Strongmen Saviours: A Political Economy of Populism in India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil [1 ed.] 1032288310, 9781032288314

Table of contents :
Dedication
Content
List of figures
List of tables
Acknowledgements
1 Introduction
Part I: India
2 India’s Transformation: From Nehru to Vajpayee
3 From ‘Pracharak’ to ‘Pradhan Sevak’: The Rise of Narendra Damodardas Modi
4 India under Modi’s Leadership
5 Part Conclusion: India
Part II: Turkey
6 The Inception of Modern Turkey: A Background Context
7 The Boy from Anatolia
8 Turkey under the Rule of Erdog˘an
9 Part Conclusion: Turkey
Part III: Russia
10 From the Tsars to Gorbachev
11 Vladimir Putin: His Life before the Limelight
12 Putin’s Russia: The System and the Man
13 Part Conclusion: Russia
Part IV: Brazil
14 The Past as a Guide to the Present
15 The ‘Poor Boy from Sao Paulo’ and his Rise to Power
16 An Election Victory – and a New Era for Brazil under Bolsonaro?
17 Part Conclusion: Brazil
18 In Summation: What We Can Learn from Cross-Country Narratives
Index

Citation preview

“Strongmen Saviours is an admirable attempt to study the rise of strong leaders in India, Russia, Turkey and Brazil in comparative perspective. It will provide readers a sense of the possible similarities and differences in these cases. One may not agree with all the authors’ conclusions, but the juxtaposition of these cases provides immense food for thought.” Dr. Pratap Bhanu Mehta “Populism is a political phenomenon that has surged in power across the world in recent years. Understanding its origins and its significance is thus more important than ever. In Strongmen Saviours, Deepanshu Mohan and Abhinav Padmanabhan’s focus on India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil helps re-orient the investigation of populism away from just Europe and America and toward these key regional powers. An important contribution to the global study of this alarming and ever-strengthening trend.” Dr. Shashi Tharoor

STRONGMEN SAVIOURS

This book is an introduction to right-wing populist movements outside the West, looking at four key case studies, their commonalities and differences. Populism has been on the rise worldwide since the global financial crisis of 2008, with few countries left entirely untouched by the phenomenon. At the same time, the specific circumstances of different countries vary considerably; and it is important that in seeking to understand these movements, we do not assume they are all the same – albeit that they have some characteristics in common. This book takes the case studies of India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil in turn, examining how they have each taken quite distinct journeys to similar destinations. It offers both a better understanding of each country’s slide towards ‘strongman’ authoritarianism and an analysis of the common elements shared between them. This book is an essential introduction to the rise of populism outside the West for students of international political economy and comparative politics. Deepanshu Mohan is Associate Professor of Economics and Director at the Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES), Jindal School of Liberal Arts and Humanities, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India. He is a Visiting Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; and an Honorary Associate Professor at the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa. Abhinav Padmanabhan is a Teaching and Research Fellow at the Jindal School of International Affairs and a Senior Research Assistant at CNES, Jindal School of Liberal Arts and Humanities, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India.

STRONGMEN SAVIOURS

A Political Economy of Populism in India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil

Deepanshu Mohan and Abhinav Padmanabhan

Cover image: The copyright of the image belongs to Jignesh Mistry, an associate of the authors’ team. First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business © 2023 Deepanshu Mohan and Abhinav Padmanabhan The right of Deepanshu Mohan and Abhinav Padmanabhan to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-032-28831-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-28832-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-29869-4 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694 Typeset in Bembo by Taylor & Francis Books

To our parents, students and all those committed to ‘learning’ and ‘knowing’…

CONTENTS

List of figures List of tables Acknowledgements

xi

xiii

xiv

1 Introduction

1

PART I

India

19

2 India’s Transformation: From Nehru to Vajpayee

21

3 From ‘Pracharak’ to ‘Pradhan Sevak’: The Rise of Narendra

Damodardas Modi

36

4 India under Modi’s Leadership

45

5 Part Conclusion: India

63

PART II

Turkey

69

6 The Inception of Modern Turkey: A Background Context

71

7 The Boy from Anatolia

83

8 Turkey under the Rule of Erdog˘ an

91

9 Part Conclusion: Turkey

107

x Contents

PART III

Russia

113

10 From the Tsars to Gorbachev

115

11 Vladimir Putin: His Life before the Limelight

129

12 Putin’s Russia: The System and the Man

136

13 Part Conclusion: Russia

155

PART IV

Brazil

161

14 The Past as a Guide to the Present

163

15 The ‘Poor Boy from Sao Paulo’ and his Rise to Power

176

16 An Election Victory – and a New Era for Brazil under

Bolsonaro?

182

17 Part Conclusion: Brazil

197

18 In Summation: What We Can Learn from Cross-Country

Narratives

203

Index

218

FIGURES

2.1 India had been running twin deficits since the 1970s 4.1 Once the UPA came to power in 2004, the top 1% earned a

bigger share of income than the bottom 50% 4.2 Inflation rose rapidly between 2004 and 2009 4.3 Average annual growth rate of per capita income of selected

states, by decade 4.4 Unemployment rates 4.5 Comparison of macroeconomic and social sector performance 6.1 GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1960–2018: Middle

income; Turkey; World 6.2 Uncontrollable rates of inflation prevailed throughout the

1990s but declined noticeably after 2002 8.1 Current account balance (% of GDP) 8.2 The nominal interest rate was high throughout the 1990s 8.3 Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) 8.4 Before Erdog˘ an came to power in 2002, income inequality fell

considerably. Under Erdog˘ an, however, it has risen

continuously – especially since his second term 8.5 Unemployment has seen an upward trend in recent years 10.1 Real GDP per head of Russia and the Soviet Union 10.2 The division of industrial output between consumer goods and

producer goods 12.1 Economic change in Russia 1990–2002 12.2 Revenue minus production cost of oil as percentage of GDP 12.3 Russia growth rate (in percentage) from 2001–2004

29

51

51

52

58

59

72

79

93

94

95

103

103

120

124

140

140

143

xii List of figures

12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 14.1 14.2 14.3 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8

Poverty and inequality in Russia, 1994–2015 Unemployment rates in Russia, 1992–2016 Russian political history versus oil prices since the 1970s Share of adults describing themselves as Orthodox GDP growth (%) from 1998–2020 Comparison of industry and GDP growth rate Inflation soared throughout the 1980s The current account deficit reached 4% of GDP in 1998 Terms of trade improved under Cardoso and Lula (1995–

2010) Unemployment rates fell under Lula (and have risen sharply

since) Per capita GDP growth rate of Brazil Expenditure on Bolsa Familia (as percentage of GDP) Education expenditure rose in Lula’s second term Brazil’s inequality problem has persisted throughout the years Bolsonaro planned to reduce crime by militarising society Press Freedom Ranking out of 180 countries. Brazil remains a

violent country for the media and its position slipped even

lower in 2020, after Bolsonaro came to power

145

145

146

147

148

165

170

171

183

184

184

185

186

190

191

192

TABLES

4.1 Class-wise party preference 2009 versus 2014 12.1 Corruption Perceptions Index for select countries (10= highly

clean, 0= highly corrupt) 18.1 A look at the neoliberal approaches attempted in the four

countries under different leaders

50

142

206

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The body of work produced in this volume is a culmination of a long, arduous journey initiated over three years ago following a dinner conversation with a dear friend, Wajahat Ahmad. Most of our research was undertaken while the COVID-19 pandemic was wreaking havoc across the globe, with waves of infection spreading across continents and overwhelming citizenries of one nation after another with grief, loss, and suffering. As social scientists, our interventions, assertations and entrenched arguments in the writing of the book have emerged from a critical assessment of secondary sources from the archived social, political and economic past of each nation in focus (India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil). In pursuing this project, we are tremendously grateful to numerous friends, peers, distinguished scholars and colleagues in the Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES) research team. Without their persistent support and patient guidance, this book would not have been possible. First, we would like to earnestly thank Professor (Dr) Ramachandra Guha, Professor (Dr) Maitreesh Ghatak, Professor (Dr) Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Dr. Neelanjan Sircar, Mr Roshan Kishore, and Dr Rathin Roy for being part of the CNES Samvaad dialogue series, which was critical in shaping the foundations of this research and contributed towards the initial stages of ideation for this book. The foundations of the research questions and objectives were laid thanks to Wajahat Ahmad, a dear friend and prolific social anthropologist whose insights and critical inputs helped us to navigate a complex web of historical sources in researching each case study and political leader. We also warmly thank Vice Chancellor Professor C Raj Kumar and Dean Kathleen Modrowski for their leadership and vision, and for the creative freedom provided to our team at CNES at Jindal School of Liberal Arts and Humanities, OP Jindal Global University.

Acknowledgements xv

Deepanshu would also like to thank the Department of Economics at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada for their generous offer to teach and conduct research during the summer terms of 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. His time spent over the summer at Carleton was instrumental in shaping conversations with students and scholars on the rise of populism and the reasons therefor, analysed through the fields of political economy, economic history and economic sociology. Special thanks also to our dear fellow team members at CNES – Swasti Ray, Achyut Mishra, Kensiya Kennedy, Archita Sridhar, Diya Chadha, Shivani Agarwal, J Mohan Sakthivel, Jignesh Mistry and Rekha Pachauri – for their unwavering support and assistance during the writing of this book. The conceptual clarity of ideas brought forth in this manuscript would not have been possible without their indirect and direct contributions. We are indelibly grateful to our dear editors, publishers at Routledge with a special mention to Simon Bates, Shelley Strelluf and Carolyn for all their feedback, input and kind assistance. Their persistent efforts also helped in the timely com­ pletion of an ambitious book project. Finally, our sincere gratitude and love to our families and students, whose affection and care inspired us to work hard and made the experience of bringing this project to fruition a blissful intellectual retreat. Without all of them, the book’s scholarship would not have been possible.

1 INTRODUCTION

Populism has emerged as the focus of much political discourse, given its prevalence in the current socio-political landscape around the globe. The trend has been widely studied to understand the rise of Donald Trump in the US, the anti-immigrant rhetoric plaguing countries in Western Europe and the polarised, hyper-nationalist campaign for Brexit in the UK, among other phenomena. The flurry of hot-takes and op-eds in the aftermath of 2016 warned readers with furious urgency that national populism was on the rise, painting a malevolent pic­ ture of the forces behind it. And while Donald Trump may have lost the 2020 presidential election, the percentage of votes he gathered indicates that populism is still very much alive in the US – a country that today is severely divided. In order both to comprehend this trend and to initiate a contextual enquiry into the subject, it is first necessary to understand the multifaceted conceptual dimensions of populism, and the factors that drive populist politics. For the basis of this understanding, we can borrow Cas Mudde’s definition of ‘populism’ as: a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the cor­ rupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people. (Cas Mudde 2017) Roger Eatwell and Mathew Goodwin expand on this definition, stating that ‘national populism’ ‘prioritises culture and interests of the nation, and promise[s] to give voice to a people who feel that they have been neglected, even held in con­ tempt, by distant and often corrupt elites’ (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018). DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-1

2 Introduction

These definitions broadly capture the concept, but barely scratch the surface in explaining it. The concept itself will be explored further in the following sections of this chapter. Before doing so, however, it is interesting to look at the factors that have contributed to the recent international interest in the conceptual designs of populism and the variables contributing thereto. As discussed by Bremmer (2018), the shift of manufacturing jobs to various emerging economies and an increase in immigration from certain war-torn coun­ tries have been the most notable factors behind the rise of populism (Bremmer 2018). The former has led to increased inequality and – coupled with the increase in automation – an actual, or at the very least perceived, closure of avenues of upward mobility for the middle class. The long-cherished ‘American dream’, metaphorically speaking, has now become just that in many parts of the Western world. And the resultant existential angst in this period of economic uncertainty has been cunningly exploited by var­ ious populist leaders who have linked the downturn in citizens’ fortunes to the presence of the culturally dissimilar ‘outsider’. As these trends continue to unfold and more attention is paid to them to understand the underlying causal mechanics, a large blind spot has simultaneously arisen. While all this theorising is quite effective in explaining the rise of populism in the developed world, its efficacy in describing the same phenomenon in emer­ ging countries is quite limited. This intellectual theorising on populism attempts neither to analyse nor to explain the rise of right-wing populism in emerging countries and the Global South – from Brazil to Turkey, and from India to the Philippines. This is not to imply that this trend has not been explored in specific emerging countries. What is conspicuously missing, however, is a larger, perhaps more ambitious attempt to study the phenomenon across multiple countries simultaneously. This book, in its research objective, sets out to achieve just that. The aim here is not simply to identify any similar trends observed in populist or authoritarian leadership that may exist in less developed countries; rather the book’s theoretical scope sets out to study the rise of authoritarian populist leadership in the context of the governing dynamics of political economy and political sociology in the emerging world.

The Goal, the Methodology and the Challenges The main goal of our research is to reorient the Eurocentric anchor of a very pertinent and continuously evolving academic enquiry of our times and place it in a geographically more representative position. We do so by undertaking a case study analysis of four countries from the emerging world that enjoy growing prominence on the international stage: India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil. There are several reasons for focusing our research on these countries. First, they are important regional powers and exercise considerable influence in their respective

Introduction 3

geographical spheres. Their politico-economic trajectories have not just endogenous, but also exogenous repercussions. Second, these countries can all be classified as middle-income countries – albeit that a significant gulf separates Russia from India, Turkey and Brazil in terms of per capita income. Add to this the spirit of the work to ensure representational equity and this spatially dispersed selection appears more reasonable. Another vital goal of this research is to gain a better understanding of the sociopolitical roots of right-wing populism in the emerging world by studying these countries. To address the project’s fundamental theme, a comprehensive and rigorous review of relevant literature was conducted. Our findings from a critical discourse analysis of available secondary literature were then used to aid in the evaluation and comprehension of each case study and each leader’s rise to power. The work adopts and relies upon a heuristic approach to simplify both its exploration and its explanation. This heuristic approach traces the journey of each respective leader – Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdog˘ an, Vladimir Putin and Jair Bolsonaro – to the very top of the political establishment. It would be prudent here to acknowledge that in conceiving an ambitious crosscomparative case study of different political, social and economic nations, our research suffers from a few limitations. Foremost of these is the fact that most of our analytical reasoning is based on a critical assessment of secondary research. No primary interviews were conducted to support our observations; and COVID-19 pandemic-induced restrictions made it even more difficult to pursue any form of primary archival work in any of the countries chosen for our study. We have tried to mitigate this through a deeper, more extensive study of diverse secondary sources for each country identified as a case study. A second limitation explicit in the research is that, as authors, we depended heavily on translations of regional language-based texts because of a lack of fluency in Turkish, Russian or Portuguese. When analysing the available literature on each country’s political, social and leadership history, we relied extensively on English translations; as a result, our observations on history and political biographical sketches of leaders may have missed some socio-cultural nuances. The third limitation is the limited sample of focus countries for our theoretical analysis. The inability to include more emerging country leaders in our study of authoritarian populism (and the reasons for its rise) may restrict the scope of our ana­ lytical observations to the specific contexts studied. This limitation, however, may be consistent with the broader aspects of most literature available in cross-comparative political economy and/or political sociology.

Populism in Our Time A couple of theoretical clarifications are also in order. First, this work in no way intends to conflate right-wing ideology with populism or infer that a populist impulse is intrinsic to a right-wing worldview. There is a

4 Introduction

long tradition of moderate right-wing governments in power in the West and the Global North. In the emerging world and the Global South too, there have also been instances of both right-wing parties and extreme left-wing parties governing well within the constitutional norms of each nation. The ideology and the phenomenon appear distinct in rhetoric, but they often overlap. It is the unchecked and unabated rise of an ideology, the marginalisation of moderate factions and, in many cases, the development of a cult personality that infuse shades of populism to the right wing. This can happen with both right-wing and left-wing ideologies; indeed, many countries in Latin America have witnessed a rise in left-wing populism – as indeed did India under the political regime of Indira Gandhi during the 1970s. Second, an analysis of the four nation-states in conjunction does not imply any parity in the extent of right-wing authoritarian populism they are experiencing. The countries exemplify different points on the spectrum of right-wing populism. To understand this, it is useful to turn to Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World report, which assesses access to political and civil rights in countries around the world. As per its 2021 report, Turkey and Russia were classified as ‘Not Free’; India was classified as ‘Partly Free’; and Brazil was classified as ‘Free’ (Freedom House 2021). In Turkey’s case, the classification was justified by citing lapses in electoral processes; restrictions on the rise of new parties; control of online and offline sources of information; a lack of academic freedom and so on. Similarly, in Russia’s case, the justification included reasons such as the dearth of political participation from outside of central government-backed candidates; the suppression of the LGBTQI+ community; and the crackdown on religious groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses. These rankings may appear to be fluid, as they are prone to changes each year due to factors that include, but are not limited to, those mentioned above in rela­ tion to Turkey and Russia. India saw its status decline from ‘Free’ to ‘Partly Free’ in the rankings because of: a multiyear pattern in which the Hindu nationalist government and its allies have presided over rising violence and discriminatory policies affecting the Muslim population and pursued a crackdown on expressions of dissent by the media, academics, civil society groups, and protesters. (Freedom House 2021) Brazil has also seen a drop in its score, primarily due to the risk of harassment and attacks faced by independent journalists and civil society activists; violence and discrimination against minorities; and corruption. The development trajectories of rising nations – particularly in the non-Western geographical landscape – have been subject to much academic attention in the discourse on the political economy of late development (20th century). This has largely been due to the phenomenal growth possibilities presented by the neo­ liberal forces of deepening market integration; the emergence of global financial

Introduction 5

capitalism, with entrenched big-capital financed privatisation; the rapid transfor­ mation in technological growth; and the internet-based communication technol­ ogy revolution. However, these possibilities bring with them their own challenges, including divergences in the economic and social wellbeing of groups within societies; the rise of an economic and political ‘elite’; and deeper structural socio-political and economic inequities. The juxtaposition of these social and political challenges with the muchdebated economic growth prospects in these countries offers a fascinating frame for a deeper research study (as we endeavour to do here). Within this frame, we consider how the ‘populist’ leadership has created a niche for itself. This involves an examination of the defining characteristics of this millennium, such as continued globalisation; the rise of a neoliberal governmentality; the global financial crisis of 2007-08; and domestic perceptions of international trends. This study will facilitate an understanding not only of the socio-radical, socio-political and socio-economic changes across these nations, but also of the repercussions of international events on domestic politics around the world.

(Right-Wing) Populism, Economy and Society Understanding a complex set of factors and its connection to the rise of a dynamic and context-specific phenomenon such as populism calls for a few conceptual clarifications. The first one involves populism, which has often been used historically to define a set of social, political and economic movements that feature groups fighting against the status quo or the ‘establishment’ (Mohan and Amal 2020). The form and subsequent goals of these (political) movements may need to be read (and understood) in the context of a given nation’s socio-political climate during a specific period (ibid). A populist movement has two main characteristics. The first is the focus on a leader himself (and in most cases we recognise that it is men who are at the centre of populist politics). A populist leader is not constrained by organisational rules and enjoys near-total control of personnel and strategic decisions within the organisa­ tion (Kenny 2017). The second is the mobilisation of the masses towards political ends (ibid). The leaders in focus in this research exhibit these characteristics, as explored in the following chapters. According to Kenny, ‘Populist mobilisation thrives where ties between the voters and either bureaucratic or clientelist parties do not exist or have decayed’ (Kenny 2018). As will be seen further in this text, macroeconomic indicators such as high inflation (an overall aggregate depicting higher average prices for goods and services bought and sold), increasing unemployment and widening wealth and income inequalities can further erode these ties and influence people’s perceptions of an incumbent government. These perceptions may in turn allow a group which does not represent the existing ‘elite’ or the political incumbents to influence people’s opinions by offering them an ‘alternative’ economic and political vision or invoking a reimagination of a glorified past to change people’s voting preferences

6 Introduction

and oust the incumbents. The prevailing economic conditions of a given society can thereby initiate long-serving social-political changes. In his 2020 study, ‘Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-wing Populism’, Dani Rodrik attempts to study how globali­ sation has fuelled populism over the past few decades (Rodrik 2020). He presents two sets of deterministic factors that have contributed to the rise of populism today: one featuring economic determinants and the other cultural determinants. Rodrik argues that the rise of populism on ‘the right’ is surprising, since common sense would direct one to deduce that ‘the left’, with its focus on redistributive economic agendas, would lead the charge. In fact, Turkey, India and Brazil have seen the right appropriate the left’s space by projecting an economic alternative to the citizenry based on a redis­ tributive, welfare-driven economic plan, allowing the state’s ‘visible hand’ to increase (rather than decrease) its reach. Bornschier (2018) further explores linkages between the emergence of the ‘radical right’ and its projection of an alternative vision based on ‘economic and cultural modernization’. He looks at the impact of modernisation on different sections of society in a bid to explore how they react to such changes. This, in turn, could be responsible for the rise of the radical right in the past decade. He argues that an increase in global competition often accelerates competition, in turn breaking down national barriers to expose domestic sectors prematurely to inter­ national competition, causing many groups to remain disadvantaged and experi­ ence a lower level of wellbeing, while a few others rise to greater economic (and then political) prominence (Bornschier 2018).

A Skewed Representation of Populist Discourse Right-wing populism is distinct from other forms of populism due to its sharp focus on the dichotomisation of society: an ‘us versus them’ mentality based on national, religious or ethnic grounds. The rhetoric is centred on anti-elitist senti­ ments and appeals to the common people. It is further amplified by the social inequalities that have arisen from inherent structural linkages between the prevail­ ing economic conditions in society (eg, high inequality, unemployment, deindus­ trialisation) and a rise in populist tendencies in its political trajectory. A more profound associative link underpinning these connections can be observed between ‘neoliberalism’ (or neoliberal economic policies) and ‘right-wing populism’. At the most general level, neoliberalism refers to the process of opening national economies to multinational corporations and global players such as the Interna­ tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank. As an economic theory, it supports maximising personal economic freedoms and reducing state intervention to the bare minimum. Seemingly innocuous as an ideology, it has become so pervasive that it has become engrained in the very way we understand the world. In a neoliberal, market-oriented ideological world, citizens are deemed con­ sumers; regulation is undemocratic; choices are exercised by buying and selling; inefficiency is eliminated; and merit is rewarded.

Introduction 7

What are the consequences of such a world? To start, growing inequality; restricted upward mobility among the lower socio-economic class; disjointed labour markets with weak worker contracts; and structural unemployment. In her book, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism - Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West, Wendy Brown (2019) observes: In countries of [the] Global North, neoliberal economic policies devastated rural and suburban regions, emptying them of decent jobs, pensions, schools, services, and infrastructure as social spending dried up and capital chased the cheap labour and tax havens of the Global South. Liberal political agendas, neoliberal economic agendas, and cosmopolitan cultural agendas generated a growing experience of abandonment, betrayal, and ultimately rage on the part of the new dispossessed, the white working- class and middle-class populations of the First and Second Worlds. (Brown 2019) Stephen Puhringer and Walter Otsch highlight the empirical and conceptual simila­ rities between neoliberalism and right-wing populism, suggesting that the state of politics in the world today might be a culmination of both these theories to form a new one, which they term ‘authoritative neoliberalism’ (Puhringer and Otsch 2018). Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Jose María Maravall and Adam Przeworski provide empirical evidence to support this link between social inequalities, neoliberalism and right-wing populism in the context of democracies. They observe that: ‘Democratic governments that followed neoliberal tenets faced stagnation, increased poverty, political discontent, and debilitation of democracy’ (Bresser-Pereira et al 1994). In his work on the American story, Rosenberg also demonstrates how democ­ racy and its structural weaknesses have given rise to extreme right-wing populism in recent years. He postulates that the democratic model finally bowed under the pressure of populism’s rise under Trump due to economic, global and technologi­ cal changes (Rosenberg 2020). Rodrik makes a similar argument in the context of European countries, where the catalysts for populism have surfaced from a wider discourse on (anti-)immigration, especially in relation to policies for Muslim and African immigration into European nations (Rodrik 2020). Starkly missing from this discussion is the non-Western context. While some scholars, such as Gandesha, have acknowledged the rise of right-wing populism in the case of India and Turkey, the discussion is still concentrated on defining the concept of populism in different contexts rather than explaining the factors that have aided its rise in emerging nations of the Global South (Gandesha 2018). In the Western world, populism and populist leaders typically emerge as a result of the complete and total acceptance of neoliberal policies and their repercussions; while the nations studied in this book accepted neoliberalism, but they tailored it to their own circumstances. As a result, populism cannot be considered in the Global South in the same way it is in the Global North; the definition must rather be adapted to suit and reflect each country’s customised neoliberal policies.

8 Introduction

Kenny defines ‘populist movements’ as: Ones in which a personalistic or charismatic leader looks to gain or retain power based on direct and unmediated and institutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganised followers. Although populists sometimes utilise party activists, unions, and other civil society organisations in their efforts to win and retain power, they rely more heavily on ad-hoc, centripetal, and weakly institutionalised direct links with voters established through the mass media and mass rallies. (Kenny 2017) The research conducted here, however, suggests a modification to this definition. In the countries studied in this research endeavour, it is seen that leaders use institutional structures to project themselves as personalistic or charismatic. They do this by leveraging the mass media, weak institutional structures and in some cases a hybrid of the two. In doing so, the leaders position themselves to exploit the disappointments of the people that have come about through decades of socio-political change.

The Process Studying the different ways in which right-wing populism has taken root in India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil involves an intense, case-dependent research process. To accomplish this, the book follows a defined pattern of examination based on a three-step process. The book is divided into four parts dedicated to each country: India, Turkey, Brazil and Russia. Each of these parts has four chapters. The first chapter examines the political history of the respective country; the second charts the childhood and rise of each leader; the third looks at the events that transpired immediately before the leader’s election to office and his time in office; and the fourth reviews the highlights of the three previous chapters to summarise the narratives of each country. In exploring its respective focus, each chapter utilises the existing literature to weave the present knowledge on the subject into the narrative. While the first chapter condenses the intricate history of each country, the second draws on the works of multiple biographers to provide an unbiased view of the respective leader’s influences and inspirations during his ascent to power. The third chapter explores the more recent history of the countries under these leaders to understand where we are now and the potential trajectory of these countries going forward. And the fourth chapter condenses the observations made in the previous three chapters to give the reader a more integrated view of the countries and their trajectories.

Countries and Leaders: A Brief Insight on the Case Studies Before delving into a more comprehensive examination of these four countries, it is useful to take a brief look at the case studies.

Introduction 9

India India gained independence in the 20th century (1947) under a leader who enjoyed much respect among the world’s leadership at the time: Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru had a vision for India that would shape the country’s political and economic outlook for years. His influence was such that he was dubbed ‘the Maker of Modern India’ (New York Times 1964). Nehru believed there was no place for faith in a nation’s policies for development and focused on the need to promote scientific thinking and temper among the citi­ zenry. This modernistic vision, supported by most of India’s founding con­ stitutionalists, was enshrined within the constitutional charter, which espoused ‘social, economic and political justice, equality of status and opportunity, and freedom of thought, religion and association’. In terms of his economic vision, Nehru believed strongly in state intervention as a key driver of growth and the ‘visible hand’ as essential in preventing inequality. The economic principles that Nehru set for the country were carried forward by his successors pretty much up until the early 1990s when, due to severe economic pressures, India was forced to open up its markets to foreign capital and business. Politically, the 1990s became known as a decade of coalition rule in Indian politics. This pattern continued well into the 21st century until 2014, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, won a thumping single-party majority to form the government. Modi had served as chief minister of Gujarat for 14 years before becoming prime minister as the leader of the BJP. Although the BJP’s parent organisation, the Rashtriya Swayam­ sevak Sangh, was a Hindu nationalist group, Modi campaigned as a visionary who promised to bring the economic success of the ‘Gujarat Model’ to the national level (Jaffrelot 2015). Since his election, however, there has been an observed rise in hate speech and religious hate crime against minorities (particularly Muslims) (Amnesty Interna­ tional India 2019). Furthermore, in December 2019, during the first year of Modi’s second term, controversial citizenship legislation proposed by the national govern­ ment provoked religious tensions and protests across the country. The Citizenship Amendment Act (2019), read in tandem with the National Register of Citizens, was perceived as an attempt to completely disenfranchise India’s Muslim popula­ tion (Changoiwala 2020). Since Modi’s election, India’s political economy has witnessed the emergence of a centralised, majoritarian political order. Our aim, in this book, is to understand the socio-economic factors that have contributed to India’s democratic backslide, the emergence of a right-wing populist agenda under Modi’s leadership and the state of political and economic affairs in Modi’s India.

Turkey Turkey, like India, was founded in the 20th century by a respected figure, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, honorarily dubbed ‘Atatürk’ (meaning ‘father of Turks’). Turkey was

10 Introduction

established in 1923 as a result of the Turkish War of Independence and the abolishment of the sultanate. Atatürk’s reformation of the erstwhile Ottoman Empire was a shock to the society of the newly formed Turkey. A visionary leader, radically nationalist and secularist, Atatürk side-lined religion in favour of liberalising policies. What was left behind was a legacy that would become an example of modern Islam’s compatibility with the democratic world. This char­ acteristic of the Turkish state would make it not just a geographical bridge, but also an ideological bridge between East and West. The current leader of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdog˘ an, stands in sharp contrast to these founding ideals. Erdog˘ an’s party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), won its first election in 2002, after which Erdog˘ an served as prime min­ ister until 2014, when he was elected president. A whole generation has since grown up under his leadership. He has leveraged his long time in office to expand his powers and wield religious influence (Gall 2018a). These develop­ ments have slowly stripped away the secular framework of governance that long made Turkey stand out to the rest of the world. In 2012, Erdog˘ an embarked on a project to raise ‘pious generations’ (Gall 2018b). The generation that has been influenced by Erdog˘ an’s rule has been exposed to a conscious distortion of the nation’s secular values. This is evidenced by increased spending on religious education; the growing number of imam-hatips, or religious schools; the inclusion of lower age groups in these schools; and a distortion of school curriculums that has removed the concept of human evolution. Turkey is now being exposed to Islamic conservatism in a way that the country had never seen before. This leads one to wonder: what has allowed such a drastic change in leadership? To understand this, we need to understand the rise of the AKP, which preceded Erdog˘ an’s rise. This was supported by a change in Turkey’s demographics, resulting from the full liberalisation and industrialisation of the economy in the 1980s. This gave rise to an initial period of extreme economic instability in the 1990s and finally to a currency crisis in 1994. For those who were attracted to urban areas during this period of industrialisation and liberalisation, the move brought with it many changes. One of these was a secular urban culture, which came as a shock to the traditional peasant population that migrated from rural Turkey. This shock in turn gave rise to divisions as the Islamist ideology that had previously been restricted to rural spaces made its mark in urban areas. Anti-secular sentiment took hold in a population who felt that ‘Secularism was forced on the people as if it were a religion’ (Amraoui and Edroos 2018). In a country with a population that is 82% Muslim, this was a long time coming. The people felt oppressed and inhibited from freely practising their religion. Erdog˘ an’s upbringing and his childhood experiences led him to echo this senti­ ment. He lived in a working-class neighbourhood and constantly felt discriminated against because of his conservative ideals. He would later tap into the anti-secular sentiment that was taking hold of the nation, which reached a new high when the military started banning parties that they considered a threat to secularism.

Introduction 11

The party to which Erdog˘ an belonged, the Welfare Party, was considered one such party. Erdog˘ an and some other leaders learned their lesson from the failure of the Welfare Party and formed a new party, the Virtue Party. This political party followed a moderate approach and did not align itself with any radical religious thought, in a bid to avoid getting shut down again. This attempt was short-lived, however, and the party was soon shut down due to its leaders’ connection to the former Welfare Party. That same year, Erdog˘ an was banned from holding public office for inciting religious violence. This can be seen as a turning point in Erdog˘ an’s political outlook, as he learned that he would have to balance his conservative ideas with liberal policies to survive in the current political climate. He learned that pragmatism was essential to politics. This lesson played a pivotal role in the inception of the AKP. The AKP, while led by right-wing leaders, leveraged the presence of technocrats to sidestep the religious-secularism debate and focus on neoliberal economic poli­ cies and the pursuit of EU membership to win over the people. They claimed that their focus was on removing the influence of an overbearing state and making Turkey a true liberal democracy. One can see parallels here with Narendra Modi’s first campaign, in which he (like Erdog˘ an) pitched the BJP as the ‘saviour’ (Business Standard 2013) of India’s economy. The bid for Western acceptance was to cement Turkey’s chances of EU accession; and Turkey’s long and complicated relationship with the EU would continue to influence Erdog˘ an’s policies over the years. In 2002, the AKP won the elections. Subsequently, the ban on Erdog˘ an holding public office was reversed and he became prime minister of Turkey in 2003. In 2004, Turkey was finally offered the chance to begin negotiations on EU membership. Turkey’s economy also enjoyed immense growth in that one year (from 5.6% to 9.64%). Erdog˘ an’s popularity reached an all-time high and he prevailed again in the 2007 elections again. After his subsequent re-election in 2011, a more profound erosion of liberal democracy emerged as the agenda of social conservatism came to the fore soon after the government became embroiled in a corruption scandal. Protests relating to the removal of Gezi Park, a public green space in Istanbul, took place around the same time. These protests escalated when the police attacked peaceful environmentalists. The events triggered public outrage and Turkey witnessed its largest protests in decades. The once liberal ruling party now resembled an authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, Erdog˘ an’s grip on Turkish society was too strong: he retained a sizeable and devoted voter base and was re-elected as president in 2014. Erdog˘ an’s victory in the 2014 elections can be seen as a culmination of the erosion of Turkey’s secular past, the rise of a conservative middle class and a vindication of Erdog˘ an’s absolute power, which is still shaped by his popular mass appeal.

Russia Russia is an important regional actor, due to its large landmass and proximity to major powers in both Europe and Asia. While its vast scale adds to the grandeur of

12 Introduction

the country, it also poses many administrative challenges; and throughout the years, these administrative challenges have fuelled social and political tensions. Russia’s transition from the Romanov dynasty to the Soviet Union was a result of these class struggles. The people’s demand for greater participation in the prosperity and functioning of the state led to the downfall of the tsars and the establishment of an ambitious communist system. This communist system, which was expected to lift the Russian people out of poverty, soon morphed into a system that suppressed personal freedoms and hinged on a policy of appeasement under Stalin. After World War II, the Soviet Union emerged as one of the two major players in a bipolar world order, giving rise to a period of international competition against a backdrop of the threat of nuclear war. As the country endured the impact of tumultuous international events, it also witnessed numerous changes on the domestic front. Stalin’s death gave way to a period of thaw, during which the people of the Soviet Union began realising their personal freedoms through aca­ demia, literature, entrepreneurship and so on. This realisation occurred even as the official restrictions on personal freedoms from Stalin’s era continued. Personal freedoms, however, acted as a medium of liberation for the Soviet people, who had been pushed to conform to a homogenous structure that favoured those with connections to the government and the business world. People were now benefiting from education and migrating to cities, despite official limitations on movement from rural to urban areas. This led to the creation of a shadow economy within the country – one that thrived while official restrictions on imported consumer goods remained in place. The realisation of the effects of state control on civil life, the rise of nationalism in the Soviet states and a deteriorating economy finally led to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Boris Yeltsin emerged as the face of the new leadership of the Russian Federation. Under Yeltsin, the economy witnessed many major transitions. In what was almost shock therapy, the country was suddenly exposed to a liberal and (skewed) competitive market. This period also saw the emergence of the oli­ garchs: a group of rich and influential businessmen who grew their fortunes on the back of Russia’s shocking liberalisation methods. While this shocking liberalisation did not significantly benefit the common people, the rise of the oligarchs and perceptions of Yeltsin as an ailing and incompetent leader paved the way for our current leader in focus. Vladimir Putin stood in contrast to his predecessor: he was young and fit, an ex-KGB officer hailing from a humble background who gave no indication of appeasing the oli­ garchy like his predecessor. Under Putin, Russia evolved into a major international player. The economy, riding on Russia’s industrial heritage and rich natural resources, provided the people with significantly more opportunities for prosperity – something that has stuck with the current population. Much of the population approves of the current situation, viewing it as an improvement on the tumultuous 1990s and the old Soviet regime. Meanwhile, the generation that have grown up under Putin’s rule have had enough opportunities and amenities to make them immune to political flux.

Introduction 13

These factors have resulted in soaring approval ratings for Putin, who has used them to centralise power and eliminate political opposition. These actions have not gone unnoticed and faction of the populace that resists Putin’s consolidation of power has emerged. However, this group has succeeded only in bringing about modest reforms; while Putin has successfully engineered major transitions in the society, economy and governance of the country. The resistance – albeit limited – continues; and it remains to be seen what the future holds for Russia.

Brazil In the past few decades, our final country in focus has emerged as one of the most important actors not just in South America, but also in the Southern Hemisphere. With its long history of indigenous civilisations, colonisation, slavery, military dic­ tatorship and, more recently, democracy, Brazil has become one of the leading countries in the emerging world. Brazil is the subject of great international interest due to certain national characteristics, including two massive hydrographic basins; an ethnically and cul­ turally diverse population; and the borders it shares with ten neighbouring countries, which have given rise to extensive commercial activity and important trade relationships (Bijos 2016). Riding the wave of globalisation, Brazil has become a major emerging world power and an influential member of the Latin American community (Armijo 2010). Brazil’s increasing significance as a world power has seen the country engage in initiatives including the Southern Common Market and the Union of South American Nations and provide the force commander to the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti and the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Bijos 2016). Going forward, as the climate catastrophe threatens our existence, Brazil is expected to play a crucial role in the fight against climate change. The World Economic Forum has repeatedly acknowledged the vital part that Brazil will play in the coming decade. With abundant natural resources, the country accounts for over 40% of the world’s tropical forests and almost 20% of the planet’s freshwater supply; and the Amazon rainforests have famously been dubbed the ‘lungs of the world’ (Huck 2020). Domestically, Brazil’s multicultural population faces rampant social and eco­ nomic inequality, even though many governments have tried to implement poli­ cies to tackle poverty since the 2000s (Huck 2020). A study conducted by FGV Social revealed that a total of 6.3 million people fell into poverty in Brazil in 2018 – more than the entire population of Paraguay (Fundação Getulio Vargas 2018). Higher incidents of public corruption and irresponsible government spend­ ing have plagued the Brazilian political economy for years. While many govern­ ments have spent time, energy and capital on addressing these problems, they have been unable to reverse the sluggish growth pattern that the nation has suffered from over the past decade (Skidmore nd).

14 Introduction

To understand Brazil’s current state, a good starting point is 1985 – the year that marks the start of contemporary Brazilian history. It was in 1985 that civilian rule was reinstated after 21 years of military dictatorship. The first few years of this new democratic period were guided by the successes and failures of different leaders and their different approaches to economic policy. Unlike Turkey and India, where the first leaders were celebrated for decades for their ideologically open and inclusive social and political principles, Brazil’s first few leaders were not hailed as visionaries; instead, the visionary came later in the form of Lula da Silva, hailed as the ‘Man of the People’. The defining characteristics of Lula’s time in office were increased government spending; an increase in the number of government jobs; and a growing apprecia­ tion of Brazil’s bountiful natural resources. One initiative that reflects the attention paid to welfare during this period is the Bolsa Familia scheme, which, according to the World Bank, halved Brazil’s poverty rate from 9.7% to 4.3% and caused a 15% drop in the country’s Gini coefficient (Wetzel and Econômico 2013). Under Lula’s presidency, the prospects of poor women and children improved markedly, due to an increase in education and thus a reduction in poverty. This is the legacy that Lula left behind after his two terms in office (Brazil’s Constitution does not allow for three continuous terms in office). After Lula’s second term ended, a huge corruption scandal came to light while his successor, Dilma Rousseff, was in office. A majority of the politicians impli­ cated in the Petrobras scandal were members of Lula’s (and Rousseff’s) Workers’ Party. The popularity of the leading party was further dented by Brazil’s high crime rates, which have always been above world averages and which soared higher still due to a spate of violence and weapons smuggling in 2018 – the year before Jair Bolsonaro came to power. Bolsonaro’s strong military background and rhetoric of (armed) self-defence presented itself to some as a form of empowerment and a solution to Brazil’s violence problem. By this point, most of the electorate had lost faith in democracy and the political ruling class and were happy to turn to an ‘out­ sider’: Bolsonaro did not belong to any of the three main parties and had only emerged as a major figure on the political scene four years previously. Thus, in 2018, Bolsonaro was elected president, having promised to rid the country of three pressing problems: rampant violence, economic stagnation and high levels of corruption. He also expressed his distaste for left-wing ideology, homo­ sexuality and women’s rights. Under Bolsonaro, the benefits of the Bolsa Familia scheme came to a halt as the number of beneficiaries fell sharply. Bolsonaro has announced his intention to scrap the programme entirely, thus undoing Lula’s legacy. Additionally, he has taken land away from many indigenous peoples in the interest of pursuing economic growth and has dismantled agencies for the protection of indigenous rights and the environment. Due to lax policies on deforestation, under Bolsonaro, the Amazon rainforest has been ravaged by fires which his administration failed to contain. His pro-development policies and the liberal grant of licences for land clearing are believed to have

Introduction 15

ultimately led to the fires, which destroyed up to 17% of the rainforest (Ekmanis 2019). Bolsonaro’s policies are the opposite of Lula’s, which aimed to protect and preserve the natural resources of Brazil’s rich tropical ecosystem. In considering these defining factors of Bolsonaro’s term in power, observers are deeply divided. While some would suggest that his actions reflect an affinity for dictatorship, many scholars and commentators on Brazilian politics claim that Bol­ sonaro is willing to take all necessary steps to rid Brazil of its longstanding problems and break the cycle of corruption. Compared to Putin, Erdog˘ an and even Modi, Bolsonaro has only been in power for a few years. Whether, as president, he can curb dissent and enjoy the popular appeal of voters for as long as Putin, Erdog˘ an or Modi remains to be seen. There is also an air of uncertainty around his future as a political leader of Brazil. Still, to understand why the Brazilian population elected someone so different from their ‘Man of the People’ – someone with populist tendencies – we examine Bolso­ naro’s rise to power amid the spectres that have long plagued Brazilian society: crime and corruption.

Varied Perspectives and Their Conclusion By examining the perspectives of these four countries, the main narrative of this book tries to move away from a Eurocentric or American-centric diagnosis of the causes of (right-wing) populism, its associative link with neoliberal economic policies and the role of other socio-cultural factors (unique to a given nation’s cultural milieu). The following chapters study the rise of Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdog˘ an, Vladimir Putin and Jair Bolsonaro, and their respective countries’ socio-political and economic histories. An explorative study into the early life, childhood experiences and professional past of each leader, and the historical narrative of his country, highlights certain similarities between their ‘strongman’ trajectories and the conditions in which they became ‘centralising’ political figures. These similarities include the emergence of a ‘hyper-nationalist’ populace, empowered by the failure of neoliberal policies; entrenched divisions between society’s underclass and the ‘elite’; and a loss of faith in the political establishment due to episodes of corruption, exacerbated in part by neoliberal policies or the premature opening-up of markets. This erosion of faith in the established polity was leveraged by Modi, Erdog˘ an, Putin and Bolsonaro to build their own mass-popular political campaigns. Religion has played a crucial role throughout this narrative, serving in various degrees across different socio-political contexts to mobilise the people, while bringing an emotive aspect to these cases (religious conservatism is a vital chord that connects the populist beliefs of each citizenry with its leader). The similarities in their trajectories highlight the common factors that help us to understand the societal shifts in their respective countries, even while their dis­ tinctiveness is preserved for authenticity. This also helps to demonstrate that a

16 Introduction

cross-comparative study such as this need not be based solely on similarities or differences between the case studies to understand, appreciate and learn from the narratives of each nation – and each leader.

References Amnesty International India. 2019. Hate Crime Reports on an Alarming Rise – Reveals Amnesty International India’s ‘Halt the Hate’. 7 October. https://amnesty.org.in/news-update/ha te-crime-reports-on-an-alarming-rise-reveals-amnesty-international-indias-halt-the-hate/. Amraoui, Ahmed El and Faisal Edroos. 2018. Is Turkish secularism under threat? 3 June. http s://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/turkish-secularism-threat-180528131157715.html. Armijo, Leslie Elliott and Burges, Sean W. 2010. Brazil, the Entrepreneurial and Democratic BRIC. Polity 42(1). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/40269387_Brazil_the_ Entrepreneurial_and_Democratic_BRIC. Bijos, Leila. 2016. The Brazilian Contemporary Foreign Policy: Challenges in the 21st Century. Social Science Research Network (SSRN). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2717032. Bornschier, Simon. 2018. Globalization, Cleavages, and the Radical Right. In Jens Rydgren, The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right. Oxford University Press. Bremmer, Ian. 2018. Us vs. Them: The Failure of Globalism. Portfolio Penguin. Brown, Wendy. 2019. In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West. Columbia University Press. Business Standard. 2013. Modi hails Gujarat model of development as ‘saviour’ of India. 3 May. https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/modi-hails-gujarat-m odel-of-development-as-saviour-of-india-113050300021_1.html. Changoiwala, P. 2020. India’s Muslims are terrified of being deported. Foreign Policy. 21 Feb­ ruary. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/21/india-muslims-deported-terrified-citizenship -amendment-act-caa/. Ekmanis, Indra. 2019. At UN, Bolsonaro’s nationalist rhetoric clashes with Indigenous lea­ ders. The World. 24 September. https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-09-24/un-bolsona ro-s-nationalist-rhetoric-clashes-indigenous-leaders. Freedom House. 2021. Freedom in the World 2021. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/FIW2021_World_02252021_FINAL-web-upload.pdf Fundação Getulio Vargas. 2018. What was the impact of the crisis on poverty and income distribution? Fundação Getulio Vargas. https://cps.fgv.br/Pobreza_Desigualdade. Gall, Carlotta. 2018a. Erdog˘ an’s Victory in Turkey Election Expands His Powers. New York Times. 24 June. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/world/europe/turkey-election­ Erdog˘ an.html. Gall, Carlotta. 2018b. Erdog˘ an’s Plan to Raise a ‘Pious Generation’ Divides Parents in Turkey. New York Times. 18 June. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/world/europ e/Erdog˘ an-turkey-election-religious-schools.html. Gandesha, Samir. 2018. Understanding Right and Left Populism. In Jeremiah Morelock (ed). Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism, 49–70. University of Westminster Press. doi:10.16997/book30.d. Goodwin, Matthew and Eatwell, Roger. 2018. National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy. Pelican Books. Huck, Luciano. 2020. This country is vital to ‘global survival’ – here’s the challenges they face. 15 Jan­ uary.World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/what-happ ens-next-in-brazil-has-global-consequences-here-are-three-priorities-for-the-next-decade/.

Introduction 17

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2015. What ‘Gujarat Model’?—Growth without Development—and with Socio-Political Polarisation. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(4) 820–838. doi:10.1080/00856401.2015.1087456. Kenny, Paul D. 2017. Populism and Patronage: Why Populists win Elections in India, Asia and Beyond. Oxford University Press. Kenny, Paul D. 2018. Populism in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. Luiz, Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Maravall, José María and Przeworski , Adam. 1994. Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach. In Carlos H Acuña, Eduardo Gamarra and William C Smith, Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives for the 1990s, 181–212. Transaction Books. Mohan, Deepanshu and Amal, Abhay. 2020. Interpreting the Rise of ‘Populism’ And ‘Hyper Nationalism’ in India: A Review of India After Modi. Kairos: A Journal of Critical Symposium 5(1), 18–22. http://kairostext.in/index.php/kairostext/article/view/81/66. Mudde, Cas and Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal. 2017. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. Puhringer, Stephen and Otsch, Walter O. 2018. Neoliberalism and Right-wing Populism: Conceptual Analogies. Forum for Social Economics, 47(2), 193–203. https://www.tandfon line.com/doi/full/10.1080/07360932.2018.1451765?scroll=top&needAccess=true. Rodrik, Dani. 2020. Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 27526. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3649890. Rosenberg, Shawn W. 2020. Democracy’s Final Act? Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development 15 (Winter 2020), 34–59. https://www.cirsd.org/files/000/000/ 007/26/fae15c4edd4d1395112fa90da4810e7bddf04a40.pdf. Skidmore, Thomas. nd. Brazil as a Global Economic Player. https://library.brown.edu/create/ fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-9/brazil-as-a-global-economic-player/. The New York Times. 1964. India mourning Nehru,74, dead of a heart attack; world leaders honor him; funeral is today; party members meet tomorrow to try to pick leader. 28 May. https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/28/archives/india-mourning-nehru74-dead-of-a-hea rt-attack-world-leaders-honor.html. Wetzel, Deborah and Econômico, Valor. 2013. Bolsa Família: Brazil’s Quiet Revolution. World Bank. 3 November. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2013/11/04/bolsa-fam ilia-Brazil-quiet-revolution.

PART I

India

2 INDIA’S TRANSFORMATION From Nehru to Vajpayee

It is both complex and fascinating to trace the modern origins of a nation such as India, which in the 75 years since independence has experienced a (socio-economic) rollercoaster shaped by its vibrant political and economic history. From the time of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, the country has transitioned to the age of Narendra Modi, the current prime minister – a transition in leadership from one end of the political thought spectrum to the other. Nonetheless, making binary observations about contemporary India’s complex evolution of poli­ tico-economic thought might be a redundant exercise. Nehru drew much of his popular appeal from the long struggle of the Indian National Congress (INC) during India’s independence movement. The INC underwent myriad transformations as a political party from the late 19th century to become the flagbearer of India’s struggle for independence and the nationalism movement in the first half of the 20th century. As a result of this influence, the INC – with Jawaharlal Nehru as prime minister – went on to guide India through its early decades post-independence. In the following decades, INC party leaders such as Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, PV Narsimha Rao and Manmohan Singh, and non-INC leaders such as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, followed in Nehru’s footsteps by making major contributions to India’s politico-economic development. To understand some of the critical transitions in the context of explaining the rise of authoritarian populism (on both the political left and the political right) in post-inde­ pendence India, it is important to look briefly at the politico-economic foundations of the nation and the leaders who directed its course in the decades after independence.

Nehru in (Post)Colonial India Like most large and densely populated postcolonial nations, India required strong leadership at the centre to conceive and sustain a democratic order. In a young, DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-3

22 India

independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership shaped, and later actualised in practice, the ‘core foundational beliefs’ of the ruling INC. By the 1940s, the INC had emerged as the poster child for Indian independence. This process was led by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who helped the INC trans­ form its image from a quintessentially moderate, anglicised and upper-middle-class party into a political organisation with the single-minded goal of securing freedom for India. The INC successfully mobilised India’s disenfranchised and poor through civil disobedience and satyagraha1 to give birth to an inclusive independence movement with mass appeal. This appeal was exemplified by the historic Salt March, when Gandhi led thousands of poor and illiterate Indians to challenge the British colonial government’s monopoly on salt making (Ganguly 1999). This continued resistance against the backdrop of World War II wore down the British, and it was decided by the rulers of the Indian subcontinent to grant it independence. In the soon-to-be independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru was the favoured candidate for prime minister. An active member of the INC and a key player in the struggle for independence, Jawaharlal Nehru was a lawyer by profession and the son of a prominent INC senior, Motilal Nehru. He enjoyed the support of Gandhi, who by that time had become a one-man symbol of the struggle for freedom. On 15 August 1947, Nehru became prime minister of India in a newly partitioned geography of South Asia. Nehru had big aspirations for India, as reflected in his speech, entitled ‘A Tryst with Destiny’, delivered on the eve of India’s independence: The future beckons to us. Whither do we go and what shall be our endea­ vour? To bring freedom and opportunity to the common man, to the peasants and workers of India; to fight and end poverty and ignorance and disease; to build up a prosperous, democratic, and progressive nation, and to create social, economic, and political institutions which will ensure justice and fullness of life to every man and woman. We have hard work ahead. There is no resting for any one of us till we redeem our pledge in full, till we make all the people of India what destiny intended them to be. We are citizens of a great country on the verge of bold advance, and we have to live up to that high standard. All of us, to whatever religion we may belong, are equally the children of India with equal rights, privileges, and obligations. We cannot encourage communalism or narrowmindedness, for no nation can be great whose people are narrow in thought or in action. (Nehru 1947) Independence freed the Indian subcontinent from the clutches of the British Raj; however, the British left behind their colonial legacies (rule of law) in a partitioned India (with the creation of East-West Pakistan), which the subcontinent had to deal with after their departure. The partition not only cleaved the subcontinent through its heart, but also planted seeds of enmity and distrust within the two dominant communities in the region: Muslims and Hindus.

India’s transformation 23

To address this problem, the Indian Constitution was infused with principles of secularism. While secular principles were enshrined in the Constitution from its inception, the term ‘secular’ itself was not included in the wording until the 42nd Amendment on 3 January 1977 added it to the Preamble. The Constitution espoused ‘[t]he conception of secularism adopted by Con­ gress under Gandhi [which] followed the inter-dependence2 model and emphasised not so much the separation of religion and politics but more so equal respect and treatment of all religions’ (Gautam 1985). This approach made it possible to add the word ‘secular’ to the Constitution in 1977 without needing to change the content of the articles within the Constitution (Tar­ kunde 1995). For example, the original Constitution guaranteed equal right to citizens; free­ dom from discrimination by the state on the grounds of religion; and freedom of conscience in regard to religion and the rights flowing therefrom (among other things) (Tarkunde 1995). This idea of religion within the state stands in contrast to Western constitutions, which tend to emphasise the complete separation of state and religion. While this difference may have led some critics to question the secular nature of the Indian Constitution, it better served the Indian context in terms of reforming society from the prevailing caste practices which were of great concern to the initial leaders of the country (Acevedo 2013). In addition to affecting the social dynamics of the country, colonialism had a deep impact on India’s economy. One example of this was the 1943 famine in the eastern state of Bengal. An estimated 2–3 million people died due to the famine, but its impact could have been cushioned had the British administration in West­ minster diverted the requisite food and rations to the victims. While their coun­ trymen starved, Indian soldiers fought in World War II as part of the British army. While the British exploited the subcontinent for its rich resources and cheap labour, its people under the British Raj laid down their lives both voluntarily and forcibly to satiate their exploiters. This phenomenon was explained by Dadabhai Naoroji’s ‘Drain Theory’,3 which became a major inspiration for Nehru’s mixed economy model. On the basis of this model, to prevent a corporate takeover such as that carried out by the East India Company centuries previously, Nehru aimed to steer the country away from capitalism or overt private capital dependence. This approach caused India to remain sceptical of capitalism in the following decades – an attitude that it would have a hard time getting rid of. Due to several of these factors, India had a very wary approach towards foreign investment and the focus was thus firmly on promoting domestic investment. As a result, major industries in the country were set up as public sector endeavours. A system of five-year plans was also introduced, marking the start of a tradition of laying out roadmaps for the economy every five years. In the second five-year plan, a path of import substitution industrialisation was introduced. This approach called for the domestic production of essential goods without being challenged by foreign competition. A plethora of government establishments and complicated administrative controls were established. These controls gave birth to another characteristic of the

24 India

Indian state: the ‘Licence Raj’ period. All of this aligned with Nehru’s goal of making India a self-reliant superpower. The shadow of British colonialism of the subcontinent and fear of the re-emergence of an East India Company-type corporate figure led the government to impose excessive controls on the economy. These actions would have unintended con­ sequences. So strong was the government’s control that it decided which companies would produce which commodities, in what quantities and at what price. This gave rise to a scarcity of choice in people’s day-to-day lives. Cars were available only in one colour; and there were just two or three brands of cars and scooters to choose from. Licences themselves became a scarce resource; businesses would acquire them not in order to expand themselves, but to prevent their competitors from expanding. Policy experiments were hard to come by, as the government was wary of taking risks lest they backfire come election time. While Nehru enjoyed the people’s uncontested support politically and socio­ economically, he faced significant problems internationally. The erstwhile colonial borders and the haphazard way in which Britain left India led to tensions with not only neighbouring Pakistan, but also China, escalating into a war during which India suffered a traumatic defeat in 1962. The impact of the 1962 Indo-China War can still be felt today, with frequent references appearing in literature, political discourse and international relations. The loss was particularly hard felt because of Nehru’s vision for an India-led Non-Aligned Movement that had envisioned China as an ally. This perception may have fogged decisions during the 1962 war. The loss took a toll on Nehru personally too: it is said that he was never quite the same, physically or mentally, until his death in 1964. Nehru’s death initiated the downfall of the INC. However, it was not evident until a few years later that the INC would soon lose its absolutist hold on Indian politics.

The Decline of Nehru’s Congress and the Divide Within the Grand Old Party Nehru was succeeded by another Gandhian moderate leader, Lal Bahadur Shastri.4 The highlight of his tenure was an attempt to liberalise the economy and work towards the welfare of Indian farmers. However, his untimely death in 1966 put a stop to this effort and simultaneously left a leadership vacuum in its wake. The INC party seniors – also known as the Syndicate5 – had two options for the prime minister’s position: K Kamaraj, the INC president; and Morarji Desai,6 one of the most popular leaders in the country at that time. Kamaraj did not consider himself to be a good candidate, as he did not speak Hindi,7 and hence took himself out of the running. The INC leadership hoped to select a candidate who would be susceptible to their influence. For this reason, Desai – an influential figure in the Syndicate – did not find favour with the leadership. In the end, the INC leadership deemed Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, the most suitable candidate for the leadership. They felt confident that as a political newcomer, she would simply be a malleable spokesperson for party policies (Walsh 2011).

India’s transformation 25

However, it gradually became apparent that Indira Gandhi would not simply be a conduit for the INC leaders. Once in office, she attempted to pursue forced policies of liberalisation (through devaluation attempts), like her predecessor, but fell short of realising them as the country soon faced a severe balance of payment crisis. A failure of crops due to droughts forced the government to take serious measures. It was at this juncture that Gandhi diverged from what was expected of her. While some scholars take a more sympathetic stance and argue that Indira Gandhi’s shift away from liberalisation was guided by her belief that ‘the Congress needed to keep its promises of integrating economic growth with the removal of poverty and to assure self-reliance in major sectors’ (Frankel 2006), the end results belied the stated objectives. Soon, stricter import licensing requirements, tariffs and export subsidies were imposed.8 The independent nature of Indira Gandhi’s decisions became a point of con­ tention between the newly elected prime minister and the Syndicate. Since the demise of Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Syndicate had exercised control of the party and Gandhi’s departure from this dynamic caused a rift with the senior party leadership. This friction within the INC hurt the party in the 1967 elections,9 where it lost serious ground and secured a weaker majority compared to the 1962 elections. This change signalled ‘the attenuation of Congress hegemony over the political system’ (Sen 2019). Indira Gandhi’s habit of ignoring the senior leadership’s advice and the friction that resulted were reflected in her relationship with her deputy prime minister and finance minister,10 Morarji Desai. In addition to being a rival candidate for the post of prime minister, Desai was part of the right-leaning faction within the INC. Indira Gandhi’s decision to nationalise the banks and other sectors became a point of disagreement within her own cabinet. Her relationship with Desai is one example of the lack of cohesiveness within the INC that caused it to lose ground in the 1967 elections. These factors contributed to Indira Gandhi’s expulsion from the party, following which she formed a new party, the Congress (R), and contested the elections in 1971. The other faction under Desai became the Congress (O), which went on to merge with the Janata Dal. The 1971 elections were fiercely contested and gave rise to the ‘Garibi Hatao’ (‘Eradicate poverty’) slogan, which became iconic and was frequently repeated in the national political dialogue over the years. The Congress (O) campaigned with the slogan ‘Indira Hatao’ (‘Banish Indira’); while Gandhi came up with the retort, ‘Woh kehte hain Indira hatao, main kehti hoon garibi hatao’ (‘They say banish Indira; I say banish poverty’). Since independence, the government’s efforts towards poverty alleviation had created a political environment that prioritised welfarism. This environment was leveraged by Indira Gandhi in her election campaign through her poverty alleviation message. The magnitude of this message, in conjunction with the decline of the original INC, attracted the attention of both rural and urban populations and focused it on Indira Gandhi. The transformation of electoral expectations and the

26 India

consequential election victory helped Indira to become a figure larger than her party – a trait that she shares with the present prime minister, Narendra Modi. In addition to her populistic rhetoric, which revolved around poverty alleviation, Indira Gandhi exhibited another key populist characteristic: centralisation of power. She has been accused, in hindsight, of centralising the government, rigging the 1971 elections and disrupting the party structure, among other things (Sen 2019). However, neither the internal friction within the government and the party nor the attempts to consolidate power were evident during the 1971 elections. Thus, on a platform of anti-poverty and socialism, Indira Gandhi was re-elected with a landslide victory. Shortly after Indira Gandhi came to power, India went to war to liberate East Pakistan (today known as Bangladesh). The costs of this war, coupled with external oil price shocks due to the Arab Israeli conflict, led to a rise in the prices of essential commodities in the country. This sparked widespread protests, as the leader who had appealed to voters’ aspirations failed to live up to her poverty alleviation rhetoric. The Indira Gandhi government cracked down on dissidents in response. The government’s problems were exacerbated by accusations of electoral malpractice, which led the Allahabad High Court to pass an order rendering Gandhi’s 1971 win null and void. Instead of stepping down, however, she resorted to the drastic measure of imposing a state of emergency from 1975 to 1977. During this period, publications were censored and many dissidents were jailed, including Desai. The emergency is cited as one of the darkest periods for democ­ racy and governance in India. This period added another dimension to Indira Gandhi as a leader. It shattered the relationship between citizen and state, casting a tyrannical, power-hungry light on a leader who was previously considered weak and malleable by senior INC figures. As described by Roy: The unresolved tensions within the socio-economic system during all this time intensified manifold and sent their shock waves all over the body politic – along class, caste, region, religion, language, etc, fissures. This, in turn, led to [a] repressive response from the growingly authoritarian power structure, which again extended and deepened the alienation of the masses. (Roy 1984) The imposition of the emergency became a nodal point for Indian politics. It not only united the entire opposition against Indira Gandhi, but also resulted in the political mainstreaming of the right-wing Jana Sangh on a previously unseen national scale. The ‘emergency’ was called off in 1977. One of the postulated motives behind this move was a fall in the prices of essential goods11 – an issue which had initially triggered public discontent. This fall in prices was expected to rekindle support for Gandhi; but in fact, this did not happen. A key point in the trajectory of Indian politics, the ‘emergency’ also brought home the lesson in ‘governing circles that biopolitical agendas cannot be

India’s transformation 27

successfully pursued without passing through the sieve of voluntary consent and that governmentality could not be effectively administered except by opening its terms of negotiation with the affected population groups’ (Gudavarthy 2019). The ‘emergency’ was one of the last instances in which these methods were pursued in Indian politics (Gudavarthy 2019) – until the rise of Narendra Modi, who returned to this top-down method of governance. The Janta alliance came to power in 1977, after the ‘emergency’. The coalition, headed by Desai, was the first non-INC government to take in power in India’s history. The coalition did not last long, however, as the alliance lost a confidence vote in Parliament and elections were held again in 1980. The INC government, headed by Indira Gandhi, assumed power once again. During this period, India’s per capita growth rate stagnated and even dipped into negative growth rates12 until the fifth five-year plan (1974–1979), when it crossed the 6% point for the first time.13 India’s average growth rate for the first three decades following independence was 3.5%, while population growth rate was over 2%, implying that growth was taking place at an excruciatingly slow rate of slightly over 1% per capita income. However, it was not the economy or the emergency that proved to be the most impactful event in the life of the third prime minister; it was a domestic military operation by the name of Operation Bluestar, which became a defining moment and ultimately the prelude to her death. Operation Bluestar was a military operation which saw the Indian army storm the Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab, which housed members of the militant Khalistan14 movement. As this was a holy site for the Sikh community, the operation generated tension and vehement opposition against Gandhi. Conse­ quently, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her bodyguard, a member of the Sikh community in October 1984. What followed was one of the largest and bloodiest riots in Indian history, against the Indian Sikh community. One explanation for Indira Gandhi’s trajectory from a leader with mass appeal to someone against whom the whole country protested could be her desire to emulate her father’s absolute popularity. However, she was unable to appease the people in the same way, as by then the INC was in a shambles. Her desire to consolidate power reflected ‘a tendency towards authoritarian rule, the cultivation of a “personality cult” and a penchant for surrounding herself with cliques and coteries’ (Sen 2019). This can be seen as another characteristic shared by Indira Gandhi and India’s current prime minister. Critics have often accused Narendra Modi of consolidating power through the centralisation of major decisions. The kind of popularity and mass appeal enjoyed by Indira Gandhi in her heyday was seen again 30 years later in the case of Modi. However, the connection between the two leaders goes beyond mass appeal. Like Indira Gandhi, Modi has a penchant for legislating with little or no consultation; a need to control the narrative; and an urge to consolidate and centralise power without caring much for constitutional values or federalist principles. These are just some similarities between the two populists from different eras and political spectrums.

