Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism: Dynamics of Contention and Their Consequences 9783030757533, 9783030757540

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism. Forms of Organization, Alliances, and Outcomes
Introduction
The Formation of the Neoliberal University (and Resistance to it)
Organizational Forms, Action Tactics, and Collective Identities
The Configuration of Allies and Political Outcomes
The Structure of the Book
References
2 What Moves Students? Ritual Versus Reactive Student Demonstrations in Mexico City
Introduction
Theoretical Expectations
Commemoration of the 1968 Students’ Movement and Massacre
#YoSoy132 March During the 2012 PresidentialElectoral Campaign of Enrique Peña Nieto
Surveying Student Protest Participation
Predicting Protest Participation Between Ritual and Reactive Students’ Demonstrations
Conclusions
References
3 Contentious Institutionalized Movements: The Case of the Student Movement in Quebec
Introduction
Unpacking Institutionalization
Research Method
The Student Movement in Quebec: Institutionalization and Disruption
Fragmented Institutionalization and the Legacy of the 1983 Act
Alliances as Support Systems
Conclusion
References
4 Structuring the “Structureless” and Leading the “Leaderless”: Power and Organization in the Student Movement at the University of California
Introduction
Direct Democracy, Horizontalism, and Prefiguration in Contemporary Movements
Perspectives on Horizontalism and Direct Democracy in the UC Movement
“Do-Ocracy” or Hidden Oligarchy? Leadership, Power, and Exclusion in the UC Movement
Structure or Fluidity: Why Do Participants Choose the Organizational Forms They Do?
Conclusion
References
5 Tweeting #FeesMustFall: The Online Life and Offline Protests of a Networked Student Movement
Introduction
Understanding #FeesMustFall: Neoliberal realities in South African Higher Education
Conceptualizing an Internet-Age Networked Movement
Methodology and Empirical Data
Case Institutions and Interview Data
Twitter Data
Protest Event Data
#FeesMustFall—A Hashtag’s Story
The #FeesMustFall Network
A Distributed, Multi-nodal, and Flat Network
#FeesMustFall Trending
A Social Media Divide in the Movement Landscape?
A Networked Student Movement: #WitsFeesMustFall et al.
Conclusion
References
6 Movement Leadership in an Era of Connective Action: A Study of Hong Kong’s Student-Led Umbrella Movement
Introduction
Movement Leadership under Connective Actions
How Movement Leadership Emerges and Acquires Authority
Movement Leadership in an Era of Connective Action
Student Leadership in Hong Kong Umbrella Movement
Formation of the Student Leadership Under a Decentralized Structure
Digital Activism and Leadership Responses
Looking for a Way Out
The End of the Umbrella Movement and its Ripples
Concluding Remarks
References
7 From the Classrooms to the Roofs: The 2010 University Researchers’ Movement in Italy
Introduction
Theories, Frameworks, and Previous Researches
Methods and Sources
The Chronology of the Mobilization: “riding the Dream”
The Organizational Form and the Action Repertoire
An (Inter)networked Participatory Organization
Repertoires and Logics of Action: From the “Unavailability for Teaching” to the “Climbing on Roofs”
The Logic of Damage: The “Unavailability for Teaching”
The Logic of Numbers: Many But Not Enough
The Logic of Bearing Witness: The “Climbing on University Roofs”
Concluding Remarks
References
8 Worker–Student Unity Against Outsourcing at the University of Johannesburg: Disrupting the Neoliberal Paradigm Through Direct Action and Alternative Relations
Introduction
Literature on FMF-EO and Alternative Lens
Research Methods
FMF-EO in Its Historical Period: Main Outcomes of the Neoliberal Trend in HEIs
The Unfolding of Worker–Student Unity in UJ
Worker–Student Unity in Action: Mutual Legitimacy and Scope
The Foundations of Worker–Student Unity in Action
Unprecedented but Precarious Outcomes
Conclusion
References
9 From Revolt to Reform: Student Protests and the Higher Education Agenda in England 2009–2019
Introduction
Gaining Influence: Movements, Alliances, and Policy Change
Cooperation and Alliances in Social Movements
Assessing the Policy Influence of Movements
English Student Protests and Higher Education Reforms
English Higher Education Reforms
Student Resistance and Protests in England
Methodology
Student Protests and Higher Education Reforms England 2009/19
The Rise and Fall of Anti-Austerity Student Activism [2009–2014]
Rising Fees and the Revival of Student Activism [2009–2011]
Fragmentation and New Student Struggles [2011–2014]
New Reforms and the Rise and Fall of Corbynism [2015–2019]
The New Higher Education Act and New Resistances
Student Activists and the Rise and Fall Corbynism [2015–2019]
Discussion and Conclusion
References
10 Chile’s Student Movement: Strong, Detached, Influential—And Declining?
Introduction
Strengthening, detachment, and Influencing
Transitioning to Democracy
The Sluggish 1990s
The Emergence of Autonomist Forces
The 2001 mochilazo Protests
The 2006 pingüino Protests
The 2011–2012 Protests
Strengthening the Movement
Detaching the Movement from Polity Members
Influencing the Government Through Popularity Threats
A Movement in Decline?
Conclusions
References
11 Ever Failed? Fail Again, Fail Better: Tuition Protests in Germany, Turkey, and the United States
Introduction
Collective Memory, Movement Outcomes, and Alliance Building
Case Selection
Germany
Turkey
United States
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFORMATION

Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism Dynamics of Contention and Their Consequences Edited by Lorenzo Cini · Donatella della Porta César Guzmán-Concha

Social Movements and Transformation

Series Editor Berch Berberoglu, Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, USA

This series tackles one of the central issues of our time: the rise of largescale social movements and the transformation of society over the last thirty years. As global capitalism continues to affect broader segments of the world’s population workers, peasants, the self-employed, the unemployed, the poor, indigenous peoples, women, and minority ethnic groups there is a growing mass movement by the affected populations to address the inequities engendered by the globalization process. These popular mass movements across the globe (such as labor, civil rights, women’s, environmental, indigenous, and anti-corporate globalization movements) have come to form a viable and decisive force to address the consequences of the operations of the transnational corporations and the global capitalist system. The study of these social movements their nature, social base, ideology, and strategy and tactics of mass struggle is of paramount importance if we are to understand the nature of the forces that are struggling to bring about change in the global economy, polity, and social structure. This series aims to explore emerging movements and develop viable explanations for the kind of social transformations that are yet to come.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14481

Lorenzo Cini · Donatella della Porta · César Guzmán-Concha Editors

Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism Dynamics of Contention and Their Consequences

Editors Lorenzo Cini Faculty of Political and Social Sciences Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa Florence, Italy

Donatella della Porta Faculty of Political and Social Sciences Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa Florence, Italy

César Guzmán-Concha Institute of Citizenship Studies University of Geneva Geneva, Switzerland

Social Movements and Transformation ISBN 978-3-030-75753-3 ISBN 978-3-030-75754-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: A-Digit, Getty Images. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To the people who struggle for a free education for all

Acknowledgments

The idea to write this book came during the preparation of the conference on “The Contentious Politics of Higher Education. Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism”, that we organized at the Center on Social Movement Studies (Cosmos), Scuola Normale Superiore (SNS), at Palazzo Strozzi in Florence on November 16 and 17, 2017. The event was part of a research project on the contentious politics of higher education, financed with internal funds by SNS. While our research focused on Chile, England, Italy, and Quebec, in the conference we were interested in expanding the reflection on other recent episodes of massive student protests in countries in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. From the theoretical point of view, our aim was to bridge the fields of social movement studies with the research on the politics of higher education. For sure, all those protests address the neoliberal transformations of the system of higher education, enacted by governments of all political leanings, promoting the outsourcing of personnel, the managerialization of governing bodies, the introduction of tuition fees as well as cuts to public funding. The outburst of the economic crisis in 2008 has represented a decisive watershed in this process of marketization: as many governments across the world have adopted the neoliberal and proausterity agenda as a way out of the crisis. These measures accelerated the implementation of neoliberal reforms in countries where they previously did not exist. Although differences between countries continue to be pronounced, national higher education systems are becoming more

vii

viii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

alike in the sense of being more market-oriented, even in countries with a strong state intervention tradition. Such transformations were not only aimed at meeting effective and well-structured policy designs, but they were also triggered by the logic of vested interests, power relations, and social conflicts. Over the past ten years, students of all around the world have indeed contested these policies and their implementation with different degrees of success. We want to express our gratitude to all those who participated in that conference. We are particularly grateful to Thierry Luescher and Manja Klemencic for their very insightful keynote addresses. As with all our endeavors, we have also enjoyed the stimulating and supportive environment of the Center on Social Movement Studies. We are grateful to our colleagues there with whom we had very stimulating discussions on the topic of the neoliberal university and its challenges. We are particularly thankful to Lorenzo Bosi, Rossella Ciccia, Riccardo Emilio Chesta, Daniela Chironi, Marco Deseriis, Andrea Felicetti, Anna Lavizzari, Chiara Milan, Mario Pianta, Andrea Pirro, Martin Portos, Lorenzo Zamponi. Finally, we want to express our biggest thanks to Liam McLean and Elizabeth Graber from Palgrave for their constant help and huge patience in supporting and bearing us!

Contents

1

2

3

4

5

Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism. Forms of Organization, Alliances, and Outcomes Lorenzo Cini, Donatella della Porta, and César Guzmán-Concha

1

What Moves Students? Ritual Versus Reactive Student Demonstrations in Mexico City María Inclán

27

Contentious Institutionalized Movements: The Case of the Student Movement in Quebec Luc Chicoine and Marcos Ancelovici

55

Structuring the “Structureless” and Leading the “Leaderless”: Power and Organization in the Student Movement at the University of California Sarah L. Augusto Tweeting #FeesMustFall: The Online Life and Offline Protests of a Networked Student Movement Thierry M. Luescher, Nkululeko Makhubu, Thelma Oppelt, Seipati Mokhema, and Memory Zodwa Radasi

75

103

ix

x

6

7

8

9

10

11

CONTENTS

Movement Leadership in an Era of Connective Action: A Study of Hong Kong’s Student-Led Umbrella Movement Chi Shun Fong and Samson Yuen From the Classrooms to the Roofs: The 2010 University Researchers’ Movement in Italy Gianni Piazza Worker–Student Unity Against Outsourcing at the University of Johannesburg: Disrupting the Neoliberal Paradigm Through Direct Action and Alternative Relations Francesco Pontarelli From Revolt to Reform: Student Protests and the Higher Education Agenda in England 2009–2019 Hector Rios-Jara

133

157

187

213

Chile’s Student Movement: Strong, Detached, Influential—And Declining? Nicolás M. Somma and Sofía Donoso

241

Ever Failed? Fail Again, Fail Better: Tuition Protests in Germany, Turkey, and the United States Didem Türko˘glu

269

Index

293

Notes on Contributors

Marcos Ancelovici is a Canada Research Chair in the Sociology of Social Conflicts and an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM). He has published numerous articles and chapters on the global justice movement, antiausterity protests, and housing struggles, as well as co-edited Un Printemps rouge et noir: Regards croisés sur la grève de 2012 (Écosociété, 2014) and Street Politics in the Age of Austerity: From the Indignados to Occupy (Amsterdam University Press, 2016; available in open access). Sarah L. Augusto is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice at Curry College in Milton, Massachusetts. Her research and teaching interests include social movements, inequalities, sex & gender, and pop culture. Her current research focuses on leadership and organization in diffuse, decentralized, non-hierarchical social movements. Luc Chicoine is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Sociology at the Université du Québec à Montréal and a member of the Canada Research Chair in the Sociology of Social Conflicts. His research focuses on student movements and its institutional repression. Lorenzo Cini is a political sociologist in the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of the Scuola Normale Superiore of Florence, Italy. His latest publication is a monograph co-authored with Donatella della Porta and

xi

xii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Cesar Guzman-Concha (Contesting Higher Education. Student Movements against Neoliberal Universities, 2020). Donatella della Porta is Professor of Political Science, Dean of the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, and Director of the Ph.D. program in Political Science and Sociology at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence, Italy, where she also leads the Center on Social Movement Studies (Cosmos). Sofía Donoso (Ph.D., University of Oxford) is Assistant Professor of sociology at the Universidad de Chile and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES). She is the co-editor (with Marisa von Bülow) of Social Movements in Chile: Organization, Trajectories and Political Consequences (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). Her research has been published in the Journal of Latin American Studies, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Bulletin of Latin American Research, as well as in numerous chapters in edited volumes. Chi Shun Fong is a Ph.D. student at the Pennsylvania State University. He is pursuing a dual-title Ph.D. in Political Science and Social Data Analytics. His major field of study is comparative politics. His research interests are authoritarian politics, contentious politics, politics of Greater China and international political economy. His current research focuses on how social media impact on the patterns of both collective action and repression. César Guzmán-Concha is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow and Principal Investigator of the project “Mobilizing for Basic Incomes: Social Innovation in Motion” (H2020-MSCA MOBILISE, project no. 839483) at the University of Geneva. María Inclán is a Profesora-Investigadora at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas in Mexico City. She has specialized in the study of comparative social movements and democratization processes. In particular, her research has focused on the development of social movements and cycles of protest within democratic transitions and individual triggers of protest participation. She is currently developing a research project on online political and mobilizing campaigns. She has held Visiting Professor positions at Brown University’s Center of Latin American and Caribbean Studies and Princeton University’s Program in Latin American Studies and has been a Visiting Fellow at UCSD’s Center for U.S.-Mexican

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xiii

Studies. Her first book The Zapatista Movement and Mexico’s Democratic Transition was published in 2018 by Oxford University Press. Other works have been published in the American Journal of Sociology, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Latin American Politics and Society, and Mobilization. Thierry M. Luescher is a Research Director for post-schooling in the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and associate professor of higher education affiliated to the University of the Free State (UFS) in South Africa. He has a Ph.D. in Political Studies from the University of Cape Town (UCT), a Postgraduate Diploma in Higher Education Studies from the UFS, and a B.A. in Politics, History, and African Languages from UCT. Thierry has a passion for researching, teaching, and publishing on the politics and policies of higher education, student politics, and student affairs and their relationship to social justice and their relationship to social justice and their relationship to social justice. His recent publications include Student Politics in Africa: Representation and Activism (with M. Klemenˇciˇc and J. O. Jowi; African Minds, 2016) and Reflections of South African Student Leaders, 1994 to 2017 (with D. Webbstock and N. Bhengu; African Minds, 2020). Nkululeko Makhubu is a Master’s Research Intern at the Human Sciences Research Council, Inclusive Development and Education program. He is also an M.Com. Information Systems student at the University of Cape Town. His current research on Information and Communications Technology for Development (ICT4D) is a case study on the #FeesMustFall student movement to describe the “soft power” influence that Twitter had on the movement online and offline in South Africa’s higher education climate. He curated the social media accounts from the University of the Western Cape during #FMF in 2015 and 2016. Seipati Mokhema studies toward a master’s degree in Sociology at North-West University (NWU) Mafikeng campus and works as a Researcher at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in the Inclusive Economic Development Division. She attained a B.Soc.Sc. in Development Studies and B.Soc.Sc. (Hons) in Sociology and completed two exchange programs during the first year of her master’s degree, as a DAAD and Erasmus Plus fellow, respectively, in Germany at Justus-Liebig Universität, Giessen. Her interests lie in projects that contribute to the

xiv

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

development of African youth in education and leadership spaces as well as the future of work in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Thelma Oppelt is a Researcher at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). She holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Human Life Sciences from the University of Stellenbosch, as well as Honours and master’s degrees in Psychology from the University of South Africa. She is currently completing a Ph.D. in Psychology in the Faculty of Health Sciences at Nelson Mandela University. Ms. Oppelt has participated in a number of important national research projects related to the social impact of the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) and, most recently, the implications of the Fourth Industrial Revolution for the regulation of gambling in South Africa. Ms. Oppelt’s most recent publications are on the SKA and Human Development. Gianni Piazza holds a Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Florence and is Associate Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Catania. He is member of the Academic Board of the Ph.D. in Political Science and Sociology of the Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa, and Associate Editor of the scientific journal Partecipazione e Conflitto. He has published books and journal articles on local government and politics, public policy analysis, social movements, territorial and environmental conflicts, student and squatting movements. He is the author of La città degli affari (1994) and Sindaci e politiche in Sicilia (1998), the coauthor of Politiche e partecipazione (2004), Voices of the Valley, Voices of the Straits (2008), Le ragioni del no (2008), the co-editor of Alla ricerca dell’Onda (2010) and the editor of Il movimento delle occupazioni di squat e centri sociali in Europa (2012). Francesco Pontarelli is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the National Research Foundation Chair in Community, Adult and Workers Education at the University of Johannesburg (South Africa). He holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Johannesburg; a M.Sc. in Labour, Social Movements and Development at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London (UK); and a M.A. in International Relations at the University of Naples “L’Orientale” (Italy). He serves as the book review editor for Notebooks, the Journal of Studies on Power. His areas of research embrace fields useful for transformative social movements, including Gramsci’s political thought, historical materialism, international political economy, labor studies, and popular education.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xv

Memory Zodwa Radasi is a Research Specialist (Postdoctoral Fellow) for education and livelihoods in the division of Inclusive Economic Development, Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Radasi holds undergraduate degrees and an M.A. from the University of the Western Cape, South Africa, as well as a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Porto, Portugal. Her Ph.D. dissertation was exploring policies made by the democratic new South African government regarding gender and race in the context of inequality in the workplace. Her research aimed at transforming inequalities that violate personhood, including gender, racism, class, xenophobia, and poverty. In addition to her research in the workplace, she is interested in policies, particularly in the education sector and human rights. She is currently examining personhood in the revaluation of children in African societies. Hector Rios-Jara is a Ph.D. candidate in Social Science at the Institute of Social Research of University College of London. He is member of the working group “Social Theory and Latin-American reality” of the Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) and a sponsored student of the Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y Cohesión Social (COES). Nicolás M. Somma (Ph.D., University of Notre Dame, Indiana) is an Associate Professor and Chair at the Institute of Sociology of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, and an Associate Researcher at the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES). His research has appeared in journals such as Party Politics, Social Movement Studies, American Behavioral Scientist, Latin American Politics and Society and Comparative Politics, among others. Among other projects, he is leading a comparative study of labor movements in 17 Latin American countries since 1990, as well as a large-scale account of power configurations in human history. Didem Türko˘glu is a Postdoctoral Associate at New York University— Abu Dhabi whose research interests focus on political sociology, social movements, and studies of social inequalities. In her current book project, she conducts a comparative analysis of higher education policies and the protests against tuition hikes over the last four decades in 34 OECD countries with a special focus on England, Germany, Turkey, and the United States. Her articles have appeared in Mobilization, Current Sociology, Social Media +Society, Sociology Compass, and Journal of Democracy.

xvi

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Samson Yuen is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. He researches contentious politics, public opinion, as well as health and food politics, with specific focus in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. He has co-edited An Epoch of Social Movements (Chinese University, 2018) and has published articles in journals including Political Studies, Geopolitics, Mobilization, Social Movement Studies, and The China Quarterly.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 2.2

Fig. 2.3 Fig. 2.4 Fig. 3.1

Fig. 3.2

Fig. 5.1

Fig. 5.2

Participants’ motivations to participate in the annual commemoration of the 1968 students’ movement on October 2, 2011 Participants’ motivations to participate in the #YoSoy132 protesting march against Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidential campaign on June 10, 2012 Predicted probability of protest participation in students’ demonstrations by education Predicted probability of protest participation in students’ demonstrations by interest in politics Student protest activity in Quebec (2005–2016) (Source La Presse. Includes street marches, rallies, occupations, and blockades) Varieties of modes of action used between 2005 and 2016 (Source La Presse. Note These numbers should not be treated as “hard data” because some protest eventsreported by newspapers did not contain information on the modes of action used) Daily Unique #FeesMustFall Tweets in October 2015 (Source HSRC, 2021. Note Data generated by Mecodify on 11 March 2020; unique tweets only) Top 10 tweeting tweeters (Source HSRC, 2021. Note Data generated by Mecodify on 11 March 2020; N = 62,191)

35

37 47 48

62

63

114

117

xvii

xviii

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 5.3

Fig. 5.4

Fig. 5.5

Fig. 5.6

Network of degree centrality by mentions of #FeesMustFall Twitter users (Source HSRC, 2021. Note Data generated by Mecodify, analysed in Kumu.io, 11 March 2020; N = 62,191) Campus-specific #FeesMustFall-related Tweets in October 2015 (Source HSRC, 2021. Design Dineo Luescher; Note Data generated by Mecodify between August 2018 to March 2020; Key CPUT = Cape Peninsula University of Technology; CUT = Central University of Technology; DUT = Durban University of Technology; NMU = Nelson Mandela University; NWU = North-West University; RU = Rhodes University; SMU = Sefako Makgatho University; SPU = Sol Plaatje University; SU = Stellenbosch University; TUT = Tshwane University of Technology; UCT = University of Cape Town; UFH = University of Fort Hare; UFS = University of the Free State; UJ = University of Johannesburg; UKZN = University of KwaZulu Natal; UL = University of Limpopo; UMP = University of Mpumalanga; UNISA = University of South Africa; UP = University of Pretoria; UWC = University of the Western Cape; UV = University of Venda; VUT = Vaal University of Technology; WITS = University of the Witwatersrand; WSU = Walter Sisulu University. No data: Mangosuthu University of Technology; University of Zululand) Campus-specific protest events vs. campus-specific tweets (Source HSRC, 2021. Note Tweet data generated by Mecodify between August 2018 and March 2020; Total 51,277 tweets; PEA data generated by authors from 77 sampled news articles. Both databases range from 14 to 26 October 2015 only. Note Data from institutions with N < 0.5% in both categories are omitted) Daily Unique Campus-specific #FeesMustFall-related Tweets in October 2015 (Source HSRC, 2021. Note Data generated by Mecodify between August 2018 and March 2020; N = 52,892)

118

119

124

126

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 10.1

Number of student protests in Chile by year (Source Data from the Observatory of Conflicts of the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies [COES]. The figure considers protest events reporting the presence of students of any kind [high school, university, or non-identified])

xix

259

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 11.1

Ideal types of higher education Surveyed protest participants and nonparticipants per student event Descriptive statistics per student demonstration Correlates of protest participation in ritual and reactive students’ demonstrations in Mexico City Adjusted Wald tests for each protest participation predictor List of cases based on presence of brokerage, the influence of collective memory, and perceived threats

7 38 41 43 45 275

xxi

CHAPTER 1

Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism. Forms of Organization, Alliances, and Outcomes Lorenzo Cini, Donatella della Porta, and César Guzmán-Concha

Introduction Since 2008, the world has witnessed an unprecedented global wave of student mobilizations. Episodes of massive social unrest in which students have played leading roles have occurred in several regions: Quebec, Chile, Hong Kong, South Africa, England, and Italy to cite just a few examples. This phenomenon can be observed in both advanced and developing economies. Students have mobilized around a variety of issues, ranging

L. Cini (B) · D. della Porta Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Piazza degli Strozzi, Italy e-mail: [email protected] C. Guzmán-Concha Institute of Citizenship Studies, Université de Genève, Geneva, Switzerland

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_1

1

2

L. CINI ET AL.

from resistance to authoritarianism to opposition to tuition fees. The scale and scope of this wave of student mobilizations are impressive and can only be compared to the global wave of campus activism of the late 1960s. In many cases, these mobilizations went beyond strictly student issues, addressing austerity cutbacks and/or neoliberalism. While these episodes of student unrest are closely intertwined with the 2008 financial crisis, they cannot be reduced to it, especially for countries that were not significantly hit by this crisis, such as Chile or South Africa. The present volume investigates such mobilizations in a range of different socioeconomic and political contexts, focusing on their repertoires of action and organizational forms, as well as the political alliances they engage in while pursuing their goals. This seems all the more important as even following the height of the anti-austerity protests, student politics has maintained center stage. During the “hot autumn” of 2019, with its global wave of protests, students were driving actors in movements active on national independence (such as in Hong Kong and Catalonia) and social justice (as in Chile or Lebanon), often combining the two sets of claims within demands for a deepening of democracy. While in 2020 contestation in the streets was temporarily halted by the pandemic, the protest was fueled by issues of citizenship rights, with the right to public and free education gaining centrality, together with the right to public health, housing, and an income. Indeed, protests emerged against the manifest failure of the system of private education to guarantee safety and services to staff and students, the visibility of the effects of years of cuts in state funding for the public system of higher education, which lacks both infrastructure and personnel, the dismissal of precarious workers at all levels, and the refusal to reduce fees and the cost of rents even when teaching was moved online. This centrality of student politics notwithstanding, recent episodes of student unrest have not received enough attention from scholars in political sociology. While there has been a growing amount of literature on social conflict in the aftermath of the financial crisis, student movements have not featured among the empirical phenomena on which scholars in the field have focused (see, for instance, Brooks, 2016; Klemenˇciˇc, 2014). This is somehow surprising, considering that these protests have achieved significant levels of mobilization, spreading from university students to other groups (e.g. trade unions, secondary students, youth organizations), that students have put forward issues neglected by mainstream political parties, and that these episodes have often been part of larger

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

3

processes of change with wider implications in society (i.e., the corporatization of universities, the massification of postsecondary education, the tertiarization of the economy, deindustrialization). Consequently, a systematic analysis of these episodes of student activism would now seem all the more necessary, especially given the fact that there are very few comparative studies of contemporary student protests in the literature (for a few exceptions, see Cini, 2019a; della Porta et al., 2020). Aimed at filling such theoretical and empirical gaps, this volume will provide a fresh analysis of student activism in different regions of the world by building upon the observation that university students have historically engaged in politics. New generations of political leaders have emerged out of the student movement, often associated with broader hopes of renewal and regeneration. While in some countries the active role of students in politics and society dates back to the nineteenth century, student movements typically represent a contemporary phenomenon: student movements are often related to the emergence of the youth as a sociologically relevant category that refers to the transition between childhood and adulthood—the “impressionable years,” in the classic definition of Mannheim. Over the course of the last century, students have played a significant role in the social conflict in most countries. Major instances of social change, including revolutions (e.g. Iran in 1978, Cuba in the 1950s) and reformist periods (e.g. the Quiet revolution in Quebec, the various 1968 revolts across the globe), have found in students a decisive actor. Campuses have been a breeding ground for new groups that have challenged political elites both on the left and on the right (Crossley, 2003). The expansion of secondary education, the secularization of society, and overarching state-led programs of industrialization and modernization run parallel to the growing relevance of students throughout the twentieth century. While student movements are not only massive but also quite influential in both contentious and institutional politics (Cini, 2020), they have, however, received only limited attention in political sociology. Traditionally, the analysis of student movements has been very sporadic, given the peculiar characteristics that such movements have displayed in their political trajectories and dynamics of contention (see Cini, 2019a; della Porta, 2010). As observed for the political year of global student protestpar excellence, namely “the 1968 movement” (Gill & De Fronzo, 2009), student protests are a mix of specific and general demands, radical and moderate frames, vanguard and mass mobilization. Their ambivalence

4

L. CINI ET AL.

is essentially due to the socially ambiguous and ill-defined location in which students find themselves, a peculiar socio-existential condition of a specific age cohort, which is no longer adolescent, but not yet adult (Cini, 2017a). Furthermore, while campuses are dense in networks, the frequent turnover of students at universities jeopardizes continuity in commitment, forcing a continuous investment in the political socialization of ever newer student cohorts. This unstable reality naturally affects the personal and political experiences of university students, especially when their age cohorts increase in number in the highly differentiated society of the twentieth century. As a result, more than any other movement, student movements are an openended and never-ending process of social formation of collective identity, claims, goals, and action repertoire. It is precisely the dynamic nature of these movements that presents their leaders and activists with an array of strategic options related to several issues during mobilizations, multiplying their “strategic dilemmas,” resulting in situations where there are “two or more options, each with a long list of risks, costs, and potential benefits” (Jasper, 2006, 1). The dilemmas they must face, time and time again, are especially related to the construction of collective identity, protest frames, movement goals, action tactics, organizational forms, and the configuration of allies (Cini, 2017b). This introduction will map out some of the main elements of contentious student politics that the various contributors to this edited collection refer to in their own contributions. In particular, drawing on social movement studies but also on other subfields in the social sciences, such as higher education studies, it will look at the specificity of the neoliberal university, as well as the forms of contentious politicsand their relations with allies and targets, that contribute to the outcomes of protests.

The Formation of the Neoliberal University (and Resistance to it) Education has traditionally been a contentious issue. The right to attend educational programs was one of the core demands of unions and left-wing parties all over the world throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In emerging nation-states and developing countries, the creation and growth of state-led educational institutions at all levels can be seen as a component of the contract of citizenship that political leaders

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

5

offered to their people. The origins of the welfare state are closely related to the expansion of mass education and the increase in minimum levels of compulsory instruction. From a historical perspective, the granting of access to higher education to the lower classes (through the so-called massification of HE) was the culmination of a process by which many states recognized university education as a social right. Indeed, by the 1960s, most industrial economies had granted free access to university to their citizens (Garritzmann, 2016). Moreover, student protests in the 1960s and 1970s addressed some contradictions of mass university enrolment, calling for more public resources to be invested in order to implement a “right to study” as well as more critical thinking and teaching (Guzman-Concha & Cini, forthcoming). At the beginning of the 1980s, the rise of the neoliberal conception of the relationship between the state and the market also had a significant impact on the educational system, challenging the idea of free university education. The assumption was that as higher education substantially increases the future economic returns of students, it follows that the state can legitimately withdraw from the area and charge the families or direct beneficiaries. Drawing on the assumption of a higher efficiency of the private sector in comparison with the public sector, the new higher education approach has promoted the discipline of the marketplace, the power of the consumer, and the engine of the competition (McGettingan, 2013). In fact, in the neoliberal conception, universities are in competition with each other for tuition fees, research funding, and private endowments. The neoliberal model brought about changes in the following areas: (a) the commodification of services, with the introduction of tuition fees and loans, or the abrupt increase in their rates, (b) privatization, with an opening up to new, profit-oriented, providers of educational certificates, (c) managerialization, with mechanisms of competition and funding allocation conditional on the performance of externally defined criteria and the introduction of cost–benefit and efficiency principles; (d) the marketization of curricula; (e) the precarizationof labor relations. In fact, common trends in the reform of HE started from an increase in commodification, “with the search for private investment and increasing tuition fees” (Klemenˇciˇc, 2014, 398). As Smelzer and Hearn (2015, 353) noted, as public funds are drastically reduced, “universities are increasingly operating like businesses and are perpetually in search of monies via increased tuition fees and private investments.” In order to do this, they

6

L. CINI ET AL.

invest more and more in marketing, brand management, and promotion (ibid.). Privatization is a related trend, which also implies the proliferation of private—de facto, for profit—institutions in competition with public ones. This transforms the function of the state from the provider of public services (such as education) to the regulator of (quasi)market competition, with the state contributing to financing higher education and regulating the quality of the courses offered by the universities. In this vision, managerialization modifies the internal governance of universities, with an enhanced role for managers and top-level administrators in the governing bodies at the expense of academics (Cini, 2016). This also involves “limiting the role of those instances where students have a say in the governance” (Forest & Altback, 2006; Ginsberg, 2011, 7). While up until the 1970s the dominant idea was that universities were self-governing bodies, in the neoliberal approach, universities must now respond to numerous stakeholders, and quickly and efficiently adapt to their requests. An especially relevant example of this is the insistence on adaptation to the labor market and industry demands, and a claim of rational administration of resources in a context dominated by austerity. As manageralization accompanied a marketization of the curricula, the very conception of the role of the university changed: from the creation of culture and knowledge to the preparation for market requirements. Thus, in the “New Managerialism” approach, universities are considered as producing goods such as teaching, research, and services (Agasisti & Catalano, 2006, 249). Changes in the courses, curricula, and academic programs aim to meet the demands of the business sector or to respond to the requests made by supranational bureaucracies (such as the EU, or the OECD). As for internal labor relations, a precarization of labor conditions follows the drop in public spending and the increase in competition. This includes changes in the internal composition of faculties in favor of less expensive positions, with a decrease in the number of professorial positions (assistant, associate, and full professors) resulting in the rise of precarious categories such as adjunct professors, external lecturers, postdoctoral researchers, and the proliferation of temporary contracts (Cini & Guzman-Concha, 2017). Moreover, measures such as the extension of probation periods and the conditionality of renewals or promotions to the approval of external grants function as mechanisms of precarization of both teaching and research positions. The outsourcing of various services also contributes to a decrease in protection for administrative workers and research positions.

1

Table 1.1 Ideal types of higher education

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

7

Dimensions of higher education regimes

Market model

Statist model

Funding system Field organization University leadership Logic of curricula delivery Labor relations

Private Competitive Managers managers

Public Cooperative Academics

Market-oriented

Academic

Precarious

Standard

It must be said that university policies are, however, still very differentiated, with high cross-national divergences (Brooks, 2016). Drawing on the notion of commodification and the making of modern markets (Polanyi, 1944 [2001]) applied to the higher education sector (Agasisti and Catalano, 2006; Willemse & de Beer, 2012), two broad ideal types can be identified: “state-dependent” and “market-dependent” university systems (see Table 1.1, from della Porta, Cini & Guzman-Concha, 2020: 13). While these trends toward a neoliberal model have affected all university systems, the degree of de-commodification—defined as “the extent to which commodities are not exclusively exchanged on market principles” (Willemse & de Beer, 2012, 107)—varies across countries, being lower in liberal welfare regimes and higher in universal welfare regimes. In liberal, market-oriented models, “HE institutions (like real companies) set their own prices for their teaching and research services without public intervention.” In welfare regimes, on the other hand, “the state finances and centrally controls education production, and regulates university activities by determining the prices (tuition) and admission to academic courses” (Agasisti & Catalano, 2006, 248). How the general trends and varieties in the models of HE impact on student politics is one of the central questions addressed in this volume. One of the main consequences of the paradigm shift in the concept of the university system is the growth in distributional conflicts, currently taking place in the field of higher education. Policy changes in student funding, including tuition fees, loans, and the myriad of student aid programs (ranging from dormitories, meals, and other services) have direct effects on the disposable income of households and the students

8

L. CINI ET AL.

themselves. It is especially where this shift has been more extreme, that commodification has represented a significant trigger for student unrest (e.g., Chile, England, South Africa). More broadly, the announcement of reforms justified by ideologies of the rationalization of public services or carried out in the context of broader austerity measures usually leads to protests in which students often join ranks with public-sector unions. Protests organized by student unions in Germany and the United States in recent years have shown that even in the context of advanced economies and consolidated democracies, students play important roles as carriers of broader political discontent with governmental policies. Therefore, economic issues are still central to the dynamics of claim-making and protests by college students and young people more broadly, which would seem to contradict the picture provided by the “new social movement” theories of the 1970s and 1980s (Cini et al., 2017). However, the economy is clearly not the only source of discontent, nor is it the only mobilizing trigger. Students have also engaged in national politics because of the polarizing effect of military coups or authoritarian turns, as can be seen in the case of recent waves of campus unrest in Turkey or Hungary, or in the wake of deep-rooted claims for national sovereignty as in Catalonia of Hong Kong (Macfarlane, 2017), demanding or resisting changes in the curricula and freedom in teaching and learning. Furthermore, demands for greater inclusion have proliferated in campuses in recent years. This can be seen, for example, in the involvement of students in broader social movements, such as Black Lives Matter or the Ni una menos movements and more broadly, in antiracist, pro-gender equality and minorities rights campaigns. The Rhodes Must Fall student campaign in South Africa, aimed at freeing South African universities from their colonial legacies (Cini, 2019b), soon resonated in England and the US, where local campaigns to remove the statues of colonizers or slavers from campuses quickly emerged (Luescher & Klemencis, 2017). The connections between these campaigns and the protests of black communities in the US, in the context of the killing of George Floyd by police officers, are apparent in both movements, with protesters targeting statues of controversial historical figures linked to racism and oppression. Undoubtedly, struggles for recognition have been significant in the history of contemporary universities. Women and ethnic minorities have long demanded that their historical exclusion from campuses be redressed, in a mobilization in which cultural and economic aspects intertwine. These conflicts can also be observed within the academic

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

9

body, as gender, ethnic, and sexual discrimination seem to be entrenched in long-standing processes that have created privilege for white, male academics from upper-class backgrounds (Guzman-Concha and Cini forthcoming). While in many respects the modern-day university is more socially heterogeneous than ever before, the greater presence of traditionally disadvantaged groups has amplified their voice within campuses. Issues of social and racial inequalities have also been central in the environmental justice movement, whose recent protest campaigns (such as those organized by Fridays For Future) have mainly been launched and carried out by students. It is very likely that these conflicts will remain at the forefront in the future.

Organizational Forms, Action Tactics, and Collective Identities It is essential to take into account the general trend toward a neoliberal model of HE, as well as its various manifestations, when considering the specific forms that contentious student politics takes, both on a day-today basis and during waves of protest. The contributions presented in this volume address organizational forms, action tactics, and collective identities in different contexts. As with any other movement, student movements act in ways that can be described along a continuum between conventional and disruptive forms of collective action (della Porta & Diani, 2006). In colleges, conventional means of participation are usually predominant in normal times. On a regular basis, students formally engage in institutional university politics, through elected representatives or delegates, at various levels. Students also act by promoting and launching media campaigns, organizing public debates with different stakeholders, and taking part in meetings with public authorities, representatives, and officials. These conventional activities are generally pursued by small groups, while rank-and-file students take passive roles. Occasionally, however, students rely on unconventional repertoires, that disturb the daily life of communities and institutions by disrupting the performance of their core functions (Piven, 2006). Blockades and occupations of buildings, in particular, open up spaces for individuals and groups to network, assuring the availability of “free time” and “free space” to think and fight (Lewis, 2013; Ross & Vinson, 2014). Events such as the occupation of university buildings aim at achieving “the

10

L. CINI ET AL.

social time necessary to articulate the protest and, at the same time, to break with the faculty daily routine and visualize the conflict inside the institution” (Fernandez, 2014, 207). While universities have often been considered as dense spaces, with students endowed with both free time and critical thinking, which facilitate mobilization, neoliberal shifts have challenged this availability, by forcing many students to work in order to pay their fees as well as pushing them toward conformist thinking (della Porta et al., 2020). This notwithstanding, students tend to organize themselves along lines that include ideology, common interests, shared causes, and various sources of affinities. In sum, student participation can take the forms of union politics and movement politics. While the former refers to the institutions of student (self) government and the ways they relate to universities and the state, the latter describes the modes and strength of student activism. As has been argued elsewhere, “exploring the interplay of these activities helps to better understand and assess the type of power that students exert to halt or encourage institutional and systemic transformations in HE across time and space” (Cini, 2020, 1467). Associated with this is the choice between different organizational models: from decentralized, campus-centered ones to models that are centrally and nationally oriented and/or exhibit a nationwide scope of intervention by claiming, for instance, to represent the entire student body. In a coordinated field of student politics (della Porta et al., 2020), student governments (federations, unions, associations) become arenas in which groups of students, organized along with ideological, political, or other common features, attempt to represent and/or mobilize the student body, exerting attraction over a significant portion of activists, thus shaping the whole field of student politics. In coordinated fields, an overlap between formal (federations, unions) and informalorganizations (politico-ideological groups, affinity groups, even branches of political parties) is noticeable. Activists often participate in both formal and informal groups simultaneously, as ideological or affinity groups consider formal organizations as tools and platforms to pursue their agenda. Participation in various organizations sometimes amplifies the effect of activism. Internal elections, congresses, caucuses, and assemblies set the clock of internal competitions for the control of these bodies. The institutions of student government—student associations, federations, or unions—are important as they offer resources and legitimacy that allow the leading

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

11

groups within the bodies to implement their agenda. When these institutions are well established, they can become the vehicles through which students attempt to influence higher education or university policies, or even intervene in national politics or transnational campaigns. On the other hand, however, when no organization can successfully claim to represent a significant part of the student body, we refer to fragmented fields of student politics. In this variation, there are no established arenas of political competition, no group can voice student demands in a coherent, structured manner, and national authorities (university leaders, politicians, governmental actors) can easily disregard students. In most cases, this scenario depicts the case of locally based networks of organizations connecting different subnational geographical areas and/or university campuses, which sometimes can be accompanied by the presence of a nationwide organization, which has, however, a low degree of autonomy vis-à-vis state authorities and with secondary roles in protest activities. Formal and informal organizations do not overlap, as they tend to work with different agendas and often pursue divergent goals, and activists must choose one of them to invest their time and efforts into. The existence of institutions of student government recognized by the student base provides incentives for coordinated collective action among affinity or politico-ideological groups. They tend to facilitate the building of coalitions within the heterogeneous landscape of campuses. In contrast to this, in fragmented fields of student politics, the weakness or lack of student governments makes it more difficult for coalitions to emerge from among the variety of groups. If they are legitimized by their bases, student governments can become a facilitating factor for the coordination of the various groups that populate university campuses. Large protest campaigns are more politically successful when competition among groups (for leadership, internal resources, support among the student base) is suspended and movements can voice a relatively coherent set of demands (these ideas have been further elaborated on in della Porta et al., 2020). Finally, the action repertories and organizational models in the contested field of HE are linked to the collective identities the student activists develop that shape their mission in society (or goals). Identities are formed in the interplay between their own actions and those of their adversaries, during critical junctures or transformative events. The traditional sociological interpretation of the student uprisings of the 1960s sees them as a manifestation of generational conflict (Rootes, 2013) in which

12

L. CINI ET AL.

the younger and better-educated cohorts in society demanded radical democratic changes in various spheres of society, ranging from academia to politics and family relations (Edmunds and Turner, 2005). However, more recent studies exploring the causes of student mobilizations have shown that the picture of student protestis much more complicated and cannot be so narrowly reduced to the idea of intergenerational conflict (Cini, 2017a; della Porta, 2010, 2015). Student protests have constantly formed part of broader cycles of struggle, such as those associated with nationalist movements, labor movements, or the so-called “new social movements” (i.e., environmental, urban, feminist, peace movements) (Melucci, 1996; Touraine, 1987). Waves of student protestare always embedded within the social and political dynamics of the societies in which they have prospered (Cini, 2017a). In this sense, the specific generational dimension of student movements, which influences their form and their spread, must be located within broader societal trends (Brooks, 2016; della Porta, 2010). As is shown by a number of contributions in this volume, in most cases of student protests these components are always strongly interwoven: students can put forward a certain generational concern related to their socio-existential condition and, at the same time, convey broader feelings of social discontent. These movements often deal with the problems experienced by the generation of their activists and, at the same time, are part of broader dynamics in society. As mentioned above, it is precisely due to the structural ambivalence of the student condition that several strategic dilemmas can arise among activists in the course of mobilization campaigns (Cini, 2017a). In principle, a larger amount of “biographical availability” (McAdam, 1986) provides young activists with more collective freedom and strategic options, compared to other groups (della Porta, 2010).

The Configuration of Allies and Political Outcomes The neoliberal model of HE not only affects the forms of student politics, but also the potential alliances and potential outcomes of protest campaigns. The idea that we must look at political contexts to understand the emergence, dynamics, and outcomes of contention dates back to the first developments of what is now known as “political opportunity structure” theory (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978). Since then, much

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

13

scholarship has adopted the assumption that environments—those factors in the “world outside” social movements—can explain mobilizing activities, demands, strategies, alliances, and the influence of social protest (Meyer, 2004). Taking distance from the rather deterministic character of such an approach, more recent developments have addressed the relational dynamics between institutions and protestors, focusing on the ways in which these interactions shape and influence both sets of actors (Goldstone, 2003; Jasper, 2015; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). While there is agreement that contexts matter for social movements, the specific questions that scholars must specify are how and to what extent they do so, which aspects of the political environment are more relevant, and for what kind of outcomes (Uba, 2009; Bosi et al., 2016). These are questions that have been addressed by several contributors in this volume. When studying the policy impact of protest movements, we should distinguish the policy field from the broader political system. Policy fields configure the immediate structure of opportunity and constraints of social movements attempting to advance alternative policy proposals. These fields usually define the legitimate actors of the relevant policy discussions and the mechanisms through which these discussions take place. Policy fields are embedded in the broader political system, which in turn shapes the constraints and opportunities that protesters face (Kriesi et al., 1995). Therefore, the contextual factors favor and/or inhibit the potential impact of social movements (Uba, 2009). In democratic systems, social movementsmust influence political partiesto obtain concessions, often by first affecting public opinion. Protests may be conceived as signals that orient politicians about the preferences of the majority. Therefore, social movements “are highly likely to succeed if public opinion is both supportive and attentive or fail if the reverse is true” (Luders, 2016, 189). The political mediation model maintains that social movements and protests are necessary, but insufficient conditions for policy change and their “impact (…) is mediated strongly by political conditions” (Amenta et al., 1992, 335). Legislative outputs are more straightforward in some cases, especially where protestors have swayed public opinion in their favor and politicians see that these events might have an impact on their electoral options. However, on occasions, windows of opportunity might open up, making dominant political actors or powerful institutions vulnerable to external pressures, which increases the options open to challengers (Moore, 1999). Eventful protests can create their own opportunities or resources over the course of a protest

14

L. CINI ET AL.

campaign, thus altering initial adverse conditions and increasing their chances of achieving positive results (della Porta, 2017b). The combined reactions of institutional actors define an “institutional sensitivity,” which political struggles can indeed modify by addressing the disposition of authorities, policy-makers, and bureaucracies. In the short run, institutional sensitivity might vary in reaction to challenges from civil society, to drastic changes in public opinion, or to exogenous crises. In the long run, the responsiveness of institutions might change due to broader alterations of the balance of power (as a consequence of transformations in the party system, demographic change, or deep socioeconomic transitions). Yet, if one were to focus solely on contextual factors, this may lead to the agency of actors being overlooked, resulting in an overly static explanation of the process under investigation. To avoid the structuralism bias that is implicit in the political mediation model—and more generally in the political process approach—it is therefore important to give actors, their characteristics, and their mutual relations at least as much analytical weight as their context of action (Meyer, Jenness and Ingram, 2005). Opportunities are seized (or lost), vulnerabilities or windows of opportunity can be created, allies can be persuaded. The literature has shown how the presence of allies in political institutions, in key decision-making bodies, in the media, and, more generally, in the public arena, is one of the main factors that facilitates the impact of movements (Amenta et al., 1992; Cress & Snow, 2000 della Porta & Rucht, 1995; Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 1995; Kriesi, 2004). Historically, left-wing parties or unions have been “natural allies” of movements (della Porta & Rucht, 1995, Kriesi et al., 1995). It has been shown from our analysis of the dynamics of student protest campaigns that specific political opportunities are important, not only as conditions, but also as the effects of protests: as protests unfold they have been able to forge new political alliances and in turn to obtain concessions. Several contributors to this volume have found that the strategic capacities of protestors to make alliances within institutions (including governments and parliaments) or to change the political scenario in such manner as to create incentives for political actors to offer concessions are important determinants of policy outcomes (Amenta, 2006; Amenta et al., 2005; Banaszak, 2005). Movement activists occasionally build coalitions and make alliances with insiders, members of the decisional bodies, in order to amplify

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

15

their influence in policy-making decisions. These have been referred to as “mediators” (Moore, 1999), “institutional activists” (Santoro & McGuire, 1997), or “tempered radicals” (Meyerson & Tompkins, 2007). Individuals located in the middle ground between institutions and movements can be in a good position to translate the claims of protest groups into changes in practices, norms, and members (Moore, 1999). However, protestors or movements can also initiate a journey toward institutions, in a process that generally takes some time. This joint pressure exerted over the centers of power seems to be crucial in producing some positive impacts. In considering a number of episodes of student protest that have occurred over the last decades, it can be observed that, to varying degrees, students distance themselves from political parties, with a mistrust toward institutional politics being noticeable in various groups. Hence the appearance of horizontal organizations and movements constituted by loose, decentered networks, which have been apparent, for example, in recent protests in Brazil (Alonso & Mische, 2017) and South Africa (Luescher, Loader, & Mugume, 2017). The origins of this trend could be traced back to 1968, and was a significant factor in Italy as early as the second half of the 1970s. However, this phenomenon takes different forms. In Chile, for instance, left-wing parties (both traditional and new) continue to enjoy a significant presence on campuses, while former student leaders contest national elections (Von Bulow & Bidegain, 2015). These differences speak to a variation in the ways in which these actors conceive elements of their environment in terms of opportunities or constraints, and accordingly, on the potential courses of action they are prepared to follow in pursuing their goals. Specific chapters included in this collection discuss how student movements strike a balance (or fail to) between identities, strategies, and goals.

The Structure of the Book All of the contributors to this volume tackle the aspects outlined above, dealing with, on the one hand, the forms of student organization and their action repertoires, and, on the other, their capacity to make alliances and to bring about various kinds of political consequences. Although these two aspects are closely interconnected, extant research in the field has rarely looked at them jointly. Therefore, it can be said that this volume makes a substantial contribution to the field by integrating these two

16

L. CINI ET AL.

aspects in an original and exhaustive manner. More notably, the various contributors explore how and to what extent the above aspects are to be understood as the result of strategic choices made by student activists during the process of mobilization. In doing so, they offer a relational and dynamic approach to these episodes of mobilizations by allowing the reader to better grasp the scope and centrality of the strategic dilemmas with which student activists and leaders need to cope (see, for instance, Jasper, 2015; Jasper, Moran, & Tramontano, 2015; Cini, 2017b). The Chapters included in this volume cover issues such as coalition building, the role of grievances, interactions with political systems, intramovement dynamics of mobilization, and higher education reforms. The authors attempt to explain the emergence of movements of contestation and how students have managed to achieve and sustain such significant levels of mobilization and commitment; how they have built alliances with other actors (e.g. faculty, civil society organizations, trade unions,and workers); the impacts of these movements in the political system and the ways in which institutional settings shape them; the ways in which policy reforms trigger resistance; and the extent to which these movements have been able to fight back and re-shape these reforms. One of the main characteristics of the volume is its geographical diversity: this collection includes cases from Latin America and North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The comparisons are innovative, as they contrast cases that are not often systematically compared within this discipline. In addition to this introduction, the volume comprises a further ten chapters that are listed and briefly outlined below. In Chapter 2, “What Moves Students? Ritual versus Reactive Student Demonstrations in Mexico City,” María Inclán adopts an innovative protest survey of protest participants and non-participants from two major student demonstrationsin Mexico City to test the assumption that protest participation triggers vary across protest events, even for demonstrating groups that are similar. Building on previous research, the author compares the motivations, mobilization dynamics, and political attitudes of students taking part in a ritual demonstration(the annual commemoration of the 1968 student movement) and a reactive protest (a march organized by the #YoSoy132 movement in response to Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidential campaign). The results suggest that the level of students’ political involvement is more influential in their decision to take part in reactive demonstrations, while for ritual demonstrations, the decision to participate tends to be driven more by their collective identity as

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

17

students. These findings add to the growing literature on contextualized contestation and debunking the myth of the protester, in this particular case of the protesting student. In Chapter 3, Luc Chicoine and Marcos Ancelovici analyze “Contentious Institutionalized Movements: The Case of the Student Movementin Quebec.” As they note, social movement scholars generally claim that the institutionalization of social movements goes hand in hand with bureaucratization, professionalization, and normalization or domestication. Simply put, as social movements institutionalize, they supposedly become less disruptive. However, in Quebec, the student movement remains disruptive in spite of a process of institutionalization. The authors argue that in order to make sense of this relationship between institutionalization and contentiousness, one needs to unpack the process of institutionalization and identify internal contradictions and tensions. The authors contend that in Quebec, a process of fragmented institutionalization and the existence of an alliance system, which includes influential non-student actors have allowed radical student associations to reproduce their contentious repertoire over time. The persistence of contention was thus made possible not only in spite of institutionalization, but also thanks to it. In Chapter 4 Sarah L. Augusto looks at “Structuring the ‘Structureless’ and Leading the ‘Leaderless’: Power and Organization in the Student Movementat the University of California.” She examines the tensions and challenges experienced by participants in the student movementat the University of California as they struggled to create new forms of decentralized organization and horizontal leadership. Focusing on the internal dynamics of the movement, the author explores how power is allocated, the process of direct democracy, and why participants prefer certain organizational forms over others. She found that informal leadership and organization created hidden power dynamics and different understandings of direct democracy and the purpose of consensus, while also creating conflicts that often got in the way of solidarity. She also found that organizational preferences were in part determined by strategy and the varying goals and tactical preferences of participants, but also influenced by ideology and symbolic associations. Chapter 5, authored by Thierry M. Luescher, Nkululeko Makhubu, Thelma Oppelt, Seipati Mokhema, and Memory Zodwa Radasi focuses on “Tweeting #FeesMustFall: The OnlineLife and Offline Protests of a Networked Student Movement.” Over ten days in October 2015,

18

L. CINI ET AL.

students from the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg and eventually from across South Africa became engaged in the #FeesMustFall campaign, shutting down university campuses nationwide and participating in intense onlineand offline protest actions. The movement stopped an increase in tuition fees for 2016 and eventually led to feefree higher education for poor and working-class students from 2018 onwards. The extensive use of social media by student activists and others transformed the South African student movement into a networked movement. In this chapter, the authors provide systematic evidence for the online and offline life of #FeesMustFall. They analyze #FeesMustFallrelated online and offline protest actions during the crucial first campaign from 14 to 23 October 2015. Using a combination of Twitter data, interviews with student activists, and protest event data, they analyze the history of #FeesMustFall, the nature and extent of Twitter use, the prevalence of protest action across different universities, and the online social network structure, leadership, and organization structure of the movement. The authors find significant differences between institutions that signal a social media divide in the movement as well as various organizational and tactical dimensions that may account for the effectiveness of the 2015 #FeesMustFall campaign. In Chapter 6, “Organizing Spontaneity: Student Leadership in Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement,” Chi-shun Fong and Samson Yuen build upon the observation that leadership is a crucial factor that influences the dynamics and outcomes of social movements. This chapter explores student leadership in Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement and suggests that trajectories of protest in the contemporary era cannot be explained simply by the presence or absence of political opportunities but must be understood through looking at the multifaceted interplay between movement leadership and its digital and spatial milieus over time. As the spontaneous eruption of the Umbrella Movement gave rise to a decentralized protest structure, formal protest leaders had to operate within a connective environment in which participants were no longer simply their obedient followers. The emergence of many informal leaders blurred the boundary of leadership and thinned out the authority of formal leaders. By studying the online and offline interaction of the two student organizations—The Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism—with ordinary protesters, it is demonstrated how such connective dynamics restrained the leading student organizations to bring together a mass mandate from various protest sites and online communities in order to

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

19

make strategic decisions. The findings show that the formation of movement leadership and their decision-making capacity can be both adversely and positively affected by digitally networked activism. Chapter 7, by Gianni Piazza, is entitled “From the Classrooms to the Roofs: The 2010 University Researchers’ Movement in Italy,” and focuses on the 2010 researcher movement in Italy and on its main collective actor, the Rete29Aprile (April29Network). Along with student movements and precarious researchers, they had a decisive role in the protest campaign against the Gelmini Bill, a neoliberal and private sector-oriented university reform. This movement of permanent researchers undoubtedly represented a novelty for Italian academia, because they chose to mobilize according to a model of “unconventional movement politics” as opposed to that of “conventional union politics.” Indeed, most researchers who took part in the protests opted for setting up an informal, networked participatory organization based on direct and participatory democracy, and chose mainly unconventional tactics, which were sometimes disruptive, such as “unavailability for teaching” and “climbing on roofs.” Despite the approval of the Gelmini Bill and the consequent demobilization of movement against it, the researcher protest left its mark and the R29A continues to play an important monitoring and observation role in Italian academia. Chapter 8 sees Francesco Pontarelli address “Worker-Student Unity Against Outsourcing at the University of Johannesburg: Disrupting the Neoliberal Paradigm Through Direct Action and Alternative Relations.” In 2015, #FeesMustFall, the largest student movementsince the end of the apartheid regime, united with outsourced university workers, in reaction to the neoliberal trajectory of the South African higher education system. Based on data collected through extended participant observation and interviews, the author explores the process of solidarity that emerged between students and workers at the University of Johannesburg and investigates how their unity in action achieved the partial removal of outsourced labor relations. The processes of solidarity that emerged, drawing on the progressive aspects of the historical senso comune, had the potential to question the whole post-apartheid societal structure, obliging the state and the university management to make remarkable concessions in order to disarticulate it. This analysis contributes to the debate about the limits and potential of student and worker movements and their capacity to question the status quo and imagine de-colonialized alternatives.

20

L. CINI ET AL.

In Chapter 9, “From Revolt to Reform: Student Protests and the Higher Education Agenda in England 2009–2019,” Hector Rios-Jara analyses how the dynamics of cooperation and competition between student movement organizations and third parties shaped the impact of student protests in higher education policyin England between 2010 and 2019. More specifically, the author analyzes the wave of higher education reforms and university student protests of 2009–2014 and 2015–2019. For each period, he examines the strategy and alliances of leading student organizations and the impact that protests have on higher education policy. The author suggests that English student protests have a low impact on policy due to the existence of competitive relationships between leading organizations, and the lack of strong connections to third parties. The chapter concludes by reflecting on strategic tensions that student activists experienced during the transition from opposition and revolt against neoliberal policies to reform and influencing higher education policy through alliances with the Labour Party and the rise of Corbynism. Chapter 10 by Nicolás M. Somma and Sofía Donoso is on “Chile’s Student Movement: Strong, Detached, Influential … and Declining?” Contrary to what is commonly argued in the literature, Chile’s student movement became influential once it had detached itself from political parties and the government. Adopting a contentious politics approach, this chapter analyses this empirical puzzle by highlighting three processes that the student movement has experienced since the 1990s: growing strength, political detachment, and an influence on education policymaking. To support these claims, the authors present a narrative that relies on the abundant scholarly literature on the Chilean student movement and on data collected in various research projects they have undertaken. They emphasize the critical junctures of 2001, 2006, and 2011–2012, where major student protestcycles took place. Finally, the authors also try to make sense of the decline of student protests after 2011. Finally, in Chapter 11, Didem Türko˘glu presents a comparative view in “Ever Failed? Fail Again, Fail Better: Tuition protests in Germany, Turkey, and the United States” by exploring student protests against tuition hikes across three different welfare state types: Germany, Turkey, and the United States. More notably, she argues that the crucial commonality across these cases was the formation of unexpected alliances made possible by the failures of past movements. The author offers a meso-level analysis of past “failures” that empowered strategic intentions through the collective memory work of activists. These positions offered new

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

21

possibilities for brokerage, enabled and constrained different alliance configurations, especially with labor unions and civil society organizations. The legacy of the 1960s and the 1990s influenced the pathways available to the student activists in the 2000s. Overall, the ten chapters of the volume offer a broad understanding of a variety of struggles in which students have been engaged across widely different contexts and educational systems during the first two decades of this century. From different disciplinary angles, ranging from political sociology to higher education studies and political economy, the ten contributions illustrate key episodes of student mobilizations contesting neoliberal education policies, in both the higher education field and broader political arena, in a period of manifold crises of global capitalism in “late neoliberalism” (della Porta et al., 2017). In mapping this variety of mobilizations in very different regions of the world, the chapters converge on two common themes: the forms of organization and action that these movements adopt on the one hand, and their outcomes on the other. The variation displayed by contemporary student mobilizations on these two specific dimensions also represents one of the main empirical contributions that this collection of studies provides. Today, students are mobilizing on issues related to racism and ethnic discrimination, gender equality, sexual harassment on campuses, colonialism in study programs, and aspects pertaining to equality of access, including movements for free university education and for the expansion of student aid programs. As student protests are also still spreading, from Lebanon to Catalonia to Turkey, bridging the criticism of commodification of education with calls for democracy, future research is needed. It will be especially important to investigate the new ways of practicing student activism, both in online and offline forms. This is all the more important in a world that has discovered how vulnerable it is to the impacts of global pandemics that have a high disruptive capacity and in which universities are already experiencing new budget constraints and changing demands from both governments and public opinion. These are compelling issues that challenge the core mission of the university, something that makes conflict and struggle all the more relevant in the foreseeable future.

22

L. CINI ET AL.

References Agasisti, T., & Catalano, G. (2006). Governance models of university systems— towards quasi-markets? Tendencies and perspectives: A European comparison. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 28(3), 245–262. Amenta, E. (2006). When movements matter: The townsend plan and the rise of social security. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Amenta, E., Caren, N., & Olasky, S. J. (2005). Age for leisure? Political mediation and the impact of the pension movement on U.S. old-age policy. American Sociological Review, 70(3), 516–538. Amenta, E., Carruthers, B., & Zylan, Y. (1992). A hero for the aged? The townsend movement, the political mediation model, and U.S. old-age policy, 1934–1950. American Journal of Sociology, 98, 308–339. Banaszak, L. A. (2005). Inside and outside the state. In D. S. Meyer, V. Jenness, & H. Ingram (Eds.), Routing the opposition: Social movements, public policy and democracy (pp. 149–176). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bosi, L., Giugni, M., & Uba, K., (Eds.), (2016). The consequences of social movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brooks, R. (Ed.). (2016). Student politics and protest: International perspectives. Routledge. Cini, L. (2016). Student struggles and power relations in contemporary universities. The cases of Italy and England. In R. Brooks (Ed.), Student politics and protest: International perspectives (pp. 31–45). Routledge. Cini, L. (2017a). From student to general struggle: the protests against the neoliberal reforms in higher education in contemporary Italy. In A. Mark & H.-M. Ratiba (Eds.), Generations and protests: Legacies, emergences in the MENA region and the mediterranean (pp. 55–72). Leiden: Brill. Cini, L. (2017b). Successful student activism in contemporary Italian universities. Italian Political Science Review, 47, 2. Cini, L. (2019a). The contentious politics of higher education. Routledge. Cini, L. (2019b). Disrupting the Neoliberal University in South Africa: The #FeesMustFall movement in 2015. Current Sociology, 67 (7), 942–959. Cini, L. (2020). Student power. In M. David, & M. Amey (Eds.), The SAGE encyclopedia of higher education (pp. 1466–1468). Cini, L., Chironi, D., Drapalova, E., & Tomasello, F. (2017). Towards a critical theory of social movements: An introduction. Anthropological Theory, 17 (4), 429–452. Cini, L., & Guzmán-Concha, C. (2017). Student movements in the age of austerity. The cases of Chile and England. Social Movement Studies, 16(5), 623–628. Cress, D., & Snow, D. (2000). The outcomes of homeless mobilization: The influence of organization, disruption, political mediation, and framing. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 1063–1110.

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

23

Crossley, N. (2003). From reproduction to transformation: Social movement fields and the radical habitus. Theory, Culture & Society, 20(6), 43–68. della Porta, D. (2010). Prefazione. Movimenti degli studenti: riflessioni comparate. In L. Caruso, A. Giorgi, A. Mattoni, & G. Piazza (Eds.), Alla ricerca dell’Onda. I nuovi conflitti nell’istruzione superiore. Milano: FrancoAngeli. della Porta, D. (2016). Where did the revolution go? Contentious politics and the quality of democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. della Porta, D. (2017a). Where did the revolution go? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. della Porta, D. (2017b). Late Neoliberalism and its discontents in the economic crisis: Comparing social movements in the european periphery. London: Palgrave Macmillan. della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Fernandes, T., O’Connor, F., Romanos, E., & Vogiatzoglou, M. (2017). Political economy and social movements studies: The class basis of anti-austerity protests. Anthropological Theory, 17 (4), 453– 473. della Porta, D., & Rucht, D. (1995). Left-Libertarian movements in context: A comparison of Italy and West Germany, 1965–1990. In C. Jenkins & B. Klandermans (Eds.), The politics of social protest: Comparative perspectives on states and social movements (pp. 229–272). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2006). Social movements. An introduction. Blackwell. della Porta, D., Cini, L., & Guzman-Concha, C. (2020). Contesting higher education: Student movements against neoliberal universities. Bristol: Bristol University Press. Edmunds, J., & Turner, B. (2005). Global generations: Social change in the twentieth century. The British Journal of Sociology, 56(4), 559–577. Eisinger, P. K. (1973). The conditions of protest behavior in american cities. The American Political Science Review, 67 (1), 11–28. Fernandez, J. (2014). Facing the corporate-university: The new wave of student movements in Europe. Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, 12(1), 191–213. Forest, J., & Altback, P. (2006). International handbook of higher education. Springer. Garritzmann, J. L. (2016). The political economy of higher education finance: The politics of tuition fees and subsidies in OECD countries (pp. 1945–2015). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Gill, J., & DeFronzo, J. (2009). A comparative framework for the analysis of international student movements. Social Movement Studies, 8(3), 203–224. Ginsberg, B. (2011) The fall of the faculty. The rise of the all-administrative university and why it matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

24

L. CINI ET AL.

Goldstone, J. A. (Ed.). (2003). States, parties and social movements. New York: Cambridge University Press. Guzman-Concha, C. (2017). Introduction: Student movements and political change in contemporary Latin America. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 36(2), 141–143. Guzman-Concha, C., & Cini, L. (forthcoming). The political economy of student revolts in the twenty-first century. In J. Goodwin & M. Schwartz (Eds.), The political economy of social movements. Jasper, J. (2006). Getting your way: Strategic dilemmas in the real world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jasper, J. (2015). Introduction: Playing the game. In J. Jasper & W. Duyvendak (Eds.), Players and arenas: The interactive dynamics of protest (pp. 9–32). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Kitschelt, H. (1986). Political opportunity structures and political protest: antinuclear movements in four democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 16, 57–85. Klemenˇciˇc, M. (2014). Student power in a global perspective and contemporary trends in student organising. Studies in Higher Education, 39(3), 396–411. Kriesi, H. (2004). Political context and opportunity. In D. Snow, S. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Ed.), The blackwell companion to social movements, Blackwell. Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Giugni, M. (1995). New social movements in Western Europe. University of Minnesota Press. Lewis, T. E. (2013). On study: Giorgio agamben and educational potentiality. London: Routledge. Luders, J. (2016). Feminist mobilization and the politics of rights. In L. Bosi, M. Giugni, & K. Uba (Eds.), The consequences of social movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Luescher, T. M., & Klemencis, M. (2017). Student power in 21st century Africa. In R. Brooks (Ed.), Student politics and protest: International perspectives (pp. 113–128). London: Routledge. McAdam, D. (1986). Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of freedom summer. American Journal of Sociology, 92(1), 64–90. MacFarlane, G. (2017). If not now, when? If not us, who? Understanding the student protest movement in Hong Kong. In R. Brooks (Ed.), Student politics and protest: International perspectives (pp. 143–156). Routledge. McGettingan, A. (2013). The Great University gamble. money, markets, and the future of higher education. London: Pluto Press. Meyer, D. (2004). Protest and political opportunities. Annual Review of Sociology, 30(1), 125–145.

1

STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN LATE NEOLIBERALISM

25

Meyerson, D., & Tompkins, M. (2007). Tempered radicals as institutional change agents: The case of advancing gender equality at the University of Michigan. Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, 303(30), 1–21. Moore, K. (1999). Political protest and institutional change: The Anti-Vietnam War movement and American science. In M. Giugni, D. McAdam, & C. Tilly (Eds.), How social movements matter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Piven, F. (2006). Challenging authority. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Polanyi, K. (2001[1944]). The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time (2nd ed.). Boston: Beacon Press. Rootes, C. (2013). Student movements. In D. Snow, Donatella della Porta, B. Klandermans, & D. McAdam (Eds.), The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. Ross, E. W., & Vinson, K. D. (2014). Dangerous citinzeship. In E. W. Ross (Ed.), The social studies curriculum (pp. 93–126). New York: Suny Press. Santoro, W. A., & McGuire, G. M. (1997). Social movement insiders: The impact of institutional activitists on affirmative action and comparable worth policies. Social Problems, 44(4), 503–519. Smelzer, S., & Hearn, A. (2015). Student rights in an age of austerity? Security, freedom of expression and the neoliberal university. Social Movement Studies, 14(3), 352–358. Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2015). Contentious politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Uba, K. (2009). The contextual dependence of movement outcomes: A simplified meta-analysis. Mobilization: An international quarterly, 14(4), 433–448. Von Bulow, M., & Ponte, G. B. (2015). It takes two to Tango: Students, political parties, and protest in Chile. In P. Almeida & A. Cordero Ulate (Eds.), Handbook of social movements across Latin America (pp. 179–194). Springer Publishing. Willemse, N., & de Beer, P. (2012). Three worlds of educational welfare states? A comparative study of higher education systems across welfare states. Journal of European Social Policy, 22(2), 105–117.

CHAPTER 2

What Moves Students? Ritual Versus Reactive Student Demonstrations in Mexico City María Inclán

Introduction Long gone are the days in which the literature characterized social movements, contentious politics, protest activity, and its participants as irregular political participation activity conducted by abnormal individuals. Scholars, students, and social movement participants have already proven that those who take part in street demonstrations are not deviant individuals, but resourceful concerned citizens who are politically informed and involved, civically engaged and connected, who want to take action to defend their interests and raise public awareness about sociopolitical, economic, or cultural issues unaddressed so far in the polity (Holzner, 2007; Klesner, 2009; Marien et al., 2010; Moreno, 2003; Norris et al., 2005; Quaranta, 2014; Tarrow, 2011; van Aeslt & Walgrave, 2001; van der Meer et al., 2009). Nowadays it is assumed that protest participants tend to be relatively more educated individuals, who are interested

M. Inclán (B) Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico City, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_2

27

28

M. INCLÁN

in politics, organized, connected, and mobilized through professional, civic, social, or personalnetworks. Therefore, they tend to easily develop collective identities. They also tend to be informed and concerned about the issues they defend, and have the time and motivation to take part in protest mobilization (Klandermans et al., 2008; Lee, 2010; Saunders et al., 2012; Schussman & Soule, 2005; Van Dyke et al., 2007). Because of this, it has been assumed that protest participants tend to be university-level students or young professionals. However, as the field of study of protest participation has become more specialized, scholars have shown that contextual factors play a big role in determining who demonstrates for what issue. Different well-informed, resourceful, and politically active individuals are motivated to take part in different demonstrations depending on the political moment and mobilizing issue (Blocq et al., 2012; Della Porta et al., 2012; Klandermans et al., 2014; Saunders et al., 2012; van Stekelenburg et al., 2012; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2009; Walgrave & Wouters, 2014). Hence, there is no single protestor portrait. Mobilizing issues tend to be diverse. Their motivations to mobilize may also differ across demonstrations and contexts. The mobilizing dynamics and political attitudes also vary depending on the type of demonstration and mobilizing moment in which it occurs, showing that the political and mobilizing context matters a great deal when influencing who decides to take their struggle to the streets. This variation becomes even more interesting to study when we compare seemingly similar demonstrating groups involved in different demonstrating events. In this study, I propose to compare protest participation of two different student demonstrations in Mexico City: the 2011 annual commemoration of the 1968 students’ movement and massacre that takes place every year on October 2, and one of the more spontaneous protests organized by the #YoSoy132 students’ movement against the presidential campaign of Enrique Peña Nieto back in June 2012. While both events were organized by students, they differed in their nature. The annual commemoration of the 1968 students’ movement tends to be more ritualistic, ceremonial, and predictable, as it takes place every year on the same day, to commemorate the 1968 student movement’s cause and its aftermath, while the march organized by the #YoSoy132 movement was an immediate contentious response to a particular event—an electoral campaign event gone wrong. As such, I consider the latter a reactive protest, one that responds to current or sudden events or policy changes (Inclán & Almeida, 2017).

2

WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

29

Hence, although both protests were organized by relatively similar groups of demonstrators, and therefore should have been mobilized through relatively similar motivational, organizational, and attitudinal dynamics, participating students in these events were motivated by different reasons and held different political attitudes toward surrounding events, as the nature of the demonstrations and their mobilizing issues also differed. Ritual demonstrations are annual commemorations of a social movement (Klandermans, 2012). They tend to be well-orchestrated public marches or rallies to celebrate collective identities, rights, past struggles, and reinforce shared solidarities (Collins, 2001; Johnston, 2009). As such, they tend to be festive events that provide positive incentives to participate, not only because participants may be celebrating their past gains, pride, and the opportunity to reunite (Saunders et al., 2012), but also because such events tend to be low-risk demonstrations (Ebert & Okamoto, 2013). Reactive protests, on the other hand, are contentious events that are organized in response to immediate changes in the sociopolitical system or the economy, such as drastic policy changes, elections, police abuse, or sudden price hikes (Meyer, 2014; Tilly, 1978). As such, they tend to be more confrontational in nature (Dodson, 2011) and may pose higher risks and uncertainty. While ritual and reactive demonstrations may occur within the same political context, such as in the same timeframe or the same authorities, their mobilizing issues will differ because they are framed by the nature of the event. Ritual demonstrations are centered around commemorating the original demands of the movement. Thus, more current grievances that the movement may have will be presented under the original movement’s discourse frame. Because of this, their demonstrating goal may not necessarily be to target sitting governments or ruling political parties. In contrast, reactive protests are primarily centered around current grievances that mobilize participants to respond to a sudden change in policy, a repressive act, a cut in prerogatives and rights, or an ongoing electoral campaign. In this case, reactive protests tend to be more likely to blame current administrations for their grievances. If these assumptions are correct, they should also hold true for protest events organized by relatively similar groups of people and/or mobilizing organizations. In this case, because both demonstrations were organized by students it is expected that participants in both events were highly educated individuals, who were informed and interested in the mobilizing politics of their events. Nevertheless, I also expect to observe differences

30

M. INCLÁN

across their motivations to take part, as well as gradual differences among their mobilizing political attitudes, and dynamics. In the next section, I explain in more detail the reasoning behind these assumptions.

