Strategy in the 21st Century: The Continuing Relevance of Carl von Clausewitz [1st ed.] 9783030460273, 9783030460280

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xix
Introduction (Lennart Souchon)....Pages 1-11
Terminology (Lennart Souchon)....Pages 13-23
The Belligerent Genesis of Europe (Lennart Souchon)....Pages 25-46
Prussia, Clausewitz and the Interpretation of His Works (Lennart Souchon)....Pages 47-68
On War: Basic Features (Lennart Souchon)....Pages 69-114
On War: Individual Aspects (Lennart Souchon)....Pages 115-172
War in the Twenty-First Century (Lennart Souchon)....Pages 173-190
Exemplary Implementation of Clausewitz’s Theory and Strategy Consulting (Lennart Souchon)....Pages 191-219
Epilogue (Lennart Souchon)....Pages 221-224
Back Matter ....Pages 225-242

Citation preview

Lennart Souchon

Strategy in the 21st Century The Continuing Relevance of Carl von Clausewitz

Strategy in the 21st Century

Lennart Souchon

Strategy in the 21st Century The Continuing Relevance of Carl von Clausewitz

Lennart Souchon Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences University of Potsdam Potsdam, Brandenburg, Germany

ISBN 978-3-030-46027-3 ISBN 978-3-030-46028-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) is said to have murmured the words Eppur si muove during the Roman inquisition trial in 1633. The heliocentric world view of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) is a scientific sensation in the Middle Ages and yet is condemned by the Catholic Church as heresy. It is a source of great trouble for the astronomer Galileo, whose observations of the tides make him the first person able to prove this “mathematical model”, as the church calls it until 1822. He conceals his phenomenal discovery that the earth revolves around the sun behind the Latin words in order to protect it. Galileo is not formally rehabilitated in religious doctrine until October 1992, during the term of Pope John Paul II. This drawn-out development illustrates how difficult it is to fundamentally change ingrained ways of thinking and doing things even if new findings compel them to be. Nowadays, the view from a space station allows the earth to be identified on its heliocentric orbit as a tiny element of the seemingly infinite universe, as an island of life set in great complexity and galactic solitude. While ways of thinking, cultures and forms of rule have drifted apart in certain regions of the world throughout history, in Mesopotamia, Egypt, in the Indus Valley, in Central Asia and in China, the world today is closely connected due to global networks and worldwide travel, trade and services. The urban centres in Europe, the Americas, Africa, Asia and Australia are linked in real time. The depletability of natural resources, the continued growth of the world’s population and the horrendous possibility that man has to devastate the planet Earth with nuclear weapons are well-known facts. The prosperity and security enjoyed in some parts of the world tremendously contrast with the immense poverty experienced in overpopulated regions. The air we breathe, the water we drink, the rainforests, agriculturally used soil and the seas are elements and bridges that connect rich and poor zones around the world. At the same time, mankind faces a multidimensional threat consisting of international Islamist terrorism, failing states, organised crime, human trafficking, cyberwarfare and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which force us to rethink national security policy.

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At the end of the twentieth century, the states of Eastern Central Europe became members of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union (EU). For them the prosperity, democracy and security in the North Atlantic Alliance appear highly attractive. As in the period after the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), the G20 states are seen nowadays as a broad concert of nations that may dominate international politics in future times. The Western societies were attacked by the Islamist terrorists on 11 September 2001. The world witnesses a strategic challenge that can ultimately take on apocalyptic dimensions if the tectonic peril of this precarious security situation fails to be comprehended and confined. The North Atlantic states are in agreement regarding the operational level and unite in the fight against Islamist terrorist networks. However, comprehending this altered threat situation and bringing about a strategic realignment in thinking and action are difficult processes comparable to Galileo Galilei’s discovery and the Catholic Church’s reaction to it. The metaphor “peace is the emergency” frequently cited in the 1970s proves to be fitting for the day, the dangerous enemy being beyond grasp with traditional patterns of thought. Another aspect renders peaceable optimism out of the question: Predominant number of crises and armed conflicts arise today within societies and at the same time have transnational networks. The fight against international terrorism demands completely different ways of thinking, strategies and capability profiles to be developed for modern armed forces. But political and military decision-makers have great difficulty in abandoning their outdated analytical methods and decisionmaking procedures for handling security policy issues and adapting to the requirements of the present. Global conflicts involve different value systems and cultures and fundamentalist radicalisation. It must be doubted whether the bureaucratic institutions are indeed able and willing to change traditional ways of thinking. Regarding those challenges, there is a need for a complete overhaul in strategic thinking and action with the aim of defining new approaches to capability profiles and forces structures. The Western military interventions in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa reveal a common pattern. They have been planned at the operational level without a precise political purpose, holistic and intermediate goals or an appropriate allotment of military and civilian resources and are shortsighted in the way they are being conducted. They are not succeeding in establishing stable conditions of peace and threaten to fail if foreign troops are withdrawn. This holds equally true for the Russian engagement in Syria or for the involvement of Saudi Arabia in Yemen. An added factor in Germany is the moralising dimension in the basic attitude towards international operations. It is enhanced in parliamentary committees for party-political reasons by an invocation of ethics aimed at regimenting rational government decisions. A holistic management of Bundeswehr operations is only possible if security policy is based on a strategy. Long-term military operations at the beginning of the twenty-first century call for clear objectives, appropriate military capabilities and an adaptable leadership culture. It is just as hard to imagine consensus-based innovations and restructuring measures being implemented in major military organisations as it is in civil enterprises, even though conviction in

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management theory is that organisations with a hierarchical structure are more adaptable and faster in bringing about change. Especially in organisations in which the management is innovative and flexible that new ways of doing things can be adopted quickly. These results also pervade the constant efforts the Bundeswehr undertakes to bring about reform. While the security challenges grow in complexity, there is a striking stoic reluctance to take innovative and decisive action. Prudent policymakers develop a holistic strategy aimed at achieving a stable state of peace before intervening in regional conflicts. They first define the political purpose before ordering plans for a military operation to be developed and then seek wide political support through discourse. One important prerequisite for initiating future-oriented changes is that of understanding the basic phenomena of our day. In Maxims und Reflections, Goethe postulates: “What is true, good and excellent is also simple and always the same in itself, however it makes its appearance” (Koopmann, 2006, 187).1 Clausewitz condenses this contemporary finding in his empirical analysis of war and concludes: “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult” (On War, 119). This sentence is a generalisation of a finding that Clausewitz applies exclusively to war. The noted rise of national and collective responsibility for global developments in international politics, the likewise limited ability to comprehend matters holistically with the goal in mind and the continued operational use of armed forces overcome from the Cold War era are creating a dangerous situation in today’s polycentric world. The declining power of the West unlocks a power vacuum which is filled by an expansionist China and aggressive Russia. Global threats such as mass migration, international terrorism and climate change are intensively discussed without leading to determined measures of the international community to curb these developments. The major threats in the twenty-first century are continuous regional wars as well as terrorist attacks and the failure of international political cooperation due to populist conservative nationalism. The destruction of the World Trade Center and the infliction of damage on the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, operations in which 19 suicide attackers killed more than 3000 people and caused damage totalling more than a trillion US dollars at a cost of around USD 100,000 US dollars, must be rated as a benchmark of the probable effectiveness of Islamist hyper-terrorist attacks.

1 All German quotations from Vom Kriege refer to: Carl von Clausewitz. Hinterlassenes Werk. Vom Kriege. Achtzehnte Auflage mit erweiterter historisch-kritischer Würdigung von Professor Dr. Werner Hahlweg (On War. Eighteenth edition with additional historical-critical commentary by Prof. Dr. Werner Hahlweg), published by Dümmler in 1973. Page references for pages 1-1251 are the same for the 19th edition, published in 1980. All English quotations are taken from On War in the edition translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. The individual books are referred to by Roman numbers and chapters by Arabic numbers. All other German quotations are unconfirmed translations.

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Islamist terrorists use their clout as a means to counter the influences of Western culture and the media-propagated fear as a weapon to achieve their goals. Generations of Muslims are growing up in the Maghreb, Caucasus and Middle East, in Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia, in parts of Europe and in the USA in a climate marked by poverty, a high population density and growth rate, poor education, a lack of prospects, high youth unemployment and corruption. These desolate social, economic and political conditions are further exaggerated by ethnic and religious conflicts, aspirations for secession and civil wars. In such a political climate, regional terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah and Hamas operate tactically with Islamic social welfare institutions and fund schools, kindergartens, hospitals and mosques. They provoke, polarise, mobilise and radicalise young Muslims. The terrorists recruit their fighters from this reservoir, going on to indoctrinate them, put them through terrorist training, provide them equipment and, finally, use them for their purposes. (Cf. Rice, 2005) To break this vicious circle of poverty, a lack of prospects, violence and twisted Islamist doctrine effectively, it is necessary to develop a deeply founded understanding of this particular situation in the twenty-first century that takes account of the political, economic, social, religious and historical circumstances. To do so, it is helpful to pose leading questions about the power of Islamist doctrine, the social reality in the states under the Islamic crescent, the primordial violence of the peoples, the elites that hold political power and their goals. A critical look must likewise be taken at the way the policies of Western democracies are perceived and at the influence they exert. The essential elements of terrorist indoctrination must first be understood in their entirety before methods can be developed to counter the ensuing threats effectively. Every form of terrorist violence and every battle are characterised by the actions and reactions of the actors involved. Thus, thoughts on cause and effect, the influence of probability, chance, danger, effort and the relation between purpose and means are of pivotal importance. The forms, natures and intensities of war have all been in constant flux throughout human history. “The semibarbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth century—all conducted war in their own particular way, using different methods and pursuing different aims” (On War, 586). Their characteristics are blind instinct, the play of probability, chance and pure reason, which form a continuum, as well as the purposes and objectives in war, which combine with danger, physical effort, nebulous intelligence and other forms of friction. It is trivial to demand postmodern nations to comprehend issues and their causes, to take prudent strategic action and to abandon a way of thinking that remains linked to the dimensions of classical state wars and is getting bogged down in the hustle and bustle of events of the day. In addition, numerous difficult obstacles have to be overcome in the real world to ensure that the strategic political focus is on the far-reaching employment of armed forces. This phenomenon can also be observed in the long-term pursuit of purposes both in all fields of politics and in major business enterprises. The majority of the current security challenges can be neither understood

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nor resolved in day-to-day politics. Having the courage to use one’s own mind, to see things in a wider context and question them, to define one’s own positions and to consider the big picture when structuring things is a pivotal demand of the philosopher Immanuel Kant and an essential idea of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. Kant destroys the illusion that there is truth without thinking. “Although Clausewitz’s program of studies included Kant`s writings, and he subsequently read the works of other systematic thinkers, he was anything but a trained philosopher” (Paret, 2015, 32). This observation must be heeded, especially since the challenges of the twenty-first century call for the political transformation process to begin now, the Cold War being history for more than a generation. What is needed in the twenty-first century is a recollection and application of strategic thinking and acting, a renewal of the Enlightenment, so to speak, which generates the courage required to focus one’s own mind and those of others on the future. There is no way of individual entities thinking about what tactics they can apply to optimise their own prospects of success anymore. Required is a prudent endeavour for a common strategy that provides for use of interdisciplinary intelligence and experience, for analytical searches for solutions to be conducted, for careful consideration to be given to critical objections and, finally, for ideas, initiative and courage to be shown. Decisions must be focused on achieving lasting results. An excellent way of developing strategies for solving complex sociopolitical and international problems is the intense interplay of creative, knowledgeable and experienced public figures, politicians, diplomats, business people and economic experts, scientists and military leaders. This applies to all fields of politics and business, though especially to security policy. The author of this book proceeds from the political, military, economic and social situation in the beginning of the twenty-first century. He examines select principles and insights of Clausewitz’s theory that can on the one hand serve as the basis for strategic thinking and action in a general sense and on the other hand can be exploited in a course of studies for future executives. This strong focus on the reality constitutes a new approach in the application of Clausewitz’s theory. A strategist thinks in broad contexts and focuses on the picture as a whole rather than on its parts. For him progress is a synonym for successful action, that is to say, specific action to achieve a higher purpose using the available means. According to Clausewitz, the ultimate purpose of every war is to achieve an advantageous peace. War encompasses the entire spectrum of military operations from armed observation in peacetime to total defeat of the enemy, and thus crisis, conflict and war as we conceive them today. This instrumental definition shall serve as the reference frame and the conceptual basis for this book. Whenever major deficits are diagnosed in the areas of strategy, the relation between purpose and means and the use of the military instrument, there are two ways of achieving long-term improvements in the situation. One way is to competently advise decision-makers so that they grasp what security challenges were important in their entirety, understand what the central elements of a strategy are and thus can find appropriate guidance for making their decisions. The final step involves presenting methods for making strategic decisions and ideas on how to

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organise and provide strategy consulting at the government level. The other is to provide up-and-coming executive personnel education in strategic thinking and action. In philosophy, genius is a mental benchmark. It combines intelligent, holistic thinking on a broad education basis with the ability to act rationally in pursuit of a particular purpose. Engaging in prudent, professional, creative and at the same time critical dialogue with policymakers requires a few more qualities, such as courage, imagination, sound judgement and clear personal standpoints. The demands a person must meet to be deemed a military genius or its business equivalent, a top executive, are very high. This is why theory-based education must be introduced for up-andcoming executive personnel. It, above all, requires a lot of persuading to be done with the present-day decision-makers in armed forces, governments and the business world and the issue to be made the subject of a broad public debate. As a Navy officer and scientist, the author was faced with the fundamental question about the rationality of military planning and the use of armed forces and was unable at first to find any convincing answers. What theoretical foundations and philosophies govern strategic action? Is the essence of things understood? Is thinking impartial and unprejudiced? How is criticism handled? Does reason rule? Are there clear standpoints established and are there decisions based on them prudent, courageous and far-reaching? Do I defend my standpoint convincingly and argue correctly? Given the fast pace of day-to-day life in that decade, most of these substantial questions seem to be utterly secondary and thus remain unanswered. People have a sense of deep-seated insecurity and dissatisfaction, but are also critical and curious. In his quest for theoretical foundations, the author has studied the works of Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Hegel, Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke, Mahan, Ruge, Liddell Hart and Aron. Clausewitz is in the author’s view the only one who examines the essence and rationality of strategy, looking at the nature of things in his attempt to glean new insights, and places his findings in a higher theoretical context, proceeding from what he learns in practice. Nevertheless, even he encounters immense opposition and substantial criticism. His main work On War is not easy to decrypt due to the profound and dichotomic way in which complementary pairs of terms and their relationships are presented. Despite this, the pith of his work is of exceptional value and a basis of singular significance both for the study of strategy and for strategic thinking and action. Items of fascinating, timeless knowledge on the one hand and contradictions and unclear or sketchy passages on the other constitute both an inspiration and an obstacle to studying the insights he gained almost 200 years ago, but they must on no account be generalised apologetically, idealised as doctrine or indeed canonised. My thoughts and doubts about the rationality of acts of policy lead to a practical question: How can strategic thinking be exploited in government, the armed forces and many other areas of society? In the mid-1980s, I served as an admiralty staff officer at the German Ministry of Defence, bearing responsibility for drafting the Konzeption der Marine (Naval Concept) and providing input for the Konzeption der Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr Concept), the Defence White Paper 1985 and the

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Militärstrategische Zielsetzung der Bundeswehr (Military Strategic Objective of the Bundeswehr). I started my work on each of these tasks with a blank sheet of paper. Nobody around me was able to give me a convincing answer when I asked for a definition of “concept”. Looking into it more closely, I realised that a concept was a clearly outlined basic idea, and nothing more. It is not a strategy, let alone a war plan. This vacuum with respect to strategic ideas and the deficits in strategic thinking are still a problem today. For example, the White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr was presented to the public as a strategy but in comparison with the equivalent American, British and French documents lacks the necessary compelling logic and clear statements on the relation between purpose and means expressed in Clausewitz’s core ideas. The Federal Ministry of Defence redefined the Federal Republic of Germany’s security policy interests in the Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (Defence Policy Guidelines, 2011). The degree to which they are implemented in the country’s national security provision remains to be seen. It took hundreds of years for the geocentric Ptolemaic world view to be replaced by the heliocentric view of Copernicus and Galileo. Devising a course of study in which the focus is no longer on opportunistic improvisation but on strategic thinking and action is also a long process, and one whose success is not assured at all. We can at any rate wonder when we will hear the words eppur si muove. Potsdam, Germany

Lennart Souchon

Bibliography German Federal Minister of Defence. (2011, 18 May). Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien. Nationale Interessen wahren - Internationale Verantwortung übernehmen – Sicherheit gemeinsam gestalten, Berlin. Paret, P. (2015). Clausewitz in his time: Essays in the cultural and intellectual history of thinking about war. New York: Berghahn Books. Rice, C. (2005, December 11). The promise of democratic peace. In The Washington Post. von Goethe, J. W. (2006). Maximen und Reflektionen. herausgegeben und mit einem Nachwort von Helmut Koopmann. Munich.

Acknowledgement

I want to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Klaus Olshausen for his tremendously motivating engagement and consistent excellent support and to Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, who helped me to navigate the project safely at all times. The English translation of the manuscript was accomplished with the superb professional skills of Marina Schultz and the excellent interpreters Kevin Hodsman, Mareike Sedlmeier and several others in the Federal Office of Languages. For more than 25 years, the University of Potsdam provided me with a grand setting to teach Clausewitz’s theory and its application to conflicts in Europe and Asia. I want to thank Oliver Heinicke, Prof. Dr. Yskert von Kodolitsch, Dr. Martin Wolff, Sascha Zwick and Martin Prokoph of the Clausewitz Network for Strategic Studies (CNSS) for their constructive remarks and critical comments about the Clausewitz’s theory. I want to thank Thomas Bantle, Prof. Dr. Christopher Bassford, Prof. Dr. Antulio Echevarria II, Thomas Hambach and James E. Monroe for their encouragement and advice. Very special thanks go to Mr. Niko Chtouris and Mr. Abdus Salam Mazumder. Their outstanding work and diligence pushed my book to completion. I wish to acknowledge the patience and assistance of my wife Ute. She has been all the time a continuous source of inspiration. For their wonderful support I thank my daughters Juliette countess of Erbach-Fürstenau, Babette Seule-Souchon and Harriet Souchon-Gresch.

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Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works on Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1 11 11 11

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Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The German Term Politik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works on Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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13 13 16 17 19 23 23 23

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The Belligerent Genesis of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Phenomenon of War and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The European World and Its Formative Strategists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Strategic Situation in Europe in the Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . Post-modern States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pre-modern and Disintegrating States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Modern States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clausewitz’s Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works on Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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25 25 27 35 39 40 40 43 45 45 45 46

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Prussia, Clausewitz and the Interpretation of His Works . . . . . . . . Prussia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Methods of Interpreting Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clausewitz from the Historical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

Clausewitz the Scholar of Military Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Understanding of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Holistic Interpretation of War with the Theory of Clausewitz . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clausewitz’s Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works on Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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58 60 62 62 64 66 66 66 68

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On War: Basic Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Fascinating Trinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Exegesis of the Fascinating Trinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Three-Dimensional Representation of the Fascinating Trinity . . . . . Appropriateness of Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Relations Between Purpose, Objective and Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Frictions, Probability and Chance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Frictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Fog of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Probability and Chance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Friction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Counteracting Frictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opportunities Due to Friction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Moral Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Military Genius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Soldier’s Courage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commander’s Boldness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . People’s Patriotic Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Military Virtues of the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Holistic Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preliminary Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clausewitz’s Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works on Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69 71 73 80 85 87 88 89 90 92 95 95 97 97 99 99 100 102 103 106 107 108 108 111 112 113 113 113 114

6

On War: Individual Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Method of Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115 116 120 121 123

. . . . .

. . . . .

Contents

xvii

Historical Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cause and Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosophical Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Politics, War and Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . War, Little War and People’s War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Absolute War and Limited War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Little War and People’s War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Primacy of Politics and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . War as an Instrument of Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Energy and Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Tasks of the Government and the Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . The Political Purpose and the Military Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Primacy of Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Theory and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Application of the Theory in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clausewitz and Jomini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Theorists and Pragmatists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategy as a Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategy as a Method of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategy as a Method of Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The War Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clausewitz’s Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works on Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

124 126 127 129 132 133 136 139 139 141 142 144 145 149 150 153 154 157 160 161 162 166 167 170 170 171 172

7

War in the Twenty-First Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Global Risks and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . War at Market Places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Collective Security Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The North Atlantic Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The German Bundeswehr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works on Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

173 173 176 181 182 183 184 185 185 189 189 189 190

8

Exemplary Implementation of Clausewitz’s Theory and Strategy Consulting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Examples for the Application of Clausewitz’s Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

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Contents

The Fascinating Trinity and the War in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The First Actor: The Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Second Actor: Afghan Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Third Actor: Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appropriateness of Means in the 2003 Iraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Relations Between Purpose, Objective and Means in the 2006 Lebanon War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Frictions Concerning USS Vincennes in 1988 and ANACONDA in 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clausewitz and Strategy Consulting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategy Consulting and War Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategic Thinking and Action in the Twenty-First Century . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works on Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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195 196 198 200 202 204 205

. 206 . 208 . . . . . . . . . .

209 210 211 212 214 215 216 219 219 219

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clausewitz’s Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works on Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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225 225 226 230

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Vom Kriege—German Terms and their English Translations in On War (Honig, 2007, 60) . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. .

15

Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3

The fascinating trinity in three dimensions . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . The fascinating trinity as a tetrahedron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The fascinating trinity as a tetrahedron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81 83 84

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3

Structure of on war: strategy, engagement, and war plan . . . . . . . . . . . Politics, war and peace . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . Purpose, objective, means and cooperation of government and military forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Relations between level of theory, purpose, means and warfare . . . Strategy, war plan, campaign plan, battle plan and corresponding responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

117 129

Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5 Fig. 8.1

144 165 169

Agenda for strategy consulting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract Souchon presents select lines of thought and insights of Clausewitz’s theory and methods of implementation to improve the strategic culture in the twentyfirst Century. This book pursues three objectives: The First is to present Clausewitz’s findings strictly based on his original work “Vom Kriege” (On War) from a presentminded perspective, interpret them in depth and highlight their timeless significance for understanding social conflicts. The Second is to expose the potential of the main elements in Clausewitz’s work and to show a methodology and depth of thought associated with strategic assessments in the twenty-first Century. The Third is to clarify whether these elements help in forming and implementing strategies and improving strategic culture as a whole. Souchon argues that this is the only appropriate approach to fathom the phenomena of twenty-first Century wars.

When the United Nations Security Council votes on 17 March 2011a no-fly zone in Libya, Germany, Russia, and China abstain. This is a debacle for German security policy because it fails to support its closest allies, the USA, France and the United Kingdom in an important decision, without any consulting taking place within the Atlantic Alliance, and snubs them in the way it handles the making of a singular decision. Another case of short-sighted strategic involvement is the armament and training of Kurdish forces fighting the Islamic State in northern Iraq beginning 2014. The consequence is the strengthening of Kurdish ambitions to form a united Kurdistan upsetting the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Similarly questionable is the German involvement in the civil war in Mali in 2016. This engagement is not the result of a sound strategic analysis but the attempt to help overstretched French forces. The interests and goals of German security policy have not yet been defined in the reunified Germany. Under constant pressure from the media, which Peter Sloterdijk aptly calls stress producers (Sloterdijk, 2011), action is taken on the basis of the priorities of day-to-day politics, often intermingled with departmental and party politics, rather than in line with long-term political purposes, let alone a higherlevel national strategy concept. Ministries struggling with bureaucratic busywork, © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Souchon, Strategy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0_1

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armed forces focused on day-to-day actions, political foundations and research institutions devoid of ideas and a scientific community concentrating on theory work mostly operate in isolation beside one another, though often seemingly against each other. The lack of specifics between the Chancellery and the ministries in the field of strategy, for example, the reality of interministerial staffing, party-political dictates and the basic overly cautious attitudes of some decision-makers reduce every result to the lowest common denominator. There is no courage to take important decisions with primary regard to the matters themselves. Multilateralism is a method in international relations, yet it is propagated as a strategy in German politics. Voting procedures in the European Union and NATO, which require every nation to approve decisions, force them to substantiate their positions. In Germany, however, the political will to define these positions does not exist. A national security strategy or grand strategy defines values, interests, risks, goals and methods of action at regular intervals, sets priorities, links the political will to the methods and means for implementing it and is a subject of public debate. Models in the use of such a procedure are to be found in France, the United Kingdom and the USA. A grand strategy is only practical if the public is informed consistently and thoroughly and given the opportunity to get involved. Intensive communication and critical discussion with all the institutions of political and social relevance are required to devise a strategy and ensure its continuity. If Germany could exist as a land of bliss, policy-making without a strategy would be a possibility. As it cannot, however, the lack of a strategy renders it a less oriented and often unpredictable actor in international politics in Europe, the North Atlantic world and at the global level. The transformation from a bipolar world order to a polycentric disorder opens powers such as China, Russia and India possibilities for their struggle to increase strategic influence in global politics. The situation is extremely dangerous due to Russia’s occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and East Ukraine and Chinas military outward reach for Islands in the South China Sea. Smaller nations like Iran, North Korea struggle for nuclear weapons is destabilizing regional orders. Japan, South Korea, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are forced to review their own political commitments. The security of the European states is threatened in the twenty-first Century by numerous state failures in North Africa and in the Broader Middle East. This opens the door in the Arab States for religious wars, organised crime and mass migration. Terrorist opponents take advantage of grey areas in which they generate initiatives and conduct their attacks where and when they choose. They are strongly influenced by religion, ideologies and the cultural traditions, disregard international legal norms and Western moral standards and often approvingly accept dying for their causes. The Western armies fielded to fight these adversaries are tangled to occidental principles, the strict observance of international law and are conducted under the public pressure to minimize fatalities and casualties. The tectonic shift in the nature of these armed conflict has not yet been fully grasped. The lengthy NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan is merciless in the way it reveals this failure.

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European Nations are particular affected by the lack of strategic culture. There are two ways to remedy this. One is to establish a modern and competent strategy consulting body for governments that is able to identify ex ante the main security risks and challenges and do the groundwork for strategic decisions to be made, proceeding holistically and looking to the future. The other is to provide up-andcoming executive personnel education in strategic thinking so that they learn how to do practical work with a greater strength of mind for the purpose of achieving political goals with the allotted means. Strategy consultation can only be successful if it calls for rational, matter-of-fact analyses and assessments and a methodical discussion and consideration of possible solutions prior to an event. A consultation project of this kind is difficult to implement as all the higher military and civilian educational institutions provide superficial instruction on the concepts and strategies of NATO, the European Union and select countries, but do not go into them in depth. In addition, major institutions tend not to teach their up-and-coming executive personnel to think for themselves, to engage in critical discourse and to act with courage, but rather to efficiently achieve pre-defined goals under stringent conditions. This does not permit holism, critical discussion and logical transparency. It is time to provide select future leaders targeted education that gives them a command of strategic thinking. How can this be achieved? First, it is necessary to define the German term Politik and the words war, primacy of politics and strategy. Then, it is necessary to define a standpoint and the resulting political purposes. What is true has to be distinguished from what is false and logically substantiated. In complicated areas of international politics, a stringent connection between theory and reality must be established. Finally, it is necessary to bring in approaches that take account of the character traits and leadership qualities of the political and military decision-makers, while not forgetting the influence of probability and chance. The wisdom of Clausewitz’s strategy theory extends far beyond the realm of security policy and can be applied both to a business enterprise’s disputes over markets or hostile takeovers and to the development of a value-based management culture within large companies. International interventions most often lack clearly stated political purposes. Equally important aspects are ultimate and intermediate goals, strict deadlines, and the ability to evaluate the opponent’s actions professionally and proactively during a mission and to respond to them effectively. Without a strategy and prior assessment of the relation between purpose and means, soldiers are ordered into action with a patchwork of tactical targets and in the end blamed for not having achieved the vaguely framed goals. What is called for is a method of thinking that is in line with Kant’s sapere aude. The ability to understand the challenges of today in their entirety, to structure them and to develop possible solutions to them is becoming an important resource in modern security policy affairs and setting standards in the selection and education of future elites. There is no modern, present-minded interpretation of Clausewitz’s method of thinking and pith of what he writes that supports the study of his principles and their application to problems related to international politics, the armed forces or the

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1 Introduction

economy in the twenty-first century. So far, there has only been sectoral research on the focal points with which, a classification scheme in which and intensity levels at which Clausewitz can be used for analysing a war and advising decision-makers. To holistically understand and evaluate concrete decision-making situations on the foundation of Clausewitz’s theory and develop options for strategic action, it is necessary to create a universally applicable edifice of ideas. Concrete notions on this issue are presented in the following section. This study offers strategy scholars a foundation for their studies of strategy based on Clausewitz’s theory in a clear and simple language. It is in addition a structured compendium that forms a theoretical foundation for specific lines of thought and action and develops distinct ideas for implementing them in present and future security policy affairs. The book starts with a political science style introduction to the subject of war as a part of social life and not of art or science. It reveals how late in the history of man unbridled conquests combined with the brutal expansion of power or the struggle of societies for survival became subjects of theoretical reflection. The history of strategy undoubtedly begins with the Greeks. Nevertheless, holistic definitions of strategy are not found until the eighteenth Century. We currently live in an extended period of peace, but a look at European history shows that this state is the exception rather than the rule. Many major wars of the past began with a number of minor ones that first flared up in separate trouble spots and only later combined to form devastating conflagration, with their strategic dimensions only having been grasped in hindsight. There are numerous minor wars today in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and South America. The inability to deal with these wars is blatant. This means that the dimensions and characteristics of the dangerous challenges of the early twenty-first Century have so far been neither recognised nor understood holistically. Hence, future consequences cannot be estimated soundly. This book examines and answers the question of what a strategist can learn from a social science thinker who developed his ideas in the context of his experiences in the Napoleonic era. It all depends on how Clausewitz’s analyses and findings are used. Formulated with philosophical acumen, the timeless axioms created by Carl von Clausewitz build upon a broad interpretation of the historical setting. His theory of war focuses on what is genuinely perceptible and can be verifiably accounted for and assessed by means of facts. This phenomenological approach, coupled with classical rationality, reveals the essence of war. Clausewitz deals with politics, war, peace and strategy in a holistic context and presents his findings with elaborate philosophical abstraction. This hermeneutic interpretation of reality, the resulting consequences and their abstraction are an important method of gaining knowledge. When applied to real events, his theory is of timeless value and indispensable to us in the twenty-first Century. This book depicts Carl von Clausewitz’s background, his development and the pith of what he states as a Prussian war theoretician. He benefits from a unique philosophical climate in Berlin. The plan to provide education in strategic thinking, strategic action and strategy development in the twenty-first Century does not hence start at scratch and can be implemented holistically and substantially if it is thought

1 Introduction

5

through, ordered, abstracted and framed along the lines of the pith of what Clausewitz states. My study presents an interpretation strictly oriented on Clausewitz’s “Vom Kriege” in correlation to select aspects of his theory from a twenty-first Century perspective. It argues that his theory can be applied in the methodical formation of strategies for responding to terrorist forms of war and the lack of power on the part of collective institutions and individual nations to do so effectively. My book is a result of the enhancement of the international reputation of Clausewitz’s work in the past few decades due to numerous representations and historical interpretations of it in German, English, French, Russian, Japanese and many other languages. There is a wide range of specialist literature on Clausewitz, the most prominent examples being the theoretical works of Hahlweg, Paret, Howard, Bassford, Aron, Schössler, Strachan and Echevarria II. In contrast, Carl von Clausewitz’s key findings and their operationalization are only discussed in a small segment of contemporary literature on war. The complexity of the aforementioned dichotomous statements and the extensive body of secondary literature, which mostly focuses on military history or the textual interpretation of the philosophical methodology, constitute a major obstacle to the implementation of Clausewitz’s work. I have no knowledge of any convincing text exegesis of On War—in a comprehensible, interesting and plausible fashion—coupled with hermeneutic interpretations of his findings that are based on a holistic perspective and are apt for analysing future challenges. This book has three objectives. The first is to present Clausewitz’s findings strictly oriented on his original work “Vom Kriege” from a present-minded perspective, interpret them in depth and highlight their timeless significance for understanding social conflicts. The second is to expose the potential of the main elements in Clausewitz’s work and to show the methodology and depth of thought associated with strategic considerations in the twenty-first Century. The third is to clarify whether these elements help in forming and implementing strategies and in improving the strategic culture as a whole. While often overlapping, these objectives also severely diverge. In other words, the intention is to use Clausewitz’s findings to fathom the phenomena of twenty-first Century wars. This is the only approach that enables these phenomena to be comprehended, tendencies and belligerent actors to be grasped and strategic thinking and action to be developed. As outlined before, this approach to analysing the theory of war is designed to serve as a seminal work for the education or self-education of future leaders—be they commanders, politicians, presidents or CEOs—or guide them in their private studies. Great commanders are not born as such—their knowledge and skills are the products of their intensive study of the theory of war and their practical experience. Likewise, strategies are not the fruit of inspiration but have to be developed methodically and purposefully on the basis of the ground-breaking findings that have evolved over the last few centuries. Here is a brief summary of this genesis. Thought starts to be given to the command of large armies about two thousand five hundred years ago, at the time of Confucius. The military objective of defeating an opponent without a fight is said

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to be an important insight of Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist (approx. 550–480 B.C.). His principles on waging war with circumspection are of timeless value. From the Greek thinkers to the Roman, from Machiavelli to Frederick the Great, numerous figures in history have sought to grasp the characteristics of war and put them down in writing. Most of these works can only be understood in the context of the period in which they were written and in association with the arsenals, military capabilities and tactics of their day and do not contain any statements that are of lasting importance to us. Two early nineteenth Century theoreticians on strategy Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini, established contrary schools of thought that are still highly relevant today. The two scholars include analytic observation and the demand for knowledge, reason and responsibility in political and military action in the development of theories on war. Both provide ways of thinking for analysing war that take account of both intellect and reason. Jomini is considered a systematician with respect to warfare who goes in almanac fashion and abides by the rules in structuring Napoleon’s campaigns in his mind, focusses his analyses on battles and publishes his set of rules and recommendations for the successful commander in The Art of War (1837). He has the unique ability to grasp all the facets and difficulties inherent in a strategic situation and to predict how it will develop. Before the Russian Campaign, Jomini forecasts operational and logistic bottlenecks and the possibility of failure to Napoleon I, but is not taken seriously. The disaster encountered by the French Army during the Russian Campaign (1812/13) and its subsequent rout confirm Jomini’s assessment (Cf. Langendorf, 2008, 243). A digression in the sixth chapter is devoted to his work. Effectively acting as an opposite to Jomini and his abidance by the rules, Clausewitz abstracts war on the theoretical level, distinguishes its core elements and phenomena and sets them in relation to the superordinate policy in On War. His terminological precision, logic, dichotomous way of thinking and careful consideration of the elements, which he combines in an abstract overview of the tendencies and characteristics of wars, bear important testimony to the history of ideas and enjoy high international recognition. Heuss honours Clausewitz’s work, saying that “because the intellectual exactitude of the book emphasises what is lasting and simple, the work of a logician who knows how to talk about his subject with linguistic force and yet with a kind of grace.” (Heuss, 1951, 67) In his analysis entitled “Clausewitz-Engels-Mahan: Grundriss einer Ideengeschichte militärischen Denkens” and published in 2009, Schössler calls for an in-depth study of Clausewitz’s findings: “What matters, though, is that I believe it takes an eye trained to understand Hegel or the entire classical philosophy to discover such dimensions in the text On War.” (Schössler, 2009, 106). This highlights the dilemma. The casual reader quotes Clausewitz à la carte to enhance the legitimacy of his arguments without taking the effort to fathom their deeper meaning. Others, such as Aron and van Creveld, distort Clausewitz’s statements by reducing the meaning of the Fascinating Trinity, as the German term Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit is now known in English, to the people, the army and the government and then dismissing him as an apologist for wars between countries

1 Introduction

7

and battles of annihilation. The British strategist Liddle Hart accuses Clausewitz of having expressed his theory of war in a far too abstract and complicated way. Without expanding on the substance of Clausewitz’s statements, he polemically says: “By the iteration of such phrases Clausewitz blurred the outlines of his philosophy, already indistinct, and made it into a mere marching refrain—a Prussian Marseillaise which inflamed the blood and intoxicated the mind. In transfusion it became a doctrine fit to form corporals not generals. . .and reduced the art of war to the mechanics of mass-slaughter.” (Liddle Hart, 1967, 355) This emotional criticism, which is based on dubious assumptions, reveals the differences in the levels of mental abstraction. Liddle Hart cultivates an image of military forces “tended to ensure that the forces were composed of good ‘fighting animals’.” (ibid. 353). Clausewitz’s ideas on how to comprehend war and strategy and his demands on commanders- or, by analogy, on decision-makers in politics and business—are above those of ‘fighting animals’ and are of lasting value to strategic thinking to this day. His book is neither a compendium of military doctrine, nor a field manual nor a dogmatic set of rules for supreme commanders. It is utterly wrong to abstract and classify his work as such. Clausewitz abstracts war across its spectrum as the continuation of politics and condemns any immature criticism in the Two Notes by the Author (On War, 69 f.— see excerpts in Chap. 4.1). Offering us a theory with philosophical arguments, he does not confine himself to the character of war, but also analyses human factors, the moral qualities of the commander—meaning his intellect and temperament—and the virtues of the army. He was not yet 24 years old when he developed his first theses and devises basic ideas on the subject of strategy to which he will adhere all his life. It is not until the end of his period of activity (approx. 1827–1830) that he manages to systematically integrate these ideas into an overarching whole (Cf. Aron, 1980, 25). Almost two hundred years later, there is still intensive interest in his theory, which lays bare the innermost characteristics of social conflicts and the very own relations in them. He comprehends the rational, irrational and emotional elements of war as a single phenomenon and war itself as an instrument of policy. Having carefully studied 130 campaigns and spoken about experiences to Gneisenau, who witnessed the fighting on the side of the 13 North American colonies opposing British colonial rule, Clausewitz defines the characteristics and dependencies of the wars waged during his era. Convincing in their logic and precision, though not always transparent, in their wording due to the language of his day, his lines of thought are so complex and comprehensive that they arouse great interest among military commanders, scientists, politicians, and even economists to the present day. In contrast to the theses of eighteenth and nineteenth Century philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Fichte and Kiesewetter, Clausewitz’s empirical analyses of war are grounded in his own experiences. He selects core elements of war and their relations and elaborates on them. His theoretical analyses and practical assessments, which he structures dichotomously and condenses deductively at varying levels of consideration, form a logical whole.

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On the other hand, Clausewitz does not leave us a consistent compendium, but an inductive collection of material in varying states of editing which he collected over decades, but did not put into any final order. Concentrating on the basic ideas helps to overcome many difficulties. Once the gist and characteristics of the most important arguments, principles and recommendations are laid bare, timeless conclusions can be drawn. Clausewitz provides the intellectual assistances for this. For our scientific and military analysis purposes, we use a selection of basic elements of his theory to comprehend the paradigmatic wars of the twenty-first Century and understand their characteristics. In times of insecurity or radical political change or in view of dangerous combinations of risks, studying the pith of what he wrote gives a lot of food for thought and valuable insights that help us to grasp the essence of war, the overall situation, important factors, frictions and demands on the moral qualities of the actors systematically and holistically, to show how they bear relation to each other and to evaluate them. Of course, the train of thought, argument, choice of words and style of writing of a German classic cannot meet modern expectations of language. It is rather a knowledge of history and philosophy, a great skill in abstract thinking and a certain feel for language that are of particular advantage for interpreting his work. Carl von Clausewitz is a Prussian war theoretician who describes the essence of war and synthesises the dichotomous acquisition of knowledge about war in the form of the Fascinating Trinity, which combines primordial violence and the play of probability and chance with the instrument of policy (See Chap. 3). This description and synthesis are unique in that they offer intellectual freedom for strategic thinking and action. They reveal the characteristics of events in their entirety, permit hermeneutical access to the rationality of purposeful action while account is taken of the effects of probability and chance and allow a grasp to be gained of the impact of emotionality and moral factors on the actual course of each war. In accordance with Hegel‘s logic of essence, they are an enduring link between the explicit state of war and the implicit events in a war. They are an intermediary between being and acting in war. Clausewitz’s ideas are particularly helpful for specifically identifying the essential features in complex twenty-first Century decision-making situations, structuring them and developing possible courses of action. This interdisciplinary interpretation of his theory is developed as an independent approach in this book. Experience shows that, things being as they are, knowledge, understanding and mastery of Carl von Clausewitz’s ideas enable effective structures to be established for estimates of the situations in today’s wars in Asia, the Middle East, Africa as well as South America, a profound understanding of the factors to be gained and holistic assessments of the actors involved to be made and prevent superficial entanglement in the backward-looking way of thinking that is common today. When the tendencies and factors of the Fascinating Trinity, for example, are applied to theatres of war around the world, it is possible to identify the opponent, the play of forces and the impacts of primordial violence, hatred and enmity and to evaluate their relations in terms of an overarching whole from the points of view of a politician and a commander. When the situation in an international operation is

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complex, analysing it by means of the Fascinating Trinity, the appropriateness of means, which is established by comparing one’s own capabilities with those of the opponent, and the relation between purpose, objective and means can foster clarity of thought in strategic thinking and substantially improve individual judgement. This logical sequence of steps, from the theory to specific case studies and practical application, can yield key findings for shaping future security policy. If this is achieved, the admittedly difficult discursion into Clausewitz’s theory can be considered highly successful. This study is structured so as to present the development of strategic thinking on the basis of the pith of what Clausewitz stated, with the Fascinating Trinity as their synthesis, and to postulate how advantageous use could be made of it in the present day. The first chapter outlines the history of Europe as a belligerent genesis up to the tectonic changes following the East-West confrontation from the political science point of view. The very first strategic question concerning the motives for and causes of war renders it interesting to look at Prussia and the French Revolution because the relationship between the middle classes and war is still the determining social element of war today. In the twenty-first century, mass-army wars between countries fighting to defend their territories against a clearly identified enemy have become a rare fringe issue. They have been replaced by hybrid wars in geographically remote regions against terrorist groups. The opponent fights covertly, using light weapons and taking advantage of his familiarity with the local conditions. He learns fast and is quick in adapting his action to changes in the situation. Fighting such an opponent is a very difficult challenge. The fundamental change in the character of wars at the beginning of the twenty-first Century calls for commanders to be educated in strategic thinking and—building on this—the method of waging war to be modified. The use of Clausewitz’s theory in strategic analyses of future wars demands two steps to be taken that provide the necessary knowledge: The first one, taken in the fourth chapter, involves the portrayal of the situation in Prussia at the beginning of the nineteenth Century, the life and work of Carl von Clausewitz in the light of his day and the belligerent and philosophical milieus in which he socialises. Previously a great power, Prussia is degraded to a French satellite state after its defeat in 1806. The end of Prussia’s independence and rational politics and its vassal-like submission to Napoleon’s sceptre inspire enormous reform in both the social domain and the military that is backed up by a revolution in education. Prussia’s social reorganisation takes place in a climate of political creativity and is marked by an immense intellectual profundity. This is then followed by a discussion of three interpretations of Clausewitz’s theory: the historical, the philosophical and the present-minded interpretations. In the subsequent chapters, primarily the third interpretation, the one related to the present, combines with the profound understanding of meanings of philosophical words and of reality as a process to form a holistic basis for analysing and assessing wars and the consequences for strategic thinking in the future.

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The fifth chapter focuses on what are the known and most frequently quoted characteristics and pith of On War from the strategy point of view: the Fascinating Trinity, the appropriateness of means, the relation between purpose, objective and means, the frictions as well as the moral factors and the virtues of the army. They are subjected to a profound and holistic textual interpretation from a reality-based point of view. Success is achieved in interpreting the entire content of On War because text passages from throughout the book are arranged according to their subject and interpreted within the overall context. The sixth chapter contains explanations of the elementary notions that constitute the key building blocks of Clausewitz’s theory: form and content, types of wars, government and armed forces, theory and practise, strategy and war plan. It shows how they relate to each other and features conclusions. The seventh chapter describes characteristics of twenty-first Century hybrid wars in the light of global networking, the confrontation between the rich and the poor, limited resources and climate change. Combinations of fundamental Islamist hyperterrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states and organised crime that are intensified by cyberspace attacks are forcing the Western community to now reassess all strategic approaches thoroughly, instead of only rudimentarily, as it has done so far. Sight has been lost in recent years of the exceptional importance of strategy for long-term success in coping with the problems posed by purpose-based political practice. Well-founded evaluations of factual information and decision-making procedures that take account of all factors of social life are non-existent at the strategy level. These striking deficits are known and rudimentary attempts to remove them by means of tactical-level activities are being made. In establishing excellence clusters, the Clausewitz Network for Strategic Studies has embarked on a promising path to counter them permanently. In the eighth chapter, the interpretation of Clausewitz’s war theory is applied to the situations in a selection of wars at the beginning of the twenty-first Century. His basic ideas are shown to be assisting substantially in reforming strategic assessments of current wars. Concrete conclusions are drawn on how Clausewitz’s theory can be used to educate future strategists and to establish a new culture in strategic thinking and action. Finally, a methodological approach to government-level strategy consulting is presented. The objective of my book is to remove strategic deficits in post-modern states in accordance with Clausewitz’s doctrine. This requires presenting an intellectual foundation for a strategy culture in the twenty-first Century and offering a course of study that educates the minds of future leaders and commanders. “Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.” (On War, 141) It is essential that the knowledge and holistic way of thinking conveyed are unique from today’s point of view, in conformity with the pith of what Carl von Clausewitz wrote and combined with practical experience so as to lead to the acquisition of mastery. The key finding of Clausewitz’s theory “is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self – education.” (On War,

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141) On War is written by Clausewitz as a libretto for the education of commanders. I have written this study to flashlight through the complexity of his work and to operationalise his findings with regard to the challenges in the twenty-first century in a credible and comprehensible way. It is intended to bridge the gap between findings of the early nineteenth Century and strategy of our times. This book opposes the denunciation of Clausewitz’s work as a set of outdated instructions for a Ludendorff-style total war. Due to its sober analysis, the focus of which is on the essence of Clausewitz’s theory, and the conclusions drawn for wars in the twenty-first century, it also counters any apologetic or doctrinaire glorification. Finally, “especially the most abstract terms cannot be understood without the historical experiences that have gone into them.” (Senghaas, 1980, 335) A number of terms need to be clarified in order to make this study easier to comprehend. This is done in the following chapter.

Bibliography Works on Clausewitz Aron, R. (1980). Clausewitz: Den Krieg denken. Frankfurt a.M.: Propyläen-Verlag. Heuss, T. (1951). Deutsche Gestalten. Studien zum 19. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Wunderlich. Langendorf, J.-J. (2008). Krieg führen: Antoine-Henri Jomini. Zürich: Vdf Hochschulverlag. Liddle Hart, B. H. (1967). Strategy. New York: Praeger. Schössler, D. (2009). Clausewitz-Engels-Mahan: Grundriss einer Ideengeschichte militärischen Denkens. Berlin: Dümmler. Senghaas, D. (1980). Rückblick auf Clausewitz. In G. Dill (Ed.), Clausewitz in Perspektive. Materialien zu Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege (pp. 334–353). Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein.

Further Literature Sloterdijk, P. (2011, April 20). Japan hätte eine Dosis deutsche Angst gut getan. Welt am Sonntag.

Chapter 2

Terminology

Abstract Souchon focus is on the essence of Clausewitz’s theory, and the conclusions drawn for conflicts in the twenty-first century, it also counters any apologetic or doctrinaire glorification or unreflected criticism. Souchon shows that the wellknown English translation of Clausewitz’s book by Howard and Paret title On War contains many inaccuracies. These liberal translations lead to ambiguities, misunderstandings and misinterpretations. The key terminology of Clausewitz’s original German book get new interpreted from today’s point of view. This is necessary in order to allow a basic understanding to be established of the essence of Clausewitz’s writings, which date from the early nineteenth century. A thoughtful reflection of the key terminology—including their historical background—is presented in this chapter.

Prior to an analysis of the basic elements of Clausewitz’s theory, it is useful to clarify the German term Politik (politics, policy and polity) and the notions of strategy and war from today’s point of view in order to allow a basic understanding to be established of the essence of Clausewitz’s writings, which date from the early nineteenth century.

The German Term Politik The German term describes the sum of all the attempts made to shape public life. It must be seen as a continuous process of rational behaviour and purposeful action in which states rival with each other over the assertion of their ideas and achievement of their goals and in which they are influenced from both within and without (Cf. Haftendorn, 2007). Politik is a time-based process in which necessary decisions are made after interest-based options have been examined and the limitations on means have been taken into account. In modern European states, Politik can be categorised by subject areas (e.g., foreign, defence and education policy), by © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Souchon, Strategy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0_2

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decision-making levels (e.g., European, national or regional politics) and by interest groups (e.g., parties, trade unions or churches). Having long been so in the Anglo-Saxon countries, it is now understood generally that the term Politik has three dimensions. In the sense of the English word policy, it is used to denote longer-term programmes of state or social relevance based on interests, general values and world views. In the sense of the English word politics, it furthermore stands for purposeful action within an overarching whole aimed at forming a will and making and implementing decisions (e.g., on education, healthcare and defence). Finally, in the sense of the English word polity, Politik is reflected in political institutions and structures established in accordance with universally binding rules of social communities or states, e.g., in parties, in a cabinet, in ministries and in parliament). (Cf. Strickmann, 2008, 74 ff.) Clausewitz sees Politik as the intelligence of the personified state, but does not substantiate his view. He uses the term to denote long-term political orientation and specific political action. Politik is frequently found in On War, while Staatspolitik (state policy) is used only once. “One clings to the word ‘government’ without recognising that Clausewitz takes it to mean the political leadership in general.” (Paret, 2008, 2) Paret distinguishes between Politik and Regierung (government) while emphasizing the general connection between them. He argues that Clausewitz gives the impression of state policy and government meaning one and the same thing: “That at all times, even in the case of a people without complex political institutions, the same interdependencies between war and policy exist and need to be analysed, no matter whether it is a prehistoric pastoral tribe or, as he puts it, ‘semibarbarous Tartars’, an empire or a nineteenth century republic.” (ibid.) This interpretation is important because numerous critics wrongly cite the term Politik as proof that Clausewitz’s work is solely applicable to the level of states. Clausewitz similarly uses the term state policy in his Two Notes by the Author (On War, 69 f.). He refers to war as the continuation of state policy, an act carried out by a cohesive community that is formed by a common politico-social constitution (Cf. Delbrück, 1907, 1 ff.). “It can be taken as agreed that the aim of policy is to unify and reconcile all aspects of internal administration as well as of spiritual values, and whatever else the moral philosopher may care to add. Policy, of course, is nothing in itself; it is simply the trustee for all these interests against other states. That it can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there.” (On War, 606). Clausewitz generally defines policy as being simply the trustee for all these interests against other states. He generally regards policy “as representative of all interests of the community.” (On War, 607). Woermann concludes about the humanist Clausewitz: “By understanding war as the continuation of this very policy by the means of force, he also sees peace as a political act of progressive reconciliation of interests which dispenses with this very means of force.” (Woermann, 2007, 35) Clausewitz distinguishes himself by his great analytical precision because his complementary classification into war and peace includes all the stages in between.

The German Term Politik Hahlweg Vom Kriege: Begriffe Niederwerfung Zweck Ziel Akt (Final) Halbding Politik Politisch Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit Takt des Urteils Hauptlineamente Moralische Größen

15 Howard/Paret On War: English Translation defeat, overthrow, disarming, overcome, subjugation aim, object, purpose, end, goal, requirement military aim action halfthings, half-hearted war politics, policy policy, political, statesman, statecraft wondrous trinity, miraculous trinity, paradoxical trinity fascinating trinity judgement, intuitive judgement, discriminate judgement, instinct of judgement lines of thought, main ideas, main features morals, moral factors.

Fig. 2.1 Vom Kriege—German Terms and their English Translations in On War (Honig, 2007, 60)

In their path—breaking English version of Vom Kriege, Howard and Paret translate the term Politik by policy and rarely by politics. Due to what is classified as a liberal translation and an excellent interpretative choice of words, they succeed in improving the readability of the English version compared to the original text. Inaccuracies in the translation of the original text are deliberately accepted. Single German terms are often rendered by several English words (See Fig. 2.1). The fact that several English words are used for one and the same German term creates some inconsistencies and inaccuracies that can lead to ambiguities, misunderstandings and misinterpretations. Clausewitz’s choice of terms is a mystery anyway. For example, he uses the term Zweck (purpose) for every matter he wants to describe and analyse. He uses it 219 times altogether in his work, though without elaborating on its connotations. There is no correlation to be found in his work between purpose and the orders or goals that may arise in politics and have to be achieved by military force. Nor is there any indication of purpose being tied to a specific form of government: a federal republic, monarchy or dictatorship. In this study, the word purpose in the relation between purpose, objective and means is correlated with the political end state that has to be achieved. Ultimate and intermediate goals are derived from the overarching political purpose and pursued at the level of the commander and his army. This correlation is chosen with an eye to the clarity of thought and hermeneutic comprehensibility of the exegesis of On War. It initially excludes the goals in other fields of politics. The situation is similar as regards the German term Instrument, which is used very frequently in the text and translated into English as instrument and tool. The famous phrase “War is an instrument of policy” (On War, 605) implies that Clausewitz considers war a means serving a specific political purpose. Elsewhere, he uses the term to describe actions or tactical matters, writing, for example, “A march that is not part of an engagement is thus a tool of strategy” (On War, 129) or “A flank position . . . is a very effective instrument . . .” (On War, 416). In present-day parlance, the term instrument is mostly used in the sense of a tool. This follows a certain inherent logic. Further inaccuracies in language and inconsistencies in

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definitions can be found in the use of the terms frictions, probability and chance. These are examined more closely in Chap. 5. In contrast to Vom Kriege a multitude of copies of the English version, entitled On War, have been sold, translated into virtually every language and are used all over the world as an important basic document for interpreting Clausewitz, even though the English version does not handle the terms with the same precision as Clausewitz’s original text. Translating an English interpretation of Clausewitz into German, together with text passages from Kant and Hegel, and then publishing it is going entirely too far.

Strategy The discussion of the term strategy calls for account to be taken of the host of historical connotations and modern interpretations that exist. The endeavour to comprehend wars and to systemise conclusions is in line with the mechanistic world view described above. After the Thirty Years’ War, cabinet wars and wars between countries are primarily an instrument of the ruling monarchs, who use armed forces in a purposefully rational manner to impose their political will. The world wars of the twentieth century link strategy to almost all areas of human existence as a result of the global alliances that they prompt and the scale of the destruction that the area bombing causes. Total mobilisation is followed by total war. The development of the nuclear bomb constitutes another quantum leap, providing man with a weapon suitable for destroying large parts of the global civilisation. A strategy that is confined to waging a nuclear war is of less value. The manifestation of international Islamist terrorism, as mentioned earlier, the disintegration of states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are combining to form an unexpectedly complex threat scenario that is formatively influenced in its development by the acceleration of time—meaning the speed of change—and exacerbated by cyberspace attacks. Taking strategic action in the twenty-first century means combining the use of global, transnational, regional and intra-societal methods in media and financial worlds that are networked in real time. Migration and refugee movements, the proliferation of weapons, international crime, vulnerable sea lines of communication and export markets as well as the vicious circle of poverty, overpopulation, the overexploitation of resources, corruption and violence, accompanied by huge natural disasters and climate change, are all factors that must be taken into account in a strategic analysis. These global combinations of risks are being intensified by the economic and military development of future powers such as the People’s Republic of China and the populous democracy of India. In view of these multifaceted dangers, there is a need for the innermost aspects of strategy to be decoded and methods of exerting influence and shaping developments to be established and communicated in a public discourse via mass media and social network resources. With an eye to the link between purpose and means, there is a

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need for strategic thinking to be remodelled on the basis of the following questions: What action do I take if something unexpected happens? What alternatives do I have and what reserves are at my disposal? What can be seen instead is that refuge is being sought in short-term political hyperactivity and illusion, and this is no longer adequate to deal with the dimensions of the problems in the twenty-first century. The change not only in the quality of events, but also in their dynamics demands a critical look to be taken at current methods of thinking and acting. Some decisive prerequisites must be met to successfully implement political ideas against the will of rivals. Purposively rational political goals must be defined as guideline; the required means must be provided; the supreme commanders must have the necessary skills. Their acquisition of the necessary knowledge and skills is the result of years of intensive training and education aimed at imparting the theory behind what they experience in practice. The proper skills are the result of a combination of sound training and education as well as practical experience. Strategic plans should comprise a variety of holistic options, and the most advantageous one should be implemented. If this path is barred, alternatives and branch plans to which careful thought has been given beforehand must be put into place. A synergy between the government and the armed forces can only be achieved on the basis of purpose, a basic knowledge of each other’s characteristics and rational cooperation, with account being taken of important factors. Such a synergy equally obliges the government and the armed forces to assess the strategic situation jointly and requires use to be made of the armed forces’ expertise in examining the possible courses of action, presenting the consequences of specific approaches and developing balanced recommendations that then serve as a basis for making decisions that fit into the overall political context. The primacy of politics applies. Following the in-depth discussion and careful consideration of the options, the government decides on the courses of action that are to be taken. There is a wide misconception about this. The primacy of politics is a dynamic principle that must be conceived as focussing on the result. While the government and the armed forces are equally involved in the close and careful assessment of matters, it is the government that makes the decisions. The primacy of politics does not prohibit the armed forces from speaking and thinking about security issues and must not be misinterpreted as the primacy of politicians.

Military Strategy A strategy, generally speaking, links will and action. It is the transformation of policy into a military course of action and specifies its purpose, the way it is to be implemented and the required means must be assigned. Strategy takes account of the interactive action of an equal opponent and the frictions that arise from events. It covers conceptual, organisational and mental dimensions of the decision-making process and contains rules. It can only really be used for the specified overarching

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purpose, with all the relevant problem areas and their complex dimensions being taken into consideration in a war plan. Decoding the inner aspects of military strategy requires recognition of the characteristics of the overall situation regarding the governments and people involved, the strengths and weaknesses of the courses of action likely to be taken by the enemy, the possible effects of probability and chance, and this must be done in an hostile environment influenced by culture, religion and tradition. Without comprehension, every decision-making process and every strategy are doomed to failure. Taking action in an environment marked by friction, under pressure due to the inability to foresee events and under extreme physical strain requires a combination of mental and emotional strength. A strategy is therefore a theory applied to coordinate diverse fields of activity in such a way as to maintain the ability of self-determination and achieve essential overarching purposes even in the face of resistance and friction (See Chap. 6). A military strategy is the tool that enables the government to exert a guiding influence on the armed forces with regard to warfare. It is an interactive link between the government and the military. Clausewitz uses the term war plan synonymously with military strategy to refer to a mechanism that linked the government with the commander and his forces. In compliance with the primacy of politics, a war plan defines the objective of the use of military force and determines the appropriate means for achieving it. The classic idea that a military strategy is a heavy tome and developed meticulously by a general staff over a lengthy period of time seems completely absurd in the information age, dominated as it is by Google, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Networked competences and holistic synergetic thinking and action in near-real time will be the tools for developing strategies in the future. A military strategy is the architectural keystone in the understanding of war: “The art of using military force against an intelligent foe(s) towards attainment of policy objectives.” (Lonsdale, 2007, 239) A crucial prerequisite for framing a military strategy is that of developing the skill of strategic thinking. This process begins with studying the wisdom of famous strategists such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini. “This is the science (from the Latin Scientia), the corpus of knowledge handed down by the masters. The challenge for the strategists is to apply such science to the art of making strategy in the crucible of modern conflict—precisely where schools of higher military education must make their contribution.” (Marcella, 2010, 90) Learning lessons from the history of war is considered essential for educating future strategists. In this time of rapid change and great complexity, however, their findings cannot be trusted without question (Cf. Boston, 2003, 46 f.). This book focuses on the holistic theory of the use of military means for purposes of state policy. However, the multidimensional and fundamental findings that Clausewitz noted about as a reasoning soldier must by no means be seen as referring exclusively to supreme commanders of the armed forces. As stated earlier, his work remains valid for all conflicts within society that are fought out between opponents who go to great lengths and accept high risks to prevail. It equally applies to processes in large business and social organisations in which individuals, groups or institutions rival with each other to achieve their own goals and assert their own

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ideas and, in doing so, are influenced by probability and chance both from within and without. What renders the validity of Clausewitz’s theory timeless are the depth and breadth of his thoughts on the topic of war. His theory must be judged holistically to reflect the conflict between the mind, imagination and blind instinct. The notion of war thus goes far beyond the command of armed forces in battle and is evaluated with an eye to the character, strengths and weaknesses of the governments involved, the characteristics of the peoples and the capabilities of the allies. By the way, the term commander refers to the highest authority in the field. It might be at the level of an army corps a four-star general. In low intensity conflicts, when troops are dispersed in small units over a large area, it might be a battalion or company commander or in the navy the commanding officer of a frigate, who is in charge. Clausewitz addresses with his theory this level of responsibility.