28 India

An End to ‘Absolutism’(?) After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the INC won the following general elec­ tions held in December 1984. Indira Gandhi’s son, Rajiv Gandhi, became prime minister. During this period, India resumed its journey towards liberalisation. This was an era of ‘attitudinal shift’ in the government, which gave rise to unprece­ dented growth (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004). In 1981, partial liberalisation took place under the conditionality clause of a medium-term loan received from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF).15 Rajiv Gandhi attempted to further this gradualist economic liberalisation while encouraging an attitudinal shift towards trade and foreign capital mobility. India’s national economic policymakers began some partial reforms, introducing some liber­ alisation in the trade and exchange rate regime, loosening domestic industrial controls and promoting investment in modern technologies. Economic policy was partially liberalised; the role of the private sector was strengthened; and import quotas, tariffs and taxes were reduced (especially for technology-based imports). Domestic private industry did reasonably well under Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure. Rajiv Gandhi insisted on generating a surplus in the public sector to ensure non-inflationary funding of the seventh five-year plan (1984–89) (Rothermund 1993). Fiscal conservatism was aban­ doned in favour of surging growth rates. This debt-led growth caused macroeconomic imbalances, but the growth rate for the 1980s eventually breached 5%16 and the economy finally took off. Rajiv Gandhi had the support of a growing elite who were tired of the stag­ nating growth rate, which had been mockingly termed the ‘Hindu growth rate’; as well as small-time business owners who were tired of bureaucratic controls and corruption. It was Rajiv Gandhi who perpetuated the belief that corruption was the fault of an overly complicated bureaucracy and not that of greedy individuals within the party. In doing so, he distanced himself from long-running allegations of corruption within the INC and gained public favour – something that can also be seen today, as Modi has successfully insulated himself from the shortcomings of his own party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). During this time, India witnessed two important socio-political events that would become historical landmarks for the country. One was the Shah Bano case;17 the other was the opening of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya so that Hindus could offer prayers (Hasan 2019). In the former, Gandhi was accused of trying to appease the Muslim electorate; while the latter was seen as a ploy to capture the support of Hindu voters. In addition to these landmark domestic events, Rajiv Gandhi increased India’s international engagements and encouraged technology-based imports. As part of this engagement, India carried out Operation Cactus in the Maldives, which helped to avert a coup against the incumbent president. He also sent a peacekeeping force to Sri Lanka to ease tensions between the government and the Tamil community. Rajiv Gandhi’s economic vision came to a halt in 1987, when he became embroiled in the Bofors corruption scandal. This was the first major corruption

India’s transformation 29

scandal to break in India and was revealed by a Swedish radio station. According to the report, Swedish artillery manufacturer Bofors – which supplied Howitzers to the Indian army – allegedly paid nearly $9 million in bribes to INC leaders and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (India Today 2019). This coincided with a period of high inflation, which saw rates jump from 6% to 9% in 1987.18 This hit the poor hard and reignited people’s pessimism about lib­ eralisation, creating resentment towards the liberalisation programme. For many, it felt as though the government was pursuing profit-making activities at the cost of poverty-alleviating policies. Although liberalisation was supposed to expand the private sector, it did not do so in a way that benefited the poorer classes. The total workforce employed by the private sector fell from 66% in 1971 to 53% in 1989. One can thus observe that the encouraging rate of growth in the 1980s was due to increased productivity, rather than the generation of employment (Rothermund 1993). During this period, current account deficits and budget deficits were rising, implying that India was importing more than it was exporting, while the govern­ ment was spending more money than it was generating. The corruption scandals and the economic uncertainties brought on by the ‘twin deficits’ enabled the political opposition – the National Front, headed by VP Singh – to come into power in 1989. After a fallout within the National Front in 1990, Rajiv Gandhi saw an opportunity to get back into power. He did not get a chance to realise this opportunity, however, as his sanctioned engagement in Sri Lanka led to his assassination in May 1991 at an election rally held in India’s southern state of Tamil Nadu.

1990–91 Economic Crisis and Era of Liberalisation

12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00

Gross Fiscal Deficit (as % of GDP)

Current Account Deficit (as % of GDP)

Combined Deficit

FIGURE 2.1 India had been running twin deficits since the 1970s Source: Reserve Bank of India nd

2017-18

2015-16

2013-14

2011-12

2009-10

2007-08

2005-06

2003-04

2001-02

1999-00

1997-98

1995-96

1993-94

1991-92

1989-90

1987-88

1985-86

1983-84

1981-82

-4.00

1979-80

-2.00

1977-78

0.00

30 India

Between 1985 and 1988, net private transfers in India increased from INR 39 billion to INR 44 billion on the current account, and from INR 29 billion to INR 37 billion on the capital account (Rothermund 1993). This was due to the con­ fidence of non-resident Indians in the process of liberalisation. However, a sudden loss of confidence ensued following the outbreak of the first Gulf War. This put a stop to the inflow of foreign exchange into India, which came in the form of remittances sent by Indian workers in the Gulf countries (Basu 2014). The collapse of the Soviet Union also had a drastic effect on India’s foreign trade, as it restricted exports and made imports of oil and military spares uncertain and expensive (Das 1994). Finally, in 1991, the current account deficit became greater than the capital inflows. This laid bare the twin deficit problem in the economy and plunged India into a balance of payments crisis. VP Singh, the newly elected prime minister, tried to prevent the crisis by bor­ rowing INR 11.7 billion from the IMF. The National Front simultaneously lost a no-confidence vote in Parliament and the coalition dissolved. Another minority government was formed, which rushed back to the IMF in January 1991 to borrow foreign exchange worth INR 33.3 billion. Spurred on by fears of political instability in India, the outflow of funds by non-resident Indians kept increasing, finally peaking from April to July at a sum of INR 25 billion for this period. The trade deficit as of March 1991 amounted to INR 106 billion (Rothermund 1993). The assassination of Gandhi in May 1991 was a shock to the INC and voters alike. While it shook the country, it also garnered sympathy for the party, helping it to form a minority government headed by PV Narasimha Rao in June 1991. He joined forces with an eminent economist, Dr Manmohan Singh, to tackle the crisis that was crushing the economy as they assumed power. It was then that the duo of Rao-Singh introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) to address the deteriorating Indian economy. India had barely $1 billion in foreign currency reserves at the time. These reserves would have sustained India for two weeks. The NEP came up with short-term and long-term measures to avoid the worst. The short-term measures included devaluing the rupee; reducing the fiscal deficit; promoting the free flow of foreign capital; privatising public sector units; making the rupee convertible; and controlling inflation (which had reached 13% by 1991). The long-term goal was to reduce government intervention in the economy. In June–July 1991, to restore confidence in the rupee, the IMF entered a standby first tranche credit of about $754 million and drawings under the com­ pensatory and contingency financing facility totalling about $1.847 billion (Bagchi 1999). Later that year, the IMF granted another standby credit authorising with­ drawals of up to $2.262 billion (Bagchi 1999). In accordance with the memor­ andum of understanding reached with the IMF, a series of policy reforms were carried out. The rupee was devalued by about 24%. In March 1992, the rupee was partially floated – a dual exchange rate was car­ ried out, the lower rate being obtainable by exporters for their requirements. In 1993, the rupee was fully floated and the two rates were unified. Quantitative restrictions on imports were moderated or removed, and import tariffs were

India’s transformation 31

reduced across the board. Earlier restrictions on foreign investment were done away with and a Foreign Investment Promotion Board was set up to attract foreign capital (Bagchi 1999).

The Initiation and Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party While it is true that the INC and its affiliates directed the course of an independent India, it is also imperative to understand the simultaneous rise of alternative poli­ tical groups within the country. These groups affected the country’s trajectory after the decline of the INC and one of the biggest was the BJP. The BJP evolved as a major player in the 1990s, a few decades after its incep­ tion, which can be traced back to the 1950s to the emergence of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) or, as it is more commonly known, the Jana Sangh. Since India’s independence, the INC itself had comprised factions that were inclined to different political ideologies. After the death of Vallabhbhai Patel in 1950, the traditionalist faction of the INC lost its biggest political representation among the party’s top leadership (Verma 2019). The INC’s reluctance to provide space for the voices of Hindu traditionalists resulted in a need for separate political representation. As a result, during the period of homogenisation of the INC, Shyama Prasad Mukherjee – a former member of Nehru’s cabinet – formed the BJS in 1951. The BJS enjoyed support from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a prominent Hindu nationalist right-wing organisation that helped the BJS, and consequently the BJP, to garner support at the grassroots level. In 1952, the BJS – along with two other right-wing political parties, Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad – managed to secure 10 seats in Parlia­ ment, reflecting that there was little appeal for a Hindu nationalist party shortly after independence. In the following years, however, as defections in the INC increased, support for the right-wing parties gained momentum – mainly in North India. The BJS witnessed a jump in its representation in Parliament in 1967, when it managed to secure 30 seats. However, the BJS still faced limitations with respect to its appeal among the more moderate sections of society and in non-Hindi speaking regions. Under Indira Gandhi’s rule, the BJS found an opportunity to expand its appeal. The party disagreed with Gandhi on most issues. And following her declaration of a state of emergency, she inadvertently ensured that the BJS ceased to be political pariahs to other parties, as she became the common enemy to the wider opposition. During ‘the emergency’, members of BJS – along with other opposition parties, such as the Congress (O), the Bharatiya Lok Dal, and the Socialist Party – were persecuted and detained. Their collective detention during the period created a space of interaction that had hitherto been absent. After fresh elections were announced in 1977, these interactions gave birth to the Janata Party. While Atal Bihari Vajpayee became the face of Jana Sangh within this alliance, LK Advani was made general secretary (Sitapati 2020). The formation of this alli­ ance, comprising such a diverse group of political thinkers, resulted in many

32 India

contradictions in the party’s approach to policy and economics. Unlike its Western counterparts, the Indian right wing under Vajpayee and Advani did not embrace market economics. As historian Vinay Sitapati points out: ‘the Indian public sup­ ported Indira’s socialism. The Jana Sangh realised that’ (Sitapati 2020). The BJP’s economic socialism during this period helped the party adapt to this situation by ensuring that it did not contradict Indira Gandhi. The party’s politics were largely shaped by voters, not by ideology. This is exemplified in the contrast between the party’s embrace of socialism when it worked (eg, it refrained from challenging Indira Gandhi’s economic approach) and the approaches of later leaders. The contrast can be witnessed in ‘Prime Minister Vajpayee’s market economics in the first decade of the new millennium, and Narendra Modi’s heavy-handed inter­ vention in the economy in recent years’ (Sitapati 2020). The ease with which BJP leaders ‘supported opposing economics suggests they do not have a principled view on the subject’ (ibid). The split in the INC helped to change the dynamics of the political system. It created a stronger opposition led by the BJS, which was able to form a political pact with another major opposition party, the Swatantra party (Sen 2019). Soon, major opposition players – including the recently split Congress (O) – went up against the Indira Gandhi-led Congress (R) in 1971. Their defeat in the election, instead of deterring them, gave birth to a mutual distaste for Indira Gandhi that eventually motivated the opposition to mount an offence in the following years. This opposition soon benefited from the changing political fabric of the country at the time. After the emergency, in 1977, the Janata Party – in coalition with the opposition parties – managed to form a government under the leadership of Morarji Desai. However, the coalition fell apart when the government lost a confidence vote in 1979. Thereafter, in the 1980 elections, the INC formed the government under Indira Gandhi. The rift within the Janata Party coalition formed the basis for the BJP in 1980. Under Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s leadership, the newly formed BJP attracted many members of the erstwhile coalition. His leadership also inspired the BJP to adopt a more moderate Hindu nationalist stand, which irked its associate, RSS; and with­ out the grassroots mobilisation and support of the RSS, the BJP managed to secure just two seats in the 1980 elections. After these elections, the BJP abandoned its moderate stance and embraced right-wing Hindu nationalist ideology. This helped the BJP to gain support from the RSS and political momentum from the Ram temple issue.19 While discussing the growth of the BJP and its newly embraced ideology during this period, one must also take into consideration the structural and circumstantial fault lines that allowed this an ideology to grow exponentially within a decade: By the 1980s, with a failing economy marred by crisis in balance of payments (BOP), lack of political will to implement land reforms, marginal benefits reaching out due to pilferages in poverty alleviation programmes and misrecognition created by progressive redistributive policies such as the

India’s transformation 33

reservations based on a quota system, the political landscape shifted from an emphasis on redistribution to the emergence of ‘politics of recognition’ that increasingly took shape of identity politics. (Gudavarthy 2019) As a result, the party jumped from two seats to 85 seats in the 1989 elections. Simultaneously, it also gained ground in the local elections, which further helped it to expand its voter base. As a result, it secured 120 seats in the 1991 elections and 161 seats in the 1996 elections. For the first time, the BJP formed the government under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1996. However, due to a lack of support to form a coalition, Vajpayee stepped down from the position of prime minister rather than face a vote of no confidence in Parliament. The United Front, comprising leftist and regional parties (Cooper 1996), formed a government after Vajpayee left office. Although small, this was still an important win for the BJP and was thanks to the efforts put in by the BJP and the RSS.20 India went to the polls again in 1998 and the BJP secured 182 seats in Parlia­ ment. Despite this increase, the government formed by the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) lost a no-confidence vote by a single vote and was dissolved after 13 months in 1999. In the following elections in October 1999, the BJP-led NDA won 270 seats and finally formed a government with Vajpayee at the helm, which lasted its full term until the country went to polls again in 2004. Thus, tracing through history, it can be observed that the political and economic instability witnessed during the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s set the stage for a new party, the BJP, to emerge as a national party alternative to the INC. The ills of the Licence Raj, the balance of payment crisis, unstable coalition governments, and the changing preferences of the public from the age-old party to a new political nar­ rative enabled India to transition to new political dynamics. This transition impac­ ted the future trajectory of popular sentiment, public discourse, political power changes and the national economy, as we observe in the following chapters.

Notes 1 An act of nonviolent civil resistance. The word satyagraha translates as ‘the path of truth’. For further reading, see Salla 1993. 2 The interdependence model emphasises the resolution of identity conflicts in favour of the national identity; as opposed to the integration model, which assumed the dis­ appearance of ethnic particularities or distinctiveness in favour of a uniform national identity which is itself identified with the identity of the majority community. For fur­ ther reading, see Gautam 1985. 3 For further reading, see Ganguli 1965.

4 Lal Bahadur Shastri was a senior INC leader who served in Nehru’s cabinet and went on

to become India’s second prime minister in 1964. 5 ‘The Syndicate’ refers to a group of leaders who collaborated to run the INC. 6 Morarji Desai was an influential senior INC leader who was chief minister for Bombay and part of Nehru’s cabinet.

7 Hindi, and all its dialects, is the most widely spoken language in India.

34 India

8 Such was the political opposition to the rupee devaluation in the Indian Parliament that Indira Gandhi did not even inform the president of the INC, Kamaraj, before Finance Minister Sachin Choudhury announced the devaluation in June 1966 (Mukherji 2009). 9 In 1967 the INC secured 283 out of 521 seats in the Lok Sabha or the lower house of the Indian Parliament, which was less than the 361 out of 494 seats it secured in the 1962 elections. 10 The portfolio of the finance minister was later taken away from him. 11 This was caused by a fall in external oil prices. 12 Negative rates in 1971 were due to the Bangladesh liberation war, consecutive droughts and the first oil crisis. 13 Negative rates in 1979 were due to severe floods, international political turmoil and the second oil crisis. 14 A Sikh separatist movement seeking to create a separate, sovereign state called Khalistan as a homeland for the Sikhs. For Further reading, see Jetly 2008. 15 The EFF was established to assist countries experiencing serious payment imbalances because of structural impediments or slow growth and an inherently weak balance-of­ payments position. The EFF provides support for comprehensive programmes, including the policies needed to correct structural imbalances over an extended period (https:// www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/20/56/Extended-Fund-Facility). 16 5.69% as per own calculations from World Bank national accounts data and Organisa­ tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) national accounts data files. 17 The case was followed by a law passed by the Gandhi government called the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986, which essentially overturned a Supreme Court judgment. For more reading, see Express Web Desk 2017. 18 Based on World Bank national accounts data and OECD national accounts data files. 19 The movement that advocated that a temple to Ram temple be built in place of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, which Hindus believe to be the birthplace of Ram. 20 The small win was significant, as it showcased the importance of grassroots mobilisation, which – as discussed later in the text – is at the heart of the RSS’s approach.

References Acevedo, Deepa Das. 2013. Secularism in the Indian Context. Law & Social Inquiry, 38(1), 138–167. doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.2012.01304.x. Bagchi, Amiya Kumar. 1999. Globalisation, Liberalisation and Vulnerability: India and Third World. Economic and Political Weekly, 34(45), 3219–3230. https://www.jstor.org/stable/ 4408602. Basu, Kaushik. 2014. A short history of India’s economy: A chapter in the Asian drama. UNU-Wider. https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/short-history-indias-economy. Cooper, Kenneth J. 1996. Indian Government Falls After 13 Days in Power. Washington Post, 29 May. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/05/29/indian-governm ent-falls-after-13-days-in-power/10f84c0d-5122-4866-ba75-4fc2bf505438/. Das, Arvind N. 1994. Brazil and India Comparing Notes on Liberalisation. Economic and Political Weekly, 29(8), 416–419. https://www.epw.in/journal/1994/8/commentary/bra zil-and-india-comparing-notes-liberalisation.html. Frankel, Francine R. 2006. India’s Political Economy 1947–2004. Oxford India Paperbacks. Ganguli, BN. 1965. Dadabahai Naoroji and the Mechanism of ‘External Drain’. The Indian Economic & Social History Review 2(2) 85–102. doi:10.1177/001946466400200201. Ganguly, Sumit. 1999. Explaining India’s Transition to Democracy. In In Transitions to Democracy, by Lisa Anderson (ed), 217–236. Columbia University Press. Gautam, Om P. 1985. The Indian National Congress and Nation Building. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 46(4),487–505.

India’s transformation 35

Gudavarthy, Ajay. 2019. India After Modi - Populism and the Right. Bloomsbury. Hasan, Zoya. Ayodhya: How Rajiv Gandhi’s plan to use the Ram temple for the Congress party came undone. scroll.in, 21 October 2019. https://scroll.in/article/941140/ayodhya -how-rajiv-gandhis-plan-to-use-the-ram-temple-for-the-congress-party-came-undone. India Today. 2019. From Bofors to Rafale: Dubious defence deals that rocked India. 8 February. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/from-rafale-to-bofors-dubious-defence-deals-that­ rocked-india-1451287-2019-02-08. Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1947. Speech on the Granting of Indian Independence. Delhi, 14 August. https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1947nehru1.asp. Rodrik, Dani and Arvind Subramanian. 2004. From ‘Hindu growth’ to productivity surge: the mystery of the Indian growth transition. National Bureau of Economic Research. Rothermund, Dietmar. 1993. An Economic History of India. Routledge. Roy, Ajit. 1984. The Failure of Indira Gandhi. Economic and Political Weekly, 19(45),1896–1897. Sen, Suhit K. 2019. The Paradox of Populism: The Indira Gandhi Years, 1966–1977. Primus Books. Sitapati, Vinay. 2020. Jugalbandi - The BJP Before Modi. Penguin Random House. Tarkunde, Vithal Mahadeo. 1995. Secularism and the Indian Constitution. India International Centre Quarterly, 22(1), 143–152. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23003717. Verma, Rahul. 2019. The Emergence, Stagnation, and Ascendance of the BJP. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 4 April. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/ 04/emergence-stagnation-and-ascendance-of-bjp-pub-78735. Walsh, Judith E. 2011. A Brief History of India. Facts On File.

3 FROM ‘PRACHARAK’ TO ‘PRADHAN SEVAK’ The Rise of Narendra Damodardas Modi

In the quiet town of Vadnagar,1 on 17 September 1950, a tea seller and his wife welcomed their third son to the world. Little did Damodardas Mulchand and his wife Hiraben know that Narendra Damodardas Modi would go on to become Gujarat’s longest-serving chief minister and, eventually, India’s 14th prime minister. During his childhood, Modi frequently spent his time running errands for his father’s tea stall. When Narendra, along with some of his peers, participated in group sessions organised by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), he was able to take a break from his monotonous everyday routine. What began as a simple after-school hangout with a group of friends evolved into a crucial building block in the development of Narendra’s character and (political) future. As an RSS volunteer, Narendra took part in the organisation’s grassroots activ­ ities, such as distributing flyers; and he attended the organisation’s daily sessions on a regular basis. Soon, this escape from the daily grind at school and at the tea stall evolved into a catalyst for him to explore and grow. The RSS training consisted of two parts: one focused on physical strength and the other on character development. This training would have a long-term impact on Modi throughout his life. It provided him with a higher calling, as well as the strength to pursue it with determination. According to Modi’s eldest brother, Sombhai Modi: ‘Narendra always wanted to do something different. Something more than what we did as a daily routine at home and at school. And the RSS shakha2 provided him just that’ (Jose 2012). Joining the RSS shaped his entire life – not just politically, but also personally and spiritually. As a grassroots organisation promoting the right-wing nationalist narrative in India, the RSS would also have a big impact on Modi’s brand of politics in the future. While the RSS shaped Modi, it also served as a springboard for his foray into active politics. Modi met Lakshmanrao Inamdar, the man who would later become his political mentor, through the RSS. DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-4

The rise of Modi 37

According to political biographer Kingshuk Nag, Modi is considered to be the ‘Manas Putra’, or ideological son, of Inamdar in RSS circles (Nag 2013). While different chroniclers place the young Modi’s first interaction with Inamdar at different periods of his life, according to Modi, this occurred during his time as a stu­ dent cadet (Marino 2014). Inamdar was an ardent member of the RSS who traversed Gujarat extensively to establish RSS shakhas. He was a lawyer by profession and was affectionately referred to as ‘Vakil Saheb’, or ‘Advocate Sir’. Modi later wrote a biography of Inamdar, titled Jyoti Punj, as a gesture of gratitude to his mentor. Modi expressed admiration for Inamdar’s work in the book, recalling how the latter worked relentlessly to fight court challenges on behalf of his peers following Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s killing. Inamdar would not only shape Modi’s political world view, but would also be the person who initiated him into a life of active politics. While he was being introduced to active grassroots politics, Modi was also refining his oratory and public speaking abilities, which observers note when assessing Modi as a politician. As a child, he was an enthusiastic participant in school plays and debates, which fostered in him the confidence that finally trans­ formed him into the camera-friendly public personality he is today. He honed the art of mobilising an audience through his oratory, compelling them to hang on every word he spoke. In the Ghanchi3 caste, to which Narendra belonged, children are often married through a three-step process. The first step involves looking for a match; the second step involves a formal marriage at the age of 13; and the third involves the couple moving in around the age of 16 or 17. As was the practice, Modi was betrothed at the age of six and married to Jashodaben at around 13. After the second step, however, Modi started protesting against the idea of marriage. Hence, after finishing his higher secondary education in 1967 and before he was supposed to move in with his spouse, Modi left home and wandered across various maths (temples or monasteries) and ashrams in Northeast India. It is during this time that he travelled to seek more knowledge at centres of learning that were based on Swami Vivekananda’s teachings. He soon came to the realisation that he was not suited to this life and hence returned home for a brief period in 1970 before moving to Ahmedabad to work in his uncle’s canteen. However, throughout these changes in his personal life, Modi always kept the RSS and its teachings at the back of his mind. In Ahmedabad, Modi reconnected with fellow RSS members and Inamdar, and devoted himself to the service of his mentor. He also became politically active, especially after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. Modi took part in protests against Pakistan’s crackdown on East Pakistan and later in anti-government demonstrations. There are reports of him being arrested as a result of his participation in these protests. His proactive work grabbed the attention of RSS members and he gained prominence within the organisation. In 1972, Modi left his uncle’s house and became a full-time member or pracharak (promoter) of the RSS, living in the Hedgewar Bhavan, the RSS headquarters in Ahmedabad. He started his growth in the RSS after completing his officer training

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course for pracharaks in Nagpur. Pracharaks are touted as the lifeblood of the RSS and devote themselves to the service of the organisation. As Bharat Karnad notes: The RSS’s role as something of a management school honing Modi’s organi­ zational talent is important from the point of view of his rapid advancement in the Sangh, and in the BJP to which he was deputed. Its more personal and intimate value to Modi lies in the Sangh being his family and home, affording him a sense of ‘belonging’ and comradeship. His experiences in and of the Sangh provided him the model, once in power, to order the reality around him in a similar manner. (Karnad 2018) In June 1975, then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency, which resulted in the prosecution and imprisonment of the government’s oppo­ nents and critics. The RSS was one of the groups that was banned during this period. Modi was urged to complete his formal study at this time by his mentor, Inamdar, and was enrolled in Delhi University. According to some reports, this was only a guise under which he could act as a ‘courier’ for the then-banned RSS (Hall 2019), and take messages back and forth between Hindu nationalists and opposi­ tion leaders. He earned a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Delhi’s School of Open Learning in 1978. It is debatable whether the motivations behind Modi’s tenure at Delhi University were academic or political; but what is unquestionable is that he became a crucial asset for the RSS during this period. He also became a member of the RSS’s student wing, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), or All-India Student Council. His activism later earned him the position of leader of the ABVP’s Gujarat chapter, which he served while studying for a master’s degree in political science at the University of Gujarat (awarded in 1983). Both of Modi’s academic credentials would be contested by his political opponents in the years to come.

Transitioning from RSS to BJP During the 1977 general elections, Modi played an important role in mobilising voters in Gujarat for the Janata Dal or People’s Party. The party won the elections and soon after, Modi rose up through the ranks of the RSS. Initially a vibhag pra­ charak, responsible for overseeing the RSS centres in Baroda, he went on to become a sambhaag pracharak, responsible for the districts of Nadiad, Dang and Panchmahal in the state. It was also during this period that India’s right wing gained momentum. The RSS, seizing this opportunity, took charge of its grassroots assets in order to rally support for its political affiliate, the Bharatiya Janata Party, (BJP). Modi was appointed to assist the BJP in 1986 and became the RSS’s organisa­ tion secretary for the state of Gujarat in 1987. The organisation secretary was tasked with linking the RSS with the BJP. Modi’s primary objective was to assist

The rise of Modi 39

the BJP’s campaign in the local and municipal elections. While the BJP garnered considerable public prominence, the RSS operated in the background. Modi began his political career in this role. Modi was the organisation secretary for eight years. He assisted in the organisation of various political campaigns and yatras, or ceremonial processions, throughout these years. Among the most notable were the Nyay Yatra or Journey of Justice for Gujarat’s famine-stricken villages at the national level. The Ram Rath Yatra was to begin in Somnath, Gujarat, and end in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, under the leadership of LK Advani. Modi facilitated the launch of the Ayodhya Rath Yatra in 1989 from its starting point at Gujarat’s Somnath Temple. This was a watershed moment in post-independence Indian history. The event can be viewed as a catalyst for the final destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992. It also marked an important point in independent India’s political history, as it triggered severe rioting across the country that resulted in the deaths of over 2,000 people (The Times of India 2019). During this period, in the early 1990s, Modi spent time away from the limelight. Still an RSS pracharak, he continued to work as a key part of the management that planned the organisation’s activities. He also got the chance to travel abroad, accompanying RSS leaders to the US where they travelled the country, staying with sympathetic affiliates of the RSS (Deccan Chronicle 2014). Modi was instrumental in mobilising 150,000 activists from the RSS and other connected organisations to assist in the BJP’s state election campaign in 1995. The BJP won the elections and appointed Keshubhai Patel as Gujarat’s chief minister. As a result of his critical role in Patel’s campaign and victory, the latter entrusted Modi with the job of containing internal resistance inside the party. This is when tensions between Keshubai’s competitor, Shankersinh Vaghela, and Modi arose. This conflict fuelled the party’s internal struggle for control. The rivalry between Vaghela and a party member 10 years his junior can be attributed either to Modi’s ‘reported egotism and self-promotion’ or to a ‘mundane case of envy at a junior doing so well that he outshone his seniors’ (Marino 2014). The internal power struggle eventually got out of hand and Patel was asked to step down in favour of Suresh Mehta. Consequently, Modi was sent away from Gujarat. By this point, Modi had found another mentor in LK Advani, who steered his participation within the BJP at the national level. He was sent to conduct party work in many states, such as Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. During the 1998 elections, Modi played an important role as a strategist for the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which concluded with a victory for the NDA. After the win, he was appointed as the BJP general secretary and party spokesperson. This position in Delhi brought Modi into the limelight, as he held press conferences and made passionate speeches – especially during the Kargil War in 1999, which occurred while he was posted in Jammu and Kashmir (Jose 2012). If one were to encapsulate Modi’s childhood and adolescence, the RSS would be a recurring theme. The shakha, which served as a haven for him as a child, later

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became a source of guidance during his youth. Modi’s active membership in the RSS gradually elevated him to a position of prominence within the BJP. Modi carved out a niche for himself as a prominent member of the organising committee for significant events such as the Nyay Yatra and the Ram Rath Yatra, and as a participant in the BJP’s projects. He would build on and hone these abilities as his political career progressed.

Modi’s Influence on India’s Domestic Politics Keshubhai Patel’s second term as chief minister (1998–2001) was plagued by accusations of corruption. ‘In fact, corruption and incompetence [were] the two striking features of the Keshubhai Patel government’ (Bunsha 2001). A report issued by the comptroller and auditor general of India during this period highlighted several irregularities in the expenses of the chief minister and his family. The report also highlighted several irregularities in the issue of government contracts and purchase orders. The state deficit almost tripled from 1998 to 2001 and industrial growth was on the decline. To make matters worse, Gujarat was hit by a massive earthquake in January 2001, killing over 12,000 people and causing damage worth billions of rupees. The government’s response to this was considered to be lackadaisical by many. And it was not only in Gujarat that the BJP was suffering politically; it was also witnessing a drop in the government’s approval ratings and losses in the municipal elections across the country. With elections just a year away, the BJP decided that a change was necessary, which led to a request by the BJP leadership for the resig­ nation of Patel on 2 October 2001. Given his ill health, Patel abided by the wishes of the BJP leadership and resigned. Modi, who had risen to prominence within the party at the time, was chosen by senior party officials (mainly LK Advani) as the man to turn around the party’s fortunes in Gujarat. He was elected as the new leader of the BJP and was sworn in as Gujarat’s chief minister on 7 October 2001. One of the key challenges Modi faced as the newly appointed chief minister was his inexperience. He had never before held public office. Disaster struck soon after Modi assumed power. On 27 February 2002, a train carrying Hindu pilgrims and activists returning from a pilgrimage at Ayodhya was allegedly attacked by a group of local Muslims in Godhra.4 The train then caught fire, claiming the lives of around 59 people. While the cause of the fire is still dis­ puted, the next day Modi issued a statement claiming that the fire was most likely an arson attack by terrorists. The religious nature of the incident made it personal for the affected communities and soon communal violence gripped the state, facilitated by segments of the political establishment. What ensued was one of the country’s bloodiest Hindu-Muslim con­ frontations since partition. According to official reports, these riots led to the deaths of over 1,000 people (BBC News 2005). Allegations flew in the aftermath of the tragedy: Modi was accused of ordering security forces to stand down while Hindu fundamentalist groups organised the

The rise of Modi 41

supply of weapons and hunted down Muslims. Modi’s handling of this situation was in stark contrast to his past abilities as an organiser and strategist for the RSS and the BJP. He faced charges of collusion in the worst-case scenario and negligence in the best-case scenario. These actions also had global repercussions on Modi’s own image, as he came under fire from numerous international human rights organisations working both in and outside India, and from other parties and civil society organisations across India. The EU and the US both refused to grant him a visa due to his alleged involvement in the 2002 riots. However, these decisions were later reversed when Modi ran for prime minister in the 2014 elections. Modi also felt the repercussions of the 2002 riots within the BJP, as there were calls for his removal. The BJP top leadership thought it essential for Modi to express remorse. As a result, he offered to resign. However, his mentor LK Advani and then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee ultimately rejected this resignation. Eventually, towards the end of 2002, Modi launched a passionate campaign targeting Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, which secured the party 127 out of 182 seats in the state legislature (Hall 2019). Modi used this campaign to portray all allegations of human rights violations as an attack on Gujarat and the Gujarati people. This ‘us versus them’ rhetoric subsequently became a recurring theme in his national campaigns (including the 2014 and 2019 Lok Sabha elections). The victory in the state legislature was the first of Modi’s three terms as Gujarat’s chief minister and he went on to become the state’s longest-serving chief minister. Modi’s post-election behaviour came to be viewed in two distinct ways, as evi­ denced by sympathetic biographer Andy Marino and the more critical Ian Hall. While the former presents Modi’s attempts to distance himself from the ‘nastier elements of the movement in Gujarat’ (Marino 2014), the latter suggests that this distancing was perhaps done in part to ‘deal with some long-standing political enemies within the ranks’ (Hall 2019). After his re-election, Modi worked to create a business-friendly environment in Gujarat, which became the highlight of his time as chief minister. The ‘Gujarat Model’ was a pro-business, pro-big capital model which led to an increase in industrialisation in Gujarat. The saga of Tata’s Nano plant served as a vehicle for this model. In October 2008, Tata – one of India’s largest automobile manufacturers – was forced to close its facility in the state of West Bengal due to a land compensation movement by farmers in the surrounding area. Four days after the incident, Tata announced that it would move its plant to Gujarat. This brought a lot of publicity, as Modi’s quick response persuaded Tata to choose Gujarat over other competing Indian states. Given the state’s accommodating approach to business, many indus­ tries were soon looking at Gujarat as a favourable destination. Companies such as Ford and Peugeot were among those that followed the Tatas (Jose 2012). While land prices rose and the government praised itself for creating opportunities for the people, other segments of the population were protesting against the government’s apathy towards them.

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Christopher Jaffrelot argues that: by focusing on ‘megaprojects,’ the ‘Gujarat model’ relied on big companies that have boosted growth rate but have not created many good jobs, not only because the rules pertaining to job creation have been relaxed… but also because companies are very capital intensive. (Jaffrelot 2018) Jaffrelot (2018) observes that the success of the Gujarat Model can equally be attributed to the pro-business tendencies inherent in the state. However, the Gujarat Model only benefited the upper class and the ‘neo-middle’ class; while those who were in need of development and upward mobility – the lower middle class and the poor – were left merely with whatever trickled down to them. Under Modi, the Gujarat government also spent considerably less on education, healthcare and social welfare compared to other states in the nation (Jaffrelot 2015). On the other hand, the praise which the Gujarat Model attracted highlights its role it played in driving growth and private entrepreneurship (Panagariya and Bhagwati 2012). Further, the state made attempts under Modi to provide incen­ tives and subsidies for corporate investments (Hirway 2013). The sales tax subsidies given to medium and large industries from 1999–2000 and 2006–2007 constituted 72% of the total sales tax revenue of the state government (Hirway 2013). The praise and criticisms that the Gujarat Model attracted both stand true, as Gujarat did indeed perform well on some indicators, such as foreign direct invest­ ment (FDI), and was consistently ranked among the top states in terms of the FDI it attracted. However, all these monetary inflows did not improve the state’s Human Development Index (HDI); albeit that the HDI in the state remained above average. In contrast to the rapid growth witnessed in Gujarat, more than 16% of the state’s population live below the poverty line (NITI Aayog 2019). Despite these paradoxes, media coverage has frequently focused on only one side of the growth model, demonstrating Modi’s ability to shape a media narrative for political gain – a pattern that remains evident in the BJP’s politics today. Exercising greater control of the independent media has been a key factor in Modi’s political ascent. While politicians pay careful attention to their public image, Jose, a renowned journalist and author, observes that Modi’s PR and poli­ tical image remained watertight – and highly efficient for a ‘good governance’ persona – ever since he became chief minister (Jose 2012). It is hinted that most of this public image control was partly due to sensitivity over the Godhra issue; Jose also recalls a famous interview with Karan Thapar5 in which Modi got up and left when the interviewer asked questions relating to his alleged prejudice against Muslims and accusations of mass murder (Jose 2012). Another example of Modi’s discomfort when unable to control the narrative concerned the fears of people connected with his infrastructure projects during his tenure as chief minister of Gujarat. Jose reports that he and his peers would have to submit requests for months, with no response, to secure an interview with Modi

The rise of Modi 43

during his time as chief minister; and that most critics would share information only if their names were not mentioned (or were kept off the record). This ecosystem of pervasive fear and the executive’s inaccessibility to the media are still criticised today. This is further elaborated by Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, who published the then chief minister’s biography in 2013; he noted that ‘Modi did not like to listen to any viewpoint besides his own’. This is a trait that Modi himself has confirmed, saying that while he listens to and learns from experts and studies the issues at hand, ‘“I am,” he admitted, “never influenced by anyone, or any place. There is no need—I get inspired, not influenced”’ (Mukhopadhyay 2013). These observations illustrate Modi’s desire to consolidate power and control all dominions of the state. This further explains the organisational hierarchy of the state. As chief minister in Gujarat – and later prime minister – Modi shaped the existing hierarchical decision-making and administrative structure into the steeper still top-down system with which he was familiar from his time in the RSS, where only the top person gives orders and everybody else buckles down to implementing them in earnest. However, first in Gandhinagar and then in Delhi, Modi took this one step further and set himself up as an overarching authority figure – and not only in govern­ ment. Gordhan Zadafia, a former minister in the Gujarat government, said of Modi that he ‘thinks of himself as above the organization whether it is Parivar or the BJP—he has a very autocratic style of functioning’ (Karnad 2018). While Modi’s electoral record in Gujarat improved over time as he won repe­ ated elections, the NDA suffered further defeats at the national level following Vajpayee’s term. The United Progressive Alliance was founded and held the national government for two terms, succeeding the NDA period from 1999 to 2004 under the leadership of the Indian National Congress. Atal Bihari Vajpayee later stated that failing to remove Modi from the role of chief minister following the 2002 tragedy was a mistake and may have contributed to the BJP’s defeat in the 2004 national elections. Along with Vajpayee, other prominent figures such as Advani snubbed Modi in order to pursue their own political objectives. However, this began to shift in the run-up to the 2014 general elections. Many in the electorate believed in Modi and in his message of ‘Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas’ (‘Everyone’s support, everyone’s development’) – so much so that an entire political party, the non-dynastic BJP, wrapped itself around him, transforming his political image into a personality cult (much like Indira Gandhi back in 1970s). Modi’s India in certain reflective reiterations resonates quite closely with the authoritarian India seen under Gandhi’s prime ministership, during which a sycophantic functionary declared: ‘Indira is India, and India is Indira’ (Karnad 2018).

Notes 1 Then part of Bombay state, but now part of Gujarat. 2 An RSS shakha is an RSS branch.

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3 Ghanchi is the name of the caste of people who were traditionally producers of vegetable oil or ‘ghanch’ (Marino 2014). 4 The key accused was acquitted by a special court in Ahmedabad in 2011 (NDTV Correspondent 2011). 5 Karan Thapar is a prominent Indian journalist who has been part of the Indian journalism fraternity since 1981. The interview referred to here was hosted by him on 19 October 2007 on CNN IBN.

References BBC News. 2005. Gujarat riot death toll revealed. May 11. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ south_asia/4536199.stm. Bunsha, Dionne. 2001. A new oarsman. Frontline, October 13. Deccan Chronicle. 2014. Flashback Friday: Old pictures of PM Modi’s US visit. September 26. https://www.deccanchronicle.com/140925/nation-current-affairs/gallery/eve-pm-mod is-us-visit-old-pictures-surface. Hall, Ian. 2019. Modi and Moditva. In Ian Hall, Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy, 61–80. Bristol University Press. Hirway, Indira. 2013. Partial View of Outcome of Reforms and Gujarat ‘Model’. Economic and Political Weekly, October 26, 26–29. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23528834. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2015. What ‘Gujarat Model’?—Growth without Development—and with Socio-Political Polarisation. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(4) 820–838. doi:10.1080/00856401.2015.1087456. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2018. Business Friendly Gujarat Under Narendra Modi. In Christophe Jaffrelot, Atul Kohli and Kanta Murali, Business and Politics in India, 215–218. Oxford University Press. Jose, Vinod K. 2012. The Emperor Uncrowned: The Rise of Narendra Modi. Caravan Magazine, March 1. Karnad, Bharat. 2018. Staggering Forward: Narendra Modi and India’s Global Ambition. Penguin Books. Marino, Andy. 2014. Narendra Modi: A Political Biography. HarperCollins. Mukhopadhyay, Nilanjan. 2013. Narendra Modi: The Man. The Times. Tranquebar Press. Nag, Kingshuk. 2013. The NaMo Story: A Political Life. Lotus. NDTV Correspondent. 2011. Godhra verdict: 31 convicted, 63 acquitted. March 1. https:// www.ndtv.com/india-news/godhra-verdict-31-convicted-63-acquitted-448265. NITI Aayog. 2019. SDG India Index. https://sdgindiaindex.niti.gov.in/#/ranking. Panagariya, Arvind and Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2012. India’s Tryst with Destiny. Collins. The Times of India. 2019. How Ayodhya case unfolded over the years: A timeline. November 8. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/how-ayodhya-case-unfolded-over-the-years-a -timeline/articleshow/71925513.cms.

4 INDIA UNDER MODI’S LEADERSHIP

The first full-term Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, lost power at the centre in the 2004 national elections. This electoral result came as a surprise for many, as most pollsters had predicted the party’s victory (FE Online 2019). Such was the confidence of the party and its leadership, in fact, that they even conducted the elections earlier than scheduled by a few months. This confidence was based on the economic growth seen under Vajpayee1 and the many pro-market reforms his government introduced – particularly relating to the disinvestment of public enterprises and the privatisation of the telecommunications sector. Roads and highways were built at massive scale across the country. To show­ case the government’s improved economic performance, the party fought the election under the campaign slogan of ‘India Shining’. Vajpayee’s electoral loss despite this strong macroeconomic performance indi­ cated that even in a ‘Shining India’, darkness still loomed over large swathes of the population. Some explanations for the loss stem from the restricted nature of this economic growth. Even though macroeconomic indicators improved, many people saw no difference in their living conditions. Added to this economic dissatisfaction was the national outrage over Modi’s handling of the Godhra incident, which hurt the party’s election prospects while pushing Modi to the side-lines of national politics. The Indian National Congress (INC), which had been out of power for eight years, was elected back to office. The INC-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) was a cohort of centre-left, left and regional parties which collectively managed to secure 335 of the 543 seats in the lower house of the Indian Parliament. The BJP’s surprising loss taught it an important lesson: post the 1991 economic reforms, Indian voters had become more aspirational and the single-minded pursuit of growth which could decrease inequality was no longer enough to appease the population. This is evidenced in the contrast between voter perceptions of the DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-5

46 India

‘biggest problem’ facing the country in a 1971 post-poll Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies survey as against those in a similar 2019 investiga­ tion. In the 1971 survey, when asked about the most pressing problem facing the country, 25% of voters cited ‘food and clothing’ (Bisht and Kattakayam 2021). Fast forward to 2019 and just 0.3% thought that ‘hunger, starvation, lack of food’ was a pressing concern (Bisht and Kattakayam 2021). Instead, voters identified ‘lack of jobs, unemployment’ as the most pressing concern (Bisht and Kattakayam 2021). It was thus important to offset the negative externalities caused by a high growth rate with a better social safety net. The UPA government tried to achieve this with policies such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). To balance out the many complexities of a diverse alliance, the INC chose a respected technocrat, Dr Manmohan Singh, to serve as prime minister. Dr Singh had been the finance minister under PV Narasimha Rao and had ushered in India’s pro-market reforms in the early 1990s during the balance of payment crisis. The UPA government under Dr Singh was in power for two terms, UPA I and UPA II, which lasted from 2004–2009 and 2009–2014, respectively. During UPA I, gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 5.9% to 8.0% and the fiscal deficit decreased from 5.5% to 3.9% of GDP. Foreign direct investment (FDI) soared to $15.44 billion. For these reasons alone, UPA I was considered the more successful term; but there was more that transpired during UPA II. In the second term, the government became embroiled in a series of corruption scandals which eclipsed the progress made by the country under UPA I. These scandals became the core issue during the 2014 elections, where they were used by NDA prime ministerial can­ didate Modi to build his campaign. To understand better how this transition occurred, the following sections set out some highlights of the UPA terms.

2004–2009: INC Returns to Power Once in power, the INC had a tough job at hand. It had to live up to the expectations of the people who had been enjoying the fruits of liberalisation while appeasing those who had not. The economic growth had increased the appetites of the people, who wanted more than just ‘Garibi hatao’ (‘Eradicate poverty’). Expectations went beyond poverty alleviation; people now had bigger aspirations and the government had to create better opportunities to cater to them. The biggest roadblock to the realisation of those aspirations was corruption. A prevalent problem in India ever since the country’s inception, this worsened con­ siderably during the Licence Raj period. In an effort to address concerns about corruption, the government passed the Right to Information Act, 2005 (‘RTI Act’). This Act allowed citizens to access ‘information under the control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority’ (Ministry of Law and Justice 2005). The move had a powerful impact. Soon, the RTI Act had become a tool of empowerment for the general public, enabling them to secure greater public

India under Modi’s leadership 47

transparency and strengthen the state-citizen trust contract. It gave a wide section of the citizenry access to the intricacies and nuances of the work done by the executive in public institutions, the bureaucracy and almost all government bodies, as they were now bound by the RTI Act. Legal activism under the RTI Act and the public interest litigation movement soon became an important part of India’s civil society, helping to strengthen the social fabric, inspiring greater participation of people in civil society and ensuring greater accountability on the part of the general government (across tiers). The numbers bear out the impact of the statute: more than 30 million RTI applications had been filed as of 2019 (Transparency International India 2019). Aside from corruption, other problems that plagued Indian society were the deep structural issues in India’s labour market (amid rising underemployment) and growing inequalities. The 1991 reforms led to a period during which income inequalities widened even as India witnessed an increase in GDP, due to the massive capital inflows that resulted. According to Oxfam India’s 2018 Inequality Report (Oxfam India 2018), these inflows triggered a domestic retail credit boom and fiscal conces­ sions that aided consumption among better-off households (which fuelled the increase in GDP); but the same trend was not observed among the masses. The labour market suffered further as a result of the manufacturing sector’s focus on directing an increased share of net-value-added towards the share of profits instead of workers’ wages. The further relaxation of regulations and corporate tax exemptions exacerbated these problems; while rural India – home to much of the country’s population – experienced little of the economic growth, which was centred on the service sectors. To address this, the UPA government introduced the NREGA (later renamed the MGNREGA) during its first year in power. It aimed to provide 100 days of guaranteed wage employment to every household in which adult members volunteered to do unskilled manual work. Since its inception, the MGNREGA has generated work for nearly 21.65 million people (Chauhan 2020). Through its implementation, the UPA government addressed its manifesto promise of an employment guarantee framework made by the INC agenda in 2004. The UPA’s policies were greatly impacted by its allies – especially the leftaligned parties, which contributed 59 members of Parliament to the alliance. One of the main reasons cited for the creation of the NREGA was the presence of these left-aligned parties in the UPA alliance. This pressure benefited the alliance, as the MGNREGA has since become a flagship scheme for the UPA government, gar­ nering praise from international organisations such as the World Health Organiza­ tion, which hailed it as an ‘innovative practice to promote financial inclusion’ (Roche 2013). According to Ghatak, Ghosh and Kotwal’s assessment, the NREGA would turn out to be a ‘vote grabber’ for the UPA government in the subsequent elections. In the same assessment, however, the authors credit the scheme with exposing the ‘ineptitude and corruption’ of the ruling UPA government, which would con­ tribute to its loss in the future (Ghatak, Ghosh and Kotwal 2014).

48 India

Shifting focus to the UPA’s performance in the foreign policy sphere, the IndoUS Civil Nuclear Deal – also known as the 1–2–3 Agreement – was a major blow to the alliance. The agreement was first proposed when then-US President George Bush visited India, and took three years to finalise. Under the deal, India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and placed the former under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. In return, India would work with the US on full civil nuclear cooperation. Although it was a major diplomatic and foreign policy accomplishment, the move did not sit well with the opposition and some of the left-aligned parties in the government’s alliance. The BJP criticised the deal on the grounds that it would hamper the development of India’s nuclear weapons arsenal. On the other hand, the left parties were opposed to the deal, as they believed the intention behind it was to convert India into a subordinate ally of the US. The disapproval of its allies was problematic for the alliance, especially since it came from the left. Its 60 MPs consequently withdrew their support from the government when the latter announced plans to meet the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 as part of the process of enabling the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. As a result, there was a floor test to prove support for Manmohan Singh’s government. After two days of intense debate, the UPA government won the floor test with 275 votes in favour and 256 votes against. While some members of Parliament from across party lines voted in favour, a major part of the opposition – that is, the BJP – voted against, claiming that if voted into power, they would broker a better deal. After the floor test, the Singh government lost its ties with the left front. The effect of this blow was not felt immediately; in the 2009 elections, the UPA went on to win an improved number of seats in Parliament. However, in the following years, the left’s departure from the alliance diluted the power of both parties, which until then had benefited from their com­ plementary relationship under the UPA umbrella. The political space occupied by the left shrank and became limited to a handful of states, while a former UPA ally turned into a vocal opponent.

2009–2014: Corruption and Decline of the UPA-II The impacts of the 2008 financial crisis were felt around the globe and India was no different. After the financial crisis, India saw a rapid decrease in its growth rate and exports. The government overcame the financial crisis by spending extensively. Over the course of three months, three stimulus packages totalling 3.5% of GDP were announced. This spending pushed the fiscal deficit from 2.7% in 2007–08 to 6% in 2008–09 (PV Iyer 2018). While these moves helped the economy to withstand the worst, rising inflation and increased unemployment chipped away at the electorate’s confidence as the UPA government began its second term. In addition to these economic woes, UPA II was plagued by corruption. So dire were the scandals that all the progress and positive work done by the UPA in its

India under Modi’s leadership 49

first term was completely tarnished. The UPA II government became the poster child for corruption charges, especially in light of the Commonwealth Games scandal, the 2G spectrum scam and ‘Coalgate’. These gave the opposition ammunition to mount a more aggressive 2014 electoral campaign under Modi. The Commonwealth Games scandal related to a series of overspending and corruption allegations surrounding the organisation of the 19th Commonwealth Games, which were held in New Delhi from 3–14 October 2010. Ever since India was announced as the host, the organisation of the games met with resistance – even from members of the government. Then-Minister of Sports and Youth Affairs Mani Shankar Aiyar stated that the money and resources allocated for the event would be better spent on social development projects within the state. The games turned out to be an unqualified organisational failure, ripe with overspending, delays and allegations of corruption against both the organising committee and the Delhi state government. The day after the games concluded, the central government ordered a probe to delve into the allegations of corruption. In May 2011, the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI), a federal investigative agency, filed its first charge sheet against Suresh Kalmadi, an INC member of Parliament and head of the organising committee for the games. The committee formed to investigate the corruption allegations submitted its findings in 2012, recommending that the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate2 file a fresh charge sheet against various members of the games’ organising committee, including Suresh Kalmadi and Lalit Bhanot, the committee’s secretary general. In 2014, the Enforcement Directorate issued fresh notices to them. This scandal was followed by corruption allegations surrounding the allocation of the 2G spectrum licences. In November 2010, the comptroller and auditor general of India (CAG) issued a report which revealed that 2G licences had been issued to telecommunications operators on the cheap. Moreover, the applicants were stated to be ineligible; and the candidates allegedly suppressed information, submitted fictitious documents and used dishonest methods to obtain the licences. The CAG reported that the licence owners had then sold the licences to Indian and international companies at a significant profit within a short timeframe, making profits that otherwise would have gone to the state. The CAG quantified the losses to the state at INR 1.76 trillion. The main accused in this scandal were the telecommunications minister of the UPA government, A Raja; the member of Parliament for Rajya Sabha, MK Kanimozhi; Telecommunications Secretary Siddharth Behura; and A Raja’s private secretary, RK Chandolia. It was alleged that the Telecommunications Ministry had advanced the cut-off date of the auction; issued licences on a first come, first served basis; issued the licences at 2001 prices instead of 2008 prices; blocked companies from entering the issue process; and acted against the advice of various concerned ministries. With UPA ministers involved, the scandal called the UPA-led government’s integrity into question. Also controversial was the coal allocation scam, also known as ‘Coalgate’, which came to light in the summer of 2012, after the CBI launched an investigation into

50 India

coal block allocation in India. The investigation was mainly sparked by a CAG report that was leaked to the press in March 2012. According to the draft, the government in 2005 chose to allocate coal blocks through a screening committee despite having option to auction the allocations. This resulted in the public and private sector com­ panies that were allocated the coal blocks gaining around INR 10.673 trillion. After these allegations came to light, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh offered to resign from office if the allegations against him were proven to be true. ThenLaw Minister and INC member Ashwani Kumar resigned from office and the CBI registered a first information report against the minister of state in the Coal Min­ istry, Dasari Narayan Rao. The opposition seized this opportunity to amplify anticorruption sentiment in the wake of the upcoming general elections. This rampant corruption gave way to a countrywide anti-corruption movement in 2011, led by social activist Anna Hazare. This was the last nail in the coffin for a failing UPA. Hazare went on a ‘fast unto death’ when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rejected his demand for a joint committee dedicated to stronger anti-corruption legis­ lation. Through this movement, a social reformer who was previously a regional player in Maharashtra captured the attention of the public, both nationally and internationally.3 The inspiration for this large-scale mobilisation of middle-class sentiments against the UPA (as seen in Table 4.1) was similar to what led to the ousting of the Vajpayee government: unfulfilled aspirations. While growth sputtered in the years leading up to the 2014 elections, the spate of corruption allegations and the widespread anti-cor­ ruption sentiment made it difficult to undertake any reforms to revive growth. While the corruption allegations damaged the UPA government’s public image, external events were at play that would add economic problems to the UPA’s woes. In addition to the economic difficulties that the UPA had carried over from its previous term, it also had to face the repercussions of declining economic indi­ cators experienced in its second term. The fiscal deficit shot up in the years leading up to 2014, adding to the INC’s reputation for reckless spending and fiscal indiscipline. As pointed out by Praveen Rai and Sanjay Kumar, ‘the UPA II government was besieged by numerous scams, high inflation and unemployment rates, price rise and the policy paralysis that hit the country in the last two years of its regime’ (Rai and Kumar 2017). TABLE 4.1 Class-wise party preference 2009 versus 2014

Class

Poor Lower Middle Upper Total

Congress

BJP

2009

2014

2009

2014

27 29 29 29 29

20 19 20 17 19

16 19 22 25 19

24 31 32 38 31

Source: Sridharan 2014

India under Modi’s leadership 51 0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

Top 1% pre-tax national income Bottom 50% pre-tax national income

0.05

0

FIGURE 4.1 Once

the UPA came to power in 2004, the top 1% earned a bigger share of income than the bottom 50% Source: World Inequality Database

16 14 12 10 8

Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)

6 4 2 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

0

Inflation rose rapidly between 2004 and 2009 Source: World Bank national accounts data and Organisation for Economic Co­ operation and Development national accounts data files

FIGURE 4.2

The UPA’s inability to find a firm footing with the public was exacerbated in the run-up to the 2014 elections as the INC failed to put up an official nominee for prime minister. This was evidence of the internal leadership crisis that had beset the INC. There was an issue of dual leadership within the ruling party: although Dr Manmohan Singh was the prime minister, people believed that Sonia Gandhi – the president of the INC and wife of the late Rajeev Gandhi – was actually running the show. While the INC struggled to over­ come these problems, the BJP announced the candidature of Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi, who by then had become a popular leader. This nomination was not favourable to senior leader and then BJP President LK Advani. Advani, who had mentored Modi during his youth, eventually resigned as party president in protest.

52 India

‘Nationalising’ Brand Modi In September 2013, Modi was nominated as the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate. With less than a year until the elections, Modi employed all his charm and oratory skills to campaign on the grounds of inclusive development, anti-corruption, job creation and economic growth. UPA II’s track record and the various corruption scandals that had come to light were leveraged effectively by Modi to play on the public’s feelings and secure their support. Two factors played an important role in Modi’s campaign: the prevailing anti-corruption sentiment and his focus on class mobility politics. The former was leveraged by Modi to present himself as a leader who had emerged from the people and had no links to the incumbent leadership, which was marred by cor­ ruption. This sentiment became the underlying accelerant to his election campaign, which preached the slogan ‘Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas’.4 The slogan, which unified the electorate through its message, was a departure from the caste-based electoral practice which was a common characteristic of many regional parties and which had become popular during the 1990s and 2000s. The campaign drew a picture of a pro-business leader with a widely advertised pro-development image, leveraging the Gujarat Model in voters’ minds and eclipsing the stigma of the 2002 Gujarat riots. This pro-devel­ opment picture, even while softening Modi’s hard-line Hindutva promoter image, did not diminish the same for his supporters (Pande 2014). However, an inspection of the data relating to the Gujarat Model suggests that it was not as brilliant as was claimed. Gujarat’s annual average growth rate from 1990–2000 was 12.77%; but it fell to 9.82% between 2001 and 2011 (while Modi was chief minister) – still higher than the national average, but not as impressive as it used to be (Shah 2014). Further, Gujarat’s above-average growth rate had been 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 Bihar Gujarat Maharashtra Tamil Nadu All India Haryana

4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 1980-89

1990-99

2000-10

FIGURE 4.3 Average annual growth rate of per capita income of selected states, by decade Note: Per capita income of a state implies net state domestic product of India. Source: Reserve Bank of India (Ghatak and Roy 2014)

India under Modi’s leadership 53

consistent since the 1980s. Therefore, it would be hard to attribute these figures numbers to the policies implemented under Modi, which runs counter to the narrative about the Gujarat Model. Figure 4.3 reveals that while the growth rate increase in Gujarat between 1999 and 2010 was the fifth highest in the country, this was mainly due to the momentum generated in previous decades. The social indices reveal average and, in some cases, below-average performance. Half of Gujarat’s children under five were undernourished, in keeping with the national average of 48%; and the number of girls born in Gujarat compared to boys remained low, in keeping with the traditionally patriarchal norms of the country (Deb 2016). Much of Modi’s claims turned out to be just rhetoric. For example, what Modi dubbed ‘the largest urbanisation project in Indian history’ was a city on the outskirts of Ahmedabad that had been constructed by architects brought in from Shanghai. Three years later, it turned out to be a city full of empty office buildings (Anand 2015). A closer inspection of the Gujarat Model, however, bears more significance in hindsight than during the 2014 elections. In the absence of a qualified opposition, by 2014 Modi had become a brand with mass appeal among the youth and the average Hindu middle class. These groups formed the two most important voter blocs in the elections. First-time voters in 2014 were part of India’s ‘youth bulge’, which had only ever experienced a post-liberalisation India and thus had high expectations of the government. The young people who voted in 2014 were part of the largest working-age population of any society in the first half of the 21st century (Malik 2015). Modi’s rhetoric of employment and dynamic personality played to the expectations of these voters through the medium they best understood: social media. Modi’s campaign in the 2014 election effectively banked on India’s social media boom effect. The main narrative associated with the campaign was one of ‘mini­ mum government, maximum governance’ – pro-business and pro-efficiency, with an undertone of Hindutva that was overshadowed by the promise of change. This promise of change was symbolised by the campaign slogan of ‘Achhe din aayenge’ (‘Good days will come’). This attractive narrative was supported by aggressive advertising and campaigning that focused more on Modi than on the party. While the social media campaign attracted both urban and young voters, grassroots mobilisation by the RSS boosted the on-the-ground campaign – unlike in the 2004 elections, when the latter was found to be at odds with the BJP. Thus, the wide circulation of the narrative of the Gujarat Model contributed to Modi’s track record as chief minister; his clean politician image distinguished him from (what appeared to be) a sea of corrupt politicians; class mobilisation through the Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas campaign motto helped to loosen the grip of caste-based politics; and the projection of Modi as a go-getter who could fulfil the aspirations of a discontented populace (especially through social media campaigning) grabbed the attention of a public which had been disappointed by the incumbent leaders. It was therefore no big surprise when the Modi-led NDA won the general elections of 2014 with around 31% of the vote, securing the alliance 282 seats in the lower house of Parliament.

54 India

Modi as Prime Minister: A Promise of Change Modi’s first tenure featured several new projects and social campaigns, reflecting a unique characteristic of the Indian prime minister. There was no doubt that Modi was active, as exemplified and cemented by the number of projects launched during his first term. Some of the more notable ones were the ‘Make in India’ and the ‘Swachh Bharat’ campaign. Through the ‘Make in India’ campaign, Modi pledged to create 100 million more jobs and attract FDI. In the first semester of 2015, with FDI of $1 billion, India did better than China ($28 billion) and the US ($27 billion) (Jaffrelot 2015). Within one year of the launch of the ‘Make in India’ campaign, officials lifted a restriction that protected small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Jaffrelot 2016) by reserving the production of certain goods – such as furniture, locks, candles and matches – to them. This move left SMEs more vulnerable to com­ petition; and the new opportunities offered by multinational corporations did not offset this vulnerability, as the workers who were engaged in SMEs lacked the education and skills demanded by large corporations. Thus, a campaign intended to cater to youth who were seeking employment ultimately catered to a very small, elite group of the population. The Swacch Bharat campaign aimed to address a social evil instead of achieving economic goals. Launched on 2 October 2014 – the anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi’s birth – its main aims included making India open defecation free and spreading awareness about cleanliness and hygiene. The government earmarked a massive INR 500 billion for the construction of toilets through a subsidised programme and for educational public awareness campaigns. As a result, rural sanitation increased from 40% to 98%. The Swachh Bharat campaign was probably the least controversial initiative of the Modi regime, with participation from celebrity ambassadors, ministers, opposition parties and schoolchildren alike. Other programmes launched by the government included the Ujjwala scheme, to give subsidised gas cylinders to poor households; the Ayushman Bharat health insurance scheme, which aimed to make healthcare accessible to the poor; and the Jan Dhan Yojana, a financial inclusion programme. In launching these initatives, Modi took a leaf from the left’s focus on welfare to address the drawbacks of his predecessors in the Vajpayee government. This focus on welfare and the big advertising campaigns surrounding Modi’s welfare schemes explain how the government came into power for a second term, even as growth rates declined. This welfare delivery, combined with the RSS’s extensive groundwork in rural and tribal areas and the BJP’s careful caste-based electoral arithmetic, significantly increased the party’s support base among other backward classes (OBCs) and Dalits.5 As well as launching widely advertised government projects and social cam­ paigns, during his time as prime minister, Modi has displayed a knack for surprise government declarations. One of the most shocking and widely criticised of these was the demonetisation campaign. On 8 November 2016, Modi stunned the

India under Modi’s leadership 55

Indian population of 1.3 billion with a surprise announcement on national television: ‘To break the grip of corruption and black money, we have decided that the five hundred rupee and thousand-rupee currency notes presently in use will no longer be legal tender from midnight tonight, that is November 8, 2016.’ Overnight, 86% of India’s currency (by value) was demonetised. The move came as a major shock to society, as hundreds of thousands lined up outside banks to deposit the newly invalid currency in exchange for new currency notes. Farmers were hit hard, as the move came just before sowing season; small industries were severely hit; and around 3.5 million people lost their jobs the following year. The move was variously explained as an attempt to reduce the amount of cash in the economy; to eliminate black money in the economy; to reduce counterfeit cur­ rency; and to promote digital payments. A report by the Tax Policy Research Unit showed that corporate investment fell by a devastating 60% as a result (Mehra 2019). The shortage of cash devastated many small businesses in India. Demonetisation was closely followed by the introduction of the goods and services tax, announced in July 2017. This aimed to transform India’s 29 states into a single market with a single tax system. Its implementation led to the introduction of five tax slabs under a complex filing system. These policies – and the suddenness with which they were implemented – took a heavy toll on small businesses in particular. The government initiated a lengthy process to address the attendant problems and simplify the tax slabs. However, the implementation of digital solutions and the sizeable increase in the number of filings required had the opposite effect, and led to dissatisfaction about the attendant administrative costs and uncertainties. Events such as demonetisation, the changes to the tax slabs and the ‘surgical strike’ carried out by Indian forces in retaliation to terrorist attacks6 attracted sig­ nificant media attention, both good and bad. While major economic events and retaliatory military operations were nothing new for India, under Modi they were often pre-emptively declared a success by the media in concert with the ruling party. This concentrated effort to applaud the government’s successes and hide its failures reveals the prowess of the new BJP, under Modi’s leadership, in shaping the media narrative. This contrasts with the BJP alliance of 2004, when the party was overwhelmed by the negative reporting surrounding the 2002 riots, which it failed to get ahead of. The initiatives of the Modi government – especially the military operations – captured people’s imaginations and inspired patriotism among the general public. The government found this narrative particularly useful during the 2019 election campaign and drew on it extensively. While the Modi government was in the limelight for something new every few months, Indian society was experiencing its own changes. To understand the stresses that were affecting the social fabric of the country, one must first understand that India is a country of diverse peoples and religions. According to the 2011 census, more than 79% of the population are Hindus, followed by 14.2% Muslims. The election of the BJP strengthened the positions of various hard-line organisations that focus on the conservative ideologies of a particular religion.

