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Reproduced from Strategic Currents: Emerging Trends in Southeat Asia edited by Yang Razali Kassim (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publishers on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg >

Strategic Currents

Emerging Trends in

Southeast Asia Yang Razali Kassim, editor

With contributions from: Anwar Ibrahim, Barry Desker, Bahtiar Effendy, C, Chandra Mohan, Go Ito, Karim Douglas Crow, Ralf Emmers and others

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the contributors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the school or the institute.

Copyright © 2009 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Published by S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University South Spine, S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue Singapore 639798 Telephone: 6790 6982 Fax: 6793 2991 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.idss.edu.sg

National Library Board Singapore Cataloguing in Publication Data

Body text set in Bodoni Book 11/15 point

Strategic currents: Emerging trends in Southeast Asia / Yang Razali Kassim, editor; with contributions from Anwar Ibrahim … [et al.]. – Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2008. p. cm. ISBN-13 : 978-981-08-1822-7 1. ASEAN. 2. Regionalism – Southeast Asia – 21st century. 3. Southeast Asia – Foreign relations – 21st century. 4. Southeast Asia – Economic integration – 21st century. 5. Southeast Asia – Politics and government – 21st century. 6. National security – Southeast Asia – 21st century. 7. Islam – Southeast Asia – 21st century. I. Yang Razali Kassim. II. Anwar Ibrahim, 1947- III. Nanyang Technological University. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Produced by BOOKSMITH ([email protected])

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Co-published for distribution by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang, Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg First published in 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

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Contents

Preface

vii

ASEAN: At Decade’s Turn YANG RAZALI KASSIM

Suharto: The End of an ASEAN Era

3

RALF EMMERS

ASEAN Regional Forum: Towards Preventive Diplomacy

7

HIRO KATSUMATA

The ASEAN Charter Controversy: Between Big Talk and Modest Actions

11

CHRISTOPHER B. ROBERTS

The ASEAN Community: Trusting Thy Neighbour

15

ALVIN CHEW

Prospects for an ASEAN Nuclear Cooperation: A Common Nuclear Facility?

21

YANG RAZALI KASSIM

ASEAN’s Future Identity: Imagined or Imitation Community? 25 THE MYANMAR CHALLENGE BARRY DESKER

ASEAN: Time to Suspend Myanmar

31

CHRISTOPHER B. ROBERTS

Plight of Myanmar’s People: Challenges for the International Community

35

C. RAJA MOHAN

India’s Outdated Myanmar Policy: Pressure for Change

39

NYI NYI KYAW

Rohingya Muslims: Myanmar’s Forgotten People

43 iii

Contents

CLIMATE CHANGE BARRY DESKER

ASEAN: Act on Climate Change

49

MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY

Coping with Nature’s Wrath: Can Southeast Asia Afford to Wait?

53

MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY • SOFIAH JAMIL

The Rush for Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: Promises and Pitfalls

57

HOO TIANG BOON • NG SUE-CHIA

The Security Dimension of Climate Change

61

CHEN GANG • LI MINGJIANG

Climate Change: ASEAN Plus 3’s New Worry

65

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND REGIONALISM ANWAR IBRAHIM

The Asian Financial Crisis 10 Years Later: What Lessons Have We Learned?

71

SHIPING TANG

East Asian Identity: After the Crisis

78

YANG RAZALI KASSIM

The New Silk Road: An Arab-Asian Free Trade Area?

81

BARRY DESKER

APEC: Time for Second-Best Options

iv

85

Contents

SINGAPORE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA YANG RAZALI KASSIM

33 Days: An Intense Month of High-Level Diplomacy

91

TAN SEE SENG

The Tao of Spider-Man: Lessons for Singapore Defence and Diplomacy

96

KUMAR RAMAKRISHNA

Self-Radicalization: The Case of Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader 100 TERENCE LEE

The Singapore Armed Forces and Domestic Security

105

YOLANDA CHIN • NORMAN VASU

Multiculturalism in Singapore: The Ties that Bind and Blind 109 BARRY DESKER

Why We Must Ponder the Improbable: Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning

113

REGIONAL SECURITY JANE CHAN • JOSHUA HO

Trends in Piracy and Armed Sea Robbery in Southeast Asia 119 EVAN A. LAKSMANA

Is Poso All about JI? The Roots of the Conflict

123

PRASHANTH PARAMESWARN

The Southern Insurgency: Rethinking Thailand’s Military Strategy

127

BAHTIAR EFFENDY

Trust and Soft Power in War on Terror

131

TAHARUDIN PIANG AMPATUAN

Abu Sayyaf’s New Leader: Yasser Igasan the Religious Scholar 135 v

Contents

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE REGIONAL POWERS C. RAJA MOHAN

East Asian Security: India’s Rising Profile

141

SAM BATEMAN

Rudd’s Rise: Changes in Australia’s Strategic Directions

144

LORO HORTA

Timor-Leste and China: The Dragon’s Newest Friend

149

GO ITO

A New Pro-Asia Doctrine? Japan’s Approach to East Asian Regionalism

153

ROBERT BECKMAN

South China Sea: Time for ASEAN-China Joint Development?

159

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND CONTEMPORARY ISLAM LUTHFI ASSYAUKANIE

The Rise of Religious Bylaws in Indonesia

165

KARIM DOUGLAS CROW

Turkey and the Türban: The Dilemmas of Laicist Ideology 168 YANG RAZALI KASSIM

New PAS, Young Ulama: Re-Defining the Future of Islamist Politics

172

MUHAMMAD HANIFF HASSAN

Responding to the Idea of Hijrah (Migration) LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

vi

176 180

YANG RAZALI KASSIM

Preface

Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

27 January 2008 must go down as an important date in Southeast Asian history. On this day, one of the two surviving founders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Indonesia’s former president Suharto—died. His passing five months after the 40th anniversary of ASEAN’s establishment on 7 August 1967, was symbolic. It drew the curtain on the precursor generation of leaders who had the vision to pave the way for the formation of ASEAN. The demise of Suharto also marked the maturing of ASEAN as a regional organization. The question is whether his death was equally an omen of the region entering a more prosperous phase leading to its rise and glory, or a dangerous one leading to disputes, despair and disintegration. Suharto’s passing in the first decade of the 21st century also underscored the transitional phase that ASEAN is going through, at a time of emerging trends. The first two decades since its founding was a period of confidence-building. The Southeast Asian states had to build trust amongst themselves after Suharto ended his predecessor, Sukarno’s adversarial policy of Konfrontasi towards Malaysia which then included Singapore. It took another two decades before Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia acted cohesively with other members such as Thailand, the Philippines and, later, Brunei to turn ASEAN into a regional zone of peace, stability and growing prosperity. Searching for that pot of gold at the end of the proverbial rainbow, they exploited the end of the Cold War to embrace ASEAN’s former ideological foe Vietnam, as well as other mainland Southeast Asian states Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, to bring to reality vii

the founding leaders’ vision of a united Southeast Asia in the mid 1990s. Recall however how soon after the reunification of Southeast Asia, ASEAN faced its first major non-ideological turmoil in the form of the pan-Asian financial crisis in 1997/98. It has taken nearly a decade for the region to get out of this quagmire. Some are still struggling from the political fallouts of the financial and economic crisis. Stripped off all the diplomatic talk, the turn of the century has actually been a painful one for the region. It is questionable whether the new millennium promises a new era of peace, stability and prosperity. But the first decade of the 21st century appears to be marked by some restiveness and change. The year 2007 saw some developments that underscored this. One example was ASEAN’s hardened attitude towards its own member Myanmar. Another was the latent tensions between close neighbours Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. This volume reflects some of the issues during this transition period for ASEAN and for Southeast Asia. This is the second issue of Strategic Currents, which debuted in 2006 to mark the launch of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). It is based on the writings of invited scholars, academics and analysts who contributed to RSIS either through RSIS Commentaries or papers between January 2007 and the first quarter of 2008. We hope it serves its purpose of recording and reflecting some of the major developments and emerging trends in the region during this period.

Yang Razali Kassim Senior Fellow & Editor, Strategic Currents, and Editor, RSIS Commentaries

viii

ASEAN: At Decade’s Turn

Yang Razali Kassim

Suharto: The End of an ASEAN era Ralf Emmers

ASEAN Regional Forum: Towards Preventive Diplomacy Hiro Katsumata

The ASEAN Charter Controversy: Between Big Talk and Modest Actions Christopher B. Roberts

The ASEAN Community: Trusting Thy Neighbour Alvin Chew

Prospects for an ASEAN Nuclear Cooperation: A Common Nuclear Facility? Yang Razali Kassim

ASEAN’s Future Identity: Imagined or Imitation Community?

YANG RAZALI KASSIM

Suharto

The End of an ASEAN Era

The passing of former president Suharto on Sunday 27 January 2008 brought to a close the most important chapter in the political history of Southeast Asia—and of the founding generation of ASEAN leaders. The successor generation faces the challenge of continuing their legacies amid changing expectations.

T

he worsening medical condition of his predecessor Suharto had forced Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to cut short his talks in Malaysia with Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi earlier in January. Not long after, Singapore’s Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew flew to Jakarta to visit the ailing 86-year-old Suharto, who Mr. Lee clearly still held in high esteem and fondly remembered as a close friend. Within a day, another aging ASEAN stalwart, Mahathir Mohamad, did likewise. He even offered prayers for the man many Indonesians still called respectfully as “Pak Harto”, using the honorific reference to “father” or “uncle”.

The Passing of a Generation Mr. Lee, 84, and Dr. Mahathir, 82, were paying what they knew would be their final respects to a former comrade-in-power fighting for his life. As a moment of poignant grief, it was pregnant with symbolism. The curtain was drawing on a key actor on the regional stage. Mr. Suharto finally succumbed to his illness and died on

Yang Razali Kassim, Senior Fellow and Editor, Strategic Currents and Editor, RSIS Commentaries at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 3

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

Sunday 27 January 2008. With that Until Mr. Suharto’s death, he and came to a close a significant chapter Mr. Lee were the only two surviving in regional history. The death of Mr. founding leaders of ASEAN. Suharto, the most senior of the three ASEAN octogenarians, marked the ending of a defining generation of leaders of the region. Mr. Suharto’s final hours had been as divisive as his last years in power, which culminated in his downfall in 1998. Indonesians who respected him for developing Indonesia felt sad that he was dying. Those who suffered under his strong-armed rule and accused him of plunder as well as power and human-rights abuse were disappointed with their failure to drag him to trial. But there was no doubt that Mr. Lee and Dr. Mahathir have grown to respect Mr. Suharto for what he had achieved under trying circumstances. Together, the three former heads of government had dominated the regional stage for so long that they not only laid the groundwork for ASEAN’s economic transformation but also played a major part in shaping its political ethos. It should come as no surprise that Mr. Lee and Dr. Mahathir have also developed a certain bond with Mr. Suharto. The manner in which the Indonesian strongman had been treated by his people since his exit must have saddened, if not hurt, the two regional figures. Notice the moist in Mr. Lee’s eyes as he spoke to the Singapore media later about the fate of Mr. Suharto. Just as touching was the quiet moment between Dr. Mahathir and Mr. Suharto, during the rare period when the former Indonesian president was conscious. According to a daughter of Mr. Suharto, Dr. Mahathir and Mr. Suharto shed tears, together. Yes, strong men do cry. Even those who were once in power, and feared because of it.

The Subdued Pathos What can we make of this moment of pathos? Dr. Mahathir disclosed nothing of his inner thoughts. If there could be any clue, it came in clear and no uncertain terms from Mr. Lee in his pre-departure session with the media. In his usual straight-talking style, Mr. Lee said Mr. Suharto had not been given the due recognition he deserved. His contribution to Indonesia was too enormous to be forgotten, or to be trifled with. Yet, Mr. Lee left hints of his deep regret that the younger generation of Indonesians had been too harsh, if not ungrateful, to the man who, on balance, brought far more good than harm. 4

ASEAN: At Decade’s Turn

Mr. Lee’s comparison of Mr. Suharto and Mr. Ne Win of Burma in the early 1960s was stark but drove home his point. Had Mr. Suharto followed Mr. Ne Win’s road to socialism and style of governance, Indonesia would be just like Myanmar today, ASEAN would not have come into existence, and Southeast Asia might have ended up in a mess, if not a warring zone.

End of an ASEAN Era Until Mr. Suharto’s death, he and Mr. Lee were the only two surviving founding leaders of ASEAN. Now, Mr. Lee is the only one left from that generation, although Dr. Mahathir came to the scene much later. Mr. Suharto, Mr. Lee and Dr. Mahathir shared several common characteristics: All three lasted very long in office as chief executive—from Dr. Mahathir’s 22 years (1981 to 2003) to Mr. Suharto’s 32 (1966 to 1998) and Mr. Lee’s 39 (1959 till 1990). They are of a similar age and come from a generation whose formative experiences were during the Japanese wartime occupation and the post-war quest for independence. It is widely accepted that the three leaders’ dominant characteristic was that of strong leadership. Their single-minded drive to bring food to the table of their respective peoples has been at the expense of civil liberties on the Western model, which these leaders argued was a necessary sacrifice. But unlike Mr. Lee and Dr. Mahathir, the price for Mr. Suharto was a heavy one. The repression of the Suharto years, and the enduring corruption, proved to be politically fatal for the retired general who came to power through an anticommunist coup and uprising in 1966. He was ousted in 1998 under similar circumstances—the result of a people’s reformasi uprising that was long waiting to happen, though triggered by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Suharto’s downfall was as earth-shaking as the financial crisis that swept the region. A little known fact was how the financial crisis also brought Dr. Mahathir and Mr. Suharto closer together. It also caused a rift between Dr. Mahathir, in his final years as prime minister, and his pro-IMF deputy Anwar Ibrahim. Suspicious that Mr. Anwar was trying to play out the Indonesian scenario in Malaysia to oust him, Dr. Mahathir shocked the world when he did a counter-strike and threw out his deputy and anointed successor in what many still believe was a political conspiracy. The sacking of Mr. Anwar, who once called Mr. Suharto “ayahanda” using the most reverential form for “father” in the Malay language, led to the rise of Mr. Abdullah Badawi as Dr. Mahathir’s alternative successor. 5

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

Changing Expectations The emergence of Mr. Abdullah in Malaysia coincided with the rise in Indonesia of a series of post-Suharto leaders, peaking with the election of Dr. Yudhoyono in 2004. They form a new generation of leaders after Mr. Suharto, Mr. Lee and Dr. Mahathir. This new cohort of leaders, which includes Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, carries the burden of continuing the legacies of their towering predecessors. But the new leaders face a different generation of citizens who will not unquestioningly accept the old style of leadership—benevolent or otherwise. It is a generation in which people want more freedom and space to do many things they regard to be within their rights as citizens. This transition to a new ASEAN is now a major agenda of the region. We see this in the ASEAN Charter, which reflects the changing values of the regional organization that was first put in place in 1967 by the founding leaders, led by Mr. Suharto. The Suharto generation of leaders is clearly passing from the scene. As ordinary mortals, they have their strengths and their weaknesses. It is understandable to heap praise for the good that they have done, and to feel aggrieved by the impact of their foibles. But the younger generation of ASEAN citizens must maintain a sense of balance and be guided by their Asian values: They should honour those who have done good, even as they do not forget the painful scars of repression. SC

6

RALF EMMERS

ASEAN Regional Forum Towards Preventive Diplomacy

On its 40th anniversary, ASEAN’s impact on Asian-Pacific security needs to be assessed. One key area is the contribution of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the primary security architecture in the region. A review of the original objectives of the ARF and its current shortcomings and constraints is in order. To remain relevant, the ARF should revisit the 1995 Concept Paper and move to its next stage—of preventive diplomacy.

T

he Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has just commemorated the 40th Anniversary of its establishment. In addition to reviewing ASEAN’s impact on Southeast Asian affairs, this historic celebration was also an occasion to reflect on the organization’s influence on the security environment in the Asia-Pacific. The primary ASEAN-led security initiative at the wider regional level has been the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) created in 1994. The ARF remains the first and only inclusive security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific. It continues to provide a diplomatic avenue to hold multilateral discussions on regional problems, to share information, promote confidence-building measures, and enhance the practice of transparency. The ARF is, however, in need of some new diplomatic momentum. It is often being criticized nowadays for being no more than a “talk shop”, unable to respond to security developments in the AsiaPacific. A new sense of direction is needed. This could best be attained by the implementation of preventive diplomacy. To look at this

Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is Head of Graduate Studies. 7

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

more closely, there is a need to revisit the motivations that led to the formation of the ARF and assess some of the limitations and constraints that it faces today. In this context, why and how preventive diplomacy should be applied by the ARF in the near future should also be examined.

Origins of the ARF ASEAN’s decision to establish the ARF resulted from several motivations. It was regarded by ASEAN as a diplomatic instrument to promote a continuing United States involvement in the region and to encourage China into habits of good international behaviour. The ARF was thus viewed as a means to both socialize Beijing in a comprehensive fashion while keeping Washington engaged in the region. Furthermore, the creation of the ARF was meant to ensure the ongoing relevance of ASEAN. Its members needed to avoid being excluded from a new strategic architecture that was chiefly dependent on a Sino-Japanese-U.S. triangle. ASEAN hoped therefore to consolidate its diplomatic position by further developing its stabilizing role in Southeast Asia and beyond. Close to 15 years later, the original ASEAN objectives have generally been achieved. The U.S. is still deeply involved in Asian security affairs. Its ongoing presence is a great source of stability although its commitment to multilateral institutions has been uneven in recent years. Washington has given preference to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and preserving its ties with ASEAN but has been less engaged in the ARF. China has added diplomatic activism to its growing economic and military development. China’s “charm offensive” towards ASEAN contrasts with its previous suspicion of multilateralism. Finally, most regional actors continue to support ASEAN’s position of leadership in seeking to develop a multilateral security structure. ASEAN being in the driver’s seat has partly resulted from the fact that no other regional player is in a position to propose the development of a multilateral security dialogue.

More than a Talk Shop? Despite these successes, it is now often argued that the ARF has lost its momentum. It is indeed ill-equipped to address a series of security issues in the Asia-Pacific. The forum cannot influence the Taiwan, North Korean, and Kashmir issues in spite of the fact that these flashpoints could seriously destabilize the region. Moreover, the ARF suffers from structural limitations that affect its de8

ASEAN: At Decade’s Turn

velopment. It has 27 members. Find- Despite these successes, it is now ing a general agreement on common often argued that the ARF has lost its objectives is a troubling matter, as momentum. deep divisions exist between the participants. Crucial differences also contrast Northeast Asian from Southeast Asian security relations. The territorial disputes in Southeast Asia cannot be compared to the complex security problems that persist in the Northeast for example. The U.S., Japan and China also have different expectations and strategic perspectives that cannot implicitly be ignored in an “ASEAN Way”. Perhaps most significantly for the ARF, however, is the perception that there might be competing conceptions of multilateralism and regionalism in Asia today. This has come in the form of the ASEAN Plus 3 and the East Asia Summit. The goal of these initiatives might well be the building of an East Asian Community which will then form a new security and economic architecture. It is unclear what role the ARF can play in such an emerging architecture. Moreover, it is still to be seen whether all these initiatives will succeed in complementing each other or whether they will instead compete and cancel each other out.

Implementing the Institutional Road Map How can the ARF find a new sense of direction? One approach is to go back to its Concept Paper of 1995, which was expected to work as a road map for the ARF. The Concept Paper emphasized a gradual approach to security cooperation and conflict management. The ambition in 1995 was to move the ARF beyond confidence building by aiming, at least in the longer run, to prevent and even solve specific disputes. The ARF was therefore expected to progress over time through three stages of security cooperation: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy (PD), and conflict resolution mechanisms. The ARF is still today primarily a confidence-building exercise. The initiative to move beyond the promotion of confidence-building measures has been painfully slow. In contrast to confidence-building, preventive diplomacy is meant to focus on specific security issues and to adopt measures to reduce the risks of open conflict. Progress towards the second stage of development has been undermined by disagreements over the definition and scope of PD. Some participants regard preventive diplomacy as a more threatening form of cooperative security, as it might in some instances lead to a breach of national sovereignty. Conse9

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

quently, many analysts have legitimately questioned whether the ARF will ever succeed to move towards its next stage of development.

Singapore’s Role as ASEAN Chair As the 2007–2008 ASEAN and ARF chair, Singapore was in a position to influence the debates on preventive diplomacy. To maintain its relevance, the ARF should move beyond definitional and conceptual discussions and seek instead to implement PD efforts in an attempt to reduce the risks of open conflict in specific areas. As a first step, such measures could be applied to cases where progress has already been attained through confidence-building initiatives. A first area of implementation could for instance be the South China Sea. The recent deescalation of the Spratly dispute offers an opportunity for the ARF to discuss and put in place mechanisms to prevent possible clashes of arms among the claimant states. The ARF certainly remains as important as ever in light of the great complexity of the contemporary security environment in the Asia-Pacific. Yet, to preserve its usefulness, the time has come for the ARF to be bold and move towards preventive diplomacy. SC

10

HIRO KATSUMATA

The ASEAN Charter Controversy

Between Big Talk and Modest Actions ASEAN’s modus operandi in the post-Cold War era can be described as a “talk big, act modestly” approach. Now that the Singapore Summit is over, the real challenge for ASEAN is to translate the group’s rhetoric into concrete actions after the summit.

I

n the run-up to the adoption of the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the group’s 13th summit in Singapore in November 2007, observers had focused their attention on the Charter’s content. Will ASEAN modify its longstanding practice, in particular, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states? In the wake of the crushing of pro-democracy demonstrations by the Myanmar government, will the Charter contain provisions for the promotion of human rights and democracy? In considering the issue of the ASEAN Charter, it is important to distinguish between “announcement” and “implementation”. It was not difficult to have foreseen what the leaders would announce in the summit: It would be an impressive charter, and as widely expected, the leaders would announce that the Charter would transform ASEAN into a rules-based organization with a legal personality. To be specific, the Charter would also stipulate that ASEAN valued international norms, such as human rights and democracy, and that the association would not tolerate the violation of these norms. Hiro Katsumata, Research Associate at the Centre for Governance and International Affairs, University of Bristol, United Kingdom. He was Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 11

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

However, would this necessarily mean that the ASEAN members will implement the provisions of the Charter? The announcement of an impressive charter would not necessarily guarantee its implementation thereafter.

ASEAN’s Modus Operandi: Talk Big, Act Modestly In the post-Cold war era, the ASEAN members have adopted what can be described as a “talk big, act modestly” approach. That is to say, they have repeatedly announced their readiness to pursue new agenda items; however, in terms of implementation, they have taken few substantial actions. The new agenda items of ASEAN cooperation, which were announced by its members, covered a wide range of issues: preventive diplomacy, conflict-resolution, post-conflict peace-building, economic integration, environmental management, human rights and democracy. These new tasks have been stipulated in milestone documents, such as the Singapore Declaration of 1992, the 1995 Concept Paper of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the 2003 ASEAN Concord II, and the 2004 Vientiane Action Programme. The ASEAN members had been “talking big,” announcing their readiness to pursue these new agenda items, but had not taken concrete steps to implement these intentions. The “talk big, act modestly” approach adopted by the ASEAN members reflects the policy dilemma which they have been facing. What has put them into this dilemma has been the pursuit of two contradictory goals—namely, the enhancement of ASEAN’s international legitimacy/reputation and the maintenance of the unity of the association. On the one hand, the ASEAN members have been trying to strengthen the international legitimacy or reputation of their association. For this reason, they have been announcing their readiness to pursue new goals. In the post-Cold War era, ASEAN’s newly-announced tasks—such as preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding, environmental management, human rights and democracy—can be considered global agenda items. These are the tasks handled by prominent international institutions in today’s globalized society, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). The Southeast Asian countries have been adopting the global agenda items tackled by these prominent institutions, with the aim of attaining a level of prominence similar to theirs. The pursuit of human rights and democracy by the ASEAN members is especially relevant here. In today’s globalized society, human rights and democracy 12

ASEAN: At Decade’s Turn

constitute elements of international The “talk big, act modestly” legitimacy. These principles have be- approach adopted by the ASEAN come global norms, which have been members reflects the policy practised by prominent international dilemma which they have been institutions such as the OSCE, EU facing. and UN. Taking into consideration the implications of these global norms for ASEAN’s international standing, it is understandable that its members have repeatedly expressed their readiness to address these norms. On the other hand, the ASEAN members have been trying to maintain the unity of their association. It is for this reason that they have been careful not to implement the new agenda items abruptly. A drastic change in their existing diplomatic practice or a sudden departure from the principle of non-interference would be detrimental to the unity of ASEAN, since many of its members are reluctant to abandon this principle. The unity of the ten Southeast Asian countries has been an important theme of ASEAN diplomacy. In the second half of the 1990s, the original five, together with Brunei, which joined the association in 1984, admitted four countries as new members, namely, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. Since then, the strengthening of the unity of the ten countries has been crucial for all of them. After all, ASEAN has become a global player only because its members have been able to speak with one voice. Since its establishment, this association of minor powers, by acting as one body, has been able to ensure a bigger role for Southeast Asia than any member could have played alone. With regard to Myanmar, the ASEAN members have been careful not to alienate this country. The worst scenario for them is that Yangon would become China’s proxy, speaking on behalf of Beijing. In this respect, ASEAN needs Myanmar as much as—or perhaps more than—Yangon needs the Southeast Asian association. This is why ASEAN has thus far avoided being intrusive. What it has done in the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the ARF is simply to include in the joint communiqué and the chairperson’s statement a clause “encouraging” the Yangon government to change its human rights practices.

After the Summit Coming back to the subject of the ASEAN Charter, given the concern for legitimacy of the ASEAN members, it was reasonable to expect an impressive charter 13

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

comparable to the foundational documents of prominent institutions such as the OSCE, the EU and the UN. ASEAN has been losing its credibility over the past decade, against a background of a series of unexpected events, notably the Asian financial crisis, terrorist attacks, and the outbreak of pandemic diseases. The crushing of pro-democracy demonstrations by the Myanmar government dealt another serious blow to the legitimacy of the Southeast Asian association. ASEAN is now seeking to reverse the trend of its declining credibility. Our central focus should, therefore, be on what the ASEAN members will do after the summit, rather than on what they had announced at the summit. The real challenge for them is to implement the provisions of the Charter, after announcing them in Singapore. In other words, their challenge is to translate their big talk into concrete actions, and to take concrete steps to reform their association.

SC

14

CHRISTOPHER B. ROBERTS

The ASEAN Community Trusting Thy Neighbour

As ASEAN pursues its vision of a single community, the trust factor within the region remains unexplored. Based on two ASEAN-wide surveys, this analysis suggests that Southeast Asian peoples and elites have not yet satisfied the requisite levels of trust necessary for an “ASEAN Community”. Moreover, the frequency of interaction throughout the region has not strongly influenced the level of trust in each of the ASEAN member-states.

C

hallenges such as the haze, SARS, and trans-national crime in Southeast Asia have all served as recent reminders of the increasing interdependence of regional security. ASEAN has responded to these “comprehensive security” threats through a commitment to establish an ASEAN community with its own political, economic, and socio-cultural identity by 2015. To assess the feasibility of this goal, the author conducted two separate sets of surveys throughout the region. The first survey was tailored towards the region’s elite (including academics and government officers) and involved 100 participants. The second asked a simpler set of questions in seven languages and involved 819 participants from all the capital cities except Yangon. During the past two and a half years, the author also conducted interviews in all the ASEAN member-states. While the surveys provided insights on several issues, this analysis focuses on the trust factor at the levels of the people and the elite of the region, along with the impact of interaction and regional knowledge on such perceptions of trust. The perceptions of trust are of fundamental imChristopher B. Roberts, Lecturer in the Faculty of Business and Government at the University of Canberra. He was Associate Research Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He also held a visiting appointment at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). 15

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

portance to ASEAN as it is difficult to Notwithstanding the quest for an imagine the existence of an “ASEAN ASEAN Community, trust remains a Community” in the absence of ad- major problem in Southeast Asia. equate trust among the people and the elite of Southeast Asia, which influence the extent of trust between and among member states.

A Long Way to Go? Notwithstanding the quest for an ASEAN Community, trust remains a major problem in Southeast Asia. While 37.5 per cent of the grassroots respondents said that they could trust all the countries in Southeast Asia to be “good neighbours”, 36.1 per cent were “unsure” and 26.4 per cent answered “no” to the question. As indicated in Figure 1, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are the three countries with the highest percentages for “trust”. In the context of the “no” response percentages, the three most distrusting countries were Myanmar, Singapore and Indonesia. However, the responses from the region’s elite were the most disconcerting.

Figure 1. Grassroots Trust in Southeast Asia Do you believe you can trust all the countries in Southeast Asia to be “good neighbours”? 100%

42.6%

57.7%

54.5%

57.5%

35.9%

25.0%

Yes 28.8%

Unsure 15.4%

No 22.2%

25.9%

38.5%

80% 52.7% 60%

29.8%

30.2%

15.7%

48.5% 50.6%

40%

58.3% 34.5%

36.4%

26.8%

41.3%

45.2%

47.6%

20% 22.3% 0 6.8%

7.7%

Laos

13.8%

Brunei Philippines

16

9.1%

15.5% Vietnam

Malaysia

Cambodia Thailand

Singapore Myanmar

Indonesia

ASEAN: At Decade’s Turn

When forced to provide only a “yes” or “no” answer to the question of “trust”, 59.8 per cent of the elites surveyed said they could not trust other countries in Southeast Asia to be “good neighbours”. Furthermore, when the sample was split between government officers and academics it was the academics who were the most cynical: 66.7 per cent of them answered “no” to the question of trust while 55.3 per cent of government respondents answered “no” to the same question.

On the Risk of Conflict The elite survey contained a further question associated with trust. It asked the survey participants if there were any circumstances where they could envisage armed conflict between two or more ASEAN states. While half the participants (50 per cent) responded “no”, 22.3 per cent responded “yes” and a further 26.7 per cent were “unsure”. Further, the chart below (Figure 2) outlines the percentages on the same question based on citizenship. It is interesting to note that the respondents from Cambodia (28.6 per cent), Thailand (41.7 per cent), and Singapore (46.7 per cent) perceived the highest risk of conflict.

Figure 2. Elite Perceptions over the Risk of Conflict in Southeast Asia Can you imagine armed conflict between the ASEAN states within the next 20 years? 100%

85.7%

75.0%

66.7%

80.0%

52.6%



No 14.3% 57.1%

80%

Unsure 16.7%

41.7%

Yes 20.0%

33.3%

60%

40%

26.3% 41.7% 20.0%

20%

28.6%

25.0% 0

46.7%

14.3%

20.0%

21.1%

13.3% Malaysia

Laos Indonesia

Vietnam

Philippines Thailand Cambodia Singapore

17

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

To better understand the potential factors influencing “expressions” of trust in Southeast Asia, the grassroots survey also questioned the participants about their knowledge of ASEAN and the region. It investigated the frequency and nature of international interaction. One question asked the participants to select the category that best described their knowledge of ASEAN. A positive result was that 52.1 per cent of respondents believed they either held a “very good” or “reasonable” knowledge of ASEAN. Of the remaining respondents, 38.4 per cent indicated that they did not really know what ASEAN does and 8.3 per cent stated that they had never heard of the Association prior to the survey. Interestingly, the countries with the highest frequency of response for the category “they understood ASEAN reasonably well” were Indonesia (52.3 per cent), the Philippines (54.2 per cent), and, somewhat surprisingly, Laos (41.9 per cent), and Vietnam (53.3 per cent).

Role of Media and Extended Family Two questions examined how often the respondents read the newspaper or watched television news. Figure 3 shows the percentage of respondents who do so “usually on a daily basis”. Interestingly, these figures do not seem to indicate Figure 3. Television News and Newspaper Readership Patterns

How often do you read the newspaper?

How often do you watch television?

Percentage indicating “Usually Every Day”

100%

80%

57%

59%

20%

76%

60% 44%

40% 33%

77%

67% 52% 53%

25%

79%

75%

74%

71%

66%

60%

0

34% 27%

Myanmar

Thailand

Laos Philippines

18

86%

82%

Cambodia

Indonesia Vietnam

Malaysia Brunei

Singapore

ASEAN: At Decade’s Turn

a significant correlation with the level of trust in the region. For example, despite the Indonesian respondents indicating a relatively high level of exposure to the region’s media, Figure 1 also demonstrated that they were among the most distrusting respondents. To another set of questions, 51.2 per cent of the grassroots respondents indicated that they had family in other ASEAN countries and 49.6 per cent indicated they had friends in other ASEAN countries. Again, there was little correlation with “trust”. For example, and despite some of the highest “yes” response rates coming from both the Filipinos and Singaporeans, the Singaporeans were among the most distrusting, with nearly half the elites believing that armed conflict was possible, while only 21.1 per cent of Filipino elites imagined such a possibility. Further, only 7.7 per cent of the Filipino respondents indicated that they did not trust all the Southeast Asian countries to be good neighbours. Thus, while both the Filipino and Singaporean respondents had relatively significant interaction with the region, they sat at opposite ends of the spectrum in regard to trust.

