Structure and Creativity in Religion: Hermeneutics in Mircea Eliade’s Phenomenology and New Directions [Reprint 2019 ed.] 9027975949, 9789027975942

Table of contents :
Foreword
Author’s Preface
Contents
PART ONE. Methodological Approaches in the History of Religions
1. Early Methodological Approaches
2. Twentieth Century Methodological Approaches
3. The Hermeneutical Situation Today
PART TWO. Eliade’s Phenomenology: Key Methodological Notions
4. Distinguishing Religious Phenomena
5. Interpreting the Meaning of Religious Phenomena
PART THREE. Eliade’s Phenomenology and New Directions: Some Methodological Issues and Conclusions
6. The Historical-Phenomenological ‚Tension‘
7. Descriptive Evaluations and Levels of Meaning
Bibliography
Index
Religion and Reason

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Structure and Creativity in Religion

M

Religion and Reason 14 Method

and

Theory

in the Study and Interpretation

of

Religion

GENERAL EDITOR Jacques Waardenburg, University of Utrecht BOARD OF ADVISERS T h . P. van Baaren, Groningen R. N . Bellah, Berkeley E. Benz, Marburg U . Bianchi, Rome H. J. W. Drijvers, Groningen W. Dupré, Nijmegen S. N . Eisenstadt, Jerusalem M . Eliade, Chicago C. Geertz, Princeton K. G o l d a m m e r , Marburg P. Ricoeur, Paris and Chicago M. Rodinson, Paris N. Smart, Lancaster and Santa Barbara, Calif. G. Widengren, Stockholm

MOUTON PUBLISHERS • THE HAGUE • PARIS • NEW YORK

Structure and Creativity in Religion Hermeneutics in Mircea Eliade's Phenomenology and New Directions DOUGLAS ALLEN University

of Maine

Foreword

by

MIRCEA ELIADE

M O U T O N PUBLISHERS • THE HAGUE • PARIS • NEW Y O R K

ISBN: 90-279-7594-9 Jacket design by Jurriaan Schrofer © 1978, Mouton Publishers, The Hague, The Netherlands Printed in Great

Britain

T o my parents, David and Frances My first teachers T o my Vietnamese comrades Some recent teachers

Foreword by MIRCEA

ELIADE

It was with great interest that I read the manuscript of this work several years ago. I knew the author, a young philosophy professor, w h o was ardently pursuing both phenomenology and Indian thought but w h o was also showing a budding interest in problems concerning the history of religions. We discussed certain chapters at length and I personally profited a great deal f r o m this dialogue. When I accepted Professor Douglas Allen's suggestion that I write this Foreword, I decided to return to and continue the discussion begun in our earlier meetings. I n o w realize the brashness of this project. T o be at all meaningful and to the point, the dialogue between an author and his critic must take into consideration all the problems posed by the author's w o r k and all the objections raised by his critic — even at the risk of extending the author's commentaries to book length. For myself, I plan someday to dedicate an entire work to discussing the objections put forth by some of my critics, those w h o are responsible and acting in all good faith (for the others do not deserve the bother of a reply). For the moment, I shall have to limit myself to a few observations of a rather general nature. In attempting to present what is essential in my methodology, Professor Allen has rightly stressed, firstly, the importance of the dialectic of the sacred and, secondly, the central role of religious symbolism. As I have stated so many times, the sacred has shown itself to be an element in the structure of consciousness and not a stage in the history of this consciousness. A meaningful world — for man cannot live in a state o f ' c h a o s ' — is the result of a dialectical process which phenomenologists and historians of religion call the manifestation of the sacred. H u m a n existence takes on meaning through the imitation of the paradigmatic models revealed by Supernatural Beings (godheads, mythical ancestors, civilizing heroes, and so forth). The imitation of transhuman models, that is to say, the ritual repetition of

vili

Mircea

Eliade

acts p e r f o r m e d b y these S u p e r n a t u r a l B e i n g s at the d a w n o f time, c o n s t i t u t e s an essential f e a t u r e o f religious life. A t the m o s t p r i m i t i v e levels o f culture, to live as a human being is itself tJ religious act\ as eating, sexual activity a n d w o r k are p e r f o r m e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h m o d e l s revealed b y S u p e r n a t u r a l Beings, t h e y t h u s h a v e a s a c r a m e n t a l value. In o t h e r w o r d s , b e i n g — o r r a t h e r b e c o m i n g — a m a n m e a n s b e i n g 'religious'. T h e dialectic o f t h e sacred, then, p r e c e d e d all the o t h e r dialectical m o v e m e n t s w h i c h w e r e later d i s c o v e r e d b y t h e m i n d a n d served as their m o d e l . T h r o u g h the e x p e r i e n c e o f the sacred, m a n g r a s p e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n that w h i c h w a s revealed as real, p o w e r f u l and m e a n i n g f u l and that w h i c h lacks these qualities, n a m e l y the chaotic a n d perilous c o u r s e o f t h i n g s , their f o r t u i t o u s a n d senseless a p p e a r i n g and disappearing. In the final analysis, t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e sacred opened the w a y for systematic thought. T h i s in itself s h o u l d b e sufficient t o s t i m u l a t e the interest o f p h i l o s o p h e r s in t h e w o r k o f religious historians a n d p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s , b u t t h e r e are o t h e r aspects o f religious e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h are n o less c o m p e l l i n g . H i e r o p h a n i e s — that is, m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f t h e sacred e x pressed in s y m b o l s , m y t h s and S u p e r n a t u r a l Beings, etc. — are a p p r e h e n d e d as structures, and these f o r m a prereflective l a n g u a g e calling f o r a particular h e r m e n e u t i c . As a result o f this h e r m e n e u t i c labor, the materials at the disposal o f the religious historian p r e s e n t a series o f ' m e s s a g e s ' a w a i t i n g d e c o d i n g and c o m p r e h e n s i o n . T h e s e ' m e s s a g e s ' d o n o t ' s p e a k ' to us o n l y o f a past l o n g stilled b u t reveal existential situations o f great m o m e n t to m o d e r n m a n . P r o f e s s o r Allen has r i g h t l y stressed t h e i m p o r t a n c e I attach t o s y m b o l s a n d to s y m b o l i c t h o u g h t in t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the religious p h e n o m e n o n . Indeed — to m e n t i o n o n l y a f e w o f the m o s t c h a r a c t e r istic features — s y m b o l s are capable o f revealing a m o d e o f reality as a s t r u c t u r e o f t h e w o r l d n o t e v i d e n t o n the level o f direct experience; their principal trait is their multivalence, the ability to e x p r e s s several t h i n g s at o n c e the c o n n e c t i o n o f w h i c h is n o t e v i d e n t o n t h e level o f direct experience; s y m b o l s are capable o f revealing a perspective in w h i c h diverse realities are linked w i t h i n a w h o l e o r e v e n i n t e g r a t e d in a ' s y s t e m ' . O f equal i m p o r t a n c e is t h e capacity s y m b o l s possess f o r e x p r e s s i n g paradoxical situations o r certain s t r u c t u r e s o f u l t i m a t e

Foreword

ix

reality w h i c h w o u l d o t h e r w i s e b e inexpressible {e.g. coincidentia oppositorum). Finally, the existential value o f religious s y m b o l i s m m u s t b e u n d e r s c o r e d , n a m e l y the fact that a s y m b o l a l w a y s a i m s at s o m e t h i n g real o r at the v e r y situation o f h u m a n existence as such. B y w a y of conclusion, I m u s t add that m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f religious s y m b o l i s m w a s greatly e n h a n c e d b y m y stay in India. I feel I w a s e x t r e m e l y f o r t u n a t e to h a v e been able to g o to India w h e n I w a s scarcely t w e n t y - o n e and to h a v e stayed t h e r e f o r t h r e e years s t u d y i n g w i t h P r o f e s s o r S u r e n d r a n a t h D a s g u p t a at the U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l c u t t a , especially f o r t u n a t e to h a v e had the c h a n c e to live in his B h a w a n i p o r e h o m e , to visit m o s t o f the cities and t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t t e m p l e s and, in particular, the chance t o s p e n d six m o n t h s in a H a r d w a r ashram in t h e H i m a l a y a s . M y e n c o u n t e r w i t h this t r a d i t i o n - l a d e n c u l t u r e at an age w h e n spiritual discoveries can still e n r i c h and t r a n s f o r m o n e ' s p e r s o n a l i t y has had i m p o r t a n t c o n sequences o v e r and b e y o n d m y w o r k as an Indian scholar. Indeed, the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f religious s y m b o l i s m as it is lived at the level o f the p e o p l e has helped m e to b e t t e r g r a s p the s y m b o l i s m still alive in m y o w n tradition, that o f an E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n people. It has been in p u r s u i n g these initial discoveries t h r o u g h the c o u r s e o f the years that m y interest has f o c u s e d m o r e and m o r e o n f o l k l o r e and p o p u l a r t r a d i t i o n s — w h e t h e r E u r o p e a n o r Asiatic —, on archaic religions, o n m y s t i c s and o n the s h a m a n t e c h n i q u e s f o r attaining ecstasy. H a v i n g h i m s e l f personal e x p e r i e n c e o f Indian culture, P r o f e s s o r Allen has f i r m l y grasped the i m p o r t a n c e o f India in m y intellectual f o r m a t i o n . O n e m o r e reason to e x p r e s s m y g r a t i t u d e f o r his a t t e n t i v e and s y m p a t h e t i c r e a d i n g and c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f m y w o r k . Paris, A u g u s t 1977

MIRCEA

ELIADE

Author's Preface

E x a m i n a t i o n of the discipline of the H i s t o r y o f Religions (Religionswissenschaft), of w h i c h the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion will be viewed as one 'branch', reveals that the central c o n t e m p o r a r y p r o b l e m s are methodological in nature. M o s t of the nineteenth and twentieth century approaches to religious p h e n o m e n a , while involving a vast accumulation of religious data, have tended to be methodologically uncritical, highly subjective and n o r m a t i v e . M y position is that if Mircea Eliade, w h o is considered the f o r e m o s t c o n t e m p o r a r y p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion, represents a methodological i m p r o v e m e n t over previous approaches, this is because of an impressive hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k w h i c h serves as the f o u n d a t i o n for his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h to religious p h e n o m e n a . T h r o u g h o u t o u r f o r m u l a t i o n of the n a t u r e of Eliade's p h e n o m e n o logical approach, o u r a t t e m p t to relate his p h e n o m e n o l o g y to various methodological p r o b l e m s and to concepts in p h e n o m e n o l o g i cal philosophy, and o u r suggestions for n e w directions in m o v i n g b e y o n d his p h e n o m e n o l o g y , the reader will notice the crucial i m p o r tance of concepts of ' s t r u c t u r e ' and 'creativity'. Structure is at the f o u n d a t i o n of Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y . Eliade will claim that religious experience has a specific religious structure; that in t e r m s of the u n i q u e structure of sacralization, w e m a y distinguish religious f r o m n o n religious p h e n o m e n a . H e will a t t e m p t to interpret m e a n i n g t h r o u g h structure; to grasp the m e a n i n g of a particular religious p h e n o m e n o n by reintegrating it w i t h i n its structural system o f s y m b o l i c associations. In Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , creativity e m e r g e s n o t o u t of s o m e void b u t f r o m structure, n o t f r o m n o t h i n g n e s s but f r o m w h a t w e do w i t h structures that are in s o m e sense 'given'. Creativity emerges w h e n w e can experience those f u n d a m e n t a l structures of the world, those essential s y m b o l i c structures, and 'revalorize' t h e m so that w e 'burst o p e n ' the prevailing limiting w a y s of experiencing reality to reveal

XII

Author's

preface

new universes of meaning. N o t only will Eliade view the history of religious manifestations as a creative process, but he will criticize 'modern' society for its provincialism and will suggest possibilities for new creative breakthroughs and new philosophical anthropologies. There are three distinguishable but interrelated parts to this study. In Part I, we examine the leading nineteenth and twentieth century approaches and arrive at some understanding of the present hermeneutical situation in the History of Religions. In order to understand Eliade's approach, it is necessary to comprehend the contributions and limitations of the evolutionists, functionalists, and other anthropologists; of the sociologists, psychologists, and phenomenologists; in short, of the various approaches which have defined the context within which Eliade interprets the meaning of religious phenomena. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 provide a brief but rather c o m prehensive introduction to the major approaches in the History of Religions. In Part II, we formulate the key methodological notions which provide the foundation for Eliade's phenomenology: the dialectic of the sacred and the profane and the 'autonomous', universal, coherent, structural systems of symbolic associations. In terms of the interaction of these methodological notions, we can begin to determine on what basis Mircea Eliade distinguishes religious f r o m nonreligious phenomena and interprets the meaning of a religious phenomenon. In contrast to the numerous interpreters of Eliade w h o have submitted that he has never been concerned with questions of methodology and is methodologically uncritical, we maintain that Eliade has an i m pressive methodological f r a m e w o r k of interpretation. This is probably the first attempt to ground Eliade's methodology in his view of symbolism. Part III presents the most controversial analysis in the book and at the same time offers the greatest possibilities for new directions and creative 'openings'. Here we go far beyond anything Mircea Eliade has ever written. We raise many methodological issues implicit in his approach and endeavor to modify his phenomenological approach to render it more adequate and to suggest many creative possibilities for future research. Several sections of this book are revisions of previously published

Author's preface

xm

articles. I w i s h to thank the f o l l o w i n g j o u r n a l s for permission to use revisions of these articles: 'Mircea Eliade's P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Analysis of Religious Experience', Journal of Religion 52 (1972): 1 7 0 186; 'Givenness and Creativity', Journal of Thought 8 (1973): 270-78. An earlier version of one section in the b o o k appeared as 'A P h e n o menological Evaluation of Religious Mysticism', Darshana International 12 (1972): 71-78. I w o u l d like to t h a n k the U n i v e r s i t y of M a i n e at O r o n o Faculty Research Funds C o m m i t t e e f o r a Faculty S u m m e r Research A w a r d , w h i c h was of great assistance in allowing m e to revise the m a n u s c r i p t and get it into publishable f o r m . I w o u l d like to a c k n o w l e d g e a debt o f gratitude to several persons w h o have assisted m e in this research. I have been o v e r w h e l m e d by the lively spirit, creativity, and dedication of Professor Mircea Eliade and by the personal interest he has s h o w n t o w a r d m y research d u r i n g the past ten years. F r o m the perspective of p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l philoso p h y and p h i l o s o p h y in general, Professor J o h n J. C o m p t o n p r o v i d e d invaluable assistance; this c o m p l e m e n t e d the suggestions of such Historians of Religion as Professors Charles H. L o n g and W i n s t o n L. King. D u r i n g the earliest stages of this research, R u t h White p r o v i d e d great assistance. Finally, I w i s h to a c k n o w l e d g e the assistance of Ilze Petersons, w h o s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g and sensitivity are reflected t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k .

Contents

FOREWORD BY MIRCEA ELIADE

VII

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Part One: Methodological of Religions 1.

2.

XI

Approaches

in the History

EARLY METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

3

Introduction The history o f religions: its prehistory Philology and comparative mythology Ethnology Modern anthropology Animism Evolutionary pre-animism Anti-evolutionary pre-animism Summary and conclusions Transition

3 6 9 14 14 15 17 21 25 27

TWENTIETH CENTURY METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

30

Sociological approaches Emile Durkheim and the 'first tradition' T h e 'second tradition' Psychological approaches Sigmund Freund C. G. Jung Several methodological contributions Anthropological approaches Several specialist approaches Several significant influences

33 33 36 39 39 41 43 45 46 52

xvi

3.

Contents

Phenomenological approaches Rudolf Otto G. van der Leeuw W. Brede Kristensen Transition: Rafaele Pettazoni and the historicalphenomenological 'tension'

57 59 63 64

THE HERMENEUTICA!. SITUATION T O D A Y

69

'Specialists' and 'generalists' T w o 'generalist' approaches Dependence on a normative (theological) basis T h e study o f religious persons C o m m o n methodological issues and problems Religious experience and the irreducibility o f the religious T h e personal dimensions o f religious phenomena Participation and sympathetic understanding T h e c o m m i t m e n t o f the historian o f religions T h e complexity o f religious phenomena and the 'total person' Religious as 'practical' and 'soteriological' B e y o n d 'mere' description T h e issue o f reductionism

69 72 74 77 80

Part Two:Eliade's Phenomenology: Notions 4.

Key

66

81 84 86 87 91 93 94 96

Methodological

DISTINGUISHING RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA

105

Introduction

105 107 113

Mircea Eliade as phenomenologist T h e irreducibility o f the sacred Religion and the sacred T h e dialectic o f the sacred T h e separation and distinction T h e paradoxical relationship

120 123 124 126

Contents

5.

XVII

T h e evolution and choice Summary Further analysis of the sacred m o d a l i t y A m b i v a l e n c e in the religious experience N o purely religious p h e n o m e n a and n o self-sufficient approach Religion as an ' o p e n i n g ' Transition

127 130 130 130

INTERPRETING THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS P H E N O M E N A

140

S y m b o l i s m and religion S y m b o l i s m and structuralism An illustration: the snake and lunar s y m b o l i s m Alternatives: erotic and initiatory s y m b o l i s m Eliade's conclusion: lunar s y m b o l i s m General features of religious s y m b o l i s m ' T h e logic o f s y m b o l s ' T h e multivalence T h e function of unification T h e expression of paradoxal and contradictory aspects of reality T h e 'existential value' Transition

140 144 148 150 153 157 159 161 163

134 137 138

164 167 168

Part Three: Eliade's Phenomenology and New Directions: Some Methodological Issues and Conclusions 6.

THE H I S T O R I C A L - P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L ' T E N S I O N '

173

T h e historical particular and the universal structure T h e i m p o r t a n c e of the historical and the particular T h e status of universal structures Historical 'explanation' and p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l ' m e a n i n g ' 'Givenness' and creativity 'Givenness' and passivity: structures revealed to homo religiosus

174 174 175 177 181 182

XVIII

7.

Contents

'Givenness' and passivity: several criticisms Creativity and the 'constituted given' P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d , free variation, and induction P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l insight and free variation Uncritical inductive generalizations P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l induction P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l insight and the dialectic of the sacred

185 187 190 190 195 196

D E S C R I P T I V E E V A L U A T I O N S A N D LEVELS OF M E A N I N G

201

Evaluating religious p h e n o m e n a Evaluations of 'authentic' and ' g e n u i n e ' Evaluations of ' t r u e ' M e a n i n g for homo religiosus versus m e a n i n g for Eliade Levels of m e a n i n g Evaluations of levels as 'elevated' and 'highest' Identifying the 'highest' level: 'the transconscious' Illustrations of n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s O n t o l o g i c a l m o v e s and levels of generality P r i m a r y s y m b o l i c structures and verification N e w philosophical a n t h r o p o l o g i e s

203 204 206 208 212 212 216 223 231 236 243

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Selected b o o k s Selected articles INDEX

199

247

247 251 257

PART O N E

Methodological Approaches in the History of Religions

1

Early Methodological Approaches

INTRODUCTION

Mircea Eliade identifies himself with the modern discipline originally known as Allgemeine Religionswissenschaft. The expression Religionswissenschaft was first used in 1867 by F. Max Müller in his Chips from a German Workshop.1 B y using the term Religionswissenschaft, Müller wanted to stress that this new discipline would be freed from the philosophy o f religion and especially from theology. This discipline would be descriptive, scientific, and objective; it would avoid the normative and subjective nature o f previous studies o f religions. The German term Religionswissenschaft has not been given a generally acceptable English equivalent. Scholars in the field refer to their discipline by such titles as 'the science o f religions', 'the history o f religions', 'comparative religion', 'the phenomenology (psychology, sociology, etc.) o f religion', 'the study o f world religions'. 2 What is at stake here is not simply a difficulty o f translatability or a trivial question o f personal preference. Many historians o f religion have little if anything in common with various comparativists. Indeed, they may claim that the exponents o f comparative religion are really theologians 1. 'It is true that the term "science o f religions" had been sporadically used earlier (in 1852 by the Abbé Prosper Leblanc, in 1858 by Stiefelhagen, etc.), but not in the strict sense given it by Max Müller, which then passed into current usage.' Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, p. 216. Cited hereafter as The Sacred. 2. For a study o f the growth o f this discipline and its nomenclature, see Louis Henry Jordan's Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and Growth (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1905). An excellent work on the development o f this field is the first volume o f Henri Pinard de la B o u l l a y e ' s L ' É W e comparée des religions (Paris: Beauchesne, 1922). Seethe two-volume work by Jacques Waardenburg, Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion: Aims, Methods and Theories of Research (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1973-74). Volume 1 consists of an Introduction ('View o f a Hundred Years' Study o f Religion') and an Anthology. Volume 2 contains what is probably the most c o m prehensive Bibliography available for the major scholars in the field from 1850 to 1950, with the exclusion o f scholars who are still alive.

4

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

in disguise. Even w h e n individuals refer to their w o r k by the same term, it is sometimes difficult to discern m u c h similarity in anything they are doing. ' C o m p a r a t i v e religion' is the m o s t popular term, but it has the disadvantage of having been e m p l o y e d repeatedly for n o r m a t i v e p u r poses. Ever since about 1880, w h e n 'comparative religion' came into c o m m o n usage, most 'comparativists' have compared religions in order to determine their relative value and then to demonstrate the superiority of their o w n position. 3 As H u s t o n Smith has written: ' C o m p a r i s o n s a m o n g things m e n hold dear always tend to be odious, those a m o n g religions most odious of all. . . . C o m p a r a t i v e religion w h i c h takes such questions [of comparative w o r t h ] for its concern usually degenerates into competitive religion.' 4 N o t only has the p r o p o n e n t of a particular religion conceived of comparative religion as a f o r m of apologetics, but, in a similar polemical fashion, others have sought to demonstrate the 'primitiveness' and lack of value in all religion. Scholars have attempted to eliminate s o m e of this confusion by agreeing to an English title that w o u l d most adequately reflect the nature of Allgemeine Religionswissenschaft. Thus, the w o r l d - w i d e organization of scholars in this field has recently adopted an official English title, ' T h e International Association for the Study of the H i s t o r y of Religions.' It is readily apparent that the term 'history of religions' has c o m e to be regarded as a s y n o n y m for the 'general science of religions', and as such the nature of the discipline must be discussed in the total context of Religionswissenschaft.5 In this study w e shall understand ' H i s t o r y of Religions' as referring to the entire discipline of Religonswissenschaft. This general study of religion has been classified in various ways; one of the best k n o w n classifications has been J o a c h i m Wach's division of the field into four branches: history, p h e n o m e n o l o g y , psychology, and sociology of 3. W . Brede Kristensen, The Meaning of Religion, pp. 1 - 2 . 4. Huston Smith, The Religions of Man, p. 15. 5. Joseph M. Kitagawa, 'The History o f Religions in America', The History Religions: Essays in Methodology, p. 15.

of

Early methodological approaches

5

religion. 6 W h e n w e wish to refer to history 'proper', which will be viewed as one 'branch' of the 'History o f Religions', w e shall use the term 'history of religions'. W h e n a scholar uses 'history of religions' while referring to the entire field of Religionswissenschaft, w e shall insert '[History of Religions]' in the text. It will be our position that Mircea Eliade is a Historian of Religions, w h o specializes in that branch of the H i s t o r y of Religions k n o w n as 'the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion'. T h r o u g h o u t this study, the t e r m s homo religiosus, premodern, traditional, archaic, and primitive7 will usually be used interchangeably. By modern and nonreligious, w e refer to a characteristic attitude of c o n t e m porary Western society: ' M o d e r n m a n ' s originality, his newness in comparison w i t h traditional societies, lies precisely in his determination to regard himself as a purely historical being, in his wish to live in a basically desacralized cosmos. ' 8 A t this.point, w e shall simply indicate that the m o d e r n person denies that which is m o s t characteristic of homo religiosus: the recognition of a 'transhuman', 'transhistorical', transcendent, absolute reality (the sacred), which manifests itself in the w o r l d and which allows us to k n o w all that is ultimately meaningful, significant, and real. 9 W e shall n o w begin our sketch of methodological approaches in the H i s t o r y of Religions. B y means of this historical sketch, w e intend to lay the foundation for understanding the nature of the H i s t o r y of Religions as an academic discipline today. M o r e specifically, w e wish to see h o w Mircea Eliade deals w i t h the central issues and problems 6. See Joachim Wach, Sociology of Religion, pp. 1 - 2 ; C. J o u c o Bleeker, 'The C o n tribution o f the P h e n o m e n o l o g y o f Religion to the Study o f the History o f R e l i g i o n s ' , Problems and Methods of the History of Religions, p. 40. 7. T h e term 'primitive' can be misleading since it immediately suggests certain pejorative meanings (naive, simple, etc.) w h i c h o f t e n interfere w i t h our attempt to describe these cultures as objectively as possible. In addition, it will often be necessary to distinguish differences in the attitudes o f various 'premodern' cultures. For e x ample, 'primitive' ('pre-literate', 'archaic') is properly applied to the Paleolithic h u n ters and f o o d gatherers, although it does not describe such cultures as Upanisadic India. See Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, p. 3; Mircea Eliade, From Primitives to Zen, p. vi. 8. Mircea Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. ix. T h i s b o o k was first published as Birth and Rebirth ( N e w York: Harper & Brothers, 1958). 9. See The Sacred, pp. 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 .

6

Methodological

approaches in the history of religions

emerging from past approaches to religious phenomena and whether his phenomenological approach can be evaluated as a methodological improvement. Our presentation will generally adhere to some sort o f chronological order. When it seems advantageous, both to bring greater coherence to the multitude o f facts and to stress crucial issues, we shall not hesitate to violate this 'horizontal' format by introducing a 'thematic' principle o f organization.

T H E HISTORY OF RELIGIONS: ITS PREHISTORY

Although the History o f Religions as an autonomous discipline only began in the nineteenth century, investigations into the nature o f religion are well documented as early as ancient Greece. Sometimes theories arose from the natural curiosity aroused by exposure to 'exotic' cultures o f hitherto unknown peoples; usually theories arose from apologetic and theological needs when different religions came into contact with each other. Charles J. Adams submits that 'The two situations most evocative o f theories on the nature o f religion have been those where rival religious systems confronted one another directly and those o f crisis and breakdown within an established religious community.' 1 0 The emergence o f rationalism in Europe, as evidenced in the reexamination o f religion by the Enlightenment, illustrates the second 'situation'. It appears that the creation o f the History o f Religions was largely a product o f the thought o f the Enlightenment. Often the Enlightenment is characterized as rejecting religion in the light o f scientific and intellectual progress. Certainly this is the strongest current in French Encyclopaedism: homo religiosus is the 'slave o f superstition', still imprisoned by the 'yoke o f religion'. One recalls Diderot's image o f the 'Hydra o f religion': Deism had cut off a dozen heads, but from the one head it had spared all the others would grow once again; all forms o f religion must be completely rejected. Ernst Cassirer has shown that this characterization o f the Enlight10. Charles J . Adams, A Reader's

Guide to the Great Religions,

p. 28.

Early methodological approaches

7

e n m e n t is extremely misleading. It is true that the authority of revelation was undermined, b u t most thinkers accepted the deistic notion of reason and proclaimed a n e w f o r m of religion. For many, 'the f u n d a mental objective is not the dissolution of religion but its "transcendental" justification and foundation'. In u n d e r m i n i n g the importance of revelation and appealing to 'the inviolable, eternal laws of reason', the Enlightenment thinkers usually emphasized the notion of religio naturalis, a universal religious quality underlying all particular religious manifestations and k n o w n t h r o u g h reason. 1 1 H o w e v e r , if the later Historians of Religions accepted this notion of religio naturalis and the sufficiency of reason in understanding religion, it should be noted that it was in terms of the n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s of reason that religious f o r m s were characteristically ascribed to the earliest 'prescientific' stages of cultural development. Indeed, w h e n phenomenologists of religion, such as R u d o l f O t t o , G. van der Leeuw, and Mircea Eliade, insist u p o n the complexity and the sui generis character of the religious, they are reacting against w h a t they consider a 'rationalistic bias' inherited f r o m the Enlightenment. If it is true that the History of Religions g r e w out of the scientific and rational attitude of the Enlightenment, 1 2 it is equally true that such a field could have begun only after being supplied w i t h a b o d y of empirical data: d o c u m e n t s were submitted on primitive cultures; the field of Orientalism began to flourish; Indo-European philology and comparative linguistics were established. We can n o w formulate the m a j o r problem which led to the birth of the History of Religions. Since scholars no longer had recourse to the n o r m s of revelation and traditional religious authority, h o w were they to understand and evaluate this multitude of recently accumulated 'religious data'? T h e direction the new discipline took in dealing w i t h this p r o b l e m can largely be seen in the cultural context of the period: 'it 11. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, pp. 134 ff. See Kitagawa, ' T h e History of Religions in America', pp. 17-18. 12. Although almost all scholars seem to agree that the History of Religions was largely a child of the Enlightenment, w e should note that there are a few Historians of Religions w h o place greater emphasis u p o n the contributions of Romanticism. See Kees W. Bolle, Introduction to Jan de Vries's The Study of Religion, p. xx;Jan de Vries, The Study of Religion, pp. 39-58; Gerardus van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, vol. 2, pp. 691-694.

8

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

is remarkable to note that the beginnings of C o m p a r a t i v e Religions took place during the middle of the nineteenth century at the very height of the materialistic and positivistic propaganda.' 1 3 Such a cultural context can be witnessed in A u g u s t e C o m t e ' s Cours de philosophie positive, in w h i c h C o m t e formulated his theory o f ' t h e law of the three stages', w i t h the theological as the 'lowest' state of development. 'This Positivism treats religion as a dated point of view, a primitive structure in the evolution of man.' 1 4 T h e positivist tended to regard religion in the m o d e r n w o r l d as 'merely a survival f r o m m a n ' s primitive past, and d o o m e d to disappear in an era of science and general enlightenment'. 1 5 T h e positivistic and materialistic viewpoint was combined w i t h a belief in evolutionism. In 1859 D a r w i n ' s Origin of Species appeared, and scholars began to look for other f o r m s of evolution, including the evolution of religion. Characteristic of the t h o u g h t of this age was H e r b e r t Spencer's belief in a 'unilinear evolution' and 'progress by evolution'. 1 6 Evolution was seen as the gradual progression f r o m w h a t was simple and h o m o g e n e o u s into w h a t was complex and heterogeneous. Significantly, Spencer believed that this entire process o f ' c o s m i c evolution' could be accounted for by the physicists' laws of matter and motion. His 'progress by evolution' even came to be viewed as ' s o m e t h i n g religiously p r o f o u n d , that here was a n e w cosmic conception based u p o n the operation of Natural Law'. 1 7 It was d u r i n g this period that the m o d e r n discipline ofReligionswissenschaft had its beginnings. T h e r e w e r e t w o m a j o r ' g r o u p s ' in its early stages: M a x Miiller and other philologists and Sir E d w a r d B. T y l o r and other ethnologists. Essays in Comparative Mythology, w h i c h s o m e 13. Mircea Eliade, ' T h e Quest for the " O r i g i n s " of Religion', History of Religions 4, no. 1 (1964): 156-157. With slight modifications, this article is reproduced as chapter 3 in Eliade's The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion. 14. D e Vries, The Study of Religion, p. 63. In his later writings, C o m t e does introduce his n e w 'Religion of H u m a n i t y ' , which seems to contrast sharply with his earlier 'positive philosophy'. It is C o m t e ' s positivism, not his 'Religion of H u m a n i t y ' , which m o s t influenced nineteenth century Historians of Religions. 15. Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, p. 3. 16. In 1855 Spencer published his Principles of Psychology and t w o years later, in Progress, Its Law and Cause, he extended his evolutionary theory to encompass all aspects of the cosmos. 17. H o m e r W. Smith, Man and His Gods, pp. 354-356.

Early methodological

approaches

9

consider the first important book in the History o f Religions, was published in 1856 by Miiller. In 1871 Tylor published his monumental Primitive Culture, in which he tried to explain the origin and evolution o f religion. Mircea Eliade, in concentrating on the nineteenth century obsession with determining 'origins' (of language, the Indo-Aryan races, culture, art, religion, etc.), offers an explanation for this 'synchronicity' between a materialistic and positivistic attitude and the great interest in archaic and Oriental religions: One could say that the anxious search for the origins o f Life and Mind; the fascination in the 'mysteries o f Nature'; the urge to penetrate and decipher the inner structures o f Matter — all these longings and drives denote a sort o f nostalgia for the primordial, for the original, universal matrix. Matter, Substance, represents the absolute origin, the beginning o f all things: Cosmos, Life, Mind. . . . Through science, man will come to know matter ever more correctly and master it ever more completely. There will be no end to this progressive perfectibility. One can unravel from this enthusiastic confidence in science, scientific education, and industry a kind o f religious, messianic optimism: man, at last, will be free, happy, rich, and powerful. Optimism matched perfectly well with materialism, positivism, and the belief in an unlimited evolution. 18 This then was the cultural context within which the autonomous, 'scientific' study o f religion began and flourished: the 'positivistic' approach to the documents o f religions; the attempt to arrive at the origin and first forms o f religion; the search for the 'laws o f evolution' o f religion; a tremendous enthusiasm and confidence in the unlimited possibilities that scientific progress in this field would yield. PHILOLOGY AND C O M P A R A T I V E M Y T H O L O G Y

The first significant group in the History o f Religions was composed o f philologists; through the scientific analysis o f language, they 18. Eliade, 'The Quest for the "Origins" of Religion', p. 158.

10 Methodological approaches in the history of religions

believed it possible to comprehend the nature of religion. These philologists formulated 'naturistic' explanations of religion which maintained that the gods were no more than personified natural phenomena, such as the sun, the moon, and the rivers. T h e leading proponent o f ' t h e nature-myth school' was M a x M ü l ler, for w h o m the 'key' to deciphering the essence of religion was 'comparative mythology', and this in turn could only be understood by a method of philological analysis. M o r e specifically, the 'key' for Müller was solar mythology. O t h e r comparative philologists emphasized the storm-clouds (Kuhn), the wind (Schwartz), and the sky (Preller). 19 Max Müller seems to endorse a traditional empiricist epistemologica! analysis: all human thought, language, and knowledge is derived f r o m sense experience. Hence, the religious 'intuition of the divine' or idea o f ' t h e Infinite' is based upon sensations arising f r o m forces of external nature on human beings. M o r e specifically, Max Müller submitted that it was the 'intangible' natural phenomena, such as the sun or the wind, which provided human beings with the idea of the infinite. His thesis was that the infinite, once the idea had arisen, could only be thought of in metaphor and symbol, which could only be taken f r o m what seemed majestic in the k n o w n world, such as the heavenly bodies, or rather their attributes. But these attributes then lost their original metaphorical sense and achieved autonomy by becoming personified as deities in their o w n right. 2 0 Religion arose when what was originally only a name (nomen), metaphorically expressing the naturalistic forces, through the 'illusion' of m y t h was given the status of a god (numeri). 'Whenever any word, that was at first used metaphorically, is used without a clear conception of the steps that led f r o m its original to its metaphorical meaning, there is danger of mythology; whenever those steps are 19. with Myth: 20.

For a detailed account of the formulation of Müller's view and his controversies A n d r e w Lang, see Richard M. D o r s o n ' s ' T h e Eclipse of Solar M y t h o l o g y ' , A Symposium, pp. 15—38. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion, p. 21.

Early methodological

approaches

11

forgotten and artificial steps put in their place, we have mythology, or, if I may say so, we have diseased language.' 21 Thus the whole supernatural world arose from the limitations, ambiguity, and 'illusion' of language; 22 myth is described as a 'pathological' condition, a 'disease of language'. It follows, according to Max Müller, 'that the only way we can discover the meaning of the religion of early man is by philological and etymological research, which restores to the names of gods and the stories told about them their original sense'. 23 For example, at first it seems that the Greek myth of Daphne makes little sense: Apollo, a solar deity, chases Daphne, who escapes his embraces when she is transformed by the Earth into a laurel tree. Müller resorts to philological analysis and submits that the Greek name for laurel can be traced back to the Sanskrit name for the dawn. N o w the original meaning of the myth becomes comprehensible: the sun chasing away the dawn which finally disappears in the bosom of Mother Earth. Although the above analysis suffices to reveal how strongly Max Müller was influenced by the cultural and intellectual setting of nineteenth century Europe — the detached, rational, scientific approach to the religious data; the concern for origins; the negative evaluation of religion— there is another side to this scholar, which is evidenced in his admiration for Oriental spirituality. 24 21. M a x Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, pp. 375-376. William A. Lessa and E v o n Z. Vogt, Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach, p. 11, describe this birth of religion and its gods t h r o u g h a 'disease of language' in the following terms: '. . . the forces of nature were transformed b y man f r o m abstract forces to personal agents, that is, spirits. . . . Natural p h e n o m e n a came to be c o m pared to h u m a n acts, and expressions originally used for h u m a n acts came to be applied to natural objects. . . . After this had been done, spirits had to be invented to account for the acts attributed to them by their names, and so arose pantheons of gods. . . . T h u s religion is really a fabric of errors. T h e supernatural world was composed of beings created out of nothing.' 22. Ernst Cassirer emphasizes the point that language for Müller is 'inherently metaphorical', and it is the 'inherent ambiguity', resulting f r o m its inability to describe things unequivocally, that best explains the origin of m y t h and the birth of the gods. See Language and Myth, pp. 3-4, 85-86; An Essay on Man, pp. 109-110. 23. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion, p. 22. 24. Müller was especially fond of Vedänta, which he described as 'a system in which h u m a n speculation seems to m e to have reached its very acme' and which he c o m -

12

Methodological

approaches in the history of religions

Probably more than any other European scholar, M a x Müller made Indian spirituality available to the West. His Sacred Books of the East represents a landmark in the History of Religions. This renowned Sanskritist felt that he had discovered in the Rg Veda the primordial form of religion. 25 In his philological analysis, Müller often attempted to understand an Indo-European religious form by tracing it back to its Aryan, Vedic, 'original' manifestation. In 1891, he claimed that 'the most important discovery which has been made during the nineteenth century with respect to the ancient history of mankind . . . was this simple equation: Sanskrit Dyaus-pitar = Greek Zeus pater = Latin Jupiter = Old Norse Tyr'. So important was this finding, according to Müller, than 'Ancient history has become as completely changed by that one discovery as astronomy was by the Copernican heresy. ' 26 Although Müller certainly overstated the role of comparative mythology in understanding religious phenomena, all Historians of Religions recognize that myth is one of the essential features of any religion; that the interpreter cannot understand a religious tradition without understanding its myths. It is therefore imperative that w e avoid a common misunderstanding, which w e can observe by distinguishing t w o general interpretations about the nature of myth. 2 7

pared favorably with the philosophical systems o f Plato, Kant, and Hegel. See Miiller's The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, pp. v - x v i i , 183, and 193. 25. W e may note that Miiller's concern f o r origins and primordial f o r m s w a s not accompanied by the c o m m o n nineteenth century formulation o f a unilinear, 'progressive' evolutionary account o f the development o f religion. In his Chips from a German Workshop, vol. 1, p. 48, Miiller writes that ' w e shall learn that religions in their most ancient form, or in the minds o f their authors, are generally free f r o m many o f the blemishes that attach to them in later times'. 26. M a x Miiller, 'The Lesson o f Jupiter', Anthropological Religion, p. 82. 27. Several excellent sources f o r comparing various interpretations o f m y t h are Daedalus 88, no. 2 (1959); T h o m a s J. J. Altizer, William A. Beardslee, J. Harvey Y o u n g , eds., Truth, Myth, and Symbol; The Monist 50, no. 4 (1966); Thomas A. Sebeok, ed., Myth: A Symposium; Joseph J. Kockelmans, 'On M y t h and Its Relationship to Hermeneutics', Cultural Hermeneutics 1 (1973): 4 7 - 8 6 ; Perry C. Cohen, 'Theories o f M y t h ' , Man, n.s. 4 (1969): 3 3 7 - 3 5 3 ; G. S. Kirk, Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures.

Early methodological

approaches

13

There is the view of the nineteenth century, which we have seen in 'comparative mythology' 2 8 and which is probably accepted by most contemporary philosophers: to say that something is 'merely' a m y t h is to point out that it is a 'fiction' or 'illusion', an 'unreal' and uncritical 'invention' of the imagination, and as such is distinguished f r o m and even opposed to 'reality'. Yet for archaic societies and for cultures in which m y t h is 'living', m y t h means 'true story' in the sense of 'sacred tradition, primordial revelation, exemplary model'. This second view is given the following formulation by Eliade: M y t h narrates a sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial Time, the fabled time of the 'beginnings'. In other words, myth tells how, through the deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence. . . . In short, myths describe the various and sometimes dramatic breakthroughs of the sacred (or the 'supernatural') into the World . . . the m y t h is regarded as a sacred story, and hence a 'true history', because it always deals with realities.29 Because of this equivocation in our contemporary usage, it is absolutely essential that w e distinguish these t w o views of m y t h in all that follows: w e must not confuse the latter, which claims to be descriptive and phenomenological, with the former, which is clearly evaluative. M a n y scholars have assumed the normative view and then have had very little patience in trying to understand just what the m y t h meant for the people w h o believed it. 28. It is interesting to note the opposite approaches taken b y R o m a n t i c i s m and 'comparative m y t h o l o g y ' . R o m a n t i c i s m extolled m y t h o l o g y as grasping w h a t is concrete and living, whereas language, 'a faded m y t h o l o g y ' , o n l y preserved things in an abstract and formal manner. Ernst Cassirer (Language and Myth, p. 85) points o u t that since 'comparative m y t h o l o g y ' in the second half o f the nineteenth century 'adopted the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l principle o f basing m y t h o l o g i c a l comparisons o n linguistic comparisons, the factual primacy o f verbal concepts over m y t h i c ones s e e m e d to t h e m to be implied in their procedure'. Eliade strongly opposes this latter tendency, w h i c h he takes to be a reductionism o f the a u t o n o m o u s structure and function o f the m y t h , and, as w e shall see, he is e v e n criticized for being 'a romantic'. 29. Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality, pp. 5 - 6 . In 'Archaic M y t h and Historical Man', McCormick Quarterly 18 (1965): 24, Eliade states that 'the f o r e m o s t function o f m y t h is to reveal the exemplary m o d e l s for all h u m a n rites and all significant h u m a n activities'. See Raffaele Pettazzoni, 'The Truth o f Myth', Essays on the History of Religions, pp. 11-23.

14

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

ETHNOLOGY

Modern

anthropology

Shortly after the birth of the 'science' of philology and comparative mythology, 'modern anthropology' began to take shape. Its first significant group was composed of British anthropologists: Tylor, Lang, Robertson Smith, Marett, Frazer, etc. Impressed by Darwinian evolution, these ethnologists tended to combine their 'positivistic' approach to the 'religious facts' with a view of historical and cultural evolutionism. Naturally they were preoccupied with the question of 'origins' or 'first forms', which would serve as the foundation of this evolutionary process. As we read these anthropologists— and the philologists, as well — we are impressed both by their desire to accumulate empirical data, amass documentary evidence, and analyze the specific facts; and at the same time by their efforts to frame the most imaginative schemes and arrive at highly speculative theories. With respect to the question of origins and genesis, where one finds the most imaginative hypotheses formulated, several approaches can be delineated. 30 According to the so-called 'comparative' method, 'evidences' from societies throughout the world were removed from their particular contexts and arranged in a sequential scheme; in each case the ethnologist had a 'preconceived plan' which enabled the anthropologist to order his or her data in this particular manner. Another method was based on discovering cultural 'survivals'; existing survivals rendered intelligible the history of the past. Other methods were based on a 'principle of the psychic unity of mankind— human nature is basically uniform, therefore similar results have come independently from the same causes'. Thus, what the evolutionists discovered in contemporary primitive cultures revealed to them the nature of human beings at the origin of culture. N o w it is evident why these cultural anthropologists, in their search for origins and evolutions, devoted so much time to religion and thought that they had defined the nature of religion. 'The study of the 30. Lessa and Vogt, pp. 9-10.

Early methodological approaches

15

religion of early m a n and c o n t e m p o r a r y primitives was considered i m p o r t a n t because the n a t u r e of religion was u n d e r s t o o d to be identical w i t h its origin.' 3 1 B y analyzing primitive cultures, one could u n d e r s t a n d the nature of religion; or, w h a t a m o u n t e d to the s a m e thing, b y analyzing 'religious data', one w a s able to u n d e r s t a n d the earliest stages of culture. A n d then, f r o m this ' p r i m o r d i a l ' stage of religion, one could discover h u m a n progression t h r o u g h ' h i g h e r ' stages of cultural evolution. Animism In 1871, E. B. T y l o r published his Primitive Culture, in w h i c h he tried to explain the origin of religion and the n a t u r e of its d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e first requisite in a systematic study of the religions of the l o w e r races is to lay d o w n a r u d i m e n t a r y definition of religion. . . . It seems b e s t . . . simply to claim, as a m i n i m u m definition of religion, the belief in Spiritual Beings. . . . I p u r p o s e here, u n d e r the n a m e of A n i m i s m , to investigate the deep-lying doctrine of Spiritual Beings. . . , 32 ' A n i m i s m ' , as the ' m i n i m u m definition of religion' and the explanation of its 'origin', is the belief that all of N a t u r e is animated, that it has a soul. T y l o r then a t t e m p t s to explain h o w archaic persons created this universal n o t i o n of the soul in t e r m s of a 'savage b i o l o g y ' and a 'rational p r i m i t i v e p h i l o s o p h y ' . It seems as t h o u g h t h i n k i n g men, as yet at a low level of culture, w e r e deeply impressed by t w o g r o u p s of biological problems. In the first place, w h a t is it that makes the difference b e t w e e n a living b o d y and a dead one; w h a t causes waking, sleep, trance, disease, death? In the second place, w h a t are those h u m a n shapes w h i c h appear in d r e a m s and visions? 3 3 Reflecting u p o n these p h e n o m e n a , the 'ancient savage p h i l o s o p h e r ' 31. Charles H. Long, Alpha: The Myths of Creation, p. 2. 32. E d w a r d B. T y l o r , Primitive Culture, vol. 1, pp. 424-425. 33. Ibid., p. 428.

16

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

probably m a d e several 'obvious inferences' and reached the following conclusion: these p h e n o m e n a could be understood in terms of the presence or the absence of s o m e 'unsubstantial' entity, the 'personal soul or spirit'. T h e primitive then extended this idea of the soul to animals, to plants, and even to inanimate objects. ' T h e soul, being detachable f r o m whatever it lodged in, could be t h o u g h t of as independent of its material home, w h e n c e arose the idea of spiritual beings, w h o s e supposed existence constituted T y l o r ' s m i n i m u m definition of religion.' 3 4 F r o m this initial stage of animism, T y l o r described the unilinear evolution of religion t h r o u g h polytheism and finally to the m o n o t h e i s m of more 'civilized' cultures. We m a y note t w o features in T y l o r ' s account which will characterize most of the early methodological approaches. First, his explanation of the origin and nature of religion seems highly 'rational': primitive animism arose f r o m empirical observations and f r o m logical deductions based u p o n these facts of nature. ' T h e y are doctrines answering in the most forcible w a y to the plain evidence of m e n ' s senses, as interpreted by a fairly consistent and rational primitive philosophy.' 3 5 Secondly, in using this highly rational basis of interpretation, T y l o r takes a rather 'negative' view regarding the nature of religion: the primitive confuses that which is merely subjective with objective reality; animism rests u p o n a 'psychological delusion and mistaken logical inference'. 3 6 We shall n o w delineate several 'pre-animistic' approaches, w h i c h are usually viewed as reactions against the animism of E. B. Tylor. M o d e r n Historians of Religions, in emphasizing the complexity of their religious data, are certainly indebted to these scholars for their 'discoveries': mana, taboo, magic, etc. H o w e v e r , the point w e wish to m a k e is that f r o m the phenomenological perspective of Mircea Eliade, these approaches m a y have accumulated n e w facts and introduced 34. Evans-Pritchard, p. 25. 35. Tylor, p. 429. 36. Ibid., pp. 428 ff. We shall see that Mircea Eliade's phenomenological approach reacts against both of these methodological tendencies. See David Bidney, ' T h e C o n c e p t of Value in M o d e r n A n t h r o p o l o g y ' , Anthropology Today, pp. 684-687.

Early methodological approaches

17

new religious types, but they did not radically alter the basic hermeneutical situation of a Tylor. These 'pre-animistic' approaches shared m o s t of T y l o r ' s methodological assumptions and underlying theories: a 'rationalistic' and 'positivistic' approach to the religious facts; a belief in a unilinear evolutionary scheme; a 'negative' view of religion in which homo religiosus was placed at the 'origin' of the evolutionary process. Evolutionary

pre-animism

M a j o r criticisms of T y l o r were first presented by anthropologists w h o f o u n d that their data on primitive cultures in Melanesia and Polynesia did n o t support his theory of animism. T h e Melanesian m i n d is entirely possessed by the belief in a supernatural p o w e r or influence, called almost universally 'mana'. This is w h a t w o r k s to effect everything which is b e y o n d the ordinary p o w e r of m e n . . . this p o w e r , t h o u g h itself impersonal, is always connected w i t h s o m e person w h o directs it; all spirits have it, ghosts generally, s o m e men. If a stone is f o u n d to have a supernatural p o w e r , it is because a spirit has associated itself w i t h it. This p o w e r or force, according to C o d r i n g t o n , was n o t physical b u t supernatural, was n o t fixed in anything but could be conveyed in almost anything. If a person is a successful warrior, if a y a m g r o w s very large, if a canoe is swift, it is not because of any 'natural' conditions but because each is influenced by or possesses mana. 3 7 N o t long after C o d r i n g t o n w r o t e about this concept in Melanesia, anthropologists began to find similar concepts of a dynamic, i m p e r sonal, supernatural p o w e r all over the world. T h e r e w e r e the Polynesian mana, the Sioux Wakanda, the A l g o n q u i n manitou, the Iroquois orenda, the C r o w maxpe, the hasina of Madagascar, the baraka of Morocco, and countless other exemplifications of this seemingly ubiquitous concept. Georges Dumézil, in criticizing this generation of scholars, indicates the extreme to which this search for variations of the concept of mana led: 'elle est présente partout où l'on peut parler de 37. R. H. Codrington, The Melanesians, pp. 118-120.

18

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

religion, et des mots précieux c o m m e sacer et numen, hagnos et thambos, brahman, tao, la "Grâce" m ê m e du christianisme, en sont des variations ou des dérivés. U n e génération de chercheurs s'est consacrée à établir cette uniformité.' 3 8 From this concept of mana and its related terms, there developed the theory of 'dynamism' or 'pre-animism'. In 1900, the British anthropologist R. R. Marett published his article 'Preanimistic Religion', which was republished in The Threshold of Religion. According to Marett, Preuss, and many others, the primordial and universal stage of religion was to be identified with the human belief in and emotional reaction to this impersonal and dynamic power. Although this force is often an attribute of a soul or spirit, it is not itself a spirit; the primordial religious experience need not presuppose the existence of a soul. In short, the first f o r m of religion is not an animistic but a pre-animistic conception. 3 9 Marett stressed an essential aspect of this pre-animistic concept which Codrington had previously observed: mana, orenda, etc., do not in themselves possess any moral dimension. They can be used for good or bad purposes. 4 0 What is essential at this first stage of religion is that this force is regarded as that which is 'real', successful, creative, perfect — that which above everything else truly 'is'. During the first t w o decades of the twentieth century, this theory of dynamism was believed to have refuted Tylor's theory of animism and was widely accepted. Even today one finds scholars, although usually not Historians of Religions or ethnologists, subscribing to the view that the concept of mana represents the universal, primordial f o r m of religion. There are several decisive criticisms of the pre-animistic theory of mana. 4 1 This notion is not a universal idea and hence cannot be taken as the first stage of all religions. In fact, mana is not even a pan38. Georges Dumézil, Preface to Mircea Eliade's Traité d'histoire des religions, p. 5. 39. R. R. Marett, ' T h e Conception of Mana', The Threshold of Religion, pp. 99 ff. 40. C o d r i n g t o n , p. 118; Marett, pp. 112 ff. 41. H. Ian H o g b i n , 'Mana', Oceania 6 (1936): 241-274; A. M. Hocart, 'Mana', Man 14 (1914): 97-101; Paul Radin, 'Religion of the N o r t h American Indians', Journal of American Folklore 27 (1914): 335-373. See Mircea Eliade, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, pp. 126-131; Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, pp. 19-23. Cited hereafter as Patterns.

Early methodological approaches

19

Melanesian concept. In their effort to uncover 'uniformities', the pre-animistic theorists generalized too quickly and w e r e insensitive to the various differences signified by these pre-animistic concepts. Research by Hocart, Radin, H o g b i n , Capell, and m a n y others (and even C o d r i n g t o n ' s original distinctions) render the description of mana as 'strictly impersonal' extremely doubtful. ' H o w can mana be impersonal if it is always attached to personal beings?' (Hocart). T h e Indian doesn't m a k e the opposition between personal and impersonal; his or her concern 'is, in the first place, the question of "real existence" ' (Radin). It follows that the question m u s t be p u t in ontological terms: that w h i c h exists, w h a t is real on the one hand, and that which does not exist on the o t h e r — n o t in terms of the personal or impersonal, n o r of the corporeal or non-corporeal, concepts which, for the c o n sciousness of the 'primitives', have n o n e of the precision they have acquired in m o r e highly evolved cultures. A n y t h i n g filled w i t h mana exists o n the ontological plane and is therefore efficacious, fecund, fertile. 42 A concept sometimes associated w i t h mana is taboo (tabu). Marett submitted 'the t a b o o - m a n a f o r m u l a ' as the ' m i n i m u m definition of religion'. 4 3 It is not difficult to understand w h y taboo w o u l d be associated w i t h mana: if things that are manifestations of the sacred are manifestations of an extraordinary and supernatural power, then they are not only to be venerated b u t also to be feared. W h e r e mana exists w e inevitably find taboo. ' T h e reverse, of course, does not always hold true, for m u c h taboo stems f r o m contexts n o t associated w i t h mana. ' 4 4 In Polynesian the opposite of taboo is noa, 'free'. T a b o o (tabu) signifies that s o m e person, place, or thing is 'forbidden', because contact w i t h it is dangerous. As distinguished f r o m our everyday usage, involving negative societal m o r e s ('Miscegenation is taboo' for 42. Eliade, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p. 129. 43. R. R. Marett, ' T h e T a b o o - m a n a Formula as a M i n i m u m Definition of Religion', Archiv fur Religionswissenschajt, vol. 12 (1909). Significant w o r k s dealing with taboo include those by A. Gennep, Frazer, French, E. S. Handy, R. Lehmann, RadcliffeB r o w n , H. Webster, and F. Steiner. 44. Lessa and Vogt, p. 203.

20

Methodological

approaches in the history of religions

most Americans), the Polynesian and religious interdictory usage always involves a sacred or supernatural power. Frazer thought o f taboo as a kind of'negative sympathetic magic': 'harmful consequences are averted when certain acts are not performed.' Sociologists have usually interpreted its function in terms o f stabilizing a cohesive social structure in a particular society. For Freud, it helped to explain the origin o f religion. It would seem that taboo has played an important part in the interpretation o f religion primarily because its interdictory connotation was 'thought to provide an understanding for the separation o f the sacred from the profane — a separation which lies at the heart o f every religion'. 45 . . . the elements o f the taboo itself are always the same: certain things, or persons, or places belong in some way to a different order o f being, and therefore any contact with them will produce an upheaval at the ontological level which might well prove fatal. Y o u will find the fear o f such an upheaval— ever present because o f this difference in the order o f being between what is profane and what is hierophany or kratophany. . . , 46 This 'negative' aspect in the dialectic o f all religious manifestations, this 'ambiguity' o f the sacred, this sacred-profane dichotomy which lies at the heart o f all religion will be seen as an essential part o f Eliade's phenomenological analysis o f the religious. Another pre-animistic hypothesis assumed that there had been a stage o f magic which preceded religion. 47 Sir James Frazer had read Waldund Feldkulte (Cults of Forest and Field, 1875-77) in which W. Mannhardt formulated his hypothesis o f the 'demons o f vegetation', a concept of'corn-spirits' and a 'spirit o f the tree'. Mannhardt claimed 45. Charles H. Long, 'Primitive Religion', A Reader's Guide to the Great Religions, p. 5. 46. Eliade, Patterns, p. 17. O f course, at this stage we have no assurance that a position incorporating such terms as 'sacred-profane', 'dialectic o f hierophanies', and 'ontological' will be more adequate in analyzing religious phenomena than were such animistic or pre-animistic theories. 47. Sir James Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. Other significant works on 'magic and religion' include Malinowski's Magic, Science, and Religion and studies by H. Hubert, M. Mauss, and Evans-Pritchard.

Early methodological approaches

21

that the 'lower m y t h o l o g y ' still 'surviving' in the culture of various peasants disclosed an earlier stage than even Miiller's naturalistic mythologies. Frazer adopted, developed, and popularized these points. In the first t w o volumes of The Golden Bough, entitled The Magic Art, Frazer discusses the nature of magic and his pre-animistic theory of the origin of religion. As is well k n o w n , he discusses magic in terms of his 'Law of S y m p a t h y ' and distinguishes t w o types o f ' S y m p a t h e t i c Magic': ' H o m e o p a t h i c ' or 'Imitative Magic' and ' C o n t a g i o u s Magic'. Magic is older than and inferior to religion. (It is 'psychologically simpler', ' m o r e u n i f o r m ' , etc.) It may evolve into religion, although this doesn't always occur. In fact, m u c h data w h i c h have usually been considered part of 'primitive religion' are classified under the prior stage of magic by Frazer. A l t h o u g h Frazer probably had had m o r e general popularity than any of the other early scholars, Historians of Religions have tended to consider h i m neither an original nor a careful thinker and have been especially critical of his methodological disregard of historical details. His vital contribution to the field lies in the unbelievable a m o u n t of factual material he compiled. 4 8 Anti-evolutionary

pre-animism

Finally, w e m a y dicuss A n d r e w Lang's pre-animistic theory of a ' H i g h G o d ' (supreme being, 'All-Father'), a view which seems completely at odds w i t h the cultural context of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Custom and Myth, Modern Mythology, and especially in Myth, Ritual and Religion, Lang decisively criticized Miiller's theories and strongly u n d e r m i n e d the field of comparative m y t h o l o g y . Strangely enough, he did this f r o m the position of an evolutionary anthropologist, w h o believed that m y t h s arose n o t f r o m a 'disease of language' but f r o m the stage of animism. 'His system began with the premise that the history of m a n k i n d followed a u n i f o r m development f r o m savagery to civilization, and that relics of primitive belief and 48. See Robert H. Lowie's Primitive Religion, pp. 137-147, for a criticism ofFrazer's theories.

22

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

custom survived still a m o n g the rural peasantry, and among contemporary savages.' 49 However, in The Making of Religion, Andrew Lang completely broke away f r o m Tylor's position: a 'progressive evolutionary' view was unjustified and animism was not the first stage of religion. A m o n g such 'low savages' as the Andamanese, Fuegians, and Australians, European scholars often spoke of the divine beings of these 'primitives' as 'spirits'; but Lang claimed that the natives themselves did not appear to advance 'the metaphysical idea of spirit': 'Are these beings spiritual or material?' Rather these 'moral and creative deities' are simply envisaged as 'beings', and there is no justification in assuming that they everywhere evolved out of the theory of spirits or ghosts. 50 A m o n g some very primitive tribes, Lang found the presence of a belief in High Gods: 'the belief in a primal being, a Maker, undying, usually moral. . . . H o w e v e r the ancestors of Australians, or Andamanese, or H u r o n s arrived at their highest religious conception (of a "Father" or "Master of Life"), they decidedly possess it.' 51 But Lang's data disclosed that there coexist the mythical and the religious elements in belief. The rational f a c t o r . . . is visible in religion; the irrational is prominent in myth. The Australian, the Bushman, the Solomon Islander, in hours of danger and necessity 'yearns after the gods,' and has present in his heart the idea of a father and friend. This is the religious element. . . . Religion, in its moral aspect, always traces back to the belief in a power that is benign and works for righteousness. 52 This belief in High Gods did not evolve f r o m a belief in nature-spirits. O n the contrary, this pre-animistic belief in High Gods was the original religious f o r m which later 'deteriorated' into such forms as worship of the ghosts of tribal heroes, theriomorphic ancestors, or nature-spirits. Although Lang's anti-evolutionary approach had little 49. 50. 51. 52.

Dorson, ' T h e Eclipse of Solar M y t h o l o g y ' , pp. 22-23. A n d r e w Lang, The Making of Religion, pp. 201-209. A n d r e w Lang, Myth, Ritual and Religion, vol. 1, pp. 3, 5. Ibid., pp. 306-307.

Early methodological approaches

23

immediate influence, w e have seen that pre-animistic theories soon came to d o m i n a t e research in the History of Religions. T o understand the nature of the History of Religions at this time, w e may observe the positions taken in the heated controversy over the so-called H i g h Gods, especially over the All-Fathers or Sky Beings of the southeastern tribes of Australia. 5 3 Eliade points out that this c o n troversy over the nature of the Australian H i g h Gods 'was entangled in a series of prejudices' on b o t h sides. For the 'evolutionists' (Tylor, Baldwin Spencer, Frazer, E. S. H a r t land), it was simply inconceivable that the Australian aborigines could have such a 'lofty' religious conception of a 'Creator, an omniscient and ethical All-Father'. These 'savages' still exemplified first stages of religion; hence, they could not possibly entertain such a religious conception, one which w o u l d be f o u n d only at the apex of religious evolution. If these 'stone-age' people claimed to believe in a H i g h God, there was u n d o u b t e d l y s o m e further explanation. T y l o r tried to explain the belief as the result of the influence of Christian missionaries. Baldwin Spencer w r o t e to Frazer that he was convinced that 'a high ethical religion a m o n g s t the lowest savages' does n o t exist, and 'it is the easiest thing possible to be misled by w h a t a native tells you in regard to such a point as this'. 5 4 Yet the supporters of the 'anti-evolutionary' interpretation shared m a n y of these ideological prejudices, mainly s t e m m i n g f r o m an equally 'rationalistic' approach. T h e evolutionists refused to attribute anything 'rational' to primitive religion; Lang f o u n d it impossible to accept anything 'irrational' about this original form. Therefore, he also had to 'explain a w a y ' m u c h of his data. H e accepted the general interpretation of m y t h as 'irrational and debas53. M i r c e a Eliade, ' A u s t r a l i a n Religions, Part I: A n I n t r o d u c t i o n ' , History of Religions 6, no. 2 (1966): 108-134. Eliade carefully p r e s e n t s t h e research o f A. W. H o w i t t in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y and ' t h e s t o r y o f a c o n t r o v e r s y ' , i n v o l v i n g L a n g ' s debates w i t h H a r t l a n d and others. T h e t w o p o s i t i o n s w e are a b o u t to p r e s e n t are s u m m a r i z e d o n pages 116-117. T h i s article is r e p r o d u c e d as c h a p t e r 1 in Eliade's Australian Religions: An Introduction. 54. E. B. T y l o r , ' L i m i t s o f Savage R e l i g i o n ' , Journal of the Anthropological Institute 21 (1891): 2 8 3 - 3 0 1 ; J. G. Frazer, Totemism and Exogamy, vol. 1, p. 148. S e e E . S. H a r t l a n d , ' T h e " H i g h G o d s " o f Australia', Folk-lore 9, no. 4 (1898): 328.

24

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approaches in the history of religions

ing', whereas for him religious belief was 'rational and even elevated'. Rather than go to the usual extreme o f completely identifying primitive religion with this irrational and aberrant state, Lang embraced the extreme opposite position: he denied that the mythical was essential to primitive religion. 55 Indeed, he even tried to account for the deterioration o f the High Gods in terms o f the later influences o f the mythological imagination. In analyzing certain 'ideological presuppositions' with which investigators approached the 'primitive world', Eliade compares the above 'two antagonistic orientations' in broader terms and refers to them as 'evolutionist' and 'romantic-decadentist'. He submits that the following question more or less tacitly guided the inquiries o f both: 'do the contemporary "Primitives" represent, religiously speaking, a stage very near the "absolute beginning" or, on the contrary, do the Primitives (or most o f them) display a more or less catastrophic "degeneration", a fall from a primordial perfect situation?' As was the case with the animists and evolutionary pre-animists, Eliade seems much more impressed by the methodological similarities in these 'antagonistic orientations' than in their obvious differences. Notwithstanding their radical differences, these ideologies have two things in common: 1) their obsession with the origin and the beginnings o f religions; 2) their taking for granted that the beginning was something 'simple and pure'. O f course, the evolutionists and the romantic-decadentists understood quite differently this primordial simplicity. . . . Both o f these ideologies postulated the unfolding o f archaic religions as a linear movement from the simple to the complex, though in opposite directions; up (the evolutionists) or down (the romantic-decadentists). Both such interpretations implied a naturalistic or a theological approach, not a historical one. 5 6 55. Lang, Myth, Ritual and Religion, p. 4: ' N o w , the whole crux and puzzle of mythology is, " W h y , having attained (in whatever way) to a belief in an underlying guardian, 'Master o f Life', did mankind set to work to evolve a chronique scandaleuse about Him? And why is that chronique the elaborately absurd set o f legends which we find in all mythologies?" ' 56. 'On Understanding Primitive Religions', Glaube, Geist, Geschichte, p. 500. This article is reproduced as the Preface in Eliade's Australian Religions: An Introduction.

Early methodological

approaches

25

Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y will b e seen as a reaction against each o f t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l tendencies described a b o v e .

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

W h a t can o n e say a b o u t t h e essential characteristics o f the H i s t o r y o f Religions d u r i n g this first p e r i o d ? 1. A s w e h a v e seen, t h e r e are t w o m a j o r 'schools': philologists a n d e t h n o l o g i s t s . O n e m u s t g u a r d against an explication o f a r a t h e r unilinear series o f d e v e l o p m e n t s in w h i c h each p o s i t i o n arises o u t o f and c o m p l e t e l y r e f u t e s t h e p r e v i o u s l y prevailing v i e w p o i n t . T h e c o m p l e x interrelationships, t h e subtle influences, and the lasting c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f earlier p o s i t i o n s will b e c o m e e v i d e n t as w e elucidate m o r e recent tendencies in t h e field. 2. T h e s e H i s t o r i a n s o f R e l i g i o n s felt that t h e y h a d established an ' a u t o n o m o u s ' discipline, a 'scientific' s t u d y of religion. T h i s ' n e w science', w i t h its e x t r a o r d i n a r y e n t h u s i a s m and its u n l i m i t e d c o n f i d e n c e in the p r o d i g i o u s discoveries a b o u t to be m a d e , w a s largely s h a p e d b y the values o f t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t and the scientific p r o g r e s s of the nineteenth century. B y a c c u m u l a t i n g 'religious facts' and l o o k i n g f o r c o m m o n e l e m e n t s or 'parallels', b y l o c a t i n g and t r a n s l a t i n g t h e 'original sources', a n d b y a s s u m i n g a critically 'rationalistic' a t t i t u d e m a r k e d b y p e r s o n a l d e t a c h m e n t , these scholars felt that t h e y c o u l d attain a 'scientific o b j e c t i v i t y ' in u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e n a t u r e o f religion. 5 7 T h u s w e h a v e seen h o w Miiller in his analysis o f m y t h as a 'disease o f l a n g u a g e ' , T y l o r ' s t r e a t m e n t o f a n i m i s m as a ' m i s t a k e n logical i n f e r e n c e ' , and t h e theories o f t h e p r e - a n i m i s t s rested u p o n a v e r y n a r r o w l y - c o n c e i v e d , rationalistic a p p r o a c h . R e l i g i o u s d o c u m e n t s w e r e a p p r o a c h e d w i t h a d e t a c h m e n t n o t u n l i k e that o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y naturalist classifying s o m e biological species. 57. Wilfred C a n t w e l l Smith, ' C o m p a r a t i v e Religion: Whither — and Why?', The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, p. 31, sees the thirteen-volume Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. b y J a m e s H a s t i n g s (Edinburgh: 1 9 0 8 - 2 1 ) , as ' t y p i f y i n g a c u l m i n a t i o n o f the first great stage o f scholarship in this field: the accumulation, organization, and analysis o f facts'.

26

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

3. This 'positivistic' approach to the facts was combined w i t h a view of historical and cultural evolutionism. For a few, this evolutionary approach still t o o k the apologetical f o r m of defending one's o w n religion as the culmination of religious evolution. H o w e v e r , most Historians of Relgions took f r o m the E n l i g h t e n m e n t a confidence in reason and scientific progress and f r o m nineteenth century organic evolutionism the possibility of approaching h u m a n history in a similar fashion. Religion was usually identified with the earliest stages of cultures. Even if scholars interpreted Christianity as exemplifying the culmination of the laws of evolution in religion, their historical evolutionism usually included stages b e y o n d all f o r m s of religion. 4. We have seen that this evolutionary approach naturally was concerned w i t h the question of origins and 'primordial forms'. Since religion was usually identified w i t h the first stages of culture, ethnologists had reason to believe that by studying primitive peoples they w o u l d understand the origin and nature of religion. Lang's theory of a beliefin H i g h G o d s and M a r e t t ' s theory of the universal experience of mana did not deviate f r o m the nineteenth century obsession w i t h 'the primordial': they claimed to have f o u n d an earlier stage than T y l o r ' s animism; indeed, they had discovered the very origin of religion. 5. Similar here to the approach of the D a r w i n i a n naturalist seems to have been an assumption as to the u n i f o r m reaction of the h u m a n m i n d to the p h e n o m e n a of Nature. W i t h o u t such a belief, it is difficult to understand h o w a T y l o r or a Frazer, after accumulating so m u c h empirical data, could then speak of primitive m y t h or ritual or belief w i t h so little regard for the particular time or place of a specific datum. In understanding a religious manifestation in Australia, for example, one could then speak o f the 'same' f o r m manifested t h r o u g h o u t the world, because there was a u n i f o r m i t y in the h u m a n reaction before natural phenomena. 6. Despite their concern w i t h objective, impersonal descriptions of the religious data, these Historians of Religions have usually been criticized f o r their highly n o r m a t i v e and speculative j u d g m e n t s . ' T h e early historians of religions [Historians of Religions] n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g their conscious " e m a n c i p a t i o n " f r o m philosophy, had definite

Early methodological approaches

27

philosophical assumptions, be they rationalistic or romantic, and they dealt w i t h religio-scientific data "philosophically." ' 58 T h e image that our nineteenth century created o f ' i n f e r i o r societies' was largely derived f r o m the positivistic, antireligous, and ametaphysical attitude entertained by a n u m b e r of w o r t h y explorers and ethnologists w h o had approached the 'savages' w i t h the ideology of a c o n t e m p o r a r y of C o m t e , D a r w i n , or Spencer. A m o n g the 'primitives' they e v e r y w h e r e discovered 'fetishism' and 'religious infantalism'— simply because they could see nothing else. 59 In short, it seems that these scholars approached their studies w i t h m a n y 'prior' beliefs about the evolution of cultures. These often served as the interpretive schema by w h i c h religious manifestations w e r e described and evaluated. T h e r e was little patience w i t h trying to understand w h a t a religion meant for its believer. Built into the very act of description w e r e the evaluative principles provided by the t r i u m p h of the m o d e r n scientific spirit. These n o r m a t i v e principles rendered possible the great syntheses and generalizations: animism, H i g h Gods, mana, magic, astral mythologies, pan-Babylonianism, etc. O n l y because one already possessed universal n o r m s for culture, history, and language could he or she then find, in countless n u m b e r s of myths, everywhere a 'disease of language'; or, in v o l u m i n o u s collections of 'primitive' data, everyw h e r e a 'belief in Spiritual beings' based on a 'mistaken logical inference'.

TRANSITION

If w e rather arbitrarily stop here and classify the above as the 'first period' of the History of Religions, our justification f o r this imperfect division is the following: n e w disciplines and n e w discoveries during the first few decades of the twentieth century seem to have gradually created a n e w hermeneutical situation in the History of Religions. In 58. K i t a g a w a , ' T h e H i s t o r y o f R e l i g i o n s in A m e r i c a ' , p. 18. 59. M i r c e a Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, p p . x i i - x i v . C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as Yoga.

28

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

light of the discoveries in such areas as archaeology, ethnology, Oriental studies, and depth psycholgy, and especially with the increased historical consciousness and the rise of phenomenology, the various assumptions and conclusions of a Tylor or a Miiller were rendered somewhat obsolete. We may conclude this chapter with what seems to be a rather remarkable observation on the relationship between Mircea Eliade's phenomenological method and the early methodological aproaches to religious phenomena. On the one hand, Eliade sees his approach as a definite rejection of the above mentioned methodological characteristics. On the other hand, we shall see that most critics of Eliade's approach claim that his method incorporates the very same characteristics of early approaches, that Eliade is simply a new Tylor or a new Frazer. 60 Thus, he will be attacked for not paying attention to the specific historical conditionings of his data; for making hasty uncritical generalizations; for 'reading into' his data all kinds of universal meanings, based upon his own 'prior' assumptions and normative principles. It seems to us that Eliade's phenomenological method is usually directed against these characteristics of early approaches: a narrowlyrationalistic, impersonal, detached, positivistic approach distorts the basic intentionality of the religious phenomena; religious data, as far as we know, have always been very complex and do not reveal a unilinear evolutionary process. At the same time, we shall submit that Mircea Eliade does assume a certain 'uniformity' regarding the human mode of being in the world; and he does go 'beyond' the descriptions of most twentieth century 'specialists' and attempts to compare and to evaluate his data. If Mircea Eliade is not to be criticized on the same grounds as the early methodological approaches, then we must show that his 60. It is true that Eliade wishes to dissociate himself f r o m the 'confusionist' position of a Tylor or a Frazer, w h o felt free to compare data which had ' n o geographical or historical contiguity', because they assumed the existence of the same ' u n i f o r m reaction of the h u m a n mind before the p h e n o m e n a of Nature'. According to Eliade, the later historico-cultural and other historicist approaches represent an 'undeniable progress'. Images and Symbols, pp. 175-176. Nevertheless, in chapters 6 and 7, w e shall analyze Eliade's attempt to describe 'the h u m a n condition, as such', and 'primordial' existential situations.

Early

methodological

approaches

29

phenomenological approach reveals a very different hermeneutical situation. More specifically, we must determine whether Eliade provides us with some 'objective', underlying hermeneutical framework, some phenomenological foundation, in terms of which he can go beyond the limitations of the specialist, compare and descriptively evaluate his data, and gain insight into the universal structures of religious experience.

2

Twentieth Century Methodological Approaches

INTRODUCTION

During the twentieth century, many scholars have identified themselves with the History o f Religions and have sought to define the specific nature o f their discipline. Among the studies o f religions, it has thus often become possible to distinguish the approach o f an anthropologist, sociologist, or psychologist from that o f a Historian o f Religions. This 'second period' is characterized by a new hermeneutical situation, which arose from the founding o f previously unknown disciplines and the increased specialization within older fields. The study o f religions was radically changed by the accumulation o f new data and the development o f new techniques and methodological principles. T o give but one example, we can discern the emphasis now placed upon history. Almost without noticing it, the historian o f religions [Historian o f Religions] found himself in a cultural milieu quite different from that o f Max Miiller and Tylor, or even that o f Frazer and Marett. It was a new environment nourished by Nietzsche and Marx, Dilthey, Croce, and Ortega; an environment in which the fashionable cliché was not Nature but History-1 Without here discussing the emergence o f various fields (such as prehistory and archaeology) or the development o f historical methods (such as cultural stratification), we may simply note the 'discovery' o f the irreducibility o f history: the human being is always a historical being, and one must respect the historical nature o f all religious data. N o w it is true that scholars o f ' t h e first period' expounded a theory o f progress, an evolutionary history. But, as we observed, these 1. Eliade, ' T h e Q u e s t for the " O r i g i n s " o f Religion', p. 166.

Twentieth

century methodological approaches

31

evolutionary histories actually reflected a general disregard for the historical dimension of the religious data. Because of numerous assumptions and theories accepted by the investigators, they were able to superimpose their evolutionary schemes upon history, were able to 'reconstruct' history largely independent of the actual historical process, and were able to analyze their religious data without sufficiently considering their specific and irreducible, historical conditionings. What gradually developed were difficult conceptions as to the nature and significance of history, and these in turn demanded new methodological approaches. Religious data were historical data, to understand religion one had to do justice to the concrete and unique conditionings of any historical manifestation. We shall see that this constitutes the basis for one of the major criticisms of Eliade's approach. By dividing the study of religions into various 'schools' or approaches, we shall elucidate the multifarious factors which have contributed to the present nature of the History of Religions. Of course, one realizes that there are no clear-cut divisions. For example, what is one to subsume under 'anthropological approaches'? 2 Much of the recent anthropological research on religions has been undertaken by 'social anthropologists'. What is the meaning and scope of this increasingly used classification of 'social anthropology'? Radcliffe-Brown and his followers in British anthropology clearly distinguish their comparative sociological approach of social anthropology both from ethnology, which is concerned with the historical study of cultural processes, and from sociology. 3 However, G. P. Murdock and most American anthropologists seem to object to this classification. They prefer the category 'cultural anthropology' and relegate social anthropology to the status of one of 2. In s o m e countries, a n t h r o p o l o g y is s i m p l y l i m i t e d to physical a n t h r o p o l o g y . In the U n i t e d States a n d m a n y o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , a n t h r o p o l o g y also includes a r c h a e o l o g y , e t h n o l o g y , linguistics, folklore, a n d n u m e r o u s o t h e r fields. See Sol T a x et al., An Appraisal of Anthropology Today, pp. 2 2 1 - 2 2 2 . 3. A. R. R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n , ' H i s t o r i c a l N o t e o n British Social A n t h r o p o l o g y ' , American Anthropologist 54, no. 2, pt. 1 (1952): 2 7 5 - 2 7 7 ; a n d A. R. R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n , Method in Social Anthropology, pp. 133 ff. a n d passim. M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y a t t e m p t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h earlier sociologists, s u c h as D u r k h e i m , f r o m social a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s : ' F r o m M a u s s t o C l a u d e Lévi-Strauss', Signs, p. 114 a n d passim.

