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Strategic intelligence for the future. 1, A new strategic and operational approach
 9781786302311, 1786302314

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Content: 1 A new strategic and operational approach. 2 A new information function approach.

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Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1

Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1 A New Strategic and Operational Approach

Henri Dou Alain Juillet Philippe Clerc

First published 2019 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address: ISTE Ltd 27-37 St George’s Road London SW19 4EU UK

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street Hoboken, NJ 07030 USA

www.iste.co.uk

www.wiley.com

© ISTE Ltd 2019 The rights of Henri Dou, Alain Juillet and Philippe Clerc to be identified as the authors of this work have been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Library of Congress Control Number: 2019930610 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-78630-231-1

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xi

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 1. For a New Strategic and Competitive Intelligence . . . . .

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1.1. Our assessment . 1.2. The present day 1.3. Tomorrow . . . . 1.4. Conclusion . . . 1.5. References . . .

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Chapter 2. Geopolitics and Strategic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2.1. Principles of analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1. Getting to the point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2. Having an open mind . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3. Knowing how to decode information . . . 2.1.4. Learning how to sort through information 2.2. The evolving world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1. The increasing power of the individual . . 2.2.2. The evolution of power relationships . . . 2.3. A changing world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1. International institutions . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2. Bilateral agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4. Increased risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1. Climate risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2. Risks linked to resources . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3. Medical risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.4. Natural risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2.4.5. Political risks 2.4.6. Nuclear risks . 2.4.7. Cyber risks . . 2.5. Conclusion . . . . 2.6. References . . . .

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Chapter 3. Competitive Intelligence Schools Across the World: Foundations, Influence and Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3.1. Introduction: what is the competitive intelligence school? . . . . 3.2. Visions that inspire schools of thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1. “Power countries” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2. “Emerging countries” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. The advent of the competitive intelligence schools . . . . . . . . 3.3.1. Geopolitical and geoeconomic framework . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2. Doctrines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. The “nourishing disciplines” of competitive intelligence and communities of public/private practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1. Disciplines and “schools of practice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2. The African and Chinese schools of competitive intelligence . 3.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 4. Competitive Intelligence as a Vehicle for International Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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4.1. The arrival of new signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1. Definitions of competitive intelligence . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2. Maintaining competitive advantages . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. Increasing instability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1. More developed countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2. Low-income countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3. The French example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4. Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1. The foundations of collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2. Academic collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3. Bilateral network collaborations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.4. Collaboration between organizations . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.5. Collaborations through international institutions . . . . 4.4.6. Collaboration via chambers of commerce and industry 4.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

Chapter 5. Regional Competitive Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1. What do we mean by territories? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1. Regional and international patterns of economic development and innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2. Intelligent specialization strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2. A typology of territories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3. Definition of territorial intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4. The challenges of territorial intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5. Rethinking our intelligence capabilities in territorial situations 5.5.1. Strategic coordination deficits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2. Needing to be organized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6. The intelligence of situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.1. The establishment of competitive and strategic regional facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.2. The goals of these facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7. The main areas of intervention of this competitive intelligence and regional strategic facility or organization . . . . . . 5.8. The generic configuration of the facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8.1. Regional strategic steering group (CRPS) . . . . . . . . . . 5.8.2. The interpretational group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8.3. The spotters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9. Strategic management approach: mapping and analysis tools . 5.9.1. The map of key territory actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9.2. Critical resources of a territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9.3. The influence potential of a territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.10. Operational implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.11. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 6. Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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6.1. The current foundations of influence . . . . . . . . . 6.2. Who is going to communicate? . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3. Knowledge of the target and information . . . . . . 6.4. Rumors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5. The “media sounding board” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6. Cultural or public diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7. Positive influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7.1. Influence, rumors and territorial attractiveness 6.7.2. Becoming attractive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 7. Sphere of Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1. The return of geopolitics in the economic field . 7.2. Power strategy and influence strategy . . . . . . 7.2.1. States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2. Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3. The sphere of influence: illustrations . . . . . . . 7.3.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.2. The sphere of influence of a company. . . . 7.3.3. The sphere of influence of a territory . . . . 7.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 8. Organizational Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8.1. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2. Organizational intelligence and cognitive pathologies . . . . 8.2.1. The brakes of the organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.2. Corporate culture: both a brake and lever of organizational intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3. An example: the US–Japan FSX Fighter program or “thinking out of the silos” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4. Organizational intelligence and strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.1. Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.2. Agile organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.3. A network of experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.4. The culture of organizations: management of cognitive biases and vehicle for the creation of a knowledge base of the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.5. Managing the culture of organizations . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.6. Learning organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5. Collective intelligence and organization of sensor networks . 8.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 9. From Military Intelligence to Competitive Intelligence . .

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9.1. From the military to the economy. 9.1.1. Military warfare . . . . . . . . . 9.1.2. Integration of the economy . . 9.1.3. The priority of the economy . 9.1.4. The economic army . . . . . . 9.2. Forms and aims of intelligence . .

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9.2.1. The importance of intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.2. Economic intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.3. Global intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.4. Intelligence as global tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3. The practice of intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.1. Intelligence for everyone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.2. Weak and strong signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.3. The tools of intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.4. Sources of intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.5. Public/private collaboration in company intelligence . 9.4. Intelligence and its cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.1. Decoding what we might notice to understand reality 9.4.2. The intelligence cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.3. Knowing oneself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.4. Definition of the research framework . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.5. Prospective vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.6. The research plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.7. Collecting data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.8. Data cross-checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6. The synthesis of information and its dissemination . . . . 9.6.1. From adequacy to expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Summary of Contents of Volume 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Preface

Since the Public Economic Intelligence Policy (PPIE) was established in France, there have been a number of conferences, and research groups, as well as the introduction of training reference bases, including publications on the subject. However, a look at its track record shows that since the enthusiasm of its beginnings, routine has prevailed and competitive intelligence has been drawn toward concerns relating to security, leaving behind the notions of foresight, strategy, and geopolitical understanding of business, and of the institutions that they export or not. In a world currently undergoing complete reconfiguration, where in 10 years’ time France will no longer be the sixth world power, there is a need to reconsider our vision of the reality. We need to “change our way of thinking”, and to no longer analyze the information we find easy to obtain (as is the case today) with references of the past. We need to re-discover competitive intelligence. The objective of this book is to put competitive intelligence into a modern context of information, as well as of its strategic exploitation. We can no longer afford to remain naïve and must move from the passiveness of theory to action. Acting is, of course, applying the methods and tools of intelligence and competitive intelligence to our understanding of the business environment. But it is also about using this mix to thoroughly immerse ourselves in the methods used by our competitors to better fight on the international market. With hindsight, we might have the impression that the initial conception of competitive intelligence has been diluted. Big companies, with their financial assets, have more or less successfully developed their own

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activities in this field. But, at the level of national industrial research and development programmes – clusters, regions, our research institutions, and SMEs and SMIs – competitive intelligence has neither penetrated nor taken its rightful strategic place. At an international level, this discipline has gained more and more followers, especially in the US, but also in China, Germany, South-East Asia, etc. It is time we opened our eyes, by analyzing errors, being aware both our strengths and weaknesses. If considered to be actionable, competitive intelligence is neither espionage, documentation nor futurology. It is the way to see things more clearly, to develop a constructive and shared vision and to create a real lever for economic and industrial development. Engaged in hyper competition, an evolution is necessary, but it is not a few hundred successful start-ups that will deeply transform our industry or help it quickly reach the threshold necessary to conquer the external markets and therefore reduce the deficit of our trade balance. The world of tomorrow is uncertain. We might be faced with new challenges posed by terrorism that need to be analyzed and forecast, as well as economic, demographic, and capitalism crises. We need to explore the future to better act in the present. It is these topics that we wanted to develop in the following nine chapters, ranging from geopolitics to competitive intelligence communities of practices, influence, spheres of influence, international cooperation, innovation, territorial intelligence. We hope that in reading this book, readers will gain new insight and be introduced to the activities of those who already practice, or those who wish to begin, methods and ways of working that break routines and lead to action. As noted by Eric Delbecque, Competitive intelligence (CI) has persisted without ever really evolving; in fact, it has reproduced over the years without significant changes. It is this cycle that we want to break to bring competitive intelligence into a new dimension. Henri DOU Alain JUILLET Philippe CLERC January 2019

Introduction

“[...] Because they are open to a movement carrying continual transformations and uncertainties, the societies of modernity have only constantly changing maps, they engage in the immediate history by moving forward by dead reckoning” [BAL 88]. We find ourselves experiencing a “great transformation” in capitalism. The recent unprecedented crisis, as well as continual technological transformation, climate and environment changes, and growing populations have all had significant effects on recent breakthroughs. Companies, states and organizations try to move forward, to find useful ways of “avoiding hazards, the unexpected, and the uncertain”, as well as changing the ways they develop. It is a priority for them to get to know and understand the world around them. Since ancient times, people have been constantly striving to study and understand the world they were living in, even with the most limited means; to build an accurate picture of it by asking intelligent questions [BOT 96]. I.1. An unstable world in search of intelligence The state of the contemporary world makes the need for an insightful grasp of situations, or of the situation, all the more important. Globalization means that major actors as new powers in terms of industry and services (Brazil, China, India, Russia, Indonesia) with their businesses, their influence networks, and their expertise are quickly beginning to emerge. But beyond these industrial or economic concerns, we also find new threats

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posed by mafia networks and terrorists, driving us to reconsider our standards of security and defense. These new participants disrupt the strategic design of our businesses, our states, our territories and their major representative institutions. They all find themselves confronted with different forms of competition and cooperation need under unprecedented terms. This has meant that the division of labor is disrupted and value chains are localized according to comparative advantages and trade opportunities. Technical, organizational, and social innovation emerges as a new weapon of differentiation, the driving force of the first mover, the key ingredient to creative strategy. The most important factor of this dynamic seems to be linked to knowledge, intelligence, and expertise. Having a firm grasp of these skills means gaining access to economic, technological, social, and cultural advantages as a means of survival. Simply being competitive is no longer enough. More than ever, it has become important to create new keys to understanding, as well as the tools necessary to gain “power” in this new century. Above all, it is important to develop the capacities of collective intelligence of new dynamics, new organizations, threats, and opportunities that will define the new century. These will be the keys to understanding, looking into the future, anticipating, deciding, and acting to avoid the risk of disappearance [TEN 09]. If the prospect of gaining this power is to be maintained, the new discipline of competitive intelligence can act as both a tool and a method for management of companies and organizations, as well as that of public policy. The present book is devoted to the significance of competitive and strategic intelligence. They are defined as the ability of the individual or organization to effectively interpret their ecosystem to drive their strategy and, of course, to understand and anticipate that of their competitors and partners, and more broadly of all stakeholders. They are sustained by a process of collection, analysis, protection, and dissemination of information and knowledge, but also by their ability to protect their own tangible and intangible assets. This definition of business practice is of course relevant to the conduct of any organization, as well as public policies and their development. This approach consists of the combination of different action of monitoring and analysis, of economic security and influence. It might be about anticipating evolutions of the new value chain in the automotive industry, aeronautics, logistics, food-processing, or publishing industries; anticipating or following consumer trends; comparing the best

Introduction

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practices; hearing the warning signal about a technological breakthrough or the emergence of a standardization, technical or legal strategy, recreating the cultural profile of a particular competing organization, the territorial public policies of its partners or competitors, or analyzing value chains and global strategies of clusters. We constantly have the need to interact with the economic, social, cultural and technical environment that surrounds us, with public and private actors, with weak signals, “promising facts”, competitive behavior, etc. Competitive intelligence allows us to resolutely adopt a mode of interpretation, to use tools of collection and analysis adapted to each situation and to give meaning to this environment and its transformations. It also means paying close attention to all possible causes of error and to strive relentlessly to master the dynamics of knowledge in order to have “prior knowledge” , to be at the forefront of the action, to avoid a particularly fatal strategic error, “to avoid falling asleep”. Here the tools of rationality and scientific spirit prove to be insufficient. In this way, we might even be experiencing “mental lying” (self-deception [GOR 17]), committing errors of appreciation or erroneous analyses of the situation due to poor stances of observation or the thoughtless application of immutable decision-making rites which are never questioned. A good system of competitive intelligence requires being effective, the cross fertilization with another “way of knowing”, a mental attitude articulating modes of knowledge close to intuition, wisdom, flair, cautious attention, or curiosity. Moreover, “the invention on an everyday life basis”, as well as for the future, the invention of new ways at the heart of organizations and complex markets, cannot be considered alone. Co-production and “co-management” of intelligence capabilities are needed as well. This book answers to these unprecedented realities and to the need in all situations of innovative approaches and tools of the decision-maker confronted with their shifting and unpredictable ecosystem/ surroundings. I.2. Objectives The objective is to provide private and public managers who are facing the implementation of an economic intelligence project, with an educational,

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operational and pragmatic guide. The same goes for all actors in the public and political spheres that are in their decision-making environment facing the same problems. The book includes methods, tool panels and methodologies. It provides illustrations and case studies. To the “man on the ground” of the public or private sector wanting to implement a project of competitive intelligence – that is to say, the mobilization of intelligence capabilities at the service of development strategies (competitive, social, cultural, international) in the framework of adapted organizations – it provides actionable methods and the guide to identify the best tools, even to build/imagine the tools for each particular situation and thus participate in the construction of the future of the users. It is therefore aimed at both business managers (start-ups, small businesses, SMEs, large groups, networks) and their teams, associative managers, managers of clusters and animation teams, government officials and those responsible for territorial economic intelligence strategies. It is also particularly suited to research-oriented issues, whether public or private [DOU 16]. It is therefore aimed at “users” as well as “competitive economy” project managers and the various managers of all these organizations. I.3. Ambition and determination We are driven by clear ambition and determination, which is to propose an up-to-date methodological book which responds to the challenges of its time and is able to contribute to the construction of the future through the innovative and diverse instruments and organizations it proposes. It must allow decision-makers to enter the new century with the tools to apprehend its complexity without relying on the tools and organizations of the previous century, designed for an outdated world. This ambition and this desire are all the more important as we are in a situation of transition and latency towards a new world [VEL 10] governed by disrupted economic, productive, societal, and environmental issues. The authors of this book are determined to break with the mimicry of experts [RES 90] and to enter into a dynamic of innovation that gives all the methods and tools presented their originality.

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I.4. Originality of the book and innovation We hope to treat competitive intelligence as comprehensively as possible from the point of view of practice, without forgetting the fundamental theoretical aspects to think the future. By presenting the logic of the competitive intelligence project, we have been able to consolidate a chain of technical tools, as well as thorough approaches and organization. The authors are at the same time innovators and “reformers” [GUI 05], but also experienced practitioners. We wanted to make a contribution within the framework of “bottom-up, participatory innovation”, that which proceeds from the uses and the practice. We imagine “clever practitioners” who undertake to adapt the methods, and cross the tools to respond to the specificity of the need for situational awareness. “The practitioner/user interprets the methods available, reinvents and participates in their design and therefore regains power over the method”. They rework tools and methods in order to adapt them. The world of applications and digital uses is in this way a fertile ground for “bottom-up and contributing innovations” following on from what was free software in the 1990s, interweaving technologies, content and organizational practices. We are convinced that competitive intelligence fits well into this approach. It sometimes requires us to use “limited means”, but also sophisticated reassembled and recomposed tools, in order to respond to an urgent need to inform a decision or strategy. This is what we often call strategic mixes: from, for example, the use of the spheres of influence techniques applied by large companies created by Richard D’Aveni [DAV 01], to territorial strategies. I.5. Structure of the book Based on this shared ambition and this approach, the book is divided into separate chapters, each of which presents a particularly necessary aspect when considering our competitive intelligence approach. Some chapters overlap partially as it is necessary to reconsider the approaches and adapt them for today’s world. Competitive intelligence cannot be split up into silos. Therefore, we have also included a list of references at the end of each chapter so that our readers can explore these notions further, whatever prior

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knowledge they might have. As part of this process, we also strived to provide an international openness by not limiting our references to a single school of thought. Finally, we must consider that the subject of competitive intelligence is so vast that we cannot, in a single work, present all of its aspects. We have focused on the essentials and those invariants which, in a modern approach to competitive intelligence, must be integrated by actors in the field. I.6. References [BAL 88] BALANDIER G., Le désordre : Éloge du mouvement, Fayard, Paris, 1988. [BOT 96] BOTTÉRO J., HERRENSCHMIDT C., VERNANT J.-P., L’Orient ancien et nous, Albin Michel, Paris, 1996. [DAV 01] D’AVENI R.A., GUNTHER R.-E., COLE J., Strategic Supremacy: How Industry Leaders Create Growth, Wealth, and Power through Spheres of Influence, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2001. [DOU 16] DOU H., “Innovation et industrialisation : Un enjeu pour la France”, Vie et sciences de l’entreprise, no. 201, pp. 168–189, 2016. [GOR 17] GORLIN E.-I., OTTO M.-W., “Truth matters: Cognitive integrity as an intervention for self-deception”, PsyArXiv, 2017, available at: https:// psyarxiv.com/72h65/. [GUI 05] GUILLAUD H., “De l’innovation ascendante”, Internetactu.net, June 1, 2005, available at: http://www.internetactu.net/2005/06/01/de-linnovationascendante/. [RES 90] RESTIER-MELLERAY C., “Experts et expertise scientifique : Le cas de la France”, Revue française de science politique, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 546–585, 1990. [TEN 09] TENZER N., Quand la France disparaît du monde, Grasset, Paris, 2009. [VEL 10] VELTZ P., La grande transition, La France dans le monde qui vient, Le Seuil, Paris, 2010.

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We are not only in a changing world; we find ourselves in a world where traditional structures are evolving, in which the power of the state and the relationship with its citizens is beginning to change. Technological breakthroughs are forcing us to rethink traditional models and ways of working. The digital revolution has opened up new, unexplored fields of activity, destroying our traditional notions of discipline demarcation, creating a hybridization of fields and its actors. The loss of cyberspace borders has led to a multipolarization of cultures, meaning that we need to start taking a particular interest in them in order to make sense of our present reality. The primacy of sovereign power has been conquered by the power of some companies and the public/private relations balance due to the mutual interest of both parties. Faced with the radical transformations in which we must take part, pragmatism and realism are essential in the reconstruction of our referents. 1.1. Our assessment For 500 years, according to the analysis of British historian Paul Kennedy [KEN 10], the most powerful state was the one with the most significant coercive force at the local, regional or international level through military capability, economic leadership or the possession of essential natural resources. Today, we are experiencing a paradigm shift. Joseph Nye [NYE 04] announced in 1990 that power would no longer be based on force, but on the ability of a state to obtain the support of other states based on

Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1: A New Strategic and Operational Approach, First Edition. Henri Dou, Alain Juillet and Philippe Clerc. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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shared values without the need for coercion, by relying on communication and exchange that the State controls. In response to some criticism, in his latest book, he adds to the outdated hard power, which is favored by George W. Bush, and the emerging soft power, advocated by Barack Obama, as well as an intermediate stage: smart power [NYE 09] advocated by Hillary Clinton. In these three scenarios, the overall strategy is at the heart of the approach and its practice, drawing on the deepest possible knowledge of all facets of the environment and its likely evolution. Within states, we are witnessing the same phenomenon at the corporate level with a direct impact on the practice of capitalism or liberalism and the expectations of users. After 30 years of creating value for the shareholder, we rediscover that the company is at the heart of community life and has a societal role, as the presidents of Danone and Veolia have recently reminded us [POS 09]. In order for it to be effective, a company can no longer stay in a closed circuit where it is only interested in its own competitors and customers. Profit must benefit investments, research, employees and, of course, shareholders. It cannot rely solely on this practice, however, like some financial practices of investment funds that have largely contributed to the current difficulties of the industrial world. The behavior of GAFAM [WIK 18a] (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft) is very revealing here in terms of a new vision of the world and its environment. To emerge from or to stay in the current competition, a company must understand and integrate the geopolitical context, the evolution of ideas, the expectations of the users, the declarations of values and the changes of practices. This complementary knowledge involves in-depth studies that are constantly updated to decode the true reality hidden behind perceived reality [JUS 17] to create effective and efficient strategies. The strategic errors of large public institutions and private groups have led to industrial and financial disasters, which are often resolved through the use of public funds, without any responsibility being seriously sought by those in power. Despite the collective refusal to study the objective reasons, giving in to the temptation of the scapegoat or fatality, Areva business, Alstom, Technip, Lafarge and how many others show a real strategic weakness. Beyond management and the market, this weakness can only be explained by the lack of information on the competitive and industrial reality of their environments. Those young elites who are straight out of school and thus protected from the harsh reality of the market, and who live in small circles, understand failure as just a sure step in the normal progression of

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their careers, without understanding the current evolution of the field. This denial, crossed with the mediatization of the methods and practices that led to these situations, contributes to a climate of unhealthy doubt in civil society that distances it from politics and the State [GAV 03]. Yet the analysis of reality and of what is happening in the world shows that the future passes through a very close public/private network in which everyone contributes to the common cause. The state can no longer assume all its missions alone and large and medium-sized companies cannot survive in isolation. Today, everything is connected. Similarly, at the regional level, as for SMEs, this situation becomes a necessity, as shown by the result of the referral “territorial intelligence” of the CESER of the Alpes Provence Côte d’Azur region [CES 17]. Widespread political correctness, imposed by the ruling classes to circumvent the pitfall of democracy and reduce the range of thought and capacity for exchange, is eliminating this contradiction. Unlike Greek philosophical rhetoric or the disputatio of Renaissance humanists, only sophist rhetoric is validated, preventing the opponent from expressing themself outside a defined framework that becomes the limits of thought. Since this contradiction has become impossible, it leaves the field open to media, political or social pressure groups to manipulate the information in order to make it compatible with the agreed thought [MON 10]. In this context, the perceived reality is based on a virtual base built on a set of imposed values that reject or eliminate all that is wrong with the path to transformation. It is therefore very difficult for the analyst to find the elements of a true reality or at least of what is closest to it [FRI 04] to technically escape from this single line of thinking [DEM 00] and to make heard other possibilities. This involves the introduction of artificial intelligence to improve strategic foresight by facilitating the collection, processing and analysis of all data available in Big Data, including those from open, digital, electronic or social sources. We therefore enter the field of smart economy [MED 17]. In this complex environment, the individual evolves by becoming a proactive and cooperative player who benefits from a level of knowledge that is out of step with previous generations and thus benefits from an extensive social network. Immersed in cyberspace, these individuals know how to use the necessary tools and can integrate the permanent evolution into their work, thus setting them apart from the older generations. Their

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openness to international travel and media opens them up to a whole new set of opportunities. Acting autonomously through an ability to acquire information and form an idiosyncratic opinion, the chain of command is disrupted by an expectation of decentralization of decision-making processes and a willingness to assume one’s share in the operational process. 1.2. The present day In 1999, Richard Heuer [HEU 99] had already shown the cognitive challenges that would be faced by intelligence analysts; be they scientists, economic or military because of the complexity of the problems, the variable reliability of the data, the growing volume of available information and the multiplicity of actors. Confronted with a double uncertainty by the intersection of complex and indeterminate intelligence problems, linked to the totally artificial denial and influence operations, at each step of the process, they tend to use cognitive biases derived from filters of their own. The problem is therefore analyzing the data and drawing useful conclusions by going beyond the limits of the human mind. This leads to applying artificial intelligence, but also the use of the theory of deterrence games which allow a fairly simple way of classifying, selecting or eliminating competing hypotheses relating to a set of data such as those shown by Michel Rudnianski [RUD 16]. Making this kind of claim leads to questions surrounding how competitive intelligence is practiced in France. The Martre and Carayon reports [DEL 06] and the formation of the Académie d’intelligence économique (academy of competitive intelligence) by Robert Guillaumot [SAL 15] were greatly useful in opening France’s eyes to the positive effects of these methods founded across the Atlantic; the lack of knowledge of which had had a negative impact on progress in France. Founded in the United States in the 1980s by Michael Porter, competitive, and later, strategic intelligence rapidly developed and was an integral part of the federal budget of every president, responding to computer and digital evolutions. The system was built around the Advocacy Center (1993) [EXP 18] which builds on the National Economic Council [WIK 18b] created the same year. The group has been gradually reinforced by a legal, defensive and offensive system, including the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988) [WIK 18c], the Toricelli Act (1992) [CUB 92], the Statement of

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Administrative Action (Uruguay Round Agreement Act 1994) [URU 18], the Helms-Burton Act (strengthening the embargo on Cuba 1996) [WIK 18d], the Amato-Kennedy Act [COS 96] against rogue states (1996), then the Patriot Act (2001) [DOU 15]. We might also mention the anti-corruption scheme with its 2010 Dodd-Frank [USC 10] and FATCA [FAT 17] extraterritorial legislation, which is based on the 1997 FCPA [USD 97] Act and was mobilized by its implementation by elected officials and all US administrations. All have understood that the preservation of world leadership in the face of Chinese methodical growth and the fierce emergence of other countries should center around the centralization of information, public action to support all American companies and the permanence of efficient economic and technical intelligence at the service of the public and private sectors. The work carried out in France since 1994 and especially in 2002 has allowed us to model the competitive intelligence approach, at both the levels of development and of practice. This popularized the required state of mind, as defined in Philippe Lemercier’s 5V grid [LEM 14]. It led to the discovery of the usefulness of monitoring and analysis, the importance of security and the practice of influence. It made it possible to draw up a territorial network with the local councils and chambers of commerce. It also opened the field of international standards and practice and inspired policy implementations of competitive intelligence in countries in Europe and Africa, as well as in China. On the other hand, they showed that France had a lot of useful information for the companies that remained in their ministries due to a strict partition that goes against the necessary transversality of the approach. They also showed the difficulty of convincing SMEs/SMIs with the model used which, for them, seems to be reserved for large companies. The problem comes from the fact that, during the period where France tried to improve existing structures, the world evolved and France did not integrate this change. As Eric Delbecque wrote [BLA 08], in France, competitive intelligence has been reproduced over the years, but always to the same specifications. This is also due to the fact that this activity involves taking an interest in both the competitive and the global environment. In this context, it is important to recognize that, despite an export requirement imposed on all companies for development or survival reasons, most of them have a complete lack of knowledge of the geography, geopolitics and cultural

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realities that they interpret through the prism of a hexagonal vision that is generally subcontracted by intermediaries [FIO 16]. Beyond the local subtleties that can create misunderstandings, like Taiwan on the maps of China or the former Spanish Sahara on those of the Kingdom of Morocco, this is particularly true for Africa. In this continent, which in the coming decades will experience the strongest demographic and economic growth, most of our leaders are opposed by the followers of a traditional developing world, or ecologist vision. The problem is that none of this has to do with the reality of the countries concerned whose younger generations have been trained in the best universities in the world and who are already ahead of us in certain areas, such as mobile phones and electronic banking [LOU 13]. In a 2012 report, Louis Gallois [WIK 18e] emphasized that France is weak in collective intelligence at all levels and in all categories of business. We do not know how to work in packs, as Christine Lagarde once professed [DAV 10]. It is true, as Pascal Frion [FRI 09] pointed out in a later thesis in his books, that the methods and techniques proposed in order to practice CI have proved to be better adapted to large industrial groups. Yet this approach is ultimately very useful for small businesses which understand the principles and exploit them for their particular needs. Admittedly, the inadequacy of the means implemented and the indispensable relays have not really provided the best conditions for the necessary process of increasing awareness of CI. The functioning of the competitiveness clusters is a good example. Their quasi-majority did not practice competitive intelligence as it had firstly been defined; that is to say, the collection of useful information according to the objectives or ongoing projects of the cluster to create the intelligence. As a result, users perceive it more as an aid to communication than as a tool that enriches analysis and facilitates decision-making. Without going as far as the Small Business Act practiced by the Americans, one can only regret the incapacity of the State and most local authorities in helping the development of local industries and actors by public order. It is indeed regrettable that the General Delegation for Armaments makes it necessary for the SME/SMI of world defense to go through large industrial groups to respond to bids with the consequences that we imagine on their margins. It is equally regrettable that regional bids involve national or international expertise without analyzing the local situation [LAL 18].

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It would make sense to include local expertise in these bids, even if they are obliged to work in liaison with other selected groups. The historical and cultural absence of transversality has a negative effect. France suffers from a weakness in territorial intelligence while our regional and departmental structures with administrations, territories, communities and companies give us possibilities that are unknown elsewhere. France has a successful example in Corsica where, as part of the training, a DU (diplôme universitaire – university diploma) [UNI 18b] situates local actors and external experts in an inclusive open offer. This state of affairs largely contributes to the low weight of French SMEs in intra-European exports [CHA 17]. 1.3. Tomorrow The context in France has meant that by simply focusing on the economic sphere in a conceptual framework derived from hard power, competitive intelligence remained fixed in a particular time period without taking into account the current world revolution. However, the work of Bernard Nadoulek [NAD 97] on the necessary integration of culture in analysis, that of Christian Harbulot [HAR 14] on the power relations and the impact of geopolitics, as well as the work of Steven Dedijer [CLE 04] at Aklund University on the socio-cultural environment, has long shown that other factors need to be addressed. Since then, some, aware of the restrictive side of the approach, have introduced a strategic dimension. However, we still have far to go, given that our approach does not allow us to extract multiple influences seeking to impose themselves in the world of information and communication. We continue to practice top-down at the expense of the bottom-up approach, which is currently a strong expectation of civil societies, beginning with the youngest. France has not succeeded, like the United States, in building lobbies of all kinds, as we have seen in the failed three-fold attempt to create a law on corporate secrecy, such as the United States’. This has existed for a long time in English-speaking countries. However, the French have developed pyramidal intelligence, stemming from the trente glorieuses; the 30 years following the end of the Second World War, on a theoretical and methodological base of traditional functioning of intelligence and competitive intelligence that no longer fits in with the realities of today [MAH 15]. We have not sufficiently grasped the possibilities offered by the cognitive dimension and the descriptive or prospective analyses in order to develop the intelligence of situations and adapt to the evolution of potential means.

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This is exemplified by the award obtained in November 2017 in the United States by Frenchman Christophe Bisson at the Congress of the World Organization for Strategic and Competitive Intelligence (SCIP) [CIW 17] for his research in strategic hybrid systems allowing any type of private or public organization to better detect and interpret weak signals in a complex and volatile environment [BIS 18]. Here, information is no longer the single key, even if we need it. In order words, the goal is strategy and advanced decision-making for competitive purposes. We are far from traditional anticipation, which is too static in relation to the evolution of the environment. Conventional modes of monitoring only allow the reaction, especially since it incorporates cognitive biases and a silo/partitioning approach. In the most recent research carried out by Bisson, we remove everything that is no longer essential, from intellectual property to computer security, to get a cross-sectional view in order to work on the predictionsimulation part of the short and medium term decisions, and adapt our vision in the long run. We are also interested in guiding machine learning for tactical and strategic purposes, because the volume of information grows too quickly to rely only on algorithmic power, the detection of fake news and the in-depth analysis of social networks. Of course, we cannot compare the state of the most advanced research with our practices, but we must keep in mind where we are going in order to alter our trajectories. Intelligence culture and practice must incorporate the dimension of innovation that allows for predictive analysis and detecting structuring trends. France has not sufficiently taken into account the persistent deficit of the culture of strategy and foresight as it becomes essential to make when competing at a global level. Although, having integrated a competitive intelligence approach, at the level of defining the framework of the action, we should have opted for an approach of hybridization of prospective steps and CI, like the research group on strategic intelligence from the University of Liège [UNI 18b]. As a result, we lose this prospective and, more recently, this predictive ability that fundamentally changes the perception of the problem. Moreover, we have not sufficiently taken into account, at the level of the state as at the corporate level, the consequences of Big Data. The exponential growth of information from all sources in a permanent stream facilitates, in the absence of effective crosschecking and prioritization, all imitations, misinformation, repetitive errors and unfounded rumors. The selection process in a system holding too much information is extremely complex and the algorithms also have their conceptual limits even though

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artificial intelligence can improve them through learning. Just as we can separate the internet into three layers (the Web, the deep web and the dark web) with their specificities and their interweaving, we will have to learn how to segment and manage the types of information and how to adapt our research to different needs to avoid excess and reduce costs. While France is known for the quality of its mathematicians, and while the Silicon Valley is full of French engineers, our research, with few exceptions, does not reach the level of international competitiveness of the main countries in this specific field. This is probably due to the fact that, in France, there is an emphasis put on fundamental and applied mathematics. Our academics have a hard time accepting a science that favors transversality, as this does not allow for categorization. However, our authorities should promote interdisciplinarity in this area by organizing the effective involvement of universities and research centers in national development, as this has been masterfully successful for a long time at CEA. In July 2017, a symposium held in Corsica [UNI 17] showed that this was possible if there was a common drive of each party involved. Similarly, if we want to innovate, we could imagine a social responsibility for research (RSR) as well as corporate CSR. At a time when IN-Q-Tel [IQT 18] is funding 137 projects directly related to artificial intelligence and its use in all sectors of intelligence, we cannot continue to limit the scope of action open to our researchers and our teachers or to compartmentalize orders and developments at the service level. Only a political will can help us break free from this penalizing situation for all the actors, as well as damaging atmosphere for the country. The research and practice of competitive intelligence cannot be evoked without mentioning training. Using a repository designed in 2004 by a dozen eminent specialists, developed by course models (OCDIE Competitive Intelligence and Organizations) [OCD 08] covering all the major aspects of the problem, updated in 2013 by the inter-ministerial delegation of competitive intelligence (D2IE) [D2I 14], it analyzes the past and the present on both theoretical and practical levels. On the other hand, not taking into account the current digital revolution and the entry into cyberspace, it cannot project itself in the future, because this would lead to another model by process change. Yet this is what we will have to do by rethinking the entire approach of intelligence gathering in the context of the economy and strategy. In this context, it is important for the analyst to speak several

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languages in order to be able to branch out and not remain in an incomplete system. Let us not forget that one can obtain between 10 and 20 times more information in English than in French because of the great difference in the amount of data and the data banks available. 1.4. Conclusion The discovery that the methods applied in CI were also beneficial in activities as varied as sport, law, the social sphere, tourism, ecology, and research should have made us understand that we had chosen a restrictive approach that essentially left us penalized. We had to resolutely adopt strategic intelligence to encompass all the possibilities offered, at the national and global levels, and to get out of a sectorization prejudicial to the openness required. That’s why it’s time to invest in a broader concept using all the new technologies, including artificial intelligence. This will link CI with strategy by designing real-time information collection and analysis systems directly related to strategic roadmaps and prioritizing their complexity to allow for their use in each type of business. The difficulty and the interest of our discipline reside in the fact that it is at the crossroads of the advanced technologies of science and the millennial generation. Mixing experience and modernity based on a pragmatic realism already existed in a simplified form at the dawn of humanity and is today at the heart of the construction of our future. 1.5. References [BIS 18] BISSON C., DOU H., “Une intelligence stratégique et économique pour les PME, PMI et ETI en France : la prise en considération des niveaux micro et méso”, Vie et sciences de l’entreprise, no. 204, 2018. [BLA 08] BLANC C., DELBECQUE É., OLLIVIER T., “Intelligence économique : quand l’information devient stratégique”, Problèmes économiques, no. 2940, 2008. [CES 17] CESER PROVENCE-ALPES-CÔTE D’AZUR, “Synthèse de l’intelligence territoriale en région PACA. Réinventer l’action publique pour et par la société civile”, 2017, available at: http://www.ceserpaca.fr/nouvelles/sites-internet/faq/ detail-actualite.html?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1877&tx_tt news[type]=3.

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[CHA 17] CHARREL M., “Les PME françaises, lanterne rouge des exportations en Europe”, Le Monde économique, 2017, available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/ economie/article/2017/11/22/les-pme-francaises-lanterne-rouge-des-exportations- eneurope_5218704_3234.html. [CIW 17] CIWORLDWIDE, “World Academic Trophy (for Europe)”, Ciworldwide, November 26, 2017, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/? p=2101. [CLE 04] CLERC P., “Hommage au professeur Stevan Dediger”, Regards sur l’IE, no. 5, 2004. [COS 96] COSNAR M., “Les lois Helms-Burton et d’Amato-Kennedy, interdiction de commercer avec et d’investir dans certains pays”, Annuaire français de droit international XLII, CNRS Éditions, Paris, 1996, available at: http://www.persee. fr/doc/afdi_0066-3085_1996_num_42_1_3370. [CUB 92] CUBAN EXPERIENCE POLITICS, The Torricelli Act, Law, 1992, available at: http://www.schoolnet.org.za/PILAfrica/en/webs/18355/the_torricelli_act.html. [D2I 14] D2IE, “La D2IE publie 22 fiches pratiques de sécurité économique”, Portail de l’IE, April 18, 2014, available at: https://portail-ie.fr/short/1017/lad2ie-publie-22-fiches-pratiques-de-securite-economique. [DAV 10] DAVID A.-S., “PME export. Chasser en meute lors des salons internationaux”, Le nouvel économiste, November 10, 2010, available at: https://www.lenouveleconomiste.fr/lesdossiers/pme-export-chasser-en-meute-lorsdes-salons-internationaux-5818/. [DEL 06] DELBECQUE E., “La politique publique, du rapport Martre au rapport Carayon”, in E. DELBECQUE (ed.), L’intelligence économique : une nouvelle culture pour un nouveau monde, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2006. [DEM 00] DE MONTBRIAL T., “Pour combattre les pensées uniques”, Politique Étrangère, vol. 65, no. 3, p. 4, 2000. [DOU 15] DOUARAN M.-C., “Quel bilan pour le Patriot Act américain ?”, L’Express, January 13, 2015, available at: https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/ameriquenord/quel-bilan-pour-le-patriot-act-americain_1640126.html. [EXP 18] EXPORT.GOV, “The Advocacy Center”, 2018, available at: https://2016. export.gov/advocacy/. [FAT 17] FATCA, “Loi ‘FTCA’ : un accord signé entre la France et les États-Unis”, Economie.gouv.fr, 2017, available at: https://www.economie.gouv.fr/signatureaccord-fatca.

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[FIO 16] FIORNINA J.-F., “La géopolitique, indispensable compétence patronale”, Les Échos Executives, 2016, available at: https://business.lesechos.fr/directionsgenerales/strategie/developpement-international/la-geopolitique-indispensablecompetence-patronale-212205.php. [FRI 09] FRION P., YZQUIERDO-HOMBRECHER J., “How to implement competitive intelligence in SMEs?”, VISIO, pp. 162–173, Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain, June 4th and 5th, 2009, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pascal_Frion/publication/ 265809466_HOW_TO_IMPLEMENT_COMPETITIVE_INTELLIGENCE_IN_ SMES/links/55f15f7d08aef559dc470c75.pdf. [FRI 04] FRITZ B., KEEFER B., NYHAN B., All the President’s Spin: George W. Bush, the Media, and the Truth, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2004. [GAV 03] GAVES C., Des lions menés par des ânes. Essai sur le crash économique (à venir, mais très évitable) de l’Euroland en général et de la France en particulier, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2003. [HAR 14] HARBULOT C., “La culture française de l’intelligence”, Géoéconomie, vol. 4, pp. 27–37, 2014. [HEU 99] HEUER R., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lulu, 1999. [IQT 18] IQT (IN Q TEL), “Bridging technology venture and intelligence”, 2018, available at: https://www.iqt.org/. [JUS 17] JUSSIM L., “Précis of social perception and social reality: Why accuracy dominates bias and self-fulfilling prophecy”, Behavioral and Brain Science, 2017. [KEN 10] KENNEDY P., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Vintage, New York, 2010. [LAL 18] LA LETTRE A, “CEIS, YE et ADIT font le plein en PACA”, LLA, no. 1804, 2018, available at: https://www.lalettrea.fr/strategies-d-entreprise/2018/01/11/ceisey-et-adit-font-le-plein-en-paca,108289099-ARL. [LEM 14] LEMERCIER P., “The fundamentals of intelligence”, in P. CAPET and T. DELAVALLADE (eds), Information Evaluation, ISTE Ltd, London and John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, 2014. [LOU 13] LOUKOU A.-F., “Les techniques d’information et de communication (TIC) et l’évolution de l’économique africaine : vers une hybridation des activités”, Les enjeux de l’information et de la communication, no. 1, pp. 103–116, 2013. [MAH 15] MAHECHA L.-E.-W., SILVA R.J.J., “La inteligencia colectiva y la responsabilidad social y política del investigador : ‘Del yo al nosotros y del nosotros al todo’”, Análisis, vol. 46, no. 84, pp. 105–123, 2015.

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[MED 17] MEDEF, Accélérer la transformation numérique de l’économie française, Faire de la France un champion de la ‘smart economy’ à l’horizon 2025, Smart Economy for Business, vol. 1, p. 31, 2017. [MON 10] MONTANYE J.-A., “Merdecracy”, The Independent Review, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 295–299, 2010. [NAD 97] NADOULEK B., Guide mondial des cultures : à l’usage des entreprises, EFE Éditions Formation Entreprise, Paris, 1997. [NYE 04] NYE J.-S., “Soft power and american foreign policy”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no. 2, pp. 255–270, 2004. [NYE 09] NYE J.-S., “Get smart: combining hard and soft power”, Foreign Affairs, pp. 160–163, 2009. [OCD 08] OCDIE, Intelligence économique et organisations, SGDN, 2008, available at: https://fr.slideshare.net/jdeyaref/ocdie-intelligence-conomique-et-organisations. [POS 09] POSTIAUX J.-M., Le rôle sociétal des entreprises : une responsabilité partagée ?, Academia, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2009. [RUD 16] RUDNIANSKI M., BERCOOF M., POMEROL J.-C., Le grand livre de la négociation, Eyrolles, Paris, p. 220, 2016. [SAL 15] SALAT J., “Hommage à Robert Guillaumot de la part de ses amis”, VEILLEmag, 2015, available at: https://www.veillemag.com/Hommage-aRobert-Guillaumot-de-la-part-de-ses-amis_a2916.html. [UNI 17] UNIVERSITÉ DE CORSE, “Interdisciplinary symposium”, Ciworldwide.org, 2017, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p= 2051. [UNI 18a] UNIVERSITÉ DE CORSE, “Diplôme d’université en intelligence économique”, Ciworldwide, 2018, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/ ?p=2129. [UNI 18b] UNIVERSITÉ DE LIÈGE, “Groupe de recherche en intelligence stratégique”, 2018, available at: https://fr.slideshare.net/AlexiaAmbron/groupe-de-rechercheen-intelligence-stratgique-ulg-hec-lige-62345135. [URU 18] URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ACT, U.S. government publishing office, 2018, available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hr5110enr/pdf/BILLS103hr5110enr.pdf. [USC 10] US COMMODITY FUTURE TRADING COMMISSION, Dodd Frank Act, Law, 2010, available at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/ 2010/04/11/9701.pdf. [USD 97] US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Law, 1997, available at: https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act.

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[WIK 18a] WIKIPEDIA, “Géants du Web”, 2018, available at: https://fr.wikipedia. org/wiki/G%C3%A9ants_du_Web. [WIK 18b] WIKIPEDIA, “National Economic Council”, 2018, available at: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Economic_Council. [WIK 18c] WIKIPEDIA, “Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act”, 2018, available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnibus_Foreign_Trade_ and_Competitiveness_Act. [WIK 18d] WIKIPEDIA, “Loi Helms Burton”, 2018, available at: https://fr.wikipedia. org/wiki/Loi_Helms-Burton. [WIK 18e] WIKIPEDIA, “Rapport Gallois ou Rapport sur la compétitivité française”, 2018, available at: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rapport_sur_la_comp%C3% A9titivit%C3%A9_fran%C3%A7aise.

2 Geopolitics and Strategic Intelligence

2.1. Principles of analysis In order to make CI truly work, we have to go beyond both business and competitive environments. It requires a curiosity that embraces all areas that can influence or impact the analysis and scenarios of the future from culture to geopolitics. It is also important to have absolute neutrality that requires ignoring our personal preoccupations. The absence of bias guarantees quality and depth of the analysis of information and overviews. This provides the most objective and complete production possible from which the decisionmaker can make a choice and build upon their strategy [WIK 18a]. 2.1.1. Getting to the point Often a methodical analysis of the international press by cross-checking the assertions of each and every one of them makes it possible to discover or decode the underside of the cards. Therefore, the situational study of the major planetary actors makes it possible to better understand the initial positions of each. A few key elements are usually sufficient to draw up the framework for analysis. Faced with the rise of China as their direct competitor [DEL 17] – and inevitably becoming the world’s largest economic power – the United States needs allies while relying on technological innovations that give them leadership in some key areas. In this context, contrary to what one might perceive, Russia and the United States, providing they want to, have a mutual interest in collaborating in order to develop their economies in the face of this threat.

Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1: A New Strategic and Operational Approach, First Edition. Henri Dou, Alain Juillet and Philippe Clerc. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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The problem of Siberia is fully in line with this logical requirement. Confronted with increasingly harsh local working conditions due to the impact of global warming on permafrost (mosquitoes, diseases, methane pollution), it is Chinese people who come to work en masse instead of the Russians. This growing migration will ultimately generate claims of ethnic belonging to China, or aspirations for further partnership with the sister country. In order to combat this threat to their energy stock and to safeguard their strategic importance, Russia will have to create both economic and military links with Europe and the United States. We can see this through calls by Russian presidents to improve cooperation with Europe, which were advocated by French President de Gaulle, as well as German chancellor Schroeder, but quickly opposed by American Democrat presidents, neo-conservatists and their European allies or spokespeople. The United States wish to continue developing their trade links with the Chinese market and so they want to continue to view Russia as their natural enemy in manipulating public opinion as we saw during the worst moments of the Cold War [SOU 17, ZEI 17]. It was this vision of the future that led, at the dawn of his mandate, President Donald Trump and his team to consider a strategic reconciliation that placed him in total opposition to the Democrats and part of the Republicans. At the same time, according to the Monroe Doctrine [MAY 17], the United States could live in a secure environment without having to care for others thanks to their self-sufficiency in oil and gas. At the international level, apart from securing their intangible bases of support, such as Israel and their strategic external bases, this leads them to reduce their consumption of military or civilian means wherever they are not ahead of China, as well as Russia. This is why they encourage locals (the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Africa) to take over by investing in their defense and development. We can add that realism leads them to fragment the possibilities of regional powers allowing the creation of a powerful pole that can oppose their strategy. In this context, they allow for development or provoke oppositions as we saw in the north of Europe with Ukraine or in the Balkans. After encouraging the creation of the Slovenian and Croatian states with Germany, they contributed to the explosion of the entire area and led to the

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creation of a mafia state in Kosovo [BRA 17]. The same destabilizing process is taking place in the Middle East between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt. 2.1.2. Having an open mind The great drama of today is that we live in the moment without truly knowing enough to understand the ins and outs of the crises we face [LEA 17]. The war in Syria began with a selection of plans to build two gas pipelines, one from Iran and the other from Qatar [JUN 16]. Iran wanted to install a gas terminal on the Syrian Alawite coast, opening traffic through the Mediterranean, while Qatar simply wanted to cross Syria to connect with Turkey on the South stream from Azerbaijan to Europe. Less than a month after the pro-Iranian choice of Syria, the unrest began. Where competitive intelligence is concerned, it is important to keep an open mind and to not give way to certain ideologies. We currently find ourselves in an evolving world in a state of complete and permanent reconstruction, different to what we might have forecasted in the past. We might have thought that following the fall of the Berlin Wall, everything would evolve into a sort of universal democracy inspired by our model, yet we were unfortunately wrong. Globalization of economy, exchanges and ideas shows how limited we are [REB 17]. Coca-Cola for everyone is no longer the only proof. In other words, we might have common interests, but different expectations. As the world moves progressively from bipolarity to multipolarity, our traditional European approach no longer fits in with the current state of affairs. As is the case for many older nations, France is finding it difficult to accept changes that actively disrupt learned behaviors. At the same time, this does not seem to pose a problem for emerging low-income countries. In France, the telephone was developed based on a system of wires. With the advent of the cell phone, we had to find a way for both systems to live side-by-side, leading to organizational problems, a loss of time, and excessive consumption of our resources. In low-income countries, however, the same problems were not encountered given that the cell phone emerged

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without any precedent of telephone communication, and without the same constraints and costs. This is why the African continent is ahead of Europe in terms of the competence of smartphone users. The smartphone also contributes to the digital transformation of Africa, allowing for the development of various sector models, including an original banking system [ATT 14]. In order to understand how the world is in a period of such drastic change, we only need to consider the rise in power of start-ups who have novel ways of working, as well as the fact that there are different modes of finance, and incredibly short-term and risky development policies within the world of business. Within this chaotic context, the role of politics is to give a new and long-term vision, allowing us to forecast, while administrations manage the daily routine. This goal-driven vision creates hope and drive, as this capacity for hope is a fundamental part of motivation. Refusing to look beyond the horizon of the next election or the annual balance sheet generates the gloomy routine typical of those who live in the short term without great intentions. 2.1.3. Knowing how to decode information We must therefore learn to decode information from a multipolar world that refuses to give way to a hegemonic power relationship imposed by some of the actors. This departure from a traditional framework, which is accompanied by the development of protectionist measures and bilateral agreements, generates new trends and new practices. We must take them into account even if they oppose our traditional patterns and contradict our fundamental ways of working, as well as our references. Information travels at a very high speed. In less than eight days, it can make laps around the whole of France, but the receiver does not always know if this information broadcast is true or false. The difficulty lies in finding out whether it is true, or whether it might be the result of manipulation. Our mindset is very different from what it was a few decades ago. Everyone today has access to information, everyone wants to build their own opinion from their own research without having to listen to others.

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The expert plays the role of authenticator in giving their opinion, but everyone knows that the experts rarely agree among themselves. It becomes difficult to identify the truth and this creates a climate of mistrust and widespread suspicion. In the past, we listened to politicians because they were part of the few who were in the know and had a grip on the information available. Today they face growing mistrust by the population who think that they are manipulating information for their own benefit or for their party or political faction. Speaking truthfully is considered an exception. It might also be added that the credibility of shared information implies not limiting its outline to the elements supporting one’s demonstration. Migration fluxes are the subject of varying different opinions depending upon those who choose to comment on this issue and who often forget the basics of such a question. The displacement of people is not new and has existed since the dawn of humanity, from poor regions to richer regions, hostile regions to welcoming regions, politically precarious regions to those who enjoy liberal ideologies, war-torn regions to those enjoying peace. This will never cease to be the case, including even possible human migration to other planets. The decrease in these fluxes is dependent exclusively upon changes to the environment and links to the attractiveness of certain regions. These fluxes do not necessarily move from the global South to the North, but work in all directions according to where humans have the best quality of life, be it across a collection of countries or continents, or the planet as a whole. That criminal or terrorist organizations exploit these unfortunate people throughout their journey is an avatar of varying intensity that must be fought. That their reception is inversely proportional to the number of arrivals given the traditional fear of the foreigner in almost all the structured societies is indeed a reality. However, we must not confuse conjunctural realities to be treated as such with the permanence of migratory flows [MAZ 16]. 2.1.4. Learning how to sort through information We have a lot more access to data nowadays; especially given that it is progressively digitalized and indexed. The way in which it is sorted through software and algorithms is becoming faster, allowing us to have access to

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more information. Internet links, as well as social network dialogs are becoming commonplace on a global level. Beyond this exponential acquisition of information, this global craze is due to the fact that people work more and more alone and have fewer opportunities to exchange, potentially disrupting their working methods. The human being is a sociable animal that needs to live in a group [VAN 17]: the development of social networks partially makes up for this lack of contact. But there remains the need to vibrate together, to share emotions, hence the success of major sporting, cultural or other events and their impact on our fellow citizens. We have now entered a world where the static image is replaced by the dynamism of videos and the traditional book by its summarized version on Wikipedia. We are no longer content with seeing a moment frozen in time; we want to put it into motion and – better still – relive it on a permanent basis, which involves mastering such a technique. The ability to access knowledge disrupts social relationships and differentiates individuals according to their ability to integrate the digital world. Today, there is a social divide based on economics and illiteracy, but tomorrow it will be the digital divide that will make the difference. In research and information processing, we are facing the same problem. We must constantly update our sources, the elements collected and how we analyze them for the most up-to-date and accurate intelligence. Those who cannot adapt or do not have the tools to cope with this evolution will be eliminated or, at the very least, marginalized. But it is no use kidding ourselves: the availability of fields of knowledge of unequaled magnitude does not mean that the receiver is able to extract the true substance and transform it into knowledge. In addition, our daily practice as an information-consuming spectator leads us to look at events and isolate them from their context, which makes their objective analysis difficult, if not impossible. 2.2. The evolving world Our world is currently evolving according to six main trends that we must build into our reflections as they influence facts and how we interpret them.

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2.2.1. The increasing power of the individual Contrary to the assertions of NGOs that have made a business out of the current state of world poverty, at the global level, the decline in the poverty index set at US $ 2 per day, or US $ 60 per month, is spectacular. In 25 years, it has decreased from 43% to 10%, which requires a change in the way in which we view the world. This reduction in the global poverty rate leads to the development of a middle class that generates a change of behavior with respect to health, the role of women and education. This also leads to an increase in the population, which has an impact on food and energy. Paradoxically, there is an increase in the level of relative poverty in some developed countries such as France (from 10 to 14%) or the United States, which poses potential problems surrounding dysfunctional political models which are currently practiced [FÖR 16]. Far from stereotyping, but simply to be effective, it is necessary to understand at what stage the country or the environment find themselves; this through adopting local culture and habits. The significant change in women’s access to decision-making roles is changing our societal models of society management, which are generally different from our own perceptions. In Mali, for example, people still may travel 5 km to search for water from the community well, yet will come home and watch the television, or use their cell phones, which is now becoming a way of paying for things on the continent. Given that the digital age has given us more full-fledged access to information, each and every individual can forge their own opinions more easily. Furthermore, the globalization of the circulation of information also makes it possible, even in China, to cover up, over time, important information. In the modern world, we are witnessing a rise in the power of individuals and their use of social networks, which are sometimes manipulated; and of NGOs, which are often manipulated, facing states that have more and more difficulty in establishing and legitimizing their power. In almost all areas, the individual becomes more and more independent and will have fewer and fewer constraints. They refuse imposed or unmotivated instructions, which calls into question tribal, clan or hierarchical structures based on the possession of the right kind of information acquired by transmission or experience. Even at the military

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level, one must explain, as well as convince people to carry out, the mission at hand. The state is there to guide and not to regulate or be the one to stop individual reflections and initiatives [BEZ 15]. 2.2.2. The evolution of power relationships 2.2.2.1. The military Total war between two countries or blocks is becoming less frequent. However, we are witnessing local wars between states, as well as rebellions inspired by ideology, other states or private groups. This destabilizing situation, dependent upon an intensive disinformation, is made possible through the easy access to arms at a reduced cost. Local wars generated by mining companies to gain exploitation rights or control production areas are a reality in some parts of the world [WIL 15]. A clear example of this can be found in the repetitive Ituri conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which can be explained by the will of the English-speaking parties, continued by Uganda and Rwanda by controlling the production of coltan and ore from which we can extract niobium and tantalum used in mobile telephones [MON 02]. With a much bigger military budget than France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia and China put together, the United States have, for a long time, been at the forefront of military investment. However, this extraordinary military power has not necessarily led to a winning streak in the last 50 years. Furthermore, for about half a century, we can see that military power does not ensure, or even guarantee victory. Indeed, this power makes it possible to scale it up and exert pressure but not to win. This is why hard power is gradually being replaced by soft power, which is more effective and more insidious by including influence [ROD 17]. 2.2.2.2. Geopolitics In the 21st Century, populations and states have been grouping together by affinity, constituting homogeneous poles (geography, climate, language, culture, religion, social relations, energy wealth, etc.). We are witnessing the creation of blocks in Asia, Africa, Central America or South America, all of which have specificities that lead to a certain appreciation, as well as different expectations from others. This multipolarity must lead us to change

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our way of seeing and understanding, and we must guide each person to realize certain expectations, without trying to impose what might seem better from our perspective. After centuries of the establishment and development of colonial empires, as well as the 20th Century based on the Western dream of globalization of trade, there will be a change leading to bilateral agreements based on the balance of exchanges between partners and competitors. In this global context, we are witnessing a decline in the influence of traditional states while emerging powers are evolving very quickly. In 20 years, France and Germany will no longer be among the 10 most powerful countries and will have been replaced by others like Nigeria, the flag bearer of African development, or South Africa. Whatever the speed of evolution, one thing is certain: Westerners are no longer the center of the world [BAD 16]. Beyond alliances and power struggles, permanent changes of varying magnitude, as a result of the problems discussed in this chapter, make it difficult to analyze and often prevent a clear result. Hidden behind the compliments of President Donald Trump given to the newly elected President of Taiwan, is the relationship with China that is at stake. It reverses the classical view to show the Chinese that the United States can act in its own sphere of influence. It is therefore normal that they react to this evolution of the threat by maneuvers in the China Sea and accelerate the securing of their maritime routes of energy supplies. When we look at the Middle East, we see that local countries have complex positions in which the United States play a divisive role. Turkey is moving toward Islamism, working with Russia and Iran, but is the home of NATO military bases. Saudi Arabia is pushed by the United States to act against Qatar, which has a large US military base. Iran, which will become a major power, is rejected by the United States, who have forgotten the Irangate [RIG 15] in which the United States provided Iran with arms against Iraq passing through Israel. They see only the nuclear aspect weakening the strategic position of the Israeli ally which is the only country to have disposed with it in the region. There is therefore a complexity which acts in the second degree and shows that there are links that are insufficiently considered if one is satisfied with a primary or schematic analysis.

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2.2.2.3. Economy and finance The analysis of recent conflicts shows that, in order to achieve victory, a major economic action must be developed at the same time as the evolution of practices becomes a priority. On the other hand, the epicenter of economic power is shifting from west to east across the Pacific. Certain emerging countries such as Indonesia will soon become part of the 10 most powerful countries in the world. If we add Taiwan, China, Korea, Japan and India, over 50% of the world economy will be centered in Asia in about 15 years’ time. Opposite them, we can see North America and, to a lesser extent, Africa. A fragmented Europe would only be an additional asset, as opposed to a major power; if it were united, however, it might be able to tip the balance. The free movement of various different forms of capital remains a major problem at a time when movements of the dollar are being controlled by binding extraterritorial court rules. In addition, there is the case of Brexit, in which London plays its role as the financial capital of Europe, with, in case of failure, a loss of power that will affect the financing of the economy and the activities in England. Of the five major world banks, we find four Chinese banks and the American bank JP Morgan. We do not find any European banks in this mix due to the fact that their world profits have reduced from 47% to 16% in just 10 years. In this context, the possibilities of using the dollar, which is the world currency of reference having replaced the gold standard, is a key strategy of the Americans. We are now experiencing the beginning of the end of the Bretton Woods system where the dollar had become the safe haven. To be less dependent on US policy, the big emerging countries want to see a bunch of currencies replace the dollar standard. In such a context, the American deficit, now financed by the rest of the world, would become an increasingly significant handicap for the country, which explains its concern to maintain the status quo by breaking any hint of change, including by certain means using extraterritoriality. On the other hand, the Chinese cannot afford to put on the market the tenth of the US Treasuries they hold without also putting themselves in danger.

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We must consider current situations and likely changes, but we must also add the links that are becoming more complex between the different actors, whether they are states or companies: today we can be friends, allies or partners in one domain and competitors or enemies in another. In the automotive world, bodywork and design are very diversified, but the construction of engines remains the prerogative of some companies whose shareholders are the user platforms. We share the highest costs generated by an essential activity, but which do not bring any real differentiation, to invest the margin released on the rest. We should also not forget the cyber war which is currently destabilizing both the services of the state and those of businesses, or even the destruction of certain resources, such as during the hacking of the French television channel TV5Monde1 [HÉR 15] or the cessation of activity due to denial of service attacks. This cyber activity may be linked to states, as was revealed by Edward Snowden [AND 16], but also to private hacking groups acting on their own, or due to outsourcing. Power relations between countries are beginning to change, but we must not forget the power of multinationals, paying close attention to the GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft) giants, and their Chinese equivalents. We should point out that the 50 most powerful multinational companies are more powerful than 50% of states around the world, creating potential problems if they move further away from the rules and ethical concerns of their countries of residence. 2.2.2.4. Population trends We often talk about the youth factor and the problems caused by a population which is mainly less than 25 years old, even if these problems are echoed at the other end of the spectrum, given an increasingly aging population. Our world is currently experiencing a general increase in the average age of its citizens, forcing us to reconsider the situation and its impact on food, the economy and health [RAI 16].

1 At around 10pm on April 11, 2015, the website and social network accounts of TV5Monde were subjected to a large-scale attack. The hack was later claimed by the so-called Islamic State group. They broadcasted their messages via this station before TV5Monde were able to take over.

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At the end of the previous century, apart from in Japan and Germany, there were very few countries whose median age exceeded 45 years old. Nowadays, there are many more countries in this category. It will therefore be necessary to provide this population with new means that are expensive where the rate of growth is low. Alongside the aging population of rich countries, Africa now has a population of around 1.2bn people, representing a 50% increase in the number of people on the continent, with an increasing power of young people who have particular expectations and needs. Unlike China, where high growth rates directly benefited the economy, as the birth rate was controlled, the 7% average growth in African GDP announced will be partially absorbed by population growth. We cannot compare the two areas and we must think about the integration of data on their respective developments. The German inability to maintain a fertility rate to maintain the population size means that in 2040, France could have a greater population than Germany. This is what motivated Angela Merkel to welcome migrants with the hope that their higher fertility rate would restore the balance of the population in favor of Germany. At the other side of the world, China has just changed the children-per-household policy from only one child to two, remaining the most populous country in the world, having to cope with the aging population and to maintain a sufficient workforce. We can also find parallels of the situation in India and its growing population. In the future, more than 50% of the world’s population will live in megacities [ALL 17]. We will see developing cities of more than 30 million inhabitants in Asia and Africa, as we see today in São Paulo, Mexico City or Shanghai. These cities will have to be managed differently and independently. They will be states within states, facing specific problems ranging from insecurity and the supply of energy to food or water supplies. We can get an idea of these new problems by looking at Rio de Janeiro. Separated by a street, chic neighborhoods like Ipanema and Leblon, in which the life expectancy is 70 years old, coexist with miserable favelas where one does not exceed 35 years old. The result is permanent insecurity, but also large-scale violence in social relations between these two groups of city dwellers who live together.

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2.2.2.5. Food and energy needs With a world population that will continue to grow, we will have, in the coming years, additional needs of more than 40% of water, more than 50% of energy and more than 35% of food [FIS 17]. We must also consider gigantic remediation projects, such as those related to pollution of rivers in India and China, or in France with agriculture and livestock that have introduced nitrates, polluting the water table. This will lead to managing new situations that can lead to situations of conflict. The Syrian Golan Heights, occupied by the Israelis since the 1967 war, are strategic for the water supply of the Sea of Galilee and Jordan which are of vital importance for the agriculture of the Israeli–Jordanian–Palestinian region. Similarly, the gradual disappearance of the Dead Sea or Lake Chad enters this field of reflection by its impact on the lives of its nearby inhabitants. Current Egyptian–Ethiopian tensions are based on the construction of a giant dam on the Nile river that could prevent or weaken the irrigation potential of the Nilotic basin in Egypt. Each time this can lead to a local or regional war. The need for raw materials and energy explain, among other things, the migration of some Chinese people to Siberia. It also explains the purchase of farmland in Australia or Africa by China. Renewable energies, while generally more expensive than fossil fuels, are a suitable solution for many developing countries that refuse nuclear power for safety reasons or initial cost reasons. Conversely, the United States is not wholly concerned by this because it is currently self-sufficient in energy. Morocco has little oil and gas and has therefore developed solar power plants that will produce electricity at a lower cost than nuclear power in France. In Africa, the Senegal River Basin will see its economic future disrupted by the construction of various hydraulic structures to produce energy and develop irrigation capacity over the next 15 years. We must not make the wrong decisions or wish to progress too quickly under the pressure of politicians, the media or NGOs. In Germany, the Chancellor’s abrupt abandonment of nuclear power for electoral reasons was considered a step forward. However, this led to the reopening of coal plants. Since German mines have been emptied, they buy

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coal from the United States, which now use shale gas and oil for their needs. As this coal is very rich in sulfur, air pollution has increased significantly in Germany, as well as in neighboring countries including eastern France [MEY 17]. 2.2.2.6. The digital future As we have already mentioned, the growing digitalization revolution is disrupting the status quo. It means that there is greater power transferred from the State to the individual, meaning that there is a higher degree of shared knowledge. Digitalization also means giving individuals access to training courses in the form of e-learning, as well as having access to networks of specialists and forums. From the ease of access to information to treatment of Big Data through algorithms, we have to rethink the way we work, as well as reflecting upon and apprehending potential problems. A good example of this can be found in the array of solutions for improvement proposed by the Smart City concept [KAL 17]. Cell phones that work differently from traditional telephone devices will soon become irreplaceable. Whereas in Europe there are certain obstacles, such as payment by telephone, which are linked to the “profitability of using a credit card”, these kinds of barriers do not exist on the African continent. The arrival of Web 3.0, allowing objects to interact with each other and thus have dialog, as well the introduction of 4.0, will indeed broaden our field of research and our ability to act. In not much time at all, cars will be able to interact with their engineers in order to relay information about potential faults, including the security of traffic flows, or with trackers placed on roads to promote safety when driving. The French National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL) [WIK 18c] is being overrun and we need to consider all new possibilities. Social networks are developing everywhere. The United States is at the forefront of this development, followed by emerging countries: Brazil, China, India and Indonesia. With no European country included in this list, Europe finds itself more and more marginalized. With quantum computers, the field of possibilities and the speed of treatment will be multiplied giving us access to unsuspected capacities

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today. Far from any philosophical reflections, we have no choice: we must adapt and take advantage of these new technologies to be more competitive. 2.3. A changing world In the current climate characterized by crises, we realize that we are facing a complete change of system. We see that productivity will increase, but at the same time, these new developments will no longer be able to ensure full employment. We will have to replace low-skilled jobs that will not be affected by this increase in productivity, but we still do not know how to do so. At present, global unemployment is expected to affect 1/7th of the population, or about 15%. We will have to find new solutions. The European Community cannot find an effective consensus solution among its 27 members with diverging interests. The revival of its development obviously involves a more structured and coherent Europe of a dozen states. If we fail to counter this two-speed Europe, other countries will follow the British path and the decline of the continent will begin. In China, the increase in the standard of living leads to the rapid development of a middle class since each year, the equivalent of the population of France reaches the European standard of living. At the same time, China is moving from a system of economic growth where wealth has been created by exporting low-cost goods to a system where the same wealth will be created from the growth of the domestic market. Our media did not understand this rupture, because it is the first time that a country has tried such a change of course to preserve its independence. Benefiting from a high demographic growth and a democratic system adapted to its specificities, India will be the second world power by 2050 if it manages to solve the problem of castes which constitute a powerful brake on the level of development. It will also have to invest in the field of security and assume its responsibilities in the surrounding geographical areas. 2.3.1. International institutions The multinational institutions created by the victors after the Second World War are disappearing. Emerging countries are questioning a system whose purpose is to reinforce Western hegemony, and the main donors no

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longer want to finance organizations that do not work in their favor. This is why an organization like the WTO has not achieved any significant agreements for 15 years. Other organizations, such as the UN, OECD or UNESCO will have to reconsider how they are structured and to act quickly for fear of falling into obscurity. The withdrawal of US funding from UNESCO as well as the criticism of the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) by the United States [FOU 17] falls within this framework. 2.3.2. Bilateral agreements While searching for a better trade balance, we are starting to replace the multilateral with the bilateral; or with agreements made between groups of countries. In this context, it is necessary to take into account the real capacities of the countries and some of their cultural traits. In China, counterfeiting does not mean anything, because the same word is used for copy and creation. In the art of calligraphy, the copy aims to reach the same level of perfection as the master copy. Reaching this artistic communion is the pinnacle of creation. It is therefore difficult to be considered harmful by producing a successful counterfeit. 2.4. Increased risks 2.4.1. Climate risks Rising temperatures are a slow and inexorable process that will cause rapid changes at the global level. Whether this result is due to human activities or a cyclical evolution in the life of our planet is the subject of expert discussion, but the fact still remains. Its indisputable impact requires strategic thinking through competitive intelligence [HAR 17]. In Sahelian zones, a rise in temperature of one degree leads to a substantial spread of the desert on to fertile grounds. In Asia, two- to three-degree growth is changing the monsoon process and impacting rice production. In most countries of the world, water management and distribution problems also occur and, for some countries, we witness a change in the formation of the coasts due to the rise in sea levels.

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2.4.2. Risks linked to resources Conflicts become more and more linked to the economy. Rare resources will generate conflicts that will be linked to their exploitation and will have a real impact on the political and investment levels. We often talk about oil and minerals, but we must not forget the management of water or environmental crime that can put some species or regions into danger. In Somalia, marine pollution from the dumping of toxic waste has triggered the process of piracy by local fishermen. The drying up of Lake Chad destabilizes local populations and bordering countries and opens the door to risks that are not necessarily identified and measured. 2.4.3. Medical risks When the standard of living increases, the standard of medicine must also increase. This leads to the eradication of certain diseases, but the population is still subject to the risk of pandemics. We can see this with Ebola, the H1N1 virus or the influenza epidemic which have developed in certain geographical areas. According to expert calculations, a virus attacking the bronchi can lead to a weakening of 1% of humanity, or 70 million people [FAN 16]. Companies, organizations and even states will have to organize themselves to face this type of eventuality. This is an area where the practice of competitive and strategic intelligence can be very useful. Moreover, if we can minimize certain risks of contagion, the significant increase in chronic noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) [WIK 18b] (such as Alzheimer’s disease, cardiovascular diseases, cerebrovascular disorders, obesity, stroke, asthma, diabetes, cataracts, etc.) is increasing dangerously. It is currently estimated that about 60% of the world’s mortality is caused by NCDs and that these are directly related to dietary behavior (fats, sugar, alcohol) and medical history, but also to environmental conditions, such as pollution, water quality, or the behavior of individuals (drugs, tobacco), etc. These diseases requiring care over long periods are now a major problem [ORG 17].

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2.4.4. Natural risks With the rise of the digital world, we usually forget that certain natural phenomena can have an impact on electromagnetic systems. Our communications are currently organized around satellites, but what will become of satellites when we face a large solar explosion since this will inevitably happen sooner or later? While it will not be fundamentally harmful to humans, it can damage and even destroy communications systems like a neutron bomb. We will have to study the impact and consequences, to see how to protect ourselves by protecting the essentials. Beyond the practice of Faraday cages [WIK 17] by the military, it is an area where there still remains a lot to be done. 2.4.5. Political risks By refocusing on the issues that directly concern them, the United States will no longer be the world’s police officer, which will mean that a number of countries and poles will be able to take charge of their own destiny. On their own territory, the policy of promoting national production and refocusing on the traditional values of the American people will widen the gap between liberal democrats from the east and west coasts and the rest of the country. China will soon reach a GDP of 15,000 USD per capita, which will have a positive impact on health, education or the role of women in society. On the other hand, as Alvin Toffler [TOF 71] observed in the Soviet Union, the growth of individual wealth, as well as that at the level of education, is always accompanied by a demand for greater independence and freedom for the individual. This expectation of a form of democracy, which usually has little to do with our definition for cultural reasons, can create problems that might destabilize the country. In the same way, Iran will become the reference power with Turkey north of the Middle East. This will bring about an evolution of their cultural and social models that their governments will have to steer to avoid confrontations between the modern and the traditional poles. Europe, as we have already seen, will no doubt move toward a two-speed system with a more homogeneous part of a dozen countries and the rest regrouped in a free trade federation. The lack of change will lead to widespread disruption with serious economic and social consequences that will have to be managed in a declining environment.

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After being blocked for a long time by the Germans, who were worried about a project of grouping the countries around the Mediterranean that could compete with their own project centered around the Baltic and change the internal power relations within the European Union, the problem of the Euro-Mediterranean is back on the agenda. It is obvious that southern Europe should collaborate with the countries on the other side of the Mediterranean as is already done directly with Morocco, if only to reduce costs of production. 2.4.6. Nuclear risks The principle of deterrence has been proven to deter certain powerhungry leaders at the head of a nuclear country from pressing the button. Everyone knows that in case of threat or action, the aggressor country will be “vitrified” by the others, which constitutes a powerful obstacle to the use of this weapon. On the other hand, there is still a tight-knit group of nuclear powers. Some countries with the bomb want to join in order to be recognized; while others want to acquire nuclear power to be at the same level as their neighbors. This situation is a permanent focus of international tension. 2.4.7. Cyber risks Another major problem is cyber warfare, which can be conducted by states, companies or individuals. It can occur at different levels, ranging from the manipulation of information to the destruction of an object, a site or a commercial or military business entity [LIA 15]. The big powers listen to everyone, or at least try to do it, as we saw with Julian Assange and Edward Snowden. The Russians intercepted messages from Hillary Clinton. A cyber caliphate affiliated with the Islamic State of Iran and the Levant (ISIL) has been suspected of having outsourced the attack on TV5 in France. Sony was attacked following the release of a film caricaturing a dictator similar to that of North Korea. Beyond states, we must not forget the big mafia organizations that refocus on these very lucrative and less risky activities. Cyber-attacks will become the biggest source of losses for companies. Therefore, it is imperative to address these new threats [HÉO 17, LUC 16].

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2.5. Conclusion Faced with the evolution of the world, relationships between actors and risks of all kinds in our environment, it is necessary to find operating models that make it possible to react and, if possible, to anticipate certain situations. This implies that we consider the structure and its possibilities, the culture of the company and its values, and the environment as a whole, and that the management has the will and the ability to question itself with each change of parameters. This requires rigorous analysis to determine its strengths and weaknesses, and identify ways to improve and remedy dysfunctional ways of working. But one’s own knowledge and one’s competitors are affected by the constant evolution of the environment. The geopolitical analysis of the present, the future and the fields of what is possible, is an indispensable element that must be available to the decision-maker. In this current complex situation, a business does not usually have all the answers, as they go through a public/private partnership or collaborate with experts who can fetch strategic information at the state level. They must also motivate those who will have to use them in the company. Across China, Teng Hsiao-Ping created motivation for work and entrepreneurship by letting the Chinese work on their own without any special taxation beyond the hours of work due to the party. This triggered the development of an internal “capitalism” in China that allowed the smartest to become millionaires; and everyone in general to want to work more. 2.6. References [ALL 17] ALLEN W., ANDERSON B., VAN HEAR N. et al., “Who counts in crises? The new geopolitics of international migration and refugee governance”, Geopolitics, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 1–27, 2017. [AND 16] ANDREGG M., “Ethical implications of the snowden revelations”, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 110–131, 2016. [ATT 14] ATTALI J., “Les nouveaux visages de la microfinance en Afrique”, Revue d’économie financière, vol. 4, no. 16, pp. 243–258, 2014.

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[BAD 16] BADIE B., Nous ne sommes plus seuls au monde : Un autre regard sur l’“ordre international”, La Découverte, Paris, 2016. [BEZ 15] BEZES P., Réinventer l’État : Les réformes de l’administration française (1962–2008), Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2015. [BRA 17] BRANCA E., L’Ami américain : Washington contre De Gaulle (1940– 1969), Perrin, Paris, 2017. [DEL 17] DELUX T., VANNAK R., “The USA and PRC competition in Asia Pacific region : Geo-economics’ and geopolitical aspects”, Cовре менные проблемы социально-экономических систем в условиях глобализации, pp. 13– 19, Belgorod, March 1, 2017, available at: http://dspace.bsu.edu.ru/bitstream/ 12345678918615/1/Sovremen_Probl_Sots_Ekon_Sistem_17.pdf#page =13. [FAN 16] FAN V.-Y., JAMISON D.-T., SUMMERS L.-H., The inclusive cost of pandemic influenza risk, Working paper, no. 22137, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 2016. [FIS 17] FISCHER G., HIZSNYIK E., TRAMBEREND S. et al., “Policy support for sustainable development: Scarcity, abundance and alternative uses of land and water resources”, IIASA Institutional Evaluation, 2017, available at: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/14447/. [FÖR 16] FÖRSTER M., THEVENOT C., “Inégalité des revenus et protection sociale : les enseignements de l’analyse internationale de l’OCDE”, Revue française des affaires sociales, vol. 1, pp. 65–91, 2016. [FOU 17] FOURNIÉ P., DOU H., “L’Indonésie à la croisée des chemins”, R2IE Revue internationale d’intelligence économique, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 103–128, 2017. [GRA 11] GRAPHSEO, “Le classement des plus grandes banques du monde”, Graphseo bourse, 2011, available at: https://graphseobourse.fr/classement-desplus-grandes-banques-du-monde/. [HAR 17] HARBULOT C., JUILLET A., REVEL C. et al., “Intelligence économique : Qu’attend l’État ?”, Les Échos, April 27, 2017, available at: https://www.lesechos. fr/idees-debats/cercle/0212019764473-intelligence-economique-quattend-letat2082996.php. [HÉO 17] HÉON S., PARSOIRE D., “La couverture du cyber-risque”, Revue d’économie financière, vol. 2, pp. 169–182, 2017. [HÉR 15] HÉRARD P., “Piratage de TV5Monde, ce qu’en disent les experts”, TV5Monde, 2015, available at: https://information.tv5monde.com/info/piratage-detv5monde-ce-qu-en-disent-les-experts-27578.

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[JUI 16] JUILLET A., “‘Absurdité totale’, soumission aveugle aux intérêts américains”, Radio Sputnik, 2016, available at: https://fr.sputniknews.com/ international/2016 05071024807843-erreurs-renseignement-france-ex-chef/. [KAL 17] KALAY Y.-E., “How smart is the Smart City? Assessing the impact of ICT on cities”, Agent Based Modelling of Urban Systems: First International Workshop: ABMUS 2016, Held in Conjunction with AAMAS, Singapore, vol. 10051, p. 189, 2017. [LEA 17] LEAR J., “Space: Reflection, critical thinking and making long-term decisions in a short-term world”, EPALE Electronic Platform for Adult Learning in Europe European Community, 2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/epale/ en/content/space-reflection-critical-thinking-and-making-long-term-decisions-shortterm-world. [LIA 15] LIAROPOULOS A., “Exercising state sovereignty in cyberspace: An international cyber-order under construction?”, Leading Issues in Cyber Warfare and Security: Cyber Warfare and Security, vol. 2, p. 191, 2015. [LUC 16] LUCAT J., “La sécurité informatique pour l’usager de base : Un expert de terrain, dix fondamentaux”, Sécurité globale, vol. 4, no. 8, pp. 57–65, 2016. [MAY 17] MAY R.-E., “The irony of confederate diplomacy: Visions of empire, the Monroe doctrine, and the quest for nationhood”, Journal of Southern History, vol. 83, no. 1, pp. 69–106, 2017. [MAZ 16] MAZZELLA S., Sociologie des migrations, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2016. [MEY 17] MEYER T., “Comparer la réussite des conflits environnementaux en Allemagne et en France : Une approche géopolitique”, herodote.net, no. 2, pp. 31– 52, 2017. [MON 02] MONTAGUE D., “Stolen goods: Coltan and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, Sais Review, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 103–118, 2002. [ORG 17] ORGANISATION MONDIALE DE LA SANTÉ, Rapport de situation sur la prévention et la maîtrise des maladies non transmissibles, Report, 2017, available at: http://applications.emro.who.int/docs/RC_technical_papers_2017_inf_doc_6_ 20023_fr.pdf?ua=1. [RAI 16] RAISSON V., 2038, les futurs du monde, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2016. [RÉB 17] RÉBILLARD C., “La mondialisation en questions”, Sciences humaines, vol. 3, p. 11, 2017. [RIG 15] RIGOULET-ROZE D., “Le ‘fantôme’ de l’Irangate dans les négociations sur le nucléaire iranien”, Politique américaine, vol. 2, pp. 49–68, 2015.

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[ROD 17] RODRIGUEZ G.-P., “Reflexiones sobre la guerra del siglo XXI”, Armada Española, p. 59, 2017. [SOU 17] SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, “Chinese in the Russian far east: a geopolitical time bomb?”, 2017, available at: http://www.scmp.com/weekasia/geopolitics/article/2100228/chinese-russian-far-east-geopolitical-time-bomb. [TOF 71] TOFFLER A., Future Shock, Bantam, New York, 1971. [VAN 17] VAN WORMER K., BESTHORN F., Human Behavior and the Social Environment, Macro Level: Groups, Communities, and Organizations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017. [WIK 17] WIKIPEDIA, “Faraday Cage”, 2017, available at: https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Faraday_Cage. [WIK 18a] WIKIPEDIA, “Illusory superiority”, 2018, available at: https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Illusory_superiority. [WIK 18b] WIKIPEDIA, “Non-Communicable disease”, 2018, available at: https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non_Communicable_disease. [WIK 18c] WIKIPEDIA, “Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés”, 2018, available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_nationale_de_ l%27informatique_et_des_libert%C3%A9s. [WIL 15] WILSON S.-A., “Corporate social responsibility and power relations: Impediments to community development in post-war Sierra Leone diamond and rutile mining areas”, The Extractive Industries and Society, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 704– 713, 2015. [ZEI 17] ZEIHAN P., “Analysis: Russia far East turning Chinese”, abcNews, 2017, available at: http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82969.

3 Competitive Intelligence Schools Across the World: Foundations, Influence and Perspectives

3.1. Introduction: what is the competitive intelligence school? Robert Guillaumot was a French pioneer, as well as international pioneer of competitive intelligence. During the early 1980s, he used to meet with emblematic figureheads of the competitive intelligence practitioners in the United States and Sweden. At this time he met the pioneers who would then become his friends: the Yugoslavian Stevan Dedijer, the Japanese Juro Nakagawa, and the Chinese Qihao Miao. In 1994, he invited the representatives of various national “competitive intelligences” (United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Australia, Japan, United States, France) to Boston in order to lay the foundations of an international alliance of business intelligence professionals. Later, he says: “with this alliance, my goal was to sketch the framework of a new discipline, to differentiate its content from that of other management methods and thus lay the foundations for an international coopetition guaranteeing fair play in defending our national interests”. The existence of this group as an “observatory” involved the exchange of information on best practices and innovations related to globalized competitive intelligence. Every school in the world aims to feed off others, always with a critical eye and awareness of the cultural specificities of each. It is important to remember that this little-reported but considerable event is indeed very relevant and we believe it is at the origin of the acceleration of

Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1: A New Strategic and Operational Approach, First Edition. Henri Dou, Alain Juillet and Philippe Clerc. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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the dynamics of competitive intelligence schools, that it finally, is the basis of the phenomenon of methodological syncretism and the “strategic mix” that characterizes the most dynamic schools. Above all, schools of competitive intelligence cannot be understood in each country without reference to this dynamic of internationalization and creativity from “advanced experiences” and, as we shall see below, “often caused by the circumstances and by specificities of each continent, region or country”. Finally, there is a concordance of the concerns of both public and private decision-makers and strategists. Throughout the world, they have gradually designed modern competitive intelligence to overcome the growing confusion they faced at the end of the 20th Century confronted with inefficiency of their world analysis matrix and the malfunction of their strategic compasses. Competitive intelligence is closely linked to the culture of strategy. In each country it feeds off an original culture of strategy (Latin, Asian, Anglo-American, African, Arab). This is expressed through a set of ways of thinking and acting that govern the conception, the organization, and the use of means; in particular information and knowledge to achieve a strategic objective [FAY 06]. It consists of an intellectual heritage, as well as experiences that are formed gradually through history and its incarnations. Peoples and rulers mobilize them to achieve conquests or to survive by drawing from each ambition the materials of strategic advantage and the ingredients necessary to remain resilient during crises. As far as we are concerned, it determines specific competition management or cooperation management skills that feed into private and public strategies aiming at increasing power and influence. The way by which we exist in the world and representing it in an interpretation of globalization produces strategic behaviors and generates creativity in this area: power strategy, influence and security strategy, conquest strategy and forward-looking strategy. In order to innovate, we have to mobilize the varying capacities of intelligence; that is to say, understanding situations, risks and crises, balance of power relationships or cooperative relationships, cultures, etc., and to think of organizations that collect, interpret, disseminate and protect information. This mobilization produces communities of competitive intelligence, communities of practice gathering researchers, experts and practitioners, across all countries. Various countries have created schools: American,

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Swedish, Anglo-American, French, Francophone, Chinese, Moroccan, African, etc. A new phenomenon has been rapidly accelerating due to the spread of globalization. It is the cross-fertilization of business intelligence practices that rely on information and knowledge mastery to drive strategies, as well as competitive offensives or partnerships. This phenomenon has grown from the hybridization of “strategic styles” and strategic cultures – Chinese, Japanese, British, Anglo-American, Latin American, Brazilian, and Arabic for example. This is not a new phenomenon. Japanese industrial strategist, Fumio Hasegawa [HAS 88], demonstrates this through a book entitled Built by Japan. Competitive Strategies of the Japanese Construction Industry in which he discusses strategies combining Sun Tzu’s thinking and modern competitive intelligence and market competition. In the field of competitive intelligence, this phenomenon of syncretism is more particularly characterized by the construction of the Chinese school. The Chinese national and provincial authorities have gradually organized the “silent revolution of open intelligence” – that of competitive intelligence – by studying through scientific exchanges, foreign practices and organizations, such as those practiced in the United States, France, Canada, Japan and Germany [CLE 11]. These crossovers can be useful when they generate a capacity for innovation in schools. They also determine the ability of one school or another to influence others. We can therefore emphasize the influence of the Japanese, American or French schools in China. The Japanese influence, through regular exchanges, began in the early 1990s when Professor Juro Nakagawa, founder of the Business Intelligence Society of Japan [NAK 13], met with both Professor Qihao Miao, founder of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professional of China and patron of the Shanghai Institute of Science and Technology Information, and the French pioneer Robert Guillaumot. This influence is characterized today by the long-term action of pioneers, such as Robert Guillaumot, Professor Henri Dou, the expert Jean-Marie Rousseau, and Philippe Clerc at the assembly of the French Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CCI) France, particularly in the field of territorial intelligence. This influence is characterized by an in-depth debate between the practitioners of the two schools, which is well illustrated in the proceedings of the 2011 symposium held in Shanghai on the theme “National Competitive Intelligence. Comparative study on practices in France in China” whose leader for France was Alain Juillet, former senior government official for competitive intelligence affairs [GRO 11].

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But we must remain vigilant. The reproduction of methods and the use of identical tools, which are often heavily culturally grounded and lacking criticism, can lead to mimicry – the “evil of generalized good practices”. It leads to inefficiency. It creates cognitive biases. It creates a “blind intelligence” of situations. From then on, a school of competitive intelligence was defined by a vision, a doctrine, a community of practice, a capacity for innovation and influence. 3.2. Visions that inspire schools of thought “See far and act quickly” is the challenge facing our nations and the actors who make them. “If you do not plan for the future, you won’t have one” Wayne Rosenkrans warned us [ROS 88] in the 2000s, at a conference of the Association of American Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP). He was in charge of international competitive intelligence at the Astra Zeneca laboratory. In order to survive, keep on influencing world history, and to guarantee one’s future within a period of globalization and its avatars, must prepare for the one future, and sketch a vision that can be shared, departing from a single ambition. Competitive intelligence in its modern definition has been formalized, made explicit both in very small countries, such as Sweden, as well as in “power countries” such as the United States, France and China. The type of competitive intelligence that is practiced on the basis of a vision becomes one of the instruments for the choice of strategies. In this case, each country, with its various specificities, implements it to develop its capacities for strategic thinking and foresight. “Power countries” tend to focus on global issues, to build multiple scenarios for the future of the world and to formulate roadmaps for their respective economic and social strategies. As for the emerging countries grouped under the term “developmentalists” (which are less and less considered as BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), given this group displays heterogeneous realities), they will be interested in competitive intelligence in order to catch up economically and strategically by seeking to master their sovereignty and develop their influence in their strategic areas.

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3.2.1. “Power countries” In France, research, development, technology, industry and innovation, as well as cultural influence, have long been strategic fields. They densified visions and created the European will-to-power aimed at guaranteeing independence. Influence was conceived and driven by state-of-the-art research and mastery of the core competencies of the major technological sectors (software, microelectronics, biotechnology, nuclear, telecommunications, transport, aeronautics, etc.). The equation “excellence, technological power” has long expressed a desire for power. In 1982, France launched a vast program of technological cooperation on the technologies of the future, from which it drew the Eureka program. The European will-to-power was expressed in 1985 by one of the major players in the Eureka program, Yves Stourdzé, Director General of the Center for Systems and Advanced Technologies Studies (CESTA – Le Centre d’Étude des Systèmes et Technologies Avancées): “The era of power fossilized in a stable regulatory system is long over. The world of deregulation and instability that has opened up is a hard world, like that of Bismarck. Those who have gathered their strengths and built a solid foundation will resist this. A new social contract of progress between the peoples of Europe, based on advanced technology, has become a burning preoccupation” [STO 16]. Today, if there is one of the last years of government foresight worthy of its name in France it is that of identifying the key technologies that we must master in order to remain in the global competition. The ambition of excellence/power remains valid, but hollow: if France does not want to disappear from the world, it must urgently retake its course of reindustrialization with a strengthened position in the “4th industrial revolution”. As we have said, this vision has also been based for some centuries on the feeling of influencing the world through French values, culture and our creativity. During the great international battles that took place at UNESCO on cultural diversity in the first decade of the 21st Century, France managed to retain its fragile influential leadership [CLE 08]. Today, it does not neglect the considerable economic interests that compete inside the cultural industries. Essentially, however, France, since the governments of General de Gaulle, since the “Pompidou industrial imperative” and the European

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technological interlude of the 1980s, has failed to define a real project, a doctrine of power as a way for the future of the country. Competitive intelligence in France has developed around these visions and this observation of the “lack of reflection on the power of France faced with the challenges of globalization” [HAR 08]. The publication of the report of the French Planning Office entitled “Competitive Intelligence and Business Strategies” in 1994 [MAR 14] and the creation of the first national strategy of competitive intelligence called “competitiveness and economic security” policy in 1995 [CLE 95a], then the public policies that have followed until today, have tried and still try to respond to this lacuna. Today, a number of stakeholders of the French school of competitive intelligence (companies, experts, think tanks administration) are working to feed the reflection, including through the definition of so-called strategic sectors and the attempt to define of a doctrine of digital sovereignty for France in the European partnership. In the United States, Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama considered that their country was the only world power and expressed in their inaugural speeches or on the state of the Union the desire to dominate both the values, as well as in the economic field. This desire for power was thus illustrated by excerpts from presidential speeches. “America has become the only indispensable nation [...]. The world’s largest democracy must take the lead of democracies [...] so as to pursue America’s eternal mission,” Bill Clinton announced in 1993. Later in 2006 George Bush in a speech on the state of the Union said: “America must lead the world.” As for Barack Obama, he got angry in 2016: “I already told you that all discussions on the decline of the US economy were a political fiction [...]. The United States of America is the most powerful nation [...]”. The desire for power and structuring influence on the world is also supported by the industrial world. In 1946, the Director of Paramount stated [CLE 08]: “We, the industry, are aware of the need to inform people in foreign countries of what makes America a great country and we think we know how to deliver the message of our democracy. We want to do it on a commercial basis, and we are ready, if necessary, to face a decline in our revenues.”

