Strategy beyond markets 9781786350206

Strategy beyond markets has been an active area of research inquiry since the early 1990s. Since its inception, the scho

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Strategy beyond markets
 9781786350206

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Contributors
Introduction
Public Politics Articles
Private Politics Articles
Integrated Political Strategy Articles
Notes
References
Strategy beyond Markets: A Step Back and a Look Forward
Introduction
A Stylized (U.S.) History of the Demand for Nonmarket Strategy
Nonmarket Strategy
Roles of Nonmarket Strategy
Levels of Nonmarket Strategy Research
The Political Economy Approach
The Firm Level
Applying the Approach
Public Politics Example: Uber
Private Politics: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup
Integrated Strategy and Private and Public Politics: The Fast Food Campaign
Market and Nonmarket Strategy
Strategic Management
Nonmarket Strategy
Self-Regulation
Research
Theory
Empirical
Data and Methods
Public Politics
Private Politics
Normative
Notes
References
Part I: Public Politics
Political Risk as a Hold-Up Problem: Implications for Integrated Strategy
Introduction
The Model
Analysis of Model
Strategies to Mitigate Political Risk
Government Commitment
Voluntary Concessions
Political Strategies
Integrated Strategy: HR, Operations, and Value Chain Management
Integrated Strategy: Ownership and Contracts
Integrated Strategy: Timing of Profits
Conclusion
Notes
Acknowledgments
References
Incorporating Legislative Effectiveness into Nonmarket Strategy: The Case of Financial Services Reform and the Great Recession
Pivotal Politics Theories
A Theory of Legislative Effectiveness with Pivotal Politics
Who Are the Most Effective Legislators?
An Illustration: Banking and Finance in the Great Recession
Conclusion
Notes
Acknowledgments
References
Appendix
A Unified Model of Political Risk
Introduction
Theory: A Unified Model of Political Risk
Disaggregating Political Risk
Modeling Each Risk
Theoretical Model: An Extensive-Form Game with War, Transfer Restrictions, and Expropriation
Structure of the Game
Investor Incentives
Government Incentives
Dynamic Intuitions from the Static Model
Capabilities of Investors
Ability to Resist
Level of Information
Ease of Exit
Mapping Capabilities to Risks
War versus Expropriation and Transfer Restriction
Transfer Risk versus Expropriation
Conclusion
Notes
Acknowledgments
References
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Motivations for Corporate Political Activity
Introduction
Transactional Nature of Campaign Contributions
Motivations for Corporate Political Activity: Strategy or Agency
Strategic Behavior of Executives
Agency Behavior of PACs
Empirical Approach
Data
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
Statistical Models and Their Interpretation
Empirical Results
Discussion
Simultaneous Presence of Strategic and Agency-Motivated Behavior
Interorganizational Dynamics in Public Politics
Managerial Implications
Highly versus Less Regulated Industries
Limitations
Implications for Future Research Design
Conclusion
Notes
References
The Market for Legislative Influence over Regulatory Policy
Introduction
Research Design
Theory and Hypotheses
Econometric Specification, Data and Measures
Results
Discussion and Conclusion
Notes
Acknowledgments
References
Part II: Private Politics
Corporate Reputational Dynamics, Private Regulation, and Activist Pressure
Introduction
The Model
Model Structure
The Firm
The Activist
Comments on the Model Specification
Equilibrium Conditions
Firm’s Bellman Equation and Kuhn Tucker Conditions
Activist’s Bellman Equation and Kuhn Tucker Conditions
Equilibrium Conditions
Computational Approach
Baseline Parameterization
Computational Analysis
Analysis
Equilibrium Behavior with no Activist
Equilibrium Behavior with an Activist
The Role and Impact of the Activist: A Preliminary Cut
Computational Results: Baseline Parameterization
Computational Results: Grid Search Over G
Comparative Statics of Long-Run Outcomes
Activist Efficacy: Variations in α and ω
Activist and Firm Patience: Variations in βA and βF
Returns to Reputation for Corporate Citizenship: Variations in θ
Activist Passion: Variations in ψ
Summary and Conclusions
Notes
References
Appendix
Second-Order Conditions