32

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

m a n y branches of cultural anthropology. Lévi-Strauss submits that there is no great difference between the approaches of cultural anthropology and social a n t h r o p o l o g y : 'the difference is only one of standpoint, not of the subject matter investigated.' 4 Such difficulties in clearly delineating and differentiating positions will be apparent t h r o u g h o u t this chapter. Nevertheless, it should become evident that the study of religion during 'the second period' became highly specialized. We should gain s o m e insight into the nature of the specialized approaches and their significance for the History of Religions. T h e following presentation will seem greatly fragmented, w i t h isolated treatments of n u m e r o u s positions and w i t h o u t a p r o n o u n c e d sense of development. T o a considerable extent, this f r a g m e n t e d presentation mirrors the actual nature of the highly specialized approaches to religion in the twentieth century. It seems unwise to impose s o m e artificial unity. Nevertheless, if w e remain cognizant of our p u r p o s e in this historical sketch, s o m e sense of direction will emerge, especially as our presentation is related to later chapters. O u r general purpose is to lay the foundation for an adequate u n d e r standing of c o n t e m p o r a r y History of Religions — a foundation largely constructed f r o m the f r a g m e n t e d treatments of earlier periods. By examining previous approaches, w e shall have s o m e grasp of the issues and problems c o n f r o n t i n g the Historian of Religions today. In C h a p t e r 3, w e shall attempt to formulate 'the hermeneutical situation today'. In addition, w e shall distinguish the phenomenological perspective f r o m other approaches and shall define the present nature of the History of Religions in terms of a certain 'tension' between historical and phenomenological approaches. It remains to be seen w h e t h e r Mircea Eliade can harmoniously relate and do justice to b o t h the historical and the phenomenological. M o r e specifically, w e wish to see h o w Mircea Eliade confronts the central issues and problems that follow, w h a t he rejects f r o m past approaches, and h o w he incorporates m a n y of the previous contributions in his p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion. W h a t m a y initially seem to be 4. 'Cultural/Social A n t h r o p o l o g y ' , An Appraisal of Anthropology Today, p. 224; Claude Lévi-Strauss, ' T h e Place of A n t h r o p o l o g y in the Social Sciences and Problems Raised in Teaching It', Structural Anthropology, pp. 353-357.

Twentieth

century methodological approaches

33

a m e r e h o d g e p o d g e (a little D u r k h e i m , s o m e Freud, then to Schmidt) of unrelated approaches will begin to assume s o m e order. W e shall observe Eliade's endeavor to develop a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k w h i c h can d o justice to the sociological, the psychological, the historical, etc. — that is, to all d i m e n s i o n s of religious data.

SOCIOLOGICAL

APPROACHES

It seems possible to distinguish t w o m a j o r trends in the sociological approaches to the s t u d y of religions. First, there is Emile D u r k h e i m and the 'French school of sociology', w h i c h often has associated w i t h it such scholars as H e n r i H u b e r t , R o b e r t Hertz, Marcel Granet, Louis Gernet, Marcel Mauss, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, R o g e r Caillois, and Georges Dumézil. 5 T h e second m a j o r sociological a p p r o a c h to religion can be seen in the w o r k s of M a x Weber. T h i s tradition includes studies by such scholars as Ernst Troeltsch, H . R. N i e b u h r , H o w a r d Becker, Talcott Parsons, J. M i l t o n Yinger, and J o a c h i m Wach. Because of o u r limited t i m e f o r analysis, w e shall only concentrate on the sociological approach of Emile D u r k h e i m . M o r e of the 'second tradition' will be discussed in the f o l l o w i n g chapters, especially t h r o u g h the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of J o a c h i m Wach. Émile Durkheim

and the 'first tradition'

In 1912, D u r k h e i m published Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, in w h i c h he a t t e m p t e d to account for the origin and n a t u r e of religion. T h e first characteristic of religion is its division of things into sacred or profane. In o p p o s i t i o n to m a n y previous scholars, D u r k h e i m c o n tended that ' n a t u r i s m ' does n o t explain this division; nature as such cannot inspire the religious attitude. Religion does n o t rest u p o n an 'illusion', as the positivists had t h o u g h t , b u t rather u p o n a 'basic fact of experience'. D u r k h e i m defines religion as 'a unified system of beliefs 5. Depending upon one's classification, many of these scholars are often said to have been influenced by the 'French sociological school', although they are distinguished from it.

34

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices w h i c h unite into one single m o r a l c o m m u n i t y called a C h u r c h , all those w h o adhere to t h e m ' . 6 B y analyzing Australian religions, D u r k h e i m arrived at the m o s t p r i m i t i v e religious f o r m : t o t e m i s m . 7 In the t o t e m , o n e can decipher the religious attitude, since the ' t o t e m i c principle' is a s y m b o l of the clan. U n a b l e to exist alone, h u m a n s b e c o m e totally d e p e n d e n t u p o n society w h i c h they then consider sacred; because of the c o m p l e x i t y of society, h u m a n s represent their clan in t e r m s of a s y m b o l , and thus direct their religious attitude t o w a r d the t o t e m . T h e 'reality' '. . . w h i c h is the universal and eternal objective cause of these sensations sui generis out of w h i c h religious experience is made, is society'. 'If religion has given birth to all that is essential in society, it is because the idea of society is the soul of religion.' 8 T h e r e f o r e , that w h i c h h u m a n beings have m e a n t b y G o d and that w h i c h has served as the object of their religious e m o t i o n s and practices is society. Society has deified itself; religion is the m e a n s of symbolically expressing the total collective life. W e m u s t distinguish b e t w e e n D u r k h e i m ' s t h e o r y of the origin of religion, w h i c h has been generally dismissed, and his v i e w of the function or role of religion, w h i c h m a n y sociologists accept. Sociologists and ethnologists have rejected D u r k h e i m ' s t h e o r y of t o t e m i s m as the primordial f o r m of religion. 9 D u r k h e i m limited h i m self to the A r u n t a and C e n t r a l Australia, whereas the Southeastern Australians, f o r m i n g the oldest stratum, d o n o t have t o t e m i s m . B y emphasizing only the sociological d i m e n s i o n of religious experiences, D u r k h e i m failed to realize that the manifestation of the sacred as social 'does n o t exhaust the manifestations of sacrality'. Charles H. L o n g has e n u m e r a t e d several w a y s in w h i c h the ' o n t o l o g i 6. E m i l e D u r k h e i m , The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, p. 47. 7. 'In r e g a r d to t h e w o r d t o t e m , w e m a y say t h a t it is t h e o n e e m p l o y e d b y t h e O j i b w a y , an A l g o n q u i n tribe, t o d e s i g n a t e t h e sort of t h i n g w h o s e n a m e t h e clan b e a r s . ' Ibid., p. 103 8. Ibid., pp. 4 1 8 ^ 1 9 a n d passim. See Lessa a n d V o g t , pp. 2, 6 6 - 6 7 . 9. See A l e x a n d e r G o l d e n w e i s e r , ' R e l i g i o n a n d Society: A C r i t i q u e of E m i l e D u r k h e i m ' s T h e o r y o f t h e O r i g i n a n d N a t u r e o f R e l i g i o n ' , Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods 14 (1917): 113-124; R o b e r t H . L o w i e , The History of Ethnological Theory, p p . 2 0 5 - 2 1 2 .

Twentieth century methodological approaches

35

cal dimension as the modality of the sacred m a y s h o w i t s e l f , and these include various nonsocial and nonritual expressions. 1 0 O n m a n y methodological issues, it seems to us that c o n t e m p o r a r y Historians of Religions m i g h t view D u r k h e i m as a transitional figure. Like the nineteenth century evolutionists, D u r k h e i m is obsessed w i t h the quest for the origin of religion, and, like those earlier scholars, explains the nature of religion by means of an oversimplified reductionism of his religious data. 11 B u t even in D u r k h e i m ' s reductionistic approach, w e can discern potential 'openings' for m o r e fruitful interpretations. T h e r e is not a negative prepossession t o w a r d the religious data; this renders possible m o r e objective analyses. T h e positivists had reduced religion to a state of ignorance and superstition, an anachronism in a modern, scientific world. D u r k h e i m challenged m a n y of the 'negative' assumptions and theories of 'the first period'. His data revealed that 'the roots of religious belief and practice lie in the very fabric of society itself and in the nature of h u m a n interrelations'. Religious institutions are 'an integral and necessary element in any stable social system'. 1 2 D u r k h e i m w e n t too far in identifying the religious with the sociological, b u t it is also true that he opened u p the sociological dimension of the religious. N o c o n t e m p o r a r y Historian of Religions can overlook the sociological nature of his or her data. Finally, by emphasizing the importance of religious symbolism, D u r k h e i m opened up n e w possibilities of interpretation. Earlier scholars had been too ' n a r r o w ' in their interpretative approaches; m a n y hidden layers of religious meaning remained to be deciphered. Mircea Eliade will submit that it is of the essence of religious s y m 10. C h a r l e s H . L o n g , ' P r o l e g o m e n o n t o a R e l i g i o u s H e r m e n e u t i c ' , History of Religions 6, n o . 3 (1967): 260-262. See L o n g , Alpha, p. 14. In Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, p. 95 a n d passim, Mircea Eliade has s h o w n that t h e d i f f e r e n t t e c h n i q u e s o f (Patañjali's) Y o g a all h a v e o n e c o m m o n characteristic: ' T h e y are antisocial, or, indeed, a n t i h u m a n . T h e w o r l d l y m a n lives in society, marries, establishes a f a m i l y ; Y o g a prescribes a b s o l u t e solitude. . . .' 11. ' T h i n g s are a b o v e all sacred o r p r o f a n e , p u r e o r i m p u r e , f r i e n d s or e n e m i e s , f a v o u r a b l e o r u n f a v o u r a b l e , i.e. their m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l characteristics are o n l y e x p r e s s i o n s o f t h e w a y in w h i c h t h e y affect social sensibility.' E m i l e D u r k h e i m a n d M a r c e l M a u s s , Primitive Classification, pp. 8 5 - 8 6 . 12. Lenski, pp. 3—4.

36

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

bolism, as an a u t o n o m o u s m o d e of cognition, that it brings into a structural w h o l e the diverse levels of religious meaning. Let us say a f e w w o r d s about Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, especially since w e still find philosophers and other scholars w h o seem to adopt m a n y of the distinctions and categories first p r o p o u n d e d by Lévy-Bruhl. Like D u r k h e i m , Lucien L é v y - B r u h l is concerned w i t h ' g r o u p ideas' (représentations collectives) and submits that these can be described in terms of a participation mystique to w h i c h all 'primitive mentality' conforms. 1 3 Primitive mentality, w h i c h pays n o attention to the law of contradiction, is completely different f r o m m o d e r n logical thought. B y 'a law of mystical participation', Lévy-Bruhl seems to mean that the primitive feels that a ' m u t u a l participation' holds between him or her and s o m e object, locality, etc. In other words, if the primitive declares that he or she is a parrot, this person means precisely that: there is an inexplicable mystical identity of h i m or herself and the parrot. These hypotheses w e r e rejected by ethnologists and sociologists. U n d e r his 'primitive mentality', Lévy-Bruhl even included the sophisticated t h o u g h t of China and India; he neglected individual variability; there is no absolute d i c h o t o m y between m o d e r n and primitive thought, w h i c h is often quite logical. 14 Nevertheless, Levy-Bruhl had a great influence on scholars in other fields and directed attention to the behavior o f ' p r e m o d e r n s ' and the importance of analyzing m y t h s and symbols. The 'second tradition' W e shall emphasize only one crucial methodological feature of this 'second' m a j o r sociological approach to religious p h e n o m e n a : a certain antireductionist tendency. In C h a p t e r 3, w e shall see that a general antireductionist approach is one of the distinguishing characteristics of c o n t e m p o r a r y History of Religions. In C h a p t e r 4, w e shall discuss 13. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality. Before his death, Lévy-Bruhl, seems to have abandoned his hypothesis of this prelogical primitive mentality. Cf. LévyBruhl's Les Carnets, published p o s t h u m o u s l y by Maurice Leenhardt (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949). 14. Lowie, The History of Ethnological Theory, p. 220. See Paul Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher and Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion.

Twentieth century methodological approaches

37

Mircea Eliade's assumption o f ' t h e irreducibility of the sacred'. Thus, f r o m the m o d e r n perspective of the H i s t o r y of Religions, one m i g h t say that this 'second tradition' is the sociology of religion sensu stricto. Wach submits that M a x Weber was the first to conceive of a systematic sociology of religion. W h a t Wach intends to stress here is that Weber, unlike a M a r x or a C o m t e or a D u r k h e i m , is n o t guilty of a reductionism of the religious: Weber rejects the interpretation that 'the characteristic feature of a religious attitude can be simply the function of the social condition of the social stratum appearing as its representation; that this attitude w o u l d be only its "ideological" expression or a reflex of it material or ideal interests'.' 5 U n d o u b t e d l y the m o s t f a m o u s illustration of Weber's antireductionism appears in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Far f r o m maintaining that religion was simply a reflection of, or was determined by, the prevailing economic conditions, Weber contended that the very source of the spirit of m o d e r n Western capitalism was to be f o u n d in the values of the Protestant Reformation. T h r o u g h o u t his writings, Weber assumes that the specific religious features are at least partially independent of the relevant social and economic conditions, and he tries to s h o w h o w religion influences economic, educational, scientific, artistic, governmental, and other societal institutions. 1 6 A l t h o u g h w e shall refer to Joachim Wach w h e n w e consider the nature and m e t h o d o l o g y of the History of Religions today, a f e w w o r d s on his sociology of religion w o u l d be appropriate here. As w e noted at the beginning of C h a p t e r 1, Wach divided the 'general science of religion' into f o u r branches: history, p h e n o m e n o l o g y , psychology, 15. M a x Weber, Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. 1, p. 240. See W. E. H. Stanner, On Aboriginal Religion, pp. vi, 27: Australian religion must be studied 'as religion and not as a mirror of something else'; it is a fallacious presupposition 'that the social order is primary and in some sense causal, and the religious order secondary and in s o m e sense consequential'. Cf. Mircea Eliade, 'Australian Religions, Part V: Death, Eschatology, and Some Conclusions', History of Religions 7, no. 3 (1968): 265-266. This article is reproduced as chapter 5 in Eliade's Australian Religions: An Introduction. 16. M a x Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism; Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pt. 3, especially pp. 267-270; Lenski, pp. 3—8. We shall not discuss Weber's 'interpretive' approach in attempting to understand an 'ethos' in its distinctive character, his m e t h o d of Verstehen, and other important features of his methodology. O n e may detect his influences in m u c h of our later analysis.

38

Methodological approaches in the history of religions

and sociology of religion. C o m p a r a t i v e studies reveal that there are three m a j o r f o r m s of religious expression: theoretical f o r m s (myth, doctrine, dogma), practical f o r m s (in cultus and f o r m s of worship), sociological f o r m s (religious g r o u p i n g and fellowship). 1 7 T h e question arises as to w h e t h e r the sociology of religion is to be regarded as a branch of the History of Religions or of sociology. Wach admonishes the sociologist not to be 'deceived' by the 'apparent identity of religious and social behavior' and thus c o m m i t the 'fallacy of regarding religion as a function of natural social grouping'. In religion, ' c o m m u n i o n w i t h the n u m e n is primary and is basic in achieving religious integration'. T h e gap between the study of religion and the social sciences can be bridged f r o m the perspective of Religionswissenschaft: ' W e like to believe that, t h o u g h there is a Catholic and Marxian philosophy of society, there can be only one sociology of religion which w e m a y approach f r o m different angles and realize to a different degree but w h i c h w o u l d use but one set of criteria.' 1 8 Nevertheless, Joseph Kitagawa seems justified in distinguishing t w o kinds of sociology of religion, one as a subdivision of sociology and the other as a branch of the History of Religions. Despite Wach's admonition, the sociologist in studying religion starts w i t h the basic assumption that 'the conduct of the p e r s o n — his w a y of thinking and ways of acting — and the nature of the social order — its structure, function and values — are to be u n d e r s t o o d as a product of g r o u p life'. 1 9 T h u s it w o u l d seem that the same 'religious expressions' taking 'sociological f o r m s ' could be viewed either by a sociology of religion f r o m the perspective of sociology or by a sociology of religion f r o m the perspective of the History of Religions. H e r e w e have the basis for one of Eliade's primary antireductionist principles: the methodological 'scale' w e e m p l o y 'makes the difference'; the various approaches, using different 'scales', will interpret the 17. Joachim Wach, Sociology of Religion, pp. 1-2; Wach, Types of Religious Experience, p. 34. 18. Wach, Sociology of Religion, pp. 107-108; Wach, 'Sociology of Religion', Twentieth Century Sociology, p. 418. 19. Kitagawa, ' T h e N a t u r e and P r o g r a m of the History of Religions Field', Divinity School News (November, 1957), p. 19; Philip M. Houser, 'Sociology', Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957).

Twentieth century methodological approaches

39

same religious data in different ways. We shall be able to relate this principle to the phenomenological claim as to the 'perspectival' nature o f all knowledge, and we shall question whether Mircea Eliade violates his own antireductionist principle.

PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES

We shall concentrate on the influence o f Freud and Jung, but should at least acknowledge the contributions to the understanding o f religion made by other scholars utilizing psychological approaches. We should mention the contributions o f Wilhelm Wundt and 'Völkerpsychologie', o f people in the Freudian tradition (Geza Röheim, Bruno Bettelheim) and o f scholars strongly influenced by Jung (Heinrich Zimmer, Joseph Campbell, Karl Kerenyi, Henry Corbin). In citing William James, Starbuck, Leuba, and Pratt, Erwin R. Goodenough submits that the psychology o f religion was America's special contribution to the field of Religionswissenschaft.20 Sigmund Freud In 1913, Sigmund Freud published Totem and Taboo, in which he theorized 'that the beginnings o f religion, ethics, society, and art meet in the Oedipus complex': religion originated with the 'first parricide', a 'primordial murder' which is ritually repeated in the 'totemic sacrifices'. 21 Accepting two hypotheses— Atkinson's 'primordial horde' and Robertson Smith's 'totemic sacrifice-communion' — Freud believed that he had explained the origin and nature o f religion in terms o f the Oedipus complex. 20. Erwin R. Goodenough, 'Religionswissenschaft', Numert 6, fasc. 2 (1959): p. 80. U n d e r a section entitled ' T w o American Psychologists', Jan de Vries discusses the psychology o f religion o f William James and J. H. Leuba in The Study of Religion, pp. 1 4 9 - 1 5 3 . See Ira Progoff, The Death and Rebirth of Psychology, for its analysis o f Freud, Adler, Jung, and Rank; Goodwin Watson, 'A Psychologist's View o f Religious Symbols', Religious Symbolism, with its emphasis upon F r o m m ; and the works o f Ernst Neumann. 21. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 258. Cf. Alfred L. Kroeber, ' T o t e m and T a b o o : An Ethnologic Psychoanalysis', American Anthropologist 22 (1920): 4 8 - 5 5 .

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In the 'primal horde' the father kept all the w o m e n for himself, and, w h e n his sons became old e n o u g h to evoke his jealousy, he drove t h e m off. Finally, the expelled sons banded together, slew their father, ate him, and appropriated his females. At this point the ambivalence of feelings t o w a r d the father emerged: having assuaged their 'hate impulse', the brothers n o w felt remorse and guilt. Consequently they created the t w o oldest and m o s t significant taboos: 'not to kill the t o t e m animal [the t o t e m being " t h e father substitute"] and to avoid sexual intercourse w i t h t o t e m c o m p a n i o n s of the other sex'. T h e totemic banquet b o t h reenacts the original parricide and establishes 'a kind of reconciliation' w i t h the 'father-totem'. C u l t u r e began w i t h this primordial sacrificial ritual, and 'all later religions have been reactions aiming at the same great event'. 2 2 As Wilhelm Schmidt has noted, for Freud, G o d is n o t h i n g other than the sublimated physical father; in the totemic sacrifice it is G o d himself w h o is killed and sacrificed. 'This slaying of the father-god is m a n k i n d ' s original sin. T h e blood-guilt is atoned for by the b l o o d y death of Christ. ' 2 3 W e shall n o t carefully elucidate the widely k n o w n Freudian theory, expressed in The Future of an Illusion and elsewhere, as to the psychological basis of w h y h u m a n beings developed the 'illusion' of religion. Let us simply recall that h u m a n beings were unable to cope w i t h the m o r e threatening forces of nature. T h e y then regressed to a childhood, wish-fulfillment experience, in which they had felt p r o tected by their fathers w h o m they depended upon, admired, and feared. T h u s religion provides the individual w i t h an imaginary fulfillment of his or her repressed infantile desires and needs. C o m p a r i n g religion w i t h the obsessional neurosis he f o u n d in children, Freud contends that 'Religion w o u l d thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity.' 2 4 Freud's interpretation of religion, as based u p o n an 'objective historical event' — the primordial 'totemic banquet' — has been decisively refuted by such ethnologists as Rivers, Boas, Kroeber, Malinowski, and Schmidt. 2 5 T o citejust a f e w objections: t o t e m i s m is 22. 23. 24. 25.

Freud, pp. 53, 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 . W i l h e l m Schmidt, The Origin and Growth of Religion, p. 112. S i g m u n d Freud, The Future of an Illusion, chap. 8 and passim. Schmidt, pp. 112-115; Kroeber, pp. 4 8 - 5 5 .

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not found at the beginnings o f religion; it is not universal, nor have all peoples passed through a 'totemic stage'; Frazer had shown that out o f hundreds o f totemic tribes, only four knew o f the 'totemic sacrificecommunions'. Neo-Freudians have tended to interpret Freud's hypotheses as 'psychological' and not necessarily 'historical' descriptions. Thus, in terms o f the Oedipus complex, one might envisage sacrificial rites as symbolic expressions o f our unconscious desire for parricide. We may detect naturistic and positivistic influences from 'the first period' in Freud's analysis o f religion in terms o f wish-fulfillment and illusion: religion originating in our confrontation with the forces o f nature; a strongly 'rationalistic' interpretation; an evolutionary theory, in terms o f which religion is seen as a pre-rational, prescientific stage. Undoubtedly Freud revealed the psychological roots o f much o f religion. However, in his preoccupation with pathological phenomena, he was not justified in identifying all religious phenomena with 'the irrational nature found in the neurotic complusion'. Erich Fromm has shown that there are religious rituals which are 'rational', meaningful, symbolic expressions and which are 'without any obsessional or irrational component'. 2 6 Because o f the many inadequacies in his theories on the origin and nature o f religion, one must not underestimate Freud's monumental contributions to the History o f Religions: his 'discovery' o f the unconscious and o f the method o f psychoanalysis. T h e significant methodological implications o f these discoveries for the History o f Religions will be elucidated at the end o f this section. C. G. Jung We shall not discuss C. G. Jung's theory o f ' t h e collective unconscious' and its 'archetypes' or 'the process o f individuation', but shall simply elucidate several Jungian features o f special significance for the History o f Religions. We shall observe that Mircea Eliade is often criticized for having a Jungian approach and for adopting Jung's notions o f 26. Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion, pp. 108-109.

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'the collective unconscious' and its 'archetypes'. In Chapter 5 and especially in C h a p t e r 7, w e shall contend that such an interpretation is inadequate; that several of Eliade's w o r k s do reveal Jungian influences, b u t that Eliade's phenomenological approach can be distinguished f r o m J u n g ' s approach to religious phenomena. 2 7 If w e contrast Freud's discussion of religion with that of Carl Jung, w e can see that whereas it seems to be implied by Freud's theory that a perfectly healthy individual (no repressed fears, hostilities, needs, or desires) w o u l d have no inclination to be religious, J u n g considers religion to be a n o r m a l and necessary psychic function. It is clear that the one theory is antithetical to religious belief in a w a y in w h i c h the other is not. 2 8 J u n g opposes Freud's attempt to 'explain a w a y ' religious p h e n o mena. H e asserts that his psychological approach is 'scientific', is f r o m 'a purely empirical point of view', and refrains f r o m 'any application of metaphysical or philosophical considerations'. Thus, for example, psychology m a y use its comparative research to determine w h e t h e r an ' i m p r i n t f o u n d in the psyche can or cannot reasonably be termed a " G o d - i m a g e " '. B u t this psychological approach says nothing about 'the actual existence of G o d ' . F r o m the standpoint of psychology, it is a 'fact' that the patient has an idea of a religious p h e n o m e n o n : 'it [the idea] is psychologically true in as m u c h as it e x i s t s . ' J u n g goes on to assert that the religious experiences are n o t only meaningful, b u t the religious symbols often are of the greatest therapeutic aid. Therefore, on the level of psychology, he rejects the characterization of religion as an 'illusion'. ' T h e thing that cures a neurosis m u s t be as convincing as the neurosis; and since the latter is only too real, the helpful experience must be of equal reality.' 2 9 W e m a y view J u n g ' s approach as ' b r o a d e n i n g ' Freud's analysis of 27. T h e best treatment of this topic is Mac Linscott Ricketts's ' T h e N a t u r e and Extent of Eliade's " J u n g i a n i s m " ', Union Seminary Quarterly Review 25, no. 2 (1970): 211-234. 28. William P. Alston, Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought, p. 228. 29. C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion, pp. 2-3, 114. C . G. Jung, Psychological Reflections, p. 299. William James arrives at a similar conclusion in The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 389. F r o m m (pp. 15-17) strongly criticizes the Jungian approach presented above.

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the unconscious by declaring that there are universal structures o f the unconscious that keep reappearing in the dreams, hallucinations, art, myths, etc., of insane and 'so-called normal' minds throughout the world. With therapeutic intentions, Jung, in his effort to understand more adequately the processes o f the mind, was gradually led to the study o f archaic and Oriental religions and alchemy. H e was struck by the similarity between the symbolic structures and images manifested by some o f his patients and the symbolism in these other areas. 30 J u n g claims that these universal symbols 'arise from levels within us deeper than our conscious self and deeper than the personal unconscious which contains, as Freud has shown, memories repressed during the course o f our early years'. 3 1 These psychic structures were not constituted by our individual, historical experiences. Hence, we can analyze symbolic expressions and the human 'situation' they express in terms not entirely limited to an individual's historical conditioning. Several methodological contributions We may conclude this section on psychological approaches by formulating several significant contributions by psychologists to the hermeneutics o f the History o f Religions. Mircea Eliade compares the discovery of the unconscious to the maritime discoveries of the Renaissance and the astronomical discoveries that followed the invention of the telescope: 'for each of these discoveries revealed worlds whose very existence had been previously unsuspected. Each of them effected a sort of "breakthrough in plane", in the sense that it shattered the traditional image o f the C o s m o s and revealed the structures o f a Universe previously unimaginable.' 3 2 Through the discovery o f the unconscious and through the techniques developed by depth psychologists, the Historian of Religions was forced to challenge many o f the uncritical assumptions and theories of earlier investigators, was presented with a new world of religious 30. See Mircea Eliade, The Forge and the Crucible, pp. 199-204. 31. G o o d w i n Watson, 'A P s y c h o l o g i s t ' s V i e w o f Religious S y m b o l s ' , p. 125. See L o n g , Alpha, pp. 22-23. 32. Eliade, 'Encounters at A s c o n a ' , Spiritual Disciplines (Papers f r o m the EranosJahrbach; B o l l i n g t o n Series 30, vol. 4), p. xviii.

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manifestations, and was given the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a m o r e adequate understanding of religious p h e n o m e n a . M u c h of the interest in s y m b o l s and m y t h s and in archaic and Oriental religions can be traced back to the impact of Freud's discoveries. M o r e specifically, the psychologists of religion exposed a ' m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' so frequent during 'the first period' interpretations: ' T h e misunderstanding consists mainly in taking the contents of symbolic language for real events in the realm of things instead of for symbolic expression of the soul's experience.' 3 3 Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y will be seen as directed t o w a r d an understanding of the symbolic structures and meanings revealed t h r o u g h the religious data. It seems unnecessary to stress the p a r a m o u n t significance of the opening u p of the psychological dimension of the religious. B u t w e m a y emphasize the methodological danger of completely reducing the religious to its psychological analysis. In this regard Eliade concludes that 'there can be no question of confusing their [the Historian of Religions and the depth psychologist] frames of reference, n o r their scales of value nor, above all, their methods'. 3 4 T h a t the religious must be approached on its own 'plane of reference', that religious p h e n o m e n a reveal an irreducibly religious dimension w h i c h can only be understood by the Historian of Religions — these will be seen as central methodological concerns in the H i s t o r y of Religions today. Finally, w e m a y observe that T h e historian of religions [Historian of Religions] is especially grateful to Freud for p r o v i n g that images and symbols c o m m u n i cate their 'messages' even if the consciousness remains u n a w a r e of this fact. T h e historian [Historian] is n o w free to conduct his h e r meneutical w o r k u p o n a s y m b o l w i t h o u t having to ask himself h o w m a n y individuals in a certain society and at a given historical m o m e n t u n d e r s t o o d all the meanings and implications of that s y m bol. 3 5 33. F r o m m , p. 112. 34. Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p. 20. For Eliade's attempt to establish this conclusion, see pp. 13-20. 35. Mircea Eliade, ' T h e History o f Religions in Retrospect: 1 9 1 2 - 1 9 6 2 J o u r n a l of Bible and Religion 31, no. 2 (1963): 102. This article is presented in revised and expanded f o r m as chapter 2 in The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion.

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Obviously, this discovery opens up m a n y n e w possibilities for interpretation by the Historian of Religions. H o w e v e r , w e may recall the highly subjective interpretations of the 'first period', evolutionary anthropologists w h e n they attempted to go ' b e y o n d ' w h a t homo religiosus was actually saying and to understand w h a t 'primitive' religion 'really' meant. Consequently, if Historians of Religions are to go ' b e y o n d ' the conscious awareness of homo religiosus, they must provide the methodologicalframework in terms of which their interpretation will be seen to evidence s o m e sense of objective understanding.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES

D u r i n g the twentieth century, anthropological approaches have become highly specialized. Within cultural a n t h r o p o l o g y alone, w e can distinguish functional, diffusionist, Kulturkreis,36 and evolutionary approaches. Because of the diversification and specialization of anthropological approaches, it will not be possible to f o r m u l a t e a s o m e w h a t unified perspective as w e attempted to do in Chapter 1. O u r presentation will be greatly fragmented. S o m e sense of unity m a y e m e r g e in the following chapters, as w e analyze Mircea Eliade's endeavor to incorporate the contributions of the diverse a n t h r o p o l o g ical approaches (diffusionist, functionalist, etc.) in his p h e n o m e n o l o g ical m e t h o d , and as w e analyze h o w Eliade deals w i t h the challenges (such as Boas's criticism of almost all generalizations as highly subjective) raised by these anthropologists. 3 7 36. ' T h e area that is characterized by, and radiates o u t w a r d , a specific culture circle. T h e t h e o r y . . . postulates a d i f f u s i o n of successive culture aggregates.' Charles Winick, Dictionary of Anthropology (Patterson, N . J.: Littlefield, A d a m s ) , p. 305. See ' T h e T h e o r y o f C u l t u r e Circles', pp. 175-180, in The Study of Religion b y j a n d e Vries. 37. A m o n g the w o r k s w h i c h outline the diversification and specialization of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l approaches are the f o l l o w i n g : Michael B a n t o n , ed., Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, w h i c h includes C l i f f o r d Geertz's 'Religion as a C u l t u r a l S y s t e m ' and M e l f o r d E. Spiro's 'Religion: P r o b l e m s o f D e f i n i t i o n and E x p l a n a t i o n ' ; Allan W. Eister, ed., Changing Perspectives in the Scientific Study of Religion; Lessa and V o g t , eds., Reader in Comparative Religion; Sol T a x , ed., Horizons of Anthropology, w h i c h includes E d w a r d N o r b e c k ' s ' T h e S t u d y of Religion'; and A n t h o n y F. C . Wallace, Religion: An Anthropological View.

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Several specialist approaches T h e f o r e m o s t p r o p o n e n t of the Kulturkreistheorie, W i l h e l m Schmidt, illustrates the culture historical approach 3 8 in his m o n u m e n t a l Ursprung der Gottesidee (twelve v o l u m e s ; 1912-55). H i s m a j o r significance for the H i s t o r y of Religions lies in his rejection of ahistorical and naturalistic approaches to religious p h e n o m e n a . D e e p l y impressed by A n d r e w Lang's pre-animistic t h e o r y and by Fritz G r a e b n e r ' s m e t h o d f o r identifying various cultural and religious strata, S c h m i d t n o w used his culture historical a p p r o a c h to p r o v e that the oldest strata revealed the belief in an eternal creator, an omniscient and beneficent H i g h G o d (a sort of Urmonotheismus).39 Starting f r o m the 'survivals' in such 'living fossils' as Southeastern Australian tribes, one could reconstruct the Urreligion. F r o m this 'original m o n o t h e i s m ' in the Urkultur, S c h m i d t traced the gradual corruption, confusion, and degeneration of this belief in a H i g h God. 4 0 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , S c h m i d t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s have been neglected because of certain o b v i o u s inadequacies. Even m o r e than Lang he utilizes an excessively rationalistic approach and identifies Western conceptions of G o d a m o n g archaic cultures. S c h m i d t n o t only claims the existence of this belief in a H i g h G o d b u t also s u b m i t s that this n o t i o n is 'the p r o d u c t of logicocausal t h o u g h t ' ; it 'arises o u t of m a n ' s supposed intellectualistic need of b e c o m i n g a w a r e of the origin and w h e r e f o r e of things'. 4 1 38. ' C u l t u r e Historical ( m e t h o d ) : f o l l o w s t h e principles o f general h i s t o r y b u t m a k e s use o f t h e c u l t u r e itself a n d its p r o d u c t i o n s as m e t h o d o l o g i c a l m e d i a t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e h i s t o r y of m a n in t h o s e t i m e s f o r w h i c h w e h a v e n o w r i t t e n d o c u m e n t s . ' W i l h e l m S c h m i d t , The Culture Historical Method of Ethnology, p. 346. 39. S c h m i d t , The Origin and Growth of Religion, pp. 177 ff. (Lang's t h e o r y ) ; p p . 262 ff ( ' T h e P r i m i t i v e Religion o f a H i g h G o d a T r u e M o n o t h e i s m ' ) ; pp. 269 ff. ( ' A t t r i b u t e s of t h e S u p r e m e B e i n g ' ) ; a n d passim. 40. T h i s s h o u l d indicate t h e s u b t l e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h e s a n d the artificially in clear-cut distinctions. See F r a n z Boas, ' E v o l u t i o n o r D i f f u s i o n ? ' , American Anthropologist 26 (1924): 3 4 0 - 3 4 4 . Y e t t h e h i g h l y d i f f u s i o n i s t o p p o n e n t o f e v o l u t i o n i s m , F a t h e r S c h m i d t , w h e n h e detects ' s u r v i v a l s ' and r e c o n s t r u c t s ' t h e stages o f t h e w h o l e d e v e l o p m e n t ' , certainly e x p o u n d s a t y p e o f e v o l u t i o n , albeit n o t a unilinear e v o l u t i o n . See L o w i e , The History of Ethnological Theory, p. 190. A n o t h e r traditional o p p o s i t i o n — ' d i f f u s i o n i s m ' o r ' f u n c t i o n a l i s m ' — also d o e s n o t necessarily o c c u r . (See C l a u d e Lévi-Strauss, 'Social S t r u c t u r e ' , Anthropology Today, pp. 532-533.) 41. Raffaele Pettazzoni, ' T h e S u p r e m e B e i n g : P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l S t r u c t u r e a n d

Twentieth

century methodological approaches

47

Schmidt was inclined to think that all the irrational elements represent a 'degeneration' of genuine religion. The truth is that we do not have any means to investigate this 'primordial religion.' Our oldest documents are relatively recent. . . . It is true that the belief in High Gods seems to characterize the oldest cultures, but we also find there other religious elements. As far as we can reconstruct the most remote past, it is safer to assume that religious life was from the very beginning rather complex, and that 'elevated' ideas coexisted with 'lower' forms of worship and belief.42 In America the major tendencies can be observed in Franz Boas and his followers. 43 Reacting against the monistic interpretations of the evolutionists, and their penchant for broad generalizations, these American anthropologists emphasized the study of particular cultures and the importance of cultural pluralism and cultural relativity. The 'ethnic phenomena which we compare are seldom really alike'. The 'selection of the material assembled for the purpose of comparison is wholly determined by the subjective point of view according to which we arrange diverse mental phenomena'. 44 This has been determinative for the formation of anthropological research in the United States: a stress upon the absolute inviolability of the individual phenomenon and a consequent unwillingness to subordinate it to any more general system of interpretation. In Historical Development', The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, p. 60. Cf. Eliade, 'Australian Religions, Part I', p. 119. 42. Eliade, ' T h e History of Religions in Retrospect: 1912-1962', p. 103. There have been a n u m b e r of other Continental anthropologists w h o have contributed to the History of Religions. We may cite the followers of Schmidt and the present Vienna School; G e r m a n and Austrian ethnologists, such as L. Frobenius, H. Baumann, and W. Miiller; Marcel Griaule and the French School of ethnology; the French social anthropologists. See the above Eliade article ('The History of Religions in Retrospect: 1912-1962') and Lessa and Vogt for a more complete listing of anthropologists interested in the study of religions. 43. Exceptions should be noted. At times such anthropologists as Clyde Kluckhohn and R u t h Benedict have attempted to overcome the highly diffusionistic and relativistic position of a Boas. We have cited the important works of Lowie, have referred to Paul Radin, and could have analyzed the contributions of Clifford Geertz and several other contemporary American anthropologists. 44. Franz Boas, ' T h e Origin of T o t e m i s m ' , American Anthropologist 18, no. 3 (1916): 320. Cf. the similar positions of Stith T h o m p s o n and Melville Herskovitz.

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practice, this has m a d e for, o n the one hand, an amassing of i m m e n s e a m o u n t s of data u p o n any given subject, but, o n the other hand, a denial that any c o m m o n structures could be perceived to i n f o r m these data, that any c o m p a r i s o n s could therefore legitimately be m a d e b e t w e e n t h e m , and, finally, that scarcely any generalizations of any kind could be genuinely applied to them. 4 5 C u l t u r a l uniformities are usually only 'apparent similarities', and, in the case o f ' g e n u i n e parallels', w e can explain t h e m in t e r m s of d i f f u sion due to the contacts b e t w e e n various cultures. In England, a l t h o u g h anthropological research has also reacted against the evolutionistic approaches, there have been a t t e m p t s to account f o r uniformities: ' u n d e r l y i n g this diversity (in the actual cultural content) there m a y be impressive similarities in basic f u n c tions, i n v o l v i n g the culturally prescribed solutions of h u m a n social and psychological p r o b l e m s and the w a y s of expressing and r e a f f i r m ing the central values of a society.' As R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n w r o t e in Taboo, 'I w o u l d suggest that w h a t Sir J a m e s Frazer seems to regard as the accidental results of magical and religious beliefs really constitute their essential f u n c t i o n and the ultimate reason f o r their existence.' 4 6 'Since w e cannot define cult and creed by their objects, perhaps it will be possible to perceive their f u n c t i o n ' ; the unity in religion can be seen 'in the f u n c t i o n w h i c h it fulfills'. 4 7 T h i s 'functionalist school' can best be seen in the w o r k s of M a l i n o w s k i , R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n , E v a n s Pritchard, and R a y m o n d Firth. 4 8 In recent years the 'structural anthropology' of C l a u d e Lévi-Strauss has received considerable attention. U s i n g his structural linguistic 45. Robert Luyster, ' T h e Study of M y t h : T w o Approaches', Journal of Bible and Religion 34, no. 3 (1966): 238. 46. Lessa and Vogt, p. 85. 47. Bronisiaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion, pp. 20 and 68. 48. For their fundamental differences, especially the comparative sociological emphasis of the latter three, see David Bidney, ' T h e Concept of Value in M o d e r n Anthropology', pp. 694-696 and Lessa and Vogt, chapter 2. Cf. Carl G. Hempel, ' T h e Logic of Functional Analysis', Symposium on Sociological Theory, ed. Llewellyn Gross (Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. May Brodbeck); Kingsley Davis, ' T h e M y t h of Functional Analysis as a Special M e t h o d in Sociology and A n t h r o p o l o g y ' , American Sociological Review 24 (1959): 757-772; Hans H. Penner, ' T h e Poverty of Functionalism', History of Religions 11 (1971): 91-97.

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approach, Lévi-Strauss asserts that 'In every one of its practical u n d e r takings, a n t h r o p o l o g y thus does n o m o r e than assert a h o m o l o g y of structure between h u m a n t h o u g h t in action and the h u m a n object to which it is applied.' 4 9 B y regarding 'religious systems as co-ordinate wholes', by trying to understand their system of classification and decode the messages they communicate, Lévi-Strauss's structuralistic approach has yielded highly controversial and often enlightening results. Thus, although 'the properties to which the savage mind has access are not the same as those which have c o m m a n d e d the attention of scientists', he submits that 'the savage mind is logical in the same sense and the same fashion as ours. . . . Its t h o u g h t proceeds t h r o u g h the understanding, not affectivity, w i t h the aid of distinctions and oppositions, not by confusion and participation.' 5 0 A l t h o u g h the f o r m s of primitive expressions m a y not seem rational, careful analysis reveals a logical structure in their symbolic expressions. H e r e w e observe that the earlier evolutionary views concerning the nature of religion and of primitive culture, and the oversimplified distinctions and distortions of a scholar such as Lévy-Bruhl, are being challenged. 'Recent anthropologists and historians of religion [Historians of Religion] have agreed courageously that w e can no longer believe in a gulf between primitive m a n and ourselves.' 5 1 T h a t clear-cut ' g u l f between the primitive and ourselves, between the p r e m o d e r n and the modern, which w e observed in the evolutionary theorists o f ' t h e first period' and in such later scholars as Lévy-Bruhl, has been rendered dubious by the brilliant findings of Alexander Marshak and other investigators. U s i n g a technique o f ' m i c r o s c o p i c 49. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, p. 91. Note Lévi-Strauss's discussion o f previous theories on totemism and his o w n position, especially in 'Totemism from Within', pp. 92-104. See Mircea Eliade's 'Cultural Fashions and the History o f Religions', The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, pp. 21-38, for an analysis, from the perspective o f History of Religions, of the popularity o f LéviStrauss. This article appears as chapter 1 in Eliade's Occultism, Witchcraft, and Cultural Fashions. 50. Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, pp. 268-269. 51. Kees W. Bolle, Introduction to Jan de Vries's The Study of Religion, p. xvi. By looking at Jensen, Lanternari, and Lévi-Strauss, Kees Bolle shows that each anthropologist has a different conception as to why this 'gulf' between primitive and modern should be opposed. This diversity Bolle traces to 'the philosophical presuppositions of each scholar', his 'underlying or presupposed idea o f man'.

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analysis', Marshak was able to interpret the 'almost invisible signs engraved on stones and bones f r o m U p p e r Paleolithic levels in E u r o p e ' as revealing a 'system' of ' t i m e notations based on lunar periodicities'. T h e evidence for a ubiquitous tradition of U p p e r Paleolithic n o t a tion w o u l d seem to verify a m o d e r n level of cognitive capacity and symbolic usage in early, prewriting, prearithmetic phases of sapiens culture. T h e complexity of the tradition in the typical Aurignacian [ca. 32,000 years ago] implies an earlier origin. T h e latter c o m p l e x ities of the tradition in the terminal Magdalenian [ca. 10,000 years ago] m a y indicate that f o r m a l writing, arithmetic, and the true calendar, w h i c h appear in the first agricultural civilizations, m a y have had reference to this earlier symbolizing tradition, one that was at least 25,000 years old. As Eliade has written: 'Such conclusions brilliantly vindicate those scholars— f r o m Wilhelm Schmidt and Oliver Leroy to Karl N a r r and Claude Lévi-Straus — w h o were convinced neither by the "prelogical" structure of the mentalité primitive nor by the supposed Urdummheit of archaic man.' 5 2 Because of limited space, w e have refrained f r o m entering into a discussion of the contributions of Malinowski, Leenhard, LéviStrauss and others t o w a r d understanding such p h e n o m e n a as m y t h s and rituals. W e should note the heated controversy over the relationship of m y t h s and rituals. Are rituals 'prior' and only later m y t h s develop to j u s t i f y t h e m (Hyman)? O r are m y t h s prior and then rituals develop to enact t h e m (Bascom)? O r , in their usual interrelation, is there no necessary primacy of one over the other (Kluckhohn)? 5 3 M o s t 'ethnologists have tended to interpret m y t h literally as an 52. Alexander Marshak, ' C o g n i t i v e Aspects o f U p p e r Paleolithic Engraving', Current Anthropology 13, nos. 3 - 4 (1972): 461; Marshak, The Roots of Civilization: The Cognitive Beginnings of Man's First Art, Symbol, and Notation; Eliade, ' O n Prehistoric Religions', History of Religions 14, no. 2 (1974): 141. 53. Stanley Edgar H y m a n , 'The Ritual V i e w o f M y t h and the Mythic', Myth: A Symposium, pp. 8 4 - 9 4 ; William B a s c o m , 'The Myth-Ritual Theory',Journal of American Folklore 70 (1957): 103-114; C l y d e Kluckhohn, ' M y t h s and Rituals: A General Theory', Harvard Theological Review 35 (1942): 4 5 - 7 9 . See Lessa and V o g t , chap. 2, ' M y t h and Ritual', pp. 134-202; Joseph M. Kitagawa, 'Primitive, Classical, and

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expression of primitive thought but have differed in their evaluation of myth'. 54 But certain anthropologists (such as Griaule, Berndt, and Lévi-Strauss), in attempting to understand what myths or rituals mean for those who believe and practice them and in allowing religious phenomena 'to speak for themselves', have arrived at some startling results. To give one illustration, the Berndts have found that a seemingly simple ritual (during a ceremony in northeastern Arnhem Land, an emblem signifying a goanna's tail and vertebrae is ritually displayed) hides a complex symbolism and rich mythology. D o w n the trunk of the emblem, totemic designs are painted and feathered penchants are attached. 'Slowly the actor removes it from its shade, posturing as he does so; he writhes along the ground, holding the sacred stick close to his breast.' Rather than tracing the diffusion of this ritual, or classifying it as a prescientific stage of 'literal confusion', or determining its function in maintaining the cohesiveness of the society, and then concluding that one had exhausted its significance as a religious phenomenon, the Berndts continue: What does this mean? Here is an emblem which is a symbol of a goanna's tail and vertebrae, withdrawn from its shade. But to the neophyte it is much more than this. The shade or hut symbolizes a special conically-shaped mat, brought by the Dyanggawul Fertility Mothers from a spirit land away in the sunrise, beyond the Morning Star. This mat is really a womb. When the goanna tail emblem is removed from it on the sacred ground, this signifies that the first people, ancestors of the present-day eastern Arnhem Landers, are being born from their Mother; and they, in turn, are associated with a combination of fertility symbols. Actually, there is symbol within symbol, meaning within meaning, much of it connected with fundamental drives. 55 M o d e r n Religions: A Perspective on U n d e r s t a n d i n g the History of Religions', The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, pp. 45-49. N o t e also the methodological debates over the ' M y t h and Ritual School' or 'patternism', especially the volumes edited by S. H. H o o k e and the criticisms of H. Frankfort. 54. Bidney, ' M y t h , Symbolism, and T r u t h ' , pp. 12-13. 55. R. M. and C . H . Berndt, The First Australians, pp. 78-79. See Mircea Eliade, 'Australian Religions, Part II: An Introduction', History of Religions 6, no. 3 (1967): 222-225. This article appears as chapter 2 in Australian Religions: An Introduction.

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O f course, w e have n o t indicated h o w one w o u l d arrive at and check this sort of interpretation. O u r p u r p o s e at this point is to s h o w the new hermeneutical situation in w h i c h Historians of Religions find t h e m selves, a situation w i t h m a n y potential 'openings' for n e w u n d e r s t a n d ings of religious p h e n o m e n a . Several significant influences W e are n o w in a position to e n u m e r a t e several of the significant influences of anthropologists on the History of Religions, w i t h emphasis u p o n the methodological issues and problems arising f r o m these anthropological approaches. 1. T h e anthropologists have amassed a vast quanity of religious data, and this has greatly assisted Historians of Religions in their interpretations. For example, t h r o u g h the meticulous research of historically oriented anthropologists, d o c u m e n t a t i o n on p r e m o d e r n religions has been pushed back f u r t h e r into Paleolithic times (decisively proving the earlier theories about religious origins and g r o w t h w e r e inadequate), and our i n f o r m a t i o n about every historical period has been greatly increased. A. E. Jensen's interpretation of a ' D e m a type', V. G. Childe's views on prehistoric cultures, and n u m e r o u s positions on 'megalithic religion' have been invaluable in identifying religious f o r m s and deciphering their meanings. 2. T h e Historian of Religions must be congnizant of all of the specific anthropological approaches. Each approach reveals different aspects of the religious p h e n o m e n a . T h e cultural historical approaches remind the Historian of Religions to avoid the earlier mistakes of the ahistorical and naturalistic approaches. T h e significance and meaning of an isolated religious d a t u m often seem unintelligible until one begins to unravel its pattern of diffusion. A p h e n o m e n o n , such as shamanism, m a y appear to be n o t h i n g less than sheer madness until the interpreter begins to c o m p r e h e n d its religious function. W h a t is required of the History of Religions is an approach which can i n c o r p o rate all of the different anthropological perspectives into its methodological f r a m e w o r k . At the same time, the Historian of Relgions recognizes that m a n y anthropologists have reduced the religious to their specific perspective.

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After tracing the diffusion or determining the function of a religious p h e n o m e n o n , the Historian of Religions has not completed his or her investigation. Each anthropological perspective sheds light u p o n b u t does n o t exhaust the total significance of the religious. 3. T h e general insistence of m o s t anthropologists u p o n specialization, w i t h a respect for cultural relativism and pluralism, is reflected in the studies of most c o n t e m p o r a r y Historians of Religions. ' T h e situation that one finds today is as follows: a considerable i m p r o v e m e n t in information, paid for by excessive specialization and even by sacrificing our o w n vocation (for the majority of historians of religions [Historians of Religions] have b e c o m e orientalists, classicists, ethnologists, etc.), and a dependence u p o n the m e t h o d s elaborated by m o d e r n historiography or sociology. . . .' 56 Following the a d m o n i s h m e n t s of Boas and others, most Historians of Religions greatly limit the scope of their w o r k . T h e y m a y specialize in one culture, attempting to trace the diffusion of m y t h s or to determine the function of rituals in that specific culture. This emphasis u p o n highly specialized research in the H i s t o r y of Religions has severely restricted efforts at comparative analysis. Oscar Lewis 5 7 has distinguished t w o general types of comparative studies in anthropology: very modest comparisons between societies that are historically related, broad comparisons between historically unrelated societies. As a reaction against the latter, usually associated with the 'failure' of those universal typologies and evolutionary sequences of a T y l o r or a Freud or a D u r k h e i m , the Historian of Religions often refrains f r o m comparative analysis. Mircea Eliade not only attempts the very modest comparisons between historically related societies, but he often makes the m o s t general comparisons between societies which are not historically or geographically related. Indeed, Eliade will claim that there are certain 'primordial' religious phenomena, such as 'ecstasy', which 'reappear 56. Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols, p. 29. N o t e the section entitled 'The Inhibitions o f the Specialist', in Eliade's Mephistopheles and the Androgyne, pp. 193-195. 57. Oscar Lewis, 'Comparisons in Cultural A n t h r o p o l o g y ' , Yearbook of Anthropology — 1955, pp. 2 5 9 - 2 9 2 . T h e attempt to reach fairly general conclusions through 'small-scale comparative studies' and 'controlled comparisons' has been attempted b y such scholars as D u m é z i l , Nadel, Evans-Pritchard, and Eggan. See Lévi-Strauss, 'Social Structure', pp. 548-549; Lessa and V o g t , p. 5.

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spontaneously' in all kinds of heterogeneous and historically unrelated societies. W e can c o m p a r e such p h e n o m e n a and decipher universal structures of religious experience. O b v i o u s l y such a position leaves Eliade open to the severe criticisms of c o n t e m p o r a r y historicists and other 'specialists', especially to the charge that he is j u s t as uncritical as the earlier 'generalist' approaches. In addition to specialization in one culture or tribe, Eliade locates another reason for d o c u m e n t a t i o n that is insufficiently broad to permit valid comparisons and generalizations: by limiting our research to primitive religions, w e have no measure of the role of that religious p h e n o m e n o n (such as m y t h ) in highly developed religions. A f e w comparativists, such as Jensen and B a u m a n n , attempt to 'deal w i t h all categories of mythological creativity, those of the " p r i m i t i v e s " as well as of the peoples of high cultures'. 5 8 While recognizing the need for specialization, w e must also stress that there are m a n y dangers in overspecialization o n the part of Historians of Religions. In the ensuing chapters, w e shall observe that there are m a n y hermeneutical advantages in having at least s o m e Historians of Relgions taking a m o r e 'generalist' approach. T h e anthropological specialists have been justified in stressing that one must do justice to the individuality of the specific religious p h e n o m e n o n . T h e methodological problem c o n f r o n t i n g the Historian of Religions seems to be one of formulating a systematic f r a m e w o r k , in terms of w h i c h he or she can b o t h interpret the particular religious manifestation and m a k e adequate comparisons and generalizations. 4. T h e r e has been a definite reaction against the 'prior' assumptions and theories of earlier anthropologists. F r o m the perspective of cont e m p o r a r y anthropology, the research of 'the first period' was often m o r e n o r m a t i v e than descriptive. M o r e attention has been devoted to 58. Mircea Eliade, ' C o s m o g o n i c M y t h and "Sacred H i s t o r y " Religious Studies 2, (1967): 172. Some Historians of Religions, realizing this neglect o f ' h i g h l y developed religions', have gone to the opposite extreme of entirely eliminating the study of primitive religions. For example, R. C. Zaehner, in contrasting his view with that of E. O . J a m e s , understands C o m p a r a t i v e Religion to be the comparison o f ' " t h e great religions and ethical systems . . . of the East" . . . with each other and with the religions and ethics of the West'. The Comparison of Religions, pp. 11-12.

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describing w h a t homo religiosus says and w h a t religious p h e n o m e n a mean for h i m or her. This same emphasis is reflected in the interpretations of the History of Religions. We shall see that with s o m e scholars, such as the phenomenologist W. Brede Kristensen, there is almost a complete unwillingness to go b e y o n d the descriptions of the believer. H o w e v e r , w i t h o u t minimizing the necessity for describing w h a t homo religiosus says, most Historians of Religions also agree w i t h Freud that there are dimensions of religious p h e n o m e n a of w h i c h the believer m a y remain consciously u n a w a r e and that these must be interpreted. 5. M e r l e a u - P o n t y claims that with Marcel Mauss w e find the attempt to regard a 'social fact' (e.g. the p h e n o m e n o n of magic) as 'an efficacious system of symbols or a n e t w o r k of symbolic values'. ' C o n c o m i t a n t variations and external correlations leave a residue', and this can only be u n d e r s t o o d by thinking ' o u r w a y into the p h e n o m e non'. 5 9 Such an approach, which can be seen in the investigations of Lévi-Strauss and m a n y other anthropologists, plays a large part in the History of Religions: the attempt to understand a religious p h e n o m e n o n f r o m within, to penetrate it and c o m m u n i c a t e with it, especially by deciphering its meaning t h r o u g h its symbolic structures. N o w , if the History of Religions really wants to understand w h a t religious p h e n o m e n a mean for homo religiosus and if it really wants to understand the religious data ' f r o m within', then the possibility for such interpretations m u s t be reflected in its methodological approach. T o supply only one illustration to which w e shall return, the History of Religions will emphasize such methodological requirements as the need on the part of the scholar for a 'sympathetic understanding' and 'participation' in the religious p h e n o m e n a of 'the other'. 6. A m a j o r difficulty in determining the influence of a n t h r o p o l o g y on the History of Religions arises f r o m the fact that it is not at all clear the extent to which m o d e r n a n t h r o p o l o g y is even interested in religion. A l t h o u g h anthropologists still devote most of their attention to primitive cultures, the study of religion seems to have fallen into the background. In his 'Introduction' to Anthropology Today — a collection of fifty 59. Merleau-Ponty, ' F r o m Mauss to Claude Lévi-Strauss', Signs, p. 115.

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' i n v e n t o r y papers' f r o m ' T h e International S y m p o s i u m o n A n t h r o p o l o g y ' — A. L. Kroeber writes that 'in short, this v o l u m e is a s u m m a r y of w h a t w e k n o w in and a r o u n d a n t h r o p o l o g y in 1952'. In his paper, 'Social Structure', Lévi-Strauss notes 'that the w o r d " r e ligion" does not even appear in the p r o g r a m of this s y m p o s i u m ' (p. 548). Indeed, in almost 1000 pages — most of t h e m dealing w i t h primitive cultures — references to religion appear only a f e w times. In an earlier study, ' T h e Structural Study of M y t h ' , Lévi-Strauss submits that 'during the past t w e n t y years a n t h r o p o l o g y has been increasingly turned f r o m studies in the field of religion' and that the field of m y t h o l o g y has been invaded by all sorts o f ' a m a t e u r s ' . 6 0 H a n s H. Penner claims that It is only since the appearance of Lévi-Strauss's article ['The Structural Study of M y t h ' ] , in fact, that a n t h r o p o l o g y has returned to religion by means of a study of m y t h and ritual. I am not saying that he alone is responsible for the return. Since 1960, however, w e have had a n u m b e r of books, anthologies, and articles on anthropological approaches to 'religion' — w h i c h means m y t h and ritual. W h e t h e r this n e w interest has resulted in a n e w understanding of m y t h and ritual remains a debatable point. 6 1 At a conference in 1963, eight years after the publication of LéviStrauss's article, Clifford Geertz began his 'Religion as a Cultural System' by submitting that anthropological w o r k on religion since the second w o r l d w a r 'has m a d e no theoretical advances of m a j o r i m p o r t ance'. H e goes on to maintain that those significant concepts w h i c h anthropological studies of religion do use are almost always d r a w n f r o m the contributions of only f o u r m e n : D u r k h e i m , Weber, Freud, and Malinowski. 6 2 60. 'The Structural Study o f Myth', Structural Anthropology, pp. 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 . This article first appeared in Journal of American Folklore 78 (1955): 4 2 8 ^ 4 4 . 61. Hans H. Penner, ' M y t h and Ritual: A Wasteland or a Forest o f Symbols?', On Method in the History of Religions, ed. James S. Heifer, pp. 4 6 - 4 7 . Penner contends that 'the n e w interest in a n t h r o p o l o g y concerning m y t h and ritual, t h o u g h revised after the gap between, let us say, T y l o r and the studies o f Leach, Turner, Wallace, EvansPritchard, D o u g l a s , and Spiro (that is, f r o m the late 1950's onward), has not i n v o l v e d an essential change in m e t h o d o l o g i c a l assumptions'. 62. Clifford Geertz, 'Religion as a Cultural System', Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, ed. Michael Banton, pp. 1 - 2 . J o h n H e n r y Morgan, 'Religious M y t h

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In recent years, there certainly have been numerous publications by anthropologists 63 on myth and ritual and other religious phenomena, on attempts to formulate new scientific approaches, and on such topics as 'civil' and 'secular' religious expressions, drug experiences and contemporary youth cults. T o what extent these studies will produce significant openings, radically changing the hermeneutical situation o f the Historian o f Religions, remains to be seen.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACHES

O f all the twentieth century approaches in the History o f Religions, the phenomenology o f religion has been the most revolutionary: it has rendered possible a more systematic study o f religions and has shaped much o f the nature o f the History o f Religions today. Charles J. Adams asserts that 'the phenomenological approach, or some variation on it, whatever it may be called, has gained more adherents — until today almost every historian o f religions [Historian o f Religions] is a phenomenologist. . . ,' 64 Adams does overstate his point: there is significant research being done in the History o f Religions by scholars who are not phenomenologists; and, as we shall observe in our discussion o f the historical-phenomenological 'tension' and elsewhere, many 'specialists' vehemently oppose any phenomenological interpretation, and some 'generalists' do not consider themselves phenomenologists. Nevertheless, it does seem to be the case that many scholars identified as Historians o f Religions do take some sort o f phenomenological approach, and many o f the major methodological concerns in the History o f Religions today are issues raised by the phenomenology o f religion. and Symbol: A Convergence o f Philosophy and Anthropology', Philosophy Today 18 (1974): 6 8 - 8 4 , submits that it is in fact the philosophical anthropology o f such anthropologists as Victor Turner, Clifford Geertz, and Claude Lévi-Strauss that presents us with 'advances o f major importance'. 63. For a partial listing o f publications, see n. 27 in chap. 1 (p. 12) and n. 37 in chap. 2 (p. 45), as well as the references listed by Penner, ' M y t h and Ritual', and Morgan, 'Religious M y t h and Symbol'. 64. Charles J. Adams, 'The History o f Religions and the Study o f Islam', The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, p. 178.

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At this point, it is not possible to explicate w h a t is meant by a phenomenological approach in the History of Religions. O u r major objective will be to determine the nature of such a phenomenological method and to assess the value of Eliade's phenomenology of religion. For now, let us begin with a general, introductory formulation offered by C. Jouco Bleeker. According to Professor Bleeker, there is no agreement as to the nature and the task of the phenomenology of religion. H e claims that at present w e can distinguish three types of phenomenology of religion: '1) the descriptive school which is content with a systematisation of the religious phenomena, 2) the typological school, which aims at the research of different types of religion, 3) the phenomenological school in the specific sense of the word, which makes inquiries into the essence, the sense and the structure of the religious phenomena'. 6 5 In focusing on the third, more specific type, Bleeker submits that 'the w o r d phenomenology gets a double meaning'. The p h e n o m e n ology of religion is 'an independent science' which creates monographs and handbooks, but it is also 'a scholarly method' which utilizes such principles as the phenomenological epoché and eidetic vision. Although these concepts 'are b o r r o w e d f r o m the philosophical phenomenology of Husserl and his school', they are used by the phenomenology of religion only in a 'figurative sense'. Indeed, Bleeker asserts that 'the phenomenology of religion would be greatly served if its scope of activities was clearly distinguished at the one side f r o m that of the philosophical phenomenology and at the other hand f r o m that of anthropology'. H e warns that the Historian of Religions is a 'layman' in matters relating to philosophical phenomenology and 'should refrain f r o m meddling in these difficult affairs'. 'In m y mind phenomenology of religion is not a philosophical discipline, but a systematization of historical facts with the intent to understand their religious meaning.' 6 6 It is our position that the above not only illustrates the orientation of many w h o consider themselves phenomenologists of religion, but it also reveals the limitations and methodological inadequacy of their approaches. It is our position that many of the fundamental issues 65. Bleeker, T h e Contribution of the Phenomenology of Religion', p. 39. 66. Ibid., pp. 39-41, 51.

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raised by philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y must be taken seriously by the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion or it will remain methodologically naive and uncritical. For n o w , it will suffice simply to say that w e are using ' p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion' in its 'broadest sense, including under " p h e n o m e n o l o g y " those scholars w h o pursue the study of structures and meanings' of religious phenomena. 6 7 M o r e than any other approach, phenomenologists have emphasized the experiential basis of religion and have attempted to describe and to systematize the basic structures of religious experience. In describing such structures, phenomenologists of religion have attempted to approach their data in a specific antireductionist manner, and, unlike the other approaches to religious phenomena, have insisted u p o n the irreducibility and uniqueness of the religious dimension of experience. 6 8 W e shall n o w consider the approaches of three phenomenologists: R u d o l f O t t o , G. van der Leeuw, and W. Brede Kristensen. Since C h a p t e r s 4—7 will be devoted almost entirely to the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion, there will be no effort to be comprehensive in the f o l l o w ing analyses. Rudolf

Otto

R u d o l f O t t o ' s interpretation of religion, especially as f o r m u l a t e d in Das Heilige (1917), is w e l l - k n o w n and has p r o f o u n d l y influenced later p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion. O t t o was familiar with the anthropologi67. Mircea Eliade, 'History of Religions and a N e w H u m a n i s m ' , History of Religions 1, no. 1 (1961): 7. This article appears in revised and expanded f o r m as chapter 1 in The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion. 68. An exception to this general pattern of reductionist approaches was seen in M a x Weber's sociology of religion. It seems to us that this is the primary reason w h y various phenomenologists interested in the social sciences, such as Alfred Schutz and Maurice Natanson, trace so m u c h of their m e t h o d o l o g y back to M a x Weber. For example, N a t a n s o n uses Weber's analysis, especially his m e t h o d of Verstehen, to distinguish and compare the 'naturalistic approach' (which is 'reductionistic') and the 'phenomenological approach' to the m e t h o d o l o g y of the social sciences. See Maurice Natanson, 'A Study in Philosophy and the Social Sciences', Literature, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences, pp. 160-165. It will b e c o m e clear that much of Eliade's opposition is directed against the very characteristics Natanson identifies w i t h the 'naturalistic approach'.

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cal theories of religion. W i t h special emphasis on the aspect of ' p r o digious p o w e r ' , he attempted to relate all of the religious p h e n o m e n a (magic, totemism, mana, animism, etc.) 'by a c o m m o n — and that a numinous — element'. 6 9 Concentrating on the nonrational aspect of religious experience, O t t o spoke of the sui generis n u m i n o u s experience, which presented itself as ' w h o l l y other' (ganz andere) and could be characterized as mysterium tremendum etfascinosum. W e shall focus on t w o significant methodological contributions w h i c h R u d o l f O t t o m a d e to the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion: his experiential approach, involving the description of the essential structures of religious experience; his antireductionist approach, involving the unique n u m i n o u s quality of all religious experience. These interdependent methodological contributions helped to transf o r m the hermeneutical situation of the Historian of Religions. Rather than emphasizing various religious 'ideas' or conceptions, as had Tylor, Lang and others in their highly 'rational' explanations, O t t o directed his attention to the different modalities of the numinous. H e emphasized the religious encounter, the experiential basis of religion. Instead of f o r m u l a t i n g various 'negative' n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s regarding such issues as w h e t h e r religion was 'illusory' or was based u p o n some sort of 'mistake', instead of speculating regarding such issues as w h e t h e r religion did in fact reveal the 'primordial' f o r m s or the 'origin' of the evolutionary process, R u d o l f O t t o examined certain data which disclosed specific structures of the n u m i n o u s experience. H e attempted to describe and analyze the structures of the experiences expressed in his data. 7 0 O t t o attempted to f o r m u l a t e a universal phenomenological struc69. Rudolf O t t o , The Idea of the Holy, p. 117 and passim. 70. Cf. the similar emphasis b y William James, w h o could easily be included under 'phenomenological' (as well as 'psychological') approaches to religions. For example, James finds 'a certain u n i f o r m deliverance in which religions all appear to meet'. Every religion has the following pattern or structure: there is a vision of perfection or of an ideal; secondly, there is an uneasiness: as compared to the ideal, 'there is something w r o n g about us as w e naturally stand'; finally, there is a solution of this 'flaw': ' w e are saved f r o m the w r o n g n e s s by m a k i n g proper connection with the higher powers'. Cf. also his analysis of the structure of mysticism in terms of four essential 'marks'. James, by elucidating these structures, affords us the o p p o r t u n i t y of organizing and c o m p a r ing the multifarious religious manifestations. The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 383-384, 292-294, and passim.

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ture of religious experience in t e r m s of w h i c h the phenomenologist could organize and analyze the specific religious manifestations. N o t only will this be Eliade's purpose in formulating a phenomenological foundation of universal symbolic structures, b u t Eliade will adopt m u c h of O t t o ' s structural analysis: the transcendent ('wholly other') structure of the sacred; the 'ambivalent' structure of the sacred (mysterium tremendum and mysterium fascinosum). W e must n o t overlook serious weaknesses in O t t o ' s analysis of religious experience, primarily s t e m m i n g f r o m a t o o - n a r r o w l y conceived phenomenological approach. In reacting against previous 'rational' interpretations, O t t o stressed the nonrational dimension of religious experience to such an extent that he tended to define religious experience too narrowly; his analysis is often quite illuminating, especially w i t h regard to certain mystical experiences, but it does not do justice to the total realm of religious p h e n o m e n a in all its complexity. 7 1 In his antireductionist approach, O t t o insisted u p o n the unique a priori quality of the numinous. H e thus protested against the ' o n e sidedly intellectualistic and rationalistic' bias of most interpretations and against the reduction of religious p h e n o m e n a to the interpretive schema of linguistic analysis, anthropology, sociology, psychology, etc. 72 In emphasizing the a priori quality of the religious and the universal structure of religious experience, O t t o was also attacking the reductionisms of the historicistic approaches to religious p h e n o mena. 7 3 In his emphasis u p o n the irreducibility of the religious, R u d o l f O t t o 71. Eliade, The Sacred, p. 10. Cf. Th. P. van Baaren, 'Science of Religion as a Systematic Discipline', Religion, Culture and Methodology, p. 40: 'Rudolf O t t o , while theorizing about the H o l y as theganz Andere, has m a d e the rare exceptions the general n o r m and has thus greatly impeded our understanding of religion as it actually is.' See Charles H. Long, ' T h e Meaning of Religion in the C o n t e m p o r a r y Study of the History of Religions', Criterion 2, no. 2 (1963): 25-26, for a discussion of w h y this 'narrowness' necessitates an extensive schematization and the problems involved therein. 72. O t t o , pp. 3—4 and passim. 73. Ibid., p. 175; 'the holy' L 'an a priori category of m i n d ' and is 'not to be derived f r o m "experience" or " h i s t o r y " '. See Charles H. Long, 'Archaism and H e r m e n eutics', The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, pp. 69-70; Charles H. Long, 'Where is the History of Religions Leading Us?', Criterion 6, no. 3 (1967): 19.

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was correct in realizing that m o s t earlier investigators, not to mention m a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y scholars, w e r e incapable of empathizing w i t h the n u m i n o u s experience, and this led to analyses which distorted the nature of religious phenomena. B u t O t t o ' s appeal to the 'unique religious element' in the reader's 'deeply-felt religious experience' 7 4 also will not do, since experience is necessary b u t not sufficient in understanding religious phenomena. T h e r e is n o 'pure' encounter; experience is not wholly self-interpreting. We always need criteria of w h a t counts. O t t o insisted u p o n the irreducibility of the numinous, but he did not succeed in providing an adequate hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k for perceiving and interpreting these irreducible manifestations. W h a t O t t o lacks and w h a t the c o n t e m p o r a r y phenomenologist must provide is a comprehensive structural analysis, in terms of w h i c h the reader can empathize w i t h the n u m i n o u s experience, distinguish authentic religious phenomena, and interpret the religious meanings of such manifestations. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , O t t o ' s antireductionistic concerns, focusing on the rationalistic and historicistic reductions of previous interpretations, led h i m t o o far in the opposite direction: he was not justified in identifying religion with the nonrational, and he was not sufficiently concerned either w i t h the f o r m s of the w o r l d t h r o u g h w h i c h the n u m i n o u s manifests itself or w i t h the specific m e a n i n g of each historical manifestation of religion. As Charles Long has written, O t t o ' s 'theory of the religious a priori operated as one of Kant's regulative ideas'. O t t o seems to provide us ' w i t h an explanatory law of religious experience and expression — a law n o t derivative f r o m historical experience'. 7 5 74. O t t o , p. 8. Those w h o cannot identify this unique n u m i n o u s element in their experience — as w o u l d seem to be the case with most readers in our m o d e r n desacralized age — are 'requested to read n o farther'. 75. Long, 'Archaism and Hermeneutics', p. 69. We have emphasized O t t o ' s antireductionist claim, especially as a reaction against the reductions evident in previous approaches. But the above should make clear that O t t o himself was a reductionist. N o t only is his p h e n o m e n o l o g y founded on certain Kantian assumptions and categories and on a preference for certain ('nonhistorical', 'mystical') types of experience, but even m o r e obvious are his underlying, personal, Christian, theological beliefs. This is evident in the many passages in Mysticism East and West, The Idea of the

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This is w h y c o n t e m p o r a r y Historians of Religions, w h o recognize the need to do justice to the historical and particular dimension of religious experience, claim to be using an empirical approach w h i c h is devoid of any a priori j u d g m e n t s . Here lies a crucial methodological problem for Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . As w e shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, Eliade will claim to e m p l o y an empirical method, which is free f r o m any a priori j u d g m e n t s and describes only w h a t the data reveal; and at the same time, he will proceed to uncover various universal structures, which seem incapable of being falsified by f u t u r e data. In Chapter 6, w e shall suggest h o w the phenomenologist m i g h t arrive at such contingent, yet necessary structures. G. van der Leeuw M a n y of the methodological contributions m a d e by Gerardus van der Leeuw have already been suggested in our analysis of R u d o l f O t t o . For example, w e need not analyze van der Leeuw's insistence on the irreducibility of the religious and his opposition to various reductionist approaches. Van der Leeuw, unlike O t t o , attempted to analyze and systematize a t r e m e n d o u s n u m b e r of historical expressions of religious experiences. His Religion in Essence and Manifestation is a classic in the systematic research of the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion. Probably m o r e than any other Historian of Religions, van der Leeuw was impressed by the religious aspect of'power', as evidenced in the findings of such investigators as C o d r i n g t o n and Hewitt. B u t unlike Marett, in his pre-animistic theory of mana or dynamism, he realized that the object of religion was n o t an 'impersonal force': 'the idea of P o w e r . . . empirically, and within s o m e f o r m of experience, becomes authenticated in things and persons. . . .' 76 T h e key to van der Leeuw's p h e n o m e n o l o g y lies in this notion of power, which is at the basis of every religious f o r m and which defines that which is religious. Beginning by simply characterizing the object Holy, a n d o t h e r w o r k s in w h i c h O t t o ' d e s c r i b e s ' t h e ' s u p e r i o r i t y ' o f C h r i s t i a n i t y — a C h r i s t i a n i t y w h o s e t r u t h is f o r t h e m o s t p a r t k n o w n in a n o n h i s t o r i c a l a n d i n t r o s p e c tive m a n n e r . 76. G. v a n der L e e u w , Religion in Essence and Manifestation, vol. 1, p. 28 a n d chaps. 1-3.

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of religious experience as a vague ' S o m e w h a t ' , his phenomenological analysis leads to the following typical assertions: ' P h e n o m e n o l o g y describes h o w m a n conducts himself in his relation to P o w e r ' ; 'Taken all together ["holy", sanctus, tabu, etc.], they provide the description of Other", w h a t occurs in all religious experience: a strange, "Wholly Power obtrudes into life. '77 In his 'epilegomena' van der Leeuw shows s o m e k n o w l e d g e of phenomenological analysis, 78 but it is difficult to discern h o w this approach is utilized in his study of religious phenomena. A l t h o u g h he maintains that one must respect the specific intentionality of religious p h e n o m e n a and simply describe ' w h a t appears into view', so convinced is he of the primacy of the notion o f ' p o w e r ' , that he forces all of his data into this interpretive scheme. Consequently, he is often insensitive to the rich complexity and individuality of the religious expressions. Van der Leeuw realized that p h e n o m e n o l o g y must constantly appeal to history, that it m u s t be open to 'perpetual correction by the m o s t conscientious philological and archaeological research', and that 'it becomes pure art or e m p t y fancy' w h e n it w i t h d r a w s itself f r o m such historical control. 7 9 Yet here lies the greatest weakness in his p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion: he is not concerned w i t h the historical conditioning and specific existential character of all religious expressions and structures. This raises w h a t is probably the f o r e m o s t challenge for the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion. His or her methodological approach to religious p h e n o m e n a must do justice to the interdependence of the historical and the phenomenological, fact and essence, the particular and the universal. W. Brede Kristensen T h e methodological point w e wish to focus u p o n in the descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y of W. Brede Kristensen is his e x t r e m e antireduc77. Van der Leeuw, vol. 1, pp. 23, 191; vol. 2, p. 681. 78. Van der Leeuw, vol. 2, pp. 671-695. Especially note chap. 107 ('Phenomenon and Phenomenology') and chap. 109 ('Phenomenology of Religion'). 79. Ibid., p. 677.

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tionistic tendencies, in terms of which he w o u l d criticize Eliade's phenomenological approach as being highly subjective and n o r m a tive. Professor Kristensen proposed that the usual systematic classifications, which were formulated as objective and essential categories of religion, were to be placed outside the d o m a i n o f descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y : all investigations into the essence and evaluation o f religious p h e n o m e n a are undertaken f r o m the viewpoint of the interpreter, are necessarily normative, and belong to such fields as philosophy and theology. T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion is the systematic and comparative approach which attempts to describe w h a t various religious p h e n o m e n a have in c o m m o n . 8 0 This c o m m o n basis is their 'inner meaning' which can only be understood by c o m b i n i n g a k n o w l e d g e of the historical facts with an 'indefinable s y m p a t h y ' , 'empathy', 'feeling' for the religious data. 81 W h a t the phenomenologist of religion attempts to understand and describe is the sole 'religious reality': the faith of the believers. 'For the historian [Historian of Religions] only one evaluation is possible: " t h e believers were completely r i g h t . " O n l y after w e have grasped this can we understand these people and their religion.' O n e finds that the believers themselves always ascribe an absolute value to their faith, and phenomenologists must respect this absoluteness in their descriptions. We are interested in determining the value of religious manifestations, 'but this is the value that they had for the believers themselves, and this has never been relative, but is always absolute'. 8 2 After a t t e m p t i n g to understand and describe h o w the believers understand their faith (this k n o w l e d g e is always 'approximate'), the 80. This may appear to contradict Kristensen's earlier point that all investigations into the essence of religious phenomena are beyond the domain of phenomenology, since most phenomenologists intend by 'essence' precisely what various 'phenomena have in c o m m o n ' . T h e history of philosophy reveals many conceptions o f ' e s s e n c e ' which are clearly normative, and w e would guess that Kristensen is referring to those metaphysical and theological formulations, in terms of which the scholar goes ' b e y o n d ' the affirmations of homo religiosus, evaluates his or her data, and establishes w h a t is ultimately true or 'really real' in religion. 81. W. Brede Kristensen, The Meaning of Religion, pp. 3, 7, 10. 82. Ibid., pp. 14, 418, 2.

