Supporting Peace in Aceh: Development Agencies and International Involvement 9789812308641

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Acronyms
Executive Summary
Supporting Peace in Aceh
Endnotes
Bibliography
Appendix. Key International Involvement in the Aceh Peace Process, 2005–06

Citation preview

Supporting Peace in Aceh: Development Agencies and International Involvement

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke

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Policy Studies 47

Supporting Peace in Aceh: Development Agencies and International Involvement Patrick Barron and Adam Burke

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Copyright © 2008 by the East-West Center Supporting Peace in Aceh: Development Agencies and International Involvement by Patrick Barron and Adam Burke East-West Center in Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: 202-293-3995 Fax: 202-293-1402 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eastwestcenter.org/washington Online at: www.eastwestcenter.org/policystudies The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Center. Hardcopies of publications in the series are available through Amazon.com. In Asia, hardcopies of all titles, and electronic copies of Southeast Asia titles, co-published in Singapore, are available through: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Road Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Barron, Patrick, 1977–. Supporting peace in Aceh : development agencies and international involvement / Patrick Barron and Adam Burke. 1. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka. 2. Peace-building—Indonesia—Aceh. 3. Conflict management—Indonesia—Aceh. 4. Aceh (Indonesia)—History—Autonomy and independence movements. I. Burke, Adam. II. Title. III. Series: Policy studies (East-West Center Washington) ; 47. DS1 E13P no. 47 2008 ISBN 978-981-230-863-4 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-230-864-1 (PDF) ISSN 1547-1349 (soft cover) ISSN 1547-1330 (PDF) Typeset in Singapore by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd

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Contents List of Acronyms

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Executive Summary

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Introduction

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Building Peace: What Works and What Does Not?

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Conflict and Peace in Aceh

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Learning from Aceh

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International Peacebuilding and Postconflict Assistance in Aceh

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Pre-Helsinki: GAM and GoI Strategies to Build International Support

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Foreign Aid in Indonesia and Aceh

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Conflict Reduction Programs before the Helsinki Agreement

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke The Response to the Tsunami: Unprecedented Scale, Limited Coherence

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The Impacts of Tsunami Assistance on Conflict and Peacebuilding Programs

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Moving into Conflict Resolution Programming

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Aceh Monitoring Mission: Direct Involvement

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The EU and “Human Security”: New Policies for Promoting Comprehensive Peace

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The Aceh Monitoring Mission: Effective, Not Comprehensive

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Working with Different Constituencies on Peacebuilding

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Maintaining a Limited Role

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The Reintegration of Former Combatants: First Steps

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Reintegration as Stipulated in the Helsinki MoU

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Reintegration: Global Practice and Local Realities

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Reintegration Post-Helsinki: Multiple Tracks

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Helping Combatants: Political Difficulties

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The Reintegration Process Continues: Islands of Aid

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Implementing the Government Reintegration Program

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June 2006–Early 2007: Consolidating Peace, Mixed Progress on Reintegration

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Supporting Peace in Aceh International Involvement Revisited: Progress of Key Agencies

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Donor Programs: Overlap, Lack of Cohesion, but Filling Some Gaps

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Conclusion

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Endnotes

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Bibliography

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Appendix: Key International Involvement in the Aceh Peace Process, 2005–06

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List of Acronyms AMM ASEAN Bappenas BRA BRR

CMI COHA COSA DAC DDR DFID EU FKK GAM GoI

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Aceh Monitoring Mission Association of Southeast Asian Nations Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional (Indonesian National Development Planning Agency) Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh (Aceh Peaceful Reintegration Agency) Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh-Nias (Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias) Crisis Management Initiative Cessation of Hostilities Agreement Commission on Security Arrangements Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Department for International Development (of the United Kingdom) European Union Forum Koordinasi dan Komunikasi (Forum for Coordination and Communication) Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) Government of Indonesia

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke HDC ILO ICG IOM KDP MoU NGO OECD Rp. TNI UK UN UNDP UNHCR UNICEF USAID

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Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (formerly Henri Dunant Center) International Labour Organization International Crisis Group International Organization for Migration Kecamatan Development Program Memorandum of Understanding nongovernmental organization Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Rupiah (Indonesian currency) Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military) United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund U.S. Agency for International Development

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Executive Summary On August 15, 2005, the Acehnese rebel movement GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or Free Aceh Movement) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Helsinki aimed at ending some thirty years of violent conflict. Given the failure of prior efforts to find a solution, widespread cynicism existed inside and outside Aceh over the chances that peace would hold. Nevertheless, both sides have maintained their commitment to the agreement. By the end of 2006, Aceh had a legal framework for greater autonomy, a newly elected governor who had previously been a senior rebel representative, and an absence of serious violent conflict. This study examines international involvement in the first sixteen months of the Aceh peace process, from mid-2005 until the end of 2006. It draws on the personal experiences of the authors, who were working for international agencies on the peace process during this period. Aceh differs from many other postconflict arenas. It is within a strong, middle-income country in which government capacity exists and markets operate. Unlike postconflict contexts in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic government resources have provided a larger share of assistance than has international aid, and the Government of Indonesia has remained in control of the peace process. This provides different opportunities and limitations for international engagement, and requires different strategies to support the peace process than in failed or failing states.

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke A number of international organizations have been involved in peacebuilding activities in Aceh. Most directly, the European Union-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) oversaw the implementation of the agreement and facilitated ongoing discussions between GAM and the GoI. Aid agencies—most notably the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Programme, the European Union, the International Organization for Migration, and the World Bank— were also heavily involved in developing programs and provided technical assistance for the reintegration of former combatants and to support conflictaffected communities. The monograph seeks to answer four questions. First, to what extent does international involvement in the Aceh peace process after the signing of the Helsinki MoU account for its success? Second, what accounts for variations in the effectiveness of international agencies that supported the peace process? Third, what factors shaped the extent to which international agencies were able to productively engage in the peace process? And finally, what are the lessons from the Aceh experience for other postconflict settings, in particular for those where the state remains strong? International engagement played a part in bringing peace to Aceh and ensuring it endured, but by and large international actors had only a supporting role. Domestic factors were more important; strong commitment from GAM and the GoI allowed ongoing hurdles to be overcome. Nevertheless, international involvement helped in particular to strengthen the incentives for both parties to adhere to the peace agreement. Much of this positive effect was an indirect consequence of the tsunami reconstruction effort, which increased the global spotlight on Aceh and resulted in thousands of international staff on the ground in a province that previously had seen very few. International actors also played a direct role, most notably through the Aceh Monitoring Mission. Generally, AMM took the peace process forward effectively. It deliberately stuck to a narrow mission and avoided complex issues. Although this approach led to some inefficiencies, in particular in dealing with reintegration issues, it helped maintain the trust of the government and kept AMM focused on its core strengths. The mission’s approach does not fit with the expectations of a “human security” approach, which favors wider, more inclusive strategies. The experience of Aceh, especially if contrasted with peacebuilding failures such as Timor Leste,

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Supporting Peace in Aceh appears to show that a limited role for international agencies can result in better outcomes—if domestic commitment to peace endures and local government capacity exists. Aid agencies supporting reintegration also played a limited role. By and large, they did not shape the direction of reintegration programming, and the technical expertise they tried to provide was often not useful to the government. Aid programs did fill gaps and provided assistance to key target groups, but these programs tended to run in parallel with government reintegration programs. In summary, international agencies undertook a series of relatively narrow programs, some of which were successful, and their impact was consequently limited to specific areas. But despite these limitations, the net effect of international engagement on the ground was positive. The primary reason for the circumscribed role of international aid agencies was the strength of the GoI, which retained control of implementation of the MoU. With the government keeping international actors out of politically sensitive programs and ensuring that it remained in charge, various aid agencies needed to define niches where they could usefully engage. Agencies stepped carefully to ensure they were not viewed as pushing the government, and this approach prevented the adoption of common strategies and positions. Yet in many ways the outcome was positive—domestic ownership of the peace process was assured, and external engagement in areas where organizations may not have had the capacity to provide local context-relevant support was limited. International bodies that did usefully contribute tended to share several key practical attributes. These include prior experience in conflict situations in Aceh and across Indonesia; long-term commitment of staff on the ground, including field managers and people working in more analytical functions; flexibility to adapt to rapidly evolving local events; and a low-key approach that afforded the respect of the GoI. Agencies that had strong relationships (often personal rather than institutional) with key actors in the government were more able to play an active role. International agencies were most effective when they diverged from blanket solutions in three ways: (1) by building on practical experience gained elsewhere; (2) by realizing and working within the competencies and limitations that the agency had in Indonesia, even where these differed from the agency’s global comparative advantage; and (3) by understanding the local context and

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke shaping assistance accordingly. Bridging gaps between field staff and agency offices and procedures at higher levels was important to ensure continued buy-in from both senior management in aid agencies and the government in Jakarta, constructive use of political weight by aid agencies, and that decisions made locally met international standards. Key lessons for future involvement in peace processes elsewhere follow from these points. Useful international engagement will inevitably be context-driven and will treat with suspicion broad policy prescriptions that limit more local definition of involvement. Given increasing global interest in conflict management, there is a risk that development or human security interventions will be promoted as a rapid and uncontroversial response to political problems. Experience from Aceh suggests that international actors can play a useful role, but their effectiveness may well be limited to relatively small areas of activity. Pragmatic approaches and realistic expectations are needed to determine how international actors can best contribute.

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Supporting Peace in Aceh

Supporting Peace in Aceh: Development Agencies and International Involvement Between 1945 and 2003, 127 civil wars in developing countries resulted in an estimated 16.2 million deaths (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In recent decades, internationally supported peace accords and postconflict assistance have been used to end such conflicts. Increasingly, international actors— United Nations (UN) agencies, regional bodies such as the European Union (EU), multilateral institutions like the World Bank, bilateral donors, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—have played a role by bringing parties to the negotiating table or supporting the implementation of agreements. According to one account, between 1980 and 1997 international actors played a prominent role in implementing sixteen peace agreements (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002), and this number has risen significantly since then.1 From 1989 to 1999, the United Nations deployed thirty-three peace missions (Paris 2004). In a number of postconflict cases, notably East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia, international agencies have temporarily taken on state functions. In many other weak or failing states, sovereignty has remained with the national government, but international agencies essentially govern—directly providing services, managing key ministries, financing the state budget, and shaping policy direction. Even in countries emerging from conflict where the state remains strong, international agencies play a major role in providing postconflict assistance. A minimal list of functions that

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke international agencies have provided in such countries includes demobilizing and disarming rebel groups; supporting the reintegration of former combatants through short-term benefits, job creation, and livelihood assistance; establishing or providing support to transitional justice programs, including support to truth and reconciliation commissions; supporting security sector reform; building the capacity of civil society; supporting human rights awareness and community development activities; rebuilding infrastructure destroyed in the conflict; planning or monitoring elections, and; building government capacity (Forman and Patrick 2000). The scope that foreign aid agencies have for providing financial and advisory assistance tends to be greater in areas that have experienced conflict. Just as the post-Cold War project of placing limits on the notion of sovereignty has increasingly justified international intervention to end internal conflicts or genocides (Ignatieff 2000; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001), countries emerging from conflict have tended to look to outside powers for help, even where expertise and resources already exist in-country. In parallel, international agencies have increasingly emphasized the development of tools and capacities for working in postconflict environments. A Peacebuilding Commission was set up within the UN system in December 2005 in recognition of the greater role international actors are playing in “soft” peacebuilding activities that go beyond traditional peacekeeping duties (Sugiono 2007). In 1997 the World Bank set up a Post-Conflict Fund, and then a Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit in 1998 and a unit focusing on Low Income Countries under Stress. The vast majority of bilateral donors have seen a similar pattern of expansion into conflict work. Incentives exist in postconflict areas for aid agencies to expand their mandates. In countries devastated by war, governments have limited ability to moderate these incentives. As a result, it is not surprising that international actors tend to play a larger role in designing and implementing postconflict programs than they do in International efforts at nonconflict contexts. building peace have met International efforts at building peace have met with mixed success. In some with mixed success places, peace deals have been successful (e.g., Mozambique in the early 1990s): conflict has not reemerged, economies have recovered, and democratic

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Supporting Peace in Aceh political systems have taken hold. Others, such as the Arusha Accords of August 1993 and the follow-up UN mission (October 1993) that sought to bring peace to Rwanda, have been outright failures. In less than a year, some 80 percent of the local Tutsi population had been killed in a horrific genocide. International experience shows that peace agreements fail more often than not, even where they initially appear to be successful (Collier and Sambanis 2005; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002). This study examines how international agencies operated during what has been seen as a highly successful peace process in Aceh in order to draw lessons that might be applicable elsewhere. Building Peace: What Works and What Does Not? An emerging literature has sought to understand why some peace agreements succeed, why some fail, and what role the international community plays in helping determine such outcomes. Scholars have pointed, among other factors, to the quality and level of international support (Hampson 1996), the provision of security guarantees by outside states (Walter 1997), the sequencing of key components like demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002), the depth of international involvement (Doyle, Johnstone, and Orr 1997), and the stage at which international agencies sponsor postconflict elections and economic liberalization (Paris 2004). Hundreds of scholars and development practitioners engaged in this research have provided important insights into our understanding of “what works” and “what does not.” Yet a number of important limitations have negated the emergence of practical, empirically based advice for policymakers, planners, and those from international agencies charged with implementing postconflict and peace process support programs. First, most of the literature has focused on postconflict efforts in failed states, where state institutions do not function at the local level and where international agencies (typically the UN) are the primary players providing funding and coordinating responses. Although reviews of these efforts may generate useful lessons for postconflict interventions in such states, it is by no means clear that they will be equally applicable in stronger, middleincome states like Indonesia that have well-developed bureaucracies and internal sources of funds. Such analyses may overstate international actors’ scope to develop and implement responses and may exaggerate the importance of international efforts. They also understate the importance of

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke national and local actors in shaping the opportunities and constraints for international actors to participate. Second, insufficient attention has been paid to disaggregating international responses according to the actors involved. In most postconflict situations, and particularly where no dominant player exists, a multitude of international agencies are active, each with different capacities, mandates, interests, incentives, and reasons for participating. This multitude may include various, often competing, UN agencies (such as the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]), many bilateral donors and embassies, at least one (and often two) multinational development banks, and a wide range of international NGOs focusing on everything from livelihoods to transitional justice to gender rights. Analyses of the role of the “international community” tend to assume a level of uniformity and consensus, or at least of coordination, between different players, whereas in practice the situation is almost always messier. Third, with a few exceptions, analyses of international involvement have implicitly used rather crude models of cause and effect, assuming that policy decisions—whether made in Washington, D.C., New York, Brussels, national capitals, or even at the subnational level—translate into changes on the ground. As has been shown convincingly in studies of development aid (e.g., Mosse 2005), policies may have little impact in changing behavior locally, not because the policies are poor but because there is inevitable discretion in interpreting them at numerous levels. In strong states, the scope that international agencies have to implement technically proficient best practice strategies and policies will inevitably be reduced, not only by their own internal politics but also by the need to gain and maintain government approval. Conflict and Peace in Aceh The study seeks to contribute to the discussion on the strengths and limitations of international involvement in building peace after settlements to civil wars. It does so by considering the case of Aceh, the westernmost province in Indonesia, which was devastated by the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, and where a peace agreement to end a thirty-year civil war between the separatist Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) is holding two and onehalf years after it was signed.

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Supporting Peace in Aceh Aceh is viewed as a prime success story and a potential model for international involvement (see, for example, Hussain 2007). Despite the impact of the conflict and then the tsunami, the state remains relatively strong in Aceh. A functioning bureaucracy extends to the village level, and local government resources are considerable. Within days of the tsunami, markets were again operating. The implementation of the peace agreement was led by the GoI, which provided political direction Aceh is viewed as a prime and primary financial support.2 The success story and a strength of the Indonesian state and the heavy emphasis on national unity potential model in Indonesian political culture and discourse made this likely. This differs from postconflict operations in areas with a weaker state presence, where resources are typically scant and government capacity is more limited. Nevertheless, international postconflict assistance was prominent in Aceh, with many agencies involved. What can be learned from Aceh to help guide international involvement in other postconflict settings where the state remains strong and markets still function? The history of the Aceh conflict has been well covered elsewhere, but a brief outline is necessary.3 Aceh is a region of some four million people situated at the westernmost tip of the Island of Sumatra, in western Indonesia. Aceh has a long history of resistance to external domination, first against the Dutch colonial authorities and more recently against the Indonesian state. Conflict in Aceh between the separatist Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government ebbed and flowed from the mid-1970s, when the rebellion erupted, until the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in August 2005. Resentment over the capture of profits from recently discovered natural gas fields by the central government (Ross 2003; Sulaiman 2006), combined with internal splits within the Darul Islam movement, magnified existing grievances over a perceived Javanization of national culture. These grievances date back to the period following Indonesian independence in 1946 and include a series of broken promises for political and cultural autonomy for the province (Miller 2006). Conflict escalated in 1989 when the Indonesian government established a Military Operations Zone that resulted in a ten-year campaign that led to thousands of deaths and widespread human rights abuses.