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Today the war of data and technologies is engaged by the American industrial world through the GAFA offensive and supported by the American administration. Both Europe and Africa appear as digital colonies of the United States. In the report defining the National Security Strategy of the United States of America published in December 2017, the Trump administration expressed the reorganisation of its power objectives. The president has decided to abandon the role of “world policeman” and focus on adressing American society and its economy. In 2017, President Trump declared that: “President Carter, President Clinton, President Bush, President Obama, fellow Americans, and people of the world, thank you… Together, we will determine the course of America and the world for many, many years to come.” The role of the White House, diplomacy, and its armed forces is no longer to “shape the world”, but to protect the “interests of the American people”, and its way of living. American power is also extended to protecting the “cyber-spatial” borders, securing the internet and especially national security, energy, banks, communication, and transport, as well as strategic sectors. The administration is planning a “brain drain” toward the United States, as well as fighting foreign state and company interventions, namely in advanced technology sectors. 3.2.2. “Emerging countries” Where emerging countries are concerned, their leaders find themselves preoccupied with controlling their sovereignty, as well as developing the influence of their regional zones and their respective strategies. On a local level, competitve and prospective intelligence concern the great challenges that face these regions, including fighting poverty, improving education standards, expanding access to healthcare, urbanization, etc. Beyond internal and local concerns, competitive and prospective intelligence serve to reinforce their local leadership. One of the common goals of emerging countries is to extend their voices so that they might be heard further afield, on the world stage. Also, the economic and prospective intelligence that they deploy progressively can be analyzed as an exercise of communication of influence intended to reinforce their internal sovereignty, both toward their populations and to project their motivation to increase their power to the outside.

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Through this approach, we are able to identify a project which consists of formalizing long-term and ideal strategic objectives, built upon the construction of internal evolutionary scenarios of society and the economy. The national prism seems to be a priority. This is understandble because the confirmation of their power by countries such as China or Brazil, for example, is based firstly on the internal issues linked to their development. Mexico is a perfect example of this approach. During his election in 2013, the former Mexican president, Peña Nieto, found a way of crossing over the two main aims – both internal and external – whilst realizing a strategy for power growth through the use of the Spanish language and Hispanic culture (toward the outside) in order to better fight poverty in Mexico (a response to an internal issue). Indeed, for emerging countries, their main threat is firstly found in the social divide and economic inequality. In a column entitled “The end of poverty in Mexico”, featured in the French newspaper Le Monde in October 2012 [NIE 12], Peña Nieto spelled out his vision: “I believe that we should make the most of Mexican culture. Beyond its symbolic importance, we should promote it so that it becomes a driving force for development and the strategic position it holds in the world […]. Our objective will be to transform Mexico into a world leader in the dissemination of the Spanish language and its culural goods (cinema, literature, radio, the press, television and higher education).” According to the “developmentalists”, the economy is not a sufficient argument to claim a place on the international scene. Although economic diplomacy is important, of course, but “radiation” and strategies based on “cultural power” appear to be more effective ways of openings doors, especially in the long run. As a result, emerging countries affirm their singularity by pointing out the importance of their culture in the face of the dominant and globalizing culture. In our view, they deploy geocultural strategies that draw on their strengths, including the economy, within their culture and the history of their culture. In China, the vision the country’s new power was formalized by President XI Jinping on the occasion of the Nineteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. In order to overcome the difficulties of Chinese society – inequality, the ageing population, pollution etc. – the Chinese president decided to change the country’s industrial strategy and launched the China 2025 digital transition industrial program. At the same time, he

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launched the new Silk Road marking China’s determination to increase its commercial outreach to the world, targeting through these new land and sea routes Europe and gradually Africa. Above all, it is a long-term vision that lays out the objectives to be achieved: 2020–2035 will engage China on the path of fundamental development and 2035–2050 will mark China’s entry into the value-added services industry. Regarding Africa, the affirmation of African schools of competitive intelligence is illustrated by the “design” of strong visions of a desire to overcome historical and material dependencies and to find new strategies for increasing power. To our knowledge, one of the first African organizations to draw a vision backed by an approach of competitive intelligence for Senegal and Africa in development is the Forum for Competitive Intelligence and Development, created in the late 1990s by Amath Soumaré [SOU 12], President of SOPEL International. During the meeting of the FCID organized in Dakar in 2015 in partnership with the International Francophone Association of Competitive Intelligence and the International Trade Center, the final declaration is clear: “The organizers share the conviction that competitive intelligence, understood as the control of information and knowledge at the service of the design and governance of development strategies, must be integrated into all current systems of support of the Senegal Plan, PSE; must have a cross-cutting dimension, in order to respect coherence in the overall implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the PES strategic policy program projects; must finally feed as ‘a cooperative strike force’ the sub-regional, continental and international alliances, which Senegal needs to realize the ambition of its development.” In May 2018, we attended a noteworthy and innovative event held on the African continent in Morocco. The Open University of Dakhla and its iconic President Driss Guerraoui, who is also Secretary General of the Economic, Social, Environmental Council of the Kingdom of Morocco [NDI 17] had invited competitive intelligence associations and subject matter experts and practitioners from 23 African countries to debate and exchange. At the end of this meeting, the former Prime Minister of Togo, Mr. Agbéyomé Kodjo

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published a “plea for a competitive intelligence action plan for an emerging Africa”. He writes: “In conclusion, economic intelligence and strategic intelligence have to be considered as a core condition intended to drive the ambitious project building a new united and strong Africa. The African continent must now adopt operational mechanisms of economic intelligence and collective strategic intelligence, supported by the promotion of good practices in this field in order to ensure the global security of the continent understood as food security, economic security and economic patriotism. Finally, the public authorities of our countries, with their prerogatives, must consider urgent measures to integrate into the conduct of public affairs a coordinated approach of strategic and economic intelligence in order to strengthen their economy, to better adapt public policies and encourage private companies to integrate the dynamic.” In his inaugural lecture at the 2nd African conference of competitive intelligence in 2017 in Casablanca, Professor Driss Guerraoui, drew a realistic vision for the future of the African continent based on a collective strategy of global security: “Ensuring global economic security in an open world has become a complex equation for nations to solve. This is at the heart of the new challenges that the African continent must meet to ensure its stability from its ability to promote in this area an appropriate collective strategic intelligence [...]. This task seems crucial in view of the specificity of the global context in which Africa is evolving [...]. Finally, given the scale of this problem, no single African country can provide an appropriate and sustainable response to this complex issue [...]. In this perspective, the creation of a new generation of regional integration whose geostrategic objective is the creation of the ‘United States of Africa’ constitutes the most appropriate spatial and institutional framework for this purpose. The overall economic security of the continent will depend greatly on it in the future.”

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Brazil is developing a vision of its position in the world based on its status as an emerging power. It seeks constantly to avoid and relativize the dependence on dominant economic and political poles: the European Union, the United States, China/Asia. It seeks instead to position itself as the bridgehead of the South American continent. During the hearing of the House of Lords commissioners on soft power and UK influence, the Brazilian ambassador to the UK explained that Brazil lack “hard power” and seeks to “maximize its soft power and increase its accessibility in international business” [HOU 13]. Like China, in the late 1990s, Brazil more recently embarked on a strategy of integrating the global governance system and its institutions, such as the WTO. Brazil has thus developed specific strategies to take regional and global leadership through the promotion of renewed alliances, different from the old colonial systems and based on the values of prosperity and democracy. Its strategic sphere of influence is spreading progressively over West Africa, which it considers to be “its eastern border”. Brazilian leaders have long bet on the choice of Brazil rather than China by Africans from this part of the continent; some of whom have the Portuguese language and former colonial territories of Europe. 3.3. The advent of the competitive intelligence schools After outlining the geopolitical and geoeconomic framework to better understand the dynamics of building the first schools of competitive intelligence, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, we will describe the foundations of the doctrines that have inspired them through recalling the essential texts of the designers of the process. We will describe the communities of practice that built them on a daily basis. 3.3.1. Geopolitical and geoeconomic framework At this point, it is necessary to go deeper to try to better understand the advent of competitive intelligence at the end of “a tortuous path strewn with contradictions” [BAU 97]. The advent and thus the construction of the schools of competitive intelligence can be understood only in relation to the great geopolitical, geoeconomic and strategic transformations of the global environment which marked the end of the Cold War and the necessity for inventing new intelligence grids of situations. These transformations can be considered as

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founders of competitive intelligence; that is to say of a new practice of intelligence of the stakes and the situations by the actors involved – companies, experts, public organizations and organizations coming from civil society. It is 1990. The end of the Cold War marked by the dismantling of the Berlin Wall brings out the ruins of the political masquerade of confrontations a reality driven by economic key-drivers and new forms of competition. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama [FUK 06] published his famous essay entitled The End of History and the Last Man, an end he explains by the global advent of market democracy. Thus, he obscures the national economic dynamics. The following year, Edward Luttwak founded geoeconomics. In a basic text, “From geopolitics to geoeconomics,” he describes the dawn of a new international order in which the economic weapon would replace the military weapon as an instrument of the will of states to gain power [LUT 90]. The major economic clashes are then played out according to the three major players, Japan, Europe and the United States in technology sectors driven by large networks of dominance: information technology, biotechnology, robotics, automotive, aeronautics and cultural industries. Japan dominates, combining in its strategies of conquest and its commercial wars the strategy of the three determinants of globalization according to the Japanese, the 3 Cs: “competition, cooperation, conflict” [YOS 98]. Europe is seeking its position in the balance of power. The United States is committed to economic resilience through a new industrial policy and strategic intelligence: the Advocacy Policy and endows the government and the so-called American economy with an advocacy center; a “War room” that drives US offensives into the top 10 emerging markets for US interests around the world. State, administration and companies coordinate their actions in the national interest. In every school of competitive intelligence, we note the same creative impulse – a political will, a desire to gain power, but also the geoeconomic pressure of the market, even strategic surprises and therefore the need to enter into a strategy of resilience – at the origin of the dynamic cycles and innovation of their pilots and their practitioners. But there will also be brakes. France, for example, stands out for the delay that policymakers and information management practitioners have made in understanding and integrating the central role of information games in economic competition. In this respect, Christian Harbulot speaks of “omission of geoeconomic power relations” [HAR 08].

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The schools of competitive intelligence will gradually be built by distinguishing themselves through intelligence and information management techniques mobilized by practitioners and decision-makers or governmental authorities: prospective and strategic analysis, strategic planning, evaluation, scientific and technical surveillance, bibliometrics, specialized documentation, current data science, economic and legal security, intellectual property, etc. These techniques have been forged and are forged in a permanent dynamic of innovation accompanying “strategic invention” along agile methodological paths; that is to say implemented differently for each situation, each avatar, each time the system is disrupted. The futurist, Thierry Gaudin, recently reminded us of what should be considered as a foundation of the French school of competitive intelligence: as early as the 1980s in France, the study of the technical-social interaction, ethno-technology and world technological surveillance organized with the commissioner for atomic energy, the CEA, and scientific advisers embassies, by the center of prospective and evaluation (CPE) he led, allowed the “the cognitive revolution” [GAU 14] to emerge as the central role of information and knowledge in the emerging technical revolution. Lastly, schools cannot understand each other without the contribution of international cooperation as we have seen above. The “pioneers, discoverers, designers” of the competitive intelligence approach come together in the United States and within a global network of experts in competitive intelligence (Chinese, Japanese, Swedish, English, etc.) launched by the French Robert Guillaumot in the 1990s. As we mentioned above, hybridization comes from this international community that continues, transforms and enriches itself. Here we find the source of the contemporary approach of competitive intelligence. 3.3.2. Doctrines We understand doctrine as a set of concepts that enlighten, guide and run any action. 3.3.2.1. The creators We now propose to visit in more detail, in the first part, the conceptual work and the production of the Anglo-American (that’s English-speaking American) school which inspired the French approach. In the second part, by presenting the French school, we will propose a reading of the criticism that

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the French pioneers have made of the Anglo-American school, the same one that allowed the French school to deploy an approach that still remains rather original even today. 3.3.2.1.1. The Anglo-American influence Philippe Baumard and Christian Harbulot [BAU 97], research professors and practitioners, are used to speaking of the “Anglo-American influence on competitive intelligence”. They identify the steps that structured these reflections. The Anglo-American school is the first to conceptualize the use of information in economic clashes, especially during a first phase of academic criticism, marked by collective knowledge exchange strategies between governments and companies, to promote power interests and thus the national interest. A second and more entrepreneurial step of their critique comes from the need to meet the new challenges of competition and to take into account the factors outside the market and the game of stakeholders who do not act in a strict market framework. Here, the deployment of the concept of competitive intelligence developed in American multinationals (Motorola, Chrysler, General Motor, 3M, etc.) has given rise to a field of very influential entrepreneurial types of practice. It has led to many academic developments. In a complementary way, a current way of thinking has developed around “social intelligence” and the attempt to create a discipline of the sciences of intelligence, repositioning the problem of information in the context of social sciences. The Anglo-American contribution in the foundational conception of the first schools of competitive intelligence and in the design of the most recent is based on five designers and thinkers. They are Americans Harold Wilensky, Michael Porter, Richard D’Aveni, Robert Edward Freeman, and Yugoslavian Stevan Dedijer. 3.3.2.1.2. Harold Wilensky: public/private strategies and organizational intelligence The international community of practitioners and researchers in competitive intelligence – at least in the West – seem to agree that the modern conception of competitive intelligence was formalized in the United States in the 1960s by Harold Wilensky [WIL 67]. A former expert in military intelligence, the latter formalizes the concept of organizational intelligence. What is his contribution? According to Wilensky, winning competitive advantages relies on cooperation and collective strategies for the

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production and exchange of knowledge between governments and businesses. It assigns a central role to organizational techniques and innovation in this field to make the production of knowledge more effective at the service of the national interest. The mobilization of analytical and interpretive skills in a process he calls “organizational intelligence” is crucial in the acquisition and preservation of strategic advantage. 3.3.2.1.3. The contributions of Michael Porter and de R.E. Freeman In 1980, Michael Porter [POR 80, POR 90] published his famous book on competitive advantage considered as the foundation of the modern approach of business intelligence. He proposes a reference grid and analysis of what he calls the five market forces (new entrants, suppliers, customers, substitute products, competitors) [WIK 17c]. Such a grid is still widely used by businesses or industries to understand the profitability of their business sector to make an informed change in their competitive strategy and gain competitive advantages. It has helped to gradually feed schools into competitive strategies, with firms and experts having a weak competition culture. Robert Edward Freeman proposes an essential approach to competitive intelligence that may even be more relevant than that of Michael Porter. It broadens the scope of competitive confrontations to the study of the influence games in the corporate environment, actors in particular “offmarket” strictly defined, stakeholders: government, local authorities, lobbies and activists, media, unions, civil society, etc. It opens the way to a matrix related to influence strategies [ENG 84]. This work remains highly relevant for organizations facing the challenges of the digital revolution and the emergence of the power of civil society vis-à-vis that of companies. “Stakeholder theory is not just a story of profits, but a way to create value for customers, suppliers, employees, and communities”, writes Freeman in 2015 [ENG 15]. We find the theory of stakeholders at the heart of the work of the chair of “competitive intelligence and strategy of organizations” led by Professor Stéphanie Dameron of the University of Paris-Dauphine [GOU 15]. 3.3.2.1.4. The contributions of Richard A. D’Aveni Richard D’Aveni, without questioning the usefulness of Michael Porter’s analysis (matrix of the five forces), debates his operability regarding the advent of new relations of power understood as hyper-competition

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[FRAZ 17, DAV 94]. According to D’Aveni, the deal is considerably modified by the advent of new provocative and even “disruptive” competitors, who no longer seek to preserve their positions, but rather their way of disrupting or fighting acquired advantages: the disruptive behavior against the given and established advantage. In 2001, by imagining the operational concept of the sphere of influence, Richard A. D’Aveni [WIK 17d] shows how “leading” companies shape the market to their advantage by mixing confrontation and cooperation with competition. He revisits the so-called “hyper-competition” strategies. His vision is now therefore to avoid weakening the market by systematic disruption, not to engender competing threats and retaliation, but to favor the evolution of the market rather than its permanent revolution. A veritable arsenal of competitiveness will be required to build favorable territories, by organizing spheres of influence. This configuration helps actors to dominate the competition by maneuvering more skillfully to avoid competitive confrontation that can lead to chaos. Based on the technique of influence strategies, this approach, formalized in 2001, gradually inspired the French school in its application of competitive intelligence. In 2003, the directors of competitive intelligence, innovation and ICT of the assembly of French chambers of commerce and industry (CCI France) invited Richard D’Aveni to give a conference in the French Senate which made its mark and inspired practices. 3.3.2.1.5. The influence of the Swedish school of societal intelligence The former Yugoslavian Communist and professor at Lund University in Sweden, Stevan Dedijer, [CLE 04], very early on introduced the social intelligence approach as the most appropriate approach to “bring out” social systems, national intelligence, or even for low-income countries. Since the 1970s, he has been designing the first Business Intelligence courses for Swedish business managers. He regularly spends time with the American Robert Steele, who is a very effective promoter of the open source revolution in the context of intelligence reform. He and some British lecturers also founded the magazine Social & Economic Intelligence (1989–1992), focusing their reflections on the methodological and cognitive aspects, considering that information, knowledge and technology represented the levers of power of the Nations in the next world without addressing the issue of power growth by the economy. Stevan Dedijer used to question the intelligence capacity of a nation and talk about its “collective IQ”. The effectiveness of social intelligence – many

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speak today of the collective intelligence of a country or territory – is based on the size and dynamism of production and knowledge development activities, as well as on the density and quality of its information and expertise networks. In this approach of competitive intelligence based on a multidisciplinary mobilization of tools of intelligence of the situations and the world, the stress is placed on the mobilization of cultural assets to boost cooperations, and on the sharing of capacities of intelligence. Today, it is a major source of inspiration for competitive intelligence, a lever for dynamic cooperatives within the Francophone world, and in relations with low-income countries and emerging economies [AIF 18]. 3.3.2.2. The original approach of the French school At present, we propose to put into perspective the French reflections that contributed to the conception of an original approach of competitive intelligence. As always, it is humans that have designed and implemented this new approach, including crossing borders. The designers have gradually constituted the French approach and its school. Three “smugglers” stand out. They have played and continue to play a vital role since the 1980s: Robert Guillaumot [VEI 14], Christian Harbulot [WIK 17a] and Philippe Baumard [WIK 17b, WIK 17e]. As early as 1990, Christian Harbulot and Philippe Baumard [BAU 97] introduced the debate on issues related to new competitive behavior based on the offensive use of information. Faced with the American mono-cultural conception, the French approach innovates from the beginning of reflection in the late 1980s by a multicultural approach based on a study and analysis of the diversity of cultures and information practices in confrontations and economic cooperation [MAR 94, HAR 15]. The short history of the French school of competitive intelligence has been forged on the fundamental debate about France’s strategy of power in the face of the challenges of globalization and the reality of our information culture alongside such a strategy. A complementary axis essential to this debate is that of the strategy culture that has thus far been entirely missing [BAU 14]. It should be remembered that the French school has also been enriched by methodological and technological know-how in library and associated software engineering. As early as 1978, the Center for Retrospective

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Research in Marseille (CRRM) [DOU 79] was already developing courses in technological surveillance which were later replaced by lectures on competitive intelligence. In 1982, the first postgraduate courses in advanced study in competitive intelligence and strategic intelligence were created at the University Aix-Marseille III and at the University of Marne la Vallée by professors Henri Dou and Clément Paoli, specialists in bibliometrics. The French school was originally conceived from a critical reading of the Anglo-American approach. The doctrine has been forged as government decisions and successive reports on the subject gradually leading the private ecosystem to appropriate the approach. The originality of the French school lies in the decision of the French government, as early as 1995, to develop a public policy of competitive intelligence, at the same time as the companies and their ecosystem of support and the world of education and training took ownership of the approach, thanks to the chambers of commerce and industry, the strong arm of the state and companies in the field. We have therefore chosen to sketch the presentation from what we will call the founding texts of the French School of Competitive Intelligence. From a geostrategic perspective, they reveal reflections and “bringing into action”, sometimes in strategy, of France that we will present at the end through the productions of the community of public and private practice. 3.3.2.2.1. A critical look at the American school We insisted on the fact that the pioneers of the French school were closely linked to those of the American school of practice. They built the French approach on the basis of a thorough analysis of the Anglo-American school, its strengths and its weaknesses. Between competition and cooperation, it is through a cultural reading of the foundations of it that they helped to build the originality of French competitive intelligence. What criticisms have they made of the British and Anglo-American conception? The latter is characterized by the focus on its own information culture. This is based on the leading role of US power in the markets. The Anglo-American elites have not “formalized” their theory of the role of information in competitive clashes. Their authors have divided their reflection according to this mono-cultural vision of the role of information and according to the following fields: the academic field (production on strategic management), the entrepreneurial field (competitive intelligence, counter-intelligence, lobbying) and the institutional field (economic

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diplomacy, soft power, economic security and national security, information security, intellectual property) [HAR 15]. This partitioning could have been deeply detrimental to US strategies. It suffices to say that the destabilization of the American economy following the Japanese offensive of the 1980s led in particular from a strategic management of information as a weapon of economic war. We now propose to present the founding texts of the French school. They intervene at particular geostrategic moments; that is to say, requiring reference grids of a new organizational intelligence. They illustrate the commitment of the public sphere, even of the political world on the subject. They have been declined in public policies. Even today, the national strategy of competitive intelligence remains based on these texts which are produced to answer the blindnesses resulting from two geostrategic breaks: the end of the Cold War, the attack of the World Trade Center of New York and the advent of a world of multipolar competitions and alliances exemplified by the power of emerging economies in the South. As an introduction to this sequence of thinking on strategic intelligence from visionary government decision makers, we wish to mention here the first French report on immaterial society published in 1983 under the direction of André-Yves Portnoff of the Center for Prospective and Evaluation (CPE) of the Ministry of Research and Technology headed by Thierry Gaudin, now president of the France 2100 foundation. Entitled “The revolution of intelligence” [GAU 14, POR 80], the report starts from an observation to contemporary echoes: “faced with the Japanese challenge, will the West lock itself in a losing scenario or bet on ‘transformative intelligence’? [...] A massive investment of gray matter can turn the most traditional sectors into a sector of the future.” 3.3.2.2 2. The Aditech economic war study The study conducted by Christian Harbulot and published in 1990 by the Aditech association, the editorial arm of the Center for Studies and Foresight of the Ministry of Research and Technology, is defined as “an essay on the nature of economic clashes that contrast at that time the different models of market economy”. The study describes and analyzes the commercial rivalries of multinational companies, the penetration of the southern hemisphere, the development of national business strategies, illustrated by the technological and commercial offensive of Japan, to highlight the behavior of company business leaders pushed to integrate more and more

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data and analysis with their own knowledge by creating strategic data processing units. This study appears when the “fourth decennial vision” of the MITI (1987) is set up to favor the international circulation of scientific and technical results; in a word, the “technoglobalism” allowing the Japanese to organize an offensive strategy of capture innovation and position itself as a central partner for future technological cooperation [CAD 94]. And we think today of China. 3.3.2.2 3. The Henri Martre report Like the United States at the end of the 1980s [MIT 86] and Europe in the early 1980s, France wondered why it was losing competitiveness. This is the theme of the great Gandois commission on the competitiveness of the 11th and last French plan (1993). In 1994, the Martre report [MAR 94] “Competitive Intelligence and Business Strategy” provides an unprecedented and decisive response. Produced by the Commissariat général du plan (the French Planning Office), a service of the Prime Minister, by a commission of experts and practitioners from the worlds of business, administration and the university, it is chaired by Henri Martre, president of the AFNOR (the French national standard office), former president of the company Aérospatiale. It was set up thanks to Jean-Louis Levet, head of the Technological and Industrial Development Department at the French Planning Office, and the strength of conviction of Christian Harbulot, advisor to Henri Martre, determined president and visionary of the Commission. While the commission’s work does not highlight the contradictions of the Anglo-American, and more precisely, the American model, it is very clearly distinguished by differentiating cultural contexts from national competitive intelligence systems and information cultures. The Martre Commission produced the first comparative analysis of several national competitive intelligence systems across the world, demonstrating through this unprecedented work the strategic effectiveness and performance of nations that know how to organize the coordination of capabilities and information management practices. He noted that the lack of coordination of the action of French public and private actors undermined strategic individual and collective effectiveness. This report is the recognized foundation and the driving force of the French School of Competitive Intelligence. The innovation is such that the Encyclopedia Universalis opens its expert pages on the subject under the heading “Companies” [CLE 95b].

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3.3.2.2.4. Report to the President of the Republic establishing a Committee for Competitiveness and Economic Security (April 1995): the doctrine of IE’s first public policy [LEG 95] To be sure, Henri Martre conceived his main action in response to the situation of the French economy which he described as “a competitive emergency”. His plea was heard. A few months after the publication of the report, the French President, François Mitterrand and his government headed by Édouard Balladur, Prime Minister, decided to react and create the first national strategy of competitive intelligence called “competitiveness and economic security policy” on the recommendation of a great prefect, Rémy Pautrat. More than an inspirer, the latter is the founder of this public policy that he has from the beginning considered a stage of state reform. An orientation council is chaired by the Prime Minister. An inter-ministerial steering committee is responsible for implementing the decisions of the latter in the field of competitive intelligence. Published in the Official Journal of April 4, 1995 [KNA 07], the report is the French response to the US commercial offensive on its major “power” markets: armaments, telecommunications, aeronautics, biotechnology, etc. The text introduces and motivates the decree creating the Committee for Competitiveness and Economic Security made up of nine industrialists, bankers, and scientists, as well as the governance and orientation mechanism of the government’s competitive intelligence strategy. It represents the government’s founding text of what was the first public policy of competitive intelligence. The writers inspired by the Martre report write: “[...] Given the capacity of its main partners and competitors, France must become more aware of the strategic role of information [...]. Such a necessity requires the adoption of a dynamic and offensive approach coordinated by the State, in order to reinforce at all levels, the capacity for coordination and exchange of information between economic and political actors [...]” [CLE 95a]. 3.3.2.2.5. The Carayon report “Competitive intelligence, competitiveness and social cohesion” (2003): the policy takes hold of the approach [CAR 03] It is 2002. In the multipolar world, models of capitalism clash (Chinese state capitalism, English or American financial capitalism, etc.). The power shift in globalization is driven by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China

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and South Africa). The national competitive intelligence systems they set up compete with the established positions of the G8 countries. In the globalized knowledge society, battles, including cooperative ones, are won through intelligence and excellence. France is badly positioned: there is a decline in national economic and industrial power and the risk of strategic dependence in several key technological areas. Since 1998, Prime Minister Jospin has put an end to the first French experience and the country is, in fact, “disarmed”. France is talking about competitive intelligence but it is unable to diagnose its strengths and weaknesses by sectors, to produce an inventory of key technological assets (companies, know-how, strategic skills), nor a vision or a shared strategy. The Gemplus affair – the acquisition of a French technological flagship by a US investment fund, TPG Capital, which was not anticipated by the French authorities – is the painful trigger of a new awareness of this collective deficit. We can also recall the recent “Alstom case” whose most strategic part (arms, nuclear and sustainable development) was sold in the United States without the State having been able to intervene effectively in this process [QUA 17]. Now facing the world, France saw the American syndrome of the 1980s against the Japanese. The elite and the community of competitive intelligence are becoming aware of the lack of a system of competitive intelligence within the State apparatus. At the request of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, MP Bernard Carayon is commissioned to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of France’s competitive intelligence capabilities, to produce recommendations to enhance the role of competitive intelligence and to establish the conditions for effective coordination of intelligence capabilities to propose the content of a national strategy in this area. He writes a report “Competitive Intelligence, Competitiveness and Social Cohesion” which is at the origin of a sustainable collective leap in this area. The State “has never defined strategic sectors of activity in terms of sovereignty, employment, influence, and so on, and has never evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of French research and industries in these sectors”. It urgently proposes the definition of a doctrine identifying the major economic, scientific and cultural interests that should be developed, promoted and protected. It advocates “engaging in applied prospective thinking” and “setting priorities for key [...] sectors and partner countries”. The central recommendation calls for the constitution of a “real and widespread public policy of competitive intelligence of the state, such as in healthcare, environmental or tax policies”.

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Following the Carayon report, President Jacques Chirac appointed a senior competitive intelligence officer to develop the national and territorial strategy for competitive intelligence. Alain Juillet held this position in charge of the definition of public policy and communication with companies in this area until 2009. Two interdepartmental delegates of competitive intelligence pursued this mission: Mr. Olivier Buquen and Mrs. Claude Revel to start in 2013. In 2015, Jean-Baptiste Carpentier took charge of the governance of a redefined strategy as a strategic information policy, and an economic security policy. In July 2018, Mr. Thomas Courbe became the new head of competitive intelligence to the government as director general of enterprises within the Ministry of Economy. Until 2015, the production of the organizations for regulatory texts, standards, methodologies and structuring actions gradually came to enrich the doctrine of the French school. This essential work has been done in close collaboration with communities of thought and practice of competitive intelligence, especially in universities and schools such as the School of Economic Warfare, the government think tanks that are the Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defense and the National Institute of Higher Studies of the Security for Justice, the Assembly of the French Chambers of Commerce and Industry and its network of CCI (CCI France), associations (SCIP France), the Academy of Competitive Intelligence, the French Association for the Development of Economic Intelligence, the French Grouping of the Information Industry (GFII), the Club of Directors of Safety and Security (CDSE) large national companies and the Association of information and documentation professionals (ABDS). This heritage can be defined in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu as a real social capital; that is to say a set of resources, including information and knowledge that, accumulated within a network, will give France “a competitive advantage while giving higher returns to investments” [BOU 00]. We now propose to put explore those productions coming from the public sphere in close and permanent consultation with the community of competitive intelligence, and listening to the evolution of the productions of other national schools. We will then examine the communities of public and private practice, after having outlined the main features of the “nourishing disciplines” [MAR 14] of the mode of thought and action [LEV 01] represented by competitive intelligence.

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3.3.2.2.6. The production of the steering structures of the national strategy of competitive intelligence This production that has been elaborated over time and, we must insist, coproduced with the representatives of the communities of practitioners and researchers, is constituted by the base of reference standards of competitive intelligence declined in regulatory or methodological tools. They can be considered as elements of an implantation and actionable doctrine. The governmental representative for competitive intelligence affairs, Alain Juillet, organized with his team a vast collaborative work that led to the 2005 publication a “training repository in competitive intelligence” whose appropriateness is undeniable. It has been developed into common tools for the dissemination of competitive intelligence (OCDIE). These tools are neither a course nor a training program. They are intended to highlight the contributions of the community of competitive intelligence made up of representatives of administrations, companies, professional unions, chambers of commerce, chambers of trades, schools, associations, universities, University institutes of technology, business intelligence firms, experts, authors, teachers, students, etc. to spread of competitive intelligence. They aim to pool all these actors with concrete practices and proven methods on topics related to competitive intelligence. In 2014, the governmental interdepartmental delegate for competitive intelligence undertook the task of updating with the aim of making the new reference “Competitive Intelligence. References and key concepts”, a teaching tool for all disciplines and the doctrine of the French school. The interdepartmental delegate writes in the introduction: “In a world where competing ideas and persuading others have become an essential key to the success of any project, our competitive intelligence corpus is in itself an intangible asset, in that it transports an operational vision of the world, just like law, culture, or research.” Each of the pilots of the government strategy, until 2015, has progressively worked to equip public authorities with competitive tools and methods. Its economic and regulatory arsenal has grown. The production of each has strengthened the doctrine of economic security and included as an offensive priority the strategies of influence so that competitive and commercial battles can be carried out on equal terms for our companies and

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administration. Economic security now includes the definition of strategic sectors using key technologies and the list of companies and know-how to be monitored. Thus, in 2007, the senior manager of competitive intelligence published 10 practical fact sheets “Fundraising and control of strategic information”. The interdepartmental delegate between 2009 and 2012, which guides the national strategy on strengthening economic security tools, offers a competitive intelligence guide for researchers and laboratories. It broadly disseminates a self-diagnosis of economic security “DIESE”. Later, in 2015, the interdepartmental delegate published a highly operational guide on competitive intelligence with regard to competitiveness clusters, as well as a training syllabus for SMEs on cyber security. This considerably creative work has always fundamentally lacked in the sense of a strategy and a vision for public policy of competitive intelligence, a real implementation doctrine of competitive intelligence. This was the stated objective of Jean-Baptiste Carpentier, commissioner in charge of strategic information and economic security, who resigned from his position in 2018 without leaving this essential doctrine for action. Establishing an annual “strategic review” of the national policy of competitive intelligence would resolve this forever-asked question, which is never addressed. 3.4. The “nourishing disciplines” of competitive intelligence and communities of public/private practice Competitive intelligence can be understood as a “way of thinking”; or more precisely, a way of knowing. Plural modes of action have been nourished by several disciplines. In fact, several schools of competitive intelligence are built on inter-disciplinarity for the effectiveness of their analysis, we mobilize several sciences and disciplines as expressed by Stevan Dedijer and as claimed by the supporters of the French and French schools. Thus, since 1991, Philippe Baumard has been building the foundations of the French school of competitive intelligence by deciding to revisit the concepts of surveillance and monitoring from an interdisciplinary approach at the crossroads of the industrial economy, the sociology of organizations, the information economy and strategy and management [BAU 91].

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We are in the “field of the complex”. In this respect, the French sociologist and philosopher Edgar Morin reinforces our approach. For a long time he has warned us: it is necessary to go beyond the compartmentalization of disciplines to understand the complexity of the world and the complexity of the local situation. “The compartmentalized, mono-disciplinary, quantifying way of thinking or knowing leads us to blind intelligence.” Interdisciplinarity becomes a necessity, indeed, it is a question of decompartmentalizing the disciplines, of mobilizing their knowledge and their methods: economics, sociology, chemistry, biology, mechanics, anthropology, information communication etc. [CLE 17]. 3.4.1. Disciplines and “schools of practice” Schools of competitive intelligence have been built around several “schools of practice” and several disciplines. Those that are evolving and transforming, those that emerge, as in Africa, are still passed by these different components that allow them to innovate and adapt to the challenges and sensitive and shifting terrains of their applications. Let us first distinguish, without hierarchizing, the community of practice of librarians and advanced or specialized documentation and that from before these periods, both fed by the discipline of the information sciences. This community of professionals has continued to evolve in expertise with the advent of the Internet and intelligent tools of digital transition, which gradually gives its practitioners knowledge and increased intelligence capabilities close to the analysis toward the production of elaborate knowledge. In France, these professionals have begun to reflect on its positioning and the evolution of the skills of information professionals [DUF 17]. In the United States, the pioneer Ben Gilad [GIL 08], founder of the Academy of Competitive Intelligence completed studies in 2008 on the future of the discipline of competitive intelligence losing expertise vis-à-vis specialist librarians trained in sophisticated tools for research and analysis. Secondly, the expertise developed by watch specialists, many of whom work in the field of engineering sciences, continues. The community of surveillance agents and specialists in bibliometrics have acquired essential expertise for the intelligence chain. They make it possible to trace in the scientific and patent databases, far beyond the states of technology and art, the path and the competency profile of engineers and public or corporate researchers, or even to recompose business strategies.

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Thirdly, a significant portion of the business intelligence community is from the world of defense and intelligence. Hybridization is fruitful in both methodology and strategy. This is a constant in a large number of countries. It is in this way that the American School, the Swedish School of Social Intelligence and the Chinese School have been consolidated more recently. In France, the Economic War, School, founded by Christian Harbulot and General Jean Pichot-Duclos [EGE 17] in 1996 fare makes this necessary bridge a permanent reality. The school provides the necessary reading of economic relations in terms of power relations and power strategies to teach the offensive techniques of economic war. A fourth consideration is that the experts in the field of the economy, the industrial economy (Jean-Louis Levet [WIK 17f]) and the sciences of management (Philippe Baumard; in France Michael Porter, Richard D’Aveni and Henry Mintzberg in the United States; Klaus Solberg Søilen in Sweden), reinforce the discipline of competitive intelligence. They analyze and anticipate the strategic movements of companies and organizations. The competitive intelligence model of AFDIE [AFD 04] (French association for the development of competitive intelligence) has been largely inspired by this trend. In France, a group of professor-researchers, led by Nicolas Moinet and Christian Marcon, lecturers at the University of Poitiers, have progressively positioned dynamic competitive intelligence in the discipline of information communication. This activity is well outlined by Christian Marcon in a 2014 book [MAR 14] and the periodic newletter Communication & Influence, created and animated by Bruno Racouchot, which gives life to the discipline in the implementation of competitive intelligence [RAC 17]. Finally, new communities of practice are developing through cyberspace and the digital world. Through the capacities of mass analysis of data (Big Data) and new professions (data scientists), artificial intelligence is producing intelligence of increased dynamics that is out of the ordinary. In China, Peking University and the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information in Beijing have begun to reflect on the impact of breakthrough innovation of Big Data on competitive intelligence since 2013 by organizing an international symposium on the problem. In France, the Collège de France has just created a “Data Sciences” chair entrusted to Professor Stéphane Mallat [MAL 18]. These communities born of the digital revolution of the year 2000, energized by the current intelligence revolution, disseminate new

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collaborative capabilities through social networks and platforms. The participative and relational capital they mobilize opens up unprecedented perspectives for shared intelligence and co-production. These different disciplines and communities of practice feed the private and public communities of practitioners from companies, their representative organizations to the State, the administration, local authorities and organizations in charge of the development of national schools of competitive intelligence. Below we will present the African and Chinese schools. 3.4.2. The African and Chinese schools of competitive intelligence Without being exhaustive, we have chosen to illustrate the evolution of schools of competitive intelligence by presenting schools still poorly documented and belonging to the new generation that sets up and develops schools in emerging countries. 3.4.2.1. The African school From the outset, it should be noted that there is an African school of competitive intelligence, but it is greatly diverse, given that is of “Africa”. Some people in Africa speak of a pan-African vision of competitive intelligence, like Babacar Diallo, director general of the pan-African school of competitive intelligence in Dakar. This conception is legitimate given the latest developments in the African community of practice. It also allows us to remain consistent in this short presentation. If we refer to the pioneering dynamics in this field, one of the foundations of this African school is found, in our opinion, in a provocatively titled article “The IQ of the Undeveloped Countries and the Jones Intelligence Doctrine” published in 1979 in the American journal, Technology in Society by Professor Stevan Dedijer, founder of the School of Social Intelligence and an international civil servant at the OECD and the UN. This article seems to be the first to address the issue of developing “national intelligence capabilities” in low-income countries. Professor Dedijer calls for the establishment in low-income countries first of a national doctrine of intelligence – which is based on a series of principles, values and standards – then a dedicated organization of the establishment to guide the development of the animation function of the national social intelligence system. Since

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1979, he has been insisting on the central couple of knowledge and the “power of intelligence” in the development of the social systems that make up the Nations: companies, government agencies, agricultural enterprises, up to the Prime Minister’s office. It is a remarkable feature in this visionary text through which the author calls decision makers to break out of dependencies and think differently. It recommends that they, as well as analysts in charge of studies and state of the art studies, identify the restrictions that are the ideological bias and “cognitive dependencies” vis-à-vis foreign models or older operating methods. It therefore calls for the establishment of a national capacity for creative and innovative intelligence. This clearly means a break with established concepts, a call to break out of “cognitive fixation zones” and to deploy “the intelligence of unprecedented situations” and crises out of the usual paths. Now let’s look at recent and significant developments toward the consolidation of the foundations of an African School of Business Intelligence. We will present the observation of the strengths and weaknesses expressed by Africans alongside our European perspective. We will then describe the significant achievements of practice members before concluding with a synthesis of issues. The dynamics of the African school are the result of associations of practitioners, and pioneers sometimes supported by public authorities. On the occasion of the opening of the first African conference of competitive intelligence organized in Casablanca on June 3rd, 2016, Professor Driss Guerraoui drew a lucid report of the reality of the practices of the public and private African communities of competitive intelligence. “With few exceptions,” he wrote, the interest of African policymakers and researchers in the practices of competitive intelligence is recent, embryonic and disparate. The initiatives, works by academics or public or private institutional actors, remain, according to him, fragmented and without effective repercussions in terms of national structuring of the field of the competitive intelligence. The first important observation is that Africa does not have a real public policy of competitive intelligence piloted at the highest level of the State. Secondly, existing practices are the preserve of large industrial, banking and financial groups, some national champions, but also transnational firms operating in African countries. According to Professor Guerraoui, the leaders attach little importance to the strategic dimension of the governance of their economies and their societies through competitive and strategic intelligence. Teaching and management research

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does not integrate the dimensions of strategic intelligence and economic intelligence. Finally, as an echo of Stevan Dedijer’s visionary vision, Professor Guerraoui points to the dependence of African countries on the big international think tanks that are undermining “the autonomous production of a strategic thinking peculiar to each country and by extension to the whole continent”. We gladly complete this observation with the evocation of a little expressed asset, but which is the lever of a true African capacity for strategic and prospective intelligence. This is the diversity of schools present on the African continent. We can say here that the syncretism they provide between Anglo-American flows, particularly through the South African school of competitive intelligence, methodological fundamentals and competitive cultural matrices, which will be able to hybridize and enrich themselves with societal and cultural intelligence practices of the French-speaking school. Crossed with “the spirit of the people” and the human intellect of each culture, this syncretism will lead to the creation of the alchemy that gives people “the ability to survive”. As we shall see, this dynamic has been at work since 2010 in the Open University of Dakhla, desired by Moroccans and created in 2010 by the association of studies and research for development chaired by Driss Guerraoui, the Francophone International Association for Competitive Intelligence, chaired by Philippe Clerc, Professor Xavier Richet and representatives of the Moroccan authorities of the southern provinces of Morocco. The founding framework was the international meeting of Dakhla, a true “world incubator” that brought together 18 countries from five continents on the theme of “Territorial intelligence and regional development by the company: comparative international experiences”. We now propose a focus on the exemplary achievements of African communities of competitive intelligence. We must distinguish between those born in the French-speaking world, for example between the French school and several African countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso for example) and those who come from the African willpower to organize this pan-African network of strategic intelligence and competitive intelligence. It is important here to make it clear who the pioneer is: the Forum for Economic Intelligence and Development, the FIED, which was created in the late 1990s by M. Amath Soumaré, CEO of SOPEL International. It

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remains the first laboratory of the African School of Competitive Intelligence. Visionary and emblematic, the Forum, which has long held its meetings at the World Bank Institute, is the first organization to combine competitive intelligence and African development strategies, particularly those of Senegal and the NEPAD program. Its originality in relation to our purpose is its desire to promote distinctive African competences through a practical approach of economic intelligence and development (IED). For this reason, this living laboratory was able to mobilize from the beginning the cultural and methodological syncretism that we mentioned earlier. Since 2010, the Open University of Dakhla has held its international meeting – it brought together the experts and representatives of 41 countries in December 2017 at the invitation of the Kingdom of Morocco – and its thematic meetings (economy and intangible assets, climate and environment, economic intelligence). These meetings are an opportunity to take stock of the advances in competitive intelligence in the world and of course in Africa. The proceedings of each meeting are published and allow us to trace the conceptual and methodological innovations, as well as the multicultural analyses produced. The authors of this book actively participate in this “international community” of sharing the world’s intelligence capacity. The theme of December 2017 was devoted to the new global economy, its structural transformations, their impacts and the responses of actors. A workshop was devoted to global security and risk intelligence. Two recent major advances were born, at the request of the founders of the university and concretized by its president, Driss Guerraoui. This is the creation of the African Forum of Dakhla in December 2017 and the Forum of African Association of Competitive Intelligence in May 2018. Created in the legitimate framework of the Open University of Dakhla, the African Forum of Dakhla is a forum for reflection, sharing of knowledge, analysis and foresight on “The Africas” designed by and for Africans. It brings together three African institutions – the African Future Institute of South Africa, the African Center of the New Economy of Senegal and the platform for the Development of African Women in Angola – as well as the Association of Studies and Research for the Development in Morocco and the International Francophone Association of Competitive Intelligence, founders of the Open University of Dakhla. A network of expertise and action, the Forum is a platform for exchanges aimed at strengthening and promoting the dialog between “The Africas”, their peoples, their business communities and political decision-makers in the service of sustainable

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development, companies and economies open to cooperation with Europe and the world. Thus, its leaders have set an essential ambition to supply the African School of Competitive Intelligence by mobilizing African collective intelligence to the service of African strategic thinking, in order to strengthen its capacity for shared diagnostics and proposals for action. The second lasting structural breakthrough for the African School of Competitive Intelligence was the recent creation under the auspices of the Open University of Dakhla of the Forum of African Associations of Economic Intelligence (FAAIE) – which aims to: implement the know-how in terms of competitive intelligence and strategic intelligence in Africa, the development of inter-African exchanges, the sharing of experiences in this area and the enhancement of the expertise of the geostrategic dimensions of the African continent with States, companies, administrations, local authorities, universities and research centers. The partnership agreement brings together the Vigilance, Intelligence and Prospective think tanks of Côte d’Ivoire, the Congo Brazzaville Strategic Intelligence Center, the Nigerian Network of Competitive Intelligence, the SOPEL International Center of Senegal, the Tunisian Association of Competitive Intelligence, the Chadian Association of Competitive Intelligence, the Moroccan Association of Competitive Intelligence and the Association of Studies and Research for the Development of Morocco. The partnership aims to “structure and mobilize African collective intelligence in the service of three essential levers of African emergence, namely: the development of African strategic thinking, the development of shared diagnostics and the proposal for collective action for a united and stronger Africa in the service of the interests of Africans. Its constitutive general assembly was held in July 2018 and will thus contribute to the work of the think tank, the African forum of Dakhla”. These advances in the competitive intelligence of “The Africas” have been made possible by the creativity and commitment of women and men who have federated around them networks of skills and know-how to gradually organize the African School of Competitive Intelligence. We wish to present the most influential. These are the African associations themselves, such as the Moroccan Association of Competitive Intelligence or the Tunisian Association. In Algeria the promoters of competitive intelligence are senior officials of the Ministry of Industry or Planning in partnership with universities and the business community. In Burkina Faso the promoter is the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in Togo the