Trust and International Exposure Other questions in the survey examined the frequency of international travel: 49.3 per cent of the respondents indicated they had previously travelled to another ASEAN country. Of the respondents who had travelled internationally, 37.8 per cent (18.63 per cent of the total sample) indicated that they would usually travel at least annually. Nonetheless, for those who had only conducted international travel “1–5 times” in their life, the sample indicated that the most infrequent travellers were from Malaysia (66 per cent), Cambodia (68 per cent), Indonesia (69 per cent), Thailand (72 per cent), and Vietnam (76 per cent). Again, there appears to be an inconsistent correlation (if at all) between the indicators of “trust” and the current frequency of international travel. In the case of both Thailand and Indonesia for example, the low frequency of interaction corresponds with a relatively higher level of distrust. However, Malaysians also indicated a low frequency of travel but they maintained one of the best response rates for “trust”. The Singaporeans indicated that they are among the most frequent international travellers (98.4 per cent had travelled internationally) but they simultaneously represented the second highest category for “distrust”. The surveys also seem to negate the notion that increased interaction and knowledge within Southeast Asia should positively affect the level of regional 19

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

trust and thus reinforce the creation of a region-wide identity. In other words, it is not necessarily true that the more you interact, or the more you know about the region, the greater the level of trust and the stronger the regional identity. However, it is important to note that this analysis has been limited to the “frequency” of interaction with little regard to the “quality” of interaction. In reality, the region’s media and political elite continue to sensationalize and scapegoat the behaviour and activities of communities and governments in other ASEAN states. The impact of such practices have been witnessed on a regular basis with examples including the destruction of the Thai embassy in Cambodia, anti-Chinese riots during the Asian economic crisis in Indonesia, and popular reactions to the Sulawesi Sea dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia in 2005. Because of the nature of this “negative interaction”, it becomes possible to understand why the period of each country’s membership in ASEAN has not (as yet) positively affected the extent of trust between the communities and the elite of Southeast Asia.

The Positives and Negatives Despite these problems, two interpretations of the data remain possible. Relative to ASEAN’s humble beginnings, the level of trust currently evident between the states and communities of Southeast Asia is a significant achievement. However, given the proposal to forge an ASEAN Community by 2015, the level of trust and perceptions regarding the risk of conflict (in some ASEAN states) remains far short of satisfying ASEAN’s own concept of a community—a concept that if realized, would foster “a regional identity”, generate greater “political and security cooperation”, and “ensure a durable peace”. To build more trust in the region, both policymakers and the media need to undertake—in rhetoric and in practice—a more significant transition towards the behaviour of a “community”. Such behaviour would be manifested through greater displays of affinity, kinship, and reciprocity. SC

20

ALVIN CHEW

Prospects for an ASEAN Nuclear Cooperation A Common Nuclear Facility?

Nuclear energy has emerged as a viable option to provide base load power for many nations. However, countries in Southeast Asia planning to develop nuclear reactors could face a multitude of problems. Therefore, a strategy for nuclear cooperation among the various nations in the region could help minimize the risks.

T

he 13th ASEAN summit is Singapore in November 2007 called for regional cooperation among the various regional nations in the sectors of energy and climate change. With advanced safety features that are to be incorporated in modern nuclear reactors, the civilian usage of nuclear energy is an attractive solution to the twin agenda of energy security and carbon reduction. Nations will benefit if it considers all available options to diversify its energy resources. With regards to the ASEAN Community, a common nuclear facility can possibly reap greater advantages than individual national plants.

A Call for a Common Nuclear Facility Global consumption of energy is expected to increase particularly in Asia, fuelled by the economic growths of China and India. Within Southeast Asia, developing nations such as Vietnam and Indonesia are treading on accelerated growth paths. The apparent linkage between economic growth and energy consumption would readily see nuclear energy emerge as a middle-term solution that enables developing nations to transit from hydrocarbons to sustainable renewables, with minimal disruption to their economies. Alvin Chew, Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was formerly with the Defence Science and Technology Agency. 21

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

To date, no ASEAN country has To date, no ASEAN country has utilized nuclear power for its energy utilized nuclear power for its energy needs, which involves a hefty upfront needs, which involves a hefty cost and investment capital. The upfront cost and investment capital. energy consumption of individual ASEAN nations is relatively small on a global scale. However, in considering the ASEAN region, its collective energy demands will be significant. Therefore, it is only prudent for a common nuclear facility to see to the needs of the region while at the same time, alleviating the financial risks associated with the operation of the nuclear power reactors. In addition, both the economic environment and geographical features are not entirely homogeneous throughout ASEAN. A small territorial space or active seismic movements poses as impediments in the operation of a nuclear plant. As such, it is not viable for some smaller states like Singapore to operate a nuclear power plant given its sheer size. But unfavourable conditions can be overcome when considering the Southeast Asian region in totality, whereby feasible sites are more readily available. The concept of a common ASEAN nuclear power plant would also provide better justification for smaller member nations that are economically stronger to enter the partnership. Cooperation in this aspect is a critical strategy for member states. They can contribute in different kinds, all for the common goal of attaining reliable energy and reducing greenhouse emissions. Another reason for cooperation lies in the domain of technology. Apart from its inherent high cost, the element of novelty is also a primary concern for stakeholders to keep up with advanced technology. Cooperation among the nations in this aspect would not only reduce the duplication of technology, but also foster individual nations to develop expertise in their niche areas. If technology transfer is to be effected, individual nations focussed on specific areas of capability could lead to more advanced technology being adopted at a cheaper cost.

Regional Energy Distribution Nuclear energy can be stored for use at a later stage. Strategic storage of energy has become critical with the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters in the region. In this regard, nations with nuclear energy are able to enhance their energy reserve, thereby achieving a level of energy independence. This concept can be extrapolated to a common strategic reserve stored for the ASEAN members that can be tapped in the event of a crisis. 22

ASEAN: At Decade’s Turn

It is timely that ASEAN has decided in August 2007 to set up a common power grid. This agreement lays the infrastructure for power to be distributed to nations within Southeast Asia. The Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN Power Grid signed by the ASEAN ministers serves as a reference document to facilitate energy cooperation programmes. This agreement lays the infrastructure for power to be distributed to nations within Southeast Asia. Significantly, the ministers also suggested the possible introduction of nuclear energy in the region. It has, however, to be noted that the ASEAN region is geographically diverse, and power connections across mountainous regions and deep seas would likely to be expensive. Nevertheless, ASEAN is committed to develop the necessary infrastructure that links its constituent members with a more reliable supply of electricity. With the appropriate market structure, electricity generated by the nuclear plant can be distributed via the common power grid.

A Common Regional Repository? Finally, radioactive wastes are inevitable in the nuclear fuel process. Currently, Finland has managed to successfully deposit its permanent high-level waste 500 metres underground. The call for a repository site poses several geological challenges, and has been met with great scepticism as to whether technology is capable of modelling tectonic movements for several thousands of years. Nevertheless, the more resisting factor in nuclear waste management stems from the societal perceptions of the host nation. The “Not In My Backyard”, or more commonly known as the NIMBY, syndrome is already prevalent among many nuclear-powered countries, not to mention a common repository site in Southeast Asia. Unless a neutral site can be located, strong resistance is likely to occur for a common repository site when the nation not only accepts its own, but also the regional nuclear wastes. Cooperation in this aspect is crucial owing to the close proximity of the nations in Southeast Asia. The NIMBY syndrome needs to be overcome, as any waste repository within the region would in one way or another have consequential impact on its constituent nations. Hence, the notion of NIMBY is inapplicable within Southeast Asia as anywhere within its premise is likely to be “everyone’s backyard” in the event of a waste leakage. Given the fact that some of its nations already decide to build nuclear reactors, the more discerning question that ASEAN needs to address is whether it would like to see a region of ten individual waste storages residing in each country, or alternatively, to cooperate with each other to safely manage a common waste facility. 23

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

Nuclear waste management remains a pertinent issue that needs to be addressed during the development stages of nuclear plants. Societal mindsets in overcoming the NIMBY mentality require innovative educational campaigns by the respective governments. They need to convince their respective publics about the common good in establishing a shared repository site. The host nation of the common waste repository needs to be “incentivized”, possibly in the form of economic gains that can trickle down to the individuals in society. If successful, it could serve as a model for other institutions to follow in the sharing of nuclear facilities. SC

24

YANG RAZALI KASSIM

ASEAN’s Future Identity

Imagined or Imitation Community?

The ASEAN Summit in Singapore in November 2007 was preceded by an unprecedented tussle for a new identity of the regional grouping. Will the Asian Way prevail, or will Western norms and values be dominant? Or will there be a third way forward?

F

ive years ago, two Western authors wrote a stinging journal article on ASEAN which they dismissed as an “imitation community”. The idea of an imitation community was borrowed and expanded from the concept of “imitation states” coined by the British political philosopher, Michael Oakeshott. Imitation states are new or young states struggling to overcome their weaknesses, including a sense of insecurity. They form regional groups for strength in numbers. But their sense of insecurity produce “regional institutions that are essentially rhetorical shells that give form but no substance to domestic and international arrangements”. ASEAN, the authors argue, is a classic imitation community. “That, sad to say, is the case with the much-vaunted Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a case study of what we might term an ‘imitation community’,” say David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith in their article in Orbis entitled, “ASEAN’s Imitation Community”. It should not be a surprise if such a view enjoys some currency, especially among scholars critical of ASEAN in the wake of the

Yang Razali Kassim, Senior Fellow and Editor, Strategic Currents and Editor, RSIS Commentaries at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 25

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

Asian financial crisis of 1997. There To be sure, there is still a lack of are also many Aseanists who would clarity over what the future ASEAN dismiss the Jones-Smith view as would look like. sweepingly extreme. I belong to those who take the middle ground—people who would not dispute the faults within ASEAN, but would not be so dismissive of it either. ASEAN is not a perfect organization. Indeed, it has its flaws, such as its fragile cohesion. But ASEAN is certainly not an imitation community, if, by imitation is implied the blind and spineless parroting of what others do in international diplomacy—certainly not after 40 years.

Strength in Insecurity? Yet, while ASEAN is not an imitation community, it does possess some attributes of an insecure organization. Non-interference is a cherished principle partly because members still harbour latent distrust, if not fear, of each other despite the years of nurtured camaraderie. There is also the fear of being sucked into the power play of the major powers, the end of the Cold War notwithstanding. Strangely, however, precisely because of this sense of insecurity, ASEAN has driven itself, after four decades, into a position of surprising strength. Believe it or not, ASEAN is today, in spite of its inherent fragility, a major player on the world stage, playing a role that has so far not been equalled by other similar groupings. Fifty years from now, when historians look back at the beginnings of the Asian Century, they will find the unmistakable handiwork of ASEAN in its rise. It is no mean feat to be able to influence and shape the political, economic and security architectures emerging in the Asia Pacific. It is no small achievement for six, and then ten small and medium-sized states, to have the collective will and skill to initiate major strategic moves to secure peace and stability, and to rally the major powers to their turf. Regional powers look to ASEAN’s regular summits as a convenient platform to sort out their differences—which these powers would otherwise not deal with on their own. It is from this position of cumulative influence that ASEAN is beginning to deal with all its inherent weaknesses that the Jones-Smith school of thought have correctly fingered. Dare we say that the 13th ASEAN summit in Singapore was the beginning of the seismic shift towards a new ASEAN—an ASEAN of the 21st century? Or will the Association be held back by old habits? 26

ASEAN: At Decade’s Turn

Glimpses of the New ASEAN To be sure, there is still a lack of clarity over what the future ASEAN would look like. But some outlines are emerging. The imagined community of the new ASEAN will not be an imitation community. It is a cohesive region that is united in diversity, developed and open, cosmopolitan and global, politically tolerant and respectful of human rights, with the citizens of ASEAN enjoying their civil liberties amidst peace and stability notwithstanding some difficult birth pamgs. The embodiment of the new ASEAN is the ASEAN Charter, which the leaders hope will embody the group’s new rules and norms. But while the hardware of the new ASEAN—the institutions and the processes—are easier to define and construct, the software is more elusive. This software has to do with ASEAN’s values, ideology and political culture. I suspect that the new ASEAN will struggle with its own soul before it successfully transits from the present to its future identity. Indeed, the run-up to the 13th summit was already showing signs of this inner struggle. It is a struggle between the “old ASEAN” that is conservative, cautious and always politically correct, to the new ASEAN that is more vocal, more dynamic and more participative in each other’s affairs. In other words, an ASEAN that is also more democratic—or intrusive. This inner struggle was triggered prematurely by the recent crisis in Myanmar. This crisis tested not just Myanmar as a nation-state but also the moral instincts of ASEAN as a regional association. Myanmar forced the new ASEAN My guess is that the future ASEAN to come to the fore when regional identity will be a blend of both—or leaders broke their usual reticence to the Asian Way with Western, or express revulsion over the junta’s vio- international characteristics. lent crackdown on the Saffron Revolution. By ASEAN’s standard of decorum, this was unprecedented. But note how as soon as it was praised by the Western-led international community for this unusual display of moral courage, ASEAN baulked at calls to suspend or sack its fellow member from the regional club. ASEAN’s fledgling aspiration for a new political identity was immediately held back by its inherent instinct to check the limits of intervention.

Struggling for the New Soul of ASEAN What we are seeing in action now, even as ASEAN prepared for its summit, is actually a clash of two sets of norms or values. One is the current ASEAN way of 27

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

doing things which is very much shaped by the Asian approach or values of organizing society and conducting relationships. This is reflected in the centrality of authority, order and collective welfare over individual rights. The other is the set of norms that is influenced more by international, or more precisely Western, values of organizing society and relationships, marked by the preference for individual rights, open societies and open markets. This new dialectic influencing ASEAN’s future continues to be debated by scholars. Barry Desker of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, in a 26 July 2007 inaugural lecture at the University of Sydney, prefers to view this tension between the two sets of values in terms of “alternative philosophical traditions”. He refers to the Asian way as the emerging “Beijing Consensus” of Asian values revolving around China, the rising Asian power whose world view is gradually finding its place in the international arena. Contrasting this is the “Washington Consensus” which he uses in a broader sense to highlight the political agenda favoured by Washington in its interactions with developing countries, especially after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The new ASEAN is only just emerging. It will take some time before its full identity will blossom in clear and unmistakable form. But the process of change is already palpable, although it is still hazy which set of values will emerge dominant. My guess is that the future ASEAN identity will be a blend of both—or the Asian Way with Western, or international characteristics. SC

28

THE MYANMAR CHALLENGE

Barry Desker

ASEAN: Time to Suspend Myanmar Christopher B. Roberts

Plight of Myanmar’s People: Challenges for the International Community C. Raja Mohan

India’s Outdated Myanmar Policy: Pressure for Change Nyi Nyi Kyaw

Rohingya Muslims: Myanmar’s Forgotten People

BARRY DESKER

ASEAN

Time to Suspend Myanmar

The ASEAN Summit in Singapore in November 2007 had been clouded by debate over Myanmar. The time has come for ASEAN to agree on the suspension of Myanmar’s membership in the grouping. As long as Myanmar is part of the highest councils of ASEAN, the region will have a credibility problem when it seeks to address issues of humanitarian concern elsewhere around the globe.

T

he crisis in Myanmar (Burma) sparked by a government crackdown on protesting monks makes it imperative that ASEAN moves beyond statements to action. The 1997 ASEAN decision to admit Myanmar under the current military leadership without any conditionality was a mistake. Myanmar took shelter under ASEAN’s wings but there was no commitment by the Myanmar junta to open up the economy or to restore its fledgling democracy. Frankly, Myanmar has been an albatross around ASEAN’s neck over the past decade. ASEAN broke new ground on 27 September 2007 when the ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to a statement by the current ASEAN chair, Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo. They stated in no uncertain terms that they were appalled to receive reports of automatic weapons being used to quell the demonstrations in Myanmar and demanded that the Myanmar government immediately desist from the use of violence against demonstrators. They strongly urged Myanmar to seek a political solution, to work

Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and concurrent Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 31

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

towards a peaceful transition to de- The ASEAN ministers recognized mocracy and called for the release of that what the Myanmar junta has all political detainees including Daw done was unacceptable. Aung San Suu Kyi. The ASEAN ministers recognized that what the Myanmar junta had done was unacceptable. ASEAN should now go further. It is time that Myanmar is suspended from the privilege of ASEAN membership.

Need for clear standards of behaviour The ASEAN Charter is designed to give the organization a legal personality. ASEAN needs clear standards of behaviour for its members. Key provisions of the Charter included the call for the promotion of democracy, human rights and obligations, transparency and good governance and strengthening democratic institutions. But ASEAN needs to agree on what it would do if a member blatantly flouts these conventions. Previously, ASEAN had adopted the practice of raising its discomfort with developments in Myanmar (Burma) privately at meetings with Myanmar leaders and in the confines of informal retreats of ASEAN ministers, where no official records were kept. Since its founding, ASEAN’s formal position was that every member had the right to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another. This principle of non-interference and non-intervention helped each ASEAN state to develop its own identity in the first years of ASEAN’s existence. The primary concern of each member from 1967 was that it should be allowed to forge its own post-colonial identity. Memories of Indonesia’s Konfrontasi policy towards Malaysia and hostility to post-independence Singapore, the bitter Singapore separation from Malaysia, the Philippines claim to Sabah and Thai fears of spill-over from the conflicts in Indochina shaped ASEAN’s handling of domestic developments in the region. An emphasis on developing mutual confidence, understanding the different perspectives of each member and creating an awareness of the regional environment and regional sensitivities marked interactions in the early years of ASEAN’s evolution. In 1967, ASEAN leaders and policymakers were more attuned to the political environment of the former metropolitan countries and needed to become familiar with their neighbours. This process of developing cohesion and the habit of cooperation received a sharp boost by the challenge posed by the Vietnamese invasion and occupation 32

The Myanmar Challenge

of Cambodia in December 1978. ASEAN’s resolute response to the invasion and ability to build an international coalition opposed to the intervention marked a high point for the policy of non-interference. It meant supporting the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia but it led to international credibility and recognition for ASEAN as the only third world regional organization able to influence UN debates and shape the conflict negotiations process. In 1967, a policy of non-interference and non-intervention also made sense to the post-colonial regimes in Southeast Asia as they were faced with domestic insurgencies by communist revolutionary movements assisted by Chinese support amidst China’s own mayhem as it underwent the Cultural Revolution. As the ASEAN states sought improved ties with China after the historic Nixon visit to China in 1972, calls for an end to Chinese support for the communist parties of the region were coupled with the need to uphold the principles of non-interference and respect for the sovereignty of the states of the region.

Changed Geopolitical Realities Forty years later, geopolitical realities have changed. The end of the Cold War undermined the logic of the policy of As long as Myanmar is part of the non-intervention and non-interfer- highest councils of ASEAN, the ence. Doctrines of humanitarian in- region will have a credibility problem tervention and “the responsibility to when it seeks to address issues of protect” are increasingly the basis of humanitarian concern elsewhere decision making in the UN Security around the globe. Council, especially as the impact of bloodshed and the consequences of riots, revolution and bombings are covered hour by hour on television screens and in widely circulated blogs and on the Internet. In 1988, the scale of the much larger crackdown by the Myanmar military only became known several weeks later. Today, these images are transmitted instantaneously around the world by mobile phones and YouTube. As long as Myanmar is part of the highest councils of ASEAN, the region will have a credibility problem when it seeks to address issues of humanitarian concern elsewhere around the globe. Not only is the junta a failure as far as ensuring Myanmar’s economic development, it has failed to build a cohesive society or ensured a political transition from military rule. The pauperization of Myanmar is evident to anyone who travels through Myanmar. At the same time, Myanmar does not play an effective role within ASEAN. 33

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

When the then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad succeeded in getting ASEAN approval for Myanmar’s admission into ASEAN in 1997, it was believed that Myanmar’s participation would lead to learning by example. As Myanmar interacted with ASEAN states, it would hopefully realize that outwardlooking policies, increased foreign investment and expanded trade, tourism and other exchanges would lead to Myanmar moving in the direction of a more open society increasingly integrated with the rest of Southeast Asia. These hopes were soon dashed. As the Singapore co-chair of the Singapore/Myanmar senior officials working group on economic issues, I realized in 1998 that we were going nowhere. As we were pre-occupied with the Asian financial and economic crisis, we decided not to proceed with these meetings as our hosts were more interested in bringing us on a week-long jaunt to gem mines and to places of tourist interest rather than engaging in serious exchanges on policy issues. As ASEAN moves towards the establishment of an ASEAN Community based on the three pillars of a Security Community, a Socio-Cultural Community and an Economic Community, can it afford to have a member seen regionally as well as internationally as having a government that has failed to ensure the well-being of its people not just recently but since it joined ASEAN? Old ASEAN hands will say that Myanmar is part of ASEAN and should be a member. Yes, but only when Myanmar can uphold its commitments. Until then, ASEAN should suspend Myanmar’s participation in its activities. SC

34

CHRISTOPHER B. ROBERTS

Plight of Myanmar’s People Challenges for the International Community

Recent protests in Myanmar headed by Buddhist monks have captured the attention of the world. The military leaders are unlikely to relinquish their power in the absence of a unified international response.

O

n the auspicious day of 8.8.88, tens of thousands of students in Myanmar led nationwide protests against an oppressive dictatorship that had needlessly driven their resource-rich country to the brink of bankruptcy. Despite decades of repressed frustration, the final spark to trigger the protests occurred when many Myanmar people lost their savings following an unfounded decision to demonetize the banknotes. Nearly two decades later, the Myanmar government, alternatively known as the State Peace and Development Committee (SPDC), was similarly erratic and arbitrary in an August announcement to increase subsidized fuel prices from US$1.18 to US$1.96 per gallon. The price of fuel had been as little as 14 cents just two years earlier. As far as the people were concerned—and reminiscent of the protests in 1988—the hike in fuel prices was simply the final straw. Nonetheless, a key difference on this occasion is that the deeply revered Buddhist monks (Sangha) spearheaded the protests. In representing the needs of the people, they have made three modest requests: to ease the living conditions of Myanmar people, to release all political prisoners, and to undertake meaningful dialogue for national reconciliation.

Christopher B. Roberts, Lecturer in the Faculty of Business and Government at the University of Canberra. He was Associate Research Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He also held a visiting appointment at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). 35

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

The Junta’s Response to the Protests While the size and immediacy of the protests may have caught the regime offguard, the 26 September military crackdown appeared to have been relatively well planned, pervasive and insidious. Rather than simply being surprised, as suggested in some media reports, the junta likely needed several days of preparation while it waited for reinforcements to arrive in Yangon and Mandalay. On the morning of the crackdown, the government declared Yangon a “restricted area” and then sought to block the Internet and phone lines. It also searched vehicles and people for cameras and recording devices throughout the many checkpoints encircling the city. Despite the peaceful nature of the protests, the SPDC security forces soon resorted to violence including the killing of monks and protestors along with the death of a Japanese photojournalist. Vivid images of the dead and dying escaped to the world media and international leaders responded with revulsion. Most of the military have very little education or professional training, and those based in the borderlands are accustomed to frequently carrying out human rights violations against ethnic minority groups. Further, military commanders had previously provided their troops with doses of methamphetamine to increase their level of aggressiveness and according to one source, similar tactics were reportedly adopted during the crackdown in Yangon. In the absence of a drug-induced rage, it is difficult to imagine how such violent acts against the peaceful Sangha could have been committed in such a deeply religious society. Aside from the many acts of unchecked brutality displayed in the media, on the whole the response of the security forces appeared to have proceeded according to plan. Thus, the ominous work of the security forces continued during the dead of night with reported raids of six monasteries and the arrest of hundreds of monks. The next day, the effectiveness of the operation was evident when only a few dozen monks were seen participating in protests compared to tens of thousands on previous days. The raids of monasteries, arrests of members of the media and protests continued each night and by the following Tuesday (2 October) there were reports suggesting that up to 4,000 monks had been detained while a further 1,000 were missing; a report by the BBC even suggested that the missing monks had been murdered. In spite of such draconian measures, the overwhelming mass of security forces, and the absence of the Sangha’s leadership, the people of Myanmar maintained their public protests against the government through to the weekend. Their con36

The Myanmar Challenge

tinued resolve to stand against such Thousands of Myanmarese have an oppressive and powerful force demonstrated that they are willing was not only indicative of a sense to make the ultimate sacrifice for the of rage towards the violence com- betterment of their country. mitted against the Sangha. It also represented a deeply-grounded feeling that the people of Myanmar can no longer remain in the shadows of humanity.

Myanmar’s Strategic Allies: Keeping the Regime Alive? In 2008, it will be 50 years since the military first ruled Myanmar, only eleven years after the country acquired independence from the British. Throughout the following half century of international isolation, the junta managed to survive through totalitarian rule, the squandering of natural resources and (more recently) vital economic and military alliances. Myanmar’s three principal export partners are Thailand (44.9 per cent), India (11.5 per cent) and China (6.9 per cent). Largely because of their recent purchases of commodities, such as natural gas, the junta has been able to claim economic growth rates as high as 12.2 per cent during the past few years. Nonetheless, the government’s actions demonstrate that it was primarily interested in applying these sources of income towards the continued development of its security and civil service sectors. Consequently, both the health and education sectors have continued to collapse and, with a GDP per capita of less than US$100, various ethnic minority groups such as the Wa, Shan and Kokang are among the poorest people in the world. Meanwhile, in recent decades several countries have been responsible for ensuring the continued survival of Myanmar’s military. Since 1988, China has provided more than US$1 billion in weapons and ammunition at concessionary prices. Russia has supplied a squadron of advanced MIG-29 fighters and, in May 2007, finalized an agreement to supply Myanmar with a nuclear reactor. India similarly snubbed a U.S. arms embargo with a January 2007 promise of weapons and military equipment while countries such as China have also assisted in the construction of local factories designed to manufacture items such as “small-calibre weapons and ordnance” and anti-personnel landmines. Given recent events, while there may exist some humanitarian grounds to justify economic engagement and political dialogue, it is argued that there no longer exist any morally acceptable grounds to justify the supply of military equipment, assistance and/or aid to the SPDC. 37

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The Way Forward? Thousands of Myanmarese have demonstrated that they are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for the betterment of their country. However, in the absence of adequate support from the international community, these sacrifices may not be enough. There are two options available to the international community to possibly force the SPDC to relinquish its power in the future. The first option would be for all of Myanmar’s key trading partners (e.g. Thailand and India) to threaten or (should that fail) implement, a total trade embargo against the regime. Recent events have demonstrated a lack of intention on the part of the junta to carry through with promises to enter into constructive and meaningful dialogue with its opponents—whether domestic or foreign. The second option, which could be carried out in conjunction with the first, would involve ASEAN and the international community applying “real” pressure on China to implement an arms embargo. An end to a total arms and trade embargo would be conditional upon an agreement by the SPDC to a “face-saving” package along the lines of an accelerated and binding version of their “roadmap to democracy”. Such a package would necessarily involve a commitment to elections within twelve months, agreement to a UN presence to oversee the elections, and a massive aid package to facilitate political change and prevent any humanitarian crisis. Admittedly, the probability of getting all of the allies of the SPDC to act in the interests of the Myanmar people remains low. Nevertheless, anything short of a determined and completely unified international position will likely fail to pressure the SPDC generals to relinquish their power. SC

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C. RAJA MOHAN

India’s Outdated Myanmar Policy Pressure for Change

India’s disturbing silence over the Myanmar turmoil can only be understood in the context of New Delhi’s long and turbulent relationship with the military rulers of Yangon. Having paid the price for being a lone supporter of the democratic aspirations in Myanmar for decades, India is hesitant to depart from its current policy of constructive engagement. However, New Delhi could begin to make incremental adjustments as it faces growing pressures to promote political change in Myanmar.

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ince the generals took charge of Burma 45 years ago, India has been its persistent critic of the military rule until the mid 1990s. The strong historic bonds between the Indian freedom movement and the Burmese national movement saw New Delhi condemn the military takeover of Burma in 1962 and a steady deterioration of bilateral relations. In the late 1980s, when the pro-democracy movement reached its zenith in Burma, India provided both moral and material support to the dissidents.

Why India Changed Its Earlier Hostility In the meanwhile, Burma’s junta has renamed the country as Myanmar. Three factors compelled India to rethink its political hostility towards the generals during the last decade. First was the China factor. As India and the world sought to isolate Myanmar in the late 1980s, Yangon drew ever closer to Beijing. Amidst the shifting balance of power in its immediate eastern neighbourhood in favour of China, India believed it could no longer stay out of Myanmar. C. Raja Mohan, Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was Professor of South Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. 39

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Second was the question of In- India’s neighbourhood policy has dia’s internal security in the restive always been torn between the North Eastern provinces. Coopera- temptation to promote positive tion with the Myanmarese military internal change and the relentless has been critical for India’s efforts pressure to deal with who ever was to counter many entrenched insur- in power. gencies in the Northeast. Third, as it sought to promote the “Look East” policy from the mid 1990s, India saw Myanmar as a natural land bridge to Southeast Asia. Together the three imperatives shaped a steadily expanding engagement with the Myanmarese generals and downgrade India’s support to the pro-democracy movement. Although the shift in India’s policy towards Myanmar is often justified in the name of “non-intervention” in the internal affairs of other nations, it was not principle but realpolitik that guided New Delhi’s changing attitudes towards Yangon since the mid 1990s. India’s neighbourhood policy has always been torn between the temptation to promote positive internal change and the relentless pressure to deal with who ever was in power. It was the specific circumstance, rather than a consistent moralpolitik that determined India’s approach to the internal affairs of its neighbours. After all India had conducted one of the world’s first humanitarian interventions in East Pakistan in 1971 to end the genocide there and created Bangladesh. It had unilaterally sent a peacekeeping force into Sri Lanka in the late 1987 to promote a reconciliation between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil separatists. And in 2007, India’s forceful diplomatic intervention persuaded the Nepalese monarchy to cede power to the people and generate a roadmap for the integration of Maoist insurgents into the political mainstream.

India’s Current Calculus on Myanmar What matters, then, is the nature of India’s calculus on its immediate and future interests and the ability to make a difference to the internal balance of forces in Myanmar. The core assumption that has guided India’s policy is that internal change in Myanmar is not on the cards. The brief but dramatic protest by the Buddhist monks has challenged this premise, but has not yet overturned it. If the internal conditions in Myanmar, which have already become unbearable for a majority of the populace, continue to provoke protests in the near fu40

The Myanmar Challenge

ture, India will have to reassess the longer-term political costs of identifying itself so overtly with the generals. More fundamentally, if New Delhi begins to take into account over-the-horizon security threats arising from a failed state in Yangon, it would have every reason to work for change in that Southeast Asian country rather than go down with an unsustainable status quo. Equally important will be the realization in New Delhi that its competition with Beijing for influence in Myanmar might have run its course. Any review of this rivalry over the last decade and a half would suggest that China has gained far more than India in Myanmar. Given its limited resources and democratic constraints, India is unlikely to outrun China there. New Delhi’s passive policy has ceded the high ground to Beijing, which has positioned itself as the agent of influence as well as the principal interlocutor between the international community and Myanmar. By simply tailing China in Myanmar, India now finds itself in dissonance not just with the United States but also Japan and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which have taken uncharacteristically strong positions against the Myanmarese generals.

An International Coalition on Myanmar? On its own, India does not have the leverage to engineer internal change in Myanmar. But it has enough stakes and equities there to contribute to the building of an international coalition. If such a coalition, involving the U.S., Japan, ASEAN, and India, is founded on the recognition that neither the attempt to isolate Myanmar nor those seeking separate engagement have delivered satisfactory results, a more credible approach might yet emerge from the current crisis. A subtle approach that focuses on carrots and sticks to induce change might have a better shot at inducing incremental change in Myanmar. From the perspective of realpolitik, too, such an international coalition might offer India a more credible option to balance China’s influence in Myanmar. If Beijing joins such a coalition, it will necessarily have to accept new constraints on its policy towards Myanmar. If it does not, India could become part of a stronger countervailing force in its eastern neighbourhood.

Recalibrating India’s Policy Given its deeply democratic character, changes in Indian foreign policy usually arise from domestic political pressures. There is deep empathy across the Indian 41

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

political spectrum for the Myanmarese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who grew up in New Delhi when her mother was her country’s ambassador there. From the communists, who oppose military rule in Myanmar, to the Hindu nationalists, who are revolted by the repression against the Buddhist monks, there is a strong domestic sentiment in India in favour of political change in Myanmar. If a solid international coalition and a credible strategy to alter the domestic dynamics of Myanmar emerge, India is bound to redo its sums on its enduring national interests to recalibrate its outdated policy on Myanmar. SC

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NYI NYI KYAW

Rohingya Muslims

Myanmar’s Forgotten People

The stateless Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar have been discriminated and excluded by consecutive governments since the 1960s, causing an exodus to Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia and other countries. The mounting jihadist propaganda of today may push the desperate ones amongst the Rohingyas towards extremism. To defuse a future problem, international action and support may be necessary.

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he Rohingya Muslims from the northern Rakhine (originally “Arakan”) State in Myanmar, number about two million, including a substantial diaspora community. They are among Myanmar’s largest ethno-religious minority groups. But the military regime still does not recognize the Rohingyas as a distinct ethnic group. According to Medicins Sans Frontieres, an international NGO which has been involved in humanitarian assistance projects in Bangladesh, the human rights violations of the Myanmar military government towards the Rohingyas are among the world’s top ten most under-reported stories of 2007. The Rohingyas have a history which dates back to the beginning of the 7th century when Arab Muslim traders settled in Arakan. The vast majority of Rohingyas live in the Rakhine State, a geographically isolated area in western Myanmar consisting of coastal plains and a network of streams and rivers. The area is separated from central Myanmar by a mountain range. The Naaf River marks part of the bor-

Nyi Nyi Kyaw, M.Sc candidate (International Political Economy) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 43

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der between Bangladesh and Myanmar. An estimated 200,000 Rohingyas also live across the border in Bangladesh, where they mostly live in abject poverty. A small number of around 26,000 reside in refugee camps scattered along the MyanmarBangladesh border.

