Strategic Communication In EU-Russia Relations: Tensions, Challenges And Opportunities 3030272524, 9783030272524, 9783030272531

Table of contents :
Foreword......Page 6
Contents......Page 9
Notes on Contributors......Page 11
Chapter 1: Introduction: EU-Russia Relations – Per Aspera ad Astra......Page 16
References......Page 29
Part I: EU-Russia Strategic Communication: Tendencies and Controversies......Page 30
Introduction......Page 31
The Synchronization of Deeds, Words and Images......Page 35
Which Part of the State Carries Out Strategic Communication?......Page 37
One Ministry of Strategic Communication and/or Coordination of Strategic Communication Through Different State Institutions......Page 39
Official and Non-official Strategic Communication......Page 41
Communication Management as One of the Core Issues of Strategic Communication......Page 43
The Challenges for Strategic Communication of the EU and the Relations with Russia......Page 45
Strategic Psychological Warfare and the Relations Between the EU and Russia......Page 54
Conclusion......Page 63
References......Page 65
Introduction......Page 75
The Diagnosis: Absence of Geopolitical Thinking at the EU Level......Page 78
The EU and Russia: Two Parallel Visions......Page 80
The Principles of the EU Toward Russia: Isolate Russia......Page 81
The EU’s Response to the Information War......Page 82
East StratCom Methodology......Page 83
Think Tanks in Brussels and the Narrative of the New Cold War: A Negative Climate for Debates on the Issue of EU-Russia Relations......Page 88
The Negative Consequences of the Geopolitical Unthought for European Security in the US-EU-Russia Triangle......Page 90
The Focus of EU Strategic Communication on Multilateralism......Page 92
The Excessive Militarization of Strategic Communication......Page 93
Focusing on Civilizational Features......Page 95
Learn from Past Mistakes and Abandon Divisive Strategies......Page 96
Articulation in Time......Page 98
At Global Level......Page 99
The A-Territorial Approach of the EU......Page 100
The Missing Link of Global Security: A New Eurasian Geopolitical Architecture......Page 102
The New Eurasian Security Architecture......Page 106
Geostrategic Issues......Page 108
Geoeconomic Issues......Page 110
Europe’s Variable Geopolitical Constellations: The Franco-German Axis and Russia......Page 111
Conclusion......Page 112
Propositions......Page 116
References......Page 117
Introduction......Page 124
Mutual Influence......Page 126
The Economy Speaks in International Relations......Page 130
Cooperation Is Possible......Page 135
Conclusion......Page 138
References......Page 141
Part II: EU-Russia Strategic Communication: Political and Economic Aspects......Page 145
Introduction......Page 146
Character Assassination as Property of Political Conflict......Page 147
Character Assassination as Strategic Communication......Page 149
Mass Media as Distributors of Dominant Frames......Page 151
EU Strategic Communication Toward Russia: A Multiplicity of Frames......Page 153
Russia’s Strategic Communication Toward the EU: Diplomatic Voice Versus Television Voice......Page 157
Character Assassination of the EU in Russian Talk Shows......Page 160
EU Image of Russia: The “Enmification” Process......Page 161
Conclusion......Page 164
References......Page 165
Introduction......Page 172
Interests of Russian Business in the EU Member States (in the Context of Russia’s and the EU’s Interests in the International Arena)......Page 174
Gazprom......Page 185
Lukoil......Page 192
Sberbank......Page 196
The Perception of Russian Companies by Target Audiences in the EU......Page 200
Information and Cyber-Security......Page 201
CEO Image......Page 202
Attitudes to Sustainable Development and the Environment......Page 203
Economic and Political Stability of the Country of Origin......Page 204
Innovations......Page 205
Cultural Initiatives......Page 206
Conclusion......Page 207
References......Page 211
Introduction......Page 223
Alternative Approaches to Securing US Interests and Sanctions......Page 224
CAATSA: Psychological Impact on Human Consciousness......Page 228
The Expected Strategic Result......Page 230
Results of CAATSA and Its Psychological Effect on EU-Russia Relations......Page 236
CAATSA and Other Sanctions: A Strategic Synchronization of Deeds, Words, and Images in the Context of US Foreign Policy......Page 245
Conclusion......Page 255
References......Page 258
Part III: EU-Russia Strategic Communication in Security Dimension......Page 267
Introduction......Page 268
Depletion of the Global Capitalism Model: Implications for the EU and Russia......Page 270
Geopolitical Shifts and Political Dynamics: Confrontation Grows......Page 276
Robotization, Artificial Intelligence: New Opportunities and Risks for the EU and Russia......Page 281
Developing a Human Being: From Human Genetic Engineering to Cyborgization......Page 290
Artificial General Intelligence: A New Challenge?......Page 292
From the Stable Dynamic Social Equilibrium to the Unstable Dynamic Social Equilibrium: The Risks Becoming More Serious......Page 298
Alternatives of Social Development: “To Be, or Not to Be, That Is the Question”......Page 305
Conclusion......Page 309
References......Page 312
Introduction......Page 321
A Terrorist Act as an Act of Communication: Problems of Definitions of Terrorism......Page 324
Communication Provision of Antiterrorist Activities as Part of Strategic Communication: Theoretical Approaches......Page 329
Use of Strategic Communication by Terrorist Groups: New Security Challenges......Page 340
European Union: Positive and Negative Experiences of Counter-Terrorism in the Context of Strategic Communication......Page 346
Conclusion......Page 354
References......Page 356
Index......Page 366

Citation preview

Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations Tensions, Challenges and Opportunities

Edited by Evgeny Pashentsev

Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations “This book is a timely reminder of the ties that join Russia and the European Union and the opportunities that still exist to improve a troubled relationship. The book does not shy away from the difficulties that the relationship currently faces, but seeks to find opportunities in these obstacles that could lead to improvements. With the voice of Russian scholars fully audible in this excellent collection of essays, this book provides excellent opportunities for English-speaking audiences to learn more about this complex relationship.” —Professor Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Chatham House, Britain “The book is extremely relevant because of the increased attention to the issue of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) developments and its role in the future. The question now is not so much that AGI will be dangerous for Humanity in the Future, but that Humanity has a very poor image of the Future without the scientific study of AGI.” —Professor Alexander Raikov, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences, Winner of the Russian Government award in the field of Science and Technology “This edited volume on the current state of play in strategic communication between the European Union and Russia offers a number of clear insights and observations from authors from both sides. Offering readers a clearly argued, rational depiction and analysis of events and trends during the contemporary environment of very strained and difficult relations.” —Associate Professor Greg Simons, Uppsala University, Sweden and Turiba University, Latvia “This timely book edited by Pashentsev draws together the work Russian, EU and US academics concerned about escalating tensions between Russia and the EU. The book discusses the growing role played by planned strategic communication in international relations and how stratcom has become a feature of Russian-EU engagements. The book will appeal to those with an interest in Russian studies; EU-studies; international relations; political communication; and public diplomacy.” —Eric Louw, Associate Professor, School of Communication & Arts, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

“The thinking of Evgeny Pashentsev presents an enlightening analysis and synthesis of the integration of the political, social, cultural and technological advances around the globe with respect to their impact on EU-Russia relations. His chapters are a must read for both scholars and strategic consultants who seek to understand the future of the paradigm shift taking place in these countries.” —Bruce I. Newman, PhD, Professor of Marketing, DePaul University, Founding Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Political Marketing, USA “This volume highlights the strategic communication as a corner stone of the general principles governing international relations and ensuring the obligations assumed by Russia and EU in accordance with the charter of the United Nations. The authors offer us a pertinent study where the relations between Russia and EU are addressed in multiple ways. This variety of approaches forms the main charm and attraction of this book.” —Fatima Roumate, PhD, President, International Institute for Scientific Research, Marrakesh, Morocco “In a shocked world, the difficult and complex relationships between the European Union and Russia could, however, find a useful way of approach.” “Per aspera ad astra summons and challenges the Editor of this very interesting book, that pursues a dialogue that could be crucial.” —Dr Ernesto López, Director, Institute of National Problems at the National University of Lanús, Argentina “This book edited by Evgeny Pashentsev allows us to understand well how strategic communication is a constituent, essential factor to the success or failure of the policies aimed at promoting cooperation between different systems; in the same time to clarify the many rational or irrational elements that influence this type of communication. The contributions drive to research the ultimate principles, goals and visions that are behind the messages, the real arena to clarify the positive or negative attitude of the promoters in building bridges among the communities.” —Marco Ricceri, Secretary General, Eurispes Institute, Rome, Italy

Evgeny Pashentsev Editor

Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations Tensions, Challenges and Opportunities

Editor Evgeny Pashentsev Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Moscow, Russia

ISBN 978-3-030-27252-4    ISBN 978-3-030-27253-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

The system of Russian-European relations has always been and remains today one of the fundamental themes of international politics. Firstly, there are obvious historical reasons. After the Great Schism of 1056, which determined a political and theological division of the until then united medieval Christian world, the great Petrine reforms of the early eighteenth century led to a new approach between Western and Eastern Europe, overcoming the effects of the long Mongol domination, that had even more deepened the consequences of the schism. Since then Russia has represented a constant in the political and cultural events of the Old Continent. The Polish and Austrian wars of succession, the Napoleonic wars and then the new world order established by the Congress of Vienna saw a regular and decisive presence of St. Petersburg. It is not necessary to remember the Russian role in the First and, above all, in the Second World Wars. The Cold War then saw in the Soviet Union one of the two superpowers on which the destinies of humanity and, in particular, of the then-­ divided Europe depended. Everything seemed to have ended in 1991, with the disintegration of the USSR and the slipping of the “new Russia” to the level of medium power, in a unipolar US-led world. But this did not happen. So we come to the second aspect of the centrality of Moscow and its relations with Europe: the geopolitical aspect. The doctrine of an international multipolar system, theorized by Evgeny M. Primakov and then implemented by President Putin, has highlighted even more the importance of dialogue and cooperation in a great Europe that from the Atlantic Ocean goes not only up to the Urals, but beyond up to the Pacific. With the rising of Chinese power, Indian growth and the American tendency to v

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concentrate on internal issues, it is more than ever evident that only a close understanding between Russia and Europe can avoid the supremacy of the new poles. The reasons are varied. First of all, socio-economic: the European Union has advanced technologies, on average very effective welfare systems and represents a market of over 500 million consumers with high spending power. The Russian Federation has one of the best scientific potentials in the world, abundant natural resources and a territory of unique dimensions. The meeting of these realities would give life to a giant able to compete as much with the American partners as with the Asian tigers. We should not forget also the potential of a common effort on the environmental front: waste management, protection of ecosystems and animal species: common problems which need to find unitary solutions and to make use of the complementary experiences gained by the EU and the Russian Federation. The second reason concerns strategic and security choices. In the light of the threats facing European Union member countries today, from terrorism to the risks associated with massive immigration (including integration or assimilation processes and religious pluralism), the Russian experience, its Eurasian nature and extraordinary ethnographic and religious wealth, can be a valuable starting point and, mutatis mutandis, a possible source of solutions also for Central and Western Europe. In this regard, it is important not to underestimate and even deepen contacts at the level of police and judicial structures, as well as security services, with information exchanges, elaboration of common strategies and political cooperation. Trans-national threats can only have equally trans-national approaches. We ought also to recognize that Russia’s unique strategic and political capacities have already shown their effects. For several years, Moscow has been actively engaged in fighting Islamic extremism in the Middle East. The one against Daesh is in fact not only a military conflict, but also a real cultural war, culminating in the rescue of Palmyra and in a difficult but effective process of normalization in Syria. The archaeological site of Palmyra represents no less than the Colosseum or the temples of Paestum in Sicily, a symbol of civilization that unites not only Russia and the West, but a much larger part of the planet, daughter of classical literary, juridical and religious culture, which sinks its roots in Athens, Rome and Jerusalem. Preventing the destruction of this jewel of humanity has been a merit recognized to Russia by the vast majority of international scientific and academic circles. The fruits of a return to cooperation are

 FOREWORD 

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obvious. Moreover, this is not a dream or a mere hope, but a path already beaten in the recent past. I just would like to briefly remember that on 18 December 1989, the then Soviet Union and the European Communities signed the Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation. The first major step towards a closer cooperation was the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994. The PCA established a framework for the political dialogue between Russia and the EU in a number of key spheres, including economy, energy and internal and external security. As Italian Foreign Minister, I had the privilege of attending another fundamental passage with the agreement on four common spaces during the EU-Russia St. Petersburg Summit in 2003. The aforementioned initiatives are concrete examples of the results of mutual respect, willingness to cooperate and awareness of the necessity of being united against the several dangerous international threats we all have to deal with. All this is possible and necessary. It was done once, we need to do it again. Roma, Italy

Franco Frattini

Contents

1 Introduction: EU-Russia Relations – Per Aspera ad Astra  1 Evgeny Pashentsev

Part I EU-Russia Strategic Communication: Tendencies and Controversies  15 2 Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations 17 Evgeny Pashentsev 3 Focusing on Common Geopolitical Interests: Changing the Focus in EU-Russia Dialogue and Communication? 61 Pierre-Emmanuel Thomann 4 Cooperation and Trust: When Russia and the European Union Listen to Themselves111 Marius Vacarelu

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Part II EU-Russia Strategic Communication: Political and Economic Aspects 133 5 Character Assassination as Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations135 Sergei A. Samoilenko and Marlene Laruelle 6 Reputation Management of Russian Companies in the European Union in the Context of Russia and the EU’s Strategic Communication161 Darya Bazarkina and Kaleria Kramar 7 “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act”: The Psychological Aspect and Its Meaning for EU-Russia Relations213 Evgeny Pashentsev

Part III EU-Russia Strategic Communication in Security Dimension 257 8 Global Shifts and Their Impact on Russia-EU Strategic Communication259 Evgeny Pashentsev 9 Counter-Terrorism as Part of Strategic Communication: The EU’s Experience and Possibilities for Russia313 Darya Bazarkina Index359

Notes on Contributors

Darya  Bazarkina  is a professor at the Department for International Security and Foreign Affairs, Russian Presidential  Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA); research coordinator on Commu­ nication Management and Strategic Communi­ cation, International Center for Social and Political Studies and Consulting (ICSPSC); senior researcher at the School of International Relations at the Saint Petersburg State University; member of the research associations: National Law Enforcement Agencies’ History Studies’ Community, East European International Studies Association (CEEISA), European-Russian Communication Management  Network (EURUCM Network); and participant of more than 60 international academic conferences and seminars in Russia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and Turkey. Darya is an author of 3 books and more than 100 publications on communication aspects of the counter-terrorist activity published in Russian, English and Serbian languages.

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Franco  Frattini is an Italian Magistrate, appointed State Prosecutor in 1981. Today, he is the Justice and Chamber President to the Italian Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d’Etat). He served twice as former Italian foreign minister (2002–2004 and 2008–2011) and as vice-president of the European Commission and Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security (2004–2008). Previously, he served as secretary-general of the Prime Minister’s Office (1994), president of the Parliamentary Committee for Intelligence and Security Services and State Secrets (1996), minister for Civil Service and for the Coordination of Information and Security Services (2001–2002), and member of the Prime Minister Commission for Constitutional reforms (2013–2014). Today, he is the president of the Italian Society for International Organization (SIOI), a non-profit organization of internationalist character, working under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. He is a special advisor to the Serbian Government for the EU integration process and president of the High Court of Sport Justice (CONI). He is the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process. Kaleria  Kramar is a researcher at the International Center for Social and Political Studies and Consulting. She holds a master’s degree in Public Relations and Advertising (2019, Lomonosov Moscow State University, the Faculty of Philosophy). She is prize-winner of XVI Russian competition of student projects in the field of development of public relations, advertising and media technologies “Crystal Orange” for the team project in nomination under the auspices of Mayoralty of Moscow “Moscow – a city convenient for the life” within the development of the city policy of Moscow in 2016–2018. The area of current research is strategic communication and cultural aspects of psychological warfare. Kaleria is an author of several publications on different aspects of building communication strategies for product promotion in

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cultural sphere and brand developing, also of an article on analysis of psychological aspects of counteraction to ISIS in information space in comparison with European experience, in Russian and English languages. Marlene  Laruelle  is an associate director and research professor at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), Elliott School of International Affairs, the George Washington University. Dr Laruelle is also a co-­ director of Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia (PONARS) and director of GW’s Central Asia Program. She received her PhD in history from the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (INALCO) and her “Habilitation” at Sciences-Po in Paris. She recently authored Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields (2018) and edited Entangled Far Rights: A Russian-­European Intellectual Romance in the 20th Century (2018), as well as Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Russia-Europe Relationship (2015). Evgeny  Pashentsev is a Doctor in History (Latin American Studies), leading researcher at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, professor at the Department of Philosophy of Language and Communication at Lomonosov Moscow State University, director of the International Center for Social and Political Studies and Consulting, coordinator of the European-Russian Communication Management Network (EURUCM Network)  and the Russian-Latin American Strategic Studies Association, author and/or editor of 35 books and more than 160 academic articles, and Honorary Research Fellow at Birmingham University (October–November 2005). He has presented papers at more than 160 international conferences and seminars for the last ten years in 24 countries. His areas of research are strategic communication, military regimes, malicious use of artificial intelligence and international psychological security, perspective technologies and models of

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social development. He is member of the international Advisory Board of Comunicar (Spain) and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Political Marketing (USA). Sergei  A.  Samoilenko is Lecturer in Public Relations, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. Samoilenko is a founding member of the Research Lab for Character Assassination and Reputation Politics (CARP), based at George Mason University, Virginia. He is the past president of the Communication Association of Eurasian Researchers (former ECANA), established to facilitate former Soviet Union–related communication research, education and its practical social application in Russia and the United States. His research focuses on issues in crisis communication, reputation management and post-Soviet studies. He is a co-editor of The Routledge Handbook of Character Assassination and Reputation Management, and Deception, Fake News, and Misinformation Online. Pierre-Emmanuel  Thomann is French Researcher, Expert and Lecturer in Geopolitics (Doctor from the French Institute of Geopolitics, Paris 8 University). He is the president/founder of an international association (EUROCONTINENT) based in Brussels, Belgium, to promote geopolitical analysis and foster common interests identification between Nations and States at EU, pan-­ European (including Russia), Eurasian (Central Asia) and Euro-­Mediterranean scales. He participated in 2016 as an expert to the “EU-Russia Experts Network” organized by the EU delegation in Moscow. He was also  an adviser at the European Institute of International Relations (IERIBrussels) from 2007 to 2014, a think tank specialized in European strategic issues. Previously, he was the Director of a French region representation office towards the EU (1997–2006).

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Marius Vacarelu  holds a PhD and is a researcher in political sciences and a legal expert. He graduated from the Law Faculty in Bucharest. Marius Vacarelu teaches public law in the National School of Political Science and Public Administration since 2005, he  is  a member of the committee which edits the Romanian magazine GeoPolitica, and is a  head of “The Geopolitics of the East Association” which runs the website www.geopoliticaestului.ro. He is an author/co-author/coordinator of 20 books and more than 180 academic articles. Marius Vacarelu is a frequent speaker on Romanian television on geopolitics issues. He is a blogger to Romania’s most important journal Adevarul. Marius presented papers and published articles in Russia, Czech Republic, France, Poland and the UK.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: EU-Russia Relations – Per Aspera ad Astra Evgeny Pashentsev

Russia’s relations with European countries have a long history, marked by both bright times and bitter conflicts with millions of victims. For centuries, there was an enrichment of each other in scientific and cultural terms and economic ties developed. Geographically, Europe and Russia form a common space, having no significant barriers (whether oceans, seas, deserts or high mountain ranges) between them. The European Union (EU) was established when the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1993. At the beginning of 2019, 28 countries had membership in the organization. Relations between Russia and the EU are those of two major actors in the international arena, as the EU—according to many researchers—is a supranational union and acts as a single entity in the sphere of powers transferred by its member states. The development of relations with the EU has never replaced previous bilateral relations between Russia and the EU member states. At a time of considerable tension between Moscow and Brussels, unprecedented emphasis is today placed on the development of bilateral relations. The relations between the EU and Russia received an appropriate international legal framework on 24 June 1994 with the signing of the Partnership E. Pashentsev (*) Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pashentsev (ed.), Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1_1

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and Cooperation Agreement, which has been in force since December 1997. The Cooperation Council between the European Union and the Russian Federation held its first meeting on 27 January 1998 in London. On 10 May 2005, an EU-Russia summit was held in Moscow. Further to a decision at the EU-Russia Summit in St. Petersburg on 31 May 2003 to create in the long term a Common Economic Space, an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, a Space of Co-operation in the Field of External Security and a Space of Research and Education (including Cultural Aspects), the leaders of the two groups adopted a single package of road maps for the creation of these four Common Spaces. These set out shared objectives for EU-Russia relations as well as the actions necessary to make them a reality, while determining their agenda for cooperation for the medium term (Council of the European Union 2005). However, this package of road maps was a set of declarations of intentions that remain far from being fully realized. Primarily due to geographical proximity, economic cooperation between Russia and the EU is of considerable importance to both sides. The EU is the largest consumer of Russian gas, and the Russian Federation in turn buys European high-tech equipment for its oil and gas industries. The development of logistics infrastructure renders it possible to conveniently and economically link most of Asia with Europe; indeed, building ties that bypass or clash with Russia is strategically unprofitable. Positive expectations of the gradual development of mutually beneficial cooperation between the EU and Russia have over time given way to mutual disappointment and then confrontation, although from the very beginning it was possible to determine the causes of these crises, not only in connection with the military-political conflict in Ukraine. Considering climatic zones and temperature conditions, contemporary official relations between Russia and the EU are more suitable for the Arctic. Even in the short summer, the temperature in this region is near zero, which can be equated with periodic statements by the parties desiring improved relations. There is generally a polar winter with temperatures below −60 °C. Sometimes you may get the impression of the only things that hold them together are the defeats and the reproaches they address to one another. Meanwhile alarming predictions of some politicians and experts about the possibility of a World War III may come true. In the worst-case scenario Russia and the EU may prove to be epicenter of the global catastrophe. Therefore, it is clear that issues of international security, with all their serious contradictions, are equally concerned about the leadership of Russia, the EU and its member states. It is also worth remembering that

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the first two world wars began in Europe, and hence there is the potential for a World War III. The US politician Walter F. Mondale stated in the already distant 1984 that: “World War III will be nothing like World War II, there will be no winners; we will all lose. There will be no free world, only a poisoned, lifeless world. And to the veterans of World War II, Korea and Vietnam, I say this: There will be no veterans of World War III” (Weinraub 1984). In his annual news conference in Moscow on 20 December 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that “There is a trend of lowering the threshold” of using nuclear weapons. “Lowering the threshold could lead to a global nuclear catastrophe” (Microsoft News 2018). Putin also emphasized that the US is considering the use of ballistic missiles with conventional warheads, stating that the launch of such a missile could be mistaken for the launch of a nuclear-tipped version and trigger a global catastrophe. “If that happens, it could lead to the destruction of civilization as a whole and maybe even our planet,” he said (ABC News 2018). In May 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron claimed that if the US fully withdraws from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), “it could mean war.” He explained: “That would mean opening Pandora’s box, it could mean war” (News Update 2018). Donald Trump has duly done so, aggravating the situation in the Middle East because Iran does not want to bow to US pressure. “The issue of military intervention in the internal affairs of states is central in a post-Cold War international system characterised by many dangerous, troubled, failed and even murderous states” (Hoffmann 1995). Now it is the conflict in Venezuela that can blow up Latin America in case of military intervention in the internal affairs of this country, great uncertainty with the future denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, fraught with nuclear war, and, Ukraine, where for several years the sluggish military conflict has not stopped. This list of local conflicts with the obvious clash of interests of great powers is far from complete and may grow. Due to the turmoil of geopolitical contradictions, each local conflict is in one way or another experiencing a negative impact. Each of these may potentially become the pretext, if not the cause, of World War III. In addition to catastrophic scenarios involving terrorist activities and cyberattacks, a real threat of a clash between the leading nuclear powers is today on the global agenda. A growing number of specialists not only talk about the possibility of a world war, but consider it very likely. Indeed, the question is raised by representatives of different academic schools regarding the crisis of the

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global model of capitalism, its economic and political foundations, and the rising danger of various populist and especially extreme right-wing “national” forms of its defense. In one of his last publications, “From Integrated Capitalism to Disintegrating Capitalism. Scenarios of a Third World War,” Gerhard Hanappi (2019)1 has offered an analysis of the current global situation, and comes to rather alarming conclusions. Specifically, he claims that the new nationalist authoritarian form of capitalism, which he terms “disintegrating capitalism,” destroys global integration. An immediate consequence of the global contradiction between worldwide interwoven production processes and rivalries between nationalist regimes is the rapidly rising risk of a Third World War. “But will World War III happen at all?” asks Hanappi. Not necessarily, but with a frightening high probability … Fortunately, the explosive accumulation of human knowledge, of science, should be able to provide just that – if it were not handcuffed by the singular tasks tailored by Disintegrating Capitalism (ibidem).

The Global Risks Report 2019 has stated that “global risks are intensifying but the collective will to tackle them appears to be lacking. Instead, divisions are hardening” (World Economic Forum 2019, p.  6). “Geopolitical and geo-economic tensions are rising among the world’s major powers. These tensions represent the most urgent global risks at present” (ibidem). Acute dissatisfaction with slow economic growth, high levels of unemployment, the bureaucracy of the EU machinery, security threats posed by terrorists and a general mood hostile to migration have boosted support for nationalists in many EU member states. These countries face serious problems in various spheres of life. Nevertheless, many similar problems (including low growth rates, unemployment, b ­ ureaucracy and corruption, criminality, ecological problems, a growing gap between the poorest and richest strata, decline of the middle class, etc.) are affecting Russia and other countries. The spectrum of contradictions in 1   Gerhard Hanappi is the Jean Monnet Chair for Political Economy of European Integration  —a European Commission appointment  —  at the Institute for Mathematical Models in Economics at the Vienna University of Technology. He also sits on the management committee of the Systemic Risks expert group in the EU-funded European Cooperation in Science and Technology research network. See more about him at the Jean Monnet European Research Study Group (2019).