56 India

In these circumstances, one issue that has fuelled rivalries between different peoples is the beef ban. For the Hindus, the cow is a holy animal and different laws prevent the slaughter of cows. The enforcement of these laws is at each state’s discretion. There was a spurt in right-wing extremism and incidents of people being lynched on suspi­ cion of cow slaughter during Modi’s first tenure. Within three days of Modi’s electoral victory, six incidents of violence against mar­ ginalised citizens were reported across the country. Violence on religious grounds and vigilante ‘justice’ became normalised; and perpetrators were punished less and less. In a televised speech to his newly elected members of Parliament, Modi said: ‘Our mantra should be “sabka saath, sabka vikas aur sabka vishwas”’ (‘With all, for everybody’s devel­ opment and having everyone’s trust’). However, the evidence would suggest otherwise. Despite assurances from the authorities and political leaders, in 2018 alone, there were 93 reported incidents of hate crime in the country (Scroll.in 2018). However, Modi managed to escape public criticism for the rise in communalism and dissent in India. One explanation for this is that over the years, Modi’s image has been carefully curated to associate him with neutral campaigns – especially through social media – in order to maintain his public image as a leader of the masses; something that he has retained from his days as chief minister of Gujarat. The spread of communalism has more often than not been blamed on other members of the BJP, the RSS or organisations associated with the RSS. On the one hand, critics accuse Modi of failing to take an unequivocal stand on these issues and to take the initiative to remedy this behaviour, which seems to stem from his party’s own people. On the other hand, his carefully curated image has helped to maintain his appeal with the majority of the electorate.

2019 Elections and Modi’s Second Term in Power Despite the rising communal tensions in the country, Modi managed to win a second term in 2019 by a large margin after securing 303 seats in the lower house of the Indian Parliament. A simplified explanation for this win is presented by Tariq Thachil, who posits that it was a result of the ‘Modi wave’. According to his hypothesis, Indian voters moved away from economic concerns and towards the anti-elite, nationalist sentiments touted in the BJP’s campaign (Thachil 2019). While in truth, the elite seemed to thrive during Modi’s first term, an anti-elite narrative was sold to the electorate. Supporting this narrative were Modi’s welfare programmes, which – as discussed above – were well executed and marketed; and the grassroots work of BJP ally the RSS, which helped the party to expand its base among OBC and Dalit voters. While OBC voters were dissatisfied with their political representation, which favoured their better-off counterparts, the ‘Yadavs’ (Bisht and Kattakayam 2021), the Dalits were dissatisfied with their brethren ‘Jatavs’ (Mishra, Attri and Mehta 2014). Both social groups feature prominently in regional political parties, which aim to offer a platform to serve their interests. In addition to revealing the central role of caste in Indian pol­ itics, this presented an opportunity for the Modi-led BJP to expand its brand of Hin­ dutva from the upper castes to other castes. During Modi’s first tenure, the cultivation

India under Modi’s leadership 57

of OBC leaders under the leadership of an OBC prime minister (The Times of India 2015) gave a much-needed boost to the party’s regular voter base. While the BJP increased its voter base, Modi’s rapport with the business community also brought in a high degree of support in the form of election finances. According to the Association for Democratic Reforms, the BJP alone earned INR 1.027 billion in 2017–18 –almost 75% of the total combined income of India’s seven largest political parties that year (Association for Democratic Reforms 2019). Almost all of this income was from donations (INR 9.89 billion). More than 50% of all-party funds were from unknown sources – something that has attracted criticism from observers. During this time, India was also experiencing a slowdown in consumption and investment across the private sector. In response, corporate tax rates were cut from 35% to 25%, to encourage investment; loan melas or fairs were planned for agri­ culture and micro and SME credit; and there were cuts in interest rates. These were later criticised as weak policy responses. A tax cut in this environment was more likely to transfer resources to business owners than to encourage investment. This seemed more like a move to shore up Modi’s business electoral support than to fix the problems in the economy. The massive corporate tax cut also added to the already high budget deficit, which was reported as 3.46% of GDP (and rectified as 5.85% of GDP by the CAG) (Narayanan 2019). While 2019 marked a massive electoral win for Modi, it was also a year of civil resis­ tance, which caused serious disruptions until the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a lockdown in 2020. The first wave of opposition came after Modi surprised the country with the controversial bifurcation of the North Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories and the modification of Article 370, which revoked the special status granted to the erstwhile state under the Indian Constitution. The BJP had made revocation of Article 370 part of its 2019 election manifesto, arguing that this would bring development to the region and integrate the state with the rest of India. As part of this move, non-Kashmiris were allowed to buy land in Kashmir. The move met with significant resistance both from within the state itself and around the country. Given that the state had been plagued by separatist organisations since its inception, this rise in resistance led to the imposi­ tion of a seven-month internet blackout on the state.7 The move was widely condemned and some experts claimed that the bifurcation was illegal under the Constitution. Some suggested that the move was part of the BJP’s religious agenda, as it would change the demographic character of this Muslim-majority region. A few months afterwards, in December 2019, the Indian Parliament passed the Citizenship Amendment Bill. The bill, later known as the Citizenship Amendment Act, allowed illegal migrants of the Hindu, Sikh, Jain, Parsi, Buddhist and Christian faiths from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who entered the country before 2014 to gain citizenship. The amendment sparked a second wave of resistance. Widespread demonstrations erupted around the country, with sit-ins and university protests conducted in every major city. These protests voiced concerns over the bill, primarily on the grounds of exclusion of Muslims, protection of the indigenous

58 India

population in India’s border state of Assam and apprehensions over the upcoming National Register of Citizens announced by prominent BJP leaders. The state responded by cracking down on the protestors, including university students at India’s leading central and state universities. Again, this move attracted a significant backlash from the international community. While most of this anger was directed towards Home Minister Amit Shah, Modi’s image of soft Hindutva was seriously damaged in the process, as more and more people spoke out against the country’s Hindutva-fuelled domestic policies. The US, the EU, Malaysia and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation were some of the international actors that expressed concerns over the statute (P Iyer 2019). Adding to this discontent, the International Monetary Fund reported India’s worst growth performance in six years and a sharp fall in private business invest­ ment (Basu 2018). By 2019, GDP had fallen to a 15-year low; unemployment had risen to a 45-year high (see Figure 4.4); and consumption had dropped to a 40-year low. The promises of booming economic development that had brought Modi to power seemed to have fallen through. On his part, Modi failed to address these issues and avoided free dialogue with the people. On reflection, India enjoyed its best macroeconomic growth performance between 2002 and 2011. This period includes the last two years of the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government and the first seven years of UPA rule. From 2012, however, economic policy management was hindered by a series of systematic disruptions combined with high inflation and ‘policy paralysis’ under the UPA-II government, as the introduction of gradualist reforms also became difficult. Modi’s rise to power was largely pitched on a ‘development plank’: he positioned himself as someone who could deliver high growth and pass tough reforms. Much of 7.5

7

6.5

6

5.5

5

Unemployment rates Source: World Bank nd

FIGURE 4.4

India under Modi’s leadership 59

PERFORMANCE IN SOCIAL SECTOR

PERFORMANCE IN MACRO INDICATORS UPA Govt's 1st seven years: 2004-05 to 2010-11

NDA Govt's 1st seven years: 2014-15 to 2020-21

GROWTH, INFLATION RATE (%) Average Annual Growth (%) 8.4% GDP

4.8%

3.5% 3.5%

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE (in US$ billion)

Inflation (%) Average CPI (IS+AL)

Average Annual Personsday Generated in MGNREGA (in 10 crore)* UPA Govt's five years (2006-07 to 2010-11)

20

NDA Govt's 1st five years (2014-15 to 2018-19)

23

Average Annual No.of Houses Completed under IAY & PMAY-G (in lakhs)

7.8%

6.8% GDPA

NDA Govt's six years: 2014-15 to 2019-20

592.9 312.7

UPA's 1st seven years NDA's 1st seven years

New CPI Combined (Rural+Urban) 4.8%

21.1 30.2

Open Defecation Free (%)

As on May 23, 2014

As on May 21, 2021

As on Oct 2nd, 2014 As on Oct 2nd, 2019

38.7% 100%

Comparison of macroeconomic and social sector performance Source: MOSPI and RBI; Graphic: Ritesh Kumar (Gulati 2021)

FIGURE 4.5

India’s elite, pro-business class – including upper-class liberals and middle-income groups – supported Modi in the hope that he would help the economy recover from the paralysis of UPA II’s tenure. However, the opposite in fact happened: demoneti­ sation wrecked the fundamentals of the economy and acted like a gunshot to the tyre of a racing car. The relationship between the central government and the states soured and has now reached a nadir. The period post-2016 saw performance worsen across all critical macroeconomic variables (eg, growth, current account balance, fiscal deficit and government debt). Meanwhile, the ruling party’s politics of polarisation and demonisation of minorities (especially Indian Muslims) have ruptured social trust both between and within communities – one of the most important factors in maintaining long-term faith and sustaining better economic performance. Despite all this, Modi still enjoys immense popular support across the country, especially in Northern and Central India, while also attracting fierce criticism in certain regional corners (eg, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu). One of Modi’s talents is his power to exercise ‘narrative control’ over the electorate. Even when faced with the challenges of a global pandemic, an increasingly strained social fabric, the threat of a major economic slowdown and potential stagflation (as is now evident),8 he can still convince his citizens that ‘Modi hai toh mumkin hai’ (‘With Modi, it is possible’). As a result, Modi still enjoys mass support – even as protests and public mobilisation attempt to chip away at his base. Modi’s rise to power marked a shift from multi-party politics in India to single-party politics, with the BJP gaining ground in every state; just as Indira Gandhi’s rise to authoritarian power during the 1960s and 1970s marked the reverse – a shift from single-party politics to multi-party politics. Each leader tapped into the mass aspirations of the people: Indira Gandhi leveraged the poverty alleviation trend under the ‘Garibi Hatao’ slogan, which had been emphasised since independence; while Modi leveraged people’s desire for development and class mobility (an indirect result of the asymmetric growth trajectory caused by the 1991 economic reforms). Each leader correctly

60 India

identified the prevailing sentiment in society and responded with ‘larger than life’ rhetoric while establishing a personality cult. The ‘emergency’ proved to be the critical turning point in Indira Gandhi’s tenure, triggering a chain of events that culminated in the erosion of public free­ doms, the loss of public institutional autonomy and constitutionally safeguarded fundamental rights. Left-wing populism under her reign took India in a regressive direction of low growth and poor socio-economic mobility. A similar trend can be observed today – albeit in a more insidious manner – given the continuous (almost permanent) erosion of public freedoms in (public) institutional autonomy, the ad hoc centralisation of power and a decline in cooperative federalism, combined with ill treatment of minorities and dissidents in Modi’s India. These trends all reflect the wider expansion of right-wing populism and authoritarianism under Modi.

Notes 1 Gross domestic product maintained an average rate of 8%, inflation dropped to 4% and foreign exchange reserves rose by 160%. For further reading see The Times of India 2018. 2 Responsible for the enforcement of the Foreign Exchange Management Act and the Money Laundering Act. 3 The Indian anti-corruption movement was named one of the Top 10 news stories of 2011 by Time magazine. 4 The motto loosely translates to ‘Everyone together (leads to) everyone’s development.’ 5 OBCs and Dalits are segments of the Indian population that have often been marginalised due to centuries-old customs. 6 A military operation carried out by the Indian army against terrorist camps across the Line of Control between India and Pakistan in retaliation for a terrorist attack on an Indian army base. 7 According to a Forbes Statista report, India experienced the highest number of internet shutdowns in the world from January 2016 to May 2018 (McCarthy 2018). This reflects the government’s efforts to curb and control the dissemination of information that might not be in its interests. 8 Inflation coupled with low growth rates

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Chauhan, Chetan. 2020. 3.5 million new enrolments under MGNREGA, as ‘distressed’ workers return to villages. Hindustan Times. 22 May. https://www.hindustantimes.com/ india-news/3-5-million-new-enrolments-under-mgnrega-as-dis tressed-workers-return-to-villages/story-aDJHYz0vz1tSeLleIhVT7I.html. Deb, Siddhartha. 2016. The New Face of India Is the Anti-Gandhi: The violence, insecurity, and rage of Narendra Modi. The New Republic. 4 May. https://newrepublic.com/article/ 133014/new-face-india-anti-gandhi. FE Online. 2019. Exit polls: How accurate are they? A look back at 2004, 2009, 2014 predic­ tions. 19 May. https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/exit-polls-opinion-polls-bjp­ congress-nda-upa-predictions-results-in-2004-2009-2014/1582662/. Ghatak, Maitreesh, Ghosh, Parikshit and Kotwal, Ashok. 2014. Growth in the time of UPA: myths and reality. Economic and Political Weekly. https://www.epw.in/journal/2014/16/ insight/growth-time-upa.html. Ghatak, Mitreesh and Roy, Sanchari. 2014. Modinomics: do Narendra Modi’s economic claims add up? The Guardian. 13 March. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 2014/mar/13/modinomics-narendra-modi-india-bjp. Gulati, Ashok. 2021. Modi’s seven-year report card: low marks for GDP, better work on welfare. Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/narendra-modi-governm ent-seven-years-covid-19-education-healthcare-gdp-7346950/. Iyer, P Vaidyanathan. 2018. 2008 global financial crisis: What government overdid, or didn’t do. Indian Express. 17 September. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/global-fina ncial-crisis-2007-08-indian-economy-lehman-brothers-fall/. Iyer, Prithvi. 2019. Analyzing global response to the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act. ORF Online. 26 December. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/analyzing-global-resp onse-to-the-controversial-citizenship-amendment-act-59529/. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2015. What ‘Gujarat Model’?—Growth without Development—and with Socio-Political Polarisation. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(4) 820–838. doi:10.1080/00856401.2015.1087456. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2016. India in 2015; a year of Modi’s prime ministership. Asian Survey, 56(1), 174–186. doi:10.1525/as.2016.56.1.174. Malik, Bijaya Kumar. 2015. Youth development in India: does poverty matter? SpringerPlus. doi:10.1186/s40064-015-1410-z. McCarthy, Niall. 2018. The countries shutting down the internet the most [infographic]. Forbes. 28 August. https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/08/28/the-coun tries-shutting-down-the-internet-the-most-infographic/#462343671294. Mehra, Puja. 2019. Data on demonetisation’s link to economic slowdown may have been suppressed. The Hindu. 22 August. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-politica lly-inconvenient-data-nugget/article29214638.ece. Ministry of Law and Justice. 2005. The Gazette of India. The Gazette of India. 21 June. https:// rti.gov.in/rti-act.pdf. Mishra, Jyoti, Attri, Vibha and Mehta, Nitin. 2014. The Bahujan Vote in 2014 Elections: Voting Pattern Among Dalits, Adivasis, and Backward Castes. Research Journal Social Sci­ ences, 22(20). https://www.lokniti.org/media/upload_files/PU-The-Bahujan-Vote.pdf. Narayanan, Dinesh. 2019. CAG demonstrates how govt relies on off-budget resources to fund deficit. Economic Times. 25 July. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indica tors/cag-demonstrates-how-govt-relies-on-off-budget-resources-to-fund-deficit/articleshow/ 70360281.cms. Oxfam India. 2018. India Inequality Report 2018: Widening Gaps. https://www.thehindu centre.com/the-arena/current-issues/article25426288.ece/binary/WideningGaps_IndiaInequa lityReport2018.pdf.

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Pande, Shamni. 2014. Just the Right Image. BusinessToday.in. 8 June. https://www.businesstoday. in/magazine/case-study/case-study-strategy-tactics-behind-creation-of-brand-narendra-modi/ story/206321.html. Rai, Praveen and Kumar, Sanjay. 2017. The decline of the Congress Party in Indian politics. Economic & Political Weekly, 25 March. Roche, Elizabeth. 2013. World Bank praises NREGA. Mint. 11 October. https://www.livem int.com/Politics/bQo79MmfcdHHl8rRKMlEvO/World-Bank-praises-NREGA.html. Scroll.in. 2018. Religious hate crimes in India rose to a decade-high level in 2018: Report. 27 December. https://scroll.in/latest/907238/religious-hate-crimes-in-india-rose-to-a-decade-hi gh-level-in-2018-report. Shah, Hemantkumar. 2014. Much against the claim that Gujarat is India’s “growth engine”, facts suggest this was not so in the last one decade. Counterview.org. 11 April. https:// counterview.org/2014/04/11/much-against-the-claim-that-gujarat-is-indias-growth-engi ne-facts-suggest-this-was-not-so-in-the-last-one-decade/. Sridharan, E. 2014. Class voting in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections: the growing size and impor­ tance of the middle classes. Economic and Political Weekly 49(39), 27 September. https://www. lokniti.org/media/upload_files/Class%20Voting%20in%20the%202014%20Lok%20Sabha% 20Elections.pdf. Thachil, Tariq. 2019. India’s election results were more than a ‘Modi wave’. Washington Post. 31 May. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/31/indias-election-re sults-were-more-than-modi-wave/. The Times of India. 2015. We gave first OBC PM, most OBC CMs: BJP. 11 July. https:// timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/we-gave-first-obc-pm-most-obc-cms-bjp/articleshow/ 48026470.cms. Transparency International India. 2019. State Transparency Report. www.transparencyindia. org. World Bank nd. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) ­ India. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?end=2020&locations= IN&start=2001.

5 PART CONCLUSION: INDIA

The ascent of Narendra Modi through India’s political hierarchy should be con­ textualised against the country’s history and current public sentiment. Modi would have never had the opportunity to use his talents to this end without leveraging exogenous factors such as the people’s aversion to corruption, their heightened economic aspirations (especially since liberalisation) and their deep-rooted religious connections. India’s post-independence history, as outlined in the previous chapters, gives an insight into the cultivation of these exogenous factors. As independent India is a diverse country with diverse languages, faiths, customs and peoples, one of the greatest challenges it has faced is unification. In the years immediately following independence, a collective victory over a common adversary helped assuage the many differences in the society. However, in later years, these differences became increasingly evident in politics, society and the economy. The country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, played a major role in directing politics and the economy during the post-independence period. He enjoyed tremendous popularity across the country; as did the Indian National Congress (INC), due to its role in securing India’s independence. This popularity proved vital in facil­ itating their visions of India without much friction. In line with their objective of addressing the diversity in Indian society, the country’s Constitution was established, recognising all religions as equal; and five-year economic plans were implemented for the economy. These five-year plans reflected the country’s scepticism of capitalism, due to India’s previous brush with capitalism-led colonialism under the British. As a result, many key industries were set up as public sector enterprises and the economy was heavily regulated. The attendant regulations and red tape resulted in an economy that catered mostly to the rich and well connected. This factor would influence the political transitions that ensued after Nehru’s death. DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-6

64 India

While Nehru’s goals may have been simple to articulate on paper, they proved extremely difficult to accomplish in practice due to India’s diverse religions and caste system. This reality was something that the country’s right wing would leverage in the years to come. After Nehru’s death in 1964, the post-independence euphoria that had facilitated the INC’s political hegemony gave way to intra-party friction. Like the nation itself, the INC was composed of a diverse group of people, with a variety of eth­ nicities, languages and religions, and a range of political ideologies. As the INC’s hold on voters dwindled, various factions emerged both within and beyond the INC to form a defined right wing. Some of these factions went on to establish the basis of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The rise of India’s right wing challenged the political hold that the INC had hitherto enjoyed. Following the demise of Nehru’s successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, the INC’s leadership – also known as the Syndicate – turned to Nehru’s daughter to lead the country. There were two main reasons for their choice. First, the INC hoped to leverage the people’s continued affection for Nehru to help prevent the erosion of the party’s popularity. Second, as a newcomer to politics, Indira Gandhi was expected to act as a mere conduit for the Syndicate’s decisions. However, Gandhi proved to be the opposite of the Syndicate’s expectations. Her independent thought and failure to abide by the wishes of the party leadership led to friction within the INC, ultimately leading to its split into Congress (R) and Congress (O). While Congress (R) (often referred to simply as ‘Congress’) was led by Indira Gandhi, Congress (O) comprised the rest of the leaders, who were irked by her actions. Like Modi, Indira Gandhi displayed an aptitude for tuning into people’s feelings. She leveraged the prevailing anti-capitalist sentiment to promote an anti-poverty and socialist message that proved popular among the Indian public. This boost in popularity was accompanied by a display of populistic characteristics that ranged from the increased centralisation of power to a tendency to stifle dissent. The climax of Gandhi’s tenure came when, faced with allegations of misconduct in the 1971 elections and the consequent nullification of the election results, she responded by declaring an emergency. Dissidents were imprisoned and criticism was censored. In addition to diluting Gandhi’s popularity, this period of emergency also allowed India’s right wing to carve a niche in what had hitherto been a largely homogenous voter base. Aiding the emergence of the right wing was the ground-level ecosystem it had developed in the years since independence. This ecosystem can be traced back to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which helped the Bharatiya Jana Sangh – the BJP’s precursor – to gain popular support in the post-emergency period. Amid all this, Narendra Modi was born in 1950 into an environment where the RSS was a prominent presence. His association with the RSS made him privy to the persecution suffered by his peers in the aftermath of the assassination of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi by a former RSS affiliate, Nathuram Godse. Modi regarded his RSS branch, or shakha, as a vital source of education and exposure. He was a bright, ambitious young man, and the RSS served as a focal

Part conclusion: India 65

point for his interactions with other political activists who aided him in his efforts to get to grips with India’s political mechanisms. Modi had become an integral component of the RSS apparatus in Gujarat by the time Gandhi declared a state of emergency in 1975 – even serving as a courier, according to some academics, when Gandhi banned the RSS. When Gandhi called elections in 1977 following the lifting of the emergency, the Janta alliance came to power. While this was an unstable government that disbanded in 1980, it marked a major turning point in India’s political history. Modi was actively involved in mobilising voters on behalf of the alliance during this period. His activism and participation were recognised in the years to come. In 1986, he was appointed as the organisation secretary to assist the BJP in bridging the gap between the RSS and the BJP. The INC managed to retain its grip on politics following Indira Gandhi’s assassina­ tion in 1984, even though its hold was weaker than before. Gandhi was succeeded by her son, Rajiv Gandhi, who strove to keep the political opposition at bay – a task that proved increasingly tricky in the years following his mother’s demise. Meanwhile, the right wing was strengthening its hold on the people and leveraging the religious schisms that were developing in Indian society. Following the Babri Masjid controversy, the BJP capitalised on popular feeling by hosting rallies and cam­ paigns in favour of demolition of the disputed religious site. Modi was actively involved in organising these rallies and campaigns and met his future BJP mentor, LK Advani, in the process. This period of societal transformation was marked by Rajiv Gandhi’s demise in the political sphere and a balance of payments crisis in the eco­ nomic sphere. And while Gandhi’s assassination in 1991 during an election rally gar­ nered enough sympathy for the INC to form a minority government headed by PV Narsimha Rao, it could not keep the economic challenges at bay. The Narsimha Rao government thus had to take drastic measures to stabilise the economy. These included the introduction of the New Economic Policy, which enabled the government to steer the country out of recession. The economic dis­ tress that India had suffered had seriously eroded the credibility of the INC, as the crisis was the culmination of years of economic mismanagement by the country’s largest political party. This change in perceptions of the INC paved the way for new parties that exploited identity politics as people sought refuge in alternative political repre­ sentatives. This was an important time for regional parties and parties such as the BJP, whose religious mobilisations were peaking as a result of the Babri Masjid movement. The post-economic crisis era also saw a rise in the number of political coalitions, as each party struggled to gain a majority in the elections. The BJP came to power in 1998, but had to step down after it lost a no-confidence vote in 1999, only to return to power a few months later in October 1999 assisted by the RSS’s grass­ roots mobilisation. Modi played a significant role in this mobilisation – just as he did in the mobilisation around the Babri Masjid movement, which helped the BJP to emerge as a viable representative of the people’s wishes.

66 India

Modi’s political ascent took off during the 1990s, as he became acquainted with the national leadership of the BJP while progressing in his state-level roles within the party. He was an important figure in Keshubhai Patel’s camp during and after the latter’s election to the chief minister’s office in 1995. In the process of becoming the chief minister’s aide, however, Modi rubbed some people up the wrong way. Modi was accused of self-promotion – something that was frowned upon within the RSS structure, which advocated the cause before the self. As a result of the friction that emerged, Modi was sent away from Gujarat. This allowed him to work for the BJP in different states, transcending the limited structure within his home state. By increasing his experience as a BJP representative in many different states, Modi familiarised himself not just with national politics, but also with the world outside the RSS apparatus. Modi’s emergence on the national stage came at a time when the BJP was attempting to embrace national politics. The party was battling to retain control not only of the federal government, but also of local government bodies. Due to the impending elections, the BJP stepped up its efforts at the local level. One of the issues that needed to be handled at the state level was the party’s internal conflict in Gujarat. To tackle this, the BJP persuaded Patel – the state’s chief minister – to resign in favour of Modi. Modi’s nomination as chief minister reflected his growing influence among the party leadership. Shortly after his appointment, Modi had to manage the Gujarat riots. Having failed to quell them, he was accused of being complicit in the riots at worst and misguided at best. However, while the riots could have proved fatal to Modi’s career, he made a point of forging a legacy beyond them and establishing himself as an administrator and politician. He would go on to be re-elected as chief minister for three additional terms. While the BJP lost the 2004 national elections, Modi was making a name for himself through major policy initiatives and smart networking and marketing. It was during this period that Modi demonstrated his ability to exploit the media and shape the narrative to position himself – and in turn, Gujarat – as the epicentre of change and progress. Nationally, under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, India was experiencing the highest growth rate in its post-indepen­ dence history. The service industry was booming and new industries were being established throughout the country. Chief Minister Modi leveraged this growth to promote Gujarat as a corporate investment destination. The Gujarat Model – which cultivated a pro-business, pro-development ethos – assisted in the national propagation of Modi’s image. While the UPA enjoyed a remarkable period of economic growth, it struggled to deal with corruption and abuse of power at the heart of government. A succession of high-profile scandals eclipsed its growth performance. In addition to dealing a blow to the UPA’s 2014 election hopes, corruption had an impact on the national psyche. While the INC struggled to retain the people’s trust – and to announce a candidate for the prime minister’s office – Modi capitalised on the Gujarat Model to position himself as the BJP’s leading candidate for the 2014 election campaign.

Part conclusion: India 67

During his years as a chief minister, Modi witnessed and internalised the influence that the media can have on people’s perceptions of a leader. He deployed his oratory abilities to design a campaign focused on anti-corruption and development, leveraging social media channels to reach the world’s largest youth voter demographic. He also positioned himself as a preferred candidate among the youth – the largest voting bloc in the country – by capitalising on their distaste for the established political fraternity due to the constant slew of corruption scandals witnessed under the UPA. Modi positioned himself as an outsider and sought to disassociate himself from the political establishment. His soft Hindutva policy – which prioritised economic and develop­ mental aims and side-lined religious aspirations such as erecting the Ram Temple on the Babri Masjid site – was a play on majoritarian politics that appealed to the Hindu community, which accounts for over 80% of the population. After his landslide victory in 2014, Modi became a constant presence on the airwaves, introducing new policy initiatives and announcing social causes. Such was the extent of Modi’s popularity that even controversial initiatives – such as demone­ tisation, which resulted in several deaths during its implementation – primarily attrac­ ted criticisms from the academic and political fraternities only; most of the public remained sympathetic to the logistical hurdles that these nationwide decisions posed for the government. Modi maintained and even grew his popularity during the 2019 elections, when his party increased the number of seats held in the Lok Sabha. The Modi government made further controversial moves following this elec­ tion – including revoking the statehood of Jammu and Kashmir and bifurcating India’s sole Muslim-majority state, which caused indignation among the public. The Citizenship Amendment Act that was passed shortly thereafter was seen as a follow-up measure. These decisions reflected Modi’s increased centralisation of power, as bills were passed with little to no consultation. The moves triggered months of protests – primarily in the country’s colleges and public spaces – and in some cases, police violence. Despite these controversies, Modi himself has mostly escaped public criticism and oversight. Although protests and rallies across the country have increased, he still enjoys a high degree of support from the majority of the electorate across the states. This disassociation from controversy is a by-product of his mass appeal among the people and unique ability to control the narrative, despite the perceived challenges faced on both the economic and political fronts. India’s complex socio-political reality and Modi’s popularity might perplex many observers. However, these conditions reflect India’s evolution from a country that envisioned a future in which diverse identities were cherished to one in which identity politics have become the norm. By charting the country’s trajectory through evolutions and revolutions in politics and social identity, it becomes clear how a refusal to accept the changing political climate allowed space for identity politics to flourish. Modi rose to power by appealing to the Indian people’s desire for stability and continuity in an increasingly corrupt and unpredictable society. He did so by promising the populace a more prosperous economy while refocusing their attention and reorienting their political views around religion.

PART II

Turkey

6 THE INCEPTION OF MODERN TURKEY A Background Context

Turkey is situated on the land bridge between the East and the West. Thanks to this strategic location, it has a vibrant cultural, political and social history. The Turkey that emerged from the erstwhile Ottoman Empire inherited this vibrant tradition and strived to preserve this diversity since its inception in 1923. The Turkish economy – like Turkish culture, society and history – has its own unique characteristics. One of the notable features of the Turkish economy is that it has consistently ranked among the ten largest emerging economies in the world;1 and its long-term economic performance has come close to both world and developing country averages, due to volatility in its gross domestic product (GDP). Significant volatility in the early years reflected the dominance of agriculture and the impact of good and bad weather conditions, while volatility in the later years resulted from repeated economic crises.

Turkey’s Roots and its Rise All modern nation-states are a product of past influences. For Turkey, the Otto­ man Empire served as its main influence. Modern-day Turkey was positioned at the heart of the glorious Ottoman Empire, whose territory during its peak stret­ ched all the way from Southeast Europe and Western Asia to Northern Africa. However, constant warring proved a drain on the empire’s resources, creating opportunities for competing powers such as the Russians and the French to chip away at its boundaries. The stress on the economy was so great that the empire came to be called the ‘sick man of Europe’ – a term used through the ages to refer to any European state on the brink of economic insolvency. This economic vulnerability paved the way for ethnic and cultural tensions within the empire in the second half of the 19th century. These tensions culminated in a period of civil unrest, in response to which the Ottoman Constitution was drafted in DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-8

72 Turkey 12

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GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1960–2018: Middle income; Turkey; World Source: World Bank national accounts data and Organisation for Economic Co­ operation and Development national accounts data files

FIGURE 6.1

1876. However, the Constitution would never get a chance to be put into practice, as the empire went to war with Russia shortly after it was drafted. While the empire was busy dealing with its international wars, the domestic unrest continued and in 1908, political reform movement the Young Turk Revolution persuaded the sultan to abdicate his throne for a people’s government. This change was short-lived, however, as the Young Turk Revolution failed to govern effectively, and the sultan returned to the throne in 1909 under the pro­ mise of recreating an Islamic caliphate. Once again, this did not last long, as more wars continued to plague the empire. The Italo-Ottoman War and the Balkan Wars caused significant damage to the empire’s territorial hold over Northern Africa and Eastern Europe. Sensing an opportunity, the British and the French attacked Ottoman territory in Western Asia and thus the Ottoman Empire became a party in World War I, forming an alliance with the Central Powers (Rogan 2015). World War I ended in the defeat of the Central Powers. For the Ottoman Empire, this meant the division of all territories it held. The once formidable empire, which had ruled for over six cen­ turies, was divided under the Treaty of Sevres, signed on 10 August 1920. This was the final act in the history of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, guided by the leadership of a charismatic Ottoman army officer, Mustafa Kemal. He would become instrumental in moulding the Turkish state for decades to come.

The Rise of Turkey The rise of modern-day Turkey is very much aligned with the rise of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, one of the most influential leaders in Turkish history. Kemal was born in 1881 in a middle-class family in modern-day Salonica, then part of the Ottoman Empire. He grew up in an interesting household, given his parents’ stance on religion. His

The inception of modern Turkey 73

father was liberal and liked the occasional drink – something that is considered a sin in the Islamic tradition – while his mother was more conservative. These belief systems created rifts between Kemal’s parents on issues such as schooling. Mustafa’s mother initially gained the upper hand in this regard and Kemal was sent to a religious school with a copy of the Quran strapped to his chest (Haniog˘ lu 2011) (Karakas 2007). However, his father subsequently withdrew him from this school and sent him to a more modern and liberal school, where he was educated until the death of his father. At a very early stage, Kemal knew that he wanted to become an army officer – a decision which his mother abhorred. He joined a military school at the age of 13 and then continued to spend the rest of his education at various military schools. He graduated in 1905 from the Ottoman Military College in Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul). It was during his military career that the full impact of Kemal’s father on his son’s political beliefs became clear. Kemal was not a staunch believer in the rule of the sultanate and joined the Young Turk Revolution movement in 1908, which successfully overthrew the sultan for a brief period (as discussed earlier, the sultan regained the throne in 1909). However, he was still a nationalist and believed in the Ottoman state as a sovereign entity. He joined the military and took part in the Italo-Ottoman War of 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. He was posted as a diplomatic attaché to Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars. Kemal was unhappy with his role as an attaché and wanted to be on the frontlines of the war; and when the opportunity to serve as a commander came up, he proved his excellence through his tactical and strategic prowess. Kemal grew to prominence when, under his leadership, the Central Power repelled the Allied invasion of the Dardanelles in 1915. He also successfully spear­ headed many counteroffensive missions at a time when the Central Powers were losing ground to the Allied Powers. However, he was not a supporter of the Ottoman Empire’s alliance with Germany, which he felt was dragging the empire down with it. He believed that the Ottomans had a better chance against the Allied Powers if they took them on singlehandedly. These bold suggestions fell on deaf ears. The Ottomans continued with their alliance with Germany and the war ended in defeat for the Central Powers. In 1918, Kemal’s fears were realised when the Ottomans signed the Armistice of Mudros, surrendering their garrisons outside Anatolia (a region which makes up the majority of modern-day Turkey) and control over the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. This was followed by the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, which marked the end of the Ottoman Empire. As a result of the Treaty of Sevres, the Ottoman Empire lost its autonomy, and its territories were divided among the Allied Powers. Kemal was a nationalist and believed that the Turkish-speaking people deserved a state of their own and autonomy to rule the country in accordance with their beliefs. He therefore saw the Treaty of Sevres as an insult to all Turks, rather than as the saving grace of the Turkish people, which is how it was presented by the Allied Forces and the sultan.

74 Turkey

By this time, Kemal had become a household name thanks to his achievements in the war. He used his popularity as a springboard to become the speaker of the Grand National Assembly (GNA). He then used this influence to convince the GNA to create a National Army with himself at the helm. Under the Treaty of Sevres, Anatolia had come under the control of the Allied Powers – primarily Britain, France, Armenia and Greece. Led by Kemal, the National Army fought the Allied Powers for Turkish independence and enjoyed considerable success, with victories against the French troops in the Battle of Marash in 1920 and the Greek troops in the Battle on the River Sakarya in 1921. They received support from the Soviet Union, which viewed the close proximity of British and French troops to its territory as a threat. These victories made clear to the Allied Powers the Turks’ considerable frustration with the Treaty of Sevres; it became apparent that the only way the battles would end was through the amendment of the treaty. In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, replacing the Treaty of Sevres. The GNA signed the treaty as the representative of the Turkish state and thus became the official government of Turkey, with Kemal as the country’s president.

From Kemal to Atatürk After becoming president, Kemal undertook a series of social, economic and cul­ tural reforms, with the vision of transforming Turkey into a secular state based on the fundamental ideas of what came to be known as ‘Kemalism’. The Kemalist ideology has six fundamental pillars that direct state action and build the nature of the state: republicanism, populism, nationalism, laicism, statism and reformism.2 Republicanism laid the foundation for Turkey to break away from the framework of absolute monarchy followed by the Ottoman Empire and become a republic ruled by people’s elected representatives according to the Constitution. The aim of laicism was to remove the state from the influence of religion. Kemal, as president, abolished the caliphate in 1924. In 1926, the Mejelle and Shariah laws were replaced with a Civil Code based heavily on the Swiss Civil Code and a penal code inspired by its German and Italian counterparts. Kemalism transformed almost all aspects of public life in Turkey. Moder­ nisation radically changed the day-to-day social and religious norms that people followed. Religious education was now controlled by the state and Shariah law was abolished. Kemal staunchly believed that religion should play no role in politics or state governance. In a speech to the GNA in 1937, he stated: It is known to the world that our main program in our state administration is the Republican People’s Party program. The principles it covers are the main lines that enlighten us in administration and politics. But these principles should never be equated with the dogmas of the books that are supposed to have descended from the sky. We have taken our inspiration directly from life, not from the sky

The inception of modern Turkey 75

and the unseen. What determines our path is the homeland we live in, the Turkish nation we leave from, and the conclusions we draw from the history of nations filled with a thousand and one tragic events and troubles. (Atatürk 1937) During this time, Kamal anointed himself with the title ‘Atatürk’, meaning ‘Father of all Turks’ – a title which he retained even after his death. Atatürk made extraordinary strides towards political and cultural reform. By 1934, Turkey had gained full universal suffrage, well before most other democ­ racies. Similarly, in terms of economic policies, Atatürk had a steadfast vision. He pursued state-controlled economic policies and sought to eliminate foreign control. Turkey experienced export surpluses and growing employment opportunities. Atatürk invested in infrastructure and capital formation. These moves aimed to provide some much-needed diversity for the Turkish economy, which was largely agricultural, due to a dearth of oil in the country. Atatürk chose industry as the tool for Turkey’s modernisation, due to its greater productivity as compared to the country’s traditional reliance on agriculture. But despite these efforts, Turkey – like other developing countries – could not keep up in the race towards industrialisation. As a result, Turkey still ended up heavily reliant on agriculture (Pamuk 2018a). Thus, under Atatürk’s rule, the gap between Turkey and other developed nations widened dramatically. Atatürk ruled Turkey for 15 years, from its inception until his death in 1938, which marked an important point in Turkish history. Arguably, it was Atatürk’s control – through both influence and coercion – that kept Turkey united during its radical transformation into a modern state. Following his death, however, the leaders in the ruling party increasingly began to disagree over their interpretation of the philosophy of Kemalism. Atatürk’s death, and the vacuum it created in Turkish politics, brought religion back to the forefront of public life after World War II. The introduction of the multi-party system in 1946 created further space for the people whose religious affiliations had been suppressed by the previous one-party system, which favoured the Kemalist fun­ damentals. It also made the prime minister the central source of power in Turkey, while retaining the president as de facto head of state. Previously, laicism had ensured that religion had no influence on the state system. The introduction of the multi-party system contributed to the state loosening control over religion. Eventually, following a coup in 1960, factions within the Republican Party founded by Atatürk started warring against each other. Left-wing members inter­ preted Kemalism as an anti-imperialist socialist movement; while right-wing Kemalists – alarmed by the socialist attitude developing among the people – started using religion as a counterbalance. During the Cold War, religion found growing support among the middle class, as Islam was increasingly seen as an antidote to Communism within Turkey. It is this balancing act that led to the rise of the right wing in Turkey.

76 Turkey

The Reintroduction of Religion in Turkish Society It is clear that religion – and the vacuum created by restrictions on religion – played a crucial role in the evolution of Turkey, which has a 97% Muslim popu­ lation. Religion has thus had a significant influence on the country’s politics and therefore its growth trajectory. Upon the establishment of the Turkish state, religion was kept under strict state control. This disappointed the Turkish public, as religion was a major part of their lives. Further, the majority of the Turkish population were illiterate peasants, which further hindered the propagation of Kemalist ideals as Atatürk had envi­ sioned. Concepts such as secularism, laicism and reformism were alien to these people – unlike religion, which was a major part of their lives. Atatürk had not taken these factors into consideration when he deprived reli­ gious institutions of their powers by abolishing the caliphate and the religious courts, replaced Shariah law with European law, and removed the requirement to teach Arabic and Persian in educational institutions. The Constitution that came into effect in 1928 included no religious references at all. Atatürk’s state reforms were supported by the one-party system that he headed until his death and by the educated and the military elite, who formed a small part of the overall population. Atatürk’s military background also helped him to quell any resistance from suppressed regional and religious affiliations. This suppression led to Turkey’s first brush with the Islamist movement in the period soon after its formation in 1923, when the members of the existing religious order lost their powers to the secular republic charted by Atatürk. Revolts were squashed by the state in the 1920s and 1930s, and the movement for the most part remained underground until 1946 (Narli 2003). The transition to a multi-party system paved the way for Islamist groups to join the centre-right factions of the Democrat Party, which was formed in 1946. In 1950, Turkey witnessed its first election, which was won by the Democrat Party. Under the Democrat Party’s rule, secularist policies were softened and the nonelite parts of society which had been subjected to radical Westernisation under Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP) regime were given a voice. This in turn led to increased acceptance of centre-right politics in Turkey. The Democrat Party ‘re-legitimized Islam and the traditional rural values’ (Mardin 1973), which further encouraged the activities of Islamist groups. This trend worried the Kemalists and in 1960, the military – which considered itself the protector of Kemalist values in Turkish society – executed Turkey’s first coup. Following the coup, a new Constitution was introduced in 1961 which led to the formation of the National Security Alliance (MGK) to serve as an advisory body to the political establishment, including the commanders in chief of the army, navy, air force and police; the prime minister; and the president. The MGK was established to ensure that domestic and foreign policies were aligned with Kemalist ideologies. The 1961 Constitution also expanded civil liberties, which made it easier for Islamist groups to operate and connect with the people – especially the poor, who had found it difficult to adapt to Turkey’s forced modernisation.

The inception of modern Turkey 77

In January 1970, Necmettin Erbakan founded the National Order Party (NOP), the first of four Islamist political parties. The NOP represented religious conservative segments of society from peripheral cities and provinces that had not enjoyed the benefits of the state’s modernisation measures. The party provided a platform for powerful – albeit outlawed – religious conservatives with an appreciable influence on society. In May 1971, the party was banned by the Constitutional Court, under military pressure, on the grounds of violating the principles of laicism. Although the party was banned, Erbakan himself went on to become an important figure in Turkey’s social and political history. The NOP was succeeded by the National Salvation Party (NSP) in October 1972. The NSP enjoyed electoral success in the 1973 general election, securing 11.8% of the vote. Its performance made it a coalition partner to the CHP, which was now headed by Bulent Ecevit. Under this coalition, the NSP established a hold on the bureaucracy and passed a bill making imam-hatips, or theological high schools, equivalent to secondary schools. The recognition of imam-hatips as valid sec­ ondary schools allowed students at these schools to attend university, thus nurturing an educated middle class with staunch Islamist ideals for the future. In the following years, the NSP formed several alliances with different parties, while its political power fluctuated. While these changes were taking place, Turkey was experiencing major societal frictions due to ongoing economic troubles. The divide between right wing and left wing, rich and poor, became starker as economic security came under threat. These differences led to violent clashes which eventually forced a military inter­ vention in 1980. After a bloodless coup, the military restructured the political system before returning power to political parties in 1982. The restructuring banned several parties (mostly far right and centre right), including the NSP. In July 1983, Ali Turkmen formed the Welfare Party (RP) to replace the banned NSP. Erbakan eventually took over as leader of the RP and in the next election, held in November 1987, the RP secured 7.2% of the vote. In the following years, the RP tightened its grip by increasing its vote in local elections across the country – especially in Istanbul – reflecting its growing popularity. Factors which contributed to this rise in popularity included increased migration of people from provincial areas to urban areas in search of jobs; a rise in the number of educated people from the conservative class; and an increase in the activities of religious groups. These trends, sparked by Turkey’s industrialisation efforts during this period, resulted in a clash between people’s traditional views and modern urban culture. People from provincial areas, with their conservative and religious attitudes and ways of life, did not adjust well to the secular urban culture they moved into, causing friction within society. This friction created space and a voter base for religious groups and political parties, whose foothold in urban areas increased along with migration. These religious groups primarily catered to the needs of Turkey’s changing demographic on three fronts: they encouraged education by offering scholarships, food and accommodation to needy students; they offered jobs to youngsters looking

78 Turkey

for employment; and they extended credit to shopkeepers, workers and peasants (Narli 2003). Through these initiatives, the Islamist parties – which had previously been limited to rural areas and provincial towns – began to make their mark on politics in urban areas such as Istanbul. During this period, the Gulen movement took root. This comprised a well­ organised community that looked up to Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen as their spiritual leader. The Gulen movement is said to have encouraged its followers to take up positions and jobs in the civilian and military bureaucracy (Tas¸pınar 2016). This proactive participation in the civil and political fraternity turned the movement into a powerful force in Turkish politics. In the following years, the national political space became more tolerant of Islamism, which in turn made Erbakan and Gulen important figures. They went on to make frequent appearances at key points of the country’s political trajectory.

The Emergence of a Kemalist-Islamic Hybrid After the political violence of 1980, which resulted in around 1,500 deaths in 1980 alone, the military establishment diverted its attention to the rise of communism and leftist ideologies in Turkish society. This shift was triggered by both internal and external factors. Turkey’s neighbours, such as Iran, were experiencing seismic political change in the late 1970s. The shah of Iran was overthrown by radical Islamists. Ayatollah Khomeini expressed his belief that the Turkish Republic was a threat to Islam – a greater threat even than the United States – due to the internal transformation of Turkey into a laicist state (Karakas 2007). Turkey feared that the spill-over effects of Iran’s Islamic revolution, coupled with domestic socio-economic problems such as rising unemployment and inflation, would fuel social unrest. To tackle this problem, once the military had established peace in 1980, it made religious education a compulsory subject in schools, opened Quranic classes and promoted state-controlled religious education. This move countered the threats of an Islamic revolution in Turkey by diluting the laicist nature of the Turkish state; controlled communism; and quelled unrest among the people by letting them embrace religion more freely. This re-politicisation of Islam was called the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ and was based on the work of a conservative group of scholars called the Aydınlar Ocagi (‘Intellectuals’ Hearth’). The Intellectuals’ Hearth used selective Ottoman-Islamic ideas to unite divergent interests in the state by emphasising the danger to ‘family, nation, and state posed by ideological fragmentation’ (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008). Through this ideological approach, the military aimed to promote a culture of depo­ liticised Islam in Turkey, which would help it to withstand the changing domestic and international order while retaining the political status quo, which favoured the elite. In hindsight, this attempt to preserve the status quo instead helped religion to formally reclaim its place in Turkish politics. This formalisation of religion in the political sphere paved the way for greater representation of religious concerns in

The inception of modern Turkey 79

society. Although they were censored time and again by the military, veiled reli­ gious concerns and political campaigns would succeed in capturing the attention of the electorate in the years to come.

Leaders and Perspectives

Inflation, GDP deflator (Annual %)

The socio-economic changes that the Turkish state has witnessed over the years are in large part due to the efforts of the leaders who have guided the country from its inception. Since the Atatürk era, certain leaders have made their mark on the country and the Turkish polity has experienced significant changes under their leadership and influence. Turgut Özal and Necmettin Erbakan were two such leaders who had a major impact in the 1980s and 1990s. Özal served as prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and as president from 1989 to 1993. He was a technocrat with an affinity for religion who had previously worked in international organisations such as the World Bank. Before founding the Motherland Party in 1983, Özal was associated with the Naksibendi order, a Sunni spiritual order, as well as with the NSP. Özal was the ideal leader to guide Turkey through a period of transition, as he was a leader who did not disregard religion, but who nonetheless focused primarily on the economy. Under Özal, Turkey took its first steps towards liberalisation. As part of these liberalising policies, foreign exchange deposit accounts were introduced in 1984. This move worsened the public sector deficit problem that had already been plaguing the Turkish economy. The introduction of foreign exchange accounts reduced demand for domestic currency, thus increasing the inflationary impact of public sector deficits. The government resorted to printing currency to finance the budget deficit. This move led to higher rates of inflation, which the government failed to bring under control throughout the 1990s, until the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002.

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Uncontrollable rates of inflation prevailed throughout the 1990s but declined noticeably after 2002 Source: International Monetary Fund, international financial statistics and data files

FIGURE 6.2

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Özal’s liberalisation reforms weakened the state’s control on the economy and created a new middle class called the Anatolian bourgeoisie, which consisted of an upwardly mobile group of entrepreneurs and small business owners, hailing mainly from Anatolian towns such as Denizli, Gaziantep and Kahramanmaras. This group benefited from the new economic policies and thus favoured a reduced role of the state in the Turkish economy. As the burgeoning Anatolian bourgeoisie gained greater influence on the country’s socio-economic fabric, they became a significant part of the voter base and hence helped to drive the expansion of religious freedom within Turkish society. In August 1989, the Motherland Party decided to fully liberalise the capital account in the face of deteriorating macro-economic balances. This entailed further liberalisation of the exchange rate regime and the removal of restrictions on inflows and outflows of capital (Pamuk 2018b). Opening up a new source of capital was a populist move, made hastily without considering its long-term effects on an already unstable economy. The short-term advantages of this move for the government were twofold, allowing the government to delay reforms and deflect unpleasant criticisms, and to solve (in the short term) the problem of budget deficits. The banking sector also expanded rapidly as a consequence of the new measures. After the decision to liberalise the capital account in 1989, high interest rates and a pegged exchange rate system brought in a large volume of short-term capital inflows. Private banks borrowed from abroad in order to lend to the government at high rates of interest, while public banks were ordered to finance the deficit. This decision to liberalise an already unstable economy without a proper regulatory infrastructure in place was a recipe for disaster. Turkey paid for it in the long run, in the form of a sustained period of economic instability throughout the 1990s. This turned out to be the worst period in Turkey’s economic history, characterised by volatile inflation rates and the lowest-ever average growth rates. It is around this period that Erbakan’s RP started performing well in the elec­ tions. Erbakan reoriented his political approach towards the modern intellectual faction, as a confident religious middle class, continued Turkish-Islamic synthesis and the growing Anatolian bourgeoisie increased their presence in urban societies. With its slogan ‘Adil Düzen’ (‘Just Order’), the RP launched a subtle attack on the un-Islamic manner in which the Turkish state had been created (Karakas 2007). The party established a narrative which attributed the inequality, economic decline, corruption and immorality in Turkish society to the unjust manner in which the Kemalist state had been established. The RP complemented its shift from religious to social issues with welfare and aid programmes on the ground. Under Erbakan’s leadership, the RP worked at the grassroots level, helping the poor and residents of urban slums by providing them with healthcare, free food, social amenities, education and job opportunities. The rise of the RP was also fuelled by peripheral factors such as growing anti-Western sentiment after the EU rejected Turkey’s membership application in 1989 and the failure of Western countries to prevent the mass killing of Muslims in Bosnia.

The inception of modern Turkey 81

Around the same time, another conflict favoured the rise of Erbakan’s RP. The Kurdish-Turkish conflict began in 1978 and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party launched an armed insurgency in 1984. This conflict added to the mounting burden on the budget (Tachau 1998). The introduction of a military regime repressed domestic politics and there was fragmentation on both sides of the political spectrum. A large number of parties were formed, leading to increased conflict and a number of shortlived coalitions through the 1990s. The political instability and economic instability fed into each other. Domestically, the RP expanded its voter base by promising to resolve the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; mobilising women against problems such as the dis­ solution of traditional family structures and drug abuse; and garnering support in urban slums through its welfare activities. This support was fuelled by increasing rates of unemployment, inflation spikes and falling wages, which decreased the popularity of the then ruling True Path Party.3 The people turned to the RP, which was already winning in local elections in areas such as Istanbul and Ankara. In the 1995 general election, the RP won 21.4% of the vote and became the strongest party in Parliament, securing 158 out of 550 seats. Erbakan successfully formed a coalition in 1996 and became prime minister. This was the first time in Turkish history that the state was ruled by an Islamist prime minister. It also marked a turning point in Turkish politics as Islamism came to the forefront. The transition of Turkey from a country guided by a singular ideology devel­ oped under its founding leader, Atatürk, to a country with an Islamist party at its helm was a people-centric process. Despite all efforts to keep state and religion separate in Turkish society, the will of the majority prevailed. Guided by leaders such as Özal and Erbakan, Turkish society slowly but steadily moved towards a point where Islamist parties became major contenders in the political sphere. These developments not only set the stage for Erdog˘ an to establish his own brand of politics, but also facilitated his ascent in society, as explored in subsequent chapters.

Notes 1 It also ranks among the top 20 economies in the world, according to International Monetary Fund and World Bank Data. According to Pamuk (2018b), this has been the case for the last two centuries. 2 For further reading on Kemalism see Kili 1980. 3 The True Path Party came to power in 1991 headed by Süleyman Demirel.

References Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. 1937. Opening of the Fifth Term and Third Meeting Year of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Atatürk Aras¸tırma Merkezi – AYK. https://www-atam -gov-tr.translate.goog/Atatürkun-soylev-ve-demecleri/turkiye-buyuk-millet-meclisinin-be sinci-donem-ucuncu-toplanma-yilini-acarken?_x_tr_sl=tr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_ tr_pto=sc.

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Haniog˘ lu, M. S¸ükrü. 2011. Muslim Communism? The Turkish War of Independence. In M S¸ükrü Haniog˘ lu , Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography, 86–128. Princeton University Press. Karakas, Cemal. 2007. Turkey: Islam and Laicism. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Kili, Suna. 1980. Kemalism in contemporary Turkey. International Political Science Review, 1 (3) 381–404. doi:10.1177/019251218000100308. Mardin, S¸erif. 1973. Center-periphery relations: a key to Turkish politics? Daedalus, (102)(1), 169–190. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024114. Narli, Nilüfer. 2003. The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey. In Barry Rubin (ed), Revolutionaries and Reformists: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East. Suny Press, 125–140. Pamuk, S¸evket. 2018a. Economic Growth and Human Development Since 1820. In S¸evket Pamuk. In Uneven Centuries: Economic Development of Turkey since 1820, 22–54. Princeton University Press. Pamuk, S¸evket. 2018b. Conclusion. In S¸evket Pamuk, In Uneven Centuries: Economic Devel­ opment of Turkey since 1820. 303–318. Princeton University Press. Rabasa, Angel and Larrabee, F Stephen. 2008. The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey. In Angel Rabasa and F Stephen Larrabee. The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey. RAND Corporation. Rogan, Eugene. 2015. A Global Call to Arms. In Eugene Rogan. The Fall of the Ottomans, 14. Basic Books. Singer, Morris. 1983. Atatürk’s Economic Legacy. Middle Eastern Studies, (99)(3), 301–311. doi:10.1080/00263208308700552. Tachau, Frank. 1998. Review of The Kurdish question and Turkey: An Example of a Tran-Sstate Ethnic Conflict, by Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow. American Political Science Review, 92(4), 961–962. doi:10.2307/2586350. Tas¸pınar, Ömer. 2016. The failed coup and Turkey’s Gulenist predicament. Brookings. August 9. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-failed-coup-and-turkeys-gulenist-predicament/.

7 THE BOY FROM ANATOLIA

Recep Tayyip Erdog˘ an was born in Istanbul on 26 February 1954 to a devout Muslim working-class family. His father, Ahmet Erdog˘ an, was a ferryboat captain on the Bosporus and, according to Erdog˘ an, an accomplished seafarer. In the initial days of the Turkish republic, migration from rural areas to Istanbul was restricted and those migrants who attempted to move to Istanbul were often sent back to their villages. These restrictions were relaxed around the time that Erdog˘ an was born. Industrialisation and the rise of a multi-party system in the 1950s paved the way for easier immigration and hordes of people from rural areas moved to Istan­ bul seeking better opportunities. Erdog˘ an’s family were part of this exodus: his father moved the family from Rize to Turkey’s largest metropolis, Istanbul, to give his children a chance at a better life. Erdog˘ an grew up in the working-class neighbourhood of Kasimpasa. Residents bore the full brunt of life in a less privileged part of town, including flood-prone sewers and polluted air. Like most traditional neighbourhoods, Kasimpasa had a strict honour code. In a television interview in 2013, Erdog˘ an recalled the area’s rich social fabric, expressing his fondness for the solidarity and support in this community (Erdog˘ an 2013). Erdog˘ an’s political ideology stems from the milieu in which he was born and raised. Kasimpasa stood in stark contrast to Istanbul’s upper and middle-class neighbourhoods, untainted by the modernist ideals of Kemalism. Erdog˘ an grew up with a sense of alienation in cosmopolitan Istanbul as a result of his birth in a diametrically opposed region of the country. Also contributing to this alienation was the fact that he was brought up on the other side of the metaphorical tracks that divided the elite residents from the religious conservative migrants in Istan­ bul. Another cause of discontent for the devout were the secularists, ‘who believed they could keep their religious brothers and sisters out of politics just by ignoring them’ (Smith 2019). DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-9

84 Turkey

The Erdog˘ an family’s annual summer trips back to Rize, the heartland of Turkish nationalism,1 had a profound impact on the future leader. During the summer, he would assist his family and friends with the tea harvest and attend lessons that his father had arranged with religious leaders (Erdog˘ an 2013). Maintaining a religious and conservative worldview in secular Kemalist Turkey was a challenge for Erdog˘ an and his family. Erdog˘ an’s father valued education, but was faced with the dilemma of whether to send his children to educational institutions that dismissed religion as a backwards construct that hindered the development of society (as the Kemalist state did during that period) or to enrol them in a religious institution, which had a stigma attached to it. After careful deliberation, Erdog˘ an’s father admitted his son to an imam-hatip – a Muslim school designed to train imams. These schools were part of Atatürk’s effort to bring the Muslim clergy under the influence of the state government after he diluted their power and abolished all madrasas. To replace the madrasas, imam-hatips were set up. Imam-hatips had free education and subsidised boarding. Due to the family’s financial circumstances and the considerable distance of the school from his home in Kasimpasa, Erdog˘ an was enrolled as a boarder. Another motivation for this choice of school was Erdog˘ an’s affinity for religious education, which his primary school teacher had noticed. This resonated with Erdog˘ an’s religious father, who wanted his son to have a proper Islamic education. This choice of school would play a major role in shaping Erdog˘ an – especially given the period during which he grew up, when ideas of secularism and Islamism were evolving. Imam-hatips were an oasis for the religious community during this period and were sources of culture and dialogue for conservative Turks (Çakır and Çalmuk 2001). In many ways, the imam-hatip, by virtue of its religious characteristics, is a social envir­ onment that encourages an Islamist lifestyle. By the same token, it is a closed educa­ tional environment, with unequivocal convictions about the kinds of people it is committed to producing. In such an organisation, members are more inclined to purposefully disregard views that disagree with their own; and to promote and rein­ force their selective reality within the group. Indeed, in the process of teaching and reinforcing a reality informed by a single worldview based on Islamic teachings, plur­ ality often became equated with confounding moral relativism (Pak 2004). This pro­ vided a platform for participants to explore themselves and their culture in a safe environment, and to voice the angst they felt due to the secular crackdown on their way of life. It is at these gatherings that Erdog˘ an developed his oratory skills and won many prizes for poetry recitation (Çakır and Çalmuk 2001). Erdog˘ an claims that he faced discrimination for attending a Muslim school during a period of secular revolution in Turkey. Two years after Erdog˘ an had enrolled in the imam-hatip, the Republican People’s Party government in power announced that no new imam-hatips would be opened. As a consequence of this crackdown on religious institutions, graduates from the imam-hatips faced difficulties in pursuing higher education and getting jobs with their diplomas due to official and unofficial discrimination (Cagaptay 2017). Erdog˘ an graduated during this

The boy from Anatolia 85

period of discrimination, in 1973. He was constantly told that his education would disqualify him from any profession other than washing the bodies of the dead (Erdog˘ an 2013). While the possibility of a bleak future did not deter young Erdog˘ an, who took solace in the support he received from his peers, it did underline the discrimination that a common man with a religious lifestyle faced in his own country. This rea­ lity – together with other influential elements such as the prevailing political atmosphere, his family background and communal life during his formative years – shaped Erdog˘ an’s political beliefs and policies upon assuming power. His workingclass origins in the Black Sea region and his youth in the working-class Kasimpasa neighbourhood of Istanbul also equipped him with the common touch and the ability to connect with ordinary voters (Lowen 2017). During the 1970s, Turkey’s conservative movement was gaining momentum and student politics were taking shape. Erdog˘ an devoted his early teenage years to the National Turkish Student Union (MTTB), a right-wing association aimed at curbing communist ideology. During this time, Erdog˘ an – who was initially meant to pursue life as a Muslim prayer leader – revised his aspirations and chose to study political science instead. To pursue this new interest, Erdog˘ an had to switch schools, as a result of which he studied at a public school in his final year (Cagaptay 2017). He was accepted into Aksaray Business and Management School after obtaining his high-school diploma (this institution later became part of Marmara University). At university, Erdog˘ an was exposed to the ideologies of the Marxist left and the nationalist right. He found solace in the latter, believing that it represented patriotic values, while the former propagated a foreign ideology. As he gained greater exposure, Erdog˘ an found more in common with the contemporary ideology pro­ pagated by theorists such as Egypt’s Sayyid Qutb and Iran’s Ali Shariati, who preached a return to Islam to free the people from their misery (Cagaptay 2017). This ideology, which subsequently evolved into a movement, was separate from the nationalistic Turk movement and thus avoided the authorities’ attention. As Cold War dynamics seeped into domestic politics around the world, Turkey fell prey to the same dilemma. As a result of the clash between left and right in Turkish society, the alternative movement gained more traction with the people – and thus with Erdog˘ an.

