Syria Divided: Patterns of Violence in a Complex Civil War 9780231555982

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SYRIA DIVIDED

COLUMBIA STUDIES IN MIDDLE EAST POLITICS

COLUMBIA STUDIES IN MIDDLE EAST POLITICS

Marc Lynch, Series Editor Columbia Studies in Middle East Politics presents academically rigorous, wellwritten, relevant, and accessible books on the rapidly transforming politics of the Middle East for an interested academic and policy audience.

Shouting in a Cage: Political Life After Authoritarian Cooptation in North Africa, Sofia Fenner Classless Politics: Islamist Movements, the Left, and Authoritarian Legacies in Egypt, Hesham Sallam Lumbering State, Restless Society: Egypt in the Modern Era, Nathan J. Brown, Shimaa Hatab, and Amr Adly Friend or Foe: Militia Intelligence and Ethnic Violence in the Lebanese Civil War, Nils Hägerdal Jordan and the Arab Uprisings: Regime Survival and Politics Beyond the State, Curtis Ryan Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco: Strategies of Centralization and Decentralization, Janine A. Clark Religious Statecraft: The Politics of Islam in Iran, Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar Protection Amid Chaos: The Creation of Property Rights in Palestinian Refugee Camps, Nadya Hajj From Resilience to Revolution: How Foreign Interventions Destabilize the Middle East, Sean L. Yom Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings, Frederic M. Wehrey The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, edited by Marc Lynch

SYRIA DIVIDED

PAT T E R N S O F V I O L E N C E in a C O M P L E X C I V I L WA R

O R A S Z E K E LY

Columbia University Press New York

Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex cup.columbia.edu Copyright © 2023 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Szekely, Ora, author. Title: Syria divided : patterns of violence in a complex civil war / Ora Szekely. Description: New York : Columbia University Press, [2023] | Series: Columbia studies in Middle East politics | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022059792 (print) | LCCN 2022059793 (ebook) | ISBN 9780231205382 (hardback) | ISBN 9780231205399 (trade paperback) | ISBN 9780231555982 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Violence—Syria—History—21st century. | Syria—History— Civil War, 2011– | Syria—History—Civil War, 2011—Public opinion. Classification: LCC DS98.6 .S99 2023 (print) | LCC DS98.6 (ebook) | DDC 956.9104/23—dc23/eng/20230110 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022059792 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022059793

Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. Printed in the United States of America Cover design: Elliott S. Cairns

TO ALL OF THOSE WHO SHARED THEIR STORIES, WITH HOPES FOR A BETTER FUTURE

•

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ix Acronyms and Abbreviations

xiii

INTRODUCTION1 1 THE SYRIAN TRAGEDY27 2 WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?72 3 PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE113 4 THE YOUTUBE WAR153 CONCLUSION193

Appendix: Methods 207 Notes

217

Index 271

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

M

y last trip to Syria was in 2009. I was finishing my dissertation research at the time and spent most of my time there chasing down interviews in Damascus, assuming that I would be able to return to see the ruins at Palmyra and other tourist sites on my next trip. Today, Palmyra, like Aleppo’s old city and so much of Syria’s architectural heritage, has now been irreparably damaged by the war. Even more tragic has been the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and the displacement of more than half of Syria’s prewar population, either inside or outside the country. For many of those who were forced to flee their country, the Syria they left may no longer exist. And yet, despite what they had endured, Syrians in Amman, Zarqa, Beirut, Berlin, and elsewhere who had lost everything welcomed me into their homes, offices, and communities, offered tea and Syrian treats, and shared their stories. I heard from staunch supporters of the opposition, from those who thought the Syrian state was the best hope for stability and a bulwark against Islamist violence, and from those who condemned everyone holding a gun in equal measure. This book is an attempt to faithfully represent the perspectives on their country’s tragedy offered by the Syrians who so generously shared their experiences, and to try to understand the particular shape of the violent catastrophe that has engulfed Syria over the past decade.

xAC K NOW LE D GM E N TS

While writing this book, I leaned on the assistance of many talented and dedicated people. I am deeply grateful to all of those who offered valuable advice, suggestions, and in some cases moral support during my field research, among them Marwa A., Raed al Omari, Rand Aljammal, Jon Brown, Tanya Habjouqa, Faten Jebai, Nasser, Wendy Pearlman, Saleh, Sally Shalabi, Kate Washington, and especially Houssam al Deen. I am also grateful to the many friends in Amman, Berlin, Beirut, London, Providence and elsewhere who offered support and good humor during my field research. To those I cannot name here, because to do so would compromise your or someone else’s anonymity, please know that you have my gratitude as well. At Clark University, my research assistants Hasnaa Mokhtar, Salma Shawa, Noor Almaslamani, and Sherry Assi did excellent work in translating and transcribing interviews, running down documents, and in Sherry’s case, collecting and categorizing propaganda videos. Marc Healy did fantastic work in drafting the maps included throughout the book. Khatchig Mouradian—not actually a research assistant, just a good Samaritan—proofread my Arabic consent form. Without their contributions, this book would be far poorer and would have taken much longer to write, although any mistakes are entirely my doing. At Columbia University Press, Caelyn Cobb offered invaluable advice at the project’s earliest stages, helping me think through the structure of the book before I had even finished the proposal. She has continued to offer excellent feedback and support throughout. Working with her has been a genuine pleasure. I am also grateful for the logistical support provided by Monique Laban and for the excellent editing provided by Helen Glenn Court. I am also, as always, indebted to the friends and colleagues who read drafts of this book, offered comments, and helped me understand the story I was trying to tell, especially Meghan Kallman, Theo McLaughlin, and Nick Seeley for reading various chapters, and to Nadya Hajj for her comments on the methods appendix. I also thank two anonymous reviewers, as well as those who offered feedback on the book proposal

ACK NOW LE D GM E NTS x i

at the Northeast Middle East Politics Working Group annual meeting in 2018, on various chapters at the International Studies Association annual meetings in 2019 and 2022, and at the Université de Montréal CEPSI speaker series in March 2019. One of the things I have missed during the pandemic—especially while working on a book—is the camaraderie of writing with a friend in a coffee shop on a Sunday afternoon, especially because the coffee shop down the block from me in Providence has Arabic-speaking staff who have, on occasion, been able to clarify the odd bit of Arabic slang for me. I am grateful for the wider academic community who have helped to maintain that sense of camaraderie even at a distance over the past three years. In particular, my colleagues at Clark—both in political science and in other departments—have been, as always, a source of friendly support and a sympathetic ear (as well as the occasional useful book) during what has been a difficult couple of years for all of us, as have my friends here in Providence and elsewhere. My students have likewise offered impromptu comments and feedback in class discussions and in office hours that—whether they know it or not—have shaped my thinking on this book and on many other projects. I am also grateful to my coauthors on those other projects, who have been very patient as this book has distracted me from our shared research. I am also, of course, grateful to my family who have offered constant support throughout this project as they have over many others. My brother Ben’s explanation of how GoPro cameras work was especially helpful, as were my parents’ always insightful questions about the project. I also found myself remembering my grandmother many times while working on this book, partly because it is thanks to her that I can speak any German at all, and partly because I heard echoes of her experiences in the stories shared with me by some of those I interviewed. And of course, I thank my wonderful spouse, Joe, who came along with me for six months of fieldwork, read chapter drafts, made me coffee, and (along with our dog Eddie) made me take breaks from writing to go for a walk now and then.

xiiACK NOW LE D GM E N TS

The most important thanks, though, go to those who agreed to participate in the research for this book and who shared their own stories and their perspectives on Syria’s story with me. It is to you and your families that this book is dedicated, with hope for a better future. Thank you.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AQI FSA HTS ISIS LCCs NDF PKK PLO PYD SAA SANA SDF SNA SNC SNHR SOHR

al-Qaeda in Iraq Free Syrian Army Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (also referred to as Daesh) Local Coordination Committees, or tansiqiyat. National Defense Forces Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Workers Party Palestine Liberation Organization Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, or Democratic Union Party Syrian Arab Army Syrian Arab News Agency Syrian Democratic Forces Syrian National Army Syrian National Council, later Syrian National Coalition (also referred to as the Etilaf) Syrian Network for Human Rights Syrian Observatory for Human Rights

xivAC RO NYM S AND ABBREVI ATI ON S

YPG YPJ

Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, or People’s Protection Units Yekîneyên Parastina Jin, or Women’s Protection Units

SYRIA DIVIDED

±

TURKEY

Qamishli

Kobane

!i

!i

Hasakah Governorate

an ne ra er dit Sea e M

Hasakah

Raqqa Governorate

Aleppo Idlib

Latakia Governorate

Aleppo Governorate

, %

Tabqa Dam

Idlib Governorate

Latakia

!i

Raqqa Euphr ates R iver

!i

!i Hama

Tartus Governorate

!i Deir Ezzor !i

Hama Governorate

!i

SYRIA

Tartus Homs

Deir Ezzor Governorate

!i !i

!i Homs Governorate

LEBANON DAMASCUS ^

IRAQ

Rif Dimashq Governorate

Quneitra

Deraa Quneitra Governorate Governorate Suwayda Deraa Suwayda Governorate

Cities Governorate boundaries

!i

JORDAN 0

FIGURE 0.1

Syria.

50

Major gas and oil fields 100

200 kilometers

INTRODUCTION

C

ivil wars are rarely “about” just one thing. Most involve a range of ideological divisions, ethno-communal antagonisms, and even regional and global rivalries, each with their own champions among the participants. This is certainly true of the war in Syria. From the Asad regime to the many secular and fundamentalist opposition factions, from the Kurdish forces in the country’s north to the Islamic State, each of the participants in the Syrian conflict has their own account of what the war is “really” about. This book therefore seeks to address two questions: How do Syrians—civilians and combatants— understand and explain the conflict that has engulfed their country? And how do these competing narratives, and the conflict between them, shape the conduct of the war? To answer these questions, the book makes the following argument. First, the multiple state and nonstate participants involved in any civil war, including Syria’s, understand the war they are fighting in very different ways. Such wars often feature multiple and competing divisions, which can be ideological, communal, geographic, or otherwise oriented. Every party to a given conflict sees the war in terms of at least one of these divisions, but not all of those fighting will necessarily agree as to which of them the war is really about. Second, everyone involved in fighting a civil war has key audiences, both at home and abroad, whom they

2INTRO D U C TIO N

seek to convince that their preferred narrative of the war is correct. Third, and perhaps most important, the drive to communicate a specific, preferred narrative of the war to those audiences, and to convince them it is the correct one, affects the behavior of those fighting. In so doing, it influences the larger patterns of violence in the war, in that the combatants sometimes perceive those who offer a rival narrative of the war as especially threatening to their interests and fight them with particular intensity. Moreover, it also creates incentives for a particularly performative kind of violence. Civilians are targeted in ways that function as messaging, and military action becomes the basis for the creation of propaganda. Access to social media has amplified both of these dynamics and blurred the boundary between military utility and political messaging. In sum, this book argues—based on accounts from Syrians from a range of political, religious, ethnic, and geographic backgrounds— that both the overall patterns of violence in the Syrian war and the use of performative violence in particular have been shaped in part by a conflict over what the war is truly about. Put differently, the conduct of the war in Syria is shaped at least in part by the debate over its causes.

THE CAUSES AND CONDUCT OF CIVIL WAR

A great deal of excellent scholarship is devoted to the question of why civil wars start and to the related but separate question of how they are conducted once they have begun. This includes, of course, the war in Syria. I begin with the most common explanations the academic literature offers on the causes of war, at least some of which map onto those the combatants themselves embrace. Scholarship on interstate war tends to focus on a combination of material factors such as territorial claims1 or competition over resources,2 and less tangible causes, such as misperception of the adversary’s intentions,3 fears regarding security,4 and changes in the nature of the international system.5 Explanations for the causes of civil war are equally diverse. They can be broadly grouped into four categories: the ideological, the communal, the material, and

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the structural. Ideological explanations focus on the actual political objectives of the warring parties,6 such as economic equality, democratization, or other broad principles. Other scholarship focuses on motivations rooted in communal animus,7 such as interethnic hostility,8 secessionism,9 or (especially in the Middle East) sectarianism.10 A third set of explanations focuses not on ideological or communal grievance but rather on material incentives, including both “top down” mechanisms (like warlordism or the desire to control and extract natural resources), and “bottom up” mechanisms (like individual fighters’ need to feed their families).11 At their extreme, economic theories of war suggest rather pessimistically that the difference between the absence and presence of war is only a matter of whether sufficient funding is available to get the fighting started.12 Finally, still other explanations focus on structural factors related to the relative positions of the parties involved and the attendant problems of history and misperception, suggesting that these can generate a conflict that no one actually wants. Distrust, mutual fear, and the failure of communication—that is, a security dilemma—lead to mutual arming, a confirmation of each side’s darkest fears about the other’s intentions, and the eventual onset of a conflict driven more than anything by a misplaced desire for self-preservation.13 Of course, even if these macro-level explanations are important to political elites and military commanders, they may not be of the utmost importance to the people doing the actual fighting. Stathis Kalyvas argues that the larger narratives of war articulated by elites— whether focused on ideology, ethnonationalist objectives, or economic grievance—often obscure the fact that motivations for many people involved in civil wars are distinctly local or even personal, such as the chance for revenge against a long-standing rival.14 Compelling research supports each of these explanations in at least some contexts, and of course, many are articulated by combatants themselves. Indeed, in any given conflict, those fighting may point to some or all of these explanations—and their variants—as causes of the war. In Syria, the war is variously explained as a fight for dignity, democracy, and human rights; a sectarian conflict between different communities; a counterterrorist campaign rooted in national security; an ethnonational

4INTRO D U C TIO N

struggle; or a proxy war between regional and global powers. For those involved in the war, these explanations are more than just causal stories: they are larger narratives that give meaning and purpose to the conflict. Nevertheless, explaining the cause of a civil war is not necessarily the same as explaining its conduct, i.e., why participants choose to direct violence in one direction rather than another.15 If a conflict has only two parties—A and B—then the question “what is the cause of this war” is the same as “why are A and B fighting?” But if multiple parties are involved (as is common in civil wars in general and in Syria in particular), the two questions are logically distinct. We must therefore also ask, “why are A and B fighting, but not B and C?” and, perhaps, “why are A and B fighting this year, when they were allies last year?” or “Why is A targeting B’s civilian supporters, but not B itself?” Answering these questions therefore requires treating the factors shaping the conduct of a war as distinct from larger narratives about the war’s causes, though a great deal of overlap between them clearly exists. Common explanations for the conduct of war—that is, the behavior of those fighting—include the pursuit of territory, communal antipathy, and economic or material motivations. The first of these, the need to control certain pieces of territory, is perhaps the most common, or at least the most obvious.16 After all, territorial control—of the country as a whole and the capital in particular—is often the key to being recognized as a legitimate government, or even just as de facto rulers with whom others must negotiate.17 A specific piece of territory may also be considered important for ideological, religious, or historical reasons regardless of its strategic or material value,18 or because it happens to have oil, an airport, or sympathetic civilians in it.19 A second set of explanations focuses on ethnic animus, and its role in motivating atrocities such as genocide, ethnic cleaning, and even wartime sexual violence. As with work that links interethnic relations to the onset of war in the first place, work on the impact of ethnic fear and hatred on the conduct of war sometimes interprets such atrocities as the inevitable outcome of narratives of ethnic supremacy or fearmongering by in-group elites.20 Still other explanations for the decisions made by

INTRO D U CTIO N5

those fighting in civil wars focus on structural or economic factors. Such arguments contend that, at a micro level, predatory violence against civilians is driven by a desire for loot on the part of fighters who have joined for mercenary, rather than ideological reasons and at a macro level, military priorities are driven by a desire to control ports and natural resources.21 Obviously, there is overlap between these explanations. For instance, members of the “wrong” ethnic group may be special targets of economic predation, or ethnic cleansing may be used to gain access to territory containing economically useful resources. Nationalist or sectarian armed groups may focus on seizing (or retaining) particular pieces of territory for historic or symbolic reasons.22 In its most extreme form, this can lead to a secessionist conflict,23 blurring not only the boundary between the motives for certain kinds of conduct of civil war, but also the distinction between conduct and cause. Indeed, part of the argument of this book is that conflicting understandings of the causes of a given civil war—including the war in Syria—can, in and of themselves, shape its conduct. Scholarship on the causes and conduct of the war in Syria echoes some of the work on civil war in general, though it also has its particular areas of focus. One focus of much of the work on Syria prior to 2011 was authoritarian persistence (a common theme in scholarship on the Middle East more broadly).24 Steven Heydemann, Lisa Wedeen, and others examine the strategies mobilized by the regime to retain power, and the relationship this created between the state and the Syrian population.25 Some of the research focused on the causes of the civil war can in some ways be seen as a continuation of this question, this time framed as “how did strategies of authoritarian persistence in Syria fail?” This is especially true of the work published earlier in the war—notably by Fouad Ajami, David Lesch, Carsted Wieland, Yassin al-Haj Saleh, and Emile Hokayem—which examines both the grievances that mobilized the 2011 protests, including state repression and corruption, and how the uprising actually began.26 Billie Jeanne Brownlee specifically explores how social media shaped the opportunity structures for mobilization in the years leading up to the war.27

6 INTRO D U CTIO N

Other work on the causes of the war tends to focus more on the combination of ideological and communal narratives embraced by those fighting in Syria. This is especially true of scholarship focused on specific actors. Work on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by Will McCants, Joby Warrick, and Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger,28 as well as the extremely useful ISIS Reader, provide a thorough examination of that group’s evolution, worldview, and motivation, as articulated by its leaders and propagandists.29 Charles Lister’s The Syrian Jihad similarly addresses the emergence, evolution, and perspectives of a range of Islamist and jihadist factions as well as the relations among them.30 There is likewise a growing body of work on the Kurdish forces, some of which presents their overall political project in great depth.31 Sam Dagher’s Assad or We Burn the Country examines the regime’s internal dynamics and priorities, though it focuses less on the regime’s grievances than its inner workings.32 Overall, however, much of the scholarship on the Syrian war has tended to examine its conduct rather than its causes. This is true of some of the aforementioned work on individual actors as well as scholarship on the war in general. Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro, and Arthur Quesnay as well as David Sorenson examine the establishment of competing social and economic orders over the course of the war; Samer Abboud, Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila al-Shami as well as Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi examine the evolution of the war over time, including the way the various actors have evolved and fragmented.33 Kevin Mazur focuses on the transformation of Syria’s popular uprising into, as he frames it, an ethnic civil war.34 Leïla Vignal examines from a geographer’s perspective how the war has remade Syria spatially, economically, and demographically.35 Other research focuses on specific aspects of the war, including analyses of sectarian violence,36 the specifically gendered aspects of the war,37 defections from the Syrian military,38 or the massive displacement of the Syrian population caused by the war.39 Still other work—notably that of Christopher Phillips—examines the war as a proxy conflict.40 Accounts focused on the experiences of ordinary Syrians—Rania Abouzeid’s No Turning Back, Alia Malek’s The Home That Was Our

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Country, and Wendy Pearlman’s We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled— powerfully illustrate the human consequences of the war.41 Nevertheless, despite the wealth of scholarship on civil war in general and Syria’s conflict in particular, aspects of the war remain puzzling. This book focuses on two of them. First, the broader patterns of violence in the war reflect an apparent disjuncture between why the various combatants in Syria say they are fighting and what they are actually doing— that is, a gap between cause and conduct. Second, the war has involved a high degree of public and performative violence, both among combatants and against civilians. The commission of public atrocities, the sharing of videos of military operations online, and the apparent performance of acts of violence for the explicit purpose of recording them, are all striking features of the war. I argue here that both of these features of the Syrian conflict are driven by the warring parties’ need to establish their particular narrative of the war as dominant in the eyes of their most important audiences at home and abroad. Although this is far from the only motivation for those fighting in Syria, understanding violence as, among other things, a form of communication can help explain some of the choices the war’s participants have made.

FIGHTING TO CONTROL TH E NARRATIVE

To summarize the argument thus far, civil wars rarely take the form of a simple two-sided fight between “the government” and “the rebels” over a clearly articulated and agreed upon point of contention. Instead, they often involve a wide range of both state and nonstate actors, both domestic and international, who may offer very different explanations for what the war is about. For some, the major division may be over the role of religion in society, pitting secularists against fundamentalists within the same community. For others, the major issue is which religious community should control the government, as in communal conflicts between Protestants and Catholics. For still others, the conflict may be less about competition between religious sects than between

8 INTRO D U CTIO N

ethnolinguistic groups, such as English-speakers versus French-speakers. For still others, the conflict may be less about communal competition than about a larger ideological dispute over economic systems (communism versus capitalism), material inequality (an impoverished public versus corrupt elites), or regime type (monarchy versus democracy). All these disputes may be present in the same conflict, but they are not equally important to all combatants, nor will they all be equally motivating to the various civilian audiences, potential recruits, and outside observers whose perception of the conflict a given faction wishes to align with its own. Individual factions therefore have an incentive to try and convince those whose opinions matter to them that their narrative of the war is the right one, which can put them in direct competition with others seeking to do the same thing. That competition has important consequences for the conduct of the war. In what follows, I define three key components of my argument: the nature of the participants in civil wars in general and in Syria’s in particular, the nature and importance of the audiences for those participants, and the narratives the participants champion.

PA RT I C I PANTS

Because most civil wars are large, messy, and complex, involving a multitude of state and nonstate actors, it is less useful to think of them as having sides than as having participants, each with a set of preferences and objectives that may at different times lead them into alliances or adversarial relationships with others. Moreover, none of these actors are necessarily unitary. Regimes under pressure sometimes schism, creating rival centers of power, or at least internal rivalries. Defections from state militaries and competing claims to represent the “legitimate” government are common. Rebel forces, too, can include many factions with their own sometimes contradictory ideologies and objectives. Previously cohesive organizations splinter, even as separate groups unite under a single umbrella. Individual organizations’ objectives may evolve over time, and the antagonisms among antigovernment forces can become as significant as their opposition to the regime itself.

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All these dynamics are present in Syria. The Syrian war includes, at a minimum, four major sets of actors: the Asad regime, the Kurdish forces, ISIS, and the disparate assortment of rebels loosely grouped together as the armed opposition. Several of the opposition factions, especially fundamentalist Islamist militias such as Jabhat al-Nusra (which eventually rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and then as the umbrella group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) are sufficiently separate from the rest of the rebels that they could perhaps be considered a separate category as well. Moreover, not all parties to a given civil war are necessarily locals. Such conflicts often involve a wide range of outside parties, including both neighboring states and international actors. In fact, many of the Syrians interviewed for this book expressed vehement disagreement with the label civil war arguing that it was as much a war between outside parties on Syrian soil as an internal conflict. One interviewee described it as “a world war, but in just one country.” 42 The involvement of outside parties in an ostensibly domestic armed conflict can take many forms. One is a proxy war, in which sponsor states provide material support to various participants in the war without becoming directly involved themselves, as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have done in Syria. In other cases, it can mean entangling the state’s forces directly in the conflict through air strikes, the deployment of ground troops, or other means, as the United States, Iran, Russia, and Turkey have all done to varying degrees. Overall, civil wars—including the war in Syria—often involve a complicated constellation of participants, both internal and external, not all of whom necessarily agree on what, exactly, the war is about. All, however, have an incentive to promote their particular narrative to those whose opinions are important to them.

AU DI E NC E S

The warring parties are not the only ones whose understandings of a conflict matter. Each has audiences at home and abroad—from local communities to potential sponsor states—whose support, or at least sympathy, they need to be successful. Moreover, in addition to those they

10 INTRO D U C TIO N

seek to actively win over to their cause, some conflict participants may find it useful to convince neutral parties, or even those antagonistic to them, that their understanding of the conflict is the correct one. The support of domestic civilian publics, at both the local and national level, can be crucial to winning a war. Although civilians rarely have the resources to provide weapons or serious financial assistance, they are an important source of nonmaterial assets, such as political support and local intelligence, and of course recruits. Yet even though local civilian support may not be enough on its own for an armed group to achieve its goals, it is rare that an armed group can achieve its objectives without it. The classic theorists of guerrilla warfare, such as Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, devote a great deal of ink to the importance of convincing locals to support the movement,43 as does the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.44 Even rank and file members of armed groups are often aware of the importance of “winning hearts and minds.” 45 International audiences matter as well, of course: foreign sponsorship can be a key source of financial support, weapons, and even direct military assistance.46 For rebel groups without access to natural resources or the backing of a wealthy local population (in other words, most such organizations), foreign sponsorship may be their only way to obtain advanced weapons, or any weapons at all. Access to a military base on foreign soil or office space and safe harbor for a government in exile can mean the difference between survival and defeat. For less wealthy states facing a spiraling insurgency, having foreign allies willing to provide arms, extend a line of credit, or offer direct financial aid can be a crucial lifeline. For both state and nonstate actors, advocacy on their behalf by an allied government can add an aura of legitimacy, or at least respectability, though this of course depends on the reputation of the ally in question. Support from Germany or China is likely more useful in this sense than support from Eritrea or Andorra, for example. In other words, both state and nonstate participants in civil wars have good reason to seek the support of external parties.47 That said, not everyone involved in the same civil war is necessarily interested in winning over the same audiences. Domestically, there can

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be a great deal of variation in terms of which civilians each party to the conflict sees as its constituents. For some, this is the entire civilian population, whereas others see only a subset of the population as defined by ethnicity, geography, class, gender, or political affiliation as their constituents. The same is true of foreign relations; conflict participants view some states as more realistic potential sponsors than others, although such relationships can sometimes develop between states and armed groups who, on the surface, appear to have little in common. Even when civil war participants do not seek—or cannot hope to receive—direct support from certain domestic or external audiences, though, they may still try to convince them that their narrative of the war is the correct one for other reasons: they may hope to prevent a powerful neighboring state from intervening in the war, supporting their opponents, or issuing statements condemning them in regional or international bodies such as the Arab League or the United Nations. Likewise, they may seek to convince local civilians that even if they dislike or distrust the actor in question, that actor’s diagnosis of the nature of the conflict is still correct. In this sense, winning over an audience is not always about direct support. It can be simply a matter of convincing that party to remain neutral. Not all participants in a given conflict have the same audiences; not all need the same support from the same constituencies. But all of them have at least one, and some overlap is likely among the parties and communities that each is trying to win to their cause. Conflict participants who are seeking to win over the same audience—even if they want different things from them—may therefore find themselves competing with one another to control the narrative of the war.

N A R R AT I V E S

The idea that winning over an audience to your way of viewing the world matters in both war and politics is hardly new. Joseph Nye and others have written extensively about the importance of soft power in international politics, which Nye defines as “getting others to want the outcomes

12INTRO D U C TIO N

you want.” 48 Soft power is based not on force, but on shared values and admiration.49 In the Middle East, for instance, Sabri Ciftci and Güneş Tezcür find that attitudes regarding religious identity have a strong influence on popular perceptions of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran as regional powers.50 In the literature on civil war and counterinsurgency, soft power is often referred to in the context of winning hearts and minds.51 For theorists of social movements, however, frame alignment— strategically identifying sets of shared characteristics and grievances—is a key part of the process of mobilization.52 Closely related to the idea of soft power is the idea of strategic narrative, that is, a cohesive story explaining the nature of the world (or nation, community, or political debate) deployed in pursuit of a specific goal.53 In conflict settings, such narratives can powerfully contextualize individual events (real or rumored) by linking them to larger master narratives and invoking broad, universal archetypes and narrative forms.54 For nonstate actors, clever branding, marketing, and international outreach can provide a real advantage.55 I argue that narratives have powerful effects in the context of civil wars in general and in Syria in particular. In this context, I use the term to mean “a cohesive explanation of the core division around which the war is organized.” Different individuals fighting in the same war may offer, with varying levels of sincerity, quite different explanations of the core differences defining the conflict.56 An explanation that provides a cohesive story about the origins and purpose of the war and organizes its meaning around a particular cleavage constitutes a narrative. A sectarian or ethno-communal narrative of a given conflict defines it as pitting one religious or ethnic group against another; a class-based narrative positions workers against the capitalist class; a reform-based narrative may frame a conflict as being about fighting corruption or overthrowing a dictatorship; a nationalist or secessionist narrative explains it as being about self-determination for a minority group. Part of what each party to a given conflict needs to do with respect to their audiences is to convince them that their specific narrative of the conflict is correct: that the war is about what they say it is about, and that

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they are therefore fighting for the reasons for which they say they are fighting. In any given war, there may be multiple narratives championed by different participants. In some cases, the same party may advocate more than one narrative; for instance, a militant group could, as several of the leftist Palestinian militias fighting in Lebanon did, offer both a classbased explanation and an ethno-communal narrative of the war. Some actors have a primary narrative and a secondary narrative; in other cases, there are narratives present as a kind of background noise, even if they are not the most important narrative for any of those involved. (Chapter  3 maps out the narratives in the Syrian war, including the relationships among them and their relative importance to the various actors.) Nor does any one group necessarily have a monopoly on a particular narrative; two groups on opposite sides of a given cleavage may agree that the war is about that cleavage even while fighting each other. In Iraq, for instance, both Sunni and Shi’ite militias—who were adversaries—sought to promote a sectarian narrative among the population at large. As this suggests, then, I am not using narrative here to refer to a position tied to a specific organization, such as the idea that a certain leader is especially worthy of admiration or that a given region should be autonomous; instead, this analysis focuses on narratives as defined by larger social or political cleavages. The question a narrative answers begins with why, not should, although the should is sometimes heavily implied. This does raise the question of why a given organization might choose a particular narrative. It may, of course, be a matter of sincere ideological commitment, and often is. But it may also be a matter of practicality: not all participants in the civil war will be equally well positioned to benefit from every possible narrative of the conflict. An authoritarian regime seeking to put down a pro-democracy rebellion stands a greater chance of attracting international support and preventing military defections if it can cast the conflict not as between dictatorship and democracy, but instead as between order and chaos, stability and terrorism, or unity and separatism. Likewise, a violent religious extremist group

14INTRO D U CTIO N

seeking to impose its views on a less religious majority may be more successful if it can cast itself as a champion of honesty versus corruption, or the poor versus the rich. Of course, not all narratives will be equally appealing to all audiences, but then, not every participant in a given conflict needs to win over every possible audience. Each has instead an incentive to establish its preferred narrative of the conflict as the “real” one in the eyes of the audiences relevant to its particular goals. This also does not necessarily mean convincing every potential audience to support the party (although that is often a desired outcome). It only means convincing them that the war is about what the state or nonstate actor in question believes it or wants it to be about. The benefits to be gained from an audience’s acceptance of a particular narrative therefore vary. For some audiences—those that the armed faction sees as potential constituents or allies—promoting a narrative may be a means of attracting recruits or obtaining other forms of direct support. For others, however, such as regional powers or neutral communities at home, the goal may be to convince them to either stay out of the conflict entirely or to see someone else as a greater threat and attack them instead.

CO N S E Q U E NC E S

Because winning the meta-conflict—that is, the war over what the war is about—is so important to conflict participants, their attempts to do so shape the conduct of the war in two important ways. First, the desire to promote a certain narrative can determine how the various combatants perceive one another. A combatant facing two adversaries—one who offers a rival narrative of the war that might undermine the combatant’s standing in the eyes of important audiences, and one who reinforces the actor’s preferred narrative—might decide that the former poses the more serious threat. This, in turn, can have consequences for their military decision-making.

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Second, performative violence—both conventional military operations and, especially, violence against civilians—is sometimes used as messaging. Just as peaceful social movements draw on what Charles Tilly terms “repertoires of performances” to promote their cause,57 state and nonstate actors use performative violence to threaten their adversaries, demonstrate their competence and commitment to their followers, recruit new members, and raise funds. In Syria, this has meant both documenting “normal” military operations for the purpose of producing propaganda and carrying out violence as an intentional performance— what Lee Ann Fujii terms a “violent display.”58 In sum, this book uses the following framework: like most civil wars, the war in Syria involves many Syrian and international participants as well as multiple points of ideological, communal, or geographic cleavage. The parties to the conflict care to different degrees about different cleavages, but all of them have a range of audiences in Syria and elsewhere (some shared, some not) whose perceptions are important to them. Convincing these audiences means both promoting their narrative of the conflict, sometimes through performative acts of violence, and undermining or eliminating competing narratives. This imperative—alongside other goals, like the need to take important territory or access resources— helps explain both larger patterns of conflict and individual acts of brutality. Nye and others argue that soft power and hard power largely function separately, or that hard power can, at most, be a source of soft power; but it is also true that when soft power becomes sufficiently important, hard power is sometimes deployed in pursuit of it.

UNDERSTANDING THE SYRIAN WAR

This book has two interrelated objectives. The first is to map out the complex conflict ecosystem of the Syrian civil war based on its major points of ethno-communal and ideological cleavage, with regard to both the narratives of the war championed by its many participants,

16 INTRO D U C TIO N

and to the patterns of violence across the war as a whole. The second is to explore those patterns using the framework outlined in this chapter. Given that the war in Syria, like many other civil wars, is characterized by multiple competing and cross-cutting cleavages, each of its many participants can be understood to be in some sense fighting its own war. Each cares about somewhat different issues than the others, and each is seeking, in addition to enforcing its preferences with regard to the actual issues, to make those issues salient for the other parties to the conflict as well. Each of these actors also has different audiences whom they seek to win over, from the entire Syrian public to those of a particular sectarian or ethnic background, to local communities, to important foreign patrons. For the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (referred to variously as ISIS, Daesh, or ISIL), the conflict is a war between (Sunni) believers and (Sunni and non-Sunni) unbelievers, shaped by ISIS’s territorial ambitions and driven by its ideological project and what McCants diagnoses as an apocalyptic worldview.59 For the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, or PYD) and its armed forces, the People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, or YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin, or YPJ), the conflict is largely about the establishment of a polity based on their preferred ideology and, by implication, with a Kurdish majority. It is also about the territorial and ideological defeat of ISIS and, more recently, their Turkish-backed adversaries.60 The opposition forces, generally speaking, share the goal of removing the Asad regime from power.61 Beyond that, though, it becomes difficult to generalize given the broad range of ideologies and goals among the various factions, brigades, fronts, operations rooms, and so on. Some see the conflict as primarily a struggle to establish a more democratic or less corrupt or more religious regime; for others the goal is to replace Alawite rule with Sunni rule. For many factions, as Samer Abboud and others observe, an ideological shift has occurred over time, influenced in part by foreign sponsorship.62 Finally, the Asad regime would very much like the conflict to be understood as a fight for stability in Syria, and for a secular state in the face of the religious fundamentalism represented by ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and others. As with the

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other parties to the war, just how sincere this belief is can be hard to parse; writing early in the war, David Lesch, for instance, assessed this as shaped by an at least partially sincere belief that Syria is the focus of a conspiracy by outside powers.63 Sam Dagher, writing much later, takes a more cynical view of the regime’s motives.64 Of course far more than four parties are involved in the Syrian conflict; a range of external actors have also become involved in the war to one degree or another, among them Russia, Turkey, the United States, several Gulf states, Iran, the Lebanese group Hezbollah, and the Turkeybased Kurdish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, or PKK). It arguably also includes the governments of Jordan and Lebanon, which between them host more than two and half million Syrian refugees and have to one degree or another engaged in conflict with ISIS, and even Israel, which has launched occasional strikes on Hezbollah targets on Syrian territory.65 Also important, although to which degree has varied over time, is the exiled civilian opposition, including the Syrian National Council (SNC, also known as the Etilaf) and other opposition figures abroad.

N A R R AT I V E S O F T H E SY R I AN CIVIL WAR

The Syrian war is organized around five major points of cleavage, each of which serves as the basis for a larger narrative of the conflict: the conflict between dictatorship and democracy; a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Alawites (or Shi’ites); a related conflict between secularists and fundamentalists; an ethnonationalist conflict between Kurds and Arabs; and a narrative of the war as a series of interrelated proxy conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Turkey and the PKK, and Russia and the United States. Although the salience of each has shifted throughout the war, they have remained relatively constant. The first of these, what might be termed the dignity and democracy narrative, is embraced primarily by secular opponents of the Asad regime. Many of those interviewed explained that at the beginning, the uprising was a peaceful protest movement driven by the Syrian people’s

18 INTRO D U CTIO N

basic need for karameh, or dignity. This narrative was challenged, however, by the emergence of two other divisions, which can be summarized as “Sunnis versus Alawites” and “secularists versus jihadists.” The former has been embraced primarily by violent Sunni fundamentalist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, and the latter has been championed by the regime, which has sought to present itself as the only feasible alternative to such groups. This view of the war has also been adopted by the Kurds as part of their conflict with ISIS, both for local consumption and in their efforts to court American support. Of secondary importance were two additional narratives, neither of which was explicitly championed by any of the parties to the war, but which were sometimes leveled as accusations against others. The ethnonationalist narrative has been embraced by the PYD’s adversaries, who claim that the organization is fighting a secessionist ethnic war, despite its own claims to the contrary. Further, many of those interviewed, on all sides of the conflict, believed that regardless of how it had begun, the war had become a proxy conflict between outside powers such as Russia, the United States, the Gulf states, Iran, and Turkey. Although no Syrian faction openly claims to be fighting for the interests of a foreign party, these rivalries are clearly viewed as significant by many Syrian civilians.

CO N F L I C T DY NAMI C S AND P E R FO RMAT IVE VIO LE NCE

The conflict between these various narratives of the war, and the high stakes each of the participants attach to their ability to convince key audiences that their narrative is the correct one, help explain both the larger patterns of the war and the sometimes performative use of violence by those fighting it. One consequence of this competition is the apparent disconnect between why the various parties in Syria say they are fighting, and what they are actually doing—that is, between (stated) cause and (actual) conduct. As discussed in chapter 3, the regime claims to be fighting a war against terrorism, but largely avoided fighting against ISIS for the first several years of its existence. The Kurdish forces claim

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to be fighting to establish a more democratic Syria but have not particularly focused on fighting Asad’s forces. ISIS claims to be fighting a religious war but has spent much of its time attacking other Sunnis. Instead, the regime has focused on fighting first the Free Syrian Army and later a range of other opposition factions, the Kurdish forces on fighting ISIS and later the Turkish-backed opposition, and ISIS on fighting more or less everyone. The rebels have been fairly consistent in their focus on the regime but have also spent some time fighting one another, and have attacked the Kurdish forces as well. The clear disconnect between the narratives of the war advanced by those fighting it and their actual behavior is of course not terribly surprising—both state and nonstate actors routinely behave in ways inconsistent with their rhetoric. Nevertheless, looking at these patterns can help us understand something useful about the priorities of those fighting in Syria. Rather than assuming that a particular cause of the war determines its conduct—that, for instance, the war is a sectarian conflict and thus members of different religious groups are fighting because they hate each other—this book instead posits that violence is sometimes shaped instead by each participant’s desire to make the war into one they can win. This in turn helps explain a second feature of the war in Syria: the performative use of violence. The conduct of the war has been documented online to an astonishing degree, sometimes with a great deal of care and intention. Civilian activists take video of regime airstrikes and put them on YouTube; members of rebel factions use wearable cameras to create first-person perspective videos of themselves carrying out military operations; the Syrian government creates videos showing their soldiers doing the same thing. In some instances, violence appears to be carried out (that is, performed) explicitly so that it can be recorded and shared, as in the case of ISIS’s heavily produced videos of its members committing atrocities. If part of the goal for those fighting in Syria is to convince key audiences that their story of the war is the true one, then we can understand some of their choices as a violent kind of storytelling.

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C AS E S E L E C T I O N

The Syrian conflict is an excellent—if tragic—example of a wider category of phenomena, that is, complex multiparticipant civil wars. The question of why such conflicts unfold as they do is relevant beyond Syria, and indeed beyond the Middle East, and the conclusions drawn here apply in other environments as well. The presence of multiple foreign actors, as well as multiple internal factions, puts the Syrian conflict in the same category as those in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, as well as complex, multiple-cleavage conflicts outside the Middle East, such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan. Although the extraordinarily high level of displacement in Syria is unusual—more than half of Syria’s prewar population has been displaced either inside or outside the country—in other respects, Syria offers parallels with other wars. Second, the conflict in Syria offers useful variation both over time and between actors. Because it contains multiple, cross-cutting cleavages, it allows for comparison between them in regard to how each is promoted (or enforced) by its adherents. In a related vein, it also offers variation on what, to use positivist language, could be termed the dependent variable: the conduct of the war in terms of the use of violence against both other combatants and civilians. Further, because of its duration over a decade it also allows us to observe variation over time in the relative importance of each narrative and in the choices made by the combatants. Third, the war in Syria in many ways represents the shape of things to come in asymmetric war, and perhaps warfare more generally. The unusually performative nature of the violence, the direct and personal involvement of foreign donors, and the degree to which violence is publicized via YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp, and other platforms, are all features we can expect to see replicated and amplified elsewhere. They are already features of the ongoing war in Ukraine, for example. Understanding these dynamics in Syria will help us better understand the wars of the coming decades.

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Finally, the war in Syria is profoundly important in its own right. Since 2011, it has claimed upward of 600,000 lives, including as many as 340,000 civilians.66 It has involved appalling atrocities, including genocide, torture, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, disappearances of activists and journalists, and mass murder with both weapons of mass destruction and weapons such as barrel bombs that simply cause massive destruction. This book is therefore also an attempt to contribute to our understanding of what has unfolded in Syria for its own sake. Indicators are that the legacies of the war will be with Syria for a long time to come. Despite the welcome reduction in casualties over the past five years, Syria remains divided and fighting continues in many parts of the country. For many Syrians, especially those in Idlib, the war is, as of this writing, far from over. Moreover, the partial destruction of several of Syria’s largest cities—including Aleppo and Homs—as well as civilian infrastructure such as schools and healthcare facilities, means that the process of reconstruction will be lengthy and expensive. Early indicators, such as the state’s appropriation of the homes of members of the opposition who fled the country, suggest that whatever reconstruction takes place will likely benefit some segments of Syrian society more than others, reproducing the resentments that sparked the 2011 protests in the first place.67 Internal displacement and resettlement has uprooted and dispossessed entire communities and created new resentments and perhaps grounds for new intercommunal or regional rivalries. Finally, the war has had powerful regional effects, some of which will be felt for decades. Much as the Lebanese civil war served as a proving ground for the rivalries of the Arab Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1970s and 1980s, so has the conflict in Syria functioned as an arena for the Saudi-Iranian rivalry as well as regional politics more broadly. Indeed, several of those interviewed saw the proxy war in Lebanon as a sad parallel to what has befallen their country. Just as the legacies of Lebanon shaped regional relationships long after the war had ended, so will the conduct of the war in Syria shape regional perceptions of and relations between the states that involved themselves. More immediately, the massive numbers of refugees created by the war have

22INTRO D U C TIO N

caused enormous strain for their host states. This is particularly true of Jordan and Lebanon, both small countries hosting large refugee populations. In Lebanon especially, a perpetually politically fragile country of five million, hosting as many as one and half million refugees, the stress on the country’s infrastructure, economy and politics has been significant, even more so because of Hezbollah’s involvement in the war. This is not, of course, to lay the blame for the current crisis in Lebanon at the feet of the Syrians sheltering there—that belongs squarely at the feet of Lebanon’s leaders. Moreover, although Syria’s is not the only war that erupted in the context of the brief, optimistic period known as the Arab Spring—the wars in Libya and Yemen are both significant tragedies in their own right—it is arguably the war that has served as the strongest cautionary tale for citizens of other Arab states who might otherwise have been inspired to seek democratic reform via a mass uprising. Of course, the degree to which this has proved true remains to be seen; the latter half of the last decade saw protest movements erupt in Lebanon and Iraq, and longserving dictators were forced from office in Algeria and Sudan. But just as the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt inspired the demonstrators in Syria, so has Syria’s tragedy (alongside those in Yemen and Libya) served as a kind of warning to those who might seek to remove the region’s autocrats, including, perhaps, future generations of Syrians.

R E S E AR C H ME T H O DO LO GY

This book is mostly based on qualitative research.68 (For a full discussion of my ethical, methodological, and logistical choices, as well as Institutional Review Board documentation, see the methods appendix at the end of this book.) My goal was to learn how Syrians—including supporters of the Asad regime, the armed and nonviolent political oppositions, the various Kurdish parties, and even groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS—understand the conflict. To this end, between August 2018 and March 2019, I conducted field research among Syrian exiles in Europe, where I was based in Berlin (Germany), and the Middle

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East, where I was based in Amman (Jordan). I chose these two sites for both practical and theoretical reasons. I was concerned that conducting interviews in only one city would lead to bias in terms of the experiences of those I was interviewing. This is also true of the refugee population more broadly, an issue I address shortly. Practically speaking, both locations are convenient to other potential research sites. Being based in Amman, for instance, allowed me to travel easily to Lebanon as well as to other cities in Jordan. Speaking with Syrians in multiple locations granted me access to a wider range of perspectives than I might have been able to gain otherwise. I was also able to make connections that allowed me to conduct interviews remotely with Syrians in other countries as well. My field research included nearly fifty in-depth interviews as well as attendance at public events such as speeches, protests, intercommunal dialogues, and other public fora. The interview participants included Syrians from every region of the country and every major sectarian or ethnic group. Those I spoke with were activists, journalists, defectors from the regime’s military and security services, former political prisoners, former members of the armed opposition, and many ordinary Syrians. I also met with the official representative in Berlin of the Autonomous Region of North and East Syria and his staff. In addition to in-person interviews in Berlin, Amman, Zarqa, Beirut, and London, I conducted interviews remotely with Syrians living in Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey, the United States, and elsewhere, as well as foreign journalists, aid workers, and government officials. Altogether, interview participants included Kurds and Arabs; Sunnis, Alawites, Druze, and Christians; those who were more religiously observant and those who were less so; Syrian-Palestinians; and former residents of Aleppo, Damascus, Deraa, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, Suwayda, and a range of smaller villages, towns, and suburbs around the country. In-person interviews were conducted in a range of settings, including cafes, private homes, and offices; remote interviews were mostly conducted over WhatsApp, usually at the request of those being interviewed, or Signal. Most lasted about an hour, but some stretched to two or three hours; a couple, delightfully, involved elaborate

24INTRO D U C TIO N

home-cooked Syrian lunches. I conducted about half of the interviews in Arabic and the rest in either English or a mixture of the two languages.69 To safeguard my interview participants’ safety and that of their families, with the exception of public figures or those officially representing political organizations, interviewees are not referred to by their full names. I did not travel to Syria, given the security situation there. This did create a selection bias in those I was able to interview, given that regime opponents were more likely to flee Syria in the first place and supporters more likely to stay. This meant that although I did interview supporters of the government, overall, interviews in the refugee communities gave me less insight into the views of those who supported Asad’s government. Nor were remote interviews with those in Syria possible— conversations about politics over the phone (or WhatsApp, or any other platform) pose a serious risk for those inside the country. To address this gap, I constructed a questionnaire based on my interview questions using Qualtrics (see methods appendix) and circulated it through my research network. Those who responded included supporters of the government, some of whom were likely living in Syria. I also shared it with those opposed to the government but received fewer responses because many of them preferred to speak face-to-face or by WhatsApp. The goal of this part of my research was not to create a representative sample but to reach out to those whose perspective I might otherwise have had difficulty in representing accurately. I was also unable to interview members of ISIS or the other violent jihadist factions. This created something of a gap in the narrative map constructed in chapter 3. To address this shortcoming, I turned to the wealth of propaganda (online and otherwise) produced by the various political and military factions involved in the Syria war. This includes YouTube videos, Twitter and Facebook posts, as well as more formal media such as Dabiq and Rumiyah, the glossy magazines published by ISIS, and the speeches and other pronouncements of their leadership.70 This was particularly helpful because it allowed me to see how the organizations tailored their messages to different audiences; the materials ISIS produces in Arabic versus English are somewhat different, for

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instance. Online propaganda was also a useful resource in constructing the narratives embraced by the Kurdish forces, the Asad regime, and the opposition. Chapter 4, in particular, is based on the analysis of more than three hundred YouTube videos generated by the opposition, PYD, and Asad regime. Even though propaganda is not necessarily helpful in gathering factually accurate information, it is useful in understanding how armed groups want themselves to be understood. The picture was rounded out by the use of media and secondary sources and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED),71 which, complemented by other data sources, I used to generate the very simple descriptive statistics in chapter  3 charting the confrontations between the various factions in Syria over time.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

This chapter, which presents the theoretical framework on which my analysis rests, is followed by a brief overview in chapter 1 of the background to the war and how it unfolded, based largely on interviews verified against media sources and reports by the UN, Amnesty International, and other organizations. Chapter 2 lays out the major narratives of the conflict: the war as a rebellion against dictatorship, the war as a sectarian conflict, the war as a conflict between the forces of secular order and the forces of jihadist chaos, the war as an ethnic or secessionist conflict between Kurds and Arabs, and the war as a regional or global proxy conflict. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the consequences of the conflict among these narratives and the struggle between the various conflict participants to establish their preferred narrative as dominant. Chapter 3 maps out the broad patterns of violence in the war in regard to violence both among the war’s armed participants and against civilians. These patterns indicate that at least some of the military conflict in Syria appears to both contradict the narratives laid out in chapter 2 and to indicate an antipathy among the combatants toward those who offer a rival narrative. Meanwhile, violence against

26 INTRO D U CTIO N

civilians, although sometimes indiscriminate or repressive, is also sometimes performative—that is, a way of underscoring or communicating a particular narrative of the conflict. Chapter 4 explores the performative nature of violence in Syria in more depth, examining the ways in which the lines between military action and propaganda have been blurred by the extensive use of online platforms by the various parties to the conflict. The book concludes with a brief discussion of the longterm implications of this argument for armed conflict and with reflections from Syrians on their country’s future.

1 THE SYRIAN TRAGEDY

U

nderstanding the complicated web of divisions around which Syria’s civil war has been organized and the patterns of violence that resulted requires some discussion of Syria’s modern history, as well as an overview of the major phases and turning points of the war itself. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the events that laid the groundwork for the communal and political narratives that have shaped the Syrian war, from the waning days of the Ottoman Empire to the French Mandate, through the transition to independence and the rise of the Baath Party, to Hafez al-Asad’s thirty-year rule, and then that of his son, Bashar. It offers as well a short history of the war from 2011 until 2020 and introduces its major participants. These include the Asad regime, the Free Syrian Army, various jihadist opposition factions, ISIS, the Kurdish forces—including the People’s Protection Units, Women’s Protection Units, and eventually the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)— and a range of other Syrian armed factions. They also include a range of foreign state actors, including Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United States. Like most long civil wars, the war in Syria has shifted course multiple times. In the early months of the uprising, much of the unrest took the  form of a civilian protest movement against the authoritarianism of  the state. However, with the regime’s violent crackdown and the

28TH E SYRIAN TRAGEDY

establishment of an armed opposition in late 2011 and early 2012, the uprising became a war. At first, the rebels appeared to be making headway against the regime. But the opposition was far from unified and increasingly included jihadist groups whose presence added heft to the regime’s argument that it represented the only alternative to al-Qaeda and its ilk. Even as they continued to take territory, the rebels were unable to cohere around a durable and unified political leadership, divisions exacerbated by foreign funding, foreign fighters, and growing ideological differences. In 2013, al-Qaeda’s Iraqi branch became involved in Syria. Following some internal conflict, part of the group rebranded as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and set about establishing a caliphate in Syria and Iraq. This in turn led to the emergence of the powerful Kurdish armed force in northeastern Syria affiliated with the Democratic Union Party, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ),

±

Qamishli Kobane

Hasakah Aleppo Raqqa

Idlib

Euphr ates R iver

Latakia Deir Ezzor

SYRIA

Hama Tartus Homs

Tadmur (Palmyra)

Total casualties per governorate

DAMASCUS

^ Quneitra

Conflict density Deraa

Governorate boundaries 0

FIGURE 1.1

High

Cities

Suwayda

50

100

Conflict intensity in Syria.

Source: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.

Low 200 kilometers

Aleppo: Hasakah: Raqqa: Suwayda: Damascus/Rif Dimashq: Deraa: Deir Ezzor: Hama: Homs: Idlib: Lattakia: Quneitra: Tartus: Unspecified location:

69,814 10,330 15,797 1,586 63,872 20,234 28,402 20,090 29,388 31,758 7,006 2,928 706 90,185

TH E SYRIAN TRAGEDY29

setting off a new conflict in the north of Syria. In 2015, the war shifted course yet again when Russia intervened directly to rescue the Asad regime. This support, and to a lesser extent the refocusing of American attention and resources from the Syrian opposition to the SDF and its fight against ISIS in the north, allowed the regime to retake much of the territory it had lost early in the war, moving steadily toward victory. Between 2016 and 2018, much of rebel-held Syria was retaken by the regime, leaving only the province of Idlib, ruled by Hayat Tahrir alSham (HTS), and the autonomous Kurdish-controlled northeast outside of its control. Turkey, meanwhile, was growing alarmed by the presence of a Kurdish proto-state on its southern border; especially after ISIS’s collapse, the Kurdish forces found themselves increasingly at war with Turkey and its Syrian proxies. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of Syria’s prewar history, then recounts in-depth the war itself throughout its various phases: the uprising; the shift into civil war; the growth of the jihadist factions; ISIS’s expansion and its conflict with the Kurdish forces; the Russian intervention and the Asad regime’s resurgence; and the emergence of a stalemated status quo characterized by economic collapse, mass displacement, and simmering conflict. It thus provides a basis for the analysis in the chapters that follow it.

THE LEGACIES OF THE MANDATE

In the years leading up to independence, Syria was governed largely by outsiders—first the Ottomans and then the French. This experience helped shape the worldview of those who would take power after Syrian independence, including Hafez al-Asad. Until World War I, Syria was a part of the Ottoman Empire. When the much weakened empire and its German allies were defeated, Syria and Lebanon were put under French rule via a mandate from the League of Nations. For nearly twenty-five years, the French pursued a divide-and-rule policy in Syria as a way of coopting some elites and marginalizing others while preventing the

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emergence of a unified independence movement. In the north, they established a separate administrative region in 1920 around Latakia, home to the Alawite minority (a sect of Shi’ite Islam),1 and in 1922 a similar “state” was established in the southern region of Jabal Druze, home to the Druze minority.2 These regions offered both communities a degree of autonomy while reinforcing their distinctiveness from the Sunni majority and lessening the likelihood of a cross-sectarian alliance against the French. The French also created separate governorates around Syria’s two largest cities, Aleppo and Damascus, consolidating several Ottomanera administrative regions to do so. Ottoman rule had reinforced rivalries between the Sunni commercial elites in both cities; French policies furthered the competition between them, entrenching political rivalries that would remain important for decades. Despite these divisions, Syrians remained discontented with French rule. Both the Arab nationalist and Syrian nationalist movements that had emerged in opposition to the Ottomans continued to grow, as did calls for independence. In 1925 a revolt broke out against the French, initially led by the Druze, but eventually spreading to the Sunni majority. The French responded with force, imposing a constitution in 1930 that did little to meet Syrian nationalist demands and was in any case suspended after the Nazi occupation of France in 1940. In 1941, the Allies, concerned that the Vichy regime (which had allowed limited selfgovernment following riots in Damascus) would provide Germany with air bases in Syria, intervened and Syria came under the control of the Free French. Despite Syria’s ostensibly becoming independent in the fall of 1941 and holding parliamentary elections in 1943, it was only in 1946 that France, badly weakened by the war, reluctantly acquiesced to British pressure and accepted Syrian independence.3 Overall, French rule during the mandate period paradoxically both reinforced sectarian divisions and led to the emergence of a robust Syrian nationalism embraced by Syria’s Sunni majority and its minorities alike. The legacies of Ottoman and French rule paved the way for the complicated web of alliances and rivalries among Syria’s geographic regions and its many ethnic and sectarian groups.

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THE RISE OF THE BAATH PA RTY

If Ottoman and French rule laid the foundation for Syria’s sectarian competition, it was the years after independence that set in motion the ideological competition that would bring the Baath Party to power in 1966 and in 2011, threaten its rule. The years after independence in Syria were characterized by almost constant upheaval. Elections were interspersed with power grabs and frequent coups. Nevertheless, a range of political parties emerged and in some cases flourished in the 1950s, including the nationalist Kutla; the Communists, who had ties to the Soviet Union; and the Baath Party. Although the Syrian Baath Party was officially founded in 1946, it had existed in various forms since the 1930s. Its founders were Michel Aflaq (an Orthodox Christian) and Salah-al-Din al-Bitar (a Sunni Muslim). The central tenets of Baathism were (and in theory, still are) Arab nationalism, pan-Arab unity, and secularism. It focuses on a shared Arab rather than Muslim identity, a perhaps understandable ideological perspective for religious minorities like Christians and Alawites in Sunni-majority Syria.4 The late 1950s were characterized by intense competition among Syria’s political factions. By 1958, President Shukri al-Quwatli was facing pressure both from the Syrian Communists who sought to bring the country closer to the Soviet Union, and from the American-allied countries of the Baghdad Pact.5 In response, Quwatli sought safety in Arab unity—or, more precisely, in unity with Nasser’s Egypt. In February 1958, in what was meant to be a first step toward creating a unified Arab state, Egypt and Syria merged into the United Arab Republic (UAR). But the UAR proved short lived. The Syrian military resented what amounted to Egyptian domination, and in 1961 a group of Baathist officers launched a coup and promptly withdrew Syria from the UAR.6 The following five years saw a rolling succession of (often intraBaathist) coups. In 1966, a Baathist faction led by two young Alawite army officers named Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Asad took power. Initially, the relatively conservative Asad and the more radical Jadid were partners. Jadid, however, alarmed many members of the relatively

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conservative officer corps by implementing a series of socialist economic reforms and earned the army’s resentment after Syria’s defeat and loss of the Golan Heights in the 1967 June War against Israel. The final blow came in the fall of 1970, when Jadid dispatched tank units to support the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in its rebellion against the Hashemite monarchy in neighboring Jordan. Viewing this as dangerous adventurism, Asad declined to order the air force to provide air cover for the Syrian tanks, which were quickly disabled by the small Jordanian air force and, humiliatingly, had to turn around and come home. This was the last straw for the Syrian military.7 That November, in a bloodless coup referred to as “the corrective movement,” Hafez al-Asad took power, becoming president of Syria, the office he would hold until his death in June of 2000.

SYRIA UNDER HAFEZ AL- ASAD

Hafez al-Asad’s ascendance brought an abrupt end to the chaos that had characterized Syrian politics since independence. Asad was less an ideologue than a pragmatist, a cautious ruler who did not telegraph his plans and whose defining traits were a preference for stability and a calculated ruthlessness in seeking to maintain it. Over the course of his presidency, he would construct a rigidly authoritarian police state that exerted control over all aspects of social, political, and economic life in Syria. Asad’s biographer, Patrick Seale, argues that Asad’s cautiousness and preference for stability had its origins in his personal background. Hafez al-Asad was born in 1930 to an Alawite farming family in the village of Qurdaha in northern Syria. At secondary school in Latakia, he became involved in activism against French rule. More drawn to Arab nationalism than communism, he joined the Baath Party, eventually becoming the leader of its student movement. In 1951, he was elected president of the Union of Syrian Students.8

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Two years later, Asad enrolled in the air force’s officer training academy.9 For Asad and other officers of his generation from rural backgrounds (many of them Alawites like him) a career in the military was one of the few paths to social and economic advancement. Seale contends that Asad, given his relatively unprivileged background, felt keenly that he had little room for error as he advanced in the military and later in politics.10 This helped shape his careful approach to politics and the premium he would place on stability as leader of Syria. Although some members of the Baath Party’s radical wing, such as Salah Jadid, championed a more confrontational foreign policy and more aggressive reforms at home, Asad was not among them. When he took power in 1970, he accordingly took a more measured approach to both regional politics and domestic policy than many of his predecessors pursued, though he was also willing to take calculated risks in pursuit of his goals. During Asad’s early years as president, he instituted a number of reforms. Lacking ties to the urban elites of Damascus and Aleppo, he relied heavily on the rural areas for support. These remained far poorer than the cities, lacking good roads, electricity, and access to medical facilities, and he instituted policies intended to improve their situation. But this was balanced by a desire to appease the Sunni economic elites, particularly those in Damascus. Therefore, while he continued some of the economic policies initiated by previous leftist and Baathist governments, including the expropriation and redistribution of land, he also allowed some entrepreneurship by former landowners who were able to rent farmland from the state,11 and liberalized other sectors of the economy as well.12 He also implemented some social reforms, including the liberalization of laws regarding women’s economic and social status and extending access to educational and medical services for rural Syrians. Overall, however, centralized economic and agricultural policies ultimately led to a weakening Syrian economy. Syria did benefit from the oil boom of the 1970s, but by the 1980s the economy was stagnating.13 In other words, Syria’s trajectory in the 1970s and into the 1980s was quite similar to other states following the Soviet model of development: major advances were made in areas like health care and literacy, coupled with

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land reform abolishing the once near-absolute social and economic power of landowners in rural areas, but Syria also suffered from a weak economy, dependence on foreign aid, and political authoritarianism.14 Moreover, the sectarian and geographic divisions that were the legacies of Ottoman and French policies remained. At least some of the early infighting among military officers in Syria in the 1960s had a sectarian flavor,15 and when the Baath Party took power in 1966, the role of the Alawite minority was elevated, a situation cemented by the 1970 coup,16 a point raised by at least one former Syrian dissident.17 The urban-rural divide was particularly potent in combination with these sectarian divisions. Despite Asad’s efforts to balance policies benefiting his rural base with those designed to appease the urban economic elites, many of the latter, especially the Sunni elites in Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, were frustrated by their exclusion from power. In this sense, the urban-rural division overlapped with the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Alawites. In the late 1970s, a new challenger emerged in the form of the Islamic Front, the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It openly questioned the legitimacy of the regime both because it was led by Alawites and because of its officially secular character. It began mounting an increasingly aggressive challenge to the state, launching violent attacks on prominent Alawites and government institutions and calling for strikes and other actions across the country. The Syrian military responded with violence, including the massacre of civilians in Aleppo in 1980. By February of 1982, as violence continued to escalate around the country, the Muslim Brotherhood had taken over parts of the city of Hama. In response, the army surrounded Hama’s old city and shelled it, eventually reducing it to rubble. Between ten thousand and thirty thousand people were killed, and the rebellion was put down.18 The message was clear: no challenge to Asad’s rule would be tolerated. For both regime supporters and opponents, 1982 seemed, in retrospect, to offer a preview of 2011. At a presentation in Berlin, a member of the organization Families for Freedom, which advocates for Syrians detained by the government and armed factions in the course of the war, explained this connection:

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My brother’s disappearance and his story is not the only one in our family. In 1981, at four in the morning, my younger uncle was dragged out of his bed in front of his wife, his mom, and his one-year-old daughter who woke up, and he disappeared. This is life in Syria. What I want to say is that these crimes, the disappearing, bombings, torture, all of these crimes are the nature the regime. These are the strategies that were always used by the regime to intimidate the Syrian people and control their rule.19

One interview participant explained that when the protests began in 2011, his father understood them through the lens of what he had experienced in the 1980s: “My father witnessed the events of the eighties so he was fearful and would always tell me that he was scared that they will do to you what they did to us. He said, ‘you did not see people being killed in the streets, people tied to cars being dragged through the streets.’ He would tell me that the regime is a criminal without limits.”20 Still others saw the regime’s response to the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982 as a preview of its (in their view, cynical) later positioning of ISIS as a perpetual justification for the use of force.21 In addition to trouble at home, the regional situation posed its own challenges. For example, by the 1980s Syria was very much isolated in the Arab world. It was the lone Arab state to back Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, cementing an alliance that would be both a powerful source of support and a further wedge between Syria and the other Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. The conflict with Israel was another ongoing complication; the defeat of the Arab forces in 1967 cost Syria the Golan Heights, and though the 1973 October War was a greater success militarily, it did not recapture Syria’s lost territory. After Egypt signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1978, joint Arab military action was no longer feasible, leading Asad to instead pursue an indirect strategy, sponsoring a range of nonstate actors—first the PLO, and then Hamas and Hezbollah—to maintain pressure on Israel.22 Events in neighboring Lebanon presented their own difficulties; in 1975, the Lebanese civil war broke out, sparked in part by the presence of the PLO in the country, although

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internal Lebanese political rivalries were the root cause. Syria soon became involved, sending troops into Lebanon in 1976, where they would remain until 2005, enforcing what amounted to Syrian rule in Lebanon well past the war’s end in 1990.23 Through all of these crises and challenges—the Hama uprising, the conflict with Israel, the war in Lebanon—Hafez al-Asad remained firmly in control in Syria. His regime’s resilience was due in part to his relationship with the military, whose loyalty helped him withstand an attempted coup by his brother Rifaat in 1983 while Asad was recovering from a heart attack. But he also relied on Syria’s massive internal security apparatus, which included multiple overlapping intelligence agencies (referred to collectively as the mukhaberat) surveilling not only the Syrian public, but also the military and one another. In one interview, I asked a former Syrian officer to estimate the number of individual intelligence agencies in Syria. He replied sardonically “You know that God has ninety-nine names? The mukhaberat has even more.”24 These agencies helped ensure that no challenger could emerge from within the military or elsewhere in the state, and that any kind of popular discontent would be immediately put down. Lisa Wedeen describes the Syrian state under Hafez al-Asad as enforcing what was essentially a cult of devotion to Asad in which all Syrians were forced to participate. She argues, though, that the state did not require actual devotion, merely the performance of it, which was in and of itself a way of disciplining the public: “Asad is powerful because his regime can compel people to say the ridiculous and avow the absurd.”25 Many of those interviewed described the Syria they grew up in in ways that emphasized the authoritarian regulation of everyday life. As one interviewee recalled, “Since I was a kid, it was forbidden to even say Asad’s name. It was forbidden to even ask or just think where the oil money goes to or where all the money that we have goes to.”26 Another, an opposition activist from Aleppo, described it as “forty years of brainwashing,” recounting being forced to attend ideological meetings and “training camps” as a child. Holding a wedding or a funeral required permission from the mukhaberat, and businesses from real estate agencies

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to supermarkets had to share information about their clients with the intelligence services.27 This shaped the relationships of Syrians not only with their government, but with one another as well, eroding interpersonal trust and relationships and limiting the growth of civil society, which was essentially illegal.28 Religiosity was also treated as suspect; a pro-opposition Syrian living in the United Kingdom related the story of a friend who became quite religious and began going to the mosque for dawn prayers, something slightly unusual for a younger man. He was brought before the intelligence services and questioned.29 The legal system, meanwhile, reinforced those intelligence services. As a former judge from Afrin explained, The security services had immunity. The judge could not pursue any of the security services. There were special courts, if I told you about the military field court which executed thousands of people, you will see that we did not have any litigation guarantees, no right of defense, all standards of a court were not present in Syria. Especially in the special courts. We also had the state security court and others.30

Overall, this state security apparatus would prove crucial not only to the elder Asad, but to his son as well.