War War refers to a state in which two or more hostile groups fight out a conflict by means of force. It is not a game of chess played by prudent strategists, but a serious test of strength conducted between antagonistic wills in pursuit of a superordinate policy, the dynamics being extremely challenging and the risks high. The interactive influence of probability and chance calls for prudent reactions in which human weaknesses are a significant factor and are used for personal advantage (See Chap. 5). The overarching purpose of war remains that of establishing a peace in which one’s own interests are permanently safeguarded. In his early works, Clausewitz acknowledges the existence of a continuous uniform history of strategy that has evolved despite all the changes in the sociological conditions. Basically, the nature of man and the “idiosyncrasy and autonomy” of the methods of action and means used in each case will reappear across time and again in any thorough analysis of historical processes (Rothfels, 1980, 63, quoted in Schmidt, 2007, 29). In this regard, Clausewitz follows his contemporary Herder and his ideas on the history of man: “For however military manoeuvres may change, with change of weapons, times and the circumstances of the world; the spirit of man, which invents, deceives, conceals its purposes, attacks, defends, advances, retreats, discovers the weaknesses of an enemy, and in this way or that avails itself of advantages, or abuses them, will remain at all times the same.” (ibid.) The essential motives of human action in a war do not even alter in a climate of high complexity and dynamic developments. Clausewitz sees war as a part of the human condition and of social life. It is a non-linear, dynamic process of action and reaction which has its own grammar, but not its own logic. A war begins when a protagonist under attack uses weapons to defend himself. The incident develops into a duel. The longer a war lasts, the greater the impact becomes of dangers, efforts, probability and chance and the interaction between them, and they alter its course. War must never be isolated from primary political purpose, or it becomes senseless. Clausewitz’s concept of war thus

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encompasses any form of violent test of strength aimed at achieving objectives in the face of resistance and is an intellectual instrument that provides assistance in gaining a deep understanding of it. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, armed forces of post-modern states, the quality of whose equipment and training is superior to that of most armies in the world, are employed in many regional conflicts around the globe. The prevailing ideas and operational procedures have been designed for battles between large land forces supported by air forces and naval fleets. In recent decades, numerous theories have been developed to provide terms for and analyse global war-related events in the twenty-first century. Terms like Neue Kriege (new wars) coined by Kaldor and Münkler and Low Intensity Conflicts by van Creveld are contributions in which individual aspects of present-day wars are elevated to the status of characteristics, but which do not holistically cover the phenomena of modern war. In the discourses and regulations of the US Army, modern forms of warfare are categorised as threeblock, full spectrum, asymmetric or counter insurgency warfare. The reception of Clausewitz’s theory has focused on the search for axioms that would help to comprehend current wars. These wars are constantly changing, and none of these concepts reflects their essence because the relation between practice and theory is insufficient. The term operations other than war used in US doctrines such as the Doctrine for Joint Operations (1993), Joint Publication 3-0, or the US Army’s Capstone Manual, Operations (2001), Field Manual 3-0, is entirely unsuitable as battle, a key characteristic of war, is overgeneralised by the term network-enabled operations used in the doctrines (Cf. Kinross, 2004, 35). The globalisation of information, communication, mobility and transport is reducing the importance of the factors of space and time and connecting all the continents. International terrorism is exploiting this to develop a decentralised way of operating that can be implemented with simple weapons, little education and training and a flat command hierarchy. The armed forces in Europe have not yet been able to develop effective counter-strategies and are confining themselves to conducting limited defensive operations and enhancing the performance of existing weapon systems. Even if they refocus on classical wars between countries in terms of their leadership culture, operational procedures and training and assignment cycles they do not prepare for wars in the twenty-first century in globally connected civilizations. Islamist terrorism is not a new form of violence, but globalisation is enabling it to assume a distinctness and degree of effectiveness that surpass anything hitherto imagined. Global violent actors recruit fighters by offering an ideology, myths of success, sources of income and prospects. Islamist terrorism focusses on the fight against the West’s values, interventions and continuing presence in the Muslim world. It does not offer any visions, but is aimed at introducing a deeply religious model of society. Without civil liberties, legal security and an intact civil society, supported by sound economic prospects, the assumption of power by Islamist terrorists is nothing short of a relapse into despotism, oppression of the people and a backward society. The situation is exacerbated by a lack of capacity for technical innovation and a disastrous economic outlook. Such a state, which is also faced with

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the rapid growth of its population, is not viable in the long term. It will become a preferential breeding ground for Islamist extremists. Terrorist fighters avoid open battles and prefer a form of fighting in which they operate in confined areas and for limited periods of time. This severely impedes the effective use of superior military technology and sometimes even rules it out. Using this method of fighting, they confront the intervening powers over lengthy periods of time, mostly operating at a low level of intensity, but occasionally engaging in minor high-intensity battles. They have the initiative on their side, use the element of surprise and decide whether terrorist or conventional action is to be taken and become highly skilled and adaptable in the conduct of operations. The result is hybrid war a form of war in which conventional, irregular and terrorist acts of violence merge into one another (Cf. Hoffmann, 2009, 5 f.). Traditional forces of western States are neither prepared, organised nor trained to counter these threats effectively. Completely different is the situation in Russia, their military forces have drawn first consequences and train their forces accordingly in hybrid war scenarios. Altogether, islamistic terrorism is a key cause of the change in strategy development and the necessity of new methods for it. Terrorism in its current form, however, is merely an expression of the considerable changes that have taken place in the forms of violence used. It plays a decisive part in the way the West perceives the threat and this book focusses on its extreme form. Traditional wars between pre-modern states continue to exist alongside this form of war, but their essence has been fathomed. A common feature of wars is the use of force for a superior purpose. Can this fight against international Islamist terrorism be understood as a war? The English term war is commonly used for quite a broad spectrum of societal conflicts and includes, for example, the war against terror. Mastering a hybrid war requires initiating a process that leads to the acquisition of knowledge on it. To this end, Clausewitz offers the following train of thoughts: He sees war as a chameleon that maintains its outer form, but constantly changes its characteristics. This meandering change in war is the starting point of his reflections. He succeeds in theory in approaching the dynamic transformation and events in war from a holistic angle, in defining its characteristics and in substantiating them by creating a context. The current terrorist threat lends his theory a whole new significance. It assists to answer the question as to what the essence of war is and what basic tendencies, characteristics and relations it comprises. Building on these phenomena, it is possible to use the terms denationalisation, asymmetric warfare and autonomisation to characterise future wars (Cf. Münkler, 2003, 10 f.). The term war as used by Clausewitz describes a state that is initially characterised by a duel. At society level, the interactive process of imposing one’s will on the opponent, who, in turn, wants to do just the same, is seen as interaction between two strategic wills in the context of the Fascinating Trinity. The theory of war is floating in a three-dimensional field of force of specific characteristics and tendencies. In irrational factors such as primordial hatred and violence and the non-rational factors of chance, probability and pure reason, Clausewitz sees a “systematic theory of war, full of intelligence and substance” (On War, 61) which goes far beyond the rational

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nature of an instrument of policy and describes its inherent characteristics. In the Fascinating Trinity, he captures the essence of the instability that exists in war, which is of timeless validity. Strategic thinking and action will experience a renaissance if the objectively distinguishable characteristics of current wars and the interaction between them can be used as a basis for grasping and analysing these wars holistically and drawing conclusions about them. Clausewitz conceives war as ranging from armed observation to battle between military units in distant provinces and large-scale wars aimed at achieving the utter defeat of the enemy. He distinguishes war from other conflicts as follows: “We therefore conclude that war does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences; rather it is part of man’s social existence. War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed—that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts.” (On War, 149) What is unique about Clausewitz is that he reckons that the opponent will implicitly act rationally in his rationality and be an equal match in the dynamics of war. It would seem pointless for a commander to try and defeat an overwhelmingly powerful enemy in an open battle in order to impose his will on him. This is the point at which Clausewitz brings in the little war and people’s war. It can force a superior opponent to abandon his intent if it is fought over a lengthy period of time. The concept of war as used by Clausewitz includes any level of intensity of trials of military strength conducted by two antagonists with the aim of achieving their objectives in the face of resistance under the most difficult conditions. In the section entitled The Maximum Use of Force, Clausewitz warns against one side surrendering in an armed conflict for the purpose of limiting violence: “Kindhearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.” (On War, 75) Every decision a government makes to assert its interests by force using the instrument of war must be taken with great earnestness, care and a high measure of responsibility. A philanthropic war that is waged with one-sided good nature is a contradiction in terms and remains a grave error. The term war, which lacks any subliminal moralising or legalising meaning, is seen here as a metaphysical term of analysis drawn from the field of political science. In this book, war in the twenty-first century is used as a generic term that encompasses the use of military force in low-intensity and protracted fighting against international Islamist terrorists, in guerrilla wars or in modern interstate conflicts in accordance with external security provision concepts. This use of force is tailored to political, military, social, economic, ethnic and international law objectives. War is seen as a form of conflict that includes cooperative and coercive measures taken between states or social groups. Morally speaking, it is despicable and evil. Nevertheless, wars also resolve political conflicts and lead to stability and peace (Cf. Luttwak, 1999, 36). According to the theory of the philosopher Kant, societies overcome war as a state of nature by means of contracts defining and protecting the rights and duties of the individual vis-à-vis the state. His idea was that war would

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ultimately be eliminated by an all-ruling universal government. Though being far from it at present, it would be good if this idea were one day to become a reality.

Bibliography Works on Clausewitz Boston Consulting (Eds.). (2003). Clausewitz-Strategie denken. Munich. Honig, J. W. (2007). Clausewitz’s on war: Problems of text and translation. In H. Strachan & A. Herberg-Rothe (Eds.), Clausewitz in the twenty-first century (pp. 56–73). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kinross, S. (2004). Clausewitz and low-intensity conflict. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 27(1), 35–58. Lonsdale, D. (2007). Clausewitz and information warfare. In H. Strachan & A. Herberg-Rothe (Eds.), Clausewitz in the twenty-first century (pp. 231–250). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Paret, P. (2008, February). Anmerkungen zu Clausewitz. In Denkwürdigkeiten, 43, Berlin. Rothfels, H. (1980). Politik und Krieg: Eine ideengeschichtliche Studie. New edition of the work originally published in 1920, including an epilogue by Joachim Niemeyer. Berlin: Dümmer. Schmidt, A. (2007). Carl von Clausewitz, kriegstheoretische Konzeption und geschichtsphilosophische Hintergründe. In L. Souchon (Ed.), Romantik, Deutscher Idealismus, Hegel und Clausewitz. Clausewitz-Information 1/2007. Hamburg: Bundeswehr Command and Staff College. Strickmann, E. (2008). Clausewitz im Zeitalter der neuen Kriege: Der Krieg in Ruanda (1990–1994) im Spiegel der “wunderlichen Dreifaltigkeit”. Berlin: Galda. Woermann, W. (2007). Carl von Clausewitz – Die Hauptlineamente seiner Ansicht vom Kriege. In L. Souchon (Ed.), Clausewitz-Information 3/2007. Hamburg: Bundeswehr Command and Staff College.

Further Literature Delbrück, H. (1907). Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte. Dritter Teil: Das Mittelalter. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Haftendorn, H. (2007). USA und Europa - Unterschiedliche Perzeption aktueller Risiken. In “Broader Middle East” in Ostasien und Afrika. Lecture series held on 11 April 2007. International Clausewitz Center, Hamburg. Hoffmann, Frank G. (2009, April). Hybrid threats: Reconceptualizing the evolving character of modern conflict. In Strategic Forum, p. 240. Luttwak, E. (1999). Give war a chance. Foreign Affairs, 78(4), 36–44. Marcella, G. (2010). Teaching strategy: Challenge and response. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College. Münkler, H. (2003). Der neue Golfkrieg. Reinbek: Rowohlt.

Chapter 3

The Belligerent Genesis of Europe

Abstract Souchon outlines the phenomenon of war and politics in the history of Clausewitz’s Europe. He emphasizes the motives for and causes of war during this period and examines the role of historical field commanders and events. Souchon stresses the major theoretical works of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini on how to conduct war and especially what theoretical and practical considerations have to be done to be successful. Souchon transfers these insights to the twenty-first century, where mass-army wars between countries fighting against a clearly identified enemy have been replaced by hybrid wars i.e. fighting against terrorist enemies. This calls for a holistic approach for commanders to be educated commanders in strategic thinking and the method of waging war.

The Phenomenon of War and Politics The thought of making war—a phenomenon of human history—an underlying subject of a study on security, seems to make sense only if it is viewed rationally and seen in a historical context. War is neither an autonomous phenomenon nor a natural event, but a means for enforcing societal power against resistance. This abstract view allows a subtle analysis of the different motives, decisions and courses of war to be conducted. Victory over an opposing army on the battlefield and the conquest of a country are two ways of deciding a war. Another is to create a situation in which the opponent realises that he can on no account achieve his purposes by the use of military force. After all, by being patient, making a show of strength and acting with ruse and cunning, it is possible for a belligerent to bring about decisions that allow him to achieve his objectives without a fight. For Sun Tzu (544–496 B.C.), an important requirement of war was to subjugate the opponent without rousing his resistance. To achieve it, he recommends countering the opponent’s diplomacy by means of deception and ruse, disrupting alliances, improving one’s own strategic situation by means of subversion and the aid of spies and agents, and identifying and thwarting the enemy’s strategy at an early stage (Cf. Stahel, 2004, 13 ff.). Sun Tzu is fascinating on account of his systematic thinking, analytical acumen and original © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Souchon, Strategy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0_3

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ideas on the circumspective conduct of war (Cf. Sun Tzu, 2002, 60 ff.). Significant use was made of Sun Tzu’s strategic ruse and deception by the USA in the opening days of the 2003 Iraq War. Since early modern times, close ties between a country’s army, government and goals have been essential for waging war successfully in the sense of achieving a purpose. In theory, the governments and army commands pursue common powerpolitical objectives that include all the military, diplomatic, economic, domestic and humanitarian dimensions. The search for regularities and rules that govern success in politics is as old as history itself. In contrast, the tendencies and characteristics observed in wars are quite different and often develop with an unforeseeable dynamism so that the application of any regulations is almost out of the question. An important approach to the acquisition of knowledge is that of analysing and comparing events and processes in the history of war. The British strategist Liddell Hart is imputed to have said something to the tune of a commander who has never had time to study history is like a surgeon who has never studied anatomy (Cf. Collins, 1998, XXIII). Learning about practical constraints, the dynamism of unforeseeable events and courses of action in past wars fosters familiarity with their inherent tendencies and characteristics. Sound judgement in complex situations demanding decisions to be made presupposes understanding and reason and the ability to think everything through to the end in a higher context. Goethe distinguishes between the two in Maxims and Reflections. “Reason is dependent on what is coming into being, understanding depends on what is already there.” (Beutler, 1948–1954, Volume 9, 571) The latter is made possible by theoretical knowledge that enables complex situations to be comprehended, gives them structures and reveals their essence. For Clausewitz, theory is more a method of viewing and not so much a dogmatic doctrine. He stresses the importance of a commander to have a strong temper and the need for him to study war in theory. The ability to comprehend complexity and realise what is essential in the higher context builds on knowledge and experience. Taking the initiative against an equal opponent is a specific characteristic of wars. The relations between causes, courses of action and effects achieved depend directly not only on the opponent’s conduct, but also on incalculable probability and chance in the way a conflict unfolds. This is why it is not enough to simply practice standardised procedures in order to be successful in war. The use of military force is only wise if—as a necessary and sufficient condition—it serves to achieve a higher political purpose and is sealed in the sought peace agreement. Accordingly, high priority must be given to close interaction between the government and the army from the beginning of a war to its end. It is the mental and practical abilities of the commander and his emotional intelligence that decide over victory or defeat. He can only achieve the objectives set for him if the armed forces and means he needs are provided by the government. The pursuit of military objectives without consideration of the political purpose and without adequate effort usually ends in disastrous defeat. Similarly, present-day wars as in Afghanistan reveal that armed forces are unable to achieve general

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political purposes without having clearly defined intermediate and ultimate military objectives. For our considerations, the connection between theory and practice, the proportionality of means and the relation between the purpose, the objective and the means, is of significance and will be analysed in detail later. A glance at human history reveals that great wars often mark turning points in the historical development of countries and continents. This is particularly true of the history of Europe and the wars waged there well into the twenty-first century.

The European World and Its Formative Strategists The history of Europe seems to contain a line of events that necessarily lead to the dominance of the Occident. This view is wrong, as the assessment neglects centres of power in the Middle East, China, India, Russia and Japan, the non-Christian world religions and orthodox Christianity. It is essential that all the factors of historical relevance figure in an analysis of the history of Europe. Unfortunately, the human brain is hardly able to purposefully and methodically comprehend the full complexity of events and see the big picture, so every report and every portrayal of a situation require a well-considered selection to be made. A look at the geographical location of Europe shows that the western extensions of the Eurasian continent accommodate a host of greatly differing ethnicities, cultures and religions. More than 60 Germanic, Celtic, Romanic, Slavic and Finno-Ugrian languages mix here with a great many ethnicities, each with their customs and traditions, in an extremely confined area. The term Europe is rarely found in the early days of historic narratives. A Spanish monk writing the chronicle of the Battle of Poitiers (732) against the Moors calls the victors Europeans. Later, the term finds its way into the vernacular of navigation. A continent called Europe is first found in cartographic representations dating from the thirteenth century. It is not until the 14th and 15th centuries, however, when the Christians are defeated by the Ottomans, that Europe and the adjective European come into parlance. Few people know that Beethoven‘s ninth Symphony “Ode of Joy”, which was chosen as the anthem of the European Union in 1985, was composed for the Congress of Vienna (1815). The Europe we know today is the result of profound shifts in power and events with far-reaching consequences that were often caused by wars. The historical processes that have resulted in the present international community can only be outlined. To this end, we turn our attention to more than two thousand years of European history. On the one hand, the Hellenic culture, which produces intellectual and political creations of timeless value and broadens the horizons in the world at the time, spreads with the conquests of Alexander the Great in the Orient and South Asia. On the other, intellectual dimensions of a global empire and global dominance make their way back into the microcosm of Greek thinking. Having endured for more than seven hundred years, the Roman Empire with its imperial power structures and professional armies falls apart under the pressure of Germanic campaigns and the period of migration of the Franks, Vandals, Ostrogoths

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and Visigoths. They flee in the fifth century from the invading Huns, who advance from the depths of Asia southwards to the Caucasus and northwards—to present-day Northern Germany—, establishing a global empire stretching from China to Central Europe. The strategic conduct of war by the Huns, whose fast horseman-army crush any resistance with devastating mercilessness, is accompanied in a psychologically highly successful manner by the spread of fear and terror. The image of a barbarian horse people, the scourge of God, does not correspond in European historiography to the image of Attila, who is known in the Nibelung Saga by the name of King Etzel and described as a tolerant heathen and hospitable hero (Cf. de Boor, 1963, no page number). At the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains in Central France in 451, the Huns are defeated by an army that includes Roman contingents and troops of Franks, Burgundians, Gauls, Alans and the powerful Visigoths. This first battle of European tribes against invaders from the depths of Asia marks the beginning of Rome’s decline as the dominant power in Western and Southern Europe. It was followed, 113 years later, by the invasion of the Avars—likewise a nomadic tribe from Central Asia, which advanced as far as present-day Lower Austria after the destruction of the Gepid Empire. Another hundred years later, a third horse people from Central Asia, the Magyars, whose language belongs to the Finno-Ugrian group, appears in the eastern part of Central Europe. Their campaigns take them as far as Bavaria and the Middle Rhine region. In 911, they cross the River Rhine near Cologne and advance to the empire of Middle Franconia. King Henry I of Saxony, the first elected German king, defeats them at the Battle of Riade by the River Unstrut west of the Middle Elbe region in 933. Finally, Otto the Great succeeds in entirely defeating the Magyars at the Battle of Lechfeld in 955 with an army composed of troops from German tribes and reinforced by Bohemians, North-western Slavs and Lorrainians. However, the Magyars do not return to the depths of Asia, but settle between the River Danube and the River Theiss, henceforth separating the Western Slavs from the Southern Slavs—and forming what was later to become Hungary. These military events contribute to the Germanic tribes growing together. In 962, Otto the Great is elected king and crowned by the pope as the first German emperor. Urban development begins, agriculture and trade flourish. It is not until the thirteenth century that the Mongols, another nomadic people from the depths of the Asian Steppe, invade Europe in an immense destructive frenzy and reach Eastern Silesia and Southern Poland. Their surprising retreat in 1241—following the death of Ögedei Khan—leaves behind a deep-rooted fear of new raids from the depths of Asia that persists for centuries. The Mongol empire is another example for an era in which major parts of the Eurasian world are ruled centrally and with a rigid organisation from the capital of Karakorum well over ten thousand kilometres away. Stretching from the headwaters of the River Volga and the lower course of the River Danube to the Pacific Ocean, the vast empire links regional civilisations in Eastern Europe, Persia and China. The Mongols pursue their objectives in individual conquests. The skills of the commander dominate the determination of the strategic purpose and means. With respect to planning, possible tactical gains outweigh wise longer-term goals.

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The spread of the Arabs in the Middle East and Central Asia, in the Eastern Mediterranean, in Northern Africa and in South-western Europe leads to the only large-scale invasion of Europe from a southerly direction, via the Strait of Gibraltar (711). The Arabs make it to Tours and Poitiers in Central France before they are defeated by a European army, led by Karl Martell (732). They stay on the Iberian Peninsula and in Southern France for 780 years and control the trade routes in the Mediterranean. When they withdraw from Europe (1492), they leave behind not only a unique intellectual heritage that includes the ancient monument in Granada, but also a wealth of knowledge in the fields of astrology, architecture, medicine and mathematics and a collection of works by Greek philosophers that would have been lost for mankind if they had not been translated into Arabic. The great invasions by Alexander the Great, Attila and Genghis Khan are above all characterised by the pursuit of the strategic goals of extending power and engrossing wealth. The tasks of recruiting, equipping, training and supplying armies are assigned and managed on a centralised basis and implemented within a precise timeframe. When a campaign begins, a leader usually specifies the nearest war objectives and pursues them with far-sightedness, tactical skill, draconian harshness and autocratic command structures. “A strategist’s genius is in principle revealed where he brings about battles and wins them by means of tactical art.” (Delbrück, 1907, 340) Strategic planning follows an iterative process which builds on the outcomes of previous battles and, with a view to the troops, their supply and the financial basis, includes plans for further objectives. “Strategy, the use of battle for the purpose of war, existed, of course, but only seldom in the sense of an art.” (Delbrück, 1907, 333). In connection with the Christian crusades to the Muslim region of the Levant and to Slav regions in the East (eleventh to fourteenth Century) and after numerous campaigns within Europe, individual powers gain strength. Following the discovery of America (1492), the subsequent onset of the colonisation of large parts of the world and the resulting acquisition of wealth, the European continent becomes the all-dominating center of power in the world. The discovery of America marks the point at which people start to turn from the next world to this world and humanism marks a change in the attitude to life, from a Viator mundi (pilgrim to the heavenly home) to a Faber mundi (creator and ruler of the world). Progress in the discovery of the world and people manifests itself in particular in art. Bramante, Raphael and Michelangelo work in architecture. Botticelli, da Vinci and Titian produce works of unmatched beauty in painting. Europe begins to establish its rule over the world in the Renaissance period. Its rise is the result of Aristotelian curiosity, paired with audacity and a firm aspiration for power (Cf. Höffe, 2001, 173 ff.). In philosophy, scholars start to abandon Aristotelian thinking of pre-Christian scholasticism and turn instead to Neo-Platonism. Machiavelli (1469–1527) is one of the first theorists in political science to think in military categories. He recognises the evolutionary changes that have occurred in politics and the social domains during the Renaissance and their dependence on the fundamental revolution in weapons technology and military tactics. The invention of gunpowder, muskets and cannons ends the supremacy of armoured knight armies. The court

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culture of knights disappears and with it the medieval forms of society. Knight armies are ousted by mercenary armies. Clausewitz characterises this transformation with the following words: “Regulated and coordinated military action did not really become possible until states replaced feudal levies with mercenary troops. Feudal obligations were transformed into money payments, and liege service either vanished altogether in favour of recruitment, or fell only on the lower classes. The nobility considered the furnishing of recruits as a kind of tribute, a human tax . . . At any rate, as we have stated elsewhere, armies now became instruments of the central government, and their cost was borne mainly by the treasury or public revenue.” (On War, 330). The beginning of the early modern period is dominated by mercenary armies that need to be trained, equipped, paid, supplied and accommodated. A wide variety of organisational elements come into being in the armies for establishing operational bases and lines of communication and for discharging duties in the fields of subsistence, logistics and administration (Cf. Delbrück, 1907, 323 ff.). King Gustav II Adolf of Sweden (1594–1632) is considered a holistic strategic thinker, a remarkable monarch, a commander, a military organiser and a theoretician. By maintaining an expertly trained and well-paid professional army, by establishing army depots and by improving fortress construction, he secures Sweden’s hegemony in Northern Europe until well into the eighteenth century. Musketeers replace pikemen and are organised as infantrymen in companies, battalions, regiments and brigades (Cf. Rothenburg, 1986, 49 ff.). Gustav II Adolf establishes a military hierarchy by introducing standardised uniforms and rank insignia, improves cohesion and fighting morale among the troops, whose nucleus is in the small units, and promotes his officers and non-commissioned officers primarily on the basis of merit. Sweden’s successful campaigns are clouded in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) however, by the premature death of Gustav II Adolf at the Battle of Lützen (1632). With his ability to comprehend war and his decision to gear the organisation and training of his army to purpose, the Swedish king is a pioneer for subsequent commanders and strategic thinkers (Cf. Stahel, 2004, 74 ff.). Thoughts on organisation, drill regulations, the conduct of war and the shaping of an order after victory or defeat in a war are developed by John Maurice of Nassau (1604–1679), a Dutch field marshal nicknamed “the Brazilian”. He combines the war of conquest in Brazil with the establishment of a civilian administration in the colonies (Cf. Stahel, 2004, 73 f.). The Thirty Years’ War is decisive for the nation building process in Germany, France and England. For Germany, it is a disaster with far-reaching consequences. On the face of it, Catholics are fighting against Protestants over questions of Christian faith. The truth, however, is that the Emperor is wrestling with the princes for supremacy in Central Europe. The peace treaties of Münster and Osnabrück result on the one hand in the sustained fragmentation of the power structures in Germany, which continues until the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, and on the other in the nationalisation of war under international law (Cf. Münkler, 2002, 200). The strengthening of the positions of the princes diminishes the influence of

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the empire, the unification of Germany is delayed for centuries and Central Europe is characterised by a proliferation of small states. A look at the history of England reveals that there is a dramatic shift in the balance of power in the country at a very early stage and that it has great repercussions. In 1660, Parliament passes the Bill of Rights, allowing the free election of Parliament, free speech and fiscal sovereignty, all of which replace a court structure of monarchy and the vague decision-making rules that have evolved over history. The English kingdom is subject to the sovereignty of Parliament. In the era of the Enlightenment, modernisation and revolutions, the English concept of a constitution becomes the foundation for the French Revolution. This is followed by England’s implementation of an expansive colonial policy that is funded by the profitable trade with slaves, spices and finished products. The country’s rise to become a global sea power in the eighteenth century is favoured by it being on an island that is unassailable by the continental powers, having a superior navy and a global base system. Trade and naval supremacy pave the way for England to become a world power. Goethe concludes this about English behaviour. “The clever Englishman sees himself surrounded from youth by a significant world that inspires all his powers; he realises sooner or later that he must collect all his wits to come to terms with it.” (Goethe’s Works, 1873, Volume 19, 118). Naval wars have also been fights for trade routes since time immemorial. To deny an opponent control of the sea transport routes, fleets often operate far from home waters and for extended periods of time (Cf. Ruge, 1955, 19 ff.). The focus of preparations for war is on the construction of war fleets, the recruitment and drilling of crews and the equipment of ships. A fleet commander sometimes sails for months and years on behalf of the monarch to fight an opposing fleet. Important decisions are taken in the course of operations and are frequently of a tactical nature. Naval warfare is an important political instrument, but it cannot be regulated and controlled like land war. In France, King Louis XIV rules from 1643 to 1715. His support for business and culture, his expansive and belligerent foreign policy and his pomposity mark a peak in France’s endeavour to gain power in Europe under the banner of court absolutism. Due to the import of raw materials, export of finished products and establishment of trading and manufacturing companies, he succeeds in achieving a high level of economic prosperity. His Minister of War, François Louvois, reorganises the military, introduces self-subsistence and prescribes strict discipline. With a powerful army and an ocean-going fleet, Louis XIV is able to expand the French colonial empire in Canada, America, Africa and India. Finally, he introduces a system of extensive patronage for the fine arts. The reign of Louis XIV reveals a cycle that ranges from economic prosperity, expansionism, military conquests, wealth and cultural prosperity to an overuse of resources and a loss of power. European powers begin to launch invasions on the Eurasian heartland in the eighteenth century. King Charles XII of Sweden leads a vastly superior army southwards through Poland and Ukraine. Decimated in numerous battles, his army is finally destroyed at the Battle of Poltawa (1709). He himself is able to flee with the

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help of the Ottomans, but does not return to Sweden for years. King Charles XII is an authentic example of a tactician who wins every battle, but loses the war. One of the first world wars is the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), which combines the colonial war in India and North America with Central Europe and Silesia to form a geostrategic war. England fights alongside Prussia against France, Russia, Sweden and Austria in Silesia, on the Indian subcontinent and in North America. The battles fought by King Frederick the Great show that a prudent commander who pursues strategic objectives and has good fortune can win a war against a force up to 20 times superior or after heavy defeats, even in seemingly hopeless situations. He succeeds in mentally linking political purposes with military objectives and the provision of means. An annex of his testament politique (1752) is the principes généraux, a summary of his remarkable strategic ideas that are geared to the guiding maxim of securing peace (Cf. Paret, 1986, 96; Stahel, 2004, 91; Schöllgen, 1992, 21). The French Revolution puts an end to absolutism in France with the Storming of the Bastille on 14 July 1789. From 1799 to 1804, Napoleon I initially rules as First Consul and then, until 1815, as Emperor of the French. A fundamental change takes place in the use of armed forces in war towards the end of the eighteenth century. In the days before the French Revolution, standing professional armies with years of training do battle. To prevent a soldier from deserting, units march onto the battlefield in closed line formation and fight with discipline under close watch. A battle is avoided when armies encounter each other, and it is obvious that one is clearly superior (Cf. Münkler, 2002, 224 ff.). The true art of a commander manifests itself in his ability to manoeuvre skilfully with superior forces before going into battle. This strictly regulated war game of kings is pushed aside by the Napoleonic method of waging war and the “levée en masse” policy. In 1817, Clausewitz concludes this about Scharnhorst: “The old system of warfare had collapsed in the revolutionary war.” (Clausewitz, 1979, 228) He complains about the lack of wit and the weak leadership of the generals in the use of the Prussian army in the days before the French Revolution: “Since most wars between developed countries have been more a matter of observing the enemy than of defeating him, it follows that strategic manoeuvre is characteristic of most campaigns.” (On War, 514) Clausewitz recognises the differences between regulated manoeuvring with elite armies and a war of Napoleonic reality (Cf. Vom Kriege, 263 ff.). A conscript army has an almost inexhaustible reservoir of soldiers. Heavy losses in battles can be compensated. In contrast to the pressed armies of the classical monarchies in Europe, the soldiers of the Grande Armée are also convinced of the objectives of national warfare and highly motivated to serve the emperor and France. Warfare is revolutionised by the art of command of Napoleon I in connection with the levée on masse policy. His outstanding ability to command large armies in battle annihilates all the principles and doctrines of classical warfare. With quick and precise orders, the discipline of his subordinate field marshals and his battlehardened soldiers, Napoleon succeeds in reaching the inner line before the battle starts, surprising his adversaries and forcing them onto the defensive. He combines quick movements, the setting of focal points during deployment, and the direction of

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the momentum of attack at the center of gravity of the enemy with the overwhelming will of his troops for victory. Compared to a mercenary army that is led into battle under close watch, the enthusiasm and the determination of the conscript army constitute a complete change of attitude. War loses its static character and is transformed into a multidimensional and dynamic battle in which chance, probability and friction gain significant influence. In the dynamism of interactive fighting with the enemy, human weaknesses have an increased effect and give rise to uncertainties that render the linear, logical and foreseeable course of war obsolete and give commanders immense freedom for proactive and bold action. Napoleon I is the best example of an innovative commander of the revolutionary generation. He enhances his reputation in Paris by achieving great victories in numerous battles and involves the entire population in war. War becomes a social event and calls for a holistic way of thinking that includes the people with their characteristics, moods and morale. His strategic approaches are discussed and explained in public and in this way escape the secret cabinets. What Delbrück said about the genius of a strategist who brings about battles and wins them by means of tactical art is extended to war as a totality (Cf. Delbrück, 1907, 340). Following the French Revolution and successful conquest of mainland Europe, the French emperor invades Russia at the peak of his power (1812). However, his plans come to nought because he is stalled by the resistance of the Russian army in the depth of the Eurasian continent. The Russian people refuse to surrender and the French army experiences an extremely cold winter for which it is not prepared. Except for the German Wars of Unification, the Congress of Vienna (1815) is followed by a period of a hundred years of peace in Europe. Impressed by Prussia’s successes in the Seven Years’ War and as contemporary witnesses of Napoleons Revolutionary Wars, two prominent strategists, Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, write their major works. During the long period of peace and prosperity in Europe, large parts of the world come under European colonial rule. Long-term plans are made for military campaigns and expeditions. Great care is devoted to the planning and conduct of the selection of commanders and captains, the recruitment, training and equipment of armies and the provision of the financial basis. In retrospect, the end of the Victorian era (1848–1886) can be regarded as the peak period for the European world. Sir Halford Mackinder, a British geopolitician, coined these periods in a controversial theory about cycles of hegemony and European powers. The Industrial Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century marks the beginning of the modern world in Europe. It is driven by the invention of the steam engine by James Watt (1765) and industrial looms that render work- and time-intensive processes more efficient and concentrate industrial production at just a few locations. The development of the railway in England (1825) and of steam shipping permits travel to geographically distant regions via land and sea routes and the transportation of people and goods faster and to a schedule. The provision of funds by capital companies (Adam Smith, 1723–1790) permits systematic development and the establishment of industrial enterprises. The Industrial Revolution is funded by wealth in Europe, most of which originates from the inflow of money from the

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colonies. It centralises industrial mass production and makes Europe the center of the world. Masses of workers in manufacturing are pooled at specific locations. Wretched working conditions, meagre wages and unfair treatment cause pre-revolutionary mass movements. The democratisation in the European world also finds its way to the United States (1776) and continues in Europe with the French Revolution (1789). As part of the secularisation (German mediatisation, 1803), Napoleon I orders church property and other imperial privileges in the occupied European countries to be redistributed. This intensifies the flow of capital and provides new scope for economic development. Warfare also undergoes significant changes in the course of industrialisation and democratisation. The establishment of mass conscript armies that involve the entire population in every war, innovations in weapons and the scientific training of officers, which begins at the Prussian War Academy in 1810, result in a revolution in warfare that merits the name. The economic power and wealth of a state are recognised as important factors. The armies lose their central significance as a means of asserting a state’s will. Diplomacy, global trade routes, capital flows, industrialisation, inventive spirit and public support all become strategic factors influencing government policy. Imperialism and colonisation reach their peaks at the beginning of modern times. Industrialisation leads to the pooling of production facilities in specific regions where coal is available as a source of energy. The masses of poorly paid workers and their calls for participation in the making of political decisions intensify a process of transformation that establishes the primacy of reason and intellect and democratic structures. In the post-Renaissance period, the interaction of national economies and the striving for power can account for the rise and fall of great powers. Great powers evolve, such as Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia, later Germany, and strive for hegemony in Europe and large parts of the world. Featuring worldwide regular transport services, continental railway connections and telephone links, this early phase of globalisation at the end of the nineteenth century is characterised by a great yearning for peace. The British philosopher and sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) proclaims that wars are only conducted in agrarian societies. Like Auguste Comte, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, he sees an evolutionary change in society and a disinterest in war on the part of the industrial proletariat. Engels logically calls for general disarmament as early as in 1893. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment puts an end to mysticism, the mechanistic idea of the world and absolutism. The human perspective of existence forms the core of Romanticism. Finally, German idealism calls for the primacy of intellect and ideals. Human reason gains influence in politics. In a philosophical aura, the cool rationality of Kantian enlightenment is replaced in Berlin by the quest to discover the individuality of human existence and the moral values of man. In On War, his life’s work, Carl von Clausewitz provides the first overall view of the phenomenon of war that includes intellectual faculties and disposition in equal measure. It is a forerunner of empirical political science, as it

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sees theory and practice as a single unit. While the compendium establishes strategy as a discipline of science, however, it hardly receives any attention in the following decades of peace. On War gains initial credit due to its interpretation by Field Marshal von Moltke (1800–1891), the ingenious Chief of the Prussian General Staff and expert on Clausewitz. His successful plans and great victories in the German wars of unification that Prussia fought with Austria against Denmark (1864), against Austria, Saxony, Hanover and Hesse (1866) and in the Franco-German War (1870–1871) are correlated with the work of Clausewitz by the European powers of France and Britain. Moltke has grasped the essence of Clausewitz’s theory. He is also convinced of the importance both of inventions such as the railway and wired broadcasting and of the developments in weapon technology and consistently uses them for mobilisation, the transmission of orders and the construction of field guns. Moltke endorses Clausewitz’s ideas and axioms. The only things he negates are the interpretation of war as an instrument of politics and thus the primacy of politics. He is convinced that in a war, a monarch must provide the commander all the means he has, but not otherwise interfere in the conduct of military operations. The view that politics must serve war is also held by Ludendorff in World War I, who justifies it in his book Der totale Krieg (Cf. Ludendorff, 1988, 10). This interpretation contradicts to the essence of Clausewitz’s findings. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) is considered to be the father of naval strategy. He writes a standard work entitled “The Influence of Sea Power upon History”. At the end of the nineteenth century, Mahan is the first to make the connection between the history of naval warfare and developments in the political world the subject of a systematic analysis. His book is translated into German and issued to every naval officer in the German Empire. Holding the rank of Captain (Navy), Mahan is the president of the US Naval War College in Newport. It is not until 1906, however,—after he has retired—that his genius is recognised and he is promoted to admiral of the reserve. His ideas about naval power, naval bases and naval supremacy are seen as signposts indicating the German Empire’s endeavour to achieve global power. In the long history of mankind, eminent commanders have used their wealth of ideas and experience to acquire and reveal the unique capability to reduce the multidimensional complexities of a war to simple, appropriate characteristics, to develop a standpoint of their own, to make decisions and to act with courage and persistence (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 196 f.). These characteristics are timeless and merit their closer examination in the other chapters of this book.

The Strategic Situation in Europe in the Twentieth Century The significance of Europe and the European powers changes markedly in the twentieth century. The great economic potential of the German Empire and its fleet-building programme upset the balance of power in Europe (Cf. Massie, 1993,

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506 ff.). A typical security dilemma arises as world powers seek to secure their spheres of power and influence, while others strive for international recognition and, in doing so, threaten each other. The calm century in Europe ends in the terrible catastrophe of World War I (1914–18). Extremely confident of victory and highly emotional, the peoples of Europe go to war. What unfolds is a remorseless trench war that can be rated as industrialised mass killing (Cf. Smith, 2005, 115). The deaths of millions of soldiers in the trenches on the Western front ruin people’s trust in both the monarchy and the nation-state. Disastrous shortages in supplies and million-fold unemployment are channelled into demands for an overthrow of existing systems and the participation of the masses in the making of political decisions and offer fertile ground for radical ideologies. A Bolshevik revolution begins in Russia and leads to the spread of Marxism-Leninism to large parts of Eurasia. At the end of World War I, the 14-point peace initiative of US President Wilson (1918) falls on deaf ears. Following the defeat of the German Empire, Emperor William II abdicates and flees into exile in the Netherlands. One result of World War I is that the continental powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire are shattered in the Treaty of Versailles. The victorious powers redefine the borders in Europe and constitute states in the eastern part of Central Europe in neglect of the fact that their borders do not correspond to the ethnic distribution of the people who live there. This holds true for Germany, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania. The first part of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) contains the peace-making regulations laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The second part decrees a victorious peace involving large reparation payments, losses of territory and the establishment of new small states in eastern Central Europe. In the 1920s, a global economic crisis entailing great economic and social hardship spreads all over Europe. It leads to the development of an unstable situation in which all the political and economic measures taken to contain it fail. It becomes the breeding ground for National Socialism and the further spread of the Communist revolution. In 1997, US strategist and security expert Brzezinski takes up the subject of the fragmentation of power in Europe and, looking at eastern Central Europe, develops a geostrategy for Eurasia. To underscore the central significance of East Europe for peace in the world, he quotes Sir Halford Mackinder, a prominent geopolitical theorist who in 1904 publishes the following thesis (Brzezinski, 1997, 38): “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, Who rules the World-Island commands the world.”

In this Heartland theory, Mackinder proposes that all endeavour to become a world power is directly linked to the rule over the eastern part of Europe. He who exercises power in this region controls developments in Eurasia and rules the world. It is worth taking a closer look at the importance of the East European heartland. The Treaty of Versailles constructs nation-states in this region and defines their borders.

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Having first occupied Czechoslovakia and annexed Austria, Hitler continues his expansion of strategic power with the attack on Poland and, in 1939, triggers off World War II. In July 1941, he begins his war of aggression against Russia. The total defeat of the Third Reich, in which it ends, is attributed to a militarisation of politics and political objectives (Cf. Kondylis, 1986, 10). In the Holocaust, the National Socialist regime commits a crime against the Jewish people in Germany and the occupied parts of Europe that is inconceivable in its dimensions. After the end of World War II, Europe is divided by the Iron Curtain and a bipolar confrontation of the nuclear superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union— that dominate their respective blocs antagonistically. The East European heartland is subjugated by Stalin in the Soviet empire. The superpower confrontation in the end overrides all aspects of global security and, due to the huge nuclear destruction potential that is built up, forces the world into a state of “security freeze” in which wars only continue to be waged on the periphery and by proxy. Strategy degenerates to a zero-sum game in which the superpowers compete in an arms race and merely conduct tactical and operational planning. Germany has no need to make national strategic considerations for decades. The reunification of Germany (1990), followed by the unification of Central Europe and, finally, the demise of the Soviet Union (1991) mark the end of a global civil war which Nolte dates from 1914 to 1989/1991 (Cf. Schivelbusch, 2007, 347 f.). The admission of the East European states to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation marks the beginning of a new era in international relations. Directly related to its reunification, regaining of full sovereignty, change of position in the Euro-Atlantic world since 1990 and the expectations that other countries have of it, Germany has an objective need to give strategic consideration to the global threats. The death of President Tito is followed by a series of civil wars that result in the disintegration of former Yugoslavia (1992–1995) and Kosovo (1999) and reveal the inability of the European powers to ensure peace in their own backyard. The massive intervention of the USA finally puts a stop to the wars and concludes a visible regression to global mediocrity on the part of the European powers. Anticipating the express wish of the East European states for admission, the North Atlantic Alliance offers to admit them to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace programme. This proves to be a great success, as some of the states are able to outline and discuss their qualification for admission and the progress they have made towards it in the negotiations with NATO. In the run-up to the 1999 anniversary summit in Washington, NATO admits the three important heartland states of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the Atlantic Alliance. A further seven states in the region are admitted at the NATO summit in Prague in December 2002. The grey zone that East Europe constituted loses its strategic significance for peace in the world. Sir Halford Mackinder‘s theory was hence confirmed in the time window up to the end of the twentieth Century, and the chapter is today closed. World War II results in the final demise of the European world powers. The characteristic feature of the period from 1861 to 1945 is their adoption of an

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approach to war that can be described as existential and aims at inflicting a total defeat on the opponent while accepting their own ruin. In contrast to the cabinet wars of the eighteenth century, this total war is not decided by military power, but by economic means (Cf. Schivelbusch, 2007, 348 f.). The planning and conduct of operations in the theatres of war are reduced to the operational and tactical levels. Strategy and, with it, strategic thinking degenerate and finally disappear around the end of the twentieth century in the nuclear stalemate of the superpowers (Cf. Brodie, 1971, 38 ff.). Liddell Hart, an Englishman who was born in Paris in 1895, is considered a significant twentieth century strategist. He deals with new weapon technologies and translates them into methods of warfare. His ground-breaking ideas on large-scale armour operations meet with just as little interest in the United Kingdom as the almost identical ideas of a French officer who was later to become highly famous— Charles de Gaulle. It is General Guderian from the Wehrmacht who takes up their operational doctrine in the campaign against France at the beginning of World War II. Liddell Hart subdivides strategy into Grand Strategy, strategy and tactics. Grand Strategy is in practice synonymous with policy in war, its aim being to make coordinated use of all the means of a nation for the achievement of the political purpose (Cf. Liddell Hart, 1967, 335 f.). With this classification of war below policy, he draws closer to Clausewitz’s model of a war of defeat. At the same time, he advocates the adoption of an indirect approach, supported by ruse and deception, and discusses the interdependencies between purpose and means in the employment of armed forces. Liddell Hart dominates the Strategic Community in Britain with his ideas to this day and is an intellectual role model for Beaufre (Cf. Stahel, 2004, 225 f.). General Beaufre from France (1902–1975) is a soldier in World War II and, in the 1950s, sees action in Indochina, Algeria and in the Suez crisis. The nuclear threat issued by Khrushchev to the United Kingdom after their invasion of the Suez Canal region (1956) and the wait-and-see attitude of the USA convince both states of the need to build up nuclear potentials of their own. Beaufre witnesses the beginning of the nuclear age and becomes a leading strategist on nuclear deterrence and indirect warfare below the nuclear threshold. In the epilogue to the relevant work, Totale Kriegskunst im Frieden, Liddell Hart concludes: “In reality, his work is the most complete, the most meticulously (!) formulated and most current (!) treatise on strategy.” (Cf. Beaufre, 1963, 189). The Italian air warfare strategist General Giulio Douhet (1869–1930) has a similarly interesting background. As a general staff officer, he is one of the first to advocate the establishment of independent air forces and the employment of aircraft in reconnaissance, target acquisition, transport and bombing. He is court-martialled and convicted for his harsh criticism of the Italian army command in World War I. After being rehabilitated and promoted to general, he leaves the Italian army and writes Dominio dell’ Aria, the standard work on air warfare. Liddell Hart, Beaufre and Douhet are strategists of their day and influenced by specific developments in

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the fields of weapons and operations. Their treatises on warfare are of only secondary importance for grasping the fundamental characteristics of war. The reassessment of the strategic situation after the end of the Cold War also features geopolitical constants. A rivalry remains between the USA, which not only is a global sea power, but also the only remaining world power, and Russia, the largest global land power. Citing numerous examples from history, Alfred Mahan, the American naval strategist mentioned earlier, argues that a global sea power can hold a land power at bay as long as it maintains its military presence on the strategic opposite coast, i.e., the continental coasts of the land power. On the strategic opposite coasts of the USA lie Japan in the Pacific Ocean and Europe in the Atlantic Ocean, with its important partner states and Germany at its heart. Both countries Japan and Germany have great political similarities: They are the main losers of World War II, have not had national armed forces of their own for a decade and have no weapons of mass destruction, while numbering among the economically most potent states in the world. One aspect of the USA’s global sea power policy is to maintain a presence in these two states on the strategic opposite coast. Seen from their angle, Germany and Japan will continue to rely on the strategic protection guarantee given by the allied world power USA in the future in view of the extensive nuclear potentials still in existence on Russian territory and the danger of a proliferation of these weapons and related technologies. As a result, a mutual strategic interest strengthens the traditional ties between these states and is a constant that also remains valid in the twenty-first century. Another constant in the changed geopolitical situation in Europe is the rivalry between the states on the periphery and those in the center, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy versus Germany. The subject is not delved into further here, however, as it would mean digressing from the topic. The end of bipolar military confrontations reveals a multitude of geopolitical changes that the international institutions of the Cold War era only have a limited length of time to deal with. It must be borne in mind that the bipolar-structured international community of the twentieth century, which was largely disciplined by the USA and the Soviet Union, the dominating superpowers, has disintegrated and the international risk situation has to be reassessed. If the conflict behaviour of the states is taken as a yardstick, a distinction can be made between the post-modern, pre-modern, modern and disintegrating states, as Cooper classifies them.

Post-modern States While the Treaties of Washington (1949) and Rome (1957) bring about integration in defence and economic cooperation in Europe after World War II, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe—signed as the CFE Treaty on 19 November 1990—puts an end to the classical system of balance in Europe (Cf. Cooper, 1995, 5 ff.). The parties to the Treaty undertake measures to reduce their numbers of heavy weapon systems and to allow inspections by the other parties. The success of this

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treaty is supplemented by the innovative idea of confidence-building measures. It reduces the danger of war due to misjudgements of an opponent’s military capabilities a thing of the past in Europe. Although the treaty loses its immediate relevance after the end of the East-West confrontation, the resulting concept of security means that the states continue to renounce unlimited control of their military instruments of power and thus part of their classical sovereignty. The year 1989 is supposed to be comparable to the Peace of Westphalia and the Congress of Vienna in its significance for the European community of states (ibid.). The unification of Germany and its integration into Europe would not have been possible without this community of post-modern states, but they at the same time mark the end of the system within which security policy was developed on a nation-state basis and of the security dilemmas that went with it.

Pre-modern and Disintegrating States These changes in the community of post-modern states, however, do not apply to a second group of states in the part of the world that has been struggling with statebuilding since the end of the era of European imperialism and the achievement of independence. Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and states in Northern Africa are examples of states that can be classified as pre-modern and disintegrating states (ibid.).

Modern States Finally, there is a third group of states, which is also the largest, that is characterised by the fact that the states in it have an intact modern state system and are incorporated into a regional system of balance—that includes the presence of hegemonial states. For this group of states, the relationship between interests, security policy objectives and international relation strategies as well as the ideas of classical Machiavellian principles of power and wealth continue to apply. Globally, the gap between poor (pre-modern) and wealthy (post-modern) states is widening. While negative conditions such as uncontrolled financial markets, terrorism, the vicious circle of poverty, civil wars, crime, the destruction of the environment, the depletion of resources and the effects of climate change are concentrated in the first group, they are having a global impact and leaving an indelible mark on international relations. Following the devastating world wars, the Cold War and the bipolar division of the world, the states are at diverging stages of development in the twentieth century and pursue completely different goals in international politics. What do the world order regimes that regulate peaceful co-existence in this complex community of states look like?

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Mahbubani, a Singaporean political scientist, postulates four competing world orders: the Truman world order, the Jiang Zemin world order, the neoconservative world order and the Bin Laden world order (Cf. Mahbubani, 2005-06, 9 ff.). 1. The Truman world order—named after US President Harry S. Truman (1945–1953)—began to guarantee peace in 1945. It is characterised by international agreements aimed at preventing war with systems of collective security that operate to institutionalised standards. International cooperation is based on the Westphalian principle of sovereignty, according to which all states are equal. The principle of legality of international law applies and is recognised by all states. The United Nations Security Council is the only body that is authorised to legitimise the use of force between states. The guarantor in this world order is the USA. The Truman order has enabled the USA to neutralise the Soviet Union’s efforts to expand. 2. In contrast, the Jiang Zemin world order (Jiang Zemin was the President of the People’s Republic of China from 1993–2003) is based on the following principles: Upon gaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (1971), the People’s Republic of China opens up and participates in the world order. The primary goal is to achieve rapid economic development while avoiding confrontation with the USA. The continuation of the status quo is in the best interest of Communist China under Xi Jinping—however the “One Belt, One Road” initiative as well as disrupting US predominance in the world’s most important sea lines of communication signal a course change. Another nation such as Russia challenge the world order by exploiting the fault lines of NATO and EU by interventions in Ukraine and Syria. 3. In the American neoconservative world order, the USA the undisputed global power, shapes the world order unilaterally and prevents the emergence of competing powers. The United Nations has lost its international legitimacy. The USA prevents the proliferation of nuclear arms unilaterally. China constitutes a major threat and is fenced in by the USA with the support of Japan, South Korea, India and Australia. Continental Europe is rated an unreliable partner. President Trump reintroduces populist conservative nationalism and turns his back on the liberal world order and orients his foreign policy along this line of thought. 4. The Bin Laden world order is characterised by the goal to expand terrorism into a global civil war against the infidels. It requires the world to be changed by force. Terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001 are the initial yardstick for this. The endeavour to form an Islamic Kalifate in Syria and Iraq extending on the Arab Peninsula fails in 2017 but is continued in grey areas in Africa and Central Asia. The world orders are accompanied by a special feature regarding the media. Western decision-makers use only a few journalistic sources in the press, radio and television such as the New York Times, the Financial Times, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, the Wall Street Journal, the BBC and CNN. The Western public usually draws its information from the same sources. Political decisions that are geared more to the needs of gaining public popularity for

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short-term political action rather than to the actual circumstances and events are often beside the point and fail. Practical examples for the impact of a deficit in strategy become visible in Afghanistan, in the effort to rescue the Euro and in the migration crises 2015. This negative assessment can be extended to almost all fields of Western government policy. An assessment of the four world orders introduced shows that the world has benefitted most to date from the Truman world order. Having provided the constitutional framework for the bipolarity of the superpowers, it is completed today or remains a major mental problem. The Zemin world order is diametrically opposed to the view of American neoconservatives, who have strong influence in Washington. It is, however, less effective in the face of the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. Although the USA has succeeded in killing Bin Laden, it has failed to neutralise the Islamists’ striving to achieve world power with terrorist means. It requires unreserved and active support from a polycentric world, especially from Europe, Japan, Russia and China, but this is by no way forthcoming. The American neoconservative world order failed during the presidency of George W. Bush. The USA’s unilateralism and lack of interest in the global condemnation of its action in Iraq resulted in a dramatic loss of confidence in the USA as a leader. President Obama opened a new chapter in American foreign policy after 2009. With his initiatives in Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea, however, he perpetuates thinking along the lines of the Truman world order—though with little success. A radical course change in international relations is initiated by President Trump. He endeavours a recapture of American predominance and faces resistance from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Mahbubani’s four world orders illustrate the degree of change and the fundamental complexity of both the strategic situation and international relations. The Bin Laden world order is the only model of the four that is rated to be not only transnational, but also aggressive, violent and proactive. It is the most dangerous world order model for the community of post-modern states. Mahbubani does not consider the dictatorship of the proletariat in a Communist society in his analysis, but highlights the gradient of both the imbalance of power and the objectives between the USA and the People’s Republic of China. Corresponding to the world orders and the conflict behaviour of the different groups of states, the nature of military clashes and threat estimates are changing as well. At the beginning of the twenty-first Century, the global security situation in the Atlantic world is threatened by a combination of transnational risks. These risks are intensified by mass migration caused by hunger and poverty in the world, a scarcity of resources, natural disasters, climate change and failing states. Instead of internationally recognised leading powers and a common will, there is an international community that is chaotic, a large number of non-governmental actors and a tendency towards the privatisation of force. Traditional approaches within the scope of collective security institutions are threatening to fail. There is no common strategy for international missions. The end of the Soviet empire and the unification of Europe are accompanied by efforts by Communist China and Russia to become world powers and numerous

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conflicts over resources, revolutions, civil wars and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Revolutionary wars in the Maghreb, Syria, Yemen and Sudan and at the Horn of Africa combine to turn the individual countries into a grey area conflict zone. There is war in Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan. Finally, global peace is threatened by nuclear armament in North Korea and in Iran. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, national conflicts are aggravated by military action taken by terrorist, criminal and economic actors exerting force. The result is regionalisation with respect to the geography and transnationalisation of conflict actors. Multi-layered conflicts exist around Europe and at the global level. Developing in geographical areas where there exists no state security, they change in a complex way and at an ever-increasing rate and can no longer be controlled by national policies. These risks and threats have a key bearing on international security provisions.

Conclusions The history of Europe over the past two thousand years can be described as a succession of recurrent power conflicts, wars and periods of peace. The seemingly continuous development of the political culture from the Hellenistic city-states and the Roman Empire to the democratic nation-states in the European Union is in reality the outcome of numerous cases of the wrong path being taken, disasters and cycles in which individual European powers acquired global standing: Firstly Following the conquests mounted by the Huns, Avars, Magyars and Mongols from deep within the Eurasian continent, the Renaissance marks the beginning of the rise and fall of great European powers. At the end of the nineteenth Century, the international structure begins to totter due to industrial innovations and the enormous rates of growth resulting from industrialisation. The United States, Japan, Germany and Russia strive to be admitted to the league of selected powers and become a threat to each other. Economic imbalances, colonial wars and naval arms races initiate the decline of the Eurocentric world system. This is followed in the twentieth Century by World War I and World War II, the great self-destructive seminal catastrophes for the Europeans. The development of nuclear weapons and the assured reciprocal destruction capability results in an unlimited arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union that becomes a matter of life and death for the bipolar world. The world system freezes in the Cold War. Secondly Following the unification of Germany and the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union enlarge and integrate Eastern Europe and the adjacent states. A host of complex risk zones come into being on the periphery of Europe and at the geostrategic level. The dynamics of the development shift to the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, Greater Middle East and the

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Muslim parts of Asia. In the light of the risk gradients and globalisation, courses of action—in the sense of a grand strategy—have to be developed both at the national and the Alliance level. Thirdly The capacity of the European powers for international policy-making has changed completely in terms of purpose, intensity and outcome. The loss of religious and social ties, customs and traditions in Europe and the lack of appreciation for history, of civic and cultural education and of the ability to understand the essence of war lead to the loss of the ability to frame strategic purposes and hamper volition and action in the political domain. This strategic deficit, which has essentially evolved from the situation created by bipolarity, has not yet been fully compensated. Fourthly New risks mainly associated with international terrorism have arisen. This terrorism is triggering low-intensity wars in geopolitical regions on the periphery of Europe, in the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and South America. Information and sound judgement are becoming important variables for global security provision. International terrorism is the globalised form of urban guerrilla and national guerrilla warfare, the core aim of which is to emancipate the people from a national and global statehood that controls everything. As this development dates back to Clausewitz’s day, aspects of his thoughts are still relevant. European history has seen many ruptures, turning points, golden ages and declines. The military evolution of Europe has reached a turning point at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as dynamic knowledge societies in the United States, China, Europe, Japan, South Korea and India and are closely intertwined global competitors. The far-reaching comprehension of war in the nineteenth century, the destructive lack of planning in the following decades and the subsequent loss of strategic thinking at the beginning of the twenty-first Century mark a path to an intellectual vacuum in present-day collective security provision. Any attempt to derive a generally accepted theory of war and regularities for achieving success in war from the abundance of warlike events is bound to fail. The aim of the strategic thoughts developed by Sun Tzu, Alexander the Great, Attila, Genghis Khan, Machiavelli, Gustav II Adolf, Frederick the Great and Napoleon I was to fathom out the grammar of wars. Their focus was more or less on establishing, equipping and drilling large armies for wars, leading them into battle and acting prudently for gaining victory. An alert mind, great boldness and a combination of knowledge and experience of war are characteristics of these famous commanders. Especially Frederick the Great reflected on and understood all the possible implications of war and drew conclusions with philosophical reserve and great wisdom. Initial holistic thoughts on the characteristics of wars are made by Sun Tzu and formulated coherently by Machiavelli. The path to holistic thinking about strategy is opened up by Clausewitz at the philosophical abstraction level and by Jomini, who established action-based objectives. The efforts of these two generals mark the start of the real development of a modern theory on strategy. Moltke, the continental thinker, Corbett and Mahan, the naval strategists, Mackinder, the geopolitician,

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Liddell Hart and Beaufre, the war theorists, and Douhet, the air warfare apologist— to name but a few—all develop clear ideas on aspects of the overall phenomenon. They are all significant for getting to know and studying the metier, but they contain only few pointers to strategic thinking at the beginning of the twenty-first Century. The world wars in the twentieth century, the world order concepts, the growth over history of the competitive behaviour of the community of modern states, and completely different security risks at the beginning of the twenty-first Century are leading highly developed nations into an intellectual vacuum when it comes to strategic thinking. The only way to fill this vacuum with ideas and thought and to make policymakers shake off their mental lethargy and engage in long-term thinking is to go back to the basics and consider tendencies and characteristics inherent in wars. The Napoleonic War era, in which a far-reaching revolution in military matters made a mockery of the existing method of waging war, can provide important impetus. The strategic thinkers of the day, Jomini und Clausewitz, understood this fundamental change. Jomini draws up a list of duties of his own that he believes commanders should perform to be successful in war. Clausewitz abstracts war and analyses it from the philosophical angle with the aim of understanding the main tendencies and characteristics. His axioms, his holistic ideas, and his practical method of considering the purpose, object and means of war grant the strategist insight into the complex tendencies of hatred and violence and into how to deal with frictions with a guiding intelligence. They sharpen his ability to differentiate and provide valuable leadership on how to respond to future risks for security in Europe.

Bibliography Clausewitz’s Works von Clausewitz, C. (1979). Verstreute kleine Schriften. Zusammengestellt, bearbeitet und eingeleitet von Werner Hahlweg. Osnabrück.

Works on Clausewitz Beaufre, A. (1963). Totale Kriegskunst im Frieden. Einführung in die Strategie. Berlin: Propyläen. Echevarria, A. J., II. (2007). Clausewitz and contemporary war. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kondylis, P. (1986). Theorie des Krieges. Clausewitz - Marx - Engels - Lenin. Stuttgart: KlettCotta. Liddell Hart, B. H. (1967). Strategy. New York: Praeger. Ludendorff, E. (1988). Der totale Krieg. Remscheid: Dt. Militär-Verlag. Paret, P. (1986). Makers of modern strategy from Machiavelli to the nuclear age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Stahel, A. A. (2004). Klassiker der Strategie (4th ed.). Zürich: Hochschulverlag an der ETH. Sun Tzu (2002). The Art of War. Translated from the Chinese by Lionel Giles. Mineola, New York: IXIA.

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Further Literature Beutler, Ernst (Ed.) (1948–1954). Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 24 vols. Zürich: Artemis Verlag Brodie, B. (1971). Strategy in the missile age (5th ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. New York: Basic Books. Collins, J. M. (1998). Military geography. New York: Oxford University Press. Cooper, R. (1995). Gibt es eine neue Weltordnung? Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Auslandsinformation, 5, 1–15. de Boor, H. (1963). Das Attilabild in Geschichte, Legende und heroischer Dichtung (2nd ed.). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Delbrück, H. (1907). Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte. Dritter Teil: Das Mittelalter. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Goethe’s Werke. (1873). Vols. 1–30. Introduction by Gustav Wendt et al. Berlin. Höffe, O. (2001). Kleine Geschichte der Philosophie. Munich: Piper. Mahbubani, K. (2005–06). Old world order. Survival, 47(4), 7–18. Massie, R. L. (1993). Die Schalen des Zorns. Frankfurt a.M.: Klagenfurt Wieser Verlag. Münkler, H. (2002). Die neuen Kriege. Hamburg: Rowohlt. Rothenburg, G. E. (1986). Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the “military revolution” of the Seventeenth Century. In P. Paret (Ed.), Makers of modern strategy from Machiavelli to the nuclear age (pp. 32–63). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ruge, F. (1955). Seemacht und Sicherheit. Tübingen: Schlichtenmayer. Schivelbusch, W. (2007). Die Kultur der Niederlage. Der amerikanische Süden 1865 – Frankreich 1871 – Deutschland 1918 (2nd ed.). Berlin: Alexander Fest. Schöllgen, G. (1992). Die Macht in der Mitte Europas. Munich: Beck. Smith, R. (2005). The utility of force: The art of war in the modern world. London: Penguin.

Chapter 4

Prussia, Clausewitz and the Interpretation of His Works

Abstract Souchon shows that the use of Clausewitz’s theory in strategic analyses of wars in the twenty-first century demands two steps to be taken to provide the necessary knowledge: The first one, involves the portrayal of the situation in Prussia at the beginning of the nineteenth Century, the life and work of Carl von Clausewitz in the light of his days and including the belligerent and philosophical milieus in which he socialises. This secondly, by an in-depth discussion of three interpretations of Clausewitz’s theory: (a) Clausewitz from the historical perspective, (b) as scholar of military science and (c) the holistic interpretation of war with the theory of Clausewitz. It is primarily, the third interpretation, related to the present, that forms a general basis for strategic thinking in the future.

Prussia A theoretical reorientation in strategic thinking would benefit from comparable periods that are marked by high instability, historical change and inherent reconsideration of the history of thought and philosophy and the resulting reforms being brought to mind. The hope is that theories from those periods in particular are of lasting relevance because the nature of the change is grasped by them. At the same time, theoretical reflection on those periods is driven by a will to structure the instability in the early twenty-first century. A period in history that lends itself for this is the one that begins with the collapse of the Prussian feudal system after the defeat against Napoleon I in 1806 and leads to a revolution from above in Prussia. A boom in philosophy renders the time favourable for the fresh mental start, diversity in ideas and courage to carry out reforms. Prussia in the early nineteenth century is a good example as it has the advantages of being a geographic epicentre and having both people of great intellect and the singular courage to make far-reaching decisions. The nascent social, educational and army reforms in Prussia mark the end of the absolutist monarchy and point the way ahead to a modern civil society.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Souchon, Strategy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0_4

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The Prussian military reforms in particular are unique and revolutionary. They constitute the intellectual foundation for the re-establishment of a German armed force, the Bundeswehr, on 12 November 1955, ten years after the total defeat in World War II. The day on which the Bundeswehr is established is the bicentenary of Gerhard Scharnhorst, the Prussian reformer whose insights and pioneering publications are used by it to this day for its concept of leadership and its mission-type command and control (Auftragstaktik). Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz are names that are synonyms for modern leadership culture in the German armed forces. It is solely due to the intellect and relentless effort of the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz that the causes of war as a phenomenon have been analysed and put into a higher context. In the early nineteenth century, a vastly superior French mass army with mental, political, psychological and social capabilities that are difficult to quantify engages in open battle with armies fighting in closed formation and accustomed to entering the fray in dynastical conflicts in pursuit of limited objectives. The Prussian armed forces, whose method of fighting in line dates back to the days of Frederick the Great, lack positive motivation and, as a result, the preparedness to accept severe exertions enthusiastically. After Prussia’s year of destiny, the monarchy loses its political, military, social and moral bearings. Heinrich Stein (1757–1831) criticises Prussia’s ailing feudal state system and calls for profound social reforms. After the defeat, the Treaties of Tilsit (1807) downgrade the Kingdom of Prussia to the status of a European middlesized power—between the Russian Tsarist Empire and the French Empire. The deep humiliation of the Hohenzollern monarchy releases reform forces that merit the attribute revolution from above for the impact they have: • The social reforms—The liberation of peasants, reforms in administration and municipal ordinance that are associated with Karl von Hardenberg (1750–1822). • The educational reforms—The foundation of Berlin University, higher education ordinance, elementary school reforms by Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) and Johann Pestalozzi (1746–1827). • The army reforms—The introduction of universal conscription, abolition of corporal punishment, promotion on the basis of merit, academic instruction of the officer corps at a war academy and the general staff by Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz. After the disastrous defeat of Prussia, the insights about the change in the conduct of war are the rule rather than the exception (Cf. Hahlweg, 1979, 301 ff.). Scharnhorst and Gneisenau become spokesmen and demand a profound reform of the Prussian military. They encounter fierce resistance from the old school, who “are convinced that the balanced, sterile, pointless game is the very zenith of development.” (On War, 515). The opponents of the reformers ignore the Napoleonic reality and initially prevent the necessary reorientation in the training of the Prussian officer corps and army. A dispute arises between the backward-looking generals and the reformers. Clausewitz criticises the old school for being out of touch with reality: “If one has never personally experienced war, one cannot understand in what the difficulties

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constantly mentioned really consist, nor why a commander should need any brilliance and exceptional ability. Everything looks simple; the knowledge required does not look remarkable, the strategy options so obvious . . . Once war has actually been seen the difficulties become clear; but it is still extremely hard to describe the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective.” (On War, 119). The radical changes between strictly regimented armies and conscript army mobile warfare provide scope for thinking and action to counter the impact of chance, probabilities and frictions. The moral grandeur of a commander and the virtues of an army are the keys to perceiving and mastering a changed situation. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Germany experiences a cultural richness that is linked especially with the names of the painter Caspar Friedrich (1774–1840) and the poets Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) and Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) and enables the composers Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827) and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–1791) to achieve immortal fame. In philosophy, the response to the mechanistic view of the world and man produced by the Enlightenment comes in the form of Romanticism, whose most famous poet is Heinrich Heine (1797–1856). It addresses the human perspectives of being and knowing, which have been neglected by rationalism, and makes human feelings, nature and art the center of human pursuit and life. At the same time, patriotic intellectual movements emerge in Prussia that lead to German idealism (1780/90–1831). It raises the spiritual nature of reality far above the materialistic and functionalistic view and goes back to the Greek classics. It postulates the primacy of the mind, ideas, phantasies and ideals. Priority is given to reason, which, as a spiritual principle, is placed before the absolute self and forms the basis from which the entire reality is metaphysically derived (Cf. Schelling, 1907, 381 ff.). In addition to Goethe and Schiller, Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843) and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) represent a philosophy of the mind that takes the ideas of classicism a step further and is completed in the writings of Georg-Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). Furthermore, the epistemology of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) is among the most important texts of German idealism. In 1794, he devises a theory centred on “the absolute, ethically free and creative self.” (Bormann, 2006, 54) Handel concludes: “Clausewitz was a product of the German intellectual world, which was experiencing one of the most creative periods in philosophy in a single nation in modern times.” (Macdonald, 2002, 482). Hegel commits his insights on phenomenology to paper in Jena in 1806; they are later published under the title The Phenomenology of Spirit. While out for a ride on 13 October, he encounters Napoleon I, who is riding at the front of his army into the victorious battle and later enters the defeated city of Berlin without a fight. Hegel is deeply impressed by Napoleon I. The absolutistic monarchy in Prussia begins to falter. What follows is the afore-mentioned spiritual and social collapse of Prussia and, as a consequence, a revolutionary reconstruction of key policy areas. In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel postulates two ways of looking at reality: One provides a complete and historical account of the process character and the other a

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holistic analysis of the present situation (Cf. Gerhardt, 2007). Even though they complement each other, historical and reality-related views should on no account be intermingled. Hegel connects an ancient Greek philosophy of Aristotle and Plato with modern Kantian Enlightenment and, in his teleology, develops the relation between purpose and means, the core of which is found in Clausewitz’s discussion of politics and war and reflected as one of the principles in On War. The philosophical ideas presented here are key in helping Clausewitz to comprehend the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon I. In the light of this analysis, his insights culminate in the categorisation of war as part of social processes and as a conflict between a will and a counter-will in a frictional action. He postulates ways of thinking for comprehending complex contexts that take equal account of forces of the mind and of disposition. This does not make it easier to approach Clausewitz. After the integration of his ideas into the history of ideas, it goes without saying that they cannot be confined to the use of armed forces in war. Rather, his insights apply to many fields of social life, business and science in which people and institutions compete with others to achieve their objectives while being influenced by probability and chance.