Introduction to Turkish Politics Necmettin Erbakan was one of the leaders who had a major influence on Erdog˘ an’s political career. Erbakan founded the National Order Party (MNP) in 1970 and went on to start other parties which were frequently ordered to disband due to their assertive Islamic rhetoric. Erbakan was an Islamic nationalist and was unapologetic about it. His primary focus, however, was on establishing a strong Turkish economy and acknowledging the deeply religious attitude of the Turkish people (Carkoglu and Rubin 2006). In 1973,

86 Turkey

he reinstated the MNP as the National Salvation Party (MSP). Around the same time, Erdog˘ an had become an active member of the Islamist youth movement and was known to be a vocal leader. It was during his time at the MTTB that Erdog˘ an was inspired by Erbakan’s work. The MTTB published a weekly paper called the Milli Genclik Dergisi, or Journal of National Youth, which introduced the teenage Erdog˘ an to Erbakan’s ideology. Erdog˘ an became president of the MTTB branch of his imam-hatip and then joined the youth branch of the MSP. Erdog˘ an went on to become president of the MSP youth branch of the Beyoglu district in Istanbul, three years after graduating high school. A year after, he became president of Istanbul’s MSP youth branch. At one of the MSP’s youth conferences during this time, he met Emine Gulbaran, whom he later went on to marry. Gulbaran was also a child of Anatolian migrants to Istanbul and an active member of the Islamist movement. The 1970s were a tumultuous time in Turkey, with growing left-wing/right-wing friction and a declining economic state. Erdog˘ an lost a number of associates to this violence, including his close friend Mustafa Bilgi, who died when the MTTB office was bombed before the coup in 1971 (Çakır and Çalmuk 2001). During this period, Erdog˘ an led a peaceful protest against the deaths of Islamist youths and was detained for this along with his peers. In 1980, after the coup by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), it became difficult for civil society groups to function, as Turkey’s major trade unions and 600 civil society associations were shut down (Yavuz 2003). Among the many politicians who were side-lined by the TAF were the political elite consisting of Demirel, Ecevit,2 Erbakan and Turkes.3 At the time, Erdog˘ an was the head of the MSP’s youth branch for Istanbul, attending university and playing football for an amateur team called Camialti Spor. When Erdog˘ an was a child, his father disapproved of sports, since he wanted his son to concentrate on his studies. Erdog˘ an was compelled to play in secret as a result; and he reaped the rewards of this skill later in his career. Erdog˘ an was transferred from Camilati Spor to the Istanbul Electricity, Tramway and Tunnel (IETT) football team, a semi-professional team which also hired him as a regular employee for the organisation at the time of his transfer. Shortly after joining IETT, Erdog˘ an resigned from his post as chairman of the MSP’s youth branch in order to take a sabbatical from politics, although he maintained contact with his former colleagues from the MSP. During his time with IETT, Erdog˘ an’s boss – a former retired colonel – asked him to shave off his moustache. Erdog˘ an, a devout Muslim, felt slighted and refused to do so, and quit his job in response (BBC 2002). He took a private sector job in a man­ agement firm, left the football team and finally undertook his mandatory military service in 1982. The political elites who had been banned after the 1980 coup started resurfacing after 1985. When Prime Minister Halil Turgut Özal removed the ban on political parties following a referendum in 1987, the political elites found themselves back

The boy from Anatolia 87

in the game. Erbakan failed to meet the electoral threshold of 10% required to secure a seat in Parliament in the 1987 elections. However, in the local elections in 1989, Erbakan’s RP prevailed in several important municipalities. Erdog˘ an re-entered pol­ itics through the RP after completing his military service. He was promoted from the youth branch to the RP in 1984 and was made chairman of the RP branch in the Beyoglu district, where he had previously been a youth leader. He gained recognition within the Islamic movement and was voted onto the party’s executive board, which was responsible for coordinating the party’s activities around the country in the following years. During the 1980s, Erdog˘ an put in a lot of effort on the ground which helped build his popularity, among the middle class especially. Erdog˘ an made his debut in active politics as an RP candidate in an election conducted in 1986 to fill 11 vacant seats in Parliament. He lost because the Islamist movement still had not gained a solid voter base at the time. His second campaign, for the post of mayor of Beyoglu in 1989, went better. This was because the Islamist movement had since gained traction and Erdog˘ an’s own efforts to connect with workers had made him a more competitive candidate. In his campaign, he reached out not just to the pious and conservative citizens who made up most of the RP’s voter base, but also to other sections of society. He organized publicity events at restaurants where liquor was served; and at the legal brothels of Istanbul, where he claimed that the RP was the only party that would help sex workers to get out of the trade (Cagaptay 2017). Despite these efforts, however, he ended up losing the race by a very small margin. The result left him visibly upset with the judge who was responsible for the vote count. His outburst at the judge landed him in confinement for a week. In 1991, Erdog˘ an ran for Parliament for the first time. Although he won, he had to hand his seat to another parliamentary candidate due to the party’s preferential voting system (Smith 2019). Despite his failure, Erdog˘ an took solace in the fact that the centre-right giants of Turkish politics had not fared well in the elections. While Erdog˘ an led the rebrand of the RP, Prime Minister Özal’s party was struggling with problems of social inequality and corruption. Özal became president in 1989. After Özal’s death in 1993, the Turkish economy declined and the country was hit by an economic crisis in 1994. The crisis had a significant socio-political impact, as the people lost trust in their political leaders, which in turn motivated them to look for alternatives. This is where Erdog˘ an saw his opportunity. At the time of Erdog˘ an’s mayoral election campaign, the municipality of Istan­ bul was facing serious problems due to disagreements with the city’s sanitation workers. The conflict culminated in an explosion caused by methane build-up. Drought and an influx of migrants exacerbated the municipality’s problems. Erdog˘ an based his campaign on Erbakan’s slogan for RP, ‘Just Order’. He com­ bined this slogan with a plan to portray the RP as an alternative to Western ways, which he considered ineffective. He won his first election in 1994, securing 25.2% of the votes. Although this was not an outright win, a divided opposition helped Erdog˘ an become the mayor of Istanbul. On taking up the post, Erdog˘ an made

88 Turkey

efforts to divert attention from his hardcore Islamist fundamentals. However, he also often referred to himself as the ‘Imam of Istanbul’ (Genc 2019); promised to build a mosque in the city centre; and took the decision to ban alcohol in government buildings and the cafes of Istanbul. While these decisions antagonised the secularists, Erdog˘ an appealed to the people through improvements to the city’s public utilities. He improved Istanbul’s air qual­ ity; built schools and hospitals; planted trees; expanded the bus system; and placed qualified people in public offices who could offer effective solutions to the public’s problems. He also catered to his core voter base – the poor and religious – by renovating Istanbul’s slums and providing free and subsidised community services (Smith 2019). However, Erdog˘ an’s administration did not escape scrutiny, and everything was not perfect. His party was regularly accused of favouritism. And while Erdog˘ an promised the people of Istanbul a corruption-free municipality, the RP was accused of using its power to the advantage of party members. Although the party exploited Erdog˘ an’s popularity to serve its own needs, his reputation as an able leader remained untarnished and his term as Istanbul’s mayor gave him a platform to realise his broader political ambitions. Towards the end of 1995, the RP won the general election. Erbakan became the prime minister of a coalition government in 1996. In January 1997, an RP district head, Bekir Yildiz, gave a controversial speech warning that Muslims who believed in the hijab would target the secular people who ‘had fallen ill with their own mistakes’, forcibly ‘injecting sharia into their arms’ (Cagaptay 2017). Yildiz was given a four-year jail sentence; but a more serious outcome of this event was an increase in tensions between the TAF and the government. On 28 February 1997, the military-dominated National Security Council issued a series of recommendations and ultimatums to the government on actions needed to protect secularism (Global Security 2013). One of these recommendations was compulsory secular schooling for eight years, which would effectively shut down the imam-hatip middle schools. Another proposal, relating to the Higher Education Council, would have made it difficult for imam-hatip students to score high marks in university entrance examinations by imposing a penalty on them. This irked Erdog˘ an, who lobbied vocally against the legislation. Despite his protests and attempts to mobilise Parlia­ ment against the proposed legislation, Erbakan was forced to sign a memorandum sent by the military. Eventually, interest groups such as secular non-government organisations, the media and members of business associations, together with the military, coerced the government to step down from power. On 30 June, Prime Minister Erbakan resigned in what was termed a ‘postmodern coup’. Following a similar pattern to Erbakan’s former parties, the RP was also banned for ‘violating the principles of secularism in the constitution’ (Childs 2011); and Erbakan himself was banned from participating in active politics for five years. In 1998, Erdog˘ an, along with the other RP leaders who had not been banned from politics, established a new party called the Virtue Party, which adopted a

The boy from Anatolia 89

comparatively more moderate approach than the RP. That same year, Erdog˘ an was convicted of reading an incendiary poem at a public rally. The poem expressed Erdog˘ an’s displeasure with the ban on Erbakan and read, in part, as follows: ‘The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers’ (Karaveli 2016). He was charged with ‘inciting the people to religious hatred’. He was convicted, sentenced to imprisonment and barred from holding any public office for life. The party itself was shut down in 2001 due to the top leadership’s close connections to the RP. Instead of being a hindrance to Erdog˘ an’s political trajectory, the downfall of the Virtue Party proved to be a springboard for his future endeavours. The connections he made and the popularity he earned as mayor of Istanbul helped him to fill the vacuum that the disbanding of the Virtue Party created. These factors were eventually com­ plemented by a set of circumstances that facilitated his ascent to the office of prime minister of Turkey. This journey wasn’t easy for Erdog˘ an: he had to carve a niche for himself, which he eventually did. He became such a popular leader – in terms of both control and power – that he was often referred to as the second coming of Atatürk himself. This is a title he resented, however, because of the significant differences in the lives and outlooks of the leaders. While Atatürk had a liberal influence in the form of his father and experienced little discrimination, Erdog˘ an was shaped into the leader he became under the guidance of a religious family, a discriminatory edu­ cation system and a classist community. As time passed and Erdog˘ an gained more power, he strove to move Turkey away from a secular Kemalist state to one that was more aligned with what he considered to be the values of Islam, which had been instilled in him from a very young age.

Notes 1 The region is a heartland of Turkish nationalism: the conservative and religious side of Turkey that felt forgotten for decades and that found its saviour in Recep Tayyip Erdo­ g˘ an. Many here were ostracised by the old secular elite, who built the Turkish republic from its inception in 1923 according to the ideals of its founding father, Atatürk – Westward-looking and fiercely secular, resisting the pull of the Islamic Middle East. Thus, the Muslims of this region often felt like second-class citizens, labelled ‘black Turks’, as opposed to the bourgeois ‘white Turks’ (Lowen 2017). 2 Mustafa Bülent Ecevit was a Turkish politician who served as prime minister of Turkey four times between 1974 and 2002. 3 Alparslan Türkes¸ was a Turkish politician who was founder and president of the Nationalist Movement Party.

References BBC News. 2002. Turkey’s charismatic pro-Islamic leader. November 4. http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/europe/2270642.stm. Cagaptay, Soner. 2017. Turkey after Atatürk. In Soner Cagaptay. The New Sultan: Erdog˘an and the Crisis of Modern Turkey. IB Tauris & Co Ltd.

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Çakır, Rus¸en and Çalmuk, Fehmi. 2001. Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an: Bir dönüs¸üm. Metis Publishing. Carkoglu, Ali, and Rubin, Barry M. 2006. In Religion and Politics in Turkey. Routledge. Childs, Martin. 2011. Necmettin Erbakan: Politician who served as Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister. Independent. March 4. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/necmetti n-erbakan-politician-who-served-as-turkeys-first-islamist-prime-minister-2231569.html. Erdog˘ an, Recep Tayyip. 2013. Interview by Ustanın Hikayesi. Bas¸bakan Erdog˘an Ustanın. Genc, Kaya. 2019. Erdog˘ an’s Way. Foreign Affairs, September/October. Global Security. 2013. 1997: Post Modern Coup. GlobalSecurity.org. July 30. https://www. globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/tu-military-coup-1997.htm. Karaveli, Halil. 2016. Erdog˘ an’s journey: conservatism and authoritarianism in Turkey. For­ eign Affairs, November/ December, 121–130. Lowen, Mark. 2017. Erdog˘ an’s Turkey. BBC News. April 13. https://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/resources/idt-sh/Erdog˘ ans_Turkey. Pak, Soon-Yong. 2004. Articulating the Boundary between Secularism and Islamism: The Imam-Hatip Schools of Turkey. Anthropology & Education Quarterly, 35(3) 324–344. doi:10.1525/AEQ.2004.35.3.324. Smith, Hannah Lucinda. 2019. Erdog˘an Rising: The Battle for the Soul of Turkey. WilliamCollins. Yavuz, M Hakan. 2003. The Political Economy of Islamic Discourse. In M Hakan Yavuz. Islamic Political Identity. Oxford University Press.

8 TURKEY UNDER THE RULE OF ˘ AN ERDOG

A significant portion of Erdog˘ an’s appeal stems from his dynamic personality and his approach to public policy. Assisting these factors were peripheral socio-economic changes that had been brewing since the 1980s. These socio-economic changes were leveraged by the grassroots engagement of the Welfare Party (RP), paving the way for Erdog˘ an’s growing popularity among the people, the political connections he would forge over more than 20 years and his ascent to the position of the mayor of Istanbul. By the 1990s, Turkey had experienced major socio-political changes in the 70 years since its inception. The previous chapters sketched out these changes and Erdog˘ an’s upbringing and rise to prominence amid them. We now examine how Erdog˘ an used his appeal and understanding of the people’s desires – given that he hailed from the same background – to tap into public expectations; and the external factors that contributed to his success.

1994: The Crisis To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment…would result in the demolition of society.

These words, written more than 75 years ago by Karl Polanyi in his book The Great Transformation (1944), turned out to be an eerie prediction of the times to come. The developed nations of the time were practitioners and proponents of a Keynesian-inspired managed market economy. This approach facilitated the private sector’s dominance with adequate government intervention. The Road to Serfdom was also published in 1944. Authored by Friedrich Hayek – an economist and philosopher who had been exiled from his native Austria – this book helped to lay the foundations for an important neoliberal doctrine. Hayek DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-10

92 Turkey

argued that government planning leads inexorably to a totalitarian state. This view found support among the wealthy classes, who sought justification for wanting to rid themselves of state regulations and taxes. Hayek won the Nobel Prize in Eco­ nomic Science in 1974. At first glance, the importance of these works in a discussion about Turkey’s evolution might not be apparent; but on closer inspection, one can clearly see the impact of these thought structures on the Turkish economy and therefore its society. If the 1990s were important transition years for the Turkish economy, politics and society, the 1994 economic crisis marked the pivotal point in this transition. Turkey had been struggling with economic instability and temporary remedies for almost a decade when the shortcomings of this period caught up with it and precipitated a major economic crisis in 1994. Turkey fell into the trap of twin deficits due to an unsustainable fiscal balance and an insufficient primary surplus to balance out external deficit fragilities. Looking back at the events that led to the 1994 crisis, one can observe a severe lapse in fiscal discipline. In the 1970s, Keynesian policies (the approach proposed in Polanyi’s work) seemed to be failing, which gave neoliberalism the chance to gain traction. State control of the markets was reduced through tax cuts, the crushing of trade unions, privatisation, deregulation and outsourcing. Turkey also faced a serious economic crisis in the 1970s, primarily due to soaring oil prices in 1973–74. The lack of protective measures in the economy against such shocks led to a rise in inflation and unemployment. The Kurdish-Turkish conflict in 1978 added the cost of war to the government’s burden and triggered a stream of migration of Kurds from rural to urban areas, which caused a sharp deterioration in income distribution. It was Turgut Özal – first as the prime minister’s undersecretary and then as prime minister himself – who led Turkey through an era of growth. Under him, Turkey undertook liberal reforms and opened up its markets. As Turkey shifted the direction of its policies, it also reduced its public spending. Therefore, while there was an increase in the productivity and output of the Turkish state, there was also an increase in inequality and vulnerability in the economy. In 1989, a restructure of the Central Bank’s monetary programme curbed credit to commercial banks. It also shifted public sector financing to domestic borrowing and imposed a threshold of 15% for Central Bank financing of the Treasury (Durgut 2002). This move made commercial banks the main source of financing for domestic debt; while the Central Bank – which now relied on foreign exchange and short-term capital – became a major source of public debt financing. A decrease in public expenditure in the 1980s caught up with the Motherland Party after the military regime’s restrictions on political parties were lifted through a referendum in 1987. The Motherland Party was now pushed to resort to populist policies in lieu of long-term stabilisation policies, as the latter had proved unpop­ ular with the people. It pursued a relaxed fiscal policy; increased wages sharply in the public sector; raised the prices of agricultural products; and broadened the

˘ an 93 Turkey under Erdog

scope of the state’s purchase programmes for agricultural crops. Through public banks, it extended cheap credit to small businesses and agricultural producers. Government expenses far exceeded revenues and these policies rapidly widened the budget deficit. The sustainability of public finances was a primary concern for policymakers, so the government pursued financing to maintain high-growth per­ formance and stay in political favour. This approach eventually led to severe public deficits comprising central gov­ ernment, local government, the social security system, extra-budgetary and revol­ ving funds, and state-owned enterprises. These deficits made up a whopping 11.7% of gross domestic product (GDP). Even the local governments, which initially had balanced their budgets, were running a deficit. The government resorted to deficit financing – that is, borrowing or printing currency notes to fund the deficit. As a general rule, deficit financing is inherently inflationary, as it increases the amount of money in circulation. If deficit financing is applied excessively, it can have serious disruptive effects on the sus­ tainability of the current account1 balance; as an important component of interest rates, this high-risk premium will eventually make borrowing more costly. Thus, sustainability bias, political instability and institutional weaknesses resulted in high borrowing costs. Nominal interest rates in domestic government borrowing were over 90% on average. The significant crowding-out2 effect on private investment that resulted impeded economic growth. Thus, deficit financing as a political tool applied to promote development turned out to be an obstacle to long-term economic performance for Turkey (Pamuk 2018). Government borrowing for the current year was always higher than the previous year’s public debt stock, which created a deadlock. This is why the ratio of interest payments to tax receipts in the public sector more than doubled throughout this 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 1995

1996

1997

1998

Current account balance (% of GDP) Source: World Bank nd

FIGURE 8.1

1999

2000

2001

94 Turkey

180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

The nominal interest rate was high throughout the 1990s3 Source: State Planning Organisation of Turkey. FIGURE 8.2

period. As a consequence of this situation, public savings plummeted to a negative value. The public saving-investment balance also began to run a deficit, necessitating even more external financing from the rest of the world. Turkey was trapped in a cycle of dependency on short-term external capital inflows, which added to the fragility of the Turkish economy and necessitated more borrowing (Kaya and Yýlar 2011). Relaxed fiscal and monetary policy, combined with a semi-independent Central Bank, resulted in an inflation rate of 60% on average. High inflation rates, high interest rates and unstable growth affected the weaker segments of society the most. By 1994, Turkey had a Gini coefficient of 41.30, one of the highest among members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (World Bank nd). Finally, in January 1994, the Turkish lira faced sharp depreciation as a result of a decade of fiscal indiscipline. The Turkish lira depreciated by almost 70% against the US dollar in the first quarter of 1994. In 1994, the Central Bank spent more than half of its foreign exchange reserves in an effort to prop up the lira. The government announced a stabilisation programme in April 1994, but significant damage had already been done. The economy had contracted by 6%, with the largest drop in output in Turkey’s history, and the Central Bank had lost around $3 billion. The currency depreciation caused many businesses to go bankrupt and many were unable to pay their foreign debt. In 1994, unemployment rose by more than one percentage point within a year and the Istanbul Stock Exchange dropped by 10.3% in the first quarter of 1994 (Durgut 2002). Turkish citizens suffered a drop in their real wages of 150% due to inflation, and lending became very difficult due to a 400% increase in lending rates. The stabilisation policy, which had been hastily put together under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was not implemented properly due to poor decision making in the wake of local elections. By December 1997, Turkey’s under­ lying economic aggregates had reached alarming levels and inflation stood at 100%. Once again, IMF aid was sought and a staff-monitored programme was implemented; but the IMF was reluctant to go ahead with a full programme due to the repeated failure of the Turkish authorities to meet structural targets. Even

˘ an 95 Turkey under Erdog

before Turkey could stabilise and dedicate itself to a recovery programme, two further shocks came in quick succession. First, the Russian economic crisis in August 1998 hit Turkey harder than other emerging markets, as exports to Russia fell by 35% (S¸ims¸ek, S¸ims¸ek and Zhanaltay 2017). Second, the Marmara earthquake of 1999 exacerbated the country’s problems as it affected highly populated, industrialised regions. The long-suffering Turkish economy buckled under the pressure of these crises and the growth rate plunged to negative levels. Inflation exceeded 100%, real wages fell and unemployment rose steadily in the following years. The general election in 1999 led to a newly formed government under Mustafa Bülent Ecevit of the Democratic Left Party, who promised a renewed commitment to economic reform. This convinced the IMF to proceed with a stabilisation programme in December 1999. The monetary policy reform was based on an exchange rate stabilisation anchor that incorporated a currency band – resembling a compromise between pegged and floating exchange rates. For this to work, rigorous monitoring by the authorities was required to estab­ lish a firm money supply rule: the Turkish Central Bank would provide liquidity only when this corresponded with increases in its foreign exchange reserves. It was intended that this signalling would improve the credibility of the peg, while still allowing the economy to capture the inflation-reducing benefits of a fixed exchange rate. Any lapse in monitoring would destabilise the programme and cause even greater losses in the medium term. The partnership with the IMF was particularly important to Turkey. An IMFendorsed programme was a strong signal of credibility to the markets. This was parti­ cularly important to Turkey as the Helsinki European Council approached, at which it was hoped that a decision would be taken to begin preparations for EU membership.

50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

FIGURE 8.3 Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) Source: World Bank nd

2000

2001

96 Turkey

However, things turned sour once the negotiations were complete and the deal was finalised. At the time, Turkey was being led by a coalition government. Ministers were reluctant to risk defending unpopular policies when flanked by competitors within the government. While the IMF monitored and enforced the tough policies, the domestic coalition partners found that it was easier to scapegoat the IMF for these unpopular policies than to explain the need for them to the public (Miller 2006). Within months, the programme was in trouble again. While the government was sticking to its expenditure commitments, public liabilities continued to rise due to contingent spending and delays in enforcing cost-saving mechanisms. Meanwhile, as intended, the interest rate fell sharply after the programme was implemented. This fall was sufficiently sharp to cause a creditfunded consumer boom; but it did not happen fast enough to prevent portfolio investors from engaging in arbitrage. These inward flows resulted in a real-time appreciation of the lira, which fuelled domestic consumption while also damaging domestic competitiveness. As imports rose by 37% in the first 11 months of 2000, the trade deficit more than doubled to $25 billion (Yeldan 2001). The interest rate fell from 110% to 36% (Kaya and Yýlar 2011), while trade balances as a percentage of GDP dropped from -0.25% to -3% (World Bank nd.).

2001 Crisis: The Rise of the Justice and Development Party The Turkish economy was on the verge of collapse by mid-2000, sustained only by continued inward flows of capital. The establishment of a Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, which had been a condition of the 1999 IMF programme, had been continuously delayed due to political haggling and soon interest rates started rising again, shooting up to 99.6% by 2001. This hampered the flow of short-term foreign capital and forced the Central Bank to intervene. Ignoring the conditions of the 1999 programme, the Central Bank provided $6 billion within a single week (between 22–29 November). Policymakers and senior officials now had to think of an immediate policy response that would halt the outward flow of Central Bank reserves and stop the interest rate from falling any further in order to avoid a massive debt default. Turkish politicians and officials were unwilling to accept that a pegged exchange rate was unsustainable or to make difficult policy decisions. Their political credibility rested on their endorsement of the 1999 programme. The IMF itself pushing for the pegged exchange rate system to be disbanded, even though it had introduced this just a few months earlier. According to the IMF, it was clear that the Turkish authorities could not fully commit to the reforms necessary for the programme to succeed (Miller 2006). Finally, Turkey and the IMF hammered out a contentious agreement that allowed Turkey to borrow more than 900% of its quota. Turkey had already lost $3.5 billion in a single day and a $2.8 billion replenishment (with promises of additional funds) was too little, too late; it merely deferred the impending economic crisis and tarnished both parties.

˘ an 97 Turkey under Erdog

Economic turmoil was not the only issue fuelling market fragility during the early 2000s; political tensions within the government were also causing uncertainty in the markets. In 2001, these tensions precipitated a spat between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, with the latter accusing the former of corruption. Doubts about the stability of the government took root among the public and thus the markets. Added to almost a decade of fiscal deficit deterioration (1995–2005), domestic banking system inefficiencies, rising interest rates and the nationalisation of Demirbank (2000), this shook the Turkish economy to its foundations. The stock market plunged by 14% and in February 2001 the lira had to be floated, resulting in a serious devaluation of the currency. Respite came once again in the form of the IMF, which approved a package of $3 billion for Turkey. As a result, interest rates finally started falling and some positive impact was seen. But while the economy displayed signs of stability, political upheaval persisted within the government. During this chaotic decade – that is, from 1994–2002 – Turkey saw an overall decrease in inequality of income along with a decline in several other social indicators. It is clear from the data that the poor bore the brunt of the crisis: unemployment soared and food poverty among the urban poor increased significantly. In 1994, for the whole country (rural and urban), it was estimated that 7.3% of the population could not afford the imputed value of a food basket. By 2001, this figure stood at 17.2% for the urban population alone. Some families had to withdraw their children from school to reduce out-of-pocket expenses; others had to seek informal earnings. To combat this, a loan of $500 million was taken from the World Bank for a social risk mitigation project. Although conditions had improved by 2002, this still was not enough. Most households felt worse off due to the lingering effects of a long period of economic struggle and despair. This had an enduring effect on employment and living standards. The opposition directed their attacks at the weaknesses of the coalition government and the IMF, which had been successfully scapegoated for the economic crises. These factors helped the opposition in the early election which was called in November 2002.

Corruption and Political Turmoil The 1994 crisis made a huge dent in the election campaign of the then govern­ ment of Tansu Çiller’s Democrat Party. As a result, in the general election at the end of 1995, the RP won the greatest number of seats. In 1996, the RP joined forces with another conservative party, the Right Path Party, to form a coalition government and Necmettin Erbakan became prime minister. Once in power, Erbakan continued to push his Islamic nationalist ideologies and called for greater cooperation with the Arab states. He was also known to summon religious leaders to his office to seek advice on government policies. Secularists saw these moves by Erbakan as a danger to the secular fabric of the Turkish state; and on 28 February 1997, the military-dominated National Security

98 Turkey

Council issued a series of recommendations or ultimatums to the government on actions needed to protect secularism (Global Security 2013). On 30 June, Erbakan resigned in what was termed a ‘postmodern coup’. Following a similar pattern to Erbakan’s former parties, the RP was also banned for ‘violating the principles of secularism in the constitution’ (Childs 2011); and Erbakan himself was banned from participating in active politics. Matters were made worse when Turkish state prosecutors discovered the involve­ ment of Erbakan and other senior members of the RP in a scandal dubbed the ‘Lost Trillion’ or ‘Missing Trillion’. The case involved Islamist leaders diverting TL 1 trillion of state-donated money from the RP shortly before it was outlawed for sedition. The prosecutor called it ‘the biggest fraud in the history of our Republic’ and said that financial records had been hidden, falsified and destroyed (BBC News 1998). Erbakan and many other officials of the RP were imprisoned for their roles in the scandal. Erbakan was succeeded by Mesut Yilmaz, who himself became embroiled in the Türkbank scandal, which revealed ties between the government, the private sector and organised crime. Yilmaz was forced to resign from office in 1999.

The Türkbank Scandal Türkbank was the first private bank to be established in Turkey, in 1913. During the 1994 financial crisis, the financial position of Türkbank weakened to such an extent that the state Treasury had to intervene and take over to avoid further damage to the economy. In 1998, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (TMSF) requested tenders to buy Türkbank. Korkmaz Yig˘ it, a businessman who had made a fortune in construction, offered $600 million for a majority stake. During this period, Yig˘ it was under surveillance by the police for alleged ties to organised crime in Turkey. The police discovered that Yig˘ it was using his mob connections to threaten other bidders to back out of the tender. Yig˘ it was arrested for money laundering for the mob and the TMSF annulled the sale of Türkbank to Yig˘ it. Under police investigation, Yig˘ it claimed that ‘Yılmaz and Taner encouraged him to buy Türkbank and offered him loans from other state banks to ensure that his bid was the highest’ (Mercan 2003). Soon after these statements by Yig˘ it were made public, the Turkish Parliament set up a parliamentary investigation committee. Seeing the writing on the wall, Yilmaz and his cabinet resigned. The committee decided to have the case tried in the Constitutional Court of Turkey, the highest court in the nation, where the accused were found guilty of bid rigging.

˘ an’s Rise Erdog During this period, Erdog˘ an had become a major leader on the political scene, having been mayor of Istanbul and part of Erbakan’s party. In 1999, he was sent to prison for inciting religious hatred. This event would later become his badge of honour.

˘ an 99 Turkey under Erdog

However, Erdog˘ an’s time in prison was not the rough experience that one might imagine. The conditions of the prison where he was held were elaborately described by Hüseyin Besli and Ömer Özbay in their book The Birth of a Leader – Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an: The electricity and plumbing were renewed, and a water heater was installed (in the prison). The door of the dormitory that opened to the corridor and the yard were painted and additional door bolts that could open from inside were installed. Magnetic barriers were placed in the roof and electronic sensors were placed in the yard. They bought furniture and white goods. The dormitory room was furnished with a large refrigerator, washing machine and dish­ washer. It had desks and meeting tables, leather armchairs, and a large-screen TV. Their room and the prison library were transferred into a living and working environment. Throughout the time he served in prison, Erdog˘ an never missed a Fenerbahçe match broadcast live on TV. The army captain and first lieutenant responsible for the security of the prison greeted him there, along with the prison prosecutor. They were taken to the dormitory. Erdog˘ an looked around and showed his appreciation. ‘Good job’ he said. (Ozbay and Besli 2018) All of these luxuries allowed Erdog˘ an to use prison as an office – a place where he could plan his future in Turkish politics; and he had a strong belief that he still had a crucial role to play in Turkish politics. And Erdog˘ an was not alone in this belief: ‘visitors came daily to see him. National and international luminaries came to see him. Their interest suggested that they saw him as a figure of political promise for Turkey’ (Sönmez 2018). However, Erdog˘ an was still banned from holding any public office. Erdog˘ an used his time in prison to consider the bigger picture: his mentor Erbakan’s failings; the 1997 coup; the strong presence of secularists within Turkey – a presence which, if antagonised, could lead to political obscurity. All of this led him to the realisation that following in the footsteps of his mentor would lead to the same consequences of failed and banned political parties, and a term at the helm of government cut short. He knew that he had to move away from Erbakan and towards the secularists; but at the same time, not so far that it would antagonise his base among the Islamists. Fethullah Gulen and Abdullah Gul were important allies of Erdog˘ an at the time. They were Islamists who believed that adherence to Kemalist principles was the only way that Turkey could succeed. Erdog˘ an would accept their assistance and guidance in order to forge a new political path, away from Erbakan but not as far away as the secularists. He understood that the only way to win was with the support of both sides. The AKP was founded on exactly these principles, with an approach that was more soft-secularist. Given the prevailing sentiment, the AKP recognised that it was important to present itself as the party of economic reform. This is where Gul came in. Gul was an economist: a graduate from the UK who had earned a PhD

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from Istanbul University and worked for the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He co-founded the AKP, thus giving the public the impression that the party could turn around Turkey’s economic fortunes. Erdog˘ an based his elec­ tion promises on the neoliberal principles of democracy, a pro-Western foreign policy and free-market economics – principles that he later abandoned. One of the most important points of Erdog˘ an getting elected was his promise to secure EU membership for Turkey. The AKP won a single-party majority in the 2002 parliamentary elections and Gul became prime minister, because Erdog˘ an was still barred from holding office due to his conviction and imprisonment in 1998. Under Gul, in December 2002, a constitutional amendment reversed the ban and allowed Erdog˘ an to compete in a byelection in March 2003. Erdog˘ an won the byelection and was invited to form the government by the then president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Gulen formed a strategic partnership with Erdog˘ an when he was re-elected in 2007. By that time, the latter had become bolder about his Islamist ideologies. At the time, Gulen had been on self-imposed exile in the US after being found guilty of plotting to overthrow the government in 2000. Erdog˘ an reversed these charges against Gulen. Gulen’s influence helped Erdog˘ an to stay in power, as the former enjoyed international repute as a preacher with a network that spanned the world. This reflected Erdog˘ an’s cunning choice of allies.4 Erdog˘ an came to power by promising political and economic liberalisation. Central to the latter goal was the pursuit of EU membership; in 2004, the EU agreed to start accession negotiations for the same. While many feared Turkey’s shift to Islamism under Erdog˘ an, Halil Karaveli, in a 2016 article, described Erdo­ g˘ an’s governance as a break away from ‘Islamism’s traditional anti-Western posture and … [towards] a pro-European, pro-American direction’. He suggested that Turkey’s move in a profoundly illiberal authoritarian direction was ‘more akin to a traditional Middle Eastern strongman: consolidating personal power, purging rivals, and suppressing dissent’ (Karaveli 2016). Later a conspiracy (known as the ‘sledgehammer conspiracy’) dating back to 2003 to remove Erdog˘ an was uncovered; Erdog˘ an claimed it was a plot by his then former ally, Fetullah Gulen. Thousands of people alleged to be in cahoots with Gulen were put in jail; the army and state bureaucracy were purged; and academics were suspended. Economically, Turkey’s integration into the global economy led to a period of growth during Erdog˘ an’s first term. Within a year of him taking office, Turkey’s GDP growth rate increased from 5.60% to 9.64%. As a result, Erdog˘ an’s popularity increased among the country’s small business owners – mostly the conservative middle class. These factors played a significant role in 2007, when Erdog˘ an won a general election for the second time in a row. However, Turkey’s Constitutional Court subsequently invalidated the vote because of an opposition boycott that resulted in fewer than two-thirds of all members of Parliament taking part in the election. The judgment came after mass demonstrations and a statement from the military declaring that it would protect the secular principles of the country. After the constitutional invalidation and the threats from the military, Erdog˘ an called for

˘ an 101 Turkey under Erdog

an early national election originally scheduled for November in July. The AKP won with 46.6% of the votes, securing 341 seats in Parliament. In his campaign, he had proposed a package of constitutional amendments, including the direct election of the president. In 2013, a corruption scandal involving money laundering, fraud and gold smug­ gling engulfed Turkey. Most of the people who were investigated were connected with the ruling AKP. Many top ministers resigned from office and there were calls for Erdog˘ an’s resignation – especially after investigations into a charity trust where Erdog˘ an’s son was a board member and the surfacing of a YouTube audio clip in which Erdog˘ an allegedly told his son to urgently get rid of tens of millions of dollars (Orucoglu 2015). Erdog˘ an dismissed the investigation as a coup attempt by his onetime ally, Gulen, whom he now saw as a threat due to the latter’s increasing influence (his organisation has 6 million volunteers based all around the world). Erdog˘ an’s election to the office of president in 2014 took place amid allegations of media bias, misuse of public resources and inaccurate opinion polls. Erdog˘ an expanded his control by exploting all of the president’s constitutional powers, which had rarely been used by his predecessors, including the power to convene and head cabinet meetings (Tahiroglu and Zilberman 2014). Following his election, Erdog˘ an tightened his grip on the media and the judiciary – further evidence of his consolidation of power. One example of this is the case of Menderes Arican, a prosecutor who was reassigned to a western province just two days after asking the justice minister to resign in a Facebook post in 2016, as a part of a nationwide restructure of the judiciary (Pamuk 2016). Around the same time, Erdog˘ an started making public statements that drew criticism for the gradual incorporation of his religious values into the secular country’s laws. Examples of these values included restricting access to abortion and contraceptives for women, banning alcohol and shutting down private schools.

The 2016 Coup On 15 July 2016, a faction within the Turkish armed forces decided to attempt a coup against Erdog˘ an. Soldiers and tanks went into major cities within Turkey, including the capital of Ankara, where fighter jets bombed the Parliament building. All of this occurred while Erdog˘ an was in the Turkish city of Marmaris with his family on holiday. What followed revealed the extent of support that the populist leader had within the nation. Citizens, armed with utensils and various other household items, took to the streets of Ankara and Istanbul to show their support for Erdog˘ an and took on the Turkish army, foiling the attempted coup. This crisis claimed the lives of over 240 people and injured a further 2,194. Erdog˘ an blamed religious leader and former ally Fethullah Gulen and his sup­ porters for the attempted coup. The Turkish Parliament set up a parliamentary Coup Investigation Commission and, after conducting investigations for over four months, released its reports, essentially backing the claims of Erdog˘ an and the AKP. However, many in the country remain sceptical of these findings and believe that

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the attempted coup was set into motion by Erdog˘ an himself in order to strengthen and consolidate his political powers. As the leader of the main opposition Repub­ lican People’s Party, Kemal Kılıçdarog˘ lu, noted: ‘It was a coup attempt designed to fail’ (Stockholm Center for Freedom 2017).

Aftermath Erdog˘ an saw that the attempted coup had increased his popularity and decided to use this as an opportunity to increase his powers. Five days after the attempted coup, he imposed a national emergency in the country, which would last for two years. Erdog˘ an also used this period to crack down on critics and rivals. By 2017, more than 100,000 people had lost their jobs and over 50,000 people had been arrested. All those suspected of having links with or being sympathisers of Gulen were sacked from their jobs; and Gulen himself was declared a terrorist by the Turkish government. The aftermath of the attempted coup also saw the souring of Turkey’s relations with the EU and the US. The EU accused Erdog˘ an of using the attempted coup as an excuse to consolidate his power and eradicate his opposition. Relations with the US were further strained because of Fethullah Gulen, who had been granted asylum in the US after his fallout with Erdog˘ an. Ankara accused the US of har­ bouring a terrorist and the Turkish Justice Ministry formally demanded that the US authorities arrest Gulen for his role in the attempted coup. The US did not arrest Gulen; nor did it start formal extradition proceedings, citing a lack of evidence against him. Following the suppression of the opposition, in April 2017 Erdog˘ an and the ruling AKP won a narrow vote on a constitutional referendum. According to this referendum, Erdog˘ an was granted ‘executive presidency’ and the parliamentary form of government and the role of the prime minister were abolished. The referendum also empowered the president to issue decrees to form and regulate ministries, and to appoint and dismiss civil servants without parliamentary approval. He could also draft the budget, dissolve Parliament and appoint senior judges. Erdog˘ an could also appoint the head of the Central Bank, deputies and monetary policy committee members for a four-year period. Other key institutions – such as National Intelligence, the Defence Industries Directorate, the High Command of the Armed Forces and the National Security Council – additionally came under full presidential control. In 2018, Erdog˘ an and the AKP won the elections again, despite rising inequality and unemployment (see Figures 8.4 and 8.5), such was Erdog˘ an’s grip on the nation. However, three terms in power had made Erdog˘ an suspicious of people. This caused some issues when it came to choosing his cabinet. His appointees eventually included his son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, as Treasury and finance minister; Fuat Oktay, his former under-secretary, as vice president; and long-time confidantes Mustafa Varank and Hulusi Akar as technology minister and minister of defence respectively.

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0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05

Pre Tax National Income Top 1% Pre Tax National Income Bottom 50%

0

Erdog˘ an came to power in 2002, income inequality fell considerably. Under Erdog˘ an, however, it has risen continuously – especially since his second term Source: World Inequality Database FIGURE 8.4 Before

16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

FIGURE 8.5 Unemployment has seen an upward trend in recent years Source: International Labour Organization; ILOSTAT database

He also appointed former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim as the speaker of the Assembly (after his previous position as prime minister was made defunct following the constitutional referendum in 2017). While the qualifications of these people to hold their positions are dubious at best, a clear pattern can be seen in their appointment: Erdog˘ an values loyalty and likes to ensure that his inner circle reflects this. This is often evident in his appointments for senior government positions. It is interesting to note these profound changes in Turkish society. While previously the military had the power to coerce Erbakan to step down in a bloodless coup, it was now being led by a leader with increasing control over the composition of the gov­ ernment and the expression of dissent. This transition was further enabled by the years of exclusion of religion from the political space and multiple instances of the military stepping in to enforce this exclusion.

104 Turkey

Kemalist ideals viewed religion as a component of society that could be separated from politics, instead of an inherent and inseparable factor. After years of blocking religion from politics, the military reintroduced it to the public space by utilising it to counter communism. However, in the process of rein­ troducing religion to serve its own goals, the military unleashed another factor that could not be so easily controlled. Since then, the military’s ‘project of restoring Kemalist centre actually prevented the established parties from pro­ viding an outlet or the hopes and demands of the people and heightened their level of alienation from the electorate’ (Cınar 2008). The lack of effective opposition from the existing political parties and the overtly religious nature of Erbakan’s political venture carved a niche for an economically focused political party that could slip under the radar of the military while also providing the religious representation that the people sought. Erdog˘ an identified this niche and acted on it through the establishment of the AKP. Yet although the AKP was voted into power on the promise of integration with international markets, citizens have since been clamouring for access to healthcare, education and workers’ rights. In 2013, protests broke out in Gezi Park against the privatisation of one of the last remaining public green spaces in Istanbul. Almost a decade later, the country is still rife with political instability and unchecked authoritarianism.

Notes 1 The record of the country’s transactions and exports minus imports (an expected effect of a rise in inflation is a fall in exports and thus a fall in the current account balance). 2 High interest rates discourage businesses from making capital investments. This is called the ‘crowding-out’ effect. 3 There was a major decline in 1999–2000 due to implementation of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) backed stabilisation programme that will be discussed later, fol­ lowed by a major jump in 2000–2001 due to failures in implementation. The interest rate started falling after that due to IMF aid and Justice and Development Party governance. 4 Erdog˘ an has since declared Gulen an enemy of the state and accused him of trying to topple the government.

References Acemoglu, Daron, and Murat Ucer. 2015. The Ups and Downs of Turkish Growth, 2002–2015: Political Dynamics, the European Union and the Institutional Slide. MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No 15–08 10.3386/w21608. BBC News. 1998. Turkish Islamist Leaders Face Fraud Charges. 25 August. http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/europe/158010.stm. Childs, Martin. 2011. Necmettin Erbakan: Politician who Served as Turkey’s First Islamist Prime Minister. Independent. 4 March. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/ necmettin-erbakan-politician-who-served-as-turkeys-first-islamist-prime-minister-2231569. html. Cınar, Menderes. 2008. The Justice and Development Party and the Kemalist establishment. In Ümit Cizre. Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey. Routledge.

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Cizre, Ümit and Yeldan, Erinç. 2005. The Turkish Encounter with Neo-liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001 Crises. Review of International Political Economy, 12(3) 387–408. doi:10.1080/09692290500170692. Dufour, Mathieu, and Orhangazi, Özgür. 2009. The 2000–2001 Financial Crisis in Turkey: A Crisis for Whom? Review of Political Economy 21(1) 101–122. doi:10.1080/ 09538250802517014. Durgut, Ahmet. 2002. The NPS Institutional Archive. Calhoun. June. https://calhoun.nps. edu/handle/10945/5936. Global Security. 2013. 1997- Post Modern Coup. 30 July. https://www.globalsecurity.org/m ilitary/world/europe/tu-military-coup-1997.htm. Jarosiewicz, Aleksandra. 2013. Turkey’s Economy: A Story of Success with an Uncertain Future . OSW Commentary No 120, 5 November. http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/58398. Karaveli, Halil. 2016. Erdog˘ an’s Journey: Conservatism and Authoritarianism in Turkey. Foreign Affairs, November/December. Kaya, Fatih and Yýlar, Selihan. 2011. Fiscal Transformation in Turkey over the Last Two Decades. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 11(1) 59–74. doi:10.1787/budget11-5kggc0zr42g6. Mercan, Faruk. 2003. An Unfinished Account. Aksiyon, 23 June. Miller, Calum. 2006. Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Turkey. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 12(4) 449–464. Orucoglu, Berivan. 2015. Why Turkey’s Mother of All Corruption Scandals Refuses to Go Away. Foreign Policy, 6 January. Özatay, Fatih. 2000. The 1994 Currency Crisis in Turkey. The Journal of Policy Reform, 3(4) 327–352. doi:10.1080/13841280008523409. Özbay, Ömer and Besli, Hüseyin. 2018. The Birth of a Leader - Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an. Manzara Verlag. Pamuk, Humeyra. 2016. In Turkey’s Judicial Overhaul, Erdog˘ an’s Critics See PaybackTtime. Reuters, 23 June. https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-judiciary/in-turkeys-judicial-overha ul-Erdog˘ ans-critics-see-payback-time-idINKCN0Z922Q?edition-redirect=in. Pamuk, S¸evket. 2018. Conclusion. In S¸evket Pamuk. In Uneven Centuries: Economic Devel­ opment of Turkey since 1820, 3030–3318. Princeton University Press. Polanyi, Karl. 2001. The Great Transformation of our Time. Beacon Press Books. Ravallion, Martin. 2001. Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Looking beyond Averages. World Development, 29(11) 1803–1815. doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2558. Rodrik, Dani. 2012. The Turkish Economy After the Crisis. Ekonomi-tek, 1(1) 41–61. https:// drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/publications/turkish-economy-after-crisis. S¸ims¸ek, Nevzat, Ayça S¸ims¸ek, Hayal and Zhanaltay, Zhengizkhan. 2017. Analysis of Bilat­ eral Trade Relations between Turkey and Russia Federation. bilig, 31 October, 1–26. Sönmez, Burhan. 2018. Erdog˘ an: A Normal Man. In Eve Ensler, Strongmen: Trump/Modi/ Erdog˘an/Duterte/Putin, 51–66. OR Books. Stockholm Center for Freedom. 2017. Erdog˘an, gov’t want to cover up the coup to protect themselves. 7 April. https://stockholmcf.org/Erdog˘ an-govt-want-to-cover-up-the-coup-to-protect-them selves/. Tahiroglu, Merve and Zilberman, Boris. 2014. Vladimir Erdog˘ an: How the Turkish Premier Is Consolidating Power, Russia-Style. Forbes, 23 July. https://www.forbes.com/sites/rea lspin/2014/07/23/vladimir-Erdog˘ an-how-the-turkish-premier-is-consolidating-power­ russia-style/?sh=476bd6af190b. World Bank. nd. Current Account Balance 9% of GDP: Turkey. https://data.worldbank. org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS?end=2001&locations=TR&start=1995.

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9 PART CONCLUSION: TURKEY

Since the country’s inception, Turkey struggled to balance the religious inclinations of the people with the secularism being propagated by its leaders. Over time, the challenges that emerged from this struggle shaped the people and Turkish society into what they are today. This new Turkey nurtured Erdog˘ an and his politics, and propelled him to the position of power he remains in today. The process began with the ideals promulgated by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, more popularly known as Atatürk. Atatürk’s impact on the Turkish people was so pro­ found that his legacy, Kemalism, survived long after his death, influencing the Turkish people’s relationship with religion and their engagement in civil society for decades thereafter. Atatürk was a member of the Young Turks movement, which briefly overthrew the sultan’s reign in 1908, before joining the military and even­ tually leading on the frontlines as a commander. He was lauded for averting the Allied invasion of the Dardanelles during World War I. His service exemplified a commitment to the state rather than to the monarch (since he was not a staunch believer in the rule of the sultanate). Turkey signed the Treaty of Sevres following the war, ceding the Ottoman Empire’s authority and territory. By then, Atatürk had become a household name due to his military success. He capitalised on this popularity by becoming the Grand National Assembly’s (GNA) leader, establishing a national army and fighting for Turkish independence from the Allied Forces. The GNA’s perseverance resul­ ted in the Treaty of Lausanne, which supplanted the Treaty of Sevres in 1923. This also allowed the GNA to become Turkey’s recognised government and Atatürk was appointed as president. Atatürk’s achievements and high-profile participation in the inception of the Turkish state enabled him to implement reforms according to his vision. These reforms were undertaken even when his envisioned ideals of Turkish society, economy and culture did not necessarily reflect those of the country’s religious DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-11

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population. Nonetheless, the changes were undertaken and Atatürk’s fundamental ideas for enacting this transformation became known as ‘Kemalism’ – a synthesis of republicanism, populism, nationalism, laicism, statism and reformism. As part of these reforms, laicism was employed to diminish the historic stronghold on religion on the state. Atatürk abolished the caliphate, replaced Mejelle and Shariah laws, and established a state-run religious education system. While these moves reflected his stance that religion should not play a part in politics, they were not always comfortable for the populace, who were accustomed to a faith-motivated way of life. The reforms ushered in seismic changes in how the country and its people had hitherto operated. While certain segments of society were amenable to the reforms, others were not. In the following years, the exclusion of religion from the political and, to an extent, public space served as a catalyst for social transformation. The country was progressing in the physical sense through infrastructure projects, industrialisation, societal modernisation, capital formation and other initiatives. However, the common people, who were not directly impacted by these developments, only experienced the erosion of their religious values and the restrictions imposed by the state on their faith. Kemalism’s notions of modernity did not resonate with those of the people; and soon after the establishment of the Turkish state, during the 1920s and 1930s, Atatürk was forced to quell revolts against the state’s attitude to politics. The divide that separated the two factions – that is, the adherents to Kemalism and its critics – grew wider. The introduction of a multi-party system of administration took place nearly a decade after Atatürk’s death in 1946. This move, which was prompted by war and internal strife within the country’s former one-party system, helped to gradually re­ establish the place of religion in Turkish politics and government. Islamist groups that had been at odds with Atatürk and had thus been suppressed during the latter’s reign now had the opportunity to use their political power to appeal to those who identified with their religious beliefs. Given Turkey’s demographic makeup, which is dominated by Muslims (97% of the population), the centre-right was in a strong position during the elections held in 1946. The tension and infighting within Atatürk’s Republican Party encouraged the advancement of the right in political affairs. While the people had always required right-leaning political representation to protect their interests, the government and military eventually came to rely on this as well. The military became reliant on religion during the Cold War, when Turkey witnessed the rise of communism. Afraid of the communist threat, the military used religion to oppose Soviet influence on society. This change in stance on the part of the military establishment, which until that point had been very sensitive to any religious presence in politics, acted as a conduit for religion to assume a greater space in Turkish society. The right-leaning parties, which previously had to be very covert when using religion in their rhetoric, experienced a degree of relaxation on this front. In considering the transitions up to this point, one can make two important observations. First, there was a significant social gap between those who adhered to

Part conclusion: Turkey 109

Kemalist ideas and those who did not. Second, people who considered religion to be a vital part of their lives were frequently subjected to subtle forms of prejudice. These were some of the difficulties that Erdog˘ an and his family had to deal with when he was growing up in Turkey in the 1950s. Erdog˘ an had to balance Istanbul’s modernist attitudes with those of his conservative and religious upbringing as the son of a migrant family who had settled in the city. Because of their background, it was difficult for Erdog˘ an’s parents to decide whether to send their son to a religious institution or a traditional educational institution. Even the most basic decisions, such as choosing where to educate their children, were complicated because of the societal context. While choosing a religious institution could have hampered Erdog˘ an’s future possibilities (given the prevailing Kemalist society at the time), a non-religion­ affiliated education would have undermined Erdog˘ an and his family’s religious beliefs. Erdog˘ an’s enrolment at an imam-hatip school enabled him to maintain his religious and cultural identity in the face of modernity and progress. Like Erdog˘ an’s family, many other people had also migrated to urban spaces from Turkey’s towns and villages, impacting the demographics of the cities. This shift in the demographics furthered the mainstreaming of centre-right parties. While previously, urban spaces had primarily been occupied by society’s elite, the people who moved to the cities in search of new opportunities now made them more balanced. These individuals brought with them the traditional values of rural settings, which acted as a counterbalance to the metropolitan areas’ affinity for Kemalism. This rebalancing took several decades to bear fruit in the form of a softer approach towards religious institutions. Imam-hatips eventually gained recog­ nition as secondary school counterparts. This created numerous opportunities for students such as Erdog˘ an, establishing the groundwork for a new educated, employed and religious middle class. Islamist organisations catered to this growing middle class by providing free education, training, employment, food and scholarships, among other things. Erdog˘ an himself profited from these initiatives, which aided in his development as an active and vocal young man. His involvement in political activities began with protesting and engaging in campaigns against communist influence organised by the National Turkish Student Union (MTTB). He continued his education at university, where he was exposed to conversations and discussions that reaffirmed his belief in religion as a means of liberating people from poverty and misery. These influences played an important role in Erdog˘ an’s personal life, while also helping to develop an electorate that was educated, accomplished and religious. Erdog˘ an was exposed to the activities and beliefs of Necmettin Erbakan during his tenure with the MTTB. Erbakan was one of the first Islamist figures to play a prominent role in Turkish politics and was part of the faction that defended Turkey’s centre-right, as a member of new parties that rose from the ashes of a previous party which had been targeted by the state for diverging from Kemalist ideas. Finally, in 1995, Erbakan’s Welfare Party (RP) became the largest party in Parliament and went on to establish a coalition government, which Erbakan led.

110 Turkey

The introduction of a multi-party system, changing urban demographics and the emergence of a new middle class had laid the groundwork for Turkey’s political transformation; and the national economy served as the spark. In the 1970s, fiscal dis­ cipline deteriorated significantly. State control over markets was reduced, and the absence of an adequate regulatory framework to facilitate this transition led to years of instability that lasted into the 1990s. This economic vulnerability was compounded by the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, which imposed additional costs on the country. A substantial proportion of voters impacted by the ensuing recession were members of a generation that had grown up in religious households and benefited from education and the welfare programmes of religious organisations; they now constituted a new middle class that was both vocal and educated. The rightward shift in voter attitudes resulted from this demographic shift and the disillusionment generated by liberal policies. Erdog˘ an entered politics during this period, fighting his first election for vacant parliamentary seats in 1986. He lost, but went on to become mayor of Beyoglu in 1989, putting him in a key position as a new decade of change began. Erdog˘ an was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994, during the currency crisis that afflicted the country. Erdog˘ an’s experiences in office as mayor, his observations of the RP and Erbakan, and his own experiences as a boy growing up during a political shift following the introduction of the multi-party system all influenced his approach. He understood how economic motivations appealed to a people who desired economic stability, given the years of economic flux during the 1980s and early 1990s. He also saw that the people needed political representation that also acknowledged their religious inclinations. Erdog˘ an observed how friction between the Turkish Armed Forces and members of the RP over contentious comments had culminated in a ‘postmodern coup’, as result of which his mentor Erbakan was forced to resign. This occurred due to a series of ultimatum-style planned modifications introduced by the National Security Council. In the past, the military had intervened in a similar manner to overturn governments that appeared to be straying from Kemalist ideas. Erdog˘ an gained prominence as a result of the coup and the prohibition. He co-founded the Virtue Party with a few other former RP members, for making an inflammatory speech. Erdog˘ an’s Virtue Party was disbanded and he was permanently barred from government. This experience made Erdog˘ an realise that any approach he undertook in future needed to be more subtle. During his time in prison, Erdog˘ an formulated and strategised. He took his cue from Erbakan’s failures and adopted a more secular approach, to increase his chances of success. It was here that Erdog˘ an developed his own brand of soft Isla­ mism. He went on to become the founder of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a soft-secular party that positioned itself primarily as an economic reformer with the assistance of leaders such as Abdullah Gul. They adopted a pro-market stance in their policy commitments, the most visible of which was accession to the EU. This strategy worked and the AKP prevailed in the 2002 parliamentary elec­ tions. Once in power, the AKP helped Erdog˘ an to revive his career by lifting the

Part conclusion: Turkey 111

ban on him serving in government, following which he won a 2003 by-election and became Turkey’s prime minister. In 2004, Turkey commenced accession negotiations with the EU. This resulted in a boost to the Turkish economy. The middle class interpreted this as confirmation that they had been right to place their trust in Erdog˘ an. His popularity reached fever pitch when he called an early election in July 2007: the AKP won with 46.6% of the vote. This popularity would soon become a stepping stone towards greater centralisation in the government. Erdog˘ an’s popularity was the result of fundamental changes in society. Erdog˘ an recognised this and capitalised on his fame, maintaining public interest and support through the use of mass media, social media and religion. Additionally, he con­ solidated influence within Turkish institutions by elevating those he favoured to positions of authority. Therefore, during his early years in office, he successfully centralised power and established a tight grip on the media to consolidate control over the populace. This acted as a failsafe in the event of retaliation by the military. The power of this failsafe was borne out in the aftermath of a coup attempt in 2016, when support for Erdog˘ an poured in from the people. When the military attempted to take control of the capital, ordinary civilians armed with implements from home successfully fought off tanks and troops. The clashes resulted in several casualties and injuries. Erdog˘ an leveraged this support and declared a state of emergency for two years following the coup attempt. He used the state of emergency to jail those he suspected had sympathies or support for his former partner and now adversary, Fetullah Gulen, whom he accused of masterminding the coup attempt. Domestically, Erdog˘ an had already stifled dissent and criticism to a considerable extent, given his control over the media; however, his persecution of the opposition and of alleged Gulen supporters drew criticisms from the EU, which accused him of abusing the state of emergency to suppress resistance. Erdog˘ an was appointed executive president following the AKP’s narrow victory in a 2017 referendum which repealed the parliamentary system of government, effectively eliminating the function of prime minister. Erdog˘ an also gained control over ministries; the authority to appoint and fire civil officials; and the ability to control the budget. Voters affirmed this consolidation of power when Erdog˘ an won the 2018 elections, thus cementing the authoritarian tendencies of Erdog˘ an’s governance. These actions, however, also took their toll on Erdog˘ an, who quickly developed paranoia about the people he surrounded himself with. He began to replace key office holders with close aides and, in some cases, family members. Turkey’s slide into populism was in part enabled by the alienation of religion in Turkish society and decades of strict control of religion. In their vision of a secular and modern Turkey, leaders such as Atatürk failed to recognise that a significant segment of the country was not prepared to deal with the cultural shocks that the Kemalist vision brought with it. Islamist groups leveraged this ignorance in order to establish a voter base and build relationships with those who had been marginalised through welfare and outreach programmes such as schools, scholarships and

112 Turkey

employment, among other initiatives. The political faction of the centre-right fostered the growth of a group that would become increasingly influential in the years to come. Those who participated in this movement helped to turn the tide in favour of a more right-leaning outlook, which thrived despite resistance from the elite and the military establishment. Erdog˘ an effectively capitalised on these conditions and his own talents to develop soft-Islamic political representation. In the years following his election to office, he banked on the initial attraction of this political approach and delivered some economic progress, cementing his popularity with the people. He then exploited that same popularity to consolidate power and position himself at the centre of the Turkish polity.

PART III

Russia

10

FROM THE TSARS TO GORBACHEV

Russia is a prominent player in world politics, as a major stakeholder in both the European and Asian geopolitical environments. Nationally, the country witnessed a series of transitions during the early 20th century. From escaping the clutches of a tsarist monarchy to becoming the torch bearer for communism, and from the Cold War to the Russian Federation that exists today, the country and its people have borne witness to seismic transitions over the years. The framing of Russia’s state identity, and its national and international image, has undergone numerous transformations during these transitions. Often driven by singular (political) personalities, these transitions have guided Russia from the reign of the tsars through numerous civil movements, conquests, defeats and bloodshed, amid critical socio-economic changes. The country’s dynamic peoples and vast geography have also been critical factors in its evolution. In a country that is home to more than 190 ethnic groups speak­ ing more than 200 languages (Minority Rights Group International nd), and whose imposing scale spreads over two continents, there exists an equally vibrant class system. These diverse factors have shaped Russia’s complex trajectory since the time of the tsars, making the task of capturing this trajectory a challenging one. This chapter seeks to capture the highlights of this trajectory in a simple manner in order to understand the dynamics of modern-day Russia.

From the Tsars to the Bolsheviks In 1861, Russia abolished serfdom – a kind of feudalism in which tenant farmers were obliged to work for landowning nobles and/or pay them a percentage of their income in the form of a quitrent, and which most of Europe had already abolished (Buggle and Nafziger 2021). While the abolition of serfdom eventually resulted in improved lifestyles for former serfs, this did not happen overnight. DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-13

116 Russia

Peasants continued to live in poverty as, once emancipated, they were required to pay the government for the land to which they were legally entitled, while land­ owners received compensation from the government (Zenkovsky 1961). This late abolition of serfdom was not the only indication that the Russian Empire lagged behind the rest of Europe. While most European countries were embracing industrialisation and modernity, Russia stood out as a ‘backward state’ that lacked the infrastructure necessary to develop a modern market economy, such as a convertible currency, a balanced state budget, a mature banking network and a developed railway system (Reiman 2016). The Crimean War of 1853–1856 and subsequent losses on the battlefield in the second half of the 18th century urged Russia’s leaders – the tsars and the nobility – to develop the Russian economy and society in a bid to catch up with the rest of Europe. This process was led by Tsar Nicholas II and his finance minister, Sergei Witte. In the Budget Report for 1893, Witte laid the foundations for Russian industry. The broad aim was to create Russian national industries that would pave the way towards improving society and, in turn, the economy. Witte also built on his predecessor Ivan Vyshnegradskii’s vision to introduce tariffs, the gold standard, forced exports and advantageous freight rates. The Siberian Railway, which was Witte’s addition to this vision, helped to improve connectivity and established the basis for industry in the state (Laue 1953). However, this rapid industrialisation was interrupted when Russia was hit by a financial crisis in 1899. Triggered by a downturn in foreign capital entering the country, the crisis saw a decline in wealth due to stock market volatility, job losses and a reduction in household incomes (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1998; Brender and Drazen 2008; De Bromhead et al 2013; Lindgren and Vernby 2016; Algan et al 2017). As a result, the government bailed out the banks using taxpayers’ money, which benefited some while ignoring others, causing unrest among the people (Halac and Schmukler 2004; Stiglitz 2013). Simultaneously, Witte’s programme of rapid industrialisation – driven by high tariffs, forced exports and foreign capital – was upsetting agrarian interests in the country. Accusations of misrepresenting growth and consumption data to support his goals further highlighted the declining appeal of Witte’s methods. Criticisms of Witte among both the public and the government spiked after the financial crisis; and in 1903 he was relieved of his duties and appointed as chairman of the Committee of Ministers – a position that, although ostensibly a promotion, gave him less power (Laue 1953). In the shadow of all this turmoil, a class of overworked and underpaid factory workers emerged. Along with the disgruntled peasantry, these workers formed the second group of citizens that were dissatisfied with their living conditions under Tsar Nicholas II. There is broad consensus that Tsar Nicholas was a well-inten­ tioned but indecisive leader, guided by the mythic connection between the tsar and the Russian people that emerged in the 1880s, according to which he was presented as the national ruler who would ‘restore a regime of personal patriarchal rule’ (Wortman 2013).

From the tsars to Gorbachev 117

Despite his good intentions, the indecisive Nicholas II did little to assuage the volatile nature of the state. To compound the problems, a war with Japan that took place from 1904–1905, which was initially expected to boost morale and nationalism among the people, did the opposite when Russia suffered a bitter defeat (Esthus 1981). The beginning of the 20th century was plagued by peasant uprisings, workers’ protests and the emergence of political reform groups. Up until 1905, these events were disparate, rather than part of a coordinated effort towards a common goal. However, in 1905, the ‘Bloody Sunday’ massacre occurred when the police opened fire on peaceful demonstrators marching to the Winter Palace in St Petersburg to present a petition for proposed reforms. More than 100 people were killed and many more were injured. The event served as a catalyst for the 1905 revolution. Uprisings by peasants, workers and liberals seeking political change were reported across the country. To add to these troubles, several instances of mutiny within the military were also reported. However, before things got out of hand, at the recommendation of Witte, the tsar approved the creation of a Duma – an elected assembly that would oversee and approve new laws. This satisfied that faction of the revolution comprised of the liberals. The tsar then used the troops that had returned from the failed war with Japan to squash the other factions of the revolution. After relative peace had been achieved, the tsar rendered the Duma toothless by watering down any say it had in drafting and approving laws. This is where a man named Vladimir Ilrich Ulyanov, who would subsequently be known as Vladimir Lenin, comes in. During the 1905 revolution, Lenin was in exile because of his communist affiliations. He would go on to head a communist group called the Bolsheviks, which later became the driving force behind the 1917 revolution. During his exile, Lenin interacted with other communists, formulating dreams and plans to turn Russia into a communist utopia.