Theoretical Expectations Previous studies on surveying contextualized protest participation in Mexico City, showed that ritual demonstrators are more likely to participate when they are mobilized through their personal or organizational connections, while protest participation of reactive protestors appears to be based more on their political interest and their experience in other political activities (Inclán & Almeida, 2017). Not only mobilizing mechanisms and factors may vary across demonstrations, but protest participants’ political attitudes may differ as well (Inclán, 2019). Those studies showed that, the decision to take part in the 2011 annual commemoration of the 1968 students’ movement and massacre in Mexico City appeared to be motivated by their lower levels of trust in political authorities, while protest participation in the #YoSoy132 march was more motivated by their lower satisfaction with the Mexican democracy, a more left-leaning ideology, a higher sense of political efficacy, political interest, and organizational participation. Hence, reactive participants in the #YoSoy132 march seemed to be more politically involved, than the ritual demonstrators of the annual commemoration of the 1968 students’ movement. In the present study, I focus on the comparison of protest participation triggers for the two student demonstrations just mentioned. As argued before, while I expect to find some similarities across factors triggering student participation in both events, I suspect that the intensity of these factors as protest participation determinants will vary between them given the different mobilizing context and nature of the events. In general, students in both events are expected to have had all the characteristics of the politically active protest participants (Hypothesis 1). Being students part of the most educated group in society, it is expected that participants in both events were also resourceful individuals, with time and interest to be better informed on the socioeconomic and political problems in society (Hypothesis 1a). Hence, they should have expressed being interested in politics, belong to civic organizations, and take part in other political activities (Hypothesis 1b). Their particular characteristics as students should have facilitated their social connectedness through personal and

2

WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

31

media networks (Hypothesis 1c), which in turn may have expedited their protest participation recruitment (Dixon & Roscigno, 2003; Kitts, 2000; Krinsky & Crossley, 2014; Lim, 2008; Scacco, 2010), particularly if they were personally invited to take part in demonstrations (Schussman & Soule, 2005; Walgrave & Wouters, 2014) that highlighted their collective identityas students (Klandermans et al., 2014; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Snow & McAdam, 2000; Stryker, 2000; Taylor et al., 2009; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014). Nevertheless, because of the different nature of both demonstrations— ritualistic versus reactive, it is probable that the role of the previously mentioned characteristics as protest participation determinants varied as well (Hypothesis 2). Being the annual commemorationof the 1968 students’ movement a more ritualistic demonstration, I anticipate that it attracted individuals more interested in celebrating the mobilizing tradition of the event and their collective identity as students (Hypothesis 2a). Because of this, it was also more likely that participants would have been personally invited to take part, as events like these tend to be perceived as opportunities to reinforce shared identities and personal bonds (Hypothesis 2b) (Collins, 2004; McPhail, 1991). In comparison, I estimate that participants in the reactive #YoSoy132 march, which was organized as a reaction to Enrique Peña Nieto’s fiasco during his presidential campaign event at Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City, were more motivated to take part because of their higher level of political involvement, interest, and political knowledge (Hypothesis 2c). Defending their shared identity as students, as they showed through social media,1 must have been also a crucial protest participation determinant. Because of the reactive nature of the event and the short notice to organize it, it is foreseeable that protest participation for this event relied more on social media recruitment (Hypothesis 2d). Moreover, the #YoSoy132 movement began online showing the students’ ability to use online social media to present and advocate for their cause. In comparison, I expect that the mobilization to a ritual demonstration like the annual 1968 students’ movement commemoration should have relied more on personal and organizational networks. More evident differences should emerge when we compare the political attitudes expressed by both groups of student demonstrations (Hypothesis 3). While both groups of students are expected to have had a left-leaning political ideology and a strong sense of political efficacy, the essence of

32

M. INCLÁN

each event should have triggered different political attitudes as mobilizing motivators. For example, because of the nature of the 1968 students’ movement commemoration, namely the remembrance of the movement causes and the brutal military repression, students suffered then as a consequence of their mobilization, it is logical to assume that those taking part in this annual celebration showed lower confidence in political institutions than their reactive counterparts participating in the #YoSoy132 protest (Hypothesis 3a). In comparison, reactive protestors in the midst of a presidential electoral campaign should have been more motivated to take part based on their dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Mexican democracy (Hypothesis 3b). To better understand these theoretical mechanisms, I now turn to a brief description of the origins of these two student mobilizing efforts.

Commemoration of the 1968 Students’ Movement and Massacre During the summer of 1968, Mexican students did not remain immune to mobilizing efforts in favor of democracy that were taking place around the world. While back then news travelled more slowly than nowadays, students in Mexico were aware of other student mobilizations in Europe and the United States despite the efforts of the authoritarian regime in the country to control the press. The students’ movement in Mexico initiated as a reaction against the brutal police repression of a brawl between high school and vocational students of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, UNAM) and National Polytechnic Institute (Instituto Politécnico National, IPN), respectively. While the brutal repressive response of the authorities was not something new, the fact that state violence against demonstrators at different mobilizing events lasted over several days detonated a students’ movement in the city. As the movement grew in popularity, so did police repression. The movement demands also began to become more political, passing from denouncing police brutality to demand justice and compensation to victims of repression, political prisoners’ freedom, and the abolition of the law of sedition and the swat-team police corporation to demand freedom of the press, defend the university autonomy from the state, and demand more student participation in internal university decisions (Pensado, 2013).

2

WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

33

Mobilizing events grew in size and frequency over the following months after that summer. School teachers, university professors, unionized workers, and parents joined the movement. The events were contentious and defiant. Violence broke out at times. Still, the repressive response was always disproportionate. The Olympic Games in Mexico City were approaching and the state authorities wanted to portray to the world an image of modernity and development, not one of discontent and contentious politics. On October 2, 1968, ten days before the Olympics inauguration, during one of the movement’s rallies in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in Tlatelolco, infiltrated snipers opened fire against the congregated demonstrators, bystanders, swat-team, and soldiers who had been sent to police the event. Chaos erupted as a cross-fire between snipers and soldiers unfolded killing hundreds, although the number has remained undetermined. Although the brutal repression successfully eliminated further mobilization prior to the Olympic Games, over the years, the 1968 students’ movement has fought against protest repression, for more transparency and participation, not only in university life but in national politics as well. It is even considered that the 1968 students’ movement gave birth to the struggle for democracy and human rights in the country (Trevizo, 2011), as the disappearance and death of so many students brought the demands for an independent investigation and justice against brutal state repression to the forefront of the movement’s agenda. Since then, each year, surviving leaders and students of the 1968 movement, together with current students, sympathizers, and supporters, hold a rally in the Tlatelolco Plaza and a march to Mexico City’s central square to commemorate the movement’s demands and remember its martyrs. In 2011, when the event was surveyed, the press reported that thousands of people participated and that the event was heavily policed.2 As every year, the event lasted for over 4 hours and involved the blocking of Eje Central, one of the major avenues in the city. The ambiance was festive. Both the rally and march developed in a very orderly manner. When asked about the reason for their participation in the event, about 42% of respondents mentioned commemorating motivations.3 Other motivating reasons included identification/solidarity with the movement, its goals, and actors (11.5%), friendship or family connections (5.7%), curiosity and fun (7.7%). 4.8% decided to take part on their own, while another 4.8% acknowledged being mobilized for the event, and an extra 1% recognized being a recurrent activist. Only 6.7% of participants

34

M. INCLÁN

expressed opposition to the sitting government as a reason to take part, while only 2% mentioned other civil or political rights such as fighting for freedom of expression, raising awareness, or defending students’ rights. Figure 2.1 shows this.

#YoSoy132 March During the 2012 PresidentialElectoral Campaign of Enrique Peña Nieto The #YoSoy132 movement began as a reaction against then presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto in the summer of 2012. On May 11, Peña Nieto delivered an invited talk at the private Jesuit Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City. At the end of his talk, students questioned Peña Nieto’s repressive measures taken during his term as governor of the State of Mexico against a movement opposing the construction of an airport in San Salvador Atenco. The responses he gave were perceived as callous and did not satisfy the audience. He stated: “… I reiterate, it was an action, that I assume personally, to re-establish order and peace, based on the legitimate right of the Mexican State to use the public force and that, in addition, I must say, was validated by the Supreme Court.”4 Soon students started to boo and protest so intensely that he was forced to leave the auditorium through the back door. Protesting students followed him through the university campus, at a point, trapping him in a restroom. The protest escalated to the point of forcing him to flee the university campus. To Peña Nieto’s bad luck, but fortunately for the students, participants recorded the entire event and it was immediately broadcasted online. The candidate’s political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and Televisa, the most important TV network in the country, tried to portray the protests as an event orchestrated by political opposition groups. Ibero students responded with a video in which 131 students identified themselves as participants in the event.5 Soon thereafter, students from other public and private universities showed their support,6 and the #YoSoy132 movement began mobilizing against Peña Nieto and in favor of freedom of the press and independent media. As time passed, other demands became more pressing for the movement. Not only the need for independent media became one of its central causes, but out of the initial mobilizing experience, the #YoSoy132 movement evolved into other collective efforts such as support for the

Fig. 2.1 Participants’ motivations to participate in the annual commemoration of the 1968 students’ movement on October 2, 2011

2 WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

35

36

M. INCLÁN

Ayotzinapa movement in 2014 and the victims of the 2017 earthquake (Verificado19s). Nevertheless, as time has passed, the movement has begun to acquire some ritualistic characteristics. On online media,one can find commemorative messages and evidence of celebratory reunions.7 The pre-electoral march against Peña Nieto’s presidential campaign was surveyed on June 10, 2012. The press reported almost a hundred thousand participants.8 Participants marched for over 5 hours from the central square, Zócalo, to the country’s independence monument, El Ángel, through the city’s main avenue, Reforma. In comparison to the reasons that brought participants in the 1968 students’ movement commemoration, in Fig. 2.2 we can observe that over 68.3% of participants mentioned their opposition to the sitting government and the PRI presidential candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto. Other motivations to participate that could signal the participants’ level of political involvement and awareness included more plural media (7.6%), freedom of expression, defend their rights, and democracy (3.7%), while 9.9% mentioned feeling solidarity or identification with the movement, its goals, and actors, and only 2.4% decided to take part on their own, and 0.5% mentioned they did so because of the mobilizing campaign launched through online social networks.9

Surveying Student Protest Participation Both student demonstrations were surveyed in situ. That means protest participants were surveyed applying a standardized face-to-face questionnaire to randomly selected respondents during demonstrations (van Stekelenburg et al., 2012). Pointers, and not surveyors, randomly selected survey respondents within the geographical area of the protest event to reduce potential selection bias. The reported response rate of the two demonstrations fluctuated between 48.64% for the 1968 students’ movement commemoration and 65.19% for the #YoSoy132 march, with a total average of 58.93% (see Table 2.1). For the further interpretation of the results, it needs to be acknowledged that the surveyed sample of 1968 students’ movements commemoration and its response rate are significantly smaller than those of the #YoSoy132march, and that these differences may introduce some bias to the analyses. These differences may be due to two factors. First, the data collected during the commemoration of the 1968 students’ movement was the pilot application of the protest survey. Second, some

Fig. 2.2 Participants’ motivations to participate in the #YoSoy132 protesting march against Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidential campaign on June 10, 2012

2 WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

37

78 192 270

165

275 440

1968 Student Movement #YoSoy132 Totals

Completed questionnaires participants

Distributed questionnaires participants

87 142

55

Distributed questionnaires nonparticipants

Surveyed protest participants and nonparticipants per student event

Demonstration

Table 2.1

44 73

29

Completed questionnaires nonparticipants

65.19 58.93

48.64

Response rate (%)

38 M. INCLÁN

2

WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

39

response bias could also have been present among ritual demonstrators, as they appeared more apprehensive about being surveyed than reactive protestors. Unfortunately, we did not collect any information to analyze the reasons for this resistance more systematically. In a moving demonstration, three pointers, each accompanied by a team of interviewers, are distributed to cover the front, the middle, and the back of protesting group. To ensure a fair dispersion of questionnaires over the marching column, pointers count the rows of participants in the moving cortege, selecting every nth row, to ensure that the same number of rows is skipped throughout the demonstration, so that the whole procession is covered (van Stekelenburg et al., 2012). During standing demonstrations three pointers distribute interviewers around the square where the protest eventis taking place. Pointers may instruct their interviewers to survey from the outer circle in the direction of the center of the square or viceversa. As pointers walk toward the center of the square, they need to count their steps and assign another surveyor every n-steps, increasing the number of steps as they approach the center. Pointers send out interviewers to the left and the right of the “line” he is following, and interviewers are spread more to the left and right at the edge of the crowd than in the center.

Predicting Protest Participation Between Ritual and Reactive Students’ Demonstrations To predict the participation of students in these two types of events according to the hypotheses presented before, the following variables were included in the predicting model: Protest participation. A dichotomous variable identifies protest participants (1) from nonparticipants (0) surveyed in each protest event. Organizational membership. A dichotomous variable distinguishes members of at least one organization (1) from nonmembers (0) in the previous 12 months. Past participation. A dichotomous variable recognizes whether survey respondents had taken part in at least one other political activity in the last 12 months (1) or not (0). Interest in politics . A five-point scale categorizes the respondents’ interest in politics from “no interest in politics at all” (0) to “very interested” (4).

40

M. INCLÁN

Political efficacy. A five-point scale ranks the respondents’ perception of the effectiveness of their participation in influencing public policies in the country from “not effective at all” (0) to “very effective” (4). Trust in the political system. An index ranks the respondents’ trust on the national government, political parties, trade unions, the judicial system, the police, and the army using a five point scale from “no trust at all” (0) to “a lot of trust” (4). A factor analysis (α = 0.69) indicated that, all variables could be combined in a normalized index from 0 to 1. Satisfaction with democracy. A scale from 0 to 10 orders survey respondents’ satisfaction with the functioning of the democratic regime in the country, on which 0 marks no satisfaction and 10 stands for total satisfaction. Left-right ideology. To measure survey respondents’ self-identified political ideology, they were asked “In politics people often talk about ‘left and right.’ Where would you locate yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, on which 0 stands for “extreme left” and 10 stands for “extreme right”? The whole scale was used for variability purposes, as additional models run with an extreme left dichotomous variable did not change the results. Personal recruitment. A dichotomous variable identifies whether survey respondents were asked to take part in the demonstration by someone (1) or not (0). Possible personal recruiters were a partner or family member (1), a relative (2), a friend (3), a peer or colleague (4), a fellow member of an organization (5), or an acquaintance (6). Informational recruitment. I used the question in the survey that asks protest participants and nonparticipants to state the most important source of information through which they heard about the demonstration. Possible answers include four different categories: (1) conventional news media (radio, television, and newspapers), (2) online media and social networks, (3) personal connections (partners, family, friends, acquaintances, fellow students or co-workers, fellow members of an organization or association, and (4) advertisements (flyers and posters) of an organization. From these possible responses, I constructed two different dichotomous variables to reflect whether survey respondents heard about an upcoming demonstration through conventional or new social media. I included advertisements and information distributed by an organization in the conventional media category. To avoid possible multicollinearity problems with the “personal recruitment” variable, I do not include “personal connections” in the model.

2

WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

41

Identification with fellow demonstrators . I used a survey question that asks protest participants and nonparticipants alike how much they identify themselves with the people participating in that protest event. A five-point scale was used: (0) not at all, (1) not very much, (2) somewhat, (3) quite a lot, and (4) a lot. Education level . A seven-point scale indicating the respondents’ highest attained level of education, as follows: no education (0), elementary education (1), middle school (2), high school (3), college (4), master’s (5), doctorate (6). Social class. Using a six-point scale, respondents self-identified as a member of one of the following social classes: lower class (1), working class (2), lower middle class (3), upper middle (4), upper class (5), or none (0). Age. The year in which respondents were born. Gender. A dichotomous variable identifies men (1) and women (0). Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables used. Taking these variables into account in Table 2.2, we can observe that the socioeconomic characteristics of protest participants and nonparticipants in both events appear to be comparable. On average, participants Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics per student demonstration Predictors

1968 student movement

#YoSoy132

Organizational membership Political experience Political interest Political efficacy Political trust Satisfaction w/democracy Left-right ideology Collective identity Personally recruited Online recruitment Traditional media recruitment Education Social class Age Gender

(ritualdemonstration) 0.15 (0.73) 0.60 (0.65) −0.15 (0.41) 0.12 (0.28) −6.18 (3.58)* −0.21 (0.15) −0.17 (0.15) 0.39 (0.3) −0.37 (0.84) −0.10 (0.76) 0.97 (0.78) 0.99 (0.44)** 0.56 (0.40) −0.05 (0.03)* 0.79 (0.63)

(reactive protest) 1.24 (0.54)** 0.73 (0.59) 0.84 (0.34)*** 0.26 (0.36) −0.38 (2.03) −0.16 (0.10) −0.23 (0.09)*** 0.69 (0.23)*** −1.08 (0.93) 1.20 (0.56)** 0.98 (0.60)* −0.20 (0.23) 0.27 (0.27) −0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.51)

42

M. INCLÁN

and nonparticipants of both protest events have a high school level of education, identify themselves with the working class, their average age fluctuates between 34 and 39 years. The groups also show similar level of political trust, satisfaction with democracy, and political ideology. Nevertheless, differences are also observable among other political participation characteristics. More men appear to have taken part in the 1968 students’ movement commemoration. These participants also show a higher level of political involvement, as about 64% of 1968 commemorators expressed being a member of an organization, in comparison to 49% of #YoSoy132 demonstrators, partially confirming hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 1b in particular, but offering partially disconfirming hypothesis 2c, as not only did ritualistic student demonstrators show more organizational membership, but they also showed a higher political experience. 65% of 1968 commemorators expressed counting with some political experience in the last year, versus 52% of #YoSoy132 protestors. However, in terms of interest in politics and sense of political efficacy, #YoSoy132 demonstrators showed relatively higher levels, 3.35 versus 2.97 out of 4 and 4.33 versus 3.54 out of 5, respectively. These results suggest that in general students participating in ritual demonstrations tend to have a relatively higher organizational experience than those protesting reactively. Ritual student participants also show relatively higher levels of involvement in other forms of political participation beyond protest activity than their reactive counterparts. However, when analyzing the role of political involvement and organizational experience as protest participation triggers, we will observe that these factors played a more significant role in influencing the decision to participate of reactive protestors than that of ritual demonstrators— probably due to their higher levels of political interest and sentiments of political efficacy prompted by the political tensions of the presidential campaign surrounding the #YoSoy132 march, but also due to the potential bias introduced by the smaller sample size surveyed during the commemoration of the 1968 students’ movement. To determine the degree to which each of these factors were significant predictors of protest participation in each demonstration, I ran seemingly unrelated estimations comparing logistic models with linearized standard errors. This comparison allows me to identify the effect that respondents’ individual characteristics had on their decision to participate (or not) in each demonstration, while controlling for possible error correlation

2

WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

Table 2.3 Correlates of protest participation in ritual and reactive students’ demonstrations in Mexico City

Predictors

F-Values, Prob > F F (1, 198)

Organizational membership

F = 1.61, 0.20 F = 0.02, 0.88 F = 4.15, 0.04** F = 0.11, 0.74 F = 1.86, 0.17 F = 0.05, 0.82 F = 0.13, 0.72 F = 0.57, 0.45 F = 0.85, 0.36 F = 1.99, 0.16 F = 0.00, 0.99 F = 5.38, 0.02** F = 0.33, 0.56 F = 0.34, 0.56 F = 0.97, 0.33

Political experience Political interest Political efficacy Political trust Satisfaction w/democracy Left-right ideology Collective identity Personally recruited Online recruitment Traditional recruitment Education Social class Age Gender

43

Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F = Prob > F =

*** ρ ≤ 0.01; ** ρ ≤ 0.05, * ρ ≤ 0.10.

across equations. Significant effects of protest predictors across demonstrations were detected running postestimation adjusted Wald tests for each predictor. The results, presented in Table 2.3, show some interesting differences among protest participation predictors for each event. For the 1968 students’ movement demonstration, only three factors came out as statistically significant protest participation predictors: respondents’ low level of political trust, their level of education, and their age. The significance of age and level of education suggests that, indeed, students were the

44

M. INCLÁN

main participants in this demonstration, further confirming (Hypothesis 1) at least for commemorating demonstrators. As for their political motivation to do so, these results indicate as predicted in hypothesis 3a, that their distrust in political institutions was their driving factor. It could also reflect the long history of the 1968 students’ movement resisting and denouncing state’s repression and impunity. In contrast, more factors appeared as statistically significant protest participation predictors for the #YoSoy132 event. As predicted in hypothesis 2c, participants in the reactive march appear to have taken part in this demonstration because of their level of political involvement. Not only their organizational membership and interest in politics influenced their participation, but also their leftleaning political ideology (hypothesis 3), their sense of collective identity, and their personal and online connections (hypothesis 2b). Contrary to hypothesis 2d expectations, it is interesting to notice that although the #YoSoy132 march was mostly organized through online media, traditional means of mobilizing advertising, such as TV, radio, and the printed press, also influenced participation significantly. Also, the fact that neither age nor education level appear to have a significant effect mobilizing #YoSoy132 demonstrators may indicate that not only students took part in the event, but that it attracted other participants as well. Table 2.4 presents the results on the adjusted Wald tests running on each predictor to determine whether they had a significantly different effect influencing protest participation in both events. We can observe that only two factors passed this test: the level of education and the level of political interest. Hence, in comparative terms, although different factors showed different effects for each protest event, only the participants’ levels of education and political interest affected their protest participation significantly differently for each event. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate these effects more clearly. In Fig. 2.3 we can observe that the probability of participating in the #YoSoy132 march remains relatively high and stable regardless of the participants’ level of education, about 80%. Hence, it almost had no predicting effect. Participants were motivated to demonstrate irrespective of their level of education. In contrast, the level of education was a definite significant factor triggering participation in the commemoration of the 1968 students’ movement. The probability of taking part in the 1968 students’ movement demonstration grows from 40% for participants with no formal education to over 80% for participants with

Personally recruited

Collective identity

Left-right ideology

Political Trust Satisfaction w/democracy

Political efficacy

Political interest

Political experience

0.64 (0.48) 0.65 (0.48) 2.97 (0.99) 3.54 (1.26) 0.10 (0.10) 1.73 (2.20) 2.11 (2.22) 2.99 (0.99) 0.40 (0.49)

0.34 (0.48) 0.27 (0.45) 2.24 (1.12) 2.96 (1.34) 0.19 (0.12) 3.79 (3.55) 4.96 (3.14) 1.65 (1.20) 0.27 (0.45)

0.49 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 3.35 (0.71) 4.33 (0.70) 0.12 (0.11) 1.83 (2.32) 2.00 (2.36) 3.65 (0.59) 0.10 (0.30)

Participants n = 192

Participants n = 78

Nonparticipants n = 29

2012 #YoSoy132

1968 student movement

Adjusted Wald tests for each protest participation predictor

Organizational membership

Table 2.4

0.18 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39) 2.48 (0.99) 3.73 (1.13) 0.16 (0.14) 3.86 (2.88) 5.09 (2.55) 2.27 (1.53) 0.16 (0.37)

Nonparticipants n = 44

0

0

(continued)

1

4

10

10

0 0

1

5

4

1

1

Maximum value

0

0

0

0

0

Minimum value

2 WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

45

(continued)

0.13 (0.34) 0.35 (0.48) 3.73 (0.85) 2.5 (0.107) 33.92 (14.83) 0.67 (0.47)

0.10 (0.31) 0.21 (0.41) 3.00 (1.00) 1.76 (0.87) 39.31 (16.84) 0.48 (0.51)

0.75 (0.43) 0.17 (0.37) 3.67 (0.91) 2.25 (0.91) 35.15 (13.83) 0.51 (0.50)

Participants n = 192

Participants n = 78

Nonparticipants n = 29

2012 #YoSoy132

1968 student movement

*** ρ ≤ 0.01; ** ρ ≤ 0.05; * ρ ≤ 0.10.

Education Social class Age Gender

Traditional recruitment

Online recruitment

Table 2.4

0.29 (0.46) 0.18 (0.39) 3.36 (0.92) 1.95 (0.83) 35.04 (12.15) 0.43 (0.50)

Nonparticipants n = 44

0 0 18 0

0

0

Minimum value

6 5 84 1

1

1

Maximum value

46 M. INCLÁN

2

WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

47

Fig. 2.3 Predicted probability of protest participation in students’ demonstrations by education

graduate studies. In comparison, in Fig. 2.4 we see that the level of political interest had no effect predicting the probability of taking part in the 1968 students’ movement commemoration. The probability of attending the 1968 students’ movement commemoration remained relatively high and stable (around 75%) regardless of the participants’ interest in politics, while the probability of marching along the #YoSoy132 students improved from about 55% for participants who expressed no interest in politics to above 80% when their political interest was high.

Conclusions These results seem to portray very different pictures of demonstrating students. They suggest that students protesting are not always the same. They are motivated to mobilize for different reasons, means, and political attitudes depending on the type of event. Participants in more ritual student demonstrations, such as the commemoration of the 1968

48

M. INCLÁN

Fig. 2.4 Predicted probability of protest participation in students’ demonstrations by interest in politics

students’ movement, were more motivated by their collective identity as students and their desire to commemorate past struggles. Not only their level of education and younger age were significant determinants of their participation, but also their expressed motivations to demonstrate. These factors highlighted their collective identity, their solidarity with the movement’s cause, and their desire to preserve the historic memory of the movement. The event seems to be then a vindication of the 1968 student movement but also of the students’ identity as members of the university community. As expected, because of the nature of the event— to commemorate the movement and the repression that annihilated it, participants still show lower levels of political trust. Lower level of trust in political institutions, thus, appears to be not only a reminder of the causes that lead students in 1968 to protest against the regime, but also a current sentiment among politically active students. Still, in the interpretation of these results, we need to consider the effect that the political context has on activating different mobilizing triggers among

2

WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

49

protest participants. The surrounding context for the commemoration of the 1968 students’ movement was relatively less politically tense than the context surrounding the #YoSoy132 march. The sitting federal and local administrations still had one more year to go and electoral campaigns were still far away. Thus, political grievances had not yet been activated yet as mobilizing triggers. A ritual demonstration can always turn into a more contentious protest depending on the events surrounding it, especially when its participants have a relatively high level of previous political involvement.10 On their part, reactive protestors of the #YoSoy132 march were motivated to take part because of their level of contextual political awareness, interest, and involvement. The political context surrounding the events at the Universidad Iberoamericana was determinant in triggering mobilizing motivations and issues. The #YoSoy132 march was organized in reaction to a presidential electoral campaign event gone wrong. It was organized against the false image of the protest and students that the mainstream media and the candidate’s political party tried to portray and in the midst of an already mobilized demand for freedom of the press and independent media.11 Because of this, the event attracted other participants beyond students. Other politically informed individuals interested in the events surrounding the presidential electoral campaign in 2012 also took part. Some of them were motivated to participate by their solidarity with the students and causes that initiated the movement, others to protest against the then current state of political affairs in the country, still others because of their left-leaning political ideology and their sympathy for the leftist presidential candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The attention that the media gave to the events that originated the #YoSoy132 movement also contributed to the mobilization of participants beyond student organizations. Despite the fact that the event was mostly mobilized through online social media networks, the events in the Universidad Iberoamericana were vastly covered by TV, radio, and printed media as well. This promoted the participation of individuals who may not have been mobilized through students’ personal or organizational networks. Additionally, given that the surveyed march took place almost a month after the emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement, other solidarian groups and individuals were able to mobilize in support of the students’ cause, such as independent journalists, and unions. Despite the particularities of the #YoSoy132 march, I still believe that in general, the logic behind a differentiated protest participation approach

50

M. INCLÁN

for different types of events applies to these two student demonstrations, namely that reactive protests should attract individuals who are more aware of the on-going political context, while ritual demonstrations, as recurrent events, are celebratory commemorations of past struggles and victories of the movement they support. As such, these findings add to the growing literature on contextualized contestation and debunking the myth of the protestor and highlighting the sophistication underlying politically active students in Mexico City. By extension, these results may also speak about the plurality of opinions among the city’s active civil society. Acknowledging Note The UC MEXUS-CONACYT Collaborative Grant Program and CIDE’s Fund for Research Support (Fondo de Apoyo a la Investigación, FAI) funded the research for this project, in which more than 40 undergraduate CIDE students collaborated as protest surveyors. I presented a previous version of this manuscript at the “Old and New Challenges to Mexican Democracy” Conference at Yale MacMillan Center Council on Latin American & Iberian Studies. I am also indebted to Luis Ulises Vera Romero for his insightful comments on the #YoSoy132 movement and to Diana Alejandra Sánchez Romero’s research assistance.

Notes 1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hca6lzoE2z8 (accessed on February 15, 2019). 2. http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/10/03/politica/014n1pol (accessed on April 28, 2018). 3. The survey frames this question as an open-ended one. Respondents are not limited to a closed list of answer options. 4. Author’s translation of Peña Nieto’s statement cited by Ruiz Muñoz and Alegre in Ruiz Muñoz and Araujo Torre (2018). 5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hca6lzoE2z8, accessed on April 28, 2018. 6. Corona, Pamela. 2010. “Alumnos Poli mandan mensaje a la Ibero.mp4”. Youtube, May 23, 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WxXfXC Wx1X0, accessed on September 25, 2019. 7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jaC0AT_cx3Q&feature=youtu.be, accessed on September 25, 2019. 8. http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2012/06/11/politica/013n1pol, accessed on April 28, 2018.

2

WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

51

9. It is surprising that despite the fact that the literature on the movement claims that it was one in favor of freedom of the press and independent media (Ruiz Muñoz & Araujo Torre, 2018), only 10% of protest participants mentioned a related reason for their motivation to take part. 10. To better confirm these claims, however, further research would be necessary. Ideally, the same ritualdemonstration should be surveyed at least twice under different administrations to analyze whether different administrations and their policies triggers different mobilizing issues, motivations, and political attitudes among protest participants. 11. https://aristeguinoticias.com/1205/entrevistas/la-entrevista-de-enriquepena-nieto-con-aristegui-en-los-medios-este-sabado/, accessed on June 18, 2019.

References Blocq, D., Klandermans, B., & van Stekelenburg, J. (2012). Political embeddedness and the management of emotions. Mobilization, 17 (3), 319–334. Collins, R. (2001). Social movements and the focus of emotional attention. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), Passionate politics (pp. 27–44). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Collins, R. (2004). Interaction ritual chains. Princeton University Press. Della Porta, D., Reiter, H., Andretta, M., Milan, S., & Rossi, F. (2012). Desperately seeking politics: Political attitudes of participants in three demonstrations for workers’ rights in Italy. Mobilization, 17 (3), 349–361. Dixon, M., & Roscigno, J. V. (2003). Status, networks, and social movement participation: The case of striking workers. American Journal of Sociology, 108, 1292–1327. Dodson, K. (2011). The movement society in comparative perspective. Mobilization, 16(4), 475–494. Ebert, K., & Okamoto, D. G. (2013). Social citizenship, integration, and collective action: Immigrant civic engagement in the U.S. Social Forces, 91(4), 1267–1292. Holzner, C. A. (2007). Poverty of democracy: Neoliberal reforms and political participation of the poor in Mexico. Latin American Politics and Society, 49(2), 87–122. Inclán, M. (2019). Mexican movers and shakers: Protest mobilization and political attitudes in Mexico City. Latin American Politics and Society, 61(1), 78–100. Inclán, M., & Almeida, P. D. (2017). Ritual demonstrations versus reactive protests: Participation across mobilizing contexts in Mexico City. Latin American Politics and Society, 59(4), 47–74.

52

M. INCLÁN

Johnston, H. (2009). Cultural analysis and contentious politics. In H. Johnston (Ed.), Culture, social movements, and protest (pp. 3–29). Farnham: Ashgate. Kitts, J. (2000). Mobilizing in black boxes: Social networks and participation in social movement organizations. Mobilization, 5(2), 241–257. Klandermans, B. (2012). Between rituals and riots: The dynamics of street demonstrations. Mobilization, 17 (3), 233–234. Klandermans, B., van der Toorn, J., & van Stekelenburg, J. (2008). Embeddedness and identity: How immigrants turn grievances into action. American Sociological Review, 73(6), 992–1012. Klandermans, B., van Stekelenburg, J., Damen, M. L., van Troost, D., & van Leeuwen, A. (2014). Mobilization without organization: The case of unaffiliated demonstrators. European Sociological Review, 30(6), 702–716. Klesner, J. L. (2009). Who participates? Determinants of political action in Mexico. Latin American Politics and Society, 51(2), 59–90. Krinsky, J., & Crossley, N. (2014). Social movements and social networks: Introduction. Social Movement Studies, 13(1), 1–21. Lee, F. (2010). The perceptual bases of collective efficacy and protest participation: The case of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22(3), 392–411. Lim, C. (2008). Social networks and political participation: How do networks matter? Social Forces, 87 (2), 961–982. Marien, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E. (2010). Inequalities in Noninstitutionalised forms of political participation: A multi-level analysis of 25 countries. Political Studies, 58, 187–213. McAdam, D., & Paulsen, R. (1993). Specifying the relationship between social ties and activism. American Journal of Sociology, 99(3), 640–667. McPhail, C. (1991). The myth of the madding crowd. Aldine. Meyer, D. S. (2014). The politics of protest: Social movements in America (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moreno, A. (2003). El votante mexicano: democracia, actitudes políticas y conducta electoral. Fondo de Cultura Económica. Norris, P., Walgrave, P., & van Aelst, P. (2005). Who demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, conventional participants or everyone? Comparative Politics, 37 (2), 189–205. Pensado, J. (2013). Student unrest and authoritarian political culture during the long sixties. Stanford University Press. Quaranta, M. (2014). The “normalisation” of the protester: Changes in political action in Italy (1981–2009). South European Society and Politics, 19(1), 25– 50. Ruiz Muñoz, M. M., & Alegre, M. L. (2018). Condiciones de producción: la emergencia del movimiento Mas de 131 en la Universidad Iberoamericana, Ciudad de México. In M. M. Ruiz Muñoz & C. J. Araujo Torre (Eds.),

2

WHAT MOVES STUDENTS? RITUAL VERSUS REACTIVE STUDENT …

53

Irrupción estudiantil y acción ciudadana. Más de 131 y #YoSoy132 (pp. 7–28). Campo Estratégico y Acción en Modelos y Políticas Educativas del Sistema Universitario Jesuita. Ruiz Muñoz, M. M., & Araujo Torre, C. J. (Eds.). (2018). Irrupción estudiantil y acción ciudadana. Más de 131 y #YoSoy132 (pp. 7–28). Campo Estratégico y Acción en Modelos y Políticas Educativas del Sistema Universitario Jesuita. Saunders, C., Grasso, M., Olcese, C., Rainsford, E., & Rootes, C. (2012). Explaining differential protest participation: Novices, returners, pepeaters, and stalwarts. Mobilization, 17 (3), 263–280. Scacco, A. (2010). Who Riots? explaining individual participation in ethnic violence. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University. Schussman, A., & Soule, S. A. (2005). Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation. Social Forces, 84(2), 1083–1108. Snow, D., & McAdam, D. (2000). Identity work processes in the context of social movements: Clarifying the identity/movement nexus. In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens, & R. W. Wright (Eds.), Self, identity, and social movements (pp. 41– 67). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Stryker, S. (2000). Identity competition: Key to differential social movement participation? In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens, & R. W. Wright (Eds.), Self, identity, and social movements (pp. 1–21). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Tarrow, S. (2011). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, V., Kimport, K., van Dyke, N., & Andersen, E. A. (2009). Culture and mobilization: Tactical repertoires, same-sex weddings, and the impact on gay activism. American Sociological Review, 74(6), 865–890. Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Addison-Wesley. Trevizo, D. (2011). Rural protest and the making of democracy in Mexico, 1968– 2000. University Park: Penn State University Press. Van Aeslt, P., & Walgrave, S. (2001). Who is that (Wo)man in the street? From the normalisation of protest to the normalisation of the protester. European Journal of Political Research, 39, 461–486. Van der Meer, T. W. G., van Deth, J. W., & Scheepers, P. L. H. (2009). The politicized participant: Ideology and political action in 20 democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 42(11), 1426–1457. Van Dyke, N., Dixon, M., & Carlon, H. (2007). Manufacturing dissent: Labor revitalization, union summer, and student protest. Social Forces, 88(1), 193– 214. Van Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, B. (2007). Individuals in movements: A social psychology of contention. In B. Klandermans & C. Roggenband (Eds.), Handbook of social movements across disciplines (pp. 157–204). New York: Springer.

54

M. INCLÁN

Van Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, B. (2014). Fitting demand and supply: How identification brings appeals and motives together. Social Movement Studies, 13(2), 179–203. Van Stekelenburg, J., Walgrave, S., Klandermans, B., & Verhulst, J. (2012). Contextualizing contestation: Framework, design, and data. Mobilization, 17 (3), 249–262. Verhulst, J., & Walgrave, S. (2009). The first time is the hardest? A cross-national and cross-issue comparison of first-time protest participants. Political Behavior, 31(3), 455–485. Walgrave, S., & Wouters, R. (2014). The missing link in the diffusion of protest: Asking others. American Journal of Sociology, 119(6), 1670–1709.

CHAPTER 3

Contentious Institutionalized Movements: The Case of the Student Movement in Quebec Luc Chicoine and Marcos Ancelovici

Introduction Like many other student movementsacross Western countries, the Quebec student movement has been institutionalized for several decades. However, the institutional arrangement established in the 1980s did not

Both authors contributed equally to this chapter. The latter is part of a larger project entitled: “The Institutional Foundations of Contentious Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Social Struggles in Québec, France, and Spain,” SSHRC Insight Grant, 2016–2021, led by Pascale Dufour and Marcos Ancelovici, and with the participation of Jean-Vincent Bergeron, Luc Chicoine, Alexie Labelle, Marion Leboucher, and Marion Sirieix. L. Chicoine Luc Chicoine, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada M. Ancelovici (B) Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_3

55

56

L. CHICOINE AND M. ANCELOVICI

prevent students from mobilizing and being disruptive at regular intervals. It experienced significant public visibility in 1986, 1988, 1990, 1996, 2005, 2012, 2015, and 2019. During that period, student organizationswere quite stable and while they used a diversity of modes of action, they consistently favored contentious mass strikes and blockades. It thus seems that in Quebec, in contrast to what the literature predicts, the institutionalization of the student movement by the state has not reduced the contentiousness of the movement and the recurrence of protest episodes. To make sense of this puzzle, we propose to look at institutionalization as a multifaceted process that can generate multiple, differentiated effects on a movement. We contend that in Quebec a particular institutional arrangement has played a major role in the crystallization of the repertoire of actionof the student movementover the last decades and has been central to the reproduction of both the disruptiveness and the regularity of contentious episodes. In other words, we put forth a neoinstitutionalist argument, contending that the institutional context has generated conditions that sustain and reproduce student contestation. This chapter is divided as follows. First, we present the literature on the institutionalization of social movementsand introduce what we call “fragmented institutionalization.” Second, after outlining our research method, we describe the level of contentious student activity in Quebec. Third, we explain how legislative changes in the early 1980s have shaped the evolution of the student movementup to this day. And finally, we show how the existence of a particular alliance system has contributed to lowering the cost of collective action and to reproducing the contentious repertoire of the student movement.

Unpacking Institutionalization Social movementsare generally considered to be opposed to institutional politics and the state. From the political process perspective, they are defined by their extra-institutional location and their use of nonconventional modes of action (McAdam, 1999; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). This is particularly obvious in Tilly’s “polity model,” in which the main actors constituting social movementslie outside the polity and challenge its members as well as the government (Tilly, 1978, 53). It is assumed that when actors become polity members, they cease being disruptive challengers, they adopt more conventional modes of action, and are no longer part of a social movement(except potentially as allies).

3

CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONALIZED MOVEMENTS: THE CASE …

57

They become interest groups or political partiesand act within the limits of institutions. Thus, when contention is institutionalized, it should theoretically shift from transgressive to contained (McAdam et al., 2001). Similarly, Tarrow (1989, 311) argues that the last phase in the Italian cycle of protest of the 1970s was characterized by institutionalization, among other things: lobbying and bargaining replaced confrontation, and actors became more specialized. This process entails a greater access to the polity and reverses “the disruptiveness of the early phase of the cycle” (Tarrow, 1989, 311, 314). More generally, Meyer and Tarrow (1998a; 1998b, 4) contend that Western liberal democracies increasingly look like “social movement societies” in which protest has become both a permanent and a conventional feature of politics. This phenomenon supposedly involves a shift toward more institutionalized forms of contention (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998b, 9). According to Meyer and Tarrow (1998b, 21), institutionalization involves the stabilization and reproduction of routines. It is made of three dimensions: (1) “the routinization of collective action” and, thus, the consolidation of a shared script; (2) the “inclusion and marginalization” of actors on the basis of their willingness to abide by this common script; and (3) the “cooptation” of actors in such a way that their claims and tactics are no longer disruptive. Once again, the institutionalization of social movementsis presented as a process shaping modes of action, gradually ruling out unconventional and disruptive ones while consolidating conventional and orderly ones. Broadly speaking, there seems to be a relative consensus in the literature that the institutionalization of social movementsgoes hand in hand with formalization, bureaucratization, professionalization, moderation, de-politicization, de-radicalization, and normalization or domestication (Hipsher, 1996, 1998a, 1998b; Kriesi et al., 1995; McCarthy & McPhail, 1998; Meyer, 1993, 2007; Oxhorn, 1994; Rucht, 1999; Staggenborg, 1988, 2013). As Katzenstein has noted, “Students of social movements commonly associate institutionalization with demobilization” (Katzenstein, 1998). The assumption according to which institutionalization fosters less disruption is built into the very definition of institutionalization outlined above. It follows that we would expect more institutionalized social movementsto be less disruptive and, inversely, less institutionalized movements to be more disruptive. Nonetheless, others stress that institutionalization is neither an inevitable stage in a movement’s development nor a linear process but

58

L. CHICOINE AND M. ANCELOVICI

rather a multidimensional phenomenon (Bosi, 2016) resulting from a collective strategic choice to achieve specific goals (Peterson, 2016, 316). Furthermore, social movementsdo not stand exclusively outside of institutions or the polity. According to Bosi (2016, 342), they can “act from within the institutions to achieve some of their goals, having an impact through public policy, lawmaking, and stronger government accountability in policy implementation” (see also Banaszak, 2010; Bereni & Révillard, 2018). Additionally, Masson (2015) contends that institutionalization is a process of co-building, in which social movement actors and state actors are in a close relationship, constantly negotiating and (re)defining what institutionalization is and will be. Looking at the women’s movement in Quebec, she argues that a group’s formalization and professionalization is not necessarily related to its involvement in institutional politics, and she shows that “professionals” were involved in the movement before its institutionalization. In a study of a public consultation on social security reform in Quebec, Laforest (2000) likewise demonstrates that participation in an institutional political process does not necessarily lead to a decline of contentious tactics. Most social actors opted for a double strategy: participating in consultative processes and demonstrating their opposition through less conventional modes of action. Laforest contends that civil society groups took part in consultations not to influence political decision-making, but for the learning experience and to be recognized as experts. In other words, social actors have some strategic leeway in their use of negotiation and their status in relation to the state. Therefore, the “notion that there are in-groups and out-groups, and that the latter engage in protests while the former engage in politics, is a caricature with little relation to reality” (Goldstone, 2003, 9). The relation to the state should thus be conceived of as a continuum rather than in dichotomous terms and the favored mode of action does not necessarily derive from the actors’ institutional location. Building on these perspectives, we look beyond static indicators and treat institutionalization as a dynamic, nonlinear process in which social and political actors confront one another and constantly negotiate their status and privileged mode of interaction. Any given social movementis always characterized by a certain level of institutionalization—there is no such thing as a completely non-institutionalized social movement— but the specific degree and form of institutionalization as well as their implications for collective action are numerous and diverse.

3

CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONALIZED MOVEMENTS: THE CASE …

59

In the next section, we argue that in Quebec the student movementembodies an instance of what we call “fragmented institutionalization,” that is, a particular form of institutionalization which meets some of the classic criteria of institutionalization aforementioned but not others and feeds contradictory dynamics that reinforce one another. We distinguish it from a segmented process, in which spheres characterized by different levels of institutionalization evolve autonomously without significant interaction, or a failed process, which makes sense only relative to an idealized standard of success and completeness. The concrete form that fragmented institutionalization takes varies across time and space. In the case of the Quebec student movement, we contend that it involves legal recognition but a partial or disjointed incorporation, which formally allows it to accumulate resources and speak in the name of the student population but not to participate in the education policymaking process that directly affects that population. Such contradiction between resource accumulation and non-participation in the policy-making process is doomed to feed both frustration and disruptive extra-institutional modes of action in order to exert pressure on the government from the outside. Furthermore, insofar as the student movementis funded from below through membership dues and does depend on public funding, it enjoys a relatively high level of organizational autonomy and is protected from standard threats and sanctions related to funding cutbacks. Therefore, we hypothesize that the fragmented institutionalization of the Quebec student movementis characterized by as a structure of incentives that fosters competition among student groups to accumulate membership dues and engage in disruptive, extra-institutional actions. Insofar as there are no institutional channels to leverage the state, student organizationshave no reason to stick to contained, non-disruptive strategies.

Research Method This chapter builds on a larger, comparative project that looks at Quebec, France, and Spain. It relies on three kinds of data. First, we conducted a public policyanalysis of the higher education sector in Quebec1 during the 2005–2016 period (Chicoine & Dufour, forthcoming) and a brief survey of the history of the sector since the 1980s. We looked at the main reforms, legislative changes, and parliamentary debates and commissions,

60

L. CHICOINE AND M. ANCELOVICI

and we conducted interviews with former public servants in the higher education ministry. Second, we performed a Protest Event Analysis (PEA) that spans from 2005 to 2016. We chose the national, daily newspaper La Presse and used a range of pre-determined keywords to refer to the mode of action (demonstration, occupation, petition, etc.), the main actors, the targets, and claims, to select relevant news articles. We then coded the articles systematically using a coding sheet that was continuously updated throughout the analysis. The objective was not so much to be exhaustive (i.e., to determine the exact and accurate number of actual protests) as to identify patterns and trends in protest actions. We understand that any PEA faces several methodological issues, partly because it depends on the media coverage of protest eventsand thus runs the risk of reproducing the media’s biases in the sampling, interpretation, and depiction of these events (for a discussion of the pros and cons of PEA, see Fillieule, 2007; Hutter, 2014). It is, nonetheless, the most accessible and recognized method to produce a global, even if partial, picture of mobilization and protest over time. Third, we rely on 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with key actors in the student movement. Interviews were coded using NVivo to facilitate a thematic analysis (Welsh, 2002). For this paper, we used the following themes: relationships to universities; relationships to government; allies; and claims. These interviews helped us to identify the constraints that the student movementfaces and reconstruct the sequence of events.

The Student Movement in Quebec: Institutionalization and Disruption At first glance, the Quebec student movementseems to meet the central criteria of institutionalization as traditionally understood. It is formally organized, bureaucratized, and has access to a stable flux of resources that allows it to provide a salary to some leaders and fund activities. Even radical affinity groups, which regularly question and challenge formal associations, benefit from this scheme and have access to subsidies from local associations. Access to the decision-making process is more complex though. While local associations have a voice within their university or college institution insofar as they sit on various committees like the board of directors, there are no formal provincial-level, public regulating bodies.

3

CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONALIZED MOVEMENTS: THE CASE …

61

In the last thirty years, the main provincial-level players have been the College Student Federation of Quebec (Fédération étudiante collégiale du Québec, FECQ), the University Student Federation of Quebec (Fédération étudiante universitaire du Québec, FEUQ), and the Student Union Solidarity Association (Association pour une solidarité syndicale étudiante, ASSÉ), which replaced the defuncts National Association of Quebec Students (Association des étudiants et étudiantes du Québec, ANÉÉQ) and the Movement for the Right to Education (Mouvement pour le droit à l’éducation, MDE). Since the 1970s, both scholars and organizational actors of the movement itself have divided the latter in two persistent branches. The concertationist branch (FEUQ and FECQ), which invests most of its resources in lobbying and political representation, and the combative branch (ANÉÉQ, MDE, ASSÉ), which engages as little as possible with institutions and focuses instead on disruptive actions and protest (Theurillat-Cloutier et al., 2014; Theurillat-Cloutier, 2017). The historical demand of the combative branch is free higher education. Although their role is to represent local student associations at the provincial level, these organizations do not actually have a formal access to the policymaking process and are only punctually consulted when significant issues in the education sector are addressed by the state, as was the case in 2013 when the Quebec government convened the Summit on Higher Education. Even though they may try to compensate for such weakness by building alliances, Quebec’s student associations do not maintain strong formal ties with political parties, although some informallinkages did exist between the FEUQ, the FECQ, and the Parti Québécois (PQ), and between ASSÉ and the left-wing party Québec Solidaire (QS). Having said that, when we look beyond the organizational structure of the Quebec student movementand focus on its practices and modes of action, it appears that disruptive tactics are surprisingly persistent and recurrent. Even in the face of organizational change, there is a strong tactical continuity. For example, our protest events analysis (PEA) data provide a clear illustration of the recurrence of student protestsbetween 2005 and 2016. There are important peaks of mobilization in 2005, 2007, and 2015, but 2012 stands out as a truly historical moment of disruption (Ancelovici & Dupuis-Déri, 2014a; Ancelovici & GuzmánConcha, 2019) (see Fig. 3.1). These instances of significant mobilization illustrate the capacity of student groups to coordinate and strongly mobilize for a specific period. Moreover, the movement uses a wide range

62

L. CHICOINE AND M. ANCELOVICI

Fig. 3.1 Student protest activity in Quebec (2005–2016) (Source La Presse. Includes street marches, rallies, occupations, and blockades)

of tactics in its disruptiveness—including demonstrations, occupations, blockades, and attacks against private property (see Fig. 3.2). In order to address the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, institutionalization and, on the other hand, the persistence of disruptive tactics over time, in the next section we unpack the institutionalization process of the student movementand explain in what respect it not only allowed for, but also fostered, the use of such tactics.

Fragmented Institutionalization and the Legacy of the 1983 Act As Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate, in Quebec the institutionalization of the student movementdid not entail a decrease in contention. We argue that this is partly due to the particular institutional arrangement that was established by the Quebec government in 1983. This arrangement laid the conditions for the reproduction of disruptive modes of action over time. Below we first present this arrangement and then explain how it contributed to the persistence of contention not only in spite of institutionalization, but also because of it. In Quebec, the intense reformist period between 1960 and 1968, known as the “Quiet Revolution,” was sustained by a “participatory ideology” (Rioux, 1968) that aimed at including stakeholders in the political

3

CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONALIZED MOVEMENTS: THE CASE …

63

Fig. 3.2 Varieties of modes of action used between 2005 and 2016 (Source La Presse. Note These numbers should not be treated as “hard data” because some protest eventsreported by newspapers did not contain information on the modes of action used)

decision-making process (Bélanger, 1984, 15). In the education sector, the provincial government organized a public consultation (the Parent Commission2 ) with the hope of fostering better access to higher education among the Francophone majority (Corbo & Couture, 2000).3 This process had a profound impact on student politics and, from this moment on, accessibility to higher education, particularly by keeping tuition fees low, has been the main and sometimes unique demand of the student movement. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, several trade unions, notably in the education sector, also started to adopt a more contentious attitude toward the state, engaging in “syndicalisme de combat ” or “combat unionism” (Laaroussi, 2016; Piotte, 1977). These unions strongly influenced the trajectory of the student movementbecause they favored an approach

64

L. CHICOINE AND M. ANCELOVICI

defending members’ interests while at the same time promoting radical political positions. The first provincial student organizationcreated around these principles was the National Association of Quebec Students (Association nationale des étudiants du Québec, ANÉQ),4 founded in 1975. The tension between the concertationist branch and the combative branch of the student movementhas never been resolved and has defined the internal dynamics of the movement since the 1970s. In the 1970s, the funding of student associations on many campuses was based on service contracts established between universities and local associations. Some universities used these contracts to their advantage, effectively ending contracts when student associations became too disruptive. These internal conflicts intensified up to a point where some students associations and university leaders asked the government to step in. In the early 1980s, the Grouping of University Student Associations (Regroupement des associations étudiantes universitaires , RAEU), a new provinciallevel organization with strong ties to the Parti Québécois government, helped write a piece of legislation that would eventually become the 1983 Act Respecting the Accreditation and Financing of Students’ Associations (Lacoursière, 2007).5 This law stabilized and secured the status and funding of local student associations, and thus constituted an important step in the institutionalization of the student movement. The 1983 Act has four major provisions that help local student associations. First, every student is de facto a member of his or her local association simply by virtue of being registered at a Cégep or university. Second, schools must collect membership dues together with tuition fees6 and then transfer the collected amounts to local associations, thereby ensuring stable funding. The funding of student associations is thus guaranteed by the law. Third, the school has to recognize the association as representative of all students and must provide it with appropriate office space and furniture. Fourth, student associations are given the exclusive prerogative to name the student representatives who will sit on the school’s governing bodies, such as the Senate. However, the Act contains no provisions relative to student representation at the provincial level. This is problematic for local associations since all major decisions in higher education are made by the provincial government. To compensate for this lack of recognition, local associations have come together to establish provincial-wide, large-scale student organizations, enabling them to gain greater visibility and coordinate their actions. Nonetheless, in contrast to local associations, funding for

3

CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONALIZED MOVEMENTS: THE CASE …

65

provincial-level organizations is provided on a voluntary basis not by individual membership dues but by local associations. On the one hand, this funding-from-below model means that provincial-level student organizationsenjoy a high level of autonomy vis-à-vis the state insofar as their resources are not dependent on their relationship with state institutions. On the other hand, this model fosters competition between provincial-level organizations to recruit and retain local associations (who can withhold their membership dues to put pressure on the provinciallevel executive). Thus, the funding-from-below model allows the student movementsignificant autonomy and the potential to be combative, but it also makes it unstable and prone to internal conflict. It follows that the institutionalization of the Quebec student movementis fragmented in two ways. First, the state recognizes local associations but not provincial ones. Second, the state ensures that the student movementhas a stable access to resources but simultaneously generally excludes it from the policymaking process. As a result, it cannot threaten it with losing access to the policymaking process if it engages in disruptive actions insofar as it never had such access in the first place. This configuration makes student associations almost invulnerable to institutional pressures or sanctions since one would have to change the law to be able to cut their funding or to deny them recognition at the local level. Furthermore, the 1983 Act also states that for student associations to be officially recognized, they need be constituted on the basis of the Companies Act.7 Thereby, student associations enjoy the status of legal persons (personne morale) recognized by the Civil Code rather than being groups dependent on administrative regulations. Such absence of vulnerabilities have contributed to the persistence of the combative branch who could use disruptive modes of action without fearing losing its funding or being denied a representative status. In this institutional framework, the survival of student organizationscould be jeopardized or threatened by students, who could vote in favor of the dissolution or disaffiliation of their organization, but not by the university administration or the state. This relative autonomy offers an extraordinary leeway to the student movement. The 2012 student strike is a good example to illustrate such leeway because the student movementkept pushing the boundary of what it could legitimately do and the Quebec government kept threatening it, but without ever questioning the funding or legal status of student associations. The government used a rhetoric of “threat amplification” (Monaghan & Walby, 2012) and tried

66

L. CHICOINE AND M. ANCELOVICI

to associate the “red square,” the most visible and widespread symbol of the mobilization against the tuition hike, with violence in order to justify repression (Chicoine, 2018). It accused student leaders of condoning violence and deployed an increasing number of riot police in the streets who regularly used kettling tactics to conduct mass arrests. About 30 such major operations were identified during the conflict and thousands of protesters received a hefty fine in the process (Commission spéciale d’examen des événements du printemps 2012, 2014). Furthermore, the government either asked for or supported legal injunctions to force students to return to class. Faced with the failure of these legal tactics and with sustained mass protests, on May 18, 2012, three months after the beginning of the strike, the government adopted a special bill (Bill 12) which attempted to squash the mobilization. It forced higher education institutions to suspend the 2012 winter and summer terms, thereby de facto ending the strike. It also required the population of Quebec to apply for a permit for any outside gathering of more than 50 people. This bill included provisions for fines up to CAD$ 1000 for individuals and CAD$ 25,000 for organizations. This last point was the only one that could have potentially undermined the financial basis of student associations, but it was never enforced and did not question the funding mechanism of the 1983 Act even though student associations violated Bill 12 numerous times and claimed their moral right to civil disobedience. Such internal contradiction in the institutionalization of the student movementallowed for the reproduction over time of the repertoire of actionof combative associations. The fact that in 2012, the student movementmanaged to stop the tuition hike also clearly demonstrated that extra-institutional, contentious tactics were effective in shaping, to a certain extent, education public policy (Ancelovici & Dupuis-Déri, 2014b).

Alliances as Support Systems Another dimension that needs to be considered to understand why and how the combative branch of the Quebec student movementwas able to reproduce itself over time is the type of alliances in which it has been involved. These alliances represent both a way of broadening the scope of student struggles and an exit opportunity for student activists. Historically, when student groups and political partiesare tightly linked, a lot of strategic resources get exchanged between the two organizations. In Western liberal democracies, these exchanges have had two important

3

CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONALIZED MOVEMENTS: THE CASE …

67

effects: they reduced the cost of student militancy by recruiting student leaders into political careers, but they also reduced the political autonomy of student associations because of the control exercised by the party on their political agenda (Weinberg & Walker, 1969). However, in Quebec, the 1983 Act makes linkages between provincial-level student organizations and political partiesdifficult because local associations have the legal obligation to represent all of their members and could rapidly lose their credibility and legitimacy if they became too apparently involved in partisan politics. Nevertheless, some informallinkages have existed at times between, on the one hand, the FEUQ and FECQ and, on the other hand, the Parti Québécois (PQ). Although these informal linkages helped to some extent these federations to achieve some of their political goals and allowed their leaders to run for office as candidates of the PQ in the September 2012 provincial election, they also contributed to a lot of internal conflicts and eventually to the dissolution of the FEUQ in 2015. This convergence between party and movement culminated in 2013, when the FEUQ presented the position of the youth branch of the PQ at the Summit on Higher Education. The combative branch of the student movementhas historically cultivated linkages not so much with political parties—with the notable exception of the 2013–2019 period leading to the dissolution of ASSÉ in 2019—as with other social movements, particularly the labor and community movements. These (historical) alliances have had several effects. Trade unionconfederations and community organizations have provided punctual financial support for student mobilizations as well as help in setting up large, multi-sector coalitions. For example, since 2009, student associations are part of the “Red Hand Coalition” (Coalition Main Rouge), which is opposed to the privatization of public services and includes more than a hundred organizations from various sectors. In 2012, this coalitionwas very active in sustaining student protestsand framing the student struggle as a promotion of the common good and the general interest of society as opposed to a defense of special interests. These alliances also allow trade unionsand community groups to voice their discontent vis-à-vis the government through the student movement. For example, in 2005 public-sector employees were facing a difficult collective agreement negotiation with the government and their unions fully supported the student strike to put some pressure on the government (Roy et al., 2006). Similarly, in 2012 both public-sector unions

68

L. CHICOINE AND M. ANCELOVICI

and community organizations used the massive student mobilization to voice their discontent over recently announced budget cuts in both public services and community sector funding. These alliances between, on the one hand, the combative branch of the student movementand, on the other hand, community groups and unions, have had an impact on the efficiency of student mobilizations and their capacity to make broader claims. They also represent a path for student activists who thereby have opportunities for pursuing other types of involvement after their student life. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that unions and community groups have been recruiting student activists who were able to use their militant skills and capital in other struggles. Such career prospects could represent a form of incentive to actively participate in the combative branch of the student movementand, thereby, contribute to the latter’s reproduction over time. Another set of alliances forged by the student movementhas had an even more important role in the reproduction of its tactical repertoire: those built with higher education faculty and staff trade unions. At the local level, the relative absence of resistance from faculty and teaching staff to the student-imposed suspension of classes (levées de cours ), the main tactic used by students to enforce strike mandates, allows students to focus their time and energies on setting up protest actions at the local level and outside academic institutions. The presence of allies in higher education institutions is especially useful to avoid repressive measures or reduce their scope. At the provincial level, these alliances make it possible to articulate a discourse of resistance to the neoliberalization of education shared by both student organizationsand faculty trade unions. This is notably the role that played the Table of University Partners (TPU), which brings together provincial-level student organizationsand provincial trade unions. Thus, when in March 2012 the Charest government tried to discredit ASSÉ’s stance on tuition fees by repeating over and over again that the organization had missed the chance to speak out on the subject by boycotting the University Partners Meeting held in December 2010, the TPU decided to hold a press conference to underline how the decision to increase tuition fees was taken by the government before the December 2010 meeting. This type of support, coming from actors little inclined to direct action, fostered not only the discourse of the combative branch, but also its systematic refusal to collaborate with the government.

3

CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONALIZED MOVEMENTS: THE CASE …

69

Conclusion As Masson (2015) has argued, different configurations of institutionalization stem from dynamic, contentious social processes in which a variety of actors are engaged. From these contentious relationships between challengers, polity members and other involved third parties, many different configurations of institutionalization can emerge. This is exactly what happened for the Quebec student movementin the period preceding the adoption of the 1983 Act (Dufour et al., 2020). We argue that after 1983, the Quebec student movement represented an instance of fragmented institutionalization insofar as the state recognized local student associations and granted them stable and predictable funding while excluding them from the policythe policy making process and offering them no real space of representation. This pattern has remained relatively stable since the 1980s. Although the 1983 Act and the fragmented institutionalization of the Quebec student movement have fostered competition between the two branches of the movement, it has also left them with the latitude to use the tactics of their choice—disruptive or not—to influence the government. As a matter of fact, both sets of tactics have managed to make some gains over the last decades. This dialectic between the two branches has sustained the movement for almost three decades. In this respect, the trajectory of the Quebec student movementshows that some past events and decisions were critical in shaping subsequent tactics, strategies, and interactions in a logic of path dependency. Furthermore, the alliances developed by the combative branch of the student movementhave also helped the reproduction of the movement by lowering the cost of mobilization and fostering the creation of synergies between students and other strata of the population during the biggest contentious episodes. Insofar as many former student activists are today involved in allied organizations, we anticipate that these allies will continue to play a supportive role in the future. Nonetheless, the Quebec student movementapparently started to decline after 2012, with the disappearance of the FEUQ in 2015 and the ASSÉ in 2019. Even though new provincial-level organizations have recently emerged—the Student Union of Quebec (Union étudiante du Québec, UEQ) and the Association for a Student Voice in Quebec (Association pour la voix étudiante au Québec, AVEQ)—the student movementcould potentially be at a crossroads. But in line with our

70

L. CHICOINE AND M. ANCELOVICI

argument, we contend that these organizational transformations will not fundamentally alter the pattern of fragmented institutionalization that we have identified and, therefore, disruptive, extra-institutional tactics and strategies are likely to remain a leading feature of the Quebec student movement in the future.

Notes 1. In Canada, education falls almost exclusively under provincial jurisdiction. 2. The official name was “Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec.” Established in 1961, it came to be known as the Parent Commission because of the name of its chair, Mgr Alphonse-Marie Parent. 3. In the early 1960s, only 3% of Francophones aged 20–24 attended university, compared with 11% of Anglophones (Dufour, 2004). 4. Later on, ANÉQ became ANÉÉQ as the name was modified to include female students (étudiantes ). 5. http://legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/ShowDoc/cs/A-3.01. 6. The amount of this contribution is set by student associations. 7. http://legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/fr/showDoc/cs/C-38?&digest=.

References Ancelovici, M., & Dupuis-Déri, F. (Eds.). (2014a). Un Printemps rouge et noir: regards croisés sur la grève étudiante de 2012. Écosociété. Ancelovici, M., & Dupuis-Déri, F. (2014b). Retour sur le «Printemps érable». In M. Ancelovici & F. Dupuis-Déri (Eds.), Un Printemps rouge et noir: Regards croisés sur la grève étudiante de 2012 (pp. 7–33). Écosociété. Ancelovici, M., & Guzmán-Concha, C. (2019). Struggling for education: The dynamics of student protests in Chile and Quebec. Current Sociology, 67 (6), 978–996. Banaszak, L. A. (2010). The women’s movement inside and outside the state. Cambridge University Press. Bélanger, P. (1984). Le mouvement étudiant québécois: son passé, ses revendications et ses luttes (1960–1983). L’Association nationale des étudiants et étudiantes du Québec (ANEQ). Bereni, L., & Révillard, A. (2018). Movement institutions: The bureaucratic sources of feminist protest. Politics & Gender, 14, 407–432. Bosi, L. (2016). Incorporation and democratization: The long-term process of institutionalization of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement. In L.

3

CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONALIZED MOVEMENTS: THE CASE …

71

Bosi, M. Giugni, & K. Uba (Eds.), The consequences of social movements (pp. 338–360). Cambridge University Press. Chicoine, L. (2018). “Proxy repression”? The causes behind the change of protest control repertoire by the Université du Québec à Montréal during the 2015 student strike. In Governing youth politics in the age of surveillance (pp. 62–76). London: Routledge. Chicoine, L., & Dufour, P. (forthcoming). La gouvernance universitaire au Québec à l’ère de la néolibéralisation de l’éducation: état des lieux. In D. Giroux, D. Karmis, & C. Rouillard (Eds.), De l’université néolibérale à l’université démocratique: refaire/repenser l’université. Commission spéciale d’examen des événements du Printemps 2012. (2014, March). Rapport de la Commission spéciale d’examen des événements du Printemps 2012 [Report of the special commission of inquiry into the events of Spring 2012]. Retrieved January 14, 2017, from http://www.securitepublique.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/Documents/ police/publications/rapport_CSEEP2012/rapport_CSEP2012.pdf. Corbo, C., & Couture, J.-P. (2000). Repenser l’école. Une anthologie des débats sur l’éducation au Québec de 1945 au Rapport Parent. Presses de l’Université de Montréal. Dufour, A. (2004). Les années 50: une décennie annonciatrice de grands changements. Bulletin d’histoire politique: une tranquille révolution scolaire? 12(2), 16–23. Dufour, P., Bergeron-Gaudin, J., & Chicoine, L. (2020). Social Movements and the National Question in Quebec: The Institutional Legacy of a Cleavage. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 658–675. https://doi.org/10. 1017/S0008423920000347. Fillieule, O. (2007). On n’y voit rien: Le recours aux sources de presse pour l’analyse des mobilisations protestataires. In P. Favre, O. Fillieule, & F. Jobard (Eds.), L’atelier du politiste: Théories, actions, représentations (pp. 215–240). La Découverte. Goldstone, J. A. (2003). Introduction: Bridging institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics. In J. A. Goldstone (Ed.), States, parties, and social movements (pp. 1–24). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hipsher, P. L. (1996). Democratization and the decline of urban social movements in Chile and Spain. Comparative Politics, 28(3), 273–297. Hipsher, P. L. (1998a). Democratic transitions as protest cycles: Social movement dynamics in democratizing Latin America. In D. S. Meyer & S. Tarrow (Eds.), Contentious politics for a new century (pp. 153–172). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Hipsher, P. L. (1998b). Democratic transitions and social movement outcomes: The Chilean shantytown dwellers’ movement in comparative perspective. In M. G. Guigni, D. McAdam, & C. Tilly (Eds.), From contention to democracy (pp. 149–168). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

72

L. CHICOINE AND M. ANCELOVICI

Hutter, S. (2014). Protest event analysis and its offspring. In D. Della Porta (Ed.), Methodological practices in social movement research (pp. 335–367). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Giugni, M. G. (1995). New social movements in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Laaroussi, J. (2016). Aux origines du syndicalisme de combat: ‘Participer c’est se faire fourrer!’. Concertation, participation et contestation dans les cegeps de Montréal et à l’UQAM (1963–1976). Masters thesis, Department of History, Université du Québec à Montréal. Lacoursière, B. (2007). Le Mouvement étudiant au Québec de 1983 à 2006. Sabotart Éditions. Laforest, R. (2000). La consultation publique et les formes d’action collective. Politique Et Sociétés, 19(1), 27–47. Masson, D. (2015). Institutionalization, state funding, advocacy in the Quebec women’s movement. In H. Ramos & K. Rodgers (Eds.), Protest and politics: The promise of social movement societies (pp. 79–97). UBC Press. McAdam, D. (1999 [1982]). Political process and the development of the black insurgency, 1930–1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention (Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCarthy, J. D., & McPhail, C. (1998). The institutionalization of protest in the United States. In D. S. Meyer & S. Tarrow (Eds.), The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century (pp. 83–110). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Meyer, D. S. (1993). Institutionalizing dissent: The United States political opportunity structure and the end of the nuclear freeze movement. Sociological Forum, 8(2), 157–179. Meyer, D. S. (2007). The politics of protest: Social movements in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meyer, D. S., & Tarrow, S. (Eds.). (1998a). The social movement society: Contentious politics for a New Century. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Meyer, D. S., & Tarrow, S. (1998b). A movement society: Contentious politics for a new century. In D. S. Meyer & S. Tarrow (Eds.), The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century (pp. 1–28). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Monaghan, J., & Walby, K. (2012). ‘They attacked the city’: Security intelligence, the sociology of protest policing and the anarchist threat at the 2010 Toronto G20 summit. Current Sociology, 60(5), 653–671. Oxhorn, P. (1994). Where did all the protestors go? Popular mobilization and the transition to democracy in Chile. Latin American Perspectives, Issue 82, 21(3), 49–68.

3

CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONALIZED MOVEMENTS: THE CASE …

73

Peterson, A. (2016). The institutionalization process of a Neo-Nazi Movement Party: Securing social movement outcomes. In L. Bosi, M. Giugni, & K. Uba (Eds.), The consequences of social movements (pp. 314–337). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Piotte, J.-M. (1977). Le syndicalisme de combat. Montreal: Les Éditions Albert Saint-Martin. Rioux, M. (1968). Sur l’évolution des ideologies au Québec. Revue De L’institut De Sociologie, 1, 95–124. Roy, L. B., Coutu, P., Dion, B., & Thibault-Bellemard, R. (2006). Carré rouge. La grève étudiante du printemps 2005. Les Édition libres du carré rouge. Rucht, D. (1999). Linking organization and mobilization: Michels’s iron law of oligarchy. Mobilization: An International Quaterly, 4(2), 151–169. Staggenborg, S. (1988). The consequences of professionalization and formalization in the pro-choice movement. American Sociological Review, 53(4), 585–605. Staggenborg, S. (2013). Institutionalization of social movements. In D. A. Snow, D. della Porta, B. Klandermans, D. McAdam (Eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movement. Tarrow, S. (1989). Democracy and disorder: Protest and politics in Italy, 1965– 1975. Oxford University Press. Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge University Press. Theurillat-Cloutier, A. (2017). Printemps de force. Une histoire du movement étudiant au Québec (1958–2013). Montreal: Lux Éditeur. Theurillat-Cloutier, A., Leduc, A., & Lacoursière, B. (2014). Les racines historiques du Printemps érable. In M. Ancelovici & F. Dupuis-Déri (Eds.), Printemps rouge et noir: regards croisés sur la grève étudiante de 2012 (pp. 37–58). Montreal: Écosociété. Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Addison-Wesley. Welsh, E. (2002). Dealing with data: Using NVivo in the qualitative data analysis process. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3(2), Art. 26. Weinberg, I., & Walker, K. N. (1969). Student politics and political systems: Toward a typology. American Journal of Sociology, 75(1), 77–96.

Laws Chapitre c-38 loi sur les companies. Chapter a-3.01 act respecting the accreditation and financing of students’ associations.