Methods of Interpreting Clausewitz The essence of Carl von Clausewitz’s writings on the philosophy of war offers insights for analysing the strategic situation in the early twenty-first century. In order to successfully deal with friction, which becomes increasingly important in the course of events, he notes leadership skills and character traits that are obligatory for a military leader. Furthermore, he believes that clear theoretical ideas are a prerequisite for such a leader to make wise decisions in practice. Clausewitz’s theory must not be transferred axiomatically to modern times. His ideas are to be understood—similar to history itself—in the context of time and situation. The work does not provide laws, rules and practical procedures for conducting war successfully (Cf. Vom Kriege, Hahlweg, 21). On War begins with a holistic overview of war and strategy, then goes into greater depth on issues of the conduct of military operations and concludes with an overall view, the war plan. The process of going from the general to the particular and back to the general in addressing this topic is to be conceived as a synthesis of theory and practice sui generis. It provides the attentive reader a productive method of thinking whose elements are disengaged from a particular period, while its theory starts in practice and its knowledge applies to practice. This represents both the appeal and the ongoing fertility of his intellectual work (ibid. 20). In the early twenty-first century, a commander makes his decisions in great uncertainty and near-real time. Metaphorically speaking, he acts on the stage of a global amphitheatre, while the people responsible for the armed forces and policy of his country and of other nations, international media and the opponent are assembled in the auditorium. Against this backdrop, risks must be countered in a situation in

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which the military action is transparent to the media and can also be viewed by the opponent. The approach taken, the structuring of the complexity, the decisionmaking and the resulting strategy must be geared to this situation. Flexibility in thinking, a deep understanding of the big picture and courage to make decisions are the qualities of mind and character required here. The possibility of some of the old approaches proving to be useful and continuing to be applied after fundamental thoughts have been made and a new strategy has been developed cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, the thoughtless transfer of lessons learned from Clausewitz to the present day must lead to drastic misinterpretations. For Aron, it is entirely legitimate to interpret Clausewitz in the light of Lenin and Mao Zedong. Such a study, however, should not mix two quite different tasks, that of interpreting Clausewitz’s works and that of defining the significance that his system has for us today, when we combine our knowledge and experience with the understanding that Clausewitz’s contemporaries had of the statements he made on account of their sharing the same experience of history and living in the same intellectual world. Aron argues that mixing these two tasks is a violation of the basic rules of science and political dialogue (Cf. Aron, 1980a, b, 28 ff.). Instead, an effort should be made to understand the nature of war and develop a theory that teaches strategists to appreciate its core functions. This caution should be borne in mind precisely by students of Clausewitz’s basic features. A deep insight into the process character of the present situation and a holistic look at reality—together with the ageless knowledge of Carl von Clausewitz—are needed to develop a well-founded method of thinking and improve the ability to make judgements and predictions. The objective of an Oxford University conference in May 2005 on the topic of Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century was to develop an interdisciplinary approach to understanding him (Cf. Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, 2007). In his paper on the interpretation of Clausewitz’s work, Bassford distinguishes between four schools of thought: • The Original Intent School interprets On War in the context of its day and focusses on the historical synopsis. • The Inspirational School studies Clausewitz’s ideas in the context of political science and economics and applies them innovatively to solve current problems. • The Receptionist School primarily consists of historians and analyses Clausewitz’s ideas and their impact over history. • The Editorial School has clear ideas of what Clausewitz really wanted to say and how the original text should be changed for the core of his ideas to become more understandable. (Cf. Bassford, 2007, 75 f.) Bassford does not draw distinct lines between these schools of thought. Rather, he believes that they inspire each other with their insights. This study presents a holistic or reality-focused school of thought that, like the Inspirational School, is intended to solve current problems by applying Clausewitz’s theory. The objective of this

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analysis is to use Clausewitz’s basic features to nurture strategic thinking and frame a strategy of relevance for the challenges of the twenty-first century. In the past two hundred years, many historians and philosophers have interpreted the intellectual world of Clausewitz without assessing the import of his statements for the present and future wars in the twenty-first century. It is therefore necessary for anyone who tackles the heavy burdens of a war or is involved in similar conflicts in social domains or the business world by applying strategies to assert their ideas in a frictional environment to themselves understand the basic features of Clausewitz’s theory. Clausewitz writes in the Author’s Preface: “Its scientific character consists in an attempt to investigate the essence of the phenomena of war and to indicate the links between these phenomena and the nature of their component parts.” (On War, 61). This approach of Clausewitz can be a crucial help for the solution of topical problems. It provides a theory which actors in today’s governments and armed forces should use. The book On War is regarded by him as a textbook for the education or the self-education of future commanders. This is his key intention. It demands intellectual work that should on no account exclude unconventional solutions from the outset. The impetus for the interpretations of Clausewitz’s key statements in my book is provided by the observation of reality. On the one hand, the process character of reality is presented in the historical context. On the other, the present is analysed from a political, a military and a social science perspective. The two approaches complement each other in a differentiated interpretation of the teachings of Carl von Clausewitz. The historical connections of his personal life and his studies extend the interpretations of his theory to the current situation. Conducting a well-founded analysis of Clausewitz’s theoretical structure also requires a fundamental look to be taken at his methods and insights from the humanities angle because of its logic and the precise terminology. These ways of looking at things lead to different insights and interpretations, which themselves complement each other.

Clausewitz from the Historical Perspective After the Renaissance, the Thirty Years’ War and the Seven Years’ War, Europe begins to be reshaped as a result of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna. The situation in Prussia at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which has already been described, constitutes a further accumulation of political events. The study of history generally sharpens the eye for danger, risk and chance in times of radical historical change. Countless explanations emphasise the importance of history for posterity in this respect. In the words of Goethe, the true can only be unfolded and preserved through its history. “What is worthy of wonder in history will only appear as wholesome and beneficiary to contemporaries and descendants if

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they are allowed to understand how the strangest and greatest things were achieved by important people under the strangest conditions and by chance.” (von Biedermann 1929, 735). But it is also necessary to be careful since history is always presented and assessed from the viewpoint of the observer and is time-bound. There is no objectivity in history where the conveyance of knowledge is concerned. In a letter of 15 February 1830 to Zelter, Goethe concludes: “How different is the information of the French about English history from that of the English.” (Beutler, 1948–54, Vol. 21, 891 f.) Historiography is the deliberate selection and interpretation of sources and facts from the viewpoint of an observer. The historian makes history. It seems that these deliberative words on historiography must be followed by an account of the life and work of Carl von Clausewitz so that the historical context can be understood. His life begins on 1 July 1780 when he is born into a Saxon family of pastors and scholars. His birth is later dated back to 1 June so that he could be included in an earlier cadet age group. From birth, his name is Carl von Clausewitz, even though his family has not had a title of noble descent since 1767 (Cf. Hahlweg, 1960, 491). At the age of 12, he joins the 34th Infantry Regiment Prinz Ferdinand as a lancecorporal, or officer aspirant, grows up in the cadet corps and undergoes hard and often drill-based training geared to the practical life of a soldier. He distinguishes himself at a young age through his diligence and keen intellect. Clausewitz takes an interest in all the events in Prussian military history. As a loyal servant of his king, he considers war to be always of an existential nature and associated with the objective of achieving the total defeat of the opponent. Also at a young age, he takes part in the Rhine campaign as a junior officer cadet as early as in 1793 and experiences the Coalition War of Austria and Prussia against France. After years as a young lieutenant at the garrison in Neuruppin and the Peace of Basel of 1795, he dedicates himself ambitiously to his own education. On 1 October 1801, he qualifies for the officers’ course at the Institute in the Military Sciences for Young Infantry and Cavalry Officers, the later War Academy, which is under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Scharnhorst (1755–1813), who is twenty-five years older than himself (Cf. Paret, 2015, 18 and Heuss, 1951, 60). Scharnhorst becomes his mentor and later a fatherly friend with whom he remains closely connected throughout his life. Scharnhorst has this to say about the young Clausewitz: “He needs to catch up, but an intellectual passion and the critical ingenuousness that makes him insist on internal independence even in view of overcome and assumed traditions lead him to creative freedom.” (ibid.) Clausewitz studies philosophy, history, military science and war theory, zealously devotes himself to his general education and develops into an ambitious selfeducator with a particular interest in military history (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 43). On Scharnhorst recommendation, he becomes a member of the prestigious Militärische Gesellschaft in which officers, members of the high nobility and bourgeois intellectuals meet regularly for talks devoted to exploring war in that day and discussing theories and lessons for practice in 1802 (ibid.). After graduating in 1803 as the top student of his class of 40, Clausewitz is appointed adjutant of

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Prince August of Prussia—again on the recommendation of Scharnhorst. He becomes acquainted with life at court, where he does not feel comfortable, being a reserved and shy young officer. On 3 November 1805, at the age of 25, he is promoted to staff captain. Clausewitz experiences the twin battle in Jena and observes the mental collapse of the formerly proud Prussian army after the devastating defeat. He and Prince August are taken prisoner by the French on 29 October 1806; he is interned in Nancy and Soissons until 1 September 1807; he returns to Berlin on 1 November 1807 following an exchange of prisoners, filled with hatred for France and everything French. He finds the total subjugation of the Prussian monarch under Napoleon’s sceptre particularly painful and dishonourable. The defeat and collapse of Prussia mark the beginning of a new period in his life. In a memorandum, he outlines revolutionary features for the reorganisation of the Prussian army (Cf. Clausewitz, 1807). As a close confidant and aide of Scharnhorst, he enters the circle of reformers around Stein, Boyen, Gneisenau and Grolman on 25 March 1808 in Königsberg and is actively involved in the development of the concept for the Prussian army reform. The considerable degree of change is also based on the lessons learned by Gneisenau in the final days of the American Civil War in 1782/83. After the relocation of the Prussian government to Berlin, Clausewitz is transferred to the second Division of the General War Department—the future general staff—on 19 July 1810, is promoted to major on 29 August 1810 and starts work on 1 October 1810 as an instructor for the little war at the newly founded General War School, Allgemeine Kriegsschule—the future War Academy, Kriegsakademie in Berlin. In his popular weekly briefings for Prussian officers from October 1810 to July 1811, he emphasises his disapproval of abstractions and mechanistic rules for the conduct of war and demands critical thought and initiative in the conduct of the little war (Cf. Hahlweg, 1966, 208 ff. and Paret, 2010). Clausewitz sees the little war, the war of patrols and ambushes, as Prussia’s last lifeline against the Napoleonic diktat and the French occupying forces. He develops the theory as a convincing reform against the battle formation of Napoleon I. It is difficult to convey to the Prussian officers, who have gained their experience of battle while fighting in line with mercenary troops, the idea of unregulated battle with small units under regionalized command on the periphery of the opponent and in the depth of the area (Cf. Paret, Paper, 2009). Finally, he becomes acquainted with the philosophy of Kant in the lectures of Kiesewetter, for which he shows great passion and critical ingenuousness, and studies the historical and political works of Fichte, who is teaching in Berlin. As a particular distinction, Clausewitz is in 1810 appointed instructor of the Prussian crown prince and future king Friedrich Wilhelm IV and his brother Wilhelm I in the subject of military history by his spiritual mentor Scharnhorst. On 17 December 1810, he marries Marie Countess Brühl, who lends him spiritual support and a sense of fulfilment in times of disappointment. “The exchange of letters is a wonderful document of an exchange of kindred souls; this woman becomes the mature, wise partner of his needs and achievements.” (Heuss, 1951, 61) He participates in the political life in Berlin, observes the management of state affairs from a close

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position, meets a large number of leading political figures and moves deftly in the court of the Prussian monarchy. His passionate disapproval of the submissive attitude of the Prussian king towards Napoleon increases. Prussia has become a French vassal state and in February 1812 enters a defensive alliance with France against Russia, undertaking to provide contingents for Napoleon’s forthcoming campaign against the tsar. Clausewitz is unable to take this complete subordination to the French sceptre against Russia. He loses his trust in the Prussian monarchy and becomes a nationalist. Clausewitz leaves Prussian service on 12 April 1812 with a journalistic bombshell, the deeply emotional Bekenntnisniederschrift (Memorial of Confession), in which he mercilessly criticises the monarchy and puts the welfare of the people above the fate of the king. He commits himself to Russian service on 1 June 1812 and participates in the war against Napoleon I. The contemporary portrait of Carl von Clausewitz exhibited at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College shows him as a lieutenant colonel (General Staff) in the green uniform of the tsar. Napoleon’s strategy is to defeat the enemy at his point of main effort by means of rapid manoeuvre and with great power and to achieve the objective of inflicting a decisive defeat. His usually successful manner of doing battle fails after initial victories due to his being held up by the resistance of the tsar’s troops. Clausewitz advises Tsar Alexander to avoid decisive battles against the French army, which is used to winning, and to benefit from Russia’s territory by making defensive use of the depth of the Eurasian continent. The advance of the French invasion army—the largest in history hitherto—into the virtually endless Eurasian continent begins in June 1812 and is delayed considerably due to weeks of rainy weather. Epidemics and poor supply result in the first notable losses. The advance of the French army is accompanied by mostly small skirmishes along the periphery of the marching columns. In August and September 1812, Clausewitz is an eyewitness to the first bloody battles at Smolensk and Borodino. He begins to doubt Napoleon’s approach to waging war, which has so far yielded such success. The onset of an unusually harsh Russian winter further slows down the advance of the French army. Napoleon and his troops, who are gravely weakened, reach the capital of Moscow on 2 September. The same evening, marauding French soldiers enkindle local fires that spread rapidly and destroy the wooden city. Without the logistic support hoped for and the possibility for his troops to regenerate, Napoleon begins to withdraw to France with 100,000 troops. Attacks by Russian Cossacks increase by the Berezina; the crossing of the river by the Napoleonic army from 26 to 28 November 1812 turns into a disastrous defeat. Under pressure from massive Russian attacks, the formations of the French army disintegrate and the troops flee in panic. The soldiers of the Napoleonic army are killed, freeze to death or die of fatigue. In late 1812, remains of the defeated army appear along the Prussian border. Clausewitz performs an important deed of a military-strategic dimension in Tauroggen when he convinces Yorck, the hesitant Prussian general, to switch to the Russian side with his auxiliary corps and join General Diebitsch in fighting the French army. Much later, on 31 July 1813, Tsar Alexander appoints Lieutenant Colonel Carl von Clausewitz as a Knight of the Order of Saint Anne for his

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outstanding efforts in fighting Napoleon (Cf. Rose, 1995, 20). The Russian campaign reveals blatant weaknesses in the Napoleonic approach to war. Napoleon’s strategy of inflicting rapid defeats fails in Russia. Clausewitz begins to think about the general purpose of wars. On 10 March 1813, he becomes an intelligence officer in Blücher‘s staff. Scharnhorst dies quite unexpectedly on 28 June 1813 as a consequence of a gunshot wound sustained at the Battle of Lützen on 2 May 1813. Clausewitz loses his mentor and sponsor and is deeply saddened. In April 1814, Clausewitz eventually returns into Prussian service as a colonel— after several unsuccessful applications (Cf. Scholtz, 1936, 178). King Friedrich Wilhelm III is for a long time reluctant to take him on because he has not forgiven him his unauthorised departure and his role as a mediator in Tauroggen and, what is more, considers him a demagogue who cannot be trusted. Clausewitz takes part in the decisive battle against Napoleon I in 1815 as a colonel and the chief of the general staff of the III Army Corps under Thielmann, planning the corps’ victorious operations near Ligny (16 June 1815) and two days later in Wavre without taking any active part in the battles himself (Cf. Hahlweg, 1960, 495). He then serves for three years as chief of the general staff under Gneisenau at the corps HQ in Koblenz. After Napoleon’s defeat in Russia, the Battle of Leipzig (18 October 1813) and finally Waterloo (18 June 1815), Clausewitz commits to a higher political purpose of war. He considers war exclusively an instrument of political activity of states for a definite purpose. The restoration begins in Prussia and many reformers—among them, Gneisenau—take their leave. King Friedrich Wilhelm III promotes Clausewitz, making him the hitherto youngest major general in the Prussian army, but transfers him to the position of administrative director of the War Academy in Berlin, a post of no more than marginal significance. Clausewitz is denied entry to the circle of highranking commanders, his innermost wish. The actual training, the curricula and the organization of everyday classes at the War Academy are removed from his influence and are directed by an especially appointed commission. He now has time for years and develops an exceptional creativity, which he uses for intensive private study and for writing his life’s work, On War, in great seclusion. Clausewitz analyses more than 130 campaigns of the Thirty Years’ War, of the Spanish War of Succession of Frederick the Great and—quasi as an eyewitness—of Napoleon I (Cf. Hahlweg, Vom Kriege, 39 f.). As a diligent theoretician, he collects all the ideas, categorisations and distinctions of his day and includes them in his secret oeuvre On War. He lives, acts, suffers and positions himself in the emerging German nationalism and eventually in the conflict between authoritarian statehood and the citizens’ striving for individual freedom. This dispute continues in the revolutionary movements far beyond the nineteenth century. Around 1827, he expresses the higher importance of politics in his work, which is necessary for systematically working one’s way through the chameleon-like changes in war, for revealing its features and for ensuring that it is waged purposefully. He incorporates this insight that politics enter into all phases of war and exert a

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moderating influence in the light of the tendencies to go to extremes in Book One and in large parts of the last book of his work. Shortly after his long-awaited activation in line service on 17 August 1830, initially as the commander of the Second Artillery Inspectorate in Breslau and then from January 1831 as the chief of the general staff of the Prussian Observation Army in Posen under Field Marshall von Gneisenau, he dies of cholera in Breslau on 16 November 1831. Clausewitz, a theoretician of war, avoided the public and issued only minor publications in anonymity: the polemic paper against the strategy theses of his contemporary von Bülow in Neue Bellona, articles on Prussia’s defeat at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 in Briefe der Minerva and Napoleon’s Russian campaign (1812/ 13) and against France (1814). His profound analysis of war and extensive elaborations are known to few of his contemporaries. After his death, his wife Marie Gräfin Brühl assumes the task of editing his complete works and eventually publishes On War in Potsdam in 1832–34. To this day, there has been no systematic research of her influence on Clausewitz’s oeuvre. Marie Gräfin Brühl dies on 28 January 1836 from the consequences of a nerve fever. In the following decades, the compendium On War attracts little attention. This situation does not change until interpreters of greatly varying quality such as von Moltke, Lenin, Ludendorff, Mao, Aron, Liddell Hart, Hahlweg and eventually Howard, Paret, Bassford, Strachan and Echevarria II recognise the substance of his work and help them to gain international currency. The generic or historical way of looking at the biography of Carl von Clausewitz, his interpretation of war and the philosophical milieu in Prussia is much written about and researched and provides a wide range of evidence of the global effect of his work from the early nineteenth Century. It also provides, however, much testimony to disastrous misinterpretations of his work. Learning about historical constraints, the dynamics of events and possible courses of action in wars of the past leads to familiarity with the essences of wars. Sound judgement in complex decision-making situations requires both knowledge and the ability to think everything through to the end in a larger context. This skill evolves from the methodical study of historical events, acting figures and circumstances. The revelation of tendencies in a war and its characteristics results in the acquisition of theoretical knowledge which makes it possible to comprehend and structure complex situations and lay open their essence. Clausewitz summarises this with the words: “Theory should be study, not doctrine.” (On War, 141). Clausewitz’s fundamental zeal for thinking about war in principle, his knowledge of history, his empirical skills and the depth of his philosophical thought can only be understood in their reciprocity to the failure of the monarchist system in Prussia, the nascent revolutionary reforms and the inspiration of the intellectual milieu. In his work on military theory, On War, he therefore connects politics and war, methodically analyses tendencies, interactions and frictions that can have a considerable influence on the course of war, and develops the profile of a counteracting military genius. This genius combines theory and practice in one quality that marks a deep caesura to the absolutistic concept of war and is of timeless validity.

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Only after the publication of his extensive estate do we know “what he was: a forceful, exceptionally creative member of the generation of Germans whose fate was determined by Napoleon I and Goethe, a soldier who had assembled an intellectual armoury that in some respects was unique. Stated in the most summary form, it consisted in his ability to combine values and some of the philosophical method of German idealism with a pronounced sense of reality, in his individualizing study of the past, which approached that of historicism, and in his understanding of the way states functioned, particularly in their foreign relations and in war.” (Paret, 1993, 18; quoted in Schmidt, 2007, 36). With his book On War, Clausewitz paves the way for the theory of modern war. It is an outline and a definition of the nature of war and its place in the education of soldiers, politicians and civilian leaders. “This theory trains the mind to gain an independent understanding of war through the interaction of experience and mediation, analysis of history and application of philosophy.” (Hahlweg, 1960, 497). A general assessment reveals that the generic interpretation of the life and work of Clausewitz contains many important historical details, renders connections transparent and offers insights that provide key help in the understanding of the backgrounds and the development of wars in the twenty-first century. Finally, this knowledge helps us to understand and judge events, connections and their causes correctly. An in-depth historical interpretation of the reception of his knowledge confirms the global effect of his ideas and the disastrous consequences of misinterpretations. Both are important arguments in favour of a historical reflection of his doctrine from the present-day point of view.

Clausewitz the Scholar of Military Science The knowledge of the late Age of Enlightenment, which ends the Age of Mysticism, God-ordained authority and the absolutistic rule of princes, is based on the rational perception of the senses and general reason. It overcomes introversive smallmindedness by means of critical rationality, openness and tolerance. The political ideas of Kant and Hegel that relate to the classic teachings of Plato and Aristotle postulate the primacy of the intellect, ideas and ideals as well as an exact, knowledge-based comprehension of causalities (Cf. Höffe, 2006a). In the early nineteenth century, a crosscurrent to the idealistic rationality of Kant’s Enlightenment begins a return to the Greek classics. Plato’s work is regarded as a guide to early Romanticism. Significant statements by Clausewitz on the Fascinating Trinity can be found in Plato’s work The Republic (See Chap. 5). It already contains an appropriate allocation of the blind natural force, the free creative spirit and reason alone to the nation, the commander and his army and those in government. During the years Clausewitz lives in Berlin, European philosophy is—as already mentioned—enjoying a heyday in Prussia. The intellectual movements are connected to thinkers like Hegel, Fichte, Kiesewetter and Schopenhauer. Clausewitz does not belong in the context of German Idealism in terms of the history of ideas.

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Rather, he uses many suggestions, trains of thought and abstractions from the philosophical aura for his studies in order to gain a full and profound grasp of the tendencies and characteristics of war. His criticism of the dominating schools of thought of the day refers to the customary inductive process used to generalise individual examples of war into tenets. Clausewitz complains that there is a lack of philosophical spirit and characterises the military science of the day as faceless practicality (Cf. Hahlweg, 1980b, 326). He demands methods of thinking to decipher complex situations and complains about the lack of philosophy in the approach to wars. In the early nineteenth century, a pessimistic attitude towards life spreads in Berlin—in the light of the systemic decline of Prussia. At the same time, private discussion salons develop profound philosophical ideas, romantic scenarios, vague social theories and superficial dogmas. Witty idealists propagate effusive ideas that are in stark contrast to the sombre reality in Prussia. Clausewitz is hard on the contemporary philosophers. This attitude is controversial and remains an important area of research. Clausewitz benefits from the wealth of ideas and quality of the philosophical discussions in Berlin. He can talk to a large number of brilliant people about his studies of the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon I and in his search for common and characteristic features, also receiving a wide range of suggestions from Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Clausewitz writes in the Author’s Preface: “Analysis and observation, theory and experience must never disdain or exclude each other; on the contrary, they support each other.” (On War, 61). Clausewitz systematically includes analytic observation, the philosophical method of thinking and the demand for reason and responsibility in political and military action in the development of theories on war. He offers ways of thinking for analysing complex connections in war which involve equally forces of intellect and temperament. Clausewitz frames basic tasks, points out and explains the detailed difficulties involved and only starts searching for a solution after assiduously discussing critical objections. He considers profound theoretical training for decision-makers the core requirement for understanding the polity, cultures and multidimensional strategic situations. They are diametrically opposed to powerpolitical obstinacy, pure functionalism and aristocratic hubris and promote political, cultural, religious and legal openness towards others in their distinctiveness. He postulates the use of philosophy as a method of thinking and a tool for comprehending contents and causes. He sees this as the only way to shed light upon complicated questions and to achieve success in framing or verifying theoretical statements in the sense of establishing unity between ideas and reality. Clausewitz’s work doubtlessly includes numerous ideas from the spiritual universe of German idealism without their being specifically indicated. It is misleading, however, to integrate his mindscape into the context of idealism in terms of the history of ideas. This would require the conduct of a separate research project in which the core statements of German idealism are compared with the philosophical statements of Clausewitz in a systematic and profound manner. It would similarly require the political ethics of Kant and Hegel to be studied in

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comparison with his statements. There is no doubt that Clausewitz benefitted from the ideas of the philosophers and used their findings to study the nature, tendencies and characteristics of war as impetus and intellectual guidance. Nevertheless, his work can be seen as that of an early sociologist whose thoughts have been further developed by Max Weber or Friedrich Engels. He succeeds in grasping the complex nature of war in its entirety and embodying it in an intellectually profound structure. Significant attributes of Clausewitz’s gain in knowledge are care in the use of terminology, its contents and relations, the methodology of analysis and discussion of the subject and, finally, argumentation in dichotomic contradistinctions and the conscientious handling of critical objections. Another is the clarity of the terms in Clausewitz’s deliberations, the contents and contexts of which to this day provide an overall terminological framework in which strategy, tactics, politics and armed forces, attack, defence and battle are discussed. The reason why Clausewitz introduces philosophy as an important key to understanding war lies in the dogmatic and strictly rational way in which he handles the topic. In the Age of Enlightenment, war is seen as a large-scale game of chess played with armies that have undergone years of training. The mere manoeuvring of superior contingents in favourable terrain and at the right time guarantees military victory. A battle does not necessarily have to be fought with the valuable professional armies. The emergence of revolutionary mass armies unhinges the dogmatic foundations of contemporary war theory. Napoleon‘s method of conducting war impresses with decisiveness, rapid troop movements, surprising manoeuvres, great momentum of attack on the opponent’s center of gravity and the unrelenting will to bring about the decision on the battlefield. Clausewitz recognises the great difference between a rule-based way of thinking and the actual dynamics of Napoleon I-style battle. In his estimation, the rational basic views on war must be carefully reduced to their core truth, supplemented and extended by emotional factors. Clausewitz chooses this generalisation of the ways of viewing and thinking as an important philosophical task for his research on war. He often uses the adjectives philosophical and scientific synonymously (Cf. Vom Kriege, 184 f and Echevarria II, 2007, 23). With an eye to the present-day concept of philosophy as part of science, philosophical is preferred here as it is considered more appropriate for the interpretation of Clausewitz’s theory. Clausewitz’s use of the philosophical approach in the analysis of war will be illustrated with his understanding of truth, his use of examples and his understanding of war.

Truth It is hardly possible to interpret Clausewitz’s ideas on truth without profound reflection. Clausewitz counters the search for regularities as grammatical key moments of successful warfare, like the building of an unconquerable fortress, with an individualisation of reflection and includes the importance of moral values

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and the virtues of the army. Clausewitz searches his philosophical knowledge on the basis of what is true and false in history. In his assessment of events, he bears in mind the dimensions of frictional problems which commanders need to overcome, often under extreme stress. He believes that success or failure can only be evaluated correctly if account is taken of all chance, probability and frictions. Any assessment of a war begins with a detailed analysis of the actual situation and events. In 1829, Goethe writes in a letter: “. . . for the true is simple and gives little to do, the false gives the opportunity to split time and forces.” (Beutler, 1948–54, Vol. 21, 825) Clausewitz searches for the truth of war in the simple order of selected features that he studies in depth. In his analysis, he follows the truth of the Kantian theses of Kiesewetter, a philosopher who teaches mathematics and logic at the Prussian War Academy and invalidates ideas that there is a sophisticated system of truth (Cf. Schössler, 2009, 71). For him, the conformity of the logical and the actual truth is the decisive factor. Echevarria II quotes text passages from Clausewitz’s paper Über die Zukunft der Theorie (28, 34) and extracts from Kiesewetter’s Grundriss der Allgemeinen Logik (110–11), the sentences of which are worded almost identically. This clearly confirms that Clausewitz is guided intellectually by Kiesewetter’s writings (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 22). Clausewitz writes further: “While there may be no system, and no mechanical way of recognising the truth, truth does exist. To recognise it one generally needs seasoned judgement and an instinct born of long experience.” (On War, 517). The logical truth is the conformity of ideas with the laws of logic. Those are the same for all people. Consequently, the logical truth must be identical for all people (Cf. Hahlweg, 1980b, 331). In contrast, the actual truth is the conformity of ideas with the observed reality. Clausewitz demands a thorough explanation of the logical truth and an examination of the statements obtained with the actual or material truth. He argues that only if theoretical ideas and reality conform to each other and form a whole is it possible to speak of truth. Differences between the logical and actual truths arise in every war due to: • free creative action and counteraction in the dynamic interplay of forces with an equal opponent, • non-rational chance, probability and frictions in both the army as well as in its command and control in battle, • irrational violence, hatred and hostility as well as • the all-engineering political rationality. For Clausewitz, the knowledge that things are only important if their essence is understood and they conform with actual practice is of great significance for the analysis of war and thus a key for his lifework. The pursuit of truth becomes his raison d’être (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 27 f.). The search for the correct truth becomes a key concern for Clausewitz and goes far beyond the specific military field into philosophy, which he uses as a method of thinking and means of acquiring knowledge.

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Examples The philosophical view manifests itself in the evaluation of historical examples to which he dedicates a chapter in Book Two. “Historical examples clarify everything and also provide the best kind of proof. This is particularly true of the art of war. General Scharnhorst, whose manual is the best that has ever been written about actual war, considers historical examples to be of prime importance to the subject, and he makes admirable use of them.” (On War, 170) With the spirit of observation and instruction, Scharnhorst comprehends experience and illustrates his insights in his Military Handbook for Use in the Field (Militärisches Taschenbuch zum Gebrauch im Felde) (Vom Kriege, footnote 68). On the other hand, Clausewitz cautions against the improper use of examples and recommends strict criteria for their use. Examples only serve to “throw the necessary light on his idea . . .” (On War, 171) and to deal with many minor situations on the periphery of events. Examples do not provide evidence per se, but are useful for illustrating Clausewitz’s thoughts. “But historical references also present a danger. The reader—in particular if he seeks regulations from the outset or would like to welcome them—can easily regard the examples, which of course express the positive and negative criticism of Clausewitz, as rules of conduct.” (Paret, 2008, 3) It can be assumed that Clausewitz recognised this discrepancy in his writing and wanted to remove it when he revised his work. As it is, they continue to exist and are the cause of numerous mistakes and misinterpretations.

Understanding of War Another cognitive process has encouraged Clausewitz to turn towards philosophical methods of thinking. It is the different levels of reflection in his estimation of war and his understanding of politics. After the subordination of Prussia to French rule, Clausewitz withdraws with the Bekenntnisniederschrift in which he proclaims: Death rather than unfreedom. The weal of the nation becomes more important to him than the sensitivities of the Prussian king. He becomes an ardent patriot and thinks about a mass army (Volkssturm) under civic command. The patriotic Clausewitz leaves Prussian service for Russia. When he returns, he is a realist without great ethical expectations. He understands the urgency for an independent rational assessment of policy and war. The frequently expressed view that Clausewitz followed a dialectic of Hegel based on German idealism and Romanticism does not get to the heart of Clausewitz’s argumentation. In his case, thesis and antithesis do not insist on a synthesis as an overarching solution. His argumentation in opposite terms primarily serves the purpose of clarifying differences in meaning (Cf. Paret, 1980, 337, footnote 13). This complementary access to the reality of war as the object of study increases the depth of knowledge and leads to great clarity in the train of thought. A

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critical examination to engineering and science standards combined with the search for regularities seems to be impractical for covering war. The essential keywords for a philosophical approach to Clausewitz’s work are: • • • •

the holistic view of war, understanding of the essence of things, the distinction between cause and effect, and a dichotomous method of thinking and presentation with respect to interaction between opposing factors.

His methodical approach begins with the establishment of clear definitions for terms, goes on to feature the use of precision, logic and care in the search for causes, the examination of the unity of ideas and reality and stands out due to the careful handling of criticism. The method is determined by reason and experiences and not passions. The great importance of handling critical statements in the cognitive process must be taken into account in the education of commanders. As a core requirement for understanding communities, cultures and complex political situations Clausewitz sees a well-founded education for members of the officer corps. By making a distinction between absolute and limited war—caused by human weaknesses and facts of life—, Clausewitz rejects the idea that war can be understood on a rational basis and the course it takes is predictable. He sets human weaknesses and chaos against military genius, whose correlations to the basic philosophical insights in Berlin are obvious. Other core statements, for instance, the Fascinating Trinity or the three interactions to the extreme are also anticipated in theological, legal and philosophical publications of Hegel, who, like Clausewitz, lives in Berlin from 1818 to 1831. Kondylis opposes the idea of seeing Clausewitz as a secondary Hegelian. His argumentation opposes the idea of any philosophical influence having been exerted on Clausewitz, and he firmly believes that no proof of this has yet been found anywhere (Cf. Kondylis, 1986, 99 f.). Herberg-Rothe recognises parallelism in the thoughts of Hegel and Clausewitz, but no direct connection, though this cannot be ruled out (Cf. Herberg-Rothe, 2000, 72). In contrast, Schössler affirms the influence of Hegel on Clausewitz’s work and gives highly convincing reasons for doing so (Cf. Schössler, 2009, 101 ff.). In the author’s view, the Fascinating Trinity definitely did not emerge without knowledge of Hegel’s ideas. It is also a well-known fact that Clausewitz discussed issues with Humboldt and Gneisenau in the intellectual circles of Berlin. Clausewitz’s findings do not become part of the development of philosophy in Berlin since he does not go public with his manuscript of On War. The story is that he communicated exclusively passages of the text in letters to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. His philosophical view runs through his work like a common thread. He succeeds in mentally combining tendencies and characteristics of war and the skills of commanders-in-chief to form a whole. His particular achievement is to present war in its rational, non-rational and emotional elements as a whole and simultaneously as a political instrument. Unlike those of contemporary philosophers, his theoretical analyses of war are based on practical experience.

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According to Hahlweg, the timelessness of Clausewitz’s method of thinking rests on the depth of historical experience, the philosophic-dialectical way of thinking and realistic and critical analysis (Cf. Vom Kriege, 39 f.). On the other hand, Clausewitz does not leave us a consistent compendium, but a large collection of material in very different states of editing which he diligently collected over decades. However, his choice of words, endless sentences and sometimes very scattered fragments of thought hinder a hermeneutic approach from being taken to the key statements of his work. For instance, he mixes the terms purpose and goal (Zweck und Ziel) or is unclear in how he distinguishes frictions from probability and chance. An intensive study of all the material is required to finally understand this philosophical way of thinking. At the end of Book Two, Clausewitz writes: “Anyone who feels the urge to undertake such a task must dedicate himself for his labors as he would prepare for a pilgrimage to distant lands. He must spare no time or effort, fear no earthly power or rank, and rise above his own vanity or false modesty in order to tell, in accordance with the expression of the Code Napoleón, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” (On War, 174) With his search for truth and lasting values in the perpetual change of history, Clausewitz has remained a philosopher and teacher (Cf. Schramm, 1965, 512). These few considerations already indicate that Clausewitz’s theories can really only be understood in the context of the basic philosophical movements of his day. Altogether, the interpretation of Clausewitz’s work by means of philosophy provides an important foundation for understanding war as the object of study, the influencing factors, priorities, interrelations and the methodology of his approach, which include the influence of emotional and moral forces. It contains important demands that have to be borne in mind in any theoretical analysis of complex phenomena, demands with respect to truth, the function of examples, the relation between theory and practice and, as a common thread, the estimation of the function of wars. The philosophical insights provided by Clausewitz’s theory regarding the clarity of terms and thought, the structuring of complex events, decision-making, the handling of objections and the importance of rational and emotional factors are quite crucial for strategic thinking and future strategies from the present-day point of view. They provide us key support in our current efforts to comprehend wars in the twentyfirst century and help us to find metaphysical solutions to the problems. After all, account should be taken of the high relevance of criticism in the cognitive process in the socialisation of leaders.

Holistic Interpretation of War with the Theory of Clausewitz The holistic or present-related view is a form of analysis of the phenomenon of war that is largely removed from the historical context and focusses on neither the action nor the actors in their day. It is based on the use of holistic, structured and profound knowledge of the past to assess events of the present and to prepare the making of strategic decisions to meet future challenges. A student of strategy needs to

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familiarise himself with knowledge of past eras. In doing so, he learns about ways of thinking, terms, logic and frictional events which need to be taken into consideration in the development of a modern strategy. For instance, the intellectual construct of the Fascinating Trinity, within whose coordinates each theory of war floats and changes its nature like a chameleon, looks like a headstone in the intellectual architecture of strategy through which theoretical access can be gained. Without theory, that is to say, a thought-out basic concept, without clear terms and ideas and without a methodical approach, any strategic consideration becomes a partially optimised makeshift. Clausewitz’s theory results in a balanced and profound look being taken at a complex matter with the aim of becoming closely acquainted with it. This is only the knowledge basis needed to improve strategic action. Familiarity comes with the application of the theory, objective knowledge turns into subjective skill. Clausewitz writes: “Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and ploughing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education.” (On War, 141). A military leader with knowledge, experience and farsightedness is able to quickly capture the essence of a complex situation and take bold action under great stress. The principles of other strategists, such as Sun Tzu, Antoine-Henri Jomini and Helmut Moltke, can also be useful, of course. But Carl von Clausewitz is the only one in the European world of ideas and the German history of mind to present a methodological basis that offers a gain of knowledge with regard to the holistic concept of war when it is applied to the object of study. He is the theoretician on strategy who succeeds in integrating policy into an analytical definition of war as a central element in its genesis, course and end (Cf. Paret, 1980, 332 ff.). In the view of the author, the reality-related way of looking at Clausewitz’s theories is an approach that enables the essence of prolonged wars in the twentyfirst century to be understood and an important prerequisite for strategic thinking and action to be created. This is not a matter of gaining a superficial grasp of war, but of improving strategy capability. This view will run through the further statements in this study like a common thread. The task of examining the belligerent events of the present as a result of historical processes and current developments is of considerable significance for acquiring a profound understanding of reality. In combination with an analysis of the present, it can make a significant contribution towards improving the strategist’s ability to make sound judgements. The methodological interpretation of Clausewitz’s theory is the starting point for understanding the object of study, for terminology, priorities and the development of methods for framing future strategies. If these considerations are implemented, two points become clear: Clausewitz can only be understood if his thoughts are placed in the proper context within the framework of the radical changes and processes in the Napoleonic era and abstracted. The timeless efficacy of his insights will only be convincingly manifested, however, when they are applied in the handling of present and future wars.

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Use is made in military and political analyses of selected lineaments of Clausewitz’s theory for comprehending future wars and revealing their essence. These attributes are particularly important for understanding the terms, rational and emotional influencing factors, priorities, methodology and core statements of Clausewitz’s theory. They provide intellectual tools for a culture of strategic thinking and action that does not exist in most of all post-modern states. A thorough study of the essential elements and their correlations is necessary to understand his complete works. Anyone quoting Clausewitz today—in the same way as Zoroaster, Mao’s Little Red Book or the Old Testament are quoted—without drawing conclusions for here and now is making the wrong use of Clausewitz’s theory and has not understood it in the slightest. In the following chapters of the book, the core statements of Clausewitz’s theory are addressed with an eye to the present in order to highlight insights and procedures that provide help in holistically understanding characteristics of current forms of war. Appropriate reference is made to historical and philosophical aspects of Clausewitz’s theory. The procedure used to dissect present-day wars according to the coordinates of Clausewitz’s theory and to reveal their characteristics and the forces involved can enhance the understanding and quality of an assessment of the global strategic situation considerably and indicate new solutions. It is not only the basis for strategic thinking and action and the development of strategies in itself, but also improves strategy competence. When the phenomena and forces of war are considered today with respect to their connections with Clausewitz’s theory and their dependencies on it, Ulrich de Maizière demands: “This scheme is not a historical look back at Clausewitz and his day, but an attempt to study the tasks set to policy-makers and strategists in the present as reflected in the insights of Carl von Clausewitz.” (de Maizière, 1980, 9). This approach cannot be found in literature today. This study therefore breaks new ground with respect to the understanding of the use of Clausewitz’s theory in the strategic analyses of war in the twenty-first century.

Bibliography Clausewitz’s Works von Clausewitz, C. (1807). Historische Briefe über die großen Kriegs-Ereignisse im Oktober 1806. In Archenholz J. W. V (Ed.), Minerva, Vols. 1 and 2, Berlin.

Works on Clausewitz Aron, R. (1980a). Clausewitz: Den Krieg denken. Frankfurt a.M.: Propyläen-Verlag.

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Aron, R. (1980b). Zum Begriff einer politischen Strategie bei Clausewitz. In ClausewitzGesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg? Beiträge zur Strategie-Diskussion der Gegenwart im Spiegel der Theorie von Carl von Clausewitz (pp. 42–55). Bonn, Dümmler. Bassford, C. (2007). The primacy of the ‘Trinity’ in Clausewitz’s mature thought. In H. Strachan & A. Herberg-Rothe (Eds.), Clausewitz in the twenty-first century (pp. 74–90). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Echevarria, A. J., II. (2007). Clausewitz and contemporary war. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hahlweg, W. (1960). Carl von Clausewitz. In H. Heimpel et al. (Eds.), Die großen Deutschen: Deutsche Biographie (Vol. 2, pp. 491–501). Frankfurt/M: Ullstein. Hahlweg, W. (1966). Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe. Dokumente aus dem Clausewitz-, Scharnhorst- und Gneisenau-Nachlass sowie aus öffentlichen und privaten Sammlungen. Band 1. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. Hahlweg, W. (1979). Nachrichten von Preußen in seiner großen Katastrophe. 1823/24. In Carl von Clausewitz, Verstreute kleine Schriften. Zusammengestellt, bearbeitet und eingeleitet von Werner Hahlweg. Osnabrück. Hahlweg, W. (1980b). Philosophie und Theorie bei Clausewitz. In Clausewitz-Gesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg (pp. 325–332). Bonn: Dümmler. Herberg-Rothe, A. (2000). Clausewitz und Hegel. Ein heuristischer Vergleich. Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte, 10(1), 49–84. Heuss, T. (1951). Deutsche Gestalten. Studien zum 19. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Wunderlich. Kondylis, P. (1986). Theorie des Krieges. Clausewitz - Marx - Engels - Lenin. Stuttgart. Klett Cotta. Macdonald, D. J. (2002), Review Essay on Michael Handel, (2001), Masters of War. Classical Strategic Thought. In: Naval War College Review. Spring 2002. Vol. LV, No. 2, Newport R.I. Paret, P. (1980). Die politischen Ansichten von Clausewitz. In Clausewitz-Gesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg? (pp. 333–348). Bonn: Dümmler. Paret, P. (1993). Clausewitz und der Staat: Der Mensch, seine Theorien und seine Zeit. Bonn: Dümmler. Paret, P. (2008, February). Anmerkungen zu Clausewitz. In Denkwürdigkeiten, 43, Berlin. Paret, P. (2009). The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806. Princeton: University Press. Paret, P. (2010). Clausewitz society lecture given on 15 October. Berlin: Humboldt University. Paret, P. (2015). Clausewitz in his time: Essays in the cultural and intellectual history of thinking about war. New York: Berghahn Books. Rose, O. (1995). Carl von Clausewitz: Wirkungsgeschichte seines Werkes in Rußland und der Sowjetunion. Munich: Oldenbourg-Verl. Schelling, F. W. (1907). Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (Vol. 1). Leipzig: C. Winter. Schmidt, A. (2007). Carl von Clausewitz, kriegstheoretische Konzeption und geschichtsphilosophische Hintergründe. In L. Souchon (Ed.), Romantik, Deutscher Idealismus, Hegel und Clausewitz. Clausewitz-Information 1/2007. Hamburg: Bundeswehr Command and Staff College. Scholtz, G. (1936). Carl von Clausewitz. Berlin: Dümmler. Schössler, D. (2009). Clausewitz-Engels-Mahan: Grundriss einer Ideengeschichte militärischen Denkens. Berlin: Dümmler. Schramm, W. R. (1965). Von der klassischen Kriegsphilosophie zur zeitgerechten Wehrverfassung. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 15(9), 493–511. Strachan, H., & Herberg-Rothe, A. (2007). Clausewitz in the twenty-first century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Further Literature Beutler, Ernst (Ed.) (1948–1954). Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 24 vols. Zürich: Artemis Verlag de Maizière, U. (1980). Politische Führung und militärischen Macht. In Clausewitz-Gesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg (pp. 91–110). Bonn: Dümmler. Gerhardt, Volker (2007, 21 April). Geist der Freiheit. Vor 200 Jahren erschien die “Phänomenologie des Geistes”. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Höffe, O. (2006a, January 9). Vom Nutzen des Nutzlosen. In Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. von Biedermann, F. F. (Ed.). (1929). Goethes Gespräche mit Eckermann. Leipzig: Aufbau-Verlag. von Bormann, A. (2006). Ungleichzeitigkeiten der Europäischen Romantik. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.

Chapter 5

On War: Basic Features

Abstract Souchon emphasises that the basic features of Clausewitz’s theory are of pre-eminent importance for strategists. He focuses on what are the known and most frequently quoted characteristics and pith of On War from the strategy point of view: The Fascinating Trinity, the Appropriateness of Means, the relation between Purpose, Objective and Means, the Frictions, Probabilities and Chance as well as the true Moral Quality of the Commander and the Virtues of the Army. The Fascinating Trinity is designed to achieve an abstract relationship between the philosophical, generic and real essence of war. It is the synthesis or capstone of Clausewitz’s entire intellectual work on the theory of war and the result of a dichotomous process that combines theory (essence) and action (manifestation) of abstract and real war. Souchon argues that with the inclusion of the important moral aspects Clausewitz sets high standards for the character and quality of commanders that still hold in today’s world.

Clausewitz defines the timeless tendencies and characteristics of war and its relation to politics. He does not proceed handbook-style in sequentially describing the individual elements of war or devising a military doctrine. It is more a case of the logical approach he takes to his analysis offering a chance of the particularities and characteristics of war being deeply understood and strategic thinking and action appreciated. It must be emphasised here that the basic features of his theory—he calls them lines of thought (Hauptlineamente)—are of pre-eminent importance. The term lines of thought is seen as the one that really fits the essence of what Clausewitz derived from his analysis of war, since the term is used in the Unfinished Note, which was written years after the note (see Chap. 6 for excerpt). The main features of war drawn in his work are the appropriateness of means, the relations between the purpose, objective and means, as well as probability, chance and friction, the commander’s genius and the military virtues of the army. The Fascinating Trinity, one of the “consequences for theory” (On War, 89), is included at a higher level as it “enables us to make an initial differentiation and identification of its major components” (ibid.). © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Souchon, Strategy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0_5

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Clausewitz defines an equal opponent in terms of the appropriateness of means he has at his disposal and compares a commander’s intellect and temperament with those of the opposing combatant. He declines the purpose, goals and means in war with all the phenomena, interrelations and effects that are associated with them and conceives the play of probability and chance “within which the creative spirit (freie Seelentätigkeit) is free to roam” (On War, 89, parenthesis added by author). Finally, he sets standards for the knowledge, experience, skill and character traits that commanders should have. More lines could be included if realistic use were made of Clausewitz’s findings. They alone, however, would not substantially improve the understanding of war. This study attempts to illustrate these timeless features of twenty-first century wars and draw conclusions from them. This is a challenging task, as the insights obtained from Clausewitz’s thoughts on war are mostly expressed dichotomously and his reasoning is highly complex. The connection between politics and war is explored in great detail, with the relations between politics and the armed forces and the primacy of politics being revealed in five steps. The first one, in which war is likened to a chameleon, consists of a study of the factors and attendant properties that have a formative influence on war’s character and orientation within the Fascinating Trinity. In accordance with Hegel’s logic of essence, the pith of what Clausewitz merges in the Fascinating Trinity to form a synthesis of his ideas. He succeeds in structuring the phenomena of war rationally, adding substance to them and putting them into an overriding context that is outlined here at the beginning. Then the appropriateness of means allows a comparison to be made of the tendencies and characteristics of the Fascinating Trinity and reveals whether it is prudent to wage a war and what means are required to do so. To determine what is appropriate, it is necessary to compare the political purpose, the strength and circumstances of the state, the character and capabilities of the government, the armed forces and the people with that of the opponent and examine possible effects on third-party states. In addition, the comparison must be based on the assumption that the opponent will do exactly the same evaluation, determining the means he sees as being appropriate and acting equally in order to make the most of his strengths. The appropriateness of means quantifies the way in which action can be taken, the capabilities of the armed forces that are to be employed and the effort that has to be made. It connects the purpose with the possible courses of action, that is to say, with the strategy. This is, in turn, the basis from which the war plan, campaign plan and battle plan are derived and further conclusions concerning the training and supply of the troops are drawn. Weighing this up is a creative activity and involves the government, the armed forces and the people. The political purpose specified by the government is then put into relation to the intermediate and final military goals and detailed plans are developed. The relations between the purpose, objective and means is the purposively rational link between the government and the armed forces, and has a rational, limiting effect on the interrelations, which would otherwise go to extremes. Any change in the goals, effort and means in the course of the war can also bring about a modification in the

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purpose. It is not possible to expend the specified means in a linear fashion in a real war as it differs substantially from a war outlined on paper. “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult” (On War, 119). Probability and chance, as well as the opponent’s action alter the course that military actions are planned to take and lead to considerable friction in the reality of war. It is caused, for example, by the fog of war, natural disasters and sudden obstacles, insufficient training, misconduct, cowardice, chaos or a lack of discipline. While this friction can radically change the course of a war, it at the same time creates room for manoeuvre for the commander that he can exploit. If the fighting is intense, chequered and protracted, the political purpose usually changes and hence its dominating influence on the action taken. Frictional difficulties become more frequent and unexpected room for manoeuvre arises. It takes these extreme conditions to bring out the true moral quality of the commander and the virtues of his army. The synopsis of the characteristics of war is the core element of Clausewitz’s theory of war. It proceeds from war in theory, with its multi-dimensional factors, to war in reality, enables the rationality of the purpose, objective and means to be adapted hermeneutically in the face of friction and emphasises the importance of emotional factors for the overall course of a war. Providing intellectual guidance for asking the right questions, understanding the architecture of war as a whole and finding individual answers, Clausewitz’s work is a premise for a timeless culture of strategic thinking. To gain a profound understanding of the Fascinating Trinity, it is wise to exegete the relevant passages of On War one by one. Clausewitz’s principles are equivalent components that are by no means assessed in a set order, but must be arranged on the basis of the subject and focus in question. The Fascinating Trinity must be considered the sole overarching element, as it combines the characteristics of war and the actions in it into a whole. It is the key that enables Clausewitz’s complete works to be understood and the entire cosmos of his ideas to be revealed.

The Fascinating Trinity The Fascinating Trinity1 is a concept designed to achieve a constant, highly abstract relationship between the generic, philosophical and real essences of war. It is the point of departure for the following detailed exegesis that concentrates on a selection of the basic features of the text. A war develops over a lengthy period of time until the moment it is considered from the generic point of view and is the result of a

1

The translation by Howard/Paret On War uses the words paradoxical trinity for the translation of Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit. Other translations are paradoxical, miraculous, wondrous or wonderful trinity. The translation fascinating trinity is best suited to reflect the analytical ideas of Clausewitz as well as its philosophical dimension.

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lengthy and multi-dimensional process. When it is considered from the philosophical point of view, the focus is on basic tasks and the difficulties they pose. Rational solutions are sought by applying reason, using experience and giving serious thought to sceptical arguments. When war is considered from the holistic point of view, it is reality, an actual state in which a variety of measurable or estimable characteristics and tendencies change dynamically in reciprocating sequences. The word trinity correlates with Christian images in its logic. Tripartite expositions are often found in literature, as in the texts of Plato, St. Augustine, and Darwin (Cf. Bassford, 2007, 78). Clausewitz does not indicate where his idea of trinity originated. A glance at the philosophers of his day in Berlin leads scholars to Hegel, who introduces a trinity that is characterised by the power to determine the general and give oneself subjectivity and subsumption under the general, that is to say, governmental power, in his lectures on the Philosophy of Right (Cf. Hegel, 1973/4, Vol. 4, 79). Being the synthesis of Clausewitz’s theory, the Fascinating Trinity combines the characteristics of war with the actions in a three-dimensional space. Every war floats between three dominant tendencies. External influences, such as duration and intensity, change the dominant tendencies in it and thus its position in the threedimensional force field. War changes like a chameleon over time: The longer it goes on, the greater the influence of probability and chance and the resulting frictions is on its course. Emotional elements, in particular enmity and hateful reactions, increase. The commander and his army lose not only the moral support of their own people, but also their support in terms of the provision of troops and materiel. Governments of democratic states are voted out of office. This simple example of a potential change illustrates the possible developments in war due to time. Presenting the polar ideas associated with the Fascinating Trinity in a three-dimensional model instead of in the way that they are customarily presented in specialist literature renders it possible to quantify the various states of war and to see how they change. Clausewitz begins his work with an examination of the duel, since this action theory basis allows his ideas to be transferred to all areas of society to the full. He goes on to describe an absolute war in a world of theoretical conditions, outlining how the interaction of the three factors would lead to extremes. As a complementary antithesis, he develops the image of real war in space and time, which unfolds under the constant pressure of dynamic events, interactive tension and determinative influences. This leads Clausewitz from his philosophical reflections to the reality of action in which the opposing forces, sustained by their political wills, interplay freely in a frictional environment. As the result of his theory, the Fascinating Trinity combines a rational, a non-rational and an irrational reality into a whole. It transforms the hierarchical relation of politics and war into an objective space of action in which war is determined by three independent variables: its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone, blind natural force composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, and the play of probability and chance within which the creative spirit is free to roam. In this way, his main ideas of

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war are condensed into three independent tendencies between which every theory of war is floating (schwebend). This pivotal concept of his work allows a holistic grasp to be gained of war, with all its political and military actors and the decisions and action they can take, and valuable insights to be gathered for systematically examining present day wars.

The Exegesis of the Fascinating Trinity

Fascinating Trinity War is thus more than a mere chameleon, because it changes its nature to some extent in each concrete case. But it is also, however, when it is regarded as a whole and in relation to the tendencies that dominate within it, a fascinating trinity—composed of: • primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; • the play of probability and chance, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and • its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason. The first of these three aspects correlates more to the people; the second, more to the commander and his army; the third, more to the government. The passions that are to blaze up in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope that the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political purpose belongs to the government alone. These three tendencies appear as three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their dimensions. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. The task, therefore, is to keep our theory [of war] floating among these three tendencies, as among three points of attraction. What lines might best be followed to achieve this difficult task will be explored in the book on the theory of war [i.e., Book Two]. In any case, the conception of war defined here will be the first ray of light into the fundamental structure of theory, which will first sort out the major components and will allow us to distinguish them from one another (Translation by the author based on Bassford, 2007, 77 and On War, 89, italics and bold face print added by author).

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This text contains widely differing statements that are analysed, discussed, and interpreted one by one in six paragraphs. This way of looking at them allows an explicit interpretation of the text to be made and permits far-reaching conclusions to be drawn. Some paragraphs have been inserted, and important passages underlined. Passage 1: The First Fascinating Trinity War is thus more than a mere chameleon, because it changes its nature to some extent in each concrete case. But it is also, however, when it is regarded as a whole and in relation to the tendencies that dominate within it, a fascinating trinity—composed of: • primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; • the play of probability and chance, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and • its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason (On War, 89).

Carl von Clausewitz grasps the way in which war can change and compares its outer nature with that of a chameleon. This comparison alludes to the constant change of colours with which the reptile adapts to its surroundings and camouflages itself perfectly. Despite its transient character, war remains a Fascinating Trinity whose inward nature never changes—even when viewed as a whole. A tripolar system merges all of Clausewitz’s experiences and findings in a philosophical synthesis and explains the tendencies and characteristics of wars. Irrational, primordial violence, the non-rational play of probability and chance and the rational nature of an instrument of policy become coordinates in a virtual three-dimensional space of tension. Clausewitz begins the presentation of the mystical trinity with a discussion of three objective tendencies: violence, probability and chance and an instrument of policy. He correlates primordial violence, a general characteristic that war has in common with other phenomena, with a natural force, the play of probability and chance with the particularity that war is a space within which the creative spirit is free to roam and the element of subordination in war, which, as an instrument of policy, makes it subject to reason alone. The subordinate nature of the instrument of policy refers to the political purpose. War is therefore not an isolated act, not some kind of armed service provided by the army for the government, and not a tactical instrument of policy that is to be used when it seems opportune, but must rather be seen as a complex whole in a threedimensional context created by the three independent tendencies and characteristics. Another concern is that with respect to the ability with which war can and the emotions and frictions that can arise in it on account of the actions involved, the idea

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of it being a continuation of policy within an area of tension constituted by three equivalent and independent regularities is grasped. The government exerts a decisive influence on war in order to accomplish its purposes. Its impact on it is reduced by the play of probability and chance and the element of primordial violence. It loses its monopoly of influence. The government must not—as stated below—be a despotic lawgiver, and it shall not be inconsistent with [war’s] means (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 88). Hence, the government must not have total control over war. To find dialectical access to the topic, it is possible to picture the theory of war as being floating—in the three-dimensional force field of tendencies. An extension of the duration of a war leads to a change in its nature because the influence of probability and chance and the resulting frictions create new obstacles and the violence, hatred and enmity change. These, in turn, have an effect on the nature of war as an instrument of policy. Probability and chance can change a war that starts as a planned and structured process, but has not been fully thought out in such a way that the war plan becomes obsolete. In addition to that, unforeseeable events make it difficult for the government to exert direct control over war. This gives the commander room for manoeuvre. His knowledge and experience allow him to exert a crucial influence on the way in which the goals are pursued. The political circumstances are an aspect of probability and chance and can also change. War as Clausewitz sees it is a dynamic process. It has its own grammar, but no logic of its own; the longer it goes on, the more it changes in terms of the influences of its characteristics and tendencies. War must never be separated from policy, for otherwise there is the threat of brigandage, with mercenaries pillaging and killing for money or pleasure (Cf. Tuchman, 1978, 163 ff.). Clausewitz primarily bases his theory of war on the purposive rationality of policy. In terms of attitude, he is a pragmatic realist, strongly influenced by neo-humanist idealism (Cf. Paret, 1980b, 338). He is unlike a scientist, who uses measurements and measuring techniques to find and prove the existence of regularities, in that he uses philosophical terms to define the relations in the Fascinating Trinity: blind natural force, creative spirit and reason alone. Passage 2: The Second Fascinating Trinity (Whom It Concerns) The first of these three aspects correlates more to the people; the second, more to the commander and his army; the third, more to the government.

Clausewitz operationalises the three objective tendencies, the relations between which can be hierarchic, equivalent, or sequential, by stating that they subjectively concern mainly the people, the commander and the government respectively. He transforms his Fascinating Trinity by stating that the individual tendencies concern specific groups of people, but qualifies this at once by adding an emphasis: . . . more

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the people... more the commander and its army... more the government. This implies that the aspects are each also connected with the other two and that they influence one another. One aspect of the Fascinating Trinity mainly concerns the government, which controls the overall policy of the state. Is a logical contradiction discernible here? As cited before, Clausewitz argues that the government—in contrast to policy as a representative of society—is in charge of every phase of the use of military force in a war. The term government includes the political executive, i.e. the cabinet, the ministries and the civil service. They say when the war is to begin, what course it is to take and what peace treaty is to be concluded. In this context of the Fascinating Trinity, however, it is an equivalent aspect, beside the people and the commander and his army. The extent of the political effects, caused by military action up to and including a military victory, must be assessed with an eye to the political order that is to be established after the war. Clausewitz points out in this context that “a victory seldom results in the definite resolution of a conflict” (Cf. Paret, 1980b, 336). Every victory produces new, and usually different, military, political and psychological circumstances and interdependent sets of problems with their own dynamics. This finding is based on whom the aspects in the second Fascinating Trinity concern. • Every political decision in war has an effect on the violence, hatred and enmity of a people and on the creative spirit of the commander with his army. • Military operations, successes and failures in a war have an effect on the people and the government. • If the people do not approve of a war, this will have a lasting influence on political decisions and military operations, going as far as to cause a shortage in the recruitment of volunteer troops and the provision of resources. These links at the same time change as the war goes on. When states are at war for many years, popular support decreases almost inevitably and this decline can eventually force the army to retreat or prompt a change of government. Passage 3: The Third Fascinating Trinity (Characteristics) The passions that are to blaze up in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope that the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political purpose belongs to the government alone.

In this paragraph, Clausewitz describes the generic origin of the three tendencies, which are not dependent on each other: • The passions that are kindled in war must already be inherent in the people. They are firmly anchored in its character and manifest themselves wherever social processes result in conflicts.

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• The effects that probability and chance produce in the interplay of courage and talent depend on the characters of the commander and his army. They must be assessed processually and dynamically in the course of a war. • Only whom the third aspect concerns is unambiguous, as the following rule is laid down for the rational use of the instrument of policy: the political purpose are the business of government alone. A grave error has slipped into the original German wording of this passage “im Reiche der Wahrscheinlichkeiten des Zufalls” (in the realm of the probabilities of chance), for there is no such thing. Howard and Paret do not include it in their translation: When chance is involved, an end state comes about per definitionem without any observable cause—and hence without any probability. Passage 4: Three Tendencies Must Not Be Ignored These three tendencies appear as three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their dimensions. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.

The deep-rooted passions in the peoples are a vertical component that goes far back into the history of man and unleash forces that can either promote or impede war. The horizontal interplay of events with the courage and talent of the commander and the virtues of his army are variables that evolve as the reality of war is experienced. Making the definition of the political purpose solely the concern of the government is a functional step and the result of a decision-making process that takes place before the war proper begins, though it influences the course of a war by directing it towards the defined goal and limiting it. The consequence is that the three tendencies between which every war is floating have vertical characteristics, are subject to horizontal, non-linear dynamics and are governed by a superordinate, functional set of rules. A change in the political purpose calls for the passions of the people and the actions of the army to be reassessed in the horizontal play of probability and chance. Clausewitz emphasises that passions, non-linearity and political purpose, the three basic tendencies that each generate a unique effect without being influenced by the other two, must be considered in every theory of war (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007a, 207). The superordinate political purpose ranks alongside the play of probability and chance and primordial violence in the Fascinating Trinity. It is only possible to specify which of the tendencies had a key influence on a specific war after subjective research has been done on its course (ibid, 208). The decisive tools needed to assess a future war are wisdom and profound theoretical knowledge, strategic experience and balanced judgement. The theory would be rendered useless if one of the three tendencies were ignored or its relationship were fixed arbitrarily.

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Passage 5: The Theory Is Floating Between Three Points of Attractions The task, therefore, is to keep our theory [of war] floating among these three tendencies, as among three points of attraction.

“Floating” means that the theory is free to move both horizontally and vertically in a three-dimensional space. The essence of war is dual: the three tendencies are part of its objective nature. Clausewitz succeeds in embedding the reciprocal effects of these three tendencies, which are features of each and every war, in an analytic definition. In his Fascinating Trinity, he leaves a legacy that is neither a historical account of the wars of his day nor a military theory handbook. He writes at a time of fundamental political change, his aim being to reveal the characteristics of war and hence create new orientations. For around two hundred years now, the Fascinating Trinity has provided serious impetus for seeking a prudent approach to every military conflict, ending the confrontation of wills and finding a lasting solution to it. Passage 6: Focus of ON WAR What lines might best be followed to achieve this difficult task will be explored in the book on the theory of war [i.e., Book Two]. In any case, the conception of war defined here will be the first ray of light into the fundamental structure of theory, which will first sort out the major components and will allow us to distinguish them from one another.