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scholar may try to classify the phenomena according to essential types and to make comparative evaluations. But this takes us beyond the limits of a descriptive phenomenology. 8 3 In Eliade's methodology we shall discern numerous points of agreement with Kristensen's descriptive phenomenology. Yet w e shall observe an effort to surmount the severe restrictions that Kristensen has placed upon a phenomenological approach. Eliade will attempt to include such vital questions as typological classifications and comparative evaluations within the domain of phenomenology of religion.

T R A N S I T I O N : R A F F A E L E P E T T A Z Z O N I AND T H E H I S T O R I C A L PHENOMENOLOGICAL

'TENSION'

Raffaele Pettazzoni attempted to define the nature of the History of Religions in terms of its ' t w o complementary aspects': the historical and the phenomenological. This point can serve as a 'transition' not only to Chapter 3, where w e investigate the present nature of the History of Religions, but also to the following chapters, because Eliade is well aware of the need to provide a method which can do justice to both the historical and the phenomenological. First, we shall direct our attention to several other features of Pettazzoni's approach. Raffaele Pettazzoni was primarily concerned with the historical factor in all religious expressions and referred to his approach as 'a historical-religious way'. Eliade distinguishes Pettazzoni f r o m most historians of religions: H e wanted to be a historian of religions, and not a specialist in a single field. This is an important distinction. Many excellent scholars likewise consider themselves 'historians of religions,' because they accept exclusively historical methods and presupposi83. Ibid., p. 271: ' G r o u p i n g religions according to a particular characteristic is n o t a task for historical or phenomenological inquiry, but rather for philosophical inquiry concerning the essence of religions. For philosophical inquiry does not aim to determine the a u t o n o m o u s value and significance of the divergent types, but attempts to give normative generalizations. It is impossible for the phenomenologist to make such normative distinctions.'

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tions. They are in fact, however, experts in just one religion, and sometimes in only one period or one aspect of that religion. . . . Pettazzoni aimed always at a historico-religious interpretation, i.e., he articulated the results of the different investigations within a general perspective. 84 Pettazzoni tended to consider religious manifestations as purely historical phenomena. The notion of a Supreme Being is a product of the mythical imagination, arising from the existential needs of the particular historical-cultural reality. For example, in pastoral patriarchal civilizations, the notion of the Heavenly Father arose from the existential anxieties of these peoples. But in the historical-cultural context of agricultural matriarchal civilizations, the new existential anxieties necessitated the emergence of a different notion of a Supreme Being, the Mother Earth, which more adequately satisfied the existential needs of that period. 'This historicism is of value for religious phenomenology. Existential anxiety is the common root in the structure of the Supreme Being, but this structure is historically expressed in different forms: the Lord of animals, the Mother Earth, the Heavenly Father. All these structures have profound cultural realities which have conditioned them and of which the various Supreme Beings are expressions.' 85 We may conclude our analysis of approaches during 'the second period' in the History of Religions by citing Pettazzoni's historical84. Eliade, ' T h e H i s t o r y o f R e l i g i o n s in R e t r o s p e c t : 1912-1962', p. 105. A m o n g specialists w h o are also c o m p e t e n t in o t h e r areas, Eliade cites M . P. N i l s s o n , J a n d e Vries, F r a n z A l t h e i m , G e o r g e s D u m é z i l , a n d T h e o d o r H . Gaster; a m o n g c o n t e m p o r a r i e s o f P e t t a z z o n i w h o also a t t e m p t e d t o c o v e r t h e entire field o f allgemeine Religionsgeschichte, h e cites C a r l C l e m e n , E. O . J a m e s , a n d G. v a n d e r L e e u w . 85. P e t t a z z o n i , ' T h e S u p r e m e B e i n g : P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l S t r u c t u r e a n d Historical D e v e l o p m e n t ' , p p . 6 5 - 6 6 . C h a r l e s L o n g ( ' A r c h a i s m and H e r m e n e u t i c s ' , p.73) p r e sents several criticisms o f P e t t a z z o n i ' s p o s i t i o n . G r a n t e d that certain s y m b o l s are d i s c o v e r e d a n d p r e d o m i n a t e in d i f f e r e n t cultural-historical periods, o n e c a n n o t ' l i m i t t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s y m b o l i s m s i m p l y t o a reflection of t h e w o r l d - v i e w o f t h e p e r i o d ' . G r a n t e d that existential a n x i e t y is a g e n e r a l characteristic o f all p e r i o d s , ' t h e m o d a l i t i e s t h r o u g h w h i c h m a n expresses this a n x i e t y take o n d i f f e r e n t f o r m s . W h a t m o r e t h a n existential a n x i e t y is e x p r e s s e d in religious s y m b o l i s m ? ' P e t t a z z o n i ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a n n o t e x p l a i n ' t h e w i d e v a r i e t y o f r e l i g i o u s s y m b o l i s m ' a n d ' t h e persistence o f t h e s a m e s y m b o l i s m in d i f f e r e n t cultural historical p e r i o d s ' .

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phenomenological formulation, which broadly identifies the directions in Religionswissenschaft today. ' T h e peculiar nature, the very character, of religious facts as such give them the right to f o r m the subject of a special science. ' This is the 'science of religion' [History of Religions]: 'the essential character of religious facts is the necessary and sufficient reason for its existence.' Within the science of religion, one can distinguish 'a historical science, the history of religion'. But w e are not satisfied with knowing 'precisely what happened and h o w the facts came to be; what w e want above all to k n o w is the meaning of what happened'. The history of religion does not yield this 'deeper understanding'; 'it springs f r o m another religious science, phenomenology'. 8 6 Yet the historical approaches have reacted against the phenomenological attempt to grasp the 'essence' and 'structures' of religious phenomena. It is this tension, with the attempt to find a. broader perspective which can incorporate both of these approaches, which defines much of the direction of the History of Religions today. Phenomenology and history complement each other. Phenomenology cannot do without ethnology, philology, and other historical disciplines. Phenomenology, on the other hand, gives the historical disciplines that sense of the religious which they are not able to capture. . . . Religious phenomenology and history are not t w o sciences but are t w o complementary aspects of the integral science of religion, and the science of religion as such has a welldefined character given to it by its unique and proper subject matter. 87 86. Raffaele Pettazzoni, 'History and P h e n o m e n o l o g y in the Science of Religion', Essays on the History of Religions, pp. 215, 216, 217. Three articles in U . Bianchi, C . J . Bleeker, and A. Bausani, eds., Problems and Methods of the History of Religions discuss the crucial methodological issue of the relationship between history and p h e n o m e n o l o g y within the History of Religions: G. Widengren, 'La m é t h o d e comparative: entre philologie et phénoménologie', pp. 5-14; U g o Bianchi, ' T h e Definition of Religion. O n the M e t h o d o l o g y of Historical-Comparative Research', pp. 15-34; J o u c o Bleeker, ' T h e Contribution of the P h e n o m e n o l o g y of Religion to the Study of the History of Religions', pp. 35-54. 87. Pettazzoni, ' T h e Supreme Being: Phenomenological Structure and Historical Development', p. 66. See Pettazzoni, 'History and P h e n o m e n o l o g y in the Science of Religion', pp. 217-219.

3

The Hermeneutical Situation Today

O u r purpose in this chapter is to arrive at a general view of the central methodological issues and problems c o n f r o n t i n g the Historian of Religions today. T o a considerable extent, such a perspective emerges f r o m the contributions and errors of previous approaches. O u r m a j o r p u r p o s e in formulating this hermeneutical situation is to lay the f o u n dation for an analysis of Eliade's phenomenological approach and to see h o w he deals with these central methodological concerns. W e shall begin by focusing u p o n Pettazzoni's crucial historicalphenomenological 'tension'. T h e n w e shall consider t w o c o n t e m p o r ary 'generalist' approaches, which will be seen as alternatives to Eliade's 'generalist' approach and as criticisms of m u c h of his m e t h o d o l o g y . Finally, w e shall f o r m u l a t e various problems, issues, and concerns, and this will lay the foundation for an understanding of the present hermeneutical situation in which Mircea Eliade investigates religious phenomena.

'SPECIALISTS' A N D

'GENERALISTS'

W e concluded our sketch of the H i s t o r y of Religions by defining its present nature in terms of a tension between the historical and the phenomenological approaches. As Kitagawa has stressed, 'the p r o b lem of " u n d e r s t a n d i n g , " w h i c h is the central task of Religionswissenschaft, requires a hermeneutical principle which w o u l d enable us to h a r m o n i z e the insights and contributions of b o t h historical and structural inquiries, w i t h o u t at the same time doing injustice to the methodological integrity of either approach'. 1 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , no one appears to have formulated such a hermeneutical principle, and the complete harmonization of these t w o 1. Kitagawa, 'Primitive, Classical, and Modern Religions', p. 42.

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approaches m a y be a methodological impossibility. N o t that this broader perspective cannot serve as a regulative ideal, but, as Eliade has written, these t w o approaches reflect to s o m e degree different philosophical temperaments. 2 H e goes on to maintain that such an inevitable tension is creative; the t w o approaches c o m p l e m e n t each other by guarding against the d o g m a t i c extremes inherent in each, and together they yield a m o r e complete k n o w l e d g e of homo religiosus.3 It should be noted that those Historians of Religions w h o are not concerned w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y do not usually express this h e r meneutical difference in terms of the historical-phenomenological tension w e have formulated. Considering the entire discipline, it is probably m o s t adequate to conceive of this methodological tension as between approaches tending t o w a r d either specialization or generality and synthesis. As w e shall see, specialist approaches tend to emphasize the unique, particular, historical conditions of the religious p h e n o m e non. P h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion, w i t h its search for universal structures and its comparative and systematic research, will be considered one kind of generalist approach. Mircea Eliade will be seen as a generalist w h o uses a phenomenological approach. D u r i n g 'the first period', w e observed ambitious syntheses and sweeping generalizations. Historians of Religions f o u n d parallels and uniformities everywhere: the quest for the universal primordial stage of religion, the delineation of a universal evolutionary scheme for religion, the f o r m u l a t i o n of a simple yet universal definition of religion, etc. T o w h a t extent Eliade can o v e r c o m e the methodological errors of earlier 'generalists' will greatly determine the success of his phenomenological approach. D u r i n g 'the second period', w e observed a p r o n o u n c e d reaction against the sweeping comparisons and assumed uniformities of earlier ethnologists and philologists. With the emergence of new disciplines and the differentiation of n u m e r o u s 'schools', the investigation of religion became highly specialized. Eliade, in b o t h describing and 2. In conversation, Eliade has suggested that this methodological tension may be viewed as a fundamental atomistic-holistic difference in approach. 3. Eliade, 'History of Religions and a N e w H u m a n i s m ' , pp. 7-8. We shall observe that Eliade attempts to formulate such a hermeneutics which does justice both to the historical and the phenomenological. H o w e v e r , it will be seen that he stresses the latter, often at the expense of the historical.

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criticizing this tendency, claims that 'from Max Miiller and Andrew Lang to Frazer and Marett, from Marett to Levy-Bruhl, and from Levy-Bruhl to historians of religions [Historians of Religions] of our day one notices a progressive loss of creativity and an accompanying loss of interpretive cultural synthesis in favor of fragmented, analytical research'. 4 Those Historians of Religions, whom we have subsumed under the category of historical approaches, have continued this emphasis upon more intensive investigations, usually limiting their research to a particular culture, or to a specific period, or to one aspect of religious phenomena. In quoting Pettazzoni, we described this more specialized approach in terms of 'the history of religions', especially emphasizing the endeavor to know 'precisely what happened and how the facts came to be'. Joachim Wach describes the 'historical approach' as attempting 'to trace the origin and growth of religious ideas and institutions through definite periods of historical development and to assess the role of the forces with which religion contended during these periods'. 5 By 'history', we shall often mean not only history 'proper' but also all of the highly specialized disciplines which provide data for the phenomenologist: ethnological studies, archaeological discoveries, etc. In a similar fashion, Eliade sometimes substitutes for 'history' such terms as 'philology'— 'understanding by this term knowledge of the language, history, and culture of the societies whose religion he [the scholar] studies'. 6 Today we can observe an increasing number of'generalists', who, while cognizant of the methodological inadequacies of earlier research, have reacted against what they consider the overspecialization of recent decades. This is evidenced in the efforts to formulate a general systematic framework, in terms of which one can then interpret the particular religious manifestation and make adequate comparisons and generalizations. It is in this light that one must see efforts such as Charles Long's attempt to articulate 'some logical framework 4. Mircea Eliade, 'Crisis and Renewal in History o f Religions', History of Religions 5, no. 1 (1965): 5. This article is reproduced as chapter 4 in The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion. 5. Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions, p. 21. 6. Eliade, 'Crisis and Renewal in History of Religions', p. 6.

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w h i c h does justice to all of these ingredients': not only the phenomenological and morphological, 'but equally the existential, social and practical dimensions of religion'. 7 A l t h o u g h all phenomenologists of religion seem to adopt a broad systematic approach, it m u s t be emphasized that m a n y use the term ' p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' in such a m a n n e r that it bears little if any resemblance to c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y . 8 'We use the term not in the sense of Husserl and Scheler but to indicate the s y s t e m atic, not the historical, study of p h e n o m e n a like prayer, priesthood, sect, etc.' 'Are types . . . the last w o r d which the historian of religions [Historian o f Religions] has to contribute? Very possibly, yes; qua historian [Historian of Religions] he cannot go further. ' 9 Here one means by p h e n o m e n o l o g y w h a t is meant by the term in m a n y fields such as Phenomenological Q u a n t u m Mechanics: the systematic study of the various types of p h e n o m e n a within one's discipline. H o w e v e r , in Pettazzoni, Eliade, and others w e have cited, ' p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' is given a m o r e specific m e a n i n g — one that will be seen to be n o t greatly at odds w i t h its present philosophical usage. Mircea Eliade will be taken as the outstanding phenomenologist of religion. First w e shall indicate several essential points of disagreement a m o n g c o n t e m p o r a r y generalists.

T w o 'GENERALIST' APPROACHES

M o s t systematic approaches consist of a series of classifications, illustrated by several references and claiming to be objective and universally applicable. But w h y are these 'the essential categories', 'the relevant data', 'the appropriate evaluations'? 7. Charles H . Long, ' P r o l e g o m e n o n to a Religious H e r m e n e u t i c ' , p. 254. T h i s need f o r a ' f r a m e w o r k ' is the p r e d o m i n a n t goal in W a c h ' s w o r k s . See The Comparative Study of Religions, p. x and passim. 8. N o t e Bleeker's f o r m u l a t i o n o f different 'types' o f ' p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f religion', w h i c h w e presented in chapter 2 u n d e r ' P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Approaches'. 9. Wach, Sociology of Religion, p. 1; Types of Religious Experience, p. 229; The Comparative Study of Religions, pp. 25-26. In his hermeneutics, Wach is definitely influenced b y philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y . H e acknowledges that his m e t h o d o l o g y greatly depends o n the perspective of Scheler, and he is deeply concerned w i t h a descriptive analysis o f the intentionality of religious experience. See Types of Religious Experience, p. 30.

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C o n s i d e r the classification of mysticism. B o u q u e t finds t w o categories of mystical religion: 'specifically Christian and specifically n o n - C h r i s t i a n ' . 1 0 Similarly, in describing 'the f o u r characteristics of true mysticism', U n d e r h i l l asserts that 'the business and m e t h o d of M y s t i c i s m is Love'. O n e can i m a g i n e the reaction of a B u d d h i s t to the description of this essential characteristic of all mysticism: the intense, passionate love of G o d , the 'attraction, desire, and u n i o n as the fulfillm e n t of desire'. 1 1 In short, it seems that m o s t systematic approaches have been m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y uncritical and have rested u p o n a highly n o r m a t i v e f o u n d a t i o n . Interpreters' classifications are plausible only if w e m a k e their assumptions, restrict o u r investigation to their evidence, and ask their questions. Several systematic approaches have a t t e m p t e d to deal w i t h such m e t h o d o l o g i c a l difficulties. O u r rationale f o r selecting these generalist approaches m a y be expressed in the f o l l o w i n g m a n n e r . T h e s e approaches are easily differentiated f r o m one another as well as f r o m Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e positions e x e m p l i f y divergent tendencies in Religionswissenschaft t o d a y and raise different m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s and issues. Each can be seen as a c o n t e m p o r a r y alternative to Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g i c a l approach. A brief consideration of each of these approaches will enable a greater c o m p r e h e n s i o n of the hermeneutical situation of the H i s t o r y of Religions today. T h e m a j o r points o f a g r e e m e n t a m o n g c o n t e m p o r a r y scholars and the central m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issues and p r o b l e m s c o n f r o n t i n g the Historian of Religions will b e c o m e evident. W e shall then be in a better position to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y 10. A. C. Bouquet, Comparative Religion, pp. 288-289. Incidentally, according to this classification, mystics such as Eckhart are 'non-Christian'. 11. Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism, pp. 85-90. It is true, as A. L. Basham notes (The Wonder That Was India [ N e w York: Grove Press, 1959], pp. 284-285), that metta (loving kindness) is occasionally described with great passion. Nevertheless, an overall view of B u d d h i s m clearly discloses that such an intense passionate love, so admired in Christianity, is a manifestation of tanha (desire, craving) which is the 'cause' oidukkha (sorrow, etc.). Buddhists generally emphasize a 'spirit of benevolent harmlessness', 'the detached radiation of metta'— not 'love aflame with all desire, but love at peace'. Winston L. King, In Hope of Nibbana (La Salle, Illinois: O p e n C o u r t Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 150-158; and Christmas H u m p h r e y s , Buddhism (London: Penguin Books, 1962), pp. 125-126.

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is attempting to do and to what extent he succeeds in interpreting the religious phenomena. Dependence on a normative (theological) basis

If Kristensen is correct and the History of Religions is a descriptive discipline which stops short of comparative classifications and evaluations, most scholars have conceived of it as preparatory to those normative fields which consider such questions. Probably most Western Historians of Religions who have granted their descriptive research this preliminary role have been Christian theologians. Usually they understood their research to be descriptive in its initial stages; it served an indispensable preparatory role for their overriding comparative and evaluative concerns. Unfortunately, it would seem that their methodology and conclusions as Historians of Religions were considerably influenced by, and were often completely dependent upon, their theological beliefs. For nineteen hundred years, the Christian theological understanding of non-Christian religions has usually taken some variation of the basic apologetic approach which early Christian theologians took toward the pagan religions. 12 The aim was to demonstrate the insufficiency of other religions when compared to Christianity. At best, these other religions had some limited value, especially in preparing one to receive the true Christian revelation. At worst, they were completely false and even demonic. We should notice that the relationship between one's theology and his or her History of Religions is far from simple. Both the nature and scope of one's History of Religions are greatly influenced by his or her specific theology. Liberal theologians have tended to be more interested in and 'sympathetic' toward other religious phenomena; many orthodox theologians have been unwilling to grant other religions even the slightest positive value. Philip H. Ashby traces the change in American theological attitudes toward non-Christian religions. 13 A liberal attitude produced considerable interest in the History of Religions in the late nineteenth and 12. Philip H. Ashby, ' T h e History of Religions', Religion, p. 19. 13. Ibid., pp. 18-24.

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early twentieth centuries. In the 1930s, under the influence of such European theologians as Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, the theological understanding of non-Christian religions greatly changed and interest in the H i s t o r y of Religions sharply declined. In a similar manner, E r w i n R. G o o d e n o u g h maintains that the change in theological attitude and decline in the scientific study of religion are related to the 'collapses which followed u p o n the catastrophe of 1914'. T h e conditions in defeated G e r m a n y of 1918, the great financial depression, the horrors o f the Hitlerian war, etc., led m a n y to emphasize 'the inherent sinfulness of m a n and the m o c k e r y of his analytical and scientific efforts'. ' M e n ' s only h o p e is in a divine act of revelation'; the scientific study of religion is futile and even impious. 1 4 It w o u l d seem that those c o n t e m p o r a r y theologians w h o are c o n cerned w i t h the History of Religions often bear a m a r k e d resemblance to the generalists o f ' t h e first period': they approach their descriptive studies w i t h prior beliefs, and inherent in their very act of description are evaluative principles provided by these accepted beliefs. In short, as Historians of Religions their descriptions do not do justice to 'the other'. N o one w o u l d deny the value of the H i s t o r y o f Religions for theology or the value of a theology of the H i s t o r y of Religions. B u t the position w e wish to question insists that the History of Religions is not possible unless aided by or based u p o n a n o r m a t i v e discipline such as theology. T o illustrate such a position, let us briefly consider the view of H e n d r i k Kraemer, Kristensen's pupil and successor as Professor of the H i s t o r y and P h e n o m e n o l o g y of Religions at the University of Leiden. While recognizing the preliminary value of Kristensen's descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y , Kraemer defends the 'ultimate Tightness of a theological approach'. O n l y a theological approach can deal w i t h 'the majestic p r o b l e m of T r u t h ' and w i t h such a ' p r o b l e m as that of the perennial ambiguity of Religion'. 1 5 It seems to us that Kraemer, as well as most theologians in the H i s t o r y of Religions, is not simply contending that theology should 14. E r w i n R. G o o d e n o u g h , 'Religionswissenschaft', Numen 6, fasc. 2 (1959): 81-82. 15. Hendrik Kraemer, Introduction to W. Brede Kristensen's The Meaning of Religion, pp. x x i v - x x v .

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continue where the descriptive History o f Religions limits itself. He is not endorsing Kristensen's view o f phenomenology and then asserting that this preliminary discipline should be supplemented by normative investigations. Rather his point seems to be the following: A descriptive History o f Religions which is not grounded in theology cannot hope to understand the very religious phenomena it attempts to describe. B y examining the forms o f expression o f a religion (myth, cultus, dogma, etc.), the phenomenologist attempts to understand the religious phenomena and to claim an objectivity for her or his descriptions. But any such analysis and claim to objectivity is always 'from the "scientific" standpoint, a psychological and sociological reality which may have great significance but is quite different from what is suggested by objektiver Geist, which points to the realm o f metaphysics. . . . [Historians o f Religions overlook] the fact that the category o f faith is essentially a different category from psychological understanding or experience, however penetrating the latter may be.' 1 6 T o understand religious phenomena one must view them 'from within'. It is for this reason that only theology 'is able to produce that attitude o f freedom o f the spirit and o f impartial understanding, combined with a criticism and evaluation transcending all imprisonment in preconceived ideas and principles as ultimate standards o f reference'. 17 Unfortunately, Kraemer's Neo-Calvinist approach is conspicuous both by its excessive 'criticism and evaluation' and its lack of'impartial understanding'. His normative position is that no one can 'know' God except through the absolute revelation o f 'Biblical realism'. 18 Kraemer, 'whose books are valuable precisely because he makes no attempt to be impartial, but takes Biblical Christianity as the absolute standard against which he judges all religions including historical Christianity, does not seem to be worried by the fact that Muslims have a precisely similar absolute standard against which the religions, 16. Hendrik Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith, pp. 5 0 - 5 1 . 17. Ibid., p. 53. 18. Hendrik Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World, pp. 61 ff.

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including Dr. K r a e m e r ' s o w n Biblical realism, m u s t be j u d g e d ' . 1 9 Invariably such a n o r m a t i v e standard renders one's H i s t o r y of Religions unsatisfactory to all save the m i n o r i t y w h o adopt this particular theological viewpoint. W h a t concerns us is not K r a e m e r ' s specific approach, which w e believe distorts any understanding o f ' t h e other'. B u t the Historian of Religions must recognize serious objections raised by any view which submits that the History of Religions is n o t an a u t o n o m o u s discipline; it is b o t h aided by and dependent u p o n a n o r m a t i v e discipline such as theology. If one proceeds b e y o n d the 'descriptive limitations' of a Kristensen, can such n o r m a t i v e questions as those of comparison and evaluation only be understood t h r o u g h an approach which has a n o r m a t i v e basis? Is any approach which is free f r o m such a n o r m a t i v e g r o u n d i n g only capable of yielding an apparent 'objectivity', which is lacking in depth and produces a distorted understanding of the religious phenomena? T h e dilemma facing Historians of Religions m a y be summarized as follows: W h e n w e g r o u n d our approach on s o m e n o r m a t i v e basis, our conclusions seem acceptable only to those w h o share our n o r m a t i v e position; w h e n w e refuse any such n o r m a t i v e foundation, the scope of our inquiry is severely restricted and o u r conclusions m a y indicate a lack of depth and a distortion in understanding the religious phenomena. Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y will attempt to preserve the a u t o n o m y of a descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y and at the same time to deal adequately w i t h the comparative and evaluative religious questions. The study of religious persons T h e r e is a c o n t e m p o r a r y 'generalist' approach which attempts to disassociate itself f r o m all positions w e have examined. In m a n y respects it will appear as antithetical to the theological approach of a Kraemer. C o m p a r a t i v e religion, according to Wilfred Cantwell Smith and several others, is 'the study of persons'. 'All religions are n e w religions, every m o r n i n g . For religions do not exist u p in the sky 19. R. C. Zaehner, The Comparison of Religions, p. 195. See pp. 172-173.

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somewhere, elaborated, finished, and static; they exist in m e n ' s hearts.' 2 0 Smith delineates several steps leading to the understanding o f ' r e l i g i o u s persons': T h e traditional f o r m of Western scholarship in the study of other men's religion was that of an impersonal presentation of an 'it.' T h e first great innovation in recent times has been the personalization of the faiths observed, so that one finds a discussion of a 'they.' Presently the observer becomes personally involved, so that the situation is one of a ' w e ' talking about a 'they.' T h e next step is a dialogue, w h e r e ' w e ' talk to ' y o u . ' If there is listening and m u t u ality, this m a y become that ' w e ' talk w i t h 'you.' T h e culmination of this progress is w h e n ' w e all' are talking with each other about 'us. ' 2 1 In light of this view of w h a t it is to study religion, Smith offers several revolutionary methodological recommendations. W e should desist f r o m using the terms and concepts 'religion, the religions, and the specific n a m e d religions'. T h e concept 'religion' is 'confusing, unnecessary, and distorting'. T h e 'vitality of personal faith' and the attempt to understand 'the traditions of other people t h r o u g h o u t history and t h r o u g h o u t the world, are b o t h seriously blocked by our a t t e m p t to conceptualize w h a t is involved in each case in terms of (a) religion'. In short, the Historian of Religions should n o t be concerned w i t h 'religion' or 'the religions' but w i t h ' m a n ' s religiousness', w i t h persons w h o have lived and are 'living religiously'. 2 2 If 'religion' is 'the faith in m e n ' s hearts', and if w e recall h o w Historians of Religions f r o m early ethnologists to c o n t e m p o r a r y theologians have attributed to 'the other' w h a t they themselves believed, w e m a y better appreciate Smith's second r e c o m m e n d a t i o n : 'that n o statement about a religion is valid unless it can be a c k n o w ledged by that religion's believers'. 2 3 A l t h o u g h this standard o f ' v a l i d i t y ' should be used as a 'pedagogic 20. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, ' T h e C o m p a r a t i v e Study of Religion: Reflections on the Possibility and Purpose of a Religious Science', McCiil University, Faculty of Divinity, Inaugural Lectures, p. 51. 21. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, ' C o m p a r a t i v e Religion: W h i t h e r — and Why?', p. 34. 22. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, pp. 50, 119-153, and 194-195; ' C o m p a r a t i v e Religion: W h i t h e r — and Why?', p. 55. 23. Smith, ' C o m p a r a t i v e Religion: Whither — and Why?', p. 42.

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principle', 2 4 w e w o u l d s u b m i t that it n o t o n l y has practical difficulties ( W h i c h a d h e r e n t s ? H o w m a n y adherents?), b u t it o f t e n is a false s t a n d a r d o f validity. C e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e m u s t b e g i v e n to w h a t t h e o t h e r believes; b u t this is o n l y p r e l i m i n a r y t o the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f religious p h e n o m e n a . H e r e K r a e m e r w a s j u s t i f i e d in d i s t i n g u i s h i n g ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l reality' f r o m a d e e p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e religious p h e n o m e n a . K r i s t e n s e n w a s w r o n g : t h e faith o f the believer is n o t 'final'. Believers o f t e n h a v e a s t r o n g a p o l o g e t i c t e n d e n c y w h e n discussing their beliefs. O f t e n t h e y m a y n o t u n d e r s t a n d certain t h i n g s a b o u t their religion o r t h e m s e l v e s w h i c h a n o t h e r p e r s o n can. S o m e t i m e s their faith takes t h e f o r m o f ' s u p e r s t i t i o n ' a n d o t h e r ' a b e r r a t i o n s ' ; usually they are u n a w a r e o f t h e s u b c o n s c i o u s a n d u n c o n s c i o u s d i m e n s i o n s o f their faith; f r e q u e n t l y t h e y are u n a w a r e o f the richness and c o m p l e x i t y implicit in their beliefs. 2 5 In short, w e m u s t b e able t o interpret and evaluate w h a t t h e o t h e r believes. B u t can w e a v o i d the pitfalls o f the h i g h l y subjective, e v a l u a tive a p p r o a c h e s o f the past? C a n w e h a v e a h e r m e n e u t i c a l a p p r o a c h w h i c h d o e s j u s t i c e t o t h e o t h e r ' s faith and at t h e s a m e t i m e is able t o evaluate his o r her d e s c r i p t i o n s in t e r m s o f s o m e larger m e t h o d o l o g i cal f r a m e w o r k ? S m i t h has c o r r e c t l y elucidated difficulties in traditional a p p r o a c h e s . W h e n w e e l i m i n a t e ' t h e personal', w e are n o l o n g e r i n v e s t i g a t i n g ' t h e religious'. O u r m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h m u s t a l w a y s p r e s e r v e the central i m p o r t a n c e o f ' t h e religious p e r s o n ' . Analyses based u p o n the c o n c e p t s o f ' r e l i g i o n ' and ' t h e religious' h a v e p r o v e n c o n f u s i n g and h i g h l y p o l e m i c a l (as in ' C h r i s t i a n versus n o n - C h r i s t i a n ' religious p h e n o m e n a ) . H i s t o r i a n s o f R e l i g i o n s h a v e been o b l i v i o u s t o t h e p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e o f listening to w h a t the believer has t o say a b o u t h e r o r his o w n religion. W h a t S m i t h s e e m s t o b e lacking is a methodological structure t o his a p p r o a c h . Yes, h e is correct in stressing that w e m u s t learn to c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h each other, w e m u s t a p p r o a c h o t h e r religious beliefs 24. Isma'il Ragi A. al Faruqi, ' H i s t o r y o f Religions: Its N a t u r e a n d Significance f o r C h r i s t i a n E d u c a t i o n a n d t h e M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n D i a l o g u e ' , Numen 12, fasc. 1 (1965): 45. 25. F o r e x a m p l e , see Eliade, Patterns, pp. 6 - 7 ; a n d The Forge and the Crucible, p. 108.

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with love, humility, tolerance, and respect. 26 But there is a difference between believing and understanding. It is not apparent that Smith has ever really raised such questions as those of hermeneutics and objectivity. Any Historian of Religions must be mindful of Smith's insights. But without raising these questions of hermeneutics and objectivity, no methodology is adequate for understanding the scope and profundity of religious phenomena.

C O M M O N M E T H O D O L O G I C A L ISSUES A N D PROBLEMS

In gaining some insight into the hermeneutical situation of the History of Religions today, we described the historical-phenomenological tension, which was seen to be a particular formulation of the specialist-generalist tension. We then analyzed two contemporary generalist approaches, which revealed different methodological tendencies today and will be seen as challenges to Eliade's phenomenology. It is now time to formulate several common methodological issues, problems, and concerns, largely arising from past approaches and defining the hermeneutical situation in which Eliade interprets the meaning of religious phenomena. Our enumeration of general points of agreement, problems, and issues is in little more than skeleton form. It is imperative that we realize that the following is not intended as a satisfactory analysis of any of these methodological points. We are simply delineating several of the issues with which Eliade's phenomenology will be concerned. Thus, under our first point, we simply and bluntly assert that most contemporary Historians of Religions seem to assume that religion presupposes religious experience. 26. Smith urges the following 'general principle' in arguing against Kraemer's position: 'that an outsider cannot understand a civilization or a great religion unless he approaches it with humility and love' ('Comparative Religion: Whither— and Why?', p. 50, n. 39). Previously we presented Smith's position as antithetical to the theological approach of a Kraemer. However, it seems to us that his approach may also depend upon a religious foundation. Unlike Kraemer, his religious basis stresses love, tolerance, and mutual respect. With Kraemer, we have a narrow methodological approach which is unsatisfactory; with Smith, we cannot discern a self-critically formulated, methodological structure to his approach.

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W e in n o w a y a t t e m p t to analyze the n a t u r e of that religious experience, h o w one can distinguish religious f r o m nonreligious experience, etc. O u r intention is to present and to evaluate Eliade's response to these and similar m e t h o d o l o g i c a l questions in the ensuing chapters. Religious experience and the irreducibility of the religious T h e general starting point f o r m o s t Historians of Religions seems to be the a s s u m p t i o n that 'religion presupposes "religious experience," h o w e v e r this t e r m m a y be interpreted, on the part of homo religiosus. Call it the experience of the H o l y , the Sacred, or the P o w e r , it is that s o m e t h i n g w h i c h underlies all religious p h e n o m e n a . ' 2 7 While starting w i t h this assumption, Historians of Religions readily concede that they d o not possess direct k n o w l e d g e of the religious experiences of others. W h a t they begin w i t h are the religious expressions of homo religiosus. W h e t h e r w e consider the religious experiences of antiquity or of o u r contemporaries, w e m u s t still interpret w h a t others express. B y carefully e x a m i n i n g the religious data, Historians of Religions a t t e m p t to u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e of the religious e x p e r i ences expressed in their data. T o give b u t one illustration, w e h a v e seen that J o a c h i m W a c h s u b s u m e s religious expressions u n d e r three m a j o r classifications: theoretical, practical, and sociological f o r m s of expression. Wach a t t e m p t s to d e t e r m i n e 'if a n y t h i n g like a structure can be discovered in all these f o r m s of expression' and 'to w h a t kind of experience this variegated expression can be traced'. 2 8 P r o b a b l y the p r i m a r y m e t h o d o l o g i c a l task facing Historians of Religions is the need for an adequate m e t h o d o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k or 27. Kitagawa, 'Primitive, Classical, and M o d e r n Religions', p. 40. W h e n w e write 'most Historians o f Religions', w e are referring to scholars w h o publish in such journals as Numen and History of Religions and in such anthologies as History of Religions: Essays in Methodology and History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding. 28. Wach, Types of Religious Experience, p. 30. Kitagawa observes that Wach assumed 'that subjective religiousness is objectified in various expressions, and that these expressions appropriate definite structures w h i c h can be comprehended'. Joseph M. Kitagawa, 'The Life and T h o u g h t o f Joachim Wach', The Comparative Study of Religions b y Joachim Wach, pp. x x i i i - x x i v .

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structure in terms of w h i c h they can interpret their data. T h e sheer quantity of accumulated religious data is impressive. W h a t is n o w d e m a n d e d is a hermeneutics w h i c h does justice to the complexity and specificity of the religious expressions, and, at the same time, provides a rigorous methodological structure in terms of which w e can interpret our data and understand the nature of religious experience. C o n c e r n i n g the nature of this religious experience, most Historians of Religions w o u l d concur w i t h the following: T h e notion that religious experience underlies all religious p h e n o m e n a has a serious methodological implication in the study of religions. In this respect, Mircea Eliade rightly reminds us that 'to try to grasp the essence of such a [religious] p h e n o m e n o n by means of physiology, psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics, art or any other study is false; it misses the one unique and irreducible element in i t — the element of the Sacred.' 2 9 H e r e w e have the point m a d e by O t t o , van der Leeuw, Wach, and m a n y others: the Historian of Religions must respect the f u n d a m e n tally irreducible character of the religious experience. A l t h o u g h s o m e one like Wilfred Cantwell Smith w o u l d be u n h a p p y w i t h such talk of 'the religious' or 'the sacred', he w o u l d also insist u p o n the irreducible character of the experience of religious persons. O n e recalls that M a x Müller proclaimed the a u t o n o m o u s nature of Religionswissenschaft. H o w e v e r , w e have seen that Historians of Religions w e r e invariably reductionists: religious p h e n o m e n a w e r e interpreted in terms of notions b o r r o w e d f r o m other fields (philology, ethnology, etc.). In defining the autonomous nature of their discipline, c o n t e m p o r a r y Historians of Religions contend that religious p h e n o m e n a must be grasped as irreducibly religious, that one must ' m a k e an effort to understand t h e m on their o w n plane of reference'. 3 0 In contrast to most of the previous investigators (sociologists, psychologists, etc.), Historians of Religions a t t e m p t to define their o w n unique perspective 29. Kitagawa, 'Primitive, Classical, and M o d e r n Religions', p. 40; Eliade, Patterns, p. xiii. 30. Eliade, 'History of Religions and a N e w H u m a n i s m ' , p. 4; and Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p. 13.

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qua Historians of Religions. If there are certain irreducible modes by w h i c h religious experiences and their expressions are given, then our ' m e t h o d of understanding must be c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h the givenness of the mode'. 3 1 A l t h o u g h Historians of Religions, in opposing the psychological, sociological, and other reductionisms, maintain that their data reveal 'an irreducible reality, the experience of the sacred', they 'do not agree a m o n g themselves even apropos of the nature of this experience'. For s o m e of them, the 'sacred' as such is a historical p h e n o m e n o n , i.e., it is the result of specific h u m a n experiences in specific historical situations. [Recall Pettazzoni's interpretation.] Others, on the contrary, leave open the question o f ' o r i g i n s ' ; for t h e m the experience of the sacred is irreducible, in the sense that, t h r o u g h such an experience, m a n becomes aware of his specific m o d e of being in the w o r l d and consequently assumes responsibilities which cannot be explained in psychological or socio-economic terms. 3 2 This last statement illustrates the type of assertion— about the h u m a n m o d e of being in the world, the h u m a n condition, etc. — which is the source of m u c h of the criticism of Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . In C h a p ters 6 and 7, w h e n we analyze Eliade's 'more-than-historicalexplanation' claim and especially the different 'levels of meaning' in his m e t h o d o l o g y , w e shall determine w h e t h e r such assertions entail ontological moves on his part. O f course, these general features will require considerable d e v e l o p m e n t and refinement. We may simply note that by ' a u t o n o m o u s ' Historians of Religions d o not mean that Religionswissenschaft is a 'self-sufficient' discipline. It depends heavily u p o n such fields as linguistics, anthropology, and sociology. In addition, by 'irreducible' w e d o n o t mean that there are 'purely religious' phenomena. T h e religious p h e n o m e n a can also be approached f r o m the perspectives of sociology, anthropology, and other disciplines. All that is claimed is that certain experiences or p h e n o m e n a exhibit a 31. Long, ' T h e Meaning of Religion in the C o n t e m p o r a r y Study of the History of Religions', p. 25. See Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions, p. 15. 32. Mircea Eliade, 'Historical Events and Structural Meaning in Tension', Criterion 6, no. 1 (1967): 30.

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fundamental religious character and that our method must be commensurate with the nature o f our subject matter. From the perspective o f the History o f Religions, the sociological, economic, or anthropological dimensions o f the phenomena are 'secondary'. At the same time one acknowledges that from the perspectives o f economics, sociology, or anthropology the 'religious' dimensions o f the phenomena are 'secondary'. What is insisted upon is that the sociological, economic, linguistic, and other studies o f certain phenomena do not exhaust the nature or meaning o f those phenomena. What 'remains' to be studied is the fundamentally irreducible religious character o f those phenomena, and this can only be understood from the perspective o f the History o f Religions. The personal dimension of religious

phenomena

What is the nature o f this approach which attempts to understand the fundamentally irreducible religious phenomena? In answering this question most Historians o f Religions now emphasize several characteristics which sharply contrast with many earlier positions. Perhaps foremost in this regard is the point so stressed by Wilfred Cantwell Smith: our approach must do justice to the personal dimension o f religious phenomena. O n e recalls earlier attempts at creating an 'autonomous', 'scientific' discipline. A 'positivistic' approach to the 'religious facts', marked by an impersonal detachment and a narrowly 'rationalistic' attitude, was the ideal. Contemporary Historians o f Religions contend that such an approach leads to the reduction o f ' l i v i n g ' data to 'dead' data, o f the personal to the impersonal; in short, o f the religious to the nonreligious. If our method be adequate for our subject matter, our hermeneutics must lead to an understanding o f the highly personal dimension o f the irreducibly religious data. In this regard Smith may be placed at the opposite end o f the spectrum from the nineteenth century scholar. It seems to us that this sheds some light on the difficulties each encounters. It was not by chance that earlier Historians o f Religions adopted an impersonal, detached attitude and a highly rationalistic and positivistic approach to their data; in endeavoring to rid their discipline o f all personal and

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'subjective' elements, they aimed for a rigorous 'scientific objectivity'. They did attain a sense of'scientific objectivity': we can observe what data they accumulated and how they reached their conclusions. Unfortunately, this was a false sense of objectivity, because these Historians of Religions were strong reductionists who were not sensitive to the specific demands of their subject matter. The approach which the naturalist might use in classifying types of insects produced less success for a scholar attempting to understand religious phenomena. In emphasizing the irreducibly personal dimension of religious experience, Smith is more aware of the demands of his subject matter. 'The externals of religion— symbols, institutions, doctrines, practices . . . are not in themselves religion, which lies rather in the area of what these mean to those that are involved. The student is making effective progress when he recognizes that he has to do not with religious systems basically but with religious persons; or at least, with something interior to persons.' 33 But in moving so far from the impersonal approach of the earlier Historians of Religions, scholars like Smith seem to encounter the very difficulties these previous investigators wanted to avoid. One's approach appears highly 'subjective' and seems to be lacking any methodological structure or framework in terms of which we can determine whether the scholar has understood the religious phenomena, i.e., whether her or his conclusions have some degree of 'objectivity'. Smith, in overstressing the personal, does not provide the criteria for objective understanding; earlier Historians of Religions, in trying to eliminate the personal, provided criteria— but not criteria sufficient for objective understanding of religious phenomena, since any approach must do justice to the essentially personal dimension of all religious experience. H o w we understand 'the personal' and what part it plays in our History of Religions will vary from one scholar to the next. The 'externals' of religion ('symbols, institutions, doctrines, practices') are highly personal and not nearly as 'external' as had been thought. But if 33. 'Comparative Religion: Whither — and Why?', p. 35.

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w e go t o o far in u n d e r m i n i n g their religious significance — as S m i t h and several others seem to d o — then w e e n c o u n t e r the a f o r e m e n tioned difficulties. Indeed, w e w o u l d s u b m i t that it is these very symbols, institutions, doctrines, and practices, w h e n approached in a m a n n e r w h i c h does justice to the personal n a t u r e of all religious p h e n o m e n a , that p r o v i d e the hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k in t e r m s of w h i c h o u r interpretations assume s o m e sense of objectivity. Participation and sympathetic

understanding

W e have seen that this emphasis u p o n the personal n a t u r e of the subject matter has focused attention on the highly personal role of the investigator. If Historians of Religions are to u n d e r s t a n d religious p h e n o m e n a ' o n their o w n plane of reference', they m u s t a t t e m p t to place themselves w i t h i n the perspective of homo religiosus. W h a t is needed is a capacity for participation in the religious p h e n o m e n a of the other. ' W h a t is required is n o t indifference,as positivism in its h e y d a y believed — " G r e y cold eyes d o n o t k n o w the value of t h i n g s , " objected N i e t z s c h e — b u t an e n g a g e m e n t of feeling, interest, metexis, or participation.' 3 4 O n e m u s t approach the religious p h e n o m e n a w i t h a sympathetic attitude. ' T h e inquirer m u s t feel an affinity to his subject, and he m u s t be trained to interpret his material w i t h s y m pathetic u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ' 3 5 C o n c e n t r a t i n g on the task o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g H i n d u i s m , A s h b y examines m a n y of the difficulties involved in e n d e a v o r i n g ' t o participate in H i n d u i s m ' . 3 6 T h e Historian of Religions m u s t a t t e m p t to ' b e c o m e as fully as possible at o n e ' w i t h the H i n d u ; it is only as the investigator 'participates b y reenactment w i t h i n himself of the l o n g c o n t i n u o u s u n f o l d i n g of H i n d u i s m . . . that he can begin to u n d e r stand the voice of H i n d u religiosity'. W h a t renders this task of participation even m o r e c o m p l e x and difficult is the fact that there seems to be n o u n i f o r m nature of homo religiosus. As A s h b y points out, the participation necessary for u n d e r s t a n d i n g 'the less intellectual H i n d u , 34. W a c h , The Comparative Study of Religions, p. 12. 35. W a c h , Sociology of Religion, p. 10. 36. Philip H . A s h b y , ' T h e H i s t o r y o f R e l i g i o n s and t h e S t u d y o f H i n d u i s m ' , History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, pp. 143-159.

The

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the homo religiosus of the countryside, the village, and the large city slums of t o d a y ' requires a religious and e m o t i o n a l capacity w h i c h f e w scholars possess. 3 7 A l m o s t all Historians of Religions stress the need f o r personal participation, sympathetic understanding, an 'adequate e m o t i o n a l condition', ' e m p a t h y ' , a 'feeling' for the religious data. B u t these t e r m s tend to be vague, and it is n o t clear h o w such a participation is to be achieved. Insufficient attention has been devoted to developing a rigorous m e t h o d o l o g y in t e r m s of w h i c h one m i g h t check w h e t h e r he or she has reenacted w i t h i n h i m or herself the experience of the other and w h e t h e r o n e has u n d e r s t o o d the religious p h e n o m e n o n u n d e r investigation. Historians of Religions a d m i t that there are inevitable limitations to the personal participation of the investigator. W e a t t e m p t to participate in religious experiences of the other; and by b e c o m i n g as fully as possible at one w i t h the other, w e can partially s u r m o u n t the barriers standing in o u r w a y of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the religious p h e n o m e n a of the other. But, as Kristensen stated, the k n o w l e d g e of the religion of others is always ' a p p r o x i m a t e ' . T h e other is always to s o m e extent other. Recognizing this limitation to o u r participation, Historians of Religions strive to decrease the distance separating t h e m f r o m the o t h e r and thus to u n d e r s t a n d the religious experience of the other as fully as possible.

The commitment of the historian of religions W h o can best participate in and sympathetically u n d e r s t a n d the religious p h e n o m e n a of others? Is only the nonbeliever capable o f i n v e s tigating the religious data impartially? Is only the person w h o identifies h i m or herself w i t h a religion or has s o m e other specific religious c o m m i t m e n t capable of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the religious p h e n o m e n a ' f r o m within'? M o s t Historians of Religions n o w reject the view that 'only a g n o s tics can be expected to achieve c o m p l e t e objectivity because they alone 37. Ibid., pp. 155-157.

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might be expected to be free from religious prejudice'. 38 Indeed, it is contended that the atheist or agnostic often lacks 'the adequate emotional condition', the sympathetic attitude, and the capacity for personal participation in the religious phenomena. Some maintain that the scholar who is a committed member o f a religion can best participate in the phenomena o f religion. Yet when we recall the highly apologetic approach o f Kraemer and o f most theologians or missionaries who have taken part in the History o f Religions, we realize why scholars tend to view such religious commitment with suspicion. Various criteria have been suggested to ensure that investigators suspend their particular religious viewpoints when interpreting the other. Kitagawa even goes so far as to list as one o f the 'three essential qualities underlying the d i s c i p l i n e . . . an attitude o f self-criticism, or even scepticism, about one's own religious background'. 39 Far more subtle than the 'narrow' normative interpretations o f a 'committed' theologian such as Kraemer are the investigations o f several Western and numerous Eastern scholars who do not seem motivated by a specific religious commitment. On the contrary, these Historians o f Religions most emphasize such qualities as tolerance and sympathetic understanding. But careful examination reveals that they do so from a specific religious commitment. Friedrich Heiler condemns 'the falsity o f numerous polemical judgments o f past times' and delineates 'seven principal areas o f unity which the high religions o f the earth manifest'. 40 With such 'sympathetic understanding', he finds 'one and the same reality' everywhere. But Heiler's analysis, albeit in reaction to an 'exclusivist' Christian tradition, is nonetheless from a Western, and more specifically Christian, viewpoint. 41 Here the History o f Religions assumes a most 'liberal' Christian orientation: Christian love and brotherhood are so allembracing that one humbly subsumes the religious phenomena o f 38. Zaehner, The Comparison of Religions, p. 12: 39. 'The History o f Religions in America', p. 15. 40. Friedrich Heiler, 'The History o f Religions as a Preparation for the C o operation o f Religions', The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, pp. 132-160. 41. Ibid., pp. 142-152. 'The reality o f the Divine is ultimate love. . . .'; 'The way o f man to God is universally the way o f sacrifice'; 'Love is the most superior way to God'; etc. Cf. Isma'il R. A. al Faruqi, pp. 5 3 - 5 4 .

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others under Christian categories and then proclaims the religious unity of h u m a n k i n d . Especially appealing in the History of Religions is the n o n exclusivism and tolerance of Easterners such as Radhakrishnan. ' T h e H i n d u thinker readily admits other points of view than his o w n and considers t h e m to be j u s t as w o r t h y of attention.' T h e H i n d u maintains 'that every h u m a n being, every g r o u p and every nation has an individuality w o r t h y of reverence'; 'the m o r e religious w e g r o w the m o r e tolerant of diversity shall w e become'. 4 2 Yet thinkers as different f r o m one another as Kraemer, Zaehner, and Wach 4 3 have correctly criticized Radhakrishnan's 'sympathetic attitude' and 'tolerance' t o w a r d all religious p h e n o m e n a as g r o u n d e d in a specifically H i n d u interpretation of 'religious tolerance'. This gives rise to highly apologetic treatments and to misrepresentations of Christianity. T o give b u t one illustration, H i n d u nonexclusiveness and religious tolerance are manifested in the views ofavataras: G o d m a y have m a n y h u m a n incarnations, such as Rama, Krishna, or Buddha. Thus, 'Jesus is an avatar' and 'the resources of G o d w h i c h w e r e available to h i m are open to us, and if w e struggle and strive even as he did, w e will develop the G o d in us'. In general, Radhakrishnan minimizes or neglects the unique and absolute Christian claims and indicates that Jesus 'should be b r o u g h t in line w i t h the other great saints of God'. 4 4 B u t if one is attempting to participate in and understand the religious experience of Christians, it may not be so 'tolerant' to regard the notion of Christ as 'the Son of G o d ' in the same m a n n e r as Indians view their avatars. Because one finds such Christian views 'dogmatic' (making for 'narrowness and intolerance'), 4 5 the Historian o f Religions qua Historian of Religions does not s h o w a sympathetic u n d e r 42. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life, pp. 16, 3 4 - 4 4 . See chapter 2 ('Conflict o f Religions: T h e H i n d u Attitude'), pp. 2 6 - 4 4 . 43. Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith, pp. 119-136; Zaehner, The Comparison of Religions, pp. 13-15; Joachim Wach, 'Radhakrishnan and the Comparative Study o f Religion', The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, pp. 445—458. 44. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, The Heart of Hindusthan, pp. 101-102, 165; Wach, 'Radhakrishnan and T h e Comparative Study o f Religion', p. 453. 45. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 59. (See pp. 160 ff.); Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith, pp. 129-130.

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standing in 'converting' the other's religious experience into s o m e thing the scholar considers m o r e religiously tolerant. At this point, w e can appreciate the question of the nonbeliever as to w h e t h e r one can have a particular religious c o m m i t m e n t and at the same time s o m e sense of impartiality and objectivity. M o s t Historians of Religions w o u l d agree that their discipline is u n c o m m i t t e d in the sense that 'not by believing, but b y imaginative participation is u n d e r standing achieved'. 4 6 This is n o t meant to exclude the c o m m i t t e d m e m b e r s of a religion f r o m the History of Religions, b u t only to affirm that such specific religious c o m m i t m e n t is not a necessary prerequisite for Historians of Religions. If they do identify themselves w i t h specific n o r m a t i v e religious positions, investigators must n o t allow their religious beliefs to color their investigation of other religious phenomena. H o w e v e r , in a sense different f r o m the c o m m i t m e n t of the 'believer', it is necessary for the investigator to be committed. 'It is of course true, as van der Leeuw notes, that the p h e n o m e n a cannot be grasped by one w h o is unconcerned, and a person w h o had n o awareness of the religious could n o t really engage in this discourse.' 4 7 T h e c o m m i t m e n t of the Historian of Religions manifests a sympathetic attitude and interest in the religious experiences of h u m a n k i n d , a sensitive awareness of w h a t is religiously expressed in her or his data, a respect for the irreducibly religious nature of the phenomena. O n l y f r o m such a c o m m i t m e n t , g r o u n d e d in a sympathetic attitude, interest, sensitivity, and respect for the p h e n o m e n a of religion, can the investigator participate in and understand the religious experiences of others.

46. W i l l i a m A. Beardslee, ' T r u t h in t h e S t u d y o f R e l i g i o n ' , Truth, Myth, and Symbol, p. 65. 47. Ibid. B e a r d s l e e ' s r e f e r e n c e t o v a n der L e e u w is f r o m Religion in Essence and Manifestation, vol. 2, p. 675. W i n s t o n L. K i n g , in his Introduction to Religion: A Phenomenological Approach, pp. 6 - 8 , describes s u c h an a p p r o a c h as a ' d e t a c h e d w i t h i n ness'. B y ' d e t a c h e d ' , K i n g d o e s n o t m e a n t h e i m p e r s o n a l , positivistic sense o f d e t a c h m e n t w e o b s e r v e d in earlier a p p r o a c h e s . H i s c o m b i n i n g a sense o f ' w i t h i n n e s s ' w i t h ' d e t a c h e d ' m a k e s this clear. W h a t h e w a n t s t o e x p h a s i z e is t h a t t h e H i s t o r i a n o f R e l i g i o n s is d e t a c h e d f r o m a n y particular religious v i e w p o i n t a n d d o e s n o t pass value j u d g m e n t s o n o n e religion o n t h e basis o f a n o t h e r religion.

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and the 'total person'

In reaction to past Historians o f Religions, we have observed a pronounced antireductionist tendency in contemporary History o f Religions: the irreducibly religious nature o f religious experience, the irreducibly autonomous nature o f the History o f Religions, and the irreducibly personal dimension o f religious phenomena. This antireductionism is evidenced in the insistence o f Historians o f Religions on the complexity o f religious phenomena. Most scholars o f 'the first period' accepted a view o f historical and cultural evolutionism. There was a unilinear evolution from the simple to the complex. Religion was usually identified with the earliest (and hence, most 'primitive' and simplest) stages o f cultures. Recent investigations have disclosed the surprising complexity o f religious phenomena. The religious life appears complex even at the most archaic stages o f culture. Among the peoples still in the stage o f food-gathering and hunting small animals (Australians, Pygmies, Fuegians, etc.), the belief in a Supreme Being or 'Lord o f the Animals' is intermingled with beliefs in culture-heroes and mythical ancestors; prayers and offerings to the gods coexist with totemic practices, the cult o f the dead, and hunting and fertility magic. 4 8 We have noted that even those Historians o f Religions o f ' t h e second period' who repudiated a unilinear evolutionary interpretation and did not subsume the religious under some homogeneous category such as totemism or 'primitive mentality' invariably oversimplified the nature o f religious phenomena. Usually they identified the religious with only one o f its perspectives: the psychological, the sociological, the anthropological, etc. This antireductionist insistence on the complexity o f religious phenomena is often expressed by claiming that religion is the concern o f the 'total person'. Charles Long describes the person's religious experience as 'the experience o f his totality in relationship to that which he experiences as ultimately real'. 49 Joachim Wach maintains 48. Mircea Eliade, 'Structure and Changes in the History o f Religion', City cible, p. 351. See Patterns, pp. xiv, 7. 49. Long, Alpha, p. 10.

Invin-

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that 'the statement that experience must be conceived of as a total response of the total being to U l t i m a t e Reality means that it is the integral person w h i c h is involved, not j u s t the mind, the emotion, or the will'. Wach contends that m a n y previous theologians and philosophers have failed to realize that religion was concerned w i t h the total or integral person and have argued about the 'seat' of religion: ' F r o m Schleiermacher to James, Whitehead, and O t t o it was sought in feeling; f r o m Hegel and Martineau to B r i g h t m a n , in the intellect; and f r o m Fichte to Reinhold N i e b u h r , in the will. ' 5 0 If homo religiosus represents the 'total person', then several methodological consequences seem to f o l l o w for the History of Religions. Since the approach must be c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h the subject matter, the H i s t o r y of Religions ' m u s t b e c o m e a total discipline, in the sense that it m u s t use, integrate, and articulate the results obtained by the various m e t h o d s of approaching a religious p h e n o m e n o n ' . 5 1 This is not to deny the unique perspective of Religionswissenschaft. What is maintained is that unless the H i s t o r y of Religions can integrate the results of other approaches within its o w n unique approach, it will c o m m i t the same kind of reductionism of past approaches which did n o t realize that the religious 'totality' included, b u t was not exhausted by, the psychological, sociological, or s o m e other perspective. Furthermore, if religion concerns the total person and if the investigator must participate in the religious experience of the other, then Historians of Religions m u s t themselves participate in the religious p h e n o m e n a as total persons. W e have seen that early investigators were highly 'rationalistic' and lacked the 'emotional condition' necessary to understand the religious p h e n o m e n a . T h e evolutionists relegated the religious to the status of the irrational, unsophisticated, and 'primitive'; Lang 'exalted' the religious to the status of the rational, ethical, and sophisticated. B u t b o t h did so on highly rationalistic g r o u n d s and thus failed to appreciated the complexity of religious phenomena. S o m e o n e like O t t o strongly u n d e r m i n e d this past intel50. Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions, pp. 32, 33. This stress upon the 'total person', the 'integral person' is undoubtedly a major factor in the Jungian evaluation o f religion as a therapeutic system which contributes to the equilibrium and unity o f the individual personality. 51. Eliade, 'History o f Religions and a N e w Humanism', p. 7.

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lectualistic bias, b u t he also reduced the c o m p l e x i t y of the religious by o v e r e m p h a s i z i n g its nonrational and nonhistorical aspects. T h e H i s t o r y of Religions m u s t e m p l o y a hermeneutics w h i c h does justice to the rational and the irrational; to the intellectual and the e m o t i o n a l and the volitional; to the anthropological and the sociological and the psychological. In short, its m e t h o d o l o g y m u s t d o justice to the c o m p l e x i t y and totality of religious p h e n o m e n a . Religion as 'practical' and 'soteriological' Recalling past characterizations of religious p h e n o m e n a in t e r m s of a n i m i s m , mana, magic, t o t e m i s m , taboo, mysterium tremendum, etc., w e m a y u n d e r s t a n d w h y Historians of Religions agree that religion is 'practical', soteriological, aiming at a c o m p l e t e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the h u m a n being. 'Religion is m o r e than a s y s t e m of beliefs, doctrines and ethics. It is a total orientation and w a y of life that aims at enlightenment, deliverance, or salvation. In other w o r d s , the central concern of religion is n o t h i n g less than soteriology; w h a t religion provides is n o t i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t life and the w o r l d b u t the practical path of transf o r m a t i o n of m a n according to its u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t existence o u g h t to be.' 5 2 It is interesting to note that m a n y Historians of Religions assert that the discipline has 'practical' effects u p o n the investigators themselves. T h e H i s t o r y of Religions is n o t merely an intellectual exercise. Kristensen felt that 'the student of religion " g r o w s himself religiously" w i t h and b y his w o r k ' . 5 3 W a c h says that the 'practical significance' of Religionswissenschaft is that 'it b r o a d e n s and deepens the semi« numinus, the religious feeling and u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; it prepares one f o r a deeper conception of one's o w n faith; it allows a n e w and c o m p r e h e n s i v e experience of w h a t religion is and means'. 5 4 W h e n w e r e m e m b e r that the investigator m u s t a t t e m p t to participate personally in the t r a n s f o r m i n g , soteriological experience of the 52. Kitagawa, 'Primitive, Classical, and M o d e r n Religions', p. 41. 53. Kraemer, Introduction to Kristensen's The Meaning of Religion, p. xxii. 54. Joachim Wach, 'Introduction: T h e Meaning and Task of the History of Religions', The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, p. 4. This article first appeared in Zeitschriftfur Missionskunde und Religionswissenschaft 50, no. 5 (1935).

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other, w e m a y realize w h y the religious u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the H i s torian of Religions o f t e n has these 'practical' effects. Nevertheless, o n e m u s t not identify the study of religious experience w i t h the experience itself. W h a t is agreed u p o n is that religious experience is practical, p r o d u c i n g a p r o f o u n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of homo religiosus. Beyond 'mere' description At the very b e g i n n i n g of o u r sketch, w e observed that M a x Müller used the t e r m Religionswissenschaft to distinguish this n e w discipline f r o m n o r m a t i v e fields such as the p h i l o s o p h y of religion and theology. B y b e c o m i n g 'purely descriptive', the H i s t o r y of Relgions m i g h t attain the a u t o n o m y and objectivity of the descriptive sciences. Kristensen conceived of the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion as 'purely descriptive', and w e noted the severe restrictions this placed u p o n the task of the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t . W a c h repeatedly e m p l o y s a similarly sharp descriptive-normative distinction. T h u s , he asserts that theo l o g y is 'a n o r m a t i v e discipline'; the 'general science of religion' is 'essentially descriptive'. T h e m e t h o d of the f o r m e r is n o r m a t i v e ; that of the latter is descriptive. 5 5 P. L. P e m b e r t o n correctly criticizes Wach as r e m a i n i n g ' t o o K a n tian, w h e r e descriptive and n o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n s m u s t be sharply divided'. 5 6 Wach does seem to realize this w h e n he speaks of the H i s t o r y of Religions in t e r m s of 'relative-normativeness' and 'relative objectivity'. Religionswissenschaft m u s t have 'the right and the courage to evaluate'; it m u s t m a k e use o f ' s c a l e s and standards'. 5 7 C o n t e m p o r a r y Historians of Religions reject the ideal of a 'purely descriptive' discipline, w h i c h avoids c o m p a r a t i v e evaluations and o t h e r seemingly n o r m a t i v e questions. C. J. Bleeker, discussing the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion, states that ' n o w a d a y s n o b o d y confines 55. Sociology of Religion, p. 1; Types of Religious Experience, p. 229. 56. Prentiss L. Pemberton, 'Universalism and Particularity: A Review-Article', Journal of Bible and Religion 20, no. 2 (1952): 98. 57. Wach, 'Introduction: T h e Meaning and Task of the History of Religions', p. 16; Wach, Types of Religious Experience, p. 57; Kitagawa, ' T h e N a t u r e and P r o g r a m of the History of Religions Field', (The University of Chicago) Divinity School News (November, 1957): 20-21.

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himself to a m e r e description of the religious p h e n o m e n a , w h i c h is like the s t o c k - t a k i n g in an antiquated m u s e u m , b u t the general trend is f o r an inquiry into the m e a n i n g and structure of these facts'. 5 8 H o w e v e r , it is n o t clear h o w an a u t o n o m o u s H i s t o r y of Religions is to g o b e y o n d the descriptive and deal adequately w i t h n o r m a t i v e questions. T h e s e scholars, such as Kraemer, w h o g r o u n d their discipline in a n o r m a t i v e basis, seem to c o m p r o m i s e the irreducibility and c o m p l e x i t y of religious p h e n o m e n a and fail to p r o v i d e the m e a n s f o r an objective u n d e r s t a n d i n g of 'the other'. K i t a g a w a analyzes the H i s t o r y of Religions as being 'neither a n o r m a t i v e discipline n o r solely a descriptive discipline, even t h o u g h it is related to b o t h ' . H e s u b m i t s that 'the discipline ofReligionswissenschaft lies b e t w e e n the n o r m a t i v e disciplines o n the one hand and the descriptive disciplines on the other'. W h a t Kitagawa intends b y this status of the discipline b e c o m e s evident later in his analysis: the H i s t o r y of Religions starts w i t h the historically given religions, and, while it 'has to be faithful to descriptive principles, its inquiry m u s t nevertheless be directed to the m e a n i n g of the religious p h e n o m e n a ' . 5 9 T h u s , it w o u l d seem that any approach, such as p h e n o m e n o l o g y , w h i c h is concerned w i t h ' m e a n i n g ' takes one b e y o n d the descriptive. N o w it seems to us that this reflects the sharp descriptive-normative b i f u r c a t i o n — even if Kitagawa tries to place the H i s t o r y of Religions 'in b e t w e e n ' — w h i c h philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s have never accepted. In fact, if there is n o possibility of describing meanings, then philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y rests u p o n a totally misconceived f o u n d a t i o n . It seems to us that this traditional descriptive-normative d i c h o t o m y m u s t be challenged. Indeed, w e shall a t t e m p t to s h o w that Mircea Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach a t t e m p t s n o t only to describe meanings b u t even to evaluate descriptively. It will be o u r position that the H i s t o r y of Religions is essentially a descriptive discipline, b u t one that must g o b e y o n d the ' m e r e ' description of religious p h e n o m e n a . In Eliade, w e shall a t t e m p t to elucidate a hermeneutics in t e r m s of w h i c h o n e can c o m p a r e and evaluate descriptively. W h a t is needed is a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k in t e r m s of 58. C. Jouco Bleeker, ' T h e Phenomenological Method', Numen 6, fasc. 2 (1959): 104. 59. Kitagawa, ' T h e History of Religions in America', pp. 19, 21.

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which one can deal with such interpretative questions as the structure and meaning o f religious facts, and, at the same time, provide the basis for an objective understanding which does not distort the nature o f the phenomena under investigation.

T H E ISSUE OF REDUCTIONISM

What follows is little more than a very incomplete listing o f a number o f antireductionist claims as found in the works o f such scholars as Mircea Eliade, G. van der Leeuw, Wilfred Smith, and Paul Ricoeur. Although this brief delineation could be extended for many pages, it should provide some indication o f the complexity and richness o f the various antireductionist methodological assumptions. 1. In most general terms, our approach must do justice to the irreducibly religious nature o f religious experience. Some scholars have insisted on a unique, irreducibly religious structure o f consciousness which comes into play only in religious experience. Many have argued that we must avoid 'naturalistic reductions': those methodological approaches which attempt to find the religious structures in the 'natural' secular facts negate the basic intentionality o f the religious phenomena. 2. Our approach must do justice to the autonomous nature o f the History of Religions. The scholar attempts to provide an irreducibly religious interpretation o f religious phenomena, to investigate religious phenomena 'on their own plane o f reference'. 3. Our approach must do justice to the irreduciblypmond/ dimension o f religious phenomena. Earlier 'positivistic' approaches to the 'religious facts', characterized by an impersonal detachment and a narrowly 'rationalistic' attitude, led to the reduction o f 'living' data to 'dead' data, o f the personal to the impersonal. 4. Our approach must do justice to the nature of religious symbolism. T o cite but two formulations o f this contention which we shall examine in Chapter 5, it is argued that we must not provide a simple 'unilateral' interpretation by reducing the 'multivalence' o f a religious symbolism to one symbolic frame o f reference. In addition, we must not reduce the nature and meaning o f religious symbolism by some

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very n a r r o w , 'rational' interpretation, as seen in a t t e m p t s to analyze religious s y m b o l i s m by s o m e m e t h o d of 'logical analysis'. 5. O u r approach m u s t d o justice to the complexity and totality of religious p h e n o m e n a . W e m u s t avoid reducing this c o m p l e x i t y of the religious either by interpreting o u r data in terms of s o m e o v e r s i m plified scheme or b y identifying the religious with only one of its perspectives. In an excellent article, ' R e d u c t i o n i s m in the Study of Relgions', J o h n Y. Fenton has severely criticized such antireductionist approaches. B y 'theologism', Fenton means 'a concept p r o p e r l y and primarily developed and used in a theological context that has been transferred w i t h s o m e residue as a non-theological concept to a n o t h e r d o m a i n such as that of the secular scholarly study of religions'. F e n t o n then attacks one of these central theologisms: T h e conception of religion as sui generis, i.e., as a p r i m a r y d a t u m w h i c h can be u n d e r s t o o d only in its o w n terms, has generally been a c c o m p a n i e d in theological circles b y its natural corollary: reductionistic explanations of religion are entirely incorrect. . . . [The secular study of religions] should n o longer be restricted b y the need to defend the faith, or to defend its theologistic residue, the antireductionistic sui generis character of the so-called 'discipline of religion.' 6 0 Fenton correctly argues that 'every systematic a t t e m p t to u n d e r s t a n d p h e n o m e n a reduces the p h e n o m e n a ' . In the s t u d y of religious or any other p h e n o m e n a , 'systematic interpretation necessarily translates the p h e n o m e n a into disciplinary terms, simplifies, and n a r r o w s the p e r spective'. F e n t o n contends that there is ' n o t h i n g w r o n g w i t h r e d u c tionism in the study of religions, unless the investigator does n o t self-consciously realize that he is reductionistic, unless the r e d u c t i o n istic scholar thinks that his discipline alone allows h i m to isolate the essence of religious p h e n o m e n a f r o m their accidents, unless he o v e r extends his m e t h o d b e y o n d its legitimate scope'. 6 1 60. John Y. Fenton, 'Reductionism in the Study o f Religions', Soundings 53, no. 1 (1970): 62. 61. Ibid., pp. 63, 64. Fenton goes on to argue for the value o f various reductive studies of religions (pp. 64—67) and to challenge the view that religions must be studied as something religious (pp. 67-71).

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N o w it is n o t o u r aim to defend all of those scholars w h o insist on the irreducibility of the religious. In m a n y cases, Fenton's criticisms seem justified. B u t the insistence on the irreducibility of the religious, o n s t u d y i n g religious p h e n o m e n a w i t h i n a religious perspective, need n o t be 'theologistic'. In this regard, w e shall f o r m u l a t e t w o , very general m e t h o d o l o g i c a l observations. First, in a very f u n d a m e n t a l w a y , all m e t h o d o l o g i c a l approaches are necessarily reductionistic. T h i s is w h y w e shall refer to Eliade's assumption of the irreducibility of the religious. W e recognize that starting w i t h the a s s u m p t i o n of the irreducibility of the religious is itself reductionistic. O u r m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s necessarily limit w h a t w e shall see: w h a t p h e n o m e n a will be included w i t h i n o u r field of inquiry, h o w w e shall describe and analyze those p h e n o m e n a , etc. V e r y f e w philosophers w o u l d e n d o r s e s o m e Cartesian m o d e l of a completely presuppositionless philosophy. Indeed, very f e w p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s since the 'early Husserl' have a t t e m p t e d to f o r m u late a completely presuppositionless p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach. In describing the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Lebenswelt, even in f o r m u l a t i n g the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l epoche, p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s a t t e m p t to render e x plicit o u r presuppositions and n o t to d e n y their existence. In the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n of the irreducibility of the religious and in o u r interpretation of the religious p h e n o m e n a as religious, w e recognize the perspectival nature of all k n o w l e d g e and a c k n o w l e d g e the fact that w e are utilizing o n e perspective and that there is value to o t h e r perspectives. In analyzing such issues as the e c o n o m i c and social basis of m a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y religious institutions, various Marxist perspectives seem m u c h m o r e insightful than m o s t perspectives w i t h i n the H i s t o r y of Religions. Indeed, if Historians of Religions, in their insistence on the irreducibility of the religious, ignored these other perspectives, their research w o u l d be exceedingly limited and shallow. For example, in their interpretations of s h a m a n i s m , Historians of Religions m u s t be aware of t h e studies b y e t h n o l o g i s t s , p s y c h o l o g i s t s , sociologists, philologists, and others. W h a t they a t t e m p t to d o is to integrate the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of other approaches w i t h i n their o w n u n i q u e religious perspective.

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O u r second observation involves the a t t e m p t to grant a certain methodological primacy to this perspective in w h i c h w e assume the irreducibility of the religious. It is possible to distinguish different kinds of reductionisms, n o t all of w h i c h are methodologically necessary and n o t all of w h i c h are on the s a m e level of analysis. M o r e specifically, while granting that all methodological approaches are necessarily reductionistic in the above m e n t i o n e d sense and that there is value to other perspectives, one m a y argue for the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i m a c y of approaches w h i c h d o n o t reduce the religious to the nonreligious. W e s u b m i t that the antireductionist claim that w e o u g h t to interpret the religious on a religious plane of reference and n o t reduce the religious to s o m e nonreligious scale need n o t be a ' t h e o l o g i s m ' . O u r justification for the a s s u m p t i o n of the irreducibility of the religious need n o t involve s o m e n o r m a t i v e theological justification. O u r j u s tification is phenomenological and involves an insistence on the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l epoche. In fact, such a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l orientation could n o t involve s o m e theological ' d e f e n d i n g the faith', since the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t m u s t 'suspend' all such n o r m a t i v e concerns, such as w h e t h e r or n o t the religious life-world is 'illusory', w h e t h e r or n o t homo religiosus really experiences ultimate reality, etc. O n e m a y a t t e m p t to j u s t i f y the p r i m a c y of the a s s u m p t i o n of the irreducibility of the religious by criticizing past reductionist approaches w h i c h reduced the religious to s o m e nonreligious perspective. Yes, all approaches m a k e assumptions, b u t it is possible for us to u n c o v e r and e x a m i n e such assumptions. T h u s , w e w e r e able to u n c o v e r and e x a m i n e various m e t h o d o l o g i cal a s s u m p t i o n s and beliefs at the f o u n d a t i o n of E. B. T y l o r ' s e t h nological approach to religious p h e n o m e n a : certain 'rationalistic' and 'positivistic' assumptions; unilinear e v o l u t i o n a r y assumptions; etc. W e w e r e able to criticize T y l o r ' s a s s u m p t i o n s and his interpretation of religious p h e n o m e n a . F r o m the perspective of the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion, T y l o r ' s reductionist approach destroyed the basic intentionality of the religious data. O u r p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l justification for this a s s u m p t i o n of the irreducibility of the religious involves an insistence on the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l epoche. B y suspending all of our interpretations of

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w h a t is 'real', the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t attempts sympathetically to reenact the experiences of homo religiosus and to describe the meaning of the religious p h e n o m e n a . T h e phenomenologist of religion attempts to describe and interpret the meaning of the religious experience as it is for the religious person w h o has had such an experience. T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t wants to deal faithfully w i t h p h e n o m e n a as phenomena, to see j u s t w h a t such religious p h e n o m e n a reveal. What is claimed by O t t o and other phenomenologists of religion is that certain people have experienced p h e n o m e n a which they have considered religious. Homo religiosus experiences the n u m i n o u s as something sui generis. If w e w a n t to describe and interpret the meaning of such a religious Lebenswelt, w e m u s t approach such religious p h e n o m e n a as something religious. T h e justification for the methodological primacy of some descriptive phenomenological level of analysis, in which w e sympathetically reenact the religious Lebenswelt of homo religiosus, in which w e interpret the meaning of religious p h e n o m e n a within a religious perspective, in n o w a y negates the value of psychological, sociological, and other perspectives. Indeed, it does n o t negate the value of n o r m a t i v e theological or metaphysical perspectives, so long as the theologian or metaphysician self-consciously realizes the nature of his or her particular assumptions and n o r m a t i v e reductionism. For example, there are n u m e r o u s creative possibilities for theological projects, such as that envisioned by Paul Tillich, w h e n he attempted to construct a theology based u p o n a phenomenological foundation. W e may conclude this discussion of reductionism by emphasizing that although all approaches are necessarily reductionistic, there are different kinds and degrees of reductionism. In this regard, w e m a y n o t e James S. Heifer's excellent analysis of h o w Historians of Religions have been guilty of 'methodological solipsism': the position that insists that all interpretations and descriptions are necessarily based on ' " o u r o w n " observational experiences'. 6 2 In the earlier investigations, w h i c h usually reduced the religious to s o m e nonreligious perspective, w e attempted to f o r m u l a t e the cultural 62. James J. Heifer, 'Introduction', On Method in the History of Religions, pp. 1-7. Heifer takes the term 'methodological solipsism' f r o m Karl Popper's Conjectures and Refutations; Popper, in turn, took the term f r o m Rudolf Carnap.