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different states is very wide, but the sharpness of problems of survival as opposed to even development has engendered a threat to international stability. The crisis touches not only the economic sphere, but politics, social relations, culture, research and education as well. The set of national problems of modern society has a general denominator: international instability. This has stimulated the threat of new local wars and even a world war that cannot be forever mitigated by the possibility of nuclear catastrophe. No country can feel secure in this unsafe world. It is a simple law that is true for even the most prosperous or militarily strong states. Unfortunately, new answers to these problems are lacking, from “mainstream” to right- and left-wing radical parties. Cosmetic tweaks by centrist parties can’t fix global capitalism. Consequently is the growth of the whole complex of the economic, social, political and military problems of our time. Right-wing populists look to conservative-national models of capitalism of the past, and right-wing radicals seek to revive a system very similar to Nazism. Despite the seriousness of the threats posed by the crisis of monopolistic capitalism, as well as the danger of imperialist wars across the world, it is unlikely that left-wing adherents of the modification of capitalism through its socially oriented correction (social democracy) or “revolutionary overthrow” (left-wing “Communist” organizations) will be successful, because both seek opportunities to correct the mistakes of the past looking back in the past. All political trends have not sufficiently developed strategic programs for the future, taking into account the unfolding of the most grandiose scientific, technical and industrial revolutions in human history. Political leaders are not the only guilty agents. The nature, volume and pace of change are far more complex today than in the past, and the consequences are immeasurably more serious. It is necessary to create new concepts of development “on the run” to conduct polemics with “traditionalists,” to make adjustments and to become convinced that the new concept will stand the test of time. Here it is simply not necessary to talk about its conscious assimilation by some “advanced part of society,” because this is itself hesitant and skeptical. This state of affairs is natural for undeveloped concepts, but problematic in terms of the success of their dissemination across target groups and the formation of appropriate social and political structures in support of new ideas.

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We are at the beginning of the biggest leap in history. Many of the achievements of modern science and technology can (as has long been the case) have civil and military applications. Of particular concern are the challenges posed by the development of artificial intelligence (AI), which, penetrating into all spheres of social life and the economy, brings considerable benefits to civilization, but also bears the risk of becoming the most destructive weapon in the history of humanity. It is no coincidence that researchers from numerous countries oppose the dangerous militarization of the use of AI. Here it is appropriate to remember that H. G. Wells described in his science fiction novel The World Set Free (1913) a disastrous war involving aircraft armed with atomic bombs, occurring in 1959, when in fact the US and the Soviet Union developed plans to use such weapons against each other. After all, the founder of atomic physics Ernest Rutherford, who together with Frederick Soddy created the theory of radioactivity, confidently argued in 1933 that all discussion regarding the large-scale use of atomic energy was simply absurd, yet 12  years later in 1945 the first A-bomb was tested in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Wells’ novel had a major influence on the development of atomic research. Indeed, the outstanding Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard read the book in 1932, the same year in which the neutron was discovered. In 1933, he conceived the idea of neutron chain reaction, and filed for patents on it in 1934. However, under the influence of Wells’ horrific depictions of the death of humanity in the flames of atomic explosions, Szilard did not publish his research, only returning to them in 1939. According to a number of surveys, many leading researchers in the field of AI argue that the emergence of AI exceeding human performance will happen within half a century. When the governments did not attach importance to the strategic foresight of the great writer on the eve of World War I, it was quite understandable. However, the delayed reaction, an insufficient strategic response at the level of state leaders and public consciousness regarding the assessment of AI challenges done by leading experts all raise questions about the growing threat of a third world war given the current existence of technologies that can destroy humanity. Solving issues of international security (as well as the qualitative development of a sociopolitical and economic system on the basis of a balanced approach to the use of revolutionary achievements of science and technology) requires an appropriate strategy for social development and strategic communication. What is the way to future of the EU and Russia: this is

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largely the task of the successful synchronization of deeds, words and images in the activities of states and supranational unions like the EU. We have noticed a sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the EU in recent years, most notably since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine. Despite the importance of the events in Ukraine (as well as their often diametrically opposed interpretations), the contributors here seek to demonstrate that this deterioration is complicated by a combination of various factors. Moreover, there are serious grounds for imagining the further degradation of EU-Russia relations, up to the highly undesirable and dangerous point of collapse and use of military means. At the same time, there are also opportunities to increase trust and gradually build friendly relations between states, not only in Europe but throughout the world. Of course, this will require radical changes in different countries, taking into account their national backgrounds, historical experiences and shared realities and trends. Strategic communication (here understood as the synchronization of deeds, words and images of state, interstate and non-state actors on the most important and long-term issues) will play an even greater role in this regard. The authors attempt to identify these challenges in the context of the scientific and technological, social and geopolitical shifts in the international arena. Bringing together scholars from different countries and from various fields of study, this book explores the synchronization of governmental deeds, words and images in the realm of EU-Russia relations. Indeed, what are words about unity, goodwill or partnership worth if they are not materialized or met with different realities, reflecting the interests of certain groups in society? History teaches us that this tends to coincide with decline and disaster, such as in the case of the collapse of the USSR, when state assets created by the Soviet people quickly ended up in the hands of oligarchs. Looking at contemporary EU-Russia relations, we potentially face a similar situation, in which certain interests of elite groups are becoming increasingly pronounced, exacerbating already tense relations between actors on a daily basis, thus precluding any form of reconciliation or dialog. This is likely to have serious consequences beyond the political realm (i.e., at the interpersonal level), with growing xenophobic stereotyping just one possible and disastrous outcome. Strategic communication represents an increasingly important element of the foreign policy of both the EU and Russia, and plays a fundamental role in the ongoing crisis in their relations. Nevertheless, by the same token, strategic communication can play a positive and determining role

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in the reconciliation process by emphasizing the need to re-establish dialog, in which a message of hope and change for the better is expressed and materialized. Multiple shared interests, on the one hand, and common threats, challenges and opportunities, on the other, should form the basis for such a message. There is a need to establish a new and progressive model of strategic communication that works in the interests of both the EU and its member states and for Russia. The ongoing clash of narratives, as well as the endless spiral of sanctions, risks culminating in the potential “mutually victorious” destruction of both parties, rather than in transition to a qualitatively new level of social development and mutually beneficial relations. Only by acknowledging these new realities, accompanied by their challenges and opportunities, will it become possible to move forward. In addition, we must understand that a new technological revolution is on the rise, and will most likely affect our lives more than ever before. The changes ahead will require us to be ready to act, and there is no better way to do this than by joining forces and counteracting both old and new challenges, shoulder to shoulder. Regardless of the enormous obstacles that exist, this will be the only way to build a shared house for future generations, free of xenophobia and mistrust. Neglecting our responsibility in this sphere risks resulting in the loss of everything we have built throughout the past decades. Of course, it will not be possible to overcome existing divisions overnight, but advocating a plurality of views based on the wisdom of civic society is certainly more productive than repeating the hollow words of proclaimed unity (or rather disunity) of ignorant fanatics or political elites. Through academic collaboration, this book intends to demonstrate that EU-Russia dialog is possible. The contributors of this volume are united, not because they follow one particular methodological paradigm, but because they have different research backgrounds and use various approaches to help bring Russia and the EU closer together on a progressive path of development in a dynamic world. The rationale behind writing this book was the result of a successful roundtable titled “The Relations between EU Countries and Russia: The Communication Aspect,” which took place at TIR 3 and at which some of the contributors here presented a paper.2 Some chapters in abbreviated 2  The 3rd international conference “Transformation of International Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Prospects” (TIR 3) took place at the Diplomatic

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form have previously been published in the Lomonosov Moscow State University E-journal Public Administration. This book brings together nine chapters pertaining to the subject of strategic communication. The collection is divided into three parts. The first part deals with current tendencies and controversies in EU-Russia strategic communication. The second builds on the topic while exploring political and economic domains. The third and final part presents two case studies focusing on the security dimension and its relevance to strategic communication. The chapter “Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations” by Evgeny Pashentsev highlights the conceptual basis of strategic communication as the synchronization of deeds, words and images in the international arena. The analysis of key documents, research literature and political practice facilitated assessment of the importance of the strategic deeds (measures in the economy, politics and social sphere), organization, efficiency and ethical dimensions of strategic communication. Comparing real and officially proclaimed strategic communication is especially important when analyzing the successes and failures of its actors. Analysis of trends in the development of the EU’s strategic communication reveals a certain discrepancy between the words of supranational bodies (advocating further integration in the interests of all member states) and the consequences of their deeds (inhomogeneous development of Northern and Southern Europe, the migration crisis, etc.). Although there are structures in the EU responsible for strategic communication, its directions are essentially limited to propaganda. Within the context of the aggravated geopolitical situation, strategic communication in relations between Russia and the EU is clearly experiencing the impacts of strategic psychological warfare, especially evident during the crisis in Ukraine. For a long-term partnership between Russia and the EU, this situation is disastrous, and the way out is possible only with the participation of all leading centers of the contemporary multipolar world. In his chapter “Focusing on Common Geopolitical Interests: Changing the Focus in EU-Russia Dialogue and Communication?” Pierre-Emmanuel Thomann emphasizes the importance of being guided not by competing ideological narratives developed during the Cold War, but by the geopolitical interests of both sides. The contemporary EU and Russia are guided by contrasting principles toward one another. The practice of East Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 27–28 April 2017, Moscow, Russia.

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StratCom Team shows that in focusing primarily on cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU seeks to debunk “fake news” created in Russia but not in other countries, thereby ignoring objective geopolitical contradictions. The use of information sources in the East StratCom Team, controlled only by Russia’s geopolitical rivals, forms a distorted idea of the nature of psychological warfare in Europe. At the level of deeds, as the author notes, “within the US-EU-Russia triangle, the geopolitical vision of the US plays a central role,” stimulating both the preservation of the liberal democratic model and the excessive militarization of strategic communication in the region. In the long term, this may destroy relations between Russia and the EU and jeopardize security in Eurasia. Therefore, it is advisable for both actors to think together about common interests (and perhaps common values), while including the US in this discussion. In the chapter “Cooperation and Trust: When Russia and the European Union Listen to Themselves,” Marius Vacarelu evaluates the possibilities of long-term and mutually beneficial cooperation between the EU and Russia, upon which it is possible to build fully fledged strategic communication. The potential for participation (under certain conditions) in treaties on the distribution of armed forces in the region, foreign trade and political interests motivates Russia to develop bilateral relations. The EU is interested in Russian energy, food and equipment. On this basis, it is feasible to compare the common interests of the parties and find areas of cooperation from which they will both undoubtedly benefit. It is important to have a mutual desire to cooperate, which can stimulate trust between the parties. Russia and the EU can find such common interests and strengthen mutual trust in a number of areas: environmental cooperation, civil freedoms defense, security and justice, migration policy and education. Indeed, long-term partnership is beneficial for both sides, but in order to achieve this goal, they must consider their positive and negative historical experiences, make good use of geographical proximity and carefully assess the economic and political situation. In the chapter “Character Assassination as Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations,” Sergei Samoilenko and Marlene Laruelle focus on the issue of psychological warfare between the two actors. In a political conflict, character assassination of the competitor becomes a means for elites to simplify perceptions of their legitimacy in the eyes of the audience. This interest largely coincides with those of the hype-seeking media. As for the elites themselves, the authors note pluralism in the strategic

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communication of both the EU member states (their discourse varying from actively anti-Russian to occasionally pro-Russian) and their institutions (attitudes toward Russia being heterogeneous in the European Parliament and the European Commission). At the same time, the diplomatic language of the Russian authorities is leveled by the aggressive propagandistic tone of the state media. Both sides use a wide range of character assassination mechanisms, which inevitably result in an inability to establish dialog. Given the context of the global political crisis, the active counteraction of the “other party” and the dangers and threats emanating from the “other party” in communication with its own citizens helps circumvent the challenges posed by declining confidence in political elites. Thus, we can raise the question of whether the use of character assassination in strategic communication in EU-Russia relations is due to the vices of the world order. The chapter “Reputation Management of Russian Companies in the European Union in the Context of Russia and the EU’s Strategic Communication” by Darya Bazarkina and Kaleria Kramar demonstrates how the economic situation, the reputation of big business (especially in strategically important sectors of the economy) and the political situation all affect each other. The authors analyze the economic interests of Russia, the EU as a whole and its individual member states, and then through the use of the concept of strategic communication study the positive and negative experiences of the reputation management of three Russian companies working in the EU: Gazprom, Lukoil and Sberbank. The examples of commodity companies demonstrate how a lack of strategic thinking among business elites (insufficient correlation between their strategic communication and that of the state, weak attention to the development of competitors, the use of inertia of the privileged position of energy suppliers, etc.) engenders reputational risks. In a challenging political environment, economic competitors are able to intensify psychological warfare in the political sphere. The experience of Russian companies in the EU demonstrates the decline of their intangible assets against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. This stimulates us to think not only about the importance of the long-term planning of deeds, words and images (in both enterprises and countries), but also the constant correlation of the interests of businesses, state and society with the defining role played by public interests. In the chapter “‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act’: The Psychological Aspect and Its Meaning for EU-Russia Relations,”

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Evgeny Pashentsev focuses on the economic sanctions imposed by the US and the EU against Russia with the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict as an instrument of psychological warfare. The author pays specific attention to the purposes, forms and methods of the use of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in the context of strategic psychological warfare, as well as to some possible areas of the Russian response to that law in the sphere of strategic communication. Economic measures can be assessed as deeds, which in themselves have a communication impact on their target groups, although this does not necessarily meet the expectations of the communicator (e.g., the sanctions helped consolidate Russian society before external hostile pressure). However, such measures reduce the intangible assets of the object of influence— Russia—in the eyes of European economic partners, and thus compromise relations between Russia and the EU. Within Russia itself, the psychological effect of sanctions was particularly manifested in the rupture of cooperation between a number of private companies with the state, under the threat of expanding the pressure of sanctions to all new enterprises and individuals. However, Russian business has partially shifted to protecting its interests from sanctions. The use of sanctions and other forms of pressure from the US has its limits due to the strengthening of Russia’s cooperation with China and other countries beyond the dictate of US will. Moreover, this zone is not growing, but shrinking, and has its own sociopsychological dimension. In the chapter “Global Shifts and Their Impact on Russia-EU Strategic Communication,” Evgeny Pashentsev analyzes changes in the global economy and geopolitics in the context of major shifts in technologies, with especial attention to artificial intelligence, robotics, cyborgization and human genetic engineering. The author also analyzes the depletion of the global capitalism model and its implications for the EU and Russia. The chapter subsequently highlights geopolitical shifts that “are affecting the foreign-policy orientation of European countries and Russia and will continue to affect them even more in the future.” Such sophisticated technologies may force both the EU and Russia to revise the foundations of their economic and social policies. Research and development present new opportunities (growth of physical and cognitive capabilities of a person, strategic planning based on predictive analytics) as well as risks and threats (mass unemployment, the threat of using artificial intelligence technologies by terrorists). In this situation, it is important to build up adequate strategic communication that considers not only the interests of both

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actors in the international arena, but also the sake of society. However, the obstacles to achieving this goal are contemporary geopolitical contradictions (which are growing over time) as well as the decline in the level of strategic thinking of elites in particular and social sciences in general. Given these and other circumstances, the chapter describes several scenarios for the future world order, both optimistic and pessimistic. The scenario that will be implemented is contingent on whether there will be elites in power capable of strategic thinking, deeds and communication in the new realities. Darya Bazarkina’s chapter “Counter-Terrorism as Part of Strategic Communication: The EU’s Experience and Possibilities for Russia” traces how the understanding of the issue of terrorism in political and academic circles has influenced the communication provision of antiterrorist activities in the EU. In addition, the chapter considers communication provision of the fight against terrorism as being part of the strategic communication of the state or supranational integration body. Following this approach, it is possible to establish the ways in which managerial decisions themselves (the creation of new antiterrorist units, the coordination of special operations and security, economic and social policy in a broad sense), together with the chosen words and images (public relations, social advertising, etc.), have a communication impact on public consciousness. The EU experience, both positive and negative, can serve as a lesson for other countries, in particular for Russia. At the same time, on the example of the so-called Islamic State (IS), the chapter shows that terrorist organizations quickly master strategic thinking. Consequently, in order to combat contemporary terrorism, all governments must promptly establish strategic communication in international relations. * * * Finally, and remembering the words of the outstanding, controversial and pragmatic British statesman Winston Churchill, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” Russians today face an even more complicated task: they have a riddle (national activity), wrapped in a mystery (national EU state), inside an enigma (the EU). The problems exist in order to solve them. This represents a challenge for researchers, but also for the EU and Russia.

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Nevertheless, the way to the future should not infringe on the basic interests of the other side. And there’s a long road ahead, per aspera ad astra.

References ABC News. (2018) Vladimir Putin issues warning about rising threat of nuclear war, blames the United States. 20 Dec. https://www.abc.net.au/news/201812-21/vladimir-putin-issues-warning-about-rising-threat-of-nuclearwar/10644916. Accessed 13 May 2019. Council of the European Union. (2005) Press release. 15th EU-Russia Summit, Moscow, 10 May. European Commission. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_PRES-05-110_en.htm. Accessed 13 May 2019. Hanappi G (2019) From integrated capitalism to disintegrating capitalism. Scenarios of a Third World War. MPRA Paper 91397. University Library of Munich, Munich. Hoffmann S (1995) The politics and ethics of military intervention. J Survival 37(4):29–51. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339508442814. Jean Monnet European Research Study Group. (2019) Prof. Gerhard Hanappi. https://sites.google.com/a/jeanmonnet-emu.eu/emu_political_economy_ apps/partners-associates/our-institutions/prof-hardy-hanappi. Accessed 13 May 2019. Microsoft News. (2018) Putin issues chilling warning on rising nuclear war threat. PressFrom. 20 Dec. https://pressfrom.info/us/news/world/-224232-putinissues-chilling-warning-on-rising-nuclear-war-threat.html. Accessed 13 May 2019. News Update. (2018) World War 3: Macron issues ‘horrifying conflict warning’ ahead of Trump decision on Iran. 7 May. https://newspaperupdate.com/ world-war-3-macron-issues-horrifying-conflict-warning-ahead-of-trump-decision-on-iran-world-news/. Accessed 13 May 2019. Weinraub B (1984) Mondale pledges immediate effort for arms freeze. The New York Times. 6 Sep. https://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/06/us/mondale-pledges-immediate-effort-for-arms-freeze.html. Accessed 13 May 2019. World Economic Forum. (2019) The Global Risks Report 2019. 14th ed. World Economic Forum, Geneva.

PART I

EU-Russia Strategic Communication: Tendencies and Controversies

CHAPTER 2

Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations Evgeny Pashentsev

Introduction Since the beginning of the century, the concept of strategic communication gradually found recognition and practically developed in the system of public administration and foreign policy of different countries and intergovernmental organizations. The term and the concept of strategic communication1 originate in the US where it also developed most of all. In the US, the concept of strategic communication has been elevated to a state policy at the highest level under the administration of Barack Obama (White House 2010). In spite of an abundance of state institutions,2 documents (Department of Defense  Stratcom, StratCom, SC and others are used rather often as abbreviations of the term “strategic communication(s).” 2  The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications (DNSA/SC), The Center for US Global Engagement, The Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R/PPR) and Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Public Affairs, and International Information Programs which are overseen by Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; The Office of the Assistant Secretary of 1

E. Pashentsev (*) Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pashentsev (ed.), Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1_2

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2010; US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center 2010; Deputy Secretary of Defense 2006; Defense Science Board 2004; US Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 2010; Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee 2007; US Congress 2008) and academic research (Corman et al. 2008; Fisher et al. 2011; Murphy 2008; O’Hair et al. 2009; Patterson and Radtke 2009; Paul 2011; Stovichek 2007), it is still in its nascent stages of development. The concept of strategic communication is similarly accepted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Gage 2014; Private Office of the NATO Secretary General 2009) and is in permanent development. Strategic communication is increasingly developing in other countries and intergovernmental organizations. The term “strategic communication” is also found in the political lexicon of China’s state leaders (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China 2010; Indo Asian News Service 2013). In 2011, the first Chinese book on strategic communication, titled Essentials of Strategic Communication (Bi and Wang 2011), was published. The book was jointly published by two publishing houses in Beijing: the press of the Chinese Academy of Governance and the Central Compilation and Translation Press. It was highly valued by General Liu Yongzhi, General Zhang Xusan and the Chief Political Commentator of Phonex TV Mr. Ruan Cishan. They wrote respectively prefaces of the book. On their website, the government of South Africa reports that the “government’s strategic communication” is available too. Strategic communication is de facto present in the public administration of other Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) countries, including Russia. Although the term itself is yet not used in official documents, it is frequently used in the spheres of business and politics as well as in academic literature and training courses (Barbosa 2016; ABONG 2017; Mafra 2006; MSLGROUP 2015; Pashentsev 2014; Vinogradova 2015; Wilson da Costa 2005; and Hindustan Times 2013).3 Defense for Public Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer, Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and other ones in this or that way dealing with strategic communication. The structures are in constant change and development. 3  In addition, in the section “Communication management and strategic communication in public administration” of the journal Public Administration. Electronic Bulletin (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia), more than 100 articles have been published since August 2012.

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Most generally, strategic communication is the state’s projection of certain vital and long-term values, interests and goals into the conscience of domestic and foreign audiences. It is effectuated by means of adequate synchronization of multifaceted activities in all domains of social life, commonly with professional communication support. It is clear that such synchronization takes place in Russia nowadays (reflecting the dynamics of the unique national symbiosis of the old and the new, of the local and the adopted aspects of administration forms and methods of influencing public consciousness). Instead, Russia tends to use terms such as “Strategy for development of the information society,” “Doctrine of the information security of the Russian Federation” and “public information policy” (President of Russian Federation 2013, 2016, 2017). This does not exclude, however, the need for strategic communication, as it is implicit in the term. At the same time, it is important to avoid abandoning strategic communication in the current state information policy, relating the tactical unity of acts, words and images to the strategy for the development of Russia. During the last few years, in the European Union (EU), strategic communication(s) received a powerful impetus. It is currently a process that cannot be disengaged from the need to counteract the various crisis factors both inside and outside the EU. Quite a few documents and analytical materials in this area (European Union 2015; Popescu 2015; European Union Institute for Security Studies 2017, 2016a, b, c; Committee on Foreign Affairs 2016) provide ground for some preliminary conclusions on the efficiency of the EU’s strategic communication. The EU’s East StratCom Task Force (or simply “StratComms”) leads the European Union’s efforts on both the public dimension of European diplomacy and its communication on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and, as well, its external action more broadly. StratComms works closely with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and other EU institutions. It provides round-the-clock professional support to the High Representative/Vice President in all her press and public diplomacy activities. StratComms provides tailor-made communications guidance and support to the EU’s network of approximately 140 delegations and offices around the world as well as to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy missions and operations. It is responsible for allocating and ­ensuring proper control of communications budgets both at headquarters and in the field (European Union External Action 2019).

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Strategic communication in the realm of foreign policy combines synchronization of affecting an allied state and non-state actors through friendly “deeds, words and images” and through a wide range of communications within the framework of information warfare (addressing foes and enemies). However, separating one from another is extremely difficult for several reasons. First, it is not easy to forge alliances in the contemporary international field, due to the conflicting interests of governing elites (who are often quite controversial). Such a phenomenon was evident when the US launched a large-scale media campaign against its ally France (due to its outspoken disapproval at the UN in 2003 with regard to America’s decision to invade Iraq).4 The modern realities and interpretations of conflict deliberately blur boundaries between war and peace, between military and civilian systems, as well as the lines between information and influence or manipulation (Brunner and Cavelty 2009). The extension of warfare into public consciousness has taken place before. However, today we can witness the evidence of a professional form of warfare being waged in the public consciousness using complex methods of communicational influence on a global level—pulling more people into the virtual world of the internet and social networking. Accordingly, it stimulates the further development and application of new kinds of informational impact and information weapons. In order to usher in a qualitatively new level of development, it is vital for Russia to raise the efficiency of management in all domains of society. The increase of Russia’s capacity for utilizing strategic communication might become one of the most efficient tools for developing new systems of this sort. It will decrease the burden on administrative and financial administration organs, have a real impact on the speed of economic growth and reinforce Russia’s international position as well as its state security. It is worth noting that we are not talking about replacing physical action with communication manipulation mechanisms—Russia needs real progress, not its propagandistic imitation.

4  Some US restaurants rewrote their menus to offer “freedom fries” instead of French fries, and national TV networks aired scenes of angry Americans dumping bottles of French wine to protest France’s resistance to the US talk of an invasion of Iraq. The then president Jacques Chirac of France could not get a break on US or British media (see Muhammad 2011).

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The relations between Russia and the EU are important for both sides. Researchers from different countries are coming to this conclusion; however, they give different answers to the question of which factors raised the confrontation between two sides (Dinan et  al. 2011; Haukkala 2011; Schoen 2016; Armistead 2004; Arpagian 2010; Maass 2016; Makarychev 2014; Rosefielde et al. 2018). We have noticed a sharp deterioration of relations between Russia and the EU in recent years, most notably since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine. Despite the importance of those events (and their different and rather often diametrically opposing interpretations), we will show that the ongoing deterioration is complicated by a combination of various factors. There are serious grounds for imagining further degradation of EU-Russia relations up to the highly undesirable and dangerous point of collapse and the use of military means. However, at the same time, there are also opportunities to increase trust and build over time friendly relations between states—not only in Europe but throughout the world. Of course, this will require radical changes in different countries, taking into account their national backgrounds, historical experience and shared realities and trends of the twenty-first century. Strategic communication plays and will play an even more important role in these crucial processes, which we try to identify in the context of scientific and technological, social and geopolitical shifts in the international arena.

Theory and Practice of Strategic Communication: Organization, Efficiency and Ethical Dimension Timely consideration of the theory of strategic communication, driven by the public interest, is essential for successful national development and the maintenance of peace and harmony in the international arena. Let us explain this by the example of the ratio of deeds, words and images in strategic communication. The Synchronization of Deeds, Words and Images Without strategic deeds, there is only a set of long-term communication goals on principal issues; whether they are adequate or truthful—or not— depends. Without relevant state deeds, the communication is very often nothing than a vague of propaganda, perhaps even a strategic one. For

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example, in Russia the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev, speaking on October 31, 1961 at the Twenty-Second Congress of the party with a report on the project of the third program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), said: “the Current generation of Soviet people will live under communism.” The document, which was adopted by the delegates of the Congress, also indicated the deadline for the completion of the “unfolded construction of communism”—20 years (Obeschania.ru 2019). Of course, the Soviet people were a bit disappointed by the results of non-existing progress long before 1980. Later, false propaganda of the party elite was one of the reasons of the collapse of the USSR. However, not only good ideas are deformed by wrong decisions. Sometimes, for example, synchronization of the wrong words, images and deeds has led to global disaster. Efficient deeds (first great and rather easy successes on the fronts of World War II, plus robbery of ‘Untermenschen’ all over Europe) made the majority of Germans firmly believe in the genius of Hitler (with the help of very efficient Nazi propaganda). The result we know well: more than 50 million of victims of German aggression. Effective synchronization of deeds, words and images almost led to the world domination of fascism. Thus, strategic communication has not only to be an efficient synchronization of deeds, words and images but has an ethical and social dimension too. In a failed state you can find no state strategy and no state strategic communication. But there is no vacuum in the current world. Instead of national strategic communication, there always appears strategic communication of other states or/and non-state transnational groups, such as in current Libya, for example. Through a rise of progressive social forces coming to power, strategic communication may appear once again, or the state will be split forever like the USSR—or taken over by reactionary forces with their own interests and agenda setting and relevant strategic communication. In failed states like Libya, such dilemmas are more or less evident. In still viable, more developed countries—yet in the group experiencing protracted crises—such processes are more difficult to detect. They are, however, no less real. Firstly, strategic communication is not only communication by itself but also communication through state deeds. Secondly, it is incorrect to consider strategic communication primarily a military tool; it is a strategic public administration tool (with a military dimension as well, of course).