Origin of Status Problem They were recognized as an indigenous ethnic group by the then-U Nu government during the parliamentary era in the 1950s. But the community lost their political and constitutional identity when the military government of General Ne Win promulgated the Citizenship Act of Burma (Myanmar’s previous name) in 1983, which effectively denied the Rohingyas recognition of their status as an ethnic minority group. Harsh discrimination against the Rohingyas soon followed. Their lack of citizenship status has severely curtailed economic opportunities and access to health and educational facilities. The plight of the Rohingyas has been compounded by social customs which forbid females to work, thereby contributing to the problems of sustainable livelihood. Not surprisingly, such conditions have sparked massive outflows of people in search for a better life overseas. Aside from Bangladesh, Rohingyas have fled to Thailand and Malaysia, at times through precarious channels such as overcrowded boats. According to some sources, about 15,000 Rohingyas entered Thailand via these channels in 2007 alone. In many instances however, they are often arrested upon arrival as illegal immigrants and repatriated back to Myanmar. While a large number of those refugees were repatriated to Myanmar over time, the outflow of Rohingyas from Northern Rakhine State fleeing persecution continues today.

Government Policy The military junta maintains a clearly articulated stance on the Rohingya people. In a press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar on 26 February 1992, the government declared: “In actual fact, although there are (135) national races living in Myanmar today, the so-called Rohingya people is not one of them. Historically, there has never been a ‘Rohingya’ race in Myanmar.” However, in response to criticisms from the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in April 2004, the junta replied that it had granted full and equal treatment to the Rohingyas, as with other races, in matters relating to birth and death registration, education, health and social affairs. Moreover, the junta 44

The Myanmar Challenge

also mentioned that the Rohingyas The military junta continues to deny are listed as a Bengali racial group full citizenship to the Rohingyas, of the Bengali race and recognized as restrict their movements, and control the growth of the Rohingya population. permanent residents of Myanmar. However, in practice the rights of the Rohingya population remained greatly restricted. The presence of the UNHCR and some other international NGOs in northern Rakhine State can only ameliorate the current plight of the Rohingyas. Without political will from within the Myanmar military junta, the plight of the Rohingyas cannot be resolved. The military junta continues to deny full citizenship to the Rohingyas, restrict their movements, and control the growth of the Rohingya population through restrictions in birth, death, and marriage registration. Many Rohingya communities have been used as forced labour to build “model” villages in northern Rakhine state as part of resettlement initiatives targeted at increasing the non-Rohingya population in traditional Rohingya lands.

Rohingyas and the Temptation of Militancy The plight of the Rohingyas has spawned several armed groups since the advent of military rule in 1962. These include the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), and the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), both of which in 1996 jointly formed the Rohingya National Alliance (RNA). In 1998 two RSO factions and ARIF merged into the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO). After the arrival of Rohingya Muslim refugees during 1991–92 in Bangladesh, some of the Rohingya armed groups became active in the refugee camps there, where they reportedly attempted to recruit refugees. According to Amnesty International, these groups have split into several smaller factions in recent years as a result of internal differences. They are reportedly operating from small bases in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border area, and do not appear to command a large following. Against the current international security climate, there remains an abiding concern for the potential links between Rohingya resistance groups and foreign extremist organizations. Several reports have surfaced regarding the activities of foreign extremists among Rohingya populations, though the evidence marshalled is sketchy and hypothetical at best. That said, there are several points of concern. For one, some 350,000 Rohingyas are purportedly now living in Pakistan, where a climate of sectarianism and religious extremism looms large. 45

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Time for International Assistance? While it is difficult to see light at the end of the tunnel, there have been some developments that have worked towards ameliorating the plight of the Rohingyas. For example, Bangladeshi authorities have softened their position on Rohingya refugees on their soil, and humanitarian support has been permitted to trickle through to the camps. The European Union donated US$15 million in December 2007 to assist the relocation of thousands of Rohingya refugees from their over-crowded refugee camps in Bangladesh to new shelters. These efforts notwithstanding, there is much more that the international community can and should do in order to improve living and educational standards of Myanmar’s forgotten Rohingya minorities, and well as pressing for their political recognition. Indeed, these considerations are of great significance if the increasingly marginalized Rohingya community of Myanmar is to be insulated from the forces of extremism and jihadism that is ever on the lookout for new and fertile soil to spawn. SC

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CLIMATE CHANGE

Barry Desker

ASEAN: Act on Climate Change MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY

Coping with Nature’s Wrath: Can Southeast Asia Afford to Wait? MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY • SOFIAH JAMIL

The Rush for Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: Promises and Pitfalls Hoo Tiang Boon • Ng Sue-Chia

The Security Dimension of Climate Change Chen Gang • Li Mingjiang

Climate Change: ASEAN Plus 3’s New Worry

BARRY DESKER

ASEAN

Act on Climate Change

The Kyoto approach of prescriptive binding obligations to reduce carbon emissions will be resisted in East Asia. ASEAN’s approach should be to emphasize changing the norms, exerting influence on major carbon emitters and obtaining consensual agreements. This could point the way forward for a deal at the UN for a new framework agreement on climate change.

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limate change is emerging as a critical issue on the security agenda of states within and outside Asia. Traditional security perspectives focused on the military and strategic dimensions. However, security in this day and age can no longer be confined to military issues alone nor can it be ensured only by focusing on military and strategic policies. With the end of the Cold War, security is much more broad-based covering non-military challenges such as economic degradation and resource scarcity, energy security, irregular migration, pandemics and trans-national crimes that increasingly threaten the survival and well-being of states and societies. Climate change has not only become a topic of common interest at the regional and multilateral levels but is also a key challenge in the spectrum of non-traditional security challenges.

Building a New Consensus When they met at the UN General Assembly in September 2007, world leaders agreed that climate change is now a global problem. This trend is demonstrated by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize

Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and concurrentl Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 49

Strategic CURRENTS – Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia

to the former U.S. Vice-President Al The global consensus on the grave Gore and the Inter-Governmental non-traditional security challenges Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) “for posed by climate change, however, their efforts to build up and dissemi- is not matched by a consensus on nate greater knowledge about man- how best to address this problem. made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such changes”. In December 2007, UN members met in Bali to consider the post-Kyoto Protocol framework. It remains moot whether the summit achieved anything significant, although it led to a deal for more talks on a new clastur treaty. It would be timely for ASEAN to act, especially as global warming threatens coastal communities in our region. The IPCC, composed of technical experts and established by the World Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), estimates that the populations in the Mekong and Chao Phraya deltas are at greatest risk while island communities are also at risk with the rising sea water levels. Deforestation threatens food gathering hill tribes in mainland Southeast Asia and has led to conflicts in Kalimantan. The global consensus on the grave non-traditional security challenges posed by climate change, however, is not matched by a consensus on how best to address this problem. The differing political responses and contentious negotiations taking place in the international community had been aptly described by U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. She observed that the “one-size-fits-all approach would not work … there must be room for each nation to tackle the problem through medium-term programmes that reflected its own needs and did not require it to put aside economic growth for the sake of the environmental health”. There is agreement on the need for a new global framework to observe the key principles put forward by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), particularly on the reduction of carbon emissions. The divergence of views between the developed and the developing countries on how to proceed to mitigate the impact of climate change was narrowed in Bali, but not completely overcome.

Need for Asian Action There is now a widespread appreciation of the severe consequences that climate change poses to the overall security of mankind (especially the developing world), and the need to prevent the negative effects of climate change. In a recent report by the CNA Corporation entitled “National Security and the Threat of Climate 50

Climate Change

Change”, retired U.S. military generals noted that climate change serves as “a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions in the world”. It is imperative that Asian states address climate change because not only does it threaten their environmental security but it would also have repercussions on their energy, economic, health and social security. Concrete Asian action on climate change is also essential as the region contributes a substantial amount of carbon emissions that precipitate climate change. According to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Earth Policy Institute, China, India and South Korea rank amongst the top ten countries for carbon emissions due to the burning of fossil fuels. However, Wetlands International suggests that if carbon emissions from human activities, such as the burning of peat land to clear land for plantation development are included, Indonesia with an average of two billion tonnes of carbon dioxide emitted each year, would be the third biggest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world after the U.S. and China. The annual haze alerts in Malaysia and Singapore over the past decade are a reminder that the burning of peat land and forests is an issue that concerns all of us. It is often claimed that such burning is the work of shifting cultivators. However, the correlation between “hot spots” on satellite imagery and the expansion of palm oil plantations and other renewable crops indicates that major commercial enterprises, not marginalized peasants, are the cause of these fires. The problem will increase in the next decade as the building of bio-fuel plants will increase the demand for palm oil and other renewable crops. Indicative of this trend is the building of some of the world’s largest bio-diesel plants in Sumatra (Indonesia). However, this development highlights the contradictory consequences of well-meaning actions. The increased use of bio-fuels arises from initiatives to promote its use. Under the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, 38 industrialized countries committed to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases in 2008–2012 to levels that are 5.2 per cent below the 1990 level. These countries have encouraged the use of fuel sources that emit fewer greenhouse gases. The EU Commission’s action plan, for example, lays down a minimum target for the replacement of fossil fuels by bio-fuels in all EU member states. This has led to an increased demand for bio-diesel and the clearance of peat land and forests in Indonesia.

ASEAN: Beyond the Kyoto Model These developments form the backdrop for the initiatives that are coming out from Asia on the climate change issue. Singapore hosted the 13th ASEAN Summit, the 51

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“ASEAN plus 3” meeting, as well as the 3rd East Asian Summit from 18–21 November 2007. The key theme of the summits and related meetings were on “Energy, Environment, Climate Change and Sustainable Development”. In line with this theme, the ASEAN Summit threw up the ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Environmental Sustainability at the ASEAN Summit and a Singapore Declaration on the Environment at the East Asian Summit. The ASEAN-EU Summit also had climate change high up on the agenda. The Kyoto approach of prescriptive binding obligations will be resisted in East Asia. An approach which emphasizes changing the norms, exerting influence on major carbon emitters and obtaining consensual agreements is much more likely to succeed. ASEAN should adopt this approach. It is also critical that measures be adopted that would not lead to environmental disasters in other areas as a consequence of the new policy orientation. It would mark a shift away from the Kyoto model. SC

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MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY

Coping with Nature’s Wrath Can Southeast Asia Afford to Wait?

Floods, landslides and strange diseases such as bird flu are occurring with greater regularity. As climate change wreaks havoc and becomes a global issue, how prepared is Asia to deal with the various fallouts on human security ?

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he news has been coming in thick and fast. Floods and landslides caused by heavy rainfalls in parts of Southeast Asia seem to have become normal occurrences. As if this is not enough, we also hear of severe warnings about the colossal consequences of global climate change. Disaster-stricken countries must be finding themselves overwhelmed by the immensity of the tasks in coping with all these natural disasters. Consider the latest flooding to hit Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta: Despite calls to step up efforts for disaster preparedness to avoid humanitarian emergencies caused by torrential rains and devastating deluge, disaster response remains woefully inadequate. One wonders how much more warning does it take for states to prioritize human security in their security agenda? To be sure, the region has already experienced several crises that could have triggered off alarm bells about the inability of states to cope with new, emerging security threats. The December 2004 tsunami should serve as a massive lesson of the human tragedies awaiting a region that cannot prepare itself. The grim tasks of undertaking disaster relief operations, providing humanitarian assistance and post-dis-

Mely Cabellaro-Anthony, Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. She is also Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies. 53

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aster reconstruction and development Asia is a region where major natural are all feeding into a vicious cycle. disasters often occur. Yet, despite Natural disasters generate complex this, are states doing enough to emergencies such as population dis- protect their people from the risks location, disruption of public services and emergencies that come with and threats of infectious diseases, all these disasters? of which require urgent and coordinated responses from a broad range of state agencies. Unfortunately, as vividly illustrated by the latest floods in Jakarta, many states in and outside Southeast Asia are least prepared to cope with these complex humanitarian emergencies.

Indonesia’s “Katrina”? The Jakarta floods had come just a few days after Indonesia declared a state of emergency due to the resurgence of the health threat from the H5N1 virus (bird flu). Images of submerged houses and vehicles, people wading through chestdeep waters and others perched on rooftops awaiting evacuation, have once again highlighted the horrendous plight of individuals and communities in disasterstricken areas. About 340,000 people had been rendered homeless as a result of the floods. Some had been swept away by strong water currents while others had died from electrocution. A crisis of this magnitude inevitably draws a grim reminder of a similar disaster that hit the American city of New Orleans in 2005. The damage that was caused by the fury of hurricane Katrina was catastrophic. It resulted in most of the city being submerged in flood waters after the Mississippi breached its levees and burst into the city—catching state authorities totally unprepared. The woeful lack of preparations in a city of the richest and most developed nation in the world resulted in the loss of over a thousand lives, mostly the old and infirmed; an estimated half a million people dislocated; immeasurable misery to hundreds of flood victims and incalculable damage to the city’s infrastructure, property and livestock. The greatest tragedy from the Katrina disaster was the fact that even in the world’s richest country, disaster preparedness was found lacking. A Time magazine report in the aftermath of Katrina had noted post-mortem analyses that pointed to the fact that “Katrina was in the cards, forewarned, foreseen and yet still dismissed until it was too late. That so many officials were caught so unpre54

Climate Change

pared was a failure less of imagination than will…” Hence, from this page of recent history, it is more often the lack and/or failure of disaster response systems that results in humanitarian emergencies of massive proportions.

Human Security: Is the Region Doing Enough? Asia is a region where major natural disasters often occur. Yet, despite this, are states doing enough to protect their people from the risks and emergencies that come with these disasters? Consider the 2006 Global Risks Report that was released at the 2006 World Economic Forum (WEF). The report had ranked pandemics and natural disasters as among the highest in the list of risks currently confronting the international community. More importantly, the report observed that despite the interplay of these multiple global risks and their combined ripple effects, “disaster planning and crisis management suffer from a number of shortcomings”. Among these are limited investments of resources in health systems and varying responses to different assessments of threats. These observations certainly reflect the situation in Southeast Asia. With memories still fresh of the catastrophic devastation wrought by the 2004 earthquakes and tsunami, one would have expected more vigilance from state authorities in the region to deal with future disasters. But there appears to be little evidence of this. The recent cases of devastating floods and even landslides across the region brought on by heavy rainfall has seen affected countries—the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia—grappling with the lack of capacity to provide immediate disaster assistance. This is particularly so to victims in the remote areas where poor infrastructure hindered transportation of basic supplies, including health services. With the erratic changes in climatic conditions, brought on among others, by climate change, there are enough reasons for raising the urgency in disaster preparedness in these countries. One need not wait for this type of disaster to strike before nation-wide responses are switched to emergency mode. As images of natural disasters unfold and captured vividly in television footages, the unfortunate lag in response time often results in unnecessary loss of lives and human misery.

No Time to Lose The latest floods in Jakarta proved to be another example of such delayed reaction, stemming from inertia in crisis management. One could argue, for instance, 55

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that the damaging effects of the December 2006 floods that laid to waste many parts of the Malaysian state of Johor, could also happen to Jakarta—given the torrential rains at this time of the year. Moreover, given the experiences of similar floods in 2002 that submerged parts of Jakarta, not to mention the capital’s problematic drainage system, it would have been a logical step to re-assess Indonesia’s national strategy to mitigate the potential risks from such disasters. But from the various reports of lack of evacuation warning and delayed assistance to victims of floods, it seems that much remains to be done in terms of disaster mitigation or risk reduction in Indonesia. The same applies to other countries in the region that face the same problems—annually and even several times in a year. With the looming threats of climate change, it may do well to examine the extent to which disaster risk reduction has become a national priority among states across the region. There is also a need to assess the institutional capacity of states to support strategies to face natural disasters. Are there sufficient regional mechanisms to complement national measures? How can regional states promote greater cooperation in disaster management? There is clearly a need to address these challenges before the next big wave strikes. SC

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MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY • SOFIAH JAMIL

The Rush for Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia Promises and Pitfalls

With the global demand for energy growing even as the threat from climate change looms large, the search for energy alternatives has led to a rush for nuclear energy. Several Southeast Asian countries have joined this bandwagon. But this new trend has also generated its own set of problems. Can the region deal with the safety imperative?

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he world’s surging demand for energy, coupled with the urgent need to mitigate the impact of climate change, has pressed many states to explore clean energy alternatives. For many developing countries in Asia, nuclear energy seems to be the most viable option. Japan—which relies heavily on nuclear energy for about a third of its electricity needs and is a prime advocate for the use of nuclear energy for civilian use—has been a good point of reference. Japan has also the largest nuclear power programme in Asia and the third largest worldwide after France and the United States. However, despite Japan’s great advancements in nuclear energy and good reputation for public safety, a series of nuclear-related disasters has raised concerns over the reliability of its nuclear industry. The recent earthquake in the country’s northern province of Niigata resulted in a fire and leak in its Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant—despite being fortified to

Mely Cabellaro-Anthony, Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. She is also Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies. Sofiah Jamil, Research Analyst at RSIS. She is with the Consortium of NonTraditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia). 57

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withstand earthquakes of as strong So far, several countries in ASEAN as 6.5 on the Richter scale. It has have jumped onto the nuclear once again provided a grim remind- energy bandwagon. er of the high risks and vulnerabilities that come with having nuclear power plants. More importantly, this raises more concerns as to whether developing countries in Southeast Asia—many of which have poor public safety records and/or are in earthquake prone areas—are able to effectively manage their own nuclear energy programmes without jeopardizing the security of the region.

Nuclear Energy in ASEAN So far, several countries in ASEAN have jumped onto the nuclear energy bandwagon. Apart from the need to utilize carbon-free forms of energy, this bandwagoning is driven by the need to increase energy supply amidst rapid economic growth. The Indonesian government has indicated that Gorontalo in Sulawesi would likely become the country’s first province to have a 4,000 megawatt nuclear power plant, which is expected to supply two per cent of the country’s total energy demand by 2017. Thailand also released plans of spending an estimated US$6 billion to build nuclear power plants by the year 2021 while Vietnam plans to build its first nuclear energy plant by 2020. The move towards the use of nuclear energy has been further strengthened by the belief that newer and safer technologies developed over the past 20 years would be better able to prevent nuclear disasters such as the Chernobyl plant in the former Soviet Union. The setting of longer time frames for the completion of nuclear plants also appears to indicate the growing awareness of respective governments of the need to build up sufficient expertise to safely operate these plants. International and bilateral support extended to certain countries—both technical and financial—had also added impetus to develop more nuclear energy plants in the region. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for instance, has approved six projects valued at almost US$1.5 billion to develop nuclear technology in Vietnam in 2007 and 2008. The Russians have also played a significant role in encouraging nuclear energy use in Indonesia and even in Myanmar.

Risks and Debates about Nuclear Energy Plants Against the growing interest in building nuclear power plants are also rising concerns in the region about the lack of transparency and public discussions about 58

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the potential dangers of the use of nuclear energy. The 1986 Chernobyl disaster was a vivid example of the severe threats to human security when a nuclear accident happens.

Lessons from Kashiwazaki With the July 2007 incident at the Kashiwazaki nuclear plant in Japan, threats arising from such disasters have been brought much closer to home. Reports about the accident point to two very important issues. First is the location of the nuclear plant. Analyses of the aftershocks indicate that the nuclear reactors actually stand directly below a fault plane which is believed to extend from beneath the Sea of Japan. This latest finding negates the earlier assumption that no active fault lines lies beneath the location. Second is the inevitability of human error. The Asahi Shimbun newspaper cited reports from Japanese geologists that while many of its nuclear plants are built to withstand an earthquake magnitude of up to 6.5, the calculations obviously underestimated and/or did not allow for a much higher magnitude. The latest quake in Niigata registered a magnitude of 6.8. Moreover, it is worth noting that an increase of 0.2 in magnitude would mean a two-fold rise in energy released. The sobering message we get from the above is that there are obviously no guarantees for earthquake-proof reactors, despite claims from manufacturers. Following the accident, alarms had already been raised about the massive radioactive leak, which had found its way into the oceans. The dangers of marine pollution can potentially snowball from having poisoned products from the sea to jeopardized livelihood of fisher folks around the region, as well as food security. In addition to disrupted electricity supply, there were also concerns about containing the structural damage of the power plant—which is the world’s largest— and whether this would be safe again for future use.

Crisis Management Aggravating the concerns for safety was the lack of transparency that frustrated efforts to efficiently manage the unfolding impact of the disaster. Anti-nuclear Japanese activists like Satoshi Fujino of the Citizens Nuclear Information Centre (CNIC) in Tokyo had cited inadequate government regulations and the “culture of secrecy” as the main factors contributing to nuclear accidents. According to him, the culture of secrecy had been used and abused to conceal information about 59

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safety procedures when plants were being prepared for inspections. Further reports from CNIC revealed that the nuclear plant industry in Japan had been plagued by scandals. CNIC claimed that there had been a number of “falsification” cases which hid and suppressed information about the extent to damage from nuclear accidents—from as far back as 1995. And, despite efforts by authorities to set up a number of fact-finding committees, it appears that many gaps still remained which could help explain why this latest accident could happen in a country that is known for its high safety standards.

Implications for the Region Issues about lack of transparency, corruption and poor crisis management are certainly not unique to Japan. It can be argued that the same problems apply to Southeast Asia—perhaps to an even more acute degree. The debacle of the Philippines’ Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) during the Marcos regime is a case in point. Lack of safety standards, economic viability and corruption had led to the failure of BNPP, leaving the Filipinos with a debt of US$2.2 billion. Given the chequered experience of operating nuclear energy plants in Asia, it may do well for countries in ASEAN to exercise more caution and diligence in executing their plans to build nuclear power plants. More so for countries which are geographically exposed to the so-called “Ring of Fire”. It may also be prudent to heed the objections from local communities living around the earthquakeprone zone, as in the case of Indonesia’s Mount Muria in central Java. Finally, given that safety standards in many of these countries are still problematic, communities therefore face higher risks when nuclear accidents happen. Failure to draw lessons from Japan and ignoring the voices of local communities who are familiar with the inherent dangers of their geographical terrain could result in catastrophic consequences. SC

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HOO TIANG BOON • NG SUE-CHIA

The Security Dimension of Climate Change While global climate change has been in the spotlight in recent times, much focus has been on its direct environmental impact. To garner greater governmental interest and political will, there may be a need to go beyond this “first-order” emphasis and to pay more attention to the security implications of these environmental effects.

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n recent months, much effort has been made by individuals, advocacy networks and trans-national organizations to raise global awareness about the perils of climate change. Much of this focus, however, has been to emphasize the first-order impact of climate change: that is the direct repercussions of climate change on the environment. Some examples of first-order effects are environmental consequences such as retreating glaciers, rising sea levels and greater weather extremes, among others. Now, in order to increase the level of international political will and secure more governmental “buy-ins”, the “first-order” approach may not be enough. More emphasis, indeed, should also be paid to the indirect second-order consequences: how these physical changes might then translate into serious security implications that would affect individual states. Climate change is more than just a

Hoo Tiang Boon, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations, Oxford University. He was previously Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Ng Sue-Chia, Associate Research Fellow at RSIS, where she is attached to the Homeland Defence Programme of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS). 61

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question of environmental degrada- The warming of the earth is likely tion; it is also about security dynam- to bring about various physical ics and this nexus should be given repercussions to the environment. greater weight. Climate change refers to the artificial warming of the earth as a result of excessive emission of greenhouse gases induced by man-made activities. While scientists are unsure about the extent and speed of shifts in climate, the overwhelming consensus is that the phenomenon is real and undeniable. Indeed, a recent report released by the Inter-govermental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concludes that “the warming of the climate system is unequivocal” and that much of this can be attributed to increases in human-induced greenhouse gas concentrations.

Second-Order Implications: The Security Dimension The warming of the earth is likely to bring about various physical repercussions to the environment. But more than just these physical manifestations of climate change, they also give rise to secondary-order problems that may well have security implications. For a start, climate change has the potential to generate more humanitarian crises. Climate change is likely to induce a greater frequency and intensity of natural disasters such as flooding and hurricanes, and these extreme weather events can result in mass mortality and grave subsistence complications for the affected community. If the situation is severe enough, this can lead to mass displacement of refugees that may well destabilize the affected area and its surrounding neighbours. Incidentally, Singapore’s experience has shown that it is not immune to the problem of refugee influx from its locality and it is not unthinkable that regional humanitarian exigencies sparked by climatic events can set off similar scenarios. Climate change also has the potential to fundamentally modify the distribution landscape of natural resources such as agricultural produce, fresh water and arable land. When that happens, competition for resource shortfalls may become exacerbating factors in provoking civil strife and conflicts. The violence in Dafur, for instance, other than being attributed to ethnic tensions, has also been linked to land resource problems caused by the abnormal drying of Darfur’s lands. While climate change is unlikely to be the primary driving force behind any specific conflict, it may nonetheless create the precipitating conditions in which conflict is more likely. 62

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Many health experts have also noted the growing nexus between climate change and the emergence and spread of diseases. In particular, the rise in global average temperatures has been identified as one of the primary reasons behind the extending ranges and seasons of various tropical disease-carriers, thereby pushing the geographical boundaries of these diseases into areas that were previously too cold to survive. The West Nile virus, for example, had never been detected in North America until some eight years ago. In addition, dengue fever and the Lyme disease are noted to be heading northwards while malaria is occurring at much higher elevations that ever recorded before. Taken together, all these signs indicate the far-reaching effect that climate change has on the diffusion of diseases and this implication should not be lost on today’s national security planners who are increasingly worried about the impact of disease threats on states.

Recognition as a Security Issue Encouragingly enough, recognition of climate change as a security problem has already started to seep into the corridors of power. In April 2007, the UN Security Council addressed the issue of global warming for the first time, warning about its potential to be a “conflict catalyst”. And in the United States, a bill calling for the elevation of climate change to a national security concern was proposed, with the ultimate objective of getting an unprecedented “national intelligence estimate” on climate change to be carried out. The U.S. military (via the Center for Naval Analyses) also published a recent study which explicitly stated that climate change “presents significant national security challenges to the U.S.” and is a “threat multiplier for volatile regions”. Meanwhile, during the 6th ShangriLa Dialogue, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s view is unequivocal: not only is climate change a potential damper to progress in Asia, it is also a “serious long term threat to the security of the region, and the world”.

What the Sceptics Say Like most major issues worth debating today, the securitization of climate change will invite its fair share of detractors. In particular, sceptics point out that the broadening of security’s agenda to encompass global warming is akin to opening the conceptual flood-gates to the extent that the idea of “security” is prosaic and analytically weak. Now, adroitly argued as the cynics’ reasoning is, they fail to see that climate change—as an indirect trigger of conflict, strife, instability and disease 63

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emergence—can result in loss of lives, involvement of security forces, or socioeconomic consequences that are just as comparable (if not even more) to conventional inter-state type of threats. This is why climate change should never be brushed aside as something which is incompatible to security analysis. Indeed, to circumscribe the notion of security within its orthodox boundaries may well be to impose unhealthy limitations on the analyst to examine implications beyond the conventional understanding. If that is the case, it is possible to counter-argue that the sceptics’ approach is conceptually parochial.

The Final Word To conclude, climate change remains one of the most pressing problems confronting states today. Unless more sustained, substantive and concerted efforts are taken by the majority of the states to curb the emission of greenhouse gases, artificial warming of the earth is unlikely to abate. But as we have argued, climate change has an undeniable security dimension to it. Paying more emphasis to this facet may well boost efforts to raise the political will and governmental interest needed to fight the global warming battle. SC

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CHEN GANG • LI MINGJIANG

Climate Change

ASEAN Plus 3’s New Worry

Climate change has become an important issue on the agenda of the ASEAN leaders, as evidenced in the joint communiqué of its 40th Ministerial Meeting and the declaration of the 13th ASEAN Summit. It is timely and of strategic importance for ASEAN to not only devote more attention to this contentious issue but also expand its bloc politics to include China, Japan, and South Korea.

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midst increasing global attention on climate change, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) vowed in the joint communiqué of its 40th Ministerial Meeting to make concerted efforts to tackle this problem. Meanwhile, the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in November 2007 ended with a declaration to also address climate change and global warming. The issue of climate change, therefore, has become an important topic on the agenda of the ASEAN leaders for the first time. In future, this will also be the case with the ASEAN plus 3 Summit, which includes China, Japan and South Korea. Echoing the concern that had been raised at July 2008 G-8 summit in Tokyo, this new ASEAN initiative came at a right time because regional states do need to act now to coordinate their positions on the upcoming international negotiations for a post-Kyoto regime.

Chen Gang, Research Fellow and Seminar Coordinator at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Li Mingjiang, Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he serves on the China Programme. 65

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Southeast Asia’s Vulnerability to Climate Change Although global warming is affecting the ecological system of the whole world and poses a threat to all countries, some regions and countries are especially vulnerable to this alarming rise of temperature due to their special geographic features and weak adaptation capacities. Many Southeast Asian countries are located in tropical areas and some of them are littoral, archipelagic or island states with long coastlines. One of the projected impacts of climate change is sea-level rise, which will bring about saltwater intrusion into surface and ground water of the coastal areas, reduce output of the fishery industry, and destroy mangroves and the habitats of various benthic organisms due to changes in salinity. Global warming also increases the frequency and intensity of tropical storms, and induces more cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. Some parts of Southeast Asia are already experiencing increasing cases of tropical diseases such as dengue fever and malaria because warmer temperature nurtures the insect population and is more suitable for vector-borne diseases. Take the Philippines and Indonesia as examples. These two archipelagic states are believed to be extremely vulnerable to climate change. Indonesia, consisting of about 17,000 islands, may witness 2,000 of them submerged by 2030 due to sea-level rise if the current trend of global warming continues unchecked. The Philippines, with approximately 7,100 islands and rocks, is suffering from more tropical cyclones and flooding that damage the country’s agriculture and infrastructure. With frequent precipitations caused by climate change, agricultural outputs could be significantly reduced. The Philippines and Indonesia thus had greater interests to take an active part in the international climate change negotiations since the late 1980s. The Philippines was one of the first countries to discuss and develop positions on climate change, and it was involved in the setting up of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). The Philippines was also among the first countries to set up a national committee to negotiate at the Conferences of Parties of the FCCC.

Preparing for the Next Round of International Talks The 1997 Kyoto Protocol only sets mandatory emission cuttings on an average level of about five per cent upon industrialized countries during 2008–2012. This has been widely criticized for its unsatisfactory results. A new round of international negotiations for a post-Kyoto pact started at the UN’s World Climate Change Con66

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ference in Bali, Indonesia at the end Many Southeast Asian countries are of 2007. At that time, this island in located in tropical areas and some Southeast Asia took the international of them are littoral, archipelagic or limelight, attracting over 10,000 con- island states with long coastlines. ference participants from around the world, including a number of heads of states. Past experience has shown that such international climate talks involving more than 100 countries were time-consuming with sharp divergences among different countries and blocs. A single country has to form a bloc with other countries of similar stances to magnify its say on such a disputed issue. So, prenegotiation policy coordination inside various blocs becomes extremely important for their future successful pursuit of interests in the global talks. During the previous climate talks on the Kyoto Protocol, ASEAN countries aligned themselves with other developing nations and formed the “Group of 77 and China” bloc. Together, they negotiated with industrialized countries and insisted on “common but differentiated responsibilities”. Due to their vulnerable geographic locations, some Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia became strong pushing forces in the global climate negotiations. This time, the 10-member ASEAN welcomed the proposal of Singapore, the 2007 chair of the regional grouping, to make “Energy, Environment, Climate Change and Sustainable Development” the theme for discussions at the 13th ASEAN Summit and Related Summits in November. This is partly because the organization found it necessary to coordinate the stances and policies of its member states on the climate change issue before the Bali conference. As ASEAN member states differ in their levels of economic development, environmental protection and geographic characteristics, policy coordination becomes highly necessary for the preparation of the new round of talks. Choosing Bali as the venue of the World Climate Change Conference underscored ASEAN’s desire to play a special and independent role in the post-Kyoto talks.

A New Area of Collaboration for ASEAN Plus 3? It is important for ASEAN to collaborate more closely with its three Northeast Asian partners—China, Japan, and South Korea—on the issue of climate change. China, the world’s second largest greenhouse gas emitter, is facing increasing international pressure for more emission cutting. Suffering from mounting domestic pollution problems, China is seeking international aid, especially through 67

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bilateral cooperation, to balance its economic development and environmental protection. It needs international support and understanding from other blocs to forestall any legally binding emission cutting obligations. Japan, the birthplace of the Kyoto Protocol, has special interest in climate change talks because it always regards environmental protection causes as an efficient means to promote its international image. Meanwhile Japan also finds it difficult to fulfil its obligations in the Kyoto Protocol to cut emissions by six per cent before 2012. Expansion of global carbon trading and more environmental investment into developing countries serve the interest of Japan, which urgently needs policy coordination and support from ASEAN. South Korea, which has been exempted from mandatory emission cuttings in the Kyoto Protocol, may also be pressured to shoulder more stringent obligations in the next climate treaty due to its high level of industrialization. Seoul already actively participated in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. Equipped with high-end technology, it certainly wants to expand regional cooperation in energy conservation and fuel switching. It is timely and of strategic importance, therefore, for ASEAN to not only devote more attention to the climate change issue but also expand its bloc politics to include China, Japan and South Korea. SC

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POLITICAL ECONOMY AND REGIONALISM

Anwar Ibrahim

The Asian Financial Crisis 10 Years Later: What Lessons Have We Learned? Shiping Tang

East Asian Identity: After the Crisis YANG RAZALI KASSIM

The New Silk Road: An Arab-Asian Free Trade Area? Barry Desker

APEC: Time for Second-Best Options

ANWAR IBRAHIM

The Asian Financial Crisis 10 Years Later What Lessons Have We Learned? There are at least six crucial lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis of the 1990s. But to be meaningful, there must first be a deep resolve to learn from the lessons of history. To be better placed to face the future ten years from now, the region must have a profound commitment to the principles of accountability and good governance.