CHAPTER 4

Structuring the “Structureless” and Leading the “Leaderless”: Power and Organization in the Student Movement at the University of California Sarah L. Augusto

Introduction Direct democracy has been employed by various groups for centuries (Polletta, 2002), but became popular in social movements of the 1960s including the Civil Rights Movement, anti-war movement, and women’s movement (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; Polletta & Hoban, 2016; Sirianni, 1995) More recently, direct democracy has been employed by the Alterglobalization movement (della Porta, 2009; della Porta & Rucht, 2013; Ghimire, 2011; Maeckelbergh, 2011; Smith 2001; 2007), global antiausterity protests (Baumgarten, 2011; Tejerina, 2013), and the Occupy Movement (Ancelovici, 2016; Sheehan, 2012; Sitrin, 2012). Unlike the

S. L. Augusto (B) Curry College, Milton, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_4

75

76

S. L. AUGUSTO

movements on the 1960s, many of these contemporary struggles share not only a commitment to direct democracy, but also an emphasis on horizontalism, prefiguration, and a rejection of formal organization and leadership. The Student Movementat the University of California exemplifies these characteristics, and unlike the previously mentioned global movements it provides a more contained case study to examine these organizational forms. Beginning in 2008, new budget cuts and fee increases prompted a wave of student activism on University of California (UC) campuses. The UC Movement encompasses many contingents, most of which are informal networks such as friendship circles and affinity groups. There is no formal or centralized organization or leadership and a great deal of diversity in terms of goals and tactical and organizational preferences. In the fall of 2011, the emergence of the Occupy Movement further complicated the UC Movement in several important ways. Occupy expanded the scope and focus of the UC protests beyond the university and connected these local concerns to a broader set of issues. The Occupy Movement also reinforced and reinvigorated the UC Movement’s already existing focus on informaland decentralized organization and collective decisionmaking. Additionally, several UC campuses embraced Occupy’s strategy of outdoor occupation and established encampments. As such, the UC Movement is derivative of the long history of student protestin the United States, particularly in California, but is also greatly impacted by global struggles such as the Occupy Movement and global anti-austerityprotests. In this chapter, I examine the internal tensions and challenges experienced by participants in the UC Movement during the 2011–2012 academic year as they struggled to create horizontal organization and leadership. Few scholars have examined the internal dynamics of social movementsin terms of organizational forms and decision-making, the distribution of power, and what happens behind the scenes at meetings and other organizing spaces. Furthermore, there is little research on the process (as opposed to the outcomes) of direct democracy in social movements. Although there are a few notable exceptions (Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2015; della Porta, 2009; della Porta & Rucht, 2013; Polletta, 2002), these studies take a broad comparative approach and examine a variety of movements or groups within large-scale networked movements. Much of this research is also focused on settings where some hierarchy or formal leadership is present. My research provides a deep dive into a particular localized setting where participants were deeply invested in horizontal organizing.

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

77

Focusing on the internal dynamics of the UC Movement, I examine the process of direct democracy and the challenges and shortcomings associated with “leaderless” and “structureless” organization. I will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this type of organizing and will show that the organization of the UC movement was influenced by a variety of factors. How does power operate in horizontal movements? Why do movements choose the organizational forms they do? The existence of cliques and friendship circles, the amount of time and energy participants have to devote to the movement, and factors such as social an intellectual capital give some participants more power than others in horizontal movements (della Porta & Rucht, 2013; Graeber, 2009; Juris, 2008; Polletta, 2002; Saunders, 2008; Saunders & Rootes, 2013; Treloar, 2003). More seasoned activists and those with experience in direct democracy also tend to dominate (della Porta, 2009; Haeringer, 2008). Research on why movements gravitate to particular organizational forms points to both strategic and non-strategic factors. Organizational preferences are shaped by ideological and cultural factors such as participants different values and understandings of democracy (della Porta, 2009; Graeber, 2009; Polletta, 2002; Polletta & Hoban, 2016). Organization is also influenced by the broader economic, political, and cultural contexts in which they develop, as well as by groups they are symbolically associated with and the influence of other movements (Baumgarten, 2011; Benski et al., 2013; Calhoun, 2013; della Porta 2015; Flesher, 2020; Polletta, 2004; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Tejerina et al., 2013). Others argue that participants choose organizational forms for more instrumental purposes such as enhancing solidarity and innovation and supporting particular tactics (della Porta, 2009; Polletta, 2002; Polletta & Hoban, 2016; Tesdahl & Speer, 2015; Yates, 2020). Through an examination of the practice of direct democracy and the rationale behind horizontalism in the UC Movement, I will show that many participants’ organizational preferences were shaped by non-strategic factors such as ideologies and values, but overall strategic choices better explain why UC Movement participants prefer horizontalism and direct democracy. Additionally, I found that some activists approached these organizational forms in earnest, while others sometimes exploited the “leaderless” ideology and the process on consensus to exercise power and decision-making over other participants. My analysis is based on two years of ethnographic research. I interviewed a total of 51 active participants in the UC Movement. The majority of my interviewees (2/3) were from the Davis campus, but

78

S. L. AUGUSTO

I also interviewed participants from the Berkeley, Los Angeles, Santa Cruz, Irvine, and Riverside campuses. All of my interviewees were undergraduate or graduate students. In addition to interviews, I attended virtually every meeting, rally, occupation, or other protest eventat UC Davis during the time of my research, and occasionally attended protests and meetings at UC Berkeley. I also spent a great deal of time in informalorganizing spaces such as parties and other social events, and downtime at occupations. Thus, my research is informed by both public and official movement spaces as well as the “backstage” of movement activities.

Direct Democracy, Horizontalism, and Prefiguration in Contemporary Movements A great deal of social movement research focuses on formal organizations (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; Kriesi, 1996; McAdam & Scott, 2005; McCarthy & Zald, 1977), yet some scholars argue that contemporary movements in general are adopting more decentralized, informal, and non-hierarchical organizational structures, which sets them apart from movements of the mid-twentieth century and before (Bennett, 2005; Diani & Bison, 2004; Smith, 2007). This is in part related to the heterogeneity of many of these movements. For example, the Alter-globalization Movementis not a single, unified movement, but rather a fluid network with diverse goals and strategic preferences held together by an opposition to neoliberalism and a commitment to direct democracy. The Occupy Movement was similarly part of an international wave of mobilizations with a wide range of grievances and goals. The UC Movement shares these traits but operates on a much smaller scale. Smith (2007) writes that the Alter-Globalization Movementis comprised of complex transnational connections between mobilizing structures, or preexisting networks that helped to build the movement (McAdam et al., 1996) as well as formal organizations. In the UC Movement, the university, affinity groups, and friendship circles act as mobilizing structures to connect activists within particular communities and across different campuses. Unlike the Alterglobalization movement, UC Movement participants generally insisted on informalorganization and leadership and refused to build coalitionswith traditional organizations. In this way, the UC Movement is similar to the Occupy Movement and many global protests against austerity and corruption which emphasize horizontalism and prefiguration.

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

79

Different strains in the literature use different terms—direct democracy, horizontalism, prefiguration—to refer to the organizational forms embraced by many contemporary movements, sometimes muddying the boundaries between these labels. To further complicate things, different activist groups have various ways of defining and practicing horizontalism, prefiguration, and direct democracy, and participants within these groups sometimes disagree about these definitions and practices (della Porta, 2009; della Porta & Rucht, 2013; Polletta, 2002, Smith, 2007). Direct democracy refers to processes that give everyone an equal voice and a direct role in decision-making, but it can be exercised by groups with formal organization and leadership as well as those without centralized organization or official leaders. della Porta (2009) further distinguishes between direct democracy that relies on a majority vote and deliberative direct democracy, where decisions are reached through dialogue between diverse perspectives. Horizontalism is based on the principles of direct democracy, but also a rejection of formal and hierarchical organization and leadership and a commitment to the autonomy of participants (Ancelovici, 2016; Sitrin, 2012). Prefiguration is an important component of horizontalism. Like horizontalism, prefiguration rejects formal organization and leadership, but also seeks to create in the microcosm the types of changes participants would like to see in the broader world. Horizontal and prefigurative organization has been widely critiqued for being inefficient, ineffective, and unsustainable. Many scholars argue that formal leadership is necessary for successful social movement organization (Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2015; Ganz, 2000; McCarthy & Zald, 1973; Oberschall, 1973; Zald & Ash, 1966) and that organization is necessary for movement continuity (Klandermans, 2001; Minkoff, 2013; Rucht, 2013; Smith, 2007). Staggenborg (2013) argues that highly decentralized movements are not well-suited for mobilizing extensive campaigns and participants are likely to disagree about strategy and tactics. Willems & Jegers (2012) similarly find that movements need to formalize organization and leadership to endure long term. Many scholars also assert that a lack of structure and formal leadership can reproduce the very hierarchies and inequalities that activists are attempting to avoid through direct democracy (Freeman, 1972; Fyke & Sayegh, 2001; Ghimire, 2011; Sutherland et al., 2013). Groups that employ direct democracy can be prone to oligarchical tendencies (Michels, 1969; Saunders, 2008) and horizontal organizing can create hidden power dynamics (Freeman, 1972; Kiersev & Vrasti, 2016; Sheehan, 2012; Sirianni, 1995). Smith (2007)

80

S. L. AUGUSTO

found that the emphasis on horizontalism in the Alter-globalization Movement created what Freeman (1972) called “tyranny of the structurelessness” and argues that more formal mechanisms of organization will improve accountability and create more equitable participation among movement actors. Critics of horizontalism and prefiguration also argue these organizational forms neglect strategy, focus on expressive goals as opposed to strategic ones, and prioritize the personal over the political (Boggs, 1977; Epstein, 1991; Gordon, 2018; Srnicek & Williams, 2015). Some scholars push back against these critiques. Fitzgerald & Rodgers (2016) note that a focus on formal organization is inadequate for understanding all movements and that movements seeking deep structural change as opposed to reforms are less likely to form traditional organizations. Reinecke et al (2018) argues that prefigurative movements must be judged by different standards, as the focus is less about achieving specific demands made of powerholders, and more about defining new forms of power through horizontal leadership and decision-making. Many scholars also argue that there are benefits to horizontalism and prefiguration and that these forms of organization do not necessarily preclude strategy (Polletta, 2002; Polletta & Hoban, 2016; Staggenborg, 1989; Taylor, 1989; Yates, 2020). Previous studies have also raised several important questions that I attempt to address in my research. Reinecke asks “how do actors attempt to reconcile expressive and strategic forms of organizing, and what conditions might affect their ability to accomplish this reconciliation?” (2018, 1303). As I will describe in the following sections, this was a tension in the UC Movement. Yates (2020) similarly calls for research into how different understandings of strategy and divergent strategic priorities are negotiated within prefigurative movements. Polletta (2002) asks why activists decide on particular ways of decision-making and organizational forms. Benski et al. state that demands for horizontalism and direct democracy “require us to rethink the nature of leadership and organization in such movements” (2013, 558) What, then, does this rethinking look like? My research offers insights into the process of attempting this reconciliation between strategic and expressive goals, why participants choose certain forms organization, and how we might begin to rethink leadership and organization in contemporary movements.

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

81

Perspectives on Horizontalism and Direct Democracy in the UC Movement Well before the emergence of Occupy, the UC Movement shared its emphasis on horizontal leadership, direct democracy, and diffuse, decentered organizing. In an attempt to maximize participation and inclusivity and minimize hierarchy, the UC occupations used a form of organizing meetings called the General Assembly (GA). The goal of the GA is to bring together a diverse range of participants and give everyone a voice in the movement and a direct role in decision-making. GAs typically employ some form of consensus and abide by a complex set of rules for discussion, proposals, and voting. Most GAs use some form of “stacking,” a process where one participant keeps a list or “stack” of everyone who wants to speak. The role of the facilitator(s) is not to determine the course of the meeting or direct discussion, but rather to ensure that participants follow procedure and everyone has an opportunity to be heard. Forms of organization in social movementsare fluid and dynamic and are shaped by both internal and external influences (Misoczky & Flores, 2020; Willems & Jegers, 2012). Movements require flexibility, adaptability, and fluidity, and formal organizations can work against this, yet without formalizing organizational structuresit can be hard to make decisions and sustain movement activity. This often creates tension within movements due to conflicting perspectives on the desirability of informalorganization and leadership (Smith, 2007), and this was certainly the case with the UC Movement. Although nearly all participants supported horizontal organizing in some form, there was disagreement about how much structure (or lack thereof) is preferable. Some participants prefer a more fluid structure and strongly advocated against formal leadership and organization, prioritizing flexibility and spontaneity over planning and strategizing. Others expressed a desire for more formal structures, while still maintaining that the movement should operate on direct democratic principles. Participants who advocated for more formal organization and leadership were also more likely to prioritize planning and strategizing and argued that the lack of structure made the movement less effective. Some social movementscholars argue that both planning and spontaneity play an important role in mobilization (Killian, 1984). However, many UC participants argued that organization and planning preclude spontaneous action or vice versa. Additionally, while some participants viewed the movement as “leaderless,” others

82

S. L. AUGUSTO

argued that this ideology obscures existing power dynamics. There was also debate about the role of the GA, the purpose of direct democracy, and when consensus was necessary. In the following sections, I will examine how power was allocated in the absence of official leaders and exercised through the GA and consensus process and debates about the role of the GA and the meaning of consensus. I will also discuss why some participants wanted more formal structures while others preferred fluid and informalorganization, and how (and when) these preferences are linked with strategy.

“Do-Ocracy” or Hidden Oligarchy? Leadership, Power, and Exclusion in the UC Movement Sutherland argues that leadership can be determined by negotiation and interaction rather than by formal processes, thus “just because an organization is leaderless, it does not necessarily mean that it is also leadershipless” (2013, p. 760). Although leadership is often defined as hierarchical and official, we can also think of leadership as the exercise of power through interactive processes of meaning-making and discourse. (Sutherland et al., 2013; Jackson & Carter, 2007) and the division of labor within movements (Ancelovici, 2016). In the small body of research on how power operates in horizontal movements, I identified several themes regarding how people become leaders and how “leaderless” ideologies can recreate the hierarchy movement participants are seeking to avoid. Cliques and friendship circles inevitably form (Ansell, 2003; Freeman, 1972; Ghimire, 2011; Haug, 2013; Sutherland et al., 2013), and while these friendships can have a positive effect on solidarity, they can also create exclusion (Saunders, 2008; Saunders & Rootes, 2013). Participants who are “highly motivated” and put in a lot of work and time tend to have more decision-making power (della Porta & Rucht, 2013; Ghimire, 2011). More seasoned activists often dominate discussion at meetings (Saunders & Rootes, 2013) and have a better understanding of the procedures of direct democracy and consensus that makes it easier to participate effectively and can sometimes be used to their advantage (Haug & Rucht, 2013). If leadership is largely determined by who participates most or loudest, then we must consider what factors affect participation. Ideological identification with the values of the movement is a precursor to participation

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

83

(McAdam, 1986), but intellectual, cultural, and social capital often determines which participants wield the most power (Ghimire, 2011; Graeber, 2009; Juris, 2008; Maeckelbergh, 2011; Sutherland et al., 2013). Direct democracy is time consuming, so those without much free time are at a disadvantage (Polletta, 2002: Rothschild & Whitt, 1986; Staggenborg, 1986; Treloar, 2003). Long meetings are more likely to be dominated by experienced activists (Haeringer, 2008) and can lead to “consensus by attrition” (Downey, 1986, 368). Those who were younger and had less work and family responsibilities are more able to engage in activism (McAdam, 1986). All of these themes were present in the UC Movement. In their attempts to create differently structured forms of organization, participants struggled to concretize relationships and processes without reproducing the bureaucratic and hierarchical forms they define themselves against. Resp1 said they would prefer to have leaders “out in the open. But how do you get them? Are you going to elect them? Then you’re reproducing the system that we all have problems with.” Many interviewees felt that the “leaderless” ideology obscured underlying power dynamics within the movement. Two people referred to the leaderless ideology as a “sham” and resp2 complained, “a leaderless movement is just not possible.” A close examination of leadership roles within the UC Movement reveals that some participants had more influence than others and exposes hidden power dynamics. Participants had varying ideas about how people become leaders or gain influence without more traditional structures in place. Some interviewees claimed that the people in leadership roles were those who are willing to take on work. Others argued that leadership was determined by who speaks out at meetings. Resp3 stated, “a leader is someone who sees a need and just does it. Occupy and activism in general is a do-ocracy. If you want something done you just go do it. You don’t need to ask anyone else’s permission.” This perspective assumes that leadership roles are equally available to anyone willing to make an effort, and that the amount of effort a participant puts in is directly proportional to the power they obtain. However, many participants believed this “do-ocracy” was inherently flawed and argued that without formal leadership, a number of factors create barriers to participation and power differentials that subvert the “leaderless” ideology. Consensus can be a lengthy process, and time is a resource that not everyone has equal access to. Some people were not able to participate as

84

S. L. AUGUSTO

much as others due to external obligations and constraints. Several interviewees noted that those who are able and willing to stay at meetings the longest are the people who make the decisions. Resp4 referred to consensus as a “longevity contest.” Resp5 stated “It seems like decisions are made through endurance.” Some participants have an upper hand in this game of endurance. Many expressed frustrations at feeling left out of decision-making because they were unable to put in enough time due to family and work obligations. These perceptions were confirmed by observation. Many meetings went on for hours, sometimes late into the evening, and what would often start as a packed room would dwindle to much small numbers as time passed. Most important decisions were made toward the end of meetings. This was in part due to the fact that consensus takes time, but I was also sometimes privy to plans to intentionally delay controversial votes. Another factor that acts as a barrier to participation and gives some people more power than others is the diversity of levels of experience with organizing and the structure of the GA. Of the several occupation sites where I attended GAs, each had its own complex set of procedures for meetings and consensus. These procedures were also continuously challenged and adapted throughout the occupations. For participants who had plenty of experience with the GA and consensus, these processes became second nature. For those who were new to movement participation, the process takes some time to get used to. Although too little structure in terms of leadership roles has thwarted attempts at horizontalism, the rigid structure and the complex procedures of the GA had similar effects. Leach (2013) notes that while OWS has been critiqued for being disorganized, the movement actually has a very complex structure. Although its purpose is to minimize hierarchy and allow everyone to participate equally, it can sometimes have the opposite effect and lead to exclusion. Some participants felt that the complex structure and rules associated with the GA and consensus could be alienating and silencing. Resp6 told me “I think we need to get away from these rigid rules, because the moment you feel like you need to know a certain rule in order to participate it becomes a competition of who knows the rules best to get their message out, sort of like a literacy test for voting.” Resp7 said: “The people who are familiar with [the GA] structure tend to be able to operate more effectively within the movement.” In my observations of meetings, I found that more seasoned participants tended to bring

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

85

forth the majority of proposals and dominate the discussion at meetings. Additionally, I attended numerous GAs where particular individuals or affinity groups wielded their knowledge of the process to exercise power over others and to influence the outcome of decisions. Many participants raised procedural issues to interrupt speakers of opposing viewpoints but allowed like-minded speakers to break procedure unchallenged. Participants who spoke out of turn were often interrupted and told to “get on stack” by those with opposing viewpoints. This deflection was so common that I heard people jokingly use it in conversation as a sort of euphemism for “shut up” to respond to something they did not want to hear, e.g. “I heard the Chancellor is coming to the GA.” “Get on stack!”. GA facilitators, who were nearly always participants with more experience and knowledge of procedures, had the power to direct the course of the meeting and shape decision-making. Many interviewees shared stories of how facilitators unfairly shaped the direction of meetings. Several interviewees also identified “strong personalities” or “ideological figureheads” who were able to exert more influence in the movement. Some interviewees said they felt that some participants used their theoretical knowledge and experience in organizing to shut down debate and silence people with opposing views. Observation confirmed that moderate voices and less experienced activists were often marginalized at GAs. Many argued that important decisions were often made by an “insider’s circle” or “exclusive group” that attempted to circumvent collective decision-making and assert their own agendas. Resp8 told me “there are these people that have all read the same books and they’re constantly dropping theory and using that to scare people off from challenging them. And it works, because they’re so sure of what they’re saying and then people like me who can’t even follow their argument because our nose hasn’t been up Karl Marx’s ass for the past however many years—I mean, how am I even supposed to engage with them?” Resp4 pointed out that this “insiders circle” exposes a discrepancy between the ideal of collective leadership and the reality of how decisions are actually made: “it’s unclear who the leaders are, and then it almost becomes a way to hide operations of power. The GA seems like anybody can come, anybody can talk, and anybody can raise concerns, but that’s not the case, because there are people who have sort of set agendas.” In reality there were multiple insiders’ circles jockeying for influence within the UC Movement. These informalaffinity groups were easily

86

S. L. AUGUSTO

observable. Participants with shared political ideologies, often friends as well, would arrive to meetings and actions together, cluster in groups at GAs and marches, hang out together at occupation sites during downtime, and spend social time together outside of movement activities. As Freeman (1972) argues, elites in social movementsare “groups of friends who happen to participate in the same political activities” (p. 287). Affinity groups functioned as unofficial organizing spaces where strategy and plans were discussed. Additionally, affinity groups acted as submerged networks of communication that transmit what Polletta (2002) terms “microinteractional rules” that inform participants’ understandings of how to navigate GA process and engage in collective decision-making. Decisions were often made among these smaller affinity groups, as resp9 told me: “there’s the planning ahead of time, which is usually done in a combination of GAs and smaller committees, as well as the fact that nobody can deny which is that most decision making actually occurs at parties, over lunch and over beers with people who also organize.” At these frequent meetings among trusted comrades, participants would discuss strategy and how to override opposing views, generate ideas and proposals, and plan meetings and actions. When a member of an affinity group made a proposal to the GA, others in the group would clearly be prepared with arguments and counter-arguments to support it. At times members of affinity groups would also stage coordinated attacks on proposals made by other groups, with one participant after another laying out an argument that had been discussed outside of the GA. While it is unclear whether this coordination was always strategic or occurred because ideas and plans had been circulated discursively, affinity groups functioned as informalorganizing spaces that undermined inclusivity and egalitarianism in the movement. Those who are not privy to informalorganizing spaces were aware that these spaces existed and felt frustrated and alienated by their outsider status. Structural inequalities played a role in internal power dynamics as well, especially in terms of race and gender. Exclusion and marginalization on the basis of gender and race in social movementshas been well documented (Barnett, 1993; Breines, 2006; Collins, 2000; Duberman, 1999; Evans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Reger, 2012; Robnett, 1997). In the UC Movement, gendered and racial dynamics sometimes silenced and alienated women and people of color. Many non-white participants told me they felt that goals and grievances particular to their identity group were not represented and were further alienated when their concerns

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

87

were silenced by the GA process. For example, I attended GAs where participants expressed offence the use of the term “occupy” because of its association with colonialism and western imperialism and made proposals to hold discussions on the topic and to re-name the encampments. In one case, facilitators sidestepped these concerns by invoking the meeting agenda and GA process. At another GA, a short discussion resulted in the decision to re-name the occupation and listserve “Occupy/Decolonize UCD.” The participants who raised this concern were not satisfied by this consolation, and to add insult to injury most people continued to use “Occupy UCD” in their speech and written communications. Gendered power dynamics were present in the UC Movement as well. Men often took up more verbal space despite roughly equal numbers of male and female attendees, an issue that caused tension and controversy. Men dominated informaldiscussions at occupation sites as well. Resp10 referred to these discussions as “intellectual dick fights,” and as the term suggests they were heavily gendered. One could often observe groups of men participating in loud and heated political discussions at occupation sites and during meetings, and many women said they found this intimidating.

Structure or Fluidity: Why Do Participants Choose the Organizational Forms They Do? What types of movements or activist groups are more likely to employ horizontalism and direct democracy? Giugni and Nai (2009) found that smaller groups within the Alter-globalization Movementwere almost 40 times more likely than large groups to engage in deliberative democracy. Older organizations within the Global Justice Movement also tended to favor hierarchical organization and were less likely to use consensus than newer groups (Haeringer & Sommier, 2009). These findings apply to the UC Movement as well. Although occupations on different campuses were networked to some extent, each campus had their own GA and internal structure. The largest GA I attended included hundreds of people, but the average was between 20 and 50 people. Most people in the UC Movement were students who were new to activism, and there were no longstanding organizations involved. In addition to the characteristics of groups that are more likely to adopt informalorganization and collective decision-making, there is some research on which types of movements can use these forms most effectively. Polletta (2002) argues that direct democracy is most beneficial in movements where tactical innovation is

88

S. L. AUGUSTO

necessary due to a lack of access to powerholders, where cost of participation is high and where incentives for participation are low, and where people have not had opportunities to develop leadership skills. The latter is particularly applicable to the UC Movement, as most participants were students who had very little organizing experience. Direct democracy is useful in movements with a diversity of goals and tactical preferences because the consensus process helps improve dialogue and understanding between various groups and divergent perspectives (della Porta, 2009; Polletta, 2002). This helps to explain why most participants supported horizontalism in some form, regardless of whether they advocated a more fluid or structured approach. Attempting to distill so many competing preferences and ideologies into a bureaucratic and hierarchical form of organization prevents diverse movements from making progress by creating conflict, driving out participants who preferences are not adequately represented, and creating competition for status and resources between those who remain (Piven, 2013). As I will show below, informalorganization and direct democracy in the UC Movement allowed for a diversity of perspectives and affinity groups to work together to some extent, but different goals and tactical preferences and conflicting understandings of the role of consensus sometimes worked against solidarity. The preference for horizontalism and the use of direct democracy in the UC Movement is fairly consistent with research on which types of movements are more likely to adopt and benefit from these organizational forms. Scholars have also identified various reasons why activists choose these forms over others. Research identifies many ways that horizontalism and direct democracy may be strategic and beneficial. Yates (2020) argues that prefiguration serves 3 kinds of political purposes: it reproduces resources, assists in mobilization, and coordinates action toward movement goals. Horizontal organization and the practice of direct democracy helps to enhance solidarity and commitment among participants (della Porta, 2009; Polletta, 2002; Polletta & Hoban, 2016; Staggenborg, 1989), which can also help sustain movements during times of demobilization (Taylor, 1989). Horizontal leadership and consensus can also help attract and sustain movements participants (Polletta & Hoban, 2016; Tesdahl & Speer, 2015) and enhance innovation and experimentation to generate new tactics and strategies (Polletta, 2002; Yates, 2020). Polletta (2002) also refers to the “developmental” benefits of direct democracy, which helps participants, especially those who have

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

89

been excluded from political participation, to develop skills in leadership, negotiation, and interaction with powerholders. Consensus also educates participants, especially newcomers, about strategies and tactics (Polletta & Hoban, 2016). These benefits suggest that there are strategic reasons activists might adopt these forms. But strategy alone does not fully explain why participants favor certain forms of organization and reject others. Research shows that ideological, cultural, and social factors play a role as well (Conway & Dufour, 2010; Leach, 2013; Polletta, 2006). Certain organizational forms may be attractive because they align with participants’ values (della Porta, 2009; Polletta, 2002; Polletta & Hoban, 2016). Strategies and organizational preferences are also influenced by groups they are symbolically associated with (Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Polletta, 2002) and the influence of other movements that participants admire or see as related to their own struggles (Baumgarten, 2011; Benski et al., 2013; Calhoun, 2013; Tejerina et al., 2013). Polletta (2005) found that Civil Rights activists began to reject direct democracy when they came to associate it with whiteness. Smith (2007) demonstrates the focus on direct democracy and prefigurative politics in the Alter-globalization Movementwas inspired by indigenous struggles such as the Zapatistas. Likewise, the Occupy Movement in the United States was part of an international wave of mobilization, and its informal structure and commitment to horizontalism was influenced by other movements in Europe, North Africa, and South America (Calhourn, 2013). All this raises the question of whether these organizational forms are more influenced by strategic or non-strategic factors, as well as whether the line between these categories is always clear or analytically useful. The dominance of resource mobilization theory has led to a focus on organizational dynamics as instrumental and strategic, and there is little research on how other factors might affect organizational preferences. Furthermore, much of the research on social movementsassumes a rigid separation between instrumental and expressive goals, with strategy set in opposition to ideology, values, and culture. Some scholars argue that there is a false dichotomy between expressive and instrumental goals (Maeckelbergh, 2011; Polletta & Jasper, 2001) and that movements choose horizontal organizing and direct democracy for both strategic and ideological reasons (della Porta, 2009; Polletta, 2002) Others argue that prefiguration is a strategy in and of itself (Ancelovici, 2016; Graeber, 2002; Haug, 2013; Reinecke et al., 2018) thus collapsing the boundary

90

S. L. AUGUSTO

between expressive and instrumental forms of organizing. Ancelovici argues, “in the case of movements engaged in prefigurative politics like Occupy, the process is the demand, the means are the end, and vice versa” (2016, p. 199). della Porta notes that “if organizational values are not just means but also ends in themselves, the question of which values are linked with which vision of democracy acquires relevance” (2009, 88). My research confirms that both strategic and non-strategic factors affected participants’ organizational preferences, but also raises questions about the line between expressive and instrumental motivations and how these might affect organizational choices. I found that organizational preferences were consistent with the differing goals of participants, which can be characterized broadly as reform or revolution. Participants advocating reform view the goals of the movement as limited to the scope of the university, such as reversing the cuts and fee increases and the establishment of safeguards against privatization. Participants advocating revolution would not be satisfied with a return to a more public and accessible higher education system. They argue that the budget crisis and privatization of the university is symptomatic of a much broader set of issues including neoliberal capitalism and global austerity and privatization and view the issue of public education as part of a larger struggle against these forces. Most revolution advocates refuse to work inside institutions or negotiate with powerholders and critique reform advocates as naïve and counterproductive for their preference for working within the system. Those who preferred more structure were almost exclusively reformists, while those who preferred a more fluid and informal structure were more likely to advocate revolution. Reform advocates still have faith in institutions to some extent. They do not want to do away with the current governmental and economic systems entirely; rather, they want to reform them so that they are more egalitarian. Revolution advocates, on the other hand, argue that these institutions are beyond reform and need to be dismantled and replaced. Given these very different end goals, it makes sense that reformists would prefer to work within institutions and therefore prefer more structured organizational forms, while revolution advocates want to work outside of and in opposition to institutions and therefore prefer more fluid organizational forms. Organizational preferences within the UC Movement also relate to tactical strategies. Formal, hierarchical organizations are better at sustaining interaction with elites and authorities, but they compromise

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

91

their capacity for disruption, while autonomous horizontal groups can carry out disruption more efficiently but lack the coordination and continuity to interact with authorities and elites (Staggenborg, 1989; Tarrow, 1994; Willems & Jegers, 2012). Given reform advocates’ preference for working within institutions and negotiating with powerholders, it makes sense that they would argue for more formal organization and leadership. Likewise, revolution advocates prefer more horizontal and autonomous forms of organization in part because they are better suited for carrying out disruptive tactics. Decentralized organization also allows for flexibility and tactical innovation. Resp11 noted, “any sort of organizing body, as soon as it gets ossified into some more formal structure starts defeating its purpose and it becomes an incredibly conservative force that slows things down…everything in general has worked out much more when it was fluid. Every organizing body has emerged in relationship to an action and then sort of fallen apart, and then we reconvene in a different way in relationship to a different action.” Here, the lack of formal organization is viewed as a strength rather than a weakness in part because it allows participants to customize organization for each action or issue using a diversity of tactics. Many interviewees shared this preference for fluidity and made similar arguments about the need for flexibility and the problems associated with a more fixed and formal structure. In some cases where informalorganization was adopted strategically, it ended up being more of an encumberment than a strength. Several interviewees who supported the leaderless ideology argued that consensus could act as a barrier to radical action because more high-risk tactics needed to be decided upon in a context where secrecy and trust could be ensured. As resp12 put it: “Sometimes it feels like certain kinds of decisions are less possible to make, especially in these large public meetings, where for instance people might not feel super comfortable talking explicitly about taking over a building. So, I think that can be a problem, where the form in some sense dictates the content.” Other participants who viewed informalorganization as a strength also conceded that it could sometimes backfire. The shared leadership model could be limiting when quick decisions are necessary. Resp13 commented, “no one feels like they have the right to make that decision themselves or to tell others what to do, so instead of harnessing that moment we end up talking it to death. I think consensus is a necessary thing because I might not always like the direction that some self-appointed leader tries to take things in, but consensus can also really inhibit radical action.” Several other interviewees

92

S. L. AUGUSTO

mentioned that the lack of formal leaders and the consensus process could be problematic in settings where decisions need to be made quickly. The commitment to consensus made it difficult for individuals to take action at crucial times, and as resp14 articulated, “if you had to get consensus on everything nothing would get done.” I also found evidence that organizational preferences in part related to non-strategic factors like ideology, values, and symbolic associations. In their arguments for more structure, reform advocates often referenced the US movements of the 1960s, which they viewed as exemplary due to their clear goals and strong leadership. Many reformists and advocates of more structure saw organizations like Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as shining examples of efficient and successful mobilization. SDS and SNCC both practiced some form of participatory democracy, but as large formal organizations with traditional leadership. It was this form of more structured direct democracy, with a high level of organization and a dash of hierarchy, that reform advocates sought to emulate. Revolution advocates with more fluid preferences tended to view these movements as having failed to pose a real challenge to the current system, thus falling short of achieving the radical changes they desire. Instead, they were inspired by more militant struggles like the student occupations in New York, Great Britain, and Puerto Rico, the Egyptian Revolution and the Arab Spring, and the Greek and Spanish Anti-austerity protests. This emulation contributed to shaping participants’ organizational preferences. In arguments for a more fluid form of organization, revolutionists often referred to these diffuse, dispersed, and decentered struggles. Some participants who saw the occupations through the lens of prefigurative politics also viewed organization expressively rather than strategically. Many participants referred to the phrase “building a new world in the shell of the old” to describe the movements commitment to horizontalism and direct democracy and tended to focus on how these processes were reflective of the values of the movement rather than as strategically effective. While the commitment to horizontalism in the UC Movement allowed participants with varying tactical preferences, goals, and political ideologies to work together, there were tensions between participants who use the GA as a legitimation and communication tool for decisions that have already been made versus those who view it as a space to iron out differences and make decisions collectively. Essentially, these conflicts were about different understandings of the purpose and practice of direct

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

93

democracy. Some participants viewed consensus through the lens of strategy and used the GA instrumentally to gain support for their own agendas. Several interviewees also indicated that the GA could be used as a tool to enhance solidarity on issues where different factions agreed rather than a way of working out different perspectives and creating compromise. For example, resp15 recounted, “if my group wanted to propose a certain action we had to structure it and make it look like we weren’t trying to dominate, give other groups some decision-making power and give them some leadership. When that wasn’t the case or when we didn’t feel comfortable handing over control of the action to other groups that wouldn’t run it the way it was meant to, then we would just organize the event through our own individual group.” Resp16 said “if something’s going to be controversial, you don’t bring it up. If it’s one of the things where you can get it through consensus and thereby create this feeling whereby everybody is like, ‘oh yeah, we decided’—that’s the kind of thing you bring up.” Resp17 noted “it’s really not that different from any other legislative process. People are coming to the table with agendas and knowing already who their allies are for the large part, and then figuring out how to present them to get them through.” Conversely, some participants viewed consensus through the lens of prefiguration and saw the process of consensus as an expression of the movement’s values and an attempt to create truly egalitarian decisionmaking processes. Resp18 stated “I think that one of the beautiful things about the GA is that you can have all of these people with different ideologies bring information to the table, and then a collective ideology can be formed based on what that collection of information looks like.” Resp19 similarly noted, “through consensus you learn to trust each other, you learn to communicate with each other, you learn to hold on to what you need but also to let go of that which is not serving you or the community.” Participants who shared this expressive approach to the GA were often frustrated by those who used it instrumentally. For example, resp20 stated, “During some GA’s I thought that I saw consensus being abused, and that’s when you bring a proposal knowing that that proposal is going to pass rather than to discuss it.” Interestingly, these different orientations to the GA cut across the reformist/revolutionist line, but I found that more seasoned participants tended to approach the GA and consensus instrumentally while new participants were likely to take a more expressive view of the GA and the consensus process.

94

S. L. AUGUSTO

These different understandings of the GA are also related to a larger tension about autonomous actions versus actions planned and carried out by the GA. Some argued that consensus made an action or decision “official” while others questioned the legitimacy of such a distinction. There was also tension around what qualifies as “autonomous action” and debates on when such action was appropriate. As noted above, affinity groups would sometimes declare actions “autonomous” when they thought they would be controversial and bypassed the GA entirely. Such actions would often be criticized by other participants for what they saw as a violation of direct democratic principles and the values of the movement. In practice, actions were sometimes designated as “official” or “autonomous” based on whether they were successful rather than on how the decision was actually made. I observed several instances where actions that were not discussed or consensed upon at the GA came to be represented as “official” actions after they turned out to be successful. For example, an autonomous group began a daily sit-in at a bank branch on campus. When the bank blockade began the action was unpopular with a significant portion of movement participants, many of whom argued that the sit-in was too polarizing and could potentially alienate students who were sympathetic to the movement. They invoked the fact that the blockade had not been discussed at the GA to claim that this action was not part of the larger movement. However, support for the action grew as it became apparent that the sit-in posed a challenge to the bank and the administration, and when the bank closed and ended its contract with the University many participants, including those who had initially been against it, celebrated the blockade as an “official” movement action. The initial occupation of the quad underwent a similar transition from autonomous to “official” action, as noted by resp21: “The general assembly consensed on removing the tents from the quad, but people refused to do so, forced the GA to disband and defended the tents. Now of course, general assembly-philes, people who are completely dedicated to that form of organizing, have started to co-opt the decision.” Indeed, while the GA voted against keeping the tents up on the quad, the autonomous actions that individuals took in defiance of the GA vote lead to a full-scale occupation of the quad and Dutton Hall, both of which came to be known as “Occupy UCD” in the following months and the official hub of the student movementon campus.

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

95

To summarize, organizational preferences were determined strategically based on participants’ goals and tactical preferences, but also non-strategically based on ideology and symbolic associations. Additionally, conflicts about consensus and the role of the GA blurred the line between instrumental and expressive approaches to organizational forms. Some activists would invoke strategic concerns to defend autonomous actions and others used expressive logic to claim these same actions were not “official.”

Conclusion While most participants in the UC Movement expressed a commitment to horizontal organizing, there was significant debate over how much structure and formal organization was necessary and how leadership and consensus should operate. The rejection of formal leadership created a lack of transparency and hidden power dynamics that sometimes subverted the equality participants were trying to create. Although the purpose of the GA is to give everyone a voice, the complex set of procedures often worked to silence some participants and grant others more power. In some cases, knowledge of GA procedure was used by more seasoned participants to exclude those with opposing views and direct the course of meetings and decisions. Differing levels of experience with movement participation and theoretical knowledge as well as the time people were able to spend at meetings also worked to give some participants a stronger voice than others. Participants often struggled in their attempts to create differently structured forms of organization without reproducing the bureaucratic and hierarchical forms they defined themselves against. Both informalmechanisms for establishing leadership and formal procedures for operating the GA and decision-making contributed to hierarchy and unequal power dynamics in the UC Movement. The lack of formal leadership roles created informalhierarchies and granted some participants disproportionate power without accountability, while overly formal and complex rules surrounding the GA process disadvantaged some participants while allowing others to dominate. My research also shows that organizational preferences were greatly influenced by different strategies based on participant’s divergent goals and tactical preferences, but also by non-strategic factors like political ideologies and symbolic associations. The role of the GA was also a source of conflict, with some participants viewing it strategically as a legitimation

96

S. L. AUGUSTO

tool for decisions that had already been made while others approached it expressively as a way of making decisions in line with the movement’s values. These differing perspectives created tension around issues of accountability and autonomy within the movement. Although critics of horizontalism and prefiguration argue that these organizational forms neglect strategy and focus on expressive goals and opposed to strategic ones, I did not find this to be the case. There were non-strategic factors that affected participants’ organizational preferences, but they were far outweighed by strategic factors. Smith argues that both formal organization and horizontalism are necessary for successful mobilization and activists must “avoid the trap of engaging in endless debates about the role of formal organizations in the movement” (ibid., pp. 239–240). Further research into the internal dynamics of movements may help to illuminate how activists can avoid these endless debates by combining both formal and informalprocesses, thus saving time and producing better outcomes. The UC Movement is only one example of many struggles—from the International Student Movement to Arab Spring to Black Lives Matter—that is changing the way that activists organize. As dispersed, informal and non-hierarchical forms of organization and leadership in social movementsbecome increasingly common, more research on these forms of mobilization is needed. This research should not only be of interest to social movementscholars, but also to movement participants. My findings demonstrate a number of challenges facing activists who employ forms of horizontal and nonhierarchical organization and leadership. Greater attention to these issues has the potential to develop social movementtheory and make scholarship more relevant to the contemporary age, as well as provide insights for activists struggling to create social change.

References Ancelovici, M. (2016). Occupy and the politics of horizontalism. In M. Ancelovici, P. Dufour, & H. Nez (Eds.), Street politcs in the age of austerity: From Indignados to Occupy (pp. 175–201). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Ansell, C. (2003). Community embeddedness and collaborative governance in the San Francisco Bay area environmental movement. In M. Diani & D. McAdam (Eds.), Social movements and networks: Relational approaches to collective action (pp. 123–144). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

97

Barnett, B. M. (1993). Invisible southern black women leaders in the civil rights movement: The triple constraints of race and gender. Gender and Society, 7 (2), 162–182. Baumgarten, B. (2011). Geração à Rasca and beyond: Mobilizations in Portugal after 12 March 2011. Current Sociology, 61(4), 457–473. Bennett, W. (2005). Social movements beyond borders: Understanding two eras of transnational activism. In D. della Porta & S. Tarrow (Eds.), Transnational protest and global activism (pp. 203–226). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Benski, T., Langman, L., Perugorría, I., & Tejerina, B. (2013). From the streets and squares to social movement studies: What have we learned? Current Sociology, 61(4), 451–561. Boggs, C. (1977). Revolutionary process, political strategy, and the dilemma of power. Theory and Society, 4(3), 359–393. Breines, W. (2006). The trouble between us: An uneasy history of white and black women in the feminist movement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Calhoun, C. (2013). Occupy wall street in perspective. The British Journal of Sociology, 64(1), 26–38. Choi-Fitzpatrick, A. (2015). Managing democracy in social movement organizations. Social Movement Studies, 14(2), 123–141. Collins, P. H. (2000). Black feminist thought. London: Routledge. Conway, J., & Dufour, P. (2010). Emerging visions of another world? Tensions and collaboration at the Quebec social forum. Journal of World Systems Research, XV, I (1), 29–47. della Porta, D. (Ed.). (2009). Democracy in social movements. Palgrave. della Porta, D. 2015. Social movements in time of austerity. Polity Press. della Porta, D., & Rucht, D. (Eds.). (2013). Meeting democracy: Power and deliberation in global justice movements. Cambridge University Press. Diani, M., & Bison, I. (2004). Organizations, coalitions and movements. Theory and Society, 33(3/4), 281–309. Downey, G. (1986). Ideology and the clamshell identity: Organizational dilemmas in the anti-nuclear movement. Social Problems, 44(5), 357–373. Duberman, M. (1999). Left out: The politics of exclusion: Essays 1964–1999. New York: Basic Books. Epstein, B. (1991). Political protest and cultural revolution. Berkley: University of California Press. Evans, S. M. (1979). Personal politics: The roots of women’s liberation in the civil rights movement and the new left. Random House. Fitzgerald, K., & Rodgers, D. (2016). Radical social movement organizations: A theoretical model. Sociological Quarterly, 41(4), 573–592. Flesher, C. 2020. Social movements in a globalized world. London: Red Globe Press. Freeman, J. (1972). The tyranny of the structurelessness. In A. Koedt, E. Levine, & A. Rapone (Eds.), Radical feminism (pp. 285–299). Quadrangle: Times Books.

98

S. L. AUGUSTO

Fyke, K., & Sayegh, G. (2001). Anarchism and the struggle to move forward. Perspectives on Anarchist Theory, 5(2), 30–38. Ganz, M. (2000). Strategic capacity in the unionization of California agriculture, 1959–1966. American Journal of Sociology, 105(4), 1003–1062. Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the new left. Berkley: University of California Press. Graeber, D. (2002). The new anarchists. New Left Review, 13, 61–73. Graeber, D. (2009). Direct action: An ethnography. Oakland & Edinburgh: AK Press. Ghimire, K. B. (2011). Organization theory and transnational social movements: Organizational life and internal dynamics of power exercise within the alternative globalization movement. Lanham: Lexington Books. Gordon, U. (2018). Prefigurative politics between ethical practice and absent promise. Political Studies, 66(4), 521–537. Giugni, M., & Nai, A. (2009). Why are social movement organizations deliberative? Structural and cultural determinents of internal decision making in the global justice movement. In D. della Porta (Ed.), Democracy in social movements (pp. 127–149). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Haeringer, N. (2008). Attac France and No Vox. In D. della Porta (Ed.), Microanalysis of practices of deliberative democracy (WP6 Integrated Report) (pp. 45–70). Florence: European University Institute. Haeringer, N., & Sommier, I. (2009). The intergenerational issue: The impact of organizations’ age on visions for democracy. In D. della Porta (Ed.), Democracy in social movements (pp. 217–233). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Haug, C. (2013). Organizing spaces: Meeting arenas as a social movement infrastructure between organization, network, and institution. Organization Studies, 34(5–6), 705–732. Jackson, N., & Carter, P. (2007). Rethinking oganisational behaviour: A poststructualist framework. London: Pearson. Jenkins, J. C., & Eckert, C. M. (1986). Channeling black insurgency: Elite patronage and professional social movement organizations in the development of the black movement. American Sociological Review, 51(6), 812–829. Juris, J. (2008). Networking futures: The movements against corporate globalization. Durham: Duke University Press. Kiersev, N., & Vrasti, W. (2016). A convergent genealogy? Space, time and the promise of horizontal politics today. Capital and Class, 40(1), 75–94. Killian, L. (1984). Organization, rationality and spontaneity in the Civil Rights Movement. American Sociological Review, 49(6), 770–783. Klandermans, B. (2001). Why social movements come into being and why people join them. In J. Blau (Ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Sociology (pp. 268– 281). Blackwell.

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

99

Kriesi, H. (1996). The organizational structure of new social movements in a political context. In D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, & M. Zald (Eds.), Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings (pp. 152–184). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leach, D. K. (2013). Culture and the structure of tyrannylessness. The Sociological Quarterly, 54(2), 159–228. Maeckelbergh, M. (2011). Doing is believing: Prefiguration as strategic practice in the alterglobalization movement. Social Movement Studies, 10(1), 1–20. McAdam, D. (1986). Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of freedom summer. American Journal of Sociology, 92(1), 64–90. McAdam, D., McCarthy, D., & Zald, M. (1996). Comparative perspective on social movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McAdam, D., & Scott, R. (2005). Organizations and movements. In G. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, & M. Zald (Eds.), Social movements and organization theory (pp. 4–40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCarthy, J., & Zald, M. (1973). The trend of social movements in America: Professionalism and resource mobilization. London: General Learning Press. McCarthy, J., & Zald, M. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. American Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212–1241. Michels, R. (1969). Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers. Minkoff, D. (2013). The changing supply side of mobilization: Impressions on a theme. In J. van Steklenburg, B. Klandermans, & C. Roggeband (Eds.), The future of social movement research: Dynamics, mechanisms, and processes (pp. 191–201). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Misoczky, M., & Flores, R. (2020). From practice to theory: Reflections on the organization of social movements and popular struggles. Revista Eletrônica Da Administração, 26(1), 18–48. Oberschall, A. (1973). Social conflict and social movements. Hoboken: PrenticeHall. Piven, F. (2013). On the organizational question. The Sociological Quarterly, 54(2), 159–228. Polletta, F. (2002). Freedom is an endless meeting: Democracy in American social movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Polletta, F. (2004). Culture is not just in your head. In J. Goodwin & J. Jasper (Eds.), Rethinking social movements (pp. 97–110). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Polletta, F. (2005). How participatory democracy became white: Culture and organizational choice. Mobilization, 10(2), 271–288. Polletta, F. (2006). It was like a fever: Storytelling in protest and politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

100

S. L. AUGUSTO

Polletta, F., & Hoban, K. (2016). Why consensus? Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 4(1), 286–301. Polletta, F., & Jasper, J. (2001). Collective identity and social movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 27 , 283–305. Reger, J. (2012). Organizational dynamics and construction of multiple identities in the national organization for women. Gender and Society, 16(5), 710–727. Reinecke, J et al. (2018). Social movements and prefigurative organizing: Confronting entrenched inequalities in occupy London. Organizational Studies, 39(9), 1299–1321. Robnett, B. (1997). How long? How long? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rothschild, J., & Whitt, A. (1986). The cooperative workplace: Potentials and dilemmas of organizational democracy and participation. Cambridge University Press. Saunders, C. (2008). Deliberation and democracy in two local global justice movement groups in Kent, England. In D. della Porta (Ed.), Microanalysis of practices of deliberative democracy (WP6 Integrated Report, pp. 17–44). European University Institute. http://cosmos.sns.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 04/6-demos.wp6_.finalreport.pdf. Saunders, C., & Rootes, C. (2013). Patterns of participation. In D. della Porta & D. Rucht (Eds.), Meeting democracy: Power and deliberation in global justice movements (pp. 72–96). Cambridge University Press. Sheehan, H. (2012). Occupying Dublin: Considerations at the crossroads. Irish Left Review. Sirianni, C. (1995). Learning pluralism: Democracy and diversity in feminist organizations. In J. Chapman & I. Shapiro (Eds.), NOMOS XXXV: Democratic community (pp. 283–312). New York University Press. Sitrin, M. (2012). Horizontalism and the Occupy Movements. Dissent, 59(2), 74–75. Smith, J. (2001). Globalizing resistance: The battle of seattle and the future of social Movements. Mobilization, 6(1), 1–19. Smith, J. (2007). Social movements for global democracy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Srnicek, N., & Williams, A. (2015). Inventing the future. London: Verso. Staggenborg, S. (1986). Coalition work in the pro-choice movement: Organizational and environmental opportunities and obstacles. Social Problems, 33(5), 374–390. Staggenborg, S. (1989). Stability and innovation in the women’s movement: A comparison of two movement organizations. Social Problems, 36(1), 75–92. Staggenborg, S. (2013). Organization and community in social movements. In J. van Stekelenburg, C. Roggerband, & B. Klandermans (Eds.), The future of social movement research: Dynamics, mechanisms, and processes (pp. 125–144). University of Minnesota Press.

4

STRUCTURING THE “STRUCTURELESS” AND LEADING THE …

101

Sutherland, N., Land, C., & Böhm, S. (2013). Anti-leaders(hip) in social movement organizations: The case of autonomous grassroots groups. Organization, 21(6), 759–781. Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, V. (1989). Social movement continuity: The women’s movement in abeyance. American Sociological Review, 54(5), 761–775. Tejerina, B., Perugorria, I., Benski, T., & Langman, L. (2013). From indignation to occupation: A new wave of global mobilization. Current Sociology, 61(4), 377–392. Tesdahl, E., & Speer, P. (2015). Organizational-level predictors of sustained social movement participation. American Journal of Community Psychology, 55(1–2), 48–57. Treloar, M. (2003). The tyranny of consensus. Clamor, 20, 38–40. Willems, J., & Jegers, M. (2012). Social movement structures in relation to goals and forms of action: An exploratory model. Canadian Journal of Nonprofit and Social Economy Research, 3(2), 67–81. Yates, L. (2020). Prefigurative politics and social movement strategy: The roles of prefiguration in the reproduction, mobilisation and coordination of movements. Political Studies. Zald, M., & Ash, R. (1966). Social movement organizations: Growth, decay and change. Social Forces, 44(3), 327–340.

CHAPTER 5

Tweeting #FeesMustFall: The Online Life and Offline Protests of a Networked Student Movement Thierry M. Luescher, Nkululeko Makhubu, Thelma Oppelt, Seipati Mokhema, and Memory Zodwa Radasi

Introduction In 2015, students made history in South Africa. The wave of the so-called “hashtag,” “MustFall,” or “Fallist” protests started with RhodesMustFall at the University of Cape Town (UCT) in March 2015. Soon after the

T. M. Luescher (B) · S. Mokhema · M. Z. Radasi Human Sciences Research Council, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] T. M. Luescher University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa N. Makhubu University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa T. Oppelt Nelson Mandela University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_5

103

104

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

inception of RhodesMustFall, student activists and disaffected students in other universities, especially historically white universities, joined the UCT students’ call for a “decolonization” of higher education under various, mostly campus-specific banners emulating the #RhodesMustFall campaign as #SteynMustFall, #AfrikaansMustFall, #OpenStellenbosch, and so forth. And they were highly effective within their respective contexts: Within a month the controversial statue of Cecil John Rhodes was removed from the Upper Campus of UCT; language policy review committees were hurriedly set up in historically Afrikaans-tuition universities; the institutional culture and whiteness of academia in the historically white universities came under renewed scrutiny; and curriculum review committees and projects to “decolonize” the curricula, especially in the Humanities, got to work. After a few weeks of frantic agitation, some of the campus-based student formations seemed to be losing steam and getting caught up with matters of internal ideological and organizational consolidation as well as the demands of the formal university decision-making processes that now got underway. As the second semester of 2015 opened in late July, university after university concluded their strategic planning and budgeting in preparation of the 2016 academic year, and university managements’ proposals of fee increments for 2016 went to their respective university councils for approval. It was in response to this that another student demand became prominent: fees must fall. Initially, after losing the battle against a double-digit fee increment proposal in the Council of the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in Johannesburg, the Students’ Representative Council (SRC) of Wits tried to mobilize the Wits student body against the fee increase using #WitsProtest and #WitsFeesProtest as part of its online campaign. Eventually, this became #WitsFeesMustFall, clearly emulating the successful MustFall label of #RhodesMustFall. Incidentally, the Wits SRC’s mobilization effort coincided with the Higher Education Transformation Summit organized by the national Department of Higher Education and Training, which was held from October 15 to 17, 2015 in Durban. At the summit, representatives of SRCs from across the public university landscape were present as well as some student activists of the now prominent campus-based decolonization movements. Informed by

S. Mokhema North West University, Mafikeng, South Africa

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

105

the developments at Wits and their own campuses and incensed by some of the proceedings at the summit itself, it was from there and then that student leaders took the idea of #FeesMustFall and a national shutdown to their campuses. This is where the analysis of this chapter delves in. In this chapter we account for the #FeesMustFall campaign-related online and offline student activism. Empirically, we are focusing on the October month of 2015, paying in-depth attention to the ten days of the highly efficient first #FeesMustFall campaign which in the main lasted from October 14 to 23, 2015. Our theoretical interest is to advance the conceptualization of the South African student movement in 2015 as an internet-age networked student movement (Luescher & Klemenˇciˇc, 2017; Luescher et al., 2017). For this purpose, our analysis focuses on the form of student organizing and the movement’s action repertoire, and particularly the dynamic relationship between online and offline protesting involved in the nationwide #FeesMustFall and related campusspecific campaigns. We do so with respect to three matters: (1) the role of social media and the nature and extent of Twitter use; (2) the prevalence of online and offline protest eventsacross different institutions; and (3) the dynamic relationship between the online social network structure and the leadership and organization of the movement. We start by outlining the context of the emergence of FeesMustFall and particularly the neoliberal realities that faced South African students in 2015 and caused the fragmented student movement to rally behind #FeesMustFall. We then consider the concept of a digitally networked student movement insofar as it is relevant for understanding the impact of social media use on the organizational forms and leadership of a student movement. This part of the chapter concludes with a description and justification of our methodology. The findings are presented in three sections. First, we discuss the origins and history of #FeesMustFall as a national student campaign. Our Twitter analysis of #FeesMustFall in the second section indicates a distributed, multi-nodal and flat digital network structure which correlates with the federal and flat organizational and leadership structure of the South African student movement in 2015. In the third section, we take a closer look at campus-specific online and offline protesting and find evidence of a social media divide in the movement. We conclude by looking at the implications of these findings and the policy impacts of the #FeesMustFall campaign.

106

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

Understanding #FeesMustFall: Neoliberal realities in South African Higher Education There are several factors that may explain the emergence of the unprecedented wave of student protests of 2015, and particularly the #FeesMustFall-related protests. Badat (2016) suggests that by 2015, South African higher education found itself in the midst of an “organic crisis” with political, economic, and ideological dimension. This resonates with several other analyses of the student movement in 2015. Several analysts have pointed out that FeesMustFall was the result of the twin pressures of declining state subsidies and massification on the economics of South African higher education (Badat, 2016; Naicker, 2016; Nyamnjoh, 2020). By the start of the 2010s, black higher education in South Africa reached the level of massification for the first time. At the same time, the National Students Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) which had been set up in 1998 to facilitate financial access to students from poor households was buckling under the heavy weight of expectation, not being able to fund all deserving students and frequently blundering administratively. Massification also produced a growing mass of “missing middle” students from households “too rich for NSFAS, too poor for fees” (Garrod & Wildschut, 2020). Even before FeesMustFall, Cele (2015) showed the paradoxical nature of South Africa’s post-apartheid higher education policy and its impact on student politics. The effects of national policy at the institutional level were far-reaching and from a student perspective included an increasing commodification of higher education at the same time as service levels seemed to decline, with increasing tuition fees and increasing class sizes, increasing residence fees and growing backlog in expanding student accommodation; the casualization and precarization of academic staffand outsourcing of support staff, and; the managerialization of university decision-making which meant that student voices became more marginal in key decisions. South African higher education reflected core characteristics of a market-dependent system but this market did not accommodate the massive inequalities between students from different background and differently resourced institutions. These recent developments made the cost-sharing model that had been operative for decades increasingly look like part of a “neo-liberal package” of realities. While several analyses of FeesMustFall observed a visceral rejection of the neoliberal regime by student activists (Badat, 2016; Cini, 2019;

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

107

Naicker, 2016), this neoliberal regime came about gradually by policy slippage rather than purposeful centralized design as a culmination of years of incremental system-level planning and funding decisions, a new quality assurance regime and other monitoring and reporting mechanisms at national level cumulated in institutional level realities. Thus, unlike in England where a specific national-level policy trigger spurred students into action (Cini & Guzmán-Concha, 2017), #FeesMustFall started as a campus-level response to decision taken at the university level to sharply increase fees: it started at one institution, Wits, and then rapidly spread across the sector in parts as other universities also announced their increments. The expectation by some policymakers that it would be possible to use “‘conservative tools’ to achieve progressive ends” for transforming the post-apartheid higher education sector thus proved to be hopelessly naïve (Lange & Luescher, 2016, 122). Neoliberalism as an ideology is, of course, not only intimately bound up with the economic dimensions of the crisis, but with other ideological dimensions as well. For instance, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017) argued that the corporate model of the South African public university was now an obstacle in the quest to becoming a truly African university—as demanded by RhodesMustFall activists. #FeesMustFall became the campaign name that eventually galvanized the student movement into national action. Prior to that, protests against fee hikes and the financial exclusion of poor students, and for increased financial aid, had mainly been held at universities of technology and rural, historically black universities, away from news media. However, when the call now came from a prestigious, traditional university in the heart of Johannesburg, utilizing the online and offline action repertoire, the new social media tools and protest tactics, first used by RhodesMustFall, the wider effect was vastly different (Madlala in Luescher et al., 2020). Eventually, #FeesMustFall crystallized the students’ demand for free decolonized higher education for poor and working-class students in one efficient campaign slogan. The political ownership of #FeesMustFall naturally became highly contested between different partisan student organizations. They included those aligned to the ruling African National Congress (ANC), which include the South African Students’ Congress (SASCO), the ANC Youth League and the Young Communist League (YCL) collectively called the Progressive Youth Alliance (PYA). Others included the contemporaneous splinter group of the PYA called ALUTA; older and smaller

108

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

student political organizations like the Pan Africanist Student Movement of Azania (PASMA); and the newly formed Economic Freedom Fighters—Student Command (EFFSC), which sprang in June 2015 from a new political party that had been formed by expelled ANC YL leaders. Naturally, the EFF-SC fiercely sought to profile itself as more progressive and fearless than the others. In mid-2015, these interrelated economic, ideological, and political factors obtainable in the higher education sector thus presented conditions ripe for a wave of student protests more far-reaching and fiercer than the sector had ever seen. And yet, these conditions can neither tell us about the organization and leadership of the student movement in 2015 nor about protest actions and tactics that may account for the unprecedented effectiveness of the #FeesMustFall campaign. While there are many potential lines of enquiry into this, our purpose here is to explore the networked dimension of the movement. It is well known that student activists, sympathizers, and others used various social media platforms prolifically and for different purposes during the activism (especially Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp). However, apart from a limited number of studies (for example, Baillie-Stewart, 2017; Bosch, 2016; Bosch et al., 2020), there is no systematic evidence of the functioning of #FeesMustFall as a networked student movement, the dynamic interaction between the online and offline protesting, and its impact on the organization and leadership of the movement.

Conceptualizing an Internet-Age Networked Movement Building on the work of Altbach (1991) and Castells (2015), Luescher and others have argued that in 2015 the South African student movement developed several characteristics typical of an internet-age networked social movement (Luescher & Klemenˇciˇc, 2017; Luescher et al., 2017). The notion of a networked movement points to the changes that a movement undergoes when assimilating digital information and communication technologies (Tufekci, 2017). In keeping with Castells (2015), important for understanding the conceptualization of a networked student movement is the notion that.

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

109

there is a dynamic relationship between the space of localised, ‘territorial’ movements and the virtual space, whereby local movements are virtually assembled, discussing ideas, engaging with knowledge, mobilising and acting virtually, and developing a common sense of being. (Luescher et al., 2017, 241)

While Castells makes a distinction between the physical space and the virtual or cyber space, the online life of networked movements is in no way less real (or merely “virtual”) than their offline life in the physical space (Tufekci, 2017). In a meta-analysis of literature on student activism in South Africa, Ntuli and Teferra (2017) found that the use of social media had positive and negative implications for the student movement. Among the positives were that social media offered themselves as powerful tools to garner support for a cause and mobilize fellow students. Conversely, a movement’s use of digital technology also had disadvantages in that there was evidence of “a leadership vacuum” as well as “a lack of collective capacity in organizing and decision-making” in these movements (Ntuli & Teferra, 2017, 77). Thus, while social media may play an important positive role in mobilizing, it may have a negative impact on organizational matters, leadership, and decision-making. Building on this work and that of Zeynep Tufekci, we can thus argue that the implications of the digitization of a student movement may manifest at three levels. Firstly, it will be evident at the level of movement coordination and leadership along with weaknesses in other “movement internalities.” Secondly, it will be evident at the level of the student body and the way calls to action are made, information is shared and conversations on the movement are held. Thirdly, there will also be changes at the level of the public sphere at large, which prominently includes mainstream news media with an online presence, where it is possible to find a more rapid development of so-called “movement externalities” (Tufekci, 2017; also see: Ntuli & Teferra, 2017; Theocharis et al., 2015). One of our keen interests in this chapter is to explore the extent of Twitter activity, the social network structure evident therein and its relationship with the movement’s internal operation, its coordination, and leadership. Given the institutional diversity in the South African higher education sector, we explore differences in social media activity and protesting on the ground across the university landscape. Altbach (1991, 257; also see Luescher, 2018) has argued that there are institutional

110

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

characteristics that impact on the likelihood and effectiveness of student activism, including the type, size, prestige, and location of a university. Significant differences in student activism can be expected between traditional universities and universities of technology, metropolitan and more rural, larger and smaller, and more or less prestigious institutions.

Methodology and Empirical Data Our study uses a multi-method approach that integrates quantitative and qualitative empirical work. Altogether, three databases inform our analysis. Firstly, we provide systematic evidence of the cyberlife of the student movement during the #FeesMustFall campaign by having established and by analyzing a social media database comprising of two datasets of tweets as well as a related data set of user information for a social network analysis. Secondly, in order to account for the interaction of Twitter activism with offline protest events we have established a protest event database and analysis. This analysis is also supported by our extensive record of transcripts of interviews with movement activists from a selection of six public universities. This interview database also provides evidence on the impact of the networked nature of the movement on the organization and leadership of the movement. Social media research and the collection and analysis of digital trace data remain an ethical challenge. In our case, we only accessed data that is publicly available on Twitter, that is public posts in which tweeters broadcast their opinions on a topic by tagging their tweets with a hashtag and/or connecting their tweet to other Twitter users by mentioning their handle. In addition, all the interviews were conducted with the informed consent of the participants. Overall, our study received ethical clearance from the Human Sciences Research Council. Case Institutions and Interview Data In order to understand the organization and leadership structure of the South African student movement during #FeesMustFall from a student activist perspective, we draw on a dataset of 17 interviews conducted between 2018 and 2020 with former student activists from six public universities. Given some historical differences in student activism between rural and metropolitan universities, different types of institutions, as well as campuses originating historically from universities reserved respectively

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

111

for black and white students under the racist apartheid-era legislation (socalled historically black and historically white institutions), we looked to involve former student activists of #FeesMustFall from a highly diverse set of institutions. • The University of Cape Town (UCT) in Cape Town is the oldest and arguably most prestigious residential university in South Africa. During apartheid, UCT was legally reserved for white students. Cape Town is the oldest colonial city of South Africa and the seat of Parliament. • The University of the Free State (UFS) in Bloemfontein is a historically white university found in the metropolitan capital of the centrally located Free State province. In 2015, the UFS was a dual medium institution offering most courses separately in Afrikaans and English. • The University of the Western Cape (UWC) is a historically black urban university found in a historically disadvantaged part of the Cape Town metro. UWC has a long history of anti-apartheid and pro-social justice student activism. It is among the most prestigious universities in South Africa. • The University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), located in the heart of Johannesburg, is one of the oldest and most prestigious institutions. Like UCT it is a historically white (English tuition) university that was restricted to white students during apartheid. Nowadays it caters mainly for black students, most of which are from relatively well-todo families and elite high schools. • The University of Venda (UV) in Thohoyandou is a historically black university located in a rural town in the North-eastern part of the country. During apartheid, Venda was an “independent,” self-governing ethnic homeland. • The Tshwane University of Technology (TUT) is a multi-campus institution located in and around the administrative capital of South Africa, Pretoria (Tshwane). TUT came about from the merger of a two historically black technikons (polytechnic) and a historically white technikon in 2004. TUT is one of the most student protestprone institutions in the country.

112

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

Twitter Data Our Twitter databases of #FeesMustFall-related digital trace data have been generated using the open source platform Mecodify (available on GitHub). We use two distinct Twitter datasets. The first dataset was generated on March 11, 2020 and contains a total of 278,859 unique #FeesMustFall-tagged tweets from 62,191 Twitter users. It is made up of two file types: A file that contains all the data and meta data of the original tweets that has been cleaned to remove all duplicates, including 807,771 retweets of the original tweets (For analyses including retweets see, for example, Lutz, 2017). The second type is files that contain userspecific data, including the data on retweets, quotes, and mentions, which allows for a social network analysis (SNA). We exported the user file from Mecodify and import it into the free SNA online tool Kumu, which allows a powerful visualization of the connections, nodes and edges in a Twitter user network map. Our SNA describes three matrices: the connections between tweeters across the network and specifically their centrality within the network; clusters or communities within the network; and the closeness between users. The second Twitter dataset is a merged data file generated over several months between mid-2018 and early 2020 from hashtag campaigns that make specific mention of a university/campus in conjunction with a FeesMustFall or Shutdown part of the hashtag (for example as #UFSFeesMustFall or #UWCShutdown). This database of 52,892 tweets provides a more fine-grained perspective of the extent of Twitter activism by the university. The date range of both Twitter datasets is from October 1 to 31, 2015, to comfortably cover the 2015 #FeesMustFall campaign. We consider the #FeesMustFall tweets contained in the first dataset as indicative of the nationwide #FeesMustFall campaign. Those tweets using a campusspecific hashtag are considered part of the way the campaign expressed itself specifically in relation to a particular university or campus. Provided that the Twitter databases were generated several years after the #MustFall campaigns occurred, some tweets and handles may be missing because the handles have been discontinued, as illustrated in the analysis below. While we also refer to Facebook and WhatsApp in our analysis, there are several reasons why we restrict our analytical scope to Twitter in this chapter. Firstly, as the name suggests, #FeesMustFall started as a Twitter hashtag, even if within days it became a rally cry far beyond that

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

113

platform and eventually gave identity to a whole generation of student activists. Secondly, in technical terms, Twitter has powerful affordances which allow users to target specific audiences by mentioning them, broadcasting their views in respect to a particular conversation by hashtagging it, and spreading tweets of others rapidly by retweeting. In this respect, Twitter is less confined to a specific user group than Facebook—being able to reach audiences beyond campus, nationwide, and even internationally while broadcasting a message. Affordances like retweeting and the limitation of tweets to a 140-character limit (while Facebook allowed for posts of 40 times that length) all contributed to Twitter being used for different purposes than Facebook and WhatsApp (see Bosch et al., 2020 for details). Finally, a platform analysis of Facebook (in the way we provide it for Twitter) would require tools and generate material that goes beyond the limitations of this chapter. We therefore focus on Twitter use during #FeesMustFall in keeping with the argument that “Twitter helped to fuel and maintain the student uprising” (Haffajee, 2015, 168). Protest Event Data To gain a broader view on (reporting on) the #FeesMustFall protest events on the ground during October, we established a record of the protest events as a third database. The event data has been collected from articles published on the online news platforms of several major South African mainstream media houses, mostly News24 (which publishes online articles from several major local titles), eNews Channel Africa (eNCA), Eye Witness News (EWN), the youth news platform Daily Vox, and the Sowetan online. Protests Event Analysis (PEA) is a method widely used in social movement studies to analyze protest actions and responses in terms of several variables (della Porta & Diani, 2009; Hutter, 2014; Koopmans & Rucht, 2002). In our case they are: #campaign, campus, event date, event time, mode of protest action, site of protesting, number of protestors, as well as several other variables, and references. Our PEA covers 77 events from the first event on October 14 to the last recorded event on October 26. Our analysis here is only concerned with the actual number of events recorded per university.

114

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

#FeesMustFall---A Hashtag’s Story In the month of October 2015, the #FeesMustFall campaign generated 278,859 unique tweets which were forwarded in 807,775 retweets thus creating a Twitter storm of 1,086,634 tweets lasting just a few days. Figure 5.1 shows the fast increase in the number of unique tweets from October 19 to 23, rising sharply on the 21st as about 5000 students from UCT and the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) marched on the South African Parliament. This was followed on October 22, when students in Johannesburg marched on the ruling ANC’s headquarters, and eventually peaked at 82,374 tweets on the following day as protests escalated at the Union Buildings, the seat of government, in Pretoria. It was on that day that the President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, announced somewhat under duress, a fee freeze for 2016. In the course of a few days, #FeesMustFall became the No. 1 hashtag of the year 2015 in South Africa, followed in third place by its close associate #NationalShutdown. Daily Unique #FeesMustFall Tweets, October 2015 90000 82374

80000

72610

70000

61533

60000 50000 40000 30000

21637

20000 10000

8445

0

4 13

44 54 74 28 73 14 15 16 17 18 19

20

7185 21

22

23

24

25

5375 26

7770

27

4898 28

3119 1915 29

30

1200 521 31

Fig. 5.1 Daily Unique #FeesMustFall Tweets in October 2015 (Source HSRC, 2021. Note Data generated by Mecodify on 11 March 2020; unique tweets only)

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

115

The #FeesMustFall hashtag was first used in March 2015 by Twitter user @SkhumbuzoTuswa. Skhumbozo made a comment to the tweet by @informer_sa that UCT’s #RhodesMustFall campaign was gaining momentum. His comment was: “Priorities?? #FeesMustFall.” While the tweet was retweeted four times, the newly invented hashtag failed to gain traction. It was only on October 13 that #FeesMustFall really came to life. According to Lutz, the discontinued Twitter account of the Wits SRC of the time (@WitsSRC) tweeted “#FEESMUSTFALL #JOINTHEMOVEMENT #OCT14” for the first time in October (Lutz, 2017, 160). In our dataset, which was generated after @WitsSRC had been discontinued, the now suspended Twitter user @Madvocate_, which was the handle of a prominent member of the Wits student activist core appears as the first tweeter. The user tweeted in the late afternoon to their over 7000 followers within a few minutes three tweets: Now it is time for me to mobilize Wits students. Tomorrow at 12 pm we meet at West Campus #FeesMustFall http://t.co/9aO790bbIr. Residence is going up by over 9 % yet I always walk up 18 flights of stairs because lifts don’t work at res. #FeesMustFall Tomorrow is D-Day. Sikhathele! #FeesMustFall http://t.co/9aO790bbIr. (@Madvocate_, 13 October 2015)

Like the @WitsSRC tweet, the first and third tweet by @Madvocate_ both called Wits students to mobilize and join the movement. “Sikhathele”— “We are fed up” was the message. The second tweet is to inform about the key issue: fee increases (while services are not adequate). The tweets by @WitsSRC and @Madvocate_ on October 13 represent the birth of the South African student movement’s #FeesMustFall campaign. After the hashtag emerged on Twitter, #FeesMustFall was soon in every tweet and Facebook post, on every movement placard, poster, and flyer, and in every protest chant to efficiently identify the student movement’s campaign and main demand. At the start of the Wits SRC’s opposition to the proposed fee hike in late September and early October, they had used other hashtags to inform and try to mobilize the student body. A senior SRC member and #FeesMustFall activist was present when the decision was taken to adopt #FeesMustFall.