SYRIA UNDER BASHAR AL- ASAD

In June of 2000, Hafez al-Asad died of a heart attack. He was succeeded by his son, Bashar, who was elected in a referendum in which he was the only candidate. Bashar had not been his father’s first choice as a successor; his elder brother Basil had been groomed since birth to take his father’s place. In 1994, however, Basil was killed in a car crash in while driving his Mercedes around Damascus, and Bashar was recalled from London where he had been working as an optometrist. Today, drivers sometimes put decals with Basil’s face in the windows of their cars, and

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pictures of Bashar, Basil, and Hafez al-Asad are a common form of state propaganda. They were sometimes referred to, extremely quietly, as “the father, the son, and the holy ghost.”31 At least initially, Bashar al-Asad’s presidency raised hopes that Syria was on the brink of an era of real reform. Bashar was seen as young and forward looking, a modernizer. Among other things, he had been— ironically, given the role of the internet in fueling the 2011 uprising— the chairman of the Syrian Computer Society, several of whose members he brought into his government early on and who were themselves seen as reformers.32 The eighteen months following his rise to power were a period of increased openness known as the Damascus Spring, characterized by a loosening of controls on intellectual and political life. Some political prisoners were released and salons featuring open political discussion flourished.33 A law was even passed allowing private media to operate for the first time, albeit under state supervision and with limits on its content.34 Soon, though, calls for the release of political prisoners and investigation into the abuses of the past began to make the regime nervous, and the period of openness came to a crashing halt as the arrests of opposition figures resumed and the police state reasserted itself. The degree to which Bashar himself was responsible for this is unclear, given the opacity of the Syrian state; one interpretation is that he was not entirely able to rein in the old guard or the mukhaberat.35 Within two years, Syrian autocracy was once again firmly entrenched. Bashar al-Asad’s defensive posture was reinforced by challenges both at home and abroad. In 2004, Syria’s Kurdish community, long subjected to economic and political exclusion, erupted into protests that became known as the Qamishli uprising (or Serhildan) discussed later in this chapter.36 Meanwhile, in neighboring Lebanon, where the Syrian government had held the country’s politics in an iron grip since the end of the civil war in 1990, massive protests broke out after former prime minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated by a massive car bomb in February of 2005. The demonstrators, and many Lebanese politicians, blamed Asad and his Lebanese allies for Hariri’s death. The demonstrations eventually forced Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon.

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At home, inspired in part by the Lebanese protest movement, a number of Syrian opposition figures issued a statement that spring known as the Damascus Declaration. Its signatories would become an important opposition group in Syria.37 On top of these political challenges, the Syrian economy was also a source of instability, or at least a source of frustration to many ordinary Syrians. The economic liberalization begun in the 1990s under Hafez al-Asad continued under his son’s rule, and Syria’s previously closed economy began to open up as foreign brands such as Coca Cola and KFC were allowed into the Syrian market for the first time. But economic liberalization did not benefit all Syrians equally, or even at all. Instead, it became another way the Asad family and their allies retained power. Bashar al-Asad’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, owner of SyriaTel, one of Syria’s two mobile phone companies, reportedly owned shares in many of Syria’s largest companies,38 and used his influence both to stave off competition from foreign companies and to expand his business empire.39 Elites with ties to the regime prospered even as ordinary Syrians did not. One longtime supporter of the opposition who was married to a former political prisoner described it as a “mafia state.” 40 By the eve of the Syrian uprising, unemployment among Syrians under the age of twenty-five (60  percent of the population) was 53 percent for women and 67 percent for men.41 On the 2010 Corruption Perception Index maintained by Transparency International, Syria ranked 134 of 178 countries, and fourteen of eighteen in the Middle East and North Africa region.42 Despite these sources of discontent, however, in the winter of 2010 there was little reason to suspect that Syria was about to be engulfed in protests or a civil war. There was almost certainly frustration with the corruption and repression that characterized the regime, as well as at the brutality of the mukhaberat, at whose hands dissidents (real or suspected) disappeared into the Syrian prison system, sometimes never to be heard from again. Nevertheless, the regime’s base—a combination of religious minorities, Alawite (and Sunni) army officers, Sunni economic elites, and a sprawling network of intelligence services— appeared to be as stable as ever. The regime’s surveillance network

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rendered any sort of political organization difficult, and many dissidents were either arrested or fled the country; Adnan Abu Odeh, a Jordanian politician, scholar, and longtime observer of Arab politics, believed that the repressiveness of the Syrian regime was itself to blame for the uprising being, as he put it, “late.” 43 As Reinoud Leenders points out, the factors that social movement theorists suggest make the emergence of a mass political movement likely—a weaking in the regime’s cohesion, for instance—were largely absent in Syria in the early 2010s.44 Yet, in early 2011, the Arab Spring, against all odds, came to Syria.

THE UPRISING

One characteristic of the Syrian war that many of those interviewed for this book were eager to emphasize was that it did not begin as a war at all. In the beginning, it took the form of a broad civilian protest movement inspired by events then taking place elsewhere in the region. In December of 2010, in the working-class town of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia, a young man named Muhammad Bouazizi had finally had enough. Despite his having a university degree, Tunisia’s sclerotic economy offered him few opportunities, and he supported his mother and sisters by selling fruit from a cart. After one humiliation too many at the hands of the local police, he stood in front of the municipal building in the center of town and set himself on fire. The young man’s death triggered something in the Tunisian public.45 Protests broke out in Sidi Bouzid, and then spread across the country. By January, Tunisians were calling for the resignation of their kleptocratic dictator Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali, who resigned and fled to Saudi Arabia on January  14, 2011. Protests soon followed in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and elsewhere. In Syria, many watched the protests with interest.46 One interview participant recalled that “when it started, it was, ok, look at Egypt, look at Tunis, look at all these places, and we want to get rid of the dictator. . . . We were all very excited. We thought it’s going to happen like the other

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countries.” 47 Another remembered feeling similarly: “I thought, that’s it, that change finally came and we can do something good to this country. And it was great. Those first days were the happiest days in my life.”48 When Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011, one Syrian journalist recalled a sense of anticipation: “I went down to the streets in Damascus—it was very empty. All people in homes, watching. . . . People were distributing kanafeh [a desert served at celebrations]. They are happy, and they are careful. ‘We are the next,’ you know? This feeling.” 49 The protests elsewhere in the region, however, were more than a source of optimism—they were also a focal point for action. One activist recounted taking flowers to the Egyptian embassy when Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak resigned and being greeted by a huge number of suspicious police.50 Another described organizing a small candlelight vigil at the Egyptian embassy, at which the fifteen to twenty attendees were outnumbered by “more than four hundred” security personnel. Despite these numbers, when one of her friends stood up and shouted “ jayek al douria, ya doctor” (your turn is coming, doctor), a reference to Asad’s previous career as an ophthalmologist, a secret police officer approached and told them that they had ten minutes to clear out before being arrested.51 By the time the protests in Libya began in mid-February, the regime already had its guard up. A similar protest at the Libyan embassy was met by police with water cannons which one police officer threatened were “not full of water, [but] full of khara—shit.”52 By this point, local protests were being organized in Syria independently of what was going on elsewhere, and the regime was getting nervous. A Facebook event appeared announcing “Days of Rage” in Damascus on February 4 and 5. MA, a longtime dissident, recounted that the police showed up at her house and arrested one of her family members on suspicion of having organized it.53 Despite the regime’s fears, however, when it did occur, the protest itself was only a small march on parliament on February 5.54 Its main consequence may have been that the Facebook event page allowed the regime to track down activists.55 Nevertheless, the protest movement was beginning to pick up steam

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in Damascus. On February 17, a small, spontaneous protest broke out in the Hamidiyeh market in the center of Damascus’ Old City after a young man was roughed up and arrested by the police; and others took place on March 15 and 18, the latter outside the Umayyad Mosque.56 Meanwhile, anger with the regime was mounting in the southern city of Deraa. In late February, as protests escalated around the Arab world, fifteen local boys ranging in age from ten to fifteen were arrested for scrawling antigovernment graffiti on a wall. By some accounts, they had written al shaab yureed isqat al nizam (the people want the fall of the regime). One of the teenagers later recounted that his cousin had actually written “Doctor, it is your turn next,” and that they had acted less out of revolutionary fervor than boredom and teenage rebellion.57 But they were taken away by the police anyway. Many of those interviewed related a similar account of what happened next, though none had been present. When the boys’ fathers went to the police station to request their release, they were told by the chief of police, Atif Najeeb, a cousin of Bashar al-Asad, “what children? Forget about your children. If you want children, you can have more, and if you don’t know how, bring your wives and we’ll show you how.”58 When the children were finally released, it was clear that they had been tortured. This story has become a core part of the narrative of the Syrian uprising. Whether every detail as related to me was entirely accurate, I cannot say. My overall impression, though, was that this story resonated with many Syrians for much the same reasons that Muhammad Bouazizi’s story did in Tunisia: these were not revolutionaries, but ordinary kids who had gotten into fairly ordinary kid-trouble and faced a brutally outsized response from the authorities. The early protests in Deraa were driven less by demands for democratization than by anger at the continued humiliation of Syrians by their own government. Public outrage in Deraa grew quickly. Deraa governorate is largely tribal, organized around large clans known as asha’er. The boys who were held by the police were from some of Deraa’s largest and most prominent asha’er, and their extended families were outraged at their treatment. Ahmad, a participant in those early protests, explained that at first the demonstrations were not against Asad or the regime, but against

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the security chief in Deraa, because he was the one who had arrested their children.59 The response of the regime—in Deraa and elsewhere— did nothing to calm things, however. On March 18, enormous protests erupted at the Omari Mosque, Deraa’s largest and oldest. The regime responded first with beatings and fire hoses and then with live ammunition. In the first few days, four people were killed.60 A funeral a few days later turned into a protest with as many as twenty thousand people in the streets.61 These protests and the regime’s response in turn inspired further protests elsewhere in Syria. One activist explained their impact: I knew that something would start but we needed something to start it because we were so afraid. It started in Deraa but I wasn’t there so I can’t say something about that. In university, we had a colleague from Deraa, and one week after it started he came and was showing us photos and videos about what happened there. Then we started organizing protests. We were afraid to ask ourselves—could this start in Syria? We were so afraid of everything. But when we saw the photos and videos from Deraa, we thought those people are also dying there. We are not better than them. We are all Syrians. This is the chance and if we don’t do anything, we will lose the chance for our children and grandchildren.62

Protests continued to spread across Syria. On March 25, the police opened fire on unarmed demonstrators in Hama after they lit a fire under a statue of Hafez al-Asad. The government denied responsibility for the escalating violence; government spokeswoman Buthayna Shaaban insisted that the use of live ammunition was a mistake, and that Asad “doesn’t want bloodshed at all.” 63 The next day, ostensibly as a concession, the government announced an amnesty, releasing 260 prisoners from Saydnaya Prison. For the most part, however, they were not members of the secular opposition, but Islamists, including several who would eventually become the leaders of prominent jihadist opposition groups.64 One interpretation of this decision that many of the secular opposition members interviewed offered was that it was a deliberate attempt to help create an Islamist opposition.65 It can also be read simply as a concession

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meant to calm public sentiment. If this was its intent, though, it was unsuccessful. The protests continued to escalate. By the end of the month, Baath Party headquarters had been set on fire in several towns, and more than sixty people had been confirmed killed by regime forces.66 Meanwhile, those who were more skeptical of the protests watched with alarm: “they said the protests were peaceful, then we saw them killing the policeman there, he was beheaded. This was in Deraa around the end of March. We were hopeful that things were going to change in the future, but when we saw the people who wanted change were killing, what is this change that is going to come?” 67 The regime clearly needed to offer a response. On March 30, Bashar al-Asad made a much-anticipated speech to parliament, but it was far from conciliatory, instead condemning the protests and dismissing them as a plot by outsiders to destabilize Syria.68 In fact, several of those interviewed referred to the speech as when they realized that the regime was not going to take a reformist approach. One activist told me that because of his family background—he was Kurdish and had family members who had been tortured in the regime’s prisons in the 1980s—he had initially thought the protests were a bad idea. He had hoped Asad would take a conciliatory approach in his speech to head off the unrest, but in the end, it was the speech itself that shifted his opinion in favor of the protests.69 A former military officer similarly described Asad’s failure that day to acknowledge what had happened in Deraa as “the minute I decided I cannot accept this person to be a president for me.”70 Whatever its intent, Asad’s speech did little to calm the protests. Nor did a series of concessions aimed at Kurds and religious Sunnis, including citizenship for two hundred thousand stateless Kurds, the end of a ban on teachers wearing face veils, and the closing of Damascus’s only casino. Even the lifting of the 1963 emergency law did not stop the protests.71 By the end of April, the opposition had gotten a good deal more organized. Local Coordination Committees (tansiqiyat) were established to organize protests every Friday, with common themes and slogans shared on social media across cities.72 The pre-Baathist Syrian flag was adopted as a symbol of the opposition.73 Rumors even began to circulate that some

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soldiers had switched sides and were now protecting the demonstrators.74 Throughout the spring and summer, demonstrations continued in Hasakah, Qamishli, Baniyas, Idlib, Hama, Homs, Deir Ezzor, Latakia, and even Damascus itself.75 Demonstrators began adopting new tactics, protesting at night or holding “flying demonstrations” in which demonstrators would run into a neighborhood, yell a few slogans, and run away before the police could arrive.76 But some parts of the uprising were beginning to take on a sectarian tinge. In mid-July, a wave of sectarian violence broke out in Homs. In response, hundreds of thousands of protesters marched across Syria in demonstrations meant to affirm unity in the face of the violence in Homs, but Syria’s minorities were increasingly concerned.77 “Dania,” an Alawite activist who had helped organize protests in Homs early on, shared that she eventually no longer felt as welcome there.78 Another reflected, I think from my side, as a person who’s opposed to the regime, that the main mistake that the opposition did was ignoring the mistakes. Ignoring the Islamic symbols that were [appearing] here and there. Closing eyes on the Saudi or Qatari money. Or the Islamic slogans, or the names of the Fridays. . . . People say it’s not a big deal, but it was because this was what the mukhaberat and regime used to make people afraid.79

Meanwhile, the regime scrambled to respond. This included some conciliatory gestures, including the offer of a national dialogue and the sacking of the deeply unpopular governor of Hama, Ahmed Khaled Abdulaziz. In general, however, the regime was pursuing an increasingly openly militarized response to the uprising. In late April, the army besieged Deraa.80 A week later, tanks rolled into Baniyas, and a few days after that, into Hama. Homs was shelled with heavy artillery. A military crackdown followed the sectarian violence in Homs and by the end of July Homs was more or less under siege, as was Hama.81 Nor was the violence any longer entirely one-sided; in response, the opposition was beginning to arm itself.82

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FROM UPRISING TO CIVIL WAR

In retrospect, some opposition supporters looked back on the militarization of the uprising as a mistake, both in the sense of being a bad policy choice and in the sense of being something that happened unintentionally.83 The Free Syrian Army (FSA) came into being in part because soldiers who did not want to fire on civilians were put, by default, in the position of opposing the government. At the same time, some protesters, in the face of escalating attacks by the state’s security forces, found the idea of some kind of protection by sympathetic members of the armed forces appealing.84 It was this dynamic, rather than a clear plan, that created the seed of what would become the FSA. Of course, not all members of the civilian opposition thought the presence of armed FSA fighters at demonstrations was a good idea, nor did all soldiers who did not want to shoot civilians defect—some deserted and simply fled the country rather than joining the armed opposition. Enough chose to do so, however, that by June 2011 some had begun to organize themselves into brigades. On July 29, 2011, Colonel Riad al-Assad, a former air force officer and its first leader, officially announced the establishment of the FSA.85 The FSA was only one component of the organized opposition. At least initially, the main center of gravity were the Local Coordination Committees (LCCs), which organized the protests and other opposition activities locally. In August of 2011, the Syrian National Council, led by longtime dissident George Sabra, was established as a kind of government in exile. It later merged with other opposition groups to become the Syrian National Coalition, also known as the Etilaf. Each benefited in some ways from cooperation with the others, and from what the others contributed—association with the civilian political opposition accorded the FSA an extra degree of legitimacy, and the LCC’s coordination work was crucial in managing things at the local level. Nevertheless, as Samer Abboud convincingly argues, one of the early problems plaguing the opposition was internal division, both among the FSA, LCCs, and SNC and within each of them.86 This would become an even greater problem later on.

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As the violence across Syria escalated, the armed opposition continued to grow, driven by defections of soldiers angry at being ordered attack their fellow Syrians. One former officer described being asked to open fire on civilians at checkpoints, and the danger of retaliation when he refused, as a motivating factor for his defection to the opposition: Even your oath, your oath to God and your military oath, that you’re going to defend the republic—from sky and seas and lands—but never against the people, or the Syrian people, or the citizen. Always to defend the Syrian people, always. So, if you want to follow your oath, it’s not mentioned that you’re going to kill with tanks your own people.87

Another described being asked to order an attack his own city, and nearly being killed in an “accidental” friendly fire incident when he refused. As he put it, “I started feeling in danger and that the nizam [regime] wanted to kill me because I do not want to go on the plane and kill my people.”88 Despite the presence of some experienced officers and the legitimacy conferred by its affiliation with the SNC, however, the FSA was a shoestring operation at best and had a highly decentralized structure.89 Few of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) officers who defected were able to bring advanced military equipment with them, and many FSA members were civilians seeking to defend their neighborhoods and villages who had no military experience at all. One defector described arriving at an FSA base to find only “around twenty, twenty-five guys. Civilians. Some of them defect[ed] as soldiers, others are just young men . . . with light arms, light arms, just light arms, they have AK-47s and some of them shooting guns, like hunting shooting guns.” 90 In addition to these local FSA units, another type of unit began to appear as the war picked up steam. These were independent brigades that, though part of the overall opposition, received their funding directly from donors abroad (often in Gulf states such as Kuwait, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia) and were largely outside the FSA chain of command. They tended to be less linked to specific regions of the country and more ideological in their outlook. They were therefore more prone to

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clashing with other units over control of important checkpoints, highways, and other assets. By 2013, more than a thousand armed factions were fighting in Syria—perhaps far more. Some began organizing themselves into larger coalitions, often labeled “fronts,” around a common objective or ideology.91 Others coordinated through what were called operations rooms in specific areas. Overall, the armed opposition was heavily fragmented. Even as early as 2012, many brigades were essentially operating on their own. This brings us to the other segment of the armed opposition that bears specific mention here: the adherents of a narrow, militaristic interpretation of Islamic theology who are often referred to (not unproblematically) as jihadists.92 As the war escalated, these groups became increasingly prominent. Some were independent factions who, in search of either state or private funding “grew beards” and adopted the ideology for fundraising purposes. Others, though, were affiliates of existing international brands. Two of the most significant of these were Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. Both Jabhat al-Nusra’s and ISIS’s roots lie in al-Qaeda, the transnational jihadist network founded by Osama bin Laden. In the early 2000s, the organization enjoyed both ideological and military prominence, demonstrating both the ability and willingness to launch attacks resulting in massive casualties. These included the September 11 attacks in the United States and a campaign of mass violence against civilians in Iraq after 2003. By 2011, however, the organization badly needed a shot in the arm. It had seriously alienated the civilian population in Iraq, the Arab Spring protests (in which it played no role) offered a powerful alternative vision for the future of the Arab world, and the American assassination of Osama bin Laden in May was blow to the group’s morale, if not its operational capacity.93 The outbreak of the Syrian war therefore represented a tempting opportunity for al-Qaeda to reassert itself. Seeking to avoid its mistakes in Iraq, al-Qaeda took a more cautious approach in Syria. It established a Syrian branch, Jabhat al-Nusra, headed by a Syrian member of alQaeda in Iraq (AQI) Abu Mohammed al Jolani. Although Jabhat alNusra embraced the goals shared by al-Qaeda as a whole—to establish

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first an Islamic state in Syria and then a caliphate in the Levant—the al-Qaeda leadership concealed the connection between AQI and Jabhat al-Nusra, instead positioning it as an indigenous Syrian organization.94 Rather than emphasizing its ideological differences with other rebel groups, it forged relationships with various jihadist factions and focused its ire on the Syrian military, building capacity by acquiring weapons, recruits, and training bases. It also went out of its way to cultivate some degree of popular support, even founding a social service wing, Qism al Ighatha.95 Not everyone in al-Qaeda supported this approach. By the spring of 2013, friction was growing between Jolani and AQI’s Iraqi leadership. AQI had been founded in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the chaos that followed the invasion and the large pool of available recruits created by the dissolution of the Iraqi military allowed them to establish a branch in Iraq for the first time. It was initially led by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who, even by al-Qaeda’s standards, displayed a particular hatred of Shi’ites. This antipathy, combined with the sectarian warfare into which Iraq was plunged for much of the decade, gave the group a strong sectarian focus even relative to the rest of al-Qaeda. After Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. airstrike in 2006, AQI’s leadership eventually passed to the Iraqi Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the group became increasingly focused on establishing an Islamic state in Iraq. Internally, it began to refer to itself as the Islamic State. This new focus brought AQI into conflict with the central leadership of al-Qaeda, in particular its leader Ayman Zawahiri. Even though the establishment of a new caliphate was part of al-Qaeda’s long-term objective, Zawahiri believed that an attempt to do so while the U.S. military remained in Iraq could not possibly succeed, and that the inevitable failure would badly damage the movement’s credibility.96 The eruption of the Syrian civil war brought these tensions out into the open, largely because it presented an opportunity for expansion that Baghdadi’s faction of AQI could not resist. In 2013, it moved first into eastern Syria and then into a number of areas it had previously lost in Iraq as well. By June of 2014, they had taken the Syrian city of Raqqa and the cities of Ramadi and Mosul in Iraq.

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This rapid expansion posed a challenge to Zawahiri’s authority and to Jabhat al-Nusra’s position in Syria. For one thing, Baghdadi made clear that he expected Jabhat al-Nusra to fall under his authority, a demand al-Nusra rejected. In doing so, he also made public Jabhat al-Nusra’s affiliation with al-Qaeda, severely complicating its relationship with the rest of the opposition.97 Separately, Baghdadi declared that his branch of al-Qaeda was establishing a caliphate on the territory it had captured, bringing the Islamic State into conflict not only with Jabhat al-Nusra but also with the rest of the al-Qaeda leadership.98 Although his claim that the division between Syria and Iraq was based on Sykes-Picot and therefore illegitimate may have been in line with al-Qaeda’s general world view, it also challenged the internal division of authority between Jabhat al-Nusra, AQI, and al-Qaeda’s leadership.99 Ultimately, in combination with the (very public) brutality of Baghdadi’s followers, this internal conflict led Baghdadi’s organization to split—or, as al-Qaeda’s leadership saw it, be expelled—from al-Qaeda in the spring of 2013, taking many Jabhat al-Nusra fighters with them.100 What had been AQI was now known as Al Dawlet al Islami fi Iraq wa Sham (Daesh in Arabic), which translates as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. ISIS, though, would not appear on the scene until the war was well under way. In the war’s early months, in 2011 and 2012, the conflict was still primarily between the regime and the nascent FSA, and the opposition had reason to be at least somewhat optimistic. The Asad regime’s former ally, Turkey, began offering first tacit and then open support for the opposition. In November 2011, Syria was suspended from the Arab League.101 As the fighting escalated, towns and neighborhoods began slipping out of the regime’s control. Opposition forces clashed with the Syrian military across the country—in some cases taking control of neighborhoods and towns. In Homs, Syria’s third largest city and an early site of antigovernment protests, Baba Amr and other neighborhoods were essentially taken over by the opposition. In response, the Syrian army besieged and bombarded the city. The SAA was able to prevent opposition forces from entirely capturing the city, but armed resistance continued in Homs until 2014.102 Likewise, in Deraa and its surrounding

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areas, opposition forces clashed with government troops.103 In the countryside around Damascus, opposition forces took control of a number of towns and in some cases—a notable example being the city of Daraya—set up local governance structures that explicitly supplanted those of the Syrian state.104 In the summer of 2012, Aleppo, Syria’s largest city and its commercial capital, became involved in the fighting as well, as clashes broke out first in the neighborhood of Salaheddin and then spreading to the rest of the city. Soon, Aleppo was divided, the rebels holding the east and the regime forces holding the west.105 The war drew closer to Damascus as well; in July, a bomb was smuggled into a meeting of members of the regime’s inner circle, killing the president’s brother-in-law Asef Shawkat and two other senior officials.106 By August, opposition factions had taken a large swath of territory in the north, running from Idlib to Manbij to the northern edge of Aleppo.107 That fall, rebel factions captured the cities of Raqqa and Maaret Numan and then launched a major push to begin capturing the oil wells near Deir Ezzor.108 Even Syria’s Palestinians, who had long tried to remain neutral, were drawn into the escalating conflict. Public opinion in Yarmouk refugee camp, Syria’s largest Palestinian community, was divided between those who supported the regime and those who sympathized with the opposition. This was based at least in part on the complicated history between the Asad regime and the PLO’s various factions.109 Yarmouk could not remain neutral for long; despite an official policy by the camp leadership prohibiting weapons, the armed opposition began moving into the camps.110 When the Damascus branch of the PLO’s armed wing refused to fight alongside the SAA, several Palestinian officers were assassinated.111 Then, in the winter of 2012, the regime bombed Yarmouk. The purpose of the attack was ostensibly to target FSA positions in the area, but it was understood differently by some Yarmouk residents. NK, a writer and longtime resident of Yarmouk whose home (including her beloved collection of books) was destroyed in the bombing recalled: On December 13, 2012, the opposition succeeded and entered weapons into the camp . . . At 4:00 a.m. there were sounds of guns going off. My

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aunt lives in Al Tadamon, her house was badly hit and the opposition liberated the area of her house so she came over to my place to sleep. . . . There was unbearable firing happening. . . . Everyone in my building (I lived on the third floor) came to my house, all my neighbors. I told Ahmed Jibril’s men [from the PFLP-GC] to stop firing because I wanted to evacuate the people in my home. To prove to you that both sides fighting were actually in agreement, they actually stopped the firing of shots. I left with the people who were with me and crossed to another street. On that street, it seemed to be like a different world. People were living, shopping, everything normal. . . . The next day I returned to the camp. That day, the regime came and bombed the camp with its planes. The regime claimed that they were bombing terrorist sites. But I know the area well, there are no terrorist sites. The mosque of Abdelqader al Husseini was bombed. There were so many refugees in the mosque that they bombed. . . . In 1948, people left Palestine but had Syrians and Lebanese to help them. But in this new expulsion, there was no one to help.112

The attacks continued periodically, targeting civilians as well as FSA fighters, sometimes deliberately dropping a second bomb shortly after the first to target first responders.113 ISIS would eventually take over parts of the camp as well. Within three years, Yarmouk’s prewar population of almost two hundred thousand would be reduced to eighteen thousand. By the beginning of 2013, things looked worrying for Asad. In February, rebel factions took control of the Tabqa hydroelectric dam, the country’s largest supply of water for drinking and irrigation, as well as a major source of electricity.114 In April, they were able to successful shell the center of Damascus115 while expanding their territory in and around Deraa and Aleppo.116 The opposition’s political leadership was also continuing to accumulate international support—though not as much as they might have liked, and without the heavy weaponry they requested— from the United States, Turkey, and many of the Gulf states.117 In March of 2013, the Arab League offered the SNC Syria’s seat.118 Increased funding

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and arms were flowing to the rebels from the Gulf states, and from private donors as well.119

THE WAR SHIFTS

By the summer of 2013, however, the tide was beginning to turn. The Syrian government also had allies, who were providing increasingly critical support as the SAA faced ongoing losses from defections, desertions, and battlefield deaths. In addition to Iran and Russia, whose military support would eventually turn the tide of the war, Syria had two key nonstate allies whose benefit became clear in 2013. One of these was the Lebanese Shi’ite armed group Hezbollah. Founded during the civil war in Lebanon in the early 1980s, Hezbollah was closely allied with Iran. After the war, the organization became a (arguably, the) major military and political force in postwar Lebanon and a close ally to Syria, whose de facto postwar occupation of the country it supported. Meanwhile, Syria was an important source of weapons and political support as well as Hezbollah’s major supply link to Iran.120 When the war broke out, Hezbollah offered its support to Asad’s government. By the summer of 2012, rumors were circulating in Beirut that coffins containing the bodies of Hezbollah fighters were coming back across the border from Syria.121 In the spring of 2013, Hezbollah openly committed its forces to defending Asad’s government, launching a massive operation to push rebel forces out of the strategically important town of Qusayr on the Lebanese-Syrian border and saving the regime from a major defeat. Over the course of the war, its fighters participated in battles in Aleppo, Homs, and the Damascus suburbs, providing (along with Shi’ite militias from Iraq) much needed manpower to the SAA.122 Some of the opposition members interviewed specifically referenced the intervention of Hezbollah as a major turning point in the war.123 The SAA’s other major nonstate asset were the Syrian pro-government militias. These were initially established in 2011 as “popular committees,”

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tasked with defending entrances to loyalist neighborhoods, often led by retired army officers.124 In January of 2013, they were formally consolidated with other pro-government militias into the National Defense Forces (NDF). The NDF was staunchly loyalist, paid and armed by the Syrian government. It also had a somewhat sectarian character—it was almost entirely Alawite and Shi’ite and was trained by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.125 Nonetheless, as a large armed force with roots in local communities, the NDF was also a locus of power in its own right.126 Acting in concert with the SAA, the NDF provided an important boost to the regime’s ability to hold and control territory. As the regime was developing its assets, serious problems were emerging within the opposition. The various rebel factions were plagued by internal rivalries, which limited their ability to build on their earlier success in the north. This was sometimes a function of differing ideologies; in July, Islamist fighters drove a rival rebel faction out of Raqqa, accusing them of drinking wine, carousing with women, and being reluctant to fight.127 However, it was also a function of the funding model becoming common across the opposition.128 Because funding to the opposition factions often flowed directly from governments or even private donors in the Gulf rather than through the FSA, individual units had little reason to adhere to any kind of unified command structure. Instead, competition for access to funding pitted units against one another rather than encouraging cooperation. This rivalry was exacerbated by the growing hostility between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, each of which had its own clients in Syria.129 In some cases, rivalries among individual donors also shaped the relations between the factions they supported.130 At times, ideological differences and conflicts over funding converged as groups adjusted their ideology—or at least their branding—to attract more funding, sometimes bringing them into conflict with other organizations.131 This may have been a pragmatic choice, but it also cast doubt among civilians on the factions’ ideological sincerity. When asked whether they admired anyone fighting in Syria, very few of those interviewed—including strong supporters of the opposition—listed any of the armed rebel factions.

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Meanwhile, the opposition’s political leadership were largely in exile in Turkey and increasingly disconnected from what was happening on the ground.132 The FSA, never especially centralized, began to fragment even further into many smaller factions, some little more than village defense militias or local warlords. At the same time, the well-funded jihadist factions, some of which included non-Syrian foreign fighters, became increasingly prominent participants in the war despite their worsening relations with the rest of the opposition. Some openly targeted Alawites; in August 2013, fighters from Jabhat al-Nusra kidnapped 106 civilians, many of them children, from the Alawite village of Salma to use as bargaining leverage with the regime.133 Many more were murdered. The war was turning increasingly sectarian. Another major turning point came in the early morning hours of August 21, 2013, when the Syrian military attacked the rebel-held Damascus suburb of Ghouta with sarin gas, a lethal neurotoxic chemical weapon. A medic who was in Ghouta that night recounted being woken at 3:30 in the morning by a friend pounding frantically on his door. When he arrived at the hospital, which was underground to prevent it from being shelled, eighty bodies were already there. The medical staff were unprepared for the use of sarin; the symptoms—widened eyes, foam from patients’ mouths—were unfamiliar. All the doctors could do was wash the chemicals off their patients with a hose or treat them with their long-expired stock of atropine. By morning, many patients died, as had hundreds of others unable to seek medical treatment, and doctors themselves had been exposed to sarin in the course of treating their patients. Many families were found dead together, in their homes, having perished while trying to open their doors.134 In interviews, a number of members of the opposition cited the Ghouta massacre as a turning point. President Barack Obama had explicitly stated that the use of chemical or biological weapons constituted a red line for the United States and would trigger international intervention. Many in the opposition therefore believed that the attack on Ghouta would force the United States to punish the regime militarily. Rumors began to circulate that those in the regime believed the same thing:

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When Bashar al-Asad used the first chemical attack on al Ghouta, and Obama [for] the first time he had balls to threaten Bashar, it was the only real threat through the whole revolution to the regime. . . . It was the safest week for the people in Syria . . . no aircrafts go to bomb the cities, no attacks, even in the regime controlled area, the checkpoints become [nicer] . . . The regime really felt [a] threat. And we had also some information that the generals, the Alawite generals they prepare themselves and their families, if the attack will come, they will flee to Lebanon.135

The expected American attack did not come, however. Instead, Secretary of State John Kerry brokered a deal under which Syria would allow in inspectors to verify that it had destroyed all of its chemical weapons. This was applauded by many in the United States who wished to avoid another American war in the Middle East. But for those in the opposition who had believed they had robust American support, the American response to Ghouta was a painful betrayal.136 The Ghouta massacre was not the first time the Asad regime had used chemical weapons, and, as many interviewees pointed out, the use of nonchemical weapons— particularly barrel bombs—had already caused an enormous number of civilian casualties. Many in the opposition interpreted the lack of an American military response as a sign that, as a former State Department official put it, the United States was “full of shit,” and could not be relied on for support.137 This would prove to be very much to the benefit of the jihadist and Salafist factions, whose generous funding from the Gulf provided real advantages with regards to arms and recruitment.

THE WAR IN THE NORTH

Not all of the new forces emerging in Syria in 2012 and 2013 were jihadists. In the north, Syria’s Kurds were developing an armed force of their own. Roughly 10 percent of the population of Syria are ethnically Kurdish, that is, speakers of one of the major Kurdish dialects,138 and a

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Kurdish political movement has existed in Syria for much of the country’s history. In the late 1950s, Syrian Kurdish politics became more explicitly nationalist. This was partly influenced by the robust Kurdish nationalist movement in neighboring Iraq and partly a reflection of their political and economic disenfranchisement.139 The Kurdish regions of Syria had been badly neglected by a government that did not entirely trust them and whose Arab nationalist ideology left little space for a Kurdish ethnic identity. In the early 1960s, some two hundred thousand Kurds were classified as noncitizens (either ajanib, foreigners, or maktoumeen, unregistered).140 Kurdish towns were renamed (in Arabic) and the teaching and use of Kurdish was discouraged.141 Some Kurdish activists were arrested and tortured.142 If the Syrian government viewed the Syrian Kurds with distrust, though, it was still willing to reach an accommodation with Kurdish nationalists elsewhere in the service of its regional objectives. In the 1980s, Syria began backing the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers Party), the left-wing Kurdish militant organization led by Abdullah Öcalan that been intermittently at war with the Turkish state since the late 1970s.143 Hafez al-Asad allowed the PKK to use Syria as a base of operations for much of the 1980s and 1990s, primarily as a way of putting pressure on the Turkish government, whose alliance with the United States and membership in NATO Syria viewed as unwelcome traits in a neighbor. In return, the PKK provided an external outlet for Kurdish nationalist sentiment. As part of this arrangement, Syrian Kurds were allowed to substitute military service in the PKK for Syrian army service.144 As many as ten thousand may have been killed fighting in Turkey.145 The most cynical possible interpretation of this figure is that for the Asad regime, Kurdish casualties were a feature rather than a bug. In 1999 the Syrian government, seeking better relations with Turkey after the end of the Cold War and the loss of Soviet sponsorship, expelled Öcalan, whom Turkey soon arrested and imprisoned.146 The PKK had no further reason to channel Syrian Kurdish political sentiment away from a challenge to the Syrian state—indeed, quite the opposite. And so, in 2003 a local Syrian Kurdish political affiliate of the PKK was founded: the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party).147 Meanwhile,

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Kurdish resentment at the indignities suffered at the hands of the Baathist state continued to simmer; in March of 2004, violence between Arab and Kurdish football fans at a match in Qamishli erupted into rioting and antigovernment protests known as the Qamishli Uprising.148 Forty-three people were killed, all but seven of them Kurds.149 The unrest in Qamishli eventually died down, but Kurdish political sentiment remained hostile to the state. When the Arab Spring protests began in Syria in 2011, Kurdish Syrians joined in early on, holding major marches in Qamishli. In June, the regime offered a series of concessions that included citizenship for the ajanib but not the maktoumeen, a move widely viewed as an attempt to buy off Kurdish support, but which was not terribly successful.150 Instead, as the protest movement grew, the Kurdish community began to organize. After an umbrella organization known as the Kurdish National Movement collapsed, Kurdish politics in Syria was divided into two camps: the PYD remained a center of gravity in its own right, and eleven non-PYD allied parties organized themselves into the Kurdish National Council. This latter group had some common ground with the Syrian National Council, but the two had difficulty working together because the Arab nationalists were suspicious of possible Kurdish ethnonational ambitions and the Islamists distrusted their secularism.151 For its part, the PYD was becoming a major actor in the Syrian conflict. In 2012, the PYD established its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units.152 Ideologically, the PYD and its armed forces remained close to the PKK, adhering to an anarchist-leftist ideology based on Abdullah Öcalan’s interpretation of the writings of political theorist Murray Bookchin, whose work he had read in prison.153 The PYD also shared the PKK’s egalitarian gender ideology and commitment to women’s participation in its armed forces as a result of which the YPG’s command staff initially included both men and women, though the enlisted ranks were mostly male.154 In 2013, with the arrival in Syria of a number of female PKK veterans, the Women’s Protection Units was established as a second force with an exclusively female membership and command structure, fighting alongside the YPG.155

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The PYD soon began expanding its control of territory in northeastern Syria. As the Syrian military withdrew, the PYD and its armed wing stepped in to fill the vacuum.156 The PYD took control of Kobane on the night of July 18, and other cities—including Afrin, Derik, and others— were soon under its control as well. By February 2013, the PYD controlled 80 percent of the Kurdish regions. In November, it declared that these territories were now cantons of Rojava Kurdistanê, or Western Kurdistan, sometimes referred to simply as Rojava, more formally the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.157 Accounts sympathetic to the PYD frame the organization as hostile to the Asad regime at this stage. Michael Knapp, Ercan Ayboga, and Anja Flach recount that when the YPG took over the secret police station in Kobane where Kurdish dissidents had been held in the past, they found a torture chamber in the basement with blood still on the walls.158 Given the nature of the Syrian mukhaberat there is little reason to doubt this account. Nevertheless, despite the history of Kurdish antagonism to the regime, including on the part of the PYD itself, the Syrian military’s withdrawal and the rapid rise of the PYD appeared suspicious to many in the opposition, who accused them of being in league with the regime.159 This did not mean, however, that the Kurds found holding their new territory easy. As early as the fall of 2012, the YPG began clashing with Jabhat al-Nusra and other opposition factions over control of territory the regime had vacated.160 After ISIS emerged as a separate organization, it too came into conflict with the Kurdish forces, for several reasons. Syria’s largest oilfields were in Hasakah, making the territory valuable in its own right.161 At least initially, ISIS was able to take control of many of them, providing a valuable source of revenue because it was then able sell oil back to the regime.162 Moreover, ISIS, like the other factions in Syria, also had expansionist ambitions in a more general sense, to which the Kurdish forces were an obstacle. In the spring of 2014, ISIS laid siege to Kobane, a town of fifty thousand that had been flooded with people fleeing the fighting elsewhere in the region. By mid-October, it had captured much of the city.163

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It would not be able to hold it for long. In Washington, the Obama administration had become increasingly alarmed by the rapid growth of ISIS in Syria. In the YPG and YPJ—the only military forces that appeared able to halt ISIS’s advance—they saw a valuable ally. The joint effort to rescue Yazidi civilians in Iraq from genocide at ISIS’s hands in August of 2014 also drew the two parties closer together. Accordingly, the United States sought to help the YPG/J in their conflict with ISIS, starting with the fight to retake Kobane. However, this stood to complicate the American alliance with Turkey, which, given its conflict with the PKK, was openly hostile to the PYD.164 Thus, rather than directly backing the PYD, U.S. forces in Syria oversaw the establishment of the Syrian Democratic Forces as an umbrella group anchored by the YPG and YPJ. Washington became directly involved in the war in Syria in way it had not in support of the FSA. American airstrikes against ISIS positions around Kobane began in October of 2014. With U.S. air support, Kurdish forces were able to retake the city in January of 2015.165 By April, they had retaken Hasakah and, by July, Tal Abyad. This left the Kurds in control of a long swath of the Syrian Turkish border, the United States directly involved in northern Syria, and the Turkish government deeply uneasy.166

THE REGIME RESURGENT

By the fall of 2014, the war in Syria had evolved into a series of interrelated conflicts playing out across the country. In addition to the fighting in the northeast between the PYD and ISIS there were sporadic battles between ISIS and various rebel groups, and sometimes between the Kurdish forces and the rebels as well.167 Moreover, the infighting among the rebels was worsening even as they continued to fight against the SAA and its allies. The remaining secular rebels were becoming badly weakened as they found themselves squeezed between the better-armed jihadists and the Syrian military. While the United States offered them diplomatic recognition and continued to provide some arms and training, it did not provide the antiaircraft weaponry that the rebels desperately

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wanted. Some rebel leaders complained that they were given just enough weaponry to keep them fighting, but not enough to allow them to win.168 By the fall, Jabhat al-Nusra had made significant gains around Idlib, at the expense of the remnants of the moderate FSA factions.169 Despite the loss of territory this represented, the advance of the more radical factions was broadly advantageous to the regime in several ways. Most obviously, a united opposition would have been far harder to defeat. The rise of the jihadists, especially ISIS, also redirected the focus of the United States and other international actors toward those groups and away from the regime itself.170 Meanwhile, the regime itself largely refrained from direct confrontations with ISIS; after the group seized Tabqa airbase and executed 150 soldiers in August of 2014 and public pressure mounted for a response, the SAA launched airstrikes but by and large was able to allow the rebels to fight among themselves and leave the United States and its allies to focus on ISIS.171 In other words, the emergence of ISIS and the other jihadist groups and the divisions among the rebels gave the regime some valuable breathing room. This alone would not have been enough to guarantee the regime a victory. Despite their infighting, by the spring of 2015, some of the rebels (led by the militant Salafist group Ahrar al-Sham) had cooperated effectively enough to complete the conquest of Idlib (which, by 2018, would be completely under the rule of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a coalition anchored by Jabhat al-Nusra which in 2016 changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham).172 The regime was not yet out of the proverbial woods. To guarantee its survival, it needed help from abroad. Foreign backing was not a new element of the regime’s strategy. Asad had relied heavily on support from Iran and Russia from the beginning. Iran, long Syria’s closest Middle Eastern ally, provided weapons, training for the regime’s irregular forces, and the assistance of its powerful Lebanese client militia, Hezbollah. Iran also offered strategic advice, helping develop the strategy deployed in the summer of 2013 of reinforcing the regime’s position in the major cities, rather than attempting to retake the entire country. Iran’s role became so extensive that some in the opposition alleged that Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Quds Force, a sort of special forces branch of the Iranian Revolutionary

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Guard Corps, was the real power in Syria, above even Bashar al-Asad himself.173 In 2015, however, it was Syria’s other major ally, Russia, that intervened to save the regime. Russia had been providing economic support for a long time. This included foreign aid and, in one instance, literal money: in late 2012 it delivered a batch of printed bank notes after EU sanctions prevented Syria from obtaining more from Austria. Russia also provided military aid, ranging from small arms, to anti-tank and antiaircraft guns, to fighter jets.174 In the fall of 2015, however, it shifted its support from providing assets to direct military intervention. In August, the Russian military began expanding Khmeimim Air Base outside Latakia into a major military installation. From there, beginning on September 30, it began launching air strikes across Syria.175 Buoyed by Russian support, the regime continued its advance over the following months. In August of 2016, regime forces surrounded Daraya, one of the last towns still governed locally and held by rebels with ties to the early days of the uprising. By the end of the month, its residents were evacuated to Idlib.176 But the regime’s most important victory was unquestionably in Aleppo, where the rebels still controlled much of the city’s east which had a population of 250,000. Before the war, east Aleppo had been a poorer working-class area where opposition to the regime was stronger than in the wealthier western part of the city. When the war came, that part of the city came under the control first of the organized opposition and then a collection of competing armed factions. Life in rebel-held east Aleppo was extremely difficult. Shortages of food, medicine, and fuel were common. Although the rebels bore some responsibility for the dismal living conditions in the areas they held, those conditions were also a direct (and intended) result of the regime’s tactics. As it advanced on opposition-held areas, the military used an approach known as surrender or starve for the two alternatives they offered. Regime and Russian forces would besiege an area and subject it to punishing bombardment while leaving a small escape route. Those who escaped would come once again under the government’s rule, and those who stayed would either starve or be killed in the bombing.

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These tactics were applied to Aleppo on a grand scale. Escalating bombardment by the regime destroyed the headquarters and vehicles of the civil defense (known as the White Helmets) in September, meaning that those trapped in the rubble after a bombing could not be rescued. The underground infrastructure developed during the siege, including schools and hospitals, were similarly destroyed, using bunker buster bombs.177 By December 12, 2016, the last remaining rebel-held areas of Aleppo had fallen to the regime’s forces—or, depending on one’s perspective, been liberated by them.178 Over the next two years, nearly all of the areas once held by the rebels were retaken. In the Damascus suburbs, SAA forces besieged the town of Madaya in the winter of 2016, leading to near-starvation conditions eventually alleviated by international aid.179 Eastern Ghouta, a collection of communities home to almost four hundred thousand people that had been the site of intense fighting since 2013, was retaken by the government in the spring of 2018 after a punishing bombardment.180 In July, Deraa, which had been under opposition rule (primarily by the Southern Front) since 2014, was retaken by the SAA, marking the defeat of the opposition in the south, a major loss.181 This in turn paved the way for the regime to reestablish control over the southern border with Jordan. One interview participant said, “they used to say when I was in Syria a while ago that al-Asad won when the Syrian-Jordanian borders were opened.”182 Meanwhile, as the SAA and Russian military were retaking territory held by the opposition, ISIS was steadily being defeated by the SDF and its allies. At its peak in August of 2014, ISIS’s ersatz caliphate covered territory inhabited by as many as 3.7 million people in Syria and Iraq, including the cities of Mosul (Iraq’s third largest) and Raqqa, its capital in Syria. This achievement, however, was short lived. Almost immediately, ISIS began to lose territory, and with it, its income from taxes, bribes, oil, and smuggled antiquities. The fall of Kobane in January 2015 was followed by its expulsion from the neighboring town of Tel Khamis. Late that spring and over the summer, the group lost a series of towns along the Syrian Turkish border to the Kurdish forces, and with them a crucial supply route. In 2016, it lost several key oil wells and refineries

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in Syria and Iraq as well as Syria’s Tishreen Dam and, in August, its remaining border crossings with Turkey.183 By November, the SDF was planning a final assault on Raqqa. Defiant, that winter ISIS very publicly destroyed large portions of the Roman ruins in Palmyra, which it had retaken from the regime in December, a move that was little more than a symbolic gesture.184 By May, the advance had begun. American bombing targeted Mosul, Raqqa, and the surrounding countryside, killing a great many civilians in the process.185 By the fall of 2017, ISIS had lost most of its territory. Raqqa fell to the SDF in mid-October, and SDF forces hoisted their flags over the city center in celebration. More than three thousand were killed in the fighting, including more than one thousand civilians.186 In November, after scrambling to beat the SDF there, regime forces drove ISIS from the last few neighborhoods it controlled in Deir Ezzor.187 By the end of the year, ISIS’s former “caliphate” had been reduced to a few villages. Although ISIS retained the ability to function militarily using both terrorist and insurgent tactics, it had ceased to be a major actor in the war, and most of the territory it had once held had been taken by SDF and the regime.188 In sum, by the end of 2018 the combination of the American and SDF campaign against ISIS, Russian and Iranian support, and infighting among the rebel forces meant that the regime appeared to be winning the war.

THE END OF THE REVOLUTION

By 2019, the Asad regime had recaptured much of what was once rebelheld Syria. The war was still not over, however, even though casualties were greatly reduced from the war’s early years. A number of territorial issues remained, and remain, unresolved. The governorate that posed the most immediate challenge for the regime was Idlib. As the SAA recaptured territory across Syria, Idlib, as the last rebel-held province, became a destination of last resort for both rebel fighters and civilians. By 2019, its population had doubled to three million. The displaced lived in increasingly desperate conditions, often without shelter or access to

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kitchens or sanitary facilities.189 Although initially governed by a patchwork of rebel forces, by the end of 2018 HTS had essentially taken over the governance of the territory. Initially, Turkey acted as the de facto guarantor of Idlib’s security, more or less guaranteeing to Russia that it would restrain the rebel forces there in exchange for which Russia and the Syrian government would leave Idlib alone. By the end of 2018, this deal appeared to be faltering. Russian and SAA forces were threatening a full-scale invasion, partially in part in response to HTS’s presence in the area.190 By spring, Idlib had become a war zone, the fighting so intense that it sent hundreds of thousands of people—some displaced for the third or fourth time—fleeing toward the dubious safety of the sealed Turkish border.191 By the time Turkey and Russia negotiated a cease-fire deal in March 2020, a million people in Idlib had been displaced, often to the dubious safety of UN-run displaced persons camps made especially perilous by the COVID-19 pandemic.192 Meanwhile, the Kurdish PYD remains in control of much of the northeast, amounting to about a third of Syria’s territory and a sizable proportion of its oil resources. A new simmering war has developed there between the SDF and Turkey and its Syrian proxy militias. In March of 2018, Turkey and its proxy force, the Syrian National Army (SNA) took control of Afrin and the surrounding area from the SDF. Since then, the SNA—among the most violent and least principled of the Syrian rebel forces193—has been accused of looting property from residents of Afrin and in some cases using Kurdish homes to house displaced Arabs from other parts of the country.194 The increasing Turkish presence in the northeast was made possible in part by the Trump administration’s erratic foreign policy regarding Syria. Turkey, never pleased with the American-Kurdish alliance or the presence of a Kurdish proto-state on its southern border, pressed Trump to allow it to take control of territory along the border. In December of 2018, Trump acceded to Erdogan’s request, announcing on Twitter, much to the surprise of the Pentagon, that the United States was pulling out of Syria. Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Special Envoy for Anti-ISIS Operations Brett McGurk both resigned in protest.195

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Although Trump’s foreign policy staff walked back the policy, ultimately leaving U.S. troops in place, this episode signaled a shift in U.S. support for the SDF. Eight months later, in October 2019, Trump essentially gave Turkey the green light to launch an operation, dubbed Operation Peace Spring, against the Kurdish autonomous region. Ostensibly intended to establish a safe zone for civilians along the border—or, as Erdogan put it in an address to members of the AKP, “to contribute to the territorial integrity and political union of Syria”196—it was essentially a bid to expel the PYD from some or all of its territory along the border. By the time a cease-fire had been negotiated by Russia and Turkey, Turkey had taken control of a nine-hundred-square-mile swath of territory along the border, and the Kurdish leadership, in desperation, had agreed to allow Syrian government forces onto their territory to try and hold back the Turkish advance.197 As of this writing, clashes continue in the area between the SDF and the SNA, and sometimes the Turkish military as well. In a 2019 survey of SDF fighters, 78 percent of Kurdish fighters and 45 percent of Arab fighters, who at this point probably make up a majority of the SDF, believed that Turkey posed the greatest threat to the region.198 One explanation for this shift in focus from ISIS to Turkey and its proxies is of course that ISIS was much weakened by the latter years of the war. On October 27, 2019, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi died by detonating a suicide vest during a U.S. raid.199 His most likely successor, ISIS spokesman Abu Hassan al-Muhajir, was killed during the same raid.200 Then, its new leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi, was killed by U.S. forces in Idlib in February 2022.201 His replacement, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, has kept a low profile.202 Nevertheless, despite its high turnover in leadership and loss of territory, ISIS has not disappeared. It retains the capacity to launch attacks in Syria and around the world, in places as geographically disparate as the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan border, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines.203 It has particularly expanded its operations in Africa. In December of 2019, the Islamic State West Africa Province released a video showing the murder of eleven people in Nigeria (whom it claimed, possibly incorrectly, were Christians) ostensibly in retaliation for the killing of Baghdadi.204

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It has also cultivated relationships with affiliated groups in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although these appear to be alliances of convenience rather than genuine commitment, it has allowed ISIS to claim responsibility for attacks in both countries.205 In Afghanistan, especially since the withdrawal of American forces in 2021, its local affiliate has continued to challenge the authority of the Taliban by attacking ethnic and religious minorities.206 Nor has the group disappeared from Syria. In January 2022, ISIS fighters launched an operation against the SDF-run Sinaa prison in Hasakah, in a failed attempt to free the 3,500 fighters held inside, along with seven hundred boys, mostly the children of ISIS fighters.207 A further dilemma for the SDF is posed by the nearly sixty thousand civilians—including Syrians and ten thousand foreign nationals—held in the al-Hol detention camp. Most are the wives and children of ISIS fighters. Although only a minority appear to be hardcore ISIS loyalists, the camp’s terrible conditions make it a potential site for a resurgence of ISIS in Syria.208

WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE PEACE

Today, the Syrian government controls around 60 percent of Syria’s territory, though what “control” means varies a good deal across the country. Russia and Iran exercise a great deal of power in Syria, vying for influence over the military and economy. In some parts of the country, paramilitary forces supporting the regime operate with impunity, some of which—most notably the Tiger Forces militia—engage in looting and abusing the civilian population. In some areas, disappearances or abductions remain common. Access to government services is uneven—in the south, areas that negotiated capitulation agreements with the SAA are more likely to have them than those which were taken by force. Even in areas controlled by the government in Damascus, however, elements of resistance remain and protests still occasionally break out. In 2019, after a statue of Hafez al-Asad was reerected in Deraa’s Tishreen Square, protesters there chanted “Freedom forever, in spite of you Asad.”209

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Some aspects of normalcy have returned—the Jordanian-Syrian border reopened in 2018, and some of Syria’s neighbors have begun taking steps toward normalization with Asad’s government. In other ways, however, the Syria over which Asad’s government presides today is damaged almost beyond recognition. Many of its major cities—including Aleppo, formerly its economic capital—have been shattered by bombs, and their populations scattered both within and outside Syria. The combination of mass displacement and casualties of war has reduced the country’s population from twenty-one to seventeen million, seven million of whom are displaced within Syria. The country’s demographics have been transformed as well, as young men fled the country, or fought and died.210 The population that remains has been plunged into poverty. In the summer of 2020, the Syrian currency collapsed. In 2011, it had traded at forty-seven lira to the dollar. By June 2020, it was at three thousand to the dollar, wiping out the value of whatever savings most Syrians still had left, and making the salaries of even government employees and military officers effectively worthless.211 In February 2021, the World Food Program estimated that 12.4 million Syrians were food insecure. In twelve months, food prices more than tripled and the price of heating oil quintupled.212 The Syrian government has, as of this writing, done little to address the crisis. Moreover, it is likely to worsen. Syria’s reconstruction will be expensive and difficult; the United Nations has estimated that it will cost as much as $400 billion, money that the Syrian government does not have and that its allies Russia and Iran, themselves the targets of American sanctions, will be hard pressed to provide.213 Signs indicate that economic pressure has already caused friction within the regime. In the spring of 2020, even before the Syrian pound went into freefall, Asad’s cousin and ally Rami Makhlouf, who is rumored to control as much as 60 percent of the Syrian economy, posted a series of videos on Facebook complaining about government interference in his businesses.214 One interpretation of this unusually public spat is that the government, badly in need of cash, decided to reach into Makhlouf’s well-stocked coffers.

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This is not to say that no one is doing well in the current Syrian economy. The drug trade is booming, specifically the export of captagon, an amphetamine used widely in the Middle East. Since 2019, tens of millions of pills shipped from Syria—more than 250 million—have been seized by police in Greece, Italy, Malaysia, and elsewhere, an eighteenfold increase over four years. A 2021 investigation by the New York Times found that the drug trade is directly controlled by the Syrian government, managed in part by Bashar’s brother Maher. Given  U.S. sanctions, the trade in captagon (and increasingly other drugs, such as methamphetamine) represents a crucial source of foreign exchange. Joel Rayburn, the Trump administration’s Syria envoy, described the Syrian government as “the drug cartel.”215 The other way Syrian elites stand to benefit financially from the war is the reconstruction process, which in some areas has already begun. One consequence of the air strikes on opposition-held areas was the demolition of entire towns and neighborhoods. In some cases, these were informal settlements home to the very poorest Syrians, who often held only customary title to their homes and land. The destruction and displacement of these communities created an opportunity for the state to assert administrative control over the land in question, which was sometimes in quite valuable locations. Once expropriated by the state, it could then be turned to the regime’s economic advantage via reconstruction projects managed by public-private partnerships led by Asad’s political and economic allies. Meanwhile, those displaced, especially outside Syria, often have no way of proving ownership of their homes. Property not destroyed by the war has sometimes been seized by the state as abandoned by those forced to flee.216 Overall, after more than a decade of violence and more than six hundred thousand casualties, the Syrian state remains weakened. The country is in a precarious economic state, large pieces of territory remain outside state control, and both state and nonstate armed groups remain active on Syrian soil. It is true that the optimistic goals of the Syrian uprising in 2011—dignity for Syrian citizens and accountability for those in power—have not been achieved. The regime has avoided

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losing the war, but it has not exactly won, either. The Syrian people, however, have lost a great deal.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the war’s various stages—the early revolt of 2012, the sectarianization of the war and eruption of the conflict in the northeast, the regime’s Russian-backed resurgence, and the shift into a simmering conflict in a weak and divided state—and across its many subconflicts are a number of common themes. One is the importance of foreign support. Without Russia and Iran, the Asad regime would not have survived. Russian weapons and ammunition were key to the government’s military strategy, particularly the use of air power to subdue pro-rebel cities and towns. When Russia became directly involved in 2015, it tipped the balance back in Asad’s favor. Similarly, without American backing, the SDF would have had a far harder fight against ISIS, and when President Trump abruptly withdrew that support, the SDF was unable to defend itself against Turkey. Similarly, the final loss of American support for the rebels in the south proved similarly disastrous to the rebel forces there. The factions that do remain depend heavily on support from foreign donors in the Gulf and, in the case of the SNA, from Turkey. At times, intervention in Syria has had complicated consequences for the countries involved. Most obviously, Russian and American soldiers have been killed in Syria, as have fighters from Hezbollah. In 2013, ISIS launched a series of suicide bombing attacks in Shi’ite areas of Lebanon, targeting Hezbollah and its civilian constituency. For Turkey, the war has not only led to attacks against Kurds on Turkish soil—notably ISIS’s bombing of a peace march in Ankara in October 2015 that killed more than one hundred people and further worsened relations between the ruling AK Party and the Kurdish political movement—but also contributed to the final collapse of the peace process with the PKK. It also placed a serious strain on Turkey’s relationship with the United States.217

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The other constant has been the persistent and widespread commission of atrocities against civilians by all participants in the conflict. As discussed in greater depth in chapters 3 and 4, ISIS targeted civilians both deliberately and indiscriminately, implemented a draconian legal code that included floggings and public executions, and abducted thousands of women and girls, subjecting them to rape and enslavement. Religious minorities were particular targets of violence, and ISIS has been charged with genocide against the Yazidi people.218 Various rebel factions have also been credibly accused of war crimes including torture, disappearances, summary executions, and other forms of violence, often against religious minorities, especially Alawites.219 More recently, Turkish-backed rebels have been accused of atrocities against Kurdish civilians in the north.220 Nor is the SDF exempt from criticism; the group has faced allegations of torture in its prisons.221 It is the Asad regime, however, with its access to an air force and the assistance of the Russian military, that has been responsible for the vast majority of the casualties in the war. It has besieged and starved rebel-held towns, used barrel bombs and other “conventional” weapons against civilian targets as well as internationally banned chemical weapons.222 Its security forces have committed other atrocities, including mass arrests, torture, execution of prisoners without trial, and “disappearances” of dissidents.223 Much of this violence continues today. In the following chapters, I explore how participants in the war explain who they are and why they are fighting, and how this has in turn shaped the patterns of violence over the course of the war.

