Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees: Voices from Jordan and Lebanon [1st ed. 2020] 978-3-030-35015-4, 978-3-030-35016-1

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xix
Introduction (Juline Beaujouan, Amjed Rasheed)....Pages 1-5
Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees (Juline Beaujouan, Amjed Rasheed)....Pages 7-25
The Dynamics of Population Pressure in Jordan: A Focus on Syrian Refugees (Wa’ed Alshoubaki)....Pages 27-34
An Overview of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon and Its Socio-Economic Impact (Juline Beaujouan, Amjed Rasheed)....Pages 35-46
The Syrian Refugee Policy of the Jordanian Government (Juline Beaujouan, Amjed Rasheed)....Pages 47-63
Analysing the Evolution of Lebanon’s Syrian Refugee Policy: The Role of Foreign Policy (Khalil El Hariri)....Pages 65-82
The Jordanian Perception of the Syrian Refugee Crisis (Musa Shteiwi)....Pages 83-98
The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Lebanese Communities (Chadi Nachabe)....Pages 99-118
The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan: Challenges and Future Opportunities for NGOs (Eyas Ghreiz)....Pages 119-137
The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Lebanese NGOs and Civil Society Sector (Isabelle Saade)....Pages 139-156
Conclusion (Juline Beaujouan, Amjed Rasheed)....Pages 157-163

Citation preview

MOBILITY & POLITICS SERIES EDITORS: MARTIN GEIGER PARVATI RAGHURAM · WILLIAM WALTERS

Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees Voices from Jordan and Lebanon Edited by Juline Beaujouan · Amjed Rasheed

Mobility & Politics Series Editors Martin Geiger Carleton University Ottawa, Canada Parvati Raghuram Open University Milton Keynes, UK William Walters Carleton University Ottawa, Canada

Mobility & Politics Series Editors: Martin Geiger, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; Parvati Raghuram, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK; William Walters, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada Global Advisory Board: Michael Collyer, University of Sussex; Susan B.  Coutin, University of California; Raúl Delgado Wise, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas; Nicholas De Genova, King’s College London; Eleonore Kofman, Middlesex University; Rey Koslowski, University at Albany; Loren B.  Landau, University of the Witwatersrand; Sandro Mezzadra, Università di Bologna; Alison Mountz, Wilfrid Laurier University; Brett Neilson, University of Western Sydney; Antoine Pécoud, Université Paris 13; Ranabir Samaddar, Mahanirban Research Group Calcutta; Nandita Sharma, University of Hawai’i at Manoa; Tesfaye Tafesse, Addis Ababa University; Thanh-Dam Truong, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Human mobility, whatever its scale, is often controversial. Hence it carries with it the potential for politics. A core feature of mobility politics is the tension between the desire to maximise the social and economic benefits of migration and pressures to restrict movement. Transnational communities, global instability, advances in transportation and communication, and concepts of ‘smart borders’ and ‘migration management’ are just a few of the phenomena transforming the landscape of migration today. The tension between openness and restriction raises important questions about how different types of policy and politics come to life and influence mobility. Mobility & Politics invites original, theoretically and empirically informed studies for academic and policy-oriented debates. Authors examine issues such as refugees and displacement, migration and citizenship, security and cross-border movements, (post-)colonialism and mobility, and transnational movements and cosmopolitics. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14800

Juline Beaujouan  •  Amjed Rasheed Editors

Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees Voices from Jordan and Lebanon

Editors Juline Beaujouan The Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS) Durham University Durham, UK

Amjed Rasheed School of Government and International Affairs Durham University Durham, UK

The University of Edinburgh Edinburgh, UK

Mobility & Politics ISBN 978-3-030-35015-4    ISBN 978-3-030-35016-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Modern building window © saulgranda/Getty This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

I am delighted to be writing in celebration of the excellent research and the collaboration which this project instigated with colleagues and partner institutions in Jordan and Lebanon. This book is a product of our ongoing research on the role of non-state jihadi actors in the MENA region and that of the Islamic State in particular. This group has not only ripped the heart out of two of the region’s “pillar states” (Iraq and Syria)—both of which have been at the centre of inter-Arab dialogues and in a defining role in shaping Arab relations with the region’s three non-Arab states of Iran, Israel and Turkey since the 1960s—but has turned an already dysfunctional regional order into a securitised chaos. Building on our current multilevel research on the narrative and impact of policies and behaviour of the Islamic State on the surrounding countries and communities, we decided to widen our research web and to focus on the socioeconomic impact of refugees on the states of Lebanon and Jordan. This project falls under the broader scope of a project led by me on the narrative and impact of Islamic State’s (IS) policies and behaviour on its surrounding countries and communities. My team’s (Juline and Amjed) part of the AHRC-funded partnership has been exploring the language and conduct of Islamists in the Middle East and North Africa region following the Arab uprisings, zooming in on the narrative and policies of the IS group in 2010s. To build on this, my colleagues Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed have spearheaded this sub-project and been investigating the socioeconomic impact of refugees on Lebanon and Jordan, and these countries’ mechanisms of coping with the rapid influx of the refugee population from Syria. Those two countries, along with Kurdistan v

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r­ egion-­Iraq, and Turkey remain the countries to have received the highest Syrian refugees. Our work on IS was thus broadened in the summer of 2018 to look more closely at the impact of IS’ policies and behaviour on Syrian society and the unleashing of the Syrian refugee crisis which engulfed Syria’s vulnerable neighbours in the shape of Jordan and Lebanon. Funding from the UK founding council’s Global Challenges Research Fund facilitated the expansion of the multimillion-pound AHRC-funded project as part of their Open Worlds Research Initiative consortium we are a part of. Given the scale of the refugee crisis facing the region, we further endeavoured to explore the humanitarian channels at the regional (3RP), national (National Resilience Plan) and sub-national (local NGOs) levels for coping with the crisis. One result of the excellent work being conducted by my team and our partners is the volume at hand, which is building on a series of papers and briefings that the al-Sabah Programme at Durham University has been providing. The subject of the book is a matter of huge importance to the regional and the international community, and the de-escalation of the conflict in Syria is going to be raising the issue of Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries up the international agenda. For this reason, as well as the most important reason for raising international awareness of this crisis, we are very pleased to be able to be contributing to the research and the debates surrounding the crisis befallen Syria’s society. This book would not have been possible without the dedicated commitment and work of Juline and Amjed, so I would very much like to express my deep appreciation of all their work and contributions, and of course also to thank and acknowledge the contribution of colleagues who met with my team in the field, helped their research, and honoured us by joining our event in Durham in September 2018. I am also very grateful to them for providing such excellent papers for this volume. I hope that this book will generate international interest in addressing the concerns of Syrian refugees and those of the host countries, and encourage greater engagement by the Arab countries and the international community in trying to give the Syrian people the lives, livelihoods and futures lost to them since 2012. They are above all in our minds and hearts, who have lost everything. It is time to give them hope and prospects of a brighter future. Durham University Durham, UK



Anoush Ehteshami

Acknowledgements

We would like to record our gratitude to Professor Anoushiravan Ehteshami—the principal investigator of this research project—for his supervision, sustained support and assistance throughout all the stages of this endeavour. His contribution and advice were greater than we could have wished for. We are also thankful for the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) for funding this project. We are also grateful to the contributors of this volume for their outstanding engagement, cooperation and patience. Finally, we are thankful to all of those who supported our research during our fieldwork in Jordan and Lebanon.

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Contents

1 Introduction  1 Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed 2 Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees  7 Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed 3 The Dynamics of Population Pressure in Jordan: A Focus on Syrian Refugees 27 Wa’ed Alshoubaki 4 An Overview of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon and Its Socio-Economic Impact 35 Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed 5 The Syrian Refugee Policy of the Jordanian Government 47 Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed 6 Analysing the Evolution of Lebanon’s Syrian Refugee Policy: The Role of Foreign Policy 65 Khalil El Hariri 7 The Jordanian Perception of the Syrian Refugee Crisis 83 Musa Shteiwi

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8 The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Lebanese Communities 99 Chadi Nachabe 9 The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan: Challenges and Future Opportunities for NGOs119 Eyas Ghreiz 10 The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Lebanese NGOs and Civil Society Sector139 Isabelle Saade 11 Conclusion157 Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed

Notes on Contributors

Wa’ed Alshoubaki  is an assistant professor at the University of Jordan. Her expertise lies in public policy and public finance with an emphasis on refugees’ and immigrants’ impact. She developed a comprehensive analytical framework for addressing the effects of refugees on receiving states and host communities. She is studying possible solutions for assisting refugees and maintaining national and humanitarian security of receiving states. Her research delineates the importance of a bottom-­up approach and participative ideologies, including utilising social capital and communitarianism concepts to respond to refugee crises in vulnerable receiving states. Juline  Beaujouan  is a research associate with the Political Settlements Research Programme, based at the University of Edinburg. She received her PhD from Durham University where she was awarded the al-Sabah doctoral fellowship and acted as a member of an interdisciplinary research team acting as a key contributor to the British Arts and Humanities Research Council’s (AHRC) Open World Research Initiative (OWRI). Her thesis investigated the effects of Islamic State’s use of language in shaping the perception of the MENA audiences about the conflict dynamics in Iraq and Syria. Khalil El Hariri  is a research assistant at Carnegie Middle East Center. He previously worked with UN-Habitat, where he conducted research on the local economic impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and on the housing, land, and property rights of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. He holds a xi

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master’s in urban economic development from University College London. Eyas Ghreiz  is a Jordanian expert in Civil Society and Human Rights. He has extensive experience in Jordan and Syria, and has collaborated with different donors and international NGOs at the regional and international levels. He has more than seven years of practical experience in Development, Gender and Human Rights. He holds a BA in Forensic Sciences in 2012. Recently, he was selected as the youngest human rights expert to provide a report for permanent mission on the HR situation in Jordan to the Human Rights Council in Geneva. At present, he delivers his technical support as Community Engagement and Gender Manager at AJACS project, which is implemented by Adam Smith International and Creative, and funded by the United States, British government, Netherlands government, German government and the Danish government. Chadi  Nachabe  is a Lebanese social and political activist, a member of Tripoli Municipal Council and founder of Trablos Ahla. He is also the president of Tripoli Youth Council, a former Minister of Youth and Sports in the “Shadow Government” in 2011 and a member of many local and regional networks related to youth, women, elections, local development, decentralisation and access to information. Following his graduation, he got highly involved in working with Lebanese Civil Society on several issues related to socioeconomic development, political reforms, good governance, youth empowerment, citizen’s participation and business/social entrepreneurship. Amjed  Rasheed  is a post-doctoral research fellow for the Open World Research Initiative (OWRI), funded by the AHRC in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University. His research interest is in the Middle East Politics and Political Islam. His latest published articles are: “The Kurdish Cause in Iraq: From the Second Republic to the Fall of Kirkuk (2003–2018)”, In Iraq After ISIS, Palgrave Macmillan, and “Syria vs. Iraq: Clashes of Authoritarians”, Middle East Policy. He is writing a co-authored book for Routledge on Political Islam and the regional order in the Middle East. Isabelle Saade  is the programme coordinator at Dorcas/Tabitha Lebanon and Syria. An accredited social worker by training, she has more than 15 years of professional experience working with migrant workers and refugees in Lebanon. In her different roles, she has been intricately involved in

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

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programme design and implementation and partnership building with donors, UN agencies, international organisations and implementing partners. She ensures safety and security of both served beneficiaries and staff, and verifies compliance with standard operating procedures and donors’ requirements. She has a special interest in donor compliance, NGO financial management, as well as in programming related to urban refugees. A number of her reports on various subjects including needs assessments for refugees in Lebanon and child labour among Iraqi refugees in Lebanon have been published. Musa Shteiwi  is Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, within the University of Jordan in Amman. He holds a PhD in sociology from the University of Cincinnati in Ohio, United States, in 1991. He is a sociologist with 17  years of experience in teaching at the University of Jordan, where he used to teach in the Gender Studies and the Human Rights and Development programmes, in addition, to the Sociology Department. His experience includes advisory and consultancies with government, UN and other international organisations and research institutions. In his sabbatical year (2006–2007), he worked as a regional advisor on social policies and social issues for  United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA). His particular skills lie in conceptualising, conducting and leading policy research projects and public opinion polls. He has played a key role as a team leader on many national and regional projects the last of which was “Social Violence in Jordan: Causes and Solutions”.

Abbreviations

3RP ACTED ALP BPRM CBO(s) CEDAW CRC CSO(s) CSS DFID DOT EU FSA GBV GDP HRCU ICCPR ICERD ICESCR IDP(s) IGO ILO IMC INGO(s) IS

Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan Agence d’Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement Accelerated learning programme Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Community-based organisation(s) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Convention on the Rights of the Child Civil society organisation(s) Center for Strategic Studies Department for International Development Digital Opportunity Trust European Union Free Syrian Army Gender-based violence Gross domestic product Human Rights Committee Unit International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Internally displaced person(s) Intergovernmental organization International Labour Organization International Medical Corps International non-governmental organisation(s) Islamic State xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

JHAS JLMPS JRF JRP JRPSC LCRP LHIF LNGO(s) MENA MNC(s) MoI MoPIC MoU MP MSD MSF NATO NGO(s) NRP PASC PRL PRS PSS PWD PWSN RRP 6 SEZ(s) SRAD SRCD TDH TM UAE UK UN UNDP UNHCR UNOCHA UNRWA US USAID

Jordan Health Aid Society Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey Jordan Resilience Fund Jordan Response Plan Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis Lebanon Crisis Response Plan Lebanon Humanitarian INGOs Forum Local non-governmental organisation(s) Middle East and North Africa Multinational corporation(s) Ministry of Interior Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding Member of Parliament Migration Services and Development Médecins Sans Frontières North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-governmental organisation(s) National Resilience Plan Persons affected by the Syrian displacement crisis Palestinian refugees from Lebanon Palestinian refugees from Syria Psychosocial support Democratic Union Party Persons with specific needs Syria Regional Response Plan Special economic zone(s) Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate Syrian Refugee Camp Directorate Terre des hommes Triumphant Mercy United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East United States United States Agency for International Development

 ABBREVIATIONS 

WASH WB WFP WWI

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene World Bank World Food Programme World War I

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List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3 Fig. 7.4 Fig. 7.5 Fig. 7.6 Fig. 7.7 Fig. 7.8 Fig. 7.9 Fig. 7.10 Fig. 8.1

Age and gender distribution of Syrian refugees and Jordanians. (Source: JLMPS, 2016; Krafft et al., 2018) 32 Do you think that employment of Syrian refugees creates tensions between Jordanians and Syrians? (Source: CSS, 2017) 88 Do you think the shop owners who employ Syrian refugees use them because they are…? (Source: CSS, 2017) 89 Are you for or against Syrians working in Jordan? (Source: CSS, 2017) 89 How do you think the Syrian refugees have affected the economic situation in Jordan? (Source: CSS, 2017) 90 Do you have a relationship with or are you married to a Jordanian/Syrian national? (Source: CSS, 2017) 91 When did this relationship start? (Source: CSS, 2017) 91 In your opinion, are Syrian refugees better off in camps or town/villages? (Source: CSS, 2017) 92 Do you have Syrian relatives living in Jordan? (Source: CSS, 2017)93 Have you or a member of your family considered moving to Europe? (Source: CSS, 2017) 93 What is the main circumstance that would motivate you to return to Syria? (Source: CSS, 2017) 94 Curfew notification in the village of Michmich. “It is not allowed for all foreign workers to pass in the street from 7 p.m. until 6 a.m.” (Source: Chadi Nachabe, 2018) 107

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed

Abstract  The Syrian conflict has turned into a humanitarian emergency, both in Syria and in neighbouring countries. For example, Jordan and Lebanon have each become a safe haven for more than one million refugees. This sudden increase in population resulted in severe pressures on infrastructures and services, as well as in growing social tensions between Syrian refugees and host communities. The volume adopts a transdisciplinary approach to investigate the political and socioeconomic impact of the Syrian refugees on Lebanon and Jordan, and these countries’ mechanisms to cope with the rapid human exodus. This chapter presents the rationales behind the volume and briefly introduces the contributions within it. Keywords  Syrian civil war • Syrian refugees • Lebanon • Jordan J. Beaujouan (*) The Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS), Durham University, Durham, UK The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] A. Rasheed School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, Durham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_1

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One of the key elements of wars, Arthur Marwick argues, is that they are “destructive and disruptive”.1 While the pace of civil wars has globally slowed down in the past three decades, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) has increased dramatically. Today, those direct victims of conflicts are nearly 60 million, that is, twice as many as they used to be ten years ago. These massive displacements of populations not only threaten the regional and global economy, but also the social demography of entire states. Finally, they indirectly increase the likelihood of conflict, especially in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region where state and identity often clash. This is all the more true in the post-Arab uprisings period that witnessed the fall of historical leaders and the erosion of state power. Wars, as Centeno puts it, “have the capacity to turn us all into lunatics and to convince us that only the state can protect us from the horrifying foe”.2 They are emergencies “during which legal rights are perceived as possibly unnecessary and even dangerous luxuries”.3 Ultimately, they produce popular politics and authoritarian tendencies. The civil war in Syria is considered one of the worst humanitarian crises in contemporary Middle East. Eight years after the beginning of the conflict, the United Nations’ reports reveal that nearly 13 million Syrians—including 5.6 million children—remain in need for humanitarian assistance. This includes 6.2 million IDPs. In addition, the Syrian civil war resulted in one of the largest and  most devastating human exoduses since World War II.  According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of November 2019, more than 5.6 million Syrians are still distributed across Turkey (65.5%), Lebanon (16.1%), Jordan (11.4%), Iraq (4.1%), Egypt (2.3%) and elsewhere.4 This sudden increase in population in host countries resulted in severe pressure on infrastructures and services, as well as in growing social tensions between Syrian refugees and host communities. He spoke loudly but in a mourning voice: “We are not going anywhere; we will stay here” (Manna rayheen in Arabic). The young Syrian boy—not older than 13 years—was sitting on the sidewalk, packing shoe polish kit. His words were directed to an adult Lebanese man in a laboratory coat near the American University Hospital. A few seconds before, the Lebanese man had looked at the kid with rage and had told him in a cold tone, “Go back to your country” (Roh ala baladak in Arabic). What led a grown-up man—who seemingly had a stable middle-class status in Beirut—to address a child who fled war in those words? That moment captured what we came to investigate in Lebanon: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the host communities. There came the idea of compiling a volume that would give a voice to those who are not only observers of the crisis, but directly affected by it on daily basis.

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This edited volume adopts a transdisciplinary approach across social science disciplines to investigate the political and socioeconomic impact of the Syrian refugees on Lebanon and Jordan, and these countries’ mechanisms to cope with the rapid influx of fleeing Syrians. The rationales behind this research  are several. First, a majority of studies on conflict and human migration have focused on refugees themselves. Without undermining the trauma of violence and displacement, it is believed that refugees are not the only victims of conflicts. It appears that the Syrian refugees had and still have a strong impact on their host countries. Moreover, re-­centring the focus on the host communities sheds light on the “politics” of the refugee crisis, namely the local and the international humanitarian interventions, and their harmful consequences on developing countries such as Jordan and Lebanon—Syria’s direct “Arab” neighbours. Second, and consequently, only the understanding of the challenges inherent to humanitarian crisis and displacement can prevent the much feared spillover effect of a conflict to neighbouring countries. Third, it is crucial to understand the grievance of host communities against Syrian refugees to mitigate tensions between the two groups, and between the Syrian refugees and other refugee populations—mainly Palestinian and Iraqi—in the case of Jordan and Lebanon. Fourth, this volume aims to review and assess the roles of the host government, the international community and the actors of humanitarian aid in shaping the perceptions towards and responses to the Syrian refugee crisis. Ultimately, this book is a contribution to the understanding of the conditions and policies of refugee hosting in developing countries, where 85% of refugees are located.5 Doing so, this volume intends to offer an alternative view of this phenomenon, going beyond the European framing of the refugee crisis, which is playing out in neighbouring countries where the vast majority of refugees continue to be hosted. The choice of Jordan and Lebanon as case studies is significant. This research underscores the fate of two Arab countries caught in the regional Arab disorder aggravated by the advent of the Arab Spring in late-2010. While both have a long tradition of hosting—mainly Arab—refugees, one could wonder whether host communities and the governments in Jordan and Lebanon showed Arab solidarity in the mid of the worst humanitarian tragedy since World War II. In other words, this volume intends to provide an Arab perspective on this Arab humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, while the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Turkey has been registered6—not least because of the significant numbers of academics with Turkish ties now working in Europe and North America— Jordan and Lebanon remain understudied contexts. The bias towards Jordan and Lebanon does not undermine the importance to deepen the

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understanding of refugee hosting in non-Arab entities, especially in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) which has not been subjected to rigorous studies. This volume consists of 11 chapters that analyse the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Jordan and Lebanon at three different levels: The state (government), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the civil society, and local populations. The selection of these levels is not incidental. During field research, it became evident to the editors of this volume that the Syrian refugee crisis had a sharp, but diverse effect on these three sets of actors in both Jordan and Lebanon. Each level, as the reader of this book will notice, provides a distinct and a different, yet complementary, analysis of the crisis. Hence, by studying each level in the two countries, the volume offers an innovative, holistic and comparative study on the Syrian refugees’ impact in Jordan and Lebanon. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive examination of the premises of the Syrian refugee crisis, situating it within the Middle Eastern regional (dis-) order, and Syrian domestic politics. Doing so, it offers an overview of the socioeconomic and political factors that led to the Syrian civil war and the influx of populations beyond the Syrian borders. In Chaps. 3 and 4, Wa’ed Alshoubaki and Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed examine the Syrian refugee crisis and its socioeconomic impact on Jordan and Lebanon, respectively. In Chap. 5, Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed highlight the changing course of the Jordanian government’s policy framework towards the Syrian refugees across time. They also investigate Jordan’s post-conflict policies and the future challenges posed by the crisis on the kingdom and the international community. In the same vein, in Chap. 6, Khalil El Hariri analyses the factors driving the changes in Lebanon’s approach towards Syrian refugees, emphasising the role of foreign policy. In Chap. 7, Prof. Musa Shteiwi reflects on the results of a survey on the Jordanian population’s perception of the Syrian refugees in the kingdom. The chapter mainly analyses the perceived impact of the crisis on the Jordanian labour market, and the future prospects of the refugee situation in the country. In a similar approach, in Chap. 8, Chadi Nachabe uses interview-based research to investigate the different perceptions of the Lebanese local communities on the refugee issue. The latter, he suggests, reveals the fragmentation of the Lebanese society along confessional lines. Chapters 9 and 10 analyse the role played by NGOs and the civil society in Jordan and Lebanon in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis. Eyas

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Ghreiz’s chapter offers an overview of the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the Jordanian NGOs and how the latter adapted their activities to the crisis. In a similar endeavour, Isabelle Saade critically assesses the role that the national and international responses have played in alleviating or exacerbating the crisis. Finally, a short conclusion suggests some ways forward by outlining avenues for further reflection on the consequences, lessons learned and future prospects of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Notes 1. Marwick Arthur, War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century: A Comparative Study of Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974). 2. Miguel  Angel Centeno, “Concluding Remarks,” in Elizabeth Kier and Ronald Krebs, eds., War’s Wake: International Conflict and the Fate of Liberal Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 255. 3. Ibid., p. 254. 4. UNHCR, “The Syrian Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR Open Data, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria. 5. UNHCR, Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2017, 2018, https:// www.unhcr.org/5b27be547. 6. Ogŭz Esen and Ayla Ogŭs, Binatlı, “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Economy: Regional Labour Market Effects,” Social Sciences 6, no. 4 (2017): 129–141; Feyzi Baban, Suzan Ilcan and Kim Rygiel, “Syrian refugees in Turkey: pathways to precarity, differential inclusion, and negotiated citizenship rights,” Journal of Ethics and Migration Studies 43, no. 1 (2017): 41–57; Kim Rygiel, Feyzi Baban and Suzan Ilcan, “The Syrian refugee crisis: The EU-Turkey ‘deal’ and temporary protection,” Global Social Policy 16, no. 3 (2016): 315–320.

CHAPTER 2

Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed

Abstract  This chapter opens up on the premises of the Syrian refugee crisis, situating it within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional order. Doing so, it offers an overview of the socio-economic and political factors that led to the Syrian civil war and the massive displacements of populations beyond the Syrian borders. It argues that the crisis is the fruit of the regional turmoil and Syrian domestic politics, mainly the authoritarian regime of Assad. The silence of the regional actors, symptomatic of the regional disorder, led Jordan and Lebanon to cope alone with the refugee influx. Although exhibiting different domestic policies, both countries became largely reliant on the humanitarian support offered by the international community. Yet, humanitarian aid contributed to the burden of Syrian refugees, failing to strengthen the resilience of host communities. Keywords  Syrian civil war • Syrian refugees • Lebanon • Jordan

J. Beaujouan (*) The Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS), Durham University, Durham, UK The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_2

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The “Arabs walk in the shadow of a glorious past, which makes their present all the more painful. They are aware both of historic glories and of recurrent failures to restore them”.1 The contemporary borders of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, imposed by European powers after World War I, resulted in a clash between pre-existing identities and the newly established states. Since then, several state and non-state structures have struggled to heal the scars left by the colonial legacy, trying to offer an alternative to the imposed nation-state system in the MENA region. This is how trans-­border panArabism, pan-Islamism and Kurdish irredentism emerged.2 In addition to drawing the borders, European powers—namely France and Great Britain—installed ruling elites at the head of the new nation-states. Those proxy powers were key to ensure their interests, without being directly exposed to the Middle Eastern populations. Yet the resisting forces, mainly the nationalists and the Islamists, considered this sleight of hand as a new form of colonialism. As a result, in the second half of the twentieth century, military officers in countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya overthrew conservative monarchy regimes and installed revolutionary ones instead. The purpose was to end colonialism and achieve progression. Nonetheless, both forms of postcolonial regimes, conservative and revolutionary alike, have failed to achieve development and prosperity. After nearly a century since the establishment of the contemporary MENA region, indicators of governance show that the Arab countries remain weak in terms of governmental effectiveness. Instead, political and administrative corruption has become a norm of political culture in the region. In addition, the authoritarian and feudal nature of the Arab governments fails to guarantee political accountability towards populations. Consequently, the rule of law is weak, reinforcing the instability of the political realm. More than 150 years after the first wave of democratisation that reshaped Europe in 1848, an outbreak of popular protests violently shook several countries of the MENA region from December 2010. Wishes were made to consider this a movement of democratisation.3 Yet, only a couple of countries were able to weather the storms. These are the cases of Morocco and Jordan, where the governments rapidly initiated needed—although insufficient—political and economic reforms. These two exceptions conA. Rasheed School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, Durham, UK e-mail: [email protected]

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trast with the fate of the rest of the region. The Arab Spring resulted in the fall of several dictators—such as Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Those popular revolts left a bittersweet taste to their instigators. Although Tunisia succeeded to manage the post-Arab Spring period peacefully, it is trapped in transition. In Egypt, the precipitous policy shift offered by Islamist Mohamed Morsi (in office June 2012– July 2013) hastened its demise and the restoration of the military rule in the country. Other popular revolts had different consequences. For example, the counter-revolutionary solidarity of the Persian Gulf monarchies thwarted the protest movement in Bahrain. Besides, the collapse of Muammar al-Qaddafi regime unleashed a civil war between forces loyal to the former regime and a spectrum of insurgent groups in Libya. A similar case occurred in Yemen where the uprising against the regime resulted in territorial and sectarian fragmentation that has devastated the country since late-2014. Hence, the Arab Spring left a power vacuum in several countries of the MENA. This vacuum, coupled with competing regional interests, led to the interference of several regional powers in the internal affairs of the destabilised countries. For instance, in Tunisia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia supported the Islamic Ennahdha Party financially and facilitated the training and transfer of jihadists to the Syrian front. In the case of Libya, Qatar got involved militarily in support of the rebels, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mandated forces to defend Libyan civilians. Finally, Yemen quickly became Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s place of confrontations. In other words, regional competition over political and economic domination added fuel to the fire of the Arab Spring.

The Syrian Political History: A Premise of the Syrian Civil War The intense militarisation and sectarianisation of the inter-Arab conflicts reached its climax in Syria. No other Arab country was affected by the popular protests the way Syria was. President Assad’s regime reacted to the demonstrations with an iron fist. The opposition also militarised the peaceful protests, plunging the country into endless chaos. These repressive measures and the armed mobilisation of the revolution caused thousands of deaths and millions became internally displaced and refugees. Although the Syrian civil war was originally often interpreted as a mere domino effect of the Arab Spring, the analysis of the conflict should not be limited to this similitude of political and social claims. The political history of the country offers important elements to understand the rise

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of the Islamic resentment to the Ba’ath regime in the country and the sectarianisation of the civil war. In other words, the current turmoil can be understood through the lens of the historical conflict between the Syrian regime and the Islamists. As Burgat noted, “it cannot be stressed enough that in order to understand current political realities in the Arab world, as in the rest of the world, a comprehensive knowledge of its history is essential […] where the first references of its political field are to be found and where the most precious symbolic traits of its collective identity are rooted”.4 Following Burgat’s guidance, a throwback on the history of modern Syria is necessary. The scuffle between the Syrian  regime and the Sunni Islamists can be analysed through the prism of sectarianism. As soon as the Ba’ath Party consolidated its power in the 1960s, the Sunni Islamists rejected its secular policies, believing that  they would lead the country—traditionally at the core of the Islamic civilisation—to become a secular state. After the 1963 coup, the Islamists suspected that the Alawites—a branch of Shi’ism that represents 10 to 12% of the Syrian population—were taking over the country. This perception was due to the fact that influential Syrian officers belonging to the Alawite sect—such as Salah Jdid and Hafez Assad—had participated in the military coup. Moreover, there were already signs of secular dictatorship looming in the horizon. When Hafez Assad took over power in 1970, he immediately established his sultanistic regime. He played on the cleavages of the Syrian society to ensure his power. This policy progressively led to the further sectarianisation of the country and to increasing grievances against the Ba’ath regime. Hafez Assad gained the loyalty of some of the Alawite families by instrumentalising their fear from the Sunni majority. He also granted many families of this community a giant wealth and social prestige.5 Furthermore, he surrounded himself with people who never dared to oppose him and used the military institution as an instrument of power control. The Military Academy—that was established in 1933 in Homs—was open to all citizens in Syria. As it provided recruits with social prestige and economic prosperity, many Alawite youths joined the military institution. As a result, the number  of the Alawite officers was on a steady increase. On the contrary, the Sunnis rejected the social inclusiveness of the academy, and therefore, they were less keen on joining the academy. At the economic level, Hafez Assad controlled the economy of the country and enhanced the reform of the public sector. This policy was referred to by  the  political scientist Raymond  Hinnebusch as the “[modernization] of the tyranny”.6 The reform of the public sector was merged with some sort of capitalism, which allowed the political elites to

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monopolise the economy of the state. This management displeased the Syrian urban bourgeoisie, especially in Aleppo, who happened to be Sunnis. Those several dynamics resulted in the marginalisation of the Sunni majority (about 70% of the population), which rapidly became politically underrepresented and socially deprived. Only a portion of the Sunni petty bourgeoisie supported the regime. In 1970, the Sunni bourgeoisie represented only 20.5% in Damascus, 24.6% in Homs and 26% in Aleppo— meaning that about 60% of the Sunni population was not wealthy.7 Additionally, the Sunni elites who used to rule the country after independence were gradually  driven away  from politics followed by the Ba’ath party after the 1963 coup. The latter was followed by a purge of Sunni military officers and Sunni youth were disallowed in the military academy.8–9 Hence, only a fraction of the Sunni population was, and remains until today, loyal to the Syrian regime. Adding fuel to the fire of sectarianism, Assad established ties between the Alawite sect and the Twelver creed of Sh’ism. This turned the Sunni resentment towards Assad into the bitterness of the majority against the ruling minority. This sectarian divide affected not only the politics inside Syria but also the regional politics. It resulted in a strategic alliance between Syria and Iran. The Shi’a community in Lebanon undeniably played a crucial role in strengthening the Syro-Iranian partnership. In 1973, Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, the head of the Supreme Islamic Shi’ite Council in Lebanon, issued a highly influential fatwa (religious verdict), recognising Syria’s Alawite as Shi’a Muslims. The Shi’a political leaders and religious scholars also provided a strong channel connecting Syrian political elites with their counterparts in Iran. As a result, the political resentment of the Sunni  Islamists in  Syria—mainly the Muslim Brotherhood—against the Ba’ath regime escalated. They began a campaign of delegitimisation of the regime, based on the affiliation between the Ba’ath Party and the Alawite creed.10 With the help of regional rivals of Syria—namely Iraq, Egypt and Jordan—and several Islamist groups, the Mujahidin—a group of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria—launched a series of terrorist attacks against the government. They targeted Alawite officers and elite and accused the regime of being anti-Islam.11 The attacks were severely crushed by Assad’s regime, and the repression eventually reached its climax with the infamous massacre of Hama in 1982, in which 1000 to 40,000 Islamists were killed.12 Hafez Assad died in June 2000. Yet, his death did not bring an end to the authoritarian political system in the country. The Syrian leader had previously prepared his oldest son, Basel Assad, to be his successor. However, Basel was killed in a car crash in 1994. At that time, his younger brother,

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Bashar Assad, was enrolled in a postgraduate course in ophthalmology at the Western Eye Hospital in London. After Basel’s death, the young Bashar Assad was immediately asked to return to Syria to be p ­ repared to be his father’s successor. The political elite had  arranged the transition by changing the eligibility age of presidency from 40 years to 34 years. Unsurprisingly,  Bashar was elected  by the People’s Council of Syria—the Parliament—to become the president of the country in July 2000. The Syrian citizens hoped for political reforms, but Bashar’s rule proved to be the continuation of his father’s authoritarian regime.13 At the 2005 Ba’ath Party conference, President Bashar announced that he would not launch any political or economic reform. Yet it appeared that the new president was not as acute as his father. For instance, he lost Syria’s military prestige after the Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. Moreover, the war on Iraq initiated in 2003 caused a wave of panic in Assad’s regime. Having the American troops next door was a nightmare for the Syrian president, especially as the United States continued to criticise him for supporting terrorism. Thus, Bashar Assad began to utilise former Iraqi Ba’athists officers and Islamist militants, including al-Qaida, to foil the United States’ project in Iraq. He also supported what he saw as the legitimate resistance of the Sunnis. Syria, therefore, became the land of transit for the jihadists on their journey to Iraq. As a result, the Syrian-­Iraqi relations deteriorated further. The diplomatic ties between Damascus and Baghdad were only restored in late 2006, with the efforts of Walid al-Muallem—the Syrian Minister of Foreign Relations—and his Iraqi counterpart, Hoshyar Zibari. This brought an end to the Syrian support to jihadists and Ba’athists, and the two countries signed a five-year defence cooperation agreement.14

The Syrian Civil War and Its Implications When the popular revolts erupted in Tunisia in late 2010, it was only a matter of time before the uprising would reach Syria. It began with a graffiti (“it is your turn Bashar”) on a wall, drawn by few teenagers in the city of Daraa, close to the southern border with Jordan. Increasingly “nervous as leaders were being toppled around the Arab world”, President Bashar Assad “reacted furiously to the slight, arresting the teenager and more than a dozen other boys and then torturing them for weeks”.15 Following this event, protestors gathered in Damascus to demand socio-economic and political reforms. Protests rapidly spread across the country. The regime’s

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response to the demonstrations was brutal, and it portrayed the repression as a war against Islamic extremism.16 The consistency of the regime’s violence transformed the revolt into an armed uprising against Assad’s regime. In spite of its concomitance with the Arab Spring, the Syrian crisis is peculiar in the history of the modern Arab world. It stirred up debates and controversy, led to the involvement of the most powerful powers within and outside of the region and resulted in the creation of as many as 1000 armed opposition groups, commanding an estimated 100,000 fighters. Furthermore, the Syrian case has been the catalyser of two main dynamics that are characteristic of the new regional disorder in the Middle East: The rise of sectarianism and territorial fragmentation. Sectarianism is both a tool and a consequence of the Syrian conflict. As discussed earlier, the civil war revealed and was fed by starker sectarian tensions. On the one hand, Bashar Assad and his family personified the Alawite sect, and so the regime was assigned the same religious identity. The regime also adopted the strategy to detach the minorities from the revolution, playing on Syria’s mosaic of identities. It promoted sectarian fear to turn the revolution into a sectarian conflict between the Sunni majority on the one hand, and the Christian, Druze and Alawite minorities on the other hand.17 The strategy largely succeeded in spreading fear and terror among the minorities that started to dread the tyranny of the majority. Indeed, Assad’s power is still supported by the Druze and the Christians, who each represented 12% of the population before the war. Although a small fraction of the Sunni population is still loyal to the Syrian president, the majority has seen the civil war as an opportunity to regain political power. Hence, the  main dynamic of the crisis is the confessional cleavage between a coalition of minorities that supports Assad’s regime and a majority that feels marginalised. In this respect, hostilities superimpose two levels of cleavage: first, a dictatorial power that confiscates public goods for the benefit of its people and their allies; second, societal cleavages that favour communities or confessions to the detriment of others. This resulted in urban guerillas between different neighbourhoods of main Syrian cities such as Damascus and Aleppo. Finally, the Syrian war is rooted in the opposition between the proponents of  a secular Syria and the supporters of traditional Islam. Bashar Assad is opposed to the Islamists whose project is to make Islam the cornerstone of society. As for the Sunni populations, the crisis is seen as an opportunity to take revenge. This is especially true for the Muslim

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Brotherhood party, which has been the victim of a military crackdown ordered by Hafez Assad in 1982. The implications of the Syrian war go well beyond national borders. In the Middle East, religion is more a factor of fragmentation than of integration. The religious divide between Sunni and Shi’a Islam partly explains the bias taken by the neighbouring states in the Syrian conflict. These confessional fractures follow the lines of ideological, political and economic divisions in the context of a race for regional domination. Consequently, the main support of Bashar Assad’s regime is Iran, the leading Shi’a power. The opposing side that supports the Free Syrian Army (FSA) is led by Turkey, which is governed by Islamists since 2002. Erdogan dreams of taking over the territories of northern Syria, where the Kurdish minority lives, to foil the emergence of a Kurdish entity, which would have a spillover effect on the Kurdihs cause in Turkey. The FSA is also supported by Saudi Arabia—up until the Qatar crisis in June 2017—and Qatar; both fund the armament of the rebel army through their petrodollars. The same goes for Jordan, which hosts American training camps for FSA troops. Iraq also has an interest in the Syrian conflict. Its successive governments are increasingly inclined to cooperate with Iranian Shi’a regime. As for Lebanon, after two years of “dissociation policy”, the country of cedars finally took part in the crisis in April 2013. Thousands of Hezbollah fighters crossed the borders and militarily engaged on the side of Assad. In contrast, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait wished for the fall of the Syrian regime. Finally, the presence of Hezbollah in Syria undoubtedly triggered the involvement of Israel, which started raids in Syria in January 2013. Israel and Syria remain technically still at war since the occupation of Golan Heights in 1967, and the annexation in 1981 of some 1200 sq. km. of Syrian territory by Israel. In light of these factors, all countries in the Middle Eastern region are more or less concerned and involved in the Syrian conflict. Yet, the war has not only been regionalised, it has gradually become internationalised. World powers, particularly within the UN Security Council, are divided on the stance to adopt. On the one hand, the United States, supported by the United Kingdom and France, initially wanted to see the fall of Bashar Assad. On the other hand, Russia supports the Syrian regime, which is an old socialist friend. The same goes for China, which promotes a multipolar vision of the world and is hostile to the principle of American interference in the Syrian internal affairs. This cleavage explains that no decision has been taken so far. Besides, since late-2014, the great powers are all involved in a military intervention against the Islamic State  (IS)  in Syria until the American withdrawal  in  October 2019. They have not yet agreed on the resolution of the crisis.