116

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

Initially we used the hashtag #WitsProtest. This was obviously very confusing because people didn’t know what we were protesting for. So, we’re like, okay, let’s try #WitsFeesProtest. Okay, you know, kind of worked but it was also very long. I remember we were standing on Yale Road, myself, Shaeera, Palo, some young comrades - and now we are debating this thing. We are like, this hashtag is not working … it is not really gaining traction. It doesn’t sound nice. And then moving on this #RhodesMustFall thing - before we even get there, we’re like fees! Obviously, it has to have fees; and, okay this is a fall thing. Then we’re talking about fees should fall, fees will fall, okay: Fee Must Fall. You know, it has that feeling: it must fall… And you know Rhodes…, okay, perfect, let’s try this: #WitsFeesMustFall. That’s how it started off. It was at Wits, but as the movement grew and became beyond Wits, we dropped the ‘Wits’ word, and also because it was very long. And that’s when it became just #FeesMustFall. (WITS resp 2)

Thus, the move from using #WitsProtest to #WitsFeesMustFall was a collective decision of some Wits SRC members with “younger comrades” in order to address the lack of traction their online campaign had gained in early October. Dropping the identifier “Wits” eventually signaled that what used to be a Wits-specific campaign had now become national.

The #FeesMustFall Network A Distributed, Multi-nodal, and Flat Network #FeesMustFall gained rapid traction when the nationwide shutdown of universities started in the wake of the National Transformation Summit on October 19, and #FeesMustFall became the trending hashtag on Twitter. The prevalence of the hashtag and surge in tweeting #FeesMustFall is, however, not so much due to any one specific tweeter or influencer’s tweet volume. Figure 5.2 shows that among the top 10 #FeesMustFall tweeting tweeters of October 2015 the overall volumes are moderate. Moreover, among the top ten are six major news media houses, including the television network eNCA, online Afrikaans news platform Netwerk24, the radio stations and online news platforms of EWN, Jacaranda News, Power987, as well as the Daily Vox. It also includes the Rhodes University

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

117

Top 10 tweeƟng tweeters ewnreporter JacaNews Power987News Sanchlet Netwerk24Berig oppianpress zimleague Mbalings eNCA thedailyvox 0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Fig. 5.2 Top 10 tweeting tweeters (Source HSRC, 2021. Note Data generated by Mecodify on 11 March 2020; N = 62,191)

student newspaper Oppidan Press, as well as accounts of two prominent social justice student journos cum activists. When looking at more in-depth engagement on Twitter, we find that the top 10 tweeters with the highest number of mentions (mentions of their handles in the tweets of others) still include several mainstream media houses and publications like eNCA, City Press, The Cape Argus, and the youth online news portal Daily Vox. It also includes prominent journalists, TV news anchors, and radio hosts like Redi Tlhabi, DJ Fresh, and DJ Sbu (circled in red below in Fig. 5.3). In addition, central to #FeesMustFall engagement online are the handles of UCT’s campus movement, @RhodesMustFall and the University of Pretoria’s (UP) @TuksUprising as well as those of several SRCs (especially of Wits, UP, UJ, UCT, Rhodes University, and UWC) (circled in yellow below). It can be expected that @WitsSRC would be at least as prominent in the network had it not been discontinued and the data lost. The major mainstream media houses noted above as well as other prominent journalists can all be found in the top 50 list of users with the highest degree centrality in the #FeesMustFall social media network (compare Fig. 5.3). Figure 5.3 visualizes the #FeesMustFall social network of October 2015 by the degree centrality of Twitter users. Degree centrality measures

118

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

Fig. 5.3 Network of degree centrality by mentions of #FeesMustFall Twitter users (Source HSRC, 2021. Note Data generated by Mecodify, analysed in Kum u.io, 11 March 2020; N = 62,191)

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

119

Fig. 5.4 Campus-specific #FeesMustFall-related Tweets in October 2015 (Source HSRC, 2021. Design Dineo Luescher; Note Data generated by Mecodify between August 2018 to March 2020; Key CPUT = Cape Peninsula University of Technology; CUT = Central University of Technology; DUT = Durban University of Technology; NMU = Nelson Mandela University; NWU = NorthWest University; RU = Rhodes University; SMU = Sefako Makgatho University; SPU = Sol Plaatje University; SU = Stellenbosch University; TUT = Tshwane University of Technology; UCT = University of Cape Town; UFH = University of Fort Hare; UFS = University of the Free State; UJ = University of Johannesburg; UKZN = University of KwaZulu Natal; UL = University of Limpopo; UMP = University of Mpumalanga; UNISA = University of South Africa; UP = University of Pretoria; UWC = University of the Western Cape; UV = University of Venda; VUT = Vaal University of Technology; WITS = University of the Witwatersrand; WSU = Walter Sisulu University. No data: Mangosuthu University of Technology; University of Zululand)

120

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

the number of connections that a Twitter user has with all other users. Handles with a high degree are the local connectors or hubs and thus important influencers within their local network. The SNA shows that there are clusters of users or “Twitter communities” in close proximity. In the upper half of the sphere are major hubs that are external to the movement: the news media organizations (some of which are indicated with a red circle) as well as individual journalists who are mentioned in their tweets (for a detailed analysis see Baillie-Stewart, 2017). The lower half and outer edge of the sphere is dominated by key student movement accounts (like @RhodesMustFall), user accounts of student organizations (like university SRCs and student political organizations like @WitsPYA) and individual activists, students and other users (such as the 2014/15 Wits SRC President @shaeera_k). These two broad clusters are connected directly as well as via civil society organizations’ handles of NGO’s like @equal_education (circled in green) and those of certain political organizations and parties like @MyANC and @DA. Closeness is another SNA metric. It measures the distance each handle is from all other handles in the network. In general, handles with high closeness can spread information more easily to the rest of the network; they usually have high visibility across the network. Our SNA data shows that there is much greater density and closeness in the news organizations’ clusters than among the student movement handles. While there are identifiable nodes in the student community with @TuksUprising and @RhodesMustFall being hubs in the network and leading identifiable Twitter communities—along with some of the SRCs—their respective tweet activity is not leading; rather, the SNA overall indicates a wide, loose and flat network structure with multiple minor nodes and connections (also see Bosch et al., 2020). Overall, the SNA therefore shows with respect to the networked nature of the movement that there was no particular national student movement handle that dominated the sphere but that as far as studentgenerated tweets are concerned, tweets originated from a wide and diverse network involving campus-based movement handles, SRC and other student organizations’ handles, and some prominent individual student Twitter handles. Moreover, even though news media houses played an important role in tweeting #FeesMustFall, they actually account only for a small fraction of all #FeesMustFall tweets. Baillie-Stewart (2017, 131) calculates that less than 1% of all #FeesMustFall tweets originated from

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

121

the 52 major news organizations in South Africa between 15 and 23 October 2015. Tufekci (2017), Castells (2015) and others have argued that the nature of social media tends to produce leaderless movements. In our datasets, there is no sustained evidence for a leaderless movement per se but rather as we observe in the SNA, there were multiple, loosely coordinated, campus-based physical sites and online sites of protest activity where leadership was exerted by SRCs directly, SRC-led formations or student formations established during campus-agitation over the course of 2015 in which SRCs and student political organizations participated (such as RhodesMustFall and OpenStellenbosch). Thus, the loose, wide, and multi-nodal network structure of the #FeesMustFall campaign observed in the SNA actually reflects the loosely coordinated, distributed or federal nature of the student movement in South Africa and institutionbased student governance where multiple student political organizations and campus-based formations seek visibility and leadership, and every institutional SRC guards its own territory closely. #FeesMustFall Trending While there was no particular national leadership core to #FeesMustFall, there were naturally certain universities that were looked to by others and certain activists playing leadership roles in the spotlight as well as behind the scenes within the collective. The success of the campaign required leadership and coordination; decisions were made, statements developed and their release into the public sphere was planned and implemented. Consider the following comment from a former SRC leader at Wits on how they ensured that a new statement would be trending: I remember because we used to write up the statement and we used to wait… We waited till after [the TV shows] Date My Family and Our Perfect Wedding because if you try and trend during that time it’s very difficult because there’s a lot of noise in the system… Then we start to release. And also, when we released statements, we didn’t just release the statements. We would also have our Twitter people ready. (Wits resp 2)

The comment is indicative both of collective decision-making (“we used to write up,” “we waited,” “we released”) as well as leadership (“our Twitter people”). In another interview, these “Twitter people” who were

122

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

on standby to tweet the message far and wide were called the “battalion,” made up of both, students and non-students who would use their personal Twitter handles and campus-specific, campaign and organizational ones in order to reach and teach various constituencies. Part of the learnings from #RhodesMustFall was to encourage a network of live-tweeters to ensure that the student narrative was told from the student perspective in social media and the public news sphere, and not only a narrative constructed by journalists and trolls. As one prominent #RhodesMustFall and #UCTFeesMustFall student live-tweeter recalls: I didn’t even know what live-tweeting was. I didn’t even know that that’s what it was called. But then I just, you know, would document and then I find people say, oh what’s going on? … there was always a sort of contentious thing about documenting FeesMustFall. It was almost, for example, it’s like a war zone journalist. … I mean if you have to run away from stun grenades and stuff, while you are busy tweeting… But I think I was just sort of like more brave. (UCT resp 6)

The uptake of #FeesMustFall by news media houses indicates the success of the distributed leadership of the campaign spread across several campuses. Yet eventually it was the combination of students’ online activism and their offline protesting across all university campuses that ensured that #FeesMustFall was trending in the cyberspace and the students’ fees demand came to trend on the political agenda.

A Social Media Divide in the Movement Landscape? There are over five times more tweets with the (national) #FeesMustFall tag than with all the campus-specific hashtag combined, which shows the national character of the campaign. The structure of the SNA network and the existence of various campus-specific hashtags at the same time supports the argument for a distributed campaign. Looking at the geographical distribution of tweet activity with campus-specific, FeesMustFall and Shutdown-related hashtags made up of 52,892 total tweets, provides a more granular picture overall. The data shows that Twitter activism using campus-specific hashtags was greatly dominated by metropolitan, historically white universities. Particularly, Wits, UCT and Stellenbosch, followed by the University

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

123

of Johannesburg (UJ), UP, the UFS and Nelson Mandela University (NMU). The only historically black university with a sizable campus-campaign footprint during October is UWC, which is the only metropolitan and arguably the most prestigious historically black institution in South Africa. Conversely, some institutions that would have been expected to have much larger footprints in this dataset are almost absent, like the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) and the mega-university UNISA. The most basic pattern visible in the spatial distribution of campusspecific Twitter activity is the difference between traditional universities and universities of technology, and between metropolitan (and mostly historically white) universities and rural (mostly historically black) universities. Several respondents have indicated that the pattern is due to two reasons: First is a choice of platform. Student activists from across various institutions have argued that students enrolled in metropolitan and historically white, traditional universities are more likely to use Twitter to “broadcast their views” than students who attend rural universities and universities of technology, who tend to prefer Facebook (and WhatsApp) (UCT resp 4; UCT resp 5; UV resp 2). For instance, a former SRC member and activist from UV argued that her fellow students “just prefer Facebook; so we give them Facebook” (UV resp 1). The second reason is that networks and capabilities that were established by RhodesMustFall, OpenStellenbosch, and other campus-based decolonization movements earlier in 2015, had developed the capabilities to ensure that #FeesMustFall was trending on Twitter. For instance, a former UCT SRC leader and RhodesMustFall activist argued: In the main the people who were organizing FeesMustFall at UCT were actually the same people that were organizing RhodesMustFall . … And in actual fact, the reason why FeesMustFall was so successful was because in many of the institutions people had already been organizing… And because of the previous organizing, we also now knew each other. (UCT resp 3)

What is true at UCT can also be said of other institutions like the UFS; in contrast, it does not apply to institutions that had no decolonization movements like TUT or UV. Rather, in those institutions, ways of protesting and related information, coordination and mobilization patterns existed in which social media, and particularly Facebook and WhatsApp played some role (but less so Twitter), alongside the traditional

124

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

student political tactics of information and mobilization via mass meetings and by compelling first year residence students to participate in protest action (UFH resp 2, UWC resp 5, UV resp 1). We can thus argue that there is some evidence of a social media divide in the South African student movement. Not a digital divide, but a divide in terms of different social media platforms used as well as the purpose and extent of use of social media in protesting, between the metropolitan and mostly historically white traditional universities on the one hand, and universities of technology and rural, mostly historically black universities on the other hand, in the process of #FeesMustFall. This pattern is also evident when comparing the number of protest events reported in news about the various institutions in our PEA database with the prevalence of tweeting #FeesMustFall and #Shutdown using hashtags amended with campus tags. Figure 5.5 illustrates that several institutions, which are dominating in the Twitter space, especially Wits, UCT, and Stellenbosch, as well as lesser so UJ and the UFS, have a far greater share of tweeting than their share of protest events reported in the news, this despite the dominance of Wits and UCT in particular even in news articles published online by major media houses. Conversely, all universities of technology (including Protest events vs. Tweets 33%

18% 14%

13%

11% 5% 1%

6% 0%

6% 6%

8% 3% 0%

5% 2%

5% 6% 1% 2% 0%

8%

5% 2% 0%

Protest Events

5% 1%

1%

10% 6%

6%7% 2% 0%

3% 0%

TweeƟng

Fig. 5.5 Campus-specific protest events vs. campus-specific tweets (Source HSRC, 2021. Note Tweet data generated by Mecodify between August 2018 and March 2020; Total 51,277 tweets; PEA data generated by authors from 77 sampled news articles. Both databases range from 14 to 26 October 2015 only. Note Data from institutions with N < 0.5% in both categories are omitted)

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

125

metropolitan ones like DUT, TUT and CPUT), and all rural universities (such as Rhodes, UFH, UL, UV and WSU) have actually a greater share of reported protest events than their share in tweeting. A Networked Student Movement: #WitsFeesMustFall et al. While there is evidently a great deal of unevenness in the national character of the Twitter campaign, the #FeesMustFall-related nationwide online and offline protest wave still provides evidence for the transformation of the student movement into a networked student movement, even if various characteristics and implications thereof are more pronounced in some institutions than others. The #WitsFeesMustFall and eventually #FeesMustFall campaign provided the trigger for the institutionally fragmented and politically subordinate post-apartheid student movement to rally together, mobilize and act in a loosely coordinated way across the vast and diverse South African higher education landscape. All this did not occur by happenstance. We have argued above that the SNA of #FeesMustFall did not suggest a leaderless movement but a distributed, multi-nodal network whereby the center of each the node represented an information and communication hub. Correspondingly, our interviews with former student activists suggest a movement formed of multiple, loosely coordinated, campus-based organizational sites and online sites of protest activity. In both cases, leadership was exerted by SRCs directly, SRC-led and oppositional partisan formations or student formations established during campus-agitation over the course of 2015 (such as RhodesMustFall and OpenStellenbosch), in which SRCs and various student political organizations and interest groups participated. As far as online and offline protesting patterns in rural universities and universities of technology are concerned, one must not forget that student protesting in these institutions has become “a recurrent, if not normalized, and frequently violent part of university life” (Luescher et al., 2020, 2). In these institutions, it is also much harder for students to get trending. #WitsFeesMustFall led in the Twitter space, transformed into #FeesMustFall and gathered all support (and spite) it could muster. While for the more well-to-do and “missing middle” students at Wits, UCT, and Stellenbosch, the issue was fee increases ; conversely, for students on financial aid who form the vast majority in rural institutions and universities of technology, FeesMustFall meant the removal of fees altogether.

126

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

On October 8, 2015 @WitsPYA tweeted to its over 8000 followers: Not a chance! #WitsFeesMustFall. @WitsPYA actually commented and quoted thereby a tweet which said: “So our parents must sell their cars and homes because of Wits fees???” The PYA’s tweet—the first tweet that was tagged with #WitsFeesMustFall—was followed in quick succession by several more tweets, some of which only emphatically tweeted the hashtag #WitsFeesMustFall. The Wits campus-specific hashtag #WitsFeesMustFall (in combination with #WitsShutdown) led the student movement-related Twitter space until October 19. After that date, UCT (#UCTFeesMustFall and #UCTShutdown), Stellenbosch (#StelliesFeesMustFall; #StelliesShutdown) and later UJ (#UJFeesMustFall and #UJShutdown) briefly took over. However, none of them came close to the traction that #FeesMustFall as a national campaign gained from October 19. Figure 5.6 also shows that the campus-specific Twitter campaign had several highpoints in October, unlike the national #FeesMustFall campaign. The first small Twitter storm from October 14–16, peaking

Campus-specific #FMF/Shutdown TwiƩer AcƟvity in October 2015 9101 8781 7848

59…

6103

4293 3515

1059

2635 7

12

48

8

9

12

1069

126 13

14

15

16

387

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2… 242 293

280

305 24

25

26

27

28

29

342 321

30

31

Fig. 5.6 Daily Unique Campus-specific #FeesMustFall-related Tweets in October 2015 (Source HSRC, 2021. Note Data generated by Mecodify between August 2018 and March 2020; N = 52,892)

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

127

on its first day, is largely the result of #WitsFeesMustFall trending. The second apex coincides with the national campaign swelling between 19 and 23 October; it is made up of a diversity of campus-specific hashtags representing every public higher education institution in South Africa, including tiny ones like the newly established Sol Plaatje University in Kimberley (with #SPUFeesMustFall and #SPUShutdown). The top ten retweeted tweets of the campus-specific dataset all refer to Wits (#WitsFeesMustFall) and UCT (#UCTFeesMustFall). When excluding from the statistic the outlier tweet by @dounia (compare Bosch et al., 2020), the average number of engagements with the top retweeted tweets is just under 1000 retweets and just over 250 favorites each. That was impressive. The ten most retweeted tweets are also noteworthy for their content and purpose. Four of them are argumentative tweets in that they appeal with different kinds of social justice-related arguments, calling for FeesMustFall to halt class-based or race-based exclusion, specifically as experienced by ‘missing middle’ students. See for example: Retweet if you know someone who left vastity or couldn’t continue studying cos they couldn’t afford the fees #UCTFeesMustFall #FeesMustFall. (@NamAfricanist 19 October 2015) Expensive university fees shut blacks out - the end result, no transformation in the workplace - no economic freedom. #WitsFeesMustFall. (@khayadlanga, 14 October 2015) Applies for NSFAS, gets rejected “sorry, u are not poor enough”. Applies for Wits, gets accepted “But are u rich enough?” #WitsFeesMustFall. (@simply_omhle 14 October 2015)

Thus, in these cases of campus-specific tweets the plight of missing middle students at UCT and Wits is foregrounded. In addition, the other six top retweeted tweets from the campus-specific dataset all document some aspect of protesting at UCT and Wits. As noted earlier, the US tweeter @dounia’s tweet tagged #UCTShutdown was retweeted over 31,000 times with its picture of white student protestors creating a human shield between police and protesting black students at the Rondebosch police station near the UCT campus (see Bosch et al., 2020, for details). Solidarity is also the topic of a top retweeted tweet from Wits that shows Wits campus security personnel supporting the students. In all these

128

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

cases, they broadcast a campus-specific experience into the Twitter-sphere, documenting (and calling for) solidarity and engagement. The stories of protesting on each campus, especially in the more rural universities and the universities of technology, must still be told (for exceptions see: Langa, 2017).

Conclusion Within ten days of the start of the campaign and merely four days of mass mobilization in major centers and across all universities, #FeesMustFall activists achieved a major concession from the South African government. There would be no fee increases for 2016 but the government would seek to fund the universities’ budget shortfalls and establish a commission to investigate the feasibility of fee-free higher education (Heher Commission, 2018). Eventually in December 2017, only weeks ahead of his resignation, an embattled President Zuma announced a new higher education funding policy of fee-free higher education for poor and working-class students, starting from 2018. In addition, several FeesMustFall-related demands, like the insourcing of support workers, were successfully taken up and implemented on several campuses. FeesMustFall thus had an unprecedented policy impact. In this chapter we have explored the online life and offline protesting related to the #FeesMustFall campaign in October 2015, using a multimethods approach and several related datasets. With respect to the online life of FeesMustFall, we have asked what the nature and extent of social media use during October 2015 was, focusing on Twitter; the prevalence of online and offline protesting across different institutions; and the relationship between tweeting #FeesMustFall (and related campus-specific hashtags) and leading, coordinating, and organizing the movement. Our social network analysis of #FeesMustFall has shown several clusters of users or Twitter communities within an overall distributed, multi-nodal and flat network. Interviews with student activists have indicated that this correlated with the flat, distributed or federal organizational structure and leadership of the student movement. A closer analysis using campus-specific hashtags as well as our analysis of online news articles on protest events on the ground has shown the geographically wide distribution of protest action across the entire university landscape. It has also shown the unevenness in tweeting #FeesMustFall, skewed toward the subset of metropolitan, prestigious

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

129

traditional universities. We conceptualized this as a “social media divide” in the movement. Future studies could fruitfully engage more extensively with the content of tweets as well as analyze the use of other social media platforms, including Facebook, WhatsApp, and others, in the course of FeesMustFall. A similar study of the more violent replay of #FeesMustFall in 2016 also remains to be done, as well as comparative work involving networked student movements elsewhere. Finally, research should also be conducted into the “after lives” of student activists themselves in terms of the mental health and wellbeing impact and longer-term biographical impact of their participation in the student movement. Acknowledging Note This work is based on research supported in part by the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa, Grant No. HSD180507326647, and The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Grant No. 1802–05,403. SDG.

References Altbach, P. G. (1991). Student political activism. In International higher education: An encyclopedia (Vol. 1, pp. 247–260). New York: Garland Publishing. Badat, S. M. (2016). Deciphering the meanings and explaining the South African higher education student protests of 2015–16. Pax Academica, 1(1), 71–106. Baillie-Stewart, A. (2017). An exploration of South African news organisations’ #FeesMustFall tweet-activity on the Twitter networked public sphere. Master dissertation, Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University. SUNScholar archive. Bosch, T. (2016). Twitter and participatory citizenship: #FeesMustFall in South Africa. In B. Mutsvairo (Ed.), Digital activism in the social media era (pp. 159–173). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Bosch, T., Luescher, T. M., & Makhubu, N. (2020). Twitter and student leadership in South Africa: The case of #FeesMustFall. In D. Taras & R. Davis (Eds.), Power shift? Political leadership and social media. London: Routledge. Castells, M. (2015). Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the Internet age. Bristol: Polity Press. Cele, M. B. G. (2015). Student politics and the funding of higher education in South Africa: The case of the University of the Western Cape, 1995–2005. Doctoral dissertation, Cape Town: University of the Western Cape. University of the Western Cape archives. Cini, L. (2019). Disrupting the neoliberal university in South Africa: The #FeesMustFall movement in 2015. Current Sociology, 67 (7), 942–959.

130

T. M. LUESCHER ET AL.

Cini, L., & Guzmán-Concha, C. (2017). Student movements in the age of austerity: The cases of Chile and England. Social Movement Studies, 16(5), 623–628. della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2009). Social movements: An introduction. Hoboken: Blackwell. Garrod, N., & Wildschut, A. (2020). How large is the missing middle and what would it cost to fund? Development Southern Africa, 38(3), 484–491. Haffajee, F. (2015). What if there were no Whites in South Africa? Johannesburg: Picador Africa. Heher Commission. (2018). Report of the commission of inquiry into higher education and training to the President of the Republic of South Africa. Johannesburg: Department of Higher Education and Training. Hutter, S. (2014). Protest event analysis and its offsprings. In D. della Porta (Ed.), Methodological practices in social movement research (pp. 335–367). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Koopmans, R., & Rucht, D. (2002). Protest event analysis. In B. Klandermans & S. Staggenborg (Eds.), Methods of social movement research (pp. 231–259). Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. Langa, M. (Ed.). (2017). #Hashtag: An analysis of the #FeesMustFall Movement at South African universities. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR). Lange, M. L., & Luescher, T. M. (2016). Governance. In Council on Higher Education (Eds.), South African higher education reviewed: Two decades of democracy (pp. 105–141). Cape Town: Council on Higher Education. Luescher, T. M. (2018). Altbach’s theory of student activism in the twentieth century: Ten propositions that matter. In J. Burkett (Ed.), Students in twentieth century Britain and Ireland (pp. 297–319). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Luescher, T. M., & Klemenˇciˇc, M. (2017). Student power in 21st-century Africa: The character and role of student organising. In R. Brooks (Ed.), Student politics and protest: International perspectives (pp. 113–127). London: Routledge. Luescher, T. M., Loader, L., & Mugume, T. (2017). #FeesMustFall: An Internetage student movement in South Africa and the case of the university of the Free State. Politikon, 44(2), 231–245. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346. 2016.1238644. Luescher, T. M., Webbstock, D., & Bhengu, N. (Eds.). (2020). Reflections of South African student leaders, 1994–2017 . Cape Town: African Minds Lutz, B. (2017). South African student protests as new imagined communities in the digital age. In D. Lambrechts & P. Fourie (Eds.), Modern state development, capacity, and institutions (pp. 151–169). Cleveland: Sun Press.

5

TWEETING #FEESMUSTFALL: THE ONLINE LIFE AND OFFLINE …

131

Naicker, C. (2016). From Marikana to #feesmustfall: The praxis of popular protest in South Africa. Urbanisation, 1(1), 53–61. https://doi.org/10. 1177/2455747116640434. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2017). The emergence and trajectories of struggles for an ‘African University’: The case of unfinished business of African epistemic decolonisation. Kronos, 43 (1), 51–77. Ntuli, M. E., & Teferra, D. (2017). Implications of social media on student activism: The South African experience in a digital age. Journal of Higher Education in Africa, 15(2), 63–80. Nyamnjoh, A. (2020). Student movement project literature review. University of Cape Town: Unpublished manuscript. Theocharis, Y., Lowe, W., van Deth, J. W., & García-Albacete, G. (2015). Using Twitter to mobilize protest action: Online mobilization patterns and action repertoires in the Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, and Aganaktismenoi movements. Information, Communication and Society, 18(2), 202–220. Tufekci, Z. (2017). Twitter and tear gas: The power and fragility of networked protest. New Haven: Yale University Press.

CHAPTER 6

Movement Leadership in an Era of Connective Action: A Study of Hong Kong’s Student-Led Umbrella Movement Chi Shun Fong and Samson Yuen

Introduction Leadership is important to social movements. Leaders mobilize followers, identify opportunities, organize logistics, frame dissents, sustain protest momentum, and negotiate with those that they seek to challenge. However, these traditional roles of movement leaders have been questioned by a new wave of social movementsthat have swept around the world since the early 2010s. From the Arab Spring revolts to the global Occupy Movement to the Spanish Indignados Movement, while protesters demonstrated against economic and political institutions that

C. S. Fong Department of Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, USA S. Yuen (B) Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_6

133

134

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

they saw as unjust, undemocratic, or corrupt in their respective contexts, they also eschewed the leadership of traditional movement organizations or political parties and instead valorized decentralized protest structures that emphasized individual participation. Though resembling the leaderless protests commonly seen among new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, such organizational features were driven not by ideological imperatives but the rise of digital communication technologies. In many of these movements, social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, played a crucial role in mobilizing protesters, framing their grievances, forging collective identities, and organizing logistics—all of which seem to have overshadowed or even replaced the position of movement leaders. How did the rise of digitally networked protests in physical spaces influence the role of movement leadership? While many scholarly works have looked at how social media facilitate or impede mobilization, much less attention has been paid to its impact on movement leaders and their ability to make strategic decisions in shaping protest trajectories. By studying the student leadership in Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, this chapter discusses how the protest trajectories were shaped by the complex interplay between movement leaders and the digital and spatial milieus, rather than simply by the presence or absence of political opportunities. First, we show how the digitally enabled and networked protests led to the emergence of many informal leaders, blurring the boundary of leadership, and thinning out the authority of formal leaders. Second, we argue how the student leaders were constrained when making strategic decisions, as they failed to assemble the mandate of the mass from various protest sites and online communities. Our findings demonstrate that the formation of movement leadership and their decision-making capacity can be both adversely affected by digitally networked activism. The chapter will proceed as follows. We first review the scholarship on movement leadership and those concerning the impact of social media on contentious politics. After establishing the importance to examine the role of leadership in digitally networked protests, we proceed to the case of the Umbrella Movement to analyze (1) how formal student leaders coexisted with informal leaders that had arisen in the digitally and spatially connective milieus; and (2) how they made and legitimized strategic decisions in several critical junctures, responding to the demand of the protestors in both online and offline terrain. We conclude by reflecting on the relationship of movement leaders and participants in contemporary protests.

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

135

Movement Leadership under Connective Actions Leadership is an understudied area in social movement research. In the extant literature on social movements, despite the recognition on the pivotal role of movement leaders throughout the mobilization process, there is an inherent tendency to relegate leadership to a dependent or indirect variable that merely expresses structural, cultural, or rational imperatives (Aminzade et al., 2001). The emergence and outcome of social movements are often seen as results of political opportunities, shared meanings, or rational calculations, during which leaders play no more than an instrumental role in enforcing these imperatives. On the other hand, social movement literature also tends to work with narrow definitions of leaders. Leaders are typically seen as people who wield authority in movement organizations, those recognized by movement participants or the public as such, or simply those whom movement scholars have judged to be so (DeCesare, 2013). Research on movement leadership, though limited, has addressed some of these theoretical issues and told us why it deserves attention. First, many of these works have posited that leaders are not merely enforcers of structural, cultural, and rational imperatives. They are instead “powerful pacesetters” that have an independent impact on the course and outcome of social movements (Aminzade et. al, 2001; Barker et al., 2001; Morris & Staggenborg, 2004), which goes beyond that of their charismatic public persona. Leaders played important roles in different stages of the mobilization process. They identify, capture, and even create political opportunities, which are not always easy to spot or readily available (Oberschall, 1973). They create frames to crystallize grievances, attribute blames to specific actors, and offer solutions for problems (Snow et al., 1986). They motivate participants by creating and sustaining collective identities (Melucci, 1996), and by devising media strategies to attract public support. Ganz (2000) argues that leadership matters because it enables movement organizations with poor resources to achieve successful outcomes by utilizing their life experience, networks, and repertoires of collective action. Aminzade et al. (2001) further argue that different types of leadership actions and styles are crucial for mobilizing movements even if structural conditions are ripe and that the variations of these actions and styles can help to explain different movement outcomes. Thus, Morris and Staggenborg (2004) call for the need to examine both the structural

136

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

conditions for social movements and how leaders make a difference within the structural contexts. Second, these studies have significantly expanded the conceptualization of leadership. Leaders are no longer regarded only as those who hold visible, formal positions at movement organizations. Multiple types or levels of leadership often exist. In the Civil Rights Movement, women organizers are found to have played prominent leadership roles though they did not hold formal positions (Barnett, 1993). Robnett (1996) and Herda-Rapp (1998) further show that women served as “bridge leaders” or “informal leaders” that connected movement organizations with local communities, and also existing leaders with potential ones. Ganz (2000) shows the benefits of having what he termed “leadership teams,” which, by combining inside and outside leaders, encourage collaboration and deliberation in movements. To reduce the organizational bias in identifying leaders, DeCesare (2013) calls for an interpretive approach that treats any individual who is perceived as one by any actors as a leader. On the other hand, seeing the difficulty to find a common definition of leaders, Earl (2007) proposes to unpack the concept of leadership by focusing on leadership tasks rather than leaders, which would make comparisons easier. Although we agree that leaders should be conceptualized more broadly, we disagree with overstretching the conceptual boundary of leaders as abovementioned. Individual leaders—their qualities, style, and choices—still matter considerably. Preserving the analytical category of leaders and demarcating their conceptual boundary helps to examine the impact of their agency. Here, we follow Morris and Staggenborg (2004, 171) to define leaders as “strategic decision-makers who inspire and organize others to participate in social movements,” which have the actual power, recognized by at least a significant group of participants, to make decisions that influence the course and outcomes of movements.

How Movement Leadership Emerges and Acquires Authority The importance of leadership opens up a key theoretical puzzle that has yet been adequately addressed: How do leaders emerge in movements? Extant literature has shown that organizational structures, political opportunities, and cultural contexts, all influence the emergence of leaders (Freeman, 1972; Morris & Braine, 2001). However, although these

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

137

works provide some answers, it still begs the question of how leaders gain legitimacy from participants. Movement participants are far from an unreflective mass that willingly cedes authority to leaders as they emerge. As Barker et al. (2001, 16) argue, “[t]he ‘elevation’ of individuals and groups into leadership roles is always, in principle, provisional and situational, […] Leadership as a relationship engages the ‘led’ in constant evaluation, such that their agreement and even simple attention are conditional and inherently fragile.” It is therefore important to examine more closely how they interact with participants in the early stages of social movements. This points to another question of how leaders maintain authority and exercise their agency to direct movements. This is crucial because movements consist of “segmented contentious entities” (Melucci, 1996) or “heterogeneous participants” (Diani, 2009) from multiple networks. While it is possible that leaders would build bureaucratic and oligarchic organizations that estrange the masses, it is more likely that leaders engage in dissension among themselves and face difficulties in cohering movement participants (Mondros et al., 1994). Factional strife and frame disputes are commonplace, and yet the extant studies have told us little about how leaders resolve conflicts and differences, or how the failure of which can adversely impact movements. Echoing Melucci (1996), Robnett (2013) thus calls for a relational perspective to study movement leadership, which focuses on the relation of power in between leaders and between leaders and participants—namely, how leaders emerge and acquire authority, how different types of leaders coexist, and how they interact with one another as well as with movement participants. Adopting this perspective, leadership is thus a contested and dialectical process, which in turn has an enormous impact on leaders’ strategic decisionmaking capacity and the outcomes of movements.

Movement Leadership in an Era of Connective Action The above theoretical issues deserve greater attention particularly in light of the rise of social media in recent social movements. Characterized by Castells (2015) as “networked social movements,” these protests, which were often triggered spontaneously by indignation, occurred through the hybridity of occupied urban spaces and online social networks, forming a “space of autonomy” that undermine the need for formal leadership. A large body of literature has shown how social media can contribute

138

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

to both the mobilization and inhibition of protests (Earl et al., 2013; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Hussain & Howard, 2013; Ogan & Varol, 2017; Theocharis et al., 2015). However, it remains unclear how social media has influenced the role of movement leadership. Bennett and Segerberg tackle this puzzle in The Logic of Connective Actions (2013). In this seminal work, the authors characterize the recent wave of digitally enabled protests around the globe as “crowd-enabled connective actions,” which are contrasted with the conventional “organization-centred and brokered collective actions.” The connective action logic is predicated on the adjoining of individual actors and their personalization of frames through social media, which makes it easier for them to participate in protests without strong organizational ties or formal organizations. By activating online and offline networks, digitally enabled connective action can scale up protests and build up repertoires quickly. In contrast, collective action relies on building a shared sense of collective identity frames, a process in which formal organizations and leaders remain central. In between these two action logics lies a hybrid mode, termed as “organizationally led connective actions,” which involves loosely tied networks of organizations that refrain from projecting strong agenda or leadership but instead sponsor multiple actions and invite followers to personalize their engagement on their own terms. These conceptualizations help to theorize the varying degree to which social media serves as an organizational principle in protest actions. However, while they have opened new theoretical directions for understanding the varied impact of social media on the organizational process of protests, less has been discussed on how these logics coexist and interact in the same action space. As Bennett and Segerberg (2013, 48–49) themselves note, “[i]n reality, the three forms of network organization interact and overlap, and various tensions may arise when they come into conflict.” One common conflict, they note, involves “conventional political organizations deliberately being forced out, being relegated to background roles, or otherwise being marginalized by the crowd” (2013, 49). Indeed, in many recent protests, conventional movement organizations and leadership often coexisted in the same space with offline and online crowds mobilized through the social media. This is particularly the case for protests under authoritarian contexts which sought to promote democratic reforms or topple dictators, where movement organizations and

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

139

leaders served an important functional role in devising movement strategies, negotiating with the authorities, or charting the post-revolutionary system. This brings us back to the relations of power between movement leaders and participants. While participants are not always the loyal and obedient followers of movement leaders, the rise of social media and the connective action logic in social movementshave further problematized and distanced their relationship. Given the coexistence of the collective and connective action logics in the same protest space, how do movement leaders interact with the digitally mobilized crowds and their various constituent groups? How do crowds, empowered by the connective logic, affect the formation process of the movement leadership and its decision-making capacity toward achieving movement goals?

Student Leadership in Hong Kong Umbrella Movement Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement in 2014 provides an illustrative case to examine how movement leadership operated within a connective environment. Erupted spontaneously in reaction to police violence, the pro-democracy movement deviated radically from its original plan (proposed by Occupy Central with Love and Peace—hereafter OCLP) and instead became a protracted street occupation. For 79 days, protesters occupied the streets in several city centers, building barricaded tent villages while calling for universal suffrage to elect the city’s leader. At first glance, given its physical semblance to the global occupy protests, one may characterize the movement as the manifestation of “connective actions.” However, as Lee and Chan (2018) observe, the Umbrella Movement differed from connective actions in two important ways: first, the movement was not entirely spontaneous in that large-scale civil disobedience was pre-announced and carefully planned; second, it had a certain degree of central leadership, a feature of conventional collective actions. Thus, Lee and Chan consider the movement as “a case in which connective actions generated through bottom-up processes intervened into a collective action with central leadership” (2018, 19). In this process, as they observe, “connective actions both empower the movement and generate tensions” (2018, 19). The interplay between collective and connective actions in the Umbrella Movement provides an interesting case to observe how a formal

140

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

movement leadership interacts with digitally connected crowds. Focusing on the student leaders will be particularly useful, since they were leaders on the one hand and active users of social media on the other. To capture these interactive dynamics, this chapter uses process tracing to unpack the interactions between online and offline public opinions and examined when and how does the perceived change in public opinion shape the decision-making process and strategies of movement leaders. Process tracing is “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case” (Bennett & Checkel, 2014, 9). To do that, we rely on several data sources. First, we conducted participant observations during various episodes of public deliberation between the formal and informal leaders, including onsite mini forums and chit-chatting between organizers and occupants. This was enabled by the fact that one of the authors was a core member of the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), a leading organization of the movement. He participated in many internal meetings of the leading organizations and was also one the representatives of HKFS in the occupied area of Admiralty. Second, we studied the online opinions that correspond to strategic actions or inactions adopted by the movement leaders. In particular, we focused on the Facebook page of three major leading organizations, namely, HKFS, Scholarism, and OCLP, which served as a communication channel between netizens and the leadership (Lee & Chan, 2018). The authors went through all posts from the three channels and their comments, from 26 September 2014, the very start of the movement, till its end, 15 December 2014. Third, we examined published materials related to the movement, such as press interviews with leaders and their speeches in talks and seminars related to the movement. The inclusion of a variety of sources is intended to provide a rich description of the multifaceted interactions between protest leaders and their constituencies in a connective space, and second, to trace the sequence of decision-making process for verifying our argument.

Formation of the Student Leadership Under a Decentralized Structure The Umbrella Movement officially began on the night of 28 September 2014, when protesters firmly held their ground against riot police who were instructed to remove them from the streets with tear gas and baton.

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

141

Yet, these protesters had been gathering around the government headquarters (GHQ) for two days to call for the release of dozens of students, who were either arrested or detained in a surprise action to storm the GHQ forecourt on 26 September 2014. Despite the firing of tear gas and rumors that the police might deploy live ammunitions, indignant citizens flocked to the streets throughout the night. They also began to occupy other city centers, including Mongkok, Tsim Sha Tsui, and Causeway Bay. By the early hours of 29 September 2014, riot police were forced to withdraw as they were outsized by the defiant crowds. The improvised protest had gone beyond the highly choreographed plan devised under the OCLP, which merely aimed to occupy one of the streets in Central District for a brief period of time as an act of civil disobedience. The Umbrella Movement, as the protest came to be known, also differed from this campaign in that the street occupation was an entirely improvised and decentralized action, instead of under a central command. Many protesters who poured into the streets regarded themselves as selfmobilized rather than being mobilized by the OCLP campaign, or even any organizations. The slogan “no central command, only the masses,” which later became a modus operandi among the protesters, epitomized such sentiments. Many of them had little or no prior protest experience before joining the Movement; they were also not attached to any political parties, traditional social movement organizations (SMOs), or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Cheng & Chan, 2016; Ma, 2020), which was a phenomenon existed a few years before the Umbrella Movement (Cheng, 2016). Empowered by digital communication tools, they created digitally and physically connected networks of self-organized groups in the movement spaces through peer-to-peer messengers such as WhatsApp, FireChat, and Telegram. Many informal leaders emerged from the self-organized groups that were mushrooming in the protest site, such as defence teams, supply stations, and first aid stations, which performed a variety of functional roles—patrolling the frontline, negotiating with the police, allocating supplies, clearing garbage, and recruiting volunteers. Meanwhile, protesters also formed online communities through social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, discussion forums, and citizenbased media sites, which facilitated the sharing of real-time information and the expression of diverse political views (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011; Lee & Chan, 2016a, 2016b). These digital tools allowed them to coordinate logistics for resource mobilization and devise innovative

142

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

micro-repertoires to sustain the decentralized protests (Cheng & Chan, 2016; Snow & Moss, 2014). Despite the decentralized dynamics, the Umbrella Movement was by no means leaderless. Two student groups—HKFS and Scholarism— were quickly identified by the media and a significant proportion of protesters as the leaders of the nascent movement (Cheng & Chan, 2016). Both groups were established student organizations, though with different histories and constituencies. The HKFS was founded in 1958 by student unions of local public universities. Over the years, although campus activism was rare except during the 1970s, the HKFS had played an active role in leading Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protests and mobilizing university students in the post-handover era. Since the early 2000s, numerous HKFS leaders had been arrested for organizing political protests. Scholarism, on the other hand, was founded in 2011 by a group of teenagers, including the young activist Joshua Wong, to oppose the introduction of a national education curriculum, which culminated in the 2012 Anti-National Education Movement. It was the very first political organization established by secondary school students, who had long been politically inactive under their depoliticized learning environment (Leung & Ng, 2004). Often regarded as a “pure” and “moral” force, students are often vanguards of activism pioneering social and political changes. This was no different in Hong Kong, where student mobilizations have been common during major protests. The HKFS and Scholarism quickly gained public attention at the beginning of Umbrella Movement due to their mobilization efforts before its outbreak. They launched a trial occupation on 1 July 2014, and a weeklong class boycott from 22 to 26 September 2014. They also took the lead to storm the GHQ, which sparked the Umbrella Movement. In contrast, the three leaders of the OCLP campaign (the Trio) commanded less legitimacy. They were heavily criticized by protesters and netizens for “hiding behind the students” when they arrived in the occupied area near the GHQ on 27 September. They were even accused of “hijacking the student movement,” after they had declared that the OCLP campaign would be launched in the early morning of 28 September (Cheng & Chan, 2016). Many protesters left the protest site subsequently, even though a veteran activist and a lawmaker by then kneeled to beg them to stay. As such, although students only comprised part of the protesters (Cheng & Chan, 2016), the movement was student-led. An onsite survey

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

143

conducted by Cheng and Chan (2016) revealed that 56.5% and 29.0% of respondents regarded HKFS and Scholarism as the legitimate leader of the movement respectively, while that of OCLP was only 17.7%. As recalled by Chan Kin-Man, a sociology professor and one of the Trio leaders, HKFS had the veto power among the leading organizations and later became the sole leader (Lam, 28 September 2017) of the movement. This accidental outcome added complication to the interplay between collective and connective actions in the Umbrella Movement. Compared with the older Trio leaders, these young student leaders grew up in the Internet era. They were more familiar with social media and consequently took online opinions more seriously when making strategic decisions. This, however, did not mean that there was good communication between the student leaders and the informal leaders who were scattered across the occupied sites, especially in the early stage of occupation. To start with, student leaders did not expect the movement would sustain for 79 days. Warned by the government that a further escalation of useof-force would be possible if the crowd continued to occupy key areas in the city, these leaders devoted most of their time on endless meetings discussing the exigency to avoid a Tiananmen-style crackdown. In such a chaotic situation, they only managed to send a small number of volunteers to station and patrol in the occupied sites. Outnumbered by protesters, these dispatches could hardly gather their voices and redress the grievance of those who felt being abandoned by the formal leaders when student leaders called for a general retreat on 28 September to avoid severe casualties. These student leaders also failed to gather enough support from their constituents. Although Hong Kong’s civil society is relatively robust, mobilization from below has long been weak (Lam, 2004; Ma, 2007, 2008). Take the HKFS as an example: it consisted of student unions of eight local universities and was managed by around 30–40 delegates from these unions, representing more than 90,000 college students in Hong Kong. However, the connection between students and student unions were weak.1 Before the Umbrella Movement, protests initiated by HKFS were often attended by few students (InmediaHK, 3 September 2015. Although they had spent half a year to mobilize their fellow schoolmates 1 One indicator is that the student unions, ranging from the student unions of Lingnan cabinet were appointed by the

low voter turnout in the 2013/2014 sessions of these 14.1 to 25.3%. And no cabinet run for the election for University and City University of Hong Kong. Provisional council of the two student unions.

144

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

and form class boycott committees to create momentum for OCLP, these newly established connections and trust later disintegrated when student leaders bargained with the government (Lai, 4 October 2018). The spontaneous occupation of several city centers resulted in the sudden intervention of connective action logic into a pre-planned collective action, giving rise to a polycentric leadership structure that lasted for the whole movement. Supported by major pro-democracy political partiesand many progressive NGOs, the three leading organizations— HKFS, Scholarism, and the OCLP Trio—focused primarily on framing the movement, developing repertoires, and negotiating with the government, serving as the “management board” of the movement (which was later known as the “Five-party Platform”). Their volunteers, selforganized groups, and the informal leaders, in contrast, performed a variety of daily logistical and housekeeping tasks. This division of labor, despite helping to maintain the order in the occupied area amid the suspension of public services (such as removing thrashes), buried the seed for the subsequent stagnation of the movement. The “management board” could not direct protesters as if they were mere followers in classic collective actions. With the connective action logic in play, participants were better regarded as “shareholders” with varying degrees of ownership of the protest. The formal leaders must, therefore, gain the trust and endorsement from the “shareholders” with voting rights—particularly the anonymous informal leaders from numerous self-organized groups and online communities—when they planned any significant strategic moves. In other words, the legitimacy of formal leaders to speak for the movement was not translated directly into their authority to make strategic decisions. Their decision-making power, instead, was contingent upon the support of self-mobilized informal leaders, who saw themselves horizontally connected to the crowds rather than vertically subordinated to the formal leadership. In the meantime, these informal leaders could hardly devise strategic moves for the whole movement. It was not only because they were excluded from the formal leadership but also because they lacked the legitimacy to represent the majority of the protesters.

Digital Activism and Leadership Responses The student leaders did observe the dynamic of connective action logic at the very beginning. As early as 29 September, HKFS and Scholarism issued a joint statement on their Facebook page (HKFS, 29 September

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

145

2014), saying that the two student bodies would “continue to participate and support the spontaneous occupation of citizens,” and “have begun to communicate with citizens in different occupied sites.” In the next few days, the two student organizations, pro-democracy political parties, and many progressive NGOs set up booths in the three occupied sites to show the symbolic presence of formal leadership. They also organized mini forums from time to time to gather the opinion of protesters. The HKFS even formed chit-chat teams to talk with campers during the midnight in mid-October. The student leaders shifted their focus as of 2 October as the Hong Kong government agreed to engage in a dialogue with the HKFS. Since then, the confrontation had subsided, and they could spend more time and energy on securing gains in the dialogue. However, the “management board” soon discovered that it was not easy to gain the support of their “shareholders.” A series of conflicts epitomized the difficulty. On 3 October, HKFS, Scholarism, and the Trio urged protesters in the Mong Kok occupation zone to retreat after pro-government mobs attacked the encampment there. This call led to a heated debate on their Facebook page and personal account of the formal leaders, attracting thousands of comments. A significant amount of comments criticized these leaders for “abandoning the mass once again” after calling for a general retreat on 28 September. It forced them to withdraw the call within several hours, asking protesters to “stand fast in the currently occupied area” (HKFS, 3 October 2014). Formal leaders also found it hard to persuade protesters to lift the blockage of several passages near the GHQ, when they would like to use this to express their sincerity to negotiate with the government. Many informal leaders regarded the blocked passages as their uncompromisable “properties.” They claimed that student leaders, who had not “shed their blood” to defend the sites, had no legitimacy to force them to leave. Sometimes, even if some of them were convinced, sooner or later, another group of protesters, who had not shown up during the negotiation, would say they were not consulted and had not endorsed the decision. Even worse, factional strife crept into this dynamic. The localist camp, a pro-democracy faction which advocated to preserve Hong Kong’s identity and autonomy, heavily lampooned the student leaders for having no legitimacy to represent the movement because they had called for a general retreat on 28 September (Wong, 1 October 2014). Chin Wan (1 October 2014a), a leading figure of the camp, called the HKFS an “agent of the

146

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

US” (1 October 2014a) and “spy of the (Chinese) communist bandit” (1 October 2014b). On 12 October, HKFS held discussion forums in all three occupied areas, inviting other students to share their thoughts. On his personal Facebook account, Chan (1 October 2014b) rebuked their call as an attempt to reclaim the leadership of the movement and it was “the time of its death,” summoning his followers to obstruct its meeting in Mong Kok. Eventually, the meeting had to be adjourned and became an “interpellation session” of HKFS. They also discredited a few veteran activists and the practice of deliberation by producing flyers and posters and circulating them on Facebook and in the protest sites. Their act created a sense of distrust among moderate and radical protesters and encouraged some protesters to disregard the formal leadership.

Looking for a Way Out On 21 October, a televised dialogue took place between five representatives of the HKFS and five high-ranking government officials. Protesters, who had been expecting to see weakening signs of the government, watched the dialogue on public screens and through their smartphones with excitement. The leading government officials of the talk, the then Chief Secretary Carrie Lam (the current Chief Executive of Hong Kong) did not make any concession on Hong Kong’s political reform, except agreeing to submit a supplementary report to Beijing to reflect what had happened in Hong Kong and the concerns of different sectors. She also agreed to hold a second-round dialogue and to establish a multiparty discussion platform for post-2017 political reform in Hong Kong. By monitoring online opinion, the HKFS confirmed that their fiery performance was welcomed by the majority, and the response of the government, in contrast, had disgruntled the protestors. Although Lam asked the HKFS to call for an end to the street occupation, the HKFS simply ignore her suggestion. After its representatives returned to the Admiralty camp, each of them went on the stage and took turns to criticize the government for not heeding their demands while calling on protesters to carry on with the occupation. To further press the government and counter the government’s claim that the movement was losing support, the formal leaders would like to seek public endorsement. The Trio proposed to hold an “occupied area referendum” in Admiralty on 26 October. There were two motions, both of which served as the counterproposal of what the government had

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

147

offered. First, in the report to be submitted to Beijing, the Hong Kong government must advise Beijing to withdraw its plan for limited democracy announced earlier on 31 August. Second, the multiparty discussion platform proposed by the government must ensure the genuine suffrage of the Legislative Council (LegCo) in 2016 and the Chief Executive in 2017. If the result of the voting was promising, the leaders could further launch a de-facto referendum by asking pro-democracy lawmakers to resign and initiate a by-election. Immediately after its announcement on 24 October, however, the plan was denounced by many protesters as “Admiralty orientated” (excluding the other two protest sites), redundant (all protesters want genuine suffrage), and risky (may be hijacked by pro-government citizens). In response to these challenges, the formal leadership made several revisions on 25 October. Still, the HKFS and Scholarism observed that these revisions failed to appease the netizens. Thus, in the early morning of 26 October, the two student bodies pressed the Trio to halt the plan. Soon after the meeting, the formal leaders announced that the voting would be called off and apologized for their immature planning. This incident suggested that the coexistence of the logic of connective and collective action not only would constrain the decision-making capacities of the formal leadership but would also create splits among the formal leadership. In a later interview, Chan KinMan believed that student leaders were too heavily influenced by online opinion, which made it hard for them to make strategic moves (Lam, 28 September 2017). Since then, the Trio decided to fade out from the movement, and the Trio leaders, Chan Kin-Man and Benny Tai, resumed their teaching duties in late October. After the voting was cancelled, the two student bodies continued to persuade the pan-democrats to support the de-facto referendum. Their rationale and logic were simple. If five pan-democrat legislators (each from one of the five geographical constituencies) resign, it would trigger a Hong Kong-wide by-election, which could serve as an opinion poll reflecting the positions of the Hong Kong citizens on the movement. If pan-democratic candidates won, it would legitimize the movement and press the government to concede. Also, protesters could spend their energy on promoting the rationale of the movement at the community level, instead of wandering in the occupied sites and debating with each other endlessly on the Internet (Wong, 3 November 2014a). Again, this idea did not materialize after weeks of discussion. Pan-democrats and some protesters reckoned this as a risky move because the pan-democrats

148

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

would lose their veto power in the LegCo if they lost the by-election. The two student bodies counter-proposed to trigger the referendum by asking one pan-democrat legislator from the District Council functional constituency to resign, which would allow a majority of voters to cast their votes without risking the loss of veto power. However, the pan-democrats requested the two student bodies to call for an end of the occupation in return, to which they objected. In the meantime, several other attempts of the HKFS failed. The HKFS wrote an open letter to Carrie Lam on 28 October for a second dialogue. It also asked her and two other proBeijing politicians to arrange a direct dialogue with the Beijing leaders. With no positive response from any of them, the HKFS wrote another open letter to Premier Li Keqiang and decided to send three representatives to Beijing the day after. Nonetheless, their travel permit to China was annulled by the Chinese authority when they arrived at the Hong Kong airport and were barred from boarding. These failures frustrated the radical wing of the protesters, who saw the moderate approach of the formal leadership as a sign of being incapable. In the hope of ending the stalemate, agitated protesters began to float the idea of escalation. On 18 November, a netizen wrote on Golden Forum, a popular Internet chatroom, that the LegCo would debate an Internet copyright law, which was widely believed to curtail the freedom of expression and urged others to surround the building on the next day. The post received more than a thousand responses, with some opposing the action and others supporting it. On that night at around 9 pm, masked protesters began to gather at the LegCo in response to the call. Some of them asked the main stage at Admiralty to make a public announcement on escalating the protest but the marshal team opposed them. Nevertheless, the action went ahead as protesters broke the front glass door of the LegCo. Many were arrested after the incident. Some of these militant protesters attributed this failure to the inaction of the main stage and vehemently attacked the marshal team on Facebook for denying them the opportunity to make their voices heard. On the following few days, hundreds of them gathered at Admiralty and protested against the main stage. They called for the disbanding of the marshal team and demanded the two student organizations to take the lead to escalate the protest. Meanwhile, the regime adopted proactive tactics to ignore the demands of the HKFS and wait out the protests (Yuen & Cheng, 2017). At the same time, pro-government elites and businessmen attempted to delegitimize the movement by mobilizing countermovement and filing

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

149

court injunctions to clear the occupied sites. Embracing the principle of civil disobedience, the student leaders find it to hard obstruct the court order, leading to the eviction of the Mong Kok protest site on 25 November 2014 with little resistance. The stalemate pressed the two student bodies to escalate the protest, in response to thousands of comments on their Facebookpage in the next few days (Ho, 17 January 2015). As Alex Chow, Secretary General of HKFS, (InmediaHK, 3 September 2015) put it, “we had no more card to play” when “protester became increasingly anxious and there was no room for further dialogue (with the government).” In the next few days, the HKFS and Scholarism jointly announced an “action finale,” calling protesters to surround the Chief Executive office on 30 November. Despite drawing much attention, the action turned out to be a disaster. Without any strategies or coordination, hundreds of protesters who echoed the call were dispersed by the police by pepper sprays and baton. Many were injured and at least 40 of them were arrested by midnight.

The End of the Umbrella Movement and its Ripples The failure of the “action finale” was disastrous to the movement. The incompetence of the two student organizations disgruntled many protesters and informal leaders in Admiralty, many of which were friendly with them. On the next day, angry protesters and informal leaders removed all barricades of the main stage in Admiralty to express their outrage toward the two student bodies. This event symbolized the complete disarticulation of the protest. To rescue the movement, Joshua Wong and a few members of Scholarism began a hunger strike on the same day, hoping to urge the government to hold another dialogue with the student leaders. The government simply ignored their demand. To fulfil the moral responsibility of civil disobedience, the Trio, in contrast, asked their followers to surrender to the police with them. Their action could not stop the court’s injunction order and the complete crackdown of the two remaining occupied sites of Admiralty and Causeway Bay. Eventually, the two sites were cleared on 11 December and 15 December, marking the end of the Umbrella Movement. The Umbrella Movement ended with severe repercussions. Radical protesters, many of which were college students, were vexed by the inept leadership of the two student organizations, which they blamed for the direct failure of the movement and the heavy casualties on 30

150

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

November. They were further enraged when a misinterpretation of Alex Chow’s quote on Facebook, which purported that the “action finale” on 30 November was purposively mis-planned to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of further escalation. In the following spring semester, under the request of these enraged college students, five university student unions organized referenda to decide whether to remain or leave the HKFS. Four out of five of these student unions decided to leave, including that of the University of Hong Kong, a founding member of the HKFS. That is to say, ironically, HKFS, the most institutionalized leading organization of the movement, was being held accountable because of its incompetent leadership in movement heavily influenced by the connective action logic. More illustratively, the exit campaign itself was facilitated by this very logic. In fact, many exit campaigners were informal leader of the movement who could micro-mobilize their fellows. Some of them had even assisted the HKFS since the pre-movement class boycott (Yan, 25 April 2015). Besides, these exit campaigns were facilitated by social media and were heavily sponsored by online media, such as Passion Times and VJ media, whose member also took part in drumming up these exit campaigns (Mingpao, 17 February 2015).

Concluding Remarks This chapter adopted a relational perspective with the objective to understand how social movement leaders maintain authority and strategize under a connective protest environment. Through the case of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, we argue that while the connective dynamics enabled by social media had helped to sustain the mobilization of pro-democracy protesters on a massive scale, it also produced a large number of informal leaders from the crowds who thinned out the authority of formal leaders during the mobilization process. As the street occupation lingered on, decisions of the formal leaders were increasingly constrained by activities and sentiments on social media platforms. This became obvious as student leaders began to come up with strategies to end the street occupation after seeing the diminishing chances of gaining government concessions and the decline in public support. Ironically, despite their objective to create conditions for retreat, these efforts inadvertently boomeranged toward the direction of escalation. During this process, formal leaders faced constant challenges from the digitally connected protest crowds and the informal leaders, which constrained

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

151

their options as they sought to maintain their support. The challenges were often mounted by movement radicals who might not appreciate the threats in the field and the difficulties in negotiating with the local government. Although these online opinion leaders and their onsite supporters might have lacked decision-making legitimacy, they enjoyed a veto power that was conferred to them through the connective protest logic. As both parties lack the capability to direct the movement, stalemate was inevitable when the government adopted a strategy of attrition. Our findings highlight the importance of revisiting leadership dynamics of social movements in the Internet era. Although leaders have maintained their relevance in the digitally enabled protests today, their relationship with protesters have changed radically. Movement leaders are no longer “commanders” of protesters who follow their orders. They serve more as the “management board” with the protesters being their “shareholders” who constantly question their legitimacy and have the ability to veto their decisions. Therefore, movement leadership and its organizational, spatial, and temporal dynamics should be seen as an interweaving process. This process constrains movement leaders’ available options and shapes their perception of legitimate constituencies, which seems to be more relational and contingent than the mainstream literature has suggested. It also suggests that trajectories of protest in the contemporary era cannot be explained simply by the presence or absence of political opportunities but must be understood through looking at the complex interplays between movement leadership, informal leaders, ordinary protesters, and the digital as well as spatial milieus over time.

References Aminzade, R., Goldstone, J. A., & Perry, E. J. (2001). Leadership dynamics and dynamics of contention. In R. Aminzade (Ed.), Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics (pp. 126–154). Cambridge University Press. Barker, C., Johnson, A., & Lavalette, M. (2001). Leadership and social movements. Manchester University Press. Barnett, B. M. (1993). Invisible southern black women leaders in the civil rights movement: The triple constraints of gender, race, and class. Gender & Society, 7 (2), 162–182. Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26(1), 611–639. Bennett, A., & Checkel, J. T. (2014). Process tracing: From metaphor to analytic tool. Cambridge University Press.

152

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2011). Digital media and the personalization of collective action: Social technology and the organization of protests against the global economic crisis. Information, Communication & Society, 14(6), 770–799. Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2013). The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics. Cambridge University Press. Castells, M. (2015). Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the internet age. Wiley. Cheng, E. W. (2016). Street politics in a hybrid regime: The diffusion of political activism in post-colonial Hong Kong. The China Quarterly, 226, 383–406. Cheng, E. W., & Chan, W. Y. (2017). Explaining spontaneous occupation: Antecedents, contingencies and space in the umbrella movement. Social Movement Studies, 16(2), 222–239. Chin, W. (2014a, October 12). HKFS is the agent of the pan-democrats, leftwing activism and the US. Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/wan.chin. 75/posts/10152713686292225. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Chin, W. (2014b, October 12) Today 3 o’clock is the death of HKFS. Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/wan.chin.75/posts/10152712104852225. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. DeCesare, M. (2013). Toward an interpretive approach to social movement leadership. International Review of Modern Sociology, 39(2), 239–257. Diani, M. (2009). The structural bases of protest events: Multiple memberships and civil society networks in the 15 February 2003 Anti-war demonstrations. Acta Sociologica, 52(1), 63–83. Earl, J. (2007). Leading tasks in a leaderless movement: The case of strategic voting. American Behavioral Scientist, 50(10), 1327–1349. Earl, J., Hurwitz, H. M., Mesinas, A. M., Tolan, M., & Arlotti, A. (2013). This protest will be tweeted: Twitter and protest policing during the Pittsburgh G20. Information, Communication & Society, 16(4), 459–478. Earl, J., & Kimport, K. (2011). Digitally-enabled social change: Activism in the internet age. MIT Press. Freeman, J. (1972). The tyranny of structurelessness. Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 2(1), 151–164. Ganz, M. (2000). Resources and resourcefulness: Strategic capacity in the unionization of california agriculture, 1959–1966. American Journal of Sociology, 105(4), 1003–1062. Herda-Rapp, A. (1998). The power of informal leadership: Women leaders in the civil rights movement. Sociological Focus, 31(4), 341–355. Ho, G. (2015). The escalation of 1130: An action without hero (3). The Standnews. https://www.thestandnews.com/politics/%E9%87%8D%E7% B5%841130%E5%8D%87%E7%B4%9A-%E5%9C%A8%E6%B2%92%E6%9C%

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

153

89%E8%8B%B1%E9%9B%84%E7%9A%84%E8%A1%8C%E5%8B%95%E8%A3% 8F-%E4%B8%8B/. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Hong Kong Federations of Students (HKFS). (2014). Statement of HKFS on mob attack and police law enforcement in Mong Kok and Causeway Bay. Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/hkfs1958/photos/a.433111302 871/10152478720577872/?type=3&theater. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Hong Kong Federations of Students (HKFS) and Scholarism. (2014, September 29). The occupation is blossoming everywhere. Facebook, https://www.fac ebook.com/hkfs1958/photos/a.433111302871/10152470384422872/? type=3&theater. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Hussain, M. M., & Howard, P. N. (2013). What best explains successful protest cascades? ICTs and the fuzzy causes of the Arab spring. International Studies Review, 15(1), 48–66. Independent media (InmediaHK). (2015). Alex Chow: The defunction of movement leadership. Independent Media, http://www.inmediahk.net/node/103 7169. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Lai, C. Y. (2018). Ivan Law: We should pay more attention to communication in protest sites. Independent Media, http://www.inmediahk.net/node/105 9812. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Lam, L. (2017). The difficult dialogue during the occupation. Citizen News, https://www.hkcnews.com/article/7214/%E9%99%B3%E5%81%A5%E6% B0%91-%E9%9B%A8%E5%82%98%E9%81%8B%E5%8B%95-%E4%BD%94% E4%B8%AD%E4%B8%89%E5%AD%90-7222/%E4%BD%94%E9%A0%98% E4%B8%8B%E7%9A%84%E8%89%B1%E9%9B%A3%E5%B0%8D%E8%A9% B1%EF%BC%9A%E9%99%B3%E5%81%A5%E6%B0%91%E9%A6%96%E5% BA%A6%E6%86%B6%E8%BF%B0%E8%88%87%E6%9E%97%E9%84%AD%E3% 80%81%E5%AD%B8%E8%81%AF%E6%BA%9D%E9%80%9A. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Lam, W. M. (2004). Understanding the political culture of Hong Kong: The paradox of activism and depoliticization. New York: ME Sharpe. Lee, F. L. F., & Chan, J. M. (2016a). News media, movement organization, and collective memory mobilization in Tiananmen commemoration in Hong Kong. Media, Culture & Society, 38(7), 997–1014. Lee, F. L. F., & Chan, J. M. (2016b). Digital media Activities And Mode Of Participation In A Protest Campaign: The case of the umbrella movement. Information, Communication & Society, 19(1), 4–22. Lee, F. L. F., & Chan, J. M. (2018). Media and protest logics in the digital era: The umbrella movement in Hong Kong. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leung, Y. W., & Ng, S. W. (2004). Back to square one: The ‘Re-depoliticizing’ of civic education in Hong Kong. Asia Pacific Journal of Education, 24(1), 43–60.

154

C. S. FONG AND S. YUEN

Ma, N. (2007). Political development in Hong Kong: State, political society, and civil society. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Ma, N. (2008). Civil society and democratization in Hong Kong paradox and duality. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 4(2), 155–175. Ma, N. (2020). Rude awakening: New participants and the Umbrella movement. In N. Ma & E. W. Cheng (Eds.), The umbrella movement: Civil resistance and contentious space in Hong Kong (pp. 77–98). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Melucci, A. (1996). Challenging codes: Collective action in the information age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mingpao. (2015). Long hair kneeled to beg protesters to stay. Mingpao, https:// news.mingpao.com/pns/%E6%B8%AF%E8%81%9E/article/20150217/s00 002/1424109745103/5%E5%A4%A7%E5%AD%B8%E7%8F%BE%E3%80% 8C%E9%80%80%E5%87%BA%E5%AD%B8%E8%81%AF%E3%80%8D%E9% 97%9C%E6%B3%A8%E7%B5%84. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Mingpao. (2015). Exit HKFS concern groups formed in five universities. Mingpao, https://news.mingpao.com/ins/%E6%B8%AF%E8%81%9E/art icle/20150928/s00001/1443071895913/%E3%80%90%E4%BD%94%E9% A0%98%E5%AF%A6%E6%99%82%E5%9B%9E%E6%9C%9B%E3%80%919-28% E5%87%8C%E6%99%A83%E6%99%8230%E5%88%86-%E8%B3%AA%E7%96% 91%E4%BD%94%E4%B8%AD%E9%A8%8E%E5%8A%AB%E5%AD%B8%E7% 94%9F%E9%81%8B%E5%8B%95-%E7%BE%A4%E7%9C%BE%E7%B4%9B% E9%9B%A2%E5%A0%B4-%E9%95%B7%E6%AF%9B%E8%B7%AA%E6%B1% 82%E7%95%99%E5%AE%88. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Mondros, J. B., Wilson, S. M., & Wilson, S. (1994). Organizing for power and empowerment. New York: Columbia University Press. Morris, A., & Braine, N. (2001). Social movements and oppositional consciousness. In J. Mansbridge & A. Morris (Eds.), Oppositional consciousness: The subjective roots of social protest (pp. 20–37). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Morris, A. D., & Staggenborg, S. (2004). Leadership in social movements. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to social movements (pp. 171–196). Hoboken: Wiley. Oberschall, A. (1973). Social conflict and social movements. Hoboken: Prentice Hall. Ogan, C., & Varol, O. (2017). What is gained and what is left to be done when content analysis is added to network analysis in the study of a social movement: Twitter use during Gezi Park. Information, Communication & Society, 20(8), 1220–1238. Robnett, B. (1996). African-American women in the civil rights movement, 1954–1965: Gender, leadership, and micromobilization. American Journal of Sociology, 101(6), 1661–1693.

6

MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP IN AN ERA OF CONNECTIVE ACTION …

155

Robnett, B. (2013). Leadership. In D. A. Snow, D. Della Porta, B. Klandermans, & D. McAdam (Eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell encyclopedia of social and political movements. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. Snow, D. A., & Moss, D. M. (2014). Protest on the fly: Toward a theory of spontaneity in the dynamics of protest and social movements. American Sociological Review, 79(6), 1122–1143. Snow, D. A., Rochford Jr, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. American Sociological Review, 51(4), 464–481. Theocharis, Y., Lowe, W., Van Deth, J. W., & García-Albacete, G. (2015). Using Twitter to mobilize protest action: Online mobilization patterns and action repertoires in the occupy wall street, Indignados, and Aganaktismenoi movements. Information, Communication & Society, 18(2), 202–220. Wong, J. (2014). Why Umbrella movement need a territorial-wide resignreferendum. Independent Media, http://www.inmediahk.net/node/201 41103a. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Wong, Y. T. (2014). No organizers but the masses. Civic Passion. Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/passiontimes/photos/a.422169814512858/ 766209933442176/?type=3&theater. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Yan, T. L. (2015). After Exiting HKFS, interviewing alex chow and Ng Ka Wai. Pentoy, https://www.pentoy.hk/%e8%a9%95%e5%8f%b0%e5%b0%88%e8%a8% aa%e9%80%80%e8%81%af%e4%b9%8b%e5%be%8c%ef%bc%8c%e9%82%84%e8% a6%81%e8%aa%aa%e7%9a%84%e6%98%af-%e8%a8%aa%e5%95%8f%e5%91%a8% e6%b0%b8. Accessed 7 Aug 2020. Yuen, S., & Cheng, E. W. (2017). Neither repression nor concession? A regime’s attrition against mass protests. Political Studies, 65(3), 611–630.

CHAPTER 7

From the Classrooms to the Roofs: The 2010 University Researchers’ Movement in Italy Gianni Piazza

Introduction During the economic and financial crisis following the 2008 credit crunch, the higher education systems of many countries have been harshly affected by governments’ policies, both conservative and progressive, characterized by budget cuts, increases in tuition fees and neoliberal, private-oriented reforms. In opposition to these policies, a global wave of protests has arisen in several countries around the world, both in advanced and developing economies (Brooks, 2016; Klemencic, 2014; della Porta et al., 2020), defending the right to an education accessible to everyone, and contrasting the corporatization, marketization, and privatization processes of universities (Cini, 2019; Piazza, 2018). In Italy too,

The previous versions were presented in 2011 at the ECPR GC in Reykjavik and at the SISP meeting in Palermo. G. Piazza (B) University of Catania, Catania, Italy © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_7

157

158

G. PIAZZA

these mobilizations involved not only the students, but also other actors in higher education such as professors, precarious researchers and those with tenure, hired with a permanent position (the latter from here on will be simply termed “researchers”).1 During 2010, Italian researchers mobilized against the “reform” proposed by the then Education Minister Gelmini, contesting the centerright Berlusconi Government policy’s programme of dismantling the public higher education system. The researchers protested in defense of public state universities and of the rights of students and other education workers, opposing the new recruitment system and proposing an alternative university reform. The emergence of the researchers’ movement in the spring, to which was added the student mobilization in the fall, undoubtedly represented a novelty for Italian academia, because the students and precarious researchers alone had previously mobilized (Caruso et al., 2010; Curcio, 2010). In fact, most researchers were not unionized or accustomed to protest before this mobilization. Nevertheless, they were able to give rise to a movement, building coalitions with students and other university categories, creating a networked organization and inventing new forms of protests. Although the researchers failed to prevent the approval of the Gelmini Bill, they were nevertheless able to attract media attention and influence the public and political agenda. In this chapter, I focus on the 2010 researchers’ movement and, in particularly, on its main organization, the Rete29Aprile-R29A (April29Network), an informal networked organization which “had a decisive role in the organization of the protest against the Gelmini Bill … building projects and concrete actions with the students’ movement and the galaxy of precarious researchers” (Maida, 2011b, xi). The study was carried out applying the analytical toolkits of social movement studies, because the R29A, in 2010, could not “be fully understood with the category of advocacy groups: its kind of engagement, structure, functioning and resources are closer to those of social movements” (Selva, 2011, 155). I therefore focus mainly on the networked organizational structure and the repertoires of action of the R29A, trying to answer some of the questions posed in this book’s introduction, although these refer to researchers and not to students. Considering the dilemma over the tactical/strategic repertoire adopted in collective action, I ask whether the Italian researchers used contentious or conventional forms of action. Did they opt for disruptive and/or more conventional forms of action? Considering strategic dilemmas concerning organizational forms, were

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

159

they more inclined to adopt a formalized or informal organizational model? Also, what were the researchers’ reasons for their choice? In a nutshell, how did they do politics? Did they prefer conventional union politics based on representative democracy or unconventional movement politics inspired by participatory democracy (della Porta, 2009), and why? In what follows, I will first discuss theories, concepts, and frameworks from social movement literature to be applied to the empirical case. Then, after a short methodological section, I will trace the chronology of the researchers’ mobilization during 2010. Subsequently, I will present and discuss the findings on the organizational patterns and repertoires of action used by the researchers. In this section, some controversial issues that later arose within the R29A will also be illustrated and discussed. In the concluding remarks, some considerations will be made on the researchers’ ways of doing university politics.