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he task before us today is daunting indeed. So much has been written and said about the Asian Financial Crisis that one runs the risk of flogging a dead horse. The academic discourse on this too has been as phenomenal as the crisis itself. We run the risk of hair splitting, or getting drowned in a sea of statistics or having our vision blurred by the dazzling display of multicoloured pie charts and towering graphs. But while it is very easy to be an armchair critic, learning the lessons from the crisis is much more difficult. I am reminded of the saying by the late John Kenneth Galbraith that this is not the age of doctrine; it is the age of practical judgment, the world of intelligent thought and action, not of adherence to controlling doctrine. There is only that much that theory can offer. We are after all talking about real situations here, as real as the fact that even as we sit here today, the world’s financial mar-

Anwar Ibrahim, former deputy prime minister and finance minister of Malaysia. He was also Visiting Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. This is an abridged version of his paper at the “Asian Financial Crisis – Ten Years Later” Seminar organized by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University on 22 August 2007. 71

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kets are again in turmoil because of The IMF prescription for the crisis in U.S. sub-prime mort- privatizations is now recognized gages. We are again seeing central to be not only undemocratic but banks particularly in Southeast Asia economically unsound. defending their currencies against panic selling, dumping millions of U.S. dollars in market interventions. On the morning of 2 July 1997 a heavy clap of thunder reverberated across the financial markets of East Asia, shook us out of our slumber and signalled the start of a financial crisis unparalleled since the Great Depression. From Thailand, the turmoil spread to the Philippines, Indonesia, then Malaysia and Singapore. The other Asian countries followed suit, then Russia and Latin America. GDPs tumbled and unemployment rose to 18 million at the end of 1998. The speed of the contagion was totally unexpected, but can anyone of us deny that the writing was already on the wall? Ten years later, the question remains: have we learnt anything?

What Lessons? Firstly, I think no one seriously disputes that there should be a major change in the principles and policies on which the Bretton Woods institutions work. A one-sizefits-all policy has been proven to have greater chances of failure than success under the global system. The need for diversity becomes all the more pressing. Hence, I make no apologies about criticizing the neo-liberal Washington Consensus and the International Monetary Fund’s standard formulae for borrowing countries. We are told that the IMF has already addressed this fundamental issue but it appears that neither sufficient thought nor serious commitment has been given to it. We are still left asking the question ten years after: Where is that new global financial architecture that was to come about after this wave of creative destruction? The IMF prescription for privatizations is now recognized to be not only undemocratic but economically unsound. This is especially so where the prerequisites are not in place. Among them are good governance, transparency and accountability. Just recently the Malaysian government unveiled a series of development projects which are so massive that the word “mega” doesn’t even come close to describing their magnitude. Obviously, my concern is not against development per se, but when you have an undertaking three times the size of Singapore that would incur tens of billions of ringgit of taxpayers’ money, the parcelling out of projects and the award of contracts is surely a matter of great concern. Without the prerequisites that must be fulfilled for such a colossal enterprise, 72

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privatization will be a passport for plundering. That such banditry can happen is not a mere possibility but a near certainty. Friendly policies and “pro-growth initiatives” may generate an even bigger pie but without those prerequisites this pie will be devoured only by the select few at the expense of the more deserving majority. And when a crisis breaks out, it is this majority who will bear the brunt. One of the most enduring lessons, therefore, is that in a financial crisis of the kind that we are talking about, the cronies and friends of the powers that be get away unscathed, or if they do get into trouble, they will be the first to be bailed out. The life boats are reserved for them in times of trouble. In good times, they get the icing on the economic cake and this applies across the board: water services, waste disposal, telecommunications, and ports, speaking of which, you might already know that in Malaysia, a five billion ringgit port scandal is about to explode and it goes back to the issues of good governance, transparency and accountability. Another lesson perhaps is about prudence or more accurately the lack of it. We also call it moral hazard. At the outbreak of the crisis, public investment expenditure in Malaysia surged, pushing the total investment to GDP ratio to 46 per cent in 1997, the highest in the region. Through the 1990s, there had been a continuous increase in the share of investment in domestic aggregate expenditure, from about 35 per cent early in the decade to over 46 per cent in 1997. Mega projects required mega borrowings. Bankers were intimidated by the political connections of the big borrowers. Through such intimidation, “moral suasion” and collusion of interests, the entire banking system became hostage to a handful of borrowers whose debts made up more than half of the entire lending of the banking system. This was vintage moral hazard. There’s much wisdom in Polonius’ dictum that one should “neither a borrower nor a lender be for loan oft loses both itself and friend and borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry”. Of course, adopting this advice would mean the collapse of the entire banking and financial system but the truth remains that excessive leverage was one of the key causes of the crisis. One should not be faulted for erring on the side of caution.

The Middle Path Thirdly, as regards managing the economy, my view is this: There must be flexibility and common sense. The rule should be Hayekian free enterprise with a dose of Keynesian fiscal remedy every now and then. This is the middle path. It has been said that Aristotle’s recommendation of the Golden Mean was an at73

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tempt to evade the inadequacy of absolute maxims. There must not be too much of anything, even of the virtues just as too much courage is rashness, too much generosity is extravagance and too much accuracy is hair splitting. In Islam we call it the awsatuha just as we are familiar with the chung yung of Confucius. Translated into practical terms, it means that when the economy is underperforming below its potential, increased public expenditures would be needed. Obviously, fiscal discipline must be maintained to ensure that the consequent fiscal imbalance remains within manageable levels at all times. As Finance Minister, I had on occasions endorsed pump-priming programmes geared towards stimulating the economy. I had committed major expenditure for projects clearly underlined with the agenda for social justice: public health, education and human resource training, basic infrastructure and industry, public housing and rural development. Direct fiscal action such as tax reduction, public job creation, and other fiscal measures to expand demand is the hallmark of a caring state based on the humane economy, and should be recommended. But I must immediately lodge a caveat here: At the level of implementation, pumppriming measures, unless executed transparently and with an even hand, will be misused. In the hands of unscrupulous and corrupt leaders and politicians, such measures become a mere metaphor for the siphoning of taxpayers’ money to line the pockets of their cronies and relatives. Fourthly, and this flows from the preceding issue, social justice must remain a long term objective. So, how does that leave my professed belief in the free market? Adam Smith’s laissez-faire economy postulated the invisible hand to maximize individual welfare and economic efficiency. With David Hume, and then fine-tuned by the Austrian school, F. A. Hayek being the most ardent of the exponents, the doctrine was that economies must be allowed to develop by spontaneous order. The injunction is that state intervention should be avoided like the plague. But while the spirit may be willing, the flesh could be weak and in this regard the invisible hand has invariably demonstrated its fragility under the crushing weight of monopolist suppliers and rent seekers alike. The dictum against state intervention is valid to prevent the overbearing tendency towards totalitarianism. But it has been shown time and again that the free market capitalist system has generated externalities that have led to gross inequalities of income distribution. So I am not totally with him either. Enough has already been seen in the history of free market that points to the exploitation of the poor by the rich whether 74

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they are individuals, corporations or countries. Unemployment goes up, wages remain stagnant or worse still, fall, while prices go up. Neoliberals will tell us that price inflation is inevitable in a well functioning economy and given time things will find their equilibrium; intervention will only worsen the situation.

Jekyll & Hyde Economics, or Humane Economics? But my view is that the invisible hand should start making itself seen to ensure that such inflation is within limits. Disparities in purchasing power are real and cannot be analysed purely from the halls of academia or the detached corridors of power. Governments must be committed to the principle that a more equitable distribution of income is a fundamental precept for the realization of social justice. They should undertake with full conviction, integrated plans for pov- Empty stomachs do not shout for erty reduction in the long run while liberty, but for food. But why should ensuring a comprehensive support development become a trade-off for system for the poor and economically un-freedom? marginalized. In other words, we can subscribe to Hayek only up to a point at which neoliberalism must make way for the paternalism of Keynes. Some call this Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde economics. I call it humane economics. Fifthly, regardless whether the economy is developing or developed, or in the Rostovian sense, at the stage of take-off or high mass-consumption, the right of workers to associate and protect their interests must be central. I subscribe to the view that income distribution is very much an issue of political power as it is of economic power. Such power must be checked by the principles of governance and accountability. Ten years after the crisis, we see the deterioration in the fabric of the institutions we have empowered to represent us. Politicians in public office are not just reneging on their promises of social justice, but are scandalizing the institutions of power with abuse and corrupt practices. Yet another lesson that may be drawn concerns the issue of the liberalization of the capital account. I know this is stirring up a hornets’ nest. Let me be the first to say that it is not the be-all and end-all. We are familiar with the negative impact of short-term capital on an economy with weak financial sectors. Countless tomes have been written about this. Nevertheless, as I had advocated before, I believe there is a case for such a measure to be introduced in phases taking into account the macroeconomic situation, the stage of development of its financial 75

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institutions, and the impact of existing controls. We will recall that recently, the Malaysian Central Bank embarked exactly on this course by first unpegging the ringgit to the dollar and substituting it with a mixed managed float instead. Indonesia, for instance, successfully liberalized its capital account very early in the reform process. We need to acknowledge therefore that, imposing capital outflow controls to deal with a short-term crisis may be tempting but the long term consequences are likely to be adverse. It would undermine the systemic ability to respond to a changing environment. To my mind, imposing capital controls was to treat only the symptoms. The lesson therefore is: in as much as the Bretton Woods institutions need reform, the respective governments in the region here are also in need of structural reform in the economic and political spheres.

Trade-off for un-freedom It has often been argued that the emphasis on political freedom, liberties and democracy is a specifically western priority. Economic development, it is said, must precede freedom. Empty stomachs do not shout for liberty, but for food. But why should development become a trade-off for un-freedom? Why should fundamental liberties be eroded and dissent muzzled in the name of development? If development is to enlarge freedom, then substantial development enlarges freedom substantially, for as the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen says in his Development as Freedom: “It is hard to think that any process of substantial development can do without very extensive use of markets.” The difference is clear: extensive use of markets does not mean letting market forces go out of control in as much as freedom cannot be absolute. In the words of Sen: Statecraft, which will necessarily warrant social support and public regulations, cannot be precluded when they can enrich—rather than impoverish—human lives. The claim that Malaysia has emerged triumphantly out of the crisis is empty. As the numbers show, Malaysia is significantly falling behind its Southeast Asian neighbours. We would have thought that among the most important lessons learnt is that unstable debt/GDP dynamics is a glaring red flag for the onset of financial crisis. It would appear that this basic lesson has not been learnt. South Korea and Singapore are still leading the pack in showing budget surpluses over GDP. Thailand posted small surpluses in 2003 and 2004 and currently registers balanced budgets and Indonesia, incurring deficit budgets year after year since the crisis. But Malaysia chalks up the highest deficit/GDP ratio among the countries affected by the crisis with low sovereign rating. 76

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I am aware I will be accused of being the proverbial dog in the manger. But let me put this to rest. I will say that much good has come out of this and great strides have been made in various areas which will help to fortify the economies in the region when crisis strikes again. Various reputable studies show that in the area of trade, for example, intra-regional exports have almost tripled, China being at the centre and the rest are riding piggyback. Ten years after, considerably much more has been expended on research and development while higher education has made leaps and bounds. The same is said about resource allocation, reduction of systemic risk and the gaining of financial depth. But invariably this perspective is only useful when talking in general terms. Some countries are lucky to be endowed with oil and so they get oil money and this may be the primary thing sustaining the economy. Yet other economies have had a head start even before the crisis, and with their infrastructures intact, have been able to recover faster. However, if we go beyond this veneer, reality bites hard. For most of Southeast Asian countries, there is little to show in the manufacturing sector, key industries and in the production of services to enhance global competitiveness. Malaysia, for example, needs a new economic agenda to propel the country to meet the challenges of global competition. And finally, in the context of a regional free market, the efforts within ASEAN are more palpable even though unfortunately no intraregional financial integration appears in sight in the near future. But that should only strengthen our resolve to work for greater cohesiveness. Deeper integration means better capacity and preparedness to counter the fluctuations of capital inflows and we cannot talk about integration without mentioning liberalization again. But liberalization must be mutual, collective and coterminous. Recalling Galbraith’s dictum that this is indeed the age of practical judgment and not of adherence to controlling doctrine, let me end by saying that with intelligent thought and action, a deep resolve to learn from the lessons of history and most importantly, a profound commitment to the principles of accountability and good governance, we would be better placed to face the future ten years from now. SC

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SHIPING TANG

East Asian Identity After the Crisis

While the Asian Financial Crisis has done damage to regional economies, it has also accelerated East Asian regionalism, contributing to the emergence of the ASEAN + 3 caucus involving the 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South Korea. But the question of East Asian identity remains elusive.

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he 1997 Asian Financial Crisis was undoubtedly one of the most dramatic events in post-Cold War East Asia. While there is no doubt that the crisis was a watershed, it might perhaps be timely to ask, on its tenth anniversary, how deep an impact it has had on the region.

The Damage and the Corrections The most obvious impact of the crisis has been the severe damage inflicted on several regional economies, most notably Indonesia and Thailand. By most estimates, Indonesia’s economic development was pushed back for at least a decade. The economic upheaval triggered by the crisis eventually led to the collapse of Suharto’s “New Order” and the democratisation of Indonesia. Thailand was also moving towards a mature democracy when it promulgated a new Constitution in October 1997, until the military coup in September 2006 brought the country back to military rule. The 1997 crisis eroded the International Monetary Fund’s moral authority in managing international financial crises and prescribing remedies. Before 1997, the IMF’s authority in dictating policy changes to developing countries in need of financial assistance had gone unquestioned even though the Fund had already mishandled a few previous crises. IMF’s clumsy handling of the 1997 crisis and Shiping Tang, Senior Fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where is with the China Programme. 78

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its severe consequences finally drove An important but often overlooked home the point that the IMF did not consequence of the 1997 crisis is have all the right answers; neither did the acceleration of the integration of the so-called “neoclassical/Washing- Hong Kong into China. ton Consensus” work all the time. The IMF’s handling of the crisis also made regional economies realize that they needed a regional mechanism that could react to an impending crisis in a timely fashion; it was out of this recognition that the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was hatched. Today, CMI has evolved from the initial bilateral reserve swap system to a multilateral arrangement, called “Emergency Currency Reserve”. Under the initial bilateral reserve swap system, a state could decline to contribute to a rescue mission on another state. Under the new “Emergency Currency Reserve” arrangement, rescuing missions are deemed as collective action. This evolution should be considered a major progress because it contributed to the integration of East Asian economies. The 1997 crisis fundamentally weakened the legitimacy of what is known as “crony capitalism”, as epitomized by the chaebols in South Korea. The lack of transparency in and oversight over the dealings between private business and banks (state-controlled or not) made an economy extremely vulnerable to external shocks. Today, most regional economies have firmly rejected this practice and many have spent much of the past decade to bolster the independence of their banks and to clean up the bad loans within their banking systems. An important but often overlooked consequence of the 1997 crisis is the acceleration of the integration of Hong Kong into China. Hong Kong returned to China’s sovereignty on 1 July 1997; the Asian financial crisis struck the next day, dragging Hong Kong into its longest recession in history. It was during this long recession that residents of Hong Kong began to appreciate their dependence on China—perhaps for the first time. For 30 years after 1949, China was closed to the outside world and Hong Kong essentially monopolized China’s international trade with the Western world and profited enormously. After China’s opening and economic reforms, however, Hong Kong’s monopoly was gradually eroded. Hong Kong today has to compete for business opportunities with other Chinese cities, especially Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Tianjin and Dalian. Residents of Hong Kong today now have to compete for jobs like never before. Someday, Hong Kong may become, for better or worse, just another major Chinese city, though hopefully a good one.

The Constants The 1997 crisis did not change everything, of course. Perhaps the biggest surprise is that the “ASEAN plus 3” or “10+3” grouping, 79

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the most touted initiative in East Asian regionalism, has come into existence. Indeed, it will come into existence sooner or later even if there had been no 1997 crisis. Actually, the financial crisis did not create the “10+3”: The ever-increasing interdependence within these East Asian economies has been a factor, and will almost inevitably lead to a pan-East Asian bloc. The 1997 crisis had merely accelerated the coming of the “10+3”. East Asia was already feeling a sense of urgency that it was rapidly falling behind the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in regional integration. East Asia also realized that this lag was weakening the region’s overall competitiveness. Indeed, the inability to deal with the financial crisis was instrumental in propelling East Asian states into action. The 1997 crisis has neither significantly affected the central role of ASEAN in pushing East Asian regional integration, despite many pundits eagerly waiting to hand a death sentence on ASEAN shortly after the crisis. Today, ASEAN remains in the driver’s seat in pushing East Asian regionalism. A key reason is that Japan and China, the two major powers in the region, do not get along too well and thus have to devolve the leadership role to ASEAN. In the long run, though, a genuine and robust reconciliation between Japan and China is a must if East Asia is to have an integrated future. Moreover, ASEAN has remained in the driver’s seat in pushing East Asian regionalism, despite the inability of Indonesia—ASEAN’s “first among equals” before 1997—to exercise leadership after it was hard-hit by the crisis. Maybe ASEAN as an institution has indeed gained its own life, independent of Indonesia’s leadership. And contrary to conventional wisdom, the 1997 crisis had also not destroyed the East Asian economic development model. The core of the East Asian model is not crony capitalism, but state-guided economic development with a market economy. While today’s East Asian economies believe in strong governance and transparency, they remain committed to the core principle of a developmental state. One can even argue that post-crisis, East Asian states became more convinced in the necessity of a strong state in managing the road towards economic success. Finally, the 1997 crisis has had very little effect on the long-term growth of the Chinese economy, although it might have brought about sooner China’s sterling economic growth.

The Fog: East Asian Identity The one area in which the impact of the 1997 crisis is hard to judge is the “East Asian identity”. While the 1997 crisis gave the East Asian states a sense of solidarity, it is difficult to argue that East Asia has a stronger common identity today. If a full-fledged East Asian Community depends on the emergence of a common East Asian identity, then the region has a long way to go. SC 80

YANG RAZALI KASSIM

The New Silk Road

An Arab-Asian Free Trade Area?

The growing assertiveness of Saudi Arabia post September 11, along with the corresponding emergence of the Middle East as an economic player on the global stage, has raised expectations of a revival of the Old Silk Road between the Middle East and Asia.

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n two counts, the 27–28 March 2007 Arab League summit in Riyadh could be the beginning of a turning point in the tumultuous history of the Middle East post-1948. The first is the political and diplomatic push for peace with Israel led by the 22-member grouping’s current leader, Saudi Arabia. King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz’s revival—with no further concessions to the Israelis—of his 2002 land-for-peace proposal showed the seriousness of the Arabs to resolve the root of the Middle East conflict. More importantly, it meant the Arab world capturing the initiative from the West to define and shape its own region, and possibly rolling back external intervention. The second development is the much underplayed, but no less significant, drive for economic integration through a pan-Arab free trade area. On both counts, we should take note of an increasingly assertive Saudi Arabia, the Arab world’s most important country, playing the role of the new primus inter pares—the first among equals. Under the stewardship of King Abdullah, the Arab world is showing signs of new seriousness to transform itself from a divided and insignificant bystander in its own backyard into a possible giant in the making. If the Arab world Yang Razali Kassim, Senior Fellow and Editor, Strategic Currents and Editor, RSIS Commentaries at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 81

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could overcome its internal divisions The significant potential of an Arab free and rally behind a common vision, as trade powerhouse can best be felt by the Riyadh summit had called for, the imagining the impact of the Middle East world could see the beginning of the at the height of the Islamic civilization in end of the Middle East conflict—no the earlier centuries. matter how remote it may seem now. A revived Middle East that ushers in peace to the region will also bring prosperity to the rest of the world. An emergent Middle East, shaken out of its slumber post September 11, could use its abundant oil wealth to become the next rising economic power, after China and India. This is where other regions like ASEAN, and countries like Singapore, must not fail to take notice.

GCC and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (Gafta)? While the land-for-peace proposal may take time to bear fruit, especially if the Israelis are less than serious in their response, it is already showing signs of triggering some movement in the peace process. Equally important here is the political resolve displayed by the Arab world and the Saudis as a regional playmaker—at a time when leadership is most needed in the region. Such firm display of resolve on the political and diplomatic fronts raises confidence of a similar positive effect on the economic front. The Saudis are clearly the current big brother in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Given its economic might and strategic role, the Saudi voice must be taken seriously not just in the Arab League but also in all the key forums where it is involved, such as the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). An emergent Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world will have a multiplier effect on these overlapping platforms. Thus, should the Saudis succeed to significantly influence the Arab League to move with greater purpose from now on, the group could well drive the incipient economic revival of the region, currently being motored by the six GCC states of which Saudi Arabia is again the leading player. The other GCC members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)— making the GCC the richest and most influential economic grouping in the Middle East. The 2007 Riyadh summit’s declaration included several strategies for economic integration that have been barely noticed. As reported by the Saudi Gazette, it called for the establishment of a customs union, starting with an Arab free trade zone, for which the GCC is already taking the lead. Non-tariff barriers would be gradually removed. Restrictions on inter-Arab capital movement would also be eased. A less restrictive foreign direct investment policy would be 82

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pursued. A network of communication infrastructure such as roads and modern railways would also be built to link the Arab world through government-business partnerships. To buttress all this, skilled labour would be freed up for greater mobility among Arab countries. Lastly, nuclear energy would be harnessed to promote the economic growth of the Arab world. The pursuit of Arab economic integration is actually not new. Initial attempts began as early as 1953 with the Treaty of Transit Trade, followed by a 1964 agreement to form an Arab Common Market involving Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Libya. All these efforts could however not be realized because of economic and political divisions within the Arab world. In March 2001, at the Arab summit in Amman, the decision was taken to step up efforts to create a strong Arab economic bloc. Six months later, the Arab League met in Riyadh to push for the formation of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (Gafta). Gafta became a reality after the September 11 catharsis when it was officially formed in January 2005. Its key goal is to increase the economic interdependence among Arab states to help boost the region’s stability and security.

Gafta and the World In other words, the aftermath of September 11 provided the catalyst that pushed the Arab world into a fundamental rethink of its place in the world. The restrictions in the West, especially the U.S., on all things Arab and Muslim led to a major “Look East” policy that diversified Arab attention from the West towards Asia. The Middle East also found itself giving greater priority to its own growth and development, as seen in the formation of Gafta. Although not much is known yet of this grouping outside the Middle East, its goal is clearly to be a major economic bloc—not unlike the ASEAN free trade area or AFTA. ASEAN aside, Gafta’s emergence also comes at a time when the world is witnessing a flurry of FTAs. For example, in 2005, Egypt and Russia agreed to set up a bilateral free trade zone. The European Union also announced that it would start talks with nine states from the Middle East and North Africa to establish a free trade zone. The significant potential of an Arab free trade powerhouse can best be felt by imagining the impact of the Middle East at the height of the Islamic civilization in the earlier centuries. The Middle East was then a centre of global trade and commerce linking Asia with Europe. This has given rise to the famous overland Silk Road and the Spice Route linking sea-borne trade between the major economic zones of the world at that time. 83

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Singapore, ASEAN and the New Silk Road Today, the resurgence of the old trading routes is palpable as the Middle East, and the Arab world in particular, begin to rise from the ashes of September 11, causing ripples across the globe. The world now talks of a “New Silk Road” linking the Middle East with Asia. Note how Malaysia has positioned itself firmly for this by becoming a hub for Islamic finance. Significantly, the U.S. does not want to be left out either. In 2003, just two years after September 11, Washington talked about the historical role of the Middle East in global trade and commerce. The U.S. proposed a series of bilateral free trade arrangements (FTAs) for Middle East nations, which it hoped would eventually meld into what it called a Middle East Free Trade Area (Mefta). Already, the U.S. has FTAs with three regional countries (Jordan, Morocco and Israel) and is finalizing similar agreements with three others (Bahrain, Oman and the UAE). Robert Zoellick, then the U.S. Trade Representative, described the Middle East as the historical “pre-eminent bazaar” of the world. Renowned for its commercial prowess that lay at the centre of the Silk Road from Europe to China, the Middle East, he said, was now charting a new future. Singapore too has jumped into the bandwagon with a flurry of high-level visits to the region, starting with Saudi Arabia. Albeit a latecomer, Singapore has joined the rush to embrace the Arab world and the Middle East with several FTAs either done or in the making, even though Gafta has still some way to go. What Singapore can do next is to ride on the economic emergence of the Middle East by pushing for a free trade bridge between ASEAN and the Arab bloc through the GCC or Gafta— in the same way that it has done for ASEAN’s other major trading relationships such as China, India and the EU. The New Silk Road is just opening up; more is yet to come. SC

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BARRY DESKER

APEC

Time for Second-Best Options

APEC has to break new ground if it is to remain relevant in an evolving Asia Pacific architecture. To succeed in this goal, creative moves have to be attempted in areas ranging from trade and security to agenda setting.

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he Sydney APEC Leaders’ Meeting of September 2007 should have been a turning point for the grouping. APEC is trying to remain relevant to its members. It risks being overshadowed by the newer, more vibrant East Asian Community (EAC) and East Asian Summit (EAS) groupings. However, the EAC is based on a model of participation by contiguous states (also known as ASEAN Plus 3 in ASEAN circles and as the 10+3 in Chinese reports, reflecting China’s preference to handle relations with ASEAN states on a bilateral basis). A rising China is the driving force behind the EAC and this grouping is likely to be dominated by China over time.

APEC and the Major Powers This consideration has been an important factor accounting for Japanese support for the establishment of a broader EAS. It is unlikely that the EAS will emerge in the near future as the key institution for the structuring of regional relationships as China, in particular, is likely to resist efforts by other members to implement proposals for functional cooperation within the EAS structure. By contrast, APEC is the United States’ preferred vehicle for engagement with East Asia while APEC also encompasses China within its framework. Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and concurrent Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 85

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It is important to bear in mind If APEC fails to break new ground, that regional institutions function it will soon fade. both as diplomatic instruments capable of mitigating some of the differences that exist between China and the U.S. as well as avenues where their different values compete and are played out. The Chinese emphasis is on an East Asian regionalism excluding the U.S. (which is not part of East Asia) rather than Asia Pacific regionalism; multipolarity rather than multilateralism; and essentially the application of uncontested and standard UN Charter principles to East Asia. The Chinese focus is on the EAC framework accompanied by a preference for the management of relations through bilateral linkages. In contrast, the U.S. prefers institutions set in the wider Asia-Pacific context (APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF come to mind) and primarily as complementary diplomatic instruments to its system of bilateral military alliances, especially its core alliance with Japan. Institutions are thus not expected in Washington to pose a threat to its unipolarity but rather to consolidate it. These different values and strategies are present in the very regional institutions currently being established in the Asia-Pacific, making the clash of norms and values quite possible.

Role of the Smaller States I would argue that the role of mitigating these differences and shaping a coherent synthesis can therefore be played by smaller states in the region. This provides ASEAN and Australia with an opportunity to shape the emerging regional security architecture and to ameliorate the risks of a clash of cultures or a clash of civilizations. How the leaders of ASEAN and Australia handled the debates in Sydney could therefore provide us with an indication of the future outlook for the region. APEC could be the key to a strategy designed to engage the U.S. and China. Australia’s hosting of the 2007 APEC Leaders’ Meeting provided an opportunity to exercise leadership in the forum on a range of issues including strengthening the institutionalized mechanisms for APEC cooperation, developing an agenda for functional cooperation, and trade facilitation. APEC will increasingly focus on non-traditional security issues such as the impact of international terrorism, trans-national organized crime, pandemics, natural disasters, climate change, the environment, energy issues, the smuggling 86

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of persons, drugs and goods across international borders and the consequences of economic crises such as the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis.

Changing Attitudes on Climate Change Interestingly, while security analysts call for an expansion of the security agenda within organizations such as the ARF to include non-traditional or human security issues, these same issues form part of the wider agenda promoted by trade negotiators through institutions such as APEC. It is noteworthy that APEC already has directors responsible for non-traditional security issues such as counter-terrorism and infectious diseases. It has also begun discussions on issues such as supply-chain security, maritime security, energy, and the environment. Through its chairmanship, Australia led the way in advancing these new initiatives within APEC as well as proposing new areas of activity such as APEC cooperation on climate change issues. There is a significant change in attitudes towards the environment and climate change in the APEC region, particularly in East Asia, where this is no longer seen as a developed versus developing countries issue but one which affects the security of their own citizens. An APEC initiative on the environment and climate change would therefore be timely. The U.S. and China are the leading global emitters of carbon dioxide, followed by Indonesia. Carbon dioxide emissions in East Asia will rise rapidly in the next two decades. The APEC Leaders’ Meeting could promote the adoption of policies aimed at encouraging the efficient use of energy in the APEC region. However, the Kyoto approach of prescriptive, legally binding obligations will be resisted in East Asia. An approach which focuses on changing the norms and obtaining consensual agreements is much more likely to succeed. This is where an APEC initiative could be effective as it would mark a move away from the Kyoto model and bring on board China, Indonesia as well as the U.S. As APEC’s programme for early, voluntary sectoral liberalization has stalled, APEC leaders will advance a security agenda at APEC meetings, albeit focusing on non-traditional security issues. This is because security discussions provide substance to the annual APEC Leaders’ Meeting, even though economists criticize the move away from an economic focus. ASEAN leaders should push for an agreement on meetings at the summit level of members of the ASEAN Regional Forum once in every three years when APEC is hosted by an ASEAN member. Although the ARF is the 87

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primary institution discussing regional and multilateral security issues, it has been marginalized because it is primarily an institution serving foreign ministers and has only recently begun to meet at the defence ministry senior officials’ level.

Time for Second-Best Options on Trade It is time for second best options as the world awaits a breakthrough in multilateral WTO trade negotiations. The U.S. and China should take the lead in proposing a multilateral APEC free trade agreement under GATT Article XXIV among countries and customs territories interested in opening markets across the board. This would help to re-shape the substance and atmospherics of international trade negotiations. The focus would shift away from free trade agreements (FTAs) while providing the necessary pressure on the European Union, the U.S. and the major developing countries to conclude negotiations in the current stalled Doha Round of WTO negotiations. Politically, it could be the imaginative approach necessary to create a new foreign policy opening between the current global hegemon, the U.S., and the world’s rising power, China. Such an alignment would assist in ensuring the peaceful development of China and prevent the emergence of new great power conflicts by creating binding interests. If a new concert of interests can be created between the U.S. and China, it is possible that China’s emergence, like that of the U.S. at the end of the 19th century, when Britain was the global hegemon, could take place within the framework of a rules-based international system willing to accommodate the emergence of new global powers with shared interests in the maintenance of global peace and stability. On the other hand, if APEC fails to break new ground, it will soon fade. APEC will then be seen as only an opportunity for a range of bilateral meetings rather than an institution at the centre of the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific regional security architecture. SC

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SINGAPORE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

YANG RAZALI KASSIM

33 Days: An Intense Month of HighLevel Diplomacy Tan See Seng

The Tao of Spider-Man: Lessons for Singapore Defence and Diplomacy Kumar Ramakrishna

Self-Radicalization: The Case of Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader Terence Lee

The Singapore Armed Forces and Domestic Security Yolanda Chin • Norman Vasu

Multiculturalism in Singapore: The Ties that Bind and Blind Barry Desker

Why we Must Ponder the Improbable: Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning

YANG RAZALI KASSIM

33 Days

An Intense Month of High-Level Diplomacy In a year when it held the rotating chair of ASEAN, Singapore embarked on some major diplomatic initiatives at the bilateral level with its immediate neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia. While analysts will debate whether these efforts have taken ties to a new threshold, 33 days between April and May 2007 captured some of the unprecedented moves, some of which are still subject to controversy.

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t was 33 days of high-powered diplomacy not seen before between Singapore and its two closest neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia. Barring any reversals, a new level of relationship will have been achieved, to the extent that the three countries will reaffirm their anchoring roles in an ASEAN that is searching for a better future. The first significant development on 11 April 2007, in my view, was unusual. Singapore conferred an honorary doctorate on Sultan Iskandar Ismail of Johor, whose name now epitomizes a new Malaysian growth zone bordering Singapore—the Iskandar Development Region (IDR), later to be known as Iskandar Malaysia. Singapore’s gesture, and Johor’s response, were pregnant with symbolism. Given their long-standing interactions, there can be no harmonious relations between Singapore and Malaysia without excellent relations between Singapore and Johor, a key state in the Malaysian polity. And given Singapore’s historical ties with Johor that even predate the coming of Raffles in 1819, there is no bet-

Yang Razali Kassim, Senior Fellow and Editor, Strategic Currents and Editor, RSIS Commentaries at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 91

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ter way of emphasizing this relation- Barring any reversals, a new level ship than such a politically symbolic of relationship will have been gesture to the Johor royalty. Indeed, achieved, to the extent that the the conferment marked the easing three countries will reaffirm their of Singapore’s apprehension, though anchoring roles in an ASEAN that is not dilemma, about taking up the in- searching for a better future. vitation to participate in the IDR, a massive project that is a key part of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s imprint for Malaysia’s future. How should Singapore take part without being accused of taking advantage? How does it say no, if staying away is the wiser thing to do, without slighting a close neighbour? If the Republic says yes, how do you then balance potential competition from the IDR with its strategic partnership with Malaysia on this project?

The Langkawi Retreat That symbolic gesture to Johor was followed by the retreat of 14–15 May between Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Prime Minister Abdullah, a retreat which should go down in history as a major highlight of the two premiers’ tenure. Helping to pave the way were assurances from Malaysian leaders that Singapore was not unwelcome. One particularly important signal came from Johor’s chief minister Abdul Ghani Othman, whose earlier scepticism of the Republic’s role in his state had transformed into a handshake, if not yet a hug. Singapore’s chief critic when it comes to Mr. Abdullah’s plan with Singapore, was Mahathir Mohamad. The former premier’s most recent bout of ill-health, ironically occurring at the same time as the Langkawi retreat, had had the effect of strengthening Abdullah’s position and favouring his IDR agenda. Despite the breakthrough that Langkawi represented, managing SingaporeMalaysia relations is still very much like walking through a path strewn with eggshells. Note how both PM Lee and PM Abdullah have to continue tip-toeing around fault lines and to assuage the critics. PM Lee was quick to correct himself over his use of the term “consultative” to describe the joint ministerial committee, lest it be misunderstood that Singapore wanted to interfere in what clearly is a Malaysian project. Still, the Langkawi retreat was ground-breaking enough. It was the first for PM Lee and PM Abdullah since they became prime ministers within months of each other—Mr. Abdullah in November 2003 and Mr. Lee in August 2004. Their rise to the top had raised expectations of a new future in 92

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bilateral relations. Can Langkawi be the turning point that both sides badly need for their relations that have suffered many setbacks over the last decade, if not more?

