Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy 9780231528085

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Public Opinion in Chinese Foreign Policy
2. Forgetting and Remembering the Past: China’s Relations with Japan, 1949–1999
3. The Origins of Public Mobilization
4. Responding to Public Opinion
5. A Potent Populism
6. The Rebirth of the Propaganda State
Conclusion
Appendices
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

STRONG SOCIETY, SMART STATE

CONTEMPORARY ASIA IN THE WORLD

CONTEMPORARY ASIA IN THE WORLD David C. Kang and Victor D. Cha, Editors This series aims to address a gap in the public-policy and scholarly discussion of Asia. It seeks to promote books and studies that are on the cutting edge of their respective disciplines or in the promotion of multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary research but that are also accessible to a wider readership. The editors seek to showcase the best scholarly and public-policy arguments on Asia from any field, including politics, history, economics, and cultural studies. Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia, Victor D. Cha, 2008 The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online, Guobin Yang, 2009 China and India: Prospects for Peace, Jonathan Holslag, 2010 India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia, Šumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, 2010 Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China, Benjamin I. Page and Tao Xie, 2010 East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute, David C. Kang, 2010 Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics, Yuan-Kang Wang, 2011

JAMES REILLY

STRONG SOCIETY, SMART STATE The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy

J

Columbia University Press New York

Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © 2012 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Reilly, James, 1972– Strong society, smart state : the rise of public opinion in China’s Japan policy / James Reilly. p. cm. — (Contemporary Asia in the world) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-231-15806-0 (cloth : acid-free paper paper) — ISBN 978-0-231-52808-5 (electronic) 1. China—Foreign relations—Japan. 2. Japan—Foreign relations— China. 3. Japan—Foreign public opinion, Chinese. I. Title. II. Series. DS740.5.J3R38 2012 327.51052—dc22 2010049310

Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. This book was printed on paper with recycled content. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared.

For Wu Na with all of my love

CONTENTS

List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction 1 1 Public Opinion in Chinese Foreign Policy 23 2 Forgetting and Remembering the Past: China’s Relations with Japan, 1949–1999 55 3 The Origins of Public Mobilization 99 4 Responding to Public Opinion 129 5 A Potent Populism 157 6 The Rebirth of the Propaganda State 179 Conclusion 207 Appendices 229 Notes 237 Bibliography 291 Index 315

Figures

Figure 1.1  Stages in a Wave of Public Mobilization  27 Figure 3.1  Global Times Reporting on Japan  118 Figure 3.2  The Public’s “Friendly Feeling” Toward Japan  123 Figure 3.3  Ranking ­Japan’s Importance to ­China’s Economy  124 Figure 5.1  Variation in Chinese Experts’ Threat Perceptions of Japan  165 Figure 5.2  Percentage of Articles Urging Cooperation and Trust ­Building  165

TABLES

Table 2.1 China’s Partnerships, 1996–1999

78

Table 2.2 China– Japan Security Dialogues: 1998–2001 83 Table 2.3 Chinese Injuries Due to Exposed ACW, 1950–2003 Table 3.1 Party and Commercial Newspapers’ Coverage of Japan, 2001–2005 117 Table 3.2 Chinese Opinions of East Asian Countries and the United States, 2005 123 Table 3.3 What Is Your Main Channel for Learning About Japan? 124 Table 5.1 Origins and Outcomes of the “New Thinking”

172

Table 6.1 Party and Commercial Newspapers’ Coverage of Japan: 2004–2008 190 Table 6.2 Shifts in Chinese Public Opinion Toward Japan Table 6.3 Closeness to Japan Before and After the Abe Visit in October 2006 199

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

oes public opinion influence Chinese foreign policy? Can the Chinese government shape public attitudes on foreign policy? I have spent the past decade struggling with these two questions. The book you are holding in your hands represents my answers. It is my great pleasure to acknowledge the generous support I have received during this journey. My favorite saying attributed to Confucius is: “Among three people walking; one of them could be my teacher” (Sanrenxing; biyou woshi). In the course of writing this book, I have been enriched by many teachers. David Shambaugh has provided that rare mix of scholarly insight, practical guidance, and personal support that epitomizes the best in academic mentorship. Mike Mochizuki has equally been a wellspring of insight, inspiration, and support. He always asked the truly hard questions, and had the kindness to sift patiently through my loquacious responses to help me find a path forward. Bruce Dickson has been exceedingly generous with his time, mixing encouragement and critiques of numerous draft articles and chapters. For teaching me how to ask interesting and important questions, I am deeply grateful to David Bachman, Dorothy Borei, Martha Finnemore, Kenneth Pyle, Susan Whiting, Kozo Yamamura, and Daqing Yang.

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Acknowledgments

This project would never have reached its fruition without the support of several close academic mentors. Ever since Bates Gill took me on as his research assistant at the Brookings Institution, his intellectual guidance, good humor, and steadfast friendship have been of utmost importance to me. Rana Mitter was an unflagging source of wisdom and encouragement throughout the daunting task of transforming a Ph.D. dissertation into a readable book. Rosemary Foot kindly took me under her wing at Oxford, generously sharing her time, insights, and hospitality. Shi Yinhong has been my close advisor over the past few years in China; he epitomizes for me what a true China scholar can and should be. I have been sustained by the good cheer of friends and colleagues now spread across the globe, particularly the GW China cabal of Phillip Stalley, John Donaldson, Injoo Sohn, and Yisuo Zeng; and by members of the China’s War with Japan project at Oxford, including Matt Johnson, Aaron Moore, Federica Ferlanti, Annie Hongping Nie, and Akiko Frellesvig. A number of individuals have given generously of their time to comment on aspects of this project over the past few years, including: Allen Carlson, Joseph Fewsmith, Edward Friedman, Yinan He, Daniel Lynch, Caroline Rose, Stanley Rosen, Simon Shen, Danie Stockmann, Shogo Suzuki, Patricia Thorton, and Jessica Weiss. I benefited greatly from extensive discussions with many individuals in China; a partial list includes: Jin Canrong, Jin Xide, Huang Dahui, Fan Shiming, Li Yonggan, Wu Xinbo, Gui Yongtao, and Ni Jianping. My colleagues at the University of Sydney have kindly shared their insights and experience, particularly Ben Goldsmith, David Goodman, Graeme Gill, Lily Rahim, and Fred Teiwes. My heartfelt appreciation goes out to all. I am especially fortunate to have been associated with a number of worldclass institutions while writing this book. From 2001 through 2007, I served as the East Asia Representative of the American Friends Service Committee. AFSC, particularly my supervisor, Alice Andrews, was exceedingly supportive of my academic interests. The Political Science Department of George Washington University was equally understanding of my professional demands. In China, I was affiliated with the School of International Relations at Renmin University, a cordial and invigorating academic host. I am also grateful to the China’s War with Japan program at Oxford University, directed by Rana Mitter and funded by the Leverhulme Trust. A fellowship with the program enabled me thoroughly to revise the manuscript and prepare it for publication. The Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney has been a supportive home for the completion of this book and the launching of my next project.

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Along the way, I have benefited from financial support from the Sigur Center of Asian Studies and the Political Science Department of GWU, the Fulbright-Hays Dissertation Research Grant program, the University China Council of London, and the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Sydney. Jia Guan and Li Junyang, both promising scholars in their own right, provided superb research assistance. At Columbia University Press, Anne Routon’s deft editorial hand and loyal support have been critical. My deep gratitude goes out to the two anonymous reviewers for CUP for their painstaking comments on two iterations of the book manuscript. The final product is much improved thanks to their efforts. All remaining shortcomings and errors remain mine alone. My family sustains me: my brother, Matt, keeps me up to date on the latest Philly sports; my mother and Elaine DeMasse have contributed their love and encouragement all along the way. The unstinting support behind the scenes by my mother-in-law, Liu Lanfang, has made all of this possible. My daughter, Reina, has grown up along with this book. Her laughter and good cheer remind me daily of what is truly important in life. Finally, and most importantly, this book is lovingly dedicated to my wife, Wu Na. With her, anything is possible.

STRONG SOCIETY, SMART STATE

INTRODUCTION

ow authoritarian regimes have endured and even prospered well after the end of the Cold War is one of the most important questions in world politics today. Successful authoritarian states must be willing to respond to public pressure through policy adaptation while also retaining the capacity to shape public opinion. Authoritarian responsiveness and persuasiveness are attributes largely overlooked by scholars to date. This book reveals their central role in sustaining Communist Party rule in China and develops a method for examining similar dynamics in other authoritarian regimes. By selective tolerance of popular protests and policy debates, Chinese leaders provide an outlet for the most mobilized, informed, and engaged segments of the population to express their opinions. At the same time, the state relies upon pervasive surveillance, coercion, and censorship to restrain activists from mobilizing to directly challenge Communist Party rule. The result is a kind of contained contention, in which popular protests continue to erupt and influence specific policy decisions but do not fundamentally undermine the party-state’s authority. By combining tolerance and responsiveness with persuasion and repression, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has developed a system of responsive authoritarianism based on accommodating

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2

Introduction

popular pressures within its policy-making processes in ways that shore up regime stability. China’s leaders appear to have discovered a solution to the dilemma laid out by Samuel Huntington over four decades ago: how to accommodate rising popular demands for participation and representation within a nondemocratic political system.1 Rather than being a harbinger of regime downfall, the rise of public opinion and its influence in Chinese foreign policy reveal a remarkable evolution in authoritarian responses to social turmoil. This strategy of selective tolerance and responsiveness is not limited to China. As the third wave of democratization comes to an end, the question of how authoritarian regimes remain in power atop restive, well-informed publics is receiving renewed attention. The tolerance, responsiveness, and persuasiveness of the Communist Party in China in facing popular pressure is echoed by many stable, nondemocratic regimes in the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, in trying to situate China’s response within a broader comparative context, we are ill served by existing concepts. The label “authoritarian” is a placeholder for a conceptual jumble of nondemocratic regimes that says much more about what they are not than what they are. Any concept that uncritically lumps together the diverse regimes in Singapore, Syria, Zimbabwe, Burma, Cuba, and Iran risks distorting more than it reveals. Given the importance of authoritarian countries to world politics, improving our understanding of the ways they sustain their rule is critical. I develop this argument through the study of China’s recent relations with Japan. Beginning in 2001, China experienced a swell of negative public opinion, protests, and sensationalist media coverage of Japan—a wave of public mobilization—that impeded diplomatic negotiations, interrupted bilateral economic cooperation, spurred belligerent rhetoric, and forced Beijing to withdraw a major diplomatic initiative. By 2005, China’s Japan policy was in crisis. Sino-Japanese relations had sunk to their lowest point since diplomatic ties were restored in 1972, while the regime faced a domestic protest movement that threatened to spiral out of control. Chinese leaders responded by combining propaganda and diplomacy with censorship and repression. Over the next few years they successfully reined in anti-Japan activism, reshaped the domestic information environment, and improved public opinion toward Japan. By 2010, relations with Japan had returned to relative stability. China’s undulating relations with Japan raise three broad questions. Was the rise in public mobilization primarily the result of actions by the state, actions by society, or developments outside of China? Did public mobilization actually

Introduction

3

influence Chinese foreign policy, and if so, in what areas, through what mechanisms, and to what degree? Finally, what role did society and the state play in bringing the wave to an end? Careful study reveals that the wave of public mobilization arose largely from factors outside of the Chinese party-state. Decades of state propaganda contributed to the broad base of popular distrust and animosity toward Japan, while official tolerance allowed protests to emerge. Yet the primary factors that instigated, drove forward, and broadened the wave of public mobilization came from beyond the state. This public pressure influenced China’s foreign policy decision making and discourse toward Japan. During the peak of public mobilization, Beijing’s rhetoric and negotiating stances, and the timing, direction, and extent of policy decisions all more closely reflected the public’s influence rather than reacting to Japanese policies. The wave of public mobilization also affected foreign policy discourse. High levels of public participation via the Internet, sensationalist coverage in popular media, and the participation of a group of populist journalists and activist-academics interjected nationalist, anti-Japanese sentiments into elite experts’ policy discourse, affecting the course and outcome of public debates and limiting the influence of moderate experts on policy makers. Yet once Chinese leaders made a concerted effort to bring the public mobilization to an end, they were effective in doing so. Faced with a deepening domestic and diplomatic crisis in spring 2005, top leaders orchestrated a remarkable reversal in their domestic propaganda toward Japan, augmented by censorship, repression, and diplomacy. The Party’s effort was largely effective in reshaping popular media content, discouraging anti-Japanese protests, and contributing to improvements in public attitudes toward Japan. Given the strength and persistence of anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese public, the Party’s success is particularly impressive. Studying the role of public opinion in China’s relations with Japan yields two payoffs for international relations theory. First, it provides an easy test for a hard argument—in academic terms, a plausibility probe. A comparative perspective suggests that public opinion will not influence authoritarian states’ foreign policy. In democracies, politicians’ fears of being punished in future elections often lead them to avoid foreign policy choices that go against articulated or anticipated public opinion.2 Richard Sobel, for instance, found that U.S. presidents since the Vietnam War have frequently felt constrained by public unwillingness to support broader objectives.3 An autonomous media sector, strong civil society, democratic norms, and decentralized state institutions all increase the likelihood that public opinion will influence

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Introduction

democracies’ foreign policy.4 Authoritarian states, defined simply as nondemocratic political systems with some measure of social freedoms, lack all of these attributes. Studies on domestic audience costs similarly presume that authoritarian leaders are not constrained by domestic public opinion.5 The study of public opinion in democratic states’ foreign policy thus generates a clear, negative expectation: public opinion is unlikely to influence an authoritarian state’s foreign policy. China’s relations with Japan also represent a hard test for an apparently easy argument. We would expect authoritarian leaders to effectively shape overt expressions of public opinion. They can censor news reports, fire journalists, close newspapers, imprison dissidents, break up demonstrations, and disband organizations. By controlling the flow of information to the public and deterring protest movements, strong authoritarian leaders should be able to effectively shape public opinion and political behavior. Yet to date, most scholarship on Chinese propaganda has focused on easy cases—instances where popular sentiments run in concert with official propaganda, such as China’s patriotic education campaign or promotion of the Beijing Olympics.6 Current scholarship thus risks replicating the determinist logic of an earlier generation of propaganda studies, which presumed that “Soviet propaganda was successful because the Soviet regime was successful; it has survived.”7 Assuming that propaganda only “fails” when the regime falls provides scant insight into when, how, and to what degree it enhances regime stability. Given the emphasis that authoritarian regimes around the world place upon propaganda, we need a better approach to assessing its effectiveness. The best test for an authoritarian regime’s propaganda capacity is a case in which the state sought to reverse previous propaganda messages or promote propaganda contrary to dominant public preferences, perhaps to justify either a domestic or a foreign policy reversal. Examining China’s efforts after spring 2005 to cool anti-Japanese emotions, rein in popular protests, and reshape popular media content thus provides a particularly rigorous test of the CCP’s propaganda capacity. The findings from these two tests challenge a widespread presumption that the rise of popular nationalism in China signals the erosion of Communist Party authority. Recent scholarship on Chinese nationalism tends to depict the state as “fragile,” warning that popular nationalist sentiments are growing out of control and will increasingly force the Chinese government to adopt more aggressive foreign and military policies.8 Instead, I develop and test a cyclical model of state–society interactions, demonstrating that the Chinese government has developed a mechanism for tolerating and responding

Introduction

5

to sporadic instances of public emotion while maintaining its overall foreign policy trajectory. This approach allows us to account for the Party’s intermittent tolerance of popular protests and responsiveness to popular pressures, as well as its subsequent crackdowns and policy reversals. I further show that even in a particularly difficult case, namely China’s relations with Japan after 2005, the Chinese government retains the capacity to reverse course in foreign policy and foster public support for its new policy approach. Earlier claims of the demise of the “propaganda state” in China appear to be, at a minimum, premature.9 These findings also question long-standing assumptions about the influence of historically derived animosity on Chinese analysis and policy making toward Japan. In his seminal study, China Eyes Japan, Allen Whiting asked: “Can the Chinese leadership overcome its negative image of Japan, derived from past conflict, in order to pursue a positive relationship based on its national interests? Or will Beijing’s perceptions and reactions remain conditioned by, if not captive to, the historical heritage of humiliation and hatred? To what extent do ‘profoundly misleading stereotypes’ continue to determine Chinese views of Japan?”10 Quantitative and qualitative data, detailed in chapter 5, demonstrate that throughout the 2000s, a number of influential Chinese experts applied a set of relatively objective criteria to analyze Japan and recommend a strategic policy response. While the public’s attitudes toward Japan remain far more negative than toward other Asian neighbors or toward the United States, these experts demonstrated the capacity to recognize the dangers of an overly emotional approach and the courage to advocate policies of restraint and engagement. This finding challenges the long-standing presumption that Chinese policy making and analysis of Japan are irrevocably distorted by memories, emotions, and misperceptions, exacerbating what one observer dubs the “perpetual conflict” between China and Japan.11 Although popular animosity toward Japan has at points constrained Chinese policy makers, their success in stabilizing bilateral relations and moderating public attitudes suggests that prospects for stable China– Japan relations are far brighter than most analysts have assumed. In aggregate, these findings help explain the endurance of Communist Party rule in China. As Elizabeth Perry reminds us, the post–Mao era has now lasted longer than the Maoist era itself. “Whether or not current political conditions persist for many more years, their distinguishing features are surely as worthy of careful attention and analysis as a previous generation of China scholars once showered upon the Maoist political system,” she writes. This requires “a sober assessment of the techniques of rule perfected by the

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Introduction

Chinese Communist state,” with particular attention to the regime’s capacity to curb and channel potentially threatening social forces.12 This book is dedicated to precisely this task: unearthing the “techniques of rule” employed by the Communist Party to remain in power amid the dramatic rise of social activism, rapid information flows, and economic dynamism in China. The remainder of this introductory chapter locates this book within two broad debates in scholarship on Chinese politics: about the likelihood that public pressure will lead to a more aggressive foreign policy and about prospects for a democratic transition in China. I then suggest that the case of China is part of a broader phenomenon of responsive authoritarianism, pointing out parallels with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. The final two sections address issues of methodology and sources and provide a road map for the remainder of the book.

WILL CHINA BECOME MORE AGGRESSIVE ABROAD? Jack Snyder argues that reforming authoritarian states such as China are likely to adopt an aggressive foreign policy. As in new democracies, authoritarian leaders faced with legitimacy crises and growing demands for political participation tend to resort to promoting nationalist myths, a strategy that risks trapping them into an aggressive stance abroad. “War can result,” Snyder warns, “from nationalist prestige strategies that hard-pressed leaders use to stay astride their unmanageable political coalitions.”13 The archetypical case is the Falklands War, in which the Argentinean military regime, its popularity waning, bowed to nationalist pressures by seizing the Falkland Islands. Stephen Van Evera agrees that “the most dangerous regimes are those that depend on some measure of popular consent, but are narrowly governed by unrepresentative elites.”14 A number of scholars see similar dynamics at work in China. In 2004, Peter Hays Gries asserted that “Party legitimacy now depends upon accommodating popular nationalist demands” and therefore “the Foreign Ministry must take popular opinion into account as it negotiates foreign policy.”15 The next year, Gries claimed that “Chinese animosity toward Japan is unquestionably out of control . . . the political leadership is increasingly held hostage to nationalist opinion in the making of China’s Japan policy.”16 Susan Shirk similarly describes China as a “fragile superpower.” She warns, “The CCP’s ability to control the information that reaches the public is declining at the same time that the country’s military capacities are improving. These two pressures combine dangerously to intensify the pressure to use force to defend China’s honor.”17

Introduction

7

Snyder’s argument and efforts to apply it to the case of China rely upon the assumption that a reforming authoritarian regime is likely to lose control over its foreign policy. The image is of a fragile state, bowing to public demands for a more aggressive foreign policy in order to redirect attention away from its own domestic shortcomings. Belligerent rhetoric, brinksmanship negotiating strategies, and military adventurism are likely to result. A similar claim inheres in the description of popular nationalism in China as a “double-edged sword”—a tool that may enhance popular support for the Party but at the cost of undermining domestic stability and forcing the regime into a selfdestructive foreign policy. Such expectations have been particularly influential in studies of China’s Japan policy. A number of experts have warned that distrust and misperceptions of Japan among Chinese policy makers and advisors, augmented by popular animosity toward Japan, exacerbate the likelihood that China will act aggressively.18 Edward Friedman puts it starkly: “If China doesn’t democratize, Beijing’s hostility toward Tokyo could facilitate a war in the 21st Century.”19 This study questions these presumptions. China’s Japan policy is a mostlikely case for Snyder’s argument—if popular pressure was ever going to force Chinese leaders to adopt a more belligerent foreign policy, we would expect it to occur toward Japan, given the high level of popular animosity, geographical proximity, prevalence of territorial and economic disputes, contentious past, nationalist pressures, and competition over strategic resources. As this book will show, while popular pressure did constrain China’s diplomacy, obstruct economic cooperation, and spur hostile rhetoric, these effects were relatively short-lived. Following each instance, Chinese leaders moved quickly to mitigate the damage to bilateral relations, offering reassurances to their Japanese counterparts and working to stabilize bilateral ties. Certainly, strategic competition and ideological differences place a ceiling on the potential for bilateral cooperation. Yet in reviewing China’s recent Japan policy, what is most striking is that despite all the popular upheaval and security tensions, the overall bilateral relationship remains relatively stable.20 The likelihood of China going to war with Japan is no greater in 2011 that it was in 2000. The case of Japan is mirrored, to some degree, across the range of China’s major power relations. Beijing’s nuanced response to nationalist protests first emerged in response to the violence against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in the summer of 1998. During the riots, many local Chinese businesses were looted and ethnic Chinese women were sexually assaulted. In Jakarta alone, human rights groups cited more than one hundred cases of rape and sexual assault. The Chinese government restricted domestic reporting on the riots.

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Introduction

When Beijing University students learned of the anti-Chinese violence via foreign media and the Internet, they immediately made plans to protest. Despite university and security officials’ warnings, students persisted in holding an “illegal” demonstration at Beijing University on August 17 and then marched, several hundred strong, to the Indonesian embassy. The protesters were quickly disbanded by police, and students were later forced to make selfcriticisms and issued black marks on their permanent records (dang’an).21 In retrospect, this incident marked the onset of the CCP’s more sophisticated response to nationalist protests. A year later, when NATO planes accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Chinese authorities initially tolerated demonstrations in Beijing, Chongqing, and elsewhere for several days before beginning to slowly withdraw support (a case discussed in detail in the concluding chapter). By the time of the 2008 protests against European criticism of China’s Tibet policy in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, state– society interactions in response to incendiary incidents abroad had fallen into a predictable pattern: a quick rise of popular anger and activism tolerated by Chinese leaders, echoed by belligerent official rhetoric and symbolic diplomatic moves; then an equally rapid shift to clamp down on protests while Chinese diplomats worked to patch up damaged bilateral relations. The case of relations with Japan thus fits squarely within this broad pattern in Chinese foreign policy. Instead of acceding to popular nationalist pressures for a more aggressive foreign policy, Chinese policy makers have developed an effective strategy for responding to sporadic outbursts of popular anger on foreign policy. By making partial policy shifts or rhetorical gestures in the directions demanded by the public, Chinese leaders enable the release of public anger and demonstrate a modicum of responsiveness to public opinion. Such shifts are generally part of a broader strategy of readjusting their overall foreign policy toward an approach that cools public anger, redirects the public’s attention, and mitigates any diplomatic fallout resulting from following too closely the dictates of an emotional public. By combining a diplomatic strategy designed to reshape the external environment with its considerable propaganda power to refocus attention, limit the flow of information, and project selective images to large segments of the public, the Party manages to end public mobilization without irreparable harm to foreign relations and without leaving behind a mass of dissatisfied, frustrated citizens. Simply put, the rise of popular nationalism in reform-era China has not correlated with a rise in military aggression. China is unquestionably seeking to assert its interests in the world commensurate with its rapidly growing economic, military, and political clout, but

Introduction

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the pattern of behavior hardly reflects a foolhardy, overly aggressive foreign policy. Stepping back from the case of China reveals the payoffs of distinguishing among different types of nondemocratic regimes. Authoritarian governments are often assumed to be more likely to be aggressive abroad due to their radical ideology, an absence of internal constraints on leaders’ power, tenuous domestic legitimacy, and a willingness to use coercion both at home and abroad. Recent work by Lai and Slater suggests instead that regime legitimacy and stability are critical for understanding states’ incentives to initiate militarized disputes. Military regimes, they argue, are “systematically more vulnerable to collapse” than party-based regimes and are therefore more “belligerent internationally to compensate for this lack of domestic institutional capacity,” picking foreign fights more frequently than their more stable and legitimate party-based counterparts.22 One reason that party-based regimes are able to avoid falling into foreign aggression is their ability to tolerate and respond to public anger in selective fashion. It is the combination of tolerance and responsiveness, together with repression and persuasion, that enables Chinese leaders to avoid slipping into the trap of a self-destructive foreign policy. The repeated eruption and temporary influence of popular protests in China in response to perceived slights to national pride signal not the emergence of an uncontrollable populace, but rather the outward manifestation of policy makers’ strategic and nuanced response to social pressures. The implications are equally significant for domestic politics in China.

WILL CHINA DEMOCRATIZE? Among the many paths to a democratic transition, perhaps the most poignant is when the public rises up against repressive authorities. Stories of “people power” in the Philippines, mass demonstrations in Eastern Europe, a lone demonstrator in Beijing facing down a tank—the power of these enduring images reflects deeply embedded Liberal notions about the fundamental vulnerabilities of authoritarian rule. Theories of democratization continue to make assumptions about how rising wealth generates popular expectations of a better future and gives birth to new social groups who demand commensurate political power. New communication technologies, emergence of autonomous social groups, and expanded international engagement add to the pressures for political change. Authoritarian leaders appear to have only two choices in response: repression or concession. Violent suppression tends

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Introduction

to spur even greater radicalism, consolidate opposition to the regime, and undermine its claims to legitimacy. Even minor concessions can trigger the “de Tocqueville effect,” in which partial reforms reveal the regime’s vulnerability while failing to ameliorate the underlying causes of dissatisfaction. The end, it appears, is inevitable. The only question is when, not if, authoritarian regime collapse will come. Signs of these trends abound in China. Widespread protests reveal rising dissatisfaction with the costs of China’s uneven economic development, widening economic inequity, and rampant official corruption.23 Control over the furor seething in Chinese society appears unsustainable. On June 28, 2008, for instance, some 30,000 people took to the streets of Weng’an, a rural town in remote Guizhou province, to protest what they believed was a cover-up by local authorities of the alleged rape and murder of a fifteen-yearold schoolgirl, Li Shufei. The protesters torched upward of 20 cars and set fire to both the local police station and the Communist Party headquarters.24 Several months later, a round of taxi strikes quickly spread to cities across China in one of “the longest sustained chain reactions of labor unrest in the history of the People’s Republic.”25 Such protests enjoy broad public support. A study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) found that half of all respondents to a national survey, when asked about their attitudes toward local petitions and protests, answered that they would either participate (21 percent) or express their sympathies (33 percent).26 An “associational revolution” has also emerged in China—a rapid spike in the number and diversity of nongovernmental organizations, most of which remain unregistered with the state.27 The rise of an urban middle class, spread of a lively online culture, and growth in religious and millenarian groups further signal societal angst and empowerment. To many observers, the CCP’s days appear numbered. Minxin Pei has been one of the most influential proponents of the argument that the Party is decaying from within. Moving away from his earlier writings on China’s “soft authoritarianism,” Pei argues that “in many crucial respects, China’s hybrid neo-authoritarian order eerily exhibits the pathologies of both the political stagnation of Leonid Brezhnev’s Soviet Union and the crony capitalism of Suharto’s Indonesia.”28 Drawing on recent studies of democratic transitions, Richard Baum raises similar concerns. “China’s unreconstructed Leninists,” he warns, “may already be living on borrowed time.”29 An Chen argues that intensifying class conflict threatens the CCP’s hold on power. “As poverty and income inequality continue to worsen, making the government a target of seething popular indignation, a revolutionary situation is looming.”30 Others

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see a more gradual process of evolution. Guobin Yang suggests that the spread of citizen activism online signals the emergence of at least an “unofficial democracy” in China.31 Cheng Li points to the emergence of inner-Party democracy and even describes factional divisions among top leaders as a kind of “bipartisanship.”32 Henry Rowen predicts that, barring a major economic collapse, the spread of capitalism and the middle class will inexorably bring about democratization in China—by 2025.33 While Liberal-minded observers scour China for signs of regime vulnerability and “inklings of democracy,” Chinese leaders have been busy retooling their governing strategies and institutions. David Shambaugh’s recent study of the Party concludes that the CCP has atrophied over time and its Leninist instruments of control are not as sharp as in the past, but its tools of rule are far from blunt—and they are being restrengthened. The party remains a nationwide organization of considerable authority and power. It is the only political game in town. . . . Just as in its experience with economic reform, the CCP is most likely to pursue political reform incrementally: experimenting with new methods here and there, expanding them gradually horizontally and vertically within the country, embracing those that work while rejecting those that do not. In this cautious and incremental process, a new kind of party-state is being born: China’s eclectic state. 34

Many of these strategies center on inclusion. The CCP seeks, in Tony Saich’s words, to “accommodate the increasingly wide range of articulate audiences to thwart or limit the possibility of an alternative political-ideological definition.”35 Bruce Dickson’s depiction of “Red Capitalists” captures the Party’s embrace of entrepreneurs in a marriage of wealth and power, helping forestall potential pressures for political reform arising from China’s burgeoning middle class.36 Perhaps most remarkable is the regime’s success in convincing a wide range of social actors to play within the Party’s rules of the game. Even NGOs, long viewed as a Trojan horse of democratization by students of civil society, have been co-opted into the system through a kind of “embedded activism.”37 Andrew Mertha argues that the influence of political entrepreneurs in China’s hydro-politics reflects a process of political pluralization, a kind of “fragmented authoritarianism 2.0.”38 China’s eclectic governing strategy also relies heavily upon rendering the Party more responsive to popular demands. As Joseph Fewsmith explains, the CCP has been working to establish a “more institutionalized, more formalized, and more

12

Introduction

procedure-based system.” Fewsmith views efforts to make government more responsive to demands of local society without threatening the ruling status of the CCP as part of its transformation from a revolutionary party to a ruling party.39 The populist turn of the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao administration is a telling example. Wang Shaoguang argues that “without the public’s questioning of the ‘reform,’ without animated debate over public policies among new and traditional media, and without the strong public call for reorienting China’s reform, such a great transformation in policy orientation would be unimaginable.”40 Dali Yang similarly describes the Hu–Wen approach as a kind of “populist authoritarianism . . . though not fully coherent as a new form of social contract, the different strands of the recent policies suggest the weaving of some sort of safety net to cushion the blows associated with the uncertainties of global markets.”41 This book illuminates a third aspect of CCP governance strategies— China’s responsive authoritarianism. The Party’s deliberate response to the rise of public opinion in foreign policy parallels what Elizabeth Perry describes as China’s “revolutionary authoritarianism.” Perry argues that “a succession of post-Mao leaders have managed to fashion a surprisingly durable brand of ‘revolutionary authoritarianism’ capable of withstanding challenges, including grievous and growing social and spatial inequalities, which would surely have undone less hardy regimes.” She adds that “although protest in Communist China has been more frequent and widespread than in other authoritarian settings, ultimately it has proven less politically destabilizing. Precisely because protest in the PRC is both routine and officially circumscribed, once the top leadership decides upon a course of repression most of the populace is quick to fall into step.”42 Although Perry is certainly correct in her subsequent assertion that China is sui generis in many ways, a quick glance around the world suggests that a number of nondemocratic regimes respond to public pressures in similar fashion.

RESPONSIVE AUTHORITARIANISM In the Middle East, a rise in Internet blogging, social protest, and influential new media sources reveal the emergence of a more assertive “new Arab public.”43 To some scholars, these trends represent blossoming political liberalization: Across the Arab world, political activists are challenging the status quo. Egyptians are demanding an end to the state of emergency that has been in place

Introduction

13

almost continuously since the 1950s; Syrians have petitioned their government for political freedoms; Jordanians are seizing new economic opportunities; women in the traditionally conservative Gulf states are seeking wider political and economic participation; even Saudi Arabia is experimenting with elections at the municipal level. In two extraordinary moments in January 2005, the Palestinian and Iraqi people freely elected their leaders. During the following eight weeks, the people of Lebanon forced an end to Syria’s military occupation of their country. Political, economic, and social changes are now clearly on the larger Arab agenda.44

These trends appear to bear out Samuel Huntington’s 1991 prediction that “liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand.”45 Yet as it turns out, authoritarianism has not only endured but also prospered. As Jason Brownlee notes, “by 2001, five dozen regimes blended liberalization with repression—signifying the durability of authoritarianism during a period that had augured global democracy.”46 Marina Ottaway describes these regimes as “semi-authoritarian states that rode the wave as far as they wanted, and managed to stop.”47 One of the most striking features of these nondemocratic regimes is their ability to tolerate a reasonably vibrant and engaged civil society. Rankings from surveys by Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization comparing countries’ social and political freedom, suggest that some 61 countries around the world (32 percent) combine authoritarian rule with a viable civil society.48 Unfortunately, traditional notions of authoritarian regimes are not helpful for explaining how these regimes coexist with a lively society. As Lisa Anderson notes, “Authoritarianism is little more than a residual category in most political science, encompassing all the otherwise very varied nondemocratic regimes that have existed throughout history.”49 Juan Linz’s classic definition, for instance, states that “authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism . . . without intensive or extensive political mobilization . . . and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits, but actually quite predictable ones.”50 Linz later acknowledged that authoritarian regimes often include a kind of “semi-opposition . . . an alegal but tolerated opposition” that exists amid conditions of “semi-freedom.”51 Recent work on the Middle East illustrates how providing a measure of “semi-freedom” can help sustain authoritarian rule.52 Holger Albrecht, for instance, suggests that a kind of “authoritarian opposition” has “existed in Egypt for 30 years, is formally institutionalized, and prevails in several societal and political contexts.” Tolerating the existence of an opposition movement

14

Introduction

bolsters the Egyptian regime’s legitimacy by signifying a modicum of political freedom, while also directing popular dissent toward interopposition competition and away from the government.53 Taking what he calls “a less sanguine view of civil society in the Middle East,” Quintan Wiktorowicz adds: “Rather than risk uncontrollable popular protest and collective action that could destabilize the political system, regimes such as those in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria (before 1992), and Jordan instead offered new, though oftentimes limited, opportunities for the creation of civil society organizations. Once created, these organizations were embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes which allow those in power to monitor and regulate collective activities. . . . Under such circumstances, civil society institutions are more an instrument of state social control than a mechanism for collective empowerment.”54 Building on such findings, Hafez and Wiktorowicz suggest that “the more accessible the state, even an authoritarian state, the less likely it is to unify opposition behind a violent strategy.”55 Although tolerating a modicum of political activism, social associations, and public debate may help sustain authoritarian rule, the resulting popular pressure can also influence authoritarian states’ foreign policy. Such influence is most likely when mobilized public opinion runs in concert with the regime’s ideological claims to popular legitimacy while challenging the government’s pragmatic foreign policies. In the Middle East, Arab states’ relationship with Israel is particularly potent. Egyptian leaders, for instance, faced mounting public criticism in January 2009, as Israeli air strikes on Hamas positions in the Gaza Strip brought thousands of protesters into the streets. As one journalist noted: Anti-Israel demonstrations in Arab capitals are nothing new. From Amman to Riyadh, governments have long viewed protests against Israel as a useful safety valve to allow citizens to let off steam without addressing grievances closer to home. But in Egypt, this time, the protests were different: some of the anger was aimed directly at the government of President Hosni Mubarak. In defiance of threats from the police, and in contravention of a national taboo, some demonstrators chanted slogans against Mubarak, condemning his government for maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel, for exporting natural gas to the country and for restricting movement through Egypt’s border with Gaza.56

In response to the public pressure, the Egyptian government resorted to a familiar formula: relying on security forces to keep calm on the street

Introduction

15

while appeasing public sentiment by strongly denouncing Israel’s policies in Gaza. As Abdel Raouf el-Reedy, a former Egyptian ambassador to the United States, warned: “The pressure is mounting on Egypt. ‘How come you keep the Israeli ambassador here? How come you keep the Egyptian ambassador in Israel? How come you still export gas to Israel in spite of a court order to stop?’ The system is on the defensive. Public opinion is more clearly on the side of Hamas.”57 The public may have demanded a more assertive stance, yet Mubarak’s government managed to walk this narrow line—appeasing popular opinion while retaining its diplomatic ties with Israel. Egyptian leaders, like their Chinese counterparts, thus responded to public pressure in ways that strengthened their claims to popular legitimacy without falling into a self-destructive foreign policy of aggression. Clearly, getting the balance right is no easy task. The system in Iran, which allows for semifree elections to select a president with only limited political power, appeared to some observers on the brink of collapse in the summer of 2009, as blatant manipulation of presidential elections led to widespread street protests and revealed cracks within the top leadership. Yet multiple subsequent public opinion surveys in Iran found that the regime continues to enjoy broad popular legitimacy. Most Iranians do not support immediate regime change.58 A year after the protests, Iranian leaders once again successfully defied yet another round of predictions of their imminent demise. The prevalence of strategic inclusion, selective policy responsiveness, and tolerance of a high level of social unrest among nondemocratic regimes in the Middle East suggest that the case of China may fit rather neatly within evolving notions of responsive authoritarianism. This study’s examination of the role of public opinion in Chinese foreign policy provides a detailed glimpse into the mechanisms that underlie these broad dynamics.

STUDYING PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY “The impact of public opinion on Chinese foreign policy is a critical but understudied topic,” argue Christensen, Johnston, and Ross in their authoritative review of the field. “Most foreign and Chinese analysts of Chinese foreign policy accept that Chinese leaders are more sensitive to public opinion today than at any other time since 1949. Most agree that on some issues—such as the relationship with Japan—mass, not just elite, opinion has prevented the leadership from exploring ways of improving relations.” However, a number of key questions remain unanswered. Whose opinions matter? “How is

16

Introduction

opinion articulated in the decisionmaking process in a system where there is limited freedom of the press, where there is no electoral recall of leaders, and where organized interest groups can be threatening to the regime?” As they rightly conclude, “this is obviously a rich set of topics, though if it is anything like the study of the influence of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy, it will be a frustratingly complex question.”59 The first challenge has been to simply define public opinion in China. Alan Liu, in his 1996 work on Mass Politics in the People’s Republic, focused on “mobilized public opinion in the form of a social movement.”60 Liu claims that public opinion, “as generally understood in the West, has existed in the PRC since its inception,” and further asserts that “public opinion in China . . . has played an important role in shaping major political outcomes” in domestic politics.61 A number of scholars have since asserted that public opinion also influences Chinese foreign policy, but developing a general framework to capture this relationship has proven elusive. Peter Gries’ work on popular nationalism, for instance, relies upon a psychological and cultural argument emphasizing common concerns with preserving “face” shared by the Chinese public and leaders.62 Yufan Hao and Lin Su emphasize instead the power of “societal force,” described as a “catch-all notion including academics, bureaucracy, media, and public opinion.”63 While both studies capture important aspects of the public opinion–foreign policy nexus in China, neither yields a reliable explanation for the conditions under which public opinion is more or less likely to influence foreign policy in authoritarian states. One of the first efforts to develop a more general explanation emerged from a chapter by Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen. They argue that three factors shape the likelihood that public opinion will influence Chinese foreign policy: levels of activism, divisions among top policy makers, and external tensions.64 Jessica Weiss’ recent work on antiforeign protests in China similarly focuses on the state. She argues that authoritarian governments tolerate nationalist protests against foreign states to gain negotiating leverage in a two-level game, generating “audience costs” due to the risky nature of domestic protests in nondemocratic states. Weiss’ work demonstrates both the benefits and risks for Chinese leaders in tolerating antiforeign protests.65 In addition to drawing upon insights from these studies, this book also builds upon recent work on China– Japan relations.66 Although he broadly claims in his recent book on China– Japan relations that “victimization-based popular nationalism has gained strength and come to constrain Chinese

Introduction

17

foreign policy,”67 Ming Wan declines to provide a general conceptual framework, instead recommending that analysts proceed by “introducing other factors as they become relevant.” The result, as he admits, is that “in fact, any of the other causal factors discussed in this book might be dominant in affecting the relationship at a given time or for a particular event.”68 Xuanli Liao instead homes in on the role of international relations (IR) think tanks in China’s Japan policy, but as she acknowledges in the end, “This book is unable to disclose a direct linkage between the IR think-tanks’ policy advice and the changes that have occurred in China’s policy-making towards Japan.”69 Given the difficulties of identifying linkages between popular sentiments and policy outcomes, others have focused instead upon prospects for reconciliation between China and Japan. Caroline Rose, for instance, argues that while both governments have sought to avoid discussion of the past since the 1990s, activists in China and Japan keep bringing history back in. “This complex interplay of the processes of domestic politics on the one hand, and the need to find an accommodation with an important neighbour, on the other, influences the outcome of history-related problems.”70 Yinan He’s paired comparison of China– Japan and German–Polish relations since World War II argues instead that “harmonization of national memories” is the key to realizing deep reconciliation between former enemies. Emotions and misperceptions resulting from conflicting historical myths in China and Japan exacerbated security, diplomatic, and economic tensions, increased the political costs of conciliatory policies, and obstructed progress toward reconciliation.71 For both Rose and He, negative Chinese public opinion toward Japan has proven a powerful obstacle to reconciliation. In short, recent scholarship on China– Japan relations and domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy suggests that public opinion does matter for Chinese foreign policy. These studies generate a number of useful empirical findings, methodologies, and insights, but there is no single study that examines the origins or impact of the rise and fall of anti-Japanese activism in China in the 2000s. We still lack a general framework for understanding the interactive effects between popular sentiments and foreign policy in China, and have made little progress toward integrating the China case into scholarship on post–Cold War authoritarian regimes. Finally, there has been almost no work that critically assesses the Chinese state’s capacity to shape public opinion on foreign policy issues.72 These are important issues for Chinese politics and international relations more broadly. This book is designed to fill these gaps.

18

Introduction

METHODS AND SOURCES The information and analysis for this study come from a collection of broad, specialized, and unique sources that distinguishes this book from previous research on Sino-Japanese relations. These include extensive interviews with Chinese activists, academics, and officials, as well as with Japanese scholars, officials, and businesspeople. The written sources include a large number of Chinese books and journal articles, as well as select internal (neibu) publications, such as confidential instructions from the Propaganda Department to Chinese newspapers. I engage in quantitative content analyses of several hundred Chinese academic articles published since the late 1990s, as well as a detailed comparison of popular and state-run media coverage of Japan over the past decade. Data on public opinion in China comes from groundbreaking public opinion polls conducted in China from the early 1980s through 2009, most of which remains unpublished in any language. I provide the first extensive study of the content of Chinese television coverage of Japan in chapter 6, thus highlighting the role of this critical tool in the CCP’s propaganda arsenal. The analysis also draws upon my own firsthand experience of living and working full-time in Dalian, China from 2001 through 2008. Relying extensively on Chinese sources, essential to this study, also presents problems of reliability. I control for this by collecting diverse data points for each major finding—survey findings, media reports (both in China and abroad), private interviews, Internet resources, and official government documents. Throughout the book, I measure trends in the rise and fall of public mobilization through a combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators, including survey results, media content analysis, personal interviews, media reports, and secondary literature. I first assess public mobilization as a dependent variable, comparing the relative influence of state and nonstate factors in shaping patterns in public opinion, commercial media content, and political activism. This is essential, since only if public mobilization arose at least in part from forces outside of the state can we reasonably consider public opinion a potential influence upon policy decisions. I then examine public mobilization as a potential independent variable. I compare the public mobilization variable against the most persuasive alternative explanation: the claim that China’s policy processes, decisions, and discourse were shaped by a reaction to Japan’s China policy. I primarily adopt a case study, process-tracing method, comparing alternative explanations for observed outcomes. In assessing the influence of public opinion on policy, I take care to avoid previous methodological problems. Most studies of U.S. foreign policy test

Introduction

19

for a correlation between public opinion, as measured through survey results, and quantitative indicators of foreign policy such as spending levels or the use of force abroad. While scholars have found “substantial co-variation between opinion and policy,” particularly on high-salience issues,73 quantitative correlation alone cannot exclude the possibility that elites may be manipulating public opinion, thus creating the correlation between policy and public opinion. To control for this problem, I assess the role of the Chinese state in shaping public opinion and also pay careful attention to timing. If public opinion shifts in advance of any policy changes, then we can be more confident in assessing public opinion as an independent factor in policy processes. Quantitative correlation also cannot control for the possibility of a critical intervening variable between public opinion and foreign policy outcomes or an independent factor affecting both public opinion and policy, creating only a spurious relationship between the two. For instance, actions by Japanese policy makers may have caused public opinion and Chinese foreign policy to move in the same direction at the same time. I avoid such pitfalls by considering whether external factors, such as developments in Japan, provide a compelling alternative explanation for policy outcomes. As chapter 4 will show, Japanese policies alone provide an inadequate and often inaccurate explanation for China’s Japan policy. Another advantage of my case study, processtracing method is that it allows us to consider nuances in policy outcomes. As chapter 1 explains, policy makers may respond to articulated popular sentiments with symbolic rhetoric, shifts in negotiating strategies, delays in policy decisions, or temporary policy shifts. I also avoid methodological pitfalls common to studies of public opinion in China. Most studies of popular nationalism in China tend to “select on the dependent variable”: namely, focus only on a rise in popular anger and activism.74 To minimize this problem, I study China’s relations with Japan over a time period that includes widely varying levels of public mobilization and dramatic shifts in China’s Japan policy. My case studies cover economics, security, and ideational issues, as well as China– Japan relations in the 1980s and 1990s and brief cases on China–U.S. relations and Chinese domestic politics. If shifts in foreign policy correlate with patterns in public mobilization throughout these variations, this strengthens my claim of a relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. A broader challenge for any study of public opinion in China is distinguishing between state and society. Much of the civil activism, popular media, and public intellectuals in China occupy an opaque grey area between state and society. William Callahan, for instance, argues that state and society

20

Introduction

overlap in the production and consumption of the discourse around national humiliation.75 While cognizant of the complexity of state–society interactions in China, I am interested in exploring the influence of societal factors upon the state and vice versa. We need to find a way to distinguish between the two for analytical purposes. I include three elements on the society side: public opinion, popular activism, and commercial media. Public opinion as measured primarily through survey data is clearly distinct from the state, save for the problems of survey data itself (an issue addressed in appendix 2). To isolate political activists from the state, I exclude individuals who work for a state-affiliated organization (aside from select academics). Although all media content in China is constrained by the state, commercial media’s responsiveness to the market provides a useful indicator of popular sentiments as well as a potential mechanism for interjecting public opinion into policy processes. Chapters 3 and 6 trace trends in all three elements and specify their relationship with the party-state. Finally, I carefully examine the state’s influence upon trends in public mobilization. As noted earlier, the CCP’s efforts to promote a positive image of Japan after spring 2005 represent a particularly difficult case, for three reasons. First, negative Chinese attitudes toward Japan are likely to prove resistant to change, since distrust of a perceived enemy tends to be embedded within a coherent intellectual “schema” that discounts additional information while retaining the negative image.76 At the collective level, social identity theory argues that the construction of in-group identity is usually accompanied by the construction of a collective out-group, or “other.” The “othering” process shapes perceptions and behavior, helping to form a coherent and resilient set of ideas and images that magnify emotions while undermining objective analysis.77 Previous propaganda also fosters a kind of path dependency. As Lazarsfeld and Merton explain, “propaganda is most successful when it channels pre-existing attitudes and values, and is far less likely to create [new behavior] or bring about radical conversions.”78 In chapter 6, covering the end of the wave of public mobilization, I isolate the content of the specific message being presented through official propaganda, identify the venues and mechanisms through which the message was delivered, and then assess the extent to which this message was in fact reflected in the public information environment, public opinion, and collective political behavior. Time series data is essential for isolating the shift in the propaganda message and then measuring change over time in media content, public opinion, and political activism. Considering all three attributes together allows us to assess potential variation among them. Most importantly, this approach captures

Introduction

21

what authoritarian leaders actually care about: using propaganda to influence public attitudes and political behavior at critical moments.

BOOK OVERVIEW The book opens with a theoretical framework for the study of public opinion in authoritarian states. The second chapter provides historical context for the study of China– Japan relations, as well as a review of state–society interactions and their influence on China’s relations with Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. The remaining four chapters cover the rise and fall of the wave of public mobilization from 2000 through 2010. Chapter 3 traces the origins of the wave, comparing the influence of the state against the role of factors from outside the state. Chapter 4 assesses the influence of public mobilization on foreign policy through four case studies of policy decisions from 2002 through 2005. Chapter 5 examines interactions between popular mobilization and elite-level policy discourse, while chapter 6 assesses the state’s effectiveness in bringing about the end of the wave of public mobilization. The conclusion summarizes key findings, addresses potential objections, and explores extensions and implications. I demonstrate the broader applicability of the framework developed in this study through two brief case studies on the role of public opinion in China’s relations with the United States from 1999 to 2001 and the public’s influence in recent domestic politics in China. It may appear paradoxical to claim that public mobilization influenced foreign policy decisions and discourse while also asserting that the Chinese government was able to contain popular mobilization. How can both be true? In fact, they represent two sides of the same coin—together they form the Chinese government’s sophisticated response to the rise of public opinion in foreign policy. It is the combination of tolerance and responsiveness, coupled with persuasion and repression, that enhances the stability of Communist Party rule in China. This study thus takes seriously both the power of social forces in China today and the resourcefulness of the Communist Party. Far from being a fragile state overwhelmed by popular nationalism, market forces, or information technology; the Chinese government emerges as a robust and flexible regime that has adapted to its new environmental conditions with remarkable speed and effectiveness. Understanding these dynamics is critical for explaining how and why the Communist Party has been able retain power amid the dramatic social, economic, and technological changes in China over the past three decades.

1 PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY To speak with precision of public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost. — V. O. KEY, PU BLIC OPI N ION AN D AM E R ICAN DE MOCRACY

efining public opinion has never been easy. Harwood Childs compiled four dozen different definitions, describing the field as “strewn with zealous attempts.”1 Susan Herbst simply gave up, deciding to “avoid discovering the true meaning of the phrase and simply grant that the definition is fluid.”2 Rarely in the social sciences has such a fundamental concept been so thoroughly contested. Floyd Allport, writing in the inaugural edition of Public Opinion Quarterly in 1937, warned against “the illusion that the item one sees in print as ‘public opinion’ . . . really has this character of widespread importance and endorsement.”3 In 1922 Walter Lippmann described a “phantom public,” arguing that public opinion was essentially a self-serving rhetorical construction created by elites.4 More recently, Pierre Bourdieu claimed:

D

Public opinion, in the sense of the social definition implicitly accepted by those who prepare or analyze or use opinion polls, simply does not exist. . . . The opinion survey treats public opinion like the simple sum of individual opinions gathered in an isolated situation where the individual furtively expresses an isolated opinion. In real situations opinions are forces, and relations of opinions are conflicts of forces.5

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Public Opinion in Chinese Foreign Policy

The essential problem is that most studies of public opinion have conflated one possible measure of public opinion, namely survey data, with public opinion itself. This includes most scholarship on public opinion in China.6 “These days we tend to believe that public opinion is the aggregation of individual opinions as measured by the sample survey,” explains Herbst. “This definition is now hegemonic; when most of us consider the meaning of public opinion, we can’t help but think about polls or surveys.”7 Yet by assessing public opinion only through these private interactions, survey data fails to capture any collective expression of public opinion. “The paradoxical result,” as Taeku Lee notes, “is that public opinion ceases to be public.”8 In this chapter, I develop an alternative approach to understanding the role of public opinion in authoritarian states’ foreign policy, based on the concept of a wave of public mobilization.9 A wave of popular mobilization consists of a rapid shift in public opinion and popular emotions, growing political activism, and expanded sensationalist coverage in popular media and on the Internet. Such a wave can arise from society, the state, and/or external events, but once it does, the state must decide to respond with either tolerance or repression. If government officials allow or even encourage protests and activism, then popular pressure may influence negotiating strategy, official rhetoric, elites’ public discourse, and foreign policy decisions. Yet once popular activism begins to threaten core foreign policy interests and undermine social stability at home, authoritarian leaders tend to respond with a mixture of repression and persuasion. One payoff of this approach is that we can examine public mobilization both as a dependent variable, assessing the relative role of state and society in causing public mobilization, and as an independent variable, measuring the public’s influence on foreign policy decisions and discourse. More broadly, this approach helps address one of the central questions of Chinese politics today: how does the world’s largest and most powerful Communist Party, dedicated to constructing a “harmonious society,” maintain its authority over a society rife with tension and contention? The common presumption is that popular protests in China reflect regime weakness.10 Yet rather than revealing the vulnerability of the CCP, popular expressions of emotion on the streets, online, and in the media may actually play a role in sustaining Party authority and legitimacy. Protests provide the leadership with information on relevant aspects of popular sentiments. They also serve as a release valve, directing popular anger toward a foreign country rather than at the CCP itself. By responding to public expressions of anger with symbolic or partial policy shifts, Chinese leaders can demonstrate their responsiveness

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to the people’s concerns, thus alleviating potential criticism from some of the most mobilized segments of society. A number of scholars have argued that the CCP tolerates nationalist protests and responds to public pressure out of weakness. They warn that Beijing may feel compelled to follow the dictates of an emotional public by adopting a more aggressive foreign policy.11 Instead, I see protests over foreign relations as fundamentally cyclical—following a familiar pattern of rapid swells of anger and activism that may influence policy decisions and discourse, but then quickly recede. The state’s capacity to bring about the end of a wave of protests through a mixture of repression and persuasion provides valuable insight into state strength. This first chapter develops the conceptual framework used to guide the remainder of the study. I first describe the origins of public mobilization, examining the three elements of public opinion, popular activism, and popular media, and explore interactive effects among them. I then turn to interactions between public mobilization and the state, laying out the conditions under which authoritarian states are likely to tolerate and respond to popular mobilization. The third section compares the role of state and societal factors in ending a wave. In developing the concept of a wave of popular mobilization, I draw together approaches typically used in isolation: studies of the role of public opinion in democracies’ foreign policy, studies of social movements, and comparative foreign policy studies. Each offers distinct methodologies and insights that, when combined, help us piece together the role of public opinion in authoritarian states’ foreign policy.

THE RISE OF PUBLIC MOBILIZATION Mobilization was a pillar of Maoist rule. As Elizabeth Perry notes, “Communist China parts company with classic authoritarianism in having periodically encouraged—indeed compelled—its citizens to express their private criticisms publicly in the form of big-character posters, struggle sessions, denunciation meetings, demonstrations and the like. The Cultural Revolution was the most dramatic, but not the last, expression of this state-sponsored effort at stimulating and shaping confrontational politics.”12 In the mobilization model developed under Mao Zedong, instructions were first issued through an official government document or in an editorial or commentator’s essay in the Party’s flagship paper, the People’s Daily. Detailed instructions were then disseminated throughout the political system according to cadres’ rank order. People were brought together in study groups to discuss the campaign, and

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Public Opinion in Chinese Foreign Policy

then organized in activities to implement the agenda. State-led mobilization, while less frequent than under Mao, has hardly been abandoned in the reform era. Since 1978, the state has relied on mobilization to introduce the one-child policy, promote economic reforms in urban enterprises, restructure the labor system, and embark upon a nationwide reform of urban health insurance.13 Focusing instead on popular mobilization opens up the possibility of weighing the influence of state and society. A wave of public mobilization consists of a shift in public attitudes, as measured through poll data, combined with a rise in sensationalist media coverage and instances of activism. The wave tends to come in four stages (see figure 1.1). It can be initiated and spread by elements within the state, by factors outside of the state, by external events, or most likely, by interactions among all three. Once public mobilization begins, authoritarian leaders are pressed into a gatekeeper role, quickly forced to decide whether to tolerate or repress early instances of popular activism and sensationalist media coverage. Tolerance is particularly likely at points when public emotions are high, bilateral relations are acrimonious, and top leaders are divided over foreign policy. Opening the gates to popular protests and sensationalist media coverage allows the wave to spread. If it grows, public mobilization can impede diplomatic negotiations, spur belligerent rhetoric, influence public discourse among policy experts, and obstruct policy makers’ efforts to pursue a conciliatory foreign policy. Paradoxically, the escalation of public mobilization also contains the seeds of its demise. As protests and anger spread, the costs of tolerance begin to loom large for political leaders. Domestic instability threatens. Nuanced foreign policy strategies are undermined by following the dictates of an angry public. In response, policy makers are likely to try to reverse course, relying upon a mixture of repression and persuasion to constrain the media, curtail popular protests, and reshape public opinion. These three elements then begin to work in reverse. As media coverage shifts and political activism declines, public attention moves elsewhere. Emotions cool and people’s attitudes become more flexible and moderate. In this calmer environment, even sporadic acts of protest or occasional sensationalist stories are unlikely to spark widespread public anger or debates. The public soon returns to a more familiar state of quiescence, marked by inattention to foreign policy issues. The wave of public mobilization has come to an end. Public mobilization may begin with a small event but then, like a snowball rolling downhill, gather greater force as it picks up speed and mass. A supportive public provides a market incentive for sensationalist media coverage and broadens popular participation in protest activities. Media coverage and

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FIGURE 1.1 Stages in a Wave of Public Mobilization

dramatic acts of activism further heighten issue awareness and popular emotions, encouraging people to form opinions on an issue that they may have previously ignored. To understand these interactive effects, we need to draw together theories typically used in isolation to study social movements, popular media, and public opinion.

The Problem with Public Opinion Three questions have challenged studies of public opinion for decades: how to define public opinion, how to measure it, and how to decide whose opinions matter. Scholars have long assumed that public opinion in authoritarian states is an oxymoron—a logical impossibility due to the lack of individual freedoms. Hans Speier defined public opinion as “opinions on matters of concern to the nation freely and publicly expressed by men outside of the government who claim a right that their opinions should influence or determine the actions, personnel, or structure of their government.”14 For this reason, Jurgen Habermas’ influential study explicitly “limits the treatment of public opinion to countries of Western Europe and North America in the last two centuries.”15 More recently, however, scholars have adopted broader conceptions. Bernard Berelson defines public opinion simply as “people’s response

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(that is, approval, disapproval, or indifference) to controversial political and social issues of general attention,” while Ithiel de Sola Pool simply requires that opinions are publicly expressed, relate to public affairs, and held by the general public.16 A related problem is identifying whose opinions matter. Scholars have traditionally distinguished between the general or mass public and what Gabriel Almond called the “attentive public . . . which is informed and interested in foreign policy problems, and which constitutes the audience for foreign policy elites.” Almond ranked ever-smaller segments of the U.S. public according to their significance—active publics, issue publics, and finally the elite.17 Phillip Converse simply distinguished “two faces of public opinion”: a general set of attitudes identified by surveys and the “effective public opinion,” evidenced by atmospherics in the news media and influence on political outcomes.18 These efforts to isolate segments of the public are based upon the presumption that elite segments are more likely to influence policy outcomes. Yet for authoritarian states such as China, general public opinion provides a base of potential support for activists and commercial media, serving as an incentive for certain kinds of media stories and providing potential participants in broader protest efforts (particularly activities with low entry thresholds, such as online petition campaigns). In addition, as I will discuss below, authoritarian leaders are likely to be particularly concerned about broad popular sentiments due to the potential for mass protests. This book spotlights three aspects of general public opinion as particularly significant in authoritarian states: levels of public emotion, the public’s attention to an issue or “issue activation,” and the content of individual attitudes, positions, or beliefs on a given issue. These attributes tend to run together: as the public becomes aware of a given issue, they are more likely to develop and express opinions and emotions on it. High levels of issue awareness and issue activation are likely to correspond with greater public influence on policy.19 Perhaps the greatest challenge comes in measuring public opinion. In the 1920s, George Gallup embarked upon polling in the United States as a more scientific and democratic way of assessing public opinion. Yet numerous studies have shown that slight changes in question content, format, and ordering, and even the survey venue, can yield dramatically different results. These results can then be presented in a selective manner to advance a particular perspective. For Justin Lewis, polls are used to “construct,” not measure, public opinion. “Polls function,” Lewis argues, “to structure opinions into forms measurable against elite discourse.” They simplify and structure individuals’ complex attitudes and beliefs into ordered responses that, when

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amalgamated, purport to represent the popular will. Publishing poll results in mass media presents the appearance of a single, majority consensus, encouraging the public to go along with it. “Polls thus validate and strengthen dominant media frames, which in turn, influence public opinion.”20 The outcome is reminiscent of the process of creating a “class,” as described by E. P. Thompson.21 Patricia Thorton argues that a similar dynamic has emerged in China today, as the Communist Party has turned away from its traditional mechanisms of grassroots investigations in favor of collecting and promulgating selective polling data through mass media in order to create the appearance of consensus in support of Party policies.22 Survey data alone is certainly not a sufficient indicator for assessing the myriad attitudes and beliefs held by individuals and collectives in society that may influence policy. It is, however, a necessary element. Surveys ensure transparency of methods, allow replicability of findings, and help capture the attitudes of a representative sample of a broad group.23 Even Bourdieu admits that “polls can make a useful contribution to social science if they are treated rigorously and with certain precautions.”24 Survey results are most likely to be accurate if they ask about issues that actually engage the public at a given moment and if they are combined with alternative measures of popular sentiments. Most importantly for our purposes here, the Chinese government conducts extensive polling of its own, most of which is not released to the public as propaganda but rather used internally as a measure of public opinion.25 In other words, the results yielded by survey data in China, accurate or not, are incorporated into policy-making processes in China and so may affect policy decisions. For all these reasons, survey data of general public opinion is one of three essential elements for assessing trends in Chinese public opinion. Political activism is the second factor.

Activists and Activism Most studies of public opinion ignore the critical moments when the public gathers to express a collective opinion. These instances of public expression, when private opinions are translated into collective action, are often stimulated by political activists. “Activism” here refers to protests and other forms of collective action instigated by nonstate actors in pursuit of a political goal, such as online petition campaigns and public demonstrations. Activism draws upon supportive public sentiments and in turn contributes to a heightened emotional atmosphere and greater issue awareness among the public. The effectiveness of such efforts often depends upon activists’ ability to get

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their message out to a broader public through popular media and information technology. Drawing upon theories of contentious politics highlights these interactive dynamics. The rise of a wave of popular mobilization poses the classic puzzle of collective action: given the difficulty of convincing disparate individuals to cooperate for costly action in pursuit of nonexclusive public goods, why do collective social protests ever happen? The answer, Tarrow, Tilly, and others argue, is that openings in the political opportunity structure “lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies, show where elites and authoritarians are most vulnerable, and trigger social networks and collective identities around common themes.”26 Seizing these opportunities, a few early risers create a “critically important moment of cultural creativity in which the cognitive and affective will to break with normal routines is achieved.”27 During such periods, the mobilization of heightened emotions alters individuals’ assessment of the costs and gains, risks and rewards involved in any collective action, helping to overcome obstacles.28 The example of sporadic protests can have a powerful ripple effect across society, sparking what Sydney Tarrow describes as a “cycle of contention”: A period of heightened conflict across the social system, with a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention, creation of new or transformed collective action frames, combination of organized and unorganized participation, sequences of intensified information flow, and interactions between challengers and authorities.29

Modern China has experienced countless such “cycles of contention,” both before and since 1949.30 After decades of a frustrating “search for civil society,” China scholars have begun to incorporate such interactions within more nuanced conceptions of state–society relations. 31 Even NGOs, long viewed as a Trojan horse of democratization, appear to have been co-opted into the system through a kind of “embedded activism.” As Peter Ho explains, “Embedded activism in the Chinese semi-authoritarian context is a negotiated symbiosis between Party, state, and society, whereby the Partystate draws certain boundaries while NGOs and activists continually attempt to test the political waters. In this process, the political opportunity structure continuously shifts over time.”32 In fostering these complex interactions between state and society, China is actually quite similar to other authoritarian states. In Pakistan, for instance, many NGOs operate as partial

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partners of the state to their mutual benefit rather than acting as a nascent opposition.33 Adopting a more nuanced perspective on state–society interactions in authoritarian states moves us beyond the traditional “movement-centered” focus of contentious politics. Traditionally, as McAdam et al. explain: “to the extent that it enters at all, the state generally acts as a diabolus ex machina, producing opportunities, awaiting mobilization, landing heavily on some actors and facilitating others, but not participating directly in contention.”34 In China today, interactions between state and society are far more complex. Much of the popular activism on foreign policy in China reflects what Kevin O’Brien describes as “boundary-spanning contention . . . situations where the aggrieved employ government commitments, legitimating myths, and established values to persuade receptive elites to support their claims.”35 Rather than directly opposing the Chinese government, activists adroitly collaborate with elements of the state in ways that shape the subsequent actions of the state itself. China’s “history activists,” for instance, seized upon the official Patriotic Education campaign to document and disseminate information about Japanese wartime atrocities and Chinese suffering through new research and publications and by founding local museums.36 As chapter 3 will show, these efforts soon went beyond the pragmatic, limited objectives of the official propaganda campaign and contributed to the swell of popular protests that eventually constrained China’s foreign policy toward Japan. Although Chinese activists are more closely linked to the state than activists in most democracies, they rely upon similar strategies. “The onset of an episode of contention,” note McAdam and Aminzade, “is associated with, and partially dependent upon, the collective mobilization of heightened emotion.”37 Activists often stimulate these emotions. China’s “redress movement” (suopei yundong), which pursues lawsuits in the Japanese court system on behalf of Chinese war victims, stimulates popular anger against perceived injustices suffered at Japanese hands. As one 71-year-old Chinese woman told a reporter after a court failure in 2003: “Even if I cannot win this lawsuit, my grandson will win it.”38 Spread via the popular media, such sentiments swell popular emotions in China. In 2002 the redress movement’s most prominent activist, Wang Xuan, was selected as an individual who “inspires China” ( gandong zhongguo) by television viewers and chosen as “Person of the Year” by readers of the influential Guangzhou newspaper, Southern Weekend.39 In China, where so many injustices have gone ignored for decades, providing the public an opportunity to express and act upon righteous anger is a potent resource for activists.

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Chinese activists also embraced innovative protest techniques, such as online petition campaigns. By 2002, widespread use of the Internet in China lowered activists’ transaction costs, broadened public impact, and strengthened their social networks. In July 2003, Feng Jinhua and Lu Yunfei, founders of the Alliance of Patriots Web site, instigated their first online petition campaign, a manifesto opposing Japanese companies’ involvement in building a high-speed rail line in China. The campaign netted over 80,000 signatures online in only 10 days. The following month, they embarked on another online petition campaign, this time in protest of the “Qiqihair incident,” the accidental unearthing of abandoned Japanese chemical weapons in northeast China, which left one person dead and 37 severely injured. This campaign collected over one million signatures in a month, an effort supported by 12,518 Web sites.40 Public anger and attention continued to swell over the next few years. In spring 2005, over 40 million people signed online petitions opposing Japan’s efforts to obtain permanent membership in the UN Security Council; this was followed by widespread street demonstrations involving thousands of people in Beijing, Shanghai, and elsewhere.41 Such efforts benefited from attention by China’s burgeoning commercial media.

The Press and the Public Popular media coverage is the third element in a wave of public mobilization. In democracies, the media selectively direct public attention. “The media may not be successful in telling people what to think,” Bernard Cohen notes, “but it is stunningly successful in telling people what to think about.”42 Scholars have established firm correlations between media content and the public’s priorities, and demonstrated how frequent, prominent media coverage increases public attentiveness to select issues.43 Justin Lewis argues that there is no preexisting state of public opinion outside of the media, which creates a “coherent ideological framework” through which the public gains its information and forms opinions.44 Susan Herbst found that staffers in U.S. state legislatures “all believed that newspaper, television, or radio content was not simply a conduit for public opinion expression: in their view, it is the very essence of public opinion.”45 Decades earlier, Walter Lippmann reached the same conclusion—public opinion was simply journalistic opinion. U.S. scholars thus tend to see the media as a “conveyor belt” that passively transports elite views to the public.46 The best-known variant of this perspective holds that the media “index” their coverage to policy makers’ rhetoric.47 There is, however, an emerging recognition among U.S. scholars that the media, public

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opinion, and policy makers are interdependent.48 As Baum and Potter argue, “Media’s framing of elite rhetoric has an independent causal effect on public perceptions of conflict characteristics, and through this process, on foreign policy. The media relies upon leaders for the supply of information, and upon the demand of the public as the ultimate consumers of this information. Mass media must walk a fine line—paying enough deference to elite frames to maintain access, while deviating enough to generate and maintain public interest in the news. The delicate equilibrium that emerges can and often does influence foreign policy outcomes.”49 This situation is remarkably similar to China. As Yuezhi Zhao argues, China’s market-oriented media deftly maneuver “between the party line and the bottom line,” avoiding offending the Party while pleasing the market.50 While the official Party newspapers (dangbao), ranging from the People’s Daily to provincial and municipal papers, are directly overseen and funded by Party committees and the Propaganda Department, China’s media market is dominated by commercial publications that rely upon sales and advertising for revenue.51 These newspapers and newsmagazines are not independent of the state: they must be “supervised” by government institutions.52 For instance, the Beijing Youth Daily, one of China’s more adventurous papers, belongs to the Beijing Communist Youth League. In some cases, Party newspapers have formed conglomerates (jituan), using their official status to launch market-oriented publications. The two often have a symbiotic relationship: the latter provide political cover while the former provide greater revenue. For instance, the influential liberal weekly paper Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumou) is under the authority of the Guangming Daily group and even housed in the same compound. Each newspaper has a bureaucratic ranking, which often affects its willingness to be critical.53 At the city level, China’s local “evening papers” (wanbao) tend to focus on soft news, such as entertainment, business, culture, and local events, topics only loosely controlled by the state. In order to monitor popular media, the Chinese state maintains an extensive oversight system.54 All major news outlets, such as the Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily, and Guangming Daily, are government agencies; their editors are government officials. Coverage is regulated by the Central Propaganda Department (CPD), which sends out regular notices to all leading television and print media with guidance as to what issues should be covered or not be covered and the proper “line” to take. 55 As Jack Snyder predicts, this partial liberalization and rapid commercialization of the media have created an “imperfect market” in China favoring nationalism.56 China’s populist press has exploded with sensationalist and nationalist writings, stories that can sell

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papers while appealing to a broad base of young, urban readers—precisely the readers advertisers seek to reach. As one journalist told me, “An endless ‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui) is boring, after all.”57 Editors often try to go as far as they can with daring coverage of a certain issue without getting punished, a strategy dubbed “da cabian qiu”—a ping-pong technique of hitting the ball right on the line without going out.58 Editors who cross over the line can be disciplined or fired, or even have their publication closed.59 The spread of commercial media, decentralization of government authority, and broad application of information technology have undermined the traditional propaganda state in China.60 Anne S. Y. Cheung argues that as a result, China is in the midst of a “quiet media revolution”: The liberalizing force of the market has triggered a quiet media revolution, and has opened up a new breathing space for the general public. China’s media outlets are no longer faithful lapdogs, a mere conduit of propaganda from the Party to the people, but are instead assuming a significant new role in China’s political and social discourse.61

Coverage of sensationalist issues even in obscure local press can spread via the Internet, sparking popular anger and activism in a process entirely outside of official channels. One instance of this media-Internet multiplier effect was the uproar over a photograph of Chinese model/actress Zhao Wei in the September 2001 issue of the popular magazine Shizhuang (Fashion) wearing a dress imprinted with a large Japanese imperial flag. There was no noticeable public reaction in China until a local Hunan newspaper ran a story on the incident in December 2001. This article was widely distributed by Internet news sites and then reprinted by urban newspapers around China. The subsequent uproar on the Internet forced the editor of Shizhuang to resign. Zhao Wei’s house was damaged and she was personally attacked in public, and later forced to make a public apology, broadcast on national television.62 Media coverage of such “focusing events” further raises societal awareness and enhances the likelihood that public sentiments will influence government policy.63 These powerful interactive effects among the general public, activists, popular media, and the Internet also highlight a critical difference between authoritarian and democratic systems. While democracies today are awash in information and opinions, in China, the scarcity of institutionalized outlets for the free expression of public opinion on political issues creates a high level of intensity in the few available venues. “China,” one scholar told me, “is like

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a pressure-cooker.”64 A single inflammatory event, a few individual activists, a controversial essay by a public intellectual, or a single sensationalist media story can spread rapidly across a broad segment of the engaged public, stimulating online debates and activism that can spill over into the streets, quickly spiraling into a powerful expression of public opinion. The line between online debates and mass protests in China is extremely thin. For precisely this reason, the Chinese state expends great effort in policing it. In sum, a wave of public mobilization consists of a rise in levels of activism, sensationalist media content, and shifts in public opinion. In tracing the origins of public mobilization, we must be attentive to the possibility that an issue that stimulates public emotions and activism may be manipulated or even manufactured by elites to advance a preexisting agenda.65 Apportioning out the exact influence of state and society is unrealistic, but careful process tracing of the origins and spread of a wave of public mobilization can indicate their relative influence. Key empirical questions include: does public opinion, as measured through polls, reflect the content of state-led propaganda efforts? Is there significant variation between state-controlled and popular press? Did the state play the leading role in developing and encouraging political activism? If we find that societal and external factors played a significant role in stimulating and spreading a wave of popular mobilization, then we can consider this manifestation of public opinion a potential factor influencing policy outcomes. We now turn to consider the avenues by which popular sentiments might be interjected into the policy process in China. Two questions arise: how does the Chinese state identify public opinion, and why would it care?

How Does the State Know Public Opinion? In a 2007 interview in Beijing, a Chinese scholar insisted to me, “The Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”66 But how does it know? Without an electoral mechanism and with limited freedom of the press, association, and speech, it is difficult for authoritarian leaders to accurately ascertain public sentiments in advance of any organized, collective expression of dissatisfaction. To solve this problem, the Chinese government has developed a sophisticated array of mechanisms to gauge public opinion. A number of intelligence agencies are responsible for submitting regular reports on public sentiment on foreign policy issues. The Party Affairs Department at every university, for instance, issues monthly reports on professors’ and students’ opinions on various subjects. Reports from across China

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are collected and summarized into analytical “situation reports” provided to top leaders by their secretarial team.67 Survey data on public opinion is collected by a number of government agencies, including the Statistical Bureau, and provided to a number of ministries as well as top leaders.68 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly monitors domestic public opinion toward foreign policy.69 The Public Security Bureau maintains an extensive domestic surveillance mechanism to identify local sentiments on contentious issues.70 Since the mid-1990s, Chinese authorities have also permitted domestic media, academics, and private corporations to conduct public opinion surveys.71 One of the most influential of these companies, Lingdian (Horizon), began operations in 1992 and was one of the first to receive a license to conduct public polling in 2000. Some of their findings are widely cited—according to Horizon, over 80 percent of news stories on public opinion polls in China originate from a Horizon study. Other Horizon surveys are solicited by government agencies and so are only reported behind closed doors.72 Individual academics and think-tank experts are often asked to analyze public sentiments toward the United States and toward Japan in their internal reports to government agencies. The Propaganda Ministry also provides top leaders with a daily “short report” (jianbao) on media reporting of contentious foreign policy-related issues. The Information Section of the First Secretariat Bureau under the General Office of the State Council is responsible for editing and submitting “Excerpts of Online Information” (hulianwang jianbao) to top leaders on a daily basis.73 These reports monitor the content of the 10 or so most popular Web sites in China. Top leaders also proactively seek out indicators of public opinion. Premier Zhu Rongji was famous for watching the investigative news program Jiaodian Fangtan (Focus) in the evenings, and then raising issues from the show the following day with his staff. Chinese leaders now regularly claim that they personally go online to gauge public opinion. During the first in a series of online chats with Chinese “netizens” on December 23, 2003, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing reassured his listeners that “Diplomats are also part of the people. The Chinese government’s point of view arises out of the views of the people, and also acts in service of the people’s and the nation’s interests.” Li went on to admit, “I’ve read online comments before that our diplomacy is sometimes too ‘soft’ (ruan) or too ‘hard’ (ying). We take such concerns seriously.”74 These various channels used by Chinese policy makers likely shape their perceptions of public sentiments. While public opinion polling in democracies tends to create the appearance of a moderate consensus,75 Chinese leaders’ reliance upon selective Internet commentary, online activism,

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sensationalist media reporting, and sporadic polling data on sensitive topics skews the final presentation of public sentiments toward a particularly negative and engaged segment of the public.76 This is most likely intentional since, unlike democratic leaders who need to persuade the “middle voter” in the next election, Chinese leaders are most concerned about the potential for widespread public protests. This study is thus less concerned with identifying a statistically accurate picture of national public opinion, if such a thing even exists, than with identifying the trajectory of popular sentiments likely to be of greatest concern to Chinese leaders. The nature of an authoritarian regime also shapes leaders’ motivations in responding to public opinion. In a democracy, electoral pressures create an incentive for politicians to avoid foreign policy choices that go against articulated or anticipated public opinion.77 In an authoritarian system like China, without free, fair national elections, with a constrained media sector, no organized opposition movements, a constrained civil society, and weak democratic norms, why would leaders ever feel compelled to alter their policy in response to public opinion? The answer lies in the power of the public to contest the regime’s claims to legitimacy.

The Power of Public Opinion Power, for political scientists, generally refers to the ability to define and achieve one’s goals.78 Power also evokes the ability to shape the environment within which identities are formed, norms take shape, and certain ideas appear compelling. The power of public opinion in authoritarian regimes rests with its ability to contest the regime’s political legitimacy: “the degree to which a state is viewed and treated by the citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power.”79 Maintaining popular legitimacy, or what David Easton labels “diffuse support,” is essential for all forms of government.80 Even in nondemocratic systems that rely heavily on coercion, the prolonged absence of political support risks political instability and even regime overthrow. Quite simply, “societies with legitimate authority systems are more likely to survive than those without.”81 Although authoritarian leaders are unconstrained by an electoral mechanism, they also lack the legitimacy conferred by submitting to competitive elections. They are thus more likely than democratic leaders to rely upon rhetoric and propaganda to sustain popular support and justify their rule. In China, as in many authoritarian states, nationalism has proven a potent source of regime legitimacy. Indeed, the very term used for patriotism

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in China (aiguo) literally means “loving the state.” Such rhetoric echoes the “potent populism” of Chinese nationalists in the late nineteenth century, who argued that China should rely exclusively upon “the genius, industry, and patriotism of the Chinese people.”82 Today, nationalism works in concert with the market. As Susan Shirk explains, “the interventions of the Communist Party’s Propaganda Department by and large reinforce the market forces that drive the new media toward stories that appeal to nationalism.”83 Most importantly, promoting nationalism seems to be working. In his surveys in Beijing, Jie Chen found that individuals who expressed strong nationalist feelings and preference for stability and who had a high level of interest in politics tended to be more supportive of the CCP regime.84 Yet relying upon nationalism to shore up political legitimacy remains a risky choice, since nationalism identifies the people themselves as the bearers of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis for collective security. Much like the May Fourth Movement of 1919, which emerged out of demonstrations protesting the Chinese government’s weak response to the Treaty of Versailles, popular nationalism can inspire challenges to the CCP’s claim to be the most effective representative of the Chinese people’s interests. The regime’s legitimacy claims thus provide “the raw material for contradictions and conflict.” As James Scott explains, “the very process of attempting to legitimate a social order by idealizing it . . . provides its subjects with the means, the symbolic tools, the very ideas for a critique. For most purposes, then, it is not at all necessary for subordinate classes to set foot outside the confines of the ruling ideals in order to formulate a critique of power.”85 Scott’s argument suggests that among the dizzying array of protests in China today, the gravest challenge comes from groups or individuals who convincingly link their demands to a broader critique of the state’s failure to uphold its own legitimacy claims. The Chinese government has, for instance, cracked down particularly hard on the extreme end of the “New Left”: activists who insist on pointing out that the state’s developmental policies have betrayed its own Marxist rhetoric by abandoning egalitarian ideals and support for the working class in favor of a neoliberal capitalism.86 Repression of Chinese military veterans’ demands for improved welfare conditions reflects similar fears of veterans publicly questioning the Party’s adherence to its own patriotic rhetoric.87 Put simply, issues matter. In the realm of foreign policy, the most sensitive issues are those that touch upon nationalist sentiments. The emergence of even small-scale nationalist protests thus presents Chinese leaders with a dangerous dilemma. If they suppress or ignore these protests, leaders could be criticized for being “too soft” on foreign policy;

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yet by tolerating them, leaders run the risk that nationalist protests will snowball into a broader movement that could encourage opponents of the regime to join together, foster divisions within the leadership, and encourage alliances between popular movements and defectors from the leadership, all elements linked with authoritarian downfall in other cases.88 For this reason, as Alistair Iain Johnston notes, “There is considerable evidence that the [CCP] regime focuses on more extremist attitudes (as found on the internet bulletin boards, for instance), presumably because these views are a barometer of the kinds of emotions that would get protesters into the streets.”89 The threat of widespread popular protests thus functions similarly to elections in democratic states, providing a transmission mechanism by which potential or articulated public opinion can influence policy-making processes and outcomes. As Robert Dahl warned for “mixed regimes” nearly half a century ago: As in hegemonies, when the barriers are lowered, oppositions, interests, and political preferences previously repressed or inhibited spring forth to engage in political contestation. Leaders in these countries of course know this perfectly well—whatever they may say in public. And the presence of these repressed forces creates a genuine danger to the regime for which it can find no easy solutions.90

In sum, for both functional and ideational reasons, nationalist pressures are most likely to exert influence over foreign policy in authoritarian states. This is partly due to nationalists’ ability to contest the regime’s legitimacy claims and partly because, in the absence of elections, authoritarian leaders must find other avenues to identify public opinion. Leaders’ attention gravitates toward the ideas and actors most likely to mobilize the public online and on the streets. We turn now to explore state reactions to an emerging wave of popular mobilization.