Theories, Frameworks, and Previous Researches Until the 2010 mobilization, there were no studies on permanent researchers in Italy, because most of them had not been able to collectively organize themselves to improve their condition and/or the university system. According to Cini (2019), one of the main reasons was the personal relation of dependency of researchers on their supervisors, defined as “barons” (Palermo, 2011), the full professors who exerted discretionary power over their career and academic life, due to the “chairbased system” (Cini, 2019, 69). To a degree, this “baronial relation” changed since the early 2000s, due to structural factors that made the full professors’ support useless for the career promotion of researchers, thus making them more independent in academic matters (ibidem, 87– 88). However, the following years showed that this type of relation has not entirely disappeared. The new situation is not in itself sufficient to explain the rise of the researchers’ movement, because resources must be mobilized to transform a condition of discontent into one of collective action. According to the resource mobilization approach, a social group needs “protest entrepreneurs,” individuals and organizations mobilizing resources from the surrounding environment to give rise to a social movement (McCarthy & Zald, 1987, 19). Usually imagined as “bookworms” or else confined to their laboratories, the researchers seemed lacking in resources: they had no money, nor academic power, nor influence within political institutions, nor access to public decision-making. Nevertheless,

160

G. PIAZZA

they were rich in other important resources, such as human and political capital. If researchers had many abilities and cognitive capacities, as scientists, scholars, and experts in different fields (human capital), some of them also had “political capital,” that is “resources in terms of know-how, of the ability to connect individual and collective actors [which] depend on past experiences in parties, trade unions, and social movement organizations” (Piazza et al., 2005, 102). As we will see later, the researchers with political capital (Piazza, 2004) were “protest entrepreneurs,” crucial in giving birth to the movement, in making alliances with other university groups (precarious researchers and students), in proposing the tactics and strategies to adopt, and in creating a new organization, the R29A, which emerged during the anti-Gelmini mobilization. Therefore, the first theoretical focus concerns the organizational model chosen by the mobilizing researchers and the reasons why they adopted it. According to literature, if some activists praise well-structured organizations with relevant resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1987), others distrust them, seeing the process of bureaucratization as limiting the disruptive capacities of protest by co-opting many of its actors (Piven & Cloward, 1977). More recently, della Porta and Diani have introduced the concept of “organizational mode of coordination,” referring to “the ways in which multiple actors connect to each other in complex network patterns” (2020, 159), identifying two basic models: “the professional social movement organization and the participatory movement organization” (ibidem). Since the former are formal, well-structured, legal organizations, with small membership and a professional leadership “speaking for a constituency” (ibidem, 139; McCarthy & Zald,1987, 375), research prior to 2010 in Italy had shown that similar actors— the precarious researchers—preferred this organizational model. In, fact, “in order to succeed as a political organization inside the university, the precarious researchers had to choose a more structured organizing model: (legally) recognized association in Rome, adhesion to a union in Naples” (Curcio, 2010, 134). Nevertheless, there is also another model through which we could explain how permanent researchers organized themselves in 2010: the participatory movement organization model, which has two versions. The first is that of Mass Protest Organization, which “combines attention to participatory democracy with certain levels of formalization of the organizational structure” (della Porta & Diani, 2020, 142); the practices of direct democracy and consensual decision-making are counterbalanced, and sometimes limited, by some degree of formalization and

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

161

centralization, especially when organization members enter representative institutions. The second is the Grassroots Organization that “combines strong participatory orientations with low levels of formal structuration” (ibidem, 143). Depending on the members’ willingness to participate in its activities, such a model is often related to locality, as in the case of environmental groups and citizens’ committees (ibidem; della Porta & Piazza, 2008). The capacity to act with continuity is limited, but sometimes grassroots organizations can be “intermittent structures … that surface each time their issues of concern become salient political topics again” (della Porta & Diani, 2020, 144), or they run the risk of internal conflicts, employing ideological and symbolic incentives (ibidem; McCarthy & Zald, 1987). The findings described and analyzed in the next section will therefore serve to identify which model the researchers chose, or which inspired them, what reasons led them to that organizational model, whether this was due to the contingent phase of mobilization or a lasting choice and, finally, whether these choices were consensual or triggered internal tensions and conflicts. The second theoretical focus concerns the action tactics used by the researchers and the motivations determining their choice, which are strongly associated with the organizational forms, above all the social movement organizations, viewed not only as means for mobilization, but also as spaces of deliberation, value construction, and arenas for experimentation (della Porta & Piazza, 2008, 33). Researchers could have acted, like the students along a continuum between institutional/conventional and disruptive/unconventional forms of collective action (della Porta & Diani, 2020). It is known that students predominantly adopt conventional tactics in normal times, while they use unconventional forms of participation in times of mass mobilization, such as informal assemblies, occupations, and other direct actions (Caruso et al., 2010), and this is not done only to achieve their ostensible goals. In fact, protests should also be viewed in its expressive dimension, because in social movements the means used are closely tied to the desired ends (Jasper, 1997). Protests trigger a sense of collective identity, which is a condition for collective action (Pizzorno, 1993) but also an outcome, as is the case for students’ occupations from the 1960s onward (Ortoleva, 1988), in which a sense of community is generally formed (Fantasia, 1988). This did not seem suitable for

162

G. PIAZZA

the researchers, who we can imagine as more inclined to employ institutional means, such as participation in internal elections and lobbying academic authorities, rather than disruptive tactics, given their average age, career position in university, and lack of tradition of activism and protest. Analyzing the events of the mobilization, we identified what types of tactics they used, if these were only conventional, unconventional, or a mixture of the two, and what logic of action they were generally inspired by: the logic of damage, the logic of numbers, or the logic of bearing witness (della Porta & Diani, 2006, 170–178). Therefore, in trying to answer the questions posed above, I have adapted and modified the theoretical framework outlined in the introduction of this volume by the editors for students to the case of researchers, given the lack of previous studies on the latter. In fact, if we consider that the organizational forms and tactics of action are strictly correlated to each other, we have a continuum between two poles representing two ideal types of ways of doing politics or political activism. On the one hand, we have a pole of “conventional union politics,” in which researchers prefer to act within university institutions by adopting a formal and hierarchical organizational structure—like a union—and conventional forms of action, such as lobbying academic leadership, based on representative democracy. On the other hand, we have a pole of “unconventional movement politics,” in which the preference for an informal and participatory organizational model is linked to unconventional and disruptive tactics, also directed outside the academy, based on direct and participatory democracy as in social movements. The empirical case studied can therefore be placed nearer or farther from one of the two poles. After the analysis and discussion of the research findings, I will identify which model of university politics or political activism the researchers were inspired by, and what reasons led them to adopt it, assuming a link with the political culture of the protest entrepreneurs. In fact, if the promoters and organizers of the researchers’ mobilization came from a unionist or party-political culture more oriented to representative democracy, they were more likely to choose the former, while the latter inspired them if they came from a culture of movement activism oriented to participatory democracy.

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

163

Methods and Sources The reconstruction and the analysis of the researchers’ movement are based on qualitative methodology and on different sources, as well as on previous research (Cini, 2017a, 2019; Selva, 2011; Piazza, 2014; 2018), and records already published by the R29A researchers (Drago, 2012; Maida, 2011a).2 Firstly, I carried out direct participant observation for nearly the whole period of the mobilization, favored by my position within the movement that gave me easy access to information and to internal relational dynamics, taking notes and recording observations and data. I joined the movement in the spring of 2010, first as a participant, and in July I was elected as R29A delegate for Catania University,3 and member of the National Coordination. Between November and December, I participated in “climbing on the roofs” at the Faculty of Architecture in Rome, and in May 2011, I was elected as one of the R29A national spokespersons.4 I then examined the daily press, which chronicled the events of the mobilization and the public discourse of key actors. I selected nine national newspapers of all political orientations (see appendix); the time frame of the data collection was the whole of 2010. Thirdly, I integrated the analysis in the daily press (which was often limited and distorted) with a systematic reading of materials produced by protest actors (documents, press releases, resolutions, flyers, etc.) obtained directly from activists and from their websites (https:// www.rete29aprile.net).

The Chronology of the Mobilization: “riding the Dream” What one activist defined “riding the dream,”5 is the story of a mobilization that grew from a first invisible exchange of emails among a few researchers to the spotlight of national mass media on the roofs of universities. Before 2010, only a few permanent researchers had protested alongside the precarious ones, both against Education Minister Moratti’s Bill in 2004–05 (Piazza, 2014), and against the financial cuts on education in 2008, with the students of the Onda Anomala (Anomalous Wave) movement (Caruso et al., 2010; Piazza, 2018; Piazza & Genovese, 2010), where they indeed played a marginal role (Mula, 2011).6

164

G. PIAZZA

Nevertheless, the researchers who had previously mobilized were the backbone of the rising movement when, in the Senate on 28/10/2009, the Education Minister M.S. Gelmini presented a Bill (DdL 1905/09) aimed at the reorganization of the public university. The Minister presented it as an “epoch-making reform” aimed at introducing “meritocracy” and evaluation for professors, at cutting waste of resources, at contrasting the hiring of relatives, and at favoring young researchers and deserving students (S, 28/10/09). The Bill was inserted in a governmental measure based on drastic financial cuts to universities, and provided for: (a) the entry of private stakeholders in the Management Board, endowed with more powers than the Academic Senate (the representative body); (b) the increased powers of rectors and full professors; (c) the introduction of honor loans for low-income students; (d) a “tenure track” recruitment system with no guarantee of funds; (e) the extinction of the permanent researchers’ role (senior) and the introduction of the new fixed-term researchers (junior).7 This last point was the crucial issue on which senior researchers started mobilizing, as they foresaw that the juniors would be favored in career advancement. In fact, the latter at the end of their contract would enter into competition with the former to become associates and, most likely, would be favored because, if they lost, they would have to leave the university. The researchers framed this issue as a conflict between two equally disadvantaged groups (guerra tra poveri in Italian), juniors vs. seniors, and reacted. On 3/12/2009, the pre-existent researchers’ association CNRU (National Coordination of University Researchers) made a proposal demanding that all researchers should become associate professors, while maintaining the same salary (DCNRU-1). The Gelmini Bill and the CNRU proposal immediately raised a debate among the researchers. If almost all opposed the Minister’s reform, many researchers disagreed with the CNRU proposal because they considered it unfair that they would occupy the same position with a lower salary than those who were already associates (Mula, 2011, 132). Between December 2009 and February 2010, some researchers started to exchange emails in order to discuss the reform Bill, but not only the specific problems of their category. One8 created a website where he published information about the Bill (Selva, 2011, 156) and the documents produced by the university assemblies and academic institutions opposing the reform (Mula, 2011, 134). In that period, mobilization against the Bill was growing in several universities, and many researchers declared themselves “unavailable,” as

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

165

a sign of protest. They refused to take on teaching assignments they had always accepted voluntarily and freely, leaving many courses without teachers (Drago, 2012). From the beginning of 2010, “unavailability for teaching,” spread throughout the country from the Universities of Turin, Cagliari, and Naples, with more than 70% adhesion by researchers (Mula, 2011, 133). In those months, the “unavailable” researchers set up informal organizations (coordination) in each university, in order to exchange information and to coordinate their actions. In March 2010, a new national mailing list was created ([email protected]). As one activist remembers, it “institutionalized the locus for dialogue between Italian researchers … This scheme allowed everyone to not feel alone anymore, but instead part of something new, a broad movement where they could find their own ideas and communicate with others, contributing to the construction of a new project for the university” (ibidem, 134). On 29 April, hundreds of researchers from more than 30 universities met in a national assembly in Milan, which was transmitted by streaming and included participation by students, precarious researchers and professors, and covered by the national media (R, Man, 30/4/10). The resolution approved recognized the necessity for a radical change in the university system, opposed the contested Bill, and the researchers announced the continuation of the “unavailability for teaching” measures, until their requests were accepted (DR29A-1). In the following weeks, the “April29Network for an Open, Free, Public University” (R29A)9 was created, as an informal national network of about 10,000 “unavailable” researchers from more than 40 universities, with a logo and a website (www.rete29aprile.it). A National Coordination group and a Board (Giunta) were elected from the grassroots (Mula, 2011, 136). The R29A also manifested its proactive profile and willingness to communicate with the government, political parties, and academic institutions. In May, the R29A published its demands to be addressed to the government online: maintenance of autonomy and the public dimension of the state university; abolition of financial cuts to research; the reorganization of staff in a single role of professorship, with different salary levels based on merit; separation between recruitment and career progression; an extraordinary recruitment plan; the introduction of a single pre-role position for young researchers with allocation of funds for recruitment; a democratic government of the university, elected by all members of the academic community; guarantee of the right to study by

166

G. PIAZZA

the state (DR29A-2). In July, these “qualifying points” were elaborated in a document, “An idea of the University,” in which R29A proposed an alternative reform, “aimed at opening an operational dialogue with politicians” (DR29A-3). In particular, the single role that would have erased the differences between professors and researchers was, and will be in the years to come, the main claim characterizing the R29A, as it was aimed at unhinging the hierarchical power relations within the university. In the meanwhile, the diffusion of the “unavailability for teaching” tactic of the researchers started to be reported by national newspapers, that warned about the risks of a block of the next academic year (“Blocked universities in autumn: the final challenge of the researchers,” R, 20/6/10), but had little effect on the political parties. After rejection of the amendments proposed by the R29A via some opposition parliamentarians, the Bill was approved by the Senate on 29 July (R, Man, 30/7/10).10 The following months were the “peak” of the mobilization, characterized by a seesaw of hopes to stop the Gelmini Bill and disappointment over failed targets, due to the continuous stop and go of the policymaking process. It was caused by both the increasing mobilization and the instability of the government majority, because of the internal conflict between the Premier Berlusconi and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Fini, who formed his new parliamentary group, FLI (Future and Liberty for Italy). In September, the R29A organized the National Coordination meeting in Rome on the 10th September (DR29A-4) and an open national assembly on the 17th, attended by students, precarious researchers and professors. They condemned the refusal of the Government to entertain dialogue, announced that they would maintain their “unavailability for teaching,” and seek alliances with the students and other higher education actors. In addition, they called for a picket in front of Parliament, and asked for the postponement of the academic year (DR29A-5). Consequently, many university leaders decided to postpone the start of classes: “Researchers, protest spreads: universities forced to postpone courses ” (Me, 18/9/10). Therefore, in October, the postponement of discussion of the Bill at the Chamber of Deputies after the Budget session was hailed as a partial victory by researchers (DR29A-6). In addition, the mobilization took to the streets on 14 October, when thousands of students and researchers demonstrated in front of Parliament and all over Italy: “Fires and slogans: students and researchers in the streets ”

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

167

(CdS, 15/10/10). Despite protests, strikes, and requests to modify the Bill (DR29A-7), the majority tabled the debate at the Chamber before the approval of the financial bill in the Senate. Even the FLI deputies voted with the majority, and were thus associated with the “traitors” of the university by R29A (DR29A-8). The restarting of the legislative process, the academic year postponed but not blocked, and the lack of a student mass mobilization prompted R29A to change its strategy of action. Inspired by the new tactics of workers and migrants, small groups of researchers, together with some precarious researchers and students, “climbed” onto the roofs of the Faculty of Architecture in Rome, of the state universities in Turin and Salerno on 23 November, and then of many other universities, giving more visibility to their protest. They announced that they would remain there until the Bill had been withdrawn or, if approved, they would continue to fight in the universities. In the following days, the roof of the Faculty of Architecture in Rome, near the Parliament building, became the national core of the protest, attracting citizens, journalists, culture workers, and the center-left political leaders. Even some rightwing FLI deputies climbed onto the roof, but they did not change their pro-reform position, despite the pressure of protesters (R, Man, 24– 25/11/10; SdI, 26/11/10). In the same days, thousands of students occupied the faculties, blockaded the streets, and climbed on the most famous Italian monuments (the Leaning Tower in Pisa, the Coliseum in Rome, Brunelleschi’s Dome in Florence, the S. Marco Basilica in Venice, the Mole Antonelliana in Turin, etc.), with the slogan “let’s re-appropriate our culture.” They achieved enormous national and international visibility: “Protest climbs on monuments ” (www.repubblica.it, 25/11/10); “Italian students blockade Coliseum and Leaning Tower of Pisa” (www. telegraph.co.uk, 25/11/10). Despite the spread of the protest and sizable confrontational demonstrations in Rome and other cities, the modified version of the Gelmini Bill was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 30 November: “Yes to the reform, university in revolt ” (R, 1/12/10); “Yes to the reform, among protests and clashes ” (CdS, 1/12/10). The modifications, even those introduced to try to quell the protest,11 made another approval by the Senate necessary. Therefore, the news that the debate in the Upper Chamber was postponed until after the confidence vote, scheduled for 14 December, (“Gelmini reform: the vote in the Senate only after the confidence,” S24O, 3/12/10) was greeted with satisfaction by researchers

168

G. PIAZZA

and students (DR29A-9). In fact, protesters hoped that the government would have been forced to resign after a negative confidence vote, caused by the passage to the opposition of the FLI group, and the Bill would be definitively blocked. On 14 December, a huge demonstration of 100,000 participants including the researchers (DR29A-10) surrounded the Parliament. After the unexpected positive confidence vote, (three former opposition members voted in favor of the Government thus ensuring its standing in office), clashes with police broke out in the historical center, a youth riot against government: “Rome in flames, over 90 injured. The protest ends in guerrilla warfare” (www.repubblica.it, 14/12/10). When some newspapers accused R29A of being the covert director of the clashes, behind the “Pact of violence between students, radicals and no global” (Mat, Me, 16/12/10), it replicated harshly to the accusations, reiterating its peaceful nature. On 22 December, 20,000 students peacefully demonstrated in the outskirts of Rome and, at the end of this event, a delegation of students and one R29A researcher was received by President Napolitano: “Rome, encounter students-Quirinale: finally, heard by the institutions ” (www.ilfattoquotidiano.it, 22/12/10). The following day, the Senate definitively approved the Gelmini Bill with the vote of the majority and of FLI, although the latter were by now in the opposition (Third Pole): “Green light to the reform. The third Pole vote divided” (www.repubblica.it, 23/12/10). Some days later, the researchers came down from the roof of the Faculty of Architecture in Rome, repeating their “unavailability for teaching” mantra, notwithstanding the approval of the reform: “Down from the roof, but stop teaching ” (R, 29/12/10). On 30 December, Law n. 240/10 was promulgated by President Napolitano, although he found “critical errors in the text” (www.repubblica.it, 30/12/10). Therefore, “riding the dream” ended with a defeat, and the implementation stage of the reform started. Recent studies have argued that this mobilization was unsuccessful not only because of the fragmentation of student organizations and the low salience of higher education in Italian public opinion (Cini, 2017a), but above all because protesters were not supported by most university staff and were instead hindered by academic authorities such as deans and rectors—CRUI (Piazza, 2018). In the aftermath of the Gelmini Law’s approval, the researchers’ movement did not disappear but most “unavailable” researchers demobilized, returning to teach. Nevertheless, most R29A activists continued

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

169

to oppose the implementation of the reform at national and local level. Therefore, in 2011, after having elected many researchers to the CUNNational University Council (Mula, 2011, 137), they tried to affect the re-elaboration and approval of the university statutes, only in some cases successfully, when they were able to act in coalition with students (Cini, 2017b). Between 2011 and 2012, however, some internal contrasts arose, as often occurs in the demobilization stage after a defeat, and some radical activists exited from the R29A.

The Organizational Form and the Action Repertoire In the aftermath, the organizational patterns and the strategy of action of the researchers were the main disputed issues within the R29A, which I will here describe and analyze, answering the research questions posed in the introduction and discussing the issues highlighted in the theoretical section. An (Inter)networked Participatory Organization In 2010, most protesting Italian researchers preferred to create a new participatory and informal networked organization rather than join the traditional unions or the existent formal association (CNRU), not only because they were pursuing different aims (general and not sectorial), but also to have the opportunity of participating directly in the mobilization. In fact, as one activist remarked, “the CNRU …appeared more open to finding channels of mediation with the government and to immediately applicable solutions, rather than tackle the complexity and plurality of the positions of the researchers” (Ferretti, 2011, 210).12 That choice was indeed consistent with their political culture, identity and claims for a more democratic university, and thus created “a stable network, based on common principles and strongly rooted in several universities, a real and permanent space of discussion and deliberation, a free circulation of ideas,” as another activist reported (Tabusi 2011a, 11).13 This participatory-networked organizational choice was fostered by the environment in which it originated—the Internet, through the diffusion of mailing lists, which allowed for the free flow and exchange of information and proposals. As previously reported, “the Internet provides researchers instruments to serve several functions: through different online platforms they can subscribe and communicate with each other,

170

G. PIAZZA

sharing news; they can discuss and define the strategy to follow; coordinate protest actions and demonstrations, and be known by the general audience” (Selva, 2011, 160). Nevertheless, the Internet was not the exclusive environment for the researchers, because also “offline” and face-to-face participation—meetings, assemblies, and street demonstrations—was relevant. Another researcher-activist, indeed, stated: “the mailing list has proven suitable to setting out topics for discussion and exposing different points of view, but for synthesizing and making important decisions about controversial issues, the assembly form, as the facts demonstrated, was irreplaceable” (Ferretti, 2011, 210). Therefore, R29A can be defined as a “participatory movement organization” (della Porta & Diani, 2020, 142) constituted by an informal national network of relations among researchers (individuals and groups), which linked several universities. It had a multiheaded, networked, and participatory organization, articulated in three levels: the “grassroots,” the National Coordination, the Board. The links and relationships among researchers were maintained mainly online—through mailing lists, forums, and the website—but also offline by means of meetings and assemblies. The decision-making processes were based mainly (but not exclusively) on direct, deliberative, and participatory democracy. The organization and the interactions among the adherents14 were informal, because there was no formal statute, nor formal boundaries between inside and outside, nor card or registration fees. Every researcher (but also other university categories) who shared the collective identity (goals, values, principles, beliefs) of the R29A, could belong to it. The researchers of the R29A claimed their autonomy from parties and unions, and had no a priori political alignment (Tabusi 2011a, 11), but most activists were progressives or radical left. The R29A was a national network because it linked researchers working in most public universities (from 35 to 40 out of 61) and was structured on the three levels above-mentioned. 1. The “grassroots” consisted of all adherents to the R29A, registered on the website or in the “wide” ricercatori-domeus mailing list, allowing them to receive information, participate in discussions and make proposals. Each group of researchers who joined R29A formed a local coordination for each university, and elected two local coordinators or university delegates (“referents of the Athenaeum”) in assembly or via emails. The total number of R29A adherents varied widely from the beginning, but they numbered several thousand.

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

171

2. The National Coordination was set up by the university delegates (from 70 to 80 for 35–40 universities),15 who were elected at the same time local coordinators for their university. It was identified as the decisional center, the “driving force” of R29A, both because its members acted as links between the two organizational levels (National Coordination and the grassroots of their universities), and because they participated directly in the debate, made proposals and took decisions about the organization, through the “coordination” mailing list or in national meetings. 3. The national coordinators, in turn, elected eight members for the Board (first known as the “Giunta,” then “group of spokespersons”), with the exclusive tasks of coordinating the debate, writing urgent press releases, and maintaining external relationships (with journalists, politicians, academic institutions, other national groups and organizations, etc.). They were not traditional leaders, because they did not exclusively take decisions for R29A, except for the specific abovementioned tasks, but acted as spokespersons of the National Coordination, which remained the main decisional arena. Having eight Board members, which characterized R29A as a polycephalous (multi-headed) organization (Gerlach, 1971), was a precise choice made in order to guarantee internal heterogeneity and the willingness to maintain the horizontal nature of the participatory process. One of the spokespersons stressed that, “the desire to protect and to enhance different points of view as much as possible, and the horizontal nature of internal debate in the network, is witnessed by the choice not to adopt a single national coordinator, instead relying on the functions of representation in a collective body of eight persons elected by local delegates” (Ferretti, 2011, 210). This multilevel participatory-networked organization, therefore, was the solution adopted by the researchers to try to guarantee horizontal processes of participation for the hundreds of activists and thousands of adherents/sympathizers. If a researcher proudly affirmed that “everyone is in contact with everybody: everyone can persuade others of their ideas and proposals, which become those of the network” (Tabusi, 2011a, 11), this was an appropriate reference to the horizontality of debate and decision-making within each level. In point of fact, the flows of information, discussions, and proposals were both horizontal, inside each of

172

G. PIAZZA

three levels, and vertical among the different levels, even if this was in a bidirectional sense. They could come from “below” (the grassroots—individuals or local coordinations) to the National Coordination and to the Board directly, because the members of the Board and National Coordination were also in contact with the other researchers, through the domeus “wide” mailing list, or indirectly through the local delegates. In addition, the same flows of information and proposals could obviously come from “above”—the Board or the National Coordination – to the grassroots. Nevertheless, only the two “upper” organizational levels could take decisions valid for the whole movement organization (local coordination, in any case, could take specific decisions regarding their universities autonomously). According to the principles of direct democracy, the Board and National Coordination members were elected with a binding mandate. Indeed, they always had to account for their actions, and could be revoked at any time by their constituencies: the coordinators/delegates by the researchers of their university, the Board members by the National Coordination (at least, by a majority). The R29A activists, however, in some cases did not refuse to take part in institutional processes of representation, according to the representative democracy model (some R29A researchers were “academic senators” or representatives of other institutional bodies). In fact, the two models of democracy are not always mutually exclusive, but can be complementary, as in the case of R29A, where, as we have seen, the direct/participatory democracy model prevailed. Moreover, the decision-making method adopted by both the National Coordination and by the Board was mainly, but not exclusively, the consensual one, according to the deliberative democracy model (della Porta, 2009). In fact, when activists had to decide, they sought the most widely shared solutions, through rational argumentation and free discussions among all participants. Nevertheless, when internal controversies arose and a shared solution could not be found, the decisions were taken by majority vote, in order to avoid decisional stalemate, as noticed in research on other movement groups (Piazza, 2013). Furthermore, if everyone involved in the process had equal opportunity to make proposals, not everyone had the same ability to influence decisionmaking. In fact, those who were more committed and had more cognitive, argumentative, and relational resources, had more chances to affect decision-making. As we have seen, the processes were based on mutual

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

173

trust, cooperative relations, and mutual recognition among the participants, which often helped to overcome internal controversies when they arose. If it is clear that the researchers decided to adopt a participatory movement organizational model, it is harder to identify which version they chose. At the beginning of the campaign, the movement was based on local coordination for each university involved, as in the Grassroots Organization model, combining participatory democracy with low levels of formalization, related to locality (della Porta & Diani, 2020, 143). However, with the formation of the R29A, the organizational model was closer to that of Mass Protest , because a certain level of centralization and structuration—the multilevel organization with the grassroots at local level and the National Coordination/Board at the central level— was introduced, while always relying on participatory democracy (ibidem, 142). Moreover, the researchers chose this participatory model not only because it was considered suitable for the protest campaign, and it allowed for the broad direct involvement of those who wanted it. They made this choice also because it was consistent with the political culture and identity of some of the most committed activists, who had a leftist orientation toward participatory democracy, and came from social movements. However, other activist researchers who came from party and union experiences, more oriented toward representative democracy, questioned the participatory organizational model in the demobilization phase between 2011 and 2012. Indeed, they argued that a well-structured and legally recognized association, with formal rules and representatives, would have been more effective in pursuing its goals in “normal times.” By contrast, the other researcher-activists wanted to maintain the participatory organizational pattern, fearing the risks associated with bureaucratization and transformation into a “little union,” which would be unable to involve large sectors of academics. The distinction was due to divergences of political culture and conceptions of politics, based on representative democracy on the one side, on direct and participatory democracy on the other. Although the supporters of the formal pattern prevailed, no operational decision was made and the national network became frayed over the following years. Very recently, however, on the occasion of R29A’s tenth anniversary, the remaining activists once more launched the proposal to set up a formal association (https://www.rete29 aprile.net, 29/4/2020). Therefore, on the one hand, most researchers preferred to adopt an informal participatory organizational model until

174

G. PIAZZA

the peak of mobilization. On the other, there was more inclination for a formal/professional model in the declining and latent phases, even if this was not implemented later, which triggered internal tensions on the organizational issue. Repertoires and Logics of Action: From the “Unavailability for Teaching” to the “Climbing on Roofs” During the 2010 mobilization, the researchers’ movement—and R29A— used a variety of strategies and forms of action, always nonviolent, in seeking to influence public opinion and decision-makers. Certainly, the activists also used conventional tactics: sometimes acting as an interest group, they sought to put pressure on parliamentarians, presenting amendments to the Bill (DR29A-7). Nevertheless, protest was the main strategy chosen by the researchers, a useful resource for a “powerless group” trying to attract the attention of public opinion and to build alliances with more influential actors, indirectly through the mass media (Lipsky, 1965). They preferred unconventional and sometime disruptive tactics to achieve their goals and express their collective identity. Furthermore, the repertories of protest have a path-dependent evolution, because activists are inspired by past struggles, they invent new tactics or use similar forms with different meanings (della Porta & Piazza, 2008, 80; Tilly, 1986). During the protest campaign, the researchers adopted different tactics and strategies of action that could be distinguished according to the “logic,” or modus operandi, which the activists assigned them: the logic of damage, the logic of numbers, the logic of bearing witness (della Porta & Diani, 2006, 170–178). The Logic of Damage: The “Unavailability for Teaching” The main strategy of action of the researchers’ movement was initially, and until the autumn, the “unavailability for teaching”: they refused to take on teaching assignments the researchers had always taken voluntarily and freely, leaving many courses without teachers. In fact, they were not formally on strike, because they were not legally obliged to teach, but only to support professors, although this new tactic was based on the same logic of damage. As workers on strike halt production, inflicting damage on their employers in order to force them to reach agreement with the workforce (ibidem, 175), the researchers’ strategy aimed to show

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

175

they were indispensable for university teaching, because without them the university would be blocked (researchers taught about 30% of all university classes). In this way, they wanted to put direct pressure on the Government, seeking to force it to modify or withdraw the Bill, and indirectly ask the academic authorities (which otherwise would have not been able to manage the university system) to put pressure in their turn on the public decision-makers. In doing so, the researchers, who were at the bottom of the hierarchical pyramid of permanent staff, not only challenged the Government, but also the academic elites (rectors, deans, full professors), questioning the way they had governed the universities. This action tactic was also an expression of the researchers’ will to change academia. In fact, for them, this tactic, associated with the request for a single role of professorship, also meant being “unavailable” to continue to be subjected to the internal hierarchical “baronial” relations of academia. It was a conscious act of disobedience, as one activist stated: “In relation to their own academia – … strongly hierarchical in terms of power and careers—most Italian researchers had to learn to disobey. They did so with an attitude that in many cases has had a liberating character, first rejecting the quiet and implicit blackmail of those professors whose power is linked to the consensus and silent work of researchers” (Maida, 2011b, xii). Furthermore, researchers were no longer inclined to tolerate the falsehoods on which the university system was based (“no substantial hierarchy,” or that “the system can operate according to the existent rules”), and wanted to unmask them. The Logic of Numbers: Many But Not Enough The strategy of “unavailability for teaching”, however, required a large number of researchers to get involved and overcome their traditional isolation, passivity, and cultural subordination, if it wanted to be effective, according to the logic of numbers. A few “unavailable” would not have blocked the university courses. Moreover, in order to be effective, the tactic needed to be extended to the other university categories, whose solidarity was necessary. The professors and precarious teachers would be required not to replace the “unavailable” researchers, taking on vacant teachings (in fact, only a part of them did this); the students, the category most at risk of immediate damage, showed their solidarity because the researchers explained the real targets of their protest to them. This

176

G. PIAZZA

strategy was initially successful, because it favored the mobilization of researchers, defined their identity traits, and placed the higher education issue on the political and public agenda. The researchers were then able to influence public decision-making, contributing greatly to the postponement of the bill’s approval, leading to considerable disruption of the university teaching organization. However, “unavailability for teaching” was not very effective because, in early November, most degree courses, although postponed, started anyway, and thus the blockage of the universities did not materialize. That was mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, the response strategy of most deans and rectors was to make the “unavailable” researchers “invisible,” replacing them with precarious and retired professors, or moving the vacant teachings to the second cycle of lessons in the following Spring. Secondly, the “unavailable” researchers were “only” 10 thousand out of 25 thousand, a great number given the pressures and blackmails of most deans and rectors, but not sufficient to totally block university courses, because the logic of damage needs to be combined with that of numbers (De Nardo, 1985). In fact, the researchers who mobilized were many but not enough; they were electorally irrelevant as a social group, and the other faculty members did not massively support the mobilization. Therefore, the “unavailability for teaching” was a necessary condition for the mobilization, but it was no longer sufficient. The Logic of Bearing Witness: The “Climbing on University Roofs” The other main form of action, which although it was radical was always peaceful, that characterized the researchers’ movement was the “climbing on roofs,” as the outcome of a collective intentional choice. In fact, the R29A National Coordination decided on the change of strategy precisely because of their awareness of the limitations of the tactics hitherto used. The necessity of actions based on the logic of bearing witness (della Porta & Diani, 2006, 176–178), which could attract the attention of mass media and public opinion, showing the importance of the university issue, emerges clearly in this email sent by an activist to the Coordination on 7 November: “So far what is missing are actions based on the logic of bearing witness, aimed at showing the opponent and public opinion, strong ethical commitment and a dedication to a cause deemed vital for society, with action possibly involving high personal costs and risks, even if these

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

177

are conducted by few people. From a hunger strike to the tactics of civil disobedience, from non-violent direct actions (road blockades in front of military bases or landfills) to spectacular actions such as climbing on roofs or on cranes (see the recent protest of workers and migrants). These actions have the most symbolic impact on the media, and not only raise an issue (media talk about it), but they also create a problem (the authorities cannot ignore it and must try to solve it). These actions do not require large numbers, but a very determined group of activists who demonstrate commitment to the cause, and serve as an example for those who, while sharing the goals, are unwilling to face the costs they entail” (partially quoted in Tabusi, 2011b, 185–186). This email shows how the resources of human and political capital of some researcher-activists were crucial to plan and lead this strategy of action. They “used what they have been studying during their university career” (Selva, 2011, 161), making their expertise and cognitive resources available to the movement. In fact, if a social movement scholar suggested the change of strategy of action, a geographer using Google Earth chose the roof of the Faculty of Architecture in Rome. The choice was based on logistics: visibility from the outside, the possibility to stay there for a period (a flat roof), the difficulties of access (against an easy immediate forced eviction), and the proximity to institutional buildings (Parliament). Inspired by the past protest actions of workers, migrants, and researchers of public bodies, the “climbing on roofs” was, however, different in forms and meanings, as a path-dependent evolution of the repertoires of protest that can lead to innovation. Firstly, it was conceived of not as an “occupation” (in Rome the action was tolerated by the academic authorities) but a presidio (rally) in defense of the public university. Secondly, the researchers and students on the roofs were not only mobilizing for their sectorial interests, by contrast with workers risking losing their jobs or migrants claiming residence permits, but also for the defense of a public university system, and for an alternative reform to that proposed by the government. “Let’s raise up university again” was the slogan written on the banner hanging from the roof of Architecture. Bearing witness by a group of activists on a roof (there were 35 in Rome), for several days under bad weather conditions in the fall (they encountered cold, wind, rain, and on one occasion it snowed), meant to show that the university was a community of people more important than the physical structures where they work and study. As reported by one researcher, “being on the roof of a university, with professors and students together, means to show

178

G. PIAZZA

concretely how the institution is not so much formed of four walls … but, rather, is a community of brains, minds, people who are determined to work together for the benefit of society as a whole” (Tabusi, 2011b, 188). The roof of the Faculty of Architecture in Rome became a place not only to stay (some tents and a gazebo were installed), but above all it represented a space of meeting, debate, organization of initiatives. It was a pole of attraction for researchers, professors, precarious staff, students, artists, journalists, politicians, citizens, who named it the “Square of the Open, Free, Public University” (ibidem, 190–191). During that month, the activists on the roof felt at the center of the country, finally decisive in really changing the university policy, because journalists and politicians— who had so far ignored them—wanted to meet and to talk with them, taking it in turns to climb the steep stairs to the roof. As in similar situations (della Porta & Piazza, 2008), the protest created community, reinforced collective identity and the activists, coming from Rome and Venice, Siena, Catania, Naples, etc., established strong relationships among themselves that were destined to last (they coined a friendly nickname for themselves “tettisti,” that is people living on roofs). Nevertheless, if all national media mainstream finally covered their protest and the university issue was put on the top of the public and political agenda—also thanks to the student demonstrations—the activists on roofs were dissatisfied with that media coverage. Indeed, they noticed that their message arrived simplified, or distorted, to the public, because of the strict rules imposed by media logic in timing and presentation of arguments, and the lack of possibilities to debate with their counterparts directly. In fact, “media tended to simplify the conflict by depicting them as students or temporary workers because this could have a higher dramatic potential, touching generational gaps or sustainment issues” (Selva, 2011, 164). Also for this reason, the R29A researchers self-produced some videos from the roof—transmitted through the website and YouTube Channel—with the aim of explaining the reform and unmasking the real meaning of the keywords of the governmental media campaign, like “space for youth,” “merit,” fighting “barons,” etc. (Tabusi, 2011b, 191). In addition, the attempts of the protesters to be heard by the politicians and to influence the policy-making process had very little success. On the one hand, they unexpectedly met all the center-left opposition leaders on the roof, who heard their reasons and promised to replace the

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

179

approved law with a new reform elaborated with the researchers, students, and professors mobilized, when they came to power. However, this did not happen in the following years; rather, the PD ministers implemented the Bill. On the other hand, neither the government nor the majority wanted to meet the protesters, and the latter were not able to persuade the FLI deputies to vote against the reform, notwithstanding the fact that they had just passed to the opposition. Because their vote was decisive, in fact, the Bill was approved. In answering the questions previously asked, we can place the tactics chosen by researchers, along the continuum between unconventional and institutional forms of collective action, as closer to the former pole than the latter, but not exclusively. Indeed, the researchers’ movement and R29A became recognized and well-known collective actors in academia, public opinion, and the political system, by means of the “unavailability for teaching” campaign and thanks to the “climbing on roofs.” While not rejecting conventional forms of participation (like the pressure on parliamentarians), the unconventional and disruptive forms of action characterized the movement in 2010, when activists used these tactics combining the three logics of action (damage, numbers and bearing witness). Unconventional tactics were preferred not only because they were considered effective, but also because they were able to create and strengthen collective identity, consistent with the political culture of the most radical activists in the movement. Most researchers had agreed the tactics and logics of action employed, however they later become the other main controversial issues after the approval of the law. In fact, during the “reform’s” implementation phase, the R29A researchers diverged about the strategies of action required to pursue the new ends, namely “to limit the negative effects of that law, building in the meanwhile a perspective for a different future” (Maida, 2011b, ix). Very schematically, some coordinators wanted to focus their actions mainly on issues related to researchers and to the university, using conventional tactics and their positions within academic institutions to pursue sectorial targets. Other activists would have preferred to extend the realm of action to other university categories (students, precarious staff, and professors) and outside academia, cooperatively interacting with other social movement organizations in defense of public and common goods, stressing the importance of unconventional tactics. The two strategies entailed risks and strategic dilemmas (Jasper, 2006). If the “sectional

180

G. PIAZZA

(or corporatist)” strategy involved the risk of transforming the movement into a bureaucratic interest group, the more “general” one entailed the risk of encouraging the exit from the movement of researchers uninterested in non-academic issues. The first strategy prevailed, and the researchers supporting the second exited from the R29A in 2012. Therefore, after the approval of the L240/10, researchers opted for the prevalence of conventional action within academic bodies, even if in some subsequent campaigns they took up less conventional methods, such as the boycott of the new university evaluation system (VQR).

Concluding Remarks In conclusion, we can place the 2010 researchers’ mobilization on the continuum closer to the pole of “unconventional movement politics” than that of “conventional union politics.” In fact, most protesting researchers opted for setting up an informal, networked participatory organization based on direct and participatory democracy, the R29A, and chose mainly unconventional tactics, which were sometime disruptive, like the “unavailability for teaching” and “climbing on roofs.” The R29A was the main collective actor representing most researchers at the national level, targeting the national government and academic authorities. Moreover, the researchers tried to connect with students, precarious staff, and other movements, even though many of them did not have a strong tradition and culture of political activism as a group. However, leading activists with resources of “political capital,” coming from experiences in progressive social movements (student, social centers, LULUs, etc.) and in leftist parties and unions, were “protest entrepreneurs” able to mobilize other researchers. Being closer to the first pole does not mean, however, overlapping with it, because the mobilizing researchers did not neglect to use conventional forms of action as well. This means that the culture of movement activism prevailed in influencing the strategies of researchers on party and trade union culture. If the activists from the latter type of political culture also shared these forms of “unconventional movement politics” to the point of mobilization, they questioned them within R29A in the next phase of demobilization. Indeed, those researchers supported a model of “conventional union politics” within the academy, by means of formal organization and by employing conventional forms of action, such as participation in internal elections and pressure on academic authorities. Since this political model

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

181

prevailed, regardless of its subsequent implementation, it can be argued that if researchers chose “unconventional movement politics” in “extraordinary” times of mobilization, they instead opted for “conventional union politics” in “normal” times. If in the first case the political culture of the more radical activists based on participatory democracy had been more influential, in the second, instead, that of the more moderate ones based on representative democracy prevailed. In recent years, researchers have no longer mobilized as a category, also because their numbers have been more than halved since the implementation of the Gelmini reform, and their identity based on university position consequently weakened. Notwithstanding this, R29A has occasionally been mobilized, such in the “StopVQR” boycott campaign in 2016, against wage discrimination and the national evaluation system, which put all universities in competition for public funds (Piazza, 2018). Considering the past ten years, it can be said that R29A has continued to be one of the few critical voices in the Italian academy, acting more as a pressure group than a movement organization. Its collective identity is based more on an alternative vison of the university (public, free and open) than on academic positions. In fact, it is increasingly made up mainly of both researchers and professors, without hierarchy and differences, thus prefiguring the single role of professorship that remains its main claim and aim for changing university system.

Notes 1. The academic staff in Italy is structured as a hierarchical pyramid. At the base, there are precarious researchers and teachers with short-term contracts, estimated at about 60,000 (there are no official figures), who number more than the permanent staff. The latter are articulated in three levels. The first consists of permanent researchers (assistant professors) with the tasks of doing research and supporting professors in teaching. The position is obtained through success in an open competition, but after the “Gelmini Reform” the role is close to being entirely run down, (they numbered about 25,000, or 43% of the permanent staff, in 2010, but by June 2020, they had become fewer than 10,000, reduced to 21.2%); and are gradually being replaced by new fixed-term researchers with and without tenure track (8,900 in 2020). At the second level are the associate professors, with tasks of doing research and teaching, about 17,000, 29% in 2010. They have become about 22,700 in 2020, increasing to 48.6%. At the top there are full professors among whom are selected the

182

G. PIAZZA

2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15.

leaders and managerial staff of the university, e.g., rectors, deans, department directors; from about 16,000, 28% in 2010 they have declined to 14,100 in 2020, 30.1% of the permanent staff (https://cercauniversita. cineca.it; 30 June 2020). Bruno Maida, historian, R29A University of Turin. Tiziana Drago, Hellenist, R29A University of Bari. I would like to thank Bruno, Tiziana, Guido, Massimiliano, Alessandro, Francesca and all the R29A colleagues for their human and professional contribution. In Catania, the local coordination took the name of CUdA—Single University Coordination, as it is composed not only of researchers but also of associates and full professors (all on the same level, as required in the single role), temporary workers and administrative-technical staff. In 2012, I exited from the R29A over disagreement on the political strategy. Piero Graglia, historian, University of Milan, R29A national spokesperson in 2010. Guido Mula, physicist, University of Cagliari, R29A national spokesperson in 2010. http://www.senato.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/testi/34595_testi. htm. Alessandro Pezzella, chemist, University of Naples, in 2010 member of the R29A board, then CUN (University National Council) councilor. The researcher Eleonora Gallucci, University of Salento, coined the name during a sit-in in front of the Senate in Rome. According to the Italian Constitution, the two Chambers of the Parliament must approve an identical text of a bill for it to become law. The “extraordinary recruitment plan” for associate professors was the only result obtained by researchers who, however, considered it as insufficient and not responding to their requests. Alessandro Ferretti, physicist, University of Turin, R29A national spokesperson in 2010. Massimiliano Tabusi, geographer, University for Foreigners of Siena, R29A national spokesperson in 2010. I preferred to use the term “adherents” instead of “members,” precisely because of the lack of formal boundaries delimiting the organization from its environment. The number of the universities involved varied during 2010.

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

183

References Brooks, R. (2016). Student politics and protest: International perspectives. Routledge. Caruso, L., Giorgi, A., Mattoni, A., & Piazza, G. (Eds.). (2010). Alla ricerca dell’Onda. I nuovi conflitti nell’istruzione superiore. Milano: Franco Angeli. Cini, L. (2017a). Italian students as a political actor. The policy impact of the recent student mobilizations in the field of higher education. Partecipazione e Conflitto, 10(1), 306–332. Cini, L. (2017b). Successful student activism in contemporary Italian universities. Italian Political Science Review, 47 (3), 337–358. Cini, L. (2019). The contentious politics of higher education: Struggles and power relations within English and Italian universities. London: Routledge. Curcio, A. M. (2010). Rappresentanza a Progetto: Precarietà, sindacato e azione collettiva in Europa. Partecipazione e Conflitto, 3(2), 114–137. della Porta, D. (Ed.). (2009). Democracy in social movements. London: Palgrave Macmillan. della Porta, D., Cini, L., Guzman-Concha, C. (2020). Contesting higher education: The student movements against neoliberal universities. Bristol: Bristol University Press. della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2006). Social movements: An introduction (2nd ed.). Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell. della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2020). Social movements: An introduction (3rd ed.). Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell. della Porta, D., & Piazza, G. (2008). Voices of the valley, voices of the straits: How protest creates communities. New York: Berghahn Books. De Nardo, J. (1985). Power in numbers: The political strategy of protest and rebellion. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Drago, T. (Ed.). (2012). ‘Preferisco di no’. I ricercatori ‘indisponibili’ e la ‘riforma epocale’. Guida Editore. Fantasia, R. (1988). Cultures of solidarity: Consciousness, action, and contemporary American workers. University of California Press. Ferretti, A. (2011). Eredità. In B. Maida (Ed.), Senti che bel rumore (pp. 209– 215). Turin: Accademia University Press. Gerlach, L. (1971). Movements of revolutionary changes: Some structural characteristics. American Behavioral Scientist, 43, 813–836. Jasper, J. M. (1997). The art of moral protest: Culture, creativity and biography in social movements. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Jasper, J. M. (2006). Getting your way: Strategic dilemmas in real world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Klemencic, M. (2014). Student power in a global perspective and contemporary trends in student organising. Studies in Higher Education, 39, 396–411. Lipsky, M. (1965). Protest in city politics. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co.

184

G. PIAZZA

Maida, B. (Ed.) (2011a). Senti che bel rumore. Turin: Accademia University Press. Maida, B. (2011b). L’università che vogliamo (e quella che non vogliamo). In B. Maida (Ed.), Senti che bel rumore (pp. VII–XV). Turin: Accademia University Press. McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1987). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. In M. N. Zald & J. D. McCarthy (Eds.), Social movements in an organizational society (pp. 15–42). Piscataway: Transaction Books. Mula, G. (2011). Come nasce un movimento: la Rete29Aprile. In B. Maida (Ed.), Senti che bel rumore (pp. 127–137). Turin: Accademia University Press. Ortoleva, P. (1988). Saggio sui Movimenti del 68 in Europa e in America. Rome: Editori Riuniti. Palermo, G. (2011). L’università dei baroni. Milan: Edizioni Punto Rosso. Piazza, G. (2004). Le risorse dei comitati nei processi decisionali. In D. della Porta (Ed.), Comitati di cittadini e democrazia urbana (pp. 137–170). Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino. Piazza, G. (2013). How do activists make decisions within social centres? A comparative study in an Italian city. In SqEK (Ed.), Squatting Europe: Radical spaces, urban struggles (pp. 89–111). New York: Minor Composition/Autonomedia. Piazza. G. (2014). Non solo studenti: le ondate di protesta nelle scuole e nelle università. In L. Alteri & L. Raffini (Eds.), La nuova politica. Movimenti, mobilitazioni e conflitti in Italia (pp. 51–70). Naples: EdiSES. Piazza, G. (2018). Not only students, but also not enough: The waves of protest in the higher education in Italy. International Review of Social Research, 8(1), 64–73. Piazza, G., & Genovese, V. (2010). L’Onda sotto il Vulcano: Catania e il Gruppo di Studio su ‘Partecipazione e Movimenti’. In L. Caruso, A. Giorgi, A. Mattoni, & G. Piazza, (Eds.), Alla ricerca dell’Onda. I nuovi conflitti nell’istruzione superiore (pp. 86–114). Milan: Franco Angeli. Piazza, G., Mosca, L., Lewanski, R., & Andretta, M. (2005). Protests and arguments: The citizens’ committees’ campaigns against traffic in four Italian cities. World Political Science Review, 1(2), 99–125. Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. (1977). Poor people’s movements. New York: Pantheon Books. Pizzorno, A. (1993). Le radici della politica assoluta. Milan: Feltrinelli. Selva, D. (2011). Net-based participation: An Italian case study. In E. De Blasio, M. Hibberd, & M. Sorice (Eds.), Leadership and new trends in political communication (pp. 149–168). CMCS Working papers. Tabusi, M. (2011a). La Rete29Aprile: dagli spazi virtuali alla «territorializzazione» di un tetto, per una Università Pubblica, Libera e Aperta, paper presented at the IV Italian and French Congress “Geografia sociale e

7

FROM THE CLASSROOMS TO THE ROOFS: THE 2010 UNIVERSITY …

185

democrazia. Opportunità e rischi della comunicazione non convenzionale”. RomaTre University. Tabusi, M. (2011b). Riportiamo in alto l’università! Ricercatori e studenti sul tetto di Roma. In B. Maida (Ed.), Senti che bel rumore (pp. 183–194). Turin: Accademia University Press. Tilly, C. (1986). The contentious French. Harvard University Press.

Documents and Press Releases DR29A-1—Document: “Documento di Milano. Mozione dell’assemblea del 29 aprile 2010” (Document of Milan. Resolution of the Assembly). http:// wpage.unina.it/apezzell/sito/unidoc/documenti/Mozione%20Assemblea% 20Milano%2029%20aprile%202010.pdf. 29/4/2010. DR29A-2—Document: “I punti qualificanti della Rete29aprile” (Qualifying points of the April29Network). 31/5/2010. DR29A-3—Document: “Un idea di università. Documento dei Ricercatori delle Università italiane” (An idea of University”: Document of the Researchers of the Italian Universities). http://www.rete29aprile.it/info/unidea-di-univer sita.html. 5/7/2010. DR29A-4—Press release: “Comunicato del Coordinamento Nazionale di R29A” (Statement of the National Coordination of R29A). 10/9/2010. DR29A-5—Press release: “Assemblea Nazionale dei ricercatori il 17 settembre a Roma” (National Assembly of researchers on 17 September in Rome). http://www.rete29aprile.it/comunicati-stampa/comunicato-stampaassemblea-nazionale-dei-ricercatori-il-17-settembre-a-roma.html. 8/9/2010. DR29A-6—Press release: “Il DdL Gelmini sull’Università alla Camera per la discussione il 14 ottobre: una vittoria dei ricercatori” (The Gelmini Bill on University at the Chamber for discussion on 14 October: a victory of researchers). 30/9/2010. DR29A-7—Document: “Resoconto del Coordinamento Nazionale” (Report of the National Coordination). 14/10/2010. DR29A-8—Press release: “I Traditori” (The Traitors). 21/11/2010. DR29A-9—Press release: “Rinvio discussione Senato DdL” (Postponement of debate on DdL at the Senate). 2/12/10. DR29A-10—Press release: “R29A partecipa alle manifestazioni del 14 dicembre” (R29A participates in 14 December demonstrations). http://www.rete29apr ile.it/comunicati-stampa/rete29aprile-partecipa-alle-manifestazioni-del-14-dic embre.html. 12/12/2010. DCNRU-1—Document: “Una proposta di soluzione del problema dello stato giuridico dei ricercatori” (Proposal of solution of the problem of the legal status of researchers). http://w3.uniroma1.it/cnru/wp-content/upl oads/2010/02/proposta.pdf. 3/12/2009.

186

G. PIAZZA

Newspapers CdS—Corriere della Sera FQ—il Fatto Quotidiano Man—il Manifesto Mat—il Mattino Me—il Messaggero R—la Repubblica S—La Stampa S24O—il Sole24Ore SdI—Secolo d’Italia

Websites http://w3.uniroma1.it/cnru https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/ https://www.quirinale.it/ https://www.repubblica.it/ https://www.rete29aprile.it https://www.telegraph.co.uk/

CHAPTER 8

Worker–Student Unity Against Outsourcing at the University of Johannesburg: Disrupting the Neoliberal Paradigm Through Direct Action and Alternative Relations Francesco Pontarelli

Introduction Historically, Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in South Africa have produced vibrant debates and struggles. This tradition has re-emerged vigorously in recent times. In 2015, South African universities experienced a noteworthy intensification of students’ as well as outsourced workers’ protests. Following significant movements and campaigns during the year, such as RhodesMustFall (Rhodes Must Fall, 2018) and October 61 among others, South African universities saw the rapid development of #FeesMustFall (FMF), the largest mass-based movement in the education sector in post-apartheid South Africa. FMF emerged through a protest

F. Pontarelli (B) SARCh1 chair in Community, Adult and Worker Education, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_8

187

188

F. PONTARELLI

to halt the annual tuition fee increase at the University of Witwatersrand (Wits) in Johannesburg and developed rapidly to embrace wider demands, including the struggle of outsourced workers organized under the banner #EndOutsourcing (EO) (or #OutsourcingMustFall).2 FMF and EO emerged as a cross-class, heterogeneous movement that involved hundreds of thousands of university students, workers, and academics, as well as community members and political activists across the country. Since its inception, it flooded the political scene, occupied the news headlines, and—due to its rapid growth and popularity—sparked a crucial debate on the state and the structure of education as well as of South African society as a whole. The movement was driven by perspectives of social change that were not uniform but based on the complex articulation of meanings given to a widespread demand: the need for free, quality, decolonized education. This demand embraced with particular emphasis the need to pursue a process of decolonization of social institutions and a reconfiguration of race and gender relations, as well as the moral and material urgency to insource all university workers. While it can be argued that FMF was composite and multifaceted, that there were many movements within the movement, this chapter narrows the analytical lens and looks at the unity between students and outsourced workers and the interdependence of their struggle in the achievement of unprecedented victories, with a focus on the FMF-EO at the University of Johannesburg (UJ). The relevance of the worker–student unity in FMF-EO is too often underestimated, thus depriving labor and social movement debates of important analysis and lessons. This chapter aims to fill the gap, providing an alternative lens to investigate the unprecedented victory that changed employment relations in South African universities. Focusing on worker– student unity at UJ, the chapter addresses two main questions: What were the political and social foundations of the worker–student unity? How did they contribute to the achievement of such unprecedented victory? Overall, this study contributes to the analysis of the relation between students and workers and the potential that their unity has to question the current social settings and overflow beyond tertiary education institutions. From a theoretical perspective, this research draws from Antonio Gramsci’s engagement with the concept of ‘senso comune’.3 The use of this analytical category is combined with a historical contextualization of the worker–student mobilization within the neoliberal trajectory that has

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

189

affected the South African tertiary education sector. At the same time, the theoretical perspective informed this study’s research methods. These draw from Burawoy’s (2009) ‘extended case method’ and the practice of a model of science that ‘embraces not detachment but engagement as the road to knowledge’ (Burawoy, 2009, 20). The combination of these research methods and methodology provided an advantageous perspective to explore the emergence of worker–student unity out of a context characterized by striking societal contradictions and by the contrast between the impact of neoliberal policies and people’s expectations. The findings of this research show that worker–student unity acquired remarkable strengths by articulating a conceptualization of identity based on racial and community lines that were embedded in the anti-apartheid struggle and in a critique of the political project of post-apartheid South Africa. This unity represented a favorable space for potentially transformative politics beyond immediate demands through the disruption of the standard institutional paths and had to be restrained by the interplay of repression and exceptional concessions. The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section, I discuss the relevance of the notion of senso comune to the analysis of the specificities and potentialities of the 2015 movement; section “Research Methods” outlines this study’s main research methods; section “FMF-EO in Its Historical Period: Main Outcomes of the Neoliberal Trend in HEI” contextualizes the FMF-EO movement within the main outcomes of twenty years of neoliberal policies in HEIs in order to analyze worker– student unity in action; section “The Unfolding of Worker–Student Unity in UJ” briefly outlines some of the main events that unfolded during the struggle against outsourcing at UJ; sections “Worker–Student Unity in Action: Mutual Legitimacy and Scope” and “The Foundations of Worker–Student Unity in Action” draws together the various strands of research findings analyzed in previous sections and highlights the social and political foundations of the unity, its different features, and the elements that added crucial value to the FMF-EO struggle; section “Unprecedented but Precarious Outcomes” presents the unprecedented yet precarious victories of the movement; and lastly, this study’s arguments and findings are summarized in the conclusion.

190

F. PONTARELLI

Literature on FMF-EO and Alternative Lens In South Africa, workers’ and students’ protests have been constant elements of educational institutions since the spread of neoliberal policies (see for instance Pithouse, 2006). Outsourced workers have protested, with relatively meager outcomes, since the late 1990s to reverse the process of externalization of services which extended over the whole South African higher education sector (Kenny & Clarke, 2000). Equally, students in many universities have struggled, in most cases unsuccessfully, against the unaffordability of education in all its spheres. The 2015 movement was unprecedented and its widespread influence on the political and social debate in South Africa encouraged the emergence of extensive academic literature. Nevertheless, the worker–student unity was one of the most interesting and insufficiently explored aspects of the FMF-EO. Not surprisingly, most of the sociological studies focus on events based on South African élite universities,4 particularly the University of Cape Town, Rhodes, and the University of Witwatersrand (Booysen, 2016; Chinguno et al., 2017). Very few analyzes have focused on outsourced workers’ struggles and their contribution to the movement (Hamilton, 2017; Luckett & Mzobe, 2016; Ntshingila, 2016). Even fewer in-depth studies have focused on students’ and workers’ joint struggles (Hlatshwayo, 2020; Sinwell, 2019). Some of the literature has completely ignored the involvement of outsourced workers, directing their attention exclusively to FMF (see for instance Ngcaweni & Ngcaweni, 2018), while others have rather downplayed the student movement influence on workers’ struggles and victories (Satgar, 2016). These studies have often underplayed the relation between the specific historical contingency in which the movement operated and the extraordinary strength acquired by the unity between workers and students. The engagement with Antonio Gramsci’s concept of senso comune provides a useful alternative analytical lens. As aptly summarized by Luporini, for Gramsci, senso comune is a philosophical concept, radically historicized and operative in practice (Luporini, 1987). The use of this notion is ascribed with different meanings throughout Gramsci’s writings, nonetheless it maintains an organic relation with key categories and the overall logic of his reflections. In this study, this category is defined as ‘the conception of the world that is most widespread among the popular masses in a historical period’ (Gramsci, 2007, 360). A conception that

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

191

is not confined to the realm of abstraction, but it is rather both influenced and influential to individual and collective practice. As a historicized shared conception of the world, embedded in specific moral and social traditions, senso comune diverges according to different social strata and it is considered an inherently contested space. In the relentless process of its forging—characterized by resistance, regressions, advancements, historical sedimentations, and sudden transformation—lies the possibility to facilitate and consolidate processes of change, to replace a senso comune with a more progressive one, to work the ground for alternative futures. In the context of this paper, the notion of senso comune as the historical product of a specific hegemonic articulation provides a key angle to analyze the nature of worker–student unity, and more generally the dynamics of social movements in precise historical periods, including the production of theory and practice within them. In particular, the use of this category helps shed light on at least three interrelated issues often overlooked by prevailing analyses of the 2015 movement. First, in South Africa the neoliberal policies that have emerged since the mid-1990s have not been able to completely erase the progressive narratives promoted by the anti-apartheid struggle. Those narratives, and their embedded conceptions of the world, endure in the masses’ senso comune and can be resumed—and rearticulated—in catalyzing moments of conflict. Second, the aspects of the senso comune that were in opposition to the neoliberal trend and its outcomes in HEIs significantly helped to trigger and legitimize worker–student unity in action. Third, and related to the second point, the movement can be interpreted as the expression of a clash between people’s expectations—about the role of higher education in their individual and collective process of emancipation—and the outcomes of the South African neoliberal trend. It is worth mentioning that the lens of senso comune provides useful reflections for a contribution to the literature on coalition building, explored for instance by sections of social movement research (McCammon & Moon, 2015; see for instance Van Dyke & McCammon, 2010). It helps to shed light on the reasons why worker–student unity emerged beyond institutionalized university politicsand was not based on traditional alliances among distinct organizations. Alliances and coalitionsusually denote a more formal relation between structured organizations. On the contrary, this chapter argues that FMF-EO unity can be characterized as unity in action. This is understood as a more instinctive tactic, a glimmer of the exemplification of ‘social consciousness inserted

192

F. PONTARELLI

directly into praxis’ (Lefebvre 1965 in Starr, 2005, 78). As will be detailed in a later section, the ‘social consciousness’ that enabled worker–student unity was built upon aspects of the most popular conception of the world among the South African population, on a historicized senso comune, providing specific articulations of common identities and perspectives.

Research Methods The analysis of the worker–student unity and its outcome at UJ is part of a wider research project that I conducted for my doctoral program from August 2015 to December 2019. This chapter’s research is based on secondary literature, 20 in-depth interviews, and a considerable amount of fieldnotes from extensive empirical research I conducted from September 2015 onward on student and worker mobilization in South African HEIs. The research draws from approaches that, using critical ethnography, question the division between researcher and research participants and investigate the relation between research methods and the aims of the research itself. In particular, my field research mainly draws from Burawoy’s (2009) ‘extended case method,’ with participant observation as the primary approach to investigate everyday life framed by a specific historical context. Also known as ‘natural sociology’ (Burawoy et al., 1991), participatory observation is based on the idea that the production of knowledge is never ‘neutral’ or free from the influence of power relations. Objectivity, as a principle of science, is thus not considered a product of being detached or impartial in the process of research but emerges from reflexivity and critical awareness by the researcher. The analysis of FMF-EO presented in this chapter stems from the extended engagement and interaction with the movement which is considered a critical perspective for understanding the processes, practices, and ideologies, rather than being perceived as a research limitation. The relation between researcher and participants was conceived of and practiced as a dialectical relation. In the collection of data I did not consider myself an outsider in relation to an ‘object of study,’ but rather the approach of the inquiry was the result of engagement ‘between two active subjects, each of whom internalizes something from the other by virtue of the process that connects them’(Hart, 2018, 8–9).5

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

193

FMF-EO in Its Historical Period: Main Outcomes of the Neoliberal Trend in HEIs In order to better comprehend the political and social foundations of the worker–student unity in action, it is necessary to look at the context in which the upsurge in 2015 occurred in terms of pre-existing material and ideological conditions in HEIs. I will pay particular attention to UJ. The FMF-EO movement emerged from a situation in which, more than twenty years since the first democratic elections in 1994, the promise of a quality public education system—through the removal of racially based laws and the development of new policies—was still perceived as elusive. Many students and workers in the movement argued that the education system still reflected and reproduced the wider inequalities in society. In the ten years prior to the rise of FMF-EO, South African public universities underwent a significant process of restructuring in terms of student numbers, sources of funding, and involvement of the private sector. The enrolment of students increased by 32.8%, reaching a total number of 985,212 in 2015 (Department of Higher Education and Training, 2017) but was not accompanied by an adequate increase of government funding. In line with the neoliberal tendency that promotes a shift from public spending to private contributions, between 2000 and 2014, HEIs experienced rising functioning costs for which the portion of government funding decreased from 49 to 38%.6 This gap was filled by third stream income and the rise of student fee contributions (Vally, 2015). While the increasing involvement of the private sector in the functioning of public institution threatens the public nature of education,7 the growth in revenue from tuition fees as a proportion of the total income of universities—increasing on average from 27% in 2006 to 34.1% in 2015—represented a growing obstacle to university access (Lehohla & STATSSA, 2016). The data from STATSSA show that on average universities’ income from tuition fees increased by 12.7% per annum over the ten-year period before the rise of the FMF movement.8 In line with the rest of the sector nationwide, UJ reached a student body of 49,452 in 2015 (a growth of 15.3% from 2006) and saw scarce public funding combined with increased reliance on private donations and student fee revenues. Tuition fees in 2015 represented 40.1% of UJ’s total university income, reaching R40,594 in 2015 (average formal tuition fee

194

F. PONTARELLI

for full-time equivalent enrolment), representing a 119% increase from R18,519 in 2009.9 The inadequacy of public funds affects students in several ways. There is a mechanism of immediate financial exclusion, following incapacity to overcome the obstacle of registration fees, but also mid-term academic exclusion based on unbearable daily life expenses. In UJ university campuses the long queues for free meals provided by NGOs and the numerous students sleeping around buildings are some of the basic and blatant symptoms of an ongoing crisis. Even the most prominent support program to fund disadvantaged students—the National Student Financial Aid Scheme—is inadequate for the size of the demand.10 Furthermore, most of the funds offered to students are loans, which burden them and their families for years with considerable levels of debt. Despite the trend in HEIs to open the doors of education to a wider spectrum of society over the past decade, particularly historically excluded Black African students, the universities have remained inaccessible for the majority of the population. The provision of access without necessary support for daily life expenses is one of the reasons behind the alarming regressive trend in the proportion of Black students who complete their bachelor’s degrees (Lehohla & STATSSA, 2016). The neoliberal approach in the higher education sector of the postapartheid South Africa can be traced back to the structural changes that took place during the global expansion of neoliberal policies (Cini, 2019; Kamola, 2016). The South African Schools Act in 1996 and the Higher Education Act in 1997 cohered with a project that envisaged a South African education system designed to produce citizens who could effectively participate in the global economy (Adams, 2006). While elements of neoliberalism may well have been present before 1994, ‘post-apartheid South Africa has seen firm and decisive shifts towards performativity and neoliberal market-driven discourses’ (Maistry, 2014, 63). The neoliberal logic behind these processes does not conceptualize education as a public good useful for the enhancement and development of the whole society, but rather primarily as a tool for individual development, career advancement and the productivity of the economy. Education is understood as comparable to any other service, commodity, or business enterprise (Adams, 2006, 8). In coherence with this rationality, schools and universities need to comply with market-driven paradigms, need to ‘manage their affairs along business lines,’ and to focus on productivity, cost-efficiency, and cost-containment (Rustin, 2016, 154). The pressure exercised on

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

195

all academic staff to produce ‘outputs’, the focus on competitiveness measured by quantitatively based rankings, the representation of students as fee-paying ‘clients,’ and the consideration of service provider employees as mere costs, among other aspects, are results of policies based on—and legitimized by—these ideological developments (Della Porta et al., 2020; Gill, 2013). Although South Africa was coming out of a formally successful liberation struggle endowed with socialist and social-democratic narratives, the neoliberal trend deeply influenced the functioning of higher education (see also Berdahl, 2008; Kamola, 2016). An illustrative example can be found in the logic behind policies of service externalization. A distinction between ‘core business’ (teaching and research) and ‘periphery’ or ‘non-core’ services (such as cleaning, security, catering, and gardening among others) was legitimated by the imperative of cutting university costs and the allegedly higher standards of the private sector, but has primarily functioned as a tool of fragmentation of the university’s community (Bezuidenhout & Fakier, 2006; Van der Walt et al., 2003), reiterating and strengthening structured hierarchies. The education sector is part and parcel of South African society, and it reflects the severe inequality that characterizes its social dynamics. In most of the universities across the country, the division of labor reproduces the characteristics of the national labor market. ‘High skilled’ (or ‘high remunerated’) jobs, such as academic professors, are mostly occupied by White men, while ‘low skilled’ positions, such as outsourced workers, are almost exclusively occupied by Black people, and particularly Black women. These social settings were so evident in people’s daily realities in 2015 and so embedded in the senso comune that students could confidently state: ‘I do not think I have ever seen a white university cleaner in my life’ (Resp1, UJ student, 2016). In 2015, at UJ, the data shows that while the student body was composed of 82% Black African11 and 9.5% White students, the academic staff was made up of 51.5% White and only 32.8% Black academics.

The Unfolding of Worker–Student Unity in UJ Students and workers at UJ demonstrated their mutual support in different forms and phases throughout the movement, with worker– student unity reaching its peak between the first FMF mass demonstration at the Union Buildings on October 23 and the signed agreement with UJ

196

F. PONTARELLI

management about the commitment to end outsourcing labor relations on November 18. Although FMF started as a student movement, the mobilization of workers at UJ came onto the scene at a crucial and challenging moment of its development. Following the first FMF national mass demonstration at the Union Buildings and President Zuma’s announcement of 0% fee increase for 2016, the UJ Student Representative Council invited students to halt the mobilization and go back to class. Defying official student representative bodies and the university, a resolute core of students showed determination to continue the struggle and coordinated numerous meetings and activities. Although these students did not succeed in organizing a mass mobilization, in part due to the climate of harsh repression, workers came to their support by making the first significant organized mass appearance on November 2. On that day, outsourced cleaners gathered in the basement not far from their changing rooms and decided to start unprotected industrial action, a ‘tools-down,’ a particular form of strike in which workers refuse to work but also refuse to leave their workplace. Their main motivation was the lack of clarity provided by the outsourcing company’s management about their provident fund, but it was clear that they were propelled by the student movement and their complaints targeted the whole system of exploitative labor relations. Once the workers took action, the students joined straightaway, providing the support and courage to continue the strike and to put pressure on UJ and the outsourcing company’s management. The following day, the ‘tools down’ strike continued and intensified. On November 3, for the first time at UJ, precarious outsourced workers— along with some students—marched on campus premises. Two hundred UJ cleaners demonstrated without authorization from the university, going workplace to workplace, gathering their colleagues, and showing their collective action to the whole university community. Trade union officials from the National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union (NEHAWU)—one of the main public-sector unions at UJ and in the country—came to address the workers and tried to divert workers collective action into a more institutionalized path. Union officials also tried to divide workers and students, describing the latter as ‘dangerous allies’ (Interview Resp8, UJ outsourced workers, 2017). The divisive attempt failed and increased distrust and skepticism toward unions and institutional routes among workers.