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke After a series of failed peace attempts, including the Humanitarian Pause (from September 2000) and the NGO-mediated Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) from December 2002 through May 2003, conflict again escalated with the announcement of martial law and the arrival of tens of thousands of troops in the province (Sukma 2004). Aceh was in effect closed off to international agencies and, largely, to international aid, with only a few programs operating in the province run by national staff. This changed with the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami and the subsequent arrival of massive international aid and accompanying humanitarian and development workers. At the same time, efforts to start peace talks between GAM and the GoI gained speed. Secret discussions had been held between representatives of both sides since the beginning of 2005 (Hussain 2007), and the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), a peacebuilding NGO run by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, issued letters of invitation to both sides to negotiate—two days before the tsunami struck (Morfit 2006). With GAM seriously weakened in the martial law period, a strong commitment from new Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and vice president Jusuf Kalla to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict, and a desire from both sides to focus on rebuilding Aceh after the tsunami, talks began in Helsinki. After five rounds of bargaining, the Helsinki MoU was signed by the GoI and GAM on August 15, 2005. The agreement went a step further than earlier peace talks. It included provisions to disarm rebel forces and to devolve considerable power from the national level to the region of Aceh, while rebel leaders would still recognize the overall sovereignty of Indonesia. An unarmed peace mission (the Aceh Monitoring Mission, or AMM) was deployed by the European Union (EU) and countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to oversee the peace process. Many other international agencies—most notably the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), UNDP, the Embassy of Japan, the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the European Union4—were active in developing postconflict programs or providing advice on peacebuilding strategies, which focused primarily on “reintegration” issues. Given the failure of earlier efforts to promote peace in Aceh, few observers felt that the initial discussions would progress as far as they have. Even when the agreement was signed, many highlighted the potential for spoiler groups to undermine it (Barron, Clark, and Daud 2005; International

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Supporting Peace in Aceh Crisis Group [ICG] 2005). Yet the peace process in Aceh achieved its initial aims. AMM successfully oversaw the destruction of GAM weapons and the partial withdrawal of Indonesian police and military from Aceh. On December 21, 2005, GAM handed over 142 weapons, bringing the total number of weapons destroyed to the 840 stipulated in the MoU. On December 31, 2005, a ceremony was held to mark the final withdrawal of 7,628 Indonesian soldiers and 2,150 police, bringing the total security forces withdrawn to 31,681.5 The demilitarization of Aceh was accompanied by a huge improvement in the security situation. Only three conflict incidents directly involving both sides were recorded from the beginning of 2006 through to late 2006:6 these were largely the result of personal grievances between former combatants and security personnel. There was a subsequent rise in local violent crime through late 2007 and early 2008 and a series of grenade attacks, the perpetrators of which are uncertain at the time of writing. But they have not resulted in any significant threat to the peace process. There is a startling contrast between the pre-MoU period, when travel off the main roads of Aceh was dangerous and any discussion of the conflict was absent from Aceh’s omnipresent coffee shops, and the situation more than two and one-half years later. Real progress also has been made on the political front. In July 2006, the Indonesian national parliament passed the Law on the Governing of Aceh, which implements many of the provisions of the Helsinki MoU. The law provided the basis for the direct election on December 11, 2006, of a new governor and almost all district heads and mayors. The elections were largely peaceful, and the GAM-affiliated independent ticket of Real progress…has been Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar won the elections for governor and on the political front vice governor. Despite initial worries, other candidates, the military, and the Jakarta government accepted the results.7 Some have pointed to the challenges that remain (e.g., ICG 2007b; Barron 2007). Yet few are predicting the collapse of the peace process. Learning from Aceh This study analyzes the role of international agencies in the initial period of implementation of the Helsinki peace agreement, from the signing of the agreement in August 2005 until the departure of AMM at the end of 2006.

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke In certain instances the analysis draws on slightly more contemporary events, but the first sixteen months of the peace process are the primary focus. It examines the roles of AMM and other international agencies and analyzes how these roles evolved in response to changes in peace process dynamics. The study also identifies lessons from international involvement in the Aceh peace process for application in other postconflict settings where the state remains strong. Consideration of how and why developments occurred as they did in Aceh can provide insights into broader questions related to the strengths and limitations of international agencies in supporting peace processes, especially in places where the government takes the lead in implementing postconflict settlements. The second section summarizes international assistance in Aceh before the Helsinki MoU and provides an overview of the different ways in which foreign aid agencies have supported the peace process. It includes an analysis of international dimensions of the conflict, the role of international agencies in peacebuilding in Indonesia, and the ways in which the changing strategies of GAM and the government created space for international involvement. The following sections look in greater depth at key international actors involved in the Aceh peace process: first at the role of AMM and then at the involvement of the international agencies supporting reintegration. Within each section, the study considers key episodes in roughly chronological order, with a focus on identifying significant dynamics related to the peace process and to the responses of international agencies. The analysis adopts an institutional approach—looking into the practice of engagement between actors, specifically between international agencies and domestic government and nongovernment (including former rebel) groups. The examination of “practice” is not limited to project implementation but also includes the more “upstream” actions that surround project formulation, including negotiations with governments, coordination with other donors, and internal communication between headquarters and field offices. The monograph draws primarily on case material collected during the authors’ time working on the implementation of the peace agreement in Aceh from August 2005 through early 2007. We should note the role we played in the peace process. One of us worked in Aceh in the early days after the tsunami as an advisor to the British Department for International

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Supporting Peace in Aceh Development (DFID) before taking on the role of reintegration advisor for AMM. The other has worked in Aceh since before the signing of the Helsinki MoU, managing the World Bank’s program of support to the peace process.8

International Peacebuilding and Postconflict Assistance in Aceh Traditional accounts of the Aceh conflict have presented it as a battle between an indigenous population defending a local identity and the Indonesian state promoting a broader national identity (see Van Klinken 2007). The emphasis on such local particularities, however, masks the extent to which Acehnese identity formulation has been driven by processes of engagement with the outside world. Aceh is also often presented as an international center, with a history of long-distance trade with people beyond present-day Indonesia as much as with the rest of Indonesia. Acehnese identity and presentations of history are largely formulated around this international image, which demonstrates distinctiveness from the rest of Indonesia (Reid 2006).9 The ways in which both sides engaged international actors before the Helsinki agreement, and concerns about the views from abroad, shaped incentives for pursuing conflict or peace. At a tactical level, the stance of foreign governments affected GAM’s capacity to operate internationally, given their exiled leadership and reliance on international links for fundraising and arms sourcing. Despite the fact that foreign aid contributes a relatively low percentage of development Both sides…felt a need financing in Indonesia, the national for international government’s attitudes toward Aceh have been shaped to a degree by the perspectives support and legitimacy and funding priorities of embassies and foreign aid agencies. Both sides in the conflict felt a need for international support and legitimacy in order to pursue their aims. For GAM, internationalizing its struggle has been a core element of its approach. At the same time, the government wanted to balance the challenge of maintaining domestic sovereignty with a need to retain its international credibility, given a fragile economy and turbulent domestic politics.

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke Preexisting relationships between international agencies and the GoI helped to encourage or discourage involvement by agencies in certain fields of peacebuilding work. This created the set of constraints and opportunities for different international agencies to become involved in the peace process post-Helsinki. The extent to which international actors pressured the government for a solution to the conflict was shaped by their existing programs and priorities across Indonesia, their capacities and structures, and their relationships with the Indonesian government. These, in turn, also shaped the ways in which different agencies became involved postHelsinki. Pre-Helsinki: GAM and GoI Strategies to Build International Support International engagement in Aceh has been perceived at various stages as a counterweight to Indonesian nationalism coming from Jakarta. Much has been written on GAM’s internationalizing strategy (e.g., Schulze 2004). In recent decades, GAM’s international connections have included their exiled leadership, based in Sweden, and a presence among the Acehnese diaspora in Malaysia, the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere. Hasan Tiro, the founder of the movement, was a former UN diplomat and sought to draw on these connections to promote support for Aceh’s struggle. Along with various other antigovernment groups around the world, GAM insurgents received training in Libya in the 1980s. However, many key figures in the movement (especially the younger generation) are now reluctant to talk about this period, distancing themselves from old postcolonial romantic views of armed struggle and emphasizing instead their vision for a democratic Aceh.10 The move by GAM toward accepting autonomy as opposed to independence was also driven in part by analysis of the global political situation. International recognition remained imperative. GAM’s exiled leadership initially strove to win support for independence. However, although some international NGOs highlighted atrocities committed by the Indonesian military during the conflict, over time it became clear to GAM that the increasing credibility of the GoI and greater global attention to terrorism were reducing possibilities for international support for Acehnese independence. International recognition for a new state became less likely following the attacks of September 11, 2001, with the United States and

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Supporting Peace in Aceh others unlikely to back any further separatism in Indonesia, especially the establishment of a new, small state with a devoutly Muslim population situated astride a major international shipping lane. As this became clear, GAM turned to other mechanisms to increase political and economic autonomy. From the Jakarta side, international involvement in Aceh has oscillated between concerns for breaches of Indonesian sovereignty and a desire for international recognition of Indonesian democratic reforms in the postSuharto era. Suspicion over outside involvement led the government under President Megawati Sukarnoputri to ban foreigners from entering Aceh during the period of martial law and then emergency law from May 2003 until after the tsunami. The relationship between Indonesia and Sweden, where GAM’s expatriate leadership primarily resides, was also tense. In 2003, the Indonesian government made a formal approach for the Swedenbased GAM leaders to be deported. It is unsurprising in this context that the arrival of a major international presence in Aceh following the tsunami was welcomed by most Acehnese and initially approached with considerably more caution by the central government. Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and a stronger commitment from senior government figures in Jakarta to search for peace in Aceh, the scope increased for external intervention as part of a peace plan. However, with concern over sovereignty heightened by the independence of Timor Leste in 2002, full international involvement was not an option for Jakarta. The United Nations, in particular, was so negatively associated with the Indonesian withdrawal from Timor that in 2003 one of the most respected international experts writing on Aceh, Sidney Jones, described the GoI’s reaction to any sign of UN presence as “allergic.”11 These concerns led the government to request the engagement of a small NGO, the Henri Dunant Center (HDC), to facilitate a peace agreement.12 HDC also garnered international political backing and financial support for the peace process as well as a panel of international experts (or “wise men”). HDC deployed a joint security committee that included international observers from Thailand and the Philippines (Huber 2004). The external intervention could not prevent a breakdown of the peace process in 2003. With the absence of a strong commitment from GAM or the government to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, international peacebuilding efforts proved to be largely ineffective.

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke The move toward new negotiations in Helsinki was strengthened by renewed domestic interest in securing international legitimacy. The Indonesian government, for example, wanted to demonstrate stability and “good governance” in order to attract foreign investment, trade, and tourism. Western campaigners and journalists highlighting abuses in Aceh were a continual source of concern, especially if they affected levels of development aid, private investment, or the opportunity to purchase military equipment. Entering into negotiations with GAM appeared to be an effective way of combating such critiques. For some elements of the military, a peace process in Aceh also presented an opportunity to demonstrate that it too had reformed. With a reduced role—closer to that of a conventional security force than a core element of the political fabric, as it had been in Suharto’s time—the military has Yudhoyono’s military attempted to cast itself as a professional and modern body (Meitzner 2003; experience enabled him to 2006).13 U.S. pressure to reform, with promote reformist elements the carrot of reestablishing stronger military links with Indonesia, may have been a significant incentive.14 President Yudhoyono’s military experience enabled him to promote reformist elements that would support his wider agenda (Morfit 2006). Foreign Aid in Indonesia and Aceh Just as the attitudes of Jakarta and GAM toward international involvement fluctuated with changing domestic incentives, international involvement in Aceh shifted in response to changes in broader strategies for engagement in Indonesia. The motivations of donor governments to provide development assistance often combine a range of considerations.15 These include a desire to support a particular regime, subsidies to domestic businesses that benefit from aid allocations, responses to pressure from specific domestic interests such as migrant groups or human rights organizations, and a broader commitment to international development and peacebuilding principles as enshrined in a range of UN treaties and conventions. A short look at the history of development assistance to Indonesia highlights changing international attitudes to the conflict in Aceh.

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Supporting Peace in Aceh Historically, international development assistance to Aceh, and to the rest of Indonesia, was broadly consistent with Western support for Suharto’s government. Indonesia was a major recipient of international aid, although considering Indonesia’s size and natural resource wealth, it was never heavily dependent on foreign aid. From the early 1990s, Indonesia followed a global pattern of declining aid flows. Accompanying the end of the Cold War, a diversification of development interests led to increased attention to human rights, inequality, environmental damage, and a range of governance issues including transparency and decentralization. The plight of East Timor captured the Western imagination, and many NGOs and diplomatic missions became interested in Aceh out of concern for human rights violations on the part of the military and state-sponsored militias. The Asian economic collapse in 1997–98 and the fall of Suharto shifted the context. With the previous state development model discredited, and amidst widespread fears that Indonesia would splinter along ethnic or religious lines, perceived shortcomings related to democratization, human rights, environmental sustainability, and intergroup equality became an increasing focus of aid provision. Donors were motivated by a concern for self-preservation as much as by the challenges facing Indonesia. For example, prior support to Suharto’s discredited regime and association with economic reforms led by the International Monetary Fund made the World Bank an easy target of popular protest. Assistance was scaled back, with emphasis shifting away from highly visible support to the government for large-scale infrastructure to a focus on strengthening community organizations and stimulating local demands for governance reform (Guggenheim 2006; Mallaby 2006). Between 2002 and 2005, annual aid to Indonesia reestablished a regular pattern, averaging under US$2 billion of net inflows—less than one percent of the country’s total annual gross national income.16 Japan was the key aid donor once again, with the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank also significant. Other large donors included Germany, Australia (especially after the tsunami), the EU and the United States. Larger portfolios increased the leverage of donors to promote good governance and democratization. At the same time, the incentives for donors to push for policies that the government may not have liked arguably declined, especially for those lending money to the country.