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competitive intelligence community is led by the CCI or by figures such as its former Prime Minister, Mr. Agbéyomé Kodjo. The African Session of Competitive Intelligence whose second meeting was held in Casablanca in December 2017 was conceived of and taught in 2016 by François Jeanne-Beylot, leader of the intelligence firm Troover and member of the international network of the school of economic war (France). Mixing the different communities of public and private practices of French schools, bringing together representatives of the French school, they provide the opportunity, in our opinion, to reveal the state of the art of organizations and practices by helping to set the major challenges to be met. The inaugural conference of 2017 has indeed drawn options for the further challenges of global security of an Africa “confronted with the emergence of a new generation of wars brought by cyberattacks of different natures and unconventional digital weapons of more in more sophisticated”. The ThinkTankers network was created in 2009 by Mounir Rochdi, expert in competitive intelligence and international consultant to the International Trade Center, UN agency and WTO in Geneva. It brings together known and recognized African experts (including diaspora) in the areas of business intelligence, knowledge management, information systems strategy and security, expert network management and collective intelligence and innovation. The objective of this network is to actively participate in the development and improvement of the global approach to competitive intelligence in Africa. ThinkTankers experts participate in conferences, workshops, seminars, training, awareness raising and expertise, as well as regularly supporting public and private organizations in developing their competitiveness. ThinkTankers today brings together business leaders, research professors, journalists, practitioners, representatives of public institutions and representatives of civil society organizations. The African Business Intelligence and Intelligence Center (CAVIE) is made up of a monitoring and business intelligence network created in 2016 by Guy Gweth, a young specialist in African markets and founder of the firm Knowdys Consulting Group, Strategic Intelligence Consulting and Due Diligence in Central and West Africa. By creating CAVIE, he intends to combine two dynamics of the African School of Competitive Intelligence: “a modern dynamic (backed up with powerful tools of numerical intelligence and analysis) mainly drawn by foreigners or Africans who have made their classes in outside the continent”, as well as that of “old human intelligence

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practices that have shown proof of their effectiveness, but out of the economic field”. He intends to work toward this rapprochement by training, researching and publishing complete watch notes. This is the object of the African intelligence and intelligence center (CAVIE). In 2016, Guy Gweth, largely inspired by the French school and its innovative productions, published the African Repository of Intelligence and Business Intelligence, because “the history, the place and the realities of our continent are such that it was absolutely necessary to define a training repository in Africa”. Africa is not short of examples and laboratories in the field of collective intelligence that have collectively mobilized social capital and national and local intelligence. The network project of collective intelligence led by the CCI of Burkina Faso in partnership with the CCI of Marseille has combined the skills of Togo and Mali mobilized by their CCI. Concluded in 2011, it allowed these companies and their economies, members of UEMOA [UNI 18a], to have a network of trained watchers, focused on the issues of development and integration of their economies in global value chains and the continent. In this trend, the permanent conference of French-speaking African Chambers of Commerce (CPCCAF) organized several training consular academies on the theme of competitive and social intelligence with the support of the International Trade Center, the ITC the UN and the WTO and experts from CCI France, to equip African consular chambers with expertise in business intelligence, economic security and influence in the service of businesses and industry territories. To conclude on a perspective of the challenges facing the African school, we will resume the five fields of competitive intelligence targeted by the Forum for African Associations of Competitive Intelligence for African countries. First, let us quote the intelligence of the strategic knowledge, in order to “have a relevant diagnosis, scientifically valid, credible and objective, because rid of the political and ideological contingencies” for “an intelligence produced by the African experts on their continent from an autonomous knowledge turned on the future of the continent’s development and backed by the priorities, needs, expectations and aspirations of its people”. Secondly, it is necessary to produce intelligence on major risks and threats (economic, financial, technological, political, social, cultural, environmental, climatic and geostrategic). Thirdly, the challenge is to master the intelligence of business intelligence and foresight. Then, it is necessary

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to master “the intelligence of the influence”. Finally, the last challenge is that of “the intelligence of global security”. 3.4.2.2. The Chinese school of competitive intelligence There is a Chinese School of Competitive Intelligence. We formulate the hypothesis that it is currently strengthening to form a “strategic mix”, a formidable weapon of support to the conquest of the markets and that our industrialists meet regularly in the negotiations on the transfer of technologies at the heart of the large contracts. What is it about? It is about the crossing of strategic cultures and practices of competitive intelligence, a phenomenon amplified by globalization. It translates into a scholarly combination of traditional Sun Tzu [SUN 09] strategic thinking and American schooling methodologies of competitive intelligence or business intelligence. Since entering the WTO in 2001, China has gradually stopped adopting a “low profile”. The new Chinese power affirmed during the last Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is based on the promotion, especially to emerging or poor countries of a model of development alternative to democratic countries. The strategy of the new Silk Road which targets Europe in priority marks China’s return to power in world trade. Since 2001, Chinese companies have gradually learned to maneuver on the new competitive playing fields. Entrepreneurship and risk appetite are developing, unleashing new productive forces that are shaking up the competitive advantages of both developed and emerging economies. Thus, an essential break has occurred in China: innovation has become the main strategy of the national industrial policy, that of breakthrough innovations in the China 2025 program. At the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the towns in the provinces have become platforms for innovation, true clusters with new technical centers at their heart. This orientation is corroborated by Professor Qihao Miao, a figure from the Chinese community of competitive intelligence, a member of the Open University of Dakhla in Morocco, who presents the development of the “competitive intelligence” as a corollary of the development model wanted by the China, that is, driven by innovation and creativity, to put an end to the image of “eternal imitators”. This set of dynamics makes it possible to put in perspective the rise of the practices of the competitive intelligence. These become a significant factor of strategic efficiency and strategic innovation deployed in companies. How are China’s national competitive intelligence capabilities moving today? They reinforce themselves to form a formidable weapon of support to the conquest of the markets. The crossroads of strategic cultures and competitive intelligence

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practices are amplified by globalization and feed schools of competitive intelligence since the founding beginnings of the American school. The combination of traditional Chinese strategic thinking, the thought of Sun Tzu [SUN 09], the methodologies of the American, Swedish and French schools of competitive intelligence, illustrates this point of view. These different cultural approaches come to feed the actual Chinese strategic culture. On the occasion of a desired “detour” through China to create a “gap” and better revisit European thought, François Jullien strives to reveal the essential features of Chinese strategic thinking based on intuition, able to use the potentialities of the environment, the “situation potential”, to better carry its influence and overcome without a fight. Another conception of efficiency that seems foreign to us. Based on “cunning intelligence” knowing how to take advantage of the circumstances and “detect buoyant factors within the situation to let themselves be carried by them. Here we are at the heart of the Chinese strategic world, in which “the mind is supposed to be able to compensate adversity, or physical weakness, by cunning, stratagems, intellectual radiation, to the point of despising the force [...]”, “How then to oppose cunning to violence, intelligence to force?” Here is the politics placed at the forefront. In this regard, the Chinese authors of La Guerre hors limite (The Transfinite War) illustrate the rapprochement of the new strategic matrices of the English-speaking world based on the art of influence and avoidance, levers of action dear to the Chinese. They consider that in order to “avoid the exhausting and hopeless arms race, the answer [...] is an extension of war actions to all areas other than the military, to all means other than military means”: the art of economic war and information war, influence as a tool of power. “Weigh the situation to produce the desired effect for your interests or how to manipulate and make the other do what I want him to do.” Joseph Nye, who studies the dynamics of power, wonders: “how far will a country be able to control the international environment to get other nations to act according to its views?” The competitive and strategic intelligence in China is the heiress of Sun Tzu who recommended in particular to attack the plans of the enemy by “the preliminary information”, acquired by secret agents and allowing to anticipate the intentions of the opponent. In the 1950s, the Chinese government promoted the development of the discipline of scientific and

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technical information within the Academy of Sciences in close partnership with Soviet experts. It is gradually organizing a network of documentation centers in the country led by the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China. In 1996, the network included 60,000 people. Its mission today is, among other things, to respond to the information needs of economic decisionmakers on globalization. Competitive intelligence in its contemporary meaning is built in the movement of the discipline founded by the American school, but in complete independence. One of its iconic founders is Professor Qihao Miao, director of the Shanghai Library. He is Vice President of the organization that brings together competitive intelligence professionals, the Society of Competitive Intelligence China, SCIC, established in 1991. Qihao Miao is one of the historical figures of the international community of competitive intelligence. He worked with Professor Stevan Dedijer, chose Robert Guillaumot as advisor to the SCIC organization and “only western horizon” of the association. He also worked with the founders of the American Professional Association (SCIP) in the United States. He began to describe in the journal of the association some elements of the Chinese economic intelligence device. He introduces himself as a knowledge broker of strategic culture, who in China strives to make “the link between the international community and local professionals”. It thus crosses in efficiency the firepower of the Chinese strategic thought, the historical know-how of collection and systematic analysis of scientific and technical information, today economic and competitive, the precepts of the social intelligence of Dedijer which also marked the French approach, and the basis of the Anglo-Saxon culture of competitive intelligence. SCIC now has 1,000 members, including 400 companies and 600 individual members. It organizes a conference every year and offers several training oppurtunities. In 2002, Chinese experts had already published a dozen books/manuals on competitive intelligence. In 2005, a new quarterly business intelligence magazine was launched in Chinese. During a visit to Paris, Professor Miao participated in the first Innovation, Competitiveness and Knowledge Meetings held from September 28–30, 2005. It was an opportunity to hear and read about the evolution of the Chinese economy, the role of competitive intelligence as an approach to support companies in the world markets and the entry of China into the WTO, for the purpose of learning the market economy. The new strategies

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are geared toward industrial reform driven by market opportunities, a new approach to intellectual property, standardization and corporate social responsibility. Confrontation with international competition opens the door to “coopetition” and encourages the implementation of a “cooperative” intelligence. The French Assembly of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CCI France) was one of the important vectors of this cooperative intelligence by creating in 2009 after several missions in the Hunan province with the new territorial center of competitive intelligence, a French–Chinese cooperation committee on innovation and competitive intelligence. In general, the concept of competitive intelligence remains poorly known and only large Chinese companies refer to it. The 2004–2005 studies showed that behind the name of economic and competitive intelligence, the market is distributed as follows: 55% for the acquisition of databases, 20% for software, 10% for consulting, 15% for training (in full expansion). Many companies do not know how to put in place or how to mobilize the concept of competitive intelligence. According to Professor Qihao Miao, the explosion of the teachings is a favorable sign of the progress of the economic intelligence. Certainly, but we must not underestimate their ability. He also described in his articles the Chinese know-how, mastered for years and based on scientific and technical culture and watch: the monitoring and control of the state of the art, the techniques of “reverse engineering”, technology transfer and diffusion, environmental monitoring and strategic planning. In the field of social intelligence, the Chinese are implementing this cultural and historical practice of “valuing social relations” according to a logic of “return on investment”. This requires constantly mobilizing the analytical capabilities of environments and social environments, as well as influence. According to Professor Qihao Miao, the state system has gradually been structured, except for a few more supervised sectors, especially energy and telecommunications. He considers that the government could do “much more to help private companies to improve their competitiveness, whether it is early warning systems in commercial matters, mutualization of monitoring of trade and regulatory policies for exporting companies”. Part of what we call “territorial intelligence”, networks of technical centers and especially the provincial institute for scientific and technical information serve as intermediaries for the computerization of SMEs, support for industrialization, the day before technology transfer and technology transfer.

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Technological and market information is at the center of companies’ concerns, but the absence of experience to refer to prevents experts from local structures from meeting these considerable needs. However, this delay is offset by the fact that our analysts report strategic capabilities of the Chinese state through the various transformations of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, MOFTEC, inspired by the Japanese model and become MOFCOM, Ministry of Commerce in 2002. Its global economic intelligence structures and networks are among the most successful in the world. It would be wildly pretentious to want to evaluate the firepower of Chinese competitive practices and organizations. However, reading in the last 10 years the content of the interventions and articles translated by Chinese experts, we measure the weak evolution of practices and organizations, based in part on the imitation/translation of the Anglo-American matrices into an often reductive form. Of course, we must neither underestimate the great learning capacity of the Chinese world, nor their formidable mastery of “cunning” and misinformation. Attendance every two years, at international meetings on competitive intelligence organized by the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information in Beijing and Peking University with the assistance of the Beijing Academy of Science and Technology is a means to note the regular changes of the Chinese school: in 2013 we dealt with the upheavals caused by the Big Data revolution on the practice of competitive intelligence. In 2016, we discussed new industrial policies and international investment control by national authorities. 3.5. Conclusion The different schools of competitive intelligence have a doctrine built on the hybridization of content developed by pioneering schools and supplemented by specific and unique analyses. These doctrines must not remain fixed. They must evolve over geoeconomic and strategic breaks. On the other hand, the bases, the foundations of these doctrines of competitive intelligence, at the service of Nations and communities of Nations, have a much longer life span. It is therefore from these foundations that it will be necessary, in a world uncertain and in motion to change practices and initiate the revolution of artificial intelligence. We thus join the problem underlying this book: thinking and acting differently, keeping the same goals. Also, one of the major projects to be urgently committed turns out to be that of bringing together or even hybridizing between the competitive intelligence approach and the prospective approach [UNI 18b].

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3.6. References [ACF 17] ACFCI (ASSEMBLÉE DES CHAMBRES FRANÇAISES DE COMMERCE ET D’INDUSTRIE), 2017, available at: http://cat.inist.fr/ ?aModele=affiche N&cpsidt= 3453398. [ADI 92] ADITECH (ASSOCIATION POUR LA DIFFUSION DE L’INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIQUE), “Techniques offensives et guerre économique”, Centre de prospective et d’évaluation, ministère de la Recherche et de la Technologie, in HARBULOT C. (ed.), La machine de guerre économique : États-Unis, Allemagne, Japon, Paris, Economica, Paris, 1992. [AFD 04] AFDIE, Modèle d’intelligence économique, Economica, Paris, 2004. [AFD 17] AFDIE (ASSOCIATION FRANÇAISE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE L’INTELLIGENCE ÉCONOMIQUE), 2017, available at: https://fr.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Association_fran%C3%A7aise_pour_le_d%C3%A9veloppement_de_l%27 intelligence_%C3%A9conomique. [AIF 18] AIFIE (ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE FRANCOPHONE D’INTELLIGENCE ÉCONOMIQUE), 2018, available at: http://data.bnf.fr/16707112/association_ internationale_francophone_d_intelligence_economique/. [BAU 91] BAUMARD P., Stratégies et surveillance des environnements concurrentiels, Masson, Paris, 1991. [BAU 97] BAUMARD P., HARBULOT C., “Perspective historique de l’intelligence économique”, Revue Française d’Intelligence Économique, no. 1, 1997, available at: https://www.ege.fr/download/16.perspective_historique.pdf. [BAU 14] BAUMARD P., Le vide stratégique, CNRS Éditions, Paris, 2014. [BOU 00] BOURDIEU P., Les structures sociales du marché, p. 237, Le Seuil, Paris, 2000. [CAD 94] CADUC P., POLYCARPE G., “Le technoglobalisme japonais”, appendix no. 7, in Commissariat général du Plan, Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises, La Documentation française, Paris, 1994. [CAR 03] CARAYON B., Intelligence économique, compétitivité et cohésion sociale, Official report, La Documentation française, 2003, available at: http://www. ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/034000484/ index.shtml. [CAR 16] CARPENTIER J.-B., Une réforme ambitieuse au service de la protection et de la promotion des intérêts économiques, industriels et scientifiques de la nation, Letter no. 212, DAJ, June 17, 2016, available at: http://www.economie. gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/daj/publications/lettre-daj/2016/lettre212/ Editorial.html.

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[CES 16] CESER (CONSEIL ÉCONOMIQUE SOCIAL ET ENVIRONNEMENTAL DE LA RÉGION PROVENCE ALPES CÔTE D’AZUR), Interview with Patrick Heintz (former general director of services in the Var department), 2016. [CIG 17] CIGREF, 2017, available at: www.cigref.fr. [CLE 95a] CLERC P., “La compétitivité et la sécurité économique : un enjeu stratégique pour la France”, Revue Défense de L’IHEDN, no. 70, 1995. [CLE 95b] CLERC P., Entreprises : l’intelligence économique, Encylopædia Universalis, Paris, 1995. [CLE 04] CLERC P., “Hommage à Stephan Dedijer”, Regards sur l’IE, no. 3, 2004. [CLE 08] CLERC P., “La culture au cœur des rapports de force économiques”, Diplomatie, special edition no. 5, pp. 32–35, 2008. [CLE 11] CLERC P., MALVEZIN L., Comprendre l’approche chinoise d’intelligence économique, Intelligence économique et propriété intellectuelle, une coopération réaliste France/Chine, Fondation Bru, Paris, 2011. [CLE 12] CLERC P., “Les enjeux informationnels des territoires”, in C. HARBULOT (ed.), Manuel d’intelligence économique, PUF, Paris, pp. 137–150, 2012. [CPC 17] CPCCAF (RÉSEAU DE COOPÉRATION ÉCONOMIQUE FRANCOPHONE), 2017, available at: http://www.cpccaf.org/. [CPM 17a] CPME (CONFÉDÉRATION DES available at: http://www.cgpme-ra.org/.

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[GOU 15] GOUR A., “La participation des acteurs externes dans la construction des décisions stratégiques”, Les cahiers scientifiques, no. 17, Fondation Paris-Dauphine, Chaire intelligence économique et stratégie des organisations, Paris, 2015. [GRO 11] GROUPE D’ÉTUDE SUR L’INTELLIGENCE ÉCONOMIQUE NATIONALE, “Étude sur l’intelligence économique en France et son influence sur l’intelligence compétitive en Chine”, in Shanghai Institute of Science and Technology, 2011. [HAO 93] HAON H., PAOLI C., ROSTAING H., “Perception d’un programme de R&D à travers l’analyse bibliométrique des banques de données d’origine japonaise”, L’information, intelligence de l’entreprise, IDT’93, pp. 22–24, 1993. [HAR 08] HARBULOT C., “Intelligence économique et problématique de puissance”, in J.-P. BERNAT (ed.), L’intelligence économique. Co-construction et émergence d’une discipline via un réseau humain, Hermès-Lavoisier, Cachan, pp. 123–137, 2008. [HAR 15] HARBULOT C., “Cadrage conceptuel de l’intelligence économique”, in C. HARBULOT (ed.), Manuel d’intelligence économique, 2nd edition, PUF, Paris, 2015. [HAS 88] HASEGAWA F., Built by Japan, Competitive Strategies of the Japanese Construction Industry, Shimizu Group, Tokyo, 1988. [HEC 17] HEC CAMPUS, 2017, available at: http://www.hec.edu/About-HEC/ Campus. [HOU 13] HOUSE OF LORDS, Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, Persuasion and Power in the Modern World, Report of Session 2013– 2014, HL Paper 150. [INH 17] INHES-J (Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la justice), 2017, available at: https://inhesj.fr. [IPT 17] INSTITUT DE PROSPECTIVE DE SÉVILLE, 2017, available at: https://ec. europa.eu/jrc/en/about/jrc-site/seville. [KNA 07] KNAUF A., Caractérisation des rôles du coordinateur-animateur : Émergence d’un acteur nécessaire à la mise en pratique d’un dispositif régional d’intelligence économique, PhD thesis, Université Nancy II, 2007. [LÉG 95] LÉGIFRANCE, Report to the President of the French Republic regarding decree no. 95–350 from April 1, 1995 about the creation of a committee for competitiveness and economic security, 1995, available at: https://www.legifrance. gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000188796&categorieLien=id. [LES 17] LESCA H., Bibliography Eyrolles, available at: http://www.eyrolles.com/ Accueil/Auteur/humbert-lesca-45799.

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[LEV 96] LEVET J-L., Sortir la France de l’impasse, Economica, Paris, 1996. [LEV 01] LEVET J-L., L’intelligence économique, mode de pensée, mode d’action, Economica, Paris, 2001. [LEV 06] LEVY M., JOUYET J.-P., L’économie de l’immatériel, la croissance de demain, La Documentation française, 2006, available at: http://www.la documentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/064000880/index.shtml. [LOR 13] LOROT P., “Un monde sous tension : Interview d’Edward Luttwak”, Géoéconomie, no. 64, pp. 21–32, 2013. [LUT 90] LUTTWAK E., “From geopolitics to geoeconomics”, The National Interest, pp. 17–24, 1990. [MAL 18] MALLAT S., 2018, available at: https://www.college-de-france.fr/site/ stephane-mallat/. [MAR 14] MARCON C., La recherche française en intelligence économique. Bilans et perspectives, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2014. [MAR 94] MARTRE H., Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises, Commissariat général au plan, Paris, 1994, available at: https://portailie.fr/resource/textes-de-reference/659/rapport-martre-intelligence-economique-etstrategie-des-entreprises. [MED 17] MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France), 2017, available at: https:/www/medef.com/en. [MEU 03] MEURTHE ET MOSELLE, Les 6 territoires, 2003, available at: http://www.meurthe-et-moselle.fr/territoire/les-6-territoires. [MIT 86] MIT, “MIT releases study on productivity”, The Tech, no. 109, 1986, available at: http://tech.mit.edu/V109/N22/prod.22n.html. [MON 06] MONGEREAU R., Intelligence économique, risques financiers et stratégie des entreprises, La Documentation française, 2006, available at: http://www. ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/064000741/index.shtml. [MOR 17] MORTIER S., Au cœur de l’unité africaine. Le droit OHADA. Harmonisation du droit des affaires et intelligence économique, Uppr Éditions, Toulouse, 2017. [MOT 03] MOTHE J., CHRISMENT C., DOUSSET B. et al., “DocCube: Multi-dimensional visualisation and exploration of large document sets”, Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, no. 54, pp. 650–659, 2003. [NAD 88] NADOULEK R., L’intelligence stratégique, ADITECH, Centre de prospective et d’évaluation, Ministère de la science et de la technologie, Paris, 1988.

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[NAK 13] NAKAGAWA J., ISHKAWA A., “An introduction to knowledge information strategy. From business intelligence to knowledge sciences”, World Scientific, 2013. [NDI 17] NDIAYE O., “Pr Driss Guerraoui, président de l’Université ouverte de Dakhla : ‘Nous voulons réinventer une nouvelle route du savoir’”, Le Soleil Online, 2017, available at: http://www.lesoleil.sn/actualites/item/73197-pr-driss-guerraouipresident-de-l-universite-ouverte-de-dakhla-nous-voulons-reinventer-une-nouvelleroute-du-savoir.html. [NIE 12] NIETO H.P., “Pour en finir avec la pauvreté au Mexique”, Le Monde, 2012, available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/10/16/pour-en-finir-avecla-pauvrete-au-mexique_1776149_3232.html. [NOT 15] NOTRE (la loi), “Loi du 7 août 2015 portant nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République”, Vie publique, 2015, available at: http://www.vie-publique.fr/ actualite/panorama/texte-discussion/projet-loi-portant-nouvelle-organisationterritoriale-republique.html. [POR 80] PORTER M., Competitive Strategy; Techniques for analyzing Industries and Competitors, New York Free Press, New York, 1980. [POR 90] PORTER M., The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York Free Press, New York, 1990. [QUA 17] QUATREPOINTS J.-M., “La vente d’Alstom était un scandale écrit d’avance”, Le Figaro, 2017, available at: http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/economie/ 2017/09/28/31007-20170928ARTFIG00240-fusion-alstomsiemens-la-france-nepeut-rester-une-grande-puissance-sans-une-industrie-competitive.php. [RAC 17] RACOUCHOT B., “L’éternel pouvoir de l’intelligence : La guerre entre ruse et force : Le décryptage de Jean-Vincent Holeindre”, Communication & Influence, no. 87, November 2017. [ROS 98] ROSENKRANS JR W.A., “Past, present, and future directions for technical intelligence”, Competitive Intelligence Review, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 34–39, 1998. [SAL 14] SALA J., “Hommage à Robert Guillaumot, de la part de ses amis…”, Veillemag.com, 2014, available at: http://www.veillemag.com/Hommage-aRobert-Guillaumot-de-la-part-de-ses-amis_a2916.html. [SCI 17] SCIP, Chapters: Paris, France, 2017, available at: http://www.scip. org/group/paris. [SOU 12] SOUMARE A., “Cinq questions à Amath Soumaré, pionnier de l’intelligence économique en Afrique”, Africa Diligence, 2012, available at: http://www.africa diligence.fr/5-questions-a-amath-soumare-pionnier-de-lintelligence-economiqueen-afrique/.

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4 Competitive Intelligence as a Vehicle for International Collaboration

Over the last 10 years, competitive intelligence has been used to help increase the competitiveness of companies across the world. We are now proposing that it can be used in a new way to open up numerous exchanges and collaborations. If the Second World War gave rise to East-West blocks and the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall was the start of a new era of world competition: globalization. We are currently entering a period of competition and struggle which is not yet known today, where the rules of the “game” are no longer stable and can change at any point. At the same time, technological developments mean that we receive information in a “shorter amount of time”. This new era has increasing instability across the world, with competition existing between societies states, and regions. In this field, attractiveness is becoming a fundamental advantage for both ensuring international development and ensuring “client” loyalty from those who use products and services. 4.1. The arrival of new signs 4.1.1. Definitions of competitive intelligence If we refer to the first definitions of competitive intelligence [CAL 05]:

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– “systematic program to collect and analyze the information upon the activities of the competitors […] in view to achieve the strategic goals of the company” (Larry Kahanner) [KAH 97]; – “analyze the information, upon the competitors which are involved within the decision process of the company” (Leonard Fuld) [FUL 06]; – “knowledge and forecast of the surrounding world – in view to assist the decision of the company’s CEO” (Jan Herring) [HER 99]. – we should mention the presence of three important words: information, competitors and company. This clearly shows a type of competitive intelligence focused on the increase of competitiveness of companies. Yet we find new definitions that are opening up way for new applications of competitive (or economic) intelligence, which are broader and have richer collaboration potential. 4.1.2. Maintaining competitive advantages Maintaining national positions is becoming an issue of the 21st Century. This orientation is clearly indicated in a number of reports that are clear signals highlighting the link between development, innovation, competitiveness and competitive (or economic) intelligence. Let us briefly mention some of these strong signals: “The U.S. Council on Competitiveness has unveiled a report entitled ‘Innovate America’. Defining innovation as the ‘single most important factor in determining America’s success through the 21st Century’, the report clearly states America’s task in the next 25 years is ‘to optimize [the] entire society for innovation’” [TAM 05]. – Beffa report (France): for a renewal of French industrial policy [BEF 05]; – Carayon Report: Competitive intelligence and social cohesion [CAR 04]; – Renaissance II Report (Canada): Canadian creativeness and innovation for the new millennium [ANA 09].

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4.2. Increasing instability At the same time as previous signals, one must also note rising tensions that are due to multiple factors. Among other things, it is expected that in the next 20 years, the number of independent or quasi-independent states will increase substantially; perhaps even double. This is not without its problems, threatening the global equilibrium. Indeed, certain regions or countries that have achieved, under political pressure and after strong crises, regionalization as a means to maintain some cohesion (e.g. Indonesia after the Asian crisis in recent years) will be faced with the need to ensure minimal development with the fear of seeing these lead to pure and simple independence, which can be seen with the creation of multiple conflicts [GOO 99]. Similarly for autonomous regions, autonomy is now multifaceted, including that of remaining alone before local needs and having to ensure the implementation of local resources alone. Thus, entire regions are confronted with the need to ensure a certain level of well-being for the local populations, with the fear of opening up conflicts. In this way, two relatively different strategies are emerging for developed countries or for those at different stages of development. 4.2.1. More developed countries These generally have fewer natural resources and have exhausted non-renewable resources during the period of industrial development; or they have not, like Japan or South Korea, been endowed with them for geological and geographical reasons. The strategy of these countries is therefore to maintain the competitive advantages acquired, and even to create others, by using all the financial and intellectual potential available to develop innovation, creativity and attractiveness. This situation highlights the direct link between technology watch, competitive (economic) intelligence, innovation and creativity. 4.2.2. Low-income countries Developing countries generally have natural resources, renewable or not. The problem of these countries is not to squander these, but rather to create higher value-added products, for example in the field of agriculture,

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petrochemicals, steel or rarer metals like copper and nickel. This development will also go through innovation and creativity, but the model will have to be different and will have to take into account the technological level of the country. We cannot go directly from level A to level B, otherwise the effort is too big. We must necessarily go through a certain number of levels which must be determined without concession. It is also necessary that foreign direct investment be more profitable and that technology transfers be provided for in the collaboration agreements. Many countries, in wanting to achieve ambitious goals, found themselves in a worse situation than the departure. Examples like South Korea and formerly Japan are to be revisited, since these countries have ensured a large part of their development by incremental innovation. 4.3. The French example In France, the first decade of competitive intelligence did not bring developments that were expected; among others in the field of SMIs and SMEs. It was after this observation that the Carayon report was written, followed by the appointment of Mr. Alain Juillet as senior competitive intelligence officer to the French Prime Minister. A national program of competitive intelligence was then developed, making it possible to raise awareness among the political, institutional and industrial leaders. It was then necessary to establish a system to actually implement the concepts in an industrial environment, then to apply them. This is what has been achieved within the framework of the development of competitiveness clusters, linking institutions, people, research laboratories, industries and institutions concerned locally with the same project. This will create new partnerships between the public and private sectors, taking into account the triple helix; that is, the new relationships that must be established between government institutions – public or private research laboratories – and industry. This should normally lead the competitiveness clusters to create a development ethic and way of governing that can “save time” and give greater coherence to groups that are still heterogeneous but concerned by one or the same projects. Indeed, if the development of centers like Sophia Antipolis (Nice, France), Research Triangle Park and Silicon Valley (United States) was achieved in more than 30 years, it is obvious that

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currently this time period is too long and must be shortened. This is the aim of competitiveness clusters. 4.4. Collaboration The government’s action in the development of a national program of competitive intelligence, as well as its application to regional development, are all actions that are currently being analyzed by different countries, in order to benefit from the gains made in this area by France. Here, we will have to consider the French-speaking world in the broad sense; that is to say, the countries that seek a possible transposition to their own case, stemming from the French example. The experience that has been conducted in the context of Indonesia, China, Chile, North Africa and Brazil shows that in the field of implementation of competitive intelligence, France is appreciated by its median position between the competitive US system and the business-centric English system. The French system, which gives a large place to intelligence (from the Latin intelligere and non-espionage) is close to developments in Northern Europe among others under the impetus of Dedijer [CLE 04]. From the French example, a method as well as tools can be used and transposed in various contexts. Some space is left to cooperative work, to the taking into account of the national interests and to a rational use of the information (both by its automatic analysis and by the study of its impact by experts in terms of SWOT analysis (strength, weakness, opportunity, threat). 4.4.1. The foundations of collaboration France having developed a global program of competitive intelligence, not only oriented toward businesses, but also toward national and regional development, has been perceived as a possible model not only by Frenchspeaking countries (through Francophonie), but also by non-French speaking countries such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc. Cooperation and collaboration can be carried out in many ways, but the five most important ways are: academic collaboration through publications of training and doctorates, bilateral network collaboration, collaboration

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between associations, collaboration through international institutions and collaboration via chambers of commerce and industry. The following examples are only a selection from many others; they simply illustrate the often personal initiatives from which the French influence in competitive intelligence develops with various countries. 4.4.2. Academic collaboration We have to be innovative. In the field, there are two examples that will illustrate this. For more than five years in Brazil, the CRRM, under the direction of Professor Henri Dou, has set up collaboration in an innovative form. Brazil’s Institute of Technology in Rio de Janeiro delivered a Latin American diploma in the field of information (lato sensu). An agreement was concluded between this center and the CRRM University Aix Marseille III, to complete the previous diploma by Advanced Studies course then the master (when one has applied LMD degrees, masters, doctorate) essential to a knowledge of the eve of technological and competitive intelligence. These courses are those given at Marseille CRRM; they were conducted in Brazil following a particular approach (whose leader is Gilda Massari Coelho). Several training centers were developed: Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Salvador de Bahia and Natal, teachers passing from one to the other. The students according to their results obtained the Advanced Study course or the master of the University Aix-Marseille III or only the lato sensu diploma of the INT. All training was done within a “continuing education” framework. Registrations were held jointly with Aix Marseille University and INT, the defense proceedings of the dissertations (Advanced Study or master) taking place in Marseille. Classes were conducted in Brazilian Portuguese or English. This collaboration then allowed various Brazilian students to do PhDs at Aix Marseille III University, as well as UTV (University Toulon Var). The result of this organization is that currently, in all major Brazilian industries, there are people in key positions who have completed their studies within the French system. The conclusion of this experiment, which has now finished, has made it possible to train about 120 students in five years (Advanced Study, masters, doctorates and lato sensu diplomas, including 40 Advanced Study courses or masters, and 15 theses). At the pace of classical academic exchanges and given the number of scholarships that could have been attributed (we can doubt the competition between disciplines) it would have taken more than 30 years at best to achieve the same result.

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This one-of-a-kind training initiative was hailed by Brazil’s Ministry of Industry Development and Foreign Trade and by the IBICT [CIW 08, CIW 12, MAS 06]. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are commemorative plaques from the Ministry of Industry and Trade Development for the commemoration of the 10 years of the beginning of competitive intelligence training (Figure 4.1) and the development of collaborative competitive intelligence with Brazilian creativity and innovation for the new century, IBICT1 (Instituto Brasiliera Informacao Cientifica e Tecnica) (Figure 4.2). The same experiment was conducted with Indonesia with the North Sulawesi region, with the exception that many scholarships were awarded by the Indonesian government, the governor of North Sulawesi or some local mayors, plus some French scholarships. Courses were conducted in Marseille or Indonesia. More than 60 students have been trained in Advanced Study programs or masters and 21 doctors. We can make the same remark as above about the effectiveness between time and the number of students trained. Currently, there are many students trained in competitive intelligence in universities (lecturers, professors and rectors), industries, banks in Indonesia, or at the political level (elected in provincial councils, mayor, etc.). It is simply regrettable that the CRRM2 no longer exists because of the retirement of some of its leaders and the non-replacement of their position in the discipline. It is obvious that the misunderstanding of the finality of competitive intelligence and technology watch by the leaders of Aix Marseille III University played a key role in this decision. 4.4.3. Bilateral network collaborations The bilateral network collaborations are due to the invitation of French researchers in the field. These are not official missions. These include international symposia organized in Indonesia, Chile, China and Morocco, and observatory projects such as CACIMA3 [REN 18]. The following few

1 Brazilian institute for scientific and technical information. 2 The center of retrospective research of Marseille. 3 Chamber of agriculture, trade of crafts industry and crafts of Saint Pierre and Miquelon.

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examples illustrate this type of international collaboration, the French experts being invited by the organizers.

Figure 4.1. Competitive intelligence development in Brazil

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Figure 4.2. Recognition of the Brazilian competitive intelligence training by the IBICT

Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate interventions in Canada and Vietnam. For Canada, this was a meeting of the CCI St Pierre et Miquelon and New Brunswick (Dieppe), in 2013. In Vietnam, the meeting was held in Hanoi at the IAB (International Advisory Board) in 2011. Patrick Gillabert (Director UNIDO Viet Nam CRRM’s Alumini), Philippe Clerc (CCI France) and Henri Dou, were present with various international experts. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show meetings in Morocco and Indonesia. One of these took place at the Open University of Dakhla in 2010 for the signing of collaboration agreements between the university and the International Francophone Association for Competitive Intelligence. The other took place in Jakarta for “Indonesia 2025”. We can see Philippe Larrat (Atelis), Alain Juillet and Julietta Runtuwené (currently the Rector of Manado State University, having completed her PhD at the CRRM).

Figure 4.3. 2014 Symposium in Beijing: Philippe Clerc and Henri Dou were invited as experts [DOU 14]

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Figure 4.4. Second competitive intelligence meeting, Canada, 2013 [CIW 13a]

Figure 4.5. International Advisor Board, Vietnam, 2011 [IAB 11]

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Figure 4.6. Meeting at the Open University of Dakhla, 2010 [CLE 14]

Figure 4.7. Indonesia in 2025 – International symposium, Jakarta, 2011 [UNI 55]

4.4.4. Collaboration between organizations The International Association of Competitive Intelligence plays a big role here. Born out of the motivation of a group of French experts of competitive intelligence, this organization managed to create many new collaborations. The following photographs are some examples of this.

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Figure 4.8. Signing of the collaboration agreement between the AIFIE4 and the Association of Competitive Intelligence of the Hunan province (China), 2011 [CIW 11]

Figure 4.9. Franco-Chinese seminar on applied competitive intelligence for companies in Changsha (China), 2012 [DOU 12b]

4 International francophone association for competitive intelligence.

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Figure 4.10. Competitive Intelligence and its International Implications, 2013 [CIW 13b]. International symposium organized in Ajaccio by the Corsican Territorial 5 Collectivity and the SFBA , following the invitation of a Chinese delegation. Left to right: Philippe Clerc, Henri Dou, Alain Juillet, Qihao Miao (Shanghai Library)

Figure 4.11. Reception of an Indonesian delegation at CCI France [UNI 55]. Business meeting between the AFDEI (French association for Indonesian economic development) and the AIFIE

4.4.5. Collaborations through international institutions In this context, French experts are solicited by international organizations (CIT Geneva), WIPO, OAPI and the European Union (for example the PASRI Tunisia program) to participate in international seminars or training sessions.

5 French society for applied bibliometrics.

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Figure 4.12. Addis Ababa certificate courses (Ethiopia), 2011 6 [DOU 12a]. Collaboration with the WIPO in Ethiopia. Experts: M. Getachew (Ethiopia) and Henri Dou

Figure 4.13. PASRI7 program. Research and Innovation System, Tunis (Tunisia), 2014 [CIW 15]

Figure 4.13 illustrates an expertise requested by the European Community in the PASRI program in Tunisia. The research and innovation system support project (PASRI), a project funded by the European Union, for 12m euros over four years (2011–2014), aims to provide solutions to the main problems identified at the level of the various actors of the innovation chain starting from the company which is in direct relation with the consumer market and employment and arriving at the unit of research which 6 World International Patent Organization. 7 Research and innovation system support program.

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accumulates scientific and technical knowledge, including the full range of institutional, administrative, financial, technical and academic stakeholders that are expected to support the transformation of technical knowledge into products, or tangible services.

Figure 4.14. Competitive intelligence and certificates, Douala (Cameroon), 2010 [OAP 10]. Certificate course for competitive intelligence and information analysis. Course seminar organized by the OAPI8 and the WIPO

4.4.6. Collaboration via chambers of commerce and industry In this context, the CCI of France is particularly active, as well as the Franco-African Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Some events are also supported by the European Union. We can also mention the university of consular cooperation with emerging countries [REN 10].

Figure 4.15. International conference on competitive intelligence, Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), 2011 [CCI 11]. Competitive intelligence in Burkina: territorial development scheme. Organized with the collaboration of CCI France, the European Union, the CCI of Burkina Faso, and the Franco-African CCI 8 African organization of intellectual property.

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Figure 4.16. Meeting of the consulate chambers of commerce, Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), 2009 [CPC 09]

4.5. Conclusion It is noted that in this set of international collaborations aimed at promoting a competitive intelligence “à la française”, the initiatives come in most cases from foreign countries or foreign institutions. At the French level, it is more particularly personal initiatives that underlie collaboration. France has developed a national program of competitive intelligence, but even if it is a proven vehicle of collaboration, it is clear that these come from either foreign partners or personal initiatives. We have therefore not grasped the importance of this vehicle, which supports Tenzer’s vision [TEN 09] on the loss of French influence in international bodies. 4.6. References [ANA 09] ANANIADOU K., CLARO M., 21st century skills and competences for new millennium learners in OECD countries, Working document no. 41, OECD, 2009. [BEF 05] BEFFA J.-L., Pour une nouvelle politique industrielle, La Documentation française, Paris, 2005. [BON 99] BONIFACE P., “Danger prolifération étatique”, Le Monde Diplomatique, January 1999. [CAL 05] CALOF J.L., Building your CI capacity and gauging the effectiveness of your CI system, Presentation, Competitive Intelligence Asia Pacific conference, Shanghai, September 2005.

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[CAR 04] CARAYON B., Rapport sur la stratégie de sécurité économique nationale, Assemblée Nationale, Paris, 2004. [CCI 11] CCI DU BURKINA FASO, EUROPEAN UNION, RIC PROGRAM, Competitive intelligence, innovation and competitiveness strategies, Burkina Faso, 2011, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=1136. [CIW 08] CIWORLDWIDE, Development of competitive intelligence: Result of the administrative inquiry of the Brazilian Ministry of Education”, May 29, 2008, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=39. [CIW 11] CIWORLDWIDE, Third Franco-Chinese seminar on Competitive Intelligence, Paris May 18–20th 2011 – ACFCI, Paris, France, May 26, 2011, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/ ?p=1073. [CIW 12] CIWORLDWIDE, Brasilia, Tenth Brazilian Workshop on Competitive Intelligence and Knowledge Management – Homage from IBICT to Professor Henri Dou, Brasilia, Brazil, November 28, 2012, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?s=brasil. [CIW 13a] CIWORLDWIDE, “Deuxième rencontre en intelligence compétitive (intelligence économique)”, Second Competitive Intelligence Symposium, Dieppe, Canada, March 25–27, 2013, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ ciworldwide/?p=1488. [CIW 13b] CIWORLDWIDE, “Les sciences de l’information et leurs implications géopolitiques”, Information Science and its Geopolitics Implications, Ajaccio, Corsica, November 28 and 29, 2013, available at: http://s244543015. onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=1592. [CIW 15] CIWORLDWIDE, Second session of the PASRI − Tunisie − Propriété intellectuelle et contractualisation − Analyse automatique des brevets et innovation, October 9, 2015, available at: http://s244543015.online-home.fr/ ciworldwide/?p=1842. [CIW 17] CIWORLDWIDE, The venue of two important Delegations from Indonesia in France, June 29, 2017, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/ ?p=2042, and: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=2020. [CLE 04] CLERC P., “Hommage à Stefan Dedidjer”, Regards sur l’IE, no. 3, 2004. [CLE 14] CLERC P., DOU H., “Du soft power au smart power. Quelles stratégies d’influence ?” and “Quelle stratégie de soft power pour le Maroc ?”, Diplomatie, Les grands dossiers, no. 24, 2014–2015.

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[CPC 09] CONFÉRENCE PERMANENTE DES CHAMBRES DE COMMERCE AFRICAINES ET FRANCOPHONES, 35e Assemblée Générale, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, November 11–13, 2009, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=773. [DOU 12a] DOU H., DOU J.-M., GETACHEW M.-A., “Automatic patent analysis: Technological strategic dependence”, Beijing ICTCI 2011 in Progress in Competitive Intelligence, Peking University Press, Beijing, pp. 173–192, 2012. [DOU 12b] DOU H., CLERC P., Franco-Chinese seminar of competitive intelligence − Using sectorial and territorial intelligence to serve the local economic development, CiWorldWide, Changsha, China, November 13, 2012, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=1417. [DOU 14] DOU H., “A new way to understand the ‘force field analysis’ from Big Data analytics may be the future engine of the smart cities development”, Beijing Symposium on Competitive Intelligence, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2014. [IAB 11] IAB, “The international advisory board of the Ministry of Science and Technology of Vietnam. Innovation, strategy, competitiveness, competitive intelligence”, UNIDO, Hanoi, 2011, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome. fr/ciworldwide/?p=1183. [KAH 97] KAHANER L., Competitive Intelligence: How to Gather Analyze and Use Information to Move your Business to the Top, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1997. [MAS 06] MASSARI G., DOU H., QUONIAM L. et al., “Ensino e Pesquisa no campo da Inteligência Competitiva no Brasil e a Cooperação Franco-Brasileira”, Puzzle, Revista Hispana de la Inteligencia Competitiva, vol. 6, no. 23, pp. 12–19, 2006, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dou_Henri/publication/ 304626163_Ensino_e_Pesquisa_no_campo_da_Inteligencia_Competitiva_no_Brasil _e_a_Cooperacao_Franco-Brasileira/links/577a67d508ae355e74f068a7/Ensino-ePesquisa-no-campo-da-Inteligencia-Competitiva-no-Brasil-e-a-Cooperacao-FrancoBrasileira.pdf. [OAP 10] OAPI WORKSHOP, Regional forum on intellectual property and exploitation of the research results in Africa, Douala, Cameroon, 2010, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=980. [REN 10] RENARD T., La vision française de l’IE à l’épreuve des pays émergents : Approches bilatérales et multilatérales, Université de la coopération consulaire, Jouy-en-Josas, France, 2010, available at: https://fr.slideshare.net/ThibaultRenard/lavision-franaise-de-lintelligence-economique-lpreuve-ucc-2010. [REN 18] RENARD T., “Projet CACIMA : L’observatoire d’information économique franco-canadien”, Intelligence économique des territoires, pp. 181–183, CNER, Paris, 2018.

