signifying God, is the imperfection at the logical-semantic level. Simply put, the imperfection results from the difference between the way these perfections are found in God and the way they are found in creatures. Whereas in creatures these perfections are found in a limited and accidental manner and are also distinct from each other, they are found in God to a ‘maximum degree.’ They are identical to God’s essence, and finally they are identical to each other as well, e.g., God’s wisdom is not something different from God’s justice. Since “the mode of signifying that belongs to perfection-terms fits and depends on the way in which the signified perfections exist in creatures,”83 they cannot express the divine perfections. Hence we cannot predicate perfection terms of God and of creatures in the same sense (ratio).84 Does this mean (1) that we simply do not know what perfection terms mean when they are predicated of God? Or (2) that we only partially know what they could mean when predicated of God? We cannot take (1) as Goris’ position, because Aquinas has clear statements to the effect that we know God, even if this knowledge is imperfect. If we take (2) to be Goris’ position, then we must ask what this partial knowledge may consist of, and how we can treat this partial knowledge with regard to other kinds of supposedly comprehensive human knowledge. Goris does not state exactly how this negative aspect of Aquinas’ theory would affect our assessment of Aquinas’ statements concerning God. However, his statement of the methodology which he wants to follow in his work might be taken as the reflection of his conclusion regarding the negative aspect of Aquinas’ position concerning theological language. He suggests that Aquinas’ texts should be read as theological texts. This means that when reading Aquinas one should keep in mind that Aquinas is talking about God as related in the Scriptures—a God who foreknows, predestines, etc. . . . In accordance with this idea, Goris’ goal

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Goris, op. cit., pp. 16–17. Goris, op. cit., p. 17. “As a consequence of this, we cannot say that the perfection-terms when predicated of God have exactly the same ratio as when they are predicated of creatures. They are not said univocally of both creatures and God, but analogically, leaving the One signified beyond their signification.” 84

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is not to talk about the abstract concept itself of e.g. foreknowledge or omniscience as isolated from talking about God, and then to analyse it and to show its conceptual coherence with other concepts like the ones of immutability or contingency. Although conceptual analysis will play a crucial role in this study, we do not aim at constructing a closed, finished logical structure in which well-defined concepts of foreknowledge, immutability, contingency etc. are the building blocks and their logical relations of implication the cement which links them. We shall be talking about God who transcends all that is, all that we know, and all that we say and who, therefore, does not fit into any conceptual framework.85

Similar to this first strategy of suspending the demands of conceptual coherence and logical structure between concepts and theories, Goris introduces a second strategy: to avoid defining God’s attributes, owing to our lack of knowledge or our incapability of comprehending those attributes as they are found in God.86 His third methodological guideline is “to take a close look at the language used for God: we have to start with a logical-semantic (. . .) and grammatical-syntactic (. . .) analysis of statements like ‘God foreknew’, ‘God provides’ etc.”87 Considering Goris’ methodological guidelines to structure his study as arguments meant to suggest the correct way of dealing with Aquinas, I would like to make some qualifying remarks. Suspending the demands of conceptual coherence and logical structure between concepts and theories may be granted to religious texts, as they are not philosophical, or theological, texts. They may not be expected to give the reader full-fledged well-constructed philosophical theories about how God is. However, when it comes to philosophical and theological texts produced by a scholar, then standard philosophical and theological criteria, such as consistency, implication, etc. . . . can be justifiably expected. Based on the unknowability of God, if one does not expect philosophical arguments to meet philosophical expectations, it would hardly be possible to criticize any theological statement. Since no ordinary man is able to have

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Goris, op. cit., pp. 18–19. Goris, op. cit., p. 19. “Stated bluntly, we do not know what God’s foreknowledge, providence etc. really is. They are divine acts and, as such, in reality identical with the divine essence itself. Therefore, in contrast with common procedure, we cannot start our reflections by giving a definition of e.g. foreknowledge. For talking about real foreknowledge is talking about God of whom we do not know what He is or how He is.” 87 Goris, op. cit., p. 19. 86

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the knowledge of God in himself, what philosophers or theologians discuss is not whether what a proposition that asserts something about God conveys exactly how God is in himself with respect to the point in question. To the contrary, what philosophers or theologians discuss is rather concerned with—granted the available data, such as natural reason, or a certain religious text—how the conception of God in this and that way would be philosophically tenable. The second reason Goris puts forward is acceptable, but must be qualified in keeping with Aquinas’ general strategy of not giving definitions of ‘divine versions’ of perfections. To be clear, this position does not mean that one may neglect whether one’s conception of a divine perfection like foreknowledge is consistent with one’s other convictions about God. When talking about God’s perfections, what a theologian or philosopher seeks after is not to have total grasp of the perfections as they are found in God, but to make a reasonable, coherent expression of what one knows of God, or thinks one knows about God. Defining ‘divine versions’ of perfections is one thing; expressing divine perfections in a philosophically tenable manner is another. The latter is the very thing that is expected from a philosopher or theologian. Now let me turn to the third factor shaping Goris’ work. It is proper and even necessary to take into account the logical-semantic and grammatical-syntactic differences required by the manner perfections are found in God and in creatures, and the manner in which we talk about these perfections. Without doubt human discourse about the Creator and about creatures differ, since these two are not equivalent. However, this does not require that human knowledge and expression of this knowledge be reasonably excluded from philosophical assessment. Worst yet would be to grant such immunity to theories of some people, i.e., theologians, to the exclusion of some others, i.e., philosophers. Such a distinction would be totally arbitrary. William P. Alston William P. Alston puts the complaints of philosophers about Aquinas’ conception of theological language into two categories: They [theological statements] (1) lack the truth conditions and (2) cannot figure in reasoning in the ways they are supposed to in Thomistic, and other, theology . . . If (1) is valid, that is going to play havoc with

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any attempt to perform inferences to or from theological statements. If it is indeterminate just what it takes to make a given (putative) statement true, then what follows from the statement, or what it follows from, will certainly be indeterminate, because what the statement “says” is indeterminate. But, of course, (2) can make trouble even if theological statements are as determinate as you please. For the determinate theological meaning might not be such as to underwrite the inferences that Aquinas and other theologians purport to perform.88

These two issues are related to the res significata and the modus significandi in Aquinas’ theory of theological language, respectively. However, these complaints regarding Thomas’ position on theological language depend on a particular interpretation of Aquinas’ position, namely that (1) knowledge of perfections as they are found in creatures is not of much help in knowing the divine perfections, for different reasons; and (2) the limitation in the grammatical structure of human language to express the identity of God and his attributes, and the identity of different attributes with each other, makes theological statements unsuitable for reasoning; hence they cannot be understood in rational terms. In the following I will examine only the first problem, which is the major problem with respect to the question whether divine perfections are determinate enough to be assessed philosophically. As for the second problem, I agree with Alston in that it does not constitute a serious impediment regarding the definite meaning of perfections, even though it constantly reminds us of the imperfection of our thought and expression of God’s perfections.89 After stating Alston’s presentation of Aquinas’ position, I will discuss whether in Aquinas’ theory there is no common meaning in the two predications of perfections of God and of creation. Then I will evaluate, if there is indeed some common element, whether it is a firm enough ground to supply some truth conditions for theological statements and make them suitable for philosophical assessment. The question whether there is a similarity between the divine perfections and the creaturely ones may be the fundamental question which determines whether our knowledge of God’s perfections is determinate enough to fit into philosophical discussions. Even though

88 William P. Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication: A Look Backward and a Look Forward,” in Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca & London: Cornell University, 1993), pp. 167–168. 89 Alston, op. cit., pp. 168–171.

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Alston accepts that according to Aquinas ‘forms of perfections’ are intrinsic in God and creation,90 he hesitates to see a similarity between the divine and creaturely perfection properties according to Aquinas. Alston rejects Cajetan’s interpretation of Aquinas’ theory of analogy as the analogy of proportionality, an analogy based on the similarity of the relationships of two things to a third thing. For example take the term ‘wise.’ ‘Wise’ is predicated of God and of creation analogically, because they bear similar relationships to wisdom.91 Against this Alston argues that the kind of analogy Aquinas sees between God and creation is the analogy of attribution and it is not based on a similarity between God and creation. We must be careful not to read Thomas on analogy in terms of the dominant current meaning of the term in which it has to do with some likeness or similarity between things. Analogically related uses of terms, or the things to which they are applied in these uses, need not be markedly similar to each other. Similarity is only one of the relations that can tie together analogically related senses.92

For Alston, the fact that Aquinas does not attempt to delimit the divine version of these perfections indicates that for Aquinas our knowledge of divine perfections is not sufficiently determinate to use in philosophical discussions. After stating that Aquinas applies various general principles concerning God’s perfections, Alston concludes: “Thus someone who is looking for as full-blooded a conception of God’s knowledge, volition, love, or power as we have of human knowledge, and so on, will be disappointed with what he gets from Aquinas.”93 Alston gives the example of ‘will,’ to illustrate what it could mean to say that ‘God wills P.’ If we say ‘God wills P,’ it means that God “does something of the same sort as what we call willing by creatures, except that it is in a higher mode.” “Understanding the divine sense does not give us as much as we might like to 90

Alston, op. cit., pp. 157–158. See Alston, op. cit., p. 153; Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), pp. 16–17, 22–23. Both authors notice how Cajetan’s interpretation of Aquinas theory of analogy as the analogy of proportionality misrepresents Aquinas’ true intention, and makes his theory of analogical predication closer to univocal predication. McInerny also emphasizes that Cajetan’s interpretation denies Thomas’ caution in ST Ia, 16, 6 saying that the ratio propria is found in only one of the analogates, which is the reason why two instances of the predication of a perfection term are analogical, not univocal. 92 Alston, op. cit., p. 152. 93 Alston, op. cit., p. 159. 91

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have by way of a detailed conception of what it is for God to will that P.”94 Referring to ST Ia. 13, 3, where Aquinas states that perfections are predicated of God literally, and ScG I, 30, where Aquinas states that perfections can be affirmed because of their meaning, Alston claims that ‘as far as the res significata is concerned, Aquinas gives the impression that he endorses univocal predication without using the language of ‘univocity-equivocity-analogicality’.’95 Based on this claim, Alston states that “if the lack of univocity” is attached “only to the modus significandi,” then there would not be any “room for analogically related senses.”96 Later, Alston considers more passages from Aquinas, such as, ST Ia. 13, 2, where Aquinas states that creatures fail to have the forms of their cause as those forms are in God, and ScG I, 32, 2 and 3, where Aquinas states that perfection terms are not predicated of God and of creatures univocally because they do not share the same form according to the same mode of being. Based on these passages, Alston concludes that, in Aquinas’ position, creaturely terms are not fully applicable to God with respect to either “lexial” or “grammatical” aspects of their meaning. “There can be no exact reproduction of form just because creatures have in a divided way what is found in God in an absolutely simple way without any real distinction among the divine perfections.”97 Again, since we can attribute to God only a more eminent analogue of creaturely perfections without satisfactorily knowing what they are,98 according to Aquinas’ position we would not sufficiently know what the divine perfections are so that we can consider them philosophically. Not being satisfied with Aquinas’ position, Alston offers his own suggestion, which would make theological statements more determinate, providing them with truth conditions. He argues that it is possible to form concepts that are univocally predicated of God and creation. In elaborating his position, Alston first examines passages 94

Alston, op. cit., pp. 160–161. Alston, op. cit., p. 164. 96 Alston, op. cit., p. 165. Although Alston acknowledges that a term cannot have lexical meaning without also having a mode of signification, here he takes Aquinas to be arguing for univocal predication. But Aquinas only says that as far as the res significata is concerned they are predicated of God literally not metaphorically. Literal predication, according to Aquinas, includes not only univocal predication, but also analogical and equivocal predication, and is the opposite of metaphorical predication. 97 Alston, op. cit., pp. 166–167. 98 Ibid. 95

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from De veritate II, 11, ScG I, 32, 2 and ST Ia. 13, 5, and he concludes that in all these passages Aquinas concludes from, “God and creature do not share exactly the same forms” that “No terms can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.” The reason why Aquinas makes this argument, as Alston states, is that for Aquinas “terms signify immediately our concepts, and through them the things of which these are concepts, this claim is based on the assumption that our concepts reflect precisely the ontological character of their objects.”99 Later, Alston also underscores that the close connection between concepts and the ontological character of the objects, through whose knowledge these concepts are formed, may not be in conformity with Aquinas’ theory of how we come to name God. Since we first know perfections through creatures and then realize that these perfections primarily belong to God, if our concepts were closely tied to their objects, then it would be impossible for us to attribute these perfections to God, as it would call for separating them from their creaturely features.100 Contrary to Alston’s reluctance, I think that on Aquinas’ part there is some similarity between the divine and creaturely perfections, no matter whether we call it analogy of attribution or not. This assertion can be supported by three arguments. First, if there were no similarity at all between divine and creaturely perfections, then (i) we would be left only with saying that God is the cause of this or that perfection, and (ii) we could no longer talk about God and his perfections. We could not know what they mean. However, Aquinas rejects that predicating perfections of God simply means that God is their cause and he talks about divine perfections and their implications throughout his works. For example, he argues from the fact that ‘God has knowledge’ to that ‘God has will.’ The second argument is based on the idea that perfection properties are intrinsic to both God and creation. As Alston himself notices, “The causality here is of such a sort as to involve transmission of form ( perfection) from cause to effect.”101 Although the mode of their realization in God and creatures is different, they are the same perfections. Leaving aside for now the discussion concerning the nature of this difference, let me state my third argument, which is based on Aquinas’ contention that 99 100 101

Alston, op. cit., pp. 174–175. Alston, op. cit., pp. 177–178. Alston, op. cit., p. 157.

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we predicate perfections of God, these perfections being known through creatures. Although, according to Aquinas, ‘ontologically’ or ‘causally’ these perfections belong to God primarily, ‘semantically,’ they are said primarily of creatures. We know these perfections first in creatures, and then apply them to God, but we acknowledge that they belong ontologically to God primarily and ‘in a higher mode.’ If there were not a similarity between the divine perfections and the creaturely ones, then we could not attribute them to God except by blind faith. We would not be able to conceive of even a nominal similarity between them, because we do not know the divine perfections in themselves and we cannot judge exactly how the names of creaturely perfections are suitable to name God’s perfections. Even though these names are names of perfections, we would not know if they denote simply creaturely perfections or not. Thus Aquinas’ theory of analogy requires a similarity between the divine and creaturely perfections from the start. Now I would like to turn to the question whether the similarity between divine perfections and creaturely perfections is firm enough as to provide us with a determinate conception of divine perfections so that they are suitable for philosophical discussions, permitting inferences from and implications of them. The fact that Aquinas does not attempt to explain what the ‘divine versions’ of perfections look like is a direct result of his position on how, or why, divine perfections are different from creaturely perfections. Whether we reduce it to simplicity or explicitly refer to other “formal features,” such as necessity, infinity and eternity, it is the divine mode of being that prevents human beings from knowing what the ‘divine versions’ of perfections are like. Since this kind of knowledge of God is in no way open to the mind of a philosopher, any attempt from Aquinas’ side would show an inconsistency. However, the fact that he does not present “full-blooded” conceptions of the divine perfections does not mean that the divine perfections as we know and talk about them are indeterminate. It only shows that our knowledge of the divine perfections is imperfect in the sense that it lacks the full grasp of God—comprehending God in himself. But from this one cannot conclude that the knowledge we claim to have of God is or must be indeterminate in such a way that makes it unsuitable for philosophical assessment. Alston’s claim—based on ST Ia. 13, 3, where Aquinas states that perfections are predicated of God literally—that “as far as the res

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significata is concerned, Aquinas gives the impression that he endorses univocal predication without using the language of ‘univocity-equivocity-analogicality”102 is an important statement that needs to be discussed. It is true that Thomas uses perfection terms for God and creation with the same res significata literally. But I would not agree with Alston that Aquinas is not aware of the implications of his argument. Aquinas would not accept the position that perfection terms are predicated of God and creation univocally, even though they, on Aquinas’ understanding, have literal and similar meanings in their predication of God and of creation such that divine perfections are as determinate as creaturely perfections are for us. From the way Alston presents univocity, it follows that univocity is determined only on the basis of the res significata. Of course one can take such a position, but according to Aquinas both the res significata and the modus significandi are required in determining whether a perfection term is predicated analogically or univocally.103 From Alston’s presentation of Aquinas’ position, we receive the impression that there is an incoherence between Aquinas’ statements in ST Ia. 13, 3, ScG I, 30, and his statements in ST Ia. 13, 2, ScG I, 32, 2 and 3. As Alston presents them, while in the first group of passages Aquinas seems to be accepting the univocal predication of perfection terms of God and creatures as far as res significata is concerned (as explained in the previous paragraph), in the second group of passages Aquinas seems to argue that there can be univocal predication of terms between God and creation neither with respect to the modus significandi nor with respect to the res significata. In order to confirm that there is in fact no discrepancy in what Aquinas argues in different parts of his work, we need to highlight Aquinas’ conception of analogical predication and its difference from univocal predication. Aquinas distinguishes between analogical and univocal predications on the basis of the ratio propria. If the ratio propria of a term is found in both subjects when a term is predicated of two different things, then it is a univocal predication. If, however, the ratio propria is found only in one of the analogates and not all, then it is a case of analogical predication.104 As opposed to a uni102

Alston, op. cit., p. 164. See Ralph McInerny, Being and Predication (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1986), p. 282. 104 Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia. 16, 6. See also Ralph McInerny, Being and Predication, p. 281. 103

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vocally predicated term, which has one and the same meaning (ratio) throughout all its predications, an analogically predicated term has different meanings (ratio) in its different predications, one being the proper meaning and others having somehow divergent meanings.105 Besides the concept of a ratio propria Aquinas also introduces the concept of the ratio communis. A ratio communis includes all the different but related rationes (conceptions or meanings) of the term in its various predications. Ralph McInerny illustrates this by using Aquinas’ recurrent example of health. The ratio propria is found only in one composition of the res significata and the modus significandi. The ratio propria of health is found only in the ‘subject of health.’ “‘Subject of ’ is a modus significandi which if joined with the res significata constitutes the ratio propria. The other notions are fashioned by conjoining different modes to the same res significata. What then would the ratio communis of the analogous name ‘healthy’ be? Perhaps something like: ‘_____health’.”106 Other modes of signifying ‘health’ that could fill in the blank include ‘cause of ’ and ‘sign of.’ Now let us examine what it means to predicate perfection terms of God and creatures analogically, so that we can decide whether Aquinas’ theory of analogy leaves us with indeterminate conceptions of the divine perfections. Based on the above discussions, if a perfection term is analogically predicated of God and of creatures, then the res significata is common to God and creation. When, for example, we say ‘Socrates is wise’ and ‘God is wise,’ the term ‘wise’ in the two predications is not simply identically written and pronounced but has a meaning found in both of analogates. Otherwise the two instances of predication would be equivocal predication, and not analogical. However, the ratio propria of the perfection ‘wise’ is found only in one of the analogates, i.e., in God but not in Socrates. If the ratio propria were found in both of the analogates, then the two predications would be univocal not analogical. The common element

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Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, p. 128. McInerny, op. cit., p. 128. McInerny’s explanation is obscure when he says that it “enters into the other accounts,” and “[t]he ratio propria is ‘the subject of health’.” However, the quotation given above in the text is clearer and coherent with Aquinas’ theory in that in all predications what is analogically predicated is the res significata, and the res significata has the ratio propria only in one of the predications. So the res significata is found with ratio propria only in one of the predications that combines the res significata and “one of ” modi significandi. See also McInerny, Being and Predication, p. 283. 106

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in both predications is ‘wise.’ ‘Wise’, taken as the res significata, is one and the same in both of them. However, this same res significata, wise, does not have the same ratio (conception/meaning) in the two applications. Following the analysis above regarding the constitution of the ratio propria, we may infer that ‘wise’ as the res significata with the combination of the divine mode of being makes the ratio propria of the perfection ‘wise.’ Aquinas’ theory that ‘perfections primarily belong to God’ confirms this result. In order to see the extent to which creaturely perfections help us to understand divine perfections, and to decide whether creaturely perfections help us to reach a determinate knowledge of the divine perfections, the relationship between the proper conception (ratio propria) and improper conceptions (rationes) of perfections must be clearly identified, as does the conception (ratio) of perfections occurring in theological statements. It should be recalled that although perfections with their proper conception are found only in God, perfections are found in God as well as in creatures. In this regard, there is an important difference between Aquinas’ favorite example of analogical predication, i.e., health, and the analogical predication of perfections between God and creatures. In the health example ‘health’ with the ratio propria is found only in the predication ‘x is the subject of health,’ and the form health is intrinsic only to ‘the subject of health.’ We may predicate ‘health’ with the ratio propria of a man and of a horse univocally, because the form health is intrinsic to both of them. Thus, in the health example what causes the analogical predication is the fact that in the subject of health the form is intrinsic, but in the cause of health, health is not intrinsic. Thus, the conception of health found as a form in the subject does not help us much in understanding the conception of health as an effect in the cause, or vice versa. However, in the case of analogical predication where God and creatures are two analogates, the cause that makes predications of perfection terms analogical is not that the form is found in one and is not found in the other. Although God is the cause of perfections in creation, Aquinas denies that when we predicate perfections of God we simply mean that God is the cause of this or that perfection in creatures. God also has perfections. I want to emphasize that perfections are found in both God and creation, as opposed to the health case where the form of health is found only in the subject of health.

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In theological statements, perfections are predicated of God with their improper conception (ratio), not with their proper conception (ratio propria) as they are found in God. Let us remember that we first know perfections as they are found in creatures. Then, we name God with the perfection terms the ratio of which is not the ratio propria, because perfections are found with the ratio propria only in God. Since we do not know God directly, we cannot know and thus name God with the perfections according to the ratio propria. Since we predicate perfections of God, as Aquinas does in practice—such perfections being known with divergent or improper conception—it must be granted that the conception of perfections as found in creatures is applied to God in theological statements. Otherwise, we could not predicate perfection terms of God, since such terms are based on creaturely perfections. In fact, this is what analogical predication is all about: perfection terms with their improper conceptions are predicated of God, but not based on proper conceptions of divine perfections. Theological statements must have the same truth conditions and philosophical value as other philosophical statements, because the conception of perfection terms we predicate of God is the same as when we predicate them of creatures. Aquinas’ conception of divine simplicity, as we have seen, is the major reason why Alston objects to this claim. Since perfections are found in God in accordance with divine simplicity, being identical to the divine essence and to each other, perfection terms as known through creatures would not be applicable to God. Can it really be the case that divine simplicity makes predication of perfections of God indeterminate and thus illsuited to philosophical assessment? How does the fact that perfection properties are found in God in a simple, undivided, manner affect our predication of perfections terms of God, and how does it affect the philosophical value of theological statements? In other words, what does divine simplicity impose on us when we predicate perfections of God? Answering this question will establish the extent of conformity and difference between the proper and improper conceptions of perfections when they are analogically predicated of God and creatures. The question needs to be divided into two parts. (1) Does considering perfections in the light of divine simplicity add something positive to the account of the divine perfection? If it adds something positive, then would this new ratio of the res significata turn out to be indeterminate? (2) Does considering perfections in the light

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of divine simplicity subtract anything from the creaturely account of the res significata, or does it limit or specify the extent to which the rationes of the res significata are applicable to God? If it subtracts or limits the extent to which the rationes of the res significata are true of God, then does this make the new accounts of the res signigicata indeterminate, and thus not suitable for philosophical discussion? For Aquinas, divine simplicity does not add anything positive to the meanings or rationes of the perfections as far as human knowledge of and discourse about God are concerned. Accordingly, Aquinas does not give any positive explanation of what the rationes of the divine perfections would be. Alston also attests this, even though he seems somehow surprised. If taking divine simplicity into account in determining the rationes of the divine perfections can yield some further positive knowledge, then it must be possible for us humans to be able to know what is simple. This is an attainment, according to Aquinas, of which human minds are not normally capable. Since taking divine simplicity into consideration does not add something positive to our knowledge of the divine perfections, we do not have new rationes, with increased positive information of the divine perfections. We do not have new rationes of perfections that would be indeterminate, and hence ill-suited to philosophical considerations. My answer to the second question is positive, and not at all a controversial answer. Taking divine simplicity into account limits and modifies the extent to which the rationes of perfection terms are applied to God. In this sense divine simplicity subtracts some elements that constitute the rationes of the perfections that are first known through creation. This is the case as far as our knowledge of God is concerned, not as far as God in himself is concerned. However, subtraction may not be a good term to express the manner in which divine simplicity affects the conception of perfections as predicated of God. For example, unlike human knowledge, God’s knowledge is not subject to change. While ‘being subject to change’ is subtracted from the conception of God’s knowledge ‘being not subject to change’ is added. Hence instead of ‘subtraction,’ ‘modification’ seems to be a more suitable term to express the effect of divine simplicity. Consequently, since divine simplicity modifies the conception of the perfections, one should discuss whether this modification would make the divine perfections indeterminate. I do not think that the modification of the conception of the divine perfections makes the divine perfections less determinate or deprives

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theological statements of the truth conditions that they otherwise would have. This modification only removes what the divergent rationes of perfection terms imply when they are predicated of God. For example, it removes the changeability, temporality and finitude. One could argue that the void after removal of the creaturely features is filled with new features, such as immutability, eternity and fullness. However, this does not make the conceptions of divine perfections indeterminate, because these new features are either of the same kind as those that are removed—hence they have similar truth conditions—or they do not add something positive the truth conditions of which we do not know. From the discussion above, it follows that the simplicity of God does not make divine perfections indeterminate or less determinate than creaturely perfections. Rather it provides guidelines to distinguish the predication of perfection terms of God and of creatures. There seems to be an unfulfilled expectation driving the arguments for indeterminacy of our knowledge of the divine perfections, This unfulfilled expectation is that Aquinas does not give a positive account of ratio propria of the divine perfections as they are different from creaturely perfections, but simply qualifies them as ‘in a higher mode,’ or ‘eminently.’ As I tried to show above, this attitude of Aquinas is in total conformity with his teaching that we do not know what God is in himself. Otherwise he would have made the mistake of assuming a privilege for himself of knowing what he deems to be unknowable for ordinary human minds. Both groups of scholars, i.e., scholars who view the negative element in St. Thomas’ theology with favor and those who assume a more critical position towards it, mistake Aquinas’ silence about the ratio propria of the divine perfections to mean that since divine simplicity does not provide us with a determinate knowledge of what the ratio propria of the divine perfections is, our knowledge of the divine perfections, hence our expression of this knowledge is indeterminate and hence ill-suited for philosophical examination. However, it is spurious to conclude from ‘divine simplicity does not teach us the ratio propria of the divine perfections’ that ‘if we do not know the ratio propria of the divine perfections, then theological statements featuring these perfections are indeterminate and elusive of philosophical assessment.’ Based on the different modes of being, divine simplicity simply limits human knowledge of divine perfections by indicating to us where the conception of the res significata is not applicable

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to God any more. Consequently, it provides us with a general framework to observe the difference between the creaturely perfections and the divine perfections. Let me emphasize that divine simplicity limits our knowledge of the perfections of God but does not make our knowledge indeterminate. Limited human knowledge concerning divine perfections may be expressed with as much philosophical rigor as human knowledge concerning creaturely perfections. The philosophical rigor of theological statements, as well as its conformity to religious teachings, is insured by observation of the requirements of divine simplicity. Contrary to negative and indeterminate interpretations of Aquinas’ position on theological language, Aquinas in fact attempts to provide a firm basis for theological language so that it may be of philosophical value while doing justice to God’s transcendence. Aquinas wants two things to be granted in our speech about God: (1) A distinction between the two kinds of terms with respect to predication of God and creatures. The first category concerns the terms denoting perfections that cannot be separated from the mode of existence of the creatures in which they are found. The second category includes terms denoting perfections that are independent of or separable from the mode of their existence. (2) Since what we know primarily are creatures, those terms that signify properties that cannot be separate from their creaturely mode of existence can be predicated of God only metaphorically. Terms that signify perfections that are independent of or separable from their mode of existence can be said of God and creatures literally, i.e., their meaning is common to all modes of being in which they are to some extent realized. Thus, they are predicated of God and creatures not univocally but analogically. They are predicated of God and creatures, because their ratio is common to God and creatures, even though their ratio does not fully express God and is not identical to the ratio of perfections as they are found in God. Since semantically we know and express perfections in the creaturely mode, when we predicate them of creatures we do not need to do anything extra. But since they are found in God other than the way they are found in creation, when we predicate them of God we must keep in mind that they are not limited, and are distinct neither from each other nor from God’s essence. The difference between the divine mode of being and the creaturely one must guide us so that we do not draw the same implications we draw from the creaturely mode of existence. We cannot

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say, for example, ‘God will know this and that tomorrow,’ or ‘God forgot this and that,’ because these implications do not apply to divine knowledge. But the fact that we cannot draw the same implications from God’s perfections and from creaturely perfections does not mean that the res significata does not have a common meaning that is true for God and creation. Based on the fact that we can only predicate perfections known through creatures, one cannot argue from that ‘we cannot grasp the whole picture,’ to ‘we cannot or should not expect from our knowledge of God, attained through creation, to meet philosophical expectations.’ One can and should think critically about any claim of knowledge about God attained through creation in order to get a better ‘human’ understanding of God, not in order to comprehend God’s essence. In our discussions of God’s perfections what we discuss is not the perfections as they are found in God, as infinite, ultimate and unknowable, but our understanding of God as revealed through creation and modified through the divine simplicity, immutability etc. Contrary to Pieper’s thesis, I argued that Aquinas’ reminders of the unknowability of God indicate that our knowledge is limited, not that we do not know God at all or our knowledge of God is not reliable. I tried to show that Goris’ strategy to study Aquinas’ philosophy, taken as philosophical arguments, exaggerates Aquinas’ emphasis on the unknowability of God. I postponed discussing Goris’ argument for not assessing Aquinas’ teaching on purely philosophical grounds on the basis of Aquinas’ theory of analogy to my discussions of Alston’s arguments. I have discussed Alston’s position defending that Aquinas’ theory of analogy makes the divine perfections indeterminate, thus not suitable for philosophical discussion. Against Alston’s position, I tried to show that although Aquinas’ theory of analogy does not help us to know the ‘divine versions of perfections,’ predication of perfections of God is as determinate as predication of creaturely perfections of creatures. Therefore, theological statements fit into philosophical assessment as much as other philosophical statements.

Conclusion of Chapter One Regarding our knowledge and discourse about God, there are points on which Avicenna and Aquinas agree. They agree that (1) we do

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not know God in himself, (2) we know God through creation, and (3) we do not predicate perfections of God and of creatures either univocally or equivocally. There is a similarity between Avicenna’s concept of tashkìk and Thomas Aquinas’ concept of analogical predication. Avicenna’s use of the term ‘tashkìk’ —expressing predication of perfections of God and of creatures—conforms to Aquinas’ use of analogy, in the sense that it excludes univocal predication and acknowledges an order between God and creatures with regard to having perfections, God being the source of perfections of creatures. In other respects, Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions regarding theological language diverge from each other. This divergence is the fact that Avicenna’s theory of predication by tashkìk is not a welldefined explanation of theological language and does not play a central role in Avicenna’s conception of theological language, whereas Aquinas’ conception of analogy plays a central role providing clear guidelines regarding how to talk about God. From the ambiguity and scarceness of his discussion of this topic, one can conclude that Avicenna does not seem to intend to develop a theory of theological language, but simply wants to state that properties are not said of God and of creatures in the same sense. This ambiguity may be discerned in his going back and forth between arguing that God’s attributes are either negations or relations and affirming that God has all perfections. He tends to reduce the positive properties to relations, even though his position in the Metaphysics of The Healing and other works may show some variations. Although he does not want to say that God is devoid of perfections, he underlines the relational character of divine attributes as we know them. Out of caution, he wavers between affirming them and reducing them to mere relations. This is why some authors argued that for Avicenna God does not have properties. Even though Avicenna argues, in many places but not all, that the positive attributes of God should be reduced to relations, and that they should not be taken as showing something of what God is, in practice this cannot be the case, because such a position would suffer from the fallacy of equivocation. We may think that Avicenna was fully aware that the perfections attributed to God do not show anything more than that God is the source of those creaturely perfections. If we follow this line, then Avicenna’s position regarding God and his attributes would amount to the fallacy of equivocation and would be meaningless. Such an interpretation does not seem to

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explain Avicenna’s theological discussions, since Avicenna only held that one cannot predicate perfections of God and creatures univocally. However, he was not able to provide a theory to explain how they are predicated of God and creatures. His conception of tashkìk serves only to indicate that they are not predicated univocally but not how they are predicated. As will be explored in chapter 2, he modifies perfection properties in the light of the divine formal features so that they are predicated of God. Unlike Avicenna, Aquinas argues that the perfections that are affirmed of God show what God is, but are found in God supereminently. In ScG, he argues that their mode of supereminence amounts to either a negation or a relation, which seems like a position closer to that of Avicenna. However, Aquinas takes a bolder position in his ST and De potentia, which are written later than ScG. There Aquinas seems to emphasize that perfections are found in God and creatures, and they cannot be reduced to relations. Consequently one can argue, at least, that Aquinas has a more stronglyheld position in affirming that God has perfection properties. Aquinas’ distinction between res significata and modus significandi of perfection terms plays a crucial role in his taking the discussion up a step further than his predecessors with regard to the predication of the divine perfections. Avicenna did not argue that God is devoid of perfections, but the fact that we know these perfections in creatures made him hesitate between affirming on the one hand that these perfections are also found in God and reducing them to relations on the other. This is because the perfections as they are found in creatures cannot be attributed to God, who is the simple, eternal, immutable being. Since he did not want to deny these perfections to God—as he conceived God to be the source of all being and perfection, just as Aquinas did—Avicenna tended to interpret the perfections as relations, i.e., the perfection terms predicated of God in relation to creation. However, Aquinas’ clarification that the way we express these perfections are creaturely, and ‘it is not and cannot be divine’ made it easy for him to argue that these perfections primarily belong to God. This impacts how they handle the relationship between God and creatures. For example, even though both argue that God is simple, Avicenna argues that because of his simplicity God creates only one simple intellect immediately. For Aquinas, it is quite the contrary. Hence, it is an important achievement of Aquinas that he was careful about the limits of human knowledge

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and its conformity to reality. That is, he considered how limited human knowledge is applicable to conceiving the divine reality and expressing it. Likewise, his position allowed him to not expect that human knowledge must conform to the divine reality in order to talk about God with the claim of knowledge. Nevertheless even after arguing for analogical predication, Aquinas prefers the negative way and this shows that his affiliation with Pseudo-Dionysius continued. Both Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ theological statements are well-suitable for philosophical assessment, although they argue that God is ultimately unknowable. Furthermore the fact that Aquinas is a theologian does not justify that his theological views be exempt from philosophical examination. If at all, such an exemption would go to Avicenna, because although Avicenna affirms that properties are predicated of God and of creatures according to tashkìk, he does not have a full-fledged theory regarding theological language. Aquinas, however, does have a well-articulated theory of theological language, indicating not only that properties are predicated of God and of creatures non-univocally, but also including the rules determining how and to what extent perfections of two analogates conform. Since both assume God’s unknowability and since Aquinas has well-articulated position regarding theological language and the value of predicating properties of God, whatever is applicable to Avicenna’s theological ideas is also applicable to those of Aquinas. That is, if Avicenna’s theories can rightfully be subject to philosophical assessment and are philosophically valuable, then Aquinas’ theories, in this regard, are also suitable—even more eligible—to philosophical assessment. I do not see any reason to exempt Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions from being subject to philosophical assessment.

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CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

Attempting to state Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ conception of God, I will discuss their conception of divine formal features and divine knowledge. Accordingly, this chapter comprises three sections, two of them are devoted to discussion of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions concerning divine formal features and knowledge, and one section devoted to the way divine formal features modify their positions regarding theological language. I include a discussion of divine knowledge in this chapter because divine knowledge is closely connected to the discussions of the nature of the creative action as well as the beginning of the universe. Since the divine will as the cause of the universe will be discussed in chapter 3, I will not discuss it here, even though it is in a sense on the same level with the divine knowledge of the universe. A discussion of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ conceptions of God’s simplicity, immutability, eternality and necessity, i.e., divine formal features, seems crucial not only for issues related to theological language but also for issues related to creation. A statement of their conception of divine formal features is important for a better understanding of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ conception of theological language, because their conceptions of divine formal features modify the way they talk about God. Discussion of divine formal features will also help us better understand their arguments regarding the nature of the divine creative action and the beginning of the universe. At first glance, for someone who argues for the sempiternity of the world, i.e., that the universe has always existed, those who defend the temporal beginning of the universe should hold that God is not simple, that he is changeable, and that his knowledge is changeable. One might expect, at least, that Avicenna and Aquinas conceive of God’s formal or nonformal attributes differently, if their position on the question of the beginning of the universe is consistent with their conceptions of God. That is, since Avicenna defends the position that the universe has

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always existed, and Aquinas argues that the arguments for the sempiternity of the universe do not yield necessary conclusions, then either each of them conceives of God in a different manner from the other—so that their conception of God is consistent with their respective positions concerning the beginning of the universe—or they have similar conceptions of God, and regarding the beginning of the universe one of them takes a position that is more coherent. The distinction between formal and non-formal divine properties is based on whether a property says something of what God is, or of how God is. David B. Burrell calls ‘formal features’ the properties that modify the mode in which God has the perfection properties he has. While non-formal properties tell something about what their subject is, formal properties do not directly tell us what their subject is. For example, simplicity, as a formal property, does not tell us about the subject that has this formal feature the way a perfection property, such as will, does. Formal features concern the ontological constitution, or the mode of existence, of the subject. Burrell states “ ‘Formal properties’ are not so much said of a subject, as they are reflected in a subject’s very mode of existing, and govern the way anything might be said of that subject.”1 Besides simplicity, limitlessness, unchangeableness, necessity, unity and eternity are included among the formal features. As opposed to perfection-terms, like good and wise, formal features are treated as negations by Aquinas and Avicenna.2 Avicenna and Aquinas agree that (1) God is simple, (2) God is necessary and immutable, (3) God is eternal, and (4) God has knowledge of himself and creation. Simplicity seems to imply self-necessity, immutability and eternity. That is, if you take one in, then you must take in the others, too. As for (1), God does not have a quiddity in addition to his being; God is an intellect, or intelligent being; the perfections that God has are identical to God’s essence. Regarding (2), Avicenna emphasizes the necessity of God, while Aquinas emphasizes the immutability of God. However, the ontological aspect of Avicenna’s conception of necessity collapses to immutability. Thus, both argue that God is altogether immutable. Regarding (3), although

1 David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sìnà, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame, 1986), p. 47. 2 For Burrell’s discussion of divine formal features, see ibid., pp. 46–50.

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Avicenna does not have discussions devoted to it, both seem to have a similar conception of the eternity of God. That is, God has being in and of himself, God has all his being at once, and is not in need of further perfection. Regarding (4), God’s knowledge of other things, both argue that God has one knowledge, God knows primarily himself, and God’s self-knowledge is inclusive of his knowledge of other things. His knowledge of other things is in accordance with his being, which is simple, immutable, intellectual and eternal. However, Avicenna and Aquinas have dramatically different positions with regard to taking divine formal features into account with respect to theological language. Whereas Avicenna tries to modify the application of perfection properties to God in the light of the divine formal features, Aquinas does not concern himself with it, because he acknowledges that we do not need to and we cannot speak about God as he is in himself. That is, while Aquinas is content with simply removing the creaturely implications of perfections in predicating them of God, Avicenna wants additionally to modify them in accordance with the divine formal features. While Avicenna adopts what I call a reductive strategy, Aquinas follows what I call an appreciative strategy traceable to his well thought-out theory of analogical predication. His ease in talking about God makes Aquinas more comfortable when explaining God’s knowledge of creatures, God’s being a voluntary agent, etc.

Avicenna’s Conception of Divine Formal Features and Divine Knowledge God Is Simple God’s simplicity is arguably the most troublesome attribute for Avicenna.3 Avicenna’s first step in arguing for God’s simplicity is to deny that God has a quiddity other than being. He argues that there

3 One may want to append to the discussions regarding God’s simplicity the discussions regarding God’s unity. Regarding God’s unity, Avicenna and Aquinas may have different positions. Whereas for Avicenna God’s unity means God’s uniqueness, Aquinas argues not only for God’s unity but also for a Trinity of Persons in God. Robert Burns rightly relates Aquinas’ conception of the divine simplicity to his rejection of a Trinitarian natural theology. Aquinas maintains that “it is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason’ since ‘we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction

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is no composition of existence and quiddity in God.4 However, whether he absolutely denies that God has a quiddity at all, or he argues that God’s quiddity is identical to his being is unclear.5 Since for Avicenna God is ‘necessary of being’ (wàjib al-wujùd ), he tries to show that ‘necessity of being’ (wujùb al-wujùd ) cannot be a quiddity for God such that it is distinct from God’s being. If ‘necessity of being’ were taken as a quiddity, then the ‘necessary being’ would not have existence, since quiddities do not, in themselves, have existence. But the necessary being is supposed to be existent and be the origin of the existence of other things.6 If the necessary being had an existence different from its quiddity, i.e., ‘necessity of being,’ and

of the persons’” (ST, 1a. 32.1). See Robert Burns, “The Divine Simplicity in St Thomas,” Religious Studies 25 (1989), pp. 271–293, p. 271. Hence Aquinas’ discussion of the creation insofar as it is within the limits of natural reason pertains only to God as one. His position regarding the Trinity does not affect his discussions concerning his arguments on creation, as, for example, simplicity affects them. This is because whether the universe has temporal beginning or not is affirmed or denied of one God as a simple being inasmuch as God is known through natural reason. Hence, I will not enter into their conception of God’s unity. For Avicenna’s discussion that God must be one, unique, without a similar, an associate, or an opposite, see Metaphysics VIII.5, pp. 349–351. 4 I want to use the term quiddity instead of ‘essence’ to denote ‘that which is’ (màhiyya). The main reason for this choice is that the Arabic term ‘dhàt’ is usually translated as essence. Whereas ‘dhàt’ denotes an individual being and includes a reference to its existence, ‘màhiyya’ is indifferent to existence and applicable to many individual members. This is why ‘the dhàt of x’ can be rendered as ‘being of x’ as well as ‘the essence of x,’ singled out as an object of thought. 5 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 344.10 “The first does not have a quidditiy (màhiyya) other than being (inniyya). You know the meaning of quiddity (màhiyya), and how it differs (tufàriq) from inniyya (being) in [respects] that it differs, from the beginning of our explanation. Now we say: It is not appropriate for the necessary being to have a quiddity (màhiyya), which must have ( yalzamuhà) the necessity of being. Quite contrary, we say at the outset: [to be] necessary of being (wàjib alwujùd ) can be thought of as ( yu'qal ) to be identical to the necessary being (wàjib al-wujùd ), just as the [number] one can be thought of to be identical to one [thing].” In this paragraph Avicenna makes ‘necessity of being’ similar to ‘one.’ Just as ‘being one’ is not the quiddity of anything, being a ‘necessary being’ is not the quiddity of God. Hence God is ‘necessary being’ but does not have a quiddity. For discussions of whether for Avicenna God has a quiddity, see Albert Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles,” Angelicum 52 (1975), pp. 340–384, 541–586; 53 (1976), pp. 184–226; Edward Michael Macierowski, The Thomistic Critique of Avicennian Emanationism from the Viewpoint of the Divine Simplicity with Special Reference to the Summa Contra Gentiles (University of Toronto, 1979, Ph. D. dissertation). In ST Ia. 11, 1, ad 1, Aquinas argues that for Avicenna ‘one’ adds something to ‘being.’ I do not know where exactly Aquinas’ reference goes, but in the paragraph that is translated above, Avicenna assumes that ‘one’ does not add anything to ‘being.’ 6 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 345.6–11.

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if ‘the necessary being’ were the necessarily existing being because of this quiddity, then ‘the in and of itself necessary being’ would be necessary by something else, i.e., by its quiddity. This contradicts the conception of a necessary being.7 Hence the necessary being does not have a quiddity which is additional to its being. For Avicenna, God cannot have a quiddity because self-necessity and having a quiddity cannot go together. Being in a general sense, which is applied to everything that exists, can be an effect, i.e., some beings are caused. But the being that is in and of itself necessary cannot be something caused. Otherwise this being would not be necessary in and of itself. Since, there cannot be a quiddity due to which the necessary being exists,8 the necessary being does not have a quiddity. That God does not have a quiddity extraneous to his being paves the way to the conception of God as pure being. At the end of his discussion of whether God has a quiddity other than his being, Avicenna concludes, “there is no quiddity belonging to the necessary being other than that he is necessary of being. And this is being (al-inniyya).”9 Avicenna confirms that necessity of being is not something other than being (al-inniyya), and his confirmation should be taken into account. First, he states that the necessity of being is not a quiddity of the necessary being and then he explains the expression ‘the necessary being,’ saying that ‘this is being.’ One may want to see a difference between the implication of the terms ‘necessary being’ and simply ‘being,’ such that necessary being has something additional to being. But here Avicenna clearly indicates that necessity of being is not something additional to being, since for him, as a general rule, actual existence is identical to being a necessary being.10

7

Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 345.12–16. Ibid., p. 346.5–8. 9 Ibid., p. 346.11–12. Avicenna reserves the term ‘inniyya’ for God’s being which is identical to his màhiyya. But it is not like the màhiyya in the sense that màhiyya is applied to other things. Inniyya is used in the sense of existence, reality, that-ness. For a discussion of the meaning and the origin of the term ‘inniyya,’ see Richard Frank, “The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term inniyya,” Cahiers de Byrsa (Paris: 1956), pp. 181–201. 10 One may want to distinguish between ‘being’ and ‘being a necessary being,’ and argue that necessity may be considered as a quiddity for God as distinct from his being. But one needs to keep in mind that for Avicenna actual existence is identical to being ‘necessary.’ In other words, whatever exists is necessary, whatever is 8

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After arguing that the necessary being is not composed of ‘being’ and a quiddity that is distinct from his being, Avicenna maintains that God is pure being, ‘is an immaterial (mujarrad ) being with the condition that non-existence and distinguishing marks (awßàf ) are negated of him.’ By this, Avicenna does not want to make God devoid of divine perfections, but he wants to distinguish God (1) from limited beings, and (2) from the being common to and predicated of all existent things, ens commune.11 To illustrate the idea that God is not one of those limited beings, let’s consider human beings. In a man, there is being, and in addition to it there is the quiddity of humanity. Consequently, a human being is a limited being, since it is being ‘with the condition of affirmation (ìjàb) of humanity of this being.’ To illustrate the second, Avicenna uses the example of universals. He contrasts this ‘immaterial being’ to universals. Universals are predicated of many things with some addition. In this sense ‘being,’ as a common ground of all things which is predicated of them all, is ‘being without the condition of affirmation of properties’ but not ‘with the condition of negation.’ Hence ‘being with the condition of negation of non-existence and properties,’ denotes and belongs to God in contrast to (1) ‘being with the condition of not necessary does not exist. For such a distinction concerning Avicenna’s conception of God as necessary being, see Edward Michael Macierowski, The Thomistic Critique of Avicennian Emanationism from the Viewpoint of the Divine Simplicity with Special Reference to the Summa Contra Gentiles, pp. 92–118. Macierowski compares Avicenna conception of God to that of Aquinas. He argues that whereas for Avicenna necessary existence is more fundamental in conceiving God, for Aquinas it is simply ‘being’ without qualification. However, Macierowski misses Avicenna’s point, since Avicenna makes painstaking efforts to argue that God does not have a quiddity, and necessity of being cannot be God’s quiddity after the manner of quiddity in other things. Indeed for Avicenna, God is not the only necessary being, but every existent thing is a necessary being. The only difference between God and other things with regard to necessity is that whereas God is self-necessary—which amounts to uncaused necessity—other things are necessary on account of something else. For Avicenna’s additional arguments, see Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 346.13 – p. 347.2. Avicenna argues that if the necessary being had a quiddity and existed by that quiddity, then that quiddity would have being before being; but this is not possible. Being then would be in need of a quiddity in its own being, which is contradictory. In Book VIII, p. 346.8–12, he argues that the necessary being may be indicated (mushàrun ilayhi ) by the intellect. If he had a quiddity, then this quiddity would be something different from the thing that is indicated by the intellect. Hence this quiddity would be the quiddity of something else. The last argument assumes that the species of immaterial things are confined to one member, and that the self-necessary being is not caused. 11 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 347.9–16. Aquinas expresses the same contention quite clearly in the ST Ia. 3, 4, obj. 1 & ad 1.