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke Conflict Reduction Programs before the Helsinki Agreement The outbreak of violent conflict across the archipelago in the post-Suharto period led development agencies to increase attention to conflict issues. Excluding Aceh and Papua, at least 9,500 died between the onset of the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime at the beginning of 1998 and the end of 2003 (Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 2006). conflict resolution and International recognition of the tensions within Indonesia since prevention became… Suharto’s demise was heightened by important…[to] many donors concern over terrorism and Islamic extremism. As a result, conflict resolution and prevention became an important activity for many donors. The World Bank and UNDP received considerable grant assistance to spend on conflict issues across Indonesia, with the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, and the Australian Agency for International Development the main contributors. USAID also developed a large conflict reduction program. The World Bank, for example, launched a program of research on local conflict in Indonesia in 2002 and began preparing a project to work in conflict-affected areas. UNDP worked in conflict-prone areas of eastern Indonesia to promote local reconciliation mechanisms, support government decentralization, and improve the livelihoods of conflict-affected groups. The EU fielded a Conflict Prevention and Assessment Mission in Indonesia in March 2002. International NGOs such as CARE and Catholic Relief Service and European bilateral donors have taken similar approaches, with a range of projects directed at conflict prevention and resolution. International work on conflict was tempered by careful political calculations to ensure that it did not offend the GoI. Although much of the World Bank and UNDP research was critical of government policies (often previously supported by international agencies), conclusions were framed in developmental language and avoided more sensitive discussions over issues such as rights abuses. Huber implies that such sensitivities led in part to the collapse of the 1999–2003 Aceh peace process and finds donor nations culpable for not providing more vocal support in their effort to avoid difficult issues (Huber 2004: 61–70).17 Notably, ICG called for concerted donor support for the Helsinki peace process as soon as the

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Supporting Peace in Aceh agreement was signed in August 2005, perhaps demonstrating a perception that international support had been lacking in the past (ICG 2005). Efforts to push for peace in the COHA period of late 2002 and early 2003 had allowed some development efforts to start again in Aceh in fields such as maternal health (from the United Nations Population Fund), village development (World Bank), and university education (Canada). The United States and Japan each funded low-key initiatives aimed at supporting peace through local NGOs. Some international NGOs also maintained a presence in Aceh, often with European or American government funding. However, when the COHA peace process collapsed in 2003 and martial law was imposed, even that limited presence largely withdrew. A few international NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross remained, and the World Bank program continued, but most foreign representatives left. When the tsunami occurred, Aceh was effectively sealed off to most international actors. The Response to the Tsunami: Unprecedented Scale, Limited Coherence The tsunami hit a remote, conflict-affected region of a nation undergoing major political change. The GoI conceded at an early stage that it could not cope with the scale of the tragedy and invited assistance from all parties. In the aftermath of the tsunami, the global disaster response and aid delivery machine arrived in Aceh, a region previously largely isolated from international attention. The proliferation of agencies and staff was driven by the scale of the disaster (with over 150,000 people dead or missing and 500,000 homeless) and of the global response. US$5.3 billion was pledged from outside Indonesia (World Bank 2006a), and continued media attention ensured that most pledges were honored. Public contributions from wealthier nations were a key source of posttsunami assistance, giving international NGOs a primary role as major donors—an unusual situation. Many NGOs held more money than the established bilateral and multilateral agencies; the larger international NGOs each amassed budgets of well over US$100 million. Although some rationalization did occur, with foreign military personnel ordered to leave before the end of March 2005, a kaleidoscope of UN agencies, donors, diplomatic field missions, consultants, and international and national NGOs populated the tsunami-affected areas, especially the

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke provincial capital of Banda Aceh.18 With no clear direction or central coordination, agencies adopted a wide variety of methods and approaches. Pooled funding arrangements are increasingly commonplace among donor agencies globally, but they never really took effect in Aceh. Donors set up a Multi-Donor Fund, but the size and publicity involved in tsunami reconstruction encouraged most agencies to act independently. The government in Jakarta established the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh-Nias, or BRR), partly at the request of the donors, to coordinate the effort, and later started implementing projects directly. Yet the vast sums of money diffused across thousands of agencies made common planning extremely difficult. The Impacts of Tsunami Assistance on Conflict and Peacebuilding Programs The level of assistance, the presence of thousands of international aid workers, and the intense media spotlight on Aceh played important roles in encouraging GAM and the GoI to reach a peace settlement. The presence of a new and large international community in Aceh was significant. Intense media coverage of the reconstruction effort supported a high global profile; in response, donor nations and the UN gave the time of senior staff to Aceh, including visits to Aceh from politicians and The tsunami created a appointed representatives such as former U.S. moral imperative…to president Bill Clinton. The scale of the reconstruction effort, its profile, and the work toward peace difficulties of operating in Indonesia prompted some donors (Canada, Germany, the EU, and the UN) to site temporary diplomatic posts in Aceh. Although the number of clashes between GAM and government forces rose steadily from the tsunami until the Helsinki agreement was signed (Barron, Clark, and Daud 2005), both sides realized that all-out offensives of the type that occurred during the martial law period were out of the question. The tsunami created a moral imperative, felt keenly by both sides and later acknowledged in the preface to the Helsinki MoU, to work toward peace. Yet although the tsunami (and the response effort) encouraged the conflict parties to find a negotiated settlement, it did little to create space

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Supporting Peace in Aceh or incentives for international agencies to address conflict issues. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the early post-tsunami days were marked by extreme caution and risk aversion from most agencies, especially on contentious political issues. Agencies were aware that until the day of the tsunami, international actors had by and large not been allowed to enter Aceh. Antagonizing the government could jeopardize not only their tsunami reconstruction programs but also other involvement in Indonesia. The UN in particular was extremely careful in the months immediately before and after Helsinki not to offend Jakarta. The failure of the earlier peace process in Aceh provided an example of what could happen, and the safest course of action was to avoid the appearance of pressuring the GoI. Other factors inhibiting involvement in the conflict included a lack of knowledge of the context and a desire not to step beyond the narrow mission of disaster reconstruction. For many donors, including the ADB and some international NGOs, conflict issues were not in their areas of competence. Practical challenges appeared to work against considering the conflict environment in any depth. In Aceh, agencies had to build up huge operations in a very short time, usually from scratch. This management challenge tended to consume the time of agency managers, who were, as a result, unwilling to take on any new problems. Many agencies were struggling just to spend the vast sums they had on “technical” projects such as housing reconstruction; moving into the messier world of conflict politics would have been a distraction from the core reconstruction effort. With a mission to provide post-tsunami reconstruction, an extremely challenging task in itself, few were willing to take on other issues that might further complicate relationships with the government. For many agencies, funding was also effectively tied: because money had been pledged for the tsunami response, they did not always consider spending it on peace or conflict-related actions to be a viable option, even if the conflict was regarded as a major threat to the sustainability of many of the tsunami reconstruction programs.19 The mandates of the MultiDonor Fund, and initially BRR, were to focus solely on tsunami reconstruction, which left little space to work in non-tsunami-affected areas or on issues related to peacebuilding. For international agencies, Aceh was a field site. When viewed from head offices elsewhere, most aid to Aceh was for repairing the damage caused by natural disaster. Conflict was rarely

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke a critical factor. At the policy level, international agencies tend to respond most quickly to domestic interests, which in this case were concerned with accountable and timely tsunami reconstruction assistance.20 A major gulf existed between Indonesian perceptions of the importance of the conflict for reconstruction and the perceptions of international actors—few of whom at the time would have agreed with an Acehnese NGO leader that “reconstruction should be about peace, not just physical rebuilding” (Burke and Afnan 2005: 38). Most international donor representatives had little knowledge of the politics, society, or conflict in Aceh. In mid-2005 one donor stated with reference to the conflict: “It is formally part of our policy, those planning projects have been asked to take it into account. But I wonder if it has really been taken into account in the de facto planning process” (Ibid.: 7–11).21 Moving into Conflict Resolution Programming As the initial emergency phase following the tsunami passed into longerterm reconstruction, some agencies started to pay more attention to the context within which they were working. Burke and Afnan’s August 2005 report found a small number of international bodies that were actively considering how their aid related to conflict conditions and implementing a range of measures. These included: •

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Specific initiatives, such as providing funding for civil society organizations that aimed to promote peace or assisting conflictaffected and tsunami-affected displaced people. “Mainstreamed” activities, whereby existing programs were adapted to take conflict into account—for example by considering whether assisting victims of the tsunami could lead to tension with others who did not receive support or by building extra safeguards to ensure against corruption, given the risk that resources could fall into the hands of conflict actors. Revised management practices, such as ensuring employment opportunities were given to local Acehnese staff rather than workers from elsewhere in Indonesia.

The move toward considering conflict in tsunami relief was perhaps inevitable. With a rising number of minor clashes between GAM and

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military troops, agencies rapidly had to build knowledge on how to operate in a sometimes tense environment. Over time, as agencies realized that the government was not going to kick them out and as the Helsinki peace process gained momentum, some became more confident and less risk averse and started to talk about conflict issues openly. With billions of dollars of support for reconstruction, some donors were concerned that continued conflict would damage the sustainability of their disaster recovery investments and began to investigate how they could support a peace deal if it arrived. Despite weak coordination at the top, many of the conflicting international pressures and interests that often govern how aid is spent in conflict areas were not present. There was very little struggle between donors over influence, and aid was not generally employed as part of the political machinations of foreign governments. Engagement with conflict on the part of donor agencies was principally motivated by concerns for stability and peace rather than by broader political or direct security-related objectives. This left scope for involvement in conflict resolution on the part of some and avoidance by others. Over time, fear of foreign involvement decreased, and international agencies were invited to contribute to conflict resolution efforts.22 An initial pre-MoU World Bank assessment of options for support to the peace process (Barron, Clark, and Daud 2005) was received by the government’s National Planning Agency (Bappenas), and the Over time, [Indonesian] fear of recommendations provided the foreign involvement decreased basis for an official government request for donor assistance. Bappenas also convened key international agencies on a number of occasions in the weeks following the signing of the MoU, ostensibly to request support. This approach ensured that initial international programs fell within government priorities and avoided what were deemed internal and inherently political issues. Key agencies in the immediate post-Helsinki period were UNDP, IOM (with funding from Japan, the United States, and especially the EU), USAID, the World Bank, and increasingly the Embassy of Japan (see appendix and further discussion in the reintegration sections below). The International Labour Organization (ILO) was also involved at the beginning,

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke although its interest started to wane when significant donor funds were not forthcoming, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) started to work with youth combatants. NGOs also began to look more comprehensively at how conflict issues affected their work. By the end of 2006, with the peace process apparently working successfully, many NGOs reported an interest in linking their reconstruction work with longer-term peace promotion.23 However, NGOs were still struggling with massive reconstruction programs already slowed by procurement difficulties, local corruption, and complaints over poor housing construction, all of which limited their direct engagement in conflict resolution initiatives.

Aceh Monitoring Mission: Direct Involvement The failure of the previous peace process in Aceh, which had been facilitated by a nongovernmental group and then backed by a small international monitoring body, led the government, GAM, and donors to believe that stronger diplomatic backing would be required this time. The role of an international presence as part of a peace agreement was discussed during the series of peace talks held in Helsinki through the first half of 2005. Martti Ahtisaari, whose Crisis Management Institute chaired the talks, approached the EU and secured financial support for the negotiations. GAM wanted to see a far greater international role, with peacekeeping functions, but the GoI rejected the idea of armed foreign forces on their soil (Kingsbury 2006: 79). The stationing of the Aceh Monitoring Mission as an unarmed monitoring team was a compromise. This section reviews AMM’s work and argues that although a narrow assignment attracted criticism, it also enabled effective performance in core areas.24 The deployment of a monitoring mission was a core element of the peace agreement. The Helsinki MoU of August 2005 states that “an Aceh Monitoring Mission will be established by the European Union and ASEAN contributing countries with the mandate to monitor the implementation of the commitments taken by the parties in this Memorandum of Understanding.”25 Further details of AMM’s structure and working methods were subsequently finalized between the EU and the GoI, and AMM was established under European Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP on September 9, 2005.26 The involvement of the EU was also accepted by both sides; the GoI may have originally wanted a mission consisting only of neighboring ASEAN nations, as occurred in 2002–03, but GAM insisted on the EU’s

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Supporting Peace in Aceh involvement. In the end, AMM was managed chiefly by the EU; monitors were from EU member nations, Norway, Switzerland, and five ASEAN nations (Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, and Malaysia). The head of AMM was Pieter Feith from the Netherlands, and ASEAN staff included the deputy head of the mission.27 The Aceh Monitoring Mission was a temporary civilian mission. It covered Aceh from eleven field offices, with a main office in the provincial capital, Banda Aceh. Although it included active military personnel from EU member nations and contributing ASEAN countries, all monitors operated on a civilian The AMM was a temporary basis. For an initial six months, from civilian mission September 2005 to March 2006, AMM deployed over 200 monitors. The mission utilized militarystyle vertical command and communication structures, ideal for rapid deployment on security monitoring tasks but less suited to more complex responsibilities. AMM adapted over time in response to new information and changing priorities. The initial eleven offices were supplemented by branch offices in more remote districts and on the tsunami-hit west coast, where roads were still frequently impassable.28 In the latter half of 2006, offices were incrementally closed and staff numbers gradually reduced in stages to a final skeleton team of thirty-six. This was designed to enable a smooth exit, something that concerned EU officials, who had seen in the Balkans how hard it can be to disengage from conflict areas. AMM also aimed to balance, on the one hand, Indonesian nationalist concerns that foreign monitors would outstay their welcome and, on the other, the perspective of many in Aceh, who rightly or wrongly felt that peace was dependent on AMM and expressed a desire for a longer-term presence. The EU and “Human Security”: New Policies for Promoting Comprehensive Peace For the EU, rapid deployment of a peace monitoring mission to Aceh was part of a broader “human security” approach that explores new ways of promoting peace (see Kaldor, Martin, and Selchow 2007).29 Human security approaches stress the possibilities of international nonmilitary intervention, including peacekeeping forces, monitoring missions, and other mechanisms

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke such as election observation and a range of aid programs to assist vulnerable groups or build civil society institutions. The promotion of a human security approach fulfilled EU interest in a more proactive international role, countering the dominance of U.S. policy and providing flexible options for promoting peace beyond limited UN interventions. In order to turn rhetoric on human security into practice, concrete models of intervention were required (Ibid.: 281–86). The European Union had been looking to expand its capacity to engage through new security mechanisms, building on experiences in the Balkans and elsewhere. AMM was the EU’s first postconflict civilian mission in Asia and the first joint operation with ASEAN nations. Its structure, involving civilian monitors on the ground, and its key role in convening ongoing discussions between GAM and the GoI, were more comprehensive than most prior EU operations. Human security as a principle is, of course, not confined to the European Union. In the 1990s the range of peacekeeping interventions and other mechanisms for mitigating conflict grew, in keeping with a greater international concern for different forms of conflict following the end of the Cold War. This political imperative also affected development interventions: aid actors became concerned that their actions on the ground could unwittingly aggravate tensions and began actively to seek ways in which aid and development work could be combined with peace promotion (Uvin 2002). This brought aid and security actors together. For example, DFID created a new conflict and humanitarian assistance department. The UN built new mechanisms for overseeing the deployment of peacekeeping missions. Adoption of a human security discourse by the EU was also seen as way of providing a model distinct from American postconflict state building, which was failing so visibly in Iraq. Adopting a human security approach requires institutions that can fill the wide gap between short-run political-security objectives and longerterm development objectives. The EU aimed to deploy a range of instruments in Aceh in 2005–06, including post-tsunami emergency assistance, funding for elements of the peace process such as reintegration, election observation, and the management of AMM. The mission was at the political end chairing high-level discussions and monitoring implementation of the peace agreement on the ground. AMM’s narrow focus meant that specific human security issues not central to the peace process, such as gender equality, were not directly addressed—despite vocal lobbying in Europe

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Supporting Peace in Aceh and in Aceh itself to address these broader concerns (Crisis Management Initiative [CMI] 2006). The Aceh Monitoring Mission: Effective, Not Comprehensive AMM was designed as a small, rapidly deployable mechanism with a limited, realizable mandate. Concern over “mission creep” into unforeseen fields and the difficulties of a viable exit strategy worried AMM’s planners from its inception. AMM’s initial six-month mandate suited the GoI, and the EU hoped not to get bogged down in a drawn-out exercise. Senior staff within AMM on temporary postings from the European Council (part of the EU) also indicated an institutional interest in developing new, nimble peacemaking tools for use elsewhere. AMM’s key relationships were first with the GoI and second with GAM. The mission was also concerned with maintaining relations across EU member nations and contributing ASEAN states.30 The government worried about maintaining sovereign control, given some hostile public opinion in Jakarta to the peace process and an embarrassing legacy of international engagement in the debacle over East Timor’s independence. This furthered the incentives to keep AMM’s role limited. Because of its rapid deployment, AMM inevitably had limited time to employ local experts or understand the Aceh context in depth. An early European Council technical assessment mission gave AMM its structure, and the Initial Monitoring Presence in the weeks leading up to the official start of the mission on September 15, 2005, provided some lead time. The Initial Monitoring Presence was mobilized in just twelve days and helped fill the potential security vacuum in the days after the signing of the Helsinki MoU (Beeck 2007: 20). Key tasks in the initial stages focused on security matters and building trust between GAM and the GoI. This involved monitoring violent incidents and observing initial actions required by the Helsinki MoU, including GAM’s transfer of [the GoI and GAM] maintained weapons and the governments’s sufficient confidence in the withdrawal of military and police. External evaluations find mission’s neutrality that AMM monitored these tasks adequately. Critically, both sides maintained sufficient confidence in the mission’s neutrality (ICG