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Thirdly, it is necessary to confront not only a wrong strategic communication by itself, but also a state-run machine—if it supports itself utilizing a wrong means of development. This often involves the use reactionary social groups. A reactionary state can follow on a weak strategic communication and it is not bad at all for progressive forces. In the case where a reactionary, especially aggressive state follows efficient strategic communication, it may be extremely dangerous for the whole world if we are speaking about a rather powerful state or international union of states. Fourthly, the progressive forces can’t underestimate the role of efficient strategic communication as a tool for progressive changes. A progressive strategy without efficient means, based on advanced technologies, is objectively doomed to death. Which Part of the State Carries Out Strategic Communication? Strategic communication is an important sphere of public administration (i.e. through synchronization of its deeds, words and images). As such, it is a function within the state’s top legislative and executive organs. That is why, logically, strategic communication in the US was integrated into public policy at the highest level under the administration of Barack Obama (upon signing a White House Strategic Communications report to Congress, dated March 16, 2010, see: White House 2010). However, the efficiency of strategic communication depends on not only the acceptance and coordination of relevant bills and decrees at high levels of state hierarchy. It depends primarily on the efficiency of the state and the moral health of the whole society itself. Dr. Christopher Paul of the RAND Corporation, in his well-known book on strategic communication (2011), underscores that “when one piece of information a government or its forces provide contradicts or is otherwise inconsistent with another piece of information provided by that government, that is information fratricide” (Paul 2011, pp. 6–7). When each state department has its own understanding of the main goals and values of strategic communication—or even worse, under the “umbrella” of strategic communication, realizes its own corporate interest—there is no state strategic communication at all. But naturally strategic communication is realized by different state institutions through some specific forms and methods while at the same time pursuing the core state interests and goals. And in socially oriented society, the state strategic communication should be under the control of the society like all the major activities of state organs.

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The problem of strategic communication, however, should not be restricted to the field of administrative cooperation and coordination, even on the upper level. Even worse, the domination of the military structures in development of the concept and practice of strategic communication could have a deforming effect on the strategic communication in times of peace without real existential military threats. “Overmilitarization” logically makes strategic communication significantly less efficient for non-­ military major strategic goals and dangerously efficient for society as a whole because it can deform social mentality (such as during the era of McCarthyism). Sometimes internal and external threats are overestimated or even falsified to justify such ends. The bright example of such “overmilitarized” strategic communication could be seen in the US under George W. Bush administration or under Donald Trump currently. Such governmental errors occur not because of new existential threats, but rather because of a split among US elites on the optimal modus operandi in response to a new economic, social and political world order—one that is more and more multipolar and transitive. Consequently, it is impossible to develop an efficient concept and application of strategic communication using only the experience of the state executive structures, existing academic centers and interdepartmental coordination. It is necessary, at a minimum, to have a large interdepartmental analytical center of strategic communication, with an appropriate hierarchy and subordinacy, an appropriate level of access of the employees to strategic information, and so on. Until there is no such a center, the cardinal changes in the efficiency of strategic communication are hardly possible. As well, it is very important to prepare specialists who are well versed in all forms of strategic communication. They must understand them as a system, as an essential part of public management. Further, relevant educational programs at the MS, PhD and MBA levels, as well as EMBA programs, should be developed. In a state, all its main institutions, at the least, are responsible in this or that way for synchronization of deeds, words and images. For that reason, in Nazi Germany, it was not the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, with Joseph Goebbels as its leader, who was responsible for manipulating public opinion: that responsibility was upon Adolf Hitler as a head of a state, expressing the interests of the most reactionary parts of German elites. Goebbels was responsible for Nazi propaganda (words and images), while Hitler was responsible for deeds (the most important part of strategic communication: that is, the integration of deeds, words

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and images). Hitler committed suicide on April 30 in Berlin surrounded by Soviet troops. When Goebbels succeeded him as Chancellor of Germany, he became responsible for the synchronization of deeds, words and images. But he was responsible for that one day only. Goebbels and his wife committed suicide, after poisoning their six children with cyanide. Perhaps they did this because they well understood their role and responsibility in poisoning of many millions by the “cyanide” of Nazi propaganda. The Nazis did not use the concept of strategic communication, and there existed no such area of science during the 1930s. But much non-­ systematic knowledge and skills for that had existed even long before Hitler came to power. Propaganda during the French and American revolutions was a very positive and progressive part of transformation (deeds) in those countries. And deeds, words and images were rather successfully synchronized. The same was true for the October Revolution. It social and anti-imperialist deeds, words and images had a great influence all over the world. In a rotten state, its propaganda is inevitably reactionary. One Ministry of Strategic Communication and/or Coordination of Strategic Communication Through Different State Institutions It seems not so important whether strategic communication is realized strictly through one ministry or through different state departments and numerous private tabloids. If you have a really democratic civil society with different non-state information channels and tools—and, first and foremost, all well-educated, socially responsible and active citizens—you inevitably have a democratic, prosperous state (with all its ministries, including that for strategic communication, working for the benefit of its people). And the last one is only an executive organ to coordinate state efforts where and to what extent it is necessary. There is no threat from this ministry if we have a “really democratic civil society with different information channels and well educated, socially responsible and active citizens” who can correct the mistakes of this ministry by using different means. And, logically, if we have to fear the ministry of strategic communication we live not in a really democratic civil society. One may wonder: why be afraid of the ministry of strategic communication (with limited resources) more than one fears atomic weapons which are controlled by few people in any country and can, in fact, transform the whole nation to ashes? And if this ministry can so easily play a role of Rattenfänger von

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Hameln, the people are not more than a flock of sheep. And the sheep are always nice meals for wolves. It is not so important whether we have a ministry of strategic communication or a coordination body and/or consultancy structure under the top leadership of the country. It is not even a hopeless situation to have egoistic powerful groups and powerful states ready to start World War III (defending their own interests, though history has proved many times that such groups are not invincible). But much more concerning is the large number of socially passive and practically illiterate people (very often with diplomas of higher education) who consider that their future will be automatically lucky for them, that global crisis is coming not after them. And never mind what country of the EU or Russia they live in. “To live here and now,” “dictatorships are in the past of Europe,” they often say (and they are “educated” in such a way not by a hypothetical Ministry of Strategic Communication but with a current order of things, through deeds and accompanying propaganda first of all). But dark pages of the past usually repeat themselves if one forgets the lessons of history. They may come in new forms and images, but they are no less cruel. Or there may be lots of people accustomed to the idea that things are going from bad to worse; they often have no will for organized protest because they see no alternative coming from the existing political parties. Without citizens there is no democracy, there is only a formal pseudo-democratic cover for a latent dictatorship. For example, ancient Rome (here is implied a rather long process of transformation of the republic in the Roman Empire) proved that fact as well. With such attitudes, of course, we can easily have a choice between pseudo-democratic splitting, weak strategic communication (or its absence at all) and a strong reactionary strategic communication. And this, of course, is an intellectual, moral, social and political challenge coming from the current situation in the world. The USSR lost more than 20 million people in the struggle against fascism. Better to remember well the words by German pastor Martin Niemöller (the original text in German is here: Martin Niemöller Foundation 2019) about his biggest mistake in life:                         

First they came for the Communists And I did not speak out Because I was not a Communist Then they came for the Socialists And I did not speak out

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Because I was not a Socialist Then they came for the trade unionists And I did not speak out Because I was not a trade unionist Then they came for me And there was no one left To speak out for me.

We are on the crossroads of history, and thinking about the lessons of the past may help to prevent the repeat of the worst scenarios. We shouldn’t permit the skeletons from the past to move us to new crusades for a “better future,” of course. Official and Non-official Strategic Communication Omnipresent together with officially proclaimed and easy seen official (open) strategic communication exists a latent and real strategic communication of the same state or non-state actor (which is very important to detect, analyze, understand and react). For example, Hitler’s leadership, officially addressing to Russians in occupied territories and international publics, declared the liberation war against Bolsheviks in defense of “Western Civilization” but, in the Generalplan Ost, was proclaimed the Nazi government’s plan for the genocide of the Slavs. That plan was realized partially through relevant deeds during the war (in the liquidation of millions of non-combatants in concentration camps and mass executions in occupied territories). The similar latent strategic communication was realized by the US in Vietnam under the pretext of “liberation” of the country from communists. American military aircraft used Agent Orange to clear jungles in Vietnam and expose enemy soldiers. Several tens of thousands of people died after the war. In total, Vietnam has about 4.8 million victims of defoliant spraying, including three million directly affected (Know This 2019). According to Charles Bailey, author of the book From Enemies to Partners—Vietnam, the U.S. and Agent Orange, there are approximately 800,000 Vietnamese people who receive assistance now for illness and disabilities because of exposure to the toxin (Jennings 2018). The Russell Tribunal found “the government and armed forces of the United States … guilty of the deliberate, systematic and large-scale bombardment of civilian targets, including civilian populations, dwellings, villages, dams, dikes, medical establishments, leper colonies, schools, churches, pagodas,

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historical and cultural monuments” (Jennings 2018). Through such “latent” effects—first from the population of the country aggressor and from global public opinion—the strategic communication was realized by many countries in different times. It effectively shaped the perception of target audiences in the desired direction—finally, however, the truth became public knowledge, albeit sometimes after the deaths of millions of people. What instead? The analysis of the current situation and strategic prospects, as well as a new progressive strategic communication based on the current nascent groups (who will be able to accept new objective realities), can yield relevant conclusions. Upon that, they will be capable of relevant deeds, words and images. But even progressive states cannot follow by absolutely open strategic communication without some latent forms of synchronization of deeds, words and images, because of the external threats first of all. Nevertheless, they pursue progressive goals and strive to be as open as possible with their citizens, other states and peoples. Perhaps some part of success of the development of the state, across all epochs, depends on the efficiency of “proto strategic communication”— the strategic communication of the previous times without a relevant theoretical basis or current diversified set of tools to realize strategic communication. Please, don’t forget that even in the most progressive society, strategic communication is synchronization of state deeds, words, images with expected perceptions and deeds of the target audiences. Under open or latent dictatorships, this strategic communication is submitted to the interests of some powerful (economic, political, military, etc.) groups firstly in their interests. This fact explains the predominantly latent way such a synchronization occurs. The elites are not eager for the masses to detect and understand the content of the real strategic communication on a systemic level (and are quite often not capable of doing that themselves) but be subordinate to an official strategic communication. Sometimes the internal clashes among elites, external influence operations, serious mistakes of the reactionary governments make not only capable individuals but also large audiences start to trace the differences between official and real strategic communication on a system-wide level. Usually, such insight and awakening leads to a serious political crisis. The progressive forces in power often want mass recipients of state strategic communication to correctly understand their strategic communication and to support it in a conscious way—in such a manner, it benefits those masses in this or that way. Thus, where the

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ruling circles have no interest to make explicit their real strategic communication, by the same token, they do not want to provide relevant education or system-based analytical capabilities to the mass audiences. The degradation of analytical forms of education in social sciences in any society opens the space for latent strategic communication and different manipulations on the mass consciousness of people. Let us recall the development and influence of occult sciences on public consciousness in the Third Reich. We observed that in the late USSR and in the 1990s in independent Russia, in an extremely evident and tragic way (it’s enough to remember a great number of extrasensories, soothsayers, etc., appeared on state and private TV channels, accompanied by the same sort of politicians). And now we have a long way to overcome that within our reality. The more advanced technologies we have, the more dangerous such an approach to strategic communication is. Communication Management as One of the Core Issues of Strategic Communication There are many definitions of communication management, and they often are quite varied (see different approaches: Grunig et al. 1992, 2002; Karbasova 2010; Orlova 2002, 2005; Pashentsev 2006, 2007; Pashentsev and Scherbakova 2005; Pashentsev and Simons 2009; Ray 1981; Reva 2001; Savrutskaya et al. 2002; Shepel 2004; Zverintsev 1996). The author assumes that communication management, above all, reaches the professional target groups and capital management by means of communications. Communication management can serve as a tool of management for both individuals and all kinds of social groups (as well as governmental structures). Communication management can be auxiliary to administrative, financial and other resources of management. On the other hand, it can serve as the main power of management. Communication management of capital is possible due to the fact that capital is a kind of social relationship, that is, a relationship between people. (Management of communications, by nature, is part of technological management and is not the object of the current chapter.) Communication management is the deliberate and systematic use of different forms (written, oral, visual, etc.), means (books, newspapers, radio, TV, internet, etc.) and types (intrapersonal, fictitious,5 interpersonal, 5

 Fictitious communication exists only in the imagination of its originator.

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group, mass, etc.) of approach (multi-channel capability, variability, etc.) to both general communication and professional communication activity (public relations, advertising, journalism, propaganda, agitation, informational warfare, etc.) and complicated communicational products (e.g. communicational chains of influence and management) for the purposes of managing the public. Communication management, in its complete embodiment, is always a multi-level construction with strategic goals, yet this does not negate the importance of practical knowledge and skills in this area for tactical purposes. Altogether, it would be a mistake to consider communication management just a sum of communicational technologies of managing. Communication management means the projection of real public actions to the public consciousness of target audiences in a way that helps increase the effectiveness of the whole system of management (reducing excessive pressure on administrative, financial and other levers of management while not denying them) (Pashentsev 2012, pp. 12–13). It is pertinent here to mention some factors of occurrence and fast development of communication management between the ends of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries: • Advancing growth of intangible assets of companies, banks and individual states. In just the ten years between 1982 and 1992, for the average Standard & Poor’s 500 company, the value of intangible assets increased from 38% to 62% of market value (Lev and Daum 2004). Tangible assets represented less than 10% of the value in the market of industrial organizations in 2006 (Web and Macros 2019). • The development of interconnected communication needs within an increasing segment of society (with development of new information technologies and communication facilities). • The further development and diversification of public administration disciplines and communication science. • The tendency to integrate both open and closed communication means in the managerial process. Being an efficient instrument of public administration in the atmosphere of intense internal and external conflicts, communication ­ management tools are frequently being used in psychological warfare. Hence, communication management—as a dual-purpose tool—is very important for the general success of strategic communication.

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After a brief analysis of the general issues of strategic communication, let’s see how it works in the EU and how that affects the relations with Russia.

The Challenges for Strategic Communication of the EU and the Relations with Russia In the realm of strategic communication, actions are crucial for the transmission of messages directed at specific target groups as well as to the entire population (which, to a large extent, determines their activities). It is quite natural for individual states and state entities to develop strategic communication concepts, even if this term is not present in their official documents. What kind of messages is the EU nowadays conveying through its actions? Unfortunately, they often are signals of internal disunity and an inability to cope with growing problems. Words on the part of high officials about the desire to strengthen European unity (even though there is a powerful communication apparatus working behind them) are experiencing more and more difficulty transmitting the idea of EU unity to European citizens. Rather, the actions and images of objective reality show another reality (the diversified development of North and South Europe, the growth of external debt, the migration problem, the growing property stratification among the population, etc.). The apparent lack of synchronization of actions, words and images indicates the practical absence of the EU’s strategic communication. This, effectively, stalls its entire complex system of national, interstate and supranational mechanisms (which are fraught with serious issues threatening the maintenance of its unity). The lack of synchronization leads to a decrease in expectations and affects all integration initiatives, because people cease to believe in them. The long-term investment appeal of the region is diminishing, interstate disunity and tensions between ethnic groups are intensifying, societies are starting to gain a growing sense of uncertainty in people about their future and so on. Quantitative indicators of such issues are contained in many European reports, international statistics and population surveys. The relationship between Russia and the EU should be considered in context of the changes that are taking place on the European scene as a whole. To do so, it is necessary to separate the supranational structures of

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the EU and the member states. The internal situation within the member states is also ambiguous and volatile. The rise of Eurosceptic parties of different social orientations in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, France and other countries does not mean that the majority of their population’s countries want to break economic, political and cultural ties with each other: they have long, though ambiguous traditions and relations. Of concern here, though, is the growing dissatisfaction with the social effectiveness of the supranational mechanism for regulating interstate relations in the EU—an issue that seems more in line with the interests of a supranational bureaucratic elite and a certain part of transnational companies than with the interests of most EU citizens. Although critical assessments of the actions and the recognition of serious mistakes and problems made in the process of European integration were heard in official statements, it is unlikely to hear similar declarations in relation to its foreign policy, particularly, vis-à-vis Russia. Brexit and the elections in several European countries have shown that the European public has the right to disagree with mistakes made at the European level. This raises questions about Russia’s disagreement with the tendency to stick on it the label of being solely responsible for the crisis in Ukraine (as well as interfering in elections in European countries). Nowadays, it seems difficult to consider those opinions that advocate a process of dialogue among equals responsible for the destinies of their peoples and, as well, a state of peace on the planet. To the contrary, those voices aggravating relations between Russia and the EU countries are dangerously and irresponsibly playing with the destiny of the world, placing the future and the very existence of European nations at risk. Russia is not indifferent to what is going on in the EU, on several accounts. First of all, there are economic reasons: the EU countries are still Russia’s largest trading partner. Second, there are cultural reasons: the interpenetration and mutual influence of the two cultures is difficult to ignore. Third, there are historical reasons: it is enough to recall that the two world wars have begun in Europe and involved both Russia and European countries. Isolationism for Russia is strategically insecure and hopeless. Russia, historically, is economically and culturally linked with Europe and other regions of the world. The stagnation, weakening and much more the ­rupture of these ties will bring harm. Russians and Europeans from different social groups and of different political and cultural orientations raise their voices for the normalization of those relations. We need a lot of

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patience and should not expect quick results; however, working for a better, more peaceful future should stand central. However, it seems that, within the central organs of the EU, including the bodies responsible for strategic communication, other moods play as well. The EU’s East StratCom Task Force was set up by the EU’s High Representative Federica Mogherini in 2015, in response to a request from all 28 EU Heads of Government to “address Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns” (EU East StratCom Task Force 2017). The task force is a team of 11 communications and Russian language experts, who also seek to improve communication on EU policies toward the Eastern Neighbourhood and to strengthen media plurality in the region (especially through the use of Russian): “The Task Force’s flagship products are its weekly Disinformation Review of pro-Kremlin disinformation stories and its social media accounts @EUvsDisinfo and EU vs Disinformation” (EU East StratCom Task Force 2017). The establishment of a strategic communication unit with the principal purpose to counteract “Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns” is diminishing the core understanding of the EU’s strategic communication as a synchronization of its deeds, words and images. A report prepared by the European Union Institute for Security Studies convincingly states: It is difficult to deny that the Union’s “soft power” has suffered considerably in recent times: internal divisions, inadequate policy delivery, and mounting populism have all contributed to creating an environment (even inside the EU itself) that is significantly more receptive to their messaging (IS and Russia  – EP). This, in turn, further undermines Europe’s “soft power” and, more generally, EU influence. Both types of campaigning have indeed scored important points, both inside and outside the EU. Russia has successfully targeted both elites and significant minority groups frustrated with mainstream politics; its main emphasis has been on negative messaging and undermining the EU’s own narrative. For its part, ISIL has operated mainly below the radar and at a grassroots level, combining a religion-­ infused anti-Western rhetoric with a violence-inspired dystopia. (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2016c, p. 45)

I do not want to comment further on what has been repeated in many materials of the EU and its think tanks, that is, to put Russia and IS “in one basket.” Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that, in the 53-page-long abovementioned report, there is no mention at all about the

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EU’s shortcomings, let alone attempts to formulate how to change the current situation for the better in the interests of the EU. Answers to how to improve strategic communication are given in the Report only with regard to the communication sphere. In terms of method and style, the EU’s communications have often been faceless, anonymous, technocratic, unemotional, and reliant upon the expectation (or rather assumption) that facts will speak for themselves. This has started to change, with a greater emphasis on story-telling and the use of “real people”. Perceptions are no less important, and they can be shaped – as the examples of Russia and ISIL confirm. (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2016c, p. 47)

But shaping perceptions by good story-telling without the changing of deeds will logically lead to perception management in the EU policy even though the authors of such reports have no intentions for doing that. The reasons for such limited interpretation of strategic communication are: 1. Methodological underestimation of strategic communication as just a communication tool. 2. Low level of responsibility for the professional activity involving strategic communication in the public hierarchy of the EU. It has to be regarded as a function of strategic management and strategic decision making through communication to be efficient. Such a tendency is already present in big business and politics, but not yet in the bureaucratic structures of the EU. 3. Strategic communication has to be controlled by genuine democratic institutions with a progressive agenda related to crisis management. This is not always the case in relation to the EU. 4. A successful European strategic communication concept is impossible without the establishment of a successful strategy for the EU. 5. Although a strategic communication concept of the EU exists, it benefits only a very narrow circle of people. From this point of view, this absolute minority (which we label here “De Lux of the EU”) benefits already for a long time because of the rising concentration of assets and power in their hands. Their position is guaranteed and stable and has seemingly its own strategic communication (which is rather unsuccessful, if not catastrophic, for the EU in its whole).

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On November 23, 2016, the European Parliament adopted the resolution “EU strategic communication to counteract anti-EU propaganda by third parties” (European Parliament 2016a). According to the resolution, the Parliament “Notes with regret that Russia uses contacts and meetings with EU counterparts for propaganda purposes and to publicly weaken the EU’s joint position, rather than for establishing a real dialogue” (European Parliament 2016a). By adopting this resolution, the EU seems, willingly or unwillingly, to follow the logic of psychological warfare. This logic, however, is not so much directed against Russia, but rather against the EU member states. So, this resolution “points out that the Kremlin’s information strategy is complementary to its policy of stepping up bilateral relations, economic cooperation and joint projects with individual EU Member States in order to weaken EU coherence and undermine EU policies” (European Parliament 2016a). This can be interpreted as follows: given the world markets’ slowdown, actions between Russia and some European countries that establish mutually beneficial economic exchanges are labeled as activities that undermine the unity of the EU. This is not in the interests of the EU states, among which some have serious economic problems. The drop in commodity prices and, to a smaller extent, sanctions led to a drop in trade between the EU and Russia by about half. The economic statistics of 2017 showed that, regardless of Obama’s comment on Russia’s “torn to shreds” economy, and despite the sanctions, the Russian economy is starting to grow faster. Russia’s economy grew in 2017 by 1.4% (RT 2018a, b) after two years of decline. The rapid growth of some high-tech industries has similarly been observed. Also, the production of computers has increased by 77% in 2017 (Byrkova 2017). In the first half of 2017, EU-Russia trade grew by 26% year-on-year, ending a prolonged downturn (European Parliament 2017). According to the World Bank “Russia Economic Report,” the growth momentum in Russia increased in the first half of 2018, supported by robust global growth, rising oil prices and a macropolicy framework that has promoted stability. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth totaled 1.3% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2018 and 1.9% year-on-year in the second. Overall, a sound macroeconomic framework, with relatively high levels of international reserves ($461 billion), low external debt levels (about 29% of GDP) and comfortable import cover (15.9 months), positions Russia well to absorb external shocks (The World Bank 2018). The Russian Economic Development Minister Maxim Oreshkin, commenting

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on the results of the development of economic relations between the EU and Russia in 2018, said: “The European Union, of course, still remains Russia’s key trading partner. However, we see that despite the fact that our trade with Europe has expanded by 20%, growth with China is much stronger, and it is clear that as far as Europe’s relations with Russia is concerned, it could have been higher, had it not been for the events of recent years” (Russia-Briefing 2018). Although serious problems in the Russian economy remain, it is of interest to compare with the corresponding indicators of most EU countries (the external debt of the UK is 314%, the Netherlands is 525%, Ireland is 725%, France is 210%, etc.). Also, Russia is reorienting itself to other markets; for instance, the relations with China are developing very dynamically. In the first quarter of 2017, there was a rapid growth of trade between the two countries which exceeded 35% (Byrkova 2017). The governments of Russia and China expect to elevate the bilateral trade turnover to the level of $200 billion by 2020 (VladTime 2016). The share of Asia-Pacific Region countries in the total external trade of Russia has risen in less than four years from 24% to 30% (Byrkova 2017). However, the rapid growth of trade with the EU (as indeed with other countries) is largely due to rising energy prices, not due to the increase in physical volume of trade. It is also necessary to take into account the instability of the world economy and the negative impact of sanctions and other factors on Russia’s relations with the EU. Meanwhile, the big debt burden of the EU member states with low (or zero) economic growth (as has been the case since the economic crisis of 2008) is sooner or later fraught with the risk of economic collapse and social-political conflict, or even worse. In addition to the dramatic decline in trade with an important partner, the EU’s support of Ukraine is likely to have other adverse effects in this difficult period of its existence. The growing sentiments in the EU countries toward the normalization of relations with Russia seem to come from the national aspirations of these countries, and are therefore not “Kremlin intrigues” for breaking the EU unity. The question arises, however: in whose interests are the opponents of the development of these relations working? Unfortunately, the resolution “EU strategic communication to counteract anti-EU propaganda by third parties” seems to affect the relationship with Russia much less than it puts the EU’s own policies, economic interests and credibility into question. And this is the position of many influential organizations in the area of communication. For example, the