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[TAM 05] TAMADA S., “Innovation-oriented industrial policies needed”, RIETI, January 25, 2005, available at: https://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0158.html. [TEN 09] TENZER N., La France disparaît du monde, Grasset, Paris, 2009. [UNI 55] UNIVERSITAS NEGERI MANADO, website, 1955, available at: https://www. 4icu.org/reviews/universities-urls/10169.shtm.

5 Regional Competitive Intelligence

“The local area, from which everything starts and towards which everything returns, is not the enemy of the universal. […] Globality can only be sustained if local development remains open and supported.” [MOH 10] In a recent book of worldwide prospective intelligence [RAI 16], the geographer Virginie Raisson and her team present us with a utilitarian and globalized future of territories. “Now that the origins of a territory, its ancestral traditions, its historical memory, or its ethno-linguistic division” matter, it is trapped in an economic model of endless growth and an “ever greater and more insatiable humanity”, as a devourer of resources. It is as if it were on the brink of complete evaporation. Globalization, international trade and finance, but also migration flows and megacities: all phenomena of the world economy that “gradually aggregates territories” and tends to remove their collective dimension and identity. In the end, a globalized economy gives territories their strategic value: earth, oil and shale gas, as well as desert and the ability to produce solar energy. They also have fertile land, water, rare land, and just as many imminent wars of resources. This particular analysis brings with it geopolitical and geo-economic factors when considering the development of territories, as well as making us reconsider the representation of territories, local development strategies and the tools and necessary steps for diagnosis and anticipation in order to guide them.

Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1: A New Strategic and Operational Approach, First Edition. Henri Dou, Alain Juillet and Philippe Clerc. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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5.1. What do we mean by territories? We define territory as a “strategist territory” [FAU 08]. This means that we understand it as a “project territory” endowed with a vision, an ambition, a strategic capacity whose purpose is to design the actions of development, of resilience, of cooperation, as well as managing power struggles with competing territories or partners. It is for the decision-makers to utilize strategy to lead the considerable battles brought about by hypercompetitivity between territories, just as between cities and metropolises. We understand here that the development and the future of a territory do not depend solely on growth; in the present day it is its capacity to increase its power alongside its competitors. Exogenous development strategies to attract investment and “intelligences” are a well-known example. But, more significantly, the “Metropolises War” illustrates how territories of intermediate size and power enter the global race for critical size by adopting a strategy of urban density to become in the future powers built on smart grids: smart cities [REN 17]. The territory has gradually become a key player in the global economic battle as an “input factor” [DAV 12]. It is also the relevant scale of deployment of: – national and European industrial strategies, such as the Europe 2020 strategy for research or smart specialization strategy (see below); – innovative local ecosystems: here sustainable development or CSR (corporate social responsibility) strategies, which consume less energy, by anchoring the networks of excellence essential to any productive entry into globalization; – the national system of competitive intelligence in France, which we call the “local system of competitive intelligence” (see below) [FRA 08]. Finally, it is the major point of reference for people [LEV 11] who see or do not see a future for themselves according to the strategies that the decision-makers in charge of their development will choose. In this sense, the territory is the place of mastery of the issues of sovereignty and the fight against economic and technical dependence.

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France has taken the measure of territory centrality in the dynamics of growth and competitiveness and its consequences in its growth and competitiveness strategies since the end of the 1980s. Indeed, the territories were the key players in the changes during this period. They then had to face the disengagement of the state as a partner during the great crisis of 2007. As these crises and transformations progressed, territorial decisionmakers and developers needed a new analysis matrix and ever-more sophisticated methods of analysis and control [CLE 18]. Since 1995, the French State has invented and deployed a formalized response through a national strategy of competitive intelligence, defined as a mode of governance based on the mastery of information management techniques [LEV 11]. Following regional experimentation, the French State acquired, in 2004–2005, an original and innovative lever: a national strategy of territorial intelligence. This strategy complements and supports the emerging dynamics of a new industrial policy based on an emblematic pillar: the set up and development of poles of competitiveness (clusters). Recently, the dynamics of territorial development are expressed through two programmatic exercises: – regional economic development, innovation and Internationalization plans (SRDEII; Schéma régional de développement économique, d’innovation et d’internationalisation) the first generation of which has just been launched under the new decentralization law; – the smart specialization strategy launched by the European Commission in 2010. 5.1.1. Regional and international development and innovation

patterns

of

economic

Regions are now responsible for setting guidelines in line with national strategies for business support, export support and support for real estate investment and innovation. In this territorial engineering framework, the State authorities in regions play a strategic role in economic development, in partnership with the regional authorities, particularly with regard to territorial intelligence

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missions. We will notice shared policies such as the co-invigoration of industries through strategic committees, the participation in the new industrial policy named the industry of the future driven by the public/ private organization known as “The industry alliance for the future” and participation in the development of poles of competitiveness. Thus, the State and the regions have developed “a state–region” platform to support SMEs, entrepreneurship and competitive intelligence. The inciting State and “impeller” asks regions to initiate discussions, “strategic dialogs” with all territorial and regional actors through the territorial public action conference, in order to design the content of SRDEII. 5.1.2. Intelligent specialization strategies The European Commission, anxious to preserve the capacity of the countries of the Union on the horizon of the technological excellence of its main rival, the United States, launched in 2010 its new strategy of coordination of the common policies of the 27 Member States. In previous years, a group of European experts, called the “K4G group”, commissioned by DG Research, assessed the competitiveness gap between the EU and the USA and proposed a strategy. Their findings converge: dispersion of R&D efforts, lack of agglomeration effects and transnational research centers and global size, tendency to mimic the best between states and regions that hinder the ability to target efforts and resources, especially at the regional level. The result is less economic and technological specialization in Europe. According to the experts, the gap must be reduced by “intelligent specialization” of the Member States and regions of the European Research Area. The commission thus designed the “smart specialization” policy. It has made it one of the decisive levers of the contribution to the Europe 2020 strategy and its declination within the territories. The strategy of “smart specialization” [EUR 13] – that the European Commission is asking the Member States and regions to implement in the framework of Europe of innovation – is a strategic intelligence approach. It consists of developing a multi-year strategy based on the identification of “a limited number of priorities” selected on the basis of an international analysis of the “strengths and weaknesses” of the country or region. The

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process must lead in each region to define “new perspectives” of specialization with regard to the demand of world markets. On the methodological support platform for the regions, the European Commission explains the approach: analysis of the regional potential, governance of the research and innovation strategy for smart specialization, development of a shared vision of the future of the region, selection of priorities, roadmaps, monitoring and evaluation. The aim is for the European Commission to direct its innovation funding to specific “differentiating” activities that meet the demand of world markets. This strategy is also part of a renewal of attractiveness strategies such as local development strategy by exogenous growth. Traditionally, these strategies aim to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to improve local supply and skills. “Intelligence specialization” is however more sophisticated. Through the choice of “intelligent, sustainable and inclusive growth”, the EU crosses the exogenous local development approach with a strategy of identification and development of endogenous assets called “areas of strategic innovation”. It is about capitalizing on the existing, while developing activities whose probabilities of socio-economic impacts are high – which has, in our opinion, an impact on their attractiveness. In this context, digital ecosystems will play a growing role and it is important to monitor the evolution of these at the global level [MID 17]. The analysis matrices used by the group of experts are those of competitive intelligence and foresight, applied in terms of territorial intelligence by the regions. To determine the competitive advantage of their region compared to other competing territories, the “public strategists”, whose Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CCI), will now speak of “value chain”, “competitive scope”, of offensive or defensive “generic strategies”, based on costs, on differentiation, they will speak of technologies as keys to competitive advantage and further of the importance of the crossfertilization of skills between know-how and technologies, etc. far from planning exercises, including strategic ones, now stored as old accessories. The inclusion in the paradigm of corporate strategy is clear, yet voluntary. 5.2. A typology of territories Schematically, the territorial engineering strategies [CER 16] defined by the central state and its public services and the territorial engineering

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strategies led by the local authorities, the State’s representatives in regions and the civil society represented by its associations have, during the implementation of these successive policies, produced three types of territories [LEV 11]: – attractive territories: engaged in adaptation strategies, they make the choice of exogenous development through international investments and the establishment of companies. They compete with other participants. Geopolitics then enters into the strategies of the territory, subject, through its attractiveness strategies, to the vagaries of wars, social and economic crises. Resulting from political voluntarism, attractiveness “fuels a real geographical war, the spatial corollary of the economic war” [FIO 16]. Competitive and territorial intelligence capabilities are focused on the international scale, competitors, competitive benchmarking and territorial marketing; – endogenous territories: decision-makers make the choice of a development based on the mobilization of social capital and historical and cultural fundamentals of the territory to drive transformation strategies. Competitive and territorial intelligence is conceived through the identification of explicit and tacit skills and know-how, as well as through the mobilization of material and immaterial critical resources in cooperative and collaborative projects; – sustainable territories: “What kind of territory do we want in 30 years’ time?” The strategy of the “deciders” is an anticipation strategy built upon a prospective intelligence approach. Territories thus unite the direction and expertise in the service of a long-term developmental vision. 5.3. Definition of territorial intelligence Competitive intelligence in each country feeds off an original strategy culture. It drives the knowledge of how to manage competition or partnership within both public and private strategic frameworks. The attitude to life and how to represent it through a geopolitical and/or geoeconomic reading of globalization produces strategic behaviors such as the strategy of power, the strategy of influence and security or the conquest strategy but such behaviors can also remain so weak and undeveloped that “the strategic vacuum” is prevailing.

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Also, to innovate in this activity, it is necessary to: – mobilize intelligence capacities – that is to say the awareness of situations and of struggles for power and to enter the paradigm of the strategy; – think about better methods and organizations for collecting, interpreting, disseminating and protecting information. Here we think of multiple networked configurations, agile organizations, etc; – design governance and organization. This mobilization generates in every country competitive intelligence communities, true communities of practice gathering experts and practitioners of business, civil society, administration, education and research. They are structured within national and local systems of competitive intelligence. For analysts at the University of Aix Marseille [CER 16], territorial intelligence as a public and strategic policy, the process of mobilizing the intelligences of the territory at the service of the creative dynamic of an innovative development and construction of a future, is an overtaking of territorial engineering. The latter, in the service of territorial projects, is “a complex notion with fuzzy outlines which leaves little room for participatory processes”. With regards to the training of the actors as well as the structures and populations involved territorial engineering is defined as “a technicoprofessional approach”. The functions of this training are: expertise, diagnosis, thematic studies and surveillance and monitoring of territories. Without the analysts writing it, it is clear that the “fuzzy” approach does not correspond to the stakes and challenges of territories subject to metamorphoses and breaks in the current great transformation of economies. Also, they introduce the territorial intelligence as another approach – more managerial, concentrating expertise and foresight – we add analysis and mobilization of the interdisciplinarity able to solve complex problems. The construction of sustainable territories, according to our experts, invites us to “go beyond the notion of territorial engineering based on specialized expertise, and to substitute the notion of territorial intelligence understood as

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a form of collective intelligence that must contribute to the administration of the territory, through a systemic vision of sustainable development, a sharing of meaning, expertise and tools at the local level”. This is how Claude Rochet, a French high-ranking civil servant and researcher, defines territorial intelligence: “It is first of all to understand the culture of a territory, to know where men who live in it come from, what is their history, how has their way of being and of living in their world built over the centuries.” [ROC 07] 5.4. The challenges of territorial intelligence Globalization has made it possible to reduce poverty in certain areas of the world, to open up international trade to emerging countries and to boost growth. At the same time, it has amplified the phenomenon of “economic insecurity”. The development based on “consumption” evoked by Virginie Raisson [RAI 16] has made us switch to a “society of risk” [BEC 01]. In our industrial societies, the “promises of modernity have not been kept. Misery has not been defeated. The underdevelopment of one part of the world has not stopped. Progress has created all kinds of ills as new risks: technological, transport, nuclear, health, pollution, food hazards, etc.”. Risk sharing is replacing risk sharing resulting from endless growth. The territory is its living receptacle: the risk of dropping out due to the globalization of trade; risk of social disintegration; risk of destructuring of territories. Fueled by these risks and threats, systemic crises are linked together economically, financially, demographically, climatically and politically. In addition to the classic threats to our strategic assets and businesses, there are emerging threats intimately linked to globalization and the “cyberworld” that greatly amplify their effects. They upset the ecosystem of our societies, that of the company, they reveal our ignorance and weaken our positions as so many challenges to be met also at the level of territories in the regions.

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As central issue of an intelligence war, knowledge and intelligence play a more decisive role than power and influence ever did. Queen of the battles, the attractiveness of brains and talents is organized through large networks of dominance by expertise and their spheres of influence. Megacities, capitals and territories are waging ruthless wars to attract start-ups, entrepreneurs and researchers. The cyberspace has become a new field of confrontation between corporations and states, but also rogue states, mafias and terrorist networks. There is an ongoing cyberwar. Here is the vast operation called “Operation Snake” of Russian espionage on Western governments (such as Europe, United States) downgraded by the unprecedented international attack that in May 2017 affected 99 countries and countless organizations in the world: the UK, Russia, Spain, Portugal, France, Mexico, Telefónica, FedEx, Renault, Saint-Gobain, the French Ministry of Education, the British National Health Service (NHS), etc. Thousands of computers were infected with malicious software that blocked their use. “Hostile” environments are endowed with unparalleled creativity in which the threats of terrorism, crime and cyber warfare overlap. The time has come for the hybridization of threats, modes of action and criminal organizations. Criminal networks are global, but they are rooted in a large number of territories. It is on this scale of proximity that security is organized. Big Data, cloud computing, 3D printing, the Internet of Things, machine learning, artificial intelligence, are all disruptive technologies [KIN 13] that represent tremendous sources of progress and transformation of our modes production, marketing and work and which, at the same time, create new threats and risks. At the heart of this technological ecosystem, we will consider three issues that stand out for the territories. The power of territories – including cities, city networks and metropolises – in the near future will rely on two technological breakthroughs in the digital domain: the opening of public data (open data) and analytical systems of treatment of masses of data (Big Data and artificial intelligence). Already, the opening of public data offers the possibility for the territories to differentiate themselves by an access of the greatest number to considerable volumes of data and information (information such as institutional, economic, social and that concerning citizens).

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The break is at the level of business intelligence technologies and new techniques of querying the exponential influx of data (mass data or Big Data). The power will come back to those who can master the uses of Big Data and the analysis of data en masse that allows us and to predict, anticipate, understand in real time the needs of the consumer, but also the intentions of competing territories. The data, or rather the ability to manage data flows and analyze them in real time, becomes a vital new skill and strategic asset. These two disruptive technologies engender a third determining challenge: that of the sovereignty of data and their security. Our economies are facing a major risk regarding these assets, which are becoming strategic; we have gradually lost control of them to the big American and Chinese Internet companies. “Who will be the custodian of our data?” Territories, regions, cities and megacities are now at the forefront of this challenge. Territories, as containers of strategies, face the challenge of increasing power and leadership of powerful and dominant economies. Territories caught up in attractiveness policies are becoming places to implement investment strategies in sectors that have become the center of debates about sovereignty. Investment (including sovereign wealth funds) has also become an instrument for conducting infiltration, technological predation or takeover of strategic businesses. Last but not least, unpredictability defeats the most sophisticated anticipation and crisis management scenarios. Competitors, other IE systems and the other actors (criminal networks, terrorists, etc.) do not respect the rules, or may even use innovative weapons as new threats and thus create asymmetrical situations. Richard D’Aveni, regarding hypercompetition, explains: “The time has come for a new vision of the world in which the winners takes all and where fighters of unequal importance resort to all possible tactics.” [DAV 94]

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This observation is completed by that of Patrick Lagadec, a French expert in the management of unprecedented crises [GUI 02, LAG 81] who describes “a civilization of risk producing economic, political, ecological and cultural catastrophes”. He advocates, with others, the mobilization of our collective intelligence abilities to anticipate, understand, solve and confront the unknown and related breakdowns. 5.5. Rethinking our intelligence capabilities in territorial situations This national and regional strategy for competitive and strategic intelligence suffers from at least two deficits. There is therefore a need to coordinate competitive intelligence and strategy in regions. 5.5.1. Strategic coordination deficits Here, coordination is cultivated, efficiencies become realized, but the observer quickly warns us that the whole is weakened by a deficit of clear goals by its deficit of aiming, orientation and finally strategy. It is the heterogeneity that prevails. So, as they see their fields of competence increase, decision-makers in the region need to strengthen their strategic capacity to ensure the economic security of their pillars of competitiveness (clusters) while maintaining their competitive advantages. Reducing risk-taking in strategic options requires information acuity and maneuverability that only fluidity in decision-support systems allows. But the performance of a coordination of competitive intelligence networks in the region is not limited to mesh companies, subcontractors, outsourced services and functions, technical centers, laboratories and universities with operators of development. 5.5.2. Needing to be organized It is important to organize to co-produce the knowledge necessary to fuel territorial strategies. The successful interweaving of public and private spheres consists of combining knowledge, bringing out the potential for innovation and supporting their development. Rare are the regions and territories in which

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economic development operators have a shared information and analysis system and in which strategies rely on interrelationships with business collectives. Thus, “coherence” is made possible by the appropriation of new modes of work, collaboration and thinking, based on trust and the convergence of mutual interests: partnerships. In the end, it is a question of co-producing the intelligence necessary for the development of the territory, the clusters, the networks, the inter-clusters, the pools of activity; this is the challenge. This approach makes it possible to act strategically through cooperation by associating key operators, such as national chambers of commerce and industry, professional organizations, technical centers, economic development agencies, regional economic, social and environmental councils (CESER) while mitigating the antagonisms between these actors, who can sometimes be seen as competitors in supporting businesses programs. All of these challenges and issues call on territorial decision-makers to establish their responsibility: to embed the goals of territorial intelligence in a paradigm of global security. Their description will make it possible to outline the road map of the latter. The first aim of territorial intelligence is to inform public policies for local development (endogenous and exogenous) and even territorial planning and to make the choices making the regional economic development strategy reliable. As examples, strategies can be: – to anticipate restructuring and supporting offshoring or critical delocalization; – to prevent failures, maneuvers or movings of key contractors; – to analyze the risks of strategic dependencies to which the territory may be exposed. The second aim is to build a capacity for influence to strengthen the attractiveness of the territory on the different transregional, national, European and global playing fields. It can for example be: – identify critical technological resources to directly acquire or to indirectly control; – have comparative and competitive performance profiles on target territories or organizations;

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– map the relevant economic areas, the size of which may exceed the traditional (administrative) territorial perimeters, according to the projects and the actors concerned. The third aim is to organize the protection of industrial assets, to promote their growth and their security against new types of risks. On an individual basis, this may involve enhancing the ability of SMEs to: – know and understand the evolution of their environments (situational awareness); – deploy and manage their networks of information sources; – map their vulnerabilities and information risks. On the collective level, for example, it is necessary to develop collaborative platforms for: – sharing alerts and weak signals; – capitalizing on collective knowledge and generating new knowledge; – sharing risk taking in the management of innovative projects; – to bring together technical centers specialized in the production of information content. 5.6. The intelligence of situations The challenges we have put forward, beyond any strategy of intellectual regional competitive intelligence, echo three postures that the decisionmakers will have the choice to adopt: – the prospective posture consisting of the analysis of weak signals announcing the future transformations of the environments in order to anticipate industrial mutations and “breaks in development”; – the next proactive attitude, based on an analysis of cyclical factors influencing the situation in the short term, before launching of operations; – finally the reactive posture, including the analysis of the factors generating the constraints to deal with crisis situations and define and manage countermeasures.

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5.6.1. The establishment of competitive and strategic regional facilities A regional competitive and strategic intelligence facility (DIESR)1 is a type of organization or framework of variable structure, which draws its resources from territorial knowledge networks to inform strategic thinking and choices and lead to plans for the development and security of economic heritage. The performance of the DIESRs is based on the mastery of methods of analysis and decryption specific to competitive intelligence. Flexibly organized, it is understood as a system of information, alerts and analysis on market or environment dynamics. The key words are anticipation, permanent diagnosis, weak signals, strategic management and interpretational groups. 5.6.2. The goals of these facilities These facilities or organizations have as their goal: – to provide territorial decision-makers with a preventive early warning system and permanent diagnosis of endogenous and exogenous environments through the definition, monitoring and treatment of key strategic issues; – coordinate the territory’s information networks in a project management mode within a common collaborative platform to pool knowledge and create collective meaning; – organize networks and spheres of influence. In order to fulfill its missions, the managers of the regional competitive and strategic intelligence system will have as a priority mission the implementation a dynamic of ongoing diagnosis. The enhancement of the economic space requires the implementation of a permanent territorial diagnosis, whose purpose is to map and understand the assets and vulnerabilities of the territory, but also to anticipate the factors of disturbance. Success therefore depends on the rapid and effective mobilization of information resources and the coordination of expertise from the territory to structure an operational network of actors and decision1 This framework or organization is inspired by what the assembly of French chambers of commerce and industry call a dispositif d’intelligence économique et stratégique régional (2004).

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makers at the regional level, with an extension to points of influence at the national and European level, and even international. Ongoing territorial diagnosis is organized according to the orientations set by the territorial decision-makers and their needs. It will adjust the strategy according to the potential of each strategic situation. The continuous monitoring of the territory’s resources and the decoding of the environments allow the implementation of a preventive warning system and interpretation of situations at risk or those carrying development opportunities. 5.7. The main areas of intervention of this competitive intelligence and regional strategic facility or organization A regional competitive intelligence facility and/or organization will be in charge of several of the following functions and tasks, which are fundamentally strategic: – coordinate in a project management framework the information networks of the territory within a common collaborative platform to pool knowledge and create collective added value; – adapt and optimize development projects or territorial resources according to the evolution of endogenous and exogenous environments in terms of potential and constraints; – map the differentiating assets and potential spheres of influence of clusters; – anticipate sectoral restructuring, failures or maneuvers of key contractors; – prevent the risks of strategic dependencies to which the territory may be exposed; – determine critical technological and tertiary resources to directly acquire or to indirectly control; – have performance comparisons and competitive profiles on target territories or organizations; – map the relevant economic areas, the size of which may exceed the traditional territorial perimeters, according to the spheres of influence targeted, projects and stakeholders; – apprehend the global risks and security challenges of the territory.

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5.8. The generic configuration of the facility In terms of organizational intelligence, the regional competitive and strategic intelligence system has three interacting devices. 5.8.1. Regional strategic steering group (CRPS) Composed of public and private territorial decision-makers, the regional strategic steering group (CRPS)2 defines the challenges and issues of the territory for which it is necessary to monitor or “remove doubts”. The realization of each key intelligence topic is entrusted to a member of the CRPS, responsible for performing the functions of facilitator. The latter composes the multidisciplinary team of its interpretation group (a network of experts), with which it will develop a dashboard, locking in the problematics of the key intelligence topics to be treated, working hypotheses, representations and contextualization elements, as well as research topics. It specifies the analyses and determines the indicators to be obtained and processed by the mobilized team (members of the interpretational group and spotters networks). 5.8.2. The interpretational group The members of the interpretational group, associated with the network of mobilized sensors, are experts and holders of public/private influence of the key sectors of activity. They collect information and collectively process and store relevant data on the platform. The analysts assigned to each line of research elaborate the synthesis. Periodically, the interpretational group (IG) meets to analyze the information obtained and adjust the searches. With the expected insights, the interpretational group produces the diagnosis of the key theme by formulating possible scenarios and recommendations. 5.8.3. The spotters On the basis of the reasoned diagnosis, returned by its facilitator, the CRPS exploits these results and proceeds with the development of action plans, prevention, adaptation or contingency plans. 2 From the French cellule régionale de pilotage stratégique

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Feedback is provided to IGs and members of the network of mobilized sensors (online posting of a summary version of the decision statement of the CRPS and the diagnosis developed by the IG). Spotters networks are composed of resource experts in strategic information (public/private). They are responsible for: – producing the state-of-the-art as well as sharing know-how and skills in the field of technologies, by distributing collective knowledge and dealing with weak alerts or signals about these fields; – acquiring targeted information according to the research topics entrusted to them by the IGs. 5.9. Strategic management approach: mapping and analysis tools 5.9.1. The map of key territory actors Territorial decision-makers intervene within four dimensions which may be mapped on a grid: political, economic, social and cultural. To act within these spaces, it is necessary for them to mobilize stakeholders by having a precise analysis matrix of the game of these actors. Also, it is necessary to locate each key actor, by establishing its profile according to its action means (material and immaterial resources), of its capacity of influence (networks, relational modes and credibility), of its sensitivity (perceptions of stakes and stakeholders) and its intentions.

Figure 5.1. Map of the key territory actors

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5.9.2. Critical resources of a territory These resources constitute the strategic core of the territory and are those that should be known (diagnosis, evaluation), monitored and protected (economic security) and of course, developed to preserve them as real, strategic assets.

Figure 5.2. Critical territory resources

5.9.3. The influence potential of a territory This potential of tangible and intangible influence consists of many useful drivers and therefore can be mobilized to create and dispose of the spheres of influence of the territory in order to dominate competitive and cooperative battles.

Figure 5.3. Influence potential of a territory

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5.10. Operational implementation Phase 1: Establish the regional strategic steering group (CRPS); bring together the main public and private territorial decision-makers involved in the development and security of the territory’s economic assets. Phase 2: Bring together the regional strategic management unit to define: – the working topics of the DIESR according to the intentions of the decision makers of the territory in terms of strategy. On this occasion, it is crucial to not spontaneously legitimize the pre-established intuitions of the decision-makers and to avoid reinforcing them in their preconceived strategy. It is necessary to shake their assumptions (impressions, convictions and perceptions). It is thus necessary to elaborate contradictory hypotheses to not legitimize dominant ideas and to avoid blind spot. This approach must allow the issues to be brought to the surface by a collective examination of actors’ interests and projects, the revelation and interpretation of spontaneous representations and the implicit representations of the members of the group. The selected themes will be formalized on a dashboard which sets the framework of the ongoing interpretation group to which the realization of the theme will be entrusted. Mapping of key actors is a prerequisite; – infrastructure and infostructure means and procedures necessary for the operational functioning of ongoing interpretational groups and spotters networks. Phase 3: Build the “intelligence” capacity to identify, within public and private regional spheres, the networks of experts, the stakeholders and the suppliers of processed information, present in the industrial and service providers, professional organizations, communities, banks, development agencies, incubators, CCIs, technical centers, laboratories, universities, etc. The key actors identified can be mapped into two categories: – ongoing interpretational groups: multidisciplinary teams (networks of experts), which will be configured according to the topics and issues defined by the CRPS; – spotters networks: resource persons, referenced according to their scope of expertise, who will be responsible for handling the research areas defined by each interpretational groups (members of the groups also perform a identification role).

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Establish at the regional level a collaborative platform allowing informational networks to be informed of the research they are assigned to, to send alerts, to enter data collected and to consult syntheses of diagnoses produced by the ongoing interpretational groups. Within this platform, groups can access spaces dedicated to the key themes to be addressed. They can view the data collected by the issue identifiers, debate in forums and produce notes or various diagnoses to capitalize on their time outside meetings devoted to the development of diagnoses. 5.11. Conclusion How can we arbitrate between today’s energy demands and the food needs of tomorrow. How can we reconcile the urgent interests of farmers and the sustainable interests of humanity? And how can we enable everyone to participate in local decisions that engage the whole of humanity? It is in the face of these challenges that the nation and its territories will have to respond, and this, without a doubt, is much faster than expected. Territorial intelligence that catalyzes goodwill, resources and the full potential of regional development can help meet these challenges. The good governance that must emanate from it depends, no doubt, on the future of the regions. 5.12. References [BEC 01] BECK U., La société du risque, Aubier, Paris, 2001. [CER 16] CERIC, “De l’ingénierie territoriale à l’intelligence territoriale pour des territoires durables”, Les notes du Pôle, no. 28, 2016, available at: https://creativite.hypotheses.org/category/parutions/les-notes-du-pole. [CLE 18] CLERC P., “Le dispositif Mutecos”, in O. COUSSI, P. AUROY, J.-F. NATIVITÉ (eds), Intelligence économique des territoires, CNER, Paris, pp. 127–130, 2018. [DAV 94] D’AVENI R.A., Hyper-Competition: Managing the Dynamics of Strategic Maneveuring, Free Press, New York, 1994. [DAV 12] DAVEZIES L., La crise qui vient. La nouvelle fracture territoriale, Le Seuil, Paris, 2012.

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[EUR 13] EUROPEAN COMMISION, “National/regional innovation strategies for smart specialization, cohesion policy 2014–2020”, RIS3, 2013, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/2014/smart_ specialisation_en.pdf. [FAU 08] FAUGOIN P., “Quelle organisation structurelle pour l’intelligence territoriale au service de l’attractivité des territoires et de la démocratie participative ? L’option de l’IAAT (Institut atlantique d’aménagement des territoires)”, in P. LARRAT (ed.), Benchmark européen de pratiques en intelligence économique, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2008. [FIO 16] FIORINA J.-F., “Géopolitique de l’attractivité”, CLES, no. 188, June 2, 2016, available at: http://notes-geopolitiques.com/geopolitique-de-lattractivite/. [FRA 08] FRANÇOIS L., Intelligence territoriale. Intelligence économique appliquée au territoire, Lavoisier, Paris, 2008. [GUI 02] GUILHOU X., LAGADEC P., La fin du risque zéro, Éditions d’Organisation, Paris, 2002. [KIN 13] KINSAY M., “Disruptive technologies: advances that will transform life, business and the global economy”, McKinsey Global Institute, May 2013, available at: http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/ourinsights/disruptive-technologies. [LAG 81] LAGADEC P., GUIHOU X., La civilisation du risque. Catastrophes technologiques et responsabilité sociale, Le Seuil, Paris, 1981. [LEV 11] LEVET J.-L., “Industrialisation et localisation des activités”, Actes de la Rencontre internationale de Dakhla 2010, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2011. [MID 17] MIDIERE O., FIQUEMONT P., “Digital disruption des écosystèmes mondiaux”, MEDEF Digital Disruption Lab, 2017. [MOH 10] MOHAMMED VI, “Projet marocain des énergies renouvelables : retombées positives sur le développement économique et social”, Atlasinfo, 2010, available at: http://www.atlasinfo.fr/Projet-marocain-des-energies-renouvelables-retombeespositives-sur-le-developpement-economique-et-social_ a10652.html. [RAI 16] RAISSON V., 2038, les futurs du monde, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2016. [REN 17] RENARD T., “La Guerre des tours”, Conflits, special edition no. 5, pp. 46–47, 2017. [ROC 07] ROCHET C., “Intelligence économique et dynamisme institutionnel”, Vie et Sciences de l’Entreprise, vol. 1, pp. 174–175, 2007.

6 Influence

In a society that is becoming more and more digitalized, where facts and information are often contradictory or of questionable reliability, we are constantly influenced by diverse information and often harmful rumors. Both of these aspects are central research subjects in the field of competitive intelligence and are becoming more significant – not only in their consequences for “democracies”, but also due to the fact that, of the 200 most powerful entities in the financial field, around 50% are not states. We will therefore briefly analyze both influence and rumor aspects and see to what extent journalists and the media are voluntarily implicated in the media attention given to these two aspects of competitive intelligence. In today’s environment that is constantly on the move, it is not enough to simply have a strategy – it has to be justified, explained and legitimized. This is necessary because we find ourselves in a hyper-mediatized setting. We are not alone and our competitors are doing the same as us. Not acting at all therefore means falling behind. 6.1. The current foundations of influence Influence means the way in which “people” (understood generically: people, institutions, etc.) think about and perceive things the way you want them to, without them feeling that you are putting any pressure on them. How has influence emerged so quickly in recent times? It is most likely due to the development of information technologies and communication, and notably the “explosion” of social media, but also the rise in power of NGOs at the international level.

Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1: A New Strategic and Operational Approach, First Edition. Henri Dou, Alain Juillet and Philippe Clerc. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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We do not attempt to describe here the ensemble of work [RAC 11, RAC 12, RAC 17] that makes reference to this subject; the majority deals with “actions of influence”, found in advertising and lobbying, but we will rather focus on the essentials, and notably influence mechanisms such as those described by Joseph Nye [NYE 16] at the level of soft power. Generally speaking, influence will call upon simple mechanisms. The first of these is the emotional quotient [FME 10], meaning that which makes people react “without thinking”. Indeed, our reactions at the level of perception are linked 70% to our emotional coefficient, and 30% to our intellectual coefficient. Before embarking on the path of influence, we should properly analyze the target and especially what will make them react. This analysis has to be rather focused given it must take into account various parameters: we can go from “compassion” to different forms of “permitted” corruption, and so the scale is very large. It is also necessary to avoid analyzing the target in static terms, but it must be done in a dynamic way to predict if possible the evolution of mentalities in a period of time in coherence with the objective which will be defined [JUI 09, JUI 15]. If we want to influence “people”, it is for a precise objective [NAT 91, NYE 16]. This objective must be clear and well defined. It must not take place in too long a time period, because, in this case, perception would be weaker. It is important that the time period be sufficiently short in order to reach the objective and motivate “people”. In other words, we cannot say that we will reach our objective in 20 years’ time, as this would be too long. Moreover, it is important that the objective be perceived as “honest” and “ethical”, and the cause must be “noble”. It is often in that respect that we make reference to children, elderly people, famine, respect for our environment, or the protection of animals, etc. We must communicate and therefore send messages we wish to pass on to our target(s). Generally speaking, two forms of communication are used: verbal communication (including the various different media which express it); and non-verbal communication, which often concerns attitudes, or the general appearance of the communicator, etc.

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Communicating also means transferring a message. It is therefore important that it be carefully constructed, both in its content, but also containing examples and reference relevant to those to whom the general message is being addressed. Retrospectively, an analysis of the discourse of American politicians legitimizing military intervention in Iraq is a good example. 6.2. Who is going to communicate? Communication can take place through an “opinion leader”, but also through an intermediary of grouping associations, political parties, etc. The person who is communicating must generally be recognized as neutral, or as someone fighting for a “noble cause”, such as the environment. In other words, we might suggest that there are several possible mediators: social media, NGOs and individuals, which we will now briefly examine. Social media [MER 12]: we can use them as a sounding board. Indeed, a rumor can make its way around a country like France in around seven days thanks to social media. On the other hand, the retransmission of a rumor or a piece of information by somebody we know (a friend, for example) is perceived as true by more than seven out of ten people. Social media is even more efficient given it uses written, spoken and visual forms of communication. NGOs: the influence of these mediators is growing significantly. More than 70% of NGOs are those created by States, multinational companies or pressure groups. They are incredibly influential given that they are often perceived as honest mediators by the public due to the different causes they defend. It is therefore necessary to understand the ways in which they operate in order to know whether or not they are manipulated. For example, political policies concerning the defense of our environment are an example; likewise there are “struggles” of some organizations and other NGOs to fight against genetically modified organisms, even if it means stopping some research under public pressure, whereas other countries continue and take a decisive lead. NGOs always appeal to our emotions [WIK 15]. Their themes are always focused on the defense of our children, a better future, the fight against poverty, looking after our planet, etc. In addition, the development of their resources concerning local wars and climatic incidents increases the impact of NGOs in the “public sphere”. Some North American foundations

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will create the necessary influence by financing certain developments so that the “funded” decision-makers act in the desired direction. This is what makes Joseph Nye [NYE 14] say the following when he draws a parallel between Chinese influence and American influence: “Chinese officials seem to think that influence is generated mainly by government policies and public diplomacy, but much of America’s influence is generated by its civil society rather than by its government”. The breeding ground of influence operations has long been prepared by a strong cultural influence, for example by cinema [MAZ 11]. In the Marshall Plan, which allowed the recovery of Western Europe after the Second World War, the cinema aspect was important. It spread American values and thus helped to divert Europeans from Marxism. We find identical cultural vectors at the level of music (jazz, rock, etc.), songs, literature, sports, etc. It is the same for large events, such as exhibitions for example [REN 15]. Different strategies of influence can be developed on the most diverse levels and subjects. Knowing how to detect and analyze them is a necessity for states, organizations, institutions and companies [FRA 16]. For individuals, the problem is different. They should, as far as possible, defend their ideas in such a way that they will also answer the questions posed by the “receiver”. The goal is to make it move from a passive form, “listening”, to an active form, “transmitting”, ideas and solutions provided by the individual engaged in the process of influence. By bringing the desired response, the “receiver” is transformed into a “transmitter” which is the initial desire at the outset. Indeed, we will use five ways of acting grouped into two categories: organizational power (legitimate, reward, coercive) and personal power (expert and referent). 6.3. Knowledge of the target and information In order to be fully aware of the target on which one wants to make influence, it requires thorough preparation. This is mainly based on the exploitation of information concerning the target itself, but also its environment. Since the majority of information is currently accessible with minimum constraint (open information), you have to learn how to search for it, be able to group it and then analyze it. Currently, the tendency is more and more to use technological facilities including “Big Data” which are

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growing more and more, from “cookies” on the Internet, your own acceptance for your personal data to be used (saying yes on smartphone applications), the analysis of your purchases in supermarkets and in the medium term in all data from smart cities [DOU 14]. Knowing how to optimally search open information and analyze it is not innate. It can, however, be learned. There are methods, software and open sources of information particularly suited to these analyses. We must go beyond the simple use of Google, for example, and use all the possibilities that are available to us. This “fine” knowledge of the target will then allow us to develop, according to our initial objective, the messages, behaviors and actions necessary for you to be aware, without realizing that you have won “the cause”. If scientific databases and patent databases were the first to be exploited [DOU 15, DOU 16b, HOL 05] in the analytic (bibliometric) sense to have a dynamic view of the environment of a subject, an institution or an enterprise and also the multiplication of data sources open a new field that goes beyond the scientist. For example, the use of social media, tweets and blogs allows us to better understand the ins and outs of a subject. We are not looking for something specific; we are going to work in a random way and therefore through a path that will, over the course of the answers found and their analyses, generate new questions, new approaches that may not have first come to mind. We are not dealing here with the finality of such representations because, by themselves, they constitute a means of influencing our reasoning which would be in itself a new article [MAY 13]. It is only explained that such analyses will make it possible to better target sets of behaviors and thus to better develop actions of influence. It is therefore obvious that, without your knowledge, you enter into a specific typology that will allow you to develop actions of influence concerning you without you feeling that there is any pressure. 6.4. Rumors We shall not present all published works on rumors, but rather situate them in the field of negative influence. For more information, the reader can consult the following references: [GAI 12, KAP 87, KIM 04, TAF 06]. They can be described as negative influence actions, the rumor being able, in the majority of the cases, to be exercised against a competitor whether it is a firm, a person, a State, etc. We have seen that the Internet and social media allow the very rapid spread of a rumor. Rumors can be, if we are not careful,

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completely destructive and lead to the loss of a company, for example. If the actions of influence are more cunning since they are aimed at “winning the cause” for us, the rumors are more easily identifiable, because they are more direct. Generally, as they are false, those to whom they are directed do not take them seriously. Yet letting a rumor spread without “counter-fire” is incredibly dangerous, because the longer a rumor lasts, the more influence it will gain. There are various sources of information describing and commenting on rumors, for example those concerning the Procter & Gamble logo [GAË 06, KAP 87, LAR 08] (this is alleged to have “made a pact with the devil” to do business better, according to the analysis of the image on its logo. The rumor was so strong that, despite very significant explanations against these rumors, the firm had to change its logo which dated from its creation). For more information on rumors (or hoaxes), the site hoaxbuster.com presents a more exhaustive list. This French site “dissects” some false rumors by presenting the related references, for example the rumors that followed the attacks of November 13, 2015 in Paris [ENG 15]. But there is no need for the Internet to spread rumors. For example, about 50 years ago, in Marseille, a rumor persisted: in a certain shop selling wedding dresses, some people disappeared in the dressing rooms. This rumor took some time to fade, but it certainly had to benefit a competitor. Fighting the spread of a rumor is to ask the question of how and by whom it was emitted (to know the source) and whom it “benefits”, allowing us to put a suitable reaction in place. We then enter the field of “crises” that we must learn to manage [COM 12]. This is not done immediately, because it is necessary to anticipate the crises and to constitute an inventory of actions to carry out to counteract their effects. Indeed, the image of a particular person’s enterprise can quickly be warped, and thus the “reputation” of this person is questioned. 6.5. The “media sounding board” The journalist is often, and in some cases in spite of themselves, at odds with their true self – or they are assigned as certain objective – given they are often forced to act immediately and thus to circulate and transmit information without having had the time to validate the sources and analyze their real scope. We are not concerned here by the so-called trusted third-party information, that is to say by information that is real and validated and on which we can base a reasoning. This is important because,

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in France, we often miss these landmarks or at least their dissemination to the general public. A good example is that of the extension of Nantes airport, where all types of information and analysis were carried out with both scientific and psychological arguments that would lead to a reasoned solution, but which ultimately ended in a referendum where all the objective, destructive, political, etc. passions developed, including “avoiding” – that is, refusing to make a decision. This is the “dark” side of influence [BAC 10]. Let us return to the media. Their constant search for an audience pushes them into immediacy, often without having a clear idea of the consequences of the information disclosed. Should journalists be held accountable [DEG 11a]? For a small majority maybe, but for others, it is the momentary context in which the profession is exercised that must be questioned. A study carried out in 2011 by Amandine Degand [DEG 11b] – still relevant today – highlighted that “Web journalists lack time to cross-reference information. This is one of the findings that emerges from fifty-six days of immersion in eleven Belgian editorial offices. This article proposes, through a comprehensive approach, to look deeper at the question of immediacy and its implications. It appears that the balance between the journalistic values of immediacy and reliability has become disrupted. This situation introduces into practice an uncertainty that journalists still only partially master, thanks to temporary arrangements”. The immediacy sought is certainly a major detail, but media dependence on the audience and advertisers are other points to consider. We will therefore be pushed, despite our better judgment and because of competition, to favor the sensational, to force on the classic clichés (for example in Marseille, certain aspects of the life of the city, etc.). What are the ethics to follow? This is not easy, because it took many months before, for example, the terrorist atrocities were no longer broadcast by television channels. Another example of a form of naivety when one is looking for the sensational and the emotional can be found in the media fiasco of the revolution and the mass graves of Timisoara [MIZ 14] in Romania. The first popular uprising broadcast live on radio and television, the Romanian revolution remains the symbol of an unprecedented media fiasco. For weeks, the Western press relayed unsustainable images, insane rumors and delirious reports, without verifying the reliability of its sources. 20 years later, several journalists who covered the event have deciphered this sensationalist cycle

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for Le Courrier des Balkans1. We must try as much as possible to protect ourselves against such eventualities. To do this, two aspects are to be taken into account: the issuer, who must check their sources and determine the extent to which the information should be disseminated or not (it is desirable that in this case there is some sort of coordination within the profession or the media as a whole), and the receiver who should not assume that everything that is broadcast is true. We will have to “sort through the facts and fiction” and analyze to what extent this information is plausible (we can easily cross-reference sources), but also to whom it benefits in the end. This attitude will bring us closer to what is called “critical thinking” [ENN 18], which is the essential link between intelligence and emotions and makes people “emotionally intelligent”. That is to say, to associate with our emotions enough intelligence to learn to control them and to analyze in a more detached way the situations with which we are confronted. This is true for individuals, but also for organizations [CLE 04]. This attitude also enters the field of editorial responsibility. Marie Laure Augry [AUG 15] asked the following questions following the terrorist attacks in France: – “what do we choose to show, to say, under such circumstances, without risking endangering anyone? – should we consider that any image is information? – how do we avoid the risks of instrumentalization? – are we careful enough not to play the game of terrorists?” It is obvious that this argues for the diffusion of magazines that will rerun the story and analyze the information, but after a potentially long “incubation time”. But between the presentation of the events and the reflection, what has happened during this period of time? In the context of the media, we must also take into account the parameters of repetition. Indeed, there is a significant number of media (for example the number of 24-hour news channels) which come to such a repetition that, even if everyone performs their job correctly, this saturation will create a potentially disturbing or even frightening context for some, changing the nature and the aim of this information, and also the behavior of those involved.

1 A French-language media website concerning events in the Balkans.

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6.6. Cultural or public diplomacy Culture has an increasingly important role in international relations. From this observation is born the concept of cultural diplomacy. We will see, in Volume 2 in Chapter 6 on social networks, the case of the Confucius Institutes, which are a form of Chinese cultural diplomacy, but it is useful in the context of influence to shed some light on this concept. Indeed, if classical diplomacy has developed from state to state, it is not the same for the cultural diplomacy which finds its field of action in the interaction between government and inhabitants of foreign countries. The aim is to disseminate information or cultural products to people in foreign countries through media (in their preferred language) or by using local human networks within the elite (e.g. scholarships, or access to publications in certain scientific journals, invitations to conferences, etc.) [WIK 18a]. But this vision, very different from classical diplomacy, has been complicated in recent years by the emergence of e-diplomacy, so the terms and “digital diplomacy”, “e-diplomacy”, “open diplomacy” and “diplomacy of influence”, appear. Diplomatic communication is profoundly changed, due to both the need to make things known and the immediacy with the world as a field of action and of course one which exists in various different languages. The communications director for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs sums up the problem well: “It [diplomatic communication] must address new audiences: the Arab Spring has shed a harsh light on the need to implement communications that appeal to the greatest number. The time is over when diplomacy was aimed at official circles or the media alone. From now on, it is young people, the opponents, minorities, civil society in all the diversity of its components that are targeted by the public diplomacy” [VAL 13]. We are witnessing the development of mobile applications, the use of the Web and the use of sharing sites such as YouTube, Dailymotion, etc. We can say globally that public diplomacy has the following objectives [LEQ 13]: – to publicize the official positions of the state, especially the press and other media; – to promote the exchange of positions and debates of ideas; – to develop cultural exchanges (education, research, sport, etc.).