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affirmation,’ as well as (2) ‘being without the condition of affirmation’ of properties. As a corollary to God’s being simple or without composition, but pure being, God does not have a genus, or a differentia. Avicenna argues from that God does not have a quiddity to that God does not have a genus. For him, whatever does not have a quiddity also does not have a genus. Genus, he argues, is in a sense a part of things that have it. But since God does not have composition, God does not have a genus.12 If God were to have a quiddity, it would either be ‘the necessity of being,’ or a ‘constituent of the necessary being.’ However, in both cases the necessary being would be subsisting by something ‘not necessary of being.’ This, for Avicenna, is a contradiction.13 The same reasoning, i.e., the necessary being cannot be subsistent by something else, is repeated to show that God does not have a differentia. Being without a quiddity, a genus and a differentia, Avicenna concludes that God does not have a definition, nor can there be a demonstrative proof for God. God’s action also cannot be assigned a reason (limmiyya).14 Accordingly Avicenna asserts that God is not matter and is devoid of the attachments (lawà˙iq) of matter.15 He usually uses this formula in order to support other philosophical arguments.16 God is separate from matter and he does not have a material cause, since (1) material things are possible of existence, (2) matter itself is something potential and (3) does not exist without a form, i.e., only as a composite. To the contrary God is (1a) the necessary being, (2a) pure act, and (3a) devoid of any composition whatsoever.17 12

Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 347.17–19. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 348.1–4. 14 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 348.5–6. Cf. Aquinas, ST Ia. 3, 5. Avicenna’s argument from the fact that God is simple to the fact that God does not have a genus is circular. But the point seems to be not to establish that God does not have a genus, or differentia—and as a result, a definition—on ‘independent’ grounds but to explain the implications of God’s being simple. 15 See, e.g., Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.5 p. 354.6–8; VIII.6 pp. 356–358; God is intellect because he is free from matter. 16 Avicenna’s explanation of what God’s being an intellection, intelligent and intelligible (knowing, knower, and known) means is a good example. Avicenna states that God’s being an intellection, intelligent and intelligible simply means “that from this immaterial being (mujarrad ) the allowability ( jawàz) of mixing with matter and its attachments ('alà"iq) is negated, and this being is taken with a consideration of a certain relation.” See, e.g., Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 368.1–2. 17 Avicenna, Risàla 'Arshiyya, p. 5.15–19. 13

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God Is Necessary and Immutable Whereas Avicenna argues for God’s self-necessity and does not offer a detailed discussion of God’s immutability, Aquinas does not emphasize God’s necessity as much as Avicenna does, but he discusses God’s immutability in detail. However, I am going to highlight the similarity of functions related to their points of emphasis, rather than directly compare their conceptions of the necessity or immutability of God. That is, I am going to argue that the necessity of God in Avicenna’s thinking has a similar function to the immutability of God in Aquinas’ thought. I will take Aquinas’ conception as the basis and argue that Avicenna’s theories conform to Aquinas’ expectations. Avicenna’s conception of divine necessity functions in a manner similar to Aquinas’ conception of divine immutability in setting God apart from creation. For Avicenna, God is the necessary being, the only self-necessary being. Avicenna’s conception of God’s necessity may be reduced to God’s self-subsisting existence and immutability in Aquinas’ approach. That for Avicenna God’s immutability follows from God’s necessity—even his conception of God as necessary being equals Aquinas’ conception of God as immutable18—can be shown through an analysis of his frequent references to God as ‘necessary in all respects.’ For Avicenna God’s being necessary in all respects means that God is fully in act and is free from potency. Similarly, for Aquinas, God’s immutability amounts to God’s freedom from potency. All other things are in some sense potential and liable to change, but God changes not in any respect whatsoever. Hence, God’s being necessary in all respects in Avicenna’s conception of God has the same function as God’s immutability in Aquinas’ system. To appreciate the full-force of Avicenna’s conception of necessity requires a precise statement of Avicenna’s conception of necessity. However, since by doing this I intend to introduce his conception of divine necessity, my discussion of necessity is limited to the modality of being and I will not enter into discussion of the modality of propositions.19 First, I will introduce Avicenna’s conception of neces-

18 The Aristotelian background of Avicenna’s conception of necessity also supports such an argument. For Aristotle’s idea of necessity, see, Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory (London: Duckworth, 1980). 19 For Avicenna’s position concerning the modality of propositions see Allen Bäck’s, “Avicenna’s Conception of Modalities,” Vivarium 30/2 (1992), pp. 217–255; Gerard Verbeke, ‘La dialectique du possible et du nécessaire’, in Avicenna Latinus,

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sity in general terms, and then state his conception of God’s necessity, which distinguishes God from everything else. Necessity for Avicenna is one of the primary concepts that are conceived before everything else. At the beginning of the Metaphysics, Avicenna talks about the primary concepts. These primary concepts cannot be defined in the strict sense, since they cannot be subsumed under anything more known. Avicenna’s examples of these primary concepts are ‘existent’ (mawjùd ), ‘thing’ (shay"), ‘necessary’ (∂arùrì and wàjib), possible (mumkin) and impossible (musta˙ìl ).20 He considers strict definitions of these terms, which can be traced back to Aristotle,21 to fall into a vicious circle.22 Although these concepts are inscribed in the mind a priori, and the conception (taßawwur) of every thing rests on their being conceived before all else, if one wants to indicate ( yadull ) what they are, this will not be a definition of something unknown, but rather a waking call (ikh†àr) for or directing the attention (tanbìh) of the mind by means of a name, or a sign ('alàma). Although they are conceived before everything else, still one may need his attention to be directed to them. However, the name or the sign—which serves to direct one’s attention to them, for some reason or condition—may clarify and be helpful in grasping them, even though they are more obscure in the mind than the primary concepts.23 Hence, for Avicenna, to consider something to be necessary is one of the primary notions which cannot be defined. For Avicenna Necessity and actual existence, imply each other. From among this triplex of necessary, possible, and impossible, according to Avicenna, ‘necessary’ is conceived before (awlà) the other two, because “it signifies certainty of existence.” To say that ‘something is necessary,’ means ‘confirmation of its existence.’24 Moreover, ‘being Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, vol. 1, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain, 1977), pp. 42*–62*. 20 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.5, p. 29.5–6 and I.5, p. 35.3–4. Avicenna uses, in this context, ‘∂arùrì’ and ‘wàjib’ interchangeably, although ‘wàjib’ is the standard term to express necessity. See Metaphysics I.4, p. 25.4–6 and I.5, p. 35 passim. See also Herbert Davidson, Proofs, pp. 289–290. 21 Aristotle’s Prior Analytics I.13, 32a 19–20, Metaphysics V.5, 1015a34, discussed in Herbert Davidson Proofs, p. 290. 22 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.5, p. 35.17–18 – p. 36.1–2. 23 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.5, p. 29.14–16. 24 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.5, p. 36.4–5. (I quoted Herbert Davidson’s translation (Proofs, p. 290)). Avicenna’s enigmatic statement about God’s simplicity makes more sense with the identification of necessity with being. Avicenna states: “Thus there is no quiddity belonging to the necessary being other than that he is necessary of

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is known by itself ’ while ‘non-being is known with reference to being.’ This close connection of necessity to being is very helpful in making sense of Avicenna’s contention that every thing that exists in re is necessary. That is, necessity is assigned to ‘what exists.’25 If necessity indicates existence, then everything that exists is necessary. Or nothing that is not necessary exists. Avicenna takes ‘that which is necessary, i.e., what actually exists, as the starting point from which further implications of the modality of being branch. Avicenna takes ‘that which exists’ into consideration and argues that it can be divided into two kinds in the mind: (1) necessarily existent in itself, and (2) not necessarily existent in itself. The latter cannot be impossible to exist, if considered in itself, otherwise it would not exist at all.26 If everything existing is necessary, and if “possibly existent” things exist in re, then “possibly existent” things are necessary insofar as they exist in re.27 While the self-necessary being does not have a cause28 —otherwise it would not be necessary in and of itself—things that are necessary by something else need a cause necessitating them, i.e., making them exist. Even the non-existence of things that we think to be possible to exist, but do not exist actually, is due to a cause, i.e., the absence of their cause.29 Avicenna’s division of being on the basis of necessity and possibility amounts to three categories, (1) necessary in and of itself, (2) necessary by something else, and (3) possible in itself and not necessitated by something else. However, only things in the first two categories actually exist.30 For Avicenna, it is self-necessity that opposes to possibility. Avicenna’s conception of necessity and possibility diverges from the conbeing. And this is being (al-inniyya).” Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 346.11–12. If necessity signifies certainty of being, then describing God as ‘necessary being,’ amounts to the self-subsisting existence of God. 25 Avicenna identifies investigation into necessity-possibility with the investigation into actuality-potentiality. This also conforms his reduction of necessity to existence. Avicenna, Metaphysics I.4, p. 25.4–6. 26 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.6, p. 37.6–10. 27 Herbert A. Davidson traces the distinction between self-necessary being and the things that are possible to exist in themselves but are necessary insofar as they exist back to Aristotle’s conception of necessary beings. For Aristotle whereas some necessary things do not owe their necessity to anything else, some necessary beings have a cause of their necessity, Aristotle, Metaphysics V.5, discussed in H. A. Davidson, Proofs, p. 291. 28 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.6, p. 38.1–10. 29 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.6, p. 38.11–16, p. 39 passim. 30 Herbert Davidson, Proofs, p. 291.

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ception of Aristotle and al-Fàràbì.31 According to Avicenna necessity, simply taken, does not oppose possibility. Only self-necessity excludes possibility. Consequently, for Avicenna, there is no difference between material things and heavenly bodies or even intellects with regard to modality of being. Although things subject to generation and corruption in the sublunar world are temporal and subject to change, and heavenly beings are not temporal and are not subject to change this does not make any difference between them with regard to their status of being. They are forever possible, if considered in themselves, and necessary on account of their cause as long as they exist. That the duration of something’s existence is longer, or shorter, or that it is sempiternal does not make any difference.32 Self-necessity sets God apart form creation. God is the only selfnecessary being, and all other things are necessary through something else, ultimately through God. Since necessity implies existence, for Avicenna, then self-necessity implies self-subsistence, i.e., having no cause. This self-subsistence, i.e., having no cause, is the necessary condition of simplicity, unity and immutability.33 In addition to God’s self-necessity, Avicenna frequently states that the self-necessary being is necessary in all respects.34 Given this, then for Avicenna the necessary being is also pure act, without any potency. In opposition to the self-necessary being, things that are necessary by something else depend on their cause, and they are composite and potential.35 Independence of and dependence on a cause is what ultimately distinguishes God from all other things. This is in fact what Aquinas’ analysis of immutability amounts to, as we shall see when discussing his account. God Is Eternal As with the discussions of the necessity and immutability of God, Avicenna does not discuss God’s eternity as much as Aquinas does. Despite the difference between Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ discussions of God’s eternity, what Avicenna attributes to God can be matched

31 32 33 34 35

See Davidson, Proofs, Avicenna, Metaphysics Avicenna, Metaphysics Avicenna, Metaphysics Avicenna, Metaphysics

p. 292. I.7, p. 47.10–15; Davidson, Proofs, p. 292. I.6, p. 37.11–18. I.6, p. 37.11–18. I.7, p. 47 especially lines: 16–19.

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to Aquinas’ conception of God’s eternity. Avicenna’s conception of qidam functions in a similar manner to that of Aquinas’ conception of aeternitas. For both asserting God’s priority or eternality amounts to saying that (1) God is a self-subsisting existent, (2) fully actual, without succession, (3) is not subject to change and so not bound to time, but not exclusive of time and temporal beings, because they depend on the eternal God. In the latter sense, God’s eternality is not being atemporal, or timeless, like numbers, but being free from and above time. Although the Arabic term qidam36 does not have the same range of meaning as the Latin term aeternitas, it should be employed as the technical term for eternity, because this term may have the sense of the measure of being just as eternity does. Qidam is not the standard term corresponding to the term eternity in the Latin translations of the Metaphysics of the Healing. Although ‘abad ’ and similar terms are rendered in Latin by eternity, they are not the proper terms expressing eternity in the strict sense.37 For Avicenna the term qidam is not exclusively predicated of God, but is a term which is used to rank things with respect to a certain criterion. For Avicenna it is God’s qidam that singles out God from everything else, although there are infinitely many respects in which qidam may be attributed to things. Aquinas’ expressions attributing

36 The standard terms to express priority and posteriority among things on the basis of a certain criterion are ‘taqaddum’ and ‘ta"akhkhur.’ ‘Taqaddum’ derives of the same radix as ‘qidam,’ which has more or less the same meaning. ‘Qadìm’ deriving of the same radix is a verbal adjective of the first form, with the function of the ‘active participle’ meaning ‘that which is prior.’ Besides the term ‘qidam,’ terms such as ‘dà"im,’ (rendered usually as semper) ‘sarmad,’ ‘azal ’ and ‘abad ’ are rendered in the Latin translation as ‘aeternus’ or ‘semper.’ Dà"im is usually rendered as semper except for it occasional rendering of eternal: I.8, p. 55, line: 69 and IX.1 p. 435 line: 25; dà"iman rendered semper: IV.2, p. 211, line: 22; IV.3, p. 217 line: 43; I.5, p. 36 line: 81; ibid., line: 92; I.7, p. 55 line: 50; dahr rendered aeternitate: IV.1, p. 189 variant reading; mu"abbada rendered aeternae, IV.2 p. 211, line: 14; abadiyyàt rendered aeterna IV.2, p. 211 line: 22; azal rendered aeternus: IV.2, p. 210, line: 4; azalì rendered aeterna, VII.2 p. 366 line: 55; sarmad rendered aeternitate: VIII.3 p. 396 line: 38; lam yazal rendered semper: IV.2, p. 210 line: 7; dà"im rendered semper: VI.1, p. 300 line: 90; qadìm rendered aeternus: IX.1, p. 443, line: 81; abadì rendered aeternus: IX.7, p. 511, line: 89. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, sive, scientia divina, ed. S. van Riet, 3 vols. (Louvain: Peeters & Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977–1983). 37 ‘Dà"iman’ can be rendered in English as ‘always.’ It was interpreted in different ways. Whereas Plato’s texts allow a temporal sense, Plotinus gives a non-temporal meaning to always. For Plotinus it denotes true being. Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1983), p. 112.

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eternity to immaterial substances38 may be similar to the usage of qidam. Aquinas sometimes employs the term eternity to express the mode of being of creatures. Nevertheless Aquinas’ texts are unequivocal that it is God’s eternity that singles out God from everything else. Both ‘God’s qidam’ and ‘God’s aeternitas’ amount to saying that God is the self-subsistent and fully actual being, and everything else owes its existence to God. In this sense, only God is eternal. All other things have a beginning either with respect to their being or with respect to time. The term ‘qidam’ may concern ranking things according to a criterion as well as the criterion itself. The fifth form of the root q-d-m, i.e., taqaddama, of which the term qidam is derived, is used to rank things on the basis of a criterion. “The thing that is prior (mutaqaddim) inasmuch as it is prior has something which the posterior thing lacks, and the posterior thing does not have anything unless the prior thing also has it. What is generally noticed among ordinary people (al-jumhùr) is that which is prior (mutaqaddim) with respect to place and time. [However,] priority (taqaddum) and being before (al-qabl ) are applicable to [vertically] ordered (tartìb) things.”39 In addition to ranking things on the basis of a criterion, ‘that which is prior’ (mutaqaddim) may also mean the criterion itself. For example, if something is prior to everything else in some respect, then this thing is the criterion on the basis of which other things are ranked.40 Priority and posteriority apply to things with respect to being as well. Avicenna considers two ways in which this is applied with regard to being. In one of them, something is the condition of the being of the second thing, although it is not the cause of the second thing, such as one and many. In order to have many there must be one, but the existence of one does not require the existence of many.41 The second way priority and posteriority apply to things with regard to being concerns the causal relationship between two things. The cause is prior to the effect with regard to having existence, since the effect depends on the cause in order to exist, while the cause does not depend on the effect.42 Avicenna denies that

38 39 40 41 42

ST Ia. 10, 2, ad 2. Avicenna, Metaphysics Avicenna, Metaphysics Avicenna, Metaphysics Avicenna, Metaphysics

IV.1, IV.1, IV.1, IV.1,

p. p. p. p.

163.8–11. 164.7–8. 164.12–17. 164.18–19 – p. 165.1–4.

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among the vertically ordered causes and effects there can be a ranking with regard to time, i.e., temporal priority. The ranking in such a chain of existents is in regard to having being. The thing that bestows being is prior to the thing that has existence because of it, and the effect is posterior to its cause since it owes its existence to its cause.43 The priority of God to everything else is not a temporal priority but an existential priority. Since for Avicenna (1) not everything is temporal,44 (2) God is not a temporal being,45 and (3) the cause of being is unlike the cause of movement,46 God’s priority to everything else cannot be a temporal priority. Avicenna argues that if a cause is essentially the cause of the being of something else, then it is always (dà"iman) the cause of its effect as long as the cause itself exists. Such a cause is prior to its effects because it does not owe its existence to its effects, whereas its effects are nothing in themselves, but exist on account of their cause.47 Since God gives being to everything else no matter whether it has a temporal beginning or not,48 the relationship of priority and posteriority that holds between God and the universe concerns being. The cause and the effect are simultaneous either during a period of time, or sempiternally, but the cause is prior to its effect with regard to being.49 When qidam is predicated of God, it means ‘to be without beginning,’ or ‘to be without origin,’ or ‘to be prior to everything else.’ If God is prior to everything else, there cannot be anything prior

43 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.1, p. 165.10–14. For the denial of temporal priority of essential and immediate causes to their effects, see also Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 266. 44 See for example Avicenna, Ishàràt, p. 153. 45 Avicenna Metaphysics VIII.5, p. 354.10; VIII.6, p. 362.1–2; IX.1, p. 373.5. In VIII.6, p. 362.1–2, he writes: “However, the First who is not subject to time and what is true of it (˙ukmuhu) . . .” 46 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 257.12–17. 47 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 266. 48 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.3, p. 342.15–19. 49 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.1, p. 167.1–5 “Thus the existence of every effect is necessary through the existence of the cause. . . . They are together (ma'an) in time or sempiternity (dahr) or something else. But they are not together (ma'an) with respect to having existence (˙ußùl al-wujùd ). That is because the existence of that [cause] is not derived (lam ya˙ßul ) from the existence of this [effect]. That [cause] has existence, but it [i.e., that it has existence] is not derived from the fact that this one has existence. This [effect] has existence; it [i.e., that it has existence] is derived from the fact that that [cause] has existence. Hence that [cause] is prior [to this effect] with respect to having existence.”

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to God’ with respect to being. In this sense qidam is a restatement that God is the cause of being of others, and that he is the self-subsistent being. Avicenna takes qidam to be negation. If God is said to be qadìm (eternal), it is a negation. “It is first reduced to (turja' ) the negation of non-existence of him [God], and secondly it is reduced to the negation of causality (sababiyya) [negation of that God has a cause] and negation of a beginning (al-awwal ).”50 In his Ta'lìqàt, Avicenna gives some explanation of how being is divided on the basis of immutability. The first concerns those things that are in time. These are changeable things, which have a beginning and an end in infinitely flowing time. The second realm of being is together with (ma'a) time, but not in time. This is called sempiternity (dahr). Sempiternity encompasses time, because time springs forth ( yansha") from the movement of the sphere (al-falak), which is a sempiternal being. The relationship of sempiternity to time is the relationship of what is permanent to what is changeable. Although there is no past, present or future in the temporal sense, the human mind cannot conceive it. It conceives of every thing in time. The third category “is the being (kawn) of what is permanent (thàbit) together with what is permanent. It is called eternal (sarmadì). It encompasses sempiternity.” This triple division gives the structure of the hierarchy of beings.51 In sum, for Avicenna only God is eternal in the true sense. He interprets this eternity negatively. The eternal being (1) does not lack being, (2) does not have a cause, and (3) does not have a beginning in any way. Hence God, being the only eternal existent, does not lack any aspect of his being, i.e., there is no succession in God, he does not have a cause, and he does not have a beginning. God Knows Creatures as well as Himself Avicenna and Aquinas have similar conceptions of God’s knowledge. The similarity between their conceptions of God’s knowledge may

50 Avicenna, Risàla 'Arshiyya, p. 7. Avicenna also uses the term ‘azalì ’ (having no end in the past) to express God’s eternity in much the same sense as qidam: “There is also mention of ‘being eternal’ (azalì ), which in reality (˙aqìqat) means that its being (hasti ) has no beginning.” Parviz Morewedge (trans. & commentary), The Metaphysica of Avicenna (New York: Columbia University, 1973), chapter 26, p. 58. 51 Avicenna, Ta'lìqàt, ed. A. Badawi (Cairo: 1973), pp. 141–142.

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be reduced to two overarching ideas. (1) God has one act of knowledge, in which God’s self-knowledge and knowledge of other things are included; and (2) since God knows other things in himself, God’s knowledge of other things is in accordance with his being: (a) intelligible (b) simple, (c) immutable, (d) eternal, but not temporal. Avicenna argues that God knows himself and that he is the principle of other things. That God knows ‘that he is the principle of other things’52 is prone to misunderstanding. For example, if John knows that he is the father of Adam, his knowledge ‘that he is the father of Adam’ does not require that John knows who Adam is, what he looks like, what his thoughts and his actions are, etc. Often God’s knowledge ‘that he is the principle of other things’ is equated with this limited kind of knowledge John might have of his son. However, the relationship between God and other things is not the same as the relationship between a father and his son, or any kind of relationship between two creatures. The closest relationship may be in this respect the relationship between the cause and its effects, even though not every cause and effect relationship conforms to the relationship between God and the universe. Since God has one act of knowledge, God primarily and essentially knows himself. His knowledge of himself is not to be understood in a narrower sense, reducing it, for example, to self-awareness. God’s self-knowledge must also include the knowledge concerning things that are concomitants of God’s being (dhàt). Since God is the only self-necessary being, and everything that exists other than him owes its existence to God’s being, the knowledge pertaining to them must be included in God’s self-knowledge. On Avicenna’s account, otherwise they would not exist. Contrary to conventional interpretations, Avicenna clearly states that God’s knowledge ‘that he is the principle of other things’ includes his knowledge of other things, not simply the relationship of being their principle. In book VIII, chapter 6 of the Metaphysics of The Healing, Avicenna states that God’s knowledge of other things does not derive from those things, but is the result of his knowledge of himself: “Since he is the principle (mabda") of all being, he knows from himself (min dhàtihi ) [i.e., through the knowledge of his self ] everything (mà) that he is the principle of, and he is the principle

52

Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 363.3–4.

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of the existent things (mawjùdàt) that are complete (tàmm) in their individual existence (bi a'yànihà) [immediately], and of the existent things that are subject to generation and corruption first in their species (anwà"ihà) and through them in their individuals (bi ashkhàßihà).”53 Thus God knows things that are not subject to generation directly, as one by one, since their species are identical to their single members. And similarly, he knows first the species of things subject to generation, and via their special form particulars that are subject to generation and corruption. In any case, God’s knowledge that he is the principle of other things does not simply mean that God is a principle, but includes God’s knowledge of other things, because of the special relationship between God and other things. In order to maintain this idea that God has one act of knowledge, Avicenna argues that God knows things in a universal way.54 53

Avicenna, Metaphysics, VIII.6, p. 359.1–4. See also Ishàràt, VII, p. 181. For a further confirmation that for Avicenna God does not only know ‘universals,’ in the sense of genera and species of things, but also particular things see Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 364.7–15. For a detailed discussion of God’s knowledge of individuals according to Avicenna and Aquinas, and the conformity between Avicenna’s position and that of Aquinas see Nicolas Louis Rofougaran, Avicenna and Aquinas on Individuation (Harvard University, 2000, Ph.D. dissertation), pp. 241–261. Rofougaran argues that Avicenna’s conception of ‘dhàt’ (individual essence) includes matter and the accidents of things. Since God knows individual essences, God’s knowledge of individuals includes both their matter and accidents, as Aquinas also maintains. Rofougaran holds that Aquinas’ and Avicenna’s conception of God’s knowledge of particulars is similar, partly due to their affiliation with Aristotle’s philosophy. 54 Here Avicenna contrasts ‘universal’ not to ‘particular’ but rather to ‘material.’ One can distinguish here two things. In the literature, Avicenna’s expression ‘God knows things in a universal manner’ is usually equated with ‘God knows universals’ with the implication that God does not know particulars. In fact, as the context indicates, Avicenna contrasts universality to materiality not to particularity. See Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 359.7–14. Avicenna does not mean that God does not know particulars. Avicenna simply means that God’s knowledge of particular material things is not a temporal changeable knowledge, or sensible knowledge. In this sense, Aquinas would not also deny that God’s knowledge is not temporal, nor is it subject to change, although he criticizes Avicenna’s account for failing to explain God’s knowledge of particulars. For Aquinas’ criticism of Avicenna, see ST Ia. 14, 11. Michael Marmura has written a superb article on Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. His semantic clarifications concerning the usage of the terms “universal” and “particular” are invaluable. However, Marmura’s interpretation of Avicenna’s position comes closer to the traditional interpretation of Muslim theologians that for Avicenna God does not know particulars in the realm of generation and corruption. (Michael E. Marmura, “Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 82/3 (1962), pp. 299–312). Contrary to the traditional interpretation of Avicenna’s position supported by Marmura, from Avicenna’s texts the most one can argue is that Avicenna does not provide a successful explanation of how God knows particulars that are

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The universal way of knowing things is contrasted to the way of knowing things which are subject to generation and corruption, inasmuch as they are subject to generation and corruption. The knowledge of material, changeable things in accordance with the conditions in which they exist must include the material and temporal properties of things. In this sense, Avicenna denies that God would have such knowledge of individuals because, he argues, this kind of knowledge is either sensory, or imaginal (mutakhayyal ) knowledge. As being sensory or imaginal knowledge, it is conditioned by the particular organs which provide this kind of knowledge. Furthermore, since things occur in time, and the knowledge pertaining to them in their material temporal conditions must be renewed, it also requires multiplicity of the acts of knowing. Avicenna concludes, as the affirmation of many actions (afà'ìl ) of God implies an imperfection in God, so does the affirmation of many acts of knowing in God.55 Hence, having a sensory knowledge of things would imply a multiplicity in God, which would not conform to his simplicity. God knows himself and other things in a simple manner without having any multiplicity. Avicenna contrasts ‘to be intellect’ and ‘to know in a simple sense’ to the knowledge that souls have. Whereas in the soul the forms of different objects of knowledge are distinguished, and arranged in a way distinct from each other, in the knowledge of an intellect there is no distinction among the forms of various objects of knowledge.56 What does this knowing ‘in a simple

subject to generation and corruption. But the claim that for Avicenna God does not know particulars is very difficult to justify, given Avicenna’s contention that God’s knowledge is the cause of things. For a detailed examination of al-Ghazàlì’s and Michael Marmura’s interpretations of Avicenna’s position see, Rahim Acar, “Reconsidering Avicenna’s Position on God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” in Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman eds., Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam, (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004), pp. 142–156. 55 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 359.11–12. 56 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 362.17 – p. 363.4 “Then (thumma), it must be known that the First [i.e., God] is said to be intellect, or intellection, ('aql ), it is said in a simple (al-basì† ) sense, which you have known in the book of the soul; and that in him there is no distinction (ikhtilàf ) among forms (ßuwar) arranged (mutarattiba) differently, as is the case in the soul in the sense [p. 363] that was stated in the book of the soul (Kitàb al-Nafs). This is why he knows ( ya'qil ) things all at once without being multiplied by them in his substance, or without that they are formed (tataßawwar) in the reality of his essence (dhàtihi ) with their [own] forms. To the contrary, their forms emanate from him as things known (ma'qulatan). He is more worthy to be an intellect more than the forms emanating (al-fà"i∂a) from his intellect-ness ('aqliyyatihi ). Since he knows himself (dhàt), and he is the principle of

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sense’ mean? Does it mean that God has the knowledge of one single thing concerning other things? And can it be God’s knowledge that ‘he is the principle of other things’ without the implication of God having the knowledge of other things? One may be tempted to think so. This would make it easy to explain God’s one act of knowledge, since for Avicenna God has only one knowledge, and since God’s knowledge of being ‘the principle of other things’ can be identified with God’s knowledge of himself without the implication of God’s knowledge of other things. Avicenna attempts to explain how God knows many intelligible things without his simplicity being damaged, and without those intelligible forms being independently existing things, as Platonic ideas, or without them being placed in an intellect containing them like a substratum. He argues that God’s knowledge of many other things does not constitute a multiplicity in God, because these forms are subsequent to God’s essence.57 Avicenna explains the relationship between God’s self-knowledge and his knowledge of other things on the basis of the relationship between a causal principle and its effect.58 Avicenna’s premises are: (1) God’s knowledge of himself is identical to himself, (2) God knows things after (ba'da) himself through his knowledge of himself. The conclusion he draws from these is: God’s knowledge of himself is the cause of his knowledge of things that are posterior to himself. Even if the relationship between God’s selfknowledge and his knowledge of things which are posterior to him is construed in causal terms, Avicenna does remind us again that the relationship between God and his knowledge of other things is everything, he knows everything from his own essence.” For Avicenna’s discussion of the simple knowledge in opposition to complex or discursive knowledge, see Avicenna, De Anima, ed. F. Rahman (London, New York & Toronto: Oxford University, 1959) V, 6, p. 242.6 – p. 244 n. 9. On the issue of whether God’s knowledge is discursive, cf. Aquinas, ST Ia. 14, 7. 57 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 364.1–6. See also Ishàràt VII, p. 182. The expression that ‘these forms are posterior to God’s essence’ may need some elaboration. What does Avicenna mean by this being posterior to God’s essence? Clearly this is not a temporal posteriority. Can one interpret Avicenna along Aquinas’ lines: ‘other things being ordered to God as their cause’? In any case Avicenna himself states that there is a causal relationship between God and his knowledge of forms of other things. Can this be a strictly causal relationship, or is it just a manner of speaking? 58 This explanation of the link between a principle and its effect is used by Aquinas frequently. Things are included in their principles. Even though Avicenna may not be as articulate as Aquinas is, as we shall see later they have similar approaches.

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the relationship between an intellect and the intelligible forms belonging to it or known by it, as opposed to the relationship between the soul and its objects of knowledge. Avicenna wants to confirm that even if between God’s self-knowledge and knowledge of other things there is the relationship of a causal principle and its effect, there is no distinction among the intelligible forms in God’s knowledge. He knows them all at once. Avicenna also asserts that the intelligible forms are simply relations.59 By saying this, Avicenna seems to deny the existence of these intelligible forms independently of the divine essence and divine self-knowledge, even if he has to talk about them as if the divine self-knowledge and divine knowledge of other things are two distinct things. Hence, the causal relationship between God’s self-knowledge and knowledge of other things conveys here more of the sense of dependency and inclusiveness than the sense of a causal relationship, in which a cause brings about a distinct effect. Showing the compatibility between God’s simplicity, God’s selfknowledge, and God’s knowledge of other things is a frequent concern of Avicenna’s. To this effect, he also proposes that intelligible forms of other things are ‘from him’ but ‘not in him.’ This formula favors an efficient-causal relationship between God’s self-knowledge and the knowledge of other things over a material-causal relationship. God’s knowledge of other things is thus not a constitutive element of God’s self-knowledge but comes out of it. This formula apparently relieves Avicenna in his quest to save God’s simplicity. But it also gives rise to new problems: what does ‘from him but not in him’ mean? Would it force him to postulate those intelligible forms as Platonic forms subsistently existing, or an intelligence containing them and functioning as their substratum? He rejects the position that they can exist subsistently as Platonic ideas or that they reside in an intellect or a soul which functions as their substratum.60 In order to explain how multiple intelligible forms do not cause mul-

59

Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 364.1–6. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 365.8–17. In Ta'lìqàt (pp. 119–120), Avicenna also uses ‘in him.’ Usually Avicenna emphasizes that God’s necessary concomitants are ‘from him’ but not ‘in him.’ Here he says ‘in him.’ He is aware that this is unusual on his part, so he explains what he means by saying ‘in him’: “These existent things are from among the necessary concomitants of his essence. And his necessary concomitants are in him, in the sense that they emanate from him, not that they emanate from something else into him such that he is receptive and has an affection (infi'àl ) . . .” See also Ta'liqàt, pp. 152, 180. 60

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tiplicity in God, Avicenna distinguishes between the emanation of ‘intelligible forms insofar as they are understood by God without any extra condition (bi-là ziyàda) and insofar as intelligible forms exist in re. He states that one should not be concerned with the existence, or more accurately the realization, of intelligible forms in re, because God’s existence does not depend on the existence of other things. Even though God’s essence may be considered in relation to things in re—since God is their principle—God is necessary by himself, but he is not necessary ‘because he is the cause of their existence.’ Avicenna seems to argue that if one considers intelligible forms without being concerned with their realization in re these do not harm divine simplicity. For Avicenna, ‘intelligible forms insofar as they are understood’ are not entities distinct from God’s self-knowledge, despite the fact that his efficient causal model suggests two distinct entities.61 God’s knowledge of other things is in accord with God’s being. To spell out what I mean by this phrase, three points come to mind: (1) Since God is independent of other things and they depend on God for their existence, God’s knowledge of other things is independent of other things. Other things depend on God’s knowledge for their existence. (2) God’s knowledge is eternal and immutable. (3) God’s knowledge is simple and intelligible. I have already spoken about the simplicity of God’s knowledge, and that God’s knowledge of other things is included in God’s self-knowledge, which is also intelligible. All three points are interconnected. It seems that one either has to take the whole package, or leave it all. Avicenna construes the relationship between God’s knowledge and the existence of other things to be such that God’s knowledge of other things is not attained from things themselves, but things exist because God knows them. In explaining his conception of the relation between God’s knowledge of creatures and the existence of creatures, Avicenna distinguishes two different relationships between the object of knowledge and the one who knows: either the knowledge is attained from the object of knowledge which already exists, or the

61 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.1–7. One may question whether Avicenna’s explanation is convincing or not. But it is certain that he knows other things inasmuch as they are intelligible, and this knowledge is, in a sense, the result of God’s self-knowledge. As I will try to show, in Aquinas’ works we come across the same formula: God’s knowledge of himself and other things are not different acts of knowledge. Still God primarily and essentially knows himself.

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knowing subject has the knowledge first and then realizes his knowledge in concrete in the external world. He gives the example of the architect and the building. First the architect has the plan of a building in his mind. Then he builds the building in accordance with the plan in his mind. For Avicenna, “This is the relation (nisba) of everything to the First Intellect, the necessary of being. This is because ( fa innahu) he knows ( ya'qil ) himself (dhàtahu) and what his self necessitates. And [because] he knows from his self (dhàtihi ) how there is (kawn) good in everything. Consequently ( fa) the forms of existent things (al-mawjùdàt) follow his intelligibly known form (ßùratahu alma'qùla) [i.e., God’s knowledge of himself ] in accordance with the order (al-niΩàm) known (ma'qùl ) by him ('indahu).”62 By arguing that God knows things from himself and not from the things themselves, Avicenna is able to assert God’s independence of other things, as well to maintain the eternity and immutability of his knowledge. Avicenna argues that if God were to know things from things themselves, this would imply that God is not self-subsistent but is subsistent because of creatures. Since God has knowl-

62 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 363.9–11. See also Ishàràt VII, p. 181. The kind of knowledge God has of creatures insofar as they exist in re needs clarification. If one thinks that God knows only universals, interpreting Avicenna’s expression ‘God knows things in a universal manner,’ then God does not know particular things, but simply universals, i.e., concepts that are predicated of many particular things. But since universals qua universal, such as humanity, do not exist outside the mind, God’s knowledge of other things, conceived to consist of universals, does not imply anything regarding the existence or the organization of things existing in re. In this context, Avicenna’s position regarding God’s knowledge of creatures— with his emanation theory at the background—as consisting of universals, hence being theoretical knowledge, is contrasted with Aquinas’ position on the artisanartifact model in the manner of practical knowledge. For this contrast see David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sìnà, Maimonides, Aquinas, pp. 72–75 and pp. 86–90. Burrell argues that for Avicenna God’s causation is not quite intentional (p. 73). God’s relation to the world is conceived of on the basis of speculative knowledge (p. 74). N. Rofougaran adopts this same position with reference to David Burrell’s article “Creation, Will and Knowledge in Aquinas and Duns Scotus,” in Pragmatik, Handbuch pragmatischen Denkens, Herausgegeben von Herbert Stachowiak, Band I (Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986), p. 248. See Nicolas Louis Rofougaran, Avicenna and Aquinas on Individuation, pp. 119–220. See also Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 102–108. It is true, Avicenna maintains that God does not know things that are material and temporal with their material and temporal properties. In this sense God’s knowledge of them is ‘universal.’ It is also true that Avicenna explains the existence of the universe with his version of the emanation model. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be true that for Avicenna God’s knowledge of other things falls within theoretical knowledge rather than practical knowledge.

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edge of himself and other things, if he did not know other things from his self (dhàt) then God would depend on other things for his knowledge of them. This would amount to God’s dependence on other things.63 However, such dependence may not be suitable for God, because it makes God’s knowledge of other things similar to creaturely knowledge. It strips divine knowledge of simplicity, necessity, etc. If God’s knowledge of other things were derived from those things themselves, Avicenna argues, this would make God’s knowledge subject to change, as well as making it temporal, in the sense that its truth or falsity is bound up with the flow of time. For example, at time T God would not know that John was born, since he was not born. Then at time T1 God would know that John was born because he was born. God’s dependence on other things for his knowledge of them would also imply uprooting God’s simplicity; as creatures are subject to change, generation and corruption, God’s knowledge of them would also follow the same course. Consequently, God’s knowledge of other things would be like accidents occurring to him and vanishing away from him. This, Avicenna argues, contradicts God’s being “necessary in all respects.” Hence God’s knowledge of other things cannot be drawn from those things, because it contradicts God’s simplicity, necessity and immutability.64

Aquinas’ Conception of Divine Formal Features and Divine Knowledge God Is Simple Aquinas’ position regarding God’s simplicity conforms to Avicenna’s to a large extent. For Aquinas, like Avicenna, God is free of matter and mixing with matter, does not have a quiddity distinct from his being, and does not have a genus, differentia or definition. Aquinas starts his discussion of God’s simplicity with the examination of whether God is a body or something material.65 Aquinas

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Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 358.14–17. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 358.14–17. 65 ST Ia. 3, 1 & 2. As menitioned in the section on Avicenna’s position, Avicenna simply assumes that God is not to be identified with matter, and does not have anything material. 64

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brings in various arguments to reject the position that God is a body, such as God’s being the unchanging first cause of all things, God’s being pure actuality without any potentiality, and his being the most excellent being, unlike any body.66 In addition to God’s not being a body, God also is not something composed of form and matter. One of Aquinas’ arguments to this effect is that God does not have potentiality at all. Since matter is potential, and God is pure actuality, God cannot have matter, so he cannot be composed of matter and form. His second argument to this effect is based on participation. In composite things, form is the component giving that thing its goodness and perfection, while matter participates in goodness and perfection. However, God is good in and of himself, and cannot therefore participate in goodness and perfection. Consequently, he is not composed of matter and form. Aquinas’ third argument is based on the idea that every agent acts by virtue of its form. As God is primarily and by himself an agent ( per se agens), he must be, primarily and in himself, a form. Hence God is essentially a form, not a composite of form and matter.67 God is a form that is not receivable by matter; he is a self-subsisting form.68 After confirming the position that God is not something material, or mixed with matter, Aquinas argues the identity of God with his essence and existence. His treatment of the question takes on a different form than that of Avicenna. Aquinas not only talks about the identity of existence and quiddity in God, but he also talks about first the identity between God and his quiddity (ST Ia. 3, 3), and then about the identity between God and his existence (ST Ia. 3, 4). When dealing with the question of whether in God there is a composition of quiddity, essence, or nature, and the subject, i.e., God, Aquinas states that God, (i.e., the subject to which the form deity refers) and his quiddity, or his nature, are identical. He contrasts their identity in God to their non-identity in material beings. Material beings are not identical to their quiddities because an individual human being, for example, has more than what its essence is, which defines the human species. An individual human being, in addition to its form, has its individuating matter (materia individualis),

66 67 68

ST Ia. 3, 1. ST Ia. 3, 2. ST Ia. 3, 2 ad 3.

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by which it becomes individuated. However, the individuality of things that are not composed of matter and form, but pure form, cannot derive from an individuating matter. These forms are intrinsically individual and by themselves subsistent. Hence, God as a nonmaterial form is identical with his quiddity, i.e. deity.69 In ST Ia. 3, 4, Aquinas discusses whether there is a composition of essence (essentia) and existence (esse) in God. He brings in arguments similar to those of Avicenna. One of Aquinas’ arguments to show that God is identical to his existence is that if God were not identical to his existence, then he must have obtained his existence from his essential principles ( principiis essentiae), or from some external cause. But it is impossible that existence be caused by essential principles as such, because nothing can bring itself into being. Since God is the first cause, there cannot be anything that brings him into existence. Hence, in God existence cannot be other than his essence.70 The second argument is based on the similarity of opposition between self-existence (ipsum esse) and essence and between actuality and potentiality. If God, the self-existing being, had an essence other than his being, then God would have potentiality. Since God does not have any potentiality, then God’s essence and being must be identical.71 Aquinas’ third argument is based on participation. Every thing that exists exists either by itself or by participation. But God cannot exist by participation. Hence, his essence and his being must be identical.72 Aquinas also shares Avicenna’s contention that God is the being with the condition of negation. He registers an interesting objection concerning God’s being unspecified existence. If God’s essence were identical to existence, then there would be nothing to specify God’s being, and everything existing would be identified with God. Answering this objection Aquinas makes a distinction between two senses of ‘unspecified (non fit additio) existence.’ It may mean either that ‘further specification is excluded by definition,’ or ‘further specification is not included in the definition.’ For example, reason is excluded from irrational animals by definition, and it is not included in the definition of animal in general. In the first sense, being with the condition of 69 70 71 72

ST Ia. 3, 3. ST Ia. 3, 4. Ibid. Ibid.