The Indonesian Front The significance of the Langkawi retreat however went beyond the bilateral. Indeed it should also be seen in conjunction with the positive turn in ties with Singapore’s other key neighbour—Indonesia. This, at a time when latent bilateral tension was brewing and threatening to complicate Singapore’s role as the incoming ASEAN chair. Three weeks before the Langkawi summit in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia surprised everyone with what clearly was another leap in neighbourly relations. Both concluded an extradition treaty and a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA). The big news, as far as Indonesia was concerned, was Singapore’s decision to finally agree on the extradition treaty. Jakarta had been pushing for this for decades, without success. The April 2007 signing of the treaty was a surprise because for a long time, it had been Singapore’s position that an extradition treaty with Indonesia would be fraught with problems. To begin with, the laws of the two countries are drawn from different legal systems. But after September 11, an extradition treaty that cuts both ways must surely have its purpose. Besides, Singapore’s long-held refusal had generated an image in the eyes of Indonesians of it being an uncooperative, if not self-centred, neighbour. This is an impression which Singapore had been working hard to overcome. There was also the perception in Jakarta that Singapore closes an eye to corrupt Indonesians “taking refuge” in the Republic—a charge which Singapore has consistently denied. The big story, really, was Singapore’s changed position. What aided this was Indonesia’s acceptance of the principle of a “balance of benefits” for both countries. The upshot was a package deal—the treaty would be accompanied with the DCA. In the evening of 23 April, a delegation of Indonesian ministers flew in to Singapore to wrap up the package. The manner in which the event took place was unprecedented, if not unusual. It is rare for a delegation of Indonesian ministers to come over to Singapore for formalities like this. Within the week, on 27 April, in the idyllic setting of Bali, the two historic agreements were duly signed, witnessed by PM Lee and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. No doubt, there were hiccups in implement93

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ing the DCA. But the package deal This may be the era in which approach meant that Indonesia’s in- Singapore wants to show that it terest in an extradition treaty should feels and cares for its neighbours, lead to a ratification of the DCA because for better or worse, it and its implementation agreement, belongs to the region. despite the wariness displayed by Indonesian parliamentarians. But this did not nullify the fact that the stage had been set, hopefully, for a new phase in Singapore-Indonesian relations.

Binding Singapore’s Future with Neighbours One cannot help but be struck by the close sequence of events that unfolded between 11 April and 14–15 May, first with Malaysia and then with Indonesia. It may all well have been purely coincidental, of course. But the cumulative impact of 33 days of high-level diplomacy cannot be considered run-of-the-mill. It is not always that two major diplomatic initiatives with two key neighbours had taken place almost simultaneously. Perhaps what we were seeing at work was a new kind of diplomacy that had come to be associated with PM Lee, Singapore’s third prime minister—as first demonstrated by his post-tsunami initiative soon after becoming premier in 2004. This diplomacy seems to revolve around a sharper balance between Singapore’s identity as a global city and its identity as a key part of Southeast Asia, between its search for unfettered global space and its own sense of destiny with the region. While this balance has always been part of the Singapore identity, the increasingly hectic pace of globalization requires a stronger emphasis on the fact that Singapore is fundamentally still part and parcel of ASEAN—even as it pushes ahead as a global city. This may be the era in which Singapore wants to show that it feels and cares for its neighbours, because for better or worse, it belongs to the region. Friendship, not conflict, is the obvious option. This message had become critical at a time when Singapore was about to take over the rotating chair of ASEAN this year—at a time of high expectations for a new roadmap for ASEAN’s next 40 years. Like it or not, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia are the core of ASEAN. The collective impact of periodic tensions between them generates an image of an unstable region. This drives away foreign investors badly needed to face the growing competition from a fast-rising China and India. An image of instability also reduces the economic space of everyone, Singapore included. It serves the region well if each country is stable, secure and prosperous, led by leaders who 94

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believe in mutual accommodation and mutual respect. Both PM Abdullah and President Yudhoyono have to face key elections and cannot afford to see their hands weakened by bilateral issues. Singapore seems to be signalling that its neighbours’ future, and ASEAN’s future, are also very much its own. SC

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TAN SEE SENG

The Tao of Spider-Man

Lessons for Singapore Defence and Diplomacy The Spider-Man movie may teach Singapore how to negotiate the regional terrain: by advancing its interests and those of the region without causing undue concern among its neighbours. This will be a crucial test of Singapore’s political maturity as a nation and a valued member of the international community.

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ingapore has made tremendous progress in its defence and diplomacy since independence. Still, numerous challenges, both longstanding and emerging, confront its security, prosperity and well-being. Postures that have served it well may, however, be neither sufficient nor suitable today as newer and more complex challenges arise. In that respect, the “Spider-Man” movie franchise— you heard it right—offers at least four broad lessons for Singapore’s foreign and security policy.

With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility If anything, the first Spider-Man movie is best known for the above adage. Therein Peter Parker (a.k.a. Spider-Man) learns, not without significant personal cost, that the possession and exercise of power—and great power at that—constitute a grave responsibility. Singapore has come a long way since its independence in 1965. There exists no greater paragon today of a nation-state and economy that has implausibly transformed, within a single generation of its

Tan See Seng, Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He directs the School’s executive education unit as well as coordinates its research programme on multilateralism and regionalism. 96

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founding, from a tiny regional back- How we navigate and negotiate water to a financial powerhouse with a the regional terrain—importantly, per capita income rivalling that of the in ways that advance our interests world’s top economies. With unparal- and those of the region without leled economic success has come also causing undue concern among our the development of a modern armed neighbours—will be a crucial test of our political maturity as a nation and force far more sophisticated than any a valued member of the international regional neighbour’s. Singapore’s incommunity. fluence on the global diplomatic and economic arenas far exceeds its size, such that pundits have described it as “punching above its weight”. Yet it has also been said that Singapore’s phenomenal success has been attained through an aggrandizing, highly calculative pursuit of power purely for self-centred purposes. The teachings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and modern day political realists, for whom the egotistical pursuit and consolidation of power and security are accepted as a moral necessity if not virtue, register fairly well with Singapore’s leaders. Included in the mix is a firm belief in the Social Darwinist dictum of “survival of the fittest”. But all of this has a downside, not least the perennial fear that one’s accomplishments are merely temporary, while the power which one has assiduously accumulated could just as easily be lost—as our arachnidal protagonist discovers in the second Spider-Man movie. And as the late Professor Michael Leifer acutely observed in his study of Singapore’s foreign policy, despite our achievements and successes, Singapore continues to assume a siege mentality in coping with perceived vulnerabilities, real or imagined. Further, the calculated and prudent manner in which we exercise our foreign policy, even when offering financial assistance, has invited the occasional allegation that Singapore is insincere and overbearing. However, of late Singapore has amply and aptly demonstrated a laudable sense of responsibility and accountability to the region. Nowhere is this better reflected than in the remarkable way Singaporeans have responded to humanitarian crises in the region wrought by the 2004 tsunamis, earthquakes, and the civil conflicts that called for peacekeeping commitments. That these events also serve as opportunities to test the operational readiness of the Singapore Armed Forces takes nothing away from Singapore’s welcomed willingness to assume greater regional responsibility commensurate with the resources and capabilities we possess. There is nothing inherently wrong with being ration97

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ally calculative. Nor am I advocating extravagant chequebook diplomacy. But if and when prudence translates into a seeming miserliness that does not reflect well of Singapore—especially a rich powerful Singapore—then we would have failed miserably as a regional stakeholder.

Overdependence on Technology A second lesson the Spider-Man movies teach us has to do with the danger of an overdependence on technology. Nowhere is this more evident than Spider-Man’s nemeses, the “Green Goblin” and Dr. Otto Octavius (a.k.a. “Doc Ock”), both scientists whose overdependence on technology leads to nefarious ends. This idea of course is nothing new; recall Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, Asimov’s I Robot, or the Wachowski Brothers’ Matrix series—all graphic statements about technology gone amok. History, at times tragic and farcical (so Marx reminds us), teaches us that untold misery and destruction all too often come about as a result of the potent mixture of an excessive dependence on technology as the panacea for the world’s problems, on the one hand, and sincere but injudicious intentions, on the other. The Americans, in their 2002 National Security Strategy, are no doubt right about the serious threat posed by the potent union of technology and radicalism. This said, overemphasis of the strategic transformation—in SAF parlance, the revolution in military affairs (RMA)—of defence capabilities at the expense of more pedestrian considerations may prove inimical to Singapore’s vital interests. Technology may bring countless “killer applications” (no pun intended) to modern warfare, and “network-centric warfare” clearly has its place. But as ground conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq today suggest, techno-warfare may have shocked America’s foes in the short run, but not necessarily awed them in the long. The fog of war still intrudes, while the force of caprice continues to confound efforts, no matter how sophisticated, to control and manage it. The RMA is no magic bullet, and we will do well to avoid radical overstatements of technology in our efforts to establish a “3G” SAF.

Humility, Not Hubris It has been said that moviegoers tend to identify more with Spider-Man than any other superhero because the former best exemplifies the “everyman’s hero”. For all his superhero status, Peter Parker is no different than others when it comes to everyday human struggles. In the third movie, Spider-Man, lured by public 98

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adulation and personal arrogance, almost succumbs to megalomania. The lesson I wish to draw here is one of humility rather than hubris. The unfortunate impression some in the region have of us is that Singapore is egotistical, conceited and cares little for its neighbours. We are seen as always desiring to “leapfrog” and transcend the region. Of course, it helps little when at times we trumpet the image of Singapore as a piece of First World real estate in a dilapidated Third World neighbourhood. Whether Singapore’s destiny is to drive or suffer the Southeast Asian region, or both, it would doubtless serve our interests better if our approach is characterized less by hubris. Finally, in the third movie Aunt May, the Spider-Man movies’ moral compass, reminds Parker that life is ultimately about the choices we make. In a mere four decades, Singapore has evolved from a revolutionary nascent political community into an influential global player. Today, with capabilities, resources and a status once unimaginable a mere generation ago, crass individualism, unbridled egotism and overweening pride will likely not do for Singapore. Admittedly, finding the right balance between power and principle is no easy task. How we navigate and negotiate the regional terrain—importantly, in ways that advance our interests and those of the region without causing undue concern among our neighbours—will be a crucial test of our political maturity as a nation and a valued member of the international community. SC

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KUMAR RAMAKRISHNA

Self-Radicalization

The Case of Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader may be an epitome of the new Global Jihadi. This is the self-radicalized militant who is a product of the Internet culture. He is part of the wider subculture of virtual communities of radicals connected via the Internet. These “e-mail jihadis” are united by their idealized notions of the global Islamic community.

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he revelation that the Internal Security Department (ISD) has detained a well-educated Singaporean Malay/Muslim who was planning to wage jihad alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan has caused concern for two main reasons. First, unlike earlier Singaporean militants arrested in 2001 and 2002 who came under the ideological sway of the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network, it appears that 28-year old polytechnic law lecturer Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader had instead “self-radicalized”. In short, he is a lone-wolf self-starter, not part of JI, who absorbed his militant jihad ideas directly from radical Islamist websites on the Internet. Such “home-grown” militants are difficult for intelligence services to pick up as they generate far smaller “signatures”. Second, Abdul Basheer does not fit the profile of someone who might be prone to religious militancy. For instance, unlike the majority of detained Singapore JI militants who come from generally bluecollar backgrounds, Abdul Basheer has a much better socioeconomic pedigree. He studied at the prestigious Raffles Institution and the

Kumar Ramakrishna, Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he is also Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS). 100

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National Junior College, before gradu- Described as very smart, well-read, ating from the National University of jovial and eloquent, we know that Singapore Law School in 2003. On top Abdul Basheer was a first rate debater of that, Abdul Basheer actually prac- in his JC days and was regarded as a tised with the prominent local law firm competent lawyer, though he did not Drew and Napier before quitting to practise law for long. teach law at a local polytechnic. Abdul Basheer, in short, had every opportunity to do well for himself. So what went wrong?

The Radicalizing Process Before addressing this question, we must first understand what we mean by “radicalization”. We could think of this as the psychological process by which an individual experiences a significant personality change through thoroughly internalizing a revolutionary subculture. In this process of becoming “acculturated” into the new subculture, the individual virtually sheds his old personality and learns drastically new ways of thinking, feeling and acting. A revolutionary subculture is usually anti-status quo-oriented. It includes an ideological “Story” that diagnoses the predicament affecting a group, identifies the cause of the problem, and suggests a remedial strategy of action. In Abdul Basheer’s case, it is likely that he had imbibed the Global Jihad subculture of Al-Qaeda and similar radical Islamist militant networks. In other words, he is likely to have bought into the Story that the cause of the Muslim world’s current problems is the loss of the old Islamic Caliphate; that the obstacle to the restoration of the Caliphate is the unholy alliance of “Zionist Israel” and the “Crusader U.S.” and their allies; and that the strategy to set things right is all-out jihad in “hot zones” such as Afghanistan and Iraq, among others. This is why he had wanted to learn Arabic in a Middle Eastern country to communicate with the “mujahidin fighters”. It is also why he sought to train with the Lashkar eTayyiba (LeT) terrorist network to prepare for joining the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Abdul Basheer’s profile There is much we do not know about Abdul Basheer, his family background, or of his experiences in school and at work. Nevertheless, the information that has emerged allows us to formulate some very preliminary observations. The first thing that jumps out is what has been revealed about his personality. Described 101

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as very smart, well-read, jovial and eloquent, we know that Abdul Basheer was a first rate debater in his JC days and was regarded as a competent lawyer, though he did not practise law for long. Furthermore, the “old” Abdul Basheer was apparently a party animal, who enjoyed the nightlife and working as a part-time bartender in a pub. While still in JC, he formed a rock band with himself as lead vocalist and drummer. He also apparently dressed like a “punk” who enjoyed wearing “big earrings”. All this is rather telling because the old Abdul Basheer would have belonged to the minority of nominal Muslims who are practically nonobservant. It would seem that before he became a religious radical, the old Abdul Basheer was a “social radical” in terms of lifestyle habits and dressing, which suggests that he was a non-conformist within the generally conservative Singaporean Malay/Muslim community. In social psychological terms, this marks him out as someone who has a strong internal locus of control. That is, Abdul Basheer is obviously someone who believes that he can exercise control over external events and actively shape his life, rather than passively resigning himself to outside forces such as fate and family wishes. The sad reality is that if Abdul Basheer had continued with that kind of proactive, go-getting outlook on life, he seemed destined to achieve the Singapore Dream. Instead, he opted out.

Reacting to the Status Quo Analytically speaking, the most likely reason for this is that at some point after starting work Abdul Basheer encountered what some psychologists would term a “de-legitimating discovery”, or an incident or series of incidents that caused him to lose faith in the innate rightness of the status quo. What we know is that after graduating from NUS in 2003, he joined a prestigious law firm but left after only a year and became a law lecturer at a local polytechnic. Apparently Abdul Basheer told friends that he had left the practice of law because the pursuit of wealth “distracted people from being close to God”. We could accept this at face value as the discovery that caused him to question his life priorities. We also know that by late 2004 Abdul Basheer had begun to immerse himself in radical Islamist discourse on the Internet, when he had apparently not done so before. There is no necessary logical connection between wanting to get out of the rat race to live simply before God and suddenly deciding to familiarize oneself with the hatefilled, us-versus-them Global Jihad view of the world. Something else is missing: the element of personal animus. In the absence of more information, we can only wonder about the de102

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tailed reasons Abdul Basheer left the law firm after such a short time, and whether he considered becoming a polytechnic lecturer a severe loss of status. Given what we do know of his strongly assertive, “in-your-face” personality, we cannot rule this out. Thus one possible reason why Abdul Basheer became susceptible to the virulent, anti-status quo appeal of Global Jihad subculture was because he himself had experienced a profound personal de-legitimating discovery. This left him with a painful “narcissistic wound” and extremely upset with the status quo. At a deeper, subliminal level, he may have sought opportunities to strike back.

Personal Transformation It is at this point that Abdul Bash- In a way, Abdul Basheer is not eer could possibly have weaved his really a lone wolf. He is part of the own individual “narrative” of having wider subculture of Global Jihad, been “wronged” in his personal life comprising virtual communities of into the wider web-based Global Ji- radicals connected to one another via had Story of the embattled worldwide the Internet. Muslim ummah undergoing persecution at the hands of an U.S.-Israeli cabal bent on destroying Islam. To Abdul Basheer, the Global Jihad worldview would have appealed to him intellectually and viscerally. It would have led him to emphasize his “authentic” Muslim identity whilst deliberately eliminating all vestiges of his “copycat” secular, Westernized, self. Furthermore, the Global Jihadi call to militant action would have appealed strongly to Abdul Basheer’s activist, let’s-do-something-about-this mentality. As a result, the old social radical would have gradually transmogrified seamlessly into the religious radical. This transformation was obvious by 2005, when an old classmate from law school chanced upon a completely different Abdul Basheer in town. While he was still his counter-cultural self, there was a huge difference: where only a few years earlier he had sported punk dressing and big earrings, he now wore a beard, religious clothing and even an obvious mark on his forehead caused by intense prostration whilst praying. Abdul Basheer represents an evolution in the radical Islamist challenge. Earlier Singapore and Malaysian JI militants, by swearing the oath or ba’ia to the likes of the late Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, had essentially imbibed a very Indonesian Islamist agenda. This is because JI emerged from the historic Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) movement in West and Central Java, 103

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and to this day has generally retained an Indonesia-first bias. Abdul Basheer, in contrast, appears to be a genuine “de-territorialized” Global Jihadi, who sees his fight as part of a worldwide cosmic conflict between Islam and the West. In his jihad, the front is wherever Muslims are oppressed, not just Southeast Asia.

Virtual Radicals In a way, Abdul Basheer is not really a lone wolf. He is part of the wider subculture of Global Jihad, comprising virtual communities of radicals connected to one another via the Internet. These “email jihadis” have severed all allegiances to the nations of their births. They are united instead by an emotionally powerful attachment to abstract, idealized notions of the global Islamic community or ummah. Conversely, they have equally abstract, deeply dehumanized notions about their enemies, and will not necessarily shy away from mass-casualty terrorist attacks on civilian populations whom they deem complicit in the “crimes” of their governments. This should be reason enough for more information sharing on the detailed backgrounds of people like Abdul Basheer, to better help analysts develop vital early warning indicators of the potential vulnerability of individuals to self-radicalization. SC

104

TERENCE LEE

The Singapore Armed Forces and Domestic Security A role for the military in domestic security is arguably appropriate and desirable, especially with the increasing global focus on homeland security. But a number of steps must be taken to clearly define that role. The SAF and the Home Team should also be in constant conversation about their roles in the evolving national security context.

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inister of Defence Mr. Teo Chee Hean on 21 May 2007 tabled in Parliament for a second time the Singapore Armed Forces (Amendment) Bill. The Bill sought to amend the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Act to give the military legal powers when conducting domestic security operations. The revisions to the Act would put in place “a proper legal framework to ensure everything in the conduct of security operations is properly specified, and to lay out clearly what servicemen can and cannot do”. As Mr. Teo noted in his parliamentary address, the context of national security had changed dramatically since the terrorist attacks of 11 September. Singapore, like other countries, “faces security threats that operate across jurisdictions for external defence and internal security”. In order to fulfil the mission of national defence, militaries around the world must undertake “homeland, air and maritime security operations in a non-war environment”.

Why the SAF? There are sound reasons to expand the SAF’s operational ambit. Firstly, the SAF is an extremely effective organization. It is the largTerence Lee, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. He was previously Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University of Singapore. 105

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est and best-funded public institu- Institutionalizing a major domestic tion. The SAF has highly competent role for the SAF is thus a necessary personnel and possesses sophisticat- step in view of the multifaceted nature ed hardware and reconnaissance ca- of security threats. However, there are pabilities not available to other civil- three reasons why caution should be ian agencies. The SAF is also used to exercised. contingency planning and the speedy deployment of forces. It has expertise in establishing control of an area quickly and monitoring movements of people and equipment. All these facets make the SAF an important asset for national emergencies. Secondly, there is already a precedent for the SAF’s role in domestic operations. The SAF has been called upon to support civilian authorities in operations requiring specialized capabilities, such as Chemical, Biological Radiological and Explosive operations. SAF personnel are deployed on a long-term basis to protect key installations, such as Jurong Island, Sembawang Wharves and Changi Airport. SAF troops have also been mobilized to assist the Singapore Police Force to provide security during major events like the International Olympic Committee Session, the S2006-IMF-World Bank Meetings and National Day parades. Moreover, the SAF has played an effective role in humanitarian operations, both domestically and internationally. For example, the SAF provided medical and logistical assistance during the March 1986 Hotel New World collapse. Beyond our borders, the SAF has made significant contributions to disaster relief missions in recent years. Most visible of these missions was the medical and logistical support to Indonesia following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

Drawbacks Institutionalizing a major domestic role for the SAF is thus a necessary step in view of the multifaceted nature of security threats. However, there are three reasons why caution should be exercised. Firstly, expanding the SAF’s role may harm its readiness to perform external security operations. Any expansion in operations would likely lead to the diversion of personnel and equipment away from external security to these new security tasks. Chains of command, doctrine and training, and rules of engagement for military personnel would also have to be designed, established and monitored. Also, the SAF is in the midst of a fundamental transformation—the move towards a 3rd Generation military. Adding domestic concerns could potentially detract the armed forces from their main combat endeavour. Indeed, the SAF’s transformation is onerous—the military already has to contend with the integra106

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tion of new weapon platforms with modern command, control and communication platforms and also manage command structure changes. Secondly, military and police work require fundamentally different mindsets. These skills are not easily interchangeable. Police are trained to de-escalate situations. They are obliged to use minimum force at all times and draw their weapons only as a last resort. Military personnel, on the other hand, are trained to be decisive with the use of force. In war, it is not customary to ask for explanations of individual deaths or woundings. But in constabulary work, it is. This is why policemen are equipped and trained in the use of non-lethal means of crowd control. Soldiers hardly ever are. Thirdly, there may be problems related to inter-operability. The police and armed forces are different organizations with non-parallel operating procedures and equipment. As the police spend almost all their time training and operating in urban settings, as individuals or groups of individuals, they are likely to be familiar with the domestic milieu and also the public’s attitudes and reactions. Military personnel, on the other hand, spend the bulk of their time training in non-urban terrain, normally as a component of larger units and for large scale combat operations. The differing organizational mindsets is best illustrated with a potentially devastating incident during the 1992 Los Angeles riots when military personnel were brought in to help restore order in the aftermath of the Rodney King verdict. During the riots, officers from the Los Angeles Police Department, accompanied by U.S. Marines, were asked to respond to a domestic dispute. When they arrived at the scene shots were fired. One police officer reportedly yelled “cover me” to the Marines. With that command, the police officer was directing the Marines to point their weapons and be prepared to shoot if necessary. The Marines responded as they had been trained to react to that phrase—over 200 rounds were fired.

What Should be Done? A role for the military in domestic security is arguably appropriate and desirable, especially with the increasing global focus on homeland security. But a number of steps must be taken to clearly define that role. Firstly, we need legislation to clearly define how the armed forces will be used domestically. The SAF (Amendment) Bill is a step in the right direction as it delineates what activities are permissible and appropriate in supporting domestic security. Secondly, the new Bill must be based on the premise that the military’s participation in domestic security is a last resort. We should not attempt to institutionalize any regular role for the armed forces in domestic concerns. The military must be an emergency force, not a daily protector. 107

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Thirdly, when military personnel are called upon for domestic concerns, it must be done with plans for integrating their units into a civilian-led command structure. Clear lines of authority and spheres of responsibility must be delineated and maintained. Otherwise, during crises, military authority and activity will coexist awkwardly with civilian law enforcement functions. Further inter-agency work is thus needed to enhance inter-operability between the SAF and the Home Team. It is essential that a “whole of government” approach is adopted. This requires an emphasis on “the need to share” information rather than the traditional “need to know” doctrine so that a silo mentality can be avoided by government agencies. Fourthly, we must expand the capacity of the Home Team so that they can develop competence in dealing with national contingencies. If Singapore relies on the armed forces to handle domestic security emergencies, we run the risk of retarding the development of the Home Ministry’s agencies, whose training, mission and function are better tailored to domestic concerns. If considerable resources will be spent on developing training programmes to teach soldiers how to behave like policemen, why not train policemen to be ready to deal with evolving security threats? The military is more important to Singapore than ever before in this changing security environment. It will face new tests in the decades ahead. It is thus imperative that our security agencies—the SAF and the Home Team—be in constant conversation about how and what their roles are in this evolving national security context. SC

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YOLANDA CHIN • NORMAN VASU

Multiculturalism in Singapore

The Ties that Bind and Blind The state of inter-racial and inter-religious relations in Singapore came under scrutiny in a recent study by the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. The findings hold that inter-racial and inter-religious relations in Singapore are more than robust, with benchmarks far exceeding similar figures in other developed countries.

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n today’s “age of terror”, it is not unusual for multicultural societies to harbour fears of social fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines. Singapore is no exception. It is unlikely that the controversial debate over what has sometimes been described as— correctly or incorrectly—a “clash of civilizations” will be resolved anytime soon. Nonetheless, Singapore’s response to this challenge to plurality needs to be calibrated with a sense of proportion to avoid well-meaning but pessimistic over-reactions. To arrive at a calibrated response, meaningful strategies to strengthen inter-communal relations will first require a better understanding of the degree to which members of the public are willing to interact with one another. Put more succinctly, even before meaningful deliberation can begin on how to encourage the different groups in society to integrate better, it would be fruitful to appreciate whether they are willing to integrate with each other in the first place.

Yolanda Chin, Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Norman Vasu, Assistant Professor and Coordinator of the Social Resilience Programme at the school’s Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS). 109

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Multiculturalism in Singapore: An Encouraging Report Admittedly, benchmarking an acceptable level of integration is a very arbitrary exercise. For example in the Pew Global Attitudes report The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other conducted in 2006, it was noted that “even in the wake of the tumultuous events of the past year, solid majorities in France, Great Britain and the United States retain overall favourable opinions of Muslims”. The “solid majorities” in France, Great Britain and the U.S. were 65 per cent, 63 per cent and 54 per cent respectively. If such levels are “solid majorities” in developed Western nations, what then may be considered a tolerable yet acceptable level of integration for Singapore? Singaporean sociologist Tan Ern Ser has noted that “from a policy perspective, a 80 per cent positive figure would suggest that the ethnic relations formula used has been successful, though policy-makers may hope for even better results”. A recent survey was done by the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) to examine the attitudes of Singaporeans towards inter-racial and inter-religious interaction. The survey suggests that policy-makers’ hope of more than 80 per cent positive responses is no mere castles in the air. The views of a nationwide random sample of 1,824 Singaporeans were solicited to assess their willingness to interact with members of each of the main racial (Chinese, Malay, Indian, “Others”) and religious (Buddhist/Taoists, Muslims, Hindus, Christians, minority religions and Free-thinkers) groups. The survey looked at a range of scenarios encompassing the private and public spheres as well as the majorityminority composition of the Singaporean state. With a benchmark of an acceptable level of inter-communal engagement set at the very high threshold of no less than 90 per cent—an extremely rigorous threshold by any measure—the results show Singaporean multiculturalism to be very positive on the whole.

The State of Race and Religion Encouragingly, inter-racial and inter-religious ties were consistently sturdy in the public sphere. In the social, economic, political and security domains where interdependence is key, the survey shows that the concepts of race and religion did not play an important role in the choices Singaporeans make. For example, with a more than 90 per cent probability, the findings indicate consistently that race and religion did not have any bearing on the choices Singaporeans made vis-à-vis their next-door neighbour, co-worker, Member of Parliament or policeman. 110

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The only two circumstances un- The only two circumstances under der which race and religion played a which race and religion played a prominent role in decision-making— prominent role in decision-making indicated by a less than 90 per cent … were in the personal sphere … approval of inter-communal interac- and with regards to majority-minority tion—were in the personal sphere status. (namely pertaining to marriage partners), and with regards to majority-minority status. For example, in terms of willingness to marry someone of a different race, the approval rate peaked at 52 per cent for the percentage of Malays willing to marry a Chinese. For inter-religious attitudes, the lowest acceptance rate amongst all religions was by the Free-thinkers of which 55 per cent were receptive to a Hindu majority. Nonetheless, this 55 per cent would be considered a “solid majority” by Pew standards.

Race and Religion Unpackaged The findings also indicated variations in the reception of each racial and religious group by those of a different communal background. An assessment of overall attitudes along racial lines indicated the Chinese were consistently the most preferred race while the most receptive of other racial groups was the category of the “Others”. Interestingly, although the Chinese were on the whole the most preferred racial group, they were the least receptive to non-Chinese. Encouragingly, the remaining three racial groups attain an equal degree of acceptance by those of a different race as them. With regards to religion, on the one hand, the Buddhists/Taoists and Freethinkers appeared to be the best received religious groups and, on the other hand, the Muslims the least. Although the Buddhist/Taoists were among the best received group, they were the least receptive of non-Buddhist/Taoists. In contrast, the Hindus were in general the most receptive of those of a different religious background as them. That said, it should be emphasized that the prospects of any racial or religious biases manifesting themselves (if at all) were very slim owing to the high acceptance threshold of 90 per cent employed by the survey. For example, the Muslims scored an overall of 89 per cent acceptance rate by non-Muslims, and the Buddhist/Taoists as the least receptive of other religious groups scored an overall 92 per cent acceptance rate of non-Buddhist/Taoists. These figures are all higher than Singapore academic Tan Ern Ser’s 80 per cent benchmark in an earlier study of a successful multicultural policy and far higher than Pew’s measure. 111

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The Future of Multicultural Singapore Undoubtedly, the survey’s findings showed that Singapore’s inter-racial and interreligious relations may not be absolutely perfect. However, it is important to view the survey results with a clear and rational mind. If the results are considered in its entirety, it is extremely encouraging that there is a high degree of civility in the common and shared spaces in the public sphere. The report has shown that Singaporeans by and large may still be conservative when it comes to inter-racial and inter-religious marriages. Some may also harbour a preference for their racial or religious group as the majority of the country. Such findings are not surprising. On the whole, with the rigorous threshold employed in the survey to detect faint signals in inter-communal relations, Singapore’s multicultural fabric is both robust and healthy. Hence, it can be surmised that the current state of inter-communal relations among Singaporeans reflects a healthy acceptance of living with diversity. Singaporeans are not just an integrated lot. They are also, more importantly, comfortable with the idea of integration. This is not a justification for complacency. Instead, the survey findings should be a reference point for a critical introspection of Singapore’s multicultural condition crucial for evolving strategies for sustaining the current communal cohesion. SC

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BARRY DESKER

Why We Must Ponder the Improbable

Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning One of the most recurrent aspects of human history is the persistence of strategic surprises such as Pearl Harbour, 9/11, the Asian financial crisis and the SARS crisis. Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning process (RAHS) provides policymakers with anticipatory knowledge of potential upcoming issues so that risks may be minimized.

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oday’s complex and uncertain international environment means that Singapore and other states now need more international and regional awareness than at any time in the past. Beyond the politics of great powers, we should not forget that regional powers and non-state actors can impact all of us as well.

Asymmetric Threats The risk of war between states in Southeast Asia is lower today than it was 30 years ago. Symmetric force-on-force threats that were feared in the Cold War are less likely now, although these still exist in the background. However, asymmetric threats such as transnational terrorism, trans-national organized crime, pandemics and natural resource shocks have regularly hit the headlines. Asymmetric threats are the current focus of attention, especially in the light of the Iraq War experience, SARS and the 2004 tsunami, and will remain so for the foreseeable future—unless one of the great powers attempts to radically realign the system. The vagueness of asymmetric threats is, in part, what makes them so unpredictable and unmanageable. Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and concurrent Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 113

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It is an age of radicalization This is a world where events and and discontent—not just in Iraq and their impact spread around the globe Afghanistan, but globally. Ayman al faster than ever before. Zawahiri, the deputy leader of AlQaeda, makes an interesting point in one his more recent audio broadcasts. He addresses not just Muslims who are discontented, but other groups as well who seek to challenge American pre-eminence. The U.S. misadventure in Iraq will lead to more cautious policies by the next U.S. President. However, it has emboldened America’s enemies. Power may still be the ultimate arbiter in a number of conflict situations. But in an asymmetric threat environment, knowledge, not simply power, is the key. In order to mitigate the effects of these threats, we must first understand them. We already know the basic answers to many intelligence and national security problems. They are increased diversity, greater networking and integration of information and intelligence at the front lines.

The Power of Ideas We will need more people in the future who can work with ideas and concepts that are in the abstract. The international environment is uncertain and complex. Those who will have to advise decision-makers in the future must be comfortable with uncertainty and change. In fact, they must be able to thrive in such an environment. One of the unfortunate side effects of highly specialized organizations is that artificial knowledge boundaries are built between the specialties, complicating the transfer and growth of knowledge. At the same time, specialists tend to be reductionists as well. They frequently believe that problems can be broken down into their component parts, and that each part can be dealt with separately. In the manufacturing or services process, this might work. But with a complex field such as international relations or trans-national terrorism, this is a doubtful proposition. The “pieces” of the problem are all interrelated. They cannot be broken down without losing the essence of the problem at hand. Specialization will be a handicap, not an advantage, for those who have to deal with abstract and uncertain problems in the future. This is the fallacy underlying the assumption that intelligence agencies must do a better job of “connecting the dots” and predicting the future. This cannot and will not happen for a variety of reasons. Instead of seeking to predict discreet 114

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future events, the strategic intelligence community, which includes analysts looking at diplomatic, political, military, economic or corporate business intelligence, must focus rather on risk-based anticipatory warnings concerning the nature and impact of a range of potential threats. In this respect, there is a need for a full and creative exploitation of technology to support—but not supplant—the work of the strategic intelligence community.