Clausewitz studies war with the aim of presenting the tendencies in a threedimensional space of tension. The first ray of light is an instrument of thought for specifying a concept that aptly describes all wars. The concept can then be used to differentiate and structure the major factors of war. Wars are not equated with each other; instead, attention is drawn to the fact that in the logic of the concept the Fascinating Trinity it provides the first ray of light which will help to identify major components. The concept of war is formulated after all the factors and their interrelations have been assessed. Clausewitz uses here the terms theory and war to mean the same thing. He hence defines war as an object of theoretical study and does not consider it so much as a reality. To analyse a war systematically, it is advantageous to identify the Fascinating Trinity of each belligerent actor separately, then analyse it as a whole and finally assess how it bears relation to one’s own. A theory of war that is floating between the three tendencies in a force field reveals a state that can change quickly and significantly under the pressure of events. The image of a theory of war in a three-dimensional space of tension allows a distinction to be made between types of wars. Political decisions are made along the

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principal axis of purpose, objective and means and are quantifiable by measuring the appropriateness of means. As the free play of forces in real wars unfolds in a dynamic and non-linear manner, being influenced by probability, chance and the frictions that arise, all war, campaign and battle plans lose some of their validity the moment the hostilities begin. They still apply, however, as they serve an army to withstand the initial impact of friction, contain alternative plans and sharpen the commander’s judgement in specific cases. A commander who shows a creative spirit in responding to the changing situation and has the moral quality that enables him to lead a battle-hardened army takes control of matters and proceeds in accordance with the superordinate political purpose. All this must be systemically embedded in a theory of war that must be visualised as being floating between the tendencies and characteristics of the Fascinating Trinity.

Conclusions Summing up, it can be said that the Fascinating Trinity is the synthesis or capstone of Carl von Clausewitz’s entire intellectual work on the theory of war. It is the result of a dichotomous process that combines the theory (essence) and action (manifestation) of abstract and real war. The foundations for a strategic culture fit for the twenty-first century will be laid if the pith of his work is studied and the courage is mustered to apply it in keeping with the times. Summers, van Creveld, and Heuser regard the way in which the three tendencies are considered to concern more the people, more the army and more the government the real Fascinating Trinity. This idea of whom they concern reveals a profound misunderstanding of Clausewitz’s theory: War is not a deterministic trinity. Instead, Clausewitz sees the theory of war as being floating between three tendencies, which, in turn, concern more the people, the army and the government in accordance with their order of magnitude. As the tendencies of the Fascinating Trinity are fundamentally equivalent and independent of each other and the way in which they concern the people, the army, and the government in the relations between the purpose, objective and means constitutes a hierarchical structure, taking this shortcut is inadmissible and only leads to trivial misinterpretations. Van Creveld criticises, for instance, the utter idealisation of Clausewitz’s theory on account of the latter’s idea of trinity. He explicitly cites the people, the army and the government, declaring that they are entirely outdated (Creveld, 1991, 64 ff.). Strachan concludes that “Creveld had not read the original text with sufficient care” and goes on to say: “Scholars during the Cold War, determined to use On War as a mirror for their own times, cherry-picked the text for readings and quotations which sustained their views rather than reflected Clausewitz” (Strachan, 2007a, 29). A similar conclusion applies to the negative comments of Kaldor and Münkler, who take the denationalisation of present-day wars as their basis and classify Clausewitz’s theory as incorrect (Cf. Strickmann, 2008, 23 ff.). This stands out when primordial violence, hatred and enmity are examined as an important tendency of the Fascinating Trinity and not the people: “The

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semibarbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth Century—all conducted war in their own particular way, using different methods and pursuing different aims” (On War, 586). Until very recently, strategists have devoted too little attention to the influence that cultural and psychological factors have on war (Cf. Bassford, 2007, 74 f.). The primordialism of the tendencies and characteristics is particularly relevance for its application. Stringent observation of it results in independent leadership cultures and holistic decision-making processes. Further pursuit of this thought reveals that this contradicts the claim that the army can be assimilated into society.

A Three-Dimensional Representation of the Fascinating Trinity All the interpretations of the Fascinating Trinity to date represent the tendencies of the theory of war as independent variables. The idea that the theory is floating between three centers of attraction has baffled many who have interpreted. Strickmann declares that it is a tripolar system consisting of three poles, above which a theory of war is floating (Strickmann, 2008, 84 f.). Strachan understands the Fascinating Trinity to be a system comprising three magnets, while Herberg-Rothe sees it as one constituted by three centers of attraction (Cf. Herberg-Rothe, 2007, 12 f.). These concepts are inherently contradictory because, in physics, fields of force are only ever formed between two poles (POSITIVE and NEGATIVE, NORTH and SOUTH). This means that two of the three poles referred to in the above explanations must be like. It is, for example, only possible to picture a theory of war that is floating between three centers of attraction as a POSITIVE pole that hovers above three NEGATIVE poles. In physics, the strength of the poles immediately causes a static equilibrium to be established. This contradicts the idea of a play of tendencies, between which a theory of war is floating and moves. All the explanations that are based on bipolarity must hence be taken to mean that war is static and do allow conclusions to be drawn as to it being a dynamic process. The following interpretation of the Fascinating stands out from the others to date. It represents the independent tendencies of war as a three-dimensional system in which each tendency corresponds to one dimension. This view allows the theory of war to be quantified in accordance with its particularities and be pictured as floating freely in a three-dimensional space (see Fig. 5.1). The three dimensions are defined as the x, y and z—axes: • X—Axis: The play of probability and chance is mastered by the commander and his army. The action is centred on the latest events, which change in response to the reciprocal influences. The play of probability and chance will be changed,

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Fascinating Trinity - a three-dimensional System Blind natural force Violence, hatred, enmity

Z-Axis Reason alone Instrument of policy

Y-Axis War -first form

War -second form

X-Axis Creative spirit Play of probability and chance

Fig. 5.1 The fascinating trinity in three dimensions

limited or eliminated in the future due to the advent of the creative spirit in the leadership of armies. • Y—Axis: War is a rational instrument and the responsibility of the government. The superordinate position of this instrument is qualified antithetically in that it is represented as one of three equivalent axes in a tripolar system. The action taken is determined by the current situation and subject to various restrictions. • Z—Axis: Primordial violence acts likes a blind natural force and is hence firmly rooted in the character of the people, which has formed over history. It is either unleashed in a war that is characterised by violence, hatred and enmity or causes the tension to abate due to its manifestation as an absolute longing for peace and stoic forbearance. Representing the trinity in a three-dimensional space opens up new dimensions for understanding it. The theory of war is taken from the cause and effect level and a holistic ambit is created for analysing it. In the real twenty-first century world, the three dominant tendencies are complemented by secondary ones such as the media, cyber networks and allies. Nevertheless, the key developments and their primary influences are covered by the Fascinating Trinity. A bipolar view of the trinity does not allow subtle statements to be made. The three-dimensional representation of the course of a war in this study resolves this dilemma, allowing the tendencies and their antipodes, which are needed to distinguish between different forms of war, to be quantified and grasped. This permits different forms of war and their specific

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tendencies to be placed and their levels of intensity and transformations to be comprehended in their dynamics. The Fascinating Trinity must be applied individually to each belligerent. An assessment of the primordial violence inherent in one party’s people in comparison to that inherent in an opponent’s must include the characteristics, histories, religions, cultures and traditions of both peoples. Comparing its own way of dealing with probability and chance with that of the opponent shows a party what options it has. The ability to conceive the trinity in a three-dimensional system is hence of assistance in analysing the origins and characteristics of war and their dynamic interactions in them in quantitative and qualitative terms. Such an analysis sharpens the judgement of Western decision-makers when it comes to aspirations of establishing democracy and a functioning civil society in every country in which their armies are on operational deployment against a belligerent actor. Considering systemic consideration to the deployment of armies means giving thought to the following question: Is the correct weight attached to the estimate of the primordial violence, hatred and enmity of the local people in the analysis of the situation and the definition of the purpose and courses of actions when military interventions are considered in geographically and culturally remote regions of the world? The point of departure of every assessment of a political and a military situation is the opponent and his purposively rational or irrational actions. Even if the deployment of military forces is a success, it does not resolve any problems, but merely moves them elsewhere or creates new ones after a while. To put an end to primordial violence, hatred and enmity in a war, which then act like a blind natural force, the goal must be to win the hearts and minds of the people. This is a crucial step towards resolving the problem of wars and their consequences. Clausewitz sees war as having certain bounds. The rationality of the instrument of policy can only go to a maximum level. Blind natural force and the creative spirit also have bounds that cannot be surpassed. Connecting the bounds of the three tendencies in a three-dimensional space forms a tetrahedron in which a war is free to move (see Fig. 5.2 and the illustrating Photograph in Fig. 5.3). A war starts in peacetime, which is the center of the coordinate system, and also ends there if a peace agreement is concluded. If the force used by the actors involved goes beyond the bounds of the tetrahedron, it gets out of control and ends in chaos when its intensity increases to a certain level. Positioning a war in the axis system of the tetrahedron permits a distinction to be made, for example, between interventions, long wars, coups, civil wars and hybrid wars and their respective changes. Establishing a reference to an actor renders the Fascinating Trinity transparent in a war-state diagram. This is what makes the Fascinating Trinity so important. It is indispensable as the first full instrument for conducting systemic analyses of international conflicts— tours d’horizon, so to speak—before any decision on going to war is made. Its expressiveness has not been used so far to assess current wars. This is not surprising because, as argued earlier, there exists an intellectual vacuum with respect to strategy. This devastating judgement applies in equal measure to most policy areas, among them foreign policy, defence, the economy, finance, education,

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Fig. 5.2 The fascinating trinity as a tetrahedron

transport and technology, as their primary goals are not defined by rational thinking, but by the amount of financial resources available. The situation is similarly bleak in the private sector. In the end, it must be said that the much-cited comparison of war with a chameleon, which can change its colour, but not alter its form, draws attention to the variability of warfare. The fact is that the colours of a chameleon change the

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Fig. 5.3 The fascinating trinity as a tetrahedron

quickest when it is in danger or has to fight and they are a means of communicating with or deterring other chameleons. In contrast to this metaphor, the form and content of war change vibrantly. This is why the methodical analysis that can be conducted with the Fascinating Trinity and the specific answers that can be provided are important before a war is started, and particularly so afterwards, repeatedly direct the focus on the context of the whole. This allows war to be treated as both a subjective and an objective phenomenon and its dual nature to be respected.

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Appropriateness of Means It there are deficits in the planning and implementation of the use of military means in foreign policy matters and a lack of rationality in the coordination of purposes, the question is, how to remedy them. The primordial characteristic of war is the use of force to coerce an opponent into doing what is wanted of him. The purpose is not a part of war, as Clausewitz believes, but purely political in its nature. It is superordinate and defines the goals, while the appropriateness of the energy and means used to wage it depends on the objectives specified in the war plan and the expected resistance. Clausewitz requests to first establishing a standpoint. Nothing is more important in life than finding the right standpoint for seeing and judging events, and then adhering to it. (On War, 606)

This standpoint is used as a basis for assessing the situation and must not be abandoned. Consideration is then given to what means are appropriate. This assists in defining the transition from the abstract reflection of the Fascinating Trinity of war and involves weighing what means, efforts and times are required in comparison with the potential of the belligerent opponent for the state to achieve its goals. The decision to wage war as a continuation of policy requires a comprehensive assessment of the situation to be conducted: “At the outset, then, we must admit that an imminent war, its possible aims and the resources it will require are matters that can only be assessed when every circumstance has been examined in the context of the whole, which of course includes the most ephemeral factors as well” (Author’s italics, On War, 586). Clausewitz establishes a relationship between the purpose and means required for an imminent war and an overview of all the circumstances. What resources and effort are required to achieve national goals? If the outcome of the considerations is a decision to wage a war, then there is a need to define the precise political purpose and the means required for it. Only when this process of weighing what means are required has been completed and the decision to wage a war has been made can the relations between the purpose, objective and means be defined and a campaign be planned. This calls for the ultimate and intermediate goals and duration for military operations to be specified in relation to the political purpose and the means required. A limited purpose calls for only a corresponding quota of means to be allocated. Furthermore, the possible effects of probability, chance and likely frictions must be estimated and counteractions must be thought out. Finally, the moral qualities of the commander and the virtues of the army must be assessed objectively with an eye to determining the extent to which they are capable of waging war successfully amid friction. Clausewitz emphasizes that “war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs” (On War, 605). Prudence in estimating what means are appropriate is crucial for success in transforming the political purpose into practical action. It is the center of all efforts

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and effectively limits the above-mentioned interactions, which would otherwise take the intensity of the fighting to the extreme. Clausewitz sees a commander’s ability to select what are the key influences and tendencies for the superordinate political purpose from the vast number of those of relevance to the outcome and to fix a quota for the corresponding resources is an expression of his creative activity and calls it “instinct of judgment” (Takt des Urteils) (On War, 213). The skill of a commander is his ability to “act on the principle of using no greater force, and setting himself no greater military aim, than would be sufficient for the achievement of his political purpose” (On War, 585). What means are appropriate is determined during the assessment of the most important facts and circumstances. Appropriateness of Means “To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war, • • • • •

we must first examine our own political aim and that of the enemy. We must gauge the strength and situation of the opposing state. We must gauge the character and abilities of its government and people and do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other states and the effect the war may have on them.

To assess these things in all their ramifications and diversity is plainly a colossal task. Rapid and correct appraisal of them clearly calls for the intuition of a genius; to master all this complex mass by sheer methodical examination is obviously impossible” (Text structured by the author, On War, 585 f.). The answer to the question of what means are appropriate follows the logic of an assessment of the situation before a war is started. It comprises all the characteristics of the second Fascinating Trinity and can only be interpreted in conjunction with it. Clausewitz first sees the potentials and circumstances of a state and the character, will and capabilities of its government and people as the variables that determine what means are appropriate and then assesses them in relation to those of the enemy state. Finally, he demands that the effects of a war on uninvolved third-party states be taken into consideration. He also takes account of the assumption that an opponent will determine what resources are appropriate from his point of view and act as an equal in order to make the most of his strengths in the dynamic interplay in war. The issue of what resources are appropriate is the key element of a strategy that defines the possible courses of action, the strength and capabilities of the armed forces earmarked for deployment and the effort required to be made. Weighing resources is a function of the creative spirit that involves the government, the people and the forces. In a real war, it is not possible to apply the relations between the purpose, objective and means in a linear fashion with the resources specified as appropriate due to the inherent frictions that distinguish real war from war on paper.

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The work of weighing what resources are appropriate must hence be continued during the course of a war. This consideration extends far beyond the mere military assessment of the situation. It adds the question of the strength of a state and capabilities of the government and the character of the people to the decision-making process. “Besides, the very nature of those resources and of their employment means they cannot all be deployed at the same moment. The resources in question are the fighting forces proper, the country, with its physical features and population, and its allies" (On War, 79). This line of thought reveals tripolar force fields in which the governments, peoples and armies involved constitute variables whose mutual dependence must be taken into account when they are assessed. According to Clausewitz, such assessments are conducted with a high degree of uncertainty, as a major share of the intelligence gathered about the opponent’s government, people and army is inconsistent, wrong or contradictory. Additional factors of uncertainty are concealed or shifting objectives of the enemy’s combat operations especially in limited wars, which are recognizable only in retrospect. In view of the extreme complexity of the situation, true genius is needed to identify the most relevant dependences and weigh them against one another. The question of what resources are appropriate is a decisive criterion and must be considered prudently in the planning and preparation of a war. As soon as it is answered, the quality of the instinct of judgement can be seen in the scale of the efforts that must be made during the war itself in order to accomplish the political purpose. The power of this principle in times of war lies in it allowing decisions to be made quickly in an environment that is complex and subject to dynamic change and frictions. Political, social and military factors are cited in the issue of the appropriateness of resources, which Clausewitz uses to establish a timeless definition of the basic variables and considerations that go into a strategy. It covers all the important characteristics, contains limitations on content and provides a profound structure for the development of a strategy. The appropriateness of resources is the main finding obtained from years of study of war and a reason for giving consideration to integrating the concept into politics in general.

Conclusions Clausewitz’s theory can be applied to present-day issues. If the subject of deliberation is a possible war, an overview of the full situation is first obtained by conducting a tour d’horizon with the Fascinating Trinity. The results of the examination of each of the tendencies and characteristics of every possible belligerent actor and a comparison of their importance are required before any decision on a war is made. It may be that other methods come into question for asserting the state’s interests and achieving similar results. Careful consideration is given to the matter

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supported by the Fascinating Trinity and then a complex comparison of the state’s own capabilities with those of the opponent is conducted. Weighing the various interconnected factors against each other is a difficult process and a moment of true genius is called for to define what means are required. The result of the appropriateness of means assessment is that the envisaged war begins to assume a more definite form. Finally, these basic principles must be applied hypothetically to possible war scenarios and comparisons must be made of the prospects of success and failure in them. The evaluation of the appropriateness of means in relation to the political purpose is the basis for the decision to wage a war. This relationship may change in the course of a war and so must be re-gauged and adapted accordingly. A continuous evaluation of the enemy is necessary in view of conclusions on how to bring war to a victorious end. The next step of this analysis based on the pith of what Clausewitz writes concerns the relations between the purpose, objective and means and is aimed at gauging the resources needed to accomplish a purpose.

Relations Between Purpose, Objective and Means In a complex war environment, an overarching political purpose can only be pursued with the support of ultimate and intermediate objectives. After the decision to go to war is made, the relation between the purpose of a war and the means that are to be used is structured by analysing the relations between the purpose, objective, intermediate objectives, time frames and means. Without these, it is impossible to plan and control the course of a war following the theory of Clausewitz. The results are written down in the war plan. Relations Between Purpose, Objective and Means “If we initially examine the objective at which the entire war must be directed to serve the political purpose with the adaequate means, we find that the object of any war can vary just as much as its political purpose and its actual circumstances” (Translation by the author based On War, 90). The strategisation theorem purpose, objective and means serves Clausewitz as a classification method and planning instrument for structuring human actions and link the instrument of policy with the play of probability and chance in the Fascinating Trinity theory. The purpose not only defines the framework for the entire war but is also a variable that is subject to a number of influences and can change in the course of a war. If it does, the objectives and means must be re-assessed. It is then necessary to gauge the courses of action possible, that is to say, to specify the means, energy and effort that are to be expended to achieve the objectives. Each belligerent considers

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his military and organisational capabilities, the forces in his society and his geography and uses the findings for developing a strategy in order to “define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose” (On War, 177). The aim of successfully asserting one’s political will is to force the opponent into a position in which further resistance would be futile. It must be borne in mind, however, that the opponent must nonetheless remain able to do what is wanted of him, even though he is defenceless. The relations between purpose, objective and means structure the political decision-making process with respect to an imminent war. The structure is based on a hierarchy of concepts whose characteristics are closely interrelated.

Purpose The purpose defined by the government determines the course that a war is planned to take. It is the basis on which the quota of the means for military actions, that are to be provided, is determined and from which the military objectives are derived. The strategy theorem of purpose, objective and means describes a rational process and links the government with the army in war by providing an overview of all the circumstances. The outcome of the deliberations in this process is the political purpose, which is specified in the war plan and used as the point of departure for defining the military objectives. “The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; [...] Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. This is another reason why your effort will be modified. The political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires” (Author’s italics in the last sentence, On War, 81). A variety of political purposes and military objectives, courses of action and means must be considered, examined and integrated into the decision-making process. Clausewitz establishes a dependency between the political purpose, the nature of the means used and the forces that explode in war. This corresponds with the characteristics of the Fascinating Trinity, in which the instrument of policy is one of the three equivalent tendencies. The purpose is hence not a despotic lawgiver, but changes as a war is waged. The characteristics of the political purpose limit the sacrifices that are made over a specified period. Once the expenditure of effort becomes too great and exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and the aim must be to attain peace (Cf. On War, 92). The governments normally use the knowledge and capabilities of the armies to weigh the purpose of a war, examine possible courses of action and gauge the prospects of success. This

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ensures that the political purpose, the resulting military objectives and the means that have to be provided match (see Chap. 6). Clausewitz uses the term purpose, as mentioned at the beginning, to not only refer solely to political matters, but also to allude to military affairs. The political purpose is superior to the military one and constitutes the yardstick for determining the effort that may be expended to achieve an objective. The rationality of the political purpose and military means pervades all levels. “Bearing in mind the elaborate structure of an army, [...] one can see that the fighting activity of such a force is also subject to complex organization, division of functions, and combinations. The separate units obviously must often be assigned tasks that are not in themselves concerned with the destruction of the enemy’s forces” (On War, 96). The purpose of the commander and his army is a binding guideline for the objectives of the fighting divisions, that of the divisions for the brigades and that of the brigades down to the battalion level. “If a battalion is ordered to drive the enemy from a hill, a bridge, etc., the true purpose is normally to occupy that point” (On War, 96). This means that the objectives of the higher level are expressed as purposes and they in turn determine the objectives of the lower level. It is this graded logical connection that guarantees that all the hierarchy levels in a military mission are bound together in accordance with the government’s intent.

Objective Once the government has decided on the purpose of waging a war, the objectives that are to be achieved during its course must be specified as landmarks for guiding the action taken. “The aim of war should be what its very concept implies—to defeat the enemy. We take that basic proposition as our starting point. [...] The conquest of the whole of the enemy’s territory is not always necessary” (On War, 595). The focus on defeating the enemy must not conceal the fact that the variance in objectives is endless in theory. Clausewitz states that identifying the enemy’s center of gravity is an important step towards selecting an objective. “[O]ne must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed” (On War, 595 f.). The center of gravity can be the opposing army. “In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally the capital. In small countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. It is against these that our energies should be directed” (On War, 596). The opponent is particularly vulnerable at the center of gravity. If he cannot withstand the pressure of war and loses his balance, he must be allowed no time. The attacking army must dare to win all and so continue to deliver blows against the

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center of gravity until the opponent goes down. “It is therefore a major act of strategic judgment to distinguish these centers of gravity in the enemy’s forces and to identify their spheres of effectiveness” (On War, 486). Clausewitz is convinced: “Basing our comments on general experience, the acts we consider most important for the defeat of the enemy are the following: 1. Destruction of his army [...] 2. Seizure of his capital if it is [...] the center of [...] political activity 3. Delivery of an effective blow against his principal ally if that ally is more powerful than he” (Author’s italics, On War, 596). The first priority of all military considerations is to defeat the enemy’s forces. The second is to occupy the capital and hence end the ability to the state to exercise its authority by incapacitating political bodies and parties and the government. This has great psychological repercussions for the people’s resistance. The third is to fight an opponent’s ally, but only if he is important. An army must fundamentally operate at high speed and with full force. With respect to material and immaterial centers of gravity, Clausewitz cites a special form of war to which he does not refer again in the discussion on the defeat of the enemy: the popular uprising. In the event of such an uprising, the centers of gravity against which the blows must be directed are the leader and public opinion. These centers of gravity link the personalities of the leaders with public opinion. The objective of the war has been achieved when the leader has been defeated or public opinion turns against the popular uprising. If the defeat of the enemy is not the top priority, then “the object of military activity can only be one of two kinds: seizing a small or larger piece of enemy territory, or holding one’s own until things take a better turn” (On War, 601). Whenever minor purposes are pursued, there can be wars “which consist in merely threatening the enemy, with negotiations held in reserve” (On War, 604). With political purposes of this kind, it may be enough to seize a few provincial areas of a country or to conduct a show of force. After all, merely threatening an opponent may suffice to achieve the envisaged goals by means of negotiations. Governments should nevertheless also show great care in waging a low-intensity war. “The art of war will shrivel into prudence, and its main concern will be to make sure the delicate balance is not suddenly upset in the enemy’s favor and the half-hearted war does not become a real war after all” (On War, 604). The lower the intensity of the fighting, the greater the influence of political affairs on a war. The commander and his army must then act within narrow limits. The government controls events in every detail. After all, a minor political purpose limits the amount of damage caused if it cannot be accomplished (Cf. On War, 81 and 605 f.).

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Means The dimensions of the military, social and economic efforts that have to be made in war are defined by the means that are considered appropriate. This consideration is going far beyond the cost-benefit calculations that are part of the essence of politics and taking account of a large number of substantial statements (Cf. Creveld, 1991, 148). The instruments linking the superordinate policy and the deployment of armies are the strategy and the war plans. Since the political purpose cannot usually be accomplished in an instant, the objectives are pursued in a process in which wills are asserted interactively under difficult conditions. The scale of the efforts made in war depends on the

Enemy’s resistance = scale of mean x strength of will (set of figures)

(estimate).

The energy that must be expended, efforts that may have to be made and means that are to be used depend on the resistance the opponent is expected to put up, which in turn is the product of the scale of means and the strength of will. The strength of will or the mental and emotional powers of the opponent can only be estimated. Dynamic and frictional elements now enter into the process of developing the strategy, which has so far been a theoretical matter and involved the establishment of a relation between objectives and means. The longer a war goes on, the greater the frequency becomes with which chance, probability and frictions exert an influence. This gives rise to uncertainty and renders it impossible to foresee how events will unfold. Additional room for manoeuvre arises and unplanned military activities present themselves. In a protracted war, the skills of the commander, the virtues of his army and the adequacy of means gain considerable importance for the achievement of ultimate and intermediate objectives. While the quota of means provided must be appropriate for the purpose, the term includes far more than merely weapons and troops. Clausewitz highlights the issue: “The political object [...] will thus determine [...] the amount of effort it requires” (Author’s parenthesis, On War, 81). Here, Clausewitz talks of efforts, whilst elsewhere he uses the term scale of means and effort in the same context (Cf. On War, 579). Defeat is a threat if the means and efforts are inadequate for the purpose. Therefore, “each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction” (On War, 585). It has become evident that the political purpose is governed by numerous limitations and can change in the course of the war. In real war, the limitations concerning the purpose are rendered ineffective due to the interaction with the opponent and the nature of the forces exploding in war and the events of war threaten to take on a life of their own. Clausewitz concludes: “Such an interaction

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could lead to a maximum of effort if such a maximum could be defined. But in that case all proportion between action and political demands would be lost: means would cease to be commensurate with ends, and in most cases a policy of maximum exertion would fail on account of the domestic problems it would raise” (On War, 585). The right quotas of means prevent events of war ever taking on a life of their own. The moral qualities of a commander are a decisive factor in the course of a war as he can restore the proportionality of objectives and means amidst the forces exploding in a complex situation. As war is not an act of blind passion, Clausewitz confines himself to the interactions of war with the superordinate value of allocating a fixed quota of means, for which the prescribed purpose and the planned timeframe remain the sole yardsticks. The purpose of war correlates with the size of the sacrifices that have to be made. If the effort required becomes excessive, war must be ended and peace made—as stated before. The means that must be provided and the energy that must be expended in the fight with the opponent must hence match the political purpose of the war as a whole and not solely the efforts of the opponent. Clausewitz adds another important political relationship, the function of allies: “I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies” (On War, 92 f.). This passage reveals what Clausewitz means by the appropriateness of means in full. The range of means is reflected in the operational courses of action that can be taken, which go from defeating the opponent to passively awaiting his attack or considering how political influence can be exerted on allies. Clausewitz sums up this idea as follows: “We can now see that in war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all involve the opponent’s outright defeat. They range from the destruction of the enemy’s forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy’s attacks. Any one of these may be used to overcome the enemy’s will” (On War, 94). Clausewitz finally limits the means still further. If a side intends to hold out longer than its opponent, it can do so by pure self-defence, in other words, fighting without a positive purpose. Over time, enough of the enemy’s power must be destroyed that he is forced to renounce his intentions (Cf. On War, 93). In 1827, Clausewitz emphasises that all the great strategic ideas are mostly of a political nature (Cf. On War, 606 f.). The planning requirements for pursuing the political purpose by no means suffice to grasp the dynamic tendencies in war, the interactions with the opponent and the influence of emotions, probability and chance. Hence, a further planning document is needed: the war plan, which is imbued with the element of policy (ibid.). The basis for war plans is a careful assessment of the overall situation. It hones the commander’s judgement in a specific

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scenario. The value of plans changes, however, when hostilities begin and frictions arise. They still define the purpose and courses of action, but they cannot regulate the actual course of events or the free play of the forces in detail. And yet, abiding by a war plan steels a belligerent against the first impacts of friction, probability and chance and paves the way for possible options. In the course of a war, the objectives and means used can change and have repercussions on the political purpose (see Chap. 6). This is why the assessment to what means are appropriate, the question of which was analysed in the previous chapter, is much more extensive than the relation between the purpose and objectives initially suggested. It forms the core of strategy as we understand it today.

Conclusions The government must show great circumspection and sense when selecting the kind of war it intends to wage, as wars can vary from a war of defeat to a low-intensity war, and must codify it in the specification of the political purpose, which can also change in the course of the war. The participation of military advisors in the decision-making process is not limited to the handling of specifically military questions concerning the preparation and conduct of operations. The question that has to be answered is how the military should be involved in the specification of the political purpose under the primacy of politics before the war begins and while it is ongoing, until the political purpose is accomplished and the war is ended. The establishment of the relations between the purpose, objective and means is a rational categorisation process aimed at enabling the complexity of war to be comprehended. Built on the appropriateness of means and established within the Fascinating Trinity, they offer a system for strategic thought aimed at linking the political will with military means in the war plan on the basis of reason rather than passion. They are hence an important part of a war planning process that covers all the forms in which war can manifest itself and has a limiting effect on the courses it can take. In a war against a general uprising, the fighting can be aimed at hitting the leader or steering public opinion. In a short and intense war, military considerations are dominant. The lower the intensity of a war and the longer its duration, the greater its political importance. As the opponent’s will and energy can only be gauged, the degree of energy and efforts required can change. One’s own priorities in waging war must therefore be adapted accordingly. The establishment of the relations between the purpose, objective and means is a method of definition, hence also an instrument of assessment and, finally, when applied, a strategisation theorem. Clausewitz uses the term purpose with reference to both the political and the military domain. It can just as well be used, however, to define any subject under consideration in many domains of society. In today’s real world, the ways in which and limits to which politics can exert an influence on war are mostly acknowledged. In Germany, however, the concept of the primacy of politics is understood mistakenly and taken to mean that the armed forces

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should remain largely excluded from governmental and parliamentary deliberations on policy. When it is understood correctly, the primacy presupposes that the armed forces and the government are in close cooperation when it comes to estimating how the situation could develop in the event of war and preparing the ground for a decision to be made on it (see Chap. 6). The next section presents an interpretation of the relations of frictions, probability and chance in Clausewitz’s work.

Frictions, Probability and Chance Frictions Clausewitz illustrates the effect of frictions by using the simple example of how a journey is prepared for and made at the time. The traveller loads his luggage onto a carriage and sets off for a distant destination that he wants to reach the same day. On the way, a rear wheel breaks. It takes hours to repair. He reaches an inn after nightfall, but it is overcrowded. He must decide whether to stay or seek some other accommodation. This example illustrates the discrepancies that exist between devising a plan, executing it amid frictions and having to decide on alterations to it. Steps that seem sequential and straight forward in the war planning phase often prove difficult or impossible to perform in real war. The term friction sums up all the unforeseeable challenges that cause chaos and confusion and provoking feelings of uncertainty, fear, disorientation and helplessness among soldiers. Friction threatens to turn war into a state that ends with instability, disorder and defeat. On the subject of frictions, Clausewitz considers the ideas developed by Machiavelli, who uses the word fortuna to describe the discrepancy between plans for war and the reality of war. This discrepancy is constituted by unexpected, sudden, chance and chaotic events that run counter to the plans and cannot be predicted by human reason. Commanders can, however, limit the effects of fortuna with their virtù. This characteristic, which is called energy or strength of will, has no moral connotation for Machiavelli (Cf. Kleemeier, 2002, 250 f.). The contrasting concepts, fortuna and virtù, are reflected in Clausewitz’s frictions and constitute the basis of his thoughts on the moral qualities of the commander. “This tremendous friction [...] is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance. One, for example, is the weather. Fog can prevent the enemy from being seen in time [...]. Rain can prevent a battalion from arriving” (On War, 120). Clausewitz expands these thoughts and writes about the dangers in war, as well as the physical strain and suffering, which are intensified by the feeling of uncertainty. “War is the realm of chance [...]. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events. Since all information and assumptions are open to doubt, and with chance at work everywhere, the commander continually finds that things are not as he expected” (On War, 101 f.).

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Frictions arise in a reality that can only be grasped fragmentarily. They are the variable discrepancy between mostly tactical, but sometimes also strategic demands that shape a real war. In order to overcome the huge discrepancies between waging a war in theory and actual events, the rational decisions made on the basis of the relations between purpose, objective and means must be complemented by consideration being given to random, frictional and emotional elements and the enemy’s unexpected reactions. Clausewitz perceives this as a broadening of the assessment so as to take account of non-rational factors as a philosophical task and supplements his work with profound thoughts on frictions, the moral qualities of the commander and the virtues of the army. Clausewitz categorises frictions by availing himself of an image from physics that was a popular means for describing and analysing human behaviour during the Industrial Revolution in the 18th Century. In mechanics, the term friction describes all the factors that make a machine work less efficiently than it could in theory. Friction is described as the force that hinders motion due to internal and external friction. Frictions in war can be categorised accordingly, depending on whether they act within units or affect the operations of entire armies. Internal friction, which in the physical sense is caused by particles colliding inside bodies, arises in armed forces due to human weaknesses. Danger to life and limb, extreme exertion and a shortage of supplies cause individual soldiers to make mistakes and lead to friction loss. Mistrust of commanders and tactical positioning can undermine discipline. External friction, which in the physical sense develops between the surfaces of solid bodies in the form of static or dynamic friction, arises in war due to the cumulative effect generated when factors such as incorrect information, a sudden change of weather, unexpected terrain obstacles or unexpected action on the part of the adversary coincide. Clausewitz recognises the difference between military action in theory and the difficulty in taking it amid the frictions inherent in real war. He uses the laws of mechanics to explain friction, but distances himself from them in the conclusions he draws. “The instrument of war is like a machine with immense friction” (Vom Kriege, footnote 35). Clausewitz affirms this negative judgement with the following words: “This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance” (On War, 120). Generally, internal friction, which is caused by a shortage of supplies, extreme physical exertion and poor leadership, by no means arises unexpectedly and can be minimised by careful planning, intensive training and sound logistics. In contrast, external friction, which caused by unexpected events or surprise moves by the adversary, is greatly influenced by probability and chance. The action taken by the commander in response to them is of high priority in uncertain situations. It is hard to say where the outer limits of friction lie. If causes and effects are considered separately, it becomes apparent that shortages and a lack of balance in the relations between the purpose, objective and means can trigger unforeseeable events with severe consequences. Gaining familiarity with internal friction and the ability to

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overcome it is important for learning to deal with external friction. Theoretical knowledge of and practical experience with the interplay of courage and initiative are crucial for the commander to be a successful leader in the uncertain environment of war. Clausewitz concludes: “Habit hardens the body for great exertions, strengthens the heart in great peril, and fortifies judgment against first impressions. Habit breeds that priceless quality, calm, which [...] will lighten the commander’s task” (On War, 122). A leader who portrays all these qualities will finally develop military genius through temperantia, imperturbable calm. “The commander must trust his judgment and stand like a rock on which the waves break in vain” (On War, 117).

The Fog of War Rupert Smith states that the main causes for friction, besides the influence of danger in battle and efforts demanded of armed forces, are an unclear intelligence situation, unforeseeable events and the impediments they entail (Cf. Smith, 2004, 78). False information causes a particularly dangerous kind of friction: “Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability” (On War, 117). Clausewitz sees the capabilities of the commander as an important resource for ensuring that targeted action is even taken when the intelligence situation is unclear. He extends this thought to all uncertainties in war and calls them the fog of war: “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty” (On War, 101). Distinguishing between what is true and false in the torrent of information, intelligence gathered, keeping track of things when the intelligence situation is confusing and making decisions with intuitive judgement are eminent qualities of the commander. “A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth” (On War, 101 and cf. 122). When discussing the moral qualities and virtues of the army, Clausewitz often concentrates on tactical-level frictions. With his Fascinating Trinity, he distils the discussion of the tendencies and characteristics of war down to what is of strategic importance.

Probability and Chance The content of the concepts of probability and chance originates in mathematics. Chance describes an event that has no observable cause, permits several outcomes and is in no way predictable. Tossing a coin is one example of an experiment

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concerning chance. The phenomenon of probability in Clausewitz’s work has so far been given little attention by many who have studied it (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 41). The French mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827) defines probability as the quotient of the number of unfavourable outcomes and all possible events. This accurate mathematic definition has been condensed by the American engineer Edward A. Murphy (1918–1990) into a simple rule: “If anything can go wrong, it will” (Bloch, 1981, 4). Clausewitz discovered the connection between the phenomenon of friction and the play of probability and chance very late in life. The author understands that they were not incorporated into On War until he added the Fascinating Trinity. In Chapter One of Book One, which Clausewitz considers finished, he refers to probability and chance in connection with the creative spirit—and not frictions— as one of the three tendencies in the Fascinating Trinity. In contrast, the influence of danger, exertion, uncertainty as to the enemy situation and the phenomenon of friction are elements that run through the entire work like a golden thread. Clausewitz connects the play of probability and chance with its effects on frictions. In no other section of his work are the differences between the stages of editing clearer than they are here. The creative spirit of the commander and the virtues of the army decide over victory and defeat in the play of probability and chance. If this line of thought is pursued further, it leads to the realisation that frictions are among the phenomena that are common to all armies at all times. What is needed to counter them effectively is soldiers who are well-trained and disciplined and commanders who proceed with sound judgement, do not demand too much of their troops and provide them adequate equipment, food and quarters. Clausewitz’s work is not about dealing with frictions, as this concern is recognised and resolved in the days of Frederick the Great, for instance, at the Battle of Leuthen. With the emergence of Napoleon’s mass armies and their land-grabbing campaigns, the play of probability and chance becomes increasingly important and can only be countered in the overall context of a war. The question of how to deal with them is Clausewitz’s central concern. When the probabilities of real life are taken into account and benefit is taken of friction, the extreme and absolute of war are replaced by a kind of war whose development is influenced in reality by a large number of factors. “Warfare thus eludes the strict theoretical requirement that extremes of force be applied. Once the extreme is no longer feared or aimed at, it becomes a matter of judgment what degree of effort should be made; and this can only be based on the phenomena of the real world and the laws of probability. Once the antagonists [...] become actual states and governments, when war is no longer a theoretical affair but a series of actions obeying its own peculiar laws, reality supplies the data from which we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead. From the enemy’s character, from his institutions, the state of his affairs and his general situation, each side, using the laws of probability, forms an estimate of its opponent’s likely course and acts accordingly” (Author’s italics, On War, 80).

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The interactions with the opponent are based on the assessable factors and the probable and chance influences that are expected to arise in every real war.

General Friction Clausewitz first defines friction as including all the differences between a theoretical war and a real one. A little later, he distinguishes between the causes of friction and the influences that are incalculable, because probability refers to possible developments, whereas chance is on no account foreseeable. Finally, to make things clearer, he introduces the overarching term general friction and uses it to denote all the impeding effects of war. “We have identified danger, physical exertion, intelligence, and friction as the elements that coalesce to form the atmosphere of war, and turn it into a medium that impedes activity. In their restrictive effects they can be grouped into a single concept of general friction” (Author’s italics, On War, 122). Clausewitz associates all internal and external impeding influences on war with general friction. Severe physical exertion is the result of the stress experienced in dangerous circumstances or generated by surprising events that change a situation and cause additional reactions. The uncertainty as to the enemy situation is partly resolved when probability and chance manifest themselves. The effects of chance are particularly expected to be felt at the strategic level of a war. Changes in its course have a negative or positive impact, and this, in turn, has repercussions on the political purpose. There are also frictions at the political level. In a letter he writes to his wife Marie in 1806, Clausewitz uses the term friction to criticise the Prussian court’s cumbersome consulting procedures for dealing with military matters. He also uses it when describing the campaigns of 1812–1815 (Cf. Smith, 2004, 79). A good example for illustrating the severe influence of chance is the sudden death of Tsarina Elisabeth in 1762. It brings about a surprising turn in the hopeless situation that Frederick the Great is in during the Seven Years’ War, due to the fact that his army is outnumbered twentyfold. Russia leaves the anti-Prussian coalition. Frederick the Great is among the winners when the war ends.

Counteracting Frictions Clausewitz uses a maritime image that is later cited in connection with theory and practice to explain how frictions can be limited. Crossing a sea with reefs in the darkness in a ship can be very dangerous if strong winds spring up. Vast experience, practiced seamanship and great efforts are then necessary to master these dangers. This ability must be acquired. To plan maneuvers so that some of the elements of friction are involved, which will train officers’ judgment, common sense, and resolution is far more worthwhile than inexperienced people might think. It is immensely important that no soldier, whatever his rank, should wait

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for war to expose him to those aspects of active service that amaze and confuse him when he first comes across them. If he has met them even once before, they will begin to be familiar to him. (On War, 122)

One effective method to reduce tactical frictions can be illustrated by citing the example of a sailing crew that is selected and trained for major regattas. The new crew is first instructed in the theory of sailing manoeuvres. It then receives detailed instruction in all the stations on board of the yacht. During the first trips, a host of manoeuvres are practised station per station. Once the crew has a command of them, it is put through hard drill until it masters them all in minimum time. The intensive training is intended to increase the skill, courage and confidence of the crew members and to consolidate their experience in dealing with problems that arise without notice during extreme sailing manoeuvres. It is not possible to optimise the strengths and minimise the weaknesses of a yacht in comparison with those of rival vessels until it can be sailed to perfection. Once the boat has been optimised to its limit and is steered with tactical acumen, the international regatta training begins, with victory demanding supreme skill, courage and expertise. A professionally trained crew must on no account be out of its depth when it is required to handle with sudden frictions. It must always be professional, disciplined, quick and effective in what it does, even in harsh and extreme situations, be it a mast breaking, vessels colliding or a man going overboard in rough waters. It is the skill of the skipper and the sailing savvy of the crew that, in combination with their joint will to win, are crucial for superbly handling a racing yacht. The training that commanders and their armies undergo for war is fundamentally based on the same logic and taxonomy: “This is true even of physical effort. Exertions must be practiced [...]. When exceptional efforts are required of him in war, the recruit is apt to think that they result from mistakes, miscalculations, and confusion at the top. In consequence, his morale is doubly depressed. If maneuvers prepare him for exertions, this will not occur” (ibid.). One of Clausewitz’s major accomplishments is his realisation that friction, probability and chance are the indeterminable variables in war. The way in which the manifestations of friction compound with probability and chance, however, is not easy to discern and is sometimes even unclear.

Opportunities Due to Friction While general friction produces a sense of powerlessness in people, it at the same time creates opportunities. The result is a paradox: Human inadequacy, probability and chance lead to friction and thus give rise to uncertainty. Yet it is only under the pressure of frictional events and extreme conditions that a commander hones his courage and skills. An understanding of friction is a large part of that much-admired sense of warfare which a good general is supposed to possess. To be sure, the best general is not the one who is most

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familiar with the idea of friction, and who takes it most to heart (he belongs to the anxious type so common among experienced commanders). The good general must know friction in order to overcome it whenever possible. (On War, 120)

In a protracted war, the influence of unpredictable events intensifies and has a greater impact on developments. Negative developments must be identified and countered. The ability of the commander to judge them soundly and counter them resolutely on time is crucial. This outstanding ability is a mark of the genius of war. When general friction becomes more frequent and changes the course of a war, the rational, controlling influence of politics decreases. The responsibility of the commander and his army for continuing to pursue the objectives set to achieve the defined political purpose despite the dynamism inherent in war increases. Friction hence creates room for manoeuvre, paves the way for radical changes and provides opportunities for a courageous commander. Every warring army is but a sum of individuals who are exposed to danger and physical exertion. The way it handles friction depends on its soldiers’ familiarity with war, discipline and motivation. A commander with experience and courage and an army familiar with war are mainstays for success in war. They decide on victory and defeat when a war drags on and friction becomes frequent.

Conclusions Rational assessment of how events are likely to develop and what efforts and means are required to deal with them reduces the tendency to strive for the ultimate goal and draw up worst-case plans to the minimum necessary. This strategic concept is dynamised due to the factors in a situation being able to change. In view of general friction, the pursuit of overriding political purposes can only be successful if the commander is granted latitude for his actions. This means that war plans must not be defined and steered down to every single engagement. Ultimate and intermediate military objectives provide both the framework and guidance for accomplishing a mission. The term friction is used as an analysis tool in many branches of industry (Cf. Boston Consulting, 2003, 98). With respect to the influence of probability and chance on the course of events and to the friction that arises, no more than a vague distinction is made between cause and effect. These days, a shift is taking place in the main probable and chance events affecting a military operation. The influence of changes in the weather, for instance, has been reduced to a minimum due to networked information processing. The effects of false intelligence, a lack of clarity regarding the enemy situation or inadequacy in the capability to deal with surprising moves by the opponent are far greater. A superabundance of exact data and computer-aided assessments in combination with a poor selection and uncertain evaluation of sources and erroneous priorities increases the probability of the situation being misjudged by the decision-makers. When other factors such as ill-trained commanders or a lack of discipline are added, a frictional situation of the kind described by Clausewitz arises.

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The efforts made to eliminate operational frictions by means of state-of-the-art technology create frictions in other areas. The downing of the Iranian passenger plane by the AEGIS- cruiser USS Vincennes in the Persian Gulf in 1988 and the heavy losses sustained in Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan in 2002 are two examples that prove that the influence of frictions, probability and chance is an issue of great topicality even when modern technology is used (see Chap. 8). In his work, Clausewitz combines the ground-breaking discoveries of the Enlightenment with the realistic requirements of war and draws conclusions for strategic thinking. His success in comprehending the phenomenon of general friction and the moral qualities that can restrict it and in drawing conclusions for war constitutes a unique intellectual accomplishment. After all, it is the character and capabilities of the commander and the virtues of his army that are the decisive factors in war. Echevarria II emphasises: “History’s greatest generals, Clausewitz observed, possessed a well-developed or innate talent for reducing war’s many complexities to simple, yet accurate expressions” (Echevarria II, 2007, 196 f.). The ability to successfully handle frictions is one of the most important characteristics of a commander.

Moral Factors In 1805, Lieutenant Carl von Clausewitz publishes an anonymous essay on strategy in which he criticises a work of the well-known war theoretician Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow entitled “Doctrines of the New War“ (Lehrsätze des neuen Krieges) with vehemence, irony and pugnacity. He asks Bülow, an Enlightenment thinker who is still deeply rooted in the concept of professional armies fighting in close formations, the following question: “And who finally came up with the idea of degrading strategy to a mechanical art or indeed a craft?” (von Clausewitz, 1805) Instead, Clausewitz demands that moral qualities—meaning a blend of intellect and temperament—also be taken into consideration: “The art of war consists [...] in making the best use of the means available [...] As a consequence, wherever the mathematics of the opposing forces yield greater advantages for one side, the other has no choice but to count on moral qualities” (von Reichert, 1987, 8). Clausewitz complies in this with the ideas of his day, as Goethe, for instance, writes on 16 August 1799: “Thus it seems that all that remains is to do what our ancestors did: do nothing and observe without thinking” (Beutler, 1948–54, Vol. 1, 113). Even much later in his life, Clausewitz fiercely criticises the purely static appraisal of war: “It is even more ridiculous when we consider that these very critics usually exclude all moral qualities from strategic theory, and only examine material factors. [...]If that were really all, it would hardly provide a scientific problem for a schoolboy” (On War, 178). While studying the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon I, Clausewitz realises that failure to consider the moral qualities of these commanders would

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contradict all the findings of his historical studies. Both are impressive because of their boldness, a fair share of rationality and their courage to break existing rules. That is why Clausewitz describes moral qualities as “the spirit that permeates war as a whole” (On War, 184). They are an important variable in the art of war, and Clausewitz chooses them as a key subject of his studies.

Military Genius The persistent pursuit of rational goals in a non-rational process turns into an art in which the creative spirit is free to roam. Military genius and the harmonious combination of the elements of the mind and temperament are decisive for dealing with friction (Cf. On War, 100). Clausewitz concludes: “The actual conduct of war—the free use of the given means, appropriate to each individual occasion— was not considered a suitable subject for theory, but one that had to be left to natural preference” (On War, 134). To his understanding, intuitive judgement is based on natural talent that is refined through knowledge and experience and should enable the right decisions to be made almost instinctively. Clausewitz condenses these impressions and findings in connection with moral factors. With intuitive judgement, a commander grasps the means that are appropriate and identifies the center of gravity of the opponent and the culminating point of an engagement by comparing all the relevant variables and means. The intuitive judgement of a commander is an indication of the degree of genius in him (Cf. On War 585 f.). He defines “genius” as “a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation” (On War, 100). Clausewitz universalised this thought, defining the moral factors of war as a product of three variables: Moral factors = genius of the commander 3 characteristics of the people 3 military virtues of the army. These correspond to the individual skills of the commander, the spirit of the people and the quality of the armed forces. In Clausewitz’s theory, thinking and purposively rational action in war are activities that are conducted in a force field and pose supreme challenges to the genius of the commander, the character of the people and the skills and habits of the armed forces. Genius is the nucleus of the moral factors. In the early nineteenth century, the debate on the characteristics of genius is well underway among Romantics and German Idealists. Immanuel Kant discusses the topic in his Critique of Judgement and develops a method for approaching the concept of genius. His efforts are aimed at identifying the reason for which finite insight can be considered valid. According to Kant,

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genius combines phantasy, intellect, courage and a certain boldness to draw innovative conclusions and rises above rules. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement “§ 46. Fine art is the art of genius. Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives rule to art. Since talent, a san innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: Genius is the innate mental ingenuity through which nature gives the rule to art. [...] From this it may be seen that genius is a talent [...] and that consequently originality must be its primary property”. The products of genius are extraordinary. Genius cannot describe itself, nor can he indicate scientifically how it brings about its product, but rather gives the rule as nature, which is not part of science, but of art” (Cf. Kant, 1911, 306–307). “§ 49. The faculties of the mind which constitute genius. [...] genius properly consists in the happy relation, which science cannot teach nor industry learn, enabling one to find out ideas for a given concept, and, besides, to hit upon the expression for them—the expression by means of which the subjective mental condition induced by the ideas as the concomitant of a concept may be communicated to others” (Kant, 1911, 317). “Genius [...] is the exemplary originality of the natural endowments of an individual in the free employment of his cognitive faculties” (ibid, 318). According to Kant, there are four key aspects of genius: 1. Genius is a talent for art, not one for science. 2. Genius presupposes a definite concept and uses its imagination to represent it. 3. Genius displays itself in the presentation of a definite concept as the imagination in its freedom from all guidance of rules in order to give an understanding of the very essence of a concept. 4. Genius presupposes the “free harmonizing” of the imagination with the understanding’s conformity to law rational logic which can only be produced by the nature of the individual (Cf. ibid, 317 f.). “The mental powers whose union [...] constitutes genius are imagination and understanding” (Author’s italics, ibid, 316). “[courage] . . . certain boldness of expression and, in general, many a deviation from the common rule becomes him well, but in no sense is it a thing worthy of imitation” (ibid, 318). Kant’s characteristics of genius are complemented by ideas of reason that arise during the Age of Idealism and Romanticism. In the Enlightenment, genius rises above rules and establishes his own norms from nature of things. In an early work, “The Sorrows of Young Werther” (Die Leiden des jungen Werthers), Goethe characterises genius as a sensitive, inspired and highly talented person who is

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curious, spontaneous and follows the slightest of his feelings and convictions (Cf. Goethe’s Werke, 1873, Vol. 10). In German Idealism, a world view is developed whose ideas and ideals are based on the primacy of the mind and in which the ideal nature of reality is considered more important than any kind of materialist dogmatism. German Idealism examines the validity of absolute knowledge and hence tries sui generis to reveal the absolute. The mind precedes the true self as an intellectual axiom by which reality can be explained meta-physically. Grappling with the exchange of ideas between Schiller and Goethe 1829 for quite sometimes, Clausewitz internalises this discussion and the connection between imagination, knowledge and experience (Cf. Herberg-Rothe, 2000, 179). He attends lectures given by the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte and enlarges upon them in letters he writes to him (Cf. Schössler, 2009, 101). Clausewitz sees a military genius as a virtuoso who, in an atmosphere of war, is resolute and creative and has enhanced mental prowess, a great strength of character and self-control in order to assert his ideas and achieve his goals against an opponent who is his equal. Goethe describes the difference between the forces of the understanding and reason with the following words: “Reason is dependent on what is coming into being, understanding depends on what is already there” (Cf. Beutler, 1948–54, Vol. 9, 571). Understanding helps to fathom the rationality of the present and the past. Reason or the forces of temperament are directed at the future. Harmony between the powers of reason or intellect and understanding as well as the resulting exceptional achievements of a commander are the significant products of education, knowledge and experience. “No activity of the human mind is possible without a certain stock of ideas; [...] these are not innate but acquired, and constitute a man’s knowledge” (On War, 145). This reveals an important point that has to be evaluated in the context of the time. Ideas are not innate, but acquired. This means that all military officers, irrespective of any noble privileges they may have, must complete courses of studies to qualify for higher duties. A genius combines resourcefulness with enhanced mental prowess. He is bold without being rash and has a strong character. In 1803, Goethe establishes a connection between boldness and holistic endeavour: “It is not always borne in mind that a bold undertaking also requires boldness in its implementation” (Cf. von Goethe, 1837, Vol. 2, 564). The atmosphere of war requires great efforts sui generis. A military genius pursues the defined purpose in a free and creative way, showing innovative discernment for the nature of war. He combines courage, resolve, perseverance and selfcontrol as qualities of temperament and tends more to scrutinize than act blindly, is more comprehensive than one-sided in his judgements and is more calm and collected and rational than hot-headed in his actions. A commander with a strong temperament will even listen to the voice of his intellect when exertion is at its greatest and emotions are at their highest (Cf. On War, 106). Only when armies are of equal quality “can the talent and insight of the supreme commander again become paramount” (On War, 350). All the qualities of a commander are utterly useless if his intellect is not sharp and his skills are of no relevance

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for reality. Undertakings that are confined by reasons of consideration and restrictions prevent their being implemented boldly from the outset. The search for the best solutions must be guided exclusively by the nature of war. Clausewitz warns of illusory security and arrogance: “A general must never forget this; he must never expect to move on the narrow ground of illusory security as if it were absolute; he must never permit himself to feel that the means he is using are absolutely necessary and the only ones possible, and persist in using them even though he may shudder at the thought of their possible inadequacy” (On War, 517). Clausewitz differs from Kant in that he does not consider the characteristics of a genius to be innate. The highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation is the result of the completion of a course of studies and is acquired.

Soldier’s Courage The first characteristic a soldier must have is courage in the face of personal danger as a result of positive motives such as patriotism, enthusiasm and ambition and courage to accept responsibility, be it before the tribunal of some outside power or before the court of his own conscience (Cf. On War, 101). Courage to grapple with new approaches and innovative solutions is a pre-eminent characteristic of an outstanding leader. The Prussian generals do not have it and hence suffer defeat in 1806 (Cf. Smith, 2004, 80 f.). Courage in the sense of a synthesis of boldness, perseverance and self-control can on no account be developed without a certain wealth of ideas and experience (Cf. On War, 145). The outcome of Clausewitz’s analysis of moral factors is that certain capabilities are of eminent importance when it comes to making complex decisions: the capability to specifically identify the essentials, to structure them, to adopt a stance, to consider human factors, to develop innovative options, to make courageous decisions and to implement them with perseverance despite any friction and, finally, to recognise whether the means provided are appropriate. There is an “imperative principle [...]; that principle is in all doubtful cases to stick to one’s first opinion and to refuse to change unless forced to do so by a clear conviction” (On War, 108). Clausewitz is of the view that genius combines pure rationality with the fictitious logic of action and reaction in war. He goes a controversial step further: “Anything that could not be reached by the meagre wisdom of such one-sided points of view was held to be beyond scientific control: it lay in the realm of genius, which rises above all rules” (On War, 136). He later qualifies this Kantian response to Antoine-Henri Jomini by pointing out that a commander should never lose sight of the theory of absolute war: “[...] it has the duty to give priority to the absolute form of war and to make that form a general point of reference, so that he who wants to learn from theory becomes accustomed to [...] approximating it when he can or when he must” (On War, 581). This highly controversial claim applies solely to the level of a commanding general and by no means to the lower officer and NCO echelons of an army. A

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lack of their moral qualities must be compensated for in the play of probability and chance by military virtues.

Commander’s Boldness A military genius faces unforeseeable events during an engagement with boldness. Clausewitz complains that leaders who are able to grasp situations in their entirety and to act with boldness, imagination and sense are rare in the armed forces. He disproves the misconception that leaders with a highly developed mental aptitude tend to brood or hesitate too much by pointing out that there has never been an outstanding commander of limited intellect (Cf. On War, 146). He contemptuously concludes: “The higher the military rank, the greater is the degree to which activity is governed by the mind, by the intellect, by insight. Consequently boldness, which is a quality of temperament, will tend to be held in check. This explains why it is so rare in the higher ranks, and why it is all the more admirable when found there” (On War, 191 f.). He deplores the loss of crucial virtues among officers when they are promoted to senior rank and shows admiration for those who retain their boldness nevertheless. He emphasises this quality and links it with that of being capable “of energetically supporting that higher form of analysis by which genius arrives at a decision: rapid, only partly conscious weighing of the possibilities. Boldness can lend wings to intellect and insight; the stronger the wings then, [...] the wider the view, and the better the results” (On War, 192). Clausewitz highlights the boldness of a genius who, in a brief moment, compares all the factors and means with a highly developed mental aptitude, intuitively finding the right solution. Temperament has a considerable influence on the decision-making process proper. Clausewitz states: “At this point, then, intellectual activity leaves the field of the exact sciences of logic and mathematics. It then becomes an art in the broadest meaning of the term—the faculty of using judgment to detect the most important and decisive elements in the vast array of facts and situations” (On War, 585). The degree of boldness and understanding correlates with the quality of the result achieved with resolute action. A genius does not compare facts or situations according to axiomatic norms, but rapidly distinguishes between what is important and what is unimportant and makes a bold choice. Due to his virtuosity, such a commander instinctively recognises the springs of action and decides with a blend of brains and temperament. “The most powerful springs of action in men lie in his emotions. He derives his most vigorous support [...] from that blend of brains and temperament which we have learned to recognize in the qualities of determination, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character. Naturally enough, if the commander’s superior intellect and strength of character did not express themselves in the final success of his work, and were only taken on trust, they would rarely achieve historical importance” (On War, 112 and cf. 100 f.). Targeted action in the midst of

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an engagement presupposes a wise decision, boldness in its implementation and a firm belief in one’s own ideas.

People’s Patriotic Spirit Clausewitz sees the influence of the people as the second moral element. A great admirer of the French Army, he analyses the success of the Revolutionary Army: “The French, inspired by the spirit of the revolution to overcome all obstacles and to expect success only from ventures followed this impulse when they found no other solution. The Germans, brought up to subordinate their will to others, accustomed to following rules and bound by responsibility, stood idly by in embarrassment” (Aron, 1980a, 184). It is not until the German Campaign of 1813 that the enthusiasm and fanatic zeal of the French Revolutionary Army are matched in Prussia. In a personal memorandum to the King, Scharnhorst outlined the key points of the Prussian military reforms in July 1807, the emotional goal being to achieve liberation from foreign rule and the independence of the Prussian state. Even though he initially expresses admiration for the French troops, Clausewitz mistrusts their unbridled, revolutionary enthusiasm. In his judgement, an army must observe order and obedience. Clausewitz concludes that enthusiasm gives fresh impetus to military virtues, but such enthusiasm is not indispensable (Cf. On War, 187).

Military Virtues of the Army Finally, the genius of the commander is complemented by the military virtues of his army. “Military spirit always stands in the same relation to the parts of an army as does a general’s ability to the whole. The general can command only the overall situation and not the separate parts. At the point where the separate parts need guidance, the military spirit must take command” (On War, 188). This interaction becomes comprehensible when Clausewitz’s remarks on mountain warfare and engagements in difficult terrain. Clausewitz notes that the commanders face each other in a war on open ground, whereas they cannot exert a direct influence on their troops in mountain warfare (Cf. On War, 186). He recognises the importance of soldiers acting on their own initiative when they are out of reach of their superiors’ orders. “An army’s military qualities are based on the individual who is steeped in the spirit and essence of this activity; who trains the capacities it demands, rouses them, and makes them his own; who applies his intelligence to every detail; who gains ease and confidence through practice, and who completely immerses his personality in the appointed task” (On War, 187).

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Military virtue is an expression of an army’s guild spirit. It is composed of talents, habits and norms that can be remembered and lived up to and denote an individual soldier’s ability to evoke the necessary strengths within him and to use his intellect to comprehend things. Constant practice first helps to develop skills and then great sureness and ease. Practice, understanding, repetition and drill are essential prerequisites for soldiers to proceed from being informed of a tactical decision to implementing it under highly exerting conditions. “An army that maintains its cohesion under the most murderous fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears [...] whose physical power, like the muscles of an athlete, has been steeled by training in privation and effort; a force that regards such efforts as a means to victory [...]—such an army is imbued with the true military spirit” (On War, 187 f.). This spirit counteracts a force’s urge to unleash its powers without restraint and is based on a kind of discipline that ensures that order, obedience and trust in its commander are maintained even in defeat. As already discussed, genius is less prevalent among the lower levels of command and so must be compensated for by military virtues. “[...] the testing process becomes less thorough the further we descend on the scale of command, and we must be prepared for a proportionate diminution of personal talent. What is missing here must be made up by military virtues” (On War, 188). To successfully handle great exertion, it is essential for soldiers to know their physical limits. This is something they can only experience if they go on doing something to exhaustion. The sense of pride they feel in having overcome exertion and danger gives them the necessary confidence that they can even maintain order and discipline in hopelesslooking situations. The ability to unleash these powers in battle is one key to an army’s virtue. “The same role is played by the natural qualities of a people mobilized for war: bravery, adaptability, stamina, and enthusiasm. These, then, are the qualities that can act as substitutes for the military spirit and vice-versa [. . .]” (ibid.).

Conclusions Clausewitz offers a way of analysing and assessing present challenges and sets standards for decision-makers in high positions. The conflict between frictions and the commander is of pivotal importance for his ideas. After all, flexible decisionmaking processes are only possible in a strategic context when potential frictionrelated changes and the moral qualities of the commander and the military virtues of the armed forces are taken into account. In the twenty-first century, the call for a wealth of ideas, for courage and the will to take action and shape the world according to one’s will is appreciable—but breaking the rules is considered impermissible. These days, the motivation of the military forces is inseparably linked to their mission. It is hence surprising how Clausewitz derives a commander’s motives without making reference to values or a purpose. Clausewitz asks whether “history has ever known a great general who was not ambitious” and comes to the conclusion that “[o]f all the passions that inspire

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man in battle, none [...] is so powerful and so constant as the longing for honor and renown” (On War, 105). General Adolf Heusinger, Inspector General of the Bundeswehr (1987–1961), takes up and greatly expands on this thought in his speech on the occasion of the opening of the German Army Academy in Bad Ems on 15 May 1957. “Knowledge and skill alone are not enough to form a general staff officer. He must command respect, inspire trust and combine an acute mind with an ardent heart” (Cf. Heusinger, 1987, 61). A longing for honour and renown is not a pivotal urge of military superiors in the Bundeswehr. On the contrary, personal ambition and an ardent heart are diametrically opposed to what is demanded in the 2008 Bundeswehr Joint Service Regulation “Innere Führung”, namely that the Armed Forces are to be formed by superiors acting as a role model and the example they set. Scharnhorst is considered to be the pioneer of the idea that an army should be guided by a sense of duty, patriotism and public spirit. Clausewitz adds enthusiasm and longing for honour and renown as purely emotional factors. Applying these ideas to the present-day situation is difficult because acting on the grounds of understanding and conviction is a matter that concerns the intellect and can on no account be applied to the enthusiasm described by Clausewitz, as it is a temperament matter. “Innere Führung” states that soldiers must be explained “the purpose and necessity of their tasks both on their own and in the overall scheme of things” in order to prepare them “for demanding missions”. It must hence be noted the fact that enthusiasm and passion—as Clausewitz conceives them—are still not imperative elements of western leadership culture, whereas ordering soldiers to take certain action without successfully conveying the purpose of seems to be equally unimaginable. Clausewitz by no means considers the three factors—the commander, the military virtues of the army and patriotic spirit—as being isolated from each other, but sees the complex interrelations of these three factors as a principal feature of his analysis. Judging by today’s standards, this concept is astute and imperishable, as studying military leadership, troop morale and the friendly indifference of society is an important activity. On account of its character and concept of leadership development and civic education, the Bundeswehr renders the establishment of a German army in a democratic constitutional state a success. Baudissin’s hope of realising the aims of the Prussian reformers in the establishment of the Bundeswehr is expressed in the call for the army and the nation to melt together as their “moral roots” lie in the basic values, namely “freedom, law and human dignity” (Cf. Opitz, 1998, 157). Leadership development and civic education is a concept based on social principles and binds military service in the Bundeswehr to the norms and values embodied in the German constitution. There are difficulties in clearly presenting what it actually means to this day (Cf. von Bredow, 2000, 112 f.). It is of great significance in armed missions abroad. Allied forces are not familiar with this concept and doubt whether it is suitable for conducting combat missions with the required rigour, robustness and sustainability (Cf. Clement, 2006, 7). Despite all the differences in opinions, it is obvious that a commander can only accomplish political purposes if he has the required moral qualities, broad public support and capable force contingents,

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observes modern leadership principles and avails himself of both his intellect and his temperament to achieve his objectives. An intellect that is used to comprehend the past and present combines a wealth of ideas with a highly developed mental aptitude and comprehensive knowledge. Temperament includes decisiveness, courage, boldness, loyalty and passion and is focused on the things to come, on coping with the future. The oath of the Bundeswehr is “I pledge to faithfully serve the Federal Republic of Germany and to bravely defend the right and the freedom of the German people”. It explicitly includes elements of temperament. Clausewitz’s theory suggests that there is an imperative necessity for refinement in the concept of leadership development and civic education with respect to conduct in the atmosphere of danger, physical exertion, uncertainty and chance that prevails in war.