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exclusion of any addition (esse sine additione) is the divine being; in the second sense it is existence in general (esse commune).73 As part of his discussion of divine simplicity, Aquinas also addresses the question whether God is composed of a genus and a differentia. Similar to Avicenna’s position he rejects that God can be composed of genus and differentia. Aquinas distinguishes two ways of belonging to a genus: (1) immediately and strictly as species and members of a species belong to a genus, and (2) mediately, just as a unity and a point both belong to the genus of quantity because they generate number and extension, that is, just as measure is considered to belong to the genus of what is measured. He offers three arguments to refute the position that God can be in a genus. The first argument is based on God’s lack of potency. Species, within a genus, differ from each other by some differentia, and the differentia is somehow an actualization of the genus. Since God does not have potentiality or since God is not the actualization of a potentiality, God does not belong to a genus as a species.74 The second argument is based on the identity of God’s essence and existence. If God had a genus, it would be the genus of ‘existent’ (ens). However, Aquinas states with reference to Aristotle, ‘existent’ cannot be a genus, because every genus has a differentia that does not participate in the essence of the genus. But there cannot be any differentia that is not an ‘existent’ (ens). Hence God does not have a genus. The third argument again is based on the identity of God’s existence and essence. Things that belong to a genus share a quiddity, or a generic essence (quidditate vel essentia generis). But as existent things, they differ from each other. For example both horse and man belong to the genus ‘animal’ but neither of them is identical to ‘being animal.’ Hence things that belong to a genus must differ from their genus. Since God’s being and essence are identical, God does not belong to a genus.75 73 ST Ia. 3. 4 obj. 1 & ad 1. Avicenna has the same contention that God’s being is the being with the condition of exclusion of any addition. 74 ST Ia. 3, 5. 75 ST Ia. 3, 5. “Tertio quia omnia quae sunt in genere uno communicant in quidditate vel essentia generis quod praedicatur de eis in eo quod quid.” Notice here, how Aquinas uses terms ‘quidditas’ and ‘essentia generis.’ Since the discussion of belonging to a genus requires a genus which can have more than one member, Aquinas uses these terms instead of simply ‘essentia.’ This may be an implication that ‘essentia’ is the individual essence when it is said of God, and that it is identical to God; and if we talk about God’s essence, we talk about an individual essence,

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Aquinas states two objections, arguing that God must belong to the genus of substance: (1) Since the definition of substance, a selfsubsisting thing (ens per se subsistens) is most suitable to God, God must be a substance;76 and (2) since measures belong to the same genus as what they measure, and God is the measure of all substance, God must belong to the genus of substance.77 Aquinas’ reply to the first objection is similar to that of Avicenna, who also states this objection and answers it. The substance signifies ‘an essence that exists by itself, not in a subject, if it exists.’ But it does not mean this essence is identical to its existence. In other words, substance does not imply its existence. Hence, God does not belong to the genus of substance.78 God’s being the measure of substances does not require that God be in the genus of substance, since nothing is commensurate with God. As the self-subsisting being God is called the measure of things to indicate that the nearer they come to God, the more fully they exist. But it does not require that God be a substance as things coming closer to him are substances.79 God Is Necessary and Immutable For Aquinas God is necessary and immutable. Unlike Avicenna, who emphasizes God’s necessity, Aquinas puts greater emphasis on God’s immutability but their positions are similar inasmuch as necessity is connected to immutability and eternity. That God is a necessary being is either clearly mentioned or assumed frequently throughout Aquinas’ writings. Perhaps his discussion of God’s eternity in ScG I, 15 and in his tertia via (ST Ia. 2, 3)80 displays Aquinas’ subscription which is identical to God’s being. In this context Avicenna’s statement that ‘God does not have a quiddity (màhiyya) other than being,’ may be more understandable. The essence God has cannot be a quiddity applicable to anything other than God. 76 ST Ia. 3, 5, obj. 1. 77 ST Ia. 3, 5, obj. 2. 78 Ibid., ad 1. For Avicenna’s position see Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 348.5–16. 79 Ibid., ad 2. 80 Aquinas’ third way is one of the much-discussed pieces of Aquinas’ writings. Two issues of debate regarding the third way are: whether Aquinas’ move from ‘if everything is possible to exist and not to exist’ to ‘then nothing would exist at some time’ is justified, and whether Aquinas means logical necessity when he argues that there must be a necessary being.’ Patterson Brown criticized scholars who interpreted Aquinas’s tertia via in this manner, such as J. J. C. Smart, “The Existence of God,” Church Quarterly Review (1955); P. Edwards “The Existence of God,” in A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, ed. A. Pap and P. Edwards (Glencoe, 1957), p. 455;

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to God’s necessity best. God is not the only necessary being, nor is God’s necessity a logical necessity.81 But God is the only self-necessary being and it is this self-necessity that sets God apart from everything else.82 Aquinas also argues that self-necessity implies eternity.83 This self-necessary being must be immutable and the origin of all change.84 In Summa Theologiae, Aquinas offers three reasons why God is immutable. God is immutable, because otherwise God would be (1) potential, (2) composite, and (3) imperfect. Aquinas has already argued that these predicates must be negated of God.85 Aquinas’ argument and C. B. Martin, Religious Belief (Ithaca, N.Y., 1959), pp. 151–152. Patterson Brown, “St. Thomas’ Doctrine of Necessary Being,” The Philosophical Review 73/1 (1964), pp. 77–78. See also Anthony Kenny, Five Ways (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1980). Brown argues that “A large number of commentators have, like Smart, interpreted the first part of Aquinas’ Third Way according to the following schema: (1) If anything exists, then there must exist a logically necessary being. (2) Something exists. (3) Therefore: there must exist a logically necessary being. St. Thomas would have to have been rather artless to defend such an argument. For the most obvious point about it is that the two premises are entirely superfluous. That is to say, if God’s existence is supposed to be logically necessary, then surely the conclusion will stand on its own. Step (3), in short, itself constitutes the rationalistic version of the ontological argument. So, if this interpretation of Aquinas’ demonstration were correct, the Third Way would really be an a priori proof merely masquerading as a posteriori.” (p. 78). Moreover, Brown argues, even in the third way Aquinas argues that there is more than one necessary being. This argument clearly indicates that ‘necessary being’ does not mean, for Aquinas ‘logically necessary being’ (p. 79). This is why Immanuel Kant’s criticism of the cosmological argument, i.e., it is a form of ontological argument, does not apply to Aquinas’ third way (p. 80). Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason, trans. & eds. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge, New York, 1998), A606–607, B634–635. 81 Patterson Brown, “St. Thomas’ Doctrine of Necessary Being,” pp. 78–80. Aquinas’ conception of necessity and necessary being(s), and his use of modal operators is a topic of debate among scholars. Aquinas employs necessity in various ways, and he grants that there are necessary beings other than God. If one does not take into consideration which kind of necessity Aquinas is concerned about on a given topic, one is likely to misunderstand him. For a brief survey of Aquinas’ understanding of necessity see J. J. MacIntosh, “Aquinas on Necessity,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 72/3 (1998), pp. 371–403. 82 ST Ia. 2, 3 (Third way). 83 ScG I, 15, [5]. 84 ST Ia. 2, 3 (First way). Aquinas is more faithful to Aristotle’s conception of necessity than Avicenna. Aquinas places necessity in the nature of things. Necessity and immutability go hand in hand. Unlike Aristotle and Aquinas, as stated in the preceding section, Avicenna places necessity in the cause, not in the nature of things. Thus, something is immutable inasmuch as it is necessary. Patterson Brown, “St. Thomas’ Doctrine of Necessary Being,” pp. 81–85. 85 Aquinas argues for a denial of potentiality and composition in God in ST Ia. 3, ScG I, 16 & 18; he argues that God is perfect in ST Ia. 4. God’s immutability is interpreted as being static by some scholars. For a discussion of both philosophical

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based on the negation of potentiality in God may be considered a modification of his first way. Since God is the first and the source of the being of other things, and actuality precedes potency, and since anything changing is potential, God must be unchangeable. On his argument based on the simplicity of God, in a changing thing there is a part that changes and there is a part that persists through the process of change. So there must be at least two parts in a changing thing. This undoubtedly requires that anything changeable must be composite. This is contrary to God’s being simple. Hence God’s simplicity requires that God be immutable. Another implication of change which is unacceptable to Aquinas is that the changing subject acquires something new that it did not have before the change. This obviously runs against God’s being the most perfect being, having all perfection and needing nothing else.86 Moreover, for Aquinas, only is God unchangeable. Not only material things, which are subject to generation and corruption, but all things including angels and pure forms are subject to change in some sense.87 Aquinas distinguishes two respects that something may be changeable: (1) Something is changeable either because of something else’s power over it, or (2) because of its own potency. All things depend on God’s power and will for both their coming to exist and their remaining in existence. In this respect all such things are changeable. But God does not depend on anything else. In terms of their own potentiality, Aquinas distinguishes two kinds passive and active. Material things are changeable with respect to their having passive potentiality, i.e., their matter is not fully actualized. Heavenly bodies, however, do not undergo substantial change, since their matter is fully actualized. But they change with respect to their place. Immaterial heavenly substances, which are angels, or intellects, are also subject to change with respect to their goal and their place. They may change their goal and choose to do evil. They are also subject to change with respect to place; since they are limited beings, they cannot be in all places at once. Thus, they may change from being in this place to being in that place.88

and biblical objections and attempts to supply answers to them see Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford & New York: Oxford University, 1992), pp. 109–117. 86 ST Ia. 9, 1. 87 ST Ia. 9, 2. 88 ST Ia. 9, 2.

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In all creatures then there exists potentiality of change, either substantially as with perishable bodies, or in place as with the heavenly bodies, or in orderedness to a goal and application of power to different things as with the angels. And in addition there is a changeableness common to the whole universe of creatures, since whether they exist or not is subject to the creator’s power. So, because God cannot change in any of these ways, he alone is altogether unchangeable.89

God Is Eternal Aquinas’ conception of God’s eternity conforms to that of Avicenna in its basic tenets. For Aquinas, God is eternal, and only God is eternal in the true sense, eternity should not be mixed with time and identified as omnitemporality. This is, because whereas eternity is the measure of being, time is the measure of movement. Consequently that which is eternal is immutable and that which is temporal is changeable. However, eternity does not mean being atemporal, or timeless, like numbers, but being free from and above time. Hence, asserting that God is eternal amounts to saying that God is immutable. This ultimately amounts to saying that God is self-subsistent being. On this point Aquinas and Avicenna agree. Following Aquinas’ procedure, let me first state how he contrasts eternity with time before discussing how he understands God’s eternity. In treating God’s eternity, Aquinas adopts Boethius’ definition of eternity.90 Having adopted Boethius’ definition of eternity, Aquinas tackles the objections raised against it. Boethius defines eternity: “Eternity is the instantaneously whole and perfect possession of unending life.”91

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ST Ia. 9, 2. Scholars agree that Aquinas’ position regarding God’s eternity should be located within a definite tradition in Western Christian theology. In some respects it may be traced to ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophers. Within the Christian tradition, Aquinas followed Augustine (350–430 C.E.), Boethius (480–525 C.E.) and Anselm (1033–1109 C.E.). See, for example, Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” The Journal of Philosophy 78/8 (1981), pp. 429–434; Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 103–104. 91 “Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.” Boethius, De Consolatione V, prosa 6. PL 63, 858, ed. E. K. Rand, in H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester, Boethius: The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1973), p. 422.9–11, quoted in Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” p. 431. Understanding God’s eternity and even whether eternity is coherent with the conception of God presented in the Scriptures is one of the areas of serious debate among theologians and philosophers of religion. Stump and Kretzmann’s article, which includes dis90

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Aquinas interprets the parts of this definition of eternity negatively.92 Following Boethius, Aquinas argues that we come to know eternity through time, as we move from the knowledge of composite things to the knowledge of simple things. According to him, time and eternity are opposed to each other in two respects: change and limit. Whereas time is associated with change “as the numbering of before and after in change,”93 eternity is associated with immutability. Change includes succession, because in changeable things one part, or state, follows another. Numbering the antecedent and consequent parts of change gives rise to the notion of time. Based on our knowledge of time, Aquinas argues that we come to know eternity. Eternity, in opposition to time, is what an immutable thing has. Since an immutable thing does not change at all, its mode of existence does not vary at all. There is no succession and no ‘before and after’ in such a thing. As for the second point of opposition between time and eternity, time is associated with things that have a beginning and an end, whereas eternity belongs to something that does not have a beginning or end.94 Aquinas points out that time is attributed to changing things, because changing things can be assigned a beginning and an end. In contrast to time, eternity belongs to unchangeable things because one cannot assign a beginning and end to them. Hence something eternal does not have a limit (interminabile) either with respect cussion of implications of Boethius’ paradigmatic definition, and its historical roots going back to Parmenides (see: pp. 429–434), pioneers the debate in the last quarter of the 20th century. In order to explain the tenability of the conception of eternity of God, they argue for the Eternal-Temporal simultaneity (ET-Simultaneity) with support from the theory of relativity. Their article has received a wide ranging reaction from philosophers of religion and theologians. David Burrell in his article “Eternity” argues that Stump and Kretzmann’s efforts to give a new explanation of eternity hardly goes beyond the traditional conception of eternity. Moreover, where it goes beyond the traditional conception, it has been subject to severe criticism. Burrrell argues, despite all the merits of the article, that it does not make any substantial contribution to the conception or deeper understanding of eternity, because eternity cannot be understood except by one who is eternal. David B.Burrell, “God’s Eternity,” Faith and Philosophy I/4 (1984), pp. 394–402. 92 That Aquinas negatively interprets the components of Boethius’ definition is maintained by Markus H. Wörner, “Der Sinn von ‘Ewigkeit’ und seine Deutung bei Thomas von Aquin,” in Ontologie und Theologie: Beiträge zum Problem der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles und Thomas von Aquin, ed. M. Lutz-Bachmann Europäische Hochschulschriften (Frankfurt: 1988), esp. pp. 93–94 and John C. Yates, The timelessness of God (London: 1990), pp. 39–40, mentioned in Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God, p. 42. 93 Implicit reference to Aristotle, Physics IV, 11.220a25. 94 Reference to Aristotle, Physics IV, 12.221b28.

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to a beginning or with respect to an end, and it does not have succession. Not having a limit, as Aquinas suggests, can be reduced to immutability.95 After clarifying the meaning of eternity, Aquinas argues that God is eternal. For him God is eternal because God is unchangeable. God’s immutability in turn may be reduced to God’s self-subsistent existence. Despite the implications of eternity being possessed by many things—because eternity runs parallel to immutability—Aquinas argues that only God is eternal in the proper sense. Moreover, eternity is not some addition to God, because eternity is identical to his being, or rather to his immutable being.96 The contrast between time and eternity amounts to the contrast between motion and being, which may be traced to ancient Greek thought through Neoplatonic sources,97 a contrast Aquinas makes explicit in ST.98 Whereas time measures movement, eternity measures being. Consequently, insofar as something is not permanent in its being, it is subject to time. Its endurance is measured by time in accordance with its change. Hence it is not eternal. This may also be interpreted in the following way: since God’s being is immutable, God’s being cannot be measured by time. God’s immutability, in turn, ultimately resides in God’s being self-subsistent being. We should recall Aquinas’ argument regarding God’s immutability. He argues that God is totally immutable because, unlike all other things, he is not subject to the power of anything else. Consequently, God’s immutability amounts to his selfsubsistent being. Therefore, eternity exclusively belongs to God, because only God is self-subsistent being.99 It should be emphasized that for Aquinas God’s being eternal amounts to God’s self-subsitent being, although one can find diverging elements in Aquinas’ treatment of eternity. On the one hand the 95 Aquinas ST Ia. 10, 1. Aquinas also states that eternity does not simply imply existence but life. So something that is eternal is living. Living includes activity and simple existence does not. ST Ia. 10, 1, ad 2. Stump and Kretzmann argue that for Boethius something eternal is alive (p. 434). William Lane Craig thinks that they are wrong in their understanding of Boethius’ position. William Lane Craig, “The Eternal Present and Stump-Kretzmann Eternity,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73/4 (1999), p. 525. But it seems that Aquinas understands Boethius in the way Stump and Kretzmann do. 96 ST Ia. 10, 2. 97 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” p. 431. 98 ST Ia. 10, 4 ad 3. 99 This is ultimately traceable to God’s simplicity, identity of existence and essence. See David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God, pp. 49–50.

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definition of eternity (ST Ia. 10, 1), his explicit statements that eternity properly belongs to God alone (ST Ia. 10, 3), and that God is identical with eternity (ST Ia. 10, 2 ad 3) amounts to saying that only God is eternal and nothing else is eternal. His statement that eternity measures being while time measures movement (ST Ia. 10, 4 ad 3), and his statements that God shares his eternity as he shares his immutability (ST Ia. 10, 2 c, and ad 1) imply that eternity accepts gradation. That is, the more something is immutable, i.e., has things that are proper to it, the more it is eternal. In this respect the only thing that sets God apart from all else, and makes eternity properly belong to God, is that he does not depend on something else in his being. As mentioned in the previous section on Aquinas’ conception of God’s immutability, God’s self-subsistent being is what ultimately distinguishes God from all else and makes him utterly immutable.100 Thus what makes God properly eternal in exclusion to other things is that his being is not subject to change because of something else’s power. That is, he does not derive his being from something else, but is self-subsisting being. Saying that ‘God is eternal’ does not in fact express ‘what God really is’ in positive terms. The contrast between time and eternity with regard to our knowledge of them is applicable between temporal beings and God. By negating what time is, i.e., measure of change, we get what eternity is. By negating the properties of temporal things, change and limit, we get how an eternal being should be. But what do the results achieved by negation amount to? Do they amount to a claim about how eternity is, or how an eternal being can act in time? Aquinas’ discussion of eternity is part of the negative dimension of his theology.101 Saying that God is eternal does not express anything positive about how God is, but rather expresses how God is not. God is neither sempiternal, nor timeless. Aquinas clearly sets eternity apart from time. If the difference between time and eternity 100

ST Ia. 9, 2. See also Aquinas’ conception of God’s infinity, ST Ia. 7, 1. Harm Goris considers Aquinas’ discussion of God’s eternity as part of “Aquinas’ project of mapping out ‘how God is not’.” Goris, Free Creatures, p. 42. David Burrell argues that eternity is one of the formal features of God besides others, such as simplicity and immutability. As such, it serves to assert the distinction between God and all the rest. It does not say how God is directly, like other attributes such as knowledge, but it indicates God’s ontological constitution. David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sìnà, Maimonides, Aquinas, pp. 46–50; “God’s Eternity,” Faith and Philosophy, pp. 390–392. 101

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were only that time has a beginning and an end while eternity lacks these limits, then time could be part of eternity. Then eternity would be transformed into sempiternity (aevum, or aeon), or omnitemporality.102 Eternity is also different from time insofar as “eternity is an instantaneous whole whilst time is not.”103 Consequently, argues Aquinas, even if time existed forever it would never be instantaneously whole—one could indicate beginnings and endings.104 God’s eternity should also not be confused with the timelessness of necessary truths. Necessary truths may be immutable, and indifferent to time and change, but they are not eternal.105 If we call the mode of their existence timeless, then eternity does not consist of timelessness in this sense.106 Thus, for Aquinas claiming that God is eternal does not mean that God is timeless, since eternity includes all times.107 Relating the eternal Creator to his temporal and/or sempiternal creatures fuels debates over topics, such as God’s knowledge of creatures, the beginning of the universe, God’s intervention in history, and so forth. Aquinas’ discussion of the difference between time, aevum, and eternity, which is of Neoplatonic origin, runs parallel to the hierarchical triple division of being. It is probably the only text of Aquinas in which we find a similarity to Avicennan texts concerning the issue of eternity. According to this triple division, God is eternal, things which are not subject to generation and corruption (i.e., heavenly

102 Richard Dales argues that early medieval commentators minimized the notion of simultaneity in Boethius’ definition with the consequence that eternity came to mean omnitemporality. Only in the 13th century did the implications of eternity become the object of philosophical and theological reflection. Richard C. Dales, “Time and Eternity in the Thirteenth Century,” Journal of the History of Ideas 49/1 (1988), pp. 27–28. 103 ST Ia. 10, 4. 104 ST Ia. 10, 4. 105 ST Ia. 10, 3 ad 3. 106 Burrell distinguishes between atemporality and eternity: while the former may be irrelevant to time, it does not include having life, but eternity does: “Other things, which for one reason or another, may be unaffected by time, or to which time is irrelevant, may be said to be atemporal (or timeless), but not, properly speaking, eternal. For what eternity adds to timelessness is the ‘perfect possession all at once of limitless life.’ Aquinas makes Boethius’ celebrated formula his own, and in doing so explicates it: the ‘perfect possession’ in question is the identity of the divine subject with its to-be, the absence of any composition whatsoever, and hence a perfect at-one-ness with itself. And such an unrestricted act of existing amounts to ‘limitless life.’.” David Burrell, “God’s Eternity,” p. 393. 107 ST Ia. 10, 2, ad 4; also see, ST Ia. 14, 13.

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bodies and angels) are in aevum, and things which are subject to generation and corruption are in time. Hence, aevum lies between eternity and time, absolute immutability and absolute changeability. Eternity is the measure of a being that is absolutely immutable and is not accompanied by something changeable. It does not have a before or an after, and it is not accompanied by before or after at all. Aevum measures beings like angels which combine unchangeableness of substance with changeability of thought, will and place. It does not have before and after in itself, but it is accompanied by before and after. Unlike aevum, time measures things that are altogether changeable.108 God’s eternity is almost a restatement of God’s otherness from creatures, based on his simplicity and immutability. Only the eternal being in the proper sense is self-subsistent and absolutely immutable. It exists all at once, and includes all times. Aquinas’ position conforms to that of Avicenna in the sense that for both of them God is the self-subsistent and fully actual being. God Knows Creatures as well as Himself Aquinas shares a similar conception of God’s knowledge with Avicenna. Even though there are divergences, they agree that (1) God knows himself as well as other things by one act of knowledge; (2) God’s knowledge of himself and other things is in accordance with his being, i.e., it is identical to God’s being. It is simple, creative and eternal. For Aquinas, like Avicenna’s contention, God knows himself and his knowledge is identical to himself. To establish his claim, Aquinas employs God’s immateriality and actuality. First, he uses the immateriality of God to argue that God is a knower. In a similar manner to Avicenna, he founds knowing on ‘being free from matter.’ Freedom from matter, according to Aquinas, is proportionate to having knowledge. Since God is absolutely free from matter,109 God knows to the highest degree.110 Secondly, he introduces God’s actuality in order to explain that in God the knower and the object of knowledge are identical, i.e., God knows himself through himself. In 108 109 110

ST Ia. 10, 5. See for Aquinas’ argument for God’s being free from matter, ST Ia. 7, 1. ST Ia. 14, 1.

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explaining how God knows himself through himself, Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of operations: one in which the object of the operation is outside the agent, and one in which the object of the operation is inside the agent. Recalling Aristotle,111 Aquinas states that an actual intelligible is identical with an actual intellect (intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu). The object of knowledge and the knowing subject are not identical if there is potency in either of them, i.e., the knowing agent or the object of knowledge. Since there is no potency in God, in God the knowing intellect and the object of knowledge are identical. Like Avicenna, for Aquinas God is intellect and intelligible.112 In God not only are the knower and the object of knowledge identical, but also the act of knowing is identical to them. Since God does not have a form separate from his being—his being is identical with his essence—and since God’s essence (i.e., knower) is identical with his knowledge, God’s being is identical to his act of knowing. Hence in God, the knower (subject), the thing known (object) and the act of knowing are identical.113 Divine knowledge for Aquinas is not limited to God’s self-knowledge so as to exclude knowledge of other things. Like Avicenna, Aquinas locates God’s knowledge of other things within God’s selfknowledge. Since other things are the effects of God that fall within God’s creative power, in order for God’s self-knowledge to be perfect, the knowledge of the effects of his power must be included within God’s self-knowledge. Since God knows other things in himself but not in themselves as they exist in re, the manner they are found in God’s knowledge is in accordance with the manner in which God exists, i.e., immaterially and simply, etc.114 Since God is simple, he must have one act of knowing, which includes both his selfknowledge and knowledge of other things.

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Aristotle, De Anima III, 2.426a16; De Anima III, 4. 430a3. ST Ia. 14, 2. 113 ST Ia. 14, 4. One can see the similarity between Aquinas’ position and that of Avicenna, if Avicenna’s triplet is recalled. God is intellect/intellection ('aql ), intelligent ('àqil ), and the object of intellection (ma'qùl ), or act of knowing, knower, and the object of knowledge. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 357.3–9. 114 ST Ia. 14, 5. In ScG I, Aquinas’ presentation of his position seems closer to the way Avicenna expresses his position. Aquinas states that God primarily and essentially knows himself, and through his self-knowledge also knows other things. One does not see an important change in both Summas regarding this question, except that his wording in ScG reveals more affinity to Avicenna’s expression. ScG I, 49. See also ST Ia. 14, 14; ScG I, 48 [7] and [8]. 112

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Another argument for the oneness of God’s knowledge can be found in Aquinas’ discussion of whether God can have speculative knowledge. God’s knowledge of things, as a master plan of things existing in re, is practical knowledge, but it is not only practical but also speculative. This is a subtle point that one does not see explicitly in Avicenna. Aquinas argues that one and the same knowledge can be both speculative and practical in different respects. Knowledge, he contends, is speculative if its aim is consideration of truth, and but not producing something based on this knowledge. However, knowledge can be in one respect speculative and in another respect practical. God’s knowledge of himself is speculative knowledge, since another God cannot be produced. God has, however, both speculative and practical knowledge of created things, given that in addition to the things that he created there are things that God could create but he has not created and will not create.115 Ultimately God’s speculative and practical knowledge of things is subsumed within his knowledge of himself. It is true that, because of his perfect knowledge, God knows things as they are producible (operabilia). However, given that God knows things other than himself in himself, and that God’s knowledge of himself is speculative knowledge, ultimately God’s knowledge of other things is also speculative.116 Hence God has one act of knowledge, i.e., his self-knowledge, which includes his knowledge of other things. Just as Avicenna felt the need to explain how God could know many things at once without having many acts of knowledge, Aquinas discusses whether God’s knowledge is discursive. He argues that God knows other things not from themselves, but in himself. Consequently, his knowledge of other things is not discursive in the sense of having pieces of knowledge succeeding one another. God knows everything at once.117 One may compare God’s being the cause of things and having knowledge of things to human knowledge of things based on a cause-effect relationship. Aquinas considers the objection that, insofar as human experience goes, knowing effects through their causes is discursive. Therefore if God knows other things through himself because he is their cause, then God’s knowledge of other

115 116 117

ST Ia. 14, 16. ST Ia. 14, 16, ad sed contra. ST Ia. 14, 7.

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things must be discursive.118 He explains that God’s act of knowing does not depend on temporal succession, nor does it depend on causal succession. Since God knows other things in himself, by knowing himself he does not consider one effect after another. In this respect, human experience with respect to knowing something through some other thing cannot be applied to God. We know effects from causes but not in their causes but God knows them in their causes, since he is the first cause of everything, and he knows his effects in himself.119 Aquinas’ argument that God’s knowledge is not discursive is largely harmonious with Avicenna’s argument that God’s knowledge is simple, despite apparent differences. On the one hand, Aquinas emphasizes that God knows other things ‘in himself ’ and implies that he does not know them ‘from himself.’ Otherwise it would suggest a similarity to the human knowledge of effects from their causes, and would imply that God’s knowledge of other things is discursive. Avicenna, on the other hand, argues that God’s knowledge of other things is not ‘in himself ’ as constitutive parts of God’s knowledge but ‘from himself ’ as a necessary concomitant of God’s self-knowledge. Both aim at securing the simplicity of God’s knowledge, even though they address different concerns because of the difference in their approach to expressing God’s simplicity, an issue which will be discussed in more detail below. The discussion I have pursued so far, i.e., that for Aquinas God has one knowledge of himself and other things, is also a discussion of God’s knowledge being simple and intelligible.120 What still needs

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ST Ia. 14, 7, obj. 2 & 3. ST Ia. 14, 7. 120 Even though God knows other things immaterially and simply, this does not mean that God’s knowledge fails to contain individuals with their individuality, because, by knowing his essence, God knows essences of all things (essentias omnium). ST Ia. 14, 14. Aquinas devotes article 6 in q 14 to emphasizing that God’s knowledge of other things is not universal, but that God knows things in their individuality. He argues that to know something with its features that are common to many things but not with its exclusive (speciali ) features is to know it imperfectly. So, if God knew things only in their universal properties (in universali tantum), but not individually, then God’s knowledge—consequently God’s being—would be imperfect. Since God cannot be imperfect, God must know other things not only in their universal features but in their proper, individual existence. Another argument Aquinas devises to show that God knows things with their specific properties is based on his theory of participation. First, he affirms that all perfections that are found in creatures are found in God eminently (secundum modum excellentem). He argues that 119

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discussing is the eternity and immutability of God’s knowledge of other things. Even though these can be deduced from God’s knowledge being identical to his being as well, some aspects may need highlighting. the nature proper to each thing consists in its participation in the divine perfection to some degree. But God would not know himself perfectly, if he did not know how other things participate in his perfection. The intelligibility of God’s knowledge vis-à-vis the extension of his knowledge to individuals is one of the topics where Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions are considered to radically diverge. When treating God’s knowledge of individuals in ST Ia. 14, 11, Aquinas’ first objection can be compared to what Avicenna states when he argues that God’s knowledge of material individuals cannot be of material individuals qua material individuals. In fact, Aquinas has also argued that God knows things ‘as they are in himself ’ in the sense that they are known in accord with his manner of knowing, (ST Ia. 14, 6 ad 1), and hence his manner of being, i.e., God is free from matter (ST Ia. 14, 1) and in accord with the way that the intelligible natures (species) of things are included in the divine essence (ST Ia. 14, 5 ad 3). With reference to Aristotle, he reminds us that the mind grasps universals and the senses grasp individuals (ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium). (Aristotle, De Anima II, 5.417b22). For Avicenna’s position, see chapter 2, section 1. Another objection Aquinas states is that matter is the principle of individuation. But matter is pure potentiality, in total contrast to God’s being, which is pure actuality. If matter is the only indispensable condition for material individuals, then God cannot know their individuality. Whereas Avicenna proposes knowing individuals in a universal manner, Aquinas argues that unlike humans who need one faculty to know universals and immaterial things, and another faculty to know individual material things, God knows both kinds of things by his simple intellect ( per suum simplicem intellectum) (ST Ia. 14, 11). Without mentioning Avicenna’s name, Aquinas mentions Avicenna’s example of how particular eclipses can be known through their causes. Aquinas maintains that Avicenna’s effort to show how God knows individuals fails. Aquinas refutes Avicenna’s argument on the ground that the forms and powers that individuals receive from their causes are not individuated except through individual matter (materiam individualem). Aquinas argues, in his turn, (a) since God’s knowledge of things is their cause and whatever exists is caused by God, only things that God knows to exist can exist. (b) And since God is not only the cause of form, which bears the universal conception (ratio universalis), but also the cause of matter, by which things are individuated, God’s knowledge must include individuals. Continuing his explanation, Aquinas reiterates that (c) God’s essence, as the productive principle ( principium activum) of things, must be a sufficient principle to know things not only in their universal natures but also in their individuality. I think one can find all three arguments (a, b, c) in Avicenna too, with regard to God’s being not only the cause of forms but also the cause of matter, God’s self-knowledge being the principle of both the knowledge and the existence of individual things. Furthermore, Avicenna’s example of an astronomer knowing particular eclipses in a universal manner seems to have been misunderstood. Avicenna’s example seems to be intended to be an example to illustrate what intellectual knowledge of particulars can be like. In the Ishàràt, VII, pp. 182–183, Avicenna clarifies his position by noting that particular events may be determined by supplying their particular causes. In this case, a particular material thing may be known with the inclusion of its particular matter. So even if we do not take it to be a simple example, it would be fine, since Avicenna’s point seems to be that God is not something temporal

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In accord with God’s eternity, God’s knowledge of other things is also eternal, i.e., all that is known about creatures is known as one simultaneous whole, embracing the whole of time.121 Having argued that time is something included within eternity, Aquinas continues, God surveys all things as they are in their presence to him.122 In accordance with God’s eternity, God’s knowledge is necessary.123 Aquinas does not specifically discuss the necessity of God’s knowledge in this context, but the necessity of God’s knowledge is assumed, probably because it can be deduced from God’s eternity and immutability. The fact that God’s knowledge is identical to his substance, not something additional, is also the basis for Aquinas’ argument that God’s knowledge is not changeable.124 If one argues for the immutability of God’s knowledge, the immediate objection to this position concerns how to explain the changeable creatures of God in relation to the unchangeable knowledge of God. This is again a concern common to Avicenna and Aquinas. They propose similar solutions as well. One of Aquinas’ objections is as follows: Knowledge implies a

and his knowledge of temporal material things cannot be like the knowledge that temporal things have of temporal things. In any case, in Ishàràt, p. 185, Avicenna states that even if God’s knowledge of particulars must be above time and sempiternity, God knows particulars in a sacred (muqaddas) manner. The existence of particular temporal things is identical to the divine execution (qadar) of God’s primal (al-awwal ) decree (qa∂à"uhu). If they were not necessary, they would not be. This may be compared to Aquinas’ statement in ST Ia. 14, 11 ad 1. Aquinas states that the intelligible species, or likeness, of the divine intellect—which is identical to the divine essence—is not immaterial by abstraction that takes place later on, but immaterial by itself. Thus, it is the principle of essential elements entering into composition in composite things, whether it be principle of species, or be principle of individuation. Hence, God knows particulars as well as universals through this intelligible species, or likeness, which is his essence. 121 ST Ia. 14, 13. 122 ST Ia. 14, 13. Aquinas contends that the eternal presence of temporal things to God does not simply mean that God has their intelligible natures present in himself. The editor-translator of this volume, Thomas Gornall, notes that Aquinas’ contention refers to Avicenna’s position. Aquinas’ manner of explaining the atemporal nature of God’s knowledge may be different from that of Avicenna. Avicenna argues that time is a corollary of movement and things subject to movement. God’s knowledge cannot be subject to time, absolutely free from matter and its attachments as he is. However, it does not mean that time and eternity are mutually exclusive, such that an eternal being does not know anything regarding temporal things or what happens in time. 123 ST Ia. 14, 13, ad 1 & 3. 124 ST Ia. 14, 15.

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relation to the object of knowledge. Since creatures, which are the objects of God’s knowledge, are in time, and creatures are subject to change, then God’s knowledge of them must change as well.125 Aquinas’ answer to this objection is that the reference of God’s knowledge of creatures is not to creatures as they exist in re but as they are known by God in himself. Hence, God’s relation to things as his objects of knowledge does not imply a change in God. In a sense, Aquinas’ argument amounts to saying that God’s knowledge of things is independent of their actual existence in re.126 Aquinas considers God’s knowledge of other things to be the cause of their existence. God’s knowledge of other things, he maintains, is to created things what the knowledge of an artisan is to his artifacts. Just as the artisan makes the artifacts through the form he has in mind, God’s knowledge of other things functions as the principle of his creative action ( principium actionis). However, taken by itself, an intellectual form does not indicate that it will be made to exist outside God’s knowledge. Furthermore, an intellectual form—as something theoretical and speculative—is indifferent to determinate objects, because it includes opposites at once. Aquinas concludes that God is the cause of things by his intellect together with his will.127

Theological Language Revisited: Talking About God in the Light of Divine Formal Features Talking about the simple God in non-simple human terms is one of the places where Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas have quite divergent

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ST Ia. 14, 15, obj. 1. In this context, one must note a difference between Avicenna and Aquinas. For Avicenna all attributes of God are eternal, as God’s being is. Avicenna defends his position by simply stating that God’s existence is independent of the existence of things in re. Aquinas, however, defends his position by arguing that some names are said of God eternally, and some names are said in time. Whereas, for Aquinas, God’s knowledge and love exemplify the former kind of divine names, God’s being Creator and Lord exemplifies the latter kind of the divine names. Whereas the former indicates God’s relations resulting from God’s act that is known to be in God, the latter arises from the existence of things in re, because of God’s action which takes its objects as existing in themselves, but not in God. Hence whereas the former do not accept change, the latter allow change of relation in accordance with the change in things existing in re. See: ST Ia. 14, 15, ad 1; ST Ia. 13, 7. 127 ST Ia. 14, 8. 126

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positions. Simplicity, as I have discussed, is one of the divine formal features acknowledged by both Avicenna and Aquinas. They share a similar conception of the simplicity of God. However, they go in the opposite directions regarding how to talk about God in conformity with divine simplicity, necessity and other divine formal features. Given divine simplicity, on which ground are we justified in attributing to God properties, which we know as existing in composite beings and through our human conditions? How can God have many perfection properties? In the face of these questions, divine formal features play a different role in the positions of Avicenna and Aquinas regarding theological language. In order to hold together divine simplicity despite the plurality and creaturely aspects of properties predicated of God, Avicenna attempts to show that (1) they are ultimately reducible to divine pure being, and (2) they are properties attributed to God in relation to creation, i.e., they do not have to be conceived in the manner they are found in creatures. Aquinas, however, emphasizes the conceptual difference among divine perfection properties, despite the existential unity and identity. He argues that human ways of signifying do not, and need not, match divine properties. This is supported by his theory of analogical predication. In addition to divine simplicity, other divine formal features, such as necessity and eternity, also affect theological language and argumentation. Here the central issue seems to be limited to modifying the meaning of perfection terms. Thus the meaning divine perfection properties and rational assessment of theological statements which feature them seem to be major issues in this regard. For example, we may have to think extraordinary ways to conceive of divine will, vis à vis divine necessity. God does not simply have will, but God has necessary will. As a result, we may not draw all the implications of the property of will but make the adjustments required by divine necessity. Still, divine simplicity modifies the whole approach to theological language, including the manner in which other formal features, such as necessity and immutability, are taken into account. The role one assigns to divine simplicity with regard to theological language determines how and to what extent divine perfection properties are modified by divine formal features other than simplicity. Avicenna thinks that

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divine perfection properties must be considered only insofar as they are modified in the light of other divine formal features. For example, divine will can be considered only insofar as it is necessary. Aquinas however takes divine perfection properties, both in the light of divine formal features and on their own. Concerned with keeping divine simplicity intact, Avicenna takes a reductive and relativizing strategy regarding divine perfection properties, attempting to show how they are reducible to divine being. He argues that divine perfections are said of God in relation to creatures despite his explicit discussions attributing various perfections to God. In explaining how various properties are attributed to God without falling into anthropomorphism Avicenna attempts to show that all attributes reside in one single or simple thing. For him the only property predicated of God in himself is ‘being.’128 All other properties predicated of God either indicate a relation to creation, or consist of a negation denying something creaturely of God. As a result, Avicenna tries to show that all that is attributed to God can be reduced ultimately to a ‘self-subsistent pure being.’ His guiding principle seems to be this: since God’s perfections are all one and simple in being, our conception of God’s perfections should be in accordance with God’s simplicity. Thus differently conceived perfections may be reduced to a simple origin: ‘being with the condition of negation.’129 Avicenna’s attempt to show how all that is said of God is reducible to being can easily be seen in his elaborations of various attributes of God. For example, when he talks about God’s being perfect, he first states that God is the perfect, or complete being, even above being perfect. And he explains ‘being perfect,’ in terms of having being. God is perfect, or above perfection, because he has all the being that belongs to him as well as to other beings.130 The same reasoning is applied in explaining that God is good, and that he is true or real (˙aqq), which are reduced to being.131 God is good not

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Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 367.12–15. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 347.9–10. 130 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.6–10. Aquinas shares Avicenna’s position. Aquinas, ST Ia. 4, 2. 131 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.11 – p. 356.15. 129

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only because he is necessary of existence by himself, but also because he bestows the perfection and goodness of all other things. God is true or real (˙aqq) since he is necessary of being, hence the belief in his existence is true and is always true. He also mentions in passing the correlation between ‘being’ and ‘being in act.’ That is, inactivity is the result of non-being.132 Thus ‘being in act’ may also be reduced to being. Avicenna includes among divine attributes that God is a pure intellect and pure intelligible. His explanation of God’s being an intellect has two implications, one a negation and the other an affirmation. He reduces it to immateriality. God is a pure intellect/intellection ('aql ) because he is a being separate from matter in all respects. Since it is matter and its attachments ('alà"iq) that prevents something to know and be known,133 God is a pure intellect and a pure intelligible. He argues that God’s being an intellect/intellection ('aql ), an intelligizer (knower) ('àqil ) and an object of intellection (ma'qùl ) at once134—or knowledge/knowing, knower and object of knowledge— does not imply any composition. For Avicenna, these three names indicate one and the same thing. They are coined only because of different points of view. One and the same thing considered “insofar as it is a separate entity (huwiyyatan), it is an intellect;” “considered insofar as this separate entity (huwiyya) belongs to its essence (li dhàtihi ), it is an object of intellection belonging to its essence (dhàt);” and “considered insofar as its essence belongs to itself (lahu) as a separate entity, it is an intelligizer ('àqil ) of its essence (dhàt).”135 Avicenna underlines that they, i.e., 'aql, 'àqil and ma'qùl, mutually imply each other. That is, an 'aql by definition is something that has knowledge, or an act which involves knowledge, and is an object of knowledge, etc.136 As they are ‘correlative’ concepts one cannot exist without the existence of the other. As a divine attribute, God’s being an intellect, deserves special attention. This is because, on the one hand, God’s being an intellect is one of the properties that Avicenna reduces to being. On the

132 133 134 135 136

Avicenna, Avicenna, Avicenna, Avicenna, Avicenna,

Metaphysics Metaphysics Metaphysics Metaphysics Metaphysics

VIII.6, VIII.6, VIII.6, VIII.6, VIII.6,

p. p. p. p. p.

355.15 – p. 356.5. 356.16 – p. 357.2. 357.3–5. 357.5–7. 357.13–20.

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other hand, God is said to be an intellect in relation to creation, since divine knowledge is the ultimate source of the existence of other things. As I have discussed above, for Avicenna things exist because God knows them to exist. Thus divine knowledge seems to be at the junction of divine attributes which Avicenna reduces to being and those which he considers to be said of God in relation to creation. Conforming to his reductive strategy, Avicenna reduces divine perfection properties that are attributed to God in relation to creation to divine knowledge. Divine knowledge is in turn reduced to divine being. In this way all divine attributes are reduced to divine pure being. In conformity with his strategy of reducing divine attributes to pure being, Avicenna also argues that divine perfection properties which are said of God in relation to creation are not conceptually different from each other. From the ‘existential identity of divine attributes to the divine essence and to each other’ Avicenna arrives at the ‘conceptual identity’ of divine attributes.137 He argues that divine will is identical to divine knowledge not only in terms of existence but also in terms of conception. He attempts to show how various divine perfection properties are reducible to divine knowledge. For example, to say that God has power means that God knows everything as an intellect and that he is the origin (mabda") of everything by himself (bi dhàtihi ). Avicenna also examines the difference between ‘life’ as found in creatures and as found in God. Life as found in God, he argues, depends on apprehension and action. In the case of human beings, each of these two actions stems from a different source. But insofar as God is concerned, they do not come from different sources, since in God the perfections are identical to his essence. If apprehension and action, which perfect life in us, are identical, then God’s knowledge, God’s willing and God’s act of creation are identical.138 Avicenna’s interpretation of divine attributes, when he explains the existence of creatures, indicates his commitment to the conceptual as well as existential identity of the divine attributes to each other.

137 For the assertion of a conceptual as well as existential identity of the divine attributes, See Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 367.7–12; Najàt, ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut: 1985), p. 287.3–12. 138 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.11–17.

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Avicenna examines the relationship between knowing something and having the power to make it. In case of human beings, knowing something and making it are different. Man knows, but the fact that he knows does not mean that what this man conceives of becomes immediately realized. But as far as God is concerned, since his knowing is identical with his having power to make what he knows to be realized, God’s knowledge of something is identical to his making it. Whereas human beings need to will in order to make the thing that they know, God does not need an additional will to make it.139 Thus we have the reduction of ‘power’ and ‘will’ of God to knowledge of God. Avicenna’s commitment to the conceptual identity of the divine attributes accords with his commitment to consider the divine perfections insofar as they are modified not only by divine simplicity but also other divine formal features such as necessity. As a result of his strategy to reduce all attributes of God to God’s being, he maintains the conceptual identity of divine perfection properties. Given his argument for the conceptual identity of divine perfection properties, Avicenna does not, and indeed could not, emphasize the difference between divine perfection properties. For example, he could not underline the difference between God’s knowledge and will in the manner Aquinas does. For Avicenna, God does not have will but necessary will. Consequently, Avicenna does not distinguish between what there is and what there could be, even though he believes that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and has free will. This can be contrasted to Aquinas’ use of the distinction between God’s power considered absolutely and God’s power as determined to something.140 Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication plays an important part in securing divine simplicity despite the inadequacy of human lan-

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Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.18 – p. 367.2. Aquinas distinguishes between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity in examining the claims for the necessity of the world. His arguments are grounded on his appreciative strategy which does not require that the divine perfections be considered only insofar as they are modified according to the divine formal features, such as necessity and eternity. Lawrence Moonan discusses Aquinas’ distinction between the divine power ‘considered absolutely,’ and ‘considered as determined to something.’ Lawrence Moonan, Divine Power (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 265–295. His discussion recalls Aquinas’ distinction between the divine will considered absolutely, and considered together with the divine formal features. 140

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guage to express it. While discussing divine simplicity, in ST Ia. 3, 6, Aquinas discusses whether God is a composite of subject and accidents. Aquinas rejects the position that in God there can be accidents by arguing (1) that accidents realize a potentiality of their subject, but God does not have a potency at all; (2) that God is identical with existence and nothing can be added to existence; and (3) that accidents are caused by the principles of the subject (accidentia causantur ex principiis subjecti ), and since God is the first cause, there cannot be accidents in God.141 One objection to this is that something accidental cannot be a substance, such as heat is accidental to hot things. Since the perfections, such as wisdom and power, are accidental in man, they must be accidental in God too.142 In his reply to this objection, Aquinas states that perfections, such as power and wisdom, are not predicated of God and of us ‘univocally.’ Since they are not predicated univocally, the fact that they are accidents in us does not require that they be accidents when they are predicated of God.143 The theory analogical predication makes Aquinas able to maintain an appreciative strategy concerning the predication of pure perfections of God. With the theory of analogical predication Aquinas was comfortable to maintain that God is simple, and that pure perfections are found in God and they are predicated of God properly. Certainly, the mode of signification in human language does not compete with the mode in which perfections are found in God, because the mode of signification in human language is proper only to the mode in which perfections are found in creatures. Predication of perfections of God and of creatures are analogical exactly because the mode of signification in human language does not conform to the manner perfections are found in God. Consequently, although God’s perfections are identical to God’s essence and each other existentially, we can talk about them without damaging divine simplicity and without modifying them to the point of being reducible to divine pure being. Indeed, Aquinas argues that these perfection properties differ from each other conceptually, since each indicates God from

141 142 143

ST Ia. 3, 6; De Potentia VII, 4. ST Ia. 3, 6, obj. 1. ST Ia. 3, 6, ad 1; De Potentia VII, 4, ad 3.

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a specific respect. His theory of analogical predication allows Aquinas to maintain that we talk about God without reducing divine perfections to the divine being and without damaging God’s simplicity. Aquinas acknowledges at the outset that neither our knowledge of God nor the way we express this knowledge can conform to God’s mode of being. Hence, he does not feel the need to modify divine perfections in accordance with the divine formal features so that they can be predicated of God. Avicenna, however, has difficulties in explaining how he can maintain that ‘God is simple,’ and also that ‘God has perfections.’ In order to keep divine simplicity intact, Avicenna argues not only for the existential identity of God’s attributes to God himself and each other, but also argues for the conceptual identity of each to the others. As a result, he attempts to modify the divine perfections in the light of the divine formal features by reducing them to pure being.

Conclusion of Chapter Two I have attempted to show that Avicenna and Aquinas share similar insights concerning God’s simplicity, necessity, immutability and eternity. Furthermore, for both of them God’s knows himself and creatures, God’s knowledge of things is the cause of their existence. Moreover, God’s knowledge of things is in accord with how God is, i.e., simple, eternal and so on. Having argued that Avicenna and Aquinas have similar conceptions of divine formal features and divine knowledge will help us better understand and examine their arguments regarding the nature of the creative act and the beginning of the world. Although Avicenna and Aquinas have similar conceptions of divine formal features, they follow very different paths with regard to theological language in light of these features. As part of his reductive strategy, in order to keep divine perfection properties separate from creaturely perfection properties, i.e., to keep them unaffected by the imperfection of human knowledge and talk of God, Avicenna considers divine perfection properties only insofar as they are modified in the light of the divine formal features. Contrary to such a reductive strategy based on divine formal features, Aquinas takes divine perfection properties into account both insofar as they are modified

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by divine formal features and on their own. Their positions with regard to any particular theological-metaphysical question must be understood in the light of this underlying difference. The issue of the nature of divine creative action which is the topic of the following chapter is going to provide a good example in this regard.