More than Scenario Planning Arising from the success of Shell in anticipating the 1973 oil shocks, which resulted in the quadrupling of oil prices, scenario-based exercises have spread in government agencies and multinational corporations. Singapore has not been an exception. But scenario planning is insufficient. Today, the current threat environment is marked by complexity and uncertainty. Thanks to what the journalist, Tom Friedman, calls the “democratizations” of finance, information and technology, states as well as corporations are becoming increasingly vulnerable to a range of asymmetric threats such as transnational terrorism, financial shocks, pandemics and supply chain fragility. This is a world where events and their impact spread around the globe faster than ever before. For example, while the direct and immediate impact of terrorist actions is to inflict human casualties and infrastructure damage, we can also see the indirect effects in the form of rising fuel costs, reduced foreign investments as well as inconveniences experienced at airports, border and immigration checkpoints owing to heightened security. There may also be psychological ramifications that can severely test any multicultural society’s social fabric and cohesion. Given the kind of multi-dimensional challenges that states face today, leaders and decision-makers require actionable knowledge to operate effectively in a rapidly changing and complex international environment. They must be prepared to meet a range of conventional and asymmetric threats. Frankly, this task will not be easy. One of the most recurrent aspects of human history is the persistence of strategic surprises such as Pearl Harbour, 9/11, the Asian financial crisis and the SARS crisis. The taproots of these intelligence failures are almost always the lack of information sharing amongst government agencies as well as business corporations. It is commonly referred to as “stove piping” or “silos”. Most humans also have rigid mindsets that can only parochially perceive information with one fixed frame of cognitive lenses. The risk is 115

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greater the longer we are in organizations as we are socialized into appropriate corporate moulds. One thing is clear, though: the traditional responses and mechanisms of national intelligence and security agencies or of corporate strategic intelligence and planning divisions are not enough.

Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning It is in this context that the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning process or RAHS in short, comes to the fore. The RAHS process, as envisioned in the Singapore context, encompasses a unique combination of cutting edge concepts, methodologies and technological solutions, and aims to provide policymakers with anticipatory knowledge of the nature of potential upcoming issues so that risks may be minimized and opportunities maximized. By detecting “faint” signals; networking and linking the various governmental and private agencies; adopting a “whole of government” and “whole of organization” approach; and fostering shared and informed analysis based on methodological diversity, RAHS will empower decision-makers in Singapore with greater foresight to minimize the possibility of strategic surprises. Decision makers need to be alert and must ponder the improbable. RAHS points us in this direction. SC

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REGIONAL SECURITY

Jane Chan • Joshua Ho

Trends in Piracy and Armed Sea Robbery in Southeast Asia Evan A. Laksmana

Is Poso All about JI? The Roots of the Conflict Prashanth Parameswaran

The Southern Insurgency: Rethinking Thailand’s Military Strategy Bahtiar Effendy

Trust and Soft Power in the War on Terror Taharuddin Piang Ampatuan

Abu Sayyaf’s New Leader: Yasser Igasan the Religious Scholar

JANE CHAN • JOSHUA HO

Trends in Piracy and Armed Sea Robbery in Southeast Asia Although the number of piracy and armed sea robbery attacks in Southeast Asia seems to be trending downwards, detailed figures suggest that it is prudent for littoral states and seafarers alike to remain vigilant to ensure safe passage within regional waters.

Regional Trends The overall number of piracy attacks and armed robbery at sea in Southeast Asia appears to be trending downwards. By the end of third quarter 2008—the latest record currently available—the Southeast Asian region has recorded one of the lowest numbers of attacks over the same period for the last five years. Theft and/or robbery remained the main types of attacks on ships transiting the sea lanes of Southeast Asia. This suggests that small-scale attacks remained the main challenge in dealing with the problem of piracy within the region, especially in Indonesia. These attacks often involve smaller boats with outboard motors that are easy to manoeuvre, and the perpetrators are usually armed with knives or small arms. Data collected on the types of weapons used during an attack is often not comprehensive as on average about half of reported cases each year omit such information. However, more attention should be paid to the types of weaponry of armed robbers as the use of small arms is getting increasingly common. The yearly average

Jane Chan, Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, where she is with the school’s Maritime Security Programme. Joshua Ho, Senior Fellow at RSIS and Coordinator of the Programme. 119

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since 2003 shows that more than half Although the third quarter of 2007 of reported actual attacks were car- recorded one of the lowest number ried out by pirates armed with guns. of piracy and arm robbery attacks However this trend is not reflected in in Southeast Asia, the Malacca and the comparison of quarterly data over Singapore Straits remain one of the previous five years. Generally, the high risk areas of water in this region. third quarter comparison over the last five years saw a similar gun-knife ratio being used; yet analysis of fourth quarter trends in weapons-use over the last five years suggests that knives were the weapon of choice for piracy attacks and armed robbery at sea. An examination of the consolidated annual trend from 2001–2005 shows that bulk carriers were the most common target in the region. This could be attributed to the slower transit speed of the bulk carriers, their low freeboard, and smaller crew. However, this trend is not obvious since 2006, and by the third quarter of 2008, tankers of sorts have been the primary targets. Such cases largely involve small tankers plying through local waters, vital to the movement of commodities within the region. The fair weather during the second quarter of each year could have contributed to the higher incidence rate as compared to the fourth quarter of each year. The calmer sea conditions may have made it more conducive for small-scale armed robbery activities. This argument is best illustrated in the case of the Malacca Strait. As the monsoon period generally occurs within the fourth quarter of any year, the sea robbers may thus have limited their activities closer to shore to lower the risk to their operations. Although the number of incidents is relatively lower during the fourth quarter of the year, ships and vessels remained vulnerable at ports or anchorage throughout the year. The majority of the attacks each year are those that take place at locations closer to shore, and within the vicinity of ports or anchorages. This might suggest that ships on local voyages are attacked more often than those on international voyages. This is because ships on international voyages tend to transit on the sea lanes, whilst those on regional voyages tend to transit closer to shore.

Hot Spots Despite the downward trend since 2005, there is no room for complacency. This is because there has been a slight uptake in the number of incidents since the 120

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third quarter of 2006. The majority of the attacks involved the use of small arms. The main concern for the Malacca Strait would be the possibility of the pirates and armed robbers resorting to more violent and sophisticated operations. Generally Indonesia has been experiencing a lower incidence rate of piracy since the third quarter of 2005. Even so, most attacks in the region still occur within Indonesian waters. Apart from those situated along the Malacca Strait, ports and anchorages along the Sunda and Makassar Straits recorded some of the highest incidences of piracy and armed robbery. Theft and robbery were the more common types of attacks, contributing to two-thirds of the numbers of actual attacks, many of which were armed with knives. The vessels most susceptible to attacks were those with lower floorboards, slower speed and low security measures in place. Although the number of attacks in the Makassar Strait had dropped dramatically since 2006, it should still be a point of focus should the trend start moving upwards. In contrast to the downward trend in other parts of the region, the number of attacks for the Sunda Strait was comparable to the last five years. More importantly, one should also note the rather low figures on reported attempted attacks. Two separate conclusions may be drawn from this. The first is that there has always been under-reporting on piracy and armed robbery cases in the Sunda Strait, thus affecting the actual figures recorded. Another interpretation of the low figures of attempted attacks is the high success rate of such attacks.

What to Look Out For Up to the third quarter of 2008, the number of piracy and armed-robbery attacks in Southeast Asian seas has been the lowest in the last five years. However, it is too early to tell if this figure will remain low in the years to come. Although regional efforts, especially those by the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have succeeded to deter piracy attacks, it would be foolhardy to be complacent at this stage. Previous trends have indicated that incidences tend to increase when there is an economic slowdown. Comparative figures show that the piracy and armed robbery incidences in the Malacca Strait is trending downward. As commercial vessels are more able to enhance their security capabilities, small tankers and fishing vessels operating in the region remained the most vulnerable. Given that recent attacks are also getting more violent in nature, more ought to be done to ensure the safety and security of all users of the regional waterways. 121

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One other concern is the risk of terrorist attacks, or the use of the sea by terrorists to transport explosive materials for use in future attacks. making high vigilance in Southeast Asia a necessity. On 9 November 2006, Indonesian authorities boarded one MV Rose at the Cita Tubindo port in Batam and found a container filled with explosive materials. Although there was no evidence to date suggesting that such materials were transported for terrorist purposes within the region, one cannot negate the possibility of such cargo being robbed or hijacked, thus being used for unknown ends. SC

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EVAN A. LAKSMANA

Is Poso All about JI? The Roots of the Conflict

The involvement of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the Poso conflict has been wrongly understood that the conflict in Poso all about JI. While it is true that JI is involved, the roots of the conflict rest with local concerns. The continued emphasis on JI and its role in Poso will blind the government to the root causes of the conflict as well as its solutions.

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n the first quarter of 2007, Central Sulawesi’s Poso saw an upsurge in violence. It was reported in The Straits Times on 3 March 2007 that the Indonesian government has finally acknowledged the role of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the violence, following a major crackdown by the police since the new year began. Many other analyses have argued that JI played an active role in Poso. Indeed, the Indonesian government through the anti-terror desk at the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, has supported this argument. Thus, one would eventually blame JI for all the political violence and terrorism in Poso. This argument is based on several facts that were revealed in the aftermath of the police raids in January. First, the suspects arrested turned out to be JI members. Second, the accused have been proselytizing a deviant form of Islam that is used to justify attacks against Christians. Third, since the eruption of religious violence in 1999, Poso has become a magnet for a cross section of the Islamist extremist movement. These arguments certainly appear to be valid. After all, they

Evan A. Laksmana, Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He is also an affiliate of the California-based Overseas Think-Tank for Indonesia. 123

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were based on police interrogations The argument that Poso is all about and investigations emphasized by JI has missed several important the confessions of several ex-JI lead- issues relating to the Poso conflicts ers such as Nasir Abbas. The armed in general. resistance to the police raid further underscored the presence of JI militants. This “evidence” was used to highlight the spread of indoctrination in Poso. The proponents of this argument conclude that the current crisis in Poso is due to JI and its extremist ideology. The response then is a mix of security and counter-ideology. The same tools are being used against JI across the region. However, this begs the question, is the Poso conflict rooted in local conditions, or is being exploited by JI? There is a difference between the two, yet it is a critical question.

What is Poso Really About? The argument that Poso is all about JI has missed several important issues relating to the Poso conflicts in general. The first is the chicken and egg question: which came first, the radical preachers or the radical believers? It is clear that JI had deployed its members to radicalize the population in Poso. But the residents, particularly the youth, were susceptible to radicalization through pre-existing issues. The two most critical were poverty & unemployment, and the desire to avenge the deaths of their relatives during the height of the religious-communal conflict in 1999–2001. This was a critical issue for Basri, one of the “star” detainees who claimed that his involvement with JI stemmed from a desire to avenge the deaths of 26 of his relatives during the aforementioned conflict. Secondly, does the armed resistance demonstrate a clear link with JI? Weapons, both home-made and organic, from past conflicts (e.g. Ambon), smuggled from the Philippines, Malaysia, or those provided by corrupt security officials, werewidely available. The large and diverse arms cache found during the December raid appeared to be consistent with local conditions, and not supporting any claims of outside involvement. Additionally, the accused men also claimed that they were threatened by the wanted men to fight off the police or they would be harmed. This seems to rebut the argument that the community simply fought the police because they were radicalized. Thirdly, JI was not the only actor involved in the Poso conflict, but one of many 124

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that include local and national political elites along with several “rogue” members of the military. A report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) has highlighted how local political elites fighting over revenues and position at the regional level contributed to the conflict in 1999–2001. This however was largely settled through the Malino Peace Accord in 2001. Adnan Arsal, a well-known cleric from the Tanah Runtuh area, had mentioned how national political elites were involved in Poso as he mentioned how the current security approach was based on the intentions of some circles running security businesses, including the security of a Water-based Electric Power Plant in the Sulewana area. Another report by HRW released in mid-2006, as well by Kontras, a coalition of human rights NGOs in 2004, showed how military personnel had been engaged in business practices in and around conflict zones. In Poso, the HRW report claimed that the military charged inflated prices to hire out military trucks and supply fuel via its cooperatives and that it also charged exorbitant illegal levies along roads. Additionally, as the report further argues, in some cases the military took advantage of humanitarian emergencies to loot or otherwise profiteer. In other cases, both the military and police had charged people fleeing communal violence for transport to safety. This shows the link between military businesses with conflict areas where they could take advantage of the situation.

How Do We Handle It? What is clear from the above is the existence of two critical levels of the conflict in Poso, the national and local. Currently the focus is on the national level but a more balanced approach to conflict resolution would perhaps help alleviate if not end the conflict. First, at the national level the government must address the presence of JI and its affiliated members. This can only be done after there is a better understanding of JI’s penetration in the conflict zone. This will permit the proper balance between the security and counter-ideological response. Second, the government must also address the corruption and other issues found in the security services and political sectors in Poso. These inappropriate actions by political, business, and security elites aggravated an already tense situation. This provided the space for JI and others to exploit for their own ends. The most critical areas to address were the local grievances where the youth are suffering from unemployment and the unresolved past killings of their relatives. A bright125

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er economic future will reduce the number of potential recruits for the extremists. However, poverty reduction alone will not end violence. There has to be a mechanism to address the grievances of both pre- and post-conflict Poso. This includes an open and honest investigation of deaths during the conflict, and perhaps either punishment or a truth and reconciliation process. This will help remove vengeance as one of the motivations for future violence. Ultimately, the focus needs to be on the mindset and values of the community. Currently violent extremists have dominated the political space in Poso. If the above steps are taken, it will permit moderate, non-violent, religious leaders to assert themselves. A secure Poso, with a vibrant economy, and an assertive moderate community will make it virtually impossible for extremists to find sympathizers, let alone supporters, in their struggle. None of this is possible if the conflict is misunderstood. Thus is the conflict in Poso all about JI? No, it involves JI, but the roots of the conflict rest with local concerns. The exploitation of this conflict by various elements has clearly deepened the aggravation. The continued emphasis on JI and its role in Poso will blind the government to the root causes of the conflict as well as its solutions. Ironically, this creates the very situation the government claims currently exists. SC

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PRASHANTH PARAMESWARAN

The Southern Insurgency Rethinking Thailand’s Military Strategy

The Thai government must resolve an array of deficiencies to reverse its counterinsurgency misfortunes. Policies must be consistently carried out in all dimensions of the counterinsurgency effort. Bangkok must remember that the insurgency has festered because of decades of heavy-handedness and neglect. Prospects for a regional jihad always lurk just beneath the surface.

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n his most incisive public remarks since Thailand’s bloodless coup, the then Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Sonthi Boonyaratkalin in June 2007 criticized security forces for their inefficiency, unprofessionalism and uncreative mindset that helped fan the flames of Thailand’s southern insurgency. As more than 2,000 had died and the insurgency raged on into its fourth year, Bangkok’s military strategy had been an unmitigated disaster, leaving the military fending off accusations of human rights abuses and engaging in mass arrests that produced little intelligence from tight-lipped insurgents. The southern region is approaching the precipice of civil war, insurgents are gaining increasing support and violence has continued unabated. In order to turn its foundering military campaign around, Thailand must address a number of critical issues relating to resources, capacities, conceptual frameworks and policies that plague its counterinsurgency effort.

Prashanth Parameswaran, Harrison undergraduate research scholar at the University of Virginia. He was a research assistant at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 127

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Too Few Good Men

The Thai government must resolve a multi-faceted array of deficiencies in order to reverse its counterinsurgency misfortunes.

The Thai military is overstretched and under-performing. Only one out of every three or four checkpoints are manned in the insurgency-wracked provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. The police eschew cooperation with the military due to deep interagency rivalry, while military personnel simply lack the rigour and enthusiasm to fulfil their combat duties. In some cases, the military has recruited poorly-trained villagers to supplement its depleting ranks, which only increases the chances for costly operational errors. The security vacuum is having adverse effects. Buddhists in the South, frustrated with the government’s ineptitude, are increasingly taking up arms and organizing their own militias. It is no coincidence that this has led to a surge in revenge attacks since 2007 between Buddhists and Muslims. These are ingredients for a full-scale civil war. Concerns about the lack of professionalism within the security forces are well-founded. Until recently, forensic teams that arrived after bomb attacks used obsolete equipment and techniques that led to dismal evidence collection. Army personnel simply refused to wear the proper protective equipment while carrying out security duties, resulting in unnecessary casualties through bomb-related accidents. The security forces’ dismissive attitude and rudimentary practice of evidence collection and law enforcement will only lead to ineffective public trials. These public prosecutions are integral counterinsurgency instruments since an increase in transparency will ameliorate the military’s reputation for brutality. Furthermore, transparent verdicts will turn the tide against the insurgents, who have stepped up their campaign of using mass village demonstrations to free detainees interned under shaky evidence.

It’s the Thought that Counts? While capacity and resource problems can be quickly rectified, it will take much more to improve the deep-seated myopia of the security forces. They view counterinsurgency through the prism of short-term operational gains, rather than a long, complex process. Part of this thought paradigm is due to the military emphasis on quick, light operations that privilege arrests over the more critical goal of acquiring intelligence from villagers by “holding” certain areas. The armed forces have engaged in “sweep up operations” and “manhunts” to clear areas of insurgent presence. While this has netted insurgents and weapons, it is unlikely to work 128

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in the long run. The insurgency is waged with simple weapons which are easily replenished. And insurgents are unlikely to know much more beyond their direct cell operations. Furthermore, “sweeps” are unlikely to succeed in obtaining intelligence from villagers and informants, simply because their allegiance will stick with the ever-present, lurking insurgents rather than transient security personnel. The few intelligence-centric operations that do exist in the villages are so ill-conceived that they are playing into the insurgent narrative rather than furthering the process of government counter-ideology. When a team leader of a psychological operations village force was asked what his most successful mission was, he enthusiastically detailed how his squad worked with Muslim villagers to plant a Thai flagpole to institutionalize allegiance to the nation-state. Soldiers seem oblivious to the fact that attempts to “Thai-se” villagers only serve to strengthen the insurgent narrative, which stresses attempts by the Thai state to “forcibly assimilate” Southern Muslims. As a result, insurgents are able to tighten their grip on the villagers, subduing them into a culture of silence locally known by the motto of tidak tahu, tidak lihat, tidak dengar (I do not know, I do not see, I do not hear). While the armed forces may win some operational battles on the ground, the insurgents have a virtual monopoly on the hearts and minds of the Southern borderland.

Actions Speak Louder than Words Exacerbating these key factors is the abject failure of concrete security policies in the southern villages. Proposals are often implemented and evaluated without the inputs of Muslim villagers. For example, the recruitment of “Rangers” or indigenous village forces is often hailed as a successful government policy to tailor security to local needs. However, most argue that these “Rangers” consist of Muslim buruk (bad Muslims) who were gamblers, drunks or petty criminals. Empowering village outcasts with vital security roles is a recipe for disaster. Even more disturbing, however, is the fact that the policy has neither been revoked nor revised. It suggests a systematic lack of engagement with the local community. Many Southern Muslims, for instance, are perplexed as to why the government has not made it compulsory for all officers serving in the south to learn the local Malay dialect. This would result in more goodwill and interaction between villagers and the military, which would in turn ameliorate the long history of distrust and suspicion between the two parties. Policies are also dogged by unbalanced implementation. Polling conducted 129

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in the South shows that village leaders are very dissatisfied with current security policies focused on “hunting militants”, while neglecting important non-military dimensions like local administration. Villagers, teashop visitors and academics interviewed all agree that “social justice” is the key to the South. Yet the government has not implemented plans related to justice—like strengthening social infrastructure and enhancing community participation. Even some government and army officers in Bangkok view the lack of implementation as the primary Southern obstacle. They offer explanations such as bureaucratic inertia, red tape, “laziness” and, most notably, Bangkok-centric distractions including political instability and elections.

The Way Forward The Thai government must resolve a multi-faceted array of deficiencies in order to reverse its counterinsurgency misfortunes. First, it must increase its security presence by three or four times, because only with the creation of security will villagers shift to or keep their allegiance with the government. Security leads to intelligence, which will in turn result in more successful and discriminate military operations. But government success is also contingent upon professionalism and possessing the right conceptual framework. The former can be accomplished by enhancing inter-agency cooperation, buying more sophisticated counterinsurgency equipment, and enforcing a strict code of conduct. The latter will probably be a trial and error process in balancing the security, social and political roles of the military that is currently too heavy-handed and operational-centric. Policy implementation must also be consistently carried out in all dimensions of the counterinsurgency effort. If other issues do threaten to distract Bangkok, it must remember that the insurgency has festered because of decades of alternating heavy-handedness and neglect. The Thai government would do well to understand that time is not on its side. Prospects for a regional jihad always lurk just beneath the surface. SC

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BAHTIAR EFFENDY

Trust and Soft Power in War on Terror The United States cannot execute the campaign against terror on hard power alone. There is so much of U.S. soft power that has not been tapped. Furious as it may be, the U.S. should not lose sight of the significance of its soft power in its fight against terrorism. A key factor in the success of soft power is trust.

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ince the dreadful attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the global campaign against terror has involved both the hard and soft power approaches. The bombings of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as other security, socioeconomic, and political measures employed by the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing” have undermined the capacity of terrorist organizations and networks. Various programmes, mostly educational and cultural, to promote moderation have to a certain extent helped public understanding that it is terrorism that the U.S.-led campaign is after, not the religion or belief system of its perpetrators. There has also been a conscious effort to prevent sweeping generalizations that the terrorist violence is being bred by religious belief. Despite the incessant war against terrorism, we are reminded that the threat is still very much out there. We are still haunted by the spectre of some of its leaders, most notably Osama bin Laden. Worse, there seems to be no assurance when the threat will cease. Because of this, the world is still being kept

Bahtiar Effendy, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He is also Professor of political science at the State Islamic University (Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN), Jakarta. 131

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busy with precautions. From time to The most logical way is to fight the time, terrorism-related travel warn- slide by preserving and promoting ings are issued. Security measures even more vigorously whatever are tightly imposed in public plac- mutual trust there is left among es: airports, train stations, shop- the parties involved in combating ping malls, hotels, and even cer- terrorism. tain houses of worship. These only indicate that the worldwide campaign to counter terrorism has encountered obstacles. There is no doubt that combating terrorism is a huge and complicated job. But observing from Jakarta how this endeavour has evolved, I see three pressing issues calling out for closer attention.

First, the Cultural Factor That the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were Muslims, and the victim, the U.S., being predominantly non-Muslim, are facts that played no small part in reviving the cultural prejudices against Islam in the West. “Most Americans’ cultural perception of Arabs/Muslims,” as the U.S.-based Middle East expert Fawaz Gerges has noted, “is that they are dangerous, untrustworthy, undemocratic, barbaric, and primitive”. These cultural preconceptions of Islam have also been echoed by several American religious leaders who cast negative aspersions not just on the religion but even its Prophet. The war against terror has somehow been influenced by this cultural factor. In spite of the denials by some Western leaders that Islam is not the target of their counter-campaign, there are evidences of many Muslims in Europe, North America, and Australia becoming victims of such cultural prejudices. And because of this, many Westerners seem to see terrorism in a rather simplistic way: that Islam is indeed the root-cause of terrorism. Many Muslims are also guilty of a comparable cultural prejudice against the West. This can be observed, for instance, from the way they reacted to America’s war on terror. Instead of seeing the U.S. strike on Afghanistan (or on Iraq) as an effort to combat terrorism, they regarded it as a rampage on the Muslim world. The rapid spread of this cultural factor on both sides of the divide has resulted in the emergence of mutual distrust and hatred between Muslims and the West, specifically the Americans, making the war on terrorism that much more difficult to execute. 132

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Second, the Political Factor Worsening the distrust and aggravating the apprehension of many Muslims is American unilateralism. While they shared the grievances of the victims and condemned the attackers of the World Trade Centre, many Muslims could not accept the U.S.-led raids on Afghanistan, or on Iraq, which have caused an even greater number of casualties. For this, some Muslim leaders even argued that the attack on Afghanistan was an act of terror in itself.

Third, the Trust Factor and Soft Power Like the U.S., some Muslim countries were actually victims of terror. Indonesia is a case in point. The Bali bomb blasts in October 2002; the bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in early August 2003; the Kuningan bombing in Jakarta in September 2004; the Bali bombing II in 2005; and other terrorists attacks thereafter, were undeniable proofs. As such, it is only logical that Indonesia should be trusted as a partner in the campaign against terror. Unfortunately, this is not the case − at least not during the early years of the war on terror. On the contrary, Indonesia was listed as one of the 26 countries where terrorism found its breeding ground. Today, the list may have changed. But Indonesia is still denied the right to question a major terrorist figure like Hambali, an Indonesian Muslim captured in Thailand, and handed over to the U.S. Access to Umar Farouq Al-Kuwaiti, another important figure in the terrorist network, who was captured in Bogor, West Java but was imprisoned in Bagram, Afghanistan, was limited. The fact that these two individuals were linked to a number of terrorist attacks carried out on Indonesian soil, and the inaccessibility of both Hambali and Umar Farouq to Indonesian investigators, only contributed to the rise of suspicions. Umar Farouq’s mysterious flight from the U.S.-run maximum security prison in Bagram only provided additional fuel to the erosion of trust between the Indonesians and the Americans in the campaign against terror. Given the above circumstances, many Muslims still have some reservations with regard to the whole issue of terrorism. There are still doubts whether the Bali bomb-blasts were actually carried out by individuals such as Amrozi, Ali Ghufron, or Imam Samudra who were suspected to have connections with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Even Amien Rais, the former chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly, perceives terrorism as something “that is orchestrated by the West to clobber Islam as it is impossible to attack [the Muslim world] directly as in the 133

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case of Afghanistan and Iraq. The Islamic world is cornered to be made a common enemy and then dominated particularly by a country which claims itself a super power and world police”.

Overcoming Distrust So how do we overcome these obstacles? The most logical way is to fight the slide by preserving and promoting even more vigorously whatever mutual trust there is left among the parties involved in combating terrorism. Putting all cards on the table would be a good start. Let there be transparency in intent. Providing Indonesia with access to Hambali, for instance, will remove the doubts of the country’s Islamic leaders. It will also facilitate cooperation between Muslims and the West in combating terrorism. The West, Americans in particular, need to restrain themselves from taking a unilateralist stance in their foreign policy postures, even in their pursuit of suspected terrorists. Unilateralism, as we have observed, generates more harm than good in this trust-building process. There is no guarantee that the U.S. can execute the campaign against terror on hard power alone. As Joseph S. Nye has suggested, there is so much of U.S. soft power that needs to be re-explored and re-developed. Furious as it may be, the U.S. should not lose sight of the significance of its soft power in bilateral as well as people-to-people relations in its fight against terrorism. A key factor in the success of soft power is trust. More can, and needs to be done to resort to trust building if the current campaign against terror is to succeed in the long run. SC

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TAHARUDIN PIANG AMPATUAN

Abu Sayyaf’s New Leader

Yasser Igasan the Religious Scholar

With the emergence of Yasser Igasan as its new leader, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is now at a strategic crossroads. The most logical response for the Philippine government is to continue the military pressure and strengthen its community engagement programmes. This will limit the military and ideological support for the ASG irrespective of the direction taken by Igasan.

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he Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt Gen. Romeo Tolentino announced recently that the radical Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) had chosen a new leader in the person of the militant Middle East-trained religious scholar, Ustaz Yasser Igasan. Although Tolentino discounted the capability of Igasan to lead the group, it is interesting to note that the new leader possesses the traits which security experts have long argued ASG has been lacking—a religious anchor and an ideological compass. With Igasan’s emergence, the ASG seems to have finally plugged this gap as the new leader is both an Islamic scholar and a recognized ideologue. Little is known about Igasan except that he was among the original founding members of the ASG alongside the late Ustaz Abdulrajak Janjalani. He joined the ASG after graduating in 1993 from Islamic religious studies in Darul Imam, an Islamic institution established in 1988 in the Philippines’ Marawi City by Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law. He had reportedly worked for the International Islamic Relief Organisation

Taharudin Piang Ampatuan, senior Philippine army officer. He was Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 135

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(IIRO), which recently had its funds frozen by the Philippine Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLAC) for its alleged involvement in assisting secessionist movements in the Southern Philippines.

Little is known about Igasan except that he was among the original founding members of the ASG alongside the late Ustaz Abdulrajak Janjalani.

Military Experience The assertion that Igasan has little military experience is misleading. As a teenager, he was reported to have participated as a Mujahideen in Afghanistan against the then Soviet Union, where he met ASG founder Abdulrajak Janjalani. On their return to the Philippines, both cooperated to establish the ASG. Igasan was absent from the Philippines during the height of the ASG’s struggle in the late 1990s to the early 2000s due to a stint in Syria, Libya and Saudi Arabia for further Islamic religious studies. However, this religious preparation placed him in good stead to lead the ASG as a more radicalized organization, guided by the late Janjalani’s political vision of an Islamic state in the Southern Philippines. This development could well put the ASG back on the radar of global jihad. The ASG determines its leaders through consensus (shura) involving the group’s top commanders such as Radullan Sahiron, Isnilon Hapilon, Albader Pared and Doctor Abu or Abu Pula. This suggests that the commanders have already supported Igasan’s appointment.

Implications of ASG’s New Leadership It will take time for Igasan to consolidate his position and implement his own vision, so it is too early to detect any changes in the strategy and tactics of the ASG. His background however does provide a potential outline for future ASG developments. From the ideological perspective, Igasan will provide legitimacy to the organization. It is likely that there will be more militant activities by the organization in the future. Igasan’s background as head of the Haraqatul Quran (Quranic Studies) of the IIRO reflects his religious knowledge. His perceived association with Syrian, Libyan and Saudi Islamists will more likely bring to the organization the sympathy and the attractiveness of the cause of global Jihad. As a consequence, the ASG will more likely engage the American forces in Jolo, Sulu or target American foreign aid workers in Southern Philippines in retaliation for 136

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what is happening in the Middle East. This return to targeting foreigners will be in part also to gain ransom, but more critically they will want to display their commitment to global Jihad. An early indication of things to come is the averted roadside bomb laid against the U.S. troops in Jolo that prompted the U.S. ambassador to the Philippines to offer a reward for a civilian informant that led to the disarming of the bomb. The relative peace brought about by American assistance may be challenged to ensure the ASG is seen as a credible armed secessionist organization in the Muslim communities. Igasan’s religious background will also likely draw sympathy from Ustaz Habier Malik, a cleric of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) who recently withdrew from the peace agreement which the MNLF signed with the Philippine government. A tactical alliance between them will affect the counter-terrorism efforts of the government, and will be a combat multiplier for both the ASG and the MNLF. The ASG will also be able to confront the counter-ideological work being advanced by some ulama (religious leaders) who have been issuing fatwa (religious edicts) challenging ASG’s legitimacy as an organization. The entry of Igasan into the ASG will address a serious weakness in the late Janjalani’s leadership as he did not have the ability to address these fatwa. Igasan’s religious credentials will put him on an equal footing with the moderate Islamic scholars.

JI Links? There may be an influx of new recruits from more radical and religiously-inclined individuals who are susceptible to the call of jihad. The ASG will likely be on the run for at least the next two years, as the Philippine military will sustain its intensive operations against the group. The ASG will however try to draw the military into a protracted war or wait for the shift in the military campaign towards the renewed threat of the left-wing New People’s Army (NPA) in the Christian provinces. The ASG can then re-emerge and conduct its terrorist activities. Special operations such as terrorist bombings will likely emerge as the most viable tactic of the ASG in the near future. The group’s targets will remain centres of foreign and non-Muslim activity in the Philippines: tourist destinations, malls, churches, airlines and shipping lines. Regionally, the ongoing relationship with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) will continue. JI’s ability to find shelter and support from an Igasanled ASG will be strengthened given their shared ideology. What is clear is that the ASG is now at a strategic crossroads. The most logical approach open for the Philippine government is to continue the military 137

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pressure and strengthen its community engagement programmes by stepping up poverty alleviation efforts as well as boosting the capacity of local government. This will limit the military and ideological support for the ASG irrespective of the direction taken by Igasan. One way to ensure this is to re-establish the cease-fire with the MNLF and sustain the negotiations with the other major separatist movement, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This will show that the government is willing and able to deliver on political and social issues to reduce the appeal of violence, since the legitimate grievances of the Southern Philippines’ population are being addressed peacefully. SC

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SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE REGIONAL POWERS

C. Raja Mohan

East Asian Security: India’s Rising Profile Sam Bateman

Rudd’s Rise: Changes in Strategic Directions Loro Horta

Timor-Leste and China: The Dragon’s Newest Friend Go Ito

A New Pro-Asia Doctrine? Japan’s Approach Towards East Asian Regionalism Robert Beckman

South China Sea: Time for ASEANChina Joint Development?

C. RAJA MOHAN

East Asian Security India’s Rising Profile

Until recently, India seemed unwilling or incapable of measuring up to its own power potential. Now, as it delivers high economic growth rates, undertakes a significant military modernization, reorders its relations with the great powers, and deepens its cooperation with the regional actors, India is poised to reclaim its role in shaping Asian security.

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he search by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for a collective security framework is being rapidly overtaken by a series of new bilateral and multilateral security arrangements. India is a surprising new actor in the unfolding security politics in East Asia, marked by China’s growing power, Japan’s new assertiveness, and the revitalization of United States military alliances. The rise of India is no longer an abstract notion, but is beginning to manifest itself in the redefinition of Asian geopolitics.