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke 2006: 9). Pieter Feith, head of AMM, ordered investigations into infringements by both parties in order to ensure that neither side had grounds to feel aggrieved. Reported allegations of continued police brutality against former GAM combatants or of persistent extortion by former GAM insurgents were used to address outstanding grievances, in doing so removing potential obstacles that could be raised by either party. This process was repeated at the field-office level, with the Aceh-wide Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA) meeting mirrored by district-level talks in those areas where local tensions had subsided sufficiently to enable them to take place. The initial mandate for AMM expired in March 2006.31 With decommissioning and redeployment completed by mid-December 2005, and a lack of serious security incidents, AMM’s further role was unclear even before any discussion of a possible [AMM] wanted to extension. The mission was still busy regularly monitoring the situation on maintain a narrow focus the ground and chairing the COSA on security issues meetings. Yet because it wanted to maintain a narrow focus on security issues and stick to an early exit date, AMM did not comprehensively engage in the wider set of issues that emerged once the initial stage of the peace process was accomplished. The Helsinki MoU included a range of issues stretching far beyond AMM’s initial involvement in redeployment, decommissioning, and security. A key initial section promised a Law on the Governing of Aceh by March 31, 2006, which was to include considerable devolution of political and economic authority to Aceh Province. Further commitments covered the field of human rights (a Human Rights Court and a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation), and amnesty for former combatants and all GAM prisoners. The MoU also included a promise of financial support, land, and employment for former combatants, prisoners, and victims of the conflict, with a Joint Claims Commission to rule on disputed claims. It was inevitable that this wider range of issues would rise up on the agenda, yet the narrow approach adopted by AMM meant that it had limited scope to engage in them. By March–April 2006, although both sides were abiding by the overall commitment to peace, many of the longer-term elements of the agreement were delayed or had not even been

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Supporting Peace in Aceh started. The Law on the Governing of Aceh was months behind schedule (although it was slowly progressing), around sixty prisoners were still detained with their status in dispute, reintegration processes had stalled under a mass of problems (see below), and the promised human rights court and justice commission were being sidelined. AMM by this point had reduced its numbers to some eighty-five monitors as part of a phased, low-impact withdrawal.32 It is possible that some members of GAM and the government were broadly content with this slow progress, although others privately expressed frustration at the failure to resolve these outstanding issues.33 However, general confidence did continue to grow among the wider population, as seen in Banda Aceh where people were happy to go out after dark once again and an air of normality returned. Over time, many former GAM leaders returned to Aceh.34 However, slow progress on wider dimensions of the peace agreement also presented some risks to stability. Several elements of AMM’s structure limited the scope for a broader approach to human security that might have supported other elements of the peace agreement at an earlier stage. The staffing, orientation, lines of instruction, training, and other elements were chiefly geared to the core monitoring functions, thereby marginalizing a wider range of issues until they were brought closer to the center of the operation at a later date. AMM incrementally paid greater attention to less security-based issues— drafting laws, supporting the reintegration of former combatants, and encouraging the two sides to reach agreement on which prisoners should be released. Over time, AMM gave more staff time at all levels to these issues once all sides realized that a rapid departure in early 2006 was not appropriate given the number and seriousness of outstanding unresolved problems. Monitors with developmental or human rights backgrounds were generally retained, and military-trained staff were more likely to be released. Monitors working specifically on reintegration efforts were given more freedom to work outside the narrow security-monitoring mandate, and a senior Swedish judge was appointed to support the resolution of the remaining disputed prisoner cases. Yet serious engagement on many of these issues did not occur until mid-2006, and the delay resulted in some lost opportunities. Working with Different Constituencies on Peacebuilding AMM kept in contact with political representatives of key nations, but (inside Aceh at least) had little formal communication with the donor

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke community of multilateral, bilateral, and NGO aid agency representatives. What discussion did take place was chiefly the consequence of informal arrangements between individuals and low-level collaboration (for example, often over sandwiches at Caswell’s in Banda Aceh, an air-conditioned cafe opened to profit from the burgeoning post-tsunami foreign aid worker market). Such collaboration enabled some interconnection between donor discussions about aid provision and political discussions about the peace process. Despite different mandates and objectives (in brief, developmental and technical as opposed to security-focused and political), some collaboration was nevertheless possible locally. In the most heavily tsunami-affected provinces, local discussions between AMM, UN agencies, and NGOs took place regularly given the heavy foreign presence on the ground.35 An unusually high level of cooperation occurred when surveys of former combatants (to determine their status and welfare) were carried out using AMM’s monitoring capacity and the World Bank’s technical staff (see World Bank 2006b). In the field, some former combatants seeking medical assistance for old injuries were transferred between AMM and NGOs or other international agencies. More strategic coordination started to emerge later in 2006, when senior AMM staff realized that after their departure unfinished reintegration plans would continue to be a key and potentially destabilizing element of the MoU. A gap persisted between the broadly political aims and discussions that AMM was involved in and donor-related involvement in other elements of the peace process. In particular, international donors were most interested in the areas of the peace agreement that addressed human rights and the reintegration of former combatants. AMM’s prioritization of issues, staff background, and, more important, the bargaining tactics of GAM and the GoI meant that human rights and reintegration were accorded little time in the ongoing discussions. The logical foreign body to bridge the gap between these tracks in Aceh was the EU, given its prominent role on both sides. Although efforts were made, gaps within the EU between the body supporting AMM (the European Council) and the body supporting humanitarian and aid work (the European Commission) made this challenging. Although actors on the ground did share information and even exchange staff, some tension between short-term political thinkers (in AMM and the European Council) and longer-term development thinkers (in the European Commission) persisted.

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Supporting Peace in Aceh Indonesian government interest in ensuring that international bodies did not assume a leadership role acted to discourage a joined-up human security approach.36 Some international actors felt that AMM could have worked more collaboratively with others who would be on the ground in Aceh for a longer period of time, including the European Commission, to devise a common approach defining international support for peacebuilding. The absence of a longer-term strategy or set of principles, they argued, meant that international agencies had no response when elements of the peace process slipped, including the peace agreement’s commitments to support the reintegration of former combatants and to pursue human rights issues.37 Bilateral donors and large international NGOs have experience operating in conflict sites where the UN assumes a stronger coordinating role; even though UN operations around the world often attract criticism, agency staff used to working under an international structure elsewhere felt their small scale in Aceh. Without a common framework for international engagement, senior staff in AMM and back in Brussels considered the organization’s exit strategy throughout 2006. Yet with a narrow role, AMM was not wellpositioned to pay sufficient attention to post-AMM institutional oversight mechanisms. AMM also unsuccessfully encouraged the GoI to maintain discussions with GAM into the future.38 The government kept broadly to its consistent stance of regarding GAM as a defunct body following the December 2006 elections in Aceh (if not earlier). There was some expectation from AMM that the involvement of other international bodies—bilaterally and through the USAID-funded Forum Bersama and a possible local peace facilitation mechanism to be established by the NGO Interpeace—would collectively act to provide strategic continuity to an unconnected array of international efforts assisting the peace process.39 Forum Bersama, which was established by the Governor of Aceh with American assistance, sought to create a space for dialogue and coordination of different key stakeholders such as GAM, the GoI, donors, and NGOs. On November 15, 2006, an advertisement was placed in the Acehnese newspaper Serambi saying that Forum Bersama would become the place for interested parties, including the government and GAM, to discuss issues related to the peace process. However, Forum Bersama organizers had not fully consulted with the Indonesian government, GAM, AMM, the wider donor community, or civil society. The advertisement came before a meeting

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke called by Pieter Feith with the main donors to discuss significant remaining challenges and post-AMM mechanisms, particularly related to reintegration. At the meeting, a number of people voiced doubts about the ability of Forum Bersama to take on the planned role. In the end, the government established a Forum for Coordination and Communication (Forum Koordinasi dan Komunikasi, or FKK) to provide oversight, and international involvement was minimized. It is unclear how much the post-AMM institutional infrastructure (the establishment of FKK, along with a renewed mandate for Forum Bersama) was planned in a cohesive way. AMM, for its part, encouraged the government to retain a delegation from Jakarta in Aceh to continue discussions. International influence continued—as much a result of the vast tsunami aid dollars as any planned policy (by the GoI, by AMM, or by other international actors). The result was limited international involvement and informal, de facto monitoring following the departure of AMM in a far less politically engaged manner. AMM was criticized for not engaging more widely with civil groups and other bodies that might have been able to maintain a more continuous, and broader, dialogue during and after AMM’s presence (Beeck 2007; Crisis Management Initiative and Sami AMM was criticized for Lahdensuo n.d.). There is a history to not engaging more widely this, given wide international NGO support for Acehnese civil society groups with civil groups during the failed efforts at peace between 2000 and 2003, in which the international body involved, the Henri Dunant Center, was censured for failing to work with civil society more widely (Barakat, Connolly, and Large 2002; Huber 2004). Global analysis of peacebuilding policy often stresses the need to bring all actors into a common process, yet the civil society movement that had been active in Aceh prior to the Indonesian government crackdown in 2003 was not meaningfully involved. The separate meetings that AMM organized for local NGOs from its headquarters and field offices were marginal, or even token, beyond the local level and were not relevant to the core negotiating process or other measures. AMM field staff, coming from a range of backgrounds but predominantly military or ex-military personnel

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Supporting Peace in Aceh acting in a civilian capacity, were not always equipped with the training, knowledge, or background to enable them to engage with a wide range of local actors. On several occasions, local civil society figures did not turn up at meetings that had been arranged, much to the frustration of AMM staff who had carefully tried to act inclusively. Without a more rooted process that local groups could tangibly engage in, such well-intentioned but smallscale efforts were not likely to have impact or local buy-in. Maintaining a Limited Role However, the role of AMM in contributing to what was a successful peace process during its period of engagement suggests that many such criticisms are misplaced if seen in isolation. There are two main reasons why a narrow approach may have been advisable in these circumstances. First, although a broader, all-encompassing engagement might have satisfied more actors and fulfilled the stipulations recommended by global human security experts, it may have risked stretching international involvement too thinly. A narrower approach enabled AMM to concentrate on areas where it could act with sufficient professionalism. International engagement is a complex process, and AMM included representatives of militaries, governments, and freelance specialists from approximately twenty different European and Asian countries. The mission, ever conscious of its departure, operated on tight timetables, and monitors were often unable to gain the on-the-ground knowledge or experience necessary for complex work on social and political issues. The EU administration is also relatively new to the peace mission scene, and is building up its knowledge of how to deploy effectively. AMM stuck to what it could realistically achieve. Second, a narrow approach ensured that elements of the GoI whose support was essential for progress toward peace remained sufficiently comfortable with the proceedings. The Helsinki dialogue between GAM and the GoI that led to the peace agreement and to AMM’s deployment was limited in scope and in its participants. Both parties became increasingly committed to a process that unfolded in a matter of months, giving little chance for blockages to arise and seizing the initial moments when sufficient common ground between the two key parties emerged. Slow, deliberate engagement of a wide range of stakeholders was intentionally avoided, successfully demonstrating that generic lessons in complex political situations

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke should be treated with caution.40 When AMM was set up, it followed on in a similar vein. AMM did build on the experience of prior peace efforts in Aceh. HDC in 2000–03 did not grasp the fundamentally asymmetric relationship between the GoI, a legitimate sovereign state with a recently and democratically elected president, and GAM, a rebel movement (Barakat, Connolly, and Large 2002).41 AMM was conscious of this asymmetry; staff were lectured on the importance of recognizing the primacy of the Indonesian government on several occasions, including during an initial training session in Medan before deployment in September 2005. Relations between AMM and the government were prioritized, with regular visits from senior AMM staff to the government delegation appointed to liaise with the mission. AMM also interacted with GAM, but at a lower, informal level: a liaison to GAM was only officially recognized in April 2006. The guarantee of protection by police escorts for most monitoring tasks is an interesting case. It surprised some observers, and frustrated some monitors, to have one party to the conflict guaranteeing security. The police were demonstrating continued government sovereignty by doing so, and of course were also effectively monitoring the monitors.42 These escorts added to logistical problems for AMM. Escorts also gave many Acehnese a perception that the monitors held a progovernment bias when they saw monitors flanked by police escorts travelling right up to the edge of a village, even when investigating allegations made against the police. Yet the value of retaining government support and comfort in its continued sovereignty was in all likelihood a more important achievement than the neutrality that was partially lost. Although the relative success of the Helsinki peace process in Aceh owes more to the shifting domestic context than any single international factor, AMM did operate as a generally accepted arbiter between GAM and the GoI. It was able to do this by keeping a narrow role that emphasized oversight of disarmament and of high level political progress and by prioritizing relationships with the two parties to the MoU. A downside to AMM’s narrow role and asymmetrical approach was that, at least until fairly late in its existence, it did not intensively engage in other aspects of its mandate, such as overseeing reintegration and addressing human rights issues. Some of the commitments made in the MoU on these two issues remained unfulfilled when AMM finally departed.

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Supporting Peace in Aceh AMM’s narrow role frustrated some Acehnese civil and NGO leaders and international actors working on reintegration and development. Low initial levels of attention to a range of “softer” human security issues also left AMM open to critical lobbying from pressure groups and member states of the EU on the need to address concerns of human rights, civic engagement, gender equality, and similar issues as universal aims. The more focused approach that was adopted looked first and foremost to maintain high-level political progress, which limited AMM to priority areas of the peace agreement and kept it entirely clear of issues (on gender equality, for example) that were outside of these.43 At times AMM did not strictly monitor the implementation of all elements of the MoU: if it did not see aspects of the agreement as significant blockages to continued discussions, it often ignored the issue unless one party objected. Human rights issues, for example, were not comprehensively tackled because neither party made a major issue of them. Decision-makers in AMM felt that pressing the issue further would have hindered rather than helped the peace process at that stage.44 AMM’s field offices across Aceh were in a similar situation—preoccupied as they were with managing the often tense dynamics between local GAM leaders and military officials (as well as civilian government representatives) and with monitoring any security incidents. They were not in a position to undertake longer-term tasks, and they were rarely equipped with the staff or resources to do so. For example, communication was geared toward monitoring security; so instructions to field offices from headquarters dealing with human rights and reintegration had to be tailored to a short, military-style format that left little scope for addressing broad or complex issues. In short, AMM was not the right vehicle to achieve longer-term, more “developmental” objectives. Given the circumscribed space in which AMM was operating, its limited role was perhaps inevitable. The narrow focus of AMM enabled a small, temporary body to focus on core areas and avoid the risk of mission creep. The tendency of organizations to spread from their the initial mandate was perceived as a real risk within AMM, given fears that moving beyond its mandate would make it harder to leave within the planned timeframe. While AMM was kept to a tight mandate, the EU used its development assistance arm to engage in other areas as necessary. This enabled AMM to exploit its internal advantages as a security-oriented organization whose structure needed to be

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke kept simple. Externally, it also satisfied the Indonesian government’s aim of keeping international intervention to a minimum and pressed both parties to the peace agreement to make progress on their own rather than rely on external mediation.