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PART TWO

TALKING ABOUT CREATION

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CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION In the first and second chapters I attempted to establish that there is a shared ground between Avicenna and Aquinas on the basis of which one can compare their theories regarding creation. I have also underlined the difference between their positions concerning theological language. In this chapter, I will discuss Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ conception of the act of creation. To be more precise, I will try to identify whether the act of creation is likened to acts stemming from nature or acts stemming from will. According to the prevalent interpretation, for Avicenna God’s creative action is similar to the actions of things acting through their natures. Aquinas, however, is credited with the second alternative. I will argue that this sharp distinction between Avicenna’s position and that of Aquinas regarding the characterization of the act of creation is unwarranted, since they agree on the basic issues. For both of them, (1) God creates by will, (2) God primarily and essentially wills himself, and his volition concerning the universe is subsumed in his self-volition, (3) the universe is not the end of God’s will, and (4) God does not need to create in order to be what he is, i.e., God’s being and goodness do not depend on the existence of other things. However, Avicenna and Aquinas reached different conclusions regarding the necessity of the actual universe, or regarding God’s freedom to create and to choose. For Avicenna there is a strong relationship between God’s being and the actual universe. He argues that all existing things are necessary concomitants of the essence of God. This argument has two plausible implications. The first is the necessity of the universe. If God’s essence necessitates other things, then they are necessary. Thus God has to create. Second, God wills only the actual universe. Or more precisely, God could not have willed a different universe because this universe is necessitated by God’s essence. Aquinas argues, contrary to Avicenna, that since God creates by will and the universe is not the end of God’s will, the universe is not necessary, i.e., God does not have to create. Moreover, God knows himself to be imitable by creatures in infinitely many

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ways. Although this universe is the actual one, God has free choice regarding which things or universe to create. For Aquinas, the universe is hypothetically necessary, i.e., if it is considered together with the eternity and immutability of God’s will. I will argue that the unspecified necessity of the universe in Avicenna’s thought corresponds to the hypothetical necessity of the universe in Aquinas’ system. This can be shown on the basis of their positions regarding theological language, discussed in previous the chapters.

Avicenna’s Position: Creation is Voluntary and Necessary In Avicenna’s account of creation, one does not find the detailed and complex explanations found in Aquinas’ account. This is partly attributable to Avicenna’s reductive strategy regarding our knowledge of God. Since our knowledge of the perfections we attribute to God is derived from our knowledge of creation, he limits himself to what is given, i.e., there is the existing world, which is not selfexisting. He also considers divine will together with how it is, i.e., necessary and immutable. For him, creation is a voluntary act, but the divine will is different from the human will, because it is simple, immutable and eternal. Moreover, the world is not the end of God’s will. God’s being and goodness do not depend on the existence of the universe; the universe necessarily follows from the essence of God, who is a knowing and willing being. Even though God’s will is independent of any factor motivating him to will creatures, and even though God’s being and perfection are independent of the existence of other things, the universe is necessary. Since the universe, considered in itself, is contingent and since God’s being and goodness do not depend on the existence of other things, the necessity of the universe in Avicenna’s argument is the result of his position regarding theological language. That is, since he considers divine perfection properties only insofar as they are modified by the divine formal features, God’s will to create and to create this universe is necessary and eternal. Consequently this universe is necessary. Avicenna usually is considered to have held that God’s creative action is similar to the actions of natural things acting through their natures. This interpretation of Avicenna’s position is supported by his denial of intention to God in creation and by his claim that the universe is necessary. Despite this, for Avicenna creation is a vol-

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untary action. When he argues that God cannot have an intention in creation, he simply wants to state that other things do not constitute a final cause for God. Furthermore, the necessity of the universe does not make the act of creation like the actions of natural beings. Nor does it take God’s freedom away, since for Avicenna the necessity of the universe is neither imposed on God from outside, nor is it required by something internal to God. The existence of the universe, as well as the form the universe takes, is necessary because God is necessary in all respects. In the following, I will first state an interpretation of Avicenna’s position concerning creation shared by many scholars. Then I will introduce Avicenna’s conception of the divine will, and his account of why and how things other than God exist. I will also explore the sense in which God is a free creator for Avicenna, and how he reconciles the necessity of the universe with divine freedom. Without attempting to question the validity of Avicenna’s arguments for divine freedom vis à vis his act of creation, I will rather show how creation is a voluntary action for Avicenna, even though he argues that God has no intention in creation and that the universe is necessary. Interpretation of Avicenna’s Position To distinguish the theistic conception of God from the Neoplatonic, pagan, conceptions of God, some contemporary scholars employ strategic pairs of opposites: necessary emanation versus creation, eternal versus created universe, God as natural agent versus God as free creator.1 In this context, one may easily contrast Avicenna’s theory of emanation to voluntary creation in reference to how the universe comes to exist. Following this contrast, emanation denies intention to the efficient cause and implies the necessity of the effect, whereas creation as a voluntary action bespeaks the intention of the efficient cause as well as the contingency of the effect.

1 For these assumptions see for example, Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas on Creation: Writings on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, Question 1, “Introduction” by translators, pp. 1–20; Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs, p. 1 footnote:1; Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 110–111. Cf. Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981). He underlines the affinity of Greek Fathers to Neoplatonic thought.

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Avicenna is regularly presented as insisting that God creates by the necessity of nature. The term “nature” in the expression “necessity of nature” may be understood as nature in inanimate things like fire or stone. It may also be taken in the sense of the essence or quiddity of anything that exists. In inanimate things nature is the principle of action. They act on account of their natures because they do not have the volition or desire with which animate beings are endowed. Let us take fire as an example. The characteristic action of fire is to burn. Obviously fire cannot refrain from burning. Within the natural order, ceteris paribus, fire acts by way of natural necessity in burning. Avicenna’s position is usually associated with nature in this sense. In a detailed study discussing Avicenna’s theory of creation, Beatrice H. Zedler2 employs the term “nature” in this sense of acting through nature as opposed to acting through will. In this article, Zedler supports the thesis that Aquinas wrote the De potentia as a Christian reply to Avicenna’s theory of emanation.3 Zedler interprets Aquinas’ 2 Beatrice H. Zedler, “Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the ‘De Potentia Dei’,” Traditio VI (1948), pp. 105–159. The idea that for Avicenna creation is like a natural action is the popular interpretation of Avicenna’s position among scholars. In a passing reference, Etienne Gilson, when discussing Duns Scotus’ conception of the function of the divine will and intellect with regard to creatures, writes: “Exterminating Avicenna’s necessitarianism at its very root Duns Scotus proves, therefore, that far from flowing from the first being in virtue of any natural law, creatures could not even have any distinct ideas in the first being without a free intervention of His will.” Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downes (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1991), p. 255. In a similar fashion Oliver Leaman presents Avicenna’s conception of creation, as though, for Avicenna things were planned by something other than God and God said yes and had to do so. Consequently, God plays hardly any part in the existence of things. “For the latter [i.e., Avicenna], God is the ultimate cause of everything which exists, but it is not clear whether, once a thing has passed the test of possibility, God can prevent it from coming into existence. God is rather in the position of a constitutional monarch, who is required to sign the legislation passed by parliament, which makes the legislation ‘royal’, so legal. But all that the crown does in this sort of situation is rubber-stamp, as it were, a decision which has already been taken elsewhere.” Oliver Leaman, A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 44. Although Arthur Hyman does not clearly articulate why the necessity opposes the divine will, he assumes a sharp opposition. He argues that by holding that God created through the divine will, Maimonides disagrees with Aristotle, “as well as with the emanationists, who affirmed that the world emanated from God by necessity.” Arthur Hyman “Maimonides on Creation and Emanation,” in Studies in Medieval Philosphy, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1987), pp. 50–51. 3 Zedler, op. cit., pp. 108–109.

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many arguments as being directed against Avicenna’s teachings, specifically that the world as eternal and necessary presumes that God acts ex necessitate naturae.4 As Zedler argues, Aquinas traces Avicenna’s insistence on the principle: “from one only one can proceed,” to Avicenna’s conception of God’s creative action: God acts by necessity of nature.5 The fact that Avicenna assimilates God’s creative action to natural actions may also be observed from Aquinas’ identification of natural action. Aquinas states throughout the De potentia that “Nature is determined to one effect,” and “explains this as meaning that nature is determined to one thing, both as regards what is produced by the power of nature and as regards producing or not producing.”6 Since for Avicenna emanation is necessary, God has to create, and to create this actual universe. This confirms the contention that God acts by the necessity of nature. Zedler explains away the passages in which Avicenna states that God’s action is not like natural actions. On Zedler’s interpretation, Avicenna’s denial is not directed to the nature of natural things, but rather intends to deny that God’s nature (intelligence) has any part in his act of creation, since for Avicenna, things are concomitants of God. This means, however, that “the production of the world is accomplished almost in spite of Him.” Hence Aquinas’ understanding of Avicenna’s account of God’s creative action, i.e., that God acts by the necessity of nature, was correct.7 Combined with necessity of the universe, Avicenna’s denial of intention to God in creation would, according to this interpretation, confirm the thesis that for Avicenna creation is not a voluntary action but a natural one. Avicenna’s adherence to the principle that “from one only one can proceed” reflects this point. Since for Avicenna God does not intend what emanates from him, the things that emanate from him can only be in accordance with the divine simplicity, which suggests comparing emanation to a natural agent producing an effect similar to it. Thus, for example fire, being devoid of intention, cannot design its effect, but simply produces something similar to itself.8 Since intention is

4 5 6 7 8

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Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

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found only in voluntary agents, if an agent lacks intention, its action cannot stem from volition. This, in turn, implies that the divine knowledge does not have a part in creation. Since willing and intention are based on knowledge, if one denies that God is an intentional or a voluntary creator, then divine knowledge can have no part in creation. Hence Avicenna’s contention that the universe is necessary and that God does not intend anything in creating apparently support interpreting his position that creation is a natural action, and not a voluntary one based on knowledge.9 God Creates by Will not by Nature Before beginning to discuss how Avicenna explains creation of the universe and the role divine will plays in the act of creation, it is proper to state that for Avicenna God’s will is in accordance with his being, following the identity of God’s attributes with his being. That is (1) God’s will is simple; God has one act of self-will which includes God’s willing of other things; (2) nothing else is the end of God’s will, so it does not depend on anything external; (3) God’s will is necessary, eternal and immutable. Avicenna takes the divine will into account only insofar as it is understood together with these divine formal features. Since the divine will is simple, God has one act of will. God primarily wills and loves himself, and God’s willing of other things must be subsumed under his self-willing.10 Besides being simple, God’s will is eternal and immutable, following from his eternity and his being pure act without any potency. Avicenna touches on the eternity and 9 David B. Burrell, siding with L. Gardet, contrasts Avicenna’s theory of necessary emanation to intentional creation, and argues that Avicenna’s and Al-Farabi’s insistence on the ‘from one only one can proceed’ is because of “an insufficiently intentional view of the divine nature.” Louis Gardet, La pensée religieuse d’Avicenne (Ibn Sînâ ) (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), pp. 157–158, as cited by David B. Burrell, “God’s Eternity,” Faith and Philosophy I/4 (1984), p. 395. Necessary emanation for Burrell may not even be counted as divine action. See op. cit., p. 404. I agree with Burrell and Gardet that Avicenna did not pursue the logical consequences of his concept of God as pure intelligible being. But I would not say that for Avicenna God acts by necessity of nature, devoid of willing and intention, because all Avicenna aims at is to distinguish between creaturely volition and divine volition. As will be discussed below, neither for Avicenna nor for Aquinas are other things the end of the divine will. 10 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 363.14–16; VIII.7, p. 366.12–13; Avicenna, Ta'liqàt, p. 157 “God is self-lover”; Avicenna, Najàt, p. 286.8–19.

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immutability of the divine will in various contexts, albeit indirectly, but notably to support the contention that God creates eternally. Since creation can be traced back to the divine will, if God’s will were not eternal and immutable, then God would be subject to change, or, in other words, receptive and in need of something external in order to be an efficient cause. Since God is eternal and since there is no change in God, God’s action must also be eternal.11 If God did not will eternally to create, nothing would be created because this implies a change both in God’s will and in God’s knowledge, due to the identity of will and knowledge in God.12 In fact, Avicenna explicitly argues that creation is a voluntary action, following upon God’s knowledge of things, which follows from God’s self-knowledge.13 God’s will is the cause of the existence and the order of things. However, Avicenna is much concerned lest the divine will should be put on a par with human will. The First knows ( ya'qilu) his essence, and the order (niΩàm) of good existing (al-mawjùd ) in everything ( fì al-kull ), i.e., how it [i.e.,everything] is according to this order, since he knows ( ya'qiluhu) it [i.e., everything] as something emanating (mustafì∂ ), becoming (kà"in) and existing (mawjùd ). And everything that is known to be (ma'lùm al-kawn), and the direction of [its] coming to be ( jiha al-kawn) on account of ('an) its place of origin is known by ('inda) its principle. And it [i.e., everything that is known to be] is good, and is not contradictory ( ghayr munàf ) [to good], since it [i.e., everything that is known to be] follows (tàbi' ) the goodness of the essence of the principle and its perfection, which are loved in themselves (li dhàtayhima). And this thing [i.e., what emanates from the principle] is that which is willed (muràd ). However, the object of volition (muràd ) of the First is not in the manner of our object of volition (muràdinâ ), such that he would have an aim ( ghara∂ ) in what comes to be ( yakùn) because of him ('anhu). It appears that you know its impossibility, and you will know [more]. On the contrary, he is the willer (murìd ) of his essence (li dhàtihi ). This kind of pure intellectual ('aqliyya) volition (iràda) and this life of his, similarly, are identical to him (bi 'aynihi ).14

This passage can be divided into two parts. In the first part Avicenna asserts God’s knowledge of things, and in the second part how 11 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, pp. 373, 376–377; see also Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 263; VI.2, p. 266. 12 See, Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 358.14 – p. 359.2; Avicenna, Ta'liqàt, p. 158. 13 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.16. 14 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.8–13.

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God’s will is related to things. In the first part Avicenna states that (1) God knows himself, (2) God knows the order by which all things exist, and (3) God knows everything that exists as well as how they exist. In the second part Avicenna attempts to explain how the divine will is related to things. God’s will is not directed at the emanation of things primarily, but as God’s self-knowledge includes his being the principle, the creator of things, it also includes the knowledge of things to be created. God’s essence and perfection are loved in themselves so God’s essence is what is willed. Other things come to exist through God’s self-volition. They are known and willed, but they are not a final cause for God’s will. By willing himself, God also wills the existence of other things. Avicenna does not explain further how God’s will with respect to himself and his will with respect to other things differ from each other. For example, we do not find the distinction Aquinas makes, whereby God wills himself necessarily, but he does not will other things necessarily. For Avicenna, nothing else constitutes an end for God, and God does not pursue an end distinct from himself in creating the universe. He gives two basic reasons for arguing this: (1) that only God exists by himself and everything else depends on him, and (2) that God is simple. Avicenna explains the first by arguing that there is nothing to be intended. Only God exists without a cause, and there can be no reason (sabab) unless it be because of God, in God or by God, or belongs to God. If we assume that God has an end distinct from himself, we propose a voluntary action similar to human voluntary actions, with possibilities independent of the agent. A voluntary agent may seek to realize one of these possibilities. However, with regard to God, since there can be nothing outside and independent of God to be intended, God does not act for the sake of something else. Hence, God creates other things even though other things do not constitute an end for God.15 Avicenna’s second reason concerns God’s simplicity and perfection. If God is supposed to have an intention for the existence of other things, three things follow from this supposition: (1) In God there is something distinct from God’s self-knowledge which is the ground for whatever God intends. This thing is God’s knowledge of the necessity or lovability or goodness necessitating this act of inten-

15

Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.6–10.

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tion; (2) God intends, and (3) there is a benefit to which the intention is directed. This is impossible for Avicenna, given that God is simple.16 God’s simplicity for Avicenna requires that God have one knowledge and one will, which are in turn identical to each other. Since God primarily knows, wills and loves himself, God’s will cannot be directed to an end other than God. Avicenna argues not only that creation is a voluntary act, but also underscores that creation cannot be similar to actions stemming from nature, where ‘nature’ is taken to mean the principle of action in inanimate things.17 For Avicenna, a natural action excludes (1) knowledge and (2) approbation (ri∂à) of the result of action by the agent.18 After stating that the act of creation is different from human voluntary acts, he continues: The existence (kawn) of everything from him is not in the way of nature [either], such that the existence (kawn) of everything from him is without a cognition (ma'rifa) and without his permission (ri∂an). How could

16 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.10–13. However, the kind of intention Avicenna denies to God regarding the creation is an intention of ‘something extraneous to the act of creation of things, and something extraneous to God’s knowledge and will of himself,’ as Avicenna indicates just before his statement that God’s action is the action of a knowing agent. This extraneous intention consists of ‘intending creation for the sake of creation, or creatures.’ 17 See for Avicenna’s conception of nature, A.-M. Goichon (ed. trans. & annot.), Introduction à Avicenne: Son Épitre de Définitions (Paris: Desclée, 1933), pp. 92–97. 18 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.13 – p. 403.1. See also, Metaphysics VIII.7 p. 363.10–13. G. Anawati translates lines 13–15 in the passage quoted above: “wa kayfa . . . ya'qilu dhàtahu . . .”: “De plus, que le tout provienne de lui par mode de nature ne signifie pas que l’existence du tout proviendrait de lui sans connaissance ni agrément de sa part. Comment cela serait-il possible, alors qu’il est intelligence pure, s’intelligeant lui-même?” G. Anawati (trans. & ed.), La Métaphysique du Shifâ" (Paris: J. Vrin, 1978–1985), vol. 2, p. 137. I think Anawati’s translation misses the very point Avicenna is trying to make. While Avicenna is trying to separate actions stemming from nature from actions stemming from knowledge and approval, Anawati conflates them. Hence the translation gives the impression that for Avicenna the idea ‘that God’s action is like a natural action’ is not opposed to the idea that God is pure intellect. On the basis of such a translation, one may argue that although for Avicenna God is a pure intellect, his act of creation is like the action of natural things, i.e., devoid of knowledge and volition. After stating that God’s action should not be identified with the action of natural agents, Avicenna quite understandably asks how the action of an intelligent agent could be identified with the action of natural agents, which are devoid of knowledge. The reason Anawati provides for his translation is this: “Parce que le nécessairement existant n’a d’aucune manière un principe; sa création du tout ne peut pas avoir lieu par mode d’intention par essence, car cela impliquerait une recherche de perfection; il serait, de ce point de vue, causé.” G. Anawati, op. cit., p. 227. Anawati’s reason is not justified, since Avicenna does not identify will and intention, as will be discussed below.

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chapter three it be so, while he is a pure intellect who knows his essence? Thus he must know that the existence of everything necessarily follows ( yalzamuhu) from him, because he does not know his essence, except as he is the pure (ma˙∂ ) intellect and the first principle. And he only knows everything from himself in accordance with being their principle, and with there being nothing in his essence preventing (màni' ), or repugnant to (karìh) the emanation of everything from him. And he (dhàtuhu) knows that his perfection (kamàlahu) and his transcendence ('uluwwahu) is such that good emanates from him, and that this [i.e., emanation of things] is of the necessary concomitants (min lawàzim) of his majesty ( jalàlatihi ), which is loved in itself (al-ma'shùqa lahu li dhàtiha).19

In this passage Avicenna contrasts voluntary action and natural action on the basis of the agent’s knowledge. He identifies the former with having knowledge and approbation and the latter with the lack thereof. Approbation for the existence of other things may be an expression suitable for the divine will concerning other things because, for Avicenna, the universe is not the end of God’s will.20 What Avicenna’s text suggests is that whatever God has not known to exist and whatever God has not allowed to exist does not come to exist.21 God Freely and Necessarily Creates the Universe Based on Avicenna’s statements that God is a voluntary creator, can we say that for him God is a free creator? If God primarily wills only himself, and if creation is not an end for God, does the fact 19 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.13 – p. 403.1. Beatrice Zedler misses the very point Avicenna is trying to make in this passage. Despite the textual counter-evidence, she equates Avicenna’s conception of concomitance with acting by way of nature. Beatrice H. Zedler, “Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the ‘De potentia Dei’,” 121–122. One can mistakenly equate Avicenna’s position with the position of Plotinus. Whereas for Plotinus the One is beyond being and knowledge, and beyond activity, Avicenna clearly argues that things follow from the divine knowledge and will. To the best of my knowledge Avicenna never attributes ‘nature’ to God. It would be unusual of him if he were to do this, unless he used it in a broader sense, given his subscription to the Neo-Platonic hierarchy of being. In this hierarchy ‘nature’ is placed below soul. In this respect, even human actions, in the proper sense, do not fall under the category of natural actions. For Plotinus’ conception of the hierarchy see Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus: an Introduction (Oxford: 1993), pp. 60–78. 20 Aquinas expresses more or less the same thing as what Avicenna calls ‘ri∂à’ in ST Ia. 14, 8. Although God’s will is the cause of things in the proper sense, God’s knowledge may be considered the cause of them because of the identity of knowledge and will in God. In this respect, Aquinas states: “God’s knowledge as the cause of things has come to be called the ‘knowledge of approbation’ (scientia approbationis).” 21 See Avicenna, Ishàràt, p. 185.

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that other things come to exist imply that God is compelled or required to create? God’s freedom to create may be taken away either by something external, or by something internal that is required by God’s nature. Avicenna rejects both of these constraints on the divine will. Avicenna argues that no cause external to the agent can be assigned to God’s volition concerning the universe. He emphasizes that God’s will is different from human will because the divine will does not depend on anything external to the agent. While for human volition there is an end distinct from the willing agent, for God’s will there cannot be anything causing God to will something. To express this idea Avicenna sometimes uses the term ‘dà'in,’ i.e., a motive, or a reason, pushing God to do something.22 Most of the time, he uses the terms “intention” (qaß∂ ) and “purpose” ( ghara∂ ).23 As I have already stated, for Avicenna there is nothing outside God that might compel God to will something. Hence God is not to be conceived as seeking after something that exists independently of God. Nor does God create for the sake of compensation ('iwa∂ ).24 For Avicenna there is nothing internal requiring that God should create, though this seems difficult for Avicenna to defend since he argues that God knows himself in such a way that the existence of things is the necessary concomitant of God’s majesty, which is loved in itself. Avicenna’s statements lead one to think that God’s volition concerning other things must be included in God’s essence, so that God would be the natural agent of the universe in the sense that God creates because of his nature. Hence one is led to think that creating other things must be a constitutive element of God’s essence: God would not be what he is if he did not create. To elucidate how Avicenna defends his case, I will first present his more negative way of explaining why other things exist, followed by his more positive explanation. Avicenna explains the existence of the universe through generosity and concomitance. While generosity concerns the negative aspect of this account, concomitance offers a positive dimension. For Avicenna, God creates out of his generosity, since he neither expects nor attains anything in return. Generosity requires that the 22

Avicenna, Ta'liqàt, pp. 103, 117. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7 p. 366.11–17; IX.3; Ishàràt VI, p. 159; VII, p. 185; Ta'liqàt, p. 149. 24 Avicenna, Ishàràt VI, p. 159. 23

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generous agent be free from internal as well as external constraints. Avicenna argues that anything—in this case, the existence of the universe—may be considered with respect to the agent or with respect to the patient. Thus something may be deemed generous with respect to the agent, while it may be called good with respect to the thing that receives and becomes perfect by it. In this case, the act of creation will be generous with regard to God and good with regard to the universe. He defines generosity ( jùd ) to be the case where the agent is not in any way affected (munfa'il ) by what it does, or by something following upon what it does. Generosity is giving out what is proper to be given not because of a debt, or compensation ('iwa∂ ), without pursuing a desire or expecting revenue.25 By excluding payment of a debt and compensation from generous actions, Avicenna indicates that in order for an action to be an act of generosity, it must be free from external factors compelling the agent, as well as free from anything internal to the agent, like expecting to attain something through the object of volition (muràd ) or intention (maqsùd ). If God were to pursue after something willed or intended, God would be imperfect. An agent might be pursuing a purpose ( ghara∂ ) “with regard to himself in his being (bi ˙asabi nafsihi fi dhàtihi ), or with regard to the exigency (maßàli˙) of his being (dhàt), or with regard to something else in his being, or with regard to his benefit (maßàli˙).” All these imply that the agent obtains something in return. Yet any agent obtaining something in return for its action is imperfect either with respect to its being or with respect to one of its perfections (kamàlàt).26 God is truly generous, since God’s giving being to things can neither be compelled by something external nor required by something internal to God. Clearly, Avicenna employs ‘denial of intention to God’ in order to support his argument that there is nothing external compelling God to create, as well as his argument that there is nothing in God’s essence requiring God to create. He seems to consider the intention both with regard to ‘what is intended’ and with regard to the ‘intend-

25 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.5 p. 296 lines: 6–11. Ishàràt VI, p. 159. See also Ta'liqât, p. 106, Metaphysics VIII.7 p. 367 lines: 7–12. 26 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.5 p. 297 lines: 7–11. Aquinas has a similar contention in ST Ia. 19, 3, ad. 2. “2. That God necessarily wills his own goodness does not demand that he will other things as well on that account, for his goodness can well be without them.”

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ing agent.’ Yet intention cannot be attributed to God insofar as it is considered with respect to the ‘intended object,’ as in compensation and debt, since there can be nothing external compelling God to create. Similarly, intention cannot be attributed to God, since it implies imperfection of the agent. Thus for Avicenna God is a free creator since God creates out of his generosity, without any external motive and without internal requirements. Before beginning to discuss whether the necessity of the universe poses a threat to the divine free will, it must be noted that for Avicenna God’s having free will does not mean that God has free choice. For Avicenna, the idea that God does not have free choice follows from the assertion that other things are not God’s end. If other things could be ends for God, then God would have free choice because one end could be distinguished from alternatives (naqì∂ ) in a free choice (ikhtiyàr). Since the one with free choice (ikhtiyàr) chooses one end as better than its alternative, then in order for God to have free choice there must be alternatives placed in front of God. Then God would be required to choose the better alternative.27 However, there can be no set of independent “possible universes” facing God so that he may choose one. Since there is nothing for God to intend, there is nothing for God to choose over others. The necessity of the universe, which Avicenna unwaveringly upholds may not necessarily contradict maintaining that God is a free creator. Avicenna argues for the necessity of the universe through his theory of concomitance, which I have called the more positive aspect of his account of why the universe exists: it is a necessary concomitant of God’s essence (dhàt). Even though God does not will the universe for something external, so that he would depend on it, the existence of the universe is a necessary concomitant (làzim) of God’s essence (dhàt).28 Here one may question whether there is a tension between Avicenna’s conception of generosity and concomitance. If other things necessarily follow from God’s essence, does that show God to be in need of creating? Or does it make God dependent upon his creatures, such that God would not be what he is if creatures did not come to exist?

27 28

Avicenna, Ishàràt VI, pp. 159–160. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 403.1; Ta'liqàt, p. 103.

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We may find an answer to these questions by identifying the relation between a concomitant and the thing of which it is a concomitant. “A concomitant,” states Avicenna, “is the thing that necessarily follows ( yalzam) something because of what it is that [the thing] is (li annahu huwa), [however] it does not make subsist (là yuqawwim) the thing [it follows].”29 Although the concomitant necessarily follows the thing of which it is a concomitant, the thing that has this concomitant does not subsist through its concomitant. That is, the thing that has a concomitant does not depend on its concomitant in order to be the thing it is. Friendship in a narrower sense may serve as an example. The constitutive element of friendship between two people consists in the fact that they love each other. But they do not make one another friends simply by expecting to get help from each other. A relationship based on mutual interests would be a business transaction rather than a relationship of loving and caring. But helping each other, when the need arises, necessarily follows from a relationship based on love. It is almost inconceivable that two friends who love each other would not help each other. In this sense, benefit is a necessary concomitant of friendship but is not constitutive of what friendship is. Avicenna distinguishes two kinds of concomitants in the Ta'lìqàt:30 Concomitance is of two kinds (wajhayn): [1] One of them is that something is a concomitant (làziman) [stemming] from ('an) some other thing because of (li ) its nature and substance, such as light [stemming] from the source of light (al-mu∂i' ) and burning [following] something hot. [2] The other is that it [i.e., something] is the concomitant (làziman) [stemming] from it [i.e., the thing, of which it is a concomitant]. And it [the concomitant] follows (tàbi'an) its [the thing that has the concomitant] self-knowledge, and it knows that this concomitant emanates from itself. This is the concomitance (al-luzùm) that necessarily follows ( yalzamu) from the Creator (al-bàrì ). This is because he is in himself ( fi dhâtihi ) perfect (kàmil ), complete (tàmm), loved (ma'shùq), and he knows ('alìm) himself. Indeed magnificence (majd ) and nobility ('uluww) belong to him. And these things, which are existent on account of him ('anhu), are concomitants (làzima) of his self-knowledge, magnificence, nobility and of his goodness (khayriyyatihi ). Goodness is not something different from his essence (dhàtihi ). 29

Avicenna, Ta'liqàt, p. 180. Avicenna, Ta'liqàt, p. 103. Cf. G. Verbeke’s statement of Avicenna’s position. Verbeke argues, “. . . der Schöpfer würde nicht sein, was er ist, wenn er die Welt hervorzubringen aufhielte.” G. Verbeke, “Avicenna im Westen: Eine historische Begegnung,” in Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 29 (1981), p. 9. 30

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Here Avicenna attempts to distinguish between the concomitants of God and the concomitants of natural beings. While concomitants of other things stem from their nature, God’s concomitants stem from his knowledge. It is, of course, open to discussion whether such an explanation can work without difficulty, but he makes a clear distinction between God and other things with regard to their concomitants. While for other things their nature necessitates their concomitants, in the case of God, it is his self-knowledge that determines the emanation of concomitants. The concomitants of natural things, such as fire or water, follow the course of nature because they are concomitants of natural things without knowledge and will. Similarly, God’s concomitants follow what God is, i.e., the divine nature. In contrast to natural things, however, God’s concomitants follow from the divine knowledge and will, which are identical to God’s essence (dhàt). Through his theory of generosity and concomitance, Avicenna wants to assert both God’s independence from the universe and the necessary existence of the universe owing to the divine will. While God’s being and goodness do not depend on the existence of the universe, the universe necessarily follows from God’s being.31 Yet if God’s being and goodness do not depend on the existence of the universe, God does not need to create in order to be what he is. We may further ask: if creation is not constitutive of God, why must the universe be a necessary concomitant? The answer to this question concerns not what God is, but rather how God is. That is, it does not concern the divine perfections, specifically the divine will, per se, but divine formal features like simplicity and necessity. Avicenna does not consider this question separately, hence he does not state in detail that the necessary concomitance of the universe is due to God’s being necessary, immutable, or fully actual. Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter 2, Avicenna takes divine perfection properties only insofar as they are modified by divine formal features. For him, when talking about God divine perfection properties must be considered in the manner they are found in God. For example, at the beginning of the first chapter of Book IX of the Metaphysics of The Healing, when he is about to begin his explanation why the universe

31 For the independence of God’s being and perfection from the existence of other things see also: Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.1–7, p. 367.7–12.

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must be sempiternal, Avicenna reminds the reader that God is a necessary being. He is necessary in all respects; nothing new or additional can happen to him.32 On the basis of the necessity of God, the universe necessarily follows the divine knowledge and will. Yet divine knowledge and the divine will concerning the universe are also necessary. Why? Because God is necessary in all respects. So God’s will concerning the universe is included in the divine self-volition, not because God’s being what he is includes or depends on the existence of creatures, but because of the formal features of simplicity and necessity. Objections Revisited Arguments designed to show that for Avicenna creation is a natural action rather than a voluntary one have in part been based on Avicenna’s contention that the universe is necessary. Indeed, the universe is necessary, but does the necessity of the universe imply that God has to create in the manner a natural agent must act? The question ‘Does God have to create?’ is an intriguing question. It can be understood as a question asking (1) whether God is compelled or forced to create, in the sense that there be something external to God compelling God to create. The question may also be understood to be asking (2) whether there is something in God requiring that he create: whether God needs to create in order to be what he is. In this way, one can take it to be inquiring whether God’s being and goodness depend on the existence of creatures. With regard to the first interpretation of the question, whether there is something external compelling God to create, Avicenna’s answer is an unqualified no. As should be clear from the discussion thus far, for Avicenna nothing can compel God to create. God’s will, unlike a human will, does not have a motive or a cause. Indeed, there cannot be anything independent of God. God does not seek after anything, nor does he create for the sake of compensation. Hence, there is nothing external compelling or moving God to create. With regard to the second interpretation of the question; whether there is something in God requiring that he create, Avicenna’s answer is again no. There is nothing in God requiring that God create the 32

Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 373.15–17.

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universe, because God’s being and goodness do not depend on the fact that God creates. If God is independent of the existence of other things, then God’s being good does not require that God create other things; God is good without creating the universe. Thus creation is not a constitutive element of ‘what God is,’ but rather follows from it. If God’s being and goodness do not depend on the existence of the universe, is the universe ‘not-necessary’? Avicenna’s answer to this question would be no again, because the universe is God’s necessary concomitant. God cannot have a freedom such that he could choose to create or not to create. For Avicenna, one may not even consider that God could have not created, because God is necessary in all respects. And saying that God could not have created assumes a possibility which is laid out ahead before God. The idea that the universe is a necessary concomitant of God does not simply take into account God’s perfections, willing and goodness in this case, but also God’s formal features, namely simplicity and necessity. Avicenna’s insistence on the necessity of the universe and this universe is closely connected to his position regarding theological language, not because he likens divine creative action to natural actions of inanimate beings. Thus, the universe is necessary, because God is necessary in all respects. As we have seen, the fact that for Avicenna God is not an intentional cause of the universe has been employed to support the argument that for Avicenna creation is a natural action. If creation is not something intentional, then creation must be the brute emanation of things. However, by denying intention to God, Avicenna simply wants to establish that other things do not constitute a final cause for the divine will. As I have tried to show, intending something meant two things for Avicenna. With respect to the object of intention, it implied the existence of something external to and independent of the agent. With respect to the intending agent, it implied that the agent is imperfect. Hence attributing intention to God with regard to creation meant, for Avicenna, both internal and external constraints on divine freedom. He thus argued that God is free from such constraints, which would constitute a final cause compelling or requiring God to create. On the contrary, God is himself the final cause of creatures. God does not will the universe in itself but primarily wills himself, so God

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himself is the final cause of the existence of other things.33 As an heir to the Neoplatonic heritage, Avicenna identifies existence with goodness. Good is what is desired, and since God is the perfect being —even above perfection as we know it—he is the ultimate good toward which all other things strive. They exist overflowing from his being.34 God, and nothing else, is the final cause of creation. For Avicenna denial of intention on God’s part does not mean that God is a non-voluntary agent. His denial of intention has been interpreted by some scholars to mean that God does not know and is indifferent to the existence of the universe. One may consider will and intention to be inseparable, or even equate intending and willing and say, for example, ‘if an agent wills something, then this agent intends that it be, or that it be such and such.’ Yet however one may conceive the relationship between intending and willing, clearly Avicenna does not consider them to be identical in regard to God. For him, ‘intending something’ cannot be devoid of acting for recompense, of seeking after something distinct from the agent. However, willing does not have to be connected with the expectation of a gain, nor should its final cause be something distinct from the agent. Even though he rejects the idea that God has an intention in creation, this does not make him conceive God to be indifferent to the existence of things. Since he argues that God wills things by willing himself, and it is his willing that allows them to exist, God cannot be indifferent to the existence of things.

33 Nàßir al-Dìn ˇùsì interpreted Avicenna in such a way that for him God is only the efficient cause of the universe. For a discussion of ˇùsì’s interpretation see, Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2003), pp. 186–187. 34 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.6 – p. 356.5. For a thorough analysis of Avicenna’s conception of the relation between efficient cause and final cause with regard to explanation of effect, see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context, ch. 10, pp. 181–195. The question of giving a successful account of cases where one thing is both the efficient and the final cause of the effect had a long history before Avicenna. In order to explain how the final cause is prior to the efficient cause without falling into circularity and without making any of the causes superficial, Avicenna employs his distinction between essence and existence. The final cause is the cause of the causality of the efficient cause by its essence, and the efficient cause is the cause of the realization of the final cause. The pair essence-existence is an evolution of the pair thingness and existence. For an explanation of this evolution and Avicenna’s sources in developing the distinction, see Robert Wisnovsky, op. cit., chs. 7–9. See also his “Notes on Avicenna’s Concept of Thingness (shay"iyya),” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10/2 (2000), pp. 181–221.

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In sum, for Avicenna creation should be likened to voluntary actions rather than to natural actions, because God is an intellect with will. However, God’s will should not be confused with human volition. God wills only himself, and nothing else can be God’s end. His being and perfection are independent of the existence of the universe. There is nothing external pushing God to create, nor does God’s essence require that God create. However, the universe is a necessary concomitant of God’s essence. The fact that Avicenna argues God’s independence of the existence of other things as well as their being necessary concomitants of God—without seeing any contradiction—may be explained by his position regarding theological language. Since Avicenna does not take into account God’s will alone, a perfection property, but considers it together with God’s formal features when he talks about God, he can consistently maintain that God is independent of the universe and that the universe is necessary. Avicenna’s argument that the universe is necessary and that God does not intend anything in creation caused his interpreters to think that for Avicenna creation is more like a natural action than a voluntary action. Avicenna would respond to such interpretations of his position by insisting that creation and this universe are necessary, not because creation is the action of an agent acting through nature, but because it is the action of a necessary, immutable and perfect being. God is a free voluntary creator because nothing, either internal or external, requires God to create. However, given that this universe exists and given that God is necessary in all respects, creation and this universe are necessary.

Aquinas’ Position: Creation is Voluntary and Hypothetically Necessary Despite the fact that Aquinas criticized Avicenna—or is interpreted as having done so—for likening the act of creation to the actions stemming from nature, his position conforms to Avicenna’s to some extent. For Aquinas, as for Avicenna, God is a voluntary agent, and God’s will is identical to his essence. Just like God’s knowledge, God’s will is simple, i.e., God’s willing of other things is included in his self-volition, and is immutable and eternal. Aquinas’ discussion concerning God’s freedom to create is founded upon the independence of God from the universe. God does not have to will the existence

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of the universe, nor does he have to will the actual, or definite set of, creatures, because God’s being and perfection do not depend on the existence of the universe. Up until this point, Aquinas’ position conforms to Avicenna’s contention. Beyond this, however, we can note differences. Whereas Avicenna argues that the universe is necessary, without further explanation, Aquinas gives a more detailed explanation of ‘how the universe is necessary,’ and in what sense God has free will and free choice. He argues that the universe is ‘hypothetically’ necessary, not ‘absolutely,’ and that God has free choice in the sense that neither the actual, nor any definite set of creatures, matches the infinite perfection of God. Comparing their positions, I am going to argue that the necessity of the universe defended by Avicenna corresponds to the hypothetical necessity of the universe in Aquinas’ terms. I will further argue that the reason why Avicenna does not, or could not, make such a distinction, while Aquinas does, can be traced to their strategy concerning human speech about God. On the basis of his distinction between ‘res significata’ and ‘modus significandi ’ in human talk about God, Aquinas was able to consider the divine will concerning creation in isolation from God’s formal features, i.e., eternity, simplicity, etc. God Creates by Will not by Nature Aquinas provides four arguments to show that, as far as creation is concerned, God is a voluntary agent, not a natural agent. One of his arguments considers the order in the universe, which must be traced back to an intelligent agent. Both nature and will act for an end. But while a voluntary agent knows and sets the goal for itself, nature does not know and cannot set up a goal for itself. The end and the means ordered to attain the end of a natural agent must be set by an intelligent and voluntary agent. Since God is the first efficient cause, he is an agent acting by will, not by nature.35 The second argument that Aquinas provides to explain why God creates by will and not by nature states that nature is determined to one effect. The way Aquinas presents the argument in the ST and the De potentia differ to some extent. The ST version of the argu-

35

ST Ia. 19, 4; De potentia III, 15; ScG II, 23 [6], [8].

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ment emphasizes that different things with different natures are created by God—not simply one kind of thing. Since the nature of an agent acting by nature is determinate, the action of a natural agent follows in accordance with its determinate nature. However, God’s being and perfection are not limited to a definite nature, but contain the whole perfection of being. “Therefore God does not act from necessity of nature, but defined (determinati ) effects proceed from his infinite perfection by the resolution of his intelligence and will (determinationem voluntatis).”36 In the De potentia, Aquinas distinguishes between God’s natural action and voluntary action. He reminds us again that nature is determined to one effect. Moreover, since every agent produces something similar to itself, “nature always produces its equal” (natura semper facit sibi aequale) unless it is hindered in some way. Hence, whatever proceeds from God naturally (naturaliter) is equal to him. This is the Son. In contrast to the Son, creatures are not equal to God. Moreover, among creatures there are many degrees of inequality. Hence, God does not create the universe by natural action, but by voluntary action.37 Aquinas’ third argument considers the relation between the divine knowledge and the divine will. Since God’s being is identical to his intellection (intelligere), creatures exist in God’s knowledge before they exist in re. And that which exists in knowledge proceeds from knowledge by means of will. Hence God creates through his will.38 The fourth argument that Aquinas uses in the De potentia is based on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic actions. Intrinsic actions such as knowing and willing, remain in the agent, whereas extrinsic actions go out from the agent to an extrinsic patient, such as heating or moving something. Since God’s action is identical to his essence (essentia), God’s action cannot be an extrinsic action going out of him to some extrinsic patient. Thus, God’s action stems from his knowledge and will. At this point Aquinas also reminds us that 36

ST Ia. 19, 4; ScG II, 23 [2], [3]. De potentia III, 15. The second argument, especially as stated in the De potentia III, 15, and ad 7, has some bearing on Avicenna’s conception of creation. Avicenna argues that only one intellect emanates from God. Because God is absolutely one and simple, only one simple being can immediately emanate from God. Since the discussion of this aspect of the issue of creation is not my objective, I wish simply to indicate the importance of the context in comparing their positions. In any case, Avicenna does not consider the first intellect to be something of the same nature as God or a divine person. 38 De potentia III, 15; ST Ia. 19, 4; ScG II, 23 [4]. 37

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the fact that God’s action is intrinsic does not contradict the begetting of the Son through God’s natural action, since the Son is not something outside the divine essence.39 Even though the Son naturally proceeds from the Father, this does not require that God’s action be an extrinsic action in the way that the action of heating is extrinsic to the source of heat. In order to understand what Aquinas intends when he rejects the idea that creation is a natural action, one needs to have a firmer grasp of the sense in which Aquinas attributes natural action to God and of the sense in which he denies it. One must know, for Aquinas, in what respect God’s natural action is similar to God’s voluntary action, and in what respect it differs from it. In the first argument Aquinas compares agents acting through will and through nature. Both kinds of agents act for an end, but only a voluntary agent can make something an end for itself because only such an agent has knowledge. If all beings are taken into account, that which creates the rest cannot be devoid of knowledge and will. Otherwise, there would not be an order within the universe, since the agent acting through nature cannot set its own goal. This indicates that in the first argument the contrast is between ‘nature’ in inanimate beings on the one hand and will in intelligent beings on the other. In this sense, God’s action is not a natural action because God has knowledge and will. That is, God’s nature is not like the nature of inanimate things. Avicenna clearly denies that God’s action is like a natural action in this sense, as discussed in the preceding section. In the second argument, Aquinas highlights another sense of natural action. Nature as employed in the second argument is different from nature in the first argument. In the second argument nature refers not to the nature of inanimate beings, but rather to the nature of an intellect. However, these two kinds of nature are similar insofar as natural action is (1) determined to one effect, (2) produces its effect necessarily—since it produces its effect, unless it is hindered— and (3) produces something equal to the agent. Aquinas approves a natural action of God in this sense, but creation is not God’s natural action in this sense either. The natural action in this sense explains the procession of the Son, and the spiration of the Spirit. While the Son proceeds from the Father on account of nature, the

39

De potentia III, 15; ScG II, 23 [5].

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universe comes to exist not on account of the divine nature but on account of the divine knowledge and will. Nevertheless natural action in this sense, for Aquinas, does not exclude knowledge and will. In ST, when distinguishing between creatures and the divine persons, Aquinas traces the procession of the Son to the divine knowledge, and that of the Holy Spirit to the divine will.40 If the Son and the Holy Spirit are assigned to the divine knowledge and the divine will respectively, and the world proceeds from God through his knowledge and will, then what is the difference between the divine Persons and the universe? While the divine Persons are of the same nature, the world is not of the same nature as God. As will be discussed below, in contrast to the procession of the divine Persons, God does not necessarily will the universe. Moreover, while the Son is one single procession, many effects are created through will. Avicenna, unlike Aquinas, does not attribute a natural action to God in this sense either. Aquinas attributes natural action to God in order to explain the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit in contradistinction to the creation of the universe. That nature is determined to one single effect, and that natural action necessarily follows unless it is hindered are ideas that may be related to Avicenna’s concepts of the emanation of things and the necessity of creation respectively. For Avicenna, only one simple and single being—the first heavenly intellect—emanates from God immediately, and is created by God necessarily. Aquinas himself indicates that the main difference between the natural action and the voluntary action concerns being restricted to one effect. While a natural action produces one effect, a voluntary action may produce many effects at once.41 Whether Avicenna’s position is a target for Aquinas’ arguments is an open question, a detailed discussion of which falls outside of this discussion. However, stating that for Avicenna the single thing that emanates from God is not a divine Person, or something of the same nature as God, is sufficient to justify my argument.42 The third reason Aquinas provides to explain why creation is a voluntary action and not a natural one is shared by Avicenna as 40 ST Ia. 28, 4; ST Ia. 27, 4. For a statement of how the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit are explained through the model of knowledge and will respectively, see Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 193–198. 41 De potentia III, 15, ad 7. 42 Cf. Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, (Leiden & New York, E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 104–105.

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well. Avicenna has similar statements explaining the existence of other things. I have not come across anything similar to the fourth argument of Aquinas in Avicenna’s texts where he explains creation. Nevertheless, generally speaking, it does not seem to contradict Avicenna’s concept of the divine creative action. Let us continue to explore Aquinas’ concept of divine voluntary action. The contrast between divine voluntary action and natural action concerns necessity. Although for Aquinas divine natural action is different from divine voluntary action, the divine will is not something distinct from, or additional to, or contrary to, the divine essence. Aquinas rejects the idea that creation is like a natural action in the sense that it is like the action of inanimate beings. Creation is not a natural action in the sense that only one creature is made immediately by God, and it is not a natural action in the sense that what is created is not of the same nature as God. Moreover, creation is not a natural action in the sense that God does not necessarily create. But the divine voluntary action—just like the divine natural action—stems from the divine nature, or divine essence. It follows from this that the divine will is identical to the divine essence. The identity of the divine will to the divine essence can be shown on the basis of the divine knowledge and divine simplicity. God has will insofar as he is an intelligence. Since God’s knowledge is identical to his essence, God’s will is identical to his essence as well.43 Since God is simple and most perfect, if God has will, it must be identical to his essence.44 Moreover, every agent acts insofar as it is in act. Since God is pure act, God must act through his essence. If God creates through his act of willing, then God’s will is identical to his essence.45 If God acts through his essence, then God’s voluntary action must be an essential, i.e., a natural, action. However, Aquinas reserves the term “natural action” to indicate what God wills necessarily. Despite the identity of the divine will to the divine nature, the divine voluntary action indicates God’s willing only insofar as it concerns the things that God wills but which are not necessary.46 Hence, the difference between divine natural action and divine voluntary action concerns the necessity with regard to what God wills. 43 44 45 46

ScG I, 73, [2]; ST Ia. 19, 1. ScG I, 73, [3], [5]. ScG I, 73, [4]; ST Ia. 19, 4, ad 2; De potentia III, 15, ad 20. ST Ia. 19, 3, obj. 3 & ad 3; De potentia III, 15, ad 6.