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International Federation of Journalists (IFJ, representing more than 600,000 journalists in 140 countries) and the European Federation of Journalists are not convinced by this controversial resolution which seems to promote censorship—as the IFJ President Philippe Leruth explained in his letter sent to Ria Novosti and Sputnik news agencies. In this letter, Leruth noted that such resolution would not contribute to dialogue between the two countries: “It’s not the first time Russia Today is targeted: when its bank accounts were blocked in the UK, the European Federation of Journalists protected it, both IFJ and EFJ still don’t believe that censorship, harassment and demonisation are never the right answers to counter so-called propaganda” (International Federation of Journalists 2016). We must take the following fact into account. Militants of so-called Islamic State and other terrorist organizations, in recent years, have taken hundreds of lives in dozens of terrorist attacks in the EU and Russia. By deploying its military force in Syria, Russia has helped to prevent thousands of militants from returning to Europe to continue their business of building a worldwide caliphate. Representatives of the antiterrorist coalition led by the US are also giving their lives. Only if we establish effective cooperation in the fight against terrorism, the losses on both sides will undoubtedly reduce. By labeling Russia for its “criminal acts” in Syria, as some media and other entities have done, gives a trump card to militants to recruit the same youth in Europe to go and fight against the Russians. Some will be pushed by unemployment, others by a hunger for adventure; unfortunately, not everyone takes this into consideration. Others can possibly return to Europe and try to prove their case there. The very structure of the resolution follows the logic of perception management. Firstly, the resolution has a subtitle “Recognising and exposing Russian disinformation and propaganda warfare” (European Parliament 2016b). In the next subtitle the resolution states: “Understanding and tackling ISIL/Daesh’s information warfare, disinformation and radicalisation methods.” This suggests that Russia is considered to be the most important foe in comparison to Islamic State/Daesh. According to an official minority opinion (tabled by the parliamentary group European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)), It is irresponsible to place a State like Russia at the same level of threat as Da’esh’… recognise Russia for what it is: a key partner for the EU and key global actor, both vis-à-vis foreign security and common fight against Daesh. (European Parliament 2016b)

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In spite of the overwhelming support for the resolution by the powerful elites and the mainstream media, only 304 MEPs supported the resolution based on the report “EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties,” with 179 voting against it and 208 abstaining. The document was criticized by some MEPs, who called it both “insane” and “ridiculous.” The EU “desperately needs an enemy, be it Russia or any other,” that it can blame for any of its own failures, French MEP Jean-Luc Schaffhaueser told RT. Spanish MEP Javier Couso Permuy said, “it fosters hysteria against Russia,” while British MEP James Carver noted the report is “worryingly reminiscent of the Cold War” (RT 2016). The confrontation approaches continue to influence the EU strategic communication toward Russia. For example, the European Parliament (2019) resolution of March 12 on the state of EU-Russia political relations states that the European Parliament “stresses that the EU cannot envisage a gradual return to ‘business as usual,’” and “that under the present circumstances, Russia can no longer be considered a ‘strategic partner.” The EU Parliament, it continues,



12. Is deeply concerned that Russia so manifestly demonstrates its military powers, articulates threats to other countries and manifests the willingness and readiness to use military force against other nations in real actions, including advanced nuclear weapons, as reiterated by President Putin on several occasions in 2018; 13. Condemns the government’s continuing crackdown on dissent and media freedom, as well as the repression of activists, political opponents and those who openly express disagreement with the government. (European Parliament 2019)

The majority of other items of the resolution are full of unilateral negative accusations against Russia, which hardly contribute to the normalization of relations between the EU and Russia. One can hardly agree and put up with those who try to avoid their responsibility of crisis development, promoting the image of a fake external enemy, and—even more— those who seek to make money with a new arms race, foolishly forgetting about the lessons from the past. The serious problems of the EU, of course, are negatively affecting Russia. In turn, the so-called decline of Europe is likely to convert into a global crisis (and, with that, the threat of a great war which can be stopped only through the revival of European nations based on progressive democracy and the formation of their friendly

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alliance). Even the mentioned European Parliament resolution of March 12, 2019, highlighted: “whereas the current persistent tensions and confrontation between the EU and Russia are not in the interests of either party; whereas the communication channels should remain open in spite of the disappointing results; whereas the new division of the continent jeopardizes the security of both the EU and Russia” (European Parliament 2019). It is impossible to solve problems of security, the environment and so on by taking only ourselves into account. The modest size of our planet increasingly requires taking into account the interests of each other—not only in words, but also in deeds. For those who doubt the strategic perspective of the relations between Russia and the EU countries, it is sufficient to look at the map: Russia and the EU are neighbors and this is not going to change. From the point of view of an elementary knowledge of the economy, it is clear that the exchange of goods between neighbors, other things being equal, is more profitable than the exchange of the same goods with countries on the other side of the world. Nobody canceled transportation costs. It is more advantageous if there are no subjective political factors. However, such political factors are present nowadays. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine provides us with an example. To whom is it beneficial? Seneca provides the answer: Cui prodest scelus, is fecit (The Latin Library 2019, line 500–501). Integration projects on the largest continent of the earth, where more than 70% of the world’s population lives, cannot be effective without Russia; this is understood both in the East (better) and in the West of Eurasia (temporarily worse). Russia needs to work toward this direction, projecting its objective significance with actions, words and images to both internal and external audiences. And, of course, it is not just military power: a nation cannot be strong with geography only, and natural resources have a harmful tendency not to grow, but to decrease. This means that Russia is in need of a lot of economic and social attractiveness, and there is still a lot of work to be done in this direction, although positive changes after the devastation of the 1990s are beyond doubt. Active interference in the latter project is likely to continue, not because of personal sympathies or antipathies toward Russia, but because of the pragmatic fear of losing trillions of profits and geopolitical leadership. This objective factor also needs to be considered, calculating possible temporary and long-term allies, wavering, and so on. We know from history that

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invaders, compelled to retreat, mercilessly purge the abandoned territory, in order that the liberation forces can no longer use it. It is quite symbolic that, in the midst of the crisis in Ukraine, the founder and then director of Stratfor, George Friedman, argued that the American empire is building a sanitary cordon against Russia (and should take into account the experience of the British Empire in inciting Europeans against each other). It should also rely on its own experience in supporting Iran and Iraq (such that they are at war with each other, but not against the US): “This is cynical, it was certainly immoral, it worked” (Friedman 2015), Friedman claimed when participating as a guest at the influential Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Following this “pragmatic logic,” a potential conflict between Russia and Europe, and the proceeds of new “Marshall Plans,” could restore the financial well-being of the American elite. Neither Europe nor Russia needs this. First and foremost, there is the extreme danger of such logic in the nuclear age. Marin Le Pen, during her recent visit to Russia, stated that the US is acting in a way that demonstrates the need for Washington to unleash a new big war on the European continent (Dukhanova 2017). “The sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation due to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine only contribute to the gloomy future of the whole of Europe, in both the economic and socio-political spheres. Something similar was observed on the eve of the World War I” (Sedova 2014). This “predicts” Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the French party “Left Front.” What, then, is necessary for the progressive development of relations between the EU and Russia? It is necessary to avoid the policy of dictating and imposing decisions and to abandon the “demonization” of the dialogue partner. We need counter-compromises and the search for ways to combine our interests.

Strategic Psychological Warfare and the Relations Between the EU and Russia Psychological warfare has several levels: tactical, operational and strategic, each of which each solves a specific task. The most important level is the strategic, which aims toward directing the development of a particular country or the international system as a whole in a desired direction. Very often, the object of that intention is not aware of the character and the real

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scope of long-term operations that are modifying its mode of thinking and behavior. In socio-political terms, strategic psychological warfare (SPW) describes the explicit and implicit long-term focused psychological impact of competing systems (state, supra-state, interstate and non-state actors) in their attempts to inflict damage and/or cause liquidation (or assignment) of intangible assets in order to win in the material arena. The conceptual development of SPW started during the Cold War by both confronting sides and continued after it. In research conducted by RAND Corporation for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) in the mid-­ 1990s, the term “strategic information warfare” was introduced. This refers to warfare with blurred traditional boundaries, an expanded role for perception management waged on a global scale and the requirement of a new quality of public administration (see more: Molander et  al. 1996). SPW was one of the factors causing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent crisis in the former Soviet republics. In the foreground, of course, there were objective socio-economic and political factors at play, but the conscious desire and professional ability of certain external forces to use the problems of the USSR in their long-term goals also played an important role. In the field of psychological warfare, there are various schemes (of both explicit and implicit influence) subserving the thinking and behavior of individuals and social groups as well as contributing to erroneous management decisions, provoking repressions against the opposition, and much more. SPW is the systematic, long-term impact on the nodal elements of the public organism, as it tends to create a dominance of negative trends. Political, economic and diplomatic steps with regard to the next planned victim of a direct aggression or latent “regime change” (sometimes two variants are combined) always have an internal logic sequence to both strengthen internal destabilization, on the one hand, and produce the external isolation of the target regime, on the other. The sequence should gradually form negative attitudes toward the authorities among the population of a country and give rise to international condemnation of an “authoritarian regime” (as, under such threats, each regime becomes less democratic). Since there are no ideal governments on earth and the existing socio-­ political systems are far from perfect from all standpoints, it is not difficult to do so with overwhelming military, economic and information power. It follows such logic: the external actor begins the open offensive within the

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country through its local proxies when the high level of degradation of the regime (corruption, bureaucracy, high property and social stratification, etc.) appears evident. This results in a high degree of discontent with the regime among significant segments of the population. Thus, from this perspective, so-called revolutions (metaphors for regime change for the purpose of geopolitical reorientation of a country) are attempts by a variety of means, and—not least—through the management of consciousness and actions of target groups (to further exacerbate existing contradictions in society through technologies of psychological warfare). It is impossible to abolish the right and duty of people to rise up against repressive reactionary regimes, let alone abolish the objective laws of the social revolution. Still, we can and should distinguish genuine revolution from regime change. In general, technologies of regime destabilization are most effective when the degeneration of the regime accumulates, but not in the very last moment. In the very end of this process, an uncontrollable chaos emerges or a generation of the new revolutionary upward force emerges. This is hard or impossible to counteract. The feudal counterrevolution broke down facing the iron will of the Jacobins and, similarly, the Triple Entente was not able to stop the Bolsheviks. As a rule, technologies of “pseudo-revolution” are used from the outside in order to prevent a democratically oriented way out of the crisis. In practice, we see democracy being used as a front for advancing forces, policies and goals, which then bear little resemblance to democracy as such. When authentic democratic forces are weak, it is possible to establish pseudo-democratic bodies which lead the “revolution” for the benefit of a new reaction and they do so by means of communication methods. When the government tries to defend itself and counteracts, images of “victims and casualties” via mass media and rumors are deployed increasing active support for the “democratic,” “national” “opposition” against the “bloody regime”—both inside the country and on the part of world opinion. If initially the display of victims is carefully organized, later (due to escalation and subsequent violence and chaos), massacres are inevitable as the regime loses power and society finds itself at risk of being engulfed in violent rage. In the case of an open crisis, people are ready to appeal to arms and violence becomes massive and more and more indiscriminate. If constant manipulations through mass media are further added, the boiling pot of social discontent is no longer containable. The unleashing of such

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chaos and violence—or regime change management by means of chaos and violence—excludes and blocks the development of genuine democracy. In this context, controversial research links the casualties of Maidan in 2014 to the Ukrainian authorities. Ivan Katchanovski of the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, rationally planned and carried out with the goal of overthrowing the government and seizing power. Katchanovski points to an alliance between far-right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland (Katchanovski 2015). The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the EU and Russia. According to the researcher, it was a well-coordinated information campaign to make people believe that it was an act of brutality of the corrupted “pro-Russian” but very weak “pro-­ Yanukovich” regime. Many phenomena and techniques fit into the fabric of SPW. There is, for instance, the case of fake news, which significantly affects public consciousness in both Russia and the EU. Fakes are ubiquitous in the media and play an important role in the construction of a fake matrix where any new fake contributes to the previous one (and thus together construct a fake reality). Where one fake dies, new ones are already on the rise, resulting in the fact that social reality, with its real contradictions, continues to be in vogue every time. We can see a sophisticated, full-spectrum assault on free will. Moreover, millions of people are accustomed to this “fake reality” and build fakes by themselves. For example, Facebook recently reported that 83 million profiles on Facebook are not authentic (Thomas 2015). Facebook has admitted that its user data has been weaponized (referring to a trove of profiles that were sold to a branch of the SCL Group, Cambridge Analytica [CA], a private “strategic communications” firm which, in some aspects, resembles more a private propaganda agency backed by a cadre of right-wing billionaires). For years, Facebook’s ­company mantra was “Move fast and break things.” It seems, however that few realized that this related to democracy itself (Cooper 2018). CA has provided its services to the Leave.eu (Brexit) campaign, two US presidential election candidates, countries in Africa and the Caribbean, and their client list is growing in light of their runaway success (Porotsky 2018). Cambridge Analytica is only one of a number of similar companies that are emerging.

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According to associate professor and data scientist at Elon University, Jonathan Albright, This is a propaganda machine. It’s targeting people individually to recruit them to an idea. It’s a level of social engineering that I’ve never seen before. They’re capturing people and then keeping them on an emotional leash and never letting them go. (Anderson and Horvath 2017)

By leveraging automated emotional manipulation alongside swarms of bots, Facebook dark posts, A/B testing and fake news networks, Cambridge Analytica has activated an invisible machine that preys on the personalities of individual voters to create large shifts in public opinion. Many of these technologies have been used individually to some effect before, but together they make up a nearly impenetrable voter manipulation machine that is quickly becoming the new deciding factor in elections around the world (Anderson and Horvath 2017). According to information from the site of Cambridge Analytica, with up to 5000 data points on over 230 million American voters, the company is building a custom target audience in order to use this crucial information to engage, persuade and motivate people to act (CA Political 2019). Yes, the company is owned and controlled by people with conservative and even alt-right interests that are also deeply entwined in the Trump administration. The Mercer family is both a major owner of Cambridge Analytica and one of Trump’s largest donors. Steve Bannon, in addition to acting as Trump’s Chief Strategist and a member of the White House Security Council, is a Cambridge Analytica board member (Anderson and Horvath 2017). In January 2017 Cambridge Analytica announced the appointment of Darren Bolding to the position of Chief Technology Officer (CTO). Bolding joins Cambridge Analytica from the Republican National Committee (RNC), where he served as CTO, the organization’s most senior technology officer, from November 2015. While at the RNC, Bolding was critical to building up the Republican Party’s technology and data infrastructure, while adding new tools and processes to support the party’s candidates. Bolding and his team at the RNC collaborated closely with Cambridge Analytica during the successful 2016 presidential campaign of D. Trump in quickly building out a massively scalable database and a suite of products that helped voters better engage with the campaign and the electoral process (Cambridge Analytica 2017).

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One can see evident attempts to bind Cambridge Analytica’s role in Brexit and Trump’s presidential success with the “aggressive activities” of Russia. For example, we read in The Guardian: “Russia, Facebook, Trump, Mercer, Bannon, Brexit. Every one of these threads runs through Cambridge Analytica” (Wylie 2018), the title of an article in the Independent, “Trump-Russia probe: Mueller ‘requests emails’ from Cambridge Analytica firm linked to 2016 campaign and Brexit” (Embury-­Dennis 2017), and a lot of similar articles. However, we could similarly mention Barack Obama’s successful use of big data as an instrument of political marketing. The Obama campaign built a 100-person strong analytics staff to churn through dozens of terabytes of data with a combination of the HP Vertica MPP (massively parallel processing) analytic database and predictive models to gain a competitive edge; analysts could quickly and easily answer nearly any question, no matter where the data originally came from (Lampiit 2013). The 2012 US presidential campaign has been called “the first big data election” (Hellweg 2012). It was distinctive in combining the use of predictive analytics with outreach tactics supported by behavioral science (Guaszcza 2012). According to Bruce Newman, one of the leading specialists in political marketing, “[a] huge part of Obama’s success was the use of technology, social media and micro-targeting to effectively communicate and distribute the ideas that the candidate represents” (Zamorski 2017). The boх of Pandora, full of nice high-technology instruments, was opened to more effectively influence people—but we perhaps forget “All that glisters is not gold.” The core issue is not whether this or that consultancy receives information about people legally or illegally (this is of course important but, in our case, less relevant). The real danger lies in the concentration of the sophisticated influence technologies in the hands of the few. The possible latent impact of these technologies is unimaginable for ordinary voters who are voluntarily supplying their own party candidates with personal data. Social media and big data analytics are changing the way political campaigns are run. The sinister side of this is that they know how to pull the right emotional strings to elicit the exact desired response. This is a perversion of the democratic process (Porotsky 2018). Between big data, artificial intelligence (AI), cyberwarfare and new levels of detail in election polling, the citizens of the EU and Russia should be thinking seriously about who owns the firms that collect these data. Some corporate interests (especially of multinational companies and banks—because of their transnational character, reach and

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financial capacities), individually or in synchronization with state support, may cause a lot of harm. The central bodies of the EU pay more and more attention to the problem of counteracting the threat of disinformation campaigns. In January 2018, the European Commission set up a high-level group of experts (the HLEG) to advise on policy initiatives to counter fake news and disinformation spread online. The main deliverable of the HLEG was a report (European Commission 2018) designed to review best practices in light of fundamental principles and suggest suitable responses stemming from such principles. This Report favors the word “disinformation” over “fake news.” Disinformation, as used in the Report, includes “all forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit” (European Commission 2018, p. 35). This systematic approach to the issue of disinformation is very positive; at the same time, the report is indecisive in its analysis of the role of responsibility of international structures, including international platforms. The EAVI (European Association for Viewers Interests, a Brussels-­ based organization that works on media literacy and disinformation in Europe) rightly comments on the HLEG research: The report is particularly disappointing when dealing with the role of platforms. EAVI finds imperative that Facebook and Google for instance, must be held more accountable for the content they share. Instead it is proposed that they take some actions, which, in fact, are already being taken, including clearly marking sponsored content, working with fact-­ checking organizations and applying flagging systems for suspect content (EAVI 2018). Once again, the question arises: is there a need to integrate the efforts of all countries, or at least the leading ones, in an effort to rapidly and only partly control disinformation campaigns (which are especially dangerous if viewed as a part of SPW). It is very important to start effective cooperation in the sphere of the usage of information weapons—not just between the official bodies and expert groups of Russia and the EU but, similarly, with effective inclusion of relevant civil structures (especially in the sphere of media literacy, communication management and psychological warfare). Since 1998, Russia has introduced annually a resolution at the United Nations calling for an international agreement to combat “means and methods used with a view to damaging another State’s information resources, processes and systems; use of information to the detriment of a

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State’s defense, administrative, political, social, economic or other vital systems, and the mass manipulation of a State’s population with a view to destabilizing society and the State” (Tikk and Kerttunen 2017, p. 9). Also, Western scholars acknowledge that, in the United Nations Organization “The groundwork and idea for a resolution on information security came from the Russian Federation … Moscow’s original proposal in the United Nations First Committee was to ban information weapons and their use by way of a dedicated international legal regime” (Tikk and Kerttunen 2017, pp. 8–9). For a long time, Western state actors have been ready to discuss cybersecurity issues but have not addressed the perception and communication management threats. They have consistently opposed these efforts to close opportunities for interstate psychological warfare through the internet, under the pretext that such initiatives represent the interests of authoritarian states to control it and restrict freedom of information. It is not surprising, from this perspective, that Russia was condemned without clear evidence for meddling in the latest American elections and that investigations as well as Western mainstream media campaigns were organized to prove such kind of interference of Russia in the EU elections in 2017. In light of recent developments (Cambridge Analytica—Facebook), Russia’s position seems to be more balanced and consistent. Over the last 20  years, much research (Korovin 2014; Makarenko 2017; Pashentsev and Polunina 2014; Rastorguev and Litvinenko 2014; Volodenkov 2015) has been published in Russia on the risks for society of perception management through the internet, especially under the conditions of global psychological warfare. There is a lot of evidence on the existence of influence campaigns against Russian civil society, not only on a global scale but, similarly, inside the country (with a support of a wide variety of front organizations, including the relevant internet structures and social networks). Their methods have been very similar to those which are so sharply critiqued by the EU and the US; it is only as a result of sharp contradictions and a split among the Western elites that such evidence has come to light. This does not mean, of course, that Russia is incapable of efficient psychological warfare through the internet—of course it is. It is therefore important that the international community adopts effective joint measures, not so much against democratic freedoms, but against the system of sophisticated technologies (which can transform in a latent way our society into something directly opposite to the very sense of democracy).

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Fakes, as a part of SPW, play a very negative role in the relations between states—whether it is in the sphere of politics or business. In October 2016, the Russian news outlet RBC reported that there were at least seven companies registered between March and July 2016  in the UK with names similar to well-known Russian firms. The company names registered in Britain were Rosneft Oil Company Ltd., PJSC Tatneft Ltd., JSC Transneft Ltd., Oil Company LUKOIL Ltd., Surgutneftegas Ltd., PJSOC Bashneft Ltd. and Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft Ltd. The companies were fake, having no connection with the real Russian companies—despite their fraudulent attempt to be registered as managed by the same persons who are the top managers of the real companies. The registration of limited companies with standard charter is easily done online in 24 hours and costs only £12 (Tkachev and Dzyadko 2016). In the beginning of 2017, five Russian oil companies won appeals and lawsuits in the UK to have their fraudulent and unconnected “doppelgangers” registered in 2016 removed from the UK Companies House, according to court rulings (The Moscow Times 2017; Paraskova 2017). If RBC did not ring the alarm bell, there would not have been such a reaction by Russian companies (and mainstream media could potentially have spread disinformation connected with the activities of so-called big Russian oil companies in the UK). This is not the first time in recent years that fake or deceptively named companies have made the news. On October 17, 2016, Scott Dworkin, an activist against then-presidential candidate Donald Trump, released what he believed to be evidence of illicit ties between Trump and Russia: a list of 249 Russian companies with “Trump” in its name. The list would later become the first item in a full-fledged report on Trump’s alleged Russian connections released by the Democratic Coalition Against Trump, where Dworkin served as a senior advisor. Dozens of articles in the style of “An Investigation Just Found Trump Has Hundreds of Businesses in Russia” (Taylor 2016) appeared in no time on the sites of supporters of the Democratic Party. For many Russia-watchers however, the company list was an obvious red herring—due mainly to Russia’s lax enforcement of laws against “illegal branding” (The Moscow Times 2016). Since 1993, 19 firms with the name “Clinton” have been registered in Russia, of which 12 have gone bankrupt. The OJSC “Clinton” in St. Petersburg, registered in 2016 for example, is specialized in the cleaning of garbage (Rusprofile 2019). Only two examples of fake news with strategic goals have been introduced here. In the first case, the fakes were the result of attacks

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synchronized in time and space on a number of Russian leading companies. The question arises whether private detractors of real companies were involved in the appearance of duplicate companies in order to inflict financial or image damage or whether it could be linked to other actors, such as special services. Answers to these questions will only emerge in the future. It is necessary to remember that psychological warfare between states has its levels: tactical, operational and strategic ones, and each of them has its own tasks to solve. In the second case, Donald Trump, a charismatic billionaire, well known for his business success, stimulated several dozen small Russian entrepreneurs to register their companies under the name “Trump.” It was done at a crucial moment in the election campaign (several weeks before the voting) to prove Trump’s illegal ties with Russia. Mr. Trump was forced to make excuses about things he had never done, and he has to do it even now, during the presidency. His political opponent can be pleased. It damages the foreign policy effectiveness of D. Trump. Moreover, it affects the national prestige of the country and its national interests. I think if Hillary Clinton had won, she would have to justify herself in dubious connections with Russia. Back in April 2016, John Schindler, a former analyst for the National Security Agency, called on Clinton to explain the details of her campaign chief’s connection to the Kremlin (Takala 2016). There were other similar attacks. Fake reality has a considerable effect on political processes and international relations and, in some ways, deforms them with exacerbated individual problems as well as on the international stage as a whole. According to Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Ottawa, Michel Chossudovsky, “US military actions are carefully coordinated. Major military and covert intelligence operations are being undertaken simultaneously in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. In turn, the planning of military operations is coordinated with non-conventional forms of warfare including regime change, financial warfare and economic sanctions” (Chossudovsky 2019).

Conclusion It is important to find more long-term elements for cooperation, not only between Russia and the EU, but among all the leading centers of the current multipolar world. The strategic task lies not in the search for the

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alternative configuration of global political and military blocks (or conserving the old ones), but rather in the aligning of joint interests in order to solve the principal issues of mankind. The efficiency of strategic communication as a means of collaboration is negligible when strategic interests and goals mismatch drastically. In this case, strategic communication inevitably becomes a tool of information warfare. There should be no illusion to the contrary. Meanwhile, the basic national interests require the opposite, namely, the harmonious interaction of countries in the interest of mutual exchange and the solution of global problems. It is also important to achieve an adequate projection of the goals, achievements, failures and prospects of this interaction in the minds of target audiences who perceive this interaction as their vital cause. That is why compromises are essential, as is the search for ways to combine interests. Strategic communication can be very fruitful for the creation of a climate useful for such search, but it can aggravate such a situation as well. To a certain extent, strategic communication itself is an important (and partly autonomous) factor of rapprochement or estrangement of the parties. It is thus vital to ensure that it supports the accomplishment of the first task. We can fully agree with the point of view of Dennis M. Murphy, a professor of information operations and information in warfare at the US Army War College: “Basic theory—you may not change someone’s mind, but you can find areas of agreement where interests overlap” (Murphy 2010, p. 10). Such a program of joint optimization of strategic communication is completely unfeasible in the face of growing tensions between Russia and China on the one hand, and the US on the other. Serious, in fact revolutionary, economic, technological, social and political shifts are necessary in all leading countries, taking into account their national characteristics, for the sake of the common interest of overcoming the threat of a new world war and a worthy, democratic, progressive development of all mankind. Unfortunately, many changes—for example, in technologies—without adequate, timely assessment and response by the society can give a very negative effect and have disastrous consequences. New factors of social development and their impact on strategic communication between the EU and Russia will be discussed in one of the next chapters of this book: “Global Shifts and Their Impact on Russia-EU Strategic Communication.”