THE STATE RESPONDS Authoritarian responses to a wave of public mobilization can be divided into two stages. First, as initial signs of sporadic protests and sensationalist media coverage appear, leaders can respond with either tolerance (and perhaps even encouragement) or repression. What explains this variation? When are authoritarian leaders more likely to tolerate popular protests? Second, under

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what circumstances might authoritarian leaders alter policy decisions in response to public sentiments? In other words, when and how is public opinion most likely to influence the foreign policy of authoritarian states? Five avenues of impact are possible: as a constraint on possible policy options; and as an influence on negotiation strategy, official rhetoric, elite-level policy discourse, and the timing and content of policy decisions. We begin with the initial dilemma facing authoritarian leaders: repression or tolerance.

Opening the Gates: The Repression–Concession Dilemma Authoritarian leaders frequently respond to protests with repression in order to demonstrate their power and show their determination to defend the political system.91 Repression, as Tilly notes, is simply any action by another group that raises the contenders’ costs of collective action. Excessively strong repression, however, can “leave the opposition little alternative but to revolt.”92 Repression can encourage radicalization of collective action, spur more effective organization among opponents, and undermine the regime’s claims to legitimacy.93 Conversely, offering even minor concessions may trigger the “de Tocqueville effect,” in which minor changes made by the regime reveal its illegitimacy but fail to fully address the causes of the illegitimacy, and so lead to greater demands for the elimination or transformation of the regime. Concessions may also increase perceptions of state weakness, making others believe that they can extract more from the regime.94 Even small-scale protests that initially do not appear threatening can quickly snowball into a powerful threat to regime stability.95 In China, public mobilization tends to emerge in response to an unexpected incident that sparks public anger. Chinese leaders are then pressed into a “gatekeeper” role, forced to quickly decide whether to tolerate or repress early instances of popular activism and sensationalist media coverage. In many instances, Chinese leaders try to block access to information expected to raise public ire, such as Beijing’s censoring of reports on China’s $2.87 million compensation payment to the United States for damage inflicted on U.S. diplomatic properties by anti-American demonstrations in 1999.96 Censoring the media and the Internet and prohibiting demonstrations may be effective but are not cost-free. If the information gets out, it can engender a sharp backlash against the government for being “soft” in response to an affront to national pride or for lacking sensitivity to public sentiments. Sustaining the suppression of information is made more difficult by the prevalence of information technology, growth of the commercial media sector,

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and deepening social autonomy, particularly when an unexpected incident engenders a strong emotional response by the public. Instead of suppressing information flows, Chinese authorities sometimes decide to tolerate or even encourage protests and sensationalist media coverage. This raises an intriguing question: why would an authoritarian state with the capacity to suppress public protests use this power only selectively? Although this appears to be a common phenomenon in many authoritarian states, the massive population in China yields the broadest set of potential cases: the official number of “mass incidents” reached 74,000 in 2004, involving an estimated 3.76 million people.97 As David Shambaugh points out, “The issue—like so much else concerning the government in China today—is really one of selective enforcement.”98 State capacity does not appear to be the decisive factor: the Chinese government is quite capable of suppressing protests, media coverage, and activism when it chooses to do so. Variation across bureaucratic interests often conditions state tolerance, particularly at an early stage. As Morton Halperin’s landmark study of bureaucratic politics and foreign policy shows, where you stand often depends upon where you sit.99 In China, agencies in the Education–Propaganda system (xuanjiao xitong) tend to view nationalist sentiments as usefully augmenting regime legitimacy.100 Domestic security agencies likely share this perspective, but also must worry about protests growing beyond state control. Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are more wary of “popular diplomacy” (minjian waijiao) undermining delicate diplomatic negotiations.101 The Ministry of Commerce and other economic agencies often have important financial interests that they do not want to see damaged. Such bureaucratic divisions are most likely to affect the state’s response when protests remain relatively dispersed and small-scale. As public emotion and attention build, the issue invariably will come onto the agenda of top leaders. At this point, the leaders must weigh their response in light of China’s two preeminent “core interests” (hexin liyi): maintaining national unity and internal stability, and ensuring an advantageous environment for sustained economic growth. Although bureaucratic politics are important, we must avoid lapsing into an ex post facto mode of explanation: presuming that any given outcome reflects the victory of one bureaucratic agency or faction over another. This is particularly a problem in China, where such struggles are largely unobservable. Therefore, it is often more useful to analyze the array of costs and benefits across the political system generated by public pressure. The most obvious reason for state tolerance is that protests can serve as a safety valve, allowing the release of popular anger toward corrupt local

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officials or toward a foreign government that might otherwise be directed at the central Chinese government. As a leading Chinese activist once told me, “We’re not extremists and we don’t oppose the government. But sometimes, when I see what Japan does, I just get so mad, and I want to do something about it. At least the government allows me that.”102 For instance, after the Belgrade embassy bombing in May 1999, the Chinese government reportedly provided buses so that students could demonstrate in front of the U.S. embassy in Beijing. As Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen quip, “If they did not throw stones at the American embassy, they would throw them at Zhongnanhai [the leadership compound in Beijing].”103 Yet only a few days after the protests began, as in other instances, Chinese leaders quickly shifted course, prohibiting subsequent demonstrations and urging students to return to the classroom. Tolerating popular protests and public debates can also quickly and reliably inform Chinese leaders of the strength of attentive public opinion on a key issue. Without elections, a free press, and autonomous political organizations, authoritarian leaders lack the institutional mechanisms to receive public feedback. As noted earlier, small-scale protests, popular media coverage, and online debates can provide policy makers with timely, reliable information about the strength of sentiments on key issues among sectors of the public most likely to engage in political activism and indicate the extent to which these activities are likely to generate broad public support and inspire further activism. Fewsmith and Rosen suggest that tolerance is particularly likely at points when public emotions are high, bilateral relations are acrimonious, and top leaders are divided on foreign policy.104 Leaders can also use public protests as a resource in a power struggle. Elizabeth Perry notes, “In the post–Mao era as well, central leaders have sometimes (implicitly if not explicitly) encouraged ordinary people to take to the streets as a means of furthering elite agendas. Although social groups often respond to stateinitiated opportunities by airing complaints that exceed official bounds, both the mobilization and the de-mobilization of mass movements proceed along state-designated occupational and territorial lines and thus reinforce social cleavages in favor of state control.”105 Anti-Japan protests in the mid-1980s, described in detail in the following chapter, provide an instructive example of this interaction between elite politics and popular protests. On September 18, 1985, student protests erupted in Beijing in response to Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s August 15 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the Shinto shrine in downtown Tokyo that honors the souls of those who died in Japan’s wars. Although the protests appear to have been spontaneous eruptions of genuine anger toward Japan, officials’ tolerance of the

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protests reflected efforts by conservative leaders Bo Yibo and Chen Yun to undermine General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang and challenge their economic reform policies.106 Essentially, student protests in 1985 were tolerated as part of a larger elite politics game among a divided leadership. Seven years later, exactly the opposite situation occurred. Facing international isolation after their violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Chinese leaders in 1992 were united around the need to reengage Japan. As top leaders prepared to receive the Japanese emperor on his historic visit to Beijing in October 1992, Beijing students embarked on a citywide petition movement and attempted to deliver an open letter to the Japanese embassy demanding that the emperor publicly apologize for war crimes and provide war reparations. This time, top officials quickly cracked down on the nascent protest effort, circulating a classified document among cadres warning them “not to raise, encourage others to raise, or support any attempts to claim indemnity against Japan as the Japanese emperor is about to visit China.”107 Their unified, decisive action prevented the spread of further demonstrations. The variation between tolerance in 1985 and suppression in 1992 was due primarily to elite divisions over the utility of protests. A fourth reason that leaders might tolerate public protests and sensational media coverage is to increase negotiators’ leverage in a two-level game. The perceived absolute power of authoritarian leaders can actually be a liability at the bargaining table. Democratic leaders can credibly claim that a certain deal would be unacceptable to powerful domestic actors, and so strengthen their bargaining position by shrinking their win sets—their set of acceptable agreements. Authoritarian negotiators, however, have difficulty sending credible signals that they too are constrained by domestic forces that render certain agreements unacceptable. As Jessica Weiss argues, allowing public protests generates audience costs for authoritarian negotiators, signaling to their counterparts that they are also vulnerable to domestic constraints while at the international bargaining table.108 This kind of hands-tying strategy is particularly important for Chinese leaders in negotiating with Japan over history-related issues. Since Beijing has no clear material interests in history issues and is not constrained by democratic elections, Japanese counterparts are likely to discount Chinese demands as simply “playing the history card.” Public protests that undermine social stability serve as a costly signal for authoritarian leaders—they strengthen China’s negotiating leverage by credibly showing that Chinese leaders are constrained by public sentiments. This hands-tying strategy was on display during the Diaoyu Islands incident in 2004, discussed in detail in chapter 4. These uninhabited islands are

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effectively controlled by Japan, though China also claims sovereignty over them. On March 24, 2004, seven Chinese activists landed on the islands and were arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard on charges of violating immigration laws. Chinese diplomats immediately demanded their return, while Japanese officials prepared to prosecute the activists for violating immigration laws. To support its demands, the Chinese government tolerated spontaneous protests in front of the Japanese embassy in Beijing. Chinese police limited the size of the protests, though they did not stop participants from burning a Japanese flag. Behind closed doors, Chinese diplomats warned their Japanese counterparts that the protests could spiral out of control if the activists were not released. In this case, China’s hands-tying tactic worked. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi quickly intervened, overruling local officials and insisting that the seven activists be unconditionally released and immediately returned to China. Regardless of officials’ reasons for tolerance, the decision to allow demonstrations and public debates creates an opening in the political opportunity structure. As Tarrow explains, such structural shifts can “lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies, show where elites and authoritarians are most vulnerable, and trigger social networks and collective identities around common themes.”109 In China, signaling state tolerance is remarkably simple. Since the state regularly restricts or punishes media coverage of prohibited topics and public demonstrations, the failure to punish any early risers during a period of heightened popular emotions sends a powerful signal to the public and the media. As one newspaper editor explained, “If the CPD (Central Propaganda Department) does not say anything about a topic, then we usually feel free to cover it. If there is a ‘hot topic’ (remen huati), they usually do say something. If not, we know where the limits are.”110 When media coverage does shift, with widespread use of the Internet, instant messaging, and cell phones, a broad segment of the engaged public, media, and activists will quickly get the message. Once a wave of public mobilization emerges, it has the potential to influence foreign policy. Drawing upon studies of public opinion in democratic states’ foreign policy helps set expectations for when such influence is likely.

A Responsive State? Public opinion is most likely to influence foreign policy during a crisis. As E. E. Schattschneider’s description of the “scope of conflict” suggests, when conflict is intense and widespread, an issue is highly visible, and ordinary

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citizens are paying attention, then public pressure is more likely to influence policy making.111 Crises stimulate public attentiveness to a given issue, increasing the salience of the issue for policy makers and public alike. Studies in democracies show that issues that attract high levels of public attentiveness and engagement correlate with greater policy responsiveness.112 The coherence and intensity of citizens’ attitudes on a given issue, which tend to be higher in a perceived crisis situation, also correspond with increased public influence on political agendas and foreign policy outcomes.113 Social movement studies yield similar findings. Tarrow argues that policy makers respond less to the claims of any individual group or movement than to the degree of turbulence in society and broad trends in public sentiments.114 Public opinion can potentially influence a range of responses by policy makers, including limiting the policy options under consideration, affecting negotiating strategy, shaping official rhetoric and public debates over policy, and affecting the timing and direction of specific policy choices. In 1961, James Rosenau argued that for democracies, public opinion sets “the outer limits within which decision makers and opinion makers feel constrained to operate and interact.”115 Powlick and Katz agree, finding that policy makers anticipating negative public reactions often exclude certain policy options.116 U.S. leaders planning military interventions, for instance, appear to have felt constrained by public unwillingness to support broader objectives.117 David Lampton suggests that public opinion plays a similar constraining role in Chinese foreign policy: Public opinion helps demarcate space within which the leadership has relatively wide latitude to operate. Although this space is large, it is not unlimited. Therefore, some issues and some domestic circumstances allow the leadership less room to operate than others. Leaders understand which issues are so sensitive that to mishandle them could lead to social instability or could provide political competitors an avenue by which to undermine them.118

In a closed-door speech, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen once admitted to students at Beijing University that the “major contradiction” facing Chinese foreign policy is “the contradiction between China’s public opinion and its constructive foreign policy.”119 Although public opinion may indeed constrain policy makers, encouraging them to leave some options off the table, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate this sort of causal relationship empirically. Although many experts argue that Beijing would never tolerate Taiwan’s legal independence due to the potential for domestic criticism, this is an

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overdetermined outcome: a number of factors militate against Beijing tolerating a declaration of independence by Taiwan. Furthermore, public opinion apparently has not served as a constraint upon the rise and fall of moderation in PRC policy toward Taiwan in recent years. Public opinion can also influence agenda setting, evoking what Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz label the “second face” of power—the ability to influence which issues and alternatives gain salience in the political arena.120 Such influence is particularly likely when the general public becomes aroused over foreign policy issues and debates.121 Activists can also initiate an incident that reshapes the policy agenda facing top leaders. One example is the baodiao (Protect Diaoyu Islands) movement, a grassroots campaign aimed at defending China’s formal claims to these islands through direct action and advocacy. As chapter 4 describes, in 2004 seven Chinese activists landed on the islands and were promptly arrested by Japan for violating immigration laws. A Chinese scholar later explained, “Those activists brought the government into the issue, as it was the government who had to intervene after the seven were arrested. It’s a disturbance to China’s diplomatic route of a ‘peaceful rise.’ ”122 A third area of potential public influence is over negotiating strategy. Robert Putnam’s two-level game approach suggests that anticipated domestic reactions may constrain the win sets of negotiators and shape their preference ordering over outcomes, strategy, and tactics.123 During periods of low public mobilization, Chinese diplomats tend to have a broader set of acceptable agreements and to adopt a less assertive strategy, and so are more likely to reach diplomatic agreements. When public mobilization is high, with greater public scrutiny and strong emotions, Chinese leaders face greater domestic reputational costs for compromising. Negotiations are more likely to stagnate, as Chinese leaders resist concessions that might engender public criticism. While high levels of public mobilization may add negotiating leverage for China, they also decrease the likelihood of reaching a deal. Although public pressure is hardly the only element affecting diplomatic negotiations, a quick review reveals that patterns in China– Japan negotiations over territorial disputes do track rather closely with levels of popular mobilization. For instance, in 1997 Chinese diplomats were able to reach an agreement with Japan over sharing fishing zones in the disputed East China Sea region, as well as, in 1999, an agreement on Japan’s cleanup of abandoned chemical weapons in China.124 Both accords were achieved relatively quickly and easily, without attracting much public attention. In contrast, negotiations on sharing access to natural gas deposits in the East China

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Sea were repeatedly interrupted and delayed during the 2002–2005 peak of public mobilization. Only after the mobilization died down and bilateral relations improved were the two sides able to sign an accord that pledged, on June 18, 2008, to turn the East China Sea into a “Sea of Peace, Cooperation, and Friendship.”125 During periods of high public mobilization, reaching such deals becomes more difficult. One striking example comes from the negotiations with the United States over China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999. As the concluding chapter will show, after U.S. negotiators published the full version of China’s (rejected) WTO offer on the Internet, “the Chinese government lost control of the flow of information” as the public denounced Premier Zhu Rongji for “selling out” Chinese interests.126 Vice Minister Long Yongtu, China’s lead negotiator in the talks, later admitted that his greatest pressure during the WTO negotiations came from domestic opinion that criticized him as a “traitor.”127 Even though the public uproar only delayed the two sides in ultimately reaching an agreement, Joseph Fewsmith calls the criticism “extraordinary . . . it was the first time since 1949 that elite politics, bureaucratic interests, intellectual opinion, and broader (but still urban) public opinion came together to oppose the official position on an important foreign policy issue.” In the wake of this incident, Fewsmith concludes that “public opinion was no longer something that could be ignored” by Chinese policy makers.128 Chinese leaders may also use inflammatory public rhetoric as an apparently low-cost way to demonstrate their responsiveness to the public. Jacobs and Shapiro describe this as “crafted talk”—politicians’ use of rhetoric “to create the appearance of responsiveness as they pursue their desired policy goals.”129 From the society side, Tarrow notes that protest movements create political opportunities as “politicians seize the opportunity created by challengers to proclaim themselves tribunes of the people.”130 While perhaps useful at home, assertive rhetoric can also impede international cooperation, damage international reputation, and inspire activism both at home and abroad. For instance, Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s criticism of Japan’s management of history issues during his November 1998 visit was widely seen as appeasing the Chinese public at the cost of exacerbating Japanese distrust of China. A fourth type of impact emerges through influential experts’ public debates over policy. In China today, these are often lively and contentious. Health care, public education, food safety, foreign relations, financial policy, the domestic stock market, and China’s international investment strategy are

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regularly debated in influential media outlets, scholarly journals, academic conferences, and on the Chinese Internet. Even within the circumscribed scope set by the state, struggles over competing positions can be fierce. These disputes often pit one set of government agencies against another, providing an opening for experts and the general public to enter into policy debates and influence policy makers’ decisions. Experts sometimes stimulate public mobilization around an issue—what Wang Shaoguang labels the “reach out” model. For instance, in June 2005 Ge Yanfeng, a researcher under the State Council, unexpectedly disclosed the findings of an internal report that China’s medical reform “had not been successful.” His comments sparked a spirited public debate in popular media and on the Internet. In response, the government eventually pledged to introduce an urban health care system covering all residents and to assist rural communities in restoring the cooperative medical system. “In this case at least,” Wang concludes, “the reach-out model performed wonders.”131 In other cases, public criticism of experts’ policy recommendations renders them less attractive to policy makers. A striking example came during the “new thinking” debate of 2002–04, in which experts’ proposals for China to downplay history issues in Japan policy were sharply denounced in what was perhaps the most vitriolic public debate over foreign policy since 1949. Although the new thinking was initially rejected, many of its proposals were eventually adopted into China’s Japan policy after public anger died down. The ebbs and flows of such public debates reveal an interactive relationship between prominent intellectuals and the general public. As Song Qiang, a coauthor of the populist book China Can Say No, declared in 1996: “We’re respecting public opinion, not misleading it. . . . Some say we have aroused public opinion. It would be better to say that public opinion aroused us.”132 Finally and most significantly, policy makers may respond to public mobilization by altering specific policy decisions. Public pressure can change leaders’ cost-benefit calculations. Certain actions undertaken when public opinion is not mobilized, such as receiving the Japanese emperor in Beijing in 1992, would be far more costly when the public is highly mobilized. Public mobilization can affect the timing, direction, and extent of policy decisions. During a wave of public mobilization, decisions that leaders expect to be unpopular are more likely to be delayed, modified, or even reversed. Feng Zhaokui, one of China’s leading Japan experts, argues that spring 2005 represented precisely this situation: the Chinese leadership had allowed itself to become trapped by public opinion.

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Under the background of a long-term political chill, the daily worsening emotions of the populace on both sides, particularly a part of the population and general public opinion, constrained both governments into a hardening policy position. The worsening public opinion reduced the governments’ space and flexibility to implement policy toward the other from a long-term, reasonable, strategic perspective . . . even though Chinese leaders needed to take a stance on the basis of China’s national interests and though they absolutely value China– Japan relations, they could not ignore the strong feelings of this part of the population.133

At the peak of public mobilization, even a strong authoritarian regime may appear to be held captive to the dictates of an emotional public. In recent years, whenever the Chinese government adopts a more assertive foreign policy stance, some observers attribute the shift to public pressure at home.134 Yet when faced with mounting diplomatic tensions during a period of peak public mobilization, Chinese leaders tend to respond by restraining domestic nationalist pressures while strengthening diplomatic and economic cooperation—a pattern we see repeatedly in interactions with the United States, Japan, and Europe. We thus turn, in the final section, to consider when, how, and why a wave of popular mobilization comes to an end.

END OF THE WAVE The study of contentious politics, and particularly the subset focused on social movements, is often faced with a conundrum: if social movements arise from powerful forces and exert an independent influence upon policy and society, then why do they often quickly and quietly disappear? Social movement theorists tend to respond by looking inside the movements themselves. The conditions that engender social movements—openings in the political opportunity structure, mobilizing emotions, and inventing new and exciting forms of protest—are rare and fleeting. As political doors close, emotions cool, and protests become mundane, movements tend to fade away of their own accord. “They rest,” Tarrow concludes, “on a razor’s edge between institutionalization and isolation.”135 Interactive effects among public opinion, activism, and popular media also contribute to a rapid drop in levels of public mobilization. As chapter 6 shows, when media coverage shifts and political activism declines, public attention moves elsewhere. Emotions cool and people’s attitudes become

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more flexible and moderate. The market incentive for sensationalist stories declines, and the media moves on to other issues. In this calmer environment, even sporadic acts of protest or occasional sensationalist stories are unlikely to spark widespread public anger or debates. The public soon returns to a more familiar state of quiescence, marked by inattention to foreign policy issues. Part of the answer also lies with the emotional sources of public mobilization. A wave of emotion is necessarily an ephemeral phenomenon—public anger may be very real, widespread, powerful, and also short-lived. Dingxin Zhao, for instance, surveyed Beijing university students several months after the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. He found that while students were very familiar with the anti-U.S. nationalism discourses in the 1990s, the anger expressed during anti-U.S. demonstrations was more a momentary outrage than a reflection of a long-term development. He thus concludes: “there is no persistent domination of radical anti-U.S. nationalism.”136 This does not mean that the public manifestations of popular anger were not genuine or politically significant; it simply means that they didn’t last long. In broadening our inquiry beyond democratic contexts, the role of the state in bringing such a rapid end to popular mobilization also looms large. Two techniques are central for authoritarian regimes: repression and persuasion.

The State Strikes Back Paradoxically, the escalation of public mobilization contains the seeds of its demise. As a wave of mobilization grows stronger, leaders’ cost-benefit calculations begin to shift. Protests have already served their usefulness: pressure has been released, popular demands have been appeased, and diplomatic leverage has been gained. Factional battles have likely been resolved. Meanwhile, the costs begin to loom large. The protests risk exacerbating domestic instability. A carefully crafted foreign policy strategy would likely be undermined by following the dictates of an emotional, angry public. Ironically, suppressing the protests may actually be easier as they spread, since top leaders’ attention is focused on the issue. Political factions or bureaucratic agencies that may have supported the protests initially are now more likely to unite behind a policy of reining in unrest that may threaten the entire regime. Collecting information about the protests and suppressing them may also be easier at this stage, since they are more prominent, with identifiable leaders and activities that can be contained through a uniform set of policies. If some of the earlier negotiating strategies have been successful, the offending state has by now offered at least some symbolic concessions to which the

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government can point in justifying its shift to a foreign policy of moderation and engagement. As concern rises over the destabilizing effects of nationalist protests, authoritarian leaders tend to shift toward demobilization—a strategy of redirecting public attention, ramping down sensationalist media coverage, cooling online sentiments, and constraining public demonstrations. Repression plays a key role. Threats of punishment increase the costs of protests beyond what most citizens are prepared to bear, particularly on issues related to foreign policy. The strength of repression applied by the state varies with the extent of the perceived threat—a factor shaped largely by the issue at stake and the strength of the protests, as well as the broader political and social environment at the time. Although the credible threat of repression is an essential element in the Party’s toolbox, force alone is inadequate. China’s propaganda masters also rely upon a combination of negative controls (censorship) and positive flows of information (propaganda) to redirect the public’s attention and cool popular emotions. Anne-Marie Brady, for instance, describes the 2008 Beijing Olympics as a “Campaign of Mass Distraction.” She argues, “The Party needs the masses to be as disengaged from politics as possible, and to be optimistic and positive in order to maintain business confidence and trust in the political status quo. Under these circumstances the role of the Central Propaganda Department has shifted from being the engine house for the political transformation of China to overseeing the political mummification of the nation.”137 While “political mummification” is hardly reflected by the widespread, often violent local protests around China or in the lively online policy debates played out amid Chinese netizens’ cat-and-mouse games with censors, Brady is certainly correct about the Party’s fears of uncontrollable protests and its efforts to rein in public mobilization through propaganda. Propaganda is often taken as a synonym for deception and manipulation in support of nefarious political objectives. In fact, all governments engage in propaganda, defined simply as “the use of communication skills of all kinds to achieve attitudinal or behavioral changes among one group by another.”138 As a U.S. military official admitted with respect to the Pentagon’s policy of embedding reporters within U.S. combat units in Iraq in 2003, “Our goal was to dominate the information market.”139 The purpose of propaganda is to persuade—to either change or reinforce existing attitudes and opinions. The Chinese translation is xuanchuan, defined by Chen Lidan as “Using various symbols to communicate a certain concept in order to influence people’s thought and their actions.”140 For authoritarian regimes such as China, propaganda takes two forms: negative propaganda, using censorship

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and repression to restrain the flow of undesirable information and images; and proactive or positive propaganda, the promulgation of select images and information through mass media, public education, and political events. Positive propaganda includes misinformation—promulgating partial or incorrect information. To be successful, propaganda requires three basic conditions. First, the regime must be able to shape the public information environment—the content of images and information that the vast majority of the population readily and regularly access. Second, authoritarian leaders must be able to influence public opinion, namely levels of public emotion, public attention to an issue or “issue activation,” and the content of individuals’ attitudes, positions, or beliefs on a given issue. Finally, authoritarian states must be able to influence patterns of collective, overt political behavior seen as potentially dangerous to the regime. The importance of these controls varies across regimes, and across issue areas, time periods, and population segments. Shaping the views of social elites may be more difficult than influencing the general public, given the elites’ greater access to diverse sources of information. It is critical, however, that authoritarian leaders remain capable of shaping the content of information and images available to the bulk of the population on controversial issues during peak periods of popular engagement, and that the resulting informational environment influence collective attitudes and political behavior. These tactics can bring about the end of a wave of public mobilization in remarkably short order—as we will see in the case of China’s relations with Japan after 2005.

CONCLUSION This book develops the concept of a wave of public mobilization to help identify patterns in state–society interactions over foreign policy in authoritarian states. A wave of popular mobilization consists of a rapid shift in public opinion and popular emotions, growing political activism, and expanded sensationalist coverage in popular media and on the Internet. A wave can arise from society, the state, and/or external events, but once it emerges, the state must decide to respond with either tolerance or repression. If the state allows or even encourages protests and activism, then popular pressure can influence negotiating strategy, official rhetoric, and foreign policy decisions and discourse. Yet once popular activism begins to threaten core national interests abroad and undermine social stability at home, authoritarian leaders

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tend to respond with a mixture of repression and persuasion in an effort to bring the wave to an end. This conceptual framework should prove a useful guide for a diverse array of empirical inquiries. We can compare the role of state and society in the rise of public mobilization, identify how the state responds to popular mobilization, assess the public’s influence on policy processes and outcomes, and examine how and why a wave ended. It is not my contention that this broad framework will approximate every case of unrest in authoritarian states; rather, by identifying critical points in state–society interactions and sharpening our focus upon critical factors and decisive moments, this analytical structure will help us better understand when, how, and why public opinion might, or might not, influence foreign policy in nondemocratic states. As the wave metaphor suggests, public mobilization tends to come in cycles: rising rapidly and often unexpectedly, peaking in a burst of activism and emotion, and then quickly disappearing from the political scene. Social movement theorists attribute this primarily to the nature of movements themselves. To this, I add two elements from the state side: persuasion and repression. Leaders’ cost-benefit calculations tend to shift as a wave of mobilization rises, and so they shift away from tolerance and responsiveness in favor of restrictions and propaganda. The combination of forces from above and below tends to bring an end to a wave of public mobilization in surprisingly short order. Yet sustaining these controls is difficult. High levels of top leaders’ engagement, media censorship, political repression, and coherent propaganda can indeed transform patterns of public mobilization, but such attributes are themselves invariably short-lived. The attention of top leaders, media minders, and security officials will move on to other issues. Over time, conditions may shift, providing an opening for yet another wave to arise. There are simply too many issues that give rise to strong public emotions in China today for the government to keep tabs on all of them. When unexpected events stimulate popular anger and activism, another wave of mobilization will swell somewhere else, and the cycle will be repeated. Rather than seeing such interactions as having a necessary endpoint—signaling either the collapse of CCP rule amid popular pressure or the final victory of China’s propaganda state over the Internet—these dynamics reveal the fundamentally cyclical nature of state–society relations in China today.

2 FORGETTING AND REMEMBERING THE PAST China’s Relations with Japan, 1949–1999 The history of the past sixty years of Sino-Japanese relations was not good. However, it is a thing of the past and we must turn it into a thing of the past. This is because friendship exists between the peoples of China and Japan. Compared to the history of a few thousand years, the history of sixty years is not worth bringing up. Our times have been unfortunate, because we have only been living in these sixty years. However, our ancestors weren’t like this. Moreover, we cannot let such history influence our children and grandchildren. — Z HOU E N LAI, TRANS. DAQI NG YANG

remier Zhou Enlai’s comments to a group of Japanese Diet members visiting Beijing in 1954 might be easily dismissed as an anachronism of history—a brief interregnum when Chinese leaders, for strategic and ideological reasons, were willing to look past Japan’s invasion and atrocities in China. In fact, Zhou’s comments reflect one enduring theme in China’s relations with Japan: a willingness to downplay contentious memories of the wartime past in order to maximize the economic and strategic benefits of closer relations. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai adopted this approach in the 1960s and 1970s as part of their balancing strategy against the threat of “Soviet hegemony” in East Asia. They normalized relations with Japan, agreed to forgo demands for reparations, restrained criticism of Japan at home, and even welcomed a Japanese military buildup. In the early 1980s, leaders Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang followed a similar strategy, looking to Japan as a source of aid, investment, and technology for China’s economic modernization. Even President Jiang Zemin, widely assumed to harbor strong personal anti-Japanese sentiments, reached out to Japan in the wake of China’s suppression of the 1989 student protests, overseeing a brief second honeymoon as China’s search for international support coincided with rising tensions

P

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in Japan–U.S. relations. Following his contentious 1998 visit to Tokyo, Jiang Zemin again adopted a restrained tone toward Japan on history issues. When Hu Jintao, a former aide to Hu Yaobang, came to power in 2002, he echoed the same theme, declaring his determination to strengthen the relationship with Japan while downplaying disputes over the wartime past. These repeated instances of Chinese leaders downplaying the wartime past for strategic purposes have been tempered by a second enduring theme in China’s relations with Japan: the temptation to deploy memories and images of Japanese atrocities for diplomatic leverage and domestic legitimization. This has also been a familiar element in China’s Japan policy. In 1982, China’s state-run press unexpectedly launched a ferocious propaganda campaign denouncing reports of revisions in Japanese history textbooks. This contributed to the first spontaneous public protest against Japan in the post–1949 era, in response to Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985. Since the 1980s, Chinese leaders have repeatedly raised concerns that historical revisionism in Japan, augmented by economic prosperity and military might, pose a danger that Japan might return to the “road of military aggression.” Finding such tactics useful for extracting economic assistance and diplomatic leverage, Beijing has returned to these themes repeatedly. The 1990s also saw the onset of China’s domestic patriotic education campaign. Although primarily aimed at shoring up Party legitimacy, this campaign exacerbated popular animosity toward Japan just as Beijing was working to stabilize diplomatic ties with Tokyo in the late 1990s. The contradictions between these two approaches—a willingness to deemphasize the wartime past for strategic and economic reasons and the temptation to use history for diplomatic leverage and domestic legitimacy—have repeatedly provided an opening for public pressure to emerge and influence China’s relations with Japan. Pairing the 1980s and 1990s in this chapter thus reveals both sides of the argument developed in this book. Public opinion can, under certain circumstances, influence the foreign policy of nondemocratic governments such as China. Yet popular nationalism in China is not out of control. China is not a fragile state. The Chinese government has repeatedly demonstrated its determination and capacity to respond to popular pressure in a limited and nuanced fashion, offering partial concessions and rhetorical gestures to appease public demands while resisting pressure to alter its overall strategy in foreign policy. This chapter opens with a review of China’s approach to history issues in the postwar period. The second section examines China– Japan relations in the 1980s. Focusing on the links between the 1982 textbook incident and

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the 1985 student protests reveals the importance of elite divisions in providing an opening for popular protests to emerge and influence policy choices. The third section covers the 1990s. After a round of tensions with the United States and Japan in the mid-1990s, China embarked on an ambitious “grand strategy” designed to reduce anxiety over its rise while bolstering economic ties with key states, including Japan. I augment this discussion with three brief case studies on economic, security, and ideational issues: China’s approach to the decline of Japanese aid, disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and Japanese abandoned chemical weapons in China. In each instance, Chinese leaders refrained from promoting public animosity toward Japan, instead preferring to settle disputes quietly, out of the glare of public attention. It was precisely this restrained diplomatic approach that came under fire during the wave of public mobilization in the 2000s. We begin with a brief review of China’s history lessons.

GETTING HISTORY WRONG Official interactions between China and Japan date back to at least the fifth century. During the Tang dynasty, the two nations enjoyed very close contact. Throughout subsequent imperial dynasties, the relationship remained largely peaceful with few ruptures of violence, though interactions were limited. In the late Qing dynasty, Japan’s successful transition to a modern nation-state served as a model for reform-minded Chinese officials and intellectuals such as Liang Qichao.1 During this period, modern concepts and vocabulary from the West were brought into China via Japan. Japanese activists played a critical role in supporting Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China.2 Tensions began to mount as Japan’s pursuit of a “rich nation, strong army” led it into foreign aggression while China grew weaker due to “internal worries and external problems.” In 1894, the two countries clashed over Korea in the First Sino-Japanese War. Defeated, China was forced to give up Taiwan and Liaodong Peninsula (later rescinded) to Japan and granted many other privileges as well as a huge indemnity. Japan’s victory over Russia a decade later gave it a foothold on northeast China (known as Manchuria) and led to its annexation of Korea. Over the next few decades, as China fell into civil war and embarked on nation building under the Nationalists, Japan’s policy toward China shifted from cooperation to military expansion. The May 4, 1919 demonstrations that led to the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party began as a denunciation of Japanese imperialism and of Chinese

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officials for taking a soft line toward Japan. Workers’ strikes and consumer boycotts against Japanese occupation and economic influence in Shanghai in the 1930s further aided the Party’s growth.3 In September 1931, Japan’s military occupied northeastern China and went on to set up the puppet state of Manchukuo. Six years later, continued Japanese expansion into north China and rising Chinese nationalism led to the fateful clash at the Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937 that escalated into a brutal eight-year war, in which Japanese troops occupied most of eastern and north China. During the war, Japan’s system of sexual slavery, the so-called “comfort women,” included up to 200,000 Chinese women enslaved in thousands of “stations” spread throughout 21 cities in China. Japanese armies engaged in research on chemical warfare on Chinese civilians and implemented an estimated 2,000 chemical attacks around China. Japan’s brutal entry into Nanjing in December 1937 later became known as the Nanjing Massacre. Estimates of total Chinese casualties in the war reached up to 20 million, with up to 100 million people displaced.4 After Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek called on his Chinese compatriots not to seek revenge on their enemy. In his August 15, 1945 speech to the Chinese people, Chiang insisted, “We have . . . repeatedly declared that we were only opposed to the Japanese leaders and harbored no enmity for the Japanese people. . . . While we must insist on the strict compliance with the terms of the surrender, we must not look forward to retaliation, and much less shall we impose insults on the innocent civilians. We can only sympathize with their plight—coerced and misled as they have been by their Fascist and Nazi leaders, and hope they will repent of their mistake and sin.”5 As the Kuomintang (KMT) on Taiwan normalized diplomatic relations with Japan in 1952, Chiang’s rhetoric of “repay hatred with virtue” was evoked by Japanese negotiators to pressure Chiang to renounce all demands of reparations from Japan and accept that the jurisdiction of the treaty applied only to areas under the control of the Republic of China. This not only left open the possibility for Japan to explore relations with the mainland but also created ambiguity over the war settlement. The Communist Party adopted a similarly magnanimous stance toward Japan after coming to power in 1949. In military tribunals in 1956 in Shenyang and Taiyuan, only 45 Japanese military and civilian personnel were indicted out of 1,108 detainees. None received the death penalty or life imprisonment. In 1956, all Japanese who were not indicted were allowed to return home, and by mid-1964 even the 45 indicted Japanese had been repatriated.6 These returnees later emerged as some of Japan’s most dedicated advocates for closer

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relations with the PRC. Throughout this period, Chinese diplomats trod cautiously over the wartime past. In the late 1960s, Chinese leaders began to seek ways to engage Japan as part of Mao Zedong’s strategy to balance against the Soviet Union, even welcoming a Japanese military buildup. In his toast celebrating the normalization of relations with Japan in September 1972, Zhou Enlai barely mentioned history issues, instead expressing his wish that “the friendship between our two great nations shall pass on from generation to generation.”7 The 1972 Joint Communiqué establishing diplomatic relations between China and Japan briefly addressed the war through the following paired statements: The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. The Government of the People’s Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese people, it renounces its demand for war reparations from Japan.8

Throughout this period, discussions of Chinese wartime suffering were suppressed as “harmful to the Sino-Japanese friendship,” in favor of a victor narrative designed to encourage a triumphant and proud Chinese national image at home.9 Memorials were built to honor heroic Chinese wartime resistance rather than document Japanese atrocities. Filmmakers were urged to avoid depiction of Chinese wartime suffering that would “dilute our hatred of imperialism” and “lower our morale.”10 Scholars who tried to investigate the Nanjing Massacre in the late 1960s were criticized for “stirring up national hatred and revenge.”11 To justify normalizing ties with Japan, state propaganda distinguished between “the small handful of Japanese militarists” responsible for the war and ordinary Japanese people, who were treated as victims of the militarists. Chinese history textbooks denounced not “Japan,” only ridi (Japanese imperialism), rijun (Japanese military), or rikou (Japanese bandits).12 After 1972, Japan became a model for study, and in some cases, for emulation. As Yinan He explains, Beijing’s attempt to create an illusion of SinoJapanese friendship in the 1970s without first settling the historical account was largely successful. Most young Chinese at that time had minimal knowledge about Japanese war atrocities. Private stories about the “Japanese devils” survived, but only within families and small communities. Moreover, because of the tightly controlled mass media at the time, ordinary Chinese people had no way to learn about Japanese history textbooks, leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, or right-wing activists and revisionist histories.13 The

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Chinese government remained concerned, however, with potential public criticism of its Japan policy. In his 1972 talks with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, Zhou Enlai noted privately, “We need to explain [diplomatic normalization with Japan] to our people. If we don’t educate the people, we cannot persuade the masses that had suffered under Japan’s ‘Three All’ policies [during the war].”14 Instead of proceeding after normalization to begin to address their disputes over the wartime past, as West Germany and Poland did by the 1970s, China and Japan agreed to “put the past behind them” and instead focus on establishing a political foundation for closer economic ties. This served the interest of Chinese leaders eager to obtain Japanese investment and technology, as well as Japanese leaders’ desire to gain access to the Chinese market. Neither side showed much interest in rehashing disputes over the wartime issues. The result was at best a “shallow reconciliation.”15 China’s legacy of manipulating history in service of the state is hardly uncommon—as Ernst Renan writes, “Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.”16 However, decades of manipulation of the past made it impossible to openly and honestly commemorate the Chinese people’s tragic suffering, while allowing Japanese conservatives to avoid a complete accounting for Japan’s wartime actions in China. The implications of China’s benevolent amnesia finally began to emerge in the early 1980s, as China’s Japan policy began to shift under the reform policies of Deng Xiaoping.

PROTESTS AND POLICY: CHINA–JAPAN RELATIONS IN THE 1980S In the late 1970s and early 1980s, China’s leadership was divided over economic policy. Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, prioritizing rapid economic growth, looked to Japan for economic aid, capital investment, and access to advanced technology. A cohort of more conservative leaders, concerned about becoming overly dependent on foreign capital and technology and seeking to rein in inflationary pressures, sought to curtail their efforts. China’s Japan policy soon became caught up in these elite divisions. Seeking to assuage conservatives in advance of a critical Party Congress, Deng Xiaoping approved a brief propaganda campaign in July 1982 denouncing reported revisions in Japan’s history textbooks. This campaign provided an opening for popular protests against Japan, which emerged unexpectedly in the fall of 1985. Over the next few years, China’s Japan policy became more negative. The student protests provided further ammunition for conservative leaders, who finally removed Hu Yaobang from power in 1987. The 1985 protests thus

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contributed to a shift in power among Chinese elites and so indirectly influenced China’s Japan policy.

Elite Divisions, Strategic Shifts, and China–Japan Relations: 1978–1982 Domestic politics in China in the late 1970s and early 1980s were dominated by two concerns: how to restore China’s economy and how to stabilize the political system in the wake of the tumultuous Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping, emerging as China’s premier leader, sought to restore the people’s trust in the Party, address the issue of Mao’s legacy, and consolidate Deng’s own power base within the Party, crucial to implementing his strategy of economic reforms and open-door policy.17 As Deng began his ascent to power after Mao’s death, two divergent approaches to restoring China’s economy began to emerge.18 Chen Yun was one of the most influential figures calling for a restrained approach. Although often labeled a conservative, Chen, who had been the architect of the Second Five-Year Plan rejected by Mao in favor of the Great Leap Forward, was actually an economic pragmatist. In the late 1970s, Chen Yun supported the introduction of market forces, decentralization of economic production, and expansion of enterprise-level decision making.19 In response to the dangers of excessive capital construction, the use of foreign investment to nonproductive ends, severe economic imbalances, and the specter of runaway inflation, Chen proposed in March 1979 a short-term strategy of fiscal conservatism and restructuring, which Deng supported.20 Chen’s more cautious approach to economic development soon brought him into direct conflict with Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. As Party Secretary in Sichuan, Zhao had implemented a rural responsibility system, the “Sichuan experiment,” that captured Deng Xiaoping’s attention. Deng soon brought Zhao to Beijing and facilitated his rapid rise to power.21 By the end of 1980, Deng had managed to place his own protégés in positions of power. Zhao Ziyang replaced Hua Guofeng as Premier, Hu Yaobang replaced Hua as Chairman of the CCP, and Deng himself took up the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission.22 Even as Deng successfully maneuvered to consolidate power, debates over economic policy continued. Chen Yun’s calls for caution in introducing foreign investment and a free market were supported by Party elder Bo Yibo, along with a cohort of veteran cadres, senior military leaders, and conservative ideologues deeply concerned about the political implications of the reform policies advocated by Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang. In February 1982, Wang Renzhong, a

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conservative ideologue, proposed a war on bourgeois influences. The attacks on “bourgeois liberalization” were followed by the 1983–84 campaign against “spiritual pollution” and another campaign against “bourgeois liberalization” in 1986–87.23 In short, a division between economic reformers and conservatives dominated China’s domestic political environment in the early 1980s, with Deng Xiaoping tactically shifting between the two camps in order to sustain the momentum of the reform process. These divisions soon began to shape China’s Japan policy. Following the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, the two governments had moved steadily to strengthen economic and diplomatic ties. They signed four economic agreements in the next few years: on trade (January 1974), civil aviation (April 1974), maritime transport (November 1974), and fishing (August 1975). Even though these negotiations touched on sensitive issues, including Japan’s relations with Taiwan, Japan’s membership in the Western camp, and territorial disputes, the agreements proceeded relatively smoothly.24 On February 16, 1978, they reached a Long-Term Trade Agreement, including a pledge to exchange goods worth US$10 billion over the next eight years. On August 12, 1978, China and Japan finally signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, in which they agreed to shelve disputes over island territories, while only vaguely and indirectly addressing differences over Taiwan and the wartime past. These two agreements established a legal framework for the expansion of trade and diplomatic ties.25 Japan quickly issued its first round of yen loans to China, pledging 300 billion yen for 1979–83.26 When Deng Xiaoping traveled to Japan in December 1978, he responded by expressing understanding about the U.S.– Japan alliance, stating: “strengthening Japan’s defense capability and the U.S.– Japan Security Treaty is a natural course.”27 When the emperor mentioned “the unfortunate events in a long history between the two countries,” Deng quickly replied that the two nations should not dwell on the past and instead should adopt a forward-looking attitude.28 As relations with Tokyo continued to improve over the next few years, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang began to link their economic development strategy to Japanese capital and technology. Transshipment arrangements facilitated Japanese investment in China’s infrastructure, allowing the export of Chinese coal and gas in exchange for manufactured goods and capital stock from Japan. This strategy soon came in for criticism by Chen Yun, who warned of becoming overly dependent upon Japan, going too deeply into debt, and dangerous overinvestment and overheating in the economy. As part of the economic readjustment policies advocated by Chen and supported

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by Deng, Beijing decided in January 1981 to unilaterally cancel or reduce a number of contracts with Japan, causing a severe backlash there. The dispute was resolved the following year, as Japan offered China additional loans to sustain the projects.29 Reformers quickly renewed their courtship of Japan’s aid and investment. In May 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Japan, where he proposed “three principles of Sino-Japanese relations,” namely “peace and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, and long-term stability.”30 Even as China deepened its economic dependence upon Japan, the strategic basis that had guided the rapprochement of the 1970s began to erode. By the early 1980s, Beijing began to reach out to the USSR under the guise of China’s new “independent” foreign policy, established after a fierce internal debate at the 12th Party Congress.31 Beijing soon resumed normalization talks with Moscow, and the “slow but steady process” of Sino-Soviet rapprochement began.32 As Chinese leaders’ fears of a Soviet threat slowly eroded, they were replaced by anxiety over Japan’s expanding military capacity, rapid economic growth, enhanced military alliance with the United States, and mounting trade surplus with China. In late 1982, two members of the CCP Politburo informed visiting Japanese politicians that China had never opposed and never supported the U.S.– Japan Security Treaty.33 When Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro came into office in November 1982 advocating a more prominent security role for Japan within the U.S. security alliance, Chinese leaders responded coolly. In February 1983, shortly after Nakasone pledged in Washington that Japan should serve as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the U.S. alliance, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian told a special envoy of Nakasone: “As an independent, sovereign state, Japan is entitled to maintain armed forces for defense against external threats. But such an armed force should be defense-oriented and of appropriate size, so that it would not constitute a threat to its neighbors.”34 Domestic politics in Japan were also changing. Rapid economic growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s emboldened conservative Japanese elites such as Nakasone, who sought to remove the shackles of the wartime past in hopes of taking a more activist international role. Nakasone openly acknowledged Japan’s “wars of aggression” upon assuming office in September 1982, but also promoted a more positive view of Japan’s recent history, particularly among Japanese youth. These domestic changes within Japan, alongside shifts in the strategic environment and elite divisions within China, all came together in the early 1980s, providing the context for the first major dispute over history issues between China and Japan in decades—the textbook incident of 1982.

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The Road from 1982 to 1985 On June 26, 1982, Tokyo newspapers claimed that Japan’s Ministry of Education had insisted that history textbooks change the phrase “invasion of North China” into “advance into North China,” and that the Nanjing Massacre be attributed to “the fierce resistance by the Chinese troops, which caused great losses of the Japanese troops. The wrathful Japanese troops then killed many Chinese troops and civilians.”35 In actuality, the Ministry of Education only suggested these substitutions, many of which Ienaga Saburo, the author of the textbook, subsequently accepted. Although both the Sankei Shinbun and the Asahi Shinbun later apologized for this misinformation, the reports triggered angry reactions throughout the region.36 On June 30, 1982, the People’s Daily declared: “Japan’s screening of textbooks distorts history and beautifies invasion.”37 Over the next month, the Chinese press ignored the issue. Then abruptly on July 20, Chinese media embarked upon a vitriolic campaign denouncing Japan’s management of the textbook issue and recapping the story of Japanese aggression and atrocities in vivid detail. “Photographs, films, reminiscences, and political cartoons accompanied dramatically worded captions, headlines, and commentaries that specifically warned against the danger of renewed Japanese militarism,” explains Allen Whiting.38 On July 24, for instance, the People’s Daily declared: The Distortion of the History of Japan’s Aggression on China Shall Not Be Allowed. History is the record of human beings’ activities, and it is an objective reality that cannot be distorted by anyone. The Japanese militarists can call the hell on earth that they created in China the “land of happiness,” they can claim that their aggression on China and on Southeast Asia was building the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” and they can change the word “invasion” into “advance” in textbooks. However . . . it is never possible for the Japanese militarists to eliminate the history, which has been engraved onto people’s minds.39

Chinese diplomats also lodged a round of protests in late July, a full month after the initial reports emerged. On July 26, Xiao Ziangqian, director of the First Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, informed the Japanese ambassador that “the Education Ministry [of Japan] . . . in screening history textbooks, falsified the history of Japanese militarists’ aggression against China. . . . This way of doing things is apparently intended to distort the real factors of history and we cannot agree with it.”40

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The torrent of articles soon fell into two categories, perhaps reflecting divisions among Chinese leaders. Some articles focused their ire upon only a “handful of militarists.” As one commentator wrote in the People’s Daily, “We are not afraid of Japanese militarism . . . and we do not want to re-focus on the past, which brought grief to people in both China and Japan. The reason for us to raise the criticism is to get the matter corrected, so that the friendship between the two countries will not be affected or undermined, and so that the plot of those who seek to oppose Sino-Japanese friendship will not succeed.”41 Another People’s Daily article warning against Japanese ambition also stressed that friendly cooperation was the main trend in Sino-Japanese relations. “The disturbance by a handful of militarist forces can never prevent friendly cooperation from developing between the people in both China and Japan.”42 Despite these inklings of restraint, the bulk of the campaign was more sweeping. A PLA Daily commentary on August 3, 1982, for instance, wrote that the textbook incident was not simply an error of terminology but was “a serious signal of the attempts to revive Japanese militarism.”43 Another commentary in Red Flag, an influential monthly publication, declared that Japanese militarists “are carrying out various activities with an attempt to revive militarism and to evolve Japan from an economic power into a military one, and to revive their dream of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” The article continued: The Chinese people have not asked the current Japanese government to undertake responsibility for the war, and have abandoned demanding war reparations for the sake of a friendly relationship between the two peoples in China and Japan. However, the Chinese people and other peoples in Asia who suffered under the Japanese aggression have a right to ask the current Japanese government to undertake a political and moral responsibility, to prevent the attempt of rightist forces in Japan from reviving militarism, to tell the truth of the history to the Japanese people—especially the younger generation—and to educate them to never again make Japan a militarist country that launches aggressive wars on foreign countries.44

Despite this vitriolic rhetoric, China limited its criticism to the media and diplomats. No popular demonstrations were allowed in the PRC, even as thousands of protesters staged anti-Japanese demonstrations in Hong Kong, Seoul, and New York.45 As the controversy deepened, Beijing canceled the visit of Education Minister Ogawa, and hinted that it might also reconsider the planned visit of Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko to China in late

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September.46 Yet once Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa pledged in late August that “Japan will pay full heed to this [Chinese and Korean] criticism . . . and the government will undertake on its own responsibility to make the necessary amendments,” the campaign soon came to an end, nearly as abruptly as it had begun.47 In retrospect, it appears clear that China’s response to the textbook issue was shaped by elite politics in Beijing. The dispute emerged just before the 12th Party Congress, scheduled to start on September 1. As Yinan He argues, Deng planned to use the Congress to make a compromise with the conservatives in exchange for their endorsement of reform and the open-door policy. To show softness toward Japan, which China placed in the same category as Western capitalist countries, would invite more criticism from conservatives and endanger Deng’s reform agenda.48 Deng’s stance also helped alleviate hard-liners’ fears that economic reforms might lead to political liberalization.49 After the textbook controversy, relations with Japan briefly resumed their positive momentum of the 1970s. Nakasone’s November 1982 speech prompted a note of appreciation from the People’s Daily: “It was the first time for a postwar Japanese PM to openly admit that the war Japan had with China was one of aggression. Therefore, it will have a positive impact on the future development of Japan’s friendly relationship with China, and with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.”50 By the time Nakasone paid a four-day visit to China in March 1984, Sino-Japanese relations were “in the best condition ever,” as the Japanese ambassador put it.51 Economic ties resumed their upward trajectory, aided by the generous yen loan packages announced by Prime Minister Suzuki in 1982 and Nakasone in 1984 during visits to Beijing. In just three years, from 1982 to 1985, the total volume of bilateral trade doubled. By 1983, Japan represented a fifth of the PRC’s overall trade. Even as criticism over Japan’s burgeoning trade surplus with China began to emerge, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang persisted in their engagement policy.52 Before his November 1983 visit to Japan, Hu Yaobang informed a group of Japanese journalists that “seeking a steady development of friendly relations between China and Japan” was a top priority in China’s foreign policy: It [the wartime past] has passed and we will not square the accounts. However, because of this history, various doubts have occurred in our friendly relations over the past decade, and it is natural. There is also the problem of mutual trust that exists in political and economic relations as well as in personal exchanges. We hope that our bilateral relations can have a long-term and stable development, because this is related to the basic interests of the people in both

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countries. This requires a frequent exchange of opinions in order to eliminate the mutual doubts. We have the sincerity and confidence to do so, and I will visit your country with this sincerity.53

While in Japan, Hu Yaobang compared China and Japan to rival heroes in a classic Chinese tale, stating: “When they fought, both sides were weakened. But when they were united, they were invincible.”54 While acknowledging difficulties in the relationship, Hu urged deeper economic cooperation and proposed that a fourth element of “mutual trust” be added to the three principles enunciated by Premier Zhao Ziyang in May 1982. Hu then invited 3,000 Japanese youths to visit China in 1984 to commemorate the establishment of the “21st-Century Committee for China– Japan Friendship,” apparently without first obtaining the support of senior colleagues back in China.55 Nakasone’s return visit in March 1984 marked a high point in the personal relationship between the two leaders, with Hu hosting Nakasone in his official residence and Nakasone bringing news of the second five-year yen loan to China, totaling some 470 billion yen from 1984 to 1990.56 In September 1984, the 3,000 Japanese youth visited China amid much fanfare. Wang Zhaoguo, China’s chief representative to the China– Japan Friendship Committee, told them: “Japan is our friendly neighbor. One important part of our basic national policy is to further our good relations with your country. We firmly believe that as long as we treat each other sincerely, trust each other, show good faith and work together, the grand goal of making the 21st Century one of closer Sino-Japanese Friendship will be realized.”57 Despite such grandiose words, the undercurrents of elite divisions over economic policy, the erosion of the strategic logic underpinning China’s Japan policy in the 1970s, and mounting concern with right-wing forces in Japan continued to course through China’s relations with Japan. These factors had largely operated at the level of elite politics, but in 1985 the Chinese public inserted itself into the relationship.

The 1985 Protests and Aftermath In the summer of 1985, Chinese propagandists coordinated a flood of articles, meetings, and special events to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific. Public emotions were fed by a lengthy television series, Four Generations Under One Roof, depicting the sufferings of a typical Chinese family amid the horrors of the Japanese invasion and occupation. On August 15, 1985, a commemoration involving ten thousand children

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was held at the Monument to the People’s Heroes in Beijing.58 The museum commemorating the Nanjing Massacre was expanded and plans were announced for a new museum at the Marco Polo Bridge in suburban Beijing, the site of the July 7, 1937 skirmish that led to Japan’s invasion of central China. Chinese leaders insisted that they were not promoting anti-Japanese sentiments. Li Changhua, deputy director of the Propaganda Bureau of the CCP Central Propaganda Department, stated: The Chinese people feel no hatred toward Japan now. Our purpose of solemnly commemorating the 40th anniversary of victory in the anti-Japanese war and reviewing the deep suffering of the Chinese people brought by foreign aggression is precisely to ensure that the two peoples of China and Japan will never again be involved in a war against each other and will live on good terms from generation to generation.59

Yet as Allen Whiting concludes, “there seems little doubt that the August events contributed to the anti-Japanese sentiments voiced by university students later that fall.”60 The summer of 1985 was also marked by student unrest over the quality of university food, reductions in student stipends, and poor living conditions.61 In the midst of this combustible atmosphere of student dissatisfaction and nationalist propaganda, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro decided to make an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto shrine in downtown Tokyo established in 1869 to “console the spirits of those who had died fighting for the imperial cause” during the Meiji Restoration in 1868. In 1879 it was designated the official shrine to honor “the spirits of the emperor’s loyal retainers.” Under the imposition of state Shinto in the 1930s, Yasukuni became the resting place for the souls of those who died in wars on behalf of the nation. The shrine became an independent religious institution in September 1952.62 Japanese leaders had regularly visited Yasukuni for years, even after it was revealed that the spirits of Tōjō Hideki and thirteen other class A war criminals had been secretly enshrined there in October 1978. Although most visits took place on the spring or autumn holidays, Prime Minister Miki Takeo made his second visit to Yasukuni on August 15, 1975, the anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific. Three of Miki’s successors also paid their respects at Yasukuni on August 15 without triggering much domestic or international controversy: Fukuda Takeo in 1978, Suzuki Zenko in 1981 and 1982, and Nakasone in 1983 and 1984.63 In 1985, Nakasone went one step further by publicly announcing that he would visit Yasukuni on August 15 in his official capacity.

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The day before Nakasone’s planned visit, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson warned that if Nakasone went to Yasukuni as planned, it would “seriously hurt the feelings” of countries that had suffered from the Japanese invasion.64 Nakasone then visited the shrine, along with eighteen members of his cabinet. The visit was highly controversial in Japan—even the conservative Mainichi Shinbum editorialized, “We should not only remember the souls enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine, but should also think about the dead in other countries, especially in Asian countries who suffered from the Japanese invasion.”65 China duly responded with official condemnation. On August 21, a Xinhua editorial stated: Like many other Asian countries, China hopes that the Japanese government will bow to the historical facts and take an unequivocal stand on where the guilt and responsibility for its appalling war of aggression must lie. This is the best guarantee against the renewal of militarism and the recurrence of any such crime. . . . In making its decision, the Japanese government has pandered to and actually emboldened those in Japan who have always wanted to deny the aggressive nature of the war and reverse history’s condemnation of Japanese militarism. This has given rise to much concern among the peoples in Asia and put them on their guard once more.66

Despite these warnings, Chinese leaders also sought to ensure that the visit would not derail the overall relationship. On August 16, the day after Nakasone’s visit, the Chinese Chairman of the China– Japan Friendship Association cordially received a top advisor to the Japan– China Economic Cooperation Association in Beijing. The Xinhua commentary on August 21 also pointedly emphasized the “unprecedented” good relations currently enjoyed by the two countries, expressing a hope that relations would develop further.67 On August 26, the Japan Socialist Party began a weeklong visit to China, meeting with Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, and other top leaders. While Deng raised his “concern” (danxin) with the possible direction of Japanese militarism, neither Hu nor Deng dwelled on Nakasone’s visit in their comments.68 On September 1, the People’s Daily published a frontpage article by two Japanese experts describing Japanese soldiers who fought alongside the 8th Route Army in China’s civil war. Two days later, in ceremonies commemorating the end of World War II, Peng Zhen, Chairman of the National People’s Congress, made a lengthy speech that only briefly addressed the history dispute with Japan.69 Reflecting China’s long-standing theme that the Japanese people were also victims in the war, Japanese guests were invited

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to participate in the public ceremonies. On September 12, yet another Japan– China Friendship delegation arrived in Beijing.70 On the eve of the September 18 anniversary marking Japan’s invasion of northeastern China in 1931, there was little indication that the Chinese government intended to emphasize Nakasone’s recent Yasukuni visit in diplomatic relations. This changed only after the student protests began. On September 13, 1985, nearly a month after Nakasone’s visit, a bigcharacter poster appeared at Beijing University denouncing the revival of Japanese militarism and calling for a commemoration of September 18, the anniversary of Japan’s 1931 invasion of northeast China. After a second poster quickly appeared echoing the call for action, university officials removed both. The next day, a new poster appeared denouncing the university’s actions as “unpatriotic” (maiguo) and suggesting that students hold a demonstration in Tiananmen Square on September 18.71 As Allen Whiting notes, the “students were acting on their own deeply felt antagonism toward Japan.” In response, the Chinese leadership reacted “ambivalently but prudently, mixing minimum force with maximum persuasion.”72 Concerned with the implications for the approaching Party Congress, scheduled from September 16 to 23, Party and Youth League officials tried to persuade the students to cancel their plans, but to no avail.73 By September 17, a large number of police blocked access to Beijing University. The university president later admitted that he stayed up all night, worrying about violence if police entered the campus.74 On September 18, a large group of students assembled in front of the Beijing University library. University authorities urged the students not to march, then locked the campus gate separating the students from the large crowd of citizens gathered just outside. School officials announced via loudspeaker that they had forbidden any off-campus commemorative activities, and that this decision had been approved by central and city party authorities. Meanwhile, several hundred Beijing University students who had managed to leave campus, joined by students from other universities, marched to Tiananmen Square. Security guards watched while they marched around the square, laying wreaths at the Monument to the People’s Heroes.75 Students shouted slogans such as “Down with Japanese militarism,” and “Down with Nakasone.” Other slogans included “Down with the second invasion,” a reference to Japan’s increasing commercial presence in China and the growing trade imbalance in Japan’s favor. One student poster of a 1930s-era Japanese soldier declared, “Forty years ago I chopped off fifty Chinese heads with my sword, now my firm sells you hundreds of thousands of color televisions.”76

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Aided by the outreach efforts of Beijing students, student demonstrations over the next few weeks were held in other cities, including Xi’an, Wuhan, and Chengdu. In early October, over one thousand university students staged an anti-Japanese demonstration over a three-day period in Xi’an, denouncing Nakasone and protesting Japanese imports.77 Marching to the provincial office, they shouted slogans such as “Boycott Japanese goods” and “Oppose the resurgence of Japanese militarism.”78 On October 16, similar protests led to the stoning of Japanese cars and the manhandling of pedestrians in Chengdu. The Sichuan Ribao blamed a small group of “lawless elements” for the vandalism, calling for stability and unity and condemning those who “advocate putting up big-character posters at will, establishing ties and exchanging experiences with various localities.”79 Facing the imminent visit of U.S. Vice President George Bush, Chengdu authorities locked the campus gates and substituted Chinese for Japanese cars in the motorcade. Smaller demonstrations were also reported in Harbin, Wuhan, and Kunming and continued to erupt sporadically in cities around China through November 20.80 Chinese leaders initially responded to the surge in protests with tolerance and persuasion. On September 28, Hu Qili and Li Peng, two rising luminaries with the Party, met with student representatives. While praising the basic motivation behind the demonstrations as patriotic and consistent with university tradition, Li Peng explained that China’s Japan policy helped preserve China’s independence and economic development. He also emphasized the importance of social stability and national unity. Surprisingly, Li conceded to the students that “some cadres” had misapplied the policy, a rare acknowledgment of elite divisions.81 The official media adopted a similar tone. The China Youth Daily paraphrased Deng Xiaoping: “after opening the door it is impossible not to allow a single fly or mosquito to come in,” while the People’s Daily urged readers: Cherish Sino-Japanese Relations, Forged with Such Arduous Effort. While acknowledging student concerns over history textbooks and the Yasukuni Shrine visit, the article emphasized positive history in the relationship and praised efforts by both sides to maintain amicable relations.82 However, Chinese leaders soon moved swiftly to contain student protests. Reports emerged that students were planning nationwide demonstrations on December 9, the anniversary of the 1935 student protests demanding that Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government resist Japan’s invasion and occupation of Manchuria. Within a year, this movement had spread across China’s cities, ultimately pushing the Nationalists into an alliance with the Communists.83 The implications of holding student protests on December 9 were clear: the

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Communist Party was adopting an appeasement strategy toward Japanese aggression similar to that of the Nationalists of the 1930s, and so it was left once again to patriotic students to insist that the government defend China’s national pride. Chinese leaders responded with a mixture of repression and persuasion. The “December 9th movement,” Li Peng told 6,000 youth at the Great Hall of the People, shows that “a youth movement can contribute to the development of history only when it conforms to the trend of the times . . . and under the leadership of the Communist Party, becomes an organized and disciplined force and maintains unity with the masses.” While in 1935, “the central task was to resist Japan and save the country . . . now the central task is to build our motherland into a strong and prosperous socialist power.”84 A Renmin Ribao editorial the following day adopted a more ominous tone: History indicates that the development of Chinese youth movements is closely bound up with the future and fate of our nation and state and with the direction and process of social progress and historical developments. . . . When the direction of the student movement or youth movement is in line with the development of history, it will forcefully propel history forward. . . . However, if the student movement or youth movement runs counter to the demands of the times, not only will there be twists and turns, but the movement itself will suffer serious setbacks and the youth of a generation or even several generations will be held back or wasted. The Red Guard movement during the “Great Cultural Revolution” was one such negative case in point.85

Even as the Party’s harder line quelled anti-Japan protests, cracks in the leadership over Japan policy were becoming apparent. Immediately following the September 18 protests, China’s diplomatic rhetoric became more critical. On September 19, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson responded to the student demonstrations by stating that the Yasukuni visit by “members of the Japanese cabinet had seriously harmed the feelings of Chinese people,” expressing hope that the Japanese side would “steadfastly implement its promises” and “steadily develop China– Japan friendship.”86 The next day, Xinhua issued a report stating that the Chinese government had requested Japan “to handle the [Yasukuni] matter with prudence. Regrettably, however, the Japanese side, ignoring our friendly exhortations, went ahead with the visit . . . seriously hurting the feelings of the Chinese people.” The report urged Japan to halt any subsequent visits and “not take the path of militarism again.”87 The following day, in a meeting with the Japan– China Economic Cooperation Association members, Deng Xiaoping sharply criticized Japan’s trade surplus with

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China.88 On October 11, Deng Xiaoping insisted to Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, “In order to continue developing friendly Sino-Japanese relations, I suggest that the Japanese leadership pay attention to this problem. If these difficult problems arise again, the situation will change. This is the truth. [On the other hand] if there are no further problems, no harm will have been done, and our economic and political relationship can continue developing peacefully and stably. This is where a true understanding should be reached.”89 Despite Deng’s sharper line toward Japan, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang continued their policy of engagement and moderation. On October 15, Zhao Ziyang gave a speech to the China– Japan Friendship Association in Beijing calling for greater efforts to increase “mutual trust” between the two countries.90 On October 18, Hu Yaobang repeated his “four points” for developing China– Japan relations, in which he urged Chinese people to remember the distinction between a few Japanese war criminals and the Japanese people in general.91 As Allen Whiting notes, even after the 1985 protests, Hu Yaobang made repeated efforts to “sell friendship with Japan to the Chinese people through official campaigns and management of the media.”92 After the two sides managed to quickly settle a second dispute over history textbooks in May 1986 and Nakasone agreed to refrain from visiting Yasukuni in August, he was warmly received in Beijing in November 1986. Nakasone came at Hu Yaobang’s personal invitation to lay a cornerstone for the Sino-Japanese Youth Exchange Center, provided as “a gift from the Japanese government through the Prime Minister.” The lavish ceremonies, attended by over 1,000 Chinese and Japanese youths, included the release of some 3,000 pigeons and 1,500 colored balloons amid the sounds of firecrackers, drums, and bugles—a marked contrast from the student protests less than a year earlier. Hu Yaobang’s speech implicitly criticized the student demonstrations by urging “a farsighted internationalist spirit of getting along harmoniously and cooperating amicably with people of other countries. If Chinese young people think merely of the well-being of their own country and . . . are indifferent to promoting unity, friendship, and cooperation for mutual benefit with young people of Japan and other countries, they are not sober-minded patriots.” The visit ended two days later with Nakasone and Hu hugging each other and promising to meet every two years.93 Hu’s quite literal embrace of Nakasone contributed to his rapid downfall. On January 16, 1987, an enlarged Politburo meeting accepted Hu Yaobang’s resignation as General Secretary of the Communist Party. Within days, Kyoto filed a “leaked” version of charges concerning Hu’s mismanagement

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of Sino-Japanese affairs.94 In his memoirs, Prisoner of the State, Zhao Ziyang describes the roles played by Bo Yibo and Chen Yun in managing Hu’s resignation.95 Internal Party documents citing Hu Yaobang’s “mistakes” later included his invitation to 3,000 Japanese students to visit China as guests of the government in 1985 and his invitation to Nakasone to visit China in November 1986. According to Ijiri, neither was first cleared with other Chinese leaders.96 Hu’s personal style of operating without consensus and his soft approach to ideological issues, both on display in his approach to Japan, also contributed to his downfall. After Hu’s removal, relations with Japan continued to decline. China responded sharply to a Japanese court decision in February 1987 accepting the Republic of China as a legal party that could sue for ownership of a Chinese student dormitory in Kyoto. On June 4, Deng Xiaoping explained to Yano Junya, Chairman of the Clean Government Party: “[because] the [dormitory] case had caused strong repercussions among the Chinese public, especially the young people, the Chinese side must handle it carefully lest the people object.” Deng went on to state: If viewed in light of history, Japan ought to do much more in order to help China’s development. Frankly speaking, among all the countries of the world, I think that Japan is the one that is most indebted to China. At the time of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization, we did not raise the demand for war reparations. . . . From the Japanese perspective that values reason, I think Japan should contribute even more to assist China’s development. The Chinese people feel resentment about this. To be honest, I have resentment in this respect.97

Summary: The Role of Public Opinion Did the public influence China’s Japan policy in the mid-1980s? The answer must be a qualified yes. Student protests influenced the balance of elite politics during a delicate period, aiding conservatives in their challenge to Hu Yaobang’s policies, undermining Hu’s conciliatory approach toward Japan, and encouraging Beijing’s shift to a more critical approach. The timing of the shift in China’s policy—after the September 18, 1985 demonstrations rather than immediately following Nakasone’s August 15 visit to the shrine—suggests that the protests played an important role in the policy process. Although official news reports provided the information that initially angered students, the 1985 protests were not initiated or openly encouraged by government officials.98 While student anger was sincere, officials’ tolerance of the

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protests reflected elite divisions. “The worsening of relations during the first half of 1987 could not be wholly divorced from inner-Party struggle,” explains Whiting. “It led to a spillover into China’s mass media, which provoked a public response which gained a life of its own; in turn exacerbating tensions at higher levels and sharpening internal divisions in Tokyo and Beijing.”99 Yinan He agrees that public pressure “significantly reshaped the balance of power between the moderate Hu Yaobang and his conservative opponents. Having staked his political career heavily on harmonious Sino-Japanese ties and even developed a personal friendship with Nakasone, Hu’s leadership in the party suffered a severe setback when the public reacted furiously to Nakasone’s shrine visit in 1985.”100 This case suggests that in periods of elite division and bilateral tensions, public opinion can become politically significant for China’s Japan policy. The 1985 protests also marked the first time in the reform era that China’s nationalist rhetoric on Japan’s wartime invasion had contributed to anti-Japan demonstrations. It would not be the last.

SEEKING STABILITY: CHINA’S JAPAN POLICY IN THE 1990S The 1990s are generally seen as an era of intensifying strategic and ideological tensions between China and Japan. Even as trade and investment continued to expand, Japan’s pursuit of a more assertive security strategy and domestic debates over history issues ran up against China’s rising economic clout, mushrooming defense budget, and anti-Japanese rhetoric in Beijing’s patriotic education campaign. Less noticed have been Chinese leaders’ repeated efforts to stabilize bilateral relations and avoid allowing popular anti-Japan animosity to constrain their diplomatic flexibility. This section first reviews China’s strategic approach toward Japan and then examines three case studies covering economic, security, and ideational issues.

A Second Honeymoon: 1989–1992 Following the violent suppression of protests at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, the combination of a Japanese leadership eager to engage China and a Chinese leadership desperate for international support led to a rapid exchange of friendly visits and diplomatic gestures. At the July 1990 Group of Seven (G-7) Summit, Japan dropped its sanctions against China, urged other G-7 states to restore ties with China as soon as possible, supported Chinese entry into international institutions, and signaled Japan’s intent to

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provide China with much-needed economic assistance. China reciprocated by not criticizing Japan’s new Self-Defense Law and signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty following Japanese urging. Deng Xiaoping gratefully informed a visiting Japanese delegation in December 1989 that Japanese activism was like “sending charcoal in snowy weather” (xuezhong songtan). “We should not only talk about the history of Japanese invasion,” intoned Deng, “but also talk about the history of the Japanese people and numerous Japanese friends struggling for Sino-Japanese friendship.”101 In April 1992, President Jiang Zemin visited Japan, seeking a reciprocal trip to China by the Japanese emperor. Jiang insisted that China had no preconditions for the emperor’s visit, reassured Japan that the recently passed Territorial Waters Law did not signal any aggressive intent by China, and reiterated China’s decision to forgo all demands for wartime reparations.102 Following Jiang’s visit, Tokyo announced an expansion of economic assistance to China.103 Relations reached a symbolic peak with the arrival of the Japanese emperor in Beijing for a historic six-day visit on October 23, 1992. During his stay, the emperor merely rehashed established statements on history, saying at the opening banquet, “In the long history of the relationship between our two countries, there was an unfortunate period in which my country inflicted great sufferings on the people of China. I deeply deplore this.” Despite this rather tepid formula, official Chinese media hailed the visit as a “milestone” in bilateral relations.104 As part of its preparations to host the emperor, the Chinese government quashed a nascent protest movement. In mid-September 1992, Beijing graduate students circulated a questionnaire on the emperor’s visit, which revealed strong support for demanding an apology from him. Students soon launched a citywide petition movement and attempted to deliver an open letter to the Japanese embassy demanding the emperor’s public apology for war crimes and war reparations.105 The claims had elicited so much support even among government officials that the Chinese government felt it necessary to circulate a red-letterhead classified document among cadres at the departmental and army levels on the eve of National Day (October 1) warning them “not to raise, encourage others to raise, or support any attempts to claim indemnity against Japan as the Japanese emperor is about to visit China.”106 In short, unlike the elite divisions and bilateral tensions that provided an opening for the 1985 anti-Japanese protests, in 1992 the Chinese leadership was united in support of engaging Japan. Their quick and decisive action prevented protests from emerging. Initially following the imperial visit, relations continued to improve. In 1993–94, Prime Ministers Hosokawa Morihiro and Murayama Tomiichi is-

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sued new statements of regret for Japan’s wartime aggression.107 In response, Chinese officials supported Japan’s participation in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia and expanded bilateral security dialogues. In June 1994, Jiang Zemin even stated that the Chinese “understand and attach importance” to Japan’s wish to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.108 Yet by the mid-1990s, tensions began to reemerge. Conservatives in Japan demonstrated a renewed interest in reaching out to Taiwan.109 A series of informal remarks by conservative Japanese cabinet officers in 1994 also provoked Beijing.110 China– Japan relations were soon shaken by a convergence of events: contention over commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995, Japan’s cancellation of part of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China in reaction to China’s 1995 nuclear tests, China’s 1996 military exercises near Taiwan, a 1996 dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, revisions in the U.S.– Japan security alliance, and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on July 29, 1996, the first prime ministerial visit since 1985. While these incidents have received considerable attention, Beijing’s strategic response has generally been overlooked.

China’s Efforts at Strategic Engagement In 1997, Chinese leaders embarked on an effort at strategic engagement with Japan, part of Beijing’s “grand strategy” of establishing partnerships to reduce fears of China, counter U.S. dominance, and bolster economic ties.111 The first step came in April 1996, when China and Russia formed a “Strategic, Cooperative Partnership of Equality and Mutual Trust,” followed by the October 1997 agreement with the United States to build toward a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” (see table 2.1). In pursuing a similar strategic relationship with Japan, Chinese leaders sought a modus vivendi on the issues of Taiwan and the wartime past that would allow the two sides to address occasional disputes without impeding functional and economic cooperation. Chinese leaders first signaled their interest in a strategic partnership with Japan by inviting Prime Minister Hashimoto to visit China in September 1997.112 Following Hashimoto’s fence-mending visit to the September 18 History Museum in Shenyang, required due to his 1996 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, Jiang Zemin refrained from emphasizing history issues, instead urging Hashimoto to view bilateral relations from a “strategic” perspective.113 In his return visit to Japan two months later, Premier Li Peng reiterated Jiang’s interest in establishing “strategic” relations while proclaiming “Five Principles” aimed at deepening bilateral cooperation.114 Li downplayed history

78 TABLE 2.1

Date

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CHINA’S PARTNERSHIPS, 1996–1999

Country

Type of Partnership1

April 1996

Russia

Strategic, Co-operative Partnership of Equality and Mutual Trust

May 1997

France

Comprehensive Partnership

October 1997

United States

Constructive Strategic Partnership2

November 1997

Canada

Comprehensive Partnership

December 1997

Mexico

Comprehensive Partnership

December 1997

ASEAN

Partnership of Good-neighborliness and Mutual Trust

December 1997

India

Partnership of Constructive Cooperation

February 1998

Pakistan

Partnership of Constructive Cooperation

April 1998

European Union

Constructive Partnership of Long-term Stability

October 1998

United Kingdom

Comprehensive Partnership

November 1998

Japan

Partnership of Friendship and Co-operation for Peace and Development

February 1999

South Africa

Constructive Partnership

April 1999

Egypt

Relationship of Strategic Co-operation

October 1999

Saudi Arabia

Relationship of Strategic Co-operation

Source: Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face”; Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] reports. 1

2

Partnership titles have been simplified. Modifiers such as “Facing the Future” and “For the Twenty-First Century” have been dropped. The two sides only agreed to build toward this goal.

issues, stating that both sides should “deal in a timely manner with whatever problems arise” to “prevent the overall development of bilateral relations from being interrupted.”115 The People’s Daily noted that Li received “a warm welcome and lavish hospitality” and “achieved a broad consensus with Hashimoto on key issues,” predicting the visit would have a far-reaching impact on the “stabilization and development” of bilateral relations. The two sides reached agreements on disputed fishing areas and economic cooperation,

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issued a joint declaration on China’s WTO accession, and pledged to institute annual summit meetings and restart high-level defense exchanges. In a sign of the maturing relationship, both China and Japan responded calmly to a potential flap over the Diaoyu Islands in May 1997.116 Chinese media also began to praise Japanese ODA to China.117 During Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian’s visit to Japan from February 3 to 8, 1998, the most substantive military exchange since 1972, Chi gently urged Japan to adopt a “reasonable attitude toward history.”118 In April 1998, Vice President Hu Jintao continued China’s light touch on history issues and the emphasis on future-oriented, strategic relations. Significantly, Hu chose Japan as the first industrial country to visit since assuming the position of vice president in March 1998. In early 1998, China also normalized relations with the Japanese Communist Party after a hiatus of thirty years and welcomed back the Sankei Shinbun, the only major Japanese daily that refused to close its office in Taiwan in exchange for opening an office in Beijing.119 China’s policy was designed to culminate in President Jiang Zemin’s scheduled September 1998 visit to Japan, timed to coincide with the twentieth anniversary of the Sino-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship (TPF). As negotiations proceeded in advance of the visit, the Chinese side stated its desire for a formal document establishing a “strategic” relationship, which would be on the level of two other foundational documents—the China– Japan Joint Statement of 1972 and the 1978 TPF.120 There was little indication in advance that China planned to use Jiang’s visit to emphasize history issues. In an August 8 preparatory meeting with Japanese diplomats at the Chinese resort of Beidaihe, Jiang Zemin himself reportedly proposed a rather tepid formula: “Japan’s invasion brought great suffering to the Chinese people. We need to develop friendly relations based on good and bad experiences.”121 If Jiang’s visit had gone according to schedule, there likely would have been limited disputes about history. However, due to widespread flooding in China, Jiang’s visit was postponed until after South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s visit to Japan. In Japan, Kim obtained a historic written apology in exchange for a pledge to no longer bring up history issues and to permit Japanese cultural products into South Korea. After Kim’s visit, Chinese negotiators demanded that “in line with the Japan–Korea joint declaration, an apology for invasion be included in the China– Japan joint declaration.”122 In exchange, China offered to highly praise Japan’s economic achievements and peaceful development in the postwar era.123 As negotiations proceeded in advance of Jiang’s visit, domestic pressure on both sides mounted.124 The South China Morning Post editorialized that “China should get an apology every bit

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as profuse as Korea’s.”125 U.S. President Bill Clinton’s June 1998 visit to China, where he stated his support for the “Three No’s” on Taiwan, also encouraged Beijing to raise the bar for Japan on the Taiwan issue.126 After hurried lastminute negotiations failed to meet Chinese demands, Jiang Zemin decided not to sign the joint statement.127 Instead, he adopted a highly critical tone on history issues during his visit. During the summit meeting, Jiang spoke for 25 minutes about history and Taiwan. In his speech at Waseda University, Jiang emphasized China’s wartime suffering: “Beginning in the 1930s, Japanese militarism launched a full-scale war of aggression against China, causing China to suffer casualties of 35 million people and property loss exceeding 600 billion US dollars. The war brought about profound national disaster to the Chinese people; it also caused much suffering to the Japanese people.”128 Media reports described Jiang as trying to “teach Japan a lesson.”129 Nicholas Kristof wrote that “Jiang’s behavior has been impolite and calculating. . . . Chinese leaders have been less interested in healing the wounds of history than in reminding everyone of their existence.”130 Peter Gries emphasized Jiang’s personal “visceral anger” and Chinese feelings of cultural superiority.131 Benjamin Self argued, “expectations for unachievable Japanese concessions on Taiwan or history remembrance might have been raised so high that Jiang had no choice but to give the Chinese public the impression that the failure was Japan’s fault.”132 These analyses, although insightful, fail to note the positive Chinese media coverage of the visit. On the day of Jiang’s arrival in Tokyo, the People’s Daily heralded it as a visit of the utmost significance for the development of friendly future relations.133 The next day the People’s Daily front page provided lengthy coverage of Prime Minister Obuchi’s apology and Jiang’s position on the history issue. The article did not indicate any dissatisfaction with the lack of a written apology. Coverage of Jiang’s speeches at Waseda University and the press conference was upbeat. One article quoted Jiang’s statement at the press conference stressing that, signed or unsigned, the document represented a solemn pledge.134 After the visit, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site stated: During his state visit to Japan in 1998, President Jiang gave a comprehensive, thorough, and systematic elaboration of China’s principles. The Japanese side recognized its aggression against China for the first time and expressed its profound introspection and apology to the Chinese people. The two sides mutually confirmed that it was an important basis for developing Sino-Japanese relations to recognize history correctly.135

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Jin Xide, a leading Japan scholar in Beijing, argues persuasively that in comparison with the status of relations in the mid-1990s, which he characterizes as the “worst situation of political friction . . . since 1972,” the 1998 visit “was the best result that could be expected . . . it was a success and had advantages for both sides.” He argues that the relationship reached “an important turning point” with “a new bilateral framework with the partnership at the core.”136 Although the resulting Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development agreement went unsigned, it took important steps forward on history issues and delineated thirty-three projects for cooperation, which the two sides quickly began to work on.137 Jiang’s visit exacerbated negative Japanese public opinion toward China, but it also led to several years of remarkably conciliatory policy toward Japan. An April 1999 visit to Japan by Zeng Qinghong, then head of the powerful CCP Organization Department and a close advisor to Jiang, signaled the renewal of Beijing’s efforts at moderation.138 Weeks later, Jiang warmly received a visiting Japanese delegation, yielding an important statement in the People’s Daily praising China– Japan cooperation.139 China also responded calmly to new Diet legislation implementing new Japan–U.S. defense guidelines in April and May 1999, and embarked on a round of “invitation diplomacy” toward Japan, hosting approximately 170 Diet members in 1999 alone.140 During Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo’s visit to China on July 8–9, 1999, Permier Zhu Rongji noted that an “important understanding had been achieved at the time of President Jiang’s visit to Japan” and acknowledged that “the majority of Japanese citizens had a correct understanding of the past, understanding and supporting the friendship between China and Japan.” The two sides reached an agreement on China’s WTO accession, signed an memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the destruction of Japanese chemical weapons in China, “confirmed the importance of early reform of the United Nations, including the Security Council,” and began implementing the 33-point action plan reached during Jiang’s 1998 visit. In early 2000, China agreed to hold talks on a mutual maritime notification regime, enabling Japan’s Foreign Ministry to release pledged ODA funds to China.141 Beijing also responded calmly to remarks by Japan’s new Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro on April 23, 2000, describing Japan as a “divine country with the emperor at its center.”142 Instead of attacking Mori, a May 20, 2000 speech by Jiang Zemin to a 5,000-member Japanese cultural delegation emphasizing the future and the countries’ “2,000 years of friendship” was widely disseminated in China and designated a guidepost for China’s Japan policy.143 In his October 2000 visit to Japan, Zhu Rongji’s “smile diplomacy” included an appearance on a

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widely televised “town meeting” in which he noted that Japanese people were also victims of Japanese imperialism and even intimated that he had been criticized in China for being soft on the apology issue. During the visit, Zhu pledged that China would better publicize Japanese ODA; signed agreements on security dialogue, defense exchanges, and mutual ship visits; and confirmed the opening of a security hotline.144 After 1998, China also expanded its nascent security dialogue program with Japan (see table 2.2). By 2001, China’s moderation appeared likely to erode, as Japan released conservative new history textbooks, hosted Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui, and instituted trade barriers on Chinese imports, and Prime Minister Koizumi made his first visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Yet as Gilbert Rozman explains, “the Chinese state worked hard to restrain public opinion in order to keep relations on an even keel centered on economic ties. They took credit for a calming effect even as bombshells kept appearing in the news from Japan.”145 The first bombshell fell on April 3, 2001, when Japan’s Ministry of Education approved a new conservative history textbook for use in schools.146 South Korea responded by recalling its ambassador to Japan, demanding thirty-five specific revisions in the texts, hinting that it might suspend the importation of Japanese cultural products, announcing the withdrawal of its support for Japan’s entry into the UN Security Council, and canceling plans for joint naval exercises with Japan.147 China’s response was far more restrained.148 Over a month after the textbook was released, a low-ranking Chinese official handed the Japanese embassy a list of eight general Chinese objections. In sharp contrast to its 1982 diatribes, the People’s Daily calmly reassured the public that “a majority of Japanese had a good understanding of history and that those trying to distort history and cause confusion were a minority.”149 Chinese moderation held despite Japan’s refusal to address Beijing’s concerns about the texts, sparking online criticism of the government as too “weak” on the issue.150 Even the contentious issues of Taiwan and Yasukuni failed to divert Beijing’s efforts. When news emerged that Japan was planning to approve a visit by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui in April 2001, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Web site initially warned that it “would fundamentally destroy SinoJapanese relations.” After the visit was approved, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi issued Beijing’s “solemn representations,” and scheduled visits to Japan by National People’s Congress (NPC) Chairman Li Peng and Liaoning Governor Bo Xilai were postponed. However, on April 22, the day of Lee’s arrival in Japan, Xinhua news coverage did not even mention the issue. The Foreign Ministry Web site soon reversed itself, noting merely that Lee’s visit

TABLE 2.2

Date

CHINA–JAPAN SECURITY DIALOGUES: 1998–2001 Activity

September 1998

General Zhang Wannian, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China’s highest military officer), visits Japan

February 1998

Minister of Defense Chi Haotian visits Japan; first visit to Japan by a Chinese defense minister since 1984

May 1998

Kyuma Fumio, head of Japan Defense Agency (JDA), pays first visit to China by a JDA chief in eleven years

Aug-Sept 1999

PLA delegation visits Japan; this leads to resumption of director-level talks between defense and foreign ministry officials.