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The Syrian Refugee Crisis The Syrian conflict seems to crystallise  the world and regional disorder which shifts back to multilateral governance, in which the power cards are redistributed. Far from solving the crisis, the regional and international interventions in Syria resulted in additional complexities, and all aforementioned stakeholders are still mired in the conflict. Moreover, the multitude of actors and their diverging interests make it very unlikely that an agreement on a settlement in Syria will be reached. Hence, the conflict resulted in the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II. Syrian refugees were already 1  million in March 2013, and their number reached 3 million in July 2014 after the utilisation of chemical weapons by Bashar Assad against the Syrian population and after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself the caliph of the Islamic State.18 In early 2015, the crisis slowly reached Europe where 100,000 refugees sought refuge. In spite of Hungary erecting a border wall to stop refugees from entering the old continent, 1 million Syrians were in Europe by the end of the year. As of September 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has registered over 5.6 million refugees from Syria and estimated that there are over 6.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Syria’s borders. In Syria, fighting continues in spite of international agreements for de-escalation. Humanitarian access remains limited, and 3 million Syrians are still surviving in hard-to-reach areas. Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Kurdistan Region of Iraq are hosting the largest populations of Syrian refugees. None of those main host countries signed the 1951 Geneva Convention, which defines the status of refugee and sets the requirements for legal identification and rights of refugees. One could have expected Arab cooperation to cope with the Syrian crisis. Nevertheless, the Arab world, since the Kuwait Crisis in 1990–1991, is as weak as ever. The region lacks a security system. The Arab League, which is the region’s largest intergovernmental organisation (IGO), has continuously failed to impose its own will on the regional subsystem. The very absence of such a hegemonic power is arguably the reason why the region suffers from mistrust, coupled with inter-state and intra-state rivalries.19 As for the international community, although there were attempts to establish  a regional instrument to deal with the crisis, such as the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3PR) initiative co-launched by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UNHCR in 2014, none of these initiatives resulted in coherent and effective coping mechanisms.

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This shall be understood in the light of a generalised decreasing concern for humanitarian issues at the global scale. For example, until 2016, rations to refugees in Jordan and Lebanon were cut by the World Food Programme due to a funding shortfall.20 As a consequence of the regional disorder and the silence of the international community, the humanitarian burden of the Syrian crisis was borne by the host countries.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan and Lebanon The focus of this volume is on Jordan and Lebanon, two major Arab hosting countries of Syrian refugees. Rampant instability in the Middle Eastern region led the two countries to welcome a diverse and ever-growing population of refugees. Since the independence of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan in 1946, the country has witnessed two major refugee influxes: Palestinian refugees after the 1948 and 1967 wars and Iraqi refugees after the 1991 and 2003 wars.21 Those events also triggered massive influxes to Lebanon.22 In addition to those major arrivals, Jordan welcomed Lebanese refugees during the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990), as well as Syrians who fled to Jordan as a result of a massacre in the Syrian city of Hama in 1982. As for Lebanon, while it was going through a major internal shift of governments—from being part of the Ottoman Empire to an independent republic through the French dominance—the country of cedars started hosting major populations of Armenian refugees as a result of the 1915 genocide and 1939 Turkish dominance.23 Hence, Jordan and Lebanon had already become the safe haven of the refugee population before the eruption of the Syrian civil war. Since the beginning of the war in 2011, Jordan hosted the largest population of Palestinians and Iraqis, and the third largest population of Syrians.24 In February 2018, reports recorded that Jordan had the second highest share of refugees compared to its population in the world, namely 89 refugees per 1000 inhabitants.25 According to the UNHCR, refugees (including Palestinian refugees who have the Jordanian nationality) currently account for about 30% of the total Jordanian population which comprises approximately 9.5  million persons according to the latest general census.26 As of September 2018, there were an estimated 670,429 people of concern from Syria, over 2 million from Palestine and up to 1 million Iraqi refugees surviving in Jordan. In Lebanon, the sensitivity of religious balance and the 15-year civil war (1975–1990) have prevented the conduct of demographic studies since

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1932. Nonetheless, as for July 2017, the Lebanese population was believed to be more than six million. With around 1.5  million Syrians and over 450,000 long-term Palestinian refugees, Lebanon has the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world. Refugees represent more than one-quarter of the Lebanese population. The number of registered refugees started decreasing in January 2018, when it dropped to below one million for the first time since 2014. As a result of the major refugee influxes and the absence of a regional mechanism to share the responsibility of humanitarian crisis, Jordan and Lebanon have developed national policies to regulate the arrival and the housing of refugee population within their borders. It is important to mention that before the Syrian crisis, both countries were characterised by the absence of international and domestic legal frameworks for refugees. Neither Jordan nor Lebanon has signed the 1951 Geneva Convention or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. In Jordan, refugees and asylum seekers are subject to Law No. 24 of 1973 concerning Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs.27 This law does not make the distinction between refugees and non-refugees; hence, refugees are treated as foreigners. In 2015, the International Labour Organization (ILO) issued a report in which it expressed the paradox of Jordan having the second highest ratio of refugees per citizen in the world, but still no clearly defined status and rights for this vulnerable population.28 Instead, the Hashemite Kingdom’s legal framework for the treatment of refugees is based on  a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Jordan and the UNHCR in 1998. In the memorandum, Jordan accepted the definition of “refugee” contained in the 1951 Convention.29 The kingdom also pledged to respect the principle of non-refoulement, which states that “no person seeking asylum can be forced to return to a country where his/her life or freedom could be threatened because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”.30 Finally, Jordan recognised that asylum seekers and refugees should receive treatment according to internationally accepted standards. However, the MoU described the presence of refugees as a “sojourn”.31 It allowed refugees “a maximum stay of six months after ­recognition, during which a durable solution should be found”. Here, “solution” refers to either repatriation or return. In Lebanon, the status of refugees falls into the scope of the 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country.32 Only Article 31 ensures the non-refoulement for a

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former political refugee. However, asylum has been granted on the basis of this disposition only once.33 As for Syrians, the history of close ties between Syria and Lebanon led the countries to sign two bilateral agreements. The Fraternity, Cooperation and Coordination Treaty was concluded on May 22, 1991, and was complemented by the Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination on September 16, 1993. The agreements allowed reciprocal freedom of movement, residence and property ownership.34 As a result, circular migration between the two countries was characteristic of their economy. Syrian workers were estimated to number around 400,000 before the onset of the war in March 2011.35 At the beginning of the Syrian conflict, those agreements enabled Syrian refugees to enter Lebanon via official border crossings. In 2015, the Lebanese government declared that the Syrian refugee crisis was governed not by law but by governmental decisions. Hence, national laws and bilateral agreements presented above have been continuously sidestepped.36 In a similar move as that made by Jordan, in 2003, the UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Lebanon. On the one hand, the memorandum allows the UNHCR to register asylum seekers in Lebanon and to proceed their application for refugee status. It also authorises registered refugees to obtain a temporary circulation permit for up to 12 months.37 On the other hand, the MoU (re)affirms that “Lebanon does not consider itself an asylum country” and specifies that an “asylum seeker” defines “a person seeking asylum in a country other than Lebanon”.38 This definition reveals that Lebanon still refuses the 1951 Convention’s definition of refugee. The term “refugee” is actually not used in the Lebanese context; fleeing Syrians are referred to as “displaced” (nazihoun) or “guests” (dhuyuf). Finally, the UNHCR is responsible for finding a solution to resettle the refugees outside of Lebanon. Furthermore, the UNHCR is not permitted to freely register Syrian refugees without the previous consent from the Lebanese government. In April 2015, the Ministry of Social Affairs requested that the UNHCR de-­ registers over 1400 Syrian refugees who had arrived in Lebanon after January 5, 2015.39 In May 2015, Lebanese authorities imposed a new ban on Syrian refugees’ registrations. This temporary suspension was supposed to enable the government to establish a new mechanism for registration of refugees. The UNHCR was compelled to stop monitoring Syrian refugees, including those already in the country and new arrivals.40 When the Syrian crisis erupted, and large numbers of refugees started flowing in the countries, the existing demographic balance and legal instruments were shaken. At the beginning of the Syrian conflict in March 2011,

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Syrian refugees who sought refuge in Jordan numbered 283,215. The registration trend boomed in 2012 (+72.5%) and 2013 (+15%). By the end of the year 2013, the number of Syrians reached 576,354, and progressively peaked to 670,429 in September 2018. However, not all Syrian refugees are registered with the UNHCR, and they are believed to be about 1.5 million in Jordan.41 The figures released by the UNHCR for 2017 show positive trends as registrations and arrivals  slowed down (respectively, +0.4% and +0.3%).42 Moreover, around 8000 Syrians are believed to have returned home in 2017 only.43 Most went after a local truce was reached in part of southern Syria in July 2018. Syrians who fled the conflict in their home country come mainly from Daraa, at the border with Jordan, and major Syrian cities of Homs, Damascus and Aleppo.44 In Jordan, about 81.1% of Syrian refugees live in urban, peri-urban and rural areas. The remaining 18.9% are encamped in three main refugee camps: Za’atari camp in Mafraq Governorate, and Emirati-Jordanian (EJ) camp and Azraq camp in Zarqa Governorate. Because of its geographical proximity with Syria, the north of the kingdom has become home for almost 90% of the Syrian refugees. This comprises Amman (29.3%), Mafraq (24.4%), Irbid (20.9%) and governorates (14.5%).45 When the UNHCR started monitoring Syrian refugees in Lebanon in February 2013, they were 113,243. Registrations increased drastically in April 2013, to reach 1,191,332 in September 2014. Eventually, the number of Syrian refugees slowly decreased to stabilise between 991,000 and one million in 2017. In January 2018, it dropped to below one million for the first time since 2014. However, reports pointed to practices of deportation and forced return in Lebanon.46 Finally, all Syrian refugees are not registered with the UNHCR. Since the suspension of new registration of Syrian refugees, the UNHCR stopped recording individuals waiting to be registered. Syrian refugees  were believed to be about 1.5  million in Lebanon, that is, more than one-fourth of the total population as of February 2017. Syrians who fled the conflict in their home country come mainly from Damascus Homs and al-Qusayr, close to the border with Lebanon, and from Jebel Saman, Idlib, al-Ma’ra and Hama in northern Syria. Most notably, many Syrians seeking shelter in Lebanon come from al-Raqqa district, which is closer to Turkey or Jordan than to Lebanon.47 There are no formal Syrian refugee camps in Lebanon. Before the onset of the Syrian conflict, 12 Palestinian camps managed by the UN Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) existed. Evidence shows that few Syrians lived in those camps, especially for a

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short-term period. However, no estimates of their number are known.48 According to the UNHCR, about 19% of refugee households live in informal settlements (tents from timber, plastic sheets, etc.), 15% live in non-­ residential buildings (worksites, garages, shops) and the remaining 66% live in regular apartments, houses or doorman rooms. Although they are scattered across the country, Syrian refugees are mainly hosted in Beqaa (36.1%), Beirut (26.1%), North Lebanon (25.8%) and South Lebanon (12.0%) districts hosting the larger population. More than a third of Syrian refugees live in the poorest regions of Lebanon such as Beqaa, Akkar and Ba’albek-Hermel.49 This has created a major burden for the local communities which were in humanitarian needs before the crisis. Considering the scale of the crisis, one may wonder how the governments in Jordan and Lebanon responded to the influx and adapted—or not—the existing instruments to the new reality. The next chapter will give an overview of the policy and coping mechanisms developed in both countries. These developments will reveal that, in spite of similar policy trajectory influenced by the position of each government in the Syrian conflict, Jordan and Lebanon ended up exhibiting two rather different reactive paradigms to the Syrian refugee situation. In Jordan, the 2016 Jordan Compact deal has proven the sustained commitment of the Jordanian government to invest in Syrian refugees and see them as an opportunity for national development. At the subnational level, identity and interests factors shaped the variation in Syrian refugee policies. As for identity, the historical affiliation between the tribes at the two sides of the borders has been influential. It explains that the northern governorates were relatively more open. Moreover, the perception of economic opportunity has encouraged several mayors to have proactive politics to integrate refugees. In Lebanon, the Syrian refugee crisis was and remains highly politicised, and the government’s stance can be explained, on the one hand, by Lebanon’s previous refugee experience with Palestinians and, on the other, by the major antagonistic political parties’ conflicting loyalty to diverse actors of the conflict in Syria. The absence of a unified government and the resulting “non-policy” towards Syrian refugees allowed a certain degree of decentralisation in policy implementation. Economic policy  and confessionalism have been the two main drivers of the refugee’s policy. Following chapters will be devoted to highlighting the socio-economic and political impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan and Lebanon. According to Planning and International Cooperation Minister Imad

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Fakhoury, the direct financial impact of the crisis is estimated at around US$2 billion annually, which equates to 20% of the total annual national revenue and 5% of the gross domestic product (GDP).50 As for indirect impact, it is estimated to reach US$3.5 billion annually by the UNDP.51 In Lebanon, the World Bank estimates that direct costs of the Syrian refugee crisis amount US$400 million per year, while indirect costs are believed to exceed US$2.5  billion in terms of the erosion of public services.52 Public spending increased by US$1 billion between 2011 and 2014, subtracting 2.9 percentage points annually to Lebanon’s GDP growth.53 Lebanese Social Affairs Minister Derbas put the direct cost of the refugee crisis at US$7.5 billion between 2012 and 2014, that is, 17% of the GDP.54 The rapid growth of the Jordanian and Lebanese populations inexorably led to the increased competition for access to public services, infrastructures and jobs. The main socio-economic impact of the Syrian refugee crisis can be summarised as follows: (1) increasing costs of various sectors such as education, health, shelter, water, energy and housing, (2) increasing pressure on public finances, (3) increasing pressure on infrastructures and public services, (4) increased competition over access to the labour market and (5) exacerbating vulnerabilities for the poorest segments of the host population. Nonetheless, the Syrian refugee crisis did not result in solely negative impacts. In Jordan especially, policymakers have shown their sustain commitment to invest in Syrian refugees and see them as an opportunity for national development.

Notes 1. Foulath Hadid and Mishana Hosseinioun, “The middle east: a long-term view,” OpenDemocracy, September 2013, https://www.opendemocracy. net/foulath-hadid-mishana-hosseinioun/middle-east-long-term-view. 2. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2014); Denise Natali, “Ottoman Kurds and emergent Kurdish nationalism,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 13, no. 3 (2010): 383–387. 3. Robert Springbourg, “The rewards of failure: persisting military rule in Egypt,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 4 (2017): 478–496. 4. François Burgat, Face to face with political Islam (London: I.B.  Tauris, 2005), p. 10.

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5. Tariq Azizyya, “Alawites of Syria from isolation to the curse of power” [in Arabic], Democratic Republic Studies Center, 2013, http://drsc-sy. org/‫السلطة‬-‫لعنة‬-‫�إىل‬-‫العزةل‬-‫من‬-‫سوراي‬-‫علويّو‬/. 6. Raymond Hinnebusch, “Syria: the politics of economic liberalisation,” Third World Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1997): 249–265. 7. Fred Lawson, “Social bases for the Hamah Revolt,” MERIP Report (November–December 1982): 25; Volker Perthes, “A Look at Syria’s Upper Class—The Bourgeoisie and the Ba’th,” Middle East Report, no. 170 (May–June 1991): 31–37. 8. Emma Jörum, Beyond Syria’s Borders: A History of Territorial Disputes in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014): 29–33. 9. Nicoloas Van Dam, The struggle for power in Syria: politics and society under Asad and the Ba’th Party (London: I.B. Tauris, 1966), p. 31. 10. Tariq Azizyya, “The Alawite of Syria.” 11. Nicoloas Van Dam, The struggle for power. 12. Lowest estimates are given by Ohn Kifner, “Syrian Troops Are Said to Battle Rebels Encircled in Central City,” The New  York Times, February 12, 1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/12/world/ syrian-troops-are-said-to-battle-rebels-encircled-in-central-city.html; Highest estimated are given by Syrian Human Rights Committee, Massacre of Hama (February 1982). Genocide and a Crime against Humanity, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20130522172157/http://www. shrc.org/data/aspx/d5/2535.aspx. 13. Flynt Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005). 14. Seth Wikas, “Syrian-Iraqi Relations: A New Chapter?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute. org/policy-analysis/view/syrian-iraqi-relations-a-new-chapter. 15. Kareem Fahim and Hwaida Saad, “A Faceless Teenage Refugee Who Helped Ignite Syria’s War,” The New  York Times, February 8, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/world/middleeast/a-facelessteenage-refugee-who-helped-ignite-syrias-war.html. 16. Tariq Azizyya, “The Alawite of Syria.” 17. Ibid. 18. UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response 2018, 2018, https://data2. unhcr.org/en/situations/syria. 19. Anoush Ehteshami, Amjed Rasheed and Juline Beaujouan, “The Crisis of the State in the Arab Region and the Rise of the Islamic State,” Open Democracy, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-westasia/anoush-ehteshami-amjed-rasheed-juline-beaujouan/crisis-of-statein-arab-region.

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23

20. World Food Programme, WFP Forced to Make Deeper Cuts in Food Assistance for Syrian Refugees Due to Lack of Funding, 2015, https:// www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-forced-make-deeper-cuts-foodassistance-syrian-refugees-due-lack-funding. 21. Abdel Baset Athamneh, “Jordanian Refugee Policy,” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016, http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/ laenderprofile/234510/jordanian-refugee-policy; International Crisis Group, Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, 2008, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-andarabian-peninsula/iraq/failed-responsibility-iraqi-refugees-syria-jordanand-lebanon; Joseph Sassoon, The Iraqi Refugees: The New Crisis in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011). 22. Amnesty International, Lebanon Exiled and suffering: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 2007, https://www.amnesty.org/download/ Documents/68000/mde180102007en.pdf, p.  6; Simon Haddad, “The origins of Popular Opposition to Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon,” International Migration Review 38, no. 2 (2004): 470–492; Jaber Suleiman, “Marginalised Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,” Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, University of Sussex, 2006, https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/media/57a08c4be5274a31e0001112/JaberEdited.pdf, p.  3; Jad Chaaban, Hala Ghattas, Rima Habib, Sari Hanafi, Nadine Sahyoun, Nisreen Salti, Karin Seyfert and Nadia Naamani, “Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,” the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 2010, https://www.unrwa.org/ userfiles/2011012074253.pdf; Lorraine Charles, “Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: The neglected Crisis,” Forced Migration Forum, 2018, https:// forcedmigrationforum.com/2018/02/14/palestinian-refugees-in-lebanon/; Danish Refugee Council, Iraqi Population Survey in Lebanon, 2007, https://iraqslogger.powweb.com/downloads/Full_Report_3.pdf. 23. Thomas Hugh Greenshields, “The settlement of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon, 1915–1939” (PhD thesis, Durham University, 1978), p. 61. 24. UNHCR, Jordan Factsheet June 2017, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/ report/jordan/unhcr-jordan-factsheet-june-2017. 25. UNHCR, Jordan Factsheet February 2018, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/ sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FactSheetJordanFebruary2018FINAL_0.pdf. 26. Jordan Department of Statistics, Results of the General Population and Housing Census 2015, 2016, https://lao.unfpa.org/en/publications/ results-population-and-housing-census-2015-english-version.

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27. Kingdom of Jordan, Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs (last amended in 1987), 1973, http://www.refworld.org/ docid/3ae6b4ed4c.html. 28. Svein Erik Stave and Solveig Hillesund, “Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market,” International Labour Organization, 2015, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@arabstates/@ro-beirut/ documents/publication/wcms_364162.pdf. 29. UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees, 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10. 30. Ibid. 31. UNHCR, Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the H.K. of Jordan and the UNHCR (1998), 1998, http://carim-south.eu/ database/legal-module/memorandum-of-understanding-between-thegovernment-of-the-h-k-of-jordan-and-the-unhcr/. 32. République du Liban, “Loi du 10 juillet 1962 réglementant l’entrée et le séjour des étrangers au Liban ainsi que leur sortie de ce pays,” Bulletin de Législation Libanaise (Journal Officiel), 1962, http://www.refworld.org/ docid/3ae6b4f30.html. 33. Maja Janmyr, “The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.” Working paper, AUB Policy Institute, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, 2016, p. 11. 34. John T. Chalcraft, The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009). 35. Françoise De Bel-Air, “Migration Profile: Lebanon,” Policy Brief (European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre, 2017), http://cadmus.eui. eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46504/RSCAS_PB_2017_12_MPC. pdf?sequence=1, p. 3. 36. Janmyr, “The Legal Status,” p. 11. 37. UNHCR, Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate of the General Security (Republic of Lebanon) and the regional Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Concerning the processing of cases of asylum-­seekers applying for refugee status with the UNHCR Office, 2003, no. 109, article 5, 8 and 9. 38. Ibid., no. 109, Preamble. 39. The Daily Star, UNHCR to cross off 5500 Syrian refugees: Derbas, April 29, 2015, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/%20 Apr-29/296164-unhcr-%20to-cross-off-5500-syrian-refugees-derbas. ashx. 40. Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge: Syrian refugees face increased restrictions in Lebanon, 2015, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ files/resources/MDE2417852015ENGLISH.PDF, p. 5.

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41. Mohammad Ghazal, “Jordan second largest refugee host worldwide— UNHCR,” The Jordan Times, March 8, 2017, http://www.jordantimes. com/news/local/jordan-second-largest-refugee-hostworldwide-—-unhcr. 42. UNHCR, Syrian Refugees in Jordan—Infographic Overview, 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/63638. 43. Mohammad Ghazal, “Around 8000 Syrian refugees return home in 2007,” The Jordan Times, February 7, 2018, http://www.jordantimes.com/ news/local/around-8000-syrian-refugees-return-home-2017. 44. UNHCR, Syrian Refugees in Jordan by Origin (Governorate Level), 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/63035. 45. UNHCR, Syrian Refugees in Jordan (Governorate Level), 2018, https:// data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/64848. 46. Saghieh Nizar, “Manufacturing Vulnerability in Lebanon: Legal Policies as Efficient Tools of Discrimination,” Legal Agenda, 2015, http://legalagenda.com/en/article.php?id=690&lang=en. 47. UNHCR, Lebanon: Place of origin of Syrian Refugees Registered in Lebanon, 2014, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/59928. 48. Laura Mackensie, “Shatila’s population unknown as Palestinian refugee camp bursts at seams,” The National, January 14, 2016, https://www. thenational.ae/world/shatila-s-population-unknown-as-palestinian-refugee-camp-bursts-at-seams-1.178993. 49. UNHCR, Registered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (District Level), 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/66530. 50. The Jordan Times, Jordan has set an example of sound management of refugee crisis—Fakhoury, September 24, 2017, http://www.jordantimes. com/news/local/jordan-has-set-example-sound-management-refugeecrisis-%E2%80%94-fakhoury. 51. Ibid. 52. World Bank, Lebanon: Economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict, 2013, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/925271468089385165/Lebanon-Economic-and-social-impactassessment-of-the-Syrian-conflict. 53. Fanack, Lebanon: Syrian Refugees Cost the Economy $4.5 Billion Every Year, June 23, 2018, https://fanack.com/lebanon/economy/lebanon-syrianrefugees-cost-the-economy-4-5-billion-every-year/. 54. Sylvia Westall, “Syria refugees set to exceed a third of Lebanon’s population,” Reuters, July 3, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-syria-crisis-lebanon- idUSKBN0F818T20140703.

CHAPTER 3

The Dynamics of Population Pressure in Jordan: A Focus on Syrian Refugees Wa’ed Alshoubaki

Abstract  Jordan is a small country situated in a turbulent region. It has been facing a population pressure due to the influx of refugees from neighbouring countries since its establishment in 1921. The latest wave of refugees from Syria put extra pressure on the Jordanian population. This chapter discusses the potential drivers of population pressure in Jordan by reviewing the increase of demand on limited resources and pressure on public services and infrastructure. It presents the demographic structure of Syrian refugees in comparison to Jordan’s demographic structure. This chapter shows that Syrian refugees—more than 1,200,000  in the kingdom—are concentrated in Amman and the northern governorates, and the majority of them are under age 15 and women. It recommends to the Jordanian government to expand the provision of public education and healthcare services in response to the requirements of the dominant age category. It also prescribes that the formulation of gender-development projects to empower Syrian women who bear the household responsibility is an imperative.

W. Alshoubaki (*) University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_3

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Keywords  Jordan • Demographic structure • Population pressure • Syrian refugees

Introduction Jordan is a fairly small country with an area of 89,213 sq. km, and its Jordanian population according to the latest census was 8,185,384.1 The kingdom is composed of a majority of Arabs (98%) and people of other ethnicities, such as Circassians and Armenians, with each making up 1% of the population.2 The geographic location of Jordan in the heart of the Middle East has made the country highly sensitive to the political and social fragility of the region. Since 1948, Jordan has received several displacement waves as a repercussion of wars and instability in neighbouring countries. For instance, the Arab–Israeli War in 1948 and the Six-Day War of 1967 led to a large influx of Palestinians to Jordan.3 The Palestinian Intifada in 1987 and the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War led to the displacement of Palestinians from Kuwait.4 Moreover, Jordan hosted refugees from Lebanon during the 1975–1991 civil war, as well as two waves of Iraqi refugees who fled to Jordan during the First Iraq War (1990–1991) and the Second Iraq War (2003) after the removal of Saddam Hussein.5 Recently, the Syrian civil war caused more than 1,200,000 Syrians to flee to Jordan to seek a safe haven.6 This sudden and massive influx of Syrian refugees put extra pressure on Jordan’s host communities due to competition for public services, job opportunities, and subsidies.7 Considering this claim, it is important to understand that the impact of Syrian refugees on Jordan’s population can be assessed by estimating the potential population pressure based on the population size and the demographic structure of Syrian refugees and Jordanians. To this end, this study utilised the Population and Housing Census 2015 conducted by the Department of Statistics to analyse the differences between the population pressure and population growth and how the massive presence of Syrian refugees may create population pressure. It also evaluates the impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian population based on the demographic structure, namely gender, age, and household composition. The chapter is organised as follows: Jordan’s population size and population pressure concepts; the indicators of Syrian population pressure, including the socioeconomic factors, geographic distribution, and demographic structure; and lastly, concluding remarks.

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Jordan Population Pressure Jordan is not an agricultural country, and about 75% of its area can be described as a desert with less than 200 mm of rain annually. Moreover, Jordan suffers from limited natural resources and energy resources, and water shortage. Jordan is the second poorest country in the world in terms of water resources, and imports 96% of its energy requirements and rare resources of renewable energy.8 The kingdom’s population witnessed an exponential increase since gaining independence from British colonialism.9 For example, Jordan’s population doubled between 1946 and 1960, to reach 895,000, and then grew to 1,670,000  in 1970.10 Since then, the population increased to 2,290,000 in 1980, 3,400,000 in 1990, and 4,800,000  in 2000.11 In 2010, the population rose to 6,100,000, and according to the 2015 census, the total population of Jordan is 9,531,712.12 This led to a debate around distinguishing between population pressure and population growth. In essence, population growth is “the exponential growth in population from the previous year to the current year”.13 Population pressure can be described as extra pressure that occurs due to the increase in population, leading to increases in the demand on the infrastructure, natural resources, food, and job opportunities.14 Jordan’s small size and lack of natural and economic resources aggravated the living conditions for Syrian refugees and Jordanians.15 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Jordan has been impacted by the civil war in Syria, and the massive influx of Syrians into the country has created substantial pressure on national and local systems and infrastructures.16 To illustrate, at the peak of the Syrian refugees’ crisis, Jordan’s market witnessed an increase in prices, in unemployment rates, and in public debt.17 The influx of Syrian refugees has also increased the demand in the real estate sector and has caused a sharp increase in rent costs, which reached 17% in northern Jordan.18 The settlement of Syrian refugees in outside camps and urban areas has overstrained Jordan government due to increased demand for water, electricity, and public services such as education, healthcare, and municipal services.19 The education sector has faced pressure related to infrastructure and services because more than half of Syrian refugees in Jordan are under 18  years of age.20 The number of Syrian students enrolled in public schools in camps and outside camps was 143,259 for the year 2015–2016.21 This number has yet increased,

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especially after the implementation of the school-return programmes for Syrian children and the facilitation of the enrolment of Syrian refugees in school system policy at the beginning of the 2017 academic year under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. The latter allowed Syrian refugees to enrol in schools without a service card.22 Although refugees have limited access to health insurance, they put pressure on the healthcare sector and healthcare services in terms of the quality of services, the number of hospital beds, and the number of physicians.23 According to the Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey conducted by the Economic Research Forum, the Syrian refugees had higher rates of chronic illness than Jordanians by age 25, the age at which the rates begin to rise.24 These rates increase by 20% among Syrians at age 39.25 Chronic illness in Syrian males is marginally higher than in Syrian females.26 The potential population pressure of Syrian refugees on Jordan’s population impacted water and energy consumption and food security. Energy consumption increased from 5548 GWh in 2011 to 7448 GWh in 2016. Moreover, the use of liquefied petroleum gas rose from 370,000 tons to 433,000 tons during the same period.27 Statistics from 2015 demonstrated that the increase in electricity consumption in the northern governorates—the regions that received the biggest share of Syrian refugees—is higher than in the governorates that received less Syrian refugees.28 Water scarcity is an inherent problem in Jordan, but this problem was exacerbated after the influx of Syrian refugees. For instance, water demand increased by 40% in the northern governorates between 2011 and 2017, and the frequency of water supply in some regions reduced from once a week to once every four weeks.29 According to the Global Hunger Index, Jordan does not suffer from a significant food security problem.30 Generally speaking, approximately only 6% of Jordanian households are considered food insecure. However, the Jordan government found a significant challenge in responding to the increased food demands.31 Evidently, the importation value of wheat has considerably increased since 2013, and consumer food prices have increased by 15.5%.32 The protracted crisis of refugees coupled with the influx of more than a million refugees—84% of those living outside camps specifically in Amman and the northern governorates—has placed pressure on government to provide public services in the already vulnerable Jordan and has contributed to creating population pressure in the country.

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Demographic Structure of Syrian Refugees At the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Jordan adopted an open-border policy and allowed free entrance to Syrian refugees and omitted residence permit requirements, which caused the inflow of a substantial number of Syrian refugees—approximately 3000 per day. Then, the Jordanian government reduced the number to a manageable level to allow 600 Syrian refugees per day. Since then, and according to the 2015 census, the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan reached 1,265,514. Looking into the demographic structure of Syrian refugees, the census informs the differences between Syrians and Jordanians and the structure of each population so decision makers can formulate appropriate policies that commensurate with the needs and properties of each population. The geographic distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordanian governorates illustrates the degree of population pressure created by the Syrian refugees’ settlements and guides mechanisms of funds and programmes allocation to support refugees and host communities. Table  3.1 shows the geographic distribution of refugees in governorates compared to the total population. The governorates with the highest concentration (percentage) of Syrian refugees are Amman with 434,478 inhabitants, roughly 10.8% of the total of Amman’s population, followed by Irbid with 343,479 inhabitants, Mafraq with 207,903 inhabitants, and Zarqa with 175,280 Table 3.1  The distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordanian governorates Governorate

Amman Balka Zarqa Madaba Irbid Mafraq Jerash Ajloun Karak Tafieleh Ma’an Aqaba

Total population Female

Male

Female

Male

% of Syrians from total population

1,855,957 227,725 643,277 89,207 855,523 266,414 113,814 85,454 151,208 45,900 68,681 81,725

2,151,569 263,984 721,601 99,985 914,635 283,534 123,245 90,626 165,421 50,391 75,401 106,435

215,100 13,951 88,555 7258 176,911 105,589 5477 7312 8341 923 4150 3721

220,478 14,031 86,725 7411 166,568 102,314 5391 7184 8736 1010 4300 4078

10.8 5.6 12.8 7.7 19.4 37.8 4.5 8.2 5.4 2.0 5.8 2.2

Source: Department of Statistics: Jordan Census (2015)

Syrians

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Fig. 3.1  Age and gender distribution of Syrian refugees and Jordanians. (Source: JLMPS, 2016; Krafft et al., 2018)

inhabitants. The capital and the northern region, the governorates that were the closest to the Syrian border, received more Syrian refugees than the southern region. The distribution of the Syrian refugee population in terms of gender and age structure can help determine the degree and the direction of the pressure on Jordan’s population. For instance, the most represented age group is 0–14 years, and roughly 48% of Syrian refugees are under the age of 15.33 Data displayed in Fig. 3.1 emphasises that the number of females aged 20–34 years is higher than the number of males of the same age. This disproportionately low representation of men can be attributed to two main factors—men stayed in Syria to fight, or they decided to flee to the European states to seek better conditions and opportunities.34 According to Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey (JLMPS), Syrian refugee households were more likely to have a woman as the head of household than Jordanian households. In all, 23% of Syrian families are led by a female compared to 14% of Jordanian households.35

Conclusion and Remarks The fierce civil war in Syria has caused millions of Syrians to flee from their homes, looking for security and safety in the neighbouring countries. Jordan received a significant portion of these refugees, who represented around 13% of Jordan’s population in 2015.36 The massive influx of Syrian refugees created population pressure on Jordan due to the increased

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demand of food, job opportunities, and public services and infrastructures. The demographic structure and geographic distribution of Syrian refugees contributed to the potential population pressure. The Syrian refugees concentrated in Amman and the northern governorates create extra pressure on the already contested governorates. The dominant age group among Syrian refugees is under 15 years old, which requires government and international humanitarian intervention to provide schooling, healthcare, and food security to these children. The number of Syrian women aged 20–34 years is more than the amount of Syrian men of the same age, which also poses probable social tension. Moreover, the percentage of Syrian households that are led by women is more than that of Jordanian households. This requires the creation of gender-related development projects to empower Syrian women and to enhance their self-sufficiency.

Notes 1. Jeremy Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S.  Relations. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 8, 2014, https://digital. librar y.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc306476/m1/1/high_res_d/ RL33546_2014May08.pdf. 2. Ibid. 3. David Becker, “The past, present and future of transnational conflict in Jordan: A study of Syrian refugees in Hashemite Kingdom” (Master capstone paper project, Illinois State University, 2013), p. 61. 4. Geraldine Chatelard, “Jordan: A Refugee Haven,” Migration Policy Institute, August 31, 2010, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ jordan-refugee-haven. 5. Ibid. 6. David Becker, “The past”; Wa’ed Alshoubaki, “A Synopsis of the Jordanian Governance System in the Management of the Syrian Refugee Crisis,” Journal of Intercultural Studies 39, no. 5 (August 2018), 596–603. 7. Razan Nasser and Steven Symansky, The fiscal impact of the refugee crisis on Jordan. Washington, DC: The United States Agency for International Development, January 5, 2014. 8. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), Jordan response plan 2018–2020 for the Syria crisis, 2017, Amman, Jordan. 9. P.R. Kumaraswamy and Manjari Singh, “Population pressure in Jordan and the role of Syrian refugees,” Migration and Development 6, no. 3 (February 2016), 412–427.

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10. World Bank, Population growth (annual), https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=JO&page=6. 11. Ibid. 12. Department of Statistics (DoS), Jordan population census. Amman, Jordan, 2015. 13. World Bank, Population growth. 14. Lawrence Keeley, “Hunter-Gatherer Economic Complexity and ‘Population Pressure’: A Cross-Cultural Analysis,” Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 7 (1988), 373–411. 15. Wa’ed Alshoubaki and Michael Harris, “The impact of Syrian refugees on Jordan: A framework for analysis,” Journal of International Studies 11, no. 2 (2018), 154–179. 16. UNHCR, “Syria End of Year Report 2015,” https://www.unhcr.org/ news/editorial/2016/2/56cad5a99/unhcr-syria-2015-end-of-yearreport.html. 17. Alexandra Frances, “Jordan’s Refugee Crisis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 21, 2015, https://carnegieendowment. org/2015/09/21/jordan-s-refugee-crisis-pub-61338. 18. MOPIC, Jordan response plan for Syrian crisis 2016–2018. Amman, Jordan: The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2015. 19. Ibid. 20. Frances, “Jordan’s Refugee Crisis.” 21. UNICEF, Annual Report 2015. Jordan, 2015, p. 18. 22. Caroline Krafft, Maia Sieverding, Colette Salemi, and Caitlyn Keo, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Demographics, Livelihoods, Education, and Health,” The Economic Research Forum, 2018, Giza, Egypt. 23. MOPIC, Jordan response plan 2015 for the Syria crisis, December 17, 2014, Amman, Jordan: The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. 24. The Economic Research Forum, Jordan—Labor Market Panel Survey, JLMPS 2016 [in Arabic], 2017, Giza, Egypt. 25. Krafft, Sieverding, Salemi, and Keo, “Syrian Refugees.” 26. Ibid. 27. MOPIC, Jordan response plan 2018–2020 for the Syria crisis, 2017, Amman, Jordan: The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Krafft, Sieverding, Salemi, and Keo, “Syrian Refugees.” 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Department of Statistics, 2015.