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In a recent report (2017) on the US National Security Strategy, “democracy” is described under the title “Competitive Diplomacy”, where different aspects are considered as well as various tools necessary for it, which are described in detail. More particularly, Part IV: “Advance American Influence” [NAT 17]. 6.7. Positive influence If in most cases influence is considered as harmful (intrusion into the way of thinking of others), it also has positive effects depending on the way it is exercised. Indeed, influence can be used as a vector of good practice; for example to maintain a suitable environment, or to ensure that good decisions are made. In this case, the mode of governance from which the influence will be organized must have an ethical dimension. 6.7.1. Influence, rumors and territorial attractiveness The regions which have recently been brought together become competitive in the current context. This means that despite European efforts, notably the RIS (regional innovation systems), to differentiate the regions and develop them on their strong points, the competition for tourism, industrial and research establishments are increasingly becoming developed. At the national level, competitive intelligence has undergone a profound overhaul that highlights the shift from a nationally organized competitive intelligence, to a more widespread competitive intelligence that will be the product of the regions [CIW 16]. There will therefore inevitably be discrimination between the regions that will have efficient systems and others that will do little or almost nothing and that will therefore become structurally irrevocable. This is the challenge of territorial attractiveness [DOU 99] and its international impact. As early as 1998, Henri Dou [DOU 98] indicated this in the context of the attractiveness of the area: “If we refer to the analysis determining the innovation criteria of the companies, we quickly come to consider that the analyzed company is big enough to present in a visible or potential way the necessary criteria, or it will be necessary, for the difficult zones, to substitute for the notion of single and

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isolated enterprise, a more global notion. Thus, the notion of an isolated enterprise, then of a network and even of a virtual enterprise, is replaced by a more modern notion, that of an identity linked to the places and the zone in which one finds oneself, to the accessible resources, the quality of the human and intellectual environment. It is the local anchoring which will evolve into the Glocal (contraction of local and global)”. 6.7.2. Becoming attractive To be attractive, it is basically up to a region to highlight its assets and opportunities and, if possible, to reduce the impact of its weaknesses and the threats that can “weigh” on those who come to work with regional companies. It is therefore necessary to create the notion of collective vision, which it will be necessary to develop or to find within a geographical area, to give it in many cases a kick start to help it back on its way. It is therefore certain that the notions of influence and rumors will take their place. A region will necessarily have to worry about two main axes to create their own influence: – to have a clear vision of its development; – to determine the targets on which its influence must bear. This cannot be done without resorting to the active forces of the area on the one hand; but on the other hand, by setting up think tanks which will bring, through brainstorming, analysis of the event, and some the ideas that will have to be integrated in the actions of influence. In this context, the development of a centralized unit allowing access to information is necessary. We have emphasized this from the beginning and it is important to master this aspect because it is the basis of group creation, and essential knowledge for necessary action. Everything is important. We find examples in the awarding of the Olympic Games to the city of London instead of Paris [BED 05], and the choice of Valencia for the America’s Cup while Marseille was also a candidate [GAZ 08, OBS 03]. Once the vision and the target are well defined, then we will move to the level of both verbal and non-verbal communication, as described by Joseph Nye [NYE 16]. It is in this context that the press, television and journalists will have to be mobilized according to a plan and definite roles. The

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triggering of an influence action (or more if the context allows it) must be followed; that is to say that we must also develop indicators to measure the impact of this or these actions. Rumors will, de facto, counteract the influence actions and they will have to be detected as soon as possible and actions to minimize them will have to be immediately put into place. This, as we have already pointed out, is beginning to emerge. A region or even a specific geographical area must have formed a group of trained people capable of managing crises. This group, through simulation exercises, must be ready for action. It is also assisted by an analysis of possible rumors, generating probable crises. In this field, one can often have a sudden and unpredictable rumor, but there are also fundamentals generating crises that must be controlled in terms of communication, but also influence. This will mainly concern security, various traffic, areas of lawlessness, strikes, cleanliness, etc. Indeed, if we do not control the rumors, we will lead to an image deficit that will be harmful at different levels: tourism, industrial or research facilities, etc. In the southern regions of France, if the climate has undeniable attractiveness, we should not simply accept this as sufficient. Indeed, in the current context of competitiveness, there are numerous factors of attractiveness. Detecting them to act efficiently is a priority in territorial influence actions. In addition, there are more and more indicators that fragmentation of the nation state, or even regions, may occur [DAV 15]. Indeed, the rich do not want to pay for the poor anymore. It will therefore be necessary, even within a territory, to think of a “redistribution” of the result of development and to take it into account concerning the aspects of endogenous influence. 6.8. Conclusion In a context of exacerbated competition, where friends one day can become the competitors of tomorrow, competition becomes the rule. If at the general level we often talk about ethics at the level of competition, we must be aware that this is only a facade and that the rules of the game are often biased. Influence is via multiple channels…rumors are part of it. So you must not be naive. Building one’s own actions of influence is fundamental, as is the development of crisis cells to fight rumors effectively. We must not be paranoid, but be aware that in a changing world the rules of the game are more and more fluid and that, for example, fighting corruption does not mean that we do not corrupt. We are simply fighting a type of corruption,

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which allows for the establishment of effective communication, but at the same time we are developing different types of corruption through different channels, all of which serve the same purpose. The challenge for states, companies, regions, departments and industrial zones is fundamental; it is not enough to have a good strategy, but it must be legitimized, explained and made attractive. It is beyond classical competitive intelligence that we must act and the introduction of strategic intelligence within organizations becomes a necessity. This is because only this will allow, through the analysis of information, the development of think tanks and the lasting creation of knowledge for action. This ties in with the concept of territorial intelligence which must take into account these different aspects (among many others) and which should lead to a new mode of participatory governance of local development, including all the stakeholders and, in particular, the citizens. 6.9. References [AUG 15] AUGRY M.-L., “Liberté d’expression et responsabilité éditoriale, que dire et montrer ?”, FranceTVInfo, 2015, available at: http://www.francetv info.fr/replay-magazine/france-3/votre-tele-et-vous/votre-tele-et-vous-du-mercredi28-janvier-2015_803041.html. [BAC 10] BACON T., “The art of getting others following your lead”, Power of Influence, 2010, available at: http://www.theelementsofpower.com/index.cfm/ how-influence-works/. [BED 05] BEDÉI J.-P., “JO 2012. La grande désillusion. France − Douche glacée hier à Singapour : Paris a perdu de quatre voix le vote pour l’attribution des JO 2012 face à Londres qui l’emporte grâce à une campagne de lobbying agressif. Un échec cinglant pour la France”, La dépêche.fr, 2005, available at: http://www.ladepeche.fr/ article/2005/07/07/318256-jo-2012-la-grande-desillusion.html. [CIW 16] CIWORLDWIDE, “Important changement dans la structuration de l’intelligence économique en France”, February 2, 2016, available at: http:// s244543015. onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=1876. [CLE 04] CLERC P., “Hommage au professeur Stevan Dedidjer”, Regards sur l’IE, no. 5, p. 32, 2004. [COM 12] COMBALBERT L., DELBECQUE E., La gestion de crise, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2012.

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[DAV 15] DAVEZIES L., Le nouvel égoïsme territorial : Le grand malaise des nations, Le Seuil, Paris, 2015. [DEG 11a] DEGAND A., “Le multimédia face à l’immédiat, une interprétation de la reconfiguration des pratiques journalistiques selon trois niveaux”, Communication, vol. 29, 2011, available at: https://communication.revues.org/ 2342. [DEG 11b] DEGAND A., “Les journalistes belges face au Web : ‘Je suis un journaliste frustré’”, Apache, February 11, 2011, available at: https://www.apache.be/fr/ 2013/02/11/les-journalistes-belges-faces-au-web-je-suis-un-journaliste-frustre-1/. [DOU 98] DOU H., “L’attractivité de zone – Quelques réflexions, comportements et indicateurs”, Rencontres de l’ORME, Technologies et communication, la France en pointe, Marseille, October 5, 1998. [DOU 99] DOU H., MASSARI COELHO G., “Au-delà de l’intelligence compétitive : L’attractivité”, ISDM, Information Science for Decision Making, pp. 12–54, 1999, available at: http://isdm.univ-tln.fr/PDF/isdm4/isdm4.pdf. [DOU 14] DOU H., “A new way to understand the ‘force field analysis’ from Big Data analytics may be the future engine of the smart cities development”, Symposium International ICCI (Competitive Intelligence) Big Data, Beijing, China, October 25–26, 2014, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ ciworldwide/?p=1702. [DOU 15] DOU H., MANULLANG S.-D., KISTER J. et al., “Automatic patent analysis used to improve innovation and development in developing countries”, British Journal of Applied Science & Technology, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 237–252, 2015, available at: http://www.sciencedomain.org/abstract/8053. [DOU 16a] DOU H., “Introduction à l’intelligence territoriale”, CESER PACA, Commission Prospective, July 22, 2016, available at: http://s244543015. onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=1942. [DOU 16b] DOU H., KONÉ H., “L’innovation frugale dans les pays en développement et la nécessité d’une protection intellectuelle appropriée”, Mondes en développement, vol. 44, no. 173, pp. 29–45, 2016. [ENN 18] ENNIS R., “Critical thinking: Reflection and perspective part 1”, Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disclipines, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 4–18, 2018, available at: https://philpapers.org/rec/ennctr. [FME 10] FME TEAM, Understanding Emotional Intelligence, Free Management eBooks, 2010, available at: http://www.free-management-ebooks.com/dldebkpdf/fme-understanding-emotional-intelligence.pdf.

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[FRA 16] FRANÇOIS L., ZEBIB R. (eds), Influentia : La référence des stratégies d’influence, Lavauzelle, Panazol, 2016. [FRÉ 15] FRÉDÉRIC, “Explosion de rumeurs !”, Hoaxbuster, 2015, available at: http://www.hoaxbuster.com/dossiers/explosion-de-rumeurs. [GAË 06] GAËL, “Procter et Gamble ou le satanisme révélé”, Les sceptiques du Québec, 2006, available at: http://www.sceptiques.qc.ca/forum/viewtopic.php? t=2912. [GAI 12] GAILDRAUD L., Orchestrer la rumeur, Eyrolles, Paris, 2012. [GAZ 03] GAZONNEAU A., “Marseille et la coupe de l’America : Un enjeu de quelque 1,4 milliard d’euros”, Batiactu, 2003, modified in 2008, available at: http://www. batiactu.com/edito/marseille-et-coupe-america-un-enjeu-quelque-14-milliard-15 569.php. [HOL 05] HOLDEN G., ROSENBERG G., BARKER K., “Bibliometrics: A potential decision making aid in hiring, reappointment, tenure and promotion decisions”, Social Work in Health Care, vol. 41, nos 3–4, pp. 67–92, 2005. [JUI 09] JUILLET A., “Stratégies d’influence, le décryptage”, Communication & Influence, Special edition, no. 1, June 2009. [JUI 15] JUILLET A., L’influence, 3e rencontre de Daklha, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2015. [KAP 87] KAPFERER J.-M., Rumeurs, le plus vieux média du monde, Le Seuil, Paris, 1987. [KIM 04] KIMMEL A., Rumors and Rumors Control, Free Press, New York, 2004. [LAR 08] LA RUMEUR, “La Rumeur sur Procter et Gamble”, December 29, 2008, available at: https://larumeur.wordpress.com/2008/12/29/la-rumeur-sur-procteret-gamble/#more-69. [LEQ 13] LEQUESNE C., “La diplomatie publique : Un objet nouveau ?”, Mondes : Les cahiers du Quai d’Orsay, no. 11, pp. 9–12, 2013, available at: https://www. diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/MONDES_11_FR-EN_cle0b857d.pdf. [MAY 13] MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER V., CUKIER K., Big Data: A Revolution that will Transform How we Live, Work, and Think, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston, 2013. [MAZ 11] MAZZUCCHI N., “Le cinéma vecteur d’influence culturelle”, Polemos, February 19, 2011, available at: http://www.polemos.fr/2011/02/le-cinemavecteur-d%E2%80%99influence-culturelle/.

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[MER 12] MERCIER A., “La place des réseaux sociaux dans l’information journalistique”, ina, October 2012, available at: http://www.ina-expert.com/edossier-de-l-audiovisuel-journalisme-internet-libertes/la-place-des-reseaux-sociauxdans-l-information-journalistique.html. [MIZ 14] MIZERA S., “Le fiasco médiatique de la révolution et des charniers de Timisoara en Roumanie”, IDEOZ, June 8, 2014, available at: http://voyages.ideoz. fr/le-fiasco-mediatique-de-la-revolution-et-des-charniers-de-timisoara-en-roumanie /#UJg9kEiQm3cdXUvF.99. [NAT 91] NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, “Strategic leadership and decision making”, 1991, available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ ndu/strat-ldrdm/pt4ch18.html. [NAT 17] NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ARCHIVE, Website, 2017, available at: http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2017/. [NYE 14] NYE J., “The information revolution and soft power”, Current History, vol. 113, no. 759, pp. 19–22, 2014, available at: http://www.currenthistory. com/Article.php?ID=1113. [NYE 16] NYE J., Great decision, soft power, YouTube, 2016, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_58v19OtIIg. [OBS 03] L’OBS, “America’s cup 2007 à Valence. Remous à Marseille”, December 1, 2003, available at: https://www.nouvelobs.com/sport/20031126.OBS0292/ america-s-cup-2007-a-valence-remous-a-marseille.html. [PAR 01] DE PARCEVAUX A.-C., “Gestion de crise : Il faut anticiper”, L’express − L’entreprise, May 29, 2001, available at: http://lentreprise.lexpress.fr/rhmanagement/gestion-de-crise-il-faut-anticiper_1527170.html. [RAC 11] RACOUCHOT B., “L’influence, pointe de diamant de l’intelligence économique : Décryptage d’Eric Delbecque”, Communication & Influence, no. 28, December 2011. [RAC 12] RACOUCHOT B., “L’influence, lobbying, public diplomacy… La France face aux armes smartpower : Le décryptage de Claude Revel”, Communication & Influence, no. 34, June 2012. [RAC 17] RACOUCHOT B., “Géopolitique & entreprise, entre puissance et influence : Le décryptage de David Simonnet”, Communication & Influence, no. 80, pp. 1– 6, February 2017. [REN 15] RENARD T., PINOT DE VILLECHENON F., “Opérations d’influence autour de l’organisation de grands événements : Le cas des expositions universelles”, Influencia : La référence des stratégies d’influence, Lavauzelle, Panazol, 2015.

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[VAL 13] VALERO B., “Éditorial : Le Quai d’Orsay sur le sixième continent, celui de la diplomatie numérique”, Mondes : Les cahiers du Quai d’Orsay, no. 11, pp. 3–5, 2013, available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/MONDES_ 11_FR-EN_cle0b857d.pdf. [WIK 15] WIKIPEDIA, “Organisation non gouvernementale”, 2015, available at: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_non_gouvernementale. [WIK 18a] WIKIPEDIA, “Diplomatie publique”, 2018, available at: https://fr.wikipedia. org/wiki/Diplomatie_publique. [WIK 18b] WIKIPEDIA, “Emotional intelligence”, 2018, available at: http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Emotional_intelligence.

7 Sphere of Influence

In this chapter, we have chosen to illustrate the fruitful articulation between the competitive intelligence approach and strategy through a “strategy of influence” approach inspired by the field of geopolitics [CLE 11]. In 2001, strategist Richard D’Aveni [DAV 02] showed how global companies achieve “supremacy” through influence by shaping the market to their advantage through the construction of spheres of influence, real competitive arsenals, and playing a mix of confrontation, cooperation and competition. In this, it illustrates what we call, among others, strategic invention or strategic innovation, essential steps that are the motivation of this book. The analyst D’Aveni debates the doxa on business strategies, hybrid analysis matrix companies with those of geopoliticians. Chambers of commerce and industry, in France, used this matrix both to think about the strategies of SMEs, clusters of companies, but also local development strategies in the French regions [DOU 16]. They used it as a matrix for organizing prospective approaches to think about their own future. This chapter illustrates the creative capacity of the competitive intelligence approach, which tirelessly links, crosses, associates, cross-fertilizes and never separates to brave the uncertain, the unforeseen, even the unknown. It also reinforces the positioning of competitive intelligence as “daughter of strategic intelligence” [BLA 06]. The strategic thinking and the steering of strategies that we describe as influencing the territories of the world modeled by a conflictual globalization therefore concern companies, like states and territories, and finally any organization in search of strategic positioning.

Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1: A New Strategic and Operational Approach, First Edition. Henri Dou, Alain Juillet and Philippe Clerc. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Before describing the concept of the sphere of influence, its implementation and advancing illustrations, we wish to return to key observations and definitions that will help to establish the relevance of the dynamic matrix of spheres of influence. 7.1. The return of geopolitics in the economic field Analysts at the geopolitics study center of Grenoble management school [GRE 17] alert us to the lack of appetite of corporate decision-makers for geopolitical issues and their priority consideration in their analyses and strategies. On the other hand, public decision-makers find it difficult to integrate political and economic forces into their strategic thinking. France, however, poses the problem well through the strategy of competitive intelligence that it implements since the first experience constituted by the establishment of the Committee for Competitiveness and Economic Security (CCSE) in 1995 [CCS 95]. Does this strategy make it possible to maintain its industrial and cultural identity, to strengthen its bargaining power at the heart of the major globalized networks of dominance (industry, technology, knowledge, information) and to fight against the multiple risks of dependencies: resources, talents, data? In a way, it is a question of questioning the soft power of France, the tools of its power, its capacity of collective intelligence of the world in order to brave the entirely new challenges of the period. There is an urgent need to integrate in our strategic anticipations the priority of geopolitical and geoeconomical – as we will see later – for at least three reasons. First, because the analysis units of balance of power situations in the global economy have changed [DAV 12]. A shift is taking place from competitive strategies for large groups to competitive strategies for nations and their networks of allies. The case is not new. Geopolitics, the object of which is the study of the interaction between space and rivalry for power, space and the search for power, concerns companies just as much as states. Then, because of the disintegration of the international system and the advent of a globalization of crises and helplessness, a phase of “strategic chaos” Nicole Gnesotto as described by [LAM 17], geopolitical specialist at

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the CNAM, in a recently published dialog with Pascal Lamy, former Director General of the WTO. Finally, because “for decades never, has the world appeared so unstable, so unpredictable, so indecipherable”. When the very notion of “strategic surprise” becomes the paradoxical foundation of the global system [AML 17], it is necessary “to explore the almost infinite complexity of the facts” and to mobilize the “ability to understand the forces, movements and contradictions of the globalization”. These observations refer us to the choice of the analysis matrix: geopolitical or geoeconomic [LAM 17]. The latter, born in the early 1990s, deals with the interaction between space and economic and commercial confrontation led by the states in the context of competitiveness and economic security policies in search of a position of influence and power, promotion and protection of national strategic sectors. Exploring the complexity requires the complementary use of the two analysis matrices. To deal with this challenge, the implementation of competitive intelligence as a way of thinking economic and cultural power struggles and as a mode of action to control them, is clearly understood as a “strategic action” approach that is in agreement with the work of Habermas [HAB 87]. In the strategic activity, the actors coordinate their action plans by means of the influence they exert on each other, aiming at success, “the will to influence others with a view to the satisfaction of his own interests” [HUY 05]. It is important to stress here the central positioning of influence strategies in the competitive and cooperative arsenals of states, territories, companies and actors engaged in the issues of civil society. As the central pillars and history of competitive intelligence, the influence and strategies that implement it have become preeminent in increasing the power of both nations and companies [DAV 02]. They are the major vehicle for steering economic and cultural power struggles [CLE 08]. 7.2. Power strategy and influence strategy For companies and states, conquering and surviving requires strategy, hence the need to develop a culture of strategy and strategic thinking [ZAI 13].

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7.2.1. States Thus, Joseph Nye, through an abundant literature, analyzes the key drivers of power [KEO 98]. He questions the ability of a country to control the international environment to lead other nations to act according to its views: typically illustrated by the will of successive American public authorities the slogan “shaping the world” [TUS 16] or the promotion of the social market economy model by the Germans as a model for Europe. Joseph Nye gives us an effective definition of these dynamics: “Power is the ability to develop a real influence on others by causing them to act according to its own interests. It manifests itself in the form of hard power that uses radical methods such as coercion and corruption or soft power that tries to convince by seduction and persuasion” [NYE 13]. It is like “acting on the situation so that it produces the desired effect for your interests or how to make the other do what you want them to do” [HUY 11]. In addition, he notes that “the new globalization” is distinguished by the emergence of new actors, including collectives whose power and influence will gradually increase. Also, to develop power and influence in a globalization where power is distributed requires maintaining alliances and creating new networks articulating hard power (power of coercion) and soft power (power of attraction and persuasion). It then becomes essential to develop “contextual intelligence” of stakeholders and situations to adjust cooperation and development strategies [CLE 15a]. Here, culture becomes the epicenter of the balance of power and growth strategies [CLE 08]. In this spectrum, let return for a moment to the discipline of international political economy. With its American, Canadian and British “branches”, it aims to “build tools to analyze the balance of political power influencing globalization”. The definition that Susan Strange [STR 15] (English school) gives power integrates, in our view, both the approach of the American Nye soft power and that of the influence of D’Aveni. The power it qualifies as “structural” consists of “the ability to elaborate, decide, legitimize, implement, control the rules of the game of globalization which others must necessarily accept”.

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Seeking to answer the ambitious question “who holds the power in the world economy? Banks, states, the G20, Google?”, Susan Strange sees the “spread of power around the world”. Traditional and new actors (NGOs, mafias and criminal networks, etc.) are all trying to influence global political relations in their favor. To conclude that, through confrontations and negotiations, the actors generate “national, regional, international public standards, private standards and areas of non-governance. All these rules constitute a moving and evolving universe” [STR 15]. 7.2.2. Companies Schematically, two major schools of strategy of organization can be distinguished [LER 08]. 7.2.2.1. Positioning strategy It is for the organization to adapt to its environment and the fields of power/confrontation it undergoes and must control. It is about acquiring and maintaining a competitive, “differentiating” advantage over rivals. By strategic positioning, the organization then seeks this differentiating advantage and for that, must conduct an analysis of its positioning in a given context (techniques and methods of competitive intelligence: analysis matrix of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities, threats) [HUY 05]. It thus defines the field of rivalries, and leads to identifing the key factor of the advantage it holds to define the type of offensive and/or defensive strategy that it wishes. There is a more recent approach that is formulated as follows: adapting to its environment today is no longer enough (positioning). Conquering and building the competitive advantage becomes the operating mode. 7.2.2.2. Influence strategy The “strategist” organizations think and drive renewed strategies, consisting of changing the rules of the game and the balance of power. It is simply called “influence”. How can one influence the forces/stakeholders at work in the active environment of the organization to give the organization a “power of influence”, an advantage. “How do you get stakeholders to do what’s in my best interest, that of the organization and its members?”

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The perspective of strategic analysis is reversed: the focus is on the organization’s ability to use and transform the environment for its own interests, vision and key objectives to gain bargaining power, the power of coercion. The organization uses a differentiating and strategic advantage, namely its resources and skills. Resources are strategic, tangible and intangible assets (know-how, reputation, goodwill, etc.). Competencies implement, organize and combine resources to provide customers with products or services that have significant value. The competitive advantage lies in the innovative exploitation of the key competences of the company. Here, context analysis is done through the lens of resources and skills. The latter approach is the one now chosen by many public and private organizations at the international level. The strategy and the strategic analysis that feeds it are based on key competencies, market shares, product lines, price competition, differentiation, unique value for the customer, and operational excellence. But, for US strategist Richard A. D’Aveni [DAV 02], this is not enough to configure strategies. Since the 2000s, to observe and study the fighting that multinationals and other large groups engage in – or do not engage in (decision not to position in certain product/market segments) – he comes to prescribe the need for companies to analyze their sector of activity as systems of power and develop in this respect strategies of power vis-à-vis the other actors of the sector. Beyond the operational excellence, it is for “the strategic supremacy” that the company must aim, explains the American strategist. The latter thus completes the arsenal of strategic business thinking – “core competencies”, product strategy, customer orientation – notably by introducing the concept of spheres of influence, as an arsenal intended to prevent short-sighted strategies – “blind spots”, the certainties and other “strategic tensions” of decision-makers. How does Richard D’Aveni define “strategic supremacy”? It consists of three principles of power. In our opinion, they correspond to a strategy of competitive intelligence: the power of perception first, understood as intelligence of the situation, competitive situations and key drivers of the influence of the company and competitors in its markets. The second power is the power of influence over customers: “capture their hearts and minds”. Finally, the third is that of shaping a favorable environment by using different competitive and cooperative combinations and models.

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7.3. The sphere of influence: illustrations After defining and describing the different spaces constituting a sphere of influence and their functions, we will try to apply and implement the strategic matrix. From the sphere of influence of a company, we will describe how the French assembly of chambers of commerce and industry, CCI France, declined the matrix for use in the regional territories. 7.3.1. Definitions According to Richard D’Aveni, who brings political economy into the company, throughout history, spheres of influence as a geopolitical concept are used in the management of power relations between countries. He takes the example of the sphere of influence of Rome during Antiquity and describes the dynamics of the spheres of influence of the Cold War – the Western and the Soviet. Nations are pursuing these strategies today. They are also, in his view, the effective, if not the best, path to establishing a profitable business order in the world’s markets. Companies expanding their hold on these markets have interest in thinking about their strategy in terms of increasing power and spheres of influence. The strategist defines the latter as the “product-geography” zones over which the company holds a decisive influence over the players in its sector of activity, as well as within the competitive power relationships that are active on it. Through the sphere of influence designed, the company redefines its product portfolio. The purpose of the sphere of influence is to promote, defend and protect one’s position. A sphere of influence is built up from existing positions, acquired positions and assets. This set, which contributes to support the company, must be supplemented by a clear strategic intention serving the sphere of influence. It is necessary to define the area of influence (regional, national, international) on which decision-makers want to establish a leadership or to develop in cooperation by strategic supremacy, before defining the fields of activity which will contribute to strengthening this influence. A well-built sphere of influence will help push competitors into a “corner” of the market, reduce the price war by “the threat of mutually assured destruction”, “encourage competitors to develop on non-confrontational markets”, and ultimately shape the sector of activity to the mutual benefit of each.

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A well-constructed and controlled sphere of influence is made up of the following areas (Figure 7.1). The core of the sphere represents the central and essential part. The company draws from these resources and core competencies the revenues essential to its survival and growth. It is not the “core market”, but geographical areas where the company or entity has a decisive influence or the product from which it derives its main incomes. Vital interests, in the sphere, consist of geoeconomic activities that provide the business or entity with the ingredients of its power. These are key assets for the performance of the core business. These activities contribute to the profitability of the products/services of the core (goodwill, anticipations of new needs, consumers’ uses or new customers). Advanced positions or forward positions have an important function of preparing market access and prefiguring new offers (innovation) that will enrich those of the core. These are essentially core-like product/market packages, but deployed by strong competitors. The advanced positions of the company are close to the core of the competitors’ spheres. For example, the company may launch harassment attacks on the competitor and divert its attention and resources while investing in other markets. This is an observation post much closer to the competition. Buffer zones protect the core against competing intrusions and predators. As zones of resistance to attacks, they make it possible to measure/analyze the offensive capacities of the competitors. In concrete terms, these are market and product areas in which the company uses a “blocking brand” against a price attack by competitors, customers in this area being more sensitive to the brand than the price. Pivotal zones, finally, are markets (geographical areas) which can shift the balance of power to areas of establishment of competition. It is about moving the strategic pivot of the company or entity and taking a position in markets or a geographic area as a “bet on the future” [MOR 00]. Richard D’Aveni also refers to competitive spaces as “void of power”, that is to say no serious competitor is established on them.

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Figure 7.1. The different parts of the sphere of influence (according to Richard D’Aveni)

We wish to make some observations here. First of all, the concept of a sphere of influence and a new way of targeting strategic supremacy is essential when the market has become a permanently changing structure (geography, product segment, services, positioning product or services, etc.), disturbed by the disruptive dynamics of hypercompetition and breakthrough innovations born of the digital revolution. Second, the dynamic nature of the spheres of influence matrix, which complements the strategic concepts already in play, should be noted. In addition, the concept of sphere of influence is an agile device of permanent intelligence of situation, mobilizing capacities of anticipation and diversified analysis. Each zone of the sphere of influence is a function of monitoring a specific reality of the competitive confrontation: the buffer zones that are subject to the attacks of the competition make it possible to collect information on the behaviors, the intentions and the capacities of the competitors. Advanced positions are also business intelligence devices designed to detect innovations and needs of client groups. What about pivotal areas, also organized to gather information on future markets and prepare future developments of the heart? Finally, the sphere of influence represents as many drivers for action and stratagems. The arsenal it represents will help to reduce the sphere of influence, thus the power of a competitor, by enclosing it on its own core.

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7.3.2. The sphere of influence of a company Now, let us try to illustrate the concept of the sphere of influence through proofreading – as another interpretation – of IKEA’s international development strategy. Why this choice? IKEA is quoted extensively by Michael Porter in his long article “What is strategy?” as a company illustrating the strategic positioning approach [POR 08]. For his part, Richard D’Aveni debates the usefulness and operationality of the analysis of Michael Porter (the five forces) in view of the advent of new relations of power qualified as hypercompetition. Indeed, he considers his view to be “incompatible with Michael Porter’s strategic analysis, whose general models are useful when the competitive advantage comes from the structure of the sector, namely, when it comes to creating an oligopoly based on the five forces”. But, according to D’Aveni, hypercompetion considerably modifies the situation: new competitors, challengers carrying disruptive behaviors [DIR 16]. It reconsiders the five forces and seeks, through strategic innovation, not the perpetuation of acquired positions, but rather, how to act to disrupt or challenge the advantages created by the five forces (barriers to entry, oligopolistic prices, etc.). In imagining the operating concept of the sphere of influence, he wants to answer the following essential questions: “how do the established leaders maintain their position in the market and how do they react when a rebel or revolutionary movement agitates their sphere of influence?” Thus, building on this opposition, we attempted to re-read the story of IKEA’s international expansion of IKEA by Clayton Harapiak in 2013 [HAR 13] by interpreting it in terms of the strategic concept of the sphere of influence. We therefore want to establish a perspective on Richard D’Aveni’s concept and show its amplitude compared to reading, for example, Michael Porter. It is only a simulation, an essay from work done with students from the Institute of Business Administration of the University of Lyon 3 and Skema Business School during the year 2017. Michael Porter [POR 15], defining strategic positioning, writes: “A company can outpace its competitors only if it makes a difference that it can preserve”. He takes several examples of strategy and is interested in IKEA.

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“IKEA has a clear strategic position. The Swedish-based global furniture manufacturer is targeting young buyers who want cheap style. This marketing concept is converted into a strategic position thanks to the set of customized services offered. IKEA has chosen to do business differently.” This differentiation takes place compared to the traditional furniture manufacturer whose value chain optimizes personalization and service, but at a high price. “On the contrary, IKEA is aimed at customers who have no problem making a concession on the service in favor of the price.” The strategic positioning approach is certainly very useful in defining the major asset of the company. When a company like IKEA enjoys a clear strategic position, the mapping of its activities reveals the major strategic themes that Richard D’Aveni defines as the heart of the sphere of influence. There are four for IKEA: “limited customer service, direct customer choice, modular furniture design, low manufacturing cost”. They are then implemented by a set of linked and combined activities, which underpins the strategy and choice of positioning, competitive advantage and sustainability: transport provided by the customer, catalogs, displays of explanatory information, great variety and simplicity of manufacture, assembly of furniture by customers, stores in the suburbs with extensive parking, vast stocks on site, etc. Let us now try to define IKEA’s sphere of influence and question its strategy on the basis of Clayton Harapiak’s monograph [HAR 13]. The Swedish-based core has been defined around the four major themes. The core and the development of the “IKEA concept” that they defined allowed the company to nourish its growth by progressing in other markets, other geographical areas. In 1974, IKEA developed in a nearby market, West Germany. In 1982, the company moved to Canada and in 1985 to the United States.

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The vital interests that reinforce and sustain core growth can be defined at IKEA by design expertise, including eco-friendly products, compact packaging, economies of scale, simple transportation, and large on-site inventory, storage throughout the year, and especially additional services in stores (attractiveness). This is the example of access to the Chinese market that has revealed that the consolidation of the brand image was around the restaurant located in the store and attended by Chinese consumers as a family. The buffer zones are assured for IKEA by the goodwill of the brand, the capacity for innovation, the 100% provision from suppliers over the long term guaranteeing cost control and quality, especially compared to imitating competitors. IKEA’s markets with significant sales volumes are security positions to ensure economies of scale and competitive advantage. Advanced positions will be used by IKEA to penetrate new markets. The company chooses highly competitive markets where, as in Japan or the United States, powerful competitors in the furniture sector are located. We can imagine here that IKEA will try to take a position by destabilizing the competitors (Walmart, Kmart, Target, etc.), by disrupting the market with prices, even if it does not win anything. Advanced positions that get closer to the core of the sphere of competitors (Japan, China, United States, etc.) will serve as advanced positions to capture the innovations of competitors and adapt products to consumption patterns. The positioning of stores in cities in China and not in the suburbs could serve as an experiment for other markets. Finally, a pivot zone stands out to build the future of the company. It is China, whose potential is considerable whereas the competition is relative. IKEA enjoys a good brand image through the restaurants located in the shops and the surprising practice of the Chinese who come to sleep on the beds in the exhibition halls. The company has been able to locally produce furniture and display costs 70% lower than other markets. 7.3.3. The sphere of influence of a territory The objective of a territory’s sphere of influence is to structure the power needed to modify the balance of forces (influence) within its strategic

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environment in favor of the interests of its population, its tangible and intangible assets, of its human capital. Ultimately, it is a question of serving the power interests of this territory, namely, for the decision-makers, to impose their will on the stakeholders of their environment, to dissuade initiatives that could thwart their plans and to contain or constrain the ambitions competing territories. The power interests of the territory are deployed particularly in the battles of attractiveness of “intelligences”, skills, foreign investments, etc. 7.3.3.1. How to deploy the power interests of a territory The strategic positioning of a territory in the European and international competition invites territorial leaders and decision-makers to develop a strategy of power, consisting in acquiring the capacity and power that results from influencing or even defining the competition or cooperation rules of the game [DAV 02]. Thus, territorial decision-makers are able to define the boundaries of their territory and shape those of their competitors. They thus establish a sphere of influence allowing them to define their strategic options according to different areas of competitiveness. They thus master key issues such as addressing the risks of strategic dependencies, increasing the attractiveness of the area and opening up new development prospects. This modeling allows decision-makers to develop their strategic intentions in a coherent framework that fosters threats or opportunities arising in the competitive and economic environment through greater maneuverability, active listening and the deployment of competitive advantages. Such an organization also makes it possible to weave an extensive and effective system of power through the multiple links that make up the network of alliances of a territory. It facilitates the exposure of its attractiveness factors without resorting to direct confrontations. Finally, these zones of influence can be activated to force the “challenger” territories to disperse or weaken their forces. It should be recalled here that to design and pilot a strategy based on a sphere of influence, territorial decision-makers have several modes of strategic mediation. These are all modes of operation chosen to reduce the constraints and the risk-taking in the engaged maneuver. They come in a strategy of confrontation, avoidance or cooperation (Figure 7.2).

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Direct confrontation consists of differentiating oneself by competition (price, investment, influence, etc.) and having the power to negotiate with the key players in the environment. The city of Vatry in the Marne had in 2003 chosen to face the city of Leipzig in Germany in the fight whose stake was the implantation of the DHL sorting platform (1,400 jobs); Vatry lost. Avoidance makes sense in the relationship between the weak actor and the strong actor; avoidance allows one to leave the risky confrontation and to lead a strategy “knowingly”, but also to distinguish oneself by sheltering direct confrontations and rebuilding one’s bargaining power. In the battle of metropolises and their power, Grenoble Alpes Metropole has made the choice of avoidance vis-à-vis Greater Lyon. To survive and not lose their identity, decision-makers have chosen to distinguish themselves from others. Cooperation allows for the establishment of agreements/agreements, but also cooperation with the “competitor” (coopetition) on themes and objectives that are shared and less competitive.

Figure 7.2. The modes of strategic mediation

Therefore, the construction of a sphere of influence requires the control of its components as defined by the strategist Richard D’Aveni. 7.3.3.2. Zone definitions of the sphere of influence of a territory The core includes the economic activities through which the territory receives most of its income. The territory is master of the rules of the game on its core. This is the part that it absolutely must preserve for its economic security. This is the area of geoeconomic influence where lies its “supremacy”.

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Vital interests represent the area that consists of activities that, by themselves, are unattractive by their density or profitability, but that contribute to the territory’s position in its environment and to the attractiveness of activities located in the vicinity of the nucleus. These activities ensure the success of the “core”. Buffer zones consist of activities that prevent a competing territory from claiming to be able to attract the activities of the territory within its core. It is an “airbag” zone that is also used to detect the movements and intentions of the stakeholders, through its network of partners. Advanced positions are combinations of activities that are developed in partnership with public or private organizations from allied territories, in order to have real “bridgeheads”, capable of providing a critical advantage over competing territories. These activities, the fruit of strategic alliances, can also contribute to accelerate the entry of the territory into innovative fields or targeted geographical areas, to catch up with competitors or to counter the desire for a dominant position in another territory. Pivotal areas consist of activities or geographical areas of interest in which the territory invests to plant milestones in anticipation of future development opportunities. This zone also makes it possible to prevent a territory from holding a dominant position in the future that would have the effect of displacing the balance of forces in a market or a geographical area, or even risking a strategic dependence. 7.4. Conclusion A company, a territory, a region or an institution have in any case a zone of influence, whether material or immaterial. It is therefore necessary above all to know their influence factors and the area in which they are exercised. Then come the operations of defending these privileged areas, and extending them. But in a fast-moving world, these zones can vary according to the competition, geopolitical events and technological evolutions. This means that the current positions should not be taken for granted and we should always have in mind that they can evolve positively or negatively. Protecting and expanding these areas is imperative for any organization; it comes with the need to have the necessary information and to analyze it on a dynamic and prospective basis [CLE 15b].

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7.5. References [BLA 06] BLANC C., DELBECQUE É., OLLIVIER T., “Intelligence économique : Quand l’information devient stratégique”, Hermès, La Revue, vol. 1, pp. 87–91, 2006. [BON 03] BONDU J., “Francophonie et sphères d’influence”, Inter-ligere, 2003, available at: http://www.inter-ligere.fr/index.php/fr/geopolitique/25451francophonie-et-spheres-d-influence. [CCS 95] CCSE, “Comité pour la compétitivité et la sécurité économique”, Les Échos, April 12, 1995, available at: https://www.lesechos.fr/12/04/1995/LesEchos/ 16877134-ECH_comite-pour-la-competitivite-et-la-securite-economique.htm. [CHA 11] CHAVAGNEUX C., “L’instabilité du monde : Inégalités, finances, environnement. À propos de Suzanne Stange”, Ésprit, December 2011. [CLE 08] CLERC P., “La culture au cœur des rapports de force économiques”, Diplomatie, Special edition, no. 5, 2008. [CLE 11] CLERC P., “Intelligence économique et stratégies d’influence”, L’ENA hors les murs, no. 416, November 2011. [CLE 15a] CLERC P., “Du soft power au smart power. Quelles stratégies d’influence ?”, Diplomatie, no. 24, 2015. [CLE 15b] CLERC P., “Les enjeux informationnels des territoires” in C. HARBULOT (ed.), Manuel d’intelligence économique, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2015. [DAV 02] D’AVENI R.A., Strategic Supremacy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2002. [DAV 12] D’AVENI R.A., Strategic Capitalism. The New Economic Strategy for Winning the Capitalist Cold War, McGraw Hill, New York, 2012. [DEP 16] DEPRAZ S., “Économie sociale de marché ou économie verte de marché ? L’équilibre délicat de la durabilité territoriale allemande”, Bulletin de l’Association de géographes français, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 3–25, 2016. [DIR 16] DIRIDOLLOU C., DELECOLLE T., LOUSSAÏEF L. et al., “Légitimité des business models disruptifs : Le cas Uber”, La revue des sciences de gestion, vol. 5, nos 281/282, pp. 11–21, 2016. [DOU 16] DOU H., “Influence, rumeur, intelligence économique et attractivité territoriale”, Réseau transméditerranéen de recherche en communication, XVIIe Forum international, Marseille, France, November 24–26, 2016.

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[GRE 17] GRENOBLE ÉCOLE DE http://www.grenoble-em.com/.

MANAGEMENT,

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[HAB 87] HABERMAS J., FERRY J.-M., Théorie de l’agir communicationnel, vol. 2, Fayard, Paris, 1987. [HAR 13] HARAPIAK C., “IKEA’s international expansion”, International Journal of Business Knowledge and Innovation in Practice, vol. 1, 2013. [HUY 05] HUYGHE F.-B., Comprendre le pouvoir stratégique des médias, Eyrolles, Paris, 2005. [HUY 11] HUYGUE F.-B., “Diplomatie publique, softpower… Influence d’État”, Observatoire géostratégique de l’information, July 5, 2011, http://www.irisfrance.org/docs/kfm_docs/docs/2011-07-12-diplomatie-publique-softpower.pdf. [KEO 98] KEOHANE R.-O., NYE J.-S. JR., “Power and interdependence in the information age”, Foreign Affairs, pp. 81–94, 1998. [LAM 17] LAMY P., GNESOTTO N., BAER J.-M., Où va le monde ? Le marché ou la force ?, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2017. [LER 08] LEROY F., Les stratégies de l’entreprise, Dunod, Paris, 2008. [MEA 17] MEARSHEIMER J.-J., WALT S.-M., “Offshore balancing : Une stratégie globale plus efficace pour les États-Unis”, Revue internationale et stratégique, vol. 1, pp. 18–33, 2017. [MOR 00] MORIN E., Les sept savoirs nécessaires à l’éducation du futur, Le Seuil, Paris, 2000. [NYE 13] NYE J.S., “L’équilibre des puissances au XXIe siècle”, Géoéconomie, no. 65, pp. 19–29, 2013. [POR 08] PORTER M.-E., “The five competitive forces that shape strategy”, Harvard Business Review, vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 25–40, 2008. [POR 15] PORTER M., “Qu’est-ce que la stratégie ?”, Harvard Business Review, 2015. [STR 15] STRANGE S., Casino Capitalism: With an Introduction by Matthew Watson, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015. [TUS 16] TUSSIE D., “Shaping the world beyond the ‘core’, in R. GERMAIN (ed.), Susan Strange and the Future of Global Political Economy: Power, Control and Transformation, Routledge, London, 2016. [ZAI 13] ZAID M., TERGHINI S., “La notion de réflexion stratégique”, Studies and Research, vol. 5, no. 12, pp. 346–355, 2013.