October 1999

Japan– China Security Dialogue resumes with directorlevel talks among foreign ministry and defense officials

November 1999

Defense dialogue in Beijing, led by JDA Vice Minister Seiji Ema and Xiong Guangkai, PLA Deputy Chief of Staff

April 2000

General Fu Quanyou, Chief of General Staff of PLA, visits Japan, the first official visit by a top Chinese uniformed officer since 1986

June 2000

General Yuji Fujinawa, Chairman of Japan’s SDF Joint Staff council, visits Beijing

June 2000

Seventh Japan– China Security Dialogue in Beijing with representatives from foreign and defense ministries

October 2000

Chairman of Japan’s General Staff of Air Self-Defense Force Shoji Takegouchi visits China; confirms the opening of the China– Japan military “hotline”

November 2000

Japan– China Security Dialogue: PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Xiong Guangkai meets Defense Agency’s ViceMinister Sato Ken; they schedule first ship visit for 2001; plan visits between Defense Ministers and Vice-Minister, and exchanges between service chiefs

February–March 2001

Visit to Japan by PLA Air Force Chief of Staff Liu Shunyao

Source: Developed from news reports and Comparative Connections, various issues

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“undermined the bilateral relationship.”151 Similarly, when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi first visited the Yasukuni Shrine on August 13, 2001, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted that the prime minister had avoided August 15, “the most sensitive date,” and had both acknowledged and regretted “the historical fact of Japan’s aggression.”152 While denouncing the visit, a State Council spokesperson hinted that the media had been held in check, stating that China wanted “to see news reporting keep balance, not focusing only on that issue.” Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan later reassured the Asahi Shimbun that despite the visit, there was “no change” in China’s Japan policy.153 Following Hashimoto’s example, in October 2001, Koizumi first visited the Memorial Hall of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression in Beijing and then was welcomed by Jiang Zemin at the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Shanghai. The two sides also addressed disputes over Chinese ship incursions by creating a system of prior notification for maritime research activities and defused a looming trade war by establishing the Japan– China Economic Partnership in April 2002.154 In sum, after 1995 the Chinese government responded to rising military, economic, and diplomatic tensions with Japan by seeking a more stable footing for the relationship. This strategy hinged upon insulating bilateral relations from popular anti-Japanese animosity. As Thomas Christensen argued in 1999, “Intense anti-Japanese feelings in Chinese society . . . have not yet affected the practical, day-to-day management of Sino-Japanese relations. On the contrary, since the 1980s the Chinese government has acted to contain anti-Japanese sentiment in the society at large to avoid damaging bilateral relations and prevent protestors from using anti-Japanese sentiment as a pretext for criticizing the Chinese government.”155 Beijing’s efforts were particularly clear on three potentially inflammatory issues: the Diaoyu Islands, abandoned Japanese chemical weapons, and the drawdown in Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA).

The End of Aid: Responding to the Decline in Japanese ODA As China’s largest bilateral aid donor, Japan played a key role in China’s economic development, providing low-interest loans to build infrastructure and develop natural resources. In 1995, Japan’s limited cuts in ODA in response to China’s nuclear tests sparked sharp criticism from Beijing. Only five years later, as Japan began a rapid drawdown of ODA to China, Beijing responded with restraint. Contrasting these two responses highlights China’s determination to improve bilateral ties in the late 1990s.

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In 1992–93, China conducted a series of four nuclear tests in quick succession. Japanese diplomats, already facing sharp questions on the aid program to China, criticized each test. Following a test on June 10, 1994, Tokyo immediately notified Beijing that it would invoke the “Kuranari Doctrine,” a political commitment to use economic aid to the Asia-Pacific region to advance Japan’s strategic interests.156 After China’s May 1995 test, the Japanese government scaled back its grant aid. When China tested yet another nuclear device in mid-August 1995, just after the fiftieth anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings, the Diet immediately passed a resolution denouncing the test. Members urged a substantial reduction in ODA to China. Put on the defensive, the Foreign Ministry decided to freeze all grant aid scheduled for 1995, a loss of $75 million to China. As Mike Mochizuki explains, “the nuclear tests issue altered the political dynamics of Japanese policy toward China” as pacifist political forces formed a “tacit coalition” with right-wing nationalists in favor of a tougher China policy.157 China’s response was severe. Top leaders, diplomats, and domestic media rejected Japanese concerns, instead denouncing Japan for linking economic assistance to political motives.158 The Foreign Ministry’s official statement read, in part: We deeply regret the Japanese government’s decision to freeze most grant aid to China for the remainder of the 1995 fiscal year. . . . This year marks the 50th anniversary of the world’s victory in the anti-Fascist war and China’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. The Japanese government should engage in deep introspection of previous war crimes and conscientiously draw lessons from history. Instead, the Japanese government is attempting to create a major issue concerning China’s nuclear testing program. Therefore, one cannot help to wonder about the true political motives of their move, a move that could very possibly be detrimental to the sound development of Sino-Japanese relations.159

Premier Li Peng explicitly played the history card, warning: “Japan should never try to apply pressure on China by economic means” when “Japanese militarist aggression inflicted such gigantic damage upon China as to dwarf the Japanese government credits so far extended.”160 Yet only after China signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and suspended all nuclear tests did Japan release the grant aid. Although they resumed the aid flows, Japanese negotiators also signaled that the era of large multiyear loans was coming to an end.161

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By the late 1990s, public opinion in Japan had shifted decisively against economic assistance to China. Billions in such assistance appeared to have purchased scant diplomatic goodwill and instead seemed to be supporting China’s military expansion. Instead, from 2000 to 2004, Japanese diplomats played a classic two-level game: emphasizing domestic opposition as a tactic to exact Chinese concessions. Surprisingly, the strategy worked. Chinese leaders refrained from criticizing the drawdown, acceding to Japanese requests even as ODA was reduced and then phased out. Japan first signaled impending ODA cuts in December 1998. Sugimoto Nobuyuki, an embassy official responsible for economic affairs, offered several reasons: an overall reduction in Japan’s ODA, lack of Chinese appreciation and publicity of Japanese aid, and concerns that Japanese aid facilitated China’s military modernization.162 In May 2000, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei warned Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan of concerns that Japanese ODA indirectly supported China’s military spending. Tang defended China’s security policy, but he refrained from criticizing Kono for raising this connection. When Kono called for the Chinese government to inform its citizens of the content and effectiveness of Japan’s ODA, Tang committed to doing so.163 Several months later, Kono again used ODA as leverage. Before his August 2000 visit to Beijing, an ODA package was being held up by Diet members in protest of Chinese ships entering Japan’s exclusive economic zone. In Beijing, Kono complained about Chinese ships’ incursions, linking them to the withholding of economic aid. Chinese leaders responded by promising to restart talks on a bilateral prior notification mechanism, allowing the aid to be released.164 After Kono’s visit, a Chinese Internet translation of a Japanese newspaper reported that Tang Jiaxuan had “softened his stance [on ODA] due to pressure from the Foreign Minister [of Japan],” sparking online criticism of Tang.165 Instead of encouraging public pressure on Japan, Chinese leaders responded to Japanese demands by expanding domestic publicity on ODA. On October 8, 2000, China held its first formal ceremony of appreciation, commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the start of Japan’s economic assistance to China. Chinese officials began to thank Japanese visitors more frequently for this assistance in 2000, noted Funabashi Yoichi, a prominent Asahi Shinbun editor. China’s Foreign Ministry also expanded the information on Japan’s ODA on its Web site.166 During his October 2000 visit, Zhu Rongji acknowledged the need for greater publicity of Japanese ODA and repeatedly expressed his appreciation for Japan’s support.167

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Despite China’s belated efforts at accommodation, ODA levels began to drop rapidly. Over the next three years, Japanese yen loans to China were cut over 20 percent annually, a drop far in excess of the overall decline in Japanese ODA.168 By 2003, the total value of yen loans was less than half the value in 2000. On March 17, 2005, the LDP’s Foreign Affairs Panel approved a plan to reduce yen loans by 11 percent and announced plans to end all yen loans to China by 2008.169 Meanwhile, Japan’s assistance to Vietnam and India steadily increased. In 2005, for instance, Japanese yen loans to India increased by 7.6 percent to 134 billion yen, making India the second largest recipient of Japanese yen loans for the second year in a row.170 Given that both Vietnam and India also have rapidly growing economies and expanding military budgets, and that India recently became a nuclear power, Chinese leaders could have used these trends to criticize Japan’s ODA cuts, but did not. Clearly, Chinese officials were unhappy with some of the justifications for reducing aid. In October 2003, Chinese Ambassador Wu Dawei urged Japanese Finance Minister Tanigaki Sadakuza to continue ODA to China, despite the criticism of the program after China’s successful manned spaceship launch. The following November, Wu Dawei explained, “if there is still a need to provide loans to China, we will go with the flow.”171 Yet as it became clear that ODA was coming to an end, Beijing responded gracefully. In March 2005, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that China only hoped the aid program would “start well and end well.”172 Instead of denouncing Japan, Beijing portrayed the end of ODA as a sign of success. Li Zhaoxing responded to journalists’ questions in November 2004 by claiming: “the Chinese people only need to rely on their own intelligence, power, unity, and determination to build a developed country.”173 China also responded favorably to the Japanese effort to shift the focus of ODA. In 2004 the two sides agreed to designate Dalian, Chungqing, and Shenyang as “model cities” for joint environmental projects.174 In sum, China’s response to the rapid decline of Japanese ODA from 2000 to 2004 differed sharply from its response to the far more moderate cut of 1995. Even as Japanese officials sought to use aid to criticize China’s military policy, Chinese officials refrained from “playing the history card” to blunt Japanese criticism or demand continued aid, as they had done a decade earlier. Instead of encouraging public criticism of Japan as a diplomatic lever, Chinese leaders apparently realized that the time had come to move on. Beijing’s response to another issue “left over from history,” the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, reflects a similarly restrained approach.

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Cooling Popular Anger: The Diaoyu Islands The Diaoyu (or Senkaku) Islands are a clump of five islets and three barren rocks 200 miles off the Chinese coast, northeast of Taiwan. China, Japan, and Taiwan all claim the islands based on history and geography.175 Japan first took control in 1895 as part of its war with China, and was the first country to actually occupy the chain, operating a fishing cannery there in the early twentieth century. After Japan’s World War II defeat, the islands were placed under U.S. administration. They were returned to Japan based on a 1971 Japan–U.S. agreement, along with Okinawa. China instead claims that the islands are attached to Taiwan and so are part of the PRC’s territory. China acknowledges that Japan gained control of Taiwan from the Qing dynasty in the Shimonoseki Treaty that ended the Sino-Japanese War and took effect in May 1895, but argues that Japan lost control over Taiwan (and the Diaoyu Islands) when it accepted the 1945 Potsdam Declaration. Japan claims that the areas that were abandoned do not include the Senkaku Islands.176 China argues that the islands rest on the East China Sea continental shelf and so by principle of “natural prolongation” belong to China,177 while Japan argues that the continental shelf should be divided along a median line between the two countries.178 Taiwan also asserts ownership of the islands. While officially remaining neutral on the sovereignty of the islands, the United States maintains that they are covered by the U.S.– Japan Security Treaty, which in effect obligates the United States to defend them in event of an attack.179 Neither the PRC nor Taiwan showed much interest in addressing the question of the islands’ sovereignty until 1969, when a report was released announcing that the seabed around them might contain one of the largest oil and gas deposits in the world, possibly 10 to 100 billion barrels of oil.180 Even in 1972, China did not prioritize the issue. At the state banquet commemorating diplomatic normalization with Japan, Premier Zhou Enlai stated: “There is no need to mention the Diaoyu Islands. It does not count as a problem of any sort compared to recovering normal diplomatic relations.”181 Yet when a group of antitreaty Japanese parliamentarians proposed that the disputed islands be included in the 1978 negotiations over the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, China dispatched some 100 fishing boats to the region. According to Tretiak, “there is little doubt that the vessels were under formal PLA naval command or that they embarked with Politburo approval.”182 In response, Japan quickly agreed to separate the territorial dispute from the treaty negotiations, enabling the talks to go forward.183 When Deng Xiaoping visited Tokyo in October 1978, he confidently informed Japanese

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journalists that the territorial dispute would “be handled better by the next generation.”184 Since 1978, China’s stance has remained consistent: the two sides hold different positions on the sovereignty of the islands, which should be “set aside” as they pursue joint development of natural resources in the area. Japan’s position instead is that there is “no dispute,” since Japan enjoys both legal sovereignty and effective control over the islands. In practice, Chinese leaders have been satisfied to declare China’s sovereignty over the islands and criticize Japanese efforts to realize or demonstrate sovereignty claims, while not actually taking steps to challenge Japan’s de facto control, a policy praised by a leading PLA scholar in 2006 as “pragmatic.”185 As one expert in Beijing told me, “Diaoyu is not a real problem in China– Japan relations; it basically can be ignored. It does not,” he clarified, “touch upon China’s core national security interests.”186 China’s willingness to downplay its sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu Islands rather than risk damaging relations with Japan was evident in a 1996 crisis. The dispute emerged in July 1996, when a group of Japanese nationalist activists traveled to the islands to renovate a lighthouse they had constructed in 1978 and then demanded that the lighthouse be recognized by the Japanese government. Chinese nationalism was further galvanized on August 28, when Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda asserted during his visit to Hong Kong that the “Senkakus have always been Japan’s territory. Japan effectively governs the islands, so the territorial issue does not exist.”187 In response, on September 2, a baodiao (Protect the Diaoyu) “Action Committee” was established in Hong Kong and immediately began plans to land on the islands. On September 12, a Chinese baodiao association was formed in New York. Three days later, 20,000 people protested over the islands in Hong Kong’s Victoria Park, with several thousand overseas Chinese holding a simultaneous demonstration in Toronto. On September 18, 6,000 people protested in Hong Kong, with large sympathy protests held by Chinese communities in Vancouver, San Francisco, and New York.188 On September 9, 700 Hong Kong scholars, including the presidents of eight colleges, signed a newspaper advertisement defending China’s sovereignty over the islands. The next day, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a strong statement on the islands, and Vice Premier Li Gangqing announced he was delaying his scheduled trip to Japan over the dispute.189 On September 22, 18 activists from Taiwan and Hong Kong, accompanied by 42 reporters, boarded a vessel toward the islands. They were prevented from landing by Japanese Coast Guard ships. One of the Hong Kong activists

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then leaped out of his ship in an attempt to swim to the islands and drowned. His death further galvanized protests. On October 6, over 200 activists from Hong Kong, Australia, and Taiwan (including one Taiwan legislator) boarded another boat for the islands, supported by another mass protest in Hong Kong. In a dramatic move, all activists aboard the boats announced they had prepared their wills in advance. The following day, the lead boat managed to evade the Japanese Coast Guard, landing on the main island of the Diaoyu chain. Together a Hong Kong activist and Taiwanese legislator raised two flags: a yellow flag embossed with the slogan The Diayou Islands are Chinese (zhongguo) sovereign territory and the PRC flag—the first time the PRC flag had ever been placed on the islands.190 Chinese leaders, preparing to resume sovereignty over Hong Kong the following year, responded to the protests with a mixed approach. They strongly defended China’s sovereignty claims and criticized Japan, but also took a number of steps to avoid having the Hong Kong protests spill over onto the mainland. Tong Zeng, the mainland convenor of the Chinese Civilian Union for Defending the Diaoyutai Islands, was “asked” to leave Beijing ostensibly for work-related reasons but amid accusations of “sabotaging Sino-Japanese relations and interfering with Chinese foreign policy.”191 Members of the NPC were prevented from issuing a protest letter to Japan.192 The Chinese media barely covered the issue—the authoritative People’s Daily did not even mention the dispute until after the situation had subsided. For instance, the September 18 People’s Daily commentary on the anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria complained about rising Japanese nationalism and the usual issues such as Japanese textbooks, high-profile visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and denial of the Nanjing Massacre—but did not even mention the Diaoyu Islands.193 Once Japan began to rein in its activists and work to cool tensions, Beijing responded with diplomatic restraint, keeping the issue out of China’s official media and continuing to deter domestic activists. As Downs and Suanders conclude: The Chinese government proved willing to incur significant damage to its nationalist credentials by following restrained policies and cooperating with the Japanese government to prevent the territorial disputes from harming bilateral relations. When forced to choose, Chinese leaders pursued economic development at the expense of nationalist goals.194

Following the 1996 dispute, Beijing took “every measure possible to forestall further incidents from breaking out over the disputed rocks.”195 The

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island dispute was carefully set aside in the fisheries agreement reached between China and Japan on November 11, 1997, and again in the February 13, 2001 agreement on mutual prior notification of maritime research activities. China’s policy of restraint is not without costs, abroad and at home. The perceived failure to defend China’s claims to the Diaoyu Islands has generated popular criticism of the leadership as weak, particularly during the 1996 dispute. Furthermore, the longer China refrains from directly challenging Japan’s “effective control,” the more consolidated and internationally recognized Japan’s title to the islands is likely to become through the legal principle of “acquisitive prescription.”196 Despite these costs, Chinese leaders sought to restrain popular protests over the Diaoyu Islands in order to avoid having public anger undermine broader strategic and economic interests vis-à-vis Japan. This approach is mirrored by Beijing’s response to Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons (ACW).

Japan’s Poisonous Legacy: Abandoned Chemical Weapons During their invasion of China, Japanese armies engaged in research on chemical warfare on human subjects and implemented an estimated 2,000 chemical attacks around China. As the war ended, Japanese units disposed of vast amounts of chemical weapons and agents by such crude methods as burial, dumping them in rivers, or mixing them in with ordinary weapons. The bulk of the known weapons were later buried in Jilin province by Chinese forces. Chinese estimates are a total of 2 million weapons still in China, while Japan’s official estimates are 700,000 weapons.197 Up to 90 percent of all known ACW in China are in Dunhua, a township-level city in northeast Jilin province. The administrative area under Dunhua city includes an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 ACW shells, spread out over 10 villages near Dunhua, covering some 1,600 square meters. From 1945 to 1993, a total of 747 local residents were injured by ACW (see table 2.3). The Dunhua city government issued statements on the ACW situation in 1980, 1994, and 1995 to the central government. However, the national government has never provided compensation for individual victims or to the city of Dunhua, and never discussed the particular case of Dunhua with Japanese officials before 1990.198 China began to raise the ACW issue with Japan in 1990, following the onset of negotiations in the United Nations’ Conference of Disarmament (CD) on establishing a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CD established a working group on the issue of ACW in 1980; however, it was ten years before the Chinese government sent its first diplomatic “note” (zhaohui)

TABLE 2.3

CHINESE INJURIES DUE TO EXPOSED ACW, 1950–2003

Year

Province

Description of Incident

1950

Heilongjiang

A schoolteacher unearthed an ACW canister, suffering lifelong injuries.

1953

Heilongjiang

70 manual laborers were injured when transporting ACW purchased as scrap metal.

1959

Shanxi

80 people injured as construction workers struck buried chemical munitions.

1970

Heilongjiang

Five farmers injured when they tried to defuse chemical munitions.

1974

Jilin

A worker on a boat injured by ACW wedged in a pump. He was permanently incapacitated.

1974

Heilongjiang

Three people overturned chemical weapons in a river; one died in July 1991; two others suffered long-term damage.

1982

Heilongjiang

Sewage construction workers unearthed ACW. Five were splashed with toxic liquid containing mustard agent; at least two were left visually impaired.

1987

Heilongjiong

Over 200 people were injured when workers at a construction supply facility tried to set fire to a barrel of liquid mustard in an attempt to identify it by testing its physical properties. Three workers eventually died from their injuries.1

1991

Hebei

Over 50 phosgene mortar rounds were discovered on the grounds of a junior high school; 90 people sought medical assistance. School officials reported economic losses of 319,000 RMB (US $ 38,500), for labor fees and subsidies to victims.2

1995

Hebei

Two people killed; one person seriously injured from an explosion of a poison gas bomb.3

1996

Heilongjiang

One farmer killed; another seriously injured after they unearthed barrels of toxic chemicals.4

2001

Heilongjiang

One person killed; three seriously injured from the explosion of an ACW bomb unearthed by construction workers.5

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TABLE 2.3 (continued)

2003

Heilongjiang

One person killed; 37 people hospitalized when mustard gas released from ACW exposed during a construction project.

Source: If not cited, from: Evans, “Destruction of Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China” 1 2

3 4

5

“Victims of Japan’s Chemical Weapons Say ‘We Long to Live in Safety,’” Xinhua (August 13, 2003). Dong Zhiyong, “Hebei qinhua rijun weiqi dudan wajue chuli xianchang caifang ji [The record of a visit to the excavation and disposal site for the Japanese invaders’ abandoned toxic shells in Hebei],” Xinhua Net, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-09-12/23581731943.shtml (accessed April 20, 2005). Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, 95. David Fang, “Japanese Veterans to Help Find Weapons,” South China Morning Post (November 6, 2003):8. “Second World War Bomb Explodes in China, One Dead,” Xinhua News Report (August 30, 2001).

to the Japanese government on the subject. The note described the situation in Dunhua and demanded that the Japanese government take responsibility for the weapons. Japan responded by sending the first team of researchers to Dunhua to investigate the shells the next year.199 Even though Japan did not send another exploratory team for four years, Chinese leaders did not raise the ACW issue in bilateral meetings. Instead, negotiations focused primarily on the CWC in Geneva, where it soon became clear that if the treaty was to include abandoned chemical weapons, China was the state party with the greatest number of ACW on its soil. After prodding by other delegations, the Chinese government finally released its first official statement on the ACW in China in 1992. Preliminary statistics reveal that direct victims alone have numbered more than 2,000. Furthermore, the danger posed by such abandoned chemical weapons to the natural environment and to the safety of human beings is increasing. For example, the lives of more than 2,000 students and teachers of Gaocheng High School (Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province) are now threatened by such abandoned chemical weapons discovered on their campus. . . . In another instance, large amounts of chemical weapons were discovered in the Dunhua region of Jilin Province. . . . Most of the weapons, manufactured years ago, are now in a badly rusted and eroded state. Any significant leakage will undoubtedly endanger the lives of the local population and have disastrous consequences for their property and the environment. Such instances have been a source of bitter grievance and serious concern for the Chinese people.200

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Four years later, as Beijing prepared to ratify the CWC, Chinese leaders finally began to press Japan directly on the ACW issue. In March 1996, Premier Li Peng told Prime Minister Hashimoto, “This [ACW] problem has existed for over half a century. The Chinese people wish that Japan will take a responsible attitude toward history, and take on the responsibility for the task of dealing with the ACW in China, and quickly resolve this problem.”201 In December 1996, the two sides began director-level talks over the issue; they established a joint working group the following year. 202 During Jiang Zemin’s November 1998 visit, Japan issued its first bilateral commitment to remove the ACW: “Japan reiterated that it will treat sincerely with the chemical weapons it has left in China, take up responsibilities and take concrete measures as soon as possible to destroy these abandoned chemical weapons.”203 On July 30, 1999, the two sides signed an MOU in which Japan undertook responsibility for the cleanup and destruction of ACW in China, as part of its obligations under the CWC.204 Japan assumed all financial and technical, expert, equipment, and facilities costs associated with the destruction of the weapons, which would be carried out in China. China agreed to support Japan’s destruction work, aided by experts from both sides. Japan pledged to complete the work by the deadline set by the CWC, the end of 2007.205 Both sides set up special offices to manage the process, reached working agreements, and began the arduous process.206 The cleanup and destruction process proved far more complicated, expensive, and time consuming than either side had anticipated. By 2003, they had only begun the initial steps of collection and storage at sixteen of the twenty known sites. At the three biggest sites, they had not even begun a process of identification.207 One reason for the slow pace was that the investigation yielded repeated discoveries of new weapons deposits.208 The weapons are also widely dispersed, the locations are often unknown, and the weapons have been ignored for sixty years (and so have moved or corroded) and employ dated technology. Many still have detonators attached. Most of these problems are specific to the China situation, so Japan cannot draw on other countries’ expertise.209 In retrospect, the time line set out in the 1999 MOU was overly ambitious. In 2006, Japan and China requested that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons extend the deadline for completing the destruction of ACW in China to spring 2012. Throughout this period, the Chinese government restrained public involvement in the ACW issue while expressing ambivalence toward the compensation lawsuits filed by Chinese ACW victims in Japanese courts. The first lawsuit was brought in 1996 by 13 plaintiffs seeking compensation of nearly

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200 million yen for illnesses, and the second in 1997 by five plaintiffs seeking a total of 80 million yen. The lawsuits originated in a trip by Japanese lawyers to China in May 1996, when they met Chinese people suffering from the accidental discovery of abandoned chemical weapons. Since then, Chinese lawyers, academics, and private individuals have worked closely with Japanese lawyers in pursuing these cases. The Chinese government has been reluctant to offer any support. In 2003, Harbin city officials even refused local residents who were plaintiffs in an ACW case the right to travel to Japan.210 The Chinese government also took no steps to seek compensation from Japan on behalf of Chinese individuals injured by ACW since 1949, even after the ACW became the subject of bilateral negotiations in the 1990s. Instead, Beijing’s official position on the compensation lawsuits is simply that “the Chinese government, proceeding from protecting the legitimate rights and interests of its people, requests that the Japanese side should take them into serious consideration and handle them properly.”211 From 1999 to 2003 the ACW issue was presented in China as a model of bilateral cooperation. In advance of the thirty-year anniversary of diplomatic normalization in 2002, Chinese media reports praised Japanese ACW cleanup efforts as strengthening bilateral relations.212 A September 2002 Xinhua report noted, “both sides hailed the [ACW] joint efforts as ‘very significant’ to future relations, especially as the countries celebrate 30 years of diplomatic ties later this year.”213 On October 15, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson again praised the cooperation between Japan and China in recently retrieving weapons in Heilongjiang province. Chinese leaders did raise the ACW issue in meeting with Japanese counterparts, but it was usually framed as an area of compromise. For instance, ACW was listed last on a six-point cooperation agreement reached by Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan in Beijing on September 9, 2002: “The Chinese side hopes that the Japanese side will further speed up the disposal of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan and bring it into the phase of physical destruction as soon as possible. The Japanese side promised to speed up the relevant process.”214 A special appendix in China’s 2002 Defense White Paper also adopted a moderate tone on the ACW issue, noting that China and Japan had conducted seventeen joint cleanup and investigation operations since February 2000.215 The Foreign Ministry’s Web site provides a similarly positive spin. After describing the scope of the problem, the site reads: Encouraged by the Chinese side, the Japanese side conducted 15 field inspections on its leftover chemical weapons. Through a number of negotiations and

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joint investigations, Japan recognized the fact that it discarded a large amount of chemical weapons and was fully aware of the seriousness and urgency of the issue. Japan keenly regretted for the damages which the Chinese people have so far suffered. On July 30, 1999, the two governments signed the “Memorandum on the Destruction of Japanese Discarded Chemical Weapons in China between the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Japan.” The Japanese side is committed to solving the issue in accordance with the principles and spirit of Sino-Japanese Joint Statement and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the relative provisions of the CWC and MOU.216

Chinese diplomats and top leaders declined to criticize Japan even when the accidental exposure of ACW in China led to injuries and deaths of Chinese citizens. For instance, when an ACW explosion in Harbin on August 28, 2001, left one person dead and another three severely injured, Chinese news coverage of the incident was limited to a short, factual account by Xinhua.217 China’s Foreign Ministry did not issue an official statement, and Chinese leaders failed to raise the issue with their Japanese counterparts. When Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao met Morihiro Hosokawa, a former Japanese prime minister, a few days after the incident, Hu did not raise the ACW issue, emphasizing instead a future-oriented approach to China– Japan relations based on maintaining friendship in the new century.218 In sum, before 2003, Chinese officials did not strongly criticize Japan on the ACW issue or publicize it in state-controlled domestic media. The Chinese government had never insisted on compensation or apologies for individual victims. Indeed, up until August 2003 the ACW cleanup and destruction process seemed to be one of the few bright spots in the increasingly contentious China– Japan relationship.

CONCLUSION China’s relations with Japan during the 1980s and 1990s reflect both sides of the argument developed in this book. Public opinion can, under certain circumstances, influence the foreign policy of nondemocratic governments such as China. In the early 1980s, China’s relations with Japan were characterized by bilateral tension over issues such as Japan’s domestic presentation of the wartime past, Japan’s shifting security stance, and a mounting trade imbalance. Top leaders disagreed about how best to respond. Seeking greater Japanese aid and investment, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang were willing to

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downplay such issues; conservatives raised strong economic, security, and ideological concerns. Amid these divisions, public pressure helped swing the balance of power toward a more critical approach in China’s Japan policy. Yet popular nationalism in China was hardly out of control. In the 1990s, Chinese leaders demonstrated their determination and capacity to pursue a policy of diplomatic engagement with Japan, first in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, and then again following a round of contention with Japan and the United States in the mid-1990s. In the late 1990s, Chinese leaders repeatedly sought to keep anti-Japanese sentiments from constraining their diplomacy. This approach was particularly clear in Beijing’s restrained response to the decline in Japanese aid after 2000 and in the cleanup of Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, as well as the limits on protests over the Diaoyu Islands. In each case, Chinese leaders offered rhetorical gestures to appease public demands but resisted pressure to alter their overall strategic approach. These efforts at moderation were undermined by Beijing’s legacy of using historical disputes for diplomatic leverage and domestic legitimacy. The contradictions between these two approaches exacerbated popular animosity toward Japan, contributing to the swelling tide of anti-Japanese sentiments by 2001, just as the new Chinese leadership was struggling to sustain its strategic engagement with Japan. Instead of trying to explain or justify this contradiction to the public, Chinese leaders simply ignored it. It was as if they believed that they could continue the approach of the Mao and Zhou era: telling the Chinese public one thing while foreign policy moved in the opposite direction. This was a mistake. The seeds of public animosity toward Japan, planted and nurtured by decades of state propaganda, began to sprout en masse by 2002. We turn, in the next chapter, to examine the sources of this wave of public mobilization.

3 THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC MOBILIZATION As a Chinese person, when I see the history written there, the people they respect and the spirits they promote, I cannot be “calm and reasonable.” It just makes a person excited and furious. If we could do some objective introductions of the Yasukuni Shrine for the average Chinese person, I believe they too would feel furious. — FE NG J I N H UA, CITE D BY LI U N I NG

n August 13, 2001, Feng Jinhua was just another Chinese citizen living and working in Japan. Early that morning, Koizumi Junichiro, the newly elected Prime Minister of Japan, fulfilled a long-standing campaign promise by making his first visit as Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine dedicated to the souls who died in Japan’s wars, including Tōjō Hideki and thirteen other Class A war criminals. Infuriated by Koizumi’s action, the next day Feng Jinhua snuck onto the shrine grounds in downtown Tokyo, where he spray painted “Gaisi” (Go to Hell) in bright red characters on the shrine wall.1 Immediately arrested for defaming public property, Feng used his court hearing in Tokyo to defiantly declare “the Chinese people’s right to resist.” Quickly convicted and deported, Feng soon found himself lionized back home as “China’s backbone.”2 He was selected as “Person of the Year” by readers of the influential newspaper Southern Weekend and by visitors to the Sina.com Web site.3 Upon his return to China, Feng Jinhua was promptly invited by Lu Yunfei to join his newly founded Alliance of Patriots Web site. On July 19, 2003, the pair instigated an online petition campaign opposing Japanese companies’ involvement in building a high-speed rail line in China. The campaign netted

O

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over 80,000 signatures in only 10 days, signaling the potential for further action. The following month, the site embarked on another online petition campaign, this time in protest of the “Qiqihair incident,” the accidental unearthing of abandoned Japanese chemical weapons in northeast China that left one person dead and 37 severely injured. This campaign collected over one million signatures in a month, an effort supported by 12,518 Web sites.4 Over the next few months, public anger toward Japan continued to swell. Online reports of a sex orgy by Japanese businessmen in southern China on September 18, 2003, a sensitive wartime anniversary, further inflamed popular sentiments. Riots soon broke out in Xi’an in response to a licentious skit by Japanese university students and again after a China– Japan soccer match in Beijing. Even Japanese car advertisements and video games sparked online protests. A consumer boycott of Japanese goods began to spread across China, and strikes erupted in Japanese-owned factories in Shenzhen and Dalian. The wave of activism peaked in spring 2005 when some 40 million people signed online petitions opposing Japan’s becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, followed by widespread street demonstrations involving thousands of people in Beijing, Shanghai, and elsewhere.5 What caused this wave of public mobilization? Was it instigated and driven forward by the state or primarily by elements outside of the state? This is an important question, for only if we identify public mobilization as arising at least partly from factors outside the state can we assess it as a potential influence on policy decisions and discourse. Following the framework developed earlier, this chapter examines the state’s role in shaping trends in activism, popular media, and public opinion—the three elements in a wave of public mobilization. I find that the Chinese government’s strategy of “using the past to serve the present”—manipulating memories and images of the traumatic wartime past to bolster popular support for a discredited regime—was primarily a pragmatic effort aimed at state strengthening. Over time, official propaganda created a built-up reservoir of anger at and distrust of Japan. When the government opened the floodgates by tolerating incidents of anti-Japanese activism and sensationalist media coverage, this pressure finally burst forth in the wave of public mobilization. Individual activists seized the opportunity proffered by official rhetoric and tolerance. They constructed networks of support among like-minded individuals, cultivated ties with individual officials, and achieved public notoriety through innovative protest techniques. Popular newspapers, seeking an expanded share in a crowded media market, eagerly covered protest events, online debates, and provocative incidents in a

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sensationalist tone. These stories, spread via the rapidly expanding Chinese Internet, focused public attention on Japan and intensified popular anger. The timing and content of shifts in public opinion toward Japan, as measured through survey research, reflect the influence of elements beyond the state. The public responded primarily to unexpected incidents and to issues emphasized by activists and the commercial press, rather than to the content of official propaganda. Activism, popular media, and public opinion fed each other, driving the wave onward until finally, top leaders intervened to bring it to an end. These findings reveal the complex interactions between state and society in shaping popular nationalism in China. While some scholars have emphasized the top-down influence of official propaganda, others have insisted that popular nationalism is driven primarily through a bottom-up process dominated by nonstate actors.6 The case of China’s relations with Japan suggests that while the state plays a critical role in shaping public sentiments and in tolerating instances of popular activism and sensational media content, the direct drivers tend to be purposeful, dedicated individuals operating either beyond or on the edges of the state. Unexpected events outside the state’s direct control are more likely to stimulate public emotion and inspire activism than official propaganda. Public emotion, commercial media content, and activism tend to exacerbate one another. The state’s role is thus a necessary but not sufficient factor in explaining the origins and spread of a wave of popular mobilization. I begin this chapter by examining the origins and content of the official patriotic education campaign, emphasizing both its pragmatic, statestrengthening objectives and the implications for popular animosity toward Japan. The second section identifies three types of activism: efforts that strengthened official propaganda, activism that went beyond the state’s pragmatic objectives, and protests that directly challenged official rhetoric. The third section distinguishes between Party and commercial media in China and compares their roles in stimulating and spreading the wave of popular mobilization. Finally, I assess the influence of official propaganda on trends in public opinion toward Japan. In each section, I draw on a diverse array of sources: interviews with Chinese officials, experts, and activists; official government documents; activists’ Web sites; Chinese academic writings; quantitative and qualitative studies of media content; and a variety of surveys on public opinion toward Japan. Wherever possible, I augment interview data with published sources. Combining information from state, nonstate, and semistate actors, and from both Chinese and overseas sources, bolsters the

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reliability of the findings. We begin by reviewing the origins and implications of China’s patriotic education campaign.

CHINA’S NEW HISTORY LESSONS In the mid-1980s, rising diplomatic tensions with Japan coincided with domestic efforts to promote “patriotism” (aiguozhuyi) as an alternative to the divisive class struggles of the Maoist era. Images of Chinese wartime suffering at the hands of Japanese aggression appeared in new history museums, textbooks, public memorials, state-sponsored movies and television dramas, and public commemoration events. The Memorial Hall for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre was established in 1984, followed by the Memorial Hall of the People’s War of Resistance Against Japan in 1987 in Beijing and the September 18 History Museum in Shenyang in 1992. New movies on the Nanjing Massacre were released in 1982, 1987, and 1995. After the suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the campaign intensified. In 1990, the State Education Commission instructed primary and secondary schools to use history learning to make students “remember historical lessons, and not to forget imperialist invasion and Chinese people’s heroic resistance.”7 The August 1994 “Outline of Implementing Patriotic Education” declared: “It is the sacred duty of the press and publishing, radio, film, and television departments of all levels to use advanced media technology to conduct patriotic education to the masses.”8 The patriotic education campaign peaked in 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, with an onslaught of propaganda on Japanese wartime atrocities.9 The patriotic education campaign was not designed to promote antiJapanese sentiments. Rather, it was envisioned as a tool for enhancing popular support for the Party and its goals of economic development, national unity, and state strengthening. It emerged early in the reform era, picking up pace after 1989 in response to fears of China’s disintegration like the USSR.10 Reminding the public of past humiliation at the hands of foreign invaders was primarily a motivational device, a classic example of how the Chinese government has repeatedly manipulated presentations of the past to strengthen the nation-state.11 As one high school history textbook reminds students: The past, if not forgotten, is the guide to the future. This is the function of history as lessons and warnings for the future. During the war of aggression by Japanese imperialism, the Japanese invading army committed unspeakable

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crimes against the Chinese people, and caused profound calamity and pain to the Chinese people. Chinese as well as Japanese should remember this period of criminal history by the invading Japanese troops. This has present significance.12

The “present significance” of the wartime past is, for the Communist Party, a simple lesson: Japan was able to invade China because China was weak and divided. The only way to avoid a recurrence of such suffering is by ensuring national unity and building China’s national strength through economic development. The CCP alone is capable of securing these goals; the populace should therefore trust in the Party’s leadership. This narrative links Chinese intellectuals’ enduring dream for a strong China (qiangguomeng) with the 1990s-era “new authoritarianism” argument that only the Communist Party is capable of holding China together to achieve the economic development essential for national security.13 As a plaque at the Memorial Hall for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre states: “The government was in disorder and our nation was weak. How could we have been safe?” A prominent statement at the September 18 History Museum in Shenyang similarly declares: “China must increase its national strength to avoid the backwardness that leads to bullying and humiliation.”14 The wartime past was also reframed as a common struggle for the “rejuvenation of China” (zhenxing zhonghua), the first of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Cardinal Principles, in an effort to reach out to the Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist Party) on Taiwan.15 Indeed, Chinese President Hu Jintao poignantly urged KMT Chairman Lien Chan to join him in a joint struggle to “rejuvenate China” in their historic meeting in Beijing on April 29, 2005.16 In the mid-1990s, President Jiang Zemin also used the campaign to assuage conservatives’ concerns about the erosion of China’s socialist ideology. “Patriotism and socialism” Jiang insisted, “are essentially the same.”17 In addition to shoring up support for China’s economic modernization drive, facilitating reconciliation with the KMT on Taiwan, and easing ideologues’ anxiety, the campaign helped redirect public frustration away from the Communist Party. As Yinan He notes, “by placing the lion’s share of the blame for China’s past suffering, longstanding backwardness and current socioeconomic difficulties on Japan, the new narrative evaded many sensitive issues that might hurt national self-respect or the party’s prestige.”18 In order to meet these diverse goals, the patriotic education campaign had to induce strong emotional reactions among the public. Only when the horrors of the Japanese invasion were painfully clear would Chinese citizens recognize the imperative of continuing to follow the CCP’s leadership. Finally

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freed up to fully publicize Japanese wartime atrocities, Party propagandists did not hold back. War movies graphically depicted Japanese acts of brutality. Textbooks provided comprehensive coverage of Japanese war crimes, with figures of fatalities, gruesome pictures, and even names of villages and individuals that had fallen victim to the aggression.19 A teachers’ guide accompanying new textbooks explained: During the war of aggression against China, invading Japanese troops committed innumerable crimes such as murder, arson, looting, and rape. One is the Nanjing Massacre. The Nanjing Massacre is among the most brutal crimes committed in China by the invading Japanese troops. . . . Another is Japan’s Unit 731. Unit 731 is the bacteriological (warfare) unit of the Japanese army. In a ruthless manner, it conducted vivisection and bacteriological experiments on Chinese alive, manufactured biological weapons, and brutally harmed numerous Chinese. These three cases are but a window into the atrocities of invading Japanese troops. They are not only war crimes; judged by their unspeakable criminal means, they are bestial crimes against humanity.20

My interviews with university history instructors in 2001 suggest that these instructions fell on welcome ears. “We can’t really use a normal perspective to analyze Japan,” one professor explained, “as it is an impossible-to-understand country.” Another criticized China’s economic engagement with Japan by drawing a parallel with England’s appeasement policy of Nazi Germany. 21 To help spread such messages, history museums hosted student visits, conducted field studies with local students, held public events on key anniversaries, created publicity materials, and donated books to nearby schools. The Memorial Hall of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression outside of Beijing even held a “summer school” for students that incorporated simulated battles with “Japanese devils” (riben guize).22 The museums also served broader policy objectives. Immediately after the military suppression at Tiananmen, the Beijing museum undertook extensive “patriotic education” activities, hosting a special exhibition on the outbreak of the Manchurian Crisis, followed the next year by a conference on “Deepening Patriotic Education” to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the outbreak of the Opium Wars.23 A number of scholars attribute the rise of antiforeign sentiments to official propaganda. Suisheng Zhao, among others, argues that the state’s patriotic education campaign was “directly responsible for the nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese people in the mid-1990s.”24 Zheng Wang agrees, suggesting that official propaganda has created a “generation of patriotic education” among

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Chinese youth.25 Certainly, the state’s campaign played a critical role. After decades of suppression of efforts to openly commemorate Chinese suffering in the war, the rise in patriotic, anti-Japanese propaganda created a supportive environment for the subsequent wave of public mobilization. It fostered a broad base of distrust and animosity toward Japan among the public and government officials and created supportive institutions such as history museums. The state’s propaganda impeded the consideration of more moderate or nuanced perspectives toward Japan and the wartime past, including more critical investigations into the CCP’s actual role in the war. Perhaps most importantly, official propaganda implicated the CCP’s legitimacy in a nationalist discourse from which it would find it difficult to extricate itself when public emotions swelled beyond the government’s pragmatic state-strengthening objectives.

CHINA’S HISTORY ACTIVISM Unlike countless other propaganda efforts in the reform era, the patriotic education campaign quickly attracted a groundswell of popular participation by Chinese academics, activists, and private individuals dedicated to documenting and publicizing the suffering of Chinese individuals and local communities during the war, pursuing compensation and recognition for individual victims of Japanese wartime atrocities, and challenging conservative historical revisionists in Japan. China’s “history activists” employed many of the techniques familiar to students of contentious politics: innovations in protest techniques, stimulating popular emotions, creating focusing events, building networks of collaboration, and mobilizing the public through the media. As social movement theory expects, social networks and supporting institutions played a key role in the emergence of these activists.26 Just as local Catholic churches supported the human rights movement in Latin America in the 1980s and some mosques and religious schools today play an incubating role for radical Islam, so too did the state’s official history museums and research institutes at universities provide material support and serve as the center of an expanding web linking history activists around China and their supporters overseas. Instead of directly opposing the Chinese government, activists adroitly engage with elements of the state in ways that shape the actions of the state itself. The results reflect Joel Midgal’s description of the “state in society.” Midgal argues that society and the state coexist symbiotically. The state is hemmed in and transformed by social forces, just as society is shaped by the

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openings and limits created by the state. They evolve together, transforming each other through their interactions. For Midgal, the state is at once a singular, powerful body and made up of loosely connected, conflicting parts, “a contradictory entity which acts against itself.”27 Midgal’s conception neatly captures the case of China’s patriotic education campaign as it was taken up by history activists who strengthened and extended the state’s efforts, and by activists who quickly went beyond the state’s pragmatic intent.

Strengthening State Propaganda Once the patriotic education campaign began, a number of academics and private individuals seized the opportunity to document and disseminate information about Japanese wartime atrocities and Chinese suffering through new research and publications and by founding local history museums. These public educational facilities tended to begin with individual initiatives, build upon local resources and connections, gain official support at the local level, and then slowly expand using media, academic, and government resources to engage in public outreach and scholarship.28 Although varying widely in scope, topics, and locations, these institutions generally address local aspects of Japan’s invasion and occupation of China. In 1999, for instance, Mr. Chen Yunfang read a newspaper article by Dr. Su Zhiliang describing Japanese right-wing historians denying that comfort women “stations” existed in Shanghai. Furious at this assertion, the elderly Mr. Chen contacted Dr. Su and told him that his former family home had in fact been one of these stations. Moreover, the home built by his father in the 1930s was still intact in its original form and was being used as a training center by a local technical college. Reaching an understanding with the college’s head, Dr. Su arranged for Mr. Chen to host visiting groups to this site. I joined one of these delegations in 2001. These visits and the former use of the building remain completely unofficial—outside the purview of the local or national government. However, local officials did inform Dr. Su that if he could raise the necessary funds, they would consider his proposal for the building to be turned into a history museum.29 In addition to establishing local memorial sites, the public has also supported state-run institutions. The Memorial Hall for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre, for instance, has received substantial financial contributions from the general public, local companies, and overseas Chinese.30 Once established, history museums serve as a kind of symbolic public space vulnerable to appropriation by local residents for their own purposes, such as the spontaneous protests I witnessed at the Nanjing

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museum in August 2001 in reaction to Prime Minister Koizumi’s first visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The patriotic education campaign created a supportive environment for the expansion of Chinese academic research on Japan’s historical atrocities.31 Although public criticism of the Party is certainly not permitted, China’s academic historians today have more resources and autonomy than ever before. Many professors at large universities work from home, travel to or host international conferences, and publish in a wide variety of forums. Within the approved limits set by their department chairs, they select their own textbooks and design their own lesson plans and lectures. This autonomy has been granted upon the presumption that a kind of firewall can be maintained between these elite academics and the modes of public education necessary for national unity. However, this distinction may be eroding, as evidenced by the social outreach, political activism, and institution building engaged in by academic history activists. The origins of academic research on Japan’s wartime atrocities can be traced back to the early 1980s, when a number of Nanjing-based scholars came together to probe their combined archival resources and produce a series of publications on the Nanjing Massacre.32 Academic history activists reached national prominence in 1991, when the Modern History Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences established the Journal of Studies of China’s War of Resistance Against Japan. A decade later, the journal had become the preeminent source for academic research on Japan’s historical atrocities.33 In 1995, the Nanjing museum opened a research center linking local researchers with their national and international counterparts through conferences and joint publications. It also helped found research centers at Nanjing University (in 1999) and Nanjing Teachers University (1998), and continues to cooperate with, and support financially, both institutions.34 These research centers also facilitated collaboration between Chinese and Japanese academics. For instance, when a former Japanese soldier was sued for slander in 1993 after the publication of his diary describing the Nanjing Massacre, museum researchers undertook and presented research in the Japanese court to support his claims. The Nanjing museum subsequently hosted four conferences on the soldier, publishing both his biography and a translation of his diary.35 By 2001, a community of scholars had emerged in China who met regularly, collaborated on research, shared their findings and primary sources, and publicly debated professional and political issues. Like many leading Chinese academics, history activists are well connected with their international colleagues. Atypically, they also work closely with

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advocacy groups and support political protests abroad. One Shanghai-based professor has taken part in “people’s tribunals” condemning Japan in Tokyo and Holland.36 A Nanjing academic center has participated in public protests along with Chinese American organizations focused on the wartime atrocities.37 Others joined a public event in Berkeley, California critically reviewing the 1951 San Francisco Treaty. Chinese academics tend to view their collaboration with liberal Japanese academics as a kind of “united front” against Japanese right-wing groups. A 2001 conference report concluded: “Our struggle with the Japanese right wing is not an academic struggle; it is a political one, and in a political struggle one must use political methods.”38 These “political methods” included the joint publication of a history textbook with Japanese and Korean colleagues, urging the establishment of an international court to re-try Japanese war criminals, and calls for Chinese textbooks to expand their coverage of Japanese wartime atrocities.39 Predictably, there have been repercussions for those who go too far.40

Extending State Propaganda China’s history activists also capitalized upon the rhetoric of the patriotic education campaign to transgress beyond the party-state’s more pragmatic objectives. The campaign calling for official commemoration of wartime anniversaries, for instance, emerged out of a grassroots movement in Hong Kong. In 2000, activists succeeded in getting Hong Kong’s Legislative Council to unanimously pass a motion demanding a written apology and compensation from Japan for wartime atrocities.41 Over the next four years, Wang Jinsi, a National People’s Congress (NPC) delegate from Hong Kong, lobbied over 100 NPC representatives to support draft legislation urging official commemoration of September 18, the anniversary of Japan’s 1931 invasion of north China, and December 13, the date of the Nanjing Massacre.42 In March 2004, twenty members of the NPC and the Chinese People’s Consultative Committee (CPCC) motioned for an official national day of mourning on September 18, but were refused. Over the summer, activists, academics, and NPC members petitioned the NPC and the State Council Legal Office to hold official commemorative events on September 18.43 After being refused again, they decided to organize a series of unofficial activities on that date, including collective horn blowing, art displays, and an academic symposium.44 Activists also held a public demonstration at Wangfujing, Beijing’s central shopping district, where they displayed signs and distributed leaflets.45 Similar demands were presented again at the annual meetings of the NPC and CPCC

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in March 2005, supported by an online petition campaign.46 Despite garnering extensive media and public attention, neither of these bills became law.47 In other instances, activists were more successful in bringing issues onto the state’s policy agenda. Advocates’ support for China’s comfort women influenced the official Chinese Women’s Federation in exactly the kind of institutional evolution within the state that Midgal predicts. Even in 1995, at the peak of the state-led patriotic education campaign, the Women’s Federation resisted NGO pressure at the UN-sponsored Beijing Conference on Women to address the comfort women issue. They instead chose to hold a “Friendship Meeting” with their Japanese counterparts that failed to even mention history issues.48 Only as popular advocacy began to grow over the next few years did the Women’s Federation began to take a more assertive stance by publicly denouncing Japanese court decisions on compensation cases.49 Since 2001, the comfort women issue has been propelled forward by individual activists and academics. Chinese diplomats have not raised it with their Japanese counterparts, and there has been no official compensation offered to these women, unlike in South Korea. Instead, Professor Su Zhiliang, China’s most prominent academic expert on the issue, included a lengthy discussion on Chinese comfort women in Shanghai’s 2002 revised history textbook, and then established an NGO to provide financial support to former comfort women. Building on his research, the Nanjing Massacre museum finally established China’s first permanent museum exhibit on the comfort women in 2006.50 A third example of Chinese activists going beyond the state’s pragmatic objectives is the “redress movement” (suopei yundong): the pursuit of compensation lawsuits in the Japanese court system for Chinese victims of Japan’s wartime atrocities. Chinese activists initiated the redress movement in the early 1990s, providing a link between progressive Japanese lawyers and individual Chinese victims. After years of laboring without much public support or attention, in 2002 the redress movement’s most prominent activist, Wang Xuan, was selected as an individual who “inspires China” (gandong zhongguo) by television viewers and as “Person of the Year” by readers of China’s premier weekly paper, Southern Weekend.51 Local media also helped: a city paper in Jiangxi province ran a series of stories on Japan’s biological warfare in the area and then helped process the hundreds of resulting claims from former victims.52 When she visited Dalian, where I was living in 2003, the city opened the “firstever national Wang Xuan hotline for biological warfare documentation.”53 The redress movement was sustained by interlocking social networks rather than state support. The biological warfare lawsuits were guided by a support group of over 100 Chinese lawyers, activists, and local village representatives who

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carried out grassroots investigations to gather evidence. The group published booklets on their findings; reported to symposia in Shanghai, Beijing, and Harbin; organized public exhibitions; and joined international NGO events.54 With their support, Chinese plaintiffs also filed suits in the United States, at the International Court of Justice, and in Chinese courts.55 The most prominent example of activism exceeding official objectives is the baodiao (Protect Diaoyu Islands) movement, a grassroots campaign aimed at defending China’s formal claims to the Diaoyu Islands through direct action. The movement’s origins trace back to 1972 protests at the United Nations in New York by overseas Chinese (primarily Taiwanese) students over Japan’s resumption of control over the islands.56 The movement spread to mainland China following the 1996 protests in Hong Kong over the islands, as described in the preceding chapter. Mainland activists first joined voyages to the islands in 1998. In 1999, mainland activists registered a company in Hong Kong and established an office in Beijing, providing a platform, location, and mechanism for their efforts. Over the next few years, they formally established a baodiao committee, applied to Beijing to lease the islands for tourism, engaged in publicity activities, and called for the Chinese government to issue a “Diaoyu” stamp, as South Korea did for the Tokdo Islands.57 None of these initiatives was approved. From June 2003 to August 2004, PRC activists attempted four trips to the islands. Each time, the Chinese government notified the Japanese Coast Guard in advance, so the activists were turned back before reaching the islands.58 After Chinese activists finally landed in 2004, an incident described in detail in the following chapter, they were briefly held by the Japanese Coast Guard. When they arrived back at the Shanghai government, hundreds of people traveled to the airport to greet them. The activists were quickly pulled aside for questioning by government agents, denying them a public reception. “Once we got home,” one activist lamented, “I went from being a ‘people’s hero’ (renmin yingxiong) to being labeled a ‘troublemaker’ (tian mafan de ren).”59 In sum, the baodiao activists, like other history activists, seized the opening provided by official tolerance to engage in political advocacy and direct action, challenging official institutions and reshaping the political landscape in which the state operates.

Exceeding State Propaganda In some cases, China’s history activists have pushed beyond the state’s limits, challenging official rhetoric and undermining long-established government policies. Demands for financial compensation from Japan for wartime

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atrocities are one example. Tong Zeng, one of China’s most influential history activists, prepared his first proposal demanding compensation from Japan in 1991, distributing it to members of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in advance of their annual meetings in the spring. The draft bill argued that the 1972 normalization agreement in which China gave up its demands for reparations only covered government reparations, not individuals’ compensation. Individual Chinese citizens’ demands for compensation from Japan, the bill argued, should receive the full and active support of the Chinese government. The bill received sufficient signatures to be considered in the full assembly for passage, but then was strongly criticized by Japanese Diet members. As Chinese leaders were seeking improved relations with Japan in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, part of the “second honeymoon” described in chapter 2, the bill was suppressed and never brought up for consideration by the NPC or CPPCC.60 Nearly a decade later, more ambitious activism began to arrive via the Internet. Online activism on Japan-related issues began with individuals who responded to events by starting Web sites, constructing social networks of support, and garnering attention from commercial media. One of the earliest Japan-focused sites was “China918,” established by a middle-aged engineer and his daughter in March 2000.61 On September 18, 2001, the site held a series of activities to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of Japan’s invasion of north China. Reports of the activities caught the attention of overseas Chinese, who began to support the Web site financially. In 2002, the site issued a call for an “online war of resistance” against Japanese right-wing and revisionist groups, inspired by the actions of Feng Jihua.62 As noted earlier, Feng Jinhua was a Chinese worker living in Japan who came to fame on August 14, 2001, when he spray painted “Gaisi” (Go to Hell) on a wall of the Yasukuni Shrine. Feng soon joined Lu Yunfei at the new Alliance of Patriots Web site, which the two quickly catapulted to the forefront of China’s online activism, becoming prominent media figures in China and abroad.63 By 2004, China was host to some 1,000 Japan-focused activist Web pages.64 These sites furthered the wave of anti-Japan activism by hosting online petition campaigns, spreading information on controversial events, and promoting a consumer boycott of Japanese goods. Much like Benedict Anderson’s explanation about how national newspapers helped create an “imagined community,” the Chinese Internet fostered a sense of common identity that in turn facilitated collective action.65 Widespread use of the Internet also provided a venue for public participation in political activism by lowering transaction costs,

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broadening public impact, and strengthening social networks. As public participation spread, the Internet and the wave of public mobilization energized each other in a kind of “co-evolutionary development.”66 The spring 2005 campaign, when some forty million people signed online petitions opposing Japan’s obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, illustrates both the power of popular activism to mobilize public opinion and the essential role played by official tolerance in allowing activism to emerge and spread. The UN campaign reportedly began among overseas Chinese activists, but then quickly spread across the Chinese Internet. Activists also organized popular sign-on events in city centers across China.67 The campaign was tolerated, and even tacitly encouraged, by a Foreign Ministry spokesman’s March 24 comment during a press conference that the petition campaign reflected a “responsible” act to make Japan reflect on its historical wrongs rather than “anti-Japan sentiments.”68 Once the state signaled that it would not censor the online petition Web sites, major profit-oriented news sites quickly embraced the campaign, enabling its rapid spread to the general public. The popular Sina.com Web site established a dedicated page with links to extensive news coverage on history-related issues, the UN sign-on petitions, and encouragement for viewers to post their own opinions on the site’s bulletin board. In one sitting, Chinese netizens could get the latest news, exchange opinions with others, and engage in political activism. The petition campaign featured not only the massive sign-on letters scheduled to be delivered directly to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan but also a number of public letters addressed to him that were widely circulated on the Internet. Most influential was a letter by Tong Zeng, a longtime leading history activist, which was eventually published in full in a major weekly newsmagazine.69 To spread information about planned street protests, activists relied on e-mail and cell phone text messages, techniques that are fast, cheap, and difficult for the state to detect or block.70 As one reporter noted at the time, “An underground conversation was raging via e-mail, text messages, and instant online messaging that inflamed public opinion and served as an organizing tool for protesters.”71 As a result, the protests that incorporated thousands of people in cities around China, including an estimated 20,000 people in Shanghai, “took almost no work to organize.”72 The spring 2005 online protests were largely tolerated, as Jessica Weiss argues, due to their utility in enhancing Chinese negotiating leverage, helping to justify Beijing’s opposition to Japan obtaining a permanent seat.73 Chinese scholars, however, were particularly impressed with the power of this new version of “popular diplomacy” (minjian waijiao) and its potential influence on foreign policy more broadly.74 Chinese diplomats expressed caution, warning

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that popular activism that exceeded state controls risked circumventing traditional diplomatic channels and upsetting delicate negotiations. As the campaign began to spread, Wu Jianmin, a veteran diplomat and China’s representative to the UN in Geneva, issued a prominent speech in Shanghai on April 1, 2005 in which he urged China’s netizens to remain moderate in their efforts.75 Cognizant of the CCP’s fear of organized opposition, activists were careful to insist that they were all “individual volunteers, not supported by any organization, and not taking any extremist actions.”76 In contrast to the sustained focus of the redress movement and academics, China’s online nationalists tend to move from issue to issue, reacting spontaneously to recent developments in China– Japan relations. They often reflect the casual associations that Pamela Oliver labels “diffuse collectives.”77 In interviews, these activists describe themselves as enacting the public’s right, even its obligation, to defend China’s national interests by stiffening the government’s resolve to stand up to Japan.78 Suisheng Zhao classifies them as “liberal nationalists” based on their defense of society’s right to set national priorities.79 They are certainly nationalists, but hardly liberal ones. China’s online activists seek a powerful state capable of defending all of China’s territorial claims and securing international respect. They tend to adopt a zero-sum view of economics and national security, and do not trust ideational or institutional constraints upon Japanese power. They do not seek the democratization of China. They are above all populists. With their fingers on the pulse of public emotions, China’s online activists have repeatedly stimulated public opinion and popular emotions over foreign policy issues, winning praise as “part of the Chinese masses; not some intellectuals’ saloon.”80 In short, tracing the origins and development of China’s history activism reveals that the state played a significant but limited role. Official tolerance allowed activism to emerge and spread, but the primary drivers were the history activists themselves. These purposeful, dedicated individuals drew upon their professional and personal connections, established networks among themselves and with state agencies and officials, utilized innovative technologies and protest techniques, and reached out to allies overseas. In connecting with the general public, history activists relied heavily upon China’s burgeoning commercial press.

CHINESE MEDIA: BETWEEN THE PARTY LINE AND THE BOTTOM LINE During a wave of public mobilization, popular media can provide publicity for activists, spreading information about their actions upward to policy

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makers and outward to the general public. Media coverage of sensationalist events stimulates popular emotions and encourages broader participation in protests. In China, commercial media and the Internet are key resources for building protest movements. This fosters a level of dependence upon the state’s tolerance. As chapter 1 explained, Chinese print media is divided between official Party newspapers (dangbao) and commercial press. Party papers are directly controlled and funded by local governments, Party committees, and the Central Propaganda Department (CPD). China’s media market is dominated, however, by market-oriented publications that rely upon advertising and sales to generate revenues. The result has been an explosion of sensationalist and nationalist writings in China’s populist press, stories that can sell papers while appealing to a broad base of young, urban readers—precisely the kind of readers advertisers seek to reach. Editors often try to go as far as they can with daring coverage of a certain issue without getting punished, a strategy dubbed “da cabian qiu”—a ping-pong technique of hitting the ball right on the line without going out. 81 These commercial media are closely regulated by the state. They must be registered under state and Party organizations, including Party papers. The popular Southern Metropolitan Daily is under the authority of the Party-run Guangming Daily and is even housed in the same compound. China’s commercial media must thus deftly maneuver “between the party line and the bottom line,” avoiding offending the Party while pleasing the market.82 To ensure that commercial media reflect the Party’s propaganda objectives, Chinese authorities also maintain a far-reaching oversight system. Propaganda officials have the authority to reshape the organization of the media industry, make personnel decisions, and issue directives for news content.83 China’s system of control, while extensive, is hardly perfect. “It is impossible to have no errors in our propaganda, given the current tremendous size of the media industry and the huge content of newspapers,” admitted Ji Bingxuan, the Propaganda Department’s executive deputy director, in a 2005 speech at the Central Party School. “But we must try our best to avoid big errors, particularly to avoid errors concerning politics, policy, and public opinion guidance.”84 One such crack in the official control system emerged in popular media’s coverage of Japan during the wave of public mobilization.

Covering Japan In late 2002, as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao came to power, they began pursuing closer diplomatic ties with Japan (see chapter 4 for

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details). To support this initiative, propaganda authorities discouraged negative, sensationalist coverage of Japan. In October 2004, Zhao Qizheng, the director of China’s State Council Information Office, openly pledged: “There will be no anti-Japanese reporting by major news organizations.”85 To ensure this policy was followed, the Propaganda Department distributed regular guidelines on Japan reporting to Chinese media. For instance, one Beijing newspaper received the following set of reporting guidelines: • “The topic of constructing the Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway [by Japanese companies] is very sensitive; no autonomous self-initiated reporting is allowed” (September 27, 2003); • “Do not report Northwest University student protests against obscene dances by Japanese students” (September 31, 2003); • Regarding activists’ sailing to the Diaoyu Islands: “media are not allowed to follow the groups; downplay relevant reports, control the use of reports supplied by these organizations; no commentary, no feature reports and interviews, only simple and objective reporting” (March 23, 2004); • “Downplay Sino-Japanese disputes over the East China Sea; no spin, no indepth analysis or interviews . . . must prevent reports that provoke extreme reactions” (July 1, 2004).86

The Party’s controls, however, were only partly effective. Despite these demands, commercial newspapers provided far more sensationalist, negative coverage of Japan than their Party-run counterparts. One study comparing Japan coverage in the People’s Daily against six city-level commercial newspapers from January to October 2004 found that the popular urban press covered Japan more frequently and more negatively. Over 35 percent of all Japan-related stories in the Shenyang, Guangzhou, and Chengdu city papers were negative, while the People’s Daily published mostly neutral reports (75.6 percent). The People’s Daily tended to report on leaders’ visits, Japanese society and culture, and China– Japan cultural exchanges, while the urban press focused on history issues and the Japanese military. 87 Another study found that Beijing Youth Daily printed a far higher percentage of negative articles on Japan than the People’s Daily. From 1996 to 2004, articles on “history issues” in the People’s Daily declined from 14.4 percent to 8.9 percent, while the percentage in Beijing Youth Daily rose from 2.5 to 14.2. Even at the height of the wave of public mobilization in 2004, three quarters of all Japan-related stories in the People’s Daily were on “neutral” issues.88 Clearly, as public anger toward Japan began to build, the Party’s flagship paper was tasked with

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cooling popular emotions. To augment these studies, I compared coverage of Japan in 12 Chinese newspapers (six commercial; six Party papers) from 2001 through 2005. Table 3.1 denotes the number of articles with both the word “Japan” and either a positive or a negative keyword in the same paragraph of the full text or in the headline (see appendix 1 for details). As table 3.1 shows, popular newspapers provided far more critical coverage of Japan than the Party press during the wave of public mobilization. The two types of papers were relatively similar in their positive coverage, with popular press emphasizing cultural issues and the Party press focusing on official aspects of the bilateral relationship. Remarkably, even as public anger began to build in 2002, the official press still ran nearly 300 articles on Japan that mentioned “cultural exchange,” “friendly relations,” and “China– Japan friendship,” far more than commercial papers. This number dropped over the next two years but then rose again by 2005, even as protests continued to spread. Official press hardly seemed to be encouraging anti-Japanese sentiments and protests. The disparity between Party and popular papers is more striking in their negative coverage of Japan. Popular newspapers had substantially more articles on issues such as “Yasakuni Shrine,” “Nanjing Massacre,” “the invading Japanese army,” and “comfort women” than the official press, reaching almost 1,500 articles by 2005. Negative descriptions of Japan’s political situation and articles touching on controversial security issues were also far more prevalent in popular newspapers than in the Party press. In short, despite the state’s calls for restraint, Chinese popular media provided far more negative, sensationalist coverage of Japan than Party newspapers from 2001 through 2005. The official press played a limited role in fanning the waves of public anger toward Japan.

China’s Global Times One of the most important sources of sensationalist, negative coverage of Japan during this period was Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), one of the most popular newspapers among well-educated, upper-income young urbanites.89 Global Times is published by the People’s Daily group; however, it is financially independent and enjoys even greater circulation numbers. Global Times has grown rapidly since its inception in 1993. By 2002 it was handing over some ten million RMB in profits to People’s Daily. Global Times is famed for its nationalist coverage of controversial foreign policy issues—clearly in pursuit of market share and advertising revenue. As a reporter for the paper noted in a 2003 interview: “There are two days where the circulation of

TABLE 3.1

PARTY AND COMMERCIAL NEWSPAPERS’ COVERAGE OF JAPAN, 2001–2005 Number of Articles

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

99

151

112

146

122

208

292

271

355

406

Party

155

287

187

197

282

Popular

66

124

85

117

227

Party

422

157

238

299

974

Popular

344

265

303

514

1,479

Party

122

34

22

33

198

Popular

97

56

59

76

364

Party

21

7

24

25

68

Popular

35

19

28

54

128

Positive Terms1 Culture Party

Popular Bilateral Relationship

Negative Terms2 History

Japan’s Political Situation

Security Issues

Source: WiseSearch newspaper database: www.wisers.com.hk 1

2

Cultural terms: Fuji Mountain, cherry blossoms, tea ceremony, superstar, and cartoon. Bilateral relationship: cultural exchange, friendly relations, China– Japan friendship. History: Yasakuni Shrine, Nanjing Massacre, invading Japanese army, comfort women. Japan’s political situation: nationalism, militarism, great nation chauvinism, right-wing strength. Security issues: missile defense, constitutional change, U.S.– Japan alliance.

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the paper is the highest—when [former Taiwan President] Chen Shuibian is on the front cover and when [former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro] Koizumi is on the front cover.”90 During this period, Japan-related reporting in Global Times peaked at two points: December 2004, when new U.S.– Japan Alliance Guidelines were released; and again in spring 2005, during the massive protests against Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (see figure 3.1). As tensions mounted with Japan in spring 2005, the number of negative articles on Japan in Global Times increased, as did the number of historyrelated articles. From April to June 2005, the peak of public mobilization, Global Times printed only eight positive articles on Japan. During this period, fewer than three reports a month covered “normal interactions” between Chinese and Japanese leaders.91 In interviews, Global Times editors admitted, “Our reporting is very critical of Japan on the history issue. We react with a story whenever the Japanese right wing says or does something that shows its support of militarism.” The editors insisted this approach promoted “patriotism” (aiguozhuyi), rather than “nationalism.”92 However, as one Chinese scholar argues, the reporting in Global Times directly exacerbated antiJapanese “parochial nationalism” (xia’ai minzuzhuyi).93 Another contributing factor was the sensationalist coverage in local urban press (dushibao). These stories initially fit into the “soft news” or entertainment categories, which are less regulated by the state, so local papers felt free to cover them. Such papers also eagerly covered instances of historical revisionism in Japan, such as the debates over conservative history textbooks in

FIGURE 3.1 Global Times Reporting on Japan

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2001.94 Although news Web sites are only permitted to reprint stories that have already appeared in domestic print media, they found ready fodder among local urban press. Several of these incidents involved contentious economic issues, such as the advertisement by Toyota in China in which a Japanese SUV faced down a Chinese-style stone lion and the mistreatment of Chinese passengers on an All-Nippon Airlines flight. Popular media and the Internet also combined to spread public anger and compel an official response to a threeday sex scandal in Zhuhai, China in 2003. The incident reportedly involved several hundred Japanese businessmen and local prostitutes and nightclub hostesses on September 18, the anniversary of Japan’s invasion of northern China in 1931. There were initially no public reports about the incident, and neither local nor national authorities took any action. A week later, China Youth Daily, a popular Beijing newspaper, published an indignant report on the incident.95 By that afternoon, the China Youth Daily story was on the front page of all major Chinese news Web sites and was reprinted in a number of urban newspapers’ evening editions. Emotions online ran high—in one online poll, 90 percent of respondents agreed that the Japanese businessmen intended to humiliate China by picking September 18 as the date.96 In response, local authorities ordered the hotel closed and began to investigate the case. As the journalist who broke the story later explained, “Because of the public anger, the authorities had to thoroughly investigate this incident.”97 One reason that sensationalist media coverage of Japan sparked such wildfires of anger and activism was the concurrent explosion of Internet use in China during this period. Before 2000, regular Internet users in China numbered less than 10 million. In 2001, China’s Internet population reached 25 million; by 2002, it exceeded 45 million.98 In 2003, China’s “netizens” numbered over 70 million, a critical mass that sparked the onset of China’s “year of online nationalism.” By 2004, as one Chinese expert explained, “the internet has become the most important space for the Chinese public to express its opinion.”99 A 2002 survey of Chinese youth in six cities found that 23 percent frequently issued online comments, while 58 percent reported doing so occasionally.100 A 2004 survey found that 21 percent of China’s middle class participated in online discussions on a regular basis.101 Online engagement fed lively debates and facilitated rapid responses to sensationalist news reports. Within five days after the Zhuhai prostitution incident was reported, over 24,000 comments were left on the Sina.com Web site. A 2003 online petition campaign calling for a boycott of Japan’s Asahi Beer garnered 1.28 million signatures in only two hours. Within one month after the March 24, 2004 arrest of Chinese baodiao activists by Japan, over 1.23 million responses

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were posted on Sina.com.102 In an April 2005 online poll on Japan’s history textbooks, 8 million “votes” were registered on Sina.com within two days.103 A Chinese expert’s 2005 Global Times article questioning if “Japan will become Asia’s England” garnered 12,000 “hits” in only one day after being posted on the China– Japan Forum.104 Such rapid online responses present a challenge for state censors. When a British Web site posted pictures of the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister appearing to bow to his Japanese counterpart after the spring 2005 protests, the site had a reported 450,000 hits in only three and half hours before the Chinese government learned of the picture and blocked access to the site from China.105 In sum, from 2001 through 2005, the Party press provided far more balanced and objective coverage of Japan than their market-oriented counterparts. Popular press, combined with online activism, rapidly spread information and anger to the general public. This variation between commercial and Party papers’ coverage of Japan illustrates the importance of official tolerance during the early stages in a wave of public mobilization. As one editor from an influential commercial paper explained, Chinese media “watches the direction of the wind” (kan fengxiang) in making decisions about what to report. “As tensions mounted in China– Japan relations during this period, we felt that we were free to report on more negative aspects of the relationship. Since these stories were not criticized by our superiors, we knew that we could keep going.”106 The sensitivity of stories also varies according to the content. One Beijing-based reporter noted that while it was acceptable to report on Taiwanese and Hong Kong activists seeking to land on the Diaoyu Islands, reports on mainland activists were generally prohibited. “This might give people the idea that they could try this themselves,” the reporter explained.107 Many sensationalist stories during this period fit under the category of “soft news,” including entertainment, business, and popular culture, so the local urban press felt free to cover them. “As long as we don’t touch upon ‘great national affairs’ [ guojia dashi], they tend to leave us alone,” clarified a journalist from a local paper in Hunan province. “After all, we have to sell newspapers to survive.”108 Chinese leaders may have found this distinction between commercial and Party papers useful for releasing public anger and putting pressure on Japanese leaders while avoiding directly criticizing Japan, though they certainly did not want to see public anger grow out of control. Even as propaganda officials issued repeated instructions for commercial media to limit their sensationalist reporting on Japan, newspaper editors found creative ways of evading official controls. Once editors found they were not punished for such

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coverage, they continued to press forward. Amid the rising tide of public anger and political activism, sensationalist stories criticizing Japan spread rapidly across the Chinese Internet, finding a welcome audience among the general public and exacerbating popular animosity toward Japan. We turn next, in the final section, to examine interactions among activism, sensationalist media coverage, and Chinese public opinion toward Japan.

THE PUBLIC’S OPINION OF JAPAN Most Chinese people’s attitudes toward Japan are extremely negative. Polls reveal a strong emphasis on history issues, a tendency to associate negative images with Japan, and scant goodwill. Surveys conducted from 2002 to 2006 by the Institute of Japan Studies (IJS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) found that less than one percent of respondents felt “very close” to Japan, while only 5.5 percent felt “close.” Over half of all respondents felt “not close” or “very not close” (hen bu qing). Overtly negative images of Japan such as the “invading Japanese army,” right-wing groups, and the Yasukuni Shrine far outweighed positive images such as the peace constitution and yen loans to China.109 A 2007 poll found that almost 60 percent of Chinese students associated Japan with “militarism” and with “nationalism”; less than 10 percent identified Japan with democracy, pacifism, freedom, or international cooperation.110 A Pew Global Survey in April 2006 found that only one in five Chinese people held a favorable view of Japan. A majority viewed Japanese people as competitive, male-dominated, arrogant, greedy, selfish, nationalistic, and violent.111 To put these figures in comparative perspective, Chinese attitudes toward Japan are markedly worse than those toward the United States. The 2001 Beijing Area Survey found that the mean score on a 1-to-7-point “warlike-topeaceful” scale attributed to the Japanese people was 4.2, to Americans 3.7, and to the Chinese people 1.5.112 The 2006 Pew Global Survey found that 47 percent of Chinese respondents had a favorable attitude toward the United States, while only 21 percent had a favorable attitude toward Japan, with 70 percent unfavorable.113 Animosity toward the United States is also moderated by positive attitudes toward American people and culture. A 2006 survey found that 66 percent of respondents reported a positive attitude toward American culture, and 64 percent felt positive toward American people. Those who felt “very good” about American culture outnumbered those who felt “not so good.” Most respondents viewed the U.S. influence on the world as at least

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“somewhat positive.”114 The reverse is true for Japan—Chinese attitudes toward Japanese people are even worse than attitudes toward Japan itself. CASS scholar Lu Yi’s extensive review of survey data finds that Chinese people are significantly more likely to “like Japan” than to “like Japanese people.”115 Comparisons across East Asia reveal a similar disparity (see table 3.2).

From Bad to Worse As the wave of public mobilization swelled after 2001, Chinese attitudes toward Japan became even more polarized and negative. CASS surveys found that the percentage of respondents who felt “very not close” to Japan rose 8 percent from 2002 through 2006, while those who felt ambivalent declined 12 percent.116 The Beijing Area Study also recorded a drop in the mean level of “warmness” toward Japan from 1998 to 2004, with a particularly steep decline in 2004.117 Annual polls conducted by Horizon Corporation showed similar trends (see figure 3.2). Horizon polls also found that the percentage of respondents who reported that they liked Japan declined from 29.2 in 1999 to 19.9 percent by 2005. Those who felt that the relationship was good or very good dropped nearly 40 percent over the six years, while those who felt the relationship was bad or very bad rose to 75 percent by 2005.118 By 2004, nearly two-thirds of respondents identified Japan as one of the countries most unfriendly to China.119 The percentage of respondents who felt that Japan was important to China’s economy also declined significantly (figure 3.3).