Holistic Evaluation Interpreting the pith of Clausewitz’s work in relation to reality is a methodical way of deciphering complex issues with a culture of knowledge and abstraction and developing strategic reflection skills. It allows philosophical ways of thinking to be applied to political and military action and the demand to be met for reason and responsibility to be shown in it. Clausewitz’s line of thought on the resolution of military conflicts is holistic, is guided by their innermost characteristics and takes equal account of the elements of intellect and temperament. Summing up, it can be said that the application of his five principles at the strategic level of abstraction allows great clarity in the issues and interrelations to be established and actionoriented decisions to be made. The Fascinating Trinity is an epistemological method of analysis that enables a conflict situation to be grasped and considered holistically. It is a tour d'horizon of the variables and the way in which they interrelate at the theory level. The analysis and comparison of the tendencies and characteristics of each belligerent party involved, its political purpose, primordial violence and creative spirit delivers fundamental insights and provides a holistic overview. The principle of the appropriateness of means enables parties to compare the state and capabilities of an opponent with their own. The result of this comparison is the basis for the decision on whether or not to start a war and, if so, on what strategic course to take in the war. The highly developed mental aptitude of a genius is needed to sift out the most important findings from the plethora available. The relations between purpose, objective and means shed a light on the relation between the superordinate political purpose, the military objective and the efforts that have to be made. The war plan defines the military actions in a planned act of war. Before the decision to wage a war can be taken, it is necessary to answer the questions of what is to be achieved by it (purpose) and in it (objective). These main issues determine the scale of means and energy that are to be expended. It is irresponsible to start a war without conducting a stringent analysis of its purpose and objective and the means required.

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This establishment of the vertical context must be followed by an examination of the unexpected events and frictions that can arise and hinder or even prevent the pursuit of the objective in the war. The course of action planned for the war must therefore be closely examined and alternatives must be considered and planned. The moral factors are a decisive aspect of warfare. They are the product of the commander’s genius, the armed forces’ military virtues and the people’s characteristics. Genius is the quality that enables a commander to take purposively rational action in the frictional environment of an engagement. He performs practical tasks with a highly developed mental aptitude. The military virtues of the armed forces are composed of experience, training, obedience and reason. The people’s disapproval of a war can have a lasting influence on political and military decisions and even lead to difficulties with the recruitment of troops and the provision of resources. The undertaking is doomed to failure from the outset if one of the three factors is missing. The five principles are a theoretical construct that enables wars to be comprehended. As for the methodology, Clausewitz frames basic tasks, points out the difficulties they involve and starts searching for a solution only after he has given close consideration to critical objections. His epistemological and action-oriented main ideas allow the characteristics of war to be analysed and responsible decisions to be made. There is no sense in reflecting on specific aspects of individual wars before they have looked at from an overall view.

Preliminary Results The first chapter of this study provides an outline of the belligerent genesis of Europe. It shows that strategic thinking as we know it today has only undergone a holistic development since the days of Frederick the Great and Napoleon I. Elements that are of particular importance are the three possible interpretations of Clausewitz’s work presented in the second and third chapters and the fundamental findings of the Prussian philosopher of war, which are presented from the present-day perspective. It would be a great mistake if the analysis of Clausewitz’s work were to end with the basic features. To understand the internal logic and weighting of his arguments, it is necessary to take a close look at the philosophical expressions he uses and their relations. The next chapter hence addresses the following selected aspects of Clausewitz’s theory: first, the structure, form and content of the work, then the relations with politics, war and peace, the forms of war and, finally, the significance of the theory for reality. In any event, having a clear idea of the terminology Clausewitz uses is highly important for understanding his work.

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Bibliography Clausewitz’s Works von Clausewitz, C. (1805). Bemerkungen über die reine und angewandte Strategie des Herrn von Bülow, oder Kritik der darin enthaltenen Ansichten. In H. P. R. von Porbeck (Ed.), Neue Bellona, Neunter Band, drittes Stück. Leipzig: Hinrichs.

Works on Clausewitz Aron, R. (1980a). Clausewitz: Den Krieg denken. Frankfurt a.M.: Propyläen-Verlag. Bassford, C. (2007). The primacy of the ‘Trinity’ in Clausewitz’s mature thought. In H. Strachan & A. Herberg-Rothe (Eds.), Clausewitz in the twenty-first century (pp. 74–90). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boston Consulting (Eds.). (2003). Clausewitz-Strategie denken. Munich. Echevarria, A. J., II. (2007). Clausewitz and contemporary war. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Echevarria, A. J., II. (2007a). Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror. In H. Strachan & A. Herberg-Rothe (Eds.), Clausewitz in the twenty-first century (pp. 196–218). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Herberg-Rothe, A. (2000). Clausewitz und Hegel. Ein heuristischer Vergleich. Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte, 10(1), 49–84. Heusinger, A. (1987). Ein deutscher Soldat im 20. Jahrhundert. Schriftenreihe Innere Führung. Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Herberg-Rothe, A. (2007). Clausewitz’s puzzle. The political theory of war. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kleemeier, U. (2002). Grundfragen einer philosophischen Theorie des Krieges. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Paret, P. (1980b). Die politischen Ansichten von Clausewitz. In Clausewitz-Gesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg (pp. 333–348). Bonn: Dümmler. Schössler, D. (2009). Clausewitz-Engels-Mahan: Grundriss einer Ideengeschichte militärischen Denkens. Berlin: Dümmler. Smith, H. (2004). On Clausewitz – A study of military and political ideas. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Strachan, H. (2007a). A Clausewitz for every season. The American Interest, 29–35. July/August 2007. Strickmann, E. (2008). Clausewitz im Zeitalter der neuen Kriege: Der Krieg in Ruanda (1990–1994) im Spiegel der “wunderlichen Dreifaltigkeit”. Berlin: Galda. Tuchmann, B. (1978). A Distant Mirror - The Calamitous 14th Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. van Creveld, M. (1991). The transformation of war. New York: The Free Press. von Reichert, R. (1987). Clausewitz' “Moralischen Größen” und die Wehrbereitschaft im späten 20. Jahrhundert [Lecture manuscript]. Hamburg: Bundeswehr Command and Staff College.

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Further Literature Beutler, Ernst (Ed.) (1948–1954). Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 24 vols. Zürich: Artemis Verlag Bloch, A. (1981). Murphy’s law (Vol. 2). London: Arrow Books. Clement, Rolf (2006). Der Beirat der Inneren Führung und seine Bedeutung für die Streitkräfte. In Mittler-Brief, 3rd quarter 2006. Bonn. Goethe’s Werke. (1873). Vols. 1–30. Introduction by Gustav Wendt et al. Berlin. Hegel, G. F. W. (1973/4). Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie, 1818–1831. (6 vols.) Commented by Karl-Heinz Ilting (Ed.). Stuttgart. Kant, Immanuel (1911). Selections from Kant’s critique of aesthetic judgement. Translated by J. C. Meredith. Retrieved June 29 2019, from http://www.mnstate.edu Opitz, E. (Ed.). (1998). Gerhard Scharnhorst: vom Wesen und Wirken der preußischen Heeresreform. Ein Tagungsband. Bremen: Edition Temmen. von Bredow, W. (2000). Demokratie und Streitkräfte: Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. von Goethe, J. W. (1837). Goethe’s poetische und prosaische Werke in Zwei Bänden (Vol. 2). Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta.

Chapter 6

On War: Individual Aspects

Abstract Souchon argues in this chapter, that the frequently quoted sentence that war is a continuation of policy is only meaningful if the close dialogue between the government and the commander is established and the intention of the political leader do not clash with the quantities and quality of the means provided and the degree of effort made in the course of a conflict. However, there are important individual aspects in the book On War that must be understood to fill the gap between Clausewitz’s line of thought and the formulation of a strategy in the twenty-first century. Souchon carefully inspects the structure and method of presentation of the book On War and explains the elementary notions that constitute the key building blocks of Clausewitz’s theory.

The manuscript On War by Carl von Clausewitz is of immense importance for research on the nature of the phenomena of war, for systematic comprehension and for the education of the future commanders. His reality-centred theory allows a mental grasp to be gained of highly complex situations and dynamic sequences of events and provides a profound basis for studying strategic thinking and action in such environments. In Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years (II, 9), Goethe concludes: “Thinking and Doing, Doing and Thinking, from all time admitted, from all time practised, but not discerned by everyone” (Goethe’s Works, 1885). As the pith of Clausewitz’s theory cannot be grasped without a profound understanding of his basic concepts of the relationships between politics and war and between strategy and tactics and as its elements can only be pieced together after his logic has first been reduced to its elements and then recomposed to once more form a whole, On War demands precise study and great thought. Clausewitz begins by considering the directness and singlemindedness of Napoleon’s approach to war and—proceeding in a way that is characteristic of Hegel, Herder, and Goethe—goes on to deduce the nature of specificity from a totality, from a generic life-nexus (Cf. Schmidt, 2007, 32). The practice of studying selects quotations in a certain order or breaking down his doctrine into isolated text building blocks in one’s mind blurs one’s view of what is of essence. Clausewitz describes his On War manuscript as a collection of separate © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Souchon, Strategy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0_6

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pieces of work. What is more, his main ideas are, like the “fruit of years of reflection on war and diligent study of it” (On War, 70), often dispersed scattered in the text and pondering different levels of reflection and correlating findings. And still, they produce a theory of war that is convincing as a whole and might even spark a revolution in thinking. Clausewitz pieces together his ideas on the theory of war at a high level of abstraction under the overarching Fascinating Trinity, which is specified by the issue of what means are appropriate, the relations between the purpose, objective and means, the considerable influence of frictions and the counteractive moral qualities in a three-dimensional space generated by tendencies and characteristics. In the following chapters of this book, the pith of Clausewitz’s theory is exemplary applied to the action taken in twenty-first century conflicts. Common concepts of strategies for the industrial wars of the past century, which were planned on the basis of huge armies, do not allow a grasp to be gained of protracted low-intensity wars that are fought by opponents operating covertly in remote geographical areas. Instead, there is a need for a fundamentally extended ability to think strategically and a strategy that allow all the factors of present wars to be grasped and taken into account in decisions. Carl von Clausewitz fundamentally has this to say about theory: “The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled. Not until terms and concepts have been defined can one hope to make any progress in examining the question clearly and simply [. . .]” (On War, 132). Sound concepts and ideas are important prerequisites for analysing war. Goethe postulates that only those with clear concepts can issue orders. To establish clarity in Clausewitz’s work, individual aspects and concepts are discussed in depth in the following section.

Structure Clausewitz starts On War (see Fig. 6.1) in Book One with a look at the nature of war. In Chap. 3 What Is War? he develops a basic idea that centers on three aspects: purpose and means in war, military genius and the atmosphere of war. The chapter ends with the Fascinating Trinity, a three-dimensional synthesis of the tendencies and influences of war. He dedicates Chap. 4, Purpose and Means in War, to the rationale and effort required to wage war, asking the following questions in the hope of their being revealing: What is to be achieved, and when does a war end? Though still at an early stage, he announces that he will further examine the question of what is needed to render a state defenceless. For Clausewitz, war is not an act of blind passion, but is waged with specified effort and adequate means in pursuit of a political purpose. The enemy’s will can be broken by a whole spectrum of measures that range in the action taken from destroying the opposing forces and conquering territory to waiting passively. As

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Clausewitz's work starts with a look at the essence of war as a whole and the relation between purpose and means, then turns his attention to the art of war and strategy. On War contains a deductive analysis of the elements of strategy and turns its attention to the core topic of waging war, the engagement as the means of achieving objectives in war. With a look at the mass of elements, he enlarges upon the psychology of good warfighting, armed forces and their use in defence and attack. With a high level of abstraction, he links purposes and means and the appropriateness of means to the nature of war as an instrument of policy. The war plan summarises the whole of military activity, determining the course of action adopted while taking account of select tendencies and influences to fulfil the political purpose

Fig. 6.1 Structure of on war: strategy, engagement, and war plan

early as in Chap. 5, he moves on from analysing war from the theoretical angle and devotes his attention to military genius. In the atmosphere of war, which he defines as a synthesis of danger, physical exertion and suffering, uncertainty and chance, he deems two characteristics a commander must have particularly important: intellect and prudence. He goes into more depth on the atmosphere of war in the other chapters of Book One. In Chap. 8, he explains the importance of the elements that form the atmosphere of war and on account of their restrictive effects groups them into a concept of general friction. Book Two deals with the theory of war. Clausewitz introduces the concepts of strategy and tactics as a doctrine for the use of combat and armed forces. Taking the latter as a basis, Book Three On strategy in General sequentially analyses the moral qualities of the commander, the virtues of the army and the elements in war, namely, strength, surprise, ruse, assembly, economy of force and dynamics of war, from physical, mathematical and geographical angles. Clausewitz’s central point of reference for war is combat, which he analyses in depth in Book Four The Engagement from the angles of duration, the decision of the engagement, the battle, the exploitation of victory or retreat after a lost battle. Here, he deductively leaves his strategy theory and turns to the operational command and control of armed forces in combat. In Book Five Military Forces, he deductively substantiates his interpretations, specifying the disposition of military forces, their camps, marches, lines of communication and questions pertaining to the theatre of operations. In Book Six Defense, he operationalises the armed forces in tactical and strategic defence. This book constitutes the essence of the complete works, covering hundreds of pages, and contains essays on attack and defence in tactics and strategy, the types of combat, fortresses, and special features typical of the theatre of operations. Book Seven The Attack which is just based on sketches and pieces of preliminary work found in Clausewitz’s estate and merely 50 pages long, deals with attack, the nature of strategic attack, the culminating point and other operational courses of action in different theatres of operations. Although Book Eight War Plans is also based just on fragments, it reflects a high level of abstraction, is of great importance and can only be understood in connection with

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Book One. Using the war plans, Clausewitz starts an overarching process of thinking about the tendencies and influences in a war that eventually prompt him to go over the complete work. From the point of view of logic, the structure of On War reflects a line of thought that starts with the overarching complexes and proceeds to simpler elements and a high level of abstraction: Considering that it took more than a decade to write On War and the final remarks in the Notes on the war plans, the books can be seen to have a revealing logic. It is not until Book Eight that Clausewitz gains profound insight into the holistic analysis of war and its sense and plans to incorporate it into the first six books. He starts with a dichotomous discussion about absolute and limited war, analysing the relations within them, the military purpose and the effort involved. When outlining the military objectives, he realises that the sense of war can solely lie in the achievement of an overarching political purpose. He develops the concept of the appropriateness of means and identifies the influences of the assessing characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of the enemy in comparison with ours. What are the enemy’s purposes in comparison with ours? How are his government and his people acting in relation to ours? His answer to the question of whether political intercourse is suspended in war is a distinct no. If an all-embracing analysis of war accommodates these situation factors, war is an instrument of policy and only conceivable in a three-dimensional influence realm. Tantamount to interventionism in politics with other means, war remains part of politics and is instrumentalised by the government. This raises further questions: What decisions does the government make, what the commander, and how do they work together? The primacy of politics and the responsibilities and restrictions imposed on both the cabinet and the armed forces can be deduced accordingly. Due to his realising this, Clausewitz alters his evaluation of strategy as an instruction and adds the theory. He concludes that the government can only succeed in exerting an influence on a war by way of a strategy. It provides the basis for drafting a war plan and instruction on the use of the armed forces. Clausewitz uses these findings as a basis for developing a three-dimensional idea featuring rationality, friction, and primordial violence as a synthesis of the analysis of war in theory and as a course of action. He starts incorporating them into the first six books—without completing the work in his lifetime—and stresses the significance of this revision of his work in the Note, which contains numerous further remarks and is presented here, together with the Unfinished Note. Note “The revision will bring out the two types of war with greater clarity at every point . . . in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the enemy––to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations . . . (continued)

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This distinction between the two kinds of wars is a matter of actual fact. But no less practical is the importance of another point that must be made absolutely clear, namely that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means . . . Book Eight “War Plans,” will deal with the organization of a war as a whole. Several chapters of it have already been drafted, but they must not in any sense be taken as being in final form. They are really no more than a rough working over of the raw material, done with the idea that the labor itself would show what the real problems were. If the working out of Book Eight results in clearing my own mind and in really establishing the main lineaments of war (Hauptlineamente) it will be all the easier for me to apply the same criteria to the first six books and make those lineaments evident throughout them. Only when I have reached that point, therefore, shall I take the revision of the first six books in hand. If an early death should terminate my work, what I have written so far would, of course only deserve to be called a shapeless mass of ideas. Being liable to endless misinterpretation it would be the target of much half-baked criticism . . . Nonetheless, I believe an unprejudiced reader in search of truth and understanding will recognize the fact that the first six books, for all their imperfection of form, contain the fruit of years of reflection on war and diligent study of it. He may even find they contain the basic ideas that might bring about a revolution in the theory of war. Berlin, 10 July 182700 (Translation by the author based On War, 69 f.) Part of this Note contains an Unfinished Note that is a printout of material found in the estate. It contains important information on the manner in which he reworked his manuscript in order for it to be revealing, and this information is likewise quoted here. Unfinished Note “The manuscript on the conduct of major operations that will be found after my death can, in its present state, be regarded as nothing but a collection of materials from which a theory of war was to have been distilled . . . Nevertheless I believe the main lineaments (Hauptlineamente) which will be seen to govern this material are the right ones, looked at in the light of actual warfare . . . The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished. It will at least serve the whole by indicating the direction I meant to follow everywhere . . . The theory of major operations (strategy, as it is called) presents extraordinary difficulties, and it is fair to say that very few people have clear ideas (continued)

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about its details––that is, ideas which logically derive from basic necessities. Most men merely act on instinct of judgement (Takt des Urteils), and the amount of success they achieve depends on the amount of talent they were born with . . . Yet when it is not a question of acting oneself but of persuading others in discussion, the need is for clear ideas and the ability to show their connection with each other. So few people have yet acquired the necessary skill at this that most discussions are a futile bandying of words; either they leave each man sticking to his own ideas or they end with everyone agreeing, for the sake of agreement, on a compromise with nothing to be said for it . . . It is a very difficult task to construct a scientific theory for the art of war, and so many attempts have failed that most people say it is impossible, since it deals with matters that no permanent law can provide for . . .” (Translation by the author based On War, 70 f.) In his foreword to the 16th edition, Hahlweg glorifies On War as a “bible of the art of governance”. This evaluation is strongly exaggerated, “yet indicates the direction in which Clausewitz is of particular relevance for the future if his main ideas are thought through. Only those who neglect this hint can call him dated” (v. Schramm, 1965, 503).

Method of Presentation Philosophers do not seek superficial approaches, but postulate an accurate, objective analysis and critical assessment of the subject matters and a thorough discussion and weighing of possible solutions. In the presentation of results, the ancient Greeks distinguished between the philosophical and the rhetorical method: A philosopher convinces his listeners by means of great expertise, the profundity of his ideas, the assurance with which he uses terms, the impartiality of his thinking, his logic, his prudent handling of objections, his reason—not passion—and his experience. He presents a subject objectively, convincingly and completely. A rhetorician is not concerned about details, stringent logic, correctly defined terms or a comprehensively balanced presentation. He impresses his listeners by wisdom and eloquence. He fascinates them by brilliantly presenting images, associations, threats and temptations and convinces them of his sophistic concerns. In ancient times, philosophers and rhetoricians were mostly equally appreciated (Cf. Pirsig, 1974, 105 ff.). The application of this view to On War requires a distinction to be made between the content and the form in which it is presented. Wise content needs to be presented in an appropriate form. Such a form, however, must never be an end in itself. Its purpose is to convey the content and so must correspond to the knowledge and terms of the day. Clausewitz used the works of

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Kiesewetter, Hegel, Fichte and Kant as a yardstick for the quality he strives to achieve. He wrote his work with philosophical profundity and rhetorical caution. An analysis of Clausewitz’s On War requires a distinction to be made between form and content. On 19 April 1819, Goethe wrote this to F. v. Müller: “Each thing, each activity demands a form of its own, a formula which, excluding the unessential, clearly defines the main object” (Dobel, 1991, 206). The form in which On War is presented renders the complex content understandable and logically comprehensible. This is why it is just as important as the work’s substance. Kiesewetter highlights the distinction between form and content by referring to a monument whose outer form is determined by its size, face, hands, and figure. The substance of the monument is composed of wood, granite or bronze (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 37).

Form As regards the way in which he analysed war by means of a systems theory approach and presented it as a result of the profundity and comprehensive substance of his theory of war and thinking, Clausewitz chose to divide his work into eight books. Topics whose content is related are addressed under the following headings: On the Nature of War; On the Theory of War; On Strategy in General; The Engagement; Military Forces; Defense; The Attack; War Plans. Clausewitz is highly subtle in his assessment of the principal elements of war and their functions. As if using a microscope, he then examines the way in which they influence each other and verifies their reasonableness by citing examples from military history. In his logic and methods of reasoning, he initially goes by Kant’s ideas on material and formal logic on the basis of Kiesewetter’s writings (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 3 ff.). He uses philosophy as a method of thinking and is more comparative than dialectical in his approach. He uses Kiesewetter’s first main work, “Outline of a General Logic following Kantian Principles” (Grundriss einer Logik nach Kantischen Grundsätzen) as a foundation (Cf. Hahlweg, 1980b, 331 ff.; Echevarria II, 2007, 3 and footnote 14). In later years, his thinking is influenced more by Hegel’s logic. Hence, what he writes in the various chapters mirrors different stages of his reflection and coalesces to become a whole again in an abstracted form. Each focussed reference to a topic in one place is followed by unfocussed references to it elsewhere. While Clausewitz comprehensively presents the nature and essence of war in Book One, numerous references to it are dispersed in other books. Each feature he develops is in turn part of a hierarchy of known concepts. Hence, what he writes in various chapters coalesces to become a whole again. Over the years in which he composes his work, Clausewitz gains different insights. By the summer of 1827, in which he finishes his work, he has fundamentally changed his view of war. This is why, in the preceding Note, he frames two overarching findings: One is that war can be of two kinds (the defeat of the enemy or only the occupation of some provinces) and the other is that it can serve as the instrument for the

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continuation of policy by other means. He developed these two aspects during his revision work after 1827 and incorporated them fully in Book One. He also poses the important question of how a reader can understand the incomplete work at all. Walther Malmsten Schering is regarded as one of the last analysts who had access to all the archives in Clausewitz’s estate. He accurately states the times when different parts of On War were finished (Cf. Aron, 24). Apparently, Books Two to Six are older and reflect the existential significance of war that the somewhat younger Clausewitz had in mind. These chapters are often called Clausewitz’s Old Testament. The remaining books were mainly revised with the proviso that war is an instrument of policy and its intensity varies in relation to its purpose. These are called Clausewitz’s New Testament (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 4 f.). Hence, it appears in no way safe to simply string together quotations from various chapters and different stages of reflection. A way out of this dilemma is offered by the introductory chapter to Book One, in which Clausewitz merges the theory of war into an overarching coordinate system known as the Fascinating Trinity. It contains an answer to the question of what war is. A practical-minded reader, however, will never find a clear answer to it due to the density of the dichotomous statements and the implementation of Hegel’s logic of being, essence and concept in Chap. 3. In Chap. 4, Clausewitz examines purpose and means in war, establishing a link to the topic of military genius addressed in Chap. 5 before turning to danger in war, the physical exertion and intelligence and their effects in the form of friction. All the following books are written in a descending order, corresponding to the hierarchy regarding matters of war: the theory of war, strategy, the engagement, military forces, defence and the attack. Book Eight, War Plans, breaks with this taxonomy, raising war to the level of society’s understanding of politics. The different stages of work on the manuscript On War and the different insights are supposed to be merged to form a holistic theory of war. This was certainly the intent Clausewitz outlines at the beginning of it. Intensive study of all the eight books is therefore required to fathom Clausewitz’s way of thinking and ideas of war. Other hindrances to understanding the work are the profound argumentation, the evaluation and the precision of the terms used. “Once again, we must remind the reader that, in order to lend clarity, distinction, and emphasis to our ideas, only perfect contrasts, the extremes of the spectrum, have been included in our observations. As an actual occurrence, war generally falls somewhere in between, and is influenced by these extremes only to the extent to which it approaches them” (On War, 517). Clausewitz is guided in his dichotomous logic by contemporary philosophers (see Chap. 4). He frames his findings in the diction of a scholar of military science and a Prussian general staff officer of the early nineteenth century. This is why quite a number of theoretical terms, logical justifications and historical examples are interpreted and assessed from today’s point of view in a way that might not exactly reflect Clausewitz’s ideas (Cf. Aron, 1980a, b, 30 f.). And yet, the contexts in which his terms are used and hierarchy in which terms such as strategy, tactics, primacy of

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politics, attack and defence, culminating point, center of gravity form the terminological basis used for war studies to this day. Clausewitz wrote the Old Testament as an idealist and the New Testament as a realist. As a pragmatist, he stipulates a radical change in the classification of the nature of war—but many idealistic ideas on the lineaments of war remain valid. What it says in the unrevised books about engagements, the concept of frictions, probability and chance, danger, physical exertion, military genius, the interaction of material and mental forces and the superiority of defence over the attack remain fully applicable in essence. Hence, the New Testament renders it easier to understand the work and is not meant to correct or replace it. Concentrating on the basic features of Clausewitz’s theory also helps to overcome many a difficulty. Only when the gist and characteristics of the arguments, principles and recommendations for action have been revealed will it be possible to draw conclusions that remain valid for strategic thinking for all times.

Content Clausewitz’s work is meant to merge subjective knowledge with universal findings. His scientific analyses focus on historical studies both on Frederick the Great and Napoleon I and on the military campaigns of Gustav II Adolf and Charles XII. His reason-driven study of sources, profound interpretation, search for objective truth, analytical approach, philosophical way of thinking and conclusions offer new angles from which to evaluate war as part of social life. He examines the essence of the phenomena of war to see whether its features and constitutive elements form a coordinate system. On War arranges them in eight books, describes the difficulties they involve and only starts searching for a solution to them after prudently handling possible objections. Rather than seeking facile procedural formulas for or manuals on waging war, Clausewitz develops a method of thinking about violent and risky conflicts that take account of the strength of mind (Seelenstärke). In his studies of numerous campaigns, Clausewitz identifies characteristics common to all wars that are applicable forever. At the end of the chapter entitled Types of Resistance, he writes: We should like to add that this chapter, more than any other of our work, shows that our aim is not to provide new principles and methods of conducting war; rather, we are concerned with examining the essential content of what has long existed, and to trace it back to its basic elements (On War, 389).

An autodidact, Clausewitz analyses all the aspects of war he deems important and puts them into relation with each other. Observing the phenomena of war, he reviews and reflects on them, carefully weighs the advantages and disadvantages from all angles and finally frames his conclusions in a manner void of any apodictic dogma. This is why access to the parts of his work can only be gained studying it as a whole. In an article on the subject of introductory literature on the history and study of On

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War, Hahlweg finds these words to characterise this approach: “Only seldom will he render his true opinion in a sentence. Instead, each sentence has its anti-sentence, which one then not only must seek, but also find” (Woermann, 1970, 3). A key to Clausewitz’s argument is his way of approaching topics by contrasting opposites and looking how they interact. He characterises abstract war as an outcome of extreme interaction, the actual course of a war as the mutual endeavour to not only thwart any action by the opponent, but also to reverse it to its opposite, and war as lying in the interaction between the attack and defence (Cf. Herberg-Rothe, 2000, 64). Clausewitz uses the term “interaction” (Wechselwirkung) 37 times in his work. Following Clausewitz’s dichotomous lines of thoughts renders war’s innermost connections visible and its grammar clear. Looking at the form and content of Clausewitz’s work, it can be said that his interpretation of war is complete and conclusive. In comparison, unfinished musical masterpieces such as Beethoven’s 10th Symphony or Schubert’s Symphony in H Minor are just fragments of complete works. In contrast, Clausewitz’s work should be received as an opus that constitutes a balanced assortment of what are in some cases contradictory ideas and is unfinished and not fully phrased, but on no account incomplete (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 7 f.). As further illustrated later in the practical discussion part of this book, the result is a genuinely profitable insight into an important area of social life, war. In the end, the core requirement for understanding communities, cultures, social conflicts and political conditions remains a sound general education. Goethe says this about the result of education: “Every education is a prison to whose iron bars passers-by take annoyance, to whose walls they can take offence, the learner, the imprisoned, takes offence, but the result is truly gained liberty” (Dobel, 1991, 76). This education counters imperial megalomania, power-political egocentrism or pure functionalism and fosters political, cultural, religious and legal tolerance of others in their otherness.

Historical Studies On War is based on detailed studies of over 130 campaigns and numerous wars. Clausewitz scrutinises them for causes and pivotal factors and eyes the acting commanders who have a key influence on the course of military events. In order to cast a light on the intricate connections, he chooses to use a level of theoretical abstraction to comprehend and assess the wars proper, justifying this approach with the aid of philosophical insight. He is successful in his intent, which is a key to the quality of his findings on war. It is not Clausewitz’s way of proceeding to use historical studies for delving into military events and issue guidance on them. His aim is rather to provide insights, explain interrelations and identify individual phenomena of great significance and the influence of moral factors in war. With a wealth of ideas, great commanders have in the past developed unique capabilities for reducing the many complexities of a

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war to simple, fitting characteristics, for defining their own stances, for making prudent decisions and for acting with courage, resolve and determination. Clausewitz notably sees a need for these outstanding capabilities in a frictional environment. If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. The first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup d’œil; the second is determination (On War, 102).

The demand made by Albert Einstein for highly complicated physical processes to be understood in their essence, for them to be explained in simple words and for answers to be sought to questions that arise during research can be considered an analogous guide. Unlike physics, however, war is void of any repetitive process or formula-based dependencies. Each war is unique in its nature and cannot be replicated in a laboratory experiment or a military manoeuvre. The observance of the principles of warfare is extremely easy. “Learning and profound knowledge are certainly not necessary here, not even great intellectual qualities” (Vom Kriege, 1079). This argument seems to undermine methodical work on Clausewitz aimed at improving strategic capabilities. This assessment reveals the duel Clausewitz fights in his work. Due to all of his historical studies, he has worked his way to the essence of war and develops it by resorting, in accordance with the theory of action, to the concept of interpersonal interaction that can be applied to major parts of social life. He uses the scientific method to identify and comprehend social structures and courses of action and discovers that the principles underlying the art of warfare as such are extremely simply (ibid.). Certainly, Clausewitz attributes little importance to the value of principles of warfare, as opposed to warfare itself. The essence of war, the tendencies and characteristics prevailing in it, the action and counter-action taken by the belligerent actors under the pressure inherent in probability and chance for the purpose of implementing an overarching policy are the aspects that are of interest to him, as he hopes they will be revealing. Clausewitz demands the commander to respond to the complex dynamics of war by harmoniously combining his powers with a high degree of virtuosity, and appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament (Cf. On War, 100). Some lines further down the text, he becomes more precise and used the word in a meaning in which “genius” refers to a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation” (ibid.). In his historical studies, Clausewitz realises the importance of the acting commanders and the tendencies and characteristics inherent in war. He accounts for them by way of a theory of elements in which the moral qualities and virtues of the army constitute a unique trait, unlike as in other war theories. He expects the reader to find his revolutionary main ideas if he does not fail to recognise the “fruit of years of reflection on war and diligent study of it” (On War, 70). He expects the reader to understand them in the reality of being and to implement them. The historical studies

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provide Clausewitz a way of looking into war that is revealing. They also indicate the benefit that can be gained from history in the present day.

Cause and Effect Clausewitz’s ideas on cause and effect (Ursache und Wirkung) must fundamentally be seen in the context of the relation between purpose and means. After all, this relation establishes the lines along which his in-depth argument about war develops. “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will . . .” (Italics in On War, 75) “Force––that is, physical force, . . . is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; . . .” (ibid.) The characterising feature of war is the purposeful use of means. They are used in a weighted manner to render the enemy powerless. The realisation that war is an instrument for the continuation of policy by other means reflects the ideas of Machiavelli formulated in Il Principe in 1513. He ties war to policy at his last level of reflection, but this does not mean a decisive change in the view of war—sui generis—or warfare. Once the purpose of a war has been established, the strategist’s primary task is to assess the means required for it. In Poetry and Truth, (Part III, Book Twelve) Goethe concludes: “. . . a fundamental defect which is common to the general run of human undertakings [is that] insufficient means were applied to a great end” (Dobel, 1991, 1106, authors parenthesis). The repeated use of the purpose and means axiom is a key characteristic of Clausewitz’s method of philosophy and not so much, as Echevarria II postulates, the strand that runs through his complete work (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 5 f.). The relation between purpose and means is used to make the first differentiation in the synthesis of the prevailing tendencies in the overall phenomenon of war. Clausewitz expands this relation to encompass purpose, objective and means (Cf. Beckmann 2011, 109). He defines strategy as “the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war” (On War, 177). He sees combat as the key element for his development of the theory of war and analyses the objectives and means with which it can be won, before finishing by weighing defence and attack against each other. He concludes by making an important statement about the magnitude of the military purpose and the action required to achieve it. The revolutionary system is Clausewitz’s way of looking at cause and effect in the context of warfare. As elaborated later in this chapter, the purpose does not despotically prescribe what means are used, but must be seen as being dynamically interrelated with them. The purpose is the cause of a war and determines the objectives and the means deemed appropriate. Any change in the way the war is waged or the means used can lead to an adjustment of the purpose. It is the end that determines the means and not the means the end. Clausewitz takes up Goethe’s idea of the strand in Elective Affinities: “There is only one means in war: combat. But the multiplicity of forms combat assumes leads

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us in as many different directions as are created by the multiplicity of aims, so that our analysis does not seem to have made any progress. But that is not so: the fact that only one means exists constitutes a strand that runs through the entire web of military activity and really holds it together” (On War, 96). Now, combat really does prove to be the strand of Clausewitz’s theory of war. Without combat, there would be no strategy, no military genius, no danger and no frictions. By focusing on combat, Clausewitz succeeds in linking cause and effect, purpose and means and probability and chance with a creative spirit in his analysis of war. He refutes the geometric and mechanistic ways of thinking of his contemporaries with empirical reality. Looking at his theory as a deductive whole reveals that the transformational road to knowledge from existential to instrumental war, as Herberg-Rothe explains in his book entitled Clausewitz’s Puzzle, is an important epistemological pointer. As far as Clausewitz is concerned, the strand concerning his empiricism is constituted by the purpose, objective and means, the one concerning his complete work by strategy and the one concerning his analysis of war solely by combat.

Philosophical Consideration In order to establish a synergetic link between scientific theory and practice, Clausewitz selects an approach, as discussed before, by which he begins by looking at the subject as a whole, breaks it down in individual components and finally looks at it as a whole again. The structural elements used are the appropriateness of means, the relations between the purpose, object and means, frictions, the moral qualities of the commander and the virtues of his army. One of the basic features of On War is the developing of critical judgement. The synthesis of his findings on war is summed up in the Fascinating Trinity and forms an all-encompassing firmament that covers every war and its characteristics. Clausewitz demands that philosophy be used as a method of thinking and a tool of knowledge. He argues that only with philosophy is it possible to comprehend a phenomenon and verify theories—that is to say, to establish a unity between ideas and reality. As a result of comprehensive historical studies, he succeeds in grasping war in its complexity as a whole and comprehending it in a structured way. This is the only way to understand the dynamic processes in war and “the elements which prompt combat and give it its special form—society, economics, technology [and] politics” (Paret, 2008, 3). This holistic endeavour to understand the primacy of the whole over its individual parts is an Aristotelian paradigm and characteristic of German idealism. It is furthermore a peculiarity of Hegel’s philosophy and reflects the view expressed by Goethe, a contemporary, in Faust, Part One. Strategic action should only be required to comply with the primacy of the whole, the principles of independent reasoning, rational and metaphysical analysis, ethical self-commitment and the morals.

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Clausewitz’s method of thinking is based on the depth and analysis of his experience and enables him to recognise the nature of change and reflect it in his deliberation in the Fascinating Trinity. Unlike Kant and Hegel, however, Clausewitz does not leave us a consistent compendium, but rather a vast amount of material at very different stages of editing which he diligently collected over years. Interpreting Clausewitz’s theory is not easy due to his nineteenth century terminology, the methodological dichotomy in his argumentation and the profundity and detail of his findings. Anyone studying Clausewitz’s strategy theory will therefore highly benefit from starting by familiarising themselves with his argumentation by means of complementary pairs of terms and his basic ideas, which are combined into a whole by his key statements. This must be borne in mind in the hermeneutic approximation to the heart of his work. It is also necessary to fathom Carl von Clausewitz’s terminology, his understanding both of war and politics and theory and practice and the pith of his work. The effort is worthwhile since we to this day base our thinking on some of Clausewitz’s terms, among them policy, strategy and tactics as well as attack and defence, and understanding complex conflictory processes is an important basis for developing strategies. Fathoming Clausewitz’s ideas is an educational process that is important for grasping and handling wars. Because of the fundamentals of action theory, Clausewitz’s revealing research is applicable to all the areas of civil society in which conflicts between people in large organisations are decided at national or international level. The process of comprehending the basic features of Clausewitz’s begins with the identification of a selection of terms and elements of his theory and a discussion of the connections between them. The theory gives priority to the absolute form of war and makes that form a reference point of which sight must never be lost (Cf. On War, 581). It demands that the character and scale of every war be understood holistically. The closer these political probabilities drive war towards the absolute . . . the more imperative the need “not to take the first step without considering the last” (On War, 584). Qualifying a war as absolute or real due to the inherent tendencies and characteristics requires an accurate assessment to be made of the individual factors and the general circumstances. Theoretical war serves as the reference point for maintaining sight of the whole. “We can thus only say that the aims a belligerent adopts, and the resources he employs, must be governed by the particular characteristics of his own position; but they will also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character. Finally, they must always be governed by the general conclusions to be drawn from the nature of war itself” (On War, 594). Clausewitz succeeds in uniting all wars in one concept and subordinating them to politics as instruments enabling the continuation of political intercourse with the involvement of other means (Cf. Herberg-Rothe, 2001, 97). Using Clausewitz’s interpretation to intensify the process of gaining insight into twenty-first century wars, we delve into his terminology and discuss the role of politics in relation to war and peace, the different types of wars and war as an instrument of policy. Building on Clausewitz’s ideas of theory and practice—and

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digressing to the relationship between Clausewitz and Jomini—we move on to the field of strategy and end with war plans. These considerations form the basis of a government’s responsibility towards the armed forces, its possible courses of action and its control of the military in the twenty-first century. At the same time, Carl von Clausewitz’s way of thinking offers a rational justification for the armed forces’ participation in the making of decisions and planning of action in war. On War is a subject of international study and is a fixture in university education. Judging from how it is debated in our time, it can be said to be only touched upon. The resulting strategy deficits are striking, pervading all spheres of politics, business and public life. The priority today seems to be on understanding and applying Clausewitz’s methodology to reduce complexity and structure the achievement of results.

Politics, War and Peace Woermann begins his analysis of Clausewitz’s On War by examining the terms politics, war and peace (Cf. Woermann, 2007, 16). In compliance with the philosophy of classical rationalism, he argues that the pith of Clausewitz’s writings can only be understood correctly if—building on clear definitions—insight and ways of thinking are acquired for taking action at a specific time and with the respective means. Clearly defined terminology is a key element of scientific truth (Cf. Hegel, 1952, 12). Misconception of the dichotomy of the terms politics and war leads nowhere, certainly not to scientific truth. To enable the essence of the terms politics, war and peace to be understood correctly, Woermann applies the principles of Kant’s logic and rule of categorical syllogisms, speaking of genuses and species in order to make a distinction. Policy as a genus is above peace and war as species in the terminology hierarchy (see Fig. 6.2). According to the rule dictum de omni et nullo, which states that whatever is affirmed or denied of a whole genus or species may be affirmed or denied of any subclass or subtype. With the aid of this distinction is it possible to succeed in identifying and correcting serious errors in the interpretation of the pith of Clausewitz’s writings in a manner that is logically consistent and philosophically justified (Cf. Woermann, 2007, 16 ff.).

Genus

Species

Fig. 6.2 Politics, war and peace

Politics

Peace

War

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All of Carl von Clausewitz’s thoughts are initially focussed on combat. After closely studying and assessing past campaigns—specifically those of Frederick the Great and Napoleon I—, he identifies recurring features, tendencies and characteristics and puts them into relation with each other. Eventually, he recognises basic elements and features and condenses them into principles. The Fascinating Trinity is the crowning synthesis of all the tendencies and findings on the topic of war. It builds upon a complex structure of terms that have to be comprehended one by one. Firstly, Clausewitz’s work contains no term that is as vague and contradictory as frictions, which is indeed almost nebulous (see Chap. 5). Clausewitz spots the often decisive influence of events that turn an absolute or theoretical war into a real one. To combat frictions, he develops the concept of the moral qualities and virtues of the commander, who uses his ability to counter them and weaken or neutralise their effects. Secondly, Clausewitz by any means imagines that military decisions should be left to be made solely on the basis of the intellect and prudence of commanders. He introduces the concept of the primacy of politics, which stipulates the military purpose, has a crucial influence in all the phases of a war and guides the development of the strategy and the corresponding war plan. Clausewitz does not consider that war is an end in itself, but—with peace in the end state—that it only serves political purposes from which intermediate and ultimate operational objectives are derived. The means required to achieve the political purpose and the military objectives must be provided by the government. In connection with his thoughts on this subject, Clausewitz also issues an unequivocal call for the government and the armed forces to collaborate and frames the responsibilities they share. Despite the dominance of the government’s assessments, Clausewitz does not see their influence as being unconditionally dictatorial. Paret writes that politics is not only a key element of Clausewitz’s theory on war, but also a pivotal element in the origination and development of that theory (Cf. Paret, 1980b, 336). This stipulation binds politics into the origination and development of war from the very beginning. War is an instrument of the government. The result—even from today’s point of view—is a very stringent concept of the government and the armed forces. As it is highly important for the formulation of a strategy that the government and the armed forces remain in close and critical dialogue—proceeding from a joint assessment of the situation—, both sides must observe rights and duties. This realisation is based on clear terminology and correct concepts of the government, the armed forces and the primacy of policy. A third aspect of Clausewitz’s findings is important in this context. It imposes tight limits on the applicability of his theory in a real war. Clausewitz interprets war itself as a dynamic conflict between two antagonists, referring to them as will and counter-will. A commander plans and executes his operations in war with the objective of defeating the opponent’s forces. This means that he wants to impose his will on the opponent and convince him of the futility of his undertaking. The opposing commander plans to do the same. What follows is a free play of forces whose final outcome decides over victory and defeat (Cf. Strickmann, 2008, 54 f.).

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Fourthly, the function of plans is limited. Each war demands an overarching political purpose to be identified, intermediate and ultimate objectives to be set and means to be provided. Once a war has started, the plan for it only proves effective in an ideal case, one in which the war can be ended quickly, with a single strike and the achievement of the outcome. In reality, however, a war drags on, sometimes for decades. The longer a war drags on and the more forces explode in it, the less important its purpose becomes and the less effective the war and campaign plans prove. While they are binding for all preparations up to the deployment phase—the work of establishing, equipping, supplying, training and stationing an army—, no plan can be made for a war in itself. A war plan changes in importance from a strict order to a mission upon the commencement of hostilities. Developing a war plan serves to hone the commander’s judgement in specific scenarios. Until hostilities begin, the plan is executed in accordance with a strict set of rules for the purpose of moving the troop contingents required, with the appropriate reaction capability, fighting strength and sustainability, into position at the right time and place. A commander’s adherence to a war plan braces him for the first impacts of probability, chance and frictions. Hence, a war plan retains its binding character beyond the commencement of hostilities. This leads to a fifth aspect. In the dynamic play of forces, it is the commander who decides over victory and defeat by the way in which he uses all his knowledge and skill to employ the means provided to achieve the military objectives assigned to him as a result of the political purpose defined. This assessment is particularly important in protracted low-intensity wars. Clausewitz presupposes that a commander’s skills are the result of a well-founded education and moral integrity. He calls for commanders to undergo a form of training in theory that begins and ends in practice. It must by no means be limited to specific military aspects. He believes that a commander should be able to really understand war, with all its tendencies and characteristics, in its essence and to appreciate how it is connected with politics. Only then will he succeed in navigating this minefield and accomplishing political purposes. According to Werner Hahlweg, Clausewitz’s work conveys an educational programme, creates clear concepts, enables the mind to grasp how things interconnect and provides standards for forming a judgement (Cf. Vom Kriege, 8 f.). Clausewitz supports the “training of the mind in the recognition and autonomous assessment of war and its characteristics in their entirety” (ibid.). He highlights aspects of a necessary and general nature in war in his theory and provides room for manoeuvre for dealing with aspects of an exceptional and chance nature (Cf. Vom Kriege, 1033). Clausewitz realises that the way in which a war is waged cannot be laid down deterministically for all times, but that it changes with the prevailing political and societal conditions and the circumstances of the day.

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War, Little War and People’s War War was defined very broadly at the beginning. In an addendum to his main work, Clausewitz writes: “War is a combination of actions guided and merged together by the mind that consists of an infinite number of parts that are not effective in themselves, but only within the overall plan” (von Clausewitz, 1990, 661). He also writes that war is “incomplete and self-contradictory, it cannot follow its own laws, but has to be treated as a part of some other whole; the name of which is policy” (On War, 606) War must be seen mathematically as a system of numerous independent variables that, forming a chaotic whole, make it difficult to find any solution. Clausewitz conceives war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (On War, 75). In the dynamic play of action and counteraction, the opponent is seen as acting rational in his rationally and at an equivalent level of abstraction. The term war covers a broad spectrum of military operations ranging from conducting armed observation to all—out fighting war of defeat. Referring to the most extreme outcome, Clausewitz writes that the “defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date” (On War, 80). This assessment can moderate the degree of force and exertion involved. Clausewitz highlights the importance of a peace treaty after a war has ended, stating “that not every war necessarily leads to a final decision and settlement. But even if hostilities should occur again, a peace treaty will always extinguish a mass of sparks that might have gone on quietly smouldering. Further, tensions are slackened, for lovers of peace [. . .] will then abandon any thought of further action. Be that as it may, we must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the purpose of the war has been achieved and its business is at an end” (On War, 90 f.). War is not an independent thing, but an instrument of policy. It assigns force as a means to an end that is stipulated. Policy subordinates force to reason and does not cease to restrict the unleashing of force (Cf. Aron, 1980a, 154). This functional assignment allows the differences in the motives for waging war, the objectives set, the decisions made and the courses it takes to be distinguished. The purpose of a war is to expand or defend territory—which includes dictating the social, religious and cultural ways of life of the people living there. A successful war ends with a balance of power that permanently safeguards the outcome achieved by the assertion of interests by force. In other words, failure to peacefully reconcile interests leads to war and produces new political, military and psychological conditions with a dynamism of their own. Consequently, a war should always be grasped and assessed in a way that takes account of its holistic characteristics and the end state.

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Absolute War and Limited War One method of deciding the outcome of a war is to destroy the opponent’s forces. Another is to bring about a situation in which the opponent realises that he can only achieve his objectives if he uses an unreasonable amount of means and accepts unjustifiable losses, if indeed then. The first form of war affects the very existence of peoples and is defined by powerful motives and extreme force. The more the destruction of the enemy becomes the central issue and the more the military aim and political object coincide, the more war approaches its abstract form. The more military and less political it appears to be (Cf. On War, 88). Contrary in its substance, Clausewitz defines the second form of war thus: “On the other hand, the less intense the motives, [. . .] war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character” (ibid.). This second type of limited war does not end in a decisive battle and is more limited in nature. Without being defeated and rendered powerless, the enemy is brought to the negotiating table to conclude a peace treaty either by diplomatic and indirect means or by conquering areas in the border regions of his empire. Both types of wars, which can be fought at all the levels of intensity possible, ranging from extreme force to non-military exertion of influence are equally political in nature since “they derive from political intentions and passions and express the importance of the interests at stake” (Aron, 1980b, 49). Finally, it is possible to deviously bring about decisions that allow warring parties to achieve their objectives without a fight. As laid out in the first chapter of this study, Sun Tzu calls subjugating an opponent without a fight a prudent war objective. The outcome of a war can be decided in a variety of ways (Cf. Stahel, 2004, 21 f.). In theory, the common objectives that statesmen and commanders pursue have political, economic, military, diplomatic and domestic dimensions. Hence, it is necessary for the army command to have close ties with the government and aims of a country if war is to be waged purposefully. The dichotomy of the two types of wars renders it easier to comprehend them. In general, war is an act of force to compel a desired end state to be established. In a situation where action is reciprocal, the result must be enforced against an equal opponent in an atmosphere of danger, physical exertion, uncertainty and chance. To reduce the complexity of this matter, Clausewitz formulates an allegory of two wrestlers who each strive to floor their opponent and rob him of any chance to continue his resistance. In abstract war, there are no limits to the degree to which force can be used to defeat the opponent and assert one’s own will. For example, each party strives to impose terms on the other or, to put it another way, every move by the opponent is blocked and reversed. What ensues is a state of unlimited force. Every duel has a purpose that lies beyond the battle. In this trial of strength, the upper hand is held by the side that fights ruthlessly and unrestrictedly, that pre-empts the other party in the use of extreme force and that is greater in strength than the means at the disposal of the opponent multiplied by his willpower. Both sides’ endeavour to

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defeat the opponent and avoid being defeated themselves thwarts any chance of limiting the intensity of the force applied (Cf. Smith, 2004, 8 ff.). This is especially true because every abstract war is characterised by three cases of interaction that lead to different extremes (Cf. On War, 75ff.). The first case of interaction: The use of force in war has a tendency to escalate. If one side increase its efforts, the other side will react likewise. The opponents will outdo each other in their use of force, which has a tendency to go to extremes. The second case of interaction: My opponent is able to defeat me until he has been defeated. The aim is therefore to manoeuvre the opponent into a situation that is more disadvantageous than the sacrifice that is demanded from him and he gives up. The third case of interaction: The power of resistance of the belligerents is equal to the product of the sum of the total means at their disposal and the strength of their will. Inferiority in terms of means can be compensated by the power of a will. The tendency to go to extremes results from a lack of knowledge of the opponent’s power of resistance. These three cases of interaction accelerate escalation to extremes, the absolute maximum being reached when all means of force are used at the same time. They are characteristic of absolute war, whose core element is extreme force. It is never waged in the real world because it does not follow the laws of logic. Clausewitz does not consider it a form of war, but rather a dichotomous antipole, an abstraction for developing war in reality: “A theory, then, that dealt exclusively with absolute war would either have to ignore any case in which the nature of war had been deformed by outside influence, or else it would have to dismiss them all as misconstrued” (On War, 593). Clausewitz uses these abstract thoughts to compose the image of the two wrestlers to describe actual war. He first adds the factor of time, then the influence of probability and chance on real events and, finally, the political purpose. In the real world, all wars are subject to these limiting factors since they cannot be decided at one place, with a single move and in one moment. “So the theorist must scrutinize all data with an inquiring, a discriminating, and a classifying eye. He must always bear in mind the wide variety of situations that can lead to war. If he does, he will draw the outline of its salient features in such a way that it can accommodate both the dictates of the age, and those of the immediate situation” (On War, 593 f.). Every war is subject to friction with respect to both its objective and the effort it requires. “We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means” (On War, 87). Events in a limited war are subject to moderating interaction due to the influence of probability and chance. The objectives are set and the required means allocated on the basis of a rational definition of the purpose. A framework is established to prevent limits being removed and war being taken to its extreme. Despite this, the dynamics of warfare permit little control since probability and chance create numerous variables that render it more intense than planned or less so. In real war, many

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frictions arise that confine the scope of action or expand it to allow the creative spirit to roam free.

Conclusions The dichotomy of absolute war and limited war is one of the core ideas in Clausewitz’s theory and serves to accentuate the characteristics of war. The result is that there are three variables to each type of war: rational purpose, primordial violence and freely roaming creative spirit; together, they define a three-dimensional space. “It is not a triad but a trinity: not just three related elements, but three parts of one whole” (Strachan, 2007a, 30). The relations between these three interactions in space do not form a mathematically tangible triad, but a trinity. Clausewitz considers war a reciprocal, dynamic relationship between acts and means. It follows its own grammar, but not its own logic of its own. The longer a war goes on, the more intensively probability and chance alter the individual tendencies and the relations between them. A common characteristic of war is the violent use of means for an overarching purpose. Traditionally speaking, wars are fought between states or—as civil wars— within them. It is more difficult to justify the use of the term war to denote the war on international islamistic terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime. Clausewitz uses the term war to denote a broad spectrum of conflicts engaged in for political purposes: • The establishment of a demonstrative military presence and exertion of influence on an opponent’s decisions by way of armed observation. • The conduct of combat operations by small military units in peripheral provinces. • The use of large armies in pitched battles. War ranges from the use of cooperation to coercion in the trial of military strength to achieve objectives. Its abstract theory essentially holds true for all conflicts in society in which the parties involved go to great lengths and take high risks to prevail, as in business, for example. Almost contrary to the inductive reasoning behind the definition of war, Clausewitz develops the idea of limited means. A commander facing an overwhelmingly powerful enemy or occupying power would seemingly have no prospect of defeating them in a pitched battle and then imposing his will on them. In this context, Clausewitz differentiates between the methods used in a little war and a people’s war. It must be borne in mind, however, that many of the world’s wars have begun as little wars and have only been classified as large-scale wars in retrospect.

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The Little War and People’s War In little wars, highly mobile detachments of between 20 and 400 regular troops operate in specific areas and for limited periods of time, mostly on the periphery of large-scale enemy operations. With the support of the people, these wars are primarily fought by small mobile units in mountainous terrain, marshlands and wooded country (Cf. On War, 349). Being one of many components involved in a major war, these detachments reconnoitre superior opposing forces, attack outposts, demolish bridges, destroy depots and disrupt supply lines. They contain opposing forces across the theatre and prevent them from advancing quickly by stalling them or engaging them in ambushes and guerrilla-style attack operations. Superior opposing forces are worn down over time with the objective of making them abandon their plans. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the little war evolved into the petit guerre or guerrilla warfare (Cf. Stahel, 2004, 120 ff.). Around 1750, 20% of the troops in the French army were trained specifically for conducting reconnaissance, patrols, commando operations and ambushes as light infantry (Cf. Kinross, 2004, 37). Teaching at the Allgemeine Kriegsschule (General War School) in 1810 and 1811, Clausewitz did research on the little war and held numerous detailed lectures on it. The troops deployed in little wars were regular units, also referred to as partisans. “The state of encampment was considered to have little connection with the actual state of war, as is proved by the expression, ‘il va à la guerre’, which was used to describe a patrol setting out from camp to observe the enemy” (On War, 298). According to Werner Hahlweg, it was at that time that Clausewitz began his studies on guerrilla warfare and developed his ideas of a general uprising, which are described in Book Six (On War, 479 ff.). “In his lectures, he vividly sought to provide his audience with a realistic picture of guerrilla warfare in practice” (Hahlweg, 1980a, 350). His theory on the little war adopts elements from Napoleonic warfare, which features small highly mobile units which can easily hide, quickly march and in which each soldier is highly motivated to face the dangers (Cf. Paret, 2010). In his Bekenntnisniederschrift (Memorial of Confession) of 1812, Clausewitz enlarges upon the petit guerre school of thought and calls for bourgeois officers to lead a Volkssturm (Prussian popular uprising) against the French occupation. He identifies geographical, strategic and psychological conditions that have to be met for a people’s war: The following are the only conditions under which a general uprising can be effective: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The war must be fought in the interior of the country. It must not be decided by a single stroke. The theatre of operations must be fairly large. The national character must be suited to that type of war. The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, or forests, marshes, or the local methods of cultivation (On War, 480).

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To be successful, a people’s war must be fought locally over a vast area which is intersected by mountains, forests and marshlands, with direct confrontation with a superior opponent being avoided and use being made of the local people’s moral support. It directs the combined effects of a protracted war at an invading army or occupying force. “Like smoldering embers, it consumes the basic foundations of the enemy forces” (ibid.). The aim is to exhaust the enemy’s physical strength and break his will by mounting stalling patriotic resistance. A general uprising, as we see it, should be nebulous and elusive; its resistance should never materialize as a concrete body, otherwise the enemy can direct sufficient force at its core, crush it, and take many prisoners. When that happens, the people will lose heart and, believing that the issue has been decided and further efforts would be useless, drop their weapons (On War, 481).

It is not service in a conscript army far from home, but the irregular defence of one’s country against an occupying force that becomes a patriotic civic duty. In such an uprising—a war fought by the people—, “there must be some concentration at certain points: the fog must thicken and form a dark and menacing cloud out of which a bolt of lightning may strike at any time. These points for concentration will, as we have said, lie mainly on the flanks of the enemy’s theatre of operations” (ibid.). Due to the geographical conditions in which it is fought, its duration and the influence of the national character, a people’s war certainly makes it more difficult for the occupying power to successfully fight the main leaders and influence public opinion and requires additional effort and means have to be expended over a long period of time.

Conclusions Clausewitz’s ideas on the people’s war were significantly influenced by Gneisenau, who closely witnessed the final outcome of the fight of the 13 North American colonies against British colonial rule in 1782 and 1783. In twentieth century literature, the people’s war mutates into a national struggle for liberation. Important targets for guerrilla attacks are colonial regimes, state institutions and occupying forces within the occupied countries. The objective is to fight these entities relentlessly and destroy them wherever possible. The idea is for the opponents to be denied control of the countries and eventually forced to pull out. National struggles for liberation aim to achieve total political success and finally culminate in their most relentless form in Algeria (1954–1962) and in Vietnam (1965–1975) (Cf. Hahlweg, 1967, 159). Besides struggles for liberation against colonial regimes, Russia and later China see the emergence of the revolutionary war as an offensive instrument of power of the communist world revolution (Cf. Daase, 2007, 182 ff.). This form of war is directed against capitalist societies and their representatives and aims to enforce ideological visions by means of force. It seeks to liquidate all of its opponents and start a Marxist world revolution. Engels, Lenin, Mao and Che Guevara carefully studied Clausewitz’s theory on war and based their ideas of the

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revolutionary class struggle on it. “This form of war is practically political” (Hahlweg, 1973, 90; cf. 160 f.). Clausewitz’s theory on war is hence broader than his critics—for example, van Creveld—are prepared to admit (Cf. Münkler, 2002a, b, 89). As the level of abstraction rises, war no longer compels force to be used by definition and becomes a true instrument of policy. By generalising the concept of war, Clausewitz succeeds in replacing the strategic interpretation with a political one that allows such concepts to be defined as the relations between the purpose, objective and means, the appropriateness of means, frictions and the commander’s moral qualities. The individual characteristics of a war determine what means are appropriate in the light of the prevailing general conditions, conclusions and the nature of war itself (Cf. On War, 594). Since the basic features of Clausewitz’s theory are permeated by these general conclusions, it can also be applied to grasp the essence of the revolutionary war at its current stage of development. Nowhere in Clausewitz’s work are the lapse of time and the changes in the forms of war more visible than in the chapters on the people’s war. Such a war was not a matter that occurred to the privileged nobility in the estate-based society in the early nineteenth century. In the twenty-first century, global Jihad and Islamist terrorism are major forms of war. The opponents are self-proclaimed “holy warriors”, who see war less as part of Islam’s religious teachings and more as a violent militant struggle to establish Islamic rule. The overwhelming share of their attacks in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan cause the most casualties among the Muslim civilian population. Even though this approach is hard to understand, the Jihadists’ ends, logic and actions can be identified and fathomed with the pith of Clausewitz’s theory (see example in Chap. 8). The crucial element is the methodology of the approach that remains focused on the nature of war. It quickly becomes clear that in the Jihadists’ logic, the natures of a conflict follows the course determined by the basic features of will and counter-will in a field of the Fascinating Trinity, the appropriateness of means and the relations between the purpose, objective and means. Clausewitz’s method of analysing war is therefore still relevant in the twenty-first century. As things are, this analysis of war can only be rejected by people who are backward-looking in the way they think and do things. The little war, peoples’ war and revolutionary war provide important pointers for developing strategies and are examined in more detail in the following chapters. As critics say that today’s strategies no longer work in hybrid wars, these types of wars form an important basis for the line of argument in the part of this study devoted to the application of Clausewitz’s findings.

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Primacy of Politics and War While a discussion of the connection between politics and war usually sees the issue being broken down deductively into individual elements, Clausewitz starts his examination of the topics by stating that “we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together” (On War, 75). In an addendum to his main work, Clausewitz writes: “War is a combination of actions that are guided and merged into one by the human mind. Although it consists of an infinite numbers of parts, none of them is effective on its own, but only within the plan for the whole” (Hahlweg, 1990, 661 f., quoted from Schmidt, 2007, 46). War is “incomplete and self-contradictory, it cannot follow its own laws, but has to be treated as a part of some other whole; the name of which is policy” (On War, 606). For Clausewitz, the spectrum of war ranges, as mentioned before, from an armed observation to the defeat of the enemy. “Once this influence of the political objective on war is admitted, as it must be, there is no stopping it; consequently we must also be willing to wage such minimal wars, which consist in merely threatening the enemy, with negotiations held in reserve” (On War, 604). The different degrees of intensity in warfare can only be recognised if the terms war and peace, which describe a species, are used subordinately to the term policy, which describes a genus.

War as an Instrument of Policy On War contains two statements on war as a continuation of policy, in the Note and in Book Eight, in which the emphasis differs, and they must be examined more closely. In the last book, Clausewitz has this to say about the relation between war and political intercourse: “[. . .] war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse [. . .]” (On War, 605; italics and bold face print added by author). This definition-related interpretation of the relation between war and policy centers on a normative integration of war into political intercourse and its subordination under it. It is a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means. The pith of this careful phrasing becomes even clearer when we replace the word is with should be or could be. Clausewitz underlines this association of war with political intercourse by using the qualifying phrase “with the addition of other means”. This suggests that there are still other ways in which politics can be continued and compensation for possible failures in war can be achieved in other fields of political intercourse.

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He reinforces this impression by establishing that “war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different” (On War, 605). With its main lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace, war forms only one political line. It is consequently politics with different means and is classified as subsidiary to continued political intercourse. War that is waged in addition to other political activities has little value and hardly allows a philosophical abstraction and analysis to be conducted on its core elements and characteristics and conclusions to be drawn on aspects up to and including the moral qualities of the commander and the virtues of his army. Clausewitz realised this when he was putting the finishing touches to On War. By the end of his studies on war, he changes the emphasis of his qualifying classification of war. In the Note, he chooses rigorous wording, writing “[. . .] that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” (On War, 69; bold face print added by author). In this quote, war is not one, but the continuation of policy. Any addition or qualification of war disappears with this wording. In a letter he writes to Major (GS) von Roeder on 22 December 1827, Clausewitz 5 months later underlines war’s function as a part of politics by distinctly emphasising the absolute domination of the political element in war and campaign plans (Cf. Vom Kriege, footnote 375). He focuses on the use of military force for the purpose of continuing policy under its primacy. This realisation is of great importance for understanding his work properly. In the final Book Eight, the framing of the relation between policy and war is more qualified and cautious. War is but one of many instruments of policy and is dominated by it in all its phases. On the other hand, the way it is framed in the Note, with war being described as nothing but the continuation of policy with other means, justifies an in-depth study of the relation between war and the continuation of policy that reveals numerous restrictions on the primacy of policy over war. Clausewitz recognises the interaction between dynamic courses of action in war and in politics: Political purposes are often changed entirely by war, and the weaker the motives and tensions, the more political he sees war. This realisation is of great importance in the assessment of war in relation to policy as it centers on the instruments with which the government can exert influence on the armed forces: strategy and the war and campaign plans. In Book One, Clausewitz states that policy guides the use of military force in war, “permeate all military operations, and, [. . .] have a continuous influence on them” (On War, 87). Policy determines the object of a war, when it starts, the intensity with which it is waged and when it ends. Clausewitz warns against reversing responsibilities and disassociating war from policy. “If that is so, then war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense” (On War, 605). It is time to [. . .] observe that while policy is apparently effaced in the one type of war and yet is strongly evident in the other, both kinds are equally political. If the state is thought of as a person, and policy as the product of its brain, then among the contingencies [. . .] is a war

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in which every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence. Only if politics is regarded [. . .] as it conventionally is—as cautious, devious, even dishonest, shying away from force, could the second type of war appear to be more “political” than the first (On War, 88).