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

197

The level of repression by the university management increased considerably after the first two days of ‘tools-down.’ On the third day, workers’ request for a meeting with UJ management was answered with the arrival of the police and with a high level of violence perpetrated against them— mostly elderly Black women—by private UJ security. The numerous attempts to arrest students and workers during a peaceful sit-in had the effect of increasing the level of mutual camaraderie. Students and workers defended each other risking pepper spray, injuries, and arrests. Eventually, thanks to the determination of the protesters, no one was detained that day. Arrests happened instead on November 6, after the university decided to ban protests on campus and to make an application for a legal interdict. A demonstration of about 200 workers and students, including members of Wits, approached UJ main campus defying the interdict that made the presence of protests illegal within 500 meters from university premises. On that day, despite the silent and peaceful nature of the march, about 143 students and workers were arrested and brought to the police station, provoking country-wide expressions of solidarity. The attempts of cooptation, the practices of intimidation, the prohibition of gatherings with more than three people on campus, the increased numbers of private security, and the numerous episodes of violence did not prevent workers and students from continuing their joint activities. The protestors’ determination resulted in the failure of the repressive and divisive strategy employed by the management and, thanks also to the favorable context created by the movement and the decisions taken by other universities in the country, resulted in the signing of an exceptional agreement. On November 18, 27 days after the first mass demonstration at UJ, numerous arrests, violent episodes, 17-day long unprecedented industrial action by hundreds of outsourced cleaning workers, the university committed to end outsourcing labor relations for all workers (including gardeners and security guards) and to start a process of insourcing. The agreement was received as an important victory and resulted in joint joyful celebrations. The relief resulting from UJ’s commitments following an intense week of struggle led to the protesters’ temporary demobilization. In this context UJ management was determined to set the conditions to hamper the continuation of forms of solidarity between students and workers. When workers returned to work on November 23, for instance, they were welcomed by a declaration to be signed in which they agreed to ‘not partake in any strike or protest’ and to ‘not disrupt any activities taking

198

F. PONTARELLI

place on any of the UJ campuses,’ otherwise workers would face the risk of removal from UJ’s premises while the employer ‘reserves the right to take disciplinary measures should any misconduct be brought to their attention’ (fieldnotes 23 November 2015). A negotiation among workers, students, and management resulted in a new declaration and the return of workers to their activities. The year break gave time for the management to reorganize their strategies while students had to face the dispersion of those who graduated and those who were still suspended. Workers were also significantly divided. Some were satisfied with UJ commitment to insource, initial financial gains, and were concerned to lose the victories achieved with so much effort. Notwithstanding divisions among workers, the struggle produced an unprecedented victory that showed the strength and the capacity of a movement that understood the politically favorable conditions and demonstrated significant determination. What led to these results has to be considered in the specific political conjuncture characterized by the clash between neoliberal policies and people’s expectations regarding the educational sector. This influenced the mass-based nature of the movement that gathered together different layers of the university community and spoke to a broader spectrum of South African society.

Worker–Student Unity in Action: Mutual Legitimacy and Scope In the period between the inception of FMF and commitments by universities to insource, from October to November 2015, the relation between EO and FMF was a crucial aspect of the mobilization in Johannesburg. Students and workers have argued that it would have been impossible to imagine the outcomes of the movement without their interconnection. Many sections of the student body did not even consider the possibility of a movement without workers. In the words of an active student at Wits: ‘Any liberation or victory of students is void without the advancement and insourcing of workers’ (Seabe, 2018, X). It is likely that the student movement, without the rise of EO, would have achieved most of the victories they attained in any case. Nonetheless, this chapter argues that the unity between these two sections of the university community represented more than the addition of their components and resulted in a qualitative advancement for both struggles and space for potentially transformative politics beyond immediate demands.

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

199

FMF and EO were organized by distinct constituencies—mainly workers in precarious employment relations and university students—and conveyed diverse demands framed by a shared, but differently articulated, rejection of the status quo. The strength of their unity needs to be understood in the interconnection of these two social strata. On one side, the young student population is a cross-class heterogeneous group that, in the public imagination, is seen as the future of society, and includes students with working class backgrounds as well as sons and daughters of the elites. Students demanded the equal society pledged in 1994 through access to free, quality, decolonized education. On the other hand, outsourced workers, predominantly elderly Black working class women, were a sign that the dominant narrative of 1994, of democracy and the rainbow nation, had been reduced to a sham over the subsequent twenty years. They demonstrate how the highly racialized, unequal, and exploitative working conditions not only persist in current South African society but are even promoted in university spaces within the imperatives of costs reduction and global international rankings. They demanded improvement of their working conditions as well as the same equal society that students were referring to. These two strata are not comparable in terms of homogeneity. The social category of students does not just overlap with that of the working class and cannot be considered as a coherent and homogeneous social class; the student body as a whole is formed by people with diverse backgrounds. Once a student gets to tertiary education, the perimeter and the lines of division between the student’s position and social strata are in a constant state of adjustment. Because of this process, students are regarded, more accurately, as a class in transition. Nonetheless, working together, these two groups created and mutually strengthened the political legitimacy of their demands targeting the core contradictions of South African society. Their unity represented the rejection of the mere corporatist and economist nature of the protests. Through a combined struggle, it was more difficult to label the students as simply middle class, petty bourgeois, eager to climb the social ladder. Equally for workers, their connection with the call for free, quality, decolonized education shifted their demands from what could have been understood as economist and a limited wage negotiation, toward a wider and more comprehensive struggle for dignity. Through their struggle they targeted the broken promises of post-apartheid South Africa, the continuation of racial

200

F. PONTARELLI

capitalism, and the role and function of neoliberal universities in its reproduction (Gillespie & Naidoo, 2019). The support that these struggles gave to each other was not only in the discursive sphere of legitimacy but also in material terms. At UJ workers support for students was vital. Before and even more so after the mass demonstration at the Union Buildings, UJ-FMF could hardly be described as able to stand on its own feet. Without the determination of the workers and their mass-based strike action, the movement at UJ would most likely not have lasted as long as it did. In the words of a student activist: The cleaners led us. Students were afraid and outnumbered by bouncers that had been hired by the university, but the cleaners revolting in their masses across all the campuses gave us the necessary courage to get up and call for free education, decolonization of the curriculum and the university as well insourcing of workers. (Mbambo, 2017, 40)

The Foundations of Worker–Student Unity in Action Worker–student unity emerged beyond the institutionalized university politics and was not based on alliances among distinct organizations. Usually in South African HEIs students have their own structures, mostly connected to youth sections of political parties, while workers mobilize around trade unions. There are a few examples of less bureaucratic and institutionalized organizations that existed before the movement, like the UJ Persistent Solidarity Forum. Nonetheless, FMF-EO was transorganizational; a different space was created in which individuals and collective identities were—partially and in different ways in different phases—fading into a wider movement. This made possible the characterization of their unity as unity in action—understood as an exemplification of ‘social consciousness inserted directly into praxis’ (Lefebvre 1965 in Starr, 2005, 78) and built on a deeply rooted and persisting senso comune. Despite their strength and capacity to gain a foothold in society and in the education sector, neoliberal policies in South Africa have been contested and encountered by various forms of resistance: ‘There is in South Africa [however] a recent memory of a different kind of university life’ (Nash, 2006; see also Pendlebury & van der Walt, 2006). Processes of commodification and market forces in this sector have to deal with the

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

201

widespread idea that associates education with a function of individual as well as collective emancipation, particularly in the interests of disadvantaged communities. The idea that opening the doors of education is the first step toward an equal society is well-grounded among Black students and workers, and South African society at large. The absence of adequate education policies and funding is considered one of the reasons for the ongoing and widening inequality in society and is often used to criticize the outcomes of the uninterrupted government of the ANC. This is a fragment of a widespread senso comune shared by the majority of the population that has its roots in the anti-apartheid struggle and its articulation can be considered the outcome of the current struggle for hegemony. The recognition of the failure of the democratic project, supported by the ruling ANC and framed in the rainbow nation narrative, was at the center of the FMF and EO protests. Placards displayed during the mass demonstration at the Union Buildings in Tshwane on October 23, 2015 showed their rejection of the whole social contract post-1994. In a famous sign, students wrote: ‘Our parents were sold dreams in 1994. We are here for the refund.’ The promises made in 1994 by the ANC government were considered unrealized and higher education was seen as a space that reiterates mechanisms of exclusion and marginalization. Exploitative labor relations, such as the ones imposed by outsourcing companies and promoted by university management, were identified by sections of the movement as part and parcel of this system. The obstacles to education extended beyond the economic field. A sense of insecurity was shared by most of the protesters, not only due to the costs of education in terms of tuition fees, accommodation, daily subsistence, academic materials, high levels of debt, and precarious and exploitative labor relations, but also institutional cultures that in many cases were described as dominated by ‘whiteness’ and as continuing the legacy of the apartheid regime and colonialism. The institutional norms and functioning of the university space represented ideological continuity between pre- and post-1994 in the eyes of many protesters. Education institutions which were supposed to provide a toolbox for emancipation from a disgraceful past were instead experienced by many Black students and workers as having an oppressive function in the present. Students and workers argued that South African universities can, in reality, be considered as ‘western universities in South Africa’ (interview Resp5, UJ student, 2017). The struggle to have access and to overcome significant

202

F. PONTARELLI

difficulties in order to complete studies, combined with the everyday experience of alienation in western structures, produced in the movements not only the demand to stop tuition fee increases, but also debates about the decolonization of education and learning institutions. Among the ways in which those debates were articulated in practice, the unity in action between students and outsourced workers represented one of the most remarkable forms. It is worth noting that for the establishing of worker–student unity the dominant motivation described by students was not an abstract application of class analysis and an identification of workers as comrades, or as fellow members of the working class. Students were also not driven by varyingly liberal tendencies to seek justice for the socially devalued and economically marginalized workers. Instead, the main unifying factor was a deep feeling of belonging to the same oppressed community. In the eyes of students, workers became ‘abazali bethu’ (‘our parents’ in Zulu) (Resp2, UJ student, 2017), potential fathers and mothers, fellow relatives subjected to the shared oppression produced in the university space. The identification of workers as members of the same community was aligned with the re-emergence of Black Consciousness (BC) politics— with political narratives of ‘Black pain’ and the ‘Black condition’—and was a critical component in the construction of forms of solidarity and unity between students and workers. It was a mutual relation; the identification of workers as mothers and fathers by students was reciprocated by the workers who took action for their daughters and sons in a potential project of emancipation from forms of oppression and exploitation. In the words of a previously outsourced worker at UJ: We [students and workers] were together. Most of the hygiene controllers are elderly people, they [students] took them as their parents, just as the workers took the students as their children. The unity started with that. Students said, these are our parents. You could hear the ‘mamas’ . (Resp3, UJ outsourced worker, 2018)

The unity expressed a connection between the sphere of the ideological references, such as BC and its emancipatory aspects, and the material conditions of being part of a marginalized and oppressed community in a specific time and space; a particular context in which race identity

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

203

intermeshed with class identity and created space for the combination of class struggle and identity politics. The struggle was legitimized by a shared senso comune that highlighted intolerable oppression and unfulfilled expectations. In the words of a student activist at UJ: [...] with being African you cannot look at an old person and not see your mother or father, this is how we have been raised. We were raised up to believe the next-door neighbor is your mother and your father. Even the way in which you interact with them, you would call them mama or baba. Also there was that thing of, you know, also my mother is a cleaner, my dad is a gardener, my dad is a security guard; in a sense we related with them on that basis. These are our people. Definitely we have seen them as our mother and father, but outside of that, when we put into context everything that is happening, we see them also as exploited as us in a sense that they are oppressed as us. I think it was more, yoh, that person could be my mother bra, actually could be my mother. (interview Resp4, UJ student, 2017)

Instead of being framed within class analysis, the consciousness of political subjectivities, in this case, was articulated mostly along racial and community lines and with the awareness that the formal end of apartheid institutions had not exhausted the need for transformation. The creation of potential alternative social relations, not based on different and subaltern roles in the university community, but characterizing the movements’ members—whether students or workers—as members of a family, was not only an organizing tactic but also a form of decolonization in practice.12 The attempt to normalize the hierarchical order and social relations in the academic environment—as a direct expression of those across society— were not only questioned but also subverted by the worker–student unity. The fact that most of the outsourced workers were undertaking reproductive labor in a capitalist system that usually ignores or undervalues such effort adds importance and significance to the potential power of this process of reconfiguration. Worker–student unity, at its peak, expressed itself in a repertoire of practices that attempted to alleviate the other’s weaknesses and intensify the other’s strengths. The findings show that the category of unity in action also expressed the capacity to act together within a framework of alternative social relations—underpinned by the re-emergence of BC politics—and to organize beyond the limits of the institutionalized path. The ability to link together ideological and practical spheres in

204

F. PONTARELLI

a national movement that was gaining momentum resulted in a potentially significant threat to the legitimacy of the system of governance of the university and beyond. The unity between outsourced workers and students gave one another visibility, moral authority, a leverage in relation to their counterparts and enhanced the effectiveness of their actions.

Unprecedented but Precarious Outcomes As the most significant post-apartheid mobilization in HEIs, FMF-EO achieved unprecedented victories. As mentioned in the previous section, only 10 days after the first demonstration at Wits, a significant achievement—0% fee increase for 2016—came directly from the ANC and South African President Zuma. However, the first victory very soon appeared to be limited. The movement’s determination expressed through forms of struggle beyond institutional platforms, such as worker–student unity, opened space for practicing and discussing alternative politics and for a profound critique of post-apartheid South Africa. The 0% fee increase announcement did not curb students’ movement and, in the space of a few weeks, under the pressure produced by unforeseen high levels of mobilization of the most precarious sections of the university community, many universities’ management across the country had to sign insourcing agreements and to contribute to immediate wage increases of workers. At UJ, after the long unprotected strike, several attempts at cooptation of student and worker leaders, numerous suspensions, and hundreds of arrests, the signed agreement between protestors and management included significant immediate concessions for workers: an additional monthly allowance of R1000 (about 30% wage increase) for the transition period, a one-off allowance of R2500 (to recover wages lost during the strike), no victimization or dismissal, and a process of insourcing that was supposed to be ‘transparent and accountable to workers’ (from the signed agreement on 18 November 2015). The end of outsourcing labor relations was an extraordinary victory. It was an unprecedented political success; the process of insourcing is a counter-tendency compared to the current unfolding of neoliberal policies across the world and a defeat of the rationale behind the development of ‘neoliberal universities.’ Furthermore, it represents prospects for the material improvement of thousands of previously outsourced workers’’ lives. The insourcing victory not only restored the dignity of workers against a narrative that considered them disposable and invisible within

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

205

university premises (Luckett & Mzobe, 2016), but resulted in an immediate 30% and a prospect of a more than 100% wage increase (Hlatshwayo, 2020). According to interviewed outsourced cleaners at UJ, their wages improved from an average of R2800 when employed by outsourcing service providers, to an R6800 monthly wage after the insourcing process (interviews Resp6, Resp7, Resp3, UJ outsourced workers, 2018). Furthermore, the more stable working conditions included entitlement to leave, sick pay, medical aid, and free education for them and their children in the institutions where they are employed. These victories can be considered limited and insufficient to alter the appalling levels of inequality in South African society, but they still represent a significant change for hundreds of workers and their families at UJ, and thousands across the country. From the process by which insourcing has been conducted, these victories can be considered as part of management’s wider strategy that aimed to favor the demobilization of workers in the students’ struggle. At UJ outsourced workers were completely marginalized in the conduct and direction of the insourcing process. The insourcing task team was implemented without the involvement of any of the students and workers active during the protests. UJ established, without consultation, a ‘roadmap to insourcing’ in which the most militant section of the previously outsourced workers, the cleaners, was to be insourced last, two and a half years after the agreement was signed (UJ Roadmap to Insourcing, Fieldnotes March 2017). Even in the aftermath of the insourcing process workers were subjected to a six-month probation contract that clearly aimed to intimidate them from undertaking any kind of protest action. This approach was combined with an increased level of securitization of the university premises that involved tight security guard checks and meticulous processes to have access to campuses, in addition to the usual fingerprint and card recognition machines at the entrances. The importance of mechanisms of control on previously outsourced workers demonstrates the extent of the threat they posed in joining their actions with students, in creating a space for changing senso comune with criticisms of the inherent contradictory nature of post-apartheid South Africa and offering glimmers of alternative social relations articulated through the worker–student unity in action. It can be argued that their unprecedented victories, which made FMF-EO stand out in South African post-apartheid history, were facilitated by the management’s and the state’s necessity to slow down a movement that was outside their

206

F. PONTARELLI

control. The prospect of no fees for a considerable number of students materialized in the following years, and the end of outsourcing relations are remarkable ameliorations in people’s living conditions, but it is clear that they are not enough for those who envision a more equal and less oppressive society. Nonetheless, the movement’s value lies also in the experience it provided for a whole generation of students and activists; it produced possibilities that could have gone way beyond the victories it achieved, and offered important lessons that need to be remembered.

Conclusion FMF is one of the most significant social movements in post-apartheid South Africa in terms of numbers, scope, and achievements. In the academic literature, little attention has been given to the role played by outsourced workers in the wider student movement, even less to the nature of their unity with students in non-elite universities. This chapter fills this gap with an analysis of the foundations of worker–student unity at UJ during the peak of the FMF-EO movement. Drawing on in-depth interviews, literature, and extensive participant observation, this chapter analyzes some of the aspects crucial to understanding the unprecedented victory—the end to outsourcing of labor relations—attained by the struggle of outsourced workers and students at UJ in October and November 2015. It argues that the success of the movement was based on an approach of worker–student unity in action that, drawing from the progressive aspects of a historically determined senso comune, was an expression of the blatant societal contradictions, as well as a concrete articulation of a potential alternative. The analysis of the worker–student unity shows that thousands of mobilized students and workers connected their desires and hopes for change through a common struggle, and not only in ideological and theoretical ways. Starting from the clash between people’s expectations and the neoliberal trend, embedded in the progressive aspects of a historically determined conception of the world among South African people, the analysis focused on three aspects of this unity: it was based on a conceptualization of collective identity that cannot be reduced to class consciousness but was instead drawn along racial and community lines; its strength also came from the possibility to go beyond the constraints of institutional paths; it represented more than the sum of its members,

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

207

offering a rejection of the status quo through the provision of possible alternative social relations. In a historical period in which activists highlighted the detachment between a radical narrative, present even in the seats of government, and its material enactment, the practical articulation of the solidarity between students and workers challenged the normalized social relations and had the potential to reach beyond the university walls. The heavy influence on public debate and the mobilization of thousands of activists across the country opened spaces for alternative politics. The foundations of a liberal democracy with shocking inequalities, and the whole nature of the post-apartheid system, were questioned. The possibility to discuss the call for free, quality, decolonized education was established. University managements together with repressive state apparatuses were united by the offer of important concessions, hampering the development of the movement. However, these institutional efforts demonstrated the fragility of the current system of governance based on high levels of inequality, and revealed possibilities for its disruption, as well as its capacity to restructure itself and absorb significant unrest. In this research, the analysis of the outcomes of the struggle, at the peak of the worker–student unity, demonstrates the potential of the movement in relation to the ideological and material conditions of South African HEIs and society. It became clear very soon to the government and universities that the wave of protests and their impact on wider society needed to be controlled through a mixture of repression and the provision of significant concessions. The recent history of the country, the influence of international movements like Black Lives Matter, the re-emergence of BC, the widespread presence of left-wing debates, and the expectations of a better future for the majority of oppressed people echoed in the worker– student movement and became fertile terrain for unveiling contradictions in the hegemonic narratives and for the promotion of processes of social change. Through working together, the different components of the university community questioned what at the time were normalized relations in HEIs, and provided a glimmer of possibility for new ones, for a new senso comune, capable of replacing the current conditions of intolerable exploitation and oppression.

208

F. PONTARELLI

Notes 1. A movement formed by students, academics, workers, and activists from Wits and UJ that took its name from its first day of action organized in 2015. On that day, two demonstrations took place at UJ and Wits protesting against conditions for outsourced workers in HEIs and promoting the cause of insourcing in the universities. 2. In many HEIs the struggle against outsourcing took the name of #OutsourcingMustFall. This chapter uses #EndOutsourcing as the label that circulated at UJ at the outset of the protest in October 2015. 3. In this study I decided to use the Italian term rather than the English translation ‘common sense’ because of the particular connotation in Gramsci’s theoretical work and its unclear correspondence with the usual meaning in English (Thomas, 2009, 16, note 61). 4. Current South Africa’s Higher Education sector continues to be strongly influenced by the heritage of apartheid (Davies, 1996). Despite 1990s ANC government policies, the division between the so-called historically White universities and the historically Black universities has yet to be structurally overcome. 5. The relation between researcher and research participants raises significant issues generated through differing positionalities which are beyond the scope of the present chapter. 6. Data available at https://www.chet.org.za/data/sahe-open-data (accessed 1 January 2018). 7. And resulted in the strengthening of hierarchies among tertiary institutions, given that most of the resources from private parties concentrated their funding in elite universities, such as the University of Stellenbosch and UCT. 8. Data available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=9131 (accessed 1 January 2018). 9. Data available at https://www.chet.org.za/data/sahe-open-data (accessed 1 January 2018). 10. At UJ, the use of financial support programs is significant, NSFAS in 2015 assisted 9658 students at UJ, almost 20% of its student population (NSFAS, 2015). 11. This chapter uses the racial descriptors ‘Black African,’ ‘Colored,’ ‘White,’ and ‘Indian/Asian’ for research purposes. I am aware that these racial descriptors characterized apartheid policies and practices. They are used to provide historical context and comparisons as well as to enquire into the effects of current practices and policies in facing the inequities of the past, and to show to what extent they continue into the present. 12. The reference to a process of decolonization in practice within the FMFEO struggle was beautifully expressed by Robin D.G. Kelley in a seminar

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

209

hosted by the History Workshop, the Centre for Education Rights and Transformation and the Palestine Solidarity Campaign at Wits on 20 March 2019.

References Adams, F. (2006). Managerialism and higher education governance: Implications for South African universities? South African Journal of Higher Education, 20(1), 5–16. Berdahl, R. M. (2008). Developed universities and the developing world: Opportunities and obligations. In L. E. Weber & J. Duderstadt (Eds.), The globalization of higher education. Calgary: Economica Ltd. Bezuidenhout, A., & Fakier, K. (2006). Maria’s burden: Contract cleaning and the crisis of social reproduction in post-apartheid South Africa. Antipode, 38(3), 462–485. Booysen, S. (Ed.). (2016). Fees must fall: Student revolt, decolonisation and governance in South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Burawoy, M. (2009). The extended case method: Four countries, four decades, four great transformations, and one theoretical tradition. Berkely: University of California Press. Burawoy, M., Burton, A., Ferguson, A. A., & Fox, K. J. (1991). Ethnography unbound: Power and resistance in the modern metropolis. Berkley: University of California Press. Chinguno, C., Kgoroba, M., Mashibini, S., Masilela, B. N., Maubane, B., Moyo, N., Mthombeni, A., & Ndlovu, H. (2017). Rioting and writing: Diaries of the wits fallists. Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP). Cini, L. (2019). Disrupting the neoliberal university in South Africa: The #FeesMustFall movement in 2015. Current Sociology, 67 (7), 942–959. Davies, J. (1996). The state and the South African University system under apartheid. Comparative Education, 32(3), 319–332. della Porta, D., Cini, L., & Guzmán Concha, C. (2020). Contesting higher education: Student movements against neoliberal universities. Bristol: Bristol University Press. Department of Higher Education and Training. (2017). Statistics on post-school education and training in South Africa: 2015. Johannesburg: www.dhet. gov.za. Gill, R. (2013). Breaking the silence: The hidden injuries of the neoliberal university. In R. Ryan-Flood & R. Gill (Eds.), Secrecy and silence in the research process: Feminist reflections (pp. 228–244). London: Routledge. Gillespie, K., & Naidoo, L.-A. (2019). Introduction #MustFall. The South African student movement and the politics of time. South Atlantic Quarterly, 118(1), 190–194.

210

F. PONTARELLI

Gramsci, A. (2007). Prison notebooks (J. A. Buttigieg, Ed., Vol. 3). New York: Columbia University Press. Hamilton, S. (2017). Pedagogy of struggle: #OutsourcingMustFall. In A. von Kotze & S. Walters (Eds.), Forging solidarity: Popular education at work (pp. 181–192). Sense. Hart, G. (2018). Relational comparison revisited: Marxist postcolonial geographies in practice*. Progress in Human Geography, 42(3), 371–394. Hlatshwayo, M. (2020). Solidarity during the ‘Outsourcing Must Fall’ Campaign: The role of different players in ending outsourcing at South African universities. Politikon, 47 (3), 305–320. Kamola, I. A. (2016). Situating ‘The Global University’ in South Africa. In M.H. Chou, I. A. Kamola, & T. Pietsch (Eds.), The transnational politics of higher education: Contesting the global/transforming the local (pp. 42–62). London: Routledge. Kenny, B., & Clarke, M. (2000). University Workers: Exclude them out. Southern Africa Report, 15(4), 27–30. Lehohla, P., & STATSSA. (2016). Financial statistics of higher education institutions 2015 [Presentation]. http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P91031/ HEI_2015_Media_Presentation.pdf. Luckett, T., & Mzobe, D. (2016). #OutsourcingMustFall: The role of workers in the 2015 protest Wave at South African universities. Global Labour Journal, 7 (1), 94–99. Luporini, C. (1987). Senso comune e filosofia. In C. Ricchini, E. Manca, & L. Melograni (Eds.), Antonio Gramsci: Le sue idee nel nostro tempo (pp. 132– 133). Rome: Editrice L’Unità. Maistry, S. (2014). Education for economic growth: A neoliberal fallacy in South Africa! Alternation, 21(1), 57–75. Mbambo, O. (2017). Iron fists & the courage of resistance. Publica[c]Tion, 1, 40–41. McCammon, H., & Moon, M. (2015). Social movement coalitions. In D. della Porta & M. Diani (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of social movements (pp. 326– 339). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nash, A. (2006). Restructuring South African Universities. In Asinamali: University Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Africa World Press. Ngcaweni, W., & Ngcaweni, B. (2018). We are no longer at ease: The struggle for #FeesMustFall. Johannesburg: Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd. NSFAS. (2015). Annual Report 2014/2015. NSFAS Toward a student-centred approach. National Student Financial Aid Scheme. Johannesburg: http:// www.nsfas.org.za/content/reports/NSFAS%20AR%202014-15.pdf. Ntshingila, O. (2016). #OutsourcingMustFall through the eyes of workers. In S. Booysen (Ed.), Fees must fall: Student revolt, decolonisation and governance in South Africa (pp. 87–100). Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

8

WORKER–STUDENT UNITY AGAINST OUTSOURCING …

211

Pendlebury, J., & van der Walt, L. (2006). Neoliberalism, bureaucracy, and resistance at Wits University. Asinamali: University struggles in post-apartheid South Africa (pp. 79–92). Africa World Press. Pithouse, R. (Ed.). (2006). Asinamali: University struggles in post-apartheid South Africa. Africa World Press. Rhodes Must Fall. (2018). Rhodes must fall: The struggle for justice at the heart of empire (B. Kwoba, R. Chantiluke, & A. Nkpo, Eds.). London: ZED Books. Rustin, M. (2016). The neoliberal university and its alternatives. Soundings, 63(63), 147–176. Satgar, V. (2016). Bringing class back in: Against outsourcing during #FeesMustFall at Wits. In S. Booysen (Ed.), Fees must fall: Student revolt, decolonisation and governance in South Africa (pp. 214–234). Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Seabe, B. (2018). Guest editorial: What activism looks like in institutions of higher learning. Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 40(2). IX-XV. Sinwell, L. (2019). The #Fees Must Fall Movement: “Disruptive Power” and the politics of student-worker alliances at the University of the Free State (2015–2016). South African Review of Sociology, 50(3–4), 42–56. Starr, P. (2005). The uses of confusion: Lefebvre’s commune. Contemporary French Civilization, 29(1), 67–84. Thomas, P. D. (2009). The Gramscian moment: Philosophy, hegemony and Marxism. Brill. Vally, S. (2015). The education crisis and the struggle to achieve quality public education in South Africa. Education as Change, 19(2), 151–168. Van der Walt, L., Bolsmann, C., Johnson, B., & Martin, L. (2003). Globalization, the market university and support service outsourcing in South Africa: Class struggle, convergence and difference, 1994–2001. Society in Transition, 34(2), 272–294. Van Dyke, N., & McCammon, H. J. (Eds.). (2010). Strategic alliances: Coalition building and social movements. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Interviews Resp1 Resp2 Resp3 Resp4 Resp5 Resp6 Resp7 Resp8

UJ UJ UJ UJ UJ UJ UJ UJ

student 2016. student 2017. outsourced worker student 2017. student 2017. outsourced worker outsourced worker outsourced worker

2018.

2018. 2018. 2017.

CHAPTER 9

From Revolt to Reform: Student Protests and the Higher Education Agenda in England 2009–2019 Hector Rios-Jara

Introduction The recent waves of student protests in the United Kingdom (2010/2017), Chile (2011/2012), Quebec (2012), and South Africa (2015) have renewed attention to student activism and its political impact (della Porta, 2020). Student protests against neoliberalism have significantly changed higher education policy and party politics. Free Education policies and the call for the elimination of student debt have gained attention in recent policy debates. And student movements have also been a fertile ground in which to spawn new political parties or endorse emergent political forces (Donoso & Somma, 2019). Recent studies on student activism remark that protest impacts depend on the links between movement alliances, governmental action, and policy

H. Rios-Jara (B) Social Research Institute, University College London (UCL), London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_9

213

214

H. RIOS-JARA

change (Cini, 2019b; Donoso & Somma, 2019). During the last wave of student protests, the introduction of fees and loan and the lack of representativeness within the political system were fundamental in defining the structure of political opportunities of student and the tendency to soften or radicalize social conflict in Higher Education (HE) (Cini, 2019b; Donoso & Somma, 2019). Still, the impact of student protests varies greatly among cases (della Porta, 2020). In countries like Chile and South Africa, students gained significant influence on policy and party politics (Cini & Guzmán-Concha, 2017). In contrast, in England, student protests failed to make significant changes in higher education policy (Cini, 2019a; Rios-Jara, 2019). In this chapter I explore two questions. What were the policy impacts of English student protests during the last decade? And what kind of strategic factors shape the low impact of English student activists on higher education policy? The fluctuating pattern of protest and close ties between higher education reforms and protests make the English case relevant for exploring how government policy shape student activists. The English case also help to understand how links between student organizations and political parties might affect the impact of protests on policy. Most of the research on the English protests has concentrated on the events of 2010–2012 (Hensby, 2017b; Myers, 2017), leaving unexplored the late trajectory of student activism, the implementation of new higher education reform in 2017, and the relationship between students and Corbynism. In this chapter, I analyze the alliance system and policy impacts of the waves of student protests in England during the higher education reforms of 2010 and 2017. In the chapter, I argue that even though student protests were unable to stop the reforms of 2010 and 2017, the alliances between student organizations and their links with party politics shape the impact of student protests on policy agenda and policy implementation. During 2010 reforms, student activists orientated their strategy to deploy massive street mobilization with low links with political parties, while in 2017 most of the campaign included a convergent combination of street mobilization with closer ties with party politics. The strategies did not stop the reforms, but the closer cooperation between student organizations and the Labour party during 2017 reform increased the impact of student activism in the policy agenda. To explore this argument, I organized the chapter into six sections: First, I analyze theoretical debates on social movement organizations,

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

215

alliance systems, and protest impact during recent waves of anti-austerity protests. Next, I give a historical context on the wave of English student protests and their links with higher education reforms during the last decade. Section four provides methodological details of the research. In section five, I analyze the alliances and policy impacts of the waves of student protests of 2009–2014 and the student campaigns against the HE reforms in 2015–2019. I conclude the chapter by sharing reflections and some dilemmas that the English case brings to the analysis of the impact of anti-austerity struggles, and their transition from social movement to party-movements.

Gaining Influence: Movements, Alliances, and Policy Change The relationships between activist groups, governments, and political parties have always been fundamental to understanding the impact of protests. In this section, I explore how the dynamics of cooperation and alliances between Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) and third parties affect the impact of protests on policy. Cooperation and Alliances in Social Movements The alliances between SMOs are fundamental to understanding the strength of movements and their impacts. Since social movements are coalitions of organizations, the development of alliances between SMOs is an essential part of the trajectory of social movements (Tarrow, 2011). SMOs refer to formal groups whose support is based on the direct participation of members that share common political goals and mobilize different forms of contentious activity (McCarthy & Zald, 1980). Rucht (2007) proposes the concept of alliance systems to analyze the dynamics of cooperation and competition between SMOs. The author explains that collaboration between SMOs relies on organizational and strategic affinities of SMOs in a specific context. SMOs with high organizational and strategic affinity have more opportunities to cooperate than groups with organizational and political differences. For example, established organizations with highly developed systems of coordination tend to be more cautious when creating alliances with new organizations, with less developed structures of coordination and less political capital. These

216

H. RIOS-JARA

differences can reduce the possibilities of cooperation and raise strategic dilemmas between SMOs that share a common field of contention. The literature on student movement describes significant tension among SMOs or faction inside movements with different political strategies (Rucht, 2007). In recent student protests, the literature distinguishes at least two ideal types of political strategy (della Porta, 2020). A radical strategy of protests that privileges massive mobilization and horizontal accumulation of alliances between SMOs with a similar economic and political status. And a moderate strategy that pursues social change with a mixture of institutional and noninstitutional alliances. Radicals tend to dismiss alliances with third parties involved in party politics because they stress the value of noninstitutional tactics as a mechanism to achieve social change. In contrast, moderates tend to rely more on political parties as crucial allies that can deliver constituencies demands without permanent mobilization. In doing so, moderate SMOs tend to operate as pressure or interest groups, lobbying or persuading political incumbents, through localized protests, in order to achieve social change (Weible et al., 2011). To understand the alliance system of a movement, it is also relevant to consider the interactive effect between SMOs and political context (Rucht, 2007; Tarrow, 2011). Alliances between SMOs can be expansive if they take advantage of political opportunities provided by political systems and the construction of links with third parties and sympathizers outside the conflict. Third parties can be political parties in government, opposition, or SMOs from other movements not directly involved in the conflict. These political forces can intervene in the trajectory of conflict and mediate their results, expanding or restricting the impacts of SMOs. In the context of anti-austerity protests, strategic alliances between SMOs and third parties have been complex. Initially, most of the SMOs involved in anti-austerity protests refused to cooperate with traditional parties adopting more radical strategies of social change (della Porta, 2015; Ishkanian & Glasius, 2018). However, during the last years, some SMOs have been active in creating or joining new political movements and moderating their mechanisms of political pressure. As della Porta et al. (2017) analyze, after 2013, some SMOs involved in antiausterity protests become founding members and active participants in new political parties. The cases of Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and Corbynism in the United Kingdom are prime examples of this trend (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019). These political forces are a mix of social movements, networks, and official political parties called

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

217

party-movements. Party-movements are political forces involved in the institutional context, but they display values, habits, and sources from social movements (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019; Kioupkiolis, 2016). The mixture of sources and strategies made more diverse the alliance system of party-movement and blurred the frontiers between institutional and noninstitutional means of pressure. However, those mixtures tend to generate several tensions inside organizations and across SMOs, making party-movement politically unstable and very sensitive to changes in the political context. Assessing the Policy Influence of Movements As Rucht (2007) stresses, the alliance system of SMOs affects the possibilities of movements to interact with the policymaking process, and therefore it determines the impact of protests. However, defining the effects of protests has always been problematic in social movement theory. Social movement studies remark on how difficult it is to distinguish between victories and failures of protests, recognizing the varieties of impacts that protests can have on political context, activists lives, and organizations (Bosi & Uba, 2009; Kolb, 2007). Recently, Cini (2019a) offered a new typology of protest impacts on universities, based on the initial proposal of Kolb (2007). Cini (2019a) identifies (a) agenda impacts, (b) alternative impacts, (c) policy impacts, (d) implementation impacts, and (e) good impacts of protests at university. Cini’s typology helps to analyze student protests in the context of university politics, but it can be used to explore the impact of student protests on higher education at a national level. Based on Cini’s typology, I distinguish between agenda and policy impacts of student protests. I define agenda impacts as the capacity of movements to, directly or indirectly, affect political and institutional plans announced by the government in higher education. I define policy impacts as the adoption of legislation or a change in the government proposal caused, directly or indirectly, by social movement action. From a policy perspective, the distinction between agenda and policy impacts represents moments and opportunities for challengers trying to intervene in the policy process (Weible et al., 2011). Agenda impacts usually describe changes derived from protests during policy design, including critical evaluation of previous policies, identifying current needs, defining priorities, and implementing alternative measures. On the other

218

H. RIOS-JARA

hand, policy impacts describe changes generated by movements once government announcements are ready to legislate or during the implementation of policies already passed by legislative bodies. During this stage, SMOs can intervene directly or indirectly, adding or removing some aspects of a policy proposal, pushing the government and parliamentary members to change, reject, or include modifications on a bill. From the perspective of movements, the differentiation between direct and indirect means is also relevant since social movements and protests are noninstitutional forms of political pressure. SMOs usually are outside of the policy process, or they have a limited scope of intervention because of the laws and rules of party politics that governed the policymaking process (von Bülow & Bidegain Ponte, 2015). SMOs can find unmediated or direct channels to negotiate with government officers, intervening by themselves in the policy cycle and becoming insiders (von Bülow & Donoso, 2017). These cases rarely occur, and most of the time SMOs impacts operate through mediated channels, where third parties or sympathetic insiders push for a policy change within the context of protests (von Bülow & Donoso, 2017). Consequently, SMOs can have access to direct negotiations with governments or parliamentary representatives, but their impact will always be a mixture of direct and indirect channels and despite the adoption of a radical or moderate strategy (Donoso & Somma, 2019). There is no clear view about if a radical or moderate strategy is better in the context of student protests. The trajectories of successful social movements usually reach a point of strategic change where organizations can increase their options of influencing policy affairs directly, becoming incumbents, or remaining as outsider challengers with more autonomy but limited power to intervene in policy (Tarrow, 2011). SMOs experience this transition as a dilemma about which direction the alliance system should lean toward. Alliances with political parties might increase policy impacts, getting more direct channels of intervention into the policymaking process. However, this strategy could erode agreements between SMOs, weakening the overall capacity of SMOs to mobilize their constituencies and deploy mass protests. This strategic dilemma also threatens divisions and even the collapse of SMOs, because it requires transforming SMOs into pressure groups, party-movements, or other forms of political affiliation.

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

219

English Student Protests and Higher Education Reforms As I argued early, the trajectory of student protests in England provides a significant case to explore how alliances generated by student organizations can affect the impact of protests on higher education policy. However, there are still several gaps and debates about how the English student protests are linked to recent higher education reforms and policy agenda. In this section, I summarize the main changes in higher education policy and their relationship to student protests. English Higher Education Reforms Between 2009 and 2019, England had two successive waves of HE reforms that coincided with a national wave of university protests and several contentious episodes and protests campaigns led by students. The “2010 reforms” correspond to changes approved between 2010 and 2011 by the Coalition Government (2010–2015), which took place in the system in 2012 (Murphy et al., 2018). The reforms were in line with the austerity agenda, which aimed to reduce the fiscal deficit; a primary target of the coalition government after the 2008 crisis (HM Government, 2010) and the guidelines suggested in the “Review of higher education funding and student finance” (2010), also known as Browne Review. The policies included a 70% reduction of teaching grants for universities, their replacement with higher tuition fees, and a massive extension of the student loan system (Carpentier, 2012; Marginson, 2018). In 2015 the new government started the second wave of reforms. In November 2015, the government published the green paper “Fulfilling Our Potential,” which later became the white paper “Higher education: success as a knowledge economy” (HM Government, BIS, 2016) and finally turned it into the Higher Education and Research Act in 2017. The act replaced the Higher Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE) by the Office for Student (OfS), which since 2018, defined a new framework and regulations for the HE system. The new structure gave universities more autonomy to offer courses, reduce quality controls over provision, and make flexible the criteria to open new universities and receive degree awarding powers. Also, during this period, maintenance

220

H. RIOS-JARA

grants were implemented and replaced with loans. The maximum tuitionfees cap also suffered a further rise, reaching a peak of £9250 for those providers with the highest teaching standards. Both reforms are part of the same policy agenda, whose aims were to reduce the state’s responsibility in the provision and funding of higher education and to liberalize the higher education system (Heller & Callender, 2013; Johnstone & Marcucci, 2010). The agenda means the transfer of responsibility of higher education funding to householders, raising tuition fees, and implementing selective financial aids for those who cannot pay upfront (Carpentier, 2012). As scholars coincide, this agenda meant a transformation of higher education’s political economy, from a regulated quasi-market to a low regulated market system (Marginson, 2018; McGettigan, 2013). Student Resistance and Protests in England The successful implementation of higher education reforms did not come about without resistance. The “2010 reforms” were met with a massive wave of protests. Protests began with the first university cuts at the end of 2009 and continue when Browne Review was published in October 2010. Protests reached a peak in November and December of 2010. After these episodes, mobilizations continued, but they progressively declined in 2011. Most of the literature agrees that in 2010 activists were unable to stop the rise of tuition fees and later reforms being defeated by the coalition government and its austerity agenda (Ibrahim, 2013). However, authors like Myers (2017), Cini (2019a), and Hensby (2017b) propose an optimistic balance stressing some partial victories of activists. Students succeeded in delaying the government white paper. So the government postponed some reforms until the next government and the debate of the new Higher Education and Research Act in 2017. Student protests also impeded fee rises in Scotland, North of Ireland, and Wales. As scholars remark, 2010 protests lost against reforms, but they helped to politicize HE and position free education as a political alternative on the national agenda (Myers, 2017). From 2015, many student activists supported the rise of Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party (2015–2019), pushing for the inclusion of the free education policy in the Labour manifesto, that was finally incorporated during the general election campaigns of 2017 and 2019 (Labour Party, 2017, 2019).

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

221

Methodology To explore the policy impacts of student activism, I analyze the contentious events led by university student organizations against higher education reforms in England during the last decade. To analyze the decade, I distinguish two periods of reform and contention. The first one goes from 2009 to 2014, and it includes the design and implementation of the 2010 reforms and the rise and fall of the 2010 student protests. The second period goes from 2015 to 2019. It includes the design and implementation of the Higher Education and Research Act of 2017 and the ups and downs of different campaigns against the policy. To delimitate each period, I pick as cut-off points the years when higher education policy changes started. For the first period, I picked 2009 because it was the year when Labour called for the Browne Review and implemented the first cuts on university grants triggering the first anti-cuts occupations. For the second period, I define 2015 because, after May’s general election, the conservative government started a new agenda of HE reforms related to student campaigns and the rise of Corbynism. My analysis goes until the general election of 2019 and the beginning of the global pandemic, which significantly change British politics, higher education agenda, and student activism. To analyze both periods, I crossed information from student protest events reported by media, interviews with activists and policymakers, and policy and student organizations’ documents. To identify the impact of protests on policy, I examine the existence of historical correlations between protests and policy changes. Then I examine documents, media reports, and reflections of activists and policymakers about the interaction between protests and policies. Finally, I analyze what, how, and why the government change some measures due to the policy process. The triangulation of those analyses helps me to identify if changes in policy proposals were related to protests events, a combination of protest with other political pressure, or other factors. The analysis that I describe in the chapter is based on the triangulation of primary and secondary sources from higher education policy and university student activism. I conducted ten interviews with higher education experts and policymakers involved in higher education reforms and fifteen student activists involved in key campaigns in the sector during the last decade. I analyzed around forty-five official documents of

222

H. RIOS-JARA

higher education reforms and 40 documents produced by student organizations and political parties. In addition, I analyze a selection of 350 media reports on student protests over the decade, publishing in national newspapers (The Guardian, The Independent, BCC ) and some local and sectoral media such as Varsity, Time of Higher Education, Counterfire. My analysis is focused on campaigns and protest events led by university student organizations against higher education reforms. Therefore, I did not include anti-racist, feminist, LGTB+, green and other expressions of student’s activism that play an essential role in university politics (Dean, 2016; Rhoads, 2016). The reason for this preference is to maximize opportunities to analyze the interaction between reforms and protests, which present closer ties in protests explicitly related to higher education reforms. Secondly, policy-orientated protests also have been the most massive and nationally spread. During the last decade, anti-racist, LGTB+, and other expressions of student activism have been localized in university campuses, usually related to everyday experiences of students with less explicit connections to policy changes and fewer efforts of national coordination.

Student Protests and Higher Education Reforms England 2009/19 In this section, I analyze two periods of anti-austerity protests led by university student activists against higher education reform in England during the last decade. For each period, I analyze the HE reforms impulsed by government, the strategy, and alliance system of student activists against higher reforms and the policy impact of protests. The Rise and Fall of Anti-Austerity Student Activism [2009–2014] The first period of reform and contention took place between 2009 and 2014. This period includes the design and implementation of 2010 reforms and the display of diverse and massive forms of contentious student activity between October 2009 and March 2011 and its progressive decline and fragmentation from 2012 to 2014.

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

223

Rising Fees and the Revival of Student Activism [2009–2011] The rise of this wave can be traced to October 2009, when the first wave of university cuts was implemented, and students organized local anticuts groups and university occupations to defend their departments. This period ended on March 26, 2011, when the Trade Union Central (TUC) called for a national demonstration marking the peak of anti-austerity protests in the United Kingdom (Saunders et al., 2015). The demo was joined by half a million protestors in London, making it the broadest coalition of SMOs against austerity. Most of the literature describes three political factors as primary causes of the wave—first, the raising fees policy proposed by the Browne Review and endorsed by the Coalition government. Second, the austerity agenda led by the Coalition government; and finally, the breaking of the pledge against fee rises signed between Liberal Democrats and the National Union of Students (NUS) during the 2010 general election (Ibrahim, 2011, 2013; Myers, 2017). The wave included eight national days of action, which started with London’s national demonstration on 10th November. That demonstration drew 50,000 students in London and ended up with the occupation of the Conservative headquarters at Millbank. The wave concluded with the rally for saving Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) at the end of January 2011. It also includes local activism, with a wave of around 53 university occupations across the country plus several local demonstrations organized during the weeks prior to the parliamentary vote on rising fees at December 9, 2010 (Myers, 2017; Rios-Jara, 2019). During this period, student organizations presented a fragmented alliance system, with multiple national organizations trying to conduct the protests. Most activists lacked organic links or membership to any of the national organizations (Rios-Jara, 2019). There were three-four leading organizations in the movement: The National Union of Students (NUS), the University College Union (UCU), the National Campaign Against Fees and Cuts (NCAFC), and the Education Activist Network (EAN). These organizations operated in two coalitions with a competitive relationship, determined by their strategic differences. NUS and UCU were a coalition of institutionalized SMOs. Both organizations present high levels of cooperation, determined by their strategical affinity during the conflict. These organizations mobilize their constituencies on the street to increase their ability to pressure MPs

224

H. RIOS-JARA

and to oppose government reform. This block concentrates efforts on lobbying MPs through direct persuasion and technical argumentation. For example, they elaborated blueprints and technical papers with alternative proposals to tuition fees rises, proposing a new tax for graduates. This group orientated its alliance system to coalitions with third parties with more influence and access to intervene directly in the policymaking process. For example, NUS and UCU tried to build alliances with the MPs from the Labour Party. NUS also tried to persuade LibDem MPs to keep the pledge signed during the campaign and reject the government’s proposals. The second group was an alliance of emergent SMOs. The NCAFC and ENA were horizontal networks of activists whose aims were to build a massive coalition of activist groups able to challenge the government through mass protests. This alliance orientated its effort to construct students–workers solidarity, which represents the largest and most affected sector by policy reforms. This strategy explicitly opposed the articulation of students with third parties and technical lobby. For example, the NCAFC fought and denounced any alliance with political parties, including Labour. In their view, Labour did not represent a genuine alternative to tuition fees and cuts, as both were part of Labour policy during the previous decade. I think the leading caves of the NUS at that point still affiliated with the Labour party, to less extent, they were very affiliated with labour students. Basically, Labour students for Blair, people like Aaron Porter were more with Gordon Brown, you know something soft. (Rep1, Former NCAFC activist, 2018)

Until October 2010, the competitive relationship between groups was productive and facilitated an expansion of networks and sources by mutual differentiation (Rios-Jara, 2019). The emergent block focused on expanding networks of influence, articulating local and regional networks of students, and participating in campus protests. The institutional group provided information about the policymaking process and critical views of the reforms that spread the debate and warn students about the upcoming changes. This group also called for the national demonstration of 10th November, where the whole organization and 50,000 university students, school students, and university staff joined (Myers, 2017).

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

225

The 10th demo was the peak of mobilizations and was the result of parallel coordination efforts of each alliance. However, it also marked the division between blocks and the fragmentation of the alliance system. During the demonstration, a group of activists diverged from the main group, walking to the Conservative Headquarters at Millbank Tower. The protests ended with clashes with the police and a spontaneous building occupation that lasted for a couple of hours. The action was shunned by public opinion and political parties but soon became the icon of the wave and symbol of student radicalism. Nonetheless, the NUS criticized the Millbank occupation declaring it a violent action and suspending further massive calls for action, focusing only on political lobbying of MPs. On the opposing side, the NCAFC and EAN defended the action and called for further protests and occupations. The division started an internal war among organizations, significantly reducing the sources for mobilization. The number of activists joining demonstrations and walkouts during November and December failed to attract the 50,000 activists participating on 10th November. In late November the government announced a new spending bill cutting teaching grants by 70% and on 9th December parliament approved fee rises with 21 votes in favor, raising annual fees from £3000 to £9000 for national students. Both issues marked the defeat of the student revolt (Myers, 2017) and a revolutionary shift in the UK higher education system (Murphy et al., 2018). Despite the approval of the bill, the protests exerted enough pressure on the public debate to delay and soften some of the measures suggested by the government. The policy of uncapped fees proposed in the Browne Review was rejected. The government preferred to triple fees from 2012 with a maximum cap of £9000. Also, the rise of the threshold repayment cap for student loans, from £15,000 to £21,000 was postponed until 2012. Similarly, the decision to remove control of enrolments was postponed until 2016. Cuts in teaching grants were softened, being more progressive than Browne’s suggestions. The Education Act was supposed to reflect the announcements of 2010, but it was postponed until 2011 and included just minor changes. Other quality measurement mechanisms in teaching and research such as the Research Excellent Framework and Teaching Excellence Framework, plus institutional changes in the higher education were delayed until the legislation of the Higher Education and Research Act in 2017.

226

H. RIOS-JARA

The impact of protests, however, does not arise from the direct influence of activists on policy. Most of the changes came from political reactions within the coalition government, and from opposition parties that tried to reduce the political impact that protests would have had on their electorate and public support. The LibDems suffered a profound internal division between MPs favoring passing government proposals and MPs that did not want to break the pledge with students. To solve the tension, LibDems inside the government pressured to soften some measures and postpone them until the next government administration. This division was explicit on the day of the vote; 21 LibDem MPs, representing 40% of the LibDem backbench, and six conservative MPs voted with the Labour against the reform. These tensions explain why the government passed the reforms with a narrow majority of 21 votes, as students surrounded parliament and political parties faced the risk of breaking up the government coalition. Fragmentation and New Student Struggles [2011–2014] The declining period of this wave lasted from late 2011 to early 2014. This period was characterized by a general demobilization of student organizations and a progressive fragmentation of the national field of contention articulated in 2010. della Porta (2020) describe these moments as fragmented fields of students politics, where protests moved from waves of national action against broad reforms and governments to parallel local campaigns focusing on different issues and embedded in separate political fields. The sense of a national movement or common front of struggle reached during 2010 disappeared after protests declined. Some national groups survived but lost their massive support and adherence. On campuses, anti-cuts groups reorganized and reallocated their fields of action embracing new expressions of university activism and narrower struggles. As one student activist described: The thing with this period is at each turn of the policy a lot people were hoping to reach the level of mobilization at the base that happened in 2010. And it never happened. We had national demos, but they were not big. You saw some fight here and there, but it never really reaches that critical mass point to flight away by itself. (rep2, student activist, NFACF 2010–2018)

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

227

During this period, the most significant campaigns were the Free Education Campaign and different expressions of student–worker solidarity at local level. The Free Education Campaign was the only attempt of national coordination during this time. The campaign involved nine calls for a national day of action, including national demonstrations in London and other major cities. The campaign focused on reverting 2010 reforms and stopping further modifications of student funding policy. The key demands were implementing a policy of free education through changes in the tax system, reestablishing EMA, and expanding university access to disadvantaged students. The campaign also tried to stop further reforms—effectively, all the changes were postponed in 2010 and 2011. During this campaign, the tensions between NCAFC and the NUS grew. The NUS maintained its position of not involving its members in mass student mobilization, providing occasional statements in favor of Free Education, calling for days of actions, coupled with selective methods of pressure on political parties. Until 2016 there was no further coordination between SMOs. As results, the annual national demonstrations for Free Education called yearly by NCAFC failed to attract more than 5000 participants. In the context of low mobilization and a fragmented field of action, national policies were resisted under the living memory of 2010 but not nationally opposed. The remnant coordination between SMOs was able to postpone some changes in the Education bill of 2011. It also delayed the implementation of new cuts in maintenance grants, rises in threshold repayments of tuition-fees loans, changes in the access of new for-profit providers, the extension of degree awarding power to new universities, and the institutional changes in the HEFCE, which were postponed until the 2017 Act. Despite some achievements, local struggles had little impact on policy change, and in 2012, most universities raised their fees to the maximum cap of £9000. In terms of policy agenda, student protest did not have a significant impact either. Despite the links between NUS and UCU with the Labour Party, during the general election of 2015 Labour maintained its policy of low fees and more financial support to students, proposing a maximum cap of £6000 and the expansion of student benefits. Only the Green party endorsed a free education policy that included the elimination of fees and loans.

228

H. RIOS-JARA

New Reforms and the Rise and Fall of Corbynism [2015–2019] The second period of reforms and protests corresponds to a soft revival of student activism against a new higher education bill and the rise of Corbynism between 2015 and 2019. Both processes are part of the same moment, but I describe them in two different sections to give more details. The New Higher Education Act and New Resistances After obtaining a secure majority in the general election of 2015, the Conservative government published a new bill for higher education, incorporating most of the changes previously postponed. The proposal included a further rise in fees to a maximum of £9250, the implementation of the Teaching Excellent Framework (TEF) to evaluate teaching quality performance, and a measure for the control of tuition fees rises. The proposal also included the creation of the Office for Students (OfS) in replacement of the HEFCE, and greater flexibilization of conditions for the opening of new universities, permitting degree awarding powers and the removals on the control of university enrollments. In 2015 the government introduced other measures such as the replacement of maintenance grants with a new system of loans as well as extending fees and maintenance loans for part-time students (HM Government, BIS, 2016). These reforms created favorable conditions to reactive student protests, but they did not trigger a national wave of contention as happened in the previous period. In fact, the fragmentation and division among SMOs remained. However, SMOs cooperated and coordinated some national campaigns during 2016 and 2017. In the annual conference of April 2016, the NUS approved a boycott against the National Student Survey (NSS), in order to stop the implementation of the Teacher Excellence Framework (TEF). The NSS was a student survey evaluating the teaching performance of academic staff in each university. Based on the result of the NSS, the TEF defines universities with a golden, silver, and bronze standard. Government proposals pursed to conditioned further tuition fees rises to the result of TEF, so universities with the golden standard could charge the maximum of £9250 fees. Universities with lower results could charge fees at a maximum of £9000. NUS launched the NSS Boycott in 2016, with the support of NCAFC and UCU, and a significant number of Student Unions and local groups

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

229

(NUS, 2016; Oxford SU, 2019). The boycott ran for three years, with significant impact in 2017 when the rate of response of NSS dropped from 72 to 68% and 12 universities, including Cambridge, Manchester, Oxford, Sheffield, and King’s College, failed to reach the response threshold to validate the survey (Times’ Higher Education, 2017). Besides, NUS, UCU, and NCAFC called for a national demonstration in November 2016. This demonstration was publicly endorsed by the Labour party, and included John Mc Donnell, Shadow Chancellor of Jeremy Corbyn (2015– 2020), as the main speaker. This was the first call for national action where the SMOs of the sector involved in the 2010 protests cooperated again. The demonstration call student to defended free education policy and oppose government proposals. The action mobilized 15,000 activists around the country, being the biggest student demonstration after the November 2010 national demonstration. The boycott and the national demonstration of 2016 were the main tools employed to oppose the new reform, but actions focused on partial aspects of the new policy. Student organizations assumed and accepted that the bill would pass despite the coordination between opponents inside and outside parliament. They orientated their efforts to exert pressure upon key changes in the bill rather than its total rejection as in 2010. During this period, NUS, and the Labour Party closely coordinated to include some critical amendments to the bill. Despite the lack of mass protests, the political pressure from campaigns enforced the Education minister Jo Johnson to discuss directly with NUS and to include some changes proposed by the Union. MPs from Labour, Wes Streeting, former president of the NUS (2008–2009), endorsed NUS demands, presenting several amendments to the bill. The coordination protests and lobby coordinated between student organizations and Labour were able to control and detach further rises in tuition fees from TEF results. It also achieved the incorporation of one student in the board of the Office for Students. More controls over transparency and accountability of financial management of institutions. New regulations on the extension of degree awarding powers to new providers and more rules for the creation of new for-profits institutions. With these modifications, in April 2017, the new Higher Education and Research Act was passed, with a majority of 65 votes from Conservative Party members and Democratic Unionist Party. An opposition led by the Labour party, endorsed by the Scottish National Party, Green and LibDems.

230

H. RIOS-JARA

After this small revival of student activism, the key SMOs declined. In 2017 the NCAFC called for the last national demonstration that failed to attract more than 10,000 participants. After this, the members decided to reorganize the campaign changing its focus and modifying its structure. In 2018, the NUS declared itself in an economic crisis, implementing several cuts in sabbatical officers, elected representatives, and some campaigns, losing significant representation and interest from student activists. After this period, the only organization that reinforced its position was the UCU who led the pensions strike in 2018 and 2019. These strikes triggered a new wave of student occupations and massive local rallies in solidarity with academic staff. However, during the strikes, any of the national SMOs was capable of coordinating the explosive support that strike received from students and new local groups of activists. Reflecting on the last decade of student protests, a former student and Labour activist says: What strikes me most about the 9th December 2010 was that it was a tipping point in this country’s slide to the right. We talked about it at the time, that if the government could get away with marketizing education then students would become less easy to mobilize as their experience became more consumerized and alienated… since the reforms took effect, the student movement has gone into seemingly terminal decline. (rep3, Labour activist and former SU officer, 2019)

Student Activists and the Rise and Fall Corbynism [2015–2019] In parallel to the student campaigns against 2017 reform, Corbynism was taking form. Jeremy Corbyn was elected leader of the Labour Party in September 2015, after Ed Miliband lost in the general election in May 2015. He obtained 59.5% of the votes, with 49.6% of votes from members and 84% from registered supporters (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019). His election resulted from a change in the party’s election mechanisms in 2014 that allowed registered supporters to take part in the leadership election. This aperture of the party to political participation allowed 100,000 young sympathizers to endorse Corbyn and secure his election (Bassett, 2019). As a leader, Corbyn reorganized the structure of Labour and shifted its policies. He endorsed an explicit anti-austerity agenda, calling for policies of increasing public investment in green industries and free public services

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

231

through radical reforms of the tax system (Saad-Filho & Ben, 2019). This agenda was complemented with a close and more direct relationship with trade unions and a broad spectrum of social movement organizations articulated around the anti-austerity struggles of 2010 and 2011 (Bolton & Pitts, 2018). These organizations included student organizations, the Save the NHS campaign, Stop the War Coalition, and Stand Up to Racism campaign, and thousands of community and political groups spread around the country (Murray, 2019). Momentum was the organizational manifestation of Corbynism and the anchor that gave the Labour the position of a party-movement, bringing together party supporters with grassroots activists (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019). Momentum was a network of Corbynist supporters that mixed party members and outsider grassroots supporters around Corbyn leadership and the new party policies (Bolton & Pitts, 2018). Momentum strengthened the connection between party members and social movement activists, increasing the participation of grassroots activists and softening the division between political representation and political participation. In this context, the links between student organizations and Corbynism were twofold. Firstly, Corbynism endorsed free education policy demands by student activists since 2010. The policy was included in Labour manifestos during the general election campaigns of 2017 and 2019 (Labour Party, 2017, 2019). The policy represents a relevant shift in the higher policy of the party, which since 1997 endorsed a policy of regulated fee, targeted grants, and income-contingent loans (Carpentier, 2012; Marginson, 2018). The free education policy proposed in the manifestos pursued the elimination of fees and reestablishment of teaching grants for new undergraduate students enrolled in universities in England. Secondly, there was a historical connection between student organizations and Corbynism. In 2010, Corbyn and the shadow chancellor John Macdonell were the only MPs welcome in the UCL occupation (Myers, 2017). This meeting forged an early connection between students and Corbyn that partially explains why many activists that came from student struggles joined the Labour Party and Momentum. Most of the student activists involved in NUS and NCAFC during previous years were engaged in Corbyn’s project. Some of them took significant roles within the new structure of the party, while others cooperated with the electoral mobilization from local groups.

232

H. RIOS-JARA

However, close ties between student organizations and Labour were not fluid. As participants explained, Corbynism had a significant impact on highlighting student demands within the public debate. But it also drained sources from key organizations into the electoral arena. As in other party-movements, the entrance into party politics represents a tension between autonomy and conditioned influence that not all organizations are willing to accept (Snow et al., 2007). For example, NUS took advantage of Corbynism by maximizing its capacity to pressure the government and alternate conventional and nonconventional tactics of influence policy during 2016 and 2017. In contrast, NCAFC, remained autonomous yet sympathetic to Corbynism without crossing its strategic line of direct and independent confrontation with government through mass mobilization. The introduction of free education in the Labour manifesto helped spread demands but left the NCAFC without any distinctive demand that could pull together its constituency, being partially drained by the electoral efforts of Corbyn during the campaigns of 2017 and 2019. This tension formed a part of activists’ debates. For radical activists, Corbynism meant a competing political force that reduced militant spirit on campuses. “it was like most of the students were waiting for Corbyn to solve all their problems of debt and fees” (rep4, local student activist, 2019). For others, Corbynism heralded a final opportunity to win the battle against fees, after several defeats of protests. As a participant explained: Even though we didn’t win the tuition fee vote, which I guess was the main objective of the movement [2010]. Now that issue is still alive, in fact, this week it’s been put back on the political table. Labour’s talking about getting rid of tuition fees. In its own way, it was the start of the group of activists, and the political culture that would bring Corbyn to lead the Labour Party and John McDonnell to be the Shadow-Chancellor. (rep3, student activist UCL occupation 2010, 2017)

The defeat of Corbyn at the 2019 general election represents the crush of a generational hope and claims for radical policy changes. However, the impact of Corbynism and student organizations on the higher education agenda was more significant than the previous wave of protests. From 2015 there were growing concerns and criticisms against fees, loans, and the liberalization of higher education. In 2018 Parliament investigated

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

233

the impact of fees and loans on student debt, unemployment and the unexpected rise of tuition fees to the maximum cap by most universities (House of Parliament, 2018a, 2018b). The result of those inquiries recommended a new review of higher education funding, called by Prime Minister Theresa May in 2018. The Augar Review (HM Government, 2019) suggests complementary measures to reduce the negative impacts and concerns of rising indebtedness, monopolistic prices, and a growing devaluation of university certifications. Before the general election of 2019, Theresa May endorsed the reduction of fees and loans and the regulation of providers, for the first time in a decade. She also announced the end of austerity and a rise in social spending, ending a decade of cuts. The rise of Corbynism was able to coordinate oppositions from streets and parliament, helping student organizations to have some policy victories. Students protests and parliamentary amendments prevent further rises in fees, enforced more regulations and transparency over providers, gained more control on the extension of degree awarding power for new for-profits institutions, gained a student representative in the Office for Students and more participations of student and staff in institutional decision-making. Nonetheless, the most important change was the UTurn in the higher education policy agenda. The vast support from young voters and university students with Corbynism was an electoral threat for Conservatives (Murray, 2019). Under the electoral pressure, the Conservative Party changed its policy orientation to the preferences of the young electorate, fearful of being defeated by Corbyn. Proposals to reduce tuition fees, expand public support to students and the general claim of the end of austerity were a major shift in government policy orientation after 2019. The changes in the HE policy and the shift in HE agenda did not mean the defeat of neoliberal policies in the sector. Still, at least they represented a softened version of the policy and a significant change in the national debate. The protests impacts were the result of the convergence of direct and indirect means of pressure from social movements and parliamentary opposition and the combination of radical and moderate strategies. The alliance between social movements and party politics that took place around and because Corbynism was the key element absent during the 2010 wave of protests.

234

H. RIOS-JARA

Discussion and Conclusion The analysis of the trajectory of student protests in England allows me to analyze how the alliance system and strategies deployed by SMOs affect the impact of protests over higher education policy. During the first wave of reforms, strategic division and competing relationships among the main SMOs divided sources and reduced the capability of the organizations to influence policy, during key moments of legislation. Moreover, the lack of cooperation within third parties, and the explicit opposition from some activists to ally with political parties reduced opportunities to gain influence over the policy process. The strategic divisions between radicals and moderates determined the low policy outcomes and agenda impacts that student activists had opposing 2010 reforms (della Porta, 2020). On the one hand, the radical strategy, with mass mobilization, broader alliances between SMOs and conducted independently from third parties, was not effective intervening the policy process or changing the policy agenda. Calls for national action never reached widescale mobilization within the sector. In 2010/2011 2,503,000 students were enrolled in English higher education institutions, 1,913,940 were undergraduates, mostly home students directly affected by the new policies (HESA, 2020). As Hensby (2017a) analyzes; just only 22.3% of students took part in some form of protest during that period, even though 73.4% of students were concerned about fees and loans, and 83.2% agreeing that higher education is a right, not a privilege. On the other hand, focalized lobbying and pressure on MPs, led mainly by NUS but detached from mass mobilization, failed to stop the vote of December 2010, nor did it alter the policy agenda of political parties after the revolt, as the analysis of party manifestos of 2015 revealed. In contrast, during 2017 reform, SMOs improved their collaboration and were open to a more extensive set of alliances. NUS assumed a more militant position, taking the lead on campaigns while avoiding confrontation with other SMOs. NCAFC supported and made a call for radicalizing protests without attacking NUS directly. This implicit coordination facilitated the merging of conventional and nonconventional means of pressure, from within and outside of party politics. Even though this dual strategy was not strong enough either to stop the reform, strategic convergence of tactics among SMOs achieved some relevant modifications on the policy, something that did not occur in 2010. The convergence of streets and parliamentary means of pressure maximized

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

235

the impact of protests on higher education policy agenda. For the first time in a decade, free education was placed in the public debate, enforcing a change in the higher education policy of most of the political parties, and marking the defeat of austerity narrative in the election of 2019. The convergence and complementary effects of pressure from the bottom and the top were possible because Corbynism was able to combine street politics with parliamentary politics, fixing partially tensions between SMOs and third parties. Nonetheless, this convergence did not result in mass street mobilizations. The accumulation of sources and capital was mainly mobilized in the election of 2017 and 2019, where thousands of young volunteers took part in Labour knocking doors campaigns instead of occupying streets and universities as happened in 2010. This tension raises doubts about the capitalization and control over political sources produced by activists within and around Corbynism. Even though the rise of Corbynism effectively improved the impact of student organizations upon higher education policy agenda, it decreased the ability of local groups to mobilize independently from Corbynist lines and party politics. This cost meant a reduction in political opportunities for SMOs to mobilize sources from the bottom, with broader demands, beyond free education policy and Corbynism. The lack of massive student mobilizations during the last wave of reforms cannot be attributed exclusively to the rise of Corbynism and its draining effect on campuses. As activists acknowledge, the 2010 reforms dramatically changed student politics. The new political economy of higher education made it harder for students to engage in politics (Brooks, 2016). Higher fees and larger debts implied that most of the students worked while studying. Students also tried to reduce costs by avoiding spending time on campus or living with their parents far from university campuses. Consequently, engaging in politics becomes riskier, more difficult, and expensive than before. Students suspended, expelled, or punished for being engaged in radical activism, had to pay larger sums of money; an extra year in fees or debt without necessarily maintaining their studies. The reduction of favorable conditions for political activism affected the path of political participation of university students after the 2010 reforms. The analysis of the chapter shares some theoretical reflection on the role that alliances and strategy decisions plays in anti-austerity protests. As the literature agrees, massive and autonomous protests tend to increase

236

H. RIOS-JARA

sources of mobilization, granting more chances for the political participation of activists and left-behind constituencies (della Porta, 2015; Rucht, 2007). The conditions required to deploy this strategy impose some political constraints upon SMOs. One of the conditions is to limit the possibility of alliances with third parties and other political insiders, that tends to decrease the direct access of movements to the policymaking process. The positive impacts of this strategy were to maximize gains in the public debate and political culture. Anti-austerity protests created collective identities and new meanings, making movements more internally cohesive and appealing to society. Nonetheless, the preference for building a collective political identity through autonomous protests will, sooner or later, bring about the dilemma of political capitalization and political efficacy of movements. Student activists express this dilemma as remaining as a rebel outsider or becoming a radical incumbent. Student movements from Chile, Quebec, and South Africa faced similar tensions, with a great variety of consequences for policy changes, party politics, and student organizations (Cini, 2019b; della Porta, 2020). There is no theoretical solution for this dilemma and is always an option for movements and activists during their struggles. For several English activists, the failures of 2010 inevitably led to a change of strategy and a need to move from sectoral battles to national struggles, and from local protests to a national political movement capable of reinventing politics and policies. To be effective, this transition required the construction of a political movement capable of embracing and accepting the culture of democratic horizontalism, participative politics, and the demands for a public and free education developed during 2010. The view of those anti-austerity activists is that the trajectory toward Corbynism was positive and necessary. The articulation of a partymovement expanded their field of struggle and their sources and thus granted more control and power to transform the politics and policies that initially triggered their fights on a broader scale of action rather than university campuses. This expansion allows activists to share a claim on party policy agendas and create political alternatives, breaking the barriers of party politics, but without entirely losing some specifics of SMOs. Under these conditions, some autonomous rebels accept and embrace party politics becoming radical incumbents or democratic socialists and join the Labour party.

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

237

References Bassett, L. (2019). Corbynism: Social democracy in a new left garb. The Political Quarterly, 90(4), 777–784. Bolton, M., & Pitts, F. H. (2018). Corbynism: A critical approach. Emerald. Bosi, L., & Uba, K. (2009). Introduction: The outcomes of social movements. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 14(4), 409–415. Brooks, R., Byford, K., & Sela, K. (2016). Students’ unions, consumerism and the neo-liberal university. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 37 (8), 1211–1228. Carpentier, V. (2012). Public–Private substitution in higher education: Has costsharing gone too far? Higher Education Quarterly, 66(4), 363–390. Cini, L. (2019a). The contentious politics of higher education. London: Routledge. Cini, L. (2019b). The 2015 student mobilizations in South Africa: Contesting post-apartheid higher education. PArtecipazione e COnflitto, 1(12), 43–70. Cini, L., & Guzmán-Concha, C. (2017). Student movements in the age of austerity: The cases of Chile and England. Social Movement Studies, 16(5), 623–628. Dean, J. (2016). “Angelic spirits of” 68’: Memories of 60s’ radicalism in responses to the 2010–11 UK student protests. Contemporary British History, 30(3), 305–325. della Porta, D. (2015). Social movements in times of austerity: Bringing capitalism back into protest analysis. Oxford: Polity Press. della Porta, D., Cini, L., & Guzmán-Concha, C. (2020). Contesting higher education: The student movements against neoliberal universities. Bristol: Bristol University Press. della Porta, D., Fernandez, J., Kouki, H., & Mosca, L. (2017). Movement parties against austerity. Oxford: Polity Press. Donoso, S., & Somma, N. (2019). “You taught us to give an opinion, now learn how to listen”: 1 The manifold political consequences of Chile’s student movement. In M. Arce & R. Roberta (Eds.), Protest and democracy. Calgary: University Calgary Press. Heller, D., & Callender, C. (Eds.). (2013). Student financing of higher education: A comparative perspective. London: Routledge. Hensby, A. (2017a). Open networks and secret Facebook groups: Exploring cycle effects on activists’ social media use in the 2010/11 UK student protests. Social Movement Studies, 16(4), 466–478. Hensby, A. (2017b). Participation and non-participation in student activism paths and barriers to mobilizing young people for political action. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd. Her Majesty’s Government. (2010). The Coalition: Our programme for government. London: Cabinet Office.