8 Organizational Intelligence

“More than technical contagion, it is the access to organizational knowledge that becomes a factor of progress.” [ETT 14] In 1994, Henri Martre, honorary president of Aérospatiale, now the Airbus Group, put organizational intelligence at the heart of the competitive intelligence approach when he wrote: “What makes the exercise of the conduct of the company and thus the decision more and more difficult is that its scope has changed dimensions: globalization of the markets, multiplication and diversity of the number of actors, multiplication of the constraints, whose speed of events and the required reactivity are unprecedented. The scale is such that their evolution can no longer be mastered in traditional organizations.” [MAR 94a] He concluded by decreeing the innovative “urgency” and need for a profound revision of our modes of reflection, our methods of approaching situations, our methods of understanding situations, our behaviors and our organizations. In the contemporary era of multiple disruptive breaks, our organizations are called upon to design the methods and tools of an organizational intelligence whose purpose is to respond to the unprecedented challenges created by the metamorphosis of the growth model through the digital revolution. More than ever, it is necessary to acquire the collective

Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1: A New Strategic and Operational Approach, First Edition. Henri Dou, Alain Juillet and Philippe Clerc. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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intelligence capacity of the new dynamics or else to “fade into the background” [TEN 09]. At the heart of complex organizations and markets, the “ability to invent on a daily basis” and the “ability to invent for the future” as new ways cannot be considered alone. Co-production and “co-management” of intelligence capabilities are needed. How do we organize them? And according to which organizations? What is meant by organizational intelligence? What challenges does this approach face? Through these questions, we will sketch some possible responses [CHU 98]. 8.1. Definition Organizational intelligence can be defined as a process of production by an organization of situational intelligence: intelligence of strategies, threats, possible futures. It is also the product resulting from the process. It is basically the capacity of a community to mobilize the intelligence capacities of the organization (information and knowledge) in order to solve unprecedented and complex productive, economic, organizational, and technological problems. The promoter of the concept and its first implementation doctrine, Harold Wilensky, defined it in 1967 [WIL 67] as the process of competitive intelligence of collection, of processing, interpretation and dissemination of information relevant to the decision-making process and mobilizing the appropriate organization to do this. The author analyzed the purpose behind the centrality of organizational intelligence: the struggle of the organization against information-related pathologies. He placed the source in the attitudes of managers and their roles vis-à-vis knowledge and the influence of information specialists on the strategic process [TEN 09]. Later, almost at the same time that the Henri Martre commission [MAR 94b] conceived the French competitive intelligence conception and a doctrine of application referring to Harold Wilensky [WIL 67], Japanese researchers [CHU 98] introduced the concept in their literature, geared toward managerial practices. They define it as the interaction, accumulation and integration of human intelligence and machine intelligence inherent in any organization. Professor Juro Nakagawa [NAK 13] notes, however, that this does not reveal the essential feature of organizational intelligence: it comes from the organizational dynamics, from the organization as a whole,

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more than from individuals or groups, even though their role needs to be taken into account in the process. Thus, strategic alliances are a source of organizational intelligence, as are knowledge-sharing networks, including international ones, making the boundaries between organizations increasingly blurred. 8.2. Organizational intelligence and cognitive pathologies If the lack of organizational and managerial innovation is a serious evil that hampers the development paths of organizations and panics their strategic compass, the lack of intelligence of decision makers, such as that noted by the sociologist James March [MAR 91a, MAR 94a], will play a major role in this game: “Decision makers often act in a supervision mode rather than a problem-solving mode. In contrast to a theory of information that states that information is collected in order to make a choice among other alternatives, decision-makers monitor their environments looking for surprises and solutions. They watch what happens. In a very obvious way, they do not solve problems; they apply rules and copy solutions in others.” [MAR 94a] 8.2.1. The brakes of the organization The brakes that we analyze here, related to the organization and the lack of “organizational innovation”, will have to be lifted to release the strategic intelligence capacity of the organization and to prevent it from any blindness. Before describing the brakes, we should remind ourselves of the central link between organizational intelligence and the culture of the organization. 8.2.2. Corporate culture: both a brake and lever of organizational intelligence In an enlightening book, with an evocative title, Disconcerted Organizations, Philippe Baumard [BAU 96] analyzes the organization as a

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“cognitive system”, which will be the focal point of our chapter. On this occasion, he characterizes the sources of perceptual defaults as generating “blind intelligence” [MOR 94]. As a perceptual filter, the organization is confronted with what the author calls “the tyranny of the local environment”. The organization is multiple, or polymorphic. In this, he writes, it produces locally within it “passive zones” and “active zones”, which are more offensive, acting by intrusion, manipulation and influence of their environment. The actors who compose it then conduct their interpretations of the environment according to a principle of “limited rationality”, of “reduction” of realities from limits they impose and local visions. Beliefs and traditions, if present in organizations, will then play an important role in the ability to interpret the environment. Thus, the environmental intelligence device, whether passive or more offensive, is constituted by a multidimensional interpretation filter composed of several factors. In the first place, the filter depends on the culture of the organization, its history, its victories, its failures, its crises, its beliefs, its customs, its novations, but also its conservatisms. The men and women of the organization shape its culture. They come from socio-professional backgrounds, cultures, peoples and regions that have built their beliefs, their ways of acting and organizing. They import into the organization traditions and rites that they live, build and perpetuate on the outside, the very ones they will use in their participation in the collective intelligence of the organization. The culture of the organization is also forged and expressed for this assembly. It is then a collective culture with its rules, roles and standards: “The culture of a human group is the set of implicit rules that condition its conduct. It consists of rites, traditions, myths, values and shared symbols. The representations of the members of the group and the meanings they attribute to information and events feed on this cultural background.” [GEN 98]

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Comparative studies (France, United States, Netherlands) showed in the late 1980s [IRI 89] that organizational modes of organization are more the expression of culture (traditions, customs and societal practices) than the result of “scientific” methods of management. Let us indicate here that it is necessary to abandon any cultural determinism to explain the management and the strategies. An American study [GIL 04] shows that during the last 70 years, the surprise attacks that have been successful have not been successful because of the introduction of powerful lures and therefore the absence of detectable weak signals but because of misjudgments, strategic tensions, misrepresentations or obsolete beliefs and beliefs that have led the organization to ignore the risks. François Dupuy, a French sociologist [DUP 15], in a book describing his consulting experience, draws up an indisputable indictment of managers. They believe that they manage but, in reality, have no grip on employees; they make simplistic decisions. The sociologist notes their “general ignorance”; they do not know the phenomenon of power. According to them, to get out of this situation, the adage “understand to act” should be generalized. It is translated into a need for thoughtful action based on a serious investigation of reality and therefore of the deep causes to be corrected: “We have to get down to reality in its complexity [...] in other words, to understand in order to be able to act.” Secondly, the filter is subject to constraints of lack of time, urgency and over-information (reports, weak and strong signals from the environment, clubs and social networks, etc.). It is in these circumstances that the “pathology” of simplification appears. Faced with complexity, we tend to look for the path of simplification, “pruning” to understand, “pruning” to clarify. “Simplifying,” writes Edgar Morin “is mutilating”. He denounces the “paradigm of simplification” which, by disjunction and reduction, creates a true “pathology of knowledge” and produces a “blind intelligence”. The consequence of a shared simplification, taught from rules that make it possible to represent the economic and social activity of the company, rubs

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out whole areas of reality, for example the inscription of the company in its ecosystem (social, environmental footprint). The endangerment of the company occurs when the market strategy is exclusively subject, for example, to representations and modeling of the marketing department. Finally, the internal interpretation filter must deal with competitors, partners and stakeholders who have the same information about the environment of their organization. Thus, not being systematic in the implementation of their device of vigilance, approaching their environment often in an informal way, acting by mimicry vis-à-vis the organizations of the same mission, of the same sector, the majority of the organizations perceive their environment in fine according to “the reflection of their own beliefs”, their “biased” representations. The culture of the organization can then lead it to act in this field as “systems of misinterpretation” of the environment. Indeed, seeking to reduce uncertainty and complexity in an emergency, it tends to refer to its traditions, beliefs, and local references against the global vision. Reproduction and mimicry in progress among experts, themselves subjected to “the imperialism of calculating and quantitative knowledge” maintain the logic of the imitation of the form (organization) and the substance (strategy) of development policies and crisis situations. Hear us well, the experts are indispensable. But their universe is not without certain defects that can affect the intelligence of situations. 8.3. An example: the US–Japan FSX Fighter program or “thinking out of the silos” “He who wishes to avoid being deceived prevents his companion’s cunning with good reflections.” [GRA 90] A report published by the Rand Corporation in 1995 [LOR 95] analyzes the failure of the FSX combat aircraft development program (derived from the F-16 aircraft). It highlights the mistakes, the blindness, the many

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dysfunctions on the American side that have frustrated this JapaneseAmerican cooperation. At the heart of the reasons, a lack of organizational intelligence clearly shows. Americans have always discouraged their allies from building their own weapons system. In this case, their reluctance was based on the fact that the Pacific was a strategic area for the United States, which needed to be controlled. As a result, US policymakers and strategists are showing their hostility to Japan’s decision to build an all-Japanese fighter plane – the Rising Sun Fighter. They propose a cooperation to jointly develop a version of the F-16 Fighting Falcon of General Dynamics, the FSX. The objective is clear: to control the process of emergence of a potential competitor, beyond a power in the Pacific zone. This is a common problem in technology transfer processes. Crucially, we live today in France and therefore in Europe which is a partner and undoubtedly a competitor of China to name only EDF in the nuclear industry and Airbus in aeronautics. The author of the report describes the consequences of the many American psychological and strategic errors. The program ultimately favored the acquisition by the Japanese of the know-how contained in the complex production programs of the American F-16. More seriously, while they wanted, through this partnership, to prevent Japan from developing a fighter plane alone, the Americans contributed by a “boomerang effect” to create a competitor. The reporter reveals a gaping gap in organizational intelligence. The entry into negotiations in “administrative silos” undermines any coordination of the American strategy between the government and the industrialists: the complexity of the bureaucratic apparatus, the absence of a common State/industrial front, the lack of a shared strategic economic and military vision. The Pentagon and the State Department are in favor of co-production, while Congress and the Department of Commerce are opposed to it because of the risks associated with technology transfers. These divergent positions generate incessant disputes. They distract the Americans from the strategic intentions and tactics of the Japanese. The lack

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of coordination led to a lack of organizational intelligence, which did not allow anticipation, monitoring and analysis mechanisms to be put in place. The consequences are unacceptable: there was a lack of American control over the technological evolution and the final configuration of the FS-X aircraft. The Americans lost control of the changes to the base model to such an extent that the Japanese partner managed to modify 95% of the technical drawings provided by the Americans. The Japanese partner with a weak R&D base was able to benefit from all the upstream work of the Americans. The Administration and the American industrialists underestimated Japanese capabilities in military aeronautics. The certainty, to the point of blindness, that the Japanese military R&D base was weak and poorly funded deprived Americans of the knowledge of the partner’s military know-how. Supreme humiliation: the Americans discover that they have become, in this program, at the end of the R&D phase, a subcontracting base of the Japanese. Americans are ignorant of Japanese technologies and know-how in the field of aeronautics. Blinded by their supremacy, the Americans did not find it useful and did not know how to negotiate the transfer to their industry of the technologies developed by their partner during the SF-X program. They forced the partner to adopt their program proposal. The latter has adopted a counter-strategy based in particular on an organizational intelligence approach leading it to use the partnership to “influence” the program, develop modifications and transform it into a system of technological intelligence at the service of the growth of power of Japan. The Americans have allowed the emergence of an autonomous and competing Japanese defense industry, as well as military power in the Asia-Pacific region. 8.4. Organizational intelligence and strategies Forms of organization are being revisited, new forms are emerging. They generate the creativity needed for organizational intelligence. We propose to examine two such forms here, agile networks and organizations, accompanied by illustrations.

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8.4.1. Networks It is a question of rethinking the organizations that we build from our territories toward a new, relevant efficiency, that is to say one that corresponds to the new economic and social dynamics born of the great upheavals of the world. The network is part of the organizational arsenal of development actors. As an essential component of the social and economic world, they can be defined as “sustainable structures resulting from interactions” [IDB 12] (relations) between their components (individuals, organizations, networks, territories, knowledge, skills, etc.). Whatever their size (global, national, local), the dynamic they create according to their purpose is based on the mobilization of their “social capital” composed of several assets: network assets (resources, information, etc.), active relational assets, participative assets and trusted assets. Thus, networks correspond to complex structures and dynamics that globalization and the digital revolution have upset in space and time. From now on, their mastery depends on their membership in the world’s major networks of knowledge, innovation and expertise, which is essential for finding new growth paths. This registration is based on the “organizational innovation” [ETT 01] capacity of companies, research and knowledge networks of universities, as well as the ability to interconnect and “unite” new partnerships. It will then be necessary to set up an identification/diagnosis procedure for the “cognitive” quality of a network and its experts or watchmen. The valorization/evaluation of true social capital will have to go beyond economic indicators and integrate into the overall performance of the organizational intelligence system [CER 02]. We suggest here four entries to qualify and appreciate the performance of networks in terms of competitive and organizational intelligence. We distinguish: – “network assets” [LAN 00]: what kind of actions and information are produced by each network. What types of networks are used, with strong links or weak links, strong signals or weak signals, according to the proximity or distance from the core of the sector of activity concerned (industry, services, cultural industries)? What strategic mobility gives one one’s involvement in the network? It is at this level that we willingly situate

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the systems of strategic intelligence allowing us to anticipate the transformations/deformations of the sectors of the cultural industries, the crises and the critical movements (mergers, repurchases, disappearances of companies, emergence of a leader, etc.), but also information risks or the risks of strategic dependencies (loss of strategic skills, loss of mastery of key technologies, massive imports of cultural products); – “relational assets”: evaluation of relations between institutions, between organizations, by which actions and between the different networks. What is the level of synergy between individuals and organizations? What are the obstacles to cooperation? It goes without saying that the map of networks of allies or partners in international relations is here called into question; – “participation assets”: they concern the assessment of density/ proximity, the regularity of the commitment of public and private actors in networks of influence (for example the coalition for cultural diversity); – “trusted assets”: this is the desire of network players to sustain their action. 8.4.2. Agile organizations The definition that is given of the practice of agile organizations enriches the approach of the networks for our exchanges and our reflections. It will be appropriate to integrate them with the themes of our round tables. What is this definition? Crises, metamorphoses and shocks that make the environment of our organizations unpredictable (illegible?) summon “our organizational innovation capabilities” to imagine and build new ones with more “decentralized” architectures, at horizontal coordinations, implementing the sharing of information obtained through experience and great flexibility. Thus, the “agile” organization is distinguished by its compatibility with its environment and its ability, in case of modification of the latter, to modify its strategy according to the new environment or to reposition itself in a more favorable environment to better to act on (influence) the environment. The “agile” organization [ADB 98] is made up of “multi-functional” internal and external (cooperative) teams involved in organizational

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adaptation. It also includes back-office structures that provide teams with resources, tools and methods including systems for sharing and capitalizing information for a more flexible and faster adaptation to the environment. The “agile” organization is distinguished by an effective mobilization of its “social capital”, an in-depth knowledge of the environment, a mastery of know-how with added value and a high degree of initiative. Very clearly, we will have to note the significant gap that exists, for example, in territorial development policies between “prescriptive rationality” – resource allocation strategy, grants, advice aids and strategic formalization – and policy driven development strategy on the project base – innovation, territorial intelligence, export and information risk. Hence the use of men and women capable of broader, more qualitative perspectives, as well as an in-depth focus in the analysis of problems. 8.4.3. A network of experts Networks of experts link knowledge and skills to combat the risk of simplification. They also make it possible to take a necessary distance for the analysis. The mobilization and learning of intelligence capabilities requires a critical gap in relation to certain approaches and to certain obstacles. How can unprecedented problems be solved by calling on a network of experts? How can the organization of this network be outlined? Choosing the experts is an essential step in mobilizing network expertise to qualify the sources of information and validate the analyses. This is called “breadth of expertise”. This allows for broad visions of business sectors. The choice then focuses on the diversity of expertise, the mix of profiles (age, training, etc.). The art of detecting weak signals or “early warning signs” and emerging disruptions calls for “in-depth expertise”, that is economists specializing in such areas, technological experts or financial analysts and engineers.

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Hence the imperative to mobilize representatives of civil society, youth and their representative organizations to increase the wealth of decisions through intergenerational dynamics, but also to make decisions and choices more effective through their ability to analyse associated with their different look. Regarding the mobilization of digital data, it is necessary to think and organize their sovereignty, especially when their treatment makes it possible to solve problems related to the future of humanity and the planet. The provision of data to the greatest number as a common good requires the preservation of this sovereignty against predation and the risks of dependence. Typically, data, the ingredients of wealth, are the prey of large Internet groups, often more powerful than states. Private use for data business development purposes requires that a doctrine on data sovereignty be thought out. 8.4.4. The culture of organizations: management of cognitive biases and vehicle for the creation of a knowledge base of the environment Here, the culture of the organization as we have defined it becomes an essential lever of the interaction of the organization with its environment, its blockages and its advantages. The culture of the organization is added to the brakes that meet the intelligence capabilities of any organization and that an approach to competitive intelligence must prevent permanently. The organization is seen as a system that processes information to solve its problems and drive its “intrusions” into the market, into its environment. To do this, the organization has information, often too much information, that prevents it from forming real knowledge. In other situations, the organization may be able to build knowledge, but may also be unaware of the knowledge it holds. Competitive intelligence will make it possible to target risks, develop countermeasures and enhance the cultural assets of the organization, or even help to transform it in the light of the constraints imposed by the ecosystem.

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8.4.5. Managing the culture of organizations The culture of the organization is produced by the organization. It is an internal variable that expresses itself through the myths, traditions and rituals of the organization. Knowledge of the identity of the organization through its culture helps guide the changes. The management of the organization as a “cognitive system” is based on the identification of the knowledge and beliefs that individuals belonging to the organization share to communicate and innovate, for example. “Subcultures” appear in the same organization that managers can mobilize to resolve certain conflicts (for example, different national cultures represented in communities of researchers or workers within the same organization are more important than the structure itself, even the attitude toward the organization, the links with colleagues). So the culture of the organization develops on the basis of common values and rituals called “cohesion” which are fed permanently by “the context” in which the organization is bathed. The organization is influenced by what some people call the “societal culture”. It can indeed be “the fruit of locally typed cultural elements, such as value systems, ideals and meanings shared by the members of a country” or a territory. The territory of Choletais [SIT 09] carries a culture of the particular community which will influence the functioning of the actors of the productive system: “The weak influence of the family group on its members, from which a tendency to individualism emerges, clashes with conservative and religious values to leave the field open to an original organization of the community. Less folded on family structures, it is more permeable to the ‘coordinating forces’ of the Church and the local Catholic bourgeoisie. [...] What emerges is the branch and the firm, more than the family or the trade community, which gives meaning to the economic coordination.” These elements allow members of the organization to read and interpret the “context” to find the paths and pathways to understand its complexity and day-to-day complexity. Thus, participation in the activities of civil society (social, cultural, civic, etc. practices) contributes to enriching the

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“collective intelligence” of the organization: company, association or public organization. In the same sense of this construction of a culture shared by the members of the organization, prospective thinking is indispensable in that it allows us to build the desired culture, the one that organizes and mobilizes “intelligences”. 8.4.6. Learning organization An intelligent organization is defined by its ability to manage complexity, that is to say, to collect, extract the meaning of the movements and signals of its environment and to share it. To this must respond an ability to innovate in the organization and a new form of management which tends to be imposed gradually: “agility.” Intelligence is defined both as the process of creation of knowledge and as the “possession of knowledge”. The intelligent organization draws on its knowledge to solve a particular problem of production, innovation or strategy. It thus produces new knowledge through innovation or the exploitation of new situations. Three types of knowledge are then mobilized: – the tacit knowledge contained in specific know-how and intuitions is difficult to formalize; – the knowledge formalized in rules corresponds to routines and standard procedures allowing the coordination of controllable actions; – cultural knowledge is more contextual and expresses itself in the discourse. It is an integral part of the organization’s culture and contains stories, beliefs, myths and traditions. It is mobilizable to shape collective visions and give meaning to information and knowledge. 8.5. Collective intelligence and organization of sensor networks Collective intelligence within business networks, for example, is intended primarily to mobilize stakeholders on development issues that they cannot access individually [TAR 10]. Its mobilization by the actors of these

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networks, at the service of their organizations rests on a permanent process of organizational intelligence and requires that it be apprehended in the surpassing of simple sharing and interpretation of the knowledge to become a real system of decoding, of intelligence and creativity in the service of collective challenges of the sector or network. This approach is well suited to social innovation networks. Regarding the present approach, the competitive intelligence devices that feed the collective intelligence appear at the center of the new strategies of differentiation, even of diversification, those of the individual companies, those of the sector or the pole. In clusters or sectors, any collective intelligence approach brings together the skills of companies, research actors and organizations supporting economic development such as technical centers, chambers of commerce and industry (CCI), and technology diffusion networks. It is a collaborative set of links or relationships between people or organizations that work together as a system that shares information, knowledge and analysis to develop projects of collective interest. One could then think that this would develop a community competitive intelligence [REN 11]. Daniel Tartonne [TAR 10] explains that the challenge of support through a collective intelligence approach is to converge the companies of a sector, for example according to federative themes and creators of value and performance, inaccessible individually. These themes are classified under the heading of challenges or productive or commercial problems requiring solutions imagined in common and then applied individually: control of innovative processes or cost reduction, new organizations, etc. The themes mentioned by the members of the sector can also be defined as opportunities, issues of growth by business gains whose mastery is beyond individual capabilities. Figure 8.1 was collated in terms of feedback from industry and industry networks led by chambers of commerce and industry in search of the most innovative collective organizations that could lead to differentiation strategies and diversification of traditional sectors. It shows the wheel of components/ingredients of an approach of collective and organizational intelligence that can be mobilized, for example, in the repositioning of a cluster of companies or a sector. Accompanied by the CCI in their approach, companies in a sector are implementing strategic creativity based on a shared approach of collective intelligence. Competitive intelligence here applies to the controlled construction of an “integrating” value chain. A matrix and

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organizational tool, this chain assembles the assets – know-how, products, services, skills of companies in several sectors – to create the conditions for access to sophisticated markets that CCI France defined in 2009 as markets created through the combination of activities without direct links, resulting in a more comprehensive offer than traditional markets that have not yet been invested in or imagined.

Figure 8.1. Wheel of parts/ingredients of the steps toward collective and organizational intelligence

8.6. Conclusion The additional cost of running an administration, the loss of performance leadership or a geostrategic position, often comes from a lack of organizational innovation [ETT 14]. Thus, the application of innovative practices in the field of organization has an important influence on the results of the development of a territory. Unsuitable organizational practices will not only result in the demobilization of actors, but also in a loss of efficiency and particularly information. It is therefore important, at the level of territorial development, to carefully analyze organizational practices in order to determine blockages, obstructing practices and inappropriate steps. It is from this analysis that the practices will have to be modified.

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8.7. References [ALB 02] ALBRECHT K., Organizational intelligence and knowledge management: thinking outside the silos, White paper, 2002. [BAD 98] BADOT O., Théorie de ‘l’entreprise agile’, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1998. [BAU 96] BAUMARD P., Organisations déconcertées, Masson, Paris, 1996. [BER 09] BERGVALL-KAREBORN B., STAHLBROST A., “Living Lab: an open and citizen-centric approach for innovation”, International Journal of Innovation and Regional Development, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 356–370, 2009. [BID 12] BIDART C., DEGENNE A., GROSSETTI M., La vie en réseau. Dynamique des relations sociales, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2012. [CER 02] CERC, Indicateurs sociaux, état des lieux et perspectives, Report, 2002, available at: http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/20021015_manifesations_ perret.pdf. [CHU 98] CHUN WEI C., Information for the Intelligent Organization: The Art of Scanning the Environment, Asis&t, Silver Spring, 1998. [DUP 15] DUPUY F., La faillite de la pensée managériale: Lost in management, Le Seuil, Paris, 2015. [ETT 01] ETTIGHOFFER D., “La clé, c’est l’innovation organisationnelle”, L’expansion management review, pp. 104–109, September 2001. [ETT 14] ETTIGHOFFER D., “Le vertige technologique masque un déficit majeur d’innovation organisationnelle”, blogs.lesechos.fr, July 16, 2014, available at: http://blogs.lesechos.fr/intelligence-economique/le-vertige-technologique- masqueun-deficit-majeur-d-innovation-a14863.html. [GEN 98] GENELOT D., Manager dans la complexité, Insep Éditions, Paris, 1998. [GIL 04] GILAD B., Early Warning, AMACOM, Nashville, 2004. [GRA 90] GRACIAN B., L’homme de cour 1664, La Bibliothèque électronique du Québec, Montreal, 1990, available at: https://beq.ebooksgratuits.com/Philosophie/ Gracian-cour.pdf. [IRA 15] IRANI L., “Hackathons and the making of entrepreneurial citizenship”, Science, Technology, & Human Values, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 799–824, 2015. [IRI 89] D’IRIBARNE P., La logique de l’honneur : gestion des entreprises et traditions nationales, Le Seuil, Paris, 1989.

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[LAN 00] LANDRY R., AMARA N., LAMARI M., Influence du capital social sur les décisions d’innovation dans les entreprises manufacturières, Presses de l’Université Laval, Quebec, 2000, available at: https://www.researchgate. net/publication/251464579_L’influence_du_capital_social_sur_les_decisions_ d’innovation_des_entreprises_manufacturieres. [LOR 95] LORELL M., Troubled Partnership. A History of US-Japan Collaboration on the Fs-X Fighter, Report, Rand Corporation, 1995, available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR612z2.html. [MAR 91] MARCH J., “How Decisions Happen in Organizations”, Human Computer Interactions, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 112, 1991. [MAR 94a] MARCH J., A Primer on Decision Making, Free Press, New York, 1994. [MAR 94b] MARTRE H. (ed.), Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises. Rapport du Commissariat général au Plan, La Documentation française, Paris, 1994, available at: http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/ rapportspublics/074000410.pdf. [MIK 02] MIKHAK B., LYON C., GORTON T. et al., “Fab Lab: an alternate model of ICT for development”, 2nd International Conference on Open Collaborative Design for Sustainable Innovation, Bangalore, India, December 1–2, 2002. [MOR 84] MORIN E., WEINMANN H., La complexité humaine, Flammarion, Paris, 1984. [NAK 13] NAKAGAWA J., ISHIKAWA A., An Introduction to Knowledge Information Strategy: From Business Intelligence to Knowledge Sciences, World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 2013. [REN 11] RENARD T., “Existe-t-il une IE communautaire ?”, L’ENA hors les murs, no. 416, November 2011. [SIT 09] SITE INTERNET DE LA VILLE DE CHOLET, Schéma de cohérence territoriale : quel avenir pour votre territoire?, 2009, available at: http://www.cholet.fr/ download/down/scot.pdf. [TAR 10] TARTONNE D., “L’intelligence collective dans les réseaux d’entreprises”, Séminaire Intelligence stratégique, Conférence permanente des chambres francophones et africaines, HEC, Toulouse, France, 2010, available at: https://portail-ie.fr/resource/hommes-de-l-ie/392/daniel-tartonne. [TEN 09] TENZER N., La France disparaît du monde, Grasset, Paris, 2009. [WIL 67] WILENSKY H., Organizational Intelligence, Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry, Basic Books, New York, 1967.

9 From Military Intelligence to Competitive Intelligence

There is often confusion when we talk of competitive intelligence by the simple use of the word “intelligence” and its similarity to military intelligence. This sometimes leads to misinterpretations. In this chapter, therefore, we have dealt with the common points that link these two disciplines. 9.1. From the military to the economy 9.1.1. Military warfare Since prehistoric times, humanity has always fought to capture the human or material goods they desired. One never goes to war simply for war, but rather wants to own what the other possesses, or to prevent them from obtaining it, or even to impose a vision and way of living that do not belong to the other. The use of force having been, until the middle of the last century, the most effective action to obtain what we wanted, it is not surprising that today the military wars in parts of Africa, in Syria or against terrorism, is obvious to everyone. The last 50 years have shown that the major military powers no longer necessarily win against weaker countries, despite the dissymmetry of their balance of power, because of the pressure of public opinion. Everyone remembers the problems encountered by the French or American leaders in getting their populations to accept the war in Indochina, or more recently, the war in Iraq. The media weapon, operational guerrilla warfare, the

Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1: A New Strategic and Operational Approach, First Edition. Henri Dou, Alain Juillet and Philippe Clerc. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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disenchantment of populations with the duration of the conflict and sensitization to the human losses counterbalance the means that one implements, whatever the virtuous motive invoked to justify these operations. Despite power relations that impact global geopolitics, large countries can no longer win wars faced with emancipation wishes of all kinds. We stabilize, we stop, we push for negotiation and we leave by leaving the locals to fend for themselves in general chaos. Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq are regrettable demonstrations. 9.1.2. Integration of the economy Historically, the military has been interested in the economy as a means of pressure or as a weapon to break the enemy and to make them surrender. Nevertheless, this economic approach to warfare has always had a hard time being taken into account by government policy and services except in the particular case of a copy, process or product that has been recovered and exploited by backdoor ways using the resources of intelligence. Just look at the daily consumption of potatoes in France to understand what Antoine Parmentier has brought by discreetly recovering seeds from this tuber. At the same time, one can imagine what would have happened in England if Captain Bligh had been able to bring back the breadfruit trees he had in his hold on the Bounty. Despite its concrete results, economic war remains secondary in the eyes of the public who misunderstand the reality and the practical consequences. Targeting either leading companies or state-of-the-art technologies, replacing deaths with unemployment and military spending with decreases in GDP, its effectiveness is not measured by media impact. Yet projection wars, or so-called “asymmetric” wars, have less impact on the daily lives of our fellow citizens than these site closures, these disappearances of activities, or those transfers of research and skills that impoverish long term and inevitably our country. To be convinced of this, one needs to look at the immediate and time-related impact of the 2,850 job losses in the first part of the recent Alstom affair, or to remember Pechiney being sold over a weekend to its Canadian competitor with the loss in the following years of 70,000 jobs mostly in mountain valleys where employment is scarce.

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This reality is all the more stronger because it is practiced without the protection and the international rule of a Geneva convention. Any means can be used to destabilize or destroy from the legal track with standards and embargoes, extraterritorial laws, export constraints like ITAR rules [USD 10], counterfeiting or illegal copying, attacks over the Internet, image or file hijacking, denial of service attacks, corruption or “compliance” defects, etc. 9.1.3. The priority of the economy When the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) took control of part of Iraq and Syria to make it the new caliphate, the organization immediately prepared the export of oil, cotton and antiquities to Turkey, which brought them a lot of money. They resisted without great problems the Western attacks their as long as we did not act on economic means. This was all the easier because, for humanitarian reasons, Westerners did not want to attack civilian tankers on their way to Turkey – where crude oil was returning to Western refineries. As soon as the Russians did so, the financial flow was reduced and ISIL could not maintain the level of its military expenses and the salaries of its fighters. Economic realism rarely mixes with good feelings. This is why we are witnessing a very clear evolution of strategic conceptions. The military becomes the targeted complement of major economic action in which the knowledge of the adversary through competitive intelligence becomes the key to success. In this context, we even witness operations exploiting the information obtained by competitive intelligence in the form of influential actions that are sometimes enough to ensure victory. The United States, which no longer has the power relationship to impose on the world its hegemonic view, understood this before many others. Embargoes decreed by the Americans throughout the Western financial system against oligarchs or rulers with dubious behavior have shown their effectiveness in pushing for negotiation. Switzerland and Luxembourg, accused of being tax havens and undergoing a threat campaign, have given up and restructured their banking systems, while Delaware [ROB 16], whose elected representative was the former US vicepresident Joe Biden, remains out of danger. 9.1.4. The economic army Today more than ever, contrary to what many strategists think when only considering their own issues, the economy is directly or indirectly at the

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heart of conflicts, because it concerns businesses, activities and the life of citizens. In all its Eastern complexity, the Syrian affair cannot be understood if we omit the original economic conflict between the Qatari and Iranian gas pipeline projects. The economic weapon has become essential for winning in the global competition, but it requires having the right information to act, anticipate and react as efficiently as possible. The condemnation of Total, the BNP affair or General Motors’ acquisition of a stake in Peugeot can only be understood by integrating the American will to ensure its supremacy in the commercial negotiations and the economic approaches with Iran. The success of this type of strategy implies a perfect knowledge of the opponent, their strategy and their material and human resources. In the same vein, that of Alstom, which is explained by the desire to recover global leadership in gas turbines, is a perfectly successful operation that has lasted more than two years in which intelligence, including the mapping of all actors, played a vital role. Threats to the completion of Nordstream 2 [NOR 17], bringing oil through the Baltic to Germany, can only be understood in the light of the interest of US majors and the desire to protect the interests of friendly countries bordering Russia. We are clearly using economics for geopolitical purposes. 9.2. Forms and aims of intelligence 9.2.1. The importance of intelligence Whether the war is conventional or not, we know from Sun Tzu [SUN 03] that the most effective attack or defense is directly related to the quality of the intelligence obtained. The knowledge of the enemy in their environment allows fighting on their weak point to reduce losses, save money, or better, secure a surrender without a fight. In the last battle of Julius Caesar in Gaul at Uxellodunum [GON 10], instead of attacking the entrenched camp, he diverted the water source which forced the valiant Carduci people to surrender without a fight – he then had their hands cut off. Blockades, embargoes, castles and cities, or the destruction of vital industrial infrastructures require information directly related to their economic values and impacts. During the Second World War, to defeat a seemingly indestructible Germany, it was decided to attack its economic capacity by destroying the heart of the strategic industrial activities in the Ruhr. Colonel Paillole

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[MEM 12], head of the German sector of the 2nd French office, had collected information before 1940 on the entire economic and technical organization of the production located there. These are the studies that allowed the English to select sites and the German’s most sensitive points. They were able to break the German military capabilities by precisely targeting their bombing on this industrial valley from 1943 to 1945. 9.2.2. Economic intelligence In the days of privateers, the most famous, like today’s Somali pirates, did not attack any boat. In both cases, the quest for maximum efficiency required the existence of informants at the heart of the enemy, who had the means to communicate the real interest of boats leaving or crossing the area. Infiltrators or agents at the court of the Viceroy of Mexico or Peru informed the English or French corsairs of the routes and calendars of passage of the fleets of gold. Recently, criminal organizations based in London were informing hackers of routes and inventories of boats cruising in the Indian Ocean to enable them to select those offering the best return on investment by the amount of the potential ransom. Recalling Napoleon against the United Kingdom, the continental blockade that forces the opponent to survive without imports or external help was already known by the Greeks and Chinese. Its effectiveness is directly related to the perfect knowledge of the enemy, their abilities, their responsiveness and their morale. In this context, we can compare the blockade of Iraq between the two Gulf Wars, where the Americans had very precise information on the gradual deterioration of the economic situation and that of Iran under which we saw developing a national economy that has been able to partially escape the difficulties of the blockade with the help of China without being able to prevent it effectively. Admittedly, it is less rewarding to control the actions and behavior of international competitors, to decode strategies or to track patent filings than to negotiate hostages, undertake geopolitical analysis, or target designations in the fight against terrorism. But in both cases, intelligence research is essential, whether it is to identify the enemy or to make reliable the positioning of companies in our country in the face of international competition.

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9.2.3. Global intelligence Intelligence practice should not be confined to strategic or financial areas. It is essential to go beyond Porter’s five strengths and market trends to focus on the global environment. Analysis of political, social and cultural developments can detect new opportunities. Comparing existing laws and practices can raise awareness of new rules of the game requiring adaptation and monitoring. Thus, the Discovery [FON 11] procedure allows a US judge to claim jurisdiction over all parts of an operation carried out in a country placed by the government under control or embargo if the business has been conducted in dollars, the company is on the New York Stock Exchange, or if it uses an American partner, support or intermediary. Refusal to comply results in criminal and financial proceedings and a ban on activities in the United States. Similarly, ITAR [USD 10] prohibits the export without a federal authorization of sensitive products in which there is at least one American coin. More than debatable in terms of international law, but imposed by force, on the basis of great principles recalled by benevolent NGOs, they collect huge fines and obtain useful information for the State and companies. Understanding the economy and determining industrial or commercial goals means having good information. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, the Americans with the CIA and the NSA, or the Chinese of Goyangbu have perfectly understood and know how to mobilize their means to follow an industrial development, to identify financial flows, to facilitate a contractual negotiation or to influence standards. To achieve these goals, they do not hesitate to use all the means in their possession. Even the US Government the systematic practice of interceptions of communications of international companies by the NSA by invoking the fight against corruption. 9.2.4. Intelligence as global tool Since Sun Tzu in The Art of War [SUN 03], we know that in the competition between states (or companies), intelligence is essential to create a defensible and sustainable competitive advantage. It is the best way to positively differentiate strategy, economics, technology, industry or commerce by the individual and global knowledge of one’s adversary, their environment and their way of acting.

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All major strategists have used intelligence to define the most favorable moment, the most suitable place, the most effective means to fight with the best chance of success. But it also allows us to know and understand to act more effectively in conquering, defending or maintaining competitive positions. Given that the essence of intelligence is to provide anticipatory capacity, its approach by the specialist must combine multiple approaches and respect a mandatory rule: – work in a forward-looking, reflective and real-time manner to have the ability to predict actions by anticipating them, to carry out an action in full preparation phase, or to launch an action in response to the events; – answer four questions requiring different methods of acquisition and analysis: the situation, the potential capacities, the intentions of the actors, the warning by early detection; – provide the person in charge of decision-making and maneuvering with information that must be factual and objective by never taking sides. The intelligence makes it possible to refine each term of the strategic equation of André Beaufre (one of the great French military strategists) and to reduce the margin of uncertainty [BEA 12]: S (strategy) = M (means) + H (people) + T (time) + alpha (chance coefficient) This allows us to decode the international, because the strategy is developed according to the culture of the country. Let us remember General Giáp, commander of Viêt Minh forces in French Indochina (now Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos), against the French and Americans, whose bedside books were the battles of Napoleon he had the genius to adapt to his own situations. Those with an Anglo-Saxon background favor the means (financial, military, communal, etc.), because they are convinced that strength is more important than any other factor. Those with a Latin background favor people, because they believe that one person can reverse the course of things, and that a small number of dedicated people (guerrillas) can destabilize a state (this is the principle of asymmetric wars [COU 02]). Those with an Asian background have a completely different vision; for them the main variable is time. We gain strength over time regardless of

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means and people. To explain this reality, let us remember the torture of the drop of water: a drop falling on your head is not a problem even if the drop of water is larger (more means), but if it falls on your head for hours and days, you will go crazy. In fact, if we integrate these variables, we can no longer reason in the moment, because we must take into account the evolution of means and people over time. Finally, for the alpha coefficient or coefficient of chance, some Japanese authors say that it is the chance and the discussion is still ongoing, but French wisdom says that sometimes it does things well. Is it not simply the result of good information? In this context, let us remember the words of Frederick the Great: “It is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be surprised”. In any case, the importance of intelligence is fundamental in building a winning strategy. At the Battle of Waterloo, Napoleon had maps that did not highlight the sunken roads. In addition, his vision of the battlefield from its geographical position did not allow him to see them. Thus, when the French cavalry attacked the English positions, they fell into hollow roads and were decimated before being able to act. In application of the Beaufre equation, any change of leader will change the relationship between the parameters and influence the strategy. Observe what happens in the United States since Barack Obama was replaced by Donald Trump. Some political commentators, even the leaders of some European countries, have not understood that, for the Republican Trump, the problem to be resolved as a priority is not that of values (such as for Clinton, Obama), but that of the economy and job creation. 9.3. The practice of intelligence 9.3.1. Intelligence for everyone The Snowden and Wikileaks cases showed those who doubted how capturing information of all kinds can build winning strategies at the economic level. But let’s not be fooled or naive. All major countries do the same with their means. To achieve the required level of economic knowledge, everyone can access the huge amount of data extracted from

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open sources by sophisticated data collection and analysis systems such as Palantir [LAU 16]. Note that this company, funded by DARPA and the CIA, was selected for use by the French General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI), which indirectly raises problem of dependence or tools from elsewhere. But economically useful information is also obtained by other means available in cyberspace, such as eavesdropping and interception, or human, such as agents or whistleblowers. Competitive intelligence through monitoring and analysis allows any company or any state to obtain useful data on their enemy or competitor. In our hypermediated world, through social networks and the help of search engines, most of a information on a subject is legally available to a person who knows how to look for them. The “benchmarking” technique, which involves obtaining prior figures and ratios from the other party, makes it possible to compare oneself, to detect weaknesses and strengths, and then to set the required objectives for improvement. The development of targeted efficiency will create an impassable rift by the competitor that will prevent a costly economic war. Thus, through the joint practice of intelligence, securing its own business and influence, we will propose the best price/quality positioning and the best innovation compared to market expectations. The company will prevail without really having to fight. If the competitor is more efficient and not suspicious, a campaign of influence well focused on its defects will limit its impact, or better – destabilize it in the eyes of its market and consumers. 9.3.2. Weak and strong signals The work done makes it possible to have an accurate picture of the situation and would have been considered successful a few years ago, but the needs have changed: today, we use the principle of video, that is to say research that evolves over time. The multiplication of available data and their evolution hour by hour constantly updates the work done. The current tools allow it without difficulty, it is necessary to redo the course of the cycle at a pace adapted to the evolution of the situation. Each round or new phase of research will enrich the synthesis of new information obtained. Thus, the constitution of the basic file and its constant updating by the additional elements brought by the watch allows us to have at any time a thorough knowledge of the situation. On request and at any time, the analyst will be

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able to provide the decision maker with a set of up-to-date information that decreases their risk of error by allowing them to have a clear view of the current situation. At the same time, we can detect the slightest variation appearing in the file at each phase of the cycle. Whether it is an anomalous drift, an unexpected incident, or a difference compared to the existing one, it is remarkable because it is unusual. In the past, it would never have been identified because it would have drowned in the background noise. Recently, it was called a weak signal because it was poorly understood in the environment and much was expected of the analyst’s intuition to react. Today, a classic research is turned upside down by the contribution of Big Data analytics and new technologies (for a definition, see [SAS 17]). The mass processing of collected data will not only reveal signals that were not seen before, but pass other signals from a low frequency to a high frequency due to the mass of information. Take the case of serial murders. We can now, over 20 years, enter into a system of treatment of all the known data related to these murders whether it is the place, the persons concerned, the entourage, the time, the date, etc. The processing of this data set will reveal invariants that will give new research leads. This is how combination with DNA analysis can be confused many years after criminals. Big Data gives tracks to go to suspects, DNA analysis (when there are traces of it) can then identify the culprits. Of course, this implies an immediate exploitation by the analyst of the weak signal, become deafening, to draw the consequences. At this point, it is necessary to be suspicious, because some companies or states do not hesitate to participate in the circuit of fake news [WAR 17] in one form or another. For example, in the field of patents, some groups file deceptive patents that are made to guide competitors on false leads. In the same way, some scientific publications are designed to make others believe in technical advances that do not really exist to train colleagues and be able to be quiet about the real field of research. 9.3.3. The tools of intelligence Modern tools for data discovery, selection and processing are evolving daily with the exponential growth of the capabilities of digital technologies and cyberspace. We are only at the beginning of a process revolution that

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will develop in the coming years. The need to be able to anticipate and act effectively requires the use of powerful and effective research and analysis tools that are costly because they need to be renewed often in light of rapid changes and technological breakthroughs. That’s why the UK with the GCHQ, the Americans with the NSA, have centralized in one place the possession and the use of these tools which makes it possible to reduce the cost, to use less of specialists and to carry out more experiments. But the purpose remains the same: in this chaos in permanent upheaval, the one who benefits from the intelligence provided by the best tools has a real competitive advantage. The possibilities offered by algorithms in Big Data, traceability in the Internet of Things or the use of connected mobile devices, changes the treatment of competitive actions. The overall strategy not only defines the axis of effort, but deals very precisely with the intermediate objectives and the means by adapting them as new information arrives. It is the most efficient, the fastest and/or the best positioned who wins. But it can become so only through the permanent use of competitive intelligence tools constantly modernized. At this point many believe that only states are able to do so and are asking for close collaboration with their companies to help them in global competition. This is obviously a gross mistake, because some companies also have the capacity. As a result, GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft), which is richer than half of the world’s countries, has the potential to destabilize countries and other companies to preserve or develop their specific interests. 9.3.4. Sources of intelligence Intelligence is characterized by the quality of its source, which is evaluated by its proximity to the origin of the information and its reliability. There are different types of sources that are defined by two criteria: – the level of accessibility that segments them: - in white or open, that everyone can get at any time; - in gray, the access of which is restricted to professionals able to find them; - in black, that are prohibited from access outside of espionage actions that is to say illegal;

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– the means used differentiates them into human sources or technical sources such as those from electromagnetic intelligence (ROEM, ROIM) [WIK 17d]. There are even more open sources due to the internet and social networks, including forums, business networks, as well as those of professions, expert reports and institutions. The publication of business reports, including annual reports of publicly trading companies, CEO and coaching communications, competitor documents and their websites, event and conference event reports, as well as patent filings and external inquiries are a mine of information for those who know how to look for them. Holding files or knowing staff can also be very helpful. Human sources remain the most effective way to obtain answers via dialog, conferences, questions or exchanges knowing that human beings always speak rather more than less. In this context, one must never neglect the fortuitous sources that can give the alert without realizing it. Technical sources have become indispensable because in some areas they hold the information and in others they are the only ones who have the opportunity to acquire it. The detection of the volumes of flows on the high voltage lines from electrical boxes placed on the ground makes it possible to know the real flows when one negotiates the sale of complementary electricity according to the needs of the supplier. We can add the impact of the production of wind turbines when we know by the weather the time of production peaks according to the estimated wind. The same goes for coffee, where the next crop decreases considerably in case of frost in the region of production. The knowledge of the situation via satellite weather makes it possible to buy available coffee stocks immediately to the detriment of those informed by telephone or the Internet. In all these cases, the company that holds this technical information has a real competitive advantage. 9.3.5. Public/private collaboration in company intelligence Everyone knows that big countries like China, Russia or the United States support their companies in winning contracts or defending competitive

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positions, by making available to them information collected by their various administrations. Faced with this situation, the French intelligence community should take charge of the problem. It should define who should take a serious interest in competitive intelligence and think of ways to disseminate it to all those who have an interest in knowing it. We are still far off this, because absolute priority is given to terrorism and geopolitics. In addition, some departments generally keep the information they should share for themselves. The order to seriously integrate competitive intelligence by the community as a whole should come from above to trigger the necessary awareness for effective implementation. Sooner or later, this will lead to the need to acquire the necessary means to search for, acquire and process information. This could lead, at the very least, to the creation of an open source data center common to all, the only cost-effective solution to rapidly gain the competitiveness and efficiency required in the face of international competition. 9.4. Intelligence and its cycle 9.4.1. Decoding what we might notice to understand reality The main objective of competitive intelligence is to understand what is really going on to give the decision-maker the keys. To this end, one must take a step backward to more clearly understand the subject and its context by remembering the Chinese saying: “when the wise man points at the Moon, the idiot looks at the finger.” The more we know each other’s ins and outs, the better we can anticipate and react. Take the example of current US President Trump’s policy, which is a daily feature of French newspapers. On the basis of the information we have, we can place our action in a more global context. Since Tocqueville, we know that America is attached to certain values. We also know that it needs to mobilize against an enemy or for a great cause to develop its messianic vision of the world. Finally, we know that has been oscillating since its creation between the temptation of withdrawal so dear to James Monroe and that of politico-military expansion using the “hard” power of the Republicans and the “soft” power of the Democrats to impose it.