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CHAPTER 3

Focusing on Common Geopolitical Interests: Changing the Focus in EU-Russia Dialogue and Communication? Pierre-Emmanuel Thomann

Introduction According to the EU Global Strategy published in June 2016, “managing the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic challenge” (European External Action Service 2016). So far, communication among political circles and media between the EU and Russia during the current crisis has largely focused on the question of “European values” and the interpretation of European and international law. This has led to a worsening of the relation at governmental level. From the EU side, the ideological debate on values focuses on the primacy of “transnational values” deriving from “universal principles.” This approach is highly divisive as the values cannot be precisely defined either between Russia and the EU or within the EU itself. In a multicentered world, a growing resistance to any monopoly of the definition of democracy, or of the “best model of civilization,” can be observed. The interpretation of international law has also been at the center of communication

P.-E. Thomann (*) International Association EUROCONTINENT, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pashentsev (ed.), Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1_3

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strategies to win the argument over the adversary, which has led to more distrust on both sides. In the past, the EU and Russia have engaged in lecturing each other on international law. However, international law remains a matter of various interpretations and changes, which depend on the shifts in the balance of power. The “right of people to determine themselves” principle in international law, for instance, was advocated by the EU during the German unification, and the dismantling of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, but also by Russia in the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence from Georgia. In the case of Crimea, on the other hand, the EU is now defending the United Nations’ “territorial integrity” of Ukraine principle, while Russia, on the other hand, defends the “right of people to determine themselves” principle. The “narrative war” between the EU and Russia also derives from distinct interpretations of the different ongoing crises, as well as from rival global geopolitical representations (Deters-Schneider et  al. 2008). Moreover, there is a generational issue because people who have experienced the Cold War have more difficulty adopting a new way of thinking, and easily fall back into old “Cold War” visions and obsolete agendas. The “New Cold War” narrative is therefore an easy tool for political forces willing to prevent the emergence of a more balanced geopolitical landscape in implementing negative strategic communication. The geopolitical visions conveyed within a nation among media, academics and politicians are based upon a mixture of reality, but also on imaginary elements (resulting from historical experience, inertia but also illusions). They represent central elements of the strategic vision of a nation-state. Since the emergence of strategic communication is increasing in the digital society, strategic narratives are increasingly shaping these visions. This is why the matching between strategic communication and a realist strategic vision, an illusory strategic vision inherited by inertia or a propagandistic narrative disconnected from reality but aimed at destabilization and spreading negative perceptions must be distinguished. Although the state is central to implementing such strategic communication, it should take into account the basic needs of a nation to be successful and anticipate the systemic evolutions. This is difficult with the global trend for “democracies” to move toward a more superficial model of “opinion democracy” easily instrumentalized by sectoral interest. This is why more diverse groups like academics, citizens and researchers have to be part of the debate, in order to avoid the monopolization of sectoral interest groups or groups dominated by inertia. The thematic of

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strategic communication issues in EU-Russia relations and its linkages with geopolitical stakes, that was so far absent in academic literature, has recently been addressed (Pashentsev 2017a, b) and would benefit from being developed further. Therefore, EU-Russia relations cannot be separated from global geopolitical trends. In order to guide the political decisions of both partners, a more common diagnosis of the global evolutions would be required. This would be possible after identifying hurdles to overcome, highlighting common interests and hopefully adopting common strategies and positive strategic communication to implement new policies. Today, the danger lies in the spreading of a spiraling crisis under the “sleepwalker” syndrome (Clark 2012), leading to confrontation caused by the absence of geopolitical knowledge about each other’s interests and priorities and the focus on negative narratives from actors willing to reinforce antagonism to maintain old power structures and slow down the emergence of a new multicentered world. To prevent further European fragmentation, it might be time to underline the potential benefit of more focus on common geopolitical interests in order to improve communication among academics, experts and politicians from EU countries and Russia. The focus on the geopolitical angle will give a different view and might thus improve knowledge of respective interests and perceptions. This approach has the advantage of moving EU-Russia relations from ideology to more focused fields of potential cooperation. Academic and expert circles have a very strong role to play in initiating new narratives, although in the end, it will depend on the political will of the different governments. It is also more fundamentally reasonable to accept respective differing geopolitical visions determined by geography and history and identify respective “red lines.” The crisis will probably reach even higher levels of intensity before both sides realize that neither of them will be able to impose their point of view on their rival partner. The resetting of EU-Russia relations should not be treated as a subsidiary matter of EU external relations, but as a central question concerning the future of the European project. The defense of obsolete models in communication narratives by actors characterized by political inertia is maintaining old paradigms. In worst cases, it leads to regression when intentional narratives like the “New Cold War” are promoted (Carpenter 2018). It should be seen instead as an opportunity to reform the European project with a more systemic approach, because

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nowadays the EU is facing a deep crisis and increasing skepticism from citizens. First of all, it is necessary to make an austere diagnosis of the situation and to highlight the main obstacles using a geopolitical angle of analysis. Second, it is useful to identify common geopolitical interests in order to engage in a strategic dialogue. This approach could help circumvent the information war based on rival ideological narratives and lead to more positive strategic communication.

The Diagnosis: Absence of Geopolitical Thinking at the EU Level The current geopolitical situation is a pivotal moment because the objective of unity in the European project is experiencing more and more obstacles. Liberal and human rights normative ideologies as the basis of the project are more and more frequently debated within European nations. The European utopia was aimed at building peace through unity, but as a result of the multipolar tendencies in the world and in Europe, fragmentation forces are stronger. The new European Union Global Strategy (European External Action Service 2016) was written to conform to EU competencies and policies. However, a comprehensive threat analysis and sound geopolitical diagnosis of the situation were not included in the document. The promotion of “cooperative orders” by the EU is also impossible without taking into account the perception of other actors, especially Russia (Korosteleva 2017). The European Union is closer to a civilian and normative power (Laïdi 2005) in international relations and fosters its own model of civil and military management and diplomacy. However, the absence of geopolitical reflection inside the EU leads to a worsening of its relations with Russia (Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences 2017), whose objectives do not match EU objectives, and further to a degradation of its own security, in the context of a difficult Franco-German attempt to revive the European project after Brexit. It is not enough for the European Union to adopt a position of “empire of standards” in anticipation of a potentially growing significance of the legal factor in international relations, and in the face of geopolitical doctrines of other political entities. Geopolitical issues are either hidden in the European institutions or are deliberately removed from the eyes of

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citizens. A better appreciation of geopolitical issues would prove useful for the EU in its analysis and comprehension of territorial issues. It would also be beneficial for the development of a power strategy based on the control of territory and subordinated to the objective of a political Europe.1 A reformed EU, as an instrument to give more geopolitical autonomy to its member states, would have a better chance of engaging in the global balance of power. EU integration and the defense of the model of liberal democracy cannot become an end in itself. The focus of the strategic communication of certain EU member state governments on past ideological models is reinforcing European fragmentation and the skepticism of citizens, but also European fragmentation both at the EU level and on a continental scale. It reinforces political inertia and avoids political responsibility on the part of actors profiting from the old order. There is no credible policy in the EU Global Strategy for delivering “strategic autonomy.” The growing number of political declarations on international relations rules and human rights is also inversely proportional to the collective inability of the European Union and its member states to manage crises in their geographical proximity in a decisive way. This is the case in Syria, Libya and Ukraine too, but also when it comes to Islamist terrorism on European territory and the migration crisis, which are reinforcing internal EU fragmentation on the question of borders. This lack of strategic reflection leads to an opportunistic use of EU policies by external geopolitical projects, disguised as negative strategic communication by actors refusing to accept change. There is also a neutralization process among rival geopolitical projects within the EU itself. The EaP (EU Eastern Partnership) is therefore instrumentalized by the states that are most opposed to cooperation with Russia and which are the most eager to implement an extreme version of the Euro-Atlantic vision, excluding Russia. We have to examine relations between the European Union and Russia in a more accurate way, because they not only impact continental European stability, but also represent major geopolitical stakes for the future of the European project. Eventually, European actors would need to adopt a more positive strategic communication to promote reforms and avoid the fall into inertia, and in the end geopolitical obsolescence.

1  The EU is not a nation but an alliance of nations, while Russia is a nation. There is a need for more clarification on the finalities of the European project among member states.

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The EU and Russia: Two Parallel Visions The European Union makes its relations with Russia dependent on legal principles declared on a unilateral basis: “Substantial changes in relations between the EU and Russia are premised upon full respect for international law and the principles underpinning the European security order, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. We will not recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilization of eastern Ukraine” (European External Action Service 2016). However, the criticism against Russia regarding the so-called nonrespect of international law has no legitimacy among Russian public opinion since the United Nations system has been challenged by the US and its close European allies over the Iraq war, and did not respect the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia after the recognition of Kosovo as an independent entity. Russia is not accepted as an equal partner, and from the EU and US government’s points of view has to be westernized. At the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, John Kerry and Angela Merkel, the most prominent Western leaders in favor of sanctions by the European Union against Russia, claimed that Russia was an actor whose behavior was a thing of the past. John Kerry declared, on 3rd March 2014, that “[y]ou just don’t in the twenty-first century behave in a nineteenth century fashion by invading another country on a completely trumped up pretext” (Reuters 2014). On 13th March, in a declaration to the government, Angela Merkel also stressed that “the conflict in Georgia in 2008 and today in Ukraine in the middle of Europe is a conflict of zones of influences and territorial claims, as we experienced in the nineteenth and twentieth century” (Die Bundesregierung 2014) and emphasized that they were outdated. The European Union is not ready to consider Russia an equal partner. From the point of view of the EU, Russia has to be westernized, that is, transformed according to the normative vision of the European Union into a “superior moral force” in defending its values. Russians perceive this positioning as an unacceptable form of “moral imperialism.” Their representations are in total contradiction to the ambition of the European Union to transform the world according to its image. The European Union aims to export its normative model based on the “interdependence theory.” This ideology postulates that commerce brings peace in

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an ­ automatic way.2 The perspectives of Russia’s westernization are blocked by the Russian government. The government defends the concept of “sovereign democracy” and, in a multipolar world, positions itself as an autonomous Eurasian pole of power, with a different geopolitical orientation, both European and Asiatic. The Russian government suggests negotiating a new European security architecture and stopping the enlargement of NATO and the EU. Today, rival visions between the European Union and Russia are an obstacle to identifying common interests. The Principles of the EU Toward Russia: Isolate Russia The European Union has outlined a number of principles to guide its policy toward Russia (European Council  – Council of the European Union 2016): • Implementation of the Minsk Agreements as the key condition for any substantial change in the EU’s stance toward Russia. • Strengthened relations with the EU’s Eastern partners and other neighbors, particularly in Central Asia. • Strengthening of the EU’s resilience (e.g., energy security, hybrid threats and strategic communication). • Need for selective engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU. • Need to engage in people-to-people contact and support Russian civil society. However, these principles are clearly an attempt to isolate Russia, which has an opposing principle to that of Europe: • Russia is part of the “Common European Home.” • The future of Europe does not consist in a transformation of Russia according to European Union principles but in a transformation of the European project where nations are placed on an equal basis (Zagorsky 2016). 2  The doctrine of economic interdependence can lead to geopolitical blindness as in the case of Ukraine where free trade zone negotiations led to a geopolitical crisis.

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With regard to these principles of the EU, the problem lies also in the difficult implementation of the Minsk agreements by Kiev. The federalization process of the Ukrainian constitution to give substantial autonomy to the self-proclaimed Donbass Republics is so far impossible to implement in a way to overcome the crisis. As for the cooperation between the European Union and Russia’s neighbors (Eastern partnership countries to Central Asia), the policy is not acceptable for Russians because the European Union prioritizes relations with Russia’s neighbors over relations with Russia itself. Ultimately, the objective of the European Union is to influence Russian civil society, which is a very sensitive topic, since Western NGOs are perceived by Russia as Trojan horses of a colored revolution (Avioutskii 2008). This assumption is not unfounded if one considers the declarations of Jacek Sayusz-Wolski, former vice-president and currently member of the European Parliament, during a round table in Brussels in 2014 (Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies 2014). He stressed that it was necessary to engage in a long battle to provoke a “regime change” in Russia and that this could be achieved through strategies of influence in civil society with NGOs, as well as through targeting middle classes in order to westernize Russia. The EU’s Response to the Information War One of the central elements of the European Union’s response to what is perceived as a propaganda war and hybrid warfare between Russia and the EU is to develop its system of strategic communication. With this in mind, a new Russian counter-propaganda service has been created. The East StratCom Task Force is supposed to expose the misinformation of Russian officials and media in the Eastern Partnership countries3 in particular, but also in the member states of the European Union. The service was created on the initiative of Russia’s most critical member states, with little enthusiasm from the rest of the members. France and the Mediterranean countries were initially more inclined to support a South StratCom to counter Islamist propaganda, but this part of the counter-propaganda service has not yet succeeded, although it has been supported by the European Parliament in its report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties from the Committee on Foreign 3

 Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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Affairs. The rapporteur was the Polish MEP Anna Elżbieta Fotyga (European Parliament 2016). An inter-institutional Arab StratCom Task Force has been created, but it has no dedicated staff and uses existing budget (EU Institute for Security Studies 2016). This reflects the differences in geopolitical priorities between member states of the European Union. The stated aim of East StratCom is to reveal fake news conveyed by the Russian media, and not to initiate propaganda for the European Union, which is considered counterproductive. The head of the unit is a British career diplomat, Giles Portman, who was initially under the supervision of Michael Mann, in charge of the communication strategy of the European Service for External Action (EEAS), and former spokesman for Catherine Ashton. Michael Mann was replaced in May 2017 by Lutz Guellner, a German and a former spokesman for Catherine Ashton. The most active member state behind this initiative seems to be the UK, which deals with most of the security posts in the EU institutions (Thomann 2016). Brexit might therefore reduce the camp of countries in the European Union that are mistrustful of Russia. East StratCom Methodology Let’s now focus on the way East StratCom operates. Fake news is produced in Ukraine, in the US, in the EU member states, in Russia, in the Islamic State in Syria and other places around the world. It is a global trend. Rival narratives, including fake news, are becoming central tools in the global geopolitical arena. East StratCom debunks Russian fake news, but not Ukrainian, US or EU member states’ ones. The Russian side is being put forward as the guilty party, although all actors use strategic communication, including fake news, as tools of influence. Since Russia is the only target in East StratCom’s fight against fake news, it raises the suspicion that the target is not the news, but Russia, and that there is a geopolitical motivation. The exclusive concentration on Russian media “fake news,” or supposed Russian hacking activities, is diverting attention from the EU member states’ and the US (Johnson 2017) own communication and influence strategies. During the French presidential elections, Russian media were accused of using “fake news” and of hacking actions against the candidate Emmanuel Macron in order to influence the electoral process. However, massive infringement from EU officials (Bloomberg 2017), European (Politico 2017) and American foreign politicians (The Guardian 2017a),

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calling openly to vote for Emmanuel Macron, at the same time as Russian authorities were accused of interfering in the process, has been neglected in mainstream media, which instead concentrated on Russian actions that were never proved (Le Monde Diplomatique 2017). Guillaume Poupard, director general of the government cyber-defense agency known in France by its acronym, ANSSI (Agence nationale de la sécurité des agences d’information), found no trace of Russian activity behind the hacking of Emmanuel Macron’s electoral campaign e-mails (AP News 2017). When, in his Senate Armed Services hearing, NSA director Admiral Rogers said that US authorities gave their French counterparts warnings about supposed Russian interference before the Macronleaks were published, Guillaume Poupard questioned the NSA’s “help” instead and said: “Why did Admiral Rogers say that, like that, at that time? It really surprised me. It really surprised my European allies. And to be totally frank, when I spoke about it to my NSA counterparts and asked why he said that, they didn’t really know how to reply either. Perhaps he went further than what he really wanted to say,” and he underlined that “if you start to accuse one country when in fact it was another country … we’ll get international chaos. We’ll get what we all fear, a sort of permanent conflict where everyone is attacking everyone else” (AP News 2017). The EU narrative focusing on Russian actions voluntarily neglects the context of a global geopolitical fight for influence among all great powers: Russia of course, but also the US, China, France and Germany. As the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz underlined, a war is like a duel (Clausewitz 2006) and requires at least two actors with rival visions and rival strategies. Their fight is a dialectic leading to reciprocal actions. Strategic communication from one actor leads to strategic communication from rival actors. Russia’s actions in cyberspace are as much a result of Russian power as of its adversaries (Gérard and Limonier 2017). The increasing presence of Russia in the European strategic communication landscape is also a result of the desire of the Russian government since the mid-2000s to offer a much more attractive image and to counter the relaunch, in the Western media sphere, of a fabrication of images of a hostile, threatening and reactionary Russia (Raviot 2017b). Russia has been able to become a major actor in European debates since the EU member states have no numerical sovereignty and are under monopolistic dependence on GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft) owned by the US. The Snowden affair has also helped ­legitimize Russian contestation of American hegemony. Russia can therefore

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enlarge its digital sphere of influence in the EU, as well as increasingly meeting the expectations of European citizens regarding alternative narratives and information, because its digital economy and specificity are outside the control of big American corporations and therefore the American state (Audinet and Limonier 2017). The very reason why East StratCom is only targeting Russia is that they are more preoccupied with the strength and durability of the transatlantic link and the complementarity with NATO than the “strategic autonomy of the EU.” In the European Parliament report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties, this is prominent in the first paragraph. It “underlines that hostile propaganda against the EU comes in many different forms and uses various tools, often tailored to match EU member states’ profiles, with the goal of distorting truths, provoking doubt, dividing member states, engineering a strategic split between the European Union and its North American partners and paralyzing the decision-making process, thereby discrediting the EU institutions and transatlantic partnerships, which play a recognized role in the European security and economic architecture, in the eyes and minds of EU citizens and of citizens of neighboring countries.” In the paragraph dedicated to the EU strategy to counteract propaganda, the report also “stresses that cooperation between the EU and NATO in the field of strategic communication should be substantially strengthened” (European Parliament 2016). The priority given to Russian activities over ISIL/Daesh’s Islamist propaganda in the report is also striking. The treatment of Russia and ISIL/ Daesh as third parties on the same footing equates to fallacious intellectual and strategic reasoning. This report, initially written in the Committee on Foreign Affairs by reporter Anna Elżbieta Fotyga, has sparked some controversy as a minority opinion tabled by Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left, GUE/NGL MEP Javier Couso rejected the report and declared that it was “irresponsible to place a state like Russia at the same level of threat as ISIL/Daesh” and demanded “a strict separation of the EU from NATO.” Let’s now focus on the sources East StratCom uses for its investigations. East StratCom claims to debunk Russian propaganda but it uses unreliable sources like Bellingcat. Information products spread by Bellingcat are incorporated in mainstream media without any critical ­distance, and informational experts have criticized the methods and tools of analysis used by Bellingcat (Simons 2017).

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East StratCom also relies on media very often financed by the US, such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Polygraph.info, a fact-checking website produced by Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, NGOs such as Stopfake (Ukrainian NGO), but also the US Department of State, the US Senate, media like the New York Times and US think tanks like the Brookings Institution and the Atlantic Council. These organizations and media openly defend the US unipolar vision of the world or are close to it, more and more to the detriment of the vision of the new American presidency and the real expectations of US citizens, and often use fake news cases to push their own narrative. There is no systematic independent assessment of fake news cases by independent experts or academics. East StratCom also tends to consider “fake news” to be anything that is not in line with the EU narrative. It mixes factual examples of fake news in a very narrow sense, and at the same time fosters its own narrative, which is only a result of its own interpretation and representations. As we underlined before, it does not take into account the geopolitical context of the situation, or the geographical and historical factors. In proceeding that way, East StratCom also wants to promote its own policies through its narrative. Therefore the EU plays the role of both judge and party since it has its own interests to defend. The Eastern Partnership policy is a good case with which to underline this claim. On the occasion of the 5th Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit in Brussels, East StratCom published a document on its website entitled “Myths about the Eastern Partnership” (European External Action Service 2017a), which was supposed to counter false information about this policy. According to its website, in its “Questions and answers about the East StratCom Task Force” it “develops communication products and campaigns focused on better explaining EU policies in the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine)” (European External Action Service 2017b). The document pretends to counter the myth that participation in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) leads to EU membership. It underlines that this claim is “false” and that the Eastern Partnership initiative “is not an EU accession process. Its aim is to build a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation.” The situation is, however, much more ambiguous. The document omits to mention that although accession is not mentioned in EU or other Eastern Partnership documents, further EU enlargement to

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Eastern Partnership countries is an objective of some countries in the European Union. EU enlargement has to be unanimously approved by member states and member states are today divided on the issue. However, the pro-enlargement countries think the situation can change in the future. This is why Ukrainian think tanks in Brussels are pushing for future enlargements after a process of Europeanization through the Eastern Partnership program. East StratCom omits to inform about the implicit sides of this policy. The EaP policy is used by both the EaP countries (Ukrainian Think Tank Liaison office in Brussels 2018) and some EU member states to push for further EU enlargement in the longer term. In a WikiLeaks cable from 2008, an American diplomat wrote about the Eastern Partnership policy that “Polish analysts tell us having a pro-­ Western buffer zone in Ukraine and Belarus would keep Poland off the front line with an increasingly assertive Russia. By offering former Soviet republics the prospect of free trade and visa-free travel to the EU, the Eastern Partnership can spur the reforms needed for eventual EU membership and stem growing Russian influence” (WikiLeaks 2008). In the cable, the diplomat refers to this Polish approach as the “Sikorski doctrine.” If the WikiLeaks cable gives a different light on the origins of the Eastern Partnership, let’s have a look at the opinion of an EU diplomat from the European External Action Service (EEAS). The former EU ambassador to Russia, Vygaudas Ušackas, declared in October 2017: “We need not only to acknowledge Ukrainians’ European aspirations but at some point grant them a path towards EU membership. We know from experience that the prospect of membership works as a stimulus for reforms. Uncertainty about Ukraine’s geopolitical position also leaves it exposed to further destabilization by Russia, which in turn has a negative impact on EU-Russia relations. A successful Ukraine will contribute to stability in our region and represent a powerful example for the Russian people” (The Guardian 2017b). In their Joint Declaration of the Brussels Eastern Partnership Summit, as agreed by the Summit participants on 24th November 2017 in Brussels (Council of the European Union 2017), the EU member states stressed that “the Summit participants acknowledge the European aspirations and European choice of the partners concerned, as stated in the Association Agreements.” The Netherlands was especially reluctant to talk of the Eastern partners’ “European aspirations.” In 2016, it negotiated changes to the EU’s association agreement with the Ukraine after Dutch voters

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had rejected the original version in a referendum, but the term was maintained, although it falls short of “accepting” these aspirations. At the Summit, the EU member states also stressed that “the Eastern Partnership aims to build a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation and is not directed against anyone.” The words “not directed against anyone” are aimed at reducing Russia’s suspicion about the EaP, in contradiction with the origins of the EaP, which can also be interpreted as a tool of the “Sikorski doctrine,” as revealed by a WikiLeaks cable. Geopolitical analysis is about highlighting the implicit objectives of actors. In this respect, the former EU ambassador to Russia has unveiled his support for EU enlargement to Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, this is in line with the posture of Poland and the Baltic countries, but also more recently Romania and Croatia (Euractiv 2017), who are openly in favor of further EU enlargement and this is precisely why they support the Eastern Partnership policy. The president of the European People’s Party (EPP) Joseph Daul also emphasized that “we must offer concrete European prospects to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. And we must offer them the hope that one day they can join our family” (Ukrainian Think Tank Liaison office in Brussels 2016). The EU narrative on the Eastern Partnership is therefore partially biased since it does not explain the complete picture and maintains ambiguity about future enlargement. This ambiguity is reducing trust, not only in Russia, but also among EU citizens. To resolve this crucial problem, as part of this reform, the EU needs to fix its frontiers in order to preserve its cohesion, strengthen its identity and facilitate the identification of its interests. Biased or fake narratives like the rewriting of history or omitting the historical and geopolitical context are a much bigger problem than the narrow definition of fake news. This EU posture is also a distraction from the real challenges. These include the reform of the EU in order to position the European project in a more realistic way in the emerging multicentered world and the renewal of trust from its citizens. Think Tanks in Brussels and the Narrative of the New Cold War: A Negative Climate for Debates on the Issue of EU-Russia Relations The information war, which is growing on both the Russian and Western sides, has led to a very negative climate for debates on the question of relations among the European Union, the US and Russia.

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With the worsening of the Ukrainian crisis, the Martens Centre has increased the number of articles that are very critical of Russia. Thus, an article by Roland Freudenstein from February 2015 is entitled “The Renaissance of the West: How Europe and America Can Strengthen by Confronting Putin’s Russia” (Freudenstein and Speck 2015). In the analysis of threats to EU security, Christian Deubner of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) equally speaks of “Russian aggression” (Deubner 2016). Another example is Karsten Voigt, of the FEPS and a former German MP, who in his article on Russia speaks of “a new phase of Russia and Ostpolitik” (Voigt 2014). The fact that these publications were written by German authors in the think tanks of the two main political groups in the European Parliament also reveals the preponderance of the German point of view in the debates on Russia in Brussels. In the different points of view expressed by the two German authors, we can identify the national division between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The CDU puts forward the notion of the West and supports an exclusive Euro-Atlantic geopolitical vision vis-à-vis Russia as long as the latter refuses to accept westernization. The SPD, on the other hand, although critical of the Russian attitude, advocates a more conciliatory attitude. The French are absent during the Brussels think tank debates and their point of view is therefore not taken into account. The extensive use of the narrative of a “New Cold War” among Russia, the European Union and the West does not, however, seem to be shared by all European citizens and varies greatly among member states. The acquisition of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbass between the Ukrainian army and the pro-Russian rebels had a particular resonance in the neighborhood of Ukraine and in Eastern Europe, in Poland and in the Baltic countries. These countries fear an extension of this so-called hybrid war, mixing irregular militias and cyberattacks, on their territory. The perception of the threat is, on the other hand, nonexistent in the member states further to the west. Due to disagreements, EU sanctions were only targeted at politicians and members of the administration in Russia supporting the acquisition of Crimea, Donbass rebels and private companies. There was no mention of military support at the EU level. These sanctions were mainly promoted in Washington and Berlin, while the other member states aligned themselves. It is interesting to observe the perceptions of citizen safety, highlighted by a survey (Stokes et al. 2016) carried out by the Pew Research

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Center. In most of the countries surveyed, the threat of the Islamic State is considered most important, especially for Spain and France. Tensions with Russia are not perceived as a major threat in the surveyed countries except for Poland (71%). Due to the lack of geopolitical reflection and the contradictory representations between the Russian government and the European Union, relations between the EU and Russia have reached a situation where positions have become immutable. Neither side will give way. The election of Donald Trump on 8th November 2016, however, initially introduced great uncertainty about the future of transatlantic relations and the position of the European Union vis-à-vis Russia and has led so far to a worsening of the situation. In the new US security doctrine, Russia and China have become strategic rivals of the US (The White House 2017). A group of states within the EU will hopefully position themselves as a stimulus to improve relations with Russia and break the deadlock. Faced with an enduring crisis, bilateral relations between EU member states and Russia might become a leverage to shift the relative geopolitical power rank within the EU. This challenge has to be addressed in order to contain the growing polarization within the EU itself. The Negative Consequences of the Geopolitical Unthought for European Security in the US-EU-Russia Triangle The sidestepping of the geopolitical dimension of the EU-Russia relationship threatens the security and stability of Europe, and makes it subject to instrumentalization by states with implicit geopolitical objectives disguised in negative and more and more militarized strategic communication. With regard to the European project, the posture of Americans has not fundamentally changed since the equilibrium of World War II till the election of Donald Trump. According to Pierre Vimont (Thomann 2010), former Secretary General of the European External Action Service, for the Americans, NATO enlargement has to be in phase with the enlargement of the European Union and has to happen according to a global vision of the European continent that extends itself to the Eurasian space. This enlarged European Union was supposed to include all members of the Council of Europe, except Russia. This vision contradicts German and French governments’ plans, which are holding back the European Union’s policy of expansion in the face of public skepticism and fear of a deterioration of relations with Russia.