The 1907 Revolution To say that the Bolsheviks led the revolution of 1917 would be to ignore the other actors that played pivotal roles in this event. As William Henry Chamberlin put it, ‘The collapse of the Russian Empire on March 12, 1917, was a consequence of one of the most spontaneous, un-planned, unorganised leaderless mass revolts in history’ (Chamberlin 1967). The stage for this revolution was set by a series of factors. First, there was the strain of continuous and unsuccessful war, which claimed many Russian casualties. Like the first revolution of 1905, when Russia’s loss to Japan amplified the problems in Russian society, World War I pushed the Russian people and, more specifically, the military to the edge. Second was the inefficient food distribution system which – even without any actual food shortages –gave rise to long queues for bread, adding to the people’s dissatisfaction. The events of the second revolution started in St Petersburg, then called Petrograd, on 8 March 1917. Dissatisfied and hungry people chose this day – a socialist holiday,

118 Russia

Women’s Day – to hold demonstrations, leading to clashes with the police. By 10 March, the number of demonstrations had increased; as had clashes between the people and the police, following which orders to fire on people who refused to dis­ perse were given. On 11 March, the police opened fire on the protestors. Many casualties were reported, while the leadership presented the illusion of success at quelling the protests. This tendency of the nobility to turn a blind eye to the suffering of the people provoked a profound distaste for state mechanisms and gave rise to a new reality on the ground that was different from the leadership’s expectations. The prime minister dissolved the Duma; while the president of the Duma appealed to the tsar through a telegram that read as follows: The situation is serious. There is anarchy in the capital. The government is paralyzed. It is necessary immediately to entrust a person who enjoys the confidence of the country with the formation of the government. Any delay is equivalent to death. (Chamberlin 1967) Another factor that set the tone of the revolution comes into play here: war exhaustion. Constant military expeditions had taken a grave toll on Russia, eating into its military leadership to the effect that the majority of the Petrograd garrison had been sent to the front, to be replaced by reserves of new and inexperienced soldiers who did not have the same allegiance as their predecessors. As a result, on 12 March 1917 – which is regarded as the date of the start of the Russian Revolution – the troops of the Volynsky Regiment, in a display of exemplary civil mobilisation, marched into the streets and encouraged others to do the same, not firing on the people but instead sharing their arms with protesting workers. The fate of tsarist Russia was sealed after this date. On 15 March, the tsar abdicated the throne without finding anyone to replace him. There were two contenders to fill the power vacuum created by his abdication. The first was the Duma, which was nominated as a provisional government; the second were the councils of elected workers – also called the ‘soviets’ – which were respon­ sible for mobilising workers in factories and soldiers in barracks during the revolution. The weaker of the two contenders was the Duma, which had lost its appeal since its inception due to the dilution of its role by the tsar and the disproportionate representation of landowners and the propertied class within the Duma. The power within the soviets rested with the social revolutionaries and the Mensheviks – both part of the Russian Socialist movement along with the Bolsheviks. These groups installed a delicate system which divided power among them; but this was soon disrupted in the second phase of the revolution. During his time in exile before the 1905 revolution, Lenin had worked out the essence of his politics. His approach considered the revolution as ‘a process for which an engine had to be constructed’ (Faulkner 2017a). This engine had four main parts, as follows:

From the tsars to Gorbachev 119

a vision of the world transformed by revolutionary action; an underground activist network to turn this vision into a framework political organisation; the growth of this organisation into a mass social movement through recruitment of the most militant people in every industrial centre; and the eventual role of this essentially proletarian-urban movement in detonating a country-wide insurrection of the Russian Narod.1 (ibid) Lenin soon got a chance to put his brand of politics to use, as the provisional government lost favour with the people. The latter had failed to extricate the country from the war and the people had seen no improvements in their daily lives. These factors culminated in a coup called the October Revolution on 7 November 1917.2

Lenin’s Utopia Thus far, we have examined the history of Russian political transitions as witnessed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The main purpose of this reflective exer­ cise was to set out Russia’s politico-sociological context.3 With this context as a base, we can now focus on the nature of Russian politics under Soviet rule. To facilitate this transition, we present a condensed study of events that can help one understand Soviet society and its politico-economic foundations. After the October Revolution, elections to the Russian Constituent Assem­ bly were held. The Socialist Revolutionary Party emerged as the winner. Fol­ lowing the Bolshevik loss, Lenin, as Bolshevik Party leader, forcibly shut down the Constituent Assembly and quashed dissent and protests. In a display of the kind of singular power that he wished to pursue, in the following months, Lenin refused to work with other socialist parties and set up a secret police force to repress dissent and kill traitors. This demonstrates Lenin’s tendency to centralise power and control while suppressing dissent against his actions – a pattern witnessed repeatedly in Russian history and also evident in the cases of Stalin and Putin. Infighting among the major political representations culminated in a civil war that lasted from 1917 to 1923. The civil war – fought between the Bolshevik Red Army, which favoured socialism, and the White Army, which represented a diverse range of political views – resulted in many casualties. In October 1922, the war ended in favour of the Bolsheviks. The United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) came into being in December 1922. During the war, from 1918 to 1921, the Bolsheviks deployed war communism as their primary economic approach to keep the country afloat. Among other things, this involved the imposition of strict controls on grain produced in the country; the nationalisation of trade and industry; and the confiscation of financial capital. This allowed the country to produce enough arms to fight the war and enough grain to barely feed its citizens.

120 Russia

GDP per head, international dollars and 1990 prices

The central control of essential economic activity such as agriculture gave birth to a dissatisfied peasant community who, without any incentive to produce extra crops, focused on growing just enough for themselves, leaving the populations of cities hungry and eventually prompting them to move to the country to grow crops for themselves. This caused a lack of skilled labour in city industries, which impacted industrial output. These factors and the war caused a dramatic decline in productivity, as can be seen in the fall in Russia’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 10.1). In May 1921, once the war had ended and the Bolsheviks had dealt with the civil unrest in the country, the government revoked the law that had nationalised all branches of industry. This paved the way for a mixed economy, which was ushered in with the New Economic Policy (NEP). The controls on agriculture were relaxed: farmers could now pay tax in the form of a portion of their crops and free trade was allowed to a degree. This partial privatisation of economic activity had a positive effect on growth. Agronomic production reached 87% of pre-civil war output in 1925, compared to the 65% production reported in 1920; and industrial production reached 73% in 1925, as opposed to the 14.28% production reported in 1920 (Enfu and Zixu 2017). Still, these numbers do not accurately reflect the hardships that the Russian people endured during the initial transition from war communism to the NEP. The wars had ravaged the country’s transport infrastructure and the government then had to inject capital into critical sectors of the economy. As a result, only certain groups of people reaped the benefits of economisation; others lost their jobs due to the closure of inefficient factories, which in turn led to starvation (Kenez 2006, 58). 6400

3200

1600

800

400 1885

1905

1925

1945

1965

FIGURE 10.1 Real GDP per head of Russia and the Soviet Union Source: Harrison and Markevich 2012

1985

2005

From the tsars to Gorbachev 121

Alongside the economy, society was also going through a transitionary period. The Bolsheviks represented the interests of the workers, who did see an improve­ ment in their general living conditions. As the new system levelled the playing field, all capable people could now look towards a better future. This was especially uplifting when people saw their peers succeed. They were also free to work for private or public corporations, which increased the political presence of workers and made the soviets important centres of deliberation and discourse in cities. However, the soviets did not enjoy the same centrality in villages, where the peasant village commune still played an important role in collective decision making. Thus, the Bolsheviks did not enjoy the same control over the peasant community as they did over the workers. Their inability to influence this community directed soviet animosity towards the kulaks – peasants who, although only marginally better off than their less prosperous counterparts, had significant land holdings (Kenez 2006, 63). The Bolshevik dynamic with the kulaks was further complicated as the latter were the only people who could produce enough surplus to feed the cities. In addition to the economy and society, another factor that played an important role in post-revolutionary Russia was the church. The church had been an ardent supporter of the tsarist regime and during the civil war, it sided with the White movement. This contributed to the friction between the church and the Bolsheviks after the latter came to power. While the Bolsheviks avoided being hostile to the church in the rest of the country, where the government had less control, many priests were killed at the hands of local Bolsheviks (Kenez 2006, 72). While animosity between the church and Bolsheviks developed, the former maintained its relationship with the peasants. In response, the Bolsheviks tried to use education to counter the influence of the church on the people. The multi-faceted exercise of administrating a vast and diverse country in which all of the factors discussed above were simultaneously at play, along with the challenges of leading a revolution, weathering continuous criticism, surviving multiple assassination attempts and charting a path for the young Soviet Union, proved too stressful for Lenin. As a result, he suffered two separate strokes in 1922. Following his second stroke in December 1922, Lenin suffered from partial paralysis, following which he withdrew from active politics. In January 1924, he passed away, ushering in a new era for the USSR.

The USSR after Lenin There were two main political candidates who were expected to succeed Lenin. The first was Leon Trotsky, Lenin’s commissar for war, who had distinguished himself during the rise of the Bolsheviks in the military, among the youth and as an orator. The second was Joseph Stalin, the general secretary of the Communist Party. As general secretary, Stalin successfully removed his opposition from key positions within the party during the period of Lenin’s decline. Therefore, when the time came, Stalin had gained the upper hand over Trotsky and duly succeeded Lenin in 1924.

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Stalin remained in power from 1924 until his death in March 1953. This was a very confusing period for the USSR, filled with fear and helplessness, as Stalin cracked down on all opposition or signs of opposition. By the 1930s, most of the old Bolshevik Party had been liquidated by the bureaucracy as Stalin sought to centralise power by appointing the leaders he favoured to key positions. By 1939, only one in 14 of the Bolshevik Party’s initial 1,917 members still belonged to the Communist Party (Faulkner 2017b). On the economic front, Stalin’s grip was equally tight. By 1928, the country was facing a crisis as a result of the peasants’ refusal to supply enough grain to the cities and the refusal of foreign countries to continue diplomatic and trade relations due to a growing fear of war and instability. The government’s response to this crisis was to ‘seize grain, drive down wages, and impose rapid industrialisation’ (Faulkner 2017b). The peasants were unwilling to sell their grain to the government at artificially low prices; but by 1927–28 the situation had become sufficiently dire that many peasants did not even have enough grain to sell and preferred to sell what little they might have to private traders who offered better prices. The kulaks were usually the only group that could afford to wait for better prices to be offered and thus attracted the ire of Stalin’s government, often being blamed as the source of the food crisis. Under Lenin, the collectivisation of agriculture had been a Bolshevik goal; but during the revolution, given the peasants’ displeasure towards this goal, the govern­ ment had refrained from executing it, even while describing land as a property of society. However, under Stalin, once the upper echelons of the leadership had qua­ shed any opposition and dissent, the government undertook the mass collectivisation of agriculture from 1929–1930. This was done under the five-year plan introduced as the successor to the NEP. By 1937, private agriculture had been destroyed (Kenez 2006, 85). Another highlight of the first two five-year plans from 1928–32 and 1933–37 was a concentration on the development of heavy industry. The five-year plans left the peasantry resentful of these new institutions, which was reflected in the rates of agricultural production. Crop production is estimated to have declined by 10% between 1928 and 1932, and animal husbandry output by 50% (Kenez 2006, 99). Another controversial element of the five-year plan was the decision to do away with the principle of equal pay. Previously, the leaders of the Bolshevik Party could not be paid more than a skilled worker. Stalin now argued that it was necessary to pay certain workers higher wages to encourage increased output. This was criticised as a departure from socialist ideals. The differences in pay were very stark: by 1937, while skilled labourers were paid SUR 200–300 a month, plant directors were receiving SUR 2,000 a month; private soldiers were being paid SUR 10 a month and colonels SUR 2,400; and top members of the state bour­ geoisie were earning up to SUR 25,000 a month (Faulkner 2017b). Under these circumstances, admission to the Bolshevik Party became one of the most sought-after ways to earn a living. The new recruits, unlike their pre­ decessors, were careerists rather than idealists who were willing to abide by the rules of the Stalinist regime. Thus, Stalin successfully maintained his authoritarian

From the tsars to Gorbachev 123

grip, characterised by centralisation and the absence of dissent within the polity, the bureaucracy and the people. By the time of his death in 1953, Russia had endured devastating famines, World War II, a deadly siege on one of its major cities (Leningrad) and the atmosphere of fear that comes with living in a police state. After Stalin’s death, there was a period of thaw. It was during this period that some of the fears that had been drilled into people’s psyches were reversed. Sta­ lin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, denounced Stalin and his personality cult in a secret address to the Communist Party in 1956 (Rettie 2006). This was important because Stalin’s impact had been such that many feared condemning him even after his death, and Khrushchev’s acknowledgement removed some of the fear around these criticisms. As the terror of Stalin’s rule dissipated, so too did the mental shackles on the people. Young Soviets slowly became participants in global culture. These youngsters, who came from different career fields, began ignoring official taboos and involved themselves in work that would have seen them detained under Stalin. In fields from literature to academia, they became more innovative while ignoring societal and governmental protocols, thus ‘forcing the government to accept what it could not alter’ (Starr 1988). This liberation of the young meant that change was undertaken by society and not centred on the Communist Party like before. Many people – mostly those who had suffered from the effects of the collectivisation of agriculture – migrated to urban spaces, often defying residency laws to make better lives for themselves and their children. This move resulted in the birth of a generation that had access to better education and opportunities than their parents. By 1987, 89% of the Soviet population had at least a 10th grade education, as compared to 1939, when this number was just 10% (Starr 1988). A major economic problem that came to light after Stalin’s demise was the lack of consumer goods in the market. For a long time, the USSR had con­ trolled industries and production in the country, with a primary focus on heavy industry and producer goods (Figure 10.2). The population, which now had the opportunity to build better lives for themselves and free themselves from their suppressed state, were looking to spend money; but since the state did not provide enough consumer goods, a parallel black economy took root in the country, which is estimated to have accounted for one-seventh of the USSR’s non-agricultural output (Starr 1988). These problems would persist in society for decades, while the Soviet Union decided on the best course for member countries after Stalin’s rule. Khrushchev was succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev in 1964. Brezhnev, who gov­ erned the USSR for almost 18 years, did not have a favourable view of the thaw that had taken place under Khrushchev after Stalin’s death. As a result, the relaxa­ tions witnessed under Khrushchev were reversed, and censorship and crackdowns on dissenters increased. In terms of foreign policy, the Brezhnev era had some positive as well as negative highlights. This era fell in the middle of the Cold War, when the USSR was competing with the United States in every field, from the

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80 70

64,9

60,5 61,2

65,9

70,5

68,8

72,5

74,4

74

60 50 40

35,1

39,5

38,8 34,1

31,2

30

29,5

27,5

25,6

26

20 10 0 1913

1928

1940

1946

1950

producer goods, %

1955

1960

1966

1975

consumer goods, %

The division of industrial output between consumer goods and producer goods Source: Ellman 2014, graph from Mazat and Serrano 2012

FIGURE 10.2

space race to sports. However, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States improved under Brezhnev, with both countries working to limit conflict and contain the arms race. US President Richard Nixon even visited Moscow in 1972. The Helsinki Accords were another landmark event, when Western countries accepted the post-World War II status quo in Europe in exchange for improved civil rights for the inhabitants of the Soviet satellite countries. Yet the negatives during this period were stark. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Afghan War in 1979 were two such events; the latter evolved into a protracted and exhausting conflict that would eventually contribute to the USSR’s dissolution. After Brezhnev, there were successive and short-term changes at the helm of the Soviet Union until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power as general secretary of the Communist Party from 1985 to 1991, and as president from 1988 to 1991. Gor­ bachev was one of the first Russian leaders who had not partaken in Stalinist repression (Figes 2014). When he assumed office, Gorbachev was faced with a stagnant economy, declining living standards, excessive military expenditure and the burdens of managing satellite states. These challenges were not unique to this period and the people had grown accustomed to living through shortages while navigating the presence of the state in their daily lives. Gorbachev aimed to change both the economy and society, picking up where his predecessor Khrushchev had left off before being interrupted by the Brezhnev era. To this end, Gorbachev expanded on the ideas of opening up the market and extending rights of expression to Russian citizens. This exercise consisted of a two-pronged approach: glasnost and perestroika. ‘Glasnost’ means ‘openness’ and ‘perestroika’ means ‘restructuring’. Perestroika’s main purpose was to help the Soviet Union catch up with the West by facilitating a more efficient industry and a semi-free market system. However, market

From the tsars to Gorbachev 125

mechanisms did not integrate quickly with the institutions of a planned economy; instead, they shocked Russia’s economic structure. State controls on wages and prices were relaxed by the 1987 Law on State Enterprises and cooperatives were legalised in 1988 (Figes 2014). This gave people access to modern consumer products and services, such as cafes and restaurants, cigarettes and other foreign imports – all while the relaxation of price control and wages exacerbated shortages of food and household essentials. The changes came as a shock not only to Communist Party veterans, but also to the people, who bore the full force of a volatile market system. Criticisms that would have been muted or attenuated in the past were unleashed in full force. Most of these criticisms were directed at Gorbachev, who was the public face of the changes. Initially intended to bring greater transparency to the government, they revealed fundamental problems – such as poor housing, ecolo­ gical catastrophes and criminal activity – which had previously been covered up thanks to the Communist Party’s grip on the media. This change made critical analysis permissible for an erstwhile politically inactive society. As Gorbachev spent more time in office, he noticed the limitations of the Leninist system and began discussing the need for checks and balances in the system and for the separation of powers within the state (Figes 2014). In 1989, a new Parliament called the Congress of People’s Deputies was instituted, in which two-thirds of the seats would be filled through contested elections. This body would then elect a supreme Soviet. Following the installation of this new system, Gorbachev became the Soviet president. He also removed the decree banning the establishment of alternative political parties, giving rise to the emergence of opposition leaders – one of whom was Boris Yeltsin, who would go on to become Russia’s president. While Gorbachev’s democratisation of the state won him a Nobel Peace Prize in 1990, it also made him unpopular in the Soviet Union, which was still ideologi­ cally resistant to the dilution of socialist principles and susceptible to growing opposition. This was the result of years of oppression under Stalin and years of depravity under the Soviet Union. Due to people’s resistance, the nature of change from thereon became increasingly top-down. In addition to Russia, the other member states of the USSR were Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus (formerly Belorussia), Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. As Russia endured a tumultuous transition period from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, nationalism – which had previously been suppressed by the iron grip of the Communist leadership – was on the rise throughout the USSR. This rise was facilitated by the changes introduced by Gorbachev. One by one, each of these states declared its independence. When Yeltsin was elected as president of Russia in 1991, he succeeded an une­ lected Gorbachev in terms of authority and legitimacy. Gorbachev tried to save the union and proposed a referendum on the renegotiation of the union treaty between its member states. Communist hardliners saw this as a threat to the Soviet Union; and in August 1991, while Gorbachev was away in Crimea on holiday,

126 Russia

they tried to seize control by organising a coup. The coup failed, but it gave rise to a new leader. In the absence of Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin became the face of the resistance. In November 1991, Yeltsin banned the Communist Party in Russia and soon after, the Soviet Union was dissolved. The fall of the Soviet Union did not happen overnight. In fact, the factors intro­ duced briefly in this chapter all had a major role to play; a full discussion would warrant a book of its own and exceeds the scope of the current text. However, all of these factors helped to bring us to the inception of the Russian state as we know it today. The failed coup in August 1991 by the State Committee and the banning of the Communist Party were the final straws in the fall of the Soviet Union. By Christmas 1991, the once-mighty USSR was no more.

Russia’s Tryst with Democracy Russia was now free to choose a new direction and, building on the liberal and democratic tilt introduced under Gorbachev, it chose democracy. The democratisation and liberalisation of Russian society were initiated under Gorbachev’s leadership. Glasnost and perestroika were efforts to open and restructure Russian society and bureaucracy, as both can be seen as a prelude to democratic principles.4 However, in his attempt to bring about change that would help lift the Soviet economy and society out of the trap of years of tight control and suppression, Gorbachev encountered a great deal of opposition. While Glasnost offered some respite to writers and intellectuals, it also formed the basis for Russian freedom of expression. However, the restructuring of the economy and institutions was less successful, as a stubborn leadership and a discouraged society did not deal well with the proposed changes. By restructuring the economy, Gorbachev aimed to combine the best of social­ ism with the efficiency of the market (Kenez 2006). At the time, people had a lot of savings because there was a lack of consumer goods in society. When Gorbachev attempted to relax state control of prices, the abundance of savings and the scarcity of available consumer goods drove up prices. Thus, households that had previously had substantial savings were left with little to nothing. To tackle the problem of centralisation, some halfway measures were imple­ mented to grant more powers to factory managers. However, the lack of a real market and the knowledge that the state would save factories from going bankrupt prevented managers from increasing production or improving the quality of their products. They often skimmed off excess profits for themselves, while workers rarely benefited from decentralisation. This piecemeal approach to economic reform eroded public faith in liberal reforms, cemented the views of conservatives and irritated supporters of liberal reform. The faction that supported liberalisation called for more radical reforms instead of the half-hearted attempts to open the economy that had been under­ taken. However, by then, support for liberal reforms among the people had dwindled and attempts at radical reforms did not win over public sentiment.

From the tsars to Gorbachev 127

To compensate for increased shortages, inflation, declined productivity and the booming black market, different economic plans were drawn up from late 1989 onwards. The first of these plans aimed to overhaul the entire economy by focus­ ing on price liberalisation; the sale of state-owned property; the introduction of a stock exchange; and the closure of unprofitable factories. It found no support among the conservatives, who thought it would introduce too much change; or the liberals, who perceived the proposed changes as insufficient (Kenez 2006, 268). The plan that resulted focused primarily on closing unprofitable factories and retaining the power of central planners, which was no real reform at all. One of the most ambitious plans envisaged the creation of a market economy within 500 days. However, of all the reforms proposed, the only change to be implemented was that the government raised the prices of essential products to meet a realistic price structure. This alienated and disrupted the daily lives of a major proportion of the Soviet people. These events and attempts to liberalise the economy irked not only certain segments of the political fraternity, but also the Russian people. Unlike scholars and the intelli­ gentsia, the common people’s understanding of the reforms was wholly informed by their consequences on their daily lives – which, as outlined above, were not good. By the time a ‘renewed Russia’ began paving the way towards a market-oriented econ­ omy in the early 1990s, the Russian people were already resistant to this concept because of their past experience. This resistance from different segments of the popu­ lace and the political fraternity to changes that were still coming from the top defined a period of chaos and uncertainty that Russia faced for much of the 1990s.

Notes 1 Narod is a Russian term that means ‘people’.

2 According to the Gregorian Calendar.

3 Up to this point, the Russian people who were suffering from the income disparities within

society were active participants in civil movements. The spontaneous nature of these move­ ments further reflects the uniformity of perceptions and experiences among the people. 4 For further reading, please see Gidadhubli 1987.

References Algan, Yann, Guriev, Sergei, Papaioannou, Elias and Passari, Evgenia. 2017. The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism. Brookings. 7 September. https://www.brookings. edu/bpea-articles/the-european-trust-crisis-and-the-rise-of-populism/. Brender, Adi and Drazen, Allan. 2008. How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries. American Eco­ nomic Review, 98(5) 2203–2220. Bromhead, Alan de, Eichenrgeen, Barry and O’Rourke, Kevin H. 2013. Extremism in the 1920s and the 1930s: Do German Lessons Generalize? The Journal of Economic History, 73(2) 371–406. Buggle, Johannes C and Nafziger, Steven. 2021. The Slow Road from Serfdom: Labor Coercion and Long-run Development in the Former Russian Empire. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 103(1).

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Chamberlin, William Henry. 1967. The First Russian Revolution. The Russian Review, 26(1), 4–12. DiPasquale, Denise, and Glaeser, Edward L. 1998. The Los Angeles Riot and the Economics of Urban Unrest. Journal of Urban Economics, 43(1) 52–78. Ellman, Michael. 2014. Socialist Planning. Cambridge University Press. Enfu, Cheng and Zixu, Liu. 2017. The Historical Contribution of the October Revolution to the Economic and Social Development of the Soviet Union-Analysis of the Soviet Eco­ nomic Model and the Causes of its Dramatic End. International Critical Thought, 7(3) 297–308. Esthus, Raymond A. 1981. Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian Review, 40(4) 364–411. Faulkner, Neil. 2017a. Lenin and the Bolsheviks. In Neil Faulkner. A People’s History of the Russian Revolution. Pluto Press. Faulkner, Neil. 2017b. Stalinism. In Neil Faulkner. A People’s History of the Russian Revolu­ tion. Pluto Press. Figes, Orlando. 2014. Revolutionary Russia, 1891–1991: A History. Penguin Group. Gidadhubli, RG. 1987. Perestroika and Glasnost. Economic and Political Weekly, 22(18) 784–787. Halac, Marina, and Schmukler, Sergio L. 2004. Distributional Effects of Crises: The Financial Channel. Economia, 5(1) 1–67. Harrison, Mark and Markevich, Andrei. 2012. Russia’s National Income in War and Revolution, 1913 to 1928. VoxEU, 11 May. https://voxeu.org/article/russia-s-nationa l-income-war-and-revolution-1913-1928. Kenez, Peter. 2006. A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End. Cambridge University Press. Lindgren, Karl-Oskar and Vernby, K̊ are. 2016. The Electoral Impact of the Financial Crisis: Evidence Using District-level Data. Electoral Studies, 44214–224. Mazat, Numa and Serrano, Francisco Javier Vázquez. 2012. An Analysis of the Soviet Economic Growth from the 1950’s to the Collapse of USSR. (Second Draft). Minority Rights Group International. n.d. World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Russian Federation. https://minorityrights.org/country/russian-federation/. Reiman, Michael. 2016. About the Russian Revolution of 1917. In Michael Reiman. About Russia, Its Revolutions, Its Development and Its Present, 13–23. Peter Lang AG. Rettie, John. 2006. The Secret Speech that Changed World History. The Guardian, 26 February. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/26/russia.theobserver. Starr, S Frederick. 1988. Soviet Union: A Civil Society. Foreign Policy, 7026–41. Stiglitz, Joseph. 2013. The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers our Future. W. W. Norton and Company. Von Laue, Theodore H. 1953. The High Cost and the Gamble of the Witte System: A Chapter in the Industrialization of Russia. The Journal of Economic History, 13(4) 425–448. Wortman, Richard. 2013. Nicholas II and the Revolution of 1905. In Wortman, Richard. Russian Monarchy: Representation and Rule, 199–218. Academic Studies Press. Zenkovsky, Serge A. 1961. The Emancipation of the Serfs in Retrospect. The Russian Review, 20(4) 280–293.

11

VLADIMIR PUTIN His Life before the Limelight

In the autumn of 1952, as Soviets were preparing for the harsh Russian winter, Maria Putina gave birth to her third son, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Putina was a worker at a local factory in Leningrad, while her husband was conscripted into the Soviet Armed Forces. Less than a decade earlier, Leningrad had borne witness to one of the most remarkable events of World War II. The siege of Leningrad became a defining event, showcasing the spirit and determination of the Soviet people, who defied – against all odds – what at the time was considered the most formidable force in World War II: the German Army. The Putin family were no strangers to the Soviet cause. Putin’s grandfather, Spiridon Putin, was a cook for Lenin; and his father, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, was a member of the Soviet Armed Forces who had suffered injuries in the line of duty. As for the other citizens of Leningrad, the siege was a transformative event for the Putin family. Bombardment by the Nazis during World War II destroyed factories and homes in the city named after Russian leader Lenin. Putina, who used to work at one of the local factories, lost her job as a direct result of the campaign. But this was not the worst that the family would face during this period. As the siege continued, she lost her second son, Viktor, to diphtheria. However, none of this would sway the family’s belief or confidence in the state machinery of the Soviet Union. This was the opposite of a family of dis­ sidents: the Putins were conformists (Judah 2013). The city persevered and emerged victorious, proudly defeating the Nazis. To have lived not only through the war but also through the siege and still have your spouse and your home was essentially a miracle that the Putin family experienced (Gessen 2012). Within a decade, Vladimir Putin was born into what, judging by its ongoing standards, was likewise a miracle period (Gessen 2012). However, his father bore the scars of the war, as his injuries left him immobilised. Once back home, Putin DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-14

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Senior (Sr) went to work at the Yerogov train car factory, which also provided accommodation for the Putins in the form of an apartment in the centre of St Petersburg. According to Vera Dmitrievna Gurevich, Putin’s school teacher: They had a horrid apartment. It was communal, without any conveniences. There was no hot water, no bathtub. The toilet was horrendous. It ran smack up against a stair landing. And it was so cold, just awful, and the stairway had a freezing metal handrail. The stairs weren’t safe either; there were gaps every­ where. There was practically no kitchen. It was just a square, dark hallway without windows. A gas burner stood on one side and a sink on the other. There was no room to move around. Behind this so-called kitchen lived the neighbours, a family of three. And other neighbours, a middle-aged couple, were next door. The apartment was communal. And the Putins were squeezed into one room. By the standards of those days, it was decent, though, because it measured about 20 metres square. (Putin, Gevorkyan, et al 2000) Maria found employment by taking up odd jobs such as a concierge (Sakwa 2004), a cleaning woman and a night watchperson (Gessen 2012). While all of this might suggest that the Putins were poor, on the contrary, by the standards of the post­ war Soviet Union, they were upper-middle class – even rich in the eyes of a few. All of this meant that Putin Junior (Jr) was showered with extravagant gifts by his parents, such as a wristwatch, ‘a rare and prestigious accessory for any age group in that time and place’ (ibid). The Soviet Union was a strong communist state and was officially atheist. During this period, the Orthodox church operated underground in fear of persecution by the government. Putin Sr’s belief in communist principles also made him an atheist, while Putina was a strong believer in the Orthodox church – so much so that she ensured that Putin Jr was christened in secret and took him to service as well. Given these two strong opposing beliefs in his household, Putin Jr would find a middle ground as neither an ardent believer in the Orthodox church like his mother nor an atheist like his father. At the time, Leningrad was a tough place to grow up in, with crime and street gangs on the rise. And because the Putins lived in a working-class neighbourhood, they saw their fair share of this. Therefore, education was not a priority for the Putins. Putin Sr was more interested in instilling his son with discipline rather than concentrating on his education. Regardless, Putin Jr was enrolled in a school a short walk from his home. He started in first grade at the age of eight and shared his father’s thoughts on educa­ tion. However, he diverged from his father’s beliefs when it came to discipline. Growing up, Putin Jr saw himself as a ‘hooligan’ (Putin, Gevorkyan, et al 2000), holding his own in the gang of older kids around him. As a result, he got involved in various infractions, altercations and fights – all before he was even a teenager.

The rise of Putin 131

But things changed when Putin entered sixth grade in school. He was able to channel his energy into sports, taking up sambo and judo. This instilled in the young boy a sense of regimental discipline – something his father had always encouraged. It also had a positive impact on his academic performance, as his grades started to improve. What started out as a way of defending himself against the thugs he grew up around turned into one of the most positive influences in his life. According to Putin, ‘It was the sport that took me off the street’ (Putin, Gevorkyan, et al 2000). As Putin’s grades started improving, he was inducted into the Pioneers – an organisation for youngsters established by the Communist Party. To have any future in government or within the Communist Party during that period, one had to be a member of the Pioneers as a youth. Putin would later graduate from the Pioneers to the Komsomol, which was considered the youth wing or student wing of the Communist Party. This reflects the personal inclinations of a young man who, during the same period, went to the Committee for State Security (KGB) headquarters and asked how he could join. He was very politely told to work hard at school and study law at university, which he would bear in mind in the future. At this time, Putin was inclined to learn only three things: judo, history and German. But as he started learning the recent history both of the Soviet Union and of his family, he started to despise the Germans. One day, while he was being taught German by his teacher, Putin stated ‘I don’t want to study German any­ more.’ When asked why that was, he said, ‘My uncle died at the front and my father was made an invalid at the front by the Germans. I can’t study German. I want to study English instead’ (Judah 2013). His learning of the German language, however, would bear fruit later in his professional career. As time went on, Putin continued to do well at school and to pursue his passions of judo and sambo. He became a master at judo in 1973 and a master at sambo in 1975.1 After school, Putin acted on the advice he had received from KGB headquarters and decided to study law at Leningrad State University. He continued to excel academically at university. However, although a part of the Komsomol and still a believer in the state machinery, he was not an active functionary of the Komsomol during this period – unlike a lot of students who aspired to join the government or the Communist Party. During this time, the KGB frequently hired students as informers in order to groom them for future employment within the KGB while also rooting out dis­ sidence against the state. But Putin has denied being an informer for the KGB during this period (Jack 2006). College provided him with the space to interact with his future political mentor, Anatoly Sobchak. Putin took a keen interest in civil law and Sobchak was a professor of civil law at Leningrad State University. The two thus developed a bond over academics. However, Putin’s interest in civil law did not dampen his intention of joining the KGB. Over the years, he watched and read spy thrillers and romanticised the idea of becoming a spy. Throughout law school, he kept wondering and waiting for the man he had spoken to at the KGB to ‘remember him’; but this did not

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happen. Finally, when Putin was in his fourth year of college, he was contacted by someone to discuss ‘a future job assignment’. This is what Putin had been waiting for during his studies and he knew right away that he was on the verge of securing his dream job at the KGB. He met with the KGB officer a handful of times – interactions which led the KGB officer to conclude that Putin was ‘not particularly outgoing but energetic, flexible, and brave. Most importantly, he was good at connecting with people fast—a key quality for a KGB officer, especially if he plans to work in intelligence’ (Hutchins and Korobko 2012). Putin graduated from law school in 1974 and joined the KGB in 1975 (Hutchins and Korobko 2012), first training in counter-terrorism measures at the 401st KGB school in Leningrad. He then briefly worked in the ‘second depart­ ment’ (counterintelligence), before being transferred to the far more prestigious and elite ‘first department’, monitoring foreigners and consular officials in Leningrad (Sakwa 2004). He also had to become an official member of the Communist Party. It was during this period that Putin met his future wife, Lyudmila, through an acquaintance. They courted for three years before marrying in 1983. They went on to have two children and remained together for almost three decades before announcing their divorce in 2013. Putin also experienced changes in his professional life as he advanced through the ranks, eventually being recommended by his superiors to join the Red Banner Institute in 1984. This was a badge of honour within the KGB, as only those with a strong analytical mind and language skills were accepted. This is where Putin’s early learning of the German language came into good use. The entrance process was gruelling, with candidates tested for physical and mental endurance. Putin made the cut and eventually graduated from the Red Banner Institute the follow­ ing year, aged 32. Throughout his time with the KGB, he was never able to reveal his true occupation to his family. He told the people close to him that he was a police officer working with the Crime Investigation Department. Upon graduating from the Red Banner Institute, Putin was told to report to duty at the KGB station in Dresden. Dresden was situated in East Germany, which, according to Putin’s own testimony, was a ‘harshly totalitarian country, like the Soviet Union, only 30 years earlier’ (Putin, Gevorkyan, et al 2000). East Germany was also almost bankrupt and surviving only due to a loan issued by West Ger­ many. All around the Eastern Bloc, a mood of protest was increasing amid the misery and shortages of the planned economy and the brutality of state law enfor­ cement agencies (Belton 2020). There is some debate as to what exactly Putin’s duties were while stationed at Dresden. His goal, according to German intelligence analysts, was to steal ‘western technologies and NATO secrets’ (Hoffman 2000). Putin denies this, stating that his goal was rather to gather information and recruit informers. While this did not fit his romanticised version of a spy’s duties, he nonetheless performed them and successfully established contacts within Germany, some of which he maintains to this day. However, Putin’s stay in Dresden did not last long. As East Germany and the Soviet Union’s economic situation became more unstable, so too did their political

The rise of Putin 133

state. Gorbachev tried to reform the Soviet Union, but East Germany refused to follow suit, with disastrous consequences. Political unrest began to grow and protests against the East German administration increased, eventually leading to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. As the streets of Berlin were filled with euphoria, the KGB office in Dresden was filled with paranoia and dread. The anti-Eastern Bloc protests became so intense that the KGB decided to burn all files on its agents and operations so urgently that, as Putin put it, ‘the furnace burst’ (Sakwa 2004). On the evening of 6 December, the paranoia of KGB officials in Dresden would turn out to be well founded, as their office were surrounded by an angry mob of protesters. Putin called on the local Soviet army barracks for help and was told: ‘We cannot do anything without orders from Moscow. And Moscow is silent.’ It was at this point that Putin realised ‘that the country no longer existed. That it had disappeared’ (Sakwa 2004). As a child, Putin had grown up believing in the Soviet Union and the principles on which the state was built. These principles also influenced his own life decisions; but the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union left him disillusioned and questioning not only the principles on which his family and he had been born and raised, but also his own life choices (Putin, Gevorkyan, et al 2000). He returned to his homeland, but the prevailing mood was very different from when he had left. He also had an exis­ tential crisis, questioning everything that he had believed growing up. Back in St Petersburg, Putin was offered a job at the Foreign Intelligence Agency in Moscow, but he turned it down. While some suggest that this was because the job did not provide accommodation for him and his family, it may also be attributed to his state of mind during this period: he was disillusioned with the system and seemed to be waiting for its inevitable demise. In his own words, ‘I knew that there was no future to the system. The country didn’t have a future. And it would have been very difficult to sit inside the system and wait for it all to collapse around me’ (Putin, Gevorkyan, et al 2000). He eventually joined his alma mater, Leningrad State University, with the intention of studying further and maybe even applying for a doctoral degree. However, he was soon appointed head of the foreign section and thus became assistant rector for international affairs (Sakwa 2004). All the while, he remained a member of the KGB’s active reserves. Through his peers at the university, he reconnected with Anatoly Sobchak. At the time, Sobchak was at the helm of the democratic movement that was forming within St Petersburg. He was also a member of Gorbachev’s Consultative Council and would later oversee the drafting of the Constitution for the Russian Federation. In 1991, following the coup against Gorbachev, Putin officially resigned from the KGB. Some people, however, remain sceptical as to whether Putin ever actually ‘left’ the KGB; when questioned about it, Putin responded that he did not agree with the coup and did not want to be part of the intelligence in the new administration (Putin 2017). Sobchak went on to appoint Putin as his assistant, which gave him his start – however humble – in Russian politics. However, this decision to hire an ex-KGB ‘spy’ invoked the ire of Sobchak’s colleagues in the democratic movement, who felt

134 Russia

that Putin had been installed by the KGB to collect information on them, much as he had done in Dresden. Sobchak came to the defence of Putin, retorting to the naysayers: ‘Putin is no KGB operative but my former student’ (Blotskii 2002). While Sobchak was a good academic and had novel ideas on the future of St Petersburg and Russia, he was no politician. Having been elected as mayor, he soon demonstrated his inability to maintain rule and consensus among the city’s people and politicians. In such instances, Putin in turn would step up to support his mentor. He was eventually appointed deputy mayor by Sobchak, who at this point was so dependent on Putin that ‘he refused to sign any documents unless pre­ viously signatured by Putin’ (Sakwa 2004). St Petersburg became a microcosm of all the evils plaguing Russia during that period. As such, it became known as the crime capital of the nation. It also saw heightened corruption, even within the city legislature. Even Sobchak was not immune to this. He was accused of buying himself an apartment using city funds while Russia and St Petersburg were in economic turmoil. Putin, however, did not share the same reputation as his mentor. He had a good relationship with the city legislature and cracked down hard on crime. In one interview, he stated: If the criminals have attacked authority there must be an appropriate punish­ ment. It’s a policeman’s duty to be severe and cruel if necessary. It is the only way to reduce criminality – the only way. We hope to eliminate ten criminals for each officer killed … within the law, of course. (Judah 2013) Despite his decent image, Putin still attracted his own share of corruption allega­ tions. In 1991, he signed agreements with foreign companies to ship food from abroad in order to save ‘St Petersburg from a famine’ (Judah 2013). The deal was worth $122 million; but the food never arrived. As a result, some members of the city legislature called for his resignation and even prosecution. However, Sobchak stood by him; and Putin soon repaid the favour. In 1996, when Sobchak was up for re-election and under attack from his rivals regarding the crime and corruption in the city, Putin – who at this point was heading Sobchak’s campaign – came to his defence, calling his opponent, Vladimir Yakolev, ‘Judas’. However, the re-election bid proved unsuccessful and Sobchak lost. This was the first and only time that Putin ever lost an election. He was dejected, as he felt personally responsible for the loss. He refused to work for the new mayor and resigned. This decision not to work for Sobchak’s successor proved to be a landmark event in Putin’s career. Meanwhile, in Moscow, other important developments were unfolding. Pre­ sident Boris Yeltsin’s public image was deteriorating and his second term, which had kicked off in 1996, was proving rocky, to put it mildly. Yeltsin had come to power on the back of peripheral factors such as the lack of a proper opposition and the backing of the rich Russian oligarchs instead of public appeal. One such oli­ garch in his camp was close aide Boris Berezovsky. When it looked as though the

The rise of Putin 135

opposition would succeed in overthrowing Yeltsin and prosecute him for the ailing state of Russia’s democracy and on corruption charges, Berezovsky was tasked with finding a favourable successor who would bring some reassurance to a populace that was growing increasingly uneasy with each passing day. Berezovsky had become acquainted with Putin in St Petersburg. Putin, who had since moved to the Kremlin to work, was rising through the bureaucratic ranks. He piqued the interest of his old acquaintance and made an impression on Bere­ zovsky as a young ex-KGB agent with democratic leanings, and for the loyalty which he had demonstrated towards his mentor. Given these qualities, in July 1998, Putin was appointed as the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) – the organisational successor to the KGB. During his time as head of the FSB, Putin proved his usefulness to Yeltsin and his family. He became the ‘family bodyguard’ (Judah 2013) for Yeltsin’s inner circle. He got rid of their enemies; prevented investigations into corruption inside the Kremlin; and on one occasion, released a graphic sex tape that discredited the state prosecutor who was part of an investigation into Yeltsin’s daughter (Judah 2013). Putin was also an unknown figure on the political scene, so the Yeltsin camp felt less threatened while considering him as a possible successor. Putin eventually gained Yeltsin’s trust and in August 1999, Yeltsin appointed him as one of the three first deputy prime ministers. Putin was subsequently appointed as the acting prime minister.

Note 1 Sambo was developed for military purposes in Russia and is considered to be one of the most effective martial arts for self-defence. It combines judo with other combat skills, including wrestling, boxing and even street fighting.

References Belton, Catherine. 2020. Did Vladimir Putin Support Anti-Western Terrorists as a Young KGB Officer? Politico, 6 June. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/06/20/ vladimir-putin-dresden-kgb-330203. Blotskii, Oleg. 2002. Vladimir Putin, Book 2. Osmos Press. Gessen, Masha. 2012. The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin. Penguin Group. Hoffman, David. 2000. Putin’s Career Rooted in Russia’s KGB. Washington Post, 30 January. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/russiagov/putin.htm. Hutchins, Chris and Korobko, Alexander. 2012. Putin. Troubador Publishing Ltd. Jack, Andrew. 2006. Inside Putin’s Russia – Can There be Reform without Democracy? Oxford University Press. Judah, Ben. 2013. The President from Nowhere. In Ben Judah. Fragile Empire: How Russia fell in and out of Love with Vladimir Putin. The University Press. Putin, Vladimir. 2017. Interview by Oliver Stone. The Putin Interviews. Putin, Vladimir, Gevorkyan, Nataliya, Timakova, Natalya and Kolesnikov, Andrei. 2000. First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. Public Affairs. Sakwa, Richard. 2004. Putin – Russia’s Choice. Routledge.

12

PUTIN’S RUSSIA The System and the Man

The main challenges that Russia experienced during the chaotic transition years of the 1990s revolved around the efforts to rebuild a market economy, redistribute power in the bureaucracy and regain the trust of a suppressed people and make them willing participants in the economy. Putin had to navigate these changes first as Sobchak’s deputy and then later as part of the bureaucracy in the Kremlin. This exercise proved challenging because, after almost seven decades of Soviet rule, entire generations had never experienced what it felt like to live in a society where citizens were not merely contributors towards the country’s progress, but also active participants in directing its trajectory. Russia somehow survived this chaotic period of economic uncertainty to cement its position as a major political actor of the 21st century. This chapter examines how this transition occurred under Vladimir Putin, who has dominated Russian politics (and its political economy) since the mid-1990s.

The Backdrop to Putin’s Rise In attempting to change Soviet society, Gorbachev sought to preserve the status quo of the Communist Party while also trying to render it more legitimate by introducing dissent and political opposition to the mix (Talbott 2017). He intro­ duced market reforms, hoping to leverage the ensuing efficiency and prosperity to support his efforts to revolutionise the union. However, revolutions are started by the people, which is something that Gorbachev failed to factor into his calculations. This miscalculation also resulted in a less participatory population in the Russian Federation. During the August coup attempt by the Communist hardliners in 1991, Boris Yeltsin – the newly elected president of the Soviet Socialist Federal Republic – emerged as a major political figure. The image of Yeltsin standing on the top of a DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-15

Russia under Putin 137

tank to prevent hardliners from taking over the Russian White House in Moscow still resonates today. As a result of this historic event, Yeltsin eclipsed Gorbachev as the prime candidate to lead Russia. However, the changes that came about under Yeltsin in the 1990s suffered from the same flaws as the liberalisation and democratisation attempts under Gorbachev in the late 1980s: they lacked the support of the common people. The participants who thwarted the August coup attempt were a ‘small percentage of the citizens, mostly better educated and middle-aged … The workers and the young stayed away’ (Kenez 2006, 275). After Yeltsin took over as president of the Russian Federation, there was a period of transition during which both institutions and the government struggled to find their feet, which did little to boost confidence among the people. The initial attempts to impose order took the form of economic transformations, which, according to Yeltsin’s camp, would form the basis of democratisation (McFaul 1991). However, these ignored the political and social aspects of democratisation. This absence of structure led different factions to believe in different models for the ultimate state power. While the Congress of People’s Deputies – a group of elected indivi­ duals – believed that the highest power in the sovereign should rest with them, Yeltsin believed that it should remain with the president (ibid). Considerable ambiguity and political friction followed these disagreements, which brought the country to the brink of another civil war. In response, Yeltsin disbanded the Parliament on 21 September 1993. During this process, the opposition leadership barricaded themselves in Moscow’s White House, which thus witnessed a second major political event in just two years (the first being the attempted coup in August 1991). Clashes broke out between police and anti-Yeltsin protestors and Russia’s major television tower, the Ostankino Tower, was attacked. A state of emergency was declared on 4 October and by midday, troops loyal to Yeltsin had secured the building and detained the opposition leaders. The chaos in October 1993 paved the way for a referendum in December 1993, in which the Russian citizens ratified the new basic laws. This new set of laws, which formed the basis of the Constitution, confirmed the equal rights of all con­ stituent elements and provided a set of rules to structure executive-legislative rela­ tions. The new Constitution also included provisions on fair elections. By the summer of 1996, a new Parliament and a formally elected Boris Yeltsin had taken charge of the country. Meanwhile, the economy was experiencing a fast-paced transformation. The rationale for these changes came from the belief that ‘during a time of extraordinary political change, sweeping changes are politically possible and the public is more willing to endure the pain of higher prices and economic dislocation’ (Desai 2005). This fast-paced transformation – famously dubbed ‘shock therapy’ – included measures such as price liberalisation; controlled money supply; reduced government borrowing from the central bank to prevent inflation; a pegged exchange rate; and massive amounts of foreign aid. However, when prices were liberalised by presidential decrees and aggressive goals to eliminate budget deficits were proposed in the first quarter of

138 Russia

1992, this was seen as a classic Soviet-style proposal which had no support from the people or the backing of Parliament (ibid). The privatisation efforts under Yeltsin’s regime also make for an interesting case study. These occurred in two stages. The first stage involved the distribution of vouchers worth SUR 10,000 to every man, woman, and child in Russia, which could then be used to purchase shares in privatised companies. This effort created a buzz among the people, giving them the opportunity to be asset owners, and was one of the peripheral reasons that kept Yeltsin’s appeal intact prior to the 1993 referendum. In reality, there was a deep asymmetry in information regarding the real worth of factories that were put up for sale. Due to this gap, many people received very little for their vouchers; it was rather the middlemen and brokers with greater informational access who came out on top as the main benefactors, as cash-hungry citizens sold their vouchers to them for less than their true value. The second stage was a ‘loans-for-shares’ programme. As part of this project, the government sold stakes in valuable natural resource enterprises to major business­ men in the country. This programme helped a few large groups to consolidate power and shored up the market hegemony of the Russian oligarchs (Shleifer and Treisman 2005). In 1992, the oligarchs owned Russia’s leading trading companies, banks and investment funds. These individuals had the financial capital to purchase ownership interests in industrial enterprises during the privatisation auctions. As these individuals amassed further wealth, they also became potent political forces. Anatoly Chubais, a politician from Yeltsin’s camp, stated: ‘I strongly believe that the only way of preventing [the communist leader] Zyuganoc from becoming the president in 1996 was the creation of big private business in Russia’ (Desai 2005). While the economic outcome of the loans-for-shares programme is still debated, the social outcome is less so. The Russian people – who had received little to nothing from the voucher programme – perceived the loans-for-shares programme as a corrupt initiative that deprived them of assets developed collectively during the Soviet era. This affected people’s perceptions of the liberalisation effort. Yeltsin was also struggling with his image and public perceptions. He was infamous for arriving drunk to international gatherings; in one such instance, he seized the baton from the conductor of a Berlin police orchestra and attempted to conduct, causing the country much embarrassment before the international media (Weaver 2007). He also appeared sick and suffered from heart problems, which sometimes forced him to avoid the public eye. These factors significantly eroded his integrity as a leader to guide Russia into a new era. Amid these economic and social uncertainties, Yeltsin’s saving grace was the fact that he was perceived as the lesser evil. By the time the 1996 election came around, he had gotten his act together: he appeared more composed and sober during the campaign, and lost weight to reassure the people of his health. This improvement in his image, combined with the peripheral factors of a supportive oligarchy and the lack of an attractive opposition, resulted in his re-election. However, despite his best efforts, Yeltsin could no longer hide the deterioration of his health from voters after the 1996 elections. He was often away from his

Russia under Putin 139

presidential duties for months; and during these periods, it was the prime minister who oversaw the various affairs of the country. Up until 1998, this position was filled by Viktor Chernomyrdin, who had been Yeltsin’s prime minister since 1992. However, as Yeltsin’s health declined, his fears about his subordinates getting more powerful increased and Chernomyrdin was dismissed in 1998. These fears continued with other leaders too, and from March 1998 to August 1999 the country had five prime ministers. The fifth person on this list was Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

Putin’s Rise Putin’s appointment took place in the shadow of a financial crisis and an ill-planned war in Chechnya. Russia had been struggling with the ghosts of an over-industrialised economy and inefficient heavy industry since the Soviet Union was dissolved. This resulted in a 40% drop in gross domestic product (GDP) between 1989 and 1996,1 with multiple bouts of hyperinflation. In mid-1995, as part of a stabilisation programme to achieve single-digit inflation by 1997 and to shrink the fiscal deficit of the federal government, the government turned to a fixed exchange rate; shifted away from printing money to debt financing of the deficit; and restricted credit to the private sector (Pinto and Ulatov 2010). However, what followed was a jump in real interest rates and an appreciation in the real exchange rate. This was caused by external political factors and the liber­ alisation of the rouble treasury bill and notes market, also known as the GKO market, which included the removal of restrictions on foreign participation in the GKO market. When the East Asian crisis hit, Korean and Brazilian investors began exiting the GKO market due to liquidity pressures at home. This had a knock-on effect for the Russian economy, exacerbating the Russian public debt exchange rate crisis (Pinto and Ulatov 2010). Oil prices in 1997–98 dipped dramatically (as shown in Figure 12.2), impacting the federal budget – especially after the country had just emerged from an expensive war. The First Chechen War was fought from 1994 to 1996 and was ordered by Yeltsin over concerns about the effects of Chechen separatism spilling over into other neighbouring regions and in turn disrupting the balance in the Caucasus. Another concern was the risk of losing oil revenue, as a major pipeline from the Caspian oil fields runs through Chechnya. The invasion was carried out without the consultation of Parliament and the resulting war stretched on for months, demoralising the Russian people. The retaliation by Chechen fighters was felt on Russian soil when the Russian town of Budyonnovsk was attacked and several policemen were killed when 2,000 patients in a hospital were taken hostage. This further soured public perceptions of Yeltsin’s decisions. Finally, pressure from the public, economic strain and concerns surrounding his re-election coerced Yeltsin to declare a ceasefire in 1996. This conflict would become a significant event in both Russian society and politics.

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Official GDP (constant prices) Electricity consumption Final consumption of households Real retail trade turnovr

120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 FIGURE 12.1 Economic change in Russia 1990–2002 Source: Shleifer and Treisman 2005

14.5

1.65 1988

1991

1994

1997

2000

2003

2006

2009

2012

2015 2018

FIGURE 12.2 Revenue minus production cost of oil as percentage of GDP Source: The Global Economy n.d.

All this political, economic, and military turmoil preceded Putin’s appointment as prime minister. Up to this point, Putin was not a well-known figure. Shortly after his appointment as prime minister, Yeltsin resigned from his post as president, six months before his term was supposed to end. Putin was appointed as the acting president on 1 January 2000. As Yeltsin had leveraged the state media to turn public opinion against the other major contenders, when Putin came to power, the opposition was already weak. Putin’s exploitation of this weakness reflects his understanding of the importance of timing. He brought forward the date of the election, thus robbing the opposition of time that they could have otherwise used to campaign. Meanwhile, Putin differed from Yeltsin in all the ‘right’ ways. In the words of Angela Stint, an author and observer: ‘When Putin came out he was such a

Russia under Putin 141

contrast to Yeltsin. He was young. He appeared to be fit’ (Martirosyan 2019). However, Putin also hailed from the Yeltsin camp, creating a sense of continuity which was welcomed by a people who had endured a tumultuous decade and did not want to return to Communist leadership. While Putin was seen as a ‘welcome change’ and entered a conducive political climate, he still had to win the people over to prevail in the election and con­ solidate control. The opportunity presented itself in the form of a second Chechen War. The Chechen conflict was reignited in August 1999 when Russia’s Dagestan region was infiltrated and declared as an independent state by the rebels. In Sep­ tember 1999, shortly after Putin’s appointment as prime minister, a series of explosions in Buynaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk killed more than 300 people. The bombings provided enough justification for Russia to take the fight to Chechnya and, in May 2000, to establish direct rule over the region. Militant resistance continued and many civilian casualties were reported on both sides. Some critics believe that the bombings in September 1999 were staged events to justify Russia’s subsequent involvement in the war. In an interview, David Satter2 stated: in summer of 1999 the approval [rating] of the former president of Yeltsin was 2%. There appeared to be no chance whatsoever that Putin, who was desig­ nated by Yeltsin … could possibly become the next Russian president. The apartment bombings changed everything … Putin came forward as the saviour of the country. He was put in charge of a war in Chechnya. The apartment bombings were blamed on Chechens without any evidence whatsoever. As a result of this successful prosecution of that war, against all odds, he was elected as the next Russian president. (Satter 2018) While these factors helped to improve Putin’s image as a strongman, his limited presence on the political scene before his appointment as prime minister helped to shelter him from the stereotype of corruption that had plagued major parts of the political fabric in the 1990s. This stereotype can be traced back to the early 1990s, when weak institutions and political struggles gave rise to a system in which orga­ nised crime, corrupt government officials and an ambitious business fraternity all had one thing in common: making money. This worsened to the point where officials demanded bribes to get anything done and society was perceived as increasingly corrupt since 1992 (see Table 12.1). Putin avoided this stereotype through the judicious shaping and use of his public profile. Although Putin avoided being cast as a corrupt politician, there is evidence that he might have presented this image simply as a matter of convenience – his deal­ ings with the oligarchs being one such example. During the course of privatisation in Russia, the oligarchs amassed vast wealth and political power. They had pre­ viously used their influence to support Yeltsin’s presidential candidature in 1996. Fearing that this influence might become greater than his own, Putin decided to

142 Russia

TABLE 12.1 Corruption Perceptions Index for select countries (10= highly clean, 0= highly

corrupt)

Italy

Poland

Czech Republic Hungary

Russia

Score Rank­ ing Score Rank­ ing Score Rank­ ing Score Rank­ ing Score Rank­ ing

1980– 1985

1988– 1992

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

4.9 31/54

4.3 34/54

3.6 40/54

5.2 27/54

5.1 27/54

5.2 27/54

1.6 46/54

5.2 26/54

5.1 27/54

3.3 39/54

3.4 34/ 54 5.6 24/ 54 5.4 25/ 54 4.9 31/ 54 2.6 48/ 54

5 30/ 52 5.1 29/ 52 5.2 27/ 52 5.2 28/ 52 2.3 49/ 54

4.6 39/ 85 4.6 39/ 85 4.8 37/ 85 5 33/ 85 2.4 49/ 54

4.7 38/ 99 4.2 44/ 99 4.6 39/ 99 5.2 31/ 99 2.4 76/ 85

4.6 39/ 90 4.1 43/ 90 4.3 42/ 90 5.2 32/ 90 2.1 82/ 90

5.5 29/ 91 4.1 44/ 91 3.9 47/ 91 5.3 31/ 91 2.3 79/ 81

5.2 31/ 102 4 45/ 102 3.7 52/ 102 4.9 33/ 102 2.7 71/ 102

Source: Buckley 2018

take precautions. In July 2000, Putin let the oligarchs know that ‘he would not interfere with their businesses or renationalise state resources as long as they stayed out of politics – that is, as long as they did not challenge or criticise the president’ (Goldman 2004). This signalled the beginning of a new type of state-business relationship, in which business was expected to stay out of state affairs. This would continue throughout Putin’s presidency.

Russia under Putin (2000–2008) Putin’s first two terms as president coincided with Russia’s economic recovery from the 1998 financial crisis. The country’s GDP increased by 70% and invest­ ments by 125% (Engel 2017). Russia experienced a steady growth rate of 6% to 7% per year from 2001 to 2004, inflation was low and the Russian central bank had $100 billion in foreign exchange reserves (Desai 2005). Putin continued the economic liberalisation that had been initiated in the 1990s under Yeltsin. He oversaw many reforms as part of this exercise, such as the adoption of a tax code that introduced a uniform personal tax rate and reduced the corporate tax rate; a land transaction bill; a criminal code; and a joint stock company law (Desai 2005). This created a conducive environment for economic development and investment. While Putin saw economic recovery as an important factor in building a new Russia, he did not think the same about democracy. The economic reforms were accompanied by a change in the composition of the upper house of Parliament

Russia under Putin 143

8 7.5 7 6.5 6 5.5 5 4.5 4 3.5 3

2001

2002

2003

2004

Russia growth rate (in percentage) from 2001–2004 Source: The World Bank nd

FIGURE 12.3

from a group of elected officials to a group of presidential appointees; the suspi­ cious killing of journalists; and the imprisonment of business tycoons who displayed political ambitions. One of the major business tycoons who fell prey to Putin’s efforts to retain control was Mikhail Khodorkovsky. With an estimated net worth of $15 billion, Kho­ dorkovsky was one of the richest people in Russia, topping the Russian Forbes list of oligarchs worth $1 billion or more in 2004 (Goldman 2004). Khodorkovsky owned 78% of Yukos, an oil and gas company that was privatised during the loans-for-shares programme in the 1990s. Khodorkovsky also enjoyed immense political influence – especially in the lower house of Parliament, the Duma. It is said that he bought as many as 100 seats in the Duma and would actively promote legislation that would benefit Yukos (Goldman 2004). Along with Khodorkovsky, other businessmen who owned media outlets often used their platforms to increase their influence and criticise Putin, especially on his policies in Chechnya and his response to the sinking of a nuclear-powered submarine in the Barents Sea in 2000.3 Khodorkovsky’s control over the Duma and accumulation of wealth did not go unnoticed. As his power grew, he became increasingly vocal in his criticisms of Putin and his support for opposition parties and candidates. In October 2003, Kho­ dorkovsky was arrested. While this move increased Putin’s poll ratings from 70% to 80% (Goldman 2004), it also highlighted the authoritarian tendencies inherent in Putin’s brand of politics, in which competition and dissent were restricted as soon as they gained momentum. These characteristics would become increasingly apparent in Russian politics – most famously in the cases of journalist Anna Politkovskaya and opposition leader Alexei Navalny, as explored later in this text.

144 Russia

Putin was re-elected with more than 70% of the vote in March 2004. However, his re-election was soon followed by an event which put a chink in his armour: the Beslan school siege in September 2004. A similar hostage crisis had taken place at Moscow’s Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002. In both tragedies, numerous people were killed due to the government’s refusal to negotiate with the captors – a move that could have reduced the number of casualties. In the Beslan school siege, more than 300 people died, including 186 children. Putin faced public criticism due to his controversial handling of this incident. His economic adviser, Andrey Illarionov, who resigned in 2005, was greatly impacted by the event. He later said that Russia was no longer a ‘free country’ and had ‘radically changed’ (Finn 2005). The siege also attracted cri­ ticism from the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that Russia had failed in its handling of the crisis (BBC 2017). One of the journalists who reported on the Beslan school siege was Anna Politkovskaya. While most journalists adopted a ‘state-friendly position’ (Polit­ kovskaya 2004) on the event, she focused on the government’s lack of action and the dire straits in which the parents found themselves as they were kept in the dark on the siege’s developments. She was poisoned while on her way to report on the event but chose to carry on with her coverage notwithstanding. On 7 October 2006, Politkovskaya was shot dead as she was getting into an elevator in her apartment building in central Moscow. She was the 13th journalist to be murdered in Russia since Putin came to power. Vigils were held and the Moscow Union of Journalists called the murder ‘a new attack on democracy, freedom of speech and openness in Russia’ (Parfitt 2006). In addition to this crackdown on media and journalists, Putin also ramped up his concerning centralisation efforts during this period. For example, while regional governors were previously elected by the people, in 2005 this method changed to government appointment (Åslund 2009). However, although critics and international observers became increasingly vocal in condemning the crackdown on dissent, intense centralisation in the government, Putin’s consolidation of power and the lack of a proper opposition, these trends inspired only limited domestic backlash. One explanation for the Russian people’s lack of concern was that, for the first time in many years, they were experiencing better and more stable living conditions. Rising international fuel prices helped the government to recover from the financial crisis of 1998 and greatly benefited the economy. Income inequality was also contracting, as reflected in a decreasing Gini coefficient, improved poverty rates and an overall decrease in unemployment rates (Figure 12.5). This was one case in which the Russian economy’s dependence on fuel prices proved beneficial. However, revenue diversification had been a key challenge for the country since before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As of 2018, the share of oil and gas production in the Russian economy increased from 34.3% to 38.9% (Warsaw Institute 2020). Figure 12.7 depicts how international fuel prices fluc­ tuated during important historical events.