Who’s Responsible: State or Society? Was the rapid decline in public sentiments toward Japan primarily due to official propaganda or to factors outside the state? As noted earlier, a number of scholars argue that the state’s official patriotic education campaign was primarily responsible for the rise of nationalist, anti-Japanese sentiments in China during this period.120 Survey data, however, suggests that popular media, the Internet, and activists were more influential than official propaganda in attracting public attention and shaping public opinion during the wave of anti-Japan mobilization. The Chinese government certainly has the potential to shape public opinion. As table 3.3 shows, Chinese people overwhelmingly get their information on Japan from domestic media. This is primarily state-controlled television— a 2007 survey found that less than 10  percent of the general public relies

The Origins of Public Mobilization TABLE 3.2

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CHINESE OPINIONS OF EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES, 2005

Country

Favorable

Unfavorable

Neither

Don’t Know

7.8

64.1

26.8

1.3

United States

18.3

39.8

40.6

1.3

North Korea

37.7

9.1

52.0

1.2

South Korea

46.5

7.3

45.2

1.0

Japan

Source: “Dong-A Ilbo Opinion Poll”

FIGURE 3.2 The Public’s “Friendly Feeling” Toward Japan1

1

Horizon calculated a level of “friendly feeling” (haogan) by adding up the percentage of respondents who chose Japan from a list of fifteen countries as one of two countries “most friendly (zui youhao) to China” and “most important to China’s economy.” This figure is divided by the percentage of respondents who included Japan as one of the two countries that “are most unfriendly to China” and as one of the two “greatest threats to China’s security.” If a greater percentage listed Japan in the “positive” questions, the figure is positive. Out of all fifteen countries included in the list from 1999 to 2005, Japan ranked dead last. Based on personal communication with Horizon staff.

primarily on newspapers and only 3.8 percent on the Internet.121 Education is also deeply influential—respondents to a 2005 poll by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) reported that formal education had the strongest influence on their “historical perspective” toward Japan, followed by mass media, entertainment, museums, and then personal or family experiences.122 For some individuals, personal experience is still central. One researcher involved in overseeing CASS’s surveys of public opinion met an elderly woman in Shenyang whose entire family was killed by Japanese soldiers, and who still

FIGURE 3.3 Ranking Japan’s Importance to China’s Economy

TABLE 3.3

WHAT IS YOUR MAIN CHANNEL FOR LEARNING ABOUT JAPAN? (CAN CHOOSE MORE THAN ONE; IN %) Univ. Students

Citizens

90.2

87.8

Chinese books and textbooks

5.6

40.6

Chinese movies and TV shows

36.6

37.2

Japanese movies and TV shows

24.6

9.6

Other Chinese people’s assessment

20.3

11.2

Family and friends

10.6

11.9

Chinese government/gov’t spokesperson

10.5

10.9

Direct contact or interviews

6.7

5.8

Other

1.5

0.1

Chinese media

Source: “2007 Report on Public Opinion in China– Japan Relations” presented to the Beijing– Tokyo Forum, 2007

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bore scars from a Japanese saber attack. “For her,” he remarked, “the ‘history issues’ are not history at all.”123 Yet for most people in China, personal contact with Japanese people in any circumstance is extremely rare—in a 2005 poll, 88.6 percent of respondents did not know a single Japanese person.124 Despite state controls over most sources of information on Japan, the patriotic education campaign that peaked in 1995 actually failed to stimulate strong emotions among Chinese youth. Surveys conducted by Renmin University found a sharp decline in public attitudes toward Japan from 1994 to 1997: a 13 percent drop in respondents who believed relations with Japan were important/very important, a 26 percent decline in those who saw relations as good/very good, and a 17 percent drop in those who said they liked Japan.125 However, attitudes toward Japan became less strongly held from 1994 to 1997. There was a 23.1 percent increase of respondents who said they “did not care” (wusuowei) about Japan. Such apathy was particularly high among the youth. In 1997, the most common response about feelings toward Japan for people under 25 years old was that they did not care about Japan (40 percent). Attitudes of disliking (taoyan) Japan were actually strongest among respondents over 56 years old, and those between 36 and 45.126 These findings suggest that the state-led propaganda campaign’s greatest impact was among older citizens, individuals more likely to be affected by memories of the wartime era passed along by family and friends and more likely to rely primarily upon state-controlled television news for their daily information on Japan. Given that the wave of public mobilization only emerged in 2002, seven years after the peak of the patriotic education campaign, it seems clear that official propaganda alone failed to inspire strong emotions or stimulate political activism among Chinese youth. In contrast, from 2002 through 2005, popular media and activism did successfully stimulate emotional responses and “issue activation” among the public. Middle-class urban residents paid close attention to activists’ 2005 petition campaign against Japan’s efforts to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the “boycott Japanese goods” campaign, even though these issues were largely ignored by official media. A Horizon poll in April 2005 found that almost half of all respondents claimed that they “supported” (zhishi) the boycott of Japanese goods (44.9 percent). Of the urban population, 47.9 percent reported that they were paying “relatively close attention” to Japan’s efforts to gain a UNSC seat, and 15.2 percent said that they were paying “extremely close attention” to the issue. Of those with technical high school education or above, 69 percent claimed to be paying attention to the issue. Respondents with higher family and personal incomes and university

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education were particularly likely to say that they would “definitely not buy Japanese products.”127 History issues, which were given greater prominence by popular press (as documented above), also rose steadily as a reason for the public not to feel close to Japan, reaching 90.3 percent by 2006 in CASS surveys.128 These results suggest that activism and commercial media content were particularly influential among the urban, well-educated, wealthier segment of the population—precisely those most likely to join in protest movements over foreign policy issues, and so most likely of greatest concern to Chinese leaders.129 Official propaganda was far less effective in shaping the public’s attitudes or issue attentiveness. For instance, the Chinese government steadily increased its criticism of Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 to 2006, yet public opinion on Yasukuni visits actually moderated from 2002 to 2006. CASS polls found that the number of respondents willing to accept prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni under certain conditions rose over the four years; while those who felt that under no conditions should Japanese leaders go to Yasukuni declined.130 The number of Chinese people who associated Japan with the image of Yasukuni Shrine was highest in 2002 and then declined over the next four years. The Chinese government also strongly denounced the 2005 U.S.– Japan Security Guidelines revisions, yet the percentage of respondents who did not feel close to Japan “because the U.S.– Japan military alliance is a threat to China’s security” dropped from 10.8 in 2002 to only 5.3 by 2006.131 Although isolating the effect of official propaganda and popular media content is admittedly difficult, the bulk of empirical data strongly suggests that popular media and political activism played the lead role in focusing the public’s attention on sensationalist issues and in exacerbating negative attitudes toward Japan.

CONCLUSION The wave of public mobilization arose from complex interactions among social actors, external forces, and the state. Decades of official propaganda contributed to the broad base of popular animosity toward Japan, while state tolerance allowed initial instances of activism and sensational media stories to emerge unchecked. The state’s role, however, was primarily indirect and passive. The main actors in this story are the dedicated activists and markethungry journalists who seized the opening provided by official tolerance to engage in innovative protest strategies and to spotlight sensationalist issues in China– Japan relations. Popular media coverage spread via the Internet drew

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the public’s attention to inflammatory events and dramatic protest actions, feeding popular anger and fomenting the wave of anti-Japan protests that exploded first online and then in the streets of cities across China. This case shows how a dynamic and engaged society can coexist with a nondemocratic regime, creating pressures for policy change without threatening regime overthrow. For many observers, the onset of civil society and social unrest invariably signals the beginning of the end for authoritarian regimes. Sporadic protests, the establishment of nongovernment organizations, a vibrant public discourse, and other “green shoots of democracy” are often taken as signs that an authoritarian government is failing to respond to popular demands. Reforms aimed at partial liberalization only further undermine the system of control. Regime collapse, the argument goes, looms near. The problem is that history hasn’t worked that way. Since the end of the Cold War, a diverse set of nondemocratic regimes around the world facing rising social pressures have repeatedly defied predictions of their imminent demise. Contrary to Samuel Huntington’s expectations in 1991, the “halfway house” of liberalized authoritarianism continues to stand.132 What explains the surprising coexistence of social liberalization and political authoritarianism? While violence, repression, and coercion are inevitably part of the story, rarely do they tell the whole tale. A more telling clue to authoritarian resilience lies in the innovative ways nondemocratic regimes have responded to the rise of new social forces with institutional innovation, policy shifts, and rhetorical persuasion. Tolerating instances of political activism, incorporating social groups into the governing system, revising policies in response to populist pressures, revamping propaganda systems—such techniques diminish the risk that a powerful, autonomous opposition will emerge dedicated to regime overthrow. Adaptation by the state represents one side of the story. Social actors tell the other side. In China, academics, activists, journalists, students, workers, and farmers have developed new ways to pursue their interests by finding allies within the system, seizing upon ideological and legal openings, devising innovative protest techniques, and working from within existing institutions. This is activism, not revolution—creating popular pressure for policy shifts without demanding a democratic transition. Through these interactive processes, state and society constitute and redefine each other. The authoritarian system, dramatically transformed, remains intact. In this case, not only did Chinese leaders stimulate and then tolerate the wave of public mobilization, they also responded to it by shifting policy in accordance with public demands. We turn now, in the following chapter, to assess the Communist Party’s responsiveness to public opinion.

4 RESPONDING TO PUBLIC OPINION The ruler is the boat, and the common people are the water. It is the water that bears the boat up, and the water that capsizes it. — XU NZ I (312 – 230 B.C.), TRANS. B U RTON WATSON

hina today is becoming a more responsive state. Communist Party leaders are now nearly as obsessed as their democratic counterparts with assessing public opinion. Countless opinion polls are taken throughout China, many secret but others widely publicized. The Internet is portrayed within China primarily not as a Trojan horse of democratization, but rather as a resource for “scientific” governance—creating a direct channel of communication between the people and their Party. From local officials who set up Web sites where residents can post their suggestions to online chats between top leaders and Chinese netizens, the Party is busily creating numerous opportunities for the public to express their opinions. In part, this is straightforward propaganda—designed to create the impression of tolerance and responsiveness. These are also the modern versions of the “squatting on the spot” techniques used during the early days of the Party: a way for Communist leaders to identify local concerns and use them to assess and guide policy decisions.1 This tradition continues in field visits by top leaders. Though primarily a propaganda tool useful for showing on the evening TV news, they have on occasion provided an opportunity for local workers or farmers to blurt out their complaints about unpaid wages, excessive taxes or

C

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fees, and poor health care directly to leaders—on occasion even stimulating a shift in national policies. Local innovations are also emerging. Zeguo township, in Zhejiang province, has established a direct plebiscite system that allows a random sampling of citizens to directly vote on a number of policy initiatives.2 Despite its echoes of ancient Athens, this is no democracy. Like the local elections held at the village and township level and even within the Party, these tactical innovations by the Communist Party are designed to stave off democracy—not bring it on.3 They represent proactive efforts at regime strengthening, not kernels of systemic transformation. The goal is to identify and institutionalize alternative techniques to assess and respond to select segments of public opinion as a way to short-circuit pressures for democratic change. The result is social liberalization without political democratization. China may eventually become a democracy through gradual evolution or perhaps through regime collapse, but the strategies of tolerance and responsiveness to public opinion documented in this book make that outcome less rather than more likely. Responsiveness to public opinion presumes that policy decisions reflect articulated public sentiments. As I argued in chapter 1, Chinese leaders are most likely to respond to public opinion when public mobilization is high, top leaders are divided over foreign policy, and bilateral relations are tense. These factors tend to arrive together: diplomatic tensions foster divisions among policy makers over how to respond, providing an opening for public mobilization. Popular unrest further widens the cracks among leaders while exacerbating diplomatic tensions. In this environment, public mobilization can affect officials’ negotiating strategy, public rhetoric, and the timing and direction of specific policy decisions. This influence, however, is likely to be limited in both time and scope. Policy makers are unlikely to risk ruptures in diplomatic ties or encourage widespread domestic upheaval by fundamentally altering overall foreign policy directions in response to public pressure. The best technique for assessing the influence of public opinion on foreign policy is also the most straightforward one: weighing competing explanations for observed outcomes in specific instances. This chapter thus examines four cases of Chinese policy making from 2002 to 2005: Japanese companies’ potential involvement in building a high-speed rail line in China, the accidental poisoning of 37 Chinese citizens due to abandoned Japanese chemical weapons, Japan’s arrest of Chinese activists who landed on the Diaoyu Islands, and Japan’s efforts to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. These cases encompass economic, security, and ideational issues. In each incident, sensationalist media coverage, popular activism, and strong public

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sentiments arose, demanding a strong response by the Chinese government. I assess the impact of public mobilization on Beijing’s negotiating behavior, official rhetoric, and policy decisions, and compare it to the most compelling alternative explanation—that the Chinese government was simply reacting to actions taken by Japan. While these cases represent a “most likely” opportunity for public opinion to influence Chinese foreign policy, they also touch upon some of the most sensitive areas of Chinese policy making. Japan represents China’s second-most important bilateral relationship—policy moves that risk damaging economic ties, triggering military escalation, or impinging upon China’s global diplomacy are not taken lightly. If popular pressure did affect Beijing’s policy decisions in these critical areas, this represents an outcome of considerable political and theoretical significance. The evidence for these cases comes primarily from media reports in China and abroad, augmented by interviews with Chinese experts, officials, and activists; Chinese scholarly writing; Chinese government documents; and Internet resources. Chinese media is constrained by the state, so it is unlikely to generate evidence across all four cases showing that public pressure compelled shifts in foreign policy. Balancing Chinese media reports with a diversity of interviews and overseas media content further limits our susceptibility to bias. To foreshadow the findings, the four case studies demonstrate that Chinese rhetoric, negotiating stances, and the timing, direction, and extent of policy decisions all primarily reflected policy makers’ responsiveness to public mobilization rather than reactions to Japanese policies. Public mobilization levels and policy impact were greatest on issues with high emotional content and at points when the state lost control over the flow of information. The influence of public pressure was, however, short-lived. In each case, China’s Japan policy reverted to previous policies of moderation and engagement once public mobilization levels died down. We begin by tracing the elite divisions that created a political opening for the wave of public mobilization.

OPENING THE GATES As chapter 2 noted, in the mid-1990s, Chinese leaders embarked on a “grand strategy” oriented around a series of partnerships aimed at reducing fears of China, countering U.S. dominance, and bolstering bilateral economic ties.4 As part of this effort, Beijing sought to formalize a “strategic partnership” with Japan that would rank equivalent with the 1972 China– Japan Joint Statement normalizing relations and the 1978 Treaty of Peace and

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Friendship, enabling the two sides to address occasional disputes without disrupting valuable trade and investment.5 Following Jiang Zemin’s contentious visit to Japan in October 1998, moderates in China’s Foreign Ministry reasserted themselves.6 Chinese diplomats quickly embarked on a round of “invitation diplomacy” toward Japan, hosting 170 Diet members in 1999 alone.7 Premier Zhu Rongji’s “smile diplomacy” during his October 2000 visit to Japan signaled the renewal of China’s engagement strategy.8 Even as Japan approved new conservative history textbooks, hosted Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui, and instituted trade barriers on Chinese imports, and Prime Minister Koizumi made his first visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001, Chinese moderation held fast. By spring 2002, the incoming leadership represented by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao was poised to resume this initiative by reaching out to Japan. One of the earliest signs of moderation was the visit by Zeng Qinghong on April 26, 2002. Normally, a leader of Zeng’s stature would not have joined this delegation of local leaders attending the inauguration of a new air route to Japan. Zeng was the head of the powerful CCP Organization Department, soon to be appointed Secretariat to the Politburo Standing Committee. Despite Koizumi’s second visit to Yasukuni only five days previously, Zeng’s comments in Japan on the Yasukuni visit were strikingly mild.9 In September 2002, Chinese leaders celebrated the “Year of Japan” in China with a flurry of public events.10 Hu Jintao, who as Hu Yaobang’s personal secretary had been responsible for implementing the controversial visit to Beijing by 3,000 Japanese youth in 1984, invited and met with 10,000 Japanese young people in Beijing as part of the celebrations. Seeking to echo the emperor’s historic 1992 visit, China also invited Crown Prince Naruhito and Princess Masako to Beijing, although Japan declined this invitation. The front page of the People’s Daily on September 29, 2002, captured the spirit, proclaiming in large print, Happy Birthday to China– Japan Friendship.11 Meanwhile, a heated debate over Japan policy was raging in foreign policy circles in Beijing in preparation for the 16th Party Congress in November 2002. Capitalizing on rumors that the new leadership was considering a major outreach to Japan, a number of China’s Japan and foreign policy experts issued competing arguments to policy makers in private meetings and through internal reports.12 The final Party Congress Resolution declared that China’s foreign policy would be guided by the slogan: “Treat neighbors as friends; treat neighbors as partners” (yilin weishan; yilin weiban).13 China’s Japan experts widely agreed that this policy signaled the new leadership’s intent to strengthen ties with Japan, an analysis reinforced by Zeng Qinghong’s

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encouraging comments to the chairman of the Japan– China Friendship Association on November 22.14 While the new Hu–Wen leadership seemed determined to stabilize ties with Japan, it remained relatively weak in 2002–03.15 Emphasizing the strong influence exerted by former President Jiang Zemin from behind the scenes, Joseph Fewsmith labeled the 16th Party Congress in November 2002 “the succession that didn’t happen.”16 Unlike Hu and Wen, Jiang was reported to favor a more hard-line response to Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine visits.17 Chinese experts later argued in private interviews that vulnerability of the new leadership undermined their ability to sustain a moderate approach to Japan in the absence of reciprocity by Japanese leaders.18 Feng Zhaokui, a leading Japan expert in China, criticized Japan for missing this opportunity, warning that “one hand clapping makes no sound.”19 The reluctance of China’s new leaders to shift to a more hard-line approach to Japan was evident in their incremental responses to Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. After Koizumi’s 2002 visit, Chinese leaders postponed confidence-building measures and held off on bilateral summits. Defense Minister Chi Haotian told a visiting Japanese delegation that had China allowed military exchanges, the events would have drawn a negative reaction from the Chinese people.20 After Koizumi’s third visit to the shrine on January 14, 2003, the Chinese reaction was slightly stronger. The Foreign Ministry criticized the visit as “erroneous,” noting that it “seriously undermines the political foundation of China– Japan relations and hurts the feelings of the people of the victim Asian countries, including China.” As Ming Wan writes, “Beijing aimed to take measures that were sufficiently high profile to send a clear message of discontent without compromising interests . . . that have a greater substantial impact on China’s long-term economic and political interests.”21 Indeed, Chinese leaders continued to meet Koizumi abroad. On May 31, 2003, in St. Petersburg, Russia, Hu Jintao refrained from raising the Yasukuni issue, emphasizing instead the two countries’ long history of good relations and calling for a strategic approach to the relationship. Hu Jintao again met Koizumi on October 20, 2003, in Bangkok, where he called for “continually expanding the common interests” between them.22 Working-level bilateral visits also continued in 2003, yielding agreements on energy conservation, financial coordination, telecommunications research, and environmental protection.23 In early August, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary and Defense Minister both traveled to China, while China’s Foreign Minister and the Chairman of the National People’s Congress visited Japan. The two sides held a military dialogue on September 1 and a Foreign Ministry

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dialogue on November 22, and arranged for a rare visit to Japan by the head of Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office on October 31, 2003.24 During this period, Chinese diplomats continued to consult quietly with their Japanese counterparts about the possibility of removing the markers for the souls of convicted Class A war criminals from the Yasukuni Shrine. As a prominent Japan expert in Beijing explained to me, “An agreement on this issue would have addressed China’s major objection on the shrine, and could have cleared the path to a resolution of this issue. These talks were ongoing throughout 2002. Yet as Koizumi kept going to Yasukuni, it became impossible for Beijing to compromise. The ‘average people’ [laobaixing] in China would not have understood.”25 Only after Koizumi’s fourth visit to Yasukuni on January 1, 2004, did China’s leadership finally began to give up on engaging him. Street protests, online criticism, and popular media in China denounced the 2004 event.26 “This visit,” stated a Chinese scholar privately, “was the final straw. There was no way to meet [publicly] with Koizumi after that.”27 In short, from 2002 through 2005, China’s relations with Japan were characterized by divisions among top policy makers and rising bilateral tensions. As Sydney Tarrow notes, such political opportunity structures serve as a “set of clues for when contentious politics may emerge.”28 We turn now to four instances of contentious politics from 2002 through 2005 and trace their influence on Chinese policy making.

CASE ONE: BUILDING A HIGH-SPEED RAIL LINE China’s plans to build a high-speed train linking Beijing and Shanghai date back to 1990. In December 1999 the National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC) of the State Council was approved to start implementing the project; progress was slowed by debates among Chinese experts over the type of technology to use, the proportion of domestic versus foreign involvement, and which country’s version of the technology to use: the Japanese shinkansen (the “bullet train”), the German magnetic-levitation (mag-lev) system, or the French rail technology. The economic potential of the overall high-speed rail project was immense, estimated in 2003 at over $10 billion USD, and offered foreign firms a potential monopoly on what might quickly become the world’s largest high-speed train market.29 Initially a German consortium was reportedly in the lead, aided by their involvement with building the Shanghai airport line. Then in 2002, the Chinese side became angry with the Germans over issues of technology transfer,

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cost overruns, and technical problems.30 Around the same time, Chinese officials openly warmed to the Japanese bid. On September 24, 2002, Chinese leaders meeting with Ogi Chikage, Japan’s Minister of Transportation, suggested that perhaps shinkansen-type technology would be more appropriate for China instead of the German mag-lev. Ogi immediately returned to Japan and put together a high-powered Japan Shinkansen Promotion Committee headed by former Prime Minister Fukuda. This committee came to China several times over the next year to promote the project.31 At the same time, a number of China’s Japan experts urged the Chinese government to offer contracts to Japan, seeing the project as a chance to shift from “cold politics, hot economics” to “politics promotes economics, and economics promotes politics.”32 As one expert pointed out in his meetings with Foreign Ministry officials, Deng Xiaoping himself had ridden on the Japanese shinkansen in 1978 and was very impressed with the technology.33 In early 2003, a researcher familiar with the project from China’s Railway Ministry’s Science Research Institute stated that “the possibility of selecting Japan’s shinkansen was already greater than 90 percent. Even though it required approval by the top leadership, the essential explanation behind the approval was already done and the only thing left to do was the procedural aspects of the auditing.”34 The research project under the Ministry of Railroad’s research academy for developing China’s own high-speed railroad was canceled, even though it had been going on for over 20 years, had established patents, and estimated speeds even higher than Japan’s shinkansen trains.35 The Railroad Ministry released an internal report announcing their plan to award contracts to Japanese firms.36 In April 2003, Japan’s Economic News reported that “China’s high-level leaders have told Japanese railroad executives that the possibility of China choosing Japanese technology is 95 percent.”37 Indeed, President Hu Jintao told Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on May 31, 2003 that he would like to factor China– Japan cooperation into the rail project.38 Japanese officials expected that China would award contracts to Japan before the end of 2003, as part of commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.39 Before the summer of 2003, there was no sign of any significant debate over the domestic political ramifications of Japanese involvement.

Public Mobilization Begins Chinese activists’ campaign against Japanese involvement in the rail project began with a comment posted on a Chinese online bulletin board in October

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2002 warning that Japan was about to receive the high-speed rail contracts. Chinese Internet discussions grew more heated in spring 2003, as Japanese media reported that Japan was sure to gain contracts.40 These reports finally spread to Chinese-language press in mid-July, with similar stories in a Hong Kong newspaper.41 In response, on July 19, 2003, the Alliance of Patriots Web site started an online petition declaring, “We refuse the use of Japanese products for the Beijing–Shanghai train.”42 They warned against allowing Japan to “reinvade” China, drawing parallels with the Manchurian railroad built by Japan and used in its invasion of China.43 A number of other sites soon began to include links to this page. On July 29, organizers submitted some 82,752 signatures to the Ministry of Railroads in Beijing, declaring later to reporters that the petition “had a definite impact” on Chinese officials.44 By early August 2003, a number of articles on the issue began to appear in influential Chinese newspapers and news magazines.45 Beijing Youth News editorialized strongly in support of the sign-on campaign and against giving contracts to Japan. The paper argued that although the Japanese government might have successfully convinced the Chinese government, it made a “strategic mistake” by not considering the emotions of the Chinese people.46 In response, the Propaganda Department quickly issued internal orders for newspapers to avoid any “autonomous, self-initiated reporting” on the highspeed rail issue.47 When Ogi Chikage, Japan’s Minister of Transport, came to China on August 3, 2003, she found a radically different reception than she had received the previous year. On her September 2002 visit, Chinese officials spoke to her encouragingly of the Japanese bid. Just a year later, she found herself unable to even secure a meeting with the Minister of Railroads or top Chinese leaders. Vice-Premier Huang Ju explained vaguely that China’s experts were evaluating the situation. Zhang Guobao, Vice Director of the NDRC, the institution directly responsible for the project, told Ogi bluntly that “domestically in China, there is debate” over the Japanese technology, explaining, “we will make a decision after listening to the Chinese citizens’ public opinion.”48 Chinese railway officials later confirmed to reporters that China’s cold reaction to Ogi’s visit was due in large part to their concern with public reactions.49 Ogi responded by downplaying expectations, telling Japanese reporters she did not expect a “concrete result” on this trip. A high-powered Keidanren delegation decided on August 8 to postpone a planned shinkansen-promotion visit to China.50 In response, Beijing’s International Herald declared, “In the current situation, as Chinese citizens’ rights of political participation are growing stronger, Internet nationalism is definitely having a clear influence upon

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government policy.”51 Other newspaper editorials praised activists for providing “support and reinforcement” for the Chinese government in standing up to Japan.52 In Japan, politicians attacked Chinese officials for their timidity while the Mainichi Shinbun editorialized against the project, warning that given the state of anti-Japan sentiment in China, an accident on a Japanesebuilt train would lead to even worse protests.53 As public pressure continued to mount, Chinese officials delayed making a decision. Soon after the Ogi visit, China’s Railroad Ministry held a closeddoor high-level meeting in which debates focused on domestic political reactions. The director of investment for the powerful NDRC, Zhang Hanya, emerged to state that the decision on Japan’s bid would depend upon “Japan’s attitude” and that political considerations were central.54 The next week, the Railway Ministry issued a rare public statement denying reports that China would use exclusively “a certain country’s” technology in the project.55 One Chinese official told Japanese reporters in December 2003 that the new Hu Jintao administration could not ignore public opinion on this matter.56 The next month, another Chinese official admitted that “politics is not an absolute factor [in this decision], but it definitely cannot be excluded.”57 In March 2004, Cheng Yonghua, a counselor in the Chinese embassy in Tokyo, emphasized Internet debates and societal opposition to the Japanese bid when meeting with Japanese journalists.58 Meanwhile, coverage of the ongoing petition campaign in the international press and on Hong Kong TV amplified public emotions.59 One early indicator of the impact of public pressure was the new policy announced by the Railway Ministry in early 2004 that all new highspeed rail cars made for the sixth round of the “improving rail speed” project could not be exclusively foreign-made, but had to be joint bids between Chinese and foreign companies.60 On August 30, 2004, Chinese officials announced that Japanese firms had received contracts to build 80 high-speed trains, with a French consortium to supply 60 trains and Canadian firms to supply 20 trains.61 Chinese activists quickly organized a new petition campaign urging, “China Should Build China’s Railways” (Zhongguo tielu; zhongguo zao), aimed at delivering one million signatures to the Railway Ministry.62 The petition called for a reversal of the decision, as well as public hearings on the decision and the creation of a supervisory body under the National People’s Congress to oversee the project. Within a single day, the Patriot’s Alliance Web site collected 68,733 signatures.63 The next day, the site was shut down by government officials and all online references to the petition campaign were blocked in China.64 Still, subsequent government decisions actually matched the demands of the

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protesters almost perfectly. The Chinese government pledged that it would use a more open bidding process to deal with subsequent bids.65 Japanese companies failed to win any more contracts, even though German and French companies succeeded in doing so.66 In December 2004, Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei told a visiting Japanese Diet delegation, “We are facing high anti-Japan sentiment in China. If our government adopts the shinkansen technique in the railway project, the people would have (negative) opinions.”67 When foreign news agencies reported on November 23, 2005 that China was planning to order an additional 60 trains from the Japanese consortium, Chinese officials quickly and vociferously denied the claims in the Chinese media.68 Finally, on March 7, 2006, the NDRC announced that China would build a conventional high-speed railway with Chinese technology for the Beijing–Shanghai line, and a mag-lev train between Shanghai and Hangzhou. Apparently seeking to appease the public, Railway Minister Liu Zhijun announced, somewhat inaccurately, that the Beijing–Shanghai line would use entirely domestic technology.69

Explaining the Outcome At first glance, Japanese government policy appears to be a plausible explanation for China’s decision not to award contracts to Japanese firms. From September 2002, when Japanese firms seemed likely to receive contracts, through the final decision that Chinese firms would build the rail line, announced in March 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine four times: on April 21, 2002; January 14, 2003; January 1, 2004; and October 17, 2005. Chinese policy makers expressed growing anger at Koizumi’s visits, halted bilateral summits, reduced Chinese support for military confidence-building projects, and slowed bilateral talks on disputed maritime regions. The rail project decision could have been another instance of Chinese leaders demonstrating their displeasure with Koizumi. However, the public mobilization explanation more closely correlates with Chinese rhetoric, negotiating stances, and policy decisions. In both public and private statements, Chinese officials and leaders repeatedly referred to domestic pressure in explaining their difficulty in awarding bids to Japanese firms. They did not use the rail project as leverage to pressure Koizumi not to go to Yasukuni, though this would have been a plausible negotiating strategy. The timing of policy decisions also more closely reflects the impact of the rise of public pressure. Up through June 2003, before public mobilization began, media reports in China and Japan and public statements by Chinese leaders

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all indicated that Japanese firms were likely to be awarded rail contracts, even though Koizumi had already visited Yasukuni three times. There was also a discrepancy between policy on the Yaskuni visits and the rail line. In November 2004, Chinese diplomats were quietly exploring possible solutions to the Yasukuni standoff with their Japanese counterparts, while at home Chinese officials were repeatedly denying to the Chinese public that Japanese firms would win any further bids. The final decision to use primarily Chinese firms was announced in March 2006, exactly at the point when Chinese leaders were already seeking ways to reengage the next Japanese prime minister. Public mobilization also shaped the decision-making process. Before spring 2003, the decision was dominated by a closed-door bureaucratic process controlled by the Railway Ministry and the NDRC in which technical and cost concerns were primary. After public protests began in summer 2003, the decision became a highly contested choice with substantial domestic political costs for the Chinese leadership. Public protest interjected emotional factors and forced a more public debate while delaying progress. Railway officials later indicated in private interviews that public emotion became a critical factor in their considerations after 2003, even worrying that people might damage Japanese-built trains or otherwise sabotage the project if Japanese technology was used.70 Jin Xide, a leading Japan expert who had publicly called for awarding the contracts to Japan, explained that after the public outcry began in July 2003, the decision by Chinese leaders became far more complicated.71 The emergence of public mobilization was driven by individual activists, Internet organizing, and news leaks from abroad, not by the Chinese government. Indeed, the government shut down Web sites critical of the initial decision to award partial contacts to Japanese firms. Public pressure was not the only element in this decision; a number of other factors also could have swayed officials against awarding contracts to Japan. In a November 26, 2004, speech at China’s Foreign Affairs College, Xu Kuangdi, the president of China’s Engineering Institute and former Mayor of Shanghai, argued against using Japanese-style technology due to technical and cost considerations.72 There was also an internal push from within China not to follow the example of the auto industry of simply producing cars for foreign brands, but to instead develop indigenous high-speed rail technology. Indeed, China’s desire to engage in domestic production was criticized by German media as “economic nationalism.”73 However, the wave of public mobilization was clearly an important factor. It broadened the scope of the decision-making process, delayed decisions, interjected the element of public emotion into officials’ calculations, and so affected the final decision. As one

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Japan expert in Beijing later mused: “This project could have been a major support for China– Japan relations, linking the two countries together. Instead, it became a major problem in the relationship.”74

CASE TWO: JAPAN’S POISONOUS LEGACY During their invasion of China (1937–45), Japanese armies engaged in research on chemical warfare on human subjects and implemented an estimated 2,000 chemical attacks around China. As the war ended, Japanese units disposed of vast amounts of chemical weapons and agents by such crude methods as burial, dumping them in rivers, or mixing them in with ordinary weapons. The bulk of the known weapons were later buried in Jilin province by Chinese forces. Chinese estimates are of a total of 2 million weapons still in China; Japan’s official estimates are of 700,000 weapons.75 From 1949 to 1990, the Chinese government essentially ignored the abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) issue, leaving localities to manage the problem on their own.76 Even today, the government remains ambivalent toward the compensation lawsuits filed since 1996 by Chinese ACW victims in Japanese courts.77 As chapter 2 noted, Chinese leaders first raised the ACW issue in bilateral meetings with Japanese leaders in 1996 in preparation for ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).78 On July 30, 1999 the two sides signed an accord in which Japan undertook responsibility for the cleanup and destruction of ACW in China as part of its obligations under the CWC.79 From 1999 to 2003, Chinese state-run media, the Foreign Ministry Web site, and Defense White Papers all presented Japan’s management of the cleanup process in a favorable light.80 The Chinese government never insisted on compensation or apologies for individual victims, even when the accidental exposure of ACW led to injuries and deaths of Chinese citizens. When an ACW explosion in Harbin on August 28, 2001 left one person dead and another three people severely injured, Chinese news coverage of the incident was limited to a short, factual account by Xinhua.81 China’s Foreign Ministry did not issue an official statement, and Chinese leaders failed to raise the issue with their Japanese counterparts.82 Indeed, before August 2003 the ACW cleanup process seemed to be one of the few bright spots in the increasingly contentious China– Japan relationship. On August 4, 2003, Japanese ACW were accidentally exposed at a construction site in Qiqihar city, in northeast Heilongjiang province, causing 37 people to be hospitalized with severe burns and vomiting. One man had

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chemical burns over 95 percent of his body and later died. The Japanese government quickly sent a team to the area, confirmed that weapons were indeed Japanese ACW, and issued a statement of “extreme regret.”83 In meetings in Qiqihar, Chinese Foreign Ministry negotiators simply requested that Japan pay for cleanup expenses, medical treatment and disability payments for victims, and costs resulting from suspending construction work in the area.84 Top Chinese officials were similarly low-key. On August 12, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi praised Japan for demonstrating “that it attaches importance to this serious incident and [for its pledge that it] will deal with it properly and with sincerity.”85 Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, then visiting Japan, refrained from mentioning the incident in his meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi, as did President Hu Jintao when he met visiting Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo on August 10. Only Wu Bangguo, chairman of the National People’s Congress, raised the subject briefly in his meeting with Fukuda, describing ACW as “a sensitive issue for the Chinese people.”86 China’s official media was similarly restrained. On the sensitive August 15 anniversary, Xinhua stated, “With the arrival of the news that the Japanese side has admitted that the barrels of toxic material hurting people in Qiqihar are part of the chemical weapons left by Japan, victims of the 4 August incident are now able to breathe a sigh of relief.”87 Liaowang, a prominent Party-run news magazine, ran articles by leading Japan scholars in China praising Japan’s management of the issue and urging continued dialogue.88 Before August 15 there was little indication that there would be much difficulty in quickly and quietly resolving the dispute in a fashion similar to previous ACW incidents.

Public Pressure Mounts: August 15 to September 18 On August 15, 2003, the same group of activists who had spearheaded the shinkansen protest the previous month began an online petition campaign demanding that Japan apologize to and offer compensation for the victims of the Qiqihai incident. Their Web site declared, “We will definitely not allow Japan to escape legal responsibility this time.” The scope and speed of the campaign quickly outpaced the shinkansen effort. Web site organizers coordinated activities, agreed on a common message and tactics, and set up rigorous standards for evaluating signatures, eventually delivering over one million signatures to the Japanese embassy on September 18.89 The online campaign was augmented by public sign-on events around China, garnering support from fiery editorials in some of China’s most prominent activist newspapers.

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The Beijing Youth Daily declared that “condolences cannot take the place of compensation.”90 Su Xiangxiang, an activist lawyer, called for Japan to provide a broad compensation package for all Chinese victims of Japanese wartime atrocities. After one of the victims died from his injuries on August 21, the movement to boycott Japanese goods spread rapidly across the Chinese Internet, urged on by postings describing Japanese people as “little bandits” and urging Japan to “pay off its bloody debts.”91 In response to public pressure, Chinese official rhetoric grew more critical and assertive. On August 22, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the Japanese ambassador that the Chinese people had every right to be indignant and urged Japan to “take substantial action to shoulder its due responsibility for the loss of the victims and the local people and to give due explanation.”92 Central officials just below the top leaders, such as former Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, now a state counselor, and Zeng Qinghong, now a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, also urged Japan to take a responsible attitude and speed up its destruction of the ACW in meetings with Japanese visitors on August 23 and 25. However, Chinese officials’ rhetoric remained restrained, simply expressing “hope” (xiwang) that Japan would settle the issue quickly and reasonably.93 Seeking to resolve the situation, Japanese officials quietly offered their largest-ever single payment to Chinese ACW victims, 100 million yen (US$856,000). In line with Japan’s practice since 1999, the money would be labeled “sympathy funds,” drawn from Japan’s ACW cleanup budget. The Japanese offer was certainly sufficient to meet the demands issued by the Chinese government immediately after the Qiqihair incident and normally would have been sufficient to resolve the dispute.94 However, the offer was revealed by Japan’s Mainichi Shinbum on September 2 and quickly distributed across the Chinese Internet. Chinese activists reacted by immediately delivering the online petition letter, currently signed by over 300,000 people, to the Japanese embassy in Beijing in advance of the bilateral talks in Beijing on September 4–5. They hoped to “put pressure on the Japanese government” and “support” Chinese negotiators.95 In fact, the activists’ demands went far beyond, and in places contradicted, established Chinese government policy.96 While Chinese officials began to ramp up their demands in response to public pressure, Japanese diplomats dug their heels in. Negotiations stagnated and public mobilization continued to mount. Popular Chinese media urged Japan to deal with the ACW issue in order to satisfy public sentiments in China. Global Times denounced Japan for not declaring its funds “compensation.” Private Chinese lawyers representing the family of the man who died from the Qiqihair incident publicly demanded US$2.7 million in

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compensation.97 Beijing Youth News endorsed this, warning that the experience of Chinese compensation lawsuits in Japan “teaches us that in the difficult road ahead of us, we must steadfastly ‘fight’ ever onward.”98 Anti-Japanese public sentiments received another boost following reports of the September  16–18 sex scandal in Zhuhai reportedly involving 380 male Japanese tourists and 500 Chinese prostitutes.99 The online petition was completed on September 18 and delivered to the Japanese embassy with the names and addresses of 1.2 million signatories.100 On the same day, the South China Morning Post, an independent Hong Kong paper, ran an article urging: “Chinese leaders must take seriously the people who have signed the online campaign and registered their grievances with Japan.”101 A national public opinion poll conducted by China Youth Daily revealed broad public support for activists’ demands: 83 percent held that the Qiqihar incident had damaged the image of Japan, 86 percent believed Japan was trying to escape its responsibilities, 83 percent said their impression of Japan worsened when they heard the Japanese government refused to use the word “compensation” in aiding the victims, and 85 percent thought Japan should make a public apology as well as providing monetary compensation to victims. Fewer than 5 percent thought that “maintaining Sino-Japanese friendship” was more important than a public apology. 102 Although the poll was skewed toward urban youth, a more rigorous 2002 national survey by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences yielded similar results—88.8 percent of respondents agreed that the Japanese government should play a role in providing compensation and only 1.6 percent felt that no compensation for Chinese wartime victims was necessary.103 Reflecting this public pressure, top Chinese officials’ negotiating posture soon became more assertive. On October 3, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing issued China’s first strong public “demand” (yaoqiu) to the Japanese ambassador to China, Koreshige Anami, noting that the incident “has touched off strong dissatisfaction among the Chinese public as well as the victims.” 104 Four days later, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told Prime Minister Koizumi in a meeting in Bali that the most pressing task in bilateral relations was to resolve the issue, pledging that “such an effort will help remove the unpleasant feeling in the hearts of the Chinese people.”105 On October 19, the two sides finally reached an agreement. Japan promised to pay 300 million yen (US$2.75 million) directly to the Chinese government to cover “costs in relation to the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons,” which the Chinese government pledged to distribute to the people and organizations concerned in an “appropriate manner.” Japan officially requested that the Chinese government explain that the funds were not “compensation” for victims, but the

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Chinese Foreign Ministry quickly pledged to use the money to “compensate” the victims.106 In his meeting with Koizumi on October 20, Hu Jintao stated, “The Japanese side should take measures to quickly fulfill the agreement and compensate the victims as early as possible” (italics added).107 After this, the Chinese government quickly resumed its positive tone about Japan’s ACW cleanup.108 In subsequent ACW incidents, the two sides worked closely together to quickly and quietly resolve potential disputes before the Chinese public could get involved.109

Explaining the Outcome Chinese rhetoric, negotiating strategy, and policy all closely reflect the impact of public mobilization. Beijing’s negotiating demands and public rhetoric were limited immediately following the incident, and only grew more assertive as public mobilization mounted. The online protests were initiated and sustained by individual activists. Similar to the shinkansen incident, the key media report sparking public mobilization came from a news source outside China and was spread rapidly through postings on the Chinese Internet. In contrast, China’s official media urged the public to remain calm and praised Japan’s response to the incident.110 Chinese phrasing in announcing the final agreement also indicated officials’ sensitivity to the public’s demands for “compensation.” Before 2003, the Chinese government had never contested Japanese payment amounts for victims, never demanded that funds be labeled “compensation,” and never negotiated on behalf of individual victims— all policies taken from August to October 2003. Yet once public mobilization died down, China’s policies reverted to this status quo. Japan’s policies cannot explain this outcome: Japan responded more quickly and more generously to the Qiqihair incident than to any similar incident previously or since. Prime Minister Koizumi made no visit to Yasukuni between the incident in August 2003 and its resolution in October. Of course, Chinese authorities could have tried to restrain all protests and negative media coverage of the incident. However, such an action would have had high costs as well—the Party would have appeared to be siding with Japan against Chinese ACW victims. Instead, Chinese officials likely calculated that tolerating the initial displays of public pressure would strengthen their negotiating leverage with Japan. This decision provided a structural opening for public mobilization to emerge and grow quickly, increasing the government’s costs of suppression. Trapped between Japanese intransigence and mounting public pressure, Chinese leaders had little choice but to take a

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highly public stance in demanding significant concessions from Japan. One activist involved in the online protests later described the leaders’ dilemma to me by citing a Chinese proverb: “Having mounted the tiger; it is difficult to dismount” (qihu nanxia).111

CASE THREE: THE 2004 DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE The Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands are a clump of five islets and three barren rocks 200 miles off the Chinese coast, northeast of Taiwan. As chapter 2 explained, China, Japan, and Taiwan all claim the islands based on history and geography. China’s long-standing policy has been to declare de jure sovereignty over the islands while urging joint development. Beijing criticizes Japanese efforts to realize or demonstrate sovereignty claims, but refrains from taking steps to directly challenge Japan’s de facto control over the islands, a policy praised by a leading PLA scholar as “pragmatic.”112 China’s stance held firm during disputes over the islands in 1992 and again in 1996. This moderation has frustrated domestic activists. As one fumed privately, “China is too passive on this issue—even willing to accept joint development on undisputed Chinese territory. How can you ‘share’ your sovereign territory with another country? That’s like sharing your wife with another man!”113 The longer China refrains from directly challenging Japan’s “effective control” over the islands, the more consolidated and internationally recognized Japan’s title to the islands is likely to become through the legal principle of “acquisitive prescription.”114 In 2004, for the first time, mainland Chinese baodiao (Protect Diaoyu) activists precipitated a crisis in which the Chinese government was forced to directly challenge Japan’s effective control over the islands. On March 24, seven activists sailed without any notice to Chinese authorities and successfully landed on the islands.115 One of the activists later told me: “We kept the trip secret, so the Chinese government couldn’t stop us. After landing on the rocks, we were quickly picked up by the Japanese Coast Guard. We demanded to sail our boats back to China, but the Japanese Coast Guard refused, saying it was too dangerous. We began a hunger strike in protest, and they soon took us to a holding station in Japan.”116 The Japanese Coast Guard then formally arrested the seven activists on charges of violating immigration laws. In Beijing, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui quickly demanded that “the Japanese side protect their personal security, and immediately release them without condition. Otherwise, the situation will expand and grow

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more complicated, and certainly will arouse the powerful indignation of the Chinese people.”117 At the same time, Chinese activists began a protest outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing, demanding the activists’ immediate release and burning Japanese flags. Although a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson called the flag burning “extremist,” he also defended protesters’ “rightful use of their constitutional right to free speech.”118 The Central Propaganda Department quickly issued internal orders for Chinese newspapers to avoid coverage of the protests.119 On the evening of March 25, Chinese Ambassador Wu Dawei delivered a strong demand in Tokyo to the Japanese Foreign Ministry for the activists’ immediate release, referring to the danger of worsening public sentiments if the situation was allowed to continue.120 The combination of Ambassador Wu’s unexpected visit and the flag burning in Beijing clearly shook Japanese officials. The Japanese Ambassador to China, Anami Koreshige, reportedly told a meeting of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, “I cannot remember flag burning ever having happened in front of the embassy in the presence of Chinese police.” That evening, senior Foreign Ministry officials held hurried meetings to discuss the issue, and at the behest of Prime Minister Koizumi, the decision was made to release the seven Chinese activists the next day.121 They left Japan on the evening of March 26, and the crisis was over. Lu Yunfei, a longtime activist, quickly claimed victory, telling reporters, “The incident marks a big victory in China’s diplomacy towards Japan. Japan released our seven heroes under the guise of ‘forced repatriation,’ which is just a way for them to save face. Japan actually sent them back without any conditions, as we demanded.”122 Yet as soon as the activists were released, the Chinese government took steps to contain domestic public sentiments while signaling appreciation to Japan. The activists were taken into custody immediately upon their return to China, denying them a public reception in Shanghai or Beijing.123 Public security officials called a leading baodiao activist at this time to warn him not to talk to the media and deter him from organizing any further protests. “Don’t be too happy with yourself (bie tai deyi),” they stated. “You guys have caused us a lot of trouble (mafan) with this.”124 The day after the activists were returned, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing promptly called Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, noting China’s appreciation for the quick return of the activists and emphasizing the importance China placed on relations with Japan.125 Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan reaffirmed that “we have an indisputable claim to these islands,” but added that China expected that “through peaceful negotiation we can come to narrow some differences.”126 Both governments quickly took

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steps to stop activists from sailing to the islands and exacerbating the dispute further.127 The crisis then seemed to evaporate almost as fast as it had emerged. Although both sides canceled upcoming bilateral talks on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Premier Wen Jiabao made a point of meeting with visiting Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi on April 3 and offering reassurances on China’s Diaoyu policy. The only sign of the previous week’s crisis was Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s last-minute absence from a signing ceremony for Japanese yen loans to China, a decision possibly influenced by concern about how it might look for China to be taking Japanese money only a week after Chinese citizens were arrested by Japan for traveling to territory claimed by China.128 Bilateral talks on a mutual notification agreement over disputed maritime regions resumed in Beijing on April 22, less than a month after the landing.

Explaining the Outcome China’s long-standing Diaoyu policy has been to argue for the shelving of sovereignty disputes while pursuing joint development. The 2004 landing incident reversed these priorities: compelling the Chinese government to reiterate its sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu Islands, heightening Japanese anxiety over the sovereignty issue, and undermining support within Japan for joint exploration. The Chinese government did not instigate the incident; it discouraged public involvement and kept the official media under tight wraps.129 As one Chinese scholar later explained, “Those activists brought the government into the issue as it was the government who had to intervene after the seven were arrested. It’s a disturbance to China’s diplomatic route of a peaceful rise.”130 Public protests were also used by Chinese negotiators as part of a two-level game strategy. Diplomats warned Japan that public anger would grow rapidly if the activists were not immediately released. In order to bolster the credibility of this threat, Beijing permitted the flag-burning protests in front of the Japanese embassy. This tactic strengthened China’s bargaining position by shrinking their win set and presenting a shortened timetable. Allowing small domestic protests while restraining media coverage was largely successful because of the brevity of the incident. If Japan had refused to return the activists quickly, blocking the flow of information and emotion from Hong Kong media to the Chinese public would have proven almost impossible. Ming Pao, an independent Hong Kong paper, issued a fiery editorial entitled Diaoyu Activists A re Patriots; China Must Protect Them , in which it

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attacked “China’s forbearance . . . as cowardice.” The paper insisted, “Beijing should dump its policy of mollifying Japan. It should take a tough stand when dealing with matters concerning sovereignty and territorial integrity.”131 If allowed to spread across mainland China, such sentiments certainly would have inspired further protests. Most significantly, Chinese activists contributed to a spiral dynamic of mounting tensions by forcing the Japanese government to strongly reassert its sovereignty claims.132 The Japanese House of Representatives Security Committee responded to the 2004 landing by calling for the government to “exercise extreme vigilance” around the islands.133 The Japanese government quickly announced that it would renew the annual contract to lease three of the disputed islands from Japanese citizens. The China Daily warned, quite accurately, that the bill was “an attempt by the Japanese to domestically legalize their claim of sovereignty over the archipelago.”134 A month after the landing, Japanese right-wing activists drove a van into China’s consulate in Osaka, sparking another flag-burning protest at the Japanese embassy in Beijing.135 The next year, the Japanese government responded to domestic pressure to take control of a lighthouse built by Japanese activists on the islands, which Japan’s Coast Guard promptly pledged to defend against “illegal incursions.”136 In turn, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced the move as “illegal and invalid,” while Chinese activists vowed to return to the island and destroy the lighthouse.137 As one PLA scholar argued after the 2004 landing, “the strengthening of public opinion and popular nationalism on both sides has worsened this issue, noticeably increasing the difficulty for both governments to control tensions.”138

CASE FOUR: JAPAN’S PURSUIT OF A UN SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT The most significant impact of the wave of public mobilization came in the massive online and street demonstrations against Japan’s pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). These unexpectedly large protests halted Beijing’s efforts to stabilize diplomatic relations and instead led Chinese leaders to openly declare their opposition to Japan’s bid for a UNSC seat. Japan took no major action between midMarch and mid-April, which would explain China’s dramatic policy reversal at that time. Before mid-March, however, the Japanese government did take a number of steps that could have sparked a hostile Chinese response. These included:

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• December 10: Japan released its 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines, suggesting for the first time that China might pose a threat to Japan.139 • December 27: Lee Teng-hui, the former President of Taiwan, visited Japan. • February 9: Japan assumed control of a lighthouse built by Japanese activists on the Diaoyu Islands. Japan’s Coast Guard announced that it would increase its vigilance against “illegal incursions” into the island range. • February 19: U.S. and Japanese defense officials issued a joint statement encouraging “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue,” the first time Taiwan had explicitly been mentioned in the context of the U.S.– Japan alliance since 1969. • Mid-February: Japanese officials openly lobbied the European Union not to end EU sanctions on arms transfers to China. • March 4: Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura called for China to alter the “anti-Japanese” tone of its historical education and to “modify” the displays at war memorials around China.140 • March 6: Japan announced plans to reduce yen loans to China by 10 percent in the coming year and cease all yen loans to China by 2008.141 • March 11: Details of the controversial new Japanese history textbooks were reported in South Korean media, sparking protests in Korea. • March 12: Mayor Nagateru Ohama of Ishigaki city in Okinawa prefecture announced his plan to “inspect” the Diaoyu Islands.

Rather than overreact to Japan’s policies, in early March Chinese policy makers embarked on a diplomatic effort to stabilize bilateral relations. The first signal came on March 6 in Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing’s press conference during the annual National People’s Congress (NPC) meetings in Beijing.142 Li emphasized China’s “set policy to develop good neighborly and friendly relations of long-term stability with Japan” and the importance of taking a “strategic and long-term view” in the relationship while striving to “continuously deepen and strengthen the mutually beneficial cooperation in all areas, and expand our common interests.” Li did not mention Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, instead praising the “leaders of both countries” for trying to stabilize ties and noting that “the leaders of China and Japan have continued to meet on multilateral occasions, where they all held very good conversations.”143 Chinese official media followed Li’s press conference with articles emphasizing China’s national interests in positive relations with Japan and arguing that China’s Japan policy should not follow the “emotionalism” of a few members of the populace.144 During the NPC meeting, Chinese leaders also resisted a grassroots push by delegates to expand commemoration of the

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Nanjing Massacre and rejected their calls for September 18, the anniversary of Japan’s invasion of northeast China, to be recognized as a national “Day of Humiliation.”145 On March 14, Premier Wen Jiabao unveiled the new outreach to Japan in his press conference after the NPC. Echoing Prime Minister Koizumi’s January 21 description of Japan– China relations as of “utmost importance,” Wen declared that the relationship was “most important” (zui zhongyao). Wen proposed “Three Principles and Three Suggestions” to address the current political obstacles. The first principle emphasized Japanese wartime suffering and urged the Japanese government to seize the sixtieth anniversary of the war’s end as an “opportunity to promote friendship between the two countries.” Wen clarified that China is only “concerned with the [U.S.– Japan] alliance because it is related to the Taiwan issue,” and urged the expansion of economic cooperation. Wen also suggested that “conditions should be vigorously created to promote a high-level exchange of visits between China and Japan,” and called for the foreign ministries to “work together to launch strategic studies on ways and means to promote friendship between the two countries.” Wen concluded by calmly noting that “problems left by history should be properly addressed.”146 The next day, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing called Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura to reiterate the significance of Wen’s proposal.147 Chinese official media also gave extensive favorable coverage to Koizumi’s March 15 statement “welcoming” and expressing “support” for Wen Jiabao’s statement.148 Chinese diplomats began to plan for Vice Premier Wu Yi to visit Japan in May to attend the Aichi Exposition, a presumed first step toward a potential resumption of leaders’ visits. In order to ensure a favorable event, Japan’s Foreign Ministry had already announced that it would revoke all travel permission for Taiwan passport holders for the duration of the exposition. China’s official media also began to run encouraging stories of Chinese leaders welcoming Japanese cultural delegations.149 A week later, the Japanese government responded to Wen Jiabao’s olive branch by issuing a cross-ministry plan to improve relations with China through exchanges and joint research, economic cooperation, and joint development of the East Sea oil and gas fields.150 Both Xinjing Bao, a popular Beijing daily paper, and leading Chinese scholars praised the effort and urged Chinese participation.151 China’s Japan experts also spoke out in influential media, warning that the downturn in relations was damaging China’s national interests and that the two sides might become “adversaries” (duishou) if the slide was not arrested.152

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Public Mobilization Begins Just as Chinese diplomats were consolidating the outreach to Japan, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued his March 21 statement calling for increased involvement in UN decision making by those countries that contribute most to the UN financially, militarily, and diplomatically. Worried that the report signaled that Japan might finally obtain its long-sought UNSC seat, overseas Chinese activists started an online petition campaign that soon spread to the mainland, aimed at delivering millions of signatures to Secretary-General Annan in opposition to Japan’s bid. As noted earlier, this was tacitly encouraged by a Foreign Ministry spokesman’s March 24 comment during a press conference that the petition campaign reflected a “responsible” act to make Japan reflect on its historical wrongs rather than “anti-Japan sentiments.”153 Aided by government tolerance, previous petition campaigns, and a highly mobilized atmosphere, the public response was overwhelming. Within a week, there were over 2.5 million signatories, with public sign-on events being held in cities across China.154 One sign-on event in downtown Guangzhou garnered 80,000 signatures in its first day.155 The consumer boycott of Japanese goods also began to pick up pace, with Web sites urging the Chinese public: “Love Our China; Boycott Japanese Goods.”156 On the weekend of April 2–3, the first of several street protests began in cities across China. After conservative Japanese history textbooks were formally released on April 5, massive street protests broke out on April 9 in several cities. In Beijing, protesters surrounded the Japanese embassy, smashing more than 20 windows and vandalizing Japanese businesses.157 The following weekend, marches of several thousand people were reported in cities including Tianjin, Shenyang, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hangzhou. Shanghai protests drew up to 20,000 people and garnered international attention after demonstrators threw rocks at the Japanese consulate and vandalized Japanese cars and businesses.158 In Shenzhen, the site of strikes against Japanese factories in late 2004, the April 2005 protests forced the city government to deploy a massive riot police force to prevent striking workers, mostly migrant women, from sparking a broad wave of anti-Japanese protest.159 The China Labor Bulletin wrote: The present strike . . . contains echoes of the strikes directed at Japanese enterprises that exploded in the 1920s, fueling nationalist and revolutionary movements. It also evokes the Chinese government’s worst fears during the

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1989 movement upsurge: that workers might join the protests on the side of students and intellectuals.160

The protests were initially tolerated by Chinese leaders, who likely saw them as a useful tool for diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis Japan. Members of the People’s Armed Police in Beijing later complained that they had not even received clear instructions from their superiors about how to deal with the demonstrations, which turned out to be far more widespread and extreme than expected.161 Publicly, Chinese officials attributed the April 2005 protests to “Japan’s wrong attitudes and actions on a series of issues such as its history of aggression.” When Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura rushed to Beijing to express his concern about protesters’ violence, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing declared pointedly, “The Chinese government has never done anything for which it has to apologize to the Japanese people.”162 Premier Wen Jiaobao even suggested on national television that the demonstrations should cause Japan to reconsider its pursuit of a permanent UNSC seat.163 Yet after the violent Shanghai protests, Chinese officials quickly shifted to a familiar blend of propaganda and crackdowns to halt demonstrations. Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing warned 3,500 propaganda officials that “the masses . . . must believe in the party and the government’s ability to properly handle all issues linked to Sino-Japanese relations.” The People’s Daily urged young people to act “calmly and reasonably” toward Japan, while Shanghai’s Party-run Liberation Daily denounced the protests as part of an “evil plot” with “ulterior motives” designed to undermine the Communist Party. A number of China’s leading activists were held temporarily, while others received phone calls or visits by Public Security Bureau officials warning them to halt all protest activities.164

Beijing Reverses Course Even as the Chinese government was cracking down on public protests, policy toward Japan shifted sharply to reflect the demonstrators’ demands. In mid-March, before the protests, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Japanese Foreign Minister Machimura had agreed “that they would take the overall situation into account, appropriately handle the sensitive issues, and further strengthen friendship and cooperation between the two sides.” Only a few weeks later, after the protests, on April 17 Li dismissed Machimura’s reference to Premier Wen Jiabao’s March 14 proposals and instead warned, “if it is left unattended, the public sentiment [in China] could landslide from

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bad to worse.”165 China’s dramatic reversal in Japan policy after the protests is particularly clear in the contrast between Wen Jiabao’s March 14 proposal and the “five-point proposal” issued by Hu Jintao during his talks with Koizumi in Jakarta, Indonesia, on April 23. Wen Jiabao had characterized the relationship as “most important,” proposed a resumption of high-level visits and joint studies between foreign ministers, downplayed tensions over history, emphasized Japanese suffering, and urged commemorations to “promote friendship between China and Japan.” Only one month later, Hu Jintao dropped all of Wen’s suggestions and his “most important” description. Instead, he took pains to clarify that the war was one of aggression and criticized Japan’s recent actions. When Koizumi issued Japan’s most public apology in a decade by expressing “deep remorse” for its wartime atrocities, Hu curtly responded that “rhetoric alone” was insufficient: “I would like you to recognize history correctly, and I would like you to translate your remorse into actual action.” Hu demanded that “things that hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and peoples of other relevant Asian countries should absolutely not be committed anymore.”166 China’s policy toward Japan’s bid to join the UNSC also shifted. Before the spring 2005 protests, China had not taken a clear stance on Japan’s membership, unlike South Korea, which had already come out in opposition. A debate was still ongoing within the Foreign Ministry and among China’s top experts about the proper approach to take in response to Japan’s bid, with conflicting recommendations to top leaders. According to one participant, Chinese leaders did not want to be alone in opposing the bid if Japan received the necessary two-thirds support in the UN General Assembly, but they were also worried about public criticism if the government acquiesced in Japan’s accession to the UNSC.167 After the protests, on May 1, China’s UN representative publicly declared for the first time that China would veto a proposal by the “Group of Five” (which included Japan) to increase the number of permanent UNSC members. A few weeks later, China issued its first White Paper on UN reform, discouraging Japan’s bid for a UNSC seat.168 Once Beijing revealed its determination to oppose the Japanese, Chinese diplomats began lobbying African states and other allies in the UN to also vote against the reform proposals.169 A number of Chinese scholars and officials insist that the unexpectedly powerful surge in public protests was an important factor in Beijing’s decision to come out strongly in opposition to Japan’s UNSC bid. One expert told me: “China accepted that India could join the UNSC, so why not Japan? Because public opinion is too negative—that’s one main reason. If the history

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issue was resolved, then maybe China could accept it [Japan’s bid to join the UNSC].”170 Peter Hays Gries agrees: “I find the circumstantial evidence compelling: China’s elite was responding to the pressures of domestic nationalist opinion.”171 Jessica Weiss is more skeptical, arguing that Chinese leaders had already decided not to support Japan’s bid, and tolerated the protests to justify this stance.172 The impact of public mobilization on China’s policy toward Japan’s UNSC seat is difficult to isolate, given that China had almost no reason to support Japan’s entry into the UNSC, but the timing of China’s announcement does suggest that public mobilization contributed to the decision to shift to a more explicit opposing stance. Aside from ongoing debates over the UNSC decision, the unexpectedly large and forceful protests clearly did influence Beijing’s decision to reverse its outreach policy toward Japan in mid-April. Japan’s policy moves on Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, yen loans, U.S. alliance, and criticism of China’s domestic education should have caused China to take a more critical approach to Japan in mid-March, rather than embark on its outreach effort at that time. The only possible alternative explanation for the timing of China’s policy reversal was the formal release of Japan’s new history textbooks on April 5. However, if this was the reason, we would not expect a new outreach policy in midMarch, just as information on the conservative new texts was already being released in South Korean media. In fact, China’s reaction came later and was more moderate than that of South Korea.173 Aside from the textbooks’ release, Japan took no major policy step that challenged Chinese interests from midMarch until mid-April. The most plausible explanation is simply that the unexpected force and scope of the public protests compelled the Chinese government to reverse its diplomatic outreach to Japan.

CONCLUSION In 2002–2003, indecision among Chinese leaders on Japan policy created a structural opening for a wave of public mobilization to emerge. As Chinese diplomats struggled to stabilize diplomatic relations, popular anger and activism toward Japan steadily mounted. In the four cases reviewed above, China’s official rhetoric, negotiating stances, and the timing, direction, and extent of policy decisions all more closely reflect the impact of public mobilization than a direct reaction to Japanese policies. Public mobilization levels and policy influence were greatest on issues with high emotional content and at points when the state lost control over the flow of information. In the

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shinkansen case, an explosion of public pressure caused a dramatic reversal in a pending policy decision that had already won the endorsement of top Chinese leaders. Subsequent policy decisions adhered to public preferences, as the government denied contracts to Japanese companies and awarded additional contracts to Chinese firms. Public pressure affected short-term policy decisions in the Diaoyu and ACW cases, though both times Chinese leaders quickly reverted to previous policies after mobilization died down. Public mobilization also shaped a “two-level game” between Chinese and Japanese negotiators, particularly in the ACW and Diaoyu cases. Chinese negotiators’ concerns with public opinion led them to insist that Japan provide compensation for ACW victims and quickly release the baodiao activists. Chinese officials permitted limited public protests as part of a strategy of signaling to Japanese negotiators that their hands were tied. This strengthened China’s negotiating position by publicly shrinking their win set, a classic twolevel game strategy. In each instance, after exacting at least partial concessions, the Chinese government moved quickly to suppress subsequent protests while reassuring Japan that China did not wish to see the dispute damage the broader bilateral relationship. Each crisis was resolved relatively smoothly in this fashion, but reiterations of this process of escalation followed by containment contributed to a spiral dynamic of mounting tensions. Public anger and protests in China generated a backlash reaction by the Japanese public and government and fostered a more assertive policy toward China. This mobilized the Chinese public even further. The spiral effect culminated in the massive online and street protests in spring 2005, which caused Chinese leaders to withdraw a major diplomatic initiative and declare their opposition to Japan’s UNSC bid. Although public pressure did influence specific policy decisions, the impact was ultimately constrained and short-lived. Faced with a crisis of spreading unrest at home and escalating diplomatic tensions abroad in the spring of 2005, Chinese policy makers soon embarked upon a broadbased initiative designed to stabilize diplomatic ties, cool public anger, and improve public opinion toward Japan. This impressive combination of initial tolerance and responsiveness to public sentiments, followed by a dramatic policy reversal supported through persuasion and repression, encapsulates Chinese leaders’ strategic response to the rise of public opinion in foreign policy.

5 A POTENT POPULISM As soon as someone tries to raise history issues, they are attacked as “damaging China– Japan friendship, damaging East Asian peace” and labeled a nationalist. . . . China’s average citizens (laobaixing) will never accept such methods. — SH I HONGTAO I N CH I NA YOUTH DAI LY , 2003

China should swallow a bitter fruit, and for the sake of the national interest, seek to overcome the history question. . . . I believe we should moderate our reactions to the history question, and that the government should cultivate a national consciousness that is friendly toward Japan, educating the people about the [limited] role of the Japanese right, and explain to them the great contributions that Japan has made to China’s economic construction. — XU E LI, TSI NG H UA U N IVE R SITY PROFESSOR, 2003, TRANS. PETE R HAYS G R I ES (2005)

n Mao’s China, debates over foreign policy took place behind closed doors. Mao Zedong, along with Zhou Enlai and a small group of top leaders, determined China’s foreign policy. Momentous decisions, such as the 1972 reception of U.S. President Richard Nixon in Beijing, were simply announced to lower-ranking officials and the general public when and how top leaders felt was appropriate. As China’s international engagement deepened during the post-Mao reform era, foreign policy became more complicated. Functional and regional expertise was required to steer the ship of state through a complex international environment. Foreign policy experts from government think tanks were slowly integrated into the policy-making process. As China reengaged the world in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, the role of experts from foreign policy think tanks and universities became more institutionalized.1 Local governments, major state-owned enterprises, and bureaucratic agencies also began to stake their claim over foreign policy. Since the turn of the century, a new group has emerged as an important player in shaping Chinese foreign policy: the public. Aided by the spread of information technology, deepening international engagement, and a vibrant private sector, a broad segment of populist intellectuals, the urban middle class, university

I

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students, and Chinese netizens have become far more informed, assertive, and engaged in China’s foreign relations. The rise of public opinion signals the arrival of a third era in the domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy. One avenue for public opinion to influence foreign policy is through engaging with policy debates among influential experts. This is a familiar pattern in democracies. Public debates about foreign policy in newspapers and policy journals, on television, and on the Internet stimulate public interest and activism, shaping public opinion and increasing the likelihood that foreign policy decisions will reflect articulated public opinion.2 A similar dynamic now occurs in China. Policy debates among specialists conducted in the public arena attract the public’s attention and spark emotional responses, providing an opening for an attentive segment of the public to enter the policy arena. As chapter 1 explained, public–expert interaction occurs both through the “reach out” model, in which experts issue controversial policy proposals or release information in order to stimulate the public’s response, and through a “reach in” process in which a mobilized public alters the course of ongoing policy debates. As the public becomes more engaged and enraged, Chinese policy makers are more likely to take public opinion into account in their decisions. The emergence of lively public debates over foreign policy does not, however, signal the inevitable onset of democracy in China. Rather, it reflects a strategic decision by Chinese leaders to occasionally tolerate public debates as a way to generate new ideas, release popular anger, and gauge public sentiments. Stimulating and tolerating public debates over policy serves as a kind of “trial balloon,” allowing leaders to test controversial new policies before adopting them. Allowing ideas to circulate between the attentive public and influential experts also creates a feedback mechanism and a seedbed for new concepts and approaches. The approach reflects a functional expectation that the best policy ideas will rise to the surface, not unlike the economic reform process in which local innovations were unofficially tolerated as a way to identify, test, and then incorporate new policies. Tolerating popular criticism of expert-sponsored ideas also creates the appearance of tolerance and responsiveness to public sentiments, letting the steam out of public anger and redirecting frustration away from the Party. In short, the state’s strategic response to the rise of a potent populism in foreign policy debates is part of an evolving governing strategy aimed at reinforcing single-party rule in China. This chapter examines policy debates over China’s relations with Japan from 1997 through 2008, spotlighting interactions between elite policy advi-

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sors and the public. To trace tends in experts’ policy analysis and recommendations, I combine quantitative content analysis of 218 academic articles with qualitative analysis of numerous Chinese writings from this decade. I then examine public interaction with experts in two debates over Japan policy: in the journal World Affairs in 2000 and again in the “new thinking” debate of 2003–04, carried out across academic journals and mainstream media as well as in conferences and online. I augment these materials with both Chinese and overseas media accounts, as well as interviews with Chinese scholars. These sources reveal the emergence of a subtle but significant shift in Chinese experts’ views of Japan. Four elements stand out: growing recognition that China’s own actions can exacerbate a security dilemma with Japan, acknowledgment of the costs of negative popular sentiments toward Japan, a more nuanced view of Japanese society and politics, and increased confidence in China’s future power position vis-à-vis Japan. A core group of experts calling for a more strategic approach to Japan first emerged in the late 1990s. Through public and private channels, they urged closer bilateral cooperation, a reduced emphasis on history issues, and the promotion of favorable public attitudes toward Japan. At the same time, the Chinese public was becoming more engaged and enraged on Japan-related issues. As the wave of public mobilization rose, the divergence between mass public opinion and elite policy experts dominated public debates over Japan policy. Online attacks by populist intellectuals and sensationalist media coverage interjected anti-Japan sentiments into elite policy discourse. Experts’ calls for strategic approaches to Japan were first widely denounced by the public and then dismissed by Chinese policy makers. Yet once public mobilization levels declined, Chinese experts resumed their previous approach toward Japan, only to find that many of their controversial proposals were now being adopted by policy makers. Just as in the foreign policy cases discussed in the previous chapter, the wave of public mobilization temporarily swamped nuanced policy debates but ultimately failed to derail the fundamental pragmatism of Chinese foreign policy. This finding challenges the long-standing consensus among Western scholars that Chinese policy making and analysis of Japan has been consistently distorted by emotions and misperceptions.3 Although popular animosity did temporarily restrain moderate approaches to Japan, the emergence, persistence, and influence of experts’ strategic approach suggests that long-term prospects for stable China– Japan relations may be far brighter than most analysts have assumed.

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SURMOUNTING HISTORY Chinese experts first began to call for a more strategic Japan policy in response to the deterioration of China– Japan relations in 1995–96. As noted earlier, a convergence of events had shaken bilateral ties: contention over commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995, Japan’s cancellation of part of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China in reaction to China’s 1995 nuclear tests, China’s 1996 military exercises near Taiwan, a maritime territorial dispute, and revisions in the U.S.– Japan security alliance in 1996–97. Jin Xide, a leading Japan scholar in China and an active participant in this process, explains that, “Around 1996 and 1997, scholars in both China and Japan began actively working on drafting possible blueprints for the Chinese–Japanese relationship for years to come. They also exchanged views on future scenarios through various channels, such as interviews, bilateral symposiums, workshops, and seminars.” In this process, Jin argues, “scholars of both sides showed changes in their approaches, from emotional ones to relatively rational ones, which were based on national interests and reality and the possible trend of the future Chinese–Japanese relationship.”4 Underlying this trend was the emergence of a new generation of Japan experts in China, many of whom had studied in Japan or had their research supported by Japan, who tried to explain Japan’s complex realities to Chinese policy elites and the general public. Yang Ningyi’s study, Understanding Japanese People, was a notable effort to highlight favorable aspects of Japanese society and culture. He urged readers to acknowledge the complex reality of modern Japan, rather than continuing to see Japan only through the distorting prism of the wartime past.5 Most remarkably, Chinese scholars soon began issuing policy recommendations strikingly similar to the subsequent “new thinking” on Japan. At a China– Japan joint symposium in Tianjin in May 1998, for instance, a number of Chinese scholars called for “surmounting history and facing the future” (chaoyue lishi, mianxiang weilai). At the conference, Jiang Lifeng, later director of the prestigious Institute of Japan Studies (IJS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), argued that history was the least important of the controversial issues in the relationship and that it would fade away as relations improved.6 Yang Bojiang, a researcher at the China Center for International Studies, called for “rational thinking” in China’s Japan policy. Yang warned that the Chinese government should be prepared for the “irreconcilability of the history problem” and so try to “contain the history problem within a realistic framework” by managing Japan policy in an interest-oriented, rational

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manner.7 Even military scholars issued newspaper articles warning of the danger of an overly “emotional” Japan policy.8 Experts delivered their arguments through public and private channels. Scholars from CASS consulted prior to Li Peng’s 1997 visit to Japan successfully urged that Li downplay history issues.9 After Jiang Zemin’s contentious 1998 trip, experts again met with Foreign Ministry officials, pointing out the backlash to Jiang’s criticism in Japan.10 He Fang, a former IJS director, wrote in the popular newspaper Global Times in May 1997 that it was inappropriate to repeatedly warn against the resurgence of Japanese militarism. He urged an objective interpretation and called for the Chinese media to report on Japan in a calm and careful manner.11 Other scholars pointed to the risk of a security dilemma, warning that China’s 1996 missile exercises near Taiwan and closer security relations with Russia would likely only strengthen the U.S.– Japan alliance.12 For Chinese economists, the 1996–97 Asian financial crisis served as a wake-up call, highlighting the need to enhance regional coordination with Japan. Yan Xuetong, an influential Tsinghua University scholar, went so far as to downplay the territorial tussle: “The effective occupation of these [disputed Diaoyu] islands has no substantial realistic interest to China, while the maintenance of a normal international relationship between Japan and China pertains to crucial political, economic, and strategic interests of China.”13 Although isolating the influence of Chinese experts on policy decisions is notoriously difficult, several examples suggest that the engagement school was particularly successful in this period. The first instance came in debates over how China should react to the U.S.– Japan security alliance enhancement in 1996–97. Liu Jiangyong, then a leading Japan expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), warned that the U.S.– Japan alliance was changing from a “cork in the bottle” containing Japan to an “eggshell for Japan to develop its conventional high-tech military strength.”14 Other CICIR scholars agreed that the alliance shifts ominously signaled Japan’s pursuit of becoming a “political power” (zhengzhi daguo),15 and so recommended that China not take part in the military dialogues then being proposed by the United States and Japan.16 Moderates from universities and CASS disagreed, arguing that the U.S.– Japan alliance would continue to contain Japan militarily and tie it closely to the United States. Ni Feng, from the Institute of American Studies of CASS, explained that “the U.S.– Japanese relationship itself will be a precondition for regional stability.”17 Another group of civilian analysts was even more sanguine, claiming that Japan would remain primarily defensive, or at most develop into a regional military power.18 Foreshadowing some of the “new thinking,” they urged deeper

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economic cooperation with Japan as a way to balance against the United States.19 Scholars such as Su Hao, from China’s Foreign Affairs University, called for China to begin security dialogues with Japan and the United States, and urged Chinese leaders to refrain from rhetorical criticism of Japanese “militarism.”20 In the end, the engagement school won out. Chinese policy makers soon embarked on security dialogues with both the United States and Japan. While criticizing the alliance shifts as outdated “Cold War thinking,” policy makers refrained from declaring them a sign of revitalized Japanese militarism.21 A number of China’s leading Japan experts had also urged privately that Jiang Zemin downplay history issues during his 1998 visit to Japan. After the visit, which many viewed as a failure, the experts held meetings with Foreign Ministry officials to emphasize negative Japanese reactions and reiterate their calls for downplaying history issues.22 Publicly, Yang Bojiang, a researcher at the China Contemporary Center of International Studies, urged “rational thinking” in China’s Japan policy. Yang warned of the “irreconcilability of the history problem” and called for China to “contain the history problem within a realistic framework.”23 Even military-affiliated scholars issued newspaper articles warning of the danger of an overly “emotional” Japan policy.24 As Gilbert Rozman concludes, “It appeared that the Chinese debate had decided that economic development, not historical justice, is the principal national interest.”25 China’s calm reaction to the decline of Japanese ODA after 2000 provides a third example. As chapter 2 notes, in 1995, when Japan froze grant aid to China in response to Chinese nuclear tests, Chinese leaders had played the history card. Premier Li Peng warned that “Japan should never try to apply pressure on China by economic means” when “Japanese militarist aggression inflicted such gigantic damage upon China as to dwarf the Japanese government credits so far extended.”26 Several years later, as Japanese aid to China declined precipitously and then began to be phased out, China’s Japan scholars used closed-door meetings to urge Chinese diplomats not to overreact.27 In public, they explained the reasons behind Japan’s declining aid and praised ODA’s contributions to China’s economic development.28 Over the next few years, Chinese officials carefully refrained from criticizing the aid reductions, instead responding to Japanese concerns by agreeing to a bilateral notification mechanism for disputed maritime zones and by praising Japanese ODA in domestic publicity.29 Perhaps emboldened by their success, a number of scholars began openly promoting a more strategic approach to Japan as part of a grand strategy befitting China’s emergence as a major power.30 Seeing Japan as having reached

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a crossroads, they urged Chinese policy makers to seize the opportunity to bolster bilateral ties.31 As Gilbert Rozman explains, these arguments were predicated upon five main claims.32 First, experts argued that Japanese power and the chance of it being used aggressively had been overestimated. China should accept Japan’s inevitable rise to power and seek to channel this into a multilateral, nonthreatening framework, rather than try to resist it. 33 Second, the primary threat to Chinese interests was the rise of unchecked U.S. hegemony. Improving relations with Japan would help balance the trilateral relationship, enhancing multipolarity in the region while containing the United States. The pursuit of a “strategic partnership” with Japan, codified in the 1998 agreement reached during Jiang Zemin’s visit, reflected this balancing strategy.34 A more balanced equilibrium in the China–Japan–U.S. triangle would also help assuage regional anxiety as China continued its inexorable rise to global power.35 Third, by embedding Sino-Japanese relations within a broader regional framework, including closer Chinese relations with South Korea, Beijing could more effectively pursue its interests vis-à-vis Tokyo. Fourth, Japanese economic assistance could still play a valuable role in China’s modernization program—as a source of technology, markets, and investment. These economic arguments were particularly influential in 1999, as plans to reform the state-owned enterprises were proving difficult, China’s economy showed signs of slumping, and fears of the costs associated with entry into the World Trade Organization began to mount.36 Finally, as noted above, a number of Chinese scholars were concerned that negative public opinion toward Japan might spiral out of control, unnecessarily constraining Beijing’s foreign policy options.

MEASURING VIEWS OF JAPAN To further assess trends in experts’ views of Japan, I analyzed 20 articles on Japan and China– Japan relations published each year from 1997 to 2007 in leading Chinese policy journals (N = 218). I evaluated the articles’ assessment of domestic politics in Japan and regional security, their awareness of a potential security dilemma, the significance of wartime history to the article, any policy recommendations, and the author’s overall threat perceptions of Japan.37 The results confirm that a large percentage of Chinese experts hold strongly negative threat perceptions of Japan, tend to see the U.S.– Japan security alliance as threatening, link Japan’s management of history issues with its security policies, and worry about right-wing tendencies in Japan. Articles

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overwhelmingly focused on Japanese actions seen as threatening to China’s interests and national security rather than on Japanese cooperative policies. The majority (74 percent of articles) emphasized right-wing tendencies in Japanese domestic politics. Of the articles that discussed the U.S.– Japan alliance, most argued that it encourages Japan to be more aggressive. Only 15  percent saw the alliance as a constraint upon Japan’s security policies. These findings echo the common wisdom that many Chinese experts, deeply influenced by the wartime past, continue to hold strongly negative threat perceptions of Japan. More surprising was the substantial number of articles that acknowledged Japan’s security concerns and demonstrated a more nuanced sense of Japanese politics. Forty-three percent of articles emphasized domestic constraints on Japan’s security policy such as pacifism and the Peace Constitution. A majority (68 percent) agreed that Japan faces rising external threats that explain its security policies, while 90 percent argued that that the rise of China or China’s security policies were one reason for Japan’s security enhancements. Among the articles that offered specific policy recommendations (N = 129), 57 percent advocated cooperation and trust-building in dealing with Japan; while 58 percent registered moderate or low levels of threat perceptions of Japan (levels 1 through 5 in figure 5.1) 38 The results also reveal a widening gap between China’s elite experts and the general public. History issues, for instance, were not raised in a substantial number of articles (40 percent), although history is overwhelmingly the most important factor in the general public’s assessment of Japan.39 Furthermore, the percentage of experts’ articles calling for cooperation and trustbuilding with Japan rose during the second half of the decade, moving in exactly the opposite direction of public mobilization.