Clausewitz stands by his concept of policy, which he sees as the product of the personified state’s brain. In contrast to Jomini, he has a profound grasp of the relation between policy and war and, in view of war’s complexity, calls for close cooperation between the government and the armed forces. He specifies that policy is fundamentally superior, but qualifies it in many respects and classifies it as an equal tendency in the Fascinating Trinity. This conditioned concept of policy allows us to now use his findings to resolve wars in the twenty-first century, as outlined in the part of my book devoted to their application.

Energy and Effort Clausewitz’s use of the terms means, degree of energy and effort is indicative of a further linguistic distinction he makes. “The political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires” (On War, 81, italics added by author). Clausewitz talks of effort and uses the terms means and degree of energy in the same context (Cf. On War, 115 ff. and 585 ff.) The means available must be appropriate for the purpose. Far more is meant by this term than just weapons and troops. Pursuing and attaining the object of a war requires great effort. If the object is redefined, the objectives, means and degree of energy must change accordingly. Every strategy starts with the specification of the overarching political purpose: What is meant to be achieved? The purpose is the foundation from which the objectives, the intermediate and ultimate objectives and the schedules are derived. The selection and provision of means and the definition of the degree of energy that is to be used and of the effort that is to be exerted must be seen as core elements of a strategy in relation to the political purpose. The strategy hence links political intercourse with the armed forces and determines the means and degree of energy that need to be provided. Since the political purpose cannot be achieved in a short time, the objectives are pursued in an interactive process in a frictional environment whose tendencies and characteristics are floating within the Fascinating Trinity. The effort required in the course of a war depends on the opponent’s resistance, which in turn is the product of the power of will multiplied by the amount of means involved. While means are tangible, the opponent’s mental strength can only be roughly estimated. Without the power of will or the right means, his power of resistance will wane. Things in war develop in a non-linear and dynamic way. The enemy’s counteractions are highly instrumental in altering the course of things. Taking account of their military, technical and organisational skills as well as the social, emotional and

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cultural forces, each party in a war develops a strategy in order to “define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose” (On War, 177). In the cited letter he wrote to Roeder in 1827, Clausewitz emphasises that all great strategic ideas are largely of a political nature. Yet, no matter how many guidelines a government issues, they are not sufficient to enable a full grasp to be gained either of the dynamic tendencies and the interaction with the opponent or of the influence of emotions and the handling of probability and chance in war. This is where Clausewitz expands his theory by adding the concept of the Fascinating Trinity, with which he succeeds in connecting the multidimensional phenomena of war in a holistic manner. War and campaign plans are needed to pursue political purposes. Clausewitz defines the war plan as something that evolves directly from political life in the two warring states and their relations with others. “The war plan evolves directly from the political life of the two belligerents as well as their relationships with other nations” (Vom Kriege, footnote 375). The war plan is the basis for the campaign plan, which is often identical to it when the war is confined to a single theatre. The campaign plan is also permeated by the political element. The result is that neither a purely political nor a purely military assessment is permissible (ibid.). War is, as said before, a continuation of political intercourse.

The Tasks of the Government and the Armed Forces Aron, the French theorist on strategy, makes a distinction between the objective and subjective dimensions of the concept of policy in Clausewitz’s work (Cf. HerbergRothe, 2004, 23 ff.). Aron regards the former as all a state’s socio-political relations and potentials that can be proven by facts and statistics. Defining the subjective side of policy, he quotes Clausewitz, who, writing that if the state is thought of as a person, sees “policy as the product of its brain” (On War, 88). It is a form of interaction that shows what can be achieved by policy, in what way and with what methods. Clausewitz remains rather vague in his depiction of the political decisionmaking level he has in mind and uses both dimensions of the concept of policy, indeed merging them and connecting them in the context of the relations between the purpose, objective and means. At first glance, this seems to be a contradiction in terms, but the issue is resolved when the ideas of Aron are used as a basis for specifying policy. It can be taken as agreed that the aim of policy is to unify and reconcile all aspects of internal administration as well as of spiritual values, and whatever else the moral philosopher may care to add. Policy, of course, is nothing in itself; it is simply the trustee for all these interests . . . and here we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community (On War, 606 f.).

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Clausewitz was not even able to establish a distinction between policy and the armed forces, to be precise, between the decision-making levels of a king or emperor and a commander in chief, after conducting in-depth studies of the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon I, since both were at once statesmen and commanders. The vagueness of his concept of policy is understandable because he started out as a loyal monarchist before first becoming an ardent nationalist and finally a political pragmatist with socio-revolutionary traits (see Chap. 5). In his last stage of reflection, Clausewitz clearly focuses On War on the level below policy. The content of the German word Politik was initially presented in its three dimensions, which are characterised by three English words: Policy—Polity—Politics. In his work, Clausewitz shows only a very vague interest in political structures. He makes a distinction between policy and the government and political intercourse. As said before, he finds that any merging of the content of words distorts their meaning and leads nowhere. Clausewitz believes that as war integrates all social interests, it is a continuation of political intercourse and hence is much more broadly embedded in society than many of his interpretations indicate. The close relations between government, war and society are expressed profoundly. He considers that the tension between such poles can only be countered at the level at all social developments and influences are felt. This view provides the basis for his idea that all areas of society should be involved in war. In times of war, those in government are supposed to pursue rational goals, as demanded in the tripolar field of tension constituted by the Fascinating Trinity, without succumbing to irrational and non-rational influences. The outcome is the development of three equal tendencies that are attributed more to the government, the people, or the commander and his army. In On War, Clausewitz frames the responsibility the government has to the commander and his army (see Fig. 6.3). He demands those in charge of general policy to have “a certain grasp of military affairs” (On War, 608 and Vom Kriege, footnote 376, 1235 f.). He sets the political actors clear boundaries with regard to the nature of the forces existing in war. He states: War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose (On War, 87).

With these limitations, namely, that the political object hence does not lay down the law like a despot, that it must adapt itself to the chosen means and so often changes because of it and in so far as the nature of exploding forces in military operations admits, Clausewitz refers to many times characterised influences that can decisively determine the course of intensive warfare. As the influence of the government dwindles, the commander continues to pursue the object. If he notices a contradiction between the designs of policy and the means, he must pose appropriate demands on the government. This responsibility to the government is of great

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Fig. 6.3 Purpose, objective, means and cooperation of government and military forces

importance, as Clausewitz stresses in a letter to Major (GS) von Roeder dated 22 December 1827: The principal task and right of the commander towards the government is to prevent the government demanding things that are against the nature of war and, ignorant of the effects of the instrument, making mistakes in the use of it (Vom Kriege, footnote 16, 1184 f.).

As a consequence, Clausewitz deems that a close dialogue between the government and the armed forces must be established and institutionalised so the intentions of the political leaders do not clash with the quantity and quality of the means provided and the degree of effort made in the course of a war. Armed forces must endure great deprivation, strain and sacrifice. The government can hardly estimate the way in which the weapons used take effect. To avoid mistakes being made due to ignorance, Clausewitz considers it the task and duty of the commander to prevent the government from demanding excessive things that are against the nature of war. Referring to the interaction and the right and tasks of the commander, he calls for a close dialogue and cooperation between the government and the armed forces.

The Political Purpose and the Military Objective The congruence of the political purpose with the means provided is an important basis for a commander’s victory. If the means initially provided are not appropriate,

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the commander can demand them to be rendered so. This statement reflects the responsibility the military has towards the government. A dialogue on the purpose, objective and means must be established between the government and the military forces (see Fig. 6.3). The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be (On War, 87 f., italics added by author).

A war approaches its absolute form if it is intensely supported by a people’s emotions. The political purpose and military objective become one. Clausewitz looks at the idea of absolute war. In this reality, the confrontation of motives and tensions generates synchronous contents. The more hatred and hostilities in the period preceding war are untamed and the more the military objective coincides with the political object, the more the focus is placed on the total defeat of the enemy and the emphasis in the conduct of the war shifts to the military dimensions. The dialogue and the primacy of politics, however, are preserved, despite the considerable impact exerted by the military requirements. In contrast, the dichotomous counter-form of war, in which the tensions are low and the motives weak, is more political in its nature. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element’s natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character (On War, 88, italics added by author).

If the emotions and motives that lead to war decrease or if they are low from the outset, a war is more diachronic in its development and the course it takes is determined more by the political powers. In such a war, the government has the unique task to limiting violence and expanding the possibilities for the exertion of political control. Clausewitz does not consider that the strength of the motives and tensions is functionally dependent on the military element, but rather that it is tendentially or seemingly so. In this, he concurs with Hegel’s logic of essence with respect to the distinction it makes between being and its manifestations (Cf. Lay, 1986, 78 f.).

Primacy of Politics The ways in which and limits to which those in government can exert influence on a war usually receive little attention in political reality, and this is why a wrong idea of the primacy of politics has taken hold throughout the history of its reception, from Moltke, Ludendorff and Hitler to this day. Clausewitz calls for the government to use the expertise of the commander “so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of

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his activities” (On War, 608). On the other hand, he calls for the commander to display great insight into the matters of the state. The result is that in the struggle to make the best decision in progress at the decision-making centers of both the government and parliament, the commander can also contribute his professional expertise and judgement responsibly and knowledgeably with respect to state matters until the decision is made by the government. Since the nature of war undergoes fundamental change again and again, numerous factors that alter ways in which the government can influence events in war and are of significance for the primacy of politics. It is therefore worthwhile to take a closer look at Clausewitz’s interpretation of the relation between the government and the armed forces at war, that is to say, the primacy of politics (see Fig. 6.3). In Book One, Clausewitz limits the role of the government: If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them (On War, 87, italics added by author).

The possible repercussions that the course of a war has on the political aim are perceived as further limitations on the primacy, and Clausewitz emphasises it: The aim must adapt itself to its chosen means and only has an influence on military operations in so far as their violent nature will admit. This corresponds with the argument in Book One, in which it is claimed that war is the mere continuation of policy and must be permanently controlled by the government, in observance of the purpose it has stipulated—and the aforementioned limitations. The primacy of politics is therefore not a normative category, but a synonym for a rationale that guides action. It is an interactive axiom of social action with a grammar of its own that triggers, controls and ends a war. The relationship between politics and war is rated initially more peripherally and less stringently in On War. However in the Note the relationship and all its consequences are at the center of government activities. This difference reveals the various ways in which Clausewitz rated it while writing On War. He spotted this and classified it accordingly: “The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished. It will at least serve the whole by indicating the direction I meant to follow everywhere” (On War, 70). The close intertwinement of politics and war reveals the possible interaction between the events of war and politics that Clausewitz points out. War hence ranks alongside others as an element of state policy and reveals its inherent tendencies and characteristics. Clausewitz develops a tripolar field of tension at the higher level of political abstraction from the influences exerted by primordial violence, hatred and enmity that work like a blind natural force, from the play of probability and chance that turns it into a creative spirit free to roam and from the subordinate nature of an instrument of policy due to which war becomes subject to reason alone. He calls it the Fascinating Trinity in which war’s likeness to a chameleon is holistically grasped in theory and by which a framework is formed for

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the relations between the purpose, objective and means and the appropriateness of means (see Chap. 5). The order in which acts of war, determined by probability and chance and conducted for quite some time against an opponent who takes equivalent action, are perpetrated prompts Clausewitz to reflect on the moral qualities of the commander and military virtues of his army. In the absence of a commander who has the moral integrity to pursue the political purpose wisely, unerringly and courageously in a frictional war environment, the violent nature of war cannot be confined and the government loses its decisive influence. Clausewitz’s words that war is the continuation of policy with other means can hence be regarded as a basis for his overall theory that was established at a later date, though one that is key and serves as a guideline for the revision of his work altogether. In view of the tripolar lines of force of Clausewitz’s Fascinating Trinity, it is logical and also necessary to have military advisers contribute their military experience, judgement and planning skills to the political decision-making process since a broad social discourse, the political will and purposive rational use of armed forces are contingent on each other. Ideally, governments take recourse to the knowledge and skills of armed forces in order to weigh the purpose of going to war or to examine and, if necessary, holistically devise plans for alternative courses of action. The military develops its own principal and alternative courses of action in compliance with the purpose specified and submits them to the government for assessment and adjudication. This ensures that the political purpose, the resulting military objectives and the means that are to be provided available are properly matched. To bring a war, or one of its campaigns, to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy. On that level strategy and policy coalesce: the “commanderin-chief must also be a statesman, but he must not cease to be a general. On the one hand, he is aware of the entire political situation; on the other, he knows exactly how much he can achieve with the means at his disposal” (On War, 112). Clausewitz commits the commander to have a profound appreciation of political matters and to responsibly develop his thoughts on them: “War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand . . . ” (On War, 87). To ensure that account is taken of this far-reaching limitation, Clausewitz calls upon the government to use the commander’s expertise and make him a member of the cabinet, as it were, “so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities” (On War, 608). The result is that in the struggle to make the best decision in progress at decision-making centers, the commander-inchief must also contribute his expertise and judgement until the decision is made by the government. These words reveal how necessary the primacy of politics renders a close cooperation between the government and the commander. This highly controversial remark becomes clear and understandable when it is considered in connection with Frederick the Great and Napoleon I. It is much more important to involve military advisors whose participation is not limited to specifically military issues regarding the preparations for and conduct of operations. The

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fundamental question that has to be answered is to what extent the military can be involved in the discussion of the security rationale and the overall course of political action for a specific theatre of operations. In view of the complex risks inherent in the use of military force for political purposes—in the social, historical and political environment of the populace in the theatre—and the corresponding circumstances surrounding it, it is wise to choose a prudent approach. This includes showing sensitivity towards different cultures, religions, and customs. It is important to bear the post-war peacetime political order in mind when evaluating the political repercussions of courses of military action that can be adopted until military victory is achieved. The termination of the use of force does not necessarily mean the end of a confrontation. A military victory rarely resolves a conflict for good. Every victory generates new military, political, and social situations, each with their own dynamics. Consequently, a war should be perceived and assessed from the perspective of its end state, peace. Summing up, it can be said that the discussion of the relationship between war and politics reveals that there are different versions of Clausewitz’s main work On War. In Book Eight, he develops the classical concept of war. War changes with the French Revolution and the transition from standing armies to conscript armies. The statutes and restraints imposed on warfare under the Westphalian peace treaties concluded at the end of the Thirty Years’ War are lifted. The focus is now on the total defeat of the enemy on the battlefield. Clausewitz subsumes war under political intercourse and shows great diligence in his discussion of where the government and the armed forces intersect and how they interact. Absolute war is initially a dichotomous fiction that helps him to grasp what real war is: “Theory must concede all this; but it has the duty to give priority to the absolute form of war and to make that form a general point of reference, so that he who wants to learn from theory becomes accustomed to keeping that point in view constantly, to measuring all his hopes and fears by it, and to approximating it when he can or when he must” (On War, 581). Clausewitz’s concept of absolute war changes with his insights. Early on, he derives it from the existential way in which Napoleon I waged war and regards it as what real war should look like. Later, as real war adopts an instrumental function, he subordinates it to the political purpose. Clausewitz conceives war as the continuation of policy by other means in the field of force of the Fascinating Trinity and grasps its most important tendencies and characteristics. He is denied the chance to fully revise further parts of his work so as to propagate this interpretation of war. The presentation of his grasp of war’s innermost characteristics at the beginning of his work is hence followed by his subtle handling of the subject in the following book and further parts. The Clausewitz research community holds different opinions on the date of the Note. Howard and Paret date it back to 1830, the last year of his academic work. Should this be correct, Clausewitz can only have revised On War rudimentarily. Hahlweg and Strachan date the Note back to 1827 (Cf. Strachan, 2007a, 31 f.). If this estimate is accepted, Clausewitz can have revised key parts of his main work sufficiently for them to reflect his later insights. I find this realistic in view of the obvious quality of the revision. As far as Germany is concerned, the concept of war

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being the continuation of policy means in today’s world that the supreme command of the armed forces in times of war lies with the leader of the government, that is to say, the Federal Chancellor, and this is accordingly provided for in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. This leads us on to another of Clausewitz’s central ideas, that of the relation between theory and practice.

Theory and Practice While Clausewitz defines strategy as the theory of the use of engagements, he quite generally regards it as a reality-oriented course of action specified by the government and pursued by armed forces in war. His philosophical reflections are based on what he has experienced and produce insights that can be used in it. This is why understanding his usage of the terms theory and practice is important for analysing his work. Clausewitz takes a close look at all aspects of wars in his effort to determine and be certain of which theory allows a grasp to be gained of the essence of things in the contemporary perception of war and which does not. “If the theorist’s studies automatically result in principles and rules, and if truth spontaneously crystallizes into these forms, theory will not resist this natural tendency of the mind. On the contrary, where the arch of truth culminates in such a keystone, this tendency will be underlined” (On War, 141). Clausewitz offers his specific explanations for the link between theory and practice since he is convinced that every theory has its origin in practice. Clausewitz builds the concept of theory on insights that have been gained from the analysis of historical experiences. It is the foundation on which individual judgements are made. Clausewitz considers theory’s primary function that of providing qualitative assistance in the inquiry into and interpretation of practical situations. He justifies this restrictive use of theory with the numerous frictions, human weaknesses and unlimited number of factors that count in reality. His characterisation of the strengths and weaknesses of theorists and pragmatists—which are discussed later—correlates with the relationship between strategists and tacticians and reveals the flaws in the general understanding of the purpose, objective and means in war. Whenever Clausewitz’s analysis leads him to a different certainty, he adjusts his views accordingly. He is looking for a theory that does not conflict with reality: This point of view will admit the feasibility of a satisfactory theory of war—one that will be of real service and will never conflict with reality. It only needs intelligent treatment to make it conform to action, and to end the absurd difference between theory and practice (On War, 142).

The following mental abilities are required for analysing war: the ability to understand and correctly evaluate the essence of things, the ability to identify key factors in a situation and subtly assess variable quantities and the ability to

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consciously deal with frictions. Priority must be given to practicing how to think carefully and systematically. This means that it is important to familiarise oneself with, understand and grasp what war is. Failure to heed important factors and developments degrades potential conclusions and results. Clausewitz considers the emotional side just as important as the mental side, referring to the integration of elements of temperament, courage, intuition, imagination and creativity, all of which are lost on the pure theorist. Clausewitz underpins his theory-oriented examination of the subject of war with the fact that war has a grammar of its own, but not such a logic. His work is a phenomenology of war that demonstrates what the mind can focus on and co-determine. While he regards all attempts to lay down general rules for strategic warfare as being doomed to failure, the answers he gives elsewhere to the question of the applicability of principles, provisions and procedures differ from level to level, and he certainly acknowledges its benefit at the tactical level. In Book Two, Clausewitz writes these attempts at theory can be called advances in the realm of truth analytically, but synthetically they are absolutely useless in the rules and regulations they offer. “They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects. They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites” (On War, 136). In On War, he is quite precise in his description of the difficulties associated with the characteristics of war: the psychological forces and effects, the hostile feelings and intentions, the impact of danger and positive reaction and uncertainty in many factors determining a situation. It is because of these incalculable influences that Clausewitz regards the idea of waging war like a game of chess as completely absurd. Those involved in a war have a key influence on the course it takes due to their talent and the subtleness of their judgement. The function of theory is to make this transparent.

Theory Theory should result in a rational, balanced and full study of a complex issue of cause and effect aimed at making close acquaintance with of it. It furthermore serves to perceive the characteristics of means and their effects, to cultivate a familiarity with complex issues and to turn objective knowledge into subjective skill. “Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgement, and help him avoid pitfalls” (On War, 141). Theory is meant to educate the mind of the future commander or guide him in his self-education. It is not meant to accompany him to the battlefield (Cf. ibid.). Clausewitz argues that all theory refers to reality. This is not a contradiction. Theoretical insights are the result of empirical studies of identical questions that arise in practice. They promote familiarity with the material facts of a case, the main

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statements and factors. If it is good, theory provides a system for approaching complex situations, clarity about the relations between cause and effect and insights into the relations between the purpose, objective and means of war. It reveals key scope for individual action by drawing attention to issues as a whole. However, a stock of ideas on what action is to be taken cannot be compiled without sound knowledge first having been acquired (Cf. On War, 145). Skill builds on knowledge and experience. Theoretical knowledge and practical skills promote clarity in concepts, soundness in judgement and comprehensibility in action. They enhance determination and, building on this, courage, flexibility and perseverance. When it comes to connecting the political purpose with military methods of action, every war manual must fail because it cannot convey the complexity of the relations between the purpose, objective and means in war, which a commander must understand in order to “act on the principle of using no greater force, and setting himself no greater military aim, than would be sufficient for the achievement of his political purpose” (On War, 585). Theoretical knowledge and practical skills are prerequisites for a commander to exercise balanced judgement and allow his creative spirit to roam freely when, systematically comparing all the factors shaping a situation, he has to choose the right course of action from an infinite array of solutions by using his judgement (Cf. ibid.). The essential elements of his intuitive judgement are his knowledge and skill, combined with his ability to cope with frictions, to justify his point of view and handle criticism with care. This is the insight that command personnel training must be geared to conveying. Clausewitz believes that a state must first consider its own political purpose and that of the enemy in order to determine what means are appropriate for achieving it. It must furthermore bear in mind its own forces and circumstances and those of the enemy state, compare characters of the enemy state’s government and people with those of its own and take account of other states’ political links and the effects that war can have on them. Clausewitz rates the task of weighing the host of factors that shape a situation a task for a genius (Cf. On War, 586). The means appropriate result from the logic of the Fascinating Trinity and can only be interpreted in conjunction with it. The intuitive judgement, the skill that enables a careful assessment of the three dimensions to be conducted, is the only characteristic that allows the complexity and variance of war, which changes its appearance like a true chameleon, to be comprehended. Clausewitz sees the people, the commander and his army and the government as the correlative factors that must be considered in order to grasp the secondary variable factors of war. Among them, he counts the political purposes, the forces and circumstances and the characters and capabilities of the government and people of both states in a conflict. He considers that a theory’s primary function lies in providing qualitative assistance in the analysis and interpretation of real circumstances and systematic approaches. In his view, a pure theorist must founder on the rational, non-rational and irrational elements of a real war. On the other hand, the pure pragmatist does not wonder about the nature of the elements and forces, the inherent tendencies and

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limits of their effectiveness in the purpose-oriented context of war. Clausewitz attributes the same great importance to the elements and tendencies in war as to the relations between the purpose, objective and means. This enables him to understand the nature of war and its elements in the play of probability and chance. A theory of war hence turns into an objective form of knowledge. According to Clausewitz’s approach, subjective skill turns into an intuitive judgement in the pursuit of purposes that counters the emerging frictions. It must be borne in mind that the purpose of gaining power is at the center of all future-oriented courses of action in wars. Without in-depth comprehension of the situation as a whole, specific military operation plans—a war plan (the government), a campaign plan (the government and armed forces) and a battle plan (the commander)—with fixed key data and times will fail and are primarily valid only until hostilities commence. Then the interplay of the forces in combination with the intuitive judgement begins. No matter what action is taken, the degree to which the political purpose is achieved remains the measure of success or failure in war. However, strategic plans are by no means pointless when it comes to the actual conduct of war. Even after a war has begun, they help in countering the initial impact of frictions by continuing to provide a valid basis for devising alternative plans and sharpening the commander’s intuitive judgement in specific instances. Clausewitz recommends the adoption of a theory-based approach to war. He justifies it with the following words: “Yet when it is not a question of acting oneself but of persuading others in discussion, the need is for clear ideas and the ability to show their connection with each other. So few people have yet acquired the necessary skill at this that most discussions are a futile bandying of words . . .” (On War, 71) Clear ideas and proof of that internal connection, however, can only be attained with the help of a philosophy-based theory of war. A fruitful dialogue between those in government and the armed forces and between the commander and his army can only take place on the basis of this theoretical foundation. There are obvious deficits in the latter, though, because so few people have yet acquired the necessary skill at this. In order to attribute judgement the quality of a free, creative activity, it is important to follow the line of thought of Carl von Clausewitz in any analysis of modern wars in view of their extreme complexity. To this end, the foundations of his theory should be taught in detail. Wagemann cautions that teaching Clausewitz must not be confined to “rediscovering in our day the political forces and forms of conflict he judged relevant in his day or the military rules he judged valid at that time. The real task is to identify the contexts and dependencies of the phenomena and forces that are new today” (Cf. Wagemann, 1980b, 398). The significance of Clausewitz’s theory hence does not lie in the historical studies and philosophical analyses he conducted, but in the method of thinking he devised, which can be used to competently evaluate the complex risks, conflicts and wars of our day. Hahlweg quotes Clausewitz who, in Volume 7 of his “Collected Works on War and Warfare” [Hinterlassene Werke des Generals von Clausewitz über Krieg

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und Kriegführung], states: “We believe that the theory deserves merit not for what we have thought, but for how we have thought it” (Quoted in Hahlweg, 1969a, b, 194). This applies for both the military and the political leaders, whose decisionmaking skills Clausewitz links to the axiom of the primacy of politics.

Application of the Theory in Practice Instead of looking for a rule-based doctrine on warfare, Clausewitz focuses on inductively examining what has long existed for inherent principles and relationships and drawing conclusions. He traces military practice back to its basic elements (Cf. On War, 389). Clausewitz elaborates on this: “[Theory] is an analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience—in our case, to military history—it leads to thorough familiarity with it. The closer it comes to that goal, the more it proceeds from the objective form of a science to the subjective form of a skill, the more effective it will prove in areas where the nature of the case admits no arbiter but talent. It will, in fact, become an active ingredient of talent” (On War, 141). Clausewitz’s Concept of a Course of Study → Investigation Objective knowledge →

→ Acquaintance Combined with experience →

→ Familiarity Subjective skill

Objective knowledge is used to unlock the secret of a matter and, in combination with experience, leads to the acquisition of subjective skill. Clausewitz’s concept begins with the search for causes. He hence starts with a phenomenon and first examines the relations between cause and effect and between purpose and means that have been derived from historical examples from the point of view of the observer and not on the basis of contemporary doctrine (Cf. Wagemann, 1980a, 23 ff.). “Clausewitz’s theory is therefore not a stand-alone doctrinal system, but a method for gaining practice in the analysis of political developments” (Cf. ibid., 33). This is then reflected in the quality of the decisions made. Clausewitz sees the primary purpose of the theory as being the acquisition of practice in a form of systematic analysis that exceeds not only chance and personal experience, but also the understanding of cause and effect and the appropriateness of the means used. Ultimately, theoretical knowledge educates people in developing an intuitive judgement.

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In every course of study on war that leads from objective knowledge to subjective skill, there is a latent danger of drifting into a linear way of thinking based on practice-oriented procedures and regulations that are undoubtedly necessary in the military domain. This results in a balancing act. Since we cannot expect every politician or soldier to have a strong interest in education and the ability to think abstractly, there is often a preponderance of superficial knowledge in combination with practical savvy and great experience in times of peace. In contrast, dealing in depth with the core elements and factors of war to which attention must be paid requires a lot of energy.

Clausewitz and Jomini The difference in the assessment of the purpose of theory, i.e. whether it is considered the basis for lines of thought or for the development of a set of rules, becomes particularly evident when the contrary approaches taken by Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini the famous Swiss strategist (1779–1869), are compared. Unlike Jomini, a contemporary of Clausewitz, who developed principles and methods for conducting war and then devised practical instructions for higherranking officers, Clausewitz examines the nature of war phenomenologically in order to discover its innermost elements. He argues that the causal relations— cause and effects—and final relations—purpose and means—that have been identified with the help of historical examples must not be examined along the lines of contemporary theory, but in accordance with the true nature of causes and means (Cf. Wagemann, 1980a, 31 f.). To this end, Clausewitz elevates war from the level of the battle, grasps its intellectual dimension and creates space for philosophical thought (Cf. Langendorf, 2008, 144). The result of his inductive investigations is a unique and timeless theory of war. His phenomenological theory of the Fascinating Trinity floating in three dimensions, according to which war is floating in three dimensions over the marked influences of rationality, non-rationality and irrationality, takes account of moral factors and combines forces of the intellect and temperament. The course of every war changes due to the dynamic play of forces and influences. With regard to the three equally weighted tendencies in the Fascinating Trinity, Clausewitz concludes with great clarity of thought: “A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless” (On War, 89). At the philosophical level of abstraction, Clausewitz draws a distinct line between his theory of war and the teachings of Jomini, who accompanied Napoleon I in many major battles. Proceeding from his personal experience of war, Jomini develops unalterable principles and frames axioms and recommendations for moves that he believes an officer should make on the chess board he sees in the battlefield in order to win (Cf. von Boguslawski, 1881, 22 ff.).

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Clausewitz, however, is convinced that it is quite impossible to capture the art of war that surrounds a commander in one comprehensive set of regulations. Opposing Jomini’s ideas on war, he voices this criticism: Efforts were therefore made to equip the conduct of war with principles, rules, or even systems. This did present a positive goal, but people failed to take adequate account of the endless complexities involved. As we have seen, the conduct of war branches out in almost all directions and has no definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite nature of a synthesis. An irreconcilable conflict exists between this type of theory and actual practice (On War, 134).

Alluding to Jomini’s numerous publications, he mockingly calls him “one ingenious mind” who seeks to condense a whole array of factors into a single logical concept. Clausewitz regards fixed rules for the successful conduct of war as completely inadmissible and as leading in a contradictory direction (Cf. On War, 135 f.). Jomini is considered to be looking for warfighting principles which, if disregarded, inevitably lead to defeat (Cf. von Boguslawski, 1881, 26). Clausewitz vehemently opposes this doctrinaire assessment: “To repeat, it is paltry philosophy if in the old-fashioned way one lays down rules and principles in total disregard of moral values. As soon as these appear one regards them as exceptions, which gives them a certain scientific status, and thus makes them into rules. Or again one may appeal to genius, which is above all rules; which amounts to admitting that rules are not only made for idiots, but are idiotic in themselves” (On War, 184). These words are condescending and difficult to top in their severity. And yet, Clausewitz is essentially quite similar to Jomini in the way he justifies his ideas: All theory refers to practice. For him, this is no contradiction at all. Theory is the result of an analysis of questions regarding the conduct of wars, their starting points, the decisions and courses taken, the frictions and, finally, their outcomes. This leads to a familiarity not only with the main factors and priorities, but also with all main circumstances, factors and ideas related to the conduct of wars. He can discern a grammar—but not a logic (Cf. On War, 605). Theory should cast a steady light on all phenomena so that we can more easily recognize and eliminate the weeds that always spring from ignorance; it should show how one thing is related to another, and keep the important and the unimportant separate. If concepts combine of their own accord to form that nucleus of truth we call a principle, if they spontaneously compose a pattern that becomes a rule, it is the task of the theorist to make this clear (On War, 578).

To Clausewitz’s mind, a theory provides sound knowledge, a method for approaching complex situations and clarity of thought with regard to the relations between cause and effect and between the purpose, objective and means of war and broadens the view on the holistic tendencies inherent in war. It creates options for individual action, flexibility and innovation in unclear situations and is an important basis for evaluating all possible forms of military conflicts. An in-depth understanding of the theoretical aspects is a basis for acquiring knowledge. Practical command of a subject matter is achieved, as in seafaring, by means of practical exercise and intensive drill. Skills are built on sound knowledge and intensive experience. They

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help commanders to develop important characteristics: the clarity of ideas they need, the ability to cope with frictions, a standpoint of their own and the ability to justify it, and the seriousness to handle criticism with care. In combination, theoretical knowledge and practical skills assist them in their development of an intuitive judgement and encourage them to show confidence, determination and—based on this—courage, flexibility and initiative in a commander when they are required to make decisions and take action. As Clausewitz puts it, theory to educate the mind of the future commander, or, guides him in his self-education (Cf. On War, 141). Clausewitz develops the innermost relationships of war at society level, creating a conceptual coordinate system for evaluating all the important elements of a war. He at the same time offers principles and axioms, though not as instructions, but as a means of further developing one’s own power of judgement. Nor can the theory of war apply the concept of law to action . . . Principles, rules, regulations and methods are, however, indispensable concepts to or for that part of the theory of war that leads to positive doctrines; for in these doctrines the truth can express itself only in such compressed forms (On War, 152, italics added by the author).

Clausewitz sees the dispute with Jomini, who reduces the whole secret of the art of war to numerical superiority on the battlefield at a certain time and in a certain place, as “an oversimplification that would not have stood up for a moment against the realities of life” (On War, 135). He strongly opposes this view by choosing the declaratory heading “They exclude genius from the rule” (On War, 136). He reproaches Jomini for failing to grasp the outstanding importance both of the intellect and reason of the commander and of the virtues of the army. Clausewitz patronisingly lectures Jomini: “Pity the soldier who is supposed to crawl among these scraps of rules, not good enough for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh at. No; what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case” (On War, 136). Clausewitz justifies his fundamental rejection of fixed guidelines for the conduct of war by referring to the fact that, in the event of a war, specific rules will be defined by the military genius. The dispute with Jomini goes on to this day. It starts after Marie von Clausewitz, née Countess Brühl, publishes On War in 1832. Reading Clausewitz’s work, Jomini comes across the sneering criticism of his way of thinking and his general approaches. He is deeply upset by this reproach and responds with a book entitled The Art of War, which is published in 1837 and contains highly disparaging remarks about Clausewitz. In the introduction to this book, Jomini describes Clausewitz’s approach as being “at times a little vagrant” and “above all too pretentious for a didactic discussion”. Moreover, he points out the overall “skepticism of the author” (Cf. de Jomini, 1854, 13; von Boguslawski, 1881, 13). “One cannot deny to General Clausewitz great learning and a facile pen; but this pen, at times a little vagrant, is above all too pretentious for a didactic discussion, the simplicity and clearness of which ought to be its first merit. Besides that, the author shows himself by far too skeptical in point of military science” (Cf. ibid.).

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In French-speaking countries, Jomini is considered to be the founding father of the art of war, whereas Clausewitz is regarded as the detached thinker who is used to generalising his ideas in terms of abstract philosophy and whose conclusions are therefore pointless. One recalls Liddell Hart’s devastating assessment of Clausewitz that was quoted at the beginning of this book. Jomini’s way of thinking shapes the leadership culture in today’s French armed forces, which is still strongly rooted in laws and rules.

Theorists and Pragmatists Immanuel Kant describes the general relationship between theory and practice in combination with the power of judgement as follows: It is obvious that between theory and practice there is required, besides, a middle term connecting them and providing a transition from one to the other, no matter how complete a theory may be; for, to a concept of the understanding, which contains a rule, must be added an act of judgment by which a pragmatist distinguishes whether or not something is a case of the rule; and since judgment cannot always be given yet another rule by which to direct its subsumption . . ., there can be theoreticians who can never in their lives become practical because they are lacking in judgment (Cf. Kant, 1940, 69).

A theorist, who does not know anything about practice and lives in the proverbial ivory tower, lacks power of judgement. On the other hand, a pure pragmatist does not wonder about the nature of elements and forces nor about the inherent tendencies and limits of their effectiveness. It was this question alone, however, that led Clausewitz to insights about the nature of war and about its elements and principles (Cf. Wagemann, 1980a, 33 f.). “Truth in itself is rarely sufficient to make men act. Hence the step is always long from cognition to volition, from knowledge to ability” (On War, 112). Clausewitz also includes emotional factors in his understanding of theory: “The most powerful springs of action in men lie in his emotions. He derives his most vigorous support, if we may use the term, from that blend of brains and temperament which we have learned to recognize in the qualities of determination, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character” (Italics added by the author, On War, 112). In his opinion, the rational and non-rational elements are equally important. He thus links the traditions of Enlightenment and Romanticism, combining objective analysis with psychological, emotional, intuitive and subjective interpretations (Cf. Handel, 1986, 87 f.). The complementary relation between calculating and rational factors on the one hand and irrational and unpredictable characteristics on the other corresponds to the phenomenon of war: a war is led to achieve rational objectives but is not a rational process in itself. The significance Clausewitz attributes to uncertainty, chance, friction and fortune in war is based on the Romantic view of the conditio humana and in Newton’s rationality.

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In his interpretation of the relation between theory and practice, Clausewitz uses a maritime metaphor: “Moreover, every war is rich in unique episodes. Each is an unchartered sea, full of reefs. The commander may suspect the reefs’ existence without ever having seen them; now he has to steer past them in the dark. If a contrary wind springs up, if some major mischance appears, he will need the greatest skill and personal exertion, and the utmost presence of mind, though from a distance everything may seem to be proceeding automatically” (On War, 120). Clausewitz illustrates options—with a maritime example—for dealing with frictions and, in passing, points out the relation between theory, intuitive judgement, and practice. If we apply Clausewitz’s thoughts to distinguish between the theorist and the pragmatist, we could say that the former is familiar with the nautical chart, can use a compass and is able to safely navigate a ship across all oceans. The pragmatist, on the other hand, masters all the skills required for seafaring: unmooring and going to sea as well as berthing a ship in port. Being able to carry out these manoeuvres in light winds and calm seas is the necessary prerequisite for safely steering a ship past reefs in the dark and in heavy weather. A stormy sea full of reefs as depicted by Clausewitz requires both the practical skill of steering a ship and the theoretical knowledge of how to navigate around the reefs while staying on course. The pure theorist who is perfectly familiar with all the navigation procedures will fail when confronted with a situation where he has to carry out such a manoeuvre in the dark, in heavy weather and in waters full of dangerous reefs. Similarly, the pure pragmatist—without knowledge of navigation—will never find the right course to safely reach a remote harbour and will simply strand at a coast somewhere. Mastering the theory is the prerequisite for commanding a ship. Theory creates opportunities for holistic thinking, individual action, flexibility and innovation; moreover, it is the basis for being able to lead in a frictional environment. Abstracting this metaphor, it is possible to conclude that excellent theoretical knowledge is an important basis and starting point for every decision a commander makes. To Clausewitz’s mind, a solid theory is derived from an analysis and evaluation of historical processes and risks. It is the result of an investigation of the problem at hand, which in turn leads to the acquaintance with the subject and eventually to familiarity with its main elements. Theory then offers profound knowledge, methods for approaching complex situations and clarity regarding the relation between cause and effect on the one hand and between the purpose and the means on the other (Cf. On War, 141). So what is the benefit of practical exercise and experience? Capabilities and skills are built on sound knowledge and intensive training. Certain competences develop: intuitive judgement, the ability to cope with frictions and to firmly present and justify one’s Standpoint and the ability to handle criticism with care. Thus, theory is of particular importance in four areas: • In an overall unstructured, complex situation of high risk, it is supposed to cover all phenomena, to show how one thing is related to another, to distinguish what is important from what is not and filter out the most important elements and to help structure a situation.

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• It is the connection between a dynamic play of forces, purpose-oriented knowledge, motivation and capabilities and practice-oriented actions. • It fosters an understanding of patterns of human behaviour. This, in turn, leads to the acquisition of insights and offers options for action to thoroughly change reality. • Theory can foster a gifted pragmatist’s ability to differentiate and improve his sense of judgement in the midst of real developments. Theory is an important precondition for outstanding performance (Cf. Boston Consulting, 2003, 12 and 39). Clausewitz treats elements of theory like a mathematician would deal with a nonlinear function y ¼ f(x), examining its behaviour at the zero point and towards infinity in the positive and negative range. He analyses his theoretical statements in the trivial and in the extremely positive and negative lines of development. Clausewitz then deepens his reflections by unfolding antithetical concepts and concludes his train of thought by discussing dichotomy. It is with this systematic way of thinking that he approaches the absolute and the limited war, the logical and the actual truth, attack and defence. This analytical method of thinking recalls the philosophical concept developed by Hegel, who transparently outlines complex philosophical topics by following the dialectic steps of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. This approach is known as the dialectic method in Marxism and Leninism (Cf. Boston Consulting, 2003, 27). Unlike Hegel’s dialectic, however, Clausewitz’s theory very often lacks the step from the dichotomous terms and the idea of interaction towards the all-encompassing synthesis. The only exception is the Fascinating Trinity, which may be interpreted as a synthesis of the characteristics of war and its courses of action. To avoid the dilemma posed by the theory of war on the one hand and by practical action in warfare on the other, a two-stage approach must be chosen. First of all, a concrete war scenario should be studied at the theoretical level along the lines of the following key questions: Why does someone wage war? What factors, tendencies and probabilities can be expected and what course can war be expected to take? What kinds of frictions may arise, and how should they be dealt with? What moral qualities of the commander are required? What strategy will be the most appropriate? Secondly, to conduct war successfully, the basic elements of Clausewitz’s theory can be used to reduce its complexity and diversity and to think through its conduct holistically, starting with the desired end state. First and foremost, the relations between the purpose, objective and means of the war, appropriate means, the overarching Fascinating Trinity and the expected frictions are aspects that must be taken into account. The selection and order of these criteria must be determined on the basis of the type of war that is to be conducted and the way in which it develops. Following this systematic treatment of the concept of war, Clausewitz’s work provides the overarching theory for reducing complexity, the systematics for successfully thinking the war through to the end and a suitable method for analysing political events of military relevance (Cf. Wagemann, 1980a, 33). This approach

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calls for close cooperation between the government on the one hand and the armed forces on the other. Approaching the concept of war from yet another angle, Clausewitz does not attempt to fathom the logic of war, as it does not exist in his opinion. Instead, he integrates the concept of war into a theoretical space of three tendencies. Within this system, the circumstances of war are explored, their core points are revealed and the grammar of war is investigated in order to assess the validity of the results of his philosophical analysis in reality. The necessity of analysing the phenomenon of war on the theoretical level is obvious. In the following, strategy is outlined as a doctrine, as a method of action and as a basis for strategic thinking, with account being taken of its contents, limitations and relations.

Strategy The word strategy comes from the Greek word strategos, which means office holder or general and is mostly associated with the exercise of command of an army on the battlefield as a free, creative activity. Strategy is part art and part science. It requires to combine systematic thinking, political purposes, military means, and people with each other. It is never a number of imperatives set in stone, because methods of action and reaction change dynamically in the course of a war. Famous commanders—Alexander the Great, Caesar, Genghis Khan, Gustav II Adolph of Sweden, Frederick II of Prussia and Napoleon I—have truly practiced the finely interwoven relations between national and military strategy because they were both statesmen and commanders. Since the discovery of America and the beginning of the modern age, military campaigns have been documented and victories and defeats analysed and commented on. The elaborate manuscripts of Maurice, Elector of Saxony (1521–1553), the Marquis de Louvois (1641–1691), Sébastien Vauban (1633–1707), Frederick II of Prussia (1712–1786) and Jacques Guibert (1743–1790) deserve special mention. Frederick the Great is generally considered to be the first commander of the European world to take a systematic look at the theory of war. The term strategy in its modern sense was first used in the late eighteenth century works of Joly de Maizeroy (1719–1780), a French military writer (Cf. van Creveld, 2001, 148). The wars of that age and their global reach justify a serious methodological interest. Jomini and Clausewitz benefitted from Machiavelli’s work on war (Cf. The Art of War, quoted from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1958, 452). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, strategy refers to a geographical area of the battlefield. In his book “The spirit of the new system of war” (Geist des neuen Kriegssystems, 1799), Dietrich Heinrich Freiherr von Bülow provides the following definition of the term: “Strategy is the science of belligerent movements outside the enemy’s field of vision; tactics refers to movements within the enemy’s field of vision” (Cf. Heuss, 1951, 45). In his day, the enemy’s field of vision was more or

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less equivalent to the range of his artillery. According to Bülow, strategy encompasses all measures, movements and support activities in a war that take place outside the reach of the enemy’s cannons. The march of the troops to the battlefield area is first a strategic element and becomes a tactical one when the troops are within range of the enemy’s guns. Similarly, the provision of the troops with weapons, ammunition, equipment and food connects the strategic level with the tactical level. Bülow’s definition is based on a geographical classification and this geometric dogmatism is in line with the common doctrine of his day. As early as in 1805, however, Clausewitz publishes a polemic paper in which he rejects this definition of strategy and tactics and applies his own. “According to our classification, then, tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war” (On War, 128). Heuss concludes: “The sharp conciseness and logical structure of this small sentence already reflect the preciseness and linguistic force typical of the Clausewitz of later years, but also the direction of his thoughts” (Heuss, 1951, 65). Clausewitz devotes Book Three of On War entirely to the central theme of strategy but also essential parts of Books One, Two, Four and Eight. His understanding of strategy connects the three basic elements of theory, the course of action and the way of thinking. He understands strategy as a theory, saying that strategy [. . .] “presents extraordinary difficulties, and it is fair to say that very few people have clear ideas about its details—that is, ideas which logically derive from basic necessities” (On War, 70).

Strategy as a Theory In Clausewitz’s work, the theory of strategy is an open system as it is geared towards understanding the factors and variables in war. Strategy is the theory of how to wage a war. It is the logical link between the human will and the purposeful employment of means. The theory of strategy is focused on combat and combines moral and psychological forces: “It [The strategy] is the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war. Though strategy in itself is concerned only with engagements, the theory of strategy must also consider its chief means of execution, the fighting forces. It must consider these in their own right and in their relation to other factors, for they shape the engagement and it is in turn on them that the effect of the engagement first makes itself felt. Strategic theory must therefore study the engagement in terms of its possible results and of the moral and psychological forces that largely determine its course” (On War, 177, bold face print and italics added by the author). The theory of strategy deals with the purposeful employment of own forces in combat. This relation is the link to reality; it connects the abstract political will with the material reality and provides a yardstick by which the success or failure of a course of action can be measured. The aim of a strategy is to impose one’s will on the opponent. The ways in which armed forces can be employed ranges from armed observation to the

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war of defeat and the intensity depends on the opponent’s power of resistance and his moral and psychological forces. Strategy decides the time when, the place where, and the forces with which the engagement is to be fought, and through this threefold activity exerts considerable influence on its outcome. Once the tactical encounter has taken place and the result—be it victory or defeat - is assured, strategy will use it to serve the object of the war (On War, 194).

The strategy includes the choice of the place, time and intensity of the use of military force and the selection of targets. The operational factors of space, time and forces referred to in the regulations of present-day armed forces derive from this. In today’s wars and regulations, information warfare is considered a fourth factor and must be taken into consideration when Clausewitz’s ideas are applied. It is important to estimate the opponent’s reactions and the possible influence of probability and chance on the engagement into the theory from the outset and to consider alternative methods of action. The primary objective of strategy is to gain a holistic grasp of the forces that must be employed in an engagement in relation to an opponent or an alliance in order to achieve the set purpose while taking account of their centers of gravity and further relevant factors: “It is therefore a major act of strategic judgment to distinguish these centers of gravity in the enemy’s forces and to identify their spheres of effectiveness” (On War, 486). In order to determine the centers of gravity, it is necessary to go through a mental process of methodologically weighing all the complex factors that exert an influence on developments—a concept presented by Clausewitz in Book Eight to define the appropriateness of means. The three overarching tendencies in each war interlinked in the concept of the Fascinating Trinity form the standard for comparing the forces and circumstances of the enemy state and the characters of its government and people to ours and assessing the effects of a war on third states. These tasks are clearly outlined by Clausewitz as the intuition of a genius. He believes that it is impossible to comply with the rules when it comes to weighing the influence that can be exerted by a strategy. Strachan emphasizes the distinction Clausewitz makes between strategy and tactics. In the strategy, a commander brings his moral qualities and genius to bear. In tactics, practical insights and the lower ranks’ experience are more important (Cf. Strachan, 2007c, 23). The theory of strategy offers a methodological approach for planning the employment of armed forces. The process of weighing the courses of action possible must never develop a dynamism of its own because this would render war useless as an instrument of policy.

Strategy as a Method of Action A national strategy or grand strategy connects the government and the armed forces by defining the purpose and method of action and determines how political objectives can be achieved in a frictional environment despite the means the belligerent

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opponent uses and the courses of action he takes. It influences the will of the opponent to change his actions to serve our interests and the achievement of our own objectives. “If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make” (On War, 77). Strategy both provides the commander a firm space within which he can take action and renders the work of the government, with its aims and procedures, transparent and predictable. This functional classification of strategy gives no indication of how it is developed and focuses assessment of its usefulness on the intended purpose. In view of unpredictable factors, probability and chance and uncertainty regarding the interdependencies with a like opponent, the actual conduct of operations requires a state to proceed holistically in its strategic thinking when it compares the courses of action it can take with those open to the opponent. This thought is elaborated upon in the chapter on the appropriateness of means. Clausewitz sees a strategy as comprising five elements (Cf. Echevarria II, 2007, 139). Firstly—intellectual and psychological elements: the genius of the commander and the experience and spirit of the army; secondly—physical elements: the size, composition and arms of the military forces; thirdly—mathematical or geometrical elements: lines of operation, deployment and points of main effort in an attack; fourthly—geographical elements: rivers, mountains and deserts; fifthly—statistical elements: logistics, service support and maintenance. A strategy links the strength of an army with its qualitative capabilities of specifically bring its force to bear on the opponent’s center of gravity. Geographical obstacles need to be overcome. The logistic effort is effective when it supports the army. Moreover, a strategy in the sense of a method of action determines recruitment, the deployment and the strength of the army and ensures the provision of the requisite means. The war plan that is devised for a specific event reflects it, contains conditions for the deployment, specifies when the war is to begin, defines the overarching intermediate and ultimate objectives, schedules and limits for the military operations in the war and states alternative courses of action. It postulates the coordinates for a termination of the war and, finally, contains basic ideas on what a subsequent peace settlement should look like. The greatest wisdom of a strategy is revealed in the allocation of means (Cf. On War, 261). Critical analysis of the methods of action and possible alternatives and the establishment of an order of priority for them are the academic steps that have to be taken in the framing of a strategy that factors in the knowledge and experience of the leaders involved. “These considerations require a creative effort from the critic” (Wagemann, 1980b, 25). Clausewitz emphasises: “Critical analysis, after all, is nothing but thinking that should precede the action. We therefore consider it essential that the language of criticism should have the same character as thinking must have in wars; otherwise it loses its practical value and criticism would lose contact with its subject” (On War, 168). War must never be separated from the political decision-making process—Clausewitz calls it political activity. And yet, great challenges call for prudent and farsighted strategists, but who do not necessarily judge and act in compliance with the rules. Frederick the Great and Napoleon I have gone down in history as great

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strategists and innovative rule breakers. A commander’s creativity is limited by the primacy of politics. An obstinate commander-in-chief who seals himself off from the government is just as unacceptable as a government that intervenes directly in the events of a war down to the tactical level of an engagement. Strategy establishes a complex framework for action. It contains rules for decision making and can only be applied reasonably in terms of an overarching purpose considering relevant problem areas in their complex dimensions. It connects approaches and the use of means with the purposiveness and rationality of a political leadership. Strategy takes account of the interactive action of a countervailing power and the frictions of the situation that goes with it. It hence includes the conceptual, organisational and mental dimensions of the decision-making process. Bernhardi emphasises the importance of planning and of the knowledge that needs to be acquired before a war is begun. “During war, it’s too late to do the mental work one had failed to do in times of peace” (von Bernhardi, 1912, 221). Presenting a method of thinking and action whose elements are detached from time, On War allows scholars to analyse and interpret the concrete complexity of war and draw conclusions and so can be considered a course of study in strategic thinking. The concept of strategy has changed in correspondence with developments in society and now, in the twenty-first century, combines not only military methods of action, but also diplomatic, economic, legal, humanitarian and psychological ones as well as thoughts on ethics and international law under the generic term politics. At first sight, there seem to be parallels between the concepts of the strategist/ tactician and theorist/pragmatist. For Clausewitz, a strategist is a “knowing” pragmatist—he rejects a pure theorist. For Clausewitz, a tactician is an experienced commander who has an eye for the next success that can be achieved in a given situation. Although experienced, sly, extremely sure of himself and committed, he in the end fails to overcome the challenges posed by probability, chance, frictions or the guile of his opponent. Short-term success is the tactician’s deadly enemy because it encourages him to act in his proven manner and deters him from developing his mental capabilities. The wiliness of the experienced tactician is usually sufficient for him to manoeuvre to advantage. The extent to which this is expedient for achieving strategic objectives or accomplishing the political purpose is a question that can only be answered by the strategist. “The original means of strategy is victory—that is, tactical success; its ends, in the final analysis, are those objects which will lead directly to peace” (On War, 143). A strategist starts to analyse a war by looking at it as a whole and breaking it down into its elements and proceeds on his intuitive judgement. Considering that something new can only evolve if there is freedom for independent decision-making, taking action in situations where there are friction and interaction with an equal opponent calls for strategic thinking, experience, willpower and perseverance (Cf. Boston Consulting, 2003, 90 f.). Each war is embedded in a system of reason, creative spirit and natural force that forms a three-dimensional field of force in the Fascinating Trinity. Strategy takes account of the free creative spirit in the frictional employment of armed forces in

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Level of Theory Strategy

Purpose

Means

Warfare

Well-being of the War people

Definition of the purpose of the war, objectives and means

War plan

Achievement of war objectives

Engagement

Tactics

Defeat of the opponent, breaking of his will

Combat C

Summarisation of all military operations in relation to the purpose Destruction, occupation, devastation or observation and relief operations.

Fig. 6.4 Relations between level of theory, purpose, means and warfare

space and time and factors in the instrumental character of a political tool, doing so in the light of the existing primordial violence of its element. Strategy as a method of action hence covers a broad range of aspects. In order to understand strategy in a wider context, Schössler offers a system of concepts that decodes the employment of armed forces in Clausewitz’s theory (Cf. Schössler, 2009, 154 ff.) In the aforementioned subdivision of strategy into the aspects of theory and warfare, the latter can be differentiated as follows: Strategy Theory State policy, art of war

Warfare War plan, campaign plan and battle plan

The levels these concepts reflect allow the understanding to be achieved that is necessary for the thought that has to be put in and the binding planning documents upon which the military operations are based to be produced. The success of a strategy is not measured by the number of battles won, but by the overall success achieved in relation to the overarching purpose of the war. At the tactical level, a battle is won when the opponent has suffered greater losses, when his will to continue fighting has been spent and when he has abandoned up his goals. It is obvious that a company or brigade do not pursue the overarching political purpose of the war in the battles they fight. “This object of course is usually remote and only rarely lies very near at hand. A series of secondary objectives may serve as means to the attainment of the ultimate goal; these intermediate ends, which are means to higher ends, may in practice be of various types. Even the ultimate object, the purpose of the entire war, differs in almost every case” (On War, 194). In a table, this can be presented as follows (see Fig. 6.4).

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The allocation of means by the higher level limits the definition of the purpose at the lower level. This continues across the structure: from army to brigade level, to battalion level and down to company level. The tasks (in the sense of objectives) of the higher levels are missions (in the sense of purposes) for the lower levels at which the action is taken. What must be taken into consideration at all levels is the overarching political purpose of a war (Cf. Beckmann, 2011, 118 ff.). As a result, a political influence can still be exerted on the course of a war despite many limitations. Defining the opponent’s center of gravity requires the relation between purpose and means to be taken into consideration. Occupying a country and its capital can be chosen to be the purpose as long as sufficient means are provided. If fewer means are provided, concessions have to be made as to the purpose, and this calls for close coordination between the levels. With regard to the methodology of action, Clausewitz writes about attack and defence, the opponent’s center of gravity, the dynamics of war and about inaction, the culminating point and the economy of force, which will not be further explored here. In the past, great commanders showed an abundance of creativity, developing special capabilities to break the multidimensional complexities of war down into simple and essential features, define their own positions, take decisions and act with persistence. Clausewitz considers that such outstanding capabilities are particularly required in frictional environments. He has a holistic view of the rational, irrational and emotional elements of war and at the same time sees it an instrument of policy. Unlike the philosophers of his day, he bases his analyses of war on practical experience. Understanding the essential elements, the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent’s courses of action and the possible influence of probability and chance is a basic requirement for strategic thinking. Knowledge, judgement, boldness and perseverance are the essential characteristics of great leaders, though they are only perceivable in extreme situations. These characteristics are not innate, but rather a result of study, which again demands certain personality traits and vast experience. Clausewitz provides the intellectual basis and the lines of thought for a general culture of strategic thinking.

Strategy as a Method of Thinking To develop a strategic way of thinking, it is particularly important to be familiar with the wisdom of great philosophers of war: “This is the science (from the Latin scientia), the corpus of knowledge handed down by the masters. The challenge for the strategists is to apply such science to the art of making strategy in the crucible of modern conflict—precisely where schools of higher military education must make their contribution” (Marcella, 90). For Clausewitz, a commander must be able to put a strategy into practice and at the same time to think in strategic terms to coordinate activity in the great number of

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fields of action in such a manner that overarching purposes can even be achieved in the face of bold resistance and frictional influences (Boston, 46). Strategic thinking connects strategy as a theory with a method of action. Strategy provides order and under the primacy of politics, it controls the instrument of war as a continuation of politics. Clausewitz recommends the first important step to be the development of a personal standpoint (Cf. On War, 606). No-one can frame a proper political purpose without a standpoint of his own. In view of the multitude of unpredictable factors and the influence of probability and chance, warfare requires holistic strategic thinking to be conducted in order to assess one’s own courses of action and compare them to those of the opponent. To back up the methodology of strategic thinking, Clausewitz develops a theoretical structure consisting of the following elements: a tripolar system of relations, the Fascinating Trinity, which puts all the characteristics of a war into relation with each other; the appropriateness of means, the result of the evaluation of the purpose, the capabilities and the character of one’s own government and people and their direct comparison to those of the opponent; the relations between the purpose of the war, objective and means, that is to be achieved and the means that are necessary to achieve it; the probabilities, chance and frictions that may have an effect on a side’s own actions and complicate the application of any strategy. The longer a war lasts, the more influence these aspects and the dialectic reaction exert on its strategic conduct. They create chances for initiative action and can therefore be a trigger and driving force for change. Frictions must be countered by the moral qualities of the commander and the virtues of his army. In large business corporations, conflicting action changes with a dynamism similar to that in a war as construed by Clausewitz. Consequently, the demands on business leaders are similar to those on military leaders (Cf. Boston, 28). Theory, therefore, demands that at the outset of a war its character and scope should be determined on the basis of the political probabilities. The closer these political probabilities drive war toward the absolute, the more the belligerent states are involved and drawn into its vortex, the clearer appear the connections between its separate actions, and the more imperative the need not to take the first step without considering the last (On War, 584).

The most important function of strategic thinking is to look at a war holistically and proceed from the desired end state. The aim of any war is to achieve a desired end state by force against the opponent’s will and to reach a peace settlement that is in accordance with one’s own ideas.

The War Plan Within the scope of a strategy, a purposive plan and the objectives of a war are defined. Clausewitz provides the following definition: “Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose.

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In other words, he will draft the plan of the war” (Italics added by the author, On War, 177). Smith refers to the fact that Clausewitz’s concepts of a Kriegsplan and große Kriegführung are interpreted as being a grand strategy, a national strategy and a national policy from a contemporary point of view. Clausewitz uses a variety of terms, including strategy, for the planning, conduct and conclusion of a campaign (Cf. Smith, 2004, 281, Note 8). The term Kriegsplan is the title of Book Eight and of Chap. 9 and is used (25 times) in On War. The term große Kriegführung is used only twice. Clausewitz calls this level ganze Kriegführung (7) or simply Kriegführung (28). In the Notes of On War, Clausewitz specifies his concept of the war plan discussed in Book Eight as the organisation of a war as a whole (see Chap. 6 for extracts). In Book One, he concludes: The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. It will be given detailed study later, in the chapter on war plans (Italics added by the author, On War, 88 f.).

This first act of judgement, which consists in the statesman and commander understanding the kind of war on which they are embarking, is decisive for developing the war plan. Conducting a war “requires a thorough grasp of national policy” (On War, 111). This requirement is of particular importance when Clausewitz’s theory is applied in strategy consulting and in the training and education of future commanders. Finally, he adds in Book Eight: “War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war––or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so––without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail” (Italics added by the author, On War, 579). After thorough consideration of what means are appropriate, a war plan is to be developed envisaging the employment of military means to achieve a situation that renders the enemy powerless. In this context, we must differentiate between three objects: “the armed forces, the country, and the enemy’s will” (On War, 90). The enemy’s forces must be put in such a condition that they cannot carry on the fight successfully and the country must be occupied. Only when the enemy’s will has been broken and a peace treaty has been signed can a war be considered over (Cf. On War, 90 f.). Clausewitz introduces the concept of the war plan below the concept of strategy so that all the aspects of warfare can be included and coordinated in a purposeful manner. He puts it at the top of a hierarchy of planning documents consisting of

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Strategy

Government

War plan

Government, consultation by commander

Campaign plan

Government and commander

Battle plan

Commander with general staff

Fig. 6.5 Strategy, war plan, campaign plan, battle plan and corresponding responsibilities

campaign and battle plans which help the government and the commander to determine the way in which they will conduct a war (see Fig. 6.5). As already explained, it is only in the final phase of his studies that Clausewitz recognises the importance of the war plan, which covers all the dimensions of military operations even after the beginning of hostilities. It turns war into an act serving a specific purpose and defines the requisite effort and means. As the methods of conducting a war provided for in strategies and plans may have severe consequences for the overarching political strategy, the distinction made between a war plan, a national strategy and a military strategy remains somewhat unclear. On the other hand, any change in a strategy inevitably has effects on the courses of military action that can be taken. Political decision-makers should therefore understand the fundamentals of the military strategy and commanders should be familiar with the political and diplomatic priorities and with strategic contexts. “Clearing my own mind” are the words Clausewitz uses in his Notes to say that when considering the sense of purpose of a war, the commander must think beyond the level of action and relate the war itself, its tendencies and its influences to the overarching policy. This is why he begins to partially revise the following books on the basis of an idea he frames precisely in Book One. The Fascinating Trinity is the synthesis of these considerations, representing an overarching coordinate system that combines all the theoretical aspects with action in war to form a whole. Generally speaking, the war plan is defined as a comprehensive compilation of the objectives and strategies for concrete human action aimed at achieving overarching political purposes in the face of resistance and frictional influences. It is the yardstick for measuring the effectiveness of all planned military operations, makes military action calculable and so forms the basis for the preparation, beginning and conduct of wars and the subsequently attainment of peace settlements. The war plan marks the turning point in Clausewitz’s work. Its importance has not yet been discussed in the literature on Clausewitz. The view today is that a strategy covers the whole spectrum of security risks, which goes far beyond military aspects. The means a state can employ in the twentyfirst century include diplomatic, economic, financial, legal, technological and humanitarian instruments. A strategy develops methods of governmental action designed to minimise security risks and optimise chances. A war plan is the plan for turning a national strategy into action aimed at dealing with a specific scenario

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and combines all the priorities, areas of employment and methods of action for the armed forces. It states the overarching political purpose and the resulting intermediate and ultimate objectives, defines the scale of means and effort and specifies details for operational planning. The hierarchy formed by the strategy, war plan and employment of armed forces can be comprehended with the aid of Clausewitz’s theory. The question is: What government has the courage to initiate this strategic procedure? The analysis of the pith of Clausewitz’s writings in Chap. 5 of this study and the detailed study of concepts in Chap. 6 conclude the discussion of his theory. The resulting question is: What practical value does this theory have for the resolution of wars in the twenty-first century? Or to put it more generally: What practical value does this theory have for the resolution of complex high-risk conflicts with a belligerent opponent? The implementation of a theoretical and philosophical construct in political practice is a difficult step that requires thorough thinking in accordance with the aforementioned principle eppur si muove. According to Clausewitz, a highly developed mind does this with the speed of lightning. In practice, political decision-making is de facto dominated by what has priority, is a long-term necessity and make sense. Two steps are taken to solve this dilemma. The first is in Chap. 7, in which the changed parameters of war in the twenty-first century and the collective solution are discussed. It is obvious that the concepts and methods of the past are no longer adequate to grasp the essence and thoroughly describe these hybrid forms of war. This is a deficit that only holistic and in-depth analyses can eliminate. To highlight the significance that Clausewitz’s theory still has today when it comes to comprehending current conflicts, five examples are provided to demonstrate the methodological approach that must be taken to apply Clausewitz’s main ideas. Finally, Chap. 8 deals with the methodology that should be used and the priorities that should be established in strategy consulting at national government level in order to help resolve wars in the twenty-first century.

Bibliography Clausewitz’s Works von Clausewitz, C. (1990). Schriften – Aufsätze – Studien – Briefe. Dokumente aus dem Clausewitz, Scharnhorst- und Gneisenau – Nachlass sowie aus öffentlichen und privaten Sammlungen. Werner Hahlweg (Ed.), Vol. II. Göttingen.