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The American President Donald Trump is more skeptical of NATO, and so far does not seem to support further NATO enlargements. The problem is first and foremost caused by the posture of the EU regarding its own borders. As the EU does not define its borders, Russia assumes that the process of enlargement has no limits, even on the Eurasian continent, since Turkey is a candidate. Despite the refusal of Germany and France to engage in further future enlargements, there is an ambiguity in the European institutions, and some member states such as Poland and the Baltic States still support the enlargement of the EU to Eastern Partnership members. The Russian government accuses the EU of trying to establish a sphere of influence in the shared neighborhood to the benefit of some of its member states. The European Union is seen as a proxy for US and NATO strategies rather than as an entity with autonomous strategic interests. Russia is thus tempted to negotiate major issues primarily with the US and to move EU member states aside in a configuration reminiscent of the Cold War. Within the US-EU-Russia triangle, the geopolitical vision of the US plays a central role. Its explicit geopolitical objective during the last 100 years was to avoid any rival power emerging in Eurasia, and Europe played the role of the Rimland, declared the former US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Aaron Wess Mitchell when he was in charge (US mission to the European Union 2018). This is in line with the Wolfowitz doctrine elaborated after the fall of the USSR (New York Times 1992) and the Brzezinski recommendations (Brzezinski 1997), which influenced the US administration till today (Vaïsse 2016). Aaron Wess Mitchell resigned from his position in February 2019. It would be interesting to examine whether strategic communication will continue to explicitly underline this long-term geopolitical objective as a legacy of Spykman, who revised Mackinder’s geopolitical vision and his Rimland theory (Zajec 2017). Will this narrative match actions in terms of foreign and military policy? The central issue is therefore to scrutinize whether President Donald Trump and his government will deviate from this doctrine. So far, no element has proved a change from the Rimland doctrine. However, the policy of sanctions and the strategic communication labeling Russia as the strategic rival with the objective of isolating Russia is only reinforcing the Russian pivot to the East and the Russian-Chinese tactical alliance, thereby accelerating the emergence of a Russian-Chinese

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Eurasian axis. This vision, if implemented, as denounced in some US circles, might be a result of a self-fulfilling prophecy, and lead to the opposite interests of the US interests in Eurasia. The new resulting EU-Russian fracture is also weakening Europe as a whole, and therefore the enlarged West (including Russia) vis-à-vis China. This is also resulting in the emergence of two main rival alliances on the Eurasian continent between a Euro-Atlantic alliance and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the other side. This is playing against more geopolitical balance in Eurasia. The US and UK fear of a continental alliance from Lisbon to Vladivostok is exaggerated. Cold War times and strict dividing lines between geopolitical blocks are paradigms of the past, since fluid situations and coalitions of the willing are more likely to become normal standards. It will be increasingly difficult for the EU to adopt common positions, as its member states will be divided in regard to both Russia and the US. The new approach of President Donald Trump, withdrawing from Cold War-time institutions, can be interpreted as an anticipation of this new multicentered world where bilateral deals take central stage. Donald Trump is suspicious of these same multilateral institutions if the US margin of maneuvering is constrained and if the US has to be the main financial contributor, with Europeans escaping “responsibility.” EU member states could also gain from this new approach if they were to take this as an opportunity to achieve more strategic autonomy, instead of trying to preserve the ideological multilateralist vision of the last century, and avoid, therefore, more responsibility since they remain mostly nostalgic about this old unipolar order buttressed by the former US governments. This is also an opportunity to reset relations with Russia. The Russian government is willing to accept multilateralism if these multilateral institutions are neutral and not aimed at “preserving the old unipolar Western hegemony” and if a better balance of power is emerging. However, strategic communication from actors defending the old crumbling order is making it difficult to think in an alternative way. The Focus of EU Strategic Communication on Multilateralism Since strategic communication is a synchronization of the deeds, words and images of the actors (Pashentsev  2017b), EU institutions’ and EU member states’ narratives have to be associated with corresponding actions. The EU and its Franco-German core axis insist on the preservation of the

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multilateralist doctrine against the unilateral doctrine of the new American presidency. The EU has created a mechanism to maintain economic links with Iran and counter the US sanctions. However, this narrative is not fully combined with efficient actions, as the promotion of the multilateralist doctrine becomes an end in itself and not a tool for reforming the crumbling system. The multilateral system can only be legitimate if an acceptable balance of power is achieved. This is clearly not the case today, and the change of doctrine of the American presidency is a huge opportunity to think collectively in a new and more balanced system. Otherwise, the EU narrative will result in empty slogans to preserve an old order in decline. Most European governments, nostalgic of the old order, need to overcome the denial of reality, accept the fundamental changes of the US approach under Donald Trump’s presidency and support some of his actions, when they are in tune with their collective interests. The emergence of anti-system political parties in the US, as in Europe, is proving that Western Europe and America are facing common challenges regarding the model of liberal democracy in crisis. Reform of this system is needed instead of trying to preserve the old one in line with actors willing to preserve the old comfortable order and unwilling to adapt to the new configuration. Strategic communication in the EU insists excessively on preserving the “liberal democracy model.” This attitude prevents more fundamental reform of the EU. In this decaying model, strategic communication in EU member states is influenced too much by the poor debates of the democracy of opinions. An increasing fracture is emerging between the elite trying to preserve the old system and so-called populists challenging this old order. In Russia, geostrategic goals and its role and responsibility in the new multicentered order are more central and do not match EU government priorities characterized by inertia. The Excessive Militarization of Strategic Communication The excessive militarization of strategic communication accompanying the American withdrawal from the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), and followed by the Russian withdrawal as a reaction, is creating a negative chain of events. France and Germany, but also most European governments in their large majority, are opposed to the installation of new missiles on their territory. However, they aligned themselves with the US and NATO

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communication narrative, focusing their accusations only on the Russian part. They became hostage to this American-Russian rivalry since they didn’t address the issue in time when the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) in 2002. Although France and Germany were initially skeptical of the Missile Defense project, they accepted its transfer to NATO. Each had their own agenda. France’s military industrial complex is willing to take part in the system and Germany is eager to relativize nuclear weapons since it is not permitted to develop its own nuclear arsenal. The militarization of strategic communication is overwhelming the debates in this case, especially on the sides of the US and Russia, logically as part of their respective deterrence doctrines. However, this reinforces the perception of Europeans being left out of the negotiations. From the perspective of promoting better EU-Russia relations, the Russian militarization of strategic communication is creating distrust among the European countries. The dilemma for Russia is how to address the deterrence message to the US political personnel and military and their European allies but at the same time underline a willingness to go beyond the current rivalry to focus on a more positive agenda, especially as a message not only to the governments but also the populations. Another central issue is Russia’s geographical location in Eurasia with its multiple potential threats, and it has different needs regarding the missile defense systems that the US located between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The question of Chinese missiles (not part of the INF Treaty) is also of central importance for the containment of the new arms race. Again here the needs of continental and maritime powers (missile systems on naval platforms are not included in treaties) have to be differentiated. Moreover, if China is the real target of the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, then the focus of strategic communication on Russia is detrimental to the prospects of better relations with Russia. Here again alternative arguments, based on ­geopolitical factors like geography, could depict this question in a less simplistic way. The militarization of Russia’s strategic communication is immediately used in an opportunistic way by political forces that want to depict Russia as an aggressive and dangerous power. This is why Russia could gain in the development of soft power and use more differentiated strategic communication according to the target to develop trust with other European partners.

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More insistence on Russian soft power, which has huge potential, could be useful, such as the development of cultural, scientific and academic exchanges and publicity about sponsoring in academic and scientific programs but also about art, painting, music, opera and ballet. Focusing on Civilizational Features The Western world as a “geopolitical representation” is gaining in importance in today’s strategic communication in the context of the new geopolitical situation. At global level, the notion of the West, mainly inherited from strategic communication from the Cold War period, thereby excluding communist countries (although communism derives mainly from the European philosophical movement period), has to be questioned. The definition of the “West” needs a wider interpretation than the one used during the Cold War. Powerful actors willing to maintain an old order they were profiting from are willing to fall back into New Cold War representations and narrative to maintain their privileges and avoid the emergence of a multipolar world. The civilizational angle is therefore useful in identifying common characteristics in the US, in EU member states, but also in Europe in general and Russia. We have to acknowledge that the ideological approach of “westernization” of Russia, with the obsolete meaning of the West inherited from the Cold War, is not acceptable, just as much as it is unacceptable for Russia to impose its own principles on the EU. To identify more common features in EU-Russia relations in a very long-term perspective, focusing on common European civilizational values and elements in the context of the emergence of Muslim fundamentalism, the rise of other civilizations like China and India, all backed by strong demographics, and the rocketing demography in Africa would be useful. The focus of strategic communication on common civilizational features could accompany an identification of common challenges. Instead of insisting on an exclusive Western configuration, excluding Russia, the concept of the Greater West, including the European pillar (Rome), the American pillar (extension of the Rome pillar) and the Russian pillar (Byzantine pillar), would develop a sense of common belonging in the balance of different orders based on different civilizational heritages. In

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today’s geopolitical situation, it is time to recognize that the Western world consists of these three pillars: the US, Europe engaged in a European project and the Russian world, although the “Eurasianist” dimension of Russia will also remain an important feature of the Russian internal geopolitical debate. A more inclusive approach would foster dialogue instead of exclusion. It would provide more support to Russians aiming to belong to the “Greater West,” and ease dialogue with “Eurasianists,” allowing them to focus on common civilizational features. As regards the ideological debate on values, the dialogue is too focused on “transnational values” deriving from “universal principles.” These are mainly governance norms of the “liberal democracy model” based on a unilateral Western interpretation. This approach is highly divisive as these values cannot be truly defined either between Russia and the EU or within the EU itself (controversies with the European Convention on Human Rights) in Poland, Hungary and France since the November 2015 terrorist attacks are proliferating. In a multicentered world, a growing resistance to any monopoly of the definition of democracy, or the “best model of civilization,” can be observed. The EU-Russia dialogue should put more focus on concrete mutual geopolitical interests on the one hand, but also on core common civilizational values, on the other. When we speak about “values,” the dialogue should focus more strongly on the common European and Western civilization features shared by EU nations as well as by Russia (values like “laicity” deriving from Christian values) but also the US. This means religious questions have to be included in the dialogue as they play a crucial role in identity formation since the emerging multipolar world, where balance of power is central, is also characterized by a strong “conflict of civilization” dimension. This means there is a need for more professional exchanges in culture and education, as well as a need for religious dialogue between Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Muslim churches, and other religions present in both entities. Learn from Past Mistakes and Abandon Divisive Strategies Both the EU and Russia should learn from past mistakes. To ease EU suspicions, the “leadership” of Russia in its “near abroad” should be given priority over the reconstruction by Russia of a “pyramidal power-style” regional alliance. It should look more similar to the Franco-German leadership in the EU. Russia should also distance itself from plans to rebuild a

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US-Russia condominium and bypass EU member states in crisis negotiations. The return to a bipolar system in Europe is not sustainable in a context of emerging multipolarity. To get away from this trend, EU member states should also have to be reliable partners and act in a more autonomous way (the Minsk Group is the model but not the format of negotiations in Syria). EU institutions and member states are waiting for a “positive signal” from the Russian side, and resent the entrenched position of Russia. The cost of delaying the reset of relations is increasing. More compromises from both sides might be opportune. The selective engagement principle of the EU, although it is not an ideal tool, is underestimated. As regards Afghanistan, the EEAS is willing to use “selective engagement” with Russia, but so far it has been difficult to change direction. Again here trust-building measures are required, although more global negotiation needs to be anticipated to convince Russians of incremental cooperation. To ease Russian suspicions, acting as a more autonomous strategic actor (as mentioned in the new EU Global Strategy) should be given priority by the EU and it should distance itself from plans to position the European project as a subgrouping of a “Greater West” escaping responsibility and putting all the burden on the US. This could be compatible with the new American approach, initiated by Donald Trump, to make Europeans assume more responsibility. This question has to be fully debated beyond taboos and implicit geopolitical objectives, especially as this trend remains ambiguous because of internal US and European disagreements. After engaging the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in a forceful way, the EU is now paying a triple price: more fragmentation of its geographical proximity in the civil war in Ukraine, more fragmentation with Russia and, finally, growing distrust from EU citizens (the negative referendum in the Netherlands regarding the EU-Ukraine free trade zone). Double-standard policies and threats are also counterproductive. The EU is sanctioning Russia for the annexation of Crimea to defend Ukraine, a non-EU member state, but the EU is not sanctioning Turkey, although they are occupying the territory of Cyprus, an EU member state. Instead, the EU is giving Turkey rewards such as negotiations on EU membership, visa liberalization and access to the EU single market. Russia should reciprocally avoid treating EU member states in different ways. In strategic communication, both the EU and Russia are respectively used as scapegoats for their past failures in opportunistic ways in order to revive old failed geopolitical projects. Some European Federalist militants

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see Russia as a perfect adversary to revive the failed “fusion of nations” doctrine at a time of growing Euroskepticism. This attitude risks triggering political forces in Russia that consider no other alternative but making the EU project fail in retaliation.4 As far as the “information war” is concerned, there is also a worrying tendency toward neo-Macchartist attitudes in public and political debates on both sides, where diverging opinions are less and less tolerated. This should be avoided, especially in the dialogues between experts and academics. Let’s have a look at a number of geopolitical ideas combining different steps in time (short-term and long-term agenda) and space (identify geopolitical priorities) to focus on common EU-Russia interests. According to Clausewitz’s principles, strategy consists in a set of priorities and actions articulated in time and space combined with a dialectic between two actors. Articulation in Time In the short term, it would be wise to find “face-saving” mechanisms. This would avoid one of the parties being seen as a loser in the different crises. It is a necessary step to rebuild trust within the current international and bilateral institutional forums. Neither the EU nor Russia wants to be perceived as backpedaling from strong positions. The long-term changing political landscape in Europe and America might offer new opportunities and new avenues for negotiations, with new governments eager to overcome the current crises. Strategic communication in the short term should also be aimed at not aggravating the situation. It is time to renew EU-Russia economic cooperation and abandon sanctions as Russia needs to diversify its economy when oil prices go down. Neither can afford to try to weaken the other. The policy of sanctions did not produce any results. It was bad for the economy of both partners and added political mistrust. With regard to the “narrative war” between the EU and Russia, in times of crises and uncertainties, it is easy to fall back into old “Cold War” representations (this is actually only shared by a very small number of strategists and politicians). As we mentioned previously, this obsession is also a generational issue as people who have experienced the Cold War have more difficulty adopting a new way of thinking. This Cold War bias 4  This scenario was already partially identified in the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission in 1995.

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is particularly visible in the last resolution of the European Parliament (European Parliament 2019) on the state of EU-Russia political relations. The rapporteur was Sandra Kalniete from Latvia, known for her very extreme positions against Russia. This resolution underlines that “Russia can no longer be considered a strategic partner” and, after a long list of accusations without tangible evidence, “calls on the Russian authorities to condemn Communism and the Soviet regime, and to punish the perpetrators of the crimes and offences committed under that regime.” Therefore, exchanges between young generations should become a priority, following the Franco-German youth exchange model. In the long term, negotiations on visa liberalization would also contribute to a better mutual understanding. To adopt a more similar diagnosis of the global evolutions and foreign policy doctrines, the only way is to boost the exchange among experts, academics and politicians from both sides, using a multidisciplinary approach. Articulation in Space The biggest challenge the European project is facing is the question of including Russia in a reformed project. The European project needs not only to be reformed internally, but also to change its geopolitical scale. Security, the civilizational dimension and energy are the main stakes. The EU and Russia need to identify common geopolitical interests in order to engage in a strategic dialogue. Different scenarios can be suggested at global, pan-European and regional levels. At Global Level As far as evolutions at a global level are concerned, it would be wise to anticipate the consequences of a potential US-China ­ confrontation/ condominium. Together, the EU and Russia could deter a worsening global scenario in the case of spiraling effects of the China-US rivalry and could position themselves as mediators. It should also be kept in mind that the EU and Russia have a different geographical position. They have a different geopolitical center of gravity and different security perceptions. EU territory lies in Europe whereas Russian territory lies in Europe and Asia. The EU can neither represent the whole of Europe in an exclusive way, nor can it extend itself to the Eurasian continent.

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Geography Matters More Than Ideological Narratives: Security and Prosperity Issues on the Eurasian Continent from the Spatial Perspective The A-Territorial Approach of the EU Can we find a way around the current mode of communication that focuses on ideological and negative aspects? The challenge now is to circumvent the current mode of communication centered on the negative aspects of the relationship between the EU and Russia, but also on a falsified and fake narrative of events. As long as the political leaders of the EU member states and Russia don’t overcome the crisis, the information war will continue. That is why it is important for the community of researchers and experts to express alternative opinions and points of view. It is their role to convey a different message, to encourage a different angle of analysis and to spread it in the widest way possible, in academic publications, but also in think tank reports for specialists, as well as in the media, to reach civil society. The EU policy on the support of think tanks should also be questioned more critically. The publication by the European Values Think Tank of a list of “useful idiots” (Richter 2017) who accepted an interview on the TV channel Russia Today shows a disturbing return to the McCarthyism of the 1950s during the Cold War. These methods should be avoided, especially in the academic and expert world. The European Values Think Tank is based in Prague. It is funded by the US and UK embassies, George Soros’ Open Society, but also by the European Union. The above-­ mentioned incident was heavily criticized by some experts but the media in the EU member states did not mention the absurdity of this report. The European Union should revise its criteria for awarding grants to think tanks whose actions are likely to aggravate the crisis. It is therefore also the role of experts and researchers to criticize EU policy in this area more openly. A greater focus on geopolitical issues with the objective to find solutions might be useful in order to circumvent the obstacle created by the information war and to identify the issues that Russia and the EU member states could face together. This new focus would allow common interests to be identified.

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By changing the scale of analysis, this approach would moreover allow the pan-European civilizational convergences to be emphasized more strongly. The member states of the European Union and Russia used to have extremely rich economic, cultural and scientific exchanges in the past and these should continue in the future (Chizov 2017). It is therefore important to remember this during academic or diplomatic conferences, as well as during cultural events. Cultural diplomacy should be an integral part of a geopolitical strategy of rapprochement. The exhibition “A Tsar in France,” in 2017, organized in the Palace of Versailles in partnership with the St Petersburg State Museum is a good example (Château de Versailles 2017). Geopolitical issues, however, are today hidden in the European institutions or are deliberately removed from the eyes of the citizens. The questions regarding territory are indeed very sensitive and that is why a taboo with respect to the geopolitical questions can be observed in the institutions. It is precisely the role of researchers and experts to break this taboo in order to deepen the debate. This should also be carried out within the different European nations, because the support of the populations is needed to initiate a reorientation of the European project, and to make it reach continental size. Without a free debate on these issues, the old geopolitical representations of the Cold War will remain and will again be instrumentalized by the opponents of a resetting of relationships between EU member states, the US and Russia. In the longer term, if a paradigm shift in relations between the EU and Russia should occur, it would only be solid and lasting if it were combined with a rapprochement of the geopolitical representations of the different nations that make up Europe, Russia included, with respect to their own role in the world. This requires trying to bring the perception of global geopolitical developments closer as well. Geography matters and that is why the spatial angle is favored here in order to identify the major geopolitical issues that European nations will have to face. Emphasis on the spatial angle is the way to deconstruct negative communication strategies. It allows one to take a step back from divisive discourses on values and norms, as well as not locking oneself into sterile legal exegeses about international law, the political system or economic model, which are imbued with ideology. In the following paragraphs, the focus will be on themes that may be the subject of an alternative narrative for a more positive strategic communication.

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The Missing Link of Global Security: A New Eurasian Geopolitical Architecture In each official EU document and each speech of EU officials at international conferences, EU-Russia relations are reduced to the “selective engagement” principle as the only positive element in a very critical and negative general posture. According to the “selective engagement” of the EU principles toward Russia, Europeans are willing to cooperate with Russia on specific thematics where common interests are identified in the wider context of difficult sanctions and rival narratives regarding the Ukrainian crisis in particular. However, there is the hope from the EU side that the different local and regional crises could be progressively resolved, like the Georgian, the Ukrainian and the Moldovan crises labeled as frozen conflicts. Contrary to the too often EU stereotyped narrative, the focus on geopolitical reality can lead to a different interpretation of the situation and broadens the horizon to overcome the current crisis. It is in reality an illusion to think these different crises can be resolved on an individual basis since they are all part of a wider systemic crisis between the rival Western and Russian visions. More global negotiations at continental level on respective red lines are more likely to change the context of rival vision. The regional crises could be resolved as part of a more systemic arrangement. The “selective engagement” principle can be a useful instrument for gaining trust in negotiating confidence building measures but cannot resolve the overall geopolitical situation that triggered the crisis. That is why a new European security architecture is the key to local and regional crises and not from the other way round, from local and regional to global. A new European security treaty at the Eurasian level is therefore the missing link in European security in the context of the emergence of the multipolar world, and in the face of the risk of a deepening rift between Euro-Atlantic alliances and emerging alliances in Eurasia. However, it is illusory to believe that relations between the EU and Russia will resume in the same format that prevailed before the Ukrainian crisis in the fluid world of today. Russia will never accept being integrated into a Euro-Atlantic entity as a subordinate element. Russia will not abandon its Asian orientation because the emerging geopolitical center of gravity of the world is Eurasia. Russia’s pivot to the East (Karaganov 2016) is here to stay, and will hopefully be accompanied by a resetting of relations with western Europe, but only in case of EU reform.

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The Greater Eurasia partnership or community Russia is looking for is a common space for economic, logistic and information cooperation, peace and security from Shanghai to Lisbon and from New Delhi to Murmansk (Karaganov 2016). The security dimension is the most important for Russia as it cannot compete with Asian giants in the economic sphere but has a competitive advantage as a security provider. This function has to be recognized by EU member states since they will equally profit from it. Contrary to some alarming narratives in the West, the pivot to the East, according to Russia, is not to turn its back to Europe. The pivot to the East is geared to not only China but also other Asian powers, and it is also viewed as a balancing act toward China in order to work on a “constructive counterbalance to China to make sure it does not become ‘too strong’ or turn into a potential hegemon scaring its neighbors” (Karaganov 2016). Since the world is in a fragmenting process, there is excessive fear of the re-emergence of a world of blocks. Russia played an important role in the European balance of power for centuries, and this role is just making its return, since the block policy of the Cold War time, although some actors would like to revive it, would be difficult to implement. Thus, if Europeans fear a Russian-Chinese alliance and an excessive orientation of Russia toward Asia, EU member states have to pivot toward Russia in order to maintain a strong European continental link. This is rational geopolitics. However, with EU sanctions against Russia, the EU is lagging behind geopolitical maneuvers. The European project is wasting time by insisting on old paradigms, while Russia is moving faster. The European project pivot to Eurasia is essentially a pivot to Russia in order to gain more weight and adopt a Eurasian geographical scale. Russia is culturally part of Europe and this will still be the case in the future. The EU has again lost an opportunity in its communication Connecting Europe and Asia – Building Blocks for an EU Strategy (European External Action Service 2018), since the reference to the Eurasian economic union is very reduced, although Russia is the essential terrestrial geographical link between Europe and Asia. This has implications for strategic communication if a positive agenda is the objective. Russia’s strategic communication insists now on its pivot to the East, but it might also be useful and less confrontational if it also emphasized more that it is ready to maintain strong relations with Western Europe. Otherwise, Atlanticist hardliners will find here another opportunity in their strategic communication to prove Russia is not part of the

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Greater West and insist the West must bet on an exclusive Atlantic orientation against Russia and China. The European project will have to be reformed, according to the lessons to be drawn, in particular regarding the thematic of the external relations. This objective seems to be shared in a still shy way by the German and French governments. A new European security architecture with Russia is the goal announced by French President Emmanuel Macron (Elysée 2018), while the German government’s coalition treaty (Bundesregierung 2018) mentions a “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” as an economic objective. The conditions laid down for the German and French governments to advance on this path, the prerequisite for strategic autonomy for the European Union in terms of defense and security, and the implementation of the Minsk agreements by Russia, while Ukraine is largely responsible for the blockage, however, are unrealistic and therefore constitute obstacles. Future crises that will affect the entire European continent may have the effect of lifting the current barriers. The extension of the Euro-Atlantic security system and the normative and integrationist vision of the European Union to Russia is unachievable. The European Union has entered a process of geopolitical fragmentation whose outcome is uncertain, with east-­ west, north-south divides, an uncertain Brexit process and a new Franco-German geopolitical rivalry since German reunification. Russia could not, even if it wanted to, align itself with the normative and political model of the European Union, which has become less attractive and will necessarily evolve in the coming years (Kortunov 2018). The doctrine of balance of power and cooperation led by nation states are more realistic for the future stabilization of the European continent. In a multipolar world, stability in Eurasia can only be achieved by a balance among the great powers, and not by a fixation on the doctrine of “enlargement of democracy,” which serves as a pretext to weaken Russia and leads to the reinforcement of reciprocal mistrust. Russia serves as a useful counterbalance in the context of a global equilibrium policy. It is also the energy and commercial hinterland of the European Union. The possibility of a strategic partnership between a reformed European Union and Russia must therefore be safeguarded. Synergy between the European Union member states, Russia and the US is also necessary to rebalance the overwhelming weight taken by the political and economic forces that precipitate a process of globalization characterized by an anarchic development of the financial, commercial,

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cultural and information networks that destroy the continental solidarities through the insufficiency of the filters at the national and European borders. The risks and threats for European companies today are internal and financial. They result from the communitarization of societies and a decomposition of the social fabric due to the loss of control of financial flows and uncontrolled mass immigration. A common approach to these topics would be welcome. The new emerging multicentered world (Russia and its European and Eurasian dimensions, western Europe and its Atlantic and continental dimension, the US and its Atlantic and Pacific dimension, China and its Asian and Pacific dimensions) is giving opportunities to all actors, and diversity, balance and fluidity in alliances, according to geography and thematics, represent the best scenario for the future, since the re-emergence of blocks and rigid alliances, like during the Cold War, makes the scenario of World War III more likely. Again here strategic communication can make new visions emerge, and balance reactionary and obsolete antagonistic visions. Then, efficient multilateralism might emerge only after an acceptable new balance of power among a reformed EU, the US, Russia and China. The problem is that the notion of “multilateralism” is highlighted in each EU strategic document and mentioned in each speech of EU representatives at international conferences as a central element of EU narrative. This notion is very vague and not confronted with geopolitical reality. The EU ideological understanding of multilateralism so far constitutes an obstacle to more common representations of global evolutions. In its last report on EU-Russia political relations (European Parliament 2019) the European Parliament has underlined that “whereas Russia’s polycentric vision of the concert of powers contradicts the EU’s belief in multilateralism and a rules-based international order; whereas Russia’s adherence to and support for the multilateral rules-based order would create the conditions for closer relations with the EU.” According to the EU narrative, the “concert of powers” is opposed to “multilateralism” and “ruled-based order.” The condition for better relations between EU and Russia is therefore the acceptance of the EU interpretation of multilateralism. According to geopolitical reality, polycentricity is increasingly a central feature of international relations. Moreover, it is not obvious to contrast the notion of multilateralism with that of polycentricity. Polycentricity implies, as it is highlighted by EU narrative, the use of balance of power as a central doctrine of the concert of powers. In the EU understanding of