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God’s Will Is Simple: God primarily and essentially Wills Himself Before starting to discuss God’s object of volition with regard to necessity it should be recalled that for Aquinas God has one act of willing. By this one act, God wills himself as well as other things. While he wills himself as the end, he wills other things so that they participate in his goodness.47 In ST, Aquinas does not explain in detail the unity of God’s will, which includes both his self-volition and volition concerning other things.48 In ScG, he includes a separate chapter on the idea that God has one act of will.49 Aquinas comes up with various accounts of how God wills himself and other things by one act of will, based mostly upon God’s simplicity.50 As God is the end for the sake of which other things are willed, the thing desired for the sake of the end is willed if the end is willed. Since God wills himself, by his self-volition other things are also willed in the same act of volition.51 If God were to will himself and other things in different acts of the will, not by one act of will, then there would be discursiveness in God—discursiveness which requires movement from one to the other. Since God is free from motion, God wills himself and other things by the same act of will.52 The eternity and immutability of the divine will follow from the simplicity of the divine will. All these in turn are reducible to the simplicity of divine knowledge, as divine will is based upon divine knowledge. When arguing for the eternity and immutability of the divine will, Aquinas highlights the contrast between the divine act of will and the object of God’s volition. There is no correlation between the way in which God’s will is and the way in which the objects of God’s will are. Even though his will is eternal, it does not require that the objects of his willing should be necessary.53 Nor does it require that they should be eternal.54 Similarly, that which is willed by God does not have to be immutable because of the immutability of God’s will. Clarifying this argument, Aquinas points out the

47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

ST Ia.19, 2; ScG I, 75. ST Ia. 19, 2, ad 4; ST Ia. 19, 5. ScG I, 76. ScG I, 76, [4], [5], [7]. ScG I, 76, [2]. ScG I, 76 [4]. ST Ia. 19, 3 obj. 1, ad 1. ST Ia. 46, 1, ad 6.

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difference between changing one’s will and willing a change. One can will contrary things to follow one after the other without changing one’s will. In order to will change, God does not have to change his will or cease to will what he willed before. Since God himself (substantia) and his knowledge are immutable, nothing causes God to change his will. Thus God’s will is immutable as well.55 God Freely Wills the Universe So far, we have seen Aquinas argue that (1) God has one act of volition, and (2) God wills himself necessarily. From these two premises one may expect to deduce the conclusion that God necessarily wills creatures as well. However, Aquinas rejects this conclusion and argues that God freely wills to create. Here the question that needs answering concerns the nature of God’s freedom. Aquinas’ conception of divine freedom will clarify whether the two premises above require that God wills to create necessarily. It will also show whether his concept of the divine freedom to create, as well as to choose, is substantially different from Avicenna’s conception. If God is free to create or not to create, then it must be granted that there is nothing obliging God to create. God’s freedom to create may be eliminated either because of something external to God or because of God’s being itself. Aquinas does not put much emphasis on the question whether something external could eliminate God’s freedom to create. He simply assumes it, probably because it seemed too obvious to require a detailed discussion.56 Aquinas mostly addresses the question whether there is something internal to God that eliminates God’s freedom in creation. In this respect, Aquinas considers whether God’s goodness, immutability and necessity would eliminate God’s freedom to create. It seems that the most difficult issue is to explain how divine goodness does not rule out divine freedom. Aquinas maintains that nothing stemming from God’s nature eliminates God’s freedom in creating. Even though God has one act of willing, by willing himself he also wills other things, the primary object of the divine will is divine goodness. God’s will concerning his own goodness is absolutely necessary, but it is not absolutely nec-

55 56

ST Ia. 19, 7; ST Ia. 19, 7, obj. 3 & ad 3. De potentia III, 15 obj. 11; De potentia VII, 10; ScG I, 87 [3].

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essary for everything that God wills.57 Since the divine goodness is the proper object of the divine will, he wills his own goodness with absolute necessity. This is similar to the human condition in that everybody wills his own happiness necessarily. A similar relation holds between every ability and its proper and principal object, such as the relation of sight to color. As the proper object of the divine will, divine self-volition is necessary.58 Aquinas conceives the relationship between God’s self-volition and volition concerning other things in terms of final causality. By creating other things God wills to communicate his goodness.59 Although God has one act of will in which he wills himself and other things at once, God’s will pertaining to himself and his will pertaining to other things have different modalities. The primary object of God’s will is his own goodness, which he wills necessarily. However, God wills other things as they are ordered to (ordinatur) his goodness as their end, not for their own sake. They do not constitute an end for the divine will. Here Aquinas makes a distinction between ends and means, which can be related in one of two ways: means are necessary in order to reach the end, or means are not necessary in order to reach the end. The relationship between God and the world, as the end and the means ordered to this end, is of the second kind.60 Even though God creates because he is good and wills to communicate his goodness, God’s goodness for Aquinas is not opposed to the divine freedom in creating. The relation between God’s goodness and his creatures is the relation between the end and the means ordered to this end. God’s goodness subsists and is complete by itself; it is independent of the existence of other things. Thus, God’s goodness does not require that God create,61 because if God did not create at all, this would not make God devoid of goodness.62 Aquinas 57 The issue of whether the divine freedom is compatible with the divine perfections caught the interest of modern philosophers of religion. See for example, William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom,” in Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. Eleonore Stump, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University, 1993), pp. 223–233; Laura L. Garcia, “Divine Freedom and Creation,” The Philosophical Quarterly 42, (Apr., 1992), pp. 191–213. 58 ST Ia. 19, 3. 59 ST Ia. 19, 2. 60 ST Ia. 19, 3; ScG, I, 75. 61 ST Ia. 19, 3; De potentia III, 15, ad 10. 62 Norman Kretzmann examines the consistency of Aquinas’ argument with his

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clearly states that the communication of goodness does not necessitate that God create. Even though God creates because he wills to communicate his goodness, the end of the divine will is not the communication of the divine goodness, but, rather, the divine goodness itself.63 The simplicity of the divine will does not require that God’s selfvolition should cause God to will other things. In explaining this point, Aquinas makes use of the relationship between God’s selfknowledge and his knowledge of other things. Just as God knows himself and other things by one act of knowledge, though his selfknowledge does not cause God to know other things, he wills himself and other things by one act of will, and his self-volition does not cause God to will other things.64 Consequently, there is no discursiveness in God’s will, as if he were first to will himself and then, because of his self-volition, he were to will other things.65 Let me repeat Aquinas’ main points concerning the divine freedom to create. God has freedom to create, because there is nothing either external or internal necessitating that God should create. God primarily and naturally wills himself, and other things are not the final cause of the divine will. God wills them to communicate conception of goodness. He argues that Aquinas’ “emphatic, unqualified” positive answer to the question whether God is free to choose whether or not to create is inconsistent with his conception of God’s being “goodness itself, not merely good.” (ScG I, 38). Aquinas adopts the neo-Platonist principle—which he traces to PseudoDionysius—that goodness is by nature self-diffusive. While Aquinas takes a libertarian explanation of creation by arguing for God’s absolute freedom to create and not to create, as well as what to create, this principle seems to require a necessitarian line of the explanation of creation. In this way, creation would be a natural consequence of the divine nature, since God is goodness itself, and goodness is selfdiffusive. Kretzmann considers Aquinas’ attempts to remove the tension between his conception of divine goodness and freedom of choice to create or not to create to be counterintuitive. Kretzmann argues that “God’s bringing into existence something other than himself is among “those things which the essential nature of his goodness includes.” If so, then God is not free to choose whether or not to create, because it is included in the divine self-volition. In this case God “freely, although necessarily wills” the existence of other things. Norman Kretzman, “A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?,” in Being and Goodness, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca, London, New York: Cornell University, 1991), pp. 208–228. See especially 215–221. I agree with Kretzmann that Aquinas’ conception of divine goodness and his concept of divine will concerning the universe are not quite compatible. However, Aquinas seems to prefer to modify the divine goodness by the divine will. 63 De potentia III, 15, ad 12, ad 14. 64 ST Ia. 19, 5 c. 65 ScG I, 87 [4].

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his goodness, but God’s goodness subsists and is complete by itself. Creatures are not constitutive of the divine goodness. Even though by willing other things God wants to communicate his goodness, communicating his goodness is not, again, the final cause of the divine will. These insights are largely shared by Avicenna. As I discussed in the preceding section, he explains creation through his concept of generosity and concomitance. For him, God’s generosity means that God gives being to all other things without acquiring anything additional and without being required to do so by any means. I have also underlined that Avicenna denies intention to God. Avicenna does this in order to defend that other things do not constitute a final cause for divine will. Aquinas shares Avicenna’s view that other things are not final causes of divine will. God Has Free Choice God wills freely not only to create but also what to create. The attribution of free choice to God can be considered as a special case, which ultimately may be reduced to God’s free will. The general statement that God has free will means that God’s being and goodness do not depend on the existence of other things. As the more specific statement, the idea that God has free choice means that God’s goodness does not depend on any definite set of creatures. Furthermore, it means that creatures that are willed to exist are not necessary, since no creature or set of creatures matches the divine perfection. Consequently, God does not have to create the actual universe. God’s free will includes choice with regard to creatures because they are not the end of God’s will, but only the means to the end of the divine will.66 However, Aquinas’ position in this regard may not be stretched so far as to make divine free choice similar to human free choice. One may consider Aquinas’ arguments for the idea that God has free choice (liberum arbitrium) to be indicating that the free choice of God is something similar to the human experience of free choice, choosing from among many alternative things or courses of events. Such an interpretation of the idea of free choice was Avicenna’s reason for rejecting the idea that God has free choice in creation.

66

ST Ia. 19, 10 and ad 2; ScG I, 88 [4].

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Understanding free choice in this way meant for him the existence of possibilities independent of God. Despite his argument that God has free choice with regard to what to create, Aquinas does not counter Avicenna’s contention. Although God is said to choose freely what to create, creating what he creates and excluding what he does not, this does not mean that there are alternatives before God and God chooses one of them.67 What Aquinas seems to argue is that God could have created things other than those he actually did, because things that exist because of God are not all of what God could create.68 That is, creation does not exhaust God. In order to clarify this point, let us look at the objections Aquinas considers. The freedom of the divine will may be thought to be opposed to its immutability. If God does

67 Norman Kretzmann interprets Aquinas’ contention that God has free choice regarding what to create as if there were possible worlds which could be configured in different ways. However, Aquinas’ point in this argument is not that there are possibilities before God but rather that no creature, or rather, no universe, matches God’s goodness and power. Norman Kretzmann, “A Particular Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create This World?”, in Being and Goodness, pp. 229–249, especially pp. 229–239. David Burrell criticizes the concept of creation as one in which God actualizes one among possible worlds. Such a conception is contrasted with the necessary emanation scheme, of which Avicenna is a follower par excellence. He argues that in fact Avicenna’s conception of creation is closer to the concept of creation as the actualizing of a possible world. Since for Avicenna existence is something coming to essence, Avicenna’s concept of creation supposes the existence of essences capable of existing before they come to exist. For Aquinas, however, there is no possibility before creation except by reference to the power of God. Burrell argues that “Avicenna’s scheme” and “possible worlds treatments” take possibles to be “identifiable prior to their existing.” In contrast to this, Aquinas asserts that God creates all things, he does not simply actualize possible things existing independently of God. David B. Burrell C.S.C., “Creation and ‘Actualism’: The Dialectical Dimension of Philosophical Theology,” Medieval Philosophy & Theology 4 (1994), pp. 25–41. I agree with Burrell in his interpretation of Aquinas’ position that in creating this world God does not choose one set of possibilities hanging out there existing independently of God. However, the association between Avicenna’s emanationist scheme and the consideration of creation as actualizing one possible world is very difficult to justify. What Avicenna meant when talking about ‘existence coming to essence’ is an issue of debate among scholars. Discussing it is far beyond my scope here. For recent discussion of the issue see, Nader el-Bizri, “Avicenna and Essentialism” The Review of Metaphysics 54 (2001), pp. 753–778. As I tried to articulate in the preceding section, Avicenna’s reason for rejecting God’s freedom to choose is that there cannot be any thing possible independent of God’s creation such that God would choose to create. Undoubtedly there is a tension between Avicenna’s rejection of possibles before God and his contention that the possibility of things is independent of the power of the efficient cause, which I shall explore in chapter 4. 68 ScG I, 82, [6].

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not will necessarily things that he wills, then his will is open to alternatives. Being open to alternatives is being open to change. If God does not necessarily will, then his will is changeable. Aquinas answers this objection by reminding us of the difference between absolute necessity and hypothetical (ex suppositione) necessity. God’s willing of other things is not absolutely necessary. However, it is hypothetically necessary based on the supposition that the divine will is immutable.69 In ScG I, 82, Aquinas raises similar objections. The answers he provides for these objections are more detailed. One of the objections proceeds in the following way: if God’s will is not determined by certain objects, then it would be disposed to opposites, and hence it would be in potency. But since there is no potency in the will of God, it must be determined to a definite alternative. Another argument for the changeability of God is framed along similar lines. It is based on God’s being in potency because of his being open to willing opposite alternatives. If God is in potency, God’s will must be changeable, since potency implies movement and change.70 The expression ‘being open to alternatives,’ which is the main point of the objection largely tallies with the idea of possible worlds, one of which God actualizes by creating. Aquinas’ answers to both objections amounts to asserting that God is independent of the existence of the actual universe. Being open to opposites may be either from the side of the agent or from the side of the objects. If it is from the side of the agent, it shows the imperfection of the agent, and that the agent is in potency. From the side of the objects of the will, if the action of the agent depends on neither of the alternatives, this openness to alternatives does not show an imperfection in the agent, but rather its eminence in dominating alternatives. Aquinas gives the example of art in which the same thing can be achieved by alternative tools. “This is how the divine will is disposed in relation to things other than itself. For its end depends on none of the other things, though it itself is most perfectly united to its end. Hence, it is not required that any potentiality be posited in the divine will.”71 ‘That God’s will is not determined to a certain effect but open to alternatives’ does not require that his will should be changeable.

69 70 71

ST Ia. 19, 7, obj. 4 & ad 4. ScG I, 82, [2], [3]. ScG I, 82, [6].

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For, if there is no potentiality in the divine will, God does not thus prefer one of the opposites among His effects as if He should be thought as being in potency to both, so that He first wills both in potency and afterward He wills in act; rather, He wills in act whatever He wills, not only in relation to Himself but also in relation to His effects. The reason rather is because the object willed does not have a necessary order to the divine goodness, which is the proper object of the divine will (. . .). The exclusion of the aforesaid necessity, therefore, does not take away the immutability of the divine will.72

Here, as his responses to the objections, Aquinas seems to argue that the actually willed things, or their existence, is not necessary in itself. Since God wills only himself necessarily, and God’s being does not depend on anything, God does not necessarily will them. But it also clarifies his position, stating that the openness of God’s will to alternatives does not mean that there are alternatives before God and that God chooses one of them. It simply amounts to saying that God’s goodness does not depend on any definite thing—actual or not—outside himself. Is the Universe Necessary? In contrast to Avicenna, Aquinas argues that the universe is not necessary. This is so because God does not have to create. He argues not only that (1) God does not have to create, but also that (2) God does not have to create the actual universe. The straightforward conclusion resulting from these arguments are that God has free will and free choice with regard to creation. The foundation of Aquinas’ argument for God’s free will and free choice is that God’s being and perfection do not depend on creating something, nor do they depend on creating the actual universe. This principle, as I stated in the previous section, is shared by Avicenna. For Aquinas the universe is both necessary and not-necessary. He argues that God has free will and free choice. It is also clear that Aquinas’ arguments for the contingency of creation are founded on the idea that God’s being and perfection do not depend on the existence of other things, nor do they depend on the existence of the actual universe. If God is free (1) to create and not to create, and (2) to decide what to create, then neither creation, nor the actual 72

ScG I, 82, [7].

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universe is necessary. But this is only one aspect of the problem. The other aspect concerns the fact that there is a universe and that God’s will is immutable and eternal. If we consider the existence of the universe along with the eternity and immutability of God’s will, then the universe—as it is—is necessary. It cannot not be. Now there seem to be involved here two contradictory judgments about the universe. The universe is not necessary, because God does not have to create; and the universe is necessary, because it exists and God, who created it, is eternal and immutable. In explaining in what sense the universe is necessary and in what sense the universe is not necessary Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of necessity: absolute (absolute) and hypothetical (ex suppositione) necessity.73 Aquinas identifies the condition of absolute necessity in the following way: either (1) the predicate is part of the definition of the subject (for example, man is an animal with an absolute necessity) or (2) the subject is part of the meaning of the predicate (for example, ‘X is a number.’ X is either even or odd with absolute necessity, because being even or odd is part of what “number” means). In these two senses, the universe is not necessary. That is to say, the world (standing for the predicate) is not part of what God is, and God’s goodness (standing for the subject) does not depend on the existence of the universe.74 The relationship between God and the world as an object of volition is like the end and things ordered to (ordinatur) that end. However, willing the end does not always require willing the things ordered to this end. Since God’s goodness subsists (esse) and is perfect without other things, God’s will concerning other things is not a constitutive part of God’s self-volition. Hence the universe is not necessary in the absolute sense. However, other things are necessary on the supposition (ex suppositione) that God cannot refrain from that which he wills, because God’s will is immutable.75 God’s eternity is also involved among the conditions that require that things be necessary. Since God’s willing

73 The distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity should be traced back to Aristotle. In Metaphysics V.5 1015a20–b15 he discusses the kinds of necessity. Absolute and hypothetical necessities are included in his quintuple division. Hypothetical necessity in general means that in order for something to exist, certain conditions must be met. Absolute necessity refers to things that cannot be otherwise. 74 ST Ia. 19, 3. 75 ST Ia. 19, 3; ScG I, 83 [2].

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that some effect to be caused is eternal, his will concerning the existence of other things is necessary. “But it is not necessary considered absolutely, because the will of God does not have a necessary relation to this willed object. Therefore, it is necessary by supposition.”76 Thus, if God’s will is considered in isolation from his immutability and eternity, things are not necessary. But if it is considered together with God’s immutability and eternity—one may extend the list under the title “God’s formal features”—and the fact that he wills the existence of other things, then the universe is necessary. This kind of necessity is hypothetical necessity. Hence, the universe is hypothetically necessary.

Talking About Creation: Necessity or Hypothetical Necessity Aquinas argues that God has freedom to create and free choice, because (1) there is nothing external compelling God to create, and (2) God’s being and perfection do not depend on the existence of other things. Since the universe is not the end of the divine will, God does not need to create in order to be what he is. Thus, the universe is not absolutely necessary. The universe may be taken as necessary only if one takes into account the fact that God willed the existence of the universe, and that God’s will is eternal and immutable. Aquinas calls this hypothetical necessity as discussed above. If Aquinas’ two premises insure that the universe is not necessary, then Avicenna would be justified if he argued that the universe is not necessary, since he himself subscribes to these two premises on which Aquinas founds his argument that the universe is not necessary. As for Aquinas, for Avicenna there is nothing external compelling God to create. God could not be creating to gain something he acquires by creating it; otherwise God would not be truly generous. We also saw that other things for Avicenna are not the end of God’s will. However, despite his subscription to these premises, unlike Aquinas Avicenna argues that the universe is in fact necessary. Avicenna’s argument that the universe is a necessary concomitant of God’s being does not contradict his belief in the independence of God’s being and goodness from the universe. As I

76

ScG I, 83, [3].

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stated when discussing Avicenna’s position, a concomitant is not constitutive of the thing of which it is a concomitant. Consequently, if these two premises provide a solid ground for arguing that the universe is not necessary, then for both of them this is true. That is, for Avicenna as well as for Aquinas, the universe is not necessary. On these same premises, Aquinas explicitly says that the universe is not necessary, and clarifies the sense in which the universe is not necessary. If the existence of the universe were constitutive of God’s being and perfection, or if it were the end of the divine will, then the universe would be absolutely necessary. Hence, the universe is not absolutely necessary if it is considered solely in relation to the divine will as the cause of the existence of other things, since creating the universe is not constitutive of what God is and the universe is not the final cause of the divine will. But if the universe is considered together with the idea that God wills the universe and that the divine will is eternal and immutable, then the universe is hypothetically necessary. The necessity of the universe as argued by Avicenna77 corresponds to the hypothetical necessity of the universe in Aquinas’ theory. Avicenna agrees with Aquinas on the point of the first premise, i.e., that the universe is not constitutive of God’s being. God does not need to create in order to be what he is. He agrees with him that nothing else could be the final cause of the divine will. Furthermore, he agrees with him on the eternity and immutability of the divine will. Despite this agreement, Avicenna simply argues that the universe is necessary. Given his agreement with Aquinas on the premises of his argument for the hypothetical, or conditional, necessity of the universe, Avicenna’s argument for the necessity of the universe indicates that he considers the divine perfections as modified by the divine formal features. I am not suggesting that Avicenna makes a distinction similar to that of Aquinas. I simply want to say that the unqualified necessity Avicenna attributes to the universe corresponds to the hypothetical necessity of Aquinas. To see this correspondence, let us follow Aquinas’ argument. Let us assume that the universe is necessary if it is considered not simply with regard to the divine will, but with regard to the eternal and immutable divine will and remind

77 For a discussion of the Aristotelian roots of Avicenna’s concept of necessity, see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context, ch. 11, pp. 197–219.

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the fact that God wills the universe. Such an assumption totally is found at the bottom of Avicenna’s position when he argues that the universe is necessary. Following Aquinas, if we call such a necessity a hypothetical necessity, then obviously the necessity Avicenna attributes to the universe is not absolute necessity. Then within Aquinas’ conceptual framework the necessity Avicenna attributes to the universe is hypothetical necessity. At this point, the question is why, then, does Avicenna argue that the universe is necessary without hesitation? The reason why Aquinas makes a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity, while Avicenna does not can be traced to their different concepts of theological language. One should not forget that the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity belongs to Aquinas. Avicenna does not and perhaps could not make such a distinction. The distinction between absolute necessity and the hypothetical one is the result of considering the divine will in isolation from the divine formal features. While the universe is not necessary if it is considered solely in relation to the divine will, it is necessary when considered together with the formal features such as eternity and necessity. Considering the divine perfections separate from their mode of being is an application of Aquinas’ understanding of predicating divine names—of talking about God. Let us have a closer look at Aquinas’ discussion of God’s will with respect to the application of his distinction between the res significata and the modus significandi of the divine perfections. The pure perfection terms are predicated of God and creatures analogically, i.e., according to similar yet different conceptions. As I argued in chapter 1, for Aquinas perfections that are attributed to God are not simple negations. They say something about what God is. As far as the res significata of perfections are concerned, they are predicated of God and of creatures literally. However, as far as their mode of signification is concerned their literal predication of God is inappropriate, because the mode of signification in human speech cannot match the way they truly are. We cannot express God’s perfections in the way in which they belong to God in himself. Since Aquinas clearly distinguishes the divine will—which corresponds to the res significata—from the manner it is in God—identity with God’s essence, eternity and immutability, which corresponds to what cannot be expressed by the modus significandi, he was able to assert God’s freedom and free choice, and the conditional necessity of the universe.

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In other words, Aquinas’ separation of the divine will and the manner in which it exists, i.e., its eternity and immutability, follows his distinction between the res significata and the modus significandi in theological language. Since Avicenna takes divine perfection properties insofar as they are modified by divine formal properties he had to argue for the necessity of the universe. In contrast with Aquinas’ appreciative strategy concerning the divine perfections, Avicenna pursues a reductive strategy by taking divine perfection properties together with the manner in which they exist. That is, even though he attributes perfections, such as will, power, life, etc., to God, he takes them into account only as they are modified in the light of the divine formal features, such as simplicity, necessity and eternity. Consequently, in discussing creation, Avicenna does not consider the divine will, as the cause of the existence of the universe, separately from the manner in which it exists. As a result, while he affirms that God’s being and perfections do not depend on creatures, and that they do not constitute an end for God, he argues only that the universe is necessary. For Avicenna, one may not even consider the possibility that God could not have created, because God is necessary in all respects. Such a possibility is applicable only to agents that are not fully in act. While Aquinas considers the divine perfections separately from the manner in which they exist with respect to human vantage point, Avicenna modifies his concept of the divine perfections in the light of the divine formal features. Consequently, he limits human speech to what actually is. By limiting himself with what actually is, he argues that the universe is necessary and that God does not choose from alternatives.

Conclusion of Chapter Three For both Avicenna and Aquinas, creation is a voluntary act, not a natural one. God’s will is simple, eternal and immutable. The end of God’s will is himself, not other things. By willing himself, God also wills other things. However, based on these premises, Avicenna argues that the universe is necessary. He further argues that God does not have free choice. Aquinas argues that the universe is not absolutely necessary and that God has free choice with regard to creatures. Aquinas’ arguments for divine free will and free choice

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are founded on the idea that God’s being or goodness is independent of the existence of other things, a principle also shared by Avicenna. However, on the basis of this principle, Avicenna does not come up with similar arguments concerning the contingency of the universe and divine free choice. The difference between Avicenna and Aquinas concerning the necessity of the universe and God’s free choice can be traced back to their consideration of divine perfection properties. Since Aquinas was able to consider God’s will with regard to the existence of the universe in isolation from God’s formal features, i.e., immutability and eternity, he could make a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. If God’s will concerning the universe is taken together with God’s formal features, Aquinas argues, the universe is necessary and God creates only this universe. This is what he means by the hypothetical necessity of the universe. Avicenna does not make a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity, since he does not consider God’s will with regard to the existence of the universe in isolation from God’s formal features. He takes, God’s perfections together with how God is, i.e., necessary, immutable, eternal. As a result, he simply argues that the universe is necessary. Given the fact that the premises on which Aquinas establishes his position are maintained by Avicenna as well, the necessity of the universe as argued by Avicenna corresponds to the hypothetical necessity of the universe in the theological language of Aquinas.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE

Throughout the preceding chapters, it has been confirmed that Avicenna and Aquinas agree on important issues concerning God and creation. To recall the main points, they agree on the point that God is eternal and immutable. God’s perfections are identical to him. His knowledge is creative. With respect to things, the divine knowledge is like the knowledge of the artisan, who makes what he has in mind to be realized in the external world. Moreover, God is a voluntary agent, not an agent acting because of his nature in the manner of natural agents, e.g., in the manner in which fire burns. The divine will, like the divine essence, is simple, eternal and immutable. God is the sufficient cause of the universe. He does not need anything else to cause the universe. Despite the background they share, Avicenna argues that the universe has always existed, while Aquinas argues that the universe could have always existed, but that the arguments brought forth to demonstrate that the universe must have always existed are not conclusive. According to Aquinas the idea that the universe began to exist after non-existence is not an issue of philosophical demonstration, but an issue of faith. Avicenna argues that the relation between God and the universe can only be conceived in terms of being. As God is eternally in act, he must be eternally creating. Eternity, sempiternity and time are kinds of duration specific to different orders of being. Since time is applicable only to some of the things in the universe, it cannot be applied to the universe as a whole. Thus a priori, the universe as a whole cannot have began to exist temporally after not having existed. Aquinas agrees with Avicenna that the fundamental relation between God and the universe must be conceived in terms of being, but holds that the relation between God and the universe can also be conceived in terms of time. Consideration of this relation in terms of time does not yield a necessary conclusion, however—either in favor of the thesis that the universe does not have a temporal beginning, or in favor of the thesis that the universe began to exist temporally after not having existed.

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For Avicenna, creation is the act by which God gives being to everything. The relation between God and the universe is the relation between a metaphysical efficient cause, i.e., the cause of being, and its effect. Even though God is not related to things as they exist outside the divine knowledge in the same way a created cause is related to its effect, this does not mean that God is not related to the universe at all. Like the relation between any efficient cause and its effect, (1) God necessitates the existence of the universe; (2) God and the universe must co-exist; (3) God and the universe are not equal, because God is the cause and has being by himself, but creatures owe their being to God; (4) God is the cause of the existence of the universe, not its non-existence. For Avicenna since God is eternally necessary in all respects, and since he created the universe, he must have always (dà"iman) created it. Since coming to exist after not having existed concerns the quiddities of things, and there are things that cannot come to exist temporally after not having existed, the universe as a whole cannot have come to exist after not having existed. Temporal posteriority requires that the thing that comes to be comes to be from an already existing matter. In this regard, if the universe started to be temporally after not having existed, then the universe does not come to exist through creation in the strict sense, but through movement undergone by some preceding thing. Strictly speaking, his argument is that the relation between the Creator and the creature cannot be construed in temporal terms. Avicenna argues that time and movement are infinite, thereby he tries to make an argument of reductio ad absurdum against the thesis that the universe has a temporal beginning. What Is Creation? Avicenna prefers the Arabic term ibdà' to express the idea of creation, corresponding to Aquinas’ use of creare or creatio.1 There are other terms that can express the idea of creation in Arabic, such as khalq and i˙dàth, which Avicenna also uses in various contexts. Even 1 As we shall see in the next section, unlike his contemporaries, such as Bonaventure, Aquinas understands that creation simply means giving being or the existential dependence of the creature on the Creator.

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though these can be rendered as creation in general, in Avicenna’s terminology they are used in a rather technical sense.2 It is the term ibdà' that Avicenna uses in a broader sense to cover all kinds of creatures with respect to their existence in the absolute sense. Creation as expressed by the term ibdà' means, for Avicenna, to give being in the most comprehensive sense of the word. It is more comprehensive than similar terms, because it takes into account the existence of all things. It accounts not only for the existence of things that have relative non-existence but also the existence of things without relative non-existence. All things are absolutely non-existent by themselves, and they exist on account of their cause, God. This giving of being in the absolute sense is creation (ibdà' ). Things exist after not having existed, but this posteriority is an essential posteriority; it is not a temporal posteriority. What belongs to things on account of their essence is non-existence and they have existence on account of something else, i.e., God. Since what belongs to something on account of something else is posterior to what belongs to it on account of its essence, things exist after not-having existed. If the posteriority of things were limited to temporal posteriority, it would require that something exists before the thing in question. This would nullify creation in the absolute sense (ibdà' ).3 Consequently creation must be set apart from generation, and must not be conditioned by that which applies to the realm of generation and corruption. If the temporal posteriority of the universe is assumed, it requires at least that a material cause exist before the universe. Then the whole universe would be conditioned by relative non-existence, but not by absolute non-existence. However, in creation the question is absolute dependence of things on God. If creation were something like preventing a relative non-existence, it would be more like a weak action than creation in the true sense.4 Avicenna explicitly states that the non-existence of things is not simply nonexistence of their form, nor is it the non-existence of their matter, 2

For a discussion of Avicenna’s terminology concerning creation, see Jules Janssens, “Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sina,” Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 8 (1997), pp. 455–477. Janssens examines Avicenna’s terminology, such as ßudùr, fay∂ and tajallì, reflecting the emanationist conception of creation. He also provides an examination of Avicenna’s use of Qur’anic terms, which are mostly adopted by and identified with Muslim theologians. 3 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 266.12–15. See also Metaphysics VIII.3, p. 342.15–19 – p. 343.1–6. 4 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 267.4–9.

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but the non-existence of the whole of their being.5 Thus, creation is absolutely out of nothing. It is the prevention of non-existence in the absolute sense.6 Creation Is not a Change For Avicenna, creation is not a change, but unlike Aquinas he does not discuss this issue at any great length.7 Avicenna’s failure to devote a systematic discussion of this point may be due to his rejection of a temporal beginning to the universe: God’s being beyond time and movement removes any doubt that creation might be a change. For him change and its corollaries start with the first celestial soul, ontologically well below God and even the heavenly intellects.8 Secondly, his distinction between efficient causes of being and efficient causes of movement, and his identification of God as the efficient cause of being rather than of movement, removes the possibility that creation is an action producing change. Since he undoubtedly argues that creation is the giving of being, he most likely did not see any point in further discussing the issue.9 Another reason may be that his conception of possible being does not leave room for such doubt. Avicenna frequently affirms that everything other than God is possible of existence, and nothing possible of existence exists on account of 5

Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.3, p. 342.6–11. Avicenna argues that beginning to exist after not having existed (˙udùth), or making something to exist after not having existed (i˙dàth) may also be used. This is the term that is usually preferred by Muslim theologians to express the relation of the world to the Creator and its beginning. The terms i˙dàth or ˙udùth as used by the Muslim theologians have temporal connotations. That is, the universe began to exist temporally after not having existed. Avicenna is quite aware of the usage of the term i˙dàth. He argues that if the temporal implication of the term is omitted then it can be used interchangeably with the term ibdà'. Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 266.16–17 – p. 267.1–3. For the Muslim theologians’ conception of creation, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalàm (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1976), pp. 355–373. 7 That Aquinas discusses the issue specifically is very reasonable. Since he argues that assigning a temporal beginning to the universe is possible, he is expected to explain how this could be. Since he adopts the Aristotelian conception of time, i.e., time is the measure of change, he needs to explain his position by showing that creation does not imply a change. We can identify a tension between allowing that the universe can begin to exist temporally after not having existed, and the danger of conceiving creation as an action of change occurring in matter existing independently of God. 8 See Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.2, p. 383.10–17 – p. 384.1–15. 9 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 257.7–17. 6

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itself. If creation were a change then it would require that there be something existing independently of God. By creation God would be acting upon this independently existing thing. Creation as the Relation between God and the Universe Before turning to discuss Avicenna’s understanding of the relationship between God and the universe, it is worthwhile to discuss how God is not related to the universe. Two seemingly contradictory strands can be found in Avicenna’s writings: (1) God is strongly related to the universe as the cause of the universe, and many positive and negative relations are predicated of God on the basis of universe; and (2) God is not related to the universe as it exists in re. The thing to which God is really related is his knowledge of things, not things as they exist in re. As stated in the second chapter, for Avicenna God’s knowledge is creative. Being a pure intellect, God knows himself, which is identical to his being (dhàt). Through his essence, God knows everything that is after or below himself in the ontological hierarchy. God’s knowledge of himself is the cause ('illa) of his knowledge of other things. But even though God’s knowledge of other things comprises all things which are multiple, God’s knowledge of them is a simple intellectual knowledge. This simple intellectual knowledge includes intelligibles which have an essential and even a temporal order insofar as they exist in re. God bears the relation of being a principle to them, such that they are ‘from God,’ as Avicenna puts it, but not ‘in God.’10 God is related to his knowledge of things as its origin, but God is not related to things which exist on account of his knowledge as they exist in re, although God is their origin as well. If God were really related to things as they exist in re, then unacceptable conclusions would follow. For example, God would not know things except those which actually exist at a given time. Moreover, God would not know himself (nafsihi ) as their principle until a certain thing actually comes to exist. Consequently, he would not know his essence either, because his being (dhàt) is the origin necessitating the existence of things, no matter 10 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 364.1–6. See also Fazlur Rahman, “Ibn Sina’s Theory of the God-World Relationship,” in God and Creation, ed. David B. Burrell and Bernard McGinn (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 47–49.

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whether they exist at a given time. Hence, God is related to things insofar as they are known by him, not insofar as they exist in re ( fi al-a'yàn).11 Paradoxically enough, Avicenna states that God has many relations to the universe. For Avicenna, the fact that God is not really related to things as they exist in re does not eliminate the situation that God and the universe are related to each other. Many positive and negative relations are predicated of God, such as God’s being the origin of the universe, or God’s being dissimilar to creatures. These relations are approved only as necessary concomitants of God, not as constitutive parts of the divine being. These relations are predicated of God, since they follow the divine being as its effects. However, God’s being related to the universe does not imply that he depends on the universe. The relations are simply the effect of the divine action.12 Even though God is related to the universe, this relation is not like relations holding between two things in the universe. The most fundamental relation between God and creatures is creation, which seemingly can be placed in the category of action-passion relations. But creation as the divine action is not something that makes God in someway dependent on creatures. For example, if one builds a house, building a house perfects and changes the builder. Creating and creatures do not perfect or change God’s being. We can resolve Avicenna’s contrary statements if we say that the relations between God and the universe, based on action and passion, are not like the relations between creatures. If relations between creatures are taken to be definitive regarding what a relation is, then God is not related to the universe. God is related to the universe if the dependence and affection are eliminated, this relation is not constitutive of his essence. Avicenna employs his concept of necessary concomitant

11 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 364.7–15. See also, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.1–7. Here Avicenna also states that God is self-subsisting by himself, not because he is the cause of the existence of things. This is reminiscent of one of Aquinas’ arguments concerning why God is not really related to the world. 12 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 343.16–17 – p. 344.1–5. See also, Metaphysics VIII.5, p. 354.12–14. “. . . If you ponder upon (˙aqqaqtahu) him, after the [the affirmation of ] being (inniyya) God is described ( yùßaf ) by negation (salb) of similarities (mushàbihàt) and by affirmation (ìjàb) of all kinds of relations (i∂àfàt), because everything is of him, he does not participate (mushàrik) in what is of him. He is the origin of everything, but he is not one of the things that are after (ba'd ) him.”

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(làzim) to explain the unique character of the relations between God and the universe. The underlying relation of God to the universe, as Avicenna considers it, is that of metaphysical efficient cause. Avicenna makes a distinction between two senses of efficient cause, one being metaphysical and the other physical. Whereas in the context of metaphysics an efficient cause is the cause that gives existence to a being distinct from itself, an efficient cause in the context of physics is the cause that gives movement to a being that already exists.13 Avicenna emphasizes the point that metaphysical efficient cause and its effect are absolutely distinct beings. Neither the efficient cause nor its effect receive each other, nor are they conjoined (muqàrana) to each other.14 The causal relation between God and the universe can be put in the group of action-passion in the Aristotelian triple division of relations.15 Even though Avicenna does not state it explicitly, this model underlies his discussion of the relation between the Creator and the universe. God is the efficient and the final cause of the universe and the universe is the effect of the divine action. Since the relation between God and creatures is the relation between an efficient cause and its effect, what holds true between an efficient cause and its effect must also be true between God and the universe. When discussing creation, Avicenna, most of the time, uses rather inclusive language. He talks in terms of agents and patients categorically. Then he adds his specific qualifications concerning the relation between God and the universe. Avicenna argues that between an efficient cause and its effect the following must hold: (1) causes necessitate their effects. Whereas God is a self-necessary being, the 13

Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 257.7–17. Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 259.11–19. Michael Marmura notes how Avicenna insists on this point. Michael Marmura, “The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna,” in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed. Michael E. Marmura (New York: SUNY, 1984), pp. 172–173. Also see Jules Janssens, “Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sina,” pp. 458–459. 15 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V.15, 1029b25–1021b11. Avicenna is very much Aristotelian with respect to his conception of relatives and the category of relation. We find the Aristotelian triple division of relatives, i.e., quantity, action-passion, and resemblance or non-mutual relations. However, in Avicenna’s discussion, non-mutual relations do not have the specific importance that they have in Aquinas’ discussion of the relation between God and the universe. Michael Marmura, “Avicenna’s Chapter, “On the Relative,” in the Metaphysics of the Shifà",” in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. George F. Hourani (Albany: SUNY, 1975), pp. 83–99, especially first part, pp. 83–87. 14

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universe is necessary by something else, i.e., God. (2) Causes and their effects co-exist. If what we call a cause exists and the effect does not exist, then the cause is not actually the cause. Effects need their cause not simply to begin to exist; they also need their cause in order to continue to exist and act. (3) Their co-existence does not require that they be on par with, or equal to, their cause. (4) The efficient cause is the cause of only the existence of its effect, not its preceding non-existence. Nor is the efficient cause the cause of the fact that the effect ‘begins to exist after not-having existed.’ Causes Necessitate Their Effects Things that are possible to exist are effects and need a cause to make them exist. For Avicenna, necessity is almost interchangeable with existence as far as it concerns things, not propositions. Saying that a cause makes its effect exist is equivalent to saying that a cause necessitates its effect. All existent things can be divided into two groups: (1) necessary to exist by itself and (2) possible to exist, if considered by itself alone. The thing that is possible to exist, if considered by itself, cannot be impossible in itself. Otherwise it could not exist at all. There cannot be more than one being that is necessary to exist, if considered by itself.16 Unlike things that are possible to exist, the self-necessary being cannot have a cause making it exist.17 Things that are possible to exist, if considered in themselves, are dependent on some extrinsic cause in both their existence and nonexistence. When explaining the existence of something possible to exist, what we consider in the mind is the quiddity of the thing. Since the quiddity of the thing is not sufficient to explain or cause its existence or non-existence, it must be determined or specified by something else.18 The existence of the effect is traceable to the cause making it exist, and its non-existence to the non-existence of its cause.19 Since the sheer possibility of something does not make the thing exist, it must have been necessitated by a cause if it actually exists. As a result every possible thing that exists is necessary by something else. If we apply this analysis to creation, God, as the efficient cause, necessitates the existence of the universe.20 16 17 18 19 20

Avicenna, Avicenna, Avicenna, Avicenna, Avicenna,

Metaphysics Metaphysics Metaphysics Metaphysics Metaphysics

I.6, p. 37.11–18. I.6, p. 38.1–10. I.6, p. 38.11–18 – p. 39.1–4. I.6, p. 39.5–16. I.6, p. 37.6–10. Avicenna’s distinction between necessary

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Causes and Their Effects co-Exist The efficient cause and its effect, Avicenna argues, must co-exist. The co-existence may be considered with regard to the beginning of the effect, such that given the cause, the effect exists, without a temporal gap between the existence of the cause and the effect. It may also be considered with regard to the continuity of the existence of the effect, such that as long as the effect exists, its cause must be existing. That is, the effect does not become independent of its cause after beginning to exist. One can think of cases where the efficient cause exists, but its effect does not exist. The effect may begin to exist temporally after the existence of the efficient cause. Consequently, one must qualify the co-existence between the cause and its effect by saying that the efficient cause insofar as it is the efficient cause must co-exist with its effect.21 For Avicenna, co-existence of the efficient cause and its effect does not simply concern the ‘beginning’ of the effect, but also its continuing to be what it is. Avicenna develops an argument to this effect on the basis of his distinction between necessary and possible being. Everything existing is necessary, either by itself, or on account of its cause. Without reference to the causal activity of the efficient cause, the effect is simply possible. It does not exist unless it is made necessary by its cause. Since after beginning to exist the effect does not become necessary by itself either on account of its quiddity or on and possible is one of the troublesome issues. Following this distinction, Avicenna talks about the properties of possible things and how they are related to being. One of the serious objections to such a talk about possible things is that non-existent possibles cannot even be referred to before they exist. For an argument saying that such things cannot be referred to before their existence see Barry Miller, A Most Unlikely God (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame, 1996), pp. 29–33. One may distinguish between talking about possible beings categorically and talking about non-existent individuals. In that case, Avicenna’s talk about properties of possible beings may escape Miller’s objection. Some scholars interpret Avicenna’s conception of possibility as if there is a realm of possible beings and God actualizes them by bringing existence to them. Avicenna’s argument that the possibility of things does not concern the power of the agent, which we shall talk about below, is one of the supporting elements in this regard. However, as we have seen in chapter 3, Avicenna denies the freedom of choice to God, simply because there cannot be a realm of possible things before God so that God may choose which ones of them to actualize. For discussions on this issue, see Gerhard Smith, “Avicenna and the Possibles,” The New Scholasticism, XVII (1943), pp. 340–357; Francis A. Cunningham, “Averroes vs. Avicenna on Being,” The New Scholasticism XLVIII (1974), pp. 184–218; Beatrice Zedler, “Another Look at Avicenna,” The New Scholasticism L (1976), pp. 504–521. 21 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 259.11–19 – p. 260.1–4.

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account of its properties, it always needs its cause as long as it exists.22 The condition of co-existence between a cause and its effect is not simply limited to the relation between God and the universe, but it is applicable to any case where a causal relation is concerned. Avicenna examines some counter-examples to show that efficient causes and their effects must co-exist. For example, a builder is the efficient cause of the building. However, the building survives the builder. A father is the efficient cause of his son, but the son may live after the death of his father.23 In fact, Avicenna argues, the 22 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 261.5–16 – p. 262.1–5. Avicenna’s argument to this effect runs as following: He refers to some people arguing that the need of the effect to have its cause is for beginning to exist. But after beginning to exist the effect does not need the cause anymore. If the effect needs the cause only in order to begin to exist, then the cause is prior to (mutaqaddiman) the effect, but does not co-exist (ma'an) with the effect. Avicenna argues that this is incorrect. He offers the following argument, which assumes the convertibility of necessity and existence. In order for something to continue in existence, it must be necessary: so the being that comes to exist after not having existed is either (1) a necessary being, or (2) not a necessary being. Since nothing possible exists simply by being possible, he does not discuss the second option further. If (1), i.e., it is a necessary being, then (1.1) either it is a necessary being by itself because of its quiddity, or (1.2) it is not a necessary being by itself. If it were a necessary being by itself, it could not have begun to exist. Hence, (1.1) is false. If it is not a necessary being by itself, then it is a necessary being (1.2.1) on the condition that it begins to exist after not having existed, or (1.2.2.) on the condition of one of its properties, or (1.2.3) on the condition of something distinct from it. The condition (1.2.1) is not acceptable, because ‘coming to exist after not having existed’ (˙udùth) is not something necessary by itself so that it could necessitate the thing coming to exist on its own. When the thing comes to exist after non-existence, the non-existence of the thing ceases to be the case. Hence ‘coming to exist after not having existed’ cannot be the condition insuring the existence of the thing. One may argue that the condition of ‘coming to exist after not having existed’ is not the cause of the existence of the thing, but rather the thing has undergone ‘coming to exist after not having existed.’ Then ‘coming to exist after not having existed’ is a property that is included in (1.2.2). On p. 261.17–19, Avicenna starts examining (1.2.2). If (1.2.2) holds, then either (1.2.2.1) the properties insuring the existence of the thing are the properties of its essence not insofar as the thing exists—thus its essence necessitates the existence of the thing—or (1.2.2.2) these properties come to exist and belong to this thing when the thing exists. This last division parallels the first division (1) and (2) (p. 262 lines 1–5). Hence (1.2.2.1) is not the case. If (1.2.2.2) is assumed, then either (1.2.2.2.1): there are infinite number of properties of this thing and they are not necessary by themselves, or (1.2.2.2.2): there is a property of the thing which is necessary by something else (1.2.2.2.1) cannot be the case. Since all of them are possible to exist, they cannot make the thing necessary, hence existent. Hence (1.2.2.2.2) holds. The thing that comes to exist after not having existed remains in existence by something else. Hence, (1.2.3) is true, that is, the thing that comes to exist is necessary by something else. Consequently it remains in existence by something else. 23 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 264.5–8.