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context within which the investigator was situated and to suggest h o w that context shaped his or her particular interpretation. Even w i t h those Historians of Religions w h o insisted on the irreducibility of the religious, w e observed this 'methodological solipsism'. Theologians, such as Kraemer, w e r e transparent in reducing religious data to their o w n , personal, theological perspective. B u t even phenomenologists, such as van der Leeuw and O t t o , interpreted religious p h e n o m e n a f r o m their o w n particular standpoint, thus reducing the complexity and specificity of the religious manifestations and distorting the intentionality expressed in m u c h of their data. It does seem that our methodological approach and interpretation are situated, are at least partially determined or influenced by the economic, social, and historical context. B u t this does not end the issue of reductionism. We must examine each particular reductionism and determine whether this reductionism was 'necessary', in the sense that all approaches are situated, perspectival, and limiting; and w e must determine w h e t h e r this reductionism was helpful or not in shedding light on various dimensions of religious phenomena. True, phenomenologists cannot claim that their approach is presuppositionless; b u t past phenomenologists, such as van der Leeuw and O t t o , could have done better in rendering explicit their assumptions and in 'neutralizing' as m u c h as possible the subjective nature of their interpretations. In C h a p t e r 4, w e shall acknowledge Mircea Eliade's 'assumption' of the irreducibility of the sacred; in Chapter 7, w e shall submit that his entire approach rests on the assumption of a privileged status for certain religious phenomena. At the same time, w e shall be concerned w i t h determining w h e t h e r such reductions can be justified in terms of formulating s o m e basis for an objective hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k , of providing s o m e sense of methodological rigor and verification, and of offering us a satisfactory treatment of m a n y of the f u n d a m e n t a l issues and p r o b l e m s raised in Part 1 of this study.

PART TWO

Eliade's Phenomenology: Key Methodological Notions

4

Distinguishing Religious Phenomena

INTRODUCTION

It seems possible to m a k e the distinction between providing the criteria for separating religious f r o m nonreligious p h e n o m e n a and providing the criteria for interpreting the meaning of a religious p h e n o m e n o n . This is analogous to the distinction between f o r m u l a t ing the criteria for distinguishing a w o r k of art and supplying the criteria for understanding the meaning of the w o r k of art. In terms of this distinction, it is our thesis that there are t w o key notions in Mircea Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y : the dialectic of the sacred and the profane 1 and the central position of s y m b o l i s m or symbolic structures. Eliade's interpretation of the dialectic of the sacred allows h i m to distinguish religious p h e n o m e n a ; his interpretation of s y m b o l i s m provides the theoretical f r a m e w o r k in terms of w h i c h he is able to understand the meaning of m o s t of these sacred manifestations. Eliade's general view of s y m b o l i s m establishes the phenomenological g r o u n d s for his structural hermeneutics; the dialectic of the sacred, w h e n combined w i t h Eliade's analysis of symbolism, conveys the irreducibly religious 'sense' evidenced t h r o u g h o u t his approach. In this chapter, w e shall focus on the first of these key notions: Eliade's attempt to provide criteria f o r distinguishing religious phenomena. For the sake of analysis, w e shall abstract several principles f r o m his m e t h o d o l o g y . Such an approach m i g h t suggest a t e m poral order in Eliade's hermeneutics: first Eliade insists on the irreducibility of the sacred, w h i c h involves the phenomenological epoche and the sympathetic effort to participate in the experience of homo religiosus; next he attempts to recreate imaginatively the conditions of the sacred manifestation and captures the intentionality of the sacred manifestation in terms of the dialectic of the sacred; then he 1. We shall use 'the dialectic of the sacred', 'the dialectic of the sacred and the profane', and 'the dialectic of hierophanies' interchangeably.

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attempts to understand the meaning of the sacred manifestation in terms of a structural hermeneutics g r o u n d e d in his interpretation o f religious symbolism. It is imperative that w e clearly recognize that such an interpretation, suggesting this temporal sequence in Mircea Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y , will not do. For example, w e shall describe Eliade's methodological insistence on suspending one's o w n interpretation and seeing j u s t w h a t one's data reveal. But surely even the most conscientious p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t cannot simply ' p e r f o r m ' or 'invoke' the epoche. T h e phenomenological epoche m u s t involve s o m e explicit m e t h o d of selfcriticism, intersubjective check, factual (as well as 'free') variations. Consequently, w e could n o t possibly understand the nature of Eliade's phenomenological epoche until w e had elucidated the additional methodological principles and hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k in terms of w h i c h one can suspend his or her o w n n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s , grasp the m e a n i n g of the experiences of homo religiosus, etc. In short, w e cannot overemphasize that the following h e r m e n e u t i cal principles, along w i t h the structuralistic principles not elucidated in this chapter, must be viewed as functioning together in Mircea Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y . A n y illusion of temporal order is an u n f o r t u nate consequence of the need for an analytic exposition. Before proceeding w i t h our systematic treatment of Mircea Eliade's phenomenological approach, w e m a y a c k n o w l e d g e that our analysis is in contrast w i t h m o s t of Eliade's interpreters, w h o seem to feel that Eliade has never developed a systematic m e t h o d o l o g y . For example, T h o m a s J. J. Altizer repeatedly describes Eliade's phenomenological m e t h o d as 'mystical' and 'romantic'; such a m e t h o d is completely divorced f r o m any approach w h i c h is 'rational' and 'scientific'. 2 Indeed, the p r o p o n e n t of this mystically g r o u n d e d approach is identified with such roles as 'prophet, seer, and shaman'. 3 We must acknowledge that Mircea Eliade himself lends considerable credence to the view that he has never really dealt w i t h the crucial 2. T h o m a s J. J. Altizer, Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred, pp. 30, 36, 41, 84, and passim; a n d Altizer, ' T h e R e l i g i o u s M e a n i n g o f M y t h a n d S y m b o l ' , Truth, Myth, and Symbol, p. 97 a n d passim. 3. Altizer, Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred, p. 17. S e e ' M y t h s f o r M o d e r n s ' , The Times Literary Supplement, no. 3, 337 ( F e b r u a r y 10, 1966): 102.

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p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l issues and consequently lacks a critical systematic m e t h o d o l o g y . W h e n asked h o w he arrived at his f r e q u e n t l y u n e x pected and b e w i l d e r i n g interpretations, this scholar is apt to reply that he simply l o o k e d at his religious d o c u m e n t s and this was w h a t they revealed. 4 It is little w o n d e r that such a seemingly uncritical a p p r o a c h is o f t e n viewed as either incredibly naive or charlatanical or at best the brilliant intuitions of a true mystic. In any case, this approach w o u l d have little value f o r the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l concerns of the r i g o r o u s phenomenologist. N o w it is o u r thesis that Mircea Eliade does in fact have an i m p r e s sive p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d . W e w o u l d s u b m i t that this is precisely w h y Eliade is a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i m p r o v e m e n t over the other p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s of religion w e have examined. As one studies a m a j o r classic in the field, say, G e r a r d u s van der L e e u w ' s Religion in Essence and Manifestation, she or he cannot help b u t be impressed b y the vast a m o u n t of data w h i c h have been collected and classified. W h a t invariably disturbs the philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t is that van der L e e u w and his colleagues never appear to have f o r m u l a t e d a critical m e t h o d o l o g y . O n w h a t basis d o they m a k e their c o m p a r i s o n s and generalizations, g u a r d agains subjectivity in their interpretations, defend their specific classifications and typologies? W h a t w e shall a t t e m p t to s h o w is that u n d e r l y i n g Eliade's approach is a certain m e t h o d o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k w h i c h allows h i m to deal w i t h m a n y of the central p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l concerns.

M I R C E A E L I A D E AS P H E N O M E N O L O G I S T

T h r o u g h o u t this study, w e h a v e referred to Mircea Eliade as a 4. In conversation, Eliade presented an interesting autobiographical explanation f o r his avoidance of a c o m p r e h e n s i v e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l analysis. While in India, he b e g a n reading the literature in t h e H i s t o r y of Religions and was struck by a pervasive dilettantism. In o r d e r to avoid superficial, p r e m a t u r e conclusions, he w o u l d p o u r himself i n t o all the religious d o c u m e n t s and n o t get involved in m e t h o d o l o g y . Nevertheless, such an explanation will n o t do. M e t h o d o l o g y is n o t the kind of t h i n g that o n e can p o s t p o n e . P o u r i n g oneself into the d o c u m e n t s necessarily entails the a d o p t i o n o f s o m e t y p e o f m e t h o d o l o g y . O n e of o u r p r i m a r y tasks is to render explicit the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s and principles w h i c h are o f t e n implicit in Eliade's phenomenology.

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' p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t ' and to his approach as 'phenomenological' w i t h o u t really j u s t i f y i n g the identification of his History of Religions w i t h these terms. It must be stated that such an identification is c o n t r o versial. Neither Eliade nor his interpreters usually identify his approach w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y . W e are aware of no interpreter w h o has s h o w n a relationship between Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y and philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y . C h a p t e r 5 is intended to lay the hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k for Eliade's phenomenological m e t h o d , and Chapter 6 attempts to relate Eliade's approach to specific notions and concerns of philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y . For n o w , w e m a y begin to present s o m e evidence to substantiate our controversial claim that Mircea Eliade is a phenomenologist. Recall that w e have discussed the present nature of Religionswissenschaft as disclosing a certain methodological tension between approaches tending t o w a r d either specialization or synthesis and generality. Phenomenological approaches were viewed as one of the tendencies t o w a r d generality. In previous chapters, w e have clearly established that Mircea Eliade is ageneralist. O n e of Eliade's consistent themes has been the need for c o n t e m p o r a r y Historians of Religions to go b e y o n d the self-imposed limitations o f specialization and to a t t e m p t creative generalizations and syntheses. In fact, Eliade frequently identifies being a Historian of Religions w i t h being a generalist: 'It is n o t a question, for the historian of religions [Historian of Religions], of substituting himself for the various specialists, that is to say, of mastering their respective philologies. . . . O n e is a historian of religions [Historian of Religions] n o t by virtue of mastering a certain n u m b e r of philologies, b u t because one is able to integrate religious data into a general perspective.' 5 In describing Eliade's generalist approach as phenomenological, w e should note a distinction w h i c h was m a d e in C h a p t e r 2 in our i n t r o duction to phenomenological approaches. ' T h e term p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion can be used in a double sense': 'It means b o t h a scientific m e t h o d and an independent science, creating m o n o g r a p h s and m o r e 5. 'Methodological Remarks in the Study of Religious Symbolism', The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, pp. 90, 91. Cited hereafter as 'Methodological Remarks'.

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or less extensive h a n d b o o k s . ' 6 Eliade's Patterns in Comparative Religion illustrates this second sense of p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion. O u r p a r a m o u n t concern is w i t h Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y , and w e shall not present a comprehensive exposition of his categorization of religious phenomena. Thus, w e shall not f o r m u l a t e Eliade's analysis of sacred space, sacred time, m y t h , ritual, and other m a j o r categories for organizing and analyzing religious phenomena. If there is any resemblance between philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y and the p h e n o m e n ology of religion as a branch of the History of Religions, this is because of the adoption of a phenomenological method. N o t only do Mircea Eliade's interpreters usually fail to associate his History of Religions w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y , but they sometimes even distinguish his approach f r o m the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion. For example, in the discussion of a paper given by U g o Bianchi, Professor Bolgiani remarks that he has the impression that 'Bianchi used such expressions as " t y p o l o g y " and " p h e n o m e n o l o g y " rather indiscriminately, w h e n it seems to m e that in the current state of "religious sciences" w e cannot purely and simply equate them. T o set the b o u n d s of the p r o b l e m correctly it strikes m e that w e o u g h t to distinguish between " t y p o l o g y " , " m o r p h o l o g y " and even " p h e n o m e n o l o g y " o f religions. T o reduce religious p h e n o m e n o l o g y simply to a " t y p o l o g y " of religions does not seem to m e to be entirely right. . . .' Professor Bianchi replies that ' s o m e historians of religions [Historians of Religions] have a certain tendency to use such terms as " t y p o l o g y " , " p h e n o m e n o l o g y " and " m o r p h o l o g y " w i t h a p r o m i s cuous meaning'. ' W h e n w e m e n t i o n p h e n o m e n o l o g y w e especially think of scholars such as Wach, Van der Leeuw and Bleeker; w h e n w e m e n t i o n m o r p h o l o g y then our m i n d goes especially to Eliade.' 7 6. C. J. Bleeker, ' T h e Future Task of the History of Religions', Numen 1, fasc. 3 (1960): 228. See Bleeker, ' T h e C o n t r i b u t i o n of the P h e n o m e n o l o g y of Religion', pp. 39-40. 7. U g o Bianchi, ' T h e Definition of Religion', pp. 26-29. A g o o d illustration of this lack of identification of Eliade with the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion may be seen in Religion, Culture and Methodology, ed. T. P. van Baaren and H. J. W. Drijvers. Although these 'Papers of the Groningen W o r k i n g - g r o u p ' repeatedly express their dissatisfaction with the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion, and a phenomenologist such as van der Leeuw is repeatedly cited for criticism, Eliade is not even listed in the index. See especially the articles by T. P.van Baaren (pp.35-56), L. Leertouwer (pp. 79-98), and the Epilogue by H. J. W. Drijvers and L. Leertouwer (pp. 159-168).

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O u r position is that a l t h o u g h m o r p h o l o g y m a y be distinguished f r o m p h e n o m e n o l o g y and m o s t m o r p h o l o g i s t s are n o t p h e n o menologists, in the case of P r o f e s s o r Eliade, m o r p h o l o g y is an integral part of his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d . In C h a p t e r 5, w e shall see that a m o r p h o l o g i c a l analysis p r o v i d e s the f o u n d a t i o n f o r Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d , primarily b y allowing h i m to reintegrate the particular manifestation w i t h i n its structural system of s y m b o l i c assocations. At the same time, w e w o u l d s u b m i t that m o s t interpreters w h o identify Eliade as a m o r p h o l o g i s t have simply taken his m o r p h o l o g y at face value; as if by s o m e m y s t e r i o u s process, the data simply revealed those essential structures. In C h a p t e r 6, w e shall analyze h o w Eliade proceeds, and w e shall elucidate s o m e of the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l principles that allow for his m o r p h o l o g i c a l analysis. At one point, Mircea Eliade specifically dissociates himself f r o m p h e n o m e n o l o g y : '[the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t ] , in principle, rejects any w o r k of c o m p a r i s o n ; c o n f r o n t e d w i t h one religious p h e n o m e n o n or another, he confines himself to " a p p r o a c h i n g " it and divining its meaning. Whereas the historian of religions [Historian of Religions] does n o t reach a c o m p r e h e n s i o n of a p h e n o m e n o n until after he has c o m p a r e d it w i t h t h o u s a n d s of similar or dissimilar p h e n o m e n a , until he has situated it a m o n g t h e m . ' 8 It seems that this reject o n of p h e n o m e n o l o g y is based o n a popular interpretation of Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l reduction and eidetic intuition. 9 O n the basis of o n e e x a m p l e and t h r o u g h reflection, r e d u c tions, and imaginative variation, one m a y gain insight into the structure and m e a n i n g of a p h e n o m e n o n . T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t m a y arrive at this p u r e vision w i t h o u t the collection of historical examples and factual comparisons. W e should note that c o n t e m p o r a r y p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s (and apparently Husserl himself in s o m e of his last w o r k s ) reject this v i e w of p h e n o m e n o l o g y . 8. Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques ojEcstacy, p. xv. C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as Shamanism. 9. T h i s is o f t e n classified as t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e ' e a r l y ' H u s s e r l . In ' P h e n o m e n o l o g i e s a n d P s y c h o l o g i e s ' , Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 5, no. 1 (1965): 8 0 - 1 0 5 , S t e p h a n Strasser p o i n t s o u t that t h e r e are several t y p e s o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y . Eliade's rejection of p h e n o m e n o l o g y is directed p r i m a r i l y at w h a t Strasser labels 'transcendental phenomenology'.

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In t e r m s of the historical-phenomenological 'tension', w h i c h Eliade and o t h e r scholars o f t e n f o r m u l a t e as defining the n a t u r e of the H i s t o r y of Religions today, Eliade invariably emphasizes the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l 'side'. Professor Eliade m a y state that the Historian of Religions 'is attracted to b o t h the meaning of a religious p h e n o m e n o n and t o its history, he tries to d o justice to b o t h and n o t to sacrifice either one of t h e m ' . 1 0 Yet in m o s t of his writings, Eliade seems to indicate that he will n o t a t t e m p t a detailed e x a m i n a t i o n of historical differences, variations, disseminations, etc.; instead he will aim at a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analysis of the m e a n i n g of his data. 1 1 Eliade's position seems to be that the Historian of Religions only completes his or her task as a phenomenologist: ' U l t i m a t e l y , w h a t w e desire to k n o w is the m e a n i n g of the various historical modifications. . . .' 12 In ' T h e Sacred in the Secular World', Eliade begins by describing himself 'as a historian and p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion' and claims that the Historian of Religions 'is also a p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t because of his concern w i t h m e a n i n g ' . T h i s m e a n i n g 'is given in the i n t e n t i o n a l l y of the structure'. So at s o m e point the historian of religion [Historian of Religion] m u s t b e c o m e a p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion, because he tries to find meaning. W i t h o u t hermeneutics, the history of religion [History of Religion] is j u s t another h i s t o r y — bare facts, special classifications, and so on. W i t h the p r o b l e m of h e r m e n e u t i c s — m e a n i n g — w e see that every manifestation of the sacred — symbol, m y t h , ritual — tells of s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is absolutely real, s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is m e a n i n g f u l for that culture, tribe, or religion in w h i c h the manifestation takes place. O n c e the historian of religion [Historian of

10. 'Methodological Remarks', p. 88. See Eliade, 'Historical Events and Structural Meaning in Tension', pp. 29-31. 11. For example, see The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp. 73-74. In most of his books, Eliade refers us to more specialized w o r k s which treat these historical questions in greater detail. These historical approaches are meant to substantiate and complement his more phenomenological analysis. 12. ' O n Understanding Primitive Religions', p. 501. This is a crucial m e t h o d o logical contention in such articles as 'History of Religions and a N e w H u m a n i s m ' , and 'Crisis and Renewal in History of Religions', and in the methodological sections of most of Eliade's books.

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Religion] takes on the search for meaning, he can, f o l l o w i n g the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l principle of suspension o f j u d g m e n t , assume the structure of synchronicity, and, therefore, as I have said before, bring together the m e a n i n g s evident in m a n y different cultures and eras. 13 T h e extent to w h i c h w e can s h o w that Mircea Eliade is a p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t , that his a p p r o a c h can be related to the concerns and n o t i o n s o f philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y , will finally rest o n an analysis of w h a t he has done. In short, w e m u s t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r Eliade approaches the central task of hermeneutics, w h e t h e r he interprets the m e a n i n g of the religious manifestations, o n the basis of s o m e phenomenological method. B e f o r e elucidating Eliade's key m e t h o d o l o g i c a l notions, let us recall f r o m C h a p t e r 3 that religion presupposes religious experience. Investigators begin w i t h religious expressions and a t t e m p t to interpret the nature of the experiences expressed in their data. ' T h e greatest claim to merit of the history of religions [History of Religions] is precisely its e f f o r t to decipher in a " f a c t , " conditioned as it is by the historical m o m e n t and the cultural style of the epoch, the existential situation that m a d e it possible.' 1 4 O v e r and over again, Eliade argues that the p a r a m o u n t concern of the Historian of Religions is hermeneutics. 'For the ultimate goal of the historian of religions [Historian of Religions] is n o t to point o u t that there exist a certain n u m b e r of types of patterns of religious behavior, w i t h their specific s y m b o l o g i e s and theologies, b u t rather to understand their meanings. . . . U l t i m a t e l y , the historian of religions [Historian of Religions] cannot r e n o u n c e hermeneutics.' 1 5 As w e have seen o n several occasions, Eliade believes that the H i s t o r y of Religions has tended to be cautious and inhibited; the task of interpretation has been left to the various 'reductionist' approaches. Yet the 'hermeneutical w o r k o u g h t to be d o n e b y the historian of 13. Mircea Eliade, ' T h e Sacred in the Secular World', Cultural Hermeneutics 1, no. 1 (1973): 101, 103, 106-107. 14. 'Methodological Remarks', p. 89. The Sacred, p. 162: ' T h e ultimate aim of the historian of religions [Historian of Religions] is to understand, and to make u n d e r standable to others, religious man's behavior and mental universe.' 15. 'Australian Religions, Part V', pp. 267-268.

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religions [Historian of Religions] himself, f o r only he is prepared to u n d e r s t a n d and appreciate the semantic c o m p l e x i t y of his d o c u ments'. 1 6 A c c o r d i n g to Eliade, the Historian of Religions 'uses an empirical m e t h o d of a p p r o a c h ' and begins by collecting religious d o c u m e n t s w h i c h need to be interpreted. U n l i k e Müller, T y l o r , Frazer, and o t h e r early investigators, the m o d e r n scholar realizes that she or he w o r k s 'exclusively w i t h historical d o c u m e n t s ' . 1 7 C o n s e q u e n t l y , Eliade's point of d e p a r t u r e is the historical data w h i c h express the religious experiences of h u m a n i t y . T h r o u g h his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach, Eliade a t t e m p t s to decipher these data, to describe the religious p h e n o m e n a w h i c h constitute the Lebenswelt of homo religiosus and to interpret their religious meaning. W e have asserted that Mircea Eliade collects religious d o c u m e n t s w h i c h need to be interpreted, a t t e m p t s to describe the religious p h e n o m e n a , etc. B u t h o w does o n e k n o w w h i c h d o c u m e n t s to collect, w h i c h p h e n o m e n a to describe and interpret? T o a n s w e r these and similar questions, w e need to i n t r o d u c e several m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i n ciples in t e r m s of w h i c h Eliade can distinguish the religious manifestations.

T H E IRREDUCIBILITY OF THE S A C R E D

T h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n of the irreducibility of the sacred can be seen as arising f r o m Eliade's criticism of past reductionist positions. In fact, this antireductionism is the p r e d o m i n a n t reason for Eliade's rejection of previous approaches. W e need n o t repeat Eliade's detailed criticisms. O n e recalls that scholars o f ' t h e first period', utilizing certain assumed n o r m s (rationalist, positivist, etc.), usually forced their data into unilinear e v o l u t i o n a r y schemes. T h e sociologist and the psychologist o f ' t h e second p e r i o d ' o p e n e d u p n e w d i m e n s i o n s o f the 16. 'Crisis and R e n e w a l in the H i s t o r y o f Religions', p. 9. O n this s a m e page, Eliade w r i t e s that ' w e d o not d o u b t that the "creative h e r m e n e u t i c s " w i l l finally be r e c o g nized as the royal road o f the H i s t o r y o f Religions'. 17. ' M e t h o d o l o g i c a l Remarks', p. 88; ' T h e Q u e s t for the " O r i g i n s " o f Religion', p. 169. See The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp. 5 - 6 ; and Patterns, pp. x i v - x v i , 2 - 3 .

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sacred, but Eliade criticized them for reducing the meaning of the religious to its sociological or psychological analysis. Similarly, Eliade readily acknowledged his debt to the diffusionist and the functionalist, but tracing the diffusion or determining the function of a religious phenomenon does not exhaust its meaning. The upshot of Eliade's criticism may be expressed by the following antireductionist claim which we have frequently cited: the Historian of Religions must attempt to grasp the religious phenomena 'on their own plane of reference', as something religious. To reduce our interpretation of the religious phenomena to some other plane of reference (sociological, psychological, etc.) is to neglect their full intentionality and to fail to grasp their unique and irreducible 'element' — the sacred. Over and over again, Eliade expresses his antireductionist stance in terms of the following principle: 'the scale creates the phenomenon'. He quotes the following ironical query of Henri Poincare: 'Would a naturalist who had never studied the elephant except through the microscope consider that he had an adequate knowledge of the creature?' 'The microscope reveals the structure and mechanism of cells, which structure and mechanism are exactly the same in all multicellular organisms. The elephant is certainly a multicellular organism, but is that all that it is? On the microscopic scale, we might hesitate to answer. O n the scale of human vision, which at least has the advantage of presenting the elephant as a zoological phenomenon, there can be no doubt about the reply.' 18 Eliade's methodological assumption of the irreducibility of the sacred can be seen as arising from his view of the role of the Historian of Religions. His justification for such an assumption seems to be that the task of the phenomenologist, at least in the beginning, is to follow and attempt to understand an experience as it is for the person who has had that experience. Unlike earlier investigators who superimposed their own normative standards upon their data, Eliade wants to deal faithfully with his phenomena as phenomena, to seejust what his data reveal. What his data reveal is that certain people have had experiences 18. M i r c e a Eliade, ' C o m p a r a t i v e Religion: Its Past a n d F u t u r e ' , Knowledge Future of Man, ed. W a l t e r J. O n g , S. J., p. 251. See Patterns, p. xiii; and Myths, and Mysteries, p. 131.

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which they have considered religious. Thus, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t must first of all respect the original intentionality expressed by the data; he must attempt to understand such p h e n o m e n a as s o m e t h i n g religious. In short, Eliade's methodological principle of irreducibility is really an insistence u p o n a phenomenological epoche. O n e recalls that H u s serl's phenomenological epoche was directed against reductionism. By 'bracketing' or suspending the interpretations w e normally place on p h e n o m e n a , the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t attempts to consider p h e n o m e n a 'just as p h e n o m e n a ' , 'to disclose and clarify the meaning of p h e n o mena, that is of whatever presents itself'. 1 9 T h e above discussion m a y be seen as relevant to one of our central methodological points in C h a p t e r 3: if Historians of Religions are to understand religious p h e n o m e n a 'on their o w n plane o f reference', they m u s t attempt to place themselves within the perspective of homo religiosus, and such a capacity for participation must be g r o u n d e d in a sympathetic attitude. By means of the epoche, phenomenologists attempt sympathetically to grasp the meaning of the experiences of the other. By insisting on the irreducibility of the sacred, Eliade attempts sympathetically to place himself within the perspective of homo religiosus and to grasp the meaning of the religious p h e n o mena. W e m a y formulate Eliade's methodological principle in the f o l l o w ing terms. As w e observed in C h a p t e r 3, our approach must be c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h the nature of our subject matter. Homo religiosus experiences the sacred as s o m e t h i n g sui generis. If w e are to participate in and sympathetically understand the religious p h e n o m e n a of the other, our scale must be c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h the scale of the other. Consequently, Eliade insists on an irreducibly religious scale of u n d e r standing in order to have an adequate k n o w l e d g e of the irreducibly religious phenomena. T o illustrate the p a r a m o u n t significance of this hermeneutical principle, consider the following question: H o w are w e to understand the e n o r m o u s prestige and the various functions and duties of the 19. Nathaniel Lawrence and Daniel O ' C o n n o r , ' T h e Primary P h e n o m e n o n : H u m a n Existence', Readings in Existential Phenomenology, ed. Nathaniel Lawrence and Daniel O ' C o n n o r , p. 7.

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Australian medicine man? Various reductionists f r o m n u m e r o u s disciplines have offered a w i d e range of interpretations. O u r data, such as the initiation rituals for b e c o m i n g a medicine man, reveal that the Australians have placed these experiences within a religious context. Eliade's 'religious scale' attempts to understand these p h e n o m e n a on their o w n plane of reference. H e finds that 'only the medicine m a n succeeds in surpassing his h u m a n condition, and consequently he is able to behave like the spiritual beings, or, in other words, to partake o f the modality of a spiritual being'. It is because of his ' t r a n s m u t a tion', his 'singular existential condition', that the medicine m a n can cure the sick, be a rainmaker, and defend his tribe against magical aggression. In short, his 'social prestige, his cultural role, and his political supremacy derive ultimately f r o m his magico-religious " p o w e r " '. 20 A second illustration of the significance of this hermeneutical principle can be seen in terms of the following question: H o w are w e to understand the shaman's strange imitation of animal cries? It has been c u s t o m a r y to interpret this p h e n o m e n o n as manifesting a pathological 'possession', clear evidence of the shaman's mental aberration. H o w ever, suppose w e suspend o u r n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s and first attempt to understand the religious m e a n i n g w h i c h such experiences have had for the other. 2 1 U n d e r s t o o d in terms of such a scale, Eliade finds that the shaman's friendship w i t h animals and k n o w l e d g e of their language reveal a 'paradisal' syndrome. C o m m u n i c a t i o n and friendship w i t h animals is one means of partially recovering the 'paradisal' situation of p r i m o r dial man; this blessedness and spontaneity existed in illo tempore, before the 'fall', and is inaccessible to our profane state. F r o m this 20. Mircea Eliade, 'Australian Religions, Part IV: T h e Medicine M e n and Their Supernatural Models', History of Religions 7, no. 2 (1967): pp. 160, 178-179. This article is reproduced as chapter 4 in Eliade's Australian Religions: An Introduction. 21. Eliade does g o o n to deny that s h a m a n i s m can be assimilated to a kind o f psychopathological condition: 'one b e c o m e s a shaman o n l y if he can interpret his pathological crisis as a religious experience and succeeds in curing h i m s e l f ; 'there is always a cure, a control, an equilibrium brought about by the actual practice o f shamanism'; the shamanic initiation includes 'a course o f theoretical and practical instruction t o o complicated to be within the grasp o f a neurotic'; etc. See Shamanism, pp. 14, 2 3 - 3 2 ; From Primitives to Zen, pp. 423—424; 'Recent W o r k s on Shamanism: a R e v i e w Article', History of Religions 1, no. 1 (1961): 155.

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perspective, Eliade begins to u n d e r s t a n d that the 'strange b e h a v i o r ' is 'actually part of a coherent ideology, possessing great nobility'. In t e r m s of this ideology, this ' y e a r n i n g for Paradise', Eliade is able to interpret m a n y shamanic p h e n o m e n a and to relate the s h a m a n ' s ecstatic experience to other religious p h e n o m e n a . 2 2 At the end of the last chapter, w e s u b m i t t e d b o t h that all approaches are reductionistic and that for s o m e p h e n o m e n a one m i g h t argue for the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i m a c y of s o m e religious perspective. Especially f o r those p h e n o m e n a w h i c h have been experienced b y homo religiosus as s o m e t h i n g religious and w h i c h reveal a basic religious i n t e n t i o n ality, the a s s u m p t i o n of the irreducibility of the religious m i g h t be justified o n p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l g r o u n d s . T h i s in n o w a y should be taken as a g r e e m e n t w i t h the f r e q u e n t l y f o r m u l a t e d antireductionist position that the religious m u s t be interpreted as s o m e t h i n g religious and that all other positions are false. All k n o w l e d g e is perspectival. Eliade is correct in a r g u i n g that the psychological or sociological perspective does n o t exhaust the m e a n ing of certain religious p h e n o m e n a , and, in s o m e cases, m a y distort or o v e r l o o k a basic structure of the sacred manifestation. B u t p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s of religion cannot argue that their perspective and their perspective alone exhausts the total m e a n i n g of religious p h e n o m e n a and does justice to all d i m e n s i o n s of the manifestations of the sacred. A f t e r n o t i n g 'the amazing popularity of w i t c h c r a f t in m o d e r n W e s t ern culture and its subcultures', Eliade undertakes an analysis o f ' t w o highly controversial p r o b l e m s : (1) the " o r i g i n s " of Western w i t c h craft, that is, the p r o b l e m of its possible relation to p r e - C h r i s t i a n beliefs and rituals; and (2) the so-called witches' orgies, which, f r o m the m o m e n t w i t c h c r a f t was assimilated to a heresy, w e r e at the center of the charges b r o u g h t against it'. Eliade then utilizes a religious scale f r o m the perspective of the H i s t o r y of Religions, and this leads to m a n y perceptive results. S o m e of the m o s t interesting ' o p e n i n g s ' in the interpretation of w i t c h c r a f t and various other religious p h e n o m e n a have been f o r m u lated in the past f e w years b y feminists. Yet one w o u l d never guess 22. Mircea Eliade, ' T h e Y e a r n i n g for Paradise in P r i m i t i v e T r a d i t i o n ' , Daedalus 88 (1959): 258, 261-266.

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f r o m Eliade's t r e a t m e n t that a n d r o c e n t r i s m and a theologically m i s ogynist tradition, that patriarchal structures of exploitation and oppression, w e r e key n o t i o n s in the interpretation of witchcraft. Thus, Eliade writes that 'the decisive fact was that, i m a g i n a r y or not, the witches' orgies, like those of the heretics, could endanger the social and theological institutions; indeed, they released nostalgias, hopes, and desires aiming at a m o d e of being different f r o m the typical Christian existence'. Feminist interpreters— w h e t h e r using a religious or nonreligious scale— w o u l d agree w i t h this conclusion w h i l e qualif y i n g and e x p a n d i n g it. F r o m a feminist perspective, those 'endangered social and theological institutions' w e r e patriarchal and oppressed and exploited w o m e n ; and those 'released nostalgias, hopes, and desires' indeed aimed at a different (nonpatriarchal) m o d e of being f r o m the 'typical Christian existence' ('typical' equals 'male-defined'), since that existence was sexist in its symbols, m y t h s , rituals, and power-relations. 2 3 In her ' A n d r o c e n t r i s m in Religious Studies', Valerie Saiving uses Eliade's Rites and Symbols of Initiation as her case study. W i t h a specific feminist sensitivity, she notes a c o m m o n characteristic in Eliade's various 'metacultural aspects of male initiation': 'the element of aggression, conquest, d o m i n a t i o n ' . She contends that w h a t Eliade 'says about the human m e a n i n g of initiation c o r r e s p o n d s almost exactly to w h a t he says a b o u t male initiation, and that it contradicts in essential respects his u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f f e m a l e initiation'. 'It m a y be true, as Eliade asserts, that w o m e n have their o w n f o r m of sacrality; b u t given his o w n conception of w h a t "lies at the core of any genuine h u m a n life," it is a s u b h u m a n sacrality. F r o m this v i e w p o i n t of w o m e n [and this author and m a n y other men], this conclusion is scarcely trivial.' 2 4 T h e above t w o illustrations are n o t so m u c h intended to s h o w that 2 3 . M i r c e a Eliade, ' S o m e O b s e r v a t i o n s o n E u r o p e a n W i t c h c r a f t ' , Occultism, Witchcraft, and Cultural Fashions, pp. 6 9 - 7 0 , 9 0 - 9 1 , a n d passim. 24. Valerie Saiving, ' A n d r o c e n t r i s m in R e l i g i o u s Studies', Journal of Religion 56, no. 2 (1976): 183-184, 188, 189, 190; Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. 135. P r o f . Saiving r e m a r k s t h a t Eliade's s t u d y o f initiation p r e s e n t s 'an especially difficult test' o f h e r h y p o t h e s i s c o n c e r n i n g a n d r o c e n t r i s m in religious studies; 'if it e m b o d i e s a n d r o c e n t r i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , these are n o t i m m e d i a t e l y visible b u t exist at a v e r y d e e p level'. W e m a y n o t e that Saiving a s s u m e s a religious p e r s p e c t i v e w h i c h is

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Eliade's scale is explicitly androcentric, b u t rather that his perspective emphasizes certain notions and o v e r l o o k s or de-emphasizes other dimensions of the p h e n o m e n a w h i c h are central to other (in this case, feminist) perspectives. While granting a certain m e t h o d o l o g i c a l prim a c y for a s s u m i n g the irreducibility of the religious, w e emphasize that n o perspective does justice to all dimensions of religious phenomena. Eliade has insisted o n the irreducibility of the sacred b u t has n o t p r o v i d e d the h e r m e n e u t i c f r a m e w o r k f o r perceiving the irreducible manifestations. H e m u s t n o w recreate imaginatively the conditions for the manifestations of the sacred; in d o i n g this, he seems to adopt a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach by focusing u p o n the intentionality of his data. In a s s u m i n g the irreducibility of the sacred, w e have recognized the need to participate in the life-world of homo religiosus, the s y m p a t h e t i c effort to u n d e r s t a n d the experiences of the other. Stephan Strasser remarks, 'In this authentically p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l attitude the w o r l d n o longer appears to us as a w h o l e of objective data, b u t as an "intentional c o n f i g u r a t i o n " [Sinngebilde] w h i c h is b o r n and becomes m e a n i n g f u l in the course of an existential m o v e m e n t of orientation. ' 25 W h e n Eliade examines his data, they do reveal a certain i n t e n t i o n ality. H e will a t t e m p t to recreate imaginatively the conditions for the 'intentional c o n f i g u r a t i o n ' w h i c h expresses the specific existential orientation oi^omo religiosus. ' T h e a t t e m p t to u n d e r s t a n d the sacred as an irreducible f o r m is a c c o m p a n i e d by the technical a t t e m p t to capture its intentional m o d e . . . . Eliade's second h e r m e n e u t i c principle, the dialectic of the sacred and the profane, is introduced precisely to capture this intentional characteristic of the sacred modality.' 2 6

i r r e d u c i b l y f e m i n i s t ; m a n y o t h e r f e m i n i s t s , o f course, d o n o t a s s u m e a religious perspective. 25. S t e p h e n Strasser, The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology, p. 3. 26. D a v i d R a s m u s s e n , ' M i r c e a Eliade: S t r u c t u r a l H e r m e n e u t i c s a n d P h i l o s o p h y ' , Philosophy Today 12, no. 2 (1968): 140. R a s m u s s e n p r e s e n t s ' t h e irreducibility o f t h e sacred' as Eliade's 'first h e r m e n e u t i c principle'. P r o f e s s o r R a s m u s s e n is o n e o f t h e f e w i n t e r p r e t e r s w h o has u n c o v e r e d s o m e of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l significance of Eliade's methodology.

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RELIGION AND THE SACRED

In order to understand m o r e fully the structure of the dialectic of the sacred, w e shall first clarify Eliade's conception of religion and the sacred. Mircea Eliade tells us that 'in the title of the "history of religions" [History of Religions] the accent o u g h t not to be u p o n the w o r d history, but u p o n the w o r d religions. For although there are n u m e r o u s w a y s of practising history — f r o m the history of technics to that of h u m a n t h o u g h t — there is only one w a y of approaching religion — namely, to deal w i t h the religious facts. Before m a k i n g the history of anything, one must have a proper understanding of w h a t it is, in and for itself.' 27 Following Roger Caillois, Eliade begins by asserting that 'all the definitions given up till n o w of the religious p h e n o m e n o n have one thing in c o m m o n : each has its o w n w a y of s h o w i n g that the sacred and the religious life are the opposite of the profane and the secular life'. Caillois admits that this sacred-profane distinction is not always sufficient to define the p h e n o m e n o n of religion, b u t such an opposition is involved in every definition of religion. 2 8 ' T h e d i c h o t o m y of sacred and profane is the invariable par excellence in the religious life of man. ' 29 In Eliade's conception, religion 'does n o t necessarily imply belief in God, gods, or ghosts, b u t refers to the experience of the sacred'. T h e sacred and profane are ' t w o m o d e s of being in the world, t w o existential situations assumed by m a n in the course of history'. 3 0 W h a t is most characteristic of religion is its being occupied w i t h the sacred, w h i c h it distinguishes f r o m the profane. T h e sacred m a y be described as that w h i c h is experienced as ' p o w e r ' (van der Leeuw), as 'wholly other' 27. Images and Symbols, p. 29. 28. Patterns, p. 1; The Sacred, p. 10; R o g e r Caillois, Man and the Sacred, pp. 13, 19. 29. Eliade, ' S t r u c t u r e and C h a n g e s in the H i s t o r y of Religion', p. 353. W i n s t o n L. K i n g has w r i t t e n in his Introduction to Religion: A Phenomenological Approach, p. 32: 'Classically speaking w h a t is n o t sacred is profane; b u t in o u r t i m e " p r o f a n e " connotes the antisacred rather than the merely nonsacred.' A l t h o u g h w e m u s t guard against this c o n n o t a t i o n o f ' p r o f a n e ' , w e shall continue t o use this t e r m since it appears t h r o u g h o u t the writings of Mircea Eliade. 30. Mircea Eliade, 'Preface', The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion, p. i; The Sacred, p. 14.

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(Otto), as 'ultimate reality' (Wach). In other religious contexts, it is described by such terms as 'absolute reality', 'being', 'eternity', 'divine', 'metacultural and transhistorical', 'transhuman', 'transmundane', 'source o f life and fecundity'. 31 B y citing several illustrations, we shall comprehend more fully the relationship between religion and the sacred. In interpreting experiences o f ' m y s t i c light', Eliade seems to feel that these experiences are religious because 'they bring a man out o f his worldly Universe or historical situation, and project him into a Universe different in quality, an entirely different world, transcendent and holy'. Yoga preserves 'a religious value' by reacting against 'the "normal", "secular", and finally " h u m a n " inclination', by thirsting 'for the unconditioned, for freedom, for " p o w e r " — in a word, for one o f the countless modalities o f the sacred'. The myriad expressions o f the 'coincidentia oppositorum' reveal religious experiences because they may be deciphered as disclosing the human being's attempt to transcend his or her 'natural' or 'human' situation in the world by transcending 'the opposites' and thus reaching a mode o f 'total' being. 32 If we consider all o f the descriptions o f the sacred, Eliade seems to be indicating that religion always entails some aspect o f transcendence. This sense o f transcendence is expressed in such terms as absolute bliss and power, transhistorical and transmundane, etc. But Eliade intends this sense o f transcendence to be viewed as a universal structure o f religion: to restrict it to any particular description or content is to relativize it. All expressions are too specific. Eliade's universal characterization o f religion in terms o f this transcendent structure is meant to include, but not be exhausted by, the definitions offered by van der Leeuw, Otto, Wach, and others. One immediately realizes that the above claim is not sufficient to define religion. Countless examples can be cited where a completely nonreligious individual, say, some scientist expounding her or his conception o f space, presents us with a purely descriptive and secular sense o f transcendence. What differentiates the religious sense o f transcendence is its special 31. For example, see Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. 130; Yoga, p. 165; The Sacred, p. 28. 32. Mephistopheles and the Androgyne, pp. 76, 7 8 - 1 2 4 ; Yoga, p. 96.

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n o r m a t i v e basis for homo religiosus. This will b e c o m e apparent in our treatment of the structure o f ' e v a l u a t i o n and choice' in the dialectic of the sacred. At this point, let us simply note that religion involves a radical break w i t h all of the secular or profane modalities. It invariably points us ' b e y o n d ' the relative, historical, 'natural' w o r l d o f ' o r d i n a r y ' experience. Indeed, Eliade goes so far as to assert that 'the principal function of religion' is to render h u m a n existence ' o p e n ' to a ' s u p e r h u m a n ' w o r l d of 'transcendent' values. 33 In a frequently quoted passage f r o m The Sacred and the Profane, Eliade contrasts religion w i t h the m o d e of being in the w o r l d of the nonreligious person: T h e nonreligious m a n refuses trancendence, accepts the relativity of 'reality,'and m a y even c o m e to d o u b t the meaning of existence. . . . M o d e r n nonreligious m a n assumes a n e w existential situation; he regards himself solely as the subject and agent of history, and he refuses all appeal to transcendence. In other w o r d s , he accepts no model for h u m a n i t y outside the h u m a n condition as it can be seen in the various historical situations. M a n makes himself, and he only makes himself completely in p r o p o r t i o n as he desacralizes himself and the world. T h e sacred is the p r i m e obstacle to his freedom. H e will b e c o m e himself only w h e n he is totally demysticized. H e will n o t be truly free until he has killed the last god. 3 4 Eliade m u s t n o t be confused w i t h the n u m e r o u s scholars w h o hold metaphysical positions concerning transcendence. H e is not claiming that 'the value of the religious p h e n o m e n a can be u n d e r s t o o d only if w e keep in m i n d that religion is ultimately a realization of a transcendent truth'. 3 5 At this stage, his empirical approach is clearly descriptive. His religious d o c u m e n t s reveal the sacred-profane d i c h o t o m y 33. 'Structure and Changes in the History of Religion', p. 366: 'the principal function of religion, that of maintaining an " o p e n i n g " t o w a r d a world which is superhuman, the world of axiomatic spiritual values'. 34. The Sacred, pp. 202-203. 35. Bleeker, ' T h e Future Task of the History of Religions', p. 227. Bleeker's n o r m a t i v e claim was rejected in a statement submitted by Professor Werblowsky, to which Eliade and m a n y other Historians of Religions were willing to associate themselves. See ' S u m m a r y of Discussion' by Annemarie Schimmel, Numen 1, fasc. 3 (1960): 237.

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and the a t t e m p t b y homo religiosus to experience the sacred b y transcending the profane. It seems that Mircea Eliade's a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e us w i t h a universal structure of religion leads to a certain peculiarity. At the b e g i n n i n g o f Patterns in Comparative Religion, he tells us that he will dispense ' f r o m any a priori definition of the religious p h e n o m e n o n ; the reader can m a k e his o w n reflections on the n a t u r e of the sacred as he goes'. Eliade will s i m p l y investigate his data in o r d e r to see 'just w h a t things are religious in n a t u r e and w h a t those things reveal'. 3 6 It w o u l d seem that a definition of religion arrived at in this m a n n e r w o u l d be open to modification; o u r conception o f religion could change d e p e n d i n g o n the n a t u r e of the f u t u r e d o c u m e n t s w e investigate. N o w Eliade appears to have given us a 'definition' of religion w h i c h is supposedly d e p e n d e n t on the nature of the religious document;, he has investigated, b u t w h i c h is n o t in fact o p e n to change. 3 7 W h a t w o u l d it be like to falsify Eliade's definition? H e cannot a d m i t to c o m i n g u p w i t h a religious d o c u m e n t n o t h a v i n g the structure of transcendence. 3 8 Eliade's definition of religion has the peculiarity of any empirical definition w h i c h claims to be universal. T H E DIALECTIC OF THE SACRED

T o recreate the conditions for the intentional m o d e of religious m a n i festations, w e m u s t carefully explicate the structure of the dialectic of 36. Patterns, p p . xvi, xiv. 37. T h i s s e e m s s i m i l a r t o t h e s t a t u s o f a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l ' e s s e n c e ' as t h e c o n c e p t is u s e d b y m o s t p h i l o s o p h i c a l p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s . See o u r t r e a t m e n t o f ' P h e n o m e n o logical M e t h o d , F r e e V a r i a t i o n , a n d I n d u c t i o n ' in c h a p t e r 6. 38. W e m a y s i m p l y n o t e t h a t this is t h e s o u r c e o f T h o m a s A l t i z e r ' s m a j o r c r i t i c i s m o f Eliade. F o r Altizer, m o d e r n r e l i g i o s i t y is d e f i n e d b y its v e r y denial o f t r a n s c e n dence. H e n c e Altizer argues that Eliade's conception o f religion does justice to archaic b u t n o t t o m o d e r n r e l i g i o n . E l i a d e w o u l d c o u n t e r t h a t s u c h m o d e r n e x p e r i e n c e s are e i t h e r n o t r e l i g i o u s o r d o h a v e a r e l i g i o u s aura, b e c a u s e t h e y r e v e a l a t r a n s c e n d e n t s t r u c t u r e w h i c h is n o t l i v e d c o n s c i o u s l y . M u c h o f E l i a d e ' s a n a l y s i s is d e v o t e d t o d e c i p h e r i n g t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t s t r u c t u r e w h i c h is e x p r e s s e d in t h e m y t h s , rituals, i d e o l o g i e s , n o s t a l g i a s , d r e a m s , fantasies, a n d o t h e r u n c o n s c i o u s o r i m a g i n a r y e x p e r i ences o f the m o d e r n person. For a discussion o f h o w Eliade m i g h t r e s p o n d t o Altizer's c r i t i c i s m s , see M a c L i n s c o t t R i c k e t t s , ' M i r c e a E l i a d e a n d t h e D e a t h o f G o d ' , Religion in Life ( S p r i n g , 1967): 4 0 - 5 2 ; R i c k e t t s , ' E l i a d e a n d A l t i z e r : V e r y D i f f e r e n t O u t l o o k s ' , Christian Advocate ( O c t o b e r , 1967): 1 1 - 1 2 .

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the sacred. W e shall divide our analysis into three parts: the separation of the hierophanic object and the sacred-profane distinction; the paradoxical relationship between the sacred and the profane; the evaluation and choice implied in the dialectic. The separation and distinction According to Eliade, the person w h o has the religious experience believes that something comes f r o m s o m e w h e r e else and shows itself to h i m or her. T h a t w h i c h appears f r o m s o m e w h e r e else is the sacred; that t h r o u g h w h i c h it appears is the profane. T o denote the act of manifestation of the sacred, w e propose to use the term hierophany. This w o r d is convenient because it requires no additional specification; it means n o t h i n g m o r e than is implied by its etymological c o n t e n t — namely, that something sacred is s h o w n to us, manifests itself. O n e m a y say that the history of religions — f r o m the most elementary to the m o s t developed — is constituted by a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t hierophanies, manifestations of sacred realities. 39 W h a t interests homo religiosus are hierophanies. These manifestations of the sacred are never unmediated: the sacred is always revealed t h r o u g h s o m e t h i n g natural, historical, ordinarily profane. T h e p r o fane alone has n o significance for homo religiosus, but only insofar as it reveals the sacred. T h e process of sacralization involves the 'radical ontological separation' of the thing which reveals the sacred f r o m everything else. W e find the singularization of a certain stone because of its size or shape or heavenly origin, because it protects the dead or is the site of a covenant, because it represents a t h e o p h a n y or is an image o f the 'center'. A medicine m a n has been singularized because he has been chosen by gods or spirits, because of his heredity, because of various physical defects (an infirmity, nervous disorder, etc.), or because of an unusual accident or event (lightning, apparition, dream, etc.). 40 39. Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p. 124. See Patterns, pp. 7ff. O f course, w e h a v e already presented a partial analysis o f t h e s a c r e d - p r o f a n e distinction in o u r discussion o f Eliade's v i e w o f religion and t h e sacred.

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W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is that there is always s o m e t h i n g else, s o m e t h i n g other; that w h i c h is singularized is 'chosen' because it manifests the sacred. If a large rock is singled out, it is n o t simply because of its impressive natural dimensions, b u t rather because its i m p o s i n g appearance reveals s o m e t h i n g transcendent: a permanence, a p o w e r , an absolute m o d e of being, w h i c h is different f r o m the precariousness of h u m a n existence. If the medicine m a n is singled out, it is because his unusual accident or event is a 'sign' of s o m e t h i n g transcendent: he is a 'specialist of the sacred'; he has the capacity to transcend the h u m a n and profane, to have contact w i t h and m a n i p u l a t e the sacred. It is o f t e n difficult f o r the Historian of Religions to recognize hierophanies. W e tend to see natural objects w h e r e o u r ancestors saw hierophanies. Eliade has o b s e r v e d that ' t o the primitive, nature is never purely " n a t u r a l " '. W e m a y u n d e r s t a n d that the sky w o u l d reveal a sense of transcendence or infinity, b u t it o f t e n seems i n c o m prehensible that a simple gesture, a n o r m a l physiological activity, or a dreary landscape w o u l d manifest the sacred. Yet w e m u s t be sensitive to the fact that all p h e n o m e n a are potentially hierophanic. W e m u s t get used to the idea of recognizing hierophanies e v e r y where, in every area of psychological, economic, spiritual and social life. Indeed, w e cannot be sure that there is anything — object, m o v e m e n t , psychological function, being or even g a m e — that has n o t at s o m e time in h u m a n history been s o m e w h e r e t r a n s f o r m e d into a hierophany. It is a very different m a t t e r to find o u t why that particular thing should have b e c o m e a h i e r o p h a n y , or should have s t o p p e d being one at any given m o m e n t . B u t it is quite certain that a n y t h i n g m a n has ever handled, felt, c o m e in contact w i t h or loved can b e c o m e a hierophany. 4 1 40. Patterns, pp. 216-238; The Myth of the Eternal Return, p. 4; Shamanism, pp. 31-32 and passim. 41. Patterns, pp. 11, 38. In several contexts, Eliade has asserted that J u d a e o Christianity contributed greatly to the process by which w e (modern, secular, Western, scientific) tend to see n^tuial objects where 'archaic' religions saw hierophanies. T h e 'cosmic religiosity' of earlier religions was criticized: a rock was 'only' a rock and should not be worshipped. 'Emptied of every religious value or meaning, nature could become the " o b j e c t " par excellence of scientific investigation.' ' T h e Sacred and the M o d e r n Artist', Criterion 4, no. 2 (1965): 23.

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A t this point, w e m a y n o t e that Eliade's doctrine of hierophanies challenges the naturalistic interpretations of religious p h e n o m e n a . Because w e tend to see natural objects w h e r e homo religiosus saw hierophanies, there is the tendency to interpret the dialectic of the sacred as a 'natural' m o d e of manifestation. B u t to d o this w o u l d be to fail to grasp the true intentionality of the sacred manifestation. W e m u s t n o w e x a m i n e the relationship w h i c h exists b e t w e e n the sacred and the p r o f a n e as disclosed by the dialectic of hierophanies. T h i s dialectical relationship has been the source of m u c h c o n f u s i o n and misinterpretation. The paradoxical

relationship

T h o m a s J. J. Altizer seizes u p o n the point 'that the sacred is the opposite of the p r o f a n e ' as Eliade's 'cardinal principle' and the key to interpreting Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d . T h i s opposition is taken to m e a n that the sacred and the p r o f a n e are m u t u a l l y exclusive or logically contradictory. F r o m this 'cardinal principle', Altizer sees the key to Eliade's approach in t e r m s of a 'negative dialectic': 'a single m o m e n t cannot be sacred and p r o f a n e at once'. An u n d e r s t a n d i n g of religious m y t h , for example, is possible 'only t h r o u g h a negation of the language of the profane'. T h e ' m e a n i n g of the sacred is reached by inverting the reality created by m o d e r n m a n ' s p r o f a n e choice'. In short, to o b s e r v e the sacred one m u s t totally negate the p r o f a n e and vice versa. 4 2 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , this interpretation destroys the dialectical c o m p l e x i t y of the religious m o d e of manifestation and leads to an oversimplification and distortion of Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l method.43 Eliade's religious data reveal that in the process of sacralization the sacred and the p r o f a n e coexist in a paradoxical relationship. This process is the intention of the h i e r o p h a n y , an intention w h i c h constitutes the structure and lies at the f o u n d a t i o n of the hierophany. A series of 42. T h o m a s J. J. Altizer, Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred, pp. 34, 39, 45, 65, a n d passim. 43. A f t e r c o m p l e t i n g this section, I c a m e across a v e r y similar criticism of A l t i z e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Eliade's s a c r e d - p r o f a n e r e l a t i o n s h i p in R i c k e t t s ' s ' M i r c e a Eliade and t h e D e a t h of G o d ' , Religion in Life-, 4 3 - 4 8 .

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illustrations f r o m Eliade will clarify this point. ' O n e m u s t r e m e m b e r the dialectic of the sacred: any object w h a t ever m a y paradoxically b e c o m e a hierophany, a receptacle of the sacred, while still participating in its o w n cosmic e n v i r o n m e n t . ' ' O n e need only recall the dialectic of h i e r o p h a n y : an object becomes sacred while r e m a i n i n g j u s t the same as it is.' T h e dialectic of the sacred consists of the fact that 'the sacred expresses itself t h r o u g h s o m e thing other than itself', that 'in every case the sacred manifests itself limited and incarnate'. It is 'this p a r a d o x of incarnation w h i c h makes hierophanies possible at all'. 44 In fact, this paradoxical c o m i n g - t o g e t h e r of sacred and profane, being and n o n - b e i n g , absolute and relative, the eternal and the b e c o m i n g , is w h a t every hierophany, even the m o s t elementary, reveals . . . every h i e r o p h a n y s h o w s , makes manifest, the coexistence of c o n t r a d i c t o r y essences: sacred and profane, spirit and m a t ter, eternal and non-eternal, and so on. T h a t the dialectic of hierophanies, of the manifestation of the sacred in material things, should be an object for even such c o m p l e x t h e o l o g y as that of the M i d d l e Ages seems to p r o v e that it remains the cardinal p r o b l e m of any religion. . . . In fact, w h a t is paradoxical, w h a t is b e y o n d o u r understanding, is n o t that the sacred can be manifested in stones or in trees, but that it can be manifested at all, that it can thus b e c o m e limited and relative. 4 5 T h u s w e observe the paradoxical coexistence revealed by the dialectic of the sacred and the profane. W h a t is paradoxical is that an ordinary, finite, historical thing, while r e m a i n i n g a natural thing, can at the same time manifest s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is n o t finite, n o t historical, not n a t u ral. W h a t is paradoxical is that s o m e t h i n g transcendent, w h o l l y other, infinite, transhistorical, limits itself by manifesting itself in s o m e relative, finite, historical thing. The evaluation and choice O u r religious data d o not simply reveal a distinction b e t w e e n sacred and profane, as seen in their paradoxical coexistence in every 44. Images and Symbols, pp. 84, 178; Patterns, p. 26. 45. Patterns, pp. 29-30.

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hierophany. T h e dialectic of hierophanies s h o w s that homo religiosus is involved in an 'existential crisis': in experiencing a hierophany, he or she is called u p o n to evaluate the t w o orders of being and to m a k e a choice. Charles L o n g describes this sense of evaluation in the f o l l o w i n g m a n n e r : ' T h e w o r l d of m a n exists as a limitation or qualification of his e n v i r o n m e n t , and this qualification or limitation is at the same t i m e a criticism. M a n ' s w o r l d is an o r d e r e d w o r l d of meaning, b u t the organizing principle is interpreted as a revelation w h i c h comes f r o m a source outside of his o r d i n a r y life. It is this source w h i c h is given (revealed) and (it) defines any f u t u r e possibility of m a n ' s existence.' 4 6 In experiencing the dialectic of hierophany, homo religiosus faces an 'existential crisis'; indeed, one's very existence is called into question. Because of the d i c h o t o m y of sacred and profane, as revealed in their paradoxical coexistence, distinction, differentiation, value, and even m e a n i n g are all introduced into one's existence. 4 7 In short, o n e d i m e n sion of being is seen as m o r e significant, as ' w h o l l y o t h e r ' and ' p o w e r f u l ' and 'ultimate', as containing a surplus of meaning, as paradigmatic and n o r m a t i v e in j u d g i n g o n e ' s existence. Eliade usually describes the p e r s o n ' s choice and evaluation 'negatively'. T h e dialectic of hierophanies t h r o w s the realm of natural o r d i n a r y existence into sharp relief. A f t e r the ' r u p t u r e ' of the sacred and the profane, the person evaluates her or his natural existence as a 'fall'. O n e feels separated f r o m w h a t is n o w evaluated as 'ultimate' and 'real'. O n e longs to transcend the 'natural' and 'historical' m o d e of being and to live p e r m a n e n t l y in the sacred. T h e u p s h o t of the a b o v e discussion seems to be the following. T h r o u g h the dialectic of hierophanies, the p r o f a n e is set off in sharp relief; homo religiosus 'chooses' the sacred and evaluates his or her ' o r d i n a r y ' m o d e of existence negatively. At the s a m e time, t h r o u g h 46. Alpha, pp. 10-11. 47. Eliade, Myth and Reality, p. 139; and G. Richard Welbon, ' S o m e Remarks on the W o r k of Mircea Eliade', Acta Philosophica et Theologica 2 (1964): 479. Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language, p. 293: 'if the sacred be the foundation of all of our profane life, then our relation to the sacred will determine the patterns of our behavior in every secular realm. For this reason, every religious s y m b o l or m y t h entails " m o d e l s " for our existence, patterns of sacrality by means of which man comprehends the f o r m s of his h u m a n existence and so by which he patterns his life and that of his society.'

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this evaluation and choice, the h u m a n being is given the possibility for m e a n i n g f u l j u d g m e n t s and creative h u m a n action and expression. T h e 'positive' religious value of the 'negative' evaluation of the profane, w e w o u l d submit, is expressed in the intentionality t o w a r d m e a n i n g ful c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h the sacred and t o w a r d religious action w h i c h n o w appears as a structure in the consciousness of homo religiosus. At this point, a brief digression m a y be useful in clarifying one of the main sources of misconceptions in interpreting Eliade's p h e n o m e n ology: m o s t interpreters do n o t endeavor to u n d e r s t a n d Mircea Eliade on his o w n grounds. W e m a y cite an e x a m p l e f r o m o u r above discussion: homo religiosus evaluates his or her natural existence as a 'fall'. M a n y interpreters have seized u p o n Eliade's personal doctrine of a 'fall' as being a pivotal n o t i o n in his t h o u g h t . It is only because of Eliade's 'theological a s s u m p t i o n s ' that he considers m o d e r n secularization to be a 'fall'. 4 8 Eliade is a ' r o m a n t i c ' w h o believes that history is a 'fall' and w h o 'insists u p o n the reality of m a n ' s prefallen state'. 4 9 T h e p r o b l e m w i t h these interpretations is that Altizer and H a m i l t o n do n o t take Eliade seriously e n o u g h o n his o w n g r o u n d s . T h e y are theologians and criticize Eliade's theological position on a 'fall'. B u t Eliade at least p u r p o r t s to be a Historian of Religions; his claim is not that Mircea Eliade is c o m m i t t e d to these diverse t h e m e s of a 'fall' b u t that homo religiosus has entertained such beliefs. T o give but o n e illustration, Eliade finds that 'the paradisiac m y t h s ' all speak of a 'paradisiac e p o c h ' in w h i c h primordial beings e n j o y e d f r e e d o m , i m m o r t a l i t y , easy c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h the gods, etc. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , they lost all of this because o f ' t h e fall' — the p r i m o r dial event w h i c h caused the ' r u p t u r e ' of the sacred and the profane. T h e s e m y t h s help homo religiosus to u n d e r s t a n d his or her present 'fallen' existence and express a 'nostalgia' for that 'prefallen' 48. See K e n n e t h H a m i l t o n , 'Homo Religiosus a n d Historical Faith', Journal of Bible and Religion 33, no. 3 (1965): 212, 214—215, 216. T h e f o l l o w i n g discussion w o u l d also a p p l y t o Eliade's p o i n t that ' f r o m t h e C h r i s t i a n p o i n t o f v i e w ' it c o u l d b e said t h a t m o d e r n n o n r e l i g i o n is e q u i v a l e n t t o a n e w o r s e c o n d 'fall'. See The Sacred, p. 213; ' A r c h a i c M y t h a n d Historical M a n ' , pp. 3 5 - 3 6 . 49. See Altizer, Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred, pp. 84, 86, 88, 161; a n d Altizer, ' M i r c e a Eliade a n d t h e R e c o v e r y o f t h e Sacred', The Christian Scholar 45, n o . 4 (1962): 282-283. See Eliade, Images and Symbols, p. 173; The Myth of the Eternal Return, p. 162.

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Paradise. 5 0 If history is a 'fall' for homo religiosus, it is because historical existence is seen as separated f r o m and inferior to the 'transhistorical' (absolute, eternal, transcendent) realm of the sacred. Summary W e m a y n o w s u m m a r i z e the structure of the process of sacralization w h i c h is revealed to us in the dialectic of hierophanies: 1. T h e r e is always the separation of the hierophanic object and the distinction b e t w e e n the sacred and the profane. F r o m o u r earlier analysis, w e recall that religion exists w h e r e the sacred-profane d i c h o t o m y has been made, and the sacred always entails s o m e sense of transcendence. 2. T h i s d i c h o t o m y is experienced in t e r m s of a certain dialectical tension: the sacred and the p r o f a n e coexist in a paradoxical relationship. W h a t is paradoxical is that the sacred, w h i c h is transcendent (wholly other, ultimate, infinite, transhistorical), limits itself by incarnating itself in s o m e t h i n g p r o f a n e (relative, finite, historical, natural). O r , w e m a y express this paradoxical coexistence as follows: w h a t is p r o f a n e (finite, natural), while r e m a i n i n g a natural thing, at the same t i m e manifests w h a t is sacred (infinite, transcendent). 3. Homo religiosus does n o t simply distinguish the sacred and the profane, a distinction revealed t h r o u g h their paradoxical coexistence in every hierophany. Implied in the dialectic of the sacred is an evaluation and a choice. T h e sacred is experienced as p o w e r f u l , ultimate, absolute, m e a n i n g f u l , paradigmatic, n o r m a t i v e . It is in t e r m s of the sacred that religious persons interpret their m o d e of being in the w o r l d and define the f u t u r e possibilities of their existence.

F U R T H E R A N A L Y S I S OF T H E S A C R E D

Ambivalence

in the religious

MODALITY

experience

It is n o w possible to relate Eliade's analysis to several of the m a j o r concerns in earlier chapters. O u r first c o m m o n m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p o i n t 50. Myths,

Dreams

and Mysteries,

p p . 59 ff.

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in C h a p t e r 3 b r o u g h t o u t the experiential basis of religion. Eliade has a t t e m p t e d to u n d e r s t a n d religion as a w a y that the h u m a n being is in the w o r l d ; religion arises f r o m existential crises and is u n d e r s t o o d as a m o d e of existence in the w o r l d . For homo religiosus the sacred 'is the category of meaning in the w o r l d . T h e Sacred is w h a t is valid in the w o r l d , authentic, substantial, real, true, eternal. It is this and m o r e . T h e Sacred is a d i m e n s i o n of being, a depth, or level, on w h i c h life is experienced.' 5 1 In o u r t r e a t m e n t of the dialectic of the sacred and the profane, w e a t t e m p t e d to recreate the conditions for the sacred m a n i festation as experienced by homo religiosus. In previous chapters, w e have frequently elucidated a certain ambivalence in the religious experience, as exemplified b y M a r e t t ' s j o i n i n g of t a b o o and m a n a in his m i n i m u m definition of religion or O t t o ' s description of the n u m i n o u s experience in t e r m s of b o t h the tremendum and the fascinans. O n the one hand, the religious experience is v i e w e d in the m o s t 'positive' terms. Mana, for example, characterizes w h a t e v e r is 'real', efficacious, and creative. In addition, the religious experience is 'practical', soteriological. T h u s w e have f o u n d that the greatest h o p e of homo religiosus is to experience this 'ultimate reality' and attain salvation. O n the other hand, the religious experience is terrifying, dangerous, s o m e t i m e s even fatal. A h u m a n being fears and is repelled b y the religious; she or he conceives of it in t e r m s of i m p u r i t y , defilement, and death. T o characterize a religious p h e n o m e n o n as t a b o o is to signify that it is f o r b i d d e n because any contact w i t h it is e x t r e m e l y dangerous. Eliade finds this same a m b i g u i t y of the sacred at the heart of the religious experience. H e observes an ambivalence in the n a t u r e of the sacred and a c o r r e s p o n d i n g a m b i g u i t y in the h u m a n reaction to the sacred. 'This ambivalence of the sacred is n o t only in the psychological order (in that it attracts or repels), b u t also in the o r d e r of values; the sacred is at once " s a c r e d " and " d e f i l e d " . ' ' M a n ' s ambivalent attitude t o w a r d s the sacred, w h i c h at once attracts and repels him, is b o t h

51. Ira P r o g o f f , ' C u l t u r e a n d B e i n g : M i r c e a Eliade's Studies in Religion', national Journal of Parapsychology 2 (1960): 53.

Inter-

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beneficent and dangerous, can be explained n o t only by the a m b i v a l ent nature of the sacred in itself, b u t also b y m a n ' s natural reactions to this transcendent reality w h i c h attracts and terrifies h i m w i t h equal intensity. ' 5 2 W e recall that there is a difference in the order of being b e t w e e n the sacred and the profane: the sacred is t r a n s h u m a n , transhistorical, etc. T h a t w h i c h is transcendent is taken as 'real', 'valid', eternal, authentic. Homo religiosus is d r a w n to the sacred reality, v i e w i n g it as the source and m e a n i n g of one's existence and as the h o p e of salvation. H o w e v e r , w e m a y recognize a quite different valuation of the sacred. H o w does one regard that w h i c h is not 'ordinary', n o t 'historical' or 'natural', n o t of the ' h u m a n ' w o r l d of experience? C o n t a c t w i t h s o m e t h i n g of a different o r d e r of being m i g h t p r o d u c e 'an upheaval at the ontological level' w h i c h could p r o v e disastrous. Should w e n o t fear and a t t e m p t to avoid s o m e t h i n g absolutely p o w e r f u l ? Such a ' t r a n s h u m a n ' p o w e r w o u l d seem terrifying and dangerous; it m i g h t result in defilement and pollution rather than sanctity and purity, destruction and death rather than salvation and i m m o r t a l i t y . A w a r e n e s s of this a m b i g u i t y of the sacred is o f t e n of great assistance in interpreting the religious. For instance, it helps us to u n d e r s t a n d the f u n c t i o n and prestige of the 'experts' in religious matters. C o n s i d e r the role of s h a m a n s as p s y c h o p o m p s : by m e a n s of their ecstatic experience, they t r a n s p o r t souls to the other w o r l d . 5 3 T h e ambivalence of the sacred helps us to u n d e r s t a n d such matters as w h y it is only the 'specialist' w h o can u n d e r t a k e these trips, w h y the ecstatic j o u r n e y s are so f r e q u e n t l y f r a u g h t w i t h perilous obstacles, and w h y it is so i m p o r t a n t f o r the society that the s h a m a n succeeds as p s y c h o p o m p . G. Richard W e l b o n elucidates an i m p o r t a n t implication of this ambivalence of the sacred. . . . if m a n really regarded the p r o f a n e as n o n - b e i n g and his o w n existence is c o n d i t i o n a l — he surely w o u l d have ' n o t h i n g to lose' in deciding f o r the sacred. T h e hesitation, the ambivalence can m e a n that the sacred is so w o n d r o u s that m a n is confused. A n d it can also m e a n that the 52. Patterns, pp. 14-15, 460. 53. Shamanism, pp. 182 ff., 205 f£, and passim.

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' n o t h i n g ' of m a n is w o r t h s o m e t h i n g after all. B o t h these p o s sibilities are true, the latter being m o r e interesting in this context. T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g w o r s e than the p r o f a n e m o d e of existence; f o r it is possible that m a n m a y lose any and all his existential d i m e n s i o n s b y t r y i n g to ascend to the sacred level. A p p a r e n t l y this fear is m o r e i m m e d i a t e than the o p p o s i n g desire. 5 4 D o e s this evaluation of the p r o f a n e contradict m a n y of Eliade's descriptions? In various contexts, Eliade has characterized the p r o f a n e as totally lacking reality, as being meaningless. It seems that W e l b o n ' s interpretation is valuable b u t s o m e w h a t misleading. It m u s t be qualified. T h e dialectic of hierophanies discloses that the h u m a n being faces an e x t r e m e existential crisis and is called u p o n to evaluate the t w o orders of being. N o w if the p r o f a n e w e r e n o t ' w o r t h s o m e t h i n g after all', there certainly w o u l d be n o crisis and need to evaluate. Also, in t e r m s of o u r rejection of Altizer's analysis of the dialectic of the sacred, it is clear that the p r o f a n e has value: one could n o t realize the sacred w i t h o u t the p r o f a n e t h r o u g h w h i c h it is revealed. W e w o u l d s u b m i t that Eliade, w h e n he describes the p r o f a n e as meaningless or nonbeing, is using a religious scale, is describing the p r o f a n e qua profane, 5 5 and is presenting the v i e w ofhomo religiosus after he or she has evaluated and chosen the sacred, after one has resolved his or her existential crisis. O u r 'hesitation' does imply that the p r o f a n e is w o r t h s o m e t h i n g ; b u t after w e have chosen the sacred and evaluated the p r o f a n e in t e r m s of the sacred, then the p r o f a n e is seen as m e a n i n g less and lacking reality. 5 6 54. G. R i c h a r d W e l b o n , ' S o m e R e m a r k s o n t h e W o r k o f M i r c e a Eliade', p. 488. Actually, Eliade m a k e s a similar p o i n t (Patterns, pp. 17-18) w h e n h e describes o n e 'side' o f this a m b i v a l e n c e in t e r m s o f o n e ' s fear that ' h e m a y lose it [his o w n reality] c o m p l e t e l y if h e is totally lifted t o a plane o f b e i n g h i g h e r t h a n his n a t u r a l p r o f a n e state'. 55. W e h a v e w r i t t e n ' p r o f a n e qua p r o f a n e ' because t h e p r o f a n e d o e s h a v e m e a n i n g a n d v a l u e f o r homo religiosus, b u t o n l y i n s o f a r as it reveals t h e sacred. 56. In s o m e c o n t e x t s , homo religiosus d o e s n o t s e e m t o describe that w h i c h is n o t sacred as ' n o n b e i n g ' or ' u n r e a l ' . For e x a m p l e , c o n s i d e r t h e case o f S a n k a r a V e d a n t a , w h i c h is p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t since this s c h o o l is m o s t f r e q u e n t l y criticized f o r its w o r l d - d e n y i n g v i e w . A d v a i t a , it is claimed, r e g a r d s t h e w o r l d as maya, as m e r e 'illusion' a n d ' u n r e a l ' . W h a t A d v a i t a V e d a n t a in fact m a i n t a i n s is t h a t t h e illusory

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No purely religious phenomena and no self-sufficient

notions

approach

Eliade's 'first h e r m e n e u t i c principle' necessitated a religious perspective w h i c h was c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h the specificity, complexity, and totality of the religious p h e n o m e n a . T o reduce the religious to a n o n religious scale is to negate the intentionality o f t h e sacred manifestation. B u t Mircea Eliade does n o t intend as a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l implication of this principle of the irreducibility of the sacred a position w h i c h maintains that there are ' p u r e l y ' religious p h e n o m e n a . . . . a religious p h e n o m e n o n cannot be u n d e r s t o o d outside of its 'history,' that is, outside of its cultural and socioeconomic contexts. T h e r e is n o such thing outside of history as a ' p u r e ' religious d a t u m . For there is n o such thing as a h u m a n d a t u m that is n o t at the same t i m e a historical d a t u m . E v e r y religious experience is expressed and transmitted in a particular historical context. B u t a d m i t t i n g the historicity of religious experiences does n o t i m p l y that they are reducible to nonreligious f o r m s of behavior. Stating that a religious d a t u m is always a historical d a t u m does not m e a n that it is reducible to a nonreligious history — for example, to an economic, social, or political history. 5 7 B y insisting o n the irreducible nature of his approach, Eliade does n o t is a self-sufficient discipline. In his m e a n that Religionswissenschaft herculean e f f o r t at a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l synthesis w h i c h can d o justice to all dimensions of the sacred, Eliade depends heavily u p o n all the approaches w e have previously considered. T o give s o m e idea of the scope and diversity of Eliade's synthesis, w e m i g h t simply e n u m e r a t e a f e w of the perspectives w h i c h he integrates in his m o n u m e n t a l w o r k , Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy. T h e p s y c h o l o g y of religion d r a w s attention to the psychic a p p e a r a n c e is certainly n o t sat (being), b u t n e i t h e r is it asat (nonbeing). T h e w o r l d o f may a is a k i n d o f ' t h i r d c a t e g o r y ' : it is ' i n d e t e r m i n a b l e ' (anirvacamya), capable o f b e i n g d e f i n e d n e i t h e r as 'real' n o r as ' u n r e a l ' . N e v e r t h e l e s s , o u r m a i n p o i n t still s e e m s valid. T h e p r o f a n e {maya), e v e n in t h o s e c o n t e x t s in w h i c h it is n o t r e g a r d e d in such t e r m s as ' u n r e a l ' o r ' n o n b e i n g ' , has m e a n i n g a n d value iorhomo religiosus o n l y to t h e e x t e n t t h a t is reveals t h e sacred (Brahman). 57. ' C o m p a r a t i v e Religion: Its Past a n d F u t u r e ' , pp. 250-251. See Patterns, p. xiii; ' H i s t o r y of R e l i g i o n s a n d a N e w H u m a n i s m ' , p. 6.

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conditions of shamanism, especially the s h a m a n ' s state of ecstasy. T h e psychological approaches help Eliade to u n d e r s t a n d his dialectic of hierophanies b y describing the crisis w i t h i n the psyche w h i c h gives rise to the shamanic vocation. S h a m a n i s m is n o t only a personal psychological experience b u t is also a societal institution. C o n s e quently, Eliade looks to the sociology of religion in order to u n d e r stand such topics as the social prestige of the shaman, his 'essential role in the defense of the psychic integrity of the c o m m u n i t y ' , etc. T h e ethnologist situates 'the s h a m a n in his cultural milieu'. H e or she establishes the ' h i s t o r y ' of the constituent elements of s h a m a n i s m and traces 'the circulation of the particular m o t i f in time and space'. It is largely on the basis of ethnological studies that Eliade can conclude that Asiatic and Siberian s h a m a n i s m is n o t a creation of southern Indian contributions. Eliade o f t e n uses the historico-ethnological perspective to distinguish specific shamanic characteristics f r o m aspects of s h a m a n i s m w h i c h either are later influences f r o m other religious p h e n o m e n a or are f o u n d in m a n y p h e n o m e n a and are n o t peculiar to shamanism. 3 8 T h i s dependence u p o n the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of other approaches is n o t m e a n t to deny the u n i q u e perspective of Religionswissenschajt. T h e latter's [History of Religions'] mission is to integrate the results of e t h n o l o g y , p s y c h o l o g y , and sociology. Yet in d o i n g so, it will n o t r e n o u n c e its o w n m e t h o d of investigation or the v i e w p o i n t that specifically defines it. . . . In the last analysis, it is for the historian of religions [Historian of Religions] to synthesize all the studies of particular aspects of s h a m a n i s m and to present a c o m p r e h e n s i v e v i e w w h i c h shall be at once a m o r p h o l o g y and a history of this c o m p l e x religious p h e n o m e n o n . 5 9 W h a t Eliade maintains is that unless his hermeneutics can integrate the 58. Shamanism, pp. xi-xiii, 495 ff., 509; Yoga, pp. 318 ff. 59. Shamanism, p. xiii. W e could g o o n to indicate that a l m o s t all o f the a p p r o a c h e s w e h a v e s t u d i e d are utilized b y Eliade in his i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f s h a m a n i s m . For e x a m p l e , h e appeals to the e v i d e n c e o f p h i l o l o g y t o establish that ' t h e idea o f " m y s t i c a l h e a t " ( " m a g i c a l h e a t " ) is n o t an exclusive possession o f s h a m a n i s m ; it b e l o n g s t o m a g i c in g e n e r a l .'Shamanism, pp. 474—477. Cf. Rites and Symbols of Initiation, pp. 8 5 - 8 7 ; Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, pp. 146-149; The Forge and the Crucible, pp. 7 9 - 8 6 ; Yoga, pp. 106-108, 3 3 0 - 3 3 4 .