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international relations, it is a model of the past. With an alternative narrative, one could on the contrary argue that an acceptable balance of power between states in a multicentric world is the pre-condition to achieve multilateral negotiations. This way of combining multicentricity and multilateralism would not only be more adapted to the geopolitical reality, but also offer more opportunities for mutual understanding between the EU and Russia. The New Eurasian Security Architecture As we mentioned before, the idea of a new European security architecture has been suggested by the French President in a recent speech (Elysée 2018). This idea is not new and has been previously suggested by Dmitry Medvedev after the Russia-Georgia war in 2008. This recurrent idea, which has reappeared over the course of crises in policy discourse, has so far not been accompanied by concrete actions and therefore appears as political communication without a future. Yet this does not diminish the relevance of this idea. For this idea to be feasible, it would be useful to confront it to the geopolitical reality. Focusing on strategic communication could contribute to making this idea more practicable to raise the probability of words being followed by action and does not remain a rhetorical exercise. Let’s examine the geopolitical situation and focus on ideas that could feed an alternative strategic communication. Konrad Adenauer, the first Federal Chancellor of West Germany, insisted on the primacy of foreign policy objectives over national domestic policy agendas (Adenauer 1965). Following this adage, let us first examine global-scale issues before we look at more regional issues. There are missing links in the security architecture of the European, Eurasian and Central Asian spaces that need to be filled in order to avoid a further fragmentation of the European continent between Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian alliances (Thomann 2013). The EU can neither represent the whole of Europe in an exclusive way, nor can it extend itself to the Eurasian continent. It would therefore be interesting to imagine a new network of treaties and institutions resembling the “Olympic circles,” which would allow stability to be maintained on the whole Eurasian continent. What could this new geopolitical architecture look like? There is a need for a new European security treaty with a Eurasian reach, and a new “Central Asian Partnership and cooperation treaty” in the context of an emerging global and European multipolar feature. Synergy is needed

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among the various actors to achieve geopolitical stability on the Eurasian continent. From a long-term perspective a new Eurasian geopolitical architecture based on a new doctrine of overlapping circles of international organizations would be a major factor in developing and improving Eurasia. We also have to assume that an enlargement of Euro-Atlantic institutions (NATO-EU-OSCE) to the whole of the Eurasian continent is impossible. Firstly, the individual EU and NATO member states disagree on further enlargement. Secondly, it would be impossible for these Euro-­ Atlantic institutions to manage the geopolitical diversity of the Eurasian continent. This new security architecture is based on the “geographical tightening” principle in the context of NATO’s and the EU’s overstretched capacities. Geographical proximity would be a central criterion for building regional alliances in order to foster stability and prevent any further Eurasian fragmentation. A new “security space” from Lisbon to Vladivostok would be the inner circle of a wider Euro-Atlantic security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok, based on a balance of interests and no longer on the westernization of Eurasian space. In this configuration, we would find the reformed EU as a pivot/political center and Russia as a neighboring pivot/political center at the crossroad of overlapping security spaces from Vancouver to Vladivostok (NATO and OSCE, USA-EU-Russia), Lisbon to Vladivostok (EU-Russia), St Petersburg to Beijing (OCS), Minsk to Dushanbe (OTSC) and Murmansk to New Delhi (BRICS). Cooperation policies and “nonaggression agreements” would need to be negotiated among these geopolitical spaces. This network of institutions resembles the “Olympic circles.” The described configuration would be adapted to the emerging multipolar world to maintain a balance among the different states, alliances and political as well as security institutions. This architecture is aimed at promoting synergies between interleaved organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and should lead to greater levels of stability. In-between spaces between these

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structures would be subject to common stabilization policies or “nonaggression agreements.” This new doctrine of “overlapping circles” supposes the acceptance by international actors of the emergence of a variety of international organizations whose objectives contribute to Eurasian and world stability. For example, the strengthening of the SCO should not be perceived in the West as a geopolitical rival, but as a future partner to manage the multipolar world. It is in the long-term interests of Euro-Atlantic structures, the EU, the OSCE and NATO to be complemented by other international organizations like the CIS, the CSTO, the EEU, the OIC and the SCO in order to stabilize the Eurasian continent. Russia is promoting multipolar features (Romanova 2016), and this is compatible with a European project striving for more strategic autonomy, but also the new approach of the US under the presidency of Donald Trump, if he succeeds in convincing his own administration to reduce American presence on the global stage. Within a new Eurasian security architecture, a resetting of relations between a reformed European project and Russia is aimed at assigning to the EU and Russia a moderating and restraining role so as to avoid a global US-China confrontation and further fragmentation between Euro-­ Atlantic and Euro-Asian alliances. The idea is to avoid being drawn into this confrontation and forced to choose a camp, and to avoid a US-China condominium (G2) sidelining the EU and Russia in global affairs. Geostrategic Issues Regarding this thematic, an alternative communication strategy focusing on the question of perceptions and geopolitical representations might be also useful to open new avenues of dialogue. When having a closer look at immediate security issues, it becomes clear that the question of Russia’s perception of encirclement (Tchernega 2015) by NATO bases and the missile defense shield is central. The lack of discussion about geopolitical issues over the missile defense shield, the positioning of US bases and NATO, as well as NATO enlargement are all particularly damaging to the security interests of the European Union. According to certain American scholars of the realist school who take into account geopolitical issues, previous and future NATO enlargements near Russia’s borders also aggravate Russian-American relations to the detriment of US long-term interests (Mearsheimer 2014). Others

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scholars insist on the need to contain Russia, mainly for ideological reason like the promotion of democracy, and do not leave much room for improvement until a regime change in Russia (MacFaul 2018). Russia’s perception of encirclement is a result of the location of the missile defense shields, NATO bases and US bases abroad. The location of the missile defense shields, NATO bases and US bases abroad is looking like a belt that makes the bases and elements of the shield appear as a continuous space ensemble around Eurasia, and reinforces the perception of encirclement of the Russians and Chinese (although the stated purpose of the shield was to protect against missiles from Iran and North Korea). For the Russians, the answer to the question of why NATO needs new members is simple: The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that “NATO seeks to cover as much geopolitical space as possible and encircle countries that somehow disagree with NATO, like Russia and Serbia, for example” (Russia Today 2016). Russia believes that the policy of enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance supported by the US and its allies is aimed at its encirclement. Whether this perception is seen as exaggerated or irrelevant does not change the fact that it must be taken into account. It is deeply rooted in the Russian vision because of its geography (the vastness of the territory without natural barriers) and history (invasions) (Tchernega 2014). The Iranian nuclear threat has so far been the main justification for the NATO missile defense project. The US has not only begun to redeploy its forces to the Asia-Pacific region but is also strengthening its strategic ­presence in Europe through the missile defense shield, which has been adopted as the “keystone” of NATO. The European territory has become an element of the device intended to protect the American territory, thereby prolonging the function of the Rimland of Europe vis-à-vis the Eurasian continent. This reminds us of the geopolitical representations of the American Nicolas Spykman, inherited from Britain’s Sir Halford Mackinder. The project lost its main justification with the agreement on Iran’s nuclear power, but the US administration, under Trump’s and Obama’s presidencies, has steadily advanced the missile defense plan. President Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal of the US from the Iranian nuclear agreement (JCPOA) has aggravated the mistrust with Russia. In retaliation, the Russians announced the installation of Iskander-­ class missiles in Kaliningrad and in Crimea. The geographical space of the EU has become a territory at stake in the rivalry between the US and Russia. This issue prevents negotiations on disarmament and EU member

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states see their sovereignty and margin for maneuver reduced. They will have no real impact on decisions regarding the use of the system because the NATO missile shield is directly linked to the American missile shield. It is therefore in the interest of both the EU and Russia to avoid a worsening of the crisis around the NATO missile shield project. Exerting pressure on the US to provide proof that this system is not directed against Russia would be useful. The withdrawal of the US from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in order to develop a new missile of short and medium range and install it on European territory or military vessels would also aggravate the security of the European Union (Gromyko 2017). The territory of the EU member states has become a geopolitical issue between Russia and the US, as was the case during the Cold War. The EU member states and Russia, but also the US, have a common interest in avoiding a revival of the nuclear arms race in Europe. It is therefore necessary to maintain the nuclear disarmament programs in connection with the anti-missile shield. In the case of an absence of a substantial rapprochement on short-term security issues, it is important to at least not aggravate the situation. It would also be useful to coordinate the preservation of the Iran nuclear deal between Russia and the European Union. In terms of the geographical proximity of the EU and Russia, Russia remains a strategic partner of the EU and the states it is made up of (Raviot  2017a). It would be helpful to break the confinement of the European Union between two arcs of crisis (one in the South and the other in the East) through a rapprochement with Russia in order to engage in a shared management of the oriental instabilities and the identification of common interests vis-à-vis the arc of crisis in the South. Common geopolitical interests vis-à-vis radical Islam (Le Torrivellec 2017) originating from the southern arc of crisis are intertwined with home-grown terrorists and should prevail over the current perception propagated by the EU that Russia is considered to be a more important foe than ISIL/Daesh (Pashentsev  2017b), as suggested in a European Parliament resolution adopted in 2016 “on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties” (European Parliament 2016). Geoeconomic Issues The focus of communication on geoeconomic issues affecting the future prosperity of the Eurasian continent might also be useful to give an incentive to work on an improvement of EU-Russia relations.

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Russia and the EU would need to anticipate consequences from continental interconnection projects initiated by China’s New Silk Road and its compatibility with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union project, and the EU. The energy and transport infrastructure will provoke a spatio-­logistical reconfiguration (Radavanyi 2017) that should be anticipated. It would also be useful to anticipate jointly the challenges of robotization, particularly in regard to networks. The effects of robotization and technological innovation on the territory will require a rethink of territorial control, but also the need to consider the well-being of populations that will face changes in employment. There will be massive job losses but also the creation of new jobs. A new industrial geography, and new development zones, will materialize, on the scale of the Eurasian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, because the economies will remain interdependent, especially in terms of energy supply and transport connections, but also information flows. Further cooperation on the new geopolitics of flows could be initiated. Reflection on land-use planning at the continental level is therefore needed so that the EU, the Russian project of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Chinese project of the New Silk Road can be built in synergy and not in rivalry. Europe’s Variable Geopolitical Constellations: The Franco-­ German Axis and Russia The focus of communication on the geopolitical balance of power within EU might also lead to new approaches and justification for more EU-Russia cooperation. It is an illusion to think that the EU can quickly overcome its antagonism toward Russia, because its paradigms are difficult to reconcile with Russia’s foreign policy principles. One way to overcome the EU stalemate is to focus on bilateral initiatives, and narrow alliances based on purpose and theme. The European Union is becoming more and more multicentered and it would be useful to proceed in the same way with regard to foreign policy. Among this Europe of “variable geopolitical constellations,” the Franco-German axis remains central. After the French and German elections in 2017, the governments of both countries announced a reform of the functioning of the European Union, but also of its foreign policy. They will hopefully gradually resume the dialogue and exchanges. The visit of the German President Steinmeier to Moscow and the visit of Vladimir Putin to Paris are a sign of this new approach.

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Another aspect of the difficulties of the European Union in the face of multiple crises is the unthought of the new Franco-German geopolitical rivalry (Thomann 2015). Behind Brexit hides a more significant geopolitical crack in the heart of the European Union: the new Franco-German geopolitical rivalry. The French and German governments fear Brexit first and foremost for reasons of balance of power within the European Union. The UK has so far allowed France to rebalance the weight of Germany and allowed Germany to hide the Franco-German asymmetry. What lies behind this issue are the divergent aims of the two nations regarding the European project. On the German side, a study of their vision of Europe since its inception shows that it is a space of flux (Martens 2000) and a subset of the liberal and democratic globalization that allows Germany to strengthen its economic power. For the French, on the other hand, the European Union should follow the model of Europe as a great power with a strong integrated Eurozone for integrationists, or the model of Europe of Nations for the Gaullists, but still offering France a lever to have an impact on the international scene. The perception of security and geopolitical priorities is different from one country to another. The French intervene militarily in the arc of crisis in the South (Ministère des armées 2017) whereas the Germans are more concerned with the arc of crisis in the East (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2016). The crisis with Russia pushes the Germans to act as a central power (Baumann 2007) in Europe and promote reassurance measures in NATO to support their allies in central and Eastern Europe. A new Franco-German geopolitical balance within the European project also involves a new Franco-German policy toward Russia from a Franco-German core; a continental rapprochement could be initiated to reduce European fractures. A rapprochement with Russia would also help to rebalance the Franco-German relationship that has suffered from a growing asymmetry since German unification and the EU’s eastern enlargement. Germany and France could therefore develop a new Franco-German “Ostpolitik” in order to rebalance the European project toward a constructive agenda with Russia.

Conclusion The focus on geopolitical stakes is a way to disentangle EU-Russia relations from negative and rival communication strategies, leading to the extensive use of fake narratives. However, the current trend shows a deepening of

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the crisis in strategic communication, as East StratCom is receiving more funding (The Guardian 2017c). The EU Commission appointed a high level of expert groups (European Commission 2018) to tackle fake news and the French President Emmanuel Macron proposed a new controversial law (Politico 2018) against fake news to defend “liberal democracy.” Russia is relentlessly accused of interfering in elections everywhere in the world, although these claims have so far never been proven (Consortiumnews 2017). These accusations are now made before the elections (Independent 2018). The objective of the EU and Western media strategic communication is also to contain criticism of the EU system and its “liberal democracy” ideology from its own citizens, who are less and less convinced of its added value for their security and prosperity. This worsening of the situation is diverting attention from the need to resolve real structural problems in the EU-Russia relationship. In this context, strategic communication and geopolitics would benefit from being thought in a positive way. The meaning given to geopolitics is too often negative. Yet geopolitics, as a method of analysis and strategic communication, can be combined for crisis resolution. We believe that strategic communication can have a positive effect in international relations marked by conflict. The objective is a rapprochement between nations through a constructive dialogue. The synergy between the geopolitical diagnosis, the identification of obstacles and common interests and, then, the diffusion of messages as part of a communication strategy that reduces tensions and opens up new avenues for negotiation with a synchronization of action is therefore a central issue. It would be useful to privilege the following triptych: inclusive geopolitical diagnosis (taking into account the interests and perceptions of all the actors), the elaboration of a concerted vision and the passage to action accompanied by a strategy of positive communication for every step in order to streamline the process. This would not leave the field to the following triptych: the promotion of unilateral geopolitical ambitions, disinformation campaigns against actors who do not share this unilateral ambition and destabilizing actions, accompanied by a negative communication strategy at all stages to achieve a unilateral geopolitical goal. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the EU moves toward a more balanced view on strategic communication. The EU should also select its sources for recognizing fake news more carefully, spend less time on cases of secondary importance and instead dedicate time to trying to bring Russian and EU narratives closer. A more cooperative approach from both

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sides would require the creation of a common EU-Russia expert group on strategic communication to avoid unilateral interpretations and actions from the EU and Russia. This could lead to an improvement of the debate climate and the emergence of more diverse think tanks, which will be able to offer analysis in terms of geopolitical perspectives rather than ideological controversies. Finally, the EU and Russia would both benefit from fighting Islamist propaganda together and being able to focus more on their common interests. The multiple crises highlighted the limits of European governance and the weakness of the European executive power, as well as the lack of clear leadership and competition between institutions and states, in the face of Westphalian states like Russia, the US and China, who are building their own geopolitical strategy. They undoubtedly have the advantage of being nations, unlike the European Union, which has to rely on “constitutional patriotism” to ensure its unity, but might seem weak against the assertion of the powers in the world. EU-Russia relations are not merely a subsidiary issue of the European Union’s external relations, or a subset of the European Union’s normative expansion strategy, but a fundamental geopolitical issue for the future of the project and the internal balance of power within the EU. These relations have entered a serious crisis, because there is a rivalry over the model of the European construction. This requires the European Union to launch a debate on its own geopolitical goals. The European project needs to be consistent with the shifting geopolitical environment. After Brexit, the EU should focus more on “Realpolitik” principles since it will be less and less in a position to impose its paradigm based on its normative ideology. The European project should be considered the latest form of the different successive historical European security architectures, such as the “Westphalian peace” or the “Congress of Vienna,” and thus give more prominence to the ancient concept of classic equilibrium (Foucault 2004). This approach would be more compatible with the “neo-Westphalian” vision of Russians (Raviot 2017a). If the member states of the European Union and its institutions elaborated a strategy of power in the multipolar world, with the prospect of a strategic awakening of the European project, the rapprochement with Russia would be an indispensable option. With Russia, Europe is reaching the Pacific Ocean. This is “Greater Europe.” The US and Russia are the keys to security and stability for the European Union in order to launch an organized strategy along its maritime and continental

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axes. The negotiation of a new security architecture from Lisbon to Vladivostok, between a reformed EU and Russia, would be complementary to a security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok, including the US. Without Franco-German rebalancing and an open dialogue on European aims, including the question on the role of borders, territorial control and the notion of sovereignty, Brexit can become the catalyst for a geopolitical process potentially as important as the fall of the Berlin Wall. The result might be an acceleration of European geopolitical reconfigurations with repercussions leading to a continuous regression of the European Union, but also a decomposition of multinational states (UK, Spain, Belgium, etc.). This could become a plausible scenario, especially since fragmentation is the global trend. In history, it is rare for an empire or an international entity to have survived a process of territorial regression. It is necessary to bring the geopolitical debate to the citizens of the European Union, rather than confine it to the political, diplomatic and military levels, in order to make progress on a legitimate political Europe. This would avoid geopolitical issues and public opinion opposing each other; bridging the geopolitical gap would help in filling the democratic deficit by giving more meaning to the European project. The crisis between the EU and Russia is not a sub-element of the EU’s external relations but is part of the deeper crisis of the aims of the European project. It is probably an illusion to think that the EU and Russia will be able to resolve their different disputes using a “one-by-one” crisis approach on a “sectoral basis.” Linkages in negotiations (Kissinger doctrine) cannot be applied that way. The long-term objective of improving EU-Russia relations implies offering each other an acceptable place in our respective projects: Russia should be given a role in the European project, and the European project should be given a role in the Russian vision. Only then might the different ongoing crises have a chance of being resolved in a more global deal. Ultimately, this cooperative option would require negotiating new and sui generis structures to institutionalize this long-term vision of a “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” (EU membership is not an option since it is not even suggested by Russia). This would not be contrary to the basic principles of the European Union, since the EU itself is based on a sui generis process. This process allowed the EU to gain valuable experience (through both successes and failures) and to improve relations on a continental scale.

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Propositions • Strategic communication: focus on positive experiences like cultural exchanges, common cultural and civilizational features. • Larger consultation of different actors, countries, ministries and associations to avoid excessive militarization of strategic communication and monopolization of narratives by actors who have an interest in a revanchist agenda. This will only be effective when political decisions are taken accordingly, and this is why researchers and civil society representatives have to impose themselves in the debate so as not to let it be monopolized by professional diplomats at the service of networks only interested in maintaining the old obsolete and declining order. • The opinions of experts on missiles and nuclear questions have to be balanced by a more geopolitical analysis with a more global view in order to avoid sectoral interests and defended by think tanks imposing their negative agenda. • Develop cooperation networks between EU members and Russia with their own internet sites, and access to and communication with social media. Alternative ideas, alternative social networks, research networks and friends have to be mobilized. • Strategic communication can be inspired by more diverse analysis; think tanks have to be diversified. Are they still too heavily influenced by the legacy of the Cold War period? • European finalities have to be put on the agenda for discussion, in order to reveal implicit agendas. • Counter the reinterpretation of history in the propaganda war, reinformation, focusing on history and geography, to deconstruct ideological narratives aimed at maintaining the obsolete power system. • Common working groups on strategic communication could be created as part of a “selective engagement” policy. The EU-Russia expert network does not produce common written propositions, and the selection of EU experts is detrimental to the positive discussions, since many of them come from very Atlanticist think tanks and open-­society NGOs influenced by ideology, and not rational geopolitical analysis. Their promotion of an extreme and exclusive Euro-­ Atlanticist ideology, leading to the exclusion of Russia or its alignment with EU normative ideology, is a nonstarter scenario.

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• Instead of insisting on an ever closer union or integration, the challenge for the European project is to have more geopolitical balance within the EU. The future lies in different coalitions of the willing according to the thematics and the challenges.

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Martens S (2000) La représentation géopolitique de la position centrale de l’Allemagne, perceptions allemandes (The geopolitical representation of Germany’s central position, German perceptions). J Allemagne d’Aujourd’hui (Germany today) 153:26–51. Mearsheimer JJ (2014) Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault: the liberal delusions that provoked Putin. Expanded Academic ASAP. http://link.galegroup. com/apps/doc/A381409213/EAIM?u=leicester&sid=EAIM&xid=8d44 49a8. Accessed 20 Apr 2019. Ministère des Armées (Ministry of the Armed Forces) (2017) Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale (Defence and national security strategic review). Ministère des Armées, Paris. https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/presentation/evenements/revue-strategique-de-defense-et-de-securite-nationale-2017. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. New York Times (1992) US strategy plans calls for insuring no rival develop. https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/us-strategy-plan-calls-forinsuring-no-rivals-develop.html. Accessed 6 Mar 2019. Pashentsev E (2017a) Migranti, crisi, clima. La comunicazione strategica di Stato – I Parte. (Migrants, crisis, climate. Strategic state communication  – part I). L’EURISPES. https://www.leurispes.it/migranti-crisi-clima-la-comunicazione-strategica-di-stato-ii-parte/. Accessed 7 Mar 2019. Pashentsev E (2017b) The geopolitical role of strategic communication between Russia and the EU, interview. Association of Studies, Research and Internationalization in Eurasia and Africa, 12.06.2017. http://www.asrie. org/2017/06/the-geopolitical-role-of-strategic-communication-betweenrussia-and-the-eu-interview-with-professor-evgeny-pashentsev/. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Politico (2017) Germany’s Steinmeier warns French voters against Lepen. 15 Apr. https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-frank-walter-steinmeier-warnsfrench-voters-against-le-pen/. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Politico (2018) Macron fake news law will threaten democracy. 7 Jan. https:// www.politico.eu/article/macron-fake-news-law-will-threaten-democracy/. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Radavanyi J (2017) Quand Vladimir Poutine se fait géographe…, Géopolitique de la Russie (When Vladimir Putin becomes a geographer…, Geopolitics of Russia). J Hérodote, Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique (Herodotus, a review of geography and geopolitics) 166–167: 113–132. Raviot JP (2017a) La Russie: une menace ou un partenaire pour l’Europe? (Russia: a threat or a partner for Europe?) J Diplomatie 40:55–58. Raviot JR (2017b) Le prétorianisme russe: l’exercice du pouvoir selon Vladimir Poutine. Géopolitique de la Russie (Russian pretorianism: Vladimir Putin’s

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exercise of power. Geopolitics of Russia). Hérodote, Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique (Herodotus, a review of geography and geopolitics) 166–167:9–22. Reuters (2014) Kerry condemns Russia’s incredible act of aggression in Ukraine. 2 Feb. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-kerry/kerrycondemns-russias-incredible-act-of-aggression-in-ukraine-idUSBREA210DG20140302. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Richter M (2017) The Kremlin’s platform for ‘useful idiots’ in the West: An overview of RT’s editorial strategy and evidence of impact. European Values. http://www.europeanvalues.net/rt/. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Romanova T (2016) Russia and Europe: Somewhat different, somewhat the same? Policy brief. Russian International Affairs Council. http://russiancouncil.ru/ common/upload/Russia-Europe-Policybrief5-en.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Russia Today (2016) NATO greedy for geopolitical space, wants to encircle those who disagree, 29 Apr. https://www.rt.com/news/341378-lavrov-sweden-nato-russia/. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Simons G (2017) The role of NGOs in knowledge management of conflicts. J Public Administration. Electronic Bulletin 64:362–376. http://ee-journal.spa. msu.ru/vestnik/item/64_2017simons.htm. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Stokes B, Wike R, Poushter J (2016) Europeans face the world divided, 13 Jun. Pew Research Centre. http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeansface-the-world-divided/. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Tchernega V (2014) Repenser les relations avec la Russie (Rethinking relations with Russia). J Revue Défense Nationale (National Defence Review) 775:93–101. Tchernega V (2015) Repenser les relations avec la Russie (Rethinking relations with Russia). J Revue Défense Nationale (National Defence Review) 776:97–104. The Guardian (2017a) Obama backs Macron in last-minute intervention in French election, 4 May. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/04/ barack-obama-backs-macron-in-last-minute-election-intervention. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. The Guardian (2017b) The West must defend its values against Putin’s Russia, 1 Oct. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/30/westmust-defend-its-values-against-putins-russia. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. The Guardian (2017c) EU anti propaganda unit gets €1m a year to counter Russian fake news, 25 Nov. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ nov/25/eu-anti-propaganda-unit-gets-1m-a-year-to-counter-russian-fakenews. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. The White House (2017) National Security Strategy of the United States. https:// w w w. w h i t e h o u s e . g o v / w p - c o n t e n t / u p l o a d s / 2 0 1 7 / 1 2 / N S S Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan 2018.