The Reintegration of Former Combatants: First Steps Although AMM was the most visible international body supporting the Aceh peace process, other international donors and agencies were also involved, especially on issues related to the reintegration of former combatants. The third section of the Helsinki MoU outlines the…MoU outlines provisions for provisions for reintegrating former combatants and political reintegrating former combatants prisoners into Acehnese social and economic life. To this end, it stipulates “economic facilitation” for former combatants, pardoned political prisoners, and affected civilians, with a Reintegration Fund (made up of money from the central government in Jakarta) to be managed by the Acehnese authorities. Donors and other international agencies were asked by the government to assist the program by supporting delivery mechanisms and providing complementary funds and technical expertise to implement the reintegration program. A number of agencies became involved (see appendix). This section and the next provide new, first-hand evidence of international engagement on reintegration issues. Although the narrow international approach to the peace process capitalized on opportunities to provide assistance and support local ownership of the process, it failed to build on experiences of postconflict contexts elsewhere. The many international agencies in Aceh only managed to support the main government-led reintegration process successfully in small areas and were constrained by their own structures as much as by a complex political environment. Reintegration as Stipulated in the Helsinki MoU The issue of reintegration was not extensively discussed during the Helsinki negotiations. According to Damien Kingsbury, an advisor to GAM during the talks, security and political arrangements—in particular, the meaning of “special autonomy,” the issue of local political parties, and the need for

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Supporting Peace in Aceh a ceasefire—were the primary issues considered. Reintegration benefits or economic compensation were not raised in the Three Point Program that provided a basis for GAM’s negotiating position in the second round of talks in February 2005 (Kingsbury 2006: 35). The discussion of reintegration was added to the agenda for the talks by Martti Ahtisaari and CMI (Ibid.: 41). Section 3.2 of the final MoU addressed reintegration. As with other parts of the agreement, the terms describing provisions for reintegration are rather general. For example, the document refers to payments to “former combatants,” “amnestied prisoners,” and “affected civilians” without clearly defining who qualifies (especially as affected civilians) or how much they should receive. By avoiding details, the parties were able to achieve their aim of providing sufficient basis for political agreement within the desired negotiating timeframe while leaving technical issues to be worked out by those with more expertise at a later point. Ahtisaari, the experienced politician and negotiator who chaired the talks, stated the need for rapid progress, giving firm deadlines by which both parties were to reach agreement (Deutsche Presse Agentur 2005). This urgency contrasts with the earlier failed peace process that was typified by protracted discussions and an allinclusive approach. The Helsinki process was kept low-key, with Ahtisaari calming Indonesian government fears of internationalization by making it clear that the United Nations would not be involved (CMI 2005). Because the process of defining the reintegration program was a political one postHelsinki, there was relatively little space for technical input. Reintegration: Global Practice and Local Realities Reintegration involves the return of ex-combatants to civilian life, generally following the cessation of conflict. It is a common element of peace agreements and can involve a range of programs to aid the return process, including financial support, job training, and medical assistance. A wide and growing body of professional experience on reintegration efforts exists globally. Generic guidance stresses the need to consider the impact of excombatants on the communities to which they return, and hence reintegration programs increasingly include assistance to affected communities as well as individuals.45 Within the international disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) paradigm, reintegration is normally treated as a third element following from disarmament and

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke demobilization.46 This general course of action links a peace process to concrete, progressive steps. It is based on experience from a range of conflicts, and implementation is often approached as a technical exercise. The UN and other bodies have set up units to disseminate best practices on reintegration. However, postconflict environments tend to be politically tense, complex, and specific, making application of international approaches challenging. Efforts to go beyond standard methods by taking note of the local context and of political currents are not easily carried out. Some practitioners feel that because DDR is viewed as a technical field of expertise, international bodies run the risk of supporting standardized approaches in an area that is extremely politically sensitive and more contingent on specific circumstance than generalized best practices. Programs to support DDR in Aceh confronted a range of technical, political, and institutional challenges. Domestic and international organizations were constrained by internal factors that limited their ability to meet the challenge of the operating environment. The MoU left the form of distribution of resources to former combatants, political prisoners, and civilians vague. Experience with similar processes elsewhere in Indonesia and globally suggests that deciding who should receive what and how would not be straightforward. Given weak social support systems and a poor record of effective government planning, intended recipients often end up with far less than planned, and sometimes with nothing at all. This practical reality presents inconvenient barriers to implementing support programs. Implementing reintegration is far more difficult than negotiating a high-level agreement on it. The GoI initially accepted technical assistance from international organizations (in particular from UNDP and IOM, and later from the World Bank and USAID), and other agencies also were keen to provide support. Yet as time went on, national and local governments began to move ahead in designing and implementing programs without the direct assistance of international agencies. Reintegration Post-Helsinki: Multiple Tracks Discussions and actions on reintegration ran on a number of parallel tracks in the early days after the signing of the Helsinki MoU. The first involved efforts by AMM to find common ground between the parties on how reintegration should move forward. Following the signing of the MoU, the

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Supporting Peace in Aceh priority of both parties to the process and of AMM was to ensure rapid and effective implementation of the critical early steps, namely decommissioning GAM weapons and monitoring withdrawal of government military forces. The regular Commission on Security Arrangements meetings between GAM and the government continued, with both sides showing commitment to solve specific issues, such as the release of disputed prisoners or the disputed status of weapons handed over by GAM.47 Although reintegration was debated from an early point, meaningful progress was harder to reach than for some other sections of the MoU. Despite having signed the agreement, major differences between GAM and the government remained. GAM disliked the use of the word “reintegration” from the start and on various occasions suggested removing it entirely.48 To GAM, reintegration implied that their cadres were somehow isolated from society and needed to be reintroduced into its fold. Prior to the 2005–06 peace process, such steps had involved “re-education” camps for surrendered GAM soldiers and other efforts to ensure government authority was reestablished. GAM perceived itself as the guardian of Acehnese society and the Indonesian state as an unwelcome impostor: the notion of reintegration from this viewpoint was nonsensical. Second, and in parallel, Bappenas, the National Planning Agency in Jakarta, started discussions on what a Reintegration Fund would look like and how donors could support it. In the days leading up to the signing of the MoU, Bappenas realized it would have a key role to play in overseeing socioeconomic development. In the absence of clear expertise in this area— previous postconflict efforts in other parts of Indonesia such as Poso and Ambon had been ad hoc—it realized that support from international agencies was needed. Its initial request for donor support came the week after the MoU was signed and identified reintegration as one priority area for support, based in part on the World Bank’s pre-MoU conflict assessment (Barron, Clark, and Daud 2005). Beneath the sheen of coordination and common planning, various donor agencies were starting to position themselves. UNDP, IOM, and ILO engaged senior consultants with experience in DDR. The World Bank, UNDP, and no doubt others brought in expert staff who wrote ambitious notes on the reintegration process that saw their agencies at the forefront. Biweekly coordination meetings of international agencies at this point were taking place in Jakarta and involved discussions over broad principles. “International experts” who emphasized best practices from

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke other postconflict situations disagreed with locally based staff with knowledge of the Indonesian situation but less postconflict experience. The International Organization for Migration moved forward with concrete programming on the ground. An intergovernmental organization established in 1951, it focuses on many issues related to population movements. It was particularly well-positioned to respond in Aceh because it was one of the few international bodies able to conduct any work there in the years before the tsunami and had developed a large post-tsunami assistance program that was held in high regard. Senior staff at IOM had strong relationships with government officials, in particular with Hamid Awaluddin, at that time minister for Justice and Human Rights who had been involved in the Helsinki talks. In the run-up to the MoU, discussions were held over how IOM could assist, and the organization was invited to oversee the release of prisoners pardoned under the MoU and to develop a program of assistance for combatants. One of the first confidence-building measures under the peace agreement involved the release of some 1,406 prisoners under a general amnesty. This took place in late August 2005, only days after the MoU was signed. Officials from IOM met released prisoners as they left prison. IOM provided interim funds, transportation, and a medical check in accordance with recognized international standards and with the MoU. The IOM presence also reduced the risk of security threats at a time when AMM was not yet fully operational.49 The European Union provided IOM with funds for its work before the MoU was signed. IOM managed to complete the registration and provision of aid to released prisoners. They brought in a senior consultant to develop the program, and the mix of international expertise and experience in making things happen on the ground in Aceh ensured that the program was a significant success. As a result, IOM was able to present itself as the lead implementing agency for reintegration. The EU, which had no other mechanisms for delivering assistance, was happy to go along, and despite some initial jostling from other international agencies for this role, the superior technical ability of IOM to accomplish tasks quickly meant that most fell in behind it. There was, however, one problem that few at the time (including AMM) sought to highlight. The IOM program consisted of direct assistance from donors (in this case, the EU). As such, a close reading of the MoU shows that the program did not actually fulfill its conditions, which state

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that the Reintegration Fund should be managed by the authorities of Aceh using central government money. This was not a problem in the early days, and indeed the early IOM projects played a key role in ensuring stability in the immediate post-MoU period. But it did mean that at a later stage, as IOM sought to roll out its reintegration program without an overall consensus on how to proceed, the Indonesian government viewed the IOM program as additional support rather than a key reintegration activity and developed a parallel stream of programs. Helping Combatants: Political Difficulties The positive experience with prisoners did not prepare Indonesian and international officials for the political and technical challenges that the next steps of reintegration would present. Few had considered exactly how the reintegration process would occur, demonstrating a lack of practical experience at this stage. It was assumed that former combatants would emerge from hiding at the same time as GAM handed over weapons in a series of arranged events. IOM, which had received additional EU funds to support the reintegration of former combatants following its success with released prisoners, consequently Few had considered exactly sent officials to the first weapons how the reintegration decommissioning ceremonies in September 2005. IOM staff expected to process would occur receive former combatants, provide clothing, a health check, and some funds, and then pass them on to government authorities in much the same way as the program had worked for released prisoners.50 This would follow best practice models from other countries, where the processes of demobilization and disarmament were directly linked to the provision of reinsertion and reintegration benefits. But at the event, although weapons were handed over by GAM on time, ex-combatants did not emerge from hiding.51 Government officials had expected to see former combatants return to society and, along with international bodies including IOM and AMM, were caught off-guard when it did not happen. Government and international agencies began to seek a list of names, with the idea that once they had the details of the 3,000 ex-combatants stipulated in the MoU, they could provide assistance. The idea of a list of 3,000 names was attractive to international agencies, including IOM, which would have a

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke valuable tool to ensure accountability. A list would help ensure that they targeted the right recipients and would improve coordination with the government.52 GAM saw the situation differently. They had no intention of providing a list, or even of approving an anonymous, photo-based scheme, for several reasons. First, the organization was concerned that any list of names would inevitably find its way to government intelligence services, who could use it if the peace process collapsed. However, just as important was a desire from GAM leadership to keep control of reintegration funds in order to reinforce their own structures as they transitioned from an armed rebel movement to a political and social body. Third, the list had become a negotiating point in its own right to be withheld as a bargaining chip for other concessions. Finally, GAM had a genuine selection problem: despite the MoU referring to 3,000 combatants, observers slowly realized that GAM’s numbers were considerably higher.53 Rather than consisting of a small band of guerrillas hiding in the hills, combatants over the years moved in and out of towns and villages. When retired fighters, civilian members, and other core figures within GAM were all taken into account, GAM’s overall strength lay at an estimated seven times the original figure. GAM leaders risked serious internal disorder if they allowed support to flow to some core combatants but not to other affiliates. Discussions over how to adapt to the reality of larger GAM numbers were politically loaded from the start, and this shaped the ways international agencies could engage. The demand for the list of 3,000 was made first by an Indonesian military general (Major General Bambang Darmono) as part of ongoing peace discussions. AMM accepted the demand, in part because it appeared to fit with international norms for DDR and in part because the mission deemed it important to build trust with the government at this point. IOM also agreed, according to its Jakarta-based country representative Steve Cook, because the requirement fit with expectations of accountability as well as with government demands. This rigidity, however politically useful it may have been at the time, prevented creative solutions for channeling assistance to the larger group of former GAM, who presented a serious security risk if they did not see any quick benefits from the peace process. As the number 3,000 developed a logic of its own, discussion over how to deal with the larger pool of those who had been involved in GAM

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Supporting Peace in Aceh became increasingly sensitive. Early drafts of the World Bank’s GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment (World Bank 2006b) noted that the number of GAM was higher than 3,000 and drew out the challenges for targeting this larger group.54 However, when this data was presented at a closed interdepartmental meeting at Bappenas in March 2006, senior government figures were extremely worried and requested the reference to numbers of GAM be dropped. A draft memo outlining the issue was leaked within the government and found its way to the cabinet level. The country director of the World Bank at the time received a worried phone call from the coordinating minister for the economy, Aburizal Bakrie, who reminded him that this was a political matter that the World Bank should stay out of. Some in the government expressed concerns that recognition of the larger number would leave those supporting the peace process vulnerable to hard-line nationalists, who would say the increased number proved that GAM had been lying during the negotiations, and that if they had larger numbers of personnel, they must also have more guns than they said. The reference to numbers in the World Bank report was dropped, replaced by bland sentences that hinted there may be more than 3,000 ex-combatants out there. It hindsight, it is unsurprising that early efforts to find ex-combatants to “reintegrate” into society were unsuccessful. With the absence of a list, the planned IOM combatant program stalled, and funds had to be returned to Brussels. The GoI responded to the problem by providing ex-combatants with interim economic facilitation packages via GAM representatives. In November 2005, during the Muslim holy period of Ramadan, two rounds of funds were provided directly from local district heads (bupati) to GAM leaders. GAM pledged to redistribute funds in turn to their cadres. A further round followed in January 2006. In each round, 3,000 combatants were to receive 1 million rupiah each (around US$100). As might have been expected given the large number of people affiliated with GAM, subsequent monitoring by AMM and the World Bank found that although some money was reaching the right people, the funds had been spread thinly over a far wider group of supporters than had been intended by the government. Some 40 percent of active GAM members received less than Rp. 200,000 over the three rounds of payments, with significant discrepancies between districts. In some areas, such as Aceh Barat Daya District, some received as little as Rp. 30,000, or just over US$3 (World Bank 2006b).

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke While these problems continued, two basic issues could not be addressed. The first concerned the needs of former combatants themselves: failing to attend to them increased the risks of criminal acts or local level contraventions of the peace agreement, which could in turn escalate toward a more Politics…reduced the scope systematic breakdown if the other party retaliated. The second was a more for innovative solutions practical issue: how to channel support so that all recipients stipulated in the MoU received funds. Politics in Jakarta and Aceh reduced the scope for innovative solutions to emerging problems. The politics of what was a firmly government-led process reduced the scope for international agencies to provide advice on reintegration issues. More positively, the actual situation on the ground was calmer than had been predicted. Former combatants gradually felt confident enough to return to villages, and despite some continued tensions at the local level, the number of reprisals or similar incidents was low. AMM-verified incidents, most of which were minor, declined from a monthly high of 107 in October 2005 to 20 in February 2006. This reflected the continued positive high-level commitment of both parties to peace and the control that senior leaders retained over local commanders. In this environment, continued discussions between GAM and the government unfolded relatively smoothly. Each party pushed the other so that it could maximize its position, but within the limits defined by the overall agreement. Discussions focused, for example, on the quality of arms handed in by GAM and on whether or not the monitors should accept each one as a functioning weapon. As the agreement continued to hold, the reintegration process, including the list of names and the failure of the government to provide assistance as expected (given its stated need for a list), became a negotiating tool.