India’s Return to the Mainstream India is simultaneously expanding its participation in multilateral security initiatives as well as deepening its bilateral defence cooperation with great powers like the U.S. and Japan as well as key regional actors like Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. Long viewed as marginal to the region, India, since the mid 1990s, has focused on returning to the East Asian mainstream. New Delhi’s much talked about Look East policy focused initially on expanding economic cooperation and becoming part of the region’s dynamic multilateralism. With the exception of the forum for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), India is now a member of all the region’s institutions including the East Asia Summit (EAS). C. Raja Mohan, Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was Professor of South Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. 141

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If security initiatives were conspic- India is simultaneously expanding its uous by their absence in the first phase of participation in multilateral security India’s Look East policy, they have begun initiatives as well as deepening its to acquire a new importance in the sec- bilateral defence cooperation with ond phase that had begun in the middle great powers … of this decade. Although India initiated a range of bilateral and multilateral military exercises with global and regional players from the early 1990s, it was the conclusion of a bilateral defence cooperation agreement with Singapore in 2004 that launched vigorous security diplomacy in the region. At the end of 2004, the Indian Navy was quick to respond, on its own, to the tsunami disaster and later joined the navies of the U.S., Japan and Australia to provide relief in Southeast Asia. In 2005, the Indian aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, arrived for the first time in the ports of Southeast Asia—Singapore, Jakarta in Indonesia and Klang in Malaysia.

India’s Military Diplomacy The intensity of India’s current military diplomacy can be gauged from the range of initiatives since the annual ARF meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 2006. At the end of 2006, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh travelled to Tokyo to proclaim “a strategic partnership”, with a strong defence component, with Japan. Mr. Singh also endorsed the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s initiative for political consultations among “like-minded” countries in the Asia-Pacific (read the U.S., Japan, Australia and India). Few observers, however, had expected this initiative to gather momentum. In April 2007, India conducted its first trilateral naval exercises with the U.S. and Japan. That this exercise took place off Guam suggested India’s increasing naval profile in East Asian waters. New Delhi, however, took care to reassure China that its expanding military diplomacy was not targeted at China. Within days after the trilateral exercise with the U.S. and Japan, an Indian naval contingent travelled to China and Russia for separate bilateral exercises. In May 2007, senior officials from the U.S., Japan, Australia and India met for the first time, on the margins of an ARF meeting in Manila, to formally launch the so-called “democratic quad” in Asia. As Beijing lodged formal protests, all the four capitals reaffirmed that the consultations were not directed against China and were limited to a few issues of common concern. In June 2007, India completed its first-ever purchase of a naval ship from the U.S., the USS Trenton. Renamed INS Jalashwa, the ship is now the second largest in the Indian Navy. It is no secret that the landing platform dock (LPD) ship increas142

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es India’s ability to conduct amphibious operations far from its shores. India now plans to acquire a second ship in the same class from the U.S. Although the Indian Navy has always been among the strongest in the region, its ability to project power has begun to acquire a new edge. In the same month, the Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee was in Indonesia to reaffirm New Delhi’s strong commitment for an expansion of security cooperation with Jakarta. The Indonesian Parliament has already approved a bilateral defence cooperation agreement that envisages arms acquisition from India as well as joint production of weapons. Earlier in July 2007, the Amnesty International criticized India (as well as China) for plans to sell a wide-range of armaments, including light helicopters, to Myanmar. New Delhi, however, insists that its sales to Yangon are limited to defensive equipment. In the last few years, New Delhi has stepped up its defence cooperation with Yangon, as part of its effort to deepen strategic ties as well as limit Beijing’s growing influence in Myanmar.

India’s Grand Strategy? July 2007 also saw the unveiling of a strategic partnership between India and Vietnam during the visit of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to New Delhi. The joint declaration issued by Singh and Dung on 7 July “welcomed the steady development of bilateral defence and security ties” and “pledged themselves to strengthen cooperation in defence supplies, joint projects, training cooperation and intelligence exchanges”. Another visitor to New Delhi in July was Brendan Nelson, the defence minister of Australia. He signed a new agreement with India to enhance bilateral cooperation in maritime security and exchange of intelligence information. In September, India hosted the largest multilateral naval exercises ever in the Bay of Bengal. Participating in these exercises were navies from the U.S., Japan, Australia and Singapore. Is there a grand strategy behind the frenetic pace of India’s military diplomacy? India argues it has no desire to align with any one power against another and that its interest lies in contributing to a stable balance of power in a “multipolar Asia”. As Indian troops contributed to the reversal of the Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia during the Second World War, the well-known diplomat-historian K. M. Panikkar argued that a “free and stable” India, “conscious of its responsibilities and capable of playing its part in Southeast Asia” is the “essential prerequisite” of any credible regional security mechanism. Until recently India seemed either unwilling or incapable of measuring up to its own power potential. Now, as it delivers annual economic growth rates of 9 per cent, undertakes a significant military modernization, reorders its relations with the great powers, and deepens its cooperation with the regional actors, India is poised to reclaim its role in shaping Asian security. SC 143

SAM BATEMAN

Rudd’s Rise

Changes in Australia’s Strategic Directions The rise to power of a Labor government will lead to some significant changes in strategic directions for Australia. Some commentators have suggested these changes may not be great, but this underestimates new Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and his keen understanding of what is happening in Asia and Australia’s potential role.

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onday, 3 December 2007, was an important day for Australia. Kevin Rudd, the leader of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), was sworn in as Prime Minister and then to fulfil a key election pledge, he ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Together these events foreshadow some significant changes in strategic direction for Australia. The Rudd government might “make haste slowly” with programmes of change but we should be assured that change is surely coming. Australia will move inexorably to the Left. Climate change is the one area to see quick change. Kevin Rudd led a team of senior ministers to the UN Climate Change conference in Bali where they jumped bravely into the minefield of international climate change politics. He has foreshadowed an active role for Australia in seeking to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries on binding greenhouse gas emissions, but this not going to be easy. Australia has vital interests in managing climate change both as a leading coal exporter and as a country that is hugely vulnerable to drought, water shortages and sea level rise. The Rudd government has a strong mandate to introduce proSam Bateman, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he is with the Maritime Security Programme. He was a former Commodore (one-star) in the Royal Australian Navy. 144

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grammes of change. While the main Significant changes in foreign policy changes will be on the domestic front to the extent that there will be such particularly with industrial relations, changes will mainly be associated with health and education, there will also China and India. be significant changes on the international front although they may emerge more slowly. Domestic issues were the focus of the election campaign. Both sides of the political spectrum had little to gain and much to lose by pushing international issues too much to the fore— climate change and Australia’s involvement in Iraq were two exceptions. But in the days just before the election, another Australian soldier was killed in combat in Afghanistan and a boatload of refugees from Indonesia was intercepted in the Timor Sea. Both incidents were “front page stories” and may have impacted on some voters. Moves towards an Australian republic will be one area where there will be no change in the short-term. This is a divisive issue in Australia which was exploited by John Howard when he called a “loaded” referendum on the topic in 1999. Kevin Rudd is unlikely to raise such an issue in his first term of office although he would no doubt recognize that Australia’s ongoing link with the British monarchy is seen by many Asians as an impediment to the more intimate involvement of Australia in the region.

The 2007 Federal Election The Federal election in Australia on 24 November 2007 ended eleven years of rule by the conservative coalition government led by John Howard. The ALP campaigned with the slogan “New Leadership”. The election was the first in Australia when an Asian factor was evident. Mr. Rudd himself is a fluent Mandarin speaker and during the campaign spoke on Chinese international television that beams into Australia as well as around the world. He also has a Chinese-Australian son-in-law. Senator Penny Wong, who was born in Malaysia, was a prominent part of the public face of the ALP as its National Campaign Spokesperson. She will have a seat in Cabinet as the Minister for Climate Change and Water, and thus becomes the first Federal cabinet minister in Australia from an Asian background. It is now history that John Howard was the first incumbent prime minister in about 80 years to lose his seat in Parliament. While he had a strong opponent in high profile television personality Maxine McKew, demographics also played a part. Bennelong, the Sydney suburban electorate previously 145

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held by Howard, has a much higher proportion of ethnic Chinese and Korean voters than the national average, and these voters were solidly against the Howard government. They had not forgotten the opposition expressed by John Howard in the 1980s to increased immigration from Asia, and his management in the 1990s of the extreme views expressed by Pauline Hanson and the One Nation party. In many ways the 2007 election was the election that Australia might have had in 2001. In the middle of that year, the polls were running strongly in favour of Opposition Leader Kim Beazley and the ALP, and there was considerable media and academic speculation about the future of conservative parties. Strong parallels were drawn with Tony Blair and his party’s domination in the United Kingdom, and basic questions were being asked about the relevance of the conservative parties. The 2001 situation changed though with events of 9/11, and the concurrent problems on the home front with the Tampa affair and the influx of “boat people” in northern Australia. These developments and participation in the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq and Afghanistan introduced clear directions in Australian foreign policy that then prevailed throughout the remaining years of the Howard government.

Howard’s Foreign Policy There are two schools of thought about the performance of the Howard government in the conduct of foreign policy. One school argues that despite some initial stumbles by the Howard government, it went on to build solid diplomatic ties in Asia. There was no downturn in Australia’s regional relations— Asian investment and trade with Australia increased steadily and Asian students continued to come to Australia in large numbers. Specific achievements of the Howard government, according to this school, include establishing firm frameworks for cooperation to deal with trans-national threats such as terrorism and illegal immigration. The other school claims that the Howard government seriously damaged Australia’s regional relations. Its perceived achievements would have occurred anyway, and are really just an expression of the geo-political, economic and strategic realities of Australia’s links into the region. An alternative government might have achieved much more. Sabam Siagian, Indonesian ambassador to Australia in the early 1990s and former chief editor of The Jakarta Post is of this 146

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view. In a recent op-ed, he referred to ”Australian political body language” during the Howard years as sending off “signals that are viewed as an extension of American arrogance and insensitivity”.

The directions of the Rudd government’s foreign policy will be clear. However initially, they will involve subtle rather than dramatic change.

New Directions in Foreign Policy The former shadow spokesman on education, Stephen Smith, a lawyer from Western Australia is the new Australian Foreign Minister. He is a very experienced politician with a reputation as a competent manager and strong debater. He will be a “steady hand on the tiller” of Australia’s foreign policy. As a Western Australian, he may be expected to tilt towards the Indian Ocean, and has already indicated that the bilateral Australia-India relationship will be one of his priorities. The directions of the Rudd government’s foreign policy will be clear. However initially, they will involve subtle rather than dramatic change. There will be greater emphasis on regional engagement although this will be more nuanced than was the case when engagement was high on the agenda in the closing years of the Keating government in the early to mid-1990s. Key areas of change will relate to the environment, nuclear issues and Iraq. The Rudd government will withdraw Australia’s combat forces from Iraq but leave support forces in place. The commitment of over 1,000 Australian military personnel to Afghanistan will be maintained. Discussions are already taking place with the United States on the Iraq troop drawdown, as Stephen Smith visited Washington early in 2008 for discussions with Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice. Despite the troop withdrawal from Iraq and differences over climate change, the alliance with the U.S. will remain pivotal. Australia enjoys unique access to U.S. intelligence resources and technology and an Australian government is most unlikely to do anything that might jeopardize that access. However, there will be some distance in the relationship with the Bush Administration and this will help pave the way for a closer relationship with the next administration. The left wing of the ALP has traditionally been opposed to U.S. bases in Australia but this will have no impact on the Rudd government, which will maintain all current basing agreements, including those made most recently by the outgoing government. 147

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Significant changes in foreign policy to the extent that there will be such changes will mainly be associated with China and India. Differences in approach towards China between Australia and the U.S. will be more apparent under the new government, which will be less supportive of any four-way relationship between Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. than its predecessor may have been. The Rudd government will be bound strongly by its non-nuclear stance and while seeking a closer bilateral relationship with India, is unlikely to approve uranium exports to India while India is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Left Wing of the ALP would remain strongly opposed to such exports, and it would be “a bridge too far” for the Rudd government to go against those views.

A New Footprint in Asia? In geopolitical terms, it is hard to argue against Australia having a foot in the Asian camp. John Howard once famously said, “Australia doesn’t have to choose between its history and its geography.” However, the Rudd government will make a choice. It will choose geography and put greater emphasis on regional relationships rather than on its historical ties with great powers. It will aim to establish a footprint in Asia that contributes positively to a prosperous and stable region. Geo-strategically, Australia is joined with Asia. The straits through the Indonesian archipelago between Singapore and Darwin are a strategic whole sitting astride vital shipping routes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Australia’s future security is inextricably linked with that of Asia and depends almost entirely on what happens in Asia. There are many areas where Australia has clear common interests with the region. The economic ties between Australia and both Northeast and Southeast Asia are strong, and economically Australia is already integrated into these two regions. The ties with South Asia are underdeveloped but may become stronger. The political ethos of a Labor government in Australia means that such a government will be much less keen on the notions of power projection and intervention that characterized the Howard years and were resented in the region. Let Sabam Siagian have the last say. He believes that the Rudd government “will shape a new Australia to become an indispensable cornerstone of the 21st century geopolitical architecture encompassing a stable and dynamic Asia-Pacific”. These are high hopes indeed, particularly so as they come from an eminent regional commentator who has not been backward in strongly criticizing Australia in the past. SC 148

LORO HORTA

Timor-Leste and China The Dragon’s Newest Friend

Despite the ongoing instability in Timor-Leste, Beijing remains committed to consolidating its presence and influence in the fledging Southeast Asian nation. China’s strategy towards Timor-Leste reveals some interesting aspects of the growing and sophisticated nature of Beijing’s new diplomacy and the projection of its soft power.

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ince the May 2006 political crisis in Timor-Leste, China’s presence and influence in the fledging Southeast Asian nation has been on the rise. Why has China increased its level of interest in Timor-Leste at a time when so many prefer to stay away from such an unstable country? What has allowed Beijing to improve its position in the territory and why is China willing to take the risk of committing itself to such a troubled nation?

Extending Aid Since 2000 China’s financial assistance to Timor Leste, or East Timor has been on the increase. In 2004 China granted East Timor US$3.7 million in aid; in 2005 this increased by 50 per cent or $5.5 million in aid package. This was followed by another increase in 2006 of an additional allocation of $2.7 million over the previous year. Since 2000 China has granted a total of $34 million in financial aid. While Chinese aid has been consistently on the rise, it remains rather modest when compared to East Timor’s major do-

Loro Horta, Associate Research Fellow and a Ph.D. candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was an adviser to the Defence Department of Timor-Leste. 149

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nors such as Portugal and Australia. … smart diplomacy and public Yet, smart diplomacy and public re- relations savvy have allowed lations savvy have allowed the Chi- the Chinese to obtain significant nese to obtain significant benefits. benefits. For instance while Japan has given six times the amount of aid provided by Beijing, Japanese discretion and certain passivity have made Tokyo’s influence and prestige much less noticeable. While the New York Times and the International Herald Tribune noticed the prominent buildings built by China, such as the presidential palace and the ministry of foreign affairs, few took notice of the far more expensive infrastructure projects funded by Japan, such as the modernization of Dili’s harbour and the planned construction of the country’s first highway at a cost of $10 million. Credit goes to the three Chinese ambassadors who have so far served in Dili, all of them fluent in Portuguese and with previous experience in other Portuguese-speaking countries. Chinese diplomats are usually far more active than their western counterparts, wasting no opportunity to score diplomatic points.

Patience is a Virtue China’s long-term strategy towards East Timor became clear with the recent crisis and subsequent collapse of the government in the former Portuguese colony. The massive unrest that erupted in early 2006 led many investors and foreign governments to lose interest in East Timor. Major investments from the Middle East, South Korea and ASEAN states were postponed or abandoned. In contrast China seems not to have wavered in its commitment towards East Timor. When on 26 May the Chinese government made the decision to evacuate its citizens from East Timor, the Chinese ambassador urged them to return to the country once the Chinese government considered the situation to be stable. Beijing understands that its private citizens, in particular those engaged in business, are becoming an important asset to its foreign policy. During the crisis, high-ranking Chinese officials continued to express optimism and solidarity towards the troubled nation. In the worst period of the crisis when food scarcity became a serious problem, China donated 3,000 tonnes of rice and 500 tonnes of cooking oil. This rather simple but highly symbolic gesture secured for Beijing valuable political points. Despite the turmoil and the slow pace of recovery, Chinese business inter150

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ests seem not to have lost their enthusiasm in East Timor. Indeed, Chinese businesses see the large UN presence as a boost to the economy and an opportunity for profit. There are also some cultural aspects typical of the Chinese way of doing business. Chinese businessmen say that nothing is permanent and that everything in life evolves in cycles; thus the instability in East Timor will pass and a new cycle will start. Chinese businesses also see the flight of other businessmen as an opportunity to consolidate their own position. Like in other unstable parts of the world such as in the various African and Asian countries, Chinese businesses, both state and private, are willing to take risks usually deemed unreasonable by their Western counterparts.

China’s Investment Some major Chinese economic moves being planned include the creation of a free trade area along the border between Indonesia and East Timor and the creation of a growth area modelled on the growth triangle concept between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The special area, to be located in the Timorese island of Atauro, aims at stimulating trade between East Timor and the near by Indonesian islands of Larantuca, Flores, Moluccas and Bali. These islands share many cultural affinities with Timor and have traded with it for centuries. Other Chinese proposals include infrastructural development and agricultural projects. While it remains to be seen if the great risks taken by the Chinese in unstable East Timor and elsewhere will pay off, the Chinese government and its people seem to be willing to take the risk. In August 2007 Chinese companies got their first contract with the Timorese government to build a hospital in the district of Suai. The hospital is the first of six to be constructed as part of the badly needed expansion of Timor’s health service. China Metallurgical Construction is well poised to win some of the other contracts due to its competitive prices and the fact that it has been in Timor since independence. But it may be the energy sector, the country’s substantial oil and gas reserves, where the biggest potential for investment lie. One of China’s largest state-owned oil companies, PetroChina, has been involved in seismic studies to gauge the extent of hydrocarbon deposits in the country. A major seismic study covering 70 per cent of the country was conducted in 2004 at an estimated cost of US$1.7 million. Beijing is expected to bid to develop these; there has also been speculation that China will finance construction of a pipeline to transfer oil and gas from the interior of the country to the coast 151

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for transportation aboard Chinese vessels. Fisheries is another area where Chinese companies have been making inroads. Early last year, Dili awarded China fishing rights in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that may see up to 100 Chinese vessels operating in Timorese waters.

Soft Power Regardless of China’s long-term intentions, the East Timorese government seems to appreciate Beijing’s commitment, particularly in difficult periods such as the one currently confronting the young nation. Since the political crisis, China has made substantial diplomatic gains in East Timor at a very modest material cost. Patience and sophisticated diplomacy have allowed Beijing to emerge in the eyes of the Timorese as a committed and much-need friend. The case of East Timor also illustrates the increasing sophistication of Chinese diplomacy and its ability to utilize its soft power as a counter to the “China threat theory” so prevalent in the 1990s in Southeast Asia. SC

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GO ITO

A New Pro-Asia Doctrine?

Japan’s Approach to East Asian Regionalism The rivalry between China and Japan has influenced their respective relationships with ASEAN. This is seen in their involvement in a number of ASEAN-related regional diplomatic processes. With the change of leadership in Japan, will the possibility of a new pro-Asia doctrine redefine the relationship with China?

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hen the Asian Financial Crisis occurred in 1997, policymakers and intellectuals recognized the ASEAN+3 as a valid regional group. The ASEAN+3 is remarkable because it is the first institutionalization of regionalism among East Asian countries. It is however intrinsically part of the ASEAN regime, which constitutes numerous frameworks and dialogues constructed among the ASEAN countries and their political-security extension, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Besides, the ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, and Korea) is not the only regional organization in the area. The ASEAN+6 (Japan, China, Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ARF and others have also been created. Thus, the future of East Asian regionalism is uncertain.

ASEAN’s Delicate Balance While Japan and China cooperate with ASEAN in the ASEAN+3, the ASEAN+6, and other frameworks, they are in a sense rival nations for predominance in East Asia. Both China and Japan are

Go Ito, Professor of International Relations at Meiji University in Tokyo, Japan. He is one of Japan’s leading experts on national and international security studies. 153

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respectively trying to tighten their In this situation, ASEAN recognizes economic and political ties with that the excessive tension ASEAN countries. More specifically, between China and Japan can be the ASEAN+3 is the framework that burdensome since the regional China pursues, while the ASEAN+6 grouping does not want to be is what Japan seeks as the foundation involved in the China-Japan rivalry. of East Asia’s regionalism because the latter is larger and can dilute China’s predominance. To accomplish this purpose, they are promoting free trade agreements (FTA) both with ASEAN and as a whole and with its member countries individually since the end of the 1990s. In this situation, ASEAN recognizes that the excessive tension between China and Japan can be burdensome since the regional grouping does not want to be involved in the China-Japan rivalry. They argue that they are not the political means both for China and Japan to attain their national interests. However, ASEAN also contends that if China-Japan relations become too close, ASEAN may lose its leverage in the making of the regional framework, since the wider cooperation between the two major powers in Asia will dilute ASEAN’s presence. In this sense, ASEAN needs to keep a delicate balance in East Asian regionalism.

The China-Japan Rivalry and Regional Frameworks China’s rapid economic growth as well as its increasing influence on regional politics in East Asia became obvious to some Japanese policymakers since the end of 1990. They were shocked at the announcement in November 2001 that China and ASEAN agreed to the establishment of an FTA just a year after Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji proposed it. The anxiety that Japan was being left behind by China and the eagerness to catch up with China’s bold approach to ASEAN countries led to the proposals for the “Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the Initiative for Development in East Asia”, that is, an “Extended East Asia Community,” by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro in Singapore in January 2002. The Japan-ASEAN Summit in November 2002 in Phnom Penh adopted a joint declaration. This declaration stipulated that ASEAN countries and Japan should work in a framework of Comprehensive Economic Partnership to be fully realized within 10 years. Then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Southeast Asia in August 2007 also stated that Japan and ASEAN should seek a broadbased economic partnership covering such areas as (i) liberalization of trade and 154

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investment; (ii) trade and investment promotion and facilitation measures, including, standards and conformance, non-tariff measures; and (iii) cooperation in other areas, including financial services, information and communications technology, science and technology, human resource development, small and medium enterprises, tourism, transport, energy and food security. Chinese policymakers in Beijing thought that China had to counter Japan’s move to examine bilateral FTAs with some Asian countries, namely Singapore and South Korea. In short, policymakers in China and Japan have been very conscious of each other’s moves and intentions. In the China-ASEAN Summit held in Cambodia shortly before the 2002 Japan-ASEAN Summit, a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation was signed. It declared that China and ASEAN would embark on trade liberalization and facilitation in goods and services; liberalization and facilitation of investment; and five other areas of economic cooperation. The agreement had a list of some 600 products, mostly agricultural, targeted for “early harvest” in tariff reduction by the following year. In addition, it included a commitment to complete negotiations on tariff reduction for 5,400 other products. In that Summit, Chinese and The entire actions by Japan stemmed ASEAN leaders also signed an agree- from the need for a balance of power ment aimed at preventing an escala- against the rise of China. tion of tension over the hotly-contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. They began to strengthen not only economic but also security cooperation and coordination. Furthermore, China will accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a fundamental document for regional cooperation, at their summit in Bali in October 2003. China has been seeking to consolidate its political and economic ties with ASEAN countries and gain more leverage over them. The Japanese government rushed to catch up with China’s efforts to initiate the community-led regionalism. But the purpose behind this hastiness was predicated on the idea that Japan cannot be delayed by the rise of China. The entire actions by Japan stemmed from the need for a balance of power against the rise of China.

ASEAN’s Autonomy Facing the China-Japan rivalry, however, ASEAN countries are not just “passive” subjects over which China and Japan has competed for predominance. They are 155

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also “active” actors searching for their independent diplomacies. ASEAN countries try to balance both China and Japan. Many ASEAN policymakers recognized that Japan is a key country for their countries’ economic revitalization because its economic presence in Southeast Asia is still unchallenged despite its prolonged economic recession. Its US$4.7 trillion economy is almost five times larger than the Chinese economy. Japan is the top ODA donor to all ASEAN members and China. Even after a decade of stagnation, Japanese firms invested about US$2 billion in ASEAN economies every year for the past decade. However, ASEAN countries have complained about Japan’s reluctance to promote freer trade, especially in agricultural products. They are eager to open up the Japanese market of agricultural goods so as to vitalize their economies. ASEAN countries have pointed out repeatedly that enhancing economic linkages without the liberalization of agricultural goods would be meaningless for them. Japan’s liberalization of its agricultural market is regarded as indispensable to the strengthening of economic linkages between ASEAN and Japan. In Japan, however, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, some politicians and pro-agriculture pressure groups have strongly resisted the opening of the agricultural market. Japan’s stubborn attitude against freer agricultural trade is hampering its “recapture” of the initiative towards Southeast Asia. In ASEAN countries, supporters for the China-ASEAN FTA argue that an FTA could make China’s huge market accessible for exports from ASEAN countries. In addition, they expected it to contribute to efficiency in various industries in ASEAN through competition in the larger China-ASEAN market. They also welcomed China’s voluntary attitude concerning agricultural goods and expected the access to China’s huge market in other sectors to become easier. Singapore, for example, is eager to enhance ties between ASEAN and China because it considers the huge Chinese market to be indispensable for further economic growth of the ASEAN countries. On the other hand, sceptics of China’s benevolence and the effects of the China-ASEAN FTA are concerned with the possibilities that economies of China and ASEAN are actually more competitive than complementary. They argue that manufacturers of such products as textile, toys, and television sets in ASEAN countries would suffer from an inflow of cheaper “Made in China” goods. They also argue that China and ASEAN compete for foreign investment in the manufacturing sector. The sceptics perceive that China rushed into a deal because the 156

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Chinese government acts not only for economic reasons but also political ones, such as the ambition to outmanoeuvre Japan for regional leadership. The misgivings about the China-ASEAN FTA and China’s influence are strong particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. East Asia is today a significant region, as reflected by various trends: competition between China and Japan over political and economic ties with ASEAN through FTAs and other collaboration schemes; optimism and scepticism in ASEAN countries about China; ASEAN’s strategy to strengthen ties with both China and Japan to revitalize their economies; and ASEAN’s intention to prevent any major powers from dominating Southeast Asia. The future development of East Asian regionalism will be strongly influenced by the triangular relationship among Japan, China and ASEAN countries. It is, however, unclear how it will be affected and how it will change. To strengthen ties between China and ASEAN and between Japan and ASEAN is not equivalent to the promotion of regional cooperation in the East Asian “region”. It is uncertain whether these two individual partnerships will merge to enhance a single Japan needs to address China and ASEAN as equal partners. East Asian regionalism.

Possibility of a New Pro-Asia Doctrine? I have argued that both China and Japan have employed the “balance of power” logic towards the making of the entire East Asian regional framework. It partly stemmed from Premiers Koizumi and Abe’s penchant for the United States as well as their disregard for Asia. Abe seemingly wanted to ameliorate Japan’s relations with China and Asia, but his efforts did not grow out of the series of summit meetings in the region. When Abe resigned because of corruption-related scandals, Yasuo Fukuda became Japan’s prime minister in late September 2007. China, ASEAN and other Asian countries welcomed his rise as he is seen more as a liberal Asianist than a hawkish, conservative “pan-American”. Political leaders in Asia now expect Tokyo to announce a new framework for Japan’s attitude towards the making of the “East Asian community”. The possibility of a “New Fukuda doctrine”, asssuming the new premier lasts a full term in office, should be predicated on the following three principles. First, Japan needs to change the “balance-of-power” logic against China into a region-wide framework building process. In this context, ASEAN cannot be the 157

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political means for Japan to enhance its national interests against China; Japan needs to address China and ASEAN as equal partners. Second, as the Fukuda doctrine in 1977 employed the term “heart-to-heart communication” with Asian countries, Japan also needs to create a new conception for the making of a regional framework. More specifically, 10 years after the Asian Financial Crisis, and 10 years since efforts to build the “East Asian Community” began, Japan needs to address key terms associated with “Asia as one world”. For instance, the new key terms can be like “Mutual Trust”, “Mutual Prosperity (or Mutual Development, or 共生)”, “Sustainability”, “Generosity”, “Plurality” and so forth. Finally, the more consolidated Asian countries are, the more attentive they will be towards the U.S., which has been concerned that its presence might weaken as the Asian countries become more cohesive. Ten years ago, Japan’s initiative for the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was turned down by the U.S. that was concerned the proposed AMF might lessen its stake in the region. Any regional framework in the 21st century, like the EU and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), cannot be closed to others as “open regionalism” will be mutually beneficial.

The U.S. Factor The posture of the U.S. towards East Asian regionalism has significantly affected, and will affect East Asian regionalism. American attitude towards East Asian regionalism at present is, at least on the surface, not as antagonistic as it was in the past, as demonstrated in such cases as the AMF proposal and the idea of an East Asian Economic Group, or later referred to as the East Asian Economic Caucus ( EAEG/EAEC). The U.S. even proposed the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) in October 2002, offering the prospect of FTAs between it and ASEAN countries. The EAI proposal reflected U.S. eagerness to strengthen its relationship with ASEAN countries. Other reasons for this proposal were the expectation of economic interests in Southeast Asia and the need for anti-terrorist cooperation. East Asia now faces market-driven regionalism, but economic issues will not be the only ones for the region. It is a region with various natural disasters, serious piracy crimes, human trafficking and smugglings, and so forth. We need various kinds of cooperation that will go beyond functional, economic issues. Serious efforts should be made by the Japanese government to address these region-wide problems. SC 158

ROBERT BECKMAN

South China Sea

Time for ASEAN-China Joint Development? As China continues its rapid economic growth and its energy needs continue to rise, talk of “shelving” sovereignty claims has increased. The time may be ripe for the ASEAN countries and China to formally agree to shelve the sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and cooperate to develop the natural resources, protect the environment, and create good order at sea.

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he Spratly Islands in the South China Sea were a source of potential conflict in the region during the early 1990s. Four states (China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam) and Taiwan claim sovereignty over some or all of the islands as well as sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources in and below the waters surrounding the islands. In addition, Brunei Darussalam claims sovereign rights to the natural resources in and under part of the disputed waters. The maritime zones in the South China Sea overlap in numerous ways, with some areas claimed by all five states plus Taiwan. In recent years the South China Sea has been relatively calm. One of the major reasons for this is that China agreed in 1995 to discuss the South China Sea disputes at the multilateral level with ASEAN. The talks resulted in the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which was signed by the leaders of ASEAN and China on 4 November 2002 during the Eighth ASEAN Summit in Cambodia.

Robert Beckman, Visiting Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University and Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law at the National University of Singapore. 159

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In the 2002 Declaration the Par- As China continues its unprecedented ties reaffirmed their respect for and economic development and its commitment to the freedom of navi- energy needs continue to rise, talk gation in and overflight above the of “shelving” sovereignty claims and South China Sea as provided for by establishing joint development zones universally recognized principles of has increased. international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Parties declared that they will resolve the territorial disputes by peaceful means in a manner that is consistent with UNCLOS and international law. The Parties also declared that they would exercise restraint and refrain from activities that would complicate or escalate the disputes, and that they will undertake efforts to establish confidence building measures and explore or undertake cooperative activities that are in the common interest. Although the 2002 Declaration also encouraged the Parties to explore or undertake cooperative activities, its major emphasis and achievement was on de-escalating the sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes and preventing potential conflict in the South China Sea.

Replacing Claims with Joint Development As China continues its unprecedented economic development and its energy needs continue to rise, talk of “shelving” sovereignty claims and establishing joint development zones has increased. A significant development took place in 2005 when the national oil companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed to undertake joint seismic surveys to determine the extent of hydrocarbon resources in a disputed area of the South China Sea. The time may be ripe for the ASEAN countries and China to formally agree to shelve the sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and cooperate to develop and manage the natural resources, protect the environment, and create good order at sea. Before meaningful discussions can take place on the creation of joint development zones, it may be necessary to first negotiate a framework document that “shelves” or “freezes” existing claims and sets out the principles upon which cooperation and joint development can proceed. The framework document need not be a formal treaty. A declaration similar to the 2002 Declaration will suffice if the Parties have the political will necessary to abide by its principles in good faith. Shelving the sovereignty claims may be the only viable option. Given the de160

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velopment of economic and political ties between China and ASEAN during the last decade and the principles in the 2002 Declaration, it is not likely that any of the Parties will attempt to resolve the disputes by the threat or use of force. Given the political sensitivity of the disputes and the potential resources at stake, the claimant states are not likely to reach an agreement to refer the disputes to an international court or tribunal and have them resolved in a win-lose format on the basis of which of the states have the stronger legal claim to sovereignty under international law. For similar reasons, it is highly unlikely that the claimants will be able to resolve the disputes through negotiations. Furthermore, if the claimant states take a close look at the applicable provisions of UNCLOS, to which they are all bound, they should realize that their sovereignty claims over the “islands” in the South China Sea are fraught with potential legal problems. For example, many of the “islands” over which sovereignty is claimed are not “islands” entitled to a 200 nautical mile economic zone and continental shelf of their own, but “rocks” entitled only to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea because they are not able to support human habitation or economic life of their own. Still others are geographic features which are not even entitled to a territorial sea of their own under UNCLOS because they are not natural formed areas of land above water at high tide, but artificial islands, low-tide elevations, reefs or shoals.