Russia under Putin 145

0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Gini

0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Poverty FIGURE 12.4 Poverty and inequality in Russia, 1994–2015 Source: Lisina and Kerm 2019

15 10 5 0 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 Unemployment rate, %

Unemployment rates in Russia, 1992–2016 Source: Lisina and Kerm 2019

FIGURE 12.5

Throughout its history, the Soviet Union, given its Communist nature, had declared itself an atheist state. In the words of Lenin: Religion is the opium of the people … All modern religions and churches, all and every kind of religious organisations are always considered by Marxism as the organs of bourgeois reaction, used for the protection of the exploitation and the stupefaction of the working class. (Ellis and Kolchyna 2017)

146 Russia

Soviet/Russia politician history v oil price Brent crude*oil price per barrel, $, 2013

SOVIET UNION 1975: “HELSINKI ACCORDS” AGREED WITH THE WEST

1979: AFGANISTAN INVANSION

Chernenko

Andropov

Brezhnev

2014: 2009: OBAMA’S “RELATIONS RESETS” ANNECTION 2008: OF CRIMEA 1991: FALL OF 1998: ROUBLE FINANCIAL CRISIS & WAR IN SOVIET UNION CRISIS WAR IN GEORGIA UKRAINE

Gorbachev

Yeltsin

Putin

2015: AIR STRIKES IN SYRIA

Medvedev Putin

120 100 80 60 40 20

1970

75

80

Sources: BP:Thomson Routers

85

90

95

2000

05

10

*Arabian tight to 1983

16

0

January 20th

FIGURE 12.6 Russian political history versus oil prices since the 1970s Source: The Economist 2016

Belief in religion, specifically the Russian Orthodox Church, remained low for the duration of the Soviet Union’s existence. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the people became disillusioned with the concepts of state and Communism, and belief in the Russian Orthodox Church began to rise once more (Figure 12.7). Putin, who had been baptised during his childhood by his mother (Putin, Gevork­ yan, et al 2000), decided to use the church as a means to strengthen his rule. Although the Russian government remained a secular state, Putin decided to relax restrictions on religion. Putin himself formed a close bond with the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Kiriil, who himself was a former KGB agent4 like Putin. This bond between state and church would later be satirised by Russian female punk band Pussy Riot at a performance in 2012, as a result of which band members were jailed (BBC 2012). With religion now playing an important role in the country’s transition, distinct generations emerged within Russian society who saw things in different ways. Older generations had experienced pre-Putin Russia, while younger ones were growing up in Putin’s Russia.5 The former had a favourable opinion of Putin and his efforts to create a new Russia, devoid of lengthy food lines, rampant unem­ ployment and blatant corruption. The addition of religion to this mix further lent a spiritual aspect to the state, reminiscent of that under the tsars. The generation that came of age under Putin’s rule experienced a comfortable, functional society. Daily political events had little impact on them; Putin had successfully inured them to politics as long as their lives were comfortable. However, this did not last forever, as people soon became more sensitive to human rights violations and the lack of political opposition in Russian society.

Russia under Putin 147

In Eastern Europe, sharp rise in share of adults who descibe themselves as Orthodox Christians % who identify as Orthodox 1991

2015 78

75

71% 69

39

37%

Russie

Bulgaria

Ukraine

Note: 1991 data are from "pulse of Europe" survey conducted by Pew Research Center's predecessor organization, the Times Mirror Center for the People & the press. The 1991 survey in Russia excluded the eastem part of country, which represents approximately 33% of the population. However, a survey conducted by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in all parts of Russia in the same year found in the share of Orthodox in Russia to be roughly the same as the Times Mirror Survey (31%). Source: Survey conducted June 2015. July 2016 in 18 countries. See Methodology for details. "Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastem Europe" PEW RESEARCH CENTER

FIGURE 12.7 Share of adults describing themselves as Orthodox Source: Pew Research Center 2017

Putin’s Russia (2008–Present) The Russian Constitution limits any president from serving more than two continuous terms. As a result, Putin named Dimitri Medvedev as his preferred successor in May 2008; Medvedev went on to win the election with 70% of the vote and Putin became prime minister. Shortly after the election, Russia fought and won a short war with Georgia, from 8 August to 12 August 2008. During this war, Russia signalled its status as a renewed military power to the West; and while many international groups and countries called for a ceasefire, none stepped in to halt Russia’s advances. By the time they ceased, Russian forces had reached within 30 miles of Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi. By this stage, Russia was also beginning to lose some of the economic momen­ tum that it had enjoyed during Putin’s first two terms. The global financial crisis of 2008, a decline in the Russian stock market and falling oil prices pushed the

148 Russia

country into recession. The GDP growth rate plunged to -7.8% in 2009 from the previous year’s 5.2% (Figure 12.8) and foreign exchange reserves contracted by $131 billion in 2008 (Barannik 2010). In December 2008, Medvedev’s administration extended the president’s term from the previous four years to six years. Many observers suspected that this was done with the aim of allowing Putin to be elected for a longer timeframe in the next term (Trudolyubov 2020). As expected, Putin went on to win the next election in 2012, but this time amid accusations of an election. Mass protests erupted around the country, the most notable of which was the Bolotnaya Square protest that took place before Putin’s inauguration on 6 May. Thousands of people gathered in Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square for the protest – the first in a series of demonstrations that marked a shift in the status quo within Russian politics. Previously, most of the protesters had largely stayed out of politics, preferring their comfortable lives under the first two terms of Putin’s pre­ sidency. However, they could no longer disguise their disappointment with the gov­ ernment’s economic performance. A few months prior to this, 50,000 people had gathered to allege ballot-rigging and demand a re-run of the 2011 legislative elections. These protests were supported by smaller rallies in other Russian cities (BBC 2011). Hundreds were detained and numerous people were prosecuted. While the protests themselves died out as a result of repression, isolation and the imposition of significant fines on participants (Bryanski 2012), the shift they caused in society marked the start of a small yet significant opposition to Putin’s rule. In the following years, Russia dealt a major foreign policy blow with the annexation of Crimea. In March 2014, Russian forces annexed Crimea – officially 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6

FIGURE 12.8 GDP growth (%) from 1998–2020 Source: The World Bank nd

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

-10

1998

-8

Russia under Putin 149

part of Ukraine – in response to a Ukrainian social movement in favour of EU accession. Crimea lies on the peninsula between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, separated from Russia by the narrow Kerch Strait. Major Crimean infra­ structure was occupied by Russian forces and plainclothes Russian soldiers, and on 6 March the Crimean Peninsula voted to accede to Russia. The whole situation generated considerable buzz domestically. For the Russian people, this served as an exciting distraction from the deteriorating economy. Russian Orthodox thinkers offered theological cover for Moscow’s imperial ambitions (Stroop 2018). Putin also used this cover to defend the annexation, stating: Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization, and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. (Putin 2014) Support for the annexation was thus strong within Russia – not least due to the political manipulation of the people through the news and media (Ragozin 2019). However, it drew the ire of the international community in the form of sanctions. The costs of the Crimean annexation also weighed heavily on Moscow’s budget. From annexation to 2019, Russia donated an estimated $20 billion to the Crimean budget and spent $3.6 billion on a 19-kilometre bridge connecting the Russian mainland to Crimea (Umland 2020). The following year, Russia launched airstrikes in Syria – its largest Middle Eastern intervention in decades, which established it as a major player in the region. Putin was re-elected president for the fourth time in 2018 with a vote share of 76.7%. Amid several social and political changes introduced in 2020, Putin put forward constitutional amendments that included ‘marriage to be defined as the union of a man and woman’ and ‘a proclamation of Russians’ faith in God’ (BBC 2020b). The amendments met both with the approval of the Russian Orthodox Church and with an international backlash – especially given the unsafe environ­ ment in which the country’s LGBTQI+ community lives. However, according to a ROMIR survey in 2013, the church’s approval rating (66%) was even higher than Putin’s (63%) (Freeze 2017). This reflects the influence of the church in Russia, which had increased ever since Christianity was recognised under a reli­ gious freedom law in 1997 (Radyuhin 2011). Its growing influence gave Putin sufficient validation for his pro-religious proposals. Meanwhile, the unrest that had surrounded the 2012 election continued in the following years and had a significant impact on Putin’s party, United Russia, in the 2019 election for Moscow City Council. Before the election, several opposition candidates were barred from participating. As a result, thousands of pro-democracy protestors took to the streets to demand a free and fair election. While the barred opposition leaders did not get to participate in the election, with some degree of strategising, different factions managed to win 19 of the 45 seats up for grabs (Hodge 2019).

150 Russia

The strategy employed, called ‘Smart Voting’, involved voting for anyone who might be able to defeat the pro-government candidate. Although Putin was still in power, it is clear that change was now taking place in how people perceived their leader in the absence of high-profile military exploits and economic prosperity. This change in society also gave rise to a new opposition. One of the opposition members was Alexei Navalny, a young blogger and Putin critic. For years, Navalny has been trying to use activism to challenge the systems of corruption and patron­ age that have proliferated under Putin’s regime. He employs social media to rally younger Russians and the Anti-Corruption Foundation to fight corruption in the country. He also attempted to challenge Putin at the polls by seeking to compete in the 2018 election, although the Central Election Commission refused to register him as a candidate. Some of his supporters were elected to the local councils in Siberia in 2020 (BBC 2021). In August 2020, Navalny was poisoned and was nearly killed by a nerve agent attack. He was flown to Berlin after falling ill on a flight and remained in a coma for a few weeks. International organisations and countries condemned the poisoning; Germany’s former chancellor, Angela Merkel, stated that there were ‘serious questions that only the Russian government can and must answer’ (BBC 2020a). After his recovery, when he returned to Russia in January 2021, Navalny was detained by the authorities on the grounds that he had violated the probation period from an earlier embezzlement case, which Navalny claims was politically motivated. In June 2021, a Moscow court denounced Navalny as an extremist and banned political organisations linked to him. This was in the lead-up to the 2021 legislative election, in which the ruling party was expected to lose ground in favour of Navalny’s supporters.

The System and the Man Navalny represents a new generation of Russians who are ready to critique and take on Putin. However, the change that he is seeking to engender will be slow, because Putin has created a conducive environment in which to flourish and a political system that has allowed him to remain in office. Putin’s success in doing so can be explained by the fact that he was not perceived to be a disrupter, but rather more of a restorer (Åslund 2009). While his immediate predecessors, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, were seen as reformers,6 Putin adopted a more traditional approach. The influence of conformist parents during his childhood, his education and a career that followed a traditional trajectory contributed to Putin’s personality and perceptions. His rise was also assisted by a socio-political environment that was resistant to change and leadership. Upon the country’s inception, the people were subjected to a radically new concept of the state under Lenin, even before they had completely escaped the clutches of Tsarist Russia. Stalin and then Lenin, who collectively ruled Russia for almost four decades, left in their stead a system that depended on the whims of a select group of officials, creating an environment in which people felt the need to curry favour with those who held power and to censor any criticisms.7

Russia under Putin 151

While reforms did occur following Stalin’s death, these primarily focused on ending the reign of terror that Stalin had established throughout his tenure. As a result, the system remained a potent presence in public life. Following repeated attempts, some improvements could finally be seen in increased freedom of expres­ sion and the availability of new economic opportunities. However, in a country with a population of roughly 280 million,8 decision making remained highly centralised. While international observers welcomed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian people saw this as a disruption of the way of life they had known their entire lives. The shockwaves generated by this upheaval could be contained only through appropriate and timely reforms; and while liberalisation can be an extremely effective tool in promoting prosperity, it can also be quite merciless. This was evident throughout the political and economic upheaval of the 1990s. While Gorbachev’s efforts in the preceding decade had tarnished perceptions of liberalisation, the dual measures of the voucher programme and the loans-for-shares programme exacer­ bated not only these perceptions, but also wealth disparities within the country. Policies that were intended to promote prosperity and facilitate Russia’s transition to a market economy merely helped the already wealthy, such as the oligarchs, by increasing their riches while simultaneously increasing public anger. This resentment would later play a significant role in Russia’s evolution. Additionally, the political reforms that elevated the president to the top of the political hierarchy paved the way for a leader such as Putin, whose subsequent acts demonstrated both his approval of market reforms and his contempt for democratic ideals (Åslund 2009). Putin has now been at the helm of Russia’s political affairs for more than two decades. During this time, he has employed many strategies to retain power, from switching between the offices of president and prime minister to extending the duration of the president’s term – all while consolidating his grip on national pol­ itics at the central and local levels. In April 2021, as part of a wider set of constitutional changes initiated in 2020, Putin signed a new law allowing him to stay in office until 2036 (Reuters Staff 2021). The law limits any future president to two terms in office and also resets the term count, which means that Putin can stay in power for 12 more years once his present term ends. While these political changes have caused concern among many international observers, Russia itself continues to deal with the economic and societal impacts of COVID-19. Russia’s future now depends on how the population reacts to Putin’s rule once the state of emergency imposed during the pandemic is lifted. The real question is: will a new generation of leaders, activists and political opponents suc­ cessfully steer Russia in a new direction; or will Putin retain his iron grip on the country for another decade?

Notes 1 Some academics argue that this data might not reflect the ground reality due to the ten­ dency of the Soviet Union to over-report its output (Shleifer and Treisman 2005).

152 Russia

2 David Satter is a US journalist who covered Russian politics for years before being expelled from the country after claiming that President Putin and Russia’s Federal Security Service may have been involved in the Chechen bombings. 3 For more information see Rainsford 2015. 4 For further reading see Satter 2009. 5 For further reading see Dougherty 2020 and Luhn 2015. 6 Reformers in the sense that Gorbachev introduced the concepts of glasnost and perestroika, while Yeltsin introduced liberal reforms to society. For further reading see Åslund 2009. 7 As observed under Stalin, when dissent was low and state control of people’s activities was high. 8 As of 1990.

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Satter, David, interview by Business Insider. 2009. Putin Runs The Russian State And The Russian Church Too. Forbes, 20 February. https://www.forbes.com/2009/02/20/putin­ solzhenitsyn-kirill-russia-opinions-contributors_orthodox_church.html?sh=5754b5973bf9. Satter, David, interview by Business Insider. 2018. How A 1999 Russian Bombing Led to Putin’s Rise To Power ( 22 March). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AVumec3ZQ9A. Shleifer, Andrei, and Treisman, Daniel. 2005. A Normal Country: Russia After Commun­ ism. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(1), 151–174. doi:10.1257/0895330053147949. Stroop, Chrissy. 2018. Putin Wants God (or at Least the Church) on His Side. Foreign Policy, 10 September. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/10/putin-wants-god-or-at-least-the­ church-on-his-side/. Talbott, Stobe. 2017. The Man Who Lost an Empire. Brookings, 7 December. https://www. brookings.edu/articles/the-man-who-lost-an-empire/. The Economist. 2016. Oil Price and Russian Politics: A history. 21 January. https://www. economist.com/graphic-detail/2016/01/21/oil-price-and-russian-politics-a-history. The Global Economy. nd. Russia: Oil Revenue. https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/ Russia/oil_revenue/. The World Bank. nd. GDP growth (annual %)- Russian Federation. https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2004&locations=RU&start=2001&view=chart. Trudolyubov, Maxim. 2020. Breaking Presidential Term Limits in Russia and Beyond. Wilson Center, 30 June. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/breaking-presidentia l-term-limits-russia-and-beyond. Umland, Andreas. 2020. Crimea could become an expensive liability for Putin. Atlantic Council, 9 June. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/crimea-could-becom e-an-expensive-liability-for-putin/. Warsaw Institute. 2020. Russia’s Economy Is Becoming Heavily Dependent on Hydrocarbons. 24 February. https://warsawinstitute.org/russias-economy-becoming-heavily-dependent-hy drocarbons/. Weaver, Matthew. 2007. Boris Yeltsin’s Magic Moments. The Guardian, 23 April. https:// www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2007/apr/23/borisyeltsins.

13

PART CONCLUSION: RUSSIA

Putin’s rise and eventual consolidation of control over Russia were both the direct consequence of his actions and the indirect result of Russia’s tumultuous trajectory. From the fall of the tsars to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, these events – which ushered in deep societal and political reforms – are nodal points in Russia’s history that have had a major impact on the country and its people. While the Russian people endured these upheavals, the true cost of this turbulent century was imprinted on the national psyche. The initiation of this transformation can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century, by which time Russia had already fallen behind the rest of Europe in terms of progress. It had missed out on the Renaissance and was behind the curve when it came to industrialisation. This meant that agriculture remained Russia’s primary economic activity for many years into the 20th century. Russia’s agrarian community only emerged from serfdom in the 19th century and, in the absence of state-led rehabilitation initiatives, continued to suffer from the poverty that had afflicted their forefathers. Another repressed and overworked segment of society emerged as a result of Russia’s industrialisation at the end of the 19th century. Like the peasants, these labourers were mistreated and underpaid, and forced to live in substandard conditions. The uprisings of 1905 and the successful revolution of 1917 were a consequence of the years of apathy shown towards the peasants and workers by the ruling nobility and the tsars. The 1905 upheavals sufficiently shocked the nobles and the tsar to prompt the establishment of the Duma, which was supposed to operate as the elected representative of the people. However, the Duma lacked real influence over national affairs and as a result, there was little improvement in the circumstances of the workers and the peasants. The scene was thus set for the 1917 Revolution; and the death and starvation that ensued from World War I served as the spark. The spontaneous and DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-16

156 Russia

unorganised nature of the 1905 uprisings was again a feature of the 1917 Revolution, which was a leaderless and disorganised undertaking. As various groups competed to lead the revolution, its real stakeholders – the people – were ignored. The country thus descended into civil war immediately after gaining independence from the tsar. The years of civil war and the wartime Communism employed during this period resulted in strict controls on grain production, nationalisation of trade and industry, and the confiscation of financial capital. This caused widespread deprivation, as the strategy emphasised growing only enough grain to feed the citizens of the Soviet Union. This caused widespread hunger among the urban population, which soon relocated to the countryside to escape poor urban living conditions. This reverse migration harmed the country’s skilled labour force and had a detrimental effect on industrial production. After the civil war ended, the Bolsheviks seized control of the country. By lib­ eralising agricultural production, reversing nationalisation and easing trade restric­ tions, they established the framework for a mixed economy. This provided some respite for one segment of the revolution: the workers. While workers became important participants in society and the soviets important centres of interaction and civil deliberation in the cities, village communes still enjoyed centrality in rural areas. The Bolsheviks also did not enjoy widespread backing from the church, which was a close ally of the tsarist administration. This absence of ties to two critical stakeholders – village communes and the church – weakened the Bolsheviks’ political grip in rural areas. After Lenin’s health deteriorated in 1922, Stalin assumed power and took drastic measures to revitalise the economy. These included agricultural control, wage manipulation and rapid industrialisation. Additionally, the collectivisation of agri­ culture had a major impact on production. Private agriculture was abolished as a result, depriving farmers of any motivation to offer better prices and greater choice. As a result, production decreased. Collectivisation was a watershed moment in Russia’s post-revolutionary history. It marked the beginning of a series of events that would render mute an active and participative populace. As well as his radical political views, Stalin was notorious for his paranoia and intolerance. From 1924 to 1953, he purged the Bolshevik Party of any dissenters, creating an environment of favouritism in which any criticism or dialogue deemed unfavourable was silenced. This top-down transformation seeped down to the wider populace. Stalin’s authoritarianism thus repressed people not only in terms of the opportunities available to them, but also mentally in terms of the kinds of opinions that were permissible in society. These restrictions psychologically inhib­ ited the Russian people: civil society engagement almost ceased to exist, while nepotism thrived and became a widely accepted and normalised way of life. In the period after Stalin’s death – often referred to as the ‘post-Stalin thaw’ – several politicians vied to assume control to the same degree as their predecessors; but this was a period marked by successive transformations. From Khrushchev to Brezhnev, these successors attempted to manage the thaw; while the former openly

Part conclusion: Russia 157

acknowledged the downsides of Stalin’s authoritarian rule, the latter tried to restore some of the state’s grip under Stalin. Putin spent his early years in this setting. Putin was born in 1952 into a family that had lived through war. Based in Leningrad, they had witnessed the siege of the city firsthand. Although Putin grew up during the thaw, his opinions were significantly influenced by his family’s experiences and outlooks. As Judah notes, Putin’s family was conformist (Judah 2013). However, this did not make life any simpler for them: living in an over­ crowded, underheated apartment, poverty and misery were always just one misstep away. Nonetheless, as difficult as these conditions may sound, they were still superior to those endured by most Russian citizens. Thus, Putin was moulded by his environment into a strong and tenacious child. Meanwhile, the post-Stalin thaw also resulted in an expansion of civil liberties. Although this was officially frowned upon, the younger generation took it upon themselves to express dissent and create art – trends which marked a fundamental shift in the Soviet Union’s approach to individual freedom. Even in this more hospitable atmosphere, Putin chose a career path that was a secure and traditional choice for someone seeking a better life. He grew into an energetic young man and an engaged student. He quickly discovered useful outlets for his energy in the form of martial arts and the youth wing of the Communist Party, the latter of which would later assist him in pursuing a career in the KGB. In an era when contacts were the only path to prosperity, the KGB provided a crucial entry point for hopefuls – a route into the echelons of the wealthy and powerful. An unofficial prerequisite to get into the KGB was an education in law; so Putin duly graduated from law school in the 1970s and joined the KGB. In the 1970s, as Russian relations with the US improved and Brezhnev attemp­ ted to re-establish power over the populace, Putin rose through the ranks of the KGB. Eventually, his superiors recommended him to join the elite Red Banner Institute in 1984. Putin was assigned to the Dresden KGB station in East Germany after graduating from the Red Banner Institute. At the time, Mikhail Gorbachev was pursuing his policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) as part of his efforts to reform the Soviet Union into a more democratic framework. These policies increased freedom of expression while simultaneously shocking the market. They thus served as a double-edged sword, as the economy deteriorated while the public was free to criticise government poli­ cies. Gorbachev’s reformation efforts had a significant impact on the stability of the region, particularly in the volatile area around Dresden. This instability peaked with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which left the KGB officers in Dresden to fend for themselves. This is when Putin realised that the state mechanisms and upwards trajectory that he had placed his faith in might soon be rendered obsolete. Disappointed, he returned home and accepted a position as assistant rector for foreign relations at his former university. Here he reconnected with an old colleague, Anatoly Sobchak, the man who would later become St Petersburg’s mayor.

158 Russia

Meanwhile, the country was undergoing its third major transition in a century. The first was the 1917 Revolution; the second was Stalin’s appointment as leader of the Soviet Union; and the third was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin succeeded Gorbachev in a coup orchestrated by a small group of affluent and elite members of society. The extent of public participation in this coup, which was minimal, signalled the change that Russian society had undergone in terms of civil engagement after Stalin’s presidency. Thus, although the people who were in power claimed that things had changed, for all practical purposes, the conditions of the Russian populace did not improve significantly. Instead, more disruptions to the economy were caused by Yeltsin’s attempts to democratise the country. Privatisation took place in two stages: the voucher programme and the ‘loans-for-shares’ programme. Initially, the voucher programme – which enabled every man, woman and child to own shares in Russian industries – increased public morale. However, inadequate management of the programme turned this potentially significant project into a source of contention. On the other hand, the ‘loans-for-shares’ programme was perceived by the populace as a sell-off of the industries that had been built through the collective efforts of the people in Soviet times. This is where Putin saw the opportunity to distinguish himself. Throughout the 1990s, during which these transformations were occurring, Putin worked for Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor of St Petersburg, who appointed him as deputy mayor. As an ex-KGB member in politics, Putin was initially viewed with suspi­ cion; and public distrust only grew as the politicians around him became mired in corruption allegations. However, Putin maintained a favourable public image by being tough on crime while maintaining cordial connections with the city legis­ lature. After Sobchak lost his attempt at re-election in 1996, Putin was offered the chance to work in the Kremlin – a move which served as his springboard to the upper echelons of Russian power. Meanwhile, Yeltsin’s public image was deteriorating. The leader who had cap­ tivated the public imagination in 1991 had become a drunkard, humiliating Russia on the world stage. Putin’s refusal to work for Sobchak’s successor in the St Petersburg administration demonstrated his loyalty, which aided Yeltsin in his decision to appoint him as prime minister. Yeltsin resigned shortly after his appointment, leaving Putin in control of a country reeling from economic diffi­ culties and the First Chechen War. Putin had previously enjoyed little public attention; he was a relatively obscure figure among the general public. As a result, he avoided being perceived as corrupt by the people, which in turn boosted his legitimacy when he was initially appointed instead of elected. Putin brought forward the election date to cement his legitimacy as a leader and deprive the opposition of an opportunity to mount a credible campaign. The Second Chechen War and Putin’s swift actions during the same boosted his image as a man of action. Exhausted from years of deprivation and change, the people sought an honest, dignified, action-oriented leader – and Putin duly

Part conclusion: Russia 159

delivered. He provided the Russian people with what they required in a leader; while the economic recovery following the 1998 financial crisis provided them with what they desired – better opportunities. Understandably, the people subconsciously iden­ tified the economic recovery with this new leader, who appeared to be different from the string of disappointing presidents they had previously endured. But while the public may have identified Putin with wealth, Putin did not necessarily associate prosperity with a democratic state model. His upbringing in a conformist family and his experience working within the state apparatus had ingrained in him an appreciation for the state. As previously discussed, the post-Stalin thaw established a climate in which most of the important changes were initiated from the top down. Putin harked back to this climate by implementing economic reforms which were accompanied by changes to the composition of Parliament, the assassination of journalists and the detention of oligarchs with political aspirations. For a long time, these executions and detentions elicited little public outrage – primarily because the people were finally enjoying a period of relative stability. These circumstances combined to produce a leader who was unconcerned about people’s impressions and input, and a society that remained absent from the political sphere. It was only after the siege of the Beslan school and the assassination of journalist Anna Politkovskaya that an air of mistrust began to emerge. Domestic and interna­ tional condemnations poured in as Russian citizens flooded the streets to conduct vigils and voice their opposition to the assault on democracy and liberties. This marked a shift in public opinion, which gradually matured into true public engagement over the years. When his first two consecutive terms as president expired, Putin succeeded in electing his favoured successor, Dimitri Medvedev, to the office and became prime minister himself. Medvedev increased the presidential term from four to six years; and Putin was once again elected as president the following term. By then, however, momentum had gathered against Putin. The country experienced widespread protests against what was perceived as an unfair election, kicking off a series of demonstrations. This newfound public consciousness spawned a new generation of leaders, such as Alexei Navalny, who criticised the prevailing political climate for its homogeneity, unfairness and lack of discussion. The impact of this new generation of leaders has been slow but steady. Due to its gradual pace, it will be some time before we witness tangible changes in the support that Putin enjoys. For now, Putin remains one of the oldest and most powerful of the leaders currently explored in this text. It remains to be seen how his rule will unfold in the environment that he has shaped for two decades.

References Judah, Ben. 2013. The President from Nowhere. In Ben Judah, How Russia Fell in and out of Love with Vladimir Putin. The University Press.

PART IV

Brazil

14

THE PAST AS A GUIDE TO THE PRESENT

In 1500, the fleet of Portuguese ambassador Pedro Álvares Cabral set sail from Lisbon with the goal of replicating Vasco da Gama’s historic trip to India three years before. Their goal was to reach Calicut, on India’s Malabar coast. Cabral, who had little to no sailing expertise at the time, ventured too far southwest into the Atlantic and the fleet landed in Porto Seguro.1 Cabral ended up exploring a new territory and claiming it as a Portuguese colony. The resource that the Portuguese found most valuable in this colony was the pau brasil:2 a tree that later gave the colony its name. This discovery of a commodity that could be used both for dyeing fabrics and for making weapons led to the colonisation of Brazil’s land and its people. Since then, the country’s trajectory has followed a familiar tale of colonisation and exploitation – especially of the indi­ genous people, who were pushed even further to the fringes of society when the Portuguese added another group of oppressed people to the mix by bringing in African slaves to work on the land. Redemption for Brazil came in the form of Dom Pedro I. When Napoleon inva­ ded Portugal in 1808, Dom Pedro I’s father, King João, and the rest of the Portuguese court fled from Portugal to re-establish themselves in Rio de Janeiro. Up to this point, the focus for centuries had been on stripping Brazil of its resources – not least follow­ ing the discovery of emeralds, diamonds and gold in the Minas Gerais area in the southeast of the country, which began to export 3,000 pounds of gold a year to Por­ tugal. However, when circumstances forced the Portuguese nobility to move to Brazil, they took initiatives to develop the country, constructing buildings, roads, banks and universities before returning to Portugal in 1821. Dom Pedro I stayed behind as the regent. Under his leadership, the colony of Brazil seceded from the Portuguese Empire, which led to the Brazilian War of Independence. In August 1825, the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro was signed, which recognised Brazil as an independent state that was no longer under the control of the Portuguese Empire. DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-18

164 Brazil

Dom Pedro I eventually abdicated the throne, leaving the leadership of the nation to his son, Pedro II. Pedro II became the ruler of Brazil at just 14. Despite his young age, he successfully governed Brazil and went on to abolish slavery in 1888 – a move which greatly irked the country’s elite. As a result, the landowners and slave owners worked in conjunction with the military to stage a coup, estab­ lishing what would be known until 1930 as the ‘Republic of the United States of Brazil’. That same year, a group of jurists and politicians began drafting the Old Republic Constitution and threw out the Imperial Constitution that had been formulated by Dom Pedro I. Brazil’s first Constitution was enacted in 1891 and denied women and illiterates the right to vote. This disenfranchisement of a major chunk of the population, which included the indigenous peoples and the descendants of the previously enslaved, would have long-term effects and would help the elite to consolidate power for nearly 40 years. The next major change for the country came in the 1930s, when the economic blow dealt by the Great Depression to the national economy paved the way for another change in government – this time led by a band of middle-class industrialists, planters and military reformers. These stakeholders were represented by Getúlio Vargas.

End of World War II Vargas came to power in 1930 and sought to include the workers – who had previously been ignored by the country’s elite – within the Brazilian social system in three ways: in the firm, through job stability which engendered mutual commitment between social classes for the welfare of some and the prosperity of others; in the state, through participation in trade unions as state agencies and in the corporative mechanisms of decision-making, which also embraced the upper classes; and in consumer society, a factor guaranteed by the establishment of a minimum wage. (Cardoso 2016) This inclusion of workers’ welfare was a first in Brazilian society, which had pre­ viously been shaped by the upper echelons. Vargas held onto power in the following years, delaying elections several times for various reasons until 1945. In 1945, as the country waited for the promised election, the domestic opposition – which had been resisting Vargas since 1930 – began to organise themselves with the support of a group of army officials and the middle and upper civilian classes of society. As a result, the Uniao Democratica Nacional (UDN) was formed. Soon, the army command – backed by the elite, who wanted to direct more attention towards economic liberalisation instead of pro­ labour initiatives – issued Vargas with an ultimatum asking him to resign

Brazil’s transitions 165

immediately. This forced him to cooperate, resulting in a bloodless coup. The military conducted a democratic election in 1945, which saw two military officers face off against each other. The winner was General Eurico Gaspar Dutra. Backed by society’s elite, Dutra echoed the anti-Communist sentiment prevalent in the aftermath of World War II and committed to America’s goal of fighting the Soviet threat everywhere. In 1947, he pushed the Supreme Electoral Court to outlaw the Communist Party (Bethell 2008) – in part to appease the Sao Paulo businessmen who had backed him. Vargas came back into power as a democratically elected leader in 1951. In his second term, he launched an ambitious economic programme that had state con­ trol of the petroleum industry at its core. However, domestic opposition and eco­ nomic instability hampered the execution of this programme, leading to a political crisis. Halfway through his term, he was accused of masterminding an attempt to assassinate one of his political rivals. Soon, the military started calling for his resig­ nation again. Before that could happen, however, Vargas shot himself in August 1954 (Fonseca nd) (Ioris and Ioris 2013). Vargas’ lasting contribution to the Brazilian economy was kickstarting the policy of import substitution industrialisation. After World War II, this policy was adop­ ted by many developing countries in the early stages of industrialisation. It was seen as an imperative to reduce foreign dependency by replacing foreign imports with domestic production. The goal of industrialisation took centre stage, as the belief that heavy industrialisation was the only way to consolidate national security took root. Thus, significant progress was made ramping up industrial processes in the 1950s (Figure 14.1). This focus on industrial growth was also spurred by Brazil’s booming population in the 1940s. By 1950, the share of the population classified as urban had increased by 10% when compared to the previous decade, reaching 40% (Skidmore 1999b). This change in the composition of the urban population marked a significant shift 18 16 14 12 Industry growth rate (%)

10 8

GDP growth rate (%)

6 4 2 0 1953

1955

1958

FIGURE 14.1 Comparison of industry and GDP growth rate Source: Tyler 1976

166 Brazil

in Brazilian society, as more people depended on industry-based employment for their livelihoods. This everyday demand was translated into a political agenda as the population of migrants demanding basic amenities and employment increased. Shanty towns called favelas that housed a significant chunk of this population sprang up on the outskirts of major cities. Juscelino Kubitschek, the erstwhile governor of Minas Gerais, succeeded Vargas. Observing the prevailing sentiment and the need to evolve economically, he adopted Vargas’ vision of economic development, launching the ‘Fifty Years in Five’ programme. This main aim of this programme was to achieve 50 years of development in the course of just five. As part of this, he initiated and led the construction of Brasilia – a new city meant to serve as the country’s new capital of Brazil. Its location in the rural highlands was intended to offer new opportunities in the country’s internal regions and reduce the resentment of citizens in these regions towards big coastal cities such as Sao Paolo. Heavy industry and infrastructure projects were promoted as part of the gov­ ernment’s ambitious plan to achieve 50 years of development in five. These initiatives were expected to generate employment opportunities for the Brazilian people. As part of this approach, Kubitschek tried to walk a fine line on centrist economic strategy by focusing on both public investment and private investment. The National Bank of Economic Development helped to channel funds for major infrastructure projects as part of the public focus of this economic strategy. Meanwhile, a government commission solicited bids for the creation of a national automobile industry as part of the private focus of the strategy (Skidmore 1999b). When Kubitschek left office in 1961, Brazil had an integrated motor vehicle industry, which paved the way for the development of many subsidiary industries that are vital to vehicle production. This industry was created from scratch (ibid). Along with improvements in electricity generation and road build­ ing, this offset one of the more draining projects of Kubitschek’s tenure: the con­ struction of Brasilia. This expensive financing continued despite growing inflation and rising balance of payments deficits. By 1960, ‘there wasn’t a penny left in the coffers, but key sectors of the economy (such as the auto industry) were function­ ing at full steam’ (Fonseca nd). Kubitschek’s legacy was twofold. On one hand, he can be credited with mod­ ernising the nation, with Brasilia the symbol of this new modernity; but on the other, he pushed Brazil towards economic vulnerability by resorting to massive unchecked spending to make this possible. The national debt grew steadily from 10.64% in 1950 to 21.88% in 1961 (International Monetary Fund nd), and infla­ tion increased by 43 percentage points from 1960 to 1964. His campaign that promised 50 years of growth in five had been fulfilled; but as the opposition at the time pointed out, he had also brought 50 years of inflation in five (Fausto 1999). Inflation is a phenomenon that often has a direct impact on society, making the price of essentials costlier, which affects lower income households in the worst possible way, further contributing to increasing inequality between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.

Brazil’s transitions 167

Throughout Brazil’s history, systemic inequality had festered in society. As the last country in the Western world to abolish slavery, Brazil had an oppressed population that had either directly experienced exploitation or was experiencing the generational burden of slavery. For centuries, the indigenous population had also been marginalised on the fringes of society. These two groups were the victims of systemic oppression for years, along with mixed-race populations and other people living in poverty. All these groups suffered mainly because of the consolidation of power undertaken by the elite and the landowners in the decades following Brazilian independence. Income inequality added another dimension to these conditions; as did the prevailing corruption in Brazilian society, in which only the rich and connected had the opportunity to progress. Janio Quadros, who succeeded Kubitschek in 1961, based his election campaign on this. With the campaign symbol of a broom, Quadros ran on the slogan of ‘sweeping away corruption’. According to Skidmore (1999), Quadros’ success can mainly be attributed to his charisma. His anti-corruption drive and oratory skills led to the evolution of his image as a messiah. He became the presidential candidate for the UDN. However, once in power, his team was faced with an ailing economy and a drained treasury. While Quadros tried to tackle these problems, he soon discovered that his charisma and oratory skills were of little help with the Brazilian Congress, political commentators and the opposition. This was exacerbated by his ten­ dency towards spontaneity when issuing presidential orders and launching ambiguous economic stabilisation programmes. In order to address the obstacles to his stabilisation programme and encourage Congress to submit to his meth­ ods, he tendered his resignation, expecting Congress to reject it. However, Congress accepted his resignation, and he soon stepped down and left for Europe. Within one year of the election, Brazil was left leaderless again. Quadros was succeeded by Vice President Joao Goulart, who was seen as Vargas’ man with leftist leanings (Fonseca nd). Goulart’s affiliation with the then deceased President Vargas put him at odds with the three military ministers, as they thought he was too radical for the presidency. They issued a manifesto ‘denouncing Goulart as subversive and pledging to prevent his succession to the presidency’ (Skidmore 1999b). However, he was nonetheless democratically elected as president in 1961. To minimise friction, a compromise was reached through which Goulard accepted, with some resistance, a reduction in his powers as president. However, this com­ promise assured peace for only three years, as he was overthrown by the military on 31 March 1964 (Fonseca nd).

Military Coup and Brazil’s Transition to Democracy The military coup took place in the early hours of 31 March 1964 due to growing concerns that the president was leading the country towards Communism.3 There followed 21 years of military rule in Brazil. A military dictatorship was established to implement economic policies that were deemed necessary while suppressing

168 Brazil

public discontent. The goal was to transform Brazil into a modern capitalist econ­ omy and a military superpower. Accordingly, reforms were introduced to remove the distortions created by import substitution industrialisation, curb inflation, incentivise foreign investment and promote exports. This led to rapid growth in gross domestic product (GDP), which averaged 11% annually (The World Bank nd.) in the period from 1968 to 1973. This period greatly influenced and defined Brazil’s domestic, economic and political trajectory in the following years. Brazil was led by five military generals, starting with Humberto Castello Branco and ending with João Figueiredo, during the years of military rule. The military seized power, suppressed dissent and tried to shape political opposition within the country. When dissent and unfavourable public opinion increased in the late 1960s, the military government became strin­ gent with censorship and used torture to quash opponents (Skidmore 1999b). Faced with a rise in dissent, the military tried to seek legitimacy by partnering with the UDN; however, this did not work, as the alliance lost two key gubernatorial elections in 1965. Shortly thereafter, the military abolished all political parties and put in place a two-party system with the ruling party and a single opposition party (Bethell and Castro 2008). This increase in suppression led to a rise in resistance groups around the country from 1969. These groups robbed banks, distributed anti-military flyers and kidnapped foreign diplomats in an attempt to demonstrate the weakness of the government. They also used their hostages as bargaining chips for the release of captured guerrillas. Against the backdrop of these political developments, the 1970s proved to be an important decade for the Brazilian economy. Inflation rates were under control and the stabilisation plan seemed to be working. This strengthening of the economy allowed Brazil to withstand the oil shock of 1973. However, the country would soon be faced with the external debt crisis of the 1980s. The average rate of growth dropped to 2.1%, while the population was growing at a rate of 1.7% annually; thus, GDP per capita growth was dangerously low in the early 1980s. This was accompanied by uncontrollable inflation that had reached almost 3000% by 1990 (The World Bank nd). The interest rates that were made available to Brazil shot up as they were dependent on global factors and Brazil soon ran out of its foreign exchange reserves. The 1980s were marked by low growth and invest­ ment, and high inflation. The price of imported oil nearly doubled due to the second oil crisis4 and world interest rates increased sharply, which worsened Brazil’s balance of payments and foreign debt problems. Foreign investment declined from an average of $2 billion in the 1970s to $500 million in 1988. Despite this, the government short-sightedly continued to borrow money in order to achieve high growth levels. Increasing uncertainty regarding the future of the economy characterised this period, which was dubbed ‘the lost decade’. To make matters worse, the government budget was badly managed due to excessive state involvement in the economy. The public deficit stood at 5.4% of GDP in 1986. Foreign borrowing and debt monetisation helped the government to finance the deficit. Monthly inflation increased from 3% in the late 1970s to more than

Brazil’s transitions 169

50% by mid-1994 (Islam 1998). In open economies, budget deficits led to an increase in interest rates, which in turn raised the exchange rate and value of the currency. As a result, exports became expensive and imports cheaper, which gen­ erated a trade deficit. Thus, Brazil fell into the inevitable trap of twin deficits.5 The 1980s ended with high and accelerating inflation along with enormous public debt and a stagnant economy that did not recover after the Cruzado Plan.6 This stagnation led to increased inequality, which in turn gave rise to social tensions. By 1983, the poorest 20% of the population owned only 2.4% of the national income, while the richest 20% owned 62.6% (World Bank 1991). This created a violent crime problem that led to Brazil becoming known as one of the murder capitals of the world. Killings increased by 80% among young children between the ages of 10 and 14 during the 1980s (Caldeira and Holston 1999). Most of the districts in the city of Sao Paulo with the highest rates of murder (75–97 per 100,000 of the population) were very poor, while those with between just three and 15 murders per 100,000 were upper-class districts (ibid). During this time, President João Figueiredo started a gradual process of re­ democratisation. He wanted to transfer power to civilian rule, despite opposition from military hardliners. Over the years, the military had become inept at main­ taining the two-party system and hence it began to ease its repression in order to eventually transition out of power. To this end, the military establishment used the democrats within the military to contact leaders of the civilian opposition, one of which was the Catholic Church. While the transition to democracy was initiated in 1974, it took Brazil another decade to finally transfer power into civil hands in 1985 (Fonseca nd). The inclusion of the Catholic Church in this process gave religion a more prominent role in domestic politics. Tancredo Neves was elected to the office of president in 1985 through the indirect vote of an electoral college. However, he died just before his investiture, due to an infection after a routine surgery. In his place, Jose Sarney took power. Sarney did not exactly control inflation or produce a miracle for the Brazilian economy and society during his tenure; but certain changes were noticed none­ theless. The primary development was the new Constitution of 1988, which established the Public Prosecutor’s Office, also called the Public Ministry, as an independent body. This body played an important role in countering corruption – so much so that Michel Temer, the 37th president of Brazil (2016–2018), called it the fourth branch of the Brazilian Republic (Associação do Ministério Público do Distrito Federal e Territórios nd). Its importance stemmed mainly from its inde­ pendent budget and autonomy. Brazil held its first direct presidential elections after 1964 in 1989. At this point, the economy was in recession, while inflation was gathering pace. Fernando Collor de Mello assumed the office of president in 1990 and got straight to work on tackling inflation. The Collor Plan was orthodox in its stabilisation strategy but was the opposite in its execution: it is considered the severest shock treatment that the Brazilian economy experienced. The centrepiece of the monetary aspect of this plan was the introduction of a new currency.7 The government imposed a limit on

170 Brazil

how much conversion could take place and froze assets beyond that, creating grave concerns about the short-term availability of money. Fiscal measures involved introducing new taxes and cutting off tax loopholes. Mello was dubbed the ‘maharajah hunter’ because of his promise to rid the government of idle and highly paid civil servants (Fonseca nd). The initial effects of the plan were dramatic and the inflation rate plummeted in two to three weeks (Figure 14.2). However, this success was short-lived: just a few months later, inflation started rising again, due to the easing of the constraints that had been imposed on conversion. By the end of the year, inflation was pushing 20% a month. On top of the failure of the Collor Plan, a corruption scam was discovered too close to home for Mello two years later: a widespread corruption scandal involving his friend and campaign manager Paulo Cesar Farias led to his ousting in December 1992. Vice-President Itamar Franco took charge after Mello’s impeachment. After grappling to form his cabinet and gain political support, he turned his attention to the inflation problem and appointed Fernando Henrique Cardoso as finance minister. Cardoso developed a stabilisation plan that was implemented with little resistance in 1994.

The Plano Real

Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)

The launch of Cardoso’s Plano Real proved to be a turning point for the Brazilian economy. The plan centred on deindexation,8 exchange rate appreciation and tariff reduction. A new currency, the real, was introduced, which had a crawling peg9 against the dollar as a nominal anchor, putting a constraint on the value of domestic money and promoting price stability. The government also embarked on large-scale liberalisation and privatisation initiatives. From July 1994 to June 1997, 26 state-owned companies were sold to the private sector, generating revenues of BRL 8.6 billion (Almeida 1997). 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

0

Year

FIGURE 14.2 Inflation soared throughout the 1980s Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data files

Brazil’s transitions 171

The plan worked: monthly inflation fell from 45% during the second quarter of 1994 to an average of less than 1% in 1996 (Clements 1997). As a result, money supply rose sharply, fuelling a dramatic increase in demand in the short term. This fall in inflation accompanied by increased demand forced the government to come up with ways to prevent the economy from overheating. It did this by controlling domestic credit and increasing real interest rates to discourage spending and encourage saving. However, a combination of high interest rates and capital account liberalisation leads to short-term capital inflows, often called ‘hot money’: the flow of funds from one country to another that occurs very quickly and can lead to market instability. This happens because the high interest rates in promising economies attract investors. On the other hand, however, this increased demand for the domestic currency causes it to appreciate, making imports cheaper and making it difficult for domestic producers to raise prices. The increase in capital inflows had a positive impact on Franco’s approval rating, which in turn influenced the presidential campaign of Fernando Henrique Car­ doso, who was supported by Franco. A former secretary of the treasury, Cardoso adhered to the dictates of the International Monetary Fund and succeeded in bringing relative economic stability ‘at the price of recession, cuts in health and educational programs, and soaring national debt’ (Fonseca nd). He also oversaw the sale of state-owned industries such as banks, mines and phone companies. He came to power for the second time in 1998 in a presidential election against Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva. Under Cardoso’s regime, some programmes were launched to address the pro­ blem of inequality – most prominently, the Bolsa-Escola Plan.10 The Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998 dealt harsh blows to the economy and by

3 2 1

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

0 -1

Current account balance (% of GDP)

-2 -3 -4 -5

FIGURE 14.3 The current account deficit reached 4% of GDP in 1998 Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files, and World Bank and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development GDP estimates

172 Brazil

1998, the current account deficit had reached 4% of GDP. The stability created by the Plano Real brought welcome relief to the poorest sections of the population, as it put an end to inflation tax. However, the policies of privatisation and liberal­ isation worked against them. Opening up the economy resulted in major dislocations. Companies modernised their processes and reduced their workforces. The new jobs that were created required qualifications and were of little help to the underprivileged. This led to the growth of the informal sector, an increase in unemployment and a further skewed distribution of income. By 2001, the top 10% of the population controlled 50% of the wealth, while the bottom 50% controlled just 12%.11 Cardoso’s popu­ larity suffered during this period and finally, a drought that triggered an energy crisis12 between June 2001 and March 2002 proved to be the last straw. Lula da Silva, who was viewed as a radical and an ardent critic of capitalism, rode this popular sentiment against reforms that had proved to be anti-poor and won the presidency in 2002.

Race and Religion in Brazilian Society Against the backdrop of these frequent changes in leadership – and the economic changes that resulted – was the diverse social fabric of the country. Brazilian society is comprised of racially and religiously diverse groups, including the indigenous peoples, the Portuguese, the Afro-Brazilians, the Europeans and the Asians. The indigenous peoples were the first residents of the territory that was later colo­ nised and named Brazil. The colonisers set up industries and developed agriculture, giving rise to a demand for labour. This demand was met by millions of African slaves brought to the country by the Portuguese. Almost 5 million African slaves were brought to Brazil to work in the fields and in the mining and sugar cane industries, leading to the emergence of a significant mixed-race population in Brazil. Further, immigration policies in the early 20th century aimed at facilitating ‘branqueamiento’, or ‘whitening’ were designed to boost the white population and improve the racial balance of Brazil (United Nations General Assembly 2016). These policies led to the inflow of almost 5.2 million Western Europeans. During the period of the ‘branqueamiento’, migration schemes were also relaxed for people from Japan and Lebanon (ibid). As of 2016, the Roman Catholic Church was the largest religious group in Brazil, accounting for nearly 65% of the population. Other religious groups repre­ sented in Brazil include Christian evangelicals, Buddhists, Muslims and Jewish communities, along with traditional African religions. The role of religion within society, like the aspects of race and ethnicity, has evolved over the decades. Due to the Catholic Church’s influence on society, it has also been a significant force in national politics. This is reflected in its role as a civilian player with which the military dictatorship communicated during the transition to democracy in the 1970s and 1980s.13 Additionally, the fact that Catholicism was the official state religion in the early years of the republic under the Portuguese meant that this

Brazil’s transitions 173

religion was adhered to by the majority of those in authority. During Vargas’ lea­ dership, the conservative Catholic Church supported the dictatorship, which strengthened the church’s position due to the regime’s ideological reliance on it (Harvard Divinity School nd). Due to its significant mixed-race population, Brazil considers itself a ‘racial democracy’, which means it is racially, ethnically and religiously diverse, without discrimination. An image of racial harmony among indigenous Brazilians, Europeans and Africans was projected by the state. This was supported by the fact that segregation was never a part of the law in Brazil, unlike in the United States. A study of race relations in Brazil in 1950, commissioned by UNESCO, claimed that Brazil had achieved the impossible by overcoming racial differences. However, just two years later, the study arrived at the opposite conclusion. It revealed that significant racial inequalities existed between the white and the other populations within Brazil – inequalities that had previously been attributed to class or wealth. It concluded that racial and social inequalities very much prevailed, and that the popular rhetoric of racial democracy was false. This acknowledgement shifted the focus to institutionalised discrimination within society and prompted calls for action from political stakeholders to address this. This reflects the importance of Article 3 of the Brazilian Constitution, which aims to promote the wellbeing of all ‘without prejudice as to origin, race, sex, colour, age and any other forms of discrimination’; and Article 5 of the Constitu­ tion, which establishes the fundamental right of equality before the law (United Nations General Assembly 2016). These racial inequalities, along with the social transformation of Brazil and the eco­ nomic ups and downs over the years, have made for a vibrant political environment. It was this environment that facilitated the rise of the leader in focus, Jair Bolsonaro. In the periods discussed in this chapter, Brazil transitioned through centuries of colonisation, a dictatorial regime and military rule. This change was compounded by the economic vulnerabilities that people had to endure during these years of transition. Such an environment is conducive to new leaders and what they bring to the table. We now explore Bolsonaro and his early life influences, as well as the leaders who preceded his rise to power and the conditions in which Brazil oscillated from one ideological disposition to another.

Notes 1 However, evidence suggests that others preceded him: Duarte Pacheco Pereira, in his book De Situ Orbis, recounts being sent to Brazil by King Manuel of Portugal in 1498 (Kimble 2017). 2 ‘Pau’ being Portuguese for ‘wood’ and ‘brasil’ a derivative of ‘brasa’, or ‘ember’. 3 The coup was supported by the US government, which had raised the alarm about the direction in which Brazil was headed in meetings as early as 1962. 4 For further reading see Graefe nd. 5 The phenomenon where a country observes both a fiscal deficit and a current account deficit. For further understanding of twin deficits, see Islam 1998.

174 Brazil

6 One of three ‘heterodox economic shocks’ designed to tackle the hyperinflation pro­ blem: the Cruzado Plan (1986), the Bresser Plan (1987) and the Summer Plan (1989). Of these, only the Cruzado Plan was effective in bringing down inflation, and even then all too briefly. 7 Or rather, the reintroduction of an old one. Collor replaced the cruzado novo with the cruzeiro. The cruzeiro was the currency of Brazil from 1942–1986 before it was briefly replaced by the cruzado and the cruzado novo. 8 A process of monetary correction that automatically adjusts for nominal values such as prices and wages, to mitigate the effects of high inflation. 9 A ‘crawling peg’ is an exchange rate system which allows for the gradual appreciation or depreciation of currency. The currency with the fixed exchange rate is frequently revised and adjusted to market factors, but it is allowed to do so within a band of rates. This allows the exchange rate to be fixed while also giving it flexibility to respond to market uncertainties. 10 A plan to provide conditional cash transfers to low-income families sending their chil­ dren to school, introduced in 1995. 11 These numbers come from the latest world inequality data provided by the World Bank and the UN in the UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database. 12 80% of Brazil’s electricity is hydroelectric. 13 The Catholic Church during the period of military rule was a vocal critic of the regime. Due to the church’s influence on the populace, it was later sought out to assist with Brazil’s transition from military rule to democracy. For further reading see Skidmore 1999 and Hewitt 1990.

References Abreu, Marcelo de Paiva. 2000. The Brazilian Economy, 1980–1994. Texto para Discussão. Afonso, José Roberto, Araújo, Eliane Cristina and Guelber Fajardo, Bernardo. 2016. The role of fiscal and monetary policies in the Brazilian economy: Understanding recent institutional reforms and economic changes. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 6241–55. doi:10.1016/j.qref.2016.07.005. Almeida, Fernando Galvão de. 1997. Privatização: A privatização na era do Plano Real. Conjuntura Economica, 51(7). Amann, Edmund and Baer, Werner. 2002. Neoliberalism and Its Consequences. Journal of Latin American Studies, 34(4) 945–959. doi:10.1017/S0022216X02006612. Associação do Ministério Público do Distrito Federal e Territórios. nd. Temer: Ministério Público é quarto Poder da República. https://amp-df.jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/2112040/tem er-ministerio-publico-e-quarto-poder-da-republica. Ayres, João, Garcia, Marcio, Guillen, Diogo and Kehoe, Patrick. 2018. The Monetary and

Fiscal History of Brazil, 1960–2016. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3238171.

Bethell, Leslie. 2008. Politics in Brazil Under Vargas, 1930–1945. In The Cambridge History of

Latin America, Volume IX, Brazil Since 1930, by Leslie Bethell. Cambridge University Press.

Bethell, Leslie and Castro, Celso. 2008. Politics in Brazil Under Military Rule, 1964–1985. Chapter. In Leslie Bethell, The Cambridge History of Latin America, 165–230. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521395243.004. Caldeira, Teresa PR and Holston, James. 1999. Democracy and Violence in Brazil. Com­ parative Studies in Society and History, October 1999, 41(4),691–729. doi:10.1017/ S0010417599003102. Cardoso, Adalberto. 2016. Work in Brazil: essays in historical and economic sociology. Universidade Do Estado Do Rio De Janeiro. doi:10.7476/9788575114551.

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Clements, Benedict. 1997. The Real Plan, Poverty and Income Distribution in Brazil. https:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/09/pdf/clements.pdf. Das, Arvind N. 1994. Brazil and India Comparing Notes on Liberalisation. Economic and Political Weekly 29(8), 416–419. Fausto, Boris. 1999. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge University Press. Fonseca, Jose. nd. A Brief History of Brazil: Colonial Days. New York Times. https://archive. nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/fodors/top/features/travel/destinations/centralandsou thamerica/brazil/riodejaneiro/fdrs_feat_129_9.html?n. Graefe, Laurel. nd. Oil Shock of 1978–79. Federal Reserve History. https://www.federalre servehistory.org/essays/oil-shock-of-1978-79. Harvard Divinity School. nd. The Catholic Church in Brazil. https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/fa q/catholic-church-brazil. Hewitt, Warren E. 1990. Religion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Brazil: The Role of the Comunidades Eclesiais de Base (CEBs). Sociological Analysis 51(2), 139–152. https:// doi.org/10.2307/3710811. International Monetary Fund. nd. International Monetary Fund: Dept % of GDP. https:// www.imf.org/external/datamapper/DEBT1@DEBT/BRA?zoom=BRA&highlight=BRA. Ioris, Rafael Rossoti and Ioris, Antonio Augusto Rossotto. 2013. Assessing development and the idea of development in the 1950s in Brazil. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 33(3) 411–426. doi:10.1590/S0101-31572013000300003. Islam, M Faizul. 1998. Brazil’s twin deficits: An empirical examination. Atlantic Economic Journal 26(2) 121–128. doi:10.1007/bf02299354. Kimble, George HT. 2017. Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis, by Duarte Pacheco Pereira. Hakluyt Society. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315580227. Leite, Alexandre César Cunha. 2016. Brazil at a Crossroads. Latin American Politics and Society,58(3), 134–141. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00322.x. Mainwaring, Scott. 1986. The Transition to Democracy in Brazil. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 28(1) 149–180. doi:10.2307/165739. Skidmore, Thomas E. 1999a. Redemocratization: New Hope, Old Problems 1985. In Thomas E Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. Oxford University Press. Skidmore, Thomas E. 1999b. Rule of the Military: 1964–85. In Thomas E Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. Oxford University Press. Skidmore, Thomas E. 1999c. World War I, the Great Depression, and Dictatorship: 1910–45. In Thomas E Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. Oxford University Press. The World Bank. nd. Brazil. https://data.worldbank.org/country/BR. The World Bank. nd. Inflation, Consumer prices (annual %): Brazil. https://data.worldbank. org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=BR. Tyler, William G. 1976. Manufactured export expansion and industrialization in Brazil. Mohr. United Nations General Assembly. 2016. Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Brazil. Vianna, Francisco J de Oleveira. 1951. Direito do trabalho e democracia social: O problema da incorporação do trabalhador no estado. José Olympio. World Bank. 1991. World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development. Oxford University Press. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5974.

15

THE ‘POOR BOY FROM SAO PAULO’ AND HIS RISE TO POWER

On 21 March 1955, in the town of Glicerio in Sao Paulo, Olinda Bonturi and Percy Geraldo Bolsonaro welcomed a new member into their family: Jair Messias Bolsonaro. There were initial disagreements over the baby’s name: after a complicated delivery, Jair’s mother wanted to name him Messias (meaning ‘Messiah’); while Bolso­ naro’s father preferred the suggestion of one of his neighbours to name him after a Brazilian football player, Jair Rosa Pinto, who also happened to have the same birthday (Saint-Clair 2018). As a compromise, he was named Jair Messias Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro had a humble childhood: his mother was a housewife and his father practised dentistry without a degree. His father supported his family by practising in an office in Glicerio and visiting patients in nearby towns and villages. This infor­ mal form of employment meant that the family did not have a steady income and hence had to move frequently. Bolsonaro was the third of six children, with two brothers and three sisters. His strict father imposed many restrictions on his sons, hoping to raise them to be smart and civilised people. His mother, a devout Catholic, offset this harshness by being caring and gentle, and ensured that religion had a continued presence in Bolso­ naro’s life. According to Bolsonaro’s brother, Renato, their mother was a very dedicated person and their father never let them do anything wrong (Domingo Espetacular 2018). In March 1964, Bolsonaro’s mother took part in the ‘March for the Family with God for Liberty’ (Carvalho 2019), a civil-military movement that overthrew President-elect Joao Goulart through a coup. The movement installed a dictator­ ship that lasted for 21 years until 1985. The family moved to Sete Barras in 1965 and to Eldorado, located in the Vale do Ribeira, the following year (ibid). Bolsonaro was reportedly a reserved, studious student who got good grades, especially in Portuguese, mathematics and science (Saint-Clair 2018). At a young DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-19

The rise of Bolsonaro 177

age, he exhibited qualities such as hard work and dedication. When he was 12, he used to help his father collect hearts of palm and passion fruit at a farm that his father managed. According to his son and biographer, Flavio, Bolsonaro’s nightly expeditions in search of hearts of palm gave him extensive knowledge of the region’s geography (ibid). Bolsonaro also fished at night. The fish were cleaned and sold in the city by his brothers the next day (ibid). Bolsonaro’s other hobbies were hunting birds and playing football in the town square.

Military Career In the 1970s, the Brazilian army was chasing Captain Carlos Lamarca, a deserter who was committed to creating a guerrilla training school for future action against the military dictatorship. He was hiding out in the Vale do Ribeira (Carvalho 2019). Bolsonaro claims that he has fought the left-wing since the 1970s, when he was a boy in the Vale do Ribeira (Ninio 2019). He helped the army to navigate the Vale do Ribeira so that they could capture Lamarca. According to son Flavio, it was during this time that one of the army men handed Bolsonaro the military prospectus that paved the way for the next stage of his life. Saint-Clair (2018) reports that Bolsonaro misinterpreted the prospectus he received in 1970; and in 1972, although he had completed a high-school equivalent education, he applied to the preparatory school for army cadets instead of directly signing up for a higher course at the Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras (AMAN) – the military academy in Agulhas Negras. Bolsonaro thus attended the Brazilian military prep school, Escola Preparatória de Cadetes do Exército, in 1973 instead. After a year at the prep school, Bolsonaro completed the test for AMAN and in early 1974 he went on to attend Brazil’s main military academy. Once at AMAN, he struggled with academics and even contemplated leaving the academy at one point. However, abiding by his father’s advice, he decided to stay. Soon he was recognised for his physical prowess (Saint-Clair 2018): he was the record holder for the four-kilometre race and his performances on the field earned him the title of ‘Cavalão’, a military nickname used for those who are in good physical shape (ibid). Ironically, when Bolsonaro applied for a skydiving course during his last year at the academy, he did not pass the medical due to a premolar cavity. At this point, Bolsonaro had his first instance of friction with his superiors. Although he had the tooth treated, he still did not make the final list of qualifying cadets because of the previous dental examination (Saint-Clair 2018). Bolsonaro challenged his omission and the medical officer in charge of the examination was called upon to testify. When the officer confirmed his disqualification, Bolsonaro called him a liar and went on to explain his treatment as advised by the medical officer. As a result, he was accepted into the skydiving group. This is one of the early examples of Bolsonaro’s outspokenness – a trait that would make frequent appearances throughout his life.1 In 1977, after finishing his paratrooper training, Bolsonaro went on to serve in the 21st Field Artillery Group (GAC) in Sao Cristovao, Rio de Janeiro. He then served in the 9th GAC, in Nioaque, Mato Grosso do Sul, from 1979 to 1981. He

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joined the Army Physical Education School in 1982 and ranked first among 45 lieutenants and captains. Bolsonaro first came into the limelight when he gave an interview in 1986 to a news magazine named Veja2 entitled ‘O salário está baixo’, which translates as ‘The salary is low’. This was the first year of democracy in Brazil after 21 years of military dictatorship. Brazil was also experiencing a period of high inflation and, according to Saint-Clair (2018), there was much discontent in the barracks. Bolsonaro was a vocal critic of the low salaries given to the troops and was reprimanded countless times by his superiors for this contestation (Saint-Clair 2018). When the army failed to respond adequately on this issue, he turned to Veja to voice his concerns. Bolsonaro’s decision to write an opinion piece that was critical of the army without a superior’s authorisation was risky and violated the army’s disciplinary regulations. The article was published during a period when the press was already critical of the military due to a wave of cadet dismissals from the military academy in Agulhas. The official reason given for these dismissals was misconduct such as homosexuality or drug use (Saint-Clair 2018). In his article, Bolsonaro contradicted the military’s official position and alleged that the military was cutting down on staff due to budget cuts instead of for misconduct, as was officially stated. An excerpt (translated) from the article reads as follows: As a captain in the Brazilian Army, on active duty, I am obliged by my con­ science to confess that the troops are in a critical situation with regard to sal­ aries… a captain with eight to nine years on the job receives … exactly 10,433 cruzados per month. A third sergeant, with the same length of stay and the same additional benefits, receives no more than 4,134 cruzados. (Saint-Clair 2018) Bolsonaro ended the article by acknowledging that this exposé could risk his career in the military, but stated that it was his responsibility to do so, which is why he had gone public. The article had a significant impact both on his career and on his position among his peers. Career-wise, he was accused of being excessively ambi­ tious and was punished by the commander of the 8th GAC, Colonel Ary Schittini Mesquitta, for his conduct (Carvalho 2019). He was imprisoned for 15 days for violating six articles of the army’s disciplinary regulations. As this was Bolsonaro’s first offence, he got off with what most considered a lenient punishment (Carvalho 2019). However, he received plaudits from active and reserve officers around the country; a public endorsement from the officers of the Military Engineering Insti­ tute in Rio de Janeiro; and support from the wives of active army officers, who sent a letter to the minister of the army stating that Bolsonaro had exposed the ‘general dissatisfaction of a class’ (ibid). In 1987, Veja – the same magazine that had published Bolsonaro’s initial article – accused him of planning to bomb military units in Rio de Janeiro. According to Saint-Clair (2018), Veja reporter Cassia Maria Rodrigues was sent to interview Bolsonaro and a colleague of his, Captain Fabio Passos, to enquire about the arrest

The rise of Bolsonaro 179

of one of their peers, Captain Salon Pereira Filho, on 21 October. The reporter was told by Passos’ wife about the pair’s alleged participation in a plan to pressure President Jose Sarney into granting a significant increase in army salaries. When Rodrigues pursued this line of questioning, Bolsonaro revealed their plan to blow some fuses without injuring anyone to get the attention of their superiors. This operation was called ‘Operation Dead End’ (Saint-Clair 2018). Though the article emphasised that Bolsonaro had clarified that he was no longer part of the opera­ tion, his mention in a second scandalous article in the same magazine within a year irked the army leadership and the Ministry of the Army. Both Bolsonaro and Passos gave statements denying the accusations about the planned explosion in the article. In response, Veja released a statement saying that it stood by what it had reported; and it published sketches of the plan in the following edition. Bolsonaro faced investigation by the military’s Justification Board, which found him guilty. The case was then forwarded to the Supreme Military Court, where he was acquitted in the absence of evidence. In 1988, Bolsonaro left the army as a captain with 15 years of service to his name.