“I CAN REMAIN SILENT NO LONGER” From 1997 to 2000, debates over China’s Japan policy were largely confined to a small group of policy advisors, think-tank experts, and academics. Although many scholars warned of the danger of the public’s anti-Japanese sentiments, debates over Japan policy had not really attracted the attention of the Chinese public. This began to change in 2000, in a debate carried on within the pages of Shiji Zhishi (World Affairs), a popular international affairs magazine published under the authority of the Foreign Ministry. In early 2000, the editors established a forum called “Dajiatan” (Let’s Discuss) about

FIGURE 5.1 Variation in Chinese Experts’ Threat Perceptions of Japan

FIGURE 5.2 Percentage of Articles Urging Cooperation and Trust Building

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Japan. Noting the importance of China– Japan ties and praising the recent improvement in relations, they asked: “How much do we really understand our neighbor?” Given the publication source, the initiative likely represented an effort by the Foreign Ministry to persuade Chinese people of the benefits of closer relations with Japan. The first article was by Feng Zhaokui, a leading Japan expert at CASS. Feng called for “promoting a new era” in Sino-Japanese relations aimed at establishing “friendly relations and cooperation.” He argued that China’s “emotional” attitude on the history issue is not productive, that the majority of Japanese people do not deny the history of aggression, and that the challenge of Japan’s right-wing nationalists can be overcome. Feng worried that negative media coverage and worsening public opinion in China were causing a “crisis of mistrust.” To counter this, he emphasized China’s economic benefits from close relations with Japan, reminding his readers, “there are many, many Japanese people who have shown sincere friendship, including deep apologies and remorse for the wartime era.”40 The initial round of letters to the editor in response to Feng’s article was largely supportive. Two Tsinghua University students agreed on the importance of stable bilateral relations and the benefits of economic ties, and praised the modern attitude of Japan’s youth. Another respondent noted that, “It is not China that is afraid of Japan, but Japan that is afraid of China.” Even critics of Japan emphasized the importance of China avoiding an “emotional” response, urging the pursuit of “national interests” by improving ties with Japan. A researcher who had lived in Japan for five years reminded readers that “every country has the right to have its own national flag and anthem.”41 Japan expert Li Zhaozhong also wrote in support of Feng, arguing that China was applying a “double standard” in its treatment of Japan. He called for China to downplay its criticism, try to understand Japan better, and recognize China’s own shortcomings.42 Li’s letter elicited a sharp response by a reader, Wei Zhong, who declared, “I can remain silent no longer!” Wei argued that “we can never trust Japan, and must always remain vigilant.” He criticized Li and even the magazine’s editorial policy for “misleading countless readers,” as well as encouraging the Japanese right wing, and so took upon himself the task of setting the record straight by strongly denouncing Japan.43 In his reply to this “simple misunderstanding” in the following edition, Li Zhaozhong explained that he was not an apologist for Japanese right-wing groups, but that he did believe that “Han chauvinism” (dahanhua) had become an obstacle for Chinese people to truly understand Japan. He insisted that his approach prioritized China’s self-strengthening and pursuit of national unity, “which is much more important than demanding Japan apologize for the war.”44

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Li’s response then led to an outpouring of letters to the editor, a sampling of which was printed in subsequent editions of the journal. The letters now came primarily from average citizens, rather than elite university students or professors. The tone was overwhelmingly critical of Japan. One seething attack bemoaned China’s decision to forgo reparations, warning Japanese that a day of reckoning was coming since “our forbearance is at an end.” Another denounced Li Zhaozhong for equating Chinese people’s faults with Japanese war crimes. He argued that the only way to deal with Japan was to “hit them repeatedly.” A second author echoed the call. “We cannot be afraid to beat (qiaoda) Japan simply because it might make them less satisfied with China . . . beating on Japan is a necessary right and a responsibility.”45 Other authors were more reasoned in tone, but took strong issue with Li Zhaozhong’s insinuation that “a full accounting for history” was unnecessary. Several commentators argued that Japan should make full financial restitution to the Chinese people for the war.46 This “debate,” though largely unnoticed in the West, did attract the attention of Japanese scholars, who worried about the impact of Chinese public opinion upon a reasoned scholarly debate in China.47 Their concern proved prescient. By late 2000, the gap between negative public opinion and China’s official Japan policy had become increasingly apparent. In August, Internet translations of a Japanese newspaper report that Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan had “softened his stance [on ODA policy] due to pressure from the Foreign Minister of Japan” sparked sharp criticism online by Chinese netizens.48 Several months later, Premier Zhu Rongji was widely denounced on the Chinese Internet after his October “friendship tour” to Japan, particularly for his argument that present-day Japanese people should not be held responsible for wartime militarism, and his statements expressing appreciation for Japan’s ODA.49 Popular stories critical of Japan began to surface in commercial newspapers and magazines.50 Even World Affairs’ articles on Japan became more critical.51 The debate over Japan policy was coming out into the open.

HIJACKING CHINA’S NEW THINKING The “new thinking” debate began with a December 2002 article in a leading policy journal by Ma Licheng, a member of the editorial board of the People’s Daily. Arguing that China “should not be too sensitive to Japan’s quest to become a political and military power,” Ma urged that “the page on apologies

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should be turned; we should pass this period of history and face the future.”52 Renmin University professor Shi Yinhong quickly praised Ma’s argument as “courageous,” arguing that the increase in Sino-Japanese enmity was “quite dangerous.”53 Shi urged a “diplomatic revolution” with Japan so that China could balance against U.S. hegemony and concentrate on the Taiwan issue. Tsinghua University professor Xue Li agreed: China should swallow a bitter fruit, and for the sake of the national interest, seek to overcome the history question. . . . I believe we should moderate our reactions to the history question, and that the government should cultivate a national consciousness that is friendly toward Japan, educating the people about the [limited] role of the Japanese right, and explain to them the great contributions that Japan has made to China’s economic construction.54

Such a policy, Xue argued, “will greatly promote economic, political, and regional co-operation between the two countries, and will not be without benefits for resolving the Taiwan question,” while “a rigid Chinese attitude will be more likely to lead Japan to rely even more on the U.S. to balance against China.”55 Most leading Japan experts in China were more restrained, echoing Ling Xingguang’s response of “correct strategy, incorrect tactics.”56 They doubted that history issues could be quickly resolved, whether such extreme Chinese concessions were necessary, and whether Japan could play a balancing role vis-à-vis the United States. Yet such nuanced responses were quickly crowded out by an onslaught of emotional attacks on Ma and Shi prioritizing moral righteousness over political pragmatism. The debate first spread to popular Chinese media with a lengthy article in the influential newspaper Southern Weekend on June 12, 2003.57 By the summer of 2003, most of China’s top Japan experts had been drawn into the fray. A number of institutes held conferences and leading journals published special editions on the new thinking. Widespread newspaper and Internet coverage of these events quickly transmitted the debate to the general public.58 The most active debate emerged online, sparked by a pair of critical essays posted on the People’s Daily Web site by editorial board member Lin Zhibo in summer 2003.59 Even excluding Internet writings, several hundred essays and five books were published in China and Japan within one year on the issue.60 In addition to fostering a fast-moving, divisive debate between two extreme positions, the Internet facilitated the public fury released on Ma Licheng personally. Ma admitted that he received “mountains” of faxes, e-mails, and letters, of which he estimated “at least 70 percent were opposed” to his

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arguments, calling him a “Chinese traitor” (hanjian) and even threatening to kill him.61 “His address and phone number were posted on the Web with calls to burn down his house.”62 “In the summer of 2003, Ma requested and took early retirement from the People’s Daily, left Beijing, and took a job working for Phoenix TV in Hong Kong.”63 One reason for the public controversy was the praise showered on Ma and Shi by Japanese media. A prominent Japanese journal quickly translated Ma’s essay under the title “Our China: Be Cautious in Opposing Japan” and then published an interview with Ma under the title, “Japan Has Already Apologized to China 21 Times.”64 A book under Ma’s name appeared in Japan, entitled Japan Has No Need to Continually Apologize to China. Shi Yinhong was invited to visit Japan in April 2003 by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and his essay was published in a Japanese journal in October 2003. An interview with both Ma and Shi was published in Japan’s leading newspaper, Asahi Shinbum, on August 15, 2003, the anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific. Many Chinese critics expressed revulsion at seeing their countrymen praised by Japanese conservatives for denouncing Chinese nationalism. Ma and Shi were labeled qingripai (the close-to-Japan faction). Zhou Nanshen, a Singapore journalist based in Japan for many years, denounced the new thinking as nothing more than “old Japanese thinking.”65 The outpouring of anger was supported and encouraged by China’s popular press. An editorial in China Youth Daily praised the criticism, complaining that “as soon as someone tries to raise history issues, they are attacked as ‘damaging China– Japan friendship, damaging East Asian peace’ and labeled a nationalist. . . . China’s average citizens (laobaixing) will never accept such methods.”66 One journalist praised online activists as “not some intellectuals’ saloon,” but instead a vital part of the “Chinese masses.” Feng Jinhua, the activist who defaced Yasukuni Shrine in 2001 and then declared in his court hearing in Japan, “I want to be a nationalist,” was lionized once again by popular media.67 In early 2004, one influential newspaper editorialized that Feng was “more representative of Chinese popular opinion toward Japan than Chinese intellectuals . . . a broad gap has opened up between intellectuals and the general public on opinions of Japan.”68 For some in China, the emotional vitriol was disheartening. One journalist warned against the influence of China’s “angry youth” ( fenqing): “Instead of reasoned opinion, the appearance of the public is of extremism and emotionalism. People are afraid to put forth alternative ideas, and those that do, like Shi Yinhong and Ma Licheng, are viciously attacked.”69 A Ph.D. student at Beijing University criticized the 2003 petition campaign against using

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Japanese high-speed trains, arguing that it was “undemocratic” to value the opinion of 80,000 people over the interests of 1.3 billion.70 Some scholars denounced such protests as “parochial nationalism,”71 while others warned that such “popular diplomacy” (minjian waijiao) would upset delicate diplomatic negotiations.72 Yet most voices challenging popular nationalism soon found themselves a target for virulent criticism. As Liu Xiaobiao, an influential journalist and scholar, explained in January 2004: “If the topic concerns Japan, the great majority of views expressed will be criticism, condemnation, and even abuse in fierce terms. Anyone who puts forward a critical or moderate voice challenging extreme nationalism is strongly denounced, resulting in a ‘screw of silence.’ ” He noted that China’s Japan experts had begun requesting journalists not to reveal their names, so as to avoid being attacked as a “traitor” online. The result, he warned, was that online nationalism toward Japan was “hijacking” Chinese patriotism.73 The outcome reflected what Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann describes as a “spiral of silence”—the retreat of a minority from public debate in the face of majority pressure.74 Initially, the new thinking seemed to reflect top Chinese leaders’ desire to implement a more strategic approach to Japan by downplaying history issues. Ma’s article in December 2002 appeared just after the 16th Party Congress, which, as noted earlier, was used to signal the new leadership’s interest in improving relations with Japan. After Ma’s and Shi’s essays appeared, there was broad speculation that the essays represented a kind of “trial balloon” by the incoming Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao leadership. Ma Licheng was widely known to be close to the personal secretary of Zeng Qinghong, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo seen as moderate toward Japan. Japan’s Yomuri Shinbum reported that “a source close to the Chinese government said that Ma’s essay came against the background of Zeng Qinghong’s comment about thinking highly of Japan.”75 Soon after the articles were published, Hu Jintao reportedly said in a closed-door meeting that China should indeed improve ties with Japan, as this would provide greater leverage vis-àvis the United States.76 Indeed, several Japan experts in China suggested that both Ma and Shi had informal discussions with officials both before and after their essays were published.77 If the new thinking was indeed a trial balloon sent up by some members of the Chinese leadership, it was soon shot down by the sharp criticism from other experts and on the Internet. Lin Zhibo, one of the strongest critics, was reportedly was granted several meetings with Foreign Ministry officials during this period, as were a number of other experts asked about the ongoing debate. In these discussions, Foreign Ministry officials stated that they

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were closely monitoring the Internet discussion.78 Participants on both sides agreed that public criticism led to the downfall of the new thinking. Lin Zhibo argued repeatedly that “Chinese people simply cannot accept this argument.” Wang Xiaodong, an influential nationalist, agreed that since most Chinese people felt that Japan had not yet sufficiently apologized, the new thinking was untenable.79 Even Jin Xide, a leading moderate on Japan policy at CASS, criticized the new thinking for ignoring public opinion. “It presumes that Japanese public opinion is very important, but the Chinese government can simply forcefully suppress China’s public opinion.” In reality, Jin explained, China’s “harsh” stance on history is in large part a result of the negative reaction by the Chinese people to actions taken by people in Japan. “This public sentiment is not something that one leader or one level of government can simply ignore.”80 As one reviewer of the debate commented in 2004, “Objectively speaking, given the decline in China– Japan relations, particularly at the popular level, many of the recommendations in the new thinking are quite reasonable. But knowing the disease is not the same as having the right cure.” Given the deteriorating state of China– Japan relations, he argued, the new thinking was simply too difficult for most people to accept.81 However, once public mobilization died down and bilateral relations stabilized, many of Ma’s and Shi’s proposals did eventually become part of Chinese policy (table 5.1).

THE RETURN OF MODERATION After spring 2005, shocked by the furor of the anti-Japan protests, Chinese experts quickly renewed their calls for diplomatic engagement and rhetorical restraint. History issues were hardly resolved at this point: Koizumi was still prime minister, and his final visit to Yasukuni was not until August 15, 2006. Yet Chinese experts had become deeply concerned that anti-Japanese sentiments were damaging China’s own national interests. Experts’ closed-door advice to policy makers encouraged the renewal of diplomatic engagement while their public writings provided a justification for China’s policy shift. In November 2005, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) International Relations College in Nanjing convened a conference on China– Japan relations, calling for the government to “lead popular emotion in China down a path of calm and reason.”82 The college’s Vice Dean, Liu Zonghe, argued: China and Japan should be in a period of peace and friendship; instead we have entered a period of foreign relations freeze. Both sides should remain

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ORIGINS AND OUTCOMES OF THE “NEW THINKING”

Recommendations of Ma and Shi

New idea in 2003?

Later adopted as policy?

Reduce emphasis on history issues

No

Yes

Stop demanding apologies from Japan

No

Yes

Encourage Japanese investment and trade

No

Yes

Express more appreciation for Japan’s ODA

No

Yes

Do not criticize Japan as “militaristic”

No

Yes

Avoid criticism of Japan’s participation in UN PKOs and antiterrorism operations abroad

No

Yes

Support Japan’s UNSC membership

Yes

No

Restrain anti-Japanese protests in China

No

Yes

Promote positive images of Japan in China

No

Yes

calm and reasonable (lengjing yu lizhi), take a long-term strategic perspective, seize and expand areas of common interest, improve trust, pursue common interests and put aside disputes, and take a long-term developmental perspective.83

While not dismissing Japanese military power or rising “conservativism” in Japan, China’s security scholars were far more concerned with popular anti-Japanese sentiments in China exacerbating a security dilemma. As Liu Zonghe argued, “The result of the steadily worsening feelings between the people of the two countries is that both sides find evidence for their antagonistic stance on security policies and other issues.”84 Liu Chang, Dean of the PLA International Studies College, warned that “narrow nationalism” might lead the two sides into conflict, and so urged both sides to establish mechanisms to rein in popular emotions and political activists.85 Instead of demonizing

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Japan, PLA scholars called for Chinese people to view Japan as a “normal country” and “accept Japanese people’s healthy feelings of nationalism.”86 A number of experts renewed their warnings of the dangers of antiJapanese sentiments. Jin Xide argued that popular nationalism in China only justified Koizumi’s hard-line policies toward China. As a rising power, Jin argued, China can afford to be more generous toward Japan. It should moderate its Japan policy and promote “warm civil society relations” (mingre guanxi); this in turn would foster a more moderate Japan policy toward China.87 Wang Shaopu, an influential Shanghai scholar, agreed that popular anger toward Japan had damaged China’s own national interests by worsening Japanese attitudes toward China and pushing the United States and Japan closer together. Wang criticized China’s “patriotic education” as promoting extremist “anti-Japan attitudes,” arguing that it should be replaced with “information providing Chinese people with a more complete understanding of Japan today.”88 Zhang Tasheng blamed the decline in China– Japan relations on negative coverage of Japan in China’s “new media,” which sped up the pace of public opinion shifts and increased public opinion’s influence on policy. He called for the government to strengthen its “leadership” of public opinion and urge the media to improve the “opinion environment” (yulun huanjing) on China– Japan relations.89 Others agreed that China should expand political dialogue, deepen economic cooperation, increase social interactions, promote joint history research, and find ways to interact with Japanese counterparts.90 Most controversially, scholars called for downplaying history issues in Japan policy. One criticized the compensation lawsuits as “interference” in China– Japan relations and urged more “balanced” media coverage on both sides. History issues should be used to promote “forward-looking relations,” he argued, not “revenge.”91 Echoing an earlier theme, Zhang Tasheng agreed that China and Japan should try to “overcome history.” The main problem of history, Zhang argued, is “the strong emotions of the Chinese people . . . only by continually improving China– Japan relations, can the history problem finally be resolved.”92 Zhang thus reversed the order of the new thinking opponents, who argued the history issue must be resolved before relations can be improved. Of course, not all Chinese analysis was so self-reflecting. Mirroring ongoing tension in bilateral relations, a good deal of public analysis still focused on criticizing Japan. A November 2005 conference hosted by the Institute of Japan Studies at CASS was dominated by mutual recriminations between Japanese and Chinese participants. A number of Chinese scholars criticized Koizumi while rejecting Japanese criticism of China’s “anti-Japan education,”

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and defending the May 2005 protests as “completely understandable” and due entirely to Japan’s own actions.93 Previous critics of the new thinking continued to denounce Japan while defending China’s youth as “completely recognizing and correctly dealing with Japan.”94 Yet only one month later at another Beijing conference, this time without Japanese scholars present, many of China’s leading foreign policy experts expressed strong concern over the dangerous implications of extremist public opinion.95 Drawing on accumulating public opinion data, Chang Cuidong warned that “negative public opinion has become an important political factor in the worsening relationship.” He criticized “despising Japan” (taori) sentiments on the Chinese Internet as “lacking rationality” and urged Chinese leaders to guide domestic opinion toward a more “reasoned” (lixing) approach to Japan.96 A round of letters to the editor of Shijie Zhishi (World Affairs) in late 2005 demonstrated the dramatic changes that had occurred since the 2000 debate in that journal. One letter called for China to take a “strategic perspective” in Japan policy by “controlling the history problem”; another argued that “the tensions between the two countries damage the people of both countries, and are in neither side’s national interests.”97 This is a powerful argument: references to China’s “national interests” are frequently deployed to blunt popular criticism of state policies.98 Chinese scholars also started to worry that the “cold politics” had finally begun to have a chilling effect on bilateral economic relations. A professor at China Foreign Affairs College, the leading institution for training Chinese diplomats, warned that that China– Japan economic and political relations were “both cold” (shuangleng).99 Scholars pointed to a slowdown in bilateral trade and investment with Japan, even as China’s overall trade and FDI continued to grow.100 Other signs of an “economic chill” included the decline in Japan’s ODA, the consumer boycott of Japanese goods in China, failure to cooperate on the high-speed train line and the absence of other large-scale economic projects, tensions over a proposed gas pipeline from Russia, ongoing East China Sea disputes, and Japan’s pursuit of bilateral free trade agreements that excluded China. Although some journalists criticized Japan for playing an “economic card” by trying to use economic pressures to alter China’s foreign policy,101 the majority of scholars simply worried that China’s interests were being damaged.102 They warned of the political implications of a decline in economic ties and urged the government to strengthen the protection of Japanese businesses’ rights and interests in China.103 In sum, by 2005–06 a large number of China’s prominent Japan and foreign policy experts had publicly embraced the core arguments of the new thinking: urging that Chinese leaders downplay history issues, stabilize po-

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litical relations, moderate anti-Japanese public opinion, restrain popular protests in China, and strengthen economic ties. This shift in thinking was soon reflected in China’s Japan policy. In announcing statistics showing a decline in trade and investment with Japan on October 20, 2005, Zheng Jingping, a spokesman for China’s National Bureau of Statistics, stated, “There is no doubt that if the two countries do not get along it will affect the economic and trade relationship between them. . . . I think it is the duty of the politicians to take a strategic point of view to secure a favorable environment for the two countries to promote economic and trade exchanges.”104 When Commerce Minister Bo Xilai met his Japanese counterparts on February 21, 2006 in Beijing, he flatly stated that the political tensions in the relationship were fi nally beginning to affect their economic relationship. As 2005 came to a close, Feng Zhaokui, a top Japan expert at CASS, warned that without leaders’ summits, 2006 looked to be a “dangerous year” for the relationship. Feng urged both sides to find a way to restore the stalled leaders’ summits.105 Other scholars agreed that as long as the prime minister did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, China should agree to summit meetings.106 As described in the next chapter, Chinese leaders followed these recommendations almost exactly. In March 2006, President Hu Jintao informed visiting Japanese politicians that as long as the prime minister would pledge not to visit Yasukuni, he would meet with him. Several months later, Chinese leaders went a step further, welcoming new Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in Beijing in October, only weeks after his election and without a pledge not to visit Yasukuni.

CONCLUSION From 1997–2001, a number of influential Chinese experts successfully, and without much controversy, urged policy makers to downplay history issues in favor of a strategic approach to Japan. They called for accepting Japan’s rise in power, urged greater regional collaboration, and pointed out the benefits of deepening economic collaboration. Most poignantly, China’s leading Japan experts warned that negative public opinion toward Japan might spiral out of control, unnecessarily constraining Beijing’s foreign policy options. Their fears proved prescient. In 2000 and again in 2003–04, similar proposals for downplaying history issues in favor of a strategic approach to Japan were widely criticized in the most virulent public debate in China over foreign policy since 1949. Experts’ calls for moderation were publicly denounced and then rejected by policy makers. After widespread anti-Japanese protests

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in spring 2005, many of the same experts resumed their calls for less emphasis on history issues in China’s Japan policy. Leading scholars declared that public pressure had undermined core Chinese interests in reducing Japanese anxiety over the rise of China, strengthening economic ties, and bolstering diplomatic cooperation. They strongly criticized extreme anti-Japan sentiments and urged the Chinese government to improve public opinion toward Japan. This time, experts’ return to moderation was not condemned by the public, and appears to have been influential among top policy makers. Over the next few years, China’s Japan policy followed these recommendations almost precisely. What explains this variation? Why were similar policy proposals strongly criticized by the public from 2000 through 2004, but not before or after this period? How do such public debates emerge, and what brings them to an end? In this case, external events alone provide an inadequate explanation for patterns in public debates over Japan. As noted earlier, China– Japan relations were shaken by a convergence of events before 1997: contention over the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, Japan’s ODA cancellation in reaction to China’s 1995 nuclear tests, China’s 1996 military exercises near Taiwan, a 1996 dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, revisions in the U.S.– Japan security alliance, and Prime Minister Hashimoto’s 1996 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Following these disputes, a quiet discussion extolling the benefits of engaging Japan would seem unlikely; yet that is precisely what emerged in China in 1997. Similarly, experts’ return to moderation came in late 2005 and early 2006, well before Abe Shinzo replaced Koizumi as prime minister, halting the shrine visits. Indeed, Koizumi’s final visit to the Yasukuni Shrine came on August 15, 2006, preceding the shift in tone among Chinese experts. External events alone cannot explain the scarcity of popular criticism of these publicly mooted proposals for moderation. We need to look inside China itself. The content and timing of patterns in public discourse over Japan policy was shaped most directly by levels of public mobilization in China. From 1997 through 2000, public anger was focused on the United States, stimulated by the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 EP-3 plane incident. During this period, Chinese policy makers were united around a policy of diplomatic engagement with Japan. Without external stimuli or overt elite divisions, there was limited sensationalist media coverage and low popular activism on Japan-related issues. Experts’ calls for moderation in Japan policy thus did not engender much public attention or emotion. The subsequent rise in anti-Japan public mobilization, as detailed in chapter 3, sparked contentious debates over very similar proposals for moderation from

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2000 through 2004. The absence of such debates after 2005, a fascinating case of a nonevent, highlights the significance of public mobilization. As the next chapter details, the spring 2005 crisis in China– Japan relations bolstered Chinese leaders’ determination to stabilize bilateral relations, limit the influence of history-related disputes, and promote more positive public opinion toward Japan. They relied on a mixture of repression, censorship, and persuasion to end the wave of public mobilization. In this environment of low public attention, calmer popular emotions, limited activism, and restrained media coverage, experts’ proposals for moderation toward Japan did not spark strong public criticism or debate. What is particularly intriguing about the World Affairs and new thinking debates is that, like many similar initiatives in Chinese public discourse, they had the opposite effect from their intention.107 Coming just before Zhu Rongji’s famed “Smile Diplomacy” visit to Tokyo in 2000, the World Affairs initiative clearly reflected efforts within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which publishes the journal) to build public support for China’s engagement policy. The decision to publish the two controversial articles in Strategy and Management was a similar kind of test, designed to gauge public support for the policy of downplaying history issues with Japan in favor of strategic engagement.108 Coming amid the rising tide of public mobilization, these articles had the opposite effect—stimulating strong public opposition and setting back the strategy of diplomatic engagement for several years. It was only after the Chinese leadership took decisive steps to reshape the domestic and diplomatic environment, bringing an end to the wave of public mobilization, that such proposals could be safely launched into the public arena without stimulating strong opposition. It might be argued that these outcomes actually reflected the original intent— that editors and their bureaucratic superiors published the articles in order to stimulate public criticism and undermine efforts to engage Japan. Although plausible, this does not appear to be the case. Both journals published multiple articles urging moderation toward Japan before the debate swung against them. In private discussions, none of the leading advocates for moderation who came in for such harsh public criticism felt they had been “set up” by editors. Most importantly, the initial articles urging moderation actually reflected the dominant approach of China’s Japan policy at the time—as the previous chapter detailed. The assumption that all policy debates in China are simply scripted from behind the scenes by top leaders is far too simplistic and outdated. In this case, the public debate was substantial and significant. The way Chinese popular sentiments affected experts’ discourse echoes Locke’s notion of the “law of opinion.” Unlike current conceptions of public

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opinion as a preexisting set of individual ideas “out there” waiting to be discovered by pollsters armed with scientific survey methodology, Locke described public opinion as a collective understanding that is dominant in the public arena and can constrain human behavior. The effect is not unlike the way constructivist scholars of international relations today see norms as constraining and guiding political behavior. In China, public opinion often operates as a set of collective notions that enter the public arena through such venues as popular media and the Internet. Such public debates are only possible with some level of political permissiveness, most likely when top leaders have not yet decisively united around a specific policy approach. Such openness enables editors to publish a more free-flowing debate on their pages, thus providing an opportunity for the expression of public sentiments to emege and potentially influence the decisions and discourse of elite policy experts and decision makers. This case also encapsulates how enduring debates over Chinese foreign policy are being reshaped in a new era. In his historical review of Chinese foreign policy, Michael Hunt describes a “pervasive tension” running through China’s “Century of Humiliation” between “a cosmopolitan response to China’s humiliation” and a “potent populism” determined to rely exclusively upon the “genius, industry, and patriotism of the Chinese people.”109 Today, as China engages the world from a position of rising strength rather than debilitating internal weakness, these debates are being revisited. Chinese foreign policy experts have once again become deeply embedded in international discourse, which in many cases nurtures their evolution toward a more pragmatic and nuanced approach to foreign policy. At the same time, the Chinese people have also become better informed and more assertive about China’s external affairs. Populist intellectuals, university students, and urban middle-class citizens are increasingly confident of their own views on China’s proper external relations, and are demanding opportunities for expression. In the wired world of Chinese public policy debates, the Internet provides the locus for lively, contentious debates. The Web transmits ideas rapidly from one individual to many, and then from the masses back to the individual—facilitating a rapid flow of ideas and information but often drowning out more nuanced or controversial perspectives. As popular sentiments are articulated, debated, and shaped through the myriad public venues, they are also refracted upward into elite policy-making circles. These public policy debates provide an avenue through which public opinion is integrated into Chinese foreign policy.

6 THE REBIRTH OF THE PROPAGANDA STATE When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion. — MAO Z E DONG, “TALK TO TH E CE NTRAL COM M ITTE E CU LTU RAL R EVOLUTION G ROU P,” CITE D I N G R I ES AN D ROSE N (1999)

he term “propaganda” first entered the modern lexicon in 1622 when Pope Gregory XV established the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith). It reached its apogee with the Soviet “propaganda state,” which Peter Kenz credits with maintaining national unity and mobilizing the population in support of World War II.1 In recent years, theorizing about propaganda has declined, due in part to the highly pejorative sense of the word as a synonym for deception and manipulation in support of nefarious political objectives. Propaganda is more usefully understood simply as “the use of communication skills of all kinds to achieve attitudinal or behavioral changes among one group by another.”2 Its purpose is to persuade—either to change or to reinforce existing attitudes and opinions. Dusting off the concept of propaganda in this fashion proves useful for engaging one of the most important puzzles in world politics today: the impressive resilience of authoritarian regimes around the world. For authoritarian leaders, influencing public opinion and shaping political behavior through the strategic manipulation of symbols and information is far less costly and more effective than brute repression alone. As a People’s Daily commentator acknowledged in 1986: “the imposition of uniformity of public

T

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opinion by force could never achieve genuine uniformity of public opinion or consensus.”3 Indeed, Charles Lindblom once described Maoist China as based upon “massive unilateral persuasion.”4 Even regimes such as North Korea and Syria rely upon an array of mass persuasion techniques to obtain compliance, shore up regime legitimacy, and mobilize the public.5 Surprisingly, for all the recent attention to “stubborn” authoritarianism, scholars have largely neglected the role of propaganda in sustaining these regimes.6 The case of China provides an opportunity to address this lacuna. In recent years, the propaganda state in China has been given new life through a dramatic revamping of the institutions and techniques used to shape public opinion, media content, and popular discourse.7 Official Web sites strive to subtly guide online debates in a “rational” (lixing) fashion.8 Press conferences and media spokespeople “spin” the news using techniques borrowed from democratic governments. The Party has even launched its own twenty-four-hour TV news channel, tasked with “correct guidance of public opinion, unity, stability, and the cultivation of propaganda art.”9 Some scholars believe the advent of a commercial media sector has fundamentally undermined the Party’s authority.10 Chinese leaders, however, describe media commercialization as an opportunity to strengthen their propaganda. As Politburo member Li Changchun declared in January 2004, “the more our cultural products conquer the market, the more fortified our ideological front will be.”11 Similar dynamics prevail online. Revising earlier assumptions of technological determinism, most scholars now agree with Rebecca McKinnon that “China’s system of Internet censorship, control, and propaganda, while by no means impenetrable, is effective enough that the picture of the world seen by the average Chinese Internet user is skewed in the regime’s favour.”12 Chinese leaders regularly express optimism that the Internet can be used “to serve the people, serve socialism, guide public opinion in the right direction, and uphold the interests of the country and the public good” by “correctly guiding and shaping public opinion.”13 How effective are such efforts? Does China’s propaganda actually work? Scholars have described China’s propaganda system, the emergence of new media, and propaganda campaigns.14 They have debated the effectiveness of China’s censorship and attempted to measure the level of popular support for the regime.15 However, few efforts have been made to assess the extent to which China’s propaganda actually achieves its objectives.16 To engage these broader issues, this chapter assesses the Party’s efforts after spring 2005 to bring an end to the wave of public mobilization. I argue that for China’s propaganda to be effective, it essentially has to do three things:

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shape the media environment in which the public gets news, influence trends in public opinion, and persuade the public not to engage in political activities the Communist Party deems threatening. The case of Japan provides a particularly robust test of the Party’s propaganda capacity, given the strength and prevalence of anti-Japanese sentiments in China. The Party’s reliance upon decades of negative propaganda on Japan to bolster regime legitimacy renders any such shifts extremely challenging. Despite these obstacles, I find that Chinese leaders’ domestic propaganda and diplomatic efforts, augmented by censorship and repression, succeeded in reshaping the information environment, improving public opinion, and discouraging anti-Japan activism. This remarkable accomplishment reveals an impressive level of propaganda power, critical to the Communist Party’s ability to retain control amid the dramatic social, economic, and technological changes in China since 1978. This chapter begins with the onset of China’s propaganda campaign in the wake of the 2005 crisis in Sino-Japanese relations, highlighting Beijing’s integration of diplomacy and propaganda. The second section documents the Party’s success in compelling popular, commercial press to expand their favorable coverage of Japan. I then turn to survey data, which shows that public opinion toward Japan improved remarkably after 2006, reversing the previous steady decline. The fourth section describes the dramatic drop in public protests and reveals a surprising shift in attitudes among Chinese activists. I conclude by examining how the Communist Party’s revamped approach to propaganda has augmented the Party’s grip on power.

ENGAGING JAPAN As previous chapters have shown, from 2002 through 2005, China experienced a dramatic rise of activism and protests; a surge of negative, sensationalist coverage; and an increase in public anger toward Japan—a wave of public mobilization. Leaders’ summits had been halted in frustration over Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. By spring 2005, Sino-Japanese relations had sunk to their lowest point since 1972, while the regime faced a domestic protest movement that threatened to spiral out of control. China’s Japan policy was in crisis. Crises tend to sharpen the mind. They focus top leaders’ attention on the issue at hand, reshape domestic coalitions, stimulate new ways of thinking, facilitate rapid learning, and encourage decisive policy steps.17 After the spring 2005 protests, Chinese leaders quickly embarked on a two-pronged

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strategy of revamped domestic propaganda and proactive diplomatic engagement. They began by restraining negative media coverage of Japan, blocking anti-Japan content on the Internet, and prohibiting all Japan-related protests. Several months later, Chinese diplomats started to engage Tokyo. They began quietly, reaching out to Abe Shinzo just days before his selection as prime minister by a special session of the National Diet on September 26, 2006. Deputy Foreign Minister and political heavyweight Dai Bingguo was sent to Japan to deliver a private message directly from President Hu Jintao: if Abe would refrain from visiting Yasukuni, he would be welcomed in China at the earliest possible date. Although Abe refused to publicly state that he would not visit Yasukuni, according to Chinese Foreign Ministry officials, the two reportedly reached an informal agreement on this basis.18 This tenuous accord quickly set off a remarkable burst of diplomatic activism. After five years without a single visit by top leaders, Japan and China held four leaders’ summits in two years. Significantly, Beijing’s engagement efforts began before the new leadership in Tokyo signaled its policy direction. They were not simply reacting to Japanese policies; rather, Chinese leaders moved proactively to create a favorable diplomatic environment in hopes of stabilizing bilateral relations and cooling public anger at home. In welcoming Abe to Beijing in September 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao issued a five-point proposal for improving relations that failed to even mention history issues.19 In his return visit to Japan in April 2007, Wen gave a landmark speech at the Japanese Diet, the first by a Chinese leader since 1985. He insisted, “I have come for friendship and cooperation.” Wen reiterated China’s long-standing view “that it was a handful of militarists who were responsible for that war of aggression. The Japanese people were also victims of the war, and the Chinese people should live in friendship with them.” He acknowledged Japan’s repeated apologies and pledged: “the Chinese people will never forget Japan’s support of China during our opening, reform, and modernization.”20 Interrupted ten times by applause, Wen’s speech was praised as “masterly” by South Korean media.21 As Wen explained to an audience of Chinese residents in Japan, “This is the most important task since I took office. I did a lot of preparation. Every sentence is written by myself and I did all the research work myself. Why? Because I feel our nation’s development has reached a critical moment. We need to have a peaceful and conducive international environment.”22 President Hu Jintao followed Wen’s example in his “warm spring trip” to Japan in May 2008. Not even mentioning wartime history in his meetings with the emperor and Diet members, Hu instead emphasized his role in the

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controversial 1984 visit of 3,000 Japanese young people to China as the head of the Communist Youth League. The joint statement establishing a “mutually beneficial strategic relationship” did not mention Japanese “apologies” or “reflection” about the wartime past. In his speech at Waseda University, the site of Jiang Zemin’s critical speech on history issues in 1998, Hu Jintao instead delivered praise for the 2,000 years of friendship between China and Japan, interrupted only briefly by Japan’s “war of aggression.” Hu explained: This brief unhappy period of history brought deep disaster to the Chinese people, and also brought deep suffering to Japanese people. We emphasis history not for hatred, but because it can be a mirror, reflecting to the future, [teaching us to] treasure peace, maintain peace, and ensure that the Chinese and Japanese people live together peacefully for future generations, so that the people of the two countries can enjoy everlasting peace.23

Reflecting their concern with domestic public opinion, Chinese leaders’ engagement strategy was supported by an onslaught of propaganda back home—an element sorely lacking in Beijing’s 1999–2002 effort at engaging Japan.

Japan: The Land of Cherry Blossoms? China’s new propaganda strategy emerged soon after the spring 2005 demonstrations, over a year before the leadership transition in Japan. In addition to prohibiting anti-Japan demonstrations and restricting Internet content, Wu Jianmin, a veteran diplomat, made a series of speeches urging Chinese netizens to view relations with Japan from a long-term perspective.24 The government also took a series of steps designed to clamp down on negative, anti-Japanese coverage in commercial media, focusing particularly on online distribution mechanisms. Following the April protests, from May through June 2005, the Propaganda Ministry arranged for a series of closed-door study sessions for the online editors of China’s leading news Web sites. Two editors from each of the forty most influential news sites were required to attend—from government sites such as Xinhua and People’s Daily Online as well as commercial sites such as Baidu.com and Sina.com. Leading Japan experts in China were brought in, each expected to lead three days of the sessions. Their task was to convince the editors: “don’t feed the fire of anti-Japan sentiments; help us to put it out.” “This was tough,” one professor reported. “Many of the younger editors from the commercial Web sites are fenqing

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[angry youth] themselves.”25 Top academic experts on Japan were also tapped to give closed-door talks at universities around China in order to build support and understanding among students for the government’s engagement policy toward Japan. One scholar explained that he did not adhere to the official rhetoric in these talks; rather, he simply tried to explain his view of Japan to the students. He found himself facing sharp questioning on the government’s moderation toward the Diaoyu Islands, acceptance of Japanese aid and investment, and history textbooks, yet felt that by referring to China’s broader national interests, he was eventually able to persuade students to be more “reasonable” in their approach to Japan.26 The most important mechanism for public persuasion is mass media. In January 2006, China Central Television (CCTV) began a documentary series featuring sympathetic portraits of Japanese individuals. In March, CCTV started broadcasting White Tower, a popular Japanese drama series.27 As Qian Xiaoqian, Vice Director of the State Council News Office, declared: “The media has an obligation to play a positive (jiji) role in promoting China– Japan relations and mutual understanding.”28 The media’s first task was to justify Beijing’s rather awkward embrace of Abe Shinzo. Abe was Prime Minister Koizumi’s handpicked successor, a well-known conservative with hawkish views on foreign policy and history issues.29 During his inaugural speech to the Japanese Diet on September 29, 2006, Abe called for revisions to Japan’s constitution and a strengthening of Japan’s military. In announcing Abe’s visit to Beijing two weeks later, the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao, hereafter RMRB) downplayed these comments, instead praising Abe’s visit to Beijing as a “decisive choice made in light of the current circumstances, a choice made in his striving for mutual benefit.”30 CCTV lauded Abe’s recognition of the importance of China– Japan relations, while Chinese experts were trotted out on CCTV to offer praise for Abe.31 Most studies of Chinese media focus upon print media, due perhaps to its accessibility and utility for quantitative content analysis,32 but television actually is the most important medium for delivering information to the Chinese public. In a 2008 poll, for instance, 92 percent of respondents identified TV news as their primary source of information on Japan. The public also relies heavily upon dramas, documentaries, and movies, as well as Japanese dramas and movies shown on Chinese television, to learn about Japan.33 Well aware of the power of television, Chinese propaganda authorities keep particularly tight control over CCTV programming. As relations with Japan improved, CCTV coverage spotlighted friendly diplomatic interactions while highlighting the payoffs of China’s diplomatic

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engagement. Television coverage of Wen Jiabao’s “ice-melting” visit to Japan in April 2007 showed Wen going jogging in a popular park, taking part in a Japanese tea ceremony, talking with farmers and students, and even pitching a baseball to show off his skill at Japan’s national pastime.34 CCTV praised Japan as “the land of cherry blossoms.”35 Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo’s speech at Beijing University in December 2007, the first time in twenty-three years that a Japanese prime minister had made a public speech in China, was broadcast live nationwide.36 CCTV News followed Fukuda’s speech with an in-depth study describing him as a “calm, rational, warm person” and emphasizing his pledge not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine.37 The efforts peaked in support of President Hu Jintao’s “warm spring trip” (nuanchun zhilü) in March 2008. Hu’s arrival in Tokyo was televised live on CCTV in order to create an air of anticipation and excitement back home. Hu’s visit was spotlighted on CCTV-1’s evening news show every night and featured in the Focus (Jiaodian fangtan) news program that immediately follows the nightly news. Television coverage was also used to promulgate a more nuanced and positive image of Japan. CCTV-News broadcast a series entitled “Viewing Japan from Close Up” on the popular news journal Oriental Horizon every night for two weeks before Wen’s visit. Reports featured sympathetic interviews with Japanese cultural figures, famous novelists, movie directors, and even former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro.38 The interview with Prime Minister Abe’s wife praised her as an articulate, attractive, energetic woman who represents the “new generation of Japanese leaders.” The reporter claimed that “as Abe and his wife descended the plane steps in Beijing, hand in hand, it gave many Chinese people a deep impression.”39 Another CCTV report favorably compared Japanese media to Chinese media, noting that “each Japanese newspaper has at least six detailed reports on China every day,” proving that “Japan pays close attention to China, and so has deep understanding of Chinese society today.”40 The influential Dialogue program on CCTV-2 interviewed an elderly Japanese businessman, praising his success in creating two Fortune 500 corporations while overcoming the negative stigma attached to the “Made in Japan” label. The moderator then turned to Chinese experts to explain the “lessons” that Japan’s economic success can “teach” for China’s own export-oriented economy.41 As part of the effort to improve public opinion of Japan, China’s domestic propaganda sought to strike a more nuanced tone on the wartime past, striving to commemorate Chinese heroism without exacerbating antiJapanese sentiments.

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(Trying to) Remember History, Not Hatred As part of the propaganda blitz, Chinese officials sought to redirect attention away from Japanese wartime atrocities. State propaganda continued to rely upon the War of Resistance to Japan to promote patriotism and shore up popular support for the Communist Party, but after 2005 these efforts were more careful to avoid aggravating anti-Japanese sentiments. In the Party’s effort to walk this narrow line, the personal recollections of Chinese military veterans proved a valuable resource. In December 2006, the Central Propaganda Ministry, along with the Party History Research Office, Academy of Military Science, and Xinhua News Agency, embarked on a new propaganda campaign entitled “The Eternal Monument: Red Memories.” Based on fifty major events in PLA history, the campaign sought to generate “vivid curriculum that will provide an idealistic, persuasive education, patriotic education, knowledge about Party history, the tradition of revolution, and moral education for youth.”42 The centerpiece was the “Genealogy of the Heroes of the War of Resistance” (kangri yinxiong pu), based on thirty-two veterans’ life stories.43 Countless veterans also traveled around the country, telling their personal stories to schoolchildren and at public events. When one of them, Zhang Xu, died in 2009, there was a blitz of publicity praising his efforts to teach the younger generation.44 Just as in the patriotic education campaign of the mid-1990s, state propaganda deployed memories of the War of Resistance to build popular support for the regime and advance diplomatic objectives. One article, “Listening to the Stories of the 8th Route Army,” quoted Chen Xifu, a local eighty-year-old veteran: “Some people are more familiar than others with the history of the War of Resistance to Japan, the history of the 8th Route Army, and the history of the (Chinese) revolution—that’s very normal. However, the spirit of the 8th Route Army and of the revolution remains very precious today. A people and a nation-state both need this kind of spirit.” Chen emphasized that the Party’s goal of establishing a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui) must begin with the youth.45 The campaign also augmented the Party’s outreach to the Nationalist Party on Taiwan. A 2007 CCTV program praised a former KMT general who went to Taiwan after the civil war, and whose former residence in Taibei was being turned into a museum.46 Another national television program commemorated the “top ten KMT generals in the War of Resistance.”47 The revamped Nanjing Massacre museum reflects this revised approach. Exhibits praise the “defending Chinese army” (zhongguo shoujun) and even describe Nanjing as “China’s capital,” even though it was only the seat of the

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Nationalist government. A picture of Chiang Kai-shek is prominently displayed over his quote urging all Chinese people to resist the invading Japanese army, as is a Nationalist flag flown by KMT soldiers in Nanjing. Plaques praising individual soldiers include a number of KMT officers who ended up in Taiwan.48 Unlike the earlier patriotic education campaign, media stories on the War of Resistance carefully framed their language to avoid presenting an overly negative image of Japan. Reports generally referred not to “Japan” or “Japanese people,” but to the “invading Japanese army.” Although local media reports occasionally slipped back into familiar references to “Japanese devils” (riben guize),49 such critical language was largely absent from national-level publications. More typical were stories about former Japanese soldiers who had returned to China to express their regret and apologize. One CCTV program described a Japanese soldier who had returned to Shandong province several times to apologize for his wartime actions. The story featured the calligraphy scroll he presented to Chinese friends expressing “apologies and regret for the invasion; [wishes for] friendship and goodwill between China and Japan.”50 Another article distributed nationwide told of a Henan family who had cared for an injured Japanese soldier during the war who had lost his memory, thus “repaying evil with good.” The story praised the soldier’s neighbors in Japan for donating funds to build a “China– Japan Friendship Botanical Garden” and “China– Japan Friendship School” in the village, and concluded by quoting a local resident, Wang Zhongke: These last few years, I always wanted to do one thing: to build a 400-squaremeter memorial hall to commemorate the heroic deeds done by my forefathers and the elder generation of this village in rescuing the injured Japanese soldier. I want to include a mural showing the letters and material goods exchanged between these two villages, so that the next generation in China and Japan could always remember this moving story of peace in which people were able to “beat their swords into plowshares.”51

The media campaign also described how Chinese veterans’ hatred of Japan later evolved, such as in the interview of Li Guangrong, an 89-year-old veteran from the 8th Route Army. He was an orphan who saw his adopted “older brother” killed by “Japanese devils,” and so in 1937, at the age of 19, he jointed the army. He told the reporter, “At that time, I had only one simple, powerful wish in my heart: to kill the Japanese devils to get revenge for my older brother.” The article explains that, “As he fought in the war, his feelings

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toward the enemies escalated from ‘family revenge’ ( jiachou) to ‘national hatred’ ( guohen).” Li Guangrong concludes, “At that time, our goal in fighting Japan was to beat back Japanese militarism, and ensure that everyone had food to eat and clothes to wear. Now that China has developed and improved so much, I feel satisfied that our blood was not shed in vain.”52 One of the most striking aspects of the veterans’ commemoration campaign is that Japan itself is nearly invisible. The heroism of Chinese veterans is spotlighted, rather than Japanese atrocities or aggression. It is almost as if there was a war with a faceless enemy. In the text of one television news program memorializing a wartime martyr over 1,000 characters long, the word “Japan” (riben) never appears, and “Japanese army” (rijun) appears only four times. The story instead refers repeatedly simply to the “enemy” (diren). “After his death in battle,” the story concludes, “his comrades loudly shouted, ‘Revenge for our platoon leader,’ and charged the enemy boats. There was a fierce battle for over an hour, and eventually they completely annihilated the enemy.”53 Such stories seek to stir emotion by focusing on the brave acts of Chinese soldiers rather than on Japanese atrocities. Revamped history museums sought to navigate the same narrow straits, praising Chinese heroism while avoiding direct criticism of contemporary Japan. The effort was particularly notable in the expanded museum dedicated to the Nanjing Massacre, which reopened on December 13, 2007, the seventieth anniversary of the massacre. On August 15, 2009, the Nanjing museum even hosted a display of a Japanese manga (comic book) series entitled My August 15 and invited the author to speak publicly about Japanese suffering during the war.54 Exhibits throughout the museum, now three times larger, repeatedly emphasize the message written by John Rabe, a German who helped shelter Chinese victims in Nanjing, in his diary: “We can forgive, but we cannot forget.” One large plaque quotes Mei Ru’ao, the KMT advisor who served on the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo after the war: “I’m no revanchist ( fuchou zhuyizhe). I have no intention to settle the blood debt created by the Japanese militarists with the Japanese people. However, I do believe that forgetting the sufferings of the past may cause calamity in the future.” Featured most prominently is the quote attributed to a massacre survivor, Li Xiuying, urging Chinese people to “remember history, not hatred.”55 China’s propaganda efforts to promote a more positive image of Japan represent a remarkable reversal after decades of negative propaganda emphasizing Japanese wartime atrocities. The contrast with the mid-1990s is particularly striking, challenging the widespread presumption that Beijing is wedded

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exclusively to negative depictions of Japan in domestic propaganda. But did it work? What was the effect of China’s propaganda campaign on popular media, public opinion, and political activism? We begin by assessing the Party’s success in shaping commercial media coverage of Japan.

PROMOTING JAPAN For its propaganda to be effective, an authoritarian state must be able to shape the content of information readily available to the public. In China, this means that the Party must be able to deliver its propaganda message through commercial media as well as the official Party press. Indeed, studies show that Chinese readers are more likely to believe what they read in commercial media than in the Party press.56 To assess the Party’s success in delivering their propaganda campaign on Japan via commercial media, I compared coverage of Japan in twelve Chinese newspapers (six commercial; six Party papers) from 2004 through 2008. Table 6.1 denotes the number of articles that had both the word “Japan” and either a positive or negative keyword in the same paragraph of the full text or in the headline (see appendix 1 for details). This study demonstrates that positive coverage of Japan did not vary greatly across Party and commercial media. Party papers were more likely to publish articles on the bilateral relationship and with political slogans, while commercial media highlighted positive cultural aspects of Japan. Both the Party and commercial press showed a dramatic increase in the number of positive articles after 2006, suggesting that the propaganda campaign was effective in disseminating positive images of Japan via popular media. Negative coverage of Japan, however, did vary significantly. After 2006, the Party press reduced negative issues in its Japan coverage. Commercial media continued to raise such issues through 2007 before finally drawing down negative coverage in 2008. Popular media also printed nearly twice as many articles on nationalism, militarism, or right-wing strength in Japan, and only began to decrease its coverage of such issues in 2008. A similar pattern prevailed in stories on security issues. These findings suggest that the state was eventually successful in shaping the tone of popular newspaper coverage of Japan, though with a significant time delay and with less success on negative issues than on positive ones. To further investigate, we turn now to a qualitative comparison of Party and popular press coverage of both positive and negative events in China– Japan relations from 2006 through 2008.

190 TABLE 6.1

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PARTY AND COMMERCIAL NEWSPAPERS’ COVERAGE OF JAPAN: 2004–2008 Number of articles per year

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Party newspapers

146

122

144

259

191

Commercial newspapers

355

406

435

541

586

Party

197

282

214

344

254

Commercial

117

227

185

226

169

Party

6

5

2

135

265

Commercial

4

4

1

79

150

Party

299

974

494

364

101

Commercial

514

1479

928

847

248

Party

33

198

69

38

17

Commercial

76

364

185

142

61

Party

25

68

58

82

27

Commercial

54

128

160

145

39

Positive Terms 1 Cultural Terms

Bilateral Relationship

Chinese Political Slogans

Negative Terms 2 History Issues

Japan’s Political Situation

Security Issues

Source: WiseSearch newspapers database: www.wisers.com.hk 1

2

Cultural terms: Fuji Mountain, cherry blossoms, tea ceremony, superstar, and cartoon. Bilateral relationship: cultural exchange, friendly relations, China– Japan friendship. Political slogans: Strategic, mutually beneficial relations, welcoming spring visit, warming spring visit. History: Yasukuni Shrine, Nanjing Massacre, invading Japanese army, comfort women. Japan’s political situation: nationalism, militarism, great nation chauvinism, right-wing strength. Security issues: missile defense, constitutional change, U.S.– Japan alliance.

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Reporting on Positive Events: Toeing the Party Line As Chinese leaders embarked on their diplomatic engagement strategy, commercial media provided extensive positive coverage of Japan during leaders’ visits, helping to reassure the public about Japan and providing justification for China’s policy reversal. During Wen Jiabao’s 2007 visit to Japan, for instance, the popular Beijing News provided extensive coverage of Wen’s visit. One editorial proclaiming that “spring has arrived” in China– Japan relations explained: “Over the next five to ten years, China needs a stable, peaceful international environment to help its economy and society develop. In this process, a stable and positive China– Japan relationship will help China overcome dangers and crises, and open greater space for China’s own development.”57 At the same time, the paper buried on page 29 a brief story on Japan’s new Patriot missiles being deployed around Tokyo.58 The following year, coverage of Hu Jintao’s visit in Beijing News included praise for Japan as a “teacher” for China’s economic reforms: Thirty years ago, Japan reached out a helping hand to support China’s reform and opening up. Japan provided Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China ever since the signing of the “China– Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship” in 1979. Though ODA is coming to an end this year, Japan provided an essential injection of support for China’s economic construction. Chinese people will not, and should not, forget this. Up until the end of the 1980s, Japan was a leading model of successful modernization and economic development in Chinese people’s hearts. Chinese people would take Japan as a teacher without the slightest amount of embarrassment or discomfort. At that time, every time Deng Xiaoping would meet visiting Japanese friends, one sentence repeatedly came out of his mouth: “learn from Japan.”59

Many other commercial media outlets that had previously fed public anger toward Japan with negative, sensationalist coverage now led the way in praising China’s engagement strategy. On April 1, 2007, the cover of the newsmagazine Nanfeng Chuang (Window on the Southern Wind) declared: “a new road has opened in China– Japan relations.” Beginning with a double-page picture of cherry blossoms in Kyoto, the 18-page spread included articles on China and Japan’s common interests in the East China Sea, the “win-win” economic relationship, daily life of Japanese businesspeople in Shanghai, collaborative history research, and praise for the diversity of opinions in Japan.60 Global Times, which had also been at the forefront of negative coverage of

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Japan, published an article just before Wen’s visit urging Chinese people to not “overly emphasize” the “very small number of right-wingers in Japan,” and instead “overcome the distinction between left and right, and strengthen foreign relations with Japan through comprehensive dialogues and exchanges with the mass of the Japanese people.”61 The same edition also explained to readers that 80  percent of Japanese citizens opposed changing the peace constitution.62 A few days later, another Global Times article argued that China– Japan should establish “mature great power relations,” a rare acknowledgment of Japan’s legitimacy as a “great power.”63

Reporting on Negative Issues: Evading the Party Line From 2002 through 2005, China’s leading commercial newspapers provided far more negative, sensationalist coverage of Japan than the Party press, exacerbating anti-Japanese sentiments during the wave of public mobilization. Even after 2006, popular papers continued to seek creative ways to go beyond the limited official coverage of Japan on negative issues. Their motivation was likely commercial: the official Xinhua stories provided inadequate content on a hot topic that could be counted on to sell newspapers and attract online readers, and so editors found ways to extend their coverage. The tendency of popular media to provide negative coverage of Japan, as documented in chart 5.1, is also reflected in coverage of sensitive issues during this period. For instance, coverage of Prime Minister Koizumi’s sixth and final visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 2006, varied sharply across Party and popular press. While denouncing the visit, China’s Foreign Ministry emphasized that “The Chinese government and people are on the same path (yidao) as Japanese politicians and the great mass of Japanese people who cherish and devote themselves to China– Japan friendship. . . . We believe that Japanese people from all walks of life will strive to remove the negative political obstacles and promote China– Japan relations soon returning to a normal path of development.”64 Echoing this tone, People’s Daily (RMRB) ran eleven stories criticizing Koizumi over three days, but most were brief and none appeared on the front page. One RMRB article assured readers that most Japanese young people and teachers wish to “correctly acknowledge” history, another quoted a Japanese reader from Osaka apologizing for the wartime aggression, a third described Japanese criticism of Koizumi.65 RMRB also quoted the comments of an unnamed Tsinghua University professor from its Web site Strong Nation Forum: “Even as we criticize Koizumi, we cannot give up on promoting the improvement of China– Japan relations.”66 The Party press was clearly trying to cool public anger.

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While most commercial media mirrored this restraint, Global Times published fourteen stories on Koizumi’s visit within three days, including an inflammatory front-page story on August 15 warning of a visit, with pictures of South Korean protests of Koizumi.67 One author declared, “Enough already! He [Koizumi] must believe that the Asian people can easily be deceived . . . does this really seem like the leader of a country?”68 A third article warned that Koizumi’s visits were designed to build up a “chip” that Japan could trade in: if the next prime minister did not go to Yasukuni, Japan could claim that it had made a concession to China and so demand compromises. “This really is a preposterous joke,” the author concluded. “If Japanese leaders keep going to Yasukuni, they must be forced to pay an even greater political price.”69 Party and commercial media coverage also diverged during the controversy over Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s March 1, 2007 suggestion that the “comfort women” might not have been coerced.70 Although Abe soon retracted his statement, the issue dogged his first visit to Washington. The Washington Post called for the prime minister to “straightforwardly accept responsibility for Japan’s own crimes—and apologize to the victims he has slandered.”71 Even the U.S. State Department urged Japan to address the issue “in a forthright and responsible manner.”72 Beijing’s response was far more restrained. On March 10, the RMRB ran an “International Commentator” article stating that “mature politicians need to choose their words carefully.” It criticized “some politicians” and “right-wing people” who don’t respect history—but did not name Abe personally.73 Several days later, the paper provided a brief notice on page 10 of Abe’s retraction.74 CCTV News adopted a similar low-key approach, briefly noting Abe’s subsequent apology but not the original controversy.75 Popular media provided far more extensive coverage: the six commercial papers studied here printed a total of 56 articles on the comfort women issue from March 10 to 27. Global Times ran prominent stories on the resolution proposed by U.S. Congressman Mike Honda demanding that Japan apologize to former comfort women and on South Korean criticism of Abe. Another article described the incident as typical of Japan’s “flip-flopping” on history issues, followed by an editorial that asked: “Why is regretting the past more difficult for Japan than Germany?”76 Southern Metropolitan Daily quoted a Phoenix TV reporter as stating: “Chinese officials should collect, organize, and preserve the materials regarding the comfort women case,”77 and ran a story praising U.S. demands for Japan to “forthrightly” admit its wartime crimes.78 Beijing News and Xinmin Evening News printed front-page articles strongly critical of Abe written by their own journalists or Chinese professors, as well as carrying the official Xinhua stories on the issue.

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Finally, and most strikingly, coverage of the seventieth anniversaries of the Nanjing Massacre and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 2007 varied significantly. RMRB’s sole article on the Nanjing Massacre anniversary date was by an expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who noted that 2007 was a “sensitive year” in China– Japan relations and urged the public to “remain calm.” He went on to explain that “correctly understanding the past can help people to remain calm, help reasonably deal with current contradictions and controversies between the two countries, and objectively guide a scientific foreign policy strategy and policies.” The article highlighted the long period of China– Japan friendship and emphasized that the War of Resistance was primarily part of a global war against fascism. The description of the war itself took up just one paragraph and failed to mention details of the massacre or even the number of Chinese deaths in Nanjing.79 The very next page had an article on Politburo member Zeng Qinghong’s meeting with a Japanese politician that did not even mention the Nanjing Massacre or history issues, presumably as an example of a more “scientific” approach to Japan.80 CCTV was similarly restrained, emphasizing that the Nanjing Massacre “is not just commemorated by Chinese people, but by people around the world, including Japanese people,” which proves that “we all want peace.”81 Despite warnings by the Propaganda Department for popular media venues not to be “self-serving” in their coverage, commercial newspapers covered the Nanjing anniversary extensively.82 The six commercial papers reviewed here each published an average of six stories on the anniversary over four days, far exceeding the RMRB.83 Beijing Youth News ran a front-page story augmented by a two-page spread inside with pictures and emotional coverage.84 A Global Times story criticized Japan for not opening up its archives on the massacre, contrasting it unfavorably with Germany.85 Southern Metropolitan News was particularly active, with sixteen stories on the anniversary over four days. They reported on activities by local middle school students and academics and even conducted an informal survey of pedestrians, concluding that inadequate awareness of Nanjing as a “Day of National Humiliation” (Guochiri) showed the need for more education about the massacre.86 This variation between commercial and Party papers may reflect an intentional effort by Chinese propaganda officials to permit the popular press to criticize Japan’s management of history and security issues while the official press promoted a positive image of Japan. Providing a longer leash for commercial press serves to release a modicum of public frustration at home, while also signaling Beijing’s frustration to Japan over these issues. However, Chinese officials had to balance their tolerance with restraint. As one

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Beijing journalist later explained, “We received repeated warnings during this time not to be too ‘proactive’ [ jidong] in our coverage of Japan. We generally knew where the line was, and what was permitted and what was not.”87 As the quantitative and qualitative study above shows, China’s popular media moved carefully along these limits, seizing opportunities to cover negative or sensationalist issues on Japan while still providing extensive positive coverage of leaders’ visits and other prominent bilateral events. “When relations are good, we look for cultural stories or other coverage that is interesting to readers but won’t get us into trouble,” noted a Guangzhou editor. “But when relations are bad, then we have more leeway (yudi) to report on negative aspects of the relationship.”88 The limits put on China’s Party press indicate the caution with which propaganda officials approached the Japan issue after 2005. If Chinese officials wanted to increase popular criticism of Japan for foreign policy leverage or domestic legitimization purposes, they could have easily used Party press and television, as was done in the 1982 textbook incident. Instead, the overall propaganda strategy sought to promote positive attitudes toward Japan among the public while still tolerating a modicum of negative coverage among the commercial press. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this nuanced strategy was its effectiveness in influencing public attitudes toward Japan.

PERSUADING THE PUBLIC The primary purpose of propaganda is to influence the public’s attitudes and beliefs. As chapter 3 demonstrates, Chinese public opinion toward Japan declined rapidly from 2002 through 2005 during the wave of public mobilization. To what extent were Chinese authorities able to reverse this trend after 2006? The most useful data for evaluating this question comes from the annual polls conducted every spring from 2005 through 2010 in Japan and China by Genron NPO of Japan, China Daily, and Beijing University on behalf of the “Beijing–Tokyo Forum.”89 Details on the survey methodology and a discussion of the reliability of the data are provided in appendix 2. The results suggest that the Party has at least the potential to influence public opinion. The primary sources of information on Japan for most Chinese citizens are television news, drama, and entertainment—all sources under tight government control. Only among university students was the Internet their primary source of news on Japan, with television a close second followed by newspapers.90 The polls also found that the Chinese public’s trust

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in the media is surprisingly high. Most people agreed that Chinese media combines some freedom with state controls, and described Chinese reporting on Japan as “objective.”91 Interestingly, almost half (43 percent) of all respondents felt that both Chinese and Japanese media reporting on bilateral disputes was “appropriate,” while only 29 percent felt that Japanese media coverage was not appropriate. Since Chinese people generally get their information on Japanese media via Chinese news,92 this surprisingly positive view was likely the result of the state’s efforts to present a positive image of Japanese media.93 Most significantly, the public’s high trust in and broad exposure to Chinese media contributed to the remarkable improvement in attitudes toward Japan from 2006 to 2010, shown in table 6.2. The findings reported in table 6.2 show a clear trend of improved attitudes toward Japan since 2006. The public’s impression about how much their attitudes changed even exceeded the actual improvement in public impressions of Japan. Positive assessments of current relations and optimism about future relations also rose markedly, particularly after 2007. The table also shows a decline in respondents who felt that better relations would not develop without a settlement on history issues, and a rise in the percentage who thought that history issues would be resolved as relations improved. This shift not only reflects a general rise in optimism about bilateral ties but also echoes Chinese government rhetoric that continued interaction and cooperation would help the two sides address history issues. Finally, impressions about Japan’s “national character” improved considerably. Since these impressions were likely shaped by images and information filtered through Chinese media, the results reflect a strong impact of the state’s propaganda campaign. Other survey data from this period also points to the success of the propaganda campaign in reversing the previous decline in Chinese attitudes toward Japan. As table 6.2 shows, the percentage of respondents with a positive impression of Japan rose slightly from June 2005 to June 2006. The timing of this improvement in public opinion toward Japan, however slight, seems best attributed to Chinese government propaganda rather than external events in Japan. After all, Prime Minister Koizumi remained in office and none of the major contentious issues in the relationship had been addressed. A national poll conducted by the Institute of Japan Studies (IJS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) found that Chinese opinions of Japan actually declined slightly after Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Beijing in October 2006 (table 6.3). These results suggest that Abe’s visit alone did not have much positive impact on Chinese public opinion. The agreement for a visit was finalized only four days before the visit itself, leaving little time for China’s propaganda

TABLE 6.2

SHIFTS IN CHINESE PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD JAPAN (Responses in percentages)

Poll Questions

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Total Change

Impression of Japan Positive

11.6

14.5

24.4

27.3

32.6

38.3

+26.7

Negative

62.9

56.9

36.5

40.6

65.2

55.9

-7

Change in impressions of Japan1 Improved

N/A

32.8

50.5

60.9

32.5

40.2

+7.7

Worsened

N/A

17.9

4.3

5.1

6.3

6.5

-11.4

Support regional cooperation with Japan Support

59

63.9

65.8

N/A

N/A

58.8

-0.2

Oppose

23

14.7

6.5

N/A

N/A

14.8

-8.2

Impression of current China– Japan relations Positive

10.5

10.4

24.9

54.3

71

74.5

+64

Negative

54.9

41.2

24.7

13.1

20.5

18.6

-36.3

81

51.2

60.2

+17.5

2.7

4.6

5.1

-41.5

13.3

15.2

10.8

22.6

13.6

Expectation of future China– Japan relations Will improve

42.7

41.4

73.1

Will worsen

46.6

20.1

17.1

Is Japan’s national character primarily:2 1. Peace-loving

N/A

9

Warlike

N/A

65.9

55

49.6

61.8

42.3

-23.6

2. Soft (ruan)

N/A

37

43

44.8

8.2

44.7

+7.7

Hard (ying)

N/A

35.2

25

31.1

63.2

27.9

-7.3

3. Trustworthy (kexin)

N/A

11.5

16.1

15.1

13.5

27.5

+16

Not trustworthy

N/A

61.2

49.3

44.9

45.5

36.7

-24.5

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4. Honest (chengshi)

N/A

21.6

18.9

21.6

20.6

27.6

+6

Not honest

N/A

48

44.2

41.2

41.4

31.9

-16.1

5. Creative

N/A

55.1

59.4

66.9

66.6

61.6

+6.5

Imitative (mofangxing)

N/A

20.9

17.4

10.5

12.5

14.3

-6.6

What are your expectations for the history issues? Relations 25.7 will not develop without resolving history issues

31.5

19.6

17.2

20.7

17.8

-7.9

As relations 51.3 develop, history issues will be resolved

50.1

52.1

57.7

57.5

51

-0.3

Regardless of 11.1 how relations develop, resolving history issues will be difficult

13.5

23.3

21.8

19.9

28.4

+17.3

Source: Annual Reports Presented to the Beijing-Tokyo Forum 1 2

This question asked: “How have your views of Japan changed over the past year?” Respondents were offered five choices: “very x,” somewhat “x,” “I can’t say,” “very y,” “somewhat y,” or don’t know/didn’t answer. This graph collapses the answers into two categories for ease of presentation.

machinery to prepare the public for the shift in Japan policy and welcoming the Japanese prime minister. Perhaps wary of stimulating public resentment over the warm treatment offered Abe and uncertain about how Abe might manage history issues after his Beijing visit, the Chinese government engaged in only limited publicity of the visit. However, only eight months after the October 2006 poll, Chinese attitudes did demonstrate a rather sharp improvement, as demonstrated by the June 2007 poll taken two months after Wen Jiabao’s widely publicized visit to Japan (see table 6.2). Domestic propaganda is the most likely explanation for the timing of this improvement in public attitudes toward Japan.

The Rebirth of the Propaganda State TABLE 6.3

199

CLOSENESS TO JAPAN BEFORE AND AFTER THE ABE VISIT IN OCTOBER 2006

% of total responses

Very close

Close

Average

Not close

Very not close

No answer

Before Abe visit (43.7%)

1.3

6.6

35.7

31.5

23.1

1.8

After Abe visit (56.3%)

0.3

4.1

35.9

33.2

24.5

2.0

Source: 2006 CASS Survey of Chinese Public Opinion Toward Japan (based on data from Jiang Lifeng, “Cultivating Feelings of Closeness”).

The media’s positive coverage of Japanese culture also seemed to arouse the public’s curiosity. A growing percentage of respondents reported that they would like to visit Japan.94 One of the themes of the propaganda campaign was the importance of good relations with Japan for China’s own national interests. The public seemed to accept this argument. By 2008, 87 percent agreed that relations are “relatively or very important,” a sharp increase from 2007, while those who felt that relations with Japan were unimportant dropped to only 2 percent. Similarly, the propaganda push seemed to give Chinese citizens a positive impression of the leaders’ summits: a majority of Chinese respondents in 2008 stated that the summits had yielded meaningful results, while most Japanese respondents were uncertain that the summits had had a positive effect on relations. In fact, Chinese and Japanese respondents viewed the same events quite differently. In 2008 three quarters of Chinese respondents felt relations had improved over the past year, while only a quarter of Japanese respondents felt that way.95 Also, 81 percent of the Chinese public felt optimistic about future relations in 2008, while only 32 percent of the Japanese public believed that relations would get better. Most strikingly, Japanese optimism declined slightly from 2007 to 2008, while Chinese optimism increased by roughly the same amount. It is not that China was seen as irrelevant: 80 percent of Japanese respondents in 2008 felt that relations with China were important, and 60 percent of Japanese respondents chose China as one of the three countries that they pay close attention to. Instead, this wide variation between Chinese and Japanese perceptions seems due primarily to the influence of Chinese domestic propaganda and media coverage in shaping the public’s perception of external events. There was also a surprisingly high level of recognition that China’s own military actions might be damaging bilateral relations. In 2008, an equal

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number of Chinese respondents picked “the rise of China’s military strength” as an obstacle to the development of bilateral relations as chose “Japan’s pursuit of military great power” (15 percent each). More people identified “Chinese people’s anti-Japan feeling and actions, as well as the stance of the Chinese government” as an obstacle (13 percent) than those who selected “Japanese people’s anti-China feeling and actions, as well as the stance of the Japanese government” (9 percent).96 Intriguingly, this critical perspective was not mutual: only 5 percent of the Japanese public thought that the actions of their people and government were an obstacle to improved ties, while 35 percent of Japanese respondents blamed the Chinese side. It seems that by 2008 the Chinese public was increasingly aware that China’s own actions, including military buildups and anti-Japan activism, could have destructive implications for bilateral relations and damage China’s own national interests. Most significantly, the propaganda push successfully fostered public support for China’s new Japan policy. Polls found a sizeable increase in the percentage of the public who felt that China and Japan should increase their cooperation in developing natural resources, and a decline in respondents who felt that “China should protect its own natural resources first.”97 There was also a slight increase in the percentage of respondents who felt that China should support Japan’s efforts to obtain permanent membership in the UN Security Council, though support remained relatively low.98 The public’s broad optimism in the future, faith in the success of leaders’ summits, optimism that history issues would be resolved as relations improved, and growing support for regional cooperation all point to Beijing’s success in building popular support for its diplomatic engagement of Japan. Other surveys find evidence of similar trends in Chinese public opinion toward Japan. The Pew Global Polls found a 5 percent increase in respondents who reported having favorable views of Japan from May 2005 to May 2008.99 As part of its annual “China Views the World” survey, Horizon Corporation created a four-point composite index of “how much Chinese people like Japan,” based upon responses to four questions with regard to Japan.100 From 2005 to 2007, this figure rose from 1.82 to 1.84 to 2.04. The percentage of respondents who agreed that China and Japan should “cast aside history problems and look to the future” rose from 30.7 percent in 2005 to 36.7 percent in 2006, and then 49.7 percent in 2007. A joint survey conducted by The Yomiuri Shimbun and Liaowang Weekly in July 2008 yielded similar results, with 67 percent of Chinese respondents describing the relationship as good, 56 percent saying they could trust Japan, and 75 percent saying that they expected the relationship to improve in the future.101

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201

Although these figures show some warming of public opinion, they also demonstrate that a majority of the Chinese public’s attitudes toward Japan remain far more negative and suspicious than toward China’s other Asian neighbors, the United States, or Europe. The Chinese people have hardly forgotten about the wartime past, or shed all animosity and distrust toward Japan. There remains, as one Chinese expert reminded me, a deep level of “embedded suspicion” toward Japan among the Chinese people. This improvement in public opinion may thus be rather fragile, subject to a reversal if relations with Japan again turn antagonistic. Public opinion on foreign policy, as Hans Morgenthau noted nearly half a century ago, is remarkably fickle.102 The available data strongly suggests, however, that Chinese public opinion toward Japan improved after 2006, that this improvement was deeply influenced by official propaganda, and that Chinese attitudes toward Japan and China– Japan relations improved far more than Japanese attitudes toward China. The contrast with Japan is particularly telling. Japanese foreign ministry officials, like their Chinese counterparts, sought to present a more positive image of China to their domestic audience.103 However, as an open, liberal democracy, the Japanese government was far less effective in shaping the public’s perceptions of events and largely failed to improve Japanese attitudes toward China. In contrast, the revamped Chinese propaganda state was able to effectively shape the content of the majority of media coverage of Japan and so contribute to an improvement in Chinese public attitudes toward Japan.

DEMOBILIZING THE PUBLIC The third major objective of propaganda, and arguably the most important one, is to shape the public’s political behavior. Propaganda, after all, seeks to influence not just what people think but also what they do. In this case, much like the shifts in public opinion and popular media coverage, popular activism on Japan issues declined substantially after 2005. State controls were the primary factor. Quick punishments were meted out for protesters and activists, deterring many long-term activists while discouraging newcomers. Tighter media and Internet controls reduced supportive media coverage and diminished the Internet’s potential as a site for activism, building networks, and attracting public attention. Improved diplomatic relations with Japan and restraint by Japanese leaders on sensitive history issues also reduced the number of potential incidents that might spark activism and public anger. Propaganda played an important role by redirecting public attention, reducing popular

202

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support for protests, and contributing to a shift in attitudes among Chinese activists. These trends were particularly visible on several of the issues that had sparked the wave of public mobilization from 2002 through 2005. Activists in the “Protect the Diaoyu Islands” (baodiao) campaign soon found their activities curtailed by the state. On April 22, 2005, three online discussion forums hosted by baodiao activists were shut down by Chinese authorities.104 On August 1, 2005, a group of activists set off from Zhejiang province to sail to the Diaoyu Islands, only to be stopped and detained by the Public Security Bureau (PSB).105 In 2006, authorities closed down a number of Web sites, prevented demonstrations outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing, and blocked efforts to sail to the islands.106 In October 2007, several Hong Kong–based activists who tried to sail to the islands but landed in mainland China were taken into house arrest by PRC authorities and forced to sign a statement that they would not try to sail to the islands again before being returned to Hong Kong.107 Activists also announced plans for demonstrations to commemorate sensitive wartime anniversaries on August 15 and September 18, 2006. In response, the PSB warned that any such activities would be strictly punished.108 Indeed, some 40 protesters were reportedly arrested on August 15 by Shanghai police for holding an anti-Japan protest.109 Small-scale demonstrations in Chengdu and in Shenyang went forward but failed to inspire wider efforts, unlike the 2002–05 period.110 Baodiao activists’ plans for a national strategizing meeting in Changsha in 2008 had to be called off (via an online notice) after local activists were visited by PSB officials.111 In interviews, baodiao activists acknowledged that security officials had visited their homes or offices several times to discourage their activities. They explained that since the “political environment” had shifted, they had to adjust their activities accordingly.112 The campaign to demand compensation for wartime victims also faltered by 2007, due primarily to legal setbacks in Japan. One decisive verdict was handed down by the First Circuit of Japan’s Supreme Court on May 9, 2007, ruling against a compensation claim that had stretched over 12 years on behalf of 180 Chinese victims of Japan’s biological warfare.113 With this ruling, the Japanese high court had ruled against Chinese plaintiffs in seven of the 11 cases that had come before them.114 As the prospects for legal compensation in Japan became bleak, Chinese activists shifted to a less political and more humanitarian focus. In conjunction with the Chinese Red Cross, they began programs distributing financial support to elderly victims of the war, such as forced laborers, former comfort women, and victims of biological and chemical warfare.115 Tong Zeng, one of the earliest leaders of the reparations

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203

movement, redirected his efforts to Chinese courts and began collecting and delivering assistance for wartime victims.116 The propaganda campaign also contributed to a decline in public support for online protests against Japan. Japan-focused activist Web sites in China dropped from a peak of over 1,000 Web pages in 2003–04 to less than 30 by 2007.117 On March 2, 2007, a Chinese netizen posted a note warning that Prime Minister Abe planned to go to Yasukuni Shrine. The responses were surprisingly calm: “this [Abe’s decision] is hardly strange” (buzu weiguai), Abe’s decision is “very normal,” “China– Japan relations are very complicated,” “this news is not reliable— China’s mainstream media hasn’t reported this.”118 Online sentiments also turned against extreme anti-Japanese statements. When online postings declared a 6.8 scale earthquake in Japan on July 16, 2007 in which nine people died to be “good news,” both online responses and mainstream media quickly denounced the comments.119 One activist reported, “We carried out a poll in our Web site about whether simplistic antiJapanese sentiments would harm China’s interests. During the four months that we carried out this poll, 30,000 people responded, and approximately 83 percent agreed.”120 The shift in attitudes was, of course, not universal. The government’s constraints on emphasizing Japanese wartime atrocities also came in for criticism. A Chinese citizen who had lived in Japan for 20 years and directed a critical documentary on the Yasukuni Shrine issued an open letter to the National People’s Congress in March 2009 asking why the documentary could still not be shown in China.121 Many Chinese activists continued to express anger toward Japan and frustration with China’s engagement policy. In advance of Wen Jiabao’s 2007 trip to Japan, comments on popular PRC bulletin boards warned that if Wen Jiabao were to “come to terms” with Japan, university students would “go to the streets again.”122 After a Japanese Coast Guard vessel accidentally collided with, and sank, a Taiwan fishing vessel in waters near the Diaoyu Islands in June 2008, Chinese netizens posted over 1,000 comments within two days on the “China– Japan Forum,” with many denouncing the “overly soft reaction” by the Chinese government.123 Online criticism often drew upon powerful historical analogies. As one posting warned after Wen’s 2007 visit, “Now we are in a critical moment. We hope Beijing is not imitating the government of the late Qing dynasty. Weakness would encourage the arrogance of our enemy. . . . We are unhappy to witness a successful China being as weak as the late Qing in handling Sino-Japanese relations.”124 Such criticism has been a staple of Chinese online discourse for years. More surprising was the number of nonevents: actions by Japanese civil

204

The Rebirth of the Propaganda State

society or government that did not spark a sharp reaction by Chinese activists. On March 29, 2006, for instance, Japan’s Ministry of Education published the changes it had required for a history textbook, including urging more obscure language on the number of deaths in Nanjing and Japan’s role in the comfort women system, while clarifying Japan’s territorial claims to the Diayou Islands.125 In March 2007, the Ministry of Education issued similar requirements for another high school textbook.126 Then on December 13, 2007, right-wing activists in Tokyo held a meeting to promulgate the “truth about the Nanjing Incident,” denouncing China’s “anti-Japan education,” and urging the “protection of Japan’s reputation.”127 All these events were reported in China, yet Chinese activists did not respond publicly. Instead, several leading activists from the previous wave of public mobilization began to express more nuanced perspectives toward Japan. In an April 2008 interview, Feng Jinhua, a leading figure since his 2001 arrest in Japan for spray painting “Go to Hell” on the Yasukuni Shrine, was solemn and reflective. Feng even praised Japan for its diversity of opinions. “I noticed that in Japan, there is a two-man act: one side is the government; on the other side is civil society. If everyone says the same thing as the Foreign Ministry, how terrible that would be.”128 Wang Jinsi, another influential activist, adopted a similarly moderate tone in his 2009 book on China and Japan. “Of course, a country’s image is multifaceted . . . we should not simply look at Japan’s historical mistakes with blinders on. Instead we should also recognize Japan’s good points. Acknowledging Japan’s merits does not stop us from exposing its shortcomings. Such an approach shows our tolerance and wisdom, which is what a mature nation ought to do.”129 Another leading activist stated in a 2008 interview: I used to believe that only our way was the true patriotism, but now I can accept that there might be differences in strategies or tactics among different people who are patriotic. . . . I used to believe that opposition to the Chinese government was right and necessary, but now I prefer to have some channels of communication with the government. I can meet with Public Security Bureau or Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives now, and deliver my concerns right to them.130

The decline in public activism and emergence of more conciliatory approaches, like the shifts in public opinion and commercial media coverage, was substantial and politically significant but certainly not absolute. Animosity and distrust of Japan, encouraged by decades of negative state propaganda,

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205

did not disappear altogether. Yet the contrast with the 2002–2005 period is remarkable. In December 2005, Peter Hays Gries warned that “Chinese animosity toward Japan is unquestionably out of control . . . the political leadership is increasingly held hostage to nationalist opinion in the making of China’s Japan policy.”131 In fact, in early 2006, Chinese leaders dramatically reversed course. They reached out to Japan diplomatically and clamped down on protests. As relations began to improve, they promoted positive images of Japan in the popular media, successfully improving public attitudes toward Japan. This combination of persuasion and repression proved successful in meeting one of the strongest tests of the regime’s propaganda capacity since 1949.

CONCLUSION Having neglected to cultivate public support during earlier rounds of diplomatic engagement with Japan, after 2005 Chinese leaders oversaw a broad propaganda campaign aimed at ensuring public acquiescence, if not support, for China’s Japan policy. As this chapter has shown, the government was largely successful in bringing about an improvement in public attitudes, commercial media coverage, and political activism toward Japan. Public opinion improved substantially, reversing previous trends. Popular media coverage followed the Party line by providing more positive coverage of Japan, though with a time delay and with greater attention to negative issues. Political protests declined and more nuanced attitudes toward Japan began to emerge. Just as in the rise of a wave of public mobilization, all three attributes affected one another. Fewer protests meant fewer media events that could inspire public participation and raise public emotion. The decline in negative, sensationalist coverage of Japan redirected public attention and eroded support for anti-Japan protests. The wave of public mobilization had come to an end. One might attribute these changes not to Chinese domestic propaganda, but rather to the external political environment. Certainly, improved diplomatic relations and restraint by Japanese leaders were essential for the success of China’s efforts. However, the shifts in Chinese domestic propaganda and foreign policy emerged before the political transition in Japan. In fact, Beijing’s new tone was a key reason that bilateral ties warmed up so quickly. Furthermore, despite the improved relations, a number of incidents occurred that could have generated popular anger in China but did not. Instead, negative state controls—censorship and repression—combined with positive

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propaganda succeeded in reshaping the information environment, redirecting public attention, and deterring anti-Japanese activism. This case demonstrates that despite the dramatic social, economic, and technological transformation of China since 1978, the Communist Party retains an impressive ability to influence public attitudes and political behavior. For Chinese leaders, sustaining their propaganda capacity is essential for ensuring the Party’s survival. As President Hu Jintao declared in his speech at the People’s Daily on the occasion of its sixtieth anniversary in 2008: In today’s society, with rapid development of society and the economy, and unceasing improvement in technology, where information transmission and reception are faster and faster, the importance of public opinion and media work is increasingly apparent. Successful media and propaganda work affects all aspects of the Party and the nation’s work; affects the overall development of reform, the economy, and society, and affects the nation’s lasting peace and stability. 132

Though much attention has gone into exploring the material foundations of Party legitimacy, the CCP’s ability to continue governing a well-informed, actively engaged, and often unruly public has much to do with its proficiency in propaganda. Taking seriously the Party’s success in influencing the hearts and minds of the Chinese public is essential for understanding how and why the CCP has remained in power. We turn next, in the concluding chapter, to summarize the key findings of this book and to consider the implications for Chinese domestic and foreign policy making.