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Works on Clausewitz Aron, R. (1980a). Clausewitz: Den Krieg denken. Frankfurt a.M.: Propyläen-Verlag. Aron, R. (1980b). Zum Begriff einer politischen Strategie bei Clausewitz. In ClausewitzGesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg? Beiträge zur Strategie-Diskussion der Gegenwart im Spiegel der Theorie von Carl von Clausewitz (pp. 42–55). Bonn, Dümmler. Beckmann, R. (2011). Clausewitz trifft Luhmann. Eine systemtheoretische Interpretation von Clausewitz' Handlungstheorie. Wiesbaden. Boston Consulting (Eds.). (2003). Clausewitz-Strategie denken. Munich. Daase, C. (2007). Clausewitz and small wars. In H. Strachan & A. Herberg-Rothe (Eds.), Clausewitz in the twenty-first century (pp. 182–195). Oxford: Oxford University Press. de Jomini, B. (1854). Summary of the art of war or a new analytical compend of the principal combinations of strategy, of grand tactics and of military policy. Translated from French by Major O. F. Winship and Lieut. E. E. McLean, New York. Echevarria, A. J., II. (2007). Clausewitz and contemporary war. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hahlweg, W. (1967). Typologie des modernen Kleinkrieges. Stuttgart. Hahlweg, W. (1969a). Umformungen im Militärwesen und das Verhältnis von Theorie und Praxis. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 19(4), 181–195. Hahlweg, W. (1969b). Clausewitz: Soldat-Politiker-Denker. Göttinge: Musterschmidt Verlag. Hahlweg, W. (1973). Das Clausewitzbild einst und jetzt. In C. von Clausewitz (Ed.), Vom Kriege. Bonn: Dümmlers Verlag. Hahlweg, W. (1980a). Clausewitz und der Guerillakrieg. In Clausewitz-Gesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg (pp. 349–358). Bonn: Dümmler. Hahlweg, W. (1980b). Philosophie und Theorie bei Clausewitz. In Clausewitz-Gesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg (pp. 325–332). Bonn: Dümmler. Hahlweg, W. (1990). Clausewitz: Schriften-Aufsätze-Studien-Briefe (Vol. 2). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Handel, M. (Ed.). (1986). Clausewitz and modern strategy. London: CASS. Herberg-Rothe, A. (2000). Clausewitz und Hegel. Ein heuristischer Vergleich. Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte, 10(1), 49–84. Herberg-Rothe, A. (2001). Das Rätsel Clausewitz. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Herberg-Rothe, A. (2004). Staatenkrieg und nicht-staatliche Kriege in Clausewitz’ Vom Kriege. In T. Jäger et al. (Eds.), Sicherheit und Freiheit - Festschrift für Wilfried von Bredow zum 60. Baden-Baden: Geburtstag. Heuss, T. (1951). Deutsche Gestalten. Studien zum 19. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Wunderlich. Kinross, S. (2004). Clausewitz and low-intensity conflict. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 27(1), 35–58. Langendorf, J.-J. (2008). Krieg führen: Antoine-Henri Jomini. Zürich: Vdf Hochschulverlag. Paret, P. (1980b). Die politischen Ansichten von Clausewitz. In Clausewitz-Gesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg (pp. 333–348). Bonn: Dümmler. Paret, P. (2008, February). Anmerkungen zu Clausewitz. In Denkwürdigkeiten, 43, Berlin. Paret, P. (2010). Clausewitz society lecture given on 15 October. Berlin: Humboldt University. Pirsig, R. (1974). Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. New York: Bantam Press. Schmidt, A. (2007). Carl von Clausewitz, kriegstheoretische Konzeption und geschichtsphilosophische Hintergründe. In L. Souchon (Ed.), Romantik, Deutscher Idealismus, Hegel und Clausewitz. Clausewitz-Information 1/2007. Hamburg: Bundeswehr Command and Staff College. Schössler, D. (2009). Clausewitz-Engels-Mahan: Grundriss einer Ideengeschichte militärischen Denkens. Berlin: Dümmler. Schramm, W. R. (1965). Von der klassischen Kriegsphilosophie zur zeitgerechten Wehrverfassung. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 15(9), 493–511. Smith, H. (2004). On Clausewitz – A study of military and political ideas. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Stahel, A. A. (2004). Klassiker der Strategie (4th ed.). Zürich: Hochschulverlag an der ETH. Strachan, H. (2007a). A Clausewitz for every season. The American Interest, 29–35. July/August 2007. Strachan, H. (2007c). Carl von Clausewitz’s on war: a biography. London: Atlantic Books. Strickmann, E. (2008). Clausewitz im Zeitalter der neuen Kriege: Der Krieg in Ruanda (1990–1994) im Spiegel der “wunderlichen Dreifaltigkeit”. Berlin: Galda. von Boguslawski, A. (1881). Abriss der Kriegskunst von Jomini. Berlin: Dresden. Wagemann, E. (1980a). Hilfe von Clausewitz. Versuch einer Bestandsaufnahme militärpolitischer und strategischer Probleme der Gegenwart im Lichte des theoretischen Ansatzes von Clausewitz. In Clausewitz-Gesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg (pp. 23–38). Bonn: Dümmler. Wagemann, E. (1980b). Zwischenbilanz einer Bestandsaufnahme. In Clausewitz-Gesellschaft (Ed.), Freiheit ohne Krieg (pp. 397–409). Bonn: Dümmler. Woermann, Wilhelm (1970). Personal effects, lecture and seminar materials. In the possession of the author of this study. Woermann, W. (2007). Carl von Clausewitz – Die Hauptlineamente seiner Ansicht vom Kriege. In L. Souchon (Ed.), Clausewitz-Information 3/2007. Hamburg: Bundeswehr Command and Staff College.

Further Literature Dobel, R. (Ed.). (1991). Goethe Zitate. Augsburg: Weltbild. Goethe’s Works illustrated by the best German artists (1885). Vols. 5. W. Meister’s travels; Elective affinities. G. Barrie (Ed.). Philadelphia. Retrieved February 11, 2020, from http://oll. libertyfund.org/titles/goethe-goethes-works-vol-5-w-meisters-travels-elective-affinities Hegel, G. F. W. (1952). Phänomenologie des Geistes. New Edition. Hamburg. Kant, I. (1940). Theorie und Praxis. In F. Meiner (Ed.), Taschenausgabe der “Philosophischen Bibliothek” (Vol. 8). Leipzig: Hinrichs. Lay, H. (1986). Die Rekonstruktion der Hegelschen Logik. In D. Heinrich (Ed.), Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik (pp. 77–93). Stuttgart. Münkler, H. (2002a). Die neuen Kriege. Reinbek: Filderstadt Weinmann. Münkler, H. (2002b). Über den Krieg: Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer theoretischen Reflexion. Göttingen: Velbrück Wissenschaft. van Creveld, M. (2001). Die Zukunft des Krieges (2nd ed.). Munich: Murmann. von Bernhardi, F. (1912). Vom heutigen Kriege. Berlin: Mittler.

Chapter 7

War in the Twenty-First Century

Abstract Souchon describes the fundamental change in the security risks and the objectives, intensities and results of the conflicts in today’s world. Wars undergo a process of tectonic decentralisation and globalisation. In the twenty-first century combinations of Islamist hyperterrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional wars, state failure, mass migration and organised crime that are intensified by cyberspace attacks and climate change are forcing the Western community to reassess all strategic approaches thoroughly. The powerful rise of China, the resurrection of Russia, new nuclear states and global operating terrorist forces increase the challenges in the post-Cold War order. In this chapter the striking deficits in coping with conflicts in the twenty-first century are identified and a fundamental change in strategic thinking will be provided.

Global Risks and War The early twenty-first century is marked by a fundamental change in the risks posed around the world and the objectives, intensities and results of the wars waged. The loss of values, of religious and social bonds and of customs and traditions, the absence of an understanding of history and of civic and cultural education and the lack of the ability to comprehend the essence of wars are leading to a deficiency of will and strategic action in politics. The absence of a globally recognised superpower that takes the political and moral lead, of a common will to maintain peace and of a strategy for doing so is leading to the failure of the power exerted in collective measures to minimise global risks. The powerful rise of China and the resurrection of Russia increase the challenges in the post-Cold War order. The dangers that arise are increasing dynamically in size and assuming such global dimensions that they ultimately pose a threat to the very further existence of humanity. The global financial crises since 2008 are proof of the loss of the ability to exercise political control and have prompted the governments of the industrialised states to initiate large-scale bailouts and economic stimulus programmes. These crisis measures have so far prevented further failure of the money and capital © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Souchon, Strategy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0_7

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markets and a plunge in the global economy. The need for the decisions to be made in a minimum of time and amid immense pressure has downright overrun the responsible politicians and is symptomatic of the form of crisis management prevalent in the twenty-first century and its focus on response. It reveals not only a growing responsibility on the part of the state to eliminate evident risks in due time, but also a profound lack of strategic thinking and action for it to actually do so. The long sequence of interstate and civil wars in the history of Europe is today being extended by warlike actions committed by violent non-governmental, terrorist, criminal and mercenary protagonists. As a result of this, dangers to Euro-Atlantic security today result from a regionalisation of the conflict geography and a transnationalisation of the engaging actors. A complex conflict landscape in which tectonic changes can take place without warning has evolved around Europe and across the globe. They are accompanied by numerous conflicts over resources, threats from cyberspace and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This change in the risk situation, the dynamics of which lie irrevocably in Asia and Africa, is having a significant influence on international security. At the same time, complex geostrategic risk zones in the Levant and the Maghreb extend across the Mediterranean Sea to the periphery of Europe. Radical Islamist terrorism has created conflicts that are generating low-intensity wars in geopolitical regions on the periphery of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia and in Africa and South America. War zones in which the protagonists are globally networked are forming. Space, time, forces, information and knowledge are becoming global factors in preventive security. This combination of risks has not yet been the subject of holistic strategic considerations that rule out the development of a threatening situation similar to that at the times of the global financial crises. The instruments that are indispensable for solving these problems are in-depth analyses of the situations, procedures for making decisions within an extremely narrow time span, resolute action and a strategy capability that is supported by a discourse in society. The international security situation at the beginning of the twenty-first century is threatened by emerging global powers and by a combination of transnational risks such as international Islamist terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberattacks, state failure, migration, organised crime, the threat to energy security and sea lines of communication as well as the privatisation and economisation of the use of military force. These risks are cited in the European Security Strategy of the European Union (2003), the New Strategic Concept of NATO (2010), and in the White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (2016). The effects of global economic and financial crises, natural disasters, drug and human trafficking, pandemics, demographic revolutions, existential impoverishment and migration towards western industrialised states and climate change are aggravating the global security situation. The transnational risks are creating new forms of conflicts and grey areas in international politics and eroding the state monopoly on the use of force that has been firmly established since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Like the brigands in the fourteenth century, that is to say, mercenary armies who have no work to go back to after a campaign and so besiege, storm and plunder towns and cities and occupied whole regions, the

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fighters in the twenty-first century finance themselves by engaging in drug, human and arms trafficking, piracy, hostage-taking, blackmail and highway robbery. Constituting around 10 % of world trade, drug trafficking alone has been a lucrative source of income in a global shadow economy for years. The elimination or at least limitation of these risks in geographically remote areas or on a global scale is a highly complex task for strategic thinking and action in the twenty-first century. The Islamist terrorist attacks (2001) in New York and Washington reveal the vulnerability of high-tech western industrialised societies and once and for all demand a change of thinking about external preventive security. Today, there are conflicts in an extensive part of the world that includes large areas of Africa, such as Darfur/Central Africa, the Horn of Africa region, sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb. The conflicts in the Middle East region, with Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Yemen, remain unsolved and the tensions in the Caucasus continue to smoulder. Iran’s grey areas ambitions and threats against Israel as well as it’s confrontation with Saudi Arabia must be regarded as particularly dangerous. In addition, there are warlike developments in Central Asia, notably in Afghanistan and the areas bordering on Pakistan, and a latent conflict between North and South Korea, which is being further exacerbated by the nuclearized communist regime in the North. China and India present themselves as independent actors in these Asian areas of conflict. War has undergone a process of tectonic decentralisation and globalisation to which the European powers have not adapted their strategic thinking, action and capabilities. The fight against Islamist terrorism, in combination with the effort to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, is being conducted in a climate of threat created by a scarcity of resources and environmental destruction and with strategies of the past centuries. War in the twenty-first century is changing its form because interstate wars are becoming a rarity. War is shifting to geographically remote regions. Globalisation, information networking, the loss of statehood and the international Islamist demonisation of western societies and democratic values are providing the worldwide Jihad operational advantages, global springboards and a breeding ground for motives. Lightly armed terrorist opponents are being fought over lengthy periods of time in low-intensity war conditions. In addition to being denationalised, signs can be seen of war being decivilised, criminalised and commercialised. (Cf. Münkler, 2002a, 131 ff.) The host of risks posed at the beginning of the twenty-first century and the challenges that will arise in Europe, on its periphery and at the strategic level will not so much have to be contained on a nation-state basis, but rather collectively by an association of willing states and globally. The absence of appropriate strategic planning means that international politics will continue to be characterised by nation-states making ad-hoc decisions that enhance these tendencies even more. The legal norm Responsibility to Protect was decisive in legitimising NATO’s air war in support of the insurgents in Libya. Although this intervention was operational successful in terms of the achievement of the objective, it intensified the erosion of state monopoly on the use of force.

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War at Market Places The kind of action in which use is made of military force has changed from industrialised wars in the twentieth century to stints of fighting at marketplaces, in suburbs and in rural areas. Complex military weapons systems such as fighter bombers, armoured artillery and main battle tanks are being used in civilian environments. Military force is engaged under government control and within the bounds of international law. The hitherto applicable taxonomy of peace-crisis-war no longer exists; peace and war virtually constitute a continuum. Winning the hearts and minds of the people in the combat zones becomes an important objective. The essence of war, the priorities regarding the use of armed forces and the courses of actions governments can adopt have undergone elementary change, and this must be taken into consideration in the development of a strategy. As wars change their guise, western armies are clashing not only with non-governmental actors, regional warlords, ethnic factions, militias, paramilitary groups, but also with Islamist terrorists, guerrilla organisations, private violent protagonists, elements of organised crime and possibly with other nations in grey area zones. Despite the specifics, these warring parties also proceed purposefully in their rationality and have to contend with clearly identifiable conditions, chance events and probabilities of many kinds. It is necessary to comprehend the rationality of these groups of enemies and draw the right conclusions for devising effective counterstrategies. Every attempt to divide them complementarily into traditional or conventional and into asymmetric or irregular opponents in war has proved completely old-fashioned and erroneous since recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan and Sub-Sahara Africa. Numerous theories have been developed over the past decades in an effort to analyse the global forms of war and to define terms for them. Terms like Neue Kriege (New Wars) by Kaldor and Münkler and Low Intensity Conflicts by van Creveld are offerings in which individual aspects of present-day wars are highlighted as characteristic features. The change in the forms of denationalised wars is reflected in the discourses and regulations of the US Army on modern warfare, the terms used there being Three Block War, Full Spectrum Operations, Asymmetric Warfare, Counter Insurgency Warfare and Hybrid Warfare. As these terms emphasise sub-aspects of the twenty-first century wars and generalise them with keywords, none of the concepts gets to the heart of present and future wars, which will constantly change in their form. The globalisation of information, communication and human mobility and the evolution of global transport routes have resulted in all the regions of this world being interlinked. Systematic use is being made of this result by international terrorists for the purpose of waging wars. The states fighting terrorism usually react by improving the capabilities and extending the ranges of their sophisticated weapons. They abide by the hitherto applicable principles of military warfare, merely transforming them with the intent of maximising what is available. Taking

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this approach is an error because account is not taken of the challenges posed by twenty-first century wars. Decades after the disintegration of the cold-war confrontation of superpowers, United States and European armed forces, whose equipment and training are of a higher quality than those of most armies in the world, are deployed in many regional wars and conflicts. The concepts of today’s elite leaders are deeply anchored in those associated with traditional interstate wars, which feature the conduct of combined arms combat operations by large land components and the use of air warfare units and naval fleets. The opponents, however, avoid open battles in the field. They opt for irregular combat tactics which largely limit or indeed neutralise the effective use of superior military technology in strictly regulated operations. The methods applied by terrorist opponents follow a common basic pattern of fighting a state government or an invading power. (Cf. Cronin, 2008, 17 ff.) 1. Terrorist attacks are perpetrated to provoke a state or invading power and compel them to take counteraction. When backed by guerrilla activities, they may culminate in a civil war. 2. The escalation in action and counteraction leads to the polarisation of the people vis-a-vis the state or invading power. The people are divided into those who sympathise with terrorist attacks and those who oppose them. 3. This is followed by a phase in which the people are mobilised by propaganda, the terrorists provide welfare services and the attacks become more radical. A campaign aimed at recruiting volunteer fighters is launched and propagated via the Internet. 4. High-intensity terrorist measures are conducted in extreme concentrations to press the opposing power into making maximum use of its assets or pulling out. 5. The state or invading power concerned is delegitimised and fought openly. A special and particularly dangerous form of terrorism is that conducted by the global network Al Qaida and islamistic terrorism. They regard themselves as the spearhead of a global insurrection by the Muslim world against the West’s cultural and economic dominance. The Taliban, operating in Afghanistan and in Pakistan against the Afghan National Army and ISAF, are more of a guerrilla organisation, as they pursue a strategy aimed at building a counter state. All terrorist organisations—Islamic State, the Taliban and Al Qaida—recruit fighters with a mixture of Islamist doctrine, myths of success, ideologies, sources of income and ways of life. Their world view focuses on the fanatic fight against Western values and intervention. Offering no visions, they aim to use the global Jihad to implement the Sharia in support of an Islamist model of society. The assumption of power by the Islamic State, the Taliban and Al Qaida would mean the acceptance of deeply religious Muslim values and moral concepts and an appropriate sharia government without an intact civil society, without civil liberties and without legal security. Such a state would not survive for long as its problems would be aggravated by a lack of capacity for technological innovation, infrastructure and economic prospects. Considering that an Arabic version of Clausewitz’s On War with hand-written notes was found in one of Al Qaida’s safe havens in Pakistan,

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however, the quality of its leaders must on no account be underrated. (Cf. Smith, 2008) There have been wars throughout the history of mankind, and the mutation in their nature has corresponded to developments in society. (Cf. Chap. 1) While terrorism is not a new kind of violence, globalisation nevertheless allows it to assume a form and achieve a degree of effectiveness that exceed anything conceived to date. A particular challenge is posed by a highly motivated terrorist opponent who, operating covertly, is an element in a flat hierarchy that is organised locally, but forms part of a global network. It must be borne in mind that an opposing violent enemy who wears no uniform, appears from within a crowd, disappears and reappears elsewhere makes systematic use of his advantages and himself chooses how and with what means he wants to fight . • He defines the target, the place, the time and the intensity of the acts of violence that are planned. • He has the initiative and can exploit all elements of surprise. • He uses simple tactics and light weapons, up to and including self-made explosive devices, combined with a minimum logistic support and short training, • He fights covertly or blows himself up. • He operates alone, in groups or with entire formations. The violent protagonist spreads fear and terror by killing civilians indiscriminately and even gains power in the setting of the media’ agenda. This form of war, also known as Hybrid War is a combination of terrorist, irregular and conventional acts of violence and simmers at a low level of intensity. (Cf. Hoffmann, 2009) The belligerent opponent dictates the intensity of the fighting, responds flexibly to countermeasures and is adaptive in his concepts of operations. Such an opponent will not be defeated in any operation involving the leadership culture of world wars past that, though now obsolete, is sustained by a sense of moral superiority. The essence of the change in how terrorists wage war today has not yet been understood. Hence, there is a latent danger of standards being disregarded for tactical reasons in the fight against terrorists and the basic consensus in society being destroyed as a result. The emergence of low-intensity wars compels western democracies to justify the purposes and objectives of military intervention. No convincing justification has so far been provided for deploying armed forces to resolve social conflicts, establish democratic conditions and end military disputes at transnational level. Freedman distinguishes between strategic and tactical terrorism. (Cf. Freedman, 2007, 314 ff.) The international terrorists of Al-Qaida number among those engaging in strategic terrorism, while the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan must preferably be assigned to those involved in the tactical variety. Terrorist organisations function with individual fighters—frequently suicide bombers—or with small groups, in networks or with regular armed forces and focusses on geographical regions where there is no central government authority— on so-called failed states. The primary objectives of its international Islamist

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operations is to achieve a coercive effect in the international information environment by committing mass killings of civilians. This group accepts the condemnation of its terrorist attacks by the local people and the deaths of the victims, most of whom are fellow Muslims. Spectacular terrorist attacks create an apocalyptic scenario in advanced information societies. The establishment of this new quality in terrorism in the virtual information environment is aimed at exerting power over the industrialised states. It offers great advantages as the information societies are vulnerable and retaliatory measures in cyberspace are often ineffective. What is more, the offensive use of the virtual battlefield is rated as attack or propaganda and therefore rejected in Germany. As a guerrilla organisation, the Taliban pursue the defensive aim of preventing the foreign troops in Afghanistan and also parts of Pakistan from gaining victory for so long that they finally withdraw, leaving the Taliban to establish a regional counterstate and to present themselves as an important element in the effort to form a government. They proceed purposively and rationally on Afghan territory and use terrorist methods and means. They instrumentalise the rejection of the foreign military presence and the measures taken by the troops with a view to winning the support of the Afghan people. Clashes between high-tech western armed forces and Islamist terrorists or guerrilla fighters cannot yield classical victories. Large-scale military offensives are highly unlikely to yield overwhelming successes in low-intensity wars. The fundamental question is: What promising ways of fighting terrorism do exist? The renowned International Institute for Strategic Studies in London has conducted research on the conditions required for successfully putting an end to terrorist movements and published its findings in an Adelphi paper. It distinguishes between six approaches and rates their prospects of success. (Cf. Cronin, 2008, 28 ff.) 1. The killing capture and presentation of their leaders to the public. Their rejection of violence is advantageous. This option was taken, for example, by the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, who was arrested by Turkey in 1999. For this method to work, it is important to check who will follow the leader. The probability of this approach putting an end to a terrorist movement is rather slight. 2. Destroying terrorism with overwhelming military power. This usually generates splinter groups which scatter to the four winds. Sometimes, several rivalling groups unite as a consequence of large-scale military operations. This approach seldom reaches the diaspora of sympathisers. The best examples are the paramilitary Irish Republican Army (IRA), which fought for the liberation of Northern Ireland from British rule, or the radical-nationalist ETA (Basque for Basque Country and Freedom), which campaigns for the liberation of the Basque Country from Spain. The prospects of destroying a terrorist movement in this way are also rather slight.

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3. An end is put to a terrorist movement in 4% of the cases in which terrorist groups with clear targets, good equipment and public support achieve great success and a larger process of power-political change takes place, such as decolonialisation. 4. Government negotiations with terrorists yield good prospects of an end being put to a terrorist movement if its organisations have been in place for at least 4–6 years. Sometimes, the terrorists split up into moderate and radical splinter groups. 5. Terrorist movements can show signs of disintegration if they lose public support or are hit by power struggles that prevent centralised control from being exercised. However, this has seldom put an end to them. 6. History shows that criminalising terrorists or drawing them into a regular war likewise renders the prospects of success in destroying them rather slight. The analysis of all the lessons from history shows that there is only one promising way of negotiating with terrorist opponents. The degree to which negotiations proceed favourably is relative to the stoutness of the government’s position in comparison to the weakness of the terrorists. The armed forces of industrialised states must be prepared for protracted low-intensity wars against terrorist opponents—involving efforts to achieve effects in cyberspace and the information environment. In order to successfully wage a war against terrorists in their cultural regions, the initial step is to understand its characteristics, then to define prudent methods of counteraction. Military, diplomatic, criminological, information-related, economic and financial capabilities, combined, for example, in a purpose-built task group, must complement each other. The first step the governments must take is to shift the conceptual focus, in a move calling for the development of theoretical fundamentals and standards for cutting the Gordian knot. The second step is to consolidate public support for the war against terrorism in their countries. Once this has been achieved, they must initiate the security policy and military planning steps described. As substantiated in great detail, the world-recognised standard work On War offers a profound and fundamental method for analysing wars. Clausewitz abstracts military conflicts, transferring them to the domain of public life with its intrinsic tendencies and characteristics and grasping their basic rational, irrational and emotional elements. His theory enables a handle to be gained of the characteristics of a protracted lowintensity war fought against fanatical terrorists. His synthesis of the acquisition of theoretical knowledge on war is uniquely suited to allowing complex decisionmaking situations to be handled by enabling the main lineaments (Hauptlineamente) to be purposefully identified and structured, a standpoint to be specified, human factors to be taken into account, options to be developed and courageous decisions to be made. Every war is composed of action and counteraction taken by equal actors in a dynamic interplay, influenced by probability and chance and the resulting friction. These alter the course that a war has been planned to take and offer dynamic leeway for courageous action. Clausewitz presents the moral qualities of the commander as an important element because his intellectual and emotional abilities decide on

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victory or defeat when the purpose has to be pursued amid friction, under extremely adverse conditions and against an opponent who fights flexibly and covertly. Hence, the following thesis is framed: A commander will be successful in the twenty-first century if he is familiar with the fundamental tendencies and characteristics of war and bases his decisions on them—even under highly exerting circumstances. All of Clausewitz’s theoretical analyses of war start and end in reality. A commander can take Clausewitz’s method of thinking with him on his way to war, but he is offered no handbook for success. Clausewitz’s work “provides training for the mind in recognising and independently assessing war and its characteristics in their entirety. It is an education course, creating clear concepts, allowing the spirit of things to be grasped in the inner correlation and offering valid standards, in other words a basis for judgement.” (Vom Kriege, Hahlweg, 1973, 8 f.) On account of their range and benefit, consideration must be given to the following ways of making practical use of his thoughts on education, character and leadership qualities: 1. The current courses of study for political and military decision-makers must be scrutinised to examine their adequacy for the future, to assess how Clausewitz’s theory can be adapted and to correct it as necessary. 2. The concepts regarding the qualities and mental capabilities of leaders must be examined on the basis of Clausewitz’s criteria to determine their continued relevance. This requires the education and socialisation of military commanders and political decision-makers to be evaluated and current training courses to be adapted. 3. Leaders must be trained to be mentally agile, adaptive and creative in the way they handle action affected by friction without memorising checklist procedures. This calls for careful handling of critical objections. Clausewitz’s work is invaluable for commanding armed forces or managing large civilian enterprises in critical confrontations. His lines of thought are path-breaking for twenty-first century strategists. They are a premise for the education of the minds of future leaders. He offers a systemic way of thinking for dealing with complex disputes in all areas of society in which objectives and ideas of large organisations rival with those of others and can only be realised in the face of matching resistance with considerable effort—and amid high risks. A major hindrance to this is posed by the old-fashioned concepts and traditional definitions, which stand in the way of any new start.

Collective Security Strategies In addition to terrorist challenges to the West’s security, there are numerous conflicts and crises in which the international community sees itself compelled to intervene militarily to keep or restore peace. The practiced procedure follows the rules of the Truman order. The United Nations Security Council issues a mandate for military

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intervention. The troops usually succeed in stabilising the security situation and forcing the parties involved to separate. Although the troops are usually unfamiliar with the cultures, religions, customs and traditions in the areas in which they are deployed and do not generally speak the native languages, they are highly appreciated as they work with civilian forces on establishing statehood and building a civil society and bring in money. The idea of using multinational intervention armies to end states of war and bring peace is an example of wishful thinking that remains persistent in the twenty-first century. International contingents do not manage to resolve ethnic, religious or terrorist conflicts in other regions. This becomes evident when an objective look is taken at the result of the approaches adopted by the collective institutions. Armed forces are usually deployed in peacekeeping or peacemaking missions under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO).

The United Nations What is the result of the UN peacekeeping and peacemaking missions so far? The first peacekeeping missions were launched in 1948 in the Middle East, in 1949 in India/Pakistan, in 1953 in North/South Korea, in 1958 in the Lebanon and in 1964 in Cyprus, though none of these have been terminated yet. To be honest, the result of UN missions to date must be considered marginal. The idea of using external troops to avert or end wars, prevent disastrous violations of human rights and render emergency aid is commendable. In reality, however, these missions fail because they are not thought through to the end holistically. A look at how an intervention is conceived to proceed helps to clarify this. At the beginning of a crisis, regional civil actors and institutions frequently fail to have an effect. When it comes to resolving a conflict or consolidating peace, this effect, and others that usually have to be achieved militarily, must be attained with the intervention of external forces. The causal chain that initially exists in a crisis, composed of personal, ethnic, structural or historical causes, cannot be loosened with military forces alone. The use of civilian instruments becomes necessary. This phase is followed by the nation building phase, that is to say, a phase in which support is provided in the building of governmental and social structures with the aim of returning responsibility to regional, civil decision-makers. The result is a paradox situation: The deployment of military forces is necessary to maintain or restore peace. If success is achieved in protecting the people and stabilising the peace established in the country in which they are deployed, civil administrative, service, judiciary law enforcement institutions and military forces are required. Key support in the building of governmental institutions and a civil society is provided by external non-governmental organisations (NGOs). When this process has been completed, the choice of the right time for responsibility to be successfully handed over from the UN intervention force and the NGOs to the country’s own

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institutions is of pivotal importance for bringing the crisis management operation to a successful conclusion. Finally, the military and civil forces of the external powers are withdrawn and power is transferred to a democratically legitimated government. This cycle has not been completed successfully even once in recent decades. There is no strategy for UN peacekeeping and peacemaking missions; at best, there are operational objectives. This fault is not due to a lack of foresight on the part of the UN. It is more a case of accentuated national and often post-colonial interests, complex organisation and decision-making structures, drawn-out coordination procedures and verbose compromises dictating the deployment of UN contingents. What is more, the UN is in the midst of several long-standing crises: Capacity crisis: In 2016, the UN deployed an all-time high 117,000 blue helmets troops in 16 missions. This cost it almost 8 billion USD per annum, roughly triple the UN regular budget for 2017. (Cf. IISS, Armed Conflict Survey, 13) Further missions have been undertaken. Legitimation crisis: The UN’s organisational structure is dysfunctional. The Security Council can outvote a General Assembly that is meanwhile composed of 193 nations. Every single permanent member (the USA, the People’s Republic of China, Russia, the United Kingdom and France) can veto any Security Council resolution and so prevent it from being implemented. The Security Council is not accountable to the General Assembly and can even outvote it and bring about changes in international law. Since the bombing attack on the United Nations in Iraq (2003), UN peacekeeping forces have often been seen as part of the intervention forces. Reform logjam: Of 101 proposals made by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, only two were implemented during his time in office. (Cf. Pleuger, 2006) Fundamental thought must be given to the functionality of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United Nations—a core element of Truman’s world order—lacks promise as an instrument of collective security. Srgjan Kerim, the president of the 62nd session of the United Nations General Assembly, concludes: “The world needs the UN—but not that of today!” (Kerim, 2008). Today, the United Nations is not an effective element of international peacekeeping, but at most a body for government-level talks.

The European Union The EU is severely handicapped by the great differences in the regulatory, economic, historical and military backgrounds of the member states and can do only little at international level. In its 2003 security strategy, it is accurate in citing the international security risks, but only vague in framing its own objectives. It has no agreed method for taking action, meaning no European strategy, and there is nothing even that resembles one in the slightest. Despite the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), decision-making in the EU remains an intergovernmental matter; any one of the members represented in the European

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Council can vote “no” and so block the complete decision-making process in the European Union. As the member states from Central Eastern and Western Europe differ in their perception of risks, accentuated differently, reaching agreement on any decision is time-consuming and calls for compromise. The BREXIT is likely to hamper future prospects in that matter. Security provision in Europe hence remains a primary responsibility of the individual nation-states.

The North Atlantic Alliance Years after intervening in Afghanistan, NATO frames the objectives of the ISAF troops for the first time. In 2010, agreement is reached on a clearly defined concept of collective action, the New Strategic Concept, even though it does not bridge the gaps in strategic thinking and action and capabilities between the American armed forces and the European allies with regard to Central Asia. The NATO decision-making process is similar to that of the EU; it is intergovernmental. This means that all the member states have to agree. Agreement on stringent strategies, approaches and allocations cannot therefore be expected. There is a fundamental consensus in strategic culture between France and the United Kingdom in the evaluation of strategic risks, objectives and priorities of national security policy. Both states base their national security provision on nuclear weapons and a policy of deterrence, France within and United Kingdom outside the European Union. At Atlantic level, the United States has already drawn far-reaching conclusions by institutionalising Homeland Security and modernising its nuclear and conventional forces. Europe is no longer the most important priority for the USA’s foreign policy. President Trump declared initially NATO as obsolete. Only about a fifth of the American people speak favourably of the North Atlantic Alliance. This is less than in any other allied country. The imminent Russian threat against the Baltic States in the wake of the wars against Ukraine and Georgia led to rethink reinforcement procedures and to a deterrent military posture in eastward direction. There is a need for a close multinational network of diplomatic, police, humanitarian, economic, financial and military countermeasures at both national and international level. The NATO and EU states are nowhere near meeting it. Despite the necessity to establish a responsible position in the intergovernmental decision-making process in the EU and NATO, Germany has no national security strategy. Any effort to shift Germany’s strategic focus is impeded by a number of obstacles: Firstly, short-term political party priorities, long interministerial procedures and staffing processes and institutional frictions delay any type of reform and water it down beyond recognition. Secondly, Germany neither has a theoretical approach to preparing a national strategy and promoting strategic thinking, nor wishes to have one. Thirdly, there is no synergistic cooperation between political, scientific and military experts. Fourthly, party-political manoeuvring to gain popular advantages dominates any form of holistic thinking in Germany. Winning votes has

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priority over gaining overviews and taking responsible action for the long-term future.

Conclusions The failure of the intervention and democratisation strategies after 1945 is selfevident. Nevertheless, governments continue to operate on that mental basis and send soldiers and civil actors into conflict zones just for the sake of doing something. New instruments are required to mentally approach the issue of the exceptionally complex reformation of security provision in the twenty-first century. They are needed to answer pivotal questions concerning the use of troops in multinational forces and civil organisations: What is the rationale for the action and what political purpose is being pursued? What specific objectives are meant to be achieved, by what measures—meaning by what strategy—by what means and by what date? In the case of peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, the logical answer is that stable political solutions are to be reached and end states constituted that justify the structured withdrawal of the military and civil support elements. This calls for commitment, thought and the will to accept responsibility. Everything begins with an open public discourse on security provision.

The German Bundeswehr Goethe writes (in 1828): “If we look at ourselves in any situation, we will find that we are outwardly limited, but that we have retained the highest form of freedom, that we bring ourselves into harmony with the moral world.” This central idea of Goethe about outward limitedness and the moral world was reflected by the Parliamentary Council in the spring of 1949 in the preamble of the constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany and expressed as follows: “Conscious of their responsibility before God and man, inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal member in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law.” (Italics entered by the author). The Basic Law is the capstone of Germany’s democratic order, security and prosperity. The underlying leadership concept Innere Führung reflects this purpose in the founding days of the Bundeswehr after World War II. A new phase of international relations begins with the reunification of Germany (1990) and the memberships of East-Central European states in the North Atlantic Alliance and European Union. The definition of the objectives of the Bundeswehr is one example that can highlight some of the key difficulties in reorienting armed forces so that they can meet the demands of fighting a protracted hybrid war in the twenty-first century. No other army has undergone such radical changes in its mission spectrum in such a short time. Over the last decades, the soldiers have had

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to bid farewell to performing peace duty in a heavy armor defence army in waiting and adjust to conducting multinational operations as elements of global intervention armies. Before the dissolution of the bipolar confrontation, the existence of Germany and other European states would have been in jeopardy if a collective defence had to be mounted against a Soviet-led surprise attack. This situation currently re-emerges after the modernisation of Russian forces, its combat experiences in Syria, the annexation of the Crimea peninsula and the order of battle against the Baltic States. Since the reunification of Germany, one of the Bundeswehr’s new priorities has been participation in missions outside Europe. Its primary purpose is to carry a fair share in the promotion of peace in the world. It is no longer existential in its nature, but an instrument of policy in Clausewitz’s sense of the term. The Bundeswehr experiences this change in the focus of its tasks in the first missions it conducts abroad, providing UN troops medical support in Cambodia (1991) and logistic support in Somalia (1992). Following a decision made by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1994, the geographical restrictions on the deployment of the Bundeswehr that have been interpreted into the Basic Law for decades are lifted without any modification to the defence and emergency legislation. What is more, a parliamentary reservation (Parlamentsvorbehalt) is decreed for Bundeswehr missions abroad. Addressing these topics leads to the issue of the primacy of politics. It stipulates that in all matters concerning the armed forces, it is the government that specifies their purposes and makes the decisions. The primacy of politics, however, is not an institutional or hierarchical principle of thinking and action, but a dynamic one. This means that the armed forces participate in the struggle to make the best decision by contributing their specialist expertise, judgement and leadership experience in matters of security until the government makes its decision. The first combat operation since World War II is conducted by the Bundeswehr without a respective United Nations mandate as part of NATO Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999). After the international Islamist terrorist attacks in New York and Washington (2001), Germany increases its participation in international operations by raising the number of soldiers deployed to up to 10,000 allowing it to then stabilise at around 7000. All the operations are planned and supported by a national command that is established in Potsdam in 2001, the Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command. Priority is assigned to improving decision-making structures, learning capabilities and adaptability, initial and follow-on training and to the intelligence sector. The changes in the security risks call for a clear-cut definition of the political purpose of the deployment of Bundeswehr assets, the provision of adequate training, equipment, the implementation of an appropriate leadership culture and the conduct of an active public debate. It calls for a fundamental review of the theoretical approaches, the methods applied to take action and the means used. Goethe’s admonition proves true (Apprenticeship, V.1): “A person can scarcely be put into a more dangerous position, than when external circumstances have produced some striking change in his condition, without his manner of feeling and of thinking having undergone any preparation for it.” (Goethe, 1901, without page)

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The gap between striking external changes in the strategic environment and unadapted preparation is particularly visible today in the Bundeswehr’s leadership culture. In his speech on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College on 15 September 2007, Federal President Köhler urges the responsible officers to actively engage in the discourse on security. He admonishes: “The soldiers also expect their military leaders to talk in plain terms to superiors and outsiders: to those responsible for foreign and defence policy and to the public.” He adds: “I therefore wish that the high-ranking Bundeswehr officers also work more to get the debate on foreign and defence policy going.” These recommendations hit the nail on the head with respect to the Bundeswehr’s rationale and leadership culture. Unfortunately, his words fade and have no further consequences. The public are not given well-founded information via mass media and social network resources on the reorientation of the Bundeswehr and its future role as a parliamentary army in international operations. There is no active public debate by the armed forces and the government on the purposes and objectives of such operations and the means that are to be used. Additional restrictions exist on the dissemination of information within the Bundeswehr. The best examples of this are the dismissals of the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, General Schneiderhan, and Undersecretary of Defense Wichert in 2009 and, finally, the resignation of President Köhler, all of which must be regarded as being connected to an inadequate flow of information within the Bundeswehr and versus the public. Today, the critical question of the extent to which the armed forces do and can assist the government and parliament in making their decisions by contributing substantial military expertise should be asked. In view of the tri-polar lines of force of Clausewitz’s Fascinating Trinity, the participation of military advisors in the preparations for political decisions is logical because a broad public discourse, the political will and the purposive and rational use of armed forces are mutually dependent. The participation of commanders in decision-making should not be limited to questions concerning the use of armed forces. It is more a matter of answering the question of the extent to which the military should be involved in the discussions on the overall political approaches, which has not been the case so far. The term war in the twenty-first century is used in this study as a collective term for the use of military force in low-intensity wars in remote countries and in wars between states as well as an external security provision measure. Hybrid states of war that favour terrorists have evolved. They use global networking of communication channels and transport routes to their advantage and operate from failing states, using organised crime methods. A fanatical opponent can get by with little financial and logistic support and little training. In the twenty-first century, this opponent erases the boundaries between violent actors and civil society and disregards international legal norms. With an eye to the psychological effect he can have on the global public due to their use of the media, he plans pin-point actions against civilian targets over a long period and usually conducts them entirely unexpectedly and with a high degree of brutality. This grey-area warfare is further operationalised by state-driven actors such as Russia during the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula with ‘little green man’ and in the cyberspace.

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The wrong answer to this form of warfare is to raise the sophistication level of military equipment issued and to sharpen tactics. Warfare in the twenty-first century must be a subject of fundamental revision of strategy. Holistic forms of fighting, incorporating all effective methods and means, must be developed. In addition the government must convince its people of the necessity of this approach because without a justified feeling of threat, there will be no long-term majority support and financing. A precondition for public support lies in information management being seen at the political level as part of the battle and appropriate regulatory measures to be taken. Another step must lie in the propaganda and disinformation campaigns of the insurgents being countered by the establishment of a broad information basis which lays the foundation for trust to develop between the government, the public and the armed forces. Another one still must be that of developing a way of altering the responses in the media, in society and in the government—in the light of global information transparency. The final step must entail taking up the fight for sovereignty in the interpretation and distribution of sensational news. In the decades since the unification of Germany and Europe and since the Bundeswehr’s involvement in the first of many operations abroad, the essential leadership qualities of a commander changes: In the twenty-first century, he is supposed to be experienced in foreign missions. He has a knowledgeable standpoint and is able to assert himself vis-à-vis superiors and subordinates and willing to put his heart and soul into supporting the soldiers under his command. His sound judgement enables him to negotiate and cooperate with civil organisations and local representatives in other countries and cultures as an equal. Summing up, the conclusions for the Bundeswehr in the twenty-first century are these: Firstly—The answer to the leading question is, that the strategy capability of the Bundeswehr is in need of elementary improvement. The upgrading must start with education in strategic thinking, continue with the participation of commanders in the public debate on strategy, become more factual as they participate in political decision-making and ends with their planning and exercising operations abroad. Secondly—The tectonic transformation in the security situation, the speed at which this change is taking place and its dynamics are decisive arguments for taking a close look at the present analysis and decision-making processes. All the present political and military procedures are slow and mostly ineffective due to the red tape involved, the seeking of consensus among the political parties, the staffing procedures and the lack of courage to come out in favour of or against something. Thirdly—The politicians must develop confidence in their armed forces to be precise in the assessment of their capabilities and in the sound mind-set of the German service members. Fourthly—The information management has to be modernized. The combat zones are nowadays transparent because all items of electronic information are also co-read outside the Bundeswehr and reach the press. Inside the armed forces information responsibility runs down through the hierarchy as far as the political corporal. This transparency is not discernible at the political level.

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Conclusions Wars in the twenty-first century will be no longer manageable without a fundamental reform of the government’s and armed forces’ strategic analysis and decisionmaking capabilities. The core elements of warlike events must be assessed holistically. This calls for the assumption of and abidance by an interest-driven standpoint. Once a complex matter has been reduced to its core elements, careful consideration must be given to priorities and the possible courses of action. It is important for the focus to first be on the matter as a whole, on the desired end state and on the intermediate objectives that it requires to be achieved. It is particularly important for care to be taken in the handling of critical objections until the political decision is made. To meet the demands of its citizens for protection from threats in war scenarios, a state must firstly grasp the essence of these holistic challenges and intensify the public discourse. Secondly embed its provision for external security in the international framework to promote world peace. Finally and most important assist decision-makers by setting up advisory bodies in the government that, given their ability to think and judge strategically, can unravel complex situations, reveal their essence and devise options for responding to them in short time. Civil leaders and military commanders must be trained for these challenges. In a globalised media world and a climate shaped by multifaceted short-term political sensations, any report on warlike events, even if it serves disinformation purposes, is accompanied by knowledgeable “experts” who spontaneously propose solutions of varying quality and profundity. In view of the expectations of the media, the wise thing to do in such a situation is to immediately initiate a well-founded analysis of the matter and have it completed within a short time, and with clear results. This calls for the selection of a method that takes equal account of the nature, main tendencies and characteristics of the security-related event, the power brokers involved and their purposes, objectives and means, and all the relevant political, military, economic, humanitarian and cultural circumstances. The modernisation of the leadership culture and the capacity to understand hybrid wars in the twenty-first century, can best be achieved based on the lines of thought of Carl von Clausewitz.

Bibliography Works on Clausewitz Smith, H. (2008). On Clausewitz. Lecture given on 20 October 2008. Hamburg: International Clausewitz Center, Bundeswehr Command and Staff College.

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Further Literature Cronin, A. K. (2008). Ending terrorism, lessons for defeating al-Qaeda. IISS Adelphi Paper, 394. London: Routledge. European Union. (2003). Ein sicheres Europa in einer besseren Welt – Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie. Brussels: European Union. Freedman, L. (2007). Terrorism as a strategy. Government and Opposition, 42(3), 10–15. Hoffmann, Frank G. (2009, April). Hybrid threats: Reconceptualizing the evolving character of modern conflict. In Strategic Forum, p. 240. Kerim, S. (2008May 31). Vereinte Nationen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Münkler, H. (2002a). Die neuen Kriege. Reinbek: Filderstadt Weinmann. Pleuger, G. (2006). Die Vereinten Nationen vor neuen Bedrohungen und Herausforderungen im 21. Jahrhundert. Lecture given on 30 November. Hamburg: International Clausewitz Center, Bundeswehr Command and Staff College. von Goethe J. W. (1901). Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship; translated by Thomas Carlyle. Edited Nathan Haskell Dole. Boston.

Chapter 8

Exemplary Implementation of Clausewitz’s Theory and Strategy Consulting

Abstract Souchon applies the interpretation of Clausewitz’s war theory to the situations in a selection of wars in the twenty-first century. His basic idea is to use the Fascinating Trinity to initially evaluate key parties in a conflict, compare their individual strength and weaknesses and developing adequate strategies are shown to be assisting substantially in reforming strategic assessments of current conflicts. Five scenarios of historical events such as the war in Afghanistan, 2003 war in Iraq, 2006 war in Lebanon and the incident on the USS Vincennes as well as Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan in 2002 are analysed as examples of how the pith of Clausewitz’s lines of thought can be applied. Finally, a methodological approach to government-level strategy consulting is presented to substantiate this statement.

In the wake of more than a century of industrial world wars fought by mechanised mass armies and then the Cold War, it is strikingly clear that there is a deficit in strategy in meeting the challenges of the future. Germany’s rearmament in 1955 and the modernisation of NATO’s theatre nuclear forces with Pershing II and cruise missiles to counter the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missile mark important steps in the security agenda and strategic decision-making. With NATO’s armies deployed and waiting at the ready, with clear-cut front lines and with the enemy having assessable capabilities and options, the Cold War reduced thinking and planning to what was necessary at the operational and tactical levels. The twentieth century sees the end of European powers’ supremacy and worldspanning colonial empires. After World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and emerging nations like China, India, South Korea and Brazil develop into global economic powers. The USA becomes dependent—due to its dual financial deficit, namely, in its budget and trade balance—on support from China, Japan, and Europe for fulfilling its role as a global power. The democratic restructuring of Europe during its process of unification and the development of a common security and defense policy does not progress beyond its early stages. It is expected, that the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, who has been paralyzing all common defense initiatives, will open the door for a step-by-step progress covering

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Souchon, Strategy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0_8

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capability improvement, operational planning, and military research. The European world drift towards an inevitable loss of global power, might be slowed down. Transnational and regional developments are exacerbated by the fact that news becomes available in virtually real time. A multitude of technical innovations accelerate globalisation in information, communication and transport and yield new remote cyber warfare threats. International terrorists, violent non-state actors, organised criminals and pirates find breeding grounds and springboards in the wake of the break-up of states and the perversion of statehood. Added to this are dangers arising from a global network of organised crime as well as natural disasters, the destruction of agricultural soil, the overfishing of the seas and climate change. Religious and ethnic fundamentalism and authoritarian power structures impede the enforcement of human rights and democratic order. Classical military power projection by individual nations cannot confine or eliminate global risks posed to western world security in the twenty-first century. Under enormous public pressure from an ubiquitous and sensationalist media world, political leaders tend to propose popular solutions when they are required to perceive, analyse and assess a situation, make decisions and take action. A consequence of this in Germany is that international-level decisions which challenge any longterm strategic tangents of foreign policy are made with an eye to short-term political events and for domestic policy reasons. Given that all the key collective institutions—NATO, the European Union and the United Nations—remain rooted in the spirit of the Truman world and are experiencing a crisis concerning their purpose, there is virtually no prospect of any multinational agreement being reached on common strategies and the associated means. While this realisation at first gives reason to believe that national solo efforts are needed, they will achieve little in view of the global threats. The coalition of the willing formed by the USA in 2003 for the war in Iraq indicates how states can proceed collectively, with purpose and on their own responsibility—outside collective institutions. Political leaders must learn to handle a drastic increase in complexity at international level. Required to observe virtually chaotic and often parallel processes, they are usually hesitant and focus on individual priority aspects. For the political leaders in Germany, this constitutes a “structural overload—a drifting apart of the demands placed on politicians by society and their chances of meeting these demands with at least some degree of success.” (Maull, 2010, 3) The ability not only to conceive present-day challenges in Central Asia, the Arab world, Africa and South America as a whole and structure them in one’s mind, but also to grasp strategic action as meaning the implementation of a strategy in the face of frictions and enemy counteraction and to start out from the desired end state when devising solutions is becoming a key resource in security policy matters. What makes the process more difficult is the fact that the international organisations and regimes cannot be expected to provide constructive responses to future strategic challenges in time. National interests and the pursuit of tactical advantages will hamper the establishment of agreement in the detection of problems and the making of decisions that are appropriate in the long term. Apart from the USA, all the western states are going

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through a phase of insecurity with respect to strategy and threaten to fall into deep gloom over it. Those responsible for security policy must first realise that a strategy deficit exists. At present, the decision-makers in the governments and parliaments are conspicuous in their tactical maneuvering and stoic resistance to advice. How can analysis and decision-making capabilities in the field of security policy and strategy first be established at national level in this situation—and then at international level? These demands can solely be met by the present-day decision-makers receiving appropriate instruction and future elite decision-makers undergoing thorough training. The advent of hybrid wars—waged for years in remote regions against opponents who only have light weapons and no clear objectives, but who fight fanatically—is creating considerable compulsion among the western democracies to explain the purpose and objectives of military interventions. No convincing justification has yet been given for the use of armed forces to resolve civil or religious conflicts in the broader Middle East and Central Asia. The ability to conceive military interventions as a whole and to start out from the political end state when required to make a decision on them does not exist. It is high time to rediscover main features of human social behavior and to set up a strategy consulting body in the present-day governmental systems in Europe. This presupposes a realistic assessment of the current threat situation and great courage and determination on the part of the political decision-makers to bring about change. Sapere aude—Kant took it to mean: Dare to be wise! This depiction of the strategy deficit puts a strong emphasis on the personal level. Yet it is highly questionable whether individuals can develop an institutional robustness even if they have the courage to do so. While certain individuals can undoubtedly change systems and organisations, systems and organisations also have a considerable influence on the actions of these figures. Its accountability to the armed forces within the scope of security provision requires governments to be far-sighted in its planning and wise in its leadership, closely considering the risks and factors involved and possible courses of action in more or less real time. As illustrated above, Clausewitz’s lines of thoughts are best suited for analysing complex problems and implementing strategic thinking because he sees war as a chameleon that meanderingly changes its outward characteristics all the time. This form of meandering war is the starting point of his reflections. He succeeds at a high level of abstraction in adopting a holistic approach to the dynamic transformation of wars, in defining its basic features and in stating reasons for them in a way that makes sense. He sees war as something that floats in a three-dimensional field of force generated by certain tendencies and characteristics. Using irrational dimensions such as primordial violence and hatred and the non-rational factors of probability and chance, he establishes a theory on war that captures the essence of its inherent elements. Clausewitz postulates that a theory must take account of all of these variable tendencies and characteristics if it is to be of timeless relevance. If the wars currently taking place below the state level were analysed and assessed on the basis of their intrinsic characteristics, success could be achieved in devising

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strategies and drawing conclusions about how to implement them. When it comes to developing fundamentally new strategies and war plans for waging wars in the twenty-first century, and that includes low-intensity asymmetric conflicts, it is necessary to start virtually from scratch again today. With respect to future wars, it is obligatory to establish entirely new definitions of their purpose, their objective and the means with which they are to be waged. The application of the pith of Clausewitz’s writings, stock of which is taken in my book for the first time within a three-dimensional field of tension involving the tendencies and characteristics inherent in the Fascinating Trinity, allows multilayered threats to international security to be comprehended. Clausewitz’s theory allows a profound grasp of the characteristics of hybrid wars to be gained methodically. Major hindrances arise from the complexity of his findings, his philosophical synthesis manifested in the Fascinating Trinity and his dichotomous argumentation. It is recommendable to use Clausewitz’s methodology. Yet, it is the way in which the individuals involved transfer it that determines how a strategy consulting body must be structured content-wise and organisation-wise. What focal elements of the line of thought of Clausewitz’s writings are of benefit for the training and strategic action of future political and military decision-makers? The task of navigating with the aid of Clausewitz’s principles will have to be organised individually, as each case depends on the subject under examination, the problem under consideration and the level of engagement to meet the requirement of the preamble of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: “to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe.”

Examples for the Application of Clausewitz’s Theory While examples are inherently helpful for illustrating complex situations, they lack conclusiveness. In this chapter, short examples illustrate how the theory of Clausewitz can be applied methodically to complex war situations. The focus is not so much on providing full accounts of the courses of action, but more on how to approach, comprehend and analyse present-day war scenarios using Clausewitz’s lines of thought. A distinction must be made between a population-centered focus and a combatant centered focus. As Islamist terrorism is the most dangerous threat to security, preference is given to the participating actors—with the population being included in the analysis of the Fascinating Trinity and the appropriateness of the means. Taliban fighters nevertheless need positive support from the local populace. Hence, population-centered considerations of the ISAF mission are supportive in counterinsurgency operations, but are less important in countering the global Islamist terrorist organisation al-Qaida and Islamic State. The emotional reactions of the populace to allied acts of war therefore render it necessary to factor the tendencies of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which act like a blind natural force, into our estimate of the multi-faceted situation in Afghanistan.

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Five scenarios are analysed as examples of how the pith of Clausewitz’s lines of thought can be applied: the Fascinating Trinity in the war in Afghanistan; the appropriateness of the means used in the 2003 war in Iraq; the relations between the purpose, objective and means in the 2006 war in Lebanon; and the frictions caused when USS Vincennes shot down a passenger aircraft in 1988 and in Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan in 2002. Discovering that political decision-makers decide on large-scale and complex missions abroad without clearly stating the overriding political purposes and providing the necessary means is one thing; demanding an analysis of the security situation by an advisory board with the appropriate competence is quite another. And even if the need to set up strategy consulting bodies for determining what action should be taken in specific security situations and for developing a clear strategy is realised and the cabinet agrees on it to be met, the idea cannot be implemented successfully until all its members have undergone methodical training in strategic thinking. The fact that the present political leaders are not familiar with Clausewitz’s strategy theory is a considerable disadvantage. The minds of today’s decisionmakers both in the government and the armed forces are still firmly stuck in the concepts of interstate wars between states and conflict stabilisation of past centuries. In fact, they cannot be expected to learn the fundamentals of strategy theory. Consequently, a renewal in strategic thinking presupposes a realization, a will and the assumption of responsibility by a new generation of decision-makers. Hence, the question is: How can success be achieved in applying Clausewitz’s method of thinking?

The Fascinating Trinity and the War in Afghanistan Three key players have been selected as examples for the ex post application of the Fascinating Trinity as a method of analysis: the Taliban, the Afghan government and Germany. Others, such as the USA, Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia and China, also qualify for illustrating the methodology for a Clausewitz-style analysis, but are not considered here. First of all, the relevance of the three tendencies in the Fascinating Trinity—primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which act like a blind natural force, —must be identified for each of the three actors in the war in Afghanistan. Then, a close look must be taken at the play of probability and chance as these two aspects turn war into uncertainty in which the creative spirit is free to roam. Finally, the instrument of policy that is used purposively and rationally must be studied. The situation is thus: Following the al-Qaida terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, NATO invokes Article 5 of its treaty. The USA responds to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, where the Islamist terrorist organisation al-Qaida finds refuge and hideouts for its training camps, by waging an intensive air war and mounting a military intervention on the ground together with international troop contingents under a United Nations mandate (Resolution 1368). In parallel with its bombing campaign against terrorist camps in Afghanistan, the USA starts the war in

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Iraq in 2003. Germany does not deploy ground troops to Iraq, but assumes more responsibility in the northern districts of Afghanistan, which are rated as rather peaceful. The image of the German Bundeswehr as a guardian, aid worker and bridge builder in Afghanistan is publicised by German media and becomes very popular. In 2008, the fighting shifts from the southern to the northern sector. At the same time, the Taliban intensify their attacks on Bundeswehr forces. The increase in terrorist attacks is the result of four developments. The first is the growth in pressure on the Taliban fighters in the southern districts of Afghanistan. The second is the fact that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) shifts its strategic supply routes from the east to the north without adapting its procedures and means to this change. The third is that the Taliban adopts a more offensive approach in the north, provoking more combat action and compelling the government in Germany to change its strategy. While these explosive developments change the political purpose, the troop levels, materiel resources and concepts of operations remain the same. The fourth and final development is that having conducted a precise analysis of the Alliance’s priorities, the insurgents identify the German forces as unreliable cantonists and try to undermine the support they have in the information environment in Germany. NATO finally reacts to the unsatisfactory coordination of the operations of its multinational contingents in 2009 by making a strategy change that shifts the center of gravity in favor of the local people and public opinion in the theatre. Clausewitz defines this objective of war as a hub of power and movement. (Cf. On War, 595 f.) In early 2011, over 130,000 troops from 40 nations are in Afghanistan under command of the NATO-led ISAF mission, in addition to police instructors and civil aid workers. With NATO support, democratic baselines are introduced in the strictly Muslim country in which tribal chiefs and warlords traditionally wield power. In the wake of quasi—free parliamentary and presidential elections, a government is formed under President Karzai, a Pashtun. The transfer of state responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from NATO to the government in Kabul is scheduled to begin in 2014.

The First Actor: The Taliban With the aid of the Pakistani secret service, the Taliban or students of the Koran establish themselves as a Pashtun mujahedeen to fight off the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union (1979). Operating with great passion, these Islamic fighters, who are supplied with weapons from the USA, Saudi Arabia and other countries, inflict severe losses on the Soviet forces, ultimately coercing them into withdrawing (1989). The mujahedeen initially discontinue fighting and do not take up their arms again until the internal power struggle in Afghanistan escalates. In 1994, former mujahedeen team up to form the Taliban, disempower numerous

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warlords and finally take control of large parts of Afghanistan. This is followed by the establishment of an Islamic emirate and an archaic sharia regime. After the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the USA precipitately goes to war in Afghanistan—using war not as an instrument of policy, but basically as a substitute for political action. In 2001, the Taliban regime is overthrown with US support, but the fighting does not end. Years of US air strikes and combat action by the international ground troops cause substantial civilian losses and collateral damage while generating hatred and enmity among the Afghan people. The Taliban step up their attacks and guerrilla activities and force the ISAF troops onto the defensive in the information battle. They do not succeed in getting the people in the West to appreciate the positive developments that are achieved in 80% of the country. NATO talks about strategic communication measures for years, but does not implement any. Heavy fighting in the south of Afghanistan and hesitancy in the buildup of local civil and governmental functions, the Afghan police and military forces frequently provide the Taliban additional options for action, and they make great use of them. In 2006, they control more than half of Afghanistan. The allied troops react by increasing the intensity of their combat operations in the south of the country, the center of resistance. In response to this, the Taliban raise the violence, brutality and number of their attacks and ambushes on the USA and its allies and move from the southern provinces to those in the north, hence involving the German Bundeswehr contingents more and more in the fighting. Even so, the Taliban wage a strictly controlled war: Although thousands of radical Muslims undergo training in the madrassas near the Afghan-Pakistani border, the Taliban do not call up and use all the resources available as they want to avoid the West mounting a fierce response. Their hit-and-run tactics are typical for guerrilla warfare, and they are applied in strict compliance with their political purpose. Attacks that would be too costly for the Afghan people or have a drastic deterrent effect upon them are terminated in an act of self-regulation. Even though NATO increases the number of troops serving with ISAF, the situation deteriorates. US President Obama, in office since early 2009, seeks a strategy that will stabilise the situation and initiate the transfer of responsibility to the Karzai government. He decides to raise the number of US troops in Afghanistan substantially, by approximately 30,000, and sets August 2014 as a preliminary deadline for the complete troop withdrawal, following the transfer of responsibility to the Afghan government. However NATO remains in Afghanistan and ISAF is transformed into the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in 2015. When the Fascinating Trinity is applied to the Taliban fighters, their leaders and the Pashtuns supporting them, three distinctions can be made: • The Pashtuns are imbued with primordial violence, hatred and enmity towards the USA and all foreign troops. Afghanistan has a centuries-old tradition of fighting against intruders. Courage, bravery and the willingness to make sacrifices have been deeply rooted in the fighters and the Afghan people for centuries. They are called up in a war or war-like situation.

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• The Taliban fight in line with their limited military capabilities. To counter the superiority of ground weapons, aerial and space reconnaissance and absolute superiority in the air, they opt to fight covertly. They select the times, the places, the intensities and the targets of their terrorist attacks. They seize the initiative and have surprise on their side. The Taliban use light weapons and self-made bombs for which only short training is needed. They only require a rudimentary logistics infrastructure and react immediately to changes in NATO’s war priorities. The Western media are used as a weapon. Taliban commanders respond to probability and chance with discipline and a substantial willingness to learn in the fog of war. • The Taliban leaders use hybrid warfare as an instrument of policy for accelerating the withdrawal of NATO troops and act rationally in their logic. They concentrate their operations on Afghan territory and the areas bordering on Pakistan and for a long time successfully prevent the USA and its allies from achieving victory. What courses of action are open to the Taliban? Without belligerent actions and bomb attacks, the Taliban will not have much clout in the future power distribution in Afghanistan. However, if, countless Muslim women and children are killed in Taliban attacks, hatred and enmity towards the Taliban could intensify in the country. If a sovereign state were constituted in the wake of the withdrawal of the NATO troops, the Taliban would have no part in it. Hence, it is rational for them to set upper and lower limits for the intensity of their acts of violence. To their way of thinking and in their judgement, the courses of action taken by the Taliban leadership are clearly rational. They use war as an instrument for asserting political purposes, just like tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan did during their century-long, successful battles against invaders from the United Kingdom and Russia. Taliban fighters are characterised by a primordial violence, hatred and enmity that must be regarded as a blind natural force. They fight outside the framework of internationally binding legal norms and initially show no consideration at all for civil victims. Tactical success and the echo in the international media are all that count. Any Western misconduct and severe violations of the law of the kind committed in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq or the US Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba play into their hands. For the Taliban, the mere fact that a low-intensity war in a vast and extremely rugged area goes on for many years is a success. Not even more NATO troops can defeat them. It is hence inevitable that the Taliban’s strategy will prove a success. This finding is of little help to Allied policymakers.

The Second Actor: Afghan Government The next actor that has been selected as an example for the application of the Fascinating Trinity as a method of analysis is the Afghan government under President Karzai. Born in 1957, Hamid Karzai comes from an Afghan patrician family and goes to university in India until 1983. He returns to Afghanistan in the late 1980s

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and in 1992 becomes the deputy foreign minister in the Rabbani cabinet. He cooperates with the USA following the 2001 terrorist attacks. At the Bonn conference in 2001, he is appointed leader of the interim government. Karzai heads the loya jirga, the grand assembly, and is elected by a large majority as the first President of Afghanistan in 2004. When he is re-elected in 2009, widespread electoral fraud cannot be denied. A run-off vote against Abdullah agreed on after a lengthy dispute is cancelled at short notice. Karzai is reappointed president in 2009. Forming an Afghan government proves difficult as individual warlords, who command their own powerful private armies, are incorporated, despite their unwillingness to accept President Karzai’s role as leader. Moreover, the proportional representation of the ethnic groups in the country plays an important role. De facto, Karzai governs only in and around the capital of Kabul. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is set up in 2002 and attains a strength of almost 140,000 troops by 2011. Germany assumes the responsibility for training the police force in Afghanistan. The fact that the police instructors are too few in number, the fund allocations are too meagre and the training priorities are erroneous, since they reflect those set for police training in Germany’s federal states, prevents rapid success from being achieved. In 2005, the USA takes over the lead in the training of the Afghan police. By 2010, about 80,000 Afghan police officers have completed their training. When the Fascinating Trinity is selected as an example for the application of the Afghan government, the following conclusions can be drawn: • Primordial violence, hatred and enmity are deeply rooted in Afghan society and can emerge anytime as a blind natural force. The Afghan people are participating in a democratic process without understanding or appreciating the basic rules, individual rights and opportunities for participation offered by a Western-style democracy. The distinctive Afghan Muslim culture and moral values and the fact that no more than 30% of the 30 million Afghans can read and write hinder any attempt to introduce democracy and build a Western-style civil society. Due to Afghanistan’s history, geographical location and division into the ethnic groups of the Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazara, the people are profoundly suspicious of Western influence. They see the Karzai government as a necessary temporary phenomenon. The people of Afghanistan are suffering from the decades of war, yearn for peace and stability and, in view of the ISAF troops being stationed in the country, can only hope that a peaceful solution will be found at the negotiating table. • The ANA is undergoing establishment. Century-old power struggles between the Pashtuns and the Tajiks are causing dispute over government and army posts. ANA troops are heavily involved in fighting the Taliban and are suffering significant losses. They are regarded as both poorly led and insufficiently motivated. The Afghan police have a ruthless reputation for harassing and robbing people. The objective is to establish an ANA high command and a police leadership culture by the time the NATO troops withdraw. Instead, numerous trained soldiers and police officers are taking their weapons and deserting to war

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lord armies that pay more and offer their families effective protection. In the current situation and given the prevailing probabilities and chances, any purposeful employment of the ANA against the Taliban requires creative spirit on the part of the commander and the motivation to fight on the part of ANA, and neither has them by any means. • The Afghan government is in a weak position as it is dependent on foreign troops and large allocations of funds. Drug trafficking is thriving and the traffickers are transferring large sums in foreign currencies into the accounts of the Taliban and other actors who are interested in the central government being weak. Allegations of corruption, nepotism and ineffectiveness are damaging the government’s reputation abroad. Its helplessness in guaranteeing security in the capital of Kabul is bringing discredit upon it in the heart of the country. The ANA forces do not have the capability to protect the people in their own country. The war in Afghanistan has been going on for a long time, but has produced neither an Afghan government, nor a powerful national army nor a trustworthy police force and continues to be mainly waged by the USA and its allies’ troops. The transfer of responsibility to the Afghan government and the country’s transition towards a stable, democratic state remain nothing but illusions. Primordial violence and the hatred among the Afghan people towards the intervention forces are impeding the West in exerting any effective influence on the country’s future. Those holding government power have no convincing rationality and no more than a rudimentary idea about how to handle probability and chance. The project aimed at building an Afghanistan based on Western concepts has failed.