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contributions o f other approaches within his own unique approach, it will be guilty o f the same type o f reductionism o f past approaches which did not realize that the sacred included, but was not exhaused by, the sociological, psychological, or some other perspective. At the same time Eliade knows that the scale makes the difference: he insists upon a specifically religious interpretation o f his data. Therefore, Mircea Eliade's phenomenological approach claims to be autonomous but not self-sufficient. In terms o f our previous discussion o f reductionism and the perspectival nature o f all approaches, we may offer an observation about Eliade's task o f synthesis and integration. In his integration o f the contributions o f other approaches, i f Eliade thinks that he is doing justice to the ethnologist qua ethnologist or the Freudian qua Freudian, then he is mistaken. He presents us with a phenomenological synthesis. He selects those aspects o f the contributions o f various specialized approaches which are relevant to his phenomenological concerns; and in integrating the data within his own unique approach, he necessarily fails to respect the perspectival nature, the specific assumptions, and the self-imposed limitations o f the ethnological, functionalist, psychological, sociological, and other particular approaches. 60 This is similar to a central task in the history o f philosophy. Philosophers examine the assumptions and contributions o f various specialized approaches in order to determine whether they can be integrated within a broad philosophical framework. What do such findings tell us about the meaning o f life and the nature o f human existence, about the nature o f the self, about questions o f truth and morality, etc.? In realizing some philosophical synthesis, the philosopher goes beyond the perspectival limitations o f the specialized approaches. Indeed, in Chapter 7, we shall submit that Mircea Eliade often raises significant philosophical questions, which involve ontological moves and take him beyond the perspectival limitations o f the phenomenology and History o f Religions.

60. Cf. Robert D. Baird, Category Formation and the History of Religions, pp. 30-31.

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Religion as an 'opening' W e have seen that Eliade believes that the principal f u n c t i o n of religion is to maintain an ' o p e n i n g ' t o w a r d a s u p e r h u m a n or transcendent w o r l d . ' O n the one hand, the sacred is, supremely, the other than m a n — the transpersonal, the transcendent — and, on the other hand, the sacred is the e x e m p l a r y in the sense that it establishes patterns to be f o l l o w e d : b y being transcendent and e x e m p l a r y it compels the religious m a n to c o m e o u t of personal situations, to surpass the c o n t i n g ent and the particular and to c o m p l y w i t h general values, w i t h the universal.' 6 1 N o w w e m a y u n d e r s t a n d h o w the dialectic of hierophanies helps to maintain this ' o p e n i n g ' . B y means of this process of sacralization, the 'closed' p r o f a n e w o r l d is 'burst open'. A natural object, such as a tree, while r e m a i n i n g a tree reveals s o m e t h i n g 'other'. ' N o tree or plant is ever sacred simply as a tree or plant; they b e c o m e so because they share in a transcendent reality, they b e c o m e so because they signify that transcendent reality. B y being consecrated, the individual, " p r o f a n e " plant species is transubstantiated; in the dialectic of the sacred a part (a tree, a plant) has the value of the w h o l e (the cosmos, life), a p r o f a n e thing b e c o m e s a h i e r o p h a n y . ' 6 2 For example, a c o m m o n ritual in s h a m a n i s m is that of climbing a tree in w h i c h a certain n u m b e r of notches have been cut. It is only because the 'natural' tree has the value o f ' W o r l d T r e e ' , the notches signifying the various heavens, that w e can interpret the climbing of a particular natural tree as the celestial ascent of the shaman, an ecstatic j o u r n e y b e y o n d the heavens. 6 3 W i t h o u t this sense of religious ' o p e n ing', the m e a n i n g of the s h a m a n ' s experience of the sacred remains unintelligible. If the process of sacralization d e p e n d e d entirely o n the 'direct' consecration b y hierophanies, the scope of religious p h e n o m e n a 61. Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p. 18. See The Quest, p. ii. In chapter 7, w e shall suggest that this assertion that religion 'opens' us to the general and the universal has crucial methodological i m p o r t for Eliade's phenomenology. It is largely on the basis of such methodological criteria as 'the most general' and 'the universal' that Eliade attempts to distinguish and to evaluate descriptively certain religious manifestations as 'elevated', 'mature', 'highest', and 'deepest'. 62. Patterns, p. 324. 63. Shamanism, pp. 117-127 and passim.

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would be severely restricted. However, from the above illustration o f celestial ascent, we may already detect the importance o f symbolism in the process o f sacralization. In Chapter 5, we shall see the primary role o f symbolism in carrying further the dialectic o f the sacred: through symbolism the profane is 'burst open' so that it reveals something 'other'.

TRANSITION

Our transition to Chapter 5 may be expressed in the following manner by David Rasmussen: It is one thing to construct an apparatus wherein the sacred may be perceived adequately; it is another to move from levels o f perception to those o f understanding. I regard Eliade's chief her meneutic achievement as the movement from an initial acknowledgment o f the sacred in its dialectical complexity and distinctive intentional modality to an understanding o f its meaning. T h e problem is epistemological; its solution is structural. The doctrine o f the irreducibility o f the sacred and the dialectic o f the sacred and the profane establish the conditions for the appearance o f the sacred. They in no way provide the meaning o f a particular sacred phenomenon. 6 4 T h e above transition is helpful so long as we guard against a certain interpretation it seems to suggest. These are not two distinct temporal stages in Eliade's phenomenology: first he sets up the hermeneutical framework for 'perceiving' the religious phenomenon (Chapter 4); then his structural hermeneutics allows him to understand the meaning o f that religious phenomenon (Chapter 5). As we wrote in the beginning o f this chapter, our order o f analysis should not be interpreted as a temporal order in Mircea Eliade's methodology. Without the methodological framework we are about to analyze, Eliade could not possibly realize the hermeneutical principles we have just elucidated. Without his structuralism which is 64. R a s m u s s e n , p. 141.

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grounded in his interpretation of religious symbolism, the phenomenologist could not 'perceive' the religious phenomenon in its dialectical complexity. In short, all of the hermeneutical principles must be seen as functioning together in Eliade's methodology.

5

Interpreting the Meaning of Religious Phenomena

SYMBOLISM A N D RELIGION

N o w that we have analyzed the dialectic of the sacred and the profane, we may turn to the second of the key methodological notions in Eliade's phenomenological approach: the symbolism 1 or system of symbolic structures which provides the hermeneutical framework in terms of which Eliade interprets the meaning of the religious data. There are other 'key notions' in Eliade's phenomenological approach, such as archetypes, images, patterns, function, and 'ideology'. 2 Our justification for focusing on symbolism is the following: Mircea Eliade is usually able to identify these other 'key notions' because there is a theoretical framework of symbolic structures underlying his hermeneutical approach. Thus, if Eliade is able to identify certain archetypes and patterns, this is primarily because he detects recurring, essential symbolic structures. At the end of Chapter 4, we suggested a transition to our present discussion of religious symbolism. After elucidating the structure of the dialectic of hierophanies, we realized that the extent of the hierophanic process would be severely limited if all sacralization depended on 'direct' hierophanies. It was suggested that symbolism extends this process of sacralization by 'bursting open' the profane so that it reveals something other. Let us now begin to document this claim. 1. In r e p o r t i n g o n the appearance oiMephistopheles and the Androgyne (also published u n d e r the title The Two and the One), Time m a g a z i n e (February 11, 1966: pp. 68, 70) entitled its article 'Scientist o f S y m b o l s ' and described Mircea Eliade as ' p r o b a b l y the w o r l d ' s f o r e m o s t living interpreter of spiritual m y t h s and s y m b o l i s m ' . 2. In s o m e w r i t i n g s , Eliade has e m p h a s i z e d the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i m p o r t a n c e o f i d e n t i f y i n g the ' c e n t e r ' of a religion: 'every religion has a " c e n t e r , " in o t h e r w o r d s , a central conception w h i c h i n f o r m s t h e entire c o r p u s o f m y t h s , rituals, and beliefs'; 'that is, a characteristic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e sacred'. See ' S o u t h A m e r i c a n H i g h G o d s : Part I', History of Religions 8, no. 4 (1969): 338-339; The Quest, pp. 10-11.

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Eliade asserts that symbolism has played an important part 'in the magico-religious experience of mankind. . . . primarily because it [the symbol] is able to carry on the process of hierophanization and particularly because, on occasions, it is itself a hierophany— it itself reveals a sacred or cosmological reality which no other manifestation is capable of revealing'. 3 Symbolism 'carries further the dialectic ofhierophanies by transforming things into something other than what they appear to profane experience to be'. 4 T o indicate the extent to which symbolism can extend the process of sacralization, consider what would appear to be an extremely 'limited' hierophany: a specific meteorite, such as the Ka'aba of Mecca. The meteorite has probably been experienced as a hierophany because of its celestial origins. In terms of the dialectic of the sacred, w e can understand w h y the meteorite would be experienced as a sacred stone: while remaining a natural object, it has been singularized by homo religiosus because it reveals something 'beyond' the profane world, something transcendent. N o w consider one of many ways that symbolism can carry further this process of hierophanization. 5 In falling f r o m the sky, the meteorite 'made a hole in it, and it was through this hole that a communication could be effected between heaven and earth. T h r o u g h it passed the Axis Mundi.' T h e stone thus becomes a symbol for the 'center of the world', and the 'symbolism of the center' introduces countless possibilities for hierophanization. Because the meterorite is n o w seen as symbolizing a 'center', a sacred place where heaven, earth, and hell are 3. Patterns, pp. 4 4 6 - 4 4 7 . O n p. 448, Eliade states that 'the authentic nature and function o f s y m b o l s can best be grasped b y a closer study o f s y m b o l s as a prolongation o f h i e r o p h a n i e s and an a u t o n o m o u s form o f revelation'. This latter point, concerning the s y m b o l s as an autonomous f o r m o f sacred revelation, will be discussed later in this chapter. 4. Ibid., p. 452. O n p. 445, Eliade describes the s y m b o l ' s 'function' as f o l l o w s : 'it is to transform a thing or an action into something other than that thing or action appears to be in the eyes o f profane experience.' 5. There are m a n y o b v i o u s s y m b o l i c extensions o f sacralization relevant to this hierophany, such as the n u m e r o u s hierophanic possibilities relating to stone s y m b o l i s m or to sky s y m b o l i s m . M a n y o f the s y m b o l i c extensions are not obvious. For example, in falling f r o m the sky, the meteorite 'cleaved' the earth. This sacred stone (of 'heavenly, and hence masculine, essence') w a s experienced b y s o m e religious persons as s y m b o l i z i n g the sacred union b e t w e e n heaven and earth. See The Forge and the Crucible, pp. 2 0 - 2 1 and passim.

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connected along one axis, an act (such as a 'ritual of ascension') taking place at this site will be seen as sacralized. 6 F r o m o n e perspective, the h u m a n being can be defined as homo symbolicus.1 T h i s conception of the h u m a n being is especially relevant to homo religiosus because religious facts are s y m b o l i c in nature. Since m a n is a homo symbolicus, and all his activities involve s y m bolism, it f o l l o w s that all religious facts have a s y m b o l i c character. This is certainly true if w e realize that every religious act and every cult aims at a meta-empirical reality. W h e n a tree b e c o m e s a cult o b ject, it is n o t as a tree that it is venerated, but as a hierophany, that is, a manifestation o f t h e sacred. A n d every religious act, by the simple fact that it isreligious, is e n d o w e d w i t h a m e a n i n g which, in thelast instance, is ' s y m b o l i c , ' since it refers to supernatural values or beings. 8 If there is one point that all writers o n s y m b o l i s m seem to accept, it is that the s y m b o l 'points b e y o n d ' itself. As Paul Tillich states, 'First and m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l is the character of all s y m b o l s to point b e y o n d themselves.' T h e s y m b o l has a 'figurative quality'; it is an indirect m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i n g that w h i c h is n o t the 'usual', ' o r d i n a r y ' , 'literal' m e a n i n g . 9 W e recall that religion is always concerned w i t h the sacred, that religious expressions always refer to ' s o m e t h i n g ' transcendent, trans6. See Patterns, p. 227; The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp. 12-17; and 'Symbolism of the " C e n t r e " ', Images and Symbols, pp. 27-56. 7. In An Essay on Man, p. 26, Ernst Cassirer writes that 'Reason is a very inadequate term with which to c o m p r e h e n d the f o r m s of man's cultural life in all their richness and variety. But all these f o r m s are symbolic forms. Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, w e should define h i m as an animal symbolicum.' 8. 'Methodological Remarks', p. 95. See Mephistopheles and the Androgyne, p. 199. 9. Paul Tillich, ' T h e Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols', Religious Experience and Truth, ed. Sidney H o o k , p. 4; and Paul Tillich, ' T h e Religious Symbol', Religious Experience and Truth, p. 301. See Paul Ricoeur's analysis o f t h e 'Criteriology of Symbols', The Symbolism of Evil, pp. 10-18. Perhaps the most illuminating aspect of Ricoeur's 'direct eidetic analysis' is his analysis o f t h e symbol's quality o f ' p o i n t i n g b e y o n d ' in terms of a 'double intentionality': a 'first, literal, obvious meaning itself points analogically to a second meaning which is not given otherwise than in it'. Ricoeur then attempts to 'understand the analogical bond between the literal meaning and the symbolic meaning'. It seems that Eliade could accept Ricoeur's analysis and that Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y requires a m o r e rigorous intentional analysis of this sort.

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h u m a n , transhistorical. In nonreligious areas, one m i g h t maintain that w e s o m e t i m e s d o n o t need to use a s y m b o l i c expression; this depends o n the nature of the m e a n i n g w e are a t t e m p t i n g to c o m m u n i c a t e . H o w e v e r , homo religiosus has n o such choice. Because of the nature of the sacred, and hence of all religious p h e n o m e n a , he or she is forced to use s y m b o l i c expressions w h i c h 'point b e y o n d ' themselves and c o m m u n i c a t e m e a n i n g s w h i c h are n o t direct, literal, ordinary. 1 0 T h u s far w e have emphasized the need f o r s y m b o l i s m arising f r o m the fact that the referent of the religious expression is experienced as s o m e t h i n g transcendent. B u t h o w is it possible for us to relate to s o m e t h i n g ' o t h e r ' than the h u m a n and natural? H e r e w e m u s t stress the specificity of the religious s y m b o l , w h i c h enables it to serve as a type ofbridge: the s y m b o l uses specific, concrete, 'natural' p h e n o m e n a in its expression and enables homo religiosus to relate that w h i c h is ' o t h e r ' to his or her specific existential situation. S y m b o l s 'render the reality of the other accessible and open to participation and c o m m u n i o n ' . ' T h e religious s y m b o l because of its specificity takes into itself those realities w h i c h are a part of the religious m a n ' s local e n v i r o n m e n t , b u t in the s y m b o l i c o r d e r i n g the local ingredients take on meanings w h i c h are m o r e than natural.' 1 1 W e shall conclude this initial discussion of religion and s y m b o l i s m by citing a p r o b l e m Eliade m u s t encounter. As is well k n o w n , in addition to asserting that s y m b o l s 'point b e y o n d ' themselves, Paul Tillich claimed that s y m b o l s 'participate in the reality of that w h i c h they represent'. 'While the sign bears n o necessary relation to that to w h i c h it points, the s y m b o l participates in the reality of that for w h i c h it stands . . . the religious s y m b o l , the s y m b o l w h i c h points to the divine, can be a true s y m b o l only if it participates in the p o w e r of the divine to w h i c h it points.' 1 2 T h i s n o t i o n o f ' p a r t i c i p a t i n g in' has 10. W i n s t o n K i n g , Introduction to Religion: A Phenomenological Approach, p. 134: ' . . . precisely because m a n in religion seeks contact w i t h that O t h e r , o r feels h i m s e l f to be m y s t e r i o u s l y a p p r e h e n d e d b y t h a t invisible O t h e r n e s s in the e v e n t s and visibilities o f his daily life, he is d r i v e n to use the s y m b o l i c to e x p r e s s m e a n i n g s a n d aspirations n o t expressible in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e . ' 11. L o n g , Alpha, pp. 8, 10. S e e j o h n E. S m i t h , Reason and God, p. 229. W e shall r e t u r n to this p o i n t w h e n w e discuss t h e 'existential value' o f t h e s y m b o l . 12. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 239; Tillich, ' T h e M e a n i n g and J u s t i f i c a t i o n o f R e l i g i o u s S y m b o l s ' , p. 4.

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been the source of m u c h c o n f u s i o n and criticism of Tillich. O n e of the difficulties is that Tillich s o m e t i m e s seems to go b e y o n d a description o f a psychological, subjective, personal experience of homo religiosus-, at times he appears to claim that the religious s y m b o l does in fact pierce t h r o u g h to the ultimate so that there is a realization of that ultimate reality. In C h a p t e r 4, w e saw that Mircea Eliade does n o t intend to m a k e this sort of n o r m a t i v e claim. As a p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion, he wishes to avoid any metaphysical j u d g m e n t as to w h e t h e r homo religiosus does or does not in fact realize a transcendent reality. At the same time, w e w o u l d s u b m i t that Eliade does n o t intend his descriptive analyses of religious m e a n i n g to be confined to a psychological account of certain subjective representations. T o go b e y o n d this psychological and subjective d i m e n s i o n and yet avoid uncritical n o r mative j u d g m e n t s requires an objective hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k in t e r m s of w h i c h Eliade can describe m e a n i n g s and m a k e descriptive evaluations. T h e key to u n d e r s t a n d i n g this hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k lies in Eliade's v i e w of the n a t u r e and f u n c t i o n of religious s y m b o l i s m . If Eliade can 'decipher in a religious fact the existential situation that m a d e it possible', it is primarily because there is a theoretical f r a m e w o r k u n d e r l y i n g his hermeneutics. A n d this theoretical f r a m e w o r k consists f o r the m o s t part of objective systems of religious symbols. SYMBOLISM AND STRUCTURALISM

W e recall that Mircea Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l epoche is directed against all f o r m s of reductionism. B y suspending all of his interpretations a b o u t w h a t is 'real', the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t a t t e m p t s s y m p a t h e t i cally to reenact the experiences of homo religiosus and to describe the m e a n i n g of the religious p h e n o m e n a . Such a 'bracketing' b y itself does n o t suffice to p r o v i d e Eliade w i t h insight into the f u n d a m e n t a l structures and m e a n i n g s of religious experience. 1 3 W e saw that Franz Boas and other 'specialists' insisted o n 13. O f course, in chapter 4, w e did u n c o v e r certain essential religious structures. H o w e v e r , w e m u s t r e m e m b e r that Eliade could n o t possibly h a v e arrived at t h o s e

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cultural pluralism and relativity and w e r e reluctant to allow for ' c o m m o n structures'. Thus, a respect f o r the irreducibility of o u r data and an a t t e m p t to reenact the experience of the other m i g h t very well lead to the conclusion that there is an unlimited plurality of religious 'life-worlds', each h a v i n g structures highly individualized and v a r y ing according to time and place. If w e are to u n d e r s t a n d h o w Mircea Eliade a t t e m p t s to gain insight into the essential m e a n i n g s of religious experience, w e m u s t n o w elucidate the structuralistic n a t u r e of his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach. W e m a y begin b y s u m m a r i z i n g D a v i d R a s m u s s e n ' s interpretation. R a s m u s s e n s u b m i t s that Eliade makes ' t w o claims' w h i c h allow the 'transition' f r o m 'perceiving' the appearance of the sacred to u n d e r standing its meaning. First, Eliade 'suggests that p h e n o m e n a of sacred manifestation will tend t o w a r d archetype', and by 'archetype' he means 'the initial structure of the sacred' and n o t the 'Jungian definition of archetype as the collective unconscious'. Second, Eliade ' s u g gests that p h e n o m e n a of a given type or structure will tend t o w a r d system'. T h e 'initial structure tends t o w a r d a larger c o n t e x t of structural associations'. 1 4 It does n o t seem that R a s m u s s e n is justified in this interpretation of 'archetype' as 'initial structure of the sacred'. As w e shall analyze in C h a p t e r 7, Eliade is s o m e w h a t a m b i g u o u s , and there are t w o p r i m a r y meanings of archetype f o u n d in his writings. In the 'Preface' to Cosmos and History, Eliade defines 'archetype' as ' e x e m p l a r y m o d e l ' or ' p a r a d i g m ' and explicitly distinguishes this f r o m the J u n g i a n meaning. T h i s is Eliade's m a i n sense of archetype. H o w e v e r , in a f e w of his w o r k s , he uses the t e r m in a m a n n e r quite similar to J u n g ' s concept. As w e shall see, this a m b i g u i t y is m o s t significant, because each m e a n i n g of archetype has radically different m e t h o d o l o g i c a l consequences for Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . 1 5 results if his m e t h o d o l o g y were based solely u p o n the hermeneutic principles previously elucidated. All of those methodological conclusions, including the very possibility of some sort of phenomenological epoche, only make sense w h e n seen as functioning together with the additional hermeneutical principles and f r a m e w o r k which w e are about to formulate. 14. Rasmussen, 'Mircea Eliade: Structural Hermeneutics and Philosophy', pp. 141-142. 15. Cosmos and History, pp. viii-ix. Cosmos and History is the same as The Myth of the

146

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Morphological analysis is Eliade's 'hermeneutic alternative' to replace the 'historical-evolutionary hypothesis' w e have previously considered. T h r o u g h morphological analysis and classification, he attempts 'to separate those p h e n o m e n a w h i c h have structural similarities f r o m those w h i c h do not'. Rasmussen turns to structural linguistics and cites the diachronic-synchronic distinction f o u n d in Ferdinand de Saussure's Course in General Linguistics as providing the 'analogy w h i c h clarifies best a hermeneutic g r o u n d e d in structuralism'. H e submits that 'Eliade has asked the structural question regarding the place o f a religious p h e n o m e n o n within a total synchronic system. This leads to the basic j u d g m e n t that religious p h e n o m e n a tend t o w a r d system. This tendency is the intentional m o d e of every particular sacred manifestation. O n this assumption morphological analysis is held to be necessary; its consequence is the transition f r o m appearance to understanding.' Rasmussen concludes that Mircea Eliade has a distinctive 'phenomenological procedure' w h i c h is g r o u n d e d in structuralism: ' U n d e r s t a n d i n g does n o t occur by the reconstruction of a particular p h e n o m e n o n , b u t rather by the reintegration of that p h e n o m e n o n within its system of associations t h r o u g h the use of m o r p h o l o g y and structuralism.' 1 6 Professor Rasmussen's interpretation of Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y is basically correct, although initially it m a y not seem very convincing to s o m e of Eliade's interpreters. W h a t needs to be added and developed is the thesis that such a phenomenological approach has considerable s u p p o r t because o f the very nature o f religious phenomena, especially religious symbolism; such a procedure is not arbitrarily superimposed on

Eternal Return, except for the addition of the 'Preface to the T o r c h b o o k Edition'. Interesting interpretations of Eliade's concept of archetypes include the previously cited ' T h e N a t u r e and Extent of Eliade's "Jungianism" ', by Ricketts; Wilson M. H u d s o n , 'Eliade's Contribution to the Study of M y t h ' , Tire Shrinker to Dragster, p. 237; Ira Progoff, ' T h e M a n W h o T r a n s f o r m s Consciousness', Eranos-Jahrbuch 1966, Band 35 (1967): 126-130, 133. P r o g o f f not only distinguishes Eliade's conception of archetypes f r o m j u n g ' s but also shows the similarity between Eliade's conception and Tillich's ' M e t h o d of Correlation'. 16. Rasmussen, p. 143. Cf. the section entitled 'Synchronicity' (pp. 104-106) in Eliade's ' T h e Sacred in the Secular World'.

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the data but is largely derived f r o m the nature of structural systems of religious symbols. If Eliade finds this tendency toward system, toward systems of associations, this is primarily because o f ' t h e function of symbols': the 'function of unification' of different zones and levels of experience, of enabling 'isolated fragments' to 'become part of a whole system'. His morphological analysis reveals that 'the various meanings of a symbol are linked together, interconnected in a system, as it were', and Eliade reserves the term 'symbolism' for such a 'structurally coherent ensemble'. 17 What Eliade finds is that we are faced with, respectively, a sky symbolism, or a symbolism of earth, of vegetation, of sun, of space, of time, and so on. We have good cause to look upon these various symbolisms as autonomous 'systems' in that they manifest more clearly, more fully, and with greater coherence what the hierophanies manifest in an individual, local and successive fashion. And I have tried, whenever the evidence in question allowed of it, to interpret a given hierophany in the light of its proper symbolism so as to discover its deepest significance. 18 If understanding occurs when the phenomenon is 'reintegrated' into 'its systems of associations', this is possible because Mircea Eliade's hermeneutics is grounded in 'autonomous', 'coherent', 'universal' systems of symbolic associations. Various interpreters, such as Edmund Leach, have criticized Eliade for emphasizing the individual symbol and not the structural relations between symbols. 19 Eliade is certainly inconsistent on this matter. However, if one considers all of Eliade's writings, it becomes clear that what is most important in his phenomenological approach is not the particular symbol but the structure of the whole symbolism; that the phenomenologist cannot grasp the meaning of the specific symbol 17. Patterns, pp. 451—453; Images and Symbols, p. 163; 'Methodological Remarks', p. 96. These cryptic remarks and the immediately ensuing observations will be analyzed in s o m e detail either later in this chapter or in chapters 6 and 7. 18. Patterns, pp. 449-450. 19. See E d m u n d Leach, 'Sermons by a M a n on a Ladder', New York Review of Books, O c t o b e r 20, 1966, pp. 30-31.

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notions

unless he or she sees the particular as one of many possible 'valorizations' of the structural system. 20 According to Eliade, the symbol arises as a 'creation of the psyche', is constituted 'as the result of existential tensions', and must be regarded as an 'autonomous mode of cognition'. 'The phenomena of nature are freely transformed by the psyche in "an autonomous act of creation" into symbols of the power and holiness they reveal to the beholder. 21 Eliade's primary concern is with determining how religious symbols function and what they reveal. In this regard he makes the following crucial assertions: symbolic thought is an autonomous mode of cognition which has its own structure; symbols have their own 'logic' and 'fit together' to make up coherent structural systems; every coherent symbolism is universal; the symbolic system will preserve its structure regardless of whether it is understood by the person who uses it.22 In order to understand some of the above assertions, we shall now examine a specific illustration: the snake or serpent as lunar symbols. Snake symbolism will be considered as one possible 'valorization' of a more comprehensive lunar symbolism. Then we shall elucidate various aspects of religious symbolism in general.

A N ILLUSTRATION: T H E SNAKE AND L U N A R SYMBOLISM

Lunar symbolism, while being extremely complex, is one of those symbolisms most easily translatable into 'rational' terms. Hence, the general reader may find the following less 'mystifying' than an analysis of a different symbolism with a less 'rational' structure or 20. Cf. Images and Symbols, pp. 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 : ' B u t it is n o t b y "placing" a s y m b o l in its o w n history that w e can resolve the essential p r o b l e m — n a m e l y , to k n o w w h a t is revealed to us, n o t b y any "particular v e r s i o n " o f a s y m b o l b u t b y the whole o f a s y m b o l i s m . ' Eliade g o e s o n to claim that the contradictions b e t w e e n particular v e r s i o n s o f a s y m b o l are usually 'resolved as s o o n as w e c o n s i d e r the s y m b o l i s m as a w h o l e and discern its structure'. 21. Images and Symbols, pp. 9, 177; ' M e t h o d o l o g i c a l Remarks', p. 105; Luyster, ' T h e S t u d y o f M y t h : T w o Approaches', p. 235. 22. For e x a m p l e , see Patterns, p. 450; Images and Symbols, p. 168.

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meaning. O u r example of the snake or serpent as one possible valorization of lunar s y m b o l i s m m a y p r o v e especially interesting because Eliade's interpretation seems highly controversial. It is certainly n o t obvious that one o u g h t to interpret snake or serpent symbols within a f r a m e w o r k of lunar symbolism. O u r p u r p o s e is not to defend Eliade's analysis — he probably overemphasizes the m o o n - s n a k e relationship — b u t only to give s o m e insight into the nature of his p h e n o m e n o l o g i cal approach. T h e m o o n was a source of p r o f o u n d meaning for homo religiosus ,23 U n l i k e the sun w i t h its sense of unchangeability, the m o o n is 'subject to the universal law of becoming, of birth and death'. B u t the m o o n ' s 'death' is never final; it is always 'reborn'. Homo religiosus 'intuitively perceived the m o o n ' s law of periodic change', 'life repeating itself rhythmically'. Lunar s y m b o l i s m expresses the m a n y valorizations deciphered in the m o o n ' s r h y t h m s . T h r o u g h lunar symbolism, homo religiosus was able to relate apparently unrelated p h e n o m e n a f r o m diverse 'spheres' w h i c h fell u n d e r the 'law of recurring cycles: water, rain, plant life, fertility'. 'Certain animals became symbols or even "presences" of the m o o n because their shape or their behaviour is reminiscent of the m o o n ' s . ' ' T h e snake, because it appears and disappears, and because it has as m a n y coils as the m o o n has days (this legend is also preserved in Greek Tradition); or because it is " t h e husband of all w o m e n , " or because it sloughs its skin (that is to say, is periodically reborn, is " i m m o r t a l " ) , and so on. T h e s y m b o l i s m of the snake is s o m e w h a t confusing, but all the symbols are directed to the same central idea: it is i m m o r t a l because it is continually reborn, and therefore it is a m o o n " f o r c e , " and as such can b e s t o w fecundity, k n o w l e d g e (that is, prophecy) and even immortality.' 2 4 Mircea Eliade n o w attempts to j u s t i f y such an interpretation by providing us w i t h n u m e r o u s m y t h s and symbols involving snakes or serpents, utilizing data which reveal their character as a lunar animal. W e shall select t w o main types of data: the snake and erotic s y m b o l i s m 23. T h e f o l l o w i n g introductory remarks about lunar s y m b o l i s m are summarized from The Sacred, pp. 156-157, and Patterns, pp. 154—157. 24. Patterns, p. 164; Aristotle, Historia Animalium 2. 12; Pliny, Historia Naturalis 11. 82.

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and the snake and initiatory symbolism. Each can be seen as a possible alternative to Eliade's lunar interpretation. Alternatives:

erotic and initiatory

symbolism

T h e snake or serpent is often connected w i t h w o m e n and fecundity. 2 5 Data f r o m t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d illustrate the beliefs that snakes are the first object of sexual contact for w o m e n , are the cause of the menstrual cycle, copulate w i t h w o m e n , and p r o d u c e children. T h e 'phallic character' of the snake is obvious, but Eliade claims that this phallic character 'far f r o m excluding its [the snake's] connection w i t h the m o o n , only confirms it'. H e submits that the f u n d a m e n t a l intuition is that o f ' t h e m o o n as source of living reality and basis of all fertility and periodic regeneration'. ' T h e r e are a great m a n y different w o m e n - s n a k e relationships, but n o n e of t h e m can be fully explained by any purely erotic symbolism. T h e snake has a variety of meanings, and I think w e must hold its " r e g e n e r a t i o n " to be one of the most important.' 2 6 Let us examine w h y Mircea Eliade w o u l d consider an interpretation of the s y m b o l i s m of snakes, which is based u p o n their phallic and erotic character, to be an unjustified reduction. T h e following analysis is in line w i t h Eliade's hermeneutical orientation and helps to illuminate his phenomenological approach. O u r data reveal that n o t all snake s y m b o l i s m has a special phallic structure. In analyzing an extant Australian secret cult, Kunapipi, Eliade describes the ritual swallowing by the snake as an initiatory pattern of return to the w o m b . In this context the snake is often described as female. T h r o u g h the ritual swallowing by the snake, there is the idea of a n e w birth, of a complete regeneration of the initiate; but this is not because of the phallic character of the snake, but because of the initiate's return to the primordial Great M o t h e r ' s w o m b , his gestation and birth by the Great Mother. 2 7 25. T h e f o l l o w i n g illustrations are t a k e n f r o m Patterns, p r o v i d e s e x a m p l e s illustrating t h e role o f t h e m o o n as t h e g o v e r n i n g t h e m e n s t r u a l cycle. T h e s e data s t r e n g t h e n t h e c o n c e r n i n g t h e s n a k e a n d l u n a r s y m b o l i s m relationship. 26. Ibid., p. 168. 27. Rites and Symbols of Initiation, pp. 4 7 - 5 1 . See R. M .

pp. 165-169. Eliade also s o u r c e of fertility and as c o n c l u s i o n he will reach

B e r n d t , Kunapipi

(Mel-

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In describing the K u n a p i p i and other similar Australian secret cults, Eliade indicates the 'sexual ambivalence' of the mythical snake and s u b m i t s that 'these variations and apparent contradictions' p r o b a b l y 'point to an original bisexuality of the Snake'. O n e illustration is of the R a i n b o w Serpent, A n g a m u n g g i , w h o is described as an 'All-Father', b u t it is also 'suggested that he had a w o m b ' . 2 8 Eliade interprets this ambivalence and bisexuality as c o n f o r m i n g to a familiar religious p h e n o m e n o n : a S u p r e m e Being b e c o m e s a 'totality' by uniting 'the opposites'. T h u s , the mythical snake w o u l d n o t be satisfied w i t h a completely 'phallic character' but has a t t e m p t e d to e m b r a c e w i t h i n its s y m b o l i s m b o t h masculine and f e m i n i n e structures and meanings. If all snake s y m b o l i s m cannot be reduced to a specific phallic structure, perhaps a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e erotic and sexual interpretation will suffice. W e m u s t recognize that w h e n homo religiosus experiences p h e n o m e n a in t e r m s of such structures as 'bisexuality', he or she intends m u c h m o r e than the m o d e r n secular person understands by such structures. In Mephistopheles and the Androgyne, Mircea Eliade contends that the spiritual m e a n i n g of the a n d r o g y n e — as an ' e x e m p lary i m a g e of the perfect m a n ' , as perfection consisting of a ' u n i t y totality' — was reduced b y m a n y m o d e r n writers to a purely anatomico-physiological significance. T h u s the a n d r o g y n e was n o longer u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of a wholeness, 'a n e w t y p e of h u m a n i t y in w h i c h the fusion of the sexes p r o d u c e s a n e w unpolarized consciousness', b u t simply as a h e r m a p h r o d i t e ' w i t h a s u p e r a b u n d a n c e of erotic possibilities'. 2 9 Yet even such an enlarged n o t i o n of sexuality w o u l d n o t enable us to reduce all snake s y m b o l i s m to an erotic interpretation. W e shall b o u r n e , 1951 ), pp. 24 ff. In this secret cult, w e m a y b e g i n t o n o t i c e t h e role o f t h e s n a k e as t h e ' m a s t e r of initiation'. 28. M i r c e a Eliade, ' A u s t r a l i a n Religions, Part III: Initiation Rites a n d Secret C u l t s ' , History of Religions 1, no. 1 (1967): 7 1 - 7 4 , 8 0 - 8 1 . T h i s article is r e p r o d u c e d as c h a p t e r 3 in Australian Religions: An Introduction. Eliade bases his c o n c l u s i o n o n t h e research o f W. L l o y d W a r n e r , A Black Civilization. A Study of an Australian Tribe; R. M . B e r n d t , Kunapipi; R. M . B e r n d t , ed., Australian Aboriginal Art; W. E. H . S t a n n e r , On Aboriginal Religion (Oceania M o n o g r a p h N o . 11). 29. See ' M e p h i s t o p h e l e s a n d t h e A n d r o g y n e o r t h e M y s t e r y o f t h e W h o l e ' , Mephistopheles and the Androgyne, pp. 7 8 - 1 2 4 , especially 9 8 - 1 0 0 , 116-117.

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soon consider data clearly not erotic. B u t even those snake and serpent symbols connected w i t h fecundity are often n o t erotic. For example, snakes and serpents are water animals ('water symbolizes the w h o l e of potentiality; it is fons et origo, the source of all possible existence') and 'bring rain, moisture, and floods, thus governing the fertility of the world'. 3 0 It seems to be Eliade's position that the erotic s y m b o l i s m of snakes really constitutes a 'secondary centre' of a m o r e comprehensive ' w e b ' of lunar symbolism. Eliade admits that the erotic s y m b o l i s m of snakes 'has in its turn " w o v e n " a system of meanings and associations which in s o m e cases at least push its lunar connections into the backg r o u n d ' . 3 1 His position seems to be that the erotic is one of m a n y possible valorizations of the inexhaustible lunar symbolism. Let us supply one m o r e illustration 3 2 and then arrive at our methodological conclusions relevant to Eliade's analysis of the snake as a lunar symbol. T h e snake or serpent plays a leading role in initiation ceremonies. W e have already referred to the initiatory pattern of being ritually swallowed by a snake. T h e r e are m a n y variations of this t h e m e of initiation b y being swallowed by a monster, the snake often f u n c t i o n ing as the master of initiation, and the passage of the initiate t h r o u g h the snake being equivalent to an initiation. 3 3 Eliade finds countless possibilities for initiatory s y m b o l i s m in the rich structure of snake symbolism. In citing examples f r o m B u d d h i s m (Majjhima-nikdya, II, 17) and f r o m B r a h m a n i s m (Jaimimya Brahmana, II, 134, etc.), he shows that 'the image of the snake and its cast skin is 30. Patterns, p p . 188-189, 2 0 7 - 2 1 0 . 31. ¡bid., p. 170. M i r c e a Eliade w o u l d p r o b a b l y a t t r i b u t e t h e a p p a r e n t e m p h a s i s o f m o d e r n p e r s o n s o n t h e sexual m e a n i n g o f s n a k e s y m b o l i s m t o o u r p r e s e n t existential situation. N o t o n l y d o m o d e r n secular p e r s o n s f i n d it difficult t o relate (consciously) t o c o s m i c h i e r o p h a n i e s , b u t Eliade m a i n t a i n s that h u m a n b e i n g s h a v e a l w a y s related t o t h o s e v a l o r i z a t i o n s o f a n y s y m b o l i s m w h i c h h a v e t h e greatest existential relevance t o their particular historical situation. T h i s discussion leads us t o t h e crucial i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l - p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l ' t e n s i o n ' w h i c h w e shall analyze in t h e n e x t chapter. 32. A n e x h a u s t i v e t r e a t m e n t w o u l d i n v o l v e a n a l y z i n g t h e c o n n e c t i o n s o f t h e snake w i t h a q u a t i c s y m b o l i s m , plant a n d v e g e t a t i o n s y m b o l i s m , t h e s y m b o l i s m o f c o s m i c d a r k n e s s a n d prenatal existence, a n d m a n y o t h e r areas. 33. F o r several a d d i t i o n a l e x a m p l e s o f this i n i t i a t o r y p a t t e r n , see Shamanism, p. 340; Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. 35; a n d ' A u s t r a l i a n Religions, P a r t IV', pp. 168-169.

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one of the oldest s y m b o l s of mystical death and resurrection'. 3 4 Because snakes live u n d e r g r o u n d , they symbolize darkness, 'the pref o r m a l m o d a l i t y of the universe', 'the primordial sacred force' concentrated in 'the depths of the earth'. T h e y e m b o d y the souls of the dead, guide initiates into the b o w e l s of the earth, and k n o w all the hidden secrets w h i c h they can ' t r a n s m i t t h r o u g h mysterious initiations'. 3 5 W e m a y add that this structure of the snake or serpent s y m b o l i z i n g the p r e f o r m a l and the p r i m o r d i a l is even m o r e apparent in its role as a water animal connected w i t h aquatic s y m b o l i s m . W i t h o u t multiplying examples, w e m a y n o w suggest the type of conclusion Mircea Eliade w o u l d arrive at concerning snakes and initiatory s y m b o l i s m . If o n e examines all patterns of initiation — p u b e r t y rites, secret society cults, etc. — she or he finds the f o l l o w i n g essential structure: a ritual death f o l l o w e d by a 'rebirth', the initiate ' d y i n g ' to the old in o r d e r to be ' r e b o r n ' into a n e w m o d e of being. N o w w e recall the m e a n i n g w h i c h homo religiosus intuitively experienced in the m o o n ' s r h y t h m s : the m o o n is subject to birth and death, but it is always ' r e b o r n ' , etc. Eliade w o u l d s u b m i t that snakes appear in initiation ceremonies because of the ' s y m b o l i s m of regeneration', and the m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e and p r o f o u n d manifestation of this s y m bolism appears in the system of lunar symbols. 3 8

Eliade's conclusion: lunar

symbolism

After considering the n u m e r o u s contexts of snake s y m b o l i s m , Mircea Eliade arrives at the f o l l o w i n g conclusion: ' W h a t emerges fairly clearly f r o m all this varied s y m b o l i s m of snakes is their lunar character 34. Yoga, p. 165. Cf. his analysis o f 'to slough the skin' in Mephistopheles and the Androgyne, pp. 8 9 - 9 0 . 35. Yoga, pp. 352, 428; Shamanism, p. 135. W e m a y simply allude to o n e very familiar, highly c o m p l e x initiatory pattern: to possess immortality (the Tree o f Life, etc.), the primeval man (or hero) m u s t do c o m b a t w i t h and vanquish the monster (or serpent) guarding the tree. See Patterns, pp. 287 ff. Heinrich Z i m m e r claims that the antagonism o f the hero-savior versus serpent s y m b o l i s m , so frequent in the West, is resolved in India. ('The serpent and the savior are b o t h manifestations o f the one, all-containing, divine substance.') See Heinrich Z i m m e r , Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization, pp. 66, 7 5 - 7 6 , 8 9 - 9 0 . 36. See Patterns, pp. 169, 174-176.

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— that is, their p o w e r s of fertility, of regeneration, of i m m o r t a l i t y through metamorphosis.' N o w it is t e m p t i n g to conclude that homo religiosus arrived at such a position in 'an analytic and cumulative' manner, i.e., the various relationships between snake s y m b o l s and lunar s y m b o l i s m gradually developed 'one f r o m another by s o m e m e t h o d of logical analysis'. B u t this is the kind of reductionism of a religious system which Eliade vehemently opposes. 'In reality, all the meanings in a s y m b o l are present together, even w h e n it m a y look as if only s o m e of t h e m are effective. T h e intuition of the m o o n as the measure of rhythms, as the source of energy, of life, and of rebirth, has w o v e n a sort of w e b between the various levels of the universe, p r o d u c i n g parallels, similarities and unities a m o n g vastly differing kinds of phenomena.' 3 7 T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t attempts to locate the 'centre' of such a ' w e b ' . Sometimes a 'secondary centre' — such as the erotic s y m b o l i s m of snakes — has ' w o v e n ' its o w n system of relationships and pushes the lunar relationships into the b a c k g r o u n d . 'What in fact w e are faced w i t h is a series of threads r u n n i n g parallel to or across each other, all fitting together, s o m e connected directly with the " c e n t r e " on which they all depend, others developing within their o w n systems.' 3 8 T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t attempts to reconstruct the w h o l e pattern: 'moon-rain-fertility-woman-serpent-death-periodic-regeneration'. B u t in certain contexts, the scholar may be dealing w i t h 'one of the patterns within a pattern', such as serpent-woman-fertility. It is true that Eliade does n o t always relate a particular snake s y m b o l to a system of lunar symbols. For example, in analyzing a snake-water pattern, it m a y suffice to reintegrate a particular snake s y m b o l within a system of aquatic symbolism. Nevertheless, for the m o s t comprehensive and p r o f o u n d interpretation, Mircea Eliade continually returns to the following type of claim: 'A lot of m y t h o l o g y has g r o w n up a r o u n d these secondary "centres," and if one does not realize this, it m a y o v e r s h a d o w the original pattern, t h o u g h that pattern is, in fact, fully implicated in even the tiniest fragments.' 3 9 37. Ibid., pp. 169-170.

38. Ibid., p. 170.

39. Ibid. This is the type of claim which Mircea Eliade makes when he asserts that

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Let us attempt to relate the above analysis to several of our earlier methodological points. We recall that Mircea Eliade maintains that Historians of Religions must go b e y o n d simply collecting religious documents; they must endeavor to understand the religious meaning revealed in their data. T h r o u g h morphological analysis and classification, Eliade attempts to separate those p h e n o m e n a w h i c h have structural similarities f r o m those p h e n o m e n a which do not. H e then attempts to understand the religious meaning of a particular p h e n o m e n o n by reintegrating it into its coherent, universal system of symbolic associations. It seems that Eliade has assembled a variety of religious manifestations dealing w i t h snakes or serpents and has attempted to gain insight into the 'invariant core' which constitutes their essential meaning. His approach, w e w o u l d submit, is n o t unlike the phenomenological m e t h o d of 'free variation'. 4 0 As w e saw in Chapter 4, Eliade clearly rejects the phenomenological approach of the 'early' Husserl, w h e r e one m a y speak of an 'imaginative variation' and pure vision of the essential structure and meaning of a p h e n o m e n o n , w i t h o u t the collection of historical examples and factual comparisons. Eliade is m u c h closer to M e r l e a u - P o n t y and other existential phenomenologists, w h o in preparing for their eidetic reflection, seem to substitute for an imaginative variation an actual variation in the historical data. Morphological analysis reveals that p h e n o m e n a expressing snake or serpent s y m b o l i s m in s o m e contexts have structural similarities w i t h p h e n o m e n a expressing water symbolism, in s o m e contexts w i t h p h e n o m e n a expressing phallic or erotic symbolism, in s o m e contexts with p h e n o m e n a expressing vegetation symbolism. T h e r e are various other types of religious p h e n o m e n a which do not seem to share structural similarities w i t h snake symbols and w i t h w h i c h p h e n o m e n a expressing snake s y m b o l i s m are rarely associated. every hierophany 'presupposes' an entire system of sacred manifestations. (For example, see Patterns, pp. 8-9.) Critics of Eliade have often cited this type of claim as s h o w i n g that Eliade's approach is clearly normative. See Robert D. Baird, Category Formation and the History of Religions, pp. 75-77, 86-87. This analysis first appeared in Baird's ' N o r m a t i v e Elements in Eliade's P h e n o m e n o l o g y of Symbolism', Union Seminary Quarterly Review 25, no. 4 (1970): 509-513. 40. T h e following methodological points will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.

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Eliade n o w searches for the invariant core, the essential meaning which allows snake symbols to be related to and systematized w i t h other religious symbols. In s o m e cases, snake symbols have a phallic structure, but m a n y other examples do not share this structure, and hence the essential structure of snake s y m b o l i s m cannot be phallic. T h r o u g h morphological analysis and variation of data, Eliade deciphers the essential meaning of snake s y m b o l i s m as revealing inexhaustible life repeating itself rhythmically. A n d it is the m o o n as a sacred manifestation w h i c h is most able to reveal this p r o f o u n d religious meaning. Thus, the invariant revealed by the diverse contexts of snake s y m bolism is seen in terms of a ' w e b ' of lunar associations. T h e religious intuition of the m o o n and its r h y t h m s is at the 'centre' of such a w e b and has ' w o v e n ' a sort of system of interdependent lunar relations. In s o m e contexts, phenomenological understanding occurs w h e n a particular snake p h e n o m e n o n is reintegrated within its aquatic system or erotic system of symbolic associations. B u t for the m o s t c o m prehensive and p r o f o u n d understanding, which involves the reintegration of the particular p h e n o m e n o n expressing snake s y m b o l i s m within its total system of symbolic associations, Eliade usually g r o u n d s his hermeneutics in the f r a m e w o r k of a coherent, universal system of lunar symbols. It is in terms of such a structural totality that Eliade attempts to understand the various relationships a m o n g snake, water, vegetation, and fertility symbols and w h a t such structural relationships reveal about the m e a n i n g of religious phenomena. W e do n o t intend to evaluate Eliade's specific analysis, since our aim has simply been to convey s o m e general sense of Eliade's phenomenological approach as g r o u n d e d in coherent systems of s y m bolic associations. T o realize h o w intricate and complex this hermeneutical foundation is, consider the fact that w e have formulated only a partial analysis of only one symbolic valorization — and n o t one of the m a j o r lunar valorizations, at that — of the total lunar symbolism. T h e reader m a y n o w have s o m e initial sense of Eliade's structuralist approach and m a y grasp the essential (lunar) structure, but he or she probably finds the snake-lunar relationship rather 'forced'. Indeed, the ' m o d e r n ' reader m i g h t find the interpretation m o r e plausible if the lunar w e r e analyzed as a 'secondary center' of a m o r e comprehensive

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erotic s y m b o l i s m . 4 1 Witness the persistent sexual s y m b o l i s m in recent literature, as seen in the f r e q u e n t t h e m e of the search f o r the 'perfect' sexual o r g a s m as a self-transcending and liberating experience. Desacralized h u m a n beings seem m u c h less likely to relate consciously to lunar or s o m e other cosmic s y m b o l i s m . In all fairness to Eliade's specific analysis, w e m u s t recall his m e t h o d o l o g i c a l principle: one m u s t use a religious scale in order to interpret the m e a n i n g of religious p h e n o m e n a . W e k n o w of the p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e cosmic p h e n o m e n a have had in revealing the sacred to homo religiosus. It m a y be that o n the plane of reference of the religious, and in t e r m s of the dialectic of the sacred and o t h e r criteria w e shall elucidate, that w e shall be able to realize w h y a lunar s y m b o l i c structure w o u l d be m u c h m o r e relevant to the existential situation of homo religiosus than to the present situation of the nonreligious person. In c o n v e y i n g s o m e sense of Eliade's approach, w e have suggested several m e t h o d o l o g i c a l criteria, such as comprehensiveness and eidetic variation, w h i c h m i g h t serve to evaluate particular interpretations. In the next chapter, w e shall analyze the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d f o r gaining insight into essential structures, free variation and i n d u c tion, criteria f o r d e t e r m i n i n g the essential structure or 'center' of a s y m b o l i c system, and other m e t h o d o l o g i c a l topics relevant to the above analysis.

G E N E R A L F E A T U R E S OF R E L I G I O U S

SYMBOLISM

Mircea Eliade describes the f o l l o w i n g characteristics and f u n c t i o n s w h e n analyzing religious s y m b o l i s m . H o w e v e r , such a structural analysis usually can be taken as referring to all s y m b o l i s m , religious 41. Eliade would never maintain that all erotic symbolism constitutes a 'secondary center' of a more comprehensive 'web' of lunar symbolism. Erotic symbolism is itself extremely complex, and, as a revelation of sacred meaning, it is far more comprehensive than its nonreligious (physiological, etc.) domain of meaning would seem to suggest. Eliade's point, if we interpret him correctly, is that the particular erotic symbolic structure, as illustrated by certain snake phenomena, constitutes a 'secondary center' of a more inclusive lunar 'web' of symbolic associations. Once again, this should indicate the complexity ofEliade's hermeneutical framework: not only has he formulated extremely complex (lunar, solar, aquatic) systems of symbolic structures, but he has found that these symbolic systems themselves interact and interpenetrate in numerous intricate ways.

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and nonreligious. For example, it is only because there is a 'logic of symbols' operating on the levels of dreams, fantasies, imagination, aesthetic creativity, 'psychopathic' creativity, etc., that Eliade can 'homologize' the symbolic structures of religious p h e n o m e n a w i t h p h e n o m e n a on other planes of manifestation. O r , to cite a second feature, w e value poetic s y m b o l i s m precisely because of such qualities as its 'multivalence'. O u r position is that these structural features refer, for the m o s t part, to symbolism in general, but e m e r g e as features of religious s y m bolism, w h e n they are related to the structure of the dialectic of the sacred. In other words, symbols are religious symbols w h e n they f u n c tion within a religious context. And, w e w o u l d submit, the crucial point of analysis in distinguishing religious f r o m nonreligious symbolism concerns the nature of the symbolic referent. As w e saw in the first section ofthis chapter, allsymbols 'point beyond'themselves. Butreligious symbols, while using specific, concrete, 'natural' p h e n o m e n a in their expressions, 'point b e y o n d ' themselves to ' s o m e t h i n g ' transcendent, transhistorical, transhuman; in short, they point to sacred meanings. 4 2 According to Eliade, the sacred 'speaks' or 'reveals' itself t h r o u g h symbols. B u t this revelation cannot be translated into a 'utilitarian and objective language'. In enumerating 'the different aspects of depths of this [symbolic] revelation', Eliade describes the nature and function of religious s y m b o l i s m in general. His m a j o r points may be summarized in the following manner: religious symbols can reveal a structure of the w o r l d n o t evident on the level of immediate experience; religious s y m b o l i s m is multivalent; because of this multivalence, the religious s y m b o l can integrate diverse meanings into a w h o l e or a system; because of this capacity for unification or systematization, the religious s y m b o l can express paradoxical situations or other structures otherwise inexpressible; finally, w e m u s t recognize the 'existential value' of religious symbolism. 4 3 42. Langdon Gilkey, relying heavily on Eliade's analysis, writes in Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language, p. 294, that ' T h e character of this [religious] language as referent to the unconditioned, the transcendent, the ultimate— or w h a t ever in a given c o m m u n i t y ' s experience is taken to have these characteristics — has differentiated it f r o m other types of discourse.' 43. 'Methodological Remarks', pp. 97-103.

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Let us n o w discuss these characteristics and f u n c t i o n s of religious s y m b o l i s m in s o m e detail. W e shall s u p p l e m e n t Eliade's t r e a t m e n t in ' M e t h o d o l o g i c a l R e m a r k s o n the Study of Religious S y m b o l i s m ' w i t h relevant observations f r o m his o t h e r w o r k s and f r o m earlier discussions of religious s y m b o l i s m . W e shall begin w i t h that feature of s y m b o l i s m w h i c h Eliade refers to as 'the logic of s y m b o l s ' , because, in o u r view, this is the key m e t h o d o l o g i c a l concept in Eliade's interpretation of religious s y m b o l i s m . 'The logic of symbols' O u r analysis o f ' t h e logic of s y m b o l s ' will be e x t r e m e l y brief, n o t only because w e have already illustrated m u c h of this concept in o u r discussion of Eliade's structuralist approach and his interpretation of the snake and lunar s y m b o l i s m , b u t also because so m u c h of o u r analysis in C h a p t e r 7 (descriptive evaluations, levels of meaning, etc.) involves this m e t h o d o l o g i c a l concept. In Eliade's view, s y m b o l s are n o t arbitrary irresponsible creations of the psyche, but they f u n c t i o n according to their o w n 'logical' p r i n ciples. It should be evident f r o m the snake-lunar relationship that Eliade wishes to emphasize that various s y m b o l s can c o m b i n e or 'fit t o g e t h e r ' to f o r m coherent s y m b o l i c 'systems', that s y m b o l i s m e n ables homo religiosus to b r i n g h e t e r o g e n e o u s p h e n o m e n a into s t r u c t u r ally interlocking relationships. In t e r m s of the logic of symbols, Eliade s u b m i t s that ' s y m b o l s of every kind, and at w h a t e v e r level, are always consistent and systematic'. ' C e r t a i n g r o u p s of symbols, at least, p r o v e to be coherent, logically connected with one another; in a w o r d , they can be systematically f o r m u l a t e d , translated into rational terms.' 4 4 In The Symbolism of Evil, Paul Ricoeur describes this concept as f u n c t i o n i n g o n the 'first level' of analysis, and Ricoeur even cites Eliade as his m a j o r e x a m p l e of such ' p u r e l y c o m p a r a t i v e p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' . T h i s level of descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y 'limits 44. Patterns, p. 453; Images and Symbols, p. 37. In The Comparative Study of Religion, p. 25, W a c h q u o t e s B l e e k e r as i d e n t i f y i n g ' t h e logos w i t h s t r u c t u r e ' : ' T h i s t e r m [logos] again e m p h a s i z e s this t r u t h : that religion is n o t an u n c o n t r o l l a b l e , s u b j e c t i v e secret o f t h e soul b u t an o b j e c t i v e e n t i t y s h a p e d by strictly spiritual l a w s w i t h its o w n a l t o g e t h e r logical, t h a t is, p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y logical, s t r u c t u r e . ' Bleeker, Revue d'histoire et philosophic religieuse 21 (1951): 408.

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itself to understanding s y m b o l s t h r o u g h symbols'. This analysis is on the 'horizontal' and 'panoramic' plane, in which the phenomenologist of religion attempts to describe the internal coherence of the w o r l d of symbols and to place symbols in a w h o l e 'which f o r m s a system on the plane of the symbols themselves'. 4 5 Ricoeur has n o t captured the full significance of Eliade's logic of symbols. It is true that this logic functions on the horizontal plane of internal coherence. But, as w e shall contend in C h a p t e r 7, this logic of symbols is manifested on higher and higher levels of reality, and it is in terms of the 'highest' or most 'elevated' manifestations that the logic is best revealed and the 'center' of the symbolic system is understood. T h e logic of symbols enables Eliade n o t only to differentiate planes of manifestation, but also to evaluate certain levels as 'higher', 'deeper', 'mature', and 'elevated'. Whether Eliade can render such j u d g m e n t s on a descriptive basis remains to be seen. At this time, w e simply wish to propose that Eliade's concept of the logic of symbols functions not only on the horizontal plane, w h e r e one appeals to some criterion of internal coherence, but also involves a 'vertical' appeal to s o m e criterion of adequacy. It is this latter type of appeal which m a n y critics of Eliade find so objectionable, since they argue that it takes h i m far b e y o n d the descriptive and involves highly n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s based on an assumed ontological position. It is this type of methodological issue which will concern us in the concluding chapter. W e take 'the logic of s y m b o l s ' to be the key methodological concept in Eliade's view of symbolism, because almost every other significant feature in Eliade's analysis of s y m b o l i s m seems to depend on the validity of this concept. It is only because of such a 'logic of symbols' that Eliade can speak of the s y m b o l ' s ' a u t o n o m o u s ' m o d e of cognition and can maintain that symbols 'preserve their structure' and reveal a sense of continuity and universality, regardless of the particular historical and temporal conditionings. O n l y on the basis of such a concept can Eliade analyze s y m b o l i s m as being 'multivalent' and c o m p r e h e n d the unification of structurally coherent meanings into symbolic wholes or 'systems'. W e shall see that w i t h o u t such a logic of symbols, it w o u l d be impossible for the phenomenologist to dis45. Ricceur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 353.

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tinguish different levels of religious manifestations and to evaluate certain levels as 'higher' or 'elevated'. In short, w i t h o u t such a logic of symbols, Eliade's hermeneutical foundation, consisting of a u t o n o mous, coherent, structural systems of symbolic associations, w o u l d completely collapse; it m i g h t then be at best a highly imaginative and creative formulation, b u t one devoid of the methodological rigor and sense of objectivity d e m a n d e d of a phenomenological approach. The

multivalence

Eliade's observation that 'religious symbols are capable of revealing a modality of the real or a structure of the w o r l d that is not evident on the level of immediate experience', 4 6 should be clear f r o m his analysis of the snake as a lunar symbol. T h e snake s y m b o l reveals the w o r l d as a living totality, as inexhaustible life repeating itself rhythmically. Such a revelation is not a matter of purely rational or reflective knowledge, but of an immediate intuition of a 'cipher' of the world. T h e w o r l d 'speaks' t h r o u g h the religious symbol; by such 'graspings' the religious w o r l d is constituted. W h a t allows such a revelation is the essential characteristic of s y m bolism which Eliade refers to as its 'multivalence': 'its capacity to express simultaneously a n u m b e r of meanings w h o s e continuity is not evident on the plane of immediate experience'. In his analysis of lunar symbolism, Eliade has s h o w n that this religious s y m b o l i s m is able 'to reveal a multitude of structurally coherent meanings': the lunar rhythms, 'the law of universal becoming', the death and rebirth or regeneration, rain and waters, vegetation and plant life, fertility, 'the female principle', h u m a n destiny, weaving, etc. 'In the final analysis, the s y m b o l i s m of the m o o n reveals a correspondence of mystical order between the various levels of cosmic reality and certain m o dalities o f h u m a n existence. Let us note that this correspondence becomes evident neither spontaneously in immediate experience n o r t h r o u g h critical reflection. It is the result of a certain m o d e of "being present" in the world.' 4 7 This emphasis on the multivalence of religious s y m b o l i s m reaffirms 46. 'Methodological Remarks', p. 98. 47. Ibid.,

p. 99.

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one of Eliade's f o r e m o s t phenomenological concerns: the criticism of all f o r m s of m o d e r n methodological reductionism. T h e meaning of lunar s y m b o l i s m cannot be reduced to s o m e 'rational' interpretation, even t h o u g h certain of its aspects, such as the relationship between the lunar cycle and menstruation, m a y seem to have developed by s o m e m e t h o d o f ' l o g i c a l ' or 'rational' analysis. T h e m e a n i n g of lunar s y m bolism cannot be reduced to one of its m a n y frames of reference, such as the erotic or sexual, even t h o u g h the erotic is indeed one of its m a n y valorizations. As w e saw in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, Historians of Religions have consistently produced 'unilateral and therefore aberrant interpretations of symbols'. Such a reductionism is necessarily 'false', because it is a 'partial' and 'incomplete' interpretation of a religious symbolism. Such reductionism annihilates s y m b o l i s m as 'an a u t o n o m o u s m o d e of cognition'. It is the s y m b o l i s m as multivalent, as a totality of structurally coherent meanings, that is 'true'. 4 8 Eliade illustrates such a 'unilateral' reduction of religious s y m bolism in his analysis o f ' r i t u a l caves'. ' N o w the cave represents the otherworld, but also the entire Universe. It is n o t the immediate, " n a t u r a l " valorization of the cave as a d a r k — and hence subterranean — place that enables us to perceive its s y m b o l i s m and its religious function, b u t the experience caused by entering a place w h o s e sacredness makes it "total", that is, a place that constitutes a world-in-itself.'1 After providing several examples of the religious meaning of ritual caves, Eliade offers this final observation: i t is only since the "naturalistic" interpretation imposed by nineteenth-century scholars, w h o reduced religious s y m b o l i s m to their concrete, physical expressions, that the cosmic meaning of caves and u n d e r g r o u n d cult dwellings have been reduced to a single value, that is, the abode of the dead and the source of telluric fertility. ' 49 48. See Images and Symbols, pp. 15-16. In ' T h e P r o b l e m o f t h e D o u b l e - S e n s e as H e r m e n e u t i c P r o b l e m and as S e m a n t i c P r o b l e m ' , Myths and Symbolism: Studies in Honor oj Mircea Eliade, ed. J o s e p h M . K i t a g a w a a n d C h a r l e s H . L o n g , p. 68, Paul Ricoeur w r i t e s t h a t ' t h e sole p h i l o s o p h i c interest in s y m b o l i s m is t h a t it reveals, b y its s t r u c t u r e of d o u b l e - s e n s e [ m u l t i p l e or d o u b l e - m e a n i n g ] , t h e a m b i g u i t y o f b e i n g : " B e i n g speaks in m a n y w a y s . " It is t h e raison d'être o f s y m b o l i s m t o disclose t h e multiplicity of meaning out of the ambiguity of being.' 49. M i r c e a Eliade, ' Z a l m o x i s ' , Zalmoxis: The Vanishing God, pp. 29, 30. T h i s c h a p t e r is r e p r o d u c e d as ' Z a l m o x i s ' , History of Religions 11, n o . 3 (1972): 2 5 7 - 3 0 2 .

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The function of unification 'This capacity of religious s y m b o l i s m to reveal a multitude of structurally coherent meanings has an i m p o r t a n t consequence': ' T h e s y m bol is thus able to reveal a perspective in which heterogeneous realities are susceptible of articulation into a whole, or even of integration into a " s y s t e m " . In other words, the religious symbol allows m a n to discover a certain unity of the W o r l d and, at the same time, to disclose to himself his proper destiny as an integrating part of the World.' 5 9 In Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, Mircea Eliade tells us that this 'tendency to h o m o l o g i z e the different planes of reality is of the essence of every archaic and traditional spirituality'. 5 1 A n d religious s y m bolism plays the most i m p o r t a n t role in this process of h o m o l o g i z a tion. O n e need only think of the snake, first as a purely natural and historical object and then as a religious lunar symbol, in order to understand h o w the snake as a s y m b o l can be homologized w i t h heterogeneous realities w h i c h reveal the f u n d a m e n t a l structure deciphered in the lunar rhythms. In this regard, Eliade's phenomenological m e t h o d adheres closely to his understanding of the very activity of homo religiosus and the nature of his subject matter. T h a t is, he attempts to empathize w i t h and derive his m e t h o d f r o m the very nature of the religious life-world. T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t 'should strive to grasp the symbolic meaning of the religious facts in their heterogeneous, yet structurally interlocking appearances'. Such a procedure does n o t imply the reduction of all meaning to a c o m m o n denominator. O n e cannot insist strongly e n o u g h that the search for symbolic structures is not a w o r k of reduction but of integration. W e c o m p a r e or contrast t w o expressions of a s y m b o l n o t in order to reduce t h e m to a single, pre-existent expression, but 50. 'Methodological Remarks', pp. 99-100. 51. Yoga, p. 123. In this section (pp. 117-124), Eliade indicates the tremendous Indian capacity for synthesis. T h e Mandukya Upanisad 'offers a system of homologies a m o n g the states of consciousness, the mystical letters, and . . . the four yugas'. T h e Mandiikya presents 'the integration of several levels of reference: Upanisadic, yogic, "mystical," cosmological.'

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notions

in order to discover the process whereby a structure is likely to assume enriched meanings. 5 2 Returning to our illustration, w e observed h o w the lunar symbols revealed a perspective in which heterogeneous realities were integrated into a 'system'. We were able to speak o f a 'logic o f symbols' and observed h o w structurally coherent meanings were fitted together to form a lunar 'web'. The spiritual graspings o f the religious meaning o f the lunar rhythms allowed many different levels (cosmological, anthropological, etc.) o f existence to be homologized. As a result, homo religiosus not only experienced a certain unity o f the world, but also understood h o w his or her mode o f being participated in the constitution and destiny o f the world. The expression of paradoxical and contradictory aspects of reality53 We have already noted the capacity o f religious symbolism to reveal structures o f the world not evident on the level o f immediate experience. Eliade often develops this observation by asserting that symbols reveal 'the deepest aspects' o f reality 'which defy any other means o f knowledge'. Symbols 'respond to a need and fulfill a function, that o f bringing to light the most hidden modalities o f being'. 5 4 52. 'Methodological Remarks', p. 97. Cf. J o h n E. Smith's analysis in ' T h e Structure of Religion', Religious Studies 1, no. 1 (1965): 65-66. T h e emphasis u p o n universal religious structures need not reduce or c o m p r o m i s e that which is singular. Citing a point made b y Cassirer in Substance and Form, Smith argues that 'it is only t h r o u g h the use of universal conceptions making possible significant critical comparisons between singulars of the same kind that w e are able to discover and express clearly w h a t is distinctive of the singular p h e n o m e n o n ' . 53. This feature of symbolism could easily be subsumed under our previous discussion of the function of unification. It is the process of homologization and systematization, based u p o n a logic and multivalence of symbols, that allows s y m bolism to integrate phenomena which appear to be contradictory or paradoxical into a coherent structural whole. We have singled out this particular type of symbolic expression because of its special significance for homo religiosus and for Mircea Eliade. 54. Images and Symbols, p. 12. These assertions and other similar claims are a major source of criticism of Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y : Eliade 'reads' all types of meaning into his data; his interpretations are highly subjective and normative. H e usually presents such observations as if they are on the same level, and have the same degree of support, as his hermeneutical efforts to describe the characteristics of s o m e m y t h or ritual. Yet m a n y of his assertions are on a different level of analysis and involve unacknowledged

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O n e notes the similar types of observations Paul Tillich often m a d e w h e n describing the general nature of all symbols. ' T h e y [symbols] m a k e accessible to our minds levels of experience f r o m which w e otherwise w o u l d be shut off; w e w o u l d not be aware of them. This is the great function of symbols, to point beyond themselves in the p o w e r of that to w h i c h they point, to open up levels of reality w h i c h otherwise are closed, and to open up levels of the h u m a n m i n d of which w e otherwise are not aware.' 5 5 In this regard, R o b e r t Luyster summarizes s o m e of Eliade's discussion of symbolic revelation: T h e s y m b o l successfully brings to expression, f u r t h e r m o r e , those aspects of reality to which the conceptualizing consciousness has been m o s t insensible and w h i c h it has been most unable to articulate. It is in fact j u s t these contradictory and mysterious features of the universe for w h i c h the very ambivalence (or, m o r e properly, multivalence) of a s y m b o l is most highly suited. A s y m b o l is an image charged w i t h m a n y meanings simultaneously. A n d it is this very indeterminacy — whatever the logical or scientific disadvantages it m a y possess — that renders it uniquely able to preserve the richness and the paradox of experienced reality. 56 N o w it is j u s t these features of reality—paradoxical, contradictory, mysterious—which have most impressed homo religiosus (and hence, Eliade) and which have led Eliade to emphasize a special revelatory capacity of religious symbolism. 'Perhaps the most i m p o r t a n t f u n c tion of religious s y m b o l i s m — i m p o r t a n t above all because of the role which it will play in later philosophical speculations—is its capacity for expressing paradoxical situations, or certain structures of ultimate reality, otherwise quite inexpressible.' 5 7 What Eliade wishes to emphasize here is such s y m b o l i s m as those of the 'Symplegades' and the coincidentia oppositorum. H e believes that such expressions reveal ontological moves. In chapter 7, w e shall attempt to differentiate several levels o f analysis in Eliade's phenomenological approach. 55. 'Theology and Symbolism', Religious Symbolism, ed. by F. Ernest Johnson, p. 109. See Tillich's 'The Meaning and Justification o f Religious Symbols', pp. 4-5. 56. 'The Study o f Myth: T w o Approaches', pp. 235-236. 57. 'Methodological Remarks', p. 101.

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the most creative spiritual experiences and the highest religious attainments oihomo religiosus. Let us cite an illustration which is relevant to the detailed analysis w e have recently presented: the conjunction of the serpent and the eagle in various myths. In these myths, the serpent is usually a s y m b o l of chthonian darkness, of the nonmanifest, of the fertilizing p o w e r s of M o t h e r Earth, 'the female principle', and the terrestrial waters. T h e eagle is usually a s y m b o l of solar light, of the manifest, of the p o w e r s of Father H e a v e n and the masculine celestial order. T h e serpent and the eagle are 'an archetypal pair of symbolical antagonists'. In some myths, the opposition of the eagle and the serpent is emphasized. 5 8 In m a n y other m y t h s f o u n d t h r o u g h o u t the world, these symbolical antagonists or polar principles paradoxically coexist. T h r o u g h the paradoxical conjunction of the serpent and the eagle, homo religiosus has attempted to express the mystery and unity of the 'totality', the divinity, or the absolute. Another illustration, extremely relevant to our analysis and interpreted at great length by Eliade, concerns the attempt by homo religiosus to unify the sun and the m o o n . O n e identifies all his or her experience w i t h the valorizations of the solar and lunar r h y t h m s ; then the person endeavors to h o m o l o g i z e these levels of experience and u n i f y the solar and the lunar r h y t h m s in his or her living b o d y ; finally, t h r o u g h such a unification, he or she aims at transcending the cosmos by realizing a primordial state of nondifferentiation, the primal unity, the original totality. 5 9 In accepting his presence in the world, precisely as m a n f o u n d himself before the 'cipher' or ' w o r d ' of the world, he came to encounter the mystery of the contradictory aspects of a reality or of a 'sacrality' that he was led to consider compact and h o m o g e n e o u s . O n e of the most i m p o r t a n t discoveries of the h u m a n spirit was naively anticipated when, t h r o u g h certain religious symbols, m a n 58. See H e i n r i c h Z i m m e r , ' T h e S e r p e n t a n d t h e B i r d ' , Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization, pp. 7 2 - 7 6 . In citing o n e scene f r o m H o m e r ' s Iliad, Z i m m e r o b s e r v e s that t h e ' h e a v e n l y bird [an eagle] r a v a g i n g the s e r p e n t s y m b o l i z e d t o h i m [Kalchas, t h e p r i e s t - s o o t h s a y e r ] t h e v i c t o r y o f t h e patriarchal, masculine, h e a v e n l y o r d e r o f G r e e c e o v e r t h e f e m a l e p r i n c i p l e o f Asia a n d T r o y ' . 59. See Yoga, pp. 2 3 6 - 2 4 1 , 2 5 3 - 2 5 4 , 2 6 7 - 2 7 3 ; Patterns, pp. 178-181, 4 1 9 - 4 2 0 .

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guessed that the polarities and the antinomies could be articulated as a unity. Since then, the negative and sinister aspects of the c o s m o s and of the g o d s have n o t only f o u n d a justification, b u t h a v e revealed themselves as an integral part of all reality or sacrality. 6 0 The 'existential

value'

Finally, w e shall discuss 'the existential value of religious s y m b o l i s m , that is, the fact that a s y m b o l always aims at a reality or a situation in which human existence is engaged'. ' T h e religious s y m b o l n o t only unveils a structure of reality or a d i m e n s i o n of existence; b y the s a m e stroke it brings a meaning into h u m a n existence. T h i s is w h y even s y m b o l s aiming at the ultimate reality conjointly constitute existential revelations for the m a n w h o deciphers their message.' 6 1 T o u n d e r s t a n d this existential d i m e n s i o n of religious s y m b o l i s m , w e m u s t recall h o w s y m b o l i s m 'bursts o p e n ' the i m m e d i a t e reality of a particular, natural, profane, existential situation. T h e s y m b o l is experienced as a 'cipher' w h i c h points b e y o n d itself and reveals h i d d e n levels of reality or structures of the w o r l d . T h e religious s y m b o l is experienced as a 'cipher' of the sacred, relating the h u m a n and natural d i m e n s i o n s of existence to a m o d e of being ' b e y o n d ' or 'other t h a n ' the profane. 'In general, s y m b o l i s m brings a b o u t a universal " p o r o u s ness," " o p e n i n g " beings and things to transobjective meanings.' 6 2 Eliade claims that lunar s y m b o l i s m adds n e w values and meanings to the snake w i t h o u t d e n y i n g its i m m e d i a t e value. T h i s s y m b o l i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the w o r l d can be related to o u r previous analysis of the dialectic of hierophanies. T h e snake, while r e m a i n i n g a natural p r o f a n e p h e n o m e n o n , 'explodes' or 'bursts' u n d e r the force of lunar s y m b o l i s m to reveal m a n y levels of p r o f o u n d existential meaning. T h e snake is n o longer experienced as an isolated p h e n o m e n o n in a completely f r a g m e n t e d universe; it is experienced as o n e of the c o u n t less valorizations of the m o o n and can be h o m o l o g i z e d w i t h o t h e r p h e n o m e n a revealing the structure of the lunar r h y t h m s . 'In application to objects or actions, s y m b o l i s m renders t h e m " o p e n " ; s y m b o l i c 60. 'Methodological Remarks', p. 102. 61. Ibid., pp. 102-103. 62. Yoga, pp. 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 .

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thinking "breaks o p e n " the immediate reality w i t h o u t any minimizing or undervaluing of it: in such a perspective this is not a closed Universe, no object exists for itself in isolation; everything is held together by a compact system of correspondences and likenesses.' 6 3 W e have really uncovered t w o stages in this 'bursting open' of natural p h e n o m e n a by religious symbolism. First, lunar s y m b o l i s m m a y be seen as an extension of the dialectic of hierophanies. Snakes are t r a n s f o r m e d into 'something other' than w h a t they appear to profane experience to be; as religious lunar symbols they reveal sacred m e a n ings. Then, by becoming symbols of a sacred transcendent reality, snakes 'abolish their material limits, and instead of being isolated f r a g m e n t s b e c o m e part of a w h o l e [lunar] system; or, better, despite their precarious and f r a g m e n t a r y nature, they e m b o d y in themselves the w h o l e of the system in question'. 6 4 In this double process of symbolic transformation, w e observe the f u n d a m e n t a l structure of the symbolic existential revelation. First, individual profane situations are t r a n s f o r m e d into spiritual experiences. Then, w h a t was experienced as an 'isolated', 'subjective', particular m o d e of existence n o w 'opens o u t ' to a w o r l d which is unified and 'familiar', to a system of structures which is 'objective' and universal.

TRANSITION

T h r o u g h o u t our analysis of the general features of symbolism, as well as our analyses in earlier sections of this chapter, one m a y notice the extreme relevance of the historical-phenomenological 'tension' which was seen to define the nature of the H i s t o r y of Religions today. T o cite our most recent symbolic feature, religious s y m b o l i s m has existential value for homo religiosus only if it can 'burst open' the natural profane p h e n o m e n o n , thus revealing a universal religious (transcendent, 63. Images and Symbols, p. 178. T h e r e s e e m s n o need t o reiterate the o b v i o u s d e p e n d e n c y o f these and similar assertions o n the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t o f the l o g i c o f s y m b o l s . See Patterns, p. 455. 64. Patterns, p. 452. T h i s distinction o f t w o stages is s i m p l y for the sake o f analysis and is n o t intended to indicate a t e m p o r a l sequence.

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transhistorical) structure; and, at the same time, b r i n g that universal structure into a d y n a m i c relationship w i t h those specific, concrete, historical, t e m p o r a l conditions w h i c h define the existential situation of the natural p r o f a n e p h e n o m e n o n . W i t h o u t such a d y n a m i c relationship b e t w e e n the historical particular and the universal structure, the religious s y m b o l i s m w o u l d have little existential value for homo religiosus. W e have refrained f r o m continually relating o u r analysis to the historical-phenomenological 'tension', because an examination of this relationship constitutes o u r p r i m a r y task in C h a p t e r 6. Indeed, the adequacy of n o t only Eliade's t r e a t m e n t of s y m b o l i s m b u t of his entire p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach rests u p o n the extent to w h i c h his m e t h o d is successful in dealing w i t h the crucial m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issues and difficulties raised b y this historical-phenomenological 'tension'.