CONCLUSION

hina presents a curious case of liberalization without democratization. The Chinese economy is now deeply embedded within the global economy, frequently buffeted by powerful market forces far beyond the control of the Communist Party. Private corporations, individual entrepreneurs, and foreign investors are at the heart of China’s remarkable economic dynamism. Individual freedoms of speech, personal movement, and job choice have all dramatically expanded over the past three decades. Information flows are rapid and extensive. Social associations abound. A substantial middle class has emerged. Protest is common. Policy debates are often fierce and wide-ranging. In many ways, Chinese society is strong. The Communist Party has responded to the rise of social and economic liberalization in incremental and instrumental fashion. Just as economic reforms developed by “feeling the stones while crossing the river,” so too has the Party’s approach to social change emerged piecemeal over time through a gradual learning process. The response is thus incremental. It is also instrumental—designed to address the public’s demands for political participation in ways that blunt pressures for broader political change. In nondemocratic regimes, establishing avenues for the expression of popular will is never

C

208

Conclusion

simple. For more stagnant societies such as North Korea, Burma, Laos, and elsewhere, relying primarily on violence and repression while resisting social and economic liberalization is a governing strategy that appears to sustain authoritarian rule—though with tragic results for the population. Yet once social and economic change begins, popular demands for political participation invariably grow stronger. Authoritarian leaders must find a way to respond to these pressures if they hope to remain in power. This is precisely what has happened in China. Chinese leaders have forged a sophisticated strategy combining tolerance, responsiveness, persuasion, and repression in response to the public’s demands for political participation. The success of their approach helps explain why and how the Communist Party continues to rule China. I begin this final chapter by reviewing the key findings of this book and then respond to potential objections. One of the most likely concerns is that the case of China’s relations with Japan is extraordinary and thus unique. In the second section, I show that similar state–society dynamics shaped China’s relations with the United States from 1999 through 2001. The third section demonstrates how this framework also provides insight into domestic politics in China. I conclude by briefly considering the broader implications of this study for state–society relations in China.

PUBLIC OPINION MATTERS This book makes essentially three major empirical findings. First, public mobilization toward Japan—shifts in public opinion, political activism, and popular media content—arose from factors largely outside of the Chinese party-state. Decades of propaganda certainly helped to create the broad base of popular distrust and animosity toward Japan. Official tolerance also played an essential enabling role by “opening the gates” for the wave of public mobilization. However, the primary factors that instigated, drove forward, and broadened the wave came from beyond the state. Events overseas and unpredictable developments within China sparked public anger and activism. Activists joined protest campaigns out of personal desires. They constructed horizontal support networks, established informal personal ties with individual officials, and gained public attention through publicity and innovative protest techniques. Commercial newspapers, seeking expanded market share amid a crowded media market, eagerly covered protest events, online debates, and provocative incidents in a sensationalist tone. These stories, spread via

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209

the rapidly growing Chinese Internet, exacerbated public anger toward Japan and focused popular attention on contentious issues. The wave of public mobilization was fundamentally a bottom-up phenomenon. Second, public opinion influenced China’s foreign policy decision making and discourse toward Japan. In the four case studies discussed in chapter 4, Beijing’s rhetoric and negotiating stances, and the timing, direction, and extent of policy decisions all more closely reflect the influence of public mobilization than a reaction to Japanese policies. Public mobilization levels and policy impact were greatest on issues with high emotional content and at points when the state lost control over the flow of information. At times, Beijing tolerated limited public protests as part of a strategy of signaling to Tokyo that its hands were tied. This tactic strengthened China’s negotiating hand by publicly shrinking its set of acceptable agreements, a classic two-level game strategy. In each instance, after exacting at least partial concessions, the Chinese government moved quickly to suppress subsequent protests while reassuring Japan. Although each crisis was resolved relatively smoothly in this fashion, reiterations of the process of escalation followed by containment contributed to a spiral dynamic of mounting tensions. This culminated in the massive online and street protests in spring 2005, which caused Chinese leaders to withdraw a major diplomatic initiative and led them to openly declare their opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The wave of public mobilization also affected foreign policy discourse. High levels of public participation via the Internet, sensationalist coverage in popular media, and the participation of a group of populist journalists and activistacademics interjected a round of nationalist, anti-Japanese sentiments into elite experts’ policy discourse, affecting the course and outcome of public debates and limiting the influence of moderate experts on policy makers. Given the paucity of scholarship on the role of public opinion in authoritarian states’ foreign policy, these findings represent a significant theoretical and empirical contribution. Finally, once Chinese leaders embarked upon a concerted effort to bring the wave of public mobilization to an end, they were effective in doing so. Faced with a deepening domestic and diplomatic crisis in spring 2005, top leaders orchestrated a remarkable reversal in their domestic propaganda toward Japan, augmented by censorship, repression, and diplomacy. The Party was largely effective in compelling popular, commercial press to expand their favorable coverage. This led to a rapid turnabout in public opinion toward Japan, reversing the previous decline. There was also a dramatic drop in public protests and even signs of an attitude shift toward Japan among

210

Conclusion

leading Chinese activists. Given the strength and persistence of anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese public, the Party’s success is particularly impressive. Far from being a fragile state overwhelmed by popular nationalism, market forces, or information technology; the Chinese government emerges as a robust and flexible regime that has adapted to its new environmental conditions with remarkable speed and effectiveness. This success reveals an impressive level of propaganda power, critical to the Communist Party’s ability to retain control despite the dramatic social, economic, and technological changes in China since 1978. Before discussing two potential extensions of this argument, I should briefly address several likely concerns. First, readers may remain skeptical of my claim that social forces were independent from the state. Given the regime’s success in shutting down the wave of public mobilization after 2005, it is clear that the rise of public mobilization could only have been possible with state connivance. Doesn’t this show that public opinion is simply manipulated by Chinese leaders to serve their own ends? The rise of public protests only as Beijing became increasingly critical of Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and its decline once Koizumi was replaced as prime minister add to the suspicion that the public was simply being used by Chinese leaders to serve diplomatic ends. A related concern is the widespread suspicion that no independent public opinion even exists in China. Given the pervasive influence of government censorship and repression, state control over the media, strong limits on autonomous civil society groups, and prohibition of any public discourse that challenges Communist Party rule, it seems unlikely that we can speak of an independent arena in which public opinion is formed and articulated. Certainly the Party plays a dominant role in shaping public sentiments in China. This is, however, hardly unique. All governments strive mightily to influence public opinion. Strong and stable regimes are particularly effective in doing so. Students of public opinion in democracies have settled into a broad consensus that governments deeply influence public opinion. The relevant question here is not: Does the Chinese government influence public opinion? Clearly it does. The more interesting issues arise in investigating the extent of government influence and exploring potential variations in this influence across issues, social groups, and time periods. This requires identifying reliable indicators of public opinion and political behavior, assessing the sources of state influence on opinion and behavior, and measuring the extent to which the indicators seem to be in line with observable state efforts. In the case of China, we would expect leaders to be more effective in shaping public

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opinion when they exert a concerted effort to do so. The Chinese government may be capable of doing nearly anything, but it certainly cannot do everything. When top leaders are distracted by other issues or divided among themselves, the state’s influence on public sentiments is likely to be less pervasive. This is precisely my finding. When Chinese policy makers were divided internally over Japan policy and uncertain about the payoffs or costs of tolerating public criticism of Japan, the wave of public mobilization emerged. Once Chinese leaders decided to clamp down on public protests and embarked on a concerted effort to reshape public opinion, they were successful. A second concern arises over my rather controversial claim that public opinion influenced Chinese foreign policy. The most compelling alternative explanation for specific policy choices is that Chinese leaders were simply reacting to external developments. To reiterate briefly the case study findings, while the worsening political environment, particularly Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visits to Yasukuni, clearly affected policy decisions and discourse, Japan’s policy alone is an inadequate explanation for the timing and process of shifts in both policy discourse and decision making in China. For instance, Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001 and 2002, even while Chinese leaders were seeking to improve relations with Japan. After all, 2002 was dubbed the “Year of Japan” in China. In spring 2002, President Hu Jintao publicly stated his interest in awarding high-speed rail contracts to Japanese firms. Controversy over this decision emerged only several months later, driven by a bottom-up process spread via the Internet. Similarly, China’s shift to a more moderate approach toward Japan in both domestic propaganda and diplomatic efforts emerged almost a year before the 2006 leadership transition in Japan. The timing is similar in the case of experts’ policy discourse. Proposals calling for a policy of engagement and restraint toward Japan were publicly uncontroversial and politically influential among policy makers both before the wave of public mobilization emerged and after it ended. Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni can explain neither the timing nor the content of these debates. In short, external events alone provide an inadequate explanation for the timing and direction of key policy decisions and public debates over Japan policy. An alternative explanation might be lodged within the domestic context in China: namely that differences among top policy makers, rather than public pressure, can best explain policy choices. This familiar approach to Chinese politics is nearly impossible to refute empirically. Reading the tea leaves in traditional “Pekingology” by positing groups of hard- and soft-liners and explaining policy as the outcome of competition among them is essentially

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nonfalsifiable. Almost any outcome can be explained ex post facto as the victory of a given faction. It is also extremely difficult to reliably identify hard- or soft-liners toward Japan. For instance, Zeng Qinghong was widely labeled as part of the Jiang Zemin faction, yet he provided key signals of moderation in China’s Japan policy in 2002. Indeed, Jiang Zemin himself was extremely conciliatory toward Japan in his 1992 visit, fiercely critical in 1998, and then remarkably cordial toward Japanese visitors by 2000. It is true, indeed almost axiomatic, that important foreign policy decisions in China are made by a small group of top leaders, that these leaders may disagree among themselves as to the preferred policy choice, and that those who are most powerful at a given point in time are likely to have their preferences enacted in policy. In addition to being nonfalsifiable and largely unobservable, the elite politics explanation also suffers from limited explanatory reach. Why, for example, are certain policies preferable to others at a given point in time? Why does a certain group win out over others? What factors shape these debates and decisions? I incorporate a role for elite politics by adopting insights derived from social movement theory. Sydney Tarrow, among others, argues that openings in the political opportunity structure create the potential for social movements to emerge and influence policy. In this case, the leadership transition in 2002–03 from Jiang Zemin to the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao group provided just such an opening. As they came to power, Hu and Wen initially sought to improve relations with Japan even as Prime Minister Koizumi persisted in his annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Hu and Wen’s Japan policy was controversial within the top leadership group, due in part to Jiang Zemin’s continued influence over policy decisions and in part to bureaucratic competition between pro-engagement diplomats and the more conservative propaganda and security agencies. In this uncertain environment, domestic public mobilization was initially tolerated and even became a swing factor influencing several specific policy choices over the next few years, particularly as relations worsened. Yet once the costs of tolerating public protests became clear by spring 2005, Chinese leaders and bureaucracies united around the strategy of diplomatic engagement and domestic propaganda. Aided by the subsequent shift in Japan’s leadership, their concerted efforts succeeded in bringing the wave of public mobilization to an end and in stabilizing ties with Japan. Perhaps the most significant objection is that the case of Japan is sui generis—that the strength of popular animosity toward Japan and the leadership’s vulnerability to legitimacy challenges render the case of Japan exceptional and thus unique. While it is not my contention that concept of

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a wave of public mobilization will neatly capture all domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy, the key features of this framework should prove a useful guide for analyzing state–society interactions in similar instances. Political activism, popular media, and public opinion should influence one another through processes that are at least partly outside of state initiative and control. We should be able to compare the influence of state and nonstate factors in bringing about a surge in public mobilization, identify variations in the state responses, weigh the public’s influence on policy processes and outcomes, and examine how and why the wave came to an end. The extent to which the findings in other cases approximate the outcomes in the case of China’s relations with Japan will strengthen the broader political and theoretical implications of my argument, as recapped above. Conducting such tests is clearly beyond the scope of this study. As more of a heuristic illustration than a rigorous test, the following two sections apply the public mobilization framework to China’s relations with the United States and domestic politics in China.

CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2001 Reviewing the role of public opinion in China’s relations with the United States from 1999 through 2001 reveals dynamics similar to the Japan case examined in this book. Divisions among elites and bilateral tensions provided a structural opening for public mobilization to emerge. Although long-standing state propaganda contributed to an atmosphere of animosity and distrust among the public, particularly among Chinese youth, specific incidents beyond the control of the Chinese state were primarily responsible for bringing the public onto the streets and online in protest. Government tolerance varied across these incidents. In 1999, officials tolerated street demonstrations after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; after the crash of a Chinese military plane in 2001, the media and street demonstrations were more tightly controlled, even though online debates were tolerated. In both instances, the government’s public rhetoric and negotiating stances appear to have been influenced by leaders’ concerns about potential public criticism, although the nature of the incidents renders it difficult to reliably isolate (or dismiss) any specific impact of public opinion. Finally, both times the Chinese leadership acted quickly to bring public emotion back under control while moderating its foreign policy toward the United States. The wave of public mobilization did not result in a substantial shift in China’s

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overall foreign policy toward the United States, nor did it directly challenge the Party’s hold on power. In the mid-1990s, a number of incidents exacerbated Chinese anger toward the United States, including the U.S. Congress’s passage of a nonbinding resolution opposing Beijing hosting the 2000 Olympic Games, the U.S. interdiction of a Chinese ship (the Yinhe, or Milky Way), Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to the United States, and accusations of Chinese espionage in the Cox Report. Within China, these incidents were generally portrayed as part of a broader U.S. plot to contain China. According to Joseph Fewsmith, by the late 1990s the Chinese leadership was deeply divided over how best to respond to these tensions in China–U.S. relations.1 By 1999, China’s relations with the United States were thus characterized by divisions among policy elites and tensions in bilateral relations—the two elements most likely to provide an opening and incentive for public mobilization to emerge and influence foreign policy. In the spring of 1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces were intensifying their air bombing campaign over the former Yugoslavia. Deeply concerned about NATO’s interventionist logic and military attacks, Chinese leaders stepped up their rhetorical denunciation of the campaign. On May 8, 1999, a U.S. B-2 bomber dropped five 2,000-pound guided missiles. All five of the bombs hit their intended target—not a Serbian arms depot, as their maps indicated, but rather the Chinese embassy in downtown Belgrade. Three Chinese journalists were killed immediately, and 23 other Chinese staff working in the embassy were injured.2 Two years later almost to the day, on April 1, 2001, a U.S. surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter jet 105 kilometers south of China’s territorial waters along Hainan Island. The collision forced the damaged EP-3E Aries with its crew of 24 to make an unauthorized emergency landing at the Lingshui military airfield and caused the Chinese Jian-8 fighter jet to plunge into the South China Sea, killing its pilot, Wang Wei. The body of the Chinese pilot was never found.3 There was a quick upsurge of public anger and activism in response to both incidents. Although popular animosity had certainly been primed by the nationalist state propaganda described in chapter 3, the passion on Chinese streets and in online chat rooms in response to the 1999 embassy bombing was real. Protests erupted in over one hundred Chinese cities. The American consul’s residence in Chengdu was firebombed. In Beijing, students quickly congregated at the U.S. embassy, where they smashed American cars, took down and burned American flags, and threw rocks and bricks at the embassy

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while Chinese soldiers looked on.4 The activism was not limited to the PRC— Chinese students protested on university campuses across North American and Europe. Two thousand people marched on the streets of Rome denouncing the bombing, most of them ethnic Chinese. Anger also surged online. The White House Web site was flooded with e-mails, forcing it to shut down. Chinese Internet chat rooms were swamped with letters of protest. As Peter Hays Gries concludes: “The Chinese people’s anger and attribution of blame were genuine and understandable.”5 While the public’s anger was directed primarily at the United States, protesters were frustrated with their own government’s inability to respond. In an “Open Letter from a Chinese University Student to Premier Zhu [Rongji]” cited by Gries, a university student rhetorically asked, “How could they dare to bomb our embassy?” He then supplied the answer: “The [Americans] know that our government policy is merely one of lodging ‘fierce protests’ [qianglie kangyi].” He went on to warn: “Premier Zhu . . . our government’s weak stance has created a distance between you and the people. . . . You are so capable, and we need you. . . . But without the people’s confidence [mingxin], how can you lead China’s economic construction?”6 The EP-3 plane incident in 2001 raised another surge of popular anger, though limited largely to online discourse due to limits on street protests. Chinese netizens virulently denounced the United States and demanded that the Chinese government take a strong stance in response to the death of its pilot.7 Within two weeks, the popular commercial Internet portal Sina.com received two hundred thousand postings and nearly one million visits.8 Another popular Web chat room, Qiangguo Luntan (Strong Country Forum), hosted by the People’s Daily, saw a similar soaring of online postings and visits.9 Online “memorial halls” were created for the pilot, Wang Wei. Numerous angry comments of ordinary Chinese were reported in newspapers and on Web sites.10 Following the embassy bombing, the EP-3 incident was widely seen as yet another example of belligerent American intent. “Look what they did to our embassy in Yugoslavia,” said one man in Haikou. “We didn’t do much to them then. This time, it’s no longer bearable.”11 Shi Hanbing, a foreign policy expert, declared that the EP-3 incident provided “China’s opportunity to implement stronger diplomacy against the United States.”12 One poll conducted in Jiangsu province in the wake of the incident asked if the United States’ apologies and compensation had been sufficient. Only 3.6 percent of respondents believed the United States had done enough; while 40.5 percent believed the U.S. actions had been insufficient, and 52.9 percent believed the United States had been “totally insufficient” (wanquan bugou).13

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Despite these similarities, the government’s levels of tolerance varied across the two cases. In 1999, officials tolerated anti-American street protests, even reportedly providing buses so that students could travel from Beijing’s university district to the American embassy. This helped direct anger toward the U.S. government and away from the CCP leadership. As Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen quip, “If they did not throw stones at the American embassy, they would throw them at Zhongnanhai [the leadership compound in Beijing].”14 In 2001, the government tolerated a range of online commentary, including thinly veiled criticism of Beijing’s response, but strongly punished any efforts at street demonstrations. Jessica Weiss argues that the critical difference between these two crises was the bilateral bargaining context. The Chinese government viewed the 1999 bombing as a deliberate provocation to test China’s resolve during the negotiations over China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. By contrast, the 2001 plane collision occurred during a period when Chinese diplomacy sought to reduce fears of the “China threat” in the United States. The 2001 collision also occurred on the eve of the final vote on which city would host the 2008 Olympics, for which Beijing was a front-runner. Weiss concludes that the Chinese government saw antiAmerican protests as beneficial in 1999, but harmful in 2001.15 Although government tolerance was a necessary condition for protests to emerge and spread, this does not mean that public opinion was insignificant in leaders’ policy calculations. As noted earlier, mobilized public opinion can constrain the options considered by policy makers, influence their negotiating strategy, spur belligerent rhetoric, and affect the timing and direction of specific policy choices. In cases such as 1999 and 2001, when public opinion runs parallel with preexisting government policy and interests, it is extremely difficult to isolate (or exclude) the public’s potential influence on policy. Alternative factors, such as the influence of conservative elites and leaders’ personal desire to respond strongly to these incidents, tend to point in the same direction as public anger. Despite these analytical obstacles, Chinese leaders did appear particularly sensitive to public opinion during two rounds of negotiating with the United States during these incidents. The first was China’s negotiations with the United States over China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). After years of talks, in February 1999 the Chinese side took a series of assertive steps designed to conclude the negotiations.16 President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji pulled together different ministerial interests and groups into a consensus on China’s negotiating position. On February 23, 1999 the United States sent a large negotiating team to Beijing, and after a month of talks, a deal appeared close.

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Premier Zhu Rongji then flew to Washington on April 7 expecting to sign the agreement. Concerned that Congress would vote against the deal, U.S. President Bill Clinton refused at the last minute to sign the agreement. The United States then unilaterally released on a government Web site a “joint statement” that publicized all concessions China had made. Before this point, the Chinese government had restricted almost all information in China about the WTO negotiations and the Chinese stance. As Joseph Fewsmith notes, once the information about China’s offer was posted online by the U.S. government, “the Chinese government lost control of the flow of information.”17 Numerous online postings in China fiercely denounced Premier Zhu Rongji for “selling out” Chinese interests. Zhu reportedly asked about these Internet articles even before returning to China.18 Vice Minister Long Yongtu, China’s lead negotiator in the talks, later admitted that his greatest pressure during the WTO negotiations came from domestic opinion that criticized him as a “traitor.”19 Margaret Pearson concludes: “Actors beyond the core structure placed a brake on WTO accession. Organizations peripheral to the formal decisionmaking structure became far more influential over time . . . this periphery certainly shaped the process.”20 After the embassy bombing on May 7, the Chinese side immediately suspended all talks, returning to the negotiating table four months later. Even though the public uproar only delayed the two sides ultimately reaching an agreement, Fewsmith calls the criticism “extraordinary . . . it was the first time since 1949 that elite politics, bureaucratic interests, intellectual opinion, and broader (but still urban) public opinion came together to oppose the official position on an important foreign policy issue.” In the wake of this incident, he concludes, “public opinion was no longer something that could be ignored” by Chinese policy makers.21 Two years later, Chinese leaders again demonstrated a high level of sensitivity to public perceptions. In response to the EP-3 incident, Beijing demanded a full apology, admission of blame, and a halt to further American aerial surveillance along China’s coast before it would release the U.S. crew.22 Most U.S. analysts argued that China’s stance was shaped by disputes between moderates and hard-liners.23 Chinese scholars, however, attributed China’s rigid insistence on a public apology to pressure put on the leadership by public opinion.24 “If President Jiang gives in to this [U.S. demands],” observed a Chinese political analyst, “people are going to say he’s soft, weak and that’s deadly in China. It’s not the right tactic. No one here wants to be seen as soft.” Beijing’s insistence on holding the U.S. crew also may have been shaped by concerns with public perceptions. “If there is no apology,” observed military analyst Zhang Yihong, “the leadership will not be able to explain to

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the Chinese people why they have released the crew.” According to Chu Shulong, of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, “the leadership is concerned about the reactions of ordinary Chinese and their anger about the incident. They are trying to satisfy public opinion to get the American government to apologize and explain. . . . We lost a pilot, remember. There will be no way for us to release the crew at least until our search for him is over.”25 After several days, the Bush administration finally hit upon an apology formula that managed to satisfy the Chinese side while placating hard-liners in Washington. After a series of public expressions of regret by President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, a formal letter from U.S. Ambassador Joseph Prueher stated that the United States was “very sorry the entering of China’s airspace and the landing did not have verbal clearance” and wished to “convey to the Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wang Wei that we are very sorry for their loss.”26 Following these “two sorries,” the U.S. crew was quickly released, bringing the incident to an end. While the Chinese government carefully controlled media coverage of the crisis and clamped down on anti-American street demonstrations, Beijing’s rhetoric made it clear that they were playing to a domestic audience. Since the official American letter was in English, both sides were able to make their own Chinese translations. As Albert Yee notes, the U.S. embassy translated the first “very sorry” as “feichang wanxi” (great sympathy) to the Chinese people and the family of Wang Wei and the second as “feichang baoqian” (extremely sorry); the People’s Daily translated both as “shenbiao qianyi,” a much stronger and clearer expression of wrongdoing and acceptance of responsibility. This official Chinese translation was then widely reprinted in Party newspapers, along with descriptions of the American letter using the strong Chinese words for apology, “daoqian” and “zhiqian.” 27 Though grumblings of public dissatisfaction continued, the Chinese government was quick to declare victory and move on. The People’s Daily declared the incident closed by reassuring its readers: “Our government and people have carried out a staunch struggle against American rule by force and compelled the United States to change its rude and unreasonable hard-line attitude and apologize to the Chinese people.”28 Finally, in both 1999 and the 2001 the Chinese government took steps soon after the incidents to begin to bring public emotion back under control and to stabilize bilateral relations with the United States. Wary that unrestrained demonstrations might spiral out of control, damaging China’s international image and diplomatic relations, as well as leading to popular criticism of the leadership as overly weak, Chinese leaders relied upon a combination of

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media censorship, positive propaganda, and threats of punishment to rein in protests. This was effective. In his survey of Beijing university students several months after the 1999 embassy bombing, Dingxin Zhao found that most students did not believe that the United States generally treated China as an enemy state, accepted economic development as China’s foremost national goal, and located “to counteract U.S. hegemony” last among eight national goals for China. “Therefore,” Zhao concludes, “there is no persistent domination of radical anti-U.S. nationalism.”29 Just as in the Japan case, the brief surges of popular animosity also did not lead to an overly assertive foreign policy toward the United States. As Suisheng Zhao argues, It is certainly not in the government’s interest to allow the emotional, nationalistic rhetoric heard on the street to dictate Chinese foreign policy. Although pragmatic leaders have consciously cultivated nationalism as a way to counter elements of Western policy perceived as containment, strong nationalist rhetoric is often followed by prudential policy actions. Beijing talks tough but acts in a highly calculated manner. Despite the warnings of some China watchers, the rise of nationalism in China has not made Beijing’s foreign policy particularly uncooperative or irrational.30

In sum, the government’s application of a nuanced strategy combining selective tolerance and partial policy responsiveness with repression and persuasion was remarkably similar in the cases of the United States and Japan. This approach was encapsulated by the speech by then-Vice President Hu Jintao in May 1999, just after the embassy bombing. As protests began erupting in cities across China, Hu Jintao addressed the Chinese people on national television: Early on the morning of May 8 (Beijing time), the U.S.-led NATO wantonly used missiles to attack the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, causing casualties and leaving the embassy buildings devastated. The criminal act, which is in violation of the international laws and norms of international relations, has aroused the utmost indignation of the Chinese people. . . . People across the country have held forums and gatherings, and issued letters or telegrams of protest to voice their support to the solemn statement of the Chinese government and to condemn the barbaric acts of the US-led NATO. The Chinese government firmly supports and protects, in accordance with the law, all legal protest activities. We believe that the broad masses will, proceeding from the fundamental interests of the nation and taking the overall

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situation into account, carry out the activities in good order and in accordance with law. We must prevent overreaction, and ensure social stability by guarding against some people making use of the opportunities to disrupt the normal public order. . . . We will uphold the policy of reform and opening to the outside world.31

This carefully crafted speech captures the Chinese government’s delicate dance with an emotional public. Hu Jintao denounced the event that sparked popular anger, accepted the protests as legitimate, and pledged that the CCP would stand up to defend Chinese pride, while also urging the public to support the Party’s reform policies and warning that “overreactions” would be strictly punished. Hu’s speech thus reflects the four elements at the heart of policy makers’ response to the rise of public opinion in Chinese foreign policy: tolerance, responsiveness, persuasion, and repression. Similar dynamics are also evident in Chinese domestic politics.

“A WORLD WITHOUT HEROES”: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE DOMESTIC POLITICS The realm of foreign policy actually represents a particularly difficult case for the argument that public opinion influences Chinese policy making. Public opinion is far more likely to influence domestic politics in China, due to higher levels of public attentiveness, more abundant information, direct personal experience, strong personal interests in policy outcomes, and more extensive media coverage. This final section describes how the dynamics identified in China’s relations with Japan are also evident in Chinese domestic politics. I will briefly mention several examples drawn from recent Chinese politics that reflect similar phenomena: the rise of public anger and issue activation from sources outside the state, the state’s tolerance and responsiveness to public pressure, the public’s influence on experts’ policy debates, and the state’s tendency to rely upon repression and persuasion to curtail surges of public protest. Although the approach here is descriptive and wide-ranging, the very ease with which we can identify any number of such instances points to the rich potential for further investigation into the public opinion–policy nexus in China, and in many similar nondemocratic systems. One of the most prominent areas of greater public involvement and assertiveness in China in recent years has been the rise of online activism.32 Identifying the Internet as the most important arena for public debate and

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political activism in China, the authoritative “2010 Society Blue Paper,” published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) coined a new term, the “new opinion class” (xin yijian ceng), to describe those netizens who are closely concerned with news and current affairs, and regularly express their opinions online: In recent years, they have leveraged the “all communicate to all” strength of the Internet, and expressed their views on all kinds of problems in China’s social development. They can gather consensus, transform emotions, induce action, and influence society within a very short period of time. In 2009, the scale of the “new opinion class” has been expanded further. According to the survey of CNNIC, on June 30, 2009, the population of Chinese netizens reached 338 million. The online population has increased 40 million within 6 months. Internet users are more than 25 percent of the total population, above the world average. They have demonstrated their enormous energy to incite public opinion.33

China today abounds with examples of this “new opinion class.” As the Blue Paper notes, “tribes of microbloggers” have created new information flows outside of traditional media. For instance, in the 2009 Shishou riots in Hubei province, an anonymous netizen logged over 200 tweets live from the streets on Fanfou, a Chinese microblogging Web site. These microblogs got around censors, distributing information far in advance of any official announcements or traditional media.34 While exciting hopes for liberalization in China, the country’s netizens refuse to behave in accordance with traditional Liberal assumptions about civil society—indeed, many of their actions are decidedly illiberal, not unlike the anti-Japanese sentiments described in this book. For instance, China has become home to the world’s largest “human flesh search engine” (renrou suosuo yinqing), a citizen-driven, blog-based hunt for alleged undesirables. In December 2008, Lin Jiaxiang, a mid-ranking government official accused of accosting a young girl, found his name, address, phone number, and workplace plastered all over PRC cyberspace for 250 million Internet users to see, and his alleged crime the subject of hundreds of insulting blog postings. He soon lost his job and was harassed in public.35 Internet users have even turned against their own providers. In September 2008, Chinese netizens accused the PRC Internet-search company Baidu.com of working on behalf of milk producers to bury online links to news stories about the tainted milk powder that killed several infants and sickened thousands of children in Hebei province. The corporation soon

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took steps to defend itself online and in traditional media.36 Such activism is only possible in an environment of official tolerance. Indeed, Chinese top leaders describe “supervision by public opinion” (yulun jiandu) as playing a useful role in containing corruption.37 The CCP Central Committee’s fiveyear anticorruption plan issued in 2008, for instance, calls for the media to play a greater role in supervising Party members.38 A second avenue by which public opinion enters the domestic policy process is through a “mass incident.” Reliable data on such incidents remains scarce, but they clearly represent an influential mechanism by which popular sentiments gain power and prominence in China. One of the most notable riots erupted in Weng’an county in southwestern Guizhou province in June 2008. Up to 30,000 people participated in the riot, in which police cars were overturned and burned and the local Public Security Bureau building set on fire.39 The Weng’an riots reflected what Yu Jianrong, a sociologist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, calls “anger-venting social incidents” (shehui xiefen shijian). Such incidents express generalized anger that has built up over time and then is released, sometimes in response to a relatively minor incident. Large numbers of people—most of whom have no relationship to those involved—mobilize quickly, sometimes engaging extremely violent behavior. Contemporary communications technology such as cell phones, text messaging, and the Internet not only aids mobilization but also quickly spreads word of the incident far and wide, thwarting the efforts of local officials to suppress information.40 The question of how to respond to mass incidents sparked a broad policy debate.41 In December 2009, four law professors from Peking University issued a rare public letter to the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee urging the government to address such popular demands more quickly and effectively, before they escalate into violence.42 A similar debate emerged over the question of how to respond to individuals who travel to Beijing to petition the central government. One delegate from Guangxi province proposed in the 2010 NPC meeting that petitioners who “seriously disrupted the normal life and work order” of local government officials should be jailed for up to fifteen years.43 After his proposal was revealed by the popular Guangzhou paper Southern Metropolis Daily, China’s netizens responded with anger, some warning that it would violate China’s constitution. Yu Jianrong then issued an article in the same paper cautioning that violent suppression of petitioners by local governments would only exacerbate popular discontent and spur further violence. As the public debate grew more heated, central officials were forced to weigh in. The Minister of Public Security, Zhou

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Yongkang, admonished local officials to treat petitioners “kindly,” warning that mishandling them could threaten social stability.44 Premier Wen Jiabao even felt the need to publicly address the issue in his annual work report to the NPC in March 2010, pledging: “We will improve the handling of public complaints lodged via letters or visits.”45 The process by which local issues or concerns escalate through street protests and online debates up to the highest levels of Chinese policy making reflects dynamics similar to those identified in China’s relations with Japan. The role of the commercial media in stimulating public attentiveness and emotion in domestic issues is also quite similar to foreign policy. Despite the continued, and in many ways tightening, regulations upon Chinese media, the activism of journalists such as Hu Shuli is impressive. While she was the editor-in-chief at Caijing (Finance), the newsmagazine was the first mainland publication to report on the SARS epidemic in 2003, publishing a nine-page editorial calling for more transparency. In 2005, Caijing broke an expenses scandal about Zhang Enzhao, then chairman of China’s second biggest bank, including lurid tales of expensive golf trips to the exclusive Pebble Beach course in the United States, travel to London for his wife, and fees at expensive schools for his family. Faced with a public uproar, he was forced to resign. The health ministry admitted in Caijing in 2006 that the organs of executed prisoners were sold to foreigners, such as rich Japanese, for transplant. The following year, Caijing reported a cover-up of an investigation into corruption in the construction of public buildings after the devastating Sichuan earthquake. When the official Xinhua News Agency ran a detailed report in 2009 of how China’s Shenzhou VII rocket made its thirtieth orbit of the Earth, complete with dialogue between the astronauts and ground control, Caijing pointed out that the craft was still on the ground. Xinhua later apologized, blaming a technical error. The same year, Caijing exposed how the area around the Xiang river in Hunan province has been blighted by pollution from the illegal extraction of nonferrous metals.46 While Caijing is hardly typical, neither is it unique—a number of other commercial media also thrive through such cutting-edge coverage.47 One instance of media pressure was the editorial demanding reform in China’s household registration system (hukou) released by thirteen urban newspapers on March 1, 2010, just before the annual NPC meeting in Beijing.48 The editorial was initiated by the editor of the Economic Observer, which began with an online survey of readers’ views, followed by a special series on the issue. Published on the eve of the annual meeting, the strongly worded joint editorial called on the nation’s legislators to abolish the hukou

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system, declaring it “obsolete,” “unconstitutional,” and “a violation of human rights.” Collaborators included well-known papers such as the Chongqing Times and Southern Metropolis Daily. As the editor of the Economic Observer later explained, the enthusiastic response among the public brought to mind a traditional Chinese aphorism: “In a world without heroes, ordinary people can make a name for themselves.”49 Editors at the Economic Observer received disciplinary warnings, but no one was fired. Instead, at the NPC meeting, Premier Wen Jiabao pledged, “We will carry out reform of the household registration system and relax requirements for household registration in towns and small and medium-sized cities,” a statement that acknowledged the public’s concerns while dampening hopes that the system would soon be abolished.50 In other instances, public pressure has forced government officials to give in to popular demands. In March 2009, online anger over reports of excessive spending at an upscale karaoke club in Liuyang, in southern Hunan province, sparked an Internet-led furor over government corruption, ending the career of a midlevel official.51 An online picture of Zhou Jiugeng, a former official in the city of Nanjing, sporting a $25,000 watch, far out of reach of the pay of a civil servant, sparked a similar online uproar, leading to a government investigation. Though the watch turned out to be a fake, Zhou was found to have accepted almost $200,000 in bribes. He was fired, prosecuted, and sent to prison.52 The opposite outcome resulted for Deng Yujiao, a young woman working in a hotel massage parlor in Badong county, Hubei province, who reportedly rebuffed sexual advances by a government official in May 2009, stabbing him to death when he attempted to rape her. Responding to emotional appeals by Deng’s Beijing-based lawyer and online reports, Chinese netizens demanded Deng’s release. Due to the online uproar, the case quickly escalated into what the Communist Party Central Political-Legal Committee later declared a “pan-political incident.”53 Bowing to public pressure, the government cleared all the charges against Deng, and arrested and dismissed the two officials present at the scene of the incident. While the political influence of the Internet hardly bodes well for legal jurisprudence in China, it clearly reflects the power of the public. As Yasheng Huang notes, “Without a vibrant Internet community in China, Zhou and Deng would probably have traded places—Zhou going about his corrupt business and Deng languishing in jail. But the Internet has given China a measure of transparency, accountability and public voice.”54 The public has also inserted itself into public debates across a broad array of domestic policy issues. One surprising instance came in a debate

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over China’s traditional salt monopoly. In December 2009, Chen Guowei, a government supervisor, issued a public call for reform: “To break the state’s monopoly, reform of China’s salt monopoly system needs to be sped up. But China Salt Industry Corporation is strongly opposed to this market reform.” China Salt responded by publicly defending its state monopoly, while pledging to implement a two-stage process of reform over a period of several years. The public then weighed in on the side of the government institution, expressing strong concern that liberalization of the salt monopoly would result in rising prices and reduced quality. “Consumers simply refuse to accept the new reforms,” one analyst argued. A survey on Sina.com found that 65 percent of respondents opposed repeal of the state monopoly, with 58 percent warning of price hikes in the event of liberalization of the salt monopoly. The reform was soon put off.55 The public’s involvement in policy debates, as well as media demands for policy reform, and lively online activism all reflect the same dynamics identified in the case of China’s Japan policy. Chinese leaders have responded in similar fashion, combining tolerance and responsiveness with persuasion and repression. In recent years, Chinese officials have struggled to create at least the appearance of responsiveness to domestic public opinion. For instance, in April 2009, the Party Secretary of Guangdong province met with twenty-six netizens in response to an online article that challenged local developmental policies. In July, Jiangxi’s Party Secretary followed his example, meeting with a group of netizens in pursuit of “the wisdom of the people” (minjian zhihui).56 Hu Jintao himself chatted online with netizens during his June 20, 2008 visit to the People’s Daily. The paper afterward dubbed Hu “China’s number one netizen,” announcing that his visit affirmed the legitimacy and legality of online public opinion.57 When asked what he does online, Hu replied: “I first look at domestic and international news, then I wish to learn what issues Chinese ‘netizens’ are paying attention to and what their thoughts are. Third, I wish to hear the suggestions and objections from Chinese netizens regarding the work of our party and our nation.” Acknowledging that there have been many “suggestions and objections,” Hu insisted that “we pay very close attention to these concerns . . . through the Internet, we can learn about the people’s situation and accumulate wisdom; it is an important avenue for communication.”58 Just as social forces are far more powerful and pervasive in domestic politics than in foreign policy, so too is the Chinese government even more determined to use repression, censorship, and propaganda in hopes of keeping public protests over domestic issues under control. Intelligence gathering,

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for instance, is particularly pervasive at the local level. These strategies identify potential challenges to local authority, seeking to intervene before local disputes spiral into mass incidents. One interview with a county-level police chief revealed that in a county of 400,000 people, there are 12,093 informants on the government payroll charged with gathering intelligence.59 Internal security documents show that China’s secret police have learned to identify potential instigators of protest, demonstrating their determination to intervene heavily in order to deter would-be protesters.60 The state, as Charles Tilly reminds us, is distinguished by its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. As the CCP showed clearly in 1989, it is willing to use mortal force against its own citizens to ensure its position. This determination remains unshaken—as the heavy-handed response to 2009 riots in Xinjiang province clearly demonstrated. After Internet reports of an incident in a factory dormitory in distant Guangdong province sparked widespread riots in Xinjiang that left at least 156 people dead and more than 1,000 injured, the government cracked down hard. It arrested individuals accused of instigating the riots, crippled all Internet service, blocked Twitter’s microblogs, purged search engines of unapproved references to the violence, and saturated Chinese media with the state-sanctioned story.61 Yet with every rise in state censorship, Chinese netizens develop new techniques for scaling the “Great Firewall,” managing to transmit information into, out of, and around China that the government would rather contain.62 Writing backward, developing innovative puns, blogging in commercial forums—the innovation of Chinese netizens and their cat-and-mouse game with censors is reminiscent of an arms race, with each side inventing new technologies in hopes of gaining a decisive edge over the other. While journalists tend to view each development as indicative of a broader trend—state censors finally gain the upper hand; Chinese bloggers move beyond state control—the reality is that these interactive dynamics of containment and breakout are probably endemic to the Internet in China.63 In short, domestic politics in China exhibit many of the same dynamics described in this book. Public opinion, sensationalist media coverage, and popular activism can influence elite discourse and policy decisions. The government tends to respond with a mixture of persuasion and repression in an effort to tamp down emotions without allowing them to swell into a direct challenge to the Party’s rule. While these disputes are certainly worrying to top leaders, they have not, at least so far, threatened the stability of Communist Party rule.

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CONCLUSION: WHITHER CHINA? In some ways, pairing the years 2008 and 2009 provides a window into the waxing and waning of tolerance and tightening that is endemic to state– society interactions in China, and indeed, to many authoritarian regimes. The year 2008 was China’s global coming-out party, choreographed around the staging of the Beijing Olympics, and seemed to augur prospects for expanded political tolerance. The round-the-clock media coverage of the massive Wenchuan earthquake in May suggested that media might be given greater leeway for more direct and engaged reporting, an impression strengthened by President Hu Jintao’s remarks the following month at the People’s Daily in which he called for a more responsive and nuanced approach to public opinion. Sensing a possible opening, democracy activists began to put forth cautious feelers, most notably in the Charter ’08 petition signed by a number of leading activists and intellectuals. Cracks began to appear online in the famed “Great Firewall of China.” A number of localized economic protests were tolerated. Environmental groups achieved major victories in rolling back the developmental juggernaut of local government and corporate interests. Just a year later, the tide appeared to have turned. In 2009, a number of sensitive anniversaries came—the twentieth anniversary of the June Fourth protests, the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC, the eightieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement—heightening Beijing’s fears that social groups would use the occasion to push for further reform. Unexpected riots in Tibet and then in Xinjiang were violently suppressed, with stringent controls imposed on media coverage. New restrictions were put on the Internet—there was even an overt effort to install surveillance software on every new computer sold in China. NGOs in China reported renewed tightening on their operations. Political dissidents were jailed and their families placed under house arrest. Advocates for greater autonomy for Xinjiang were hounded overseas while Chinese diplomats released yet another burst of denunciations aimed at the Dalai Lama. A number of newspaper editors and journalists were arrested, as were influential scholars who appeared to have strayed beyond the Party’s tolerance. Taken alone, each one of these trends seems to point toward a different future. One set of events held out hope for Liberal visions of Party reform or collapse; another seemed to reveal a robust and repressive regime. Instead of seeing each iteration as signaling an inevitable trend—either emerging democratization or intensified authoritarianism—they should be seen as two

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sides of the same coin. Waxing and waning in the Party’s tolerance of social activism has become a defining feature of Communist Party rule in China. The greatest threat to the Party’s prospects for maintaining power is the possibility that Chinese leaders will veer too far in either direction. Failing to sustain a modicum of tolerance, responsiveness, and persuasion in the face of social pressure will be as destructive to the CCP’s hopes for continued rule as is passive tolerance in the face of widening social protest and political dissent. The prospects for single-party rule in China depend upon the Party’s success in sustaining this delicate balance.

APPENDIX

1

NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF JAPAN, 2001–2008

conducted the media studies described in chapters 3 and 6 using WiseSearch, a database that provides full text of all articles published in Chinese newspapers and is searchable according to year, newspaper, and specific terms that appear in either the headline or full text (http://www.wisers.com. hk). My data set consists of all articles printed in twelve newspapers from 2001 through 2005, including six commercial newspapers and six Party-run newspapers, with one national newspaper and city-level newspapers from Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu in each category. I identified keywords based upon the results of eight national public opinion surveys that asked respondents: “What comes to mind when you hear the word ‘Japan’?” This includes four polls conducted by the Institute of Japan Studies (IJS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 and four polls conducted for the Beijing–Tokyo Forum from 2005 to 2008. I then tested these terms’ utility by reading random articles generated by this search to ensure that they were reliably either positive or negative, and that the search generated only articles on Japan. This review led me to exclude some terms that had been identified in the polls as prevalent images of Japan but yielded articles that were not clearly classified as positive

I

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or negative, such as: advanced science and technology, Japanese electronics, international cooperation, history textbooks. Table 3.1 and table 6.1 show the results from searches that identify the number of articles printed in the set of six Party and six popular newspapers in a given year in which the term “Japan” and a specific term appeared together in either the same paragraph of the full text or in the headline. Newspapers and search terms in Chinese are given below.

Party Newspapers People’s Daily—人民日报 Beijing Daily—北京日报 Liberation Daily—解放日报 Nanfang Daily (Guangzhou)—南方日报 Shanghai Daily—上海日報 Chengdu Daily—成都日报

Commercial Newspapers Global Times—环球时报 Beijing News—新京报 Beijing Youth Daily—北京青年报 Southern Metropolitan Times (Guangzhou)—南方都市报 Xinmin Evening Times (Shanghai)—新民晚報 Chengdu Evening News—成都晚报

Keywords Used Positive terms: 1. Culture: Fuji Mountain, cherry blossoms, tea ceremony, superstar, cartoon 富士山, 樱花, 茶道, 明星, 动画. 2. Bilateral Relationship: cultural exchange, friendly relations, China– Japan friendship (but not “hospital,” to exclude references to the China– Japan Friendship Hospital in Beijing. 文化交流, 友好关系, 中日友好 but not 医院. 3. Political Slogans: Strategic, mutually beneficial relations, welcoming-spring visit, warming spring visit 战略互惠关系, 迎春之旅, 暖春之旅, 中日友谊

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Negative terms: 1. History: Yasakuni Shrine, Nanjing Massacre, invading Japanese army, comfort women 靖国神社, 南京大屠杀, 侵华日军, 慰安妇 2. Japan’s political situation: nationalism, militarism, great nation chauvinism, right-wing strength 民族主义, 军事主义, 大国主义, 右翼势力 3. Security issues: missile defense, constitutional change, U.S.– Japan alliance 反倒导弹, 修改宪法, 日美同盟

APPENDIX 2 CHINESE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS—ARE THESE NUMBERS RELIABLE?

he survey results reported in table 6.2 come from the reports presented at the annual Beijing–Tokyo Forum from 2005 through 2008. A description of survey methodology used for the 2007 and 2008 surveys is available (in Japanese) online at www.tokyo-beijingforum.net (accessed November 24, 2008). This appendix discusses the reliability of this data (methodological explanations for other surveys cited in this book are generally available in their original publication source). Perhaps the polling data reported in table 6.2 should be taken with a degree of skepticism. After all, over several years, the polls in China were jointly funded, designed, conducted, and reported out by a Party-run newspaper (The China Daily), a Chinese university (Beijing University), and a Chinese company (Horizon). Two kinds of error, or bias, are possible: inexactitude in poll design and implementation and/or political influence on the reported poll findings. I will deal with each in turn. The methodology reported by the polling agencies themselves, and confirmed through interviews at Beijing University and Horizon Corporation and personal evaluation of the survey documents used, largely adheres to standard methodology for survey research in China. Polls were conducted

T

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using in-person interviews by pairs of trained Chinese university students following a standard questionnaire format, with respondents identified through random sampling based on urban neighborhood residence records. One potential problem is that urban residence records in China are notoriously unreliable. This might generate a somewhat biased sample, such as favoring long-term residents over the migrant population. A second problem is that many of the questions used in 2005 were not well designed, though by 2006 most of these problems had been corrected. By 2008, the questionnaire generally follows standard survey research methodology. For this reason, I report only on questions in 2005 that adhere to standard survey question format. I also report a number of different findings and emphasize broad trends over time, rather than any one finding. Finally, I also do not engage in statistical tests for a relationship between individual elements. My argument thus does not rely upon minor variations in particular answers, but rather on the broad trends captured by this poll and reflected in a number of other survey results. It is extremely unlikely that so many of the figures would point in the same direction if the findings, year after year, were completely unreliable due to methodological errors. A more likely and more disconcerting concern is that the poll findings may have been altered in some way due to political objectives, particularly since the findings do support the policy thrust of the Chinese government after 2005. Indeed, the 2008 poll findings were publicized by the China Daily as evidence that relations were improving.1 I have not used these public reports, but rather the original survey results. Political influence is still possible; however, several factors mitigate this possibility. First and foremost, individuals responsible for designing, implementing, and analyzing the polls insisted in private discussions that they were not pressured to achieve a certain result by government officials. Second, the poll results reveal significant variation in response to specific questions. For instance, from 2007 to 2008 there was a decline in respondents who felt that economic relations were growing more competitive, but an increase in the percentage that identified Japan as a threat to China.2 Similarly, even though overall attitudes toward Japan improved substantially, a greater percentage of the public defined Japan’s political situation in 2008 as characterized by “militarism,” “nationalism,” or “great power chauvinism,” while only a small minority identified Japan with “pacifism,” “international cooperation,” or “democracy.”3 If the government was manipulating the results to demonstrate improved public attitudes toward Japan, such contradictory trends are unlikely to be reported out.

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235

Another indicator that the outcome was not manipulated by the Chinese government was the surprisingly high recognition among the Chinese public that China’s own military actions might be damaging bilateral relations. In 2008, an equal number of Chinese respondents picked “the rise of China’s military strength” as an obstacle to the development of bilateral relations (15.3%) as picked “Japan’s pursuit of military great power” (15.5%). A larger percentage identified “Chinese people’s anti-Japan feeling and actions, as well as the stance of the Chinese government” as an obstacle (13.4%) than selected “Japanese people’s anti-China feeling and actions, as well as the stance of the Japanese government” (9.4%).4 It hardly seems likely that the Chinese government would manipulate results so the Chinese public would emphasize Chinese military strength as a primary obstacle to improved ties with Japan. Finally, while the figures generally show a “warming” of public opinion, they still find that a majority of the Chinese public holds strongly negative views of Japan, in sharp contrast to the government’s rhetoric since 2007. In fact, it is unclear which kind of result would be beneficial for the Chinese government to report publicly. A dramatic improvement in public opinion toward Japan might enhance Beijing’s diplomatic engagement strategy; yet emphasizing the continued negative sentiments offers potential diplomatic leverage useful for pressing Japan to maintain its restraint on issues such as history textbooks, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and constitutional revision. In any event, the bulk of empirical evidence and logical inference point away from the possibility that these polling results were systematically and strategically manipulated by the Chinese government for political benefit. One of the most poignant critiques of public opinion polls comes from Justin Lewis, who argues that political elites publicize survey results to “construct” public opinion.5 In this case, that seems an unlikely explanation for the outcomes observed, given the relative scarcity of reporting in China on Chinese public opinion toward Japan. The survey results were not reported on CCTV, by People’s Daily, or by most commercial newspapers. It is telling that the only newspaper involved in the Beijing–Tokyo Forum survey was an English-language paper aimed at overseas audiences, China Daily. Lewis also raises the possibility that public opinion polls may force respondents to express opinions about issues they have not thought about and about which they do not have a clear opinion. By reporting their answers, polls can “create” opinions where none existed. In this case, the prevalence of Japan-related issues in popular discourse, media coverage, and public education suggests that urban Chinese residents have had extensive opportunities to form opinions on issues related to Japan and China– Japan relations.6 Lewis is certainly

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correct about the power of the state and of mainstream media to shape such public attitudes, particularly an authoritarian state like China. He is also correct that public opinion polls are hardly unproblematic or sufficient indicators of public attitudes. For this reason, I also examine popular media content and levels of public mobilization.

POLLING METHODOLOGY The polls in China were designed by professors at Beijing University and implemented by Horizon (Lingdian) Corporation. Each survey was conducted in spring of each year through in-person interviews among a random sample of urban residents in Shenyang, Beijing, Shanghai, Xi’an, and Chengdu, drawing upon housing records. (N = 1,500–2,000 per year; response rates not available). In 2007, age distribution was: under 19 (1.9%); 20–29 (19.2%); 30–39 (24.7%); 40–49 (28.3%); 50–59 (20.8%); and highest education obtained was: elementary school or below (2.9%); middle school (23.1%); high school (46.7%); technical college (19.1%); university or above (8%).

NOTES

INTRODUCTION 1. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1–15. 2. Jacobs and Shapiro, “Studying Substantive Democracy,” 12. 3. Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion. For a contrary view that emphasizes the influence of a “power elite” in U.S. policy, see Domhoff, “The Power Elite.” 4. Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus”; Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures”; Foyle, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.” 5. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests”; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff, “Why Democracies Cooperate More.” 6. Zhao, “A State-led Nationalism”; Wang, “National Humiliation, History Education”; Brady, “The Beijing Olympics.” 7. Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State, 252. 8. Shirk, China: The Fragile Superpower; Gries, China’s New Nationalism. For a contrary view see Zhao, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism.” 9. Lynch, After the Propaganda State. 10. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 3. 11. Hsiung, China and Japan at Odds. 12. Perry, “Studying Chinese Politics,” 6–9.

238 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

Introduction

Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 7. Snyder specifically cites the case of China (233). Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism,” 33. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 20. Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 847, 849–850. Shirk, A Fragile Superpower, 104. Christensen, “China, the U.S.– Japan Alliance;” Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions”; Wu Xinbo, “The Security Dimensions”; Calder, Asia’s Deadly Triangle. Friedman, “Preventing War Between China and Japan,” 99. For a similarly optimistic view, see Manicom and O’Neil, “Sino-Japanese Strategic Relations.” Zhao, “Problems of Nationalism,” 106–107. Lai and Slater, “Institutions of the Offensive,” 117. Li, Zhang, Zhao, and Liang, Class Conflicts; Cai, “The Resistance of Chinese Laid-off Workers”; Hurst and O’Brien, “China’s Contentious Pensioners.” Simon Elegant, “China Protests: A New Approach,” The New York Times (July 4, 2008). Simon Elegant, “China’s Taxi Strikes: A Test for the Government,” Time (November 28, 2008). Li, Zhang, Zhao, and Liang, Class Conflicts, 106. Wang, “Changing Models.” For the earlier argument, see Pei, “China’s Evolution.” For the later argument, see Pei, “China’s Governance Crisis,” 96. Baum, “The Limits of Consultative Leninism,” 19. Chen, “The New Inequality,” 58. Yang, The Power of the Internet in China, 220. Li, “The New Bipartisanship.” Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free?” Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 175, 181. Emphasis in original. Saich, “Discos and Dictatorship,” 252. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China. Ho, “Self-Imposed Censorship,” 37. Mertha, “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”; Mertha, China’s Water Warriors. Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 1–18. Wang, “Changing Models,” 81. Yang, “Economic Transformation,” 155. For similar approaches, see also Wright, Accepting Authoriarianism; Tsang, “Consultative Leninism.” Perry, “Studying Chinese Politics,” 21. Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public; Beckerman, “The New Arab Conversation”; Anderson and Eickelman, New Media in a Changing Middle East. Cook, “In Support of Arab Democracy,” 10. See also Cook, “The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform.” Huntington, The Third Wave, 174–175. Brownlee, Authoritarianism, 16.

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239

47. Ottaway, Democracy Challenged, 9. 48. This measure excludes all countries listed as liberal democracies and countries that received a rating of 7 on the Freedom House ranking of civil liberties, which indicates effectively no civil liberties at all. The remaining list includes countries in the Middle East: Egypt (5), Jordan (4), Lebanon (4); Southeast Asia: Vietnam (5), Cambodia (5); Sub-Saharian Africa: Zambia (4), Zimbabwe (6); and Central Asia: Armenia (4), Azerbaijan (5). Freedom House’s civil liberties rankings are given in parentheses, with a lower number indicating greater civil liberties. Drawn from the Freedom House 2006 reports, http://www.freedomhouse.org/ (accessed March 2, 2007). 49. Anderson, “Searching Where the Light Shines,” 207. 50. Linz, “An Authoritarian Regime,” 297. 51. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, 170. 52. Zaidi, “Pakistan After Musharraf,” 38–39. 53. Albrecht, “How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism,” 390. 54. Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control,” 43. 55. Hafez and Wiktorowicz, “Violence as Contention,” 66. 56. Samantha M. Shapiro, “Revolution, Facebook-Style,” The New York Times Magazine (January 22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/magazine/25bloggers-t.html? th&emc=th (accessed April 15, 2010). 57. Michael Slackman, “Egyptians Seethe Over Gaza, and Their Leaders Feel Heat,” The New York Times (January 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/world /middleeast/10cairo.html?_r=1&th&emc=th (accessed April 15, 2009). Emphasis added. 58. Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, Stephen Weber, and Evan Lewis, “An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public,” February 3, 2010, World Public Opinion.org, www.world publicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb10/IranElection_Feb10_rpt.pdf (accessed April 15, 2010). 59. Christensen, Johnston, and Ross, “Conclusions and New Directions,” 405–406. 60. Liu adopts Neidhardt and Rucht’s definition of a social movement: “an organized and sustained effort of a collectivity of inter-related individuals, groups, and organizations to promote or resist social change with the use of public protest activities.” Liu, Mass Politics, 5. 61. Liu, Mass Politics, 3. 62. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 13–29. 63. Hao and Su, China’s Foreign Policy Making, 8–10. One exception is the excellent chapter in this volume by Yanmin Yu on media reactions to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. See Yu, “The Role of the Media.” 64. Fewsmith and Rosen, “The Domestic Context,” 152–156. 65. Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 13–25. 66. The literature on China– Japan relations is voluminous. Recent edited volumes include: Howe, China and Japan; Söderberg, Chinese–Japanese Relations; Austin and Harris, Japan and Greater China; Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations; Heazle and Knight, China–Japan Relations. 67. Wan, Sino–Japanese Relations, 336. 68. Wan, Sino–Japanese Relations, 338.

240 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74.

75. 76. 77. 78.

Introduction

Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks, 261. Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, 127. He, The Search for Reconciliation, 1. One important exception is Stockmann, “Who Believes Propaganda.” Page, “The Semi-Sovereign Public,” 326. For examples from U.S. domestic politics, see Erickson et al., Statehouse Democracy; Erikson et al., The Macro Economy. For instance, see Gries, “Tears of Rage.” Jessica Weiss avoids this in her dissertation by including a case of the “dog that did not bark”—the absence of popular protests in the case of PRC relations with Taiwan. She thus attributes patterns in antiforeign protests to the role of state tolerance, and focuses on explaining variations in state tolerance and permissiveness. See Weiss, Powerful Patriots, esp. 186–196. I argue that state tolerance is a necessary, but not sufficient factor in explaining patterns of popular mobilization. For this reason, I also compare the influence of state and society in bringing about popular mobilization. Callahan, China, 183. Burnstein et al., “How the Mind Preserves the Image of the Enemy.” Johnston and Stockmann, “Chinese Attitudes Toward the United States and Americans,” 164–176. Lazarsfeld and Merton, “Mass Communication,” 102.

1. PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

11. 12.

Childs, Public Opinion, 14. Herbst, Numbered Voices, 92. Allport, “Toward a Science,” 12. Lippmann, Public Opinion. Bourdieu, “Public Opinion Does Not Exist,” 128. See Jie Popular Political Support; Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change. Both rely primarily upon survey results as a measure of public opinion. Herbst, “On the Disappearance of Groups,” 90. Lee, “The Sovereign Status of Survey Data,” 296. Emphasis in original. The term is not entirely new. Alan Liu refers to “mobilized public opinion,” Taeku Lee uses “activated mass opinion,” and Bourdeiu describes “mobilized opinion.” Yufan Hao and Lin Su adopt the phrase “societal force,” a “catch-all notion including academics, bureaucracy, media, and public opinion.” See Liu, Mass Politics in the People’s Republic; Lee, Mobilizing Public Opinion, 3–9; Bourdieu, “Public Opinion Does Not Exist”; Hao and Su, China’s Foreign Policy Making, 8–10. John Burns, for instance, argues that rural protests are “an indication of the failure of the party to successfully institutionalize effective formal channels” for interest articulation. Burns, “Chinese Peasant Interest Articulation,” 145. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 139–140; Shirk, China: A Fragile Superpower, 7–12. Perry, “Permanent Rebellion,” 215.

1. Public Opinion in Chinese Foreign Policy

241

13. This description draws from Wang, “Changing Models,” 62. See also Schoenhals, “Political Movements, Change and Stability.” For the pre-1949 use of mobilization, see Chen, Making Revolution. 14. Cited in Liu, Mass Politics, 28n11. Original in Speier, The Truth in Hell, 144. 15. Habermas, The Structural Transformation, xvii–xviii. 16. Cited in Liu, Mass Politics, 28nn12, 13. 17. Almond, The American People, 138. 18. Converse, “Changing Conceptions,” S13–S16. 19. Page and Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy”; Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, 148–149. 20. Lewis, Constructing Public Opinion, 34. 21. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class. 22. Thorton, “Retrofitting the Steel Cage.” 23. Johnston, “The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion,” 347. 24. Bourdieu, “Public Opinion Does Not Exist,” 124. 25. For instance, in April 2010, Beijing University professors embarked on a governmentbacked effort to survey some 60,000 respondents in 25 provinces. The Chinese Family Panel Studies will be the largest undertaking of this kind in the developing world. See Mara Hvistendahl, “Survey to Reveal True Face of Chinese Society,” Science 328, no. 5978 (April 30, 2010): 554–555. 26. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 20. See also McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements; Diani and McAdam, Social Movements and Networks. 27. Sewell, “Space in Contentious Politics,” 239. 28. Aminzade and McAdam, “Emotions and Contentious Politics,” 17. For instance, Act-Up (an AIDS protest group in the United States) defines itself as “a machine for the construction of anger.” Tarrow, Power in Movement, 112. 29. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 142. 30. Perry, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven. 31. White, Howell, and Shang, In Search of Civil Society. Recent work includes: O’Brien, Popular Protest in China; Kang and Han, “Graduated Controls.” 32. Ho, “Self-Imposed Censorship,” 37. 33. Zaidi, “Pakistan After Musharraf.” 34. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 74. 35. O’Brien, “Neither Transgressive nor Contained,” 107. 36. Reilly, “China’s History Activists.” 37. McAdam and Ammenzade, “Emotions and Collective Politics,” 17. 38. Su Haihe, “Jun yiliu huaxue wuqi yihai wuqiong [The abandoned chemical weapons leave behind an endless legacy of trouble],” Beijing Qingnian Bao (September 30, 2003). 39. Nan Xianghong, “Jiyi bushi weile hen [Remembering is not for hatred],” Nanfang Zhoumou (December 26, 2002). 40. Li Mutong, “Wangluo minzhuzhuyi xiankai zhongguo minzhuzhuyi xin pianzhang [Internet nationalism opens a new chapter in China’s nationalism],” September 18,

242

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53.

54. 55.

56. 57. 58.

59.

1. Public Opinion in Chinese Foreign Policy

2003, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003–09–18/12061767730.shtml (accessed January 5, 2005). Peng Lewu, “1000 Wan qianming de quanliucheng [The complete process of gaining ten million signatures],” Nanfang Zhoumou (March 31, 2005). Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy, 13. Emphasis added. See, for instance: Kuypers, Presidential Crisis Rhetoric; Graber, Mass Media and American Politics; Paletz, The Media in American Politics. Lewis, Constructing Public Opinion, 16. Herbst, “How State-level Managers ‘Read’ Public Opinion,” 179. Brody, Assessing the President; Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public”; Bennett et al., “None Dare Call It Torture”; Zaller and Chiu, “Government’s Little Helper.” Hallin, The “Uncensored War”; Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations.” Entman, “Media and Political Conflict”; Nacos et al., Decisionmaking in a Glass House; Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Baum and Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” 40. Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market and Democracy, 67–71. Hu, Political Communication in Contemporary China, 57. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xinwen chuban zongshu, baozhi chuban guanli [Provisions on the administration of newspaper publication, order no. 32] (General Administration of Press and Publications) (September 20, 2005; effective December 1, 2005), www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_375808.htm. This ranges from bu (ministry) to ju (bureau), chu (branch), and ke (section). Studies show that even more adventurous papers like Southern Weekend rarely investigate government officials above their own bureaucratic ranking. Hu Wei, Political Communication, 149–150. See Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System”; Cheung, “Public Opinion Supervision”; Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy.” The CPD recently changed the English translation of “propaganda” to “publicity” or “information,” but the Chinese name remains the same. Keller, “Media Ownership,” 286n38. Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 47–56. Interview, Beijing, April 15, 2007. The preceding description is drawn from a number of personal interviews with Chinese officials, particularly in the media sector, and Chinese academics: in San Francisco (July 15, 2007); Beijing (August 30, 2007); Dalian (August 25, 2007); Shanghai (September 12, 2007). The entire editorial board of Southern Weekend was fired in 2003 for unapproved coverage. In 2006, Bingdian, a weekly magazine associated with the China Youth Daily, was shut down for two months, and the editor-in-chief and his deputy were replaced when the journal printed an article critical of the textbook account of the Boxers Rebellion. See Yuan Weishi, “Xiandaihua yu lishi jiaokeshu” [Modernization and history textbooks] Bingdian (January 11, 2006), http://zqb.cyol.com/gb/zqb/2006–01/11/content_118530 .htm (accessed May 4, 2007), cited in He, “Remembering and Forgetting,” nn79–80.

1. Public Opinion in Chinese Foreign Policy 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70.

71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

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Lynch, After the Propaganda State. Cheung, “Public Opinion Supervision,” 384. Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 832. Birkland, After Disaster, 14–17. Interview with Chinese scholar, Hong Kong, August 24, 2006. Page, “The Semi-Sovereign Public,” 337. Interview, Beijing, August 12, 2007. Based on interviews with Chinese officials and academics in San Francisco (July 15, 2007); Beijing (August 30, 2007); Dalian (August 25, 2007); Shanghai (September 12, 2007). Interview with Statistics Department official in Beijing, April 12, 2007. Interview, Chinese scholar, Beijing, November 6, 2006. Liu Xingchen, “County Police Chief: The ‘Three Ones’ Model of Intelligence Gathering; Internal Document of the Domestic Security Department of the Public Security: Follow the Path of Staying Close to the Masses; Strengthen the Foundation of the Domestic Security Department,” China Digital Times, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/01 /internal-document-of-the-domestic-security-department-of-the-public-security -bureau-part-i/ (accessed March 12, 2010). For an early example, see Horizon Survey Company Guancha Zhongguo [Observing China]. Interviews with Horizon Consulting, Beijing, September 30, 2007; January 10, 2008. Dong Ruifeng and Yang Taoyuan, “Wangshang yizheng cuisheng minyi shengchanli [Political workshops on the Internet boost the production of public opinion],” Liaowang zhoukan 11 (2006). http://vancouver.china-consulate.org/chn/news/t56855.htm (accessed August 15, 2009). Lewis, Constructing Public Opinion. Biased perceptions of public opinion are, to some degree, endemic to all political elites. See, for instance, Kull and Destler, Misreading the Public. Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay also found that members of the U.S. foreign policy elite systematically misperceive public opinion about foreign policy, presuming the public holds isolationist opinions that are not actually reflected by polling data. One reason is that elites rely upon “vocal publics” with quite unrepresentative views. Kull and Ramsey, “The Myth of the Reactive Public,” 213–220. Jacobs and Shapiro, “Studying Substantive Democracy,” 10. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power, 8–9. Gilley, “Political Legitimacy,” 31 . Easton, A Systems Analysis, 278. Ingelhart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 15. Hunt, The Genesis, 24. Shirk, “Changing Media,” 67. Chen, Popular Political Support, 181. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 338. For a discussion of legitimacy in the Chinese context, see Schubert, “One-Party Rule.” Zhao Yuezhi, Communication in China, 52–57.

244 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

98. 99. 100. 101.

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117.

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Diamont, Embattled Glory. O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 2–15. Johnston, “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes,” 626. Quoted in Liu, Mass Politics, 14. Davenport, “Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception.” The following paragraph draws from Cai, “Power Structure and Regime Resilience,” 413–414. See also Cai, Collective Resistance, esp. 21–43. Gartner and Regan, “Threat and Repression,” 285. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 93. Goldstone and Tilly, “Threat (and Opportunity),” 188. Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never,” 8; Lohmann, “The Dynamics of Information Cascades.” Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, 160. Lorentzen, “Regularized Rioting.” This is still under 0.3 percent of the population. In a nationally representative sample of 7,714 adults, only 2 admitted to participating in protests, a rate of under 0.03 percent. See: Landry and Tong, “Disputing the Authoritarian State.” Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System,” 27. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, esp. 11–25. For a discussion of systems (xitong) in Chinese bureaucratic politics, see Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 151–160. See, for example: Wang Guoping, “Cong fandui ribe changren kan minjian xingwei de zuoyong [Understanding the role of social action from the opposition to Japan’s permanent membership in UN Security Council],” Huanqiu (April 16, 2005):28–29. Interview, Beijing, September 2007. For a similar argument, see Perry, “Popular Protest.” Fewsmith and Rosen, “The Domestic Context,” 69. This draws from Fewsmith and Rosen, “The Domestic Context,” 153–165. Perry, “Studying Chinese Politics,” 12. Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy,” 655; Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 178. Cited in He, The Search for Reconciliation, 250n57. Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 1. For the broader concepts, see Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics”; Fearon, “Bargaining.” Tarrow, Power in Movement, 20. Interview, Beijing, December 2, 2009. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, 1–19. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, esp. 148–149. Page and Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,” 373; Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics, 107–108. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 163–172. Rosenau, Public Opinion, 36. Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American.” Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion.

2. Forgetting and Remembering the Past 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125.

126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132.

133. 134.

135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140.

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Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process,” 12. Cited in Shirk, China, 139. Bachrach and Baratz, “Two Faces of Power.” Molotch, “Oil in Santa Barbara.” This statement is by Liu Xiaobiao, a Chinese scholar, quoted in David Fang, “Diaoyu Activist Pushes Boundaries of Protest,” South China Morning Post (April 13, 2004). Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.” For details, see Reilly, “Harmonious World.” Drifte, “Japanese–Chinese Territorial Disputes.” This is not to claim that the agreement has been fully implemented. See Drifte’s supplementary update at http://www .rfwdrifte.ukgo.com/review.htm (accessed December 12, 2008). Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 210. For a similar finding, see Wei Liang, “China’s WTO Negotiation Process.” Ma Licheng, “Duiri guanxi xinsiwei [New thinking on relations with Japan],” 45–46. Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 213, 232. Jacobs and Shapiro, “Politics and Policymaking,” 55. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 88. Wang, “Changing Models,” 67–68. Song Qiang et al., Disidairen de jingshen: Xiandai zhongguoren de juishi qingjie [The spirit of the fourth generation: The savior complex of modern China] (Beijing: Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1996), 251–252, cited in Gries, “Popular Nationalism,” 187. Feng Zhaokui, “Dui zhongri guanxi ‘zhenleng jingri’ de zai sikao [Rethinking ‘cold politics, hot economics’ in China-Japan relations],” 2. James Mann, “Behold China: Repressive at Home. Aggressive Abroad. Driving Obama Nuts,” The New Republic (March 17, 2010), http://www.tnr.com/article/world/behold -china (accessed April 1, 2010). Tarrow, Power in Movement, 138. See also Tarrow, “Modular Collective Action,” 85. Zhao, “An Angle on Nationalism,” 887. Brady, “The Beijing Olympics,” 6. Thomson, Easily Led, 7. Baum and Potter, “The Relationships,” 45. Cited in Stockmann, “Who Believes.”

2. FORGETTING AND REMEMBERING THE PAST: CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, 1949–1999 1. 2. 3. 4.

Fogel, The Role of Japan. The classic work is Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen. Wasserstrom, “Chinese Students.” For the highly politicized debates over these figures, see Coble, “China’s ‘New Remembering,’ ” 404; Yang, “Convergence or Divergence,” 858.

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5. Chiang Kai-shek, “Statements and Speeches by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek” (August–October 1945), 3; cited in Yoshida, The Making of the ‘Rape of Nanking.’ 6. Yoshida, The Making of the ‘Rape of Nanking’, 67. 7. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji [Documents on postwar Sino-Japanese relations], 109. 8. Full text at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html (accessed August 10, 2009). 9. Yang, “Mirror for the Future.” For the victor and victimization narratives, see Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 69–86. 10. Chen Bo, “Genggao di juqi Mao Zedong sixiang hongqi, wei chuangzuo gengduo genghao de geming junshi ticai yinpian er nuli [Lifting higher the red flag of Mao Zedong’s thoughts, striving to produce more and better revolutionary military movies],” Dianyin Yishu (August 1960):5–6; cited in Yinan He, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 69. 11. Yang, “Convergence or Divergence,” 858. 12. He, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 49. 13. He, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 50. 14. Minutes of the Tanaka–Zhou talk, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn (accessed March 24, 2006). This refers to Japan’s reputed policy of “kill all, burn all, rape all.” Accurate or not, impressions that such a policy existed are widespread in China. 15. See He, The Search for Reconciliation, 18–19. 16. Quoted in Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 12. 17. He, The Search for Reconciliation, 212. 18. For these debates, see Bachman, “Differing Visions”; Hamrin, “Competing ‘Policy Packages’ ”; Solinger, “The Fifth National.” 19. Goodman, Deng Xiaoping, 92–93. See also Bachman, Chen Yun. 20. Goodman, Deng Xiaoping, 92. 21. Goodman, Deng Xiaoping, 92–93. 22. Goodman, Deng Xiaoping, 97. 23. He, The Search for Reconciliation, 213. 24. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 21. 25. Lee, “The Making of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty.” 26. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 22. 27. Cheng, “China’s Japan Policy,” 96. 28. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 89n22. 29. See Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 197–238. 30. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 23. 31. Cheng, “China’s Japan Policy,” 93–94. 32. He, The Search for Reconciliation, 207. 33. Cheng, “China’s Japan Policy in the 1980s,” n. 12. 34. He, The Search for Reconciliation, 219n41. 35. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 353. 36. My appreciation to Mike Mochizuki for this clarification. See also Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 204n13.

2. Forgetting and Remembering the Past 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

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Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (June 30, 1982). Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 47. Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (July 24, 1982), cited in Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 154. Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (July 27, 1982), cited in Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 155. Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (July 30, 1982), cited in Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 155. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 377. Jiefangjun Bao [People’s Liberation Army daily] (August 3, 1982), cited in Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 156. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 374. Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 48. Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (August 2, 1982). Far Eastern Economic Review (April 10, 1986):22–23. He, The Search for Reconciliation, 214. See also Goldman, Sowing the Seeds, chapter 2. Deng and Zhao Ziyang faced strong conservative criticism in advance of the Congress. See, for instance, the article by Zhao Yiya, “The Thought of Communism Is a Core of Spiritual Civilization in Socialism,” which warned of the danger of “bourgeois spiritual pollution.” Jiefangjun Bao [People’s Liberation Army daily] (August 28, 1982), cited in He, The Search for Reconciliation, 214. Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (February 21, 1983), cited in Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 157. Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy,” 648. For the economic concerns, see for instance the comments by Gu Mu, the head of China’s delegation to the fourth bilateral cabinet meeting, in July 1985. Cited in He, The Search for Reconciliation, 224n56. For security warnings, see Xin Ping, “Japan: Political Trend Causes Concern,” Beijing Review (August 29, 1983):10. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 413–414. “Two ‘Giants’ Get Together,” Newsweek (April 2, 1984):9. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 452. For the claim that Hu was acting on his own, see Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy.” Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 23. Shijie Zhishi [World affairs] (July 16, 1984):10, cited in Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 157. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 6; Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 51. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 54n24 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 55. Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 51. Mochizuki, “Memory and Reconciliation.” See Mochizuki, “Memory and Reconciliation,” 35. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi shinian biao, 539–541. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 549. Beijing Review (August 29, 1983):10, cited in Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 162. “Japan’s Whitewashing of History,” Xinhua News Reports, in FBIS (August 22, 1985, sec. D, 1), cited in Dirlik, “Past Experience,” 41. Lu, “How Far Away,” 189.

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69. Peng noted that “the hostile history between the two countries caused by the Japanese militarist aggression had ended, and this history will not be allowed to occur again. There are still some people in Japan trying to revive the militarism, but their behavior is against the will of the people in both China and Japan, and it will also be harmful to Sino-Japanese friendship and peace in the world.” Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 556. 70. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 542. 71. Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 52. 72. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 7 and 67. 73. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 69. 74. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 69. 75. The preceding few sentences draw from Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 54. 76. For descriptions of the protests, see Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy,” 650–655; Gordon H. Chang, “A Report on Student Protests at Beijing University,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 18 (July/September 1986): 29–31; and Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), chapter 8. 77. Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 56. 78. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 68. 79. “Editorial condemns beating, smashing and looting,” BBC Monitoring Service: AsiaPacific, October 21, 1985; cited in Weis, Powerful Patriots, 57. 80. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 68. 81. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 69–70. 82. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 71. 83. See Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 75; Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 61. 84. Xinhua Domestic Service (December 8, 1985); as cited in Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 75. 85. Renmin Ribao [People’s daily], Overseas Edition (December 9, 1985), cited in Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 75–76 (italics added by Whiting). 86. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 545. 87. “China Urges Japan to Avoid the Path of Militarism,” Xinhua News Reports, in FBIS (September 20, 1985, Section D, 1); cited in Dirlik, “Past Experience,” 41. 88. Tian Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 545. ]. Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy,” 655. 89. “Deng Xiaoping Sixiang Nianpu (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping’s Thinking): 1985,” http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/69113/69683/4723405.html; cited in Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 58. 90. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 539–541. 91. Hu’s speech was made at the China– Japan Friendship Committee meeting in Beijing on October 18, and printed in Renmin Ribao the next day. Hu Yaobang, “Fazhan zhongri youhao guanxi de sidian yijian 9Four-point view for developing Sino-Japanese friendly relations],”) Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) (October 19, 1985). 92. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 3. 93. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 151. 94. Kyodo (in English) (January 26, 1987). 95. Zhao, Prisoner of the State, 169–180.

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96. Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy”; He, The Search for Reconciliation, 230. 97. Cited in He, The Search for Reconciliation, 229. 98. See Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy,” 650–655; Chang, “A Report on Student Protests at Beijing University,” 29–31; and Baum, Burying Mao, chapter 8. 99. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 178. 100. He, The Search for Reconciliation, 230. 101. Yong, “Chinese Relations with Japan,” 381. 102. The TWL law explicitly referred to China’s claims over Taiwan, and implicitly to the Diaoyu Islands. It served to clarify China’s claims in advance of Beijing signing the Law of the Sea Treaty. For details, see Kim, “Japanese Policy Towards China,” 229–30. 103. This included ¥700 billion ($5.2 billion) of aid for oil and coal development projects in China, a memorandum between the Ex-Im Bank of Japan and the Bank of China regarding financial aid to projects, and ¥810 billion in the third package of yen loans to China for FY1990 to 1995. See Bong, Flashpoints at Sea, 46. 104. Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks, 177. 105. “Student Campaign for Japanese War Reparations,” Hong Kong AFP, September 24, 1992, cited in Yinan He, Overcoming Shadows of the Past, 323n620. 106. “Indemnity Claims During Emperor’s Visit Discouraged,” Hong Kong Ming Pao (October 2, 1992), cited in He, The Search for Reconciliation, 250n57. 107. Mochizuki, “Terms of Engagement,” 98–99. 108. Jiang qualified this by adding, “The wealth of a country should not be the sole condition taken into consideration, and that the principle of fair regional distribution, and the principle of unanimity in consultation should be fully honored in approaching this issue.” Xinhua, “Xinhua Reports on Interview,” June 10, 1994, carried in FBIS-CHI, June 13, 1994, 2. 109. The initial indicators that Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui would be invited to the Asian Games opening ceremony in Hiroshima in 1993, and the eventual attendance by Taiwan’s vice-premier, Hsu Li-The, sparked strong Chinese protests. 110. Mochizuki, Beyond Bilateralism, 110n23. 111. Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face.” 112. Hashimoto had also recently signaled his interest in engaging China. See Johnstone, “Japan’s China Policy,” 1072–1074. 113. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia, 42. 114. The five principles are: mutual respect and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, seeking common ground while setting aside differences, handling disputes properly, increasing dialogue and understanding, deepening economic cooperation, being forward looking, and carrying on friendship from generation to generation. 115. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia, 142. 116. In May 1997, two right-wing Japanese politicians visited the islands and raised the Japanese flag. Prime Minister Hashimoto quickly and openly expressed his displeasure. In response, Beijing did not lodge any protest, other than cursory Chinese television coverage of the incident and a brief meeting with Japan’s ambassador to Beijing. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Asia-Pacific (May 7, 1997). 117. For instance, see reports by Xinhua News Agency (December 28, 1997).

250 118. 119. 120. 121.

122. 123.

124.

125. 126.

127. 128. 129.

130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137.

138. 139.