The Reintegration Process Continues: Islands of Aid By early 2006, many government departments were involved in planning different elements of the reintegration package. The office of the governor of Aceh began to play an important role, although strategic decisions continued to be made in Jakarta, with the Coordinating Ministry for Security, Politics, and Law (Menko Polhukam) and Vice President Kalla’s office key. Separate initiatives also emerged at the district level using local budgets.55

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Supporting Peace in Aceh In order to give some order to the reintegration process, the government in early 2006 decided to establish the Aceh Peaceful Reintegration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh, or BRA) to channel and coordinate reintegration assistance. International agencies were broadly supportive. The move answered concerns among international agency staff in Jakarta that there was a lack of structure to the evolving reintegration program and hence no clear government counterparts for offering assistance. BRA was established under the governor of Aceh. In many ways, BRA was a response to Forum Bersama, the earlier initiative established with American assistance and backed by the governor that aimed to set up a transparent process of discussions and debate on the peace process through a series of working groups. BRA, a government body, would ensure that decisions on reintegration were made by government representatives. Although the agency’s primary role was to plan and spend the reintegration budget allocated by the central government, it also took over some of the coordination function that Forum Bersama had been planning to play. Although on the face of it the establishment of BRA devolved decisionmaking over reintegration from Jakarta to Aceh, it can also be seen as a means for central agencies in Jakarta to ensure they maintained control. Even though BRA was set up under the governor, it soon became clear that Jakarta was setting the direction. Bappenas coordinated the development of the reintegration budget (the funds from the central government to be spent on reintegration programs). BRA in essence reported to Bappenas and to the Coordinating Ministry for Security, Law, and Politics, which was responsible for political elements of the peace process. Indeed, BRA staff complained privately that they had little scope to shape how budgets would be spent, including the delivery mechanisms used for reaching different target groups.56 With a growing body of international agencies interested in entering the reintegration discussion, including UNDP and the World Bank, the Coordinating Ministry for Security, Law, and Politics took steps to ensure it controlled the process. Forum Bersama was folded into the BRA structure, and its mandate was changed to being a weaker “think tank” for reintegration issues. Poor initial relations between the implementation arm (and in particular BRA coordinator Islahuddin) and the think tank arm of BRA reduced the scope for international actors to directly influence reintegration policies and programs, except where agencies were directly supporting BRA

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke programs (as was the case for the IOM-supported prisoner and the World Bank-supported victims programs). BRA kept the international community at a distance—as observers but not as direct participants—and ensured that central agencies in Jakarta stayed involved. Implementing the Government Reintegration Program In late 2005, the GoI drafted a reintegration budget for the rest of 2005 and 2006 that amounted in theory to some Rp. 850 billion (over US$85 million). It included provision for aid and land or housing for 8,844 exGAM households;57 government land to be distributed to ex-GAM members or “victims of conflict”; housing funds for some 16–20,000 victims who lost homes and for affected local civil servants, including teachers; the establishment of vocational training centers; and support for 12,000 transmigrants to return to Aceh and for 6,500 individuals affiliated with antiseparatist groups. BRA was tasked with managing the initial program, with further funds to follow. It was apparent that many of the issues in the proposed government budget would be not only politically controversial but also difficult to operationalize. Yet at this point GAM was not properly involved in discussing the terms of reintegration assistance. The main ongoing peace discussions chaired by AMM were narrow in format and scope, with biweekly meetings to discuss key points. There were no parallel talks or subcommittees in operation, which limited the scope for time-consuming or complex issues such as reintegration, as well as grassroots-level experience, to filter up to top-level decision-makers. The result was a gap between field reality and political discussions. A workshop on peacebuilding, sponsored by USAID and UNDP, had already been held in Banda Aceh in December 2005. It helped begin a process of interchange between GAM and the government on reintegration issues. As tensions receded further and more GAM figures emerged into the public sphere, it became possible for the two parties to begin discussing elements of the peace process without mediation. By March 2006, BRA was An agreement was beginning to operate as a body that could bridge the gap between GAM and the brokered in early 2006 government and then engage with international agencies. An agreement was brokered in early 2006 that aimed to move ahead with payments to former

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Supporting Peace in Aceh combatants and with a process for compensating “affected civilians” as stipulated in the peace agreement. Former combatants were to receive support indirectly. The government had by this point dropped its insistence on a list of names of former combatants, agreeing instead to let former GAM leaders set up microprojects for groups of their former cadres. Project proposals were to be vetted by a BRA committee to ensure some transparency.58 Many international actors saw this proposal as risky, even though they recognized that the very act of developing a joint agreement between former rebels and the government with little external intervention was a positive step. The proposed processes were not transparent, did not adhere to expectations of best practices, and did not achieve the goal of splitting up former rebel units. It was not a process that international agencies could engage with, since it did not meet their requirements.59 Civilians affected by conflict were offered a different mechanism that both GAM and the government agreed on. BRA set up a list of ten criteria to identify valid recipients. Each was to be given Rp. 10 million in cash (over US$1,000). Again, international agencies complained that this process was doomed to failure: the criteria were vague, appraisal would prove impossible, the number of people included under the agreed criteria was likely to be massive, and in any case there was no proven way of channeling funds that would not run the risk of massive “leakages.” One of the two processes proposed by the government and GAM at least partially worked. The other did not. Monitoring by the World Bank and the EU suggested that micro-projects for former GAM combatants did manage to provide funds and livelihoods to some of the target group (Zurstrassen 2006), and the management by former GAM leaders was more effective than international agencies had predicted. Given the lack of other available mechanisms for delivering support, this has to be regarded as a modest success. In contrast, the proposed system for awarding compensation to affected civilians failed and was eventually abandoned. Once publicized, the vetting process was flooded with tens of thousands of applications. It is estimated that proposals covered in total around 700,000 persons. The scheme proved unworkable, as advisers in international agencies had predicted. The politically sensitive nature of the reintegration process emerged once more in April 2006, when the recently formed BRA imploded as the initial chairman, Usman Hasan, resigned claiming ill health. It took several

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke weeks until a replacement acceptable to both parties was found. Prior to the resignation, a former military figure on BRA had attempted to channel reintegration funds to progovernment groups (“militia” or antiseparatists) that had been active in opposing GAM and who were linked with influential local business figures. A total of 6,500 were to receive assistance from BRA. Discussions with Irwandi Yusuf, at that time senior GAM representative to AMM, suggested GAM might accept that benefits would be paid to these groups “for the sake of peace” but could not accept the involvement of former militia on the decision-making boards of BRA and Forum Bersama.60 In the end, the antiseparatists left BRA along with all other nongovernmental representatives, including civil society figures and, indeed, GAM. The issue occupied both parties in the continuing highlevel peace negotiations for several weeks and further stymied international efforts to make progress on reintegration. Meanwhile, other government agencies were charged with implementing different parts of the reintegration package. Local district heads and mayors in some areas were finding available land for resettlement, and some line ministries were also developing programs. Few of these speculative plans were built on international best practices, despite the large foreign presence in Aceh, a range of experiences with such programs in different countries, and broad acceptance that local government had inadequate mechanisms to deliver support. June 2006–Early 2007: Consolidating Peace, Mixed Progress on Reintegration Throughout 2006, peace strengthened in Aceh, with both parties continuing to adhere to the MoU and an absence of any major incidents despite some continued tension. The new Law on the Governing of Aceh, cementing the degree of autonomy to be granted to Aceh, was approved in Jakarta in July. Despite some serious reservations, GAM decided to respect the process. Elections for governor and for the leaders of many of Aceh’s districts were held in December 2006. GAM-affiliated candidates fared far better than most outside observers had predicted, with Irwandi Yusuf elected governor. His election, and more generally GAM’s success at the polls, further strengthened the prospects for longer-term peace, and although threats— including rifts within GAM and potential backsliding on agreements in Jakarta—were genuine concerns that could undermine stability, the overall

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Supporting Peace in Aceh situation in Aceh was more positive than most observers had hoped for just eighteen months earlier (ICG 2007a). Over this period, progress on the overall situation in reintegration was mixed. Available information suggests a gradually [became] more positive increasing level of extortion and crime, some of which was attributed to former combatants. With few alternative sources of livelihood and a background of raising illicit revenue locally through arbitrary taxes, some former GAM combatants and local leaders resorted or returned to crime (World Bank/ DSF 2007).61 The Indonesian government provided some funds from the reintegration budget, but as international observers had predicted, support was haphazard in its targeting and piecemeal in its delivery. GAM finally felt that it could hand over a list of 3,000 ex-combatants to AMM (which then passed the list on to BRA) in return for an economic assistance package totaling Rp. 25 million (US$2,750) per person. Other groups, including GAM “noncombatants,” amnestied prisoners, antiseparatists, GAM members who surrendered before the peace agreement, and civilian victims of conflict were also due to receive support.62 By and large, the funding initiatives undertaken by BRA were similar to the earlier support for ex-combatants, or indeed to many schemes undertaken by the Indonesian government elsewhere. Mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating effectiveness were well below the standards that international agencies generally insist upon. Checks on who actually received funds and whether they had been put to productive use that impacted local community relationships were haphazard and largely motivated by local political or financial interests that wanted to channel assistance toward favored groups. It is interesting to compare BRA with the far larger BRR, the government coordination body set up to monitor post-tsunami reconstruction. BRR was established under a presidential decree with its leader given the same authority as a senior cabinet minister. In contrast, BRA was established under the governor of Aceh. BRR had major inputs of international technical assistance, a dedicated anticorruption unit, and hundreds of staff, while BRA had just a handful.63 UNDP, the EU, and other bodies provided funds and technical assistance to BRA, but in small amounts, incomparable

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke with what BRR received. BRA’s capacity to deliver programs was weak and relied on existing mechanisms, including the Social Affairs agency, local government, and GAM’s own networks. Senior figures in BRA did not possess the power or direct contacts of BRR’s leadership. The lack of effective reintegration delivery mechanisms made it hard to provide former combatants with sustainable, peaceful livelihoods. A preoccupation with budgets and funding flows on the part of the GoI, GAM, and international agencies also contributed to this problem. The size and distribution of budgets dominated reintegration discussions. Locallevel reconciliation, access to employment and economic opportunities, and concern for justice or human rights were secondary. Problems with reintegration had been predicted in advance by international agencies, with concerns already being raised in 2005, shortly after the MoU was signed, over the weakness of the process to decide upon reintegration support.64 Despite knowledge of these shortcomings from an early date, international agencies failed to make concerted inroads into the reintegration process. International Involvement Revisited: Progress of Key Agencies With the GoI wanting to control international engagement in the peace process, donors attempting to enter the scene had to work hard. It took time and patience for them to establish relationships, both in Aceh and in Jakarta, that might enable the Indonesian parties to take advantage of their technical expertise. In some cases, such “expertise” proved not to be particularly helpful, which may have prevented a wider role for agencies as time went on. International Organization for Migration: Political Constraints to Delivering Projects IOM offered an efficient technical approach that gave priority to concrete impact over political process. This shielded the organization from some of the inevitable problems associated with shifting policies and shared decisionmaking. Yet the approach also risked promoting technically competent yet politically irrelevant programming. Although IOM arguably developed the best reintegration programs of the aid agencies, the extent to which these programs influenced the government’s broader reintegration effort was minimal. By late 2005, IOM’s main program of support for former combatants had failed to take off, despite the fact that the organization had set up a

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range of district offices to administer funds. These problems were overcome later when IOM stopped demanding a list of combatants, perhaps in response to the government’s de-emphasis of the issue. Its combatant program restarted with funding from the Embassy of Japan and provided effective assistance. However, this required moving the program beyond the political realm of the MoU. IOM also managed to set up several other programs, including in conflict-affected communities, with support from USAID and UNDP, and a psychosocial program for conflict victims with support from Norway and the World Bank. BRA, Bappenas, and GAM did not treat these programs as part of official reintegration assistance, and the opportunities to use IOM delivery mechanisms (and accompanying technical knowledge) to influence broader government reintegration strategies were lost. UNDP: Providing Technical Support to the Government The second major agency involved, UNDP, focused in 2005–06 on providing technical assistance to Bappenas. Alejandro Bendana (originally a Nicaraguan Sandinista politician and more recently a postconflict specialist) sat in Bappenas from an early point. Yet his influence was minimal. Language difficulties prevented cooperation with Bappenas staff, and Bappenas also appeared reluctant to cede any real decision-making to a foreigner. UNDP has long worked with Bappenas, and good relations between the head of its conflict program, Kusuma Adinugroho, and senior Bappenas figures created space for UNDP support, despite initial wariness from the UN about becoming heavily involved. After Bendana’s departure, UNDP developed a new program to help Bappenas formulate reintegration budgets. The downside of this approach was that until mid-2007, UNDP’s capacity in Aceh remained weak, with most support targeted in Jakarta. until mid-2007, UNDP’s capacity At times the value of their assistance was unclear, given the in Aceh remained weak relative capacity already existing in Bappenas compared with BRA, which was facing many difficulties on the ground in Banda Aceh. UNDP promised a package of technical assistance for BRA, but it was finally developed only in the second half of 2007, causing some agencies to voice their frustrations at UNDP’s “inability to deliver.”65 Assistance that did arrive primarily focused on areas such as gender and conflict sensitivity.

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke But without concrete programs to back these efforts, UNDP advisors had little impact. European Union: Key Donor, but Still Limited Options for Support The European Commission was the key international funding body behind peacebuilding in Aceh. The commission funded the initial peace negotiations in Helsinki in early 2005 and followed up with backing for AMM. It supported these efforts with a range of developmental initiatives, including assistance for the reintegration of former combatants, aid to conflictaffected communities, and human rights training for government officials. The EU channeled peacebuilding assistance, which totaled around US$20 million (not including the cost of the Aceh Monitoring Mission), through other international agencies—IOM, UNDP, and the German Technical Cooperation Agency. Despite its role as a funder rather than implementer, the EU still deployed considerable staff in Jakarta and in Aceh. It had already established a presence in Banda Aceh following the tsunami, and it recruited and positioned experienced conflict specialists to work directly with government bodies in Aceh.66 The presence of staff on the ground is generally felt to have been an essential asset in developing sufficiently sensitive programs and engaging with other local and international bodies.67 Nevertheless, the EU had relatively limited options, which consisted chiefly of funding other agencies or providing advisers. USAID: Investing in Structures USAID supported various measures around the peace process, including public information campaigns and some local poverty-reduction projects. As noted, the United States also funded Forum Bersama, an attempt to create a meeting place for the GoI, GAM, and other Acehnese or international actors to discuss and work collaboratively in support of the peace process. Forum Bersama resulted from regular meetings in Banda Aceh between key USAID staff and local officials (most notably Azwar Abubakar, the acting governor of Aceh) over a long period. USAID’s aim— building common positions to broaden what had been a narrow negotiation process and to enable agencies to promote issues of common concern—was a logical step that followed best practice models of promoting an inclusive process. It also responded to specific concerns that the high-level negotiations

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Supporting Peace in Aceh marginalized many local groups. Forum Bersama provided a neutral, lowlevel forum from early 2006, and AMM viewed it as a valuable initiative that could continue to ensure an international profile on an unofficial basis once the mission withdrew. But Forum Bersama did not realize its goal. Other international agencies found it to be too closely aligned to its donor and perhaps inevitably unable to offer a genuine space for groups to work in common. By late-2006, Indonesian government authorities also felt that Forum Bersama was not yet reaching its objectives, although many also felt that it had some potential to do so.68 When determining mechanisms to fill the vacuum left by AMM’s departure, the government chose to develop a new body (the FKK) rather than work through Forum Bersama, which had much larger donor participation. World Bank: Building on Existing Mechanisms The World Bank preferred to employ the existing system it had previously helped set up across Indonesia. The Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) operated across Aceh after it was scaled-up post-tsunami. With the collapse of BRA’s initial planned assistance for conflict victims, an opportunity arose to employ the program based on a World Bank needs assessment that had recommended the use of local systems like KDP for reintegration assistance (World Bank 2006b). Initial discussions on a plane from Jakarta to Aceh between a World Bank representative and the deputy head of BRA sparked interest from the government agency at a point when BRA was facing major problems with its victims program. The World Bank then produced a concept for how KDP could be used and started to canvass interest from other donors and Jakarta government agencies. The program involved block grants transferred to villages to assist conflict-affected persons. BRA spent US$24 million of its 2006 funds on the program, covering around 1,700 villages, or 30 percent of all those in The [World Bank] program Aceh, as chosen by BRA using a World involved block grants Bank-generated conflict index. Villagers chose the beneficiaries through a transferred to villages process of conflict victims mapping and then decided how funds should be allocated and what they should be spent on. The conceptual logic behind

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke the program was that communities know best who should receive assistance and how to prioritize claims. This approach seemed necessary given that BRA’s original ten criteria for conflict victims were so broad that they covered most of Aceh’s population. Program rules stated that fund disbursement could only come after the development of technically verified proposals for spending the money, with on-the-ground facilitators providing expertise (World Bank 2007). If the Indonesian government had followed the same logic, it would have channeled other forms of assistance to conflict victims through the program. Yet parallel to the program, BRA channeled direct cash payments to conflict victims through its diyat program (direct compensation to the families of conflict victims paid through the social affairs agency) and provided various other ad-hoc benefits to victim groups. The government did not fully follow the BRA-KDP plan for various reasons. First, it was promoted by only one donor agency: each international body involved in victim assistance was proposing its own vision of how support should be provided. Second, government decision-makers wished to retain overall control of the reintegration process rather than cede it to any internationally affiliated program. BRA felt that it was not getting credit when the program was successful, with communities (mistakenly) thinking funds were from the World Bank. Third, both the government and GAM perceived a need to provide direct support to individuals rather than to communities and were concerned about the accuracy of targeting. The political need to recompense individual claimants was not fully met by a community-based scheme. Long-term institutional rivalries supported fears in other donor agencies that their own plans would be pushed aside by a better-funded, slicker World Bank operation. Some also felt that the World Bank’s claim to promote “community-driven development” was somewhat overblown. The World Bank was unable, or felt it was not its role, to address such concerns, feeling that as KDP was a government mechanism (run by the Ministry of Home Affairs) and being used to channel government resources (in this case, from BRA), these agencies should share results and progress. Lack of information also raised doubts about the program. In the end, BRA put a stop to the program, deciding not to move ahead with the planned second round in 2007–08, despite evidence that it was extremely popular among