2 WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?

A

s is clear from the history presented in the previous chapter, the Syrian civil war evolved a great deal over the course of a decade. It has also been understood and explained very differently by its many participants. These competing explanations are the focus of this chapter. Specifically, the chapter explores the five broad narratives promoted by the various participants in the conflict or by Syrian civilians themselves. For some, the war was (or perhaps is) a fight for dignity and democracy; for others, a sectarian conflict, or a defensive war against terrorism; for still others, an ethnonationalist conflict or a proxy war. Some of these narratives are shared by multiple parties to the conflict, others by only one or two. The first three—dignity and democracy, sectarian conflict, and counterterrorism—are each the primary narrative of the war for at least one party to the conflict; the latter two are secondary narratives for many actors. The importance of narratives in general, and these five in particular, appears either directly or indirectly in a good deal of the existing scholarship on Syria. Lisa Wedeen’s classic prewar examination of authoritarianism under Hafez al-Asad, Ambiguities of Domination, argues that public embrace of the state’s narratives was a key pillar of Syrian authoritarianism. The regime both derived and demonstrated its power through the enforcement of participation in a cult of devotion to Asad

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as a symbol of the state, through the repetition of the regime’s political script. The state therefore enforced its authority not only through the promotion of an official narrative through the state media— Wedeen describes state newspapers as “widely considered to be functional table-cloths, rather than respected records of current events”1— but also by forcing Syrians to actively participate in the promotion of that narrative.2 This strategy appears to have continued under Bashar al-Asad as well. More recent work has examined the narratives promoted during the war. Daniel Corstange and Erin York also describe the Syrian war as being at least in part “a war of narratives.” Using experimental methods, they find that the narratives to which ordinary Syrians were exposed shape their understanding of the war in important ways. Government supporters who were exposed to a sectarian narrative in isolation did indeed see the conflict in sectarian terms, but when other narrative frames were introduced, this effect disappeared.3 Other work focuses on the narratives of the war that combatants promote via the media. Marc Lynch, Deen Freelon, and Sean Aday argue that the opposition activists sought to leverage media coverage to present a narrative of a “peaceful, pro-Western uprising” while the Asad regime tried to portray them as Saudi and Qatari backed Islamic radicals.4 Cesare Scartozzi diagnoses the regime’s approach similarly, arguing that it has become more successful in defining the narrative over time.5 Research on the experiences of Syrian refugees explores the narratives through which Syrian civilians make sense of the war either as a way of social boundary formation (as in Kathrin Bachleitner’s work) or as shared understanding of the nature of the war (as in Wendy Pearlman’s).6 In other words, existing work on the war highlights the importance of narratives for its various participants as well as for Syrian civilians in understanding the nature of the conflict. Taken together, it suggests competing understandings of the war as a fight for democracy and human rights versus a sectarian conflict, or as an indigenous Syrian uprising versus a radical jihadist movement driven by outsiders. I think it is analytically useful, based on the rhetoric of the combatants, to further disaggregate these narratives into five categories.

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First, it is helpful to disaggregate the sectarian narrative from a narrative of the war as a fight for secular order against a jihadist threat. The former division is determined by specific sectarian content; the latter is about a broader orientation toward the nature of political order. Second, a narrative that frames the war, or one of its subconflicts, in ethnonationalist terms should be treated as distinct from a sectarian narrative, given the nature of the political claims made by and about communities defined by religious versus ethnolinguistic identity. The political debates about the balance of power between Syrians of different religious backgrounds—particularly the position of Alawites— concern political authority in Syria as a whole, whereas questions about the status of the Kurdish minority in Syria are about Kurdish membership in the Syrian polity in the first place. Although not all Kurds favor secession or regional autonomy, these issues are on the table in Kurdish politics in way they are not in Syria’s sectarian debates. This chapter therefore examines sectarianism and ethnonationalism separately. Finally, proxy warfare is included as a separate narrative because even though it certainly overlaps with other narratives here, it also functions separately and is understood that way by many Syrians. Sectarian solidarity, counterterrorism, or democratization are sometimes offered as reasons for intervention by foreign powers but may not necessarily be the only or even most important interests for those intervening. More important, such explanations are not universally convincing to the Syrian public. From the perspective of many of the Syrians interviewed, intervention in and influence over Syria were objectives in and of themselves for the intervening states, or a way of resolving disputes that had nothing to do with Syria itself. I therefore treat it as a separate narrative even though it was not the primary narrative for any of the warring parties. I also recognize that many other scholars use narrative as a concept slightly differently than I use it here. Perhaps a closer analog would be the term strategic narrative as used by international relations scholars.7 However, given that it can be difficult to assess just how strategic (that is, deliberate) the various actors in Syria have been in deploying their chosen narrative, I have elected to stick with “narrative.”

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As I use the term, each of these narratives of the war does several things. Most simply, each explains what the war is “really” about by positing one division (and the grievances that accompany it) as the most important in defining the purpose of the war. By extension, each narrative also conveys to its audience that those on the opposite side represent a (even the most) serious threat to Syria, Syrians, or some subset thereof. In this sense, each narrative offers a template for how violence in Syria should be organized; by defining threat in a specific way, each narrative therefore has implications for how those fighting in Syria “should” be behaving, although, as discussed in chapter 3, the disconnect in practice is often substantial. Rather than exploring how each of the actors in the war see it, this chapter is instead organized around the narratives themselves as a way of highlighting the sometimes-surprising commonalities among actors who are openly antagonistic to one another. I explore these narratives and how the various parties articulate them. These characterizations clearly matter in their own right, in that they reflect how the war was understood by those fighting it.

DIGNITY AND DEMOCRACY

For many Syrians—especially the early secular opposition and, in a slightly different form, the PYD—the civil war is framed in largely ideological terms, as a struggle for human dignity and a democratic future. This is striking, given the substantial differences in their political objectives: For the opposition, this narrative is characterized by an emphasis on political freedom, individual dignity, and anger at the Asad regime’s corruption and brutality, whereas the PYD’s objectives focus on the establishment of their preferred system of decentralized governance (known as democratic confederalism) along with greater political rights for women and minorities. Nevertheless, both frame the war as a struggle between an adversary seeking to impose a form of violent authoritarianism, whether Asad or ISIS, and those fighting for

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human dignity and a more just system of government. Moreover, both root their narratives in universalist values such as human rights and freedom from oppression, and both intentionally draw connections between their movements and others around the world. However, these narratives are articulated differently and produce different forms of performative politics from each. For the opposition, this took the form of coordinated and themed mass protests, documented on YouTube and elsewhere. Meanwhile, the PYD, with its smaller base of support, leaned on more traditional leftist rhetoric and propaganda, some of it disseminated online. The two groups also openly distrusted one another. Nevertheless, both saw the objectives of the war in at least superficially similar terms. For members of the nonviolent secular opposition who participated in the early stages of the Syrian uprising, this narrative manifests as a number of specific grievances. Perhaps the most prominent is a demand for dignity and greater freedom. In interviews with both activists and former FSA members, the Syrian conflict was often described in terms such as “a people’s war against injustice”8 or a “ ‘thawret al-karama,’ [a] revolution for dignity . . . a revolution for social justice and a rule-based state.” 9 Similar phrases appeared in protest chants and memes circulated online.10 The first of the nationwide Friday protests organized via the “Syrian Revolution” Facebook page was even dubbed the Day of Dignity.11 One longtime dissident explained that “When you live in a state and feel that you have no rights, you feel that you are not allowed to travel, there are these things which make you feel you have no dignity and your dignity is destroyed.” She described the demands of the revolution as “freedom and dignity from the government [and] a just constitution that respected human rights.”12 Another activist explained, “It’s my dignity. It’s my freedom. You know if you touch or taste the meaning of the freedom you will fight for this word. You will ask others to fight for this word.”13 Others (including members of the Druze and Alawite minorities who felt they had been comparatively privileged under the Asads’ rule) noted that they wanted freedom and dignity not only for themselves, but for their fellow Syrians as well.14

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In some cases, this demand was framed in terms of specific political rights and freedoms. One activist explained, “we wanted to live like all the people in the world, to have democracy, freedom [of] speech, freedom of belief, to elect our representatives, to ya’ani—to be a democratic state, you know?”15 This sometimes involved explicit comparison with the political rights enjoyed in Europe and North America: “I remember my friends every time we passed by the U.S. embassy in Damascus, they were like [salutes] to the flag, and we laugh and I say, ‘why you do that?’ And they say, ‘one day we’re going to be like the U.S., you know?’ And this is the dream that they have, actually, people want to be like the U.S., like Europe, they want to live freely.”16 Beyond the general emphasis on political freedom and individual dignity, this narrative also emphasizes the specific repressiveness of the Asad regime, including both Hafez and Bashar. Several interviewees described the murders of family members by regime forces, torture by the police, lengthy prison sentences, lost jobs and homes, and a stifling political environment that left no room for dissent. One former activist described the uprising as primarily a search for “a new political life” after decades of rule by the Asads.17 Another explained that the Asad family “sees Syria as its farm and sees the people of Syria as their slaves.”18 Nor was this limited to civilian dissidents. One former SAA officer who defected to the Free Syrian Army described the surveillance and internal reviews that military officers experienced, although he noted that as an officer he had somewhat more freedom than the general public. Syria under the Baath Party, he said, was “much worse than North Korea.”19 A second specific grievance focused on corruption. One interviewee cited the use of wasta (that is, cronyism or nepotism) in hiring decisions.20 Another described the share that Asad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf held in most large businesses in the country, as well as the Asad family’s theft of income from the port and its control of Syria’s natural resources.21 Both women were from families with connections to the military. Still another pointed to the way the regime expropriated the property of those killed in the conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime

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in the 1970s and 1980s. It was, she said, a “mafia system,”22 a word several others used as well.23 Even “Marwan,” a Syrian living abroad from a middle-class family who was skeptical that the uprising was understood by most participants as being about democracy believed that it reflected real resentments against the Syrian elite, refracted through the politics of class, education, and religion.24 At the same time, however, this narrative rejected sectarian language. Many of those involved in the early protests described the multisectarian nature of the movement, and several pointed out that they were themselves Alawites or members of other religious minorities.25 As opposition activist “Firas” put it, “I’ve been in the demonstrations . . . They say al shaab yureed isqat al nizam [the people want the fall of the regime]. . . . they didn’t say al shaab want to kill the Alawites.”26 The regime’s violent response to the protests (described in more depth in chapter 3) became folded into this narrative as well. In the beginning, one activist explained, “people wanted democracy and freedom without any demand to overthrow the government, it was more about fixing the government and making it better. But when the regime was monstrous in its reactions and killed people, there were more demands to overthrow the government instead.”27 Another, “Maha,” shared her family’s specific tragedy: “One of the people who fell a victim to the massacre was my brother. . . . He was a junior in college studying law. When this incident happened in August 2012, he was still protesting peacefully in the uprising. If I were in the ruling administration, I wouldn’t have launched a massacre against the people for demanding their rights.”28 One implication of this narrative is that the entire war could have been avoided had the regime been willing to cooperate with the protesters’ demands for reform. Instead, it created its own adversaries. Some of those interviewed—including former SAA officers who defected— described the emergence of the FSA as a reaction to the regime’s brutality.29 This narrative also draws connections between the conflict in Syria and other struggles elsewhere. Many of those interviewed described the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and the other Arab Spring states as a source of inspiration for the uprising in Syria,30 framing “the revolution” as part

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of a wider call for justice, dignity, and democracy across the Arab world, even if these demands were not always terribly well defined.31 At other times, regime opponents—particularly those who identified as secular and nonviolent—drew connections to other social movements around the world in ways that often appear strategic. When protests against the murder of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis broke out across the United States in the summer of 2020, activists in the town of Binnish outside Idlib painted a mural of George Floyd’s face with the words “I Can’t Breathe” above it, in an echo of the images and slogans associated with the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States.32 Images of the mural then circulated on social media. The village of Kafr Nabel (also spelled Kafranbel) became especially associated with this kind of activism. Its residents produced witty and pointed banners and posters in English and Arabic criticizing the Asad regime, responding to developments in the war, and addressing events in the wider world, which were shared on its Facebook page. One banner from 2013 was dedicated to Trayvon Martin and read, “Martin Family! The Syrians Are the Best Who Know What It’s Like to Lose Loved Ones by Immune Criminals.” It was signed “The Syrian Revolution 15 7 13.” Another, produced in 2014, also bore the phrase “I Can’t Breathe,” in response to the death of Eric Garner at the hands of police in New York City. Later comments on that post drew an explicit connection between Floyd’s death and the murder of the Kafr Nabel activist Raed Fares, likely by Jabhat al-Nusra (discussed in greater depth in chapter 3).33 These messages are a strategic way of drawing attention to events in Syria, but they also cannily position the Syrian uprising as part of a wider struggle. A former U.S. State Department official recalled being astonished and deeply impressed with the sophistication of the work being done by the opposition media—it was, he said, “next level stuff—no one had ever seen anything like that before coming out of the Middle East.”34 The Kurdish PYD and its associated armed groups also promote a narrative of the conflict as a fight to establish some form of democracy in Syria, contrasting their movement with both the Asad regime and with the opposition. This narrative is in some ways an outgrowth

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of—or at least necessitated by—the PYD’s ideology. The core of the group’s current ideological project is the concept of democratic confederalism as articulated by the American anarchist theorist Murray Bookchin.35 After PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan was arrested in 1999, he read Bookchin’s work while in prison and was deeply impressed. He subsequently shifted the PKK’s ideology away from the combination of Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish secessionism that characterized its first two decades and toward Bookchin’s ecologically focused, locally oriented, anarcho-socialism.36 The PYD also looks to Öcalan as its ideological leader. Accordingly, democratic confederalism was also adopted by the Syrian Kurdish PYD and has served as the political blueprint for their proto-state in northeastern Syria. This has had two important implications for the ways in which the PYD’s leadership and members understand and explain the Syrian war. First, they emphasize the conflict as a struggle to build a direct, local democracy, focused less on state institutions and borders and more on local civil society and mass participation. Rojava’s Social Contract (essentially its constitution) uses the word democratic 137 times in the document’s seventeen pages.37 Second, because this ideological project rejects statism and ethnonationalism, the PYD’s leaders are able to frame it as applicable not only to what it refers to as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria but also, at least theoretically, to Syria as whole. This is also in some ways an extension of the PYD’s efforts to win over the non-Kurdish population of northeastern Syria, driven in part by its reliance on the Arab factions fighting with the Syrian Democratic Forces. By extension, this ideological approach is also present in the way the PYD and its armed wings talk about the war. For instance, the YPG media office’s website features a slogan across the top of its Englishlanguage page that reads “Securing Rojava in a free and democratic Syria.” The Arabic and Kurdish slogans are slightly different, translating as “Securing a free Rojava and a democratic Syria.”38 It is unclear whether this was simply a translation error or a deliberate choice. Leaders in the organization also reference the establishment of democracy in Syria when talking about their objectives in the conflict, especially

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to foreign audiences. In a 2014 BBC interview, then PYD chair Salih Muslim responded to a question about whether the PYD was fighting to establish a separate Kurdish state by saying, “No, not at all. We said from the beginning—I mean, we are [a] democratic force …we are trying to establish a democratic Syria, a democratic plural Syria for future, and what we are doing is a part of this solution at the end.”39 It is striking how much this emphasis on democracy echoes the goals expressed by the secular opposition. Like the opposition’s, the PYD’s messaging includes not only a general condemnation of authoritarianism but also a specific critique of the repressiveness of the Syrian state. Staff interviewed at the Northeastern Syrian Mission in Berlin (essentially the PYD’s embassy in Germany—the office doorbell was labeled “Rojava”) explicitly pointed to the 2004 Qamishli uprising as evidence of the Kurdish movement’s long-standing opposition to the Baathist regime.40 In media interviews, PYD officials sometimes display a defensiveness against charges of collusion with the Asad regime.41 They often reference the history of Kurdish antiregime activism42 as well as state repression against Syria’s Kurds.43 Unlike the opposition’s, however, the PYD’s primary adversary for most of the war was not the Asad regime but ISIS, though eventually it became embroiled in a conflict with Turkey and its Syrian proxies as well. Much of the PYD’s rhetoric frames ISIS—with reasonable accuracy—as a violently authoritarian and misogynist extremist movement. It is both a security threat and an ideological foil. Both former PYD chair Salih Muslim and Syrian Democratic Council co-chair Ilham Ahmed have publicly positioned the multisectarian democratic project pursued by the PYD as a direct threat to ISIS, and argued that ISIS’s autocratic governance is part of what makes the movement so objectionable.44 The YPG’s main YouTube channel includes, among others, a whole subgenre of videos devoted to depicting ISIS’s brutality toward civilians (discussed in more depth in chapter 4). In one video from 2017, a truck full of women and children arrive from ISIS-held Raqqa. One woman weeps, recounting how her husband was killed by a mortar strike on their house. Another pulls off her black abaya, the robe women were forced to wear in ISIS-held areas, under which she is wearing a dress of the kind more

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commonly worn by rural Syrian women, and yells, “someone give me a lighter, I’m going to burn this thing.” A man smiles while telling a barber to shave off his beard, another rule enforced by ISIS.45 Another video, descriptively titled “Why are the Kurds fighting to liberate Raqqa?,” touts the value of Arab and Kurdish cooperation in the SDF against ISIS, and describes Turkey as supporting ISIS and other jihadist factions against the interests of Syrians, Kurdish and Arab alike.46 In a third, YPJ spokesperson Nesrin Ebdullah draws a connection between the authoritarianism of the Asad regime, the emergence of ISIS, and Turkey’s role in the region, saying, “Erdogan has some weird dreams, like being emperor of the Middle East, or creating an Erdoganic empire.”47 These are only a few examples but are representative of some of the broad themes in the PYD’s messaging around the war. This leads to a second component of this narrative for the PYD: like the secular opposition, it touts its commitment to universal values and draws links to social movements abroad. A quick search for “Rojava” on YouTube generates pages of videos, mostly by Western leftists, anarchists, and communists, praising the “Rojava Revolution” as a real-world manifestation of anarchist and Marxist principles, and encouraging Western leftists to support it in any way possible.48 A more extreme manifestation of this trend has been the formation of units of Western fighters who have come to Syria to fight with the YPG/J in what some of them see as a modern version of the International Brigades formed to fight the fascists during the Spanish Civil War.49 This even included a brigade of queer international fighters known as The Queer Insurrection and Liberation Army, or TQILA, whose slogans included “these faggots kill fascists,” although it is unclear how substantial this group was in reality.50 Beyond these connections to the global Left, the leaders of the PYD and in particular the SDF and its legislative body, the Syrian Democratic Council have sought to emphasize the Kurdish movement’s commitment to a broader set of liberal democratic values. Salih Muslim explained: “We found by protecting ourselves, protecting our democracy, we are just defending all the humanitarian values: democracy, brotherness, women’s rights, the equality between the women and the men, even the secularism for the religious people, for the believers. All

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these are the values of the West, of Europe, of the community which we are looking for.”51 Another of these principles is a rejection of sectarianism or ethnonationalism, which is often rhetorically linked to the PYD’s democratic project. Kurdish political leaders tout the presence of Arabs fighting under the umbrella of the SDF which, by 2020, was probably majority Arab.52 In describing the importance of the defense of Kobane against ISIS, YPG military leader Polat Can framed the town as being broadly symbolic of “democratic and peaceful existence” because of the support the YPG enjoyed from “all ethnicities in the region, including Syriacs, Arabs, Chechens and Turcomans” as well as the presence of “fighters from many other nations in our ranks.” Kobane, he said, “is no longer an issue for Kurds, Syria or Kurdistan, but it also belongs to the whole world.”53 Ilham Ahmed has pointed to cross-sectarian cooperation as a core component of the democratic political project being pursued by the PYD and SDF; when describing cooperation between Kurdish and Arab fighters in the defense of Deir Ezzor and later of Kurdish territory in the northeast, she explained, “This is what a free and democratic society means. Neither in Syria nor in the Middle East, you can’t find a second example.”54 There are, then, clear similarities between the version of the “democracy and dignity” narrative articulated by the secular opposition in the early stages of the uprising and by the PYD later on. Both refer to broad, universalist principles such as human rights and democracy; both seek connections to movements outside Syria; and both reject sectarianism, at least rhetorically. That said, the version of this narrative as the Kurdish forces articulate it differs in three ways from the way the opposition frames it. One, as noted, is the focus on ISIS rather than the regime as an adversary. Another is the PYD’s leftist political orientation: although the secular opposition does include members of the long-repressed Syrian left, the PYD is committed to a specific ideological project. Despite its leaders’ rhetorical focus on Syria itself in their public statements, the organization has historically been linked with the PKK’s transnational Kurdish leftism, which in the 1980s and 1990s took an especially austere form,

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referred to by some former members as Stalinist.55 Although the PYD has demonstrated at least some flexibility in adapting both to the pressures of the Syrian context and the demands of its U.S. allies, its ideological roots are quite different from those of much of the Syrian opposition. A third distinction—closely related to the other two—is the PYD’s explicit focus on women’s rights. This has long been a core feature of first the PKK’s and then the PYD’s ideology,56 as expressed in Öcalan’s writing,57 and it is frequently mentioned by Kurdish political leaders and fighters in explaining their hostility to ISIS.58 Stories of ISIS fighters’ fear of being killed by the female soldiers of the YPJ are almost certainly exaggerated, but ISIS’s exclusion of women from public life and its widespread practice of enslavement and rape creates a particularly sharp ideological contrast with the PYD.59 Insofar as women’s liberation is central to the PYD’s larger narrative of the conflict as a fight for human liberation, this aspect of its ideology reinforces its antagonism toward ISIS and frames the war against it as being at least in part a fight for democracy and women’s rights. Overall, the dignity and democracy narrative explains the war as a fight to establish a more democratic Syria, drawing on universalized values such as democracy and human rights. It is articulated, in slightly different ways, both by the opposition (or at least some segments of it) and the Kurdish PYD. Yet these groups view each other with something between suspicion and overt hostility. This mutual distrust is not particularly surprising. Most obviously, the two groups have different long-term goals regarding the Syrian state and the degree of autonomy that individual regions should enjoy. Part of their mutual distrust is also a function of the fact neither really believes that the other is genuinely committed to the narrative it publicly espouses. For the opposition, Kurdish claims to support democracy are understood as a smokescreen for what is really an ethnonationalist project. For the PYD, the presence of Islamists in the opposition makes them inherently untrustworthy. Neither, in other words, entirely believes the other’s version of this narrative.

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SECTARIANISM

A second narrative posits that the most important cleavage in Syria is between religious groups, framing both the struggle for power and use of violence as organized along sectarian lines, and linking divisions between Sunnis and Alawites in Syria with regional divisions between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims. This is in turn mapped onto wider alliance patterns, particularly the alliance between the Shi’ite Islamic Republic of Iran and Alawite-led Syria, which puts Syria at odds with much of the rest of the Sunni Arab world.60 Politics in Syria have long had a sectarian tinge, though it would be a mistake to view them in entirely sectarian terms. Before the war, sectarian differences were both present and forbidden to acknowledge publicly. Alawites made up approximately 12 percent of the population by 2011. As members of that minority, the Asads had a strong incentive to downplay sectarian differences in favor of a common Arab identity. Baathism’s ideological emphasis on a pan-Arab, rather than Muslim, identity was particularly appealing in this sense.61 Overtly sectarian ideologies—such as that articulated by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s and 1980s—were brutally suppressed.62 This iron fist approach did have the effect of reducing sectarian conflict; one former resident of Damascus’ Old City noted that before 1970 sectarian conflict had been much higher across its various neighborhoods.63 But despite the veil of silence around sectarian identity, it was still understood to shape politics in Syria in important ways. It was widely believed—with some accuracy—that Alawites filled many important positions in the state, military, and even the economy. One interviewee, herself an Alawite from Latakia, said that “the authority and positions are always in the hands of the Alawīyah sect or party. They have special and big preferences in the government. This I felt because I belong to this sect. I used to see that I was given some privileges when I was in university or at school or at anything.” 64 Power was not entirely concentrated in the hands of the Alawite elite—many powerful Sunni families in

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Damascus had ties to the regime as well, and Bashar’s wife, Asma alAsad, is herself Sunni. Many military officers and most of the Damascus business elite were as well. It is also true, however, that some of the regime’s closest allies, who benefited from the cronyism and corruption that characterized the Syrian economy under the Asads, were Alawite.65 In the military, Alawites were somewhat disproportionately represented in the professional officer corps, whereas conscripts were more representative of the country as a whole.66 Meanwhile, Syria’s minorities also experienced episodes of exclusion or discrimination. At a panel discussion on Syria’s future held in Berlin—a more open environment for such a discussion than would have been possible in Syria—Alawite and Ismaili Syrians described sometimes tense social relations with their Sunni neighbors.67 At the same time though, most concurred that before the war intracommunal relationships had been peaceful.68 Indeed, a consistent theme in interviews with Syrians of all political stripes was a deep pride in and nostalgia for the peaceful relations among Syrians of different religious backgrounds before the war. Even now, a journalist who had relocated to Jordan told me, in “a lot of . . . towns . . . inside Syria, Alawite, and Sunni living together.” His village near Hama, he told me proudly, was an example.69 Two other interviewees, neither of whom were Christian, said explicitly that they thought Syria should have a Christian as a president, saying that the Christians were good people.70 Many of those interviewed went out of their way to note, with real sincerity, that they rejected sectarianism. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Syrian uprising and then its descent into civil war, a variety of actors emerged who quickly latched onto sectarian identities to drive their narrative of the conflict. Chief among these were the groups variously labeled jihadists, Salafists, or Islamists, which included both larger groups, such as Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, and ISIS, and a panoply of smaller, local groups. Among these organizations, ISIS stands out for the zeal with which it applied a sectarian framework to explain its participation in the conflict. Much of its outward-facing rhetoric positions the war as part of a much wider, global struggle between Muslims (narrowly defined) and

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all others. One place this is particularly evident is in the propaganda they produce for foreign audiences. Between 2014 and 2017, ISIS published two glossy magazines titled Dabiq and Rumiyah, intended to promote the organization, its ideology, and its political goals to audiences in English, French, Russian, and other languages. In these publications, the war is described not as a conflict over the future of Syria, but as a sectarian conflict reflecting a broader global struggle, in which the non-Arabic speaking readers of these publications might also believe themselves to have a stake. The Asad regime—consistently referred to as “the Nusayri regime,” a pejorative term for Alawite—is entirely conflated with the Alawite sect. Alawites are frequently and almost offhandedly described as apostates, the killing of whom is not only acceptable but required.71 Similarly, Shi’ites are described as Rafidāh, also a pejorative term.72 Hezbollah is referred to as Hizbul-Lat (a play of the name of a pre-Islamic pagan goddess, implying that Shi’ites are polytheists)73 and as Bashar al-Asad’s Rafidi allies.74 Indeed, the editors dedicated an entire issue of Dabiq to the denigration of Shi’ite religious beliefs and justification of violence against them. One article is largely devoted to a comparison of Shi’ites and Jews, which is hostile to both: These are the Rāfidah. Initiated by a sly Jew, they are an apostate sect drowning in worship of the dead, cursing the best companions and wives of the Prophet (PBUH) spreading doubt on the very basis of the religion (the Qur’ān and the Sunnah), defaming the very honor of the Prophet (PBUH), and preferring their “twelve” imāms to the prophets and even to Allah! Their hordes of followers all partake in the apostasy of their heads and leaders.75

Other religious groups are described in similarly adversarial tones. Christians are compared with swine (a particularly vile insult in Arabic),76 referred to as Crusaders and dhimmis,77 violence against whom is halal (permitted) as long as they have not submitted to the Islamic State.78 Even though some of this rhetoric is framed around the acceptability of targeting civilians in Europe and the United States, it is also explained in explicitly theological and sectarian terms,79 at one point stating simply,

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“We hate you first and foremost because you are disbelievers.”80 Nor are smaller, less militarily threatening minorities spared—attacks on the Druze, for instance, are also justified in religious terms.81 Shi’ites, Alawites, and others are described as threatening to Sunnis, and the Islamic State as Sunnis’ only source of protection: “After Allah, you have nothing but the Islamic State to protect your religion, safeguard your authority, and bolster your strength, a state wherein you can either live with glory or die with dignity, without the lowly Rafidāh, wicked Nusayriyyah, and vile atheists daring to touch your honor.”82 ISIS’s ideologues appear to be convinced that this narrative—that the war is part of a global sectarian fight—is a core feature of the conflict not only for them, but also for the wider (Sunni) Syrian public. In their outward-facing propaganda, secular democracy and Syrian nationalism are explicitly dismissed as less appealing to “the common folk”83 and ethnonationalism, specifically Kurdish nationalism, is “ultimately doomed to fail.”84 This is also a theme of their inward-facing rhetoric; in speeches in Arabic directed toward ISIS’s existing membership, the organization’s leaders often characterize the world as divided into two camps: “the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the jews [sic], the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the jews.”85 One implication of this worldview is that the global war that ISIS sees itself as fighting can and should be fought not only in Syria but also in the United States, Europe, Australia, and elsewhere.86 A second is that sectarian identity trumps national identity. Baghdadi stated this explicitly in one of his rare speeches in 2014, saying, “Therefore, rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. . . . The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims.”87 Of course, ISIS’s definition of Muslims is quite narrow, limited to adherents of a highly specific interpretation of Sunni theology. This is also reflected in their use of propagandistic violence (discussed in greater depth in chapter 3). Of course, ISIS is far from the only group to use sectarian messaging. It is also embraced and promoted by a wide range of jihadist factions,

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many of which, like ISIS, also frame the war as a part of a global jihad that pits Sunni Islam against all other faiths. When Jabhat al-Nusra was founded, it announced its existence via a video released by its media wing, al-Manara al-Bayda. In that video, Jabhat al-Nusra’s newly minted Syrian leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, his face hidden, explained that the war in Syria was “only half the struggle ahead” and that the goal was to establish Islamic rule across the Levant. The video emphasized Jabhat al-Nusra’s global jihadist bona fides, using terms such as sahat aljihad (field of jihad), a catchphrase to indicate participation in global jihadist military action and including images of the Dome of the Rock.88 Jabhat al-Nusra, though, also embraced a pragmatic doctrine focused on the long term—which meant not alienating the public with extremist rhetoric and focusing (as discussed in chapter 1) on fighting the regime.89 Nevertheless, its overall orientation was heavily influenced by jihadist sectarian narratives that privileged a common Sunni identity over national (Syrian) or ethnic (Arab) ties. One particularly clear instance of this came in the aftermath of the sarin gas attack on Ghouta in August 2013. On August 25, Jolani released a video on YouTube declaring that Jabhat al-Nusra would exact revenge through attacks on both the regime and civilians in pro-regime areas. This was framed in starkly sectarian terms: not only would the Syrian military be targeted, but one Alawite village would also be attacked for every sarin gas rocket that had hit Ghouta.90 This rhetoric was not limited to Jabhat al-Nusra. The presence of units of foreign fighters such as the Kataib al-Muhajireen in wider coalitions of jihadist groups in Aleppo and elsewhere strengthened the narrative that the war in Syria was part of a global conflict between Sunni Islam and everything else.91 This narrative was amplified by voices from outside of Syria, such as the prominent Sunni cleric Yusuf Qaradawi, who gave a pivotal speech in Qatar in May of 2013 describing the war in Syria in explicitly sectarian language: Every Muslim trained to fight and capable of doing that [must] make himself available. . . . Iran is pushing forward arms and men so why do we stand idle? The leader of the party of Satan [Hezbollah] comes to fight

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the Sunnis. . . . now we know what the Iranians want. . . . They want continued massacres to kill Sunnis. . . . How could 1000 million Shia defeat 1.7 billion [Sunnis]? Only because [Sunni] Muslims are weak!92

Finally, by pitting members of religious groups against one another, the sectarian narrative also sets the stage for an in-group competition over claims to leadership and legitimate representation of the community. The various jihadist organizations in Syria, ISIS in particular, generate a great deal of propaganda material aimed at delegitimizing rival organizations’ positions as representatives and defenders of Syrian Sunnis. One regular target of ISIS’s ire is the Muslim Brotherhood, who are often referred to as murtadd, or apostates.93 Moderate clerics in the West are similarly denounced, often as kufr or infidels,94 as are clerics in other jihadist movements.95 The editors of Dabiq dedicated space in five consecutive issues to a series titled “The Allies of al-Qaeda in Sham,” which offered a systematic critique of rival jihadist groups. The Jolani faction, that is, Jabhat al-Nusra, is a particular target of criticism. Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, and others dismissively referred to as the sahwah factions (in a reference to the al-Anbar Awakening movement that ejected al-Qaeda in Iraq from the city of Ramadi) are also declared apostates for defying the Islamic State.96 This rhetoric from ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and others only confirmed what many Syrians who were skeptical of the opposition believed: Right away, we knew that our decision [not to join the initial uprising] was the right one because in the beginning individuals started raising extremist Islamic slogans. . . . they started denouncing all of the other Sunnis, the Christians, the Shias, Yazidis, and everyone who is left. Their beginning was from the days of Deraa, when they said the protests were peaceful, then we saw them killing the policeman there, he was beheaded. This was in Deraa around the end of March. We were hopeful that things were going to change in the future, but when we saw the people who wanted change were killing, what is this change that is going to come?97

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This same interviewee shared that he had grown up in Idlib, where he had gone to school with Druze, Armenians, Sunnis, and Shia, but never encountered a problem until “the foreign fighters” and “the religious Wahhabi individuals” got involved.98 Another interviewee, a Syrian Palestinian, put it more directly, saying simply that though the FSA had been basically “normal,” people disliked the jihadists because they called people kafirs (unbelievers) and tried to tell them what to do.99 Perhaps unsurprisingly, those sympathetic to the opposition were likely to blame the regime for the sectarianization of the conflict. As MA, a longtime opponent of the regime, put it, “Syria was never sectarian, the Druze, Alawites, Sunnis, Christians, we all lived together in peace. This regime is the one that transformed the situation from revolution to civil war between sects.”100 This was echoed by “Roula,” also critical of the government, who said, “I personally who lived with them for years and our things are OK and we’re friends and I haven’t discussed any political topic with them and despite all that I was rejected because I am Sunni.”101 Another interviewee, formerly in the military, said plainly, “Bashar al-Asad created a sectarian strife.”102 AM, a former judge, explained that “the regime is the one that wanted this, the revolution never spoke of sectarian rhetoric, but the regime is the one that spoke about sectarian rhetoric and they are the ones that wanted to drag the others to a sectarian solution.”103 As these statements suggest, some of those interviewed suggested that the regime’s response to the protests was colored by a deliberate desire to create a sectarian conflict where one had not existed. Roula, who wore hijab herself explained that women wearing hijab were targeted for especially rough treatment at protests for this reason.104 Another, an Alawite woman from an Alawite and Christian neighborhood in Homs, recounted what she believed was an attempt by the secret police to stir up sectarian tensions by broadcasting calls from the local Sunni mosques for attacks on Alawites in her neighborhood: Can you imagine a neighborhood of Christians and Alawites. . . . in my parents’ street, there were four or five army officers. In such an area,

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can you imagine that the mosques will be bold enough to call to kill people? It was very obvious that, ok, it’s mukhaberat who’s doing this, come on. And in two minutes, anyone who’s doing this can be captured and taken to prison, it was only a silly way to scare people, but it worked. It’s amazing how people can just stop thinking when they face such a case of uncertainty and fear.105

One reason suggested for this was to ensure the loyalty of the religious minorities—especially the Alawites—by convincing them that the opposition was motivated by sectarian animus. As one opposition member, a former police officer, put it, “the regime is playing a sectarian game and was able to lure the Alawites for their own advantage . . . he would tell his sect . . . that the Sunni majority will kill them, however, this statement is not true at all.”106 Using similar logic, another interviewee insisted that regime supporters themselves were behind a particularly threatening sectarian slogan attributed to the opposition—alawieen ila al-taboot, mesiheen ila Beirut (Alawites to the coffins, Christians to Beirut).107 Others hypothesized that the regime used sectarian language because they wanted to create an enemy that they knew they could beat, referencing an often repeated theory that the 2012 prisoner amnesty was intended to create Islamic extremist groups by releasing men such as Zahran Alloush, the founder of Jaysh al-Islam, from prison: First, why the regime wanted to go with a sectarian situation has two reasons? The first is so that he can influence the whole Alawite sect, to keep the whole sect under pressure to support him so that it does not break apart. So, he made enemies between them and Syrian society so that they remain an ally with him. The second thing, which is connected to what I told you about when he released the detainees and the radical Islamists, he wanted to show the international community that these are terrorists so that the international community will be allied with him and show that it is not an issue of freedom of rights, but an issue of sectarian conflict or a religious conflict.108

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Another interviewee put it more simply: “the regime is the one that allowed these dirty militia to come into Syria . . . and remove the focus from the fight against him so that people get busy with Daesh and Nusra.”109 This perspective overlaps somewhat with the narrative of the war as a fight against terrorism, as well as the idea that it has become dominated by outside forces—a blurriness that some saw as a deliberate choice on the part of the regime.110 Those more supportive of Asad, however, saw things differently. Of twenty-seven survey respondents whose views of the 2011 protests had been mostly negative and whose responses overall suggested a positive view of Asad’s government, eight said that sectarianism was the most important division among people in Syria. Nine said that “opinions about the Asad regime” were, three said “opinions about democracy,” and six said “some other issue.” They did not, however, describe the war itself in explicitly sectarian terms, instead framing it as either a proxy war or a fight against terrorism (discussed later in this chapter.) One explanation for these different framings is that, as Nikolaos van Dam argues, the Asad regime had little to gain from an explicitly sectarian narrative. Although it might shore up support among minorities— especially Alawites—it would also further alienate the Sunni majority whose support the regime would very much like to retain. Van Dam notes that the regime did perhaps unintentionally reinforce a sectarian narrative through its alliance with Iran and Hezbollah, and its use of pro-government militias (the shabiha and later NDF) who were largely Alawite, or at least perceived as such.111 Many of those interviewed pointed explicitly to the involvement of Iran,112 Hezbollah, and the Iraqi Shi’ite militias as a sectarianizing influence on the conflict, either on their own113 or in combination with ISIS.114 This illustrates the degree to which forces opposed to one another militarily may nonetheless share a narrative of the war. Overall, though, the regime did not explicitly promote a sectarian narrative of the war, at least not in the direct way that the jihadist factions did; it had little to gain by doing so directly.115 Instead, it used a different, though related narrative: the conflict as a struggle between secular stability and terrorism.

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CONTAINING TERRORISM

The way in which the Syrian government would like the war to be understood was neatly summarized by Bashar al-Asad in a speech in June of 2012. Syria, he explained, was being pulled in opposite directions by two forces: The first force pushes backward and tries to weaken Syria and violate its sovereignty and perpetrate acts of killing, sabotage, ignorance, backwardness and serve the interests of foreign powers. The second force pushes forward and is fully determined to implement reforms which have materialized in a package of laws and a new constitution and which has broadened popular participation in managing the affairs of the homeland.116

The war, in other words, is a conflict between the forces of secular order on the one hand, and agents of violence and chaos (or, as defined by the Syrian state, terrorists) on the other. A slightly different version of this narrative is clear in the anti-jihadist rhetoric of the PYD as well, but the Asad regime has been its chief proponent. As articulated by the Asad regime, this narrative has a number of components. First, the opposition is treated as an undifferentiated whole. As participants in the effort to overthrow the Syrian state, all members are equally culpable regardless of their specific ideological orientation or military tactics, or indeed, membership in an armed group versus a civilian organization. The armed opposition as a whole is characterized as being motivated by a fundamentalist, jihadist political project.117 Although much of this rhetoric targets ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other armed groups actively involved in the Syrian war, it encompasses other groups as well. The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, is rhetorically conflated with ISIS and al-Qaeda despite their mutual antipathy and that the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is largely defunct.118 Saudi Wahhabism is also sometimes also included; at the International Conference on Combatting Terrorism held in Damascus in 2014, where the

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focus was almost entirely on terrorism by Sunni jihadist groups,119 the Minister of Awaqf (Islamic endowments) Mohammed Abdul-Sattar alSayyed referred to Wahhabism as “a terrorist mentality.”120 This rhetoric certainly has sectarian overtones, but it differs from the sectarian narrative in both its terminology and its emphasis on unity against the enemy. Rather than focusing on specific sectarian identities, it collapses all opponents of the state into a single category: terrorists. The most common definition for the term in academic research is probably something along the lines of “public violence against civilians intended to cause widespread terror in the service of a political goal,” but the Syrian government uses it as a catch-all descriptor for its adversaries.121 Terrorist is the term used most frequently in government publications and speeches by officials, and Bashar alAsad himself, in describing the opposition.122 In particular, it undergirds much of the regime’s outward-facing characterization of the conflict. A typical example appears in a speech to the General Assembly delivered by Syrian UN ambassador Walid Mouallem, in which he described the conflict as “a terrorist war of unprecedented brutality, which has spared no one and no-thing, targeting innocent people, services, the infrastructure and cultural heritage.”123 If those waging war on the Syrian state are a homogenous mass of terrorists engaged in a common jihadist political project, by implication any other goals expressed by enemies of the regime must be insincere. Talk of democracy is either ill informed or duplicitous,124 and can result only in chaos and violence, as Bashar al-Asad explained later in the same speech from June 2012: Chaos is the natural environment for terrorism and those who have promoted a new age of freedom and prosperity, without knowing what they are talking about, have embraced chaos, and chaos embraced terrorism; and consequently, and without knowing it, these people have become involved in, in one way or another, in terrorism. Today we see, as a result of short-sightedness, that the freedom they have chanted slogans for is about the blood and the dead bodies of our children and that the democracy they talked about is soaked with our blood.125

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A second feature of this narrative is that, if the war is a conflict between a state defending order and civilization from terrorist forces seeking chaos and violence, then almost by definition all violence—and especially all atrocities—must be the fault of the opposition rather than the regime. The regime’s response in the aftermath of the 2013 Ghouta massacre is illustrative in this regard: it placed responsibility for the use of chemical weapons solely on the opposition, claiming to “have the confessions of the terrorists who brought some chemical agents from neighboring countries into Syria.”126 A UN investigation found that the sarin gas used in the attack was deployed using surface to air missiles, which the regime had and the opposition did not.127 A separate investigation by Human Rights Watch explicitly identified the regime as the perpetrator.128 Likewise, the refugee crisis is framed as a result of violence by terrorists against the civilian population, at the instigation of Western countries, with the intention of weakening Syria. At a conference in Syria on the return of refugees, many of whom have been quite reluctant to do so, Asad explained: Spreading terrorism was the easiest way, and it started by establishing the Islamic State terrorist organization in Iraq in the year 2006 under the patronage of the US which during the war on Syria joined other terrorist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Jabhat al-Nusra and others, and they destroyed the infrastructure and killed the innocent people, in addition to paralyzing the public services intimidating the Syrians and forcing them to leave their homeland.129

Despite the regime’s rhetorical conflation of the opposition with Sunni jihadism, however, the narrative of the war as defense against terrorism still leaves it with important room to maneuver. Because it is used almost interchangeably with opponents of the regime, terrorist as a category remains conceptually a bit fuzzy, especially relative to Sunni and Alawite, whose categorical boundaries are fairly well defined. So, although the sectarian narrative focuses directly on antipathy between communal groups, the terrorism narrative leaves space for the cooptation of loyal members of other sectarian groups.

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For the Asad regime, this has meant very publicly supporting government-backed Sunni institutions that endorse the state’s narrative of the war as a fight against terrorism rather than a sectarian conflict. The establishment of the state-sponsored Cham International Islamic Center, which hosts talks on Sunni Islam by friendly clerics and issues statements denouncing extremism, is one example.130 The frequent presence of Sunni officials, such as the minister for Waqf endowments, at press conferences and public events is another. The regime’s frequent references to support for Palestine as a pan-Arab and pan-Islamic cause can also be read in part as a component of this narrative. Tellingly, a quick search of the regime-backed Syrian Arab News Agency’s Arabiclanguage website for the term ‫( إرﻫﺎﺑﻲ‬erhabi) or terrorist yields (as of 2022) more than sixty thousand results over the past twelve years. A search for ‫( ﻋﻠﻮي‬Alawi) or Alawite generates closer to six hundred. In sum, the Syrian government would like the war to be understood as a conflict in which it is the only actor standing between Syria and the forces of jihadist chaos. Only the state—and Asad in particular—is capable of restoring stability and defeating the terrorists who seek to murder Syrians, displace the population, and weaken and destroy the country. The war, in Asad’s words, is not between “religious or sectarian or ethnic groups” but instead “between us the Syrians and terrorists exclusively.”131 This understanding is shared by some segments of the Syrian public. In written survey responses from Syrians who were otherwise supportive of the government and army, the war was often explained as a fight against terrorism, often in combination with outside influence. One respondent wrote, The difference was either we would be with Syria and its army and its leader, President Assad, to confront this foreign terrorism supported by all the Western world and the Gulf, or we would accept that our people and our children be slaughtered and Syrian women raped under the pretext of marrying the Wahhabi jihad, if we are either sovereign with our army, or traitors and criminals . . . and we chose to protect Syria.132

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Another—who had initially viewed the protests mostly positively but later came to see the conflict as a civil war worsened by foreign intervention—wrote simply, “The war is a struggle for authority between the authority of Asad and the extremist terrorist group.”133 Others wanted non-Syrians to know that “there is terrorism and not a revolution,”134 “that Syria is not a source of terrorism, but on the contrary, Syria is a country to which terrorism was exported through the Gulf states,”135 and that “terrorism and all armed terrorist factions kill, slaughter and rape innocent people and kill the great Syrian army.”136Admiration for Bashar al-Asad and the army were also mentioned. One respondent wrote, for example, “We will overcome this dirty war together, under the leadership of President Dr. Bashar al-Assad, may God protect him.”137 Another, in response to the question “are there any participants in the civil war whose goals are admirable?” answered, “The Syrian Army, as it fights to liberate the Syrian land from ISIS, and its like.”138 Supporters of the opposition, of course, did not share this view. Many believed that the government had deliberately taken steps to position itself as fighting a war against terrorism rather than a pro-democracy uprising. One opposition member explained: The regime is very good at . . . changing pictures and showing people that what’s actually the truth is something else, in many different ways. People were first of all worried about Syria, and then they were worried about Aleppo, and then made the picture smaller and smaller. That’s what they do with everything. He change it from revolution to a civil war to a terrorist organization to fighting terror, you know?139

Another, “Firas,” a Sunni, described a conversation with an Alawite friend, who told him about a rumor that “six thousand terrorists” armed with Kalashnikovs had gathered in the mosques in Homs to start the protests there. Firas believed this to be an attempt to scare members of minority groups into supporting the government against armed terrorists.140 The belief that the regime has sought to position itself as fighting a war against terrorism is sometimes extrapolated into a theory of actual

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collusion between ISIS and the regime, or at least the theory that the regime found ISIS useful. One opposition member noted that the emergence of ISIS turned public opinion in Syria in the regime’s favor, given that the regime seemed fairly reasonable by comparison.141 Another noted that for its part ISIS seemed to prefer fighting Jabhat al-Nusra to fighting the regime.142 Several of those interviewed, including a former judge and a former police chief, believed that the 2012 prisoner amnesty was intended, through the release of violent Islamists, to fuel the growth of the jihadist factions and allow the regime to credibly claim to be fighting terrorists.143 As a filmmaker from Deraa put it, Asad “released all of these people, the Islamists, the radicals and these crazy people he released. He knows that these are the people he wanted to fight against.”144 Opposition supporters felt that the presence of ISIS helped the regime in other ways as well. An activist who had been involved in civil society opined that ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra were extremely helpful to the regime because their presence would cause Western donors to pull out and weaken the growth of functional institutions in the “liberated areas.”145 In other words, the opposition viewed this narrative of the war with extreme skepticism. Although the Asad regime has been the chief proponent of this narrative, it is not the only one. The PYD and its armed forces have also at times framed the war as a conflict between the forces of secular order and jihadist chaos. The official YouTube channels for the YPJ, YPG, and SDF include, alongside the memorial videos for fallen fighters and military training montages, interviews with individual fighters and short videos celebrating particular battles. In all of these, ISIS fighters are regularly referred to as terrorists, jihadists, or (in English) thugs.146 Other common topics are interviews with YPG and YPJ fighters who describe, in both Kurdish and Arabic, rescuing grateful civilians from “Daesh terrorists,”147 and footage of YPJ fighters helping women and girls remove the face coverings imposed by ISIS in areas formerly under its control.148 In addition to their extensive use of YouTube (discussed in more depth in chapter 4) this message is also promoted via interviews with the international press in outlets as diverse as Russia Today,149 Rolling Stone,150 and Marie Claire.151

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In a more general sense, the Kurdish leadership has sought to distance itself from both the regime and the opposition by framing its own project as a pathway to stability, in contrast with the violence and chaos promoted by the other participants in the war: “the opposition has adopted the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. In Rojava it is a secular equal ideology. The nizam [regime] has the ideology of one party. So, the nizam came back after all the years of killing and murder and is talking about the national ‘unity.’ In reality we are the ones talking about unity and who can accomplish it.”152 In a speech in Berlin, Salih Muslim put it more succinctly. The Middle East, he said, is in the middle of a “Third World War” and it is the Kurdish people who are leading “the struggle against extremism, against jihadism.”153

ETHNONATIONALISM

A fourth narrative of the conflict frames it as organized primarily around ethnonational identities, such as Arab or Kurdish. One might expect this to be most commonly articulated by the PYD, given the status of the Kurds as an ethnic minority in Syria, but it is not the group’s primary narrative. The PYD actually spends a great deal of time trying to reassure ethnic minorities in its territory that it is not a Kurdish separatist group, as reflected in its leaders’ rhetoric. Indeed, none of those fighting in Syria offer an explicitly ethnonational explanation for the war as their primary narrative. It is, however, a secondary narrative for at least some of those involved, and others have accused their rivals and adversaries of being closet ethnonationalists. Thus it bears some discussion. A close cousin of the sectarian narrative, an ethnonational narrative positions the rights and grievances of members of a certain ethnic group as central to a conflict or uses ethnonational identities to mobilize support and generate group cohesion against an outside threat. For the PYD, an ethnonational narrative centered on Kurdish grievances and the Kurdish desire for autonomy is a kind of background noise to their more

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explicitly articulated ideological project. Similarly, the Asad regime has used Arab nationalism to offset the Alawites’ status as a religious minority and to frame the opposition as agents of Israel and the West. The PYD’s political leadership does not currently call for a separate Kurdish state. Although this was the PKK’s goal for decades, the PYD was formed after Öcalan’s ideological shift away from Kurdish separatism in favor of democratic confederalism. Instead, the group’s leaders focus on local autonomy. That said, PYD politicians do reference Kurdish grievances in their rhetoric. These include the banning of education in Kurdish under Hafez al-Asad, the stripping of Syrian citizenship from Kurdish Syrians in the northeast in the 1960s, the crackdown that followed the 2004 Qamishli uprising, and other such frustrations.154 PYD leaders are particularly likely to frame the subconflict with Turkey in ethnonational terms, framing it as driven by Turkish hostility to Kurdish national identity.155 On the other hand, the same leaders often take pains to tout the multiethnic coalition they have formed under the umbrella of the SDF. On the YPG, YPJ, and especially the SDF’s YouTube channels, Arab fighters explain, in Arabic, their reasons for joining.156 Non-Kurdish fighters also appear to largely agree with the organization’s mission. In a 2019 survey of SDF members that was generally representative along ethnic and gender lines, fighters across all ethnic groups listed similar incentives for joining: salary or other incentives, antipathy to Turkey and ISIS (in that order), and ideological commitment. Certainly the responses of Kurds versus Arabs, Turkmen, or other ethnic groups differed, but for none of them—including Kurds—was the desire for a separate ethnic state a major motivation.157 Nevertheless, the PYD’s roots in the PKK, its Kurdish ethnic identity, and the family ties between the Kurds of northeastern Syria and those across the border in Turkey all leave the PYD vulnerable to accusations of ethnonationalism by both the regime and the opposition. In a 2017 speech, Bashar al-Asad made this charge somewhat elliptically: “It is necessary now to refute the ethnic concept. There are people who talk about federalism, nationalism, and federalism on national basis. We have to assert that the concept of Arabism is an inclusive civilized

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concept that includes everyone, which means that Arabism is greater than being ethnic, the cultural concept includes everyone, includes all ethnicities, religions, and sects.”158 At other times, the regime has dismissed the PYD and its affiliates as “political extremist groups.”159 It also periodically convenes meetings of loyalist Kurdish organizations to issue statements voicing support for the regime160 and reaffirm that any attempts to “transgress against the territorial integrity of Syria are parts of a plot to cause chaos and division and undermine the resistance axis.”161 The opposition, too, sometimes dismisses the PYD as fighting a separatist war that does not reflect the perspective or wishes of the majority of Syria’s Kurds. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, which has been fighting the SDF since 2018, has expressed distrust of Kurdish intentions, sometimes in ethnonationalist terms. During the 2019 Turkish invasion of Kurdish-held territory on the border dubbed Operation Peace Spring, SNA commanders spoke openly to the foreign press of their distrust of the Kurds and what they saw as a cult of personality around Abdullah Öcalan.162 These sentiments, though, are also sometimes expressed by Kurdish members of the opposition, who express a political rather than ethno-communal distrust of the PYD.163 This framing echoes that of may Arab opposition members, a position that might be summed up as “The Baath Party does not represent the Arabs and the PYD does not represent the Kurds and ISIS does not represent Islam.”164 The complexity of the position of the PYD and the Kurds more broadly in Syrian politics was sharply apparent in the dialogue series held in Berlin in 2018 among members of various ethnic and sectarian groups, most of whom represented political parties or factions in one way or another affiliated with the opposition. One common theme was the tension between the federal model preferred by many minority groups, especially the Kurds, and the more centralized model preferred by others.165 At the same time, however, the Kurdish participants—many affiliated with the Kurdish National Council, a generally proopposition Kurdish political faction—were adamant that they were not represented by the PYD and saw their future as lying within Syria,

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albeit a more federal version of it. Nevertheless, some participants in the discussion appeared skeptical of these claims and voiced concern that too much autonomy for the Kurdish northeast would result in a weakened and fragmented Syria.166 This echoed a concern voiced in interviews by members of the opposition, who believed that the PYD was willing to deal with the regime if it meant a chance of dividing Syria and gaining a Kurdish state.167 All this is to say that, regardless of the PYD’s contentions that it is not an ethnonational party, at least some of its concerns are colored by the history of the Kurds in Syria, and, at the same time, it is viewed with suspicion by others who believe it to be, at heart, an ethnonationalist or even separatist party. One exception to this, oddly, is ISIS. Because ISIS is not particularly committed to Syria’s existing boundaries, or to the existing system of nation states in general, its opposition to the PYD is not driven by suspicion that its members are secretly ethnic separatists seeking to carve off a piece of Syria for their own state. ISIS also takes pains to point out that it has nothing against Kurds as a community. Rather, its hostility to the PYD is because PYD members are unbelieving murtaddīn:168 Our war with Kurds is a religious war. It is not a nationalistic war—we seek the refuge of Allah. We do not fight Kurds because they are Kurds. Rather we fight the disbelievers among them, the allies of the crusaders and Jews in their war against the Muslims. As for the Muslim Kurds, then they are our people and brothers wherever they may be. We spill our blood to save their blood. The Muslim Kurds in the ranks of the Islamic State are many. They are the toughest of fighters against the disbelievers amongst their people.169

The other place we see an ethnonational narrative at work is in the Asad regime’s invocation of Arab nationalism, alongside its primary narrative of the war as a fight against terrorism. This is a continuation of the Asads’ long history of promoting their Arab nationalist and pan-Arab bona fides for both domestic legitimacy and regional prestige. A core feature of Baathism—at least in theory, if no longer in practice—is the idea that the Arabs are one nation and should accordingly be united in one

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state. Other identities—including sectarian identities—are subsumed under the more important Arab identity.170 For the Asads, this offered a real advantage. As Alawites, they were a minority. As Arabs, however, they were part of the same community as the vast majority of those they ruled. Nevertheless, despite the regime’s Arab nationalist orientation, Syria often found itself at odds with its Arab neighbors, especially given its support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. In November 2011, Asad suffered the humiliation of seeing Syria suspended from the Arab League as increasing numbers of Sunni officers defected from the military. This perhaps partly explains Asad’s choice to once again lean on the rhetoric that had long offered common ground with the other Arab states: support for Palestine and antipathy toward Israel. Trumpeting Syria’s support for the Palestinian people in general and for various Palestinian armed groups in particular had for decades allowed the regime to burnish its pan-Arab credentials while making common cause with the Sunni majority in the Arab world. The Syrian belief that Israel—against which it fought three wars in the three decades after independence and to which it lost the Golan Heights in 1967—represents a threat to its security and that of the Arab world is sincere. Former military officers interviewed for this book explained that they had joined the army to defend their country against what they believed to be a very real threat from a hostile power on their border. At the same time, the Syrian government’s relationship with the Palestinian cause, to which it often rhetorically links its foreign policy, has been complicated. Hafez al-Asad’s relationship with the PLO was sometimes supportive but at other times antagonistic. In perhaps the most extreme example, he backed the PLO in the early years of the Lebanese civil war but then shifted his support to their Maronite adversaries in 1976, invading Lebanon to forestall a complete victory for the PLO and its allies. After the 1993 Oslo Accords, Syria’s relationship with the mainstream of the PLO collapsed, and its primary Palestinian client became Hamas. This arrangement, always a bit odd given Hamas’s origins in the Muslim Brotherhood, also collapsed when Hamas very publicly distanced itself from the regime after the outbreak of the civil war.

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Nevertheless, rhetorical support for Palestine—and the loyalty of the handful of Palestinian factions that remain headquartered in Damascus—remains a way the regime seeks to signal its pan-Arab commitment.171 It shares this tactic with Iran and Hezbollah, which likewise reference the Palestinian cause and opposition to Israel as a basis for regional credibility. Together, the three refer to themselves as the Axis of Resistance against Israel and the West. Using starkly binary logic, the regime has accordingly argued that anyone who opposes it—including the opposition, al-Qaeda, and even ISIS—must be a tool of Israel. Syrian government officials make this argument frequently in their public rhetoric,172 as does Bashar al-Asad himself.173 This logic also underpins the descriptions of strikes on civilian targets such as schools or hospitals as a form of counterterrorism. If an ethnonationalist narrative is not the core of the regime’s explanation of the war, it is still invoked in combination with the narrative of the war as a fight against terrorism, and a defense of Syria against hostile outside forces.

PROXY WARFARE

The final narrative I explore here explains the civil war in Syria as “other people’s war on Syrian land”174 or “a big political game.”175 As one survey respondent put it, “There is no winner in this war for both sides of the internal conflict. As for America and its allies on one side, and Russia and its allies on the one side, there are deals and therefore the two sides are winners at the expense of the Syrian people.”176 This is in some ways less a narrative than an accusation: all of the various participants in the war have at one point or another accused others of functioning as agents for foreign powers, while denying doing so themselves. ISIS describes itself as the defender of the Sunnis; the regime casts itself as defending Syria against terrorism; and the Kurds and the opposition claim the high ground as champions of (some version of) democracy and human rights. The proxy narrative, in contrast, has no heroes.

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It is also a perspective shared by those whose views of the war otherwise differ. Many civilian supporters of the opposition accused all parties of accepting foreign support, to Syria’s great detriment. This sentiment was echoed by supporters of the regime, though they did not include the Syrian government in this appraisal. In other words, like the ethnonational narrative, the proxy narrative tends to be used primarily to delegitimize other positions. It also tends to overlap with other narratives, insofar as those accused of acting on behalf of outside parties are often framed as doing so for reasons that echo other narratives of the conflict. One version of this comes from the Asad regime, which frequently accuses the opposition of acting on behalf of foreign interests, including those of the United States,177 Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf states,178 rather than of the Syrian people they claim to represent.179 By implication, then, any claims to be motivated by a desire for democracy or even by sectarian loyalty are disingenuous or a sign of gullibility. The leaders of the opposition are at best dupes of foreign powers, or at worst, in Asad’s words, cynically “seeking to build glories for themselves at the expense of the people’s blood.”180 The opposition is also sometimes dismissed as being dominated by foreigners in the form of al-Qaeda and ISIS (both transnational groups with a largely non-Syrian leadership).181 In a similar vein, the war is also sometimes framed as an attempt by outside forces to weaken Syria through sectarian, ethnic, and ideological divisions because of its role in the region as a pillar of the Axis of Resistance, a supporter of the Palestinians, and an adversary of Israel and the United States.182 In this framing, the only reasonable defense against such an attempt is unity, against both terrorism and outside interference.183 The sentiments expressed by Syrians sympathetic to the government strongly reflect this narrative, diagnosing the war as largely the work of outside forces hostile to Syria. In response to a question asking what the war is about, several respondents who supported Bashar al-Asad referenced “regime change.”184 Others explained it as being in the interests of the United States, Israel, or the West generally.185 One described it as being about “overthrowing governments that are not under the influence of Western agenda.”186 Another drew explicit connections with

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events elsewhere in the region, writing, “Just as Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Egypt, and several Arab countries have been destroyed, they want to destroy Syria because of its positions in the equation of American and Israeli foreign policy.”187 Several described the war as the result of a mu’amara, or conspiracy against Syria.188 In response to the question asking what they thought those outside Syria should know about the war, one respondent answered, “Stay out of our country. You caused this destruction.”189 Another wrote, “The government is innocent and fighting a war that has been brought into us from outside forces.”190 The Western media itself was also seen as implicated in the imposition of the war on Syria by outsiders. Several said that they wanted those outside Syria to know about the “lies and fraud in the Western media” and that the “Western and Gulf media were turning the facts.”191 Others wrote similarly that the war was “not as portrayed in the American news,”192 “manufactured by the Western media,”193 and “not what MSM [mainstream media] makes it out to be.”194 If the government and its supporters accuse the opposition of being foreign agents, the opposition likewise condemns the Asad regime for its relationship with Iran and Russia. One common complaint was growing Iranian and Russian cultural influence. One person referred to this as an “invisible occupation” via soft power mechanisms such as the teaching of the Russian language and import of Iranian goods.195 Another expressed a concern about Iranian cultural and religious influence.196 A second concern was Iranian and Russian political influence, backed by military force. One former FSA officer recounted how, when he flew to Iran for training as an SAA officer, he was limited in how many kilos he was allowed to fly with, despite the privileges usually granted to officers, because the plane returning from Iran was packed with weapons, leaving little weight allowance for passengers. Even commercial flights were used to bring in military aid from Iran to Syria. Now, he said, Syria has been completely delivered into Iran’s hands—more even than into Russia’s. Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, he believed, all had their own interests in Syria—Hezbollah sought to defend their position in Lebanon, Russia to maintain access to its port in Tartus, and Iran, to extend its influence.197 Others pointed disparagingly to Asad’s subservient position

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with regard to Iran and Russia, describing him as “the tail of the dog . . . like a puppet.”198 One longtime activist and former political prisoner described the situation in stark terms: “The Iranians and Russians won, and the Syrians lost, including the regime because the regime has no opinion over what happens in Syria.”199 Hezbollah and other nonstate actors were also mentioned by several activists as key supporters of the regime,200 their involvement described as proof that the regime was using outsiders to attack Syrians.201 ISIS, meanwhile, despite being led largely by non-Syrians and recruiting a great many foreign fighters, also accuses its enemies of being foreign proxies. Both the YPG and FSA are accused of being American proxies, and the Kurdish forces accused of having to rely on foreign fighters because they do not enjoy broad local support among the local (Muslim) Kurdish population.202 In reality, this argument probably applies more to ISIS than the YPG or YPJ, although both organizations do accept foreign volunteers. It also accuses the jihadist factions in the opposition of being foreign agents, scathingly describing them as agents of the taghut (idolatrous) regimes.203 These groups—arguably ISIS’s closest ideological rivals—are accused adopting a veneer of Islamic ideology only because they found themselves in a “propaganda race” with the Islamic State,204 but in reality work on behalf of either the crusaders205 or taghut countries such as Turkey.206 ISIS propaganda argues that foreign sponsorship is inherently dangerous, and that even groups with pure motives are in danger of being corrupted if they enter into alliances against the mujahideen (that is, ISIS), risking a slide into “blatant hypocrisy” or “entering into the religion of taghut presidencies.”207 There may be an element of sour grapes in this analysis, given that ISIS has no state allies or patrons. For their part, the PYD leaders frequently accuse the opposition of having become Turkish proxies, acting to carry out Turkey’s vendetta against the Kurds and to promote its interests in the region at the expense of the Syrian people’s.208 Ibrahim Murad, the representative at the Northeast Syrian Mission in Berlin was explicit about this: “The opposition in Syria from the beginning was in under the control and influence of Turkey,” he said, “and the Muslim Brotherhood controlled the movement.