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builder is not the cause of the subsistence of the building. The builder is the cause of the movement of the material making up the building. But the organization of the building-materials in a certain way, and the conditions of the configuration of the building, are the causes of the subsistence of the building. Causes contributing to the subsistence of the building are simultaneous with the subsistence of the building.24 In the case of father-son relations, the father is only the cause of the movement of the semen towards a definite direction. From then on, Avicenna argues, for each specific situation there can be assigned a cause, or causes, that exists simultaneously with the effect in question.25 Avicenna traces this co-existence between causes and effects up to the giver of forms, which governs what happens in the sublunar world. True (˙aqìqiyya) causes, he maintains, co-exist with their effects. Causes that precede their effects are either accidental causes or specifying causes (mu'ayyinàt).26 One possible objection to the condition of co-existence is that if efficient causes must co-exist with their effects, then for any present effect now an infinite number of causes must actually exist. To counter this Avicenna makes a distinction between essential and accidental causes,27 and between immediate and remote causes. Essential causes, which co-exist with their effects, are finite. Auxiliary and preparative causes, which precede their effects and which are accidental, may be infinite. As far as particular things are concerned, their causes may be infinite, some of them temporally prior to their effects which have come to exist after not having existed. However, even for the things that come to exist after not having existed, the causes that make them necessary and actually exist must co-exist with them.28 Since things subject to generation and corruption are things coming to exist after not existing, their causes also come to exist after not having existed. Even though an effect can be traced back to infinitely many causes, which must co-exist with their effects, no effect requires that an infinite number of actual causes exist for

24

Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 264.9–11. Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 264.12–14. 26 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 265.1–5. 27 Aquinas agrees with Avicenna that God is the essential cause of the universe. For what an essential cause is and how Aquinas has this conception, see William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton & London, 1975), pp. 18–25. 28 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 365.6–11. 25

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it. Only the immediate and the essential cause of something must co-exist with it. Each essential cause co-exists with its effect. Through movement both the cause and effect cease to exist but new causes and new effects emerge through continuous renewal. The former cause becomes the remote cause of the new effect. Movement is the participating or conserving cause of the order of the realm of generation and corruption. Hence, for any effect only its immediate and essential causes must co-exist with it.29 Avicenna distinguishes between the things that are subject to generation and corruption and those that are not, the latter being free of time, matter, and movement. Ungenerable things exist without the mediation of matter and change; they co-exist with their cause. In contrast to them, things that are subject to generation and corruption are conditioned not simply by the existence of their essential efficient cause, but also their immediate causes. They must come to exist after not having existed. This is why Avicenna traces the continuity of the building made by a builder to the giver of forms. While the properties of the material making up the configuration are the immediate causes of the continuity of the building, the giver of forms is the one that gives this particular form to this material. Let us consider the case of an individual man: (1) Brian who is the son of (2), the son of (3), the daughter of (4) the son of (5) John. The existence of Brian is conditioned not simply by the existence of his essential cause, ultimately God, but as well by his immediate cause (2). (2) in turn is conditioned by the existence of God and (3) so on and so forth. The conception of the relations between an efficient cause and its effect does not involve a temporal gap between the existence of the efficient cause and its effect as such. The efficient cause simply by being what it is can be an efficient cause. However, not all efficient causes must be efficient cause simply by their existence. If one sets up the condition that there be a temporal gap between the existence of the efficient cause and its effect this would be a limited viewpoint. This conception, which Avicenna states to have been adopted by the majority—which refers to theologians—requires that the effect be temporally after the existence of the efficient cause. On this condition, the cause is simply the cause of the beginning of the effect.

29

Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 265.17–19 – p. 266.1–8.

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Its remaining in existence does not depend on the cause. He argues that this condition requires that there be something that goes along with the cause which has no part in the existence of the effect, i.e., the preceding non-existence of the effect.30 For Avicenna, within such a limited conception of the efficient cause, moreover, every efficient cause must be potential and changeable. The implication of this argument is serious. If the conception of an efficient cause is limited to the causes whose effects follow later on, then God cannot be the efficient cause of the universe. On this conception, the cause would not be an efficient cause, at the outset. It would become an actual efficient cause, only when its effect begins to exist. Furthermore, the cause would become an actual cause by something happening to the cause, such as volition, or compulsion. And the action of the efficient cause would take place because of this thing happening to the efficient cause. Hence, according to such a conception, the efficient cause is an efficient cause after having been a potential efficient cause.31 Since nothing new or additional can happen to God, on this condition God cannot be the efficient cause of the universe. The co-Existence of Causes and Their Effects Does not Require that They Be Equal If the cause and the effect are simultaneous, one can object by saying that there is no ground to identify one as the cause and the other as the effect.32 Although the cause and its effect co-exist and there is no temporal gap between their existence, this does not mean that they are on the same level. The cause and its effect are not equal because while the effect exists simultaneously and on account of the cause, the cause exists only simultaneously with the effect. Coexistence does not suffice to explain the causal relation between the

30 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 263.3–11. See also, Avicenna, Ishàràt V, pp. 147–148. 31 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 263.12–18. 32 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV, p. 167.60–8. This objection may refer to the positions of Muslim theologians. Michael Marmura traces two objections which Avicenna discusses to Bàqillànì, an Ash'arite. One of the arguments concerns the necessary connection between the cause and the effect, the other concerns the co-existence of causes with their effects. Michael Marmura, “The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna,” in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed. Michael E. Marmura (New York: SUNY, 1984), pp. 184–186.

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two. Based solely on co-existence, if one takes the cause away, then the effect is taken away. But then if one takes the effect away––according to the rule of co-existence––the cause is also taken away. As a result, what is supposed to be the cause depends on the effect as much as the effect depends on the cause. Avicenna answers this objection by saying that one cannot take the effect away unless the cause is prevented from being the cause, or is already removed.33 Neither does the fact that both cause and effect are necessary mean that they are equal. The co-existence of an effect and its cause concerns their ‘duration,’ but not their subsistence or having existence. If the cause exists, the effect simultaneously exists. “They exist together (ma'an) in time, or in sempiternity (dahr), or something else. But they are not together with respect to having (˙ußùl ) existence.”34 As far as existence is concerned, while the effect becomes necessary on account of the cause, the cause is not necessary on account of its effect. The cause is either necessary by itself, or it is necessary on account of its own cause. But it is not necessary on account of its effect. Everything existing––except for the self-necessary being––is possible in itself, i.e., without reference to its cause. If it is taken with the existence of its cause, then it becomes necessary by something else. In any pairing of an efficient cause and its effect, the effect is necessary with reference to its cause, but not vice versa. Hence, the cause and the effect are not equal, although they coexist and they both are necessary.35 The Efficient Cause Is the Cause only of the Existence of Its Effect The cause has a part only in the existence of the effect, not in its non-existence. Avicenna considers the existence and the non-existence

33

Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.1, p. 167.9–16; p. 169.3–5 and 9–13. Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.1, p. 167.2–3. There is a hidden problem here. If both the effect and the cause have the same kind of being, such as being temporal or sempiternal, then it is conceivable that both the cause and the effect ‘exist together.’ However, if the cause and effect are not of the same genus, or of the same order of being, how can they be temporally simultaneous or co-existing? I want to simply point out the problem, the discussion of which goes far beyond my objectives. Although this is a problem for Avicenna in this context, because of the co-existence of the cause and its effect, this is also applicable to the thought of many philosophers and theologians. This is true especially with regard to the divine knowledge of things and God’s intervention in history, such as his response to prayers. 35 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.3, p. 274.7–17. 34

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of the effect as separate units. Since not all efficient causes exist forever, and since not all efficient causes are unstoppable from exerting their causal activity, some effects may come to exist temporally after not having existed. In such cases, if the cause is not such that it immediately causes its effect, the cause must become an actual efficient cause. No matter whether the effect exist simultaneously with the cause or it comes to exist later on, the relation of the effect to the cause concerns its existence. The cause has a part in the existence of the effect,36 but it does not have a part in the non-existence of the effect. Since the cause is the cause of the being of the effect, it does not have a part in the preceding non-existence of the effect insofar as it is the efficient cause of the effect. The preceding non-existence can have a cause, which can be simply the non-existence of the cause. It may also be due to something preventing the cause from exercising its causal power. In this case, the cause does not exist as the cause, though it exists without being a cause. Hence, the existence of the effect is on account of a cause, i.e., the existence of the cause. The non-existence of the effect is, again, on account of a cause. Its cause is the non-existence of the cause.37 The compound made up of ‘preceding non-existence’ and ‘posterior existence’ cannot be traced to one cause. Within the universe, there are things the quiddities of which require that they temporally begin to be after not having existed. There are also things that cannot begin to exist after temporal non-existence. All of them can be traced to their cause. However, if the prior non-existence and the posterior existence of the effect is taken as a compound, it cannot be traced to a single cause. Each part of the compound, then, can be traced to its own cause. The effect taken by itself is simply what is possible to exist. It does not reveal anything about whether it actually exists or not. Its existence or non-existence is due to the existence or non-existence of the cause. The cause is the cause of the existence of the effect, even if the effect begins to exist after not having existed despite the prior existence of the cause. The non-existence of the cause is the cause of the non-existence of the effect. However, ‘beginning to exist after not having existed’ is not something possible to exist among other things. Rather it is something that supervenes on some of the things that are possible to exist. 36 37

Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 260.1–4. Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 260.5–11.

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Thus, there is not one single cause for the fact that ‘something begins to exist after not-having existed.38 The claim that ‘the preceding non-existence’ and ‘the posterior existence’’ of an effect cannot be traced to a cause needs some further explanation. The cause in this statement does not refer to one entity with regard to its quiddity. It rather refers to all the conditions under which the cause exerts its causal activity. As will become clear through the discussions of divine immutability, for Avicenna God is the cause of the universe by willing it to exist. He might have been the cause of its non-existence by not willing it, but if at first he willed not to create, in order to be the cause of the universe God must have a new volition different from the former. Thus ‘a cause’ in this context includes all that makes the cause a cause, not simply an entity without reference to its causal activity. The compound made up by the ‘preceding non-existence’ and ‘posterior existence’ concerns the quiddity of things that exist. What Avicenna intends by saying this may be exemplified by comparing ‘a man’ to ‘a heavenly intellect.’ Man, a rational animal, if he exists outside the mind, exists as composed of form and matter, a material and temporal thing with a certain bodily construction brought forth through generation. A heavenly intellect, however, is not a material and temporal thing. If it exists outside of the mind, it exists without reference to time. If the effect is such that its quiddity requires that this effect may exist as something material and temporal, then the effect may begin to exist after temporal non-existence. In the preceding non-existence of the effect, the cause does not have any involvement. The cause has a part only in its existence. Since ‘beginning to exist after not having existed’ (˙udùth) concerns the quiddity of the thing in question, it does not concern the power of the agent. It is not something that can be done. Within the universe, the quiddities of some things are such that they cannot exist, except after preceding non-existence.39 These consist of the things in the sub38

Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 260.12–17; p. 261.4. In this context Aquinas’ analysis of the constraints on God’s creative activity may provide clarification. He maintains that “[n]ecessity arises from the end when the intention of the end cannot be fulfilled, either not at all or not conveniently, without this or that thing. It remains therefore that necessity in God’s works cannot arise except from the form which is the end of operation . . . thus we might say, for instance, supposing that God intends to make a man, that it is necessary and due that he give him a rational soul and an organic body, without which there is no such thing as a man.” De potentia III, 16. 39

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lunar realm, also known as the realm of generation and corruption. Some other things, however, cannot begin to exist temporally after not having existed. Things in the supralunar realm, which are not subject to generation and corruption, belong to this category. Hence some of the things in the universe must necessarily (wàjib ∂arùratan) exist ‘after temporal non-existence’ ('adam), and some others must necessarily exist ‘not after temporal non-existence.’40 Arguments for the Sempiternity of the Universe For Avicenna, the world is not eternal in the technical sense of the word. As discussed in chapter 2, for him, eternity (qidam) belongs only to God. Being eternal, for him, is to exist by itself and to have full perfection of being. In this sense only God is eternal, i.e., prior to all other beings. The universe, in the sense of everything other than God, may be characterized as sempiternal. Sempiternity, for Avicenna, is not infinite temporal duration. Rather it is above time, and is a non-temporal duration. Sempiternity is applicable to the vertical order of the universe, beginning from prime matter and going up to the first intellect. Within sempiternity, temporal things and time exist. Time is applicable only to things that are subject to generation and corruption. As the measure of movement, time is applicable to things that are subject to change. Since not all things in the universe change and are thus temporal, the basic argument of Avicenna is that considered as a whole, time is not applicable to the universe; it is rather a part and applicable to only some part of the universe. From there on, based on this conception of movement, he argues for an infinite temporal duration. But this latter again applies only to part of the universe. Further arguments, based on divine immutability and the nature of time, are meant to show the absurdity of a temporal beginning to the universe. Minimal adjustment is sufficient to apply the foregoing explanation of the relations between an efficient cause and its effect to the relation between God and the universe. The preceding four relations between an efficient cause and its effect are assumed in all arguments. In addition to this, that God is not like any other efficient cause must be underlined. In this respect, Avicenna reminds us that

40

Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 262.6–14.

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God is necessary in all respects, i.e., God is fully in act eternally. By implication, God is immutable, and nothing new may happen to God. Thus, Avicenna argues, since God exists always and is the essential cause of the universe, God always (dà"iman) causes the universe to exist.41 The First Argument: Time and Temporal Beginning Are not Applicable to All Things Avicenna draws a fundamental distinction among the things in the world: (1) things the quiddities of which require that they cannot come to exist after temporal non-existence, and (2) things that must begin to exist after temporal non-existence.42 In other words, there are things that do not need a substratum in order to exist, and there are things that need a substratum in order to exist. This corresponds to the distinction between ungenerable and generable things. Heavenly intelligences, souls, and bodies, as well as movement and time, are included in the first category. As we saw in chapter 2, Avicenna divides things with regard to duration into three categories: eternal, sempiternal and temporal.43 God is at the highest level, he is the eternal being who is self-subsistent and all-necessary. At the other end of the chain of being there are the things that are subject to generation and corruption. These are temporal things the quiddities of which require that they begin to exist after temporal non-existence. All things which are in between God and the things in the sublunar world are sempiternal. These are the things the quiddities of which require that they be non-temporal, and that they must not come to exist after temporal non-existence. One must ask why the quiddity of something must require that it be without temporal beginning, or that it be with a temporal beginning. In order to answer this question, Avicenna discusses the 41

Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 373.13–18. Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 262.6–14. 43 Avicenna’s triple division of the hierarchy of being possessing three types of duration may not be coherent, since heavenly bodies and heavenly intellects may not quite fit the same kind of duration. See Fazlur Rahman, “Ibn Sina’s Theory of the God-World Relationship,” pp. 43–46. Fazlur Rahman compares Avicenna’s conception of dahr to Proclus’ concept of ‘perpetual becoming.’ He argues that while Proclus considers ‘perpetual becoming’ within time, Avicenna places it beyond time. According to this interpretation, which seems justified to me, if we render Avicenna’s term ‘dahr’ as ‘sempiternity’ in English, then sempiternity is not infinite temporal duration. It is rather a kind of non-temporal duration. Hence time and movement is applicable neither to sempiternal beings nor to the eternal being, i.e., God. 42

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relationship between the possibility of something and its actual existence. Everything other than God, considered in itself, is possible of existence. Something that is possible to exist is also possible not to exist. If it is not possible to exist before it actually exists, then it cannot exist. The possibility of existent things must precede them, either temporally or essentially. Hence, in order for something to exist it must be something possible to exist before it actually exists. In this context, Avicenna divides things into three categories: (1) something possible to be a substratum, (2) something possible to exist in a substratum, and (3) something possible to exist without a substratum.44 In order for things to exist through a substratum, e.g., stone, wood and man, their substratum must exist. The possibility of their existence is in their substratum. Unless their substratum exists, they have no possibility of existing. The possibility of things that exist without a substratum cannot be temporally prior to them, because they do not exist through a substratum where their possibility is found. The possibility of things that exist in a substratum is in their substratum.45 Things that exist through a substratum, that is, things that are subject to generation and corruption begin to exist after temporal non-existence. But those that exist without a substratum cannot begin to exist after non-existence in the temporal sense.46 Avicenna places the possibility of material things in prime matter, but also considers placing the possibility of things in the power of the agent. The latter is what Aquinas argues when refusing one of the arguments for the sempiternity of the world. For Avicenna the possibility of something cannot be reduced to the power of the agent. The agent can do only what is possible. If one defines the possible in terms of the power of the agent, saying that ‘power is applicable only to something possible’ this declaration would mean ‘power is applicable only to that to which power is applicable.’ If possible is what can be done and the impossible what cannot be done, then if we doubted whether something can be or cannot be done, we could not reach the resolution of this doubt at all. Hence, the possibility of things must be different from the power of the agent to make

44 45 46

Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2, p. 177.5–12. Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2, p. 177.13–20 – p. 178.1–5. Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2, p. 177.6–8; p. 182.7–18.

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them. That something can be done necessarily follows from its being possible. Something ‘is possible’ with regard to itself, and ‘can be done’ with regard to the power of the agent. Therefore, the possibility of things is distinct from the power of an agent over it.47 Special emphasis may be appropriate regarding the beginning of movement and time. They do not exist through a substratum. In the Aristotelian spirit, Avicenna defines time as the measure of movement with regard to before and after. Time co-exists with movement. Movement is not one of the things that are subject to generation and corruption and it does not have a temporal beginning.48 Avicenna reaches this conclusion through his arguments that every movement requires a preceding movement. On the basis of the discussion above, Avicenna’s argument can be constructed as follows: (1) God is the efficient cause of the universe and the universe is the effect of the divine creative action. (2) Beginning to exist temporally after not having existed concerns the quiddity of existing things. (3) Only things that can exist in a substratum can begin to exist after not having existed. (4) There are things in the world the quiddities of which require that they exist without a substratum, (5) Hence the universe cannot have begun to exist temporally after not having existed. In this argument, (2) states that the universe’s beginning to exist after not having existed cannot be traced to the divine action. One may object that God is not simply the cause of the existence of things with quiddities which require that they are not after temporal non-existence, but God is also the cause that determines which quiddities existent things should have. In a sense God is the designer of the quiddities of things. Nevertheless, even if this argument is granted, the fact that there exist things that cannot come to exist temporally after not having existed (4) makes this objection ineffective. The things indicated in (4)—the things the quiddity of which requires existence without a substratum—cannot begin to exist temporally after not having existed.

47 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2, p. 181.6–16 – p. 182.1–6. See also, Avicenna, Mabda" wa Ma'àd, pp. 40–41. 48 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 381.8–11; p. 374.17–19. It is generated by the soul of the first celestial sphere, both of which are sempiternal. See also, Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.2, p. 383.10–17 – p. 384.1–9; p. 386.14 – p. 387.3.

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The Second Argument: Temporal Posteriority Requires a Change in God That the universe begins to exist temporally after not having existed is not compatible with the immutability and eternity of God. As stated above, for Avicenna causes and effects are simultaneous. ‘Existing after not having existed,’ as a compound, cannot be traced to a cause. Avicenna’s support for this claim is that the cause is the cause of the existence of the effect, not its preceding non-existence. If, despite the existence of the cause, the universe did not exist at first––on the assumption of God’s immutability––it could not come to exist at all. Or, if the universe has begun to exist after not having existed, then the universe as a whole must be something generable that needs the existence of a substratum that exists before it.49 If the universe begins to exist after not having existed, then God is not immutable. Consequently, either its cause must begin to exist after not having existed, or there must be a chain of remote and close causes leading to the existence of the effect. Since none of the parties debating the beginning of the universe would accept that God begins to exist after non-existence, this may be dismissed. If, despite the existence of God, the universe does not exist, in order for the universe to begin to exist, some other cause must come to exist. This new cause is the immediate cause of the universe,50 in addition to the existence of the essential cause, i.e., God. This immediate cause in turn needs its own immediate cause ad infinitum. Members of this chain come and cease to exist through movement, which itself does not begin to exist after not having existed.51 Thus, if the universe begins to exist temporally after not having existed, then God is not the sole cause of the universe. Clearly this is not the conclusion acceptable by defenders of the thesis that the universe began to exist after temporal non-existence. If God is the sole cause of the universe, and if, given the cause, i.e., God, the universe does not exist, then God must change so that the universe comes to exist. God is a necessary being, the necessitating agent of all other things. If God did not at first necessitate all things existing on account of him and then did this later, God would have two states: (1) one state in which he does not create, and (2) another state in which he creates. If God has two states, he 49 50 51

Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 374.1–6; p. 376.7–9. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 374.8–10. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 374.17–19; p. 375.1–4 and 9.

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would change from being not the creator to being the creator. If one conceives divine will to create to be identical with God, then God must change in order to create. Or if one conceives the divine will to create as something separate from God’s being, then there is no doubt that it would be additional to God. In any case, whether one conceives the divine will to create the universe as something identical to God’s being or something distinct from God, it must be new. The divine will itself must come to exist after not having existed.52 However this contradicts divine immutability and necessity in all respects. In order to explain both that the universe as a whole does not begin to exist and that within the universe some things begin to exist after not having existed without affecting the divine immutability, Avicenna reminds us of the distinction between the vertical and horizontal orders of things. There are things which are immediately given existence and there are things produced by the mediation of some of the things in the former group, i.e., matter, movement. At the vertical level which concerns the existence of things which are given existence immediately, things cannot come to exist after not having existed. If they came to exist after not having existed, then there must be a reason to prefer the non-existence of the things at first. Since their existence depend solely on the divine will but does not require time or matter, at first God must have willed not to create, and then must have willed to create. Were God to will not to create and then to create, he would be changeable, because the divine will is not something apart from God’s being, in the manner where the object of volition is something outside of him.53 Hence, as far as the vertical order of things is concerned, the immutability of the divine will requires that the universe cannot begin to exist after not having existed. At the horizontal level, however, things that are subject to generation and corruption need their essential cause as well as their immediate causes, such as movement and time. Their beginning to exist after non-existence does not oppose to the necessity and immutability of the divine will. Another argument for the thesis that the universe does not have a temporal beginning is based on God’s relation to the universe. If the universe comes to exist after not having existed (˙adatha), then a 52 53

Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 376.10–17. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 377.4–7.

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new relation (nisba) occurs to God, the relation of being the creator of the universe. This must occur to his essence (dhàt) and be in his essence (dhàt). If it is outside of the divine being, i.e., if this relation does not occur to God but to something else, then this is not the relation that is sought after. This is because the relation that is sought after is the relation that should explain the existence of everything other than God. If this relation is not in God, then it must be in something else which is distinct from God. Since creation includes everything, nothing other than God can be the origin of this relation.54 Avicenna is so certain about the demonstrative power of his argument that he maintains that one cannot possibly deny it. He confirms that without something new happening to the cause, nothing can come to exist after non-existence. One may deny this with the tongue, but cannot escape from acknowledging it in one’s conscience (∂amìr). God is immutable, and nothing possible can exist by itself. Avicenna implies that if the universe as a whole were conditioned to come to exist after not having existed, then now it would not exist at all.55 But is Avicenna’s argument sufficient to justify his conclusion? Does the claim that ‘the cause is the cause of the existence of the effect’ contradict the claim that ‘the cause can be the cause of the existence of the effect as well as its preceding non-existence’? If causes that act simply on account of their nature are considered, this seems to be the case. The cause causes the existence of the effect unless it is prevented. But does it apply, in the same way, to the divine action, which stems from divine knowledge and will? In order to get a firmer grip on this question, let us break it into two smaller pieces, reflecting the two alternatives the question implies. (1) Why cannot God be such that he wills not to act at first, and later on he wills to act? (2) Why cannot God be the cause of the preceding non-existence and then the existence of the effect by one act of will? That is, why cannot God, as a voluntary agent, cause the effect to be such that it exists temporally after not having existed? Avicenna argues that if an agent does not cause the effect at first and then later causes the effect, this agent is a potential efficient cause at first and then becomes an actual efficient cause. He states that the majority of people have such a conception of an efficient

54 55

Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 377.18–19 – p. 378.1–4. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 377.8–17.

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cause. He argues that no matter whether the efficient cause is a cause acting on account of its nature or on account of its will, if the cause does not cause the effect simply when it itself exists, then the cause is a potential efficient cause. As long as the cause does not actually cause the effect, it is a potential cause of the effect. Additionally, if the cause does not cause the existence of the effect when it itself exists, then the cause must become an actual efficient cause by something occurring to it, such as a new nature, or a new volition, or something else. Hence, according to such a conception, the efficient cause, in the same manner as the effect, begins to act by becoming an actual efficient cause after being a potential efficient cause.56 Moreover, in this conception, the efficient cause acts on account the thing that occurs to it.57 In light of the foregoing, let us come back to question (1), i.e., why cannot a voluntary cause be such that it wills not to act at first, and later on it wills to act? This may be applicable to voluntary causes in general, but it cannot be accepted with regard to God. For Avicenna, God cannot will not to act at first and will to act later on. Otherwise God would be, at first, the potential efficient cause of the universe, then the actual efficient cause. This would require that God be changeable. Furthermore, it would require that God have his perfections in a manner similar to creatures. That is, God’s perfections would not be identical to his being, but rather the relation between his being and his properties would be similar to the relation between a created subject and its accidents. Moreover, God would then be acting for the sake of something else, that is, for the sake of the thing that occasions him to act. As for question (2), i.e., why cannot God be the cause of the preceding non-existence and then the existence of the effect by one act of will? Avicenna does not seem to consider this form of the question specifically. This may be due to the fact that he was not aware of the question in this form, or that he did not consider it to be substantially different from the previous form of the question. It is, in fact, the argument Aquinas comes up with, as will be discussed in the following section. However, Avicenna’s argument that ‘the quiddity of some things require that they must not be after temporal non-existence’ turns out to be a kind of reply to this. Avicenna 56 57

Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 263.3–11. Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1, p. 263.12–14.

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maintains that there cannot be such a temporal, or any kind of, gap between God’s willing something to be and its existence, because the divine knowledge of things is identical to the divine willing, the latter being identical to making them exist.58 If the divine will concerns the making of creatures, then he must have made them exist by willing them. Otherwise, one can ask questions about the timing of creation. Avicenna argues that if God’s volition concerning the universe is identical with making it, i.e., God does not have a purpose which he would reach by creating the universe or a benefit God expects by creating,59 then the following questions can be asked: (1) why did God not create the universe before he did? (2) did God think the moment when he created the universe was more suitable? (3) did the time when the universe could exist begin when God created it? (4) and finally, was God unable to create the universe before? These questions may sound absurd. However, Avicenna argues that they are all valid questions and applicable to all times, if the universe is assumed to be after its preceding temporal non-existence.60 The Third Argument: Temporal Beginning Leads to Impossible Conclusions Avicenna questions the applicability of time to the whole universe and attempts to deduce absurdities from the assumption that the universe began to exist after not having existed on the basis of the nature of time. One of his arguments is based on the non-existence of time without the existence of movable things (3.1). He argues, by assuming that time is the measure of movement, and exists as supervening on movement and movable things, if no movable thing exists, there cannot be two distinct instants of time, by which the temporal posteriority of the existence of the universe may be traced.61 Another argument of Avicenna concerns the priority of God to his effects (3.2.1). He asks the question ‘by what is God prior to his action (af 'àlahu) that comes to exist after not having existed (˙aditha)?’ Avicenna’s use of the word ‘action’ needs to be interpreted. For him God is eternal and God’s action is identical to himself in the strict 58

Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.14–15; IX.1, p. 378.14–16. Since God does not benefit from the existence of the universe and cannot be seeking after a purpose in creating, divine volition is identified with making creatures exist. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 378.15 and p. 379.2–3. 60 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 378.15–16 – p. 379.1–2. 61 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 378.8–9. 59

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sense. He seems to be speaking here not of the divine action in the strict sense, but the effects of the divine action. Is God prior to the universe by his being (dhàtihi ) or by time? Since all the effects owe their being to him (kà"ina 'anhu) and God is eternal, he is prior to the universe with regard to being, not with regard to time.62 One may also consider why God should not be prior to the universe with regard to time in addition to his priority with regard to being (3.2.2). If God is assumed to be prior to the universe by both essence and time, then the situation can be described as following: (1) There is a time when God exists, and the universe does not exist. (2) Now God exists and the universe exists. Statement (1) indicates a past time when God existed but the universe did not. When (2) is true, (1) is no longer true. This implies that there was a time with finite duration before the existence of the universe. In turn this implies that there was an existence (kawn) before creatures were created (khuliqa), since time does not exist on its own. This existence must have finite duration, since at the beginning of the existence of the universe this time-period, during which ‘God was’ and ‘the universe was not,’ ended. Since such an assumption would require that some creature exists before creation, God cannot be prior to the universe by time.63 By the co-existence rule between cause and effect, if time begins, the cause of the time, i.e., God, must have begun to exist, or have become an efficient cause, at that instant (3.2.3). Of course, one may reject the co-existence rule. However, Avicenna argues that if God’s priority to the universe with respect to time is such that ‘he was, and there were no creatures,’ this implies more than that time had a beginning. The statement that ‘he was and creatures were not’ does not mean that ‘simply God existed,’ or ‘God existed alone.’ Rather, Avicenna argues that when the universe begins to exist, God’s essence is realized (˙àßil ).64 Since before the universe begins to exist God does not create the universe, God’s act of creation is not realized. Since God’s action is identical to his being, his being is realized after creating the universe. Here Avicenna does not distinguish between the divine action and the effect of the divine action, and he maintains that God’s willing to create is identical with the 62 63 64

Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 379.4–8. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 379.7–12. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 379.14–19.

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existence of what he has willed to create. Aquinas rejects such a requirement. For him since God is not really related to the universe, even though the divine will is eternal and God’s act of creation is identical to God, the fact that the effect of the divine action begins to exist after not having existed does not contradict divine immutability. Assuming that God is temporally prior to the universe requires that God cannot be prior to the universe with regard to being (3.2.4.1). That is, if temporal priority applies to God, then God cannot be eternal. If by God’s temporal priority to the universe one means that there was a time when God existed but the universe did not exist, then three things are implied: (1) God’s existence, (2) the non-existence of the universe and (3) a time period before the universe began to exist. This priority of God to the universe in terms of time does not simply imply the beginning of time, but rather a time period in which God could have created. This would mean that God’s priority can be measured and quantified by something impermanent, something subject to renewal, which time is. Hence, if God is assumed to be prior to the universe by time, this implies that God is not absolutely prior to the universe but only temporally prior. Since time is attributed to God, and since there are two different situations so that we say ‘God was, and the universe was not’ and now ‘God is and the universe is,’ God’s duration is assumed to be a temporal duration, which is not the duration of something permanent (thabàt).65 Avicenna states, “If you have realized (ta˙aqqaqta) [this], you have known that, according to their position, the first is prior to creatures not by absolute priority (sabqan mu†laqan), but by temporal priority, which includes (ma'ahu) movement and bodies (ajsàm), or one body.”66 Avicenna provides another argument to deduce absurdities based on the assumption that God is temporally prior to the universe. If God is assumed to be temporally prior to the universe, this implies that God is not absolutely prior to creatures, but this indicates that God is prior only to this universe (3.2.4.2). Since time is the measure of movement, there must be something the movements of which make time exist before this universe. Since time is the measure of

65 66

Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 380.1–8. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 380.9–10.

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the movement, there must be something movable during the nonexistence of the universe which, when its movement is measured, allows God’s duration is quantified as well. Let me remind essential points in Avicenna’s arguments for the sempiternity of the universe. For him, God is the metaphysical efficient cause of the universe. What applies between a cause and its effect is also applicable between God and the universe. Avicenna advances four rules that hold between causes and effects. These are (1) causes necessitate their effects; (2) causes co-exist with their effects; (3) causes are prior to their effects with regard to being, not with regard to time; and (4) causes are causes of the existence of their effects, not their preceding non-existence. These four rules apply between God and the universe, granted that God’s relation to the world has its own specific aspects that must be taken into account. For Avicenna, the universe must be sempiternal, because there are sempiternal beings. In addition to the four rules mentioned above, Avicenna maintains that the temporal posteriority concerns not the cause but the quiddity of things. Some of the things in the universe must begin to exist after temporal non-existence, and yet some others must not begin after temporal non-existence. Things that must begin to exist after temporal non-existence are material, changeable things, i.e., things that are subject to generation and corruption. The condition of some of the things in the universe cannot be applied to the whole universe. Thus although some things in the universe begin to exist temporally after not having existed, the universe as a whole cannot have begun to exist temporally after not having existed. If one admits that the universe began to exist after not having existed, for Avicenna, this implies various unacceptable results. It requires that God’s will is changeable, and that God is first a potential cause of the universe, then its actual cause. Furthermore, the assumption that the universe began to exist after not having existed is also self-defeating, because one cannot make such an assumption, unless one also assumes that there is a time period—hence some movable thing—existing before the universe. Thus, on this assumption God is not temporally prior to all other things, i.e., the universe, but only this universe.

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Aquinas’ Position Before tackling the question whether the universe has always existed, Aquinas’ position concerning the nature of creation should be stated in its essential points. This will help us grasp to what extent his position accords to that of Avicenna, and to identify what the major differences between Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ positions are. It will also provide a guide to assess whether Aquinas’ refutation of arguments for the sempiternity of the universe are successful. Aquinas’ discussion of the sempiternity of the world makes up only a small part of his writings on creation. He wrote on all issues essential to religious teachings, such as creation out of nothing, God’s creating without intermediaries, God’s ability to create many things, etc.67 I want to highlight four main points that characterize Aquinas’ conception of creation: (1) Creation is existential dependence, (2) creation is not a change, (3) creation is a relation, (4) whether the universe is sempiternal, or it has begun to exist temporally after not having existed, cannot be demonstrated through rational arguments. Aquinas emphasizes that creation is neither motion, nor change from one type of existence to another. It is simply a relation between God and the universe. While it is not a real relation from God to creatures, it is a real relation from the universe to God. For Aquinas, that the universe has not always existed, i.e., is not sempiternal, cannot be proven through philosophical demonstration. This is because God creates by his will and all properties of the universe, including its duration, are determined by the divine will. Since God creates freely, not necessarily, the duration of the universe cannot be known through investigating the divine will.68

67 For more inclusive studies of Aquinas’ theory of creation see Steven E. Baldner & William E. Carroll, “Introduction,” in their translation of Aquinas on Creation: Writings on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, Question 1, pp. 22–62; Etienne Gilson, The Christian philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1994), pp. 120–160. 68 Moses Maimonides is considered to be one of Aquinas’ sources of influence in regard to his agnostic position. See David Burrell, “Aquinas and the Islamic and Jewish Thinkers,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Elenore Stump (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 70–74. For Maimonides’ theory concerning creation, see Andrew L. Gluck, “Maimonides’ Arguments for Creation Ex Nihilo in the Guide of the Perplexed,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 7 (1998), pp. 221–254; William Dunphy, “Maimonides’ NotSo-Secret Position on Creation,” in Moses Maimonides and his Time, ed. Eric L. Ormsby

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What Is Creation? Creation primarily concerns the being of things, not their duration. Only God is the self-subsisting being, which does not owe its being to anything else. No other thing is identical with its own existence, but exists by participating in existence. And all things existing by participation must be caused by God who is being in the fullest sense.69 All things including prime matter exist on account of creation.70 In considering creation, one looks not at specific features of already existing things, or any particular thing which comes to exist in the already existing universe; the whole universe is taken into consideration. Thus creation designates the emanation (emanatione) of all being (entis) from a universal cause, the causal power of which reigns over all things. This universal cause is God, and the coming forth of all things into existence (emanatione) is creation.71 Creation is out of nothing. Since creation designates the fact that everything comes to be-ing, then everything must be coming to be (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1987), pp. 151–172; Arthur Hyman, “Maimonides on Creation and Emanation,” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1987), pp. 45–61. Gluck and Dunphy interpret Maimonides’ position to be similar to that of Aquinas. They argue that Maimonides maintains that there is no demonstration either for or against “creation,” e.i., beginning of the universe temporally after not having existed. Arthur Hyman states four propositions summarizing Maimonides’ view: “(1) God brought the world into existence after absolute non-existence; (2) He brought everything into existence through His will and volition (though, as has already been noted, His wisdom was operative as well); (3) He brought everything into existence out of nothing; and (4) time is created, so that, whatever one’s theory, creation must be considered as atemporal.” (p. 49). I cannot further enter into Maimonides’ position. But as Hyman interprets it, Avicenna would endorse all of these propositions wholeheartedly. The fourth proposition might be most welcomed by him, because Avicenna’s main point in his theory is that time is not applicable to the whole universe, let alone divine action. Hyman reminds us that Maimonides considers the second proposition to be the major difference between his position and that of Aristotle and emanationists. As I have tried to show in chapter 3, for Avicenna, who can be included among the emanationists, divine will and necessity do not exclude each other. Hyman argues that through the sharp distinction made by Maimonides between the temporal and the atemporal realms, “it makes no sense to ask: ‘what did God do before He created the world?’ or ‘why did God create the world at one time rather than another’.” (p. 53). Avicenna raises such questions concerning time, because he thinks that the conception of creation as the existence of the universe after temporal non-existence rests on unwanted assumptions regarding divine action. It implies that divine action is like human actions conditioned by the pre-existence of time and matter. 69 ST Ia. 44, 1. 70 ST Ia. 44, 2, c. 71 ST Ia. 45, 1; ScG II, 15; De potentia III, 14, ad s. c. (= sed contra) 8.

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from non-being. Consequently, there is no being presupposed in creation, no being from which the universe is made. Just as a man becomes a man out of what is not-man, everything comes to be out of what is non-being, which is identical to nothing. Hence everything comes to exist by creation from nothing, i.e., out of nothing.72 Creation out of nothing (ex nihilo) denies the existence of anything preceding the existence of the universe. The preposition “ex” may be considered to imply the existence of a material cause, out of which things are created. However, when something is said to be made from nothing (ex nihilo fieri ), the preposition “ex” signifies a sequence, not a material cause, e.g., noon comes from dawn. This expression can be considered either to modify, or be modified by the expression “nihil.” According to the first view, the actual situation is connected to what precedes: the universe exists, and it is preceded by nothing. Following the second view, such a sequence is denied, because there is nothing preceding the universe. Thus it means the universe is not made from something pre-existing.73 The priority and posteriority here is an essential priority and posteriority, since what belongs to something on account of itself is essentially prior to what belongs to it on account of something else. Before they are created, things in themselves are nothing; they do not exist. They exist because God created them.74 72 ST Ia. 45, 1; De potentia III, 1, c.; ScG II, 16. In ScG, Aquinas provides various arguments why creation must be out of nothing, i.e., not something already existing. In some of them, he argues that otherwise creation would be the same as movement, in some of them he argues that in contrast to causes of movement God must be the cause of being, and still in some others he argues that movement does not explain the existence of things. 73 ST Ia. 45, 1, ad 3; De potentia III, 1, ad 7. See also Steven E. Baldner & William E. Carroll (trans. & ed.), Aquinas on Creation Writings on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard 2.1.1, p. 67: “Because of these two points, creation is said to be “out of nothing” [ex nihilo] in two ways. On the one hand, the negation [in the word “nothing”] denies the relation implied by the preposition “out of ” [ex] to anything preexisting. Thus, the creature is said to be “out of nothing” because it is “not from something pre-existing.” And this is the first point. On the other hand, the order of creation to a pre-existent nothing remains affirmed by nature, such that creation is said to be “out of nothing” because the created thing naturally has non-being prior to being. If these two points are sufficient for the meaning of creation, creation can be demonstrated and in this way philosophers have held [the doctrine of ] creation.” 74 Aquinas, On the Eternity of the World, trans. Steven E. Baldner & William E. Carroll, in Aquinas on Creation Writings on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard 2.1.1, p. 119; De potentia III, 14 ad 7. Essential priority of nothingness in things is reminiscent of Avicenna.

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200 Creation Is not a Change

That creation is not a change is immediately implied by the fact that creation is not out of pre-existing matter. In this respect, Aquinas’ affirmation that creation is not a change must be considered as part of his argument that creation is not out of some pre-existing thing. If creation were a change, it would imply that something already existed independent of God, something from which God created the universe.75 The principle ‘nothing comes from nothing’ may be raised, on the authority of ancient philosophers, as contradicting the position that creation is out of nothing. This principle, however, applies only to the forthcoming of particular effects from particular causes. It does not apply to the whole being of all things existing on account of God.76 Another objection Aquinas discusses is based on the analysis of the terms of creation. If creation is to make something from nothing, by creation the thing created ‘becomes’ something. But ‘becoming’ is change, and change supposes that the subject precedes the end of the action. Thus God does not create out of nothing. For Aquinas the mistake in this objection is to consider creation as a kind of change. Creation is not change, even though it is conceived in such a manner. Unlike various kinds of change, e.g., accidental and substantial, in creation it is not some part of things but their entire substance that is produced. The preceding non-existence and following existence of things can be understood as a change from nothing to something by the human intellect, but this is only in our understanding, and by extension in our expression.77 Creation is an instantaneous act that does not take place in time. It is not a process, which takes time, such that the beginning and the end of which could differ. If it were a process taking up time, then creation as the act by which creatures come about would be prior to the created thing. This would require the existence of some subject prior to the created thing. However this is contrary to what creation is.78 Unlike an action causing a change, in creation the two ends with regard to the created things are not in the same category.

75 76 77 78

ST Ia. 45, 2; ScG II, 17, [2], [4]. ST Ia. 45, 2, ad 1. ST Ia. 45, 2, obj. & ad 1; ScG II, 18, [2], [3]. ScG II, 17, [5]; ST Ia. 45, 3, ad 3.

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In change the beginning point of the change and the end point fall in the same ontological order, in that both exist. In creation, however, there is nothing existing to begin with, simply something comes to exist.79 Creation as the Relation between God and the Universe Since creation is not a change, if one eliminates the idea of change in conceiving creation, what is left is the creator, the created thing, and the relations between them. Creation is a relation between the agent and the patient.80 But the relationship between God and the world is not reciprocal. Whereas the relation of God to the universe is not a real relation, but a conceptual one; the relation of the universe to God is a real relation. In order to have a better grasp of Aquinas’ conception of the relations between God and the universe, we need to highlight his conception of relation in general and identify the place of relations between God and the universe within this context. Aquinas was one of the pioneering theologians, in the Medieval Christian world, to use Aristotle’s theories in this regard.81 Real Relations of God Aquinas follows the Aristotelian triple division of relations in general, though he modifies Aristotle’s theory in important ways.82 In Metaphysics V,83 Aristotle divides relations into three kinds on the basis of their foundations: numerical, causal and psychological. In the first division, Aristotle includes not only “strictly numerical relations,” such as ‘greater than,’ ‘equal to,’ but some other relations such as “specific identity, qualitative similarity, and qualitative equality,” on

79

ScG II, 17, [3]. ST Ia. 45, 3. 81 Some scholars argue that Aquinas did not raise all the relevant questions concerning relations, and his discussions are ambiguous. For example, see Mark G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) (Henceforth Relations), p. 13; Earl Muller, “Real Relations and the Divine: Issues in Thomas’s Understanding of God’s Relation to the World,” Theological Studies 56/4 (1995). 82 Mark G. Henninger, Relations, pp. 17–18 and 33–39. For a critical assessment of Aquinas’ transformation of the notion of relation in his metaphysics of creation, see Jan Aertsen, Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought (Leiden, New York: Brill, 1988), pp. 168–170, 274–275. 83 Aristotle, Metaphysics V.15, 1029b 25–1021b 11. 80

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the grounds that “all refer to unity.”84 The second division includes relations whose foundations are “the accidents of action and passion and active and passive potencies,” for example the thing that heats and the thing that is heated, the thing that cuts and the thing that is cut. The third class consists of the relations between a measure and the measured thing, and example of which is the relationship between the thing known (measure) and the knower (whose knowledge is measured by the thing known).85 Not all relations are real relations. Whether a relation is a real relation or a conceptual one depends on the related things and the foundation of the relation. For medieval theologians and philosophers, including Aquinas, in a relation there are three elements: the subject, which has the relation to the term, on the basis of a foundation. For example a and b have a relationship of similarity, because both are white. The subject a bears the relation of similarity, R, to the term b, on the basis of the foundation of being white, inhering in a as an accident. B bears the relation of similarity, R’, to a, on the basis of the foundation of being white, inhering in b as an accident.86 For Aquinas, “a relation R of a to b is real only if a and b are really distinct extra-mental things, and there is a real extra-mental foundation in a for R.” Aquinas also held that a relation R of a to b or a relation R’ of b to a is a relation of reason only if either (i) a and/or b is not real, or (ii) a and b are not really distinct, or (iii) there is no real foundation in a for R or in b for R’.87

84

Mark G. Henninger, Relations, p. 6. Ibid., p. 7. 86 Henninger, Relations, p. 5. 87 Henninger, Relations, p. 7; ST Ia. 13, 7. See also ST Ia. 28, 1; Earl Muller, “Real Relations and the Divine: Issues in Thomas’s Understanding of God’s Relation to the World,” pp. 675–676. The condition for real relations, as Henninger formulates it, i.e., extra-mentality, is a bit problematic. His formulation works when he tries to explain Aquinas’ position concerning the relations between God and the world, but if one requires the same condition, i.e., the relata must be distinct extramental things, and there must be a real extra-mental foundation in the subject, then the relations among the divine persons turn out to be non-real. This is because the divine Persons are not three distinct beings. In ST Ia. 28, 1, when explaining why relations among the divine Persons are real, Aquinas argues that those relations are real because the divine Persons have an identical nature. This simply requires that in order to have real relations to each other, relata must be of the same order of being. However, in addition to the requirement that both relata must be of the same order, the thing that is really related to the other must also in some way depend on the other. One may consistently apply these two conditions to the 85

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The relations among divine Persons are real relations, although God is not the subject in which accidents inhere. For Aquinas, there are two kinds of relations that concern God: (1) relations among the divine Persons, and (2) God’s relation to the universe through creation. Whereas the relations among divine Persons are real, God’s relation to the universe is not a real relation. It is a conceptual relation, or a relation of reason. In explaining why the divine Persons are really related without God’s being subject to accidents inhering in him, Aquinas distinguishes between relatives—terms that belong to the category of relation—and relations supervening on other categories of accidents, such as quantity and quality. Only relative terms can indicate conceptual not real relations, even though they are by no means limited to this. Relative terms do not indicate or require that something inhere in the subject. In contrast to relative terms, terms expressing relations supervening on other accidental categories (e.g., similarity based on quantity, quality) do require and indicate something inhering in the subject. As far as the divine Persons are concerned the relative terms signify a real relation. Relatives, terms expressing pure relations, indicate only a reference to something else by their meaning, such as father implying having a son. What a relative term often signifies may be simply in the mind (ipsa apprehensione rationis), but it may signify something real as well. If the thing a relative term signifies is simply in the mind without referring to something real, such a relation signified by this relative term is a conceptual, or logical, relation (relatio rationis tantum). Man is related to animal as a species to its genus. Since ‘animal’ as such does not have a real existence when we speak of man as a rational animal, man taken as a relative term signifying a relation to animal as such does not indicate a real relation. Whereas animal, when we speak of a rational animal, does not exist as simply being animal, man exists in re. Hence they are not of the same order. However, the divine persons are of the same order and have the same nature, one being the principle of what proceeds from it. Thus, concludes Aquinas, the relations arising from the divine processions must be real.88 As God cannot have accidents, in God all real relations are identical with the divine nature. The relations among the divine Persons and to the relations between God and the universe. See ST Ia. 13, 7; De potentia VII, 8–10. 88 ST Ia. 28, 1.