238

H. RIOS-JARA

Her Majesty’s Government, BIS. (2016). Success as a knowledge economy: Teaching excellence, social mobility and student choice. London: Cabinet Office. HESA. (2020). Who’s studying in HE? https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-ana lysis/students/whos-in-he. Accessed 20 Aug 2020. HM Government. (2019). Review of post-18. Accessed 20 Aug 2020. House of Parliament. (2018a). Value for money in higher education inquiry. https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/com mons-select/education-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/value-formoney-higher-education-17-19/. Accessed 20 Aug 2020. House of Parliament. (2018b). Student loans inquiry. https://www.parliament. uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/treasury-commit tee/inquiries1/parliament-2017/student-loans-17-19/. Accessed 20 Aug 2020. Ibrahim, J. (2011). The new toll on higher education and the UK student revolts of 2010–2011. Social Movement Studies, 10(4), 415–421. Ibrahim, J. (2013). The moral economy of the UK student protest movement 2010–2011. Contemporary Social Science, 9(1), 79–91. Ishkanian, A., & Glasius, M. (2018). Resisting neoliberalism? Movements against austerity and for democracy in Cairo, Athens and London. Critical Social Policy, 38(3), 527–546. Johnstone, B., & Marcucci, P. (2010). Financing higher education wordwide: Who pays? Who should pay? The Johns Hopkins University Press. Katsambekis, G., & Kioupkiolis, A. (2019). The populist radical left in Europe. London: Routledge. Kioupkiolis, A. (2016). Podemos: The ambiguous promises of left-wing populism in contemporary Spain. Journal of Political Ideologies, 21(2), 99–120. Kolb, F. (2007). Protest and opportunities: The political outcomes of social movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Labour Party. (2017). For the many not for the fee: Labour party manifesto 2017 . Cramlington: Potts Print. Labour Party. (2019). It’s time for a real change: Labour party manifesto 2019. Cramlington: Potts Print. Marginson, S. (2018). Global trends in higher education financing: The United Kingdom. International Journal of Educational Development, 58, 26–36. McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1980). Social movement industries: Competition and cooperation among movement organizations. Research in Social Movements, 3, 1–20. McGettigan, A. (2013). The great university gamble: Money, markets and the future of higher education. London: Pluto Press. Murphy, R., Scott-Clayton, J., & Wyness, G. (2018). The end of free college in England: Implications for enrolments, equity, and quality. Economics of Education Review, 71, 7–22.

9

FROM REVOLT TO REFORM: STUDENT PROTESTS …

239

Murray, A. (2019). The fall and rise of the British left. Verso Book. Myers, M. (2017). Student revolt: Voices of the austerity generation. Pluto Press. National Union of Students. (2016). University staff join calls for boycott of the national student survey. https://www.nus.org.uk/en/news/university-staffjoin-calls-for-boycott-of-the-national-student-survey/. Accessed 21 Aug 2020. Oxford Student Union. (2019). Oxford students successfully boycott national student survey. https://www.oxfordsu.org/news/article/oxfordstudent/Oxf ord-Students-Successfully-Boycott-National-Student-Survey/. Accessed 21 Aug 2020. Rhoads, R. A. (2016). Student activism, diversity, and the struggle for a just society. Journal of Diversity in Higher Education, 9(3), 13. Rios-Jara, H. (2019). Cooperation and competition in the wave of British student protests 2009–2011. Interface: A Journal for and About Social Movements, 11(2), 37. Rucht, D. (2007). Movement allies, adversaries and third parties. In D. Snow, S. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to social movement (pp. 197–216). Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell. Saad-Filho, A., & Ben, F. (2019). Economic policies for the many, not the few: Assessing the economic strategy of the Labour Party. Theory and Struggle, 120, 14. Saunders, C., Roth, S., & Olcese, C. (2015). Anti-cuts protests in the UK: Are we really all in this together? In M. Giugni & M. Grasso (Eds.), Austerity and protest: Popular contention in times of economic crisis (pp. 171–190). Farnham: Ashgate. Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A., & Kriesi, H. (2007). The Blackwell companion to social movements. Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell. Tarrow, Sidney. (2011). Power in Movements: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Times’ Higher Education. (2017). National student survey 2017: Student activism has shown its power. Available at: https://www.timeshighereduc ation.com/blog/national-student-survey-2017-student-activism-has-shownits-power. Acessed 21 Aug 2020 von Bülow M., & Bidegain Ponte, G. (2015). It takes two to tango: Students, political parties, and protest in Chile (2005–2013). In P. Almeida & A. Cordero Ulate (Eds.), Handbook of social movements across Latin America (pp. 179–194). Handbooks of sociology and social research. New York: Springer. von Bülow, M., & Donoso, S. (2017). Social movements in Chile. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Weible, C. M., Heikkila, T., de Leon, P., & Sabatier, P. A. (2011). Understanding and influencing the policy process. Policy Science, 45(1), 1–21.

CHAPTER 10

Chile’s Student Movement: Strong, Detached, Influential—And Declining? Nicolás M. Somma and Sofía Donoso

Introduction Scholars on Chilean social movements tend to agree that the student movement has been the most influential movement since the restoration of democracy in 1990 (Bellei et al., 2014; Donoso & von Bülow, 2017; Somma & Medel, 2017). While students could not press authorities to

We are grateful for the following grants that made this research possible: ANID/FONDAP nº 15130009, ANID/Fondecyt Regular nº 1160308 and nº 1200190, and ANID/Fondecyt de Iniciación n° 11180890. N. M. Somma (B) Instituto de Sociología, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile e-mail: [email protected] S. Donoso Departamento de Sociología, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile N. M. Somma · S. Donoso Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES), Santiago, Chile © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_10

241

242

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

replace the market-based educational system inherited from dictatorship (1973–1990), since the mid-2000s they succeeded in achieving significant policy changes. These include the replacement of the main high school educational law, massive state budget increases for education, the creation of new public agencies for regulating the quality and integrity of educational institutions, and free university scholarships for popular background students, among other reforms (Donoso & Somma, 2021). Given its political influence, one could expect that the student movement would have strong connections with “polity members”—actors with low-cost and routine access to institutional political power such as political parties, governments, and state agencies (Tilly, 1978). In fact, a key insight in the social movements literature is that support from and alliances with polity members are central for granting political influence to social movements (Amenta et al., 2010). One of the classic dimensions of the structure of political opportunities is the presence of allies that act as “tribunes of the people” (Tarrow, 2011). Movements enjoying the support and certification (McAdam et al., 2001) from, and organic links with polity members, will have credibility, access, and influence. This is especially the case if polity members are governments, which by definition control political power. However, contrary to these expectations, the Chilean student movement was all that influential despite having gone through a process of increasing detachment from political parties and governments. Moreover, the movement became more influential as it managed to forge autonomous spaces to activate the student masses politically. This allowed the student movement to press for changes that granted the state a stronger role in regulating the educational system. In the absence of such detachment from polity members, the impact would have been unlikely. A closer relationship with political parties on the center-left in previous years had only resulted in cooptation and the watering down of student demands. Moreover, when the movement somehow reattached itself to polity members after 2014—when President Bachelet aimed at reforming the education system—its mobilization capacity declined. This chapter analyzes this empirical puzzle to explain the exceptionality of Chile’s student movement. While our case confirms that organizational strength constitutes a precondition for movement influence—a common assumption in the social movements literature—our broader theoretical contribution is to show that, under certain conditions and contrary to expectations, it is the weakening alliances with polity members

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

243

that surprisingly boost a movement’s strength and ensuing impact. We adopt a contentious politics approach that emphasizes how broad processes, and specific mechanisms within these processes, combine across protest waves to create a given outcome (McAdam et al., 2001). Specifically, we highlight three processes—strengthening, political detachment, and influence—each composed of three (mostly relational)1 mechanisms. To support our claims, we present a narrative (Tilly, 1984) of the Chilean student movement since the end of dictatorship in the late 1980s until the end of the 2010s. We rely on the abundant scholarly literature on the Chilean student movement and on data collected in various research projects undertaken by us. We show how the combination of movement strengthening and political detachment made the student movement an influential force in Chilean politics and society. We emphasize the critical junctures of 2001, 2006, and 2011–2012, where major student protest cycles took place. Finally, we also try to make sense of the decline of student protests after 2011.

Strengthening, detachment, and Influencing Since the publication of Dynamics of Contention two decades ago (McAdam et al., 2001), the contentious politics approach has provided a novel way of understanding and dissecting several episodes of contention, from protest campaigns and revolutions to democratization processes and civil wars. While the approach soon elicited considerable debate and criticism,2 it had the virtue of providing a flexible set of conceptual tools that could shed light on contentious episodes of different nature across time and space. The authors provided a long list of processes, and their constituent mechanisms, as a way of supporting the analytical power of the approach. But the spirit of the enterprise was an open one: these processes and mechanisms could be refined, and new ones could be created to suit the particularities of the empirical cases at hand. In that spirit, we define the following processes and mechanisms to understand the puzzle of the Chilean student movement. The first process is the strengthening of the movement. A movement is “strong” when it mobilizes a large number of supporters sharing a common political consciousness and ready to act, and when it is composed of organizations and informal groups with a considerable degree of articulation. According to this conception, the process of strengthening can be decomposed into three mechanisms:

244

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

• Massification: a large and sudden increase in the number of people that would benefit if the movement achieves its goals (its “potential beneficiaries” according to McCarthy & Zald, 1977). • The political activation of potential beneficiaries, that is, raising their awareness about common grievances and increasing their disposition to act collectively on behalf of the movement (“supporters” for McCarthy & Zald, 1977). • Brokerage: the creation of links among actors previously unconnected or weakly connected.3 Importantly, it is an implicit assumption in the scholarly literature that before having an impact, social movements need to build up strength. Movements that gather the support of large masses, politically activate publics and create linkages between different actors are more likely to be able to force the political authorities to address their claims. Indeed, as Amenta (2010) proposes in his political mediation model, to succeed, a movement requires strong organization, a large number of people committed to its cause and favorable political conditions. Strengthening, however, is only one part of the story. A strong movement that remains coopted by political authorities is unlikely to press them in a direction that is unwanted by the latter. For instance, Argentinean labor unions during Perón’s era (the 1940s and 1950s) would probably qualify as strong in the terms defined above. Still, they were too close to the government to defy it (Brennan, 1998). Thus, we suggest the relevance of a second process we call political detachment—understood as a movement’s increasing ideological and organizational distance from polity members (Somma & Medel, 2017). In our case, detachment increases a movement’s chances of political influence.4 Detachment involves three mechanisms: • Disembeddedness : individuals that participate simultaneously in movement organizations and polity organizations (e.g., parties in government) stop participating in the former, resulting in a lower capacity of polity members to contain movement protests from the inside. • Disillusion: activists previously sympathetic to polity members— e.g., political authorities—became disenchanted with the actions, presumed intentions, and discourses of such authorities. This makes

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

245

activists less prone to negotiate with authorities in future rounds of contention, and more prone to sustain protests. • Ideological radicalization: activists develop goals of social change that increasingly diverge from the actual state of things, and from the preferences of polity members, which remain more attached to the status quo.5 Combining both processes—strengthening and detachment—we obtain strong movements with weak ties to polity members, which therefore have little to lose and much to gain from engaging in sustained protest. But this is not the whole story: movements must make it happen. Thus, the third process is influencing, namely, movement actions that directly or indirectly create incentives for authorities to be responsive and enact changes related to movement demands. In our case, influencing took place through the following mechanisms (with different weight depending on the protest juncture (della Porta, 2018a): • Threat : due to massive protests, authorities fear losing public popularity, risking reelection chances, and damaging their international image if being unresponsive to movement demands. Therefore, they act in ways consistent with such demands. • Persuasion: movements enter the public debate, present their claims, and resignify the terms in which a given problem is understood. Accordingly, authorities realign their views and actions in ways that move them closer to movement demands. • Replacement: due to the complex array of factors that shape electoral results, polity members more sympathetic to movement demands replace those less sympathetic and enact policies consistent with movement demands.6 Threat and persuasion imply an effect from movements to political authorities. In contrast, replacement implies that changes in external political conditions (e.g. the party or coalition in power) make movement actions more effective (in line with Amenta’s political mediation model). But of course, real events are messier than these analytical distinctions. Threats may lead to rethinking some issues in ways that, in the long run, result in persuasion. Signs of authorities being genuinely persuaded may hinder feelings of threat. Also, social movement actions may contribute

246

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

to replacement. As McAdam and Tarrow (2010) note, social movements may create polarization within political coalitions and help empower polity members more sympathetic with movement demands. This was the case in Chile with the student movement and the creation of the “New Majority” (Nueva Mayoría), a coalition ranging from Christian Democrats to Communists that governed Chile between 2014 and 2018 (Donoso & Somma, 2019).

Transitioning to Democracy The student movement of the last years of the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–1990) can be characterized as organizationally weak, considerably attached to opposition political parties, and with little capacity to shape educational policies. Like the rest of Chile’s historically strong civil society, the student movement suffered during the authoritarian era. The dictatorship declared illegal student organizations, replaced them by other ones controlled by the military regime, and repressed and assassinated student leaders with leftist or even centrist political orientations. It also shut down research centers and departments—especially in the realm of social sciences—given its “contamination” with leftist ideologies. At the university level, movement weakness also resulted from a relatively small student base composed of upper and middle classes (Thielemann, 2014). Although the university rectors designated by the authoritarian government prohibited autonomous student organizations, new leaders emerged in the 1980s and staged mobilization campaigns. For instance, in 1987, students at the Universidad de Chile (one of the two most important universities in the country) joined a group of faculty members who launched a campaign against government-designated rector Federici, low wages, and inadequate infrastructure. The faculty led the conflict even though students were the most mobilized ones (Thielemann, 2014, 34). Once this conflict ended and rector Federici resigned, all actors opposed to Pinochet focused on the next, transcendental battle: the 1988 plebiscite for ousting the dictator. Reemerging political parties such as the Christian Democracy and the Socialist Party led the campaign, and students mobilized through the parties’ youth organizations. Thus, before the plebiscite, the CONFECH—the umbrella organization grouping university student federations—campaigned for the NO option (against Pinochet). Students trained the polling supervisors and the general population about the intricacies of voting in the context of a military regime.

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

247

They also helped with registration and monitored the electoral process (Thielemann, 2014, 36). A small radical student wing called to defeat Pinochet by force, but it was overwhelmed by the majority who chose the electoral path. High-school student organizations, in turn, were controlled by student representatives who were members of centrist and leftist parties (Bidegain, 2015, 205). Once the NO option—against Pinochet—won, students pledged their support for presidential candidate Patricio Aylwin, who won and took power in 1990. The presence of centrist and leftist parties in the student movement— embeddedness in our terms—was not new. During the mid-century, many student leaders were part of the Christian Democratic Party and the Radical Party—centrist parties which controlled the university federations. During the 1960s, leftist forces—the Communist Party, and the far-left group Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)—gained ascendancy over student organizations, while rightist student organizations appeared in the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (Thielemann, 2014). The party-led struggle against Pinochet strengthened these links in detriment of student autonomy. Accordingly, once democracy was restored, the student movement had no clear agenda—their struggle as students was ill-defined. Also, the defeat of Pinochet provided wide legitimacy to center and leftist parties, now in government under the Concertación coalition. This government considered that the new democracy was too fragile to withstand social mobilizations (students included) and used their links with social movements to deactivate them and forestall an authoritarian reversal (Hipsher, 1996).

The Sluggish 1990s Given the subordinate role it played during the last years of the dictatorship, the student movement during the 1990s was hardly capable of going beyond recreational activities such as organizing the end of the year celebration. While there were occasional mobilizations spearheaded by university students—e.g., in 1992 and 1997—these were not massive campaigns. These campaigns did not gather much public attention beyond a few specific successes—such as a reform in the university credit system after the 1992 protests, or increases in public budget to state universities after the 1997 protests (Bidegain, 2015, 219–226).

248

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

Why were students unable to deploy massive and influential protests during the 1990s? Above all, protesting meant challenging the democratic governments of the Concertación, and few wanted to put under strain a recently recovered democracy. But there was a more specific reason that relates to our mechanism of disembeddedness . Government parties were highly embedded in the student movement. Most student federations of the time were governed by leaders who militated in Concertación parties. Instead of protesting, these leaders saw negotiations with authorities as a less costly way of advancing their claims. And given their presence in student organizations, parties could prevent or deactivate protests with relative ease. When protests did take place, incumbent party leaders or government representatives called student leaders and convinced them to stop the protest, sometimes offering small concessions. Concertación personnel knew how to do it: many had been student leaders during the transition era (Donoso, 2017, 73). Consider the protest campaign launched in 1992 by the Universidad de Chile’s students demanding to increase public funding to student loans. It was staged by leftist groups not belonging to the Concertación. The student federation—the FECH—did not join national mobilizations, to a large extent, because its leaders militated in the Concertación and did not want to challenge Education Minister Ricardo Lagos, a central figure of the governing coalition. Thus, the campaign did not achieve much success. A similar story took place by that time in the Universidad de Concepción, where Concertación leaders told mobilized students they had to be “efficient” rather than “fighters” (Bidegain, 2015, 219; Thielemann, 2014). Likewise, in 1997 Communist student wings protested against the Ley Marco de las Universidades Estatales. This bill, which was being discussed in Congress, sought to reform the statutes inherited by the military regime but without aiming public financing of state universities and students’ legal right to participate in university governing bodies. Concertación student leaders reached an agreement with the government, and protests declined (Bidegain, 2015, 234). In our terms, in all these cases, the embeddedness of polity members within the movement forestalled protest. This happened despite the broad ideological affinities between a governing center-left coalition and the student movement. Of course, other factors contributed to the weakness of student protests during the 1990s in comparison to later mobilization efforts. First, the student body was relatively small compared to what was going

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

249

to be in the next decades—massification had not yet taken place. Second, corruption scandals across several university federations weakened the student movement. For instance, in 1992, student representatives of the Universidad de Chile were accused of receiving “wages” from the rector’s office. These scandals delegitimated student leaders to the point that, by the mid-1990s, many student federations did not reach the minimum turnout quorums to elect their representatives (Bidegain, 2015, 216–219; Thielemann, 2014).

The Emergence of Autonomist Forces The strong linkages between student leaders and governing parties not only resulted in demobilization. It also produced a wedge between leaders and student masses demanding more radical changes. As a result, since the 1990s, both in high schools and universities, new leftist forces began to emerge, marking the beginning of a process of political detachment from parties. These forces were especially strong in the Universidad de Valparaíso, Universidad de Concepción, and the Universidad de Chile, among others. Their criticisms had several targets: Concertación parties for not engaging in substantive reforms that would challenge the market model of education ; student leaders militating in Concertación parties for preempting protest, and for using student organizations as a trampoline for accessing governmental positions; and Communist student leaders, which the new forces saw as mainly interested in accumulating votes. Likewise, the “social collectives” (colectivos sociales ) that emerged in high schools in the late 1990s criticized official student centers, which students saw as part of the governmental apparatus (Donoso, 2013). Accordingly, these new forces developed organizations autonomous from political parties. In universities, the main “autonomist” forces were the SURDA, La Franja, Colectivo EEII , Estudiantes por la Reforma, Estudiantes en Movimiento, and Frente de Estudiantes Libertarios (Thielemann, 2014). They faced a daunting task: to activate politically a growing mass of students from popular backgrounds, often coming from outside the metropolitan region, which faced a heavy burden of educational debts, and which lacked links to political parties. These new forces also innovated organizationally. For reducing the risk of cooptation, they built horizontal organizations with “spokespersons” instead of “presidents.” The autonomist groups were well received by first-generation university students and changed the fate of the student movement. Bidegain

250

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

(2015, 235) documents their growing strength within university student organizations: in 1992 more than 80% of university student federations were dominated by Concertación youth wings; in 1997, half were dominated by the Concertación, and half by Communists; in 2005 they were divided into thirds among concertacionistas, communists, and autonomistas (closer to the SURDA). This change was not due to an “evolution” among Concertación student leaders, but due to the growth of an autonomist wing inside the movement. While the rise of autonomous forces in the student movement was at the expense of the Concertación parties, in parallel, Communist student leaders strengthened their presence at the universities. These two political sectors on the left dominated student politics from the late 1990s onwards.

The 2001 mochilazo Protests The protests staged by high-school students during 2001 under the administration of Socialist president Ricardo Lagos, known as the mochilazo (“backpack demonstrations”), marked an important point in the process of political detachment and influencing of the student movement. This was the first time in decades that secondary students led massive mobilizations in Chile. During the mochilazo, secondary students protested against the high prices of student transport fees and their administration by private companies. The protests were led by the Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students (ACES), a recently created student organization with few organic connections to the government— and thus an example of a disembedded organization in our terms. Through a group called frente anti-alzas (anti-increase front), the ACES gathered students from radical autonomous “collectivities”—colectivos (Donoso, 2017, 74). Mobilizations included demonstrations with about 10,000 participants and successful student strikes, occasionally persuading as high as 80% of students to miss classes (Bidegain, 2015, 225–226). Protests started in traditional public high schools in Santiago, but then spread to popular-class high schools in the periphery of the capital (Donoso, 2013, 6). The mochilazo illustrates how links with polity members can weaken protests. Mobilizations were not supported by those student organizations more connected with the government. The Chilean Congress had created in 1997 the Youth Congress, where student representatives from several high schools met and debated in a congress-like fashion. Through

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

251

the Youth Congress, the government could monitor the activities of students and created links to student leaders, which could eventually be used to defuse protests. After the first important demonstration took place in April 2001—with an attendance of about 10,000—representatives of the Education Ministry called a leader of the Youth Congress which militated in the Socialist youth wing and asked him to stop the protests if he wished to continue his political career (Bidegain, 2015, 226). As a result of these maneuvers, the organizations closer to the Concertación youth wings quickly reached an agreement with the government. The mochilazo also illustrates the other side of the coin. It shows how the disembeddedness of polity members from movement organizations can help to promote protests. The ACES, imbued by more autonomous students, did not validate the Youth Congress, which they saw as a cooptation instrument, and continued the mobilizations (Bidegain, 2015, 234). The government could not demobilize the ACES because it lacked organic ties to it, and because the ACES was organized around assemblies and spokesperson rather than traditional student representatives. Spokespersons could not impose to the student body the agreements they reached with authorities. The transmission belt was weaker, making the movement less vulnerable to cooptation. This anticipated a phenomenon that would take full force during the 2006 protests. The mochilazo also brought new issues to the debate. Student spokespersons claimed to fight not for the traditional struggles of the political left but the real problems of Chilean students. They emphasized daily problems such as school infrastructure, the authoritarianism of educational authorities, internet access, and more inclusive dressing and hair codes in schools and leisure facilities (Donoso, 2017). Based on a politically detached student movement, the mochilazo was successful by the standard of the times. After several weeks of protests, the Education Ministry accepted taking care of the administration of transport school passes, which were in the hands of a private company. It also issued several thousands of free passes to students (Donoso, 2013, 2017). The triumph was on a specific issue. But it showed to students that sustained protests could influence political authorities. Thus, it was a necessary step to the broader, more ambitious demands, and deeper influences of the subsequent waves of student protest. The Youth Parliament was not convoked anymore—it had proven useless for containing student demonstrations.

252

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

The 2006 pingüino Protests In 2006, a new wave of student protests shook Chile. It was again led by high-school students, but it was more massive and consequential than the 2001 protests. While the mochilazo was staged by secondary students already disaffected with political parties, the 2006 pingüino (penguin) campaign was to an important degree led by students linked to youth party wings. For example, key pingüino leaders such as Karina Delfino and César Valenzuela militated in the Socialist Party youth wing. One of its results, however, was growing student disillusionment with the leftist parties in power that were supposedly responsive to student demands. This boosted students’ detachment from the institutional left. Another important consequence is that it took students’ influence on authorities to a higher level: the campaign forced political parties to replace the main national law regulating secondary education. Brokerage took place in 2005 to strengthen the movement. In 2005 the Education Ministry convoked student representatives from different schools to discuss issues of educational policy. As an unintended result of this invitation, students from diverse schools in Santiago—public and private, from the center and the periphery, from the middle-class and popular backgrounds—met each other for the first time. They started thinking about structural demands that went beyond those displayed during the 2001 campaign. These meetings also provided students with experience for negotiating with political authorities (Donoso, 2013). In early 2006, this resulted in the fusion of two organizations—ACES and the Assembly of Student Centers of Santiago (ACAS)—into the Assembly of High School Students (AES) (Bidegain, 2015, 239). Political authorities could not coopt the AES. Its organizational structure was conceived in a way that granted disembeddedness . Following the organizational learning developed in 2001, the AES was structured around assemblies and spokespersons that minimized vertical hierarchies. Thus, authorities could not deactivate protest through closed-room negotiations with student leaders, as was the case during the 1990s. As a government official noted, “the spokespersons had to go back to the assembly and ask what the assembly thought on each proposal made by the government” (quoted in Donoso, 2013, 24). Student disillusionment with authorities started in 2006 when it became clear that the new Education Ministry of the Bachelet government, Martín Zilic, ignored the 2005 negotiation tables convened by the

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

253

previous educational authorities (Donoso, 2013). In May, after the police violently repressed several marches, students shifted tactics. From street rallies, students began seizing hundreds of school buildings. In a clear example of radicalization, they also shifted to more structural demands such as the derogation of the Constitutional Law of Education—drafted during the Pinochet regime—and the end of the school administration by municipalities. These mobilizations were way more massive than the 2001 ones (Bidegain, 2015, 244–255). The protests also elicited broad public support. Surveys revealed that about 87% of the population agreed with student demands. The proportion considering education as a policy priority doubled during 2006 (Donoso, 2017, 77). With her popularity under threat , Bachelet convoked a presidential advisory commission for studying the subject of education and elaborating proposals to reform the system. The commission included a few student representatives as well as a larger and heterogeneous majority of academics, experts, and teachers. Combined with the fatigue after months of intense mobilization, and the disengagement of some students who wanted to return to classes, the outcome was inevitable: students stopped the mobilizations and focused their attention on the work of the presidential commission. Six months later, the commission issued a report. While not backed by students and teachers, it did include some student demands, such as ending economic profit in state-subsidized schools. In 2007 Bachelet launched a bill proposal based on the report, yet the rightist forces in Congress opposed it. In 2009, after many negotiations between both political coalitions, the result was a new law—the LGE—that did not consider any of the core student demands (Donoso, 2017; von Bülow & Bidegain, 2015). The campaign ended up deepening the process of student detachment from leftist parties—a process taking place since the mochilazo. Our three mechanisms operated to this end. Regarding disillusion, students saw the whole process as a treason by the political status quo, given the distance between the new law and student demands. They learned they had made a strategic mistake when deciding to stop mobilizations for negotiating (Bidegain, 2015)—in fact, a key purpose of the presidential commission was to deactivate protests (Donoso, 2013, 25). This deepened among students the perception that leftist parties, while in theory sympathetic to their demands, in practice were not. This paved the way for further ideological radicalization of student demands. Already in 2006, and different

254

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

from 2001, students were envisioning structural reforms to the educational system, as would be made clearest during the 2011 campaign. Finally, the resignation of socialist spokespersons, and the strengthening of autonomist representatives in the AES as the protest wave advanced, disembedded even more leftist parties from student organizations. This limited their future capacity to coopt and defuse protests. It is also important to note how the 2006 experience strengthened the movement via brokerage. We already mentioned that during the 2005 discussions, different student leaders, schools, and organizations had the opportunity to meet each other. But brokerage went beyond movement boundaries during 2006. Participation in the presidential advisory commission created new interpersonal ties and showed the affinities among secondary students and teacher unions, university students, and parents’ organizations—the so-called “social bloc” (Bellei et al., 2014). These ties would prove essential during the next wave of protests.

The 2011–2012 Protests The 2011–2012 cycle of student protests marked a watershed in social movement activity in Chile. High-school students led the 2001 and 2006 cycles. This time, university students took the lead. Protests started in early May 2011 in the Universidad Central, a private university whose students opposed the purchase of half of the university’s shares by a financial group (Figueroa & Araya, 2011). In the following months, these students received the support of the CONFECH and high-school student organizations. Protests increased in May after the presidential address of Sebastián Piñera—the first president on the center-right since democracy was reinstated in 1990—in which he did not announce changes on education. Soon, all over the country, students were staging the largest demonstrations in Chile since the return to democracy—some demonstrations convoked over 100,000 people and surpassed the 2006 ones (Bidegain, 2015). Student demands escalated. Now they included free, public, and highquality education backed by constitutional reform and tax reform, as well as a stronger role of the state in regulating education. While the protests started criticizing the illegal profit practices of some institutions, they also denounced a credit system managed by banks that resulted in unbearable debts for students, and more generally, the market model of education and its low and unequal quality. Between 2000 and 2012, about 44% of

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

255

all participants in protests in Chile took part in events supporting these or other educational demands (Donoso & Somma, 2019). Demands for structural reforms of the educational system doubled in 2011 compared to previous years (Donoso & Somma, 2019). In the following, we analyze the 2011–2012 protest wave in terms of the processes highlighted in this chapter: the strengthening of the movement, its detachment from polity members, and its influence on the political system. Strengthening the Movement At the base of the strengthening of the university student movement was the massification of upper education and the simultaneous creation of a market of educational institutions. Before the dictatorship, public universities were free and provided education to the better-off sectors. But the number of universities in Chile grew from 8 in 1980 to 60 in 2012, to which we should add about one hundred centers of technical education (Bidegain, 2015, 190). Given the expansion of educational credits, the number of university students approximately doubled between 1987 and 2000, ranging from 15% to 25% of the youth (Thielemann, 2014, 65). In 2012, the enrollment rate of young people in post-secondary education was an impressive 59% (Bellei et al., 2014, 429). Such institutions charged high fees and competed for attracting the best students. Using the terminology explained in the introduction of this volume, this created a “market-dependent” university system. Massification was not only about more students. It also entailed a more heterogeneous student body with new demands. Traditionally, the university student movement represented a small constituency of middle- and upper-class students from Santiago, which used to struggle for issues such as university autonomy or student participation in university governance (Thielemann, 2014). By 2011 this had changed. University education grew markedly outside the Metropolitan Region (where the capital Santiago is located), and many students from outside Santiago came to the capital to study too. Also, most of the new students came from popular backgrounds. Many were the first generation in their families to access upper education—and most of them did so through educational loans such as the state-sponsored educational credit (CAE)—instituted during the presidency of Ricardo Lagos, from the Socialist Party. The CAE had a burdensome 6% interest rate.

256

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

For activating the new mass of students politically, its leaders launched a fierce attack against the “neoliberal” education model. Given their weaker attachment to the center-left parties that had consolidated this model in democracy, this attack resonated among the new students, which had a more critical view of political institutions and were more inclined to support radical leftist organizations (Thielemann, 2014). Student leaders on campuses nurtured the new political consciousness by organizing small conversation circles (conversatorios ) and broader assemblies (Somma, 2012). The movement also grew stronger via brokerage. First of all, the connections among university student organizations broadened across time. During the 1990s, many of the new private universities prohibited student organizations—or, if existing, they were tightly controlled by university authorities. This changed during the 2000s, resulting in the creation of many student federations (Bellei et al., 2014). Accordingly, by 2011 the CONFECH comprised not only presidents of traditional universities, but also those from newer universities as well as representatives of indigenous Mapuche students. This allowed a better representation of the full spectrum of university students (Bellei et al., 2014). Additionally, brokerage was also favored by an alliance between the university and high-school students. While university students led the demonstrations, high-school students occupied the buildings of several schools—e.g., about 140 high schools were occupied in Santiago alone by July 2011 (Guzmán-Concha, 2012). Detaching the Movement from Polity Members In the years previous to the 2011 protest cycle, the student movement had grown increasingly detached from the political status quo. This took place through the three mechanisms previously mentioned. One was ideological radicalization. From 2008 onwards, student federations closer to leftist autonomist views became progressively stronger, and in 2011 new forces reached power in the two most important Chilean universities. The New University Left (NIU) won the student elections at the FECH (Universidad de Chile), and a new center-left force, the New University Action (NAU), won at the Universidad Católica de Chile. NAU’s triumph was consequential since it broke the hegemony of conservative student groups in that university’s student federation. In a joint congress in 2009, both forces—NIU and NAU—had developed a

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

257

common diagnostic of Chilean education which emphasized the negative consequences of the neoliberal model, profit-making, and the subsidiary role of the state (Donoso, 2017). The ideological affinity between the new federations favored their coordinated actions during protests. Moreover, as 2011 advanced, more radical forces inspired by anarchism, Trotskyism, anticapitalism, and the far-left group MIR gained space in many student federations. This furthered ideological radicalization even more (Bidegain, 2015; von Bülow & Bidegain, 2015). Another mechanism for political detachment from the traditional parties was the disembeddedness of polity members from the movement. We noted that during the 2006 cycle, some student leaders militated in parties belonging to the governing coalition and that this made them vulnerable to pressures by party leaders to deactivate protests. The situation was completely different in 2011: Piñera’s government had no ties to the student movement because rightist parties lacked them. Finally, detachment also operated through disillusion. Students in 2011 had vivid memories of the 2006 “treason” by political parties, and this had a profound effect on their strategy toward negotiations with authorities. From the beginning of the protests, the students reaffirmed they would not stop mobilizations to negotiate (von Bülow & Bidegain, 2015). Also, this time the center-right ideology of the government seemed to preclude any approach to the students. Strikingly, one of the rallying cries in the student marches was “united, the people, advance without parties” (el pueblo, unido, avanza si partidos ) (von Bülow & Bidegain, 2015). Influencing the Government Through Popularity Threats While the 2011–2012 cycle did not lead to a paradigmatic change in educational policies, it had immediate effects on many fronts (Bellei et al., 2014; Bidegain, 2015; Donoso, 2017; Guzmán-Concha, 2012). To appease the movement, president Piñera changed the education minister three times in two years. Most importantly, by mid-2011, he announced an unexpected increase in the education budget, including 400 million US$ for scholarships to the poorest students, and credits for the rest. He also reduced the interest rates of educational loans from 6% to 2%, and established limits to the repayments of educational debts based on student wages when they graduated and began to work. Finally, Piñera promoted the creation of public agencies for assuring the quality of education and

258

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

sent a project for creating new institutions for monitoring the educational system, which was implemented during the following government (Bellei et al., 2014). The student movement also directly influenced Congress. In 2012 the Congress invited student leaders to discuss the National Budget Law. After the movement denounced the existence of profit in educational activities—with profit being prohibited by law—the Congress began to investigate many institutions suspected of violating the law, leading to the closure of a few of them. The 2011–2012 cycle also had consequences for Bachelet’s second government (2014–2018), as we will see below. How could the movement force Piñera’s government to make such changes? Above, we defined three mechanisms of movement influence— threat , persuasion, and replacement. We argue that threat was the most important one in this case. It is not that student protests posed a security threat to the government. The movement was peaceful despite some violence in the demonstrations, and nothing was resembling a violent takeover of political institutions despite the radical, or even revolutionary ideologies that inspired some student wings. The threat the movement posed on Piñera’s government was based on democratic mechanisms. It pointed to the government’s popularity and image (in Chile and abroad). It also posed an electoral threat for reelecting the right-wing coalition in 2014. Soon after protests started in 2011, public opinion polls revealed that about 70% of the population supported the movement and its demands (Donoso, 2017). The percentage considering education as the country’s main problem doubled between 2010 and 2012 (Donoso & Somma, 2019). Also, Piñera saw his public approval rates plummeting from a high of 66% in October 2010 (Mascareño & Cádiz, 2012) to a low of 23% about a year later (Radio Universidad de Chile, 2011)—a record low since democratic restoration in 1990. In our analysis, we privilege threat over persuasion as a mechanism of influence. Why not persuasion? Educational reforms were not present in Piñera’s electoral program and were not an issue before protests gained strength. Piñera endorsed a market view of education and considered education to be a consumption good rather than a public good or a social right (Cooperativa, 2011). It is difficult to believe that student demands genuinely persuaded him and his government.

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

259

A Movement in Decline? The 2011–2012 student protest cycle has received much scholarly attention, but we know less about what happened afterward. Graph 1 reports the yearly number of protest events all over Chile reporting the presence of students. The peak was in 2011 as expected, but student protests decreased dramatically in 2012 and the years that followed, up to a small resurgence in 2016. Why this decline? Many factors were at play. A general one is that collective protest is a demanding activity. Even very motivated students with high biographical availability (McAdam, 1986) run into exhaustion, and after some time, the cycle begins its downward phase (Fig. 10.1). But there are more specific factors. Below we consider three without assigning causal primacy to any of them. They all contributed in different ways to the decline of the student cycle, and made it difficult for the arousal of a new, comparable cycle during the rest of the decade. 1200

1129

Number of student protests

1000 800 600 448 400 200

427

390 278

130

173

377 256

213

0 2009

2010

2011

2012

2013 2014 Year

2015

2016

2017

2018

Fig. 10.1 Number of student protests in Chile by year (Source Data from the Observatory of Conflicts of the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies [COES]. The figure considers protest events reporting the presence of students of any kind [high school, university, or non-identified])

260

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

The first one is the obverse of the processes of detachment. We argued above that a key driver for the movement since the mid-2000s was its detachment from polity members. Following the same logic, one of the reasons why the student movement lost salience after 2012 was a process of reattachment to the political system. This was not, however, a reattachment to the political status quo in general. It was a “selective reattachment” to promote changes from the inside of the system. The gifted 2011–2012 generation of student leaders graduated and could not continue promoting the movement from the inside. Many of them rapidly got involved in party politics. They could not focus exclusively on educational issues and had to take a more comprehensive, catch-all stance toward politics. This reattachment shifted the energies of some of the best leaders away from the movement, and into more institutional spheres of political action. This happened, for instance, with Communist former student leaders such as Karol Cariola and Camila Vallejo, who were elected as deputies in 2013. Others, such as Giorgio Jackson and Gabriel Boric, founded their own political forces, which soon converged into the Frente Amplio coalition (Donoso & Somma, 2021). The four student leaders elected as deputies in 2013 (Boric, Cariola, Jackson, and Vallejo) were soon caricatured by the press as the bancada estudiantil (student caucus), a label they rejected precisely arguing that they were devoted to broader issues. Other former student leaders were hired by the Ministry of Education of Bachelet’s new government (2014–2018) (Pérez, 2014), but resigned a few months later under severe criticisms (La Tercera, 2016). In the Winter of 2017, we surveyed 195 participants in a student demonstration in Santiago using the Caught in the Act of Protest (CCC) methodology adapted to Chile (Somma et al., 2019; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2012). Some of the findings illustrate how this “selective reattachment” played out among demonstrators. On the one hand, demonstrators—most of which were students—show a clear detachment from mainstream political institutions. For instance, on a scale of satisfaction with the way democracy works in Chile, in which 0 = “very unsatisfied” and 10 = “very satisfied,” demonstrators average a low of 2.8. Average trusts toward political institutions are very low, too (on a 1–5 scale: 2.0 for the national government, 2.2 for local governments, and 1.8 for political parties). And, in a country in which about half of the population votes, only 28% of student demonstrators reported having

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

261

voted, a telling sign of their detachment from political parties and the electoral process (the survey was only applied to voting-age people). But it would be a mistake to interpret these findings as political apathy. 73% of the sample reported being “quite interested” or “very interested” in politics, suggesting that in their views, politics goes beyond parties and elections. Their political behaviors confirmed this: in a repertoire of nine types of political actions, half of the demonstrators surveyed declared having participated in three or more during the last 12 months. Although when asked about the political party they felt closer to, only 30% mentioned some political party or political force, 73% of such 30% mentioned a party or political movement that belonged, or would belong soon, to the Frente Amplio. This leftist coalition resulted from the impulse of former student leaders such as Boric and Jackson. Only 4% of those mentioning closeness with a political party referred to the Communist Party, and only 2% mentioned a party belonging to the center-left Concertación coalition. This suggests that, although students were detached from the traditional left and center-left, they were increasingly attached to newer political forces. A second factor for understanding why no massive student protest cycle happened after 2012 has to do, precisely, with the prior success of the movement. The consequences of student protests went far beyond Piñera’s first government. When Bachelet won the elections for a second time for the 2014–2018 period, her campaign and policies were very aligned with student demands (Guzmán-Concha, 2017; PalaciosValladares & Ondetti, 2019). In our terms, this is a clear example of influence through replacement. The three pillars of the second government of Bachelet were broadening free access to university education to the popular sectors, a tax reform for financing the latter, and a constitutional reform that would allow reforming the “neoliberal model.” Student organizations criticized the Bachelet government as these and other reforms advanced. Yet it was more difficult for them to persuade the student masses to mobilize than when Piñera was in power. Instead of taking the streets as in 2011, students took an active role in monitoring and suggesting changes to the reforms (Donoso & Somma, 2021). Finally, changes in the Chilean social movement sector (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) during the 2010s also conspired against the salience of the student movement. One of them was the “crowding” of the protest space. The 2011–2012 student mobilizations helped create a “social movement society” (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998), where a host of aggrieved groups

262

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

began to adopt student tactics for anew (Somma, 2017). This revitalized Chilean movements in general and led to a dramatic increase in all forms of protest (Donoso & Somma, 2021; Somma & Medel, 2017). The unintended consequence of this crowding was that in the years following 2011–2012, student demands lost some ground relative to other demands that were taking the scene. The Chilean political class, as any other one, has to prioritize the street demands to be addressed, and educational demands were already receiving much attention. New groups gained the attention of the political class and the public opinion, indirectly contributing to the declining relative salience of student demands. These included sexual diversity groups challenging heteronormativity, communities facing severe health problems due to industrial pollution, women organizations denouncing male violence, and a labor movement revitalized by a labor reform project and low pensions (Garretón et al., 2018). It is important to acknowledge that the student movement reacted to these changes. Actually, students were drawing attention to these problems from their own experiences. For example, the feminist wave that shook the country during 2017 and 2018 to denounce male violence, and sexual abuses against women was rooted, to a large extent, in university campuses. Mental health problems also became an issue among students simultaneously stressed by labor, educational, and economic demands. Yet, the efforts resulted insufficient to fuel student mobilizations as potent as those in 2011–2012.

Conclusions Using a contentious politics approach, we have addressed a theoretical puzzle raised by Chile’s student movement since democratic restoration in 1990. We argued that the student movement became increasingly influential on authorities’ decisions and public policies. However, at the same time, it became less attached to polity members—including governments, and centrist and leftist political parties, which had traditionally been close to the movement. This is puzzling because polity members are supposed to provide movements the resources and opportunities that grant them influence. Our answer to this puzzle consisted of showing how the student movement managed to combine successfully two processes—strengthening and political detachment—in ways that rendered it more likely

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

263

to exercise threat or persuasion on authorities, and also to take advantage of authorities’ replacement by more sympathetic ones. Our narrative of the student movement since the late 1980s also shows how these processes can be unpacked into more specific mechanisms such as political activation, ideological radicalization, disembeddedness, brokerage, and massification, among others. Finally, we followed McAdam et al.’s (2001) suggestion of going beyond cases in the advanced North. We used the contentious politics approach in a Southern country with a relatively recent authoritarian experience (1973–1990) and high levels of economic inequality. We believe these processes and mechanisms are general enough to help understanding student movements in other countries—or other types of movements, for that matter. However, some features of the Chilean case may not occur everywhere, or may occur in different ways, thus conditioning how these processes and mechanisms operate. For instance, massification—a rapid increase in the number of potential beneficiaries of a movement—should be a relatively extraordinary phenomenon. This concerns especially the growth of student bodies, in which increases happen in specific junctures and are difficult to revert. Likewise, political detachment obviously requires a previous situation of attachment. In our case, this resulted from the common struggle against the dictatorship in the late 1980s, which unified emerging student organizations with centrist and leftist parties. Nevertheless, it remains an open question how likely this is in countries without similar processes of cohesive struggle against dictators. In other words, processes and mechanisms should be put in context to uncover the full potential of the contentious politics approach.

Notes 1. Relational mechanisms “alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks” (McAdam et al., 2001, 26). The authors also identify environmental and cognitive mechanisms. 2. See the volume 8, issue 2 (2003), and volume 16, issue 1 (2011) of the journal Mobilization: An International Quarterly; and the volume 2, issue 1 (2003) of the journalSocial Movement Studies. 3. We take this mechanism from McAdam et al. (2001). See also the concept of “mediation” in Ancelovici and Guzmán-Concha’s (2019) article on student movements in Canada and Chile.

264

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

4. This is similar to “autonomization” in Bidegain’s works on the Chilean student movement (see Bidegain, 2015; von Bülow & Bidegain, 2015; also Garretón, 2016; Somma & Bargsted, 2015). 5. Political activation, as a mechanism in the strengthening process, seems similar to disillusion and ideological radicalization (mechanisms of detachment). The difference is that the latter two are directed against the authorities and status quo, while activation is not. In this chapter we emphasize ideological radicalization. McAdam et al. consider both ideological and tactical radicalization—they define radicalization as “the expansion of collective action frames to more extreme agendas and the adoption of more transgressive forms of contention” (2001, 69). Della Porta (2018b, 462) emphasizes tactical radicalization (“Radicalization is a process of escalation from nonviolent to increasingly violent repertoires of action that develops through a complex set of interactions unfolding over time”). 6. For making explicit the concepts presented in this section, in the narrative that follows we use bold letters for indicating processes, and italics for indicating mechanisms.

References Amenta, E., Caren, N., Chiarello, E., & Su, Y. (2010). The political consequences of social movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 287–307. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-120029. Ancelovici, M., & Guzmán-Concha, C. (2019). Struggling for education: The dynamics of student protests in Chile and Quebec. Current Sociology, 67 (7), 978–996. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392119865763. Bellei, C., Cabalin, C., & Orellana, V. (2014). The 2011 Chilean student movement against neoliberal educational policies. Studies in Higher Education, 39(3), 426–440. https://doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2014.896179. Bidegain, G. (2015). Autonomización de los movimientos sociales e intensificación de la protesta: estudiantes y mapuches en Chile (1990–2013) [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Santiago: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Brennan, J. P. (Ed.). (1998). Peronism and Argentina. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Cooperativa. (2011). Presidente Piñera: la educación es un bien de consumo. Cooperativa. https://www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/pais/educacion/proyec tos/presidente-pinera-la-educacion-es-un-bien-de-consumo/2011-07-19/ 134829.html. Accessed 20 July 2020 della Porta, D. (2018a). Protests as critical junctures: Some reflections towards a momentous approach to social movements. Social Movement Studies, 19, 1–20.

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

265

della Porta, D. (2018b). Radicalization: A relational perspective. Annual Review of Political Science, 21, 461–474. Donoso, S. (2013). Dynamics of change in Chile: Explaining the emergence of the 2006 Pingüino movement. Journal of Latin American Studies, 45(1), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X12001228. Donoso, S. (2017). “Outsider” and “Insider” strategies: Chile’s Student Movement, 1990–2014. In S. Donoso & M. von Bülow (Eds.), Social movements in chile. Organization, trajectories, and political consequences (pp. 65–97). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Donoso, S., & Somma, N. M. (2019). “You Taught us to Give an Opinion, Now Learn How to Listen”: The manifold political consequences of Chile’s Student Movement. In M. Arce & R. Rice (Eds.), Protest and democracy (pp. 145–172). Calgary: University of Calgary Press. Donoso, S. & Somma, N. M. (2021). The student movement in Chile: Normalizing protest and opening up political space. In J. Bessant, A. Mejías Mesinas & S. Pickard (Eds.), When students protest. Universities in the Globasl South. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Donoso, S., & von Bülow, M. (Eds.). (2017). Social Movements in Chile. Organization, trajectories, and political consequences. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Figueroa, J. P., & Araya, T. (2011). El negocio que esconde la venta de la Universidad Central. Ciper. https://ciperchile.cl/2011/04/28/el-negocio-que-esc onde-la-venta-de-la-universidad-central/. Accessed 21 July 2021. Garretón, M. A. (2016). La gran ruptura: institucionalidad política y actores sociales en el Chile del siglo XXI. Santiago: LOM Ediciones. Garretón, M., Joignant, A., Somma, N. M., & Campos, T. (2018). Introducción. In M. Garretón, A. Joignant, N. M. Somma, & T. Campos (Eds.), Informe Anual Observatorio de Conflictos 2018 (pp. 4–7). Santiago: COES. Guzmán-Concha, C. (2012). The students’ rebellion in Chile: Occupy protest or classic social movement? Social Movement Studies, 11(3–4), 408–415. https:// doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2012.710748. Guzmán-Concha, C. (2017). Undoing the neoliberal higher education system? Student protests and the Bachelet reforms in Chile. World Social and Economic Review of Contemporary Policy Issues, 8, 32–43. Hipsher, P. L. (1996). Democratization and the decline of urban social movements in Chile and Spain. Comparative Politics, 28(3), 273–297. La Tercera. (2016). Gonzalo Muñoz y Miguel Crispi renuncian al Ministerio de Educación. La Tercera. https://www.latercera.com/noticia/gon zalo-munoz-y-miguel-crispi-renuncian-al-ministerio-de-educacion/. Accessed 21 July 2020. Mascareño, C., & Cádiz, P. (2012). Los mejores y peores registros del gobierno de Piñera en la encuesta Adimark. La Tercera. https://www.latercera.com/

266

N. M. SOMMA AND S. DONOSO

noticia/los-mejores-y-peores-registros-del-gobierno-de-pinera-en-la-encuestaadimark/. Accessed 21 July 2020. McAdam, D. (1986). Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of freedom summer. American Journal of Sociology, 92(1), 64–90. McAdam, D., & Tarrow, S. (2010). Ballots and barricades: On the reciprocal relationship between elections and social movements. Perspectives on Politics, 8(2), 529–542. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592710001234. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO978051180 5431. McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. American Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212–1241. Meyer, D. S., & Tarrow, S. (Eds.). (1998). The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Palacios-Valladares, I., & Ondetti, G. (2019). Student protest and the Nueva Mayoría reforms in Chile. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 38(5), 638– 653. https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12886. Pérez, N. (2014). Califican como jugada política designación de 2 ex dirigentes estudiantiles como asesores de Mineduc. Biobio. https://www.biobiochile. cl/noticias/2014/03/06/califican-como-jugada-politica-designacion-de-2ex-dirigentes-estudiantiles-como-asesores-de-mineduc.shtml. Accessed 21 July 2020. Radio Universidad de Chile. (2011). Histórica caída: Solo un 23% aprueba a Piñera. Diario U Chile. https://radio.uchile.cl/2011/12/29/historica-des aprobacion-solo-un-23-aprueba-a-pinera/. Accessed 21 July 2020. Somma, N. M. (2012). The Chilean student movement of 2011–2012: Challenging the marketization of education. Interface: A Journal for and About Social Movements, 4(2), 296–309. Somma, N. M., & Medel, R. (2017). Shifting relationships between social movements and institutional politics. In S. Donoso & M. von Bülow (Eds.), Social movements in chile. Organization, trajectories, and political consequences (pp. 29–61). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Somma, N. M., Rossi, F. M., & Donoso, S. (2019). The attachment of demonstrators to institutional politics: Comparing LGBTIQ pride marches in Argentina and Chile. Bulletin of Latin American Research. https://doi. org/10.1111/blar.12956. Somma, N., & Bargsted, M. (2015). La autonomización de la protesta en Chile. In C. Cox & J. C. Castillo (Eds.), Socialización política y experiencia escolar: aportes para la formación ciudadana en Chile (pp. 207–240). Santiago: Ediciones UC.

10

CHILE’S STUDENT MOVEMENT: STRONG, DETACHED …

267

Somma, N. M. (2017). Protestas y conflictos en el Chile contemporáneo: quince tesis para la discusión. In R. Araya & F. Ceballos (Eds.), Conflictos, controversias y disyuntivas (pp. 37–85). Santiago: Ediciones Abierta. Tarrow, S. (2011). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thielemann, L. (2014). La anomalía social de la transición: movimiento estudiantil e izquierda universitaria en el Chile de los noventa (1987–2000) [Unpublished M.A. dissertation]. Santiago: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison–Wesley. Tilly, C. (1984). Big structures, large processes, huge comparisons. Russell Sage Foundation. Van Stekelenburg, J., Walgrave, S., Klandermans, B., & Verhulst, J. (2012). Contextualizing contestation: Framework, design, and data. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 17 (3), 249–262. von Bülow, M., & Bidegain, G. (2015). It takes two to tango: students, political parties, and protest in Chile (2005–2013). In P. Almeida & A. Cordero Ulate (Eds.), Handbook of social movements across Latin America (pp. 179–194). New York: Springer.

CHAPTER 11

Ever Failed? Fail Again, Fail Better: Tuition Protests in Germany, Turkey, and the United States Didem Türko˘glu

Introduction “Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try Again. Fail Again. Fail better.” This is a rather dark quote from Samuel Beckett that foresees a life where the best outcome is a better failure. It reflects the mood higher education activists have shared across the board in many countries. Many find themselves locked in a battle against a never-ending onslaught of neoliberal reforms that keep privatizing public higher education, which takes away the agency of the students and faculty alike by turning them into customers and service providers, respectively. For some, universities are turning into graveyards where the ideals of public higher education are buried six feet under, never to walk the earth again. And yet, it is perhaps analytically more meaningful to take Beckett’s words out of context and take them literally. In fact, past “failures” could provide a legacy to take

D. Türko˘glu (B) New York University Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0_11

269

270

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

small steps toward the outcomes these disillusioned activists have once sought. In this chapter, I present a comparative historical analysis of the student’s protests against tuition hikes, and their outcomes, in three different welfare state types: Germany, Turkey, and the United States. I demonstrate that the perceived positionality of the student movements in past failures—narrated in collective memory making—could influence the structure of the alliances built later by movement actors. All three countries experienced strong student mobilizations in the 1960s and 1970s that shaped the institutional involvement of student collective action in the later decades. Despite the relative silence of the student movements of the late 1980s and 1990s, they were once again revived in the 2000s (Cini & Guzmán-Concha, 2017). They were inevitably based on the institutional legacy of the past movements and a partial memory of what was once possible. Della Porta et al. (2018) analyze the legacy of the social movements in democratic transitions and identify two paths: eventful transitions and elite pacts. In the former, movements play a major role in changing the political system while in the latter the elites take the spotlight. In eventful transitions, we would expect open and inclusive political opportunities for the movement actors because of the positive memory of the role movements played. In elite pacts, we would expect closed and selective political opportunities because movements either took a supporting role or are simply reduced to tertiary characters in a movie. In this paper, I build on these findings. I show that the institutional setup of the contemporary student organizations reflect the legacy of student movements in the 1960s. Furthermore, I build an analogy to the eventful transitions and elite pacts to argue that when student movements perceived impact in the 1960s resemble eventful transitions, they could be recognized as an important players even when their mobilization is relatively small. If, on the other hand, their involvement is marginalized in the narratives, then they might have to get involved in elite pacts to gain recognition. Collective action has unintended consequences. It may not reach its stated goals but might create an advantage for the constituency (Amenta et al., 2010, 290), create a legacy (Polletta & Kretschmer, 2015), or lay the organizational structures which could trigger another wave of mobilization with an advantageous outcome in the long run (Andrews, 2001). This chapter builds on unintended consequences to discuss how past “failures” motivated alliance building in the subsequent wave of mobilization.

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

271

Most of the studies on student mobilization focus on the moments when the mobilization makes the biggest impact. However, examining mostly “successful” moments contributes to selection bias (McAdam & Boudet, 2012). I argue that past “failures” become a building block in two ways: through the organizational structures that open a possibility of alliance building and through the outsiders’ perceptions built around the political power of a movement actors’ collective identity. At the organizational level, “failures” turn into a collective learning experience that has the capacity to reshape alliance structures. However, studies that focus on the impact of past mobilizations mostly rely on extensive case studies and rarely on comparative work. I show that the crucial commonality across the cases of Germany, Turkey, and the United States was the formation of unexpected alliances made possible by the failures of the past movements. I ask, in protest waves where the activist cadres remain intact, could collective memory work mediate the lessons derived from past “failures”? If so, how? To answer this question and show different paths of collective memory work activists put in place, this research takes a comparative approach to capture variation across political and organizational structures. In this case, I compare anti-tuition hike mobilizations that incorporated alliances between student organizations and labor unions in Germany, Turkey, and the United States. I combined interview and media coverage data in all three cases to examine the dynamics in different ways of mobilization. In the first half of the 2000s, Germany’s conservative-led states introduced tuition fees, and student protests failed to stop this introduction of tuitions. However, a second wave that started after the introduction of tuition fees managed to get tuition fees abolished. I focus on the case of Hesse which has been the first state to abolish tuition fees after their introduction. In Turkey, leftist students demanded free tuition for three decades. They were only able to decrease the hike increases. In the 2010s, former student activists were also active in the unions. Together with decreasing membership figures and government policies targeting opposition unions, labor unions supported student groups’ mobilization against tuition hikes. This time the mobilization resulted in the abolition of tuitions in public universities. In the United States, on the other hand, despite rising tuition fees, there has not been a national movement against the hikes. However, state-level mobilization provides important insights into the dynamics of alliance building within the political context of the United States. I focus

272

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

on California, as its higher education system has been presented as exemplary for the country and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Rothblatt, 1992). In the 1990s, protests against tuition hikes got fragmented in California and failed to prevent further increases. I offer a meso-level analysis where past failures turn into an empowering capacity that later shapes the strategic intentions of the actors through collective memory work. Depending on the interpretation of these failures, actors might position themselves differently in the field of higher education. This positionality could then influence the degree and duration of the alliances they build. By using a comparative research design that can uncover and explain variation across waves of anti-tuition hike mobilizations, this study contributes to the literature on alliance building and movement outcomes. In addition to the structural constraints and opportunities, the selectivity of collective memory work mediates these constraints and opportunities for alliance building.

Collective Memory, Movement Outcomes, and Alliance Building Collective memory work is social. It is social not just because people try to reshape each other’s perception of the past but also because the outcome of the efforts to influence collective memory might depend on the power relations and the structure of networks (Zamponi, 2013). While some short-term framing strategies work for campaigns, collective memory building requires long-term commitments to a narrative (Amenta & Polletta, 2019; Wang et al., 2018). Long-term commitments to collective memory formation might trigger a new cycle of mobilization through the constant reiteration of specific events, modes of collective action, or organizational formation (Kornetis, 2019; Schwarz, 2019; Whitlinger, 2019). Collective memory could also enlarge the sphere of influence of an ongoing mobilization. Alliance building is one way to increase the impact of collective action if it changes the perception of other plays that might open new possibilities of collaboration. Two mechanisms can link collective memory with alliance building motivations. One mechanism is solidarity networks that form through collective memory work. Solidarity lies at the root of social movements, both as a dynamic for

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

273

building intra-movement relations and as a resource to gain influential allies. Internal solidarity is necessary to build bonds between the members in a social movement (Della Porta & Diani, 2020) while external solidarity depicts identification with groups one does not belong to (Hunt & Benson, 2004). Movement organizations might form temporary alliances based solely on pragmatic motivations, but for a large number of social movement alliances external solidarity is the first step toward alliance building (Lee, 2016; Mantler, 2013; Mayer et al., 2010). Scholars suggest that preexisting social ties, common identities, and activists that work in multiple social movement fields make alliance formation easier (Jung et al., 2014; Van Dyke & Amos, 2017). Through collective memory work, activist groups might form a common identity that enables alliance formation in the long run. Another mechanism that links collective memory and alliance building is the politics of remembrance, which itself requires collective action. Collective memory, in this sense, is composed of two parts: the politics of the collective in the present and the instrumentalization of the past. Movements might try to challenge the established power structures by institutionalizing their own instrumentalization of the past (Gongaware, 2010). Collective memory work creates a narrative of the past mobilizations to inspire present action. In an environment where odds for a meaningful positive outcome is perceived to be slim collective memory work could be used to alter the perceptions of protest participants. The reinterpretation of past failures could fragment fledgling movements (Zamponi, 2012) or could unite different factions of the movement. For example, in the case of Turkey, opposition to tuition hikes continued for more than a quarter of a century without any tangible gain. Carrying the torch of previous generations became a motivator for some activists, as I will explain below. Nevertheless, different groups would highlight different memories based on changing contexts and groups’ self-demarcation in the movement field (Zamponi & Daphi, 2014). Movements could utilize strategic remembrances by building frameworks that build ties with the past based on groups’ preferences (Daphi & Zimermann, 2020). Social movement scholarship has increasingly sought to understand the dynamics of alliance building as alliances are important to expand the boundaries of a social movement, share know-how and influence policy outcomes (Levi & Murphy, 2006; Wang et al., 2018). Social movement groups seek alliances to increase their resources (McCammon & Campbell, 2002; Staggenborg, 1986), make better use of emerging

274

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

opportunities (Isaac & Christiansen, 2002; McAdam, 1982) as perceived by the activists (Kurzman, 1996), and provide a stronger reaction to perceived threats (Dixon & Martin, 2012; Dolgon, 2001; Van Dyke & McCammon, 2010). These reactions might be triggered by events (Fisher et al., 2017; Meyer & Corrigall-Brown, 2005; Vasi, 2006), countermovements (Zald & McCarthy, 1980), or an optimism about the effectiveness of collective action (Kadivar, 2013). In contribution to these discussions, I argue that this strategic remembrance of past “failures” might be an important facilitator for alliance building. The point of reference could be the past generation or the past protest cycle. This remembrance could be a positive narrative of the past or a negative one that indicates a lesson learned. Previously, case studies of student protests have indicated the importance of memory work. In Turkey, the legacy of 1968 was used to establish a student union which took an active part in anti-tuition hike protests (Erdinç, 2013). Similarly, the student movement in Brazil in the late 1970s built on the memory of the 1960s, the heroic efforts and self-sacrifice of the past generation (Mische, 2008). While this memory work could happen for a new generation of activists’ reinterpretation of the past, it could also occur within the same generation to make sense of the events the activists themselves participated in. For example, in the United States, in the 1960s student activists organized many sit-ins against racial segregation. They later narrated their involvement and the spread of protests “like a fever” which helped contribute to the recruitment of new activists even if there was no institutionalization of the narrative yet (Polletta, 2009). However, the student movements at the time is largely narrated through the civil rights movement (Biggs & Andrews, 2015). These findings demonstrate the role the reconstruction of the past plays in the movements in reinterpreting the legacies of protests. However, the impact of these legacies on alliance building is rarely explored, especially through comparative work in interaction with different political structures.

Case Selection I selected three different cases that have different tuition regimes, welfare state types, and different degrees of higher education centralization. Also, each has a distinct political and organizational structure. Because of the differences in political structure and decentralized decision-making in the

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

275

federal states of Germany and the United States, I focus on one state in each country that has played a vanguard role in higher education. Despite all these differences, in all three cases, students were able to stop tuition hikes after a “failed” attempt but followed different trajectories as proposed by scholars based on the perception of movement legacies (Donatella et al., 2018). As I have discussed in the theoretical framework, scholars who study alliance building in social movements point out the following factors that motivate alliance seeking: need to increase resources, provide a stronger reaction to perceived threats, or take advantage of emerging opportunities. The brokerage of key actors helps facilitate alliance building (Diani, 2013), so does the instrumental use of collective memory. The Table 11.1 summarizes the characteristics of each case based on the presence of these factors. The table above suggests that Brokerage and collective memory work have facilitated anti-tuition hike alliances. Student movement “failures” in the past two decades helped increase their know-how and motivate alliance seeking. However, the narrativizing the role the students played in the eventful 1960s shape the perception of self-efficacy that influences the movement actors to act in pacts or in more equally formed alliances. In all three cases, facilitation and threat perception factors were present. In Hesse, Germany student mobilization happened in two waves: in 2003–2005 and 2006–2008. Students could not stop the introduction of the tuition fees in Hesse and were disillusioned with the symbolic protests and lobbying tactics they used to reach the political insiders. In the second wave, unions’ commitment to highlighting tuition fees as a prominent election issue as well as the students’ willingness to change their tactics Table 11.1 List of cases based on presence of brokerage, the influence of collective memory, and perceived threats Case

Brokerage (Former student activists in unions)

Germany (Hesse) N/A Turkey 1 USA (California) 1

Collective memory (student movement influential in the 60s) 1 1 0.5

Perceived Perceived threat II threat I (Prior student (Unions mobilization “failure”) under threat) 1 1 0

1 1 1

276

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

based on prior mobilization motivated a closer alliance between unions and the students. However, the legacy of the ’68 movement still created a narrative of self-potential even if the participants were skeptical about the fulfillment of that potential. In Turkey, student mobilization of the 1990s created a subculture for leftist students to keep pursuing anti-tuition hike protests with strategic utilization of a collective memory of dissent. Furthermore, the students who were active in the 1990s, later on, took an active part in the unions in the 2000s. They played a crucial brokerage role in building informal relationships between labor and higher education unions and political student organizations. Furthermore, the surge of the narrative of the 60s and the power of the students to shape politics have also contributed to a vision that students could change higher education policy if they gather enough support. While these factors facilitated alliance building, past failure of the student mobilization and the government’s increasing pressure on the unions motivated alliance building. Finally, in the case of California, the United States, the positions former student activists took in the unions led to the formation of organic ties with some of the unions and the student groups. These ties helped facilitate alliance building even if there was not much of collective memory work used during the mobilization. Prior “failure” of the lobbying efforts of the students to stop tuition hikes led them to take more contentious and assertive action. Unlike the cases in Germany and Turkey, there was no national movement against tuition hikes in the United States. However, many unions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in California had been working for a new measure to increase public spending due to a perceived advantage to push for change. Student mobilization was able to join this union-NGO alliance in formation.

Germany Since the 1960s, the federal government in Germany had jurisdiction over higher education. As a result of the student movement, university reforms and constitutional amendments were introduced (Gellert, 1984). Free higher education was one of them. In all public schools and universities teaching is free of charge. …”Admission …is only to be dependent upon the ability of the student. (State Law, article 59)

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

277

This is a very significant clause as the overwhelming majority of higher education in Germany was provided by public universities. However, since the late 1990s, the center-right endorsed a tuition policy. The most recent revival of the tuition debate can be traced back to the German Rectors’ Conference (HRK) in 1995 (Hüther & Krücken, 2014) where it was debated but not endorsed. However, in 1998, Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft and the Centrum für Hochschulentwicklung (CHE) picked up the debate again. They presented a Studienbeitragsmodel (model for a financial contribution to the cost of a degree course) in a joint publication (Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft & CHE, 1998). This move coincided with the student protests against the low quality of teaching and the financial situation of the universities. In a way, tuitions emerged as the neoliberal recipe to increase the quality of higher education in Germany. In 2004, the German Employers Association Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande (BDA) presented a tuition model. In the same year, HRK stepped in to argue that tuitions should be an option (Hüther & Krücken, 2014). The tuition endorsement of these two organizations is quite significant given the constant cycles of electoral campaigns at the local level: once the federal option was exhausted, the right opted for a local option. In 2005, the center-right Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) brought the tuition issue to the constitutional court to oppose the federal jurisdiction. It obtained a ruling in favor of state rights. Once states had the right to introduce tuitions, the states that were ruled by conservative governments announced the introduction of tuitions starting from 2006 to 2007. The Christian Democrats, CDU, and the centrist liberals, Free Democratic Party (FDP), favored tuitions in Germany while the center-left and the left opposed them at the federal level. In the case of Hesse the right-wing government announced the introduction of tuitions starting in 2006 (Türko˘glu, 2019a). There has been an active collective action scene in Germany where education “strikes,” occupations, and demonstrations have been used relatively frequently by radical left-wing student groups in the 1980s and 1990s against education budget cuts, cancellation of courses, and university reforms (Francisco, 2006. European Protest and Coercion Data). When the tuitions debate erupted in 2003–2005, the majority of student activism focused on symbolic tactics and lobbying efforts, while some

278

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

student groups opted for contentious tactics (Interview Ger1, Ger3). The collective memory of more contentious student action was to be invoked during the second wave. In Hesse, labor unions, in general, have faced with decreasing membership and an unfriendly government in power. Despite this overall trend, the education union, Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW), was particularly strong compared to other branches in the German states (Turner, 2011). In the case of education, the channels of communication between the government and the union were blocked to such a degree that the union decided to work on shifting the public opinion rather than using traditional lobbying tactics (Turner, 2011). This perceived threat and the obstacles for lobbying would eventually motivate the alliance with the student protestors (Türko˘glu, 2019a). Student mobilization in 2003–2005 could not stop the introduction of tuitions. CDU under the leadership of Ronald Koch in Hesse, was determined. Tuition fees were finally introduced in October 2006 despite the oppositions (FAZ, 2006b, 2006c). GEW continued to oppose tuition, but the larger union network Deutsche Gewerkshaftbund (DGB) was focused on opposing the welfare state reforms. A perceived loss of power would soon motivate DGB to seek broader social movement alliances (Dörre, 2019). While the unions deepened their commitment to social movement alliances, student opposition decided to try more confrontational tactics and broaden their alliances to stop tuitions. I think the protests after 2006 were much more intense and much more confrontational and weren’t focused on distributing information, talking to politicians, and doing creative stuff but much more focused on disrupting the [daily routine of the] university not symbolically but really. Not only the university but the city as well, like the rail ways, motor ways. That is the reason why there was news coverage where people talk about 2006 as summer of resistance. (Interview Ger2)

The nation-wide student union, Allgemeiner Studierendenausschuss (AStA), which is organized in every major campus, was also politicized along the way. On some campuses, students refrained from paying the fees to protest. For example, in Marburg one interviewee explained their tactics in the following way:

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

279

We were supposed to pay 500 euros a semester. There was a fund created by AStA where you could pay 500 euros but not pay the fees, as a kind of protest. Students could still pay to the AStA account so that no one could ex-matriculate you. It would look like you have paid the fees but the money wouldn’t go to the university, it was a special account. (Interview Ger14)

In short, the perception of threat on the part of the unions and move to more contentious and assertive tactics on the part of the students paved the way for an alliance between the student groups in Hesse not only with the education union but also the general workers union DGB. The alliance was able to keep the tuition fees issue as a top priority for the state elections forcing the hand of the government (Türko˘glu, 2019a). Opposition parties put emphasis on tuition policy in their electoral platforms and the media covered this topic widely (Türko˘glu, 2021). With an uncharacteristic move, unions announced that they would not vote for a party that insisted on tuition fees. The state election ended up in a hung parliament with the government losing seats. However, coalition talks failed, elections were repeated. This time, rather than risk a failure, the CDU government announced the abolition of tuition fees in Hesse. One of the richest states in Germany, Hesse, created a domino effect. In three years, all of the states that experimented with tuition fees abolished them. Despite these gains, many activists felt that they had not achieved enough to stop the tide of the commercialization of higher education (Interview Ger1, Ger3, Ger2, Ger7, Ger8). Nevertheless, this result shows a fault line in the neoliberal reform packages for higher education in Germany.