Firm’s Problem
Activist’s Problem
Computational Method
Proofs of Propositions
Proofs of Propositions 1
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 6
Self-Regulation and Regulatory Discretion: Why Firms May Be Reluctant to Signal Green
Introduction
The Model
Regulatory Flexibility and Firm Compliance
Legislative Stage
Self-Regulation
Uninformed Regulator Offers Flexibility (λλ.)
Numerical Example
Discussion
Conclusions
Notes
Acknowledgments
References
Private Politics Daily: What Makes Firms the Target of Internet/Media Criticism? An Empirical Investigation of Firm, Indust...
Introduction
Internet/Media Criticism and Activist Campaigns
Internet/Media Criticism and Campaigns as Different Aspects of Private Politics
Internet/Media Criticism as Early Stage of Activist Campaigns
Hypotheses
Firm-Specific Factors
Industry Factors
Country-Specific and Institutional Factors
Data and Methods
Dependent Variable(s)
Independent Variables
Firm-Level Variables
Industry-Level Variables
Country-Level Variables
Results
Results for Model 1 – General Criticism Sample
Model 2: Likelihood of Being Severely Criticized
Model 3: Determinants of Criticism Intensity
Discussion – Conclusion
Limitations
Notes
References
Part III: Integrated Political Strategy
Navigating Natural Monopolies: Market Strategy and Nonmarket Challenges in Radio and Television Audience Measurement Markets
Introduction
Market Structures of the Radio and Television Ratings Markets
Radio and Television Audience Ratings
Overview of the Evolution of Audience Measurement Markets in the United States
Economic Characteristics of the Radio and Television Ratings Markets
Economies of Scale
Value of Comparability
Information Imperfections
Partially Conflicting Buyer Preferences
Summary
Firm Strategies, Nonmarket Constraints, and Industry Dynamics
Competition for the Market
Positioning
Pricing and Deep Pockets
Acquisitions and Alliances
Exploiting Monopoly
Maintaining Monopoly
Business Practices to Limit Available Customers or Increase Switching Costs
Innovation Competition and Displacement of the Incumbent
Summary
Threats of Governmental Intervention, Self-Regulation, and Negotiation
The 1963 Harris Hearings
Switching to Local People Meters in the United States, 2002–2009
Summary
Alternative Models of Television Audience Measurement Markets
Television Audience Measurement in the United Kingdom
Television Audience Measurement in Australia
Television Audience Measurement in India, 2008–2014
Discussion: No Exit and the Political Economy of Complaints
Notes
Acknowledgment
References
The Organization of Nonmarket Strategy
Introduction
A Typology of Nonmarket Organization
Model
Integration
Specialization
Optimal Organizational Form
Economy of Scope β
Importance of CSR for Output α
Manager Valuation of CSR δ
Firm Valuation of CSR
Non-CSR Nonmarket Functions
Relating Theory to Organizational Form in Practice
Conclusion
Notes
Acknowledgments
References
Appendix A: Proofs
Appendix B: Organizational form Typology Coding
Complementarity in Firms’ Market and Political Capabilities: An Integrated Theoretical Perspective
Introduction
Political Tactics and Market Capabilities
Common Political Tactics and Underlying Political Capabilities
Building Political Capabilities from Market Capabilities
Information Provision
Constituency Building
Sustainability of Political Advantage
Internal Alignment
External Alignment
Consistency of Internal and External Alignments
Discussion
Can Firms Entirely Replace Political Capabilities with Outsourcing?
How Far Can Capabilities Travel within the Firm?
Theoretical Contributions
Limitations and Future Research
Conclusion
Notes
Acknowledgments
References
How Patent Strategy Affects the Timing and Method of Patent Litigation Resolution
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Generic Patent Strategies and the Timing of Patent Litigation Resolution
Proprietary Patent Strategy
Defensive Patent Strategy
Leveraging Patent Strategy
Data and Methods
Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
Proprietary Strategy: Patentee Stakes and Patent Age
Defensive Strategy: Portfolio Citations and Counter-Suit
Leveraging Strategy: Size Ratio
Control Variables
Empirical Model
Results
Discussion
Notes
Acknowledgments
References
About the Authors

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