CHAPTER 4

An Overview of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon and Its Socio-Economic Impact Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed

Abstract  The arrival of more than 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon since 2011 has created dramatic demographic pressure on a country that was already home to about half a million of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. The population growth highlighted several structural weaknesses that stem from the internal policies implemented after the creation of the modern state of Lebanon and after the civil war (1975–1990). This chapter

This chapter is based on a paper titled “Syrian Conflict, Syrian Refugees. The Case of Lebanon”, published by the al-Sabah Publication Series, Durham University, 2018. J. Beaujouan (*) The Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS), Durham University, Durham, UK The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] A. Rasheed School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, Durham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_4

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offers an overview of Lebanon’s refugee population. It then shortly reviews the main socio-economic impact of the demographic pressure on the country. It concludes that the demographic pressure, the strain on municipalities, and the degrading livelihoods of vulnerable groups contribute to a situation that could lead to deepened social divisions and strongest social unrest. Keywords  Lebanon • Syrian refugees • Demographic pressure

Introduction While Lebanon was going through major internal shift of governments— from being part of the Ottoman Empire through the French protectorate and finally to an independent Republic—the country of cedars welcomed major populations of refugees as early as 1915. The Armenian genocide of 1915 and the Kemalist uprising against the domination of the Allies and their proxies  enshrined in the Treaty of Sèvres  led to a first wave of Armenian refugees in Lebanon in 1920. Although many Armenian refugees left Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990), around 170,000 well-integrated Armenians still reside in Lebanon. When the Arab-Israeli conflict broke out in 1948, a total of 100,000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon and were not allowed to return.1 More Palestinians arrived later in the 1960s and 1970s due to sporadic conflicts following the Six-­ Day War in 1967.2 Finally, Lebanon experienced two main waves of Iraqi refugees. Moreover, in the early 1990s, a total of 10,000 mostly Christians and Shi’a refugees reached the country, fleeing Saddam Hussein’s repressive regime as well as the hardships of international sanctions imposed on Iraq after the Kuwait crisis (1990–1991).3 As a direct result of the instability and violence that followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 20,000 more Iraqi refugees sought refuge in Lebanon. Their number reached between 40,000 and 45,000 after the February 2006 bombing of al-Askari Mosque in Samarra which triggered a wave of sectarian violence in the country.4 The resilience of the Lebanese state and the Lebanese population to the successive waves of refugees amid internal and regional conflicts sets an example—put aside the differentiated treatment the Lebanese government accorded to refugees. Yet, the wave of Syrian refugees proved especially challenging for the country of cedars. Such a humanitarian crisis is

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unprecedented in scale and implications—both at the national and the regional levels. Because of the sensitivity of the religious balance and the 15-year civil war in Lebanon, no national census has been conducted since 1932, that is, before the founding of the modern Lebanese state in 1943. As of July 2017, the Lebanese population was believed to be more than six million. The migrant population is mainly composed of Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis, and Sudanese. Smaller numbers are from various African and Asian countries such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.5 With about more than one million Syrians and over 450,000 long-term Palestinian refugees, Lebanon has the highest concentration of refugees per capita in the world. Refugees represent almost more than one-quarter of the Lebanese population. This chapter offers an overview of the characteristics of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon. It then analyses the main socio-economic impact of the refugee crisis on the Lebanese state.

Syrian Refugees in Lebanon When the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) started monitoring Syrian refugees in Lebanon in February 2013, they were 113,243. Registrations increased drastically in April 2013, to reach 1,191,332 in September 2014.6 This period corresponds to the escalation of the Syrian conflict and the violent involvement of the Islamic State (IS) that secured power over large Syrian territories. The resurgence of violence also triggered the formation of an international coalition with the mission of stopping the military advances and exactions committed by the Salafi-jihadi group. While Syrians who fled the conflict came mainly from Damascus Homs and al-Qusayr, close to border with Lebanon, many Syrians seeking shelter in Lebanon came from al-Raqqa district.7 Al-Raqqa district became infamous for being the stronghold of IS in Syria and one of the last regions to be fully liberated from the group. It is interesting that Syrians from al-Raqqa region fled to Lebanon because their home towns are closer to Turkey or Jordan. Eventually, the number of Syrian refugees reaching Lebanon slowly decreased, to officially drop to below one million in January 2018, for the first time since 2014. However, it is not clear how many have actually returned to Syria, either forcibly or voluntarily. Faced with deplorable living conditions in Lebanon, a high number of Syrian refugees attempted

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the journey to neighbouring countries or to Europe under the auspices of the International Migration Office (IMO). Moreover, reports pointed that Lebanese authorities and political parties—especially Hezbollah and Aounist—deported and “encouraged” return of refugees to Syria.8 Finally, all Syrian refugees are not registered with the UNHCR. The latter is not permitted to freely register Syrian refugees without the previous consent from the Lebanese government. In April 2015, the Ministry of Social Affairs requested that UNHCR de-register over 1400 Syrian refugees who had arrived in Lebanon after 5 January 2015.9 In May 2015, Lebanese authorities imposed a new ban on registrations. This temporary suspension was supposed to enable the government to establish a new mechanism for registration of refugees. The UNHCR was compelled to stop monitoring Syrian refugees, including those already in the country and new arrivals.10 Lebanese experts estimate the total number of Syrian refugees—registered and not registered—around 1.5 million in Lebanon, that is, more than one-fourth of the total population. Along the political stance to portray Lebanon as a land of transit as opposed to a land of refuge, the country of cedars did not establish any formal Syrian refugee camps. Lebanon hosts 12 Palestinian camps that have always been managed by the  UN  Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Evidence shows that few Syrians live in those camps, especially on a short-term period. However, no estimates of their number are known.11 According to the UNHCR, about 19% of refugee households live in informal settlements (tents from timber, plastic sheets, etc.), 15% live in non-residential buildings (worksites, garages, shops), and the remaining 66% live in regular apartments, houses, or doorman rooms.12 Syrian refugees are scattered across Lebanon, with Beqaa (36.1%), Beirut (26.1%), North Lebanon (25.8%), and South Lebanon (12.0%) districts hosting the larger population. More than two-thirds of the Syrian refugees live in the poorest regions of the country such as Beqaa, Akkar, and Ba’albek-Hermel.13 Indeed, poverty in Lebanon—28% of the Lebanese population lives below the poverty line—falls along geographical lines. Notably, the north region of Lebanon has the lowest per capita expenditure and second highest level of poverty (36%).14 This precarious situation is rooted in the aftermath of the Lebanese civil war, which saw most rebuilding and development efforts concentrated in Beirut. This resulted in disparities between the capital and its peripheries. Hence, the presence of

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Syrian refugees has created a major burden for the local communities which were in need of humanitarian assistance before the Syrian refugee crisis. In spite of the efforts—albeit late—made by the Lebanese government and the help of the UNHCR and other humanitarian actors to cope with the massive influx of refugees, 69% of Syrians households live below the poverty line of US$3.84 per person. The figure reaches more than 80% in the districts bordering Syria. This represents an increase of almost 30% since 2014.15 The precariousness of Syrian refugee populations in Lebanon is further increased by the fact that 55% of Syrian refugees are children under 18 years old, with 49% under 15 years old. Finally, 66% of households have at least one member with a specific need. The largest share of households is reported having one or more members with a chronic illness, while one-third of households include a member with a temporary illness.16

The Main Socio-Economic Impact of the Syrian Refugees on Lebanon Although the Syrian refugee crisis had undeniable effects on Lebanon’s economy, the country has long suffered from regional instability. Before the conflict erupted, Syria was Lebanon’s main trade partner and transit ground. As a result of the Syrian civil war, Lebanon’s exports had to rely on more expensive sea shipments and the country lost significant market shares, especially in the Gulf and in Iraq. Altogether, exports have decreased by one-third since 2011.17 Hence, the Syrian crisis led not only to a slowdown in consumer confidence, investment, and tourism, but also to a direct negative impact on services and goods imports/exports. The refugee crisis further deteriorated the Lebanese economy. While the neutrality of Lebanon allowed thousands of Syrians to seek refuge in the country, as time passed and the number of refugees grew steadily, fear gripped the Lebanese that the presence of a large number of mostly Sunni Syrian refugees will alter the demographic balance and interests between the Sunni, Shi’a, and Christian sects and political groups. In 2011, when Syrian refugees arrived en masse, Lebanese GDP dropped to barely 1%. From 2012 to 2015, as a result of slower growth, Lebanon’s average standard of living worsened, with real GDP per capita marking an 8.3% drop, representing a total loss of US$726  million.18 While the UNHCR described the living conditions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon worse than ever,19 Lebanese population is also getting poorer. Yet, between the onset of the crisis and 2016, state revenues grew by

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almost US$600 million.20 The purchase of basic goods in the local markets by more than one million refugees boosted revenues from consumption taxes. The same applies to the telecommunications sector. The number of subscribers to mobile telephony in Lebanon increased by about 400,000 between 2013 and 2016. Finally, residence permits for Syrian refugees have become a major source of taxation for the government. Lebanon imposes a fee of US$200 per year after one year in the country and for all Syrians aged 15 and above. While only 20% of concerned p ­ eople renew their permit each year,21 Lebanon still increased its revenues from US$35  million to 50  million from residence fees between 2011 and 2015.22 Furthermore, Lebanon has received large amounts of foreign aid from the international community in order to cope with the influx of Syrian refugees and strengthen the Lebanese population’s resilience to the crisis. According to official figures, the country receives roughly US$1.5 billion each year.23 Nevertheless, virtually all sectors of the Lebanese state have been negatively impacted by the Syrian refugee crisis. The education sector has been deeply affected by the demographic pressure that stems from the arrival of Syrian refugees in the country of cedars. Around 586,540 Syrian refugees in Lebanon are between the age of 3 and 18, which represents half of the total Syrian refugee population in the country. Nearly 10,000 other Palestinian refugees from Syria are aged under 18. Finally, 451,323 Lebanese children are in need of education assistance.24 The education costs are mainly supported by the government, putting more pressure on public finances. The average annual costs of public basic education are over US$1000 per student after donor’s contribution.25 Although 67 public schools have been opened since 2011, they are saturated. Teachers were obliged to cover double shifts without receiving fair financial compensation, which means that children spend less time in the classroom. Lastly, the recruitment of additional teaching staff creates an additional burden on public finances. All those constraints impede the quality of education and teaching in the country for both Syrian and Lebanese population. The impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the health sector is also considerable. All Syrian refugees, regardless of whether they are registered or not registered with the UNHCR, have free access to primary healthcare facilities. Between January and September 2017 only, 878,481 consultations were provided to Syrian refugees in Lebanese infrastructures. During the same period, 61,257 Syrians were admitted for hospital care, at an

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average of 6806 admissions per month.26 According to official figures, public hospitals have accumulated a deficit of US$15  million between 2011 and 2016. This is mainly due to the inability of Syrian refugees to cover hospitalisation fees after surgery. Moreover, Lebanon has witnessed a 27% increase in tuberculosis rates since 2011.27 Finally, the country lacks staff, equipment,28 and medication.29 Consequently, the Lebanese have decreased access to primary healthcare because of the perceived reduced quality of care, overcrowding, and increased waiting time. The refugee crisis also had great impact on Lebanese livelihood. The agricultural sector, which represents a large part of food production capacity in Lebanon, has been greatly impacted. Around 15% of the refugee population is scattered across 4881 informal settlements, mostly located on and near agricultural lands.30 Furthermore, prices of basic goods have soared due to the increase in population and demand, the injection of cash and food/cash vouchers for Syrian refugees, and the reduced access to cheaper goods from Syria. Inflation also affected housing and the vulnerable Lebanese populations who are unable to cope with this rise. A 44% increase in rents was reported between June 2012 and June 2013.31 In Beirut, the situation is dramatic. In some districts of the capital, rents are believed to have increased by up to 400%.32 Currently, the 445,000 Lebanese who live under the poverty line have no access to adequate housing.33 While Lebanon enjoys a favourable water endowment, the Syrian refugee crisis highlighted the poor resilience of the water management in Lebanon. Before the crisis, only 8% of all water consumed was treated before being sent to the environment.34 Since 2011, the demand of water increased by an estimated 8 to 12%, straining the country’s resources. The impact has been especially strong for the agricultural sector, which accounts for 61% of total water demand. This increased demand and the following shortage have led refugee and local community to overrely on alternative sources such as water delivery by truck, unsafe wells, or illegal network tapping. This resulted in the creation of an unregulated parallel water supply market where rates are 200 to 300% higher than public water rates.35 The most tangible impact of Syrian refugees is seen on the existing job opportunities, wage level, and working conditions. Some voices consider that the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is the main cause of rising unemployment. The correlation is undeniable. Since the onset of the Syrian crisis, the labour force has increased by 50% in the country. While

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official figures announced 10% of unemployment in Lebanon, in March 2018, President Michel Aoun directly pointed to Syrian refugees as the main cause of the rise of unemployment rate (to 46%) in the country.36 Simultaneously, the  International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that half of the working-age Syrian refugees are active.37 While some studies suggest that structural gaps prevent real competition between Syrian refugees and Lebanese workers, it is likely that Syrians directly compete with other immigrants.38 The competition is particularly high in the informal sector that contributes to more than 56% of total employment. Not only skilled jobs have become highly competitive, but it has become more difficult to even acquire low-paid jobs. Also the fact that Syrian refugees are accepting lower incomes and longer work hours without any social benefit presents direct challenge to job opportunities for Lebanese. Syrian refugees have an average monthly income of US$277, which is 40% lower than the minimum monthly average of US$448 for Lebanese.39 As a result, labour market standards have sunk.40 Recent estimates suggest that unskilled wages in some areas have fallen by as much as 50%.

Conclusion The political legitimacy of the Lebanese regime is based on the fragile balance between three different sectarian groups; Christian, Shi’a, and Sunni. The demographics have been dramatically altered by the influx of mostly Sunni Syrian refugees. Moreover, the arrival of more than one million Syrians echoed the painful memories of the Lebanese civil war, partly caused by the influx of Palestinian refugees in the 1960s. Moreover, the security situation has deteriorated since the arrival of Syrian refugee populations in the country. As early as 2013, a national poll addressing Lebanese perceptions towards the Syrian crisis revealed that 52% of the interviewees believed that Syrian refugees were threatening national stability and security. In addition, 98% presumed that Syrian refugees were taking jobs from the local population, and another 50% thought that the refugees were benefitting from financial aid in an unfair manner.41 To conclude, Lebanon’s confessional systems, population pressure, the strain on municipalities, and the degrading livelihoods of vulnerable groups contribute to a situation that could lead to deepened social divisions and strongest social unrest.

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Notes 1. Amnesty International. Lebanon Exiled and suffering: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 2007, p.  6, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/7F3A90202D09FC3C49257379000874EE-Full_Report.pdf. 2. A census completed in January 2018 found that only 175,000 were still living in Lebanon, while another study placed the number between 260,000 and 280,000 and the UNRWA estimates varies between 400,000 and 500,000. See Amena El-Achkar, “The ‘forbidden’ tastes of Palestine,” Beirut Today, March 14, 2018, http://beirut-today.com/2018/03/13/ forbidden-taste-palestine/; Jad Chaaban, Hala Ghattas, Rima Habib, Sari Hanafi, Nadine Sahyoun, Nisreen Salti, Karin Seyfert and Nadia Naamani, “Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,” Report published by the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), December 2010; UNRWA, Where We Work, Figures as of July 1, 2014, https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon. 3. Jason Sassoon. The Iraqi Refugees: The New Crisis in the Middle East (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 4. Ibid. 5. Françoise De Bel-Air. “Migration Profile: Lebanon,” Policy Brief. European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre, 2017, p. 8, http://cadmus. eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46504/RSCAS_PB_2017_12_MPC. pdf?sequence=1. 6. UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response 2018, 2018, https://data2. unhcr.org/en/situations/syria. 7. UNHCR, Lebanon: Place of origin of Syrian Refugees Registered in Lebanon, 2014, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/59928. 8. Saghieh Nizar, “Manufacturing Vulnerability in Lebanon: Legal Policies as Efficient Tools of Discrimination,” Legal Agenda, 2015, http://legalagenda.com/en/article.php?id=690&lang=en; Nora Stel and Anke van der Meijden, “Lebanon’s Eviction of Syrian Refugees and the Threat of de facto Refoulement,” LCPS Featured Analysis, October 2018, http:// www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=188. 9. Inter-agency Coordination Lebanon, Protection Monthly Dashboard April 2015; The Daily Star, UNHCR to cross off 5500 Syrian refugees: Derbas, April 29, 2015, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/ 2015/Apr-29/296164-unhcr-to-cross-off-5500-syrian-refugees-derbas. ashx. 10. Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge: Syrian refugees face increased restrictions in Lebanon, 2015, p. 5, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb. int/files/resources/MDE2417852015ENGLISH.PDF.

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11. Laura Mackenzie, “Shatila’s population unknown as Palestinian refugee camp bursts at seams,” The National, January 14, 2016, https://www. thenational.ae/world/shatila-s-population-unknown-as-palestinian-refugeecamp-bursts-at-seams-1.178993. 12. Government of Lebanon and UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon. Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017–2020, 2019, p. 170. 13. UNHCR, Registered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (District Level), 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/66530. 14. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Financing Grant in the Amount of US$10 Million to the Lebanese Republic for an Emergency National Poverty Targeting Program Project, June 2016 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/984391472013062965/pdf/PAD1850-PJPR-P158980-P149242Project-Paper-Box396302B-PUBLIC.pdf, p. 10. 15. Government of Lebanon and UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon, Lebanon Crisis, p. 115; UNHCR, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, 2016, p.  60, https://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefweb.int/files/resources/VASyR%202017.compressed.pdf. 16. Ibid., p. 11. 17. Government of Lebanon and UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017–2020, 2018, p. 81. 18. The World Bank, Lebanon Economic Monitor. The Big Swap: Dollars for Trust, 2015, p.  12, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/560211478178124830/pdf/109738-WP-PUBLIC-on-November8-9-AM-The-World-Bank-LEM-Fall-2016.pdf. 19. UNHCR, Survey finds Syrian refugees in Lebanon became poorer, more vulnerable in 2017, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/ 2018/1/5a548d174/survey-finds-syrian-refugees-lebanon-poorervulnerable-2017.html. 20. Republic of Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Public Finance Monitor, 2016, p.  2, http://www.finance.gov.lb/en-us/Finance/Rep-Pub/DRI-MOF/ PFR/Public%20Finance%20Monitor/Monthly%20PFM%20-%20 November%202016%20-%20Final%20version.pdf. 21. World Food Programme, UN Children’s Fund and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2016, p.  1, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/VASyR2016.pdf. 22. Republic of Lebanon. Ministry of Finance, Public Finance Annual Review 2015, p. 14, http://www.finance.gov.lb/en-us/Finance/Rep-Pub/DRIMOF/Public%20Finance%20Reports/YR_2015.pdf. 23. Jac Chaaban, “Should Lebanon het more funds for hosting refugees,” BBC News, April 5, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/fea-

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tures/2017/04/lebanon-funds-hosting-refugees-170405082414586. html. 24. Republic of Lebanon. Ministry of Education and Higher Education, RACE 2 Quarterly Fact Sheet—September 2017, 2017, http://www.racepmulebanon.com/images/MEHE-REC-21-11-2017FINAL_2.pdf. 25. Government of Lebanon and UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon, Lebanon Crisis, p. 50. 26. Ibid., pp. 95 and 99. 27. Adam P. Coutt, Fouad M. Fouad and Batniji, “Assessing the Syrian health crisis: the case of Lebanon,” The Lancet 381, No. 9875 (2013), p.  9, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/issue/vol381no9875/ PIIS0140-6736(13)X6021-0. 28. David Holmes, “Chronic disease care crisis for Lebanon’s Syrian refugees,” The Lancet 3, no. 2 (2014): 102, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/ landia/article/PIIS2213-8587(14)70196-2/abstract?code=lancet-site. 29. Fadi El-Jardali et al., K2P Dialogue Summary: Promoting Access to Essential Health Care Services for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (Beirut, Lebanon: Knowledge to Policy (K2P) Center, 2014), https://www.aub.edu.lb/ k2p/Pages/K2P-Publications.aspx. 30. Government of Lebanon and UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon, Lebanon Crisis, p. 81. 31. Roger Zetter, Héloïse Ruaudel, Sarah Deardorff-Miller, Eveliina Lyytinen, Cameron Thibos and Finn Skadkaer Pedersen, The Syrian Displacement Crisis and a Regional Development and Protection Programme: Mapping and Meta-Analysis of Existing Studies of Costs, Impacts and Protection (Denmark: Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford, 2014), p. 19. 32. Lorraine Charles, Lebanon livelihoods. Economic Opportunities and Challenges for Palestinians and Lebanese in the Shadow of the Syrian Crisis, 2017, p. 13, https://insight.jbs.cam.ac.uk/assets/cbr-sharq-lebanon-livlihoods-report.pdf. 33. Government of Lebanon and UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon, Lebanon Crisis, p. 155. 34. Ibid., p. 180. 35. Oxfam, Feasibility Assessment for Water Services Provision to Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) in Lebanon. A Case Study of North Bekaa, 2018, p.  8, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ox_ FeasibilityofWaterServiceProvisiontoITSs_FINAL.pdf. 36. The Daily Star, Jobless rate at 46 pct, president warns, March 30, 2018, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Local/2018/Mar-30/443613jobless-rate-at-46-pct-president-warns.ashx.

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37. ILO, Regional Office for the Arab States, Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and their Employment Profile, 2013, p.  8, https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wcms_240134.pdf. 38. Bachir El-Khoury, “The Economic Benefits of the Massive Presence of Syrian Refugees,” The Peace Building in Lebanon, no. 16 (2017). 39. ILO, Syrian refugees in Lebanon face harsh working conditions, 2014, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsr oom/news/ WCMS_240126/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm. 40. Murat Tinas, “Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Economic, Political and Sectarian Challenges in the Absence of a Governmental Strategy,” ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs 62 (May 2017): 9. 41. Mona Christophersen, Jing Liu, Cathrine Moe Thorleifsson and Age A. Tiltnes, Lebanese Attitudes Towards Syrian Refugees and the Syrian Crisis: Results from a National Opinion Poll. Lebanon: ALNAP, 2013, https:// www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/10179.pdf.

CHAPTER 5

The Syrian Refugee Policy of the Jordanian Government Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed

Abstract  This chapter analyses the Jordanian governmental response(s) to the Syrian refugee crisis. It argues that, because of the uncertainty of the Syrian civil war, the kingdom relied on temporary and reactive policies in accordance with (1) the course of the war in Syria and (2) Jordan’s involvement in the Syrian civil war. In other words, Jordan lacked a strategic outlook to mitigate the impact of the sharp increase of its population. Keywords  Jordan • Syrian refugees • Syrian crisis • Policy

This chapter is based on a paper titled “Syrian Conflict, Syrian Refugees. The Case of Jordan”, published by the al-Sabah Publication Series, Durham University, 2018. J. Beaujouan (*) The Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS), Durham University, Durham, UK The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_5

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Introduction The position of Jordan—a small landlocked country surrounded by troubled states—arguably makes the kingdom highly sensitive to the regional instability. Since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1946, Jordan has been at the centre of Middle Eastern politics. The fate of the Hashemite country was greatly affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict. The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 led to a massive departure of 506,200 Palestinians to Jordan (Transjordan at that time).1 Following the December 1948 Jericho Conference—that was intended to decide on the partition of Palestine and  held by Jordan at the end of the conflict—King Abdulla annexed the West Bank. The action became known as the “Unification of the Two Banks”. The unification was later legally recognised in the 1954 Jordanian Citizenship Law. Its Article 3 provides that a Jordanian national is “Any person with previous Palestinian nationality except the Jews before the date of May 15, 1948 residing in the kingdom during the period from December 20, 1949 and February 16, 1954”.2 Palestinian refugees who had fled the conflict in Palestine were granted Jordanian nationality on the basis of this law and were rapidly integrated into the Jordanian society. Thus, and although Jordan lost control over the West Bank during the 1967 war against Israel, the Palestinian cause remained a “Jordanian cause” in the heart of many inhabitants of the Hashemite Kingdom. Before the onset of the Syrian civil war, and because of its “geographical curse”, Jordan had become the safe haven to more than 2 million Palestinian refugees and between 750,000 to 1 million Iraqis.3 Results of the General Census of Population and Housing (November 30, 2015) in Jordan indicated that the Jordanian population growth rate between 2004 and 2015 was 5.3%, 18% for non-Jordanians versus 3.1% for Jordanians.4 This development is undoubtedly linked to the increased influx of migrants into Jordan during that period. Since the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011, Jordan hosted the largest population of Palestinians and Iraqis, and the third largest population of Syrians. While the official estimates announced that the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan peaked to 670,429 in September 2018, not all Syrian refugees are registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).5 In early-2017, they were believed to be about A. Rasheed School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, Durham, UK e-mail: [email protected]

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1.5 million in Jordan.6 One year later, in February 2018, reports recorded that the kingdom had the second highest share of refugees compared to its population in the world, namely 89 refugees per 1000 inhabitants.7 This paper discusses the policies implemented by the Jordanian government towards the Syrian refugee population inside the kingdom. Although the government has been able to contain the crisis to a certain extent, it adopted a reactive and shifting approach based on the course of the Syrian conflict. Jordan’s policy can thus be analysed along four main phases that are described in the first part of this chapter. The incoherence of the country’s approach impeded the implementation of a much-needed strategic outlook that would take into consideration the relevant stakeholders, impact, and future of the Syrian refugee crisis inside the kingdom. In the second part, this chapter critically reflects on some of the structural challenges highlighted by the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. The chapter concludes with a short analysis of the foreseen future of Syrian refugees in the country.

The Contingent Valuation Approach of the Jordanian Government Towards Syrian Refugee A Short-Living Open-Door Policy At the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the kingdom was relatively open and tolerant to Syrians. This was due to the  country’s historically open policies towards Syrian migration and refugees in general. Yet, the purpose of such open-policy until 2013 was to display a neutral position of non-­ interference in the conflict between the Syrian government and opposition groups. In July 2012, the Jordanian government opened the Za’atari refugee camp in the north of the country, only a few miles from the border with Syria. The camp had an initial capacity of 9000 refugees in 1800 tents.8 Syrian refugees, thus, found safe haven in Jordan and were welcomed. However, the government imposed some restrictions on the right to work and strongly incentivised refugees to settle in camps rather than in urban areas. Palestinian refugees who had found refuge in Syria before the conflict were less welcomed. Reports showed that the Jordanian government attempted to deport Palestinians who entered without documents.9 From 2013, as the conflict in Syria escalated, Jordan started securitising Syrian refugees. In March 2013, the government created the Syrian Refugee Camp Directorate (SRCD) in order to control movements inside and outside refugee camps. In April 2014, the Ministry of Interior (MoI)

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replaced it with the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD) as a branch of Jordan’s security services. The new Directorate has the mission of policing Syrian refugees inside and outside camps. This evolution was symptomatic of the institutional transformation within the government that the refugee crisis triggered in the kingdom. In May 2014, Jordan opened its sixth and largest camp for Syrians. This policy echoed the previous no-­ camps strategy to deal with Iraqi refugees, which made the crisis invisible to the international community and prevented Jordan from attracting media attention and aid. Building camps for Syrian refugees, therefore, was thought as a way to increase international visibility and to attract international assistance through encampment. In an interview given in March 2017, the Jordanian security official in charge of the Azraq refugee camp explained: “If we had not built the camps, then the world would not understand that we were going through a crisis”.10 The strategy proved effective as refugee camps became the representation of the humanitarian crisis in international media covering the refugee exodus. The Creation of a Policy Framework to Support Host Communities Before the Syrian refugee crisis, Jordan was characterised by the absence of a legal framework on refugees. Similarly, as the main regional host of refugee population in the Middle East—Lebanon, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and Turkey—Jordan has not signed the 1951 Geneva Convention or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The country’s Constitution only provides protection against extradition for political asylum seekers in its Article 21(1).11 The Hashemite Kingdom’s legal framework for the treatment of refugees is based on the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Jordan and the UNHCR.12 Eventually, the memorandum proved inadequate to provide a convincing answer to the needs and impact of more than one million Syrian refugees. The increasing number of Syrian refugees in the kingdom rapidly turned the Syrian refugee crisis into a Jordanian crisis. Hence, the authorities realised the urgency to establish a legal framework to cope with the kingdom’s growing refugee population. From 2013, the Government of Jordan took a proactive role in seeking to respond to the challenges of the Syrian refugee crisis. In June 2014, those efforts resulted in the formulation of the National Resilience Plan (NRP), a three-year programme supported by development and humanitarian agencies operating in Jordan. The NRP focused on addressing the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on

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the country and host communities. Jordan planned to invest US$2.41 billion over three years in local institutions and communities in the following sectors: health, education, water and sanitation, livelihood and employment, energy, housing, and social protection.13 In parallel to the development of the NRP, in September 2014, the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis (JRPSC) was established to “coordinate, guide and provide oversight to the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the JRP [Jordan Response Plan] 2015 and the JRP 2016”.14 The JRP was first launched three months later, in December 2014, as a one-year programme. It was developed jointly by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) and the UN, and represented a drastic change in the approach to the Syrian refugee crisis. While humanitarian relief was the priority of the Jordanian government before 2013, from 2014, national and international actors cooperated to implement an overall and comprehensive response to the crisis. In other words, Jordan and the UN adopted a more sustainable plan based on long-term development for both the refugee population and the host communities. Accordingly, the JRP was underpinned by three main principles: mitigate the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities, sustain socio-economic stability, and safeguard the development gains made in recent years. In other words, it tackled issues of social integration, capacity building, and prevention of extremism, without undermining the protection of the Syrian refugees. In this realm, the responsibilities and the role of the MoPIC in Jordan were upgraded. The JRP was developed on the ashes of the Human Rights Committee Unit (HRCU), within the MoPIC, that was created during the Iraqi refugee crisis. The JRP can be seen as a platform that gathers the main stakeholders of the refugee crisis, namely ministries, ambassadors, representatives of the UN and other NGOs, donors, and universities.15 As explained by Marco Stella, a UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) representative at the MoPIC in Amman, the JRP can be described as a process that coordinates the response to the Syrian refugee crisis to support the capacities of the Jordanian government and strengthen the trust between all partners.16 Similar to the National Response Plan, the JRP outlined almost US$3 billion to be injected in 11 strategic sectors. Donors’ contributions to the plan are coordinated through a unified channel, the Jordan Resilience Fund (JRF), launched by Jordan and the UN.17 With the persistent influx of the refugee inside Jordan, the JRP 2015 was renewed until 2020 in two phases: the JRP 2016–2018 and the current JRP 2018–2020. In spite of the

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strong will to bring the development dimension in the JRP from 2013, the response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan remained heavily focused on the refuges, while neglecting the burden on the host community. This unbalanced intervention inevitably created a Jordanian discontent and produced social tensions. Thus, the Jordanian authorities added two additional, yet essential, pillars to the JRP from 2016—refugees and resilience—to tackle both the needs of the Syrian refugees and the consequences of the demographic pressure on the Jordanian state and its population. Finally, Jordan signed the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) launched in December 2014 by the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Lebanese Republic, and the Republic of Turkey. The plan aimed to ensure protection and humanitarian assistance and strengthen resilience.18 It is aligned with existing national plans, in the case of Jordan, the Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis 2018–2020. The JRP is said to be a chapter of the 3RP. Yet, many political and humanitarian actors underlined the lack of coordination between the two plans and the two levels of policy, which directly impeded the efficiency of the response to the crisis. First, there is a lack of coordination between the 3RP and the JRP.  Although it officially signed it, the Government of Jordan never approved the 3RP, nor is it included in the plan as a main governmental actor. The rationale for the non-inclusion of any national government was to achieve neutrality and avoid corruption and the politicisation of the aid. In other words, the 3RP is not much of a policy plan, but rather an appeal document which does not include the national government of host countries or national NGOs, but only the international community. As such, the 3RP fails the take into consideration the needs of national actors and their capacity building. Therefore, the 3RP also ignores the priorities highlighted in the national-based JRP.  While the 3RP and the JRP do not properly clash, the two plans ignore each other. This results in the mismanagement in the allocation of the aid sent to the kingdom, as some needs receive much funding while others fail to attract the attention of international donors that channel their contributions through the 3RP. Said differently, there is a competition for appeals, as donor must choose only one plan— and the needs and priorities each emphasises—to donate funding. It is thus regrettable that the international community coined a different response plan instead of supporting and complementing the initiatives of the Jordanian government that adopted a specific plan, the JRP, from 2014. In Jordan especially, where a plethora of institutions and national NGOs prove

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stable and active in the mitigation of the Syrian refugee crisis, the justification and legitimacy of a formatted international framework such as the 3RP is highly debatable. To sum up, there is a d ­ amaging lack of cooperation between the international and domestic levels of response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan and other host countries. The Securitisation of Syrian Refugees and IS Spectre From 2013, and while Jordan started developing a comprehensive approach to mitigate the consequences of the refugee crisis in the kingdom, the government adopted a strong stance towards the presence of Syrian refugees. In June 2013, Jordan started closing all its informal western border-crossings and installed checkpoints to prevent Syrians from entering the country. As a result, Syrian refugees were forced to travel to informal crossings along the eastern side of the border.19 The turning point of Jordan’s policies on Syrian refugees came with the growing influence and violence committed by the Islamic State (IS) in Syria from September 2014. Jordan responded to the threat with increased securitisation of the Syrian refugees and with greater restrictions. On the one hand, there was a growing fear among the Jordanians that the refugee camps would be infiltrated by IS members and would pose serious security threats inside the kingdom. On the other hand, from June 2014, IS launched a media campaign against the kingdom, especially against the royalty and the government in Jordan. Between June 2014 and June 2017, IS released 16 videos targeting Jordan. Most notably, on February 25, 2015, a video entitled “A Message to Jordan”, addressed King Abdullah II bin al-­Hussein and threatened to “cut off [his] neck”. In another infamous video released on December 7, 2015, the son of a Jordanian Member of Parliament (MP) proudly burned his Jordanian passport and renewed the threat to King Abdullah and other MPs. As a direct consequence of the threat, the Jordanian society and the government became less keen on hosting new Syrian refugees on the Jordanian soil. In 2014, a national poll showed that nearly 80% of Jordanians were opposed to accepting more refugees.20 In addition, several reports pointed to several instances of massive refoulements and to the suspension of registration for new arrivals at the border.21 Thousands of Syrians were turned away and abandoned in a demilitarised area known as “the berms”. The capture of Jordanian pilot Mu’adh al-Kasasbeh at the hands of IS and his gruesome immolation in February 2015 triggered the direct involvement of Jordan in the Syrian conflict. On February 5, 2015, Jordan

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launched an intense bombing raid against IS in Iraq and Syria in retaliation for the murder of the pilot. The country has been militarily involved in the conflict ever since, targeting IS positions in Syria and hosting major airbases for the planes of the international coalition. The road access to Jordan from Syria was closed in April 2015 to limit the influx of Syrian refugees. The kingdom shut its last points of entry after the attack on June 21, 2016, which was allegedly supervised by IS supporters from the Syrian Rukban refugee camp. The debate about the opening of the borders was rekindled in late June 2018. When the Russian-led offensive on Daraa started on June 18, 2017, about 13 kilometres north of the border with Jordan, more than 270,000 Syrians fled towards the Israeli-occupied Golan Height and Jordan’s doors.22 The people of Jordan were divided evenly between those who promoted the opening of the borders for humanitarian purposes, and those who feared that IS fighters might infiltrate the refugee population and threaten Jordan from within. The border eventually remained closed. On the international stage, the Hashemite Kingdom raised its voice to denounce the inadequacy of international responsibility-sharing. It urged European countries to financially support the hosting of over one million Syrian refugees. It is important to note that a major donor to Jordan is Japan who gave approximately US$59 million to international organisations operating in Jordan so far.23 In 2017, the country gave US$1.494 million grant to the UN Office for Project Services in order to finance a project called “Improving Safety and Security for Syrian Refugees at the Refugee Camps in Jordan”. In a public statement, Shuichi Sakurai, ambassador of Japan in Amman, said that “Japan has acknowledged that security is one of top priorities in managing refugee camps; because assistance for the refugees, who are living in severe condition, can be provided only under a secure and safe environment”.24 The Cooperation with International Donors and the Humanisation of Syrian Refugees Politics of international aid drive the national policies of states. As soon as the refugee crisis became a global  challenge in 2015, Jordan saw the opportunity to turn the humanitarian emergency into an opportunity. Accordingly, the kingdom began to negotiate with the European countries to support the Jordanian government in dealing with the crisis as a price for keeping the refugees outside Europe.