W H AT ARE W E FIGH TING FOR ?1 09

The ideology of Muslim Brotherhood and Erdogan was what constituted the opposition’s ideology.”209 Salih Muslim put it even more succinctly, stating that “Turkey is supporting Daesh because they aim to destroy the Kurdish people everywhere.”210 This is echoed by the rank-and-file SDF fighters of Holmes’ survey, a majority of whom cited Turkey as the greatest threat to northeastern Syria.211 This reflects the general skepticism in the Kurdish leadership regarding the opposition’s political goals.

R Yet, despite all of this finger-pointing, there is also notable overlap in the way that Syrians with very different political alignments describe the role of outside influence in the war. One place this is striking is in regard to the influence of the United States. Several former members of the FSA offered a diagnosis strikingly similar to the regime’s, blaming the war on outside parties seeking to weaken Syria by taking advantage of the regime’s corruption,212 or blaming Western states for Asad’s remaining in power for so long.213 One officer who defected to the FSA blamed the United States directly for the rise of ISIS, and Turkey for not allowing FSA units to fight them more aggressively.214 This is also true in regard to the involvement of the Gulf states. Those sympathetic to the government (or at least skeptical of the opposition) were likely to highlight the role of foreign fighters and the support of states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey for various extremist factions.215 This criticism, though, was also raised by former civilian activists with the opposition. Several of the civilian activists involved in the early days of the uprising blamed the involvement of foreign states—including the backers of both Asad and the armed opposition— for transforming the uprising from a fight for democracy in Syria into a regional war216 in which regional conflicts divided the opposition and subverted Syrian interests in favor of “the agenda of many outside countries—Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and . . . Jordan—and and and others.”217 Foreign sponsorship was blamed for having distracted the opposition from its original purpose and encouraging infighting among the various factions: early on, the various opposition factions had had

110 W H AT ARE W E FIGH TIN G FOR ?

“a moral code, or a revolutionary code” that prevented them from attacking one another, but with foreign sponsorship “they dropped everything and started following orders.”218 Turkish involvement in particular was described as motivated not by a concern for the safety of Syrians but instead by a desire to control territory and pursue Turkey’s objectives regarding the Kurds, in what amounted to a proxy war against the PKK on Syrian soil. In this, their diagnosis is very similar to the PYD’s.219 Further, in an echo of the some of the government’s rhetoric, many in the opposition blamed backing from the Gulf states for the sectarianization of the war, whether because of a lack of backing for civil society groups relative to jihadist factions220 or an interest in a sectarian narrative for its own sake.221 In sum, the proxy narrative seems to be the one narrative broadly embraced across Syria’s political spectrum. Although all sides accuse others of being supported by outsiders, at least some agree that outside intervention is not in Syria’s best interest, nor motivated by concern for the well-being of Syrians: “Take a pen for example, the pen can write the Qur’an, can write a poem, and so on. In this case, the Syrians were a pen, and the international community was using us to do what they want. The person who was running the show and controlling Syrians was the international community.”222

CONCLUSION

Taken together, the multiple narratives characterizing the Syrian civil war suggest several conclusions about the larger shape of the conflict. First, it is entirely possible for groups that do not see themselves as allies, or that may even be adversaries, to see the war in similar terms. For instance, both the PYD and the secular opposition have claimed at various points to be fighting to establish some kind of democracy in Syria. Although each might dispute the stated motives of the other, one group that does not really dispute either set of claims is ISIS; public-facing rhetoric by ISIS’s ideologues seems to accept that these parties are fighting to establish democracy in Syria. They simply believe that the “pagan

W H AT ARE W E FIGH TING FOR ?1 1 1

religion” of democracy is far from desirable.223 At the same time, groups that may see one another as fellow travelers may understand the conflict in sharply different ways. Whereas the secular parts of the opposition argued that they were fighting for a largely political set of objectives, the jihadist groups that first fought alongside them and then essentially took over the opposition saw the war in sectarian terms instead, or perhaps in some cases as well. Second, each of these narratives has implications for what we should perhaps expect of those who embrace them. Each narrative of the war is essentially a story about its origins and meaning. Accordingly, each identifies clear heroes and villains; those who agree on a narrative but see themselves on opposite sides of it may reverse the casting of these roles. Thus each narrative identifies a clear adversary or threat. A sectarian or ethnonational narrative of the war identifies members of the outgroup as the threat; a narrative framing the war as a struggle for dignity and democracy positions the dictatorship as the enemy; a narrative of the war as a fight between stability and terrorism positions the latter as the greatest threat to the nation. The proxy narrative suggests that the involvement of outsiders is itself dangerous. Each narrative also suggests a particular desirable outcome to the war, whether it is the triumph of democracy over dictatorship, the eradication of terrorism, protection of the status of certain communities, or even the enforcement of a given community’s preferred cultural or religious norms. Given all of this, if we take those fighting at their word, these narratives should therefore tell us something about whom they ought to be fighting and what their broad objectives should be. All of this assumes, of course, that those fighting in Syria actually believe in the narratives they are promoting, which is of course not necessarily the case. Does Bashar al-Asad genuinely believe that he is fighting a war against terrorism or is this a cynical way of excusing attacks on civilians? Does the PYD leadership actually intend to establish a democratic polity in at least some portion of Syria? To what degree do those who champion a sectarian narrative genuinely seek to remake Syria along religious lines or care about the well-being of their coreligionists? How many ISIS members are true believers? Many opposition factions assumed a Salafist or jihadist ideological orientation when it became

112W H AT ARE W E FIGH TIN G FOR ?

clear that sponsorship by wealthy patrons in the Gulf states was more likely to be available to those who at least adopted a veneer of Islamist politics: what, if anything, does this imply about their overall goals? There are plenty of reasons for skepticism on all counts. Although a lack of sincerity certainly may explain behavior that is not in line with a group’s chosen narrative, sincerity is also in some ways beside the point. Sincerely held or not, these narratives matter because they are how the parties to Syria’s war explain themselves, and their actions, to important audiences at home and abroad. Whether those articulating a particular narrative genuinely believe it is perhaps less important than whether they can convince potential patrons abroad, supporters at home, and third parties whose sympathy (or at least neutrality) they need that their account of the war is the correct one. Establishing a preferred narrative of the war as “correct” in the eyes of potential patrons abroad, supporters at home, and third parties whose support, or at least neutrality, is desirable, can bring with it powerful advantages. The opposition, for instance, benefited from its ability to convince Syrian army officers that the nascent civil war was a fight to protect Syria’s civilians from the regime and to create a better Syria in that this helped provoke defections from the SAA early in the war. It also benefited from its ability to convince the Obama administration of the same thing, leading to at least some American support. Later on, the Kurdish forces and, incidentally, the Asad regime benefited from the shift in American perception of the war from a fight for democracy to a fight against terrorism. Even though this was no doubt driven by the Obama administration’s strategic priorities, it also reflects the importance of these larger narratives of the conflict. But narratives also matter because they helped shape the nature of violence during the war. For one thing, the combatants’ interest in promoting a particular narrative of the war sometimes shaped the conduct of the war. For another, those fighting in Syria often chose to convey and enact their chosen narratives through the use of highly performative violence. The impact of the fight to determine how the war was understood by both Syrians and outsiders on the patterns violence in the war are explored further in the following chapter.

3 PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE

O

ver the course of the Syrian civil war, its internal dynamics have shifted many times; subconflicts have erupted and subsided, territory has changed hands repeatedly, and antagonisms and alliances have constantly shifted. In short, as in many protracted civil wars, the overall patterns of violence are complex and difficult to neatly summarize. This is in part because although in some cases the choices made by the various participants are in line with their respective narratives of the war (explored in the previous chapter), they are not always. If we take the various combatants in Syria at their word as to the explanations for the war that each of them offers, their main adversaries should be clear. The Asad regime, which explains the war as a conflict between the forces of secular order and jihadist violence, should especially focus on fighting ISIS and groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. The PYD and those factions of the opposition who say they are interested in establishing a more democratic future for Syria should focus on fighting those who threaten this goal. Those who cast the conflict as primarily sectarian should focus on attacking those opposite them across the sectarian divide. Some of the actors in Syria do indeed behave in ways that fit some of these patterns, at least some of the time. Perhaps unsurprisingly, though,

114PATTERNS O F VIO LEN CE

this is hardly the whole picture. A number of patterns in the behavior of the war’s various participants are out of sync with their explanation for what the war is about. The regime, for example, has largely focused on fighting the mainline opposition rather than ISIS or the Kurdish forces, even though ISIS arguably fits the description of a violent jihadist group better than any other participant in the war, and both it and the Kurds present a greater territorial challenge to the regime’s authority than the opposition did. ISIS, meanwhile, demonstrates a far greater interest in fighting the regime than the regime does in fighting ISIS, but also spends a great deal of its time attacking other Sunni factions as well as civilians. The Kurdish forces have been far more involved in conflict with ISIS and the Turkish-backed opposition than with the regime despite their professed commitment to establishing democratic rule in Syria. The use of violence against civilians is more in line with the various actors’ narratives of the war but often appears to have little if any military utility and is sometimes obviously counterproductive, especially in ISIS’s case. None of this is exactly surprising—both states and nonstate actors routinely act in ways that do not necessarily reflect their leaders’ rhetoric. In Syria, as in most wars, the behavior of the combatants is driven by a range of motivations, including material considerations such as the need to take or defend heavily inhabited territory or a desire for natural resources. But the disconnect between what the war’s participants say the war is about and what they are actually doing is still worth exploring in more depth because of what it implies about the combatants’ priorities. This manifests in two ways. First, an examination of the broader patterns of violence in the war reveals that in addition to attacking those who “should” be their enemies based on their respective explanations of the war, many of the combatants are also involved in fighting those whose narrative threatens to undermine their own in the eyes of key constituents. Second, and more significant, a good deal of the conduct of the war in Syria is infused with a notable and consistent element of performativity; that is, the use of violence carries an intent to communicate a message to observers. This is especially true of attacks on

PATTE RNS O F VIO LE NC E1 1 5

civilians which, perhaps unsurprisingly, often closely reflect the narratives the perpetrators embrace. But even violence among combatants sometimes has a performative element to it, as explored in more depth in chapter 4.1 In this chapter, I first sketch the general patterns of the conflict among the armed factions in Syria before moving to a discussion of violence of against civilians, including indiscriminate, repressive, and propagandistic violence. I assess these patterns in light of both the actors’ larger territorial and political goals and the audiences for which this violence is being performed. The patterns of violence in the Syrian war, I argue, suggest three things: first, some of those fighting in Syria—especially ISIS and the Asad regime—are not necessarily fighting the war that they claim to be, at least based on their narratives of what the war is about. Second, and relatedly, some of the time this manifests as a focus on attacking those who offer a different narrative, especially one that might prove compelling to important audiences. Third, violence—especially against civilians—is also used as a form of messaging to promote a given narrative.

QUANTIFYING THE SYRIAN TRAGEDY

This analysis is based on simple descriptive statistics using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED),2 complemented in some places by data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),3 the Violations Documentation Center (VDC),4 and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR).5 Each of these datasets has particular strengths as well as blind spots. The UCDP data, for instance, offers granular detail on individual confrontations but varies in the degree of specificity with which it identifies armed opposition factions. The GTD data excludes state violence entirely and includes only nonstate violence that meets its definition of terrorism. There are also significant disparities among the casualty figures from different sources, especially regarding violence against civilians.

116 PATTERNS O F VIO LEN CE

As of July 2022, the SNHR and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights put the total number of civilian casualties in Syria at 228,893 and 350,209 respectively, a sizable gap.6 Meanwhile, the 2020 UCDP data, which are based heavily on reports by two Syrian organizations, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and the Violations Documentation Center, offered the considerably lower figure of 108,767.7 This disparity is compounded by the often unclear distinction between civilian deaths as a result of deliberate targeting and those resulting from indiscriminate violence, that is, deaths resulting from actions that could reasonably be expected to kill civilians, but whose primary target was something or someone else.8 Of the civilian deaths in the UCDP data, only 15,357 are coded as having been the intended targets. All others—the vast majority—are coded as having been a consequence of conflict between combatants, rather than an ends in and of themselves. Table 3.1 demonstrates the difficulty in sorting through these figures. Nevertheless, taken together and complemented by documentation from the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and accounts from Syrian witnesses, these sources offer at least the broad outlines of the violence in Syria. My goal is not to establish clear causal relationships, but to look at general patterns in terms of which participants in the war are fighting one another and which are not, and which combatants are attacking which groups of civilians.

MI L I TARY V I O L E N CE

The various armed groups involved in the Syrian civil war were and are far from uniform in regard to their primary military targets. Some have focused on one adversary; others shifted their focus over time or confronted multiple adversaries at once, though not necessarily by choice. Although the regime has focused heavily on the opposition and the opposition on the regime, both have also confronted ISIS at times. The Kurdish forces focused primarily on ISIS, though later in the war they became increasingly embroiled in conflict with Turkey and its proxies.

PATTERNS O F VIO LE NC E1 1 7

TABLE 3.1

Civilian Casualties

UCDP (deliberate targeting)

UCDP (all)*

SNHR

GTD

1,087

79,320

4,651

4,560

152

8,385

1,235

173

Regime

9,006

92,399

199,939

ISIS

5,112

21,342

5,023

Casualties Opposition forces YPG/J and SDF

n/a 3,497

Source: UCDP and SNHR figures from 2020. GTD figures from 2019. * The UCDP figure for “all” refers to all civilian casualties resulting from any dyad including the actor. For the Kurds, this includes the PYD (that is, the YPG and YPJ) and SDF. The UCDP figure for direct targeting is all dyads including the actor and civilians, indicating that civilians were the intended target of the violence. Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no.  4 (July  1, 2013): 523–32, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313484347. Shawn Davies, Therese Pettersson, and Magnus Öberg, “Organized Violence 1989–2021 and Drone Warfare,” Journal of Peace Research 59, no. 4 (2022): 593-610. The GTD figure is calculated as the total number of casualties minus “terrorists killed,” for all targets excluding government, military, police, violent political parties, and terrorist groups. For rebels, this is all opposition movements listed, not including blanks or “Muslim Extremists.” For the Kurdish forces, this includes the SDF and YPG/J, along with Wrath of Olives and the Afrin Falcons and the PKK. For ISIS, this includes all operations with ISIS as perpetrator as well as casualties from operations ISIS carried out with other jihadist groups. Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 2 (April 6, 2007): 181–204, https://doi.org /10.1080/09546550701246817. ** SNHR, “226247 Civilians Were Killed in Syria from March 2011 to September 2020,” Syrian Network for Human Rights, January 20, 2020, https://snhr.org/syria-map-snhr/; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “Global Terrorism Database [Data File]” (University of Maryland, 2021), http://www.start.umd .edu /gtd /search /?back= 1& search = islamic%20jihad&count = 100; Sundberg and Melander, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.”

Meanwhile, ISIS has divided its attention among the war’s other participants. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present instances of confrontation per dyad from 2011 to 2020 using the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.9 I begin with the opposition. As noted elsewhere in this book, it is difficult to generalize too much about the fractious array of organizations large and small that make up the Syrian opposition. They can be broadly sorted into a few categories, the borders between which are porous at best. At the outset of the war, much of the armed opposition fell under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army. Composed in part of SAA soldiers who defected because of the orders they were being asked

118 PATTERNS O F VIO LEN CE

Syrian Government

ISIS 21%

3%

30%

8% 3% 0.1%

89% 8% 38% SDF/PYD Civilians Governments of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey

Regime Opposition

ISIS Civilians Syrian Insurgents

YPG/J and SDF

YPG/J and SDF

The Opposition

9% 2% 1% 4%

11% 1% 2% 3%

74% 93%

ISIS Opposition and ISIS Civilians Mixed opposition Turkish-backed opposition

FIGURE 3.1

Regime

0.5%

ISIS Other opposition factions Regime YPG/J and SDF Civilians

Principal adversaries.

to follow, it quickly became the standard-bearer for a largely secular and “moderate” version of the Syrian revolution. However, as discussed in chapter 1, it lacked cohesion, and even early on was less a single organization than a collection of affiliated units ranging from hard-line Islamists to secularists vetted by the United States to receive funding and training.10 In the later years of the war, a separate Turkish-backed coalition emerged that is sometimes referred to as the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA) or the Syrian National Army.11 Both inside and

PATTE RNS O F VIO LE NC E1 1 9

20,000

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0 SAA ISIS PYD

2011 241

FIGURE 3.2

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

11,103 17,735 11,813 8,214 35 1,336 585 12 176 13 17

2012

2013

2014

5,188 535 136

2,576 230 113

1,811 101 383

1,480 33 283

641 10 135

The opposition and its adversaries, 2011–2020.

outside the FSA—which had largely disintegrated by the middle of the war—were a variety of Islamist and jihadist groups, ranging from Muslim Brotherhood–flavored organizations backed by Qatar to Salafist organizations such as Ahrar al-Sham, to jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra.12 There were also a wide range of regional and local militias of varying ideological stripes. The various factions frequently formed, dissolved, and reformed into coalitions—some national, such as the jihadist Islamic Front, some regional, such as

120 PATTE RNS O F VIO L EN CE

Fatah Haleb13—“operations rooms” used for coordinating among factions in a particular area, and temporary alliances—such as the antiISIS Euphrates Volcano—built around specific operations. These organizations and coalitions embraced a range of narratives, some articulating their fight as a struggle for democracy, and others, especially those seeking funding from donors in the Gulf states, taking a more sectarian line. Despite this diversity, the various factions of the Syrian opposition have a common primary adversary: the Asad regime. As figure 3.2 indicates, the vast majority of the opposition’s military engagement—more than 90 percent—was against the Syrian military. This was especially true in the earlier, more intense period of the war, from 2012 to 2015. The regime’s forces were the opposition’s primary target, but they were not its only adversary. It also clashed with ISIS in what were some of the latter’s most costly engagements. Later in the war, the opposition and the Kurdish factions also clashed periodically. The most intense confrontations took place in Aleppo governorate in 2018 and 2019, but earlier episodes occurred as well, in Hasakah and Raqqa. Much of the hostility between them was driven at least as much by Turkey’s suspicion of Kurdish territorial and political ambitions as by animosity between the rebels and the Kurdish armed groups. Finally, Syria’s rebels also engaged in at least some onside fighting— that is, in conflicts purely among themselves.14 These clashes were not a primary focus for the opposition as a whole—the UCDP data include only 333 incidents resulting in 1,697 combatant deaths, versus 12,877 in conflicts with ISIS and 5,487 against the Kurdish forces. These internal conflicts also tended to involve certain segments of the opposition more than others. The jihadist, Salafist, and Islamist factions were the most prone to fighting with other rebel factions. This was especially true of Ahrar al-Sham (106 clashes), in part because it was often targeted by other opposition factions. It was also true of Jabhat al-Nusra, both on its own (115)15 and as a part of HTS (174). Less involved in onside fighting were larger FSA-allied groups such as the Southern Front, the Northern Storm Brigade, and the Dawn of Freedom Brigades; the Syrian

PATTERNS O F VIO LE NC E1 21

Revolutionaries Front was an exception, participating in twenty-three confrontations with other rebel factions.16 Emily Gade, Mohammed Hafez, and Michael Gabbay find that onside fighting was more likely between groups with broad ideological differences. Interestingly, they also demonstrate that sharing the same sponsor did not necessarily reduce intra-rebel clashes, which supports the idea that at least some of it was driven by competition for resources.17 This level of infighting is hardly unique; some degree of onside fighting is common among rebel factions, particularly in sprawling, protracted conflicts such as Syria’s.18 It reflects a lack of cohesion that was, though not usual, nonetheless a real problem for the opposition. Even when not directly attacking each other, the Syrian rebels competed for recruits and resources from foreign sponsors and often showed a reluctance to cooperate and coordinate against the regime’s forces. Even though direct fighting among the rebel factions represented a relatively small portion of their military activity, it was costly in terms of casualties, at least relative to confrontations with other adversaries. Further, insofar as it effectively eliminated entire factions from the opposition—thereby reducing its overall fighting capacity—it was counterproductive in regard to the larger objective of removing Asad, if not to the specific preferences of individual organizations. One especially glaring example was the September  2014 assassination of most of Ahrar al-Sham’s leadership via the bombing of a meeting in Idlib. Ahrar al-Sham’s Salafist politics and the resulting support they received from Saudi Arabia and other sponsors made them a powerful fighting force and therefore a potential military asset to the opposition as a whole, but these same characteristics also earned them the enmity of some of the more hard-line factions. It was unclear who the culprits were, but Jabhat al-Nusra was the chief suspect.19 Overall, however, such conflicts were still a relatively small portion of opposition’s military engagements. Despite the various opposition factions’ hostility to one another, the bulk of their attention and firepower focused on the regime’s forces. This was largely mirrored by the regime, which, despite its rhetoric framing the war as a fight against terrorism, spent most of its time

122PATTERNS O F VIO LEN CE

fighting the opposition, jihadists, and moderate FSA factions alike, rather than ISIS. Of 68,140 incidents of conflict involving the government of Syria between 2011 and 2020, 89 percent were coded as involving “Syrian insurgents,” versus less than 8  percent involving ISIS.20 Incidents of conflict with the Kurdish forces (including first the PYD’s armed wings, the YPG and YPJ, and later the SDF) were negligible, amounting to fewer than one hundred incidents in total. The data indicate clear patterns in whom the Asad regime was fighting, where it was fighting them, and when it was doing so. Broadly speaking, fighting between the rebels and the government escalated sharply in early 2012 and peaked in 2013, gradually declining annually thereafter. The UCDP data do not disaggregate the rebel organizations beyond Syrian insurgents in its coding of the regime-opposition dyad. Some of the most intense fighting took place in the suburbs of Damascus, especially in 2013, as the FSA began to take control of towns and villages in the rural area around the capital. The governorates of Deraa, Hama, and Homs followed a similar pattern, although Hama experienced a small surge of violence in 2019 that Homs and Deraa did not. Fighting between rebels and the regime was also severe in Aleppo governorate, including in the city of Aleppo itself, but dropped sharply after the regime retook the city in 2017 (see figure 3.3). As figure 3.1 makes clear, ISIS was a far less important focus for the regime. Even though the organization conquered significant territory in 2013 and 2014, confrontations between the two did not escalate until 2015. Some fighting between the regime’s forces and ISIS took place in Hasakah, Aleppo, and Raqqa, but most was in Deir Ezzor and Homs (see figure  3.4). Deir Ezzor is home to much of Syria’s small oil industry, perhaps adding an added value to that territory. A former FSA officer contended that the operations against ISIS—by the regime, the Kurdish forces, and the opposition alike—were largely a matter of containing rather than defeating ISIS and shifting them from one area to another. Moreover, he suggested, they’ve been all along coordinating, in an indirect way, with ISIS. I mean, you give me electricity, I’ll let the gas go. If you don’t give me

PATTERNS O F VIO LE NC E1 23

±

Qamishli Kobane

Hasakah Aleppo Raqqa

Idlib

Euphr ates R iver

Latakia Deir Ezzor

SYRIA

Hama Tartus Homs

Tadmur (Palmyra)

Total casualties per governorate

DAMASCUS

^ Quneitra

Conflict density Deraa

Governorate boundaries 0

FIGURE 3.3

High

Cities

Suwayda

50

100

Low 200 kilometers

Aleppo: Hasakah: Raqqa: Suwayda: Damascus/Rif Dimashq: Deraa: Deir Ezzor: Hama: Homs: Idlib: Lattakia: Quneitra: Tartus: Unspecified location:

45,237 1,161 1,816 688 56,430 17,269 6,231 16,294 18,371 28,848 6,467 2,789 178 75,701

Conflict between Syrian government forces and opposition.

Source: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.

gas, I will cut the electricity. I mean, ISIS were controlling Deir Ezzor . . . and these areas, and these areas never have any electricity off. And the electricity source from this area is from where? It’s from a regime area, near Homs. . . . I’m not saying they were talking [to] each other. . . . they were selling oil, they were getting gas, giving electricity, the opposite, through a corporation, not in a direct way. . . . And Asad was happy about them staying there because Asad knew “my problem is my people. It’s not ISIS—ISIS is the problem of everyone. Everyone will deal with ISIS and fix it. I’m not going to be left alone with them. Someone else will come in and fight with ISIS instead of me because I don’t want to do it. I don’t want to drain my resources fighting these ISIS. There’s someone else will fight on my behalf. But I should fight my people. I

124PATTE RNS O F VIO L EN CE

±

Qamishli Kobane

Hasakah Aleppo Raqqa

Idlib

Euphr ates R iver

Latakia Deir Ezzor

SYRIA

Hama Tartus Homs

Tadmur (Palmyra)

Total casualties per governorate

DAMASCUS

^ Quneitra

Conflict density Deraa

Governorate boundaries 0

FIGURE 3.4

High

Cities

Suwayda

50

100

Low 200 kilometers

Aleppo: Hasakah: Raqqa: Suwayda: Damascus/Rif Dimashq: Deraa: Deir Ezzor: Hama: Homs: Idlib: Lattakia: Quneitra: Tartus: Unspecified location:

3,943 1,194 2.988 775 2,298 560 10,315 2,020 8,305 82 3 20 0 13,093

Conflict between Syrian government forces and ISIS.

Source: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.

should focus on these poor people and kill as much as I can from my people and contain the situation with my people not to drain my resources against—by the end.”21

So, although the contention of some in the opposition that the regime ignored ISIS entirely is not completely accurate, it is certainly true that it was not a major focus of the regime’s military campaigns, even when it was taking significant territory. If ISIS was not a major focus for the Syrian military, however, the reverse was not the case. Conflict with the regime made up 38 percent of ISIS’s military operations, concentrated, as noted, in Aleppo, Deir Ezzor, and later Raqqa as it fought to defend its territory. This is in part simply a function of the fact that the Asad regime’s forces were much larger than those of ISIS and were

PATTERNS O F VIO LE NC E1 25

fighting a larger war, meaning that confrontations between the two represented a smaller share of the regime’s total military engagements. Still, for an armed group that positioned itself as fighting a primarily sectarian war against an Alawite regime (although ISIS propaganda uses slurs rather than the word Alawite), it is striking that the majority of ISIS’s military confrontations were against actors other than the regime’s forces. This was pointed out by at least one Syrian journalist, who scathingly suggested that ISIS spent more time fighting the opposition than the regime.22 This is not strictly true; ISIS also spent almost a third of its time (29 percent) fighting the Kurdish military forces in the form of first the YPG and YPJ and then the SDF. ISIS’s remaining operations, however, setting aside direct attacks on civilians and operations against the Iraqi and Turkish governments, were indeed against the opposition. Between 2013 and 2017, a wide range of rebel groups, most of them jihadists or Islamists, clashed regularly with ISIS in an attempt to halt its advance. This conflict was most intense in 2014, concentrated around Aleppo and secondarily around Deir Ezzor. The hostility toward ISIS among the rebels was so severe that in September of 2014 they took the extraordinary step of forming a coalition dubbed Euphrates Volcano (Burkan al-Furat)—comprising six FSA factions, the jihadist Liwa al-Tawhid, and the Kurdish YPG—against it. That rebel factions whose views of the YPG otherwise ranged from distrust to open hostility were willing to cooperate with its forces in this case demonstrates the depth of their shared antipathy toward ISIS.23 Jabhat al-Nusra also fought bitterly against ISIS, as did Ahrar al-Sham and the large jihadist coalition known as the Islamic Front. ISIS’s forces also clashed repeatedly with the Fatah Halab coalition in Aleppo and with the Turkish-backed Hawar Killis Operations Room in northern Syria.24 This put ISIS in the unique position of fighting both the Kurdish forces and the Turkishbacked rebels, who were otherwise mutual antagonists. All this suggests that, despite ISIS’s sectarian rhetoric, it was spending a significant amount of its time fighting other Sunnis, including both Arabs and Kurds, secularists and jihadists. Some of this—especially the clashes with the opposition in 2013 and 2014—was a result of attacks

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launched by ISIS’s adversaries, but it was also driven by ISIS’s military choices. Its ill-fated war against the Kurds, for instance, was largely a function of its drive to expand into Kurdish-dominated territory. For their part, the Kurdish forces, largely in line with their narrative of the conflict, focused on fighting ISIS for most of the war. Eighty percent of the confrontations involving the PYD, SDF, and their smaller allied factions involved ISIS, either alone or in combination with other jihadist groups. The Kurdish forces also sometimes fought against other jihadist factions, such as Jabhat al-Nusra. As figure 3.5 indicates, much of the fighting between ISIS and the Kurdish factions took place in Hasakah and in and around the towns of Kobane and Manbij. The siege, occupation, and liberation of Kobane (discussed in greater depth in chapter 1) was particularly intense. Later, in 2017, the focus shifted to Raqqa, as the YPG and YPJ merged with

±

Qamishli Kobane

Hasakah Aleppo Raqqa

Idlib

Euphr ates R iver

Latakia Deir Ezzor

SYRIA

Hama Tartus Homs

Tadmur (Palmyra)

Total casualties per governorate

DAMASCUS

^ Quneitra

Conflict density Deraa

Governorate boundaries 0

FIGURE 3.5

High

Cities

Suwayda

50

100

Low 200 kilometers

Conflict between ISIS and the Kurdish forces.

Source: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.

Aleppo: Hasakah: Raqqa: Suwayda: Damascus/Rif Dimashq: Deraa: Deir Ezzor: Hama: Homs: Idlib: Lattakia: Quneitra: Tartus: Unspecified location:

5,238 4,896 8,297 0 0 0 6,689 0 3 15 0 0 0 153

PATTERNS O F VIO LE NC E1 27

other factions to form the SDF and, with U.S. backing, went on the offensive. With the fall of Raqqa, anti-ISIS operations moved on to Deir Ezzor until it was defeated there as well. ISIS, though, was not the Kurdish forces’ only adversary. In the later years of the war, with ISIS weakened and the Turkish government growing ever more hostile toward the prospect of a PKK-allied Kurdish proto-state on its southern border, the SDF was increasingly embroiled in fighting the Turkish-backed FSA factions, which had organized into a coalition dubbed the Syrian National Army in 2017. The conflict intensified when Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in January  2018, culminating in the Turkish occupation of Afrin. It spiked again after the Trump administration’s abrupt withdrawal of U.S. support for the SDF in 2019 removed what had been a buffer between the Kurds and Turkey. Whether it wanted to or not, the SDF was being drawn into a conflict with strong ethnonational overtones. To summarize the broad patterns of violence in the war: the regime and the opposition were principally focused on one another. Both occasionally also clashed with ISIS. ISIS fought against the regime’s forces, the Kurds, and the rebels in different regions and with varying intensity over the course of the war. The Kurdish forces mostly fought against ISIS, though later in the war also fought against the Turkish-backed opposition. None was perfectly consistent, though their degree of focus on a single adversary varied a great deal. This does not tell us the whole story, however. Although the frequency of conflict between the war’s various parties is important, so is the lethality of those confrontations. As table 3.2 shows, conflicts involving some combatants were more lethal than others, reflecting both changes in the intensity of the war over time and the formation and disintegration of new alliances. Of course, those fighting also experienced higher or lower casualties depending on whom they were fighting. For instance, the regime’s conflicts with ISIS, though far less frequent than those with the rebels, were deadlier for both. Clashes between ISIS and the PYD’s forces, that is, the YPG and YPJ, were deadlier for all concerned, but especially for ISIS.25 Clashes with the Turkish-backed SNA were slightly deadlier for

TABLE 3.2

Average Lethality in Incidents Involving Each Conflict Participant

Conflicts

Casualties*

Average lethality per incident

Government of Syria

74,313

1.09

ISIS

30,336

2.25

8,452

1.61

PYD (YPG/J)

1,875

1.98

SDF

6,577

1.53

Kurdish-led forces (all)

Opposition

78,021

1.12

4,645

2.59

Southern Front

824

2.00

Ahrar al-Sham

1,511

2.09

1,643

2.05

82,685

1.35

Jabhat al-Nusra**

SNA “Syrian insurgents”

Source: UDCP GED includes several entries covering a year’s worth of casualties for the government of Syria versus Syrian insurgents and government of Syria versus IS dyads. These were retained for the overall casualty figures, but removed for the conflict intensity figures, as having large numbers of casualties listed for a single instance of conflict skewed the conflict intensity for those dyads. For a further discussion of the UCDP GED data on Syria, see Therése Pettersson, Shawn Davies, Amber Deniz, Garoun Enström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, and Margareta Sollenberg Magnus Öberg, “Organized Violence 1989–2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria,” Journal of Peace Research, July 1, 2021, https://doi.org /10.1177/00223433211026126. *Includes casualties for all combatants in confrontations involving the participant **Includes Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

TABLE 3.3

Average Lethality per Incident by Dyad

Side A versus side B

A

B

Overall

344

2.19

1.41

3.60

Government of Syria versus PYD

52

1.75

1.12

2.87

Government of Syria versus SDF

43

1.72

1.40

3.12

60,797

0.99

1.10

2.09

5,225

2.66

2.24

4.90

130

4.45

2.35

6.80

83

1.40

1.80

3.20

ISIS versus PYD

439

4.50

2.08

6.58

ISIS versus SDF

3,195

2.19

1.27

3.45

SNA versus SDF

Government of Syria versus “Syrian insurgents” Government of Syria versus ISIS ISIS versus HTS ISIS versus Jabhat Fateh al-Sham

Incidents

PATTERNS O F VIO LE NC E1 29

the SDF than its war with ISIS had been, but even deadlier for the SNA. On average, the Kurdish forces tended to take fewer casualties than their adversaries; the opposition tended, on average, to take slightly more. (These numbers are likely somewhat skewed by the UCDP data, which code all rebel factions as Syrian insurgents when they are fighting the government but code them separately when fighting ISIS, the Kurdish forces, or each other.) Also, fighting between the Syrian government and the Kurdish forces was rare, though not necessarily less intense than fighting against the opposition, though given the much smaller number of incidents, this is probably not a fair comparison to make. One thing this makes clear is that the factions fighting in Syria often made decisions somewhat at odds with their claims about the nature of the war: ISIS, despite its rhetoric about fighting a sectarian war, was actually spending much of its time fighting other Sunnis. The regime, meanwhile, focused less on ISIS than on the opposition. The Kurds, though heavily focused on fighting ISIS, were in fact increasingly engaged in a proxy war against Turkey. There are of course many possible reasons nonstate armed groups might make decisions at odds with their rhetoric—a desire to hold territory, a need to defend against attacks, or a desire for natural resources, which can all trump ideology, even when sincerely held. It is probable, for instance, that the Syrian government’s focus on fighting ISIS in Deir Ezzor (but not Raqqa) was motivated by a desire to control Syria’s limited oil resources. It is also clear that the Kurdish forces did not have much of a choice in their fight against the Turkish-backed rebels, so attributing intent in this case is at best complicated. However, one motivation that bears some discussion here is the apparent hostility to those whose who offered a competing narrative about the nature of the war. This is evident both in some of the broad trends in the war and in much more specific decisions by individual actors. One clear example is the regime’s consistent focus on fighting the FSA rather than ISIS. This was certainly believed by many of the former’s members to be both deliberate and driven by the belief that the moderate opposition represented a greater threat to its legitimacy than the jihadists whose existence and behavior reinforced the regime’s narrative of the war. A

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former FSA fighter speculated that “it seems there’s an agreement between Russia and the regime and this ISIS group,” despite the fact that defending Syria against terrorism and extremism was the regime’s rhetorical rationale for the war.26 A second example is the infighting among the various jihadist and Islamist factions. Take the intensity with which Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS targeted Ahrar al-Sham, which advocated an Islamist and Syrian nationalist vision of the war that competed against their own universalist, borderless narrative. This was arguably a more appealing alternative in the eyes of potential recruits and, crucially, international backers such as Saudi Arabia, and was seen as threatening by its rivals. The repression of the secular opposition by Jabhat al-Nusra reflects similar motives. In other words, at least some of the violence among the combatants in Syria was shaped not by the narratives that the various combatants embraced, but by a desire to silence those who offered an alternative story about the nature and causes of the war.

V I O L E NC E AGA I NST C I V ILIANS

If violence among combatants in Syria falls somewhat outside their own narratives of the conflict, violence against civilians, in contrast, often serves to enact and promote them in deliberately performative ways. Although most of the combatants in Syria claim to be fighting to defend the innocent and accuse everyone else of victimizing them, in reality civilians have suffered at the hands of all of the war’s participants, though not equally. Violence against civilians falls into three broad categories: indiscriminate violence, which does not recognize the distinction between civilians and combatants;27 repressive violence, which is used to quell or punish dissent or criticism;28 and, of particular relevance here, propagandistic violence, such as terrorism or lynching, which is meant to send a wider message about the perpetrator’s goals and values.29 Some ambiguity surrounds these categories. It is not always clear what constitutes a deliberate attack on civilians—as opposed to civilian death

PATTERNS O F VIO LE NC E1 31

as a secondary consequence of fighting between combatants—nor is it always obvious who is responsible for which deaths. If a member of an armed group executes a civilian in cold blood, then both intent and culpability are quite clear. But if multiple rebel factions are fighting the Syrian army in a crowded urban neighborhood and civilians are killed in the crossfire, it can be difficult to discern either who is responsible for which deaths or who they were actually shooting at. Moreover, even those who appear to be intentionally targeting civilians often claim not to be; the Syrian government, for instance, has claimed that attacks on civilian targets such as densely populated urban neighborhoods were in fact intended to target enemy forces in the area. For the sake of clarity—to the extent that that is possible—what follows focuses primarily on violence against civilians that can be clearly attributed to a specific perpetrator, distinguishing between violence causing civilian deaths for their own sake, and knowingly causing civilian deaths while aiming at another target. The first kind—the intentional murder of civilians as civilians—includes both propagandistic and repressive violence: propagandist violence is intended to convey a specific message about and to the victims, and about the organization’s goals more broadly; repressive violence is used to constrain or punish opponents. Genocide and ethnic cleansing fall into the first category. Show trials and executions of journalists and political opponents fall into the second. The assassination of political opponents falls into both. Indiscriminate violence, meanwhile, can result from poorly disciplined or unskilled troops, or from a general lack of distinction between civilians and combatants. The latter, insofar as it results from the conflation of everyone in a certain ethnic group, religion, or neighborhood, from soldiers to toddlers, into a single hostile category probably constitutes a political message in and of itself.30 Some of those fighting in Syria have used all three kinds of violence; others have focused primarily on one or two. Despite some variation among the opposition factions most have engaged in some level of repressive violence. The jihadists in particular have also committed propagandistic attacks on religious minorities. ISIS likewise engages in both repressive and propagandistic violence, at levels higher than most other

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conflict participants.31 Conversely, the Kurdish forces target civilians less frequently than others, but nonetheless do engage in repressive violence. The overwhelming majority of civilian deaths in Syria, though, have been caused by the Asad regime’s forces, which has engaged in all three forms of violence against civilians throughout the war.32

The Syrian Government The largest number of civilian deaths attributable to the Syrian regime are the result of indiscriminate violence, which does not distinguish between combatants and civilians. Throughout the war, the regime has consistently used tactics and weapons ostensibly against the opposition that are demonstrably harmful to the civilian population. These include chemical weapons, such as the August  2013 sarin gas attack on the Damascus suburb of Ghouta; incendiary weapons or firebombs; cluster munitions; and improvised weapons such as barrel bombs. Perhaps the weapon most closely associated with the Syrian war, a barrel bomb is made by filling a metal container—perhaps an actual barrel, but often just scrap metal folded to create a crude envelope—with explosives and shrapnel and adding a fuse that is ignited before throwing the device from an aircraft.33 In 2014, barrel bombs filled with chlorine gas were used against civilians in Hama and Idlib, combining improvised and chemical weapons.34 These weapons have primarily—and it appears deliberately—been used by the regime and its allies against civilian rather than military targets. Based on VDC data, Debarati Guha-Sapir and her colleagues describe their impact on the latter as minimal. Of the almost eight thousand fatalities from barrel bombs documented by the VDC between 2011 and 2016, 97 percent were civilians and 27 percent were children. Overall, a majority (57.3  percent) of noncombatant deaths during the most severe years of the war were caused by shelling or bombardment, including by barrel bombs. Combatants, in contrast, were overwhelmingly likely to die by gunfire, rather than by being either executed—almost 25  percent of civilian male casualties—or killed in an air strike.35

PATTERNS O F VIO LE NC E1 33

Analysis of the war as a whole by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) finds that heavy weapons and bombs accounted for 23.3 percent of civilian deaths and small arms and light weapons for 21.8  percent.36 Not all of these casualties were from military action by the regime—the OHCHR data attribute about half of the civilian casualties for which a single perpetrator is identifiable to the government, another third to “Islamic Factions,” and around 7 percent each to ISIS and other rebel factions. However, given the arms that each had at their disposal, the deaths from heavy artillery and bombardment, at least, were likely caused by Syrian government forces. The Syrian military also targeted civilian institutions, including schools, hospitals, markets, residential areas, civil defense centers, displacement camps, and other targets that Human Rights Watch describes as having “no apparent military objective.”37 These attacks were sometimes followed immediately by a second strike, intended to kill first responders.38 Health-care facilities in particular were frequently targeted: as early as 2013, UN investigators found evidence that the regime was deliberately targeting hospitals and health-care workers, especially in Aleppo.39 Amnesty International likewise reported an unusually high number of attacks on health-care targets, including strikes on hospitals in Hama, Idlib, the town of Kafr Nabel, and other opposition-held areas.40 Bombardment was also used in combination with other tactics, especially siege and starvation. Besieged towns were denied access to food or medical supplies, leading to malnutrition, starvation, no access to health care for the sick and injured, and other hardships.41 These tactics were overwhelmingly leveled against areas held by the opposition, such as the Damascus suburbs, Aleppo, Homs, Idlib, Deraa, Hama, and Deir Ezzor. Regime-held and loyalist areas such as Latakia and Tartus experienced less direct violence from the government’s forces. This was also true of areas held by ISIS, such as Raqqa, or the SDF, such as Hasakah. The center of Damascus was also largely spared.42 The focus on opposition-held areas can certainly be understood as a practical military choice. The use of weapons and tactics that were clearly more harmful to civilians than to the armed opposition factions, though,

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also suggests an element of collective punishment to this violence, and that it carried an implicit message: civilians who remained in rebel-held areas were considered to be supporting or even part of the opposition, and hence legitimate targets. To the extent that we interpret this violence as targeting civilians directly rather than incidentally, then, it can also be considered propagandistic—that is, a way of communicating the regime’s narrative of the war.43 Nor was this limited to the use of barrel bombs. Reports attest to other forms of propagandistic violence by the state’s allies. A former member of the military who defected at the beginning of the war recounted, The Alawites on [street name] had a checkpoint. There came a bus that had fourteen passengers, both women and men. They found out they were Sunni so they emptied the bus and tied up the men and stripped them and put them to the side. They raped the women in the street in front of their husbands and kids and then killed all of them just to anger the men. Is this an army that protects the people or that kills them? How are the people going to return to this army?44

This particular incident is not independently verified, but it is in line with other reports of violence against civilians by paramilitary forces aligned with the government.45 Finally, the Asad regime has long engaged in extraordinary levels of repressive violence as a matter of state policy since well before the war. This included events such as the 1982 Hama massacre and the repression of the 2004 Qamishli uprising, as well as broad and consistent repression of dissent, including arrests, disappearances, torture, and murder. When the uprising began in 2011, the regime responded, as it had in the past, with violence (see chapter 1). Protesters and activists were routinely “disappeared” by the secret police.46 One Syrian journalist described plainclothes members of the security services abducting demonstrators at protests by forcing them into the trunks of taxis and driving away with them.47 The use of repressive violence continued throughout the war, with attacks on ever rarer protests, arrests of dissidents, and attacks on Syrian and international journalists.48

PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE135

The regime’s prisons—where many of those arrested eventually found themselves—bear special mention as sites of extraordinary abuses of human rights and violations of human dignity. Syria’s political prison system was not—is not—an instrument of criminal justice, but of violent repression and punishment of dissent. There was little to no judicial process for those detained. Survivors interviewed by the UN’s investigators described being held for offenses such as distributing food in rebel-controlled areas, or as a way of pressuring relatives involved in the opposition.49 Those detained for nonviolent offenses were sometimes tortured into confessing to other crimes, such as planting bombs, with which they had no involvement.50 A comprehensive investigation by the OHCHR documented the use of torture and practice of extrajudicial murder on a “massive scale,” including against men, women, and children as young as seven years old.51 Sexual assault against prisoners, especially but not only women, is widespread.52 So are forms of torture such as beatings, electrical shock, hanging prisoners in stress positions, and others. The Syrian Network for Human Rights puts the number of deaths under torture in the regime’s prisons at 14,464.53 Deaths among prisoners also resulted from prison conditions themselves, including medical neglect, starvation, and overcrowding.54 Thousands of prisoners were also executed, sometimes after brief show trials, often at Damascus’s notorious Saydnaya Prison, which is administered by the military police.55 As of January 2022, the SNHR reported 102,000 persons still missing in Syria, 85  percent of whom were believed to be detained by the Asad regime.56 Based on five hundred interviews, UN investigators found that these abuses—carried out in the prisons run by the Air Force Intelligence, Military Intelligence, General Intelligence, and Political Security Directorates, as well as the military police—represent a deliberate policy by the Syrian state rather than isolated incidents.57 A former detainee described her experience as follows: “I was so lucky. I’m not like others, they didn’t torture me physically but psychologically. Actually being there in detention center, itself it’s a kind of torturing. . . . I’m not the same person anymore, because nobody can enter that place and get out from it the same person.”58

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The Opposition If the complicated nature of the Syrian opposition makes it difficult to generalize about its behavior toward military targets or to parse the choices of particular factions, it is even more difficult in regard to civilians.59 Even if some rebel factions were less likely to brutalize civilians (or prisoners of war) themselves they sometimes cooperated with those who did, muddying the waters in terms of culpability.60 Nevertheless, broad patterns are still evident in the kinds of violence used by the opposition overall; much of the rebel violence against civilians was indiscriminate or repressive, though the jihadist factions, who were more prone to violence against civilians in general, were especially likely to use it for repression or propaganda, or both. Generally, and perhaps unsurprisingly, indiscriminate opposition violence against civilians was most common in territory that armed groups controlled or attempted to control, such as the Damascus suburbs and the cities of Homs and Hama. Early in the war, scattered reports appeared in the international press of rebel strikes on civilian urban areas, including Damascus.61 Civilian casualties were also significant in Latakia in 2013. In Aleppo, rebel forces shelled civilian areas of government-held east Aleppo, including with a homemade piece of artillery known as a jahannam, or hell cannon, that fired the compressed gas cannisters used for cooking and heating. The impact of one of these was equivalent to 22 to 33 kilograms of TNT.62 They also bombarded the Kurdish neighborhood of Sheikh Maksoud.63 Civilian deaths resulting from deliberate attacks, however, are only part of the story. The UCDP figure for all civilian deaths from military activity in which the opposition was involved, mostly against the regime, is a much higher 79,320. At least some of these deaths are the result of indiscriminate opposition violence, as opposed to indiscriminate violence by its adversaries, but disentangling which side was specifically responsible for which civilian deaths is difficult, especially given the military asymmetry resulting from the regime’s access to air power. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, which focuses solely

PATTE RNS O F VIO LE NC E1 37

on violence by nonstate actors, can fill in some of the gaps here, though the GTD does not cover all of the forms of violence used in Syria. It documents 771 attacks by various opposition factions or groups of factions on civilian targets overall, resulting in 5,799 fatalities.64 At least some of these were carried out by the FSA and its affiliated militias— the GTD records forty-seven between 2011 and 2019 and an additional sixty conducted alongside non-FSA affiliated rebel groups.65 Other factions were more frequently involved in indiscriminate violence against civilians; Jabhat al-Nusra, for instance, was involved in nearly two hundred incidents.66 In contrast, the opposition’s use of repressive violence, especially in areas they controlled, is much easier to assess. Many rebel factions seem to have engaged in a kind of generalized abuse of civilians on a regular basis. While Aleppo was under opposition rule, a UN investigation found that some factions withheld food aid or prevented civilians from fleeing areas under regime bombardment so that they could be used as human shields.67 Governance was ad hoc and sometimes predatory, and access to services, food, and other resources was based heavily on wasta, or connections.68 In Idlib, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s rule was characterized by even more extreme repressive violence. The SNHR reported the arbitrary arrests of 184 people in September and October of 2018, most of whom were either participants in protests against HTS or clerics who refused to publicly praise or align with the group. HTS fighters also used live ammunition against civilians, killing and injuring children and the elderly, and used other forms of violence to enforce their rule.69 Similar behavior was documented in Maaret Numan70 and communities near Aleppo.71 Journalists were often targeted—the GTD documents twenty-four attacks on media targets—and in Idlib they were subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture, murder, and imprisonment in the notoriously brutal Okab and Harem prisons.72 In 2014, Jabhat al-Nusra abducted and tortured Raed Fares,73 one of the activists behind the opposition banners shared on social media by activists in the town of Kafr Nabel. Fares was also the founder of the opposition Radio Fresh, which attracted Nusra’s ire for playing music and employing female

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presenters. After being ordered to cease playing music, Radio Fresh broadcast barnyard animal noises and other random sounds instead. Fares was murdered by unknown gunmen in Kafr Nabel in 2018.74 Repressive violence of this sort—public and symbolic—is also propagandistic insofar as it is meant to send a message, in this case to potential opponents of HTS’s rule, much like the regime’s indiscriminate violence against civilians in rebel-held areas. Opposition factions— again, especially the jihadists—engaged in other kinds of propagandistic violence as well (as discussed in greater detail in chapter 4). Performative sectarian violence appears to be less a preoccupation for the opposition as a whole than it was for, for instance, ISIS. The GTD data indicate that 294 of 475 opposition attacks on civilian targets were against private citizens rather than institutions, which might pack more of a symbolic punch.75 That said, variation across the opposition is also evident. For one thing, Jabhat al-Nusra in its various incarnations has been more likely than the FSA to attack religious targets—especially those associated with minorities—and more likely to treat civilians harshly in the areas it controls. Of the eighty-two attacks on religious figures or sites included in the GTD data, Jabhat al-Nusra/HTS were involved in at least thirteen; the FSA was involved in only one. Of the eighty-two, seven targeted Christian sites or clergy. Jabhat al-Nusra was also involved in attacks on a number of Christian towns and villages, including Maaloula, Knaya, Suqaylabiya, and Yaqubiyah, and Alawite and Shi’ite towns such as Dorien, Maskar al-Hesan, Ishtabraq, and of course Latakia. It used siege and starvation tactics not unlike the regime’s against Shi’ite civilians in the towns of Fou’a and Kafraya76 and massacred civilians in villages in the Damascus suburbs and Hama in the winter of 2013 and 2014.77 The behavior of the jihadist factions in minority towns is instructive. When a coalition of jihadist groups—including Jabhat al-Nusra— attacked the Christian village of Sadad in 2013, its inhabitants reported that they were prevented from fleeing the fighting and used as human shields. Forty-six residents—forty-one of whom were civilians—were killed, some by execution, others by sniper fire or indiscriminate shelling.78 Three churches were desecrated and badly damaged. Graffiti tags

PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE139

were found in one of them reading “Jabhat al-Nusra,” “Liwa al-Haq,” and “Liwa al-Tawhid.”79 These attacks do not necessarily reflect an overall focus on attacking minority communities or sectarian targets, but the behavior of the fighters—desecrating churches, using civilians as human shields—does suggest that attacks on minority targets were sometimes carried out in ways designed to convey a particular contempt for religious minorities. This suggests that though much of the opposition’s violence against civilians was driven by pragmatic considerations, at least some of it was propagandistic as well.

ISIS The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria holds the distinction of deliberately directing a larger share of its operations against purely civilian targets than any other actor in the civil war, although depending on how one interprets the intention behind the regime’s attacks on urban areas, this could certainly be disputed. It is certainly true that ISIS victimized civilians at a higher rate than the opposition factions; the SNHR attributes 4,625 civilian fatalities between 2011 to 2020 to all of the opposition factions combined versus 5,305 to ISIS alone, a likely low number, given that it may not fully account for casualties of the Yazidi genocide.80 ISIS engaged not only in indiscriminate violence resulting in civilian deaths, but also in extraordinarily brutal repression in the areas under its control and in deliberately public and performative propagandistic violence as well. Given both the nature of its military forces—unlike the Syrian regime, it had no air force and therefore could not indiscriminately bomb civilian neighborhoods—and its ideology, civilian deaths at the hands of ISIS were heavily tilted toward repressive and propagandistic violence, the lines between which could sometimes be blurry. Of course, the fighting between ISIS and its adversaries resulted in civilian deaths as well.81 Civilians in the territory under ISIS rule endured excruciatingly violent repression. The Islamic State was governed by a draconian legal code that imposed penalties such as public flogging for offenses such as smoking or conducting business during prayer times. Children were asked to

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inform on their parents, and common elements of Syrian culture, such as music at weddings, were banned, often by officials who were not themselves Syrian.82 Like the punishments meted out in Idlib to those accused of defying HTS, these penalties can be understood in multiple ways. The creation of a society based on its ideology was, for ISIS, an end in and of itself. Further, as in all dictatorships, the public enforcement of these rules was a way of asserting power and deterring dissent;83 like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Syrian regime, ISIS sometimes responded to unarmed protests against its policies with live ammunition.84 ISIS’s repressive violence, then, can also be understood as a form of propaganda. The public punishment of immorality was a core aspect of its political mission, and, at least in the minds of ISIS leaders, one of its selling points.85 Thus the boundary between repression and propaganda was exceedingly blurry. This is especially true in regard to its use of violence against minorities, women, and gay men. Religious minorities in general faced severe persecution under ISIS’s rule. In Mosul and Raqqa, Christians were forced to either convert to Islam, pay a tax, or leave the city. Christian and (in Mosul) Shi’ite holy sites were destroyed and individuals were executed.86 ISIS also expelled ethnic minorities—predominantly Kurds—from Tel Abyad and other towns.87 The most extreme example, however, was the genocide against the Yazidi ethno-religious minority in northwestern Iraq in August of 2014. The Yazidis are a small community of about 1.5 million people, primarily Kurdish speakers, who practice a four-thousand-year-old faith that that bears some kinship to Zoroastrianism as well as the other Abrahamic faiths of the region.88 On August 3, 2014, ISIS forces attacked Sinjar City, home to four hundred thousand people and the largest existing Yazidi community. Men who would not convert to Islam were murdered; women and girls were abducted, enslaved, and subjected to sexual violence; and boys were forcibly converted and conscripted. As many as sixty-eight Yazidi temples and shrines were dynamited.89 Thousands fled the city to the dubious safety of Mount Sinjar, where, without food, water, or shelter, they were encircled by ISIS forces. The survivors

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escaped only when the United States launched airstrikes against ISIS on August 8 and Kurdish forces, primarily the PKK and YPG/J, opened a corridor for the civilians to escape. Approximately 3,100 Yazidis were killed: 1,400 by execution and 1,700 as a result of hunger, thirst, or exposure on Mount Sinjar. An estimated 6,800 were abducted and more than 2,000 remain missing.90 Vicken Cheterian observes—quite correctly—that the attack on Sinjar made very little sense as a strategic choice.91 It required ISIS to halt its advance toward Baghdad to shift direction north and attack a group of civilians who posed no threat. It risked opening hostilities with the Iraqi Kurdish forces as well, which had previously been content to let ISIS and the Iraqi government fight each other. It also eventually both provoked American airstrikes and drew the United States closer to the YPG/J. Yet it was important enough to ISIS to divert its forces. This suggests that this was not a strategic choice for ISIS but a manifestation of its broader ideological project. This is also true of a second aspect of ISIS’s brutalization of civilians— its use of targeted violence against women. ISIS is unusually misogynistic, even relative to other jihadist groups.92 Misogyny is a central tenet of its ideology, as reflected in the propaganda it produces for both Arabicspeakers93 and non-Arabs.94 In practice, this has meant the stringent regulation of women’s public and private behavior.95 Penalties were brutal for those who did not comply, as in the case of the female dentist in Mayadin who was publicly beheaded in 2014 for treating male patients.96 It also established the sexual assault of women and girls as officially sanctioned policy.97 Yazidi women and girls abducted by ISIS were subject to repeated rape and enslavement by ISIS fighters.98 Yazidi and Christian women were sold or trafficked to raise funds.99 Syrian girls as young as thirteen were forced into marriage with ISIS fighters, leading desperate families to arrange marriages for their young daughters themselves.100 Likewise, as discussed in chapter 4, ISIS’s use of violence against gay men has been tied to its ideology. In 2014, ISIS began releasing videos of men accused of “sexual deviance” being thrown off of buildings by its fighters in Raqqa and Mosul, which were then reported on in the American media.101 Human Rights Watch has documented executions

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and disappearances of gay men or men accused of homosexuality in other areas controlled by ISIS as well.102 One way of interpreting these attacks based on gender and sexual orientation is as what Ariel Ahram terms “competitive state building”—a way of enforcing its norms and exerting political power via the same tools of torture long used by the Iraqi and Syrian states.103 Joshua Tschantret similarly argues that attacks on sexual minorities are a form of ideological outbidding against state and nonstate rivals, as well as a way to signal territorial control through the ability to mete out selective punishment. Tschantret notes that Jabhat al-Nusra followed ISIS’s example and also began executing gay men. Tschantret’s argument differs from Ahram’s, however, in that he identifies a third factor—a genuine ideological commitment to hatred of those outside its narrowly defined norms regarding gender and sexuality.104 ISIS’s use of violence against women and religious minorities follows a similar logic: although it is certainly motivated by the need signal their authority through violence, especially in competition with the Syrian state, what sets their behavior apart from that of other perpetrators is their persistent and very public justification of this violence on the basis of the victims’ identities. In this sense, ISIS’s use of violence is not only a form of governance but also a form of propaganda.