PART T H R E E

Eliade's Phenomenology and New Directions: Some Methodological Issues and Conclusions

6

T h e Historical-Phenomenological 'Tension'

It has been our thesis that if Mircea Eliade's phenomenological approach to religious phenomena is an improvement over previous approaches we have elucidated, this is primarily because his creative method is grounded in a hermeneutical framework which enables him to interpret the religious meaning of his data. The two key interacting notions in his phenomenological approach were formulated as the dialectic of the sacred, which allows Eliade to distinguish religious phenomena, and the coherent universal systems of religious symbols, which serve as the foundation in terms of which he interprets the specific meaning of a religious manifestation. We shall now attempt to relate Eliade's phenomenological approach to the basic methodological 'tension' which was seen to define the present discipline of the History of Religions. We wish to discuss the basic concrete, particular, historical versus general, universal, phenomenological tension which we initially elucidated in our analysis of Pettazzoni's approach. At the beginning of Chapter 7, entitled 'Descriptive Evaluations and Levels of Meaning', we shall summarize our conclusions. In describing the history-phenomenology tension, we have shown that Mircea Eliade is primarily a phenomenologist whose methodology is grounded in universal coherent systems of symbolic structures. He conceives of his task as the interpretation of religious '-meaning' and asserts that one interprets meaning through structure. H o w does the phenomenologist regard the unique historical conditionings of his data? H o w do the universal structures interact with the historical particular dimension of existence in yielding meaning? Is interpreting phenomenological 'meaning' something different from providing a historical (psychological, causal, etc.) 'explanation'? Is there a 'given' (perhaps a 'constituted given') revealed in the History of Religions? Does Eliade use some phenomenological method, such

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as the technique of free variation, in c o m p r e h e n d i n g the structures and m e a n i n g s of religious experience?

T H E H I S T O R I C A L P A R T I C U L A R A N D THE U N I V E R S A L S T R U C T U R E

The importance of the historical and the particular T o interpret the actual m e a n i n g of any religious manifestation, p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s of religion m u s t be sensitive to the unique, specific, historico-cultural conditionings of all data. U n l i k e the early philologists and ethnologists, t h e y a c k n o w l e d g e the irreducibility of history. P h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s w o r k w i t h historical d o c u m e n t s , historical expressions of the experiences of homo religiosus. T o assert that all religious p h e n o m e n a are historical is to a c k n o w ledge that all religious p h e n o m e n a are conditioned. T h e r e are n o ' p u r e ' religious p h e n o m e n a . T h e sacred is always manifested in history; temporal, spatial, cultural, and o t h e r factors always condition the religious manifestation. T h e e x t r e m e i m p o r t a n c e of the particular and the historical d i m e n sions of experience should be evident f r o m Eliade's analysis of the process of sacralization. In order to realize w h y one cannot grasp the religious w i t h o u t taking into consideration specific historical conditions, one need simply recall the f o l l o w i n g : that w h i c h is infinite, transhistorical, eternal, limits itself b y incarnating itself in s o m e t h i n g finite, historical, temporal. A particular, finite, historical p h e n o m e n o n , while r e m a i n i n g a 'natural' thing, manifests s o m e t h i n g universal, infinite, u n c o n d i t i o n e d . Each h i e r o p h a n y is a historical fact, is set in a specific historical situation, and reveals s o m e attitude h u m a n beings have had t o w a r d the sacred. As L a n g d o n Gilkey has noted, 'every experience of the W h o l e c o m e s t h r o u g h s o m e particular finite m e d i u m in s o m e particular historical situation, and thus is given its particular f o r m ' . 1 T h e significance of particular historical factors becomes even m o r e evident w h e n w e emphasize a p o i n t m a d e by M e r l e a u - P o n t y and 1. Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language, Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, p. 111.

p. 42. C f . Patterns, p. 2; a n d

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other existential phenomenologists: our perception of the w o r l d is alwaysperspectival and incomplete. Insight into meaning does depend on certain factual conditions. 2 H u m a n beings tend to relate to those valorizations of a religious s y m b o l i s m which have the greatest existential relevance to their particular historical situation. G. Richard Welbon writes that 'it is the disposition of m a n ' s m i n d and being which finally determines whether specific modalities of the sacred are discovered. A n d that disposition is historically conditioned—to s o m e extent, at least.' 3 T h e fact that f e w of us can experience the snake as a 'cipher' of the sacred in one of its lunar valorizations attests to this importance of historical conditionings. Indeed, ' m o d e r n m a n ' has difficulty experiencing the m o o n as hierophanic in any of its valorizations. T h e phenomenologist recognizes that certain religious symbolisms were constituted at specific historical times and were dependent on specific historical situations. T o illustrate this point, w e m a y refer to one widespread s y m b o l i s m w h i c h expresses the solidarity between the fertility of the land and the fertility of w o m e n . W e find the identification of the snake w i t h the phallus, of the seed with the semen virile, of the tilled field with w o m a n , of ploughing w i t h conjugal union and the h i e r o g a m o u s fertilization of the E a r t h — M o t h e r . 4 Such anthropo-telluric homologies could not have been constituted before 'the discovery of agriculture'. T h e y are dependent on s o m e u n d e r standing of b o t h agriculture and the cause of conception. The status of universal structures Recognizing the necessity of interpreting the unique, specific conditionings of religious data, a scholar may not be overly impressed by Mircea Eliade's sensitivity to these particular, historical aspects of 2. For several illustrations of this point, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'Preface', Phenomenology of Perception, pp. vii-xxi; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ' P h e n o m e n o l o g y and the Sciences of Man', The Primacy of Perception, pp. 43-95; Paul Ricoeur, 'Existential P h e n o m e n o l o g y ' , Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology', pp. 202-212. 3. Welbon, p. 469. 4. See Patterns, pp. 256-260; The Sacred, pp. 166-167; The Forge and the Crucible, p. 144.

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experience. Rather w h a t p r o b a b l y stands o u t is the significant status Eliade has granted the universal structures of religious experience. 5 It is true that all hierophanies are historical manifestations, b u t w h a t is m o s t crucial for Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y is that their structures remain the same. O n l y because there is a p e r m a n e n c e and continuity of structure can w e participate in the life-world of the other and interpret religious data w i t h s o m e sense of objectivity. Eliade maintains 6 that f u n d a m e n t a l religious structures are n o n t e m p o r a l and nonhistorical. W e cannot s h o w that religious structures are created by certain societies or historical m o m e n t s . W e can only establish that specific societies and historical m o m e n t s f u r n i s h the opportunity f o r the manifestation or p r e d o m i n a n c e of a particular n o n t e m p o r a l structure. T h u s w e find countless and multifarious revalorizations of the s y m b o l s of 'flight' t h r o u g h o u t history. Yet despite the historical conditionings, there is a structural solidarity expressed b y the s y m b o l i s m o f ' f l i g h t ' : transcendence and f r e e d o m , an ontological m u t a t i o n or abolition of 'the h u m a n condition'. H i s t o r y does n o t basically m o d i f y the structure of an archetypal s y m b o l i s m . H i s t o r y does add n e w meanings; n e w valorizations of a s y m b o l i s m are occasioned b y particular historical situations. B u t the n e w valorization is conditioned b y the basic structure of the s y m bolism. T h u s , the p r i m a r y structure of the s y m b o l i s m of the C r o s s was n o t created at a specific historical m o m e n t . T h e r e are n u m e r o u s variants of the universal s y m b o l i s m of the ' C e n t r e ' , such as the m o u n t a i n , the ladder, or the C o s m i c Tree. W h a t interests the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t is the

5. Baird, Category Formation and the History of Religions, pp. 152-153, c o n t e n d s t h a t ' T h e search f o r s t r u c t u r e s m a y b e a l e g i t i m a t e i n q u i r y , b u t it is n o t an historical one, a n d w h e n it e n t e r s historical s t u d y u n d e r t h e g u i s e o f o f f e r i n g t h e " r e l i g i o u s d i m e n s i o n " o f t h e data, it d o e s violence t o a u t h e n t i c historical i n v e s t i g a t i o n . P h e n o m e n o l o gical s t r u c t u r e s are n o t historically falsifiable, a n d their m e t h o d o f verification is t h e r e f o r e m o r e akin t o t h e o l o g i c a l verification t h a n t o historical v e r i f i c a t i o n . ' Baird a r g u e s t h a t Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h is like this, since 'it is n o t historically falsifiable. Since it is an ahistorical a p p r o a c h , h o w e v e r l e g i t i m a t e that m i g h t b e in itself, w h e n it e n t e r s i n t o historical d e l i b e r a t i o n it b e c o m e s a b a r r i e r t o t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f a u t h e n t i c religio-historical u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ' 6. S o m e o f t h e e n s u i n g analysis can b e f o u n d in Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, 107-108, 110, 178; The Sacred, p. 137; Images and Symbols, pp. 159-161.

pp.

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basic structure t h r o u g h which the meaning of the s y m b o l i s m of the ' C e n t r e ' is interpreted. Christianity b r o u g h t about a n e w valorization of this s y m b o l i s m by having the Cross take the place of the Tree of the World. This is not to deny that such a homologization took place in history. T o interpret the actual meaning that the Cross had for homo religiosus, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t m u s t consider the unique, specific, historical conditionings and the originality of the Christian experience. B u t the historical manifestation of the Cross did not radically m o d i f y the universal s y m b o l i s m of which it was a significant variant. In fact, the n e w valorization of the Cross was already conditioned by the archetypal s y m b o l i s m of the C o s m i c Tree standing at the ' C e n t r e ' of the universe. O v e r and over again w e see that religious structures, especially symbolic structures, are ' a u t o n o m o u s ' . T h e r e is a logic and coherency of symbolic structures. Each coherent s y m b o l i s m is universal. Eliade's hermeneutics is g r o u n d e d in a u t o n o m o u s , coherent, universal systems of symbolic structures, w h i c h allows him to reintegrate a religious p h e n o m e n o n into its system ofassociations. T h r o u g h a structural analysis, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t can interpret religious meanings even w h e n a particular person or g r o u p is not consciously aware of the religious m e a n i n g of its experience.

HISTORICAL 'EXPLANATION' A N D PHENOMENOLOGICAL

'MEANING'

In the ' F o r e w o r d ' to Shamanism, in Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, in Images and Symbols, and in several other works, Mircea Eliade seems determined to differentiate w h a t he is doing f r o m historical (psychological, causal, etc.) explanation. A scholar m a y 'explain' the origin or the diffusion of a particular religious manifestation in terms of various historical, cultural, and temporal conditionings. B u t Eliade continually maintains that the task of the phenomenologist is n o t completed by his or her historical research: one still m u s t interpret the meaning his or her data reveal. At the m i n i m u m , Eliade is m a k i n g a claim c o m m o n to p h e n o m e n o l o g y : giving a historical (causal, psychological) explanation does not exhaust the m e a n i n g of one's data. P h e n o m e n o l o g y , it is

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often stated, is concerned not w i t h giving 'explanations' but w i t h finding 'meanings'. In this sense, interpreting m e a n i n g is n o t tantam o u n t to uncovering historical and temporal conditions. But, w e w o u l d submit, Eliade intends s o m e t h i n g far m o r e controversial than this by his more-than-historical-explanation claim. H e seems to be m a k i n g definite ontological claims about the nature of the h u m a n being and experience. O n e m i g h t even contend that these j u d g m e n t s lay the f o u n d a t i o n for a philosophical anthropology. Since Eliade wishes to f o r m u l a t e a descriptive phenomenological approach and w o u l d be reluctant to accept any analysis w h i c h attributed to h i m ontological j u d g m e n t s , it is imperative that w e provide s o m e d o c u m e n t a t i o n to j u s t i f y our interpretation, namely, that Eliade's more-than-historical-explanation claim involves ontological j u d g m e n t s about the nature of the h u m a n being and experience. 7 M o r e documentation will be provided in the following sections on evaluating descriptively and on different levels of m e a n i n g in Eliade's approach. This Historian of Religions acknowledges that he w o r k s w i t h historical data, but he asserts that his d o c u m e n t s disclose ' s o m e t h i n g m o r e than the simple fact that they reflect historical situations'. Eliade maintains that 'they reveal to h i m i m p o r t a n t truths about m a n and m a n ' s relation to the sacred'. 8 In 'Recent W o r k s on Shamanism', Eliade describes 'ecstasy' as seeming 'to f o r m an integral part of the h u m a n condition'. Hence, it is n o t necessary 'to look for its " o r i g i n " in a particular culture or in a particular historical m o m e n t ' . 'As an experience, ecstasy is a n o n historical p h e n o m e n o n ; it is a primordial p h e n o m e n o n in the sense that it is coextensive w i t h h u m a n nature. O n l y the religious interpretation given to ecstasy and the techniques designed to prepare it or facilitate it are historical data. T h a t is to say, they are dependent on 7. A l t h o u g h an a p p r o a c h w h i c h claims t o b e ' p u r e l y ' d e s c r i p t i v e m a y r e g a r d s u c h an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as a criticism, all m e t h o d o l o g i e s necessarily i n v o l v e implicit p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s a b o u t h u m a n b e i n g s a n d t h e universe, a n d n o t all o f t h e s e claims are e v e r entirely j u s t i f i e d s i m p l y in t e r m s o f t h e data investigated. T h i s is n o t t o assert t h a t w e m u s t accept all such a s s u m p t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s uncritically. O n c e w e h a v e r e n d e r e d t h e m explicit, w e m a y f o r m u l a t e v a r i o u s criteria (consistency, applicability, etc.) f o r e v a l u a t i n g t h e m . 8. ' T h e Q u e s t f o r t h e " O r i g i n s " o f R e l i g i o n ' , p. 169.

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various cultural contexts, and they change in the course o f the history.' 9 In the 'Foreword' to Images and Symbols, Eliade discusses 'the nonhistorical portion o f every human being'. In Rites and Symbols of Initiation (pp. 130-131), he analyzes the phenomenon o f initiation as not only a historical fact but also an experience which 'exhibits a dimension that is metacultural and transhistorical', an 'existential experience that is basic in the human condition'. Perhaps the most illuminating discussion o f this more-thanhistorical-explanation claim, which illustrates several o f Eliade's assertions about the human being and his or her existential situation, is contained in the 'Foreword' to Shamanism. (Celestial ascent) appears to be a primordial phenomenon, that is, it belongs to man as such, not to man as a historical being; witness the dreams, hallucinations, and images o f ascent found everywhere in the world, apart from any historical or other 'conditions.' All these dreams, myths, and nostalgias with a central theme o f ascent or flight cannot be exhausted by a psychological explanation; there is always a kernel that remains refractory to explanation, and this indefinable, irreducible element perhaps reveals the real situation o f man in the cosmos, a situation that, we shall never tire o f repeating, is not solely 'historical.' 10 9. 'Recent Works on Shamanism: A Review Article', p. 154. During a conversation, I cited this passage and asked Mircea Eliade whether he intended by this description o f 'ecstasy' as 'nonhistorical' anything other than an analysis o f the 'meaning' o f this experience. While acknowledging that he is not entirely happy with such terms as 'transhistorical' and 'nonhistorical', Eliade stated that he intended to say something about the experience itself. T h e experience itself'isn't conditioned'; 'only the values given to this experience are historical'. When Eliade examines such religious phenomena as the innumerable ecstatic experiences o f ' f l i g h t ' or of'mystical light', he sees that they are 'not so much related through their particular historico-cultural contexts' o f the hunter, the Eskimo, the Indian; Zen, Jewish, or Christian mysticism; etc. Rather they are structurally homologous because they constitute primordial 'experiences as such'. 10. Shamanism, p. xiv. In Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p. 106, Eliade expands this analysis and makes various ontological assertions when discussing the structure o f freedom revealed by this symbolism of'flight'. T h e 'roots o f freedom are to be sought in the depths o f the psyche, and not in conditions brought about by certain historical moments'. T h e creation of'countless imaginary universes' with this essential structure 'speaks volumes upon the true nature o f the human being'. This 'longing' is 'not a

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In asserting 'the ahistoricity of religious life', Eliade points to the spontaneity and the reversibility of religious positions. 1 1 Certain coherent mystical experiences 'are possible at any and every degree of civilization and of religious situation'. T h a t is, 'for certain religious consciousnesses in crisis, there is always the possibility of a historical leap that enables t h e m to attain otherwise inaccessible spiritual positions'. In short, particular historical and cultural conditionings cannot account for these primordial existential experiences, for these p r i m o r dial p h e n o m e n a which are constitutive of the h u m a n condition as such. T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t m u s t consider the particular historical and cultural influences, but not all of the experiences of homo religiosus are historically determined. Sometimes h u m a n beings transcend their specific historical context and have certain primordial experiences simply by virtue of their h u m a n m o d e of existence. 1 2 We have confined o u r references to assertions about the historical nature of h u m a n beings and experience. Similar assertions can be f o u n d t h r o u g h o u t Eliade's w o r k s . It seems clear that Eliade is asserting something ' m o r e ' than the view that interpreting ' m e a n i n g ' is not the same as giving an 'explanation' by uncovering historical and cultural conditionings. It also seems clear that he is asserting s o m e thing ' m o r e ' than the interpretation that homo religiosus experiences religious p h e n o m e n a as having transhistorical meaning. B y means of the basic n o n t e m p o r a l and nonhistorical religious structures, especially the archetypal systems of religious symbols, Mircea Eliade is m a k i n g significant claims about h u m a n beings and their existential situation, about the h u m a n m o d e of being in the w o r l d and the h u m a n condition. Without evaluating such ontological assumptions and j u d g m e n t s at this time, w e can submit one i m p o r t a n t criticism: Eliade usually fails to acknowledge that such claims are on a different level of analysis and have a lesser degree of support than the m o r e clearly descriptive analyses w e have previously elucidated. Deciphering an essential result 'Such 11. 12.

o f c o s m i c pressures or o f e c o n o m i c insecurity— it is constitutive o f man. . . '. a desire . . . must be ranked a m o n g the specific marks o f man.' Shamanism, pp. xvi—xix. See H u d s o n , 'Eliade's Contribution to the Study o f Myth', pp. 2 3 4 - 2 3 5 .

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structure of 'the h u m a n condition as such' is quite different f r o m deciphering an essential structure of a particular c o s m o g o n i c m y t h . Eliade's failure to distinguish different levels of analysis and meaning in his approach has been a m a j o r source of dissatisfaction a m o n g his readers. It seems n o t unfair to say that a c o m m o n initial reaction— which is often a final reaction—to Eliade's writings is that his approach is hopelessly uncritical; after all, h o w can a descriptive History of Religions m a k e such ontological claims? By clarifying various levels of analysis, w i t h varying degrees of support, Eliade w o u l d go s o m e distance in meeting this type of criticism.

'GIVENNESS' A N D CREATIVITY

N o w if Mircea Eliade is correct in asserting that there are fundamental universal religious structures w h i c h are n o n t e m p o r a l and nonhistorical, then w e m a y have a 'given' which reveals a sense of permanence and continuity and can function as a foundation for Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y . If there are certain general structures of experience which are n o t completely determined by particular, relative, historical, temporal, and cultural conditionings, then w e m a y have a 'given' which can serve as a hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k in terms of which the phenomenologist can understand religious phenomena, m a k e c o m parisons and generalizations, and evaluate descriptively. O n e m a y notice a certain ambiguity t h r o u g h o u t Eliade's phenomenological analysis of w h a t is revealed in religious experience. O n the one hand, Eliade usually interprets the revelatory experience by emphasizing a fundamental'givenness' in experience and a definite passivity on the part of homo religiosus (and a corresponding passivity on the part of the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t w h o is interpreting the religious experience). For example, the sacred reveals itself to homo religiosus. T h e emphasis here is on universal or general religious structures, w h i c h are n o n t e m p o r a l and nonhistorical and are 'given' or revealed to people in religious experiences. O n the other hand, Eliade sometimes analyzes the revelatory experience by emphasizing a sense of activity and creativity on the part of homo religiosus (and a corresponding sense of activity and creativity

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on the part of the phenomenologist). Thus, homo religiosus deciphers the sacred and constitutes her or his religious 'World'. Emphasized is the extreme importance of the particular and the historical conditionings of the revelatory experiences; the phenomenologist is sensitive to the specific linguistic, cultural, historical, and other influences of the particular Lebenswelt of homo religiosus. W e shall provide s o m e elucidation of the m o r e frequent analysis of a sense o f ' g i v e n n e s s ' and passivity; then w e shall introduce s o m e criticism of such analysis; finally w e shall suggest s o m e w a y of bringing into relationship the universal and the particular, the passive and the active, the 'given' and the constituted. 'Givenness' and passivity: structures revealed to h o m o religiosus In different contexts, the universal structures which are given in religious experience are described in various ways. We have maintained that the t w o key methodological notions in Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y are the dialectic of hierophanies and the structural systems of symbols. W h e n these are taken together, w e begin to perceive the underlying f r a m e w o r k of Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y . N o w w e w o u l d submit that the f u n d a m e n t a l universal structures given in religious experience are most frequently revealed by the dialectic of the sacred and the coherent symbolisms. In Chapter 4, w e elucidated the universal structure of the process of sacralization which is revealed in the dialectic of hierophanies: the invariable separation of the hierophanic object, the sacred-profane dichotomy, the paradoxial coexistence of the sacred and the profane, etc. T h e point w e wish to emphasize is that this process of hierophanization is analyzed as a universal given in the sense that its structure exhibits an a u t o n o m y , permanence, and continuity. T h e 'sacred expresses itself according to the laws of its o w n dialectic and this expression comes to m a n f r o m w i t h o u t ' . T h e religious person does n o t actively create this basic structure. T h e person rather passively experiences that which reveals itself to h i m or her. 1 3 13. See Patterns,

pp. 3 6 8 - 3 6 9 ; Shamanism,

p. xvii.

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W h e n w e look at the structures given b y religious s y m b o l i s m , w e find that ' N o religious tradition u n d e r s t a n d s itself as h a v i n g invented or even discovered its f u n d a m e n t a l s y m b o l s ; rather, p h e n o m e n o l o g i cally they are always seen to have been " g i v e n " to that tradition.' 1 4 In C h a p t e r 5, w e analyzed m a n y senses in w h i c h s y m b o l i c structures could be said to be given or revealed in experience. W e f o u n d that every coherent s y m b o l i s m is universal. Such s y m b o l i c structures are ' a u t o n o m o u s ' in the sense that the s y m b o l s have their o w n logic and interlock to f o r m coherent structural systems. H i s t o r y does n o t basically m o d i f y the structure of such universal symbolisms. T h u s , t o return to an illustration recently cited, the essential structure of f r e e d o m and transcendence is revealed t h r o u g h the universal, coherent s y m b o l i s m of 'flight'. T h i s structure has n o t been actively created by a specific culture at a certain historical m o m e n t . It is t r u e that particular cultures and historical m o m e n t s have p r o v i d e d the occasion f o r the manifestation of such an archetypal s y m b o l i c structure. B u t the structure itself is given in the sense that it is nonhistorical and n o n t e m p o r a l and exhibits an a u t o n o m y , continuity, and u n i v e r sality. Mircea Eliade tells us that 'the W o r l d " s p e a k s " or "reveals i t s e l f " t h r o u g h s y m b o l s ' ; religious s y m b o l s reveal f u n d a m e n t a l structures of 'the W o r l d ' . T h e W o r l d 'speaks' to man, and to u n d e r s t a n d its language he needs only to k n o w the m y t h s and decipher the symbols. T h r o u g h the m y t h s and s y m b o l s of the M o o n m a n grasps the m y s t e r i o u s solidarity a m o n g temporality, birth, death and resurrection, sexuality, fertility, rain, vegetation, and so o n . . . . In the last analysis, the World reveals itself as language. It speaks to m a n t h r o u g h its o w n m o d e of being, t h r o u g h its structures and its r h y t h m s . 1 5 14. Gilkey, p. 446. 15. Myth and Reality, p. 141. It s e e m s t h a t Mircea Eliade has i n t e n t i o n a l l y used t h e t e r m ' t h e W o r l d ' t o d i s t i n g u i s h its m e a n i n g f r o m that o f t h e ' e x t e r n a l ' u n i v e r s e alone. W h e t h e r h e uses t h e t e r m ' t h e W o r l d ' o r the m o r e usual ' t h e w o r l d ' , h e usually is r e f e r r i n g t o t h e total Lebenswelt o f homo religiosus. W i l s o n M . H u d s o n ('Eliade's C o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e S t u d y o f M y t h ' , p. 223) is c o r r e c t in stating t h a t ' T h e w o r l d , b y w h i c h Eliade d o e s n o t m e a n t o indicate e x t e r n a l n a t u r e alone b u t t h e w h o l e existential situation o f m a n , speaks t o m a n in t h e l a n g u a g e o f s y m b o l s . . . .'

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Very often, as w e consider symbols of a 'cosmic structure', it appears that the universal structures are given-in-the-world. These seem to be structures which can be seen in the natural, temporal, secular universe and which can serve as an 'objective' basis for the religious revelation. If w e wish to understand the sacredness and religious s y m b o l i s m of the sky, it w o u l d seem that the basic structures can be grasped in the very nature of the sky itself: high, infinite, transcendent. Similarly, one m i g h t argue that the basic structure of lunar s y m b o l i s m is given in the very nature of the m o o n ' s r h y t h m s : the lunar cycle of periodic change, the m o o n endlessly repeating itself rhythmically. T h e danger in locating structures in the universe itselfis the t e m p t a tion of a naturalistic reduction of religious meaning. As w e saw in the first part of our study, m a n y excellent scholars have succumbed to this temptation. W e recall that homo religiosus has never viewed the natural as simply natural. It is obvious that a ' m o d e r n ' secular person can observe, analyze, and calculate the basic structures of the lunar r h y t h m s and find it absurd, or at least irrelevant, to suggest that this can serve as the basis for religious revelation. Therefore, while it m a y be possible to gain s o m e insight into the nature of certain religious intuitions and sacred manifestations in terms of basic structures given-in-the-world, w e must never reduce the total meaning of a sacred manifestation to such a 'natural' structure in the universe. This becomes even m o r e evident w h e n w e examine symbolic structures o f ' t h e W o r l d ' w h i c h are 'given' but could not possibly be 'given' in the 'natural' universe. Indeed, these structures often seem to be completely at odds w i t h w h a t is given-in-the-world. For example, if w e consider the sun f r o m a 'rational' and secular perspective, it seems unintelligible that solar s y m b o l i s m w o u l d reveal connections between the sun and darkness, serpents, and the dead. T h e 'dark side' of the sun, its 'ophidian' ('dark' or 'indistinct') aspects, revealed in such d o c u m e n t s as the m y t h of Helios, the Rg Veda and the Brahmanas, w o u l d seem the complete opposite of its 'natural' meaning. 1 6 Such s y m bolisms as those of the 'Symplegades' (the paradoxical passing between t w o rocks that clash together continuously or the entering of a m o u n t a i n w h i c h has n o opening) and the coincidentia oppositorum, 16. See Patterns, pp. 142-147.

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which Eliade seems to evaluate as the highest spiritual realizations, illustrate this same point. Often the only way to begin to decipher the meaning o f a symbolic structure is to examine the 'sacred history' preserved in myths and periodically reenacted in rituals. Thus, the World o f the Australian has a structure because the myths reveal the creative acts o f the Primordial Beings; this knowledge o f what happened in illo tempore transforms a chaotic universe into a structured meaningful World. 17 Homo religiosus does not feel he or she actively created these sacred histories; phenomenologically, the myths are seen to have been revealed to the religious person. Finally, the World reveals itself through religious symbols related to 'the human condition': symbols which 'refer to situations constitutive o f all human existence, that is to say, to the fact that man is mortal, is a sexual being, and is seeking what today we call "ultimate reality" \ 18 Many o f the symbolisms we have considered— flight and ecstasy and ascension, initiation, lunar, coincidentia oppositorum — illustrate such structures o f 'the human condition' which are revealed to homo religiosus in religious experience. We have delineated several o f the kinds o f general structures o f ' t h e World' which are 'given' or revealed in religious experience: the structures given in the dialectic o f the sacred; symbolic structures which have a 'cosmic structure' and are sometimes related to structures 'given-in-the-world'; symbolic structures related to the 'human condition' as such; etc. What all o f these structures have in common is that they are 'given' to homo religiosus; the religious person does not actively constitute them, but in a rather passive manner experiences that which reveals itself to her or him. 'Givenness' and passivity:

several criticisms

Many difficulties arise from this view o f the givenness o f universal structures which are passively experienced by homo religiosus. Several 17. See the following illustrations provided by Eliade: Myth and Reality, pp. 4 3 - 4 5 ; 'Cosmogonic Myth and "Sacred History" pp. 179-183; 'Australian Religions, Part II: An Introduction', pp. 2 0 8 - 2 3 5 . 18. Eliade, 'Methodological Remarks', pp. 104-105.

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difficulties will be cited here; others will be formulated later in this chapter. It does n o t seem forced to contend that there is a definite similarity between Eliade's analysis of these universal religious structures and the claim by m u c h of existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y that it can 'read o f f the 'given' universal structures of the Lebenswelt. Richard F. Grabau 1 9 has stated that the p r i m a r y feature of the phenomenological Wesenschau or intuition of essences is a 'passive receptiveness'. His criticisms of such a position are relevant to Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e r e is n o experience ' w i t h o u t symbolization (thematization)' and 'these s y m b o l s are created by m e n in concrete historical situations' in response to their particular existential concerns. Therefore, these s y m b o l s cannot be regarded as given structures to be 'read o f f . Grabau's alternative to this view of consciousness as a passive receptiveness of universal given structures is to claim that consciousness is a 'creative interaction w i t h and interpretation of a situation b y means of mediating symbols'. It also does n o t seem forced to propose a certain similarity between Eliade's 'empirical approach' and the m e t h o d o l o g y of 'classical' British empiricism. True, the f o u n d a t i o n for D a v i d H u m e ' s epist e m o l o g y consists of discrete particular sense impressions and n o t Eliade's universal structures. Nevertheless, b o t h seem to analyze experience in terms of a rather passive reception by the self of w h a t is given to it. In ' T h e Experiential Foundations of Religion', J o h n E. Smith distinguishes t w o principal types of empiricism: he rejects 'the classical or British type w h i c h f o u n d its m o s t incisive expression in the t h o u g h t of David H u m e ' and opts for 'the broader, vaguer type sometimes called "radical" w h i c h characterizes, in different degrees, the t h o u g h t of an entire g r o u p of critics of the classical type—Hegel, Bradley, Peirce, James, D e w e y , Whitehead, and perhaps even Heidegger'. H e claims that this latter 'reconstructed' conception 'is required if religion is to be m a d e intelligible as experience'. Smith delineates four of the features of this reconstructed conception, the first t w o of w h i c h directly challenge the a b o v e interpretation 19. Richard F. Grabau, 'Existential Universals', An Invitation to Phenomenology, James M. Edie, pp. 150-153.

ed.

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of givenness and passivity: experience is a 'reciprocal affair' involving an 'organic togetherness of the experiencing self and the experienced w o r l d ' ; therefore, experience cannot be taken as the 'passive reception' o f ' b a r e ' or 'given' data and is 'impossible w i t h o u t interpretation f r o m the side of self'. 2 0 W h a t m a y seem astonishing at first is the assertion that Mircea Eliade w o u l d probably w a n t to accept as valid most of the a f o r e m e n tioned 'criticisms'. A l t h o u g h he w o u l d reject m u c h of Grabau's analysis, he w o u l d concur that religious consciousness is a 'creative interaction' and not merely a 'passive reception'. H e m i g h t be in total agreement w i t h Smith's 'reconstructed' conception of experience. B u t the above points were presented as criticisms of Eliade's analysis of experience. Consequently, it seems necessary to m o d i f y or reconstruct the view that religious experience consists of a passive reception of n o n t e m p o r a l and nonhistorical universal structures w h i c h are 'given' or revealed to homo religiosus.21 Creativity and the 'constituted given' We recall f r o m the dialectic of hierophanies that an essential aspect of the structure of sacralization consists of the evaluation and choice by homo religiosus. T h e religious person is called u p o n to respond to that which is given or revealed. W i t h o u t such an evaluation and choice, homo religiosus could not o v e r c o m e his or her existential crisis and realize a structured meaningful life-world. W i t h o u t such an active response, there w o u l d be no religious experience. In asserting that the f u n d a m e n t a l symbolic structures are given in 20. J o h n E. Smith, ' T h e Experiential Foundations of Religion', Reason and God, pp. 173-183. Eliade w o u l d unhesitantly concur with the third and fourth features, involving the presence o f ' r e l a t i o n and directionality or purpose' within experience and the presence of the 'intensive quality of experience'. 21. T h e following attempt to relate the active and the passive, the particular and the universal, the historical and the structural, is n o w h e r e to be found in Eliade's writings, although it may very well be consistent with m u c h of his methodology. T h e f o l l o w ing may be taken as a partial criticism of Eliade, or, as I prefer to view it, as an attempt to m o d i f y Eliade by dealing with issues he does not consider, thus rendering his phenomenological approach m o r e adequate. In any case, we do not wish to minimize the p a r a m o u n t significance Eliade grants to the universal structures which are 'given' in experience and the criticisms relevant to such a position.

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experience, it must be emphasized that our notion of this sense of givenness and passivity, which already involves the self's being situated in the w o r l d and dynamically open to symbolic structures, is considerably different f r o m the self's 'bare' passive receptiveness of a David H u m e . Whether these structures should be viewed as Platonic f o r m s or Whiteheadian eternal objects or Jungian archetypes or in s o m e other m a n n e r is another matter. But to analyze the general structures as w e have is an abstraction, which, it is possible to argue, m a y be necessary for the sake of analysis. What m u s t be insisted u p o n is that a passive reception of such structures does not constitute religious experience. T h e actual religious experience consists of j u s t w h a t homo religiosus does w i t h the symbolic structures. These structures function as an inexhaustible source of religious m e a n i n g and offer virtually infinite possibilities for actualization. S y m b o l i s m is n o t present initially as fully articulated, as 'fulfilled' meaning. Symbols are present initially as 'ciphers', usually manifested on the level of the prereflective, experienced t h r o u g h vague intuitions and as ' e m p t y intentionalities', which ' k e y ' into experience and p r o v i d e inexhaustible possibilities for gradually experiencing fulfilled meanings and structuring a m e a n i n g ful World. Actual revalorization of a religious s y m b o l i s m is the particular w a y homo religiosus 'uses' a s y m b o l i s m to structure his or her World. A n d j u s t w h a t homo religiosus does w i t h these structures must always be seen in terms of his or her specific existential situation. W h a t w e b e c o m e aware of, h o w w e respond to our 'discovery', w h a t m e a n i n g it has for us, h o w w e use it to structure our World, etc., depends largely u p o n our historical, cultural, and other particular conditions. Phenomenologically, the religious experience has an initial emphasis u p o n a kind o f passivity and then a creativity e m e r g i n g f r o m the passivity. T r u e creativity emerges w h e n w e can decipher the f u n d a m e n t a l givenness that is revealed to us. It emerges f r o m w h a t the particular and historical does with this givenness: h o w it constitutes or actualizes these inexhaustible possibilities by e m b o d y i n g t h e m in a specific historico-cultural context, by providing t h e m w i t h a particular content and particular values. This sense of an active creativity e m e r g i n g f r o m a passive givenness

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seems to be w h a t Paul Ricoeur intends b y 'Le S y m b o l e donne a penser.' This m a x i m that I find so appealing says t w o things. T h e s y m b o l invites: I do n o t posit the meaning, the s y m b o l gives it; b u t w h a t it gives is something for thought, something to think about. First the giving, then the positing; the phrase suggests, therefore, both that all has already been said in e n i g m a and yet that it is necessary ever to begin and re-begin everything in the dimension of thought. 2 2 Perhaps the relationship between the passive givenness of universal structures and the active creativity which involves the historical and the particular can be viewed in t e r m s of a 'constituted given', an 'in itself for us'. O n the one hand, homo religiosus experiences a W o r l d of given structures, a W o r l d of meanings already constituted and simply revealed to h i m or her; on the other hand, the person experiences his or her W o r l d as still to be constituted, as given meaning by his or her active creativity. 2 3 T h e structural givenness expresses the horizon within which h u m a n beings orient themselves and constitute the specific meanings of their ' n e w ' World. W h a t emerges is a radical intentionality of h u m a n consciousness: universal structures are given but are always experienced as given for the perceiving consciousness. Such a conception of religious experiences involves a sense oiorganic mutuality and dynamic interaction between religious consciousness and its intended World. T h e person simultaneously looks at the W o r l d and feels looked at by the World. Homo religiosus feels that not only other h u m a n beings, but also the m o o n and stones and trees 'look' at us and 22. Paul Ricoeur, ' T h e Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection', International Philosophical Quarterly 2, no. 2 (1962): 193. This same m a x i m provides the title for another article by Ricoeur: ' T h e Symbol: Food for T h o u g h t ' , Philosophy Today 4, no. 3 (1960): 196-207. T h e 'Conclusion' of The Symbolism of Evil, pp. 347-357, is entitled ' T h e Symbol Gives Rise to T h o u g h t ' . 23. Cf. Richard C. McCleary, Preface to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Signs, p. xiv: ' T h e central problem, Merleau-Ponty once said . . ., is to understand h o w w e can simultaneously constitute the meaning-structures of experience and find that it is always already constituted in f r r n s of meanings w e have not bestowed u p o n it.' Later on p. xiv, McCleary writes that 'This experiencing of the world as always still to be constituted by our active and spontaneous involvement in it is precisely what it means to h i m [Merleau-Ponty] to "exist," to " b e present to the w o r l d " as an "existential field." '.

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reveal to us the inexhaustible possibilities by w h i c h w e can constitute their religious meaning. In such a conception of religious experience, the W o r l d is always structurally given and at the same time dynamically alive and continuously open to n e w valorizations and creative spiritual experiences.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL M E T H O D , FREE VARIATION, AND INDUCTION

A t various points in o u r analysis, w e have insisted o n the necessity f o r b r i n g i n g historical particulars and universal structures into s o m e kind of d y n a m i c relationship. Perhaps w e can increase o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this d y n a m i c interaction by focusing o n several aspects of the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d for gaining insight into meaning. Phenomenological

insight and free

variation

B e f o r e considering a general p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l procedure, w e shall offer an incisive criticism of the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d for intuiting existential universals and shall then consider t w o contrasting m e t h o d o l o g i c a l passages. T h e s e preliminary considerations will shed light on different m e t h o d o l o g i c a l tendencies. A c c o r d i n g t o Richard F. Grabau, p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s a d m i t that existential universals are always e m b o d i e d in s o m e particular person's 'lived experience'. B u t p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s assert that their m e t h o d enables t h e m to 'read o f f these universals f r o m concrete experience. Such universals are t h e n taken as constituting 'the universal structures of historical existence', 'an o n t o l o g y of h u m a n existence', and 'the conditions of the possibility of ontic experience'. T h e aim of existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y is thus 'to c o m p r e h e n d existence by delineating a set of these universal structures, all " r e a d o f f " i m m e d i a t e experience'. 2 4 Grabau then criticizes such a general p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach: ' T h e point is this: ontic experience, in w h i c h ontological structures are said to be rooted, is concrete and of the particular. Universals j u s t d o 24. G r a b a u , p p . 147-148.

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not appear at this level; hence they cannot be "read o f f . " . . . Universal structures, consequently, are never a matter of reading off; they are always a matter of construction.'25 A l t h o u g h G r a b a u does n o t subscribe t o s o m e H u m e a n conception of experience based on the perception of 'bare' particulars, the a b o v e emphasis of the concrete and particular nature of i m m e d i a t e experience and the 'later' construction of u n i v e r s a l contrasts w i t h m u c h of the emphasis in p h e n o m e n o l o g y . 2 6 W e shall n o w simply paraphrase t w o methodological passages f r o m ' S y m b o l i s m s of Ascension and " W a k i n g D r e a m s " in w h i c h Mircea Eliade seems to emphasize t w o different tendencies in relating the historical particular and the universal structure. T h e first passage calls attention to the p a r a m o u n t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l status of universal structures and the hermeneutical m o v e m e n t f r o m universal structures to the particular historical expressions. 2 7 It is only after p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s have clarified the w h o l e structure of the s y m bolism o f ' f l i g h t ' and grasped its essential m e a n i n g (as expressing 'the abolition of the h u m a n condition, transcendence and f r e e d o m ' ) that they can then begin to u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g of each particular historical manifestation. T h e second passage f o r m u l a t e s the hermeneutical m o v e m e n t f r o m particular historical expressions t o universal structures. 2 8 It is only after deciphering or ' d e c o d i n g ' each particular m e a n i n g in its o w n specific ' f r a m e of reference' that p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s can begin t o see 'different b u t interconnected planes' (of the oneiric, of m y t h and of ritual, of metaphysical speculation, of ecstatic experience) and to discern that particular s y m b o l i c revalorizations of ascension express a structural solidarity. F r o m the diverse, particular contexts, 25. Ibid., p. 148. 26. For t h e m o m e n t , w e m a y s i m p l y n o t e t h e d i f f e r e n t e m p h a s i s in t h e f o l l o w i n g assertion b y M e r l e a u - P o n t y ( ' P h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d t h e Sciences o f M a n ' , The Primacy of Perception, p. 72) w h i c h is characteristic o f m u c h o f the p r e s e n t o r i e n t a t i o n o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y : ' a n y k n o w l e d g e o f fact a l w a y s i n v o l v e s una priori u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f essence'. A t t h e s a m e time, w e m u s t n o t c o n f u s e this e m p h a s i s in existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y w i t h t h e ' e a r l y ' H u s s e r l i a n p o s i t i o n in w h i c h k n o w l e d g e o f essences s e e m s c o m p l e t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t o f all k n o w l e d g e o f particular, historical, c o n t i n g e n t facts. Cf. E d m u n d H u s s e r l , Ideas, pp. 5 7 - 5 8 ; and H u s s e r l , ' P h i l o s o p h y as R i g o r o u s Science', Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 112. 27. Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p. 110. 28. Ibid., p. 118.

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p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s begin t o grasp 'structurally indissoluble m e a n i n g s w h i c h fall into a pattern'. T h e y a t t e m p t to integrate all of the particular m e a n i n g s into a whole, to interpret each s y m b o l i s m as a ' s y s t e m ' w h i c h 'can only be really u n d e r s t o o d so far as w e study it in the totality of its particular applications'. It m a y be possible t o relate several of the above m e t h o d o l o g i c a l emphases in t e r m s of a general p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e f o r gaining insight into meaning. Since o u r procedural outline is of a very general nature, w e shall n o t d o c u m e n t the f o l l o w i n g analysis. 2 9 It is imperative that w e a c k n o w l e d g e the impossibility of outlining a linear t e m p o r a l p r o c e d u r e in w h i c h the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t m o v e s f r o m particular facts to universal essences or vice versa. T h e particular and the universal m u s t be seen in constant interaction and m u s t be b r o u g h t into s o m e dialectical relationship. In the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Wesenschau, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion a t t e m p t s to disengage the essential structure e m b o d i e d in the particular religious fact. His or her starting point is a specific perceptual experience of homo religiosus, a particular d a t u m of religious experience. T h i s does n o t m e a n that one can collect and describe particular religious facts and then generalize to universal religious structures. T h e particular qua particular is unintelligible. Experience always involves the u n i t y of fact and essence. O u r a b o v e analysis is n o t confined to s o m e 'mystical' or supersensible experience b u t expresses a p r e c o n d i t i o n of any experience. Either consciously or unconsciously w e m a k e a distinction b e t w e e n the fact that w e have an experience and w h a t is experienced. It is in t e r m s of this ' w h a t n e s s ' of an experience that w e can distinguish, compare, and relate it t o other experiences; that w e can classify it as an experience of a certain kind. N o w the central aim of the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d is to disclose the essential ' w h a t n e s s ' or structure e m b o d i e d in the particular facts, 29. In addition to the primary sources (various w o r k s of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, etc.), see Lawrence and O ' C o n n o r , ' T h e Primary P h e n o m e n o n : H u m a n Existence', Readings in Existential Phenomenology, PP- 8-10; Jules Bednarski, ' T h e Eidetic Reduction', Philosophy Today 6, no. 1 (1962): 15-18; R e m y C. Kwant, 'Merleau-Ponty's Criticism of Husserl's Eidetic Reduction', Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans, pp. 402—408. (The latter is a selection f r o m K w a n t ' s From Phenomenology to Metaphysics.)

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to gain insight into the essential m e a n i n g w h i c h constitutes the facts as facts of a certain kind. This is n o t to say that one begins w i t h a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the universal structure e m b o d i e d in a particular d a t u m . Rather the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t begins w i t h a vague intuition of w h a t is revealed in the particular fact. W i t h o u t such a vague eidetic intuition, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t could n o t even begin to distinguish, describe, and classify the particular d a t u m . If w e t u r n to a f r e q u e n t l y cited illustration, a particular religious d a t u m expressing snake s y m b o l i s m , one p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion m a y see w h a t is revealed in t e r m s confined entirely to other snake p h e n o m e n a ; a second scholar m a y vaguely intuit an essential erotic structure; s o m e o n e like Eliade m a y initially grasp the essential m e a n ing of that same d a t u m in t e r m s of a lunar structure. This diversity in the initial eidetic intuition, as well as in the completed or 'fulfilled' Wesenschau, is attributable in large part to the diversity in the particular Lebenswelts of different p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s . A l t h o u g h Husserl m i g h t be u n h a p p y w i t h such an i n t r o d u c t i o n of contingency into p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l insight into meaning, this is a w a y of accounting for the fact that different p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s , while considering the same p h e n o m e n a and claiming to be using the same m e t h o d , have continually c o m e u p w i t h different eidetic intuitions. T h e usual w a y to gain insight i n t o m e a n i n g is by the m e t h o d o f ' f r e e variation'. In certain cases, such as s o m e mathematical p h e n o m e n o n , one m a y be able to grasp an essential structure b y reflecting o n o n e e x a m p l e only. H o w e v e r , in the case of religious p h e n o m e n a , the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion m u s t compile and c o m p a r e a great variety of examples b e f o r e she or he can gain insight into the essential m e a n i n g of the data. T h e r e m u s t be n o t simply a purely imaginative variation b u t also a factual variation of one's data. B y the ' m e t h o d of invariance', the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion searches for the invariant core w h i c h constitutes the essential m e a n i n g of the religious p h e n o m e n a . T h e snake example, w h i c h is already p r e s u m e d to be a variation of a certain type (erotic, lunar, etc.), is subjected to a process of free variation. A variety of snake p h e n o m e n a assume certain f o r m s w h i c h can be considered 'accidental', in the sense that the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t can g o ' b e y o n d ' the 'limits' i m p o s e d b y such structures and n o t destroy the basic character of his or her

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data. For example, a particular aquatic or earth structure disclosed b y s o m e examples of snake hierophanies does n o t reveal the invariable m e a n i n g of snake p h e n o m e n a . T h r o u g h free variation, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t gradually sees that snake p h e n o m e n a assume f o r m s w h i c h can be regarded as 'essential', in the sense that such structures i m p o s e certain 'limits' b e y o n d w h i c h one changes the basic ' w h a t n e s s ' of the data u n d e r investigation; one c a n n o t ' r e m o v e ' such 'elements' w i t h o u t d e s t r o y i n g the basic nature of the data. Such essential insight is n o t instantaneous. W h a t Husserl calls an ' e m p t y intention' is the v a g u e appearance of certain p e r m a n e n c e w i t h i n the variations. A m i d s t the diverse revalorizations, o n e g r a d u ally deciphers a certain structural identity. W h e n the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion has grasped the invariant core w h i c h constitutes the essential m e a n i n g of the data, he or she then has 'achieved' the eidetic intuition. For Eliade, the invariant core w h i c h constitutes the essential m e a n i n g of the snake p h e n o m e n a was u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of a structural ' w e b ' of lunar s y m b o l i s m . T h e essential structure e m b o d i e d in the particular snake examples was grasped as inexhaustible life repeating itself rhythmically. It is n o w possible t o b r i n g Eliade's t w o m e t h o d o l o g i c a l passages into d y n a m i c relationship. In actual religious experience, fact and essence are inseparable; a l t h o u g h in analysis, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion can distinguish t h e m and disengage or abstract the e m b o d i e d universal structure. In p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analysis, especially by the m e t h o d of free variation, there is a h e r m e n e u t i c a l ' m o v e m e n t ' f r o m the historical particular to the universal structure. T h i s is n o t t o d e n y that there is a continual universal-particular interaction and that w e could never even begin t o distinguish and describe the particular unless w e had already p r e s u m e d s o m e eidetic structure. H o w e v e r , once w e have delineated a variety of such particular (snake) examples, w e can then subject the particulars to free variation; begin to decipher certain structural similarities (erotic, initiation, etc.) and dissimilarities; and finally, ideally, grasp the invariant as a definite (lunar) structure. P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analysis also involves a hermeneutical ' m o v e m e n t ' f r o m the universal structure to the historical particular. T h e

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invariant (the lunar ' w e b ' ) serves as the hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k in t e r m s of w h i c h w e can u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g of a particular (snake) d a t u m . P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the religious m e a n i n g of the particular p h e n o m e n o n (expressing snake s y m b o l i s m ) involves reintegrating that p h e n o m e n o n w i t h i n its coherent universal (lunar) system of s y m b o l i c associations, w i t h i n that totality w h i c h constitutes its universal (lunar) structure. Uncritical inductive

generalizations

B y f o c u s i n g o n w h a t is p r o b a b l y the m o s t f r e q u e n t criticism of Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach, it m a y be possible to deepen o u r analysis of h o w the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion gains insight into universal structures of meaning. As w e observed on several occasions, this general criticism usually contends that Mircea Eliade, while investigating particular religious manifestations, arrives at his universal structures by means of highly subjective, uncritical, hasty generalizations; thus, he 'reads into' his specific religious data all kinds of 'sophisticated' universal structures and meanings. U n d e r l y i n g m o s t of these m e t h o d o l o g i c a l criticisms is the a s s u m p tion that Eliade proceeds b y s o m e kind of inductive inference. Critics s u b m i t that they cannot repeat Eliade's inductive process: they do n o t find it possible to generalize f r o m the particular examples t o Eliade's ' p r o f o u n d ' universal structures of religious experience. Such criticisms have considerable merit. Eliade never f o r m u l a t e s a c o m p r e h e n s i v e and critical m e t h o d o l o g i c a l analysis in w h i c h he clarifies and justifies his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l grasping of universal religious structures. T h e impression he o f t e n conveys is that his p r o cedure is n o t unlike the 'classical' f o r m u l a t i o n s of inductive inference f o u n d in J o h n Stuart Mill and o t h e r philosophers. H o w did Mircea Eliade arrive at the universal structure of religious experience revealed in his analysis of the dialectic of the sacred? D i d Eliade e x a m i n e m a n y particular religious examples and then detect certain c o m m o n characteristics f o u n d in each particular p h e n o m e n o n : a sacred-profane d i c h o t o m y , a sense of transcendence, etc.? It w o u l d then seem that Eliade m i g h t be able to claim v a r y i n g degrees of probability for his generalized conclusions.

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B u t Eliade has granted these universal structures of religious experience a sense of necessity, as if they had s o m e synthetic a priori status. His generalized conclusions are supposedly dependent on the nature of the religious d o c u m e n t s he had investigated, but they are n o t open to falsification: in the future, one could not investigate a religious d a t u m w h i c h was w i t h o u t any of these structures. It does not seem possible for Eliade to grant these structures such a universal necessary status if they are arrived at by s o m e inductive process of generalization. T u r n i n g to Eliade's analysis of snake symbolism, it often seemed that he studied m a n y snake examples, deciphered c o m m o n characteristics in each datum, and then inductively generalized to his conclusion asserting their universal lunar structure. But then w h y d o n ' t other scholars discern in each of these particular facts that 'inexhaustible life is repeating itself rhythmically'? W i t h o u t multiplying our examples, the above should suffice to establish our conclusion: if Eliade insists that he has inductively generalized f r o m the particular religious facts to his universal religious structures, then m a n y of the aforementioned criticisms of his m e t h o d o l o g y seem justified. Phenomenological

induction

B u t perhaps the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion does not arrive at his f u n d a m e n t a l structures t h r o u g h s o m e 'classical' (Mill, etc.) inductive inference. 3 0 W e w o u l d like to suggest that if one can f o r m u l a t e universal religious structures, such as those of the sacred and the profane, sacred space, sacred time, initiation, ascension, etc., he or she m a y grasp such meanings t h r o u g h a kind of induction which bears s o m e similarity to the phenomenological Wesenschau.31 O u r suggestion is 30. O n c e again, the interpretation w h i c h f o l l o w s is not what Mircea Eliade ever claims he is doing. A s w a s just stated, Eliade tends to c o n v e y the impression o f s o m e 'classical' inductive m e t h o d generalization, and such an approach is not c o m m e n s u rate w i t h the status he grants his conclusions. O u r interpretation is intended to suggest an alternate approach w h i c h m i g h t render the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l insight into universal religious structures m o r e acceptable. 31. T h e f o l l o w i n g s u g g e s t i o n is very similar to the analysis o f induction f o u n d in ' P h e n o m e n o l o g y and the Sciences o f Man', pp. 6 6 - 7 2 . W e m i g h t add that whereas Merleau-Ponty argues for such an analysis in The Primacy of Perception, defending an interpretation w h i c h he takes to be implicit in Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , he later appears to reject m u c h o f this position in The Visible and the Invisible.

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submitted as one possible means to supplement, and n o t to negate, the recently elucidated general analysis of the phenomenological m e t h o d and its use of eidetic variation. T h e phenomenologist of religion proceeds by means of various 'idealizing fictions' which are based on the particular facts. O n e recalls that there are no 'pure' religious p h e n o m e n a ; the religious manifestation is viewed as spatial, temporal, conditioned, relative, 'limited'. B y reflecting on the particular, contingent, 'imperfect' manifestations, the phenomenologist of religion attempts to disengage an ideal religious structure, to 'read o f f a conception of a 'pure case'. This ideal structure is actively constructed by the phenomenologist. A key point in this analysis is the contention that such a conceived ideal structure or p u r e case is founded on the particular facts but is not found in the facts. In examining different expressions of flight and ascension symbols, the phenomenologist o f religion conceives the ideal structure: transcendence and freedom, an ontological abolition of the h u m a n condition. N o w a critic of Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y analyzes the ascension p h e n o m e n a and does not find such an ideal meaning expressed in each manifestation. H e n c e she or he assumes that Eliade is guilty of a highly subjective, uncritical inductive generalization; that Eliade has 'read into' his data 'pure', 'sophisticated' religious meaning. O u r position concedes that 'transcendence and f r e e d o m . . .' is n o t a generalized structure which is f o u n d in each particular, historical fact. Rather it, like other atemporal and ahistorical universal structures, is a 'pure' or 'perfect' structure w h i c h has been actively conceived or constructed by the phenomenologist. It is f o u n d e d on the p a r ticular, historical, 'imperfect' facts, but is n o t found fully in any of them. T h e phenomenologist of religion m a y attempt to analyze 'the difference' between the ideal structure of ascension and any specific ascension d a t u m in terms of the particular, historical, cultural, and other relevant conditionings of the existential situation within w h i c h the ascension manifestation is experienced. Perhaps this is one clue to Eliade's frequent evaluations of a p h e n o m e n o n as a 'higher' or ' m o r e perfect' religious manifestation. T h e Indian yogi, for instance, m a y achieve a 'higher' spiritual realization in the sense that the experience is

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'closer' (is less conditioned, etc.) t o the ideal m e a n i n g or ' p u r e case' of ascension s y m b o l i s m . T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion a t t e m p t s to verify the ideal structure b y s h o w i n g h o w it illuminates the m e a n i n g of the particular empirical facts. A c c o r d i n g to M e r l e a u - P o n t y , T h a t w h i c h gives its p r o b a b l e value to the induction and w h i c h finally s h o w s that it is truly f o u n d e d o n things is n o t the n u m b e r of facts i n v o l v e d to j u s t i f y it. N o ! It is rather the intrinsic clarity w h i c h these ideas shed o n the p h e n o m e n a w e seek to understand. . . . [Induction is] a process of intellectual analysis w h o s e verification consists in the total, or at least sufficient, clarity w h i c h the g r o u p of concepts w o r k e d o u t in this w a y b r i n g to the given p h e n o m e n a . 3 2 T h e a b o v e v i e w of i n d u c t i o n can be c o m p a r e d w i t h the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Wesenschau. B o t h are based o n facts; b o t h involve a 'reading' of universal. B u t they can be 'differentiated w i t h respect to their elaboration': (Husserl's) Wesenschau ' m o v e s o n the plane of the i m a g i n a r y ' , i n v o l v i n g an i m a g i n a r y variation of certain facts; i n d u c tion m o v e s ' o n the level of actual facts', i n v o l v i n g 'effective variations in considering the different cases that are actually realized'. 3 3 In light of this inductive approach, it w o u l d seem that G r a b a u ' s criticism has s o m e justification if the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion maintains that he or she simply 'reads o f f ' universal structures w h i c h are f o u n d in the particular facts. T h e atemporal and ahistorical essential structures are 'a m a t t e r of construction'. W e m a y also recall Altizer's b r o a d criticism of Eliade's m e t h o d as being 'mystical', brilliantly intuitive, b u t completely divorced f r o m any 'rational' and 'scientific' approach. If the p a r a d i g m for a 'rational' and 'scientific' empirical a p p r o a c h entails s o m e f o r m of 'classical' inductive generalization, t h e n this criticism seems justified. B u t H u s serl argued that intuiting essences is n o t s o m e t h i n g 'mystical' or 'supersensible', b u t s o m e t h i n g w e all d o w i t h v a r y i n g degrees of insight. If o u r suggested inductive approach has any value, then certainly a t r e m e n d o u s l y creative p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t such as Eliade, w h o 32. The Primacy of Perception, pp. 69-70. 33. See Bednarski, ' T h e Eidetic Reduction', p. 22; Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, p. 70.

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can f o r m u l a t e ideal universal structures of religious meaning, w o u l d have to be 'brilliantly intuitive'. T h e crucial m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p o i n t is that such a brilliant intuitive conception of essential religious structures is n o t completely arbitrary and subjective. Such a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e is n o t arbitrarily s u p e r i m p o s e d on the religious data b u t is largely derived f r o m the nature of the religious facts. T h u s , Eliade analyzes the specific snake examples, subjects t h e m to an 'actual variation', begins to decipher structural similarities, etc. 34 W h a t emerges is s o m e sense of a h e r meneutical f o u n d a t i o n derived f r o m the religious p h e n o m e n a , a structural ' w e b ' of religious symbols. N o w b y reflecting on this f o u n d a tion, Eliade is able actively and creatively to conceive an ideal lunar structure, w h i c h then helps t o illuminate the m e a n i n g of the particular manifestations. T h i s is n o t to m i n i m i z e the brilliant creativity in gaining insight into such ideal meanings, b u t rather to indicate that such insights are f o u n d e d on the facts and are n o t simply arbitrarily imposed.

Phenomenological

insight and the dialectic of the sacred

W e m a y conclude this section b y taking n o t e of a remarkable similarity b e t w e e n the (philosophical) p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d for gaining insight into meaning, especially the inductive p r o c e d u r e for 'reading o f f ' essences, and Mircea Eliade's analysis of the n a t u r e of religious experience. Indeed, it was largely because this similarity struck us as so r e m a r k a b l e that w e felt that an elucidation of various aspects of the philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d m i g h t have considerable relevance for Religionswissenschaft. In the dialectic of hierophanies, homo religiosus intuits that w h i c h is paradigmatic, 'perfect', the ideal structure, 'the p u r e case'. T h e ideal religious structure is n o t f o u n d in the particular, spatial, temporal, historical, conditioned facts. W e have analyzed those methodological approaches w h i c h a t t e m p t t o find the religious structure in the ' n a t ural' p r o f a n e facts as naturalistic reductions w h i c h negate the basic 34. This is not to deny o u r previous methodological point that there must be s o m e eidetic intuiting, at least at the level of an indistinct 'empty intentionality', even to begin this procedure.

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intentionality of religious phenomena. What 'verifies' the sacred model, the paradigmatic structure, for homo religiosus is that he or she can use it to illuminate the nature of the particular existential situation; to give m e a n i n g to the chaotic, isolated, finite, 'impure', 'imperfect' facts of his or her profane existence. W e should note that for Eliade the ideal religious structures, such as those of ascension or of the m o o n , do not constitute 'original' constructions by the phenomenologist. Eliade's position seems to be that the ideal religious structure is actually experienced by homo religiosus in at least a f e w cases. T h e religious structure is n o t revealed in the profane facts qua profane facts. A n d it is not revealed fully in the vast majority of religious phenomena. B u t at certain highly creative m o m e n t s in the history of h u m a n k i n d , homo religiosus did conceive fully the 'pure case', the ideal religious meaning of ascension, of agriculture, of the m o o n , etc. Hence, in 'reading o f f these ideal structures, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion is attempting to empathize with, participate in, and reenact within his or her o w n experience the ideal meanings w h i c h homo religiosus has experienced.

7

Descriptive Evaluations and Levels of Meaning

T h r o u g h o u t Chapter 6, w e attempted to relate Eliade's phenomenological approach to the basic 'tension' which was seen to define the c o n t e m p o r a r y field of Religionswissenschaft: the historical and the particular versus the phenomenological and the universal. T h e historical and the particular were analyzed as playing an indispensable role in Eliade's hermeneutics, but his primary methodological emphasis was placed on the lofty status of n o n t e m p o r a l and nonhistorical universal structures. Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y was seen as addressing itself to the task of finding phenomenological 'meanings' rather than formulating historical (psychological, causal) 'explanations'. In his m o r e - t h a n historical-explanation claim, w e submitted that Eliade often seemed to be m a k i n g n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s about h u m a n nature, our m o d e of being in the world, and the ' h u m a n condition as such'. In further analyzing the historical-phenomenological relationship, w e attempted to s h o w that the universal structures of religious experience revealed by the dialectic of hierophanies and the religious s y m bolisms could be analyzed in terms of a f u n d a m e n t a l 'givenness', which served as a foundation for Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . At the same time, w e maintained that actual religious experience and creativity always entailed the d y n a m i c interaction between the historical particular and the 'given' universal structures, and that it might be fruitful to conceive of such a relationship in terms of a 'constituted given'. Finally, w e attempted to deepen our analysis of Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y , w i t h its h e r m e n e u t i c a l f r a m e w o r k and h i s t o r i c a l phenomenological relationship, b y formulating a general approach for intuiting essences f r o m philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y . We submitted that in interpreting the data and uncovering universal structures of religious experience, the approach of the phenomenologist of religion was not unrelated to the phenomenological Wesenschau, the

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relating of fact and essence, and the m e t h o d o f ' f r e e variation'. W e then a c k n o w l e d g e d w i t h m a n y of Eliade's critics that the conclusions Eliade reaches concerning the p r o f o u n d meaning of his essential u n i versal structures are n o t c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h s o m e 'classical' empirical m e t h o d of inductive generalization. O u r methodological alternative was to suggest that the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion m a y decipher and verify these universal structures b y s o m e phenomenological m e t h o d of induction, involving eidetic variation and the construction of the ideal structure or 'pure case', w h i c h is f o u n d e d on b u t not f o u n d in the particular facts. W e concluded b y noticing a remarkable similarity b e t w e e n the philosophical analysis of the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Wesenschau, eidetic variation, and induction, on the one hand, and Mircea Eliade's analysis of the nature of religious experience, on the other. A l t h o u g h w e have never intended our study to be restricted to an exposition of Mircea Eliade's writings and have continually strived for original and creative interpretations of his p h e n o m e n o l o g y , one m i g h t argue w i t h s o m e justification that m u c h of our analysis in C h a p t e r 6 simply goes too far b e y o n d anything Eliade has written to be taken as an interpretation of his m e t h o d o l o g y . It is true that w e have felt free to go b e y o n d Eliade's t h o u g h t and to analyze h o w his phenomenological approach could be used, and in s o m e cases modified, to deal w i t h significant methodological issues. H o w e v e r , it could be argued that w e are n o t simply broadening and deepening Eliade's p h e nomenological approach but are in fact criticizing it; i.e. w e are exposing the fact that Eliade has n o t dealt adequately w i t h m a n y of the methodological questions implicit in his approach. Mircea Eliade w o u l d probably agree that he has n o t devoted sufficient attention to these methodological issues, but he w o u l d contend that, as a descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t and Historian of Religions, such questions usually do n o t fall within the d o m a i n of his particular field of investigation. Indeed, it is a proper role for the philosopher to reflect on and go b e y o n d Eliade's descriptive analyses and to deal with m a n y of the methodological questions w e have been raising. Such a response has considerable merit, but it w o u l d have even greater force, save for one telling observation: as w e have occasionally seen, Mircea Eliade himself goes far b e y o n d the limits of analysis set by

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almost all descriptive phenomenologists and other Historians of Religions. T h i s renders his p h e n o m e n o l o g y open to frequent criticisms. If Eliade is to m a k e assertions, which at least seem to be n o r m a t i v e and to entail ontological j u d g m e n t s , then he must deal w i t h the methodological questions raised by such assertions. In this concluding chapter, under the general topic of 'Descriptive Evaluations and Levels of Meaning', w e shall discuss several of the most i m p o r t a n t of these methodological issues implicit in Mircea Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . In rather schematic fashion, w e shall suggest w a y s that Eliade's methodological approach could be employed or modified in order to deal w i t h such questions.

E V A L U A T I N G RELIGIOUS P H E N O M E N A

A m a j o r source of m u c h of the criticism of Mircea Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y centers around the various types of evaluative j u d g m e n t s f o u n d t h r o u g h o u t his works. T h a t this w o u l d arouse considerable criticism should be obvious if one recalls our elucidation of previous methodological approaches. T h e initial effort by M a x Miiller to define a new, a u t o n o m o u s , scientific discipline k n o w n as Religionswissenschaft was largely m o t i vated by his desire to remain descriptive and avoid the n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s of philosophy of religion and theology. Past Historians of Religions usually insisted on this sharp descriptive-normative distinction. P h e n o m e n o l o g y , according to Kristensen, is 'purely descriptive' and avoids all evaluative questions. N o statement can be taken to be valid, according to Wilfred Smith, unless it is acknowledged by the believer. At the end of C h a p t e r 3, w e indicated that most c o n t e m p o r ary Historians of Religions reject the past ideal of being 'purely descriptive'; but it is n o t clear w h e t h e r scholars can provide the objective basis for their comparisons, classifications, and other interpretations. T h e p r o b l e m c o n f r o n t i n g Eliade is w h e t h e r he can m a k e his frequent evaluations of religious p h e n o m e n a w i t h o u t c o m m i t t i n g h i m self to s o m e highly n o r m a t i v e and subjective approach, which, in the m a n n e r of H e n d r i k Kraemer, seems to distort the basic intentionality

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and meaning of the data under investigation; w h i c h does not do justice to the experience of 'the other'. It has been our thesis that if Mircea Eliade is able to describe religious meanings and to deal w i t h comparative and evaluative questions, he is able to do so on the basis of the hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k underlying his phenomenological approach. In this regard, w e have o f t e n suggested that the sharp descriptive-normative distinction may n o t be adequate and that one o u g h t to entertain the possibility of evaluating descriptively or phenomenologically. This does not mean that all of Eliade's evaluations of religious p h e n o m e n a are on the same 'level' o f analysis, n o r that all can be s u b s u m e d under the classification o f ' d e s c r i p t i v e evaluations'. It seems possible to m a k e an initial differentiation of at least three general 'senses' of evaluation in Mircea Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . First, there is the sense in w h i c h the religious person her or himself makes n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s concerning w h a t is meaningful, valid, and real. As w e saw in C h a p t e r 4, the very structure of the process of sacralization always entails evaluations and choices by homo religiosus. All past Historians of Religions have agreed that the description of such j u d g m e n t s is a necessary part of their discipline. Second, there is a sense of evaluation w h i c h involves such criteria as authentic, genuine, and true. This level of evaluating is m o r e c o n t r o v e r sial since Eliade o f t e n goes beyond the descriptions and affirmations of homo religiosus. Third, there is a sense of evaluation w h i c h seems least descriptive and appears based on an assumed ontological stance. Illustrations of such j u d g m e n t s m i g h t be Mircea Eliade's assertions about the nature of the h u m a n being and the h u m a n condition as such. Evaluations of 'authentic' and 'genuine' W h e n Mircea Eliade continually distinguishes authentic f r o m inauthentic religious phenomena, genuine f r o m n o n g e n u i n e religious experience, his evaluations raise a crucial methodological p r o b l e m : he seems to be m a k i n g n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s and n o t simply describing j u s t w h a t appears or manifests itself. O u r suggestion is that the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion m a y evaluate descriptively. W e do n o t

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contend that Mircea Eliade consistently adheres to the following suggestion, b u t only that this is a possible means for dealing w i t h s o m e of the methodological difficulties raised by such evaluations as authentic and genuine. For the phenomenologist of religion, the authentic-inauthentic distinction is not t a n t a m o u n t to distinguishing 'the real' f r o m 'the u n real'. In terms of the phenomenological epoche, the scholar suspends her or his j u d g m e n t concerning the reality or unreality of the particular p h e n o m e n o n . If the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion wishes to use the term 'real', then w e m a y say that all the p h e n o m e n a are taken as 'real' in the sense that they 'appear' or manifest themselves as phenomena. 1 Phenomenologists of religion a t t e m p t to uncover various structural differentiations within their data. Certain p h e n o m e n a reveal an essential structure which w e classify as religious. Thus, for Eliade, p h e n o m e n a which disclose the general structure analyzed in the dialectic of the sacred are authentic religious manifestations. O t h e r p h e n o m e n a exhibit a structure w h i c h can be classified as nonreligious. In terms of Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , an expression w h i c h clearly rejects any structures of 'transcendence' does not express a genuine religious experience. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the structural differentiations are frequently n o t so clear-cut. S o m e p h e n o m e n a appear similar to religious phenomena, but as phenomenologists continue to describe and analyze their data, they begin to detect various structural dissimilarities. Eliade often describes 'magico-religious' expressions, but usually concludes his analysis by differentiating the p h e n o m e n a of magic as n o t authentically religious. H e sometimes evaluates such m o v e m e n t s as 'spiritism' and T h e o s o p h y and various developments in depth psychology and in m o d e r n art as 'parareligious', as having a religious 'aura', b u t n o t as genuinely religious. 2 O u r point is that the above distinctions of inauthentic and n o n g e n u i n e are arrived at by evaluative j u d g m e n t s , but such evaluations do not have the usual n o r m a t i v e sense of unreal or illusory. All of 1. Cf. Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, pp. 74, 75, 88, 89. 2. See 'History o f Religions and a N e w H u m a n i s m ' , p. 3; 'The Q u e s t for the " O r i g i n s " o f Religion', p. 158; ' T h e Sacred and the M o d e r n Artist', pp. 2 2 - 2 4 ; 'Cultural Fashions and the History o f Religions', pp. 21-38.

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the p h e n o m e n a are real in the sense that they appear or manifest themselves, b u t the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t can descriptively evaluate s o m e manifestations as n o t authentic or genuine religious expressions o n the basis of a structural analysis. N o t all of Eliade's evaluations of authentic-inauthentic concern the a b o v e distinction b e t w e e n the religious and the nonreligious. H e will o f t e n differentiate different types of religious experience in t e r m s of their essential structures. T h u s , he will evaluate certain p h e n o m e n a as authentically shamanic because they reveal a certain essential structure of 'ecstasy'. 3 As w e h a v e f r e q u e n t l y indicated, if Eliade can describe such essential structures and m a k e these descriptive evaluations, he does so o n the basis of his hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k , w h i c h consists f o r the m o s t part of coherent universal ' w e b s ' of structures of religious symbols. T h e r e is a third kind of evaluating as authentic w h i c h m a y be less descriptive t h a n the religious-nonreligious distinction and the structural differentiation of essential types of religious p h e n o m e n a . Eliade o f t e n distinguishes different levels of religious p h e n o m e n a and evaluates certain levels as m o r e authentic, in the sense that he evaluates certain religious experiences as 'elevated', as ' h i g h e r ' or 'deeper' than religious experiences o n ' l o w e r ' levels. W h e t h e r he can arrive at such hierarchical distinctions t h r o u g h a descriptive analysis remains to be seen. Evaluations

of 'true'

Related to, and s o m e t i m e s s y n o n y m o u s with, the evaluations of authentic or genuine is Eliade's f r e q u e n t j u d g m e n t of religious p h e n o m e n a in t e r m s o f ' t r u e ' or 'false'. B e f o r e delineating w h a t seem to be t w o different levels of analysis in Eliade's evaluation, let us cite an a m b i g u i t y in his use of the t e r m 'true'. U s u a l l y he evaluates the p h e n o m e n a as true or false, and in this regard, true is o f t e n s y n o n y m o u s w i t h authentic or genuine. S o m e t i m e s he evaluates a scholar's a p p r o a c h or interpretation as true or false. 4 T h e s e t w o uses o f ' t r u e ' are 3. See Yoga, pp. 3 1 9 - 3 2 0 ; Shamanism, pp. 3 - 3 2 . 4. W e n e e d n o t analyze t h e m o s t d e s c r i p t i v e sense in w h i c h Eliade describes w h a t homo religiosus j u d g e s t o b e true.

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not unrelated, because, as w e have seen, Mircea Eliade a t t e m p t s to derive his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach f r o m the n a t u r e of the religious data. T h u s , the religious s y m b o l i s m as a w h o l e b u n d l e of m e a n i n g s is 'true', and a Freudian approach to religious s y m b o l i s m is 'false', because it is 'partial' and interprets only one s y m b o l i c ' f r a m e of reference'. Eliade usually seems to evaluate the t r u t h or falsity of a religious manifestation by s o m e criterion ofcoherency. As w e have seen, Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d is g r o u n d e d in a hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k of universal, structural, s y m b o l i c 'systems'; p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is usually achieved by reintegrating the particular d a t u m w i t h i n its coherent ' w e b ' of s y m b o l i c associations. If the religious manifestation 'fits' into such a ' w e b ' , if it is consistent w i t h its s y m b o l i c 'system', Eliade can evaluate it as a ' t r u e ' religious (lunar, etc.) manifestation. Conversely, w h e n Eliade evaluates a p h e n o m e n o n as 'aberrant' and 'false', this is o f t e n based on his j u d g m e n t that the p h e n o m e n o n cannot be reintegrated into, and is not consistent with, its ' p r o p e r ' structural system. O n this level o f c o h e r e n c y , it seems that the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion can evaluate descriptively. T h e r e are serious m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s and hermeneutical limitations if w e confine o u r evaluation of true or false to this level of analysis. O n e could have a very consistent and at the same time false system. For example, in times of severe existential crisis, certain archetypal escape m e c h a n i s m s m a y be used in a very consistent m a n ner. T h u s , 'superstition', 'infantilism', and other 'aberrant' manifestations m a y reveal coherent structural systems of s y m b o l i c associations. In addition, Paul Ricceur has pointed o u t that on this 'first' level of understanding, in w h i c h the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion c o m prehends coherent s y m b o l i c systems or totalities, 'the question of t r u t h has n o t yet been b r o u g h t up'. If the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t gives the n a m e t r u t h to 'the internal consistency' of this s y m b o l i c world, 'such t r u t h is t r u t h w i t h o u t belief, t r u t h at a distance'. 5 N o w w h e n one examines Mircea Eliade's n u m e r o u s evaluations of true, it appears that he does n o t r e m a i n on the 'horizontal and p a n o r a m i c ' level of coherency, b u t he s u p p l e m e n t s standards of c o n 5. Ricceur, The Symbolism of Evil, pp. 353-354; ' T h e Symbol: Food for T h o u g h t ' , p. 203.

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sistency w i t h a 'vertical' appeal to s o m e criterion of adequacy. For example, a s y m b o l or i m a g e is described as ' t r u e ' in the sense of expressing a deep level of reality, a p r o f o u n d m o d e of being; a p h e n o m e n o n is described as ' m o r e true' in the sense that it is ' m o r e adequate to the actual situation of m a n ' . 6 W i t h o u t m u l t i p l y i n g examples, it seems clear that Mircea Eliade is n o longer evaluating o n the 'horizontal' plane of coherency but is j u d g i n g p h e n o m e n a on a different level of analysis. W e previously s u b m i t t e d that, in t e r m s of an u n d e r l y i n g f r a m e w o r k of a u t o n o m o u s structural systems, it m i g h t be possible to evaluate descriptively if o u r standard for t r u t h w e r e coherency. But in t e r m s of s o m e criterion of adequacy, it m a y be m o r e difficult to evaluate descriptively, and Eliade's evaluations m a y often be based on various ontological assumptions. Meaning for h o m o religiosus versus meaning for Eliade A crucial m e t h o d o l o g i c a l difficulty, illustrated b y Mircea Eliade's evaluation of p h e n o m e n a as authentic, genuine, and true, arises f r o m the fact that Eliade's interpretation o f t e n goes b e y o n d , and even contradicts, w h a t religious persons tell us about their p h e n o m e n a . In r e v i e w i n g The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion, W i n s t o n L. K i n g poses the question: ' W h a t m e a n i n g does he [Eliade] have in mind, and for w h o m ? ' T h e answer K i n g finds in Eliade's writings is seen in the contrasting of ' M e a n i n g for the investigator' and 'for the homo religiosus in situ'.7 M o s t scholars w h o have f o r m u l a t e d such a d i c h o t o m y have intended it as a criticism of Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y : the level of analysis of ' m e a n i n g for homo religiosus' is m o r e descriptive and objective; ' m e a n i n g for Eliade' is highly subjective and normative, fails to d o justice to the experience o f ' t h e other', and is m e a n i n g w h i c h Eliade o f t e n 'reads into' his data. T h e methodological difficulty seems to be the f o l l o w i n g : if Mircea 6. See ' T h e Luyster, ' T h e 7. W i n s t o n Journal for the

Sacred and t h e M o d e r n Artist', p. 24; The Forge and the Crucible, p. 45; S t u d y o f M y t h : T w o A p p r o a c h e s ' , p. 243. L. K i n g , B o o k R e v i e w o f The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion, Scientific Study of Religion 9, no. 1 (1970): 71.