Entry to Politics According to a television interview, Bolsonaro’s grandfather was a candidate for councillor in Campinas Sao Paulo and his father was once a candidate for mayor in Golden Paulista (Domingo Espetacular 2018). However, according to his son Flavio, he entered politics purely by chance in 1989. Bolsonaro entered his candi­ dature for the position of city councillor in Rio de Janeiro because it was the only way that he could avoid being targeted by his military superiors after his retirement from the Brazilian military, as he had not left on cordial terms. In July 1988, Bolsonaro was invited to run for a seat on the Rio de Janeiro City Council by the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). At the time, Bolsonaro was a magnet for the media due to his prior incidents with the military. Therefore, his candidature garnered significant media attention. The fact that his opponent was Felipe Monteiro, whose mother was a bomb victim, played well with the media and a national newspaper, O Globo, published an article entitled ‘Specialist in explosives and son of a bomb victim fighting at the ballot box’ (Saint-Clair 2018). Bolsonaro was elected to the Rio de Janeiro City Council as the 16th highest-voted councillor (out of 42 elected councillors). During his two years in the Municipal Chamber, he was seen as a quiet and conservative councillor who participated mostly to draw attention to military causes such as retirement benefits for ex-offi­ cers and free public transport (Jansen and Paulo 2017). In the 1990 elections, Bolsonaro represented the PDC (later known as the Social Christian Party), keeping in line with his Catholic roots. He was elected to the position of federal deputy in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Brazil’s National Congress. He was consecutively elected for seven terms and went on to serve in the chamber for 27 years. During his time as a federal deputy, he intro­ duced around 171 bills and one constitutional amendment. According to Jose

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Alvaro Moises, a professor of political science at the University of Sao Paulo, Bol­ sonaro had an average rate of 6.5 proposals per year, which is a telling indicator of his activism in the lower house (Jansen and Paulo 2017). Given his background, it is no surprise that during his time as a federal deputy, Bolsonaro catered to his core voter base: the military. Of all the legislative propo­ sals put forward by him, 53 concerned the military and 44 concerned public security. Bolsonaro worked hard to broaden his voter base over the course of his 27 years in office. While in his first term he proposed 17 projects concerning the military and only two concerning public security, in his last term –which ended in 2019 – he addressed nine issues concerning security and three concerning the military. Due to the high rates of public insecurity and crime in Brazil, Bolsonaro’s activism in the lower house of Congress won him many supporters. Despite his activity in the Congress, the leader succeeded in getting just two of his proposals approved: one law which exempted computer goods from the tax on industrialised products and another which authorised the use of synthetic phos­ phoethanolamine, a controversial ‘cancer pill’. During his time in office, Bolsonaro often made statements that revealed his nostalgia for the values of Brazil’s dictatorship period. In one example of this con­ troversial stance, he stated as follows in a television interview in 1999: Voting won’t change anything in this country. Nothing! Things will only change, unfortunately, after starting a civil war here, and doing the work the dictatorship didn’t do. Killing some 30,000 people and starting with FHC [referring to then-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the Brazilian Social-Democratic Party]. If some innocents die, that’s just fine. (Bevins 2018) In 2016, during the vote to impeach Dilma Rousseff, then president of Brazil, Bolsonaro cast the deciding vote and dedicated it to a man who had overseen the torture of Rousseff when she had been a left-wing guerrilla. His outspoken criticism of gender, sexuality and human rights issues frequently positioned him at the centre of controversies, while also increasing his popularity and reach. He has more than 6.4 million followers on Twitter (at the time of writing), which is further evidence of this controversy-fuelled reach. On the topics of human rights and LGBTQ+ rights, on several occasions he has stated that ‘the minority has to shut up and bow to the majority’ (ibid). In 2017, in relation to Brazil’s indigenous population, he said: ‘There won’t be a centimetre demarcated for indigenous reserve or for quilombolas [territories for the descendants of African slaves]’ (Hatzikidi 2019). He repeated this sentiment when campaigning for president in 2018 and even went on to correct himself, saying that ‘not one millimetre’ more of indigenous land would exist (Survival International 2020). While controversy has surrounded Bolsonaro throughout his life, this attention has also fuelled his campaigns and he was soon seen as one of the most popular candidates in the period leading up to the 2018 elections. While his military

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background helped him to make his mark on mainstream politics, many external factors also played a crucial role in his rise to power. We look at some of these factors in more detail in the following chapter.

Notes 1 He would get into trouble later for speaking out about wages, as explained in the fol­ lowing paragraphs. 2 A magazine that publishes articles on politics, economics, culture and world events in Portuguese.

References Bevins, Vincent. 2018. Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil’s Would-be Dictator. New York Review, 12 October. https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/10/12/jair-bolsonaro-brazils-would-be-dictator/. Carvalho, Luiz Maklouf. 2019. O pequeno mateiro e o capitão Lamarca: Uma história mal con­ tada. In Luiz Maklouf Carvalho, O cadete e o capitão: A vida de Jair Bolsonaro no quartel. Todavia. Domingo Espetacular. 2018. Conheça a trajetória de Jair Bolsonaro na vida política. Video. Translated by Auto-translator. 28 October. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= O0dDVhZ6Zjs. Foggin, Sophie. 2020. One year into Bolsonaro’s presidency. Latin America Reports, 3 January. https://latinamericareports.com/one-year-into-bolsonaros-presidency/4023/. Folha De S. Paulo. 2018. For voters, health and violence are the country’s main problems. 11 September. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/09/para-eleitores-saude-e-violencia -sao-os-principais-problemas-do-pais.shtml. Hatzikidi, Katerina. 2019. “Ethnic group” land regularisation at the crossroads: some notes on the challenges faced by quilombolas in Brazil. St Antony’s International Review, 14(2), 154–169. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27027742 Jansen, Roberta. 2017. Como vereador, projeto de transportte gratuito para tropas. O Estado de S Paulo, 26 November. https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,como-vereador-p rojeto-de-transporte-gratuito-para-tropas,70002097328. Muggah, Robert and Giannini, Renata. 2019. Brazil is tackling high murder rates with a new wave of crime programs. apolitical. 25 March. https://apolitical.co/en/solution_a rticle/brazil-is-tackling-high-murder-rates-with-a-new-wave-of-crime-programs. Ninio, Marcelo. 2019. Ao deixar Israel, Bolsonaro diz que respeita os palestinos e não quer ‘encrenca’. 3 April. Saint-Clair, Clóvis. 2018. O jovem Palmito. In Bolsonaro. O Homem que Peitou o Exército e Desafia a Democracia. Maquina de Livros. Schipani, Andres. 2019. High hopes, and much fear, as Jair Bolsonaro assumes Brazil pre­ sidency. Financial Times, 2 January. https://www.ft.com/content/ee1d1e92-0d23-11e9-a 3aa-118c761d2745. Survival International. 2020. What Brazil’s President, Jair Bolsonaro, has said about Brazil’s Indigenous Peoples. https://www.survivalinternational.org/articles/3540-Bolsonaro. Woody, Christopher. 2018. These were the 50 most violent cities in the world in 2017. Business Insider India, 7 March. https://www.businessinsider.in/politics/these-were-the-50-most-vio lent-cities-in-the-world-in-2017/articleshow/63194175.cms.

16

AN ELECTION VICTORY – AND A NEW

ERA FOR BRAZIL UNDER BOLSONARO?

Bolsonaro has played a role in Brazilian politics since 1989; but despite this long tenure, he had not garnered the same level of attention or admiration as other prominent politicians by the time of the 2018 election. However, Bolsonaro’s election campaign was aided significantly by his peers’ deteriorating public image. His campaign relied on this to appeal to the public’s dissatisfaction with crime and corruption, while his rivals became embroiled in political and corruption scandals. Some of these competitors were big names in Brazilian politics. The following sections briefly look at two of these big names to understand their lives, work, appeal and downfall. The first leader in focus is one of Brazil’s most popular pre­ sidents, Lula Inacio da Silva; the second is Dilma Rousseff, famous for being the first female president of Brazil and Lula’s mentee. It is imperative to understand the political careers of these leaders in order to understand how Bolsonaro leveraged their downfall in the context of other peripheral factors to build an election campaign that captured the hopes and aspirations of a dis­ appointed populace.

Lula Inacio da Silva President Luis Inacio da Silva, popularly known as ‘Lula’, has been the most popular Brazilian figure of the 21st century. Lula began his career in politics as a trade union leader who headed a strike movement that organised labour against the military in the 1970s and early 1980s. He founded the Workers’ Party (PT) and later went on to become the Brazilian president. The PT won its first general election under Lula’s leadership. The country had just emerged from a decade of economic transformations that had centred on pri­ vatisation and industrialisation, among other things. As industries automated their manufacturing processes, the government’s approach had a negative impact on DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-20

Brazil under Bolsonaro 183

unskilled labour. Working-class employees were losing their jobs and perceived the privatisation efforts underway in a negative light. As a result, the electorate began looking for a leader who was more pro-labour and Lula met those expectations. Brazilians believed that Lula – a former labour union leader who was skilled at negotiating with global corporations on their behalf – could turn the tide, create more employment and stabilise the economy. Business executives, on the other hand, were sceptical of Lula and believed that his socialist welfare ideology would do more harm than good to the economy. Lula’s radical roots and opposition to the Plano Real during the first few months of his presidency resulted in economic tensions as international investors lost faith in the country’s potential as an invest­ ment destination. Brazilian credit ratings were downgraded by credit rating orga­ nisations such as Moody’s and Fitch as a result of this scepticism (BBC News 2002). Lula took cognisance of the impact that his socialist image had on the economy. To balance out this impact, he appointed career banker Henrique Meirelles as the head of the Central Bank of Brazil. Lula thus deviated from his leftist leanings and signalled a more investor-friendly approach, while being careful not to make any drastic changes to the nature of his own brand of politics.1 Aided by the work of his predecessor, Cardoso, during his time in office, Lula’s shift towards the centre helped to improve the economic indicators. Brazil enjoyed steady growth during this period due to increased demand for its commodities. This acted as a positive shock in terms of trade and allowed for exchange rate appreciation and a reduction in external debt. In essence, Cardoso brought Brazil to the edge of good fortune and Lula took the final leap. In order to live up to his reputation as a pro-labour leader, Lula raised govern­ ment spending while also pursuing a balanced economic policy. He increased

Net barter terms of trade index (2000=100)

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FIGURE 16.1 Terms of trade improved under Cardoso and Lula (1995–2010) Source: The World Bank nd

Unemployment (% of total labour force)

184 Brazil

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

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Unemployment rates fell under Lula (and have risen sharply since) Source: International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database

FIGURE 16.2

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 24681961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

GDP per capita growth (annual %)

government expenditure, created jobs for the middle class and invested in the development of Brazil’s natural resources, among other accomplishments. Lula’s popularity grew as a result of a favourable economic environment and a satisfied electorate, which contributed to his landslide election victory in 2006. The economy’s improved resilience even saw it through the 2008 global financial crisis. Brazil responded to the crisis by increasing government spending and cutting interest rates – both policies which stimulated the economy. This had a chain effect: it created more jobs, resulting in increased spending, which in turn drove up aggregate demand. This led to a greater increase in gross domestic product (GDP) than the government’s initial injection. Reduced interest rates increased business spending on capital goods, which was an indicator for long-term growth. The economy recovered rapidly and the GDP growth rate per capita rose from 0.9% in 2009 to 7.5% in 2010. Around the same time, in 2008, large oil reserves were found in the Atlantic Ocean, which meant that Brazil could become a major oil producer (CBS News

Year

Per capita GDP growth rate of Brazil Source: The World Bank nd

FIGURE 16.3

Brazil under Bolsonaro 185

2008). In 2010, Petrobras, a partially state-owned multinational company in the petroleum industry, raised $70 billion in the world’s biggest initial public offering to date. However, as the Eurozone crisis deepened, growth fell in the following years. The European economic slowdown reduced demand for manufactured goods in emerging economies, as well as demand for minerals from resource-rich countries. In 2011, Brazil’s GDP growth rate fell to 2.7%. Stability and economic growth were the hallmarks of Lula’s tenure. According to the Washington Post, ‘Under Lula, Brazil became the world’s eighth-largest economy, more than 20 million people rose out of acute poverty’ (Forero 2010). While adopting a centrist economic stance, Lula was still able to maintain his socialist ideology by implementing a variety of social welfare programmes throughout his presidency. He boosted the minimum wage and introduced a slew of initiatives aimed at reducing economic disparities and supporting rural development. Bolsa Familia was one such programme, which provided allowances to families for food and education expenses. ‘While Cardoso had begun these efforts, Lula combined— under the program known as Bolsa Familia—transfers of money, education, and medical services as the central focus of the PT’ (Fishlow 2020). These initiatives contributed to the growth of Lula’s popularity in Brazil and are one of the primary reasons why he was able to serve two consecutive terms in office. Under the Brazilian Constitution, no one can hold the office of the presidency for three consecutive terms and thus Lula decided not to contest the 2011 election. Instead, he picked his former chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, to be the next PT party candidate for the election.

Dilma Rousseff

Expenditure on Bolsa Familia (% of GDP)

Dilma Rousseff’s election was historic, as it marked the first time that a woman assumed the presidency in Brazil. Lula’s support played no small part in this: one report attributed her election to people’s affinity for ‘Continuity. And because Lula chose her’ (The Economist 2010). Rousseff was considered Lula’s political protégé; 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Year FIGURE 16.4 Expenditure on Bolsa Familia (as percentage of GDP) Source: MDS nd and World Bank nd

Education Expenditure (% of GDP)

186 Brazil 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2004

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OECD countries

Education expenditure rose in Lula’s second term Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics

FIGURE 16.5

the latter departed government with an 80% approval rating and leveraged this popularity to campaign for Rousseff in the Brazilian presidential election. As pre­ sident, Rousseff pledged to follow in Lula’s footsteps and implement policies that were similar to her predecessor’s. Rousseff herself was a socialist who began campaigning for her political beliefs following the 1964 coup, when she joined a guerrilla group whose goal was the violent overthrow of military rule in Brazil. She was arrested in 1970 and released three years later. After being released from prison, Rousseff dedicated her life to public office – first as a civil servant and later as a founding member of the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) along with her husband, Carlos Araujo. In the 1980s, Rousseff went on to hold various posts in the cabinet of the state government of Rio Grande do Sul. She was a representative of the PDT, but eventually left the PDT in 2001 after internal disputes within the party. Rousseff joined the PT in 2002 and became minister of energy. In 2005, when Lula’s cabinet was hit by a vote-buying scandal, Lula had to replace his incumbent chief of staff with Rousseff. Rousseff followed the welfare path set by Lula in the initial years of her pre­ sidency. She increased public spending and raised the minimum wage by 6.78% to BRL 724 per month (Reuters Staff 2013). Her welfare spending triggered inflation, but little was done to curb it. Instead, she cut sales taxes and reduced the prices of some essential commodities. The initial fears regarding Lula’s presidency remater­ ialised during Rousseff’s time in office and business leaders felt compelled to reduce investment in the face of excessive government intervention. Her management of the economy, which consisted of alternately raising and lowering certain taxes, relied excessively on stimulating domestic demand at the expense of investment. Rousseff sought to increase government subsidies and protect favoured sectors. But while Rousseff spent on social programmes, she did little to create sustainable jobs. The optimistic period that marked Lula’s time in office thus came to an end in 2014 when the economy was hit by a severe crisis, resulting in two recessions in

Brazil under Bolsonaro 187

2015 and 2016. Brazil’s hosting of the football World Cup in 2014 also slowed down business activity, as many cities declared holidays and factories shut down production on match days. Inflation was high and the country’s economic condi­ tion was deteriorating. Some suggest that the big fall in Rousseff’s approval ratings from 57% to 30% in 2013 going into the second election was less than expected given the condition of the economy, because she introduced federal tax cuts (Romero 2013). This helped her weather the opposition and win the 2014 elec­ tion to stay on as president of Brazil. However, unlike her mentor, she was not allowed to complete her second term. The Petrobras scandal first surfaced in 2015 as a result of Operation Car Wash. Brazil suffered severe repercussions as a result, both politically and economically. Rousseff was one of the people accused in the affair. The Senate of Brazil subsequently decided on 12 May 2016 to remove Rousseff from her position as president (Shoichet, McKirdy and Almasy 2016).

Corruption Bolsonaro has never had the same appeal as Lula and Rousseff, but his campaign hit just the right notes for the people of Brazil and exploited growing discontent caused by high rates of crime, rampant corruption and the ensuing anti-incumbency sentiment. One of Bolsonaro’s promises was to deal with corruption in Brazil. For years, Brazil had been plagued by high unemployment and periods of high inflation, high interest rates and economic crisis. These factors, along with high crime rates, exacerbated the problem of corruption in the country. In 2013, protests and riots that came to be known as the ‘Brazilian Autumn’ (Rogério 2013) – a reference to the Arab Spring – broke out in over 100 Brazilian cities. More than 1 million people, who were tired of the rampant corruption within the government and of insufficient government expenditure, took part. The movement gained momentum after the government decided to increase the price of public transport to offset expenses incurred in hosting the World Cup and the Confederations Cup. These protests led to multiple deaths and injuries, along with the destruction of property worth millions of dollars. According to Transparency International’s Annual Global Corruption Index, Brazil ranked 76 out of 180 nations in 2016 for corruption and how corrupt the government is perceived to be. This figure has fallen steadily over the years: in 2017, Brazil dropped to 96 in the rankings; and by 2019, it had slid all the way down to 106. Bolsonaro had no corruption allegations made against him, while his political rivals were facing numerous investigations due to the Petrobras scandal. Under these cir­ cumstances, Bolsonaro’s core message of fighting corruption resonated with voters.

Operation Car Wash and the Petrobras Scandal For much of its independent existence, Brazil has experienced rampant corruption, which became ingrained in the Brazilian mindset as a result of a stratified society

188 Brazil

dominated by a distinguished elite that relished the luxury of getting away with whatever they wanted. The Petrobras scandal was one of the most significant cor­ ruption scandals in recent history – the result of decades of normalisation. The scandal was discovered by chance when the authorities detained a man named Alberto Youssef in 2013. Youssef had nine previous arrests for money laundering and was suspected of similar activities during his latest detention. While under investigation, he told prosecutors, ‘Guys, if I speak the republic is going to fall’ (Beauchamp 2016). Eventually, he decided to cooperate with the authorities and started to share details of the original source of the cash, stating that it belon­ ged to top executives of Petrobras, Brazil’s state-owned oil producer. This came as a shock to the authorities, which suspected that the source of the money was organised crime. This led to an investigation called Operation Car Wash, which gained its name from the initial investigation of a car wash that was suspected to be a front for money laundering (Smith, Valle and Schmidt 2015). The investigation led to the arrest of a former Petrobras official named Paulo Roberto Costa, to whom Youssef had ‘gifted’ a luxury Land Rover worth BRL 250,000 (about $125,000 at the time). In fact, it was this expensive gift that kickstarted the investigation, as it struck the authorities as odd that an ex-official was receiving luxury items from a known money launderer. With Costa’s cooperation, the police uncovered the deeply woven corruption scheme that came to be known as the Petrobras scandal. Brazil’s Public Ministry oversaw the investigation. A constitutionally established public body, the Public Ministry has its own budget and autonomous prosecutors, which has helped Brazil in resisting dictatorships. The Public Ministry’s independence has enabled it to pursue corruption charges against the powerful elite. After investigating further, the authorities learned that officials from the stateowned Petrobras corporation were receiving kickbacks for awarding inflated contracts to Odebrecht, one of Brazil’s largest construction companies. It was discovered that Petrobras had served as the setting for a high-profile, high-stakes corruption operation between 2004 and 2014. This implicated members of Petrobras’ top management, executives from some of Brazil’s largest construction companies and representatives of the country’s political elite. The construction businesses had formed a cartel in order to coordinate bids and overcharge Petrobras. As a result of the massive sums of extra money that the construction companies were receiving, any Petrobras workers who were in a position to uncover the scam were bribed to overlook the fraudulent operations. In addition, because Petrobras was a partially state-owned corporation, politicians had a significant say in the appointment of officials at the company. Construction companies took advantage of this, using the extra capital they were extracting from the government to bribe politicians in the form of personal gifts and campaign donations. Many of the people who were suspected of involvement were arrested as part of Operation Car Wash in 2014 and 2015. They included engineers, construction executives and Petrobras officials. In March 2015, Brazil’s Supreme Court launched an investigation into 34 politicians who were suspected of involvement in the

Brazil under Bolsonaro 189

corruption scheme. Further investigation implicated almost one-third of Brazil’s 594-member Congress as part of the probe (Lopes 2017), as well as the former president, Lula. From there, the scandal snowballed, and Brazil witnessed mass demonstrations and huge protests in which millions of people participated.

The Aftermath of the Scandal The scandal halted Petrobras’s operations. This proved seriously disruptive, as Pet­ robras was one of Brazil’s most influential companies abroad. The company had to suspend construction projects and lay off employees. This in turn plunged the region into recession. According to estimates by the Getulio Vargas Foundation’s Environmental Solutions and Infrastructure Group, ‘engineering, consumer spend­ ing, construction, and oil and gas service firms all suffered from Petrobras’s reduction in investments to cover costs of the scandal’ (Severich 2016). The estimates also predicted that Brazil’s federal government would need approximately $4.5 billion to cover layoffs in construction (ibid). According to Rapoza (2015), some of the major construction firms involved in the scandal had to file for bankruptcy. Operation Car Wash had a grave impact on the political careers of many leaders, the voting psyche of the citizens, public sentiment and the national economy. One estimate suggested that the scandal itself caused a loss of $27.1 billion – equivalent to 1% of Brazil’s GDP (Rapoza 2015). In 2016, the ailing economy suffered a further hit from Rousseff’s ill-planned spending on higher pensions and unproductive taxes (The Economist 2016). The fiscal deficit increased from 2% of GDP in 2010 to 10% in 2015, while public debt increased to 70% of GDP (ibid). In 2016, the scandal and the pressure on the economy triggered the impeachment of Rousseff, who had been the chairwoman of the Petrobras board from 2003 to 2010. She was succeeded by her vice-president, Michel Temer.

Crime Rate The crime rate in Brazil has always been higher than the world average. The favelas or slums of Rio de Janeiro have been fertile breeding grounds for city crime. According to one estimate, at least 1,060,000 Brazilians have been murdered since 2000 (Atlas Da Violencia nd). A variety of factors have contributed to this. Brazil has had to deal with high unemployment rates, low literacy rates and increasing income inequalities in recent years. These factors, combined with a long history of racial and ethnic oppression, have turned Brazil into a fertile ground for criminal activity. Brazil has also had to deal with high levels of illicit drug activity. The country is one of the major consumers of cocaine after the US. It is also a hub for the illicit production of cannabis. In due course, it has become an important transhipment point for Bolivian, Colombian and Peruvian cocaine headed for Europe. The slums of Rio de Janeiro are a notorious hotspot for drug-related violence and upwards of 1.5 million people in the favelas have been affected by it (Gonzalez 2018).

190 Brazil 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1

Bottom 50% share of national income Top 1% share of national income

0.05 0 200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015

FIGURE 16.6 Brazil’s inequality problem has persisted throughout the years Source: Morgen 2017

In 2017–2018, Brazil saw an upsurge in violence, weapons use and weapon smuggling. Some 59,000 people were killed in 2017; a figure which fell by 13% to 51,000 the following year (Muggah 2019). In 2017, Brazil also saw 17 of its cities ranked among the 50 most violent cities in the world (Woody 2018). According to survey polls conducted prior to the election period, voters considered violence to be the second most important problem facing Brazil, after the country’s inefficient healthcare system (Folha De S Paulo 2018). Therefore, it is no surprise that tackling crime was one of the factors that united candidates across all political parties. Bolsonaro offered a range of solutions to this problem, promising to toughen the punishments handed out to the offenders and to relax gun ownership laws. Bolsonaro propagated the idea that arming citizens was the ideal solution to the crime problem, as it would make them better able to fight crime. This message reso­ nated with the average white male voter (Londoño and Darlington 2018). The middle class in Brazil was plagued by national unemployment rates of around 12.5% (The World Bank nd), which exacerbated insecurities relating to the traditional roles that men are expected to play in society. Given these insecurities, Bolsonaro’s upfront sexist and violence-oriented narratives, along with his stance of self-empowerment, proved sufficiently attractive enough to create a voter base for him. In fact, ‘guns for self-defence’ was one of the core campaign mottos of his election campaign. He also discussed legitimising torture and bringing back the death penalty. Bolsonaro’s mis­ ogynistic and sexist public opinions inspired tens of thousands of women to take the streets against him in a movement recognised by the hashtag ‘Ele Nao’, or ‘Not Him’. Despite this, the average middle-class man was drawn to Bolsonaro’s macho narrative, and such men thus became his most active supporters during the campaign.

Bolsonaro at the Helm Bolsonaro left the Social Christian Party for the Social Liberal Party in January 2018 and was nominated as the latter’s presidential candidate in July 2018. His main opponent up until September 2018 was Lula da Silva, who had been

Brazil under Bolsonaro 191

Per 100K Population

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2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

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2000

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1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15

Annual % Change

Bolsonaro planned to reduce crime by militarising society2 Source: World Bank nd FIGURE 16.7

campaigning from jail. Lula was later officially barred from contesting the elections by the country’s top electoral court. In Lula’s place, Brazil’s left-leaning PT announced Fernando Haddad as its pre­ sidential candidate. However, Fernando could not inspire the same popularity as Lula among the population. Meanwhile, Bolsonaro’s popularity increased after he was stabbed by a rogue assailant on 6 September 2018. After this event, Bolsonaro’s popularity soared as he continued to campaign aggressively through social media. In the run-up to the 2018 election, the polls suggested that more than 60% of Brazilians wanted a president from outside the country’s three main parties (Bethell 2018). This was the perfect climate for a leader such as Bolsonaro to turn the tide in his favour. The massive Petrobras corruption scandal and growth rates that had plummeted to -4% created the perfect setting for a populist leader. He represented a shift in the attitudes of the general populace towards their leaders and in October 2018 won 55.2% of the vote to become Brazil’s next president. While previous leaders were elected based on their economic policies, Bolsonaro won on a cam­ paign characterised by authoritarian and ultra-conservative attitudes, described as an ‘illiberal backlash’ (Hunter and Power 2019). In his first presidential speech, Bolsonaro claimed that he would free Brazil from left-wing ‘ideological moorings’, combat the ‘ideology of gender’ taught in schools and respect Brazil’s ‘Judeo-Christian tradition’ (Schipani 2019). Through this mes­ sage, he sought to appeal to the conservative sections of society. It also reflected his own conservative upbringing. He addressed economic development by passing pension reforms through Congress in October 2019 that raised the retirement age from 55 to 62 for women and from 60 to 65 for men. Bolsonaro nonetheless witnessed a drop in his approval ratings, from 32% in April 2019 to 29% towards the end of the year (Foggin 2020). This can be attrib­ uted to reported connections between his son Flavio and Rio’s largest paramilitary gangs, following which there were raids on Flavio’s property. This dented Bolso­ naro’s stance on corruption and tainted his otherwise clean record, which in the

192 Brazil

62 60 58 56 Press Freedom Ranking

54 52 50 48 2015

2020

Press Freedom Ranking out of 180 countries. Brazil remains a violent country for the media and its position slipped even lower in 2020,3 after Bolsonaro came to power Source: Reporters Without Borders

FIGURE 16.8

shadow of the Petrobras scandal remains a major concern for voters. As for crime, he addressed his campaign promises by making it easier for citizens to keep guns at home. However, over the past year, Congress lawmakers have diluted this decree by specifying the groups of people that can be granted easier access to guns. Under Bolsonaro’s regime, payments to government beneficiaries have slowed down or been cancelled altogether. The number of families covered by the Bolsa Familia programme has fallen from 275,000 to fewer than 2,500 a month. The number of individuals receiving benefits has fallen by 1 million (Belágua 2020). Bolsonaro holds a strong stance against abortion and same-sex marriage, and sup­ ports the death penalty. He has also displayed a lack of concern for indigenous rights and proposed that indigenous peoples be integrated into wider Brazilian society. Bolsonaro’s sexist and authoritarian rhetoric continues to appeal to men, who seem to have lost their traditional identity as the sole breadwinners due to economic shocks and rising inequality. Economically, he promised tax cuts and millions of new jobs generated by countering the Chinese influence. He also relaxed necessary controls on mining and agriculture. The biggest international backlash that Bolsonaro has suffered has been over the fires that ravaged the Amazon rainforest during Summer 2019, sparking international outrage from a variety of interest groups, governments and celeb­ rities. French President Emmanuel Macron described the fires as an international crisis; in response, Bolsonaro accused Macron of ‘portraying himself as being the “one and only person” concerned about the environment’ (Velho 2019). He further stated that foreign powers should not interfere with Brazil’s sovereignty and internal affairs. He accused international organisations of starting the fires, while the latter accused Bolsonaro’s policies of facilitating deforestation in the Amazon.

Brazil under Bolsonaro 193

Brazil’s Future: More Bolsonaro or Less? Of all the leaders explored in this text, Bolsonaro is the newest to politics and has been in office for the shortest time. This makes him a good case study to under­ stand how people’s attitudes are affected and how this can bring about tangible change in the political environment. The external factor that had the biggest impact on Bolsonaro’s rise was the corruption that has long plagued the country. Corruption has been part of Brazilian society ever since the abolition of slavery: the landowners who lost their supremacy and standing in society as a result of this move resolved to establish a new republic with them at the top. This old Brazil, in which women and the illiterate were disenfranchised, and today’s modern Brazil, in which corruption remains both prevalent and worrying, have one thing in common: the oppression of the already oppressed. Faced with such factors and a corruption scandal of the magnitude of Operation Car Wash, which threw these inequalities into stark relief, the people were driven to react; and react they did. They chose Bolsonaro, who did not subscribe to modern or politically correct rhetoric, and who was markedly dissimilar from Lula in personality. Their choice revealed the trust deficit between the people and the prevailing political class, which can be seen as the major reason for Bolsonaro’s election to office. However, Bolsonaro has witnessed a sharp drop in his approval ratings during the second half of his first term in office; and this critical fall in popular support is likely to have a significant impact on his future. Given that the corruption charges against Lula were recently annulled and he is set to re-enter politics in the next election (Watson 2021), Bolsonaro may find it difficult to maintain popular support for a second term. Nonetheless, it will be interesting to witness how Bolsonaro leverages his popularity to face off against a political giant such as Lula, whose downfall served as a springboard for Bolsonaro’s election prospects.

Notes 1 As explored later in the text, Lula preserved his own brand of politics by pairing eco­ nomic initiatives with welfare projects. 2 There was actually an impressive 13% drop in crime rates from 2017 to 2018, though there is little evidence that this had anything to do with Bolsonaro, who won the election in October 2018. To the contrary, since his election, police killings have increased (Muggah 2019). 3 The Press Freedom Ranking for 2020 was calculated for 160 countries. A value of 53 in 2020 implies that Brazil ranked 107 out of 160 countries.

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Barros, Laura and Santos Silva, Manuel. 2020. Right-wing populism in the tropics: The rise of Jair Bolsonaro. Vox EU, 24 January. https://voxeu.org/article/right-wing-populism -tropics-rise-jair-bolsonaro. BBC. 2005. Brazil to pay off IMF debts early. 14 December. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ business/4527438.stm. BBC News. 2002. Brazil hit by debt downgrade. 21 June. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/busi ness/2057137.stm. Beauchamp, Zack. 2016. Brazil’s Petrobras scandal, explained. Vox, 18 March. https:// www.vox.com/2016/3/18/11260924/petrobras-brazil. Belágua, Maranhão. 2020. Bolsa Família, Brazil’s admired anti-poverty programme, is flail­ ing. Economist, 30 January. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2020/01/30/bolsa -familia-brazils-admired-anti-poverty-programme-is-flailing. Bethell, Leslie. 2018. The Long Road to Democracy in Brazil. In Leslie Bethell, Brazil: Essays on History and Politics. University of London Press. Caldeira, Teresa PR, and Holston, James. 1999. Democracy and Violence in Brazil. Com­ parative Studies in Society and History, 41(4) 691–729. doi:10.1017/S0010417599003102. CBS News. 2008. Brazil Oil Find May Be World’s 3rd Largest. 14 April. https://www. cbsnews.com/news/brazil-oil-find-may-be-worlds-3rd-largest/. Fausto, Sergio. 2015. Brazil after the 2014 Elections: A bumpy Road Ahead. Policy Brief, Wider Atlantic Program. Filho, Fernando Ferrari. 2010. Brazil’s response: How did financial regulation and monetary policy influence recovery? Revista de Economica Politica, 31(5) 880–888. doi:10.1590/ S0101-31572011000500019. Fishlow, Albert. 2020. Lava Jato in Perspective. In Paul Lagunes and Jan Svejnar, Corruption and the Lava Jato Scandal in Latin America. Routledge. Foggin, Sophie. 2020. One year into Bolsonaro’s presidency. Latin America Reports. 3 January. https://latinamericareports.com/one-year-into-bolsonaros-presidency/4023/. Folha De S. Paulo. 2018. For voters, health and violence are the country’s main problems. 11 September. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/09/para-eleitores-saude-e-vio lencia-sao-os-principais-problemas-do-pais.shtml. Forero, Juan. 2010. Brazilian president’s handpicked successor leads, faces runoff. Washington Post, 4 October. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/ 03/AR2010100304612_pf.html. Furtado, Henrique Tavares. 2014. Brazil’s economy of violence: the 50-year noose. Open Democracy, 4 June. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/brazils-economy-of-violence-50yea r-noose/. Gonzalez, David. 2018. In Brazil’s Favelas, Caught Between Police and Gangsters. New York Times, 12 July. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/lens/in-brazils-favelas-caught-bet ween-police-and-gangsters.html. Hunter, Wendy, and Power, Timothy J. 2019. Bolsonaro and Brazil’s Illiberal Backlash. Journal of Democracy 30(1), 68–82. doi:10.1353/jod.2019.0005. Loman, Herwin. 2014. Brazil’s macro economy, past and present. RaboResearch - Economic Research. Londoño, Ernesto and Darlington, Shasta. 2018. Jair Bolsonaro Wins Brazil’s Presidency, in a Shift to the Far Right. New York Times, 28 October. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 10/28/world/americas/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-election.html. Lopes, Maine. 2017. Brazil’s political class is in crisis as over 100 are investigated for cor­ ruption. Washington Post, 12 April. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_america s/brazils-political-class-is-in-crisis-as-over-100-are-investigated-for-corruption/2017/04/ 12/d2832a8a-1f7e-11e7-bb59-a74ccaf1d02f_story.html.

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Markoff, John, and Baretta, Silvio R Duncan. 1990. Economic Crisis and Regime Change in Brazil: The 1960s and the 1980s. Comparative Politics, 22(4) 421–444. doi:10.2307/ 421972. MDS. nd. Bolsa Familia. http://mds.gov.br/assuntos/bolsa-familia. Morgen, Marc. 2017. Falling Inequality beneath Extreme and Persistent Concentration: New Evidence for Brazil Combining National Accounts, Surveys and Fiscal Data, 2001– 2015. World Wealth & Income Database. March. https://wid.world/document/extreme-p ersistent-inequality-new-evidence-brazil-combining-national-accounts-surveys-fiscal-data -2001-2015-wid-world-working-paper-201712/. Muggah, Robert. 2019. Brazil’s Murder Rate Finally Fell—and by a Lot. Foreign Policy, 22 April. Noriega, Roger F and Trigos, Felipe. 2015. Can Brazil overcome economic malaise and scandal? American Enterprise Institute. Rapoza, Kenneth. 2015. How Much of Brazil’s Economy Got Lost in Petrobras Scandal? Forbes, 4 April. https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/04/04/how-much-of-bra zils-economy-got-lost-in-petrobras-scandal/#1f6e1e42228a. Reuters Staff. 2013. Rousseff says Brazil raises 2014 minimum wage by 6.78 pct. 24 December. https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-economy-wage/rousseff-says-brazil-ra ises-2014-minimum-wage-by-6-78-pct-idUSL2N0K21FW20131223. Rogério, Paulo. 2013. What Do the Protests in Brazil Signify? Americas Quarterly, 27 June. https://www.americasquarterly.org/blog/what-do-the-protests-in-brazil-signify/. Romero, Simon. 2013. After Protests, Brazilian President’s Popularity Plummets. New York Times, 29 June. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/americas/after-protests­ brazilian-presidents-popularity-plummets.html. Schipani, Andres. 2019. High hopes, and much fear, as Jair Bolsonaro assumes Brazil pre­ sidency. Financial Times, 2 January. https://www.ft.com/content/ee1d1e92-0d23-11e9-a 3aa-118c761d2745. Severich, Nicolas Lema. 2016. The Fall of Petrobras and its Impact on the Brazilian Economy. ScholarWorks. https://scholarworks.uark.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context= finnuht. Shoichet, Catherine E, McKirdy, Euan and Almasy, Steve. 2016. Dilma Rousseff: ‘I’m the victim of a great injustice’. CNN, 13 May. https://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/12/america s/brazil-rousseff-impeachment-vote/index.html. Smith, Michael, Valle, Sabrina and Schmidt, Blake. 2015. The Betrayal of Brazil. Bloomberg, 8 May. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-05-08/brazil-s-massive-corrup tion-scandal-has-bitterness-replacing-hope. The Economist. 2010. Lula’s legacy. 30 September. https://www.economist.com/briefing/ 2010/09/30/lulas-legacy. The Economist. 2016. Brazil’s fall: Disaster looms for Latin America’s biggest economy. 2 January. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2016/01/02/brazils-fall. The World Bank. nd. Brazil. https://data.worldbank.org/country/BR. The World Bank. nd. GDP Per Capita Growth Rate (annual %) - Brazil. https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?locations=BR. The World Bank. nd. Net Barter Terms of Trade Index (2000=100) - Brazil. https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WD?end=2018&locations=BR&start=1983. The World Bank. nd. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate) ­ Brazil. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.NE.ZS?locations=BR. Velho, Porto. 2019. Bolsonaro says Amazon nations should decide region’s future. The Hindu, 29 August. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/bolsonaro-says-ama zon-nations-should-decide-regions-future/article29285971.ece.

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Watson, Katy. 2021. Lula: Brazil ex-president's corruption convictions annulled. BBC, 9 March. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-56326389. Williamson, John. 2003. Lula’s Brazil. Foreign Affairs, 82(1) 105. Woody, Christopher. 2018. These were the 50 most violent cities in the world in 2017. Business Insider India, 7 March. https://www.businessinsider.in/politics/these-were-the-50-most-vio lent-cities-in-the-world-in-2017/articleshow/63194175.cms.

17

PART CONCLUSION: BRAZIL

As explored in the previous chapters, the demise of the prevailing political class in Brazil made way for Bolsonaro’s election to office. To understand why the Operation Car Wash corruption scandal had such a grave impact on people’s trust and perceptions of the political elite, one must bear in mind the periods of flux that Brazilian society has witnessed over the centuries, from colonisation to military rule and from dictators to welfare-centred politicians. Brazil gained independence from Portugal in 1825, under the leadership of Dom Pedro I, the Portuguese king’s son. Pedro II, Dom Pedro’s son, succeeded him after he abdicated the throne and was instrumental in the abolition of slavery in 1888. This marked a key point in Brazil’s history. Although it gave a significant proportion of the population their freedom, it sowed discontent among land­ owners, who staged a coup in 1889, resulting in the establishment of the Brazilian Republic. Soon thereafter, in 1891, Brazil adopted its first Constitution, which denied women and the illiterate the right to vote, thus allowing wealthy elite men to wield power in society and establishing a status quo that would shape civilian life for decades to come. As has been noted, change in Brazil was frequently delivered in a top-down manner, driven by the monarchy, its descendants or the wealthy. This pattern denied the poor and oppressed opportunities and fuelled their discontent. The resulting unrest culminated in a coup led by Getulio Vargas in 1930, who was backed by a coalition of middle-class industrialists and military reformers. Vargas remained in power until the end of World War II. These years had a profound effect on the Brazilian psyche, as what appeared to be a dictatorial regime led by a leader who kept delaying elections fought against other dictators in World War II as part of the Allied Forces. The discontent that resulted from Vargas’s rule gave birth to the Uniao Democratica Nacional (UDN), which staged a bloodless coup in 1945 with the support of the military. Following the coup, Brazil finally DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-21

198 Brazil

received the election it had been denied for nearly 15 years, which was won by General Eurico Gaspar Dutra. Dutra ruled until 1951, after which Vargas was re-elected. However, Vargas was no longer the man who had deprived the Brazilian people of their constitutionally guaranteed elections until 1945. He had since rebranded himself and had devised an ambitious economic programme aimed at leveraging the Brazilian petroleum industry through state control in order to accelerate the country’s development. This plan, however, could not be carried out at the time due to his untimely demise. Regardless, Vargas contributed to a vision that inspired his successor, Juscelino Kubitschek, to propose an ambitious economic programme. Brazil’s population boom in the 1940s heightened the importance of economic issues in political campaigns. It increased the country’s urban population and sparked heightened demand for jobs and opportunities, resulting in a concerted effort to industrialise in the 1950s. During his tenure in office, Kubitschek took a two-pronged approach, emphasising both public and private investment as a means of economic progress. Kubitschek oversaw the development of Brazil’s automobile industry and its subsidiary industries, as well as the construction of electricity generation infrastructure, road networks and a new capital, Brasilia. These enhancements were part of Kubit­ schek’s campaign promise to deliver 50 years of development in the space of five. But while leaders focused on the economy, social hierarchies were frequently overlooked in Brazil. The late abolition of slavery resulted in the establishment of a class system. Throughout much of Brazil’s independence, the wealthy generally retained power, while women and the illiterate were excluded from the political process until much later. Within these class hierarchies, a racial dimension is evident, as indigenous peoples and descendants of those forced into slavery were dis­ proportionately affected by the lack of opportunities. Janio Quadros appealed to this group of people. His anti-corruption campaign won him majority support in 1961, but his charisma and oratory skills did not help him with the actual responsibilities of the president’s office. Within a year, he had resigned, to be succeeded by his vicepresident, Joao Goulart. In 1964, the military deposed Goulart, believing that he was leading the country towards Communism. The primary objective of the military dictatorship that followed the coup was to transform Brazil into a modern capitalist economy and a military superpower. This, however, resulted in widespread discontent among the populace, as policies deemed necessary to achieve this objective were imple­ mented despite widespread opposition. These policies aimed to mitigate the effects of previous import substitution measures taken by Brazil and to attract foreign investment while promoting imports. By collaborating with the UDN, the military sought to legitimise their rule. However, the partnership did not receive widespread support. The military perse­ cuted dissidents and exerted control over the media in order to stifle negative sentiments towards the government. By 1969, the military’s approach to dissent had resulted in the formation of resistance groups throughout the country. These

Part conclusion: Brazil 199

organisations distributed anti-military flyers, kidnapped foreign diplomats and committed bank robberies. Jair Bolsonaro grew up during this era, witnessing first-hand the military dictator­ ship and the resulting resistance. He was born in 1955 into a modest family in which his father was the sole breadwinner. As evidenced by his narratives, his family’s political leanings were towards the military-civil alliance: the family reportedly participated in the 1964 civil-military coup that deposed President-elect Joao Goulart. Bolsonaro himself adopted these inclinations. According to his interviews, he assisted the army in pursuing guerrillas and was advised to enrol in military school as a result. He was admitted to Brazil’s primary military academy in 1974. Bolsonaro hails from a segment of the population that favoured military rule – a sentiment that can be attributed to the era in which he grew up, when he witnessed the military coup and the country’s economic performance under military rule. However, this acceptance of the military was not universal, as can be seen from the growing resistance against the military. While resistance to military rule was initially kept at bay due to Brazil’s positive economic performance under the regime, this performance ended around the 1980s as a result of an external debt crisis. To maintain high growth rates, the government increased borrowing, further exposing the country to economic vulnerabilities. This exacerbated societal inequalities, driving an increasing number of people towards crime, which became a major issue in the 1980s. Seeing an increase in discontent, incumbent President João Figueiredo began the process of democratisation, eventually ceding power to civil leaders in 1985. The Catholic Church was used to assuage civilian opposition during this process, demonstrating the influence of the church among the people and within political circles. In the meantime, Bolsonaro was himself becoming a major figure within the military, especially due to his criticism of working conditions and wage differ­ entials among the ranks. Inflation was a major issue, and its effects were felt even in the army barracks. Bolsonaro, who was a captain at the time, published an op-ed in a magazine criticising the army’s low wages – a move which enraged his superiors. Bolsonaro was later identified as one of the masterminds behind a plot to plant a bomb in the barracks by the same magazine, with the aim of drawing his superiors’ attention to the ongoing problems. While Bolsonaro denied the claims made in the magazine article, the accusation remained a source of contention throughout his military career. Bolsonaro resigned from the army shortly afterwards. Given this history, he did not leave the army on good terms with his colleagues, which he cites as one of his reasons for entering politics in 1988. As evidenced by the rise of church-affiliated parties, the role of the Catholic Church in re-democratising Brazil had elevated it to a position of prominence in the country’s political environment. Bolsonaro ran in the Rio de Janeiro City Council elections on behalf of one of these parties, the Christian Democratic Party. He was elected to Brazil’s lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, in 1990 as a representative of the same party.

200 Brazil

During this period, at the national level, Fernando Collor’s election as president in 1989 led to significant economic changes in the country. These included the introduction of a new currency and strict controls on assets and transactions. In 1992, Collor was removed from office after his campaign manager was implicated in a corruption scandal. Itamar Franco, Collor’s successor, oversaw the implementation of the Plano Real, which had been formulated by his finance minister, Fernando Cardoso. The Plano Real had a significant impact on inflation, which fell dramatically. Franco’s succes­ sor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was backed by Franco, who had gained public approval by this point. Cardoso thus presided over the privatisation of state-owned industries such as banks, mines and telecommunications companies. Most people in Brazil endured a series of ups and downs during the 1990s. While the Plano Real provided stability for the populace, the privatisation of industry took a toll on their jobs. As industries automated, demand for unskilled labour decreased, resulting in a significant increase in income inequality. The loss of job opportunities soured people’s perceptions of the reforms, prompting them to seek a pro-labour leader in the form of Lula Inacio da Silva. Lula was elected president in 2002, representing his own party, the Workers’ Party. His background as a labour union leader who had organised workers against military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s, combined with the name of his party, created the impression of a pro-labour leader. Lula’s election was aided by public expectations based on this impression and his past initiatives. Lula’s pro-labour stance instilled fear in the business community, which viewed him as an anti-capitalist reformer. However, as can be seen, Lula’s approach to governance was more centrist, signalling an investor-friendly approach. He adopted a balanced strategy, similar to what had been done in the 1990s, when privatisation and cash transfers to the poor were carried out concurrently; and he did so more effectively. As the economy grew, he increased government spending and created jobs and opportunities for the middle class in particular. Increased job opportunities are a tangible change that the masses can see and feel, which contributed to Lula’s popularity. His appeal was further based on the stability he provided during his tenure. As a result, he was re-elected for a second term in 2006 and the Brazilian economy weathered the 2008 financial crisis under his leadership. During his second term, he expanded the number of social welfare programmes, which further boosted his appeal. In the subsequent elections, Lula stepped down from office, given that the Con­ stitution does not allow an individual to serve more than two consecutive terms in office. Instead, he supported his protégé, Dilma Rousseff, as the next presidential candidate. Rousseff became Brazil’s first female president with Lula’s support. Rousseff’s tenure was marked by a return to economic mismanagement and corruption scandals, some of which altered Brazil’s political landscape. As in several other developing countries, decades of inherent corruption had built up Brazilian society’s tolerance towards corruption. This widescale normalisation of corruption is generally addressed only when large-scale corruption scandals are unearthed. The

Part conclusion: Brazil 201

Petrobras scandal was the first such scandal to galvanise the public and elevate corruption to a major issue. Rousseff, along with a number of other high-ranking government officials and elected officials, was implicated in the scandal, which ultimately resulted in her impeachment in 2016. The magnitude of the Petrobras scandal and its subsequent impact on Brazilian society can be compared to the series of corruption scandals that embroiled the second United Progressive Alliance (UPA-II) government in India. Like the UPA-II, Lula’s brand of politics proved popular in Brazil for nearly two decades. However, in the aftermath of the Petrobras scandal, his chances of re-election were severely dented and his protégé Rousseff was impeached. This was a major change for Brazilian society, as a large proportion of the youth had grown up during the country’s growth period under Lula. Their focus had now shifted to the widespread corruption that had festered in society even during the presidency of a beloved leader. The Petrobras scandal also had a significant impact on the economy, due to the magnitude of the organisation. The shutting down of Petrobras’s operations had a major impact on employment, as construction projects around the country were halted and employees were laid off, plunging Brazil into recession. In light of these factors, by the time the next election came round, the public had lost faith in the prevailing political class, most of whom had been embroiled in the Petrobras scandal. This lack of trust in senior politicians paved the way for Bolsonaro, who – despite a lengthy career in politics – avoided the spotlight and benefited when his peers were implicated in corruption scandals. Having witnessed one of the world’s largest corruption scandals unfold and one of their favourite leaders implicated, the populace gravitated towards Bolsonaro, whose campaign was built on anti-left rheto­ ric, a promise to crack down on crime and an emphasis on Brazil’s Judeo-Christian traditions. Bolsonaro’s campaign emphasised social issues, in contrast to those of his predecessors, which focused primarily on economic reforms. Bolsonaro has frequently been in the spotlight since assuming power, due to his divisive stance on a variety of social issues, including gun control, abortion, samesex marriage and the death penalty. Under his administration, the number of families covered by major government programmes such as Bolsa Familia has fallen sharply. The Amazon fires of 2019 also sparked widespread international outrage. Bolsonaro emphasised Brazil’s sovereignty in these instances and urged international powers to stay out of the country’s internal affairs. Bolsonaro emerged as the frontrunner for the presidency due to the public’s dis­ satisfaction with the current leaders and mass resistance towards the ruling political elite. This trend was similar to how voters shifted towards a ‘left-leaning’ candidate when they voted for Lula after increased privatisation caused job losses. In the context of this book, Bolsonaro’s rise to power and the circumstances sur­ rounding it are aligned with those of Modi, Erdog˘ an and Putin. In each case, one can observe how the prevailing political class lost the people’s trust and support, due to either widespread corruption or demonstrated incompetence (in particular, in failing to address instances of corruption when exposed). This disappointment with the status quo paved the way for the rise of an alternative form of leadership: each of the leaders

202 Brazil

in focus was hailed as an ‘outsider’ who alone could resolve the people’s social and economic woes. Like his counterparts, Bolsonaro exploited this ‘anti-status quo’ sentiment and discontent over the poor design and implementation of neoliberal economic policies to carve a niche for himself as a future leader. Such was the popularity that Lula and Dilma had enjoyed at the height of their tenures that the rise to power of such an extremist figure would not have been possible without the revelations of flagrant corruption scandals and the people’s discontent with neoliberal economic policies that had caused widespread inequalities. Despite these similarities with his counterparts, Bolsonaro’s approval ratings have declined over the last three years. His poor handling of the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed in particular to this decline (see further discussion in Chapter 18). While he still retains his appeal among a small segment of the Brazilian population, it remains to be seen whether or how he will keep his hold on power – especially since Lula has re-entered politics following the annulment of the corruption charges against him. This is also what may separate Bolsonaro from the other the leaders discussed in this book: while Modi, Erdog˘ an and Putin all face weaker opposition, Bolsonaro might soon find himself going up against a political heavyweight such as Lula. It remains to be seen what strategies Bolsonaro will employ to shore up the popularity he gained from the power vacuum that was left by previous leaders – including Lula himself.

18

IN SUMMATION What We Can Learn from Cross-Country Narratives

The socio-political and socio-economic historical trajectories of four different coun­ tries – India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil – have been explored in this book thus far. The historiographies of these cross-country narratives have been formed through a closer analysis of their respective leaders and their (socio-political) biographical history, against the backdrop of their individual economic roadmaps at different phases of their devel­ opment. This critical review has allowed us to study the rise of each leader – Modi, Erdog˘ an, Putin and Bolsonaro – to power in the mainstream politics of each country. In understanding the context and rise of these leaders, it can be observed that at various points in all four countries – despite their diverse and heterogeneous tra­ jectories – similar experiences and factors have shaped the rise of each authoritarian leader. Economic vulnerabilities; corruption within the administrative and political systems; the decline of the prevailing political class (the ruling elite and the masses); and exacerbated divisions in the social fabric based on religion, caste and race are some common similarities that have played a critical role in aiding the rise of authoritarian leaders across India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil. In a bid to address existing economic vulnerabilities, all four countries adopted different versions of neoliberal economic policies during different phases of the 20th century. These policies included the premature opening-up of markets to private capital; the encouragement of foreign investment across most sectors; the parallel relaxation of state economic and price controls; and a substantial reduction in the public financing of social services, among others. In India, this neoliberal shift was observed in the introduction of the 1991 reform package. In Turkey, Özal spearheaded similar policy changes at around the same time (during the 1990s). In Russia, a similar neoliberal policy shift was carried out under Gorbachev and then under Yeltsin. Finally, in Brazil, a neoliberal eco­ nomic shift was envisioned by Vargas and later carried out by Kubitschek as part of the ‘Fifty Years in Five’ programme. DOI: 10.4324/9781003298694-22

204 In summation

As a result of these attempted neoliberal economic transitions, India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil enjoyed brief temporary phases of higher economic growth during the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This trend, combined with a mutual openness towards foreign capital and trade, cemented their positions both as strategically important economic actors in the international community and as ‘regional hegemons’, with significant growth observed in the agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors, accompanied by a growing educated middle class. Against this backdrop of upheaval, society-state relations in each country were also undergoing significant (almost seismic) transformations. Mass waves of migration were underway due to an ‘urban-concentrated’ model of economic growth, which affected household size, income patterns, traditional belief systems, gender relations and so on. Religion, or the quest to secure a conservative belief system based on pre-conceived religious moral codes, is another recurring theme in these narratives. As pointed out by Bloom and Arikan, ‘religion’ has deep ties to democracy and people’s attitude towards it (Bloom and Arikan 2012). Religion is something of a double-edged sword in the political sphere: while it presents challenges to democratic institutions, given its con­ nection to political intolerance, Bloom and Arikan posit that it can also contribute to the development of democratic components such as voter turnout and public partici­ pation due to its social nature, which helps to develop civic skills and political efficacy in the people. Given religion’s integral connection to democracy as highlighted above, it is interesting to observe how and why the leaders in focus tapped this link to varying degrees to influence the majoritarian public within a democratic set-up. From a moderate extent in Russia to a more significant extent in Turkey, India and Brazil, ‘religion’ (and the demand for religious conservatism) became a significant influ­ ence in guiding societal transformations and shaping the social expectations of majoritarian populations within these countries. It also fuelled the rise of each leader as the ‘face’ of this ‘new’ moral, societal transition. In Russia, Putin’s attitude towards the Orthodox Church marked a departure from a long period of political dismissal of religion in society, which began with the fall of the tsars. In Brazil, the more prominent role of religion is evident in the military’s efforts to employ the Catholic Church in a bid to ease the transition from military rule to democratic rule. This carved a niche for religious parties in Brazil, making them a constant presence in domestic politics. In India, the Indian National Congress (INC) also used (minority-majority) religious appeasement – caste politics – to appeal to voters’ religious sentiments (through the Shah Bano case and the conflict over the Ram-Mandir and opening of temple doors in Ayodhya). As a result of these consciously crafted political manoeuvrings (often done for electoral gains), religion assumed a more prominent role in mainstream Indian politics during a neoliberal, pro-market economic age; and it remains entwined in the nation’s political sociology even today. And, in Turkey, the military’s use of religion to counter the threat of Communism made it easier for the right wing to operate freely, whereas previously it had to be careful of contravening Kemalist ideals.

In summation 205

Neoliberal economic transitions and the role of religion/religious conservatism in mainstream politics – in conjunction with a few other context-dependent factors (e.g., repeated episodes of widespread corruption) – thus played pivotal roles in engendering societal changes and preferential shifts in voter expectations away from the prevailing political class, creating a conducive environment for an alternative form of political leadership which was perceived as being outside the status quo of the ruling elite. The following sections critically examine the cases of India, Turkey, Russia, and Brazil to gain a better understanding of the nature of the socio-political transitions seen across these case studies.

Economic Trajectories All four countries, at different points in the latter half of the 20th century, began opening up their economies in pursuit of higher growth, inspired to some degree by the growth experienced by more industrialised Western economies. They undertook measures to liberalise their markets and adopted neoliberal policies in order to address existing economic vulnerabilities. In adopting neoliberal policies, each country took a different approach in light of the potential shocks that its economy and society could suffer due to these changes to the prevailing economic ideology. These approaches were underpinned by an understanding that one cannot change the economic landscape, domestic percep­ tions and values overnight, because this could do more harm than good. Hence, the countries incorporated neoliberal policies while trying to retain their existing socio-political systems in a bid to ensure continuity in political practice and main­ tain social cohesion. In India, the government tried to strike a balance between adapting to the new open economy model and finding a place for the public sector enterprises and ‘licence raj policies’ that had prevailed since the country’s independence. After more than three decades of stagnated growth, India partially liberalised its economy in 1981. However, a combination of factors – including political unrest after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, macro-fiscal profligacy and sky-high oil prices – soon left India’s balance of payments in dire straits. By 24 July 1991, India had barely enough foreign exchange to last a fortnight and aid from the International Mone­ tary Fund (IMF) was sought. Dr Manmohan Singh, then finance minister, introduced drastic Washington Consensus-style reforms that were a far cry from the red tape and quotas that for­ merly regulated the country. The rupee was devalued – first partially and then fully by 1993. Most quotas and licences were abolished, tariffs were reduced and the economy was opened up to foreign capital. Singh claimed that India’s time for liberalisation had come and emphasised his point by quoting Victor Hugo: ‘no power on Earth can stop an idea whose time has come’ (Singh 1991). Like other high-performing countries, it was India’s time to break free from the protective net of excessive regulation.

206 In summation

TABLE 18.1 A look at the neoliberal approaches attempted in the four countries under dif­

ferent leaders Country

Year

Leader

Liberalisation efforts

India

1980s

Rajiv Gandhi

� � �

Liberalisation of economic policy Relaxation of domestic industrial controls Reduction of import quotes, tariffs and taxes

1991

PV Narasimha Rao

� � � � �

Flotation of the rupee Free flow of foreign capital Privatisation of public sector units Removal of quantitative restrictions on imports Reduced import tariffs

1980s

Turgut Özal

� �

Liberalisation of the capital account Removal of restrictions on inflows and outflows of capital Introduction of foreign exchange deposit accounts Introduction of pegged exchange rate

Turkey

� � Russia

Late 1980s

Mikhail Gorbachev

� �

Brazil

1990s

Boris Yeltsin

1930s 1960s

Getulio Vargas Juscelino Kubitschek Itamar Franco

1990s

Slight relaxation of state control on factory production Relaxation of state price control

�

Voucher programme for the purchase of shares in privatised companies � Loans-for-shares programme that allowed the sale of stakes in natural resource enterprises to businessmen � Removal of restrictions on foreign participation in the rouble treasury bill and notes market � Adoption of import substitution industrialisation � Encouragement of private bidders for the development of the automobile industry

� � � � �

Deindexation1 Exchange rate appreciation Reduction of tariffs Introduction of a currency with a crawling peg Privatisation of state-owned companies

The claims that this move saved India from the brink of ruination were not farfetched. India’s growth rate picked up from 1% in 1991 to almost 9% in 1999. The biggest upside was the economic stability and consistency that resulted from a shift to neoliberal eco­ nomic policies: the pick-up in growth and foreign capital flows into India was unprece­ dented. In fact, growth rates remained high throughout the 1990s and skyrocketed after 2002 for a decade or so. However, this steadily rising growth rate brought certain dis­ tortions with it, as observed in the disproportionate levels of employment.

In summation 207

The high levels of growth post-1991 did not lead to equally high levels of employment, as demonstrated by declining ‘employment elasticity’ over the decade (Mehrotra et al 2013).2 At different phases, India achieved what was famously called ‘jobless growth’ by macroeconomists and the benefits of a consistently higher growth trajectory were limited to certain sections of Indian society. It did little to bring about structural transformations, such as workers moving out of non-pro­ ductive agriculture into the manufacturing sector. Public expenditure on social programmes also decreased during the 1990s. For many economists, this economic model was a classic case of ‘growth without development’ for the majority in India. In 2009, journalist P Sainath labelled this ‘neoliberal terrorism’, due to the alarming increase in farmer household debt during the first decade of neoliberal reforms (i.e., the 1990s) (Sainath 2009). The number of households in debt doubled and resulted in an increase in the number of farmer suicides – something that would haunt Indian society and become a major social issue in the following years. The simultaneous growth of the services sector further highlighted a problematic trend, as this indicator, rather than signalling growth, suggests a pattern of exclusionary growth. In Turkey, the reaction to neoliberal policies was more intense. Turkey adopted these policies at around the same time as India, fully liberalising the capital account in 1989. While the immediate effects were positive, the long-term effects were less so. Whereas full liberalisation made the Indian economy resilient and high per­ forming (albeit at the cost of social equity), Turkey did not experience the same results. The country fell into the twin deficit trap and by 1994 it was facing an economic crisis. The Turkish lira depreciated by almost 70% against the US dollar in the first quarter of the year. Like India, Turkey had to seek IMF aid and a recovery programme was duly implemented. The goal was to achieve economic stability, which had eluded the country for a long time. These discrepancies between the outcomes in the two countries can be explained by Turkey’s prevailing political structure. Turgut Özal, the man credited with bringing liberalism to Turkey, ruled with a high degree of autonomy and broad discretionary powers in an environment devoid of political opposition.3 The austerity measures required for the IMF programme to succeed were not imple­ mented as agreed. Additionally, liberalisation measures facilitated the emergence of a new middle class comprised of entrepreneurs and business owners from smaller areas. Religion was a vital part of life for these groups; and as their influence grew, so too did the role of religion. These newly religiously motivated individuals came from a group that had suffered from social estrangement for years as a result of Turkey’s official rejection of religion. This same pattern of social alienation was also observed in Russia. One of the key challenges facing Russia was the changing attitudes of its citizens. These changing attitudes – from Khrushchev to Gorbachev – had a strong impact on the Russian people, who viewed liberal policies and the free market with a high degree of scepti­ cism. When Russia finally tried to chart a new trajectory for its future in the 1990s, these attitudes made people wary of the country’s shift to liberal markets; and the approach of the Russian leadership did not help.

208 In summation

The people – who already viewed liberalism as a catalyst for inequality – could potentially have been appeased by the voucher programme introduced by the government in 1993. This programme, which aimed to facilitate the public’s par­ ticipation and stake in national industries, gave people the opportunity to buy shares in newly privatised companies. However, the information gap regarding the worth of these privatised industries and inefficiencies in the actual purchase system made space for middlemen who bought vouchers from cash-strapped citizens for significantly less than their full worth. In addition to the failure of the voucher programme, the loans-for-shares programme further harmed perceptions of liberalism in the country. It allowed the wealthy to consolidate their grip on the country’s industries – industries which the public saw, through a Communist lens, as belonging to the people, and in part to them too. In addition to fuelling people’s distrust, it created a system in which the oligarchs became a major political force. The inefficiencies and unfairness exacerbated the difficulties of the Russian Fed­ eration, which was struggling to find its footing after the fall of the Soviet Union. An IMF-supported stabilisation programme of 1995, intended to pave the way for a more structured approach to liberalisation, did little to make the country more resilient to external fluctuations. Thus, the fall in oil prices and the East Asian crisis impacted on the Russian markets, giving rise to the Russian financial crisis of 1998. By contrast to its counterparts, liberalisation in Brazil was initiated a few decades earlier. It began in the 1950s with the launch of the ‘Fifty Years in Five’ programme – an ambitious plan to achieve high levels of growth in a limited period. Once again, however, a similar pattern of exclusionary growth was witnessed in Brazil, which fell prey to the twin deficit trap. Here again, the IMF stepped in and implemented a structural readjustment programme. By 1980, inflation in Brazil had reached four digits. It was at this time that several pro-labour political organisations emerged to cater to the middle class, who complained that they had seen none of the benefits of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation. Whereas in Turkey and India, we witnessed the rise of right-wing populist groups as a result of social fragmentation, in Brazil, we witnessed the rise of a socialist group called the Workers’ Party (PT). Due to its rise and resultant influ­ ence on the country, liberalisation policies in Brazil had an unorthodox tilt to them, placing greater emphasis on welfare policies. Under Lula (of the PT), inequality and poverty declined. He also set up a large-scale cash transfer programme called the Bolsa Familia. The success of Lula’s welfare programmes led to a spike in popularity among voters and gave him near-absolute control over the country’s development trajectory. However, his charisma was dented by the Operation Car Wash scandal. Although he still enjoyed immense popularity while in jail, he was banned by a court judgment from contesting the next election. In Lula’s absence, and in light of the corruption charges against the prominent poli­ tical fraternity, the people turned towards Bolsonaro, who presented himself as an outsider and leveraged social media to appeal to the masses.