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In February 2016, at the London Pledging Summit, Jordan and the European Union concluded “the Jordan Compact” deal to support Syrian refugees in Jordan. The agreement focused on integrating Syrian refugees in the labour market. Jordan accepted to soften its strict regulations on refugees’ right to work. For example, the Government of Jordan exempted Syrian refugees from work permit fees. Syrians are currently required to pay only JD10 administration fees, while the fees were originally JD700 (approximately US$1000). The exemption is renewed every year by the Council  of Ministers for several low-skilled sectors such as agriculture, construction, and manufacturing. In return, the donor countries committed to better support the Jordan Response Plan, which, by 2016, was only 30% funded.25 Moreover, Jordan pledged to create up to 200,000 work opportunities for Syrian refugees. More specifically, the Compact entails a model designed to help Jordan integrate refugees into pre-existing Special Economic Zones (SEZs). In order to facilitate this integration, the EU has offered tariff-free access to European markets on condition that businesses in Jordan employ a certain proportion of Syrian refugees. Those businesses should also produce in at least one Jordanian SEZ and in specific product categories. Furthermore, for the first time, the World Bank offered a Concessionary Finance Initiative to Jordan, providing lowinterest loans.26 As of July 2018, the Government of Jordan had taken the necessary steps to open formal employment opportunities to Syrians. In 2017 alone, 46,000 work permits were issued in sectors approved for foreign workers.27 As of mid-July 2018, a total of 105,000 work permits were issued by Jordan to Syrian refugees, mostly in the construction and agriculture sectors.28 Syrians have also been formally entitled to work outside the camps for up to one month before returning to renew their paperwork. Yet, two main challenges remain. First, migrant workers in Jordan were greatly affected by the new policy towards Syrian refugees. Since 2016, to create job opportunities for Syrians, the Jordanian government halted the recruitment of migrants, did not renew their work visa, and even launched intense work inspection campaign among migrant ­workers.29 Second, as reminded by economist and World Bank consultant Susan Razzaz, giving a work permit cannot be equated to creating a job opportunity. In other words, a high number of the permits delivered to Syrian refugee since 2016 corresponds to the legalisation of a de facto working situation, and not to the actual creation of a work opportunity.30

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Regarding the SEZs, fewer permits have been issued. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department for International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom funded the identification of 300 existing manufacturers within the SEZs. Meanwhile, the UNHCR collaborated with the Jordanian Investment Authority to engage Jordanian firms. Job fairs are currently regularly organised in refugee camps, especially in Za’atari, in collaboration with the Norwegian Red Cross and the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate.31 Nevertheless, Jordan should still increase its efforts in ensuring fair working conditions for Syrians. Another challenge is to attract multinational corporations (MNCs) to establish factories in Jordan and to employ Syrian refugees as well as Jordanians. Razzaz regretted that Jordan lost the opportunity to attract Syrian businessmen from the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Arguably, the government feared that Syrians might have better business skills than the Jordanians, and thus would potentially monopolise business activities in the kingdom. Yet, it appears that the Jordanian argument was exaggerated. The country has no manufactured or handicraft products, neither food nor tourism strong sectors. Syrians could have imported those skills. Confronted with the restrictive laws of the Hashemite Kingdom, numerous Syrian businessmen moved to Turkey instead.32 Finally, as part of the Jordan Compact, Jordan was offered no-interest grants from the United Kingdom, as well as market-interest loan form the World Bank (WB). Yet, the World Bank refugee loan caused controversy. As explained by Susan Razzaz, the WB loan would have to be paid at the market rate.33 The Jordanian government and population were reluctant to borrow money with interest to tackle the Syrians refugee situation in the country. The rationale was, “Why should we borrow, and thus reimburse, money that will not even go to our own population?” Although the money pledged by the UK and the WB was directed at both the Syrian and Jordanian populations, the deal became a source of confusion. Clearly, Jordan did not see the opportunity in those grants and loans, Razzaz reflected. The economist emphasised that this was the first time Jordan was able to borrow money from the international financial institution. In the past, the kingdom was prevented from doing so because of the high level of its debt. She concluded that the money lent to the Jordanian ­government has been thought as a way to support its policies towards the refugee crisis. It is thus considered a long-term development loan which, in theory, should not be hard to reimburse.34

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The Structural Weaknesses Revealed by the Syrian Refugee Crisis Despite the governmental and international policies to contain the Syrian refugee crisis, the latter has highlighted some pre-existing structural challenges to the state and the society in Jordan. Numerous social and political reforms which had been initiated before the Syrian conflict were paused by the massive influx of Syrian refugees. Competition over access to public services and infrastructures has caused tensions in the population. Perhaps the most evident pressure was seen on the labour market, as Professor Sheitwi extensively analyses it in Chap. 7 of this volume. Furthermore, some sectors suffered from the mismanagement of the refugee crisis by the Jordanian government. This is the case of the health sector. At the beginning of the refugee influx, the kingdom granted free access to health facilities to the Syrian refugees. This led to an increase in the demand, needs, and costs of the healthcare system. Moreover, health centres suffered from a shortage of medicines and vaccines. Between the beginning of the influx and 2016, around 630,000 Syrian refugees were admitted in public hospitals.35 Congestion over health services led Jordanians to turn to private centres and hospitals, which are less accessible and more expensive. This created tensions with the Jordanians, many of whom lacked the privilege of free healthcare. Moreover, as recorded by Dr Yaroup Ajlouni—president of the Health Aid Society Jordan—a number of Syrian refugees took advantage of the state policy; they were living in Syria but delivering babies and accessing free healthcare in Jordan.36 Faced with the injustice, Jordanians developed coping mechanisms to benefit from free medical treatment. Dr Ajlouni mentioned that some Jordanians would hide their national identity cards and buy UN voucher from Syrian refugees and pretend to be refugees to access free healthcare. In order to overcome the tensions over health access, in early 2015, the Jordanian government granted universal and free access to healthcare for Jordanians, while Syrian refugees were no longer entitled to free medical services.37 The mismanagement of the Syrian refugee crisis in the health sector also highlighted an underlying conflict of interests between the public and the private sectors in Jordan. Currently, there are 670 private health centres and 30 private hospitals in the kingdom. Civil society members who wished to remain anonymous mentioned the monopoly of Jordanian ­officials over the health sector, and the corruption that goes with it.38 More precisely, some politicians own public clinics and hospitals that are

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infamous for their low-quality treatments. Similarly, those officials would sell poor-quality medications to the Jordanian populations and have the monopoly over medical exports. Yet, the owners escape quality controls and closures, which would testify for the lack of transparency in the public health sector. Those civil society members who denounce the corruption of the health sector advocate for neutral assessment of public clinics and hospital by an independent committee. They also call for the privatisation of the health sector, which they believe would encourage competition, and thus a better quality of treatments, medications, and health services to all Jordanians.39 One may wonder why the health sector is the only sector which remains under the full control of the government, while other sectors such a water and sanitation or petrol and public transportations have long been privatised and offer better services. On a different note, the government has failed to coin a communication strategy aimed at explaining its goals and policies to the Jordanian population. At the same time, the government developed a very well-­ crafted message to the international community in order to attract funding. This message emphasised the burden of the Syrian refugees and the significance of international support to contain the crisis. While the Jordanian population received a discourse built around the negative impact of the Syrian refugees, it was not given the opportunity to comprehend the governmental policies towards the refugees nor how the international aid was spent on both the refugee and the Jordanian population. Hence, the miscommunication from the government fuelled domestic discontent and tensions between the refugees and the host communities. Moreover, the government was unsuccessful in reassuring its people and fostering a positive—or at least unbiased—image of the Syrian refugee crisis. During a parliamentary session in 2013, a Member of Parliament described Syrian refugees as “invaders” who threatened local people in terms of population, economy, and morals.40 According to the same parliamentarian, the Syrian refugees have stolen bread from Jordanians and encouraged drug use and prostitution. This hate speech resonated in parts of the Jordanian middle class, which was already under high economic pressure before the influx of Syrian refugee in the kingdom. Even more alarming, this discourse was promoted by media professionals, politicians, and activists from the Arab nationalist left led by the late journalist Nahed Hattar, who expressed unconditional support to the Syrian regime against the rebels.41

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Conclusion: The Future of the Syrian Refugees in Jordan The Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan has been met with evolving and diverse policies in the kingdom. At the political level, the Jordanian government adopted a reactive stance to the Syrian issue, indexing its approach on the surrounding political and security dynamics. Although it took a proactive approach to mitigate the humanitarian crisis and its impact from 2013, Jordan failed to accommodate its own objectives to attract international aid with the needs of the Jordanian population. Furthermore, the crisis exposed the existing corruption in the country. In addition,  while the Syrian refugee situation became the political priority, attempts to pass socio-economic reforms were paused. Those factors created public discontent about the governmental performance. This popular dissatisfaction materialised in a wave of protests against the Jordanian government in June 2018. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that the kingdom remained stable in spite of the neighbouring conflict and the arrival of more than one million Syrian refugees. The future of the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan is undoubtedly linked to the Syrian civil war. On October 15, 2018, the main border-crossing between Jordan and Syria was reopened after being closed for three years.42 The move arguably followed a deal struck between Damascus and Amman to return refugees to Syria. The transfer was supervised by the Russian military.43 Yet, all refugees who have been repatriated to Syria will not be able to return to their home. Furthermore, many more will likely refuse to go back, fearing retaliation from the Assad regime. Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the conflict in Syria has not come to an end yet. Even if a general and permanent ceasefire were to be declared tomorrow, the resolution of the conflict, postwar recovery, and rehabilitations will take decades. Hence, the refugee crisis in Jordan will surely continue. Experts estimate that between 400,000 and 500,000 refugees will stay in the country in the long term.44 If the refugee situation has already posed multiple challenges to the Hashemite Kingdom and its population, in the long run, the crisis might pose some serious political and social threats. While the demographics have been dramatically altered by the influx of Syrian refugees, political structures are likely to remain unchanged. One example on how Syrian refugees may affect the political legitimacy in Jordan is the nationality law. Legally, Jordanian women do not have the right to grant their own nationality to their child. In other

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words, when a Jordanian woman has a child from a non-Jordanian man, the child cannot be considered Jordanian. Many of those cases already occurred with the increasing Palestinian population in Jordan and the occurrence of mixed marriages. It is likely that the next generation of individuals living in the kingdom will not all have the Jordanian nationality, and thus will constitute an unrepresented “second class”. This fringe of the population may eventually question the legitimacy of the government and ask for more rights or a status equal to the one of Jordanians, which might ultimately lead to social upheavals in the future. Surely, Syrian refugees will change the future of Jordan, just as it was the case with the Palestinian refugees. In a few years, if all Syrians are granted the Jordanian citizenship, those same Syrians might well decide to elect a Syrian prime minister. After all, the current queen is Palestinian. The Jordanian government will need to find the right balance between granting non-controlled and open access to Jordanian services and imposing harsh restrictions on Syrian refugees. One option might be to grant Syrians a Jordanian passport but no national ID. In this case, they would not be allowed to vote and to change the political structures and legitimacy of the government.

Notes 1. UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Annual Report of General Commissioner of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Covering the period 1 July 1994 to 30 June 1995, UN GAOR, 50th Sess. Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/50/13, 1995, p. 65. 2. Kingdom of Jordan, Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (last amended 1987), 1954, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ea13.html. 3. UNRWA, Where We Work, Figures as of July 1, 2014, https://www. unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan; Jack Redden, “Iraq Conference: Iraq and host countries promise to aid Iraqi refugees,” UNHCR News and Stories, April 17, 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/ latest/2007/4/4624b0814/iraq-conference-iraq-host-countries-promise-aid-iraqi-refugees.html. 4. Jordan Department of Statistics, Results of the General Population and Housing Census 2015, 2016, https://lao.unfpa.org/en/publications/ results-population-and-housing-census-2015-english-version. 5. UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, Refugees from Syria by Date, last updated April 9, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/ location/36.

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6. Mohammad Ghazal, “Jordan second largest refugee host worldwide— UNHCR,” The Jordan Times, March 8, 2017, http://www.jordantimes. com/news/local/jordan-second-largest-refugee-host-worlwide-–-unhcr. 7. UNHCR, Jordan Factsheet June 2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Jordan%20Fact%20Sheet%20June%202017-%20 FINAL.pdf. 8. Alexander Betts, Ali Ali and Fulya Memişoğlu, Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis. Exploring Responses in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, 2017, p. 9. 9. Ricardo Santos, “Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Jordan: An Overview,” al majdal 56 (Autumn 2014): 26–27. 10. Alexander Betts, Ali Ali and Fulya Memişoğlu, Local Politics, pp. 9–10. 11. Kingdom of Jordan, Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1952, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b53310.html. 12. UNHCR, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the H.K. of Jordan and the UNHCR (1998),” Official Gazette No. 4277 of 3 May 1998, No. 107, article 5, http://carim-south.eu/databases/legal/ Jordan/Bilateral%20Agreements/LE2JOR002_AREN.pdf. 13. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, National Resilience Plan 2014–2016. Brief on the Impact of the Syrian Crisis by Sector, 2014, http://www.jordanembassyus.org/sites/ default/files/NRP_Sector_Impacts_01.06.2014.pdf. 14. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, The Jordan Response Plan for The Syria Crisis. 2015 Appeal, 2014, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/JRP 2015 Appeal_ENG.pdf. 15. Marco Stella, Syria Crisis Coordination Specialist at the MoPIC, personal communication with the authors, July 4, 2018. 16. Ibid. 17. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. The Jordan Response Plan. 18. UNHCR, Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015–2016 in Response to the Syria Crisis. Regional Strategic Overview, 2015, p.  7, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3RP-Report-Overview.pdf. 19. Human Rights Watch, Jordan: Syrian Blocked, Stranded in Desert, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/03/jordan-syrians-blockedstranded-desert. 20. Björn Rother, Gaëlle Pierre, Davide Lombardo, Risto Herrala, Priscilla Toffano, Erik Ross, Greg Auclair and Karina Manasseh, The Economic Impact of Conflicts and the Refugee Crisis in the Middle East and North Africa, 2016, p. 16, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/ sdn1608.pdf.

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21. Rana F.  Swels, “No Syrian Are Allowed into Jordan, Agency Say,” The New  York Times, October 8, 2014, https://www.nytimes. com/2014/10/09/world/middleeast/syrian-refugees-jordan-borderunited-nations.html; Amnesty International, Jordan: Risk of humanitarian disaster as 12,000 refugees from Syria stranded in ‘no man’s land’, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/12/jordan-risk-ofhumanitarian-disaster-as-12000-refugees-from-syria-stranded-in-nomans-land/; Emma Gatten, “Jordan blocks Syria border leaving thousands of refugees in the desert—including hundreds of pregnant women,” The Independent, January 22, 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ world/middle-east/jordan-blocks-syrian-border-to-leave-thousands-ofrefugees-trapped-in-the-desert-including-hundreds-a6828471.html. 22. Human Rights Watch, Syria/Jordan: Open Borders to Daraa Residents. Dire Conditions for Thousands Fleeing Fighting, July 4, 2018, https:// www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/04/syria/jordan-open-borders-daraaresidents. 23. The Jordan Times. Japan hands over security equipment to Syrian refugees Affairs Directorate, August 2, 2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/ news/local/japan-hands-over-security-equipment-syrian-refugees-affairsdirectorate. 24. Ibid. 25. Alexander Betts, Ali Ali and Fulya Memişoğlu, Local Politics, p. 10. 26. Ibid., p. 11. 27. UNHCR, Jordan Factsheet—February 2018. 28. Ammar Kelbani and Yacoub Hamdan, Head of the Syrian Refugees Department, Policies and International Cooperation Directorate within the Ministry of Labour, personal communication with the authors, June 25, 2018. 29. Ibid. 30. Susan Razzaz, Economist and World Bank Consultant in Jordan, personal communication with the authors, July 8, 2018. 31. ILO, “EU-Funded Zaatari Camp Job Centre Hosts Unprecedented Job Fair,” ILO News, October 4, 2017, http://www.ilo.org/beirut/mediacentre/news/WCMS_579487/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm. 32. Susan Razzaz. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Dana Al-Emam, “‘Public healthcare services to Syrian refugees costing Jordan JD271m annually’,” The Jordan Times, December 19, 2016, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/public-healthcare-servicessyrian-refugees-costing-jordan-jd271m-annually’. 36. Yaroub Ajlouni, President of the Health Aid Society Jordan, personal communication with the authors, July 1, 2018.

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37. Alexandra Francis, Jordan’s refugee crisis, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015. 38. Personal communication with the authors, July 2018. 39. Ibid. 40. Al-Madina News, The Facilitator of the Narrative and the Syrian Refugees in Mafraq [in Arabic], March 27, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Z9yG1KJnbzM. 41. Hana Jaber, “Blessed Investors and Cursed Refugees: A Reading of Syrian Presence in Jordan,” Arab Reform Initiative, December 5, 2018, p.  6, https://www.arab-reform.net/pdf/?pid=2077&plang=en. 42. Osama al-Sharif, “Jordan, Syria reopen border,” al-Monitor, October 17, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/10/jordansyria-nassib-border-crossing-trade-economy.html. 43. The New Arab, Syria says deal struck with Jordan to return refugees, August 14, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/amp/news/2018/8/14/ syria-says-deal-struck-with-jordan-to-return-refugees?__twitter_ impression=true. 44. Musa Shteiwi, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, personal communication with the authors, July 8, 2018.

CHAPTER 6

Analysing the Evolution of Lebanon’s Syrian Refugee Policy: The Role of Foreign Policy Khalil El Hariri

Abstract  The Syrian conflict has seen multiple twists and turns since the start of uprisings in 2011. Simultaneously, neighbouring states, such as Lebanon, have also seen drastic changes to their policy towards Syrian refugees. As the Syrian conflict evolved, the stances of ruling parties in Lebanon towards the Syrian crisis changed and so did their approach to Syrian refugees. With time, Lebanon’s approach towards Syrian refugees has shifted from an open-door policy to one that is restrictive and finally to active measures encouraging the ‘safe’ return of refugees. This chapter analyses how the ruling parties’ stances towards the Syrian conflict impacted Lebanon’s refugee policy, and argues that while foreign policy considerations are major factors shaping the said policy, they are not enough to understand what  is driving the changes in Lebanon’s approach towards Syrian refugees and that hence other factors should also be considered.

The author would like to thank the Carnegie Middle East Center for offering him the opportunity to attend the roundtable, and Camille Mroue for his insightful comments on this article. K. El Hariri (*) Independent Researcher, Beirut, Lebanon © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_6

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Keywords  Lebanon • Syrian refugees • Syrian crisis • Foreign policy

Introduction Lebanon is no stranger to refugee crises. It has hosted Armenian refugees following the Armenian Genocide in the second decade of the twentieth century, and Palestinian refugees following the 1948 Nakba and 1967 Naksa. However, the Syrian refugee crisis has been different to its predecessors in that the Lebanese political scene has been severely divided over the conflict in Syria between those who are supportive of the regime and those who favour its downfall. As the conflict evolved in Syria, so did the ruling political parties’ stances on the conflict and, accordingly, the government’s policy towards Syrian refugees. In December 2018, the Lebanese foreign minister explained that Lebanon’s Syrian refugee crisis should not be politicised and used as a political card as part of the conflict in Syria.1 Despite such claims, the approach of the Lebanese government has been—at least partially—influenced by the political changes happening in neighbouring Syria. This chapter analyses the evolution of Lebanon’s policy towards Syrian refugees. It will do so by exhibiting how the stances of the consecutive governments’ different constituents on the Syrian conflict since 2011 have impacted Lebanon’s refugee policy. The first section will review the different factors that shape a host country’s refugee policy before elaborating on how relations between the host government and the government of the country of origin impact a refugee policy. The following section will describe the different phases of Lebanon’s policy towards Syrian refugees since 2011. This will be followed by an analysis of the evolution in Lebanon’s refugee policy before ending with a conclusion.

Factors Shaping Refugee Policy A number of factors impact refugee policy-making.2 To begin with, security concerns are often influential in shaping refugee policies. Refugees are perceived as a security threat because of concerns that they would use the host country as a base for military attacks on their countries of origin. Security concerns are often the reasons why host countries refuse to build camps for refugee housing. Host countries fear that refugee camps would turn into military bases, which would expose the areas in which camps are

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in to attacks from other sides of the conflict.3 Host countries might also take restrictive measures against refugees due to concerns that they increase crime rates.4 In addition, the choice of a state agency that is assigned with managing refugees impacts refugee policy-making. If the agency is civilian (such as those which are under ministries of interior or social affairs), then the policy towards refugees tends to be generous, that is, in favour of the wellbeing of refugees. To elaborate, a civilian agency has an incentive to put forth a generous policy since that would increase its access to funding from humanitarian donors.5 However, if military and security apparatuses manage the refugees’ portfolio—such as when refugees are perceived as a security threat—then refugee welfare would not be a top priority contributing to a restrictive refugee policy. Host communities’ attitudes towards refugees are also a factor that is taken into consideration when a refugee policy is made. For instance, past experiences with refugees or with displacement affect the ways communities react to refugee crises. In addition, host communities’ attitudes towards the refugees’ ethnicity also play a role in whether they are hospitable or hostile towards refugees.6 The potential impact of refugees is an additional factor the shapes refugee policy. The influx of refugees incurs costs due to strains on a country’s social and physical infrastructure.7 Refugees can also compete with locals for jobs in the labour market. However, it is worth mentioning that the economic costs of a refugee influx can be overlooked when the host state’s economy is doing well. Yet, these costs would be more felt during economic slowdown which might cause policymakers to devote fewer resources to refugees.8 Furthermore, host states take into account the international refugee regime when setting refugee policies. Signatories to the 1951 refugee convention have to commit to the principle of non-­refoulement for instance.9 Moreover, the  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also has a set of operational conditions a host country has to fulfil for it to receive international aid through the agency. Relations with the Country of Origin: How Foreign Policy Impacts Refugee Policy Relations between the country of origin and the host country often define how the latter deals with refugees. If the host government is on unfriendly terms with the government of the country of origin, then it might open its

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borders to undermine the latter, thus implying that the government of the country of origin is persecuting its own people.10 However, if the host state is on good terms with that of the country of origin, then it would be hesitant to identify the displaced as refugees in order not to implicate the sending government as one that oppresses and abuses its own people. Costa Rica’s policy towards refugees from Nicaragua and El Salvador can showcase how foreign policy impacts refugee policy.11 Moreover, the Costa Rican government was critical of the socialist government in Nicaragua, which was in armed conflict with counter-revolutionary right-­ wing rebels. To delegitimise the Nicaraguan government, Costa Rica largely opened its borders to Nicaraguan refugees, despite internal security concerns, increased labour market competition, and general opposition to hosting refugees. On the other hand, the Costa Rican state was less hospitable towards Salvadorian refugees, despite that public attitudes were more favourable towards them.12 As opposed to its stance with regards to the Nicaraguan government, the Costa Rican government was on friendly terms with its Salvadoran counterpart and had no incentive in undermining its legitimacy. As such, Costa Rica’s refugee policy was heavily determined by internal security concerns and economic challenges related to the Salvadoran refugee influx, which led to Costa Rica taking restrictive measures against Salvadoran refugees. The United States (US) is similar to Costa Rica in that both countries have shown discrimination in their policies towards refugees based on the country of origin.13 To undermine the communist regime in Cuba, the US initially opened its borders and allowed in hundreds of thousands of Cuban refugees from 1959 up until the mid-1990s. This was not the case with Haitian refugees, who started fleeing to the US since the late 1970s. The US had a friendlier relationship with the anti-communist Haiti leadership and did not want to undermine its legitimacy by admitting refugees.14 A host government can change its policies towards refugees from the same country of origin due to changes in its foreign policy considerations. For example, the US open-door policy towards Cuban refugees has changed over the years. After 1980, the Castro regime declared that those who wanted to leave the country are free to do so. This was an attempt by the Cuban regime to overwhelm the US with refugee flows and turn them against the US interests. Partially as a result, and especially that the end of the Cold War meant that the US was less driven to undermine the legitimacy of the Cuban regime, the US struck an agreement with the Cuban regime in 1994 to cut the influx of refugees.

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Lebanon’s Syrian Refugee Policy There are around 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon who have fled the Syrian conflict since 2011. Of those, around a million are registered with the UNHCR, while another half a million informally reside in the country.15 Consecutive Lebanese governments since 2011 have adjusted the state’s approach towards Syrian refugees. As a consequence, Lebanon’s refugee policy has shifted from an open-border policy to a restrictive one aimed at stopping the inflow of refugees and then to one that is aimed at encouraging the ‘safe’, albeit not voluntary, return of Syrian refugees. As such, Lebanon’s refugee policy can be categorised into three phases. Phase I 2012–2014: Open-Border and Non-Encampment Policy Lebanon is not a signatory of the 1951 refugee convention and its related 1967 protocol.16 This means that the Lebanese state has no obligation to uphold the refugee rights outlined in the said documents, unless they are mentioned in other international treaties that Lebanon has ratified. As such, and from the start of Syrian refugee inflow into Lebanon, the Lebanese government referred to Syrians fleeing the war as “guests” and not as refugees.17 The 2012 Baabda Declaration, which was signed by all major political parties in the country, outlined the government’s policy towards Syria.18 The declaration ensured that Lebanon would dissociate itself from the armed conflict in Syria while upholding the “right to humanitarian solidarity”. In line with the declaration, the Lebanese government opened its borders to Syrians fleeing the war. In addition, the government did not set up formal camps to house refugees, as did other neighbouring countries such as Jordan and Turkey.19 Moreover, the government’s refugee response was divided among different ministries and agencies that were tasked with providing support to refugees according to their respective mandates. Phase II 2014–2016: Restrictive Policy Lebanon’s approach to the Syrian refugee crisis changed with the formation of a new government in 2014. In its ministerial statement, the 2014 government explained that “Lebanon has surpassed its ability to withstand the effects of the Syrian refugee presence on the social, economic, security and political levels”.20 It also assigned responsibility to the international

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and regional community in supporting Lebanon so that it could “achieve its moral and humane responsibilities and to facilitate the return of refugees back to their homes”.21 In December of that year, the General Security introduced restrictions on Syria nationals. Syrians were now required to pay an annual US$200 for residency permits to stay in the country.22 Obtaining a residency permit presented a serious challenge to many Syrians since it required a valid passport and a document signed by a Lebanese national that commits to sponsoring their presence in Lebanon. Around the same time, the Ministry of Labour introduced harsh employment restrictions on Syrian nationals.23 For instance, Syrians were allowed to work legally in only a limited number of low-skilled occupations such as those in construction, agriculture, and cleaning. In addition, refugees who were working were not allowed to register with the UNHCR and were ineligible to receive its humanitarian assistance.24 In May 2015, the Ministry of Social Affairs demanded the UNHCR to suspend the registration of Syrians. The motivation behind this was to reduce the number of refugees and to force Syrians who wanted to reside in Lebanon to do so as economic migrants.25 Phase III 2016–: Encouraging the ‘Safe’ Return of Refugees The appointment of a new government in December 2016 resulted in further variation to the state’s refugee policy. The 2016 ministerial statement reiterated that the Lebanese state has surpassed its capacity to bear the ‘burden’ of Syrian refugees and that the international community has a responsibility in supporting Lebanon to continue to host Syrian refugees.26 However, the statement also explicitly declared that the only solution to the Syrian refugee crisis is their ‘safe’ return back to their country and that the Lebanese state will reject any form of integration of refugees. Subsequently, President Michel Aoun assigned Director of the General Security Abbas Ibrahim to coordinate with the Syrian regime in order to facilitate the return of refugees.27 Accordingly, and by mid-2018, the General Security set up centres all over Lebanon where refugees could approach the General Security to express their intentions to go back to Syria. After that, the General Security shares the list of refugees intending to return to the Syrian regime, which then approves or disapproves their return. Then, the Syrian regime provides buses that transport refugees into its territory.28 Moreover, in July 2018, a Russian-Lebanese joint committee was formed to coordinate the return of refugees.29 This came after

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the announcement of the Russian initiative for refugee repatriation that followed the meeting between the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the US President Donald Trump.30 The initiative sets a target for the number of returnees from the host states and identifies specific areas where refugees can return.31 It also states that refugee repatriation is contingent on reconstruction, which cannot take place without foreign aid. After the May 2018 parliamentary elections, a new government was appointed in February 2019. On the Syrian refugees’ issue, the ministerial statement was almost identical to the 2016 one aside from declaring that the Lebanese government “welcomes the Russian initiative to return the Syrian displaced to their countries”.32

Analysing Lebanon’s Refugee Policy: How the Ruling Parties’ Stances on the Crisis in Syria Have Impacted Refugee Policy Evolution of Syrian Crisis and Foreign Policy Priorities of International Actors in Syria To better understand how the subsequent Lebanese governments have adjusted the state’s refugee policy in partial reaction to the conflict in Syria, it is important to take into account how the conflict has evolved in Syria and the priorities of the major international actors with regards to the Syrian conflict. Moreover, the Syrian crisis has witnessed drastic changes since the Syrian people’s uprising against Bashar Assad in 2011. With officers defecting from the Syrian regime’s army to form the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Assad called upon his regional allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, to intervene and save his regime.33 On the other hand, Turkey and Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar backed various opposition militias in line with their respective agendas.34 Not only did Assad’s brutal and criminal response cause massive destruction and displacement, but it also emboldened the extremist elements of the opposition. Under the pretext of containing the extremist threat from Syria, the US and its EU allies launched an aerial campaign in 2015, targeting the positions of extremist groups such as the self-­ proclaimed Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JTS) (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra).35 Russia, on the other hand, also intervened in 2015, as Assad realised that the backing of Iran and its proxies was not

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enough to preserve his regime. By early 2019, Assad largely succeeded in maintaining his dictatorship. The Russian military limited the areas under Syrian opposition to the northwestern province of Idlib, while the regime’s army reoccupied former opposition strongholds. Turkey and its proxies currently control the north of Syria, also known as Rojava, to the west of the Euphrates river, while the US-backed Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) controls parts of Syria to the east of the Euphrates river as IS has lost most of its territory in Syria. In addition, international actors that initially opposed Assad and called on him to step down are now more focused on other priorities The US shifted its top priority in Syria to limit the extremist threat of militant Jihadi movements such as JTS and IS and to contain Iranian influence in Syria.36 While the EU’s priorities are in line with the US with regards to combating Jihadi movements in Syria, the EU is also interested in stability in Syria to curb refugee flow into its territory.37 Similarly with the US, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are now more interested in limiting Iranian influence than dethroning Assad.38 As for Turkey, preventing Kurdish autonomy in the north of Syria has become its top priority after PYD expanded is control over regions in north and east Syria. A Brief Overview of Lebanese-Syrian Relations Pre-2011 Lebanese political parties have been divided over the issue of relations with the Syrian regime, especially since the occupation of the Syrian army of Lebanon in the aftermath of the Lebanese civil war. In 2005, Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri was assassinated after his role in lobbying for the UN Security Council 1559, which called upon all foreign armies, that is, the Syrian army, to withdraw from Lebanon, and for militias, including Hezbollah, to disband. Following al-Hariri’s assassination, relations with the Syrian regime became the top issue that split the Lebanese political scene into two camps: the ‘March 14’ coalition that demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon and the ‘March 8’ coalition that was opposed to such a withdrawal. The most prominent party of the March 14 camp was the Future Movement—headed by the son of slain Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri—while the most prominent party in the March 8 camp was Hezbollah. In the years following the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon in 2005, and entering in 2011, Lebanese political parties remained divided between those that were closer to the US, EU, and their regional allies such as Saudi Arabia, and those that were closer to the Iranian-Syrian axis.

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Analysing Phase I of the Refugee Policy With the start of the Syrian uprising in early 2011, political parties in Lebanon were divided between those who backed the uprising and the toppling of the regime, those who supported Assad’s regime, and those who cautiously waited to see how the crisis would unfold and chose to remain neutral. A couple of months after the uprising, a new government was formed in Lebanon in June 2011. The 2011 government did not include representatives from the ‘March 14’ camp as it was dominated by the ‘March 8’ camp and was headed by Najib Mikati. Although Mikati had close business ties with Assad’s close circle,39 his government followed a dissociation policy with regards to the ensuing conflict in Syria.40 This was distinct from the ‘March 8’ coalition that wanted an explicit official backing of Assad’s regime by the Lebanese government. With regards to the Syrian refugee crisis, Mikati clarified that although his government would dissociate Lebanon from the conflict in Syria, it would not dissociate itself from humanitarian support to Syrian refugees.41 This partially explains why the government opened its borders during that period. As Mikati attempted to maintain neutrality in his stances towards the Syrian conflict, he made sure to stress that the open-border policy was strictly humanitarian and not driven by political motives. The decision to open the border for refugees was also shaped by domestic politics as Mikati had to cater to his base in Tripoli, which was supportive of the Syrian uprising.42 He did not want to see his electorate switching to support his major competitor—the Future Movement—who explicitly supported the uprising against the regime.43 Whereas Mikati provided a humanitarian justification to the open-border policy, the Future Movement framed refugee support in more political terms. For example, MPs from the Future Movement called upon the government to support refugees and not “to [terrorize] them … to please the Syrian regime”.44 It is also worth noting that the Lebanese government did not take substantive measures towards Syrian refugees since a majority of Lebanese political actors perceived the Syrian conflict as short-lived.45 Hezbollah, on the other hand, was the most vocal in its opposition to building camps to house Syrian refugees. Naim Qassem, deputy secretary-­ general of Hezbollah, explained that “any [refugee] camp … will become a military pocket that will be used as a launchpad against Syria and then against Lebanon”.46 Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, from the March 8 aligned Free Patriotic Movement, shared Hezbollah’s stance on refugee

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camps, especially that the camps can constitute a security threat due to the “jihadist agenda” of the Syrian rebels.47 In his stance, Bassil established a link between refugees and jihadism by association, echoing the regime’s narrative on Syrians who revolted against Assad.48 Analysing Phase II of Lebanon’s Refugee Policy In April 2014, Tammam Salam formed a national unity government, which included ministers from both Hezbollah and the Future Movement. The end of 2014 also saw both parties engaging in dialogue to reduce sectarian and security tensions in the country. With the formation of Salam’s government, the Future Movement changed its discourse towards Syrian refugees and now agreed to restrictions on Syrian refugees to stop their influx and even reduce their numbers in Lebanon. The Minister of Interior in Salam’s government, Future Movement’s Nohad El Machnouk, explained that borders will have to be closed and that the General Security’s restrictions are aimed at decreasing the “unjustified” cases of Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon.49 The General Security restrictions, which were supported by the Future Movement, had the same effect as Hezbollah’s harassment and haphazard arrests of Syrian refugees in that both signalled to them that they are no longer welcome in Lebanon.50 A number of factors could have been behind this change in the government’s policy towards Syrian refugees. To begin with, Lebanon was rocked by numerous bombings between 2013 and 2015, some of which were claimed by jihadist organisations in Syria such as IS and JTS51 This is besides the fact that JTS established a strong presence in the northeastern border town of Arsal, which, by 2015, housed tens of thousands of Syrian refugees.52 All of this strengthened the argument of those who wanted to close borders so that Jihadist elements do not spill over into Lebanon. In addition, as the crisis developed throughout the years, it was becoming clearer that the international backers of the anti-regime political actors in Lebanon did not, or at least no longer, have dethroning Assad as their top priority in Syria. For instance, the US did not intervene militarily in 2013 despite the then-President Barack Obama’s “red line” on the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime.53 However, the US did later launch a military campaign in Syria in 2015, albeit against IS and, to a lesser extent, JTS.  As for Saudi Arabia, the groups that it supported in Syria became occupied with fighting groups such as IS and JTS rather than exclusively focusing on ousting Assad’s regime.54 As such, the chances of

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Assad being ousted militarily and with active international support grew dimmer. As a result, anti-regime political actors in Lebanon had to reconsider their stance vis-à-vis the regime since its chances of survival had increased during this phase, especially with the Russian intervention in 2015. This meant that such actors had less motivation to undermine the regime compared to the previous phase, and that maintaining an open-­ border policy to refugees was no longer a foreign policy priority to such actors. Analysing Phase III of Lebanon’s Refugee Policy In December 2016, Saad El Hariri returned as prime minister as part of a deal that also saw the pro-Assad Michel Aoun, Hezbollah’s top candidate, become president.55 El Hariri had to reach a compromise with Hezbollah and Aoun to return to power, especially after Saudi Arabia had no longer reserved the support it had for El Hariri in the past.56 Although Saad El Hariri headed the 2016 government, the majority of its ministers were pro-regime. Despite the fact that both El Hariri and Hezbollah agreed that refugees should return to Syria, the two sides disagreed on how that should happen. Hezbollah and pro-regime political actors wanted the Lebanese government to coordinate directly with the Syrian regime to facilitate the return of refugees.57 In doing so, the pro-regime political actors wanted to normalise relations between the Syrian regime and the Lebanese state, and, more importantly, wanted to increase the legitimacy of Assad’s regime on the international stage. On the other hand, Prime Minister Saad El Hariri insisted, in mid-­ 2017, that the Lebanese government would only coordinate with the UN on the issue of refugee repatriation.58 However, following the announcement of the Russian initiative on refugee repatriation in mid-2018, El Hariri changed his approach, stating that the Lebanese government is working with Russia to secure a voluntary return of Syrian refugees.59 El Hariri, who is an ally of the US, supported the initiative as opposed to the US and other states critical of Assad that did not back or approve of the initiative.60 The reasons behind this could be that El Hariri, and not Assad, needed the deal with Russia when it comes to all matters related to Syria— not just with regards to refugee repatriation, but also with regards to gaining access into Syria’s reconstruction market. Indeed, the economy minister in El Hariri’s 2016 government explained that the relations with

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Russia could facilitate the participation of Lebanese firms in Syria’s reconstruction through partnering with Russian firms yet without direct coordination with the Syrian regime.61 Moreover, El Hariri’s stance towards the Syria crisis had also changed from supporting the toppling of Assad’s regime to encouraging a political settlement in Syria.62 The change in El Hariri’s stance towards the Syrian crisis came amid a change in a number of regional actors’ (Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain) stances towards normalising relations with the Syrian regime.63

Conclusion Lebanon is not the only country that has seen a change in its refugee policy towards Syrian refugees. Both Turkey and Jordan have shut their borders as the crisis dragged, especially with the rise of security concerns as a consequence of the Syrian conflict.64 Foreign policy has also influenced the refugee policy towards Syrian refugees, specifically in Turkey.65 The EU-Turkey deal stipulated that Turkey obstruct the passage of illegal migrants into EU in return for facilitated access of Turkish citizens into the Schengen area and financial support from the EU. As a result, Turkey introduced restrictions on Syrian refugees to prevent them from illegally entering the EU. There are three points worth noting to conclude this chapter. First, foreign policy and relations with the government of the country of origin are not the only factors that have shaped refugee policies. Security threats associated with the Syrian conflict have driven host governments to follow restrictive refugee policies. In addition, and specifically in Lebanon, past experiences with Palestinian refugees have supported the case against building camps to house Syrian refugees and classifying Syrians fleeing the war as refugees. Displaced Syrians were not granted refugee status on the pretext that it would extend their stay in Lebanon and increase their chances of naturalisation. Second, and more importantly, despite the changes to Lebanon’s refugee policy since 2011, in none of the three phases—mentioned in the chapter—were the priorities and needs of refugees the major factor in refugee policy-making. According to Syrian refugees, the top priority for return is safety and security, which could only be achieved through a political process that ensures accountability, access to justice, and demilitarisation.66 As things currently stand, this priority is far from being fulfilled. Despite that, and irrespective of refugees’ priorities, there is currently a near-consensus among ruling political parties in Lebanon to push for the return of refugees back to Syria.