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Supporting Peace in Aceh communities and that funds were by and large being used effectively (World Bank 2007). Donor Programs: Overlap, Lack of Cohesion, but Filling Some Gaps Throughout the reintegration process, all of the donors implementing reintegration programs worked, to a large extent, outside of the main government line ministry delivery systems. This is normal donor practice, especially in disaster and postconflict settings, and agencies such as IOM, the World Bank, and USAID sought to keep in contact with government departments as well as to coordinate their mechanisms with BRA’s objectives. The need of agencies to remain even-handed, with deference to GAM as well as to the government, added to the challenge they faced in implementing programs. But parallel delivery processes emerged.69 Donors also struggled to coordinate effectively among themselves. They had little success in forming a common position through which to propose alternative ways of operating, although regular discussion among officials in Aceh did minimize overlap and help share information. Part of the lack of coordination stemmed from donor concerns that the government would think international organizations were trying to take over the process. A formal donor group on reintegration was never formed, although the donors did meet frequently in bilateral settings and through Forum Bersama. For a while, informal meetings at Caswell’s took place. But attempts to arrive at common positions were challenging. Even when donors did agree, for example on problems with the assistance package for combatants, they rarely spoke with one voice. Attempts to get agencies to sign a joint letter to BRA stating such concerns and assuring support stalled as the language in the letter became less precise and watered down and agencies started to argue over whose name should go first. Lack of linkages between donors was frustrating to agency representatives, who could see the shortcomings on the ground but had little scope to change them, and to staff in BRA. Islahuddin, a senior coordinator in BRA, later stated that he had hoped to see collective engagement and support from donors rather than criticism from afar, and was frustrated at the inability of many donors to provide the basic help he needed.70 As in other locations, setting up operations in Aceh was not simple. Even with the benefit of an institutional base established since the

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tsunami, agencies including the EU, World Bank, UNDP, and IOM were still working to place staff and resources in Banda Aceh over much of 2005 The international and even 2006. The international community was inherently limited in community was inherently what it could offer, largely unable to limited in what it could offer create competent offices on the ground that could engage in political processes as well as implement projects. Donors often cannot trust government systems to deliver assistance and will struggle to set up programs on shifting political sands. Yet they can also achieve little in isolation from government. Aid agency staff on the ground also have difficulty collaborating due to different office priorities and professional opinions. Less effective government bodies, including the newly formed BRA, may at first find that a plethora of international bodies simply confuses the picture. The failure of international actors to present a coherent perspective allows an effective government to pick and choose what advice to take and to play agencies off against each other. For international engagement to add value on the ground, it needs to combine grounded, field-based approaches with wider policy involvement. A supportive “road-map” document for reintegration, developed collaboratively by international bodies at an early stage in the process, could have provided ideas amenable to GAM and the Indonesian government for planning more effective assistance. But the likelihood of such a plan taking root and being conducted effectively would have depended on the domestic dynamics of the peace process and on the quality of international agency involvement. Neither element worked in its favor. International donors and peace monitors do not generally have a strong track record in responding to sensitive domestic political challenges. Given that the key factors driving the success of the peace process in Aceh were the positive orientations of the key domestic parties involved, a more limited international engagement may have been preferable to an overbearing presence.

Conclusion By analyzing how international agencies turned policies into programs on the ground, this study has made a number of arguments about (1) why

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Supporting Peace in Aceh peace has thus far held in Aceh, (2) the role of international agencies, and (3) the lessons for international support of other peace processes. First, the study has shown that international engagement played a part in bringing peace to Aceh and ensuring it endured, but this was by and large in a supporting role. The bulk of credit for the success of the peace process should be given to the GoI and GAM. Strong commitments from both sides—underpinned by enthusiasm from the people of Aceh—allowed ongoing hurdles to be overcome. The rise to power of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a figure with much respect from and control of the Indonesian military apparatus, meant that, in stark contrast to the last failed attempt at peace, a political commitment to peace would not be usurped by dissent from military ranks. GAM also demonstrated greater commitment than before. They suffered heavy losses during the 2003–04 period of martial law and from the tsunami. It became clear to GAM leaders that they could not win militarily, and they committed themselves to a peaceful solution. Nevertheless, international involvement was useful, particularly in strengthening the incentives for both parties to adhere to the Helsinki MoU after it was signed. Generally these incentives were an indirect consequence of the tsunami and the subsequent reconstruction effort, which increased the spotlight of the international media and embassies on the actions of the conflicting sides. Global media attention was accompanied by a protracted and extensive international presence on the ground, with hundreds of agencies working where there were previously very few. This proliferation of agencies acted as a positive check on both parties to the conflict, who were concerned with maintaining a positive international profile. The real need of the government for post-disaster support created space for organizations to engage on the ground; difficulties in implementing tsunami projects drew aid agencies incrementally into conflict issues in the areas in which they worked. Major injections of funds also stimulated the local economy, providing business opportunities for contractors (including those established by or affiliated with GAM leaders) and jobs for underemployed workers (including some former combatants). In the longer run, this economic situation helped in the reintegration of former combatants and prisoners—perhaps more so than the formal reintegration programs— although inequalities in access to post-tsunami resources and jobs may cause difficulties in the longer-run. Indeed, the post-tsunami effort probably played a larger role in contributing to peace in Aceh than the dedicated

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke reintegration programming that followed the Helsinki MoU. This demonstrates the importance in postconflict settings of considering the impacts of all development interventions on conflict and peace, rather than only those that are seen as “peacebuilding” or “reintegration” projects (Barron 2007). International actors also played a direct role in supporting the peace agreement, most notably through the Aceh Monitoring Mission. AMM took the peace process forward by overseeing events on the ground—such as demobilization and decommissioning—that began to generate their own positive momentum. It did so by keeping to a fairly narrow mission and avoiding a wider, more complex array of issues. Although this approach led to some inefficiencies, especially in reintegration work, it also ensured that AMM stuck to core strengths. This pragmatic, operational approach does not accord with the expectations of a human security approach that generally favors more inclusive, wider peace processes. Yet the experience of Aceh, especially if contrasted with places such as Timor Leste, appears to show that a limited role for international agencies can result in better outcomes if domestic commitment to peace holds and domestic government bodies are functional enough to put the commitment into practice. In any case, most international agencies will simply be unable to successfully pursue a complex, wider mission even if the situation calls for it. Other aid agencies—most notably the EU, USAID, UNDP, the Embassy of Japan, and the World Bank—were involved in supporting reintegration. Each committed considerable financial and human resources. Such efforts contributed significantly to reintegration by filling gaps and providing much-needed assistance to key groups such as former prisoners, combatants, and conflict-affected communities. However, by and large international agencies and expertise did not shape the overall direction of the reintegration program or other elements of MoU implementation. Programs of aid agencies tended to run parallel to government programs; donor-supported spaces for policy formulation (such as Forum Bersama) were marginal in determining the direction of the reintegration program in 2005–06. International aid agencies thus played a relatively minor role, although at certain points support from different agencies or individuals helped keep things on track. A second finding of this study is that the primary reason for this more circumscribed role was the strength of the GoI, which was able to retain control of the process of implementing the MoU. Worries about being seen

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Supporting Peace in Aceh to push the government too much prevented the development of common positions on reintegration strategies, and this also prevented potentially productive coordination between bodies. As a result, most postconflict international engagement occurred on a relatively small scale and was largely restricted to low-level support in the GoI…was able to retain specific areas such as reintegration of control of the [MoU former combatants and assistance to conflict victims. With the government implementation] process concerned that it would lose control of the process due to the apparent availability of international aid—as occurred in the aftermath of the tsunami in early 2005—donors attempting to enter the scene did not find easy access points. The chief exception was AMM, part of a more political and direct engagement led by the EU and linked directly to the peace agreement. But it too kept to a narrow mission and departed from Aceh once it was viable to do so. AMM’s narrow role suited the GoI (worried about losing sovereignty) and its organizers in the EU (concerned about becoming entrenched for too long in too many fields). This had many benefits, including enabling a largely domestic process to develop its own dynamic and limiting external involvement in areas where organizations may not have had the capacity to engage. Such a narrow approach also contained drawbacks. It limited the scope to set any kind of framework for international assistance, for example in the field of reintegration. It risked alienating some civil society groups within Aceh, possibly leading to a missed opportunity to broaden political processes. And a strong concern for maintaining good relations with Jakarta meant that opportunities were lost to help resolve some of the fundamental issues underlying the conflict. Most notably, some Acehnese feel that AMM was not sufficiently critical of the Government of Indonesia’s Law on the Governing of Aceh in 2006. The final text approved by parliament in Jakarta does not address some important issues of political autonomy and, it is argued, does not completely fulfil the terms of the peace agreement signed the previous year (Schulze 2007: 27–28). It is difficult to say if AMM’s position successfully ensured Jakarta’s support for the entire process and kept international involvement out of areas where it would have done more harm than good, or if the mission’s

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke approach failed to seize a rare opportunity to push for a comprehensive solution. Although a narrow approach seems to have been justified, there may have been more scope for encouraging further concessions from the government than AMM realized. The circumscribed room of the aid agencies to influence reintegration strategies had pluses and minuses. A low profile on the part of international actors helped government ministries and planners to implement their projects without raising fears that an international presence was infringing on sovereignty. Most international actors with experience in Aceh were acutely aware of these tensions and gave little publicity to their engagement in peacebuilding.71 The highly public tsunami reconstruction programs meant that smaller-scale work on conflict issues could go unnoticed. A third finding is that tremendous variation existed in the ability of different aid agencies to have an impact. Maintaining an engaged presence on the ground involved active negotiation with relevant government departments in Jakarta and in Aceh. Donor agencies used experience working with central and local governments to create space and secure official invitations to be involved in implementing programs for reintegration. Those agencies that maintained a strong relationship with local and national governments included, perhaps most notably, IOM, which had high-level links in Jakarta as well as existing field involvement in Aceh, USAID, whose links with local government in Aceh enabled it to move ahead with programming, and UNDP, which had strong relations with Bappenas. A combination of personal connections and long-established programs gave agencies the capacity to move rapidly with government support and to build on existing bases of institutional knowledge that others did not have. Analysis of the different roles played by the donor agencies uncovers some key factors found among those who managed to engage. These include: •

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Experience. Organizations previously working on conflict issues across Aceh were noticeably more able to plan and implement programs. These included USAID, the World Bank, IOM, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, as well as some international NGOs such as Medecins Sans Frontieres. Staff skills. International actors that successfully assisted in the peace process displayed confidence and understanding of a complex

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•

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and sensitive political situation. Organizations that employed staff with relevant generic skills (e.g., political analysis or conflict experience) or specific knowledge (e.g., language or understanding of Indonesia) were more able to engage. Internal space to operate. This included freedom to allocate funds and scope to negotiate with government officials in Jakarta and with GAM and local government in Aceh. Presence in Aceh. For organizations initiating and implementing programs of support rather than funding other bodies, this presence is important. In a complex and changing environment, implementation requires staff on the ground able to interact with all parties. Few international actors were geared up to engage in this manner. A low-key approach. Given Indonesian concerns within the military and other influential elements in Jakarta over internationalization, a quiet approach was more effective. The temporary ejection of UNHCR from Aceh in mid-2005 demonstrated the need to act with caution.

International engagement was most effective when it diverged from blanket solutions in three ways: (1) by building on practical experience gained elsewhere rather than adopting policy-led positions; (2) by realizing and working within the limitations that a specific agency has in a particular country, even where this may differ from the agency’s global International engagement was comparative advantage; and (3) by understanding the specific context most effective when it diverged and shaping assistance accordingly. from blanket solutions At the same time, bridging gaps between field staff and agency offices and procedures at higher levels was important to ensure continued buy-in from both senior management in aid agencies and the government in Jakarta, constructive use of political weight by aid agencies, and that decisions made locally met international standards. A primary factor leading to differences in success of various programs was the extent to which they were based on understandings of local political and bureaucratic realities in Aceh and Jakarta rather than on

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke “technical” quality alone. International agencies—or, more accurately, their staff—were able to be effective when they navigated between institutional priorities and the constraints (and incentives) of local actors. Given constantly changing dynamics on the ground and the fact that the government was very much in charge of peace process implementation, agencies were most effective when they used their resources to find solutions in partnership with local actors. Management therefore needed to foster creativity and flexibility at the ground level. Evidence from the case material presented in this study suggests a fourth conclusion: donor agencies may not need to prioritize coordination of aid and development of a common strategy too highly. International experience calls for the adoption of common frameworks for postconflict programming that link initial decommissioning and demobilization to reintegration measures and then longer-run development strategies. Typically in postconflict states, the UN (or other donor bodies such as the EU) play the lead role in outlining a process, with the government often in the backseat. In Indonesia, this was never going to be the case, given the strength of the state and the considerable domestic resources available. In Aceh, coordination was led by the government. Security issues were held together by a range of bodies that answered directly to high levels of the national government (in particular the Coordinating Ministry for Security, Law, and Politics and Bappenas) and, ultimately, to the president. Local government bodies in Aceh were less involved, and that is a significant issue of its own as it may result in less buy-in or local capacity later on, but the basic premise of ownership by government was clear. With the Government of Indonesia leading the process, bureaucratic procedures at times resulted in less-than-ideal programming decisions, and opportunities for drawing on international practices were sometimes limited. Yet Jakarta might have viewed the adoption of common internationally driven frameworks as a threat. In such a case, the incentive structures of the government and GAM that were promoting a resolution to the conflict might have been derailed. Strong international leadership by default demotes indigenous bodies— especially government bodies but sometimes also local NGOs, who tend to have their best staff poached by higher paying international agencies—to a marginal position, a condition that is unlikely to support sustainable

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solutions. It is unclear whether international models for postconflict assistance—which tend to draw on a body of theory and practice largely developed from devastated postconflict states in sub-Saharan Africa—had much relevance for Aceh (or other conflicts in middle-income countries), where the state was still strong and markets were functioning. Experience from Aceh suggests that a pragmatic approach and realistic expectations of how international actors can contribute to solving domestic problems through direct intervention or aid programs may result in more sustainable solutions than all-embracing approaches. Insofar as the EU practiced a coordinated human security approach in Aceh, it was by adopting a range of inputs split between two main bodies, the European Commission and the European Council, rather than by creating an allembracing mechanism. The European Commission’s funding for reintegration assistance and other inputs overlapped and followed from AMM. Although its assistance might have appeared piecemeal, it enabled different bodies to operate in their fields of competence. A loosely connected and informally networked international community fulfilled a similar function—enabling some coordination and avoiding overlap, but ensuring domestic leadership of domestic processes. This was far from ideal, and certainly frustrated international staff taking part at the time, but it is perhaps the best that the international community collectively is likely to be able to provide in most cases. In conclusion, the analysis shows the extent to which many international agencies are ill-equipped to construct effective programs that support peace processes. Globally, contemporary donor development agencies and knowledge are heavily focused toward postconflict [there is an] absence of local reconstruction in shattered states (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan) or to operations in actors [offering] analysis and areas of limited state control (e.g., policy prescriptions Somalia, Sudan). A commonly perceived need for external solutions in these contexts serves to reinforce the absence of local actors in analysis and policy prescriptions. In doing so, international actors risk overlooking the local context and the need to plan around the possible rather than the desirable (see, for example, Glasius 2006). Attempts to encourage broad policies within the EU that

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke connect “hard” security issues with “soft” social and human rights concerns require very careful application in practice. Otherwise, international organizations risk encouraging overly ambitious expectations of what external interventions may be able to achieve. However strongly they may be affected by global events or international actors, conflicts generate specific and distinct contextual dynamics that in each case require knowledge and experience to understand (Kalyvas 2001: 118). It is not surprising that the key donors who were able to become involved with peace promotion in Aceh were those with staff on the ground and whose institutions provided the necessary space for addressing the specific dynamics of the conflict rather applying a generic model. For international agencies, even a narrow approach requires understanding and political sensitivity. Perhaps most significantly, time horizons for interventions are often too short. Most agencies also have inadequate understanding of local institutional, political, and cultural environments. In Aceh, this led at times to a channeling of international aid into separate silos, with directly implemented projects effective but having little impact on the longer-term institution-building needed for sustainable peace. Finally, international agencies struggled to adapt to a postconflict environment in which they were not the key players. Analytically, the implications are that assessments of aid effectiveness in postconflict environments need to concentrate more on how interventions contribute to longer-run processes of institution-building than on immediate outcomes. Operationally, international agencies involved in peacebuilding need to improve their local knowledge and restructure their own institutions in order to do so. For Aceh, it is not yet entirely clear if 2005–06 represents a successfully grasped opportunity to build domestic peace in favorable international circumstances or whether it will end up being seen as a golden chance that was only partly seized.