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divine nature and the relations in God are identical in reality but differ only in our understanding.89 How God Is Related to the World The idea that the universe is really related to God but God is not really related to the universe was an idea common among many medieval philosophers.90 Aquinas conceives the relations between God and the world as the third category in Aristotle’s division. However, the third category in turn may be considered as a specific case within the second category, i.e., relations based on action and passion. Aquinas definitely places the relations between God and the universe in the category of action and passion in a broader sense. He even criticizes Maimonides for failing to see this.91 In the third group of relations, in Aristotle’s division of relations in Metaphysics, the relations between relata are not mutual. While one of the two related things bears a real relation to the second, the second is not really related to the first. The relations between God and the universe are of this kind. Aquinas brings in two arguments to explain why God is not really related to creatures. An agent and patient are mutually related (1) 89

ST Ia. 28, 2. For the reality of relations among the divine Persons without implying there be three distinct natures or three gods, see also Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 198–202. 90 Henninger, Relations, p. 31. In modern times this proposition has been criticized, especially on the ground that it is a consequence of the commitment to the divine immutability. Henninger, op. cit., p. 32. Henninger discards the view that Aquinas’ rejection of real relations from God to creatures stem from his view that God is immutable. Since the universe cannot come to exist unless God creates it, no change in the status of the universe with regard to existence occurs by itself. Even if Aquinas does not explicitly use the immutability of God in denying that God is really related to the universe, it is in the background. Since according to faith, the universe was created temporally after not being created, if God were really related to the world, then upon creation God would have acquired a new relation. This contradicts the belief in divine immutability. Henninger argues that for Aquinas something can be really related to something else without any change in the subject. If God were not the creator of the universe, then this would hold. For example, John grows old, and Adam becomes equal to John in size. Even though Adam did not change, he bears the real relation of being equal to Adam. However, if God did not create, the world would not exist. Hence the change implied by the beginning of the world’s existence would not be a mere Cambridge change. If God were to have real relation to the world, and if God created the world after not having created it, then it would imply a change in God. Henninger, Relations, pp. 21–22; 32–33. 91 De potentia VII, 10. See also Earl Muller, “Real Relations and the Divine: Issues in Thomas’s Understanding of God’s Relation to the World,” pp. 676–678.

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if there is mutual dependence between the relata, and/or (2) if they are of the same order of being. One of Aquinas’ arguments is that the agent and the patient must be ordered to each other so that they are mutually related to each other. In the relations based on action and passion, while in some cases both the agent and the patient mutually depend on each other, in some cases the patient depends on the agent, but the agent does not depend on the patient. By the action of the agent, the patient may be perfected as well as the agent itself. Or the patient might move the agent. This may be found especially, as Aquinas puts it, in univocal agents. That is, mutual dependence is characteristic of cases where the agent and patient are of the same order of being. For example by producing something in its own species, the agent preserves the perpetuity of its species. For the cases in which one of the relata is not really related to the other, Aquinas gives the example of knowledge. While the knower, by the act of knowledge is related to the object of knowledge, the thing known is not related to the knower. This is because the act of knowing is an intellectual act and in no way touches the thing known. The act of knowing is not something intervening and common between the two relata. While the knower is related to thing known through the act of knowing, in the thing known there is nothing corresponding to the act of knowing. Hence the thing known is not related to the knower, because there is no foundation in it to provide a relation to the knower.92 Since none of the aforementioned conditions are true for God, God is not really related to the universe. God does not depend on the universe in any way. God does not acquire anything by creating; his actions are supremely liberal. God acts without moving, without being changed. Furthermore God and the universe are not of the same order of being. The universe does not exist on account of God’s nature, but on account of his will and knowledge. Consequently, the universe is not another God but a creature. These two premises justify the position that God is not really related to the universe, although the universe is really related to God. God does not act through an action “proceeding from God and terminating in the creature, but his action is his substance and whatever is in him is

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wholly outside the genus of created existence by which the creature is related to God.”93 Aquinas raises an objection highlighting the difficulty of using the model of knower and the thing known to reflect the relations between God and the universe. On this model the knower is related to the thing known but the thing known is not really related to that by which it is known. God is the knower with respect to the creatures, and things are the objects which are known with respect to God. Consequently God must be related to the universe. In answering this objection, Aquinas notes the dissimilarity between divine knowledge and human knowledge of things. While divine knowledge is the measure of things, human knowledge is measured by them. Hence as the measured thing is related to the measure, but not vice versa, things are really related to God, but God is not really related to them. Since God knows other things by knowing himself, the relation of the divine knowledge is not directly to things but to the divine essence.94 At most one can say that there is a real relation between God himself and his knowledge of things. But one may not posit a real relation from God to things as they exist outside God’s knowledge.95 Yet even this cannot be said in the case of God, because in God knowing and what is known are identical.96 Henninger correctly notes that for Aquinas non-mutual relations between the knower 93 De potentia VII, 10, c., ad 6; ST Ia. 13, 7; ST Ia. 28, 1, ad 3. Henninger considers these premises, i.e., God is independent of the universe, and God and the universe are not of the same order of being, to be parts of separate arguments to establish that God is not really related to the universe. He argues that the argument that ‘since God and the universe do not belong to the same order of being, God is not really related to the universe’ is more radical and fully developed than the other. See Henninger, Relations, p. 33, footnote: 55. However, this argument, if taken by itself, implies that the universe can be ‘not really related to God’ as well. That ‘while from the side of God there is nothing extra-mental, but creatures exists in re’ does not constitute a justifying ground for the non-mutual relations either, since being mental by itself does not justify that the relations between two things be non-mutual. Otherwise relations in the Trinity would not be real. See, ST Ia. 28, 1, ad 4. Moreover God’s knowledge of things and human knowledge cannot be compared in this respect. While in the human case the knower is really related to the thing he knows, God is not really related to things existing on account of the divine knowledge and will. Hence these two premises must be taken together. 94 De potentia VII, 10, 5 and ad 5. What Aquinas argues amounts to saying that the relations between God and the universe are not reciprocal. See Sara Grant, Towards an Alternative Theology (Bangalore, India: Asian Trading Corporation, 1991), pp. 35–52. 95 ST Ia. 28, 1, ad 4. 96 ST Ia. 28, 4, ad 1.

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and the object known in the usual sense do not hold between God and the universe.97 If this were to be applied to God and the universe—God being the knower and the universe being the object known—then God would be, at first sight, really related to the universe, while the universe would not be really related to God. Dependence of the universe on God for its existence and the difference between God and the universe in the ontological hierarchy make up ground that justifies the real relation of the universe to God. While creatures are really related to God, the Creator is only conceptually related to creatures. As stated above, Aquinas uses two premises in arguing that God is not really related to the universe: (1) God does not depend on the universe, and (2) the universe and God are not of the same order of being. The universe totally depends on God in its existence. The universe is not of the same order of being as God. These two insure that the universe is really related to God.98

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Henninger, Relations, p. 33. ST Ia. 13, 7; De potentia VII, 9, c. In De potentia VII, 9, Aquinas uses an argument based on the order among things. The universe is ordered to God as its principle. But God is not ordered to the universe. Hence the order among things parallels the dependence and independence between them. See also, De potentia VII, 10. Of course, that God is not really related to the universe while the universe is really related to God follows from his premises. However, the first premise reduces ‘relation’ to ‘dependence.’ This may not be easily acceptable. P. T. Geach in Logic Matters (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980) criticizes it sharply: “We must take it as a way of saying that some relational propositions latch on to reality in a way that others do not. This difference would have to hold between true relational propositions, and even between pairs of logically equivalent true propositions; for clearly “God providentially governs the world” is logically equivalent to “The world is providentially governed by God”, but by the Thomistic theory only the second of these propositions predicates a ‘real’ relation, though both are true.” Geach blames interpreters of Aquinas rather than Aquinas himself (p. 318). “If a relational proposition indeed made no predications about A or B, but only affirmed a relation ‘between’ them, then it would be quite unintelligible how, if true, the proposition could correspond to a reality in A rather than to a reality in B; and of the two converse relations, alike holding ‘between’ A and B, one could not very well be more ‘real’ than the other” (p. 319). Harm Goris, in his Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will (pp. 24–28), responds to this objection of Geach. He argues that Aquinas intends “to consider the semantics of words that signify relations,” not to make a distinction “between relations as real entities.” (p. 24). Moreover, “The distinction serves to indicate how a specific group of divine names, viz. terms that signify a relation, fall short in signifying the divine essence.” (p. 25). His explanation is not quite convincing, because as he immediately states, all our talk about God, all names we predicate of him, fail to express the divine essence perfectly. 98

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That God is not really related to the universe does not prevent the predication of relative terms of God and creatures. As God is the origin and the principle of all things, God bears to the universe a relation of being the origin as well as the relation of being different from the universe. In fact, an infinite number of relations exist between God and the universe.99 Consequently, relatives, such as Lord-servant, Creator-creature and cause-effect, apply to God and the universe without requiring that God and the universe be equal.100 By positing one of the relatives in things such as creature and servant, one posits the counterparts of those relatives, such as Creator and Lord, in God. This does not require, however, that the subjects of the relations be equal. The relationship between Creator and creature is not similar to the relationship between any cause and its effect, e.g., father and son, since God is not a univocal cause with regard to the existence of the universe. That is, the effect, which is creation, is not another god.101 Consequently, even though creator and creature are relative terms––if one affirms one, the other is affirmed by it––still this does not require that both must be affirmed in the same way.102 Anything that is said of God on the basis of the existence of creatures outside the divine knowledge is said ex tempore, not eternally. Some of the divine actions are internal actions, such as knowing and willing, and do not require the existence of anything outside of God. These names are said of God eternally. Yet some other divine names are such that there must be something corresponding to them outside God, for example creating and forgiving.103 They refer to divine actions in relation to creatures. God’s names that require the existence of creatures are not said of God eternally. They are said of God not because God is really related to things, but because things are really related to God. Following the creaturely conditions, we can predicate of God terms implying temporal sequence, change, etc. Thus the terms predicated of God on the basis of the existence of creatures are said of God from time, in accordance with crea99

De potentia VII, 8. De potentia VII, 8, ad 1 and ad 2. 101 De potentia VII, 10, 3 and ad 3. 102 De potentia VII, 10, 12. 103 For Aquinas’ distinction between God’s actions that require an object outside the divine knowledge and those that do not, see ScG I, 79 [9]; ScG II, 13 & 14; Harm Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God, p. 23. 100

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turely conditions, not from eternity.104 Aquinas’ distinction between the divine names that are said of God from time (ex tempore) and those that are said from eternity conforms to his distinction between real relations and relations of reason. The relations implied by the divine names that are said of God from time are relations of reason.105 Aquinas interprets creation in accordance with the non-reciprocal character of the relations between God and creatures. He argues that creation does not place anything real in God, while it denotes something real in creatures. Creation may be taken in the active sense denoting the action of the agent, i.e., to create, and it may be taken in the passive sense denoting the action of the patient, i.e., to be created. Following the active sense of creation, if God were really related to creatures, this would rule out creation as temporal in the passive sense. This is so because if God is really related to the universe and if the universe has a temporal beginning, then something temporal would be in God, i.e., a new relation. One may object that if on this ground such a relation is not real in God, then neither should it be real in creatures.106 In his reply to this objection, Aquinas states that creation in the active sense is God’s action, “which is his essence with a relationship to a creature.” While God’s relation to the world is merely conceptual, the relation of creatures to God is real.107 Their relation to God is real, because creatures really depend on their creator—otherwise they would not exist.108 Another objection to the reality of creation is that if creation is real, it can be considered as a reality mediating between God and creatures. But since creation is not eternal, it cannot be in God. It is not in the creature either. Otherwise another creation would be required for creation, ad infinitum. Hence creation is not something real.109 In reply to this objection, Aquinas reminds us that creation should not be understood as a change. In the passive sense, creation

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ST Ia. 13, 7. For a lucid articulation of the conformity of the real and non-real relations of God to the distinction between the divine names said of God from time and from eternity, see D. J. Wennemann “Saint Thomas’ Doctrine of Extrinsic Denomination as Mediate Correspondence in Naming God Ex Tempore,” The Modern Schoolman LXV ( January, 1988), pp. 119–129. 106 ST Ia. 45, 3, obj. 1. 107 ST Ia. 45, 3, ad 1. 108 ScG II, 18, [4]. 109 ST Ia. 45, 3, obj. 2. 105

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is in the creature and, in this sense, is co-created with creature. There is nothing additional to the created thing as a relation. Just as accidents and the forms of things do not exist by themselves, but with a substance, creation in the passive sense is not something existing by itself. Since things have relations with reference to another thing, a relation is by itself referential. A relation does not need another relation in order for two things to be related. Hence no further creation is needed for creation.110 Aquinas’ argument that God is not really related to the universe as it exists in re is important for his position concerning the beginning of the universe. As will be shown in the next section, Aquinas distinguishes between the divine actions, such as knowledge and will, and the effect of the divine action. The universe, as it exists in re, is the effect of the divine act of knowing and willing. By arguing that God is not really related to the world, Aquinas provides grounds for keeping the divine immutability intact.111 The Sempiternity of the Universe Is Possible but not Necessary Aquinas takes an agnostic position concerning the beginning of the universe. Such a position amounts to saying that neither the proposition that the world began temporally after not having existed, nor the proposition that the world has always existed can be demonstrated through philosophical argumentation. Taking eternity in a broader sense, Aquinas states that nothing besides God is eternal (aeternum), and that arguing this does not contradict reason (impossibile). That is, the arguments for the sempiternity of the universe do not yield a necessary conclusion. Hence arguing that the universe has not always existed is reasonable.112 His argument that rejecting the sempiternity of the universe is reasonable may also be applicable to his rejection of the position that the temporal beginning of the universe can be demonstrated by rational arguments. That is, arguments aiming to establish that the universe began to exist tem110 ST Ia. 45, 3, ad 2; ScG II, 18, [4]; De potentia VII, 9, ad 2; De potentia III, 3, ad 2. For a discussion of Aquinas’ theory that creation in the passive sense and the creatures are co-created, and how the relation of creation might be prior, or posterior, to the creature, see F. D. Wilhelmsen, “Creation as a Relation in Saint Thomas Aquinas”, The Modern Schoolman 56 (1979), pp. 107–33. 111 De potentia VII, 8, ad 5. 112 ST Ia. 46, 1.

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porally after not having existed do not yield a necessary conclusion.113 Aquinas argues that something can be possible in three senses: (1) with regard to the power of the agent; or (2) with regard to its terms, i.e., the universe and being sempiternal; or (3) with regard to a substratum. It is possible for the universe to have always existed in the sense that God could have it so. It is also possible for the universe to have existed sempiternally in the sense that the terms ‘world’ and ‘being sempiternal’ do not contradict each other, as does the idea of a square triangle. However, the world is not possible to be sempiternal in the sense that there is a passive potency, a substratum by which the universe could have always existed. The possibility of the sempiternity of the universe contradicts the truth of the Catholic faith only in this third sense.114 For Aquinas, it is possible that the universe has always existed. But it is not necessary that the universe has always existed. Aquinas deduces from the position that the world is not absolutely necessary that the world does not have to be sempiternal. If the existence of the universe is necessary, then it is necessary either by itself, or by something else. If the universe were necessary by itself, then it would not need an efficient cause giving it existence.115 Since the universe is not necessary by itself, it needs an extrinsic cause so that it could exist. Properly speaking, it is the divine will which is the cause of things and from which the necessity of things is derived. Since in the absolute sense God wills necessarily only himself, he does not have to will the existence of the universe, and he does not have to will an everlasting (semper) universe. The world exists so long as God wills it to exist. Thus one does not have to accept that the world has always existed.116

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ST Ia. 46, 2. De potentia III, 14. John Wippel traces the increasing sharpness of Aquinas’ position concerning the possibility of the universe to have always existed. Wippel argues that until Aquinas wrote the De potentia III, 14, he defended only the position that no one successfully demonstrated that the world began to be. But in De potentia III, 14 he comes very close to asserting “an eternally created effect” is possible. And in the De aeternitate mundi, Aquinas is quite satisfied with asserting the possibility of the sempiternity of the world. See John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1984), pp. 191–214. 115 ScG II, 31 [2]. 116 ST Ia. 46, 1; ScG II, 31, esp. [3] and [5]. 114

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From the side of the agent, we cannot reach a necessary conclusion concerning the duration of the universe. The existence of the universe, considered as a whole, depends absolutely on the divine will, and we cannot assign any necessity in any way. Since God does not necessarily will the universe, and we cannot inquire into matters which God freely wills, we cannot reach a demonstrative conclusion regarding the duration of the universe on the basis of the divine will.117 Such an argument cannot be provided on the basis of the universe, either. Aquinas distinguishes between the case of particular things within the universe and the universe as a whole. We can explain why a particular thing is such and such, or that it came to exist through something else (relating it to its causes), or by taking the order of the universe into account. However, if we want to explain the properties of the universe, such as its beginning after not having existed, we cannot refer to any creature as being the reason why the universe is such and such. Moreover, neither the divine power nor the divine goodness can be the reason for a particular disposition of the universe. The sole reason for the existence of the universe and the properties it has, e.g., the particular size of the heavens, is the divine will. The universe exists with its structure and properties because God willed it to be so. Just as the distance between stars—even if this can be attributed to their nature—does not limit the divine will, neither does the question of the time of the universe. This is even truer, because, for example in the heavens there is no possibility for a different quantity, or a different accident. Since time and place are not intrinsic to things, their nature as it is given does not require a definite time or place. Thus determining the duration of the universe depends absolutely on the divine will. Consequently, rational arguments based on the properties of the universe do not yield a necessary conclusion as to whether the universe is sempiternal, or has a temporal beginning.118 Let me summarize my discussion of Aquinas’ conception of creation and his position regarding the sempiternity of the universe. Aquinas agrees with Avicenna that creation in the philosophical sense is an existential dependence of the effect on its cause. Coming to

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exist anew, or beginning to exist temporally after not having existed, is not included in the conception of creation, which can be argued on philosophical grounds. Creation is a non-reciprocal relation of dependence the universe bears to God. While God is not really related to the universe, the universe is really related to God. Consequently, the names attributed to God on the basis of the existence of creatures are said of God from time, not from eternity. Since God is not really related to the universe as it exists in re, the emergence of creatures does not imply any change in God. On philosophical grounds, it is possible that the universe has always existed. However, there can be no philosophical argument to demonstrate that the universe has always existed. This is, because no demonstrative argument can be provided either on the basis of the agent, or on the basis of the universe. On the one hand, the divine free will is the cause of the universe, and we cannot inquire into the divine will with respect to things God freely wills. On the other hand, we cannot explain the dispositions of the universe as a whole, including its duration, on the basis of a cause within the universe, as we do with regard to particular things in the universe.

Countering Avicenna’s Arguments for the Sempiternity of the Universe Since I am comparing Aquinas’ position to that of Avicenna with regard to the temporal beginning of the universe, I will not attempt to cover all that Aquinas discusses in this regard. Aquinas brings in almost all of Avicenna’s arguments for the sempiternity of the universe as objections in questioning whether the world has always (semper) existed. However, they may not conform to Avicenna’s arguments exactly, since Avicenna is not the only person whose arguments Aquinas wants to refute. Countering the First Argument Aquinas raises objections from the conception of possibility and the existence of ungenerable things. These are related to Avicenna’s first argument for the impossibility of a temporal beginning of the universe. As already stated, he argues that God is the cause of everything. Some of the possible things must begin to exist temporally after not having existed, yet some others must not have a temporal

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beginning. Those that begin to exist after a preceding temporal nonexistence need a substratum in which their possibility resides before they begin to exist. And those that do not need an immediate, or preparative, cause cannot begin to exist after temporal non-existence. Highlighting the issue in question based on the possibility of the universe, Aquinas raises the following objection: if the world has not always existed, and since it is not impossible to exist, then the world must have been possible before it began to exist. Its possibility means it had the potency to exist. Its potency requires a substratum, which is matter. Since matter cannot be found without form, the assumption requires that there existed a body before the universe.119 Aquinas’ objection partly captures Avicenna’s point. Avicenna would add that given such a conception, the whole universe would be treated like a generable thing. Given the existence of God, the efficient cause of the universe, if something does not exist by simply being possible, two alternatives result: (1) either the possibility of the universe must be in matter, or (2) God is the potential efficient cause of the universe at first. I will have the opportunity to discuss this second point later. The first alternative is the issue of concern here. The possibility of the universe must be in matter, because only things that need an immediate cause besides the essential cause may come to exist temporally after not having existed. If the world began to exist temporally after not having existed, such an assumption would posit the existence of a substratum before the universe. Thus, God would not be the creator of all things. It would also require that the whole universe is subject to generation and corruption. Aquinas argues that the possibility of the world before it began to exist does not require a substratum. The possibility of the universe does not have to be traced to a passive potency. But this possibility is traced to an active potency, residing in the power of the agent. Or one may even dispense with the reference to the power of the agent, and consider the possibility of the world in the sense of ‘not impossible.’ In this respect, that the subject and the predicate of the statement, ‘the world exists,’ do not contradict each other is sufficient to justify the possibility of the universe before its existence.120 However, from Avicenna’s perspective both of Aquinas’ 119 De potentia III, 17, obj. 10; ST Ia. 46, obj. 1. See also, De potentia III, 17, obj. 11. 120 De potentia III, 17, ad 10; III, 1, ad 2; ST Ia. 46, ad 1. For a similar argu-

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explanations for the possibility of the universe before it began to exist are not acceptable. Given the cause of the universe, if the universe depended only on God, not requiring a substratum and temporal order, it must have existed immediately. Given the cause, if the universe still remains non-existent, then it would mean that God is not the cause of the universe. Thus, the universe is impossible, not in itself, but because of the non-existence of its cause. Aquinas’ argument that a voluntary agent can determine the time when it begins to exist is the way out from this dilemma. Avicenna’s argument for the thesis that some things must not be after temporal non-existence can be found in a slightly different manner dispersed throughout the objections that Aquinas discusses. In De potentia, referring to Avicenna, Aquinas states that effects are necessary given the existence of their cause. If, given the cause, the effect still remains possible, then some other cause would be needed. Since God is the sufficient cause of the universe, and God has always (semper) existed, concludes the objection, the universe has always existed.121 Aquinas brings in a similar objection in ST. But in ST, the argument concludes that since God is eternal (ab aeterno), the universe is eternal (ab aeterno).122 Since both Aquinas and Avicenna agree that the universe is not eternal in the strict sense, I take the eternity attributed to the universe in this argument in the sense of sempiternity. In ST, Aquinas raises the objection based on the nature of ungenerable things. Ungenerable things do not begin (incoepit) to exist. Matter and heavens are ungenerable. Hence, the universe did not begin (incoepit) to exist.123 This basically echoes Avicenna’s contention that time is not applicable to all things in the universe. Hence if we take ‘incoepit’ in Aquinas’ text in the sense of temporal beginning, it comes down to saying that ungenerable things cannot have a temporal beginning. In replying to this objection, Aquinas acknowledges that every effect is necessary (necessariam habitudinem) on account of its natural

ment see, Al-Ghazàlì, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, ed., trans. & annot. Michael Marmura (Utah: Brigham Young University, 1997), p. 42. The argument placing the possibility of things in the agent may be traced to Philoponus. See Herbert A. Davidson, “John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 89/2 (1969), p. 360. 121 De potentia III, 17, obj. 4. 122 ST Ia. 46, obj. 9. 123 ST Ia. 46, obj. 3. See also, De potentia III, 17, obj. 2.

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or voluntary cause. God does not cause the universe by necessity of his nature, but by his will. Consequently, it is not necessary that ungenerable things exist whenever the divine nature (natura) existed. However, the effects of God follow in accordance with the divine will, in the manner God willed them to exist.124 Aquinas maintains that in arguing that matter and the heavens do not begin to exist, Aristotle’s point was that they are not generated.125 But it does not contradict the theory that everything is produced in existence through creation.126 Aquinas’ answer to the question does not seem to adequately address the crux of the debate. Two main points need to be highlighted: (1) God is the voluntary agent of the universe, and (2) everything began to be through creation. As for the first point, that the universe is the effect of God, a voluntary agent explains well enough that the universe depends on the divine will. The divine will determines how and when the universe exists. The implication of this view will be discussed further below. As for the second point, even if one grants that Aristotle may not be of help as an authority, on this issue, the debate is not resolved. Avicenna acknowledges, just as Aquinas does, that everything is created by God and depends on God with regard to its existence. But Avicenna rejects that ungenerable things can be assigned a temporal beginning. If time is applicable only to generable things, then temporal beginning cannot be assigned to ungenerable things. Thus, the issue of debate is not whether everything owes its being to God, but is rather whether everything can have a temporal beginning. Countering the Second Argument As discussed in the preceding section, Avicenna’s second argument is based on the immutability of God. Based on his conception of the relation between causes and effects––that is, causes and effects co-exist and the cause is the cause of the existence of the effect, not its previous non-existence––Avicenna argues that the universe always existed. The universe exists now, but if, at first, God existed and the 124

De potentia, III, 17, ad 4. For Aristotle’s discussion of the generation of matter and heavens see, Physics I, 4. 192a28 and De caelo I, 3. 270a13–22 respectively. 126 ST Ia. 46, ad 3. 125

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universe did not exist, a change in God would be required. God must have willed first the previous non-existence and then the existence of the universe. Furthermore, with the beginning of the universe, a new relation would occur to God. More importantly, a temporal beginning of the universe implies a time before the existence of the universe, which raises further questions, such as why God did not create before. Some of objections on the basis of the divine immutability, which are discussed by Aquinas, concern various divine perfection properties. Since an immutable agent always produces the same effect unless it is prevented, and since God cannot be impeded, God seems to have always (semper) created the universe from eternity (ab aeterno).127 This objection concerns divine power in combination with the divine immutability. With reference to Augustine (Confessions VII, 4) Aquinas raises an objection based on the identity of the divine power, will, and action. God must have willed to create the universe from eternity, otherwise he would change. If he willed the universe from eternity, since there is no impotence in God, then the universe appears to have existed from eternity (ab aeterno).128 If God did not create at first and then created, he would be moving from potency to actuality. Since God is immutable, he seems to have created from eternity.129 Furthermore if God willed to create from eternity, there is no reason why God should delay the creation of the universe.130 Some other objections based on the divine immutability concern the emergence of the universe existing in re, taking into account the relative names expressing relation between God and creatures. If God is said to be Lord from eternity (ab aeterno), then creatures must have existed from eternity. Since being Lord implies having subjects, and since God is eternally Lord, then creatures must have existed from eternity.131 Another objection in the same vein considers God’s being the cause of the universe. This, in fact, better reflects the Avicennan spirit, emphasizing the relationship of cause and effect between God and the universe. If God were not eternally the cause of the universe, then at first he must have been its potential cause

127 128 129 130 131

De De De De De

potentia potentia potentia potentia potentia

III, III, III, III, III,

17, 17, 17, 17, 17,

obj. obj. obj. obj. obj.

6. See also ST Ia. 46, 1, obj. 10. 9. 12. 22. 21.

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and then its actual cause. Since nothing is a cause unless it has an effect, the world seems to be created by God from eternity (ab aeterno).132 Moreover, since God creates through his knowledge, and knowledge is related to the thing known, and since relatives are simultaneous, it appears that God created from eternity.133 Given that God is the voluntary agent of the universe, if the universe begins to exist after not having existed, this implies a change at least with regard to time, as well as a supposition of a time period before the universe. For example, “he who plans to build a house tomorrow and not today, anticipates something tomorrow that is non-existent today, and at least he expects that today will pass and tomorrow will come. Since time is the measure of change, this requires a change before the universe begins to exist.”134 Despite the eternity of the divine will to create the universe, if he did not create from eternity, then something must have pushed God to create the world when he created it. But since there cannot be anything before creation, it appears that the world was made from eternity.135 This objection concerns Avicenna’s argument that if the universe began to exist after not having existed, then one can ask questions, such as why God did not create before, whether he could not create it before, or whether something arose that pushed God to create. Avicenna also asks how an instant of time can be distinguished from another in the non-existence of temporal things. In responding to the objections concerning the immutability the divine perfections, Aquinas distinguishes between the divine perfections referring to the divine actions and the effects of the divine actions. Aquinas underlines the fact that God is the voluntary agent of the universe, as he reminded us when dealing with part of the first argument. A voluntary agent, through its will, determines not only the form of the effect, but also its place, time and other conditions. Consequently, although God is immutable and willed the universe eternally, it does not follow that the universe must exist forever (semper).136 That is, that God’s will is eternal does not require

132

De potentia III, 17, obj. 26. De potentia III, 17, obj. 19. 134 ST Ia. 46, 1, obj. 6; ST Ia. 46, 1, obj. 5. 135 De potentia III, 17, obj. 13. 136 De potentia III, 17, ad 6; ST Ia. 46, ad 10. For a similar argument see, alGhazàlì, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, pp. 13–17. 133

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that God willed the universe to exist forever (semper).137 If God did not create the world at first and created it later on, would it require that God move from potency to actuality? Or would it require any change in God? Aquinas’ distinction between God’s action and the effect of his action is sufficient to respond these objections. Aquinas argues that if God were to begin acting later on, or begin a new action when the universe begins to exist, then it would require that God move from potency to actuality. However, God’s action is eternal, because it is his very substance. Although God does not begin acting with regard to himself, he may be said to begin to act with reference to the effect. Since the effect follows the condition of the action—in this case a voluntary action which determines not only the form but also the time and other properties of the effect—the beginning of the universe after temporal non-existence does not require that God move from potency to actuality.138 God’s will is eternal and he acts eternally, but he determines the time when the effect begins to exist. Hence the beginning of the universe after temporal non-existence does not require that God’s will be changeable or that God move from potency to actuality when the universe begins to exist. Aquinas also responds the objection which asks why God would wait to create. The objection runs as follows: if God had the power to create the universe, and he also knew it and willed it, then there is no reason why God would wait to create the universe. Aquinas refers this objection to Augustine and argues that by this statement Augustine wanted to prove the co-eternity of the Son with the Father and the co-equality of the Son to the Father. Since the Son is of the same nature as the Father, this holds true. But since the universe is not of the same nature with God, there is no reason requiring that God create the universe immediately, without waiting.139 Aquinas does not find any serious challenge in objections based on the divine immutability with regard to the emergence of the universe existing in re. Relative terms require that both relatives should exist. Thus one may argue that in order for God to be Lord, there must exist at least one subject. Aquinas maintains that if lordship is

137 138 139

De potentia III, 17, ad 9. De potentia III, 17, ad 12. De potentia III, 17, ad 22.

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“regarded as consequent to the action whereby God actually governs creatures, then God was not Lord from eternity.” But ‘being lord’ may also be taken in the sense of having power to govern from eternity. On this interpretation, in order for God to be Lord, the universe does not have to actually exist from eternity, except potentially.140 Similarly, on the assumption of the temporal posteriority of the existence of the universe, God was not always (semper) the cause, since the universe did not always actually exist. However, this does not mean that God was a potential cause, because God is always (semper) in act. God may be said to be a potential cause only with regard to the effect of his action, i.e., the universe.141 Here Aquinas does not provide a further explanation of why God’s being a potential cause with regard to the effect does not cause a problem. But his position may be constructed on the basis of his conception of the divine names. Some divine names are said eternally, some are not. While Avicenna considers the existence of the effect in re to imply a new relation to God, hence a change in the cause, Aquinas does not see any trouble in the existence of the effect in re. Since for both of them God is not related to the universe in the usual sense, Aquinas’ reply is sufficient. That is, the posterior emergence of the effects of the divine action does not require that God be at first a potential cause and then an actual cause when the effects come to exist. Otherwise, a similar problem would be posed for Avicenna’s position as well. This time the problem would concern not the beginning of the whole universe, but the beginning of particular things within the universe. The objection linked to the relation between the knowledge and the object of knowledge does not require that the universe should always exist. The relation between the divine knowledge and things and between human knowledge and things are opposites. While our knowledge of something requires the existence of the object of knowledge, the divine knowledge does not require that what he knows exist outside the divine knowledge.142 What applies between the divine will and the object of volition is applicable here between divine knowledge and the object of that knowledge.

140 141 142

De potentia III, 17, ad 21. De potentia III, 17, ad 26. De potentia III, 17, ad 19.

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Using the distinction between God’s action and the effect of the action, Aquinas rejects the implication of even an imaginary time or change of time on the assumption that the universe began to exist after not having existed. The objection was that even if a voluntary agent may delay the action without itself being changed, this implies a change in time, and a time period before the action takes place. Aquinas maintains that unlike a particular agent acting through matter and in time, God, by creating, produces all things including time. God as the universal cause cannot be considered to be acting now and not before. God acts eternally without any change, but the effect of his action takes place according to God’s will. And a universe that begins to exist temporally after not having existed shows the divine power more evidently.143 Even if one grants that God’s will to create the universe is eternal, and God does not move from potency to actuality when the universe begins to exist, one may ask why God chose the moment when the universe began. Did something push God to create at that moment? In responding to this Aquinas states, in a manner similar to the preceding response, that this argument assumes that the agent acts in time and not as the cause of the time itself.144 These two responses of Aquinas are not satisfactory, because Avicenna’s point is not merely a question of something pushing God at that moment to create. Aquinas’ distinction between the divine action and the effect of the divine action does not presuppose a time period. But if the agent may determine that the effect may come to exist temporally after having not existed, this assumes the existence of a time period before the effect begins. Avicenna’s point is that the assumption of temporal posteriority of the universe requires the universe could begin to exist at various times. If so, why does God prefer the moment at which the universe actually begins? It amounts to saying: the assumption of temporal posteriority of the universe assumes God to be like an agent acting in independently existing time. So, each blames the other for likening God to a temporal agent.

143 144

ST Ia. 46, 1, ad 6. De potentia III, 17, ad 13.

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Countering the Third Argument Avicenna’s third argument is mainly an attempt to deduce unacceptable conclusions on the basis of the conception of time. One of his arguments to this effect is that time does not have a temporal beginning. Without the existence of temporal things there can be no time, and no two instants of time can be distinguished. If God is prior to the universe by time as well as by being—which follows from the assumption of temporal posteriority of the universe—then God cannot be absolutely prior to the universe. But he can be temporally prior to this universe. Hence the assumption that the universe began to exist after temporal non-existence is self-defeating. Temporal posteriority of the universe may also be considered in the following way: The universe did not exist at first, and then it existed. This latter can be considered as a change, caused by God as the agent creating the universe. But nothing changes unless the changing thing and the agent causing the change alter from one state to another. Alteration from one state to another is change. As a result, the beginning of the universe after not having existed implies a change before it, ad infinitum. If there is always change, then there is always something changeable. The objection concludes that the universe or something other than God has always existed.145 Time is always at its beginning and its end, because it is the instant which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Hence, time never begins and ends, but exists always. Since there is no time without movement and movable things, which are included in the universe, the universe should have always existed.146 Another objection, which better captures Avicenna’s contention, concerns the priority of God to the universe. God precedes the world either by nature (natura), or by duration (duratione). If God precedes the world just as any cause precedes its effect which co-exists (coaevum) with its cause, then God precedes the universe only by nature (natura), not by duration.147 Then since God exists from eternity (ab aeterno), so does the 145 ST Ia. 46, 1, 5. The argument for the infinity of change is referred to Aristotle, Physics VIII.1, 251a8–28. 146 De potentia III, 17, obj. 15; ST Ia. 46, 1, 7. This objection of Aquinas considers the conception of time being always at its beginning and at its end, never beginning or ceasing to exist. Since, time never begins nor does it end, consequently, movement and movable things do not begin or cease to exist. Thus, the whole world does not have a temporal beginning. 147 De potentia III, 17, obj. 20; ST Ia. 46, 1, obj. 8.

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universe. If God precedes the world by duration as well as by his nature, then there must have been a duration prior to that of the world, such that there would be a before and an after in duration, which is what time is. Thus, on this assumption, the universe would be preceded by time, movement, and movable things. Hence the universe has not begun to be after temporal non-existence.148 In replying to the objection that any new change requires a change in the cause as well as in the effect, Aquinas restates the position that God, the prime mover, is absolutely changeless. Although the primary subject of change is changeable, it does not begin to exist through change, but through creation. Aquinas argues that the movement has always been there since the beginning of the existence of movable things. But it does not exist apart from the movable things.149 Aquinas’ answer does not seem to meet the expectation of Avicenna’s argument. The crucial point is that, if the effect of the divine action did not exist at first, then it begins to exist. From Avicenna’s perspective, this requires that some new thing should happen to God to make God create. But Aquinas’ response is, since God is the voluntary cause of the universe he determines when the universe begins. Aquinas’ distinction between the divine action and the effect of the divine action defeats Avicenna’s argument for the implication of two situations in God. That is, if the universe begins to exist temporally after not having existed, there would be two situations: (1) God exists without the universe, and (2) God exists with the universe. Since Avicenna and Aquinas agree that God is not really related to the existence of things in re, Aquinas’ response is quite satisfactory. The posterior emergence of the universe does not imply a relation in God, such that this relation would require a change in God. Responding to the objection intended to prove that time does not begin and cease to exist, Aquinas states that this objection is circular. If one supposes that time always exists, then one has to conclude that there is no beginning and no end of time. But if one supposes that movement neither always existed nor will it always exist, then it is not necessary that every instant is a beginning and an end. It is possible, however, that there is a first moment, which is only the beginning, and there is a last moment which is only the

148 149

De potentia III, 17, obj. 20; ST Ia. 46, 1, obj. 8. ST Ia. 46, 1, ad 5.

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end.150 Thus if one does not take the sempiternity (aeternitas) of movement as a given, one does not have to accept that each moment is a beginning and an end in motion. After all, Aristotle’s point in his argument is not to show that time always existed, but rather to show that time and movement go together. If one is taken to be always, the other must be taken in the same way.151 Avicenna’s point is not that the sempiternity of movement and time should be taken as a given, rather his point is that if something comes to exist after not having existed, this implies a change and the existence of a time period before its coming to exist. Granting Aquinas’ response that God might have planned the existence of the world such that it comes to exist at such and such time, the implication of change in God is eliminated. However, the idea of a time before the existence of the universe remains. From this point, one may again argue that since time is the measure of change, and change does not exist without changeable things, the temporal posteriority argument is selfcontradictory. Regarding the objection whether God preceded the world by being only or by being as well as by time, Aquinas states that God is before the world by duration. But the term ‘before’ indicates the priority of eternity, not the priority of time. Aquinas’ answer so far is a bit ambiguous. None of the parties debate that God is eternal. If one considers God’s being and eternity separately, then it would be easy to assert God’s priority to the universe by both nature and duration, since God’s duration is eternity. Thus, what Aquinas says so far does not contradict Avicenna’s thesis. However, what if God is considered to be temporally prior to the world? Since God’s duration is not measured by time, God is not temporally prior to the universe. But then, how can the temporal posteriority of the beginning of the universe be explained? The temporal posteriority of the universe requires assumption of a time-period before the beginning of the universe. Aquinas argues that this time before the universe is not a real time, only an imaginary time. “We can imagine an infinite space of time running with eternity and preceding the beginning of time.”152 Aquinas gives the example of saying, ‘there is nothing beyond

150 151

De potentia III, 17, ad 15. ST Ia. 46, 1, ad 7. See also, Aristotle, Physics VIII.1, 251b10–28.

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the heavens.’ In such a statement, the term ‘beyond’ indicates an imaginary place.153

Remarks on Arguments Concerning Sempiternity Aquinas’ argument that while we can trace particular things to their cause, we cannot trace any disposition of the universe, including its duration, to a cause other than the divine free will is not a convincing argument to refute Avicenna’s argument for the sempiternity of the universe. That time is the measure of change is granted by Avicenna as well as Aquinas. Change in turn occurs in changeable things, and requires a pre-existing subject. That creation is not a change is again granted by Avicenna as well as Aquinas. The existence of non-temporal things is also granted by both of them. Hence saying that the divine will freely determines the duration of the universe does not solve the problem. If time were applicable to all things, and were not the measure of change, then the universe could begin to exist temporally after not having existed. However, in this case, temporal posteriority would lose its distinctive feature. From Avicenna’s perspective, on Aquinas’ account all things are considered like things subject to generation and corruption, which are only part of the universe. If the Aristotelian definition of time is granted by both of them, i.e., the measure of change according to before and after, and if it is applicable to only things in movement, then Aquinas seems to be pushing too hard, as he also follows the triple division of things into eternal, sempiternal, and temporal.

152 De potentia III, 17, ad 20; ST Ia. 46, 1, ad 8. al-Ghazàlì adopts a similar strategy when he discusses the issue in his Tahàfut al-Falàsifa. In his Medieval Islamic Controversy between Philosophy and Orthodoxy: Ijmà' and Ta"wìl in the Conflict between alGhazàlì and Ibn Rushd, (Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill, 1989), Iysa A. Bello discusses al-Ghazàlì’s and Averroes’ positions concerning the sempiternity of universe. He attempts to vindicate al-Ghazàlì’s position. However, his discussion is confusing and does not provide a clear and consistent examination of the issue. See especially, pp. 83–110. 153 For a similar reply to Avicenna’s argument, see al-Ghazàlì, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, pp. 30–36. Al-Ghazàlì considers this kind of time to be imaginary and gives a detailed explanation of the analogy between the time before the universe and the place beyond the universe.

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If time is applicable only to some of the things belonging to the universe, then it cannot be applicable to all of them. Hence, Aquinas’ counter-argument for the possibility of the temporal beginning of the universe does not seem to successfully defeat Avicenna’s argument. Although both Aquinas and Avicenna think that God is not related to the universe in such a way that this relation posits anything external to God, Aquinas pursues logical consequences of this argument. Despite his position concerning the relation between God and the universe existing outside the divine knowledge, Avicenna argues that if the universe begins to exist temporally after not having existed, this would imply a new relation occurring to God. Thus, it would require that God is not immutable. By distinguishing between the divine action and the effect of the divine action, Aquinas provides a satisfactory response to this argument of Avicenna. Whereas the divine action and will are eternal, and thus exist forever, the effect of the divine action does not have to exist forever. Consequently, the beginning of the universe after not having existed does not require that God change or move from potency to actuality. The distinction between the action and the effect of the action, in a sense, depends on Aquinas’ argument that God is the voluntary cause of the universe. By his distinction between the action and the effect of the action, Aquinas goes in the opposite direction of Avicenna’s argument. Avicenna argued that there cannot be any gap between the action and the emergence of the effect of the action. His main reason for this argument is the inconceivability of a time before the existence of universe, or rather the inapplicability of time to nontemporal beings. Aquinas’ distinction between a voluntary agent and a natural agent is his major counter argument. If successful, it counters the demonstrative force of Avicenna’s argument for the sempiternity of the universe. By distinguishing between agents acting by nature and agents acting by volition, Aquinas hits the core of Avicenna’s theses: (1) that as a compound ‘existence after non-existence’ cannot traced to one single cause, and (2) that true agents and their effects co-exist. But can one grant this? In the case of a natural agent, if there is no impediment, its effect follows the existence of the agent immediately. For a voluntary agent, however, this does not have to be the case. A voluntary agent can determine when its effect begins to exist. For example, take a man planning to do something next week. Such a planning sounds familiar to us. But one should carefully

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examine the example. The plan, in the example, is carried out in the already existing world. The man, in the example, carries out his plan within the universe. That is, there exists time, independent of this man, and no matter what the realized plan is, it is a kind of movement. The realization of the plan is a movement of already existing conditions, or things, from one state to another, or from having one form to having another. Simply speaking, the carrying out of the plan requires the existence of matter and time in the human case. Thus, what happens in the example is ‘existence after movement,’ but not ‘existence after non-existence,’ in the true sense. In Avicenna’s terms, it is ‘existence after relative non-existence,’ but not ‘existence after absolute non-existence.’ To what extent is such planning applicable to creation of the universe by God? Can it be freed from the creaturely conditions, i.e., the requirement of matter and time existing independently of the man in the example? If, as a voluntary agent, God planned the universe to begin to exist temporally after not having existed, does this require the existence of time and matter existing independently of creation? I believe it does. If there is no preceding time, then the universe does not begin to exist temporally after not having existed. If there is time before the universe, then, according to the definition of time, there is a changeable thing before the universe. Thus, the model of a voluntary agent cannot be applied to creation unless one allows for the existence of time and temporal things before the universe. Even though Aquinas does not accept such an assumption of time and matter, the conception of a voluntary agent determining its effect temporally after not having existed includes the assumption of time and temporal things independent of this voluntary agent. Aquinas acknowledges the assumption of time once. If God is said to be prior to the universe with regard to time as well as with regard to his being, then the existence of time before the universe is assumed. Aquinas maintains that this time is only in the imagination. But if the time before the universe is only in the imagination, then the temporal posteriority of the universe must be in the imagination as well. That is, if the time preceding the universe is imaginary, then the posteriority of the time when the universe begins is also imaginary, because there is no time to which the world can be posterior. If the time before the universe, and the posteriority of the instant when the universe begins, is imaginary, then the temporal beginning of the universe does not take into account what really exists. One

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may conclude that the posteriority of the universe is only in the imagination. However, this is not the conclusion Aquinas would like to argue for. From another perspective, one can ask whether an imaginary element can be used in an argument which is designed to show that something is in fact the case. That is, in the argument all the other elements either refer to existents or their properties that exist outside the mind of the one who argues. It is agreed that God really exists, that the universe really exists, and that time is a property of temporal things and part of the external world. A statement simply expressing an imaginary state of affairs cannot be used as part of an argument to indicate a state of affairs in the real world. For example, let’s imagine that John robbed Adam of a hundred dollars. From this premise, ceteris paribus, it does not follow that John must be punished indeed. His punishment can be justified only in our imagination, because stealing from Adam took place only in the imagination, and we know that John has not committed robbery in fact. There is no ground to punish John for robbing Adam’s money in reality, because John did not in fact commit the crime. Thus, if the time after which the universe began to exist is imaginary, then the universe did not really begin to exist temporally after not having existed.