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And finally, this chapter has shown that the refugee crisis is a highly politicised issue, and that the ruling parties’ approach to the humanitarian situation in Lebanon has been at least partially informed by their stances on the conflict in Syria. Therefore, a durable solution to the Syrian refugee crisis can be achieved only through comprehensive political settlement to the Syrian conflict.

Notes 1. National News Agency, Bassil in a speech to the United Nations: Lebanon rejects the naturalization or integration of refugees or the displaced and insists on the necessity of not politicizing the refugee crisis and using it as a political card [in Arabic], December 18, 2018, http://nna-leb.gov.lb/ar/ show-news/381661/. 2. Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host governments to Mass Refugee Influxes,” The International Migration Review 30, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 655–678, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/2547631. 3. Ibid. 4. Danial Masterson and Vasil Yasenov, “Does Halting Refugee Resettlement Reduce Crime? Evidence from the United States Refugee Ban,” IPL Working Series, Immigration Policy Lab, December 2018, https://osf.io/ preprints/socarxiv/w2x7p/. 5. Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing Policy Responses.” 6. Ibid. 7. George Borjas, “Economic Theory and International Migration,” The International Migration Review 23, no. 3 (Autumn 1989): 457–485, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2546424. 8. Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing Policy Responses.” 9. The principle of non-refoulement stipulates that states should not forcible return refugees or asylum seekers to countries where they are subject to persecution. 10. Benjamin Gedan and Nicolas Salidas, “Latin America Has an Open-­Door Policy for Venezuelan Refugees,” Foreign Policy, August 23, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/23/latin-america-has-an-opendoor-policy-for-venezuelan-refugees/; Tanya Basok, “Welcome Some and Reject Others: Constraints and Interests Influencing Costa Rican Policies on Refugees,” The International Migration Review 24, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 722–747, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2546205. 11. Tanya Basok, “Welcome Some.” 12. Ibid.

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13. Michael McBride, “The Evolution of US Immigration Policy: public opinion, domestic politics and UNHCR,” New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, May 1999, https:// www.unhcr.org/research/working/3ae6a0c74/evolution-immigrationrefugee-policy-public-opinion-domestic-politics-unhcr.html. 14. Ibid. 15. Maha Yahya, Jean Kassir, and Khalil El Hariri, “Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home,” Carnegie Middle East Centre, April 16, 2018, https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058. 16. UN General Assembly, Convention and Protocol Related to the Status of Refugees (United Nations, 1951), Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. 17. Tamirace Fakhoury, “Governance Strategies and Refugee Response: Lebanon in the Face of Syrian Displacement,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 49, no. 4 (November 2017): 681–700, https://www. cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-middle-east-studies/article/governance-strategies-and-refugee-response-lebanon-in-theface-of-syrian-displacement/8D3CE6391426B3B84FE3B00917648 1DC/core-reader. 18. Presidency of the Lebanese Republic, The Baabda Declaration published after the National Dialogue Committee [in Arabic], June 11, 2012, http:// www.presidency.gov.lb/Arabic/News/Pages/Details.aspx?nid=14483. 19. Lewis Turner, “Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan,” Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 3 (September 2015): 386–404, https:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2015.1078125. 20. Presidency of the Council of Minister, Ministerial Statement of the National Interest Government [in Arabic], February 15, 2014, http://www.pcm. gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=9001. 21. Ibid. 22. Amnesty International, Lebanon: Pushed to the Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions in Lebanon, June 15, 2015, https://www.amnesty. org/en/documents/mde24/1785/2015/en/. 23. Francesca Battistin and Virginia Leape, Towards the Right to Work: A Guidebook for Designing Innovative Public Employment Programmes— Background and Experiences from the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon (Beirut: International Labour Organization, 2017), https://www.ilo. org/beirut/publications/WCMS_559668/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm. 24. Amnesty International, “Lebanon: Pushed to the Edge.” 25. Maja Janmyr, “UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon,” The International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 3 (March 2017): 393–419, https://www.tandfonline.com/ doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2017.1371140.

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26. Presidency of the Council of Minister, The Ministerial Statement of Saad El Hariri’s Government, http://www.presidency.gov.lb/Arabic/Pages/ MinisterialStatement.aspx. 27. Russia Today, Lebanese Security Organizes the Return of a New Batch of Syrian Refugees to Their Country [in Arabic], July 7, 2018, https://arabic. rt.com/world/955543-‫دفعات‬-‫سلسةل‬-‫من‬-‫جزء‬-‫اليوم‬-‫املغادرة‬-‫الثالثة‬-‫النازحني‬-‫دفعة‬/. 28. Joe Macaron, “What’s Next for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,” Al-Monitor, June 6, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/ lebanon-syrian-refugees-return-process.html. 29. The Daily Star, Lebanon Appoints Members for Russian Joint Committee on Refugee Returns, September 12, 2018, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ News/Lebanon-News/2018/Sep-12/463179-lebanon-appointsmembers-for-joint-russian-committee-on-refugee-returns.ashx. 30. Reuters, Russia sends Syrian refugee proposal to U.S. after Trump summit, July 20, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriarussia-usa/russia-sends-syrian-refugee-proposal-to-u-s-after-trump-summit-idUSKBN1KA1VA. 31. Rudayna Al Baalbacki and Nasser Yassin, “Position Paper on Russia’s Initiative for the Return of the Syrian Refugees to Their Country,” Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, August, 2018, https://website.aub.edu.lb/ifi/publications/Documents/position_ papers/2018-2019/20181026_position_paper_russian_initiative_english.pdf. 32. Ministry of Communications, El Hariri recited the ministerial statement of his government requesting the parliament’s confidence: There is a clear opportunity for a promising projects that lifts up the country on the economic social, services, and investment level [in Arabic], February 12, 2019, http://www. ministryinfo.gov.lb/32233. 33. Armenak Tokmajyan, “Hezbollah’s Military Intervention in Syria: A political choice or religious obligation,” Approaching religion 4, no. 2 (2014): 105–112, https://journal.fi/ar/article/view/67554/27850. 34. Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/maps/view/syria. 35. Sara Al Mukhtar and Tim Wallace, “No Easy Target: U.S. and Russia Take on Nusra Fighters in Syria,” The New York Times, August 3, 2016, https:// www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/26/world/middleeast/nusraisis-syria-us-russia.html; Martha Raddatz, Luis Martinez and Lee Ferran, “Airstrikes ‘Successful’ Against ISIS Targets in Syria, US Military Says,” ABC News, September 23, 2014, https://abcnews.go.com/International/ us-airstrikes-syria/story?id=25686031; Jabhat al-Nusra later became

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known in 2016 as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham before merging with other groups in 2017 to form Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. 36. CBS News, Transcript: U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley on ‘Face the Nation’, April 15, 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-u-n-ambassador-nikki-haley-on-face-the-nation-april-15-2018/; Michel Nichols, “U.S. Priority on Syria no Longer Focused on ‘getting Assad out’: Haley,” Reuters, March 30, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-syria-usa-haley-idUSKBN1712QL. 37. Rim Turkmani and Mustafa Haid, “The Role of the EU in the Syrian Conflict,” Security in Transition, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February 2016, https://www.fes-europe.eu/fileadmin/public/editorfiles/events/ Maerz_2016/FES_LSE_Syria_Turkmani_Haid:2016_02_23.pdf. 38. Frederic Wehrey, “Gulf Calculations in the Syrian Conflict,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 9, 2014, https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/09/gulf-calculations-in-syrian-conflictpub-55865. 39. Jihad Yazigi, “Mikati’s Investments in Syria: 20 Additional Years?,” Al Modon, https://www.almodon.com/economy/2014/8/29/ ‫�إضافية‬-‫عاما‬-20-‫سوراي‬-‫يف‬-‫ميقايت‬-‫استامثرات‬. 40. Paul Salem, “Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis?,” Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, December 11, 2012, https://carnegie-mec.org/2012/12/11/can-lebanon-survive-syrian-crisis-pub-50298. 41. Anbaa Online, Mikati on the Syrian Crisis: We are all in the Same Ship that could Drown, September 5, 2012, https://archive.anbaaonline. com/?p=43407. 42. Paul Salem, “Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis?” 43. Hashem Osseiran, “Analysis: Assad’s Allies Trying to Reshape Lebanon’s Syria Policy,” Syria Deeply, August 23, 2017, https://www.newsdeeply. com/syria/articles/2017/08/23/analysis-assads-allies-tr ying-toreshape-lebanons-syria-policy. 44. The Daily Star, Future Movement Calls on Govt to House Syrian refugees, February 6, 2012, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/ Feb-06/162335-future-movement-asks-govt-to-house-syrian-refugees. ashx. 45. Filippo Dionigi, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon State Fragility and Social Resilience,” LSE Middle East Center paper Series, February 2016, https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/syrian-refugee-crisis-lebanonstate-fragility-and-social-resilience. 46. The Daily Star, Hezbollah Rejects Syrian Refugee Camps in Lebanon, March 10, 2012, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2012/ Mar-10/166204-hezbollah-rejects-syrian-refugee-camps-in-lebanon.ashx.

6  ANALYSING THE EVOLUTION OF LEBANON’S SYRIAN REFUGEE POLICY… 

81

47. NOW Lebanon, Bassil Warns Against Syrian Refugees ‘Demographic, Political’ Threat, June 9, 2013, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/lebanonnews/bassil-warns-against-syrian-refugees-demographic-politicalthreat. 48. Anthony Shadid, “Syrian Leader Vows ‘Iron Fist’ to Crush ‘Conspiracy’,” The New  York Times, January 10, 2012, https://www.nytimes. com/2012/01/11/world/middleeast/syrian-leader-vows-to-crush-conspiracy.html. 49. Wafaa Awad, “Lebanon Starts Implement Visa Conditions on Syrians” [in Arabic], Al Bayan, January 6, 2015, https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/ arabs/2015-01-06-1.2281759; Thaer Abbas, “Nohad El Machnouk … Artist in his Home … a Hawk in the ‘Interior’” [in Arabic], Asharq al-­ Awsat, May 14, 2014, https://aawsat.com/home/article/96026. 50. Mazen Ezzi, “Syrians in Lebanon: the Threat of Extremism,” [in Arabic], Al Modon, March 22, 2015, https://www.almodon.com/arabworld/2015/3/22/‫التطرف‬-‫�شبح‬-‫لبنان‬-‫يف‬-‫السوريون‬. 51. Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Deadly Attack Kills Dozens, November 13, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/13/lebanon-deadlyattack-kills-dozens. 52. International Crisis Group, “Arsal in the Crosshairs: The Predicament of a Small Lebanese Border Town,” Crisis Group Middle East Briefing, February 23, 2016, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/56cd70e64.pdf. 53. Paul Lewis, “US Attack on Syria Delayed after Surprise U-turn from Obama,” The Guardian, September 1, 2013, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2013/aug/31/syrian-air-strikes-obama-congress. 54. Primary groups that Saudi Arabia supported were the salafist Jaish al-­Islam and Ahrar al-Sham; for more information on these groups and others see: Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/maps/view/syria. 55. Tom Perry and Laila Bassam, “In Lebanon Deal, Iran Wins and Saudi Retreats,” Reuters, October 26, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-analysis/in-lebanon-deal-iran-wins-and-saudiretreats-idUSKCN12Q1YU. 56. Ibid. 57. Al-Jazeera Mubashar, “Nasrallah: We will put a mechanism that ensures the return of the largest number of Syrian Refugees to their Country,” [in Arabic], June 3, 2018, http://mubasher.aljazeera.net/news/ ‫بدلمه‬-‫�إىل‬-‫السوريني‬-‫الالجئني‬-‫من‬-‫عدد‬-‫ أ�كرب‬-‫ إلعادة‬-‫�آلية‬-‫�سنضع‬-‫هللا‬-‫نرص‬. 58. Reuters, Lebanon Will Coordinate Refugee Returns to Syria with U.N.: PM Hariri, July 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-lebanon-syria-idUSKBN19Z1M4.

82 

K. EL HARIRI

59. Sputnik News, El Hariri: We are Coordinating with Russia for the Return of the Syrian Displaced Back to their Homes [in Arabic], August 28, 2018, https://arabic.sputniknews.com/arab_ world/201808281034927917-‫دايرمه‬-‫السوريني‬-‫النازحني‬-‫عودة‬-‫رو�سيا‬-‫احلريري‬/. 60. Arshad Mohammed and Phil Stewart, “Exclusive: Despite tensions, Russia seeks U.S. help to rebuild Syria,” Reuters, August 3, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ar ticle/us-usa-russia-syria-exclusive/ exclusive-despite-tensions-russia-seeks-u-s-help-to-rebuild-syriaidUSKBN1KO2JP. 61. Caroline Akoum, “Lebanon’s Participation in Syria’s Reconstruction reignites the debate on ‘normalization with the regime’,” [in Arabic], Al-sharq al-Awsat, September 15, 2017, https://aawsat.com/home/article/1024591/‫النظام‬-‫مع‬-‫التطبيع‬-‫جسال‬-‫تعيد‬-‫سوراي‬-‫�إعامر‬-‫�إعادة‬-‫يف‬-‫لبنان‬-‫مشاركة‬. 62. El Nashra, El Hariri: We are with the Political Solution in Syria as Soon as Possible [in Arabic], April 25, 2018, https://www.elnashra.com/news/ show/1203374/‫ممكن‬-‫وقت‬-‫ب�أرسع‬-‫سوراي‬-‫ال�سيايس‬-‫احلل‬-‫حنن‬-:‫احلريري‬. 63. Andrew England, “United Arab Emirates Reopens Embassy in Syria,” Financial Times, December 27, 2018, https://www.ft.com/ content/72f3db46-09e2-11e9-9fe8-acdb36967cfc. 64. Laura Batalla and Juliette Tolay, “Toward Long-Term Solidarity with Syrian Refugees? Turkey’s Policy Response and Challenges,” Atlantic Council, September 20, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/toward-long-term-solidarity-with-syrian-refugees-turkey-spolicy-response-and-challenges; Joe Macaron, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: the Politics of their Return,” Arab Center Washington DC, June 28, 2018, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/syrian-refugeesin-jordan-and-lebanon-the-politics-of-their-return/. 65. Gerda Heck and Sabine Hess, “Tracing the Effects of the EU-Turkey Deal,” Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies 3, no. 2 (2017), h t t p s : / / m o v e m e n t s - j o u r n a l . o rg / i s s u e s / 0 5 . t u r k e y / 0 4 . h e c k , hess%2D%2Dtracing-the-effects-of-the-eu-turkey-deal.pdf. 66. Maha Yahya, Jean Kassir, and Khalil El Hariri, “Unheard Voices.”

CHAPTER 7

The Jordanian Perception of the Syrian Refugee Crisis Musa Shteiwi

Abstract  This paper addresses the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. It uses a survey to investigate the general Jordanian perception of the Syrian refugee presence in the kingdom and sheds light on the current dynamics and future prospects of the crisis. It concludes that the crisis has had material effects on the labour market and housing. Thus, social discontent has emerged between the host and hosted communities. The chapter shows, however, that the crisis has not led to serious tensions between the two communities. Nevertheless, relations between Syrian refugees and Jordanians seem far from being completely settled as far as inclusion is concerned, at least in the short term. Keywords  Jordan • Syrian refugees • Population perception • Host and hosted communities • Labour market • Housing When the Syrian crisis erupted, Syrians were allowed to enter Jordan without any restrictions, apart from security considerations. If we review the webpage on Registered Syrian Refugees by Date on the United Nations M. Shteiwi (*) Centre for Strategic Studies, Amman, Jordan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_7

83

84 

M. SHTEIWI

High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) data portal, we see that by the beginning of 2012, approximately 2749 Syrian refugees had arrived in Jordan, and that the estimated annual inflows regularly increased thereafter.1 By the end of 2013, nearly 10 percent of Jordan’s population was made up of Syrian refugees, with an increase from 119,400 UNHCR-­registered refugees to 576,354 within the year, of whom 53 percent were younger than 18. This movement appears to be continuing: the two largest cohorts of Syrian refugees settled in Jordan in October 2019 were individuals aged 5–11 and 18–35 (respectively 21.5 percent and 28.9 percent of the Syrian refugee population).2 Consequently, education and, more recently, higher education are two of the most urgent issues on Jordan’s political agenda, especially in the light of the prolonged conflict in Syria.3 In mid-October 2019, Syrians represented the largest group of refugees in Jordan with 654,955 officially registered refugees, mostly concentrated in the northern governorates of the country due to its proximity to the Syrian border. The largest number (192,687—29.4 percent of the total) lives in Amman Governorate.4 Unofficial estimates report that the number of hosted refugees in the Hashemite Kingdom has reached 1 million compared with a population of 10,381,764 million Jordanians5; refugee numbers may then equal to about 11 percent of the native population. Based on these considerations this chapter intends to illustrate the Jordanian reception model, by focusing on the way in which the Hashemite Kingdom has altered its response framework since the advent of the Syrian crisis and in anticipation of future post-conflict scenarios, challenges and return policies. The approach that Jordan implemented at the time the conflict started was subsistence- and humanitarian-based and, consequently, characterised by temporary hospitality, basic needs provision, and aid support for early-­ arriving Syrians, and not necessarily holistically conceived. Due to the prolonged nature of the conflict in the neighbouring country, the Jordanian approach progressively turned into a long-term response focused on gradual economic and social inclusion of Syrian refugees in the host community, potentially leading to refugee integration. In detail, the Jordanian Government turned its response from a humanitarian assistance-based framework to the implementation of the so-called empowerment approach.6 As a consequence, sustainability- and resilience-oriented approaches became unavoidable steps for the efficient management of the Syrian refugee crisis without overburdening the Hashemite Kingdom, and turning a crisis into a development opportunity for the host country.

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85

From Humanitarian Assistance to Empowerment Once the Syrian conflict became protracted, the need for an alteration to the response framework became apparent. In recognising the scope and magnitude of this crisis, in 2014 the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP 6) was introduced by the UNHCR in collaboration with the UNDP, so that a humanitarian response could be closely aligned with long-term development actions in the host country. In outlining the plan, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, stated that the aim of this collaborative effort was to design a comprehensive regional strategy led by the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator.7 The RRP 6 posed strategic objectives and consisted of short term emergency aid support, which provided protection and essential services to the Syrian refugee community, including food, health, education, and material assistance. In 2014, increased convergence between humanitarian and development interventions was anticipated, as national planning and coordination arrangements were established by host governments to accelerate this convergence.8 The National Resilience Plan (NRP) is currently being developed under the leadership of the Jordanian government in close collaboration with donors, UN agencies, and international NGOs within the dedicated coordination mechanism, “the Host Community Support Platform,” led by the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). Based on these findings, the government of Jordan expects the UN and partners to support the development of the NRP, which aims to strengthen medium- and long-term coping systems targeting infrastructures and services in host communities, while preventing deterioration in services for Jordanians. It is also aimed at adjusting health and educational services offered to Syrian refugees, and minimising the spillover effects of the Syrian refugee crisis on Jordanian host communities in order to preserve Jordan’s economy. Resilience building starts with identifying and understanding existing capacities and strengthening local and national level planning, coordination, and delivery systems to support implementation and ensure an appropriate and adequate response to evolving needs of refugee and host communities.9 Refugee inflows can present unique opportunities for important transformations, requiring an urgent scaling-up of national, local, and community capacities to respond to the needs generated by a massive inflow of people. In 2015, Jordan adopted a resilience-based

86 

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approach known as the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), designed to respond to, and mitigate the effects of, the Syrian crisis on host communities in Jordan. The main aim was to ensure the protection of Syrian refugees and vulnerable parts of Jordanian society. The JRP included provisions to strengthen the capacities of the main services in several fields such as health, education, and water and sanitation, especially at the municipal level, since services and infrastructure were degrading as a consequence of growing pressure on water, housing, environment, energy and transport resources. As the flows evolved into a constant phenomenon within the Jordanian socioeconomic environment, a more comprehensive plan was urgently required. In this sense, in February 2016 following the London Conference on supporting Syria and the region, which was hosted by the  United Kingdom, Germany, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Nations, the Jordan Compact—an agreement between Jordan and the international community in general and the European Union (EU) in particular—was composed and released. Its approach was based on three main actions: turning the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan into a development opportunity; investing in Jordan’s communities (with a focus on the resilience of host communities); and supplying Jordan with grants sufficient to meet the financial needs and sustain the economy over the next three years. The Jordan Compact drew a route forward toward long-term sustainability and integration between the Syrian and Jordanian communities.10 It brought together international humanitarian and development actors under host country leadership, combining humanitarian and development funding through multi-year grants and concessional loans, with pledges of $700 million in grants annually for three years and concessional loans of $1.9 billion.11 Payment of grants and loans were linked to specific targets. One of these targets was related to the formalisation of labour market access for Syrian refugees in Jordan that was officially introduced through the Jordan Compact in 2016. This meant that it was only in 2016 that Syrian refugees became officially and legally eligible for work in Jordan, officially opening their economic inclusion in the Hashemite Kingdom. The Jordan Compact also committed the EU to relaxing trade regulations to stimulate exports from 18 designated economic zones and industrial areas in Jordan, in return for employment quotas for Syrian refugees in these businesses. It also stipulated that Jordan would institute reforms to improve the business and investment environment and formalise Syrian businesses. Further, it committed Jordan to providing school places to all Syrian children, and some vocational training opportunities.12

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87

This initiative should be framed within broader EU support for Jordan in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis. It was intended to facilitate Jordan’s export trade with the  EU, and encourage investment and job creation both for Jordanians and Syrian refugees.13 It is in this context that a debate developed on the possibility of officially opening up the labour market to Syrians without negatively affecting the Jordanian economy. Previous research conducted by  the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) had recommended that understanding structural constraints on the economic inclusion of Syrian refugees in the Jordanian context was vital and that labour policies should be consistent with the realities of local job markets. Where the local labour market was conducive, the sectors of work open to refugees should be better aligned with their skill sets and aspirations. In general, the overall business environment in Jordan was considered risky in comparison to other countries, and this explains why investment in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) has been limited. This negative affect is also due to the fact that potential social conflict between the hosted and hosting communities could occur in case internal regulations are not complied with—a possibility that should be carefully considered by decision-makers especially when it comes to implementing long-term inclusive economic policies, specifically when enabling formal access to the labour market. This aspect will be further developed in the next section.

The Social and Economic Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis: Perceptions of Host and Hosted Communities As the crisis continued, more Syrians possessing different skills came to Jordan and entered job sectors that were normally occupied by Jordanians, thus pushing Jordanians out of the labour market. A growth of the informal sector was registered, since the majority of Syrian refugees employed in Jordan occupied low-skilled positions that used to be filled by Jordanians or migrant workers. As a consequence of the employment of Syrians, potential risks of labour market saturation, social segregation, and social conflict emerged. The Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan conducted a  research to analyse the  mutual perceptions of Jordanians and Syrian refugees concerning employment opportunities  in the kingdom. Questions were asked  to both the host Jordanian community and the hosted Syrian refugees to explore reciprocal attitudes.

88 

M. SHTEIWI 80

73

70 60 50

49

44

40 30

24

20 10

3

7

0 Yes

No Jordanian sample

Don’t know Syrian sample

Fig. 7.1  Do you think that employment of Syrian  refugees creates tensions between Jordanians and Syrians? (Source: CSS, 2017)

When both groups were asked if they thought that employment of Syrians created tensions between Jordanians and Syrians, it emerged that 73 percent of Jordanians believed that acute tension might occur (Fig. 7.1).14 Further questions explored how Jordanians perceive Syrian refugees’ job performance. In detail, when asked why shop owners employ Syrian refugees, 95 percent of the Jordanian participants in the survey answered that the Syrian refugees are willing to work for lower salaries. It is worth reflecting how such a near-universal perception is able to explain why 73 percent of Jordanians think that there is a high risk of tension between the two groups (Fig. 7.2).15 By a small margin, the majority of the Jordanian population seems not to agree with the formal inclusion of the hosted community in the job market. The survey shows that 50 percent of Jordanian respondents explicitly expressed their disagreement with Syrian refugees being allowed to take up legal employment in the local economy (Fig.  7.3), while 47 percent supported Syrian refugees’ inclusion in the job market.16 Considering the narrowness of the margin, it is clear that the question needs to be further investigated. Further, deeper analysis show how Jordanian citizens perceive the effect of the Syrian refugees’ work permit eligibility; 89 percent of Jordanians believe that Syrian refugees negatively affect the labour market (Fig. 7.4).17

7  THE JORDANIAN PERCEPTION OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 

2

1 4

2

89

3

29 50

57

95 69 46

41

Skilled and experienced

Willing to work long hours

Yes

Willing to work for lower salaries than Jordanians No

Skilled and professional

Don’t know

Fig. 7.2  Do you think the shop owners who employ Syrian refugees use them because they are…? (Source: CSS, 2017)

60 50

47

50

40 40 20 10 2 0 For

Against

Don’t know

Fig. 7.3  Are you for or against Syrians working in Jordan? (Source: CSS, 2017)

90 

M. SHTEIWI

100 90

89

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

4

7

Positively

No effect at all

0 Negatively

Fig. 7.4  How do you think the Syrian refugees have affected the economic situation in Jordan? (Source: CSS, 2017)

After this review of economic issues related to the inclusion of Syrian refugees in the Jordanian labour market, we explored the nature of the social coexistence between both communities. Empirical studies of the reciprocal relationship between Jordanians and Syrian refugees do not reveal any acute tension between host and hosted communities. On the contrary, there is increasing evidence that Syrians are gradually entering the Jordanian societal network at the ground level through mixed neighbourhoods and progressive employment in both the informal and formal sectors. It is reported that 24 percent of Jordanians have a relationship with, or are married to, a Syrian national, and that 22 percent of these relationships were initiated after the Syrian Crisis. However, the survey shows that many such relationships pre-dated the crisis and that the rise of the conflict did not impact heavily on the phenomenon. (Figs. 7.5 and 7.6).18 According to previous research supported by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), almost all Syrian refugee workers outside the camps are employed in the private sector (albeit often outside the labour laws). Among Syrian refugees living outside refugee camps, as many as 98 p ­ ercent of workers are employed in the private sector and none in the government sector. Among the employed Za’atari camp refugees, 9 percent are reported as being employed in the government sector, 55 percent in the private sector, 24 percent are working in NGOs and 12 percent run their own family

7  THE JORDANIAN PERCEPTION OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 

100

91

89

90

76

80 70 60 50 40 24

30 20

11

10 0 Yes

No Syrians

Jordanians

Fig. 7.5  Do you have a relationship with or are you married to a Jordanian/ Syrian national? (Source: CSS, 2017) 100 90 80

90 78

70 60 50 40 30

22

20

10

10 0

Before the Syrian Crisis

After the Syrian Crisis Syrians

Jordanians

Fig. 7.6  When did this relationship start? (Source: CSS, 2017)

businesses.19 Recent official data stated that from January 1, 2016 to April 30, 2019, 142,520 work permits were issued to Syrian refugees; 95.5 percent of these work permits had been issued to men, only 4.5 percent to women, a striking gender imbalance.20

92 

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Further examining the perceptions of social relations between both communities, issues of housing location were investigated, seeking to find the extent to which the host population regards its daily coexistence with the hosted communities positively.21 Jordanians and Syrian refugees’ opinions diverge over the preferred location for refugee accommodation. Seventy-four percent of Jordanians would prefer Syrian refugees to live inside the camps and not in urban areas, whereas 87 percent of Syrian respondents reply that they should be able to choose between camps and other locations (Fig. 7.7).22 This datum is supported by further arguments and estimates concerning neighbourhood dynamics. It should be highlighted that Syria and Jordan have always had strong ties, and many Syrians have had and continue to have relatives living in Jordan. The research reports that 83 percent of the Syrian refugees hosted in Jordan currently have relatives living in the country, whilst, 92 percent of Jordanians do not have a Syrian relative living in Jordan (Fig. 7.8).23 It should be highlighted that  the role of personal networks is highly important for such communities because this might indicate to what extent strongly tied groups of people such as families are willing to migrate together to third countries. When Syrians were asked if they or a member 100 87

90 80

74

70 60 50 40 30

23

20 10 0

9 3 Better in camps

They should be able to choose between camps and other places Jordanian Sample

4

Don’t know

Syrian Sample

Fig. 7.7  In your opinion, are Syrian refugees better off in camps or town/villages? (Source: CSS, 2017)

7  THE JORDANIAN PERCEPTION OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 

92

100

93

83

80 60 40 20 0

17

8 Jordanian

Syrian Yes

No

Fig. 7.8  Do you have Syrian relatives living in Jordan? (Source: CSS, 2017)

Fig. 7.9  Have you or a member of your family considered moving to Europe? (Source: CSS, 2017)

30

70

Yes

No

of their family have considered moving to Europe, 70 percent of them did not show any willingness for such a move (Fig. 7.9).24 As a result, it can be assumed that Syrians currently living in Jordan are more likely to have a prolonged stay in the country thanks to their stronger ties. Family ties represent a potentially important pulling factor in sustaining long-term residency by the hosted community in the host country.

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In contrast to the question marks over economic inclusion, it is clear that social coexistence seems not to cause any serious disputes between the two communities. However, relations between Syrian refugees and Jordanians appear far from being totally inclusive-oriented, at least in the short term.

Future Challenges, Return Policies, and Post-­Conflict Directions What new scenarios might Jordan face in the coming years? To throw some light on this matter, we investigated the life expectations of Syrian refugees. We asked what circumstances would motivate the hosted community to return to Syria. The highest-scoring option was conflict resolution: 40 percent of Syrians answered that they would be willing to repatriate in the event of a ceasefire or truce between the conflicting parties. Analogously, 32 percent of the respondents answered that a political solution would be the key to their return (Fig. 7.10).25

Regime Victory

2

Don’t know

2

I do not want to go back

3

The decline/interruption of aid and assistance

3

Lack of job opportunities in Jordan

4

Opposition victory A political solution A ceasefire truce between the conflicting parties

15 32 40

Fig. 7.10  What is the main circumstance that would motivate you to return to Syria? (Source: CSS, 2017)

7  THE JORDANIAN PERCEPTION OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 

95

Finally, what are the post-conflict scenarios for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan? One of the options might focus on efficiently balancing Jordanian economic policies while sustaining the employment of Syrian refugees and tackling unemployment among Jordanians. In parallel, the Jordanian approach should take into account the formulation of refugee policy in post-conflict Syria which might require coordination with the Syrian government in future years. Furthermore, the Jordanian government could pursue an active policy of voluntary return for Syrian refugees; such an option would require both governments’ roles, the Jordanian and the Syrian states might cooperate to assure a coherent, jointly supported, return policy. However, some scholars argue that the current scenario shows that the Syrian regime is definitely controlling refugee return. Indeed, the regime has the power and the will to control the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees to their previous residence.26 Scholars maintain that political negotiations are an essential precursor to these disposals, which means that if there is no political dialogue among all the parties involved in this conflict, Syrians are more likely to prefer to stay in Jordan, even if their life conditions do not significantly improve. Secondly, considering that many refugees already  stayed in Jordan for almost a decade, temporary settlement should be reopened for discussion. If we look at housing systems, the camp solution that at the beginning was considered to be a temporary settlement no longer seems to be a temporary nor a sustainable solution, especially as so many Syrians have officially entered the Jordanian labour market or have established their own businesses in the Hashemite Kingdom. Moreover, consistent cohesion and social coexistence between both groups is taking place and these social and economic dynamics surely would make the Syrian community more likely to opt for long-term settlement in the host country. As a ­consequence, the Jordanian government undoubtedly needs to implement long-term settlement policies to deal with those Syrians who will stay for a prolonged period. In order to convert such policies into a development opportunity for the host country, education and higher education must become priority issues on Jordan’s political agenda, particularly in the light of potential prolonged stays. In addition, further attention should be paid to employment policies for the youngest cohorts of Jordanians since the country is affected by serious unemployment: Jordan’s unemployment rate had increased to 19.2 percent by May 2019.27

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It is certain that any successful strategy will be based on realistic scenarios and involve those actors and forces who can concretely support post-conflict solutions. The ILO suggests that the focus should be kept on how Syrian refugees’ involvement in the Jordanian labour market can be formalised in ways that could benefit the Jordanian economy so to avoid any further tensions and potential social conflicts between the host and hosted communities.28 In fact, with regard to employment, the Jordanian government has taken several steps to facilitate the employment of Syrians and has committed to supporting the employment of 200,000 Syrians in the future. However, such interventions must boost employment opportunities for Jordanians since there is serious concern among them as it appears their economic situation is deteriorating and their unemployment is  steadily increasing. In conclusion, “since the Jaber/Nassib border reopening until February 26, 2019, a UNHCR spokesman in Amman stated that they identified 12,846 Syrian refugee returnees based on the departure lists provided by the Jordanian government”; “As of June 30, 2019, a total of 179,118 refugees were reported to have returned to Syria since 2016—most of them from Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan, with smaller numbers from Europe and North Africa.”29 Taking this into consideration, the main challenge the government of Jordan faces today with regard to Syrian refugees is to balance its economic policies by taking equally into account voluntary return to the home country and prolonged stay for those who expect to settle in the host country.

Notes 1. UNHCR, Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response, last updated October 15, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36. 2. Registered Syrians in Jordan, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/ download/72129. 3. Musa Shteiwi, “From humanitarian assistance to empowerment in Jordan,” Looking Ahead: Charting New Paths for The Mediterranean, ISPI—Italian Institute for Political and International Studies, 2017, pp.  118–120. https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/media/img/rapporto_ med_ispi_2017.pdf. 4. UNHCR, Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response.

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5. Jordanian Department of Statistics, Jordanian CENSUS, last updated April 22, 2019, http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/. 6. Musa Shteiwi, “From humanitarian assistance.” 7. UNHCR, 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan: Strategic Overview, December 16, 2013, pp.  1–492, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb. int/files/resources/Syria-rrp6-full-report.pdf. 8. Ibid. 9. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 2016, http://www.mop.gov.jo/DetailsPage/NewsDetailsEN.aspx?NewsID=718. 10. Musa Shteiwi, “From humanitarian assistance.” 11. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, The Jordan Compact. 12. Veronique Barbelet, Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Dina Mansour-Ille, “The Jordan Compact: Lessons learnt and implications for future refugee compacts,” ODI, Policy Briefing, 2018, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org. uk/files/resource-documents/12058.pdf. 13. European Commission, Jordan—Trade—European Commission, 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/ jordan/. 14. CSS, Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Citizens: Perceptions and Trends, [in Arabic], September 2017. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Svein Erik Stave and Solveig Hillesund, “Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labor market Findings from the governorates of Amman, Irbid, and Mafraq,” International Labour Organisation and Fafo, 2015, https:// www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/%2D%2D-arabstates/%2D%2Dro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_36416. 20. Ministry of Labour, Syrian Refugee Unit, Syrian Refugee Unit Work Permit Progress Report April 2019, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/69604. 21. CSS, Syrian Refugees. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Samar Batrawi and Ana Uzelac, “Four ways in which the Syrian regime controls refugee return,” Clingendael Institute, 2018.

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27. CEIC, Jordan Unemployment Rate [2000–2019] [Data & Charts], 2018, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/jordan/unemployment-rate. 28. Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker and Mansour-Ille, “The Jordan Compact.” 29. Mohammad Ghazal, “UNHCR validating number of Syrian returnees from Jordan,” The Jordan Times, March 12, 2019, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/‘unhcr-validating-number-syrian-returnees-jordan’; “TIMEP Brief: The Return of Refugees,” Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, August 26, 2019, https://timep.org/reports-briefings/ timep-brief-return-of-refugees/.

CHAPTER 8

The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Lebanese Communities Chadi Nachabe

Abstract  This chapter analyses the disparity of the relationships between the Lebanese communities and the Syrian refugees, according to geographical, political, and confessional considerations. It discusses the different social sectors that experienced tensions as a result of the forced cohabitation, such as the education, economy, health, and infrastructure sectors. The chapter is based on interviews conducted with different societal actors in Lebanon between August 2018 and February 2019. It concludes that the Syrian crisis created societal anxiety due to its economic and political impact on the Lebanese society. Keywords  Lebanon • Syrian refugees • Syrian crisis • Confessionalism

Introduction Lebanon is a small Middle Eastern country that has been continuously facing challenges to its political and national unity ever since its establishment in 1943. When it comes to the case of human displacement, and while it was already home for a population of approximately 300,000 C. Nachabe (*) City Council of Tripoli, Tripoli, Lebanon e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_8

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Palestinian and Iraqi refugees,1 Lebanon welcomed more than 1.2 million Syrian refugees since 2012. This number refers to the refugees registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It is believed that an additional half million non-registered Syrian refugees are currently living in Lebanon. The Lebanese government considers individuals who crossed the Lebanese–Syrian border since mid-2012 as “displaced” people (nazihoun in Arabic), emphasising its long-standing position that Lebanon is not a state of refuge. Along with this policy line, the state has also refused to establish refugee camps and adopted a policy plan that explicitly aimed at reducing the number of refugees in October 2014. As a result, the humanitarian response to the Syrian influx to Lebanon has been handled by the UNHCR at the international level, and by the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) and other local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the national level.2 This chapter discusses the nature of the Syrian refugee crisis in the country of cedars. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the perceptions of the different Lebanese communities on the question of Syrian refugees and their presence in the country. The perceptions of the Lebanese populations were gathered through a series of interviews conducted in different geographical areas in Lebanon—such as Beirut, Tripoli, Wadi Khaled, Anfeh, Beqaa, and Michmich—between August 2018 and February 2019.