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Eliade interprets the religious m e a n i n g of a particular p h e n o m e n o n and claims that homo religiosus has a false u n d e r s t a n d i n g of his or her o w n p h e n o m e n o n , if he evaluates as inauthentic a p h e n o m e n o n which the religious person regards as authentic, w h a t kind of methodological check does Eliade have on these m e a n i n g s and evaluations? O n e possibility for checking such interpretations of m e a n i n g w o u l d be to suggest s o m e kind of 'historical reconstruction': if the investigator reconstructed w h a t was g o i n g on and if she or he b r o u g h t this to the attention of the participant, homo religiosus w o u l d then recognize the interpretation to be true. But, unlike Wilfred Smith, Eliade could never accept such a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l check. In s o m e cases, there is n o possibility that the participant w o u l d recognize the authentic religious m e a n i n g of her or his experience. W e m a y suggest one w a y of a p p r o a c h i n g the above methodological difficulty w h i c h partially u n d e r m i n e s the ' f o r homo religiosus' — ' f o r Eliade' d i c h o t o m y . W h a t needs to be challenged is that such a contrast illustrates a sharp distinction b e t w e e n the descriptive and objective versus the n o r m a t i v e and subjective. B y the phrase ' m e a n i n g for homo religiosus', the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion m a y be indicating those religious meanings of w h i c h the religious person is conscious. But, as w e saw in Kristensen's descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y , limiting o u r d o m a i n of investigation to such ' c o n scious' meanings imposes severe restrictions o n o u r p h e n o m e n o l o g i cal analysis. In addition, the psychological approaches of Freud and J u n g clearly established that s y m b o l s and images convey their ' m e s sages' even w h e n they are n o t consciously u n d e r s t o o d . Accordingly, by the phrase ' m e a n i n g for Eliade', w e m a y be indicating the total religious m e a n i n g of s o m e p h e n o m e n o n , even if homo religiosus is n o t conscious of, or only partially understands, this m e a n ing. W e saw that religious experience concerns the w h o l e person and does n o t limit itself to the plane of consciousness. O u r analysis of ' m e a n i n g for Eliade' seems to gain greater s u p p o r t if w e recall his views on the all-important f u n c t i o n of religious s y m b o l i s m : s y m bolism, as an a u t o n o m o u s m o d e of cognition and w i t h its o w n 'logic', 'speaks to the w h o l e person', and n o t j u s t t o the intellect; 'the validity' of the s y m b o l i s m does n o t d e p e n d on its being u n d e r s t o o d ; archetypal s y m b o l i s m s preserve their structures and 'reappear s p o n t a n e o u s l y '

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even unconsciously in nonreligious p h e n o m e n a ; w h a t matters to the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t is that the symbolic meanings 'are present' even if they are not consciously understood. 8 T h e key methodological point in our above proposal is that 'meaning for Eliade' need n o t be taken as arbitrary, subjective, and n o r m a t i v e if the analysis of the total religious m e a n i n g is based on s o m e 'objective' hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k . This w o u l d enable the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion to go b e y o n d the conscious understanding of homo religiosus, to analyze the full intentionality of a religious manifestation, and to evaluate descriptively. 9 O f course, the very possibility for such phenomenological analyses depends on the lofty status granted to those structures which provide the foundation for Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g y . H o w can Eliade account for the remarkable sense of permanence, continuity, and universality he attributes to the archetypal symbolic structures? O n w h a t g r o u n d s can Eliade maintain that archetypal religious structures persist and preserve their structures, even w h e n not consciously understood; that they can spontaneously reappear at any time and in any place? Mircea Eliade seems to provide us w i t h t w o general kinds of explanation, one of w h i c h was suggested in o u r interpretation of his m o r e - t h a n historical-explanation claim. 1 0 Eliade's first explanation for the remarkable continuity, p e r m a nence, universality, and spontaneous reappearance, of the archetypal symbolic structures seems veryJungian: these are 'imprinted structures' or primordial ' m e m o r i e s ' which persist in the unconscious. We noted Eliade's a t t e m p t in Cosmos and History to distinguish his sense of 'archetype' ('exemplary m o d e l ' or 'paradigm') f r o m J u n g ' s meaning. It should also be acknowledged that Eliade never speaks o f ' t h e collective unconscious' and that, in conversation, he claims never to have intended a Jungian account. 8. F o r e x a m p l e , see The Sacred, p. 129; Patterns, p. 450; Images and Symbols, pp. 2 4 - 2 5 . 9. Eliade w o u l d s u b m i t t h a t all o f his analysis is at t h e level o f ' m e a n i n g f o r homo religiosus'. O u r d i c h o t o m y m i g h t b e r e f o r m u l a t e d as 'conscious m e a n i n g f o r homo religiosus' a n d 'total m e a n i n g f o r homo religiosus'. S u c h a r e f o r m u l a t i o n has c o n s i d e r a b l e m e r i t . Its m a j o r d r a w b a c k , as w e shall see, arises f r o m t h e fact t h a t Eliade s o m e t i m e s g o e s b e y o n d e v e n this ' e n l a r g e d ' d e s c r i p t i v e level o f i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e 'total m e a n i n g f o r homo religiosus' a n d bases his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o n an a s s u m e d o n t o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n . 10. See Ricketts, ' T h e N a t u r e a n d E x t e n t o f Eliade's " J u n g i a n i s m " ', pp. 2 1 6 - 2 2 4 .

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Nevertheless, there are m a n y passages in Eliade's writings w h i c h seem to propose a rather Jungian explanation: . . . profane m a n is the descendent of homo religiosus and he cannot w i p e o u t his o w n history — that is, the behavior of his religious ancestors which has m a d e h i m w h a t he is today. This is all the m o r e true because a great part of his existence is fed by impulses that c o m e to h i m f r o m the depths of his being, f r o m the zone that has been called the 'unconscious.'. . . Yet the contents and structures of the unconscious are the result of i m m e m o r i a l existential situations, especially of critical situations, and this is w h y the unconscious has a religious aura. 11 Eliade's second explanation for the universality, permanence, and continuity of the essential religious structures is seen in his views of the commonality of certain 'primordial' existential situations, the h u m a n m o d e of being in the world, the h u m a n condition as such. T h e evolutionary view of m a n is prevalent today, but a historian of religion [Historian of Religion] generally w o r k s f r o m a n o n evolutionary view of h u m a n consciousness. W h e n a m a n becomes aware of his m o d e of being, he has something in c o m m o n w i t h the so-called primitive and the m o d e r n philosopher. W e k n o w f r o m letters and publications of anthropologists that w h a t the philosopher calls 'angst', anxiety and death, was experienced by the primitives. I mean that lagrande situation humaine has probably been the same in every era. I consider this a kind of basic universal. 1 2 11. The Sacred, pp. 209, 210. A d d i t i o n a l r e f e r e n c e s cited by R i c k e t t s as illustrating a r a t h e r J u n g i a n a c c o u n t include: Images and Symbols, pp. 12-13; Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. 128; Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, pp. 27, 28; Mephistopheles and the Androgyne, p. 10. R i c k e t t s asserts ( ' T h e N a t u r e a n d E x t e n t o f Eliade's " J u n g i a n i s m " p. 223) that ' B y n o t clearly d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n his o w n idea o f a r c h e t y p e a n d t h a t o f j u n g , h e [Eliade] has i n t r o d u c e d c o n f u s i o n i n t o his w o r k ; a n d b y a c c e p t i n g w h a t is w i d e l y c o n s i d e r e d t o b e t h e w e a k e s t p o i n t in J u n g ' s h y p o t h e s i s , h e has created — unnecessarily, I b e l i e v e — p r o b l e m s and e n e m i e s f o r h i m s e l f . ' 12. ' T h e Sacred in t h e Secular W o r l d ' , pp. 102-103. O n p a g e 101, Eliade w r i t e s ' t h a t t h e sacred is an e l e m e n t in t h e s t r u c t u r e o f h u m a n consciousness, t h a t it is a p a r t o f t h e h u m a n m o d e o f b e i n g in t h e w o r l d ' . 'If t h e sacred m e a n s b e i n g , t h e real, a n d t h e m e a n i n g f u l , as I h o l d it does, t h e n t h e sacred is a p a r t o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f h u m a n c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ' S u c h claims will b e analyzed u n d e r ' o n t o l o g i c a l m o v e s ' .

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W e observed Eliade's interpretation o f ' e c s t a s y ' as f o r m i n g 'an integral part of the h u m a n condition'; as a ' p r i m o r d i a l p h e n o m e n o n ' in the sense that it is 'coextensive w i t h h u m a n nature'; as revealing ' s o m e t h i n g of the h u m a n condition, regarded in its o w n right as a m o d e of existence in the universe'. Eliade also claimed that historical c o n d i t i o n ings could n o t account for these ' p r i m o r d i a l situations, of the h u m a n condition as such'. T h i s is Eliade's m a i n explanation f o r the status of his universal structures: h u m a n beings, simply by their presence in the w o r l d , continually experience various ' p r i m o r d i a l ' existential situations; they continually e n c o u n t e r various archetypal kinds of existential crises, i n v o l v i n g suffering, death, etc.; they continually utilize certain p a r a d i g m a t i c m o d e l s for resolving these crises, as seen in such religious structures as those of ascension and initiation. W h e t h e r Mircea Eliade can decipher all of this in his data or w h e t h e r such an explanation entails certain ontological m o v e s remains to be seen. W e shall e x a m i n e m o r e closely his views a b o u t p r i m o r d i a l existential situations and the h u m a n condition as such u n d e r 'levels of meaning'.

L E V E L S OF M E A N I N G

Evaluations

of levels as 'elevated' and 'highest'

As w e saw in C h a p t e r 5, s y m b o l s are n o t arbitrary irresponsible creations of the psyche, b u t f u n c t i o n according to their o w n 'logical' principles. It is because of such a 'logic of s y m b o l s ' that Mircea Eliade can speak of structurally coherent m e a n i n g s w h i c h 'fit t o g e t h e r ' to f o r m s y m b o l i c w h o l e s or 'systems'. In t e r m s of such a logic, s y m b o l i s m was seen to be 'multivalent': it has the capacity to reveal a m u l t i t u d e of structurally coherent meanings; it can reveal a perspective in w h i c h h e t e r o g e n e o u s p h e n o m e n a on different planes of reality are b r o u g h t into structurally interlocking relationships. N o w Eliade n o t only distinguishes these different planes of reality, b u t he evaluates s o m e levels as 'higher', as 'deeper', as m o r e 'elevated'. P h e n o m e n a manifested o n these higher levels are evaluated as ' m o r e

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authentic', ' m o r e true'. Such evaluations are of crucial m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i m p o r t a n c e because it is primarily in t e r m s of such 'elevated' m e a n i n g s that Mircea Eliade is able to grasp the essential structure of the religious experience, to c o m p r e h e n d the 'center' of the s y m b o l i c ' w e b ' , to interpret and evaluate the m e a n i n g o f ' l o w e r ' level religious m a n i festations. Such evaluations by Eliade certainly appear to be the very kinds of n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s w h i c h Historians of Religions have traditionally avoided and h a v e ascribed to such fields as p h i l o s o p h y and t h e o logy. For example, one expects the Christian theologian to evaluate the p h e n o m e n o n of Jesus as the C h r i s t as manifested o n the 'highest' plane of reality, b u t such a j u d g m e n t clearly rests on a n o r m a t i v e basis. If Eliade is to meet such a criticism, he m u s t p r o v i d e us w i t h 'objective' criteria on the basis of w h i c h he can descriptively evaluate these levels of religious meaning. W e shall begin w i t h several hints f r o m Eliade's w r i t i n g s and then develop an analysis which, it m u s t be admitted, is n o w h e r e explicitly p r o p o u n d e d in Eliade's p h e n o m e n ology. Mircea Eliade begins the final p a r a g r a p h of ' M e t h o d o l o g i c a l R e m a r k s on the S t u d y of Religious S y m b o l i s m ' w i t h this conclusion: 'In o r d e r to decipher a religious s y m b o l , n o t only is it necessary to take into consideration all of its contexts, b u t o n e m u s t a b o v e all reflect on the m e a n i n g s that this s y m b o l has had in w h a t w e m i g h t call its " m a t u r i t y . " ' T w o sentences later, in w h a t seems to be s u b m i t t e d as restatement of the above conclusion, Eliade writes: '. . . since the " c i p h e r " constituted b y this s y m b o l i s m carries w i t h it in its structure all the values that have been progressively revealed to m a n in the course of time, it is necessary in deciphering t h e m to take into account their m o s t general meaning, that is, the one m e a n i n g w h i c h can articulate all the other, particular m e a n i n g s and w h i c h alone permits us to u n d e r s t a n d h o w the latter have f o r m e d a structure'. 1 3 It is this relationship b e t w e e n Eliade's evaluation of religious p h e n o m e n a as 'mature', 'elevated', and 'highest', on the one hand, and his use of criteria such as 'the most general' and 'the universal', on the other hand, w h i c h w e wish to develop. 13. ' M e t h o d o l o g i c a l R e m a r k s ' , p. 107. Cf. Patterns, pp. 6 - 8 .

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Let us recall only a f e w of the n u m e r o u s illustrations, f o u n d t h r o u g h o u t o u r s t u d y , w h i c h h a v e clearly e s t a b l i s h e d t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l emphasis o n the universal and the general in Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach. Eliade wishes to f o r m u l a t e a m e t h o d w h i c h can 'integrate' the sociological, the psychological, the historical, etc., into the general perspective of the H i s t o r y of Religions. H e interprets the m e a n i n g of the particular (snake) d a t u m by reintegrating it into its universal (lunar) structural s y s t e m of s y m b o l i c associations. In gaining insight into the essential structure of various (snake) p h e n o m e n a , the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion, t h r o u g h such m e t h o d s as 'free variation', a t t e m p t s to grasp the universal (lunar) 'invariant core' w h i c h constitutes the essential m e a n i n g of the particular (snake) phenomena. T h a t Mircea Eliade as a p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t emphasizes the general and the universal is evident, b u t why should these standards be so relevant to religious p h e n o m e n a and, m o r e specifically, to evaluations o f religious data as 'elevated', ' m a t u r e ' , 'highest', and 'deepest'? O u r analyses of the dialectic of the sacred and the p r o f a n e and of the n a t u r e of religious s y m b o l i s m clearly established a necessary relationship b e t w e e n such criteria and the n a t u r e of religious experience. In C h a p t e r 4, it w a s seen that homo religiosus experiences the sacred as the transcendent, absolutely 'real' d i m e n s i o n of existence w h i c h provides h i m or her w i t h universal e x e m p l a r y models; in t e r m s of such paradigmatic structures, the religious person can experience w h a t w e r e chaotic, isolated, p r o f a n e p h e n o m e n a as n o w part of a coherent, m e a n i n g f u l , spiritual Lebenswelt. T h u s , w h e n w e discussed the nature of religion as an ' o p e n i n g ' , w e q u o t e d Mircea Eliade as asserting that 'by being transcendent and e x e m p l a r y it [the sacred] compels the religious m a n to c o m e o u t of personal situations, to surpass the contingent and the particular and to c o m p l y w i t h general values, w i t h the universal'. 1 4 In C h a p t e r 5, it was seen that religious s y m b o l i s m , as an 'extension' or ' p r o l o n g a t i o n ' of the process of hierophanization, enables homo religiosus to experience and 'to live' the universal. Religious s y m b o l i s m has an 'existential f u n c t i o n ' : it 'bursts o p e n ' the i m m e d i a t e reality of 14. Myths,

Dreams and Mysteries,

p. 18.

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the historical, 'natural', p r o f a n e existential situation, ' o p e n i n g ' the particular beings and things to 'transobjective meanings'. W h a t w e r e experienced as ' f r a g m e n t e d ' , p r o f a n e situations are t r a n s f o r m e d into spiritual experiences; w h a t w e r e experienced as 'isolated', 'subjective' particular m o d e s of existence n o w ' o p e n o u t ' to universal systems of coherent structures. Indeed, Eliade o f t e n uses these criteria of m o s t general and universal to distinguish the religious f r o m the nonreligious and to distinguish the authentically religious manifestations f r o m 'parareligious' p h e n o m e n a . For example, it is o n such a basis that he can j u d g e the distance separating the universe of the unconscious, w h i c h o f t e n has a 'religious aura', f r o m the universe of religion. In t e r m s of the s y m bolism of 'the T r e e of the W o r l d ' , homo religiosus m a y experience a particular p h e n o m e n o n as signifying ' t h e w h o l e of the cosmos', and thus, as a total religious experience, he or she m a y succeed in 'living the universal'. A depth psychologist, such as J u n g , m a y observe the i m a g e of the T r e e f u n c t i o n i n g on the d r e a m level, and this m a y reveal to h i m that the individual is n o w able ' t o integrate a crisis in the d e p t h s and to recover his psychic balance'. But for Eliade this does n o t constitute a religious experience unless there is the revelation of the universal structure of the t r e e - s y m b o l i s m : periodic and u n e n d i n g renewal, regeneration, i m m o r t a l i t y , absolute reality. 'But, n o t h a v i n g been accepted in its s y m b o l i c sense, the i m a g e of the T r e e [in d r e a m s ] has n o t succeeded in revealing the universal, and therefore has not lifted the m a n u p to the plane of the Spirit, as religion, h o w e v e r r u d i m e n tary, always does.' 1 5 W e m a y n o w be able to relate Eliade's criteria to his evaluations of 'elevated' and 'highest'. As w e h a v e j u s t seen, all religion 'opens o u t ' to the universal. B u t it has been s h o w n that n o t all religious expressions are equally successful in revealing the universal. A particular snake p h e n o m e n o n , expressing one possible lunar valorization, m a y reveal very little of its universal lunar structure. It m a y be a very limited religious expression, in the sense that the manifestation hardly 'points b e y o n d ' the finite, contingent, historical conditionings of its p r o f a n e existential situation, and homo religiosus is n o t even conscious of the 15. Ibid., pp. 18-20.

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essential lunar structure. Such a religious p h e n o m e n o n is manifested on a ' l o w ' level ofreality, and, in s o m e cases, that level m a y be evaluated as 'degenerate' or 'infantile'. At the other extreme, there are certain religious expressions, arising f r o m archetypal intuitions of essential religious structures, w h i c h clearly reveal the universal. At various, highly creative m o m e n t s in the history of h u m a n k i n d , homo religiosus actually grasped the essential lunar structure, and, in t e r m s of this m o s t general or universal structure, he or she was able to h o m o l o g i z e the diverse planes of lunar valorization. T h u s , the religious person was able to 'fit t o g e t h e r ' the h e t e r o g e n e o u s p h e n o m e n a manifested o n different levels into a structurally coherent lunar 'system'. Such a religious p h e n o m e n o n , fully revealing the universal lunar structure, is evaluated as o n the m o s t 'elevated', 'the highest', or 'the deepest' level of reality. In o u r analysis of the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d for gaining insight into m e a n i n g and of a specific kind of induction, w e suggested a possible 'clue' to Eliade's f r e q u e n t evaluations of religious p h e n o m e n a as 'higher'. In light of o u r present analysis, w e m a y p r o p o s e that homo religiosus achieves a ' h i g h e r ' spiritual realization to the extent that his or her religious experience is less limited b y the particular, finite, historical and cultural conditionings relevant to the existential situation w i t h i n w h i c h the sacred is manifested; to the extent that the religious experience is 'closer' to, or m o r e fully reveals, the essential religious structure and thus enables the person to 'live the universal'. Identifying

the 'highest' level: 'the transconscious'

Perhaps the best w a y to check such an interpretation w o u l d be to identify those specific religious experiences w h i c h Mircea Eliade evaluates as 'the highest' or m o s t 'elevated' religious p h e n o m e n a . If there is a logical principle in t e r m s of w h i c h s y m b o l s point b e y o n d themselves t o w a r d higher and higher levels of manifestation, w h a t type of religious experience is expressed by the religious s y m b o l in its ' m a t u r i t y ' ? W h a t type of religious experience best enables homo religiosus to intuit the essential religious structure and to 'live the universal'? In a n s w e r i n g these questions, w e m a y r e t u r n to the s y m b o l i s m of

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ascension, w h i c h is p r o b a b l y that religious s y m b o l i s m Eliade m o s t capable o f revealing t h e ' h i g h e s t ' religious experiences.

finds

All this a d m i t t e d , o n e c a n n o t refrain f r o m a f f i r m i n g that the s y m b o l i s m o f ascension reveals its deepest m e a n i n g s w h e n it is e x a m i n e d in relation to the m o s t ' p u r e ' activity o f t h e spirit. It m a y b e said t o deliver its ' t r u e m e s s a g e ' u p o n t h e planes o f m e t a p h y s i c s a n d m y s t i c i s m . O n e m i g h t also say that it is t h a n k s t o the values that ascension s t a n d s f o r in the spiritual life (the l i f t i n g - u p o f t h e soul t o G o d , m y s t i c ecstasy, etc.) that is o t h e r significances, discernible o n the levels of ritual, m y t h , d r e a m - l i f e o r p s y c h a g o g y , b e c o m e f u l l y intelligible and disclose their secret p u r p o r t . 1 6 A w o r d o f c a u t i o n o n Eliade's use o f t h e t e r m ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' m a y b e h e l p f u l . A l t h o u g h a p h i l o s o p h e r , t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n Eliade's criteria o f the ' m o s t g e n e r a l ' and 'universal', could easily u n d e r s t a n d w h y Eliade w o u l d evaluate the m e t a p h y s i c a l plane as elevated, t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t o f religion d o e s n o t restrict this t e r m to the h i g h l y rational and s y s t e m a t i c f o r m u l a t i o n s o f traditional p h i l o s o p h y . T h u s , Eliade can speak o f an archaic m e t a p h y s i c s because t h e s y m b o l s , m y t h s , a n d rites e x p r e s s a ' c o m p l e x s y s t e m of c o h e r e n t a f f i r m a t i o n s a b o u t the u l t i m a t e reality o f t h i n g s ' , a ' r e c o g n i t i o n o f a certain situation in t h e c o s m o s ' . 1 7 In this sense, t h e ' p u r e ' mystical consciousness, w h i c h enables homo religiosus t o h o m o l o g i z e diverse planes o f reality a n d e x p e r i e n c e in a u n i f i e d c o h e r e n t s t r u c t u r a l ' s y s t e m ' , reveals a h i g h l y spiritual, m e t a p h y s i c a l position. Let us cite a s e c o n d illustration: the final 'stage' r e c o m m e n d e d b y Patanjali w h i c h enables t h e y o g i t o e m a n c i p a t e h e r o r h i m s e l f f r o m o n e ' s h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , t o realize a b s o l u t e f r e e d o m and the u n c o n ditioned. T h e act o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e , samadhi, is a ' p a r a d o x i c a l state', w h i c h can be related t o o t h e r m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f ' t h e c o i n c i d e n c e o f o p p o s i t e s ' . 'Like all p a r a d o x i c a l states, samadhi is e q u i v a l e n t to a r e i n 16. Ibid., p p . 118-119. Ibid., p. 122: ' T h e i m a g e s o f " f l i g h t " a n d o f " a s c e n s i o n " , so f r e q u e n t l y a p p e a r i n g in t h e w o r l d s o f d r e a m a n d i m a g i n a t i o n , b e c o m e p e r f e c t l y intelligible o n l y at t h e level o f m y s t i c i s m and m e t a p h y s i c s , w h e r e t h e y clearly e x p r e s s the ideas o {freedom a n d transcendence. B u t at all t h e o t h e r , " l o w e r " levels o f t h e p s y c h i c life, these i m a g e s still s t a n d f o r p r o c e d u r e s that are h o m o l o g o u s , in their t e n d e n c y , t o acts o f " f r e e d o m " and " t r a n s c e n d e n c e " . ' 17. See The Myth of the Eternal Return, p. 3; Images and Symbols, p. 176.

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tegration of the different modalities of the real in a single modality — the undifferentiated completeness of precreation, the primordial U n i t y . ' This ' s u p r e m e reintegration' is n o t a 'mere regression to primordial nondistinction', which is the case w i t h various trances and other means of ' e m p t y i n g consciousness'. O n e essential fact must always be borne in mind: the yogin w o r k s on all levels of consciousness and of the subconscious, for the purpose of opening the w a y to transconsciousness (knowledgepossession of the Self, the purusa)... the recovery, t h r o u g h samadhi, of the initial nonduality introduces a n e w element in comparison w i t h the primordial situation. . . . T h a t element is knowledge of unity and bliss. T h e r e is a 'return to the beginning,' b u t w i t h the difference that the m a n 'liberated in life' recovers the original situation enriched by the dimensions o f f r e e d o m and transconsciousness. 18 W i t h o u t multiplying examples, w e m a y identify the 'highest' type of religious experience: it is the liberating experience of the 'pure', u n i f y ing consciousness, the mystical intuition of undifferentiated unity, of mystical union with the Ultimate, in w h i c h all finite, historical, 'limiting' conditions of h u m a n existence are transcended. It seems to m e that this identification of such a higher religious consciousness is consistent w i t h Eliade's general antireductionist orientation, as illustrated b y the methodological assumption of the irreducibility of the sacred. M a c Linscott Ricketts, in a section entitled ' T h e Religious a Priori', analyzes this concept of the transconscious as Eliade's a t t e m p t to render m o r e adequate R u d o l f O t t o ' s a priori category of the Holy. 'Eliade wishes to designate a mental structure or capacity set apart f r o m all others, one which comes into play only in religious experience': this is 'a higher logos', which involves trans18. Yoga, pp. 9 5 - 1 0 0 . W e shall a d o p t this t e r m , 'transconsciousness', as d e s c r i b i n g t h e m o s t elevated o r h i g h e s t state o f religious consciousness. Eliade, himself, rarely uses t h e t e r m , a n d , his u s a g e in several c o n t e x t s is q u i t e a m b i g u o u s . A s w e s a w in t h e case o f s u c h t e r m s as ' t r a n s h i s t o r i c a l ' and ' t r a n s h u m a n ' , M i r c e a E l i a d e n e v e r a p p e a r s entirely satisfied w i t h any specific t e r m w h e n h e describes this ' h i g h e r ' religious experience. R i c k e t t s cites t h e f o l l o w i n g places in w h i c h t h e e x p r e s s i o n , ' t h e t r a n s c o n scious', is e m p l o y e d : Patterns, pp. 450, 454; The Forge and the Crucible, p. 201; Images and Symbols, pp. 17, 37, 119-120; Yoga, pp. 99, 226.

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cending of b o t h conscious and unconscious levels, as seen in the highest mystical experiences. 1 9 T h i s n o t i o n of transconsciousness m a y be related to o u r analysis of evaluating levels of m e a n i n g as elevated, highest, or deepest. In C h a p t e r 3, w e saw that m o s t c o n t e m p o r a r y Historians of Religions, reacting against past reductionist approaches, claim that religious experience concerns the 'total person'. Accordingly, for Eliade, religious experience includes all levels of consciouness: the conscious, the unconscious, and the transconscious. T h i s m a y p r o v i d e us w i t h an additional criterion for distinguishing the authentically religious f r o m the nonreligious and the 'parareligious'. Recall o u r recently f o r m u l a t e d e x a m p l e f r o m Myths, Dreams and Mysteries in w h i c h Eliade distinguished the i m a g e o f ' t h e T r e e of the W o r l d ' as a 'psychic p h e n o m e n o n ' f r o m its religious manifestation. T h e d r e a m i m a g e of the T r e e was n o t genuinely religious, because it was manifested only on the plane of the unconscious; the s y m b o l i s m of the T r e e of the W o r l d was evaluated as religious, because it w a s manifested on all levels of reality and thus included the transconscious, w h i c h was, in fact, that higher consciousness w h i c h enabled homo religiosus to unify the diverse levels of manifestation, t h e r e b y experiencing 'the totality' and 'living the universal'. W e m a y h a v e u n c o v e r e d a serious m e t h o d o l o g i c a l difficulty. Mircea Eliade o f t e n e m p l o y s this concept of the transconscious as a criterion f o r all genuine religious experience. Indeed, the very i n t e n tionality of the dialectic of hierophanies (experience of ' s o m e t h i n g ' t r a n s h u m a n , transhistorical, n o t 'natural', n o t temporal) w o u l d seem to require a ' h i g h e r ' or at least u n i q u e structure of consciousness. T h u s , in t e r m s of this irreducibly religious structure of consciousness, w e can distinguish genuine religious p h e n o m e n a f r o m such pseudoreligious and parareligious p h e n o m e n a as those of various f o r m s of nationalism and of M a r x i s m ; certain science fiction stories, movies, and other aesthetic creations; secular rituals, such as m o s t W e s t e r n N e w Year's celebrations. B u t Eliade usually describes the transconscious state in such a w a y that it appears to be a structure of only the 'highest', 'deepest', ' m o s t 19. Ricketts, ' T h e N a t u r e and Extent of Eliade's "Jungianism" ', pp. 228-230.

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elevated' religious experiences. It is on such a basis that he often distinguishes the lower level phenomena o f the masses f r o m the higher consciousness o f the 'religious specialist', w h o grasps the essential structure o f the phenomena and may have the only 'correct' or 'genuine' understanding o f the religious manifestations. O u r proposed solution to this methodological difficulty is the following. All genuine religious experience involves the transconscious; without such a unique, 'higher', religious consciousness there would be no experience ofhierophanies. B u t the degree to which the transconscious functions in different societies and in different people within the same society varies considerably. Consequently, certain mystical religious experiences can be evaluated as 'the highest' because homo religiosus is fully aware o f the essential structure revealed in the manifestation and thus his or her consciousness 'opens out' to the universal. During several o f our sessions, Mircea Eliade has agreed with the identification o f this kind o f mystical experience as the most elevated and has gone on to say that such ' c o m p l e x ' mystical experiences are 'related to elaborate symbolic constructions' and seem to be 'the most revealing' in terms o f the meaning given to them. Eliade claimed that the raptus mysticus was 'considered in the religions as the highest attainment', i.e., this evaluation has been made by homo religiosus. Thus, in light o f the above analysis, Eliade's claim is that homo religiosus has e x perienced and evaluated such a mystical 'pure' consciousness o f undifferentiated unity as best revealing 'the most general', as best 'opening out' to the universal; in short, as the highest religious experience. Such an evaluation would seem to be at least partially based on an assumed ontological position, much more characteristic o f Eastern rather than Western religious traditions. Indeed, Eliade's general methodological orientation leans somewhat toward a more Eastern 'direction'. Arnold T o y n b e e , in An Historian's Approach to Religion, and many other scholars have suggested that the Western religions (Judaism, Islam, Christianity) tend toward 'exclusivism'. Thus, it would be a temptation for such a synthetic generalist as Mircea Eliade to derive much o f his methodological framework from religious phenomena o f the m o r e 'inclusivistic' Eastern traditions. W e shall cite only one illustration and then offer several general c o m m e n t s on the kind o f religious experience Eliade evaluates as highest.

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T h o m a s Altizer is p r o b a b l y correct in a r g u i n g that the coincidentia oppositorum is Eliade's ' f a v o r i t e ' s y m b o l i s m . Eliade certainly r e g a r d s 'the S y m p l e g a d e s ' , the coincidentia oppositorum, and o t h e r ' p a r a d o x i c a l ' s y m b o l i s m s so p r e v a l e n t in m y s t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s as e x p r e s s i n g the h i g h est level o f religious experience. Eliade is j u s t i f i e d in stating that t h e s y m b o l i s m o f ' t h e c o i n c i d e n c e o f o p p o s i t e s ' is universal, a n d h e does cite such W e s t e r n illustrations as M e i s t e r E c k h a r d t a n d N i c h o l a s o f Cusa.20 N e v e r t h e l e s s , such W e s t e r n religious figures w e r e n e v e r in t h e m a i n s t r e a m , b u t r a t h e r o n t h e fringe, o f their particular religious traditions. C h r i s t i a n i t y and the o t h e r H e b r a i c religions h a v e b e e n theistic a n d h a v e usually a t t r i b u t e d o n l y ' p o s i t i v e ' a t t r i b u t e s to G o d . O n e n e e d o n l y recall that such W e s t e r n m y s t i c s w e r e usually suspect a n d o f t e n persecuted, e x c o m m u n i c a t e d , o r e v e n p u t to death. If o n e t u r n s to E a s t e r n religions, t h e situation is q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . H e r e , in t h e m o r e m o n i s t i c traditions, s y m b o l i s m s such as the coincidentia oppositorum a b o u n d and are o f t e n c o n s i d e r e d t h e best m e a n s f o r e x p r e s s i n g u l t i m a t e reality. E a s t e r n m y s t i c s w h o e m p l o y such s y m b o l i s m s are o f t e n r e v e r e d as h a v i n g attained the h i g h e s t spiritual realizations. It s e e m s possible to f o r m u l a t e t w o general ' m o d e l s ' o f religious m y s t i c i s m w h i c h differ w i t h respect to their v i e w s o f U l t i m a t e Reality and o f the mystical realization. First, t h e r e is the p a t t e r n w e m a y call ' u n i o n w i t h a r e m a i n d e r ' . In this pattern, t h e mystical realization is o f u n i o n w i t h the S u p r e m e Reality (usually e x p r e s s e d as G o d ) , b u t G o d is a l w a y s t r a n s c e n d e n t and ' O t h e r ' . T h i s p a t t e r n is u n i o n w i t h a r e m a i n der, c o m m u n i o n w i t h G o d , u n i o n i n t e r p r e t e d dualistically. T h i s is t h e usual W e s t e r n ' m o d e l ' , a l t h o u g h all theistic religions t e n d t o illustrate it. S e c o n d , t h e r e is t h e p a t t e r n w e m a y call ' u n i o n w i t h o u t a r e m a i n der'. In this religious pattern, t h e mystical realization is o f c o m p l e t e u n i t y and i d e n t i t y w i t h t h e U l t i m a t e Reality. H e r e w e h a v e t h e m o r e typical E a s t e r n ' m o d e l ' , a l t h o u g h v a r i o u s W e s t e r n m y s t i c s such as E c k h a r d t s e e m t o e x e m p l i f y it. N o w it is o u r c o n t e n t i o n that the t y p e s o f experiences that Eliade 20. See Altizer, Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred, pp. 17-20, 8 1 - 1 0 4 , a n d passim; Patterns, pp. 41iM-23; Mephistopheles and the Androgyne, pp. 7 8 - 1 2 4 .

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evaluates as the highest are m u c h closer to the second, m o r e typically Eastern, pattern of religious mysticism. H e r e w e have the mystical intuition of a completely undifferentiated unity; the transconscious experience of the universal, in w h i c h all particular, historical, 'natural', 'limiting' conditionings are transcended. Finally, w e m a y c o m m e n t o n a point already suggested in o u r discussion o f t h e coincidentia oppositorum. It seems that religious m y s t i cism in general is m o s t prevalent in Eastern religions. Salvation, as seen in the 'highest' f o r m s of H i n d u i s m and B u d d h i s m , is identical w i t h the ultimate mystical realization. B u t the Western religions, while manifesting religious mysticism, are n o t essentially mystical; their m a j o r sources, scriptures, and values are usually n o t mystical and are s o m e t i m e s even at o d d s w i t h mysticism. Christian mystics usually appear as the 'exceptions' and are o f t e n looked u p o n w i t h suspicion b y the traditional religion. Traditional J u a d a i s m has not encouraged its mystical paths of Kabbalism and Hasidism. Islam subjected the Sufi mystics to considerable persecution; m a n y M u s l i m s consider these mystical strains to be an i m p u r e and insignificant Indian influence. T h e r e f o r e , I w o u l d conclude that Mircea Eliade has n o t simply described w h a t homo religiosus has evaluated as ' m o s t elevated'. In fact, Eliade has g o n e b e y o n d a descriptive evaluation of w h a t the data f r o m each religious tradition revealed. His assessment is partially based on n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s : that the plane of mystical experience (in itself m o r e characteristic of Eastern religious p h e n o m e n a ) is evaluated as the ' m o s t elevated'; that the 'highest' or 'deepest' manifestations o n the level of mystical experience have a structure m o r e typical of Eastern mysticism. Mircea Eliade could take the very bold step and claim that n o t he, b u t the religious data t h e m s e l v e s — the structure of the dialectic of the sacred, the n a t u r e of the s y m b o l i c structural systems, the ' b u r s t i n g o p e n ' of the particular and the revealing of the universal, etc. — establish the conclusion that the highest levels of spiritual realizations are m o r e o f t e n expressed by Eastern rather than Western p h e n o m e n a . A n d w e suspect that this is precisely h o w Eliade feels a b o u t his religious data. A l t h o u g h Mircea Eliade has never explicitly m a d e such a j u d g m e n t , there are other equally bold, equally controversial claims

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f o u n d t h r o u g h o u t his writings, and it is to several of these that w e shall n o w turn. Illustrations of normative

judgments

T h r o u g h o u t this study, w e have cited a n u m b e r of controversial statements by Mircea Eliade, w h i c h seemed to be highly n o r m a t i v e and w h i c h w e r e o f t e n the source of considerable criticism of his p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion. T h e s e assertions o f t e n involved j u d g m e n t s a b o u t the h u m a n m o d e of being in the w o r l d and 'the h u m a n condition, as such'; a b o u t w h a t is ' t r u e ' and 'authentic' and 'the highest' aspect of reality. In the vast m a j o r i t y of such assertions, it is o u r position that methodological difficulties can be resolved by inserting 'for homo religiosus' or ' f r o m the perspective of the H i s t o r y of Religions' in the text. Eliade is describing n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s m a d e b y the religious person; evaluations arrived at on the basis of a 'religious scale'. As Ira P r o g o f f writes: ' T h e question to w h i c h Eliade addresses himself is n o t h i n g less than the question of h o w m a n establishes his sense of w h a t is real and ultimately valid in his life. T h i s is n o t a philosophical question, but a m a t t e r of fact. It is a question of w h a t individuals feel to be real w i t h sufficient conviction so that they can base their conduct u p o n it.' 2 1 T h u s , w e observed that m a n y interpreters have criticized Mircea Eliade for his personal (theological) doctrine of a 'fall'. B u t in m o s t of his statements a b o u t a 'fall', Eliade is describing the evaluations m a d e b y homo religiosus. In t e r m s of the dialectic of hierophanies, in t e r m s of the 'perfect', transhistorical, transcendent, e x e m p l a r y m o d e l s revealed t h r o u g h m y t h s , the religious data disclose that religious people have evaluated their historical, temporal, 'natural', 'conditioned', p r o f a n e m o d e of being in the w o r l d as a 'fall'. Similarly, most of the assertions a b o u t p h e n o m e n a as 'real' and 'true' are m a d e o n the basis of a religious 'scale'; f r o m the perspective of a nonreligious scale, such religious p h e n o m e n a m i g h t be evaluated as 'unreal', 'illusory', or 'false'. 21. 'Culture and Being: Mircea Eliade's Studies in Religion', p. 51.

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W e have seen that m a n y scholars, w h o m i g h t be s y m p a t h e t i c w i t h such an effort at describing religious p h e n o m e n a o n the basis of a religious scale, have criticized Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y precisely f o r n o t d o i n g this. T h e y c o n t e n d that Eliade goes far b e y o n d a description of m e a n i n g f o r homo religiosus; that he 'reads into' the religious data all kinds of m e a n i n g and is guilty of highly personal and subjective judgments. T o meet such criticisms, w e suggested that Eliade's p h e n o m e n o logical a p p r o a c h o f t e n allows h i m to evaluate descriptively. W e granted that Mircea Eliade o f t e n goes b e y o n d a description of the (conscious) interpretations and evaluations of homo religiosus. B u t w e s u b m i t t e d that, in t e r m s of his hermeneutical f r a m e w o r k , Eliade could evaluate religious p h e n o m e n a as 'real', 'true', 'higher', etc., and that such j u d g m e n t s could be rendered o n a descriptive level and f r o m the religious perspective of the H i s t o r y of Religions. Nevertheless, several of o u r previous illustrations seem to indicate that even such an 'enlarged' n o t i o n of the descriptive does n o t c o m pletely r e m o v e the impression that Eliade is s o m e t i m e s very subjective and is j u s t interjecting his o w n personal feelings. B e f o r e t u r n i n g to a delineation of several such n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s , let us emphasize t w o points w h i c h m u s t be kept in m i n d . First, only a small part of Mircea Eliade's total scholarship is represented by such n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s ; m o s t of his analysis is on the level of descriptive hermeneutics. Eliade devotes far m o r e of his scholarship to describing the particular historical and cultural c o n d i tionings and to interpreting the m e a n i n g of, say, s o m e Australian c o s m o g o n i c m y t h than using that p h e n o m e n o n to render a j u d g m e n t a b o u t the h u m a n condition. Nevertheless, even if they represent a small part of Eliade's total scholarship, these n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s are e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t : they are the source of m u c h dissatisfaction w i t h Eliade's H i s t o r y of Religions; they reveal a level of creative speculation, synthesis, and generality w h i c h distinguishes Eliade f r o m almost all other Historians of Religions; they illustrate the m o s t philosophical level of Eliade's analysis. Second, w e w o u l d never claim that all of w h a t follows, especially m u c h of the analysis u n d e r ' O n t o l o g i c a l M o v e s and Levels of G e n e r -

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ality' and ' P r i m a r y S y m b o l i c Structures and Verification', can be f o u n d in Eliade's writings. M u c h of the following, a l t h o u g h never f o r m u l a t e d by Eliade, does seem implicit in his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approach. O f t e n o u r p r o c e d u r e takes the f o r m of b e g i n n i n g w i t h Eliade's significant n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s and then asking w h a t a s s u m p t i o n s he had to m a k e and w h a t principles he had to adopt in order to arrive at such conclusions. S o m e t i m e s o u r analysis goes b e y o n d a n y t h i n g Eliade has written; this m a y be taken as an a t t e m p t to suggest s o m e n e w directions and possible o p e n i n g s for f u t u r e creative thought. W e shall n o t repeat o u r previous illustrations, such as assertions a b o u t the p h e n o m e n a of ecstasy and ascension, w h i c h described p r i m o r d i a l existential situations and the h u m a n condition as such. W h a t f o l l o w s are several other statements by Mircea Eliade w h i c h seem to be highly n o r m a t i v e and the reactions of a f e w of his i n t e r p r e t ers to this level of analysis. In Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, Eliade s u b m i t s that religion is the e x e m p l a r y solution of every existential crisis. R e ligion 'begins' w h e n and w h e r e there is a total revelation of reality; a revelation w h i c h is at once that of the sacred — of that w h i c h s u p r e m e l y is, of w h a t is neither illusory n o r evanescent — and of m a n ' s relationship to the sacred, a relationship w h i c h is multiple, changing, s o m e t i m e s ambivalent, b u t w h i c h always places m a n at the heart of the real. 22 O n w h a t basis can Eliade m a k e these claims? H e is n o t simply asserting that religion always presents a p a r a d i g m a t i c m o d e l in t e r m s of w h i c h religious persons resolve their existential crises. 'Religion is the e x e m p l a r y solution of every existential crisis.' O n w h a t basis can Eliade assert that the religious revelation is n o t 'illusory', is o f ' r e a l i t y ' , and 'always places m a n at the heart of the real'? Eliade w o u l d p r o b a b l y claim that these are n o t his personal j u d g ments, but are j u d g m e n t s m a d e b y homo religiosus, and that they are valid only in t e r m s of such a religious perspective. Nevertheless, in this and in n u m e r o u s other contexts, it does seem that Eliade has g o n e 22. Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p. 18. The Sacred, p. 210: 'For religion is the paradigmatic solution for every existential crisis.'

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b e y o n d such a level o f analysis and is presenting us w i t h s o m e very general, n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s about the nature of our m o d e o f b e i n g in the w o r l d and our existential crises. W h a t Professer Eliade wishes to claim, as w e shall see in the next t w o illustrations, is that it is more authentically human to live one's life in terms of transcendent exemplary models than to identify oneself fully w i t h the temporal and historical dimension of existence; that the m o d e r n historical person, w h o refuses any 'religious solutions', cannot solve his or her most f u n d a m e n t a l existential crises. In The Sacred and the Profane, Eliade describes the religious perspective of archaic societies in which 'the w h o l e of life is capable o f b e i n g sanctified'. H e then goes on to assert that 'For nonreligious man, all vital experiences— w h e t h e r sex or eating, w o r k or p l a y — have been desacralized. This means that all these physiological acts are deprived of spiritual significance, hence deprived of their truly h u m a n d i m e n sion.' 2 3 As Ricketts has written, 'instead of choosing historicism, Eliade chooses the transhistorical or the religious m o d e o f b e i n g as the m o r e truly h u m a n ' . 2 4 O n e m a y question the g r o u n d s on which Eliade makes such a j u d g m e n t , especially since C a m u s , Sartre, most other existentialists and historicists claim j u s t the opposite. T h e y w o u l d evaluate such religious appeals to transcendence as escapes f r o m reality, asnegations of authentic h u m a n existence. O n l y desacralized experience allows h u m a n beings to realize their 'truly h u m a n dimension' of existence. ' T h e y [those in rebellion] choose, and give us as an example the only original rule of life today: to learn to live and to die, and, in order to be a man, to refuse to be a g o d . ' T h e rebel rejects all appeals to divinity so that one m i g h t share in the struggles of h u m a n i t y . Unless w e assume the struggle and tension of the revolt, w e betray our true nature as h u m a n beings. 2 5 23. The Sacred, pp. 167, 168. Cf. ' T h e Sacrcd in the Secular World', p. 104: 'I cannot limit his [the m o d e r n person w h o claims not be religious] universe to that purely self-conscious, rationalistic universe which he pretends to inhabit, since that universe is not h u m a n . ' 24. Ricketts, 'Mircea Eliade and the Death of God', p. 43. 25. Albert Camus, The Rebel, pp. 304-306 andpassim. What makes a comparison of Sartre or C a m u s and Eliade especially interesting is that they seem to be in basic agreement as to the nature of religion and religious experience. It is their evaluations of religious p h e n o m e n a which are so antithetical.

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Illustrations of such normative claims may be found throughout the final chapter of The Myth of the Eternal Return, which is entitled 'The Terror of History'. For example, Eliade contends that 'Whatever be the truth in respect to the freedom and the creative virtualities of historical man, it is certain that none of the historicistic philosophies is able to defend him f r o m the terror of history.' When the modern person confronts Nazi concentration camps, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, and other historical 'tragedies', Eliade submits that 'the terror of history' must lead to nihilism or despair if the person completely makes her or himself through one's historical situations. Eliade claims that 'the man w h o has left the horizon of archetypes and repetition can no longer defend himself against that terror except through the idea of God'. 'Any other situation of modern man leads, in the end, to despair.' 26 F r o m various comments about the peasants and history of his native Romania, it is evident that Mircea Eliade identifies with the above analysis in a very personal manner. He concludes his essay on the most popular Romanian ballad, the 'Mioritza', by telling us that the R o m a nians and other peoples of eastern Europe became conscious of 'the terror of history': Despite all that they are ready to accomplish, despite all sacrifices and all heroism, they are condemned by history, because they are situated at the very crossroads of invasions . . . or in the immediate neighborhood of military powers dynamized by imperialistic fanaticism. There is no effective military or political defense against the 'terror of history,' simply because of the crushing inequality between the invaders and the invaded peoples. T o be sure, this does not mean that the latter did not defend themselves, militarily and politically, and often with success. But in the end the situation could not be changed. Small political groups of peasants could not long resist the masses of the invaders. 27 M a o Tse-tung told the Chinese peasants and H o Chi Minh told the Vietnamese peasants that despite the past successes of outside invaders, and despite the military and imperialistic forces that oppressed 26. The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp. 159, 161-162. 27. ' T h e C l a i r v o y a n t L a m b ' , Zalmoxis: The Vanishing

God, p. 254.

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and exploited t h e m , the situation could be changed. Feudalism, colonialism, capitalism, and neocolonialism w e r e specific structures that w e r e manifested at different stages of history and hence w e r e n o t inevitable or eternal. If the peasants w e r e divided into small groups, they m u s t unite w i t h o t h e r peasants and other anti-imperialist forces so that they could free themselves f r o m the invaders and in the process change history. Eliade, i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g the a b o v e quotation, s u b m i t s that ' T o despair and nihilism the only response is a religious interpretation of the terror of history.' As in his interpretation of the R o m a n i a n ballad, the 'essential e l e m e n t ' in o v e r c o m i n g the terror of history 'lies in the capacity to annul the apparently irremediable consequences of a tragic event by charging them with previously unsuspected [religious] values'.28 Certainly, the history of peasants in R o m a n i a and India m a y lend considerable s u p p o r t to Eliade's interpretation. Certainly, the successes of peasants and w o r k e r s in C h i n a and V i e t n a m m a y lend considerable s u p p o r t to the interpretations by M a o and H o . As w e have previously s u b m i t t e d , the 'scale' m a k e s the difference, and all interpretations are perspectival. U n d e r 'verification', w e shall suggest h o w one m i g h t begin to verify such perspectives. Let us cite a n o t h e r illustration f r o m Albert C a m u s , his ' e x p e r i m e n t w i t h nihilism', b u t this time, instead of indicating h o w the existentialist m i g h t disagree w i t h Eliade's j u d g m e n t , w e shall indicate h o w Eliade m i g h t defend his a b o v e j u d g m e n t s . In The Myth of Sisyphus, C a m u s describes the total absurdity and meaninglessness of the w o r l d . T h e n in The Plague, and especially in The Rebel, he finds value in the h u m a n protest against one's absurd conditions. B u t if all is m e a n i n g less, w h a t does it m a t t e r if others suffer and protest against the c o n d i tions that oppress you? C a m u s bases his social d i m e n s i o n and t h e o r y 28. Ibid., pp. 254-255. A l t h o u g h our study is not intended to be a biographical study of Mircea Eliade, w e may mention that there is a considerable documentation, especially in Romanian, which clearly establishes h o w deeply Eliade identifies both himself and his native Romania with such a position. T h e most comprehensive documentation in English of such views is Dennis A. Doeing, 'A Biography of Mircea Eliade's Spiritual and Intellectual D e v e l o p m e n t f r o m 1917 to 1940' (Ph.D. diss., University of O t t a w a , 1975). Several of the selections in Myths and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea Eliade, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa and Charles H. Long, especially the essay by Virgil Ierunca, make clear this personal identification.

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of revolt on the value of solidarity revealed in rebellion. W i t h o u t this sense of complicity, w e are still in the w o r l d of Sisyphus's solitary defiance. But it seems possible to contend that in a universe of the absurd, this affirmation of solidarity is just another manifestation of our curtailing lucid reason and attempting to escape nihilism t h r o u g h 'hope' and 'philosophical suicide'. 2 9 O u r point has not been to s h o w that Mircea Eliade's j u d g m e n t m a y be correct: that h u m a n beings, w h o completely make themselves t h r o u g h history, m a y n o t be able to o v e r c o m e nihilism and despair. O u r point is that such j u d g m e n t s , as well as our previous illustrations, involve a very different level of analysis f r o m , say, an analysis of the meaning of s o m e m y t h or ritual for homo religiosus. A n d Eliade has left himself open to considerable criticism by not distinguishing these different levels of analysis. T h e above illustrations are typical of hundreds of similar statements f o u n d t h r o u g h o u t Eliade's writings in w h i c h he makes j u d g m e n t s about the 'true' nature of the h u m a n being and one's 'actual' situation in the world, the nature of the m o d e r n Western h u m a n being and his or her alienated m o d e of being in the world, the present need for a ' n e w h u m a n i s m ' based on the m o d e r n person's encounter w i t h the primordial religious symbolisms, etc. 30 T h e point w e wish to stress is that such assertions are n o t simply on the descriptive level o f ' f o r homo religiosus'. Eliade has g o n e b e y o n d w h a t the religious data directly reveal. It is evident that he wishes to m a k e such observations about m o d e r n h u m a n beings, Western so29. E v e n in The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, in w h i c h C a m u s is so d e t e r m i n e d t o u p h o l d this raisonnement absurde, h e e n c o u n t e r s this s a m e k i n d o f difficulty. H e a r g u e s that it is b e t t e r t o live like S i s y p h u s , w i t h a c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e a b s u r d , t h a n t o live u n d e r religious or o t h e r illusions. B u t , to b e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h his analysis o f t h e a b s u r d , it s e e m s t h a t C a m u s s h o u l d m a i n t a i n that it m a k e s n o d i f f e r e n c e w h e t h e r o n e is a w a r e o f t h e a b s u r d o r blind t o t h e h u m a n c o n d i t i o n . 30. S u c h claims f o r m t h e basis o f ' H i s t o r y o f R e l i g i o n s a n d a N e w H u m a n i s m ' , ' C r i s i s a n d R e n e w a l in H i s t o r y o f Religions', a n d v a r i o u s o t h e r articles b y M i r c e a Eliade. M a n y o f these articles h a v e b e e n revised a n d r e p r o d u c e d in The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion. S u c h claims are also e m p h a s i z e d in Eliade's collections o f essays a n d articles: Images and Symbols, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, and Mephistopheles and the Androgyne o r The Two and the One. M o s t significantly, in o u r o p i n i o n , is t h e fact that s u c h n o r m a t i v e assertions can be f o u n d in t h o s e w o r k s w h i c h w e c o n s i d e r Eliade's m o s t scholarly b o o k s : Shamanism, Yoga, Patterns, a n d The Myth of the Eternal Return.

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ciety, and the f u t u r e of h u m a n k i n d f r o m the perspective of the History of Religions. B u t it is equally evident that he is claiming s o m e t h i n g very different f r o m a descriptive interpretation o f the meaning o f religious phenomena. W h y are these claims different f r o m the n o r m a tive j u d g m e n t s of such disciplines as theology and philosophy of religion? Robert D. Baird argues that Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y of s y m b o l i s m is 'as n o r m a t i v e as theology because it is based on an assumed o n tology which is neither historically derived nor descriptively verifiable'. In discussing Eliade's use of archaic m a n as a 'model of authentic existence', Baird writes as follows: ' O n c e one sees " t h e sacred" or " r e l i g i o n " as an ontological reality and once one operates as t h o u g h its structures are also ontologically real, having identified these structures one has discovered reality. It then follows that those w h o s e lives are lived in the sacred as completely as possible are the most authentic since they exist closest to reality.' 3 1 In a similar manner, T h o m a s Altizer contends that Eliade's analysis (in 'Methodological Remarks') 'assumes an essential continuity bet w e e n the religious s y m b o l and the structure of the world: it assumes an ultimate identity between reality and the sacred'. Eliade 'believes that the religious s y m b o l opens m a n to the real as such — to Being i t s e l f . According to Ricketts, Eliade 'is convinced that the study of religious data as such (and n o t as psychological data, for example) is the best w a y to understand n o t only the symbols and images, but also the nature of m a n h i m s e l f . In Eliade's differences w i t h Jung, it 'is the nature of m a n and the reality of the religious experience that are at stake'. 3 2 O u r purpose in citing these illustrations has been neither to argue for or against Eliade's j u d g m e n t s nor to agree or disagree w i t h his interpreters. O u r purpose has been to substantiate the fact that Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y functions on different planes of analysis and that at 31. Baird, Category Formation and the History of Religions, pp. 8 6 - 8 7 . It is o u r p o s i t i o n t h a t Eliade is n o t n e a r l y as n o r m a t i v e as B a i r d and, t o a lesser e x t e n t , Altizer s e e m to t h i n k . T h i s is because t h e y d o n o t a c k n o w l e d g e Eliade's h e r m e n e u t i c a l f r a m e w o r k , w h i c h allows h i m to describe m u c h o f w h a t t h e y d e e m to b e o b v i o u s l y n o r m a t i v e . 32. Altizer, ' T h e Religious M e a n i n g o f M y t h a n d S y m b o l ' , p. 89; Ricketts, ' T h e N a t u r e a n d E x t e n t o f Eliade's " J u n g i a n i s m " ', p. 232.

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least s o m e levels of his analysis seem to consist of highly n o r m a t i v e judgments. N o w w e recall that Mircea Eliade, in arguing against various reductionist approaches, has insisted on the religious perspective of the History of Religions. In terms of such a scale, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion can distinguish religious phenomena, interpret their religious meaning and evaluate t h e m as 'higher' or ' l o w e r ' religious manifestations. T o avoid being guilty of the same kind of reductionism he so vehemently opposes, Professor Eliade must grant that f r o m a different (sociological, psychological, anthropological, economic) perspective, an investigator w o u l d interpret different meanings and m a k e different evaluations. But f r o m the above and similar illustrations, it seems that Mircea Eliade is attempting to go beyond such a perspectival orientation. He has not limited his approach to participating sympathetically in the religious experiences ofhomo religiosus and to describing the structures of the religious life-world. H e is presenting us w i t h claims about the highest and deepest aspects of reality, about the true nature of the h u m a n being. Are Eliade's n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s about, say, our m o d e r n secular m o d e s of being in the w o r l d and about the h u m a n condition in general simply arbitrary and subjective? Has Eliade completely divorced h i m self f r o m the proper d o m a i n of the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion and f r o m any perspective within the History of Religions? It is the endeavor to answer such questions, especially by relating Eliade's n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s to his descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y , to which w e n o w turn. Ontological moves and levels of generality In trying to analyze the status of such n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s , we w o u l d submit that Mircea Eliade's analysis moves to greater and greater levels of generality and that such a methodological procedure reveals an ontological stance. O u r position is that such an approach, involving ontological moves which allow for analyses on greater levels of generality, can be seen in the w o r k s of most m a j o r philosophical phenomenologists. For example, M e r l e a u - P o n t y describes the structures of perceptual

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consciousness in o r d e r to gain insight into the f u n d a m e n t a l structures of h u m a n consciousness generally. A n d the a s s u m p t i o n is that perception will in s o m e w a y reveal this. T h i s is an ontological m o v e . T h i s is n o t to say that such m o v e s to greater levels of generality are simply arbitrary and subjective. M e r l e a u - P o n t y and other p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s are concerned w i t h verifying or j u s t i f y i n g such m o v e s in light of the greater clarity, coherency, etc., they b r i n g to o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the phenomena. T h i s is h o w w e interpret Eliade's m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e w h e n , after describing the n a t u r e of s o m e religious p h e n o m e n o n in t e r m s of its particular historical and cultural conditionings, he f r e q u e n t l y asks w h e t h e r that p h e n o m e n o n ' m i g h t n o t reveal s o m e t h i n g of the h u m a n condition regarded in its o w n right as a m o d e of existence in the universe'. T h u s , Eliade describes a variety of examples expressing 'ecstasy' and finally deciphers the essential structure of religious ecstasy. H e then seems to assume that the structure of ecstasy, as a f u n d a m e n t a l religious p h e n o m e n o n , will reveal s o m e t h i n g essential a b o u t the h u m a n m o d e of being and the structure of consciousness; a b o u t o u r 'real' situation in the w o r l d and 'the h u m a n condition, as such'. A crucial m e t h o d o l o g i c a l difficulty in Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y arises f r o m the fact that he usually presents his interpretations as if they are all on the same level of analysis, arrived at by the same m e t h o d , and h a v i n g the same degree of support. H e does n o t a c k n o w l e d g e that a j u d g m e n t a b o u t an essential structure of the h u m a n condition is arrived at in a m a n n e r different f r o m , say, a description of an essential structure of s o m e c o s m o g o n i c m y t h ; it is on a less descriptive level of analysis, is far m o r e difficult to verify, and does n o t have the same degree of certainty. C o n s i d e r o u r illustration of the snake and lunar s y m b o l i s m . At a certain stage in his analysis, Eliade detects various structural similarities b e t w e e n certain p h e n o m e n a . Finally, he is able to grasp the total lunar ' w e b ' and can then interpret the religious m e a n i n g of the particular snake d a t u m by reintegrating it within its coherent, lunar, structural ' s y s t e m ' of s y m b o l i c associations. T h i s hermeneutical m o v e m e n t to greater and greater levels of g e n erality has led m a n y critics to charge that such interpretations are

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highly n o r m a t i v e . H o w e v e r , w e a t t e m p t e d to s h o w the possibility of f o r m u l a t i n g such a general perspective t h r o u g h a descriptive level of analysis. B u t Mircea Eliade proceeds to even greater levels of generality, and, in this regard, it seems unlikely that he can avoid assuming s o m e ontological position. Eliade a t t e m p t s to f o r m u l a t e a 'general picture' of w h a t all the lunar hierophanies reveal; to determine w h e t h e r they 'fit t o g e t h e r ' to f o r m a 'theory', expressing a series o f ' t r u t h s ' w h i c h constitute a 'system'. 3 3 B y g r o u p i n g the lunar hierophanies a r o u n d f o u r central themes, Eliade grasps 'the d o m i n a n t idea' in all these t h e m e s as ' o n e of rhythm carried out by a succession of contraries, of " b e c o m i n g " t h r o u g h the succession of o p p o s i n g modalities'. N o t h i n g in the sublunar w o r l d can be 'eternal'; n o change is final, since 'every change is merely part of a cyclic pattern'. Mircea Eliade n o w m o v e s to an even greater level of generality. H e wishes to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t this m o s t 'general picture' of the structure disclosed by all of the lunar hierophanies reveals to us a b o u t the h u m a n m o d e of being in the w o r l d and about the n a t u r e of the h u m a n condition. It m i g h t be said that the m o o n s h o w s m a n his true h u m a n condition. . . . T h o u g h the m o d a l i t y of the m o o n is s u p r e m e l y one of change, of r h y t h m , it is equally one of periodic returning; and this pattern of existence is disturbing and consoling at the same time — for t h o u g h the manifestations of life are so frail that they can suddenly disappear altogether, they are restored in the 'eternal r e t u r n i n g ' regulated by the m o o n . Such is the law of the w h o l e s u b l u n a r y universe. O n this general level of analysis, Eliade s u b m i t s that the infinite variations of the universal ' m y t h of reintegration' express m a n ' s 'thirst to abolish dualisms, endless returnings and f r a g m e n t a r y existences'. A c c o r d i n g to Eliade, this universal expression reveals that man, ' f r o m the t i m e w h e n he first realized his position in the universe', s o u g h t to pass b e y o n d 'his h u m a n status ( " r e f l e c t e d " so exactly b y the moon's)'.34 O n c e again, the interpretations of the n a t u r e o f ' t h e h u m a n c o n d i 33. See t h e section in Patterns, 34. Ibid., pp. 184-185.

pp. 182-185, entitled ' L u n a r M e t a p h y s i c s ' .

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tion' and religious experience formulated by C a m u s and Eliade seem remarkably similar. Indeed, the nature of the h u m a n mode of being in the world, which Eliade deciphers in the 'sublunary law' of the universe, is quite similar to Camus's understanding of the existential situation of Sisyphus. In addition, C a m u s concurs fully with Eliade's interpretation of the ' m y t h of reintegration': the h u m a n being, in experiencing 'his position in the universe', has an intense desire and 'nostalgia' for a more meaningful, coherent, unified existence; for a m o d e of being beyond 'his h u m a n status'. Their differences in analysis arise f r o m radically different evaluations of such phenomena. For Camus, an authentically h u m a n existence necessitates that one does not 'escape' f r o m or negate her or his ' h u m a n condition'. T h e ' m y t h of reintegration' thus reveals a religious 'leap' which leads to 'existential suicide', to an inauthentic and illusory existence which negates what is 'truly human'. Let us n o w consider a recently cited illustration: Eliade's analysis of 'the terror of history'. We shall then propose several methodological conclusions regarding the status of the lunar judgments, the following claims, and other similar interpretations. At the beginning of The Myth of the Eternal Return, Mircea Eliade states the purpose of this book: 'to study certain aspects of archaic o n t o l o g y — more precisely, the conceptions of being and reality that can be read f r o m the behavior of the man of the premodern societies'. By studying multifarious 'facts' drawn f r o m many different cultures, Eliade gains insight into 'the mechanism of traditional thought': ' h o w and why, for the man of the premodern societies, certain things become real'. In this manner, he hopes 'to identify the structure of this archaic ontology'. After investigating the particular facts, Eliade submits the following conclusion about 'the same "primitive" ontological conception: an object or an act becomes real only insofar as it imitates or repeats an archetype. Thus, reality is acquired solely through repetition or participation; everything which lacks an exemplary model is "meaningless," i.e., it lacks reality.' 35 35. The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp. 3-6, 34. O n e can understand w h y Eliade asserts that this 'primitive' ontology might be viewed as having 'a Platonic structure'. O n p. 35, Eliade formulates 'a second aspect of this primitive ontology': the 'abolition

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Mircea Eliade proceeds to an even more general level of interpretation, in which he seeks to analyze just what such an ontological conception reveals about the nature of the 'traditional' or 'premodern' person. H e claims that the person's desire 'to refuse history, and to confine himself to an indefinite repetition of archetypes [probably] testifies to his thirst for the real and his terror of "losing" himself by letting himself be overwhelmed by the meaninglessness of profane existence.' 36 In the last chapter of The Myth of the Eternal Return, Eliade attempts to confront the modern historical person with the archaic conception, which is 'archetypal and ahistorical'; more specifically, he wishes to analyze 'the solutions offered by the historicistic view to enable m o d ern man to tolerate the increasingly powerful pressure of contemporary history' within the horizon of the archaic ontology. H e concludes with the j u d g m e n t s w e have previously described: none of the historicistic philosophies succeeds in defending a person f r o m the terror of history; any solution to this terror which rejects the idea of God must lead to nihilism and despair. 'Justification of a historical event by the simple fact that it is a historical event' cannot free humanity ' f r o m the terror that the event inspires'. ' O n l y such a freedom', grounded in the Judaeo-Christian 'category of faith' — 'for God everything is possible'— can defend the modern Western person ' f r o m the terror of history'. 'Every other modern freedom . . . is powerless to justify history.' 3 7 o f p r o f a n e time, o f d u r a t i o n , o f " h i s t o r y " t h r o u g h 'the imitation of archetypes and t h e r e p e t i t i o n o f p a r a d i g m a t i c gestures'. 36. Ibid., p p . 9 1 - 9 2 . O n p. 91, Eliade describes this as t h e t r a d i t i o n a l p e r s o n ' s 'thirst f o r t h e " o n t i c " , his will t o be. . .' K i r k (Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures, p. 255 n) s u b m i t s t h a t Eliade's a s s u m p t i o n that such t r a d i t i o n a l p e r s o n s ' m u s t in all l i k e l i h o o d h a v e possessed c o n c e p t s o f " b e i n g " , " n o n - b e i n g " , " r e a l " , a n d " b e c o m i n g " , e v e n if t h e y did n o t h a v e t h e w o r d s f o r t h e m . . . . [and o t h e r ] s u c h e x t r a v a g a n c e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h a m a r k e d repetitiousness, h a v e m a d e Eliade u n p o p u l a r w i t h m a n y a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s and s o c i o l o g i s t s . ' Eliade's p o s i t i o n , as w e h a v e seen, is t h a t w h e n i n v e s t i g a t o r s u n c o v e r and i n t e r p r e t t h e m e a n i n g o f the basic s t r u c t u r e s e x pressed in their data, t h e y find t h a t t h e r e are f u n d a m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e s of h u m a n c o n s c i o u s n e s s and o f t h e h u m a n m o d e o f b e i n g in t h e w o r l d ; a n d these s t r u c t u r e s , w h i c h at their m o s t essential level are c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h e h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , t r a n s c e n d t h e historical a n d cultural c o n d i t i o n i n g s o f their particular religious m a n i f e s t a t i o n . 37. The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp. 141, 150, 159-162. It m a y s u r p r i s e t h e r e a d e r that Eliade uses t h e t e r m ' G o d ' , r a t h e r t h a n a m o r e general t e r m s u c h as ' t h e sacred';

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W h a t concerns us is n o t the adequacy of Eliade's particular interpretation, b u t rather the fact that Mircea Eliade is n o longer defining his analysis simply in t e r m s of the perspective of homo religiosus. H e seems to h a v e m o v e d to a level of generality b e y o n d such perspectival limitations. In other w o r d s , Eliade is n o t claiming the f o l l o w i n g : f r o m a religious perspective, n o historicistic 'solution' can defend us f r o m 'the terror of history'; b u t f r o m s o m e nonreligious perspective, there m a y be a 'solution' w h i c h can 'justify' history and o v e r c o m e nihilism and despair. H e is m a k i n g general j u d g m e n t s a b o u t the h u m a n m o d e of being in the w o r l d and the h u m a n condition as such; and, on the basis o f such j u d g m e n t s , he is claiming that the 'historicistic philosophies' of Hegel, M a r x , Dilthey, and others cannot defend the m o d e r n W e s t e r n h u m a n being f r o m the terror of history. N o w such a p r o c e d u r e clearly involves an ontological stance. O n w h a t basis can Mircea Eliade proceed b e y o n d his perspectival limitations? Isn't he guilty of the same reductionism he attacked w h e n he f o r m u l a t e d his m e t h o d o l o g i c a l principle that 'the scale creates the p h e n o m e n o n ' ? It w o u l d appear that Eliade assumes that the structures of religious experience, as seen in the religious person's refusal to identify her or himself w i t h the t e m p o r a l and historical d i m e n s i o n of existence, reveal f u n d a m e n t a l structures of the h u m a n m o d e of being generally. H o w does one arrive at such j u d g m e n t s ? H o w does the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t j u s t i f y t h e m ? D o such j u d g m e n t s simply express subjective, personal 'feelings'? A r e they related in any w a y to m o r e descriptive, p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analysis?

PRIMARY SYMBOLIC STRUCTURES AND VERIFICATION

W e interpret the n a t u r e of m o s t of Eliade's highly n o r m a t i v e claims in light of the ontological status he grants the archetypal symbolic structures. As w e have seen, Eliade v i e w s these universal, a u t o n o m o u s , coherent such a choice is dictated by the specific context, i n v o l v i n g an analysis of the m o d e r n , Western, historical person. Cf. Eliade's similar level of analysis in the last chapter of Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, 'Religious S y m b o l i s m and the M o d e r n M a n ' s A n x i e t y ' , pp. 231-245.

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s y m b o l i s m s as revealing the inexhaustible possibilities f o r expressing p h e n o m e n a o n all levels of reality. Such s y m b o l i s m s allow f o r expressions on the ' l o w e s t ' and m o s t 'aberrant' planes of manifestation and f o r expressions of the 'highest' and m o s t creative metaphysical and mystical realizations. A n d the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion, in gaining insight into the essential structure of a s y m b o l i s m , can integrate the h e t e r o g e n e o u s p h e n o m e n a manifested on diverse planes of reality into a unified structural system. O f t e n , in v i e w of the particular historical and cultural conditionings and existential crises, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t can u n d e r s t a n d w h y w e have expressed o u r experiences t h r o u g h certain of the infinite possibilités of s y m b o l i c valorizations. It is o u r interpretation that Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analysis, on all levels of generality, is d e p e n d e n t o n this p r i m a r y s y m b o l i c f o u n d a tion. M o s t of these levels of p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analysis are descriptive. T h u s , on the 'horizontal' plane of hermeneutics, Eliade describes s y m b o l s t h r o u g h o t h e r symbols; describes h o w s y m b o l s f u n c t i o n according to their o w n 'logic' and interlock to f o r m coherent structural ' w e b s ' ; and describes the m e a n i n g of a particular s y m b o l i c expression b y reintegrating it w i t h i n its ' p r o p e r ' s y m b o l i c system. In addition, these 'logical' structural systems allow the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t of religion to distinguish different planes of s y m b o l i c expression and to evaluate descriptively certain p h e n o m e n a as 'higher', 'deeper', or 'elevated' manifestations. W i t h o u t recalling all of the levels of interpretation, let us consider the m o s t general and m o s t controversial level of analysis. H e r e Eliade m o v e s b e y o n d even the general analysis of w h a t the religious data reveal a b o u t the basic m o d e o f being of homo religiosus. H e formulates n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s a b o u t the h u m a n m o d e of being generally, a b o u t the h u m a n condition as such. O n this greatest level of generality, Mircea Eliade is n o longer w i t h i n the d o m a i n of descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y . Indeed, m a n y of his j u d g m e n t s are on the level of analysis of philosophical a n t h r o p o l o g y . N o w the crucial m e t h o d o l o g i c a l point, as w e interpret this level of generality, is the f o l l o w i n g : Mircea Eliade has g o n e b e y o n d the limits of descriptive analysis and has f o r m u l a t e d various ontological c o n cepts, but such an ontological move isfounded on and informed by the primary symbolic structures.

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T r u e , w h e n Mircea Eliade claims that m o d e r n h u m a n beings cannot o v e r c o m e their sense o f alienation if they completely m a k e t h e m selves t h r o u g h history; that in the authentically h u m a n d i m e n s i o n of existence, Sartre is w r o n g and existence does n o t precede essence; his analysis reveals an ontological m o v e . It reveals a n o r m a t i v e 'leap' in the sense that analysis o n such a level of generality is m o r e speculative and less certain than the m o r e descriptive levels of analysis. T h e m o r e descriptive analyses are 'closer' to or m o r e directly d e p e n d e n t on the p r i m a r y s y m b o l i s m s . T h e general n o r m a t i v e claims are o n the greatest level of generality and are m a n y levels ' r e m o v e d ' f r o m the fundamental symbolisms. T h e special ontological status of archetypal s y m b o l i s m , w e w o u l d submit, is the f o l l o w i n g : they are the f u n d a m e n t a l expressions for an extralinguistic reality, they reveal various places where language does 'key in' with actual experience.38 S y m b o l s serve as 'ciphers' of reality. W e can decipher the m e a n i n g of such ciphers in an infinite variety of w a y s and o n m a n y planes of interpretation. T h e s y m b o l i s m s express the enigm a s and ambiguities of being and the inexhaustible possibilities f o r philosophical reflection. Philosophical reflection— and w e interpret Professor Eliade's m o s t significant n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s as on the plane of philosophical a n t h r o p o l o g y — is m a n y levels r e m o v e d f r o m the archetypal s y m bolisms. T h u s , b e t w e e n describing a lunar structure and m a k i n g an ontological j u d g m e n t a b o u t one's true nature, there are m a n y interv e n i n g stages of interpretation, w h i c h w e have usually expressed as Eliade's analysis on greater and greater levels of generality. B u t this does n o t m e a n that such ontological m o v e s are completely arbitrary and subjective. If they are to express deep aspects of reality, they m u s t be i n f o r m e d b y and be consistent w i t h the basic intentionality of the p r i m a r y s y m b o l i s m s . In short, the levels of philosophical analysis arise o u t and g o b e y o n d the 'givenness' of the archetypal s y m b o l i s m s and the f u n d a m e n t a l l y descriptive levels of analysis. B u t philosophical reflection m u s t c o n tinually return to its foundation, n o t only to be enriched and r e n e w e d 38. Cf. Ricceur, ' T h e P r o b l e m of the D o u b l e - S e n s e as H e r m e n e u t i c P r o b l e m and as S e m a n t i c P r o b l e m ' , pp. 64-68; D o n Ihde, ' S o m e Parallels B e t w e e n Analysis and P h e n o m e n o l o g y ' , Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27, no. 4 (1967): 583-586.

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t h r o u g h the realization of previously unseen creative possibilities, b u t also to check that its ontological analyses and j u d g m e n t s on this 'distant' level of generality have n o t distorted the basic intentionality w h i c h constitutes its philosophical f o u n d a t i o n . 3 9 N o w h o w m i g h t Eliade verify such ontological moves? H o w can he be sure that, in ' m o v i n g ' to levels of interpretation m o r e r e m o v e d f r o m the archetypal symbolisms, his analysis still 'keys in' w i t h aspects of reality? O n e realizes that this process of verification, unlike s o m e of the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 'checks' on the levels of descriptive hermeneutics, cannot be carried o u t exclusively on the plane of s y m b o l i c structures. Such ontological analyses are f o u n d e d o n the s y m b o l i c structures, b u t use symbols to get beyond the symbolic plane. For example, Eliade m a y analyze a specific shamanic or y o g i c p h e n o m e n o n o f ' m y s t i c a l flight' as revealing a structure o f ' f r e e d o m and transcendence'. H e m a y check his interpretation b y reintegrating that s y m b o l i c expression w i t h i n its total coherent system o f ' a s c e n s i o n s y m b o l i s m ' . B u t h o w does Eliade verify his ontological claim that this s y m b o l i c structure reveals s o m e thing a b o u t 'the true nature of the h u m a n b e i n g ' and is 'constitutive of man'? It seems to us that implicit in m u c h of Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y is a sense of verification not unlike the proposals of Paul Ricoeur and o t h e r existential p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s . Ricoeur distinguishes three different levels of interpreting s y m b o l s : descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y , where, as w e have seen, he places Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion and discusses verification in t e r m s of the 'horizontal' plane of internal coherence; the 'circle of hermeneutics'; and philosophical h e r m e n e u tics. 40 Paul Ricoeur describes the level of philosophical hermeneutics in 39. We would never maintain that all of Eliade's normative j u d g m e n t s can be viewed in this manner. Within his p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion, one finds the insertion of various parenthetical remarks and highly subjective, personal feelings. But the above analysis expresses our general understanding of h o w Eliade arrives at his most significant ontological claims. 40. The Symbolism of Evil, pp. 351-357; ' T h e Symbol: Food for T h o u g h t ' , pp. 202-207. O u r concern here is not with describing the methodological ' m o v e m e n t ' f r o m one level to the next, but only with the notion of verification on the 'third level' of philosophical hermeneutics, which 'is the properly philosophical stage'.