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Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia, 143. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia, 143. Jin Xide, “The Background and Trend of the Partnership,” 109. The two sides also reportedly agreed to a draft communiqué stating: “the Japanese government reconfirms the significance of the ‘Murayama Speech’ in August 1995.” See the reports in Asahi Shinbum (November 24, 1998, 5; November 29, 1998, 3). Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, 104. Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 190. On the Japanese side, Prime Minister Obuchi wanted Jiang Zemin to make pledges similar to Kim Dae Jung, that China would prioritize a forward-looking relationship and agree that the state would no longer raise history issues. My appreciation to Mike Mochizuki for this clarification. Hong Kong legislators urged Jiang to demand a formal apology issued by the Japanese emperor or prime minister and endorsed by the Japanese Diet, as well as compensation for wartime atrocities, full disclosure of war crime information, rapid clearance of the chemical weapons abandoned in China, and the return of the Diaoyu Islands to China. Kyodo News Service (November 17, 1998). Cited in Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 90n19. The three “No’s” are: no support for Taiwan’s independence, no support for “one China, one Taiwan” or “two Chinas,” and no support for Taiwan’s membership in any international organization whose members are sovereign states. Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, 105. Jiang Zemin, “Yishi weijian, kaichun weilai [History as a mirror, opening to the future],” Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (November 29, 1998). Ruan Cishan, “Jiang Zemin cunxin jiaoxun Riben [Jiang Zemin intended to teach Japan a lesson],” Lianhe zaobao [United morning news] (Singapore) (December 9, 1998). Nicholas D. Kristof, “Burying the Past: War Guilt Haunts Japan,” New York Times (August 30, 1998):A2. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 92. Self, “China and Japan.” Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (November 26, 1998):1. Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, 107. Drawn from China’s Foreign Ministry’s Web site: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb /zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2722/t15974.htm (accessed April 15, 2010). Jin Xide, “The Background and Trend,” 109–110. The joint declaration was the first time that the Japanese government had used the word “aggression” in a written statement. Agreements included economic assistance, technology transfer, environmental protection, annual summits, and a “hotline” linking Tokyo and Beijing. The text is available online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia -paci/china/visit98/joint.html (accessed August 5, 2010). Yoshihisa Furumori, “Zeng Qinghong’s Japan Visit Assessed,” Sankei Shimbun (April 19, 2000). Cited in Mochizuki, “Terms of Engagement,” 110.

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140. In just a three-week period in summer 2000, eight groups with a total of 51 Diet members visited Beijing. See Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism, 259. 141. Söderberg, “Role of ODA in the Relationship,” 122. 142. In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry simply expressed its regret and its hope that Japan would deal with questions of the past in a responsible and conscientious manner. James J. Przystup, “Japan– China Relations: No Escaping History—or the Future,” Comparative Connections 2, no. 1 (April 2000); http://www.csis.org/media/csis /pubs/0001q.pdf. 143. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan later told his Japanese counterpart Tanaka Makiko on May 24, 2001 that Jiang’s May 20, 2000 speech was the basic line for China’s Japan policy. Available online from Japan embassy Web site in Beijing (May 24, 2001), http:// www.japan.org.cn/2ndpercent20tier/03jckankei/j-c010524htm (accessed May 10, 2008). 144. James J. Przystup, “Japan– China Relations: The Zhu Visit and After  .  .  . Efforts to Steady the Course,” Comparative Connections 2, no. 4 (January 2001):78–88; http:// www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0004q.pdf. 145. Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism, 320. 146. The textbook, published by the Association for the Writing of New History Textbooks, which had previously criticized existing Japanese texts for “self-torment,” was approved for use in schools only after over a hundred ministry-ordered revisions had been made. 147. Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, 63. 148. China’s Ministry of Education issued a critical statement, and China requested meetings on the issue at the ambassador level in both Beijing and Tokyo a week later, on April 11. Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, 64. 149. Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, 65. 150. James J. Przystup, “Japan– China Relations: Trouble Starts with ‘T,’ ” Comparative Connections 3, no. 2 (July 2001), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0102q.pdf; Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 356. 151. The overview in this paragraph draws from: Przystup, “Trouble Starts with ‘T.’ ” 152. Japanese and Chinese officials had worked together to plan Koizumi’s visit for after August 15, rather than while liberation-related activities in China were approaching a crescendo. However, last-minute political intervention by several LDP politicians close to Koizumi advised him to go before August 15. My appreciation to Mike Mochizuki for this clarification. 153. This summary draws from: James J. Przystup, “Japan– China Relations: Spiraling Downward,” Comparative Connections 3, no. 3 (October 2001); http://www.csis.org /media/csis/pubs/0103q.pdf. 154. This established annual vice-ministerial meetings on foreign policy, economics and trade, finance, and agriculture. See Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 60. 155. Christensen, “China, the U.S.– Japan Alliance,” 54. 156. Koo, Scramble for the Rocks, 175. 157. Mochizuki, “Terms of Engagement,” 103. 158. For Chinese criticism at this time, see Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 440nn113–115.

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159. Beijing Review (September 18–24, 1995):9; cited in He, The Search for Reconciliation, 278. 160. Mochizuki, “Terms of Engagement,” 103. For other examples of China’s criticism at this time, see “News Briefings by the Chinese Foreign Ministry,” Beijing Review (September 18–24, 1995):9; Christopher B. Johnstone, “Grant Aid Suspension Heightens Tensions in Japan– China Relations,” JEI Report 34B (September 15, 1995):8–10. 161. Bong, Flashpoints at Sea, 90–91. 162. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 268. 163. James J. Przystup, “Japan– China: Old Issues . . . and New Approaches?” Comparative Connections 2, no. 2 (July 2000). 164. Ibid. 165. He, Overcoming Shadows of the Past, 362–364. 166. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 282. 167. Söderberg, “Role of ODA in the Relationship,” 122. 168. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 269. 169. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 271. 170. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 272. 171. Xinhua (November 29, 2004); http://chinanews.com/news/2004/2004–11–29/26/510 695.shtml. 172. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 285. 173. “ODA Not Needed, Chinese Official Says,” Japan Times (November 28, 2004), http:/// www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getarticlepl5?nm20041128a3htm (accessed February 4, 2008). 174. “Inventory of Environmental Work in China,” China Environmental Series 3 (2005): 129–130; www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF4BE.pdf. 175. I use the Chinese term “Diaoyu” for simplicity sake, since I focus on Chinese policy. This does not suggest a preference for one country’s claim. 176. Reiji Yoshida, “Is the Senkaku Row About Nationalism—or Oil?” The Japan Times (March 27, 2004). 177. Hagström, “Quiet Power,” 162. 178. Downs and Saunders “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism,” 124. 179. This policy was tested in the 1996 dispute over the islands, when U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale and U.S. State Department officials initially claimed that the U.S.– Japan Security Treaty did not apply to the islands. Japanese diplomats eventually extracted a commitment by the U.S. Department of Defense that the Security Treaty did apply. Green, “Managing Chinese Power.” 180. Downs and Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism,” 124. 181. Tian, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, 92. 182. Tretiak, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty,” 1242. 183. Tretiak, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty,” 1243–44. 184. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, 69. 185. Zhang, “Several Thoughts,” 34. 186. Interview, Beijing, September 4, 2008.

2. Forgetting and Remembering the Past 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200.

201. 202. 203. 204.

205. 206.

207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213.

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Downs and Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits,” 119. Bong, Flashpoints at Sea, 223. Bong, Flashpoints at Sea, 223. Bong, Flashpoints at Sea, 224. Downs and Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits,” 120. ),[ Chung, “The Diaoyu,” 152. Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (September 18, 1996). Downs and Saunders. “Legitimacy and the Limits,” 117. Chung, “The Diaoyu,” 152. Hagström, “Quiet Power,” 176. Lu, How Far Away, 139. Su Zhiliang et al., Problems Left Over, 669; Lu, How Far Away, 127–130. Lu, How Far Away, 642. China’s statement was prefaced by this explanation, suggesting pressure from other member states: “In response to requests and proposals by some delegations, the Chinese delegation is now authorized to provide the relevant information in the sections below with a view to promoting mutual understanding and facilitating the work of the Conference and its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.” The full statement is available online. “Some information on discovered chemical weapons abandoned in China by a foreign state,” CD/1127 (CD/CW/WP.384) (February 18, 1992); http://www .fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/cw/CD1127.htm (accessed March 19, 2006). Lu, How Far Away, 131. See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2722/t15974.htm. Lu, How Far Away, 131. The full name is the “Memorandum on the Destruction of Japanese Discarded Chemical Weapons in China between the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Japan.” The document text is available (in Chinese) at http://www.sjhistory.org/site /newxh/yjzt8–4mb_a200504113155.htm. Lu, How Far Away, 132–133. China established a special office headed by Ambassador Liu Zhigang in the Foreign Ministry while Japan established the Office for Abandoned Chemical Weapons within the Prime Minster’s office. “Japanese Mission Unearthed Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China,” Xinhua (October 1, 2000); Jin, “Background and Trend of the Partnership,” 113n9. Lu, How Far Away, 134. Lu, How Far Away, 139. Lu, How Far Away, 135–36. Chow Chung-yan, “Chemical Weapons Victims Hope for Redress in Tokyo,” South China Morning Post (September 18, 2003):5. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 323. Robert J. Saiget, “Sino-Japanese Team Begins Excavating WWII Chemical Weapons,” AFP (September 5, 2002). “Japanese Team Retrieves Chemical Shells Abandoned in China,” Xinhua News Reports (September 27, 2002).

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214. “Chinese, Japanese Foreign Ministers Agree to Promote Better Ties,” Xinhua (September 8, 2002). 215. The 2002 Defense White Paper is available at http://english.people.com.cn/features /ndpaper2002/app5.html (accessed October 15, 2007). 216. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2722/t15974.htm (accessed March 10, 2010). 217. “Second World War Bomb Explodes in China, One Dead,” Xinhua News Reports (August 30, 2001). 218. “PRC Vice President Hu Jintao Meets Japan’s Former PM on Developing Future Ties,” Xinhua News Reports (September 4, 2001).

3. THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC MOBILIZATION 1. Huang Zhangpu, “Jinguo shenshehou ‘chenmou de luoxuan’ [The spiral of silence after Yasukuni],” Qingnian Cankao (January 7, 2004). 2. Feng was given a ten-month sentence, suspended for three years, after refusing to admit his crime and pay a fee. His work visa was revoked and he was asked to leave Japan within six months. He had been in Japan for nine years by that time. Liu Ning, “Feng Jinhua: Wo yuanzuo yige minzuzhuyizhe [Feng Jinhua: I want to be a nationalist],” Xinwen Zhoukan (June 24, 2002). 3. Han Xuan et al., “2003: Wangluo minzuzhuyi faren [2003: Internet nationalism explodes and endures],” Guoji xianfeng daobao (September 19, 2003). 4. Li Mutong, “Wangluo minzhuzhuyi xiankai zhongguo minzhuzhuyi xin pianzhang [Internet nationalism opens a new chapter in China’s nationalism],” Guoji Xianfeng Daobao (September 18, 2003). 5. Peng Lewu, “1000 Wan qianming de quanliucheng [The complete process of gaining ten million signatures],” Nanfang Zhoumou (March 31, 2005). 6. Compare, for instance, Gries, China’s New Nationalism; Zhao, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism.” 7. Ministry of Education, China Education Yearbook, 1990, 103. Cited in He, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 57. 8. “Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaoyu Shishi Gangyao [Outline on the Implementation of Education in Patriotism].” 9. Zhao, “A State-led Nationalism,” 287. 10. Zhao, “We Are Patriots First.” 11. Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation. 12. Li Weike, “(2) Kang-Ri zhangzhen yike jieshao,” at Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe Web site (http://www.pep.com). For an overview of the government policy on patriotism education in Chinese schools since 1949, see Pu et al., Patriotism and National Spirit. For more on the highlighting of patriotism in Chinese school history education since the mid-1980s, see Jones, “Politics and History,” 554–556. 13. For these two schools of thought, see Zhao, “Chinese Intellectuals’ Quest.”

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14. Personal visits to Shenyang and Nanjing museums, summer 2001. 15. Most striking is the rehabilitation of Zhang Zizhong, who was essentially a “warlord” who fought under Chiang Kai-shek. See Waldron, “China’s New Remembering,” 947; and Mitter, “Behind the Scenes,” 285. 16. CCTV-1 live television broadcast (April 29, 2005). 17. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, 58. 18. He, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 59. 19. He, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 57–58. 20. http://www.pep.com.cn/gzls/jszx/kb/ls1bx/jsys/200802/t20080218_445623.htm (accessed August 24, 2009). 21. Interviews (Changhsa, Shanghai, and Dalian, summer 2001). 22. Mitter, “Behind the Scenes,” 290. 23. Mitter, “Behind the Scenes,” 290. 24. Zhao, “A State-led Nationalism,” 287. 25. Wang, “National Humiliation,” 800. 26. For example, see Maryjane Osa, “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People’s Republic,” in Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, eds., Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77–104. 27. Midgal, State in Society, 22–34. 28. For instance, Lu Fusheng, a retired businessman from Liaoning province, rented a former military watchtower to document the Japanese occupation and its abuses, and to commemorate local (non-Communist) resistance. It was opened in 2001, soon gained official status as a “patriotic education center,” and now hosts regular visits from local schoolchildren. Chen Wangqi and Wen Jingyi, “Nongmin zijian Liaoning yiyongjun kangri shi zezhanguan [Rural farmer establishes the Liaoning Volunteer Japanese Resistance Army History Museum by himself],” Liaoshen Wanbao (September 25, 2001). 29. Interviews, Nanjing, 2001. 30. For the 1995 renovations, a Hong Kong businessman augmented local contributions and the local government contributed a quarter of the costs. Interview, Nanjing (September 2001). 31. This discussion of academic history activists draws from: Reilly, “China’s History Activists.” 32. Qinhua rijun Nanjing datusha shiliao [Sources on the invading Japanese Army and the Nanjing Massacre] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Antiquarian Press, 1985). 33. Editorial Board, “Yinianlai kangri zhanzhen yanjiu shuping [Annual review of studies of China’s war of resistance against Japan]” Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu [Journal of studies of China’s war of resistance against Japan] 1, no. 39 (2001): 234–253. 34. Interviews, Nanjing, 2001 and 2007. 35. Dong Shilang, Dong Shilang Riji [Dong Shilang’s diary]. 36. Interview, Shanghai (August 30, 2001). 37. These include the U.S.–based Museum of the Japanese Invasion Activities in China and the Global Association of the History of the War of Opposition to Japan.

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38. Niu Dayong, “Kangri zhanzheng yu ahongri guanxi xueshu yantaohui zong shu [Summary of the scholarly conference ‘the war of resistance to Japan and China– Japan relations’],” 217. 39. The textbook was published simultaneously in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese. The Chinese version is Dongya Sanguode Jindaishi [Modern history of three East Asian countries]. 40. Tong Zeng, a university lecturer who organized a sign-on petition urging the Chinese government to demand reparations from Japan, was stripped of his position in 2000. Yang, “History Card,” 13. 41. Bridges, “Hong Kong and Japan.” 42. Wang Cong, “Renda diaobiao huhu yigao guige jinian kangzhang shenli 60 zhounian [NPC representative calls for greater official commemoration of the 60th anniversary of war victory],” Beijing qingnian bao (March 8, 2005). 43. On NPC trends of mounting “pluralist delegate assertiveness” and greater accessibility to academics and civil society, see Dowdle, “Constructing Citizenship.” 44. These were coordinated by the 9/18 War Research Association of Beijing, in collaboration with the 9.18 and Patriots Alliance Web sites. See “China Refuses to Back Events Marking Anniversary of Japanese Aggression,” Kyodo News Services (September 15, 2004). 45. “Zhengxie weiyuan jianyi meinian Nanjing datushari juxing guojia gongji [Consultative Committee representative proposes a national day of commemoration on the date of the Nanjing Massacre],” Xinjing bao (March 10, 2005). 46. “Consultative Committee Representative Proposes a National Day of Commemoration.” 47. For instance, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs failed to respond to a Chinese reporter’s question about these bills in August 2005. “Live Broadcast of State Council Information Office Press Conference,” CCTV-4, August 30, 2005 (personal observation). 48. Hahm, “Urgent Matters.” 49. “Riben bohui shanxi ‘weianfu’ supei bogong, zhongfang qianglie kangyi [The Chinese side vigorously protests the Japanese rejection of the shanxi ‘comfort women’ restitution lawsuit],” Zhonghua shibao (June 19, 2001). 50. Interviews, Shanghai (August 2001; July 2007). See also Su Zhiliang, ed., Weianfu yanjiu [Comfort women research]. Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishers, 2000. 51. Nan Xianghong, “Jiyi bushi weile hen [Remembering is not for hatred: Person of the Year, Wang Xuan],” Nanfang Zhoumou (December 26, 2002). 52. Duan Bayi, “Jiangxi Meiti Jielou qinhua rijun zai gan shiyong xijunzhan jiqi minfen [The Jiangxi media reveals that invading Japanese armies used biological warfare in Jiangxi, arousing popular anger],” Xinhua (March 5, 2003). 53. “Quanguo shoukai ‘xijunzhanzhengju’ wangxuan rixian [Opening of the first-ever national ‘biological warfare documentation department’ Wang Xuan hotline],” Dalian zaobao (May 15, 2003). 54. Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, 93. 55. The Chinese court found that according to international law, it only has jurisdiction for a suit against a natural person and so rejected the lawsuit. “Zhongguo minjian duiri

3. The Origins of Public Mobilization

56. 57.

58.

59. 60. 61.

62. 63. 64.

65.

66. 67.

68. 69.

70.

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supei de guanjian ge’an [The crucial case for Chinese civil lawsuits for compensation from Japan],” Nanfang zhoumou (June 13, 2002). Zhu Hongjun, “Haiwai baodiao ‘dilingtuan’ huiguo shiwei [The return visit of the ‘number zero’ overseas baodiao delegation],” Nanfang zhoumou (October 6, 2005). The requests to lease the islands and establish a Diaoyu stamp were never granted. Feng Jinhua, “Zhongguo dalu shouci minjian baodiao xingdong qiuyuanxin [A request for support for mainland China’s first social action protecting the Diaoyu Islands],” http://www.1931 918.org/bbs/dispbbs.asp?boardID=220&ID=1063 (accessed March 28, 2005). Also based on interviews with activists in Beijing and Shanghai in 2007. The closest the group came was on January 14, 2004. This incident was only briefly reported by Xinhua. “Chinese Fishing Boats Attacked Near Diaoyu Islands,” Xinhua (January 15, 2004). Interview, Beijing (September 21, 2008). Interviews, Beijing (May 23, 2007). The site was initially labeled “china1937net,” in reaction to right-wing Japanese groups’ efforts to repudiate the Nanjing Massacre. For details, see http://www.china918.net/918jn /918gkx.htm (accessed November 21, 2007). See http://www.china918.net/918jn/918gkx.htm (accessed June 22, 2007). Han Xuan et al., “2003: Wangluo minzuzhuyi faren [2003: Internet nationalism explodes and endures],” Guoji xianfeng daobao (September 19, 2003). Shen Tao, “Shilun dangdai zhongguo wangluo minzuzhuyi jiqi dui zhongri guanxi de yingxiang: yi aiguozhe tongmengwang wei li [Contemporary Chinese Internet nationalism and its impact on Sino-Japanese relations: A case study of the ‘Patriot Alliance’]” M.A. thesis, Beijing University, June 2006. For instance, the Huaxia zhiqing [Chinese educated youth] Web site helped create a community on the Internet, facilitating a common identity and strengthening their activism and cooperation both on- and offline. Yang, “The Co-evolution,” 417. Yang, “The Co-evolution.” For instance, the first day of the signature campaign in downtown Guangzhou in late March garnered 80,000 signatures (Zhang Liang, “Guangzhou City Residents Eagerly Rush to Sign Up Opposing Japan’s Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council [Guangzhou shimin yongyue qianming fandui riben lianheguo changren lishiguo],” Fast News [Xinquai Bao] [March 29, 2005]). Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 390n72. “Zhongguo minjian renshi zhi annan huhuxin quanwen piluo [Revealing the complete text of a Chinese private individual’s appeal letter to Annan],” Huanqui (April 16, 2005):29. During the Beijing protests (April 9–10), protesters’ postings on Internet bulletin boards complained that their text messages were being interrupted or blocked by security forces. These postings were removed almost immediately. After the government began to crack down on the protests, Beijing public security forces sent a text message to tens of millions of cell phone users discouraging them from participating in “illegal protests” and urging them to “express patriotism rationally.” Joseph Kahn,

258

71. 72. 73. 74.

75.

76.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

84. 85. 86. 87.

3. The Origins of Public Mobilization

“Beijing Finds Anti-Japan Propaganda a 2-Edged Sword,” New York Times (May 3, 2005). Jim Yardley, “A Hundred Cellphones Bloom, and Chinese Take to the Streets,” The New York Times (April 25, 2005). Xiao Qiang, of University of California, Berkeley; quoted in Magnier, “Letting Passions Burn.” Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 90–93. Wang Guoping, “Cong fandui ribe changren kan minjian xingwei de zuoyong [Understanding the role of social action from the opposition to Japan’s permanent membership in UN Security Council],” Huanqiu (April 16, 2005):28–29. The term “popular diplomacy” (minjian waijiao) was first used in China– Japan relations to describe the informal interactions between government officials before China and Japan normalized relations in 1972. Xu Wanqing, “Wu Jianmin: wangmin fandui riben ruchang ke lijie dan xu lixing [Wu Jianmin: Netizens’ opposition to Japan’s entry to UN Security Council is understandable, but must be reasonable],” China News Web (April 1, 2005), http://news.sina.com .cn/c/2005-04-01/17365530478s.shtml (accessed April 21, 2007). Feng Jihua, “Zhongguo dalu shouci minjian baodiao xingdong qiuyuanxin [A request for support for mainland China’s first social action protecting the Diaoyu Islands]” (April 8, 2003), http://www.1931–918.org/bbs/dispbbs.asp?boardID=220&ID=1063 (accessed March 4, 2004). Oliver, “Bringing the Crowd Back In,” 24. Interviews, Beijing (July 12–13, 2007). Zhao, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism,” 133. Li Mutong, “Internet Nationalism.” Shirk, “Changing Media.” Zhao, Media, Market and Democracy. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System”; Stockmann, “Who Believes Propaganda,” 8. Recent directives issued by the Propaganda Department are posted on the “Ministry of Truth” blog, available online (in Chinese): http://zhenlibu.wordpress.com (accessed August 4, 2010). Cited in Zhao, Communication in China, 35n63. “Beijing Tightens Controls on Domestic Reporting on China,” Straits Times Interactive, cited in Zhao, Communication in China, 172n151. Cited in Zhao, Communication in China, 31n42. The last order was issued by the Press Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Researchers from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) compared six papers: Beijing Youth News, New Citizen Evening News (Shanghai), Sheep City Evening News (Guangzhou), Western China Metro News (Chengdu), China Commercial Morning News (Shenyang), and China Commercial News (Xi’an). “Zhongguo baozhi dui Riben baodao de neirong fenxi [Analysis of Chinese newspapers reporting on Japan]” (no date), http://www.comrc.com.cn/mtdc.asp?id=6 (accessed May 6, 2007).

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88. Data cited in “Analysis of Chinese Newspapers Reporting on Japan.” Unfortunately, this study did not provide an explanation of the standards used to divide articles into positive, negative, and neutral. 89. Horizon Research Consultancy Group, “Eyes on the World, Future in Hand: Horizon 2006 Chinese Opinion Polls,” http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/poll-06–19.htm (accessed August 12, 2007). 90. Interview, Beijing, 2003. 91. Yan Taining, “Zhongguo guojia liyi yishi jiaozhong de riben: huanqiu shibao ruhe baodao riben [The national image of Japan from the view of China’s national interest: How Global Times reports on Japan].” 92. Shirk, “Changing Media,” 52. 93. Yan Taining, “The National Image,” 128–129. 94. For example, see: “Qianming laoren suwen bosu riben diguozhuyi qianhua jiaoyu de fane xingwei [Thousands of elderly scholars denounce the illegal education actions regarding Japan’s imperialist invasion of China],” Canguan Xiaoxi (September 26, 2001):1; “Riben you cewukong tiaobo zhongguo [Japan dares to disregard China],” Da Jia (August 20–26, 2001); Liu Di, “Yige ‘731’ laobing de canhui [The regrets of an old ‘731’ soldier],” Nanfang Zhoumou (September 6, 2001):5. 95. Lin Wei, “Zhu Hai: riben luyoutuan gouchiri daohuan, shengcheng laihua zhiwei maichun [Zhuhai: Japanese tour group announces that on China’s Day of Humiliation, they have come to China just for prostitutes],” China Youth Daily (September 26, 2003). 96. See http://www2.nedu.edu.cn/bbs/archiver/?tid-2461.html (accessed August 21, 2006). 97. Lin Wei, “Ribenke zhuhai maichunlian: shehui zhennu Guangdong lingdao yaoqiu yancha [Japanese prostitution scandal in Zhuhai: Societal anger pushes Guangdong authorities to seriously investigate],” China Youth Daily (September 28, 2003). 98. China Internet Network Information Center (CINIC), “2008 Report on China’s Internet Use,” http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/doc/2008/1/22/212245.doc (accessed November 20, 2008). 99. Chen Weixing, Chuanbo de guannian [Perspectives on broadcasting], 252. 100. Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Guoqing Diaocha 2002 [2002 investigation of the national state of affairs],” 919. 101. The percentage is slightly higher among the middle class who are “within the government system” (such as officials and staff of state-owned companies) than among those “outside the system.” Zhou Xiaohong, Zhongguo zhongchan jieji diaocha [Survey of the Chinese middle class], 322. 102. Zhao Guochen, “Cong zhongri minjian shijian tuoshi wangluo minzuzhuyi [Perspectives on Chinese online nationalism through a series of civil society incidents between China and Japan],” 18–19. 103. “800 Wan wangyou qianming fandui riben cangai jiaokeshu [8 million netizens sign up to protest Japan’s revised textbooks],” Jinghua shibao (April 7, 2005). 104. Interview (Beijing, April 17, 2008). The article is available online at: http://japan.people .com.cn/GB/35464/40041/42165/3865467.html (accessed April 19, 2008). 105. Interview, Beijing (April 17, 2008).

260 106. 107. 108. 109.

110.

111.

112. 113. 114.

115.

116.

117.

118. 119.

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Interview (November 21, 2008). Interview, Hong Kong (July 12, 2006). Interview, Changhsa (February 3, 2007). Jiang Lifeng, “Zhongguo minzhong dui riben henshao you qingjingan: diyici zhongri yulun diaocha jieguo fenxi [Chinese public rarely feels close to Japan: Analysis of the results of the first China-Japan public opinion survey]”; Jiang Lifeng, “Zhongguo minzhong dui riben de buqingjin xianzhu zengqiang [Chinese public’s feeling of not close to Japan noticeably strengthens]”; Jiang Lifeng, “Peiyu liangguo renmin de qingjingao dui gonggu zhongri youhao de genji yiyi zhongda [Cultivating feelings of closeness between people of the two countries has great significance for consolidating the foundation of friendship between China and Japan].” This finding is further supported by three polls from 2005 to 2007, which also found that while both positive and negative images coexist, negative images of Japan predominate among respondents. “Reports Presented to the Beijing–Tokyo Forum, 2005–2007.” The 2007 and 2008 results are available (in Japanese) from www.tokyo-beijingforum.net/ (accessed November 24, 2008). Additional annual survey reports were unpublished, and were provided directly to the author. Citizens’ selection of images associated with Japan from 2005 to 2006: militarism increased from 58.9 to 60.3 percent; nationalism declined from 49.5 to 35.5 percent; and “great power chauvinist” increased from 30 to 34.1 percent. “Reports Presented to the Beijing–Tokyo Forum, 2005–2006.” Pew Global Survey, “Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Another; China’s Neighbors Worry About Its Growing Military Strength,” http://pewglobal.org /reports/display.php?ReportID=255 (accessed March 28, 2008). Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” 45. Pew Global Survey, “Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Another.” “Eyes on the World, Future in Hand: Horizon 2006 Chinese Opinion Polls,” Horizon Research Consultancy Group (2006), http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/poll-06–19 .htm (accessed January 12, 2007). Lu Yi, “Cong yulun diaocha jieguo kan zhongri liangguo renmin xianghu lijie de xianzhuang [Observing the situation of mutual understanding between Chinese and Japanese people through public opinion poll results].” Jiang Lifeng, “Zhongguo minzhong dui riben henshao you qingjingan,” “Zhongguo minzhong dui riben de buqingjin xianzhu zengqian,” “Peiyu liangguo renmin de qingjingao dui gonggu zhongri youhao de genji yiyi zhongda.” The BAS also found, however, that “perceived identity difference” or “othering” of Japanese people remained relative stable from 2000 to 2004. Johnston, “The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion,” 358. Horizon Research Consultancy Group, “Eyes on the World, Future in Hand: Horizon 2006 Chinese Opinion Polls.” Respondents could pick up to three countries. Horizon Corporation, “Zhongguo ren kan meiguo de ganshou hen fuza [Chinese people’s views of the United States are very complicated],” Diyishou 19 (2005).

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120. Zhao, “A State-led Nationalism,” 287; Wang, “National Humiliation,” 800. 121. See “Report Presented to the Beijing–Tokyo Forum, 2007,” http://www.tokyo-beijing forum.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=78&Ite mid=169 (accessed November 24, 2008). 122. “Dong-A Ilbo Opinion Poll: Special Research on Chinese Attitudes Toward Japan and Other Nations,” conducted with Asahi Shimbun and the Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), released April 26, 2005, http://www.mansfieldfdn .org/polls/poll-05–3.htm (accessed September 10, 2006). 123. Interview, Beijing, 2008. 124. “Report Presented to the Beijing–Tokyo Forum, 2005,” 8. 125. These were conducted by the Public Opinion Research Institute of Renmin University. See Yu Guoming, “Zhongguoren yanzhong de riben he ribenren [Japan and Japanese people in the eyes of Chinese people].” The polling methods, as described in these reports and in personal discussions with the author, suggest that standard random survey methodology was followed. The possibility of state manipulation shaping these figures is unlikely since the results suggest that state propaganda was ineffective in shaping attitudes toward Japan, particularly among the youth. 126. For the over-56 group, 51.4 percent “disliked” (taoyan) Japan; for the 36–45 group, it was 40.6 percent. Yu Guoming, “Japan and Japanese People,” 61. 127. It is important to note, however, that the actual impact on behavior was limited. Even at the peak of the “boycott Japan” campaign in April 2005, less than 20 percent of respondents said they would “definitely” not buy Japanese products, with over half saying that they would buy Japanese products or that they didn’t care about products’ nationality. See “2005 nian zhongguoren yanzhong de shijie: radianhuati” [China eyes the world 2005: hot topics], http://www.horizonkey.com/showart.asp?art_id=432&cat_id=6 (accessed December 10, 2007). 128. The 2002–06 CASS surveys asked respondent who did not feel close to Japan to list their reasons. The two most common choices were “Japan’s invasion of China” or “because Japan to this day has not thoroughly reflected on (fanshen) its invasion of China.” The percentage of these responses rose from 63.8 (2002) to 87.7 (2004) to 90.3 (2006). Drawn from Jiang Lifeng, “Zhongguo minzhong dui riben henshao you qingjingan,” “Zhongguo minzhong dui riben de buqingjin xianzhu zengqian,” “Peiyu liangguo renmin de qingjingao dui gonggu zhongri youhao de genji yiyi zhongda.” 129. Many observers have noted that antiforeign protests since the late 1990s are overwhelmingly dominated by urban, well-educated, wealthier youth, contrary to the expectations of liberal theories of social and political change. For evidence challenging this assertion, see Johnston, “Chinese Middle-Class Attitudes.” 130. The rate of response for those who agreed that visits are acceptable under the condition that Japan apologies satisfactorily for the wartime invasion or removes the souls of Admiral Tojo and other war criminals are as follows: 2002: 31.6 percent; 2004: 36.3  percent; 2006: 41.7 percent. The response rates for those who accepted no visits under any conditions: 2002: 50.9  percent; 2004: 42.0  percent; 2006: 45.3  percent. Drawn from Jiang Lifeng, “Zhongguo minzhong dui riben henshao you qingjingan,” “Zhongguo

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minzhong dui riben de buqingjin xianzhu zengqian,” “Peiyu liangguo renmin de qingjingao dui gonggu zhongri youhao de genji yiyi zhongda.” 131. Jiang Lifeng, “Zhongguo minzhong dui riben henshao you qingjingan,” “Zhongguo minzhong dui riben de buqingjin xianzhu zengqian,” “Peiyu liangguo renmin de qingjingao dui gonggu zhongri youhao de genji yiyi zhongda.” 132. Huntington wrote: “Liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand.” Huntington, The Third Wave, 174–175.

4. RESPONDING TO PUBLIC OPINION 1. For the Maoist-era techniques, see Blecher, “The Contradictions of Grass-roots Participation.” 2. He and Lang, “The Enhancement.” 3. On the elections, see “Special Issue: Village Election and Governance in China,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 15, no. 2 (June 2010): 135–218. 4. Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face.” 5. Jin, “The Background and Trend,” 109. 6. Jin, “The Background and Trend,” 109–110. 7. Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism, 259. 8. Przystup, “Japan– China Relations: The Zhu Visit and After.” 9. Zeng simply commented that the Yasukuni visit “contravenes both the spirit of SinoJapanese friendship and the fundamental interests of our two nations. We hope that the Japanese Government will set great store by China’s position and concerns by refraining from doing anything more to damage Sino-Japanese relations.” Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia, 23. 10. Lu Yi, Zhongri xianghu lijie haiyou douyuan?, 45–49. 11. People’s Daily (September 29, 2002). 12. Interview, Institute of Japan Studies, CASS (July 14, 2007). 13. Shi Jiafang, Zhanhou Zhongri guanxi: 1945–2003 [Postwar China– Japan relations: 1945–2003], 219. 14. Interviews at Beijing University (May 15, 2007) and Renmin University (August 12, 2007). 15. For a similar description of the CCP as led by “two roughly equally powerful coalitions,” see Li, “New Bipartisanship,” 387–388. 16. Fewsmith, “The Sixteenth Party Congress.” Emphasizing the uncertainty of this transition is Shirk, “Will the Institutionalization of Party Leadership Survive the 2002–03 Succession?” 17. He, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 66n77. 18. Interview, Renmin University (September 20, 2007). 19. Feng Zhaokui, “Lun duiri guanxi xinsiwei [Discussion of the new thinking on relations with Japan],” 12. 20. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 246.

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21. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 248. 22. Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] October 23, 2003. Koizumi also met Zhu Rongji in Copenhagen on September 22, 2002, and Jiang Zemin in Mexico on October 27, 2002. 23. See Shi Jiafang, Zhanhou ZhongRri guanxi, 223. 24. Shi Jiafang, Zhanhou ZhongRri guanxi, 223. 25. Interview, Beijing, 2007. 26. “Shiming zhongguo gongmin zai riben zhu shanghai lingguan kanyi xiaoquan canbai [Ten Chinese citizens protest Koizumi’s shrine visits in front of the Japanese consulate in Shanghai],” Dongfang Zaobao (January 4, 2004). Online postings denouncing Koizumi are available at http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2004–01–02/12222527989.shtml; a summary of critical media coverage is available at http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2004 –01–02/11172527423.shtml (both accessed March 10, 2005). 27. Interview, Beijing, 2008. 28. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 20. 29. Market analysts expected that China would prefer to use a single type of technology for all its high-speed trains. Liu Ning, “Jinghu gaotie zaoyu minyi menjian [Beijing– Shanghai high-speed rail encounters the threshold of public opinion],” Nanfeng chuang (August 16, 2003):44. 30. Liu Ning, “Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Rail.” 31. Liu Ning, “Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Rail.” 32. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 369n63. 33. Interview, Beijing, 2008. 34. Liu Ning, “Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Rail.” 35. Liu Ning, “Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Rail.” 36. Interview with Chinese professor, Hong Kong (August 24, 2006). 37. Han Xuan, “Hujing gaotie pengshang minzuzhuyi liangchao [The Beijing–Shanghai high speed train encounters a wave of nationalism],” Guoji xianfeng daobao (August 4, 2003). 38. Przystup, “Japan– China Relations: Not Quite All About Sovereignty.” 39. “Riben zhengduo jinghu gaotie qianjing buming; faguo lungui jiantao kaijiang [Prospects unclear for Japan’s pursuit of the Beijing–Shanghai rail line; France’s rail technology begins to take the lead],” Caijing shibao (January 31, 2004). 40. Han Xuan, “The Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Train Encounters a Wave of Nationalism.” 41. Han Xuan et al., “2003: Wangluo minzuzhuyi faren [2003: Internet nationalism explodes and endures],” Guoji xianfeng daobao (September 19, 2003). Japanese companies later speculated that perhaps the German or French competitors encouraged the spread of this news to the Chinese public. See Liu Ning, “Beijing–Shanghai HighSpeed Rail.” 42. The Web site is Aiguozhe tongmeng wang [Alliance of patriots] at http://www.1931 –9-18.org. The sign-on campaign (no longer available) was at http://www.1931–9-18 .org/bbs/guest_sign.ASP (accessed July 29, 2003). 43. Han Xuan, “The Beijing–Shanghai High Speed Train.”

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44. Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 844. 45. See, for instance: Niu Jianjun, “Riben jiaotongchen wugong erfan tulao daikuan huan jinghu gaosu keneng tulao [Japan’s transportation slavery-getting benefits without merit: using loans to get the Beijing–Shanghai high-speed rail line may be labor in vain],” Caijing shibao (August 11, 2003); and Cankao xiaoxi (December 31, 2003). 46. Shi Hongtao, “Ribenren dui zhongguo jinghu tielu gan xingqu, jiji tuixiao xinganxian [Japanese people have interest in China’s Beijing–Shanghai rail line and actively promote the shinkansen],” Beijing qingnian bao (August 11, 2003). 47. Propaganda guideline received by a Beijing newspaper on September 27, 2003, cited by Zhao Yuezhi, Communication in China, 31, #42. 48. Liu Ning, “Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Rail,” 44. 49. Li Mutong, “Wangluo minzhuzhuyi xiankai zhongguo minzhuzhuyi xin pianzhang [Internet nationalism opens a new chapter in China’s nationalism],” Guoji Xianfeng Daobao (September 18, 2003). 50. Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 844. 51. Yang Jinlin, “Zhongguo zhengzai xingqi xinyilun minzuzhuyi liangchao? [Is a new wave of nationalism now springing up in China?],” Nanfeng chuang (October 16, 2003). 52. Li Mutong, “Internet Nationalism Opens a New Chapter.” 53. Liu Ning, “Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Rail,” 44. 54. Zheng Jiawen, “Jinghu gaotielu zhonglu zhong xianjiangju; Guojia juece chengwei guanjian [The debate over the Beijing–Shanghai rail line falls into a deep deadlock; national policies will be critical],” Dongfang zaobao (September 9, 2003). 55. “Jinghu gaotie bu dan yi caiyong mouguo jishu [Beijing–Shanghai rail will not simply use a certain country’s technology],” Harbin Ribao (October 12, 2003). 56. Cankao xiaoxi (December 31, 2003). 57. Shi Yuhua, “Jinghu gaotie caiyong lungui jishu qiyong cixuanhu defari zhengbiao [Germany, France, and Japan compete over contracts and over the choice of rail or maglev technology for the Beijing–Shanghai high-speed rail],” Jinghua Shibao (January 15, 2004). 58. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 138n28. 59. The online petition campaign was covered by Phoenix TV (Hong Kong); Lianhe Zaobao in Singapore, Mainichi News in Japan, and the International Herald Tribune. 60. Shen Tao, “Contemporary Chinese Internet Nationalism,” 27. 61. “Alstom, Kawasaki Heavy, Bombardier win China high-speed train contracts” Xinhua Financial Network News (August 30, 2004). The total Japanese order was valued at approximately 140 billion yen (US$1.3 billion), with Kawasaki Heavy Industries’ portion projected to be around 80 billion yen. Kawasaki would initially manufacture the trains in Japan, with China’s CSR Sifang Locomotive and Rolling Stock Co., the Chinese partners in the consortium, taking over production at a later date. See: “Kawasaki Heavy Clinches Chinese Rail Car Order,” Asia Pulse (October 21, 2004). 62. Shen Tao, “Contemporary Chinese Internet Nationalism,” 33. 63. “Chinese Officials Shut Down Anti-Japanese Activists’ Web Site,” Kyodo (August 31, 2004).

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64. See: Jane Cai, “Patriot’s Website Closed Because of Railway Protest,” South China Morning Post (September 1, 2004); “Aiguozhe tongmengwang zhige xiongde wangzhan de ganxie xin [Patriots Alliance Web issues a thank-you letter to all brother Web sites] (September 4, 2004), http://www.sinophoto.com.cn/content/040912/04091226.htm (accessed September 10, 2004). 65. Niu Jianjun, “Rijun duji shijian suochang jaijin jiaoshe; minjian huodong shengsuan jiaoda [Bargaining tightens in the demands for compensation from the incident of Japan’s military poisoning; a relative success for civil activism],” Caijing shibao (September 6, 2003). 66. Contracts on the high-speed rail project were awarded to French companies in October 2004 and to German companies on June 7, 2005 and on June 6, 2005. See Zhang Xufeng, “Shei xian shixiang jinghu gaotie [Who will drive the Beijing–Shanghai highspeed train first?],” Hubei Ribao (April 21, 2006). 67. Taipei Times (December 31, 2004). 68. “China denies plan to order Japanese bullet trains,” Kyodo News Service (November 23, 2005). 69. In fact the ministry required only that 70 percent of the rail project content be from Chinese companies. “Zhongguo gaotie mengxiang sange tielu jishu zuifada guojia qiangduo shichang [China’s high-speed rail dream: Three of the most developed countries with high technology plunder the market],” Zhongguo Keji caifu (July 3, 2006). 70. Interviews, Railway Ministry officials, Beijing (March 22, 2006). 71. Han Xuan et al., “2003: Internet Nationalism Explodes.” 72. Liu Ning, “Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Rail.” 73. “China’s High-Speed Rail Dream.” 74. Interview, Beijing, 2007. 75. Lu Yi, How Far Away, 139. 76. Up to 90 percent of all known ACW in China are in the city of Dunhua, a townshiplevel city in northeast Jilin province. From 1945 to 1993, a total of 747 local people in Dunhua were injured by ACW. The Dunhua city government issued statements on the ACW situation in 1980, 1994, and 1995 to the central government. However, the national government has never provided compensation for individual victims, and never raised the case of Dunhua with Japanese officials before 1990. Su Zhiliang et al., Problems Left Over, 669; Lu Yi, How Far Away, 127–130. 77. While the government officially requests that “the Japanese side should take [the lawsuits] into serious consideration and handle them properly,” local Chinese officials have on occasion refused permission for Chinese citizens to travel to Japan to pursue the lawsuits. See Chow Chung-yan, “Chemical Weapons Victims Hope for Redress in Tokyo,” South China Morning Post (September 18, 2003). 78. In March 1996, Premier Li Peng told Prime Minister Hashimoto in Thailand at an Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) conference that “this [ACW] problem has existed for over half a century. The Chinese people wish that Japan will take a responsible attitude toward history, and take on the responsibility for the task of dealing with the ACW in China, and quickly resolve this problem.” Lu Yi, How Far Away, 131.

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79. The “Memorandum on the Destruction of Japanese Discarded Chemical Weapons in China Between the Governments of the People’s Republic of China and Japan” is available (in Chinese) at: http://www.sjhistory.org/site/newxh/yjzt8–4mb_a200504113155 .htm (accessed March 12, 2005). 80. China participated in 17 joint cleanup and investigation operations with Japan from February 2000 to November 2002, according to a special appendix in the 2002 Defense White Paper, available at http://english.people.com.cn/features/ndpaper2002 /app5.html. The MOFA Web site on the ACW issue is available at http://www.fmprc .gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2722/t15974.htm (both accessed April 14, 2006). See also “Japanese Team in China Retrieves Wartime Chemical Weapons,” Xinhua News Report (September 27, 2002). 81. “Second World War Bomb Explodes in China, One Dead,” Xinhua News Report (August 30, 2001). 82. When Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao met Hosokawa Morihiro, a former Japanese prime minister, a few days after the incident, Hu did not even mention the ACW issue. “PRC Vice President Hu Jintao Meets Japan’s Former PM on Developing Future Ties,” Xinhua News Agency (September 4, 2001). 83. Wu Xiaodong and Liang Dong, “A History of Suffering, Real Choices: What Does the ‘4 August’ Incident of Injury from a Chemical Agent Abandoned by the Japanese Army Invading China Tell Us? (A Follow-up Report),” Xinhua News Reports (August 21, 2003). 84. Wu Xiaodong and Wang Qian, “Chinese Breathing Sigh of Relief on Toxic Gas Incident,” Xinhua News Reports (August 15, 2003). 85. “Chinese Foreign Ministry Again Makes Solemn Representation to Japanese Side on Incident of People Injured by Toxic Chemicals Abandoned by Japan,” Xinhua News Reports (August 13, 2003). 86. Verna Yu, “Hu Issues a Mild Rebuke to Japan; President Tells Visiting Minister That Relations Can Be Improved ‘by Reviewing Lessons of the Past,” South China Morning Post (August 10, 2003). 87. Wu Xiaodong and Wang Qian, “Chinese Breathing Sigh of Relief.” 88. Feng Zhaokui, “Correct Handling of Historical Problems Remains an Issue,” Liaowang (August 18, 2003). 89. Excluding the 300,000 signatures deemed invalid, within one month they collected 1,119,248 individual signatures from the Web, in a campaign supported by 12,518 individual sites. Han Xuan et al., “2003: Internet Nationalism Explodes.” 90. Liu Jianqiang, “Qinhua rijun weidu weixiao dixia keneng haiyou zongduo duqidan [The harmful impact from the chemical weapons abandoned by invading Japanese armies have not been fully destroyed; there may be many more chemical warheads buried underground],” Nanfang Zhoumou (August 14, 2003); Zhang Tianwei, “Pinglun: 8–4 duqi shijian ‘weiwen’ buneng daiti ‘peichang’ [Editorial: In the August 4 incident, ‘condolences’ cannot replace ‘compensation’],” Beijing qingnian bao (September 4, 2003).

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91. Verna Yu, “Abandoned War-Era Gas Claims Its First Victim; China Lodges a Protest with Japan Over the Father’s Death 18 Days After Accident,” South China Morning Post (August 23, 2003). 92. Xinhua News Reports (August 22, 2003). 93. “Chinese Politburo Member Holds Talks with Japanese Delegation,” Xinhua News Reports (August 25, 2003). 94. In the 1999 MOU on ACW cleanup, Japan pledged that it would give necessary “assistance” (buchang) but not “compensation” (peichang) in the event of an accident during the process of destruction. In practice, Japan began to distribute medical expenses and “subsidies” (buzu) whenever someone reported an injury related to ACW after the cleanup actually started, regardless of whether the incident was caused by an ACW cleanup operation. For instance, when a drinking well was poisoned from ACW in Cicheng township in 2003, Japan gave each victim 700,000 yen (approximately 50,000 RMB) as “medical expenses.” In 2002, Japan provided a total of 33.3 billion yen (approximately 220 million RMB) in “subsidy” (buzu) funds to Chinese citizens. Liu Hua, “Riben tuoyan jiejue ‘yihua’ wenti zhenxiang [The true facts behind Japan’s delay in resolving the ACW issues],” Huanqui (September 4, 2003). 95. Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 849n76. 96. The online petition called for Japan to provide “detailed information about the specific location of chemical weapons dumps in China,” to provide a broader “compensation proposal” for all ACW victims, and to remove all ACW weapons from China rather than destroy them in China, as the Chinese government had already agreed to. It also demanded that Japan fund health checks for residents near places where chemicals were buried and pay for environmental damage as well as apologize to and compensate all victims injured by the chemicals since the Japanese invasion of China in 1931. Verna Yu, “Poison Gas Leak Fuels Anti-Japan Crusade on Net,” South China Morning Post (August 22, 2003):A7. 97. “Japan Urged to Resolve Weapons Issue,” China Daily (October 21, 2003). 98. Zhang Tianwei, “Pinglun: 8–4 duqi shijian ‘weiwen’ buneng daiti ‘peichang’ [Editorial: In the August 4 incident, ‘condolences’ cannot Replace ‘compensation’],” Beijing Qingnian Bao (September 4, 2003). 99. Lin Wei, “Zhu Hai: riben luyoutuan gouchiri daohuan, shengcheng laihua zhiwei maichun [Zhuhai: Japanese tour group announces that on China’s Day of Humiliation, they have come to China just for prostitutes],” China Youth Daily (September 26, 2003). 100. “Chinese Sign up in Anger,” Courier Mail (September 19, 2003). 101. Wenran Jiang, “Confronting a Poisonous Past,” South China Morning Post (September 18, 2003). 102. Jane Cai, “Anti-Japanese Sentiment Swells Among Students,” South China Morning Post (November 10, 2003). 103. Jiang Lifeng, “Zhongguo minzhong dui riben henshao you qingjingan: diyici zhongri yulun diaocha jieguo fenxi [Chinese public rarely feels close to Japan: analysis of the results of the first China– Japan public opinion survey],” 12.

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104. See also Wu Bangguo’s meeting with Prime Minister Kozumi, and comments by China’s Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan. “Wu Bangguo Meets Japanese Political Party Leaders,” Xinhua (September 6, 2003); “Japan Urged to Resolve Weapons Issue,” China Daily (October 21, 2003). 105. “Principle of ‘Drawing Lessons from History and Looking Towards the Future’ Must Be Upheld in Developing China– Japan Relations,” Xinhua (October 11, 2003). 106. “WWII Cleanup Approved Ahead of Summit,” The Daily Yomiuri (October 21, 2003). 107. Koizumi was equally cautious with his language, stating, “As regards the incident in Qiqihar where people were injured by toxic chemicals, the Japanese government is willing to treat the matter earnestly with sincerity and implement the agreement reached between the two governments.” Chen Hegao and Che Yuming, “Chinese President Hu Jintao Meets with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi,” Xinhua (October 20, 2003). 108. See, for instance: “Positive Cooperation with Japan in Chemical Weapon’s Cleanup,” Xinhua (November 14, 2003). 109. This includes an incident on May 24, 2004 when eight workers in Qiqihair city were hospitalized as a result of exposure to Japanese ACW and on July 23, 2004, when two Chinese children were burned by mustard gas leaked from ACW. In both instances, the Chinese Foreign Ministry coordinated closely with the Japanese side to investigate, issue apologies and funds to victims, and clean up the site without raising the issue in the Chinese media or in public statements. Lu Yi, How Far Away, 140. 110. The China Daily, for instance, pointed out: “Truly, after the case of poisoning, Japan did express regret over the incident and extended sympathies and condolences to the victims. Further, some medical workers were dispatched to China to provide treatment for those who took ill in the incident.” “Japan Must Show Accountability,” China Daily (September 24, 2003). 111. Interview with Chinese activist, Shanghai (February 2007). 112. Zhang Tasheng, “Guanyu 21 shiji zhongri changqi youhao hezuo guanxi de jidian sikao [Several thoughts regarding long-term cooperation and friendly cooperation in China– Japan relations in the twenty-first century], 34. 113. Interview, Beijing, 2007. 114. Hagstrom, “Quiet Power,” 176. 115. In their four previous failed attempts, activists had notified the Chinese government in advance, who then notified the Japanese Coast Guard, which intercepted the activists before they reached the islands. 116. Interview, Beijing, 2008. 117. “Waijiaobu fubuzhang Zhang Yesui 24 xiawu jiji yuejian riben dashiguan daibiao [Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui urgently summoned Japanese embassy representative on the afternoon of 24 March],” Renmin Ribao (March 26, 2004). 118. “Japanese Flags Burn in Chinese Capital,” South China Morning Post (March 26, 2004). 119. Cited by Zhao Yuezhi, Communication in China, 31n42. 120. “Deputy Foreign Minster Zhang Yesui.”

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121. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi later confirmed his personal involvement. “While dealing with it appropriately based on law, I instructed government officials to consider how to handle the issue from a comprehensive view so as not to hurt the bilateral relationship with China.” “Japan Deported Chinese Protesters Under Political Pressure,” Japan Economic Newswire (April 1, 2004). 122. Irene Wang and Alice Yan, “Diaoyu Islands Activists Celebrated as ‘Heroes’ in Beijing,” South China Morning Post (March 29, 2004). 123. Several hundred supporters were waiting at the Shanghai airport when the activists were brought back from Japan; however, they were hustled immediately into government cars upon deplaning and taken to police headquarters for questioning. Interview with Chinese activist, Shanghai, July 2, 2006. 124. Interview, Shanghai, 2007. 125. “Beiri feifa kouliude 7 ming zhongguo gongmin anxuan huilai [Seven Chinese activists who were illegally detained by Japan return home],” Renmin Ribao (March 27, 2004). 126. “China Restates Senkakus Claim, But Ready to Talk with Japan,” Japan Economic Newswire (March 30, 2004). 127. “Japan Bans Political Group from Sailing for Disputed Islands,” Kyodo News Service (March 25, 2004); Anthony Faiola, “Isles Become Focus for Old Antagonisms,” Washington Post (March 27, 2004). 128. Nailene Chou Wiest, “Souring Sino-Japanese Ties Spread to Business,” South China Morning Post (April 6, 2004). 129. Renmin Ribao provided only two brief factual accounts of the incident after the activists’ return had been essentially secured, both buried on page 4. PRC-controlled press in Hong Kong was similarly moderate. Wen Wei Po editorialized, “We should believe in and support our Government to solve the Diaoyu Island issue through diplomatic means. Civilian groups may consider using safer and workable methods to express their patriotic motives to defend the territorial integrity of our country.” “Resolutely Safeguard Sovereignty, Soberly Deal with the Incident,” Wen Wei Po (March 25, 2004). 130. This is a statement made by Liu Xiaobiao, a CASS scholar, quoted in David Fang, “Diaoyu activist Pushes Boundaries of Protest,” South China Morning Post (April 13, 2004). 131. “Diaoyu Activists Are Patriots; China Must Protect Them,” Ming Pao (March 25, 2004). See also Agnes Cheung, “H.K. Protesters Urge Tougher Chinese Stance on Isle Dispute,” Japan Economic Newswire (March 25, 2004). 132. For critical editorials in Japan, see “Japan: Editorials on PRC Activists’ ‘Illegal’ Landing on Senkaku Isles,” FBIS Report (March 25, 2004). 133. “Parliament Panel Urges Prevention of Illegal Landing on Senkaku Isles,” Kyodo News Service (March 30, 2004). 134. “Japan Has No Right to Claim Diaoyu Islands,” China Daily (April 2, 2004). 135. “Diaoyu renshi Ping Jinhua deng xiang rizhuhua dashi dijiao qianzeshu [Diaoyu activist Feng Jinhua and others submit a demand note to the Japanese embassy in Beijing],” Xinjing Bao (April 24, 2004).

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136. Wang Shaopu, “Jianchi cong zhanlue quanju bawo he quli zhongri guanxi [Continue to seize and manage China– Japan relations from a comprehensive strategic perspective],” 15. 137. “PRC, HK Media on Diaoyu Islands Situation,” China FBIS Report (March 20, 2005). 138. Zhang Tasheng, “Several Thoughts Regarding Long-Term Cooperation,” 34. For instance, the first demonstrations on the East China Sea dispute were held outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing in July 2004. In the violent Asia Cup protests in Beijing in August 2004, Chinese fans held up signs claiming, “The Diaoyu Islands are Chinese sovereign territory.” See Japan Economic Newswire (July 9, 2004); The Straits Times (August 14, 2004). 139. “National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and After” (December 10, 2004), http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/index_e01.htm (accessed December 28, 2005). 140. Fu Zhuhui, “Riben yao ‘xiugai’ zhongguo kangri jinianguan [Japan wants to ‘revise’ China’s memorials on the War of Resistance to Japan],” Zao Bao (March 8, 2005). 141. Fu Zhuhui, “Riben tichu tingzhi yuanhu sanliyou [Japan puts forth three reasons it will stop aid to China],” Zao Bao (March 6, 2005). 142. The Anti-Secession Law passed during the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2005 established a domestic legal basis for using armed force against Taiwan if it declared independence. Though long planned, the law also served as a response to the February 19, 2005 U.S.– Japan statement on Taiwan and had implications for the Diaoyu dispute, given China’s stance that the Diaoyu Islands are part of Taiwan (and hence, Chinese territory). It is possible that having warned Japan on both Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands, Chinese leaders felt more confident in reaching out to Japan in early March 2005. 143. “Text of FM Li Zhaoxing’s News Conference on March 6 During NPC Session,” Xinhua (March 6, 2005). 144. For instance: “Bawo duiri guanxi de zhanlue yu zhengce [Seize strategy and policy in relations with Japan],” Dongfang Zaobao (March 8, 2005). 145. “Zhengxie weiyuan jianyi meinian Nanjing datushari juxing guojia gongji [Consultative Committee representative proposes a national day of commemoration on the date of the Nanjing Massacre],” Xinjing bao (March 10, 2005). 146. “Wen Jiabao tichu jiaqiang he gaishan zhongri guanxi de sanyuanze [Wen Jiaobao proposes three principles to strengthen and improve China– Japan relations],” Xinhua (March 14, 2005). 147. Xinhua’s account of the call praised Machimura for reiterating that the Japanese government upholds the one-China policy and follows the spirit of “taking history as a mirror.” He Yi, “Li Zhaoxing Has Phone Conversation with Japanese Foreign Minister,” Xinhua (March 16, 2005). 148. “Ri shouxiang xiaoquan huiying diabiao huanying [Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s response expresses welcome],” Chongqing Shibao (March 17, 2005). 149. For instance, see Chen Gang, “Wu Bangguo huijian Riben chadao daibiaotuan [Wu Bangguo receives a Japanese tea ceremony delegation],” Renmin Ribao (March 19, 2005).

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150. For a description of Wen’s statement as an “olive branch floated to Japan,” see Willy Lam, “Anti-Japanese Protests Pose Long-Term Challenges for Beijing,” China Brief 5, no. 9 (April 26, 2005), www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id= 408&issue_id=3311&article_id=2369716 (accessed November 14, 2006). 151. “Liyong hao zhongri youhao de meiyige jihui [Seize every opportunity to improve China– Japan friendship],” Xinjing Bao (March 28, 2005); Chen Jieshe, “Ri zhiding zhongri gongtong zuoye jihua, tuijin donghai youqitian kaifa [Japan sets out a plan for common tasks for China and Japan in pushing forward joint development of the East China Sea gas fields],” Xinjing Bao (March 28, 2005). 152. Zhao Ligen, “Bama zhongri guanxi ‘zhengleng’ kunju [Taking the pulse of the difficult situation of ‘cold politics’ in China– Japan relations],” Xinhua bi-monthly report (March 25, 2005). 153. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 390n72. 154. Peng Lewu, “1000 Wan qianming de quanliucheng [The complete process of gaining ten million signatures],” Nanfang Zhoumou (March 31, 2005). 155. Zhang Liang, “Guangzhou shimin yongyue qianming fandui riben lianheguo changren lishiguo [Guangzhou city residents eagerly rush to sign up opposing Japan’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council),” Xinquai Bao (March 29, 2005). 156. For one example of the spreading consumer boycott in April 2005, see Zhang Xilei, “Hangzhou maichang jujue mai richan shouji [Hangzhou market refuses to sell Japanese cell phones],” Hangzhou Wanbao (April 1, 2005). 157. Norimitsu Onishi, “Tokyo Protests Anti-Japan Rallies in China,” The New York Times (April 11, 2005). 158. Howard W. French, “China Allows More Protests in Shanghai Against Japan,” The New York Times (April 14, 2005). 159. Cited in Yuezhi Zhao, Communication in China, 175n160. 160. China Labor Bulletin, “Striking Shenzhen Workers at Japanese-Owned Wal-Mart Supplier Firm Demand Right to Unionize,” http://www.japanfocus.org/-China_Labor -Bulletin/2105 (accessed July 10, 2009). 161. Based on my discussion with a Chinese expert who was asked to give a talk with these People’s Armed Police in Beijing. Interview, Beijing (September 12, 2007). 162. “Waijiao buzhang lizhaxing yu riben waixiang macun xinli huitan [Meeting between Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura],” Xinhua Net (April 18, 2005). 163. “Waijiaobu tan Beijing dengdi kangyi shiwei yundong: riben yinggai fansheng [Ministry of Foreign Affairs discusses the protest demonstration movement in Beijing and other cities: Japan should engage in self-reflection],” Renmin Wang (April 12, 2005). 164. Interview, Beijing, 2008 165. Quoted in The Japan Times (April 18, 2005). 166. “Leaders of Japan, China Try to End Dispute,” The New York Times (April 23, 2005). For Hu’s statement, see Chen Hegao and Che Yuming, “Hu Jintao Makes 5-Point Proposal on Sino-Japanese Ties in Meeting with Koizumi,” Xinhua News Service (April 24, 2005). 167. Interview with leading Japan expert who participated in discussions at the time on the UNSC issue at the ministry of foreign affairs, Beijing, September 10, 2007.

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168. See: “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms” (June 7, 2005), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t199318.htm (accessed June 14, 2005). 169. Interview, Beijing (September 28, 2007). 170. Interview, Beijing (June 4, 2007). 171. Gries, “Nationalism, Indignation,” 105. 172. Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 96–100. 173. South Korean President Rho Moo-hyun personally denounced Japan’s new history textbooks on March 23 and briefly recalled the ambassador to Japan over the incident. The South Korean government formally brought a complaint against the Japanese textbooks to UNESCO and demanded a number of specific revisions in the texts. Chinese leaders did not directly raise the issue, Chinese media criticism came later and was more moderate than that from South Korean press, and China never demanded any specific revisions. See “Riben jiaokeshu wenti yinggai guojihua [The problem of Japan’s textbooks should be internationalized],” Renmin Ribao (March 25, 2005); “Distorted History Textbook Unacceptable,” Xinhua (March 31, 2005).

5. A POTENT POPULISM 1. Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy.” 2. Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus.” 3. For instance, see Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions”; Christensen, “China, the U.S.– Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma;” Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking.’ ” 4. Jin Xide, “The Background,” 106–107. 5. Yang Ningyi, Liaojie ribenren [Understanding Japanese people]. For another returnee’s book, see Zhou Donglin, Riben duihua wuchang yuanzu shilu [The true record of Japan’s voluntary assistance to China]. 6. “Baokan ziliao suoyin [Media resources collection].” 7. Yang Bojiang, “Yi lixing siwei mouqiu zhongri guanxi de kanshiji fazhan” [Seeking cross-century development of Sino-Japanese relations through rational thinking].” 8. Zhu Chenghu, “ZhongRi guanxi: liyi yu qinggan [Sino-Japanese relations: Interest and emotion],” Huanqiu shibao (July 30, 1999). Senior Colonel Zhu Chenghu is from the PLA’s National Defense University. 9. Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 185. 10. Interviews with Japan experts in Beijing, September 4–7, 2007. 11. He Fang, “Women nengtong riben youhao xiaqu ma? [Can we maintain friendship with Japan?],” Huanqiu shibao (May 11, 1997). 12. Jiang Chunyue, “Xin shiqi de zhongri guanxi [Sino-Japanese relations in a new era].” 13. Yan Xuetong, “Guojia liyi de panduan [The assessment of national interests].” 14. Liu Jiangyong, “Mei-Ri chongjian anquan tizhi yu Zhong-Mei-Ri guanxi [Reestablishment of the U.S.– Japan security alliance and China–U.S.– Japan relations]. See also Liu Jiangyong, “Xin ‘Ri-Mei fangwei hezuo zhizhen’ heyi lingren youlu [Why the new ‘Guidelines of Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation’ arouse concerns].”

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15. Guo Zhenyuan, “Riben xin anquan zhanlue yu jinhou de Zhong-Mei-Ri anquan guanxi [Japan’s new security strategy and China–U.S.– Japan security relations in the future].” 16. Lü Yongsheng “Lengzhanhou Meiguo Ya-Tai zhanglüe yu jinhou de tedian [Features of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy in the post-Cold War era]”; Chunyue Jiang, “Xinshiqi de Zhong-Ri guanxi [Sino-Japanese relations in the new era].” 17. Ni Feng, “Mei-Ri tongmeng yu diqu anquan [U.S.– Japan alliance and regional security].” 18. Feng Zhaokui, “Maodun yu fengxian: Riben de ‘junshi daguo’ zhilu [Contradictions and risk: Japan’s route to a ‘military power’]”; Jiang Lifeng, “Zhong-Ri guanxi de xianzhaung yu weilai [Sino-Japanese relations: Present and future].” 19. Feng Zhaokui, “Xianshi zhuyi, quanqiu zhuyi, minzu zhuyi-renshi Zhong-Ri guanxi de butong jiaoudu [Realism, globalism, and nationalism—different angles to understand China– Japan relations].” 20. Su Hao, “Guanyu Zhong-Mei-Ri sanfang anquan duihua de kaolü” [Some thoughts regarding China–U.S.– Japan triangular security dialogues].” 21. For a review of this debate, see Xuanli Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy Toward Japan, 136–137. 22. Interviews (Beijing, September 4 and 7, 2007). 23. Yang Bojiang, “Yi lixing siwei mouqiu zhongri guanxi de kanshiji fazhan [Seeking cross-century development of Sino-Japanese relations through rational thinking],” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary international relations] (September 1999):1–6. See also: Yang Bojiang, “Riben lengzhanhou de anquan zhanlue,” in Zhongguo yu Yatai anquan, ed. Yan Xuetong et al. (Beijing: Shishi chubanshi, 1999), 135–162. 24. See the article by Sr. Col. Zhu Chenghu from the National Defense University: “ZhongRi guanxi: liyi yu qinggan [Sino-Japanese relations: Interest and emotion],” Huanqiu shibao [Global times] (July 30, 1999). 25. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Trust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 320. 26. Mochizuki, “Terms of Engagement,” 103. For other examples of China’s criticism at this time, see “News Briefings by the Chinese Foreign Ministry,” Beijing Review (September 18–24, 1995); Christopher B. Johnstone, “Grant Aid Suspension Heightens Tensions in Japan– China Relations,” JEI Report 34B (September 15, 1995): 8–10. 27. Interview, Beijing, September 2007. 28. “Interview with Feng Zhaokui,” People’s Daily.com (September 23, 2002); “Interview with Zhang Zheng” (July 17, 2002), http://202.99.23.237.wsrmlt/jbft/20020707071701 .html (accessed April 5, 2006). For Feng Zhaokui’s op-ed, see Nanfang Zhoumou (June 12, 2003). 29. For details, see Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 268–269, 283. 30. Tan Shiping, “Zailun Zhongguo de dazhanlue [Another discussion on China’s Grand Strategy]”; Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shizai bixing [China must exercise major power diplomacy].” For a public argument applying such thinking to Japan policy, see Jin Xide, “Zhongguo xuyao daguo xintai [China needs the mind-set of a major power],” Huanqiu Shibao (September 12, 2002).

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31. Zhang Yunling, Huoban haishi duishou [Partners or enemies]; Liu Jiangyong, Panhuanzhong de Riben [Wavering Japan]. 32. Rozman, “China’s Changing Images of Japan,” 117–118. 33. Shen Haitao, “Koizumi neigaku de zhengce quxiang yu Zhongri guanxi de qianjing [The direction of Kozimumi’s domestic policies and prospects for China– Japan relations].” 34. Jin Xide, “21 shijichu Zhongri guanxi de tezheng yu keti [Special characteristics and issues for China-Japan relations at the opening of the twenty-first century].” See also Gao Ke, “9–11 shijian yu Dongbeiya diqujian de daguo guanxi [The 9–11 incident and great power relations in the northeast Asia region].” 35. Yang Yuanzhong, “Zouxiang 21 shiji de zhong, mei, ri, e, siguo zhanlue guanxi [Fourcountry relations between China, U.S., Japan, and Russia into the twenty-first century]”; Song Yimin, “Zhong mei ri sanjiao guanxi de dangqian taishi [The current situation of three-country relations between China, U.S., and Japan].” 36. Feng Zhaokui, “Guanyu ZhongRi guanxi de zhanlue sikao [Strategic thoughts on SinoJapanese relations]”; Jin Xide, “Zhongri huoban guanxi de queli he weilai fazhan [The establishment and future development of Sino-Japanese partnership relations].” 37. I randomly selected approximately 20 articles each year from the China Academic Journals database (CNKI) via keyword searches on China– Japan relations. Distribution by author affiliation: foreign policy think tanks (46%), academic institutions (45%), military think tanks (11%), and economic think tanks (1%). Distribution by journal type: foreign policy journals (45%), Japan-specific journals (30%), military journals (9%), and economic journals (16%). The most common topics were Taiwan and the U.S.– Japan alliance (17.4%) and domestic politics in Japan (10.5%); others included missile defense, the East China Sea dispute, the Diaoyu Islands, and global security. I assessed each article according to eight bifurcated questions (yes/no), including: did the article discuss either a cooperative or threatening act by Japan; mention history issues and/or rightwing groups in Japan; acknowledge that Japan faced external threats and/or that the rise of China or China’s security policies might be causing Japan to alter its security policies? 38. Each article’s overall threat perception of Japan was assessed on a scale from 1–10 (from least to most threatening). I based my analysis of threat perceptions upon the author’s analysis of four factors: Japan’s intent, its capacity, the immediateness of the threat, and the importance of Chinese interests being threatened. 39. This finding is due in part to my decision to not include articles from the Journal of the War of Resistance to Japan (Kangri zhanzheng yanjiu), the flagship journal of China’s “history activists.” For details on this journal, see chapter 2. 40. Feng Zhaokui, “Zengyang zuo lingju—dui shiji zhijiao Zhong-Ri guanxi de sikao [How to be a neighbor: Thinking on China– Japan relations at the dawn of the century].” 41. There were also a number of letters critical of Feng, some describing Japan as China’s “competitor,” criticizing Japan’s unwillingness to address history, and attacking Japanese. See Shijie Zhishi [World affairs] 1 (January 2000): 31–33. 42. Li was hardly pandering to Japan. He argued that China should focus on selfstrengthening, rather than always criticizing Japan, since “Japan is afraid of the strong

5. A Potent Populism

43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50.

51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56.

57. 58.

59.

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and abuses the weak” (qiruan paying). Li Zhaozhong, “Zai Lishi wentishang: ribenren ruhe kandai zhongguo [How do Japanese people look at China on the history question?].” Wei Zhong, “Butubukuai [Uncomfortable if keeping silent].” Li Zhaozhong, “Huida yizhong jiandian de wujie [To answer a kind of simple misunderstanding].” Shijie Zhishi [World affairs] 12 (2000): 26. Shijie Zhishi [World affairs] 13 (2000): 28–29. Tatsumi Okabe, “Nitchu kankei to yoron [Japan– China relations and public opinion],” Toa [East Asia] 399 (September 2000): 2–3, cited in Shen and Cheung Mong, “Reshaping Nationalism.” “Release on Internet of Translated Version of Japanese Articles Annoys Beijing,” Sankei Shimbum (September 7, 2000), cited in Yinan He, “Ripe for Cooperation or Rivalry?” Rozman, “China’s Changing Images of Japan,” 114. For example: Lei Zhining, “Women de jiyi, women de teng: yi shenjian zhongri guanxi de linglei jiaoshe [Our memories, our pain: An alternative angle to look deeply at China– Japan relations],” Nanfengchuang 6 (2001): 76–79. Jin Xide, “Riben zenmele: riben lishishang de sanci zhuanxing [What’s wrong with Japan: Japan’s three shifts in history].” Ma Licheng, “Duiri guanxi xinsiwei [New thinking on relations with Japan].” For an in-depth discussion of Ma’s article and subsequent “New Thinking” debate, see Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking.’ ” Shi Yinhong, “Zhongri jiejing yu ‘waijiao geming’ [China– Japan rapprochement and a ‘diplomatic revolution’],” 71; as translated by Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 839. Xue Li, “Zhongri guanxi nengfou chaoyue lishi wenti? [Can Sino–Japanese relations overcome the history question?],” as translated by Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 841. Ibid. Ling Xinguang, “Zhanlue duitou zhanshi quiantuo-ping ma licheng he shi yinhong de liangpian wenzhang [Correct strategy, incorrect tactics—Comments on the two articles by Ma Licheng and Shi Yinhong].” Sun Yafei, “Duiri xubuxuyao ‘xinsiwei’? [Is the ‘new thinking’ toward Japan really necessary?],” Nanfang Zhoumou (June 12, 2003). Special editions on the “new thinking” were issued by Shijie zhishi [World affairs], Kangri zhanzheng yanjiu [Journal of the War of Resistance to Japan], and Zhanlue yu guanli [Strategy and management]. Prominent conferences on the new thinking held in Beijing in July and August 2003 were widely covered in the Chinese press. See Wang Yizhou, “Zhongri guanxi de shige wenti [Ten issues in China– Japan relations].” Lin Zhibo, “Duiri guanxi xinsiwei zhiyi [Questioning the ‘new thinking’ in China– Japan relations],” People’s Net (July 22, 2003), www.people.com.cn/BIG5/guandian /1036/1978531.html; Lin Zhibo, “Duiri guanxi xinsiwei zai zhiyi [Another question on the ‘new thinking’ in China– Japan relations],” People’s Net (August 15, 2003), www .people.com.cn/BIG5/guandian/183/8456/8457/2017423.html (both accessed March 13, 2004).

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60. Liu Ning, “Duiri xinsiwei” liubian yizhounian [One-year anniversary of the evolution of the ‘new thinking’ on relations with Japan],” Nanfengchuang 4 (2004): 18. 61. Sun Yafei, “Is the ‘new thinking’ toward Japan really necessary?” 62. Liu Xiaobo, “Hezhe aiguo, hezhe haiguo? [Who loves their country and who harms their country?],” Waitan Huabao (August 14, 2003), as translated by Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 838n33. 63. Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 839. Notably, Ma returned to China in 2006 and began writing a weekly column in Jingji Guancha [Economic Observer], the leading liberal economics newspaper in China, indicating that the furor had finally blown over. 64. The journal is Bungei shunju, issues 3 and 10; cited in Lu Yi, How Far Away Is Mutual Understanding, 318. 65. Preceding points noted in Zhuo Nanshen, “Jiujing shui xuyao xinsiwei [Who exactly needs the new thinking?].” 66. Shi Hongtao, “Beijing bufen xuezhe zhiyi duiri xinsiwei [Some Beijing scholars raise questions about the new thinking toward Japan],” Zhongguo qingnianbao (September 29, 2003). 67. Liu Ning, “Feng Jinhua: Wo yuanzuo yige minzuzhuyizhe [Feng Jinhua: I want to be a nationalist],” Xinwen Zhoukan (June 24, 2002):42–45. 68. Huang Zhangpu, “Jinguo shenshehou ‘chenmou de luoxuan’ [The spiral of silence after Yasukuni],” Qingnian Cankao (January 7, 2004). 69. Liu Ning, “Beijing–Shanghai high-speed rail.” See also Huang Woyun, “Duilimian de jiazhi [Value of the opposing point of view],” Nanfeng Chuang (December 16, 2004):12. 70. Li Ying, “Zhongguo xuyan shenmeyang de minzuzhuyi [What kind of nationalism does China need?],” Guoji xienfeng daobao (August 4, 2003). 71. Le Shan, Qianliu: dui xaiai minzu zhuyi de pipan yu fansi [Undercurrent: Criticism and reflections on parochial nationalism]. 72. Wang Guoping, “Cong fandui ribe changren kan minjian xingwei de zuoyong [Understanding the role of social action from the opposition to Japan’s permanent membership in UN Security Council],” Huanqiu (April 16, 2005):28–29. 73. He was interviewed by South Korean media, later translated in Yi Zhengli, “Xuezhe xinlun: Fangzhi jiduan minzuzhuyi qingxu ‘jiechi’ zhongguo [New scholarly forum: Oppose extreme nationalist emotions that ‘hijack’ China],” Renminwang (January 8, 2004). 74. Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence. 75. Hiroyuki Sugiyama, “People’s Daily slams anti-Japan rhetoric,” Yomuri Shinbum, December 14, 2002, cited in Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 843. 76. Interview, Beijing (September 30, 2007). 77. Interviews, Beijing (September 29, 2007; July 8, 2008). 78. Interview, Beijing (September 28, 2007). 79. Wang Xiaodong, “21 shiji zhongri guanxi-yichang youjiang jingcai youxi [SinoJapanese relations in the twenty-first century—A lottery game],” Xianggang Shangwubao (February 24–25, 2003). 80. Quoted in Sun Yafei, “Is the ‘new thinking’ toward Japan really necessary?” 81. Liu Ning, “One-year anniversary,” 18.

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82. Chen Feng, “Daiqianyan: Jiaqiang zhongri guanxi yanjiu, cujin zhongri heping youhao [Forward: Strengthen studies of China– Japan relations, promote peace and friendship between China and Japan],” 3. 83. Liu Zonghe, “Tongwei daguo de riben yu zhongguo ruhe xiangchu [How can China and Japan coexist as great powers?],” 7. 84. Liu Zonghe, “How can China and Japan,” 7. 85. Liu Qiang, “Zhongri haishang weiji de fangfan yu kongzhi [Controls and lessons for maritime crises between China and Japan],” 101. 86. The first quote is from Zhang Tasheng, “Yixie sikao guanyu zhongri changqi hezuo [Several thoughts regarding long-term cooperation between China and Japan],” 53; the second from Liu Zonghe, “How Can China and Japan,” 7. 87. Jin Xide, “Zhongri guanxi de xianzhuang yu fazhan [Current situation and developments in China– Japan relations].” 88. Wang Shaopu, “Continue to Seize and Manage China– Japan Relations,” 25. 89. Zhang Tasheng, “Several Thoughts Regarding Long-Term Cooperation Between China and Japan,” 45. 90. Hua Jiaping, “Riben zhengfu youpaihua yu zhongri guanxi [Right-wing tendencies in the Japanese government and China– Japan relations],” 189. 91. Chu Wansheng, “Lun lishi renshi wenti yu zhongri guanxi [Discussing the history issue in China– Japan relations],” 153. Chu Wansheng is a professor at the PLA Foreign Languages College. 92. Zhang Tasheng, “Several Thoughts Regarding Long-Term Cooperation Between China and Japan.” 93. Zhang Yong, “Zhongri anquan yu hezuo yantaohui jiyao [Record of conference on China– Japan security and cooperation].” 94. The latter quote comes from: Liu Jiangyong, “Zhongri guanxi ‘zhengleng jingri’ de zhengjie yu chulu [The obstacles and route out for ‘cold politics, warm economics’ in China– Japan relations].” For the first point, see the edited volume by two journalists, Wu Xuewen and Zhuo Nansheng, Zhongri guanxi qu shenme wenti [What is the problem in China– Japan relations?]. For a somewhat critical review, see Zhang Wenqing, “Zhongri guanxi daodi chu shenme wenti [What really has gone wrong in China– Japan relations].” 95. The essays were published in Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu [International politics] 99, no. 1 (2006). See also: Wang Jun, “Shixi dangdai zhongguo de wangluo minzuzhuyi [Tentative analysis of contemporary Internet nationalism in China]”; Cui Jianwei and Guan Qingfan, “Minzu zhuyi dui zhongri liangguo guanxi de yingxiang.” 96. Chang Cuidong, “Yulunzhong de zhongri guanxi: zhengjie yu fenxi [Public opinion in China– Japan relations: Obstacles and analysis],” 69. 97. “Zhongri guanxi sanbianhua ji qishi [Three changes and lessons for China– Japan relations],” Shijie Zhishi [World affairs] 24 (2005): 5. 98. See Zhou, “Understanding Chinese Internet Politics.” My appreciation to an anonymous reviewer for reiterating this point. 99. Jiang Ruiping, “Zhongri jingji guanxi de kunjing yu chulu [Difficulties and the route out for China– Japan economic relations].”

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100. In the third quarter of 2005, China– Japan trade grew at a rate of only 10 percent, a drop of 16 percent from the same quarter in 2004. For the first six months of 2006, the number of new Japanese investments in China declined 8.2 percent from the same period the previous year, with contracted FDI down 0.4 percent from the same period in 2004. At the same time, China’s trade with the United States and European Union continued to grow at over 20 percent a year. See Jiang Ruiping, “Difficulties and the Route Out,” 65. 101. Yang Jun, “Zhongri guanxi: Ba jingji de haige jingji [China– Japan relations: Seizing the economy, and the economy],” Nanfengchuang 4 (2006):14–16. 102. For instance, see Feng Zhaokui, “Rethinking ‘Cold Politics, Hot Economics.’ ” 103. Wang Shaopu, “Continue to Seize and Manage China– Japan Relations,” 26; Zhang Tasheng, “Several Thoughts Regarding Long-Term Cooperation Between China and Japan,” 41. 104. “PRC’s Zheng Jingping Says Koizumi Shrine Visit Likely to Hurt Economic Ties,” AFP (October 20, 2005). 105. Feng Zhaokui, “Rethinking ‘Cold Politics, Hot Economics,’ ” 2. 106. Hua Jiaping, “Right-wing Tendencies,” 179. 107. My appreciation to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this broader phenomenon within Chinese political discourse. 108. Based on my discussions with leading participants in the “new thinking” debate. 109. Hunt, The Genesis, 20.

6. THE REBIRTH OF THE PROPAGANDA STATE 1. Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State, 252. 2. Thomson, Easily Led, 7. 3. Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (September 8, 1986):5; cited in: Chan “Guiding Public Opinion,” 552. 4. Lindblom, Politics and Markets, 13. 5. Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun; Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination. 6. For example, propaganda is not emphasized in Posusney and Angrist, Authoritarianism in the Middle East; Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization; Geddes and Zailer, “Sources of Popular Support.” This is particularly surprising given the renewed interest in “persuasion” among international relations scholars. See Crawford, “Homo politicus.” 7. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship; Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System.” 8. Cao Yunwu, “Su Qian: yindaowanglu yulun shijian [Su Qian: Directing the implementation of public opinion supervision],” Nanfang Zhoumou (May 19, 2005):A5. 9. Zhang, “Breaking News, Media Coverage,” 583. 10. Baum, “Political Implications.” 11. Que Zhihong and Qiu Hongjie, “Qianfan jinfa, fengpeng zhengjü—2004 tisu wenhua tizhi gaige [Accelerating cultural system reform in 2004],” Renmin Ribao (January 4, 2005):1.