The Lebanese Facet of the Syrian Conflict At the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the Lebanese political circles, as well as the Lebanese communities, were divided between the pro-Syrian regime and pro-revolution positions. This polarisation shall be understood under the light of the significant role played by Syria in Lebanon during and after the civil war (1975–1990). The latter was followed by a period of Syrian occupation, during which Syria was controlling the Lebanese politics, and was accused of involvement in the assassination of prominent Lebanese politicians such as that of Rafik Hariri in February 2005. The political division on the Syrian refugees’ case follows sectarian lines. The Shi’a and Christian political parties/communities—that supported the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon after the civil war—showed their support for the government of Bashar Assad. Therefore, they upheld anti-refugee sentiments, and still do. On the contrary, the Sunni parties/communities—that always saw the Syrian power as backed by Shi’a

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Iran—supported the Syrian revolution and the hosting of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. In political terms, the March 8 alliance—mainly composed of Shi’a and Christian parties—considers the Syrian regime an ally. On the other hand, the March 14 alliance—led by the Sunni Future Movement— shows political enmity towards the Syrian neighbour. Thus, this chapter argues, there is not one united Lebanese community, but rather, disparate Lebanese communities. Each of these communities has been impacted differently by the Syrian refugee crisis, and each has developed its own policies to cope with the massive influx of displaced people. The lack of agreement on the question of the Syrian crisis and, henceforth, on the Syrian human displacement, allowed a great number of Syrian refugees to pass the borders and seek refuge in Lebanon. Yet, in early 2015, the Lebanese government started imposing several conditions for the Syrians to enter the country legally. Among other requirements, Syrians had to provide the reason for their stay in Lebanon, as well as a valid identification document (ID).3 In many cases though, refugees were not able to provide valid IDs. In fact, many Syrians avoided visiting the national administrations that issued passports inside Syria because they were either wanted by the intelligence services, or in age to perform the compulsory military service, if not to join the Syrian army in the context of the conflict. In all cases, many Syrians would rather hide and cross the border to Lebanon, sometimes without proof of their identity. After eight years of conflict and humanitarian emergency, the Syrian crisis has become a Lebanese crisis. Nowadays, the number of Syrian refugees in several towns and villages exceeded that of local inhabitants. This is the case in Wadi Khaled, a predominantly Sunni town located in the northern border with Syria. Therefore, the increasing local resentment comes as no surprise, even among those who initially supported the case of the refugees. As mentioned by Mohamed Khaled, a 53-year-old shop keeper in this town, the relationship between Wadi Khaled residents and the Syrians has always been strong, as many are connected by family and tribal ties. He added that the Lebanese residents of the city were initially welcoming the Syrian refugees, opening their houses to them. Yet, after years of crisis and the settlement of hundreds of Syrian refugees, he explained: “We thank the international organisations that implemented many projects in our area, but this is not sufficient. Before the Syrian conflict erupted, our major source of income stemmed from the trade between our village and Syria. Our kids were studying in Syria for free and our healthcare was provided in Syria for low fees. Now, our situation is that we

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are losing economic opportunities and services in Syria. At the same time, we are facing local problems due to unemployment and pressure on infrastructures”.4 As local communities suffer from the presence of Syrian refugees, the latter ones’ situation is worsening. This is mainly due to the implementation of the October 2014 “Policy Paper on Syrian Refugee Displacement” through a series of rules on entry, residency, renewal, and regularisation, enacted on 5 and 13 January 2015, and on 3 and 23 February 2015. This policy increases the risks of abuse towards Syrian refugees and jeopardises their access to work, education, and healthcare. For instance, according to  the  United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), approximately 250,000 school-age Syrian children were out of school during the 2015–2016 school year. This was largely due to parents’ inability to pay for transport, child labour, school directors imposing arbitrary enrolment requirements, and the lack of language support for Syrian children.5 The precarious situation of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon might be explained by the fact that around 70% of them have illegal status. Moreover, 16% of them live in 2000 informal settlements, and 40% live in unfinished buildings, empty stores, and parking lots. Finally, the arrival of Syrians has been accompanied by a surge in the number of small crimes, that increased by more than 60% between 2011 and 2015. The Lebanese prisons have become overcrowded, and 26% of their population are Syrians.6

Political and Security Aspects of the Syrian Refugee Crisis Politics in Lebanon is  based on a sectarian and political power-sharing system. In other words, the proportionality of the consensus democracy established in the country after the 1989 Taif agreement lies on a sectarian balance. Hence, the presence of a majority of Sunni Syrian refugees is highly politicised. The latter ones are perceived as an existential threat for Christians, as a security threat for Shi’as, and as an economic threat for underprivileged Sunnis living in poor areas where Syrians have settled in masses. The case of Syrian refugees has been used for political legitimacy in Lebanon. With the influx of over one million refugees and migrants to Europe in 2015, international donors developed a growing vested interest in keeping Syrian refugees inside Lebanon and other neighbouring countries of Syria. Countries and international donors devoted billions of

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­ ollars to support Lebanon for hosting Syrian refugees. Additional donad tions and loans aimed at boosting the country’s economy and fostering its resilience. As such, a large number of Lebanese politicians have benefitted from the crisis. They repositioned Lebanon’s government on the international scene, using the threat of Syrian resettlement in Europe as leverage for receiving international funding. A similar game was played by the Jordanian government and by the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) government in Turkey. On the other hand, Lebanese politicians have simultaneously advocated  for the return of refugees to Syria, as a means of appeasing rising tensions from the host communities, and as a pretext for defending the sectarian demographic balance.7 The political groups represented in the Lebanese government have not been able to agree on the establishment of formal refugee camps.8 The political divisions and the security challenges affected the functionality of the government and other state institutions. As a result of the lack of a united policy or a clear strategy towards the Syrian refugee crisis, the government ill-managed the issue. This mismanagement created further societal problems and increased the tensions between the Lebanese communities and the Syrian refugees. The weak central government transferred power to the municipalities by default. Hence, each municipality dealt with the issue differently, according to its confessional setting. By October 2014, the Lebanese government and the municipalities securitised the refugee policy. This was justified by the soaring instability in Lebanon. Between 2011 and 2014, the country witnessed increased tensions between the different Lebanese political groups. Furthermore, 29 bomb attacks and clashes shook different areas in the country. Many Lebanese were injured and died during those incidents. These tensions were allegedly directly related to the instability in neighbouring Syria. As mentioned before, the Lebanese society is divided along ethnic and political lines, as well as conflicting loyalties to diverse actors in the Syrian conflict. In addition to those security tensions, other security incidents worsened the general situation in Lebanon. First, in 2011, clashes erupted in Tripoli between the Sunni pro-Syrian revolution and the Alawite community, which is pro-Assad regime. The author conducted an interview with a 42-year-old participant to the clashes between Tebbnaeh and Jabal Mohsen neighbourhoods. He sought to remain anonymous, as he is wanted by the Lebanese government because of his involvement in the Syrian conflict. He mentioned that he joined the clashes in Tripoli because he was actively supporting the Syrian

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revolution. He violently opposed those Lebanese who supported Assad’s regime, which he accused of sending (Shi’a) Alawite Shabiha—armed militias—to fight on its side. When asked why he stands against the Syrian regime, he answered: “If someone killed your mother and sister, would you forgive him? What do you want me to do? To forgive? If I forgive them [the Syrian regime], other mothers will be killed. My mother was killed by the Syrian regime when I was three years old. I cannot forgive and I want to protect my brothers and sisters in Lebanon and Syria from this”.9 This fighter’s testimony starkly shows the resentment against the Syrian regime that takes roots in the occupation of Lebanon after the civil war. It seems that the Syrian conflict is perceived by several Lebanese as a mere continuation of the Syrian violent rule that plunged countless Lebanese families into mourning. The Syrian conflict and the resulting humanitarian situation are thus very personal for the majority of the Lebanese. The second incident happened in 2013  in Saida, southern Lebanon. The clash involved Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir of the Imam al-Rabah mosque— a Sunni anti-Syrian regime cleric—and the Lebanese army forces. After supporters of al-Assir opened fire on a military checkpoint, 18 Lebanese soldiers and more than 10 armed men loyal to the Sheikh were killed.10 In 2017, al-Assir and seven other defendants were sentenced to death, although no death sentence has been carried in Lebanon since 2004.11 Finally, more confrontations took place in 2014 between Islamic State (IS) soldiers and al-Nusra members in Arsal, Beqaa, and eastern Lebanon. These tensions led the Lebanese government to impose further restrictions on Syrian refugees such as visa requirements. In the case of Tripoli, those restrictions affected Syrian refugees at the socio-economic level, resulting in further tensions. The Syrian Refugees in the Sunni Areas: A Political Support At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, inhabitants of Sunni areas were supporting the refugees for political reasons. Notably, the Sunnis still hold resentment against the Syrian regime’s violent actions in Lebanon between 1975 and 2005. This Sunni animosity towards Assad is mostly driven by the latter’s involvement in previous Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri’s assassination in 2005. One of those Sunnis is Ahmad Jaber, 56 years old, living in the Tebbaneh area, Tripoli. He recorded that, at the beginning of the

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influx, Lebanese houses were opened to Syrian refugees: “I remembered what happened in our area in 1986 when the Syrian regime killed many people during the Tebbaneh massacre”. Ahmad mentioned that he lost many friends and relatives on that day. He added: “We helped the refugees because we were supporting the Syrian revolution”.12 Those words reflect the perception that welcoming Syrian refugees and, henceforth, supporting the popular revolution against Bashar Assad, are seen as a revenge against the Syrian regime and as retribution for the Lebanese casualties under the Syrian occupation. Nevertheless, the situation in the Sunni areas evolved and today’s perceptions of the Lebanese populations shifted. At the early stage of the crisis, local citizens thought that the Assad regime would rapidly collapse. As a result, they supported the refugees, believing that they will quickly go back to their country. Yet, the crisis surprised both local and international actors. As time passed, and the situation became protracted, the Sunni irritation grew stronger. In some Sunni villages, tensions emerged between the municipalities and international organisations due to the lack of coordination. Notably, a conflict arose over humanitarian priorities and informal settlements. On the one side, international organisations supported the establishment of informal settlements and prepared necessary infrastructures to host the refugees. On the other side, the local government sought to benefit from these infrastructures and to alienate the refugee communities from international help. More precisely, Sunni local municipalities wanted humanitarian projects to be based on their own local priorities, while international organisations prioritised Syrian refugees, neglecting the precarious situation of the local populations. Those tensions sometimes resulted in drastic and radical policies against the Syrian refugees. For example, in Deddeh, a village located in Koura, North Lebanon, the majority of inhabitants are Sunni. Two years ago, in 2016, the municipality drove the refugees out due to the establishment of non-­formal settlements. This incident was later contained through negotiations between the different stakeholders. An agreement was eventually reached. The municipality allowed the informal settlements and international donors committed to implementing an infrastructure project for the village and its Lebanese population.

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The Syrian Refugees in Christian and Shi’a Areas: Fear and (In-)Security In the Christian and the Shi’a areas, the issue of the Syrian refugees is different. More restrictions were imposed on the refugees, especially after the rise of radicalised violent groups in Syria in 2014. As stated above, most of the Syrian refugees are Sunni. Hence, their settlement in Christian and Shi’a areas led to demographic changes. This brought to memory the resettlement of half a million Sunni Palestinian refugees after the 1948 and 1967 wars. In addition to the fear of demographic change, the number of small crimes in these areas has increased by more than 60% since the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2011.13 George Nakhoul is a 32-year-old civic activist from Anfeh, a Christian village located in north Lebanon. He explained: “We do not feel safe in our village, especially that the number of refugees is more or less the same as that of local inhabitants […] We are not afraid only of the normal crimes, but of the suicide bombings that were conducted by radicalised groups”.14 As a result of security incidents, George mentioned, the number of municipal police increased to achieve better security in the area. Elias Antoun is 56  years old and comes from Michmich village, in Byblos district. He told the author that the municipality carried out strict policies regarding the refugees, especially that many settled there to work in the agriculture sector. He also indicated that the rate of crimes has increased along with the number of Syrian refugees in the area. He added: “We are benefiting from the refugees in the agricultural sector, but at the same time, our security is a priority. So, we supported the curfew decision that states that no refugees should be in the streets from 7 p.m. until 6 a.m. This is a means to preserve security, and reduce the rate of crimes […] For sure, in the refugee community, there are good people and bad people just as in our community” (Fig. 8.1).15 Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian crisis played a critical role in the party’s politicisation of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. The party has been involved militarily in the Syrian civil war since 2013. It directly supports Assad regime against its foes, namely the Syrian Free Army (FSA) and Salafi-Jihadi groups such as IS and al-Nusra (later renamed Ahrah al-Shām). Therefore, more restrictions were imposed on the Syrian refugees in the Shi’a villages than in other Lebanese areas. As a result, these villages were targeted by Sunni jihadists. Ali Zaaiter is a 42-year-old taxi driver from the Burj al-Barajneh area, southern Beirut, that is under the

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Fig. 8.1  Curfew notification in the village of Michmich. “It is not allowed for all foreign workers to pass in the street from 7  p.m. until 6  a.m.” (Source: Chadi Nachabe, 2018)

control of Hezbollah. He stressed that the people living in this area have divided the refugees into two types. The first type refers to those who have family and tribal ties with Lebanese; the second type denotes those refugees who lack these ties. With regards to the second type, Ali stated: “We do not know them well and we had several suicide bombings in the villages, which made us fear them”.16 He added that there is also anxiety over terrorist groups’ infiltration in the refugee population. In 2015, Ali narrated: “I was very close to where the bomb exploded in our area Burj al-­ Barajneh. It was a dramatic day and I will never forget it in my life […] I put our security first and then I think about humanitarian things”. Therefore, Ali postulated that he is in favour of restrictions imposed on refugees in his area. He argued that knowing everything about the refugees’ whereabouts helps to prevent any security threat. He concluded: “This will be good for us and for them also because one of them could die in a suicide bombing”.17 The author interviewed Mohamad Lakis, a 42-year-old inhabitant of the predominantly Shi’a town of Baalbek to discuss the local perception of the Syrian refugees in his area. He stated that the Syrian crisis brought a lot of problems on the economic, security, and social levels. He explained that since 2011, “our city and neighbouring villages recieved a

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load of refugees, which created a sense of fear for us, especially that the majority of the refugees are against Assad regime and are Sunnis”. In these circumstances, there were high tensions between Sunnis and Shi’as due to the crisis, he said. Mohamad continued: “after three years [since the beginning of the conflict], IS and al-Nusra took control of the Lebanese part in Arsal, which put us under security pressure, especially that they conducted several suicides bombings in Beqaa region”.18 A sense of security was only re-established when the Lebanese army forces and Hezbollah drove jihadists from the Lebanese mountains. Mohamad said that life was very difficult during those years and they were afraid to send their kids to school or to go out from their houses. Surely, the security incidents played a major role in countering the refugee influx and “we would feel better if they left our villages”, he said. As the security situation slowly de-escalates in Syria, the Lebanese people in Shi’a areas are looking forward to seeing refugees returning to Syria. Mohamad made the argument that it would be better for them and the local community if they return to Syria, “especially that, economically, the rate of unemployment is currently very high, and our government is not fostering development much in our areas. This lack of governmental policy has negative social results within the community, more youth use drugs to forget the precarious situation”.19

The Socio-Economic Aspects of the Crisis In Lebanon, Syrian refugees are mainly concentrated in peripheral areas that are historically poor and deprived, thereby exacerbating the already difficult living conditions of the local populations. Competition over job opportunities is one of the most urgent challenges faced by host communities. The employment conditions have worsened with the surge in labour supply. The national unemployment rate increased from 11% before the Syrian refugee crisis to 36% in 2018.20 In addition, the Lebanese labour market has experienced a sharp decrease in wage and working conditions. This is due to the fact that Syrian workers accept lower incomes, work for longer hours, and do not request social benefits. Nevertheless, Lebanese employers and business owners benefit from the availability of less costly labour. In another instance of the negative impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Lebanon’s economy, a number of micro and small Syrian-owned businesses have opened in the host regions. These enterprises sell goods ­originating from Syria at lower prices and, thus, directly compete with equivalent Lebanese businesses. Hassan Sheikh Taha, who owns a clothes

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shop in Tripoli, explained to the author that he had to close two of his businesses in the past two years because of the competition with the Syrian clothes shops. The latter ones, Hassan said, offer better prices because they buy their products at a lower price in Syria. Moreover, Syrian shop owners employ other Syrian refugees, which helps them lower the cost of labour. As a result, Syrian shops are more attractive for Lebanese clients.21 The establishment of Syrian businesses (about 8.9% of the national percentage) has resulted in negative prejudices. As a consequence, Syrian refugees have become more visible. On the other hand, their presence in the economic sector in spite of their refugee status has increased the frustration of Lebanese entrepreneurs who are struggling to cope with the economic decline in Lebanon. The owner of a sweet shop in Tripoli, who sought to remain anonymous, offered an honest account of the positive side of the Syrian refugee influx in Lebanon. He mentioned that he is recruiting Syrian workers for his business because they work for longer hours with a lesser salary. “We hope that we can recruit more Lebanese”, he said, “but the economic situation in the country is leading us to recruit more Syrian to get more profit. This is the business”.22 The surplus of population in host communities has placed additional pressure on already deficient healthcare and education services, in terms of access and quality.23 The impact has mostly been evident on the healthcare system, witnessing a 27% increase in tuberculosis rates since 2011, currently struggling and lacking staff, equipment, and medication.24 Consequently, the Lebanese population has seen its access to primary health care drastically decreased. This reduced access is often a forced choice for Lebanese people, as they observe that the quality of health is lower, health centres are overcrowded, and waiting time is endless. As a result, the Lebanese population has turned to private healthcare, which cost is much higher, thus pressuring the Lebanese families’ expenditures. Similarly, most Lebanese children are enrolled in private schools, while only 300,000 or 27%, attend public ones.25 In addition, the Syrian refugee crisis has caused environmental problems. A research published in 2014 by the Ministry of Environment traced the range of damage to the already fragile environment in Lebanon.26 It indicated that municipal spending on waste disposal, particularly in Akkar and Beqaa governorates, has increased by 40%. In spite of this, 92% of sewage is still running untreated into water sources due to the increased demand for land, water resources, electricity, and waste disposal. As a result, since 2011, wastewater pollution has increased by 33%.27

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In al-Arz Street, in the Kobbeh neighbourhood of Tripoli, two similar banners were displayed to the attention of Syrian refugees. The signs read: “My brother Syrian worker, sorry. I am more entitled to work in this country than you”. The researcher spoke to Omar Saada, a 39-year-old local activist in Tebbaneh, Tripoli, to investigate the local views on the labour market since the arrival of thousands of Syrian refugees in the city. Omar was clearly pessimistic in his answer and described the situation in his neighbourhood as catastrophic. He explained that, although people in his area are against the Syrian regime, the Syrian conflict and the refugee crisis lasted for too long. To emphasise the tenuous living conditions, he said that the situation in Tripoli was still better during the urban clashes that opposed jihadi groups between 2011 and 2014. He stressed that Lebanese people could not continue like this, calling the government to “find a solution […] especially that the majority of the youth are unemployed”. Omar continued: “youth cannot own houses or at least get married, which increases anxiety and depression, leading them to join extremist groups or take drugs”.28 The increased demand for rented accommodations has resulted in the surge of rental prices. This inflation was directly attributed to the presence of Syrian refugees, namely to population growth. Real estate owners capitalised on the situation to make more profit. Mahmoud Jabakhanji is 32 years old, and he has been engaged for the last three years. He told the researcher that he could not get married due to the rise of the price of rent: “The house that we rented before was US$200 or US$250, it became between US$400 and US$500 [after the beginning of the crisis]”. With a salary of US$600, he wondered: “how can I get married if I have to put all my salary for rent and electricity?”29 In spite of the many challenges they face on a daily basis, the Lebanese do not put all the blame on Syrian refugees. They denunciate the central and local governments for the deterioration of public services. This is leading to numerous protests and to the decreased faith in politicians. A consequence of this distrust is the low turnout to elections. For example, during the legislative elections in May 2018, only 49.2% of the citizens voted.30 As a matter of fact, structural problems already existed before the Syrian crisis. The influx of refugees only made it worst. For example, in Tripoli, the daily trash amounted around 200  tonnes before the Syrian crisis. After 2011, it rose to around 450  tones.31 This created a major waste management problem in terms of both collection and distribution. Shafik Abdelrahman, from UTOPIA organisation and a civic activist in Tripoli, mentioned that his team launched a campaign against the “mountain” of trash in the city. He said: “This situation cannot continue because

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every day, we wake up with a bad smell and the situation of the dump becomes dangerous, especially that maximum height for waste should not exceed 28 meters. Now, it is around 45 meters”.32 As briefly demonstrated, the Syrian crisis affected the Lebanese socio-­ economic life on different levels, which created further tensions between the hosting community and the refugees. The different problems mentioned above result from weak governance, poor planning, a lack of resources, the absence of the government in the management of the refugee crisis, and the absence of coordination between the local and international humanitarian organisations. It is worth mentioning that, a few months before the Syrian crisis erupted, there was already public discontent against the Lebanese government. The country witnessed several protests that called for the end of the sectarian system, as well as social and economic reforms.33 Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the government did not act directly. It sought neutrality, especially that the country was witnessing the opposition between pro- and anti-Syrian government positions. This point of contention explains the disagreement about the naming of Syrians as refugees or mere visitors. The Lebanese government was not prepared to deal with an unprecedented refugee influx. Syrian refugees caused an increase in the expenditures of Lebanese families, while their income has decreased due to the competition in the labour market. This came in addition to the security conditions and decreased smuggling activities between Syria and Lebanon. Some cities were more affected than others. For example, Tripoli is the second-largest city in Lebanon and also one of the poorest ones, with a poverty rate reaching around 30% before the Syrian crisis. This precarious situation is mainly due to the governmental policy after the Lebanese civil war. The state chose Beirut, the capital, as a priority for economic development. In contrast, no development plan was though for the outskirts of Beirut and the rest of the country. This led to a strong discrepancy in the level of development between the centre and its peripheries. After the Syrian crisis, the rate of poverty in Tripoli increased to reach around 57%.34 It clearly shows that the Syrian refugee crisis highlighted and worsened the results of decades of governmental mismanagement. In another instance, since the end of the civil war in 1990, electricity costs used to amount US$1.5 billion annually.35 Until now, and in spite of the conflict that partly destroyed Syria, Lebanon remains dependant on its Syrian neighbour to meets its electricity needs, which undoubtedly increased after the arrival of Syrian refugees. Syria supplies Lebanon with

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300 MW of electricity over high-voltage power lines that have remained intact despite a raging war.36 Hence, one cannot argue that Lebanon’s lack of electricity is directly caused by refugees. In fact, politicians use the refugee crisis’ narrative to cover their mismanagement. One of many examples of the poor infrastructures became particularly visible in January 2019 when the country experienced strong rains that flooded several roads. This happened in spite of the fact that, since the 1990s, the Lebanese government spent billions of dollars in this sector. Yet, it seems that the money goes directly in the pockets of corrupted contractors. Corruption is Lebanon’s gangrene; it has jeopardised the governmental management of the country for decades. Inaya al-Khouja is 62 years old and lives in the Kobbeh area in Tripoli. She told the author that ever since the civil war, she has not felt the presence of the Lebanese government. She explained that her husband died six years ago because of the poor electrical installations: “He was using an oxygen machine when he lacked oxygen. One day, the electricity cut off and we did not have the financial resources to have a private generator. So, my husband died because the machine did not work”. She added that her son lives in Ghana, Africa, because of unemployment in Lebanon. Her second son became unemployed after the Syrian crisis. He used to work in a bagel shop, but his boss hired a Syrian worker instead because he could pay him less. Inaya concluded the conservation showing discontent over the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon: “I am not happy about the Syrian presence in Lebanon, the situation in the country is becoming worse […] the Lebanese government is terrible. Maybe if we had good governance, I would not blame the Syrian”.37 Inaya’s story encapsulates many of the impact of both governmental weakness and the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. Those two dynamics merged to create a protracted crisis for the Lebanese population. It seems that a solution must be urgently brought to this crisis, as young people disillusioned with their government and future constitute the preferred ground for recruitment for violent criminal and terrorist groups in the region.

What Future for the Syrian Refugees in Lebanon? The Syrian refugees in Lebanon are not a monolithic group. They have fled from different socio-cultural backgrounds, from different geographical areas, and for different reasons. At present, existing proposals for their return do not consider those differentiating factors that can put thousands

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of lives at risk.38 In addition to differences in age, gender, sect, and socio-­ economic status, the situation of the regions inside Syria, from which refugees have fled, differs greatly. Various areas are still unstable, as foreign armies and militias are spread across the country, and several areas are still occupied by the Islamic State and other armed groups.39 Syrian refugees’ right to return is further restricted by the fact that Lebanon has become home to Syrian activists who took part in the uprisings. Activists who challenged the legitimacy of the regime face potential threats, notably that of being detained as they cross the border and tortured in Syrian prisons. The case has occurred frequently since the uprising. Finally, the Syrian regime has adopted policies that discourage and obstruct the return of Syrians, most notably the conscription law mandating all men aged between 18 and 42 to join the Syrian army. An important number of Syrian refugees refuse to go back to their home country because they do not want to serve the army for two years or more. A main point of contention is the fact that conscripted Syrian men currently serve under the law of emergency. The latter eliminated the service period, which has become potentially endless. On the other side, some Syrian refugees do not have a place to go back to, since decree no. 66 and law no. 10 have enacted the possibility for the state to seize private properties located in formerly rebel-held areas.40 Hence, one might wonder how possible it is for Syrian refugees to go back to Syria, without taking the risk to live under a brutal dictatorship or inhuman conditions. An anonymous interview was held with a Syrian refugee from Aleppo. He is 27  years old, thus, the conscription law applies to him. He mentioned that he is looking forward to going back to his village. Yet, he admitted, with regrets, that although the situation is becoming better and safer, he cannot go back to Syria because of the martial laws—especially since there is no longer a time limit for military service. Still, the interviewee was hoping to go back to his country, to become an entrepreneur and open a business, after he gained skills in Lebanon.41 Should the Syrian refugees not go back to their country within a few years, the consequences would be disastrous for both the Lebanese ­communities and the Syrian refugees themselves. In Lebanon, the impact of the refugee crisis on the economic, political, and social sectors will have a continuous effect. All the more so because the international community has already started decreasing its funding and interest in the Syrian refugee crisis. If the situation in Syria and Yemen stabilise, funding will be decreasing in Lebanon. At the political level, the prolonged presence of Syrian

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refugees will probably increase sectarian tensions. One could wonder: Will Lebanon and the Lebanese communities be resilient for much longer in the face of a shifting demographic balance and collapsing socio-­ economic sectors?

Conclusion The Syrian refugee issue in Lebanon is a mixture of politics, security, and socio-economic factors. The least one can say is that it is complicated. Currently, even the Lebanese areas that were most supportive of the Syrian refugees’ rights started encouraging their return to Syria. The impact of the Syrian refugees’ presence in Lebanon differs from one geographical area to another, depending on sectarian affiliation, the number of refugees re-settling, and the pre-existing socio-economic situation of the area. Syrian refugees mainly settled in the peripheries, such as in the villages of Wadi Khaled and Arsal, where the number of refugees exceeded that of Lebanese inhabitants. As such, the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon reinforced the pre-existing inequalities between the wealthy and developed centre, Beirut, and the poor and marginalised peripheries. The rate of poverty in Beirut amounts 16%, while it peaks at 38% in Beqaa district and 36% in North Lebanon.42 Simultaneously, those two most vulnerable regions—Beqaa and North Lebanon—have welcomed around 62% of the Syrian refugees.43 As exemplified by the Lebanese context, the inequity of the burden-sharing regarding the Syrian refugee crisis has also a national trend. After eight years of the humanitarian crisis, it seems that the issue of Syrian refugees has finally become one of the top priorities for the Lebanese government. The latter participated in several discussions with the international community on this matter, and most recently, it started cooperating with the Russian government in order to find a solution to the humanitarian burden.44 Russia played a key role in negotiating the future of Syria and it is a long-time ally of the Syrian government. At the same time, Lebanon remains the scene of a political conflict between the ­political groups that support Assad regime and those that oppose it. The latter ones do not want the Lebanese and Syrian governments to officially cooperate. Instead, they suggest indirect coordination through security forces for humanitarian and political relief. Some anti-Assad groups even argue that the return of Syrian refugees does not require any official coordination.

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Lebanon keeps facing numerous socio-economic and security challenges as a result of the Syrian crisis. Yet, the Lebanese government cannot deal with the Syrian case from a mere security and socio-economic perspective. The humanitarian side should be taken into consideration, which has not often been the case so far. Moreover, the Lebanese government failed to cope with the crisis using a clear and comprehensive strategy. Instead, political parties took decisions on the basis of regional politics and confessional considerations. This has further increased the many challenges posed to the Lebanese hosting communities and the Syrian refugees alike. Not only the governmental stance has impeded the resolution of the refugee crisis, but it has also endangered its own stability, as well as the resilience of the country at several levels. The Syrian refugee crisis has brought the unfortunate proof that Lebanon has never been able to implement national reconciliation between the many political and ethnic groups within the country. Moreover, the country remains highly sensitive to regional politics, especially to its Syrian enemy brother. Lebanon remains divided among many communities—whose lack of consensus has paralysed the national institutions. Yet, the humanitarian situation has also highlighted Lebanon’s incredible resilience, confirming its reputation as the “last man standing”.

Notes 1. Estimates vary between 175,000 and 500,000. Amena el-Achkar, “The ‘forbidden’ tastes of Palestine,” Beirut Today, March 14, 2018, http:// beirut-today.com/2018/03/13/forbidden-taste-palestine/; Jad Chaaban, Hala Ghattas, Rima Habib, Sari Hanafi, Nadine Sahyoun, Nisreen Salti, Karin Neyfert and Nadia Naamani, “Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,” AUB and UNRWA, 2010; UNRWA, Where We Work, https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon. 2. Zeinab Cherri, Pedro Arcos González and Rafael Castro Delgado, “The Lebanese-Syrian crisis: impact of Syrian refugees to an already weal state,” Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, 9 (2016): 165–172. 3. Al-Nahar, Syrian entry into Lebanon detailed: ‘Let us all be excused … We are forced’ [in Arabic], January 3, 2015, https://www.annahar.com/ article/202611-‫مضطرون‬-‫امجليعنحن‬-‫فليعذران‬-‫ابلتفاصيل‬-‫لبنان‬-‫اىل‬-‫للسوريني‬-‫اجلديدة‬-‫ادلخول‬-‫�إجراءات‬. 4. Mohamed Khaled, personal communication with the author, August 2018. 5. UNICEF, UNICEF Annual Report 2016, 2016, https://www.unicef. org/about/annualreport/files/Lebanon_2016_COAR.pdf.

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6. Khalil Gebara, The Syrian Crisis & its Implication on Lebanon. Social, Economic, Political and Security Challenges and Potential Solutions, Université St. Joseph, Beirut, March 9, 2015. 7. Zainab Cherri et al., “The Lebanese-Syrian crisis.” 8. Carnegie Middle East Center, Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, 2018, https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/18/ ar-pub-76067. 9. Ahmed Mentash, “The army resolved the battle of Abra after 24 hours of clashes—the prisoner disappeared after the fall of his stronghold and failed to attempt to ignite the reconstruction front,” [in Arabic], al-Nahar, June 25, 2013, https://newspaper.annahar.com/article/ 44206 -‫جهبة‬-‫اشعال‬-‫حماوةل‬-‫وفشل‬-‫معقهل‬-‫سقوط‬-‫اثر‬-‫اختفي‬-‫اشتبااكاتالسري‬-‫من‬-‫ساعة‬-24-‫بعد‬-‫عربا‬-‫معركة‬-‫حسم‬-‫جيش‬ ‫تعمري‬. 10. Mohammed Zaatari, “Lebanese Army storms Assir complex—preacher flees,” The Daily Star, June 24, 2013, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ News/Local-News/2013/Jun-24/221395-fierce-clashes-rock-southlebanon-city-for-second-day.ashx#ixzz2X8xHbYVw. 11. Middle East Eye, Lebanese cleric Ahmad al-Assir sentenced to death over Sidon clashes, September 28, 2017, https://www.middleeasteye.net/ news/lebanese-cleric-ahmad-al-assir-sentenced-death-over-sidon-clashes. 12. Ahmad Jaber, personal communication with the author, October 2018. 13. Khalil Gebara, The Syrian Crisis. 14. George Nakhoul, personal communication with the author, September 2018. 15. Elias Antoun, personal communication with the author, September 2018. 16. Ali Zaaiter, personal communication with the author, September 2018. 17. Ibid. 18. Mohamad Lakis, communication with the author, September 2018. 19. Ibid. 20. Manal Ayoub, “Unemployment in Lebanon,” [in Arabic], al-Diyar, October 27, 2018, https://www.addiyarcomcarloscharlesnet.com/ article/1618508-‫لبنان‬-‫يف‬-‫البطاةل‬. 21. Hassan Sheikh Taha, communication with the author, August 2018. 22. Personal communication with the author, August 2018. 23. ILO, Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile, 2014, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/ public/%2D%2D-arabstates/%2D%2D-ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_240134.pdf. 24. Zainab Cherri et al., “The Lebanese-Syrian crisis.” 25. Ibid. 26. Minister of Environment, Lebanon Environmental Assessment of the Syrian Conflict & Priority Interventions, September 2014, http://www.undp.

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org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Energy%20and%20Environment/ Publications/EASC-WEB.pdf. 27. Zainab Cherri et al., “The Lebanese-Syrian crisis.” 28. Omar Saada, personal communication with the author, August 2018. 29. Mahmoud Jabakhanji, personal communication with the author, September 2018. 30. Martin Chulov, “Low turnout in Lebanon election amid voter scepticism,” The Guardian, May 6, 2018. 31. Benjamin Redd, “Tripoli sleepwalking into trash crisis,” The Daily Star, July 6, 2018, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/ Jul-06/455536-tripoli-sleepwalking-into-trash-crisis.ashx. 32. Shafik Abdelrahman, personal communication with the author, August 2018. 33. Reuters, Thousands protest against Lebanon’s sectarian system, March 6, 2011, h t t p s : / / w w w. r e u t e r s . c o m / a r t i c l e / u s - l e b a n o n - p r o t e s t / thousands-protest-against-lebanons-sectarian-system-idUSTRE7251SR20110306. 34. UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Poverty in Tripoli, February 2015, https://www.unescwa.org/news/poverty-tripoli. 35. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Country Partnership Framework for the Lebanese Republic for the Period FY17-FY22, June 2016, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/111451467996685776/pdf/94768-CAS-P151022-R2016-0126OUO-9-Box396270B.pdf. 36. Osama Habib, “Syria supplying more electricity to Lebanon,” The Daily Star, August 8, 2017, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/ Local/2017/Aug-08/415279-syria-supplying-more-electricity-tolebanon.ashx. 37. Inaya al-Khouja, personal communication with the author, September 2018. 38. Carmen Geha and Joumana Talhouk, “Politics and the Plight of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. Political Brief on the Return of Syrian Refugees,” American University of Beirut, August 2018, http://www.aub.edu.lb/ Documents/Politics-and-the-Plight-of-Syrian-Refugees-in-Lebanon.pdf. 39. Sam van Vliet and Guita Hourani, “Regional differences in the conditions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon,” Civil Society Knowledge Centre, April 2014, https://civilsociety-centre.org/paper/regional-differencesconditions-syrian-refugees-lebanon. 40. Human Rights Watch, Q&A: Syria’s New Property Law, May 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/qa-syrias-new-property-law. 41. Personal communication with the authors, September 2018.

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42. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Financing Grant in the Amount of US$10 Million to the Lebanese Republic for an Emergency National Poverty Targeting Program Project, June 2016, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/984391472013062965/pdf/PAD1850-PJPR-P158980-P149242Project-Paper-Box396302B-PUBLIC.pdf, p. 10. 43. UNHCR, “Total Registered Refugees,” Operational Portal Refugee Situations, Syria Regional Refugee Response, Last updated February 28, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71. 44. Sunniva Rose, “Lebanon and Russia form committee on Syria refugee repatriation,” The National, July 26, 2018, https://www.thenational. ae/world/mena/lebanon-and-russia-form-committee-on-syrian-refugeerepatriation-1.754488.

CHAPTER 9

The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan: Challenges and Future Opportunities for NGOs Eyas Ghreiz

Abstract  Since 2011 and the resulting refugee influx to Jordan, the role of local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has been vital to supporting the coping mechanisms for host communities as well as Syrian refugees in the country. This chapter offers an overview of the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the Jordanian NGOs and how the latter ones adapted their activities to the crisis. To do so, it builds on primary data collected on the field, and the existing literature related to the Syrian refugees’ presence in Jordan. Finally, the chapter suggests developing more inclusive mechanisms that emphasise a participatory approach and more needs-based strategies. It also stresses the need for developing new laws and regulations to address the Syrian refugee crisis’ impact on Jordan. Keywords  Jordan • Syrian refugees • NGOs • Humanitarian intervention

E. Ghreiz (*) Freelance Consultant, Human Rights and Development, Amman, Jordan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_9

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Introduction The fate of Jordan is to be located in a region filled with political conflicts and humanitarian crisis. The Hashemite Kingdom, by virtue of its adjacency with three unstable neighbouring Arab states (Palestine, Syria, and Iraq), has often been significantly affected by the repercussions of political and humanitarian emergencies. Because of its limited resources, Jordan has developed close ties with its neighbours. These special relationships are not only economic and commercial exchanges. They are also social bonds that stem from relations and marriages between Jordanians and residents of surrounding countries, especially in Syria. For example, family and tribal ties are evident between Jordanian inhabitants of the northern regions such as Irbid, Ramtha, and Mafraq, and the populations of southern Syrian regions like Daraa and Quneitra. There are also significant cultural links between the north of Jordan and southern Syria—the so-called historic area of the Houran plain (from the borders of the province of Suweida, southeast of Syria, ending in Jerash and Ajloun mountains in northern Jordan)—which make the population of the Houran plain a single societal fabric that has common customs and tribal traditions. For instance, many tribes are present both in southern Syria and in northern Jordan, such as the Zu’bi, Jahmani, Bani Khalid, and al-Sardyah tribes. The names of several cities and villages in this cross-border area are similar such as al-Taybeh, al-Shajarah, and Aqraba. This multifaceted affiliation is an important factor to understand the way the Jordanian society responded to the Syrian crisis at the beginning of the conflict in mid-March 2011. It also explains the incipience of the Syrian asylum process towards Jordan at the beginning of 2012. At that time, the Jordanians living in the north of the kingdom rejected opening camps for Syrian refugees who fled from the south of Syria. Instead, Jordanian residents received Syrians in their homes because of their family and tribal relations. With the increase of the refugee influx, Jordanian citizens started to rehabilitate abandoned buildings and homes for the refugees. These gestures resulted from the Jordanian’s famous generosity, and initially met with great success. In Ramtha, a Jordanian businessman donated several empty buildings that eventually became al-Bashabsha camp for Syrian refugees. The initiative was launched in coordination with the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the competent government agencies dealing with refugees. In 2012, Syria witnessed an increase in the conflict’s intensity. The country became the locus

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of spreading violence, murders, enforced disappearances, and other human rights violations. The escalation of the Syrian conflict pressured the Jordanian government and the international community to deal with the humanitarian consequences of the conflict as an emergency. The exacerbation of the housing problem and the rise in the number of refugees increased the need to organise and provide shelter to absorb the large numbers of Syrians. Projects were launched to open and rehabilitate a number of sites. As a result of the demographic pressure, al-Za’atari camp was opened in the northern city of Mafraq in July 2012.1 It became the second-largest refugee camp in the world with more than 100,000 refugees. The soaring numbers of refugees increased the need for humanitarian assistance in Jordan and, thus, greatly impacted on the role of non-­ governmental organisations (NGOs) inside the country. The dire situation led several Jordanian NGOs to shift their focus from fostering development for the Jordanian community to providing emergency response for the Syrian refugees. This eventually led NGOs to decrease their focus on host communities. This chapter analyses the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the NGO sector in Jordan. First, it will provide a brief background on refugees, human rights international conventions and the state of Jordan. Then, it will analyse the role of NGOs in mitigating the crisis, including areas and levels of intervention, and their role in the management of conflict sensitivity between host communities and refugees. Finally, this chapter will provide recommendations and concluding remarks.