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terms of a 'wager': 'I wager that I shall have a better understanding of m a n and of the b o n d between the being of man and the being of all beings if I follow the indication of symbolic t h o u g h t . ' Ricceur calls the task oiverifying his wager a 'transcendental deduction' of symbols, 'in the Kantian sense' o f ' j u s t i f y i n g a concept by s h o w i n g that it makes possible the construction of a d o m a i n of objectivity'. Ricoeur's description of this task seems to reveal precisely w h a t Eliade is doing: 'In fact, the symbol, used as a means of detecting and deciphering h u m a n reality, will have been verified by its p o w e r to raise up, to illuminate, to give order to that region of h u m a n experience. . . which w e were too ready to reduce to error, habit, emotion, passivity — in short, to one or another of the dimensions of finitude that have no need of the symbols . . . to open t h e m up and discover them.' 4 1 T h e s y m b o l is not 'a simple revealer of self-awareness', but has an 'ontological function' of speaking to us 'of the situation of the being of man in the being of the world'. Hence the task of philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y is 'starting f r o m the symbols, to elaborate existential concepts — that is to say, n o t only structures of reflection but structures of existence, insofar as existence is the being of man ' . 42 W e have selected Ricoeur's formulation, in preference to other similar accounts in existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y , because it describes almost perfectly our understanding of Eliade's ontological analysis. Perhaps this is w h y w e regard Eliade's approach to religious phenomena, at least on several levels of interpretation, as having m o r e in c o m m o n w i t h various approaches in existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y than w i t h most approaches of scholars in the H i s t o r y of Religions. We w o u l d submit that Mircea Eliade's occasional reluctance to be identified in any w a y w i t h philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y usually is based on the 41. The Symbolism of Evil, p. 355. If this is precisely what Mircea Eliade is doing, the reader may w o n d e r w h y Ricceur limits Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion to the 'first level' of comprehension. (One very brief exception is in ' T h e Symbol: Food for T h o u g h t ' , p. 202, where Ricceur states that Eliade goes beyond 'living the life of symbols to a u t o n o m o u s thinking'.) Mircea Eliade has accounted for this 'first level' interpretation by explaining that Ricceur had read only his Patterns and that w h a t impressed Ricceur most was Eliade's descriptive and comparative analysis o n the symbolic plane of internal coherence. 42. Ibid., pp. 356-357.

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very same criticisms which philosophical phenomenology has directed against traditional (normative, reductionist, etc.) philosophy. As we have seen, Eliade conceives of religion as a total existential orientation; as the religious person's irreducible mode of being in the world. By reflecting on the archetypal symbolisms, those inexhaustible 'ciphers' of reality, Eliade creatively formulates those most general of existential concepts, which reveal the fundamental structures of the human condition, of our 'true' nature and our 'real' mode of being in the world. What makes Eliade's verification of these existential concepts so controversial, what adds to the impression that he reads into the religious data all kinds of sophisticated meanings and provides us with completely subjective interpretations, is the fact that he seems almost obsessed with those phenomena which Ricoeur describes in terms of 'error, habit, emotion, passivity'. In other words, Eliade frequently verifies his existential structures by their power 'to raise up, to illuminate, to give order to' those phenomena which traditional philosophy has usually deemed unworthy of investigation and which other disciplines have reduced to the most 'aberrant', 'infantile', 'superstitious', and lowest levels of manifestation. Thus, one might empathize with the phenomenologist's endeavor to verify some structure of transcendence in the light of the most 'elevated' expressions of philosophical and mystical yoga. But Mircea Eliade will devote more of his time to verifying this same structure of transcendence by its power to illuminate the nature and reveal the ontological foundation of customs of peasants, of erotic forms of tantric yoga, of beliefs and practices of alchemy, etc. Eliade often verifies such ontological structures by showing how they render more intelligible so much of modern behavior which we consider completely secular: our dreams, nostalgias, and fantasies; our various games and athletic contests; our movies, science fiction, contemporary novels, sculpture, paintings, and other aesthetic creations; our national chauvinism, way of regarding foreign peoples, and attitude toward work; our 'secular' rituals and customs, such as getting drunk on N e w Year's Eve; etc. In short, Mircea Eliade, by reflecting on those essential symbolisms which 'key in' with many layers of actual experience, is able to 'burst

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o p e n ' the 'limited' dimensions of experience in order to reveal the most profound ontological structures. H e r e w e have Eliade's frequent image of the h u m a n being, n o t simply as a historical being, but as 'a living symbol', w h o unifies p h e n o m e n a o n different levels of experience, w h o renews her or himself by 'opening o u t ' to the transcendent, and w h o succeeds in 'living the universal'. W e offered an earlier observation that Mircea Eliade's ontological m o v e to greater and greater levels of generality appears to take h i m b e y o n d his perspectival limitations. His ontological analysis often takes h i m b e y o n d s o m e evaluation of w h a t homo religiosus, on the basis of one's religious scale, regards to be real. In disregarding such perspectival limitations, isn't Mircea Eliade violating his o w n antireductionist principles and being guilty of the same kind of methodological reductionism he has consistently attacked? O u r position is that Mircea Eliade, on his levels of greatest generality, is involved in a reductionistic analysis, which, if he upholds his previously elucidated methodological principles, probably pushes his p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion b e y o n d the proper d o m a i n of the History of Religions. B u t such an analysis arises out of and is i n f o r m e d by the religious perspective. Indeed, it is dependent o n a certain privileged status of the religious reality. O n this level of ontological analysis, w e understand Mircea Eliade as saying the following. O n the basis of the religious perspective, especially in the light of the f u n d a m e n t a l symbolic structures of the sacred, w e shall f r a m e general existential concepts. O u r assumption is that the f u n d a m e n t a l symbols, w h i c h point b e y o n d themselves to 'extra-linguistic' reality, exhibit their highest and deepest function when they reveal the sacred. In this case of religious symbolism, the symbols point beyond themselves and reveal 'the universal'; they 'open o u t ' to the most general structures of reality. N o w let us 'wager' that such ontological concepts, formulated f r o m the religious perspective, will reveal the nature of the h u m a n being and of reality better than the existential concepts f r a m e d in terms of s o m e nonreligious perspective. We shall verify such a wager by s h o w i n g that the p r i m a r y symbolic structures of religious experience have the p o w e r to illuminate the f u n d a m e n t a l structures of the h u m a n consciousness and m o d e of being generally, of the h u m a n condition as such.

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Indeed, such a level of ontological analysis will reveal that only by experiencing the symbolic structures of the sacred, only be renewing ourselves through new revalorizations of religious symbolisms, can modern Western human beings overcome their 'terror of history' and their existential anxiety and live a truly meaningful h u m a n existence.

N E W PHILOSOPHICAL

ANTHROPOLOGIES

As w e have seen, on the levels of greatest generality, Mircea Eliade is concerned with ontology. His general normative j u d g m e n t s reveal an ontological analysis which, as w e have suggested, often functions on the plane of philosophical anthropology. We may conclude this study by relating t w o themes which appear throughout the works of Eliade and which suggest his quest for laying the foundation for new philosophical anthropologies. T h e first theme concerns Eliade's persistent critique of the provincialism and impoverishment of our contemporary Western orientations. Here w e find his negative j u d g m e n t s of our modern attempts to define the h u m a n m o d e of being and the h u m a n condition in purely historical, temporal, rational, scientific, or other secular ways. Second, there is Mircea Eliade's almost obsession with the theme of œuvres. H e even praises 'reductionists' such as Freud and D u r k h e i m for these creative 'breakthroughs', which 'burst open' the prevailing and limiting conditionings and open us to n e w universes of meaning. Eliade frequently analyzes the function of religion and the dialectic of the sacred in terms of such 'openings'. O n the level of interpretation we have just examined, on the level of such general normative judgments, it would seem that Mircea Eliade is concerned with both of these themes and is suggesting the possibilities for new and creative philosophical anthropologies. H e contends that w e have severely limited our present and possible future œuvres by defining reality in terms of our conditioned and selfimposed historical, temporal, and other structures. And his j u d g m e n t s reveal his view that there are countless possibilities for 'breakthroughs' which w e have excluded because of our narrow, impoverished, contemporary perspectives.

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T h r o u g h o u t his works, Professor Eliade has n o t only been critical of m u c h of our m o d e r n Western perspective, b u t he even maintains that o u r limiting views of the h u m a n m o d e of being in the w o r l d and the h u m a n condition have not allowed us to understand our o w n behavior. This has led to self-deception and impoverished sensitivity and creativity. W e have seen his claim that an awareness of a religious perspective, especially the p r i m a r y symbolic structures, w o u l d lead to a n e w understanding of our dreams and fantasies, our artistic creations, and m a n y of our 'secular' customs and institutions. Eliade tells us that e v e r y w h e r e in the religious universe w e find 'the same fundamental conception of the necessity to live in an intelligible and meaningful world, and w e find that this conception emerges ultimately f r o m the experience of a sacred space'. N o w one can ask in w h a t sense such experiences of the sacred space of houses, cities, and lands are still significant for m o d e r n desacralized man. Certainly, w e k n o w that m a n has never lived in the space conceived by mathematicians and physicists as being isotropic, that is, space having the same properties in all directions. T h e space experienced by m a n is oriented and thus anisotropic, f o r each dimension and direction has a specific value. . . . T h e question is w h e t h e r the experience of oriented space and other comparable experiences of intentionally structured spaces (for example, the different spaces of art and architecture) have s o m e t h i n g in c o m m o n w i t h the sacred space k n o w n by Homo religiosus.43 It is Eliade's view that such reflection on m a n y of o u r f u n d a m e n t a l m o d e r n p h e n o m e n a will lead to creative breakthroughs, to the discovery of n e w universes of meaning, to n e w philosophical anthropologies. B y focusing on our recent illustrations of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionary experiences, w e m a y be able to suggest the 43. Eliade, ' T h e W o r l d , the C i t y , the H o u s e ' , Occultism, Witchcraft, and Cultural Fashions, p. 30. O n p. 27, Eliade c l a i m s that o u r 'scientific u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o s m i c space — a space w h i c h has n o center and is infinite — has n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h the existential e x p e r i e n c e o f l i v i n g in a familiar and m e a n i n g f u l w o r l d ' . O n p. 31, he s u b m i t s that 'the c o s m i c s y m b o l i s m o f sacred space is s o o l d and s o familiar that m a n y are n o t yet able t o r e c o g n i z e it'.

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possible relevance of Eliade's phenomenology for creative openings and new philosophical anthropologies, even though this is an area far removed from Eliade's specific values and concerns. During the past few decades, millions of Westerners have been inspired by and have identified with the Chinese and Vietnamese anti-imperalist struggles. Such modern Westerners have often criticized contemporary perspectives as leading to meaninglessness, alienation, and dehumanization; as being provincial, reactionary, and outdated; and as not allowing us to cope with those phenomena we considered under 'the terror of history'. The Chinese and Vietnamese, it has frequently been maintained, have presented us with new views of the self and of human nature, of a harmonious and meaningful life-world; in short, with new philosophical anthropologies. N o w such Westerners, in interpreting the successes of the Chinese and the Vietnamese, have almost always emphasized the 'correct' economic and political analysis formulated by Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and other revolutionaries. And certainly the Vietnamese and Chinese struggles would not have been successful without such a correct analysis. But to someone who is sensitive to the phenomenological analysis of an Eliade— and who is also sensitive to such economic and political factors, in a way that Eliade is not — the Vietnamese and Chinese experiences will reveal many other dimensions of reality. The correct economic and political analysis will be seen as necessary but not sufficient in accounting for such experiences. The interpreter will decipher profound mythic and symbolic structures in the thought of Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh; essential symbolisms which key in with the deepest levels of reality and allow the integration of the fragmentary, meaningless, and even terrifying aspects of existence into a coherent, meaningful, purposeful whole. Just as Eliade would not call for us to return to some archaic mode of being, Mao and Ho did not call for a return to Buddhist, Confucianist, and other earlier Oriental modes of being. But those aware of the phenomenological foundation we have formulated would begin to grasp how Mao and H o did not simply reject, but revalorized certain progressive aspects of those values, integrating them within a new Marxist framework; so that we are presented with new creations, new

246

Eliade's phenomenology

and new directions

universes of meaning, possibilities for new philosophical anthropologies. As a phenomenologist of religion, Eliade has uncovered profound universes of meaning by interpreting the past symbolic and mythic structures of the archaic and the Oriental life-worlds. He has also seen that religious symbolism provides inexhaustible possibilities for future cosmic and other symbolic revalorizations which we have excluded because of our narrow sensitivity and intellectual horizon. We would propose that Mircea Eliade seems to be suggesting that modern human beings, by establishing a dialogue with those archaic and Oriental universes of meaning and by establishing a dialogue with those primary symbolic structures and their inexhaustible possibilities for revalorization on all planes of reality, will be able to burst open our present limiting structures, so that we shall be able to see new creative possibilities and experience new philosophical anthropologies.

Bibliography

SELECTED B O O K S Adams, CharlesJ. (ed.), A Reader's Guide to the Great Religions, N e w Y o r k : Free Press, 1965. Alston, William P., Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought, N e w Y o r k : Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963. Altizer, T h o m a s J . J., Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963. , Beardslee, William A., and Y o u n g , Harvey J . (eds.), Truth, Myth, and Symbol, E n g l e w o o d Cliffs, N . J . : Prentice-Hall, 1962. Baaren, T h . P. van, and Drijvers, H. J . W. (eds.), Religion, Culture and Methodology, T h e Hague: M o u t o n & C o . , 1973 (Series 'Religion and Reason', vol. 8). Baird, R o b e r t D., Category Formation and the History of Religions, T h e Hague: M o u t o n & C o . , 1971 (Series 'Religion and Reason', vol. 1). Banton, Michael (ed.), Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, N e w Y o r k : Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Berndt, R. M . , Kunapipi, Melbourne: F. W. Chesire, 1951. , and Berdnt, C. H., The First Australians, Sydney: U . Smith, 1952. Bianchi, U . , Bleeker, C . J . , andBausani, A. (eds.), Problems and Methods of the History of Religions, Leiden: E. J . Brill, 1972. Bouquet, A. C . , Comparative Religion: A Short Outline, London: Penguin B o o k s , 1962. Caillois, Roger, inan and the Sacred (translated by M e y e r Barash), Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959. C a m u s , Albert, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (translated by Justin O ' B r i e n ) , N e w Y o r k : R a n d o m House, Vintage B o o k s , 1959. , The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, N e w Y o r k : R a n d o m House, Vintage B o o k s , 1956. Cassirer, Ernst, An Essay on Man, N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. , Language and Myth (translated by Susanne K . Langer), N e w Y o r k : D o v e r Publications, 1946. , The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (translated by Fritz C. A. Koelln and J a m e s P. Pettegrone), B o s t o n : B e a c o n Press, 1961. Codrington, R. H., The Melanesians, O x f o r d : Clarendon Press, 1891. D ü r k h e i m , Emile, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (translated by Joseph Ward Swain), Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1954. , and Mauss, Marcel, Primitive Classification (translated with an Introduction by R o d n e y Needham), C h i c a g o : University o f C h i c a g o Press, 1963. Eliade, Mircea, Australian Religions: An Introduction, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973.

248

Bibliography

Eliade, Mircea, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return (translated by Willard R. Trask), N e w York: Harper & R o w , T o r c h b o o k s , 1959. , The Forge and the Crucible (translated by Stephen Corrin), N e w York: H a r p e r and Brothers, 1962. , From Primitives to Zen: A Thematic Sourcebook of the History of Religions, N e w Y o r k : Harper & Row, 1967. , Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism, N e w York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. , Mephistopheles and the Androgyne: Studies in Religious Myth and Symbol (translated by J. M. Cohen), N e w York: Sheed and Ward, 1965. , Myth and Reality (translated by Willard R. Trask), N e w York: Harper & R o w , 1963. , The Myth of the Eternal Return (translated by Willard R. Trask), N e w York: Pantheon Books, 1954. , Myths, Dreams and Mysteries (translated b y Philip Mairet), N e w York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. , Occultism, Witchcraft, and Cultural Fashions: Essays in Comparative Religions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. , Patterns in Comparative Religion (translated by Rosemary Sheed), N e w York: World Publishing Co., Meridian Books, 1963. , The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. , Rites and Symbols of Initiation (translated by Willard R. Trask), N e w York: H a r p e r & R o w , T o r c h b o o k s , 1965. , The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (translated by Willard R. Trask), H a r p e r & Row, Torchbooks, 1961. , Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy (translated by Willard R. Trask), N e w Y o r k : Pantheon Books, 1964. , Yoga: Immortality and Freedom (translated by Willard R. Trask), N e w York: Pantheon Books, 1958. , Zalmoxis: The Vanishing God (translated by Willard R. Trask), Chicago: U n i v e r sity of Chicago Press, 1972. , and Kitagawa, Joseph M. (eds.) The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. Evans-Pritchard, E. E., Theories of Primitive Religion, O x f o r d : O x f o r d University Press, 1966. Frazer, James George, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion, 1st ed., 1890. (3d ed., in 12 vols., London: Macmillan and Co., 1907-15.) , Totemism and Exogamy, Vol. 1, London: Macmillan and Co., 1910. Freud, Sigmund, The Future of an Illusion (translated by W. D. Robson-Scott), N e w Y o r k : Liveright Co., 1961. , Totem and Taboo (translated by A. A. Brill), N e w York: Moffat, Yard and Co., 1918. F r o m m , Erich, Psychoanalysis and Religion, N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. Gilkey, Langdon, Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969. Heifer, James S. (ed.), On Method in the History of Religions (Beiheft 8 of History and Theory), M i d d l e t o w n , C o n n . : Wesleyan University Press, 1968.

Selected books

249

H o o k , Sidney (ed.), Religious Experience and Truth, N e w York: N e w York University Press, 1961. Husserl, E d m u n d , Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), London: George Allen & U n w i n , 1931. , Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (translated with an Introduction by Q u e n t i n Lauer), N e w York: Harper & Row, Torchbooks, 1965. Kirk, G. S., Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures, Cambridge: At the University Press; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970. James, William, The Varieties of Religious Experience, N e w York: N e w American Library, M e n t o r Books, 1958. Johnson, F. Ernest (ed.), Religious Symbolism, N e w York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. Jung, C. G., Psychological Reflections (edited b y j o l a n d e j a c o b i ) , N e w York: Harper & R o w , T o r c h b o o k s , 1961. , Psychology and Religion, N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1938. King Winston L., Introduction to Religion: A Phenomenological Approach, N e w York: Harper & Row, 1968. Kitaga wa, Joseph M. (ed.), The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding (Vol. 1 o(Essays in Divinity, edited b y j e r a l d C. Brauer), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. , and Long, Charles H. (eds.), Myths and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea Eliade, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Kockelmans, Joseph J. (ed.), Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1967. Kraemer, Hendrik, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World, London: James Clarke & Co., 1956. , Religion and the Christian Faith, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956. Kristensen, W. Brede, The Meaning of Religion (translated by J o h n B. Carman, Introduction by Hendrik Kraemer), T h e Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. Kroeber, A. L. (ed.), Anthropology Today, Chicago: University o f C h i c a g o Press, 1957. Lang, A n d r e w , The Making of Religion, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1898. , Myth, Ritual and Religion, Vol. 1. 4th ed., London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913. Lawrence, Nathaniel, and O ' C o n n o r , Daniel (eds.), Readings in Existential Phenomenology, E n g l e w o o d Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Leeuw, Gerardus van der, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, 2 vols, (translated by J. E. Turner), N e w York: Harper & R o w , T o r c h b o o k s , 1963. Lenski, Gerhard, The Religious Factor, N e w York: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1963. Lessa, William A., and Vogt, E v o n Z. (eds.), Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach, N e w York: Harper & R o w , 1958. Lévi-Strauss, Claude, The Savage Mind (translated f r o m La Pensée Sauvage), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. , Structural Anthropology (translated by Claire Jacobson and B r o o k e Grundfest Schoepf), Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1967. , Totemism (translated by Rodney Needham), Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien, Primitive Mentality, London: George Allen & U n w i n , 1923. Long, Charles H., Alpha: The Myths of Creation, N e w York: George Braziller, 1963.

250

Bibliography

Lowie, Robert H., The History of Ethnological Theory, N e w Y o r k : Farrar and Rinehart, 1937. , Primitive Religion, N e w Y o r k : B o n i and Liveright, 1924. Malinowski, Bronislaw, Magic, Science and Religion, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1948. Marett, R. R., The Threshold of Religion, London: Methuen and Co., 1909. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenology of Perception (translated by Colin Smith), N e w Y o r k : Humanities Press, 1962. , The Primacy of Perception (edited with an Introduction by James M. Edie), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964. , Signs (translated with an Introduction by Richard C. McCleary), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964. Müller, F. Max, Anthropological Religion, London: Longmans & Co., 1892. , Chips from a German Workshop, Vol. 1, N e w Y o r k : Scribners, 1869. , Contributions to the Science of Mythology, Vol. 1, London: Longmans & Co., 1897. , Lectures on the Science of Language, 2d series, N e w Y o r k : Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., 1875. , The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, 1919. (Reprint. Varanasi, India: C h o w khamba Sanskrit Studies, n.d.) O t t o , Rudolf, The Idea of the Holy (translated by J o h n W. Harvey), N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d University Press, A Galaxy B o o k , 1958. Pettazzoni, Raffaele, The All-Knowing God (translated by H. J . Rose), London: Methuen and Co., 1956. , Essays on the History of Religions (translated by H. J . Rose), Leiden: E. J . Brill, 1954. Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., Method in Social Anthropology (edited by M. N. Srinivas), Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1958. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, London: O x f o r d University Press, 1958. , The Heart of Hindusthan, Madras: G. A. Natesan & Co., 1936. , The Hindu View of Life, London: U n w i n Books, 1963. Ramsey, Paul (ed.), Religion, Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. Ricceur, Paul, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology (translated by Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967. , The Symbolism of Evil (translated by Emerson Buchanan), N e w Y o r k : Harper & R o w , 1967. Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.), The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (Vol. 8 of The Library of Living Philosophers), N e w Y o r k : T u d o r Publishing Co., 1952. Schmidt, Wilhelm, The Culture Historical Method of Ethnology (translated by S. A. Sieber), N e w Y o r k : Fortuny's, 1939. , The Origin and Growth of Religion (translated by H. J. Rose), London: Methuen and Co., 1931. Sebeok, T h o m a s A. (ed.), Myth: a Symposium, Philadelphia: American Folklore S o ciety, 1955. Smith, Homer W., Man and His Gods, N e w Y o r k : Grosset's Universal Library, 1957. Smith, Huston, The Religions of Man, N e w Y o r k : N e w American Library, M e n t o r Books, 1959. Smith, J o h n E., Reason and God, N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

Selected articles

251

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, The Meaning and End of Religion, N e w Y o r k : Macmillan C o . , 1963. Stanner, W. E. H., On Aboriginal Religion ( T h e Oceania M o n o g r a p h N o . 11), Sydney: Australian Medical Publishing C o . , 1963. Strasser, Stephan, The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1962. T a x , Sol, Eiseley, Loren C., Rouse, Irving, and Voegelin, Carl F. (eds.), An Appraisal of Anthropology Today, C h i c a g o : University o f C h i c a g o Press, 1953. Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, C h i c a g o : University o f C h i c a g o Press, 1951. T y l o r , E d w a r d B . , Primitive Culture, Vol. 1., 1st ed., 1871. (6th ed. in 2 vols. L o n d o n : J o h n Murray, 1920.) Underhill, Evelyn, Mysticism, N e w Y o r k : E. P. D u t t o n and C o . , 1961. Vries, J a n de, The Study of Religion: A Historical Approach (translated with an Introduction by Kees W. Bolle), N e w Y o r k : Harcourt, B r a c e & World, 1967. Wach, J o a c h i m , The Comparative Study of Religions (edited with an Introduction by J o s e p h M . Kitagawa), N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1961. , Sociology of Religion, C h i c a g o : University o f C h i c a g o Press, Phoenix B o o k s , 1962. , Types of Religious Experience: Christian and non-Christian, C h i c a g o : University o f C h i c a g o Press, 1951. Weber, M a x , From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (translated by H. H. Gerth and C. W r i g h t Mills), N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d University Press, 1946. , Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssosiologie, Vol, 1, T ü b i n g e n : J . C. B . M ö h r , 1922. Partly translated as The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by T a l c o t t Parsons, L o n d o n : G. Allen & U n w i n , 1930. , The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (translated by T a l c o t t Parsons), N e w Y o r k : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. Zaehner, R. C., The Comparison of Religions, B o s t o n : B e a c o n Press, 1962. Z i m m e r , Heinrich, Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization (edited by J o s e p h Campbell), N e w Y o r k : Harper & Brothers, T o r c h b o o k s , 1962.

SELECTED ARTICLES Adams, Charles J., ' T h e History o f R e l i g i o n s and the Study o f Islam', in: The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, edited by J o s e p h M . Kitagawa, C h i c a g o : University o f C h i c a g o Press, 1967. Christian Altizer, T h o m a s J . J . , 'Mircea Eliade and the R e c o v e r y o f the Sacred', The Scholar 45 (1962): 2 6 7 - 2 8 9 . , ' T h e Religious Meaning o f M y t h and S y m b o l ' , in: Truth, Myth, and Symbol, edited by T h o m a s J . J . Altizer, William A. Beardslee, and J . Harvey Y o u n g , E n g l e w o o d Cliffs, N . J . : Prentice-Hall, 1962. Ashby, Philip H., ' T h e History o f Religions', in: Religion, edited by Paul Ramsay, E n g l e w o o d Cliffs, N . J . : Prentice-Hall, 1965. , ' T h e History o f Religions and the Study o f Hinduism', in: The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, edited by J o s e p h M . Kitagawa, C h i c a g o : University o f C h i c a g o Press, 1967.

252

Bibliography

Baaren, Th. P. van, 'Science of Religion as a Systematic Discipline: S o m e Introductory Remarks', in: Religion, Culture and Methodology, edited by Th. P. van Baaren and H. J. W. Drijvers, T h e Hague: M o u t o n & Co., 1973. Beardslee, William A., ' T r u t h in the Study of Religion', in: Truth, Myth, and Symbol, edited by T h o m a s J. J. Altizer, William A. Beardslee, and J. Harvey Y o u n g , E n g l e w o o d Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962. Bednarski, Jules, ' T h e Eidetic Reduction', Philosophy Today 6 (1962): 14—24. Bianchi, U g o , ' T h e Definition of Religion: O n the M e t h o d o l o g y of HistoricalC o m p a r a t i v e Research', in: Problems and Methods of the History of Religions, edited by U . Bianchi, C. J. Bleeker, and A. Bausani, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972. Bidney, David, ' T h e C o n c e p t of Value in M o d e r n A n t h r o p o l o g y ' , in: Anthropology Today, edited by A. L. Kroeber, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. , ' M y t h , Symbolism and T r u t h ' , in: Myth: A Symposium, edited by T h o m a s A. Sebeok, Philadelphia: American Folklore Society, 1955. Bleeker, C. Jouco, ' T h e C o n t r i b u t i o n of the P h e n o m e n o l o g y of Religion to the Study of the History ofReligions', in: Problems and Methods of the History of Religions, edited by U . Bianchi, C. J. Bleeker, and A. Bausani, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972. , ' T h e Future Task o f the History of Religions', Numen 1 (1960): 221-234. , ' T h e Phenomenological M e t h o d ' , Numen 6 (1959): 96-111. Boas, Franz, 'Evolution or Diffusion?', American Anthropologist 26 (1924): 340-344. , ' T h e Origin of T o t e m i s m ' , American Anthropologist 18 (1916): 319-326. Bolle, Kees W., Introduction to The Study of Religion, by Jan de Vries, N e w Y o r k : Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967. Dorson, Richard M., ' T h e Eclipse of Solar M y t h o l o g y ' , in: Myth: A Symposium, edited by T h o m a s A. Sebeok, Philadelphia: American Folklore Society, 1955. Dumézil, Georges, Preface to Traité d'histoire des religions, by Mircea Eliade, Paris: Payot, 1949. Eliade, Mircea, 'Archaic M y t h and Historical M a n ' , McCormick Quarterly (Special Supplement: Myth and Modern Man) 18 (1965): 23-36. , 'Australian Religions, Part I: An Introduction', History of Religions 6 (1966): 108-134. , 'Australian Religions, Part II: An Introduction', History of Religions 6 (1967): 208-235. , 'Australian Religions, Part III: Initiation Rites and Secret Cults', History of Religions 7 (1967): 61-90. , 'Australian Religions, Part IV: T h e Medicine Men and Their Supernatural Models', History of Religions 7 (1967): 159-183. , 'Australian Religions, Part V: Death, Eschatology, and Some Conclusions', History ofReligions 1 (1968): 244-268. , ' C o m p a r a t i v e Religion: Its Past and Future', in: Knowledge and the Future of Man, edited b y Walter J. O n g , S. J., N e w Y o r k : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. , ' C o s m o g o n i e M y t h and "Sacred H i s t o r y " ', Religious Studies 2 (1967): 171-183. , 'Crisis and Renewal in History of Religions', History of Religions 5 (1965): 1-17. , 'Cultural Fashions and the History of Religions', in: The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, edited by Joseph M. Kitagawa, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. , 'Encounters at Ascona', in: Spiritual Disciplines. Papers f r o m theEranos-Jahrbuch, Bollington Series, Band 30, Vol. 4 (1959): xvii-xxi.

Selected articles

253

, 'Historical Events and Structural Meaning in Tension', Criterion 6 (1967): 29-31. , 'History o f Religions and a N e w H u m a n i s m ' , History of Religions 1 (1961): 1-8. , 'History of Religions in Retrospect: 1 9 1 2 - 1 9 6 2 J o u r n a l of Bible and Religion 31 (1963): 98-109. , 'Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious Symbolism', in The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, edited by Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. , ' O n Prehistoric Religions', History of Religions 14 (1974): 140-147. , ' O n U n d e r s t a n d i n g Primitive Religions', in Glaube, Geist, Geschichte: Festschrift für Ernst Benz, edited by Gerhard Müller and Winfried Zeller, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967. , ' T h e Q u e s t for the " O r i g i n s " o f R e l i g i o n ' , History of Religions 4 (1964): 154-169. , 'Recent W o r k s o n Shamanism: A Review Article', History of Religions 1 (1962): 152-186. , ' T h e Sacred and the M o d e r n Artist', Criterion 4 (1965): 22-24. , ' T h e Sacred in the Secular World', Cultural Hermeneutics 1 (1973): 101-113. , South American H i g h Gods: Part I', History of Religions 8 (1969): 338-354. , 'Structure and Changes in the History of Religion' (translated by Kathryn Atwater), in: City Invincible, edited by Carl Kraeling, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. , ' T h e Yearning for Paradise in Primitive Tradition', Daedalus 88 (1959): 255-267. Faruqi, Isma'il Ragi A. al, 'History of Religions: Its N a t u r e and Significance for Christian Education and the Muslim-Christian Dialogue', Numen 12 (1965): 35-65. Fenton, J o h n Y., 'Reductionism in the Study of Religions', Soundings 53 (1970): 61-76. Frye, N o r t h r o p , 'World E n o u g h W i t h o u t Time', The Hudson Review 12 (1959): 423-431. Geertz, Clifford, 'Religion as a Cultural System', in: Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, edited by Michael Banton, N e w Y o r k : Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Goldenweiser, Alexander, 'Religion and Society: A Critique o f Emile D u r k h e i m ' s T h e o r y of the Origin and N a t u r e o f R e l i g i o n ' Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods 14 (1917): 113-124. G o o d e n o u g h , E d w i n R., 'Religionswissenschaft', Numen 6 (1959): 77-95. Grabau, Richard F., 'Existential Universals', in: An Invitation to Phenomenology, edited by James M . Edie, Chicago: Q u a d r a n g l e Books, 1965. Hamilton, Kenneth, 'Homo Religiosus and Historical Faith',Journal of Bible and Religion 33 (1965): 213-222. Hartland, E. S., ' T h e " H i g h G o d s " of Australia', Folklore 9 (1898): 290-329. Heiler, Friedrich, ' T h e History of Religions as a Preparation for the Co-operation of Religions', in: The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, edited b y Mircea Eliade and Joseph M . Kitagawa, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. Hocart, A. M „ 'Mana', Man 14 (1914): 97-101. Hogbin, H. Ian, 'Mana', Oceania 6 (1936): 247-274. H u d s o n , Wilson M., 'Eliade's C o n t r i b u t i o n to the Study of M y t h ' , in: Tire Shrinkerto Dragster, edited by Wilson M. H u d s o n , Austin: T h e Encino Press, 1968. Ihde, D o n , ' S o m e Parallels Between Analysis and P h e n o m e n o l o g y ' , Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (1967): 577-586. King, Winston L., Review of The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion, by Mircea Eliade, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 9 (1970): 70-72.

254

Bibliography

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Selected articles

255

. ' M y t h s f o r M o d e r n s ' , Times Literary Supplement ( L o n d o n ) , 10 F e b r u a r y 1966: 102. N a t a n s o n , M a u r i c e , ' A S t u d y in P h i l o s o p h y a n d t h e Social Sciences', in: Literature, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences, T h e H a g u e : M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1962. P e m b e r t o n , Prentiss L., ' U n i v e r s a l i s m a n d Particularity: A R e v i e w Article',Journal of Bible and Religion 20 (1952): 97-99. P e n n e r , H a n s H., ' M y t h a n d Ritual: A W a s t e l a n d o r a Forest o f S y m b o l s ? ' , in: On Method in the History of Religions, edited b y J a m e s S. Heifer, M i d d l e t o w n , C o n n . : Wesley an U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968. Pettazzoni, Raffaele, ' T h e S u p r e m e B e i n g : P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l S t r u c t u r e a n d H i s t o r i cal D e v e l o p m e n t ' , in: The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, edited b y M i r c e a Eliade a n d J o s e p h M . K i t a g a w a , C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1959. P r o g o f f , Ira, ' C u l t u r e a n d B e i n g : M i r c e a Eliade's Studies in Religion', International Journal of Parapsychology 2 (1960): 4 7 - 6 0 . , ' T h e M a n W h o T r a n s f o r m s C o n s c i o u s n e s s ' , in: Eranos-Jahrbuch 1966, B a n d 35 (1967): 99-144. R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n , A. R., ' H i s t o r i c a l N o t e o n British Social A n t h r o p o l o g y ' , American Anthropologist 54 (1952): 2 7 5 - 2 7 7 . R a d i n , Paul, ' R e l i g i o n o f t h e N o r t h A m e r i c a n Indians', Journal of American Folklore 27 (1914): 335-373. R a s m u s s e n , D a v i d , ' M i r c e a Eliade: S t r u c t u r a l H e r m e n e u t i c s and P h i l o s o p h y ' , Philosophy Today 12 (1968): 138-146. Ricketts, M a c Linscott, ' E l i a d e a n d Altizer: V e r y D i f f e r e n t O u t l o o k s ' , Christian Advocate, O c t o b e r 1967: 11-12. , ' M i r c e a Eliade a n d t h e D e a t h o f G o d ' , Religion in Life 36 (1967): 4 0 - 5 2 . , ' T h e N a t u r e a n d E x t e n t o f Eliade's " J u n g i a n i s m " ', Union Seminary Quarterly Review 25 (1970): 2 1 1 - 2 3 4 . Ricoeur, Paul, ' T h e H e r m e n e u t i c s o f S y m b o l s a n d P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e f l e c t i o n ' , International Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1962): 191-218. , ' T h e P r o b l e m o f t h e D o u b l e - S e n s e as H e r m e n e u t i c P r o b l e m a n d as S e m a n t i c P r o b l e m ' , in: Myths and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea Eliade, edited b y J o s e p h M . K i t a g a w a and C h a r l e s H . L o n g , C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1969. , ' T h e S y m b o l : F o o d f o r T h o u g h t ' , Philosophy Today 4 (1960): 196-207. Saiving, Valerie, ' A n d r o c e n t r i s m in Religious Studies', Journal of Religion 56 (1976): 177-197. S c h i m m e l , A n n e m a r i e , ' S u m m a r y o f t h e D i s c u s s i o n ' , Numen 7 (1960): 2 3 5 - 2 3 9 . 'Scientist o f S y m b o l s ' , Time, 11 F e b r u a r y 1966: 68, 70. S m i t h , J o h n E., ' T h e S t r u c t u r e o f R e l i g i o n ' , Religious Studies 1 (1965): 6 3 - 7 3 . S m i t h , W i l f r e d C a n t w e l l , ' C o m p a r a t i v e R e l i g i o n : W h i t h e r — and W h y ? ' , in: The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, edited b y Mircea Eliade a n d J o s e p h M . K i t a g a w a , C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1959. , ' T h e C o m p a r a t i v e S t u d y o f R e l i g i o n : R e f l e c t i o n s o n the Possibility and P u r p o s e o f a Religious Science', McGill University, Faculty of Divinity, Inaugural Lectures, M o n t r e a l : M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950. Strasser, Stephan, ' P h e n o m e n o l o g i e s a n d P s y c h o l o g i e s ' , Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 5 (1965): 8 0 - 1 0 5 .

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Tillich, Paul, ' T h e Meaning and Justification o f Religious Symbols', in: Religious Experience and Truth, edited by Sidney Hook, N e w Y o r k : N e w Y o r k University Press, 1961. , 'The Religious Symbol', in: Religious Experience and Truth, edited by Sidney Hook, N e w Y o r k : N e w Y o r k University Press, 1961. , ' T h e o l o g y and Symbolism', in: Religious Symbolism, edited by F. Ernest Johnson, N e w Y o r k : Harper & Brothers, 1955. Tylor, E. B . , 'Limits o f Savage Religion', Journal of the Anthropological Institute 21 (1891): 2 8 3 - 3 0 1 . Wach, Joachim, 'Introduction: T h e Meaning and Task o f the History o f Religions', in: The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, edited by Joseph M. Kitagawa, (translated by Karl W. Lückert with the help o f Alan L. Miller), Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1967. , 'Radhakrishnan and the Comparative Study o f Religion', in: The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, N e w Y o r k : Tudor Publishing C o . , 1952. , 'Sociology o f Religion', in: Twentieth Century Sociology, edited by G. Gurvitch and W. E. M o o r e , N e w Y o r k : Philosophical Library, 1945. Watson, Goodwin, 'A Psychologist's View o f Religious Symbols', in: Religious Symbolism, edited by F. Ernest Johnson, N e w Y o r k : Harper & Brothers, 1955. Welbon, G. Richard, ' S o m e Remarks on the W o r k o f Mircea Eliade', Acta Philosophica et Theologica 2 (1964): 4 6 5 ^ 9 2 .

Index

A d a m s , C h a r l e s J., 6, 57 A g r i c u l t u r e , 67, 175, 200 Allgemeine Religionswissenschaft. See H i s t o r y o f Religions; Religionswissenschaft Altizer, T h o m a s J. J.: criticisms o f Eliade, 106, 123n, 129, 198; i n t e r p r e t i n g Eliade's a p p r o a c h , 1 2 6 , 1 3 3 , 2 2 1 , 230, 230« A n d r o g y n e , 151 A n i m i s m , 1 5 - 1 6 , 2 2 , 2 6 . See also T y lor, E d w a r d B. Anthropological approaches: and the H i s t o r y o f Religions, 52-57, 8 3 - 8 4 , 93; n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , 14-15; t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , 31, 31«, 32, 45, 4 5 « , 4 6 - 5 7 , 235n Anthropology, philosophical. See Philosophical anthropology A n t i r e d u c t i o n i s m . See R e d u c t i o n i s m A priori, 191«; a n d Eliade, 123, 196, 218-219; and the History of Religions, 62; and O t t o , 61, 61«, 62, 218-219 Archaic, 91, 123«, 125«, 163, 226, 230, 235, 246. See also Homo Religiosus\ 'Primitive' Archaic m e t a p h y s i c s a n d o n t o l o g y , 217, 2 3 4 - 2 3 5 A r c h e t y p e s : and h i s t o r y , 176, 227, 234, 234«, 235, 235«; a n d J u n g , 188, 211«; a n d ' p r i m i t i v e ' o n t o l o g y , 234, 234«, 235, 235«; status of, in Eliade, 140, 145, 145«-146«, 2 1 0 211, 21 In, 212; a n d s y m b o l i c s t r u c tures, 180, 183, 2 0 9 - 2 1 2 , 216, 2 3 6 243 A s c e n s i o n : as a p r i m o r d i a l p h e n o m e n o n , 179, 185; s y m b o l i s m , 1 3 7 138, 191, 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 , 217«, 239; s y m -

b o l i s m and t h e 'ideal s t r u c t u r e ' , 196-198, 200 A s h b y , Philip H „ 7 4 - 7 5 , 8 6 - 8 7 A t k i n s o n , J. )., 39 Australia, 2 3 - 2 4 , 34, 37«, 46, 51, 91, 116, 150, 151, 185 Avatars, 89 Axis Mundi, 141-142 Baaren, T h . P. van, 61«, 109« Baird, R o b e r t D „ 176«, 230, 230« Barth, Karl, 75 B a s c o m , William, 50 B a s h a m , A. L. 73« B a u m a n n , H., 54 B e r n d t , R. M „ 151« B e r n d t , R. M . a n d C . H „ 51 Bianchi, U g o , 109 Bleeker, C . J o u c o , 5 8 - 5 9 , 9 4 - 9 5 , 109, 122«, 159« Boas, Franz, 45, 46«, 4 7 - 4 8 , 53, 1 4 4 145 Bolgiani, Franco, 109 Bolle, Kees, 49« B o u q u e t , A. C., 73, 73« B r u n n e r , E m i l , 75 B u d d h i s m , 73, 73«, 152, 222, 2 4 5 - 2 4 6 Caillois, R o g e r , 120 Calvinism, 76-77 C a m u s , Albert, 226, 226«, 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 , 229«, 234 C a r n a p , R u d o l f , 100« C a r t e s i a n , 98 Cassirer, Ernst, 6, 7, 11«, 13«, 142«, 164« ' C e n t e r ' ('centre'): o f a religion, 140«; o f a s y m b o l i s m , 152, 154, 156, 157, 157«, 160, 213; o f t h e w o r l d , 124, 141-142, 1 7 6 - 1 7 7

258

Index

C h i l d e , V. G., 52 China, 227-228, 244-245 C h r i s t , 40, 89, 2 1 3 C h r i s t i a n i t y , 62«, 73, 73«, 7 4 - 7 7 , 8 8 89, 117-118, 125«, 129«, 177, 213, 220, 221, 222, 235 C o d r i n g t o n , R. H., 17-18, 19, 6 3 Coincidentia oppositorum, 121, 165— 166, 184, 185, 217, 2 2 1 - 2 2 2 C o m p a r a t i v e religion, 3 - 4 , 54«, 7 7 78. See also H i s t o r y o f R e l i g i o n s C o m t e , A u g u s t e , 37 C o s m i c s y m b o l i s m , 157, 162, 184, 185, 244«, 2 4 5 - 2 4 6 C r e a t i v i t y , 71, 1 8 1 - 1 8 2 , 1 8 8 - 1 9 0 , 201, 243-246 Cross, 176-177 C u l t u r a l a n t h r o p o l o g y , 3 1 - 3 2 , 45 C u l t u r a l historical a p p r o a c h , 46, 46«, 47, 52 Darwin, Charles, 8 Deism, 7 D e s c r i p t i v e evaluations. See E v a l u a tions, d e s c r i p t i v e Descriptive-normative distinctions, 3, 6 5 - 6 6 , 66«, 9 4 - 9 5 , 203, 204, 209 D i a c h r o n i c , 146 D i a l e c t i c o f h i e r o p h a n i e s . See Dialectic o f t h e sacred Dialectic o f t h e sacred, 105, 133, 135, 167-168, 173, 174, 187, 195, 1 9 9 200, 205, 214, 219, 223; general analysis o f t h e s t r u c t u r e of, 1 2 3 130; as a ' g i v e n ' , 182, 185, 201; a n d religion as an ' o p e n i n g ' , 137, 243; a n d s y m b o l i s m , 138, 141, 141«, 158. See also Sacred; S y m b o l i s m , s y m b o l s , a n d t h e dialectic o f t h e sacred D i d e r o t , Denis, 6 D i f f u s i o n i s m , 45, 46, 52, 53, 114 D i l t h e y , W i l h e l m , 236 D o e i n g , D e n n i s A., 228« D r i j v e r s , H. J. W „ 109« Dumézil, Georges, 17-18 D u r k h e i m , E m i l e , 3 3 - 3 5 , 37, 56, 2 4 3 D y n a m i s m . See P r e - a n i m i s m ; M a n a

Earth, 67,141,141«, 142,147,175,194 E c k h a r d t , M e i s t e r , 221 E c o n o m i c s , 82, 84, 245 Ecstasy: as a ' p r i m o r d i a l ' p h e n o m enon, part of 'the h u m a n condition', 178, 179«, 185, 212, 232; a n d s h a m a n i s m , 117, 132, 135, 137, 178, 178«, 206 E m p i r i c a l a p p r o a c h , 63, 113, 122, 123, 186, 198 Empiricism, 186-187 E n l i g h t e n m e n t , the, 6, 7, 7«, 25 Epoche, 9 8 - 1 0 0 , 105, 106, 112, 115, 144, 144«-145m, 205 E r o t i c s y m b o l i s m , 150-152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 157«, 162, 1 9 3 - 1 9 4 Essence, 68, 82, 97, 123«, 127, 186, 238; a c c o r d i n g t o K r i s t e n s e n , 65, 65«, 66, 66«; fact and, 191«, 192, 194, 201 Essential s t r u c t u r e s : and e v a l u a t i o n s o f religious p h e n o m e n a , 205, 206, 213, 216, 220; a n d p h e n o m e n o l o g i cal m e t h o d , 192-194, 214; a n d s y m b o l i s m , 140, 153, 155, 156 E t h n o l o g y , 14-15, 31, 34, 36, 4 0 - 4 1 , 47«, 5 0 - 5 1 , 68, 70, 71, 135, 136 E v a l u a t i o n s , descriptive, 204, 213, 224, 237; of 'authentic' or ' g e n u i n e ' , 2 0 4 - 2 0 6 , 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 , 215, 2 1 9 - 2 2 0 , 230; as ' h i g h e r ' or 'elevated' religious manifestations, 197-198, 206, 2 1 2 - 2 1 6 , 2 1 9 - 2 2 0 ; b y t h e religious p e r s o n , 204, 206«, 220, 223, 235; o f 'true',- 204, 206, 206«, 2 0 7 - 2 0 8 , 2 3 3 . See also Dialectic o f the sacred, general analysis o f t h e s t r u c t u r e of; Homo religiosus, m e a n i n g for, v e r s u s m e a n i n g f o r Eliade; N o r m a t i v e ; O n t o l o g y , o n t o l o g i c a l ; Sacred, a n d t h e e v a l u ation a n d choice b y religious persons; Verification E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d , E. E., 4 8 E v o l u t i o n i s m , 41, 45, 46«, 146, 211; criticisms of, 2 3 - 2 4 , 31, 49, 91, 92, 113; o f n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y a p p r o a c h e s , 8, 9, 12«, 14, 15, 16, 17,

Index

2 3 - 2 4 , 26, 3 0 - 3 1 ; p r e - a n i m i s t i c , 17-21 E x i s t e n t i a l i s m , 226, 226«, 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 , 229«, 234 Faith, 65, 76, 78, 79, 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 , 2 2 9 , 2 3 5 'Fall', 116-117, 128-129, 129«, 130, 223 F e m i n i s m , 117-118, 118« F e n t o n , J o h n Y „ 97, 97«, 9 8 Fertility, 149, 150,150«, 1 5 2 , 1 5 4 , 1 5 6 , 161, 162, 166, 175 Firth, R a y m o n d , 48 'Flight', 176, 179, 179«, 183, 185, 191, 197, 217«, 239. See also A s c e n s i o n Frazer, J a m e s G „ 2 0 - 2 1 , 26, 41, 48, 71, 113 Freud, S i g m u n d , 39^11, 4 2 , 4 3 , 55, 56, 136, 206, 209, 243 F r o m m , Eric, 41, 42« F u n c t i o n : o f s y m b o l i s m , 158, 161, 163-164, 164«, 165, 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 Functionalist: a p p r o a c h , 45, 48, 48«, 52, 136; r e d u c t i o n i s m , 37, 53, 114 Geertz, C l i f f o r d , 56, 56« ' G e n e r a l ' : a n d Eliade's e v a l u a t i o n o f religious p h e n o m e n a as ' e l e v a t e d ' and ' h i g h e s t ' , 2 1 3 - 2 1 6 , 220 Generalist a p p r o a c h e s , 7 0 - 7 2 , 108 G e n e r a l i t y : levels of, in Eliade's phenomenology, 231-236, 237238, 242 Generalizations: uncritical, Eliade criticized for, 195-196, 196«, 197,

202 Gilkey, L a n g d o n , 128«, 158«, 174 G o d , g o d s , 10-11, 11«, 34, 40, 42, 46, 73, 88«, 89, 91, 120, 122, 129, 217, 221, 227, 235, 235«. See also Sacred G o o d e n o u g h , E r w i n R., 39, 75 G r a b a u , R i c h a r d F., 186, 187, 1 9 0 191, 198 G r a e b n e r , Fritz, 46 Greece, 149, 166« H a m i l t o n , K e n n e t h , 129 H a s i d i s m , 222

259

Hegel, G. W. F„ 186, 236 H e i d e g g e r , M a r t i n , 186 Heiler, Friedrich, 88 Heifer, J a m e s S., 100, 100« Hermeneutics: foundation or f r a m e w o r k of, a n d s y m b o l i s m , 105, 106, 140, 144, 147, 156, 157«, 161, 173, 177, 181, 194-195, 199, 201; and levels o f generality, 2 3 2 - 2 3 3 , 237; main concern of History of Religions today, according to Eliade, 111-112, 113«; a n d ' m o v e ment' relating the historical p a r t i c u l a r and t h e universal s t r u c ture, 191-192, 194-195; a n d v e r i f i cation, 2 0 7 - 2 0 8 , 237, 239, 239«, 240. See also Historical, and phenomenological relationship ('tension'); Symbolism, symbols, and structuralism H i e r o p h a n y , 124-127, 137, 140-142, 147,152«, 154«-155«, 174, 176, 220, 233. See also Dialectic o f t h e sacred; Sacred ' H i g h G o d s ' , 21-24, 26, 46, 47 H i n d u i s m , 8 6 - 8 7 , 89, 152, 222 Historical: all d o c u m e n t s are, 113, 134, 174; and Eliade's e m p h a s i s on, 113, 174-175, 201; a n d Eliade's lack o f e m p h a s i s on, 111, 111«, 120, 129, 146, 176«, 230; essential s t r u c t u r e s are n o t , a c c o r d i n g t o Eliade, 176, 178-180, 181, 183, 212, 235«; 'explanation' versus p h e n o m e n o logical m e a n i n g , 177-181, 201; a n d phenomenological relationship ('tension'), 66-68, 68«, 69, 70, 111, 168-169, 173-200 passim, 201; a n d Eliade's rejection o f t h e m o d e r n identification w i t h , 226, 243 H i s t o r y : and despair o r faith, 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 , 229, 235; and historicism, 30, 61, 61«, 62, 67, 226, 227, 2 3 5 - 2 3 6 ; irreducibility of, 113, 134, 174; r e j e c t i o n b y t h e religious p e r s o n , 130, 2 3 4 « - 2 3 5 « , 235, 236; ' t e r r o r o f , analyzed b y Eliade, 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 , 229, 234, 234«, 235, 235«, 236, 243; i m -

260

Index

History (continued) portance of, in twentieth century approaches, 3 0 - 3 1 , 46, 52, 64, 6 6 68, 71 ; and the History ofReligions, 5, 68, 71, 135 History ofReligions. as'autonomous', 8 2 - 8 3 , 96; classification of, 4 - 5 , 3 7 - 3 8 , 68, 7 0 - 7 2 , 111, 112; and the complexity o f religious phenomena, 9 1 - 9 3 , 97; as descriptive, 9 4 95, 203; integrates results o f other approaches, 135-136, 214; and the irreducibility o f the religious, 8 1 84; nineteenth century characteristics, 2 5 - 2 7 ; and participation in religious phenomena, 8 6 - 8 7 , 115; and the personal dimension o f religious phenomena, 7 7 - 7 8 , 8 4 - 8 6 , 9 1 - 9 2 , 96; and theology, 7 4 - 7 7 . See also Anthropological approaches, and the History o f Religions; Historical, and phenomenological relationship ('tension'); History, and the History o f Religions; Normative, and descriptive in the History o f Religions; Phenomenology, and the History o f Religions; Psychological approaches, and the History o f Religions; Religionswissettschaft ; Sociological approaches, and the History o f Religions Hocart, A. M., 1 8 - 1 9 H o Chi Minh, 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 , 245 Homer, 166« Homo religiosus, 5; meaning for, versus meaning for Eliade, 2 0 8 - 2 1 0 , 210«, 2 1 1 - 2 1 2 ; participation in phenomena of, 8 6 - 8 7 , 100, 105, 106, 115, 119, 144; and the sacred, 115, 123, 124, 126, 128-130, 131-133, 133«, 181-182, 189-190, 199-200; and symbolism, 142-143, 143«, 159, 163-166. See also Archaic; 'Primitive' Hudson, Wilson M., 183n Hume, David, 186, 188, 191 Humphreys, Christmas, 73«

Husserl, Edmund, 58, 72, 98-99, 110, 110«, 115, 155, 191«, 193, 194, 196« 198 Hyman, Stanley Edgar, 50 Ierunca, Virgil, 228« Immortality, 149, 153«, 154, 215 Incarnation, 127, 130, 174 India, 12, 107«, 153«, 153«, 163«, 1 9 7 198, 222, 228 Induction: 'classical', 195, 196, 196«, 198, 202; phenomenological, 1 9 6 199, 202, 216 Initiation, 116, 116«, 118, 118«, 1 5 0 153 passim, 179, 185, 196 Intentionality, 115, 117, 119, 146, 188, 189, 194, 199«, 203-204, 210; and the dialectic o f the sacred, 105, 119, 123-124, 126-127, 219; and reductionism, 96, 99, 101, 114, 115, 117, 126, 134, 199-200; and symbolism, 142«, 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 Intuition, 110, 161, 186, 188, 192-194, 198, 199, 199«, 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 , 216, 218 Irreducibility: o f the religious, 44, 59, 6 1 - 6 2 , 82-84, 9 6 - 1 0 1 , 117-119, 145; o f the sacred, 113-119, 134, 2 1 8 - 2 1 9 . See also Reductionism Islam, 7 6 - 7 7 , 220, 221, 222 James, E. O . , 54« James, William, 42«, 60«, 92, 186 Jensen, A. E., 52, 54 Judaism, 125«, 220, 221, 222, 235 Jung, C. G., 41-^3, 92«, 145, 146«, 188, 209, 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 , 211«, 215, 230 Kabbalism, 222 Kant, Immanuel, 62, 62«, 94, 240 King, Winston L., 73«, 90«, 120«, 143«, 208 Kirk, G. S. 235« Kitagawa, Joseph M „ 38, 69, 81«, 88, 95 Kluckhohn, Clyde, 50 Kraemer, Hendrik, 7 5 - 7 7 , 79, 80«, 88, 89, 90, 95, 101, 203

Index

K r i s t e n s e n , W . B r e d e , 55, 6 4 - 6 6 , 66«, 7 4 , 7 5 , 7 6 , 77, 79, 87, 93, 94, 203, 209 K r o e b e r , A. L., 5 5 - 5 6 Kulturkreis, 45, 46 Lang, A n d r e w , 2 1 - 2 4 , 26, 46, 60, 71, 92 Leach, E d m u n d , 147 Lebenswelt, 98, 100, 113, 145,163, 176, 182, 183H, 186, 187, 193, 214 L e e r t o u w e r , L., 109« L e e u w , G. van der. See Van der L e e u w , G. Lévi-Strauss, C l a u d e , 32, 46«, 4 8 ^ 9 , 56, 56« L é v y - B r u h l , L u d e n , 36, 49, 71 Lewis, O s c a r , 53 Linguistics, 82, 83, 84, 146. See also Philology L o n g , C h a r l e s H „ 61«, 62, 67«, 7 1 - 7 2 , 91, 128 L u y s t e r , R o b e r t , 165 M c C l e a r y , R i c h a r d C . , 189« Magic, 2 0 - 2 1 , 91, 135«, 205 M a l i n o w s k i , B r o n i s t a w , 48, 56 M a n a , 17-19, 26, 63, 131 Mannhardt, W „ 20-21 M a o T s e - t u n g , 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 , 245 M a r e n , R. R., 18, 19, 26, 63, 71, 131 Marshak, Alexander, 49-50 M a r x , M a r x i s m , 37, 38, 98, 219, 236, 245-246 M a u s s , M a r c e l , 35«, 55 Mecca, 141 M e d i c i n e m a n , 116, 124, 125 Melanesia, 1 7 - 1 9 M e r l e a u - P o n t y , M a u r i c e , 31«, 1 5 5 , 1 7 4 - 1 7 5 , 1 8 9 « , 191«, 196«, 231-232 M e t a p h y s i c s , 76, 100, 122, 144, 217, 217«, 237 Mill, J o h n Stuart, 195, 196 'Mioritza', 227-228 ' M o d e r n ' (nonreligious), 5, 184, 226«, 229, 235, 241, 2 4 3 - 2 4 6 M o o n , lunar symbolism: and h u m a n c o n d i t i o n ' , 185, 233;

55, 198, 191,

226, 'the and

261

t h e n a t u r e o f s y m b o l i s m , 149, 149«, 153, 159, 161-162, 163-164, 166, 167-168, 183-184, 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 , 232; and phenomenological method, 155-157, 163-164, 193-195, 199, 2 3 2 - 2 3 3 ; religious m e a n i n g of, 149, 149«, 153, 183-184, 189-190, 233; snakes and, 150, 150«, 153-157, 159, 161-162, 163, 167-168, 175, 193-195, 196, 199, 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 , 232 M o r g a n , J o h n H e n r y , 56« M o r p h o l o g y , 109-110, 135, 146-147, 155, 156 M ü l l e r , F. M a x , 3, 8 - 9 , 10-13, 13«, 2 1 - 2 2 , 25, 71, 82, 94, 113, 203 M u r d o c k , G. P., 3 1 - 3 2 M y s t i c i s m , 73, 180, 217, 217«, 2 1 8 222, 237, 239 M y t h , 12-13, 111, 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 , 1 4 0 « , 151, 166, 166«, 179, 183, 217, 223, 2 3 3 234, 245; and e x e m p l a r y m o d e l s , 13, 13«, 128n, 223; L a n g ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of, 2 2 - 2 4 ; M ü l l e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of, 10-11, 11«, 12; a n d ritual, 50-51, 56, 56«, 57«; a n d sacred h i s t o r y , 13, 185 N a t a n s o n , M a u r i c e , 59« N a t u r a l i s m (naturalistic): e x p l a n a tions, 10, 24, 33, 41, 46, 52; r e d u c tions, 59«, 85, 96, 126, 162, 184, 199-200 ' N a t u r i s m ' (naturistic explanations). See N a t u r a l i s m N i c h o l a s o f C u s a , 221 N i e t z s c h e , F., 86 N i h i l i s m , 2 2 7 - 2 2 9 , 229«, 235, 236 N o r m a t i v e : a n d d e s c r i p t i v e in t h e H i s t o r y o f Religions, 3, 65-66, 66«, 7 4 - 7 7 , 94-95, 203, 204, 209; j u d g m e n t s b y Eliade, criticisms of, 154«-155«, 160, 164«, 203, 213, 223-224, 232-233; j u d g m e n t s by Eliade, illustrations of, 2 2 3 - 2 2 9 , 229«, 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 , 2 4 3 - 2 4 4 ; j u d g m e n t s of nineteenth century approaches, 2 6 - 2 7 , 54-55. See also E v a l u a t i o n s , descriptive; Homo religiosus, m e a n -

262

Index

Normative (continued) ing for, versus meaning for Eliade; Ontology, ontological; Sacred, privileged status of, in Eliade's phenomenology Numinous, 60-62, 61«, 62«, 100, 131 Ontology, ontological: archaic or primitive, 234, 234«, 235; and criticisms o f Eliade, 160, 164«, 165«, 230; judgments by Eliade about human nature and 'the human condition, as such', 1 7 8 179, 179«-180«, 180-181, 204, 232, 235«, 236, 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 ; and illustrations o f normative judgments by Eliade, 2 2 0 - 2 2 2 , 2 2 3 - 2 3 1 ; moves in Eliade's phenomenology, 2 3 1 236; and primary symbolic structures, 2 3 7 - 2 4 2 ; and religious reality, 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 ; and verification, 2 3 9 - 2 4 3 . See also Normative j u d g ments 'Opening', 'openings', 35, 43^-5, 117-118, 137-138, 167-168, 2 1 4 215, 2 4 3 - 2 4 6 O r g y , 117-118 Origins o f religion: different explanations of, 11, 1 1«, 12«, 15-18, 26, 3 3 35, 3 9 - 4 0 , 46, 47; nineteenth century obsession with, 9, 14, 15, 24, 26 Otto, Rudolf, 59-61, 61«, 62, 82, 9 2 93, 100, 101, 120, 121, 131, 218 Paradise, 116-117, 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 Paradoxes, paradoxical, 124, 126-127, 130, 164«, 165-167, 184, 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 , 221 Particular, 173-175, 190-191, 1 9 5 196, 197-199, 201, 214. See also Hermeneutics, and 'movement' relating the historical particular and the universal structure; Historical; Universal structure Pattern, 140, 152, 152«, 153, 153«, 154, 192, 2 2 1 - 2 2 2

Peasants, 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 , 241 Pemberton, P. L., 94 Penner, Hans, H., 56, 56« Pettazzoni, Raffaele, 6 6 - 6 7 , 67«, 68, 71, 173 Phenomenological method: and criticisms o f Eliade, 106-107, 1 8 0 181, 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 , 232; and 'free variation', 155, 156, 157, 193-194, 1 9 8 199, 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 , 214; for gaining insight into meaning, 155,156, 192— 194, 199-200, 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 , 214, 216; and induction, 196-199, 202; and the irreducibility o f the religious, 9 8 - 1 0 1 ; and ontological moves, 231-236, 242-243 Phenomenology: descriptive, 6 4 - 6 6 , 159-160, 178, 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 , 237, 239, 240«; Eliade identified with, 1 0 8 111, 111«, 112, 136, 145-148, 160, 173, 178, 214, 2 4 0 - 2 4 2 ; Eliade not identified with, 109, 109«, 110, 110«, 2 4 0 - 2 4 1 ; existential, 155, 174-175, 186, 190-191, 191«, 2 3 9 240; and the History o f Religions, 57-66, 68, 72, 76, 108-109, 242; meaning versus historical 'explanation', 177-181; philosophical, 58, 72, 9 5 , 1 0 8 , 1 0 9 , 1 2 3 « , 201, 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 , 240-242. See also Historical, and phenomenological relationship ('tension'); Phenomenological method Philology, 10-12, 68, 70, 71, 98, 135« Philosophical anthropology, 56«, 178, 237-238, 243-246 Philosophical phenomenology. See Phenomenology, philosophical Philosophy, 3, 92, 94, 136, 202, 211, 217, 224, 227, 239, 239«, 240; and symbolism, 162«, 165, 2 3 8 - 2 4 0 Plants, 137, 149, 152«, 161 Plato, 188, 234«-235« Poincaré, Henri, 114 Polynesia, 1 9 - 2 0 Popper, Karl, 100« Positivism, 8, 9, 14, 26, 33, 35, 41, 84, 86, 96, 99

Index

Pre-animism, 17-24 ' P r i m i t i v e ' , ' p r i m i t i v e s ' , 5«, 54, 125, 211; n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y v i e w s of, 15, 2 3 - 2 4 , 27; o n t o l o g y of, 234, 234«, 235; and r e l a t i o n s h i p to ' m o d e r n ' , 36, 49, 49«, 50 P r o g o f f , Ira, 146«, 223 P s y c h o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h e s : and t h e H i s t o r y o f Religions, 76, 82, 93, 98, 100, 134-135; a n d r e d u c t i o n i s m , 82-84, 114; t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , 3 9 45

263

verification, 159-160, 207, 239, 239«, 240, 240«, 241 Rituals, 51, 111, 117-118, 123«, 140«, 162, 191, 217, 219, 241; o f a s c e n sion, 142, 217; o f initiation, 116, 118, 150, 152, 153; a n d m y t h , 5 0 51, 56, 56«, 57«, 185 R o m a n i a , 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 , 228« R o m a n t i c i s m , In, 13« Sacred, 122, 131, 140-143, 158, 158«, 167, 178, 181, 211«, ambivalence of, 131-133, 133«; a n d t h e e v a l u a t i o n a n d c h o i c e b y religious p e r s o n s , 128-130, 131, 214; a n d h i e r o p h a n i e s , 124-125, 137, 174; as irreducible, 82, 83, 114; a n d t h e paradoxical relationship with the p r o f a n e , 126-127, 130; privileged status of, in Eliade's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , 230, 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 ; a n d t h e p r o fane distinction, 3 3 - 3 5 , 35«, 120, 122, 124, 125, 130; a n d religion, 120-123, 214, 225. See also Dialectic o f t h e sacred; Homo religiosus, a n d t h e sacred; Irreducibility, o f t h e sacred

R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n , A. R „ 31, 48 R a d h a k r i s h n a n , Sarvepalli, 89 Radin, Paul, 1 8 - 1 9 R a s m u s s e n , D a v i d , 119«, 138, 1 4 5 146 ' R a t i o n a l ' , 'rationalistic': a p p r o a c h t o religious p h e n o m e n a , 6 - 7 , 11, 1 6 17, 2 3 - 2 4 , 25, 41, 4 6 ^ 7 , 6 0 - 6 2 , 84, 92-93, 96, 97 R e d u c t i o n i s m , 3 4 - 3 5 , 3 6 - 3 7 , 37«, 44, 52-53, 59, 59«, 6 0 - 6 2 , 62«, 6 4 - 6 6 , 85,96-101; and antireductionist claims, 9 1 - 9 3 , 9 6 - 9 7 , 9 8 - 1 0 1 ; a n d Eliade, 3 8 - 3 9 , 113-119, 134, 136, 144, 2 1 8 - 2 1 9 , 231, 236, 242; a n d t h e p o s i t i o n that all a p p r o a c h e s are necessarily reductionistic, 97, 97n, 98, 117-119; and s y m b o l i s m , 154, 162, 163-164, 184. See also I r r e d u c ibility, o f t h e religious; I r r e d u c ibility, o f t h e sacred; N a t u r a l i s m (naturalistic), r e d u c t i o n s R e g e n e r a t i o n , 149, 150, 154, 161, 215

Saiving, Valerie, 118, 118« Sartre, J e a n - P a u l , 226, 226«, 238 Saussure, F e r d i n a n d de, 146 Scheler, M a x , 72, 72n S c h m i d t , W i l h e l m , 40, 46, 46«, 47 Schutz, A l f r e d , 59n Science, scientific; a p p r o a c h t o relig i o u s p h e n o m e n a , 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 25, 84, 85, 125« Self, 186-188, 218

Religionswissenschaft, 38, 39, 68, 69, 73, 83, 92, 93, 9 4 - 9 5 , 1 0 8 , 1 3 4 , 1 3 5 , 1 9 9 , 201; b e g i n n i n g s of, 8 - 9 ; and M a x Müller, 3, 8 - 9 , 82, 94, 203; t r a n s l a tion of, 3 - 5 . See also H i s t o r y o f Religions Revelation, 74—76 Ricketts, M a c Linscott, 123«, 211«, 218, 218«, 219, 226, 230 Ricceur, Paul: a n d s y m b o l i s m , 142«, 159-160, 162«, 189, 189«; and

Sexuality, 150-152, 152«, 157, 183, 185 S h a m a n i s m , 98, 116, 116«, 117, 131, 134-135, 135«, 137, 206, 239 S i s y p h u s , 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 , 229n, 234 Sky, 125, 141, 141«, 142, 147, 184 S m i t h , J o h n E „ 164«, 186-187, 187« Smith, Huston,4 S m i t h , W. R o b e r t s o n , 3 9 - 4 0 S m i t h , W i l f r e d C a n t w e l l , 77-80, 80«, 82, 8 4 - 8 6 , 203, 209

264

Index

Snake, serpent, 166; a n d e r o t i c a n d sexual s y m b o l i s m , 150-152, 152«; and the m o o n and lunar symbolism, 149,153-157,159,161,163,167-168, 1 7 5 , 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 , 232; a n d t h e p h e n o m enological method, 155-156, 193-194, 196 Sociological a p p r o a c h e s : a n d t h e H i s t o r y o f Religions, 8 2 - 8 4 , 93, 98, 100, 135; and r e d u c t i o n i s m , 8 2 - 8 4 , 113-114; t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , 3 3 - 3 8 , 235« Soul, 15-16, 132 Space, 147, 196, 244, 244« Specialist a p p r o a c h e s , 45, 45«, 53-54, 70-72 Spencer, B a l d w i n , 2 3 Spencer, H e r b e r t , 8 ' S p i r i t i s m ' , 205 S t a n n e r , W. E. H., 37«, 151« Stones, 124, 125, 125«, 141, 141«, 142, 189-190 Strasser, S t e p h a n , 119 S t r u c t u r e , 43, 4 7 - 4 9 , 58-59, 6 0 - 6 1 , 6 7 - 6 8 , 112, 144-145, 159«, 176«, 2 4 0 - 2 4 2 ; o f t h e dialectic o f t h e sacred, 124-130; essential, status o f a n d e x p l a n a t i o n for, 175-177, 180, 181, 183, 2 1 0 - 2 1 2 ; as a ' g i v e n ' a n d a ' c o n s t i t u t e d g i v e n ' , 181-185, 1 8 6 187, 188-189, 189«, 190; 'ideal', 197-199, 202; p r i m a r y s y m b o l i c , 2 3 6 - 2 4 3 , 246; a n d s y m b o l i s m , 1 4 5 148, 158, 162«, 167-168. See also Historical, essential s t r u c t u r e s are n o t , a c c o r d i n g t o Eliade; Historical, and phenomenological relationship ('tension'); Phenomenological method, for gaining insight into meaning S u f i s m , 222 Sun, 147, 149, 157«, 166, 184 Symbolism, symbols, 34-35, 42^-5, 50, 51, 55, 8 5 - 8 6 , 9 6 - 9 7 , 1 2 8 « , 140«, 143-144, 146-147, 148, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162«, 167-168, 176-177, 183, 2 1 4 - 2 1 5 , 245; as a u t o n o m o u s m o d e o f c o g n i t i o n , 141«, 148, 160,

162, 209; ' c e n t e r ' of, 152, 154, 156, 157, 157«, 160, 213; a n d t h e dialectic o f t h e sacred, 105, 138, 140, 141, 141«, 158, 173;'existential v a l u e ' o f , 143, 148, 152«, 158, 167-169, 175, 2 1 4 - 2 1 5 ; f u n c t i o n of, 141«, 147, 163-164, 164«, 165, 209-210; general features of, 157-168; as 'given', 182-185, 201; and h e r m e n e u t i c s , 105, 106, 140, 144, 147, 156, 157«, 161, 173, 177, 181, 194-195, 199, 201; 'logic o f ' , 148, 158, 159-161, 209, 212, 237; m e a n i n g o f t e r m , 147; as ' m u l t i v a l e n t ' , 158, 160, 161-162, 164«, 165, 212; a n d ' o p e n i n g s ' , 140, 167-168, 2 1 4 215; a n d p a r a d o x i c a l a n d c o n t r a d i c t o r y aspects of reality, e x p r e s s i o n of, 158, 164, 164«, 165-167; ' p o i n t s b e y o n d ' itself, 142, 142«, 143, 158; a n d p r i m a r y s y m b o l i c structures, 176, 177, 2 3 6 - 2 4 3 , 246; a n d r e d u c t i o n i s m , 154, 162, 163-164, 184; its referent, 141, 141«, 142-143, 143«, 158, 158«; a n d religion, 140-141, 141«, 142-143, 143«; a n d s t r u c t u r a l i s m , 145-148, 148«; a n d u n i f i cation, f u n c t i o n of, 158, 160, 1 6 3 164, 164«; ' v a l o r i z a t i o n s ' of, 148, 149, 152, 152«, 156, 162, 166, 167, 176, 177 ' S y m p l e g a d e s ' , 165-166, 184, 221 S y n c h r o n i c , 112, 146 T a b o o (tabu), 19-20, 39^10, 131 T h e o l o g y , 3, 7 4 - 7 7 , 80«, 88, 92, 94, 9 7 - 1 0 1 , 118, 127, 129, 176«, 213, 223, 230 T h e o s o p h y , 205 Tillich, Paul, 100, 142, 143-144, 146«, 165 T i m e , 147, 176, 180, 181, 183, 185, 196, 226, 234, 234«-235n, 236, 243 T o t e m i s m , 34, 34«, 3 9 - 4 1 , 91 T o y n b e e , A r n o l d , 220 'Transconsciousness', 'the transconscious', 218, 218«, 2 1 9 - 2 2 2

Index

Tree, 137, 142, 153«, 176-177, 189190, 215, 219 Troy, 166« Turner, Victor, 56« Tylor, E d w a r d B., 8-9, 15-17, 22, 23, 25, 26, 60, 99, 113 Unconscious, 41-45, 145, 209-211, 215, 219 Underhill, Evelyn, 73 'Universal': and Eliade's evaluation of religious phenomena as 'elevated' and 'highest', 213-216, 220 Universal structures, 175-177, 190191, 195-199, 201, 210-212 Van der Leeuw, G., 63-64, 82, 90,101, 107, 109, 109«, 120, 121 Vedanta, 11«, 133« Vedas, 12, 184 Vegetation, 147, 152«, 155, 156, 161, 183

265

Verification, 196, 198, 200, 207-208, 230, 232, 239-240, 240«, 241-243 Vietnam, 227-228, 244-245 Wach, Joachim, 4-5, 37-38, 71, 72«, 81, 81n, 82, 89, 91-92, 93, 94, 109, 120, 121, 159« Warner, W. Lloyd, 151« Water, 149, 152, 152«, 153-156, 157«, 161, 166, 194 Weber, Max, 33, 37, 56, 59« Welbon, G. Richard, 132-133, 175 Werblowsky, R. J. Z w i , 122« Whitehead, Alfred N o r t h , 186, 188 Witchcraft, 117-118 Yoga, 35«, 121, 197-198, 217-218, 239, 241 Zaehner, R. C , 54«, 89, 90 Z i m m e r , Heinrich, 153«, 166«

Religion and Reason Method

1.

and Theory

in the Study

and Interpretation

of

Religion

Category Formation and the History of Religions, by Robert D. Baird (University o f Iowa) 1971, X I I + 178 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-6889-6

2.

Western Religion. A Country by Country Sociological Inquiry, ed. by Hans Mol (McMaster University) 1972, 642 pages. Clothbound I S B N : 90-279-7004-1

3 + 4 . Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion. Aims, Methods and Theories o f Research, B y Jacques Waardenburg (University o f Utrecht) Vol. 1: Introduction and Anthology 1973, X I V + 742 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7226-8

Vol. 2: Bibliography 1974, VIII + 332 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7971-5

5.

Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity. An Essay in Comparative Phenomenology o f the Spirit, by J. G. Arapura (McMaster University) 1972, VIII + 146 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7180-3

6.

The Cardinal Meaning. Essays in Comparative Hermeneutics: Buddhism and Christianity, ed. by Michael Pye and Robert Morgan (University o f Lancaster) 1973, 204 pages. Clothbound I S B N : 90-279-7228-1

268

7.

'Religion

and

Reason'

Logique et Religion. L ' A t o m i s m e logique de L. Wittgenstein et la possibilité des propositions religieuses. Including 'Logic and Religion', a shortened and adapted English version of the text, par Jacques Poulain (Université de Montréal, Canada) 1973, 228 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7284-2

8.

Religion, Culture and Methodology. Papers of the Groningen W o r k i n g - g r o u p for the Study of F u n d a m e n tal Problems and Methods of Science of Religion, ed. by Th. P. van Baaren and H. J. W. Drijvers (University of Groningen) 1973, 172 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7249-4

9.

Religion and Primitive Cultures. A Study in Ethnophilosophy, by Wilhelm D u p r e (University of Nijmegen) 1975, X + 356 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7531-0

10.

Christologies and Cultures. T o w a r d a T y p o l o g y of Religious Worldviews, by George R u p p (Harvard University) 1974, XIV + 270 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7641-4

11.

The Biographical Process. Studies in the History and Psychology of Religion, ed. by Frank E. Reynolds (University of Chicago) and Donald Capps (University of N o r t h Carolina at Charlotte) 1976, XII + 436 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7522-1

12.

The Study of Religion and Its Meaning. N e w Explorations in Light of Karl Popper and Emile Dürkheim, by J. E. Barnhart ( N o r t h Texas State University) 1977, X I V + 216 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7762-3

'Religion

13.

and Reason'

269

Studies in the Methodology of the Science of Religion, ed. b y Lauri H o n k o (University of T u r k u , Finland) 1978, approx. 600 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7854-9

14.

Structure and Creativity in Religion. H e r m e n e u t i c s in Mircea Eliade's P h e n o m e n o l o g y and N e w Directions, by D o u g l a s Allen (University of Maine) 1978, X V I I I + 266 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7594-9

15.

Refections on the Study of Religion. Including an Essay on the W o r k of G e r a r d u s van der Leeuw, by Jacques W a a r d e n b u r g (University of U t r e c h t ) 1978, XII + 284 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7604-X

16.

Interpretation and Dionysos. M e t h o d in the Study of a G o d , by Park M c G i n t y (Leigh University) 1978, VIII + 258 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7844-1

17.

Principles of Integral Science of Religion. b y G e o r g S c h m i d (Teachers College, C h u r , Switzerland) 1978, approx. 200 pages. C l o t h b o u n d ISBN: 90-279-7864-6

Other volumes are in preparation M o u t o n Publishers • T h e H a g u e • Paris • N e w Y o r k