The Kurdish Forces Finally, the Kurdish forces also engaged in violence against civilians, albeit at lower levels than many of the other participants in the war. In 2014, Human Rights Watch reported that in comparison with the Syrian state and ISIS, “while the human rights abuses committed by the PYD and its security forces are far less egregious and widespread, they are nonetheless serious.”105 Much of the violence used by the Kurdish forces was repressive. In 2016, the SNHR reported that the PYD, the political party of the YPG/J armed forces, arrested a number of critical journalists and held them for several days before releasing them and deporting at least two to Iraq.106

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Human Rights Watch reported that members of rival political parties in Rojava experienced arbitrary arrest and imprisonment on fabricated charges. Prisoners sometimes experienced abuse and torture such as beatings and a general lack of due process.107 Those accused, accurately or otherwise, of membership in ISIS faced special abuse in prisons which became overcrowded after the fall of Raqqa.108 There are also reports of the PYD and its armed forces using violence against protesters. One subject of frequent protests was the Kurdish forces’ forcible conscription of men, a policy many other participants in the war practiced, and the related issue of the recruitment of children as young as thirteen, a practice for which the YPG has been criticized by human rights organizations.109 In the spring of 2021, SDF fighters opened fire on civilian demonstrators against conscription in Manbij, killing eight people. Although the SDF eventually suspended its policy of forced conscription,110 whether the move will be permanent is hard to know. A broader form of civilian abuse was the destruction and displacement of communities. In 2015, fighters from the SDF destroyed entire villages in al-Hasakah governorate near Husseiniya, Tel Hamees, and Suluk, and depopulated others around Tel Abyad and Tel Tamer. They burned down homes, destroyed crops, and in some cases shot at livestock after ordering villagers to leave. Some reported to Amnesty International that YPG or SDF fighters told villagers they needed to leave for their own safety, sometimes returning several times with the same message, before demolishing their villages. Others reported that SDF fighters had accused them, their family members, or communities of supporting ISIS, before ordering them to leave their villages and demolishing their homes.111 The YPG argued that these displacements were necessary to prevent ISIS from using the villages as a base for retaking territory or attacking the civilians themselves. This assertion, though, is contested by the displaced, most of whom stated that their villages were uninvolved in fighting and that any ISIS supporters in their towns had long since fled or never been there in the first place.112

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One way of interpreting this violence is as a form of ethnic cleansing. Most of the villages destroyed were predominantly Arab or Turkmen.113 On the other hand, in the larger mixed Arab and Kurdish town of Suluk, Kurdish residents who had fled when ISIS took control of the city were not allowed to return by the SDF any more than their Arab neighbors were.114 Although many interviewees described the fighters who told them to leave their homes as speaking Kurdish and Arabic, others reported that those who told them to leave spoke only Arabic, suggesting that non-Kurdish SDF factions were involved in implementing this policy as well.115 Another interpretation of these actions, then, is as a form of collective punishment against those perceived to have sided with ISIS. This notion is supported by the fact that the YPG/J also targeted specific families or individuals whom they accused of having ties to either ISIS or the opposition, between which the PYD leadership has not always clearly distinguished.116 Both of these motives likely have some truth to them—the YPG/J saw Arab villages as being more likely to support ISIS, and therefore more likely to pose a threat, leading to targeting of civilians. Finally, civilians were also killed in the fighting between the YPG/J and later the SDF and other factions. As is true of the other nonstate actors involved, it can be hard to discern who is responsible for which civilian deaths when everyone involved in a given confrontation is similarly armed. One exception though are the heavy civilian casualties resulting from U.S. airstrikes in support of the SDF campaign against ISIS between 2014 and 2018 known as Operation Inherent Resolve. These were concentrated in Raqqa, the suburbs of Aleppo, and Deir Ezzor. Amnesty International documented 1,724 civilian casualties in Raqqa alone, a result of the combination of ISIS’s refusal to allow civilians to leave the city, enforced through sniper fire and landmines, and bombardment of the civilian population by the United States and its allies in support of the SDF’s campaign to capture the city.117 Investigative reporting by the New York Times into the unit responsible for targeting in northern Syria, a strike cell known as Talon Anvil, suggests considerable carelessness on the part of its members in regard to civilian life.118

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PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE

To summarize the broad patterns of violence described here, the Asad regime caused a majority of the civilian casualties in the war by indiscriminate attacks on the population in opposition-controlled or contested areas, even as it engaged in repressive violence against political opponents, both of which at times shaded into propagandistic violence. Meanwhile, it concentrated its military forces overwhelmingly on the opposition, expending far less manpower on attacking either ISIS or the Kurdish forces. For its part, ISIS engaged both in repressive violence against civilians in general and in propagandistic violence against women and religious and sexual minorities in particular. (Together, of course, these are the majority of the civilian population.) Its military confrontations have been divided among the regime, the Kurdish forces, and various opposition factions. The Kurdish forces and their allies in the rest of the SDF have mostly focused on military targets and engaged in only limited, repressive violence against civilians; their military force has been primarily devoted to fighting ISIS and, secondarily, a series of Turkish proxy militias among the opposition. They and the regime have largely ignored each other. Finally, the various components of the fragmented opposition vary in their behavior. Broadly speaking, though, the jihadist factions have attacked civilians for both propagandistic and repressive reasons, and at times the more moderate factions have cooperated with them while also engaging in indiscriminate violence. Overall, the rebel forces have focused on fighting the regime, although some also attacked ISIS earlier in the war, the Kurdish forces later on, and occasionally each other. These patterns suggest several conclusions. The most obvious is that, at least some of the time, the participants in the war in Syria were not fighting those who they claimed to see as their principal adversaries. Despite ISIS’s sectarian rhetoric and demonization of Alawites, confrontations with the Asad regime made up less than 40 percent of its military activity. The regime, despite its rhetorical framing of the war as a

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fight against extremism, focused heavily on fighting the opposition, rather than ISIS, especially early on. Further, despite the PYD’s stated goal of establishing a democratic confederalist government for Syria, for most of the war it has had a de facto détente with the Asad regime, which is many things but democratic is not among them. This can be at least partly explained by material and strategic concerns such as the need to control territory; early in the war, the regime was clearly rattled by the opposition’s success in taking control of territory in cities like Homs, Hama, Deraa, and Aleppo, which led to significant violence in those areas, as well as collective punishment of the civilian population. The violence between the Kurdish forces and ISIS was similarly shaped at least in part by competition for control of key territory, as was at least some of the fighting between ISIS and various opposition factions. It also indicates, however, that at times the choice of targets for those fighting in Syria was motivated either by the desire to promote a particular narrative of the war or by a focus on defeating those who offered a different interpretation. I address the latter dynamic first. Each of the parties in Syria had important audiences, both at home and abroad. At home, the Asad regime needed to win over the Syrian public, or at least, a significant portion of it, particularly the elite. Abroad, in addition to maintaining Russian and Iranian support it needed to convince outside observers, including neighboring states such as Jordan and international powers such as the United States and the EU, that the alternatives to Asad’s rule would be far worse and that it at least represented a degree of stability. The opposition likewise sought to win over the Syrian public, or at least segments of it. Many of the jihadist factions claimed to represent Syria’s Sunni majority; the moderate factions of the Free Syrian Army claimed, at least in theory, to represent Syria as a whole. This was also true, of course, of the civil society activists who launched the uprising in the first place in 2011. Practically speaking, the most important Syrian audiences for many rebel factions were probably whichever civilians they were trying to recruit or govern at any particular time. But for at least some factions, their most important audience in practice was not Syrian at all, but instead potential and actual foreign sponsors. For some,

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this meant governments, as in the case of Turkey’s proxy militias in the north, or the short-lived American backing of the vetted factions of the FSA. Others found support from wealthy private donors, mostly based in the Gulf.119 Unlike the opposition, the PYD focused less on winning over the entirety of the Syrian public than the specific civilian population under their rule. This includes both Kurds and Arabs, who became particularly important with the broadening of the SDF to include non-Kurdish fighters. Abroad, its leadership has clearly seen the U.S. government and its allies as an important audience. Finally, ISIS is something of an outlier in regard to its audiences, both in Syria and elsewhere. It has never had substantial foreign backers, or at least none willing to openly affiliate with the organization. Although it does have important state audiences for its messaging, those audiences are largely hostile, and its messaging often seems threatening or confrontational. More important to ISIS has been its ability to appeal to potential recruits in Syria and elsewhere, as well as the Sunni public in the areas under its rule, although its approach often reads less as an attempt to win them over than to browbeat them into compliance. As this suggests, then, there is a good deal of overlap in terms of which audiences those fighting in Syria seek to win over, at the local, national, and international levels. Because of this competition, in addition to military decisions motivated by territorial or political ambitions, we also sometimes see those fighting in Syria attacking those they perceive as rivals for the support of key audiences. The regime, for instance, has expended proportionally far fewer resources attacking ISIS or Kurdish forces than the opposition has, despite the greater territorial threat that both have presented at various times. One explanation is that the regime believed it did not need to engage with either of these actors because the United States and the Kurds would deal with ISIS and Turkey would deal with the Kurds. But it has become increasingly clear as the war has ground on that the latter proposition, at least, does not hold. The Kurdish forces, as of this writing, control as much as one-third of Syria’s territory. More important, Turkey’s taking over the territory held by the PYD would hardly be an

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improvement from Asad’s point of view, given its support for the opposition. And though the contention that Asad was banking on the United States and the Kurdish forces defeating ISIS has some truth to it, it is also true that ISIS was able to advance seemingly unchecked by the government’s forces, including on territory containing oil that the government then had to buy back from ISIS. At least some of those interviewed—particularly those close to the opposition—saw this as a deliberate policy. They believed that the presence of ISIS, in all its flamboyant brutality, was useful for the regime because it confirmed Asad’s argument that the war was a fight between the forces of secular order and the forces of jihadist chaos; a more precise representative of the latter than ISIS could hardly be imagined. The early secular opposition, on the other hand, was more difficult to cast as the villain, and the young demonstrators who began the uprising in 2011—some of whom later perished in Saydnaya Prison—were even more so. Consequently, an early and consistent priority was to repress the protests that framed the uprising as a fight between dictatorship and democracy. This interpretation is obviously tilted toward the opposition’s view of the war, but likely also has some truth to it. At the same time, although the opposition’s overwhelming focus on fighting the regime is neither particularly puzzling nor surprising, at least some of its use of violence also reflects a desire to stifle or discredit rival narratives of the war. One obvious example is the use of repressive violence by groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra/HTS against secular opposition figures such as Raed Fares of Radio Fresh, who was murdered, in all probability, by the former. Fares was a civilian, but he and journalists like him were a real danger to al-Nusra’s authority. Ironically, the attention devoted by some segments of the opposition to attacking ISIS reveals a similar set of motives. ISIS was more than a territorial threat: its viciousness threatened the image of the Syrian revolution as a fight against tyranny, and its jihadist credentials and utopian framing of the war as a fight to establish not a new Syria but a new caliphate threatened to peel off potential recruits. For its part, the time ISIS spent fighting the opposition is a consequence at least in part of having to defend itself against a concerted campaign in 2013–14, but not entirely. At least some of this

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violence reflected an intra-jihadist struggle over which organization would be the standard-bearer for the jihadist project in Syria, and whose version of the jihadist narrative would come to dominate. The Kurdish forces too can be understood as perceiving the major threats to their interests as coming not from those on the other side of the divide they rhetorically invoke to define the war but against those who offer a different narrative entirely. For the Kurds, this meant those advocating either an ethnonational narrative—the Turkish-backed opposition, who see the conflict as being between Arabs and Kurds—or a sectarian one—ISIS and some of the jihadists. One explanation is that this position is basically pragmatic—if the regime poses no immediate threat, then picking a fight with it serves no purpose. It can also be understood as an extension of the PKK’s historical devil’s bargain with the Asads: despite the repression of Syria’s Kurds, Turkey was seen as the greater threat, so conflict with the former was avoided to make war against the latter possible. This perspective is reflected in the suspicion of and hostility toward Turkey expressed in surveys by SDF fighters, including both Arabs and Kurds, and in the propaganda discussed in greater depth in chapter 4.120 The PYD’s choices can also be read as a reflection of its priorities and understanding of the nature of the war. At a fundamental level, despite their ideological and ethnic antagonisms, the regime and the PYD share an understanding as to what the war in Syria is really about: a conflict against jihadism and in defense of secularism. In contrast, violence against civilians in Syria has been less shaped by competition over the narrative of the war than it has been a way of promoting each faction’s chosen narrative. This has, for some, included the public use of violence as a deliberate form of propaganda. For the Asad regime, indiscriminate violence was both a form of collective punishment against civilians who were seen as supporting the opposition, and a way of demonstrating that the opposition could provide neither peace nor security to those under its rule. Civilians under rebel rule were framed as partisan supporters of the government’s enemies, and therefore, based on the regime’s characterization of the war as a fight against terrorism, not actually civilians in any meaningful sense of the word.

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Indiscriminate and repressive violence against the civilian population were both a product of this narrative and a way of conveying it. The use of violence against civilians by the opposition factions also functioned as a way of communicating their ideological positions. Although much of the violence perpetrated against civilians by the rebels who controlled territory in Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, and elsewhere was meant to repress dissent and exert control, in some instances it also functioned as a kind of propaganda: violence against religious minorities reinforced a sectarian framing of the war that was apparently appealing to at least some potential recruits and foreign funders. Even for FSA factions that sought to avoid violence against civilians, cooperation with the jihadists considerably complicated their claims to be building a better Syria for all Syrians in that they were assumed to be complicit in the actions of other factions. For instance, Jabhat al-Nusra’s massacre in 2015 of more than twenty Druze civilians in the village of Qalb Loz near Idlib led Druze at the other end of the country, in Suwayda, to mobilize in defense of a regime airbase against the FSA, ultimately handing the government’s forces a victory they might not otherwise have had.121 Especially striking is ISIS’s preoccupation with attacking civilians, which made up a larger proportion of its military activity than that of any other actor in the war—so much so that it interrupted its advance in Iraq to turn northward and commit genocide against the Yazidis. This genocidal violence, along with its highly publicized atrocities against women, gay men, foreign hostages, religious minorities, and others was clearly at least in part an end in and of itself. But the group’s public defense and even celebration of these acts suggests that the strategy is also a deliberate one. These attacks are clearly meant to frighten members of the target group, but the very public way they are carried out and then celebrated can also be interpreted as a form of trolling, as discussed in the next chapter. In contrast, the Kurdish forces engaged in very little of the kind of propagandistic violence against minorities that ISIS did, or of the massive, indiscriminate violence the regime carried out. Even though the air strikes by the SDF’s American allies did cause substantial civilian death in Raqqa, rather than celebrating or promoting these casualties, the

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American government sought to conceal them. Following the deadly air strike on the town of Baghuz in March of 2019 that killed eighty civilians, the U.S. military did not investigate or even acknowledge the casualties until the New York Times published an independent investigation of the incident.122 More common from the PYD was the use of repressive violence against critics or opponents of its ideological project, or the repression of demonstrations against its policies, sometimes violently. It also, of course, expelled civilians in some regions from their homes and demolished their villages, apparently as punishment for perceived community sympathy with ISIS. Both kinds of repression send the message that neither dissent nor support for the group’s adversaries—even by civilians— will be tolerated. Overall, however, all of the available data suggest that the Kurdish forces engaged in less violence against civilians than the regime, ISIS, or Jabhat al-Nusra did. This makes a certain amount of sense, given both the audiences the PYD is seeking to win over and the nature of their ideological project. Propagandistic violence against ethnic minorities would convey nothing about the PYD’s larger narrative of the war and, given the increasing prevalence of Arab fighters in the SDF, would only make holding the SDF’s internal coalition together more difficult. If the Asad regime used indiscriminate violence to convey that it considered civilians in opposition areas to be complicit in the rebellion against its rule, the jihadists attacked minorities to burnish their sectarian credentials, and ISIS promoted its atrocities to demonstrate its principles, the PYD, given its narrative of the war, had little to gain by doing the same. That the exception to this was the expulsion of civilians accused of supporting ISIS only reinforces this conclusion.

CONCLUSION

Although the fighting in Syria has receded significantly as of this writing, it remains a dangerous place for civilians. Much of the organized violence can be understood as a function of the broader objectives of the

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various participants—to take and hold territory, to establish their preferred system of governance, to defend against adversaries—but their choices of target are also shaped by a need, not necessarily recognized or acknowledged by the combatants, to defeat those who frame the conflict in a fundamentally different way. At the same time, violence against civilians sometimes functions as a form of propaganda in and of itself, and a way that armed groups seek to spread their message. In this sense, as the following chapter explores, it can serve as a kind of performance, a characteristic of the war that has often led to even greater suffering, especially by civilians. In 2021, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights put the total number of civilian casualties in Syria at over 350,000, or 1.5 percent of Syria’s prewar population.123 This does not include the thousands of additional combatant deaths. Tens of thousands of Syrians have disappeared into the regime’s prison system or been abducted by armed groups such as ISIS. This chapter attempts to trace some of the broader patterns in the overall conduct of the war. It is also important, however, to acknowledge that for those killed and wounded, and for their families and communities, no logic can rationalize the suffering inflicted on the people of Syria over the course of the war.

4 THE YOUTUBE WAR

E

ven after more than a decade, video footage from the protest held in Damascus’s Old City on February 17, 2011—among the earliest of the Syrian uprising—is still available on YouTube.1 The video was shot with a cell phone camera, and tilts wildly from side to side, capturing a sea of young men packed in closely together. Some look exhilarated, some nervous, some angry. The chants shift from “Thieves! Thieves!” to “the Syrian people will not be humiliated!” to “there is no God but God!” At one point, someone attempts to start a chant of “With our souls and our blood we sacrifice for you oh, Bashar,” a common progovernment chant, but the crowd largely ignores it. A man in a brown jacket climbs up on the roof of a car. Then Minister of the Interior Said Sammour arrives and attempts to calm the crowd, but with little apparent success. And, in what is now a familiar image, everywhere the camera turns, hands are raised, holding cell phones. The video, which would be followed by thousands more, offered what was in retrospect a preview of what was to come. As the uprising— which, like those in other Arab states, made extensive use of social media—shifted into open war, all sides turned to the internet to promote their respective narratives. This took many forms, from attempts to expose abuses by adversaries, to fairly traditional propaganda, to videos documenting military operations for recruitment or fundraising,

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to videos of gruesome atrocities meant to threaten or troll adversaries. The violence documented in these videos includes both military operations either deliberately or incidentally captured on film, and acts of violence explicitly carried out to be recorded; in some cases, the boundaries between the former and the latter are fuzzy at best. The idea that violence is a form of communication is not new; when a state seeks to deter aggression from its neighbor through a show of force, or a militant group launches a terrorist attack on a civilian target, these actions are understood (at least by political scientists) as ways of communicating a message. But, as this chapter demonstrates, access to social media as a tool for disseminating propaganda, threatening adversaries, recruiting new members, and connecting with donors has created new incentives for those fighting in Syria and introduced a new kind of performativity to the conduct of the war. This in turn raises important questions as to how we should understand the motivations of those fighting and how we should interpret individual acts of violence.

THE PERFORMANCE OF WAR

Years after resigning, Richard Nixon lamented in his memoirs that “more than ever before, television showed the terrible human suffering and sacrifice of war. Whatever the intention behind such relentless and literal reporting of the [Vietnam] war, the result was a serious demoralization on the home front, raising the question whether America would ever again be able to fight an enemy abroad with unity and strength of purpose at home.”2 Nixon was not alone in this conclusion; conventional wisdom has come to hold that seeing the reality of the war unfold on the evening news fed into public opposition.3 Vietnam was hardly the first conflict shaped by new media technology. World War II was covered heavily over the radio, which was used to disseminate news and propaganda to audiences in new ways. During the Cold War, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe broadcast Louis Armstrong and American news into Eastern

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Europe. With the advent of satellite TV, especially when Al Jazeera went on the air in 1996, authoritarian governments in the Middle East lost the ability to control the television news consumed by their populations, changing public opinion and opening new space for debate.4 The advent of the internet represented yet another revolution. If previous technological shifts had extended the audience for the news and other information, the internet, and later the exponentially greater access to it that smartphones offered, expanded not only potential audiences but also potential sources of information. Whereas satellite TV meant that those watching the news were no longer limited to state-sponsored broadcasts, the internet, first via platforms such as blogs and later social media, offered those outside the media a newfound ability to produce and disseminate information themselves. The arrival of mobile phones and smartphones capable of capturing and sharing photo and video radically altered the ways in which information was shared and produced not only in the Middle East, but also around the world.5 In Syria, the internet was functionally inaccessible to most Syrians until 1999. In 2000, public internet cafes under state supervision were established; five years later, private providers were allowed to offer internet access for the first time. The government even established initiatives aimed at extending internet access to rural areas. The internet, though, soon proved to be a more powerful tool for political dissent than the state had anticipated; it therefore quickly moved to crack down. By 2007, Syria had the largest number of online dissidents incarcerated in the Middle East; in 2009, the Committee to Protect Journalists declared it the third worst country in the world in which to be a blogger.6 When social media platforms such as Facebook became available, the government blocked them. It also began requiring internet cafes to register users.7 In 2011, as protests spread from Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Morocco, and elsewhere, social media platforms proved a powerful tool for organizing events, sharing information, swapping tactical advice, and documenting both mass protest and the regimes’ responses. One common narrative is that Facebook was used for networking, YouTube by “citizen journalists,” and Twitter for

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coordinating in real time.8 In Syria, Facebook and YouTube were the most widely used, the former often serving as a vehicle for sharing videos hosted on the latter.9 The social media platforms were only tools: it was local activists, not the platforms themselves, who were responsible for the eruption of the Arab Spring. The platforms were also a double-edged sword in that the security services soon realized they could be used to track and arrest activists. Nor was internet access deterministic: Yemen, where in 2011 only 9.7 percent of the population had access to the internet, had a robust protest movement, whereas the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which had internet penetration rates of 69  percent and 43.6  percent respectively, did not.10 Nevertheless, it is clear that access to social media had an impact, albeit a varied one, on both the eruption of the Arab Spring uprisings in general, and Syria’s uprising and eventual civil war in particular. Indeed, despite the widespread use of social media by nonviolent activists during the Arab Spring, it is a striking feature of the Syrian conflict that so much of the war was documented and shared online. An American journalist who has covered the wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere observed that the use of YouTube by activists in Syria on what he termed an “industrial scale” was unusual; he noted that he had not seen a similarly systematic use of YouTube or any other online platforms in Iraq or Libya.11 In that sense, those fighting in Syria can be considered early adopters of new civilian technology for military purposes. On the other hand, if the heavy use of social media by the combatants in Syria was unusual, the way they did so was actually quite similar to their use by other subcultures and communities. Posting videos to YouTube to gather likes and attract followers and fans, trolling political adversaries on Facebook or Telegram, or bragging about one’s exploits on Twitter for “clout” (that is, internet prestige) are all common uses of social media by typical users. They are also heavily engaged in by the various factions fighting in Syria. Further, as with other uses of social media—the college student posting a selfie taken on a spring break service trip, the skier strapping a GoPro camera to his chest before hurtling down a mountain, or the influencer livestreaming video of themselves in a club—use by the participants in the Syrian war created new

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incentives to behave in certain ways for the sake of capturing them on camera. If our hypothetical influencer chooses to spend her Saturday night at one club over another because its décor would look better on Instagram, her choice, and therefore her behavior, is being shaped by the knowledge that her night out is not just a night out, but also a performance of a night out. Similarly, if a fighter knows that her attack on an enemy military base is being filmed to create a propaganda video, that awareness likewise has the potential to shape her decisions—she is not only conducting a military operation, but also performing one. This is not to say that all violence in Syria captured on video is deliberately performative or was even carried out with the knowledge that it was being filmed. It is helpful to draw a distinction between three categories of documented violence: that carried out and filmed incidentally either by supporters or adversaries; that which would have been happened anyway but was carried out with the knowledge that it would be filmed; and that carried out for the express purpose of being filmed. These categories are obviously blurred, and it may not even be entirely clear to those involved what their primary intentions are. One way of understanding this is as what Charles Tilly terms a “contentious performance.” Tilly, along with Sidney Tarrow and other scholars of social movements, argues that those seeking to make claims on the state through collective action do so via coordinated actions meant to demonstrate the worthiness of the cause, the movement’s unity and numbers, and the commitment of its members.12 Through repetition, these actions—strikes, marches, pickets, leafleting campaigns, and so on—come to take on a clear and specific meaning to observers, participants, and protest targets. In this sense, they are a kind of performance. These actions are powerful in their own right—a strike or a picket line can affect a company’s profits, for instance. They also carry symbolic power, however. Blocking traffic to protest the killing of Black people by the police will not necessarily punish specific police officers or even the city governments that employ them, but it does demonstrate the strength, commitment, and anger of those involved. Although press coverage has always been important in expanding the audience for a given performance beyond those physically present, the use of social

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media allows protesters to expand their audience still further without relying on conventional media. Activist repertoires have accordingly evolved to match the social media ecosystem. Funny protest signs—in the United States, Syria, or anywhere else—are more likely to go viral on Twitter or Instagram, thereby raising awareness of the activists’ message and cause. This dynamic was already apparent in the early stages of the Syrian uprising. Protests with specific themes, slogans, and objectives were coordinated across the country on specific Fridays, demonstrating unity, numbers, and commitment especially given the risks of attending a protest. Activists also worked to tie their message into the larger project of the Arab Spring by adopting slogans and chants that were in some cases similar to those used in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere. Some of this was directed at the regime, in a literal sense—one slogan in the early days of the uprising in Syria translated as “Your turn is next, Doctor” in reference to Asad’s prior career as an optometrist. But the regime was not the protesters’ only, or even most important, audience. Especially in the spring of 2011, the activists also sought to win over those in Syria and beyond who doubted that such a thing could happen there at all.13 Hence the flying protests held in the early days of the uprisings, involving a small group coming together, shouting some slogans, and quickly dispersing before they could be arrested, all while—crucially—being filmed.14 As the protests spread and grew in size, the Syrian protesters also became adept at leveraging social media to get the traditional media to disseminate their message. In this, the regime’s policies proved helpful. Because foreign journalists other than Russian and Iranian reporters were largely banned from Syria, YouTube videos of protests produced by the opposition and, due to state internet controls, smuggled out of Syria on USB drives became a significant part of the early narrative in the Western media.15 When the regime claimed that the videos were faked by hostile news stations, especially Al Jazeera, as part of a massive conspiracy against Syria,16 activists began taking steps to help authenticate videos, including showing landmarks and leaders of demonstrations.17 Even in interviews for this book, activists sometimes shared or described YouTube videos to corroborate their descriptions of events.18

THE YOUTUBE WAR159

These protests were, in an almost literal sense, performative, in that filming them and then sharing the resulting video was a large part of the point; an opposition activist interviewed by Sahar Khamis, Paul Gold, and Katherine Vaughn said bluntly that “the YouTube video has become as important as the demonstration itself.”19 One interpretation of this—which the Syrian government championed—is that this performativity implies that the protests were in some way fake or staged. Another interpretation, however, more in line with Tilly’s argument, is that all protest is by definition performative in that it is directed at an audience. That a protest is conducted with the intent to be filmed does not mean that the sentiments expressed by the protesters any less authentic, only that they are seeking a larger audience. Many of the participants in the Syrian civil war approached the use of violence in much the same way. Like peaceful protest, performative violence also allows the perpetrators to make claims about the worthiness of their goals, the unity and numbers of their movement’s members, and their commitment to their cause. It can, in other words, be a form of communication, on both an individual and a massive scale. In Show Time, Lee Ann Fujii examines what she terms “violent displays,” public and performative episodes of violence such as lynchings that function as a way of “bringing to life ideas about how the world should be and more specifically, how it should be ordered.”20 These violent displays—carefully cast, staged, and performed—are in Fujii’s analysis a way to reinforce certain identities and hierarchies, not only for victims and perpetrators, but also for observers. Research on terrorism has likewise found that broad campaigns of terrorist violence are intended to send a message to the community as a whole in addition to targeting individual victims.21 In this sense, at least some of the violence in Syria—especially, but not only, that directed against civilians—worked as a kind of performative messaging. Just how literal a performance it is can be hard to parse. Much of the online propaganda being distributed in the context of the Syrian war documents military operations that were likely going to happen anyway, but were captured on film either opportunistically or deliberately. On the other hand, there is also evidence of acts of violence

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being carried out explicitly for the sake of recording them. The destruction and loss of life being filmed is real insofar as those being killed are really dead and the buildings being shelled are really destroyed. However, at least some of these operations—whether artillery barrages against enemy positions or executions of hostages—appear to have been carried out, or carried out in a certain way with the intent to create footage to be disseminated later. In what follows, I discuss the ways in which performative violence— amplified by social media—has been used by those fighting in Syria to convey specific narratives of the war. The resulting propaganda serves a range of purposes, including not only promoting the creator’s worldview, but also raising funds, recruiting fighters, and threatening adversaries. First, though, I begin with the use of social media for an entirely different purpose: citizen journalism.

CITIZEN JOURNALISM

Many of the combatants involved in the war in Syria have a welldeveloped online presence, but one important corner of the Syrian social media ecosystem is occupied by those civilian activists—generally oriented toward the opposition—who are seeking to expose the abuses carried out by the armed actors in the conflict. Most are or were focused on documenting air strikes and other attacks by government forces and sharing them online and with the international media. On YouTube, both collaborative media centers and individual users produced and shared thousands of videos documenting what life was actually like for Syrians during the war and sharing horrific footage of airstrikes and civilian casualties, contradicting the official narratives promoted by state-controlled media. They also exposed abuses by nonstate actors such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. One of the most prolific media centers, Raqqa Is Being Silently Slaughtered, created videos of long lines at bakeries under ISIS’s rule as well as other footage contradicting ISIS’s carefully crafted utopian narrative.22

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The work of the activists affiliated with these groups was dangerous: filming air strikes was and is extremely risky, and activists faced special targeting by the regime and other actors in the conflict.23 Several leaders of Raqqa Is Being Silently Slaughtered were murdered abroad by ISIS,24 and an American journalist who covered Syria extensively told me that most of his contacts from opposition media centers were now either in exile or dead.25 The risk entailed in making these videos paradoxically added to their power, however, or at least to their credibility. As one Syrian activist based in London put it, It is not like before, when you just listen to the BBC, and you know what is going on in the world. No. Syrians are risking their lives to take video, to put it on YouTube, to put it on Facebook, to put it on Twitter, to tell the world, look, hear our voice, hear and see what is going on. Here you go. Watch. How many civil activists, civil journalists died in Syria? Countless. Everyone talking about Marie Colvin, which is—she’s an amazing human being. How many civil journalists died in Syria?26

Although this activism did not force the government to halt its campaign against the civilian population or pressure outside powers into taking steps to protect Syrian civilians, it did grant the activists a surprising degree of control over the narrative around the nature and causes of the war. As with the coverage of the protests in the early months of the uprising, this was partly the Syrian government’s own doing: even before the war, reporting in Syria had been a challenge, and after 2011 international journalists found it increasingly difficult to access the country.27 On top of that, the government itself showed very little interest in engaging with the foreign media, even when contacted for a comment.28 Groups such as ISIS and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham were, of course, even more isolated from international media coverage in part because of their repeated abduction and murder of foreign journalists. The opposition activists, on the other hand, were extremely forthcoming. The same American journalist who described the high casualty rate among his opposition contacts explained that when he needed to write a story about events in a specific area, he would go to the

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Facebook page for the local media center, and they would send him video he could use to piece together what had happened. He acknowledged that, especially early on, journalists relied heavily on oppositiondominated social media for information, but largely because there were no other options, given the regime’s stance on foreign journalists.29 Additionally, because activists wanted the foreign media to use their footage, videos were produced with an eye toward credibility, filming without edits or cuts and taking pains to verify the date and location when possible.30 Many were very skilled at this, beginning the video by shouting the date and location and showing identifying landmarks.31 They also became adept at producing clever, viral content that a former state department official described as “next-level stuff,” full of pop-culture references and clever memes, which “[spoke] to the rest of the world in a language they could understand.”32 This dynamic meant that the activists were able to help shape Western perceptions of what was happening in Syria without much interference from the Syrian state, or, for that matter, the Islamist segments of the opposition. The bubbles created by social media networks meant that material produced in English, largely by the secular opposition, was circulated in different social media networks than that produced by the Islamist opposition, which was more likely to be in Arabic. Journalists who did not speak Arabic, especially those without the budget for a local translator, did not necessarily have access to the latter, which might have offered a different perspective on the war.33 In sum, social media allowed those Syrian activists who were most skilled at using it to both bypass the historical gatekeeping function of the media and simultaneously work through them to promote their own narrative. On the other hand, the documentation of the war and exposure of the use of violence against civilians by the regime and others had other consequences that were sometimes unfortunate for the opposition. For one, it sparked a backlash from the regime, which, in addition to using Facebook to keep track of the opposition, eventually found ways to use malware to gain direct access to opposition members’ computers.34 The government also created a body known as the Syrian Electronic Army tasked with shutting down and defacing opposition websites, spamming

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opposition Facebook pages, and creating its own videos intended to discredit the opposition. Ruari Nolan of the Syria Campaign, a Western human rights organization supportive of the civilian opposition, offered the following example: If we post anything about the White Helmets, if the UK government posts anything about the White Helmets, if a celebrity posts anything about the White Helmets—if anyone posts something about the White Helmets—you can almost guarantee on Twitter that underneath you’ll get trolling. I think our research kind of showed that a lot of it’s driven by a small number of people that are highly motivated, and prolific, and form a network that are . . . you know, jump on this. And they have been effective in getting that narrative more widely known. . . . To give one example, the White Helmets once did a mannequin challenge . . . it was that kind of thing where people would freeze . . . and the White Helmets decided to do that I suppose to draw attention to their work. But then the footage of them doing that mannequin challenge was then used dishonestly, as if it wasn’t them doing the mannequin challenge but was them faking footage, so that’s one example. . . . Some of this is fundamentally dishonest. And it is effective. The disinformation is effective.35

Further, news coverage of regime atrocities and civilian suffering contributed to narratives less welcomed by the opposition. Marc Lynch, Deen Freelon, and Sean Aday argue that this footage sometime exposed rebel abuses as well, lessening the opposition’s legitimacy, and perhaps creating the sense that the war was an omnidirectional catastrophe that must be stopped at all costs.36 It also sometimes inspired civilians to flee rebel held areas in fear of a likely regime response. A former resident of Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus, which was destroyed by regime bombing in 2014, explained: “We were seeing what was happening with the towns that the Free Army was going into—this is why people left. They did not want to die like this. The airplanes were continuous. . . . December 19th the airplanes struck. December 16th the people were leaving and the next day by 9 p.m. I was in Lebanon.”37

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Civilians flee areas of fighting in all conflicts—Syria is scarcely unique in this regard. The constant coverage—even if intended to expose the regime’s bombardment of civilian areas—also served as a warning, however. Still, overall, for the activists of the civilian opposition, social media provided real advantages. It allowed them to share their message to an expanded audience, with or without the participation of the conventional media, and to document the war on their own terms. This was also true of war’s combatants, but with an important difference: whereas the nonviolent opposition activists running the media centers documented violence being carried out by others, those doing the fighting in Syria were often documenting themselves. Social media, especially YouTube, allowed them the chance to tell the story of the war they were fighting, in real time, while they were fighting it, sometimes blurring the line between real and performative warfare. One way of disentangling the complicated motives behind this performative violence is to sort through the practical intent behind the content being produced. Much of it functions as relatively straightforward propaganda, promoting the broader narratives discussed in chapter 3. It also serves other purposes, such as threatening adversaries, fundraising, and recruiting. In all of these instances, violence is a powerful form of communication. This is not a new feature of war. Lynching, car bombs, ethnic cleansing, suicide terrorism, pogroms, ethnic riots, and other forms of public, spectacular violence are all designed to send a message.38 The availability of social media, however, both expands the audience and adds a new set of incentives.

PROPAGANDA

One of the functions of performative violence in the Syrian war is the creation of propaganda, broadly defined as narratives, images, and symbols promoting a specific world view.39 It may promote an organization or government’s ideology, glorify its successes, or demonize its adversaries. Sometimes it can shade into trolling or threatening, as discussed

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later in this chapter. When violence is either carried out in ways that render it symbolically powerful or documented and then disseminated to promote a narrative or ideology, it has a propagandistic function. Social media enables and incentivizes this process. It has also changed the balance of power between states, nonstate actors, and the media. Governments such as Syria’s that have access to state-controlled media have long had access to a platform through which to share their version of events, threaten their adversaries, or solicit support. Nonstate actors have not always had the same option. Although some, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, have their own television stations, not all are so lucky. Access to social media provides a way for nonstate actors to both distribute propaganda and, in some cases, promote news of their attacks on both civilian and military targets without going through the media, state-controlled or otherwise.

T H E S O C I A L ME DI A B AT T LE FIE LD

The social media footprint of the various parties to the Syrian civil war varies considerably. The Syrian government’s online presence includes both official and unofficial sites. For a time, the Ministry of Defense had a YouTube channel linked from its official website, although that account was later terminated.40 A range of independent, pro-government channels still exist that post videos praising the Syrian military and condemning the opposition.41 Material from all of these channels is sometimes shared on pro-government Facebook pages and Twitter accounts.42 The government also benefits from its access to and control over conventional state-controlled media such as the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) and state-controlled stations such as al-Ikhbaria Syria. As Reporters Without Borders puts it, “State radio, TV and print media outlets just relay the government’s propaganda, which they take from the all-powerful SANA news agency.” 43 Each of these outlets also has a social media presence, including its own YouTube channel as well as accounts on other social media sites, which mix reporting on politics,

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sports, and other subjects with reporting on the conduct of the war, as well as material praising the Syrian government and Bashar al-Asad.44 The opposition social media universe is more decentralized. YouTube is host to a range of accounts and channels featuring videos from the perspective of the opposition, often shared by sympathetic Twitter accounts or on Facebook pages hosting other pro-opposition content. Many rebel factions have a robust presence on the platform. Some maintain their own, branded channels, which sometimes have quite large followings. The channel affiliated with the fairly small Jaysh al-‘Izza faction, for instance, posted a video of a military operation shot from a first-person perspective, that is, filmed with a GoPro camera or similar, that as of 2022 had received more than five and a half million views.45 Not all factions are able to do this, of course; channels affiliated with al-Qaeda or Jabhat al-Nusra or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham tend to be taken down by YouTube, although those posted by Ahrar al-Sham were not. Other channels are affiliated with the opposition more broadly, rather than one specific faction. One example is the Revolutionary Forces of Syria (RFS) Media Office; although it is loosely affiliated with the Free Syrian Army, it posts content from a range of factions. As of 2022 it had a total of nearly three thousand videos and nearly twenty-six thousand subscribers, featuring mostly FSA factions and footage from outlets such as Orient TV. Of course, material produced by accounts affiliated with specific factions is often shared by individual users who share material from many opposition factions, sometimes with very different ideological profiles.46 The Kurdish forces likewise established a robust online propaganda apparatus, including websites, Facebook pages, and YouTube and Telegram channels. These provide information on everything from the writings and political thought of Abdullah Öcalan to contact information for foreign recruits interested in traveling to Syria to fight with the People’s Protection Units and Women’s Protection Units. The three official YouTube channels of the Kurdish armed forces are the YPG Press Office, the YPJ Media Center, and the SDF Press channel.47 Each has a slightly different focus: the YPG’s channel, which as of 2022 had more than nine hundred videos and one hundred thousand

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subscribers, dates to soon after the YPG’s founding in 2013 and has videos on everything from the Democratic Union Party’s ideological project to footage of military operations by the YPG and YPJ, and later the SDF as well. Much of its content is in Kurdish, but there are videos in Arabic as well, and many of the videos in Kurdish have Arabic descriptive text. The YPJ’s current channel, which replaced an older one in 2019, has slightly fewer videos, around five hundred, and some thirtytwo thousand subscribers, and focuses both on the YPJ as a military force and on the PKK and YPG/J’s ideology of women’s liberation. The SDF’s channel is both larger, nearly three thousand videos, and more polished than the other two, including videos of press briefings by the SDF’s media officer and multiple versions of each video with subtitles in Arabic, English, and sometimes Kurdish.48 The material is also more focused on documenting reconstruction projects and good governance initiatives in northeastern Syria than on military operations. For its part, ISIS also created a substantial media apparatus, including the al-Furqan and al-Hayat media centers, al-Itisam and Ajnad foundations, al-Bayan Radio, and A’maq News Agency. It also included a host of regional media offices responsible for regions of Iraq, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Europe.49 These generated reams of propaganda for ISIS, including both print and video. ISIS-branded content is removed from YouTube fairly quickly, so it tends to use other platforms—notably Telegram and Google Drive—for sharing its material.50 None of these actors’ online presence existed in a vacuum, of course. Just as they received funding and weapons from abroad, many of the combatants in Syria also benefited from online support from their allies. This included Russian content in support of the Asad government, including reporting from the government-affiliated Russia Today, cheerleading for the Syrian opposition from supporters abroad, and leftist support for the Kurdish factions, all on social media. This amplified and in some cases reinforced the messaging the combatants themselves were promoting. Moreover, the supporters of the various combatants in Syria engaged with one another online, often in an attempt to undercut the messaging of their rivals.

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T H E ME S AND CO NT E NT

Regardless of who has created it, the video propaganda created by those fighting in Syria often falls into clear genres. Indeed, many are similar enough in format that, at first glance, a casual viewer might be hard pressed to tell which armed force they are meant to be promoting. Not all of it employs performative violence as a form of messaging. One common subject is training.51 The pro-government SANA and alIkhbaria YouTube channels include clips of news stories on subjects like the graduation ceremony for officers at the women’s military academy52 or the training undergone by soldiers and police.53 Both the YPG Press Office and the FSA-aligned RFS Media Center feature footage of soldiers in their respective forces learning to shoot, practicing martial arts, rappelling down buildings, and jumping through literal hoops, some of which are on fire.54 The YPG’s channel also includes what are probably more much more realistic montages of recruits doing sit-ups and cleaning their guns.55 Another common format is the battlefield interview: in carefully produced videos, FSA fighters explain their reasons for defecting to the FSA with reference to the repressiveness of the Asad regime.56 YPJ veterans offer their gratitude to their fallen comrades, and to Abdullah Öcalan.57 SAA military officers, in serious but optimistic tones, describe the steady progress of the war.58 A consistent theme in the messaging by many participants in the war is the close relationship each claims to have with the civilian population. Most minimize their use of violence against civilians, whether deliberate or indiscriminate, and emphasize the gratitude of the civilian population toward their fighters for protecting or liberating them from enemy forces. Al-Ikhbaria’s YouTube channel, for instance, includes clips in which civilians state their support for the army, and declare their gratitude for having been liberated from opposition rule.59 In other videos, Syrian civilians thank soldiers and wish them success in the war, which is followed by footage of the same soldiers returning to the front (see figure 4.1),60 or chant the pro-government slogan “with soul, with blood, we sacrifice for you oh Bashar.” 61

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SAA soldiers are shown celebrating with grateful civilians at the Damascus International Exhibition before returning to the front.

FIGURE  4.1

Source: Wassim Isa, “The other side of SAA soldiers in the war” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =YgqlgFladhc.

The YPG’s channel is similarly replete with videos of civilians— especially Arabic-speaking civilians—expressing their gratitude to the YPG and YPJ for saving them from ISIS.62 A cluster of these was released after the YPG’s capture of Raqqa in 2017.63 Many include shots of civilians kissing and hugging fighters or dancing alongside them, and of fighters helping civilians carry their belongings or otherwise assisting them.64 Some have a slightly staged quality: in one, YPJ fighters help a group of women carry some conveniently stacked pillows down a long road.65 In another, smiling civilians thank a group of slightly embarrassed-looking international fighters.66 Pro-opposition accounts likewise include interviews with civilians expressing their support for the opposition,67 reinforcing the message that it is not the rebels who are

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harming civilians. In one clip taken from a program on Orient TV, a fighter whose specialty is launching TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) anti-tank missiles is interviewed, intercut with footage of missile strikes on Aleppo International Airport. A voiceover explains that “he, like others in the movement, is careful to ensure that the many innocent civilians trapped in these conflicts are never targeted.” 68 In another, footage of a military advance into the countryside outside Afrin is followed by a carefully filmed exchange in which an officer explains to an older civilian man that their war is against the party of “the terrorists,” the PKK and the PYD, not with him or his community. The video ends with a shot of two little boys chanting “long live the Free Army!” 69 Of course, a good deal of the propaganda produced by all of the parties focuses on military operations themselves and the military prowess of specific factions. The YPG and YPJ platforms are full of videos of fighters conducting house-to-house operations,70 firing small arms, mortars, or shoulder-mounted rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs),71 and destroying “Daesh” or “terrorist” positions, weapons, and tanks72 against a soundtrack of patriotic music praising the YPG or Rojava.73 Especially successful or important operations—especially the defense and then recapture of Kobane74 and later the fighting around Raqqa75 and Deir Ezzor76—are often the subject of clusters of videos, some shot on a single smartphone, others of much higher quality. Those from Kobane in particular feature intense street fighting, although they do not show fighters being injured or killed.77 Later videos focus more on the fight against Turkey and its Syrian allies,78 in a reflection of the changing nature of the war in the northeast. Meanwhile, the pro-opposition channels share videos—in some cases quite similar ones—of FSA fighters firing missiles and RPGs, exchanging fire with regime forces, riding in convoys of vehicles, and so forth.79 As true of the YPG and YPJ focus on specific operations, the content of the pro-opposition propaganda reflects the FSA’s evolution: earlier videos focus exclusively on the conflict with the regime, showing street fighting against the Syrian military and Hezbollah80 or artillery strikes on regime targets.81 Operations against the Russian military—often

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emphasizing the civilian costs of Russia’s involvement in Syria—are also a frequent theme, especially after 2015.82 One video demonstrating the use of anti-aircraft guns refers to their targets as Putin’s airplanes.83 Later on, the adversaries in the videos broaden. In 2016, a number of videos were created documenting the campaign against ISIS, dubbed Euphrates Shield, outside Aleppo.84 By 2017 and 2018, footage of military operations reflects the FSA’s increasing closeness with Turkey and hostility to the PYD and its armed forces, which are sometimes referred to as “PKK terrorists,” such as in videos from 2018 celebrating the conquest of Afrin from the PYD by Turkish-backed forces.85 Like that created by the civilian citizen journalists of the opposition media centers, the propaganda produced by the various armed factions often feels as if the filmmakers are trying to prove a contested set of facts through video documentation. The Kurdish forces film captured Turkish military equipment in Afrin,86 for example, and shared footage of their fighters destroying a vehicle flying an ISIS flag to show that their forces are the ones fighting the Islamic State.87 The opposition films regime air strikes to show that the government is attacking civilians. The footage of fighters of all stripes training often feels designed to showcase the professionalism, and, by extension, legitimacy, of those fighting. In sum, many of these videos feel very much as if those behind them are arguing a case, which is of course the nature of propaganda. Beyond these similarities in both format and content, though, there are important differences in the material produced by the various participants in the war, often reflecting their preoccupations and narratives. One of the defining traits of the Syrian government propaganda is its origins in and connection to official state media. As in many autocracies, the line between the Syrian media and pro-government propaganda is a blurry one. (This is also true of RT Arabic, the Arabic version of the statesponsored Russian news channel, whose YouTube channel also produces content favorable to the Syrian government.88) This has meant that though it does use social media, the government is perhaps the least reliant of all the war’s participants on social media platforms to promote its narrative and distribute its propaganda. It also means that, unlike many of the nonstate forces, however, the government has also been able to

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harness the power of the state-run film and television industry to produce pro-government content. Spots created using well-known Syrian actors such as Waddah Halloum, Toulay Haroun, and cast members of the wildly popular historical drama Bab al-Hara call for, in Halloum’s words, the end of “unjust criminal sanctions by America and the West,”89 appealing to universal human values to end the suffering Syrians experience because of the economic sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic. A second feature of the Syrian government’s propaganda is the consistent depiction of all of its adversaries as terrorists. In one video distributed by SANA, footage of SAA soldiers training is intercut with interviews, set to stirring music, in which soldiers describe their commitment to defending Syria against the terrorists.90 Others, created and shared by individual users, show footage of FSA positions being destroyed or fighters, referred to as terrorists, being killed. The footage, often quite graphic, is presented in a celebratory manner.91 The emphasis on the war as a counterterrorist operation is often overlaid with a focus on—and adulation of—Bashar al-Asad himself as both a military leader and a national symbol. In one clip produced by SANA, a montage of photos of Asad visiting “military units at the antiterrorist front” throughout the war is set to soft piano music.92 In another, hosted on the Ministry of Defense’s site, a song praising Bashar al-Asad titled “Like the Sun, Your Forehead is High” plays against a montage of footage of Asad in uniform, visiting the front, and eating with soldiers.93 Support for Bashar al-Asad is conflated with support for the military in its fight against terrorism and for Syria itself; by implication, opposing Bashar al-Asad means supporting terrorism and attacking the Syrian nation. The propaganda produced by the Kurdish forces, meanwhile, is distinguished by two particular messages, both linked to its claims about the war. The first is that the YPG, YPJ, and later and especially the SDF are fighting for Syrians of all ethnicities, not just for Kurds. Footage of military operations is intercut with interviews with Arabic-speaking civilians expressing gratitude to the YPG and YPJ, or complaining about specific aspects of ISIS rule, such as the clothing women were made to wear.94 Arabic-speaking fighters with the SDF—including several Arab

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women—explain what moved them to join, sometimes referencing the need to protect their communities from ISIS, but in other cases speaking about the PYD’s broader ideological project around democratic confederalism and women’s liberation.95 By 2018, the subjects of these videos also begin to draw parallels between the conflict with ISIS and the conflict with Turkey, and to frame both as a struggle on behalf of all Syrians, not just Kurds.96 As this suggests, then, the second message conveyed in the YPG’s military propaganda is that the use of violence by the Kurdish forces is part and parcel of its larger ideological project. Some of this manifests in general references to Abdullah Öcalan and his ideology of democratic confederalism, but it also takes the form of a more specific focus on the PYD’s ideological commitment to—and the broader global struggle for—women’s liberation. This is conveyed perhaps implicitly by footage of YPJ fighters in combat, either on their own or alongside men from the YPG. Given the gender balance in the Kurdish forces, the latter footage is probably at least somewhat organic. The ideological focus on women’s rights is also reiterated in interviews with members of the YPJ, usually fairly explicitly. In a video celebrating a graduation ceremony from the YPJ’s main military academy, the presiding officer invokes the spirit of famous female PKK martyrs, such as Zilan (the nom de guerre of Zeynep Kınacı, who carried out a suicide bombing in 1996), as well as the martyrs of Kobane.97 In carefully produced video messages for International Women’s Day, YPJ fighters speak in explicit terms about fighting for women’s liberation. Their expressions of best wishes to the viewer for the holiday are intercut with footage of YPJ fighters firing a machine gun on the roof of a technical, rhetorically linking their specific military campaign to women’s liberation more broadly.98 Others connect the YPG and YPJ’s military operations with women’s liberation from ISIS in particular: one video celebrating the liberation of Manbij includes footage of women burning the long black abayas that were mandatory under ISIS’s rule, intercut with footage of YPJ fighters being kissed by civilian women, and YPG and YPJ fighters firing weapons.99 In another, two thirteen-year-old Yazidi girls who had been abducted by ISIS from Sinjar at age ten are interviewed after being rescued by the YPJ.100 The

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fight against ISIS and its ideology is framed as a fight not only for Kurds, Syrians, and Iraqis, but for women everywhere.101 Videos produced by the opposition likewise tend to use military footage to promote broader political messages. One common theme is the direct and lasting link between the initial uprising “against tyranny” and the FSA.102 In one video from 2016, footage of the war set to stirring music is intercut with shots of fighters from different factions in different cities reciting political slogans associated with the uprising, such as “Allah, Suriya, hurriya, wa bas” (God, Syria, and freedom only) or “al shaab yureed isqat al nizam” (the people want the fall of the regime.)103 In another, slightly self-referential example, an FSA military photographer involved in producing media explains that he became involved in the uprising by attending peaceful demonstrations in 2011. After seeing the violence of the regime’s response, he joined the FSA and now uses his camera “for the liberation of Syria.”104 The narrative linkage between the uprising and the armed opposition is overlaid with hints of an overarching unity among the many armed opposition factions that in reality was often absent; the RFS channel, like other pro-opposition accounts and channels, highlights many factions inside and outside the official FSA,105 from the overtly Islamist Jaysh al-Islam106 to the explicitly pro-Turkish Sultan Murad Division.107 In reality, Jaysh al-Islam operated outside the umbrella of the FSA for most of its existence, and the Sultan Murad Division was far closer to Turkey than many other FSA factions. This too, however, reflects a narrative of the war as a unified people’s uprising against the regime, which was probably more of a political objective than a military reality. Of course, many opposition factions outside the FSA had their own robust propaganda apparatus, including the factions sometimes labeled jihadist, Islamist, or Salafist—depending on both the faction and the perspective of whoever is describing them. Videos created under the Ahrar al-Sham brand offer an excellent example. Much of Ahrar al-Sham’s propaganda has a specific tone: its videos are heavily edited and incorporate dramatic animated transitions between shots. They are sometimes filmed from a first-person perspective, giving them the feeling of a

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first-person shooter video game.108 Footage of fighters is often mixed with images of weaponry or of fighters traveling in vehicle convoys or on foot, often carrying the white Ahrar al-Sham flag.109 It also produces propaganda that looks more like that produced by other factions, showing its fighters firing light artillery or destroying SAA tanks.110 In line with its ideological project, Ahrar al-Sham’s propaganda tends to connect its operations more explicitly to religious themes than videos produced by the FSA do.111 Its videos are often set to a custom-made nasheed praising Ahrar al-Sham.112 (Nasheeds are a form of Islamic religious music sometimes used in, though not at all unique to, Salafist or jihadist propaganda.)113 Footage of actual battles is sometimes intercut with religious speeches. One video highlighting Ahrar al-Sham’s defense of Aleppo provides a whole narrative arc: it begins with footage of a training mission, during which fighters march through the hills and practice firing weapons, and then transitions to footage of an actual battle. Throughout, a nasheed plays in the background interspersed with the recitation of religious verses.114 If the Kurdish videos use footage of military operations to promote democratic confederalism and gender equality, and the FSA-oriented opposition to tie armed resistance to the goals of the 2011 uprising, groups like Ahrar al-Sham use it to position themselves as pious warriors, fighting to defend Muslims in Syria. The major outlier among the participants in the war in terms of its use of propaganda is, of course, ISIS. Although it does produce propaganda that mirrors that produced by the other combatants in the war— celebrating military victories and showing off the skills of its fighters— its propaganda stands out for the degree to which it deliberately highlights and celebrates violence against those it deems enemies of the Islamic State.115 Of special note are the videos of executions circulated across its online networks. Most of are amateurish in quality, shot with a single cell phone camera, and depict the murders of Iraqis and Syrians, who make up the overwhelming majority of ISIS’s victims. Many are police officers, sex workers, or others deemed to have violated ISIS’s laws.116 Others, however, especially those documenting the executions of symbolically significant hostages, such as Syrian soldiers or international

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hostages, are carefully and expensively produced performances.117 These include the murders of the American journalists James Foley and Stephen Sotloff, British aid workers David Haines, Peter Abdul-Rahman Kassig, and Alan Henning, and the Jordanian pilot Muath Kasasbeh. In some cases, videos were shot with GoPros, drones, or even underwater cameras to document executions by drowning.118 Judith Tinnes finds, based on expert analysis, that the multi-execution video titled “Although the (Dis-) Believers Dislike It” was likely shot over four to six hours, involved professional-level cinematography and editing, and probably cost around $200,000 to make.119 A former member of ISIS’s Ministry of Media in an interview after his capture, described a careful process whereby completed footage was delivered on an SD card to the media unit’s headquarters in a villa outside of Raqqa, where the footage was edited and a storyboard and narrative arc were developed for each video. They were careful to include a diverse array of executioners in the videos and never to focus on a single individual too closely, “so as not to make anyone into a celebrity.”120 The violence is carefully staged, with shots composed symmetrically and visually coded to convey a larger message: In “Although the (Dis-) Believers Dislike It,” the hostages wear orange jumpsuits reminiscent of those worn by prisoners in the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the executioners wear black, symbolically tying them to an (imagined) historical caliphate. The videos are almost always shot outside, demonstrating that ISIS is in control of its territory and has no need to hide what it is doing. Many were edited to be short enough to fit nicely into an evening news segment; like others fighting in Syria, ISIS sought to leverage conventional media coverage to promote its message.121 The purpose of the violence in these videos is multifold. As discussed later in this chapter, they often convey direct threats against one adversary or another, often without much subtlety: the video showing the executions of James Foley and Stephen Sotloff is titled “A Message to America.” As the title suggests, it directly addresses the U.S. government. But this does not necessarily mean that the video is meant to extract a

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ransom or other concessions. Interviews with former hostages suggest that by the time these videos were created ISIS’s decision-makers knew that the United States would not negotiate for the release of hostages, suggesting that their purpose was less to induce compliance and more to humiliate their adversary. That Foley and Sotloff are forced to read statements condemning the United States is a part of the performance.122 Judith Tinnes similarly notes that the use of a knife creates a visual parallel to animals being slaughtered, further dehumanizing the victim.123 All of this suggests that the executions were carried out not only for their own sake, but also to convey a message about ISIS’s power relative to its adversaries. Filming was not incidental to these executions, but their primary purpose.124 One way of understanding this kind of propaganda is as a form of trolling.125 Trolling is online behavior meant to deliberately provoke, mock, or outrage one’s opponents, as an end in and of itself, or “ruining complete strangers’ days” for no real reason other than entertainment.126 At some level, ISIS’s gleeful promotion of its atrocities seems to be about demonstrating and celebrating its rejection of the values and stated moral positions of its adversaries, thereby provoking a reaction which it can then celebrate in subsequent pieces of propaganda. For instance, issue 11 of Dabiq features a full-page advertisement featuring two hostages, one Norwegian and one Chinese, including their photos, ages, education, home address, and other information, and a message at the bottom that reads: To whom it may concern of the crusaders, pagans, and their allies as well as what are referred to as human ‘rights’ organizations, this Chinese [or Norwegian] prisoner was abandoned by his government which did not do its utmost to purchase his freedom. Whoever would like to pay the ransom for his release and transfer can contact the following Telegram number. . . . Note: This is a limited time offer.127

This appears less a serious attempt to collect a ransom than a way of signaling contempt for the governments of Norway and China and

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human rights groups as well. Another example is its lengthy and enthusiastic defense in the pages of Dabiq of the practice of slavery in response to the international outcry that followed its abduction and enslavement of civilians, especially women and girls.128 Similarly, ISIS’s execution videos—especially its carefully and expensively produced videos of the murders of international hostages—seem designed to taunt their audience. Even the use of beheading as a form of execution telegraphs a deliberate brutality and lack of concern with the victims’ humanity. Nor was this limited to Western hostages; the captured Jordanian pilot Muath Kasasbeh was burned to death in a cage as part of an ISIS propaganda video released a month after his death. Kasasbeh’s captivity and death, which provoked furious outrage in Jordan, itself led to an #IamMuath social media campaign.129 Videos of gay men being murdered by being thrown from rooftops similarly convey a deliberate choice to use not only violence, but especially horrific violence— that is, violence intended not only to kill, but to provoke horror in the viewer.130 An entire subgenre of videos features executions and other acts of violence carried out by children.131 In its print and video content—the latter created in a format meant to appeal to the international media— ISIS has sought to publicize its brutality not only to an audience to whom it thinks this might appeal, but also and explicitly to those it knows will find its actions horrifying. Much like trolls who post racist memes in an effort to provoke a fight on Twitter, for ISIS, their enemies’ outrage is part of the purpose behind their propaganda. As discussed in greater depth later in this chapter, ISIS is not alone in its production of abusive or violent content, but it is somewhat unusual in its intense focus on the production of this this kind of material.

UN D E R STANDI N G V I O L E N C E AS PRO PAG ANDA

It is probably unsurprising that the ways in which military conflict among the warring parties in Syria is portrayed in the propaganda that each creates reflects their specific narratives of the war. After all, almost by definition propaganda presents each side’s adversaries, battles, and

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victories in a way that tells the story of the war as they would like it to be understood. It is also true, however, that the nature of social media as a platform for the creation and dissemination of propaganda both enables and incentivizes those fighting to produce content that, by virtue of the way it is created, blurs the line between standard military operations and performative violence. First-person perspective videos like the ones created by Jaysh al-‘Izza, which received millions of views on YouTube, or those carefully edited to look like video games created by Ahrar alSham, are both recordings of real events. They are also products in their own right, however, a piece of performance created with the intention of sharing it with a wider audience. This is also true of ISIS’s beheading videos, which are carefully staged and produced to convey a very distinct message about both ISIS’s goals and its contempt for its enemies. The ability to create this kind of content raises some questions about the relationship between propaganda and military decision-making. A military operation may well have entirely genuine military objectives, but if one of the fighters involved is wearing a GoPro camera with the goal of creating a video to promote his particular faction, how might that shape his choices? If the goal of that video is to accrue views or likes on YouTube, might that encourage riskier behavior? Conversely, might the fighter with the camera decide to be more cautious to preserve the footage? Could it also create incentives for commanders to choose targets or tactics that could produce particularly impressive footage, or encourage those fighting to pursue confrontations they might have otherwise avoided out of a desire to create more content? The nature of the propaganda created by those fighting in Syria suggests that, at least sometimes, this may be the case. One way of answering these questions is to look at the specific goals behind the material in question. The promotion of the various factions’ particular narratives of the war is, of course, an end in and of itself. However, propaganda is also a way of achieving other, more specific goals. Chief among them are threatening adversaries, recruiting new fighters, and raising money.

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MAKING THREATS

One clear goal of at least some of the propaganda produced by those fighting in Syria is to threaten their opponents.132 Of all of the participants in the Syrian war, ISIS was arguably the most successful at producing footage of violence designed not just to promote a particular narrative of the war but also, as an American journalist put it, to make anyone watching it “shit their pants.”133 The carefully produced videos of beheadings, immolations, and other executions of civilians and captured military personnel, served at least in part to threaten ISIS’s opponents, including political leaders and ordinary people. Many are narrated or captioned in English or other languages, indicating an interest in reaching a global audience, or at least an audience beyond Iraq and Syria. This is partly a function of ISIS’s interest in recruiting new members, as discussed later in this chapter but these graphic depictions of violence also appear intended to threaten ISIS’s adversaries. In some cases, the videos are at least rhetorically addressed to specific political leaders. In “A Message to America,” the video depicting the executions of American journalists Foley and Sotloff, footage of the executions is intercut with footage of Barack Obama announcing American strikes on ISIS targets and of the strikes themselves. ISIS’s leaders may not have had any illusions that they could extract a ransom by threatening to execute American hostages, but they could still use the executions to threaten retaliation. Embedded in its overall message of ISIS’s supremacy over its opponents is a more specific message: attacks on ISIS’s territory will result in harm to American citizens.134 If the goal of this material is to inspire fear and anxiety in ISIS’s opponents, they appear to have been at least somewhat successful: one study indicated that, much like the median American television viewer, viewers of these videos were mostly unemployed Christian men who were watching not out of sympathy to ISIS, but instead out of interest in the videos’ grim subject matter. The same study found that watching at least part of one of ISIS’s beheading videos was associated with “fear of future negative events and global distress” as much as two years after the videos were released.135

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Nor was the use of performative violence to inspire fear and threaten opponents limited to ISIS. Factions of the opposition have also released videos clearly intended to threaten members of the Syrian state military, perhaps with the intent of reducing morale. In one incident from the spring of 2013 that was widely reported in the U.S. media, a video was released that appeared to show a rebel fighter removing and eating the lungs of a dead SAA soldier.136 In another, a rebel known as Abu Sakkar removes the heart of a dead soldier and appears to put it in his mouth, saying, “I swear to God, soldiers of Bashar, you dogs—we will eat your hearts and livers! Takbir! God is Great! Oh my heroes of Baba Amr, you slaughter the Alawites and take their hearts out to eat them!”137 Jabhat al-Nusra has released videos showing its fighters executing captured SAA soldiers as well.138 Even if they were explicitly threatening members of the military, these videos were viewed by civilians as well. One Syrian with a Shi’ite background explained that he used to watch Jabhat al-Nusra’s videos specifically because they were the ones attacking his village. In his opinion, based on the videos he had seen of both Jabhat al-Nusra’s behavior and that of Ahrar al-Sham, which tried to portray itself as less brutal, he saw “no difference between the two at all.”139 Although it did not for the most part publicize this through the creation of videos or other propaganda, the Asad regime—like many authoritarian states—has long used punitive and public violence to communicate the risks of challenging its rule. With the outbreak of the war, it began to do so with increasing intensity. Critics of the regime were sometimes subject to violence that seemed designed to convey a particular message. The prominent political cartoonist Ali Fezat was attacked by the shabiha and had his fingers broken. The singer Ibrahim Qashoush, who wrote and performed the popular protest song “Yalla Erhal Ya Bashar” (“Resign already, oh Bashar”) was murdered in July 2011 and found with his vocal cords cut out.140 This happened to ordinary Syrians as well. One woman interviewed described how a friend of hers had been arrested and raped by security forces and a video of the attack sent to her family to threaten her brother, whom they accused of having joined the Free Syrian Army.141 The bodies of those who had been tortured to death in the regime’s prisons were sometimes returned to their

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families with the marks of torture still apparent, a kind of message as to what happened to those who opposed the regime.142 Like the other acts of extraordinary violence described here—beheadings, rapes, even acts of cannibalism—these atrocities appear to have been carried out not only for their own sake, but so that they could be seen by others.

RECRUITMENT

A second objective of the propaganda produced by those fighting in Syria is the recruitment of new fighters, both at home and abroad. Many factors, of course, drive military recruitment in Syria, as in any conflict. Family and social ties matter a great deal, and of course not all recruitment is voluntary—both the Syrian state military and many of the nonstate forces engage in forced conscription. Nevertheless, individual preferences matter as well. Accordingly, the propaganda produced by those fighting in Syria appears designed at least in part to make fighting—and specifically, fighting with their particular faction— look as appealing as possible to potential recruits. The opposition factions arguably face the greatest challenge in this regard, because would-be recruits have a lot of choices in terms of which rebel faction to join up with. Especially in the early years of the war, family and personal connections were for many the strongest determinant of defection from the Syrian army to the opposition; existing social or family ties made it much more likely that a new recruit could be trusted.143 Still, online propaganda is an additional recruiting tool, and at least some of the propaganda produced by the various opposition factions seems designed to appeal to potential new members. In interviews, fighters often emphasize the nobility and camaraderie of life in the FSA.144 Heavily edited “first-person shooter” videos created an image of the conflict that closely resembles a video game, in ways that seem designed to appeal to younger viewers (see figure 4.2).145 Indeed, many militant groups, including Hezbollah, ISIS, and others have gone so far as to create their own video games as recruiting tools.146

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First-person perspective video of an operation by Jaysh al-‘Izza. This video had 5.6 million views on YouTube before it was taken down.