Refugees, Human Rights Conventions, and the State of Jordan The modern concept of refugee protection was enshrined in the aftermath of World War II as a response to the needs of millions of refugees who had fled their countries of origin. As a result, in 1951, it was agreed internationally to establish the Refugee Convention. The latter was complemented by an optional annexed Protocol in 1967. The Refugee Convention defines the status of a refugee as “any person who is outside his or her country of nationality because of a justified fear of being persecuted on the basis of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion”.2 Although the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan did not ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the UNHCR in 1998,3 which basic provisions stipulate that the

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t­reatment of refugees should be no less than the treatment of Jordanian citizens in terms of (a) practice of religious rituals; (b) non-discrimination based on race, religion, or homeland; (c) consistency with the provisions of the Jordanian constitution and; (d) that such rituals shall not be contrary to laws, regulations, and public morals. Both parties agreed not to expel or repel any refugee seeking asylum in Jordan within the established framework. In addition to the Memorandum of Understanding, Jordan has ratified a number of human rights conventions that recognise the right to protection for refugees as human beings, such as the 1987 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture), the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Finally, the 1963 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) is a distinctive treaty which ensures that refugees and asylum-seekers enjoy a wide range of rights under its Article 5.4 These international instruments prohibit the deportation of persons to places where they may be at risk of torture or ill-treatments. As well as the UN conventions and regional instruments stated above, other treaties protect a range of human rights for refugees and asylum-­ seekers. While there are situations in which the full scope of certain rights is expressly restricted to citizens, these cases represent the exception rather than the rule. Thus, refugees and asylum-seekers are entitled to all the human rights enshrined in most of the international conventions, such as the right to live, freedom from torture, ill-treatment and liberty, freedom of movement, expression, peaceful assembly, participation in associations and equality before the law, and the right to a nationality. Article 25 of the ICCPR contains an exclusive exception for citizens5; the right to participate in public affairs and in voting, to take part in elections, and the opportunity to hold public office. Similarly, the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides for the protection of the right of refugees and asylum-seekers to obtain just and favourable conditions of work and in the formation of trade unions and in social security, and in achieving an adequate standard of living and access to education. Article 2(3) of the Covenant states; “with due regard to human rights and national economy, to determine to what

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extent the economic rights recognised in the present Covenant shall be guaranteed to non-citizens”.6 However, this determinant must be construed narrowly, since it represents an exception to human rights guarantees. Furthermore, the UN Committee responsible for the interpretation of the ICESCR has clarified that the rights included in the text shall apply to all persons, including non-citizens, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers, and victims of international human trafficking, regardless to their legal capacity and identity documents. Jordan has different commitments to these conventions, which influenced its position and response to the Syrian refugee crisis. In parallel, the Jordanian NGOs advocated for refugees’ rights based on these conventions. Having said that, Jordan is still struggling with different human rights issues related to refugees’ rights, the lack of protection, and the partial observance of international standards in addressing refugee issues. Furthermore, Jordan has not been able to provide educational and health services to most of its refugee population. This failure generated further problems such as child labour and early child marriage amongst refugees.

The Role of NGOs in Responding to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan Since March 2011, the government of Jordan estimated that a steady stream of 1.4 million Syrians has crossed the border into Jordan in order to flee the violence and persecutions inherent to the Syrian conflict. With around 80% of refugees living in host communities, the Jordanian people quickly felt the strain on economic resources and infrastructures. Therefore, the Jordanians’ growing negative perception of the Syrian refugees limited the ability of the Jordanian government to develop and implement effective policy measures that address the refugee crisis. As a result, the NGO community stepped in to fill the void left by state policies. According to Donnison, the role played by NGOs partially bridges gaps where official efforts are absent. In his words, NGOs “provide a mechanism that might work where government has failed”.7 Reversely, the suspension of NGOs’ work in post-conflict societies might (re)create the structural challenges which were partially handled in the first place. In other words, NGOs offer only temporary relief and—in most cases—local governments fail to transform the humanitarian momentum into sustainable development policies. In Jordan for instance, the cycle of humanitar-

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ian policies can be summed up as following: before an emergency, the nature of humanitarian ­intervention is based on development and revolves around the betterment of living conditions of the local communities. An emergency triggers the shift of NGOs’ policies towards emergency response, due to the temporary nature of the unrest. Emergency response is usually narrower than development policies, both in the nature of the aid provided and in the communities targeted. This shift also affects the efficiency of certain NGOs which expertise is not necessarily linked to emergency situations. Once the crisis is over—or in the case of the Syrian refugee crisis, when the crisis becomes protracted—funders and NGOs cut down emergency projects to go back to their initial developmental policies. Yet, rebuilding a network of activities is rather complicated after years of interruption, especially that donors tend to cancel their support when initial objectives are not met and disregard the volatility of the situation. Donors are also likely to (re)allocate their funds to more urgent crises in other countries. In the context of the Syrian humanitarian crisis, Jordanian NGOs provided basic needs to refugees, from food, clothing, and shelter, to medical care and access to clean water. This mission required funding for both materials and human field staff workers. Without external financial support, UN agencies and NGOs would not have been able to provide these services, which would have pushed the Jordanian government deeper into crisis. Undoubtedly, the government faced great challenges in providing even a portion of these services alone. Over the eight years of the Syrian conflict, the continuous influx of refugees fleeing to Jordan, together with the increased donor fatigue due to the protracted nature of the crisis, raised a new set of questions about the sustainability of the humanitarian response provided by NGOs. The following developments review the Jordanian NGOs emergency strategy in three main sectors recipient of humanitarian aid: Food and shelter, healthcare, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH). Food and Shelter Food security “exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.8 Food aid programmes, therefore, respond to the food insecurity that arises during and following emergencies, as in the case of the Syrian conflict. The goals of

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food assistance are to manage wasting and malnutrition and to provide adequate food consumption to its recipients.9 While the risk of food insecurity in Jordan before the refugee crisis was low—2.1% of the ­ Jordanian families were vulnerable to food insecurity in 201010—the increase in population from 5915 million in 2009 to 9702 million in 2017 has exacerbated that risk.11 On the other hand, providing shelter to its refugee population continues to be a challenge for Jordan. The UNHCR, in cooperation with the local NGOs, has developed three main strategies to address the accommodation of Syrian refugees. First, the settlement is defined as enabling refugees to have access to and live in dignity in secure settlements that improve their social, economic, and environmental quality of life as a community. Second, shelter aims to enable refugees to access shelter solutions that provide privacy, security, and protection from the elements, emotional support, and a space to live and store belongings in a dignified manner.12 Finally, camps are meant to be an emergency response programme. They are built to provide physical shelter, but they are not appropriately functional for long-term living.13 In spite of the existing mechanisms to deliver food and shelter services to refugees, since 2005, cash vouchers and unconditional cash assistance have become some of the most popular ways for NGOs to give aid in Jordan. Using food vouchers, beneficiaries can select food items according to their preferences and individual consumption needs. Besides, unconditional cash assistance can be used to pay rent, especially that more than 80% of Syrian refugees living outside camps. Given the nature of the service, unconditional cash assistance has been implemented by numerous international and local NGOs in Jordan. The United Nations World Food Programme’s (WFP) food voucher programme was implemented through multiple international cooperating partners—such as Save the Children, International Orthodox Christian Charities, and Catholic Relief Services— in cooperation with local NGOs and the Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development (Princess Basma Centre). Initially, cash vouchers were limited to food items such as rice and sugar. These items were sold to refugees at lower rates than on the market. On the other hand, hygiene items were not included in these vouchers. This resulted in the development of a parallel market where refugees sold their food vouchers—about JD24 (around US$34) per person—to buy hygiene items. This trade would regularly occur inside and at the gates of refugee camps, such as in Za’atari where refugees and local inhabitants would exchange vouchers

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and goods on a weekly basis. Such practices eventually resulted in Syrian refugees being stigmatised by locals as receiving more support than they need and living in better conditions than the Jordanians. Consequently, humanitarian aid in the form of cash assistance/voucher deepened the social gap between host communities and refugees, fuelling hate speech towards the latter. Furthermore, the non-regulated trade of vouchers and food goods negatively impacted the local economy and small businesses. The fluctuation of prices hindered regular selling points that became less attractive, as they proposed similar products for higher prices. Healthcare In the context of the Syrian humanitarian crisis, Jordanian NGOs provide primary care, medicines, obstetrics and gynaecology services, mobile clinics, and first aid training to refugees. These services used to be provided for free inside and outside refugee camps by the UNHCR in cooperation with a local NGO, Jordan Health Aid Society (International). However, in 2015, these services were suspended outside camps due to abuses, mismanagement, and growing discontent of the local population. The Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan has brought important realisations. For instance, recent Jordanian reports showed that the mental health issue within the refugee community is much higher than in a non-refugee population.14 To deal with those cases, International Medical Corps (IMC) and Jordanian local NGOs have opened several clinics around the county.15 Another key part of refugee healthcare is obstetrics and gynaecology, including contraception and natal healthcare. Finally, one important strand of NGOs’ activities in the healthcare sector in Jordan is to foster the refugees and local communities’ awareness of early marriage and the health risks associated with it. Doing so, NGOs take the cultural specificities of the society their work in into account. In Jordan, early marriage is considered one of the main reasons behind gender-based violence and school dropout.16 With regards to the training of specialised NGO workers, it seems that NGOs highlighted the importance of education of cultural sensitivity in healthcare contexts. Additional training for specific healthcare or medical issues of refugees were mentioned during several interviews conducted in Jordan, such as suicide, although only a few publications mention particular training methodologies or topics relating to health.17 This sector’s training practices are unique, as most volunteers or employees are medical professionals. Moreover, the scarcity of healthcare services and medicine

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in the context of a humanitarian crisis must be taken into account by NGOs. A great challenge is to provide adequate healthcare to sometimes deeply traumatised patients and with restricted supplies. Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation (WASH) Most of the NGOs’ water programmes in Jordan target Syrian refugees within the official camps, as they are the most water unsecured populations. Refugees living in host communities usually have access to running water through the country’s existing water pipe infrastructure. The host communities also have reliable access to sewage infrastructures. On the other hand, a number of comprehensive WASH projects that were launched during the Syrian refugee crisis tend to be macro projects focused on helping the entire Jordanian population as opposed to singling out refugees. Before the crisis, much of the Jordanian water and sewage infrastructures were in disrepair, leaking up to 70% of the running water.18 Oxfam has implemented a Hygiene Voucher Programme in July 2013 and a Water Voucher Programme in November 2013 in the governorates of Balqa and Zarqa. Beneficiaries were able to redeem vouchers at local vendor shop for various hygiene products, as well as bottled water. Similarly, the Agence d’Aide à la Cooperation Technique et au Development (ACTED) actively focused on increasing water resources within the camps, as well as promoting personal and environmental hygiene. ACTED is especially present in Za’atari, Azraq, Cyber City, and King Abdullah Park camps. Finally, the Jordan River Foundation and the Royal Scientific Society implemented programmes in the communities to teach water conservation. These programmes help children and their families learn the importance of water preservation, clean water, and hygiene. These are supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Mercy Corps. All of these projects are carried out in collaboration with the relevant ministries. It is worth mentioning that in September 2013, in the context of the Jordan Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis (JRPSC), international NGOs and the Jordanian government agreed to allocate 25% of every funding to the Jordanian host community.19 This percentage was generally allocated to all governorates and all sectors recipients of humanitarian aid in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis. This initiative took into account the importance of supporting host communities’ resilience and cohesion with refugees. Yet, the agreement failed to recognise that the governorates

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hosting the largest populations of refugees were in greater need and should have been allocated a larger share of the aid. In other words, there was no differentiation between host areas and the amount was not based on a proper needs assessment which could have reflected the actual needs of each locality and paved the way for a better response.

Level of Interventions, Emergency, Development, and Sustainability The framework of an emergency situation versus a long-term crisis affects the areas of impact for organisations. In Jordan, NGOs that viewed the situation as a long-term crisis focused more on long-term development and sustainability as opposed to humanitarian relief. For example, in the health sector, such NGOs have opened clinics that focus on reconstruction as opposed to lifesaving care. This is the case of Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) that constructed a complete medical centre in Ramtha district, five kilometres from the Jordanian-Syrian border, where severely wounded Syrians can be treated. In the same vein, Jordan Health Aid Society has inaugurated clinics to treat chronic and non-chronic illnesses.20 However, regarding the main basic needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan (food and shelter, healthcare, and WASH), each organisation approaches the same needs in different ways. Taking the example of a Syrian refugee, who lost a leg in the conflict: healing this refugee would be considered an emergency and, thus, the NGO in charge would receive an important amount to cover the surgery. Yet, what if this same patient has been traumatised by her/his experience of violence and needs long-time psychological support? This mental need is not likely to be given as much importance as healing her/his limb, it is less of a “pressing” need, although it will have a great impact on the patient’s life. Another mismanagement of aid relates to the lack of coordination between humanitarian actors. In the food sector, it resulted in incoherence in the distribution of goods. Countless times, refugee families have received duplicated food products but no hygiene merchandises, and vice versa. Hence, there is a need for harmonisation on what constitutes an urgent or life-threatening need for the refugee population. Harmonisation should also ensure that all the needs that stem from a conflict—should they be urgent or long-term needs—are met by NGOs. Only such a complementary and coherent process can allow NGOs to design their activities to provide a comprehensive and efficient response.

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Perhaps the sector that focuses the most on a long-term impact is the healthcare sector in Jordan. Few NGOs in the WASH sector are building programmes with long-term impact, as water and sanitation are largely the government’s responsibilities. Only the WASH educational programmes are sustainable. Lastly, food security is mostly considered an urgent need. Once again, only a few programmes attempt to raise awareness of refugees on the importance of nutrition, which play an important role in food security. The programmes implemented by some NGOs have different levels of sustainability. Most have short-term funding periods—three or six months—which limits their potential impact. Besides, depending on the sector organisations work in, their projects and efforts may or may not contribute to long-term development. As stated previously, health and medical organisations’ development efforts vary according to the location of implementation, and to the focus on immediate emergency care or long-term chronic issues and regular medical care. As for food, shelter, and WASH projects, NGOs use their own needs assessments, or those produced by Jordan, to determine which services are the most pressing. Interviewees working in NGOs clearly emphasised that their efforts primarily focused on immediate issues, even though they acknowledge the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis. Surely, immediate needs cannot be disregarded in the interest of longer-term development projects. However, there is a definite need to address the sustainability of humanitarian projects. Importantly, NGOs remain constrained by the  policy of the main donors, such as Department for International Development (DFID), USAID, and UN agencies. From their part, international donors must abide by the international policies and agreements. Donors and NGOs tend to have diverging objectives that jeopardise efficient and coherent cooperation. In Jordan, NGOs have put many efforts into making (inter) national laws and humanitarian projects as compatible as possible with the factors on the grounds. One example of the discrepancy between international standards and field realities in Jordan is the implementation of a specific type of funding for micro-projects. This funding is limited to JD500 (about US$705) per initiative. In many cases, the amount barely covers the preparation of the humanitarian initiative. Hence, the latter cannot be implemented, unless the beneficiary of the funding exceeds the initial budget. This usually leads to the failure of such initiatives. This is but another example of the lack of needs assessments prior to h ­ umanitarian

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interventions. While donors determine the amount allocated to an organisation, they are not on the ground and fail to apprehend humanitarian interventions in their entirety. Only NGOs and other humanitarian actors that are in daily contact with the targeted population can assess how to make a significant impact. Those actors, thus, should be given an earlier and more prominent role in the decision-making process in the context of humanitarian interventions.

NGOs and Conflict Sensitivity Between Host Communities and Refugees The flux of Syrian refugees into Jordan has created unprecedented social and economic challenges. These challenges are felt by Jordanian citizens on a daily basis, in terms of both rising housing costs and the lower level of availability of public services such as health and education. There is no doubt that the treatment of Jordanians as a host society towards Syrian refugees was generous in an unrivalled manner, especially at the social level. Yet, tensions between host communities and Syrian refugees in Jordan have become evident. One of the cases the researcher witnessed occurred in North Badia, northeast of Jordan, in a village that was deprived of water. While the Syrian refugees were provided water access by an INGO, their Jordanian neighbours were denied this service. In other words, both Jordanians and Syrian suffered from a lack of water but only the Syrian families received humanitarian help. The head of the Jordanian family inquired about the reason behind helping its Syrian neighbours and depriving his own family of the same aid. The INGO worker replied; “This is only for Syrians”. The situation escalated rapidly; the Jordanian man pointed a gun to the humanitarian worker. The latter was compelled to provide water to the Jordanian family to solve the conflict. The early mismanagement of the crisis by international organisations is but one of the factors that led to increased tensions between host communities and Syrian refugees in Jordan. The inequitable distribution of aid excluded the Jordanians from humanitarian assistance, while locals suffered from the demographic pressure. On the other hand, (international) NGOs argued that Syrians were the prime victims of the crisis and should thus be prioritised. In the Jordanian context, the realisation that sustainable conflict-management must also include host communities came very late. As a result, (international) NGOs contributed to creating a gap between Syrian refugees and host communities in Jordan.

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Tensions were further fostered by a lack of coordination between the providers of humanitarian services, and by poor communication between the service providers and the host community. For instance, when Syrian refugees received direct cash assistance or in-kind donations, rumours spread like wildfire amongst Jordanians. Exaggerations on the amount of the aid provided to the Syrians led to the belief among Jordanians that refugees were receiving large amounts of money and donations from the UNHCR. Additionally, Jordanians linked cash assistance to the increase of housing rents in Jordan. The Jordanians were furious to witness that the presence of Syrian refugees—with the help of NGOs—was causing inflation. Worst, Jordanians observed that Syrian refugees could easily pay high rent thanks to the aid they received from multiple channels.21 In spite of the growing protest, NGOs and other humanitarian actors did not attempt to mitigate the negative impact of their programmes. The implementation of humanitarian projects in Jordan in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis not only created conflicts between the refugees and the host community, it also fuelled tensions among NGOs workers. First, NGOs failed to show communication skills with their staff and to provide training to their field teams, which affected the quality of the services delivery. For example, the training provided usually focuses on the senior staff rather than on the field staff, so the latter does not have appropriate skills to deal with the refugee population. In addition, several humanitarian workers are not committed to the international standards of humanitarian work principles—again, due to a lack of training and a lack of individual motivation. Second, there is a lack of communication between the senior and the field staff. One field officer reflected on a specific occurrence, stating that; “I was part of a programme for bread distribution, which targeted only refugees older than 18 years old. We were forbidden to distribute bread to the younger ones for security reasons. This policy was not viable, nor based on actual facts. Explaining this view to my managers took much efforts because I could not directly communicate with them. Eventually the organisation altered its policy and we are now able to distribute bread to children starting from five years old, while ensuring a safe and accessible location of distribution”.22 As exampled by this anecdote, the lack of monitoring within NGOs to adapt programmes to field realities damages the efficiency of humanitarian relief. The Jordanian government and the state’s discourse on refugees contributed to social tensions inside the country. When the Jordanian government committed to create 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees during

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the “London Donors Conference” in 2016, Jordanian social media erupted against this policy. Once again, social media fuelled the perception that Syrian refugees were receiving better services than Jordanians. In 2016, the unemployment rate in the country peaked to 15.28%, which was unprecedented since 2002.23 This was not the first instance where the labour market was at the centre of social tensions. Prior to 2016, Syrian refugees had contributed to the expansion of the informal economy in Jordan. The Jordanian government’s commitment to create work permits for refugees was thus seen as the legalisation and normalisation of the Syrian presence on the labour market, at the expenses of the Jordanians. Yet, the Jordan Compact gave Syrian refugees the permission to work in specific sectors in which they would not directly compete with Jordanians. Surely, Jordanians were narrowly affected by such policy, especially in sectors such as agriculture. In reality, Syrian refugees compete with migrant workers such as Egyptians, who had lived and worked in Jordan for decades. One can argue that Syrian refugees’ access to these sectors helped to develop those sectors, making them more appealing and more productive. Linda Kalash, the head of a local NGO called Tamkeen Fields for Aid, explained that “The informal sector exploited Syrian refugees, as all were aware of Syrians’ struggle to work in Jordan. Still now [after 2016], many professions are not opened to Syrians, along the Jordanian Ministry of Labour’s policy”.24 Linda postulated; “Professional Syrian workers, such as craftsmen, found it appealing to work individually and started to have a foothold in local markets rather than working in the formal sector and suffering from discrimination and unfair working conditions”.25 In spite of Jordan’s commitment made in London, out of the 94,527 permits given since then, only 40,000 were actually created while the rest were mere regularisation of existing illegal working status. Taking those numbers into consideration, it appears that Jordan achieved only 20% of its objective.26 In fact, Jordanian officials in charge of the work policy’s implementation recognise that the country simply does not have the ability to create such a high number of work opportunities.27 The developments above presented several causes of the tense relations between the Syrian refugees and the host community in Jordan. In fact, tensions are inherent to a wide range of long-term refugee situations.28 The longer the crisis lasts, the more important it becomes to recognise the potential for human rights violation arising from the growing social discontent. After eight years of humanitarian crisis, the Jordanian government and humanitarian actors have not been able to develop a long-term

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policy aimed at defusing a potential crisis inside the kingdom. A recent survey conducted by NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions Premises in 2018 indicated that 87% of Jordanians believe that the Syrian refugees should return to Syria. The same survey showed that 66% of the Syrian refugees themselves share this wish. On the other side, 33% of the Syrian refugees believe that they “will never go back” and 24% think that they “probably will not go back”. Syrian refugees perceive their situation in Jordan as a pull factor, which encourages them to stay. They also believe that certain conditions in Syria serve as push factors. According to the survey, only 14% of Syrian refugees said they are “very determined to go back”, and 29% foresaw that they “probably would go back”.29 Those results clearly demonstrate that, in spite of the numerous mismanagements of the humanitarian crisis in Jordan, Syrian refugees feel integrated enough to contemplate a future in the kingdom. As a result, the Jordanian government and the international community should prepare the post-­ Syrian refugee crisis, and support the great number of Syrian refugees in Jordan who will not go back, without detriment to the Jordanian and migrant communities.

Recommendations In light of the above analysis of the current situation that results from the hosting of a large number of Syrian refugees in Jordan, this section offers a series of recommendations. The latter ones stem from personal observations and meetings with several local and international actors concerned with the refugee crisis. 1. Creating a legislation at the national level that regulates the status of refugees, as well as the mechanisms for dealing with them. This legislation would mend the weaknesses of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the Jordanian government and the UNHCR in 1998. Furthermore, the MoU should be updated to integrate the new realities specific to the Syrian refugee crisis. 2. Establishing a national group of qualified individuals to advise the Jordanian government on refugee issues. 3. Creating solid waste recycling projects that would involve Syrian refugees as workers. This sector would be an opportunity to create jobs for both Syrians and host communities.

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4. Differentiating the humanitarian approach for each refugee crisis. International NGOs should take into consideration that each crisis has its unique modality, rather than trying to adopt a common approach to all humanitarian situations. 5. Exerting more efforts to enhance joint humanitarian projects and coordination to overcome overlapping. These projects should be developed on a solid and comprehensive needs assessment for refugees and the host communities. 6. Focusing on developing long-term, sustainable, and productive initiatives and projects managed by both Jordanians and Syrian refugees. For instance, NGOs they should emphasise the importance of peacebuilding, combating hate speech, and bridging community gaps. 7. Moving from emergency aid to development-oriented policies. As a crisis becomes protracted, there should be a shift in focus from emergency assistance programmes to mid-range or long-term development programmes. 8. Providing psychological support and training to the local Jordanian NGOs—especially to the Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and refugee volunteers—while most of the focus is currently still limited to major international NGOs and UN agencies. 9. Leveraging existing technologies to increase coordination. Current coordination databases are often limited to a mere subset of humanitarian organisations, such as UN agencies, which help those bodies coordinate but do not incorporate international NGOs or local CBOs. 10. Establishing joint vocational training centres between Jordanians and Syrian refugees to enable both communities to enter the labour market. Similarly, the Jordanian government could encourage joint ventures of micro-projects between Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens (i.e. reclaiming land for agriculture, encouraging food industries, and investing in grazing). 11. Maintaining funding to Jordan and the commitments of the international community towards the Syrian refugee crisis to achieve the principle of burden sharing. It is also recommended to extend the involvement of the local NGOs in implementing international projects, with direct donation to those local NGOs. 12. Maintaining proper coordination between international organisations and UN agencies, and government agencies to better implement response plans and avoid overlapping service delivery.

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13. Creating an umbrella or a coalition for NGOs working in the response to refugee’s crises to enhance their capacities to include long-term crises projects.

Conclusion This chapter aimed at evaluating international and local NGOs’ response to the Syrian refugee crisis, and the impact of this crisis on the Jordanian NGOs. It also tried to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of implementation mechanisms of (international) NGOs projects. Although the Jordanian communities initially received Syrian refugees well, they quickly felt pressured by the competition over the labour market, infrastructures, and services. Jordan is committed to several international conventions that protect the rights of refugees, and it signed a MoU with the UNHCR in 1998. Yet, the kingdom lacks a national legal framework to deal with refugees’ cases. This has increased the pressure on NGOs to support the refugee community. Most local NGOs have changed their approach of humanitarian relief to cope with the donors and international NGOs’ policies and to sustain the funding of their programmes. This shift affected NGOs’ work and resulted in a disproportionate focus on Syrian refugees. In addition, Jordanian NGOs stepped back from development to provide a humanitarian emergency response to the Syrian crisis. The sustainability of humanitarian projects was a major obstacle in all sectors affected by the refugee influx. The poor coordination among international NGOs, UN agencies and local NGOs from the one side, and between the Jordanian government and humanitarian actors from the other side, has affected the quality of the response and services provided. Poor coordination also affected the capacity of the Jordanian NGOs. After eight years of crisis, the Jordanian government and humanitarian actors now face another challenge, that of enabling thousands of Syrian refugees to settle in Jordan, without alienating and depriving the Jordanian communities.

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Notes 1. Sybella Wilkes, “Jordan opens new camp for Syrian refugees amid funding gaps,” UNHCR News and Stories, July 12, 2012, https://www.unhcr. org/news/makingdifference/2012/7/5016861c9/jordan-opens-newcamp-syrian-refugees-amid-funding-gaps.html. 2. UN General Assembly, Convention and Protocol Related to the Status of Refugees (United Nations, 1951), Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. 3. UNHCR, Jordan: Planning Figures for 2019 [in Arabic], 2019, https:// www.unhcr.org/ar/4be7cc278c8.html. 4. UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (United Nations, 1965), Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195. 5. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966), Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. 6. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations, 1966), Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3. 7. David Donnison, “The challenges of urban regeneration for community development,” Community Development Journal 28, no. 4 (1993): 293–298. 8. Committee on World Food Security, Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (first version), 2012, p. 4. 9. European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, Humanitarian Food Assistance. From Food Aid to Food Assistance, 2013. 10. Government of Jordan, Department for Statistics and World Food Program, The State of Food Insecurity in Jordan (2013–2014). Analytical Report, 2016, p. 12. 11. World Bank, Population, total, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.POP.TOTL?locations=JO. 12. UNHCR, Global Strategy for Settlement and Shelter. A UNHCR Strategy 2014–2018, 2014, p. 4. 13. Juan Manuel Ros-García, “Humanizing Architecture in Emergencies: Towards an Improved Model of Basic Settlement without Negative Impact,” International Journal of the Constructed Environment, 4 (2013): 25–39. 14. Amjed S. al-Fahoul, Marianna Diomidous, Aggelos Mechili, Olga Archangelidi, Panos Theodoromanolakis and John Mantas, “The Provision of Health Services in Jordan to Syrian Refugees,” Health Science Journal 9, no. 2 (2015), http://www.hsj.gr/medicine/the-provision-of-health-services-in-jordan-to-syrian-refugees.php?aid=5185. 15. Tom James, “Aid agency to open mental health clinics for refugees in southern districts,” The Jordan Times, November 26, 2014, http://www. jordantimes.com/news/local/aid-agency-open-mental-health-clinics-ref-

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ugees-southern-districts; Sonia Lowman, “‘The remedy of a soul’: Mental health worker Hadeel Naser helps Syrian refugees heal,” The New Arab, October 10, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/ indepth/2018/10/10/mental-health-worker-hadeel-naser-helps-syrianrefugees-heal. 16. UNICEF, A Study on Early Marriage in Jordan, 2014, https://www.unicef.org/mena/UNICEFJordan_EarlyMarriageStudy2014.pdf; Save the children, Too Young to Wed. The growing problem of child marriage among Syrian girls in Jordan, 2014, https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/content/dam/global/reports/education-and-child-protection/too-youngto-wed.pdf. 17. Tala al-Rousan, Zaker Schwabkey, Mara Jirmanus and Brett D.  Nelson, “Health needs and priorities of Syrian refugees in camps and urban settings in Jordan; perspectives of refugees and health care providers,” East Mediterranean Health Journal 24, no. 3 (2018), http://applications. emro.who.int/emhj/v24/03/EMHJ_2018_24_3_243_253.pdf?ua=1. 18. Anas Salameh, personal communication with the author, December 2018. 19. Government of Jordan, The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis, http://www.jrpsc.org. 20. UNHCR, A guide of the services delivered to refugees [in Arabic], 2015, https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/43779. 21. The so-called eye print is a direct financial assistance provided by UNHCR for some Syrian families and has been suspended financial support but there is still the impression of the host community that Syrian refugees continue to receive financial support from several quarters and international organisations. 22. Bilal Olama, personal communication with the author, July 2018. 23. World Bank, “Unemployment, total, Jordan,” ILOSTART Database, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=JO. 24. Linda Kalash, personal communication with the author, September 2018. 25. Ibid., January 2019. 26. Rania al-Sarayra, “94 thousand work permits for Syrian refugees since 2016,” [in Arabic], al-Ghad, May 15, 2018, https://alghad. com/94-2016‫منذ‬-‫السوريني‬-‫لالجئني‬-‫معل‬-‫ترصح‬-‫�ألف‬/. 27. Personal communication with the author, August 2018. 28. Gil Loescher, James Milner, Edward Newman and Gary Troeller, Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008). 29. Jassar al-Tahat, “Only 14 per cent of Syrian refugees ‘very determined’ to return—poll,” The Jordan Times, December 16, 2007, http://jordantimes.com/news/local/only-14-cent-syrian-refugees-‘very-determined’return—poll.

CHAPTER 10

The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Lebanese NGOs and Civil Society Sector Isabelle Saade

Abstract  Since 2011, Lebanon hosts the largest concentration of refugees per capita. In March 2019, despite some voluntary returns, Lebanon was still home for about 1.5 million Syrian refugees. On the other hand, 1.5  million Lebanese from host communities have been negatively impacted by the Syrian crisis and live below the poverty line, while 336,000 require humanitarian assistance. Yet, humanitarian aid funding remains insufficient to cover demand for basic assistance for both refugee and host communities—only one-third of requirements are funded—and the Lebanese government failed to implement efficient policies. Confronted with those gaps, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and civil society actors stepped up. After providing an outlook on NGOs’ efforts to mitigate the main effects of the humanitarian crisis in the country, this chapter sheds light on the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on

I. Saade (*) Programme Coordinator, Tabitha for Relief and Development Dorcas Lebanon, Bauchrieh, Lebanon e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_10

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the NGOs and the civil society in Lebanon. It concludes by reflecting on the future prospects of the crisis in Lebanon and formulating recommendations. Keywords  Lebanon • Syrian refugees • NGOs • Localisation

Introduction Lebanon is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which aims to ensure the fair treatment of refugees and the protection of their human rights. However, as soon as the Syrian conflict started, Syrian nationals were permitted unrestricted entry into Lebanese lands, a short-lived policy based upon a 1993 Syrian-Lebanese agreement for economic and social cooperation.1 Hence, initially, Lebanon welcomed Syrian refugees unconditionally. Yet, on 31 December 2014, in defiance of that agreement, the Lebanese government imposed border entry restrictions on Syrians. It introduced six strict visa categories resembling those applied to foreign nationals.2 Lebanon was not prepared to receive and host this unexpected high number of refugees. Even in the commencement of the emergency, the government’s approach towards the arrival of Syrian refugees was characterised by negligence and dissociation. During the first five months of the conflict, the Lebanese government did not even officially recognise the presence of refugees in Lebanon. As of November 2019, refugees are still considered “internally displaced people”, and not refugees. Therefore, the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the Lebanese civil society has progressively become vital, especially in providing services to both refugees and hosting communities. Without the support of NGOs and the civil society sector, refugees would have been in poorer conditions. Civil society organisations (CSOs) also became essential actors in facilitating the response to the humanitarian crisis. They played and are still playing an important role in fostering communication between donors, United Nations (UN) agencies, and governments on the one side, and between the latter ones and vulnerable citizens on the other side. Doing so, they were able to carry out a bi-directional facilitating mission. Local NGOs (LNGOs) in Lebanon have a long history in acting for relief ever since the Lebanese civil war (1975–1989). During those

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15 years, they have been essential providers of different types of humanitarian response to the population in need; including humanitarian assistance, emergency, and relief, various primary healthcare programmes, education, and livelihood programmes. Similarly, during the July 2006 war, LNGOs have done a well-coordinated work at the local level to respond to the crisis. Lebanon suffered two large Israeli military offensives in the south after the end of the Lebanese civil war, in 1993 and 1996, respectively. It resulted in considerable demolition, and 400,000 persons were forced to move to safe areas in the northern regions.3 Both military interventions lasted for more than one week and the internally displaced populations were primarily hosted by national organisations, with negligible help from the international community. In 2006, Israel launched another attack that lasted 34 days. More than 1500 were killed, around 4000 were wounded and one million persons were internally displaced. Moreover, the raids that targeted infrastructures in the whole country caused wide destruction. The southern regions were particularly overwhelmed. In all situations, LNGOs have always been able to access unreachable areas that international NGOs (INGOs) or UN agencies could not approach. The role of local NGOs was always seen as complementary to that of other security institutions. The particular context of Arsal, a mountainous village located in Ba’albek district, showed the impact of local actors in critical situations. In this village, local and national NGOs have played a fundamental role in fostering social cohesion and stability, and in bringing divided groups together. Arsal was but one of the numerous examples of LNGOs’ commitment to human dignity. Moreover, LNGOs’ daily support to Lebanese communities is oriented towards sustainable development. As such, they differ from the short-term emergency relief provided by foreign agencies. Hence, it is likely that changes in terms of living conditions and development in Lebanon will mainly come from local humanitarian actors. When the Syrian crisis erupted in early-2011 and propagated to neighbouring countries, Lebanon was considered attractive by INGOs. The latter ones were able to settle in the country, worked to ensure funding, and provided services to affected populations. In Lebanon, all humanitarian agencies work under the interagency system that is guided by the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP). The latter serves as the Lebanon chapter of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), which has been implemented at the regional level to mitigate the impact of the humanitarian

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face of the Syrian crisis in the Middle East. The LCRP is co-led by the Ministry of Social Affairs on behalf of the Government of Lebanon, and by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In Lebanon, more than 100 humanitarian actors cooperate to provide services in the sectors most impacted by the crisis. Regrettably, the Syrian crisis proved that local actors such as national NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) were not much involved in humanitarian intervention. In spite of their potential to meet populations’ needs, international actors do not consider them capable enough to play the leading role in emergency response. Due to prejudgement on the capacities of LNGOs, interactions between the latter ones and external/international humanitarian actors seem to be paternalistic. This generated tensions between the two, as it will be further explained below. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that some donors, especially governments, prefer to provide financial assistance through their compatriot agencies to decrease the threat of corruption and mismanagement. Foreign governments seem to favour working with partners they know, even though it means they will pay a higher cost. This causes further challenges to the localisation of humanitarian aid.4 Within this chaotic atmosphere, LNGOs and CBOs were still able to assume a crucial role in the Syria crisis. Donors, UN agencies, and the international community in general have relied on local humanitarian actors to collect information about the situation on the ground. Conversely, local NGOs have exchanged their knowledge in order to access financial resources. In compliance with the humanitarian cornerstone of immediate alleviation of suffering, international agencies tend to prioritise emergency relief provision, which they would then often transform into post-conflict development programmes. Hence, longer-term projects are quickly abandoned whenever new emergencies call for urgent action and attract funds. The Middle Eastern region was no exception to the rule, starting with several Israeli invasions of Lebanon, most notably in 1978  and 1982, the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq, the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon, and more recently the Syrian crisis. Needless to say, the re-occurrence of armed conflict and pressing humanitarian needs in the region has never allowed NGOs to focus on one single crisis for too long, consequently harming sustainable development.