In summation 209

The Shared Perils of Corruption As previously discussed, the introduction of neoliberal policies in these four developing countries came as a shock not only to their economies, but also to their citizens. This shock was exacerbated by the absence of efficient institutions to oversee their economic transformation. This gap was exploited by the upper echelons of society, which had the necessary resources to benefit unfairly from the fruits of liberalisation. The lack of oversight led to the establishment of certain fault lines which allowed corruption to flourish within the system. There are two contradictory electoral outcomes that are believed to stem from rampant corruption in politics. The first is based on the widespread belief that if given a chance, the voters will punish a corrupt incumbent. This belief is aligned with the principle of checks and balances associated with the democratic voting model, in which the people keep a check on leaders by exercising their right to vote and cor­ ruption – as unacceptable behaviour of leaders – is therefore punished (Fearon 2012; VO Key 1966; Vries and Solaz 2017). Some commentators (Healy and Malhotra 2013, p289; Vries and Solaz 2017) suggest that retrospective voting can be seen as a four-step process, involving the voters’ observation of a change in societal welfare; the attribution of responsibility for this change to particular elected office holders and revised evaluations of their performance; the adjustment of voting decisions; and finally the translation of these observations into specific election results that incentivise office holders to change their behaviour. The breakdown of any of these steps may result in a failure to mete out electoral punishment. The prevailing corruption in our four countries of focus prior to the introduction of neoliberal reforms and the absence of well-equipped institutional structures to tackle this corruption can explain the breakdown of these steps in two ways. First, deeply entrenched corruption hindered changes in societal welfare; and second, there was a lack of incentivisation due to corruption across partisan lines. This explains why cor­ ruption for the most part went unpunished in these countries for long periods of time. The second observed outcome of corruption is reduced political participation. To understand this, one should consider how corruption is normalised within a society when it goes unpunished for a long period. Školník (2020) would add to this that a ‘perception of corruption leads to absence in all selected forms of participation, (while an) experience of corruption was found to have exactly the opposite effect’. The backlash against corruption observed in our four countries of focus after the adoption of neoliberal policies can be explained by the second observed outcome of corruption, whereby the sheer magnitude of the scandals that emerged caused the electorate to perceive them as a personal experience, leading to significant electoral shifts after years of tolerated corruption. In India, almost a decade and a half of growth was eclipsed by the numerous scandals that the INC became embroiled in while in government from 2004–2014. The INC – a party that had held power for most of the electoral terms since India gained independence – was suddenly seen as untrustworthy in the eyes of the Indian public. The Commonwealth Games scam was a perfect example of how the

210 In summation

‘licence raj’ system of awarding licences to the top bidder, in addition to the increase in capital due to the newly opened economy, created a nexus between lawmakers and businesses, leading to bloated contracts and the award of tenders exclusively to people who were either part of this nexus or close to it. While the Commonwealth Games scam placed India in the international spotlight, other major scandals such as the 2G spectrum scam and ‘Coalgate’ led the Indian elec­ torate to perceive the system as rife with corruption. This was reflected in the emergence of many anti-corruption movements and transparency campaigns led by civil activists. The prevailing political class started crumbling and the public’s trust in this class plummeted along with it. As in India, the Brazilian people were also forced to face up to the extent of cor­ ruption in their country. The Petrobras scandal was not just a shock in its own right, but also the prelude to major socio-political change. The scandal – which involved a large number of leading political figures – marked the culmination of a growing anticorruption movement in Brazil. Notably, before Operation Car Wash, Brazil was experiencing civil mobilisation which began with the ‘free fare movement’ and soon came to encompass bigger topics, such as corruption. Indeed, it was this movement that resulted in the bribery laws which later made Operation Car Wash possible. In a similar manner to India, one can chart the emergence of a new anti-corruption senti­ ment within the Brazilian psyche, which was finally tipped over the edge by the Pet­ robras scandal. Even Lula, who was once considered a visionary and a leader of the masses, was imprisoned due to corruption allegations. In Turkey, periodic bouts of economic instability were commonplace in the 1990s, giving way to the first substantial political shift towards an Islamic party. Erbakan’s presidency marked the beginning of this shift. The change was historic in a country where politics had previously been tightly controlled by the military and the elite, and where Kemalist ideology thus had greatest influence. While appealing to people’s nostalgia for the ‘old Turkey’, this Kemalist ideology also served to shore up the prevailing social hierarchies. Throughout the late 1990s, almost every single Turkish government was plagued by charges of corruption; and Erbakan’s government was not immune to this either. In a country that was already suffering from economic instability and limited recovery despite IMF intervention, corruption was the final nail in the coffin for the populace. This led to a decline in Erbakan’s rule. The ‘lost trillion’ scandal – involving major members of the ruling Welfare Party, including Erbakan – hit the country hard. The Turkish public, who had upturned the status quo in the previous election, now craved someone with a more dynamic image. This afforded the opportunity for a certain type of right-wing leader to showcase his authority at a time when the country and its people were seeking other forms of leadership. In Russia, corruption had taken root through the patronage system established during Stalin’s rule, under which only those who were in Stalin’s good books or well connected to influential figures in society could advance or avail of opportunities. The influence of this system was observed during Russia’s liberalisation efforts in the 1990s through the voucher programme and the loans-for-shares programme. In both cases,

In summation 211

those who benefited had close ties to the upper political echelons. The emergence of the oligarchs bred mistrust among Russian citizens towards the government, con­ tributing to Yeltsin’s decline in popularity. Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996 would have been difficult without the backing of the oligarchs. Therefore, it was no surprise that the people accepted Putin when he succeeded Yeltsin. As Putin tried to control and manage the oligarchs’ growth in a bid to consolidate and retain political power, this move had a favourable consequence for him. Putin’s attitude towards the oligarchs was viewed by the population as a stance against corruption, which appeased the public and contributed to his initial popularity and approval.

Seeking Change The previous governments in all four countries had disappointed in one way or another. In the cases of Russia and Brazil, corruption played a bigger role in this regard. In Russia, the establishment failed to win the people’s trust despite having an opportunity to start afresh after the fall of the Soviet Union. This added to mistrust among an already strained population. In Brazil, widespread societal cor­ ruption was accepted as a feature of a developing country. However, following the revelations of Operation Car Wash, the people were forced to face the con­ sequences of this accepted corruption, as even the country’s most admired leaders were charged in the scandal. Similar factors were at play in Turkey and India, but with the added dimension of greater religious sentiment included in the mix. Founded on a vision of uni­ fication, India witnessed a slide towards identity politics when the government failed to meet people’s expectations. This helped right-wing parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party leverage the sentiments of the country’s Hindu majority. In Turkey, the establishment’s affinity for Kemalism made a major chunk of the population feel like their needs and beliefs were being disregarded. This sentiment led to a slow transition towards a politically right-wing outlook, spurred on by external factors such as a fear of Communism and economic instability. In light of these factors, one can conclude that the rise of these leaders rested on the axis of domestic sentiment and their efficiency in leveraging the window of opportu­ nity presented by their corrupt predecessors. In all four countries, corruption served as a bridge that connected economic inefficiencies to society in a way that made them tangible to the common man. This prompted calls for change as people rejected the status quo and demanded a new set of leaders. The corruption among the prevailing political class acted as a catalyst for the rise of the four leaders in focus, after the stage had been set for such change by the inefficiencies of previous governments and their failure to keep up with the evolving desires of the populace. To understand why corruption played such a significant role in this regard, one must examine the domestic sentiments at play. Neoliberalisation ushered in a new era of heightened expectations. The common people finally experienced a degree of prosperity, which led to a rise in expectations as this was reflected in how these countries were perceived. This ‘perception aspect’ was so strong that each country, at

212 In summation

one point or another, was championed as the ‘next best thing’ in the international arena. These high expectations on the global stage also had a knock-on effect on domestic public expectations. Therefore, the heightened public awareness of corruption in these countries may be viewed as the result of a people who expected more, were more engaged in the political process and were better informed. The people’s heightened expectations translated into political impact in the form of growing anti-corruption sentiment, which some politicians – ironically – leveraged for their own benefit. The four leaders in focus took this one step further by leveraging this sentiment while distancing themselves from the ruling political class. All four leaders were seen as peripheral political figures in their respective countries. All four were also seen as competent leaders in the previous posts that they held. Bolsonaro served as a Brazilian council member for almost three decades. Corruption helped to fuel his campaign as it damaged his main opponents, such as Dilma Rousseff and Lula da Silva. Similarly, Modi was seen as a successful chief minister due to his much-celebrated economic model in the Indian state of Gujarat. As corruption weighed down the ruling INC, Modi benefited from his anti-corruption stance. In Turkey, Erdog˘ an was seen as one of the most efficient mayors of Istanbul, whose personality fitted with the aspirations of voters who favoured a different type of leader for the office of prime minister. His break from Erbakan’s party was another factor that contributed to his rise. In a similar manner, Putin also made a mark on local administration – first in St Petersburg under Sobchak and then later in Moscow. He, like the other leaders studied here, stood in contrast to his pre­ decessor, Yeltsin. Putin offered people a choice – something that was not available during the 1996 election, when Yeltsin had been re-elected. Although Putin was handpicked by his predecessor, in the public’s mind he was a staunch young exKGB officer who was nothing like his drunk and sickly predecessor. The final catalyst for these leaders’ ascent to power was the demise of their colleague. While Bolsonaro benefited from the downfall of one of Brazil’s most powerful leaders, Lula, his Indian counterpart Modi gained from the downfall of a political dynasty and its failure to mount a credible opposition. Almost identically, the demise of a trailblazing leader such as Yeltsin made way for Putin; while the downfall of Erbakan made room for Erdog˘ an.4

The Initial COVID-19 Response The COVID-19 pandemic provides us with a unique opportunity to assess these lea­ ders from another angle. The pandemic touched all aspects of our lives and impacted the functioning of countries around the world while altering their political-economic landscapes. It has already become a major focus in academic and policy circles, dis­ cussed in reference to everything from unemployment to pop culture. We have avoided focusing on the social, political and economic ramifications of the pandemic for the respective countries studied (and for their leaders), as the pandemic is not yet over and the subject lies outside the scope of this book. While it is not possible to

In summation 213

judge the outcome of the leaders’ responses before the pandemic is over, it is never­ theless possible to evaluate their initial choices and decisions made in the early stages of the outbreak, and the economic and social responses to this novel situation. In Russia, the first COVID-19 cases were reported in late January 2020. A few months later, in March, the first death was reported, following which the government announced a high alert status for 85 of its regions. This state of high alert was followed by an increase in the number of infections and in the hoarding of ventilators by the rich. Putin announced a non-working week from 28 March to 5 April, which was extended multiple times until May. In May, Putin instructed different regions to implement their own action plans to ease the restrictions and tackle the virus, following which different regions adopted different approaches. These usually included encouraging non-essential workers to work from home; asking people with health risks to stay indoors; and requiring the use of masks and gloves in public spaces. In June, Moscow ended its lockdown; and by the end of the month, gyms, restaurants, swimming pools and recreational facilities were reopened even as COVID-19 cases rose. Russia also held its landmark Victory Day Parade in Red Square, although several regions cancelled their celebrations due to the rise in cases. By June 2020, the Russian Federation had reported 647,847 cases of COVID-19 and around 9,300 deaths (World Health Organization 2020). The central government diluted the potential for criticism of the situation by delegating much of the pandemic response to regional governments. As elsewhere in the world, Russia also felt the economic impact of the pan­ demic. Restricted movement, lockdowns and changes in demand impacted the country’s businesses and firms. As of August 2020, there had been a 17.5% decrease in the total permanent workforce, as 71% of firms experienced reduced demand (Karalashvili, Miller and Ponomareva 2020). The impact on society was harsh, as criticism was curbed and fines were imposed on anyone found circulating information that was not approved by the government. The first two of Putin’s COVID-19 addresses to the nation mapped out an economic cushioning plan that included an increase in minimum unemployment benefits, early bonuses for World War II veterans and an order for pandemic-hit businesses to pay their employees for the duration of the pandemic-induced non-working period, among other things. This last instruction was given to businesses without any clarity on whether the state would compensate them, putting them in a difficult position and thus adding to the insecurity and ambiguity surrounding the pandemic. Erdog˘ an was quick to respond to the pandemic, which reached Turkey in early March 2020. Turkey adopted a strategy that employed testing, isolation and restricted movement to tackle the virus. Severe restrictions were imposed on people over 65 years of age and under 20 years of age. Despite the many measures adopted by the government, by June 2020 Turkey was nearing 200,000 positive cases and 5,000 deaths due to COVID-19. According to Cagaptay and Yuksel, although Turkey’s response was quick, Erdog˘ an’s power-grabbing initiatives of 2018 proved to be a hindrance to the swift implementa­ tion of policy within the state (Cagaptay and Yuksel 2020). The recently instituted

214 In summation

executive-style presidency, which placed Erdog˘ an at the helm, centralised power and prevented the quick and well-thought-out implementation of policies (ibid). In the meantime, opposition representatives – such as Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, and Ankara’s mayor, Mansur Yavas – tried to put in place social measures to battle the pandemic, including fundraising campaigns and calls for a nationwide curfew. These proposals were initially rejected by Erdog˘ an’s office but were later coopted or refabricated as centre-led initiatives as the pandemic progressed. This is an example of how political insecurity crept into Turkey’s policy response, delaying its implementation. Further, during this period the usually vocal leader also delegated responsibility to other officers in his administration, in what may be seen as an attempt to distance himself from the response so as to not damage his image (Cagaptay and Yuksel 2020). Some of the measures introduced by the Turkish government to address the impact of the pandemic on the livelihoods of the common people included an employers’ incentive for keeping or increasing levels of employment; the introduction of a shortwork allowance; and restrictions on dismissals. However, even with these measures in place, it is expected that, due to a lack of demand, many sectors – including the textile industry – will have taken a big hit during the course of the pandemic. In India, the first COVID-19 case was detected in late January 2020. In late March, the country went into a stringent, almost curfew-style lockdown without sufficient prior notice. This move attracted both applause and criticism from dif­ ferent sides of the political spectrum. While proponents hailed its decisiveness, opponents condemned the undemocratic and abrupt nature of the lockdown. The lockdown set in motion a series of effects that included reduced demand for labour and a blow to the informal sector, which culminated in unprecedented and unan­ ticipated reverse migration. Many workers in the informal sector left India’s cities on foot to return to their hometowns and villages. Due mainly to the insecurity arising from the lack of employment in cities, they walked hundreds and thousands of kilometres, resulting in many casualties due to exertion and starvation. During the lockdown, Modi frequented the airwaves with live studio messages that asked people to take steps ranging from clapping outside their homes for health workers to switching off the lights at home. These appearances, which reflected the prime minister’s taste for showmanship, managed to divide public opinion on the govern­ ment’s COVID-19 response until a much-needed comprehensive economic package was announced in May 2020, almost a month after the lockdown was imposed. The package, valued at around $260 billion, aimed to maintain liquidity in the market by allowing states to increase their borrowing limits and targeting daily wages (Gettleman and Kumar 2020). Eventually, the lockdown was lifted with suggested precautions. Like Modi, Bolsonaro was a frequent fixture in the news during the pandemic; but not for the right reasons. The first case of COVID-19 in Brazil was recorded in late February 2020 and by June 2020, Brazil had the second-highest rate of COVID-19 in the world, trailing just behind the United States. However, the Bolsonaro adminis­ tration and the president himself downplayed the impact of the virus and the pan­ demic. As people’s responses are often influenced by the tone of the leadership, the

In summation 215

Brazilian people were also less vigilant about adopting the recommended precautions and the pandemic as a whole. Bolsonaro condemned the strict measures put in place by state governors by equating them to a crime and dismissing the virus as ‘a little flu’ (Biller 2020). His intransigent attitude towards the Brazilian health authorities earned him the nickname ‘Trump of the tropics’ (Phillips 2018). As a result, the pandemic not only overwhelmed Brazil’s health infrastructure, but also put a strain on its economy and macro-fiscal priorities, which were still recovering from the 2015–16 crisis. As in India, the vulnerable sections of lowincome migrant workers who were most significantly impacted by the pandemic restrictions and the subsequent economic crisis included the residents of favelas and members of the informal economy. Limited access to water and sanitation, coupled with Bolsonaro’s ‘pandemic as flu’ stance, made people in the favelas more vulner­ able to COVID-19. It is expected that those employed in small-scale firms and industries across the nation will also be disproportionately affected in terms of employment and wage growth patterns, due to the observed adverse impact of the pandemic on the lives and livelihoods of small and medium-sized businesses.

The Way Forward In each of the four non-Western countries studied, one can observe the diverse and complex changes that state-society relations underwent over the course of several decades. These transitions resulted from the different economic approaches adopted by the incumbent leaders and their impact on society. As outlined in the introductory section of this book, the leaders who are the focus of our case studies exploited these transitions, sensing the prevailing public sentiment and the needs of the people, and leveraged institutions such as the media to present themselves as ‘the only alternative’ to a corrupt, elitist system. They captured the people’s imaginations and hopes to position themselves as major political forces in their respective countries. The scene in each country was set by decades of societal transitions that helped to trigger a wave of national populism. This is clearly in evidence in India and Brazil, where the leaders have emphasised the indigenous culture of each country. Each has emphasised national sovereignty – as in the case of Bolsonaro, who stressed Brazil’s sovereignty during the Amazon fire controversy; and in the case of Modi’s campaigns to promote Indian-made goods. The same applies to Erdog˘ an’s attempts to ignite nostalgia for Turkey’s religious past through the conversion of Hagia Sophia back into a mosque; and Putin’s exhortations of national pride during controversial military exercises such as the 2014 intervention in Ukraine. These are just a few instances in which the leaders’ focus on nationalism has been clearly on display. In each country studied, the societal transitions that occurred, while seismic and diffuse, were also subtle – the result of factors such as the empowerment of dif­ ferent sections of society in response to neoliberal policies and the emergence of conservative (religious) belief systems (to name a few). As a result, these sections of society became more politically conscious and engaged, paving the way for political

216 In summation

transformations when factors such as corruption and incompetence resulted in the downfall of the prevailing political class. Given the role that these countries have played in the international (Global South) landscape, and the influence that Modi, Erdog˘ an, Putin and Bolsonaro have had on their regional political networks, it is important to understand these nuances and explore them further. Going forward, we hope that we can continue to learn from the historical, social and political experiences of each case study, while critically assessing the role of societal transitions and (reimagined) public attitudes – driven by the forces of neoliberal economics and other factors – in shaping the rise of authoritarian popu­ lism in a given country. We also need more evidence from cross-country and intra-country political sociology and political economy literature to deepen our understanding of author­ itarian populism and the reasons for its rise, while also exploring how certain leaders use religion, social media and false developmental propaganda to exploit prevailing socio-political conditions in order to acquire and consolidate power and make elec­ toral gains. It is equally important to recognise how ‘the people’ (not just the ‘politics of power’) can direct or necessitate change when pulled from either side of the ideo­ logical spectrum – whether under the veil of right-wing or left-wing populism. As a suggestion for further research in the multidisciplinary field of populism or ‘populist studies’, a more nuanced psychoanalytical profiling of each ‘strongman’ and other authoritarian figures would be helpful – from the role played by their early life experiences before coming to power to the behavioural influences that shaped their policymaking once in power – to better understand their populist tendencies. Within the limited scope of this book, we have tried to highlight some of the key biographical details of each leader and to examine their early life experiences to reflect on how these might have influenced their personality and public profile in positions of lea­ dership. However, a lot more work remains to be done in this regard.

Notes 1 A process of monetary correction that automatically adjusts for nominal values such as prices and wages, to diminish the effects of high inflation. 2 From 0.44% in 2000–2005 to 0.01% in 2005–2010. For further reading see Mehrotra et al 2013. 3 By the time Özal came to power in 1983, most of the political elites had already been removed due to a 1980 military coup in which all political parties were banned. 4 While this section lists many of the similarities between the leaders, it is important to keep in mind their distinct trajectories. Modi and Erdog˘ an played active roles in politics from a young age; whereas Putin and Bolsonaro began their careers in the armed forces. Further, while corruption seems to be an underlying factor in all four narratives, the impact of these scandals was felt most intensely in Brazil, followed by India and Turkey; in Russia, it appears to have been more of an underlying wave than a cataclysmic change.

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Biller, David. 2020. Brazil’s Bolsonaro calls coronavirus ‘a little flu,’ claims strong measures unnecessary. Global News, 28 March. https://globalnews.ca/news/6746747/brazils-bolsonaro­ coronavirus/. Bloom, Pazit Ben-Nun and Arikan, Gizem. 2012. Religion and Support for Democracy: A Cross-National Test of the Mediating Mechanisms. British Journal of Political Science, 43(2) 375–397. doi:10.1017/S000712341200042. Cagaptay , Soner and Yuksel, Deniz. 2020. Turkey’s COVID-19 Response. Washington Insti­ tute, 4 June. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/turkeys-covid-19-response. Fearon, James D. 2012. Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Poor Performance. In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, by Susan C Stokes and Bernard Manin, 55–97. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/ CBO9781139175104. Gettleman, Jeffrey and Kumar, Hari. 2020. Modi Announces $260 Billion Coronavirus Rescue Package for India. New York Times, 12 May. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 05/12/world/asia/virus-india-rescue-package.html. Healy, Andrew and Malhotra, Neil. 2013. Retrospective Voting Reconsidered. Annual Review of Political Science, 16, 285–306. Karalashvili, Nona, Miller, Christopher and Ponomareva, Tatyana. 2020. Facing the Storm: COVID-19's Impact on Russia’s Private Sector in 10 Graphs. World Bank, 25 August. https:// blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/facing-storm-covid-19s-impact-russias-private-sector­ 10-graphs. Key, VOJr 1966. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936–1960. Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674497764. Mehrotra, Santosh, Gandhi, Ankita, Saha, Partha and Kishore Sahoo, Bimal. 2013. Turn­ around in India’s Employment Story: Silver Lining amidst Joblessness and Informalisation? Economic and Political Weekly, 48(35) 87–96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23528759. Phillips, Tom. 2018. Trump of the tropics: the “dangerous” candidate leading Brazil’s pre­ sidential race. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/19/jair-bol sonaro-brazil-presidential-candidate-trump-parallels. Rapoza, Kenneth. 2020. Brazil’s Coronavirus Response Has Been An Embarrassment. Forbes, 23 June. https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/06/23/bolsonaro-brazils­ coronavirus-response-has-been-an-embarrassment/?sh=62ac27df226a. Sainath, Palagummi. 2009. The Largest Wave of Suicides in History. CounterPunch.org, 12 February. https://www.counterpunch.org/2009/02/12/the-largest-wave-of-suicides-in-history-2/ Singh, Manmohan. 1991. Budget 1991–92 Speech of Shri Manmohan Singh, Minister of Finance. Indiabudget.gov.in. 24 July. https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/bspeech/bs199192.pdf. Školník, Milan. 2020. The Effects of Corruption on Various Forms of Political Participation in Colombia. Latin American Policy, 11(1) 88–102. doi:10.1111/lamp.12180. Tarneja, Niharika. 2020. Brazil’s COVID-19 response and regional dynamics. Observer Research Foundation, 21 August. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/brazil-cov id19-response-regional-dynamics/. Vries, Catherine E De and Solaz, Hector. 2017. The Electoral Consequences of Corruption. The Annual Review of Political Science 20, 391–408. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-p olisci-052715-. World Health Organization. 2020. Coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Situation Report. https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/20200630-covid-19-sitrep-162. pdf?sfvrsn=e00a5466_2.

INDEX

Page numbers in italic indicate a figure and page numbers in bold indicate a table on the corresponding page 1–2–3 Agreement see Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal 2G spectrum scam 49 1961 Constitution 76 1962 Indo-China War 24 1990–91 Economic Crisis of India 29–30 1991 reform package 30–31, 47, 203 1996 Russian presidential election 138–139 2002 Gujarat Legislative Assembly elections 41 2002 Gujarat riots 40–41, 45, 66 2008 financial crisis, impacts of 48 2014 Indian general election 41; ‘Achhe din aayenge’ slogan of 53; class-wise party preference in 50; core issue during 46; Modi’s campaign 52–53; ‘Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas’ slogan 43, 52; voter blocs in 53, 67; see also Indian general election Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras (AMAN) 177 Advani, LK 31–32, 39, 41, 43, 65 Afghan War 124 agriculture 57, 71, 75, 120, 122, 155, 192 Aiyar, Mani Shankar 49 Akar, Hulusi 102 Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) 38 Albayrak, Berat 102 Allahabad High Court 26

Amazon rainforest 13, 14–15, 192 ‘American dream’ 2 Anatolia 73–74, 83, 85, 87 Anatolian bourgeoisie 80 anti-capitalist sentiment 64 anti-corruption: movement 50, 52, 67, 167; sentiment 50, 52, 210, 212 Anti-Corruption Foundation 150 anti-Eastern Bloc protests 133 anti-immigrant rhetoric 1 anti-secular sentiment 10 apartment bombings 141 Araujo, Carlos 186 Arican, Menderes 101 Armistice of Mudros 73 Article 370, revocation of 57 assassination 28–30, 64–65, 121, 159, 165, 205 ‘Ataturk’ 9–10, 74–76, 84, 107–108, 111 authoritarianism 60; populism 2, 21; neoliberalism 7 Aydınlar Ocagi (‘Intellectuals’ Hearth’) 78 Ayodhya Rath Yatra see Ram Rath Yatra Ayushman Bharat health insurance scheme 54 Babri Masjid: catalyst for destruction of 39; movement 65; opening of 28, 34n18, 65, 204 balance of payments (BOP) crisis 25, 30, 32, 33, 46, 65, 166, 168

Index 219

Bangladesh liberation war 26

Banking Regulation and Supervision

Agency 96

beef ban 56

Behura, Siddharth 49

Bengal famine of 1943 23

Berezovsky, Boris 134–135 Berlin Wall, fall of 133

Beslan school siege 144

Besli, Hüseyin 99

Bhanot, Lalit 49

Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) 31–32, 64; early

electoral success of 31; formation of 31;

under Indira Gandhi’s rule 31; political

mainstreaming of 26; political pact with

opposition parties 32

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 9, 11, 28,

31–33, 38–41, 45, 48, 50–57, 59, 64–66,

65, 211; 2019 election campaign 56;

criticism of 1–2–3 Agreement 48; defeat

in 2004 national elections 43, 45, 66;

economic socialism of 32; election

finances to 57; growth of 32–33;

initiation of 31, 32, 64; Modi

transitioning to 38–39; reasons for rise of

33; voter base of 56–57

Birth of a Leader – Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an, The

(Besli and Özbay) 99

black economy 123

‘Bloody Sunday’ massacre 117

Bofors corruption scandal 28–29 Bolotnaya Square protest 148

Bolsa Familia scheme 14, 185, 185, 192,

201, 208

Bolshevik Party/Bolsheviks 115, 119,

117–121, 122, 156

Bolshevik Red Army 119

Bolsonaro, Jair Messias 3, 14–15, 173, 176,

199, 201–203, 208, 212, 214–216; 2018

election campaign of 182, 190–191, 201;

on Amazon rainforest fire 192; campaign

promises of 190; as city councillor of Rio

de Janeiro 179, 199; context and rise of

203; controversial statements by 178–180,

190; drop in approval ratings of 191, 193;

entry to politics 179–181; factors

impacting rise of 193; family background

of 176; as federal deputy in Chamber of

Deputies 179–180, 199; first presidential

speech of 191; hobbies of 177; military

career of 177–179, 199; military

nickname of 177; naming of 176;

nominated as presidential candidate 190;

nostalgia for dictatorship period 180;

popularity of 180, 191; pro-development

policies of 14–15; promises of 14;

promises of fighting corruption 187;

school education of 176–177; scrapping

of Bolsa Familia scheme 14; sexist and

authoritarian rhetoric of 192

Brasilia 166

Brazil: bloodless coup in 164–165, 197–198;

civilian rule reinstatement in 14; class

system of 198; colonisation of 163;

contemporary history of 14; corruption in

169, 187–189; Corruption Perceptions

Index ranking of 187; credit ratings 183;

crime rate in 189–190, 199; dictatorial

regime 164–165, 173, 197; discovery by

Cabral 163; as emerging world power 13;

first Constitution of 164, 197; formation

of resistance groups in 168, 198–199;

Freedom in the World ranking of 4;

globalisation and 13; immigration policies

of 172; income inequality in 167;

independence of 197; as independent

state 163; inequality problem of 190;

military coup in 167–168; military rule in

168, 173, 198; mixed-race population of

172–173; national characteristics of 13;

oil reserves 184; population growth of

198; poverty in 13; press freedom ranking

of 192; racial inequalities in 173;

redemocratisation of 169, 172; response

to COVID-19 pandemic 214–215; role

in fight against climate change 13; social

inequalities in 173; systemic inequality in

167; violence problem 14; violent crime

problem in 169

‘Brazilian Autumn’ 187

Brazilian Constitution 185; of 1988 169;

Articles 3 and 5 of 173

Brazilian economy 165, 168–170, 200–202;

automobile industry 166, 198; under

Bolsonaro 192; Collor Plan and 169–170;

current account deficit 171, 171–172;

external debt crisis of 1980s 168, 199;

GDP per capita growth 168, 184,

184–185; Great Depression impact on

164; high interest rates 171; import

substitution industrialisation 165;

industrial growth 165, 165–166, 168;

inflation rates 168–171, 170; under Lula

183–184; Operation Car Wash impact on

189; Plano Real and 170–172, 200;

privatisation and liberalisation policies

170–172; problems affecting 13; reforms

168; under Rousseff 186–187; stagnation

169; terms of trade under Cardoso and

Lula 183, 183; trap of twin deficits

220 Index

168–169, 189; urban population impact on 165–166 Brazilian society 15, 164, 166–167, 172, 197, 201; institutionalised discrimination within 173; race and religion in 172–173; workers’ welfare inclusion in 164 Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos 7 Brezhnev, Leonid 123–124, 146, 156–157 Brown, Wendy 7 bureaucracy 28, 47, 77, 122–123, 126, 136 Bush, George 48 Cabral, Pedro Álvares 163 capital account 30, 80, 206–207 capitalism 5, 23, 63, 172 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 164, 170–172, 183, 185, 200 caste-based electoral practice 52 Catholic Church 169, 174n13, 199, 204 Catholicism 172–173 Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI) 49, 49–50 centre-right politics 76 Chamberlin, William Henry 117 Chandolia, RK 49 Chechen conflict 140–141 Chernomyrdin, Viktor 139 China 24 Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 179 Chubais, Anatoly 138 Citizenship Amendment Act (2019) 9, 57–58, 67 civil disobedience 22 civil war 119, 121, 137, 156, 180 coal allocation scam see ‘Coalgate’ ‘Coalgate’ 49–50 coalition governments 9, 27, 30, 32, 33, 65, 77, 88, 96–97, 109, 197 Collor Plan 169–170 colonialism, capitalism-led 63 colonisation 13, 163, 197; Brazil 163; capitalism-led 63; and India’s economy 23 Commonwealth Games scandal 49 communalism 22, 56 communism 12, 75, 78, 108, 115, 146, 167, 198, 204, 211 Communist Party 121–126, 131–132, 136, 157, 165 comptroller and auditor general of India (CAG) report: on auction of 2G licences 49; on coal block allocation 50 Congress (O) 25, 64 Congress (R) 25, 64 Congress of People’s Deputies 125, 137

constitutional referendum 102 Constitution of Russian Federation 137 corporate tax cut 57 corruption 4, 13–15, 28, 40, 46–50, 52, 55, 63, 66, 80, 87, 97, 134, 141, 146, 150, 158, 167, 169, 182, 187, 191, 200–201, 203, 205, 209–212, 210, 216 Corruption Perceptions Index 142 corruption scandals 4, 11, 13, 14, 15, 29, 46, 52, 67, 101, 167, 170, 182, 187, 188, 193, 200–202; Bofors corruption scandal 28–29; in Brazil 169; bureaucracy and 28, 46; Gujarat government 40; involving money laundering 101; ‘Lost Trillion’ 98; Operation Car Wash 187–188, 193, 197; outcome of 209; Petrobras scandal 14, 187–188, 201; in Russia 210–211; Türkbank Scandal 98; in Turkey 210; UPA II 48–51, 66, 67, 209–210 Costa, Paulo Roberto 188 coup 28, 75–76, 86, 99, 101–102, 110–111, 119, 126, 133, 137, 158, 164, 176, 186, 197–198; bloodless 77, 103, 165, 197; civil-military 199; against Pedro II 164; postmodern 88, 98, 110; in Turkey 76, 77, 86, 101–102; against Vargas 164–165 Coup Investigation Commission 101 COVID-19 pandemic 57, 212; Brazil’s response to 214–215; India’s response to 214; Russia’s response to 213; Turkey’s response to 213–214 ‘crawling peg’ 174n9 crime 15, 98, 130, 134, 141, 158, 180, 182, 187, 188, 189–192, 199, 201, 215 Crimea, annexation of 125, 146, 148–149 Cruzado Plan 169, 174n6 cult personality 4 currency 97, 116, 169, 206 current account balance 59, 93, 93, 171 current account deficit 29, 29–30, 171–172 da Silva, Lula Inacio 14–15, 171–172, 182–187, 189–191, 200–202, 208, 210, 212; ban on 191; centrist economic stance of 183, 185; popularity of 184, 185; socialist image of 182–183, 185; support to Rousseff 185–186; as trade union leader 182; see also Lula’s presidency deficit financing 93 Delhi state government, allegations of corruption against 49 democracies 7, 13–14, 26, 75, 100, 126, 135, 142, 144, 159, 167, 178, 204 Democratic Labour Party (PDT) 186

Index 221

Democratic Left Party 95 Democrat Party 76 demonetisation campaign 54–55, 59, 67 depoliticised Islam, in Turkey 78 Desai, Morarji 24, 25, 27, 32 discrimination 4, 23, 84–85 dissent 4, 15, 56, 100, 103, 119, 122–123, 136, 143–144, 157, 168, 198 dissidents 26, 64, 129 ‘Drain Theory’ 23 Dresden 132–133 Dubrovka Theatre, siege of 144 Duma 117–118, 143, 155 Dutra, Eurico Gaspar 165, 198 East Germany 132–133, 157 Eatwell, Roger 1 Ecevit, Bülent 77, 95 economic crisis 29, 87, 92, 95–97, 187, 207, 215 economic growth 14, 25, 45–47, 52, 66, 93, 185, 204; performance, fall in 58; under UPA I 46, 47, 66; under Vajpayee 45 economic inequality 13 economic instability 10, 92, 165, 210–211 economic liberalisation: attempt to further 28; capital account 80; under conditionality clause 28; exchange rate regime 80; New Economic Policy 30–31, 65; under Özal 79–80; people’s pessimism about 29; under Putin 142–143 economic policies 6–7, 11, 14–15, 28, 75, 167, 191, 202–203, 206 economic reforms 45, 59, 95, 99, 126, 142, 159, 201 economic stability 110, 171, 206–207 education 12, 14, 42, 54, 64, 73, 80, 84–85, 109–110, 121, 130, 150, 157, 177, 185 employment 29, 47, 53–54, 78, 95, 97, 109, 112, 130–131, 166, 176, 183, 201, 206–207, 214–215 Erbakan, Necmettin 77–80, 85–89, 97–99, 109–110, 210, 212; 1987 elections and 87; ban on 88, 89, 98; corruption scandal 98; primary focus of 85; as prime minister 88, 97; resignation of 98 Erdog˘ an, Recep Tayyip 3, 83–89, 107, 109–112, 201–203, 212–216; 2002 general elections 11, 100; 2007 general elections 11, 100–101; 2011 general elections 11; 2014 general elections 11, 101; 2018 general elections 102; attempted coup against 101–102; banned from holding public office 11, 100;

childhood experiences of 83–84; consolidation of power 101, 102; context and rise of 203; convicted of reading incendiary poem 89, 98–99; corruption scandal 11, 101; discrimination faced by 84–85; election promises of 100; Erbakan’s influence on 86; ‘executive presidency’ granted to 102; family background of 83; generation influenced by 10; income inequality under 103; leadership of 10; at Marmara University 85; mayoral election campaign of 87; as mayor of Istanbul 87–88; political ideology of 83, 85; popularity of 89, 91, 100; as president of MSP youth branch 86; as prime minister 10; protest against deaths of Islamist youths 86; re-entered politics 87; religious education of 84; reputation of 88; rise of 98–101; ‘sledgehammer conspiracy’ against 100; strategic partnership with Gulen 100; suppression of opposition 102; time with IETT 86; unemployment under 103 Europe 11, 115–116, 124, 155, 167, 189 Eurozone crisis 185 Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 28, 34n15 Farias, Paulo Cesar 170 Faulkner, Neil 118, 122 Federal Security Service (FSB) 135 ‘Fifty Years in Five’ programme 166, 198, 203 Figueiredo, João 169 Filho, Salon Pereira 179 financial crisis 48, 98, 116, 139, 142, 144, 146, 159, 200, 208 five-year plans 23, 27–28, 63, 122 fixed exchange rate 174n9 Ford 41 foreign capital 9, 31, 116, 204–205 foreign direct investment (FDI) 42, 46, 54 foreign exchange 205; deposit accounts 79; inflow of 30; reserves 94–95, 142, 148, 168; and short-term capital 92 Foreign Intelligence Agency 133 Franco, Itamar 200 Freedom in the World report 4 Gandesha, Samir 7 Gandhi, Indira 4, 21, 24–28, 32, 38, 64; 1971 election campaign 25–26; 1980 elections and 27; assassination of 27, 65; centralisation of power 26, 27, 59, 64; decision to nationalise banks 25; expulsion from party 25; forced policies of liberalisation 25; guilty of electoral

222 Index

malpractice 26, 64; imposing state of emergency 26, 64; left-wing populism under 60; and Modi, connection between 27; Operation Bluestar 27; populistic rhetoric of 25–26, 59, 64; selected for INC leadership 24; shift away from liberalisation 25 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand 64 Gandhi, Rajiv 21, 65; assassination of 29, 30, 65; Bofors corruption scandal 28–29; economic vision of 28; Shah Bano case and 28 Gandhi, Sonia 51 ‘Garibi Hatao’ (‘Eradicate poverty’) slogan 25, 59 GDP (gross domestic product) 29, 46–48, 57–61, 71, 93, 96, 120, 139–140, 142, 168, 171–172, 184–185, 189; growth rate 148, 165, 184; per capita growth 72, 168 Georgia, war with 147 Gezi Park, protests relating to removal of 11, 104 globalisation and populism 6 Global North 4, 7 Global South 2, 4, 7, 216 Golden Temple 27 goods and services tax, introduction of 55 Goodwin, Mathew 1 Gorbachev, Mikhail 124–126, 133, 136–137, 150, 151, 203, 206–207 Goulart, Joao 167, 176, 198 governmentality 27 Grand National Assembly (GNA) 74, 107 Great Transformation, The (Polanyi) 91 gross domestic product see GDP (gross domestic product) Gujarat 36, 38–44, 52–53, 65–66, 212; annual average growth rate of 52, 52–53; chief minister of 9, 42, 56; organisational hierarchy of 43; social indices of 53 Gujarat Model 9, 52, 66; circulation of narrative of 53; inspection of data relating to 52, 52–53; pro-big capital model 41–42 Gul, Abdullah 99–100 Gulbaran, Emine 86 Gulen, Fethullah 78, 99, 100–102 Gulen movement 78 Gurevich, Vera Dmitrievna 130 Haddad, Fernando 191 hate crime 56 hate speech 9 Hayek, Friedrich 91–92 Hazare, Anna 50

Helsinki Accords 124 Helsinki European Council 95 Higher Education Council 88 ‘Hindu growth rate’ 28 Hindu Mahasabha 31 Hindu nationalist ideology 32 ‘hot money’ 171 Human Development Index (HDI) 42 ‘hyper-nationalist’ populace 15 identity politics 33, 65, 67 Illarionov, Andrey 144 illicit drug activity 189 imam-hatips 10, 77, 84, 86, 88, 109 immigration 2, 172 import substitution industrialisation 23, 165 Inamdar, Lakshmanrao 36–37 income inequality 47, 103 India 9, 63; colonialism impact on economy of 23; corruption in 209–210; Freedom in the World ranking of 4; India, emergency in 26–27, 60, 64–65; independence of 22; partition of 22; political history of 21; response to COVID-19 pandemic 214; right-wing populism in 7; unification challenges of 63; see also postcolonial India Indian Constitution 63; 42nd Amendment of 23; equal right to citizens 23; secular principles enshrined in 23 Indian general election: 1967 election 25; 1971 election 25–26, 64l; 1977 election 32, 38, 65l; 1980 election 32; 1989 election 33; 1996 election 33; 1998 election 33, 39; 1999 election 33; 2004 election 43, 45; 2009 election 50; 2019 election 56; see also 2014 Indian general election Indian National Congress (INC) 21–22, 24–25, 27–28, 30–34, 45–46, 51, 63–66, 204, 209; Bofors corruption scandal and 28–29; change in perceptions of 30, 65; choice for Nehru’s successor 24, 64; decline of 27, 31; factions of 31, 64; Indira Gandhi’s expulsion from 25; internal leadership crisis 51; minority government 30, 65; as poster child for Indian independence 22, 63; religious appeasement 204; split in 32, 64; transformations as political party 21 ‘India Shining,’ campaign slogan of 45 indigenous peoples 172 Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal 48 industrialisation 10, 41, 75, 83, 108, 116, 122, 155–156, 165, 182, 208

Index 223

inflation 5, 29–30, 48, 50–51, 51, 58–60,

59, 78–79, 79–80, 92, 94–95, 137, 139,

142, 166, 168–171, 170, 178, 187,

199–200, 208

interdependence model 33n2 interest rates 57, 80, 93, 94, 94, 96–97,

168–169, 171, 184, 187

International Atomic Energy Agency 48

international competition 6, 12

International Monetary Fund (IMF) 6, 28,

30, 58, 79, 94–97, 166, 170–171, 205,

208; 1999 programme 96; stabilisation

programme under guidance of 94–96,

104n3; standby credit to India 30

In the Ruins of Neoliberalism – Rise of

Antidemocratic Politics in the West (Brown) 7

investment 28, 57, 142, 168, 186, 189

Iran, political change in 78

Islam/Islamic 75, 78, 85, 169; conservatism

10; revolution 78; re-politicisation of 78

Islamism 10, 78, 84, 100

Islamist Movement 76, 86–87 Istanbul Electricity, Tramway and Tunnel

(IETT) football team 86

Jaffrelot, Christopher 42

Jammu and Kashmir, bifurcation of 57, 67

Jana Sangh see Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) Janata Party 31–32 Jan Dhan Yojana 54

Janta alliance 27, 65

jobs 39, 42, 46, 54–55, 77–78, 84, 86,

102, 120, 129–130, 133, 178, 183–184,

198, 200

Jose, Vinod K. 42

justice 10, 22, 39, 46, 56, 79, 96, 110

Justice and Development Party (AKP)

10–11, 79, 99–102, 104, 110–111;

inception of 11; rise of 10, 96–97;

success in 2002 elections 11

Jyoti Punj (Modi) 37

Kalmadi, Suresh 49

Kamaraj, K 24

Kanimozhi, MK 49

Karaveli, Halil 100

Karnad, Bharat 38

Kasimpasa 83

Kemalism 74–75, 83, 107–109, 211;

fundamental pillars of 74; interpretation

of 75; Kemalist-Islamic hybrid,

emergence of 78–79; obstacles to

propagation of 76; on religion 104

Kemal, Mustafa 9–10, 107; achievements in war 73–74; anointed with ‘Ataturk’ title

75; death of 75; economic policies of 75;

family background of 72–73; military

career of 73; one-party system 75, 76;

political and cultural reform 75, 76;

school education of 73; as speaker of

GNA 74; speech to GNA 74–75; as

Turkey’s president 74

KGB 131–135, 157

Khalistan 34n14 Khodorkovsky, Mikhail 143

Khomeini, Ayatollah 79

Khrushchev, Nikita 123, 156, 207

Kubitschek, Juscelino 166, 198, 203

labour market 47

laicism 74, 74–77, 108

Lal Bahadur Shastri 24, 64

Lamarca, Carlos 177

land compensation movement 41

left wing: parties 4; populism 4, 6, 60

legal activism, under RTI Act 47

Leningrad, siege of 129

Leningrad State University 133

Lenin, Vladimir see Ulyanov, Vladimir Ilrich LGBTQI+ community 149

liberal and competitive market 12

liberalisation 10, 12, 25, 28–30, 46, 63,

79–80, 100, 137, 139, 142, 164, 170,

172, 205–209

‘Licence Raj’ period 23–24 loans-for-shares programme 138, 151

‘Lost Trillion’ 98

Lula’s presidency: economic growth under

183–185; education expenditure in 186;

government spending under 14,

183–184; policies of 15; social welfare

programmes of 185; vote-buying scandal

186; see also da Silva, Lula Inacio

macroeconomic growth performance 58,

59, 59

Macron, Emmanuel 192

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural

Employment Guarantee Act

(MGNREGA) 46, 47

majoritarian politics 67

‘Make in India’ campaign 54

Maldives 28

manufacturing jobs, shift of 2

Maravall, Jose María 7

‘March for the Family with God for

Liberty’ 176

market economy 32, 116, 136

Marmara earthquake of 1999 95

224 Index

medium-term loan, conditionality clause

of 28

Medvedev, Dimitri 147–148 Mehta, Suresh 39

Meirelles, Henrique 183

Mello, Fernando Collor de 169–170 Merkel, Angela 150

Mesquitta, Ary Schittini 178

military: coup 167–168, 199; dictatorship

13–14, 167–168, 172, 177–178, 186,

198–200, 204

Milli Genclik Dergisi (Journal of National

Youth) 86

‘Missing Trillion’ see ‘Lost Trillion’ Modi, Jashodaben 37

Modi, Narendra 3, 9, 15, 21, 27–28, 49,

63–67, 64, 201–203, 212, 214; 2002

Godhra riots and 40–41, 66; 2014

election campaign 52–53; as BJP general

secretary 39, 65; as BJP’s prime

ministerial candidate 51–52, 66; calls for

removal of 41; campaign targeting

Pakistan-sponsored terrorism 41;

centralisation of power 43, 67; as chief

minister of Gujarat 40–41, 66–67; as chief

minister’s aide 39, 66; childhood

experiences of 36; college education of

38; context and rise of 203; electoral

record in Gujarat 41, 43; family

background of 36; first campaign of 11;

first tenure as prime minister 54, 67;

‘Gujarat Model’ of 41–42, 66; image of

41–43, 42–43; and Indira Gandhi,

connection between 27, 59; marriage of

37; mass support to 59, 67; as member of

ABVP 38; oratory and public speaking

abilities of 37, 67; participation in protests

37; political mentor of 36–37, 39;

post-election behaviour of 41; as

pracharak of RSS 37–39, 64–65; reasons

of ascent of 63; second tenure as prime

minister 56–60; as strategist for NDA 39;

transitioning to BJP 38–40; ‘us versus

them’ rhetoric of 41; and Vaghela, rivalry

between 39

Modi, Sombhai 36

Modi government 67; Ayushman Bharat

health insurance scheme 54; bifurcation of

Jammu and Kashmir 57, 67; corporate tax

cut 57; demonetisation campaign 54–55,

59, 67; goods and services tax,

introduction of 55; Jan Dhan Yojana 54;

macroeconomic growth performance

58–59; ‘Make in India’ campaign 54;

‘surgical strike’ 55; Swacch Bharat

campaign 54; Ujjwala campaign 54;

welfare schemes of 54, 56

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi 22

Moises, Jose Alvaro 179–180 Monteiro, Felipe 179

Motherland Party 80, 92

Mudde, Cas 1

Mukherjee, Shyama Prasad 31

Mukhopadhyay, Nilanjan 43

Mulchand, Damodardas 36

multi-party politics/system 59, 75

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 34n17 Nag, Kingshuk 37

Naoroji, Dadabhai 23

National Army 74

National Bank of Economic Development 166

National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 33,

39, 43, 46, 53, 59

national emergency 102

National Front 29, 30

nationalisation 97, 119, 156

nationalism 10, 12, 21, 73–74, 85, 108, 117,

125, 215

National Order Party (MNP) 85–86 National Order Party (NOP) 77

national populism 1

National Register of Citizens 9

National Salvation Party (NSP) 77, 79, 86

National Security Alliance (MGK) 76

National Security Council 88, 97–98, 102, 110

National Turkish Student Union (MTTB)

85, 86

Navalny, Alexei 143, 150, 159

Nehru, Jawaharlal 63; death of 22, 63, 64;

five-year plan 23, 63; government’s

control 24, 63; import substitution

industrialisation 23; ‘Licence Raj’ period

23–24; mixed economy model of 23;

popular appeal of 21; as prime minister

21; promoting domestic investment 23;

speech of 21; tensions with Pakistan and

China 24; visions of 9

Nehru, Motilal 22

neoliberal economic policies 6–7, 11, 15,

202–207, 203–205, 206, 209, 215;

adopted by Brazil 208; adopted by India

205–207; adopted by Russia 207–208;

adopted by Turkey 207

neoliberalism 92; consequences of 7;

definition of 6; and right-wing 7; and

right-wing populism, link between 6–7;

social inequalities and right-wing

populism, link between 7, 15

Index 225

Neves, Tancredo 169

New Economic Policy (NEP) 30, 65,

120, 122

Nicholas II, tsar 116–117 Nixon, Richard 124

Non-Aligned Movement 24

Nuclear Suppliers Group 48

Nyay Yatra 39

OBCs (other backward classes) 54, 56–57 October Revolution 119 Odebrecht 188

oil prices 92, 139, 146–147, 208

Oktay, Fuat 102

oligarchs 12, 134, 138, 141–143, 159,

208, 211

one-party system 75–76, 108

Operation Bluestar 27

Operation Cactus 28

Operation Car Wash 187–188, 193, 197, 208

‘Operation Dead End’ 179

Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD) 94, 171

Orthodox Church 130, 204

other backward classes see OBCs (other backward classes) Otsch, Walter 7

Ottoman Constitution 71–72 Ottoman Empire 71–74, 107; Ataturk’s

reformation of 10; dealing with

international wars 72; ethnic and cultural

tensions within 71–72; as party in World

War I 72

Oxfam India 2018 Inequality Report 47

Özal, Halil Turgut 79, 86, 87, 92, 203

Özbay, Ömer 99

Passos, Fabio 178–179 Patel, Keshubhai 39, 40

Patel, Vallabhbhai 31

Pedro I, Dom 163–164, 197

Pedro II 164, 197

personal freedoms 12

personality cult 27, 43, 60, 123

Petrobras corporation 185, 188–189, 201

Petrobras scandal 14, 187–189, 191, 192,

201, 210

Peugeot 41

Pew Research Center 147

Plano Real and Brazilian economy

170–172, 200

Polanyi, Karl 91

political economy 2, 4, 9, 13, 136; academic

attention in 4–5; challenges to 5;

cross-comparative 3

political violence 77, 78

Politkovskaya, Anna 143–144 populism/populist movement 15, 74, 108,

111; characteristics of 5; definitions of

1–2, 5, 7–8; factors contributing to

international interest in 2; form and goals

of 5; niche for 5; reasons for expansion of

5–6; reasons for focusing research on 2–3;

rise in 1; see also specific types

Portuguese Empire 163

postcolonial India 21–24; five-year plans 23,

63; government’s control 24, 63; import

substitution industrialisation 23; ‘Licence

Raj’ period 23–24; promoting domestic

investment 23; tensions with Pakistan and

China 24

‘postmodern coup’ 88, 98

poverty 12–14, 22, 97, 109, 144, 167, 208;

alleviation programmes 29, 32; alleviation

rhetoric 25–26, 46, 59; and inequality in

Russia 145, 155

poverty and inequality, in Russia 145

Pracharaks 37–38 pragmatism 11

press freedom ranking 192

private agriculture 122

privatisation 45, 92, 141, 158, 172, 182,

200, 206

protests 9, 11, 37, 51, 57, 59, 67, 88,

117–119, 132–133, 148, 187, 189;

anti-government demonstrations 37;

Bolotnaya Square protest 148; ‘Brazilian

Autumn’ 187; against Citizenship

Amendment Act 57–58; relating to

removal of Gezi Park 11, 104; against

revocation of Article 370 57; against rise

of prices of essential goods 26

Przeworski, Adam 7

public interest litigation movement 47

Public Ministry see Public Prosecutor’s Office Public Prosecutor’s Office 169, 188

Puhringer, Stephen 7

Pussy Riot 146

Putin, Lyudmila 132

Putin, Spiridon 129

Putin, Vladimir Spiridonovich 129

Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich 3, 12, 15,

119, 157–159, 201–203, 211–213;

approval ratings for 12–13; backdrop to

rise of 136–139; college education of

131–132; consolidation of power 13,

144; context and rise of 203; corruption

allegations against 134; as deputy mayor

of St Petersburg 134, 136; economy

226 Index

under 12; family of 129–130; first two terms as president 142–147; Foreign Intelligence Agency’s job offer 133; fourth term as president 149; generation grown up under 12; as head of foreign section 133; as head of FSB 135; image as strongman 141; inducted into Pioneers 131; joined KGB 132; opposition to 148; personality and perceptions of 150; reconnected with Sobchak 133–134; resigned from KGB 133; resistance to 13; rise of 139–142, 150–151; school education of 130–131; spy’s duties of 132; stay in Dresden 132–133; third term as president 148–149; usefulness to Yeltsin 135 Quadros, Janio 167, 198

Qutb, Sayyid 85

race 75, 87, 172, 203

‘racial democracy’ 173

racial inequalities 173

radical right emergence and modernisation,

link between 6

Raja, A 49

Ram Rajya Parishad 31

Ram Rath Yatra 39, 65

Rao, PV Narsimha 21, 30, 46, 65

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 9,

31–33, 36–41, 53–54, 56, 64–65; banned

during state of emergency 38; grassroots

mobilisation by 65

Red Banner Institute 132

referendum 86, 92, 102–103, 111, 125,

137–138

reformism 74, 76, 108

religion/religious 9–10, 22–23, 26, 55,

63–64, 67, 72, 74–76, 78–79, 107–109,

111, 145–146, 169, 172, 203–204, 207;

conservatism in 15; education 78;

hate crime against minorities 9;

mobilisations 65

republicanism 74, 108

Republican Party 75

Republican People’s Party 76

Right Path Party 97

Right to Information Act, 2005 (‘RTI Act’) 46–47 right wing: governments 4; ideology 3;

political parties 4, 31

right-wing populism 2–4, 6–8, 15, 60;

authoritarian 4; catalysts for 7;

dichotomisation of society 6; factors

contributing to rise of 6–7; groups 208;

and neoliberalism, link between 6–7; sociopolitical roots of 3

Road to Serfdom, The (Hayek) 91

Rodrigues, Cassia Maria 178–179 Rodrik, Dani 6, 7

Roman Catholic Church 172

Romanov dynasty, downfall of 12

Rousseff, Dilma 14, 180, 182, 185,

200–201, 212; corruption scandals and

187–188, 193, 197, 200–201;

impeachment of 189; Lula’s support to

185–186; as member of guerrilla group

186; public career of 186; welfare

spending by 186

rupee 40, 205–206; devaluation of 30; dual exchange rate of 30; political opposition to devaluation of 34n8 Russia see Russian Federation Russian Constituent Assembly 119

Russian Constitution 147

Russian economy 95, 116; black economy

123; dependence on fuel prices 144;

economic change in 1990–2002 140;

fast-paced transformation of 137–138;

financial crisis in 1899 116; five-year

plans 122; GDP growth rate 148, 148;

GKO market 139; global financial crisis

of 2008 impacting 147–148; growth rate

142, 143; impact of falling oil prices 139,

140; industrial output of 23, 124; mixed

economy 120; partial privatisation of

economic activity 120; recovery from

1998 financial crisis 142, 144; revenue

diversification 144

Russian Empire 116–117 Russian Orthodox Church 146, 149

Russian Revolution 118; 1905 revolution 117; 1917 revolution 117–119 Russian Socialist movement 118

Russian Federation 11, 12, 136; 1905

revolution 115, 117; 1917 revolution

117–119; abolition of serfdom 115–116;

administrative challenges for 11–12;

annexation of Crimea 148–149; ‘Bloody

Sunday’ massacre 117; church and

Bolsheviks 121; civil war in 119–120;

corruption in 210–211; emergency in

126, 137; fall in per capita GDP of 120,

120; Freedom in the World ranking of 4;

history of political transitions 115–119;

industrialisation of 116; influence of

church in 149; LGBTQI+ community of

149; political history vs. oil prices 146;

poverty and inequality in 145; public

debt exchange rate crisis 139; religion and

Index 227

145–147, 147; response to COVID-19 pandemic 213; shocking liberalisation methods 12; society 117, 120, 126, 139, 146, 158; transitions witnessed by 115; tryst with democracy 126–127; unemployment rates in 145; war in Chechnya 139–141; war with Japan 117; wealth disparities within 151 Salt March 22 Sarney, Jose 169, 179 Satter, David 141, 152n2 satyagraha 22 secularism 10, 23, 63, 76, 84, 88, 98, 107 serfdom 91, 115–116, 155 shadow economy, creation of 12 Shah Bano case 28, 204 Shariati, Ali 85 Singh, Manmohan 21, 46 Singh, VP 29, 30 single-party politics 59 Sitapati, Vinay 32 slavery, abolition of 164, 197, 198 ‘sledgehammer conspiracy’ 100 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 54 ‘Smart Voting’ 150 Sobchak, Anatoly 131, 133–134, 157–158, 212 social conservatism 11 social inequalities 6, 7 Socialist Revolutionary Party 119 social media campaigning 53 society-state relations 204 Southern Common Market 13 Soviet Union 12, 30, 74, 120, 123–126, 129–133, 139, 144–146, 155–158, 208, 211; as atheist state 145; collapse of 133; fall of 12; population of 123; see also Russian Federation stagnation 7, 14, 169 Stalin, Joseph 12, 119, 121–123, 125, 151, 156–157, 210; collectivisation of agriculture under 122; death of 123; grip on economic front 122; succeeding Lenin 121 standby credit 30 state control 12, 76, 92, 110, 126, 165, 198, 206 stimulus packages 48 Stint, Angela 140–141 ‘surgical strike’ 55 Swacch Bharat campaign 54 Syndicate 24–25, 33n5 Tata, Nano plant 41 Temer, Michel 169

Thachil, Tariq 56 Thapar, Karan 42, 44n5 top-down system 43 trade deficit 30 Treaty of Lausanne 74 Treaty of Rio de Janeiro 163 Treaty of Sevres 72–74, 107 Trotsky, Leon 121 True Path Party 81 Trump, Donald 1, 7 Türkbank Scandal 98 Turkey 9; chances of EU accession 11; corruption in 210; economy of 11; emergency in 102, 111; employment to population ratio 95; evolution of 76; Freedom in the World ranking of 4; full universal suffrage of 75; GDP per capita growth of 72, 72; independence, National Army for 74; Islamist movement and 76; leaders of 79–81; lira 94, 96, 97; military establishment 78; under Özal 79–80; partnership with IMF 94–96; political violence of 1980 77, 78; politics 75, 78, 79, 85, 87, 99, 108–109; response to COVID-19 pandemic 213–214; right-wing populism in 7; rise of 72–74; secularism propagated by leaders of 74, 76, 77, 83, 84, 88, 97–98, 107; strategic location of 71; transformation into secular state 74; transition to multi-party system 75, 76 Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) 110; attempted coup against Erdog˘ an 86, 101–102; and government, tensions between 88 Turkish Constitution 76 Turkish economy 71, 75, 79–80, 87, 92, 94–97, 111; 1994 economic crisis 87, 92–96; 2001 crisis of 96–97; budget deficit 93; Central Bank’s monetary programme 92; contraction of 94; deficit financing 93–94; diversity for 75; economic crisis in 1970s 92; during Erdog˘ an’s first term 100; inflation rates 79; instability throughout 1990s 80; monetary policy reform 95; Özal’s liberalisation reforms 79–80; public deficits 93; public saving-investment balance 94; Russian economic crisis impact on 95; stabilisation programme for 94 Turkish general election: 1994 election 95; 1995 election 81; 2002 election 100 ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ 78, 80 Turkish society, religion reintroduction in 75, 104; 1961 Constitution and 76; changes with 103; with Democrat Party’s

228 Index

rule 76; friction within society 77;

Islamist political parties and 77–78;

multi-party system 76

Ujjwala campaign 54

Ukraine 125, 146–147, 149, 215

Ulyanov, Vladimir Ilrich 117–119, 121–122,

145, 150; assassination attempts 121; in

exile 117, 118; political candidates to

succeed 121; USSR after 121–126;

utopia of 119–121

unemployment 50, 58, 94, 95, 97, 103,

144–145, 172, 184, 190

Uniao Democratica Nacional (UDN) 164,

167–168, 197–198

Union of South American Nation 13

United Front 33

United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 43, 45;

see also UPA government

United Russia 149–150 United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR)

119; under Brezhnev 123–124; fall of

126; under Gorbachev 124–125; under

Khrushchev 123; under Lenin 119–121;

member states of 125; under Stalin

121–123; and United States, relations

between 124

United States 78, 123–124, 164, 214

UPA government 45, 46–50, 66; Indo-US

Civil Nuclear Deal 48; NREGA 47;

policies of 46–47; pre-tax national

income 51; UPA I 46–48; UPA II 46,

48–50, 48–51, 52, 58–59, 201

Vaghela, Shankersinh 39

Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 21, 31–32, 41, 43,

45, 45

Varank, Mustafa 102

Vargas, Getúlio 164–165, 167, 173,

197–198, 203

Veja 178–179 violence 4, 11, 14, 56, 78, 86, 169, 190

violent crime 169

Virtue Party 11, 88–89 voters: base 11, 57, 64, 77, 87–88, 111, 180,

190; perceptions of ‘biggest problem’

45–46

voucher programme 138, 151

wages 47, 94–95, 122, 125

war communism 119

Welfare Party (RP) 11, 77, 91; ban on 88,

98; charges of favouritism against 88;

coalition government 97; corruption

scandal 98; rise of 80–81; success in local

elections 87

Western constitutions 23

White Army 119

‘whitening’ 172

Witte, Sergei 116

Workers’ Party (PT) 182, 208

World Economic Forum 13

World War I 72

Yeltsin, Boris 12, 125–126, 134, 136–142,

146, 150, 158, 203, 206, 211–212; 1996

elections and 138–139; decision of war in

Chechnya 139; disbanded the Parliament

137; as president of Russian Federation

136–137; privatisation efforts under

137–138; public image of 134, 138

Yig˘ it, Korkmaz 98

Yildirim, Binali 103

Yildiz, Bekir 88

Yilmaz, Mesut 98

Young Turk Revolution 72, 73

Youssef, Alberto 188

Yukos 143

Zadafia, Gordhan 43