Turkey In 1980, a coup d’état happened in Turkey. Before Turkey returned to democracy in 1983, a new constitution was drafted. In this constitution, many political liberties granted by the previous constitution were curtailed because the military leaders that staged the coup blamed the political polarization of the 1970s on those liberties. The student movement of the 1960s was later radicalized with the clashes between the right-wing and left-wing student movements (Alper, 2019) and thus the narrative of violent student clashes used to legitimize the coup. For the left-wing students in the 1970s, “Denizler” was an important empowering symbol, they were three students executed with the 1971 coup. As the left- and right-wing movements continued to clash, all protest

280

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

activity came to a halt with the coup d’état in 1980, student organizations banned and leaders imprisoned. Not surprisingly, the student movement in the 1980s targeted authoritarian policies of the university administration, the presence of police on campuses acceptance of the students who were dismissed from universities during the coup (Cumhuriyet, 1986a), and Higher Education Council (Cumhuriyet, 1986b) that was established to centralize the higher education institutions. In 1995, the government proposed a tuition hike which doubled the existing fees as part of the economic stability package (Cumhuriyet, 1995). This hike arrived on top of a 50% hike passed the previous year (Cumhuriyet, 1994). In response, student organizations mobilized and demanded the abolition of the tuitions once more. Because of the stigma of the violent student protests of the 1970s, the Student Coordination, the most prominent student organization at the time, decided to endorse horizontal organized with a decidedly less partisan tone. This was part of a tactical move because political student organizations and unions were still illegal at the time. Strictly speaking, there was no legal ground that made the organization legal. Every campus was supposed to establish its own front. Faculty of Literature front (of Istanbul University), Istanbul Technical University Ta¸skı¸sla Front etc. You don’t have to belong to any specific organization. (…) Of course, this was a different time than the 1960s but we could have been as influential nevertheless because everyone was fed up with the fees. (Interview Tur17)

For some, those tuition hikes were a serious concern over their ability to actually pursue higher education at a time of rampant inflation and economic crisis. The student movement in the mid-1990s was especially famous for its usage of creative as well as assertive tactics. There were violent clashes with the police as well as nonviolent protests that made to the headlines which marked a stark difference compared to the 1960s. They occupied campuses and protested in the National Parliament in Ankara, which was then illegal. Their arrest triggered a wave of human rights protest in Turkey. The student mobilization in the 1990s was not able to reverse the tuition hikes, but they opened up a debate about the right to protest because of the harsh prison sentences some of the student protestors received. Student mobilization shifted its course toward joining the

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

281

democratization movement at the time. Nevertheless, their mobilization vitalized the student movement for the decades to come. Tuition hikes passed the national parliament under the leadership of both right-wing and left-wing governments in 1992, 1994, 1995, 1999. In the meantime, the legacy of the past continued to shape the discourse of student activism. This influence has become especially salient when a TV series that narrated the student protests of the 1960s became very popular in Turkey. Did you know that I come from a very apolitical family? I was born years after the 1980 coup and for my family it was best to not get involved in politics at all. So there was no discussion of recent history, no talk about what happened back then. But you know.. that TV series…Çemberimde Gül Oya.. that changed everything for me. I got curious. As I read more and talked to my friends who were involved in politics, I just couldn’t ignore inequality. It was our generation’s turn. (Interview Tur8)

“Çemberimde Gül Oya” was a popular TV series that combined romance and political drama. For many young people, it was the first opportunity to get familiar with the collective memory of the past generation that lived through street fights between the students on the left and the right as well as the coup d’etat that followed. Some students on the other hand listened to their parents; stories of the recent past. Nevertheless, there was a short period of relative silence on the student activism front. Student groups continued to protest the neoliberalization of higher education, rising tuitions, and the Higher Education Council, but these protests did not turn into large-scale mobilizations. In 2008, students once again mobilized against tuition hikes when the government was initially proposed to double the tuitions. However, this time, the mobilization of the left-wing student activists was backed by labor union resources (Türko˘glu, 2019a). In the early 2000s, left-wing unions endorsed social movement unionism. As the government-backed “friendly” unions and put pressure on the left-wing unions, left-wing unions perceived an existential threat (Erdinç, 2014). This threat motivated them to consider alliances with student organizations in higher education as well. The left-wing bluecollar union, the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey ˙ (DISK) helped the establishment of a student/youth union, Genç-sen (Erdinç, 2013) which organized many protests against the neoliberalization of higher education. Secondly, the left-wing education, Education

282

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

and Science Workers Union (E˘gitim-sen), supported free tuitions. E˘gitimsen is a member of the Confederation of Public Employees’ Trade Unions (KESK) and KESK also supported free tuitions as a white-collar umbrella union organization. Both KESK and E˘gitim-sen have had members who were student activists in the 1990s. Former student activists continued their opposition to the commercialization of higher education when they became professors and union members. They played a brokerage role between student organizations and unions. A former student activist and a union leader make the following remark: The commodification of higher education actually started in the 1990s. We have started the opposition back then in the 1990s against the tuition hikes. That was a de facto commodification of higher education.. but it went beyond that. The reforms [at the time] also introduced the framework for the universities to function like companies, organize like companies, and create their own resources. […] What the union did [in 2008-10] was try to connect different groups in universities and provide resources…which was critical at the time. (Interview Tur4)

Student activists who took part in 2008–2011 mobilization trace their “roots” to the 1990s as well. In Turkey, tuition hikes became a burning grievance in the 1990s. Just when I entered the university it started again like [that time] when the government discussed a 300 -500 % increase (Interview Tur12) Students have always been an important part of Turkish history. In the 1960s..in the 1990s and now. (…)You know our older brothers [former student activists, no familial relation] then became union members we kept in touch (…) (Interview Tur11)

Student activists from left-wing student organizations acknowledge the support of E˘gitim-sen even if they would have liked to see the union get more involved with their mobilization (Interview Tur12, Tur11). A shared memory of the 1990s activism and the brokerage role of former student activists facilitated alliance building as both the labor unions and the students faced a threat from the government. On the eve of elections, the biggest opposition party, the social democrats, Republican People’s Party (CHP), endorsed free higher

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

283

education posing a challenge to the governing party Justice and Development Party (AKP). Following the election, AKP remained in power but lost seats to social democrats. Despite the fact that AKP had not promised the abolition of tuition fees, AKP reversed its own policy and announced that public higher education would be free for the students following a regular track. This outcome demonstrates how the past “failure” of the student mobilization in the 1990s made an impact on the strategic decision-making of alliance building in 2008–2011. Instead of joining a pact, student groups turned into alliance building as equals. Both the collective memory of the 1960s and the1990s and brokerage of the former activists facilitated an alliance between labor unions and students.

United States In the United States, the legacy of past student activism played a role in how students make sense of racial and social inequality for some while it signified personal liberties for others (Barlow, 1991; Gitlin, 1993). However, the latter was perceived to be more of an issue for the white middle-class students. The black students’ involvement in politics has been largely studied within the broader framework of the civil rights movement or in anti-Vietnam movement (Barlow, 1991; Fendrich, 2003). Black student activism institutionalized Black studies (Rojas, 2010) and later the student activism for Chicano studies (Rhoads, 1998) highlighted debates around racial diversity and multiculturalism. These precedents may have also reinforced student networks to follow racial lines. This created a fragmented student mobilization field making it more difficult to unite different student groups. Furthermore, the narrative of the impact of the students in the eventful 1960s were also fragmented. Historically, tuition was free in the public universities in California based on the master plan of the early 1960s. However, in response to the student activism of the 60s, then California governor Ronald Reagan proposed to introduce tuition fees as a punitive measure (Türko˘glu, 2019b). Even if the initial proposal did not pass, in the early 1970s, punitive budgetary measures were endorsed in response to student activism (LA Times, 1970). The student mobilization focused on urban issues in the 1970s and remained fragmented in the 1980s and 1990s. Public university systems continued to increase tuitions. Similar to the case of

284

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

Turkey, there has been a student mobilization against tuition hikes, but unlike Turkey, it remained fragmented. Throughout the 1990s, tuition fees increased under republican-led congress. In 1991, because of an economic recession and budget cuts, tuitions were increased on average by 12% in California’s public four-year universities (Gordon, 1991). There were small-scale contentious protests at the University of California (UC) Regents meeting to protest the hikes (Lindgren, 1991a, b), but the student mobilization could not prevent the tuition increases. A year later, the governor proposed a 24% fee increase in UC and 40% fee increase at the California State University (CSU) system in return for not cutting the higher education budget (Trombley & Gordon, 1992). Both systems increased tuitions (Gordon, 1992; Smollar, 1992). This time students resorted to lobbying and letterwriting campaigns to protest the hikes (Cekola, 1992). Despite these tactics, more hikes were passed in 1993 and 1994 (Ballou & Frammolino, 1994; Di Rado, 1994; Gordon, 1993). The Fragmentation of the 1960s and the perception that the student activism is mainly a matter of white middle-class students’ mobilization (Barlow, 1991) limited the opportunities for alliance building. The students of color were disproportionally affected by the tuition hikes at a time when affirmative action in universities was also being repelled (Quinn, 2011). Because students were perceived to be middle class, labor unions at the time tended to focus more on blue-collar issues. In Los Angeles, for example, the campaign for Justice for Janitors revived the labor movement in California. However, students were not able to work together with them. We were able to get people going, pluck into larger efforts ongoing in the city but a lot of unions at the time saw affirmative action more important. I remember talking to someone who was a staff person who worked for justice for janitors. Saying that is a middle-class problem, that is not a working-class problem. (Interview US9)

Throughout the 2000s and early 2010s tuitions increased, both republican and democratic governors proposed budget cuts. A much larger wave of protest occurred in response to the tuition hikes in 2008–2010 and then in 2011–2012. In 2009, the UC Board of Regents increase tuition by 32%, students respond by occupying buildings (O’Leary, 2009). CSU Trustees approved a 10% hike in May and

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

285

an additional 20% hike in July (Rivera, 2015). In 2009–2010 there were massive walkouts, a call for a national day of action across campuses to protest tuition hikes both in the UC and CSU systems (LA Times, 2010a, 2010b). Some students sued the CSU system for breach of contract and “violating its duties of good faith and fair dealing” (Rivera, 2015). These protests and legal action did not overturn tuition hikes. However, these “failures” motivated the students to seek a broader alliance (LA Times, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). This time, the student movement became part of a pact similar to the argument provided by Donatella et al. The perception of fragmentation of the students’ activism in the 1960s limited their ability to pursue alliances. Student groups in California opted to join an already existing alliance among the education unions and NGOs, instead. With this decision, brokerage played a bigger role in the outcome of the anti-tuition hike movement. California Federation of Teachers (CFT) took the initiative in 2010 to propose a millionaire’s tax as a remedy to the budget cuts K-12 (Kinder garden to high school) education received. Seeing the ongoing budget cuts, these organizations decided to take assertive action and help change taxation. In California, new tax measures are subject to voters’ approval. In each election cycle, a series of ballot measures that are voted into local law. Initially, California Federation of Teachers together with the progressive NGOs working on education issues, focused on a ballot measure to raise the taxes for the richest residents of California which would then be challenged into public education spending. Through the union networks of American Federation of Teachers (affiliated with AFL-CIO), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), which represents most of the university employees, and the United Auto Workers (UAW), which mostly represent graduate students, an alliance between the higher education and K-12 education was negotiated (Interview US3, US8, US9, US12, US14). In 2012, while the broader coalition prepared a ballot measure to increase the education spending, unions also provided resources for the mobilization of students in favor of the ballot measure. That march on Sacramento [March 2012], we had people speak at that march, leaders of the American Federation of Teachers and the Courage Campaign. We raised the money from the California Nurses Association from AFSCME [American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees] from UAW [United Auto Workers]from American Federation

286

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

of Teachers to bus the students there so it was this larger societal coalition. (Interview US3)

Former student activists played a brokerage role between the unions and the student groups (Interview US3, US4, US12). The alliance for the ballot initiative pushed the state legislature to include the tuition freezes as a condition of the state budget (Interview U3, LA Times, 2012b). The measure passed. The involvement of the unions played a decisive role in the ballot measure that leads to a tuition freeze, they organized the assertive action and brokered an alliance between different interest groups K-12 and higher education. When the ballot measure passed and the taxes were increased in order to increase the budget reserved for education, tuitions in public universities were also frozen for five years. The positions former student activists took in the unions led to the formation of organic ties with some of the unions and the student groups. This case shows how failed mobilizations could motivate student groups to seek broader alliances and how perceptions of the events in the 1960s could influence the student groups decisions to join pacts rather than forming higher education focused alliances. Unlike the case of Turkey, in the case of California collective memory did not refer to the mobilization in the 1990s.

Conclusion At the turn of the millennium, multiple countries erupted in student protests against tuition hikes in public universities. In this chapter, I analyzed three unlikely cases that have not attracted much spotlight in the international press: Germany, Turkey, and the United States. The “success” of all three cases was built on the opportunities and limitation of previous waves of student protest that ended in “failure.” Past “failures” become a building block in two ways: through the possibility of personal investment based on one’s own experience that turned into a brokerage role and through the empowering narrative of agency based on collective remembering of the 1960s. Previous studies highlighted the importance of analyzing the structural opportunities and constraints that organizational fields embody as well as the motivations for alliance building among different social movement organizations. Studies that focus on student mobilization tend to look at the past mobilizations mostly in extensive case studies and rarely in comparative work. Using

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

287

the theoretical framework of the collective memory of eventful transitions in democratization, I demonstrate that in addition to the structural constraints and opportunities, the selectivity of collective memory work mediates these constraints and opportunities of alliance building. A key implication for this study is that future research should go beyond the successful instances of mobilization especially in comparative work and consider the legacies of past mobilizations. Research would benefit from more precise modeling of how past “failures” enable and constrain alliance building across different political contexts in interaction with different collective memory narratives. The intersection of alliance building capacity (structural opportunities and constraints) and the motivators for alliance building (based on brokerage initiatives, collective memory work, and threat perceptions) is also critical in further research to better under variation in movement outcomes. This chapter demonstrated how student organizations were able to build alliances with the unions. They might not have stopped neoliberal reforms altogether as some of them hoped to do but they “failed” better. Acknowledging Note I would like to thank Neal Caren, Charlie Kurzman, Andy Andrews, Karam Hwang, Lorenzo Cini, and Cesar Guzmán-Concha for their insightful comments and suggestions regarding earlier drafts of this paper. ˙ I am grateful to Ismet Akça, Fred Block, Charlie Eaton, Thomas Sablowski, and Sabrina Zajak for their help in establishing contact with my interviewees, helping with fieldwork visa applications, and accessing data. Research fellowships from the European Union/Center for European Studies at UNC-Chapel Hill and the Graduate School partially supported the fieldwork for this research.

References Amenta, E., Caren, N., Chiarello, N., & Su, Y. (2010). The political consequences of social movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 287–307. Amenta, E., & Polletta, F. (2019). The cultural impacts of social movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 45, 279–299. Andrews, K. T. (2001). Social movements and policy implementation: The Mississippi civil rights movement and the war on poverty, 1965 to 1971. American Sociological Review, 66, 71–95. Barlow, A. (1991). The student movement of the 1960s and the politics of race. The Journal of Ethnic Studies, 19(3), 1–22.

288

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

Biggs, M., & Andrews, K. T. (2015). Protest campaigns and movement success: Desegregating the US South in the early 1960s. American Sociological Review, 80(2), 416–443. Cini, L., & Guzmán-Concha, C. (2017). Student movements in the age of austerity: The cases of Chile and England. Social Movement Studies, 16(5), 623–628. Daphi, P., & Zimmermann, J. (2020). ‘Like a family tree’? Memories of ’68 in the German anti-austerity movement Blockupy. Social Movement Studies, 20(1), 93–114 Della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Fernandes, T., Romanos, E., & Vogiatzoglou, M. (2018). Legacies and memories in movements: Justice and democracy in Southern Europe. Oxford University Press. Della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2020). Social movements: An introduction. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Diani, M. (2013). Brokerage. In The Wiley-Blackwell encyclopedia of social and political movements. Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing. Dixon, M., & Martin, A. W. (2012). We can’t win this on our own: Unions, firms, and mobilization of external allies in labor disputes. American Sociological Review, 77 (6), 946–969. Dolgon, C. (2001). Building community amid the ruins: Strategies for struggle from the Coalition for Justice at Southampton College. Forging radical alliances across difference: Coalition politics for the new millennium (pp. 220– 232). Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield. Dörre, K. (2019). Social movement unionism: theoretical foundations and empirical evidence. In Social stratification and social movements. London: Routledge. Erdinç, I. (2013). Trade union strategies and legacy of the 1960s in student mobilization in Turkey: The case of the student youth union Ö˘grenci Gençlik Sendikası (Genç-Sen). European Journal of Turkish Studies, 17. Retrieved May 23, 2015, from http://ejts.revues.orgwqww.ejts.revues.org/4795. Erdinç, I. (2014). AKP Döneminde Sendikal Alanın Yeniden Yapılanması ve ˙ s ve Ötekiler. Calisma ve Toplum, 41(2), 155-174. Kutupla¸sma: Hak-I¸ Fendrich, J. M. (2003). The forgotten movement: The Vietnam antiwar movement. Sociological Inquiry, 73(3), 338–358. Fisher, D. R., Dow, D. M., & Ray, R. (2017). Intersectionality takes it to the streets: Mobilizing across diverse interests for the Women’s March. Science Advances, 3(9), eaao1390. Gellert, C. (1984). Politics and higher education in the Federal Republic of Germany. European Journal of Education, 19, 217–232. Gitlin, T. (1993). The sixties: Years of hope, days of rage. New York: Bantam Books.

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

289

Gongaware, T. B. (2010). Collective memory anchors: Collective identity and continuity in social movements. Sociological Focus, 43(3), 214–239. Hunt, S. A., & Benson, R. D. (2004). Collective identity, solidarity and commitment. In Blackwell companion. Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing. Hüther, O., & Krücken, G. (2014). The rise and fall of student fees in a federal higher education system: The case of Germany. In Oxford studies in comparative education. New York: Symposium Books. Isaac, L., & Christiansen, L. (2002). How the civil rights movement revitalized labor militancy. American Sociological Review, 67, 722–746. Jung, W., King, B. G., & Soule, S. A. (2014). Issue bricolage: Explaining the configuration of the social movement sector, 1960–1995. American Journal of Sociology, 120(1), 187–225. Kadivar, M. A. (2013). Alliances and perception profiles in the Iranian reform movement, 1997 to 2005. American Sociological Review, 78(6), 1063–1086. Kornetis, K. (2019). Projections onto the past: Memories of democratization in Spain, Greece, and Portugal during the great recession. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 24(4), 511–524. Kurzman, C. (1996). Structural opportunity and perceived opportunity in socialmovement theory: The Iranian revolution of 1979. American Sociological Review, 61, 153–170. Lee, C. (2016). When solidarity works: Labor-civic networks and welfare states in the market reform era (Vol. 41). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levi, M., & Murphy, G. H. (2006). Coalitions of contention: The case of the WTO protests in Seattle. Political Studies, 54, 651–670. Mantler, G. K. (2013). Power to the poor: Black-brown coalition and the fight for economic justice, 1960–1974. Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books. Mayer, B., Brown, P., & Morello-Frosch, R. (2010). Labor-environmental coalition formation: Framing and the right to know. Sociological Forum, 25, 746–768. McAdam, D. (1982). Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930–1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McAdam, D., & Boudet, H. (2012). Putting social movements in their place: Explaining opposition to energy projects in the United States, 2000–2005. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCammon, H. J., & Campbell, K. (2002). Allies on the road to victory: Coalition formation between the suffragists and the woman’s Christian Temperance Union. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 7 (3), 231–251. Meyer, D., & Corrigall-Brown, C. (2005). Coalitions and political context: US movements against wars in Iraq. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 10(3), 327–344. Mische, A. (2008). Partisan publics: Communication and contention across Brazilian youth activist networks. Princeton University Press.

290

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

O’leary, K. (2009). Tuition hikes: Protests in California and elsewhere. Time. Accessed 3 Aug 2020. Polletta, F., & Kretschmer, K. (2015). Movement factions. Players and processes. In Players and Arenas (pp. 35–54). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Quinn, R. A. (2011). Class action; community mobilization, race, and the politics of student assignment in San Francisco. Stanford University: Phd Dissertation. Rivera, C. (2015). Jury finds Cal State acted reasonably in 2009 tuition hikes. Los Angeles Times. Accessed 3 Aug 2020. Rothblatt, S. (1992). The OECD, the master plan and the California dream: A Berkeley conversation. Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley. Schwarz, C. H. (2019). Collective memory and intergenerational transmission in social movements: The “grandparents’ movement” iaioflautas, the indignados protests, and the Spanish transition. Memory Studies, 1–17. Staggenborg, S. (1986). Coalition work in the pro-choice movement: Organizational and environmental opportunities and obstacles. Social Problems, 33(5), 374–390. Turner, E. (2011). Political parties and public policy in the German Länder: When parties matter. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Türko˘glu, D. (2019). Student protests and organised labour: Developing a research agenda for mobilisation in late neoliberalism. Current Sociology, 67 (7), 997–1017. Türko˘glu, D. (2019b). The political price of a public education: Neoliberalism and struggle over tuition. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: PhD dissertation. Türko˘glu, D. (2021). Stones versus routines: Students and politicians in higher education policy. Politics of Inequality, Research in Political Sociology, 28, 67– 90. Van Dyke, N., & Amos, B. (2017). Social movement coalitions: Formation, longevity, and success. Sociology Compass, 11(7), e12489. Van Dyke, N., & McCammon, H. J. (2010). Strategic alliances: Coalition building and social movements. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Vasi, I. B. (2006). The new anti-war protests and miscible mobilizations. Social Movement Studies, 5(2), 137–153. Wang, D., Piazza, A., & Soule, S. A. (2018). Boundary-spanning in social movements: Antecedents and outcomes. Annual Review of Sociology, 44, 167–187. Whitlinger, C. (2019). The transformative capacity of commemoration: Comparing mnemonic activism in Philadelphia, Mississippi. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 24(4), 455–474.

11

EVER FAILED? FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER: TUITION PROTESTS IN …

291

Zald, M. N., & McCarthy, J. D. (1980). Social movement industries: Competition and cooperation among movement organizations. Research on Social Movements Conflict and Change, 3, 1–20. Zamponi, L. (2012). ‘Why don’t Italians occupy?’ Hypotheses on a failed mobilisation. Social Movement Studies, 11(3–4), 416–426. Zamponi, L. (2013). Collective memory and social movements. In The WileyBlackwell encyclopedia of social and political movements. Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing. Zamponi, L., & Daphi, P. (2014). Breaks and continuities in and between cycles of protest: Memories and legacies of the global justice movement in the context of anti-austerity mobilisations. In Spreading protest: Social movements in times of crisis (pp. 193–225). ECPR Press.

Newspaper Articles Alper, A. (2019). Jakobenlerden devrimcilere.Tarih vakfı yurt yayınları. Cumhuriyet. (1986a, November 6). YÖK’e 5. Yılda siyah çelenk. ˙ ˙ Cumhuriyet. (1986b, November 6). Eski¸sehirde bulu¸stular: Izmir ve Istanbul’dan gelen ö˘grenciler birlikte yürüyor. Cumhuriyet. (1992, March 10). Bo˘gaziçi’nde i¸sgal. Cumhuriyet. (1994, September 3). Harçlara zam resmi gazetede. Cumhuriyet. (1995, August 3). Harç kararnamesi Demirel’e sunuldu. FAZ. (2006a, June 14). DGB: Vermögenssteuer statt Studiengebühren. FAZ. (2006b, June 29). Tausende demonstrieren gegen Bildungspolitik/ Auseinandersetzungen mit der Polizei. FAZ. (2006c, September 23). Studenten plannen “protestherbst” Zummanarbeit mit DGB. FAZ. (2007, June 1). Zweite Klage gegen Studiengebühren, 62 500 Unterschriften gesammelt. FAZ. (2008a, January 23). ‘Land zweifelt Volksklage an’, Studiengebühren: Streit um Unterschriften. FAZ. (2008b, January 25). GEW kritisiert hessische Hochschulpolitik. FAZ. (2008c, November 16). Keine Studiengebühren mehr. Hürriyet. (2010, November 5). Bo˘gaziçi Üniversitesinde arbede. Hürriyet. (2011, January 24). Kılıçdaro˘glu ö˘grencilerle bulu¸stu. LA Times. (1970, August 26). New Activism Spurred by Student Fee Boosts: Participants Developing Programs to Help Low-Income Enrollees Pay Costs of College. Ballou, B., & Frammolino, R. (1994, January 21). UCI students protest proposed $630 fee hike. LA Times. Cekola, A. (1992, November 30). Countywide students quietly protest fee increases. LA times.

292

˘ D. TÜRKOGLU

Di Rado, A. (1994, October 21). Trustees OK Higher CSU Fees Education: Students will pay 10% more next year, but the board votes to request enough state funding to avoid another increase for 1996–97. LA Times. Gordon, L. (1991). Tuition up an average 12% at public colleges. LA Times. Gordon, L. (1992, January 18). UC regents raise students fees $550. LA Times. Gordon, L. (1993). More fee hikes planned for state’s colleges. LA Times. LA Times. (2007, January 20). Governor’s office defends CSU hike. LA Times. (2010a, March 5). Thousands protest California education cuts. LA Times. (2010b, November 8). UC proposes tuition hike, reduced pension benefits. LA Times. (2011a, July 14). University of California raises tuition nearly 10 percent. LA Times. (2011b, November 16). University students vent frustration; Rallies across state show support for the Occupy movement, anger at tuition hikes. LA Times. (2011c, November 17). Tuition hiked at Cal State amid clashes; Trustees OK a 9% increase after police clear demonstrators from raucous meeting. LA Times. (2011d, November 29). Protests disrupt meeting of UC regents; Students voice their criticism as board asks for more state funds and reinforces probe into pepper-spraying. LA Times. (2012a, March 6). Activists protest education cuts; Coalition of students and labor unions draws thousands to Capitol; 68 arrested after refusing to leave. LA Times. (2012b, July 19). Tuition at UC linked to tax vote; leaders endorse Gov. Jerry Brown’s measure and warn of fee hikes if it fails in November. Lindgren, K. (1991a, May 16). Irvine students hit wall over fee hikes. LA Times. Lindgren, K. (1991b, May 17). I150 students stage noisy protest education: Upset over impending fee hike, demonstrators march on UC regents meeting in Irvine. LA Times. Polletta, F. (2009). It was like a fever: Storytelling in protest and politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rojas, F. (2010). From black power to black studies: How a radical social movement became an academic discipline. Baltimore: JHU Press. Rhoads, R. A. (1998). Freedom’s web: Student activism in an age of cultural diversity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Smollar, D. (1992) CSU Chancellor gives bleak lesson higher education. LA Times.

Index

A Academic life, 159 Academic managers, 6 Accountability, 58, 80, 95, 96, 229 Action, 4, 9, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 27, 34, 56–63, 65, 68, 81, 88, 91–94, 107, 109, 113, 124, 128, 138, 141, 148, 149, 161, 162, 167, 169, 174–177, 179, 180, 189, 191, 193, 196, 197, 200, 202, 205, 206, 208, 213, 217, 223, 225–227, 229, 234, 236, 273, 276, 278, 284–286 Action repertoire, 4, 11, 15, 105, 107, 169 protest repertoire, 177 repertoire of action, 2, 56, 66, 158, 159, 264 Activation, 244, 263, 264 Activism, 10, 19, 83, 87, 108, 110, 112, 122, 134, 142, 144, 162, 180, 222, 223, 226, 235, 282, 285

Activity, 27, 39, 42, 56, 62, 81, 109, 120–123, 125, 215, 222, 254, 259, 280 Admiralty, 140, 146, 148, 149 Affinity groups, 10, 60, 76, 78, 85, 86, 88, 94 African National Congress (ANC), 107, 108, 114, 201, 204, 208 #AfrikaansMustFall, 104 Agasisti, T., 6, 7 Agency, 14, 136, 137, 242, 257, 269, 286 Agenda, 10, 11, 20, 33, 67, 85, 87, 93, 122, 138, 158, 176, 178, 214, 217, 219–221, 223, 227, 230–236, 247, 264 impacts, 217, 234 Allgemeiner Studierendenausschuss (AStA), 278, 279 Alliance-building, 275 Alliance(s), 1, 12–17, 20, 21, 56, 61, 66–69, 160, 166, 174, 191, 200, 213–219, 222–225, 233–236,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Cini et al. (eds.), Student Movements in Late Neoliberalism, Social Movements and Transformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75754-0

293

294

INDEX

242, 256, 270–276, 278, 279, 281–287 system, 17, 56, 214–218, 222–225, 234 Altbach, Philip G., 108, 109 Alter-globalization movement, 75, 78, 80, 87, 89 Alternative social relations, 203, 205, 207 American Federation of Teachers, 285, 286 Ancelovici, Marcos, 17, 61, 66, 75, 79, 82, 89, 90 ANC Youth League (ANC YL), 107 Ankara, 280 Annual, 16, 28–32, 35, 188, 225, 227, 228 commemoration, 16, 28–31, 35 Anti-austerity, 2, 75, 76, 92, 215, 216, 222, 223, 230, 231, 235, 236 movements, 2, 76 protests, 2, 75, 76, 92, 215, 216, 222, 223, 235 Anti-tuition hike mobilization, 271, 272 Apartheid, 19, 106, 107, 111, 201, 203, 208 Arab Spring, 92, 96, 133 Assembly of High School Students (AES), 252, 254 Association des étudiants et étudiantes du Québec (ANÉÉQ), 61 Association pour la voix étudiante au Québec (AVEQ), 69 Association pour une solidarité syndicale étudiante (ASSÉ), 61, 67–69 Attitudes, 63, 175 context, 16, 28, 30 Austerity, 2, 6, 8, 78, 90, 219, 220, 223, 233, 235

agenda, 219, 220, 223 policy, 230, 233 Autonomist student wings, 250 Autonomy, 11, 32, 59, 65, 67, 79, 96, 145, 165, 170, 218, 219, 232, 247, 255 autonomous action, 94, 95 Aylwin, Patricio (former President), 247 B Bachelet, Michelle (former President), 242, 252, 253, 258, 260, 261 Badat, Saleem M., 106 Baillie-Stewart, Adrian, 108, 120 Barons, 159, 178 Beijing, 146–148 Benski, Tova, 77, 80, 89 Berlusconi, Silvio (Premier), 158, 166 Black consciousness (BC), 202, 203, 207 Black Lives Matter, 8, 96, 207 Board of Regents, 284 Boric, Gabriel (student activist), 260, 261 Broad Front (political coalition), 246, 253 Brokerage, 21, 244, 252, 254, 256, 263, 275, 276, 282, 283, 285–287 Brooks, Rachel, 2, 7, 12, 157, 235 Budget cuts, 68, 76, 157, 277, 284, 285 Budgeting, 104 Burawoy, Michael, 189, 192 Bureaucratic, 83, 88, 95, 137, 180, 200 C California, 76, 272, 275, 276, 283–286

INDEX

California Federation of Teachers (CFT), 285 California State University System, 284 Campaign, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 18, 28, 29, 32, 34, 36, 37, 42, 49, 79, 104, 105, 107, 112, 115, 116, 121–123, 125–128, 141, 142, 150, 173, 178–181, 187, 214, 215, 219–222, 224, 226–232, 234, 235, 246–248, 252–254, 261, 272, 277, 284 event, 28, 31, 49 Campus activism, 2, 142 Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT), 114, 119, 125 Capital, 68, 77, 83, 111, 235, 250, 255 human, 160 political, 160, 177, 180, 215 Cariola, Karol (student activist), 260 Caruso, Loris, 158, 161, 163 Castells, Manuel, 108, 109, 121, 137 Casualization, 106 of academic staff, 106 Central University of Technology (CUT), 119 Change, 3, 14, 29, 40, 61, 65, 80, 140, 165, 167, 175–177, 191, 205, 206, 217, 218, 221, 230, 233, 235, 236, 250, 257, 275, 276, 285 Chan, Kin-Man, 143, 147 Chow, Alex, 149, 150 Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), 277–279 Cini, Lorenzo, 1, 3–10, 12, 16, 106, 107, 157, 159, 163, 168, 169, 194, 214, 217, 220 Civil disobedience, 66, 139, 141, 149, 177

295

Civil Rights Movement, 75, 136, 274, 283 Civil society, 14, 50, 58, 143, 246 civil society organizations, 16, 21, 120 Class, 9, 18, 41–43, 46, 66, 106, 107, 127, 128, 142, 144, 150, 188, 196, 199, 202, 203, 206, 250, 255, 262, 284 Climbing on university roofs, 176 Cliques, 77, 82 Cloward, Richard, 160 Coalition, 11, 14, 67, 78, 158, 169, 191, 215, 223, 224, 245–248, 257, 258, 260, 261, 279, 285, 286 government, 219, 220, 223, 226 Coalition building, 16, 191 Collective, 12, 19, 34, 58, 67, 85, 93, 109, 116, 121, 139, 143, 160, 171, 176, 179, 180, 191, 201, 236, 249, 259, 271, 273, 286 framework, 287 identity, 4, 9, 11, 17, 28, 29, 31, 41, 43–45, 48, 134, 135, 138, 161, 170, 174, 178, 179, 181, 200, 206, 236, 271 Collective action, 9, 11, 56–58, 135, 138, 139, 144, 147, 158, 159, 161, 179, 196, 264, 270, 272–274, 277 Collective decision-making, 76, 85–87, 121 Collective memory, 20, 270–273, 275, 276, 278, 283, 286, 287 Combative branch, 61, 64–69 Commemoration, 16, 28–32, 35, 36, 42, 44, 47, 49, 50 1968 student movement, 16, 28, 30–32, 35, 36, 42, 44, 47–49 Commercialization, 279, 282

296

INDEX

Commodification, 5, 7, 8, 21, 106, 200, 282 decommodification, 7 Competition, 5, 6, 10, 11, 20, 59, 65, 69, 84, 88, 164, 181, 215 Concertationist branch, 61, 64 The Confederation of Progressive ˙ Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK), 281 The Confederation of Public Employees’ Trade Unions (KESK), 282 Confederation of Students of Chile (CONFECH), 246, 254, 256 Connections, 8, 20, 30, 33, 78, 112, 120, 143, 144, 199, 202, 222, 231, 242, 250, 256, 263 personal, 30, 40, 44 Connective actions, 133, 135, 137–139, 143, 144, 150 crowd-enabled, 138 organizationally-led, 138 Consensus, 17, 57, 77, 81–84, 87–89, 91–95, 175 Conservative Party, 229, 233 Contentious, 3, 4, 9, 17, 28, 33, 49, 56, 58, 63, 66, 69, 158, 215, 219, 221, 222, 243, 276, 278, 279, 284 events, 29 politics, 4, 20, 27, 33, 134, 243, 262, 263 Contentious politics, 4, 20, 27, 33, 134, 243, 262, 263 Contestation, 2, 16, 17, 50, 56 contextualized, 17, 50 Coordinated fields, 10 coalitions, 11, 14, 67, 78, 158, 169, 191, 215, 223, 224, 245–248, 257, 258, 260, 261, 279, 285, 286

Corbynism, 20, 214, 216, 221, 228, 230–233, 235, 236 Corporatization, 3, 157 Courage campaign, 285 Culture, 6, 89, 104, 162, 167, 169, 173, 179–181, 201, 232, 236, 276 Cumhuriyet, 280 Curcio, Anna, 158, 160 D Debt, 194, 201, 213, 232, 233, 235, 249, 254, 257 Decentralization/decentralized, 10, 17, 18, 76, 78, 79, 91, 134, 141, 142, 274 Decision-making, 14, 19, 58, 60, 63, 76, 77, 79–82, 84, 85, 93, 95, 104, 106, 109, 134, 137, 139, 140, 144, 147, 151, 159, 160, 170–172, 176 Decolonization, 104, 123, 188, 200, 202, 203, 208 DeFronzo, J., 3 della Porta, Donatella, 7, 9, 12, 14, 21, 28, 75–77, 79, 82, 88–90, 113, 157, 159–162, 170, 172–174, 176, 178, 195, 213, 214, 216, 226, 234, 236, 245, 264, 273 Democracy, 2, 19, 21, 32, 33, 36, 40–43, 45, 77, 87, 90, 92, 147, 159, 160, 162, 170, 172, 173, 180, 181, 199, 207, 241, 246–248, 254, 256, 260, 279 deliberative, 79, 87, 170, 172 Democratic socialism, 236 democratization, 243, 281, 287 Demonstrations march, 16, 36, 44, 197 ritual, 16, 29, 31, 41, 42, 47, 49–51

INDEX

student, 16, 28–31, 36, 41, 42, 47, 49–51, 178, 229, 251, 260 Demonstrators, 29, 30, 32, 33, 39, 41, 42, 44, 260, 261 #YoSoy132, 16, 28, 30–32, 34, 36–38, 41, 42, 44–47, 49 De Nardo, James, 176 Dense networks, 4 Detachment, 20, 189, 207, 242–245, 249, 250, 252, 253, 255, 257, 260–264 Deutsche Gewerkshaftbund (DGB), 278, 279 Diani, Mario, 9, 78, 113, 137, 160–162, 170, 173, 174, 176, 273 Digital communication, 134, 141 Digitally networked, 105, 134 Direct, 5, 7, 19, 68, 79, 81, 85, 94, 95, 137, 144, 148, 149, 151, 161–163, 170, 173, 175, 177, 203, 215, 218, 224, 226, 231–233, 236 participatory, 19, 162, 172, 173, 180 representative, 218 Direct democracy, 17, 75–83, 87–89, 92, 93, 160, 172 Disembeddedness, 244, 248, 251, 252, 257, 263 Disillusion (with political elites), 244, 253, 257, 264 District Council, 148 Drago, Tiziana, 163, 165 Durban University of Technology (DUT), 119, 125 Dynamics of contention, 3, 243 E Economic crisis, 230, 280 Economic Freedom Fighters – Student Command (EFFSC), 108

297

Education free, 2, 200, 205, 213, 220, 227, 229, 231, 232, 235, 236 level, 41, 44 Education Activists Network (EAN), 223, 225 Educational, 4, 5, 21, 190, 198, 242, 246, 249, 251–255, 257, 258, 260, 262 Education and Science Workers Union (E˘gitim-sen), 282 Education policy, 20, 59, 106, 213, 214, 219, 221, 233–235, 276 Efficacy, 30, 31, 40–43, 45, 236, 275 Efficiency principles, 5 Efforts, 11, 32, 34, 83, 104, 142, 150, 198, 203, 207, 222, 224, 225, 229, 232, 248, 262, 272, 274, 276, 277, 284 Elections, 10, 15, 29, 67, 143, 147, 148, 162, 180, 193, 220, 221, 223, 227, 228, 230–233, 235, 256, 261, 275, 279, 282, 283, 285 Electoral, 13, 28, 29, 32, 34, 49, 231–233, 245, 247, 258, 261, 277, 279 campaign, 29, 32, 34, 49, 277 Elite pacts, 270 End of outsourcing, 204, 206 English higher education policy, 234 reform, 219 system, 219 Ethnicity, 8, 9, 21, 111 Eventful transitions, 270, 287 Events, 9, 11, 13, 18, 28–34, 36, 38, 39, 41–44, 47–50, 60, 63, 69, 78, 93, 105, 110, 113, 124, 125, 128, 140, 149, 162, 163, 168, 189, 190, 214, 221, 222, 245, 255, 259, 272, 274, 286

298

INDEX

Experience, 4, 12, 17, 20, 30, 34, 41–43, 45, 56, 58, 76, 77, 83–85, 88, 95, 127, 128, 135, 141, 160, 173, 180, 187, 193, 201, 202, 206, 218, 222, 230, 252, 254, 262, 263, 270, 271, 286

F Facebook, 108, 112, 113, 115, 123, 129, 134, 140, 141, 144–146, 148–150 Faculty, 10, 16, 68, 176, 246, 269 Fantasia, Rick, 161 Fédération étudiante collégiale du Québec (FECQ), 61, 67 Fédération étudiante universitaire du Québec (FEUQ), 61, 67, 69 Federations, 61, 285 Fee-free higher education, 18, 128 Fee increase, 76, 90, 104, 115, 125, 128, 188, 196, 202, 204, 284 Fees, 2, 10, 106, 107, 122, 125, 170, 194, 206, 214, 220, 223–225, 227–229, 231–235, 250, 255, 278–280 England, 231 #FeesMustFall (FMF), 17–19, 105–108, 110–126, 128, 129, 187 FeesMustFall (campaign), 18, 105, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 115, 121, 125, 126, 128 Ferretti, Alessandro, 169–171 Fields, 11, 13, 160, 226 Financial cuts, 163–165 Financial exclusion, 107, 194 Financing, 6, 73, 248, 261 Fini, Gianfranco (Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies), 166 Fitzgerald, Kathleen, 80

Followers, 18, 115, 126, 133, 138, 139, 144, 146, 149 Formal, 10, 11, 18, 44, 60, 61, 76, 78–83, 90–92, 95, 96, 104, 134, 136–140, 143–148, 150, 160–162, 169, 170, 173, 180, 191, 193, 203, 215 informal, 10, 11, 17–19, 61, 67, 76, 78, 81, 82, 85–91, 95, 96, 134, 140, 141, 143–145, 149–151, 158, 159, 161, 162, 165, 169, 170, 173, 180, 243, 276 student, 134 Forms of, 4, 9, 10, 12, 15, 17, 21, 42, 57, 80, 81, 83, 89–91, 95, 96, 138, 158, 161, 162, 174, 179, 180, 197, 200, 202, 204, 215, 218, 222, 262, 264 Fragmented institutionalization, 17, 56, 59, 62, 69, 70 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 278 Free Democratic Party (FDP), 277 Freeman, Jo, 79, 80, 82, 86, 136 G Gallucci, Eleonora, 182 Gelmini, Mariastella (Education Minister), 158, 164 Gender, 9, 21, 41, 43, 46, 86, 87, 188 General Assembly (GA), 81, 82, 84–87, 92–95 Genovese, Valentina, 163 Gerlach, Luther, 171 German Rectors’ Conference (HRK), 277 Germany, 8, 20, 270, 271, 275–277, 279, 286 Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW), 278

INDEX

Gill, J., 3 Giugni, Marco, 87 Global Justice Movement, 87 alter-globalization movement, 75, 78, 80, 87, 89 Goals, 2, 4, 11, 15, 17, 33, 36, 58, 67, 76, 78, 86, 88–90, 92, 95, 139, 161, 170, 173, 174, 177, 215, 244, 245, 270 expressive goals, 80, 89, 96 strategic goals, 4, 58, 78, 80 Governance, 6, 121, 204, 207 Graglia, Piero, 182 Gramsci, Antonio, 188, 190, 208 Grassroots, 161, 165, 170–173, 231 Guzmán-Concha, César, 1, 107, 256, 257, 261, 263

H Hegemonic narrative, 207 Hesse, 271, 275, 277–279 Hierarchical/Hierarchy, 76, 79, 81–84, 87, 88, 90, 92, 95, 162, 166, 175, 181, 203 Higher education funding, 2, 7, 128, 219, 220, 233 policy, 7, 20, 59, 106, 213, 214, 219, 221, 233–235, 276 reform, 16, 20, 214, 215, 219–222 Higher Education Council (YÖK), 280, 281 Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), 18, 140, 142–150 Hong Kong government, 145, 147 Horizontalism, 76–81, 84, 88, 89, 92, 96, 236 Hunger strike, 149, 177

299

I Identity, 31, 48, 86, 113, 145, 169, 173, 176, 181, 189, 202, 236, 273 collective, 4, 9, 11, 16, 28, 29, 31, 41, 43–45, 48, 134, 135, 138, 161, 170, 174, 178, 179, 181, 200, 206, 236, 271 Ideology, 10, 17, 30, 31, 40–45, 49, 77, 82, 83, 89, 91–93, 95, 107, 257 leftist, 246 left leaning, 30, 31, 44, 49 Impacts, 5, 7, 13–16, 20, 21, 58, 63, 68, 76, 105, 106, 108–110, 128, 129, 134–138, 177, 189, 207, 213–219, 221, 222, 226, 227, 229, 232–236, 242–244, 270–272, 274, 283 Indebtedness, 233 students, 233 Inequalities, 9, 79, 86, 106, 193, 195, 201, 205, 207, 263, 281, 283 Influence, 11–13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 44, 58, 63, 69, 77, 81, 83, 85, 89, 95, 134, 136, 138, 147, 150, 158, 159, 172, 174, 176, 178, 190–192, 195, 198, 207, 208, 214, 215, 217, 224, 226, 232, 234, 242–244, 251, 252, 255, 258, 261, 262, 270, 272, 273, 275, 281, 286 Informal, 10, 11, 17–19, 61, 67, 76, 78, 81, 82, 85–91, 95, 96, 134, 140, 141, 143, 144, 149–151, 158, 159, 161, 162, 165, 169, 170, 173, 180, 243, 276 Innovation, 77, 87, 88, 91, 177 Insourcing, 128, 197, 198, 200, 204, 205, 208 of support workers, 128, 198, 200 Institutional activists, 15

300

INDEX

Institutionalization, 17, 56–60, 62, 64–66, 69, 274 of student representation, 64 Institutional power, 13, 242 Institutional sensitivity, 14 Institutions, 4, 6, 7, 9–11, 13–15, 18, 32, 44, 48, 57, 58, 60, 61, 65, 66, 68, 90, 91, 105–107, 110, 111, 121, 123–125, 127, 128, 133, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165, 168, 171, 178, 179, 188, 190, 193, 201–203, 205, 208, 229, 233, 234, 242, 254–256, 258, 260, 280 involvement, 16, 44, 58, 193, 274 Interest, 10, 27, 30, 31, 41–45, 47–49, 57, 64, 67, 96, 105, 109, 125, 174, 177, 180, 201, 216, 230, 255, 257, 286 International Student Movement, 96 Interviews, 18, 19, 60, 78, 110, 121, 125, 128, 140, 147, 192, 205, 206, 221, 271, 278–282, 284–286 Issues, 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 16, 21, 27–29, 49, 51, 60, 61, 76, 85, 87, 90, 91, 93, 96, 115, 125, 135, 137, 144, 159, 161, 164, 169, 170, 174, 176–180, 191, 208, 225, 226, 232, 245, 251–253, 255, 258, 260, 262, 263, 275, 277, 279, 283–285 Istanbul, 280 Istanbul Technical University, 280 Istanbul University, 280 J Jackson, Giorgio (student activist), 260, 261 Jasper, James, 77, 89 Justice and Development Party (AKP), 283

Justice for Janitors, 284 K Klemenˇciˇc, Manja, 105, 108 L Labour, 144, 188, 220, 221, 224, 226, 227, 229–232, 235 precarization, 5, 6 Labour Party, 20, 214, 220, 224, 227, 229–232, 236 Labour unions, 21, 244, 271, 278, 281–284 trade unions, 2, 16, 63, 67, 68, 160, 180, 196, 200, 231 Lagos, Ricardo (former President), 248, 250, 255 Laws, 193, 218 Leach, Darcy, 84, 89 Leaderless, 17, 77, 82, 83, 91, 121, 125, 134, 142 Leaders, 3, 4, 11, 15, 16, 18, 33, 60, 64, 66, 67, 79, 82, 83, 85, 91, 92, 105, 108, 121, 123, 133–139, 143, 150, 220, 230, 246–252, 254, 256–258, 260, 261, 279, 280, 282, 285 bridge, 136 Leadership core, 121 structure, 105, 110, 144 vacuum, 109 Legislative Council (LegCo), 147, 148 LiberalDemocrats, 223 Li, Keqiang, 148 Lipsky, Michael, 174 Live-tweeting, live-tweeter, 122 Lobbying, 57, 61, 162, 216, 224, 225, 234, 275–278, 284 Localist, 145

INDEX

Logic of action of bearing witness, 162, 174, 176 of damage, 162, 174, 176 of numbers, 162, 174, 175 Los Angeles Times, 78, 284 Luescher, Thierry M., 8, 15, 17, 105, 107–109, 125 Lutz, Barend, 112, 115 M Maida, Bruno, 158, 175, 179 Managerialization, 5, 106 Marburg, 278 Marches, 29, 86, 253, 257 Marketization, 5, 6, 157 of curricula, 5, 6 Market model, 7, 249, 254 Massification, 3, 5, 106, 244, 249, 255, 263 McAdam, Doug, 12, 31, 56, 57, 78, 83, 242, 243, 246, 259, 263, 264, 271, 274 McCarthy, John D., 57, 78, 79, 159–161, 215, 244, 261, 274 Media coverage, 60, 178, 271 independent, 34, 49, 51 networks, 31, 49, 117 online, 36, 40, 44, 150 Mediators, 15 Membership, 39, 41–45, 59, 64, 65, 160, 223, 271, 278 Mexico City, 16, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 43, 50 Mexican democracy, 30, 32 Meyer, D., 13, 14, 29, 57, 261, 274 Middle classes, 41, 199, 246, 252, 283, 284 Mobilization/mobilizing context, 8, 12, 28–30, 227 influence, 44, 69, 89, 134, 207, 270, 272, 275

301

sources, 8 Mochilazo protests, 250 Mong Kok, 145, 146, 149 Motivations, 16, 28, 30, 33, 35–37, 44, 48, 49, 51, 90, 161, 196, 202, 272, 273, 286 Mouvement pour le droit à l’éducation (MDE), 61 Movement legacies, 275 1960s, 2, 5, 11, 21, 63, 75, 76, 92, 134, 161, 247, 270, 274–276, 279–286 1990s, 20, 21, 190, 191, 247–250, 252, 256, 270, 272, 276, 277, 280, 282–284, 286 Movement of the Wave, 133 Movement outcomes, 135, 272, 287 Movement politics, 10, 19, 159, 162, 180, 181 Movement(s) alliances, 14, 20, 270, 272, 275, 278 commemoration, 28–32, 35, 36, 42, 44, 47, 49 demonstration, 16, 27–29, 31, 36, 42–44 leaderless, 17, 77, 81–83, 121, 125, 134, 142 manifestos, 232 participation, 9, 10, 27, 31, 33, 42–44, 59, 80, 82, 84, 95, 129 policy, 13, 16, 213, 215, 233, 236 politics, 10, 19, 159, 162, 180, 181 Mula, Guido, 163–165, 169, 182 N Nai, Alessandro, 87 Napolitano, Giorgio (President of the Republic), 168 Narrative, 20, 122, 199, 201, 204, 207, 235, 243, 263, 272–274, 276, 279, 283, 286

302

INDEX

National, 2, 7, 8, 11, 15, 33, 60, 104–107, 116, 120–122, 125–127, 142, 163, 165–167, 169–171, 173, 178, 180–182, 195, 196, 204, 217, 219, 220, 222, 223, 225–230, 233, 236, 248, 252, 260, 271, 276, 281 day of action, 227, 285 demonstration, 223, 224, 227, 229, 230 National Campaign Against Fees and Cuts (NCAFC), 223–225, 227–232, 234 National Coordination, 163, 165, 166, 170–173, 176, 222, 227 National Coordination of University Researchers (CNRU), 164, 169 #NationalShutdown, 114 National Students Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS), 106, 208 National Union of Student (NUS), 223–225, 227–232, 234 National University Council (CUN), 169, 182 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J., 107 Nelson Mandela University (NMU), 119, 123 Neoliberal/neoliberalism/ neoliberalization, 2, 5–7, 9, 10, 12, 19, 21, 68, 78, 90, 105– 107, 157, 188, 191, 193–195, 206, 213, 256, 257, 277, 281 Neoliberal policies, 20, 189–191, 194, 198, 200, 204, 233 Neoliberal reforms, 269, 279, 287 Neoliberal universities, 4, 200, 204 Networked social movements, 108, 137 Networked student movement, 17, 105, 108, 125, 129

Networks, 11, 15, 28, 31, 49, 76, 78, 86, 123, 135, 137, 138, 141, 216, 224, 263, 272, 283, 285 online, 17, 40, 49, 109, 116, 137, 138 Network structure/distributed/flat/loosely coordinated/multi-nodal, 18, 38–40, 105, 109, 116, 120–122, 125, 128, 177 New Majority (political coalition), 246 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 141, 144, 145, 194, 276, 285 Non-hierarchical organization, 78, 96 Ntuli, Mthokozisi Emmanuel, 109

O Occupation, 9, 60, 62, 76, 78, 81, 84, 86, 87, 92, 94, 139, 141–146, 148, 150, 161, 177, 221, 223, 225, 230–232, 277 Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 139 Occupy Movement, 75, 76, 78, 89, 133 October 6, 187 Olympic Games, 33 1968, 33 Onda anomala (Anomalous Wave), 163 Online, 2, 17, 18, 21, 31, 34, 36, 41, 43, 44, 46, 104, 105, 107–109, 112, 113, 116, 117, 121, 122, 124, 125, 128, 134, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 151, 165 media, 36, 44, 150 #OpenStellenbosch, 104 Opportunities, 13–15, 29, 31, 66, 68, 81, 88, 133, 148, 169, 172, 215,

INDEX

217, 222, 232, 234, 254, 262, 272, 274, 275, 284, 286, 287 Opposition parties, 226, 279, 282 Organizational/organization experience, 42 membership, 39, 41–45 networks/structure, 18, 31, 49, 61, 81, 128, 136, 158, 160, 162, 252, 270, 271, 274 Organizational fields, 286 Organizational forms, 2, 4, 9, 17, 76, 77, 79, 80, 88–90, 95, 96, 105, 158, 161, 162, 169 Organizational preferences, 17, 76, 77, 89, 90, 92, 95, 96 Organizational structures, 61, 81, 128, 136, 158, 160, 162, 252, 270, 271, 274 Organization (structure/model) grassroots, 161, 173 mass protest, 160, 173, 218 participatory movement, 160, 170, 173 professional movement, 160 Organizing spaces, 76, 78, 86 Ortoleva, Peppino, 161 Outcomes, 4, 12–14, 18, 21, 76, 85, 96, 135–137, 143, 161, 176, 189–193, 198, 201, 204, 207, 234, 243, 253, 269, 270, 272, 273, 283, 285 Outsourcing, 6, 19, 189, 196, 197, 201, 205, 206, 208 of academic staff, 106 of support workers, 187, 188, 190, 195–197, 199, 202–206, 208 OutsourcingMustFall, 188, 208 P Palermo, Giulio, 157, 159 Pan Africanist Student Movement of Azania (PASMA), 108

303

Participant observation, 19, 140, 163, 192, 206 Participants, 16–18, 27–31, 33–42, 44–49, 51, 76–96, 110, 134–137, 139, 144, 163, 168, 172, 173, 192, 208, 216, 227, 230, 232, 250, 255, 260, 273, 276 motivations, 35–37 Participation determinants, 30, 31, 48 protest, 16, 28, 30, 31, 39, 42–45, 47, 49 Parties participants, 29, 86, 216 trust, 40 Parti québécois (PQ), 61, 64, 67 Partisan organisations, 107 Party, 14, 61, 67, 146, 173, 180, 213–218, 227, 230–236, 245– 248, 252, 255, 257, 260, 261, 279 members, 231 Path dependency, 69 Peña Nieto, Enrique, 16, 28, 31, 34, 36, 37, 50 Performance, 5, 9, 146, 228 Personal, 4, 28, 30, 31, 40, 44, 49, 80, 122, 145, 146, 159, 176, 283, 286 social, 28, 30 Persuasion (of political elites), 224, 245, 258, 263 Pezzella, Alessandro, 182 Piazza, Gianni, 19, 157, 160, 161, 163, 168, 172, 174, 178, 181, 273 Piñera, Sebastián (former President), 254, 257, 258, 261 Pingüino protests, 252 Pinochet, Augusto (former dictator), 246, 247, 253 Piven, Frances Fox, 9, 88, 160

304

INDEX

Pizzorno, Alessandro, 161 Police, 8, 29, 32, 33, 66, 127, 139–141, 149, 168, 197, 225, 253, 280 repression, 32 Policy, 7, 13–16, 20, 29, 58, 59, 61, 65, 66, 69, 104, 105, 107, 128, 158, 166, 178, 213–215, 217–227, 229, 231–236, 252, 253, 273, 277, 279, 283 supporters, 230, 231 Policy change, 7, 13, 28, 29, 214, 215, 218, 221, 222, 227, 232, 236, 242 Policy fields, 13 Political action, 260, 261 activities, 30, 86 change, 142 coalition, 246, 253 factions, 216 impacts, 213, 226 opportunities, 14, 18, 134–136, 151, 214, 216, 235, 242, 270 parties, 2, 10, 13, 15, 20, 29, 34, 49, 57, 61, 66, 67, 108, 134, 141, 144, 145, 165, 166, 200, 213–216, 218, 222, 224–227, 234, 235, 242, 246, 249, 252, 257, 260–262 Political alliances, 2, 14 alliances, 14 Political attitudes, 16, 28–32, 47, 51 Political economy, 21, 220, 235 Political expression, 34, 36, 141 Political factionalism, 216 Political mediation model, 13, 14, 244, 245 Political movements, 216, 236, 261 Political opportunities, 14, 18, 134–136, 151, 214, 216, 235, 242, 270

Political opportunity structure, 12 Political parties, 2, 10, 13, 15, 20, 29, 34, 49, 57, 61, 66, 67, 108, 134, 141, 144, 145, 165, 166, 200, 213–216, 218, 222, 224–227, 234, 235, 242, 246, 249, 252, 257, 260–262 Political process approach, 14 Political sociology, 2, 3, 21 Political structures, 274 Political subjectivity, 203 Political system, 13, 16, 29, 40, 179, 214, 216, 255, 260, 270 Politicization, 278 Politics, 3, 8–12, 15, 28–30, 33, 39, 40, 42, 44, 47, 48, 56–58, 67, 89, 90, 92, 159, 162, 173, 191, 200, 202–204, 207, 213, 214, 216–218, 221, 222, 226, 232–236, 243, 260, 261, 273, 276, 281, 283 Polity members, 56, 69, 242, 244– 246, 248, 250, 251, 255–257, 260, 262 Polletta, Francesca, 75–77, 79, 80, 83, 86–89, 270, 272, 274 Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 247 Post-apartheid South Africa, 189, 194, 199, 204–206 Power dynamics, 17, 79, 82, 83, 86, 87, 95 Precarization, 5, 6, 106 of academic staff, 106 Predictors, 41–45 triggers, 44 Prefiguration, 76, 78–80, 88, 89, 93, 96 Presidential, 16, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 42, 49, 247, 253, 254 2012 campaign/candidate, 34, 36, 37, 49

INDEX

Pressure, 13, 15, 59, 65, 67, 106, 167, 174–176, 179–181, 194, 196, 204, 216–218, 221, 223, 225–227, 229, 232–235, 257, 276, 281 transformation, 218 Private investment, 5 Private sector, 5, 19, 193, 195 Private universities, 34, 256 Privatization, 5, 6, 67, 90, 157 Process tracing, 140 Professors, 6, 33, 143, 158, 159, 164–166, 174–179, 181, 182, 195, 282 Progressive Youth Alliance (PYA), 107, 126 Protest action offline, 18 online, 18 Protest campaigns, 9, 11, 12, 14, 19, 173, 174, 243, 248 Protest entrepreneurs, 159, 160, 162, 180 Protest event analysis (PEA), 60, 61, 113, 124 Protest repertoire, 138, 177 Protests, 2, 4, 8–11, 13–20, 27–34, 36, 38–45, 47–49, 56, 57, 60, 61, 107, 115, 121, 125, 133, 134, 139–142, 144, 146–151, 158, 160–163, 165–167, 174, 175, 177, 178, 187, 197, 214, 221, 234, 243, 245, 248, 249, 252, 254–256, 259–262, 271, 273, 274, 277–281, 284, 285 events, 16, 18, 29, 36, 39, 41, 42, 44, 60, 63, 78, 105, 110, 113, 124, 125, 128, 221, 222, 259 impacts, 213, 215, 217 Public education, 90, 193, 285 Public funding, 59, 193, 248 cuts, 2

305

Public good, 194, 258 Public universities, 104, 107, 110, 142, 164, 170, 177, 178, 193, 255, 271, 277, 283, 286 Q Quebec, 1, 3, 17, 55, 56, 58–62, 64–67, 69, 70, 213, 236 Québec solidaire (QS), 61 R R29A-Rete29Aprile (April29Network)/Board, 158 Race, 86, 188, 202 Radicalization, 57, 253, 264 ideological, 245, 253, 256, 257, 263, 264 Radicals, 3, 12, 17, 60, 64, 91, 92, 146, 148, 149, 151, 165, 168–170, 176, 179, 181, 207, 216, 218, 231–236, 247, 249, 250, 256–258, 277 Rainbow nation, 199, 201 Reactive protestors, 30, 32, 39, 42, 49 protests, 16, 28, 29, 41, 50 students, 39, 43, 228 Reform, 5, 8, 16, 19, 20, 58, 59, 80, 90–92, 138, 146, 157, 158, 164, 166–169, 177–179, 181, 214, 215, 219–222, 224, 226–231, 234, 235, 242, 247–249, 253– 255, 258, 261, 262, 276–278, 282 Regroupement des associations étudiantes universitaires (RAEU), 64 Reinecke, Juliane, 80, 89 Relational, 13, 16, 137, 150, 151, 163, 172, 243

306

INDEX

Relational mechanisms, 263 Repertoire of action, 2, 56, 66, 158, 159, 264 conventional, 138, 158 unconventional, 9, 159 Representation, 61, 69, 171, 172, 195, 230, 231, 256 Repression police, 32 repressive response, 32, 33 swat team, 32, 33 Republican People’s Party (CHP), 282 Researchers fixed-term, 164, 181 movement, 78, 135, 191 permanent, 19, 159, 160, 163, 164, 181 precarious, 19, 158, 160, 165–167, 181 Resource mobilization approach, 159 Resource mobilization theory, 89 Revolution, 3, 90–92, 243 Rhodes, Cecil John, 104, 125 #RhodesMustFall, 104, 115, 116, 122 RhodesMustFall, 103, 104, 107, 121, 123, 125, 187 Rhodes University (RU), 116, 117, 119 Right to study, 5, 165 single pre-role position, 165 single role of professorship, 165, 175, 181 Ritual, 16, 29–31, 39, 41–43, 47, 49–51 Rodgers, Diane, 80

S Sacramento, 285 Scholarism, 18, 140, 142–145, 147, 149

Securitization, 205 Sefako Makgatho University (SMU), 119 Selva, Donatella, 158, 164, 170, 177, 178 Senates, 64, 164, 166–168, 182 Sensitivity, 14 institutional, 14 Senso comune, 19, 188–192, 195, 200, 201, 203, 205–207 Service Employees International Union (SEIU), 285 Shareholders, 144, 145, 151 Sit-in, 94, 182, 197, 274 Smith, Jackie, 75, 78, 79, 81, 89, 96 Social conflict, 2, 3, 214 factions/networks, 36, 40, 117, 137 movements, 8, 12, 13, 17, 18, 27, 29, 56–58, 67, 75, 76, 81, 86, 89, 96, 133–137, 139, 150, 151, 158, 159, 161, 162, 173, 177, 180, 188, 191, 206, 215–218, 231, 233, 241, 242, 244, 245, 247, 254, 261, 270, 272, 273, 275, 278, 281 student, 3, 4, 18, 27, 57, 105, 109, 117, 122, 124, 150, 180, 195, 199, 207, 214 Social change, 3, 96, 188, 207, 216, 245 Social consciousness, 191, 192, 200 Social forces, 216 Social media, 18, 31, 40, 105, 107–110, 121–124, 128, 129, 134, 137–141, 143, 150 Social media divide, 18, 105, 122, 124, 129 Social media platforms Facebook, 108, 112, 113, 123, 129, 134, 141, 146, 148–150

INDEX

Twitter, 18, 105, 108–110, 112, 113, 124–126, 128, 134 WhatsApp, 108, 112, 113, 123, 129, 141 Social movement, 8, 12, 13, 17, 18, 27, 56–58, 67, 76, 81, 86, 89, 96, 133–137, 139, 150, 151, 158, 159, 161, 173, 177, 180, 188, 191, 206, 215–218, 231, 233, 241, 242, 244, 246, 247, 254, 261, 270, 272, 273, 275, 278, 281 commemoration, 29 studies, 4, 113, 158, 217 Social movement organizations (SMOs), 79, 141, 160, 161, 179, 214–218, 223, 224, 227–231, 234–236, 286 Social movements’ dynamics, 76, 151, 191 Social Network Analysis (SNA), 110, 112, 120–122, 125, 128 Social networks, 36, 40, 117, 137 online media, 36, 44, 150 Solidarity, 17, 19, 29, 33, 36, 48, 49, 77, 82, 88, 93, 127, 128, 175, 197, 202, 207, 224, 227, 230, 272, 273 Solidarity networks, 272 Sol Plaatje University (SPU), 119, 127 South Africa, 1, 2, 8, 15, 18, 103, 106, 109, 111, 114, 121, 123, 127, 187, 190, 191, 194, 195, 200, 201, 208, 213, 214, 236 South African student movement, 18, 105, 108, 110, 115 politically subordinate, 125 South African Students’ Congress (SASCO), 107 South African universities, 8, 187, 188, 201

307

Spontaneity/Spontaneous, 18, 28, 81, 139, 144, 145, 225 Staggenborg, Suzanne, 57, 79, 80, 83, 88, 91, 135, 136, 273 State, 2, 3, 5–7, 10, 11, 19, 20, 32–34, 40, 44, 49, 56, 58, 59, 61, 63, 65, 69, 80, 83, 84, 93, 106, 158, 165–167, 170, 175, 188, 195, 199, 205, 207, 220, 242, 245, 247, 248, 253, 254, 257, 270, 271, 274, 275, 277–279, 286 Statist model, 7 Stellenbosch University (Stellies/Stellenbosch/SU), 119, 122, 124, 126, 230 #SteynMustFall, 104 Strategy, 17, 20, 58, 76, 79, 80, 82, 86, 89, 93, 96, 151, 167, 170, 174–177, 180, 182, 197, 205, 214, 216, 218, 222, 224, 234–236, 257 Strengthening, 195, 208, 243–245, 254, 255, 262, 264 Structure, 13, 18, 19, 59, 78, 79, 81–84, 87, 89–93, 95, 122, 134, 158, 161, 177, 188, 200, 202, 214, 215, 219, 230, 231, 242, 270–273 Structureless, 17, 77 Struggle anti-apartheid, 189, 191, 201 outsourced workers, 188, 206 student, 66, 67, 231 Student activism, 3, 10, 21, 76, 105, 109–111, 213, 214, 221, 222, 228, 230, 277, 281, 283, 284 Student aid programmes, 7, 21 Student associations, 10, 17, 61, 64–67, 69 Student Coordination, 280 Student debt, 213

308

INDEX

Student demonstrations, 16, 28, 30, 31, 36, 41, 47, 50, 178, 229, 251, 260 Student federations, 246, 248–250, 256, 257 Student fees, 193 Student loans, 219, 225, 248 Student maintenance grants, 220, 227, 228 Student mobilization, 1, 2, 12, 21, 32, 67, 68, 142, 158, 188, 227, 235, 261, 262, 270, 271, 275, 276, 278, 280, 283, 284, 286 Student movement, 2–4, 9, 12, 15, 17, 19, 20, 48, 55, 56, 59–70, 76, 94, 105–110, 115, 120, 121, 125, 128, 129, 190, 196, 198, 206, 207, 213, 216, 230, 236, 241–243, 246–251, 255– 258, 260–263, 270, 274–276, 279–281, 285 Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), 92 Student organizations, 15, 18, 20, 49, 56, 59, 64, 65, 67, 68, 107, 120, 142, 145, 148, 149, 168, 214, 219, 221–223, 226, 229, 231–233, 235, 246–250, 254, 256, 261, 263, 270, 271, 276, 280–282, 287 Student politics, 2, 4, 7, 9–12, 63, 106, 235, 250 Student protests, 3, 5, 12, 15, 20, 21, 61, 62, 67, 76, 106, 108, 111, 213–222, 227, 230, 234, 243, 248, 251, 252, 254, 258, 259, 261, 271, 274, 277, 280, 281, 286 Students, 148 1968/#YoSoy132, 16, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 42, 44, 47, 49

activists, 11, 16, 18, 20, 21, 66, 68, 69, 104, 106, 108, 110, 111, 113, 115, 123, 125, 128, 129, 200, 203, 214, 220–222, 226, 230–232, 234, 271, 274–276, 281, 282, 286 demand, 11, 104, 232, 242, 252–254, 258, 261, 262 demonstrations, 16, 28, 30, 31, 36, 41, 47, 50, 178, 229, 251, 260 funding policy, 227 high school, 32 movement, 2–4, 9, 12, 15, 17, 19, 20, 48, 55, 56, 59–70, 76, 94, 105–110, 115, 120, 121, 125, 128, 129, 190, 196, 198, 206, 207, 213, 216, 230, 236, 241–243, 246–251, 255–258, 260–263, 270, 274–276, 279–281, 285 organizations, 15, 18, 20, 49, 56, 59, 64, 65, 67, 68, 107, 120, 142, 145, 149, 168, 214, 219, 221–223, 226, 229, 231–233, 235, 246–250, 254, 256, 261, 263, 270, 271, 276, 280–282, 287 protest, 3, 5, 12, 15, 20, 21, 61, 62, 67, 76, 106, 108, 111, 213–222, 227, 230, 234, 243, 248, 251, 252, 254, 258, 259, 261, 271, 274, 277, 280, 281, 286 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), 92 Student unions, 8, 142, 143, 150, 228, 274, 278 Subsidies, 60, 106 Survey, 16, 33, 36, 38–41, 49–51, 59, 142, 228, 229, 253, 260, 261 respondents, 36, 39, 40 Sutherland, N., 79, 82, 83

INDEX

T Table of University Partners (TPU), 68 Tabusi, Massimiliano, 169–171, 177, 178, 182 Tactical, 18, 61, 68, 76, 87, 90, 91, 158, 264, 280 Tactical preferences, 17, 88, 92, 95 Tactics, 4, 9, 19, 57, 58, 61, 62, 66, 68–70, 77, 79, 88, 89, 91, 107, 108, 124, 148, 160–162, 167, 174–177, 179, 180, 191, 203, 216, 232, 234, 253, 262, 275, 277–280, 284 Tai, Benny, 147 Tarrow, Sidney, 13, 27, 56, 57, 91, 216, 242, 243, 246, 261, 263 Teferra, Damtew, 109 Tempered radicals, 15 Threat, 59, 151, 204, 205, 233, 245, 253, 257, 258, 263, 274, 275, 278, 279, 281, 282 Threat perceptions, 275, 287 Tilly, Charles, 12, 13, 29, 56, 57, 174, 242, 243, 263 Tools down, 196 Trade unions, 2, 16, 63, 67, 68, 160, 180, 196, 200, 231, 281 Transformative politics, 189, 198 Tshwane University of Technology (TUT), 111, 119, 123, 125 Tufekci, Zeynep, 108, 109, 121 Tuition fees, 2, 5, 7, 18, 63, 64, 68, 106, 157, 193, 201, 219, 220, 232, 233, 271, 275, 278, 279, 283, 284 Tuition hikes, 20, 66, 270–276, 280–282, 284–286 Turkey, 8, 20, 21, 270, 271, 273–276, 279–282, 284, 286 Twitter, 18, 105, 108–110, 112–117, 120–123, 125, 126, 128

309

U Umbrella Movement, 18, 134, 139–143, 149, 150 Unavailability for teaching, 19, 165, 166, 168, 174–176, 179, 180 Unintended consequences, 262, 270 Union, 114, 159, 160, 162, 173, 180, 196, 200, 229, 276, 278, 282, 285 Union étudiante du Québec (UEQ), 69 Union politics student, 10, 19 trade, 2, 16, 63, 67, 68, 160, 180, 196, 200, 231 unions, 19 United Auto Workers (UAW), 285 Unity in action, 19, 191, 202, 203 Universidad Central, 254 Universidad de Chile, 246, 248, 249, 256, 258 Universidad de Concepción, 248, 249 Universidad Iberoamericana, 31, 34, 49 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), 32 University College Union (UCC), 223 University governance, 255 university governing bodies, 248 University(ies) campus, 11, 18, 34, 122, 194, 222, 236, 262 field, 7 historically black, 107, 111, 123, 124, 208 historically white, 104, 111, 122–124, 208 metropolitan, 110, 123–125, 128, 249 politics, 9, 159, 162, 191, 200, 217, 222

310

INDEX

recruitment, 158, 165 rural, 123, 125, 128 students, 2–4, 20, 142, 150, 188, 199, 221, 222, 224, 233, 235, 246, 247, 249, 250, 254–256 universities of technology, 107, 110, 123–125, 128 University of California (UC), 17, 76–78, 80, 81, 83, 85–88, 90, 92, 95, 96, 284 University of California, Davis (UC Davis), 78 University of California (UC) Student Movement, 17, 76 University of California System, 285 University of Cape Town (UCT), 103, 104, 111, 114, 115, 117, 119, 122–127, 190, 208 University of Fort Hare (UFH), 119, 124, 125 University of Hong Kong, 143, 150 University of Johannesburg (UJ), 19, 117, 119, 123, 124, 126, 188, 189, 192–198, 200–203, 205, 206, 208 University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), 119, 123 University of Limpopo (UL), 119, 125 University of Mpumalanga (UMP), 119 University of Pretoria (UP), 117, 119, 123 University of South Africa (UNISA), 119, 123 University of the Free State (UFS), 111, 119, 123, 124 University of the Western Cape (UWC), 111, 117, 119, 123, 124 University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), 18, 104, 111, 119 University of Venda (UV), 111, 119, 123–125

University of Witwatersrand, 188, 190

V Vaal University of Technology (VUT), 119 Vallejo, Camila (student activist), 260 Values, 45, 46, 161, 189, 206, 216

W Walter Sisulu University (WSU), 119, 125 Wave occupations, 223, 230 protests, 2, 9, 12, 106, 108, 125, 157, 207, 213–215, 219, 220, 232, 233, 243, 251, 252, 254, 255, 280, 284, 286 reforms, 219, 234, 235 Welfare state, 5, 20, 270, 274, 278 WhatsApp, 108, 112, 113, 123, 129, 141 Whiteness, 89, 104, 201 Willems, Jurgen, 79, 81, 91 Wong, Joshua, 142, 145, 147, 149 Worker-student unity, 19, 187–193, 195, 198, 200, 202–207

Y Yates, Luke, 77, 80, 88 Young Communist League (YCL), 107

Z Zald, Mayer, 78, 79, 159–161, 215, 244, 261, 274 Zapatistas, 89 Zilic, Martín (former Minister), 252 Zuma, Jacob (President), 114, 128, 196, 204