FIGURE  4.2

Source: Jaysh al-Izza, “Watch as if you are in the heart of the battle how Jaysh al ’Izza entered the Zalaqiyat checkpoint,” YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wmr1jfQvTzU.

Other pieces of propaganda invoke a kind of gendered shame. In one video, shot in Deir Ezzor in October 2012 during an “operation,” several male fighters run past the camera, followed—somewhat unusually for most FSA factions—by a female fighter. She stops to talk to the camera, and in response to questions from a voice off screen, gives a lengthy speech about women having to fight, ending by asking the viewer plaintively, “Where are the chivalrous ones? Where are the Arabs?”147 The general implication is that she has to fight because men are not volunteering to do so. The YPG and YPJ also produce videos that appear geared toward local recruitment, documenting the training new YPG members receive and encouraging—often through interviews with new members—others to join.148 Some focus on the importance of what the SDF, YPG and YPJ

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are fighting for: one seemingly scripted example features three Arabicspeaking YPJ fighters sitting around a campfire talking about the terrible things they had seen in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor.149 Others paint an idealized picture of life in the Kurdish forces, especially in the YPJ: female YPJ fighters are shown laughing together while cleaning their weapons or running foot races, drinking tea, gardening, riding in trucks while waving the YPJ flag, and in one case, cuddling a pair of white rabbits (see figure 4.3).150 All told, these convey the sense both that the YPG and YPJ are a legitimate, professional military, and that life in their forces is full of camaraderie and a bit of glamor. Even ISIS, which during the years of its self-declared caliphate had access to more coercive methods of recruitment, used propaganda as a recruiting tool, distributing videos to be shown at mosques and on public screens, and for download at physical media centers. Even though it relied mostly on a combination of conscription, high pay, and access to food and housing to recruit adult fighters in Syria and Iraq, this

FIGURE 4.3

YPJ fighters in Raqqa.

Source: SDF Press, “Side of the Life of YPJ Fighters in Raqqa,” YouTube, 2019, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v =Wc18C-gsCOs.

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material was helpful in recruiting children and young people, especially those whose parents might not have been entirely supportive of the Islamic State.151 However, where online propaganda arguably offers the greatest advantage is as a way of reaching those not accessible by face-to-face communication: that is, as a method of recruiting internationally. Jihadist organizations such as al-Qaeda have long used internet propaganda—often based on footage of armed conflict in Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, and elsewhere—as a way of recruiting fighters. Thomas Hegghammer convincingly argues that this has partly contributed to a preference on the part of those recruited in Europe or the United States to go abroad to fight rather than launching operations at home.152 Many of the jihadist factions in Syria have attracted foreign fighters—especially the al-Qaedaaffiliated Jabhat al-Nusra—but the most popular destination for foreign jihadists has been ISIS.153 Interestingly, Güneş Tezcür and Clayton Besaw find that ISIS’s rigid and puritanical ideology appears especially appealing to those without much experience or religious knowledge, at least among recruits from Turkey.154 The organization has a robust online recruitment infrastructure, of which videos presenting a utopian narrative of life in the caliphate are a core component. In addition to the promises of food, housing, and good pay directed at local recruits, prospective recruits living abroad, especially in the West, were sold the prospect of a quasi-utopian society.155 This was, of course, very much at odds with the reality of life in Raqqa, especially for women. Although much of this propaganda is focused more on an ideological narrative than on battlefield footage, it also leverages ISIS’s self-proclaimed role as defender of Muslim civilians to make a moral argument for coming to Syria to fight.156 In its efforts to recruit fighters from abroad, ISIS made strategic use of the foreign fighters it already had; by creating propaganda with English narration, it was able to reach a wider audience. One of its most elaborate videos, the fifty-five-minute Flames of War, was, like some of the videos shot by various opposition factions, shot in part from a firstperson perspective, mimicking a video game or a high-budget action movie, and narrated in Canadian-accented English by a fighter from Toronto. It proved a powerful recruiting tool.157

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The YPG and YPJ have also attracted foreign fighters.158 The majority are from Turkey and generally have ties to the PKK, but hundreds of Americans and Europeans have also joined the Kurdish forces. Many of the Americans are former soldiers, drawn to Syria either by the chance to continue fighting against ISIS after doing so with U.S. forces in Iraq, or to use their skills as soldiers after having trouble adapting to civilian life in the United States.159 Others, though, from the United States, Europe, and elsewhere are leftists driven by admiration for the YPG’s political project, for them the conflict in northeastern Syria is a modern iteration of the Spanish civil war.160 Despite the availability of foreign fighters, however, a large pool of local recruits and support from the U.S. military has meant that the YPG and YPJ have been able to be highly selective about which foreign recruits they do accept. Those who are interested have to fill out a lengthy questionnaire, available on the YPG website, and only slightly more than half are accepted. As the website explains, What we need are people who want to be part of this for the right reasons. We don’t need people who think that they are Rambo or people seeking fame—and please no Fascists. Rojava is not an adventure park, this war is not a Hollywood film and YPG is not a PR-Agency. It is also not a place for people which like to kill people because of their nationality, religion, ethnic, sexual, or political identity. Supporting YPG in Rojava is not possible for actual members of police, army, or intelligence services.161

Recruitment as a goal is close enough to the broader purposes of political propaganda that it can be hard to disentangle to what degree acts of performative violence were meant to appeal to prospective recruits versus the population as a whole. It is easy to imagine that videos that repackage footage of actual battles as if they were scenes from a movie or a video game might have a particular appeal to young people. After all, the U.S. military has done something similar, creating a video game called America’s Army.162 More generally, YouTube appears to have been effective as a recruiting tool. In a study of former ISIS members, Anne

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Speckhard and Molly Ellenberg find that 24.7 percent of men and 13.1 percent of women reported YouTube as an influence in their decision to join the organization.163 Ironically, images of atrocities committed by ISIS also appear to have been a major motivator for international recruits who chose to join the YPG.164

FUNDRAISING

The connection between the performance of violence—generally against other military forces—and fundraising is far more clear, especially on the part of the opposition. Many rebel factions, especially Islamists, used videos of their groups’ military operations to raise money from private donors in the Gulf, especially in Kuwait, and, at times, to thank those donors or verify that they had spent existing funds as promised, as a kind of receipt-cum-thank you-note. Although the Saudi and Qatari governments provided generous funding to many of the rebel factions in Syria, funding from private donors in the Gulf was also extremely important. After Saudi Arabia banned private donations in May 2012,165 Kuwait, in part because of its more open political culture, became the center of much of this fundraising.166 David Cohen, Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, lamented in the press that Kuwait “posed the region’s biggest problem” with regard to “financing linked to extremists in Syria.”167 Initially, fundraising efforts in Kuwait were led by Syrian expatriates, who then began reaching out to local Kuwait donors and charitable networks, often with Salafist ties. As early as the winter of 2012, some of these networks had begun funding the creation of armed groups, and individual factions had established representatives in Kuwait charged with fundraising and engaging with donors.168 Prominent preachers and sheikhs raised funds for the rebels via social media169—one of the best known of whom, Hajjaj Al-Ajmi, was eventually designated a terrorist by the U.S. Treasury Department170—and wealthy Kuwaiti Islamists hosted fundraising events in their private

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diwaniyehs (salons). One such event, held during Ramadan in 2013, hosted by a former Kuwaiti MP named Falah al-Sawagh, by his account raised 80,000 Kuwaiti dinar (more than $265,000) in four hours.171 A second, hosted by another former MP, Mohammed Matar, reportedly raised 100,000 ($350,000).172 Tribal networks were also leveraged to raise funds collectively, sometimes publicizing the amount of their donations over social media.173 Fundraising appeals were also circulated on social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and others soliciting donations in smaller amounts.174 Fundraising was often explicitly framed in military terms: an 800 dinar donation might be solicited as for the purchase a missile or RPG, for instance.175 Individual families might agree to sponsor specific groups of mujahideen for a specific amount of cash. A large family might agree to equip twenty-eight fighters at 700 dinar per fighter, and a smaller one might sponsor only two or three.176 Overall, the cash being raised in Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf—some of it being sent to larger organizations such as Ahrar al-Sham or Jabhat al-Nusra and some to smaller factions funded almost entirely by the donors themselves—likely totaled hundreds of millions of dollars.177 All of this put the Kuwaiti government in a sometimes difficult position. The government did not arm the rebels itself, as Saudi Arabia and Qatar apparently did, and blocked bank transfers directly to Syria, meaning that donors had to bring the cash physically to Syria via intermediaries in Jordan or Turkey. The government, though, did not crack down on private fundraising, perhaps because the royal family sought to avoid handing further ammunition to the Islamist political opposition,178 and perhaps for logistical reasons: in response to a question from a journalist, Minister for Cabinet Affairs Sheikh Mohammed alAbdullah al-Sabah responded, “How am I supposed to stop someone who gets on a plane with $10,000 in his jacket pocket?”179 Regardless of the position of the Kuwaiti authorities, social media became an important fundraising tool, wooing donors both in Kuwait and in countries like Saudi Arabia which had banned fundraising for the Syrian rebels.180 For one thing, it allowed fundraisers to reach out to a wide audience: in March and September of 2012, Hajjaj al-Ajmi’s

THE YOUTUBE WAR189

instructions on how to donate to arm those fighting in Syria were the second most retweeted of all tweets referencing Syria in English or Arabic.181 For another, the very nature of social media made it especially useful for fundraising: those raising money for armed factions in Syria were able to do so in part by positioning support for the Syrian opposition as a source of social media prestige. Those who donated at large donor conferences in the Gulf sometimes posted pictures on their social media of the cars or other luxury goods they had donated.182 Especially generous donors were sometimes given the chance to visit Syria, documenting their trips on Twitter or other platforms, much like influencers on Instagram showing off vacation selfies. Some, like former Salafist MP Waleed al-Tabtabie, even posed in combat fatigues.183 Occasionally this could be a headache for the militias involved—in one case, a visiting donor tweeting about his trip accidentally gave away a rebel position to enemy forces.184 But in general, the attention served to generate further publicity and sometimes funding for the armed factions they supported.185 For the factions themselves, online platforms—especially YouTube— were a valuable tool for connecting with these donors. In one highly publicized incident in 2012, a faction named themselves after Hajjaj alAjmi and thanked him personally in a YouTube video (see figure 4.4), much as a university might name its chemistry building after a wealthy alumna who had donated enough to replace the roof.186 Social media also allowed for less direct connections. Many factions created videos that were essentially advertisements, which their representatives in the Gulf could show potential donors to demonstrate that this specific faction “had suffered more martyrs and fought more difficult battles” than their rivals.187 Demonstrations of their military exploits, showcasing both their bravery and their need for weapons and funding, were therefore important in making the case that they deserved support.188 This, combined with the need to show donors how their money was being spent, created perverse incentives for some factions. If no opportunity to distinguish themselves militarily were readily available, there might be pressure to create one. Some of those interviewed stated that

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FIGURE 4.4

Grateful fighters of the Hajjaj Al-Ajmi brigade.

Source: siglvm, “Sheikh Hajjaj Al-Ajmi Sends Donations to the Free Army Himself” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = tXkeTw16wAI.

they believed armed factions in their neighborhoods had filmed attacks specifically in order to create videos to send to donors in Qatar, Kuwait, or elsewhere. As one interviewee put it, Some groups try take photo only that they try to shoot some rockets. After that, stop video, they stop everything, only take a video to send it to the donors, to take money on it. There are a lot of videos, as the people inside Syria said that, only take video only to take money. They take a video while the soldier using this rocket against the regime, and maybe it’s not against the regime but only they put this car and started to shoot the rockets, and they say, “Allahu Akbar, now we are fighting against the regime, this is against that city which is supported by regime. We are now shelling this airport.” They finish the video, stop everything, they move. Only to take money from the donors. And they took money, because when Qatar or Saudi Arabia sent money, they said, “In

TH E YO U TU BE WAR1 91

this money we pay for example 10 rockets, 100 rockets” we will send a video for them. Like for the report sent to the donors in NGOs.189

Another interview participant went further, describing what she believed to be complicity between the regime and the FSA: What was happening a lot in Deraa, there were a lot of agreement between the Free Army and the regime. . . . Go and hit a little so we can shoot videos and by then the money would have arrived from Saudi Arabia . . . that’s what was really happening. . . . There were members of the army who would tell us that tonight there will be bombing and shooting so don’t worry and don’t be scared it’s only for video shooting to send to Qatar.190

These accounts are not possible to verify, but they do reflect the cynicism with which at least some Syrians viewed the rebels’ motives, their use of YouTube, and their relationships with foreign donors.

CONCLUSION

What is striking about the performative use of violence via social media in Syria is how much it resembles internet culture more generally. At least some of ISIS’s videos appear geared toward trolling its adversaries. Wealthy Islamists in Kuwait, seeking to raise their personal prestige, donate to Syrian rebel groups for clout and tweet photos of themselves in expensive combat gear hanging out with rebel factions. Donors compete with one another as to who can donate the most, all documented on Twitter. Rebels use knock-off GoPro cameras to shoot videos of themselves running through battlefields to rack up views on YouTube or make moody propaganda videos edited to look like videogames, set to custom-made nasheed, shared by their followers. Teenagers sitting in their bedrooms in Europe (those Jarrett Brachman and others term jihobbyists)191 can find all kinds of raw material to remix and produce

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their own propaganda, which ISIS can then reuse both for recruitment and to strengthen the bonds within its networks.192 What is less clear is how all of this will impact the war’s participants in the long run. In practical terms, although some factions—such as ISIS and the PYD—have found online propaganda an effective way of recruiting new members, others, even those whose material is widely circulated, have not been as successful. For example, Jaysh al-’Izza, the faction whose first-person perspective video of a military operation was viewed five and a half million times on YouTube, is not particularly large or powerful. ISIS’s efforts at trolling and threatening its adversaries do seem to have been successful in that if what it wanted was to position itself as the chief antagonist against the United States and Europe, it seems to have done so, although that probably owes more to its use of terrorism—itself a form of violent propaganda—in Europe and the United States. The use of social media to fundraise from private donors was certainly successful for many of the opposition factions, although the intra-rebel rivalries, ideological drift, and influence of foreign jihadists and warlords that followed probably renders this a mixed blessing at best.193 In a more general sense, however, the existence of these platforms has shaped the ways in which Syrians themselves understand the war. Many of those interviewed for this book shared videos and other material via YouTube, WhatsApp, and other social media platforms as a way of explaining to me what had happened to their country. For those fighting in Syria, social media became a powerful tool for telling their story of the war, sometimes shaping their decision-making in the process. It also, however, provides an important record for all Syrians of the tragedy of the war.

CONCLUSION

War is ugly and there is no winners . . . we all lost. —RESPONDENT 7

T

hose fighting in Syria have claimed that the war is about many things—a fight for freedom and dignity, a sectarian conflict of almost millenarian dimensions, a showdown between the forces of jihadist terrorism and those of rational, secular order, a separatist war waged by an ethnic minority seeking to break Syria apart, or a proxy war fomented by outside powers. All of those involved have sought to convince those whose support they need—or whose neutrality they would prefer—that their own narrative is fundamentally correct. Those who undermine that narrative of the war are sometimes perceived as especially threatening, leading to decisions about who to fight or ignore that may not be motivated entirely by concerns about territorial control or even long-term political goals. It would of course be naïve to take any of the combatants fully at their word, but at least some of the violence seems very much out of sync with their respective explanations of the nature of the conflict. One finding of this book, then, is that the gap between how those fighting a war explain it—specifically, who they characterize as a threat—and

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their actual behavior can be significant. The Asad regime, for instance, despite its characterization of the war as a fight against terrorism, bombed civilian targets and avoided conflict with ISIS for several years. ISIS spent less than half of its time fighting the regime, despite its sectarian rhetoric, clashing repeatedly instead with the opposition and the Kurds. Although the opposition largely focused on the regime, there was also some onside fighting and toward the end of the war, an increased focus from some factions on fighting the Kurdish forces. This is not unique to Syria, nor is it terribly surprising. State and nonstate actors alike have a range of motives that may conflict with their stated narratives of the war. They may also generate narratives later on to explain their choices after the fact. At times, however, some of them have also appeared to be acting based on a desire to target those offering a rival narrative of the war, especially one that might be of interest to a key audience whose support the actor in question believes it cannot afford to lose. This, then, is the second finding of this book: that winning the war sometimes means first winning the argument. This in turn leads to a third finding: that the need to convince important audiences of a certain framing of the war—especially when there is a real disjuncture between that narrative and the group’s actual military choices—can also lead to the treatment of warfare as a kind of propaganda. Violence against civilians can become a way of reinforcing the group’s narrative of the war, and violence against both armed and civilian targets can become highly performative in the sense that it is at times carried out with the awareness that it needs to communicate a specific message to those watching. This suggests that a key finding of the work on nonviolent social movements—that activists communicate with their audiences via what Tilly terms performances from a set repertoire— also applies to violent conflict. Peaceful protesters organize sit-ins, marches, or postcard campaigns. ISIS releases carefully produced videos of beheadings, Ahrar al-Sham creates YouTube clips of (surprisingly clean and well-groomed) fighters firing mortars while a nasheed plays in the background, and the YPG circulates videos of their fighters firing weapons at vehicles flying ISIS’s black flag. All of these use the performance of warfare to convey a specific message about each

CONCLUSION195

group’s objectives, its capacity to achieve them, and its commitment to doing so. Taken together, these three findings suggest some larger questions about the future of warfare and possible avenues for future research. The extent to which the war in Syria has been documented by the participants themselves challenges a number of previously clear boundaries. One of these relates to the role of the media; if participants in armed conflict can document the war themselves, the role of the media as a gatekeeper is greatly reduced. If large media outlets have historically had the power to determine which images and stories are distributed to a wider audience, access to social media platforms has unquestionably changed that dynamic. That is not to say that the media no longer matters—indeed, one of the advantages of social media for combatants and civilian activists alike is that it provides a mechanism through which to try and shape media coverage. In the event that that media coverage is not forthcoming, or is not favorable, however, it also offers a way of cutting out the middleman and connecting with audiences directly. In Syria, the conventional media, Syrian and international alike, has retained a great deal of influence through its ability to amplify—or contradict—the messages being produced by the war’s participants. There can be no question, though, that access to YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms has greatly increased the ability of even marginal rebel factions to share their version of events, promote their ideological projects, and communicate directly with potential supporters. This leads to a second boundary that has been tested by the war in Syria: the role of the state. When individual donors are able to connect directly with factions vying for funding, the position of national governments as primary sources of external financial support is challenged, as is their monopoly on the provision of military aid as a matter of foreign policy. In turn, diplomacy—that is, communication and negotiation—with armed factions becomes less reliant on formal state channels. Even as the Kuwaiti government refused to fund some of the armed factions in Syria, individual Kuwaitis did so enthusiastically, circumventing banking controls by traveling to Turkey with suitcases full of

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cash to be distributed to the armed faction of their (or someone else’s) choice through Syrian middlemen. This suggests the potential for an increased privatization of diplomacy and foreign aid, especially in countries with high concentrations of private wealth and an ideological stake in regional or even global conflicts. In some Gulf states, this was in part possible because it did not run strongly counter to the preferences of the state, but in Kuwait at least it put the government in a complicated position. In a situation in which donors’ interests were diametrically opposed to the state’s, or in which the state was weakened, this could both create conflicts at home and, in some cases, empower nonstate entities in new ways. What might this look like in the context of the growth in private military contractors—some of which are essentially private armies—in Africa, for instance, or transnational drug cartels? Imagine if, in the 1980s, rather than relying on Oliver North to divert funding in their direction from illegal arms sales to Iran, the Contras had simply been able to appeal directly on Twitter to someone like Elon Musk? Finally, the performativity of violence in Syria—as well as the extraordinary brutality of the war—has challenged the boundary around the battlefield itself. If television brought the war in Vietnam into Americans’ living rooms, YouTube and smartphones have brought the war in Syria into our hands. Moreover, the version of the war being shared online is often produced directly by the combatants themselves, unmediated and without the context and framing often provided by the conventional media in coverage of past conflicts. Many of the activists involved in setting up the various opposition-oriented media centers which captured and shared videos of regime air strikes, or, in Raqqa, American ones, believed that by exposing the reality of what Syrians were living with, they could inspire—or force—the world to act. This was ultimately not the case; indeed, many of the Syrians I spoke with for this project lamented the degree to which the Syrian tragedy has been ignored by the rest of the world, and the Syrian people largely abandoned, even though their suffering was visible for anyone who cared to look. At the same time, in comparison with other historical and contemporary atrocities, the war in Syria has been extraordinarily well documented. It is possible that the record of Syria’s agony may perhaps be used at some point in the future to hold those responsible—whether

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from ISIS, the SAA, HTS, the SDF, the FSA, or the Russian, Turkish, or American militaries—to account. The Syrian Archive, a nonprofit organization based in Germany dedicated to preserving the digital record of the war, has been scraping, tagging, and geocoding videos of the war in Syria with the goal of using them for future war crimes prosecution.1 Ironically, YouTube’s policies around videos showing certain kinds of violence may be a barrier to accountability in the long run; when videos of attacks on civilians are removed from the platform, valuable evidence is lost.2 This too may offer a blueprint for the aftermath of future conflicts in other countries; a Sudanese Archive and Yemeni Archive have already been created.3 When the war in Syria first began, some of the dynamics explored here, especially the leveraging of social media by those fighting and the incentives it created for performative violence in the service of the combatants’ respective narratives, were somewhat unusual. This was especially true in comparison with the other wars which resulted from the failed transitions after the Arab Spring, in Yemen and Libya. The Yemen Ansarallah channel on YouTube—one of the few I could find clearly affiliated with Yemen’s Houthi movement—has only 453 videos and 743 subscribers as of 2022.4 This may in part be a function of the degree of regional investment in the war in Syria. Performativity implies the existence of an external audience—without that audience, the incentive to create YouTube videos to send to donors to solicit further funding, or to live-tweet a visit to a rebel camp is somewhat reduced. The war in Yemen, in contrast to Syria’s, has for better or worse attracted far less attention, despite its staggering humanitarian cost. But if the Syrian war was unusual in this regard when it first began, it is now far less so. Instead, it may well represent a template for the future of warfare, or at least, provide a preview of what may be a feature of many wars in the future. The ongoing war in Ukraine, for instance, has been heavily documented on TikTok and Twitter. In February  2022, the Ukrainian border guards defending a military post on Snake Island in the Black Sea responded to a demand for surrender from the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, with the now famous phrase “Russian warship, go fuck yourself.”5 The audio clip went viral, contributing (though how much is difficult to parse) to the outpouring of

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support for Ukraine in the early days of the Russian invasion. The incident achieved such prominence that as of this writing, the most common autocomplete result for a Google search of “Russian warship” is “go f yourself.” It has also been commemorated on a Ukrainian postage stamp, issued the day before the Moskva was sunk by the Ukrainian navy.6 Although this is a particularly dramatic incident, it is not an isolated example. Not only are there now YouTube videos of military operations in Ukraine, Ukrainian civilians have likewise used social media sites—including TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, Telegram, Facebook, and others—to document the impact of the Russian invasion on civilians.7 Outside Ukraine, sympathetic social media users have organized to combat Russian disinformation online and raise funds for the Ukrainian military under the banner of NAFO (North American Fellas Organization) a reference to both NATO and an internet meme of a shiba inu, in this case wearing a Ukrainian military uniform. In August 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense publicly thanked them on Twitter.8 The Ukrainian government itself has used crowdfunding to purchase weapons; an appeal launched over social media by the Ukrainian embassy in Prague raised nearly $30 million in three weeks.9 Individual Ukrainians also solicit donations on Twitter to raise money to buy supplies for local troops, and crowdfunding websites—one example being Signmyrocket.com, which bills itself as “artillery mailing”—have cropped up that allow donors to pay to have a message written on a Ukrainian shell.10 As of this writing, the rates ranged from $150 for a 155 millimeter shell to $5,000 for a message painted on the side of an M777 howitzer.11 As in Syria, social media has facilitated a new degree of access between combatants and outside observers. As of today, the war in Syria, although not over, has settled into a grim holding pattern. Casualties have plummeted since their height in the war’s early years, though sporadic military operations continue. The regime, with Russian backing, has reconquered much of the territory formerly held by the opposition, which now controls only a small area in Idlib governorate. The PYD, meanwhile, has managed to hang on to much of the swathe of northeastern Syria in which it has established

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what it calls the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria but how long it will be able to hold the territory if the regime turns its sights toward recapturing it is unclear. Perhaps Asad, and his Russian protectors, will be content to allow the PYD to govern, as long as it does not pose a threat or try to actually secede, but given the history between the Syrian state and its Kurdish citizens, this is hardly certain. There is also no shortage of violent nonstate actors still active on Syrian soil; ISIS has lost its self-proclaimed state but still poses a threat to the security of civilians in Syria and elsewhere. Even if Syria were able to return to the prewar political status quo, massive challenges remain. Half of its population has been displaced, more than six million of them outside the country. Aleppo and Homs, two of the largest cities, remain badly damaged, as is a great deal of Syria’s infrastructure. Reconstruction, whenever it begins, will be expensive and time consuming.12 Asad’s main allies, Russia and Iran, are likely not in a position to fund it at present, given American sanctions and, for Russia, the war in Ukraine. Further, a host of long-term social consequences of the war will take years to disentangle. Children born to parents in rebel-held areas may not be registered with the state, or, if their parents’ marriages were not registered with the state, may be considered illegitimate.13 Thousands of women formerly married to ISIS fighters—some of whom may themselves be war criminals—and their children remain stranded in al-Hol refugee camp.14 Millions more Syrians are displaced elsewhere around the country, especially in Idlib, many with little hope of returning home. The war has also divided families in which some members sided with the government and others with the opposition. One interview participant explained that she was from a loyalist family and her husband from an opposition family; her in-laws, she said, engaged with her as if she were a person without a family, and her family did the same with her husband. These scars will be difficult to heal.15 In an interview I conducted toward the end of my research, I described to the interviewee some of the public events I had attended as part of my fieldwork and the questions I was trying to answer in this book. He responded almost wistfully, saying, “that was one of my dreams—to

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stand in the park in Aleppo and ask people their opinions about things. But it won’t happen any time soon.”16 That is almost certainly true. And so, because it is not possible for Syrians to stand in their own city parks— those that remain—and openly exchange their views on the war and their hopes for the future, I will give them the last word here. One of my standard questions was to ask research participants to share their predictions, hopes, fears, or general thoughts regarding Syria’s future, and to speculate as to what the next decade or so might hold. I asked this both for its own sake and as a way of trying to understand the degree to which Syrians’ hopes for their country are reflected—or not—in the narratives offered by the participants in the war. In answering, many of those interviewed outside of Syria spoke of their desire to return home, though most believed they would not be able to do so. Some stated that they did not believe that the country could move on while Asad remained in power; others hoped that other countries, especially the West, would cease interfering in Syrian affairs. Many—of all political opinions—shared their pride in being Syrian and their desire to live together peacefully once more, despite the events of the past decade. We want to go back; we want peace and security in Syria. This is the most repeated statement I have heard. What do you want? What are your return conditions? What’s your understanding of transitional justice? Some people said that their return condition was the departure of Bashar, the criminal. Some people said that I want to go back to my home and if Bashar remained or not, I have no problem as long as there are no bombings and shootings. This is the group of people that we’re talking about. What’s their future in Syria? Is this the civil society that will accept the situation in Syria later? Is this the society that will work on the infrastructure project and the political projects and the economic projects to help Syria because there is no such thing as returning Syria. Syria will never be the same as it used to be. Impossible. Impossible. We might make some restoration to Syria. It might be a place that some people can live in because it’s one of the most dangerous countries in the world. It can be a touristic destination for

CONCLUSION201

people who want to watch the destruction. That’s what is happening in Syria. They’re at the borders watching. Some people miss Syria. Love to go to Syria.17 —Syrian woman from Latakia

I hope that something will happen that will cause the regime to fall and that we will be able to return to Syria. What will happen—but even with this dreamy nice dream that I have, in five, ten years . . . there will be a lot of faudha [chaos] because the destruction is very big. And the needs inside Syria is very big, and it’s not an easy to solve all these problems.18 —Syrian activist

If I ask myself, am I happy here in Germany? I would say no, I like it as a tourist, as a student, or someone who wants to live here, not by force. I do not want to be here. This is the whole world’s responsibility and the whole world is complicit in this problem and is an accomplice.19 —N

I wish as I said to you that they remove Bashar al-Asaad . . . to leave room for people to come back . . . I’m one of the first people I tell you I will go back . . . If I know that things are safe and that I will get my civil rights fully . . . I don’t want luxury or live in a palace . . . I want my house and to live in dignity . . . no one is asking for more than this.20 —“Roula”

Every civil person who actually didn’t want a war in Syria, didn’t want to carry a weapon, didn’t want to fight anybody, they either died, or in jail, or in Germany or somewhere else now. And all we have left is a bunch of people who want to kill each other.21 —LK

As long as Asad and his family [are] in power, 25% of the refugees will return, Syria will still remain the same. . . . If there is a change in the

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regime similar to Asad regime, I mean, a minor change, by changing Asad himself, as a person, and the group around him, and keeping the same regime—I mean, it’s impossible now to remove the regime while you have Iran and Russia behind him, but if you keep the regime with an acceptable faces, for little bit change, minor change, I think in 10 years, you wouldn’t see revenge—the revenge would be less. I mean, people will return and reconstruction will happen, because many countries have interests in reconstruction, many people will be interested in this, and Syria will be alive again, and we might lose part of the country by referendum, normal referendum.22 —Senior officer who defected from the SAA

We are not going to regress. The issue is more than just punishing the criminals, there is a right to know the right to truth. We are dreaming of a free Syria that has justice for all Syrian people who are living together. If I do not speak, no one will hear my voice. All of Syria has a different voice that needs to be heard. There is nothing that will make us regress.23 —Member of Families for Freedom

It will not be easy, but the country and the Syrian people will prevail once the USA recognize that the regime change policy should change to “earning SYRIAN people trust” policy.24 —Respondent 12

My opinion, after all of this happened and they say let us forget and forgive. Is this something that can be forgotten? You killed us, destroyed us, and forced us to migrate. Between us, our generation will not forget. Maybe there are kids that will not remember.25 —Former member of the SAA

Syria will be much better if the Syrian people are left alone without the meddling of the Western powers.26 —Respondent 16

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Syrian people needs to understand that they need to forgive and work together to rebuild their own country . . . not run away and forget about it.27 —Respondent 7

I see that the future is in the hands of the big countries which are America and Russia and the regional states which are Iran and Turkey. So now it is clear that there is no will to bring peace to Syria.28 —AM, judge

The thing we need is forgiveness, but this can only happen if people acknowledge their crimes and mistakes, but there must be some justice, for both sides, but the first point to make this justice happen is to go down with [get rid of] Asad. If he’s still there, nothing will be solved. I’m not naïve, he’s just one person [not the entire regime]. But for the public it means a lot, because this man is now the symbol of blood. He’s the first killer. If he’s out then maybe people can have some relief or revenge. He should be in some court, he should be . . . hanged maybe, I don’t know. I hope that justice will come somehow, but I don’t have belief in the United Nations . . . in the big powers. I don’t believe in them.29 —Alawite woman from Homs

But I think that the situation in Syria is very complicated and intertwined. There are no signs of a political solution or even military. And this is why the great powers, Western, and regional intervened. Every country has its own interests and got involved in Syria. All of these countries have interests inside of Syrian territory. For this reason, I believe that Syria will not be divided geographically, but there will be a political division. In other words, areas of influence in which each region follows these countries that are involved in Syrian affairs whether that is regional countries or global countries or the great powers. Only God knows that may happen.30 —Former police chief

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I think the future will not be after ten years that bright. It will not be bright at all. Maybe brown? Or gray? But, look, for me the war [is] almost done. We as Syrians lost a big part from our identity. We have big problems now with our identity. Who we are, where we belong to. If we’re inside Syria or outside Syria.31 —“Dania”

Imagining and hoping are two things that are negative. Even in fifty years, the country will not be better. The reality is sad and will be sad in the future. The Russian[s] can bomb people now. I think even in fifty years we won’t be able to do anything. I just hope that the Syrian person will be rebuilt and preserved. Because as I said, we have millions of orphans, millions of people who are disabled or their bodies deformed. Millions of widowed women, so we need to rebuild the Syrian person, educate, and nurture a dream in the Syrian person. The reality of Syria is hurtful and sad. This is why I am also always sad. The soul has been killed. When someone is removed forcibly like this from their country and when you see this much damage and destruction. The soul is destroyed. Even if the regime falls, who will go back there? There is nothing left. It is all destroyed. No soul no breath. I am so sorry, my answer was very melancholy and sad. But this is the reality.32 —MA

I am optimistic about the future. I mean after this destruction, I am sure people will learn to accept more each other, because the losses are huge, I mean, I think definitely there are families that were split between opposition and pro-government, even my own family for example, I can say that. Like me and my brother sometimes we argue. Yeah. Its families that actually split . . . Yeah, it’s really difficult. Because you cannot justify which way or another, but I think we will move forward eventually, because revolutions take a lot of time.33 —“Marwan”

I believe now that if there is going to be a solution in Syria, first an end must be put to sectarianism. In fact, I now speak with an Alawite

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official from the Syrian regime, because in the end my problem is not sectarian, it is the lack of organization in the law and violence, I believe that there needs to be a just court system for the violence.34 —AH, Syrian journalist

This is a hard question. All the parties in Syria will have different visions and answers to your question. For us, we will want to end terrorism on the ground and sit down as Syrians and find a solution to the crisis. There might be some groups that work with outsiders, those people might be trying to lengthen the crisis’ time. We are unable to answer this question because in reality by 2021 the crisis might continue to happen especially given the terrorist groups. In the Middle East the scenario keeps repeating itself, just like in Iraq war in 2003 and now in Syria. We just want everyone to live in freedom and stability. In the end, Syria is part of the Middle East and the Middle East is part of this world. The whole world I hope will have freedom.35 —Ibrahim Murad, Northeast Syrian Mission, Berlin

When you look at the history, a country that is around five thousand or seven thousand years old does not get ruined in ten years. It is not possible, and the proof is that there are still friends that have different political opinions and the communication has not stopped. 36 —M

We, the people in Syria, should not stick with the point of revenge. They have to be tolerance, and it’s not only motto and some literary or literature words, it’s—we have to apply this thing, to pass to the future, because if we’re still in the circle of revenge, we’re still fighting each other, and a lot of people will migrate out of the country, like me. Because a lot of people believe that violence will not find a solution for the people. So, the—different parties should sit together to the table and discuss all the different points between them. And the international community should push to this point, that discussing and talking about the problems, not keeping them fighting each other. So, the

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international community should oblige them to sit together, negotiate, not only still in the field and fighting.37 —MI

I know that people are dying and those are my people, but as I told you, from the beginning, this was going to happen either now or later— it’s not a nightmare, it’s something that should happen now or then. Something good will come out of it. Either we’ll be divided into countries where people in each country will really love each other, or we’ll get rid of this hatred that we have.38 —“Samer”

APPENDIX Methods

T

he following is broken down into two sections, research methods and research ethics.

SECTION 1: RESEARCH METHODS I NT E RV I E WS

The interviews for this book were carried out primarily in person, in Berlin, Germany; Amman and Zarqa in Jordan; Beirut, Lebanon; and London. Additional interviews were done remotely with participants in Sweden, Canada, the Netherlands, Turkey, the UK, and elsewhere. These were carried out both while I was traveling and from my home in Providence, Rhode Island. I used what social scientists euphemistically refer to as snowball sampling—that is, I started with a few contacts, who then introduced me to a few more people, and so on. In this, I was helped a good deal by friends and colleagues from the years I was fortunate to spend living, working, traveling, and doing research in the Middle East, especially Jordan. I also met a great many people at protests, events, and elsewhere

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who agreed to be interviewed and to introduce me to their friends and colleagues. I tried to expand my network as much as possible in order to represent as many perspectives as I could. As I note in the introduction, my interviews included Syrians from across the country, including Afrin, Aleppo, Damascus, Deir Ezzor, Deraa, Hama, Idlib, Homs, Latakia, Suwayda, and elsewhere. I interviewed Palestinian residents of Syria, all from Yarmouk camp, as well as several Kurdish Syrians (among whom Kurdishness carried varying degrees of personal or political significance). Those I interviewed also reflected Syria’s religious diversity—I spoke with Alawites, Druze, Sunnis, Shi’ites, and those from mixed families. Some were devoutly religious, others not at all. I spoke with defectors from the Syrian military and their families, former members of the FSA, and members of the civilian opposition including former political prisoners. I also heard from people who were sympathetic to the government, and those with little sympathy for any of the combatants. My interviews were semi-structured. Although I had a list of questions I used as a starting point, no two interviews covered precisely the same ground. Some of my frequent interview questions included the following: • • • • • • • • •

What is the war in Syria about? What do you remember about the beginning of the uprising? What are some of the most important divisions in Syria? Are there any factions or participants in the war that you admire or think are good for Syria? What were some of the most important turning points in the war? What are relations like between the opposition and the Kurdish parties, the government and ISIS, and so on? What has been the influence of the involvement of countries like Iran, Turkey, Russia, or others? What do you think leads people to support the government/the opposition/the Kurdish forces, or other actors? What do you think Syria will be like in five or ten years? What are your hopes for the future?

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• •

What is the most important question to ask if someone really wants to understand what has happened in Syria? Are there any questions I should have asked that I did not?

Most of my interviews lasted around one and a half hours. A few were shorter, and some were several hours long. They took place in cafes, offices, private homes, and sometimes over lunch. With the affirmative permission of those being interviewed, I recorded many of them, in part so that I could concentrate on our conversation rather than on taking notes, and in part so that I could go back later and sort through any details I might have missed. I conducted the interviews in Arabic, English, or in one case in which a respondent sent me recorded answers to my interview questions via WhatsApp, in German.

S U RV E YS

In an effort to reach those who might not be interested in a face-to-face interview but might still want to share their thoughts with me, I also put together a fully anonymous Qualtrics survey (also approved by the Clark University IRB) of my most common interview questions, phrased in such a way as to avoid soliciting personally identifying information or making respondents uncomfortable, and some very basic demographic information regarding age and gender. Respondents were able to skip any questions they preferred not to answer, and participation was, of course, entirely voluntary. I shared the link with some of those I interviewed as well as with Syrian friends to pass along to anyone they thought might be interested. I was pleased that this resulted in a set of responses from people who were strong supporters of the Syrian government and in some cases, based on their comments, apparently still living in Syria, although because the survey was designed to ensure anonymity, I cannot know for sure. I received about thirty responses (excluding blank surveys) with varying degrees of detail. Respondents were evenly split between men and women. Most reported their home city as Damascus, although Tartus, Latakia, Qamishli, and Hama were also represented.

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While this was not a perfect substitute for in-person interviews, it did help me fill an important gap: I was not able to travel to Syria because of the security situation there, and even had I done so, conducting interviews safely would have been difficult. Even conducting interviews remotely with people living in Syria would have posed a greater risk to participants than I was comfortable with. I knew that this was likely skew my interview pool toward those critical of the government because government supporters were more likely to have stayed in Syria (although I did interview Syrians living abroad who were supportive of Asad, or at least of the prewar status quo). In short, sharing my interview questions as an anonymous survey allowed me to reach people who hold a perspective less common among the Syrian diaspora.

PART I C I PA N T O B S E RVAT IO N

Particularly in Berlin, I was able to attend a number of public events organized by Syrian expatriates. Some were explicitly political. For instance, the Black Box of Syria (Al Sunduq al Aswad al Suriya) public dialogue series held at UlmanAlee36 in Charlottenburg brought together Syrians from various backgrounds to discuss Syria’s future, culminating in a discussion of a new potential constitutional framework. Most of those involved appeared to be at least in some way linked to the Etilaf leadership, an impression reinforced by the fact that some people in attendance appeared to be from the German foreign ministry. Speakers at these events offered useful insight into the position of the “official” opposition leadership. I also attended panel discussions and presentations by former political prisoners or the families of current prisoners. These were organized primarily by the prisoner-advocacy group Families for Freedom. One of these events was held in a former East German prison and included German former prisoners on the panel, which added an unsettling element to the conversation. I also attended other events, such as screenings of the films The Impossible Revolution and Flucht Aus Syrien, and panel discussions sponsored

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by groups such as Adopt a Revolution and Women Now for Development. These events, and the conversations that followed them, shed light not only on the specific experiences of the speakers (who included, among others, a medic who had treated victims of the Ghouta chemical weapons attack, a dissident filmmaker, and women’s rights activists) but also on how those in the opposition wanted their struggle to be understood outside Syria. Finally, I also attended a number of protests. These included a Kurdish-led protest against Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Germany, whose organizers appeared broadly oriented toward the PKK; a protest led by the Syrian prisoner-advocacy group Families for Freedom at the Brandenburg Gate; and a Friday afternoon protest at the Gedächtniskirche against the bombing of Idlib. Finally, in addition to these overtly political events, I also participated in an intercultural dialogue program held over several successive Saturdays at the wonderful Coop Campus in Neukölln. The program involved Syrian refugees, Germans, and others like me who were neither, learning modern dance together, followed by lunch and a discussion. I was also eventually drafted to help with the German-to-Arabicto-English translation, which certainly strained my abilities, though not nearly as much as the modern dance did. The conversations at these events are not included in this book, because that was not their purpose, nor did I recruit interviewees there, but they left me with an increased admiration for the bravery and resilience of the Syrians who have been forced to flee their homes and make a new life in Germany.

DATA

Although this book is primarily based on field research, I did find it helpful to use some basic descriptive statistics to map out the patterns of violence in the war in very broad strokes. This was based mostly on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Georeferenced Event Dataset. I looked at the total incidents of conflict between individual dyads, as well as casualties per incident, casualties per combatant actor, and in some cases

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civilian deaths, although civilian fatalities are likely undercounted in the UCDP data. I also looked at variation across governorates between 2011 and 2020. This was supplemented with descriptive statistics based on data from the Global Terrorism Dataset. This analysis was not intended to establish causation but instead to show larger trends in terms of which of the parties to the civil war were fighting one another, when, and where. Because the statistics involved were fairly simple, I used Microsoft Excel to do the analysis and to generate the figures in chapter 4. The associated maps were created using GIS by my research assistant, Marc Healy, who managed to put these together while preparing to defend his dissertation in geography at Clark University. The data was separated by actor, and then a customized kernel density function (which calculates the density of conflicts within a given radius) was performed to better display the areas with higher amounts of conflict.

P R O PAGA N DA MAT E RIAL

In establishing the narratives of the war discussed in chapter 2, I used a wide range of propaganda sources to supplement my interview and participant observation data. This included both print and video propaganda. With regard to the former, Aaron Zelin’s jihadology.net provides a real service to other scholars by making clean (that is, not malwareinfested) pdfs of ISIS’s propaganda materials available online. Both chapter 2 and especially chapter 4 were based in part on the close analysis of more than three hundred YouTube videos produced by the Revolutionary Forces of Syria Media Center, Jaysh al ‘Izza, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, the Sultan Murad Brigade, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the SANA news network, Syria Alikhbaria, and the YPG, YPJ, and SDF press offices. These were hunted down, sorted through, and catalogued by my excellent research assistant, Sherry Assi. Neither I nor my RAs watched ISIS’s beheading videos for this project. I would under no circumstances ask anyone else to watch that sort of content, and, having seen some of them previously myself, I had no desire to watch them again for this book. A

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great deal of existing excellent scholarship focuses on these videos and I am both happy to make use of it and grateful to the scholars who have done the difficult work of engaging with this material.

SECTION 2: RESEARCH ETHICS

The research for this book was approved and overseen by Clark University’s Institutional Review Board (protocol number 2017-111). I was a member and (briefly) co-chair of Clark’s IRB when I initially submitted my proposal but recused myself from any discussion of my project. In planning and carrying out my field research, I wrestled with a number of ethical questions, which included participant safety, transparency, and objectivity.

PART I C I PA N T SAF ET Y

Perhaps the most obvious ethical issue concerns the protection of my interview participants’ safety and that of their families. One piece of this was thinking carefully about my research practices, especially interviews. These were for the most part conducted wherever those I was talking to felt safest. That mostly involved cafes or offices, or sometimes private homes. In public spaces—which many of those I interviewed preferred—I did my best to ensure that we were not in a position to be overheard. Remote interviews were generally conducted using WhatsApp, as this was the most commonly requested option by my interview participants and is (or at least, was) used almost universally by Syrian refugees. This was, admittedly, not my preference; although WhatsApp is still end-toend encrypted, its parent company Meta does collect some user data. A better option is Signal, which I used when communicating with journalists (since they mostly used it anyway) or anyone else I could convince to do so.

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A second issue is data security, which I think of as having two parts: securing my data and making sure that if anyone does gain access to it that it does not contain information that could endanger anyone. The data in question for this project included interview recordings and notes. Most of my interviews (with the obvious exception of those who preferred otherwise) were recorded using my quite battered and muchloved Olympus digital USB recorder and then transferred first to my laptop, which is password protected and the hard drive encrypted, and then to encrypted cloud storage. (I used BoxCryptor, which is no longer available as of this writing; for current best practices I recommend consulting the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s guides to data security and online privacy. The University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab also has excellent resources.) My notes and photos of my numbered oral consent forms were stored there as well. Before crossing an international border, I destroyed all physical notes and removed my research material as well as any apps that could access it from my devices. My interview recordings were later translated and transcribed, either by my research assistants—who were all briefed on how to handle the data safely and appropriately—or by me, and the transcriptions stored along with the recordings. All that said, I take the view that it is impossible to ever fully secure my data against someone who is better equipped than I am and determined to get access to it. The better option is to ensure that there is nothing there to find in the first place. Accordingly, before beginning an interview, I asked each participant how they would like to be referred to in my book and subsequently referred to them only by that name in my notes and in the interview recording. I also asked whether they still had any family in Syria—if the answer was yes, unless they were a public figure speaking in a professional capacity, I used only first names, pseudonyms, or initials out of an abundance of caution. In other cases, I opted not to use full names out of a concern that these interviewees’ comments might deanonymize or otherwise put others at risk were their identities connected with them. I also omitted place names, military ranks, and other identifying details from my notes if asked, and

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sometimes at my own discretion. As a result, I do not know, and therefore could not write down or accidentally expose, the identities of most of those I interviewed. In many instances I also turned off the recorder and put down my pencil for parts of interviews, because the person being interviewed wanted to share something to illustrate a larger point or fill in a historical gap or just share a funny story, but not have it included in my published research. A second concern around participant safety relates not to the risk of retaliation from outside parties, but to the risk of retraumatization posed by the research process itself. The experience of recounting traumatic events—especially outside a therapeutic context—carries the risk of forcing someone to relive the worst things that have ever happened to them, potentially reinforcing their trauma. To avoid this possibility, I tried to let those I was talking to guide the interview as much as possible. My interview questions were designed to be open ended, allowing them to choose what they wanted to share and what they wanted to avoid. If we strayed into topics that were difficult or upsetting, I asked whether they would like to stop or talk about something else.

T R A N S PA R E NCY

The second pillar of research ethics, for me at least, is “don’t try to get away with anything.” In other words, transparency. In practice, this means being as clear as possible with those with whom we are conducting research about who we are and what we are doing. One obvious piece of this is including a clear and comprehensive informed consent form in the appropriate language and in terms that those who are not social scientists can comfortably understand. Because this project involved participant observation, it also meant being clear with those I met at protests, talks, film screenings, and other events about who I was and what I was doing. I gave out business cards, shared copies of my informed consent form, and explained my project (and in some cases, other projects I had done in the past) in as much

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detail as anyone was interested in hearing. In general, my experience has been that this has practical benefits, in that it has led me to make new connections I might not otherwise have been able to. More importantly, though, transparency is a matter of ethics: if someone would not be willing to talk to me if they knew I was writing a book about Syria, then it is important that they know that up front so they can say no. A lack of transparency takes agency away from other people and as such is unethical.

OBJECTIVITY

Finally, I would like to say a bit about the question of objectivity. Some of the stories shared with me in the course of my research for this book were harrowing. People shared accounts of imprisonment and torture, of the murder of family members and the disappearance of loved ones. Former military officers told me in anguished tones about being asked to commit atrocities in violation of their oaths. People who saw themselves as falling on all “sides” of the war described the tragic dissolution of their families and destruction of their country. I found it impossible to remain unmoved by these conversations. I think this is a good thing. Academic researchers are not human tape recorders—we cannot and should not leave our human emotions behind when we conduct research.1 Our responsibility is to both hold on to our empathy and to ensure that it does not obscure our ability to understand the behavior, motivations, and choices of all of the actors in a given conflict. Ultimately, the best we can and should expect from ourselves as researchers is not a kind of content-free neutrality, but instead a willingness to approach everyone involved in our work, regardless of what we think of their political objectives or even their personal history, with compassion for their humanity.2

NOTES

INTRODUCTION 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). Jeff D. Colgan, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010); Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 341–70, https://doi.org /10.1177/1354066106067346. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Elisabeth Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). This was critiqued by Stathis Kalyvas, “ ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?,” World Politics 54, no. 1 (2001): 99–118. James Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90; Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); James D. Fearon and David Laitin, “Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War,” World Development 39, no.  2 (2011): 199–211.

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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16. 17.

Stephen  M. Saideman, “Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 721–53; Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Daniel Corstange and Erin A. York, “Sectarian Framing in the Syrian Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 2 (2018): 441–55, https://doi.org /10.1111 /ajps.12348; Christopher Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” Third World Quarterly 36, no.  2 (2015): 357–76; Sami Zubaida, “Sectarian Dimensions,” Middle East Journal 68, no. 2 (2014): 318–22; Fanar Haddad, “Sectarian Relations in Arab Iraq: Contextualising the Civil War of 2006–2007,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 115–38, https://doi.org /10.1080/13530194.2013 .790289. David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); Karen Kampwirth, Women and Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, Cuba (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002). Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers, no. gpn029 (2008), https://oep .oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2008/08/24/oep.gpn029.full; Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no.  1 (2002): 3–12; Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” In this sense, such arguments echo the resource mobilization theorists among scholars of social movements, e.g., John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1212–41. Stephen  M. Saideman and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Intra-State Conflict, Governments and Security: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Assurance (New York: Routledge, 2008); Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma,” in Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 15–37; David D. Laitin and James Fearon, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996): 715–35. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil Wars,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (2003): 475–94. The conduct of war also, of course, includes the specific type of violence used by all participants. Although obviously important, this variation is not central to the question being examined in this book. Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, “The Geography of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 4 (July 1, 2002): 417–33, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039004003. Territorial control can also raise challenges of its own, as the literature on rebel governance points out. See Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly, Rebel Governance in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

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18.

19.

20.

21.

22. 23. 24.

25.

26.

Such explanations are often offered by combatants themselves, as well as in scholarly work on conflicts. On the war in Kosovo, for example, see Gerlachlus Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (London: C. Hurst, 2000). On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see David K. Shipler, Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land (New York: Broadway Books, 2015). Marc Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from 13 Cases,” International Organization, no. 58 (2004): 35–67; Päivi Lujala, “The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 15–28, https://doi.org /10.1177/0022343309 350015; Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Lene Hansen, “Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 3, no. 1 (2000): 55–75. John Mueller, “The Banality of Ethnic War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 42–70; Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Toft, Geography of Ethnic Violence. Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20, no. 4 (April 1, 1996): 136–75, https://doi.org /10.1162/isec.20.4.136. Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (January 1, 2004): 139–57, https://doi.org/10.2307/4150140; Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (January 1, 2012): 127–49, https://doi.org /10.5129/001041512798838021. Steven Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946– 1970 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). Fouad Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2013); Carsten Wieland, Syria—a Decade of Lost Chances: Repression and Revolution from Damascus Spring to Arab Spring (Seattle: Cune Press, 2012); Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant (New York: Routledge, 2017); David W. Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013); Yassin al-Haj Saleh, The Impossible Revolution: Making Sense of the Syrian Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). For excellent histories of pre-war Syria, see Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba’th Party (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); David W. Lesch, Syria: A Modern History (New York: Wiley, 2019); Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above (New York: Routledge, 2004). The preeminent biography of Hafez al-Asad remains Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

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27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37.

38.

Billie Jeanne Brownlee, New Media and Revolution: Resistance and Dissent in PreUprising Syria (Montreal: McGill– Queen’s University Press, 2020). Greenberg offers an analysis of the role of social media in other states during the Arab Spring. Nathaniel Greenberg, How Information Warfare Shaped the Arab Spring: The Politics of Narrative in Egypt and Tunisia (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019). William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York: Macmillan, 2015); Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2015); Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS (London: Transworld, 2015). Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter, The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al- Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Michael Knapp, Ercan Ayboga, and Anja Flach, Revolution in Rojava: Democratic Autonomy and Women’s Liberation in Syrian Kurdistan (London: Pluto Press, 2016). Sam Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country: How One Family’s Lust for Power Destroyed Syria (New York: Little, Brown, 2019). Samer N. Abboud, Syria, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro, and Arthur Quesnay, Civil War in Syria: Mobilization and Competing Social Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); David S. Sorenson, Syria in Ruins: The Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War: The Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2016); Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila AlShami, Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War (London: Pluto Press, 2016); Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi, Syrian Requiem: The Civil War and Its Aftermath (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021). Kevin Mazur, Revolution in Syria: Identity, Networks, and Repression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021). Leïla Vignal, War-Torn: The Unmaking of Syria, 2011–2021 (London: C. Hurst, 2021). Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria”; Corstange and York, “Sectarian Framing in the Syrian Civil War.” Ora Szekely, “Fighting about Women: Ideologies of Gender in the Syrian Civil War,” Journal of Global Security Studies, June 2019, https://doi.org /10.1093/jogss/ogz018; Ariel I. Ahram, “Sexual Violence, Competitive State Building, and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 13, no. 2 (March 15, 2019): 180–96, https://doi.org /10.1080/17502977.2018.1541577; Jane Freedman, Zeynep Kivilcim, and Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu, A Gendered Approach to the Syrian Refugee Crisis (New York: Routledge, 2017). Holger Albrecht, Aurel Croissant, and Fred H. Lawson, Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Holger Albrecht and Kevin Koehler, “Going on the Run: What Drives Military Desertion in Civil War?,” Security Studies 27, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 179–203, https://doi.org /10.1080 /09636412.2017.1386931.

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47.

48.

“Security and Resilience Among Syrian Refugees in Jordan,” MERIP, October 14, 2014, https://merip.org /2014 /10/security-and-resilience-among-syrian-refugees-in -jordan/; Wendy Pearlman, We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria (New York: HarperCollins, 2017). Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016). Rania Abouzeid, No Turning Back: Life, Loss, and Hope in Wartime Syria (New York: Norton, 2018); Alia Malek, The Home That Was Our Country: A Memoir of Syria (New York: Nation Books, 2017); Pearlman, We Crossed a Bridge. Ahmad, filmmaker, interview 3, WhatsApp, 2018. Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961); Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, trans. J. P. Morray, with an introduction by I. F. Stone (New York: Vintage Books, 1961). U.S. Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual: US Army Field Manual No. 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). In interviews conducted for previous projects with former members of Amal, Fatah, Hamas, the PFLP, the DFLP, the PKK, and many other armed groups, most recognized the importance of civilian support and public sympathy to their cause, even if they were not always successful in attracting it. Ora Szekely, The Politics of Militant Group Survival in the Middle East: Resources, Relationships, and Resistance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Ora Szekely, “Doing Well by Doing Good: Understanding Hamas’s Social Services as Political Advertising,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 4 (April 3, 2015): 275–92, https://doi.org /10.1080/1057610X .2014.995565; Jessica Trisko Darden, Alexis Henshaw, and Ora Szekely, Insurgent Women: Female Combatants in Civil Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019); Ora Szekely, “Exceptional Inclusion: Understanding the PKK’s Gender Policy,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, May  12, 2020, 1–18, https://doi.org /10.1080/1057610X .2020 .1759265. Navin A. Bapat, “Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups,” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 1 (January 2012): 1–29, https://doi.org /10.1017/S00071 2341100007X; Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Daniel Byman, “Understanding, and Misunderstanding, State Sponsorship of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 45, no. 12 (2022): 1031–49, https://doi.org /10.1080/1057610X .2020.1738682; Tim Heinkelmann-Wild and Marius Mehrl, “Indirect Governance at War: Delegation and Orchestration in Rebel Support,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 66, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 115–43, https://doi.org /10.1177/00220027211027311. Idean Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Szekely, Politics of Militant Group Survival; Byman, Deadly Connections. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 5.

222INTRO D U C TIO N

49. 50.

51. 52.

53.

54.

55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60.

61.

62. 63.

64. 65.

Nye, Soft Power, 6–15. Sabri Ciftci and Güneş Murat Tezcür, “Soft Power, Religion, and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 3 (July 1, 2016): 374–94, https://doi .org /10.1111/fpa.12090. U.S. Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual. David A. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–81, https://doi .org /10.2307/2095581; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611–39; Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022). Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin, “Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power,” Media, War & Conflict 7, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 70– 84, https://doi.org /10.1177/1750635213516696; Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order (New York: Routledge, 2014); Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Daniel Leonard Bernardi, Pauline Hope Cheong, Chris Lundry, and Scott Ruston, Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extremism, and the Struggle for Strategic Influence (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 24–36. Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Kalyvas, Logic of Violence. Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Lee Ann Fujii, Show Time: The Logic and Power of Violent Display (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021). McCants, ISIS Apocalypse. Michael M. Gunter, Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Harriet Allsopp, The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015); Knapp, Ayboga, and Flach, Revolution in Rojava. I use the term opposition because it is the term most commonly used by those I interviewed, including both former FSA members and members of the civilian opposition. The term in Arabic is maarada (‫)ﻣﻌﺎرﺿﺔ‬. Abboud, Syria. David  W. Lesch, “The Uprising That Wasn’t Supposed to Happen: Syria and the Arab Spring,” in The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East, ed. David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (New York: Avalon Publishing, 2012). Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country. Itamar Rabinovitch and Carmit Valensi suggest that Israeli decision-makers were unenthusiastic about the prospect of the hostile-but-predictable Asads being replaced

1. TH E SYRIAN TRAGEDY223

66.

67. 68. 69.

70. 71.

with an Islamist regime. They also note that given Israel’s experience of the 1982 invasion and subsequent occupation of Lebanon, there was no appetite for direct military intervention in Syria (Syrian Requiem, 139–44). Estimates of civilian casualties by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights range between 280,000 to 340,000 (“Civilian Deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/50/60, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 28, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/ahrc5068-civilian-deaths -syrian-arab-republic-report-united-nations-high). Vignal, War-Torn. Approved and overseen by the Clark University Institutional Review Board. I conducted all interviews myself, although in a few instances, those who had arranged the interview were also present, and in some cases offered clarification around specific terms in Arabic. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, English, or a mixture of the two and one, somewhat by accident, in German. Public events in Germany were mostly in Arabic with German translation, or in German with Arabic translation. As much as possible, I tried to rely on the original (whether German or Arabic). Recordings of Arabic interviews were translated into English by a research assistant, or by me. Research methods are discussed in greater depth in the appendix. Ingram, Whiteside, and Winter, ISIS Reader. Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 4 (July 1, 2013): 523–32, https://doi.org /10 .1177/0022343313484347.

1. THE SYRIAN TRAGEDY 1.

2.

3. 4.

The Alawite sect is an offshoot of Shi’ite Islam dating to the ninth century. It differs doctrinally from the more common Twelver Shi’ism in its trinitarian understanding of the nature of God, and the role it assigns to the founder of the sect, Muhammad ibn Nusayr, as the special confidant and interpreter of the Imams. Although Alawites have experienced persecution and exclusion by both Sunnis and mainline Shia, they consider themselves Muslims. Yaron Friedman, The Nuṣayrī-ʻAlawīs: An Introduction to the Religion, History, and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria (Leiden: Brill, 2010). The Druze are a religious minority group with communities in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel/Palestine. Originally an offshoot of Shi’ite Islam in the ninth century, they are now considered a separate religion. For further discussion of religious minorities in Syria, see Benjamin Thomas White, Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). David W. Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 58–59. For further discussion of sectarianism in Syria’s post-independence period, see Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba’th Party (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011).

2241. TH E SYRIAN TRAGEDY

5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

For an excellent summary of this period, see Lesch, Syria, 62–81. James P. Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 141–58; see also Radwan Ziadeh, Power and Policy in Syria: Intelligence Services, Foreign Relations and Democracy in the Modern Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012). Ora Szekely, The Politics of Militant Group Survival in the Middle East: Resources, Relationships, and Resistance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 86–90. Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 37. Seale, Asad: The Struggle, 39. Seale, Asad: The Struggle, 60. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above (New York: Routledge, 2004), 111–13. Fred Haley Lawson, “From Neo-Ba’th Nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad’s Second Decade,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 14, no. 2 (1990). Volker Perthes, “The Syrian Economy in the 1980s,” Middle East Journal 46, no. 1 (1992): 37–58. See Hinnebusch, Syria. Nikolaos Van Dam, Destroying a Nation: The Civil War in Syria (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 27–28. Van Dam, Struggle for Power; Lesch, Syria; Seale, Asad: The Struggle. WS, interview 20, 2018. Dara Conduit, The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 120–30; Raphael Lefevre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), chap. 6. Asma Farraj, “Wenn Menschen einfach so Verschwenden” (When people simply disappear), Families for Freedom, Gedenkstätte Hohenshausen, Berlin, September 4, 2018. Judge AM, interview 43, 2019. Former member of the SAA, interview 29, 2019; Um M, interview 30, 2019. Ora Szekely, “A Friend in Need: The Impact of the Syrian Civil War on Syria’s Clients (A Principal-Agent Approach),” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 3 (2016): 450–68. Szekely, Politics of Militant Group Survival. Anonymous, interview 8, 2018. Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). “Samer,” interview 42, 2019. This name is a pseudonym, as are most of the names of those interviewed. LK, political activist, interview 11, 2018. MN, interview 19, 2018; Judge AM, interview 43. Abdulaziz Almashi, interview 39, 2019. Judge AM, interview 43. Neil MacFarquhar, The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah Wishes You a Happy Birthday: Unexpected Encounters in the Changing Middle East, reprint ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010), 331.

1. TH E SYRIAN TRAGEDY225

32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56. 57.

58.