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General Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Lebanon The Syrian crisis has impacted the Lebanese society, starting from the high rate of unemployment among the Lebanese population to the impact on the local economy, infrastructures, rents, education, politics, and also security. Since 2011, the civil society sector in Lebanon has also experienced important changes. Lebanon is hosting the largest number of refugees per capita in the world, almost 1 in 4 Lebanese citizens. The crisis has stroke refugees, host communities and donors in full force. At present, and entering into its eighth year, all impacted actors are showing signs of fatigue.5 This section focuses on the impact of the refugee crisis on specific sectors, and the humanitarian response brought by NGOs. At the beginning of the crisis, the Lebanese community welcomed Syrian refugees. However, as the situation lasted and became protracted, tensions escalated, especially when refugees started to compete with the Lebanese on their daily bread. The UNDP published a “Narrative Report Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon: Wave II” in January 2018. The study indicated that competition for lower-­ skilled jobs remained the primary source of tension (64%), especially in areas with the highest concentration of refugees, such as Beqaa (92%). Nevertheless, figures also showed that there was a limited intersection between the sectors in which the two communities work. For instance, 75% of Syrians indicated that they work in construction and agriculture compared to only 15% of the Lebanese. Another important source of tension between the local and refugee populations is the unfairness of humanitarian assistance, as seen by the Lebanese communities. Syrian refugees are highly concentrated in peripheral regions and some of the poorest areas of the country, mainly Beqaa, the north, and the south. Those areas witness high levels of illiteracy, low educational completion, low revenues, seasonality of jobs, and inexistent social protection mechanisms.6 Similarly, poverty is increasing even more in the rural regions of the north, namely Akkar and Minnieh-Dinnieh.7 In those poor areas of Lebanon, Syrian refugees have involuntarily increased the vulnerability of host communities. Their presence has led to rent increases and competition over jobs. When paired with the growing pressure on healthcare and education, many of the vulnerable host communities consider themselves as much as victims of the crisis as the Syrian refugees. For instance, Lebanese children are at risk of being involved in child labour due to the deterioration of the economic situation; although

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there are no concrete figures to show this tendency. Definitely, the hosting of Syrian refugees worsened the already difficult living conditions of poor host communities. Yet, while both populations—refugees and host—face the same challenges, Lebanese have developed the perception that Syrians receive more support from humanitarian actors. At the beginning of the crisis, host communities were receiving assistance just as Syrian refugees. Nonetheless, as funds decreased, Syrian refugees were given priority over local communities. This caused or aggravated tensions between Syrians and Lebanese.8 Furthermore, humanitarian responses have sometimes exacerbated the struggle of host communities. This was the case of the targeted medical assistance provided by the UNHCR. While the programme offered medical support to vulnerable Syrians, it failed to recognise that a significant ratio of the Lebanese population could not afford adequate health insurance. Many Lebanese still fight to be admitted into hospitals. Similarly, being covered by the Ministry of public health or any other public institution is a long and tedious process. In this context, Syrians were seen to get easier referrals for treatments.9 Members of the host communities find it gradually more difficult to access primary healthcare centres due to overcrowding from the refugee population. As a result, Lebanese felt  that Syrian refugees are being prioritised, while vulnerable local citizens are being neglected, or even forgotten.10 Host communities developed the perception that Syrian refugees enjoy privileged access to Lebanese healthcare services and hospitals. This might be due to the humanitarian support directly targeting refugees, which appears to fuel tensions between the two communities.11 What is important to mention here is that even if the Lebanese have access to the health in the primary healthcare centres, services are not always available due to the increasing demands. To mitigate the tensions, NGOs have been advocating to include Lebanese and refugees in all their programmes. The government in general and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) in particular supported the initiative. Recently, it seems that humanitarian policies have become more inclusive, targeting Lebanese and Syrian refugees equally. Donors are also more aware of social tensions and have adjusted their funding policies. For instance, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM) has tried to ensure that a proportionate number of host communities and refugees beneficiate from funding and humanitarian services. Besides health, education is the next affected sector by the Syrian crisis. This is due to the increased number of refugee students accessing public

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schools; the latter ones are overcrowded. A second daily shift has been introduced in Lebanon, which has effectively reduced the pressure on students and teachers from the first (morning) shift. Nonetheless, additional students add a burden to an already weak public-school system in need of safer buildings, healthier sanitary conditions, sufficient material and equipment, and qualified personnel. The high influx of Syrian students turned into a key challenge for host communities.12 In addition, Syrian students are facing several learning problems. They had to adapt to the Lebanese curriculum that is different from the Syrian one—especially in terms of the language barrier. Indeed, the majority of Syrian students do not speak English or French, which are the main two teaching languages of the core materials in Lebanese schools. Facilitating the integration of Syrian refugees in the Lebanese education system requires additional support from teachers, heads of schools, and parents. On the other hand, the support provided to Syrian students has a reverse effect on the quality of education for all children—both Syrian and Lebanese. The time and efforts of education staff are diverted from regular school tasks towards the integration of Syrian refugees. NGOs have tried to alleviate the burden on the education sector. They provided a wide range of activities starting from provision of transportation, homework support, to psychosocial support (PSS), accelerated learning programme (ALP), school feeding programmes, rehabilitation of schools’ facilities, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) inside schools. Finally, the labour sector sparked the greatest debate in Lebanon. Syrian refugees are generally unqualified workers with low educational background, and they are prepared to work under difficult conditions. This threatens the Lebanese workers, mainly in the construction, agriculture, and, to a lesser extent, the services sector. Competition between Lebanese and Syrian workers is remarkably high, particularly because Syrian workers work for lower salaries, longer hours and without requesting any social security profits. The sudden increase in the labour supply and the availability of low-cost Syrian labour explains the general decline in wages and the strain on jobs, which translated into more limited job opportunities for Lebanese nationals.13 This struggle unquestionably caused growing hostility between the two communities. Some municipalities have even prohibited Syrians from working in their area, some others have imposed curfews—although these measures were limited to some regions and were later removed. Nevertheless, for Syrian refugees, not being able to work is not an option. The majority of them have arrived in Lebanon with very

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little or even no savings and have no other means to meet the basic needs of their families. Hence, Syrian refugees’ only opportunity to find income is to cork, and thus, compete with Lebanese workers. Developing sustainable livelihood activities for people affected by the crisis is a key priority for the government of Lebanon but also the civil society. It is crucial to reduce the dependence of vulnerable populations on aid, while increasing the productivity and income of local communities.14 As a result, NGOs have been focusing on fostering market-based skills training and employability, apprenticeship, income generation opportunities, innovation, and entrepreneurship programmes. NGOs are trying to maintain a strong focus on developing tailored technical vocational education and/or training. Such trainings include life skills training and youth initiatives that focus on developing learning, employability, personal empowerment, and active citizenship skills. However, the economic situation and the instability in the country remains the main challenge. Only in mid-2018, the country’s settings stabilised when a government was formed after months of negotiations. As for the host communities, they believe that they are unable to compete with Syrians workers for several reasons. On the one hand, living costs in Lebanon are high, and until recently, Lebanese populations did not receive assistance for health, education, rent, and so on. On the other hand, Lebanese workers do not accept poor working conditions, as the Syrian do. Finally, Lebanese communities acknowledge the deteriorating economic conditions due to the drop in tourism and cross-border trade with Syria. Nevertheless, refugees are the first to be blamed by Lebanese for the economic situation in the country.

The Effect of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Lebanese Civil Society Sector To manage the overwhelming number of Syrians living in Lebanon, the Lebanese civil society has expanded with the creation of new civil society organisations (CSOs), as well as the introduction of supplementary programmes and projects in existing CSOs. As an example, Tabitha for Relief and Development is a local NGO that was initially established in Aley in 2016, Mount Lebanon, based on recommendations of the UNHCR. Aley was considered a gap area, meaning that it was not covered by humanitarian aid. This was in spite of the fact that the city welcomed more than 6000 refugees, while more were dispersed in the whole district. In the context of the Syrian crisis, local NGOs such as Tabitha filled a void left by

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the Lebanese government and the international community. The incapacity of those major actors to assist the vast number of refugees had devastating consequences in almost all sectors in Lebanon. The impact of the Syrian crisis on the NGOs (local and international) and the civil society was a double-edged sword. On the positive side, civil actors were able to fulfil their raison d’être: providing support to the most vulnerable ones. LNGOs were able to reach all affected people, and they were innovative in the implementation of their mission. New ideas were elaborated. For instance, in 2014, Migration Services and Development (MSD) developed an application where women victims of gender-based violence (GBV)—whether refugees or migrant workers—could communicate, share pictures, and request help. However, due to a lack of funds, the team was not able yet to implement the project. Digital learning is another innovative approach that was adopted by Digital Opportunity Trust (DOT). The latter supports the youth to become innovators and leaders, and to create and apply digital solutions that have a positive impact on their communities. In another case, Tabitha for Relief and Development launched a programme around food for children attending education activities. The mothers of the students, who prepare their food on a daily basis, were trained on food safety and food storage. The costs of this food programme were relatively reduced since those women only get paid a small incentive covering their transportation for attending the training. Furthermore, the increasing number of INGOs working in Lebanon has resulted in having many Lebanese people hired by humanitarian organisations. It gave working opportunities to Lebanese youth who were already suffering from unemployment and were looking for opportunities outside the country. As for the CSOs and LNGOs, they have recognised that forming coalitions and networks increased their chances of receiving the fund and having their voice heard. Some CSOs and LNGOs collaborate with others in their areas of interest, rather than working in an isolated and more closed manner. The crisis also encouraged cross-sectoral engagement and interaction between different civil society groups, all of them trying to find funding opportunities. Local NGOs initially formed a consortium with international NGOs that had more chances of securing funding. The Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs, which is working closely with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), recommended the UN body to work with LNGOs in order to build their capacities. More recently, LNGOs have joined efforts and tried to submit proposals in order to cover needs on a larger scale. In this context, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Tabitha

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worked together in the northern city of Batroun to establish a project on child protection and legal assistance. Similarly, Terre Des Hommes Italy (TDH) partnered with LNGOs on a child protection programme, including Kafa, Abaad, Tabitha, and Triumphant Mercy (TM). On the other side, NGOs are working hand in hand with the government’s institutions such as ministries, social development centres, and municipalities in order to solve some pressing problems that resulted from the refugee crisis. NGOs made sure to include locals as their beneficiaries alongside the affected refugee population. Furthermore, in the frame of innovation, NGOs tried to engage local citizens in CSOs in order to ensure and maintain an active and democratic society based on principles of justice, equality, and fairness. Additionally, and to compete with INGOs, locals CBOs/NGOs worked to increase their performance. They became better organised, improved their communication strategies, and they worked on providing effective results to prove donors and the international community that they have the capacity to ensure a proper response to the crisis. INGOs who partnered with LNGOs and CBOs were able to contribute to building their capacities through training opportunities and coaching. This enabled LNGOs/CBOs to develop abilities and skills that make them more effective and viable, thus increasing their potential to develop. It is important to mention that two or three years ago, LNGOs started to be represented in the coordination of the interagency. While the sector model is dominating in Lebanon, local coordination remained weak for some reason. Capacity is still an issue, with many local actors busy with full-time implementation jobs, but also a lack of skills to be part of these vast coordination meetings. The Syrian refugee crisis also had a negative impact on the NGOs/CBOs in Lebanon. LNGOs tend to see international humanitarian organisations to a large extent as “emergency tourists”.15 Yet, LNGOs would exchange their local knowledge and access with INGOs to secure financial resources and gain greater public visibility. In Lebanon, in a general climate of disaffection towards domestic politics, local people’s reactions reveal popular mistrust and resentment towards all aid actors without distinction. Up till now, the localisation of humanitarian response seems to be ignored by INGOs and the international community. A new practice consists in the registration of international organisations as national offices. Although this process is considered to be localisation, in fact, it does not empower local organisations. Instead, it leads to competition between LNGOs and INGOs,

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which is not always fair and results in the replacement of local organisations by international ones with national registration. Furthermore, the absence of localisation is mostly observable through the flows of direct funding. As the Global Humanitarian Assessment Report 2015 reveals, in 2014, only 0.2% of total international humanitarian assistance went directly to local and national NGOs.16 The majority of LNGOs access funding indirectly through establishing partnerships with INGOs, which have easier access to financial resources. Yet, local reactions to the humanitarian crisis are significant in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. For instance, in most cases, local/national organisations are faster to respond. This is mainly due to their geographical proximity to the affected zones. LNGOs are usually the first to arrive in conflictual areas. For example, in January 2019, several storms hit Lebanon, resulting in hundreds of displaced Syrian refugees and flooded tented settlements. Further bad weather threatened thousands more. The UNHCR in Lebanon launched an urgent response as thousands of refugees across the country were in need of supplies, food, and temporary accommodation after refugee settlements in low-lying areas were flooded. Yet, LNGOs were the first ones to provide support to the affected people. Moreover, this closeness helps LNGOs to better understand the context, and eventually to better act, based on do-no-harm principles. More importantly, LNGOs have a deeper acquaintance of the composition, customs, native culture, language, and dynamics of the country to prepare humanitarian responses. The similarity between LNGOs workers and affected local populations is crucial in gaining affected communities’ trust and cooperation. NGOs’ knowledge of the field enables them to quickly and more accurately assess the short-term needs and necessities and link them to longer-term development objectives. In other words, their engagement is not time bound and their commitment to empowering communities in a sustainable manner is their raison d’être. This strong, locally tied foundation should go hand in hand with a local CSO’s right to define its own development path and long-term strategies based on its right to self-determination. Altogether, gap areas in the humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon include but are not limited to the following: . A lack of organisations working in labour law. 1 2. A lack of organisations covering sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) legal intervention, especially when it relates to custody.

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This explains the fact that the prosecution for those cases is long and complex. 3. A lack of legal intervention for personal status law that goes together with a gap in birth registration. 4. The poor provision of services in Palestinian camps such as Bedaoui, in the north of the country. It concerns not only Palestinian refugees from Lebanon (PRL) but also Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS). 5. The poor provision of safe shelters for all refugees all over Lebanon. The existing safe shelters do not have the capacity to host beneficiaries for a long period (maximum six months). 6. A failure to work with persons with specific needs (PWSN), especially children with autism and other disabilities. Those needs are believed to be pressing in the north of the country. 7. A lack of programmes targeting child labour.

The Future Prospects of the Syrian Crisis and Its Effect on the Lebanese NGOs/CBOs As the Syrian conflict entered its eighth year in March 2019, donors are progressively cutting their assistance to the Syrian refugees across Lebanon and other host countries. In 2018, the back-to-school campaign was even cancelled. This reflects donors’ fatigue of the UN agencies and international community. As a result, in the long run, locals working in the humanitarian sector will lose their jobs while the economic hardship in the country is likely to remain. In September 2018, the UNHCR issued an urgent appeal, warning that if more funds were not received, it would have to suspend services for refugees, including cash assistance to vulnerable Syrians in hosting countries such as Lebanon.17 Should the UN suspend its activities in Lebanon, the pressure on LNGOs and CBOs would increase, especially that few refugees are going back to Syria. Many vulnerable beneficiaries remain in need and the local community would have to search for alternative solutions with no funding. The cut in assistance could cause thousands of children dropping out of school to work, and thus, to an increase in child marriages, crime, human trafficking, and exploitation. As a consequence of the funding cut, many services were already revised. Moreover, mild winters over the past couple of years have led NGOs not to prioritise winterisation in 2019. This year, however, the

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situation changed; refugees and Lebanese host communities were extremely affected by heavy rains and low temperatures, which increased the burden on CBOs. Young and small NGOs were the first to be affected by the reduction of funds, since the main channels go through the biggest international NGOs, as donors aim for quick impact. When localisation was voiced up in the Grand Bargain that was officially launched during the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, some funding was allocated to the main Lebanese LNGOs. Yet, the latter ones were overwhelmed, and few tried to reach remote areas. On the other side, small NGOs that were on the field, working in small villages and remote areas, did not receive any support and were considered not able to have a “big impact”, that is, an impact on the national scale. The only LNGOs that have more than local capacities are most probably related either to religious or political entities. While one can understand that donors favour “big impact”, this policy results in the homogenisation of funding opportunities. This, in turn, impedes the expected “big impact”. Recently, the UN  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) decided to pilot a project with four LNGOs that were never able to get UN funding before. The OCHA team supported them to develop their appeal proposals. It also planned to provide coaching sessions in 2019. Although risky, this initiative should be regarded as a great accomplishment. The mere fact of listening to local voices and giving them an opportunity is a step forward. Although INGOs are trying to partner with LNGOs, it seems that the same LNGOs are constantly being prioritised. In other words, few INGOs tried to cooperate with small CBOs and LNGOs that work in small remote communities. In the same vein, INGOs still fail to target individuals who are not gathered in the tented settlements but remain deeply affected by the crisis. INGOs tend to focus on the largest concentrations of refugees, allowing their intervention to have a “big impact”. Surely, targeting groups of people in both tented settlements and other less visible locations requires more staff and is not always cost-efficient. When funding started to be reduced and allocated to areas outside Lebanon, such as Yemen and Syria, it created a competition between organisations and affected their missions. Competition between NGOs became the main concern, each one advocating for their own area of expertise, not considering the actual needs of the population. On the

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bright side, competition may result in innovative ideas, as each organisation wants to differentiate itself from the others to secure funding. In other words, NGOs do not want to be seen as mere substitutes for one another. Sometimes, NGOs feel that donors are inciting competition, as a means to create better outcomes. In such a situation, humanitarian actors have no choice but to play the game. The situation is worrying since it is not clear how this competition will impact the outcomes of the aid. The Syrian crisis has led to LNGOs’ overdependence on short-term project-based funding from international donors. This has posed major challenges since funding remains unpredictable, hard to secure and insufficient to enable LNGOs strengthening and developing their capacities.18 Furthermore, INGOs only offer partnership to LNGOs who can align to their funding needs, working conditions, and perceived priorities.19 This scenario has created a competitive environment for LNGOs and other stakeholders that compete for funds among other resources. Meanwhile, young NGOs still hope that they will eventually be able to receive funds from UN agencies, in spite of their relatively small size. So far, these NGOs are being hindered. A number of studies have shown that competition for funds can have a negative effect on NGOs’ activities; the “excessive fundraising problem”.20 In the quest to attract donations, NGOs may increase their resources, time, and effort in fundraising and pleasing the donor, as opposed to focusing on finding solutions and implementing projects to help the needy.21 Competition between non-governmental organisations, especially for funding among other resources is not a new phenomenon. This has been the case even for large and well-established INGOs that compete for donations through their fundraising activities. On the other hand, and as a result of this competition and the mushrooming of LNGOs, humanitarian aid has been able to access almost all parts of Lebanon, and aid has been generally provided to the vulnerable people whether refugees or Lebanese. As a result, several NGOs are not coordinating with each other, although the interagency is pushing all humanitarian actors to report on a regular basis. Nevertheless, many do not report on “activity info”, or share their planning for several reasons such as the lack of staff and the lack of knowledge on the importance of reporting and coordinating. Many do not see the added-value in cooperating. As a result, duplication of services keeps happening and harms affected communities. The LNGO forum has been active since 2014/2015  in Lebanon. However, it was always led by staff of NGOs who were already handling

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many tasks and, therefore, were unable to advocate properly. Only recently in late 2018, the  UNOCHA supported the forum to establish its own secretary similarly to the Lebanon Humanitarian INGOs Forum (LHIF). This is the main achievement and will allow LNGO to be more active. Recently, the LNGO forum members, along with the Working Group for Persons Affected by the Syrian Displacement Crisis (PASC), were actively involved in the preparation of the Brussels conference that took place in March 2019. Jointly with the LHIF, they were able to voice up and attend the conference with a large group of representations. This slow shift in the importance given to local actors of humanitarian response will hopefully allow the LNGOs and BCOs to be stronger, work independently, and advocate for the future of Lebanon and its most vulnerable populations.

Conclusion This chapter aimed to shed light on the impact that the enormous influx of refugees from Syria had and is still having on the NGOs and civil society in Lebanon. It also explained the role that the national and international responses have played in alleviating or exacerbating the crisis. NGOs and CBOs have been affected, as they shifted their policies from development to emergency response—and had to prioritise certain populations over others—therefore, creating tensions between Syrian refugees and the host community. This prioritisation over humanitarian assistance was a result of both funding needs and, later, fund cuts while needs were still high. Modifications should start to be implemented in order to reduce the negative impact of humanitarian policies. The main recommendations are relevant to all actors engaged in Lebanon (local, national, and international) and aim to ensure that adequate aid is directed to those people most in need, regardless of whether they are refugees or host communities. To answer efficiently to the crisis, it is important to invest in a combination of humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development interventions. Worldwide experiences on humanitarian assistance reveal that serious changes should be adopted in order to achieve effective and efficient outcomes. Those changes primarily need to be adopted by local humanitarian actors, who are the most affected by a crisis. The author recommends that a humanitarian network be built, in order to enhance and strengthen coordination and joint interventions, as well as fostering inclusion of all interested partners, especially the local ones. However, the author recognises that this objective of cooperation and inclusion is always more diffi-

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cult to achieve when financial means decrease, and cost-effectiveness is a driving goal of any humanitarian intervention. Additionally, and due to the protracted nature of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, the impact of the conflict will surely last for many years ahead—even when peace comes back. Consequently, any humanitarian involvement should be linked to a long-term development vision, instead of an emergency response one. Humanitarian assistance should be consistent with the sustainable development needs of the country and the host communities who are engaged in the response efforts. Commitment to long-term and sustainable funding should be part of the new humanitarian system with increased transparency, and where aid and development effectiveness principles are fully respected. Finally, the Lebanese case shows that localisation is becoming a core principle of humanitarian response since it enables the inclusive representation of the civil society’s components at large. It also involves complementarity between humanitarian partners, including international organisations. Finally, this principle ensures the sustainability of actions and highlights the local capacities of the host country. The importance of localisation does not undermine the essential support of international partners. Rather, it postulates that international actors should change the nature of their support to national networks. Localisation should be facilitated not because LNGOs are cheaper but because it is a means to protect LNGOs’ operational space. In Lebanon and elsewhere, local organisations are growing in strength and impact, becoming more organised, informed, and engaged. Hence, investment in the sustainability of local actors, outside the context of a humanitarian crisis, is critical.

Notes 1. The government of the Lebanese Republic and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination between the Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic, 1993, http://www.syrleb.org/SD08/msf/1507751474_.pdf. 2. Ola el-Hariri, “The Role of Institutions in Responding to the Syrian Refugees Crisis in Lebanon: The Humanitarian Aid Framework of Saida” (Master’s thesis, Columbia University, 2015), p. 26. 3. Abdel Samad and Bihter Moschini, “Humanitarian Assistance in Lebanon Overview, Challenges and Recommendations. Revisiting the Humanitarian System: The Call for Country Ownership in the Case of Lebanon,” Arab

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NGO Network for Development, Policy Paper, October 2016, https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resources/humanitarianassistancelebanon-overviewchallengesrecommendations-ls2016.pdf, p.  9; Peter Harling, Alex Simon and Rosalie Berthier, “The Syria aid regime that needed help. Touching the ground,” Synaps, January 2017, http://www. synaps.network/the-syria-aid-regime-that-needed-help. 4. Ibid., p. 10. 5. AUB4Refugees, Forum on Tackling Fatigue and Building Resilience for refugees and Hosting Communities, Beirut, 27–28 November 2016. 6. International Labour Organisation, Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and their Employment Profile, 2013, p. 35. 7. Ministry of Social Affairs and UNDP, Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon, 2008; World Bank and Government of Lebanon, Economic and Social Impact Assessment, 2013; Nupur Kukrety and Sarah al-­Jamal, “Poverty, Inequality and Social Protection in Lebanon,” Policy paper, AUB Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, 2016. 8. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Government of Lebanon, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015–2016, 2014, https:// reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-crisis-response-plan-2015-2016. 9. Dylan O’Driscoll, “Donor Response to Refugee Tensions in Lebanon,” K4D Helpdesk Report, 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ media/5ab0cbb0e5274a5e1d62d84d/Donor_response_to_refugee_tensions_in_Lebanon.pdf, p. 5. 10. Integrity Research and Consultancy, Research Summary Report: Local Truces in Syria, June 2014, https://www.integrityglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/Integrity-Research-Summary-Report-Localised-Trucesand-Ceasefires.pdf. 11. CARE International in Lebanon, Integrated Rapid Assessment Report, August 2013, https://www.care.org/sites/default/files/documents/ CARE_Rapid%20Integrated%20Assessment%20Mount%20Lebanon_ August2013_0.pdf. 12. UNICEF, Syria’s Children: A Lost Generation? Crisis Report March 2011– March 2013, 2013, https://www.unicef.org/files/Syria_2yr_Report.pdf. 13. FAO, The Impact of the Syria Crisis on Agriculture, Food Security and Livelihood on Lebanon. Secondary Data Review, November 2014, http:// www.fao.org/3/a-az722e.pdf. 14. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Government of Lebanon, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017–2020 (2018 update), 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/LCRP2018_ EN_Full_180122.pdf, p. 12.

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15. Kamel Mohanna, “National and international NGOs: equal partners?,” Amel Association International, 2017, https://amel.org/ national-and-international-ngos-equal-partners/. 16. Global Humanitarian Assistance, Report 2015, 2015, http://devinit.org/ wp-content/uploads/2015/10/GHA2015P_Friendly2.pdf, p. 5. 17. UNHCR, UNHCR 2018 Critical funding needs—Syrian refugees and IDPs, September 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/UNHCR%20Critical%20Funding%20Needs%20-%20Syria%20 situation%20-%20September%202018_0.pdf. 18. Catholic Agency or Overseas Development, Funding at the Sharp End: Investing in national NGOs response capacity, July 2013, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CAFOD%20national%20 ngo%20financing%20study%20July%202013%20%283%29.pdf. 19. Yuri Tsitrinbaum, “Humanitarian Partnership Under Fire: A Case Study of Somalia,” (Master’s dissertation, Université de Genève, 2012), p. 21. 20. Thierry Verdier and Gani Aldashev, “When NGOs Go Global; Competition on International Markets for Development Donations,” Journal of International Economics 79, no. 2 (2010): 198–210. 21. Peter Nunnenkamp and Hannes Öhler, “Funding Competition and the Efficiency of NGOs: An Empirical Analysis of Non-charitable Expenditure of US NGOs Engaged in Foreign Aid,” Kyklos International Review for Social Sciences 65, no. 1 (2012): 81–110.

CHAPTER 11

Conclusion Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed

Abstract  The Syrian conflict caused the worst refugee crisis since the horrors of World War II.  The influx of fleeing Syrians into Jordan and Lebanon affected the countries and their communities at all levels. This concluding chapter suggests some ways forward by outlining avenues for further reflection on the consequences, lessons learned, and future prospects of the Syrian refugee crisis. The latter has taken a political shape at both the regional and domestic levels, revealing a new emerging order in the Middle East. In the humanitarian field, it has also brought about the realisation that emergency and development approaches must cooperate to provide a comprehensive assistance that includes both refugees and host communities. Finally, this chapter raises a series of questions on the potential return of refugees to Syria and on their settlement in host countries should they not be allowed to return. Keywords  Middle East • Syrian refugees • Politics • Return

J. Beaujouan (*) The Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS), Durham University, Durham, UK The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 J. Beaujouan, A. Rasheed (eds.), Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees, Mobility & Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35016-1_11

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This volume intended to shed light on the humanitarian face of the conflict, giving a voice to the communities most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. To that end, it brought together local actors from different ­backgrounds to discuss the impact of the humanitarian situation on Jordan and Lebanon. Their contributions constitute an original and honest account of the daily experience of what they depict as a Jordanian and a Lebanese crisis. In just a few months, the Syrian crisis became a Jordanian and a Lebanese crisis. For indeed, the Syrian conflict spread like wildfire across the whole region, especially in its immediate neighbours. The influx of fleeing Syrians into Jordan and Lebanon affected the countries and their communities at all levels. Both countries welcomed more than one million registered and non-registered Syrian refugees over less than five years. The demographic pressure inevitably led to growing tensions between the refugees and the host communities in both contexts. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the Jordanian and Lebanese governments exhibited similar policy shift towards Syrian refugees—from open-door policy to increased securitisation and, eventually, cooperation with the international community and European countries. Yet, the similarities probably stop here. Certainly, Jordan and Lebanon turned to different strategies to attract international attention to the humanitarian burden they carried. Domestic specificities effectively matter. First, Jordan chose to encamp Syrian refugees to raise international awareness. Reversely, Lebanon stuck to its long-­ lasting refusal to consider itself as a country of refuge and, thus, to open refugee camps. This choice aggravated consequences of the government’s inaction and pressed the Lebanese civil sector and other humanitarian actors to take action. Second, the level of decentralisation of the Lebanese government gave a bigger role to the municipalities and encouraged a localised response to the Syrian refugee crisis and, thereby, a case-by-case treatment. In contrast, the centralised nature of the Jordanian government allowed for a more cohesive and coherent national response to the humanitarian crisis across the country. It is evident that the central role assumed by the Jordanian government in the mitigation of the crisis proved more fruitful than in Lebanon. Third, the demographic features of the Hashemite Kingdom—composed by 95% of Sunni—were arguably a A. Rasheed School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, Durham, UK e-mail: [email protected]

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factor of cohesion that helped the country to remain relatively united over the welcoming of more than one million of mostly Sunni Syrian refugees. This situation strongly contrasted with the institutionalised sectarianism and religious diversity of Lebanon, which had a profound impact on the differentiated political response to the refugee crisis. Rather than summarising the contributions from previous chapters, this conclusion shall suggest some ways forward by outlining avenues for ­further reflection on the consequences, lessons learned, and future prospects of the Syrian refugee crisis. First and foremost, the Syrian refugee crisis is intrinsically political. Although it took roots in the Syrian domestic politics, the conflict will only be settled with the involvement of all actors it affected, including the Middle Eastern countries that hosted thousands of Syrian refugees. Reversely, the refugee situation is conditional upon the resolution of the Syrian crisis. It seems that the case of the refugees will remain at the cornerstone of future negotiations for post-conflict Syria. These negotiations necessarily involve the political and humanitarian cooperation between Syria and host countries. Yet, the process of return might be hampered by existing tensed diplomatic relationships between Syria and its neighbours, especially Lebanon. Finally, several questions remain to be answered regarding the future of Syrian refugees: • What are the prospects of return for the Syrian refugees? • Who will be allowed to return to Syria, and how will this impact the demography of the country? The Syrian refugee crisis also took a political shape at the domestic level in host countries. This is especially true in Lebanon, where the political answer to the crisis is constrained by divisions over the Syrian conflict. Moreover, in Jordan and Lebanon, the influx of Syrians has been portrayed as a security threat by the ruling power, as a means to reinforce their grip on the states’ affairs and general policy. Besides, as the following months portend a progressive resolution of the Syrian conflict, the refugee situation in Lebanon and Jordan is likely to last for years to come. Hence, one might wonder: • What are the prospects for the Syrian refugees who will stay in Jordan and Lebanon? • How longer will Jordan and Lebanon be resilient in front of the crisis and its multilevel consequences?

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• How will Jordan and Lebanon adapt their politics and policies to the potential stay of thousands of Syrian refugees? This last question is all the more crucial for Lebanon, which state system is based on a sectarian balance that mirrors its population. Second, although the Syrian refugee crisis was an undeniable strain on the politics, structures, and populations of host countries, it also  had ­salutary developments. While Arab countries are often portrayed are weak and unstable, one must recognise that Jordan and Lebanon have proven incredibly resilient in the face of the influx of Syrian refugees. This resilience goes for political systems, infrastructures, and local communities. Equally so, ruling elites and corruption—especially in the case of Lebanon—have barely been affected by the humanitarian situation. In the humanitarian field, the Syrian refugee crisis has brought an unprecedented shift in the way the international community approaches conflicts. Namely, the emergency response—under the leadership of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR)—and the development approach—guided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)—have cooperated and joined hands to provide a comprehensive and efficient response to the Syrian refugee crisis in the Middle East. In other words, emergency and development are two faces of the same coin when it comes to alleviating the human suffering inherent to conflicts. In the same vein, the refugee situation brought about the realisation that the refugees themselves are not the only victims of conflicts. Hence, the humanitarian response must include both refugee and host populations to prevent the risk of social tensions and the spillover effect of conflict in hosting countries. In spite of those steps forwards, the international community will need to keep adapting its mission to local specificities and to assist the host governments in mitigating the potential stay of thousands of refugees. The main point of contention might be: • How to foster the integration of Syrian refugees, without dismissing the rights of local communities? Third, the Syrian refugee crisis revealed important dynamics, both at the regional and at the domestic level. The general silence of Middle Eastern countries on the Syrian refugee case is symptomatic of a lack of regional leadership and regional cooperation. While Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq welcomed the bulk of Syrian refugees, the Gulf countries remained conspicuously deaf to their neighbours’ call to share the human-

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itarian burden of the crisis. This is in spite of their infamous financial involvement in the Syrian conflict. On the other hand, Russia—which deserted the Middle Eastern stage for two decades—used the Syrian conflict to impose itself as a central actor of regional politics. The Syrian refugee case was no exception, as the Russian government offered to facilitate negotiations between host countries—mainly Lebanon—and Assad regarding the return of Syrian refugee populations. As such, the Syrian conflict—and the Syrian refugee crisis to a lesser extent—characterised a period of transition in the Middle Eastern order. At the domestic level, the Syrian refugee crisis poses a challenge to the Lebanese society. On the one hand, it served as a reminder that Lebanon remains fragmented along confessional lines. In fact, it appears that the country never recovered from the civil war (1975–1990) and failed to implement national reconciliation. On the other hand, Lebanon remains deeply traumatised by the influx of Palestinian refugees after the 1948 and 1967 wars. For the Lebanese, the Syrian case  is reminiscent of demographic change and instability—and brought fear that Syrian refugees might settle in the country. The same is true in Jordan, where the population is believed to be almost equally divided between Jordanian and Palestinian refugees who were given the Jordanian citizenship.1 The sensitivity of the refugee issue in Jordan and Lebanon—which both have a long history of welcoming refugees—might explain the lack of a domestic legal framework to deal with refugee populations in both the host countries. Moreover, it shows that the question of identity in the Middle East remains at the centre of street and state politics. One could have expected that Syrians and host communities would be united by their “Arabness” or by their common Arab and Islamic identity. Yet, it seems that Lebanese and Jordanians were quick at distancing themselves from their fellows. While modern borders in the Middle East are often contested and several non-state actors call for the establishment of a transborder Islamic state, the Syrian refugee crisis proved that territorial nationalism and citizenship are powerful drivers of everyday politics. This realisation also enshrines—yet another time—the decay of transborder ideologies such as pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. In light of this, several questions arise regarding the Syrian refugee situation in Jordan and Lebanon: • What will be the status of Syrian refugees if they stay in Jordan and Lebanon? • Shall the governments adapt their policies to the presence of Syrian refugees, will they take the opportunity to reconsider the status of

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other refugee populations (mainly Palestinian in Lebanon, and Iraqi and Jordan and Lebanon). • What is the role of the media in the integration/exclusion of Syrian refugees in the host society? Finally, the study of the Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on Jordan and Lebanon shed light on the importance to adopt a multidisciplinary approach to the analysis of complex phenomena in a complex region. Moreover, the Syrian refugee crisis encapsulates a series of themes that remain understudied in the context of conflict, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. Some of those topics include but are not limited to: displacement and identity, education at time of conflict, human dignity for displaced people, gender-based violence, child labour, humanitarian and human rights law for refugees, the anthropology of post-­conflict societies, socio-economic integration of refugees in host countries, the impact of refugee influx on the “marriage market”, and so on. The contributors hope that this volume will pave the way to multidisciplinary and original studies on the impact and consequences of hosting refugee populations in a context of regional disorder. Beyond the Syrian crisis and the Middle Eastern region, this volume intended to shed light on the reality and consequences of humanitarian crisis on developing countries. As highlighted by the cases of Jordan and Lebanon, the influx of refugees strongly halted the development process and shook the relative stability of fragile economic and socio-political structures. Several lessons learned in the case of Jordan and Lebanon are applicable to different countries or regions confronted with similar human exodus. First, there is a pressing need to unite the skills and efforts of the international, national, and sub-national humanitarian actors. The intervention of the international community should not be detrimental to the high potential of local actors in terms of access, skills, and knowledge. To say it differently, humanitarian intervention has to go beyond the politics of the UN and INGOs that are often cooked in New York. Second, it is crucial that the much-needed humanitarian response to a refugee crisis does not adversely affect the development measures already in place in developing countries. Observers and practitioners must realise that humanitarian short-term interventions and developing long-term policies have a mutually complementary nature. In other words, emergency and resilient policies must go together.

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Third, corruption increases rapidly during emergencies, both at the international and the national level. This study shows the need for the reinforcement of existing external and domestic monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to tackle corruption. The flow of money typically channelled via international organisations to mitigate the effects of a humanitarian crisis tends to reinforce the bribery that often undermines developing countries. Finally, host communities tend to rely on the international communities and developed countries instead of their own government to mitigate a humanitarian crisis. This can be explained by the fact that governments confronted to a crisis often coin a double discourse; one discourse that is directed to the host communities and that fosters a sense of normalcy and patience, another discourse directed to an international audience that stresses the urgency of the situation and calls for immediate action. Ironically, the latter discourse is often heard by the locals—partially because the psychology of fear always prevails—causing public discontent. Hence, it is crucial that governments coin one common message to all audiences—domestic and international—to avoid further divisions in a tense context such as that created by the massive influx of refugees. While a humanitarian crisis challenges a country at all levels, it can also be seen as an opportunity for a government to bring its population together, without infringing the rights and interests of the refugees themselves.

Note 1. U.S.  Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, Jordan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2001; Sawsan Ramahi, “Palestinian and Jordanian citizenship,” Middle East Monitor Special Report, December 2015, p. 9.