The Third Actor: Germany The third actor that has been selected as an example for the application of the Fascinating Trinity as a method of analysis for the war in Afghanistan is the Federal Republic of GermanyFollowing the terrorist attacks on the USA in 2001, NATO invokes Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Chancellor Schroeder declares Germany’s unreserved solidarity with the USA. By the end of 2001 and in parallel with the US bomb war in Afghanistan, the security situation in the Middle East deteriorates. The USA creates another theatre of war in Iraq and forms a coalition for invading the country (in 2003). For domestic election reasons, Chancellor Schroeder, the leading candidate of the Social Democrats (SPD), refuses to involve Germany in the Iraq War in the run-up to the federal parliament election. Germany compensates for US calls to increase its share of the risks inherent in collective defense by committing more Bundeswehr forces to ISAF in Afghanistan and taking on more responsibility there. When Germany is selected as an example for the application of the Fascinating Trinity, the following conclusions can be drawn:

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• Bundeswehr troops are sent out on a humanitarian-style operation in the comparably peaceful north of Afghanistan without a holistic strategic analysis of the situation having been conducted, without a clear political purpose having been defined by the government and without unambiguous military objectives having been established. During the first few years, the means provided are determined by the purposes of Alliance policy, that is to say, the Bundeswehr deploys symbolic troop contingents that highlight Germany’s full sovereignty, but do not meet the requirements in Afghanistan. The leadership culture and stringent legal and political restrictions are such that the Bundeswehr command cannot allow its creative spirit to roam when it has to deal with probability and chance in the severity of the war in Afghanistan. • Conducted with limited means, the Bundeswehr operation drags on for many years and only mutates into a low-intensity war because the Taliban intensify their activity in the northern provinces. Originally conceived to be a contribution to the Alliance and as a regional defence force for Central Europe, the Bundeswehr is inadequately prepared and little motivated for such an operation. The legal foundations in Germany are complicated and only permit the use of weapons in self-defense or within narrowly defined legal boundaries. The logistics system, that is to say, the capacities for airlifting by aircraft or helicopter, the armored vehicles, the means of communication and reconnaissance and the personal equipment of the troops are initially inadequate for the military operations in Afghanistan. The Federal Defense Administration continue working in compliance with bureaucratic regulations as in peacetime and do little in the pursuit of a specific purpose in a given time. The courses of action open to the Bundeswehr troops in the war against the Taliban are confined to tactical defense. National caveats initially impede the employment of Bundeswehr units in support of the allied forces that are involved in heavy fighting in other regions of Afghanistan. It is not possible for them to go on the offensive and try to impose their will on the Taliban under these circumstances; no such action is even planned. An analysis of the German-led effort in northern Afghanistan reveals that the Bundeswehr’s scope for action is extremely limited in view of the dangerous situation and due to the prevailing probabilities and chances. The report issued by the Bundeswehr Structural Commission in October 2010 lists the key deficiencies and proposes rigorous changes to the Bundeswehr’s structure, organisation and command and control procedures—without any consequences. (Cf. Bundeswehr Structural Commission, 2010). • The German government’s purely rational approach to the operation in Afghanistan is doomed to fail due to the mere fact that no political purpose and no military objectives are clearly defined. The Bundeswehr is used as an instrument for pursuing tactical and defensive objectives for reasons of Alliance solidarity alone. • The German people are braced for the ISAF operation by former Defense Minister Peter Struck, who remarks that Germany’s security is being defended in the Hindu Kush. The image of the Bundeswehr as a guardian, aid worker and bridge builder has been publicised for too long. The increase in the intensity of the

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fighting between the Bundeswehr and the Taliban in 2008/2009 and a backwardlooking information policy that is not geared to the way in which the war is actually going mean that the public is given an entirely misleading impression. This becomes obvious when, in August 2009, the Bundeswehr requests US support in bombing two hijacked tankers and killing Taliban leaders, wittingly accepting numerous civil casualties. A scandalous political debate begins in Germany which demoralizes the armed forces. • German public support for the operation in Afghanistan dwindles. Without backing from the public and rational instrumentalisation by the government, the war becomes a Bundeswehr matter in the analysis framework of the Fascinating Trinity. The military personnel deployed are left with the job of explaining what they are doing in the country and what objectives they are pursuing. Without an overriding political purpose and without the emotional support of the public, the Bundeswehr operation becomes entirely a responsibility of the armed forces. It is closely defined and regulated. All the Bundeswehr’s combat operations are rated negatively per se in the public media. A thorough study of the war in Afghanistan would have to include an analysis and assessment of the USA and the United Kingdom, as well as Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, China and other states on the basis of the Fascinating Trinity. This section is intended to provide examples of how Clausewitz’s theory can be applied methodically. The next step is to conduct a comparative analysis and assessment of primordial violence inherent in the individual war actors, their creative spirit and their instruments of policy. All the results will be integrated directly into the outlining of a strategy.

Conclusions It only takes a few glances to make out the weaknesses and strengths of the individual protagonists. A national strategy must allow courses of action to be devised that exploit the country’s own strengths and the opponent’s weaknesses to the full. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the primordial violence inherent in the people and their enmity towards the ISAF forces, which are fueled even further by the high level of collateral damage caused and a lack of sensitivity towards the culture of the country, have been misjudged completely. The Taliban’s weakness lies in the large number of Muslim civilians who have been killed or injured in bomb attacks in urban zones. They spread fear and extend the distance between the people and the Taliban fighters. The Taliban leaders have realized this. Mullah Omar reacted to this as early as in 2008 by introducing rules of conduct aimed at winning back the people’s hearts and minds. Imposing one’s will on the opponent calls for holistic action. To this end, the weaknesses of the Taliban must be consistently exploited to ISAF’s advantage in Afghanistan. In contrast, the creation of a common will among the coalition forces is

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almost impossible. The first few years were marked by a constant struggle by the ISAF commander to establish independent Provincial Reconstruction Teams, to remove the line separating ISAF action from the US activities within Operation Enduring Freedom so as to lift the national restrictions at the operational level, and to assert his will in all the regions of the country. There is no common political will in Germany either due to the ministerial principle; this was revealed in the non-existing cooperation between the Bundeswehr and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Finally, a comprehensive study should give as much consideration to the human rights violations provoked at times and the loss of soft power within NATO, the United Nations and the civil organisations as to the foreseeable economic consequences of the intervention and the fact that the forces of the Western sending nations will remain committed for years. Now, these findings may not be new. The point is that the method of analysis used is Clausewitz’s Fascinating Trinity. It is the starting point for an assessment of the strategic situation and “will be the first ray of light into the fundamental structure of theory, which will first sort out the major components and will allow us to distinguish them from one another.” (On War, 89) The second step involves conducting a comparative evaluation of the individual tendencies and characteristics of the Fascinating Trinity that exist on the horizontal level between the Taliban, the Afghanistan and Germany. This enables the advantages and disadvantages of the employment of allied troops in Afghanistan to be identified and courses of action to be devised that maximise the prospect of success of their employment. These differentiations serve to reduce the complexity of war to its core elements and to enhance its comprehensibility by means of Clausewitz’s theory and hence allow the political purpose and military objectives of an intervention to be defined before it is mounted. Taking the war in Afghanistan as an example for briefly illustrating how the Fascinating Trinity can be applied may suffice to identify some of the core elements of the Taliban’s actions and the weaknesses of Afghanistan and Germany and to indicate the added value that Clausewitz’s lines of thought offers for such analyses. Even though brief, this illustration proves that his theory is an effective and convincing instrument for comprehending low-intensity wars in the twenty-first century. The appropriateness of means is a key element of Clausewitz’s theory and the subject of the following section. It is the element that determines the war plan, links the relation between the purpose, objective and means to the tendencies and characteristics of the Fascinating Trinity and enables a systemized look to be taken at them all.

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Appropriateness of Means in the 2003 Iraq War The appropriateness of means constitutes the actual core element of the strategic considerations made prior to the decision to use of military means for a political purpose. Unlike the classic estimate of the situation, which focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy armed forces, a state defines what means are appropriate by conducting a qualified comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy actor and its own within the coordinate system of the Fascinating Trinity. The 2003 Iraq War is taken here as an example for illustrating how appropriate means are determined. In the Second Gulf War (1990–1991), Kuwait is liberated from Iraqi occupation and no-fly zones are established in the north and south of Iraq to protect the Kurds and Shiites there, though the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, is not removed from office and his regime is still in power. Despite the imposition of a tight embargo against Iraqi imports of technology and the creation of a weapons inspection regime, intelligence delivers increasing indications of production sites for weapons of mass destruction—indications that in hindsight prove to be wrong. The USA forges a coalition of roughly 30 countries and deploys troops to the Middle East. On 20 March 2003, combat operations against Iraq begin with US air strikes. No later than 7 April 2003, US forces capture the city center of Baghdad. The war against Iraq’s armed forces ends on 1 May 2003. The method applied to determine what means are appropriate begins with a comparison of the political purposes: The USA’s purposes of the invasion are to depose Saddam Hussein, to destroy alleged weapons of mass destruction and their production sites and to democratise Iraq. The objectives and means resulting from them are not derived with a focus to the end state: peace. It remains doubtful whether this method of social engineering has any chance of success at all when it is applied to foreign cultures. Sunnites feel oppressed in Iraq. The Hussein regime has used poison gas on the Kurd minority and marginalised the Shiites in the south. The Iraqi people can therefore hardly be considered to have the character and will to fight a defensive war. The authoritarian regime of President Saddam Hussein concentrates all its forces on repelling the invasion and retaining the status quo. In 2003, the Iraqi army numbers just under 400,000 troops and although it has a large arsenal, most of it is obsolete. There is also the Republican Guard, which consists of about 20,000 religiously fanatic fighters. On the opposite side, the USA, the world’s leading military and economic power, has state-of-the-art reconnaissance and weapon systems and support from the United Kingdom and other countries. With its ability to project military power anywhere in the world, its military bases in the region and its high-tech military combat units, the force ratio and circumstances clearly favour the USA achieving success with its allies in the war. A comparison of the character of the Bush administration with that of the Saddam Hussein regime shows that both are extremely goal oriented. Things are different when the character and capabilities of the American people are compared with those

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of the Iraqi people. A highly controversial debate on the objectives of the invasion arises in the USA. Within the administration, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Powell argue over what kinds of troops should be deployed in the invasion, how many of them and what approach they should take. The USA reckons that a large proportion of the Iraqi people will welcome the coalition forces as liberators and that the mere success of the invasion will bring about peace. If account had been taken of the Iraqi people and armed forces in the reflections on what means were appropriate, the result would have been that fewer military means than planned had been required for the US invasion and that any resources freed up should have been used in the civil reconstruction effort. The coalition does not analyse the possible impact of the invasion on third countries, notably the neighbouring Muslim states of Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The USA also fails to convince Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg that the invasion of Iraq is a reasonable response. These countries refuse to participate in the Iraq War. There is profound disunity in NATO for years. The successful campaign of the US and allied forces ends in a stalemate because the coalition combat units fail to follow up the occupation of Iraq by restoring law and order, administration, security and the supply of food, water and electricity to the people. There are no plans for enabling Iraq to make the transition to a Western-style democracy. The issue of what means are appropriate is resolved by the USA weighing up its strengths and weaknesses against those of the opposing state. The achievement of the political purpose, in this case the deposing of the regime and the democratisation of Iraq, determines what efforts are to be made altogether and what means are required. If a war plan ignores or incorrectly assesses the post-war order, the political purpose cannot be achieved and the campaign is bound to end in a defeat. With an eye to the desired post-war order in Iraq, which by no means had positive backing from the people of the country, completely different results would have been attained if careful consideration had been given to the question of what means were appropriate beforehand. The issue of what means are appropriate is an element of the evaluation of the three tendencies and characteristics of the Fascinating Trinity: primordial violence, hatred and enmity; probability and chance; and reason alone. By contrast, the relations between the purpose, objective and means form the link between the instrument of policy and the creative spirit that is free to roam. Both, the appropriateness of means and the relations between the purpose, objective and means, can only be understood in the context of the synthesis manifested in the Fascinating Trinity.

Conclusions The appropriateness of means is an element that must feature in any strategic analysis and the foundations of any war plan. It enables a state to compare its own

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political purposes, forces and circumstances, character and capabilities with those of the enemy state’s government and people and examine the impact on third countries. The emphasis in the assessment of forces is on the armed forces and their capabilities. The will and characteristics of the people also have a big influence. The appropriateness of means instrumentalises the Fascinating Trinity in a specific case and against a certain enemy before acts of war are committed. It creates the important background that allows the commander to render his creative spirit free to roam in the play of probability and chance. The holistic analysis considers all the factors that might have an impact on the planned course of the war. The evaluation of the appropriateness of means forms the basis upon which the decision is made to wage war—or to refrain from it.

Relations Between Purpose, Objective and Means in the 2006 Lebanon War The 2006 Lebanon War is selected as an example for illustrating how the relations between the purpose, objective and means can be used as a strategisation theorem. The war starts on 12 July 2006 as an armed conflict between two entirely different parties, the covert Islamic terrorist organisation Hezbollah and the high-tech and combat-proven Israel Defence Forces, whose actions are later the subject of an official inquiry, the results of which are presented in a report submitted to the Israeli parliament. (Cf. Winograd Commission Report, 2007) A ceasefire is declared on 14 August 2006 and both parties claim victory. The actors in this war in Lebanon are Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defence Minister Amir Peretz and Israel Defence Forces Chief of Staff Dan Halutz on the Israeli side and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who only comes into it when he calls for UN forces to be dispatched. The run-up to the war is characterised by sustained clashes between Hezbollah and the Israel Defence Forces along Israel’s border with Lebanon. The war is triggered by the killing of an Israeli border patrol on 12 July 2006 and by the abduction of Gilad Shalit, a corporal in the Israel Defence Forces, by Hamas militiamen on 25 June 2006. Shalit is not released until the autumn of 2011, in an exchange with Hamas prisoners. The military action immediately initiated by Israel is based neither on a careful analysis of the strategic factors, the capabilities of the opposing party and its objectives and means, nor on a carefully elaborated war plan. (Cf. ibid.) As early as on 13 July 2006, Israel imposes a sea blockade on Lebanon and opens the fighting by conducting air strikes throughout Lebanon. The Israeli air raids target supply routes of Hezbollah and Hamas forces to Syria and Iran. Key infrastructure such as bridges, airports and motorways are destroyed. Meanwhile, Hezbollah continually fires hundreds of missiles on the north of Israel, some of which also hit Haifa, the country’s third-largest city. In a spectacular manoeuvre previously announced on

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Arabian TV, Hezbollah fires an Iranian anti-ship missile at an Israeli Navy vessel off the Lebanese coast. On 17 July 2006, Prime Minister Olmert declares Israel’s war objectives in a speech to the Knesset: the liberation of the abducted soldier, the termination of the firing of missiles on the north of Israel and the disarmament of Hezbollah. (ibid.) On 25 July 2006, Israel launches a ground offensive and a bomb war against Bint Jbeil, Hezbollah’s stronghold in Lebanon. When Israeli forces attack a UNIFIL supply convoy, kill four United Nations personnel and cause the deaths of 30 civilians in the village of Qana, their actions in the war come under heavy criticism from international media. The number of missiles fired on Israel by Hezbollah rises from initially between 50 and 100 a day to up to 200 towards the end of the war. All in all, the war claims the lives of 1191 Lebanese, 48 Israelis and 200 Hezbollah fighters. The cost of the war for Israel is estimated to be just under five billion US dollars and that of the damage in Lebanon to be around 12 billion US dollars. After the campaign, there is public criticism of Israel’s strategy and the operational command of the Israel Defence Forces. A commission of inquiry chaired by a former Supreme Court judge, Eliyahu Winograd, is appointed by the Israeli government and assigned the task of examining the political and military decisions made during the war. The above-mentioned report of April 2007 cites considerable deficits in the preparation and conduct of the campaign and erroneous decisions made by the Israeli government and the Israel Defence Forces. A particularity of Israeli legislation is that such inquiry reports allow consequences for office-holders to be demanded and implemented. While Halutz and Peretz resign from their offices, Prime Minister Olmert is exonerated in the final report. In the end, the Israel Defence Forces High Command is held responsible for all the errors committed in the Israeli war effort. Israel does not achieve any of its war objectives. The reputation of the Israel Defence Forces is damaged. Hezbollah declares itself the winner, claiming that it has been able to withstand the massive attacks of the Israel Defence Forces and to increase the number of missiles it fired as the war went on as well as to enhance its social standing among the people of Lebanon. This is based on the assumption that Hezbollah establishes positive popularity among the people by funding social projects. It hands over money to inhabitants of houses destroyed by the Israeli Air Force so that they can rebuild them. In terms of the relations between the purpose, objective and means, the outcome of the Lebanon War must be considered undesirable for Israel. The political purpose of the campaign was not clearly defined, the military objectives of the war were not achieved and the means of the Israel Defence Forces proved inadequate. The overriding political purpose of Hezbollah was to provoke a military strike by firing missiles on Israel. Its objective of remaining functional in the face of intensive air strikes and ground operations is achieved. However, the price it must pay for this—the substantial damage to infrastructure in Lebanon—is much too high. On 12 August 2006, the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1701 and issues a peacekeeping mandate, featuring a maritime surveillance task force aimed at preventing Hezbollah from smuggling weapons by sea and involving frigates, fast

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patrol boats and maritime surveillance aircraft of the German Navy. A ceasefire comes into effect two days later.

Conclusions Applying the relations between the purpose, objective and means to the Lebanon War shows how important it is to conduct an ex ante strategic evaluation. The first question that must be raised in this regard addresses the nature of war as an overall phenomenon composed of the primordial violence of its element, the instrument of policy and the impact of probability and chance. These tendencies include the people, the commander with his army and the government as variables. The objective of each war is to break the enemy’s will by the use of force if that is the right means for the political purpose, which must be framed prior to a campaign, and it must match the desired end state. The objectives of the armed forces must be derived from that purpose and appropriate means must be provided. This must be followed by an assessment of the opponent’s purpose, objective and means, which must then be compared with one’s own. It is not necessary for these steps to be based on the worst-case scenario regarding the opponent’s action. It is more important for the influences of primordial violence, the impact of probability and chance and the nature of the instrument of policy to be assessed and possible courses of action to be thought through. Finally, account must be taken of the influences of third countries. Prudent planning includes the development of alternatives to the relations of the purpose, objective and means. All these factors are evaluated and are included in the formulation of the war plan Israel’s strength is essentially based on the legendary reputation of its armed forces and support from the USA and Germany. In Israel, as in other highly industrialized states, the prevalent mentality towards war such as boldness and self-sacrifice are being pushed aside by a belief in the technical superiority of reconnaissance and precision weapons. The capability to fight a war of devastating dimensions from a distance against an terrorist opponent who is inferior in technology has turned out to be a serious deficit. The objective of rendering the opponent defenceless refers to his armed forces, country and will. Israel did not succeed in stopping the missile bombardment, destroying Hezbollah, disrupting the organisation’s support from the people of Lebanon and visibly demonstrating the military superiority of its armed forces. The Israeli government failed to examine the holistic nature of the war before engaging in fighting. If it had, it would have recognised the dimensions of Hezbollah’s objective, which went far beyond prompting a military, political and ideological border incident and was to gain perception in the media all around the world. By provoking human rights violations and fighting a well-prepared defensive war, Hezbollah focused its evaluation of the purpose, objective and means on the center of gravity at which the Israelis would apply their power in order to decide the matter of the media war in its favour.

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Clausewitz believed that a purpose must be geared towards a subsequent state of peace. Current research on strategy highlights this positive purpose as it renders a peaceful future conceivable. By contrast, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon served no purpose but that of a punitive expedition.

Frictions Concerning USS Vincennes in 1988 and ANACONDA in 2002 A great number of examples could be cited to highlight frictions and their impact on the course of a war. The shooting down of an Airbus passenger aircraft by the AEGIS cruiser USS Vincennes in 1988 and the US commando operation in Anaconda Valley in Afghanistan in March 2002 are two particularly instructive ones about the impact of internal and external frictions. On 3 July 1988, shortly before the end of the 8-year Iran-Iraq War, the USS Vincennes, a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser, is operating in the Strait of Hormuz on its way to the Persian Gulf. The cruiser is attacked by Iranian gunboats. The crew man their battle stations and fire at the gunboats with the ship’s guns. In the Iranian city of Bandar Abbas, north of the Strait of Hormuz, an Airbus with 290 passengers on board takes off for Dubai. Almost at the same time, the USS Vincennes detects a fire control radar of Iranian F-14 fighter aircraft. The ship clearly identifies the radar contact of the Airbus in the civil air corridor and classifies it as a passenger aircraft. However, due to the USS Vincennes detecting the radar signature of the Iranian F-14s, the situation in the cruiser’s combat information center becomes chaotic. The commanding officer , Captain William Rogers, loses control of it, assumes that the Airbus is a fighter aircraft on the attack, despite all the information and classifications provided by the AEGIS system being correct, and orders it to be shot down. The commanding officer of the missile cruiser USS Vincennes is unable to keep abreast of developments. Instead, the deficits in training and discipline within the crew of the combat information center give rise to panic and create the situation in which the decision to shoot down a civilian passenger aircraft is made. The sum of all the deficits has a disastrous impact. The International Court of Justice in The Hague orders the USA to makes payments to the passengers dependents. The professional reputation of the US Navy is damaged and the USA is discredited around the world. The USS Vincennes case underlines how internal frictions can be caused by deficits in training, deficiencies in discipline and insufficient competence in command and control. External frictions are a different matter. In early March 2002, US Army and Afghan forces are planned to conduct Operation ANACONDA to destroy or at least drive out the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters operating in the Shah-i-Kot Valley in Afghanistan. According to the

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carefully devised ANACONDA plan, known as the Hammer and Anvil, allied combat units are to land on a high plateau and then encircle the opposing forces. The region is carefully reconnoitred with the aid of all the means available and finally classified as being clear of any enemy. When US Army forces land by helicopter, they come under a hail of bullets fired by a large number of enemy fighters. This marks the start of a fight for survival that goes on for two days and entails heavy losses. General Franks later assesses that the US battle plan was void of any validity when the fighting began as the enemy situation was utterly different to what had been expected. This example underlines the impact of external frictions on military operations. A well-prepared and combat-proven force is employed on the basis of a carefully devised plan. Despite intensive reconnaissance, the presence of strong enemy forces cannot be detected. When the forces land, a dangerous situation arises and can only be stabilised by the commanders involved making bold decisions and requesting massive air support. Two conclusions can be drawn from the ANACONDA battle: One is that no matter how carefully and professionally a strategy has been devised, it cannot be implemented without generating frictions that can have a significant impact on the course of a battle. The other is that once hostilities have begun, the fight against probability and chance, frictions and enemy action is determined by a creative spirit that is free to roam. It is the moral qualities of the commander and the virtues of his army that decide whether a battle ends in victory or defeat.

Conclusions Strategic plans are of great importance for the build-up and deployment of armed forces. Once a battle has begun, it undergoes non-linear dynamic developments caused by probability and chance, frictions and enemy action that only the commander and forces with virtues can successfully handle in the free play of forces. The differences between the course a war is planned to take and the course it does take are caused by the many ways in which probability and chance can influence it and frictions can arise. They destroy any logic in war and create a complex grammar of their own. When a commander faces an absolutely equal opponent, it is his moral qualities, such as his prudence, judgement, boldness and level-headed calmness that decide the outcome as events dynamically unfold. He looks at his capabilities and takes such action as is appropriate in the situation and compliant with the specified political purpose. His knowledge, experience and courage are crucial factors when it comes to determining the course of a war and tip the balance between victory and defeat. The analysis of Operation ANACONDA reveals another aspect of strategy, that of strategic action. In addition to strategy development and strategic thinking, there is also a requirement for training in strategic action. In a hostile environment, unknown unknowns have a formative influence on events—dangerous situations

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arise that render plans useless. The talent and discernment of the commander and the virtues of his army gain importance and can be decisive for the pursuit of the political purpose. Learning how to handle unforeseeable events and frictions must be a priority element in the training of future commanders as it will enable them to develop the courage they need to make decisions and take appropriate action for success in an atmosphere of war. The virtues of an army are also of great importance and must be developed by enabling it to undergo good training, to exercise intensively and to gain experience of war. The step from Clausewitz’s theory to practice has been illustrated with the aid of five examples: • The Fascinating Trinity serves as the first ray of light. It lays open the rational, non- rational and irrational tendencies of the belligerent actors in a future war. • The Appropriateness of Means estimates all factors determining the capabilities and intentions of the warring parties involved. Based on this analysis the decision to wage war of not is based. • Purpose, Objective and Means need to be weighted before a war is started. The resulting findings are summarised in a war plan. • The examples USS Vincennes and Operation ANACONDA illustrate the impact of probabilities, chances and friction on a planned war. The influences of unknown unknowns and flog of war must be taken into account in the planning process and determine the leadership qualities of the commander and the moral of his forces. The analysis of past events must now be further expanded so as to encompass wars of the future and the strategy development process. The author considers the instrumentalisation of the pith of Clausewitz’s writings on the purpose of strategy to be a particularly difficult step and one that requires political and military decisionmakers to have highly developed abstraction skills and profound knowledge of international power structures and foreign cultures and to be able to proceed systematically. What they need is the ability to think and act strategically. The application of the basic features of Clausewitz’s theory shows how a body of theory can be used to reduce the complexity of the circumstances in a given case and to comprehend and evaluate them. The real significance of this theory is only revealed, however, if it is methodically used to develop a strategy ex ante, that is to say, before the outbreak of a war. A system for strategy consulting is presented in the following section to substantiate this statement.

Clausewitz and Strategy Consulting Important decisions regarding military interventions are mostly made by international institutions. On the participating national levels neither political nor military decision-makers have undergone adequate training in strategic decision making.

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There is no holistic appreciation of a state’s purposes. In addition, national authorities fail to give careful consideration to the superordinate political purposes of the operations. Thus the ultimate objectives of interventions, their planning and the stipulation of the means required remain at an operational level and short-sighted. Bloated ministerial bureaucracies, with their unimaginative mentality and in-built tendency towards busywork that is deeply rooted in a timid staffing culture, are known to impede the political decision-makers’ ability to take targeted and forwardlooking prudent action. Any improvement in the quality of the estimate of the strategic situation, the holistic judgement at government level is inconceivable because all the ministers’ offices, planning staffs and specialist branches are pushed to their limits in the hustle and bustle of daily routines despite being manned with top-level personnel. Every decision of an international organization to intervene with military forces in a conflict is a compromise between the participating actors. The result may not coincide with the national interests of each individual member state. In this situation, convincing operations and corresponding communication with the public and, as a consequence, support from society can hardly be expected. The trouble is that they are crucial for a long-term success in the operations abroad. By contrast, Clausewitz’s lines of thought provide a methodical basis for strategic decision-making and the development of a course of study in strategic thinking. In On War, he writes about commanders and armies without discussing in detail hierarchy levels that exist in armed forces between the commander and the soldiers in the field. When his theory is viewed from this angle, it is easy to conceive it being applied to chief executive in hierarchically structured large-scale organisation that must overcome the resistance of rivalling opponents and put itself at risk to implement its ideas.

Methodology In a strategy consulting body set up to prepare government decisions, Clausewitz’s theory is used to first structure what is addressed in a complex situation and then to identify and assess the key elements and the way they interrelate. It follows that a strategy consulting body assembles experts and political decision-makers whose consultations are structured in accordance with Clausewitz’s lines of thought as regards both the method applied and subjects addressed. Policy consulting can be occasioned, for instance, by an imminent major securityrelated event in Africa or Asia that concerns vital national and international interests. In a media world that is globalised and a climate that is marked by multifaceted short-term political sensations, any report on warlike events receives comments given on the spur of the moment and prompts routine proposals for resolving the underlying problems that vary both in quality and profundity. In such a situation, it is wise to respond to the expectations of the media by immediately initiating an in-depth holistic analysis of the facts, clarifying possible developments, discussing possible options for action or inaction and coming up with results in almost real time.

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The method selected must take into account the nature, key tendencies and grammar of the security-related event itself, the purposes, objectives and means of the power brokers involved and spinoff effects of second- and third order as well as other relevant security factors. Warlike events must be categorised and assessed on the basis of their core elements. An interest-based and entirely justifiable standpoint must be established and upheld throughout the policy consulting process. Present-day politicians and military leaders communicate in more or less real time. Decisions are prepared in extreme time constraints which tend to minimize the inputs of multiple agencies and ministries. Together with a theory-based structure, this fact must always be considered a norm when an attempt is made to reorganise strategic decision-making for the twenty-first century. It would result in an electronically networked strategy consulting body. A capability of strategic generalisation, profound expertise, solution-minded flexible thinking and care in dealing with criticism are of equal importance for not only comprehending the complexity of the subject, but also for devising and weighing possible courses of action. It is also crucial for the politicians and experts involved to be familiarised with Clausewitz’s method of thinking and be conversant with the consulting process before the decision—making begins. The strategy consulting body must focus on identifying the nature of the war at hand, on gaining a wide-ranging grasp of the geostrategic situation and general conditions and on reducing and structuring the complexity of the matter. It must follow this up by specifically analysing the individual combatants involved with selected experts while concentrating in depth on the inherent tendencies and characteristics of the Fascinating Trinity. The possibilities of third—party influence and spin-offs being exerted must also be assessed. This must be followed by an effort to achieve consensus on the overarching political purpose, military objectives and the means required to assert the government’s interests in the face of resistance. Finally, the situation must be evaluated on the basis of the pith of Clausewitz’s writings, with consideration being taken of important political, military, humanitarian, economic, cultural, and psychological factors. It is wise to carefully weigh critical objections. Red Cell assessments prove effective to challenge possible courses of actions. If the overarching political purposes cannot be reached with the available means the costs for inaction must be assessed. Additionally these decisions and approaches should incorporate enough flexibility for an ongoing adaptation after initiating an operation. A complex system or an opponent will adapt the behaviour according to own actions. This means, in an initial phase, we have to test a system, its reaction, evaluating the results and adapt own actions. Flexibility is inherent in a developed strategy. According to Clausewitz, the ever-changing nature of war corresponds to the requirement of flexibility and continuous adaptation. The outcome of the consulting process must be outlined as a strategy whose pros and cons are then critically discussed. Together with the main alternatives, it must subsequently be submitted to the political decision makers, which then must make the final decision. Osgood states three rules that must be observed:

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1. The range of relevant political war objectives and the extent of the military action taken should be limited. This must be made clear to the enemy. 2. Diplomatic relations must be maintained during the hostilities so that a limited war can be ended with a negotiated peace treaty. 3. Political control decreases as the intensity with which a war is waged increases. The greater the exploding violence in a war, the further the extent to which fear and hatred are aroused. Great passion leads to rampant warfare and hinders the attainment of a balanced peace agreement. The dimensions of violence in a war must hence be limited to the extent compatible with a state’s objectives in it. (Cf. Osgood, 1980, 691 ff.) Limiting a war and ensuring clearness in the action taken counter emotional charge and allow a peace settlement to be achieved later. After consolidating the knowledge available in core elements, the consulting body must weigh the priorities and write a carefully and nuanced crafted policy decision and an implementation strategy. It is important for it to give precedence to the matter as a whole over individual aspects and to focus both on the desired end state and the intermediate objectives that must be met to achieve it. Deep scientific expertise is the corner stone to prudent decisions. It is consequently important to include in addition to top level decision makers a number of experts who guarantee that the course of action decided is sound.

Strategy Consulting and War Plan The term strategy has developed further since the world wars of the past centuries due to the pressure exerted by factors like globally networked war combatants, constellations of space power and cyberwar. Considering the multi-dimensionality of possible events, the top-priority task of a strategy implementation designed for achieving goals in the face of resistance will be to determine overarching political purposes. Such a strategy can on no account point out possible courses of action a priori for all the future war-like events that may develop around the world. The long-held assumption of a grand strategy for systematically asserting national interests and achieving national goals by means of military power has been buried for good. Given the complexity of future wars that can take place in remote geographical and different cultural regions, there is a need for decisions to be made that take account of the essence of the multidimensional security-related and social tendencies and characteristics and bear in mind the final outcome. A war plan must be prepared for each war engagement, specifying the measures that have to be taken at the national level, the allies with which action has to be taken and the legal grounds on which operations are to be based. Governments can command troops successfully in the wars of the coming decades if they have a holistic grasp of the tendencies and characteristics of global security risks and wars and take account of it in their decision-making. The

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administrations must tackle complex high-risk security events on the basis of the tendencies and characteristics of the Fascinating Trinity and draw conclusions with an eye to the relations between the political purpose, military objective and the means required. The practice of determining what means are appropriate provides systematic information about the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and all other opposing combatants involved. The top level decision makers must decide on the overarching political purpose and, in appreciation of possible frictions, specify adequate measures to be taken for the armed forces to be prepared and equipped for a planned operation and dispatched in due time. National security policy is the core government responsibility. The proposal is that the ministries involved be represented in a strategy consulting body. The choice of the body’s expert members is of significant importance. Being highly qualified scientists, general or admiralty staff officers and civil servants, these members are responsible for identifying the subject of consultation and for adopting a systematic and abstracting approach that takes account of all the key facets. Furthermore, they watch out that the possible courses of action are methodically crafted and that a clear implementation strategy framed is related to the subject of consultation. The excellence of the results is the only standard that can be used to gauge the quality of the body. The most important task of the strategy consulting body is that of finally devising a war plan for dealing with specific high-risk security events. This task includes assessing and defining foreseeable risks, national priorities, the general conditions, priorities and fundamental courses of action. Great care and expertise are required to grasp the essential elements of security risks and succeed in peacetime in developing effective options for waging a war geared to achieving the desired end state. The decision as to what can be achieved rests solely with the government.

Agenda The development of a new strategy begins with a theoretical construct composed of constituent and dynamic factors of war. It takes account of possible courses of action. A reality-based interpretation of Clausewitz’s findings allows analyses to be conducted of modern wars that are waged in remote geographical and cultural regions. An agenda is proposed to feature the following steps in a specific war scenario. (See Fig. 8.1) The first step is constituted by a holistic analysis of the strategic situation and the warring parties involved based on the Fascinating Trinity. The next two are composed of an appraisal of the political purposes of the opposing combatants and the appropriateness of their means and an assessment of the relations between the purposes, objectives and means. The final two involve estimating the play of chances and probabilities and discussing courses of action and appropriate alternatives. The outcome of the strategic assessments is summarised in the war plan.

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Step 1: Holistic estimation of the strategic situation regarding each warring party individually in its Fascinating Trinity, then in comparison with those of the others and finally from a third-party perspective. Step 2: Analysis of the political purposes and capabilities of the individual warring parties in an assessment of the appropriateness of means. The decision to go to war or not is formulated. Step 3: Defining the purposes, ultimate and intermediate objectives and courses of action and specification of the means along the relations between the purposes, objectives and means in conjunction with the definition of the combat power and sustainability required by the armed forces and of interfaces to civilian and other actors. Step 4: Estimates of the frictions, probabilities and chances likely in a planned war and discussion of courses of action and applicable alternatives. Step 5: Summary of the results in a war plan.

Fig. 8.1 Agenda for strategy consulting

It is important for politicians to realise that grave deficits in top level strategic decision—making exists and the establishment of a strategic consulting body is a necessity. The purpose of this study is to present a theoretical basis and to propose methods that try to minimize the strategy deficit. It points out the need for training and education of future commanders in strategic thinking and the exercise of judgement based on reason and prudence. The numerous wars in Eurasia, Africa and South America have caused high demands on the competence of the government and armed forces and on the quality of the decisions they make to soar. This accounts for the huge requirement for expertise analysis procedures and methodical action in strategy consulting. They require the members of the consulting bodies to be networked and professional in their procedures. If Clausewitz’s theory is to be used as a basis, there is an urgent need for a harmonisation of procedures and methods before any networking is initiated. Consulting sessions begin immediately after a body has been activated. It ends with the mapping of a clear implementation strategy in a war plan. Once an operation has begun, the body must assume the work of evaluating how the strategy is implemented and report to the cabinet whenever further important decisions have to be made.

Strategic Thinking and Action in the Twenty-First Century In the European mindscape and German intellectual history, Clausewitz presents a timeless basic notion of war that is perfectly suited to revolutionise twenty-first century strategic thinking. When the tendencies and factors of the Fascinating

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Trinity are applied to future crises and theatres of war, it will be possible to proceed from the point of view of politicians and commanders in evaluating the enemy, the free play of forces and the violent impacts and assess wars by looking at how these elements relate to an overriding whole. A realistic concept of war is the prerequisite for a party in one to identify its opponent’s priorities, to proceed strategically and to have the prospect of success with whatever action it takes. In a complex international crisis situation, this analysis can foster clarity in strategic thinking and substantially improve political decision making. Experience shows that the pith of Clausewitz’s writings is suited to structure evaluations of future wars effectively, to help a more profound understanding of the factors to be gained and a holistic assessment of the actors to be conducted and to justifiably improve the framing of a political purpose and the definition of what means are appropriate. If this logical sequence of steps is achieved, the admittedly difficult excursion into Clausewitz’s theory can be considered successful. It provides a valuable theoretical basis for strategic thinking in the twenty-first century. The methods applied in the training of future elite decision-makers and strategy consulting have been undergoing initial evaluation by the Clausewitz Network for Strategic Studies (CNSS), which I founded in 2008, in cooperation with the University of Potsdam and the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College in Hamburg. In its efforts to gain knowledge from its studies of the complex twenty-first century wars, the CNSS pursues two purposes: One is to conduct strategic analyses of present wars in Syria, Yemen and Ukraine on the basis of the holistic research that has been done on Clausewitz’s war theory; the other is to develop an educational agenda for future commanders based on the lines of thought of Clausewitz. The CNSS promotes an interdisciplinary and cross-institutional discourse and provides input for answering questions on security in the future that are discussed between politicians, representatives of academia and the armed forces and interested members of the public. It is constituted by political scientists, general and admiral staff officers and competent individuals from many branches of society. Hence, the start-up groundwork has been initiated in Germany that enables an intellectual grasp to be gained for a renewal of strategic culture. In summary, the following steps must be taken for a culture of strategic thinking and action to develop: 1. Theoretical fundamentals and findings The pith of Clausewitz’s writings forms a holistic fundament that must be studied intensively. His work is a powerful tool for training commanders or providing guidance for their self-education in strategic matters. 2. War plan Governments should convene strategy consulting bodies in which agencies of relevance for security connect with selected experts. Their primary task is to draw up a war plan. It includes assessing and defining foreseeable risks, national interests and general conditions, priorities and fundamental courses of action on an event-driven basis. A suitable approach to adopt is that of defining the means appropriate and the

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relations between the purpose, objective and means in the synopsis of the Fascinating Trinity. Great care and expertise are required to grasp the essential elements of security risks and succeed in peacetime in developing effective options for waging a war geared to achieving the desired end state in the peacetime that follows. The decision as to what political achievements can be made and what action must be taken rests solely with the government in each specific case requiring consulting. 3. Use of military means Important prerequisites for strategic action are a clear definition of powers and responsibilities, the assignment of which must be in relation to the political purpose of a military operation, a methodical and comprehensive assessment of the situation and the making of decisions on the intermediate and ultimate objectives, schedules and military means required. This work is done by a strategy consulting body of networked experts and decision-makers on the basis of an agreed theory-based agenda and within a confined period of time. 4. Public discourse In a democratic society, gaining and maintaining public acceptance for a war plan for dealing with a major high-risk security event calls for an intensive discourse among all political, military, academic and social groups. This objective can only be successfully achieved if mass information and social network resources are intensively used to comprehensively inform and involve the interested public. 5. Alliance commitments and priorities Western nations must assign priority to act as a responsible ally in the United Nations, the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union or in the formation of ad-hoc alliances.. From the national point of view, each nation must present and defend its own standpoint and estimate of the relations between purposes, objectives and means in an alliance context, that is to say, the one that is defined and disclosed in a war plan. In justified individual cases, this will involve it making demands on other partner states or refusing to participate at all in joint projects. What matters is that the reasons for doing so are transparent and sound. Whenever there are signs of national priority issues arising that cannot be resolved consensually within an alliance, like-minded states must be found to form an ad-hoc coalition and enable agreement to be reached on a specific course of action. It is crucial for each government to convincingly call attention to the rationality of its security policy in the international context.

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Bibliography Works on Clausewitz Osgood, R. E. (1980). Der Primat der Politik. Zur Theorie des begrenzten Krieges. In G. Dill (Ed.), Clausewitz in Perspektive: Materialien zu Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege (pp. 678–695). Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein.

Further Literature Maull, H. W. (2010). Weltpolitik in der Turbulenz. Schlussfolgerungen für die deutsche Außenpolitik. Internationale Politikanalyse. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr [Bundeswehr Structure Commission]. (2010). Vom Einsatz her denken: Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr. Berlin: Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr. Winograd Commission. (2007). Winograd Commission submits Interim report. Online press release by Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Retrieved February 3, 2017, from http://www.mfa.gov.il/ MFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Winograd+Inquiry+Commission+submits+Interim +Report+30-Apr-2007.htm

Chapter 9

Epilogue

Abstract This book discovers the complexity of Clausewitz’s work and operationalises his findings with regard to the challenges in the twenty-first century in a credible and comprehensible way. The instrumentalisation of Clausewitz’s theory to analyse conflicts in the twenty-first century and to develop strategies is uniquely presented in this chapter. This book is intended to bridge the gap between findings of a strategic theorist in the early nineteenth century and strategy of our times and to encourage reflection and study in strategic thinking in order to transform knowledge into genuine capability. Souchon presents an intellectual foundation for a strategy culture in the twenty-first century and offers a libretto that educates the minds of up-and-coming creative, knowledgeable and experienced future strategic leaders.

European history can be seen as a succession of warlike events and social processes. Isolated skirmishes have often turned into full firestorms and become what has been classified in hindsight as Great or even World Wars. After a phase marked by great inter-state wars and the East-West conflict, Europe now sees itself threatened by a number of dangerous threats, at the heart of which is Islamist terrorism. Combined, these twenty-first century risks have not yet been comprehended as a hybrid form of strategic challenge. Thinking continues along the lines of the criteria established for the world order of the bygone Truman era rather than along those of the timeless basic features of a complex, high-risk confrontation against a belligerent opponent. Classic military power projection is the instrument commonly used at present, and wielded under the aegis of collective security institutions without a thorough evaluation of the strategic situation—is proving unsuitable for averting global security risks and ending wars in the twenty-first century. Not one single Western military intervention has so far been completed successfully. In contrast Russian interventions in Ukraine and Syria were successful. What is more, any Western

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Souchon, Strategy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0_9

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attempt to shape security multilaterally is thwarted by marked national differences in perception, analysis and priorities. There is hence little prospect of international agreement being achieved on joint purposes and war plans. The advent of hybrid wars—waged in areas characterised by far-removed cultures against adversaries who have different values and fight fanatically—has given rise in Western democracies to the compulsion for justification to be given of the purpose and objectives of military interventions via the media. No convincing answers that would justify the use of armed forces to resolve terrorist or internal military conflicts have yet been given in the public discourse. The strategic brain power has been lost in all the domains in which high-level decisions have to be taken. Priority-based action takes precedence over long-term soundness. The interministerial staffing culture, party-political constraints and decision-makers ridden with anxiety reduce any result to the lowest common denominator. What is needed is a holistic understanding of present and future high-risk conflicts against vicious adversaries in a frictional environment. The foundations of such a strategic culture have to be laid afresh. Clausewitz offers a theory on how to think about war which, based on combatant action and counteraction, covers both basic features and the impact of probability and chance. Assessing complex security situations, developing a grammar of action and counteraction, drawing up war plans that encompass the entire act of war for a political purpose and training leaders in strategy are the multi-layered benchmarks of this project. Bookshelves are full of historiological works on Clausewitz presenting his biography, intellectual development and insights in the greatest of detail, but none of them so far provide an outline for strategic thinking. My book offers a fundamental change in perception. Focussing on the twenty-first century, the essence of strategy and the phenomena of future wars are examined by applying the basic features of Clausewitz’s theory. It has been shown that these timeless elements assist in grasping the essence of twenty-first century wars and comprehending them. Clausewitz addresses the issue of dealing with the play of probabilities and chance in war and draws conclusions on what knowledge and skills commanders’ need, which can easily be extended to the political and economic executives. Great commanders are not born as such—their knowledge and prudence are the products of their intensive study of the theory of war and their practical experience. Clausewitz sees a military genius as a virtuoso who, in an atmosphere of war, is resolute and creative and has enhanced mental prowess, a great strength of character and selfcontrol in order to assert his ideas and achieve his goals against an opponent who is his equal. This book offers a pioneering and comprehensive contemporary interpretation of the original version of On War. Clausewitz’s theory is an intellectual foundation and an outline for the education of a military genius and the development of a strategic culture in the twenty-first century. This book presents Clausewitz’s theory as a tool for conducting an intensive study of the theory of war and a method for structuring strategy consulting. The work of fully understanding the challenges of the twentyfirst century, recognising their basic features, identifying tendencies and assessing

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strengths and weaknesses in comparison with an belligerent opponent has to be done in three dimensions before the beginning of operational planning and multinational interventions—within the framework of the Fascinating Trinity, which is presented here first time in three dimensions. Probability and chance, both of which alter the planned course of wars considerably, must be given just as much consideration as the meandering stages of development, as they turn from confined, short-term interventions into simmering unresolved conflict or military firestorms. The decision as to whether a war is to be waged in the twenty-first century, for what political purpose and within what framework cannot be taken until the result of a holistic analysis is known. Before armed forces are used, systematic thinking must be done about the appropriateness of means and the relation between the purpose, the goal and the means in a methodical framework. Decisions on issues such as whether action is to be taken and with what intensity must be laid down in an event-driven strategy, the war plan, which sums up the entire act of a specific war. In the fog of war, commanders’ decisions often have considerable impact. They pursue the political purpose with a blend of reason and disposition and in combination with the virtues of their forces. Coordination at the international level does not begin until the national level has comprehended an imminent war and has adopted a clear standpoint based on a transparent rationale. The next logical steps are to actually estimate the military situation and to conduct operational planning. The public discourse and the struggle for authority of interpretation both in the mass media and in cyberspace are important benchmarks and must be taken into account. When events occur that jeopardise vital interests, such as international terrorist attacks, the assessment of the strategic situation serves as a basis for the formation of ad-hoc alliances with like-minded states that are able to take action within a very short time. A strategy is a guideline for setting priorities in security matters, laying down maxims for action and assigning resources. The idea of a national security strategy which contains instructions for all kinds of risk situations based on national interests is long since outdated. In an age of global information networking, approaches must be developed case by case which allow well-founded strategic statements to be made—within the framework of a war plan—on a specific event in a very short time. This calls for high-level decision-makers to be closely connected with expertise analysts and to be educated in applying a systematic approach. The courses of action possible in response to a concrete security event range from cautious observation to large-scale military intervention for clearly defined purposes and with the required means. A time limit must be set for the use of these means and plans for such action must be developed on a broad basis on short notice. A war plan —in the sense of an event-based grand strategy—only makes sense if it coordinates all aspects of foreign policy, economic, military means and society and if the civil society is well-informed and actively participates in the discourse on security. These demands seem illusory at present. In Germany, there is no public and multipartisan consensus on existential questions of external security. In general terms, the most important major organisations in the fields of politics and business do not prepare their future executives to either think strategically or to

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take bold strategic action. The capability to reduce complex projects to their simplest core elements and to analyse and assess military interventions as a whole and with an eye to the end state is non-existent. To counter this situation fundamentally, it is necessary to combine the culture of strategic thinking with a value-based stance, care in the handling of criticism up into the highest echelons of power and an intensive public discourse. The application of strategic thinking and action to a specific event in the strategy consulting process needs systematic preparation. It requires the acquisition of knowledge and skills by the politicians, scientists, soldiers and other actors involved to be geared to the basic features of Clausewitz’s theory. The cooperation between the government and the armed forces must at any rate undergo fundamental change, on the basis of the primacy of politics. This study contains concrete proposals for upto-date forms of political consulting and the training of elite leaders. In view of the global risk development in the twenty-first century, countries cannot manage without establishing a strategy consulting capability and providing appropriate training for its leaders if it is to be capable of framing its national political interests and rules on its participation in acts of war responsibly and defending them convincingly in international fora. The ground-breaking theses of the astronomer Galileo Galilei stood the test of scientific proof. When it comes to twenty-first century risks and threats, subjective experience and reason, each of which is beyond methodical quantification or proof, are just as important as rational analysis. The words eppur si muove—“and yet it moves”—attributed to him also apply to the renewal of the strategic culture.

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Index1

A absolute and limited war, 63, 118 absolute war, 145, 148 Afghan government, Fascinating Trinity, 199 Afghanistan, Fascinating Trinity, 195 Age of Enlightenment, ix, 34, 49, 50, 58, 60, 102, 104 Age of Mysticism, 58 Alexander the Great, 27, 29, 44 Allgemeine Kriegsschule, 54 American neoconservative world order, 41 appropriateness of means, 9, 69, 70, 79, 85, 93, 94, 118, 138, 147, 162, 163 appropriateness of means, basis for decision to wage a war, 88 Aristoteles, 29, 50, 58 army structure, 90 Aron, Raymond, x, 5, 6, 51, 57, 132, 142 attack, 117 Attila, 28, 29, 44 Auftragstaktik, 48 Author’s Preface, 52

B Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 194 Bassford, Christopher, 5, 51, 57, 72, 73

1

Battle Berezina, 55 Catalaunian Plains, 28 Jena and Auerstedt, 47, 57 Lechfeld, 28 Leipzig, 56 Leuthen, 98 Ligny and Wavre, 56 Lützen, 30, 56 Poitiers, 27 Poltawa, 31 Riade, 28 Waterloo, 56 Baudissin, Graf Wolf, 110 Beaufre, André, 38 Beethoven, Ludwig, 27, 49 Bin Laden world order, 41 blind natural force, 72 Blücher, Gebhard Leberecht, 56 boldness of a genius, 107 boldness vs. military rank, 107 breaking the rules, 109 BREXIT from European Union, 191 Briefe der Minerva, 57 Brühl, Marie Gräfin, 54, 57 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 36 Bülow, Lehrsätze des neuen Krieges, 102, 160 Bülow, Neue Bellona, 57

Terms referring to Clausewitz’s theory or its discussion are italicized.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Souchon, Strategy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46028-0

237

238 Bülow, strategy definition, 161 Bundeswehr Concept, Konzeption der Bundeswehr, x Bush, George W., 42

C cause and effect, 101, 126, 150, 155 cause and effect, Ursache und Wirkung, 126 center of gravity, 60, 90, 103, 162, 163, 166, 196, 208 centre gravitates, 33 Charles XII, King of Sweden, 31 Clausewitz and Jomini, 6, 18, 129, 154, 155, 160 Clausewitz Network for Strategic Studies, 10, 217 Clausewitz, Carl von, x, 33, 44, 45, 48, 59 Clausewitz, key finding, 10 Clausewitz, literature, 5 Clausewitz, strategy essay 1805, 102 Clausewitz, Über die Zukunft der Theorie, 61 combat, 127 commander, 19, 22, 28, 50, 52, 63, 101, 105, 124, 130, 131, 144, 156, 158, 166, 189, 217, 223 commander as statesman, 147 commander, capabilities, 97 commander, intellect and temperament, 105 commanding officer USS Vincennes, 209–210 concept of war, 159 Confidence-Building Measures, 40 Congress of Vienna, vi, 27, 52 Copernicus, Nicolaus, v coup d’œil and determination, 125 courage of a soldier, 106 culminating point of an engagement, 103 cyber war, 192

D decision on going to war, 82 defeating the opponent, 93 Defence Policy Guidelines, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2011, xi Defence White Paper 1985, x defense, tactical and strategic, 117 Douhet, Giulio, 38

E East Europe, 36 Echevarria II, 126

Index Echevarria II, Antulio, 5, 57 effort, 92 Einstein, Albert, 125 energy and effort, 141 engagement, 117 Engels, Friedrich, 6, 34, 60 English translation VOM KRIEGE, 15 Enlightenment, 157 essence of war, 125 Europe, 27 European Union, vi, 2, 3, 182–184, 192, 218 European Union, anthem, 27 examples, use of historical, 62, 194

F Faber mundi, 29 Fascinating Trinity, 8, 21, 65, 70, 71, 73–80, 85, 128, 138, 147, 167, 169 application, 88, 216 different codes of law, 77 First Trinity, 74 floating, 154 floating among three tendencies, 78, 80, 81 Second Trinity, 75 synthesis, 79 tetrahedron, 82 tetrahedron (drawing), 82 tetrahedron (photograph), 84 Third Trinity, 76 Fichte, Johann, 7, 49, 54, 58, 105, 121 fighting, defeat of the enemy, 91 fighting, low intensity, 91 first opinion, stick to, 106 first ray of light, 78 first type of war is absolute, 133 fog of war, 97, 223 fortuna and virtù, Machiavelli, 95 Frederic the Great, testament politique by, 32 Frederick the Great, 6, 32, 44, 48, 50, 59, 98, 99, 102, 130, 143, 147, 160, 163 freie Seelentätigkeit, 70 friction, 50, 79, 85, 95, 96, 98, 99, 103, 106, 134, 157, 164 friction, external, 96 friction, internal, 96 frictions, maritime example, 99 Friedrich, Caspar David, 49

G Galilei, Galileo, v, 224 Gaulle, Charles de, 38 general friction, 99–101, 117

Index General Logic following Kantian Principles, Grundriss einer Logik nach Kantischen Grundsätzen, 121 General War School, Allgemeine Kriegsschule, 54, 136 Genghis Khan, 29, 44 genius, x, 29, 33, 57, 63, 87, 88, 105, 107, 109, 111, 151, 155, 156, 163 genius of war, 101 genius rises above all rules, 106 genius, Clausewitz definition, 103 genius, Kant definition, 104 genius, military, 97, 103, 105 German Idealism, 34, 49, 58, 59, 62, 104, 127 Gneisenau, August, 7, 48, 54, 56, 57, 59, 63, 137 Goethe, Die Leiden des jungen Werthers, 104 Goethe, Faust, Part One, 127 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, vii, 26, 31, 49, 52, 58, 61, 102, 105, 115, 116, 121, 124, 126, 185, 186 government and commander, 145 government and the armed forces, dialogue, 144 grand strategy, 38 große Kriegführung, 168 Guderian, Heinz, 38 Gustav II Adolf, King of Sweden, 30

H Hahlweg, Werner, vii, 5, 57, 120, 124 Hamas, 206 Hardenberg, Karl, 48 Hauptlineamente, 69, 119 Hegel, Friedrich, x, 6–8, 16, 49, 58, 59, 62, 63, 70, 72, 121, 128, 145, 159 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 72 Heine, Heinrich, 49 Hellenic culture, 27 Herberg-Rothe, Andreas, 63 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 49 Heusinger, Adolf, 110 Heuss, Theodor, 6 Hezbollah, 206 Historiography, 53 Hölderlin, Friedrich, 49 holistic evaluation appropriateness of means, 111 Fascinating Trinity, 111 moral factors, 112 purpose, objective and means, 111 Howard, Michael, vii, 5, 15, 57, 77, 148

239 Humboldt, Alexander, 48 hybrid war, 21, 185

I Innere Führung, 110, 185 instinct of judgement, Takt des Urteils, 120 instrument of policy, 146 Instrument, (German word), 15 intellect and prudence, 117 interaction, Wechselwirkung, 124 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 179 intuition of a genius, 162 intuitive judgement, 97, 151–153, 156, 158, 164 intuitive judgement (Takt des Urteils), 103 Iraq War 2003, appropriateness of means, 204 Iraq war 2003, appropriateness of the means, 195 islamist terrorism, v, 20, 138, 174, 175, 194, 221

J Jiang Zemin world order, 41 Jihadists’ ends, logic and actions, 138 Jomini, Antoine, x, 33, 44, 45, 65, 106, 141, 156 Jomini, The Art of War, 6, 156

K Kaldor, Mary, 20, 176 Kant, Immanuel, ix, 3, 7, 16, 22, 58, 59, 106, 121, 128, 129, 157, 193 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgement, 103 Kant, Immanuel, enlightenment“, 34 Kiesewetter, Grundriss der Allgemeinen Logik, 61 Kiesewetter, Johann, 7, 54, 58, 61, 120, 121 Königsberg, Prussian Government exile, 54 Kosovo War 1999, 37, 186 Kriegsplan, 168

L Laplace, Pierre-Simon, 98 leadership qualities, 181 Lebanon War 2006, purpose, objective and means, 195, 206 levée en masse, 32 Libya 2011, 1, 175 Liddell Hart, Basil, x, 7, 26, 38, 45, 57, 157 limited war, 134 little war and people’s war, 22, 54, 136

240

Index

little war or petit guerre, 136 longing for honour and renown, 110 Louis XIV, French king, 31 low-intensity war, 180 Ludendorff, Erich, 35

New Testament Theory, 122, 123 North Atlantic Alliance, vi, 2, 3, 37, 182, 184, 191, 192, 195–197, 205, 218 Note in On War dated 1827, 69, 118, 148 Note, unfinished, 119

M Machiavelli, “Il Principe”, 126 Machiavelli, Niccolò, x, 6, 29, 44, 95, 160 Mackinder, Halford, 33, 36, 37 Mahan, Alfred, x, 6, 35, 39, 44 Mahan, naval strategy, 35 Mahbubani, Kishore, 41 main lineaments, Hauptlineamente, 119, 180 Maizière, Ulrich de, 66 Marx, Karl, 34 maximum use of force, 22 means considered appropriate, 92 Memorial of Confession, Bekenntnisniederschrift, 55, 62 method of thinking, 152 Militärische Gesellschaft, 53 military forces, 117 military genius, definition, 105, 222 military qualities, 108 military spirit of the army, 108, 109 military virtues, 112 Military-Strategic Objectives of the Bundeswehr, Militärstrategische Zielsetzung der Bundeswehr, xi Moltke, Helmut, x, 35, 44, 57, 65, 145 moral factors, definition, 103 moral qualities, 7, 8, 85, 93, 102, 107, 117, 130, 138, 147, 159, 162, 167, 210 moral qualities and virtues of the army, 97 moral qualities of the commander, 71, 109, 110, 140, 180 Moscow 1812, 55 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 49 Münkler, Herfried, 20, 176

O Obama, Barack, 42 objective, 90 objectives higher level are purposes for the lower level, 90 Öcalan, Abdullah, 179 Old Testament Theory, 122, 123 On War, form and content, 121 On War, method of presentation, 120 On War, structure, 116 Operation ANACONDA 2002, frictions, 195, 209 opposing combatant, 70

N Napoleon, 9, 32, 34, 44, 47, 49, 54, 58–60, 98, 102, 130, 143, 147, 154, 163 Napoleon’s strategy, 55 Nassau, John Maurice of, 30 NATO, ISAF mission, 2 nature of war, 152 Naval Concept, Konzeption der Marine, x network-enabled operations, 20 New Strategic Concept of NATO, 174

P Paret, Peter, vii, 5, 14, 15, 57, 62, 77, 130, 148 parliamentary reservation, Parlamentsvorbehalt, 186 passively awaiting attack, 93 patriotic spirit, 110 patriotic spirit of the people, 108 people, bravery, adaptability, stamina, and enthusiasm, 109 people’s war, 137 people’s war, conditions, 136 personal standpoint, importance, 167 Pestalozzi, Johann, 48 phenomenon of war, 115, 123, 142, 157 philosophical approach to Clausewitz’s work, 63 physical force as means of war, 126 Plato, 29, 50, 58, 72 play of probability and chance, 72 policy, trustee for all interests, 14 political and military objective, 89 political purpose, 3, 88, 144 politics and war, 50, 139 politics, policy and polity, 13, 143 politics, war and peace, 129 Politik, 3, 13–15, 143 Politik and Regierung (Paret), 14 post-war political order, 148 primacy of politics, 3, 17, 18, 35, 70, 94, 130, 145–147, 153, 164, 167, 186, 224 the cabinet and the armed forces, 118

Index primordial violence, hatred and enmity, 146 principles, rules, regulations and methods, 156 probability and chance, 3, 16, 18, 19, 26, 64, 70–72, 88, 93, 95–102, 107, 134, 135, 142, 146, 163, 166, 167, 180, 193, 195, 200, 206, 208, 210, 222 probability, chance and friction, 69 Prussian reforms, social, educational, military, 48 Prussian War Academy 1810, 34, 61 purpose and goal, Zweck und Ziel, 64 purpose of a war, 88, 132, 166 purpose, defeat of the enemy, 91 purpose, objective and means, 9, 15, 69, 70, 79, 85, 86, 88, 89, 94, 96, 126, 127, 138, 142, 145, 147, 151, 155, 159 purpose, threatening the enemy and negotitions, 91

R real war, 92, 96, 130 reason alone, 72 Renaissance, 29 resources fighting forces, country, allies, 87 Responsibility to Protect, 175 revolutionary war, 138 Rice, Condoleezza, viii Roman Empire, 27 Romanticism, 34, 49, 58, 62, 104, 157 Ruge, Friedrich, x, 31

S scale of means, 92 Scharnhorst, Gerhard, 32, 48, 53, 54, 56, 59, 62, 63, 108, 110 Scharnhorst, Militärisches Taschenbuch zum Gebrauch im Felde, 62 Schiller and Goethe, 105 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 58 Schössler, Dietmar, 5, 6, 63, 165 second type of war is limited, 133 Security Strategy of the European Union, 174 Seven Years’ War, 32 Sloterdijk, Peter, 1 Smith, Adam, 33 Spencer, Herbert, 34 Staatspolitik, 14 standpoint, 3, 85 Stein, Heinrich Friedrich Karl Reichsfreiherr, 48

241 Strachan, Hew, 5, 57, 79, 80, 148, 162 strategic thinking, 167 strategist, 164 strategists, rule breakers, 164 strategy, vii, ix, x, 1–3, 5, 16–19, 21, 25, 44, 51, 64, 89, 92, 117, 126, 130, 149, 160–162, 164, 167, 196, 197, 223 strategy and war plan, 169 strategy as theory, 161 strategy consulting, 3, 212, 213, 215–217 strategy scholars, 4 strategy, five elements, 163 strategy, grand, 162 strategy, military, 18, 160, 169 strategy, national, 162 strategy, specification, 141 strategy, theoreticians, 6 strength of mind, Seelenstärke, 123 strength of will, 92 Strickmann, Eva, 14, 80 Sun Tzu, x, 6, 18, 25, 44, 65, 133

T Takt des Urteils, 86 Taliban purposes, 179 Taliban strategy, 198 Taliban, Fascinating Trinity, 197 Taliban, fog of war, 198 Taliban, rules of conduct, 202 Taliban, strictly controlled war, 197 Tauroggen, 55 terrorism, 21 terrorist fighters, 21 terrorist method of fighting, 177 terrorist objectives, 178 terrorist organisations recruitment, 177 terrorist war, 178 terrorist war, six possible endings, 179 terrorist, initiative and timing, 178 theoretical and real war, 99 theoretical war, 130 theory and practice, 50, 149, 157 theory as study guide, 150 theory educates commanders, 150 theory on war, 138 theory purpose, 116 theory, particular importance, 158 theory’s primary function, 151 Treaties of Tilsit, 48 Treaty of Versailles, 36 Truman world order, 41

242 truth, 60 actual truth, 61 logical truth, 61 Two Notes, On War, 14

U understanding war, 60, 131 unfinished note, 69 United Nations, 182 unknown unknowns, 210 USS Vincennes 1988, frictions, 195, 209

V van Creveld, Martin, 20, 176 Viator mundi, 29 Vienna Congress 1815, 33 virtues of his army, 71, 167 Volkssturm, 62, 136

W war, 3, 7, 19, 21, 22, 25, 62 as a continuation of policy, 139 Asymmetric Warfare, 176 Counter Insurgency Warfare, 176 decision to go to, 216 Full Spectrum Operations, 176 Hybrid War, 178 Hybrid Warfare, 176 Low Intensity Conflicts, 176

Index Neue Kriege, 176 Three Block War, 176 War Academy, Kriegsakademie, 54 war and peace, 132 war elements, 7 war has a grammar but no logic, 150 war is the continuation of policy, 14, 140, 147, 148 war plan, 50, 70, 75, 88, 89, 92–94, 111, 118, 130, 131, 142, 163, 168, 169, 208, 211, 215, 217, 223 war studies, key questions, 159 war to the extreme, three interactions“, 134 war, analysis, 164 war, assessment, 140 war, desired end state, 167 war, has own grammar but no logic, 135 war, nature of exploding forces, 143 war, part of social life, 4 war, range of, 22 war, spectrum of engagement, 135, 139 Watt, James, 33 Weber, Max, 60 Westphalian peace treaties, 30, 148 Wilson, Woodrow, 36 World Trade Center 2001, vii Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit, 6

Y Yugoslavia War 1992–1995, 37