David  W. Lesch, “The Uprising That Wasn’t Supposed to Happen: Syria and the Arab Spring,” in The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East, ed. David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (New York: Avalon Publishing, 2012), 79–80. Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising, 67; MacFarquhar, Media Relations Department, 43–45. Brownlee, New Media and Revolution, 81–82. Lesch, “Wasn’t Supposed to Happen.” Michael M. Gunter, Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 93–94. “The Damascus Declaration,” Carnegie Middle East Center, March 1, 2012, https:// carnegie-mec.org /diwan/48514. Anthony Shadid, “Rami Makhlouf Becomes Magnet for Syrian Dissent,” New York Times, April 30, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com /2011/05/01/world /asia /01makhlouf .html. Syrian journalist, interview 32, 2019. MA, interview 5, 2018. Lesch, “Wasn’t Supposed to Happen.” Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010,” https://www .transparency.org /en/cpi/2010. Adnan Abu Odeh, interview 23, 2019. Reinoud Leenders, “Social Movement Theory and the Onset of the Popular Uprising in Syria,” Arab Studies Quarterly 35, no.  3 (2013): 273–89, https://doi.org /10.13169 /arabstudquar.35.3.0273. Nathaniel Greenberg, How Information Warfare Shaped the Arab Spring: The Politics of Narrative in Egypt and Tunisia (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019), 3–5. Interviewees mentioned Egypt and Tunisia far more frequently than any other Arab Spring state. DA, interview 12, 2018. Alawite woman from Homs, interview 17, 2018. Syrian journalist, interview 32. Syrian activist, interview 45, 2019. “Dania,” interview 18, 2018. “Dania.” It is unclear whether this was actually true. MA, interview 5. One Syrian now living in the United Kingdom who had attended said that he had had to leave the country almost immediately afterward because the police were looking for him. “Marwan,” interview 38, 2019. “Marwan,” interview 38. Syrian journalist, interview 32. Kareem Fahim and Hwaida Saad, “A Faceless Teenage Refugee Who Helped Ignite Syria’s War,” New York Times, February 8, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02 /09 /world /middleeast /a -faceless -teenage -refugee -who -helped -ignite - syrias -war .html. This story was recounted to me in several interviews: MA, interview 5; AB, interview 6, 2018; Um M, interview 30; former member of the SAA, interview 29.

226 1. TH E SYRIAN TRAG EDY

59. 60.

61. 62. 63.

64. 65.

66.

67. 68.

69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78.

Ahmad, filmmaker, interview 3. Katherine Marsh, “Syria: Four Killed in Deraa as Protests Spread across South,” The Guardian, March 22, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/22/syrian -protests-troops-kill-deraa. BBC News, “Protesters March at Syria Funeral,” March 24, 2011, https://www.bbc.com /news/world-middle-east-12846856. “Samer,” interview 42. Michael Slackman, “Syrian Troops Open Fire on Protesters in Several Cities,” New York Times, March 25, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/middleeast /26syria.html. This was true at the local level as well. One activist arrested at a protest in Damascus said that the police scolded her and the other women arrested with her, telling them that the protests were all a Western conspiracy. “Dania,” interview 18. Van Dam, Destroying a Nation, 81. This perspective was held by “Firas” (interviewee 21), Abdulaziz Almashi (interviewee 39), and Judge AM (interviewee 43), among others, though it was contested by MN, interviewee 19. Michael Slackman and Liam Stack, “Tension and Grief in Syria after Protests and Deadly Reprisals,” New York Times, March 26, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011 /03/27/world/middleeast/27syria.html. M, interview 34, 2019. lihill2002, “Bashar Al-Assad Speech 30.03.2011 1/4,” YouTube, 2011, https://www .youtube.com /watch? v = ODTcCj53QOA; lihill2002, “Bashar Al-Assad Speech 30.03.2011 2/4,” YouTube, 2011, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v = 02f5DbxJuzI; “Bashar Al-Assad Speech 30.03.2011 3/4,” YouTube, 2011, https://www.youtube.com /watch?v =-vX4Ml4ORNE. LK, political activist, interview 11. Senior officer who defected from the SAA, interview 24, 2019. Rania Abouzeid, No Turning Back: Life, Loss, and Hope in Wartime Syria (New York: Norton, 2018), 78. Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila al-Shami, Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 34. Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising, 74–75. BBC News, “Syrian Army ‘Attacks Protest City of Deraa,’ ” April 25, 2011, https://www .bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13185185. Anthony Shadid, “Protests Across Syria Despite Military Presence,” New York Times, May 6, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com /2011/05/07/world /middleeast /07syria .html; Nada Bakri, “Syrians Protest at Night to Elude Forces,” New York Times, May 26, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/world/middleeast/27syria.html; MI, interview 31, 2019; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, Burning Country, chap. 4. Syrian journalist, interview 32. Nada Bakri, “In Syria, Protesters Show Their Staying Power,” New York Times, July 22, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/world/middleeast/23syria.html. “Dania,” interview 18.

1. TH E SYRIAN TRAGEDY227

79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

89. 90. 91. 92.

93.

94. 95.

96.

97. 98. 99. 100.

Alawite woman from Homs, interview 17. Much of this violence was chronicled through the assiduous reporting of Anthony Shadid, who died in Syria in 2012. Nada Bakri, “Syria Extends Siege on Hama as Toll Rises,” New York Times, August 6, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/world/middleeast/07syria.html. Abouzeid, No Turning Back, 34–35. “Dania,” interview 18; former police chief, interview 44, WhatsApp, 2019. Judge AM, interview 43. Samer N. Abboud, Syria, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 94. Abboud, Syria, 75–82. Senior officer who defected from the SAA, interview 24. He also described being asked to cover up friendly fire deaths as being particularly frustrating. Former SAA officer, interview 9, 2018. This was not limited to soldiers. A high-ranking police officer described having to flee with his family to Turkey after being sentenced to death for refusing to kill demonstrators. Former police chief, interview 44. Members of the military faced pressure from the FSA itself as well—one defector said that although he did not want to be “a killer,” he also defected in part because “the opposition called me and they also told me that ‘if you don’t defect’ they will kill me and my family. Former SAA officer, interview 9. Jonathan Spyer, “Defying a Dictator: Meet the Free Syrian Army,” World Affairs 175, no. 1 (2012): 45–52. Senior officer who defected from the SAA, interview 24. Abboud, Syria, 99–110. In Islamic theology, jihad means struggle and can connote a personal, spiritual struggle, a political struggle, or a military one. Repurposing a religious term in this way is an unfortunate nomenclature, but also reflects the language some of these actors themselves use. It is at this point so widespread in the media and in academic work that I use it here for the sake of simplicity. Barak Mendelsohn, The Al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of Al-Qaeda and Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 171; Charles  R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Lister, Syrian Jihad, 122–23. Mendelsohn, Al- Qaeda Franchise, 172; Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat Al-Nusra Li-Ahl al-Sham Min Mujahedi al-Sham Fi Sahat al-Jihad. A Strategic Briefing” (London: Quilliam, 2013). McCants, ISIS Apocalypse, 12; Ayman Zawahiri, “Letter from Al-Zawahiri to alZarqawi,” Combating Terrorism Center, July 9, 2005, https://ctc.usma.edu/harmony -program/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-original-language-2/. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 122–23. Mendelsohn, Al- Qaeda Franchise, 187. Mendelsohn, Al- Qaeda Franchise, 178–79. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 133.

2281. TH E SYRIAN TRAGEDY

101.

102. 103.

104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

109. 110. 111.

112. 113. 114.

115.

116.

117. 118.

119. 120.

Neil MacFarquhar, “Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown,” New York Times, November 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/arab -league-votes-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html. Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi, Syrian Requiem: The Civil War and Its Aftermath (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021), 50–51. Ian Black, “Syrian Rebels ‘Kill 27 Secret Policemen and Soldiers,’ ” The Guardian, December 15, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/15/syria-rebels-kill -secret-police-soldiers. Leïla Vignal, War-Torn: The Unmaking of Syria, 2011–2021 (London: Hurst, 2021). Sam Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country: How One Family’s Lust for Power Destroyed Syria (New York: Little, Brown, 2019), 324–25. Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country, 324–25. Abouzeid, No Turning Back, 145. Rabinovich and Valensi, Syrian Requiem, 52; BBC News, “Syria Rebels ‘Capture Oilfield’ in Deir Ezzor,” November 4, 2012, https://www.bbc .com /news/world-middle -east-20199240. Syrian Palestinians from Yarmouk Camp, interviews 35, 36, and 37, 2019. NK, Palestinian author and journalist, interview 4, 2018. Rod Nordland and Dalal Mawad, “Palestinians in Syria Drawn into the Violence,” New York Times, June 30, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/world/middle east/palestinians-in-syria-drawn-into-the-violence.html. NK, Palestinian author and journalist, interview 4. Syrian Palestinians from Yarmouk camp, interviews 35, 36, and 37. Hwaida Saad and Rick Gladstone, “Syrian Insurgents Claim to Control Large Hydropower Dam,” New York Times, February 11, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02 /12 /world /middleeast /syrian-insurgents -claim-to -control-large -hydropower-dam .html. Anne Barnard, “Syrian Rebels Hit Central Damascus Square with Mortar Shells,” New York Times, March  25, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com /2013/03/26/world /middleeast/mortars-hit-central-damascus-square-at-least-one-killed.html. Hania Mourtada, “Assad Forces Push Back at Rebels Across Syria,” New York Times, April 7, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/world/middleeast/syrian-forces -push-back-at-rebel-positions.html. Phillips, Battle for Syria, 105–15. Hala Droubi and Rick Gladstone, “Syrian Opposition Joins Meeting of Arab League,” New York Times, March  26, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com /2013/03/27/world /middleeast/syrian-opposition-group-takes-seat-at-arab-league.html. See chapter 4; see also Phillips, Battle for Syria, 113–15. Szekely, Politics of Militant Group Survival; Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel (New York: Random House, 2011).

1. TH E SYRIAN TRAGEDY229

121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127.

128.

129. 130.

131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138.

139. 140. 141. 142. 143.

144. 145. 146. 147.

I heard rumors to this effect in Beirut in June and July of 2012 from both foreign and Lebanese contacts. Abboud, Syria, 128–30. Former police chief, interview 44; MI, interview 31; Syrian journalist, interview 32. Mazur, Revolution in Syria, 249–50. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 90. Abboud, Syria, 124–25. Anne Barnard and Hania Mourtada, “Opposition in Syria Continues to Fracture,” New York Times, July 7, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/world/middleeast /tension-between-rebel-groups-intensifies-in-syria.html. Anne Marie Baylouny and Creighton A. Mullins, “Cash Is King: Financial Sponsorship and Changing Priorities in the Syrian Civil War,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41, no. 12 (December 2, 2018): 990–1010, https://doi.org /10.1080/1057610X .2017 .1366621. Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country, 334–40. Thomas Pierret, “Brothers in Alms: Salafi Financiers and the Syrian Insurgency,” Carnegie Middle East Center, May  18, 2018, https://carnegie-mec .org /2018/05/18 / brothers-in-alms-salafi-financiers-and-syrian-insurgency-pub-76390. Pierret, “Brothers in Alms.” Phillips, Battle for Syria, chap. 5. Abouzeid, No Turning Back, 222–33. Abdulsattar Sharaf, “Chemiewaffen—Mir Doch Egal?” (Berlin, Germany, August 21, 2018). Syrian activist, interview 45. John Jaeger, CEO of Hala Systems and former State Department official, interview 47, Signal, 2021. Jaeger, interview. The two largest dialects of Kurdish are Sorani and Kurmanji. Kurds are religiously quite diverse, including Sunnis, Shia, Alevis, Jews, and Yazidis. The figure of 10 percent was accurate as of 2012. Harriet Allsopp, Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 73–98. Gunter, Out of Nowhere, 17. Gunter, Out of Nowhere, 21. Allsopp, Kurds of Syria. Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York University Press, 2007); Vera Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011). Allsopp, Kurds of Syria, 103–104. Gunter, Out of Nowhere, 40. Marcus, Blood and Belief. Trisko Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely, Insurgent Women, chap. 3.

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148.

149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162.

163. 164.

165. 166. 167. 168. 169.

170. 171.

Michael Knapp, Ercan Ayboga, and Anja Flach, Revolution in Rojava: Democratic Autonomy and Women’s Liberation in Syrian Kurdistan (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 47–48. Jordi Tejel, Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics and Society (New York: Routledge, 2008), 108–16. Knapp, Ayboga, and Flach, Revolution in Rojava, 49. Phillips, Battle for Syria, 111. This replaced the Self-Protection Units, also known as YXG, established in 2011 (Knapp, Ayboga, and Flach, Revolution in Rojava, 51). Murray Bookchin, The Modern Crisis (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1987); Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future (Boston: South End Press, 1990). Trisko Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely, Insurgent Women. Knapp, Ayboga, and Flach, Revolution in Rojava, 133–36. Knapp, Ayboga, and Flach, Revolution in Rojava, 54–55. Phillips, Battle for Syria, 133–34. Knapp, Ayboga, and Flach, Revolution in Rojava, 56–57. Phillips, Battle for Syria, 111; Judge AM, interview 43. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 95. Phillips, Battle for Syria, 199. Ben Hubbard, Clifford Krauss, and Eric Schmitt, “Rebels in Syria Claim Control of Resources,” New York Times, January 28, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29 /world/middleeast/rebels-in-syria-claim-control-of-resources.html. Phillips, Battle for Syria, 197–210. Phillips, 210; Robert Mackey, “Clashes across Turkey as Kurds Demand Relief of Syrian Kin Besieged by ISIS,” New York Times, October 7, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com /2014/10/08/world /europe/clashes-across-turkey-as-kurds-demand-relief-of-syrian -kin-besieged-by-isis.html. The Turkish government’s refusal to allow PKK fighters to cross the border to aid in the city’s defense led to protests by Kurds in Turkey, the government’s response to which contributed to the eventual collapse of the fragile 2013 ceasefire. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 320. Phillips, Battle for Syria, 211. See chapter 4. Ben Hubbard, “Warily, Jordan Assists Rebels in Syrian War,” New York Times, April 10, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/world/middleeast/syria.html. Ben Hubbard, “As Qaeda-Backed Group Makes Gains, Rift Grows Among Rebels in Syria,” New York Times, November 4, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com /2014 /11 /05 /world/middleeast/nusra-front-gains-in-syria.html. Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country, 336–40. See chapter 4; see also Ben Hubbard, “ISIS Said to Kill 150 Syrian Captives in 2 Days, Videotaping the Horror,” New York Times, August 28, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com /2014/08/29/world/middleeast/golan-heights-un-peacekeepers-syria.html.

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Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 2. Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination. Daniel Corstange and Erin A. York, “Sectarian Framing in the Syrian Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 2 (2018): 441–55, https://doi.org /10.1111 /ajps.12348. Marc Lynch, Deen Freelon, and Sean Aday, Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War, Peaceworks no.  91 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 8, https:// www . usip . org /sites /default / files / PW91 - Syrias%20Socially%20Mediated%20 Civil%20War.pdf. Cesare Marco Scartozzi, “Assad’s Strategic Narrative: The Role of Communication in the Syrian Civil War,” Contemporary Review of the Middle East 2, no. 4 (December 1, 2015): 313–27, https://doi.org /10.1177/2347798915610037. Kathrin Bachleitner, “Legacies of War: Syrian Narratives of Conflict and Visions of Peace,” Cooperation and Conflict 57, no. 1 (March 1, 2022): 43–64, https://doi.org /10 .1177/00108367211032691; Wendy Pearlman, “Narratives of Fear in Syria,” Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1 (March 2016): 21–37, https://doi.org /10.1017/S1537592715003205. Daniel Leonard Bernardi, Pauline Hope Cheong, Chris Lundry, and Scott Ruston, Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extremism, and the Struggle for Strategic Influence (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 24–36; Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order (New York: Routledge, 2014); Joanna Szostek, “The Power and Limits of Russia’s Strategic Narrative in Ukraine: The Role of Linkage,” Perspectives

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8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

31. 32.

on Politics 15, no. 2 (June 2017): 379–95, https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X; Isabelle Hertner and Alister Miskimmon, “Germany’s Strategic Narrative of the Eurozone Crisis,” German Politics and Society 33, no. 1 (June 1, 2015): 42–57, https://doi.org /10.3167/gps.2015.330104. “Jamal,” interview 1, 2018. N, interview 16, 2018. Banners of Occupied Kafrnabel (‫)ﻻﻓﺘﺎت ﻛﻔﺮﻧﺒﻞ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻠﺔ‬, Facebook, accessed January 13, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/kafrnbl. Basma Wikstrom and Cajsa Atassi, “Battle to Name Friday Protests,” Al Jazeera April 14, 2012, https://www .aljazeera .com /features /2012 /4 /14 /the -battle -to -name -syrias-friday-protests; Syrian Revolution Network (‫)ﺷﺒﻜﺔ اﻟﺜﻮرة اﻟﺴﻮرﻳﺔ‬, Facebook, accessed February 10, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/Syrian.Revolution. MA, interview 5. Similar sentiments were articulated by Dania, interview 18. “Firas,” interview 21, Skype, 2018. N, interview 16; Alawite woman from Homs, interview 17. Syrian activist, interview 45. LK, political activist, interview 11. MI, interview 31. Syrian activist, interview 45. Senior officer who defected from the SAA, interview 24. He also described Iran’s regime as “a lighter version” of Syria’s. “Roula,” interview 26, 2018. “Hala,” interview 27, 2019. MA, interview 5. Former SAA officer, interview 9; Alawite woman from Homs, interview 17; Syrian activist, interview 45. “Marwan,” interview 38. DA, interview 12; Alawite woman from Homs, interview 17; “Dania,” interview 18. “Firas,” interview 21. K, interview 7, 2018. “Maha,” interview 28, 2019. K, interview 7; former SAA officer, interview 9; Senior officer who defected from the SAA, interview 24. See also Holger Albrecht and Dorothy Ohl, “Exit, Resistance, Loyalty: Military Behavior during Unrest in Authoritarian Regimes,” Perspectives on Politics 14, no.  1 (March  2016): 38–52, https://doi.org /10.1017/S1537592715003217; Albrecht and Koehler, “Going on the Run,” April 3, 2018. MA, interview 5; anonymous, interview 8; AB, interview 6; DA, interview 12; Alawite woman from Homs, interview 17; “Roula,” interview 26; “Dania,” interview 18; MI, interview 31; Syrian journalist, interview 32. AH, Syrian journalist, interview 22. Banners of Occupied Kafranbel (‫)ﻻﻓﺘﺎت ﻛﻔﺮﻧﺒﻞ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻠﺔ‬, “Bennesh, Idlib, Today,” Facebook, June 1, 2020, https://www .facebook .com / kafrnbl /photos /a .274568635969917 /3107709139322505/.

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Banners of Occupied Kafranbel (‫)ﻻﻓﺘﺎت ﻛﻔﺮﻧﺒﻞ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻠﺔ‬, “We Stand in Solidarity with the Oppressed Who Cannot Breathe,” Facebook, May 26, 2020, https://www.facebook .com/kafrnbl/photos/a.1465996336827135/3092542220839197/. Jaeger, interview 47. Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy (Chico, CA: AK Press, 2005); The Modern Crisis (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1987); Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future (Boston: South End Press, 1990). Abdullah Öcalan, Democratic Confederalism (Köln: Neuss, 2013). “Constitution of Rojava (The Social Contract): January  29, 2014 (Syrian Arab Republic [Sy]),” Oxford Constitutional Law, OUP ref. no. OCW CD 1573 (SY-roj), accessed January  21, 2021, https://oxcon.ouplaw.com /view/10.1093/ law-ocw/ law -ocw-cd1573.regGroup.1/law-ocw-cd1573. People’s Defense Units, “YPG | English,” accessed January 23, 2021, https://www .ypgrojava.org /english. BBC HARDtalk, “Salih Muslim Mohammed—Democratic Union Party, Syria,” YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =-_ 3krnX4CjI. Ibrahim Murad, interview 13, 2018; anonymous, interview 15, 2018. BBC HARDtalk, “Salih Muslim Mohammed.” BBC HARDtalk, “Salih Muslim Mohammed”; Academy for Cultural Diplomacy (ACD), “Salih Muslim (Co- Chair of the Democratic Union Party of Rojava-North Syria), Keynote Address, Berlin, May 31,” YouTube, June 16, 2017, https://www.youtube .com/watch?v = OT3e0BD7GzQ; Institute for the Study of Human Rights (ISHR), “A Conversation with Ilham Ahmed: November  22,” YouTube, 2019, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v = jQF_CwVcM08. Murad, interview 13; ISHR, “A Conversation with Ilham Ahmed”; Michael Knapp, Ercan Ayboga, and Anja Flach, Revolution in Rojava: Democratic Autonomy and Women’s Liberation in Syrian Kurdistan (London: Pluto Press, 2016). ACD, “Salih Muslim”; ISHR, “A Conversation with Ilham Ahmed.” YPG Press Office, “Raqqa Civilians Speak of Atrocities Committed by Daesh Terrorists,” YouTube, July 22, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =YlaZNMgZhz8. MSN News, “Why Are the Kurds Fighting to Liberate Raqqa?,” YouTube, 2017, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v =vUg4nCH5Bjo. YPG Press Office, “YPJ Spox. Nesrîn Ebdullah’s Statement Regarding Future of Syria, Idlib and Attacks against #Afrin,” YouTube, November 22, 2017, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v= 6UfppEb2J54. Leslie Luette, “What’s Happening in ROJAVA and Why Should YOU Support It?,” YouTube, December 31, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =H1YMUkMHpyY; NonCompete, “The Anarchist Revolution in Syria | Interview with Internationalist Commune of Rojava,” YouTube, 2018, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v=hMMH W0Ay7ko; Unicorn Riot, “International Volunteers of the Rojava Revolution,” YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v =Ig6dDbqPxEg; Institute of Art and Ideas, “Understanding the Rojava Revolution | Elif Sarican,” YouTube, 2019,

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https://www.youtube.com /watch? v =UOGd30eFuqI; Democracy Now!, “Turkey Moves to Crush Rojava, the Kurds’ Radical Experiment Based on Democracy, Feminism & Ecology,” YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =DPJqCVj-Li0. Nathan Patin, “The Other Foreign Fighters: An Open-Source Investigation into American Volunteers Fighting the Islamic State,” Bellingcat, August 26, 2015, https:// www.bellingcat.com/news/mena /2015/08/26/the-other-foreign-fighters/; Mehmet Furkan Ergül, Classifying Foreign Fighters: The Case of YPG (Adalet Publishing, 2020, Kindle); Ariel Koch, “The Non-Jihadi Foreign Fighters: Western Right-Wing and Left-Wing Extremists in Syria,” Terrorism and Political Violence 33, no.  4 (June  10, 2019): 669–96, https://doi.org /10.1080/09546553.2019.1581614; Jason Fritz and Joseph K. Young, “Transnational Volunteers: American Foreign Fighters Combating the Islamic State,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 3 (April 2, 2020): 449–68, https://doi.org /10.1080/09546553.2017.1377075. @IRPGF, “The Formation of The Queer Insurrection and Liberation Army,” Twitter, July 24, 2017, https://twitter.com/IRPGF/status/889460892450115588. ACD, “Salih Muslim.” Amy Austin Holmes, “SDF’s Arab Majority Rank Turkey as the Biggest Threat to NE Syria: Survey Data on America’s Partner Forces” (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2019). Mutlu Civiroglu, “Polat Can of YPG on November 1, World Kobane Day,” Mutlu Civiroglu (blog), October 31, 2014, https://civiroglu.net/2014/10/31/world _ kobane _day/. ISHR, “A Conversation with Ilham Ahmed.” Ora Szekely, “Exceptional Inclusion: Understanding the PKK’s Gender Policy,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, May  12, 2020, 1–18, https://doi.org /10.1080/1057610X .2020.1759265. See Jessica Trisko Darden, Alexis Henshaw, and Ora Szekely, Insurgent Women: Female Combatants in Civil Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019); Szekely, “Exceptional Inclusion”; Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York University Press, 2007); Vera Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York University Press, 2007); Knapp, Ayboga, and Flach, Revolution in Rojava. Abdullah Öcalan, Liberating Life: Women`s Revolution (International Initiative, 2013); Abdullah Öcalan, The Political Thought of Abdullah Öcalan: Kurdistan, Women’s Revolution and Democratic Confederalism (London: Pluto Press, 2017). ISHR, “A Conversation with Ilham Ahmed”; Ilham Ahmed, “The Young Feminist Who Died for My People,” New York Times, March 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com /2018/03/21/opinion/anna-campbell-kurds-syria.html; ACD, “Salih Muslim”; Murad, interview 13. Ora Szekely, “Fighting About Women: Ideologies of Gender in the Syrian Civil War,” Journal of Global Security Studies, June 2019, https://doi.org /10.1093/jogss/ogz018. The Syrian-Iranian alliance was itself shaped in part by internal Syrian politics. In the 1970s, the Asad regime faced increasing pressure from the Syrian branch of the

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72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77.

Muslim Brotherhood, which used Asad’s Alawite identity to impugn his legitimacy as leader of Syria, going so far as to question whether the Alawites were in fact Muslims at all. In 1974, the prominent Lebanese cleric Musa Sadr did Asad the enormous favor of declaring that Alawites were in fact Shi’ite Muslims, which not only shored up Asad’s position at home, but also further cemented the regime’s relations with Sadr, his movement, and after the Islamic Revolution, Iran. Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). Other minorities include the Druze, around 3 percent, and a range of smaller Christian sects, around 9 percent (Christopher Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” Third World Quarterly 36, no. 2 [2015]: 357–76). The Druze are, like the Alawites, an offshoot of the Ismaili sect of Islam dating to the eleventh century. Nikolaos Van Dam, Destroying a Nation: The Civil War in Syria (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), chaps. 1–2. “Marwan,” interview 38. Syrian woman from Latakia, interview 25. Bassam S. A. Haddad, Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). Senior officer who defected from the SAA, interview 24; former SAA officer, interview 9. “The Black Box of Syria: Alawites and Ismailis,” Ulmenallee35 panel discussions (Berlin, Germany, September 15, 2018). “The Black Box of Syria: Alawites and Ismailis.” MI, interview 31. This sentiment was echoed by others, including Jamal, interview 1. Former member of the SAA, interview 29; Um M, interview 30. Rumiyah, “The Weakest House Is That of a Spider,” Safar 1438 (2016–17), jihadology. net; Rumiyah, “Operations,” Muharram 1348 (1929–30), jihadology.net; Dabiq, “Operations,” Rabi al-Akhir 1437 (2015–16), jihadology.net; “Military Operations,” Dabiq, Dhul Hijja 1435 (2013–14), jihadology.net; Dabiq, “The Yarmuk Camp,” Sha’ban 1436 (2014–15), jihadology.net; Dabiq, “A Selection of Military Operations across the Islamic State,” Dhul Al-Qadah 1436 (2014–15), jihadology.net. Rumiyah, “Operations,” Dhul-Hijjah 1437 (2015–16), jihadology.net. Aaron  Y. Zelin and Phillip Smyth, “The Vocabulary of Sectarianism,” Foreign Policy (blog), January  29, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com /2014 /01 /29/the -vocabulary-of-sectarianism/. Dabiq, “A Selection of Military Operations by the Islamic State,” Safar 1437 (2015–16), jihadology.net. Dabiq, “The Rafidah: From Ibn Sabah to the Dajjal,” Rabi’ al-Akhir 1437 (2015–16), 45, jihadology.net. Rumiyah, “The Kafir’s Blood Is Halal for You So Shed It,” Dhul Hijjah 1437 (2015–16). Dabiq, “Break the Cross,” Shawwal 1437 (2015–16), jihadology.net; Dabiq, “Why We Hate You and Why We Fight You,” Shawwal 1437 (2015–16).

2. WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?239

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96.

97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104.

Rumiyah, “The Kafir’s Blood.” Dabiq, “Break the Cross.” Dabiq, “Why We Hate You.” Dabiq, “The Allies of Al-Qaidah in Sham: Part III,” Ramadan 1436 (2014–15), jihadology.net. Rumiyah, “This Is What Allah and His Messenger Promised Us: A Speech by AmirulMuminin Abu Bakr Al-Husayni Al-Baghdadi,” Safar 1438 (2016–17), jihadology.net. Abul-Harith Ath-Thaghri, “And as for the Blessing of Your Lord, Then Mention It,” Dabiq, Safar 1437 (2015–16), 31, jihadology.net. Dabiq, “American Kurdistan,” Ramadan 1436 (2014–15), 32–34, jihadology.net. Amirul-Mu’minin Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi, “A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah in the Month of Ramadan (July 1st 2014),” in The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement, ed. Haroro  J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 163. Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani ash-Shami, “Indeed, Your Lord Is Ever Watchful (22 September 2014),” in The ISIS Reader. Amirul-Mu’minin Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi, “A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah in the Month of Ramadan (July 1st 2014),” 164. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 59–60. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 66–68. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 163–64. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 92. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 136–37. Rumiyah, “The Weakest House.” Dabiq, “Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West,” Rajab 1437 (2015–16), jihadology.net. Rumiyah, “The Wicked Scholars,” Dhul Hijjah 1437 (2015–16), jihadology.net. Dabiq, “The Allies of Al-Qaidah in Sham,” Jumada al-Akhira 1436 (2014–15), jihadology.net; “Allies of Al Qai’dah: Part II,” Sha’ban 1436; “The Allies of Al- Qaidah in Sham: Part III,” Ramadan 1436 (2014–15); “Allies of Al- Qai’dah: Part IV,” Dhul Al-Qadah 1436; “Allies of Al-Qaida: The End,” Safar 1437 (2015–16); “The Laws of Allah or the Laws of Men?,” Ramadan 1436. M, interview 34. This interviewee was not a particularly ardent supporter of the Asad regime. M, interview 34. Anonymous Syrian Palestinian, interview 2, 2018. MA, interview 5. “Roula,” interview 26. Former member of the SAA, interview 29. Judge AM, interview 43. “Roula,” interview 26. Other women interviewed similarly described gendered violence as a way of punishing members of communities deemed disloyal to the regime. “Hala,” interview 27; “Maha,” interview 28.

240 2. W H AT ARE W E FIGH T I N G FOR ?

105. 106. 107. 108.

109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118.

119.

120. 121. 122.

123.

Alawite woman from Homs, interview 17. Former police chief, interview 44. Former member of the SAA, interview 29. Judge AM, interview 43. This was also suggested by a journalist whose boyfriend, an activist, had been in prison before the uprising with a number of Islamists. LB, interview 33, WhatsApp, February 8, 2019. “Roula,” interview 26. “Marwan,” interview 38; “Firas,” interview 21. Van Dam, Destroying a Nation, 68–74. “Maha,” interview 28. “Roula,” interview 26. AH, Syrian journalist, interview 22. Van Dam, Destroying a Nation, 68–74. Bashar Assad, “Syria: Speech by Bashar al-Assad,” al-bab.com, June 4, 2012, https://al -bab.com/documents-section/syria-speech-bashar-al-assad-3. Takfiri can be roughly translated as “those who accuse others of being kufr, or infidels.” Hazem al-Sabbagh, “President Al-Assad: Everything Related to the Destiny and Future of Syria Is a 100% Syrian Issue, Unity of Syrian Territory Is Self-Evident and Not up for Debate,” Syrian Arab News Agency, August 20, 2017, http://sana.sy/en/?p = 112238; Hazem al-Sabbagh, “President Al-Assad: Main Goal of War on Syria Is Undermining Pan-Arabism and Affiliation,” Syrian Arab News Agency, November 14, 2017, http://sana.sy/en/?p = 118174. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, “Syria Slams U.S. Anti-IS Coalition, Proposes ‘International Counterterrorism Forum,’ ” December  1, 2014, https://www.rferl.org /a /under-black-flag-syria-slams-coalition/26721535.html. Its participants also included speakers accused by the Anti-Defamation League of links to the far-right and to antisemitic websites. Other governments, of course, do this as well. Assad, “Speech by Bashar Al-Assad”; Carnegie Middle East Center, “Bashar Al-Assad’s Opera House Speech, January 6, 2013,” https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50513?lang=en; Hazem al-Sabbagh, “President Al-Assad Interview with TeleSUR TV,” Syrian Arab News Agency, September 26, 2013, http://sana.sy/en/?p=3709; Ruaa Al-Jazaeri and Hala Zein, “President Al-Assad in a Speech at Opening of Int’l Conference on Return of Refugees,” Syrian Arab News Agency, November  11, 2020, http://sana.sy/en/?p=209573; Mazen Eyon, “President Al-Assad Inaugurates the International Islamic Cham Center on Confronting Terrorism and Extremism,” Syrian Arab News Agency, May 20, 2019, http://sana .sy/en/?p=166020; SANA, “President Al-Assad: Terrorists Are the True Tool of the Israeli Aggression, and Confronting Israel Requires Confronting Its Tools First,” Syrian Arab News Agency, August 26, 2015, http://sana.sy/en/?p=52585. Hazem al-Sabbagh, “Al-Moallem at UN General Assembly: Syria Is Marching Steadily Towards Rooting out Terrorism,” Syrian Arab News Agency, September 23, 2017, http:// sana.sy/en/?p = 114420.

2. W H AT ARE W E FIGH TING FOR ?241

124.

125. 126. 127.

128.

129. 130.

131.

132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146.

Barry Temmo, “President Al-Assad: The Priority Is Eliminating Terrorism Wherever It Is Found in Syria,” Syrian Arab News Agency, July 27, 2015, http://sana.sy/en/ ?p =49473. Assad, “Speech by Bashar Al-Assad.” Al-Sabbagh, “President Al-Assad Interview with TeleSUR TV.” UN General Assembly, “Report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013,” A/67/997–S/2013/553 (Geneva: UN Security Council, September 16, 2013), http://www . securitycouncilreport .org /atf /cf /%7B65BFCF9B - 6D27 -4E9C - 8CD3 - CF6E4FF9 6FF9%7D/s _ 2013_ 553.pdf. Human Rights Watch, “Attacks on Ghouta,” September 10, 2013, https://www. hrw .org /report /2013 /09 /10 /attacks - ghouta /analysis - alleged -use - chemical -weapons -syria. Al-Jazaeri and Hala Zein, “President Al-Assad in a Speech.” Eyon, “President Al-Assad Inaugurates”; Cham International Islamic Center (‫ﻣﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺸﺎم‬ ‫)اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ‬, Facebook, accessed January 12, 2021, https://www .facebook .com /ChamIICenter/. Bashar al-Assad, “President Al-Assad: The War Was Between Us Syrians and Terrorism, We Triumph Together Not Against Each Other,” SANA, February 17, 2019, http://sana.sy/en/?p = 158819. Respondent 15. Respondent 1. Respondent 11. Respondent 14. Respondent 15. Respondent 6. Respondent 12. LK, political activist, interview 11. “Firas,” Interview 21. Syrian woman from Latakia, interview 25. “Hala,” interview 27. Judge AM, interview 43; former police chief, interview 44. Ahmad, filmmaker, interview 3. Syrian activist, interview 45. “Operation Against Turkish-Backed Jihadists by YPG in Occupied Afrin,” YouTube, 2018, https://www.youtube.com /watch?v = tYBKKDQhhF8& has _verified = 1 (private video); “2 Turkish-Backed Terrorists Killed in Jindirese, Afrin,” YouTube, 2018, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v = gR-V0T33pUE (private video); “An Ahrar Sharqiya Terrorist Member Was Killed in Afrin,” YouTube, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v =bgBAUgza1XQ (private video); “Two Liwa Al-Waqas Thugs Were Neutralized in Afrin’s Shiya Town,” YouTube, 2018, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v=vWC8G bA7DuI&has _verified= 1&bpctr = 1610481348 (private video).

2422. W H AT ARE W E FIGH T I N G FOR ?

147.

148.

149.

150.

151.

152. 153. 154. 155.

156.

157. 158. 159.

160.

161.

“The Tale of the SDF in the Battle of Baghouz” (‫)ﻣﻠﺤﻤﺔﻗﻮات ﺳﻮرﻳﺎ اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘ ﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺒﺎﻏﻮز‬, YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EvGLEkheiuQ [video no longer available]. “Kêfxweşiya Şîniyên Gûndê Cebil Şêîr Bi Hatine Şervanên QSDê” (The Joy of the Mourners of the Village of Jabal Sheyr with the Arrival of the SDF Fighters), YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hhkGXI5T4BI [video no longer available]; “Şervanên Xezeba Firatê Hem Şer Dikin, Hem Jî Alîkariya Gelê Koçber Dikin” (The Wrath of Euphrates Warriors Both Fight and Help the Immigrant People), YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UC63xb-UeVo [video no longer available]. RT International, “ ‘All Massacres Being Committed by ISIS’—Kurdish Paramilitary Commander Fighting for Raqqa to RT,” April 9, 2017, https://www.rt.com/news/384141 -kurdish-commander-raqqa-interview/. Seth Harp, “The Anarchists vs. the Islamic State,” Rolling Stone, February 14, 2017, https:// www. rollingstone . com /politics /politics -features /the - anarchists -vs -the -islamic-state-109047/. Elizabeth Griffin, “These Remarkable Women Are Fighting ISIS. It’s Time You Know Who They Are,” Marie Claire, October 1, 2014, https://www.marieclaire.com /world-reports/inspirational-women/these-are-the-women-battling-isis. Murad, interview 13. ACD, “Salih Muslim.” Knapp, Ayboga, and Flach, Revolution in Rojava. Ilham Ahmed, “We’re America’s Best Friend in Syria. Turkey Bombed Us Anyway,” Washington Post, April 28, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy - post / wp /2017 /04 /28 / were - americas - best -friend - in - syria - turkey - bombed - us -anyway/; ISHR, “A Conversation with Ilham Ahmed.” YPJ Media Center, “‫( ”ﺳﻨﻘﺎوم ﺣﺘﻰ اﺧﺮ ﻗﻄﺮة دﻣﺎء ﻓﻲ اﺟﺴﺎدﻧﺎ‬We Will Resist Until the Last Drop of Blook in Our Bodies), YouTube, 2020, https://www .youtube .com /watch ?v =ywm -TiashmA. This video features an Arab YPJ fighter who explains that she joined because she wanted to defend her land against the Turks. Holmes, “SDF’S Arab Majority.” Al-Sabbagh, “President Al-Assad: Main Goal of War on Syria.” Ghossoun, “President Al-Assad: The American Presence in Syria Will Generate Military Resistance which Will Exact Losses among the Americans, Consequently Force Them to Leave,” Syrian Arab News Agency, November 15, 2019, http://sana.sy /en/?p = 178449. Hazem al-Sabbagh, “National Kurdish Movement Rejects Any Divisive or Federal Project in Syria,” Syrian Arab News Agency, March 20, 2016, http://sana .sy/en /?p = 72483. Hazem al-Sabbagh, “Civil Democratic Gathering of Syrian Kurds: Ayn al-Arab Will Continue to Raise the Syrian Flag,” Syrian Arab News Agency, October 31, 2014, http:// sana.sy/en/?p = 16595.

2. W H AT ARE W E FIGH TING FOR ?243

162.

163. 164. 165.

166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172.

173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182.

183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189.

Carlotta Gall, “Syrian Rebels See Chance for New Life with Turkish Troops,” New York Times, October 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/world/middleeast /turkey-kurds-free-syrian-army.html. LK, political activist, interview 11. Judge AM, interview 43. He used the Arabic name Daesh rather than ISIS. These were a series of six panel discussions held in Berlin and dubbed “The Black Box of Syria” for the flight recorder meant to preserve data in the aftermath of a plane crash (attended by the author between September and November 2018). “The Black Box of Syria: Kurds and Turkmen.” K, interview 7; Judge AM, interview 43. Dabiq, “The Fight against the PKK,” Ramadan 1435 (2013–14), jihadology.net. Dabiq, “Unifying the Ranks,” Muharram 1436 (2014–15), jihadology.net. David Roberts, The Ba’th and the Creation of Modern Syria (RLE Syria) (New York: Routledge, 2013), chap. 7. See Ora Szekely, The Politics of Militant Group Survival in the Middle East: Resources, Relationships, and Resistance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). SANA, “General Director of Ifta: Syria Will Never Abandon Palestinian Cause,” Syrian Arab News Agency, September  10, 2014, http://sana.sy/en/?p = 12704; SANA, “Mikdad: Syria Is Fighting Terrorism to Defend Its Sovereignty and Independence,” Syrian Arab News Agency, August 25, 2014, http://sana.sy/en/?p = 11083. SANA, “President Al-Assad,” August 26, 2015. MN, interview 19. Syrian woman from Latakia, interview 25. Respondent 17. Bashar al-Assad, “President Al-Assad,” February 17, 2019. SANA, “Al-Jaafari: Terrorist War on Syria Disclosed Fragility of International Law,” Syrian Arab News Agency, September 19, 2016, http://sana.sy/en/?p = 88431. Al-Sabbagh, “President Al-Assad Interview with TeleSUR TV.” Assad, “Speech by Bashar Al-Assad.” Carnegie Middle East Center, “Bashar Al-Assad’s Opera House Speech, January 6, 2013.” SANA, “President Al-Assad: Our War on Terrorism Continues, We Will Liberate Every Inch of Syria-VIDEO,” Syrian Arab News Agency, June 7, 2016, http://sana.sy /en/?p = 79525. Bashar al-Assad, “President Al-Assad,” February 17, 2019; Carnegie Middle East Center, “Bashar Al-Assad’s Opera House Speech, January 6, 2013.” Respondents 2, 12, 24, and 27. Respondents 8, 11, 13, 16, and 18. Respondent 11. Respondent 8. Respondents 4, 6, 8, and 10. Respondent 2.

2442. W H AT ARE W E FIGH T I N G FOR ?

190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223.

Respondent 3. Respondent 15. Respondent 22. Respondent 20. Respondent 27. Syrian woman from Latakia, interview 25. Judge AM, interview 43. Senior officer who defected from the SAA, interview 24. MA, interview 5. AB, interview 6. “Firas,” interview 21; “Dania,” interview 18. K, interview 7; “Dania,” interview 18. Dabiq, “American Kurdistan,” 32–34. Ath-Thaghri, “And as for the Blessing of Your Lord.” Ath-Thaghri, “And as for the Blessing of Your Lord,” 31. Dabiq, “The Yarmuk Camp.” Dabiq, “The Allies of Al-Qai’dah in Sham: Part IV,” Dhul Al-Qadah 1436, 6, jihadology.net. Dabiq, “From Jihad to Fasad,” Dhul Al-Qadah 1436, 25, jihadology.net. ISHR, “A Conversation with Ilham Ahmed.” Murad, interview 13. ACD, “Salih Muslim.” Holmes, “SDF’s Arab Majority,” 15–16. An overwhelming majority of respondents also had a positive view of U.S. involvement in northeastern Syria (21). Former SAA officer, interview 9. Anonymous, interview 8. Former SAA officer, interview 9. M, interview 34. Dania, interview 18. Bave Salar, author, interview 10, 2018. This point was echoed by LK, political activist, interview 11; MI, interview 31. “Samer,” interview 42. AB, interview 6; LK, political activist, interview 11. “Firas,” interview 21; AB, interview 6. N, interview 16; AB, interview 6. K, interview 7. Ath-Thaghri, “And as for the Blessing of Your Lord.”

3. PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE 1.

Although the performative aspect of violence is widely understood as a key component of terrorism, it is also true of wartime violence more generally. If we understand

3 . PATTE RNS O F VIO LE NCE245

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

the definition of terrorism to simply be “propaganda by violence,” one could argue that the vast majority of wartime violence should be considered terrorism; I am not overly interested in splitting this particular definitional hair, and in any case, doing so would seem to stretch the definition of terrorism past utility. Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 4 (July 1, 2013): 523–32, https://doi.org /10 .1177/0022343313484347; Therése Pettersson, Shawn Davies, Amber Deniz, Garoun Enström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, and Margareta Sollenberg Magnus Öberg, “Organized Violence 1989–2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria,” Journal of Peace Research, July 1, 2021, https://doi.org /10.1177/00223433211026126. Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 2 (April 6, 2007): 181–204, https://doi.org /10.1080 /09546550701246817. Center for Documentation of Violations in Syria, “About VDC,” accessed July 20, 2021, https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/about. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Commits Wide Violations in Idlib Governorate,” SNHR (blog), October 21, 2017, https://sn4hr.org / blog /2017/10 /21/47854/. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Civilian Death Toll,” SNHR (blog), June 2022, https://snhr.org / blog/2021/06/14/civilian-death-toll/; Human Rights Council, “Civilian Deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/50/68, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), June 28, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org /en /documents /reports /ahrc5068 - civilian - deaths - syrian - arab -republic -report -united-nations-high. SOHR is cited for 70 percent of incidents documented in the UCDP and the VDC for 43 percent. Many incidents include multiple sources. Other sources include international organizations such as Airwars and Amnesty International, academic sources such as the Long Wars Journal, and media sources such as Al Jazeera and the BBC. The UDCP GED makes this distinction but SNHR does not. The Asad regime’s confrontations with the opposition are collectively coded “Government of Syria—Syrian Insurgents.” The opposition’s confrontations with all other parties are coded by individual faction or coalition. Factions and coalitions are coded as they existed at the time of the confrontation. Factions included as members of the opposition for the purposes of this analysis are as follows: 16th  Division, 23rd Division, Ahfad al Rasoul Brigade, Ahrar al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, Ahrar Ghurayan, Aknaf Bait al-Maqdis, al-Farouq Brigades, al-Moutasem Brigade, alQa’qa Brigade, al-Tawhid Brigade, Army of Ahl al-Sunni wal Jamaa, Army of alIkhlas, Army of Maoata al-Islami, Authenticity and Development Front, Bayareq al-Shaaitat, Baz al-Islamiya, Dawn of Freedom Brigades, Eastern Ghouta Unified Military Command, Eastern Qalamoun Operations Room, Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front, Euphrates Vulcano, Fatah Halab, FSA, Furqan Brigades, Ghuraba alSham, Hamza Division, Harkat Hazm, Hawar Kilis Operations RoomHTS, Islamic Front, Islamic Kurdish Front, Jabhat al-Akrad, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Jaysh

246 3. PATTE RNS O F VIOLEN CE

10.

11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, Jaysh al-Fatah Idlib, Jaysh al-Nasr, Jaysh al-Asha’er, Jaysh al-Islam, Jaysh al-Jihad (Saraya al- Jihad), Jaysh al-Nukhba, Jaysh Usud al-Sharqiya, Jazeera-Euphrates Liberation Front, Liwa al-Aqsa, Liwa al-Fateh, Liwa al-Jihad fi Sabeel Allah, Liwa al-Qadisiya, Liwa al-Sultan Murad, Liwa Thuwar ar-Raqqa, Majd al-Sham, Mare’ Operations Room, Martyr Lieutenant Ahmed Abdou Brigades, Mujahideen Army, National Front for Liberation, Northern Storm BrigadeNour al-Din Zenki, NSA, Omar al-Mukhtar Battalion, Rahman Corps, Salahadin Brigade, Sham al-Rasul Brigade, Sham Legion, SNA, Sons of Yarmouk Movement, Southern Front, SRF, Suqour al-Sham, Syrian Liberation Front, Tahrir al-Sham Army, Tajamu Shuhada al-Sharqiya, Tanzim Hurras ad-Din, and the Yarmouk Army. Sundberg and Melander, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.” Helene Cooper, “Obama Requests Money to Train ‘Appropriately Vetted’ Syrian Rebels,” New York Times, June  26, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/world /middleeast /obama-seeks-500-million-to-train-and-equip-syrian-opposition.html; CJTF-OIR Public Affairs, “Coalition and Vetted Syrian Opposition Forces Repel ISIS Attack,” U.S. Central Command, April  10, 2017, https://www.centcom.mil / MEDIA / NEWS -ARTICLES / News -Article -View /Article /1145992 /coalition - and -vetted-syrian-opposition-forces-repel-isis-attack/. Khaled Al-Khateb, “Turkish-Backed Syrian Armed Groups Unify Forces,” Al-Monitor, June 8, 2021, https://www.al-monitor.com /originals/2021/06/turkish-backed-syrian -armed-groups-unify-forces. Charles R. Lister, Syrian Jihad: Al- Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Al-Monitor, “Rise of Islamic Front a Disaster for Syria,” accessed July 19, 2021, https:// www . al -monitor . com /originals /2013 /12 /syria - lebanon -islamic -front - political -transition-conflict.html. Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “On-Side Fighting in Civil War: The Logic of Mortal Alignment in Syria,” Rationality and Society 32, no. 4 (2020): 402–60. Jabhat al-Nusra is referred to in the UCDP GED as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. Sundberg and Melander, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset”; Pettersson et al., “Organized Violence 1989–2020.” Emily Kalah Gade, Mohammed  M. Hafez, and Michael Gabbay, “Fratricide in Rebel Movements: A Network Analysis of Syrian Militant Infighting,” Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 3 (May 1, 2019): 321–35, https://doi.org /10.1177/00223433188 06940. Austin C. Doctor, “A Motion of No Confidence: Leadership and Rebel Fragmentation,” Journal of Global Security Studies 5, no. 4 (October 7, 2020): 598–616, https:// doi.org /10.1093/jogss/ogz060; Jesse Driscoll, “Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 118–49, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711429696; Eric S. Mosinger, “Brothers or Others in Arms? Civilian Constituencies and Rebel Fragmentation in Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): 62–77, https://doi.org /10.1177/0022343316675907; Olivier  J. Walther and Patrick Steen Pedersen, “Rebel

3 . PATTE RNS O F VIO LE NCE247

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25.

26. 27.

28.

Fragmentation in Syria’s Civil War,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 31, no.  3 (April  2, 2020): 445–74, https://doi.org /10.1080/09592318.2020.1726566; Schulhofer-Wohl, “On-Side Fighting in Civil War.” Lister, Syrian Jihad, 285–86. Of the 68,140 conflict dyads recorded in the UCDP GED as involving the government of Syria, 60,802 were coded as involving Syrian insurgents relative to only 5,229 involving ISIS. Senior officer who defected from the SAA, interview 24. Syrian journalist, interview 32. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 285–88. Al-Monitor, “How Turkey Intends to Secure Return of Syrian Refugees,” May 2016, https:// www . al - monitor . com /originals /2016 /05 / turkey - plan - safe - zone - syria -refugees.html. This may be a function of the greater commitment and resolve of ISIS fighters, or perhaps of their willingness to use tactics such as suicide terrorism, which tends to inflict greater casualties than other forms of violence. GTD data indicate that about 29 percent of all of ISIS operations meeting the GTD definition of terrorism used suicide tactics, versus only 6  percent of the FSA’s, for instance (LaFree and Dugan, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database”; START, “Global Terrorism Database,” 2013, http://www.start .umd .edu /gtd/). Of four hundred suicide attacks included in the GTD data on Syria, 58 percent (231) were carried out by ISIS, relative to only 3 percent by the FSA. Senior officer who defected from the SAA, interview 24. Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence from Chechnya,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 (June 1, 2009): 331–62, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708330881; Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, “One-Sided Violence against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 2 (March 1, 2007): 233–46, https://doi.org /10.1177/0022343307075124; Reed M. Wood, “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no.  5 (September  1, 2010): 601–14, https://doi.org /10.1177 /0022343310376473; Benjamin A. Valentino, “Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence against Civilians,” Annual Review of Political Science 17, no. 1 (2014): 89–103, https://doi.org /10.1146/annurev-polisci-082112-141937. Erica Chenoweth, Evan Perkoski, and Sooyeon Kang, “State Repression and Nonviolent Resistance,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 9 (October 1, 2017): 1950–69, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717721390; Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 1–23; Nimmi Gowrinathan and Zachariah Mampilly, “Resistance and Repression Under the Rule of Rebels: Women, Clergy, and Civilian Agency in LTTE Governed Sri Lanka,” Comparative Politics 52, no.  1 (October  1, 2019): 1–20, https://doi.org /10.5129/001041519X1 5698352040097; Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly, Rebel Governance in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

248 3. PATTE RNS O F VIOLEN CE

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 379–99, https://doi.org /10.2307/421717; Stewart Emory Tolnay and E. M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882–1930 (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1995); W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880–1930 (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993). Scholars of police violence in the United States identify a similar dynamic, leading to the treatment of unarmed Black children as threatening adults. Rebecca Stone and Kelly M. Socia, “Boy with Toy or Black Male with Gun: An Analysis of Online News Articles Covering the Shooting of Tamir Rice,” Race and Justice 9, no. 3 (July 1, 2019): 330–58, https://doi.org /10.1177/2153368716689594. As figure 3.1 makes clear, a full 8 percent of ISIS’s military engagements deliberately target civilians, higher than any other faction, though this number is predicated on an interpretation of the regime’s intentions in the UCDP data that may not be entirely accurate. This is somewhat unusual: in general, and especially in conflicts over control of the state, rebels tend to kill far more civilians than governments do. See Hanne Fjelde, Lisa Hultman, and Margareta Sollenberg, “Violence Against Civilians During Civil War,” in Peace and Conflict 2016, ed. David Backer, Ravinder Bhavnani, and Paul Huth (New York: Routledge, 2016), 44. Eliot Higgins, “A Brief Open Source History of the Syrian Barrel Bomb,” Bellingcat, July 8, 2015, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2015/07/08/a-brief-open-source -history-of-the-syrian-barrel-bomb/; Sam Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country: How One Family’s Lust for Power Destroyed Syria (New York: Little, Brown, 2019), 326–27. Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/28/69, OHCHR, February 5, 2015, https://www. securitycouncilreport .org /atf /cf /%7B65BFCF9B - 6D27 -4E9C -8CD3 -CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a _ hrc _ 28_69.pdf. Debarati Guha-Sapir, Benjamin Schülter, Jose Manuel Rodriguez-Llanes, Louis Lillywhite, and Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks, “Patterns of Civilian and Child Deaths Due to War-Related Violence in Syria: A Comparative Analysis from the Violation Documentation Center Dataset, 2011–16,” The Lancet Global Health 6, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): e103–10, https://doi.org /10.1016/S2214-109X(17)30469-2. The Russian military likewise attacked civilian targets. The SOHR reported that Russian airstrikes killed 8,661 civilians between 2015 and 2020, relative to 5,638 members of ISIS and 6,210 fighters from other rebel factions (“Total Death Toll,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 1, 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/217360/). ACLED’s data tell a slightly different story, reporting that between 2017 and 2020, around a quarter of Russian targets were civilian when fighting alongside the Syrian military, and around 30 percent when acting alone (“The Russian Involvement in Syria, Whom Do They Target?” April 27, 2018, https://acleddata .com /2018/04 /26/the-russian-involvement-in -syria-whom-do-they-target/). Human Rights Council, “Civilian Deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic.”

3. PATTE RNS O F VIO LE NCE249

37.

38. 39.

40.

41. 42. 43.

44. 45.

46.

47. 48.

Human Rights Watch, “Targeting Life in Idlib,” October 2020, 20, https://www.hrw .org /sites/default /files/media _ 2020/10/syria1020_web.pdf; Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/33/55, OHCHR, August 11, 2016. Guha-Sapir et al., “Patterns of Civilian and Child Deaths,” e109. Human Rights Council, “Assault on Medical Care: A Distinct and Chilling Reality of the Civil War in Syria,” OHCHR, October 8, 2013, https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories /2013/10/assault-medical-care-distinct-and-chilling-reality-civil-war-syria. Amnesty International, “Syria: At Least 15 Hospitals Targeted in Idlib and Hama Since Beginning of May,” May 17, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org.uk /press-releases/syria -least-15-hospitals-targeted-idlib-and-hama-beginning-may; Sayaka Ri, Alden H. Blair, Chang Jun Kim, and Rohini J. Haar, “Attacks on Healthcare Facilities as an Indicator of Violence Against Civilians in Syria: An Exploratory Analysis of OpenSource Data,” PLOS ONE 14, no. 6 (June 10, 2019): e0217905, https://doi.org /10.1371 /journal.pone.0217905; Sophie Cousins, “Under Attack: Aleppo’s Hospitals,” The Lancet 384, no.  9939 (July  19, 2014): 221–22, https://doi.org /10.1016/S0140-6736(14) 61197-1. Human Rights Council, “Report on the Syrian Arab Republic,” August 11, 2016. Guha-Sapir et al., “Patterns of Civilian and Child Deaths.” One interviewee who was skeptical of the opposition believed that the government was aware of the damage that the allegations of civilian targeting were doing its reputation. He recalled an instance in which a military base was overrun by opposition fighters and the soldiers there executed. He believed that the government did not deploy helicopters from a nearby base to rescue the soldiers because of the widespread criticism of its previous airstrikes: “My personal opinion was that people already had a prejudgment about the government that the government uses violence against the people. Therefore, the government did not want to use violence to send a message that they are not in fact using violence and they sacrificed eighty to 120 soldiers” (M, interview 34). Former member of the SAA, interview 29. Human Rights Council, “Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria: Periodic Update, 20 December 2012,” OHCHR, https://reliefweb.int /report /syrian -arab-republic/independent-international-commission-inquiry-syria-periodic-upd ate-20. Human Rights Council, “Without a Trace: Enforced Disappearances in Syria,” OHCHR, December  19, 2013, https://www.ohchr.org /en / hr-bodies/ hrc/iici-syria /documentation. Syrian journalist, interview 32. Spencer S. Hsu, “Syria Ordered to Pay $302 Million for ‘Targeted Murder’ of Journalist Marie Colvin,” Washington Post, January 31, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost .com / local / legal-issues/syria- ordered-to -pay-302-million-for-targeted-murder- of -journalist-marie -colvin /2019/01 /31 /3ea6eade -2582-11e9 -81fd-b7b05d5bed90_ story .html.

25 0 3. PATTE RNS O F VIOLEN CE

49.

50.

51. 52.

53. 54. 55.

56.

57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62.

63. 64.

Human Rights Council, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in Syria,” OHCHR, February 3, 2016, https://www.ohchr.org /EN/ NewsEvents/Pages/Death sindetentioninSyria.aspx. Anne Barnard, “Inside Syria’s Secret Torture Prisons: How Bashar al-Assad Crushed Dissent,” New York Times, May 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/11/world /middleeast/syria-torture-prisons.html. Human Rights Council, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind.” Human Rights Council, “ ‘I Lost My Dignity’: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/37/CRP.3, OHCHR, March 8, 2018, https://www .ohchr.org /en/hr-bodies/hrc/iici-syria/documentation. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Death Toll Due to Torture,” SNHR (blog), June 14, 2. Human Rights Council, “Report on the Syrian Arab Republic,” August 11, 2016. Amnesty International, “ ‘It Breaks the Human’: Torture, Disease and Death in Syria’s Prisons,” August 18, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org /en/documents/mde24/4508 /2016/en/. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “143 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syria in January 2022, Including Two Children,” SNHR (blog), February 2, 2022, https://snhr.org / blog /2022/02/02/57285/. Human Rights Council, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind.” Syrian activist, interview 45. Moreover, the impact of the presence of large numbers of rebel groups on the level of deliberate violence against civilians in any given war is not entirely clear. Rebel violence against civilians by more established groups is found to increase when new groups emerge, as a function of competition for resources. See Reed M. Wood and Jacob D. Kathman, “Competing for the Crown: Inter-Rebel Competition and Civilian Targeting in Civil War,” Political Research Quarterly 68, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 167– 79. Conversely, the mean amount of violence against civilians per rebel group is found to decrease as the number of rebel groups involved in a war increases (Fjelde, Hultman, and Sollenberg, “Violence Against Civilians During Civil War”). Lister, Syrian Jihad, 86–87. Barnard, “Syrian Rebels Hit Central Damascus.” Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/34/64, OHCHR, February 2, 2017, 11, https://www. securitycouncilreport .org /atf /cf /%7B65BFCF9B - 6D27 -4E9C -8CD3 -CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a _ hrc _ 34 _64.pdf. Human Rights Council, “Report on the Syrian Arab Republic,” February 2, 2017, 16. This figure includes private citizens and their property, media, educational and religious targets, businesses and NGOs, and transportation infrastructure, regardless of whether noncivilian targets were attacked as well. It excludes military, police, government, and nonstate military targets. The groups included here are Abu Amarah Battalion, Ahrar al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, Ajnad al-Sham, Al-Furqan Brigades, Al-Muthana Islamic Movement, Al-Nasir Army (Syria), Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat

3. PATTE RNS O F VIO LE NCE251

65.

66.

67.

68. 69.

70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

al-Nusra), Al-Sham Legion, Aleppo Fatah Operations Room, Ansar al-Din Front, Ansar al-Tawhid, Authenticity and Development Front, Diraa al-Shahbaa Rebel Brigade, Free Syrian Army, Gathering to Aid the Oppressed, Greater Damascus Operations Room, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Islamic Front (Syria), Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (Muhajireen Army), Jaysh al-Mujahideen (Syria), Jaysh al-Islam (Syria), Jund al-Aqsa, Khaled Ibn al-Walid Army, League of Damascus for Special Tasks, Liwa al-Haqq, Liwa al-Islam, Liwa al-Tawhid, National Liberation Front (NLF-Syria), Northern Homs Countryside Operations Room, Nur-al-Din al-Zinki Movement, Jaysh al-Fatah (Syria), Revolutionaries Army (Jaysh al-Thowwar), Sawaid Al-Khayr, Shamiya Front, Southern Front, Syrian Turkmen Brigades, the Mujahadeen Room in Latakia Countryside, Turkestan Islamic Party, and Turkish-backed militia (LaFree and Dugan, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database”; START, “Global Terrorism Database”). START, “Global Terrorism Database.” These forty-seven operations include all those coded as carried out against targets other than the military, police, government, or other armed groups by the Free Syrian Army, the Southern Front, the Shamiya Front (Jabhat Shamiya) or the Al-Nasir Army (Jaysh al-Nasr). The group was involved in 148 attacks as Jabhat al-Nusra and fifty as part of HTS. These numbers are probably low, given the somewhat narrow criteria under which incidents are included in the GTD, but do provide a sense of the comparative frequency of indiscriminate violence by various members of the opposition. Human Rights Council, “Attacks on Syrian Civilians and Aid Workers in Aleppo Were War Crimes,” OHCHR, March 3, 2017, https://www.ohchr.org /en/stories/2017 /03/attacks-syrian-civilians-and-aid-workers-aleppo-were-war-crimes. Human Rights Council, “Report on the Syrian Arab Republic,” February 2, 2017, 13. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Exploits the De-Escalation Agreement and Escalates Their Violations,” October  21, 2018, 2, https://sn4hr.org / wp - content /pdf /english / The _ Sham _ Liberation _ Organization _ exploits _ the _truce _ agreement _ and _escalates _ its _violations _en.pdf. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “HTS’s Violations During The Raid on Ma’aret al Nu’man City,” SNHR (blog), June 21, 2017, https://sn4hr.org/blog/2017/06/21/42927/. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Exploits.” Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Commits.” Ruth Sherlock, “Remembering Syrian Activist Raed Fares Who Was Killed Last Week,” Morning Edition, November  26, 2018, https://www.npr.org /2018/11 /26 /670752914/remembering-syrian-activist-raed-fares-who-was-killed-last-week. BBC News, “Raed Fares: Syria Radio Host Shot Dead in Idlib,” November 24, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46320355. For targets included under the heading of “civilian,” see Syrian Network for Human Rights, “HTS’s Violations.” Human Rights Council, “Report on the Syrian Arab Republic,” August 11, 2016. Human Rights Council, “Report on the Syrian Arab Republic,” February 5, 2015. Three were police, one a reserve soldier, and one a soldier home on leave.

2523 . PATTE RNS O F VIOLEN CE

79.

80. 81.

82.

83.

84. 85. 86.

87. 88.

89.

90.

91. 92. 93.

94.

Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Opposition Abuses During Ground Offensive,” November 19, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/19/syria-opposition-abuses-during-gro und-offensive. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Civilian Death Toll.” One argument is that ISIS’s choice of targets must be understood as resulting both from their search for material assets (such as oil and territory) and from a need to maintain social cohesion within the organization by attacking members of the outgroup. The outgroup is framed in terms of sectarian or ethnic identity, given ISIS’s hostility to Sunnis who they deem traitors or rivals, but this designation could perhaps be applied more broadly. Michael Burch and Elise Pizzi, “Strategic Targeting: The Islamic State and Use of Violence in Iraq and Syria,” Terrorism and Political Violence 34, no. 6 (June 9, 2020): 1162–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1763963. Human Rights Council, “Rule of Terror: Living Under ISIS in Syria,” OHCHR, November  19, 2014, https://reliefweb.int /attachments/1f07e3ac-2a87-3940-9088 -ba9fa328f650/HRC _CRP_ ISIS _14Nov2014.pdf. Ariel I. Ahram, “Sexual Violence, Competitive State Building, and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 13, no. 2 (March 15, 2019): 180–96, https://doi.org /10.1080/17502977.2018.1541577. Lister, Syrian Jihad, 187. Public punishment of immorality is a theme across much of the propaganda produced with the aim of recruiting foreigners to live in the Islamic State. Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities,” July 19, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/19/iraq-isis-abducting-killing-expelling-min or ities; BBC News, “Syria Crisis: ISIS Imposes Rules on Christians in Raqqa,” February 27, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26366197. Human Rights Council, “Rule of Terror,” 5. Günes Murat Tezcür, Kurds and Yezidis in the Middle East: Shifting Identities, Borders, and the Experience of Minority Communities (London: Bloomsbury, 2021); Nadia Murad and Jenna Krajeski, The Last Girl: My Story of Captivity, and My Fight against the Islamic State (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018). Vicken Cheterian, “ISIS Genocide Against the Yazidis and Mass Violence in the Middle East,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 48, no. 4 (October 30, 2019): 635– 42, https://doi.org /10.1080/13530194.2019.1683718. Valeria Cetorelli, Isaac Sasson, Nazar Shabila, and Gilbert Burnham, “Mortality and Kidnapping Estimates for the Yazidi Population in the Area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in August 2014: A Retrospective Household Survey,” PLOS Medicine 14, no. 5 (May 9, 2017): e1002297, https://doi.org /10.1371/journal.pmed.1002297. Cheterian, “ISIS Genocide.” Szekely, “Fighting about Women.” Al Khansaa Brigade, “Women of the Islamic State: A Manifesto on Women by the Al- Khansaa Brigade,” trans. Charlie Winter (London: Quilliam, February 2015), www.quilliamfoundation.org; Ingram, Whiteside, and Winter, ISIS Reader. Dabiq, “The Rafidah,” Rabi’ al-Akhir 1437 (2015–16); Dabiq, “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” Dhul Hijjah 1435 (2015), jihadology.net; Dabiq, “Kill the

3. PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE253

95.

96. 97. 98.

99. 100. 101.

102. 103. 104.

105.

106.

107. 108.

109.

Imams of Kufr,” Rajab 1437 (2016); Dabiq, “Know Your Enemy,” Rabi’ Al Akhir 1437 (2016); Umm Summayah Al Muhajjirah, “Slave Girls or Prostitutes?,” Dabiq, Sha’ban 1436 (2015), jihadology.net. Rukmini Callimachi, “For Women Under ISIS, a Tyranny of Dress Code and Punishment,” New York Times, December 12, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12 /world/middleeast/islamic-state-mosul-women-dress-code-morality.html. Human Rights Council, “Rule of Terror,” 9. Human Rights Council, “I Lost My Dignity,” 16–19; Dabiq, “Revival of Slavery.” Amnesty International, “Escape from Hell: Torture and Sexual Slavery in Islamic State Captivity in Iraq,” 2014, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/escape_from_hell_-_torture _and_sexual_slavery_in_islamic_state_captivity_in_iraq_-_english_2.pdf. Ariel I. Ahram, “Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS,” Survival 57, no. 3 (May 4, 2015): 67, https://doi.org /10.1080/00396338.2015.1047251. Human Rights Council, “Rule of Terror.” Cassandra Vinograd, “ISIS Hurls Gay Men Off Buildings, Stones Them,” NBC News, June  30, 2014, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/isis-hurls -gay-men-buildings-stones-them-analysts-n305171. Human Rights Watch, “Islamic State’s War on Gays,” June 8, 2015, https://www.hrw .org/news/2015/06/08/islamic-states-war-gays. Ahram, “Sexual Violence, Competitive State Building”; Ahram, “Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS.” Joshua Tschantret, “Cleansing the Caliphate: Insurgent Violence Against Sexual Minorities,” International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 260–73, https:// doi.org /10.1093/isq/sqx074. Human Rights Watch, “Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses in PYD-Run Enclaves of Syria,” June 2014, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria0614_kurds_ForUpload .pdf. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “The Most Significant Human Rights Violations by Kurdish Democratic Union Party and the Kurdish Self-Management Forces,” SNHR (blog), January 18, 2016, https://sn4hr.org / blog /2016/01/18/16610/. Human Rights Watch, “Under Kurdish Rule.” Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/45/31, OHCHR, August 14, 2020, 16– 17, https://undocs.org /A /HRC/45/31. Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/37/72, OHCHR, February 1, 2018, https:// w w w . securit ycouncilrepor t . org / atf /cf / %7B65BFCF9B - 6D27 - 4E9C - 8CD3 -CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_hrc_37_72.pdf; Human Rights Watch, “Under Kurdish Rule”; Human Rights Council, “Report on the Syrian Arab Republic,” February 5, 2015; Fabienne Vinet, “Syrian Democratic Forces Sign Action Plan to End and Prevent the Recruitment and Use of Children—Office of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Children and Armed Conflict,” July 1, 2019, https://childrenandarmedconflict .un .org /2019/07/syrian-democratic-forces-sign-action-plan-to -end-and-prevent-the -recruitment-and-use-of-children/.

25 43 . PATTE RNS O F VIOLEN CE

110.

111.

112.

113. 114. 115. 116. 117.

118. 119.

120.

121. 122.

123.

Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, “Syria: Manbij Military Council’s Decision to Stop Forced Conscription Is Not Enough— Civilians Must Be Protected,” June 3, 2021, https://www.euromedmonitor.org /en /article/4444 /Syria:-Manbij-Mil itary- Council%E2%80%99s - decision -to -stop -forced - conscription -is -not- enough -%E2%80%93-civilians-must-be-protected. Amnesty International, “We Had Nowhere Else to Go: Forced Displacement and Demolitions in Northern Syria,” October 2015, https://www.amnesty.org /en /docu ments/document/?indexNumber =mde24%2f2503%2f2015& language = en. Amnesty International, “Syria: US Ally’s Razing of Villages Amounts to War Crimes,” October  13, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org /en / latest /news/2015/10/syria-us-allys -razing-of-villages-amounts-to-war-crimes/. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Most Significant Human Rights Violations.” Amnesty International, “We Had Nowhere Else to Go.” Amnesty International, “We Had Nowhere Else to Go,” 18. Amnesty International, “We Had Nowhere Else to Go,” 20–21. Amnesty International, “Rhetoric Versus Reality in the War in Raqqa,” 2017, https:// raqqa .amnesty.org. See also Human Rights Council, “Report on the Syrian Arab Republic,” February 1, 2018. The New York Times reported that the strike cell handling much of the air war against ISIS, Talon Anvil, often cut corners and conducted strikes without sufficient intelligence, leading to civilian casualties. Dave Philipps, Eric Schmitt, and Mark Mazzetti, “Civilian Deaths Mounted as Secret Unit Pounded ISIS,” New York Times, December 12, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/12/us /civilian-deaths-war-isis.html. Philipps, Schmitt, and Mazzetti, “Civilian Deaths Mounted.” Baylouny and Mullins, “Cash Is King”; Kylie Baxter, “Kuwait, Political Violence and the Syrian War,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no. 2 (March 4, 2017): 128–45, https://doi.org /10.1080/10357718.2016.1210081. Amy Austin Holmes, “SDF’s Arab Majority Rank Turkey as the Biggest Threat to NE Syria: Survey Data on America’s Partner Forces” (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2019). Lister, Syrian Jihad, 360–62. Dave Philipps and Eric Schmitt, “How the U.S. Hid an Airstrike That Killed Dozens of Civilians in Syria,” New York Times, November 13, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com /2021/11/13/us/us-airstrikes-civilian-deaths.html. Human Rights Council, “Civilian Deaths.”

4. THE YOUTUBE WAR 1.

Misbar Syria, “2011 ‫ ﺷﺒﺎط‬17 ‫( ”ﻣﻈﺎﻫﺮة اﻟﻐﻀﺐ اﻟﺴﻮرﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ دﻣﺸﻖ‬Demonstration of Syrian anger in Damascus, February 17, 2011), YouTube, 2011, https://www .youtube .com /watch ?v = qDHLsU-ik_Y.

4. TH E YO U TU BE WAR255

2. 3.

4. 5.

6. 7. 8.

9. 10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

15.

16.

Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978). Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Chester Pach, “ ‘Our Worst Enemy Seems to Be the Press’: TV News, the Nixon Administration, and U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1969–1973,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (2010): 555–65. Marc Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave?: Digital Media and the Arab Spring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017); Mohammad-Munir Adi, The Usage of Social Media in the Arab Spring (Berlin: LIT Verlag Münster, 2014). Billie Jeanne Brownlee, New Media and Revolution: Resistance and Dissent in PreUprising Syria (Montreal: McGill and Queen’s University Press, 2020), 101–103. Brownlee, New Media and Revolution, 108. Sahar Khamis, Paul B. Gold, and Katherine Vaughn, “Propaganda in Egypt and Syria’s ‘Cyberwars’: Contexts, Actors, Tools, and Tactics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies, ed. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 421. Brownlee, New Media and Revolution, 169. Internet World Statistics, “Middle East Internet Statistics, Population, Facebook and Telecommunications Reports,” 2011, https://internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm #me. Journalist for a major international newspaper, interview 46, Signal, 2021. Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Syrian journalist, interview 32. Marc Lynch, Deen Freelon, and Sean Aday, Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War, Peaceworks no. 91 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), https://www .usip.org /sites/default /files/PW91-Syrias%20Socially%20Mediated%20Civil%20War .pdf. Josepha Ivanka Wessels, “Video Activists from Aleppo and Raqqa as ‘Modern-Day Kinoks’?: An Audiovisual Narrative of the Syrian Revolution,” Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 10, no. 2–3 (January 1, 2017): 164, https://doi.org/10.1163 /18739865-01002005. Sahar Khamis, Paul B. Gold, and Katherine Vaughn, “Beyond Egypt’s ‘Facebook Revolution’ and Syria’s ‘YouTube Uprising’: Comparing Political Contexts, Actors and Communication Strategies,” Arab Media & Society, March 8, 2012, 9, https://www . arabmediasociety.com / beyond - egypts -facebook-revolution -and -syrias -youtube -uprising-comparing-political-contexts-actors-and-communication-strategies/.

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Lynch, Freelon, and Aday, Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War, 12. A journalist from Aleppo did relate that when she and her friends tried to send video of an early demonstration to Al Jazeera, they were rebuffed and told that it was “too early” for Aleppo to be the headline news. LB, interview 33. “Firas,” interview 21; Syrian activist, interview 45; former police chief, interview 44. Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn, “Beyond Egypt’s ‘Facebook Revolution’,” 20. Lee Ann Fujii, Show Time: The Logic and Power of Violent Display (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021), 2. Robert Anthony Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 379–99, https://doi.org /10.2307/421717. Wessels, “Video Activists from Aleppo and Raqqa.” Kari Andén-Papadopoulos, “Citizen Camera-Witnessing: Embodied Political Dissent in the Age of ‘Mediated Mass Self-Communication,’ ” New Media & Society 16, no. 5 (August 1, 2014): 753–69, https://doi.org /10.1177/1461444813489863. Wessels, “Video Activists from Aleppo and Raqqa.” Journalist for a major international newspaper, interview 46. Almashi, interview 39. Lynch, Freelon, and Aday, Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War, 8. Journalist for a major international newspaper, interview 46. Journalist for a major international newspaper, interview 46. Wessels, “Video Activists from Aleppo and Raqqa.” Journalist for a major international newspaper, interview 46. Jaeger, CEO of Hala Systems and former State Department official, interview 47. Lynch, Freelon, and Aday, Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War. Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn, “Beyond Egypt’s ‘Facebook Revolution’,” 11–14. Ruari Nolan, the Syria Campaign, interview 40, WhatsApp, 2019. Lynch, Freelon, and Aday, Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War. Syrian Palestinians from Yarmouk Camp, interviews 35, 36, and 37. Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”; Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond,” World Politics 53, no.  3 (April  2001): 362–98, https://doi.org /10.1353/wp.2001.0012; Pape, Dying to Win; Naimark, Fires of Hatred. Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn, “Propaganda in Egypt and Syria.” Beyond this, the aims of any specific piece of propaganda can vary a good deal. A linguistic analysis of seventynine videos produced by ISIS in English, for instance, finds that the most common kinds of language used in the videos were directive—which includes threatening, inciting, commanding, forbidding, inviting—and expressive language, either condemning or praising. These were present in around half and a quarter of videos respectively. Far less common was commissive language (another form of threat), declarative language (pronouncing or declaring) or assertive language (boasting, claiming, informing, and so on). Yuanbo Qi, “The Language of Terror: Exploring Speech Acts in Official EnglishLanguage ISIS Videos, 2014–2017,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 31, no.  6 (August  17, 2020): 1196–241, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1775055.

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.youtube.com /watch? v = bHM0GUp1gZ4; YPG Press Office, “Graduation of a new batch of drivers in Girê Legê” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2015, https://www.youtube.com /watch?v =DD7WUeYFJI8; Syrianarabnewsagency, “Graduation of a new class of students from the military college for girls for the year”; YPG Press Office, “Martyr Khabat Military Academy, training of YPG fighters 2014” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =lTVEPSHi6tE. Syrian Arab News Agency, “Graduation of a new class.” syria alikhbaria, “Aleppo | Training for members of the Special Task Force in the police command” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021. https://www.youtube.com /watch? v =BtuWV6qVtzs. RFS Media Office, “101 Infantry . . . a new batch of fighters with high readiness – RFS” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = 04gtcklGy2Q; “The Martyr Khalaf Dushka Battalion Launches a New Training Course for Commandos,” 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =_ EAoCTLBNgs. YPG Press Office, “Commando exercises for the People’s Protection Units” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =RWPY9ldBxgk; YPG Press Office; “Martyr Khabat Military Academy, training of YPG fighters, 2014” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =lTVEPSHi6tE. RFS Media Office, “This is how Asad’s soldiers live” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =Ys6VgmNudKk. YPG Press Office, “Meşa Azadî Li Reqqayê” (Freedom March in Raqqa), YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = alNWddOwD34. syria alikhbaria, “Southern Countryside of Aleppo: Army units continue their advance and expand their areas of control” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2018, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v = tbYQBUjhuAc. syria alikhbaria, “Aleppo countryside - Alikhbariya’s camera toured Qawiyah Tal Rahal and the surrounding villages” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube .com/watch?v =ZQeCgDxt9VA. Wassim Isa, “The other side of SAA soldiers in the war” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =YgqlgFladhc. The Syrian Arab Army, “Watch: They want you to leave, and we do not accept your replacement. This is what a long-time displaced woman from Raqqa said while cheering for Dr. Bashar Al-Assad” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021, https://www.youtube .com/watch?v =DZFvVlgbq8s. YPG Press Office, “YPG counters ISIS attacks on the villages of Ashma and Ja’da, which are located in the southwest of Kobani canton” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =UlbM8rwLe6w. YPG Press Office, “Raqqa Is Fully Liberated!,” YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube .com /watch? v = nrZoFhv-Jjc; YPG Press Office, “Em Bi Aşqekî Mezin Li Bende We Bun” (We are waiting for you with great love) [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2017, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v =vPzqGjcpoHw. YPG Press Office, “YPG Opened Safe Crossings for the People of Şengal to Enter Rojava,” YouTube, 2014; YPG Press Office, “The people of Tal Tamr receive the

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heroes of the People’s Protection Units during their liberation of the highway between Hasakah and Tal Tamr” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2013, https://www.youtube .com/watch?v =nzDmDoyHNew; YPG Press Office, “Vegere Gelê Girê Sipî Ji Axa Azad Re” (The people of Gire Sipi return to the free land) [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= cMcCLSOx16g; YPG Press Office, “After the SDF’s liberation of the north of Raqqa, the citizens return to their homes” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 7hcQDrCF3IM. YPG Press Office, “Heroes in life and the battlefield,” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = 175rCjxUPFo. YPG Press Office, “Yekîneya Enternasyonel Ya YPG Li Tebqayê Di Operasyonê de Ne” (The YPG international unit is operating in Tabqa) [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =PwVyUaoyumY. RFS Media Office, “FSA in the Eyes of Syrians,” YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube .com/watch?v =Re7NVA6RP6I; RFS Media Office, “The international day of democracy . . . Syria begins” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =MBkjUnEcbgk. RFS Media Office, “Abu-TOW is a fighter who specializes in destroying the Asad regime’s tanks” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2015, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v =v048Z94lkHM. RFS Media Office, “Lens RFS accompanies fighters from the free army during their takeover of the town of Mirsta in Afrin” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2018 https://www .youtube.com/watch?v =JjKhie0XZuk. YPG Press Office, “YPG’nin Devrimci Savaşı” (The Revolutionary War of the YPG [in Arabic], YouTube, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =-DZ4CqvQn-4. YPG Press Office, “Battles to confront ISIS mercenary attacks in the village of Tal Khanzir, west of Sere Kaniye” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2015. https://www.youtube.com /watch?v = eMYNM3yUwy8. YPG Press Office, “An ISIS military vehicle was blown up and more than five mercenaries were killed in the countryside of Serêkaniyê” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2015 https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v = gx4nRwn _6gs; YPG Press Office, “The destruction of the mercenary terrorists’ tank by our forces in Manajir” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = 1HENfqvK6QU. YPG Press Office “The amazing battles that our units are leading in Kobani” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= GLFzZ8NQP4U; YPG Press Office, “Fierce clashes between our YPG units and mercenary groups in Kobani” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PdyE17OUVfQ; YPG Press Office, “Quality operations carried out by our units in Kobani” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = dDxE4hvfGcM; YPG Press Office, “The most beautiful and strongest battles that our units draw in Kobane” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =zUKHJ-eL0r4. YPG Press Office, “Operation of the Women’s Protection Units YPJ against terrorist groups affiliated with Daesh in Kobani Canton 04 04 2014” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =Fnw7EsdOj6Y; YPG Press Office, “The western

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front of Kobani Canton, 12 07 2014” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021, https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=Uzhj8Fv46Es; YPG Press Office, “Clashes between our units and Daesh mercenaries, east of Kobani Canton” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v =XkX9j0J3Sb0. YPG Press Office, “Di Taxa Hîşam Bin Ebdul Melîk a Reqqayê de Şerên Dijwar” (Fierce fighting in Hisham Bin Abdul Malik neighborhood of Raqqa) [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yRD2I64S3as. YPJ Media Center “Di Pêşengiya YPJ’ê De Cardî Êrîş Têkçûn” (De Cardi’s attack on the leadership of the YPJ failed) [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube .com/watch?v = e9zcWb_ BeNo; YPJ Media Center, “Li Dêrezorê Şer Girane” (Heavy fighting in Deir Ezzor) [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v =4VBJ-KMJF38. YPG Press Office, “Battle of victory in Kobani” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v = gzb6nxAL8rQ; YPG Press Office, “The People’s Protection Units lead the street war against ISIS on the outskirts of the city of Kobani, 10/12/2014” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v = qB9 _Qx2qxHE; YPG Press Office, “Very strong battles led by our valiant units in Kobani, ‘street war’ ” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021, https://www.youtube.com /watch ? v= aEM7dhkOl7Y. YPG Press Office, “Fighters to Defend #Afrin in Case of Any Attacks by Turkey,” YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = SEhUNbbgZ1A; YPG Press Office, “Turkish Armored Vehicle Captured by YPG,” YouTube, 2019, https://www .youtube.com /watch? v = kDubIqNguYs; YPG Press Office, “Turkey-Backed Thugs Continue Shelling #Efrin,” YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = dJ4o goVfR0c. RFS Media Office, “Tanks and Aircraft Destroyed by the FSA in the Third Quarter of 2014,” YouTube, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= G2AxcEzKyvk; RFS Media Office, “Targeting the 1st Coastal Division of the regime’s positions in Lattakia countryside with grad missiles” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube .com/watch?v =n83egszd77A. RFS Media Office. “Jabhat al Atha’at in Aleppo” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2013, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v = bZzKbiT_qf4. RFS Media Office, “Hama: The Free Syrian Army targeted the military airport with grad missiles 26-5-2014” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v =FfCy252pjWg. RFS Media Office, “Northern Hama suburbs, the rebels are responding to the biggest attack they have ever been exposed to – RFS” [in Arabic], YouTube, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v =ULfNQiLXMqM. RFS Media Office, “Training course on Duskha weapons” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = QzENrwLwN1g. RFS Media Office, “The free army: Part of the battles for control of the village of AlRai in the northern suburbs of Aleppo with Daesh” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2016, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v =T-3D02ybRA8; RFS Media Office, “The Free Syrian

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Army advanced at the expense of Daesh, north of Aleppo, in the third phase of the Euphrates Shield Battle” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v =A2Xq3lBgGSk. RFS Media Office, “The official spokesman for the National Army announces the entrance into the city of Afrin” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2018, https://www.youtube.com /watch?v = f-Ym6Oequqs; RFS Media Office, “Statement: The Free Army has now liberated all of the city of Afrin north of Aleppo” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2018, https:// www.youtube.com /watch? v = nuR57go9lCE; RFS Media Office, “A band of the Free Syrian Army north of Aleppo” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com /watch?v =Ug4K4M8oTRw. SDF Press, “The plane Erdogan signed was shot down in Afrin” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =BjTetqIgZLM. YPG Press Office, “An ISIS military vehicle was blown up and more than five mercenaries were killed in the countryside of Serêkaniyê” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2015, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v = gx4nRwn _6gs. Chatterje-Doody and Crilly find that RT’s videos generate audience engagement based on an emotional response, particularly at significant turning points in the war. Precious N. Chatterje-Doody and Rhys Crilley, “Making Sense of Emotions and Affective Investments in War: RT and the Syrian Conflict on YouTube,” Media and Communication 7, no. 3 (August 9, 2019): 167. Waddah Halloum, “Lift the Sanctions on Syria,” YouTube, 2020, https://www.youtube .com /watch? v = 257I7hC3BdU; Actress Toulay Haroun, “Lift Embargo Imposed on Syria,” YouTube, 2020, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v = 2pd0jnZLlD0; Actress Ghada Bashour, “Lift Sanctions on Syria,” 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = 8YLGU06YSOo; Actor Mohammad Qanou, “Lift the Sanctions Imposed on Syria,” YouTube, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =Ylb0eG1AY0s; Syrianarabnewsagency, “Actress Wafaa Mousalli: Lift the sanctions against Syria” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = s4xLW72NsT8. Syrianarabnewsagency, “Tishreen Nebras illuminating the paths of victory and liberation” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= a8sLsY5sjys. 88EMENEM, “SAA (Syrian Arab Army) Killed Fsa-Terrorists,” YouTube, 2013, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=0aKUPwAaL7w; Syrian Santa, “Daraya: FSA Terrorists’ Dens Destroyed,” YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BsS-2aXb2Fc. Syrianarabnewsagency, “Field visits to military units fighting on the fronts of the fight against terrorism” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2021, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v =mKOsU4Ep3e8. Syrian Defense, “Like the Sun, Your Forehead Is High,” YouTube, 2021, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v = GZ _ r-5dNWtc [account terminated]. YPJ Media Center, “Li Dêrezorê Operesyonek Taybet Li Ser Şaneyên DAIŞ’ê” (A special operation against Daesh cells in Deir Ezzor) [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2019, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v =EA7MKn8vCxE. SDF Press, “A Fighter from SDF,” YouTube, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =IsoaNed16ms.

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YPJ Media Center, “A Fighter in the ranks of the Women’s Protection Units: We will keep fighting until we liberate our land #YPJ” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2020, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v=fUMhgQ98img; SDF Press, “Asmar morale high despite being hit by shrapnel from the shells of Turkish occupation,” YouTube, 2018, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v =vuJTqvJw2bI. YPJ Media Center, “Akademiya Şehîd Bêrîvan Dewreyeke Din A Şervanê Nû Vekir” (The Martry Berivan Academy has opened another cycle of new fighters) [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =E1xjaupF-nw. YPJ Media Center, “Our Struggle Is Our Victory, and Our Resistance Is Freedom,” YouTube, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= CnZKfjIdzrY; YPJ Media Center, “Ji Eniya Dêrezorê Şervanên YPJ Girîngiya 8 Adarê Vedibêjin” (From the front of Deir Ezzor, YPJ fighters explain the importance of March 8th) [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =I7AslO3iJ3A. YPG Press Office, “#Manbij Liberation Campaign 8: Some Images of the Day City Was Liberated, August  15, 2016,” YouTube, 2018, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v =rCoCrXNlhtY. YPJ Media Center, “Du Keçên Ciwan Yên Bi Navê Suad û Hind Bi Destê Şervanên YPJ’ê Hatin Rizgar Kirin” (Two young girls named Suad and Hind were rescued by YPJ fighters) [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v = 1wTLcIDLmTY. Ora Szekely, “Fighting About Women: Ideologies of Gender in the Syrian Civil War,” Journal of Global Security Studies, June 2019, https://doi.org /10.1093/jogss/ogz018. RFS Media Office, “Abu-TOW Is a Fighter.” RFS Media Office, “The Whole Story from Beginning to End . . . from Freedom to the Syrians,” YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =JKN1w3M-CVA. RFS Media Office, “Lens of the Free Army . . . Ayoud Al Bayoush” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = gJ6q7wlBtjI. RFS Media Office, “The Whole Story from Beginning to End . . . from Freedom to the Syrians” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v=YJ62 WCYwB2Q. RFS Media Office, “Spokesman for the Army of Islam Staff to RFS: Hawsh alDhawahira is steadfast and we will continue to defend our homeland against alAssad’s Militia” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v = -2RRLNaklcE; RFS Media Office, “Aid enters eastern Ghouta, loaded with medical supplies, under the protection of Jaysh al-Islam” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2017, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v =Mal2--Y6YEQ. RFS Media Office, “Sultan Murad Band . . . towards organizational work to defend the nation.” Majd al Za’alou, “The winds of anger blew (Islamic Ahrar al Sham Movement)” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKXTEoGsBqc; Rwad Alfikr TV, “Hama Al Fida Edition 1 - for the Battles of Hama 2016” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = ezpaomtrG50.

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MuhamedBenMaslamah, “Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement: Promo of the Muhammad bin Maslama Brigade in Zabadani” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2013, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v =42YZ4nfi09M; Majd al Za’alou, “Winds of Anger Blew.” The Islamic Ahrar al Sham Movement, “Exclusive - the Ahrar al Sham Movement destroys a T72 tank with a guided missile on the Maan front” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= soU0uaQRny0; AhrarAlsham lewaa.ahlalsona, “Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement || Battle of (Al-Zalzala) 14.5 machine gun fire at army checkpoints” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v =kcxxpjiasS4. Ahrar Lens, “Our leaders are martyrs - Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yb2NhhvBUs; Suleiman Al Shaami, “Ahrar Al-Sham Nasheed l ‘Tighten the Rows’ - English Lyrics,” YouTube, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = bLt7k _ iLVRQ; aboj3fr, “Al-Rased Press || Emir in the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement, witness and judge || God Bless You o Our Syria” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v=w3tHd nNT7iI; km mk, “Ahrar al Sham Islamic Islamic Revolution” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hX-MkXGgXL0; imadeddin omar, “Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement: A visual version of the Sharia office and its activities in the countryside of Hama” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2013, https://www.youtube.com /watch?v = 5maM _ 3pagL0. Hassan Abu Ibrahim, “The Islamic Ahrar al Sham Movement will continue and expand” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6I7_l_82GwA. Behnam Said, “Hymns (Nasheeds): A Contribution to the Study of the Jihadist Culture,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 12 (December 1, 2012): 863–79, https:// doi.org /10.1080/1057610X .2012.720242; Henrik Gråtrud, “Islamic State Nasheeds As Messaging Tools,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 12 (December 1, 2016): 1050– 70, https://doi.org /10.1080/1057610X .2016.1159429. AHRAR, YouTube, December 23, 2017, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v= 6tyM1 ew8Gfs. A Syrian journalist interviewed noted that these videos are likely to have long-term consequences for Syria, in that many of them show the execution of Syrian captives from large clans, sometimes by Syrians from a different, equally large clans. This stands to provoke long-standing clan violence, which can last in some cases for years before it is settled. AH, Syrian journalist, interview 22. Simone Molin Friis, “ ‘Beyond Anything We Have Ever Seen’: Beheading Videos and the Visibility of Violence in the War Against ISIS,” International Affairs 91, no. 4 (July 1, 2015): 725–46, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12341; Judith Tinnes, “Although the (Dis-)Believers Dislike It: A Backgrounder on IS Hostage Videos,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 1 (2015): 76–94. Friis, “Beyond Anything We Have Ever Seen.” Rukminni Callimachi and Falih Hassan, “Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, ISIS Leader Known for His Brutality, Is Dead at 48,” New York Times, October 27, 2019, https://www

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.nytimes .com /2019/10/27/world /middleeast /al-baghdadi-successor-reported-killed .html. Tinnes, “Although the (Dis-)Believers Dislike It.” Rukmini Callimachi, “The English Voice of ISIS Comes Out of the Shadows,” New York Times, February 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/17/world/middleeast /isis-islamic-state-narrator.html. Tinnes, “Although the (Dis-)Believers Dislike It,” 77–78. Roxanne L. Euben, “Spectacles of Sovereignty in Digital Time: ISIS Executions, Visual Rhetoric and Sovereign Power,” Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 4 (December 2017): 1007–33, https://doi.org /10.1017/S1537592717002134. Tinnes, “Although the (Dis-)Believers Dislike It.” Friis, “Beyond Anything We Have Ever Seen.” Jessikka Aro, “The Cyberspace War: Propaganda and Trolling as Warfare Tools,” European View 15, no. 1 (June 1, 2016): 121–32, https://doi.org /10.1007/s12290-016-0395 -5; Whitney Phillips, This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Mapping the Relationship Between Online Trolling and Mainstream Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015); Anthony McCosker, “Trolling as Provocation: YouTube’s Agonistic Publics,” Convergence 20, no. 2 (May 1, 2014): 201–17, https://doi.org /10.1177/1354856513501413; Marta Dynel, “ ‘Trolling Is Not Stupid’: Internet Trolling as the Art of Deception Serving Entertainment,” Intercultural Pragmatics 13, no.  3 (September  1, 2016): 353–81, https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2016-0015; Justin Cheng et al., “Anyone Can Become a Troll: Causes of Trolling Behavior in Online Discussions,” in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing, CSCW ’17 (New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 2017), 1217–30, https://doi.org /10.1145/2998181.2998213. Phillips, This Is Why We Can’t, 10. Dabiq, “Norwegian Prisoner for Sale,” Dhul Qa-dah, 1436 (2015), jihadology.net. Dabiq, “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” Dhul Hijjah 1435 (2015), 14–17, jihadology.net. Muath Freij, “#IamMuath—Social Media Activists from Around the World Voice Solidarity with Jordanian Pilot,” Jordan Times, February  5, 2015, http://www . jordantimes . com /news / local /iammuath - %E2%80%94 - social -media - activists -around-world-voice-solidarity-jordanian-pilot. Cassandra Vinograd, “ISIS Hurls Gay Men Off Buildings, Stones Them,” NBC News, June  30, 2014, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/isis-hurls -gay-men-buildings-stones-them-analysts-n305171. Flora Khoo and William J. Brown, “Innocence Killed: Role of Propaganda Videos in the Recruitment of Children of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” Journal of International Communication 27, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 79–105, https://doi.org /10.1080 /13216597.2021.1879203. In Syria, YouTube was used especially heavily by organizations creating content documenting atrocities or threatening adversaries, especially in combination with Twitter. A study by Maura Conway and her colleagues found that YouTube was the most

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outlinked platform from Twitter posts by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, and the second most common for ISIS, behind Google Drive, likely only because ISIS’s videos are removed from YouTube so quickly (Conway et al., “A Snapshot”). Journalist for a major international newspaper, interview 46. Friis, “Beyond Anything We Have Ever Seen.” Sarah Redmond, Nicholas M. Jones, E. Alison Holman, and Roxanne C. Silver, “Who Watches an ISIS Beheading—And Why,” American Psychologist 74, no. 5 (2019): 555– 68, https://doi.org /10.1037/amp0000438. Aryn Baker, “Savage Online Videos Fuel Syria’s Descent Into Madness,” Time, May 12, 2013, accessed August 19, 2021, https://world.time.com/2013/05/12/atrocities-will-be -televised-they-syrian-war-takes-a-turn-for-the-worse/. Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Brigade Fighting in Homs Implicated in Atrocities,” May  13, 2013, https://www.hrw.org /news/2013/05/13/syria-brigade-fighting-homs -implicated-atrocities. Rick Gladstone, “Video Is Said to Show Syrian Rebels Executing Prisoners,” New York Times, November 2, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com /2012/11 /02/world /middleeast /video-said-to-show-executions-by-syrian-rebels.html; France 24, “ ‘Rebels’ Execute Syrian Soldiers in Shock New Video,” May 16, 2013, https://www.france24 .com /en /20130516-video-al-nusra-rebel-executing-syria-soldiers. M, interview 34. Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn, “Beyond Egypt’s ‘Facebook Revolution’,” 16. “Roula,” interview 26. Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn, “Beyond Egypt’s ‘Facebook Revolution’,” 14. Holger Albrecht and Kevin Koehler, “Going on the Run: What Drives Military Desertion in Civil War?,” Security Studies 27, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 179–203, https://doi.org /10.1080/09636412.2017.1386931. RFS Media Office, “Film: The call” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2016 https://www.youtube .com /watch? v = Gv1mZoQYPXI; RFS Media Office, “Film: To whom?” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SzxfkRAoBlE; RFS Media Office, “From Aleppo: The Free Army, training under the flag of the revolution and the purity of its beginnings” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2015, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v=JdhSFSj9luU. Jaysh al-‘Izza, “Watch as If You Are in the Heart of the Battle How Jaysh al ’Izza Entered the Zalaqiyat Checkpoint”; Majd al Za’alou, “Winds of Anger Blew.” Linda Schlegel, “Jumanji Extremism? How Games and Gamification Could Facilitate Radicalization Processes,” Journal for Deradicalization, no.  23 (June  24, 2020): 1–44; Ahmed al-Rawi, “Video Games, Terrorism, and ISIS’s Jihad 3.0,” Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 740–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1207633. sham qamshlo Sham, “Interview with a free fighter during a search operation in AlUmmal neighborhood” [in Arabic], YouTube, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v =z1U2D4Ufdq8 YPG Press Office, “Çima Tevlîbûn Di Nav Focên Yekîneyên Parastina Gel De? (Why join the forces of the People’s Protection Units?)” [in Kurdish], YouTube, 2017,

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Fritz and Young, “Transnational Volunteers.” Thomas Pierret, “Brothers in Alms: Salafi Financiers and the Syrian Insurgency,” Carnegie Middle East Center, May  18, 2018, https://carnegie-mec .org /2018/05/18 / brothers-in-alms-salafi-financiers-and-syrian-insurgency-pub-76390. Pierret, “Brothers in Alms.” Ben Hubbard, “Private Donors’ Funds Add Wild Card to War in Syria,” New York Times, November 12, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com /2013/11 /13/world /middleeast /private-donors-funds-add-wild-card-to-war-in-syria.html. Elizabeth Dickinson, “Playing with Fire: Why Private Gulf Financing for Syria’s Extremist Rebels Risks Igniting Sectarian Conflict at Home,” Analysis paper no. 16 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, December 2013), 5, https://www.brookings.edu /research/playing-with-fire-why-private-gulf-financing-for-syrias-extremist-rebels -risks-igniting-sectarian-conflict-at-home/. Pierret, “Brothers in Alms.” U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Three Key Supporters of Terrorists in Syria and Iraq,” Press release, August 6, 2014, accessed August 16, 2021, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2605.aspx. Sylvia Westall and Mahmoud Harby, “Insight—Kuwaitis Campaign Privately to Arm Syrian Rebels,” Reuters, June  26, 2013, https://www.reuters.com /article/uk-syria -kuwait-insight-idUKBRE95P0TK20130626. Elizabeth Dickinson, “Shaping the Syrian Conflict from Kuwait,” Foreign Policy (blog), December 4, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com /2013/12/04 /shaping-the-syrian -conflict-from-kuwait/. Dickinson, “Shaping the Syrian Conflict.” Anne Marie Baylouny and Creighton A. Mullins, “Cash Is King: Financial Sponsorship and Changing Priorities in the Syrian Civil War,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41, no. 12 (December 2, 2018): 990–1010, https://doi.org /10.1080/1057610X .2017 .1366621. Dickinson, “Playing with Fire.” Westall and Harby, “Insight—Kuwaitis Campaign Privately.” Dickinson, “Playing with Fire,” 2. Dickinson, “Shaping the Syrian Conflict.” Hubbard, “Private Donors’ Funds.” Dickinson, “Playing with Fire.” Lynch, Freelon, and Aday, Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War, 24. Dickinson, “Playing with Fire.” Westall and Harby, “Insight—Kuwaitis Campaign Privately.” Dickinson, “Playing with Fire,” 9. One American journalist speculated that part of the reason the SDF did not post similar videos was that their American military partners did not want them giving away battlefield positions. Journalist for a major international newspaper, interview 46. Dickinson, “Playing with Fire.”

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Syrian Archive, accessed October 30, 2021, https://syrianarchive.org/. Hadi Alkhatib, “Chemiewaffen—Mir Doch Egal?” (Berlin, Germany, August 21, 2018). Sudanese Archive, accessed October 22, 2022, https://sudanesearchive.org /; Yemeni Archive, accessed October 22, 2022, https://yemeniarchive.org/. Yemen Ansarallah, YouTube, accessed October 30, 2021, https://www.youtube.com /channel/UC9VJhYLpa3EEQO5FCxjSyqQ/videos. Guardian News, “ ‘Go Fuck Yourself,’ Ukrainian Soldiers on Snake Island Tell Russian Ship—Audio,” YouTube, 2022, https://www.youtube.com /watch? v= 6Y2iV HU MZhg. Amy Cheng, “Ukraine Sells 700,000 Stamps Celebrating Defiance to Sunken Russian Flagship Moskva,” Washington Post, April 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost .com/world/2022/04/15/ukraine-stamp-russian-warship-moskva-meme/. Megan Specia, “ ‘Like a Weapon’: Ukrainians Use Social Media to Stir Resistance,” New York Times, March 25, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/world/europe /ukraine-war-social-media.html. Adam Taylor, “With NAFO, Ukraine Turns the Trolls on Russia,” Washington Post, September 1, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/01/nafo-ukraine -russia/. Jane Arraf, “Crowdfunding a War: How Online Appeals Are Bringing Weapons to Ukraine,” New York Times, May 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/world /middleeast/ukraine-crowdsourcing-online-donations.html.

CO NCLU S IO N269

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

John Hudson and Kostiantyn Khudov, “Americans Are Paying for Slogans on Bombs Aimed at Russians,” Washington Post, August 17, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost .com/world/2022/08/17/ukraine-russia-bombs-slogans-fundraising/. Center of Assistance to the Army, Veterans and Their Families, “Sign My Rocket— Send Your Greetings to Russian Occupiers!,” SignMyRocket .com, 2022, https:// signmyrocket.com. Steven Heydemann, “Beyond Fragility: Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States,” Faculty publications, Smith College, 2018, https://scholarworks .smith.edu/mes _ facpubs/3/. Ammar Hamou and Alice Al Maleh, “After Displacement to the North, Syrians from East Ghouta Navigate Fragmented Opposition Administration,” Syria Direct, September  5, 2018, https://syriadirect.org /after-displacement-to-the-north-syrians-from -east-ghouta-navigate-fragmented-opposition-administration/. Vera Mironova, “Life Inside Syria’s al-Hol Camp,” Middle East Institute, July 9, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/life-inside-syrias-al-hol-camp. In an echo of other aspects of the war, Mironova suggests that women in the camp have used social media to perform loyalty to ISIS as a way of raising funds from ISIS members elsewhere. Alawite woman from Homs, interview 17. “Samer,” interview 42. Syrian woman from Latakia, interview 25. Syrian activist, interview 45. N, interview 16. “Roula,” interview 26. LK, political activist, interview 11. Senior officer who defected from the SAA, interview 24. “Wenn Menschen einfach so Verschwenden” (When people simply disappear), Families for Freedom, Gedenkstätte Hohenshausen, Berlin, Germany, September 4, 2018. Respondent 12. Former member of the SAA, interview 29. Respondent 16. Respondent 7. Judge AM, Interview 43. Alawite woman from Homs, interview 17. Former police chief, interview 44. “Dania,” interview 18. MA, interview 5. “Marwan,” interview 38. AH, Syrian journalist, interview 22. Murad, interview 13. M, interview 34. MI, interview 31. “Samer,” interview 42.

270 AP P END IX : M ETH ODS

APPENDIX: METHODS 1.

2.

These issues are discussed in much more depth by a range of authors. Related titles include Ian Lustick’s “Fieldwork and Emotions” and Ora Szekely’s “On Being Seen” in Peter Krause and Ora Szekely, Stories from the Field: A Guide to Navigating Fieldwork in Political Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020). This issue is addressed in great depth by Jessica Stern in “How to Interview a Terrorist,” in Krause and Szekely, Stories from the Field.

INDEX

Page numbers in italics indicate illustrations; those with a t indicate tables Abu Odeh, Adnan, 40 Adopt a Revolution (organization), 211 Afghanistan, 20, 67 Aflaq, Michel, 31 Ahrar al-Sham, 28, 61, 121; adversaries of, 130; combat casualties of, 128t; fundraising by, 188; media of, 174–75, 194 AK Party, 66, 70 Alawites, 76; atrocities against, 71; in Baath Party, 34; biases against, 86; Christians and, 91–92; civilian atrocities by, 134; history of, 30, 223n1; jihadist factions and, 55; pejorative term for, 87, 88; population of, 85; as Shi’ites, 223n1, 238n60 Aleppo, 62–63, 256n17; massacre of 1980 in, 34; opposition forces in, 51 Algeria, 22 al-Hol refugee camp, 199 Al Jazeera, 155, 158, 256n17 Al Kansaa Brigade, 252n93 Alloush, Zahran, 92 al-Qaeda, 28, 48–50, 94; in Iraq, 90; propaganda of, 185; proxy warfare by, 106

A’maq News Agency, 167 Amnesty International, 116, 133, 231n185 Arab Cold War, 21 Arabism, Asad on, 101–2 Arab-Israeli conflicts, 21, 104; of 1967, 32, 35; of 1973, 35 Arab League, 11; Syrian National Council and, 52; Syria’s suspension from, 50, 104 Arab Spring (2010–11), 22, 40–45, 158, 197; Kurds and, 58; social media and, 155–56, 220n27 al-Asad, Asma, 85 al-Asad, Bashar, 37–40, 55–56; on Arabism, 101–2; Hezbollah support of, 53; media coverage of, 172; one-party ideology of, 100; socioeconomic reforms of, 38; on terrorism, 94–100 al-Asad, Basil, 37 al-Asad, Hafez, 32–37; in Baath Party, 31–33; biographer of, 32, 33; death of, 37; Hamas and, 35, 104; Kurdish policies of, 101; PKK and, 57; socioeconomic reforms of, 33–34; Wedeen on, 72 al-Asad, Maher, 69

272IND E X

al-Asad, Rifaat, 36 Asad regime, 16–19, 113, 146; adversaries of, 118, 120; civilian violence by, 132–35, 145; combat casualties of, 128t; Hezbollah and, 35, 53, 93; Iran and, 238n60; ISIS and, 18–19, 99, 108, 122–26, 124, 129, 148, 194; Palestinian support of, 35, 97, 104–5; pejorative name of, 87; replacement of, 200–206; Russian support of, 29, 62, 99, 108, 146; sectarian rhetoric of, 91–93. See also Syrian Arab Army al-Assad, Riad, 46 Baath Party, 31–34; Alawites in, 34; Arab Spring and, 44; Christians and, 31; pan-Arab views of, 85; radical wing of, 33; student movement of, 32 al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, 49–50, 66 Baghdad Pact, 31 barrel bombs, 21, 56, 71, 132–34 Ben Ali, Zine el-Abedine, 40 bin Laden, Osama, 48 al-Bitar, Salah-al-Din, 31 Black Lives Matter movement, 79, 248n30 Bookchin, Murray, 58 Bouazizi, Muhammad, 40, 42 bunker buster bombs, 63 Can, Polat, 83 Cham International Islamic Center, 97 chemical weapons, 55–56, 71, 89, 96, 132 Christians, 66, 86, 90; Alawites and, 91–92; Baath Party and, 31; demographics of, 238n61; ISIS attacks on, 140, 141, 180; Jabhat al-Nusra attacks on, 138 citizen journalists, 155–56, 160–64 civil defense (White Helmets), 52, 63, 133, 163 civilian casualties, 115–16, 117t, 130–32, 145–52 civil war: audiences of, 9–11; causes of, 2–8, 18–19, 113; conduct of, 4–7, 14–15; participants in, 8–9 Colvin, Marie, 161

Committee to Protect Journalists, 155 Communist Party of Syria, 31 conflict dynamics, 18–19 corruption, 39, 86 Counterinsurgency Field Manual (US), 10 COVID-19 pandemic, 65, 172 cronyism (wasta), 77–78 Dabiq (ISIS magazine), 24, 87, 90, 177–78 Daesh. See Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Damascus Declaration (2005), 39 Damascus Spring, 38 Daraya, 51, 62 Dawn of Freedom Brigades, 120–21 Deir Ezzor oil wells, xvi, 51, 122–25, 124, 129 democracy, 17–18; dignity and, 75–84; ISIS on, 110–11 Democratic Republic of Congo, 20, 67 Democratic Union Party (PYD), 18, 57–60, 147; adversaries of, 118, 119; anti-jihadist rhetoric of, 94, 99, 149; Asad regime and, 146; Autonomous Administration of, 198–99; combat casualties of, 128t; ethnonationalism and, 100–103; human rights abuses of, 142–44, 151; ISIS and, 60, 81–82, 103; media of, 170–71; objectives of, 75–76; Öcalan and, 80, 101; PKK and, 101; SBA and, 65; strategies of, 147; Turkey and, 66, 147–48; YPG and, 28–29, 58; YPJ and, 16, 28–29 Deraa, 50–51; Arab Spring in, 42–44; Southern Front in, 63 dignity (karameh), 17–18, 75–84 “disappearances,” 35, 71, 134, 214 disinformation, 163, 198 drug trafficking, 69, 196 Druze, 30, 223n2; demographics of, 238n61; on dignity, 76; ISIS and, 88; massacre of, 150 Ebdullah, Nesrin, 82 Egypt, 22, 31; Arab Spring in, 41; Israeli peace treaty with, 35

IND E X 273

Erdogan, Recep, 82, 211 ethnic animus, 4–5 , 8, 21 , 131, 144 ethnocommunal narrative, 12–16 ethnonationalism, 3, 18, 100–105; proxy warfare and, 106; PYD and, 100–103; sectarianism and, 100–101 Etilaf. See Syrian National Council Euphrates Shield campaign, 171 Euphrates Volcano, 120, 125 Facebook. See social media Families for Freedom, 34–35 Fares, Raed, 79, 137–38, 148 Fatah Haleb, 120 Fezat, Ali, 181 Flames of War (recruitment video), 185 Floyd, George, 79 “flying protests,” 158 Foley, James, 176–77, 180 Free Syrian Army (FSA), 19, 46–47, 191; allied groups of, 120–21; battlefield interviews of, 168; civilian casualties by, 137, 150; emergence of, 78; factionalization of, 54; foreign proxies and, 108, 146–47; ISIS and, 109; media of, 166, 170, 174, 175; members of, 91; SAA and, 117–18, 172; Turkish-backed, 118, 127. See also Syrian National Army French Mandate, 29–31 fundraising, 187–91, 190 al-Furqan, Abu Muhammad, 176 Garner, Eric, 79 gay men, executions of, 141–42, 178 genocide, 4, 21, 131, 144; of Yazidi, 60, 71, 90, 139–40, 150 Ghouta, 63; sarin gas attack on, 55–56, 89, 96, 132 Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 115–16, 117t, 137, 212, 247n25, 251n66 Golan Heights, 32, 35, 104 guerrilla warfare, 10

Hajjaj Al-Ajmi, 187–89, 190 Halloum, Waddah, 172 Hama, 122; hospital bombing in, 133; massacre in, 134; siege of, 34 Hamas, 35, 104, 165 Hariri, Rafik, 38 Haroun, Toulay, 172 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), 29, 65; civilian casualties by, 137; Jabhat al-Nusra and, 61; media coverage of, 161; militia of, 9 Henning, Alan, 176 Hezbollah, 22, 87; al-Asad’s regime and, 35, 53, 93; ISIS attacks against, 70; PLO and, 105; Qaradawi on, 89–90; television station of, 165 Homs, 45, 50, 122 HTS. See Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Human Rights Watch, 116, 133; on gay men executions, 141–42; on Ghouta massacre, 96; on PYD, 142–43 ideological differences, 1–8, 13, 15–16, 28 Idlib, 62, 199; bombing of, 133, 211; Druze massacre and, 150; HTS in, 29 al-Ikhbaria Syria news agency, 165, 168 intelligence agencies. See mukhaberat interviews, 207–9 Iran, 35, 89–90, 146; Asad Regime and, 238n60; Hezbollah and, 53, 93, 104; Revolutionary Guard of, 54, 61–62; Saudi Arabia and, 21 Iraq, 22, 35, 48–49, 57 Islamic Front, 34, 119–20 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 6, 18–19, 113–14; adversaries of, 118, 119, 130; al-Qaeda and, 48, 50; Asad regime and, 18–19, 99, 108, 122–26, 124, 129–30, 148, 194; Christian attacks by, 140, 141, 180; civilian violence by, 71, 131–32, 139–42, 146, 150; combat casualties of, 127–29, 128t; critics of, 90–91; on democracy, 110–11; Druze and, 88; enemies of, 88;

274IND EX

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (continued) execution videos of, 176–80, 194, 212–13; foreign proxies and, 108; FSA and, 109; gay men executions by, 141–42, 178; Hezbollah attacks by, 70; Jabhat al-Nusra and, 99; jihadist groups and, 61, 86–87; Kurdish conflicts with, 125–27, 126; magazines of, 24–25, 87, 90, 177–78; media coverage of, 160–61, 167; misogyny of, 141–42; Muslim Brotherhood and, 35, 90, 94; names of, 16; Obama and, 60; propaganda of, 180–82, 212–13, 256n39; proxy warfare by, 106, 108; PYD and, 60, 81–82, 103; SDF and, 29, 63–64, 67, 144; Sunnis and, 252n81; threat of, 148–49, 199; Yazidi genocide by, 60, 71, 90, 139–40, 150 Ismaili Syrians, 86 Israel, 87–88; Arab conflicts with, 21, 32, 35, 104; Egyptian peace treaty with, 35; Lebanon invasion by, 223n65 Jabhat al-Nusra, 9, 18, 181; adversaries of, 130; al-Qaeda and, 48–50; Christians attacks by, 138; civilian casualties by, 137–39; combat casualties of, 128t; Druze massacre of, 150; Free Syrian Army and, 61; fundraising by, 188; gay men executions by, 141–42; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and, 61; ISIS and, 90, 99; murder of Fares by, 137–38; sectarianism of, 89; YPG and, 59 Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, 18, 61 Jadid, Salah, 31–32 jahannam (homemade cannon), 136 Jaysh al-Islam, 92 Jaysh al-‘Izza, 179, 183, 192 jihadist groups, 43, 55, 149; Asad regime’s view of, 94–100; definition of, 227n92; ISIS and, 18, 61, 86–87; members of, 86, 89–90 jihadology.net, 212 al-Jolani, Abu Muhammad, 48–49, 89 Jordan, 22, 32, 68, 109–10, 146

karameh (dignity), 17–18, 75–84 Kasasbeh, Muath, 176, 178 Kassig, Peter Abdul-Rahman, 176 Kataib al-Muhajireen, 89 Kerry, John, 56 Khmeimim Air Base, 62 Kosovo, 219n18 Kurdish forces, 114, 199, 229n138; civilian violence by, 132, 142–44, 150–51; combat casualties of, 127–29, 128t; ethnic cleansing and, 144; ISIS conflicts with, 125–27, 126; media of, 166–67, 172–73; Turkey and, 29 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), 17, 70; founder of, 80; media of, 170–71; recruitment by, 186; Turkey and, 57, 110, 230n164; Yazidi and, 141 Kurds, 18–19, 38, 50, 56–60, 66, 83; nationalism among, 58, 59, 66, 83, 88, 100–105; population of, 57–58; religious diversity of, 229n138 Kuwait, 187–88, 195–96 League of Nations, 29 Lebanon, 22; civil war of, 35–36, 38, 104; Israeli invasion of, 223n65 Lesch, David, 5, 17 LGBTQ executions, 141–42, 178 Libya, 22, 41, 197 Local Coordination Committees (LCCs), 44, 46 Makhlouf, Rami, 39, 68, 77 malware, 162–63 al-Manara al-Bayda, 89 marriage, interfaith, 86 Martin, Trayvon, 79 Matar, Mohammed, 188 Mattis, James, 65 McGurk, Brett, 65 methodology, 22–25, 115–16, 207–13, 223n69 Mouallem, Walid, 95 Mozambique, 67

IND EX 275

mu’amara (conspiracy against Syria), 107 Mubarak, Hosni, 41 al-Muhajir, Abu Hassan, 66 mukhaberat (intelligence agencies), 36–37; Damascus Spring and, 38; disappearances by, 39; sectarian foment by, 92 Muslim, Salih, 81, 100, 108 Muslim Brotherhood, 77–78, 238n60; Hamas and, 104; ISIS and, 35, 90, 94; Islamic Front and, 33 nasheeds (religious music), 175, 194 Nasser, Gamal Abel, 31 National Defense Forces (NDF), 54 nationalism. See ethnonationalism Nicaragua, 196 Nigeria, 66 Nixon, Richard, 154 North, Oliver, 196 North American Treaty Organization (NATO), 198 Northern Storm Brigade, 120–21 North Korea, 77 “Nusayri regime,” 87, 88 al-Nusra, Jabhat, 16 Obama, Barack, 55–56, 60, 112, 180 objectivity, 216 Öcalan, Abdullah, 57, 166; Bookchin and, 58; democratic confederalism of, 173; as PKK founder, 80, 101 Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 116, 133, 135, 152 Operation Inherent Resolve, 144 Operation Olive Branch, 127 Operation Peace Spring (2019), 66, 102 Oslo Accords (1993), 104 Ottoman Empire, 29–31 Palestinians, 13, 23, 32; Asad’s support of, 35, 97, 104–5; Yarmouk refugee camp of, 51–52, 163

participant observation, 210–11 participant safety, 213–14 People’s Protection Units (YPG), 28–29, 58; anti-jihadist rhetoric of, 99; combat casualties of, 128t; foreign proxies and, 108; human rights abuses by, 142–44; ISIS and, 60; Jabhat al-Nusra and, 59; media of, 166–70, 169, 172–73, 194; recruitment by, 166, 186; Yazidi and, 141 performative violence, 15, 18–20, 154–60, 168 PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê). See Kurdistan Workers Party post-traumatic stress, 215 prisoner amnesty, 92 propaganda, 164–65, 185, 212–13, 256n39; themes of, 168–78, 169; violence as, 130–31, 138, 149, 178–82, 244n1 proxy warfare, 74, 105–10, 147 PYD (Partiya Yelkîtiya Demokrat). See Democratic Union Party Qamishli Uprising (2004), 58, 101, 134 Qaradawi, Yusuf, 89–90 Qashoush, Ibrahim, 181 Qatar, 119–20, 187, 191; proxy wars of, 109–10, 147 Qism al Ighatha, 49 Qualtrics survey, 209 Quds Force, 61–62 al-Qurayshi, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashemi, 66 al-Quwatli, Shukri, 31 Radio Free Europe, 154–55 Radio Fresh, 137–38, 148 Radio Liberty, 154–55 Rafidāh, 87, 88. See also Shi’ites Raqqa, 51, 64; Amnesty International on, 231n185; media outlet of, 160–61 Rayburn, Joel, 69 recruitment, 182–87, 183, 184 Reporters Without Borders, 165–66 research ethics, 213–16

276 IND EX

Revolutionary Forces of Syria (RFS), 166 Rojava, 59, 66, 82–83, 186 Rumiyah (ISIS magazine), 24, 87 Russia, 31, 167, 171; Asad regime and, 29, 62, 99, 108, 146; civilian airstrikes by, 248n35; Idlib and, 65; ISIS and, 130; Ukraine war and, 197–99 SAA. See Syrian Arab Army al-Sabah, Mohammed al-Abdullah, 188 Sabra, George, 46 Sadr, Musa, 238n60 Sakkar, Abu, 181 Salafists, 111–12, 120–21, 174–75, 187, 189 Salah Jadid, 33 sarin gas. See chemical weapons Saudi Arabia, 119–20, 187; Ahrar al-Sham and, 121; internet access in, 156; Iran and, 21; proxy wars of, 109–10, 147 al-Sawagh, Falah, 188 Saydnaya Prison, 135, 148 al-Sayyed, Mohammed Abdul-Sattar, 95 SDF. See Syrian Democratic Forces secessionism, 5, 18 sectarianism, 18, 85–93, 100–101, 149 Self-Protection Units (YXG), 230n152 September 11 attacks (2001), 48 Shaaban, Buthayna, 43 Shadid, Anthony, 227n80 Shawkat, Asef, 51 Shi’ites, 87, 88; Alawites and, 223n1, 238n60; Druze and, 223n2; Iraqi militias of, 93; Jews and, 87; Kurds as, 229n138; Twelver, 223n1 Sinaa prison (Hasakah), 67 SNA. See Syrian National Army SNC (Syrian National Council), 17, 46–47, 52, 58 SNHR. See Syrian Network for Human Rights social media, 5, 155–59, 165–67, 212; Arab Spring and, 155–56, 220n27; citizen

journalism and, 155–56, 160–64, 197–98 Sorenson, David, 6 Sotloff, Stephen, 176–77, 180 Southern Front forces, 63, 120–21, 128t Spanish civil war, 186 strategic narrative, 74–75 Sudan, 22, 197 Suleimani, Qassem, 61–62 Sunnis, 16, 17; Alawites and, 223n1; Baath Party and, 31; communal tensions with, 86; French Mandate and, 30; ISIS and, 252n81; Kurds as, 229n138 surveys, 209–10 Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 50 Syria, 56–60; conflict intensity in, 28; Corruption Perception Index of, 39; currency devaluation in, 68; demographics of, 39; governorates of, xvi, 28, 30; history of, 27–30; independence of, 30; Kurdish population of, 57; oil fields of, xvi, 51, 122–25, 124, 129; suspension from Arab League of, 50, 104 Syrian Arab Army (SAA), 47, 50; adversaries of, 119; battlefield interviews of, 168; FSA and, 117–18, 172; Hezbollah and, 53; Idlib and, 64–65; NDF and, 54; PLO and, 51–52. See also Asad regime Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), 165–66, 168, 172 Syrian Archive, 197 Syrian Computer Society, 38 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), 66; combat casualties of, 128t; human rights abuses by, 71, 143–44; ISIS and, 29, 63–64, 67, 144; media of, 172–73, 267n184; non-Kurdish fighters in, 147; Raqqa and, 64; SNA and, 102 Syrian Electronic Army, 162–63

IND EX 27 7

Syrian National Army (SNA), 118; combat casualties of, 127–29, 128t; PYD and, 65, 102; SDF and, 102; Turkey and, 70, 102, 127. See also Free Syrian Army Syrian National Council (SNC), 17, 46–47, 52, 58 Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), 115–16, 117t, 135, 137; on ISIS, 139; on PYD, 142–43 Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 116, 245n7, 248n35 Syrian Revolutionaries Front, 120–21 SyriaTel, 39 Tabqa Dam, 52 al-Tabtabie, Waleed, 189 Talon Anvil strike force, 144, 254n117 tansiqiyat. See Local Coordination Committees territorial control, 4, 218n17 terrorism, 48, 93–100, 245n1, 247n25. See also violence Tiger Forces militia, 67 Tishreen Dam, 64 torture, 21, 59, 77, 135, 143, 181–82; Ahram on, 142; disappearances and, 35, 71, 134, 214; of journalists, 137; OHCHR on, 135 transparency, 215–16 Transparency International, 39, 225n42 Trump, Donald, 65–66, 70 Tunisia, 22, 40–41 Turkey, 50, 147, 211; FSA and, 118, 127; Idlib and, 65; Kurdish forces and, 29, 60, 66; Muslim Brotherhood and, 108–9; PKK and, 57, 110, 230n164; proxy war of, 109–10; PYD and, 66, 147–48; SNA and, 70, 127 Ukraine, 197–99 Union of Syrian Students, 32

United Arab Emirates (UAE), 156 United Nations, 203 UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 116, 133, 135, 152 Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset (UCDP GED), 25, 115–16, 120, 122, 211–12 uprisings: of 2004, 38, 58, 101, 134; of 2010, 40–45. See also Arab Spring Vietnam War, 154 Violations Documentation Center (VDC), 115–16, 117t, 132 violence, 34–35, 135, 239n104; clan, 263n115; as collective punishment, 134; as communication, 154; indiscriminate, 130–31, 136–37, 139; internal conflicts and, 120–21; military, 116–30, 117t, 118, 119, 123–26, 128t; patterns of, 113–15, 136, 145–52; performative, 15, 18–20, 154–60, 168, 244n1; as propaganda, 130–31, 138, 149, 178–82, 245n1; in protests of 1980s, 34–35; repressive, 130–31, 137, 139–40, 148, 151; sectarian, 138–39, 142; terrorism and, 48, 93–100, 242n1, 245n25 Wahhabism, 91, 94–95, 97 warlords, 3, 55, 192 wasta (cronyism), 77–78 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 21, 55–56, 71, 89, 96, 132 Western Kurdistan (Rojava Kurdistanê), 59, 66, 83 White Helmets (civil defense), 52, 63, 133, 163 Women Now for Development (organization), 211 Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), 16, 28–29; adversaries of, 118; anti-jihadist rhetoric of, 99; combat casualties of, 128t; human rights abuses by, 142–44; ISIS and, 60; media of, 168–70, 169, 172–74; in Raqqa,

278 IND E X

Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) (continued) 184; recruitment by, 166, 186; Yazidi and, 141 World Food Program, 68 World War I, 29

YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel). See People’s Protection Units YPJ (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin). See Women’s Protection Units YXG (Self-Protection Units), 230n152

Yarmouk refugee camp, 51–52 Yazidis, 60, 71, 90, 139–41, 150 Yemen, 22, 156, 197 YouTube. See social media

al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 49 Zawahiri, Ayman, 49–50 Zilan (Zeynep Kinaci), 173 Zoroastrianism, 140