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The then-president Kennedy, after the humiliation of Sputnik and then Gagarin’s spaceflight, set a goal of walking on the moon in 10 years. With this goal he mobilized all the forces and capabilities of American society in a revival of technological development at a time when growth was struggling. In the days of George Bush Sr., the apparent enemy was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In fact, the United States was convinced that its main oil supplier, Saudi Arabia, was going to be destabilized and that another production area needed to be controlled. Since Bill Clinton and especially since George W. Bush, apart from the global war against terrorism that has made it possible to pass protectionist laws in the United States, the chosen enemy was Russia. Although it is not very dangerous a opponent because of its low real military investment (US 716 billion, China 210 billion, Saudi Arabia 70 billion, Russia 65 billion and France 49 billion). With the curent US President, everything changes. To decode his policy and his behavior, it must be borne in mind that he was above all a real estate “salesman” and therefore a person who deals with problems in sequence: we agree on a specific point, then we move on to the next and so on. It’s a mentality that you have to understand when you want to negotiate. Hew was elected by underprivileged neighborhoods the subprime or 20% of the population, by the victims of mortgage crisis – those who have lost everything, but have kept their debts and must live in caravans without assistance from the state [BAR 16] – and by deep America who wants to preserve his “American dream”. His priority issue is therefore job creation in the United States, which involves reviving the national economy. He therefore wants to save money in foreign defense and international aid budgets by questioning anything that does not seem useful to him. As a businessman, every dollar invested must pay more than the stake. Moreover, he notes that the only country going beyond the United States is China, which puts Russia in the background despite military–democratic pressure. It is clear that he is a supporter of the doctrine of 5th US president James Monroe [HER 15] (developed in 1823 in the United States), and wants to leave his area only to be respected, hence the decrease or abandonment of a number of international activities or responsibilities. With this type of program, the president [USN 17], despite the blockages of his political enemies, will revive the US economy and create a number of jobs which will probably ensure his reelection. The French press did not understand this change, because it reasons with references linked to the democratic policy of Clinton and Obama.

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On the international front, the current US president, upon his election, received Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, showing that the United States will remain associated with Japan for surveillance and control of the area. The welcome of the British Prime Minister Theresa May, directs a choice of alliance that puts Europe in front of its responsibilities: the reinforced defense with the UK post-Brexit will have as counterpart a partial disengagement of the NATO that is dear to Europeans. At the same time, the significant tax cut promoted by the president will be a strong bargaining chip with the Europeans when they leave England. On the domestic front, the President wants to repatriate to the United States the jobs created by American companies abroad. Hence the threat of an import tax of 35%, while at the same time deciding a lowering of corporate expenses. In addition, there is very low cost energy since the United States became independent with the exploitation of shale gas at a cost of US$ 30–40 per barrel. All this led companies like General Motors or Ford to repatriate factories based in Mexico to the United States. The energy policy of the United States also helps to understand the movements of OPEC. This organization believed that by lowering the price of oil to US$ 50 a barrel would prevent the development of shale gas in the United States. On the contrary, the research and exploitation of this type of gas made it possible to continue to drive down the cost to an unachievable level for OPEC, forcing it to change its strategy. No longer looking for American buyers, they have increased the price per barrel for other “customers” who are forced to go through them. It is this type of decoding, based on the information available to everyone, but exploited by very little, which makes it possible to understand what is happening and to start a real strategic reflection. It is necessary to take the height and abandon the vision by the “small end of the spyglass”, to place oneself in a broader context which makes it possible to understand the facts and actions in their entirety. Let us add that this analysis of the American policy is visibly that made by the Chinese president Xi Jinping which led him to come to the summit of Davos and as opposed to the inner fold of the United States to propose for China a role more open, a globalist strategy characterized, for example, by the Silk Road (OBOR), which helps internal development in connection with external development [FRA 17].

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9.4.2. The intelligence cycle Intelligence practice is essential because it underpins action. Its effectiveness is based on the respect of fundamental rules to be implemented successively in a cycle of intelligence which is permanent, because the file must be perpetually completed and enriched by the new information collected. Unlike State intelligence, competitive intelligence must respect legality and some nostalgic people may regret it. This is forgetting that 95% of the existing information in the world on any person or any activity is legally accessible to anyone who knows how to look for it. The main barrier is that of language, because one cannot explore data banks or interact on social networks without knowing and practicing it. This is why machine translation tools have become a strategic issue that favors those who benefit from them. The second is that of culture, because to interpret a behavior or a reasoning implies knowing its origin and to understand its environment. Finally, we must be able to cover all areas and deal with all types of information, because intelligence is global: it concerns science, technology, the market, competitors, leaders, the environment, etc. The method for obtaining the blue of Flemish painters was of as much economic interest for the time as the use of traditional machines to make Calais lace today. At this stage, we must also specify the necessary terminology to avoid confusion, because, semantically, words have meaning. That which is proposed by the French Armaments Council is the most interesting. Raw elements of all kinds, stored in an indefinite place in one form or another, are considered neutral data. When they have been selected, transferred and grouped together on one or more sites, this is information considered useful. Once cross-checked, validated, analyzed and synthesized, the data become information. Thus, information alone is of little interest because it is intelligence which is valuable, given it helps to create a competitive advantage. Obtaining information useful to the decision-maker goes through a number of steps that must be followed if you want to be effective. The use of current digital technologies makes it possible to work on much more data and faster, but the diagram remains the same and can be applied as a method of reasoning or as an operational technique.

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9.4.3. Knowing oneself Before taking an interest in the outside world, one must first obtain the most rigorous and objective knowledge possible of one’s own activity and those who work there. This is an essential prerequisite, as it allows one to identify one’s strengths and weaknesses and to judge one’s actual level of competitiveness. Given the extent of the flaws detected, the result of this analysis may lead to privileging internal improvements first before considering the global competition. 9.4.4. Definition of the research framework The first step is to define the framework for the action. For this, it is necessary to know precisely the intention and the objectives of the strategist or the decision-maker in the long term. As Seneca said, “there is no favorable wind for the sailor who doesn’t know where to go”. This makes it possible to draw the limits of the research by ensuring the integration of all the actors, real and potential, as well as their environment. Experience shows that competitors and market trends are taken into account, that we neglect potential new entrants and changes in legal and behavioral rules, and that we have great difficulty in imagining substitute products resulting from technological or societal breakdowns. The precise definition of the targeted domain and the chosen size is essential, because if it is too small, it will hide certain opportunities or threats, while if too great it will drown you under the excess of useless information. 9.4.5. Prospective vision Foresight is fundamental to clarify and define the field of action. It is this which makes it possible to imagine and develop alternative strategies. Starting from the framework of the first step and the defined objectives, it is necessary to imagine all possible scenarios in a medium–long term to identify all that could impact our research framework. In the 18th Century, the journey from Paris to Marseille was realized in several weeks, in the 19th Century the train took 24 hours, then cars did it in two days before the highway reduced it to 8 to 10 hours. The plane created a break with a time of three hours (one hour to go to the airport, a one hour flight, and one hour to get to one’s meeting point), then arrived the TGV

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that allows a connection in three hours from center to center, with the possibility to work on the train, so to be productive during the travel period. Foresight announces the arrival of the “tube” or “hyperloop” [GUI 15]; that is to say a kind of rocket moving in a vacuum tube and going at 1000km/h, hence a link time of 30 minutes. Tests are currently in progress and it will start operationally at the end of the decade. Thus, the possible scenarios change over time by technological changes in the modes of travel. But it is also necessary to take into account alternative scenarios of complete behavioral changes such as the development of video conferencing, which is constantly improving with probably a longer-term holographic presence of the actors. This is therefore a very important step, as it enables new entrants to be identified, possible breaks and foreseeable changes in the near or far environment. It is imperative to evaluate their level of occurrence and their consequences that will have to be taken into account in research and analysis. It is too often forgotten by practitioners whose vision is polluted by ambient “short-termism”. The horizon of politics ends at the next election, that of the leader to the quarterly or annual result, or that of the editor of the newspaper. The strategist must know how to overcome these limits. Instead of living and working in the moment, you have to take a step back and project yourself into a longer time through the use of projection techniques and scenario logic. We must be aware that, in the long term, with the tools and data at our disposal, it is predictive ability that will make the difference. 9.4.6. The research plan The framework being defined with its possible evolutions, it is necessary to elaborate a research plan by identifying all the sites likely to hold useful data and the means to be implemented to reach them in the respect of legality. The digitization of the world and the growing confusion between what is held by the public and the private sector allows us to go further. Where the beginner will be content with a semantic search using a classic search engine, the professional will deepen his research using all available links and expanding the scope to conceptual research. Beyond open sources, they will look at gray sources and all the possibilities offered at national or

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international level by different types of social networks, databanks, “clouds”, not to mention the Internet of Things. After constitution of the basic file, it is this research plan which will allow the setting up of a permanent watch with adapted sensors. 9.4.7. Collecting data Today, research is essentially digital and uses all the resources of Big Data in cyberspace. Every day, the development of open source processing capacity, relying on the use of targeted algorithms and ever more efficient software, makes it possible to discover and select more useful elements. In this context, scanning the web and collecting data will be more effective if the search area has been perfectly defined. Data collection must focus on useful data to avoid ending up with a surplus that must be unnecessarily cross-checked for quality so as not to use or publish false information. This primarily technical approach revolutionized the world of classical intelligence whose main support was the use of networks of informants constituted in time by agents. They had constructed them using at best four of the key parameters of human behavior summarized by the acronym MISE (money, ideology, sex, ego) [WIK 17c]. The multiplicity of sectors covered made it possible to detect topics of potential interest and to react quickly to the requests of decision-makers. Today, we must not neglect this traditional approach that has been proven for centuries. If technological means are systematically used first, we will always need to supplement or test their results with human intelligence. A common misconception in the intelligence community has been that the all-digital could replace the human with the advantage of reducing the risk to staff and contractors. The Americans owe this realization in part to 9/11 and the French to the errors of appreciation of Libya and Syria. To privilege the machine or to refuse an inconvenient reality is a natural tendency of the decision maker against which it is necessary to fight. We have a good example in the Second World War with the story of Richard Sorge [STR 11], spy of the Soviet Union in Japan. As he was very friendly with the German ambassador, he was able to learn, two months before the date, that Germany was going to invade Russia. This information, which gave Stalin time to act, was not believed by officials

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who considered that the German–Soviet pact guaranteed them safety against any invasion. 9.4.8. Data cross-checking Data recovery leads to overlap, because it must be validated by selecting and prioritizing the most credible sources after verification. Fake news [WAR 17] does not exist only in politics. Some competitors do not hesitate to launch false tracks while some media, by insufficiency or by ideology, and take virtualities for realities. Let’s not forget that on average, 20% of the information we hear or read every day is false [MAN 16], mainly as a result of the techniques used by those who inform us. The investigative journalist who validates his sources has been replaced by the exploitation of the press agency press release, via search engines, digital dictionaries or other tools, with the consequence of the possibility of integrating errors from each of these sources. Cross-checking is therefore an essential and difficult phase that involves checking the quality of the data, their sources and their importance. False information pollutes the entire analysis, but a rejection of useful information can remove its interest. This is a well-known problem of investigators and the courts dealing with witnesses who explain and tell the facts based on their personal observation and recollection. It is by cross-checking the facts recounted by different witnesses that we can form a picture close to reality. The cross-checking of sources and data to verify their reliability implies the practice of constructive doubt, which is the first method of verification. A good principle is to never spontaneously believe everything that one is told. If the source is unique, be wary, knowing that the intelligence base is to cross-check information from different sources. 9.5. Analysis In the analysis and cross-referencing of information, the technical tools do the main thing, but the analyst adds their experience and their intuitive ability to turn the whole into a summary that becomes intelligence. It often happens that at this level, it appears difficult to be able to make the compilation as complete as possible. These black holes are due to multiple reasons, ranging from the construction mode of the data banks used, to problems of precision algorithms or the lack of use of multilingualism. The

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analyst must illuminate these areas of darkness to get closer to the target. This might mean relaunching a numerical search, with modified or different parameters and using human intelligence to fill the gaps, or by launching very targeted searches which will make it possible to complete the collection of useful information. This requirement for additional information also comes with the use of cartographic techniques whose act of “filling in” leads to interest in elements previously unknown. The major risk of the analyst is to be locked in a vision far from reality often by ideological will, but also by the use of an insufficient network of sources. Whoever reads a single newspaper has an incomplete or impartial view of the situation. Whoever reads all the major newspapers in a country has only a national vision. Whoever reads newspapers from different countries draws a generally more balanced overall vision. Moreover, we must never forget that our perception, being in direct relation with our culture, can lead us to have misinterpretations if we are not careful. At a time when everything is going very fast and nothing is static, the value of intelligence is closely linked to objectives. It will be useful only if it brings a complement or a new fact. However, we must not take sides [LES 16] in the choice of data or in the constitution of the information. The analyst must remain neutral. It is imperative and a guarantee of success, because the vision will not be biased. Reasoning on false information or a priori information is the worst thing because it always leads to failure. That is why you should never provide information to “please” your leader, or the Prime Minister for national intelligence services. When the United States invaded Iraq, American services thought that American soldiers would be treated as liberators, like American soldiers in Europe at the end of the Second World War. This led to a complete failure. In Libya, the services stubbornly portrayed opponents as angry citizens when they were mainly radical Islamist fighting groups. The result was disastrous. Whatever the quality of the help, the experienced analyst remains indispensable to achieve and optimize the last parts of the cycle [ARM 17]. 9.6. The synthesis of information and its dissemination The analysis of the elements collected by comparing them with the old elements makes it possible initially to specify the existing one, to detect the

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weak signals and to identify the gaps. All this methodical work then makes it possible to arrive at an overview validated by the analyst of all the useful elements with, in certain cases, the highlighting of several hypotheses and just as many analyses. Thus, the data has become reliable information presented in a form that can be taken into account by the user. 9.6.1. From adequacy to expectations The person in charge of the strategy or tactic must receive the information they expect in due time and in the right form. Experience shows that in the absence of a link and a permanent dialog between the analyst and the recipient(s), there is progressively an operational drift between the expected and the received. The transmitter has their own interests and the receiver sees their need and their priorities change according to the evolution of the situation. This is why each message must allow the applicant to express their level of satisfaction with the expectations so that the analyst can permanently correct or adapt the framework, the orientations, the size and the precision of the contents as well as the form of the analysis sent. In addition, there is hardly ever a single recipient in the dissemination of information, which will require differentiation of the message sent, focusing on the points of interest of each, or to prioritize the receivers by focusing on their priorities. Keep in mind that if you regularly give someone information that does not concern them, they will not read anything. As a result, very important information will be eliminated before being considered. 9.7. Conclusion Competitive intelligence is the civil application of intelligence techniques from the military. Unlike espionage, it uses only legal means that are largely sufficient to gather information necessary for a good analysis of the situation. In any case, one must be insensible to practice espionage in private affairs, given the risks it poses in the event of failure for the leader and the company concerned. In the modern world, information is available everywhere. Just look at and know how to get out of the ambient pressure to find out which ones bring the keys. It is required to know how to search them methodically with the required tools, to study them with hindsight and the capacity of doubt necessary to reduce the risk of error or manipulation. It is required, finally,

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to ensure one keeps a strict neutrality and their spirit totally free, in order to draw useful information. The practice of competitive intelligence aims to always have a head start and to promote a very fast reaction. It is the ability to anticipate that will provide a significant competitive advantage. It is not necessary to be perfect everywhere, because a few performance points are enough to create the difference. It is also necessary to have identified the competitors, discovered their weak points and exploited your own strengths, hence the importance of intelligence. It is also necessary, in the context of competitive intelligence, to know how to protect what is essential [LAM 15] by avoiding investing in the rest. For example, Coca Cola protects the recipe of the concentrate (called “7X”) [WIK 17b] worldwide and not sugar, water or other components. In France, the key for election candidates looking for sponsorship in national elections is the list of personal e-mails of 35,000 mayors. Knowing how to identify these key points and then making an effective search is at the heart of the intelligence process. The creation of a competitive advantage is conceivable only by having, throughout the course of the intelligence cycle, the desire to constantly have a perfect, updated knowledge of the targets and their environment. Far from being content with staying on the defensive, we have to go back to the saying that the best defense is offence. In this competitive war, the important thing is to put the adversary, if possible, in an unfavorable position, which implies holding the most accurate information about oneself, our competitors and partners, as well as about the environment. This has a cost, because in this type of competition you do not win at a discount: refusing this investment is like condemning yourself to a slow death. We must be able to compare the specific value chains of each, according to the principles of the “competitive intelligence” dear to American universities, by adding our better understanding of the legal, social, cultural and political environment. We will be able to create the difference by building a competitive advantage strong enough over time to get the other to give up any action in this area. This is why the permanent use of competitive intelligence to have a reliable database and thus to be able to detect any weak or strong signal to anticipate or react is the base of modern economic

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competition. As in a marathon, the one who races ahead at the start cannot be caught, except for an accident in the last few kilometers. 9.8. References [ARM 17] ARMÉE DE L’AIR, Officier analyste du renseignement, fiche de poste, 2017, available at: https://devenir-aviateur.fr/sites/default/files/brick_download/ files/poste-81_officier-analyste-du-renseignement.pdf. [BAR 16] BARTNIK M., “Comprendre la crise des subprimes en quatre questions simples”, Lefigaro.fr, May 4, 2016, available at: http://www.lefigaro.fr/economie/ le-scan-eco/explicateur/2015/09/03/29004-20150903ARTFIG00126-la-crise-dessubprimes-en-quatre-questions.php. [BEA 12] BEAUFRE A. (GENERAL), Introduction à la stratégie, Fayard, Paris, 2012, available at: https://www.diploweb.com/Introduction-a-la-strategie.html. [BUL 12] BULINGE F., PAUTRAT R., JUILLET A. et al., De l’espionnage au renseignement : la France à l’âge de l’information, Vuibert, Paris, 2012. [COU 02] COURMONT B., RIBNIKAR D., Les guerres asymétriques : conflits d’hier et d’aujourd’hui, terrorisme et nouvelles menaces, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2002, available at: http://www.grotius.fr/guerres-asymetriques/. [DIC 17] LE DICO DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL, “Définition de GAFA”, 2017, available at: http://www.glossaire-international.com/pages/tous-les-termes/gafa. html. [ECO 15] ÉCONUM, “Les GAFAM et les NATU, nouveaux maîtres du monde de l’économie numérique ?”, September 20, 2015, available at: http://www.econum. fr/gafa/. [FON 11] FONDATION PROMETHEUS, “La procédure dite de discovery”, May 2011, available at: http://www.fondation-prometheus.org/wsite/publications/ newsletter/201105/la-proc%C3%A9dure-dite-de-discovery/. [FRA 17] FRANCE 24, “Au forum de Davos, Xi Jinping défend le libre-échange face à Donald Trump”, January 17, 2017, available at: http://www.france24.com/ fr/20170117-xi-jinping-president-chine-forum-economique-mondial-davos-libreechange-protectionnisme-tru. [GON 10] GONDOIN S., “Uxellodunum : Le dernier combat de César en Gaule”, Le blog de Richesheures.net, January 30, 2010, available at: http://www.richesheures. net/blog/dotclear/index.php?post/2010/01/30/Uxellodunum-%3A-Le-derniercombat-de-C% C3%A9sar-en-Gaule.

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205

[GUI 15] GUICHETEAU B., “Le Tube qui va révolutionner les transports”, Paris Match, April 21, 2015, available at: http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Sciences/ Hyperloop-Le-tube-qui-va-revolutionner-les-transports-748128. [HER 15] HERODOTE.NET, “La Doctrine de Monroe”, December 2, 2015, available at: https://www.herodote.net/2_decembre_1823-evenement-18231202.php. [LAM 15] LAMIGEON V., “‘Le renseignement français va devoir réapprendre certaines choses’, selon Alain Juillet”, Challenges, January 19, 2015, available at: https://blog.challenges.fr/supersonique/defense/le-renseignement-francais-vadevoir-reapprendre-certaines-choses-selon-alain-juillet/. [LAU 16] DE LAUBIER C., “Palantir Technologies, la ‘boule de crystal’ de la CIA, vise la France…”, La Tribune, January 2, 2016, available at: http://www. latribune.fr/technos-medias/innovation-et-start-up/palantir-technologies-la-boulede-cristal-de-la-cia-vise-la-france-537238.html. [LES 16] LE SOMMIER A., “Alain Juillet : ‘Un service de renseignement doit être neutre’”, Paris Match, May 5, 2016. [MAN 16] MANJOO, F. “How the Internet is loosening our grip on the truth”, The New York Times, November 2, 2016. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/ 2016/11/03/technology/how-the-internet-is-loosening-our-grip-on-the-truth.html [MEM 12] MÉMOIRES DE GUERRE, “Paillole Paul”, June 24, 2012, available at: http://laloupe.over-blog.net/article-paillole-paul-107361769.html. [NOR 17] NORD STREAM 2, “Arthur D. Little & EWI: Two New Studies Highlight Economic Benefits of Nord Stream 2”, October 20, 2017, available at: https://www.nord-stream2.com/media-info/commentary-analysis/two-new-studieshighlight-economic-benefits-of-nord-stream-2-16/. [ROB 16] ROBEQUAIN L., “Le Delaware, paradis fiscal ‘made in USA’”, Les Échos.fr, May 1, 2016, available at: https://www.lesechos.fr/01/05/2016/lesechos. fr/021891005093_le-delaware--paradis-fiscal---made-in-usa--.htm. [SAS 17] SAS, “Big Data Analytics”, 2017, available at: https://www.sas.com/ en_us/insights/analytics/big-data-analytics.html. [STR 11] STREIFF G., Richard Sorge. L’espion qui a vaincu Hitler, Oskar Éditeur, Paris, 2011, available at: http://www.gerardstreiff.fr/spip.php?article493. [SUN 03] SUN TZU, “L’Art de la Guerre”, Luxorion, December 2003, available at: http://www.astrosurf.com/luxorion/Illustrations/suntzu-art-de-la-guerre.pdf. [USD 10] US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, “DDTC Homepage – Mission”, September 13, 2010. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20100914172706/http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/inde x.html.

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[USN 17] US NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, “President Donald J. Trump announces a National Security Strategy to advance America’s interests”, Fact sheet, US Government, Trump Administration, December 18, 2017. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumpannounces-national-security-strategy-advance-americas-interests/. [WAR 17] WARDLE C., DERAKHSHAN H., Information disorder: towards an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making, Report, Council of Europe, September 27, 2017, available at: https://firstdraftnews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Information_Disorder_FirstDraft-CoE_2018. pdf?x40896. [WIK 17a] WIKIPEDIA, “Cloud computing”, 2017, available at: https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Cloud_computing. [WIK 17b] WIKIPEDIA, “Coca-Cola Formula”, 2017, available at: https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Coca-Cola_Formula. [WIK 17c] WIKIPEDIA, “Motives for spying”, 2017, available at: https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Motives_for_spying. [WIK 17d] WIKIPEDIA, “Signals intelligence”, 2017, available at: https://fr.wikipedia. org/wiki/ Signals_intelligence.

Conclusion

The publication of our book has come when a paradigm shift is occurring. We are entering a time characterized by the end of Panopticism developed by Jeremy Bentham where “to see without being seen and to be seen without seeing” is no longer operative, in a horizontal panopticism or reversed panopticism where the surveillance of all by all applies [BOR 16]. In such a context: – the digital revolution and its algorithms disrupt cognitive practices by considerably increasing their capacity; – the development of a collective intelligence places the citizen at the heart of a knowledge system fundamentally challenging the pyramidal organization of the intelligence of economic and political situations. A wise observation of the modes of public and private governance leads us to highlight a generalized state of strategy vacuum [BAU 14]. The elites, the rulers, the decision-makers, the managers and the economic and social political world cease providing the relevant answers to crises and can no longer provide a long-term vision, but only a “universe of tactics” based mainly on the reproduction of the past focusing on static rent-seeking. Do not imagine that we are in an increasingly dynamic world that leads to ineffective business models to meet the current and future challenges of our societies. Our intelligences have become blind and irresponsible [MOR 99] and they must join the “paradigm of the general or epistemic complexity” that is formed in more open crucibles. The intelligence of complexity links separate information and knowledge data, for which the intelligence of reality is not a reflection of reality, but a translation/reconstruction of this

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reality from a human mind/brain; it connects knowledge and action, the epistemic and the pragmatic [LEM 07]. It is urgent in this context to reorganize “our strategic compasses” [ADA 16] and revisit our interpretative tools to adjust our intelligences to situations that confine us to the unknown with which dialog is now essential. Competitive intelligence must resolutely shift into the paradigm of strategy, with the responsibility to contribute to filling the “vacuum” by making innovation work in a resolutely forward-looking position involving all the players in a territory or in a situation. In order to understand the key issues that strategic intelligence must address, it is important to preserve the approaches, methods and tools that have been proven while designing new interpretative matrix and visions. Individuals and organizations will have to make a profound change in their representation of the world, “our community of perils”. Going beyond Porter [ANS 91], it is actually creating new models of strategic analysis, as well as new behaviors, where we will no longer endure the pressure of our multiple environments, but on the contrary, will control it and use it to create new competitive advantages. We propose in the various chapters of this book a first perspective of this “silent revolution” [CAL 07] that should be operated and which highlights the major areas on which the national intelligence and security community must focus [LAG 15]. Management “in complexity” has guided the reflections of the French working group chaired by Henri Martre [MAR 94] and it is still relevant. However, it should be supplemented by integrating it into priority reflections: a holistic perception of the questionings and the stakes, a mobilization of the cognitive capacity of both men and women, increased by the analysis of exponential masses of data as well as anticipation and foresight. Applied to the major challenge of global security [STR 96] taking into account climatic, environmental, social, political, economic, industrial, cyber, etc. risks [WIK 17], such an approach leads us to reintroduce as a major objective the concept of deep security [ATT 09] extending global security to a way of being and acting. This approach, implemented as a strategy, consists of a new way of seeing, thinking and acting by integrating a growing complexity and a ceaseless innovation process:

Conclusion

209

“The best way to think deep security is to see it as a kind of immune system, an instinct that can react to the slightest danger and identify, adapt and control it” [COO 10]. This leads to thinking in a revolutionary way – that is to say global – by developing the resilience capacities of our societies, by collectively responding to risks whatever they are and in a decentralized, voluntary and autonomous way [COO 10]. Companies, communities and institutions acting at their own level “like the lymphocytes of our global immune system which is revealed as an individuality in its own right, equipped with a language, a sensitivity, pre-established strategies, those of our ‘innate defenses’, but also of learning and memory that characterize ‘adaptive’ immunity” [THÈ 15]. This new concept is now taken into account by a multidisciplinary community of reflection expressed in the magazine Préventique [PRÉ 17], through an approach called “global security of territories”. It is deploying an intelligence (understanding) of risks and crises as well as capacities of resilience of the territories and the metropolises still too impregnated with the visions and methodologies of the past. It would be useful to introduce an interpretative matrix that is both strategic and prospective taking into account the hybrid risks (combining natural, technological, socio-economic, health, security etc., risks), the risks inherent in scientific and technological developments impacting the activity of companies, increasingly frequent global risks (health, climate, etc.) and geopolitical risks (including the transition from multilateralism to bilateralism). This permanent and global perception of risks becomes a way of being and perceiving “things” leading to the concept of “increased competitive intelligence”. In the same direction and at the territory-level, it would be advisable to create communities of local intelligence involving the various components of civil society, organized sometimes in real think tanks and intended to enter “the strategic vacuum” from the territory itself. In this context, civil society will occupy a privileged place. These intelligence capabilities will, once recognized, become part of the local governance system and redefine a longterm vision for a strategizing territory [CES 17]. There then arises the crucial question raised by the French economist Patrick Artus [DAV 17], well beyond the territorial issue, which is that of the “decline in competitiveness due to the overall decline in skills of individuals”. For us, this means reviewing the skills grid adapted to new industrial, economic and societal challenges in a dynamic way and promoting permanent personal

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development [BEL 14]. In addition, it is necessary to resume the momentum initiated in 2005 by the government official in charge of competitive intelligence, by the Ministry for Higher Education and Research and later by the interministerial delegate for competitive intelligence, to introduce the knowledge necessary to master the strategic intelligence in all taught disciplines in teaching institutions. In reality, it will take a “democratization of strategy” to survive and develop in a world in deep and constant change [BAU 14]. C.1. References [ADA 16] ADASI, La Boussole stratégique d’un projet d’intérêt général, Guide, October 2016, available at: http://www.associations.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/la_ boussole_strategique.pdf. [ANS 91] ANSOFF H.-I., “Critique of Henry Mintzberg’s ‘The design school reconsidering the basic premises of strategic management’”, Strategic Management Journal, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 449–461, September 1991. [ATT 09] ATTALI J., Survivre aux crises, Fayard, Paris, 2009. [BAU 14] BAUMARD P., LE ROY F., Le vide stratégique, YouTube, March 13, 2014, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9laVBd5iDgU. [BEL 14] BELLAICHE A.-S., “Jacques Attali : ‘Avec le numérique, travailler et consommer vont se confondre’”, L’Usine Digitale, May 29, 2014, available at: https://www.usine-digitale.fr/editorial/jacques-attali-avec-le-numerique-travailleret-consommer-vont-se-confondre.N264681. [BOR 16] BOREL S., “Le panoptisme horizontal ou le panoptique inverse”, Tic&société, vol. 10, no. 1, September 2016. [CAL 07] CALLEBAUT W., “Herbert Simon’s silent revolution”, Biological Theory, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 76–86, 2007. [CES 17] CESER PACA, De l’intelligence territoriale en région PACA – réinventer l’action publique pour et par la société civile, Overview, December 20, 2017, available at: http://www.ceserpaca.fr/nouvelles/sites-internet/faq/detail-actualite. html?no_cache =1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1877&tx_ttnews[type]=3. [COO 10] COOPER RAMO J., L’âge de l’impensable : Comment s’adapter au nouveau désordre mondial, JC Lattès, Paris, 2010.

Conclusion

211

[DAV 17] DAVESNE S., GATEAUD P., “La France a un gigantesque problème de compétences”, L’usine nouvelle, October 25, 2017, available at: https://www.usinenouvelle.com/editorial/la-france-a-un-gigantesque-probleme-decompetences.N604113. [LAG 15] LAGADEC P., Le continent des imprévus : Journal de bord des temps chaotiques, Les belles lettres, Paris, 2015. [LEM 07] LE MOIGNE J.-L., MORIN E., L’intelligence de la complexité : Épistémologie et pragmatique : Actes du Colloque de Cerisy, 23 au 30 juin 2005, Éditions de L’Aube, La Tour-d’Aigues, 2007. [MAR 94] MARTRE H. (ed.), Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises. Rapport du Commissariat général au Plan, La Documentation française, Paris, 1994. [MOR 99] MORIN E., Relier les connaissances : le défi du Paris, 1999.

e

XXI

siècle, Le Seuil,

[PRÉ 17] PRÉVENTIQUE, Website, 2017, available at: http://www.preventique.org/. [STR 96] STRANGE S., The Retreat of the State, The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. [THÈ 15] THÈZE J., La force du système immunitaire, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2015. [WIK 17] WIKIPEDIA, “Sécurité Globale (concept)”, 2017, available https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A9curit%C3%A9_globale_(concept).

at:

Index

A, B ageing population, 26 agile organizations, 172 analysis matrices, 109 Assange, Julian, 33 assets network, 171 participation, 172 relational, 172 strategic, 112 trusted, 172 attractiveness, 137 avoidance, 158 beliefs, 166 Big Data, 191 bilateral network collaberations, 91 Bretton Woods system, 24 Bush Jr., George W., 2, 44, 45, 194 Bush Sr., George, 45, 194 C campaign of influence, 189 cell phones, 28 Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CCI), 109 Franco-African, 100 choice of alliance, 195

chronic diseases, 31 civilization of (the) risk, 115 climate change, 30, 69, 209 Clinton, Hillary, 2, 33 William J. (Bill), 44, 45, 188, 194 cognitive pathologies, 165 quality, 171 system, 166 communication, 128 competing hypotheses, 4 competitive advantage, 186 competitiveness clusters, 6, 88, 177 economic security, 59 Confucius Institutes, 135 cooperation, 89, 158 cooperative work, 89 counterfeiting, 30 critical thinking, 134 cross-checking assertions, 15 cross-fertilization, 41, 109, 145 cultural and social models, 32 culture of organizations, 174 current climate, 29 cyber security, 63 war, 25, 199, 208

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D

I

decode strategies, 185 definitions of competitive intelligence, 85 denial, 3 dependence on tools, 188 developing world, 6 dimension cognitive, 7 strategic, 7 diplomacy cultural, 135 public, 135 direct confrontation, 158 disruptive dynamics, 153

immediately, 132 independence, 87 India, 29 influence cultural, 130 French, 101 information analysis, 200 collection, 199 tools, 190 transmission, 202 innovation, 90 and creativity, 88 intelligence, 52 blind, 42, 166 collective, 176 cycle, 203 military, 52, 129, 181 organizational, 53, 163 shared, 66 situational, 164 prospective, 105 territorial, 111 war, 113 interdisciplinarity, 9, 64 International Association of Competitive Intelligence, 96 issues of sovereignty, 106 investigative journalism, 200

E eavesdropping, 189 ecologist, 6 economic realism, 183 war, 182 ecosystems digital, 109 innovative local, 106 e-learning, 28 emotional quotient, 128 espionage, 89, 113, 191, 202, ethics, 133 Euro-Mediterranean, 33 European Research Area, 108 existing laws and practices, 186 F, G, H fake news, 190 foreign direct investment, 88 Francophonie, 89 global security, 116 hostile environments, 113 hypercompetition, 53, 54, 153 hyper-mediatized, 127

L legitimizing, 129 level of satisfaction, 202 limited rationality, 166 M mafia, 33 state, 17 major military powers, 181 manipulation of information, 33

Index

megacities, 26, 105, 113, 114 Metropolises war, 106 military budget, 22 mimicry, 168 Monroe doctrine, 16, 193, 194 multipliation of data sources, 131 multi-year strategy, 108

raw materials and energy, 27 remediation projects, 27 repetition, 134 rigorous analysis, 34 rivalry for power, 146 rumors, 131 Russia, 16, 22, 23, 33, 113, 183, 184, 186, 192, 194, 199

N, O natural phenomena, 32 positions, 86 networks, 171 of experts, 173 new industrial policy, 50 NGOs, 21, 129 nourishing disciplines, 61 nuclear warfare, 23, 27, 33, 43, 60, 112, 169 Obama, Barack, 2, 44, 45, 188 open mind, 17 operational vision of the world, 62 opinion leader, 129 organizational innovation, 165 practices, 178 strategies, 170 overall vision, 201 P, R partitioning, 5 pathology of knowledge, 167 permanent interpretation group, 123 power, 148, and influence, 148 interests, 157 of the territories, 113 relations, 25 geoeconomic, 50 problem solving, 165 project territory, 106 rare resources, 31

215

S sensors, 120, 121 silos, 5 smart economy, 3 power, 2 Snowden, Edward, 25, 33, 188 social media, 20, 129 soft power, 2, 128, 146, 148 sources human, 192 open, 192 sphere of influence, 23, 146 advanced positions, 152 buffer zones, 152 heart, 152 vital interests, 152 SRDEII, 107 State authorities, 107 strategic action, 147 analysis, 150 culture, 110 dependence, 159 equation, 187 intelligence, 4 intentions, 157 invention, 145 positioning, 144 steering, 120 supremacy, 151 tensions, 167 thinking, 146 value, 105

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strategist territory, 106 strategy of influence, 110 strengths and weaknesses, 197 strict neutrality, 202 structurally irrevocable, 136 structuring trends, 8 systems of misinterpretation, 168

territorial engineering, 111 territories attractive, 110 endogenous, 110 sustainable, 110 Trump, Donald J., 16, 23, 45, 188, 193–195

T

W

tacit knowledge, 176 target, 130 technical sources, 192 technoglobalism, 58

weak point, 184 signals, 8 widespread political correctness, 3

Summary of Volume 2

Preface Introduction Chapter 1. From Information Metabolism to Economic Intelligence 1.1. Introduction 1.2. Information metabolism according to Timothy Powell 1.3. Let us examine this concept in more detail 1.4. Organizations and human beings 1.4.1. Individuation according to Jung 1.4.2. Individuation according to Simondon 1.5. Change within organizations via the information function and an epigenetic approach 1.6. The zone of proximal development 1.7. Conclusion 1.8. References Chapter 2. Changing Our Way of Thinking 2.1. Plato’s cave, or the fight against the world of received ideas 2.2. A society without schools 2.3. On the intelligence cycle 2.4. Thinking outside the box and the iron cage 2.4.1. Thinking outside the box 2.4.2. The iron cage 2.5. Holistic thinking 2.6. Lateral thinking

Strategic Intelligence for the Future 1: A New Strategic and Operational Approach, First Edition. Henri Dou, Alain Juillet and Philippe Clerc. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Strategic Intelligence for the Future

2.7. To unravel Parkinson’s law and received ideas 2.7.1. Parkinson’s law 2.7.2. The cost of received ideas 2.8. The individual and their behavior 2.9. Thinking about the future or a return to future studies 2.9.1. General remarks on future studies 2.9.2. Foresight in business 2.9.3. Regional prospective 2.10. Conclusion 2.11. References Chapter 3. Innovation 3.1. Some definitions 3.2. The innovation mechanism 3.3. Different types of innovation 3.3.1. The development of innovation 3.4. Restraints on developing innovation 3.5. Science, technology and innovation policies 3.5.1. Innovation systems 3.5.2. A quick comparison between France and Germany 3.5.3. The evolution of innovation policy in the United States 3.5.4. Innovation in Asia 3.5.5. The European Union and innovation 3.5.6. The role of cities in innovation systems 3.6. Public innovation policies in France 3.6.1. Innovation and territories 3.7. Conclusion 3.8. References Chapter 4. Formal Information Research 4.1. The importance of the time factor in scientific data 4.2. Different information typologies 4.3. Information research 4.4. Research practices: reductionist, holistic 4.4.1. The reductionist approach 4.4.2. The holistic approach 4.4.3. Holistic approach and meta-information or metadata 4.5. On scientific journals 4.6. Conclusion 4.7. References

Summary of Volume 2

Chapter 5. Examples of Bibliometric Analysis of Scientific Information and Patents 5.1. Specialist search engines 5.1.1. Carrot2 5.1.2. Wikimindmap 5.1.3. Newsmap 5.2. Scientific publications 5.2.1. Google Scholar 5.2.2. Access to Google Scholar since PoP (Publish or Perish) 5.2.3. The Web of Science (WoS) 5.2.4. Pubmed 5.3. Information contained in the patents 5.3.1. General remarks on patents 5.3.2. Analyzing patent information 5.4. Text mining from unstructured texts 5.5. Automatic summaries 5.6. Conclusion 5.7. References Chapter 6. Social Networks 6.1. Different types of social networks 6.2. General remarks on social networks 6.2.1. Why use social networks in a business? 6.2.2. The risks of social networks in a business 6.3. The dangers of social networks 6.4. Minimizing negative influence on social networks 6.5. An example of an international social network: the Confucius Institutes 6.5.1. Public diplomacy and Confucius Institutes 6.5.2. Structuring the network of Confucius Institutes 6.6. Examples of software enabling analysis of social networks 6.6.1. Analyzing tweets 6.6.2. Sentiment mining or opinion mining 6.6.3. A more general approach: analyzing tweets in social networks 6.7. Beyond socialbots and other IT systems, human action: fake news 6.7.1. The fake news dynamic 6.7.2. Beyond publishing online 6.8. You love, you “like”, you click, you evaluate, but beware of “click farms” 6.8.1. Calling Facebook into question? 6.8.2. Click farms 6.8.3. A new type of fake news

Strategic Intelligence for the Future

6.9. Big Data 6.9.1. The development of Big Data analytics 6.10. Conclusion 6.11. References Chapter 7. Information and Economic Security 7.1. Security 7.1.1. Physical security 7.1.2. Security, personnel and visitors 7.1.3. Security of immaterial goods 7.2. Disinformation and image management 7.3. Pressure groups and NGOs 7.4. IT security 7.5. Safeguarding data 7.6. Respecting security clearance 7.7. Crisis management 7.8. Conclusion 7.9. References Conclusion Index

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2017 AÏT-EL-HADJ Smaïl The Ongoing Technological System (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 11) BAUDRY Marc, DUMONT Béatrice Patents: Prompting or Restricting Innovation? (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 12) BÉRARD Céline, TEYSSIER Christine Risk Management: Lever for SME Development and Stakeholder Value Creation CHALENÇON Ludivine Location Strategies and Value Creation of International Mergers and Acquisitions CHAUVEL Danièle, BORZILLO Stefano The Innovative Company: An Ill-defined Object (Innovation Between Risk and Reward Set – Volume 1) CORSI Patrick Going Past Limits To Growth D’ANDRIA Aude, GABARRET

Inés Building 21st Century Entrepreneurship (Innovation and Technology Set – Volume 2)

DAIDJ Nabyla Cooperation, Coopetition and Innovation (Innovation and Technology Set – Volume 3) FERNEZ-WALCH Sandrine The Multiple Facets of Innovation Project Management (Innovation between Risk and Reward Set – Volume 4) FOREST Joëlle Creative Rationality and Innovation (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 14) GUILHON Bernard Innovation and Production Ecosystems (Innovation between Risk and Reward Set – Volume 2) HAMMOUDI Abdelhakim, DAIDJ Nabyla Game Theory Approach to Managerial Strategies and Value Creation (Diverse and Global Perspectives on Value Creation Set – Volume 3) LALLEMENT Rémi Intellectual Property and Innovation Protection: New Practices and New Policy Issues (Innovation between Risk and Reward Set – Volume 3) LAPERCHE Blandine Enterprise Knowledge Capital (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 13) LEBERT Didier, EL YOUNSI Hafida International Specialization Dynamics (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 9) MAESSCHALCK Marc Reflexive Governance for Research and Innovative Knowledge (Responsible Research and Innovation Set – Volume 6)

MASSOTTE Pierre Ethics in Social Networking and Business 1: Theory, Practice and Current Recommendations Ethics in Social Networking and Business 2: The Future and Changing Paradigms MASSOTTE Pierre, CORSI Patrick Smart Decisions in Complex Systems MEDINA Mercedes, HERRERO Mónica, URGELLÉS Alicia Current and Emerging Issues in the Audiovisual Industry (Diverse and Global Perspectives on Value Creation Set – Volume 1) MICHAUD Thomas Innovation, Between Science and Science Fiction (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 10) PELLÉ Sophie Business, Innovation and Responsibility (Responsible Research and Innovation Set – Volume 7) SAVIGNAC Emmanuelle The Gamification of Work: The Use of Games in the Workplace SUGAHARA Satoshi, DAIDJ Nabyla, USHIO Sumitaka Value Creation in Management Accounting and Strategic Management: An Integrated Approach (Diverse and Global Perspectives on Value Creation Set –Volume 2) UZUNIDIS Dimitri, SAULAIS Pierre Innovation Engines: Entrepreneurs and Enterprises in a Turbulent World (Innovation in Engineering and Technology Set – Volume 1)

2016 BARBAROUX Pierre, ATTOUR Amel, SCHENK Eric Knowledge Management and Innovation (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 6)

BEN BOUHENI Faten, AMMI Chantal, LEVY Aldo Banking Governance, Performance And Risk-Taking: Conventional Banks Vs Islamic Banks BOUTILLIER Sophie, CARRÉ Denis, LEVRATTO Nadine Entrepreneurial Ecosystems (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 2) BOUTILLIER Sophie, UZUNIDIS Dimitri The Entrepreneur (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 8) BOUVARD Patricia, SUZANNE Hervé Collective Intelligence Development in Business GALLAUD Delphine, LAPERCHE Blandine Circular Economy, Industrial Ecology and Short Supply Chains (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 4) GUERRIER Claudine Security and Privacy in the Digital Era (Innovation and Technology Set – Volume 1) MEGHOUAR Hicham Corporate Takeover Targets MONINO Jean-Louis, SEDKAOUI Soraya Big Data, Open Data and Data Development (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 3) MOREL Laure, LE ROUX Serge Fab Labs: Innovative User (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 5) PICARD Fabienne, TANGUY Corinne Innovations and Techno-ecological Transition (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 7)

2015 CASADELLA Vanessa, LIU Zeting, DIMITRI Uzunidis Innovation Capabilities and Economic Development in Open Economies (Smart Innovation Set – Volume 1)

CORSI Patrick, MORIN Dominique Sequencing Apple’s DNA CORSI Patrick, NEAU Erwan Innovation Capability Maturity Model FAIVRE-TAVIGNOT Bénédicte Social Business and Base of the Pyramid GODÉ Cécile Team Coordination in Extreme Environments MAILLARD Pierre Competitive Quality and Innovation MASSOTTE Pierre, CORSI Patrick Operationalizing Sustainability MASSOTTE Pierre, CORSI Patrick Sustainability Calling

2014 DUBÉ Jean, LEGROS Diègo Spatial Econometrics Using Microdata LESCA Humbert, LESCA Nicolas Strategic Decisions and Weak Signals

2013 HABART-CORLOSQUET Marine, JANSSEN Jacques, MANCA Raimondo VaR Methodology for Non-Gaussian Finance

2012 DAL PONT Jean-Pierre Process Engineering and Industrial Management MAILLARD Pierre Competitive Quality Strategies

POMEROL Jean-Charles Decision-Making and Action SZYLAR Christian UCITS Handbook

2011 LESCA Nicolas Environmental Scanning and Sustainable Development LESCA Nicolas, LESCA Humbert Weak Signals for Strategic Intelligence: Anticipation Tool for Managers MERCIER-LAURENT Eunika Innovation Ecosystems

2010 SZYLAR Christian Risk Management under UCITS III/IV

2009 COHEN Corine Business Intelligence ZANINETTI Jean-Marc Sustainable Development in the USA

2008 CORSI Patrick, DULIEU Mike The Marketing of Technology Intensive Products and Services

DZEVER Sam, JAUSSAUD Jacques, ANDREOSSO Bernadette Evolving Corporate Structures and Cultures in Asia: Impact of Globalization

2007 AMMI Chantal Global Consumer Behavior

2006 BOUGHZALA Imed, ERMINE Jean-Louis Trends in Enterprise Knowledge Management CORSI Patrick et al. Innovation Engineering: the Power of Intangible Networks