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12. MacKinnon, “Flatter World and Thicker Walls,” 33. 13. “Regulating Internet News Transmission, Promoting Internet’s Sound Development,” People’s Daily (November 9, 2000):5. 14. On the propaganda system, see: Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System”; Brady, Marketing Dictatorship. On media, see: Shirk, “Changing Media”; Zhang, “Breaking News, Media Coverage”; Chan, “Guiding Public Opinion.” On propaganda campaigns, see: Brady, “The Beijing Olympics”; Zhao, “A State-Led Nationalism.” 15. On the censorship system, see Cheung, “Public Opinion Supervision.” On support for the regime, see: Chen, Popular Political Support; Chen and Shi, “Media Effects”; Kennedy, “Maintaining Popular Support.” 16. One partial exception is Stockmann, “Who Believes Propaganda?” 17. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision; Thornton, “Crisis and Governance,” 110. 18. This discussion reportedly happened on the sidelines of the China– Japan strategic dialogue held in Tokyo on September 21, 2009. Interview with prominent Chinese expert on Japan, Beijing (January 12, 2010). 19. “Wen jiabao yu anbei pusan shouxiang huitan jiu weilai zhongri guanxi fazhan tichu wuge yijian [Wen Jiaobao meets Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, puts forth five suggestions for the future development of Sino-Japanese relations],” Renmin Ribao (9 October 2006):1. 20. “Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao.” 21. “Premier Wen Jiabao’s Masterly Visit to Japan,” Chosun Ilbo (April 16, 2007). 22. Howard W. French, “Letter from China: Wen Reveals Himself as a New Kind of Chinese Leader,” International Herald Tribune (19 April 2007), http://www.iht.com /articles/2007/04/19/asia/letter.php. 23. Hu Jintao, “Zai riben tadaotian daxue de yanjiang [Speech at Waseda University],” Renmin Ribao (9 May 2008):2. 24. Xu Wanqing, “Wu Jianmin: wangmin fandui riben ruchang ke lijie dan xu lixing [Wu Jianmin: Netizens’ opposition to Japan’s entry to UN security council is understandable, but must be reasonable],” China News Web (April 1, 2005). 25. Interview with Japan expert who was asked to give such talks (Beijing, April 17, 2008). 26. Interview, Beijing (April 17, 2008). 27. Liu Zhiming, “The Image of Japan and Other Countries in Chinese TV” (2006), http:// www.jamco.or.jp/2006_symposium/en/002/index.html (accessed May 19, 2007). 28. Qian Xiaoqian, State Council News Office Vice Director, presentation at Beijing– Tokyo Forum (Beijing, August 28, 2007). 29. In May 2005 in a speech at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., Abe (then Secretary-General of the LDP) declared that the next Prime Minister of Japan should continue Koizumi’s tradition of annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. See http://www .brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/events/2abe20050502.pdf. 30. Yu Qing, “Zhizhe xunshi ermou [A wise move to take advantage of the opportunity],” Renmin Ribao (8 October 2006). See also: Chang Yu, “Dapo zhongri guanxi ‘jian bing’- zhuanjia tan riben shouxiang anbei pusan fanghua [Breaking the ‘hard ice’ in China– Japan relations—experts discuss Prime Minister Abe Shizo’s visit to Beijing],” Renmin Ribao (October 5, 2006).

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31. See: http://vsearch.cctv.com/tvls.php?page=2&ln=zh_CN&c=%C8%AB%B2%BF&q= %C8%D5%B1%BE&s=date&mindate=2007–04–01&maxdate=2007–04–10 (accessed February 5, 2009). 32. See, for instance, Cai, “Perspectives Toward the United States.” One excellent case study on newspaper coverage is Yu, “The Role of the Media.” 33. Three top sources of information on Japan: domestic media (91.5%), entertainment (i.e., Chinese television dramas, special TV programs, and movies) (48.6%); and Japanese TV dramas and movies (19.3%). Survey results presented at the 2008 “Beijing– Tokyo Forum,” available (in Japanese) at www.tokyo-beijingforum.net/ (accessed March 2, 2009). 34. See http://vsearch.cctv.com/plgs_play-cctvnewsprog_20070412_164205.html (accessed February 15, 2009). 35. For a list of all CCTV stories on Japan and China– Japan run from April 1 to 11, 2007, see: http://vsearch.cctv.com/tvls.php?page=2&ln=zh_CN&c=%C8%AB%B2%BF&q= %C8%D5%B1%BE&s=date&mindate=2007–04–01&maxdate=2007–04–10 (accessed February 12, 2009). 36. For the speech video, see http://vsearch.cctv.com/plgs_play-CCTVNEWSprog_2007 1228_2634835.html; for the CCTV-1 evening news coverage, see: http://vsearch .cctv.com/plgs_play-cctvcomprog_20071226_2625924.html (accessed February 5, 2009). 37. http://vsearch.cctv.com/plgs_play-cctvcomprog_20071227_2626901.html (accessed February 8, 2009). 38. The video of the interview with Nakasone is at: http://vsearch.cctv.com/tvls .php?page=3&ln=zh_CN&c=%C8%AB%B2%BF&q=%C8%D5%B1%BE&s=date&min date=2007–04–01&maxdate=2007–04–10 (accessed February 9, 2009). 39. See the interview at: http://vsearch.cctv.com/tvls.php?page=2&ln=zh_CN&c=%C8% AB%B2%BF&q=%C8%D5%B1%BE&s=date&mindate=2007 – 04 – 01&max date=2007–04–10 (accessed February 18, 2009). 40. http://vsearch.cctv.com/plgs_play-cctvnewsprog_20070403_162636.html (accessed March 4, 2009). 41. http://vsearch.cctv.com/plgs_play-CCTV2prog_20080511_6261362.html (accessed March 2, 2009). 42. See http://news.cctv.com/china/20061226/102683.shtml. 43. See http://www.cctv.com/news/special/C15905/07/index.shtml. 44. Zhao Liangying, “Zhuiji mofan gongchangyuan Zhang Xu” [Remembering model Party member Zhang Xu],” (March 25, 2009), http://www.hb.xinhuanet.com/hb people/2009–03/25/content_16056634.htm. 45. Zhu Xing, “Ting laobalu chenxifu jiang geming gushi” [Listening to revolutionary stories from old 8th route army member Chen Xifu]” (December 25, 2006), http://www .tianshannet.com/special/content/2006–12/25/content_1535862.htm. 46. Liu Lian, “Kangri mingjiang Li Youbang taibei guju pai [War of Resistance famous general Li Youbang’s ancestral home in Taibei]” (December 10, 2007), http://news.cctv .com/taiwan/20071210/104836.shtml. 47. http://news.cctv.com/science/20071207/109037.shtml.

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48. Personal visit to the museum on April 8, 2009. 49. Li Guanping, “Kangzhan laobing Ji Lin 16sui toushen junyin rudui [An old solider of the war of resistance threw his body into the military camp at 16 years old],” Haikou Wanbao, July 27, 2007, http://www.hainan.gov.cn/data/news/2007/07/35263/. 50. Fan Jing, “Riben qinhua laobing xiezui shandong taian kangri shilingyuan [Former invading Japanese soldier expresses regrets and apologies at the memorial hall to the resistance to Japan in Taian, Shandong province],” (November 11, 2007), http://news .cctv.com/china/20071111/102483.shtml (accessed February 20, 2009). 51. Xiong Puqiu, “Yide baofan: Henan nongmin sandai shouyang riben shangbing [Repaying evil with good: Three generations of Henan farmers care for an injured Japanese soldier],” Zhenzhou Wanbao (August 10, 2006). 52. Xiao Yanni, “Ba yisheng xiangei kaixian de hebei laobing [Dedicating one’s life to a Hebei old soldier from Kai county],” Kaixian Chuanbowang (June 26, 2006), http:// www.cqkx.com/html/200606/26/082000580.htm. 53. http://www.cctv.com/news/special/C15905/20060608/104333.shtml. 54. Yoshimi, “Healing Old Wounds.” 55. Personal visit to the museum in Nanjing (April 8, 2009). 56. Stockmann, “Who Believes Propaganda?” 57. “Zhong-ri guanxi: ‘rongbing’ yixian huichun keqi [China– Japan relations: Ice-melting reveals that the ‘arrival of spring’ is here],” Xinjing Bao (April 13, 2007). 58. “Riben fandao xitong xuezhe ‘liulan’ dingqi zai dongjing zhoubian jide jijian jidong yidong [Japan’s missile defense system fixes the date for ‘roaming’ mobile missiles to be moved around bases near Tokyo],” Xinjing bao (April 11, 2007). 59. Liu Ning, “ ‘Yiri weishi’ zutui zhongguo gaige [‘Japan as a teacher’ helps push forward China’s reforms],” Xinjing Bao (May 7, 2008). 60. “Zhongri guanxi you yi cun [A new opening in China– Japan relations],” Nanfeng chuang (April 1, 2007):28–41. 61. Liu Ding, “Chaoyue ‘zuo’ ‘you’ kan riben [Surpassing ‘right’ and ‘left’ in viewing Japan],” Huanqiu shibao (April 6, 2007). 62. “Riben bacheng minzhong yuan youngfang zhanzheng [Eighty percent of Japanese people wish to forever forgo war],” Huanqiu shibao (April 6, 2007). 63. Geng Xin, “Zhongri guanxi shi erzhi de daguo guanxi? [Are China– Japan relations youthful great power relations?],” Huanqiu shibao (April 11, 2007). 64. The editorial was printed in full in the People’s Daily and then read out on CCTV’s nightly news, a signal of its importance. See http://vsearch.cctv.com/plgs_playcctv comprog_20060815_1468853.html (accessed March 22, 2009). 65. Cao Pengcheng, “Fansi, qianyi [Regrets and apologies],” Renmin Ribao (August 17, 2006). 66. “Xiang yazhou linguo fachu tiaozhan xinghao [Sending a challenge signal to Asian neighbors],” Renmin Ribao (August 16, 2006). 67. Wang Leicui, “Xiaoquan canbai chengmouti jiaodianzhong hanfan yingling shijie guanzhu, riben yinglai mingan yitian [Koizumi’s visit becomes a focus point, China and South Korea opposition makes the world pay attention, Japan should be sensitive for one day],” Huaqiu shibao (August 15, 2006).

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68. “Xiaoquan cunyiliang de jinshen shijie [Koizumi Junichiro’s spirit world],” Huanqiu shibao (August 16, 2006). 69. Lei Zhining, “Jingxi riben ba canbai dang chouma [Beware of Japan using the visit as a bargaining chip],” Huanqiu shibao (August 15, 2006). 70. Abe told reporters, “The fact is that there is no evidence to prove there was coercion as initially defined.” Asked if the lack of evidence might suggest a review of the 1997 Kono Statement, which had acknowledged the existence of coercion, Abe replied: “We need to consider that possibility on the premise that the definition of coercion has changed.” Przystup, “New Year, Old Problems,” 4. 71. “Abe Shinzo’s Double Talk,” Washington Post (March 24, 2007). 72. “Denial Reopens Wounds of Japan’s Ex-Sex Slaves,” New York Times (March 8, 2007). 73. Jiang An, “Zhengzhijia qing jingyan zhenxing [Politicians, please speak and act with caution],” Renmin Ribao (March 10, 2007). 74. Wu Gufeng, “Riben zhongshen chengren ‘Heyetanyua’ lichang [Japan reaffirms the stance of the ‘Muruyama statement’],” Renmin Ribao (March 13, 2007). 75. http://vsearch.cctv.com/tvls.php?page=&ln=zh_CN&c=%C8%AB%B2%BF&q=%C8%D 5%B1%BE&s=date&mindate=2007–03–09&maxdate=2007–03–11 (accessed March 18, 2009). 76. “Fanshen lishi, riben weihe bi deguo nan? [Why is expressing regret for the past more difficult for Japan than Germany?],” Huanqiu shibao (March 27, 2007). 77. Xu Lina, “Fenghuang weishi junshi pinglunyuan kaijiang yingjin kuai zhengli weianfu zhuanmen dan’an [Phoenix TV military affairs commentator declares that the special records on the comfort women should be quickly organized],” Nanfang Dushibao (March 10, 2007). 78. “Meiguo: riben ying ‘tanbai’ renzui [United States: Japan should ‘forthrightly’ admit its crimes)],” Nanfang Dushibao (March 28, 2007). 79. Wang Bing, “Yong jinian qu kaikuo weilai [Use memories to open the future],” Renmin Ribao (December 13, 2007). 80. “Zeng Qinghong huijian riben ximindang qian shizhang [Zeng Qinghong meets previous LDP leader],” Renmin Ribao (December 13, 2007). 81. http://vsearch.cctv.com/plgs_play-cctvcomprog_20071213_2576083.html (accessed March 1, 2009). 82. For the official warnings, see Przystup, “Wen in Japan,” 136. 83. The distribution was as follows: Beijing Youth News: 2; Global Times: 5; Southern Metropolitan News: 16; Beijing News: 8; Xinmin Evening News: 7. 84. “70 Nian buneng wangqu de jinian [Unforgettable 70-year-old memories],” Beijing Qingnian Bao (December 13, 2007). 85. Yu Qing, “Shijie renqing lishi zhenxiang riben xu yongyu peihe jiean [The world directly faces the truth of history but needs Japan’s cooperation to close the case],” Huanqiu Shibao [Global times] (December 13, 2007). 86. Lu Xiaozhao, “Shoushao baonian Nanjing datusha: foshan liuzhong xuesheng zili Nanjing datusha zhuti shouchabiao [Random survey report on Nanjing Massacre: A spontaneous survey conducted by the middle school students at Foshan number 6 middle

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87. 88. 89.

90.

91.

92. 93. 94.

95. 96.

97.

98.

99.

100.

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school],” Nanfang Dushibao (December 14, 2007). For a discussion of this concept’s historical role in Chinese nationalism, see Callahan, “History, Identity, and Security.” Interview with journalist in Beijing (April 9, 2007). Interview, Oxford (November 21, 2008). The 2007 and 2008 results are available (in Japanese) from www.tokyo-beijingforum .net/ (accessed November 24, 2008). Additional annual survey reports (unpublished) were provided directly to the author. In the 2008 Beijing–Tokyo poll, 46.7% of university students reported that among Chinese media, the Internet was their main source of information on Japan, followed by television (35.3%) and then newspapers (12.5%). In the 2008 poll, 54.1% of respondents agreed that media freedom and state controls coexist in China, 13.2% felt that the Chinese media is not controlled and that freedom of expression and reporting is protected, and 12.5% felt that the Chinese media is tightly controlled, without freedom of expression or reporting. In another question, 72.3% felt the Chinese media is objective in reporting on China– Japan relations. Only 9% of respondents in 2008 chose “Japanese media” as one of the first three sources for information on Japan. For example, see the CCTV-News program on April 3, 2007, http://vsearch.cctv.com /plgs_play-cctvnewsprog_20070403_162636.html (accessed March 7, 2009). Respondents who said they wanted to go to Japan increased slightly: 2006 = 33.5%; 2007 = 36.3; 2008 = 39.3%. In 2008, the primary reasons they gave for not going were language barriers (61%) and “too expensive” (45.4%). A vast majority of Chinese university students in 2008 also agreed that relations had improved: 76.2%, an increase of 26.6% over 2007. The 2008 findings among Chinese university students were similar to those among the public, except that 70.6% of students chose “territorial disputes” as a major obstacle, while only 33.6% of the general public did. Those who felt the two sides should increase cooperation went from 16.8% in 2007 up to 59.9% in 2008; while those who felt that “China should protect its own natural resources” dropped from 51.3% in 2007 to 15.5% in 2008. In 2006, 6.9% of respondents said that China should support Japan’s efforts to gain a UNSC seat, while 27.7% said they supported it if certain conditions were met. In 2007, these figures rose to 11.1% unconditional support and 32.7% conditional support. In the May 2005 poll, 17% of respondents reported favorable views of Japan; 76% reported unfavorable views. The May 2008 polls found 21% favorable; 69% unfavorable. “24-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey,” Pew Research Center Report (June 12, 2008):96. Horizon conducted the survey in spring of each year. In June 2007, they conducted a stratified random sample survey in 10 cities across China, with personal interviews of individuals in their homes, identifying respondents based upon residence records. They reported the polls have a 95% confidence level, with an error level of ±1.1%. See report at http://www.horizonkey.com/showart.asp?art_id=759&cat_id=6 (accessed February 3, 2009).

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101. News reports said the poll was conducted via random sampling of 1,286 people aged 20 or older, urban residents, from July 11 to 16, 2008, giving valid answers. “Only 36% Say China Relations Good, but 67% of Chinese Judge Links as Positive,” Yomiuri Shimbun (August 4, 2008). 102. “The rational requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count on the support of a public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational.” Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 558. 103. See, for instance, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site on relations with China: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/index.html (accessed August 12, 2009). 104. Reported by the Chinese Federation of the Defenders of the Diaoyu Islands on their Web site: www.china918.cn/forum.asp (April 23, 2007) (accessed May 5, 2007). 105. Huang Wenwei, “Zhongri bufen jieji di 60ge 8–15 [Several Chinese and Japanese focus on the 60th 8–15],” Riben xinhuaqiao bao, http://www.jnocnews.jp/news/show .aspx?id=10012 (accessed April 2, 2009). 106. Willy Lam, “Wen Jiabao Softly, Softly Approaches Japan,” Asia Sentinel (April 16, 2007). 107. Kenji Minemura, “Activists in China Find it Harder to Stage Anti-Japan Protests,” Asahi Shimbun (December 13, 2007). 108. Huang Wenwei, “Several Chinese and Japanese Focus.” 109. “Shanghai gou 42 fanri xianweizhe [Shanghai arrests 42 anti-Japanese protesters],” Ming Pao (August 29, 2007). 110. See the reports at http://juele.org/jueleblog/article.asp?id=166 (accessed December 12, 2008). 111. The warning is available online at http://www.cfdd.org.cn/bbs/viewthread.php? tid=58445 (accessed February 4, 2010). 112. Interview (Beijing, June 4, 2008). 113. Minjian duiri tousu yujian kunjing [Civil lawsuits in Japan encounter difficulties],” Nanfang Xinwenwang (May 17, 2007), http://news.163.com/07/0517/08/3EMCMDRU 0001124J.html (accessed June 28, 2009). 114. For background, see the report in Nanfang Zhoumou [Southern weekend] (May 17, 2007); and Wang Xuan’s appearance on “Phoenix Satellite TV” on July 27, 2007, available at http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_cd00XNjY5NjUyOA==.html (accessed May 15, 2009). 115. “Erzhan shouxin cunzhe shouzu huodong zhengshi qidong [Humanitarian programs for the survivors of World War II atrocities commence],” Xinhua wang (June 10, 2007). 116. “Zhongguo minjian duiri supei lianhehui huizhang: rang erzhan shouxin cunzhe anning wannian shi danwu zhiji [The chairman of China’s civil society campaign for compensation from Japan: Letting World War II atrocity survivors have a peaceful old age is a pressing duty],” Xinhua wang (July 8, 2007). 117. Shen Tao, “Contemporary Chinese Internet Nationalism,” 36. 118. Comments posted on “China– Japan Forum,” http://bbs.people.com.cn/postDetail .do?view=1&id=1653714&bid=13 (accessed December 20, 2009). 119. “Jiandan de chouhen rang women wuluele riben de ‘kepa’ [Simplistic hatred makes us overlook Japan’s ‘fear’],” Zhongguo qingnian bao (July 20, 2007).

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120. Interview (Beijing, July 20, 2007). 121. His posting is available at http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/pubvp/2009/03/2009 03121626.shtml (accessed February 4, 2010). 122. “OSC Analysis: China–Japan.” The postings were quickly removed. 123. For the comments, see http://comment.news.163.com/news_guonei7_bbs/4E3ER9 QA0001124J.html. For the China– Japan Forum debates, see http://bbs.people.com.cn /boardList.do?action=hotClick&boardId=13 (both accessed November 15, 2008). 124. “Xiwang Zhongguo zhengfu buyao chengwei wanqing zhengfu [Hope Beijing is not the government of the late Qing dynasty],” posted at Zaobao Web site on July 9, 2007 (no longer available); cited in Shen and Cheung, “Reshaping Chinese Nationalism.” 125. “Rixiu jiaokeshu ‘lingtu yu lishi’ yuexiu yuemu [Japan revises textbooks, ‘territory and history’—the more they revise, the more erroneous they become],” Xinhua wang (March 31, 2006). 126. “Ri gaozhong jiaokeshu yiran ‘miwu zhongzhong’ zhengfu yingai zhengshi lishi [Japan’s high school textbooks are as stuck in a ‘dense fog’ as before—the government should correctly face history],” Zhongguo xinwen wang (April 3, 2007). 127. Reported on Xinhua.net on December 13, 2007, http://world.people.com.cn/GB /14549/6650694.html (accessed December 12, 2008). 128. “Feng Jihua: Banian shijian, yige ren biangcheng yi xianren [Feng Jinhua: In eight years, one person becomes a crowd],” Nanfang renwu zhoukan (April 11, 2008). 129. Wang Jinsi, Riben xing; zhonggo geng xing [Japan is fine; China is even better]. This quote is available from the online version at http://data.book.163.com/book /section/0000JbFe/0000JbFe8.html (accessed September 7, 2010). See also Shogo Suzuki, “Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese Relations: Prospects for Desecuritising the ‘Victimised China’ Among Chinese Nationalist Activists,” paper presented at IARU International Security Conference, Sydney, Australia, April 2008. 130. Interview (Beijing, June 4, 2008). 131. Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking,’ ” 847, 849–850. 132. Hu Jintao, “Zai renmin ribao kaocha gongzuoshi de jianghua [Hu Jintao’s speech while inspecting the work at People’s Daily],” Xinhua (June 20, 2008).

CONCLUSION 1. Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 107–108 2. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 13. 3. On the EP-3 incident, see: Valencia and Li, “The ‘North Korean’ Ship”; Slingerland et al., “Collision with China.” 4. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 14. 5. Gries, “Tears of Rage,” 26. 6. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 129n52. 7. For examples, see Li and Qin, “Who is Setting the Chinese Agenda,” 156–169. 8. Jiefangun Bao [People’s Liberation Army daily] (April 24, 2001):1, cited in Shen, “Holding Nationalist Flags,” 245.

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9. The People’s Daily reported a fivefold increase of visits to their Web site. See People’s Daily (April 14, 2001):5, cited in Shen, “Holding Nationalist Flags,” 245. 10. Shen, “Holding Nationalist Flags,” 246. 11. Hong Kong AFP (April 4, 2001). 12. Quoted in Shen, “Holding Nationalist Flags,” 234 n. 35. 13. Yu and Chen, “Sino-American Relations,” 42. 14. Fewsmith and Rosen, “The Domestic Context,” 69. 15. Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 157–174. 16. Much of the following discussion draws from Liang, “China’s WTO Negotiation Process,” esp. 709–711. 17. Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 210. For a similar finding, see Wei Liang, “China’s WTO Negotiation Process.” 18. Wei Liang, “China’s WTO Negotiation Process,” 718. 19. Ma Licheng, “Duiri guanxi xinsiwei [New thinking on relations with Japan],” 45–46. 20. Pearson, “The Case of China’s Accession,” 369. 21. Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 213, 232. 22. Yee, “Semantic Ambiguity.” 23. See the comments by Kenneth Lieberthal, Minxin Pei, Yasheng Huang,and Douglas Paal in April 2001, as cited in Yee, “Semantic Ambiguity,” 59. 24. Li, “ICT and the Demise of Propaganda in China.” 25. All quotes from Washington Post (April 4, 2001). For a similar argument pointing to the importance of public opinion as a constraint on Beijing, see James Mulvenon, “Civil-Military Relations and the EP-3 Crisis,” China Leadership Monitor 1, no. 1 (September 2001): 4–5. 26. Yee, “Semantic Ambiguity,” 77. 27. Yee, “Semantic Ambiguity,” 79. 28. Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (April 11, 2001), cited in Yee, “Semantic Ambiguity,” 79. 29. Zhao, “An Angle on Nationalism,” 887. 30. Zhao, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism,” 143. 31. “Hu Jintao’s Speech on NATO Attack,” http://www.people.com.cn/english/199905/10/ enc_990510001002_TopNews.html (accessed September 20, 2007). Emphasis added. 32. Yang, The Power of the Internet. 33. China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), “Di 24 ci zhongguo hulianwang gei fazhang qingkuang tongji baogao [Report on the effect of the Internet on China’s development],” (December 22, 2009), http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026 /10629707.html (accessed March 15, 2010). Emphasis added. 34. Ibid. The Shishou riots in Hubei province on June 19–21, 2009 were the result of dubious circumstances surrounding the death of a 24-year-old local chef. Although local police claimed his death was a suicide, accounts differ on what really occurred. Crowds were angered by what they alleged to be cronyism, illegal drug trafficking, and lack of transparency from the city’s top officials. Protesters clashed with police, and violence escalated into a mass riot involving thousands of individuals and police officers. For the official account, see the China Daily report at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn /cndy/2009–06/22/content_8306438.htm.

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35. Peter Ford, “China’s Virtual Vigilates: Civic Action or Cyber Mobs,” The Christian Science Monitor (December 2, 2008). 36. “Web Users Fault China’s Baidu,” The Wall Street Journal (September 28, 2008). For a listing of a number of similar instances, see “Sanui wangmin beijingxia de ‘zhuliu yulun chang’ [‘Mainstream public opinion forum’ in an environment with 300 million netizens],” Lioawang xinwen zhoukan (January 19, 2009). 37. See Lorentzen, “Regularized Rioting.” 38. “CPC Publicizes Party’s Five-Year Anticorruption Plan,” Xinhua (June 23, 2008), http:// en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18141. 39. Fewsmith, “An ‘Anger-Venting’ Mass Incident.” 40. Yu Jianrong, “Zhongguo saoluan shijian yu guanzhi weiji [Unrest incidents and governance crisis in China],” Zhongguo xuanju yu zhili (October 30, 2007), cited in Fewsmith, “An Anger-Venting Mass Incident.” 41. For these debates, see: “2009 Nianchu becheng xiantixing shijian gaofanian chuli fenshou jidaibawo [2009 is declared the peak year for mass incidents; respond with discretion, and urgently seize the issue],” Xinhua (January 5, 2009), http://news .xinhuanet.com/politics/2009–01/05/content_10605345.htm; Dan Guangnai, “ ‘Sanbu’ shi weili bimian baoli [‘Taking a walk’ in order to avoid violence],” http://www.infzm .com/content/22872/0. For an official response, see “Meng Jianzhu: shenru xuexi shixian kexue fazhanguan zuo dang de zongcheng weishi [Meng Jianzhu: Deeply study how to achieve scientific development; serve as the Party’s loyal defender]” (November 2, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008–11/02/content_10294388.htm. (All accessed June 10–12, 2010.) 42. Noted in “Protests Grow Violent, Even Deadly, as Citizens Lose Homes to Development,” Associated Press (December 16, 2009). 43. Nanfang Dushi Bao (March 11, 2010). 44. Zhou Yongkang, “Daizhe duirenmin de shenhou ganqing zuohao xinfang gongzuo [Carry a deep feeling toward the sentiments of the people; fully implement the work of letters and visits],” Xinhuawang (January 25, 2010), http://cpc.people.com.cn /GB/64093/64094/10841458.html. 45. Coverage by China Central TV (CCTV-1), March 5, 2010. 46. Clifford Coonan, “Crusading Editor Fights New War on Censorship,” The Independent (January 13, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/crusading-editor -fights-new-war-on-censorship-1866131.html (accessed April 2, 2010). 47. Jennifer Haskell, “Press Freedom Contradictions and the Trend Towards Transparency” (July 2, 2008), http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18278. 48. The hukou editorial followed the model used in 2009, when the Economic Observer [ jingji guanchabao] joined with the British newspaper The Guardian in a joint editorial on climate change that was published by 56 media outlets. 49. See http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100309/BCH182059.asp. An English translation is available at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/03/09/i-am-a-moderate-adviser/. 50. South China Morning Post (March 6, 2010):4. See also “Quanguo fanweine shixing juzhuzheng zhidu, huibuui ‘huantang buhuan yao’? [Will the implementation of the

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51. 52.

53. 54. 55.

56.

57.

58.

59. 60.

61. 62.

63.

Conclusion

national residence permit system be a case of ‘changing the soup but not the medicine’?],” Nanfang Ribao [Southern daily] (June 6, 2010). “China Web Users Turn Keen Eye Back on Government,” Reuters (March 31, 2009). Yasheng Huang, “Why Google Should Stay in China,” Washington Post (March 28, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/26/AR20100 32603133.html (accessed April 2, 2010). Jerome Cohen and Oliver Zhong, “The People’s Will: Public Sentiment Can Play a Dangerous Role in Mainland Justice,” South China Morning Post (February 3, 2010). Huang, “Why Google Should Stay.” Sun Tianfu, “Huan gaige youyuzheng, dacheng xiaofeizhe fandui feichu qiannian shiyan zhuanying zh” [Suffering from reform angst, 60% of consumers oppose abolishing the age-old salt monopoly].” The article was originally published in Toyo Keizai (January 1, 2010), then translated by the author into Chinese and posted at http://blog .caijing.com.cn/expert_article-151187–2700.shtml. Li Shu, “Cong chuanboxue de jiaodu laijiang, hulianwang yichengwei dangdai zhongguo de zhuliu meiti, [From the perspective of communication studies, the Internet has already become mainstream media in China],” Liaowang (January 19, 2009), http:// news.sina.com.cn/c/2009–01–19/092317073885.shtml (accessed January 12, 2010). Li Jingrui, “Zuanjia cheng Hu Jintao yu wangmin jiaoliu kending wangluo minyi hefaxing” [Experts declare that Hu Jintao’s online chats with netizens reafirm the legality of online public opinion],” Xinjing Bao (June 22, 2008), http://news.sina.com .cn/c/2008–06–22/032615791158.shtml. Wu Jimei, “Hu Jintao kaocha renmin ribao gongzuo yu wangmin zaixian jiaoliu [Hu Jintao inspects the work of the People’s Daily and chats online with netizens],” Xinhuawang (June 21, 2008), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008–06–21/002515786370.shtml (accessed April 3, 2010). On a similar note, see Bao Jian, “Dangdaibiao lianxi cunzhong ‘ling juli’ [Party representatives connect with the people in ‘zero distance’],” Renmin Ribao [People’s daily] (May 18, 2010). Posted by China Digital Times, http://tinyurl.com/yj3yfx2 (http://chinadigitaltimes .net/2010/02/how-many-information-agents/). “Internal Document of the Domestic Security Department of the Public Security: Follow the Path of Staying Close to the Masses; Strengthen the Foundation of the Domestic Security Department,” http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/01/internal-document-of -the-domestic-security-department-of-the-public-security-bureau-part-i/. Edward Wong, “In Latest Upheaval, China Applies New Strategies to Control Flow of Information,” The New York Times (July 8, 2009). See, for instance: Michael Wines, “A Dirty Pun Tweaks China’s Online Censors,” The New York Times (March 11, 2009); Juliet Ye and Geoffrey A. Fowler, “Chinese Bloggers Scale the ‘Great Firewall’ in Riot’s Aftermath,” The Wall Street Journal (July 2, 2008). For a useful review of recent interactions, see this special edition: “China’s Internet: Staking Digital Ground,” China Rights Forum 2 (2010). The 2010 Internet White Paper is available online at http://china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm (accessed August 4, 2010).

Appendix 2

289

APPENDIX 2 1. Nie Ligao, “China–Japan Relationship ‘Warming Up’—Survey,” China Daily (September 9, 2008). 2. From 2007 to 2008, there was an increase of 23% in respondents who felt China and Japan economic relations were becoming more complementary, and a decline of 7.6% of those who felt that economic competition was growing stronger, even though a greater number of respondents expected Japan’s economic influence to increase. Yet there was also an increase in the percentage of the public that identified Japan as a threat to China (from 41.2% in 2007 to 48.1% in 2008, a rise of 6.9%). 3. Descriptions of Japan’s political system in the 2008 polls were: “militarism” (58.9%, up 8.4%), “nationalism” (35.6%, up 2.9%), “great power chauvinism” (30%, up 10%); “pacifism” (8.1%), “international cooperation” (8.6%), and “democracy” (13.7%). 4. The 2008 findings among Chinese university students were similar to the public, except that 70.6% of students chose “territorial disputes” as a major obstacle, while only 33.6% of the general public did. 5. Lews, Constructing Public Opinion. 6. For instance, in 2008, 87% of respondents agreed that relations are “relatively or very important,” while only 2% felt that relations with Japan were unimportant.

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INDEX

Note: Italic page numbers refer to figures and tables. Abe Shinzo: and China–Japan relations, 175, 176, 182, 184; and media coverage, 185, 193, 282n70; and public opinion of Japan, 196, 198, 199; and Yasukuni Shrine, 279n29 Academy of Military Science, 186 Africa, 2 Aichi Exposition, 150 Albrecht, Holger, 13 Algeria, 14 Alliance of Patriots Web site, 32, 99, 111, 136, 137, 256n44 Allport, Floyd, 23 Almond, Gabriel, 28 Aminzade, Ron, 31 Anderson, Benedict, 111 Anderson, Lisa, 13 Annan, Kofi, 112, 151

anti-Japan activism: and China’s Japan policy, 60–61; and diplomacy, 75, 112–13, 154, 209; discouragement of, 2, 3, 4, 72, 182, 183, 202, 203; and elite-level policy discourse, 42–43, 57, 60, 76, 159, 164, 171–73, 175–76, 209; and Japan’s revision of history textbooks, 65; and media coverage, 192; and online petitions, 111, 127; origins of, 17; and public debates, 176–77; and public opinion of Japan, 200, 210; and student protests, 70–72, 74–75, 76; tolerance of, 42–43, 44, 100 Anti-Secession Law, 270n142 Asahi Shimbun, 84, 86 Asian financial crisis of 1996–97, 161 authoritarian states: control of foreign policy, 7, 9, 14; defining, 13; democracies compared to, 34, 37; and

316 authoritarian states (continued) democratization theories, 9–10; leaders’ legitimacy crises, 6; military regimes compared to party-based regimes, 9; and propaganda, 4, 20–21, 127, 179–80, 278n6; public opinion in, 1, 2, 3–4, 21, 25, 27, 28, 209; reforming regimes, 6, 7; response to populism, 127. See also responsive authoritarianism Bachrach, Peter, 46 Baratz, Morton, 46 Baum, Matthew A., 33 Baum, Richard, 10 Beijing Area Survey, 121, 122, 260n117 Beijing Communist Youth League, 33 Beijing Conference on Women, 109 Beijing News, 191, 193 Beijing Olympics, 4, 8, 51, 214, 216, 227 Beijing–Tokyo Forum, 195, 229, 233, 235 Beijing University, 8, 70–71, 241n25 Beijing Youth Daily, 33, 115, 142 Beijing Youth News, 136, 142, 194 Belgrade embassy bombing of May 1999, 8, 42, 176, 213, 214–16, 218, 219–20 Berelson, Bernard, 27–28 Bingdian, 242n59 Bo Xilai, 82, 175 Bo, Yibo, 43, 61, 74 Bourdieu, Pierre, 23, 29, 240n9 Brady, Anne-Marie, 51 Brezhnev, Leonid, 10 Brownlee, Jason, 13 Burma, 2, 208 Burns, John, 240n10 Bush, George H. W., 71 Bush, George W., 218 Caijing, 223 Callahan, William, 19–20 censorship: and China–Japan relations, 2, 3; effectiveness of, 180; of Internet, 40, 180, 182, 183, 201, 202, 203, 221, 226, 227; of

Index

media coverage, 40, 53, 182, 201, 227; as negative propaganda, 51; and partystate’s authority, 1; of protest movements, 40, 51, 225; and public emotion, 40; and public mobilization, 177 Central Asia, 2 Central Military Commission, 61 Central Propaganda Department (CPD): and China’s high-speed rail line, 136; and Chinese nationalism, 38; and Diaoyu Islands incident of 2004, 146; and English translation of “propaganda,” 242n55; and history issues, 186, 194; and media coverage, 33, 114, 115, 194; and political mummification, 51; and tolerance, 44; and World War II anniversary, 68 Chang, Cuidong, 174 Charter ’08 petition, 227 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 91, 93–94, 96, 140, 265n78 Chen, An, 12 Chen Guowei, 225 Chen, Jie, 38 Chen, Lidan, 51 Chen Shuibian, 118 Chen Xifu, 186 Chen Yun, 43, 61, 62–63, 74 Chen Yunfang, 106 Cheng Yonghua, 137 Cheung, Anne S. Y., 34 Chiang Kai-shek, 58, 71, 187, 255n15 Chi Haotian, 79, 133 Childs, Harwood, 23 China: domestic politics of, 19, 220–26; Japan policy, 7, 19, 56, 60–61, 62, 67, 71, 72, 75, 81, 97, 131, 160, 164, 173, 175, 176, 177, 181, 200, 225; nuclear testing of, 77, 84, 85, 87, 160, 162, 176; prospects for democratic transition, 6, 9–12. See also diplomacy; legitimacy claims; rhetoric China918 Web site, 111, 257n61

Index China Center for International Studies, 160 China Central Television (CCTV), and propaganda, 184–88, 193, 194, 281n64 China Contemporary Center of International Studies, 162 China Daily, 148, 195, 233, 234, 235, 268n110 China Foreign Affairs College, 174 China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), 161, 218 China–Japan Friendship Committee, 67, 69, 70, 73 China–Japan Joint Statement of 1972, 79, 131 China–Japan relations: and China’s high-speed rail line, 135–40, 154–55, 169–70, 174, 264n61; and China’s Japan policy, 7, 19, 56, 60–61, 62, 67, 71, 72, 75, 81, 97, 131, 160, 164, 173, 175, 176, 177, 181, 200, 225; and Chinese nationalism, 16–17, 58, 59, 75, 89, 97, 173; and cooperation, 164, 165, 166, 200; and Diaoyu Islands incident of 2004, 130, 145–48; and economic ties, 57, 60, 62–63, 66–67, 69, 70, 71, 72–73, 74, 75–79, 81, 84–87, 90, 97, 135, 149, 154, 160, 161–63, 166, 167, 174, 175, 191, 249n103, 277–78n99, 289n2; “Five Principles,” 77, 153, 249n114; historical context of, 21, 55, 57–58; and history issues, 43, 47, 48, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64–67, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77–78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 87, 96, 118, 160–63, 164, 166, 170, 171, 174, 177, 182–83, 248n69, 250n121, 250n124, 251n142; and international relations (IR) think tanks, 17; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 32, 46, 57, 81, 84, 91–96, 92–93, 97, 100, 130, 140–45, 155, 202–3, 250n124, 253n200, 253n206, 265nn76–78, 266n80, 266n89, 267n94, 267n96, 268n107, 268n109; and Japan’s “Three All” policies, 60, 246n14; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 148, 151–52, 153; and Japan–U.S.

317

relations, 56, 62, 63, 81, 88, 161; normalization of, 62, 74, 95, 111, 258n74; and “perpetual conflict,” 5; and propaganda, 189–95, 190, 208; and public mobilization, 2, 44, 46–47, 49, 52, 131, 154, 164, 208; and public opinion of Japan, 2, 5, 7, 15, 17, 60, 84, 97, 159, 177, 199, 201, 235–36, 283n95; and public support for policy approach, 5; and reconciliation, 17; security dialogues, 82, 83; and shallow reconciliation, 60; and South Korea, 57, 163, 182; and Soviet Union, 55, 59, 63; stability in, 5, 7, 149, 159, 177, 182; and strategic engagement, 77–84, 97, 131–32, 161, 162, 163, 176, 177, 182, 183, 250n137, 251n140, 279n18; and Taiwan, 57, 58, 62, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 134, 148, 149, 150, 154, 160, 161, 168, 176, 249n102; and threat perception of Japan, 164, 274n38; three principles of, 63, 150. See also diplomacy China Labor Bulletin, 151–52 China Salt Industry Corporation, 225 China–U.S. relations: case studies of, 19, 21; and Internet, 47, 213, 215, 216, 217; and public mobilization, 50, 213–14; and public opinion, 213–20; and state–society interactions, 208 China Youth Daily, 71, 119, 143, 169, 242n59 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 10, 121–23, 126, 143, 160–61, 171, 194, 221, 261n128 Chinese Civilian Union for Defending the Diaoyutai Islands, 90 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule: and China–Japan relations, 57–59; and Chinese nationalism, 4, 38; and corruption, 222, 224; eclectic governing strategy of, 11–12; and media coverage, 3, 33, 114, 120; and new authoritarianism argument, 103; and patriotic education campaign, 102, 103–4; and polls, 29, 129;

318 Chinese Communist Party rule (continued) and post–Mao era, 5–6, 12, 26, 42, 157; propaganda capacity of, 4, 180, 181, 189, 191–92, 195, 206, 210–11; and public debates, 158; and public mobilization, 24, 25, 101; response to liberalization, 62, 66, 207–8, 227–28; response to nationalist protests, 8, 24–25; responsive authoritarianism of, 1–2, 11–12, 15, 129–30; stability of, 21; weakness of, 10–11, 24, 25. See also state–society interactions Chinese foreign policy: and Diaoyu Islands incident of 2004, 130, 145–48; and hands-tying strategy, 43–44, 209; and high-speed rail line, 130, 134–40, 263n29; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 130, 140–45, 265nn76–77; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 130; lack of aggressiveness in, 6–9, 25; and Mao Zedong, 157; and negotiations, 43, 46, 50–51, 52, 131; partnerships, 77, 78, 131, 132; pragmatism of, 31, 61, 89, 100, 101, 105, 106, 108, 109, 145, 159, 168, 178, 219; and public mobilization, 2–3, 19, 21, 45, 47, 49, 50, 131, 209, 213; public opinion’s influence on, 2, 3, 4–5, 6, 8, 12, 15–17, 36–37, 40, 45–46, 47, 53, 56, 96, 130–31, 155, 157–58, 178, 209, 211; and strategic engagement, 77–84, 161, 162, 163; and think tanks, 157 Chinese nationalism: and China–Japan relations, 16–17, 58, 59, 75, 89, 97, 173; and Chinese Communist Party’s authority, 4, 38; and Chinese foreign policy, 7–8, 15, 16–17, 39, 56; and Diaoyu Islands incident of 2004, 148, 270n138; and Internet use, 119; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 154; and legitimacy claims, 37–38, 39, 41; and media coverage, 33, 114, 116, 118; and online petitions, 113; and patriotic education campaign, 105; promoting nationalist

Index

myths, 6; and public debates, 169–70, 171, 209; and public opinion of Japan, 6; and state–society interactions, 101, 210; and temporary influence of protests, 9 Chinese People’s Consultative Committee (CPCC), 108–9 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 111 Chinese Women’s Federation, 109 Chonqing Times, 224 Christensen, Thomas J., 15, 84 Chu Shulong, 218 Clinton, Bill, 80, 217 Cohen, Bernard, 32 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 85 Conference of Disarmament (CD), 91 Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith), 179 Converse, Phillip, 28 core interests (hexin liyi), 41 cost-benefit calculations, 48, 50, 53 Cox Report, 214 Cuba, 2 Cultural Revolution, 25, 61 cycles of contention, 30–31 Dahl, Robert, 39 Dai Bingguo, 182 Dalai Lama, 227 December 9th movement, 72 democracies: authoritarian states compared to, 34, 37; and policy debates, 158; and propaganda, 180, 210; and public opinion polling, 36, 37; and public opinion’s influence on foreign policy, 3–4, 25, 43, 44, 45, 210; role of media in, 32, 34 democratization: liberalization without, 207; and nongovernmental organizations, 10, 11, 127; prospects for China’s democratization, 6, 9–12, 227–28; responsiveness as alternative to, 129–30; third wave of, 2

Index Deng Xiaoping: and China–Japan relations, 62, 72–73, 76, 135; and Diaoyu Islands, 88–89; and history issues, 60, 62, 66, 69, 74, 76; reforms of, 60, 61–63, 66, 71, 72–73, 247n49 Deng Yujiao, 224 “de Tocqueville effect,” 10, 40 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: dispute of 1996, 77, 90, 91, 176; and dispute of 1997, 79, 249n116; disputes over, 77, 79, 88–91, 97, 145, 154, 204, 249n116; and elitelevel policy discourse, 274n37; incident of 2004, 43–44, 46, 57, 130, 145–48; and Japan’s control of lighthouse, 148, 149; media coverage of, 120, 146, 147, 148, 269n129; and propaganda, 184, 203; and protest movements, 89–91, 97, 110, 147, 155, 257nn57–58; and Taiwan, 88, 89–90, 145, 270n142; and Territorial Waters Law, 249n102 Dickson, Bruce, 11 diplomacy: and anti-Japan activism, 75, 112–13, 154, 209; and China–U.S. relations, 215, 216; and engagement strategy, 182, 183, 184–85, 191, 203, 205, 212, 235; and five-point proposal, 182; and history issues, 56, 59, 62; and Japan’s revision of history textbooks, 64; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 148, 149, 150; and leaders’ summits, 182, 199, 200; and political activism, 201; and propaganda, 3, 114–15, 181, 183, 184–85, 205, 209, 212; and public debates, 170, 176; and public mobilization, 2, 26, 46, 70, 90, 130, 154, 155; and public opinion, 7, 8, 60, 262n9; and public opinion of Japan, 97, 147; “smile diplomacy,” 81–82, 132, 177 Downs, Erica Strecker, 90 East China Sea region: and Diaoyu Islands, 88; and elite-level policy discourse, 174, 274n37; fishing zones, 46; natural gas

319

deposits, 46–47; and protest demonstrations, 270n138 Eastern Europe, 9 Easton, David, 37 Economic Observer, 223–24, 287n48 Education–Propaganda system, 41 Egypt, 12–15 elite-level policy discourse: and anti-Japan activism, 42–43, 57, 60, 76, 159, 164, 171–73, 175–76, 209; and China–U.S. relations, 213, 214, 217; and cooperation with Japan, 164, 165, 166; and criticism of Japan, 173–74; and economic growth, 60, 61–63, 67, 71; and history issues, 159, 160–63, 164, 166–67, 168, 173, 174, 175, 176, 274n37; and Japan’s revision of history textbooks, 66; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 154; and mass incidents, 222–23; and media coverage, 33, 159, 209; and moderation, 171–75, 176, 177, 211–12; and “new thinking” debate, 48, 159, 160, 161, 167–71, 172, 173, 174–75, 177, 275n57; and propaganda, 184, 211; and protest movements, 74–75; and public debates, 47–48, 158–59, 178, 211–12, 220; and public mobilization, 3, 21, 26, 130, 131–34, 211; and threat perceptions of Japan, 164, 165 embedded activism, 30 EP-3E Aries, 176, 214, 215, 216, 217–18 Falklands War, 6 Feng Jinhua, 32, 99, 111, 169, 204, 254n2 Feng, Zhaokui, 48–49, 133, 166, 175 Fewsmith, Joseph, 11–12, 16, 42, 47, 133, 214, 216, 217 First Sino-Japanese War, 57 Foreign Affairs University, 162 Four Generations Under One Roof (television series), 67 fragile state, 7, 21, 56, 210 France, 138, 265n66

320 Freedom House, 13, 239n48 Friedman, Edward, 7 Fukuda Takeo, 68, 135 Fukuda Yasuo, 141, 185 Funabashi Yoichi, 86 Gallup, George, 28 Ge, Yanfeng, 48 Germany, 134–35, 138, 139, 265n66 Global Association of the History of the War of Opposition to Japan, 255n37 Global Times, 116, 118–21, 118, 142, 161, 191–92, 193, 194 Great Leap Forward, 61 Gregory XV (pope), 179 Gries, Peter Hays, 6, 16, 80, 154, 205, 215 Group of Seven (G-7) Summit, 75 Guangming Daily, 33, 114 Habermas, Jurgen, 27 Hafez, Mohammed, 14 Halperin, Morton, 41 hands-tying strategy, 43–44, 209 Hao, Yufan, 16, 240n9 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 77–78, 84, 94, 176, 249n112, 249n116, 265n78 He Fang, 161 He, Yinan, 17, 59, 66, 75, 103 Herbst, Susan, 23, 24, 32 history activists, 31 Ho, Peter, 30 Honda, Mike, 193 Horizon Corporation surveys, 36, 122, 123, 125, 200, 233, 236 Hosokawa Morihiro, 76, 266n82 Hsu Li-The, 249n109 Hu Jintao: and Belgrade bombing, 219–20; and China–Japan relations, 56, 79, 96, 114, 132, 133, 141, 153, 175, 182–83, 185, 191, 212, 266n82; and China’s high-speed rail line, 135, 137, 211; and history issues, 56, 79; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 96, 144; and

Index

populism, 12; and public debates, 170; and public opinion, 206, 225, 227; and Taiwan, 103 Hu Qili, 71 Hu Shuli, 223 Hu Yaobang: and China–Japan relations, 55, 56, 60, 62, 66–67, 69, 73–74, 96–97, 132, 248n91; and public opinion, 75; and reform, 43, 60, 61, 62 Hua, Guofeng, 61 Huang Ju, 136 Hunt, Michael, 178 Huntington, Samuel, 2, 13, 127 Ienaga, Saburo, 64 Ijiri, Hidenori, 74 India, 87, 153 Indonesia, 7–8, 10 Institute of American Studies, 161 Institute of Japan Studies (IJS), 121, 160–61, 173, 196, 229 intelligence agencies, and public opinion, 35–36, 225–26 International Herald, 136–37 international relations theory, 3, 17 Internet: censorship of, 40, 180, 182, 183, 201, 202, 203, 221, 226, 227; and China–Japan relations, 134, 167; and China’s high-speed rail line, 135–37, 139, 211; and China–U.S. relations, 47, 213, 215, 216, 217; and Chinese foreign policy, 47, 158; Chinese use of, 119, 129, 221–22, 259n101; common identity on, 111, 257n65; and Indonesian violence against ethnic Chinese, 8; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 141, 142, 144; and liberalization, 221; and media coverage, 34, 35, 119, 121, 126–27; and microbloggers, 221, 226; and “new thinking” debate, 168, 170–71; and political activism, 111–12, 201; and propaganda, 180, 183–84; and public debates, 48, 158, 170, 178, 220–21; and

Index public mobilization, 3, 24, 52, 101, 209; and public opinion, 36–37, 42, 178, 220–22, 224, 225, 226; and public opinion of Japan, 122, 123, 124, 126–27, 174, 195, 209, 283n90; and Shishou riots, 221, 286n34. See also online petition campaigns Iran, 2, 15 Iraq, 13 Israel, 14–15 issue activation, 28, 38, 45, 52 Jacobs, Lawrence R., 47 Japan: abandoned chemical weapons in China, 32, 46, 57, 81, 84, 91–96, 92–93, 97, 100, 130, 140–45, 155, 202–3, 250n124, 253n200, 253n206, 265nn76– 78, 266n80, 266n89, 267n94, 267n96, 268n107, 268n109; Meiji Restoration, 68; National Defense Program Guidelines, 149; policies of, 19; public opinion of China in, 199, 200, 201; revisions in history textbooks, 56, 59, 60, 63–66, 71, 73, 82, 90, 118–19, 120, 132, 149, 151, 154, 195, 204, 251n146, 251n148, 272n173; Self-Defense Law, 76; and UN Security Council seat, 32, 77, 81–82, 100, 112, 125, 130, 148–54, 200, 209, 249n108, 283n98 Japan–China Economic Cooperation Association, 69, 72–73 Japan–China Economic Partnership, 84 Japan–China Friendship Association, 133 Japanese wartime atrocities: academic research on, 107–8; and China–Japan relations, 56, 59; and Chinese American organizations, 108, 255n37; and comfort women stations, 58, 106, 109, 116, 193, 202, 204, 282n70; and patriotic education campaign, 31, 102–4, 105, 106, 255n28; and redress movement, 31, 109, 110–13 Japan Socialist Party, 69

321

Japan–U.S. relations, and China–Japan relations, 56, 62, 63, 81, 88, 161 Ji Bingxuan, 114 Jiang Lifeng, 160 Jiang Zemin: and China–Japan relations, 55–56, 76, 79–80, 84, 132, 133, 161, 162, 163, 212, 251n143; elite-level policy discourse, 212; and EP-3 incident, 217; and history issues, 47, 56, 183, 250n121, 250nn123–124; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 94; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 77, 249n108; and patriotic education campaign, 103; and World Trade Organization, 216 Jiaodian Fangtan (Focus), 36 Jin, Xide, 81, 139, 160, 171, 173 Johnston, Alistair Iain, 15, 39 Joint Communiqué of 1972, 59 Jordan, 13, 14 Journal of Studies of China’s War of Resistance Against Japan, 107 Katz, Andrew Z., 45 Kenz, Peter, 179 Kiichi, Miyazawa, 66 Kim Dae Jung, 79, 250n123 Koizumi Junichiro: and China–Japan relations, 150, 153, 173; and China’s highspeed rail line, 135; and Diaoyu Islands incident of 2004, 44, 146, 269n121; and elite-level policy discourse, 173; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 141, 143, 144, 268n107; media coverage of, 118, 192–93, 196; and Yasukuni shrine, 82, 84, 99, 107, 126, 132, 133, 134, 138–39, 144, 149, 171, 175, 176, 181, 192, 210, 211, 212, 251n152, 279n29 Kong Quan, 146 Kono Statement, 282n70 Kono Yohei, 86 Korea. See North Korea; South Korea Koreshige Anami, 143, 146

322 Kristof, Nicholas, 80 Kull, Steven, 243n76 Kuomintang (KMT), 58, 103 Kuranari Doctrine, 85 labor system restructuring, 26 Lai, Brian, 9 Lampton, David, 45 Laos, 208 Law of the Sea Treaty, 147, 249n102 Lazarsfeld, Paul, 20 Lebanon, 13 Lee, Taeku, 24, 240n9 Lee Teng-hui, 82, 84, 132, 149, 214, 249n109 legitimacy claims: and China–Japan relations, 97, 212; and patriotic education campaign, 56, 102–3, 105; and propaganda, 37, 181; and public opinion, 37–39, 100; and repression, 40 Leninism, 10, 11 Lewis, Justin, 28, 32, 235–36 Li Changchun, 180 Li Changhua, 68 Li, Cheng, 11 Li Gangqing, 89 Li Guangrong, 187–88 Li Peng: and China–Japan relations, 77–78, 82, 161, 162; and history issues, 77–78, 85, 161; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 94, 265n78; and protest movements, 71, 72 Li Xiuying, 188 Li Zhaoxing, 36, 87, 141, 143, 146, 149–50, 152–53 Li, Zhaozhong, 166–67, 274–75n42 Liang, Qichao, 57 Liao, Xuanli, 17 Liaodong Peninsula, 57 Liaowang, 141 Liaowang Weekly, 200 Liberalism: and civil society, 221; and vulnerabilities of authoritarian rule, 9, 11

Index

Liberation Daily, 152 Lien Chan, 103 Lin Jiaxiang, 221 Lin Zhibo, 168, 170, 171 Lindblom, Charles, 180 Ling, Xingguang, 168 Linz, Juan, 13 Lippmann, Walter, 23, 32 Liu, Alan, 16, 239n60, 240n9 Liu Chang, 172–73 Liu, Jiangyong, 161 Liu Xiaobiao, 170 Liu Zhigang, 253n206 Liu Zhijun, 138 Liu, Zonghe, 171–72 Locke, John, 177 Long, Youngtu, 47, 217 Long-Term Trade Agreement of 1978, 62 Lu Fusheng, 255n28 Lu, Yi, 122 Lu Yunfei, 32, 99, 111, 146 Ma, Licheng, 167–69, 170, 171, 172 Machimura Nobutaka, 149, 150, 152, 270n147 Mainichi Shinbun, 69, 137, 142 Manchukuo, 58 Manchuria, 57, 71, 90, 136 Manchurian Crisis, 104 Mao Zedong, 25–26, 55, 59, 61, 97, 102, 157, 180 Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, 58, 68, 194 Marxism, 38 May Fourth Movement of 1919, 38, 57–58, 227 McAdam, Doug, 31 McKinnon, Rebecca, 180 media coverage: and authoritarian reform, 12; censorship of, 40, 53, 182, 201, 227; and China–Japan relations, 2, 18, 59, 73, 75, 80, 90, 120, 134, 149–50, 161, 166, 167, 173, 176, 270n147; and China’s

Index high-speed rail line, 136, 138, 139, 263n41; and Chinese domestic politics, 220, 223–24; and Chinese foreign policy, 130; demobilization of, 51; and Diaoyu Islands incident, 120, 146, 147, 148, 269n129; and elite-level policy discourse, 33, 159, 209; and EP-3 incident, 218; influence of state on, 20; of Japan, 18, 114–16, 117, 118–21, 118, 161, 181, 182, 183, 189–95, 190, 201, 205, 229–31; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 96, 140, 142, 144, 268n110; and Japan’s textbook revision, 64–65, 272n173; and “new thinking” debate, 168, 169, 275n57; and patriotic education campaign, 102; and political activism, 30, 32, 34, 35, 113; and propaganda, 18, 34, 120–21, 180, 181, 184, 189–95, 190, 199, 201, 205, 283n91; and public debates, 48, 158; and public emotion, 34, 114, 115–16, 119, 120, 121, 125, 205; and public mobilization, 3, 24, 25, 26–27, 32–35, 40, 44, 49, 50, 52, 100–101, 113–21, 192–95, 208–9; and public opinion, 28, 29, 32–33, 37, 42, 178; and public opinion of Japan, 34, 114–16, 118–19, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 189–95, 199, 236, 283n94; reshaping of, 4; tolerance of, 41, 43, 100, 101, 114, 120–21, 126, 194–95, 227, 283n91; and Yasukuni Shrine, 59, 69, 71, 72, 116. See also press Mei Ru’ao, 188 Memorial Hall for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre, 102, 103, 106–7, 109 Memorial Hall of the People’s War of Resistance Against Japan, 102, 104 Mertha, Andrew, 11 Merton, Robert K., 20 Middle East, 2, 6, 12–14 Midgal, Joel, 105–6, 109 Miki Takeo, 68 Ming Pao, 147–48 Ministry of Commerce, 41

323

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: and China– Japan relations, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 95–96, 132, 133–34, 140, 141, 144, 146, 148, 164, 166, 251n142, 268n109; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 151, 153; and “new thinking” debate, 170–71; and political activism, 112; and propaganda, 192; and protest movements, 41; and public opinion, 36 Ministry of Railroads, 135, 136, 137, 139 Mochizuki, Mike, 85 Modern History Institute, 107 Mondale, Walter, 252n179 Monument to the People’s Heroes, 68, 70 Morgenthau, Hans, 201, 284n102 Morihiro Hosokawa, 96 Mori Yoshiro, 81 Morocco, 14 Mubarak, Hosni, 14 Murayama Tomiichi, 76–77 Museum of the Japanese Invasion Activities in China, 255n37 Nagateru Ohama, 149 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 42, 56, 63, 66–71, 73–74, 75, 185 Nanfeng Chuang, 191 Nanjing Massacre: casualties of, 58; commemoration of, 68, 102, 103, 106–7, 109, 149–50; and Japan’s revision of history textbooks, 64, 90; and media coverage, 116, 194; museum exhibits, 68, 186–87, 188; and patriotic education campaign, 102, 104, 107–8; and propaganda, 59; and protest movements, 202 National Day, 76 National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC), 134, 136, 138, 139 National People’s Congress (NPC), 108–9, 111, 149–50, 203, 222, 270n142 NATO, and bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 8, 42, 176, 214–16, 218, 219–20

324 neoliberal capitalism, 38 New Left, 38 Ni, Feng, 161 9/18 War Research Association of Beijing, 256n44 Nixon, Richard, 157 Noelle-Neumann, Elizabeth, 170 nondemocratic regimes: and authoritarianism, 2; response to public pressures, 12, 127, 207–8; and responsive authoritarianism, 13, 239n48; types of, 9 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): and cycles of contention, 30–31; and democratization, 10, 11, 127; restrictions on, 227 North Korea, 180, 208 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 76 O’Brien, Kevin, 31 Obuchi Keizo, 80, 81, 250n123 Ogi Chikage, 135, 136, 137 Okinawa, 88 Oliver, Pamela, 113 one-child policy, 26 online petition campaigns: and China’s high-speed rail line, 136, 137, 169–70; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 266n89, 267n96; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 151; and political activism, 32, 99–100, 109, 112, 113, 119–20, 257n57; repression of, 203 Opium Wars, 104 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 94 Ottaway, Marina, 13 Pakistan, 30–31 Palestine, 13 Party Affairs Department, 35 Party History Research Office, 186 patriotic education campaign: and elitelevel policy discourse, 173–74; and

Index

Japanese wartime atrocities, 31, 102–4, 105, 106, 255n28; and local history museums, 106, 255n28; and political activism, 105–13; and popular opinion of Japan, 56, 75, 101, 103–5, 122, 125, 173; and propaganda, 102, 104, 106–8, 186–87; and state-run history museums, 102, 103, 106, 255n30 Pearson, Margaret, 217 Pei, Minxin, 10 Peng Zhen, 69, 248n69 People’s Daily Online, 183 People’s Daily (RMRB): and China–Japan relations, 66, 69, 71, 72, 78, 80, 81, 82, 90, 115, 132, 152, 167, 248n91; and China–U.S. relations, 215, 218, 286n9; and Diaoyu Islands, 269n129; and Japan’s revision of history textbooks, 64, 65; and “new thinking” debate, 168–69; and propaganda, 33, 179–80, 184, 192, 193, 194, 206, 281n64; and public mobilization, 25; and public opinion, 227, 235 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 88, 89, 145, 148, 186 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) International Relations College, 171–73 Perry, Elizabeth, 5–6, 12, 25, 42 persuasion: and party-state’s authority, 1; and political activism, 53; and propaganda, 179, 180, 278n6; and protest movements, 70, 71; and public mobilization, 50, 177; and public pressure, 2; repression combined with, 9, 21, 24, 25, 26, 205, 208, 219, 220, 225, 226, 228 Pew Global Polls, 121, 200 Philippines, 9 PLA Daily, 65 political activism: and China’s high-speed rail line, 135–38, 139; and China–U.S. relations, 214; and Chinese foreign policy, 130; and Diaoyu Islands incident of 2004, 145, 146, 148, 268n115,

Index 269n123, 270n138; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 151–52; and media coverage, 30, 32, 34, 35, 113; and patriotic education campaign, 105–13; and propaganda, 101, 105–13, 201–2; and public debates, 158, 204; and public emotion, 29, 30, 31, 32, 39, 101, 113, 125; and public mobilization, 25, 26–27, 29–32, 35, 40, 49, 52, 101, 208–9; and public opinion of Japan, 31, 32, 99–100, 122, 126, 181; repression of, 53, 201, 202, 209; tolerance of, 101, 112, 113, 126, 127, 209. See also protest movements populism: authoritarian states’ response to, 127; and Chinese foreign policy, 157–58; of Chinese nationalism, 38, 113; and elite-level policy discourse, 159, 178; and Hu Jintao, 12 Potsdam Declaration, 88 Potter, Philip B. K., 33 Powell, Colin, 218 Powlick, Phillip J., 45 press: bureaucratic ranking of, 33, 242n53; and China–Japan relations, 79–80; and China’s high-speed rail line, 136–37; and Chinese nationalism, 33–34; and Japan’s revision of history textbooks, 64; and protest movements, 72; and public mobilization, 25, 32–35, 101; and redress movement, 31; state control of, 34, 242n59. See also media coverage; and specific newspapers propaganda: and authoritarian states, 4, 20–21, 127, 179–80, 278n6; and China–Japan relations, 2, 3, 5, 56, 59, 115; conditions required by, 52; defining of, 179; definition of, 51; and diplomacy, 3, 114–15, 181, 183, 184–85, 205, 209, 212; effectiveness of, 180–81; forms of, 51–52; and history issues, 185, 186–89; and legitimacy claims, 37, 181; and media coverage,

325

18, 34, 120–21, 180, 181, 184, 189–95, 190, 199, 201, 205, 283n91; and path dependency, 20; and patriotic education campaign, 102, 104, 106–8, 186–87; and political activism, 101, 105–13, 201–2; and protest movements, 51, 152, 181–82, 201–2, 225; and public mobilization, 53, 101, 201–5; and public opinion of Japan, 3, 97, 100, 101, 104–5, 122, 125, 126, 181, 183–89, 195–96, 198–201, 204–5, 208, 209–10; refocusing attention with, 8; responsiveness as, 129–30; and World War II anniversary, 67–68. See also Central Propaganda Department (CPD) Propaganda Ministry, and public opinion, 36, 183 Protect Diaoyu Islands movement, 46, 145–48, 202 protest movements: censorship of, 40, 51, 225; and China–Japan relations, 2, 43, 70–72, 74–75, 76, 134, 154, 181; and China’s high-speed rail line, 139; and China–U.S. relations, 214–15; Chinese Communist Party’s response to, 8, 24–25; and Diaoyu Islands, 89–91, 97, 110, 147, 155, 257nn57–58; and Indonesian violence against ethnic Chinese, 8; and Internet, 112, 257n70; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 151–54; and legitimacy claims, 38–39; and media coverage, 35, 114; participation in, 41, 244n97; and propaganda, 51, 152, 181–82, 201–2, 225; and public mobilization, 50, 127; and public opinion, 28, 37, 39, 42; and public opinion of Japan, 42, 108, 126, 181, 182, 261n129; repression of, 51, 182, 183, 202, 218, 225; rise in, 10, 12, 181; temporary influence of, 9; tolerance of, 1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 41–42, 44, 71, 74–75, 112, 212, 216, 219, 220, 227, 240n74 Prueher, Joseph, 218

326 public debates: and anti-Japan activism, 176–77; and China’s high-speed rail line, 139, 169–70; and Chinese domestic politics, 224–25; and Chinese foreign policy, 158; and elite-level policy discourse, 47–48, 158–59, 178, 211–12, 220; and history issues, 161; “new thinking” debate, 48, 159, 160, 161, 167–71, 172, 173, 174–75, 177, 275n57; and propaganda, 180; and public mobilization, 47–48, 176, 211; and “reach in” model, 158; and “reach out” model, 48, 158; tolerance of, 1, 158 public emotion: and China’s high-speed rail line, 136, 137, 139; and China–U.S. relations, 213, 218, 220; and Chinese foreign policy, 130–31; and Diaoyu Islands incident of 2004, 147; and elite-level policy discourse, 171–72; and history issues, 166, 168; and Internet, 119; levels of, 27, 28, 42, 44; and media coverage, 34, 114, 115–16, 119, 120, 121, 125, 205; and patriotic education campaign, 103–4, 105, 125; and political activism, 29, 30, 31, 32, 39, 101, 113, 125; and propaganda, 52, 125; and protest movements, 41–42; and public debates, 48, 158, 169–70; and public mobilization, 26, 40–41, 46, 48–50, 52, 53, 154–55, 209; and World War II anniversary, 67 public mobilization: causes of, 2, 3, 21, 24, 100; and China–Japan relations, 2, 44, 46–47, 49, 52, 131, 154, 164, 208; and China’s high-speed rail line, 138–40; and Chinese foreign policy, 2–3, 19, 21, 45, 47, 49, 50, 131, 209, 213; Chinese leaders’ containment of, 3, 8, 21, 25; as dependent variable, 24; and Diaoyu Islands incident of 2004, 155; and elitelevel policy discourse, 3, 21, 26, 130, 131–34, 211; end of wave, 49–52, 205, 209, 210, 212; as independent variable, 24; and Japan’s abandoned chemical

Index

weapons, 141–44, 155, 202–3; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 148, 151–52, 154, 155; and Mao Zedong, 25–26; and media coverage, 3, 24, 25, 26–27, 32–35, 40, 44, 49, 50, 52, 100–101, 113–21, 192–95, 208–9; origins of, 25; and propaganda, 181, 201–5; and public debates, 47–48, 176, 211; and public emotion, 26, 40–41, 46, 48–50, 52, 53, 154–55, 209; and state–society interactions, 39–49, 50–52, 53, 101, 127, 213; trends in, 18; wave of, 24–25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 35, 39–44, 48, 50–53, 57, 97, 100, 105, 113–16, 120, 122, 125, 126, 131, 144–45, 159, 177, 180, 181, 205, 208–9, 211, 212–13. See also political activism; protest movements; public opinion public opinion: and authoritarian persuasiveness, 1; biased perceptions of, 243n76; and China’s high-speed rail line, 136; and China–U.S. relations, 213–20; and Chinese domestic politics, 220–26; Chinese state’s shaping of, 19, 210; defining, 23–24, 27–28; influence on Chinese foreign policy, 2, 3, 4–5, 6, 8, 12, 15–17, 36–37, 40, 45–46, 47, 53, 56, 96, 130–31, 155, 157–58, 178, 209, 211; intelligence on, 35–36, 225–26; and Internet, 36–37, 42, 178, 220–22, 224, 225, 226; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 152–53; Locke’s view on, 177–78; and mass incidents, 222, 226; measurement of, 27, 28; and media coverage, 28, 29, 32–33, 37, 42, 178; new opinion class, 221; and plebiscite systems, 130; and political activism, 29–32, 112; polls of, 18, 24, 26, 28–29, 36, 129; power of, 37–39; and propaganda, 179–81, 183; and public debates, 158; and public mobilization, 24, 35, 49, 52, 101; and responsive authoritarianism, 1, 2, 3–4, 14–15, 129–30; and segments of

Index public, 28; and state–society interactions, 19–20, 35–37, 210; studies of, 27–29; of United States, 121–22, 123, 214, 215 public opinion of Japan: and Abe, 196, 198, 199; and China–Japan relations, 2, 5, 7, 15, 17, 60, 84, 97, 159, 177, 199, 201, 235–36, 283n95; and China’s high-speed rail line, 137, 138, 169–70; and Chinese nationalism, 6; and consumer boycott, 100, 111, 119–20, 125–26, 142, 151, 174, 261n127; and Diaoyu Islands incident of 2004, 147, 148, 155; and elite-level policy debates, 3, 159, 172–73, 174, 175, 176, 177; and history issues, 59, 118–19, 121, 126, 163, 164, 166–67, 168, 169, 171, 177, 195, 196, 200, 201, 261n128; improvement in, 181, 196, 197–98, 198–201, 203, 205, 209–10, 234, 235; and Internet, 122, 123, 124, 126–27, 174, 195, 209, 283n90; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 94–95, 141–44, 155; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 153–54; and media coverage, 34, 114–16, 118–19, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 189–95, 199, 236, 283n94; and patriotic education campaign, 56, 75, 101, 103–5, 122, 125, 173; and personal experience, 123, 124, 125; and political activism, 31, 32, 99–100, 122, 126, 181; polls of, 121–22, 122, 123, 124, 195–96, 229, 233–36, 260n117, 260nn109–110, 261nn125–126, 283nn89–92, 283nn94– 98, 283n100, 284n101, 289nn2–5; and propaganda, 3, 97, 100, 101, 104–5, 122, 125, 126, 181, 183–89, 195–96, 198–201, 204–5, 208, 209–10; and protest movements, 42, 108, 126, 181, 182, 261n129; and public mobilization, 101, 122, 195; ranking of Japan’s importance to China’s economy, 122, 124; resistance to change, 20; sources of information on Japan, 122, 124, 184, 195, 280n33,

327

283n90, 283n92; and Yasukuni Shrine, 121, 126, 261n130 Public Security Bureau: and Diaoyu Islands, 202; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 152; and mass incidents, 222; and public opinion, 36 Putnam, Robert, 46 Qian, Qichen, 45 Qian Xiaoqian, 184 Qing dynasty, 57, 203 Qiqihair incident, 32, 100 Rabe, John, 188 Ramsay, Clay, 243n76 reach-out model, 48, 158 Red Flag, 65 redress movement (suopei yundong), 31, 109, 110–13 el-Reedy, Abdel Raouf, 15 Renan, Ernst, 60 Renmin University, 125, 261n125 repression: and China–Japan relations, 2, 3; liberalization blended with, 13; as negative propaganda, 51; and party-state’s authority, 1, 12; persuasion combined with, 9, 21, 24, 25, 26, 205, 208, 219, 220, 225, 226, 228; of political activism, 53, 201, 202, 209; propaganda compared to, 179; of protest movements, 51, 182, 183, 202, 218, 225; and public mobilization, 24, 26, 39, 40–41, 43, 50–51, 52, 53, 177, 209 responsive authoritarianism: broad phenomenon of, 6, 12–15; Chinese Communist Party rule, 1–2, 11–12, 15, 129–30; and nondemocratic regimes, 13, 239n48; and public opinion, 1, 2, 3–4, 14–15, 129–30 responsiveness: and party-state’s authority, 1, 11; as propaganda tool, 129–30; and public mobilization, 53; and public pressure, 2, 4–5, 8, 9; and state–society

328 responsiveness (continued) interactions, 44–49; tolerance combined with, 9, 21, 129, 130, 155, 158, 208, 219, 220, 225, 228 rhetoric: and China–Japan relations, 2, 3, 7, 72, 97, 144; and legitimacy claims, 37; and political activism, 110–13; and protest movements, 101; and public mobilization, 26, 52, 100, 131 Rho Moo-hyun, 272n173 Rose, Caroline, 17 Rosen, Stanley, 16, 42, 216 Rosenau, James, 45 Ross, Robert S., 15 Rowen, Henry, 11 Rozman, Gilbert, 82, 162, 163 Russia, 57, 77, 174 Saich, Tony, 11 San Francisco Treaty, 108 Sankei Shinbun, 79 SARS epidemic, 223 Saudi Arabia, 13 Saunders, Phillip C., 90 Schattschneider, E. E., 44 scope of conflict, 44–45 Scott, James, 38 Second Five-Year Plan, 61 Self, Benjamin, 80 September 18 anniversary: call for national “Day of Humiliation,” 150; China918 Web site, 111, 257n61; and China–Japan relations, 76, 77; commemoration of, 108; Japanese businessmen’s sex scandal on, 100, 119, 143; media coverage of, 90, 119; and political activism, 141–42; and protest movements, 42, 70, 72, 74, 89, 100, 202 September 18 History Museum, 77, 102, 103 Shambaugh, David, 11, 41 Shapiro, Robert Y., 47 Shi, Yinhong, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 215

Index

Shimonoseki Treaty, 88 Shintaro Abe, 73 Shirk, Susan, 6, 38 Shizhuang, 34 Sichuan earthquake, 223 Sichuan experiment, 61 Sichuan Ribao, 71 Singapore, 2 Sino-Japanese Wars, 57, 88 Sino-Japanese Youth Exchange Center, 73 Slater, Dan, 9 Snyder, Jack, 6, 7, 33 Sobel, Richard, 3 social identity theory, 20 social movements: definition of, 239n60; and elite-level policy discourse, 212; ending of, 49, 53; and public influence on political agendas, 45; and public opinion, 16, 25, 27; and role of social networks, 105 Sola Pool, Ithiel de, 28 Song, Qiang, 48 South China Morning Post, 79–80, 143 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 114, 193, 222, 224 Southern Metropolitan News, 194 Southern Weekend, 31, 33, 99, 109, 168, 242n53, 242n59 South Korea: and Abe, 193; and China–Japan relations, 57, 163, 182; and comfort women issue, 109; and Japan’s revision of history textbooks, 82, 149, 154; and Japan’s UN Security Council seat, 153 Soviet Union: and China–Japan relations, 55, 59, 63; dissolution of, 102; as propaganda state, 179 Speier, Hans, 27 State Council Information Office, 115 State Council Legal Office, 108 State Education Commission, 102 state-owned enterprises, reform of, 163 state–society interactions: and China– Japan relations, 21, 208, 213; and

Index China–U.S. relations, 208; and cycles of contention, 30–31; cyclical model of, 4–5, 53; and patriotic education campaign, 105–6; and political activism, 31, 127; and public mobilization, 39–49, 50–52, 53, 101, 127, 213; and public opinion, 19–20, 35–37, 210; responsiveness of state, 44–49 Statistical Bureau, 36 Strategy and Management, 177 Su, Hao, 162 Su, Lin, 16, 240n9 Su Xiangxiang, 142 Su, Zhiliang, 106, 109 Sugimoto Nobuyuki, 86 Sun Yat-sen, 57, 103 surveillance, 1, 35–36 Suzuki Zenko, 65–66, 68 Syria, 2, 13, 180 Taiwan: and China–Japan relations, 57, 58, 62, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 134, 148, 149, 150, 154, 160, 161, 168, 176, 249n102; and Chinese foreign relations, 45–46, 80, 250n126, 270n142; and Diaoyu Islands, 88, 89–90, 145, 270n142; and elite-level policy discourse, 274n37; and history issues, 186–87; and patriotic education campaign, 103 Tanaka Kakuei, 60 Tanaka Makiko, 251n143 Tang Jiaxuan, 84, 86, 95, 142, 167, 251n143 Tang dynasty, 57 Tanigaki Sadakuza, 87 Tarrow, Sydney, 30, 44, 45, 47, 49, 134, 212 television. See China Central Television (CCTV) Territorial Waters Law, 76, 249n102 Thompson, E. P., 29 Thorton, Patricia, 29 Tiananmen protests of 1989, 43, 55, 75, 97, 102, 111, 157 Tibet policy, 8

329

Tilly, Charles, 30, 40, 226 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 10, 40 To[-]jo[-] Hideki, 68, 99, 261n130 tolerance: of media coverage, 41, 43, 100, 101, 114, 120–21, 126, 194–95, 227, 283n91; and party-state’s authority, 1; of political activism, 101, 112, 113, 126, 127, 209; of protest movements, 1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 41–42, 44, 71, 74–75, 112, 212, 216, 219, 220, 227, 240n74; of public debates, 1, 158; and public mobilization, 24, 26, 39, 41–44, 52, 53, 100, 120, 144–45, 208; and public pressure, 2, 4–5; responsiveness combined with, 9, 21, 129, 130, 155, 158, 208, 219, 220, 225, 228 Tong Zeng, 90, 111, 112, 202–3, 256n40 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 62, 79, 88, 131–32, 135, 191 Tretiak, Daniel, 88 two-level game approach, 43, 46, 86, 147, 155, 209 UN Security Council, Japan’s pursuit of seat on, 32, 77, 81–82, 100, 112, 125, 130, 148–54, 200, 209, 249n108, 283n98 urban enterprises, economic reforms in, 26 urban health insurance, 26, 48 U.S.–Japan alliance: and Deng Xiaoping, 62; and elite-level policy discourse, 160, 161, 163, 164, 173, 176, 274n37; revisions in, 77, 160; and Taiwan, 149, 161, 270n142 U.S.–Japan Alliance Guidelines, 118 U.S.–Japan Security Guidelines, 126 U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, 62, 63, 88, 252n179 Van Evera, Stephen, 6 Vietnam, 87 Wan, Ming, 17, 133 Wang, Jinsi, 108, 204 Wang, Renzhong, 61–62

330 Wang, Shaoguang, 12, 48 Wang, Shaopu, 173 Wang Wei, 214, 215, 218 Wang Xiaodong, 171 Wang Xuan, 31, 109 Wang Yi, 82, 83, 141, 142, 147 Wang Zhaoguo, 67 Wang, Zheng, 104–5 Wang Zhongke, 187 War of Resistance to Japan, 84, 102, 104, 107, 186–89, 194 Washington Post, 193 Wei, Zhong, 166 Weiss, Jessica, 16, 43, 112, 154, 216, 240n74 Wen Jiabao: and China–Japan relations, 114, 132, 133, 150, 152–53; and Diaoyu Islands, 147; and diplomacy, 182, 185, 191, 192, 198, 203, 212; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 143; and populism, 12; and public debates, 170; and public opinion, 223, 224 Wen Wei Po, 269n129 White Tower (television series), 184 Whiting, Allen, 5, 64, 68, 70, 73, 75 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, 14 World Affairs, 159, 164, 167, 174, 177 World Trade Organization (WTO), 47, 79, 81, 163, 216–17 World War II anniversaries, 67–69, 77, 102, 160, 169, 176 Wu Bangguo, 141 Wu Dawei, 87, 138, 146 Wu Jianmin, 113, 183 Wu, Xueqian, 63 Wu Yi, 150 Xiao, Ziangqian, 64 Xinhua News Agency: and China–Japan relations, 192, 270n147; and Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 95, 96, 140, 141; and propaganda, 33, 183, 186, 193; and Shenzhou VII rocket, 223; and

Index

Taiwan, 82; and Yasukuni Shrine visits, 69, 72 Xinjing Bao, 150 Xinmin Evening News, 193 Xu Kuangdi, 139 Xue, Li, 168 Yan, Xuetong, 161 Yang, Bojiang, 160, 162 Yang, Dali, 12 Yang, Guobin, 11 Yang, Ningyi, 160 Yano Junya, 74 Yasheng Huang, 224 Yasukuni Shrine: and China–Japan relations, 72, 82, 84, 90, 134, 182; documentary on, 203; and Feng Jinhua, 99, 111; Hashimoto’s visit to, 77, 176; Koizumi’s visits to, 82, 84, 99, 107, 126, 132, 133, 134, 138–39, 144, 149, 171, 175, 176, 181, 192, 210, 211, 212, 251n152, 279n29; and media coverage, 59, 69, 71, 72, 116; Nakasone’s visits to, 56, 68–69, 70, 73, 75; and public opinion of Japan, 121, 126, 261n130 Yee, Albert, 218 Yinhe (ship), U.S. interdiction of, 214 Yomiuri Shimbun, 200 Yoriko Kawaguchi, 95, 146, 147 Yu Jainrong, 222 Yu, Yanmin, 239n63 Yukihiko Ikeda, 89 Zeng Qinghong, 81, 132–33, 142, 170, 194, 212, 262n9 Zhang Enzhao, 223 Zhang Guobao, 136 Zhang Hanya, 137 Zhang, Tasheng, 173 Zhang Xu, 186 Zhang Yesui, 145–46 Zhang Yihong, 217–18 Zhang Zizhong, 255n15

Index Zhao, Dingxin, 50, 219 Zhao Qizheng, 115 Zhao, Suisheng, 104, 113, 219 Zhao, Wei, 34 Zhao, Yuezhi, 33 Zhao Ziyang, 43, 55, 60–63, 66–67, 73, 74, 96–97, 247n49 Zheng Jingping, 175 Zhou Enlai, 55, 59, 60, 88, 97, 157

331

Zhou Jiugeng, 224 Zhou, Nanshen, 169 Zhou Yongkang, 222–23 Zhu Rongji: and Belgrade bombing, 215; and China–Japan relations, 86, 167; and public opinion, 36, 167; “smile diplomacy,” 81–82, 132, 177; and World Trade Organization, 47, 216–17 Zimbabwe, 2