Developing a Management Regime Hence, the most viable option is to shelve the sovereignty claims and develop a management regime based on cooperation in order to deal with impending problems and issues such as the increasing need for offshore gas and oil resources, the potential collapse of fisheries resources in the region, and the need for cooperative measures to protect the marine environment and create good order at sea. However, a new declaration to promote cooperation in the South China Sea will not succeed unless it addresses the major obstacle to enhanced cooperation. Some claimant states have been reluctant to cooperate because they fear that by cooperating they will be renouncing their own claim, recognizing the legitimacy of another state’s claim, or somehow assisting another state’s claim. Therefore, any new declaration must make it clear that existing sovereignty claims in the South China Sea are “shelved” during the period of the declaration, and that a claimant state cannot prejudice or diminish its claim to sovereignty by cooperat161

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ing under the declaration. The declaration should provide that it will be valid for a significant period of time, such as 50 years. The proposed declaration should also contain a clause that will enable Taiwan to unilaterally declare or affirm that it supports and will abide by the declaration. This is essential, given that Taiwan occupies the largest island and is a major fishing entity in the South China Sea. One formula that could be considered would be to include a clause which permits states and “other entities with interests in the South China Sea” to unilaterally declare that they support and will abide by the declaration. Finally, the declaration should state that the conduct of the Parties to the new declaration in the South China Sea should be in accordance with the United Nations Charter, UNCLOS and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. A new declaration along the lines outlined above, together with the 2002 Declaration, would establish the legal framework necessary for the claimant states to “shelve” existing claims and cooperate to solve problems and issues of common concern, without prejudicing their existing claims. If ASEAN could successfully negotiate such an agreement with China and move the South China Sea disputes from conflict prevention to meaningful cooperation, it would greatly enhance its prestige as a regional body. SC

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SOUTHEAST ASIA AND CONTEMPORARY ISLAM

Luthfi AssyaUkanie

The Rise of Religious Bylaws in Indonesia Karim DOUGLAS Crow

Turkey and the Türban: The Dilemmas of Laicist Ideology YANG RAZALI KASSIM

New PAS, Young Ulama: Re-Defining the Future of Islamist Politics Muhammad Haniff Hassan

Responding to the Idea of Hijrah (Migration)

LUTHFI ASSYAUKANIE

The Rise of Religious Bylaws in Indonesia The liberalization of the Indonesian political system has also been accompanied by a rise of religious bylaws at the district level, with at least 35 districts implementing them. Each district is motivated by different concerns, ranging from an obligation to the shari’ah to regulating decency in dressing and moral conduct. The trend however is not always driven by pure ideological impetus.

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error and violence may be declining in Indonesia, but there is another development that Indonesians—particularly the nonMuslims and the secular Muslims—are following closely. This is the emergence of religious bylaws. Coming on the back of new regional regulations known as “Perda” (peraturan daerah), such religious bylaws have now been adopted by no less than 35 Indonesian regions. The Perda themselves are a response to the regional autonomy law that was enacted in 1999. This regional autonomy law stated that local governments at the district level are entitled to have their own implementation regulations. The central government will no longer interfere in the local administration. The law that introduced Perda itself was part of the reform agenda put forward in 1998 following the fall of the Suharto regime. Some Perda are purely secular as they deal with administrative matters such as the formation of the parliamentary system, the rules of elections, and the constitution of local government. Others deal with economic matters such as tax and fiscal regulations. There are,

Luthfi Assyaukaunie, Lecturer at the Paramadina University and Research Associate at the Freedom Institute in Jakarta. He was a PostDoctoral Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 165

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however, some Perda that distinctly bear an ideological agenda to Islamise the local governments. They are referred to as “religious bylaws” or in Indonesian “Perda bernuansa syari’ah” (Perda with shari’ah nuances).

The Failure of Political Islam Apart from the regional autonomy law, the emergence of religious bylaws in the last five years has been triggered by the current political situation. Since 2002, the trend in Islamization at the central level has suffered a setback. The 2002 annual meeting of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), the highest policymaking body in Indonesia, annulled a proposal to insert the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution. The Jakarta Charter is a constitutional amendment dating back to the 1940s. Had it been adopted, the Jakarta Charter would have obliged Muslims to implement the shari’ah in the country. Throughout the history of the Indonesian nation-state, many Muslims have been struggling for this charter. Islamists consider the 2002 MPR meeting as a disastrous event. The proposal to implement shari’ah was only supported by two small political parties; major Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) were ironically against the proposal. This setback was worsened by the failure of the Islamic political parties to win the majority of the votes in the 2004 general election, even collectively. The limited support for the Islamization agenda at the central level forced the Islamists to turn their attention to the level of the local government. An impetus for this reorientation is Aceh, which has been given the status of a special region (daerah istimewa) to implement its own local government and laws. For many regions, Aceh has become the role model for the implementation of shari’ah in the country. There are other factors why such religious bylaws are now in high demand. The secular government has been considered to have failed in managing the country. Corruption is still rampant, crime and social malaise have shown no signs of abating, poverty is everywhere while disasters seem to have become frequent. All these factors are influencing Muslims to seek solace in the shari’ah.

Freedom Issue The application of shari’ah through Perda has been carried out by several regions at the district level. It should be noted that apart from Aceh, the autonomy system in Indonesia is not at the provincial level, but at the lower level of the district. Currently, about 35 districts have implemented or are in the process of implementing the religious bylaws. 166

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Each district implementing the The limited support for the religious bylaws have different con- Islamization agenda at the central cerns, but generally they address level forced the Islamists to turn seven issues; (i) the obligation to im- their attention to the level of the local plement the shari’ah; (ii) decency in government. dressing and moral conduct; (iii) the obligation to read the Quran; (iv) male and female interaction; (v) gambling; (vi) the drinking of liquor; and (vii) alms giving. Some of these issues are embedded in a general bylaw, such as the issue of gambling—a social habit which has been opposed by the Indonesian government at the central level. Others, however, are distinctly religious. Some critics say that there are aspects of the religious bylaws that have created problems not only with regard to Indonesian culture and tradition but also to the Constitution. A bylaw in Tangerang (Perda No. 8/2005), for instance, prohibits women to go out at night. This Perda has stirred controversy amongst many Indonesian women who have to work till late night. Some Muslim scholars openly state that certain religious bylaws discriminate against women. Musdah Mulia, a Muslim intellectual and activist, criticizes such a Perda as achieving nothing but encroaching women’s rights. In Padang, West Sumatra, a Perda on Islamic dress (busana muslimah) is said to impinge on people’s freedom as the Perda is not only applied to Muslims but also to nonMuslims. The Bishops Conference of Indonesia reported that several Christian students in Pasaman Barat, West Sumatra, complained that they had to wear Islamic dress to school even though theirs is a public school which is supposed to be faith-neutral.

Bylaws and Politics The trend towards shari’ah implementation in some regions is not always driven by pure ideological impetus. Some politicians see shari’ah as beneficial for their own political standing. Thus, support for the shari’ah bylaw comes not only from the Islamic political parties but also from secular ones such as the Democrat Party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the Golkar Party of Vice-President Jusuf Kalla. These trends are the background for the repeated warnings by Muslim leaders from the liberal camp, such as former president Abdurrahman Wahid and former chairman of Muhammadiyah, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, to Indonesia’s politicians that they risk turning their country into another Afghanistan. SC 167

KARIM Douglas CROW

Turkey and the Türban

The Dilemmas of Laicist Ideology

The head-cover or türban has emerged as an icon for the mainstream Turkish Muslim agenda and a target for laicist, or secular, protests. The head-cover issue is now crystallized into a non-negotiable boundary between laicism and Islamic identity. For the European Union and the United States, the revival of Muslim identity in their NATO ally Turkey tests their commitment to the democratic process and their capacity to shed their phobia of “Islamists”.

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he successful bid by the ruling Justice & Development Party (AKP) to elect Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as Turkey’s new president has been preceded by controversy, plunging the country into its most serious political and social crisis in decades. The armed forces, guardian of Kemalist secularism, warned of a possible military coup and huge street demonstrations were held in major cities by opponents of AKP. But the Islamic revivalist tide proved to be too strong. All in all, the national laicist identity—defined as identity based on the secular control of political and social institutions in society—is being contested in the face of resurgent Islamic identity. Interestingly, the current tension between a resurgent Islamic identity in Turkey and the national laicist identity may be better understood through a deeper appreciation of the divisions within the country over the wearing of the female turban. Nothing is more symbolic of this than the unprecedented emergence of a president with a headscarf-wearing wife.

Karim Douglas Crow, Principal Research Fellow at the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies, Kuala Lumpur. He was Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he taught in the Contemporary Islam Programme. 168

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The Head-Cover

… the current tension between a resurgent Islamic identity in Turkey and the national laicist identity may be better understood through a deeper appreciation of the divisions within the country over the wearing of the female turban.

In today’s Republic of Turkey, Islamic veiling refers to wearing a head-cover together with long loose-fitting gowns. In the mass media and general public this new use of head-cover is termed türban (originally Ottoman Turkish tülbend—via Persian dülband). The current style contrasts with the traditional head-cover which enclosed a woman’s hair yet left her neck uncovered. Islamic veiling is an instrument of morality that seeks to conceal a woman’s hair and body from male view, requiring modesty of behaviour to limit her appeal in public. In many Muslim societies the sexuality and even the beauty of women have been and are still frequently perceived as threats to community order as Islam exhibits an emphatically communal social ethos. Such attitudes may also spring from deeply embedded patriarchal privileging that prove resistant to change. Among Turkish elites the position of women in society became the touchstone either of cultural “integrity” or of “backwardness”, and, since the early 1980s, a fierce controversy over banning the türban has animated public debate. The reality underlying the ongoing socio-political crisis is the acute tension between the Republic’s official laicist ideology and the resurgence of public religion in Turkey. This tension reflects major social and ideational changes ushered in by rural to urban migration accompanied by the rise of Muslim networks gaining political empowerment through access to state resources. In 1982 the Council of Higher Education issued a directive prohibiting students from attending academic classes if they wore the türban. This provoked grassroots dissatisfaction, and over the following decade a convoluted process of making and reversing decisions ensued. From 1984 to 1987 the ban was lifted only to be re-imposed in 1987; from 1990 to 1997 came a de facto lifting of the ban, only to be revived in 1997 in the all-encompassing form still in force today. These reversals provoked waves of protest actions making the türban the frontline issue of contestation and mobilization for both its supporters and opponents. Evidenced by the unprecedented level of sensitivity on the part of political elites and the massive street protests, the symbolic gravity of this matter in Turkey’s current crisis is difficult to exaggerate from the perspectives of the guardians of the official nation-state ideology as well as their Islamic opponents. Historical perspective helps one to apprehend the seriousness of the present impasse. 169

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State Domination of Religion As a predominantly Muslim society Turkey is a unique example of state-religion. The model it aspires to is a constitutional, democratic secularist polity. In practice, this model is expressed in a political regime that excludes interpenetration of the religious sphere with public order. Kemalist reformism defined a political system free of religious and dynastic legitimacy, placing the Republic upon a laicist-nationalist basis. Pursuit of secularization was promoted by laicist policies: in 1928 Islam was dis-established as the state religion; in 1937 the principle of laicism was made an integral part of the Constitution; and, in 1982, laicism was reiterated in the Constitution. Religion was something to be “modernized”, reformed and relegated to the private sphere by restricting it to a question of individual conscience. The military coup of 1980–1983 led by the former Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren was a turning point in official policies towards religion. Amidst heightened political polarization and prevailing radical left-wing discourse, the high command of the armed forces passed laws promoting a “religious culture”. Their intention was to elicit the support of Islamic loyalties of the populace behind an authoritarian institutionalization. The ensuing politicization of state institutions and their penetration by communally-organized political networks has led to the unforeseen consequence of Islamic networks gaining access to state resources. The Republican civilian and military elite failed to anticipate the secular side of religious interests: the organizational efficacy and political momentum that Islamic circles achieved by offering systematic community benefits to its members. In the decade following the 1980 coup, the head-cover issue emerged in this politicized atmosphere of increased political significance and public visibility of Islam—particularly at the local municipal level. By the late 1980s the political atmosphere in Turkey was roiled by paradoxical and unintended consequences of this official attitude.

Consequences of the Ban The state-imposed head-cover ban has far-reaching consequences for those women who view veiling in public life to be a religious obligation. These women are excluded from the entire public sector in Turkey. By being deprived of the opportunity of a university education, their access to employment in public offices and other forms of engagement in public life become blocked. Their only alternative is to work in the private sector, be self-employed, or remain at home. 170

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Sociological research shows that contemporary Muslim women in Turkey consider learning and acquiring an education to be a religious duty advocated by Islam. The ban engenders a conflict by forcing them to choose performance of one religious duty over the other, creating avoidable incompatibility between covered women’s religious convictions and their wish to be productive members of society through education and employment. This is especially relevant for children of migrants from villages to cities seeking increased opportunities yet maintaining intact their preference for Islam’s communal social ethos. They form the chief constituency voting into office successive political parties with opaque Islamic inclinations, most recently the AKP. The mothers may be maids or grow and sell vegetables, but their daughters seek university education and professional employment. The Republican civilian and military elite have ideologized wearing the türban to the point of completely disregarding its significance as a tenet of individual religiosity. Banning of the head-cover has transformed a religious manifestation into a symbol of systematic ideological opposition. In justifying this ban, legislators and judges portray wearing the türban as a politicized act of infidelity to Kemalist nationalism. Women with higher education who wear the türban are seen as consciously adopting a habit symbolizing their rejection of women’s rights in a laicist state. Alarmist rhetoric that Turkey risks regression into a Taliban or Iranian-like repressive society only magnifies such polarization. Advocates of the türban portray Islamic faith as a conscious commitment to the totality of Islamic values and obligations rather than mere habitual unreflective participation. The status of women as the core symbol of the socio-communal dimension of Islam is being forcefully asserted as an alternative to the Kemalist cultural project, shaking its very legitimacy. This effectively puts the Turkish experience of modernization/ westernization back onto the public agenda. The türban now serves as the primary icon for the mainstream Turkish Muslim agenda, just as it offers a target for the most ardent laicist protests. The 2007 elections promised to be a decisive if not divisive showdown for Janus-headed Turkey. The head-cover issue is now crystallized into a non-negotiable boundary between laicism and Islamic identity, with looming risks of yet another internal military coup or an imminent cross-border military adventure into Iraq. For the European Union and the United States, the inevitable impetus of their NATO ally Turkey towards recovering its overtly Muslim identity poses a real test of commitment to the democratic process and to the capacity to shed their phobia of “Islamists”. SC 171

YANG RAZALI KASSIM

New PAS, Young Ulama

Re-Defining the Future of Islamist Politics AS PAS continues its political adaptation, a new breed of young ulama leaders is emerging to bridge the professionals and the senior ulama class. The reformist drive in PAS is a barometer of sorts for the mainstreaming of Islamist politics in the region as it seeks a role in the national democratic space. The ability or otherwise of PAS to come out of this intact will also influence the course of Islamist politics in other parts of the Muslim world.

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f the trend from the 2007 party elections of Malaysia’s PAS holds, the reform drive currently under way in the Islamist party could significantly impact not just its leadership but also the future of political Islam, or Islamist politics, in the country. Through secret ballot, the party rank-and-file voted in favour of the current shift away from orthodoxy, yet carefully preserving the collective charisma of the ulama class of senior religious scholars. If the last party elections two years ago started this reformist trend with the rise to prominence of the technocrats and professionals, the 53rd muktamar or general assembly in Kota Baru, Kelantan, saw the emergence of a new breed of clerics with a reformist image—the “young ulama”. The rise of the young ulama in 2007 is reminiscent of the ascendancy of the young ulama of the early 1980s, which paved the way for the current ulama leadership in PAS. But contrary to some expectations, the emergence of the new generation of young ulama actually reaffirmed the role of the technocratic class as agents of change in the party. This is because the young ulama sit well with Yang Razali Kassim, Senior Fellow and Editor, Strategic Currents and Editor, RSIS Commentaries at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 172

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both the senior ulama class as well as Like the professionals who are the technocrats and professionals. In either Western-trained in secular this respect, the young ulama, who knowledge or in the Islamic now dominate the youth wing, act as sciences, or both, the new breed of a bridge between the senior ulama young ulama straddles the ulama class and the technocrats/profes- class and the technocrats, sharing much in common with both groups. sionals. Their emergence therefore prevents any divisive dualism in the party, which some party leaders were beginning to worry about. Indeed, as PAS’s spiritual adviser “Tok Guru” Nik Aziz Nik Mat told the media, the long-term goal of the party is to mould an integrated personality such that in future, an ulama is as much a professional, and a professional an ulama.

Impact of the Young Ulama Contrary to popular belief, PAS leaders told RSIS, the young ulama are welcome by the professionals in the party. Like the professionals who are either Westerntrained in secular knowledge or in the Islamic sciences, or both, the new breed of young ulama straddles the ulama class and the technocrats, sharing much in common with both groups. What this means is that the leadership of PAS in the coming years will be a unique blend between the professionals and the young ulama, with the latter group providing the fulcrum of leadership—just as the elder ulama are currently providing that locus. This symbiotic relationship between the young ulama and the professionals will ensure the continuity of the ulama-professionals partnership when the elder ulama, now in the 60s and 70s, completely leave the scene. An example of the young ulama is Mujahid Yusof Rawa, son of former PAS president Yusof Rawa. Together with his successor Ustaz Fadhil Noor, the late Yusof Rawa ushered in the era of ulama leadership in the early 1980s. Although trained as an ustaz, Yusof Rawa was at home with using the English language. There are signs that this ease with the ways of the world is being continued by his son Mujahid, who has coupled his Ph.D. in Islam with organizational management courses. More significantly, Mujahid is heading the PAS’s bureau for national unity, a new unit formed to spearhead the party’s outreach to the nonMuslim communities. Indeed, a key feature of the young ulama is their exposure to the plural nature of Malaysian society, given their tendency to mix with people outside the Muslim community. It is a quality that some of them developed when, 173

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as student activists, they plugged themselves into student politics and interacted with non-Malay and non-Muslim student leaders in pursuit of common agendas such as democracy, human rights and justice. The icon of the young ulama group is of course Ustaz Nasharuddin Mat Isa, the re-elected deputy president who wears the suit as easily as he does the kopiah or traditional skull cap. His success in defending his position from the challenge by a stalwart from the senior ulama class, Ustaz Harun Taib, confirmed the leadership transformation in PAS that is designed to make it more appealing to a broader constituency while maintaining the party’s core identity. A significant but little known fact is that this remoulding of the PAS leadership actually enjoys the full support of the two top ulama leaders—Nik Aziz, who is also chief minister of the PAS-controlled Kelantan state, and party president Abdul Hadi Awang. Why has PAS—one of Asia’s longest-surviving Islamist parties—gone to this extent of remaking itself?

Global Trends and the New PAS In terms of electoral politics, the immediate goal is political survival. The emergence of this “new PAS” is more than just a re-branding exercise that accompanied the rise of the professional class in the party elections of 2005. This remoulding of the party leadership is partly a response to the aftermath of September 11, which forced PAS into a major rethink of its basic approach to politics in a multi-religious society. Another factor was the sharp electoral reverses it suffered at the hands of UMNO under Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s leadership in 2004. If the 1980s and 1990s were a period of confrontation with UMNO under then premier Mahathir Mohamad, the dawn of the new century demanded a softer image of the global Islamist movement, or more specifically, of political Islam, of which PAS is clearly a part. Indeed, the mainstreaming of PAS is consistent with the global trend affecting Islamist parties elsewhere. In many parts of the Muslim world, old-style Islamist politics that are exclusivist and focused solely on the Islamic State agenda have given way to new-style inclusionary politics to break the barrier between Islam and the non-Muslim world. The successes of Indonesia’s Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), for instance, have convinced PAS, especially the professionals and the young ulama, that this is also the way to go for the party. Both the PKS and the AKP emphasize the substance rather than the form of political Islam, leading to a de-emphasis in the Islamic State agenda in favour of universally 174

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shared values such as democracy, hu- Clearly, the ability or otherwise of PAS man rights and justice. The PKS has to come out of this intact will also even fielded non-Muslim candidates influence the course of Islamist politics in national elections, specifically in in other parts of the Muslim world. areas with significant non-Muslim populations. We now see the new PAS emulating the model by similarly toning down the Islamic State agenda and even fielding a non-Muslim candidate in the 2008 general election. It was not a flash in the pan that Hadi Awang’s presidential address at the 53rd muktamar ditched any mention of the Islamic state in favour of the theme “Save Democracy and Uphold Justice”. The party has also introduced a PAS Supporters Club comprising ethnic Chinese and Indians. Indeed, new ground was broken when for the first time, the leader of the club, an ethnic Chinese Christian, Hu Pang Chaw, addressed the assembly. The new PAS is slowly but gradually narrowing the ideological gulf with the other opposition parties which proved lethal in the March 2008 general election. The unified opposition went on to score an unprecedented victory, denying the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition its two-thirds majority and capturing five states, including the PAS-controlled Kelantan. This narrowing gulf has led to a pact with Anwar Ibrahim’s Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) but more indirectly with the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP) which rejects any pact with PAS for as long as it stresses an Islamic state agenda, giving rise to the opposition Pakatan Rakyat alliance.

Mainstreaming of Islamist Politics PAS is clearly positioning to expand from its home base in Kelantan. The future of PAS as the flag-bearer of Islamist politics in the country has brightened since the March 2008 general elections. Had Kelantan fallen into the hands of UMNO, it could have forced PAS back into the fringe, and into orthodoxy. The reformist drive in PAS is a barometer of sorts for the mainstreaming of Islamist politics in the region. Whether PAS can survive its latest challenge will determine not just the future of the new PAS but also the future of political parties that are driven by Islam as an ideology but are seeking a role in the national democratic space. Clearly, the ability or otherwise of PAS to come out of this intact will also influence the course of Islamist politics in other parts of the Muslim world. SC 175

MUHAMMAD HANIFF HASSAN

Responding to the Idea of Hijrah (Migration) The Idea of hijrah or migration has a special place in the history of Muslims. It denotes the flight of Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslims to Medina to take refuge from persecution in the then pagan Mecca. Today, the idea of hijrah has however been given its own interpretation by Muslim extremist groups. They use it to argue in favour of the isolation of minority Muslims from the larger non-Muslim community. It is also used to encourage Muslims living in a non-Islamic environment to migrate and live with the “jihadists” who claim to live the life of the pious pioneers of Islam so as to establish a better Muslim ummah or community.

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glimpse of the jihadist idea of hijrah or migration was provided in the 2003 White Paper report on the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members in Singapore. It was reported that one of the JI leaders had sent a letter to Mullah Omar, the former head of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, asking whether Muslims (members of JI) should migrate to Afghanistan. Some Muslim extremist groups criticize Muslims who settle down in non-Muslim countries and call them to migrate instead to a Muslim country. There are also extremists who label these Muslims as disbelievers just because they live in a non-Muslim country.

Living Under Unislamic Conditions They argue that living in a non-Muslim country is wrong because Muslims will have to live under unislamic conditions. They also

Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Associate Research Fellow and Ph.D. candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 176

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claim that Muslims who willingly ac- It also means that Muslims are allowed cept the rule of non-Muslims, and live to live in a non-Muslim country or under any rule other than the shari’ah under a non-Muslim government, (Islamic law), in all circumstances, as long as they have the freedom are committing acts that will nullify to worship their religion and can their faith. For the extremists loyalty experience basic human rights. and sovereignty can only be given to and by God and Islam is the only way of life for Muslims. They base their argument, among others, on the following verses: When angels take the souls of those who die in sin against their souls, they say: “In what (plight) were ye?” They reply: “Weak and oppressed were we in the earth.” They say: “Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?” Such men will find their abode in Hell, What an evil refuge! Except those who are (really) weak and oppressed—men, women and children—who have no means in their power, nor (a guidepost) to their way. – The Quran, 4:97–8 The consequence of this thinking is the idea that one cannot be a proper Muslim unless one lives among Muslims only. Such thinking encourages ghettoism and an exclusivist attitude in social life.

Theological Response It is argued that the verses (4, 97-9) cannot be used as absolute proof that Muslims cannot live in a non-Muslim country. On the contrary, it could also be interpreted otherwise, that is to allow a Muslim to do so. The verse, “Except the weak ones among men, women and children who can not devise (a) plan, nor are they able to direct their way” (4:98), has been interpreted by Muslim scholars to mean a Muslim is only required to migrate from a non-Muslim country if he is unable to practise his religion freely and is being oppressed. Consequently, it also means that Muslims are allowed to live in a non-Muslim country or under a non-Muslim government, as long as they have the freedom to worship their religion and can experience basic human rights. There is no reason or compulsion for Muslims who live in such situation to migrate. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the Prophet himself permitted his uncle, Abbas to remain in Mecca, which at that time was not under 177

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Muslim rule. That proved that the injunction to migrate was not binding over everybody. Secondly, the migration of the Prophet’s companions to Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and their return six years after the Prophet’s migration to Medina, also suggests that migration is only necessary for those who are weak and fear religious persecution. Therefore, living in a non-Muslim country is allowed if a Muslim’s right of worship is protected. Thirdly, not all Muslims during the time of the Prophet migrated to Medina. One such case was Abu Nu’aim. He became a Muslim and wanted to migrate to Medina. As he was the financial provider for a group of orphans and widows for his tribe, his people asked him to stay with the promise to protect him from any abuse. He postponed his migration plan and when he eventually migrated to Medina, the Prophet said to him: “My people have ousted me and wanted to kill me. Whilst your people protected you.” Fourthly, the Prophet said (in one narration by Imam Muslim), that those living in a non-Muslim country who later became Muslims could still remain living there and did not need to migrate. From the evidences, it can be concluded that there cannot be a general ruling for or against Muslims living in a non-Muslim countries. The ruling depends on the status of the individual and the context. Clearly then, any position prohibiting Muslims from living and settling in non-Muslim countries is not the consensus of Muslim scholars. The scholars are of the opinion that a ruling on migration depends on the situation and can be summarized as such: (i) it is obligatory for a Muslim to migrate if he or she cannot practise his religion and fears that he cannot maintain his faith (4:97–9); (ii) Muslims who can practise Islam and can afford to migrate are only encouraged to do so. This is based on the actions of the Prophet’s uncle, Abbas, and his companion, Abu Nu’aim; (iii) Muslims who cannot afford to or face difficulty in migrating are not required to do so and can remain living in that country (4:97); and (iv) it is obligatory for a Muslim to remain in a non-Muslim country if his presence and expertise is required by the Muslims there.

Rational Response In today’s context, migration to a Muslim country is no longer relevant or practical as no particular country today can be truly classified as Dar Al-Islam (land of Islam) in the classical sense. 178

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Furthermore, the world has been globalized. Any attempt to isolate Muslims from other communities to preserve their faith and commitment to the religion is a futile effort. Also, there is no one country, be it a non-Muslim or Muslim country, that is perfectly suitable to meet the original objective of migration, which is to allow a Muslim to practise Islam as a religion comprehensively. Practically anywhere a Muslim chooses to live, he still has to make the appropriate adjustments and accommodations to his society. The early Muslims travelled and settled widely, from their origins in Instead of isolating themselves, the Arab world to continents such as Muslims must strive to actively engage China and the Malay Archipelago. In with their host society by being a each case they settled and lived with constructive member of the country. the non-Muslims, which eventually caused the spread of Islam. Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim democratic countries must realize that whatever the imperfections, remaining in these countries is critical. By doing so, they provide abundant opportunities to share their Muslim way of life and dispelling any misconceptions about Islam. Instead of isolating themselves, Muslims must strive to actively engage with their host society by being a constructive member of the country. Active participation in the nation’s progress and development is the strongest argument against the negative image of Islam. This can be achieved in part by living in accordance with the principles of democracy and the laws of the state. This will assist Muslims in building a foundation for peaceful coexistence with others. SC

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CONTRIBUTORS Profiles of contributors, correct at the time of writing

Anwar Ibrahim, former deputy prime minister and finance minister of Malaysia. He has held teaching positions at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford as a Visiting Fellow; Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, as a Distinguished Senior Visiting Fellow; and Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service where he was a Visiting Professor. Barry Desker, Dean of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and concurrently Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was formerly CEO of the Trade Development Board and Singapore’s Ambassador to Jakarta. He also holds a number of other appointments, including the chairmanships of Jurong Port Pte Ltd and Singapore Technologies Marine.

About the Editor Yang Razali Kassim, Senior Fellow and Editor, Strategic Currents and Editor, RSIS Commentaries at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was also a Wolfson Press Fellow at Wolfson College, Cambridge University. An award-winning journalist, he was previously Regional Editor of the Business Times and Principal Assistant to Editor and Senior Correspondent at The Straits Times.

Bahtiar Effendy, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He is also Professor of political science at the State Islamic University (Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN), Jakarta and deputy director of the Institute for the Study and Advancement of Business Ethics, Jakarta. C. Raja Mohan, Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was Professor of South Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. He also writes a column on India’s foreign and security policies for The Indian Express, New Delhi.

Contributors

Alvin Chew, Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was formerly with the Defence Science and Technology Agency. He has been working on defence-related issues and energy security in the Asia Pacific region. Christopher B. Roberts, Lecturer at the University of Canberra, Australia. He was an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was also a Post-Doctoral Fellow at RSIS and has held a visiting appointment at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). Chen Gang, Research Fellow and Seminar Coordinator at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He has a Ph.D. from the China Foreign Affairs University. Before joining EAI, he was a journalist with Xinhua new agency, covering Chinese political and business news. Evan A. Laksmana, Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He is also an affiliate of the Californiabased Overseas Think-Tank for Indonesia. He was a paper presenter at the 2008 Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations (HPAIR) at Harvard University. Go Ito, Professor of International Relations at Meiji University in Tokyo, Japan and one of Japan’s leading experts on national and international security studies. He has received several domestic and international honours for his work, including the Eisenhower fellowships in 2005 and the Yasuhiro Nakasone award in 2006. Hiro Katsumata, Research Associate at the Centre for Governance and International Affairs, University of Bristol, United Kingdom. He was Research Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was awarded the Prime Minister Abe first prize in the Liberal Democratic Party foreign policy essay competition in 2006/2007. Hoo Tiang Boon, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations, Oxford University. He was previously Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he was attached to the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) . Prior to RSIS, he was a civil servant. Jane Chan, Associate Research Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. She is with the school’s Maritime Security Programme. 181

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Joshua Ho, Senior Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he is also Coordinator of the Maritime Security Programme. He is a Singapore Armed Forces (Overseas) scholar and is currently a serving Naval Officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel with 22 years of service. Karim Douglas Crow, Principal Research Fellow at the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies, Kuala Lumpur. He was Associate Professor at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he taught in the Contemporary Islam Programme. A professor of Islamic Thought, he has taught Islamic and Arabic studies in the United States at Columbia, Fordham and Virginia Universities. Kumar Ramakrishna, Associate Professor at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he is also Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS). He was a US Asia Foundatiom Freeman Fellow and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC. Li Mingjiang, Assistant Professor at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he serves on the China Programme. He received his Ph.D in political science from Boston University. He has also studied at the Foreign Affairs University (Beijing) and the John Hopkins-Nanjing Centre. He was a diplomatic correspondent for Xinhua News Agency from 1999 to 2001. Loro Horta, Associate Research Fellow and a Ph.D. candidate at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was an adviser to the Defence Department of Timor-Leste. He is also an international consultant for the Portuguese Institute of International Relations. Luthfi Assyaukaunie, Lecturer at the Paramadina University and Research Associate at the Freedom Institute in Jakarta. He was a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Melbourne and is a co-founder of the Liberal Islam Network. Mely Cabellaro-Anthony, Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. She is also Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies and Secretary-General of the Consortium of NonTraditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia). 182

Contributors

Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Associate Research Fellow and Ph.D. candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He graduated from the Faculty of Islamic Studies, National University of Malaysia (UKM). He sits on the Council of the Association of Islamic Religious Teachers and Scholars of Singapore (Pergas) and the resource panel for the Government Parliamentary Committee (Defence and Foreign Affairs). Ng Sue-Chia, Associate Research Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where she is attached to the Homeland Defence Programme of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS). She was an (IDSS) MSc Research Assistant Study Award recipient. Norman Vasu, Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He is Coordinator of the Social Resilience Programme at the school’s Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS). He was a Post-Doctoral Fellow with the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at RSIS. Nyi Nyi Kyaw, a M.Sc candidate (International Political Economy) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He is a Muslim native of Myanmar, where he has lived all his life before coming to Singapore to study. Prashanth Parameswaran, a Harrison undergraduate research scholar at the University of Virginia. He conducted field research on the Southern Thailand insurgency and was a research assistant at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is Head of Graduate Studies. He has two single-authored books on Asia Pacific security and is the co-editor of three books on security and non-traditional security. Robert Beckman, Visiting Senior Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University and Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law at the National University of Singapore. He has served as General Rapporteur for the Singapore Conferences on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

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Sam Bateman, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he is with the Maritime Security Programme. A former Commodore (one-star) in the Royal Australian Navy, he was the inaugural Director of the Centre for Maritime Policy (now the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security) at the University of Wollongong in Australia. Shiping Tang, Senior Fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where is with the China Programme. He was formerly an associate research fellow at the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in Beijing, China. Sofiah Jamil, Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. She is with the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia), where she produces the Consortium’s bimonthly newsletter as well as its fortnightly news bulletin (NTS Alert). Taharudin Piang Ampatuan, senior Philippine army officer. He was Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was formerly with the Anti-terrorism Taskforce of Philippine National Security Council and former Chief of the Philippine Army’s Doctrine Centre. Tan See Seng, Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He directs the School’s executive education unit as well as coordinates its research programme on multilateralism and regionalism. He is also Convenor of the Sentosa Roundtable on Asian Security, an annual forum for security dialogue. Terence Lee, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. He was previously Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University of Singapore. He was a Postdoctoral Fellow in National Security Studies at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University. Yolanda Chin, Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. A former secondary school teacher of History and Social Studies, she was also a tutor at the National Institute of Education on Singapore history and social studies and conducts research on social cohesion issues in national security. 184