Conclusion of Chapter Four Avicenna and Aquinas have similar views on important aspects of their theories concerning creation. They agree that creation is the existential dependence of the creature on the creator. Creation is out of nothing, it is not a change and there is nothing independent of God’s bestowal of being. However, while the existential dependence of all things on God is the only meaning of creation for Avicenna, Aquinas distinguishes between the philosophical and theological senses of creation. For Aquinas, on philosophical grounds, only the posteriority of the universe with regard to being can be established. The temporal posteriority of the universe cannot be demonstrated by rational argumentation. In contrast to Aquinas, Avicenna defends the position that the universe does not have a temporal beginning. The difference between their positions does not have much to do

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with their conceptions of God. Both of them agree on the immutability of God, and their conception of divine immutability is consistent with their views concerning beginning of the universe, even though they argue contradictory positions. The only exception to this agreement between them may be Aquinas’ distinction between on the one hand those divine names that do not concern the existence of the universe in re at all, and those which are related to the actual existence of things, such as Creator and Lord, on the other. They agree that God is not really related to the world. However, Avicenna argues that the temporal beginning of the universe after not having existed would imply a new relation occurring to God. Rejecting Avicenna’s argument, Aquinas maintains that the posterior emergence of the universe does not posit a new relation requiring that God be changeable. He takes full advantage of the argument that God is not really related to the universe. The difference in their positions regarding the question whether the universe must have always been concerns their conception of the things in the universe, and the applicability of time to all things. While Avicenna takes a strict position and rejects that time is applicable to all things in the universe, Aquinas is inclined to apply time to all of them. On Avicenna’s position, simply the existence of sempiternal things would be enough to say that the universe is sempiternal. Another difference may concern not strictly their conceptions of God, but their positions regarding the extent of the applicability of human experience to God, or their answer to the question ‘To what extent may creaturely conditions be applied to conceiving God or divine actions?’ Perhaps Aquinas’ strongest counter-argument is that a voluntary cause can will something such that it begins to exist temporally after not having existed, and God is a voluntary agent as far as the existence of the universe is concerned. Avicenna would argue against this and say that for such a conception of the voluntary agent, the existence of matter and time—which exist independently of the action of the agent—are essential. These cannot be eliminated so that the conception of voluntary agent can be applicable to God to explain creation without reservation. Avicenna is, again, strict with regard to the unacceptable implications of the idea of the temporal posteriority of the beginning of the universe. In contrast to Avicenna, Aquinas adopts a lenient attitude. He argues that the time implied in God’s temporal priority to the universe is only in the imagination.

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Aquinas’ arguments for the possibility of the temporal beginning of the universe enrich the discussion. However, for a convincing argument in this respect a more fundamental modification of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic heritage is required. As long as one clings to the definition of time in the Aristotelian sense—as the measure of movement, which is applicable to the lowest part of the universe—and to the triple division of duration, it seems very difficult to argue for the possibility of the temporal posteriority of the universe as a whole.

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CONCLUSION

I have argued that Thomas Aquinas’ theories concerning God and creation can be philosophically assessed as much as Avicenna’s theories can be. This argument is based on the fact that Avicenna and Aquinas have similar positions regarding human knowledge and discourse about God. Both argue that we do not know God in himself and that our knowledge of God is derived from creatures. They also share the insight that perfections which are predicated of God are not predicated of God and of creatures univocally. Avicenna’s theory of tashkìk is to some extent similar to Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication. However, it is not as developed as Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication so as to yield definite criteria concerning theological statements. Having established that Avicenna’s theological statements and those of Aquinas are equally examinable from a philosophical perspective, I have attempted to trace a further similarity between Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ teachings in chapter 2. I have shown that they have similar conceptions of God’s simplicity, necessity, immutability, eternity and knowledge. Discussion of their conception of God through examining divine formal features helped us to better understand their positions concerning theological language. In the first chapter, I argued that Avicenna’s theory of tashkìk and Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication are similar in denying that terms are predicated of God and of creation univocally, but the similarity between their positions is limited. Avicenna and Aquinas follow quite divergent paths with regard to theological language. In order to avoid the deception of expressing God in human terms, Avicenna takes a reductive strategy in the light of the divine formal features. He considers divine perfection properties insofar as they are modified by divine formal features, i.e., as necessary, eternal etc. By taking divine attributes only insofar as they are modified by divine formal features, which belong exclusively to God, he intends to maintain the difference between God and creatures and the inadequacy of human language to talk about God. In contrast, Aquinas considers divine perfection properties in both ways, i.e., with and without being modified by divine formal features. Thus although Avicenna and Aquinas have

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a similar conception of God, they have divergent positions regarding theological language. The difference between their positions regarding theological language influences not only their talk about God, but also their theories of creation. Discussion of their conception of divine formal features and divine knowledge was also intended to be a preliminary step in studying their conception of divine creative action and their positions regarding the beginning of the universe. Given the similarity of their conception of God, one could examine their positions regarding the nature of divine creative action and the beginning of the universe. That is, using the common conception of God one could decide if Avicenna’s or Aquinas’ position regarding the divine creative action and the beginning of the universe is more coherent with this common conception. Contrary to the widely shared interpretation of Avicenna’s position, I argued that Avicenna’s conception of the divine creative action is not substantially altered in Aquinas’ thought. Avicenna and Aquinas agree on basic issues in this regard, such as God’s being a free creator and not needing to create other things. In fact they have similar positions even with regard to the necessity of the universe. Nevertheless, Avicenna could say only that the universe is necessary. He could, thus, address only philosophical concerns because of his reductive strategy concerning divine perfection properties. Aquinas asserted both the contingency of the universe as well as its necessity. Thus he was able to address both philosophical and religious concerns. I argued that the difference between their positions despite the fact that they accept similar premises is due to their positions regarding theological language. By his theory of analogical predication, Aquinas was able to predicate perfections of God and of creatures without thereby violating divine simplicity. Aquinas distinguishes between res significata and the modus significandi of the perfections. He argues that when we predicate perfections—which we know through creation—of God, we affirm of God only their res significata not their creaturely modus significandi. Hence he could predicate perfection properties of God without being compelled to take them together with divine formal features. It shows that Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ theories regarding creation are closely connected to their positions regarding theological language. In chapter 4, I argued that Avicenna and Aquinas agree on the basics concerning the conception of creation—creation is out of noth-

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ing, is not a movement—although they disagree about whether the universe has a temporal beginning. Avicenna strongly believes that the universe cannot have a temporal beginning. Contrary to Avicenna, Aquinas argues that whether or not the universe has a temporal beginning cannot be established on philosophical grounds. Consequently, he argues that the view that the universe cannot have a temporal beginning—which is what Avicenna defends—cannot be demonstrated rationally. I have argued that Aquinas’ responses do not successfully refute Avicenna’s arguments. The disagreement between Avicenna and Aquinas regarding the beginning of the universe does not have much to do with their conception of God. In this regard, one might consider Aquinas’ use of divine will to refute Avicenna’s argument for the sempiternity of the universe. Aquinas’ major counter-argument employs God’s being a voluntary agent. As I discussed Aquinas’ use of divine will to explain the posteriority of the universe heavily relies on human experience of volition, which operates within an already existing universe. However, for the divine volition no independent universe, and hence no time, exists, such that a definite future point of time may be applicable for planning the beginning of the universe. Yet this does not imply a major difference between them with regard to the nature of divine volition. Avicenna’s position regarding the beginning of the universe is more consistent with the Aristotelian conception of time combined with the Neoplatonic triple division of the duration of things, i.e., eternal, sempiternal and temporal. Since both Avicenna and Aquinas adopt the Aristotelian conception of time and the Neoplatonic triple division of beings, Avicenna’s position shows more consistency, stating that temporal posteriority is not applicable to the universe as a whole.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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——. “Le mythe d’un monde eternel.” Revue philosophique de Louvain 76 (1978), 157–179. Stump, E. and Kretzmann, N. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Cambridge, England & New York: Cambridge University, 1993. ——. “Eternity.” The Journal of Philosophy 78/8 (1981), 429–458. Stump, Eleonore. (ed.) Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1993. Taylor, Richard C. “Aquinas, the Plotiniana Arabica, and the Metaphysics of Being and Actuality.” Journal of the History of Ideas 59 (1998), pp. 217–239. ——. “A Critical Analysis of the Structure of the Kalàm fì ma˙d al-khayr (Liber de causis).” In Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, ed. Parviz Morewedge. Albany: SUNY, 1992. Te Velde, Rudi A. Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas. Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995. Torrell, Jean-Pierre. Saint Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1996. Verbeke G. “Avicenna im Westen: Eine historische Begegnung.” In Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 29 (1981). Vollert, C., Kendzierski, L. and Byrne Paul. (ed. & trans.) St. Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, St. Bonaventure, On the Eternity of the World. Milwaukee: Marquette University, 1964. Wennemann, D. J. “Saint Thomas’ Doctrine of Extrinsic Denomination as Mediate Correspondence in Naming God Ex Tempore.” The Modern Schoolman LXV (1988), pp. 119–129. Wilhelmsen, F. D. “Creation as a Relation in Saint Thomas Aquinas.” The Modern Schoolman 56 (1979), pp. 107–33. Wippel, John F. Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1984. ——. “Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One: a Dialectic between Being and Nonbeing.” Review of Metaphysics 38/3 (1985), 563–590. ——. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 2000. Wisnovsky, Robert. “Notes on Avicenna’s Concept of Thingness (shay"iyya).” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10/2 (2000), pp. 181–221. ——. Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2003. Wolfson, Harry A. “St. Thomas on Divine Attributes.” In Studies in Maimonides and St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Jacob I. Dienstag. Ktav Publishing, 1975. Pp. 1–28. Reprinted form: Melanges Offerts a Etienne Gilson. Paris: J. Vrin, 1959, pp. 673–700. Wörner, Markus H. “Der Sinn von ‘Ewigkeit’ und seine Deutung bei Thomas von Aquin.” In Ontologie und Theologie: Beiträge zum Problem der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles und Thomas von Aquin, ed. M. Lutz-Bachmann. Frankfurt: Europäische Hochschulschriften, 1988. ——. Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion. Ed. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1973. ——. The Philosophy of The Kalam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1976. Yates, John C. The Timelessness of God. London: 1990. Zedler, Beatrice. “Another Look at Avicenna.” The New Scholasticism L (1976), pp. 504–521. ——. “St. Thomas, Interpreter of Avicenna.” The Modern Schoolman 33 (1955–1956), pp. 1–18. ——. “Why Are the Possibles Possible?” The New Scholasticism (1981), pp. 113–130. ——. “Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the ‘De Potentia Dei.’” Traditio 6 (1948), pp. 105–159.

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INDEX OF AUTHORS

Aertsen, Jan 201 n. 82 Albert the Great 3, 11 Algazel 20 n. 41 Alston, William P. 55–56, 62–63, 63 nn. 88–89, 64, 64 nn. 90–93, 65, 65 nn. 94–97, 66, 66 nn. 99–101, 67–68, 68 n. 102, 71–72, 75 Ammonius 6 Anawati, G. C. 11 nn. 30–31, 12 n. 32, 139 n. 18 Anselm 108 n. 90 Aristotle 2, 2 n. 1, 4, 4 n. 9, 6–8, 8 n. 20, 9, 9 nn. 21–24, 39, 39 n. 35, 40, 86 n. 18, 87, 87 n. 21, 88 n. 27, 89, 95 n. 53, 104, 106 n. 84, 109 nn. 93–94, 114, 114 n. 111, 117 n. 120, 134 n. 2, 163 n. 73, 175 n. 15, 198 n. 68, 201, 201 n. 83, 204, 216, 216 n. 125, 222 n. 145, 224, 224 n. 151 Augustine 3, 9, 9 n. 25, 10, 108 n. 90, 217, 219 Averroes 14 n. 36, 20 n. 41, 30 n. 13, 37 n. 28, 177 n. 20, 225 n. 152 Baldner, Steven E. 20 n. 42, 197 n. 67, 199 nn. 73–74 el-Bizri, Nader 160 n. 67 Boethius 43, 43 n. 39, 108, 108 nn. 90–91, 109, 109 nn. 91–92, 110 n. 95, 112 nn. 102, 106 Brown, Patterson 105 n. 80, 106 nn. 80–81, 84 Burns, Robert 81–82 n. 3 Burrell, David B. ix, 11 n. 32, 19, 19 n. 38, 39 n. 32, 55 n. 70, 80, 80 nn. 1–2, 100 n. 62, 109–10 n. 91, 111 n. 101, 112 n. 106, 136 n. 9, 160 n. 67, 173 n. 10, 197 n. 68

Davidson, Herbert A. 3 n. 4, 7 n. 18, 8 nn. 18–20, 9 nn. 21–23, 10 n. 27, 20 nn. 41–42, 87 nn. 20–21, 24, 88 nn. 27, 30, 89 nn. 31–32, 133 n. 1, 215 n. 120 Davies, Brian 42 n. 36, 107 n. 85, 108 n. 90, 153 n. 40, 204 n. 89 Dunphy, William 197–98 n. 68 Duns Scotus 100 n. 62, 134 n. 2 al-Fàràbì 2, 2 n. 2, 89 Frank, Richard 83 n. 9 Garcia, Laura L. 157 n. 57 Gardet, Louis 13, 13 nn. 34–36, 14 n. 36, 136 n. 9 Geach, P. T. 207 n. 98 al-Ghazàlì 3, 12 n. 32, 20 n. 41, 96 n. 54, 218 n. 136, 225 nn. 152–53 Gilson, Étienne 4 n. 7, 10 n. 29, 11 nn. 2, 10–11, 14 n. 36, 134, 197 n. 67 Gluck, Andrew L. 197–98 n. 68 Goichon, A.-M. 3, 3 nn. 5–6, 11 nn. 31–32, 37 n. 28, 139 n. 17 Goris, Harm 55, 56, 59, 59 nn. 79–82, 60, 60 nn. 83–84, 61, 61 nn. 85–87, 62, 75, 109 n. 92, 111 n. 101, 207 n. 98, 208 n. 103 Grant, Sara 206 n. 94 Gundissalinus 12 n. 32 Henninger, Mark G. 201 nn. 81–82, 202 nn. 84, 86–87, 204 n. 90, 206, 206 n. 93, 207 n. 97 Hibbs, Thomas 55 n. 70 Hourani, George F. 175 n. 15 Hyman, Arthur 134 n. 2, 198 n. 68 Iskenderoglu, Muammer

Cajetan 64, 64 n. 91 Carroll, William E. 20 n. 42, 197 n. 67, 199 nn. 73–74 Clement 6 Cunningham, Francis A. 177 n. 20

238

Janssens, Jules 175 n. 14 John of Damascus 3 Judy, Albert 19, 19 nn. 39–40, 82 n. 5

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Kant, Immanuel 106 n. 80 Kenny, Anthony 106 n. 80 Kretzmann, Norman 47 n. 49, 108 nn. 90–91, 109 n. 91, 110 nn. 95, 97, 157–58 n. 62, 160 n. 67, 197 n. 68 Leaman, Oliver 134 n. 2 Lee, P. 11 n. 31 Louth, Andrew 21 n. 43, 133 n. 1 MacDonald, Scott 158 n. 62 Macierowski, Edward Michael 11 n. 31, 82 n. 5, 84 n. 10 MacIntosh, J. J. 106 n. 81 Mahdi, Muhsin 2 n. 2 Marmura, Michael E. 3 n. 3, 11 n. 31, 95–96 n. 54, 175 nn. 14–15, 181 n. 32, 215 n. 120 Maurer, Armand 11 n. 30, 43 n. 39 May, Gerhard 5 n. 11, 6 n. 14 McGinn, Bernard 39 n. 32, 173 n. 10 McGinnis, Jon 96 n. 54 McInerny, Ralph 64 n. 91, 68 nn. 103–104, 69, 69 nn. 105–106 Miller, Barry 177 n. 20 Moonan, Lawrence 43 n. 39, 124 n. 140 Morris, Thomas V. 239 Muckle, C. S. B. 20 n. 41 Muller, Earl 201 n. 81, 202 n. 87, 204 n. 91 O’Callaghan, John 55 n. 70 O’Meara, Dominic J. 7 n. 17, 10 n. 28, 140 n. 19 Ormsby, Eric L. 197 n. 68 Philo 6, 6 n. 13, 9 Philoponus, John 2 n. 2, 3–7, 8 n. 18, 10, 215 n. 120 Pieper, Josef 55–56, 56 n. 71, 57, 57 nn. 72–76, 58, 58 nn. 77–78, 75 Pines, S. 240 Plato 2, 4, 4 n. 8, 5, 5 n. 11, 6–7, 10, 90 n. 37 Plotinus 2, 6–7, 7 n. 17, 10, 28 n. 6, 90 n. 37, 140 n. 19 Proclus 2, 2 n. 1, 6, 10, 186 n. 43

Pseudo-Dionysius 158 n. 62

3, 48 n. 52, 78,

Rahman, Fazlur 39 n. 32, 97 n. 56, 173 n. 10, 186 n. 43 Reisman, David C. 96 n. 54 Rofougaran, Nicolas Louis 95 n. 53, 100 n. 62 Rolnick, Philip A. 55 n. 70 Rowe, William L. 157 n. 57, 179 n. 27 Sadra, Mulla 12 n. 32 Sezgin, Fuat 3 n. 3 Simplicius 6 Smith, Gerhard 177 n. 20 Sorabji, Richard 3 n. 4, 4 n. 10, 5 n. 12, 6 nn. 13–16, 7 n. 18, 9 nn. 24, 26, 10 n. 27, 86 n. 18, 90 n. 37 Stump, Eleonore 63 n. 88, 108 nn. 90–91, 109 n. 91, 110 nn. 95, 97, 157 n. 57, 197 n. 68 Synesius of Cyrene 6 Taylor, Richard C. 2 n. 1 Te Velde, Rudi A. 48 n. 52, 100 n. 62, 133 n. 1, 153 n. 42 Themistius 10 Van Riet, S. 87 n. 19 Van Steenberghen, F. 240 Verbeke, Gerard 12 n. 32, 86 n. 19, 144 n. 30 Wennemann, D. J. 209 n. 105 Wilhelmsen, F. D. 210 n. 110 Wippel, John F. 43, 43 nn. 39–40, 45 n. 46, 51 n. 59, 134 n. 2, 198 n. 68, 211 n. 114 Wisnovsky, Robert ix, 148 nn. 33–34, 165 n. 77 Wolfson, H. A. 30 n. 13, 33 n. 18, 37 n. 28, 48 n. 51, 172 n. 6 Yates, John C.

109 n. 92

Zedler, Beatrice 11, 11 n. 32, 13, 13 n. 33, 134, 134 nn. 2–3, 135, 135 nn. 4–8, 140 n. 19, 177 n. 20

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INDEX OF TOPICS

ab aeterno 215, 217–18, 222 abad 90, 90 n. 36 Abrahamic religions 11 n. 32, 19–20 absolute non-existence 171, 198 n. 68, 227 accidental causes 179 actions stemming from nature 139, 139 n. 18, 149 actual efficient cause 181, 183, 191–92 actual universe 131, 135, 159, 161–62 actuality 9, 102–103, 107, 113, 117 n. 120, 217, 219, 221, 226 aevum 112–13 affirmation 4, 84–85, 96, 122, 174 n. 12, 200 affirmative theology 59 a˙ad 39 ajzà" 31 analogates 64 n. 91, 68–70, 78 analogical predication 16–18, 20, 25–26, 37 n. 28, 39–41, 43 n. 39, 51, 51 nn. 58–59, 52, 55, 55 n. 70, 56, 58–59, 64 n. 91, 68, 70–71, 76, 78, 81, 120, 124–26 analogy 37 n. 28, 40, 51, 51–52 n. 60, 55 n. 70, 56, 64, 64 n. 91, 66–67, 69, 75–76, 225 n. 153 appreciative 18, 81, 124 n. 140, 125, 167 approbation 139–40, 140 n. 20 'àqil 114 n. 113, 122 'aql 96 n. 56, 114 n. 113, 122 artisan model 7, 10 beginning of the universe 1–2, 8 n. 18, 7, 9, 15, 17–18, 79–80, 112, 189, 198 n. 68, 210, 217, 219, 222, 224, 229, 232–33 bi’l-fi'l 36 Book of Causes 2 n. 1 causal order 25, 40 coming to exist 8, 107, 170, 178 n. 22, 179, 224 concept of generation 8

conceptual relation 203 concomitance 140 n. 19, 141, 143–45, 159 concomitants 27, 29, 31, 94, 98 n. 60, 131, 135, 140, 144–45, 149, 174 Confessions 9 n. 25, 217 constituent parts 31, 35 contemplation model 10 contingency 61, 133, 168, 232 contingency of creation 20, 162 correlative 122 created universe 20, 133 creative action ix, 2, 10, 13, 119, 188, 232 creaturely implications 81 dahr 90 n. 36, 92 n. 49, 93, 182, 186 n. 43 ∂arùrì 87, 87 n. 20 De trinitate 43, 43 n. 39 Demiurge 5–6 dhàt 27, 31, 32, 82 n. 4, 94, 95 n. 53, 96 n. 56, 101, 122, 142–43, 145, 173, 191 discourse about God 25, 59, 72, 75, 231 discursive 97 n. 56, 115–16 divine actions 208, 210, 218, 229 divine attributes 1–2, 19–20, 76, 122–23, 123 n. 137, 124, 231 divine creative action 1, 10, 12, 17–18, 79, 147, 154 divine essence 28 n. 6, 42, 43 n. 40, 45, 61 n. 86, 71, 98, 117–18 n. 120, 123, 152, 154, 169, 206, 207 n. 98 divine formal features 1, 17, 18 n. 37, 34, 48, 50, 77, 79, 80 n. 2, 81, 120–21, 124, 124 n. 140, 126–27, 132, 136, 145, 165–67, 231–32 divine freedom 133, 147, 156–57, 157 n. 57, 158 divine goodness 29, 156–58, 158 n. 62, 159, 162, 212 divine knowledge 17, 57, 75, 79, 98, 101, 123, 126, 136, 140 n. 19, 145–46, 151, 153–55, 169–70, 182

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n. 34, 191, 193, 206, 206 n. 93, 208, 208 n. 103, 220, 226, 232 divine necessity 86, 120 divine perfection properties 1, 18 n. 37, 34, 120–21, 123–24, 126, 132, 145, 167–68, 217, 231–32 divine perfections 17, 20, 25, 29, 47, 50, 56, 59–60, 62–75, 77, 84, 124, 124 n. 140, 126, 145, 157 n. 57, 165–67, 218 divine persons 153, 202 n. 87, 203, 203 n. 87, 204 n. 89 divine properties 33, 34, 80, 120 divine self-knowledge 98 divine simplicity 14, 19 n. 39, 50, 71–75, 81 n. 3, 99, 104, 120–21, 124–26, 135, 154, 232 divine will 79, 120–21, 123, 124 n. 140, 132–33, 134 n. 2, 136, 136 n. 9, 137–38, 140–41, 145–47, 150–51, 153–58, 158 n. 62, 159–62, 164–67, 169, 190, 193, 195, 197, 198 n. 68, 211–13, 216, 218, 220, 225, 233 efficient cause 133, 137, 148 nn. 33–34, 150, 160 n. 67, 170, 175–78, 180–82, 185, 188, 191–92, 194, 196, 211, 214 emanation 4, 6, 99, 100 n. 62, 134–35, 138, 140, 145, 147, 153, 198 emanationist cosmology 13 ens commune 84 equivocally 50–51, 51 n. 58, 76 esse sine additione 104 essence of God 35, 131–32 essential cause(s) 179 n. 27, 180, 186, 189, 190, 214 essential posteriority 171 eternal 13, 18, 20, 48, 50, 77, 80–81, 90, 90 n. 36, 91, 93, 93 n. 50, 94, 99, 108–109, 109 n. 91, 110, 110 n. 95, 111–12, 112 n. 106, 113, 118, 118 n. 122, 119 n. 126, 126, 132–33, 135–37, 149, 155, 163–65, 167–69, 185–86, 186 n. 43, 193–95, 209–10, 215, 218–19, 224–26, 231, 233 eternality 32, 79, 90 eternity 1, 2 n. 2, 8 n. 19, 18 n. 37, 50, 67, 73, 80–81, 91, 93, 100, 105–106, 109–10, 110 n. 95, 111–12, 112 nn. 102, 106, 113, 117,

118 n. 122, 120, 124 n. 140, 126, 132, 136, 150, 155, 163–68, 185, 189, 209, 209 n. 105, 210, 213, 215, 217–18, 220, 222, 224, 231 everlasting 211 ex nihilo 199, 199 n. 73 ex tempore 208–209 existence after non-existence 4, 226–27 existential priority 38, 92 fallacy of equivocation 51, 51 n. 58, 76 final cause 7, 133, 138, 147–48, 148 n. 34, 158–59, 165, 175 formal features 67, 80, 111 n. 101, 120, 146–47, 149, 164, 166, 168 formal properties 18, 34, 80 free choice 132, 143, 150, 159–60, 160 n. 67, 162, 164, 166–68 free creator 11 n. 32, 133, 140, 143, 232 generation and corruption 9, 35, 89, 95, 95 n. 54, 96, 96 n. 54, 101, 107, 112–13, 171, 179–80, 185–88, 190, 196, 214, 225 generosity 141–43, 145, 159 Genesis 5 ghara∂ 137, 141–42 God as free creator 20, 133 God as natural agent 20, 133 God as the efficient cause 7, 172 God’s concomitants 145 God’s creative action 131–32, 135 God’s creative knowledge 57 God’s duration 195–96, 224 God’s essence 26–27, 40, 42–45, 60, 74–75, 80, 97, 97 n. 57, 99, 103–104, 104 n. 75, 114, 117 n. 120, 125, 131, 138, 141–43, 145, 149, 166, 194 God’s eternity 89–91, 93 n. 50, 105, 108, 108 nn. 90–91, 111 n. 101, 112–13, 118, 163 God’s free will 159, 162 God’s freedom 86, 131, 133, 141, 149, 156, 160 n. 67, 166 God’s goodness 156–57, 159, 160 n. 67, 162–63 God’s immateriality 113 God’s knowledge 19, 50, 56, 64, 72, 81, 93–95, 95 nn. 53–54, 96 n. 54, 97, 97 n. 56, 98, 99, 99 n. 61, 100,

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index of topics 100 n. 62, 101, 112–16, 116 n. 120, 117, 117 n. 120, 118, 118 nn. 120, 122, 119, 119 n. 126, 123–24, 126, 137–38, 139 n. 16, 140 n. 20, 149, 151, 154, 173, 206, 206 n. 93 God’s necessity 79, 86–87, 101, 105–106, 106 n. 84, 126, 156, 231 God’s perfections 29, 41, 48–50, 55, 62–64, 67, 75, 121, 125, 138, 147, 166, 168–69, 192 God’s self-knowledge 81, 94, 97–99, 99 n. 61, 114, 116, 117 n. 120, 137–38, 158 God’s simplicity 49, 59, 79, 81, 81 n. 3, 87 n. 24, 98, 101, 107, 110 n. 99, 116, 121, 126, 138–39, 155, 231 God’s will 50, 123, 131–32, 136–39, 139 n. 16, 140, 140 n. 20, 141, 146, 149, 154–59, 161–64, 166–68, 196, 218–19, 221 huwa huwa 27 hypothetical necessity 124 n. 140, 132, 150, 161, 163, 163 n. 73, 164–66, 168 ibdà' 13, 170–71, 172 n. 6 i∂àfa 29–30, 30 n. 13, 31–33 ìjàb 84, 174 n. 12 immaterial substances 91 immediate cause(s) 92 n. 43, 180, 189–90, 214 immutability 93, 110, 120 immutability of God 9, 50, 61, 73, 75, 79–80, 86, 89, 100–101, 105, 106 nn. 84–85, 109–11, 111 n. 101, 113, 117–18, 126, 132, 137, 155–56, 160, 162–68, 184–85, 189–90, 195, 204 n. 90, 210, 216–19, 229, 231 immutable 18, 48, 50, 77, 80–81, 86, 94, 99, 105–106, 106 n. 84, 107–13, 132, 136–37, 145, 149, 155–56, 161, 163–65, 167–69, 186, 189, 191, 204 n. 90, 217–18, 226 imperfection 27, 54, 59–60, 63, 96, 126, 143, 161 impossible 87, 187 inniyya 82 n. 5, 83, 83 n. 9, 88 n. 25, 174 n. 12 intellect 43, 54, 77, 80, 84 n. 10, 85 n. 15, 89, 96, 96 n. 56, 97–98, 107, 114, 114 n. 113, 117–18 n. 120, 119, 122–23, 134 n. 2, 139 n. 18,

247

140, 149, 151 n. 37, 152–53, 172–73, 184–85, 186 n. 43, 200 intention 64 n. 91, 132–33, 135–36, 136 n. 9, 138–39, 139 nn. 16, 18, 141–42, 147–48, 159, 184 n. 39 kamàl 28, 32, 36 Kitàb fì al-Khayr al-Ma˙∂ 2 n. 1 lawà˙iq 85 lawàzim 27, 29, 31 mabda" 94, 123 màhiyya 36, 82 nn. 4–5, 83 n. 9, 105 n. 75 Maimonides 3, 12 n. 32, 19 n. 38, 37 n. 28, 43 nn. 39–40, 47, 48 nn. 51–52, 51 n. 58, 80 n. 1, 100 n. 62, 111 n. 101, 134 n. 2, 197–98 n. 68, 204 ma'qùl 100, 114 n. 113, 122 mawjùd 31, 87, 137 meaning of creation 4, 199 n. 73, 228 modality of being 86, 88–89 modus significandi 52–53, 63, 65, 68–69, 77, 150, 166–67, 232 motion 5, 8–9, 110, 155, 197, 224 mujarrad 84, 85 n. 16 mumkin 87 mushàrun ilayhi 84 n. 10 Muslim theologians 3, 3 n. 3, 10, 13, 95 n. 54, 171 n. 2, 172 n. 6, 181 n. 32 musta˙ìl 87 mutakhayyal 96 natural action 10, 18, 20, 134 n. 2, 135–36, 139, 139 n. 18, 140, 140 n. 19, 146–47, 149, 151–54 natural agent 135, 139 n. 18, 141, 146, 150–51, 169, 226 nature of creative action ix, 1–2 nature of divine creative action 15, 127, 232 nature of God 9 nature of things 8, 106 n. 84 nature of time 8, 185, 193 necessary being 30, 32–33, 35–36, 39 n. 32, 82, 82 n. 5, 83, 83 n. 10, 84, 84 n. 10, 85–86, 87 n. 24, 88 nn. 24, 27, 89, 105, 105 n. 80, 106, 106 n. 80, 146, 178 n. 22, 189

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index of topics

necessary emanation 20, 133, 136 n. 9, 160 n. 67 necessary of being 82, 82 n. 5, 83, 85, 87 n. 24, 100, 122 necessity 17, 18 n. 37, 32, 34–35, 50, 67, 80, 83 n. 10, 86, 86 n. 18, 87 nn. 20, 24, 88, 88 n. 25, 89, 101, 105, 105 n. 80, 106 nn. 81, 84, 118, 120, 124, 124 n. 140, 131, 133–34, 134 n. 2, 138, 145–47, 154–55, 157, 161–63, 163 n. 73, 164–65, 165 n. 77, 166–67, 176, 178 n. 22, 184 n. 39, 190, 198 n. 68, 211–12, 232 necessity of being 33, 34, 82, 82 n. 5, 83, 84 n. 10, 85 necessity of creation 153 necessity of nature 13, 134–35, 136 n. 9, 151 necessity of the universe 4, 131–33, 135, 143, 146–47, 150, 165–68, 232 negation 28, 32–33, 33 n. 18, 43 n. 39, 44, 46–48, 48 n. 51, 50, 54, 76–77, 80, 84, 93, 103, 107, 111, 121–22, 166, 174 n. 12, 199 n. 73 negative element 17, 25, 41, 55, 59, 73 negative terms 4, 28 n. 6, 46–47 Neoplatonic 2 n. 1, 5, 18, 20–21, 21 n. 43, 110, 112, 133, 133 n. 1, 148, 230, 233 niΩàm 100 non-being 33, 88, 122, 199, 199 n. 73 non-voluntary agent 148 nothingness 9, 199 n. 74 omnipotent 31–32, 124 omnitemporality 108, 112, 112 n. 102 participation 102–103, 116–17 n. 120, 198 passive potency 211, 214 perfection(s) 8, 25–26, 28, 28 nn. 6, 8, 29, 34–36, 37 n. 28, 38, 40–41, 45–48, 48 nn. 51–52, 49, 49 n. 53, 50–51, 51 n. 58, 52, 52 n. 60, 53, 53 n. 64, 54, 55 n. 70, 56, 60, 60 n. 84, 62–64, 64 n. 91, 65–78, 80–81, 102, 107, 121–22, 125–26, 132, 137–38, 140, 142, 148–51, 162, 164–67, 185, 192, 231–32

perfection properties 8, 20, 32, 36, 40, 45, 48–49, 52, 64, 66, 71, 77, 80–81, 120, 125–26, 232 perfection terms 51, 51 n. 58, 53–56, 59–60, 65, 68–73, 77, 120, 166 Platonic forms 98 Platonic ideas 97–98 positive 25–26, 28 n. 6, 29–30, 30 n. 13, 31–33, 33 n. 18, 34, 36, 41–43, 43 n. 40, 44, 46, 54–55, 59, 71–73, 111, 141, 143, 158 n. 62, 173–74 positive attributes 47, 76 positive properties of God 32, 47 possibility 9, 88, 88 n. 25, 89, 134 n. 2, 147, 160 n. 67, 167, 172, 176, 177 n. 20, 187–88, 211, 211 n. 114, 212–15, 215 n. 120, 226, 230 possibly 9, 88 posteriority 26, 37–41, 90 n. 36, 91–92, 170–71, 199, 228, 233 potential efficient cause 181, 191–92, 214 potentially 9, 39, 220 prime matter 6, 8, 47 n. 49, 185, 187, 198 priority 26, 37, 37 n. 28, 38–41, 90, 90 n. 36, 91–92, 193–94, 199, 199 n. 74, 222, 224 properties 25, 28–30, 30 n. 13, 31–33, 33 n. 18, 34–37, 39, 41, 46, 47 n. 49, 48, 49 n. 53, 74, 76, 78, 80, 84–85, 96, 100 n. 62, 111, 116 n. 120, 120–22, 177 n. 20, 178, 178 n. 22, 180, 192, 197, 212, 219, 228 qaß∂ 141 qidam 32, 90, 90 n. 36, 91–93, 93 n. 50, 185 quidditative 42–45, 56 quiddities 82, 102, 170, 183–84, 186, 188 ratio 60, 69–71, 74 ratio propria 56, 64 n. 91, 68–69, 69 n. 106, 70–71, 73 real relations 202, 202 n. 87, 203, 204 n. 90, 209 reductio ad absurdum 170 reductive 121 reductive strategy 18, 18 n. 37, 81, 123, 126, 132, 167, 231–32 relata 202 n. 87, 204–205

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index of topics relation(s) 26, 29–30, 30 n. 13, 31–34, 48 n. 51, 51 n. 60, 52, 61, 64, 76–77, 98–100, 100 n. 62, 118–19, 119 n. 126, 120–21, 123, 144, 148 n. 34, 151, 157, 161–62, 164–66, 169–70, 172 n. 6, 173–74, 174 n. 12, 175, 175 n. 15, 178, 180–81, 183, 185, 190–92, 196–97, 199 n. 73, 201, 201 nn. 81–82, 202, 202 n. 87, 203, 203 n. 87, 204, 204 nn. 89–90, 205–206, 206 nn. 93–94, 207, 207 n. 98, 208–10, 210 n. 110, 213, 216–17, 220, 223, 226, 229 relation of reason 202–203 relationship 7, 9, 12 n. 32, 13, 34, 37 n. 28, 38, 41, 51, 56, 64, 70, 77, 91–95, 97, 97 n. 57, 98–99, 115, 124, 131, 144, 148, 157–58, 163, 173, 187, 202, 208–209, 217 relative non-existence 171, 227 remote causes 179 res significata 52–53, 63, 65, 65 n. 96, 67–69, 69 n. 106, 70–73, 75, 77, 150, 166–67, 232 ri∂à 139, 140 n. 20 salb 32, 174 n. 12 Íamad 33 self-necessary being 84 n. 10, 86, 88, 88 n. 27, 89, 94, 106, 175–76, 182 self-necessity 80, 83, 86, 88–89, 106 self-subsistence 89 self-subsisting form 102 self-volition 131, 138, 146, 149, 155, 157–58, 158 n. 62, 163 semper 90 n. 36, 211, 213, 215, 217–20 sempiternal 8, 89, 93, 111–12, 146, 182 n. 34, 185–86, 186 n. 43, 188 n. 48, 196–97, 211–12, 225, 229, 233 sempiternity 8–9, 38, 79–80, 92 n. 49, 93, 112, 118 n. 120, 169, 182, 185, 186 n. 43, 187, 196–97, 210–11, 211 n. 114, 212–13, 215, 224–25, 225 n. 152, 226, 233 ßifàt 32 similarity 15, 17, 29, 31–32, 40–41, 45–46, 51 n. 58, 63–64, 66–67, 76, 86, 93, 103, 112, 114 n. 113, 116, 201–203, 231–32 simplicity 17, 34–35, 39, 48–49, 53, 67, 73, 77, 80, 82 n. 3, 89, 96–97,

249

99, 101, 107, 111 n. 101, 113, 116, 120, 124, 145–47, 150, 155, 158, 167 substratum 30, 97–98, 186–89, 211, 214–15 sufficient cause 10, 169, 215 synonyms 49 tashkìk 26, 37, 37 n. 28, 38–40, 76–78, 16, 231 temporal beginning 1, 5–6, 18, 79, 82 n. 3, 92, 169–70, 172, 172 n. 7, 185–86, 188, 190, 209–10, 212–13, 215–17, 222, 222 n. 146, 226–29, 233 temporal non-existence 183–89, 192–93, 196, 198 n. 68, 214–15, 219, 222–23 temporal posteriority 13, 97 n. 57, 171, 193, 196, 220–22, 224–25, 227–30, 233 temporal priority 13, 38, 92, 92 n. 43, 195, 229 temporal succession 116 theological language 1, 15, 17–19, 25–26, 40–42, 56, 60, 62–63, 74, 76, 78–79, 81, 120, 126, 131–32, 147, 149, 166–68, 231–32 theological statements 26, 41–42, 59, 62–63, 65, 70–71, 73–75, 78, 120, 231 Theology of Aristotle 6 Timaeus 4 n. 8, 6 time ix, 5–9, 18, 90–92, 92 nn. 45, 49, 93, 96, 101, 108–12, 112 n. 106, 113, 118, 118 nn. 120, 122, 119, 169–70, 172 n. 7, 180, 182, 184–86, 186 n. 43, 188, 190, 193–96, 198 n. 68, 200, 208–209, 209 n. 105, 212–13, 215–19, 221–22, 222 n. 146, 223–25, 225 n. 153, 226–30, 233 univocal predication 52, 53 n. 64, 64 n. 91, 65, 65 n. 96, 68, 76 univocally 25, 36, 50, 51 n. 58, 56, 60 n. 84, 65–66, 68, 70, 74, 76–77, 125, 231 unknowability of God 55–56, 58, 61, 75 unspecified existence 103 vertically ordered 92 voluntary act 132, 139, 167

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250

index of topics

voluntary action 10, 18–19, 132–33, 135, 137–38, 140, 149, 151–54, 219 voluntary agent 14, 81, 136, 138, 149–50, 152, 169, 191, 215–16, 218, 221, 226–27, 229, 233

wàjib 87, 87 n. 20 wàjib al-wujùd 33, 82, 82 n. 5 wujùd 31, 36

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ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE TEXTS AND STUDIES ISSN 0169-8729 8. Fakhry, M. Ethical Theories in Islam. Second expanded edition. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09300 1 9. Kemal, S. The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna. 1991. ISBN 90 04 09371 0 10. Alon, I. Socrates in Medieval Arabic Literature. 1991. ISBN 90 04 09349 4 11. Bos, G. Qus«¸ ibn L¢q¸’s Medical Regime for the Pilgrims to Mecca. The Ris¸la fº tadbºr safar al-¥ajj. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09541 1 12. Kohlberg, E. A Medieval Muslim Scholar at Work. Ibn T¸w¢s and his Library. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09549 7 13. Daiber, H. Naturwissenschaft bei den Arabern im 10. Jahrhundert n. Chr. Briefe des Ab¢ l-Fa¥l Ibn al-{Amºd (gest. 360/970) an {A¥udaddaula. Herausgegeben mit Einleitung, kommentierter Übersetzung und Glossar. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09755 4 14. Dhanani, A. The Physical Theory of Kal¸m. Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian Mu{tazilº Cosmology. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09831 3 15. Ab¢ Ma{±ar. The Abbreviation of the Introduction to Astrology. Together with the Medieval Latin Translation of Adelard of Bath. Edited and Translated by Ch. Burnett, K. Yamamoto and M. Yano. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09997 2 16. S¸b¢r Ibn Sahl. Dispensatorium Parvum (al-Aqr¸b¸dhºn al-ªaghºr). Analysed, Edited and Annotated by O. Kahl. 1994. ISBN 90 04 10004 0 17. Maróth, M. Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie. Übersetzung aus dem Ungarischen von Johanna Till und Gábor Kerekes. 1994. ISBN 90 04 10008 3 18. Ibn Abº al-Duny¸. Morality in the Guise of Dreams. A Critical Edition of Kit¸b alMan¸m, with Introduction, by Leah Kinberg. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09818 6 19. Kügelgen, A. von. Averroes und die arabische Moderne. Ansätze zu einer Neubegründung des Rationalismus im Islam. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09955 7 20. Lameer, J. Al-F¸r¸bº and Aristotelian Syllogistics. Greek Theory and Islamic Practice. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09884 4 22. Adang, C. Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10034 2 23. Dallal, A.S. An Islamic Response to Greek Astronomy. Kit¸b Ta{dºl Hay}at al-Afl¸k of Õadr al-Shari{a. Edited with Translation and Commentary. 1995. ISBN 90 04 09968 9 24. Conrad, L.I. (ed.). The World of Ibn Þufayl. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Ýayy ibn Yaqª¸n. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10135 7 25. Hermansen, M.K. (tr.). The Conclusive Argument from God. Sh¸h Walº All¸h of Delhi’s Ýujjat All¸h al-B¸ligha. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10298 1 26. Abrahamov, B. Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qur}¸n in the Theology of al-Q¸sim ibn Ibr¸hºm. Kit¸b al-Mustarshid. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10408 9

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27. Wild, S. (ed.). The Qur}an as Text. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10344 9 28. Riddell, P.G. and T. Street (eds.). Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and Society. A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H. Johns. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10692 8 29. Jolivet, J. and R. Rashed (eds.). Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d’alKindº. Volume I. L’Optique et la Catoptrique. Edited by R. Rashed. 1997. ISBN 90 04 09781 3 30. Rudolph, U. Al-M¸turºdº und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10023 7 31. Endress, G. and J. A. Aertsen (eds.). Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition. Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198). Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996). ISBN 90 04 11308 8 32. Elmore, G.T. Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time. Ibn al-{Arabº’s Book of the Fabulous Gryphon. 1999. ISBN 90 04 10991 9 33. Ab¢ Ma{±ar. Kit¸b al-milal wa-d-duwal. Arabic text edited by K. Yamamoto with an English translation by K. Yamamoto and Ch. Burnett. 1999. ISBN 90 04 10725 8 34. Albumasar. De Magnis Coniunctionibus (On the Great Coniunctions). Latin text edited by Ch. Burnett and Arabic-Latin, Latin Arabic Glossaries by K. Yamamoto and Ch. Burnett. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11074 7 35. Stroumsa, S. Freethinkers of Medieval Islam. Ibn al-R¸wandº, Ab¢ Bakr al-R¸zº, and Their Impact on Islamic Thought. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11374 6 36. King, D.A. World-Maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca. Innovation and Tradition in Islamic Science. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11367 3 37. Bar-Asher, M.M. Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imãmº Shiism. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11495 5 38. Sayyid Jal¸l al-Dºn Ãshtiy¸nº et al. Consciousness and Reality. Studies in Memory of Toshihiko Izutsu. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11586 2 39. Schmidtke, S. Theologie, Philosophie und Mystik im zwölfershiitischen Islam des 9./15. Jahrhunderts. Die Gedankenwelten des Ibn Abº ©umh¢r al-A¥s¸}º (um 838/1434-35 — nach 906/1501). 2000. ISBN 90 04 11531 5 40. Griffel, F. Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam. Die Entwicklung zu al-Ûaz¸lºs Urteil gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11566 8 41. Heemskerk, M.T. Suffering in the Mu{tazilite Theology. {Abd al-Jabb¸r’s Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11726 1 42. Rashed, R. and H. Bellosta. Ibr¸hºm Ibn Sin¸n. Logique et Géométrie au Xe Siècle. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11804 7 43. Tamer, G. Islamische Philosophie und die Krise der Moderne. Das Verhältnis von Leo Strauss zu Alfarabi, Avicenna und Averroes. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12029 7 44. Genequand, C. Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos. 2001. ISBN 90 04 11963 9 45. Calverley, E.E. and J.W. Pollock. Nature, Man and God in Medieval Islam. Volume one. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12381 4 Volume two. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12382 2

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46. Swartz, M. A Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism. Ibn al-Jawzº’s Kit¸b Akhb¸r aª-Õif¸t. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12376 8 47. Kusuba, T. and D. Pingree. Arabic Astronomy in Sanskrit. Al-Birjandº on Tadhkira II, Chapter 11 and its Sanskrit Translation. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12475 6 48. ~skendero¯lu, M. Fakhr al-dºn al-R¸zº and Thomas Aquinas on the Question of the Eternity of the World. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12480 2 49. Reisman, D.C. The making of the Avicennan Tradition. The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sºn¸’s al-Mub¸¥at¸t (The Discussions). 2002. ISBN 90 04 12504 3 50. Behloul, S.M. Ibn Ýazms Evangelienkritik. Eine methodische Untersuchung. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12527 2 51. Charette, F. Mathematical Instrumentation in Fourteenth-Century Egypt and Syria. The Illustrated Treatise of Najm al-Dºn al-Mºªrº. 2003. ISBN 90 0413015 2 52. Reisman, D.C. (ed.). Before and After Avicenna. Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12978 2 53. Kahl, O. S¸b¢r Ibn Sahl. The Small Dispensatory. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12996 0 54. Burnett, C., J.P. Hogendijk, K. Plofker and M. Yano. Studies in the History of the Exact Sciences in Honour of David Pingree. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13202 3 56. McGinnis, J. (ed.). Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13960 5 57. Eschraghi, A. Frühe SE aiÒº- und B¸bº-Theologie. Die Darlegung der Beweise für Mu¥ammads besonderes Prophetentum (Ar-Ris¸la fº Itbat an-Nub¢wa al-Ù¸ªªa). 2004. ISBN 90 04 14034 4 58. Acar, R. Talking about God and Talking about Creation. Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ positions. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14477 3 59. Akasoy, A. Philosophie und Mystik in der späten Almohadenzeit. Die Sicilianischen Fragen des Ibn Sab" Ên. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14522 2 60. Schöck, C. Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik. Zum Verhältnis von arabischer und aristotelischer Urteils-, Konsequenz- und Schlußlehre. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14588 5 62. Mourad, S.A. Early Islam between Myth and History. Al-Ýasan al-Baªrº (d. 110H/728CE) and the Formation of His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14829 9

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