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Endnotes Thanks to Scott Guggenheim, Michael Bak, Sidney Jones, Renate Korber, Leena Avonius, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on drafts of this monograph. Conversations with many people, including Soei Liong Liem, Sandra Hamid, Lina Frodin, Mark Knight, and Suprayoga Hadi, helped sharpen many of the points in the paper. This views in the monograph are those of the authors and do not represent the views of any organization with which the authors are, or have been, affiliated. 1. Cases since 1997 include Kosovo, Iraq, and our case here—Aceh. 2. Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 15/2005 outlined ministerial and agency responsibilities for implementation of the provisions of the agreement. 3. See, for example Kell 1995; Reid 2006; Aspinall and Crouch 2003; McGibbon 2004; Schulze 2004; Sukma 2004; Aspinall 2006; numerous ICG analyses; and Barron and Clark 2006. 4. The European Union’s central institutions include the European Commission, the main bureaucracy that deals with foreign aid (among many other issues), and the European Council, a more political body that runs EU peace monitoring operations and other foreign policy tasks. 5. The final group of 2,150 police actually departed on January 4, 2006. 6. As reported in local media. Figures are from the Aceh Conflict Monitoring Updates, produced monthly and available online at www.conflictanddevelopment.org. 7. One exception was the district level bupati election in Aceh Tenggara, where tensions continue at the point of writing (December 2007). See the Aceh Conflict Monitoring Updates for more information on the case. 8. There are inherent tradeoffs when “insiders” write about events in which they have been intimately involved. On the one hand, the fact that we were on the ground and at the center of many of the events discussed in the study provided us with a unique opportunity to document and reflect on events as they occurred. The study

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9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17.

18. 19.

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draws on formal documentation (internal memoranda, minutes of meetings, and published documents) and informal material to which few other observers had access (including field visits; personal meetings and correspondence; and discussions with key informants, including international, Acehnese, and other Indonesian representatives and senior figures from government, civil society bodies, and GAM). Gaps were filled through follow-up interviews conducted in early and mid-2007. On the other hand, our views on the peace process are obviously colored by the places from which we observed it (and, indeed, participated in it). We are aware of the tensions inherent in such arrangements and took concrete steps to control for conflicts of interest and to ensure objectivity, including formal and informal peer review of findings and conclusions at various points of the writing process. The views in this monograph are certainly not those of the agencies we worked for. (Indeed, at points we are critical of decisions made by AMM and the World Bank). Nevertheless, and as with any applied research/study, the diligent reader should consider the ways in which our experiences and backgrounds may shape our discussion and analysis. Calls for independence (before the MoU) and greater autonomy from Jakarta (after the MoU) have included demands for greater direct access to international markets. The Helsinki MoU includes the right for Aceh to raise funds through external loans (clause 1.3.1), to conduct international trade (clause 1.3.2), and to gain direct access to foreign countries by sea and air (clause 1.3.7). It also guarantees adherence to United Nations’ International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Social and Cultural Rights (clause 2.1). The movement of GAM toward a discourse based on the fundamentals of democratic participation and “good governance” can be viewed as a way of appealing to international support. Sidney Jones, Lateline, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, May 19, 2003. Now the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; the acronym remains HDC. Some have argued, however, that the change in discourse has not been followed by a change in practice on the ground (e.g., McCulloch 2006). In November 2005, the U.S. Department of State lifted a ban on arms sales to Indonesia put in place in 1999. The ban was imposed in response to violent acts by Indonesian troops and associated militia in East Timor (U.S. Embassy, Jakarta 2005). International assistance is defined here as flows of official nonmilitary grants or concessional loans, normally provided from a developed nation government or multilateral institution to the Government of Indonesia. Support provided from nongovernmental organizations (charities or not-for-profit groups) to Indonesia is also included in this category. However, private capital flows, personal remittances, and other categories are not. Statistics from OECD/DAC website, accessed May 22, 2007. Japan was a notable exception. The Japanese did their most to make HDC work under its then ambassador, Yutaka Iimura, essentially promising to finance the peace deal if it stuck. According to Schulze (2006), by the end of January 2006 some 3,645 nongovernmental organizations had registered at the United Nations’ compound. Discussions with Oxfam staff, March and April 2007, over interpretations of

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20.

21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

34.

35.

funding rulings observed by British NGO members of the UK Disasters Emergency Committee. Some agencies—notably the EU, which was politically engaged directly in peacebuilding efforts—found ways around such earmarking of funds for tsunami damage along. The inability or unwillingness of other agencies to do so suggests that they had less interest in looking beyond the narrower issues of success or failure of reconstruction projects. Unlike their managers, field workers providing assistance in villages found themselves involved in conflict issues, and at times needed to gain the approval of both local military commanders and local GAM representatives in order to be assured of protection. Authors’ discussion with Suprayoga Hadi, Director for Special Areas, National Planning Agency (Bappenas). Information from personal interviews with international NGO representatives, May 1–3, 2007. This section draws on a wide range of unclassified AMM reports. Clause 5.1 of the Helsinki MoU. The AMM was to be a civilian monitoring mission with all monitors unarmed. It was established under the European Security and Defense Policy and financed by the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy budget line along with contributions from participating countries (Beeck 2007). The head of AMM, Pieter Feith, is deputy director general for Politico-Military Affairs in the European Council of the European Union. The deputy head of AMM was Major General Nipat Thonglek from Thailand, who was succeeded by Major General Rozi Baharom of Malaysia. Offices were opened in the Acehnese towns of Singkil and Blangkejeuren. The eleven initial field offices were in Banda Aceh, Sigli, Bireuen, Lhokseumawe, Langsa, Lamno (later moved to Calang), Meulaboh, Blang Pidie, Tapaktuan, Kutacane, and Takengon. AMM’s headquarters were in Banda Aceh. Kaldor, Martin, and Selchow (2007: 273) write that “human security refers to the security of individuals and communities, expressed as both ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want.’” Information contributing to this paragraph and other parts of the section on AMM is partly drawn from many discussions and meetings in Aceh that the authors attended with different AMM staff between August 2005 and December 2006. AMM apparently reached an implicit agreement with the government that the mandate would be extended for a further six months should all parties be willing. See clauses 2.2 and 2.3 of the Helsinki MoU. At this stage, both authors heard frustration expressed from GAM and government officials regarding the slow rate of progress. However, such comments were kept outside the public arena, demonstrating a continued commitment to the overall process. De facto leader Malik Mahmud returned from Sweden temporarily. Other leaders have assumed elected positions following GAM’s successes in the elections of late 2006. In Meulaboh, for example, the local UN coordinator acted as a liaison figure and facilitator between many international agencies and the local AMM office. Personal interviews with AMM staff, NGOs, and the UN in Meulaboh, 2006.

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke 36. The European Commission and the European Council operate as largely separate bureaucracies, leading to inevitable differences despite efforts to promote common working. 37. Interviews with officials from the European Commission, IOM, and the German Technical Cooperation Agency, May 2–4, 2007. 38. Information from staff of the Aceh Monitoring Mission who remained until December 2006. 39. Internal AMM communication, May 2006. 40. Information from informal communication with senior members of AMM and observers of the Helsinki talks, May 2006. 41. Huber (2004: 44–45) also comments on the lack of local knowledge that HDC was able to access. AMM shielded itself from similar criticism as much by keeping a tight focus on core areas as by increasing understanding of the local context. 42. Information from discussions with AMM monitors on various occasions between September 2005 and March 2006. 43. International commitments on gender considerations within monitoring missions mean that the EU will have to take a more active line in the future. 44. Many observers outside AMM with experience in human rights issues in Indonesia felt similarly at the time. 45. See for example information resources developed through the United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre. www.unddr.org/ iddrs/. 46. The last seven peacekeeping missions established by the UN Security Council have included DDR in their mandate (United Nations 2006). 47. The Indonesian military regularly disputed the status of arms handed over by GAM during the first stages of implementation of the peace agreement, claiming that many were not still serviceable and should not count toward the total. AMM had the final say on these cases. 48. It was informally reported by parties on the margins of the early peace negotiations held in Helsinki that GAM preferred not to use the word reintegration. This was repeated in early 2006, when GAM disputed the use of this word in the title of the government’s reintegration agency (BRA, or Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh). 49. AMM Special Report 001, “GAM amnesty and prisoner release,” August 31, 2005. 50. AMM Special Report 008, “Background and progress of reintegration in Aceh,” October 24, 2005. 51. Information from working discussions with GAM, IOM, and AMM staff members, September–November 2005. 52. AMM Special Report 008. 53. AMM Special Report 023, “Reintegration update,” November 23, 2005. 54. The GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment (World Bank 2006b) was commissioned by the acting governor of Aceh. 55. AMM Special Report 023. 56. Discussions with Islahuddin, former Coordinator of BRA, June 2007. 57. This included 6,200 GAM “noncombatants.” Data in this section was compiled in AMM Special Report 008. Other sources provide different figures, reflecting the inconsistent use of data in government budgetary and planning processes. 58. AMM Special Report 2004. “Reintegration Update 002 and issues for 2006,” January 17, 2006.

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Supporting Peace in Aceh 59. Information from interviews with donor staff from IOM, UNDP, and the World Bank undertaken in Banda Aceh, February–March 2006. 60. Discussions with Irwandi Yusuf, April 2006, Banda Aceh. 61. Enforced local revenue raising by GAM is known as “Pajak Nanggroe,” or Aceh state tax, and was demanded from commercial transport, businesses, and wealthier individuals during the conflict. The military and police also engaged in informal revenue raising at check-points on roads and elsewhere. 62. Data sourced from BRA reintegration assistance table, April 2007, provided by Lina Frodin, European Union reintegration adviser. 63. Despite these measures, over time BRR became mired in a range of accountability controversies. Information from discussions with BRR international staff including Kevin Evans (September 2005) and Bruno Dercon (November 2005). See also BRR media update, September 22, 2005, available at www.reliefweb.int. 64. AMM Special Report 008. 65. Interviews with World Bank and IOM staff, March 2007. 66. Interview with Francisco Fontan, Europe House, Banda Aceh, May 4, 2007. 67. Information from interviews with aid agency staff in Jakarta, late May 2006, and in Aceh, May 2–4, 2007. 68. Information from interviews with donor representatives of the European Union, Forum Bersama staff, and BRA, May 3–4, 2007. Forum Bersama started to play a more active and useful role in the second half of 2007, when it began organizing working groups to advise on certain parts of the reintegration program and increased its role as an information hub on peace process issues. 69. Donors were described as operating reintegration programs in “defensive silos” by one aid official in Aceh. Interview with Francisco Fontan, Europe House, Banda Aceh, May 4, 2007. From the donor perspective, BRA was too unaccountable and opaque to enable more open engagement. 70. Interview with Islahuddin, Banda Aceh, May 6, 2007. 71. For the public, finding information on peacebuilding initiatives in Aceh is not straightforward. The European Union publicizes its wider role openly, and USAID widely demonstrated sponsorship of local information and peace awareness events. IOM has been reasonably effective at publicizing programs. The World Bank’s www.conflictanddevelopment.org website provides analytical work on the peace process but has much less on World Bank programming. Other agencies have tended not to provide extensive information on peacebuilding programs they are involved in.

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Supporting Peace in Aceh Lane, Timothy et. al. 1999. IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment. Occasional Paper 178. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. Mallaby, Sebastian. 2006. The World’s Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and the Wealth and Poverty of Nations. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. McCulloch, Lesley. 2006. “Greed: The Silent Force of Conflict in Aceh.” In Kingsbury, Damien, ed. 2006. Violence in Between: Security Issues in Archipelagic South-East Asia. Melbourne/Singapore: Monash Asia Institute/Institute for Southeast Asian Studies. McGibbon, Rodd. 2004. Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? Policy Studies 10. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington. Meitzner, Marcus. 2003. “Business as Usual? The Indonesian Armed Forces and Local Politics in the Post-Suharto Era.” In Aspinall, Edward, and Greg Fealey, eds. 2003. Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation, 245–58. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asisan Studies. ———. 2006. The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and International Resistance. Policy Studies 23. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington. Miller, Michelle Ann. 2006. “What’s Special about Special Autonomy in Aceh?” In Reid, Anthony, ed. 2006. Verandah of Violence: the Background to the Aceh Problem, 292– 314. Singapore: Singapore University Press. Morfit, Michael. 2006. “Staying on the Road to Helsinki: Why the Aceh Agreement Was Possible in August 2005.” Paper prepared for the international conference on “Building Permanent Peace in Aceh: One Year After the Helsinki Accord,” sponsored by the Indonesian Council for World Affairs (ICWA) in Jakarta, Indonesia, August 14. Mosse, David. 2005. Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Police and Practice. London: Pluto Press. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee. www.oecd.org/dac/. Paris, Roland. 2004. At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reid, Anthony, ed. 2006. Verandah of Violence: The background to the Aceh problem. Singapore: Singapore University Press. Ross, Michael. 2003. “Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia.” Prepared for the Yale-World Bank project on “The Economics of Political Violence,” July 5. Schulze, Kirsten E. 2004. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist. Organization. Policy Studies 2. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington. ———. 2006. “Dealing with Destruction.” World Today 62(1): 11–12. ———. 2007. “Mission not so impossible: The AMM and the transition from conflict to peace in Aceh, 2005–6.” Working Paper 131. Singapore: SJ Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Stedman, Stephen John, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds. 2002. Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Reinner. Sugiono, Muhadi. 2007. “A need for common understanding: Peacebuilding

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Appendix Key International Involvement in the Aceh Peace Process, 2005–06

Key peacebuilding-linked aid programs

Other relevant support or approaches

Staffing location

European Union - Peace process negotiations, Helsinki - Funding of Aceh Monitoring Mission - Reintegration assistance for former GAM (through IOM) - Human rights support for police and judiciary - Public administration improvement - Technical assistance for local government and for government reintegration authority

- Local election monitoring Office in Aceh and other election support - Diplomatic support for the peace process

United States Agency for International Development - Information and awareness campaigns - Support for peace consultation forums - Technical assistance for local government (establishment of Forum Bersama) - Community-based development programs in targeted communities.

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- Diplomatic support for the peace process

Staff with peacebuilding mission based in Jakarta (except for technical experts on short-term postings to the government)

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Patrick Barron and Adam Burke Key peacebuilding-linked aid programs

Other relevant support or approaches

Staffing location

Japan - Community-based development programs in targeted communities - Funding for IOM programming

- Diplomatic support for the peace process

Representative in Aceh

World Bank - Information/awareness campaign - Extension of KDP village fund program to conflict-affected areas - Research and ongoing incident monitoring

- Development of program to strengthen district government planning - Public expenditure analysis and damage assessment work

Office in Aceh

International Organization for Migration - Information/awareness campaign - Wide range of reintegration assistance, counseling, health services for former GAM (primarily funded by the EU and USAID)

Office in Aceh

United Nations - UNDP information campaign - UNDP technical support to government on reintegration issues - Some smaller programs through other UN agencies

- Low-key policy support - Efforts to promote conflict sensitivity of UN agencies

UN coordinator in Aceh; some UNDP technical expert input in Aceh, but staff in Jakarta

Sweden - Funding for democracy training and other initiatives

- Logistical support for Aceh Monitoring Mission - Diplomatic support for the peace process

In Jakarta and Sweden

Finland - Some funding for NGOs

- Hosting peace negotiations through Crisis Management Institute, Helsinki

In Jakarta and Finland

ASEAN Nations - Thailand, Singapore, In respective Malaysia, Philippines, national capitals and Brunei support for Aceh Monitoring Mission

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Supporting Peace in Aceh Key peacebuilding-linked aid programs

Other relevant support or approaches

Staffing location

International Labour Organization - Development of guidelines on demobilization, decommissioning, and reintegration

- Microcredit program - Road building using former combatants

Office in Aceh

Canada - Support to community-based reintegration programs (through IOM)

- Diplomatic support for the peace process

In Jakarta

Australia - Housing program in conflict areas

Office in Aceh/ Jakarta Norway

- Support to psychosocial program for conflict victims (through IOM)

In Jakarta

International NGOs (various) - Increasing focus on reaching conflictaffected as well as tsunami-affected populations - Support for local NGOs: human rights and other issues

04 EWC PS47 Appendix

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Many staff in Aceh, few engaged in peacebuilding issues

8/27/08, 3:43 PM

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