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Thomann PE (2010) Research interview with Pierre Vimont, former Secretary General of the European External Action Service. Brussels. Thomann PE (2013) Russie et Union européenne: le chaînon manquant en matière de défense et sécurité (Russia and the European Union: the missing link in defence and security). J Revue Défense Nationale (National Defence Review) 762:127–134. Thomann PE (2015) Le couple franco-allemand et le projet européen: représentations géopolitiques, unité et rivalités (The Franco-German duo and the European project: geopolitical representations, unity and rivalries). L’Harmattan, Paris. Thomann PE (2016) Research interview with an official of the Council of the EU, 28th Nov. Ukrainian Think Tank Liaison office in Brussels (2016) Prospects for EU enlargement after 2019. https://ukraine-office.eu/en/prospects-for-eu-enlargementafter-2019/. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. US mission to the European Union (2018) Remarks by A/S Wess Mitchell: Anchoring the Western Alliance, 5 Jun. US mission to the European Union. https://useu.usmission.gov/remarks-by-a-s-wess-mitchell-anchoring-thewestern-alliance/. Accessed 7 Mar 2019. Vaïsse J (2016) Zbigniew Brzezinski, stratège de l’empire (Zbigniew Brzezinski, strategist of the empire). Odile Jacob, Paris. Voigt K (2014) A new phase of Russia and Ostpolitik has begun. Foundation for European progressive studies. http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/1b1242575061-4cf5-9309-83e33aee57af/karsten-paperpdf.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. WikiLeaks (2008) Poland, a natural ally on Eastern policy, 12 Dec. https:// wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08WARSAW1409_a.html. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (2014) Conference: building a lifeline for freedom: Eastern partnership 2.0. 7 Oct. https://www.martenscentre. eu/publications/building-lifeline-freedom-eastern-partnership-20. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Zagorsky A (2016) Russia-EU relations at a crossroad, common and divergent interests. Working paper. Russian International Affairs Council. http://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/workingpapers/rossiya-i-es-na-perepute-obshchiei-raskhodyashchiesya-inter/. Accessed 31 Jan 2018. Zajec O (2017) Le réalisme interactionnel de Nicolas J. Spykman, une sociologie des relations internationales dans l’entre deux guerres (The interactional realism of Nicolas J. Spykman, a sociology of international relations in the interwar period). J Annuaire français de relations internationales, Université Panthéon Assas, Centre Thucydide, Paris (French yearbook of the international relations, Panthéon-Assas University, Thucydides Center, Paris) 18:599–616. http:// www.afri-ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Article-Zajec.pdf. Accessed 7 Mar 2019.

CHAPTER 4

Cooperation and Trust: When Russia and the European Union Listen to Themselves Marius Vacarelu

Introduction Communication, in its simplest form, not only helps states to construct and preserve a productive and friendly political environment, but also maps out the shared needs, values and attitudes among the citizens who receive more trust to develop their skills, which in turn results in economic progress for individual countries and for the whole of humanity (Manescu 2017). Communication objectives, such as message efficiency, creation of learning networks and sharing of knowledge, represent the guidelines for any strategy that aims to develop a modern distribution of information (AdPlayers.ro  2017). At the same time, when talking about the globalisation of communicational practices, it should be acknowledged that the changes brought to this area by social media platforms diffuse power and the hierarchical structure inside states however, yet are still dependent on some old-style practices (Zerfass and Huck 2009).

M. Vacarelu (*) National School of Political Science and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pashentsev (ed.), Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1_4

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For states, strategic communication is one of the most important ways of acting in international relations. It is a process that includes the ­integrating function, the planning function and the staffing functions and has budgetary implications (Paul 2011). Strategic communication is defined as an informational resource, building persuasive, discursive, as well as relational communication in order to achieve the mission (Hallahan et al. 2007). In a 2011 Chatham House report, strategic communications were described as “a systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences and identifies effective conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behaviour”. In practice, for policyrelated organisations, it includes elements of public diplomacy and “spin”, media relations, advertising, recruitment and training and, most notably, situational awareness (“detect and deter”). In operational terms, it entails both a defensive (“react and respond”) and an offensive (“probe and push”) dimension (EU Institute for Security Studies 2016). This chapter attempts to describe some lines of communication, cooperation and trust between Russia and the European Union (EU), while searching for the most recent data on economy, political contacts, geography, public documents and public agreements. After analysing them, we will give some conclusions about the necessity for peace and cooperation among the states on the European continent. Relations between Russia and the European Union are analysed in recent literature—a modest number (e.g. Talseth 2017; Piet and Simao 2016), but with a larger amount of inside reports published by different think tanks; unfortunately, the literature regarding the strategic communication on this topic (Russia–EU relations) in the last years is quite politicised on both sides of “the battlefield”. A vast body of scholarship exists on strategic communication, as general topic. A Google search on the topic reveals more than 18 million results. The simple questions “what is strategic communication” or “what is the definition for strategic communication” give more than 4.8 million results. In this sense, the “power” of strategic communication has been elaborated and increasingly enlarged in the few years preceding—and the decade after—the turn of the twenty-first century. What makes strategic communication powerful is not only its informational quotient but also, at a deeper level, the modes through which it reshapes visibility, subjectivity and agency (Comunicarea strategica (Strategic communication) 2007). Such transformations contribute to the processes of political and social change. The landscape in the first decade of the millennium has changed profoundly, enough to catalyse the transformative process.

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When searching for “cooperation”, the same search engine reveals 240 million results; for the word “trust”, 980 million results appeared. Indeed, strategic communication is a specific field of scientific enquiry; however, the positive outcomes of its practice are, on the one hand, an increase of trust in states’ administration and state rulers, and on the other hand, a rise in cooperation between states. Therefore, it is the task of scholars to develop the principles and good practices of strategic communication, offering better perspectives for cooperation and strengthening of trust. This research is based on statistics and official documents of the World Bank and the European Union, as well as scholarly literature from Russia, Romania, the United States and the United Kingdom. This chapter presents an attempt to find arguments for cooperation and trust, while searching for a more effective strategic communication between Russia and the EU.

Mutual Influence It is not easy to analyse the relations between Russia and the European Union in today’s political climate. Firstly, a human mind is not totally segmented in conceptual thinking and only few of us are able to make sense of complex problems. Secondly, the multiplicity of information transmitted via various channels (television, internet, radio) often results in a “mental chaos” and blurred. In this case, the relations between Russia and the European Union are not separated into segments and very often the correct way of analysing them is corrupted by information abundance (see also Friedman et al. 2019). For some four and a half decades after World War II, the Cold War dominated the landscape of European affairs. However, for a few short years after 1985, Europe’s economic, political and military division was overturned (Europe seen as continent). The suddenness and scale of this process owes almost everything to the developments in the former Soviet Union. Opening up to the West under Mikhail Gorbachev and Moscow’s consent to the removal of communism in east-central Europe (ECE) were the defining events of the Cold War’s end. Russia, the largest of the states to emerge from the ruins of the Soviet Union, hardly qualifies as a successor of similar stature and influence (Webber 2000, p. 1). The political, economic and military reconfiguration of Europe that has taken place over the last decade has, however, not occurred in its absence. Contemporary Russia—like the Soviet Union and, indeed, Tsarist Russia

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before it—has claimed an important role in Europe and has actively sought an involvement in the affairs of the continent (Nistor 2014). Historically, Russia’s standing with regard to Europe has not been a comfortable one. Russia’s status as a European state has not always been recognised, either in Europe itself or, indeed, by Russia’s own leaders and opinion makers. Moreover, Russian/Soviet involvement in Europe has often been regarded as temporary, contingent or at the service of some mischievous foreign policy design (Webber 2000, p.  2). In fact, some experts (Hare and Stoneman 2017) consider Russia an unavoidably difficult country for the EU to “manage”. The poor state of EU relations with Russia also adversely affects relations with several eastern neighbours, not least because there can be conflict between the alternative economic models offered by the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the EU. Relations between the European Union and Russia are based on some special paradigms, of which one of the most important is the Westernisation of Russia. Is Russia part of the Western world? Tankers of ink have been written and entire forests have been cut down for paper addressing this issue; one of the “cursed questions” that has plagued Russian intellectuals and Western observers alike for the past two centuries. “Russia and the West” is a theme that never seems to be exhausted, a question that cannot be answered satisfactorily. It seems everyone has an opinion on the matter, and the answers (from no, to maybe to yes) deploy a staggering number of criteria to determine Russia’s suitability (or lack thereof) to being viewed as “Western”, ranging from the geography and the linguistic specificities to the political and institutional realm (Godsev 2007). A Google search for the phrase “Russia and the West” shows an astonishing 109 million results. Certainly, some of these were false hits, where the term picked up some extraneous subjects, but the vast majority testifies to the ease with which both Russian and non-Russian commentators are prepared to juxtapose the idea of “Russia” with that of “the West”. Sometimes Russia’s conditional association is expressed by the phrase “Russia is European, but not Western” (Godsev 2007). The main answer to this formidable question, “is Russia a part of Western world or not”, is given in terms of geography. Russia is unique in terms of its climate, size and location. The Russian Federation is the largest country in the world, taking up 11.5% of the world’s landmass. Yet the majority of this vast land area is virtually uninhabited. Around 65% of Russian territory is exposed to continuous or

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sporadic permafrost. The average January temperature in Moscow is −10 °C, but over 90% of Russia’s territory is even colder. Accessibility is another problem. In the northern part of Russia most of the rivers flow from south to north. There are no cheap transcontinental water transportation routes from Europe to Asia, making costly land transport the only practically option. Most of Russia’s territory is not only cold, but also remote, separated from the global markets and from the main population centres in Russia itself. Physical geography presents natural constraints to the distribution of economic activity over the territory (Russian Federal State Statistic Service 2018). Given such a climate and land endowment, it is not surprising that the Russian population is concentrated in the areas with relatively favourable natural conditions. The western part of the country and a narrow strip along its southern border to the east of the Ural Mountains, which together constitute less than 20% of its total land endowment, host the majority of population. However, even there the population density is generally low relative to international standards. It is an unusual combination: Russia’s population is quite concentrated, if we consider all of its vast territory; at the same time, however, it is still sparse compared to the majority of other countries. This scarcity of population and economic activity on the huge territory is one of the key features of Russia’s economic geography. Physical geography is also an important motor of spatial evolution of the Russian economy. Natural resources compose a bulk of the value of the Russian frontier—Siberia and the Far East. The desire to exploit them resulted in the expansion of the Russian Empire and has always been an essential determinant of state policy. Exploitation of these resources is costly. The state—the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union or the modern Russian Federation—has always faced the same trade-off. On the one hand, there is the desire to reap the benefits of this vast territory; on the other, there are the enormous economic costs of development related to a hostile natural environment (Markevich and Mikhailova 2012). The rest of Europe is influenced by the Russian climate especially on winter: cold winds and cold air streams came to the Central Europe and downgrade the level of life. Russia gets from the Southern part of Europe more hot air streams, which are a real benefit for its agriculture and develop the touristic season on the large Black Sea area. Regardless of geographical factors, Russia’s difference from Europe has also been explained in a sense of political and cultural distinctiveness

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characteristic of the country. This relates simultaneously to how Russia is regarded in Europe and to how Europe is regarded in Russia. In both cases, Russia is held to possess a unique set of qualities that mark it as Europe’s “Other”, explaining its distance from the far-reaching European movements of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Reformation and the liberal-democratic transformations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, having left the country in its own peculiar slipstream of development. Russian Orthodoxy, pan-Slavism, the evolution of Russian nationalism since the eighteenth century and even Bolshevism/Soviet communism (understood here as a unique Russian variant of Marxism) have all contributed to a Russian self-definition that is, in part, juxtaposed to, rather than in correspondence with, European influences. Also the fact that the Soviet Union spent some 70 years in the pursuit of an alternative model of political, economic and societal development of which the credentials are showcased in the ideological defiance of Western Europe (and, indeed, the West more generally) only reinforced the idea that the Russia it then encapsulated had parted company with Europe (Mazower 1998). It seems that people without a decent knowledge of its geography and culture can easily exaggerate the separation of Russia from Europe. In fact, Russia is not so distant from the continent. Notwithstanding the peculiarities of Russia’s development noted above, it has been clearly linked to the development of European civilisation. Its cultural contributions—not least in the spheres of art, music and literature—to a common European canon are beyond dispute. Similarly, in historical terms, Russia has, at least since the end of the eighteenth century, been a major actor in European affairs. This was first apparent through its impact on the continent’s major wars from the Napoleonic period onwards; second, through its involvement in various arrangements of an attempted European order; third, in its participation in European-based alliances. European cultural influence in Russia starts before the time of Peter the Great, strengthening its dimension after the Napoleonic wars, which ended with a coup d’état tentative in 1825. Economic modernisation of Russia had exclusive European roots; the main foreign languages spoken were German, French and—in the last decades—English. It is impossible to understand Russian society without knowing the main European socio-­ political doctrines, but we need to underline their different results, with some mutual mistrust on today public sphere.

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The Economy Speaks in International Relations Russia’s connections to Europe carry certain very important implications. Firstly, Russia inherited from the Soviet Union military capabilities and treaty commitments (principally the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty) with a heavy focus on European contingencies. These have subsequently been refashioned by virtue of the withdrawal from ECE, the disintegration of the Soviet armed forces and Russian military reforms; but in essence the Russian order of battle remains concentrated west of the Urals, even though the eventuality of its deployment in war is now a distant prospect. Secondly, European states account for a sizeable proportion of Russian foreign trade and this share has increased during the 1990s as Russia has re-oriented its trade away from less profitable markets in the successor states. Moreover, the fact that the Eastern Europeans have simultaneously shifted their trade patterns away from Russia means that the European direction of Russian trade has been increasingly concentrated on transactions with EU member states. Thirdly, Russia’s pretensions of preserving its role as a great power require an active engagement in European affairs. While it could be argued that Russian influence is more easily demonstrated among the successor states, such a position is problematic on two levels: the region is as much a burden as an asset in economic and military terms, and Russia’s sense of status cannot be sufficiently realised by reliance on its own periphery. A great power views itself in a global context, and Europe remains in geopolitical terms still a pivotal region which demands engagement (Webber 2000, pp. 8–9). The European Union has so far occupied a much less prominent place in Russian foreign policy than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The EU has been perceived primarily as an economic organisation and its aspirations to play a leading political and security role in the “new Europe” have only gradually come to be recognised, let alone accepted, by the Russian authorities. Certainly, Russia does not appear to share the EU’s own perception of itself as the other major power on the continent and has continued to regard bilateral relations with the traditional “great European powers” such as Germany and France as the normal way of conducting relations with the EU member states. Although access to the EU’s market has been seen as an important objective by Moscow, the potential benefits of a

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closer political relationship are only gradually being appreciated. The other major reason for the relatively low profile of the EU in Russian foreign policy has been that membership does not seem to be a serious policy option, despite occasional press statements to the contrary. Russia’s huge size, Eurasian geopolitical position, global interests and the continuing perception of itself as a great power would make it very difficult to accept the constraints of EU membership (Malcolm 1994, p. 16). The 1990s, after the fundamental changes which took place in the Eastern European space, were a time of expectations, because a new world order acted to the extension of a Western style of politics. Thus, just at the end of the century, at the Cologne Council in June 1999, the EU adopted a “Common Strategy on Russia”, wherein the following phrase was written: “A stable, democratic and prosperous Russia, firmly anchored in a united Europe free of new dividing lines, is essential to lasting peace on the continent. The issues which the whole continent faces can be resolved only through ever closer cooperation between Russia and the European Union. The European Union welcomes Russia’s return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of European civilization” (The European Council 1999). The reference to an “ever closer cooperation” clearly implied a progressive evolution of the relationship. One of the principal objectives of the Common Strategy was to enable Russia to integrate into a “common economic and social area in Europe”, particularly through the achievement of the free trade area and the accommodation of Russian legislation to EU norms (The European Commission 2016). However, it is clear that the “vision” extended beyond the creation of a form of European Economic Area reaching from Reykjavik to Vladivostok. The partnership was then described as “strategic”, and the “reinforced relationship” would include “a permanent policy and security dialogue designed to bring interests closer together and to respond jointly to some of the challenges to security on the European continent” (Webber 2000, p. 68). In the economic sphere, there is already evidence of growing interdependence and both parties would experience difficulties if trade was to be interrupted or reduced. In the case of Russia, the importance of the EU market is obvious: unless a future Russian leadership decides to retreat into autarky, trade with the EU member states is likely to continue to expand. Moreover, although statistically the EU trade appears to be much

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more important to Russia than vice versa, Russia is a major supplier of energy and raw materials to the EU and also a growing market for machinery, equipment, consumer goods and food. From the EU’s perspective, the 142 million Russian consumers are seen as a very promising market, nearly one and a half times bigger than the combined market of all ten of the ECE applicant states. If the Russian economy becomes more stable (in the last years the Russian currency was not so strong, losing half of its value from 2014 until 2019), then the development of a closer relationship with the EU may also contribute to a more favourable climate for direct foreign investment. However, all these positive developments are dependent on the success of continuous political and economic transformations in Russia. If all goes well, increased business contacts, the development of trans-European communications and supply networks, increased confidence and mutual trust will all make Russia an integral part of the wider European economy. If a Russia–EU free trade area becomes a reality, a genuinely pan-European marketplace could be created and Russia could expect to share in the resulting economic prosperity and stability. This growing economic interdependence, which gives Russia a stake in the new European order, is the surest foundation for the development of stable and peaceful political relations (The European Council 1999). On the website of the European Union we can read: “The EU is Russia’s main trading and investment partner, while Russia is the EU’s fourth trade partner. In 2015 EU exports to Russia totaled €73.9 billion, while EU imports from Russia amounted to €135.8 billion. The EU trade deficit with Russia was therefore €61.9 billion in 2015, and it is primarily the result of significant EU imports of energy products from Russia. The internal economic difficulties in Russia, the strong depreciation of the RUR and the fall in global commodity prices have resulted in a drop in Russia’s trade with nearly all partners…. Russia, accounted by 10% of the EU’s trade in 2012, currently accounts for less than 6% (and 4% of EU exports). Russia still remains an important trade partner for the EU. The EU is by far the largest investor in Russia. The total stock of foreign direct investment in Russia originating from the EU approached €170 billion in 2014” (European Union. External Action 2017). Whereas the role of Asia, particularly the Pacific countries, increased from 24% to 31% in the last four years, the role of the EU decreased drastically. The dynamics of Russian trade in 2018 show (Russian Central Bank 2019) a great increase especially with respect to China; similarly, there has been notable progress with respect to the EU. “The EU has been a strong supporter of Russia’s

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WTO membership since the start of the process to the accession on 22 August 2012. Russia’s WTO membership should be a major element to further the development of economic relations between the EU and Russia. It should also introduce better stability and predictability in Russia’s trade policy, limiting the scope for introducing unilateral tariff hikes or other restrictions as has been the case in the past. The correct implementation of WTO commitments is key. … Russia is the largest oil, gas, uranium and coal exporter to the EU. Likewise, the EU by far the largest trade partner of the Russian Federation. Based on this mutual interdependency and common interest in the energy sector, the EU and Russia developed a close energy partnership and launched an EU-Russia Energy Dialogue in 2000. The EU is ready to cooperate with Russia in further developing a number of basic market principles in the energy sector, such as: an energy efficiency and saving policy, investment facilitation and protection, the right of access to energy transport infrastructure, network operators’ independence from the natural monopoly producers, sector regulation, and reform of monopolies” (European Union – External Action 2017). In recent years, crises brought some new perspectives to the relations between the European Union and Russia. The Valdai Discussion Club, one of Russia’s best think tanks, wrote about this change related to the bilateral relation’s paradigm (The Valdai Discussion Club 2016): “Russia has long viewed Europe as an important reference point for values, a civilisational model worthy of emulation. This attitude is rooted in long-­ standing intellectual traditions, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union Russians genuinely considered the ‘European path’ as the preferred scenario for the country’s development. At some point, that sense of cultural and historical solidarity with Europe was transferred to the European Union as the current form of its institutional organisation. However, there has always been a gap between what was declared and what actually happened in practice. Russia, despite repeating all of the necessary ‘mantras’ for years, has always been guided by pragmatic interests in relation to Europe, and that pragmatism eventually took shape as its official policy. Russian interests primarily included the following: a fair and predictable commercial relationship in the energy field, the free movement of citizens, non-interference by the EU in the internal affairs of countries within Russia’s zone of vital interests and, finally, a sufficient degree of access to the rich European market for competitive Russian goods. … These are the objectives that Russian negotiators have actually pursued since the early 1990s”.

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Behind those ideas and purposes is the capacity of the Russian economy. Although Russia’s economy is currently not in the best state, suffering from the effects of fallen energy prices and economic sanctions, it remains, in relative terms, stronger today, than it was for much of the period since the end of the Cold War. In 2018, Russia’s economy was valued at $1.576 trillion (The World Bank 2019), placing it 12th in the world (IMF 2019), with 1.85% of global gross domestic product (GDP), up from 0.78% in 2000. Despite the current difficulties, this affords Russia a platform for some regional and global influence. Russia’s reasonably large foreign currency reserves, standing at $482.6 billion in February 2019 (Russian Central Bank 2019), and moreover, its large sovereign wealth funds, have acted as a shock-absorber to the global economic shifts and more recently to the sanctions. Russia’s energy reserves and exports remain the core of its economy and constitute its largest economic strength. Moreover, it is one of its most significant diplomatic tools. As of 2015, Russia holds the sixth largest proven oil reserve in the world (6% of the global total), it is the third largest producer of oil (12.4%), it holds the second largest proven gas reserve (17.3%) and it is the world’s second largest gas producer (16.1%). Russia accounts for just fewer than 20% of global gas exports, far ahead of its next two competitors Qatar and Norway on 12.1% and 11%, respectively. Russia’s energy reserves are in relatively more stable locations than their competitors in the Middle East and Africa, making it a relatively attractive supplier to some importers. Most recently, Russia’s energy strength has allowed it to negotiate huge deals with China to the East, and to account, respectively, for 39% and 34% of the EU’s 2013 gas and oil imports; Russia was the main supplier to the EU of crude oil, natural gas and solid fuels in 2016 (Eurostat 2018). The biggest opportunity for Russia would be to pursue cooperation with both Europe and Asia in tandem, and become an important Eurasian hub or “bridge power” in a common Eurasian space. This would allow Moscow to demonstrate the value of its geographic reach to both its eastern and western neighbours. Russia has the potential in both arenas, and the potential to pursue a truly multi-vector foreign policy; its unique geography allows this as in no other case, except for Turkey. With the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and its potential integration into China’s Silk Road, Russia also has the opportunity for its regional integration project to become a linchpin in a developed Eurasian space. Russia’s position vis-à-vis the rest of Europe still presents a massive opportunity to secure economic relations with one of the world’s largest,

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most stable and most prosperous markets. If partnership relations can be reached, the European Union could provide Russia with a stable energy market, a source of much needed capital and a stable situation at its western borders. Moreover, the costs of producing and transporting energy to Europe is far lower in comparison to China, making it a far more attractive destination for Russian energy exporters in an era of low oil prices. The EU further represents a wealthy consumer market of 506 million people, worth $18.769 trillion (22.12% of the world’s economy), a figure that will decline relatively but increase absolutely in the coming decades.

Cooperation Is Possible To have real cooperation between states we should observe some conditions: first, it is necessary for both parties to truly want to cooperate not using agreements simply to create the time necessary to prepare and resume hostilities. Second, in order to obtain an effective cooperation it must bring profits to both parts, without a real disproportion between achievements. The most sensible part of cooperation is represented by the first condition; if everyone can understand and also measure the profits of agreements, the behaviour of signed contracts/treaties is more flexible, but also more dangerous. When we analyse the agreements between states (and institutions of course), we should always remember how actors fulfil their obligations; only after this observation we will be able to say: “we have trust in this state/institution”. What trust is? What are its antecedents and consequences? How should we measure it? What model best explains trust and changes in trust? Is trust the same across individuals, institutions, societies and time? How should we define trust? Currently, no single definition serves as a focal point for research. The intensity and scope of trust and trusting relationships are capable of variation. With respect to trust, intensity refers to the strength of an actor’s perception of the trustworthiness of others. With respect to trusting relationships, intensity refers to the amount of discretion trustors grant trustees over their interests. The scope of trust and trusting relationships can vary as well, although the extent of this variation is disputed (explored further in Gherasim 1981). Citizens are unlikely to trust a government willing to use lethal force arbitrarily against its own population, but citizens might trust their government to regulate

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health care even though it has not done so previously. In short, there are always limits to trust, but those limits are not necessarily obvious, particularly the administrative strength of the state (Balan 2008). Citizens very often compare the situation of their rulers to the results of rulers from other states, and at that moment they might put pressure on their leaders to change their behaviour in international relations, to make alliances with some states and to renounce alliances with others, as a result of the loss of social trust (as expressed in voting). The deep institutional crisis—seen in electoral participation and lower trust level in democracy’s emblematic institutions, in both Russia and the EU (Edelman 2019)— forced both sides to find a common language not just for them, but for planet interests too. In fact, a good contract is implemented with trust; a good negotiation should have an adequate level of trust to end with an agreement. Today times are full with nervous people and a lot of possible topics for a “political explosion” with affect not just one state, due to globalisation (Pashentsev 2017). This lack of calm affects states and citizens; a real trust is not able to appear when just “the suspicious mind” makes the public agenda. So, while analysing the relation between the European Union and Russia we should first determine the “quantity of mutual trust” and, secondly, find the easiest steps to strengthen it; complete autarchy is impossible in the twenty-first century. In mutual self-interest, there is a powerful strategic rationale for seeking a more cooperative relationship in the long term between the European Union and Russia, however difficult that might be. If not, the costs of confrontation will increase, the threats will be less manageable, the strengths will be diminished and opportunities will be missed. Some directions for cooperation are very clear to any analyst, and are similarly identified by the European Union: a) The EU environmental policy can only be efficient in cooperation with Russia as only together the two parties can successfully combat the consequences of trans-boundary and global environmental degradation. Confronting the global challenges of climate change, the loss of biodiversity, deforestation and air and water pollution requires real commitment and effective cooperation on an international level. The close partnership that has developed between the EU and Russia on a number of strategic ecological issues is essential for ensuring sustainable environmental security worldwide.

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b) Cooperation between the EU and the Russian Federation in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security is now a key component in the development of the strategic partnership. The EU is focused on making progress in the implementation of the roadmap for the EU-Russia Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice. The Permanent Partnership Councils (PPCs) on Justice, Freedom and Security set priorities and monitor progress during its regular meetings. c) The EU and Russia aim at further enhancing cooperation on migration and asylum issues. For this purpose, in 2011 they decided to establish a specific EU-Russia Migration Dialogue, which brings together experts to discuss issues related to international protection, irregular migration, migration and development and legal migration. At this point, we should mention the cooperation on state border management. The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX) has been cooperating on an operational level with its Russian counterparts on the basis of a working arrangement established in 2006; this practical cooperation comprises risk analyses, training and research and development related to border management, as well as possible joint operations under the aegis of FRONTEX. d) In the last few decades, the fight against organised crime became very important. There are some agreements between the EU institutions and Russia. The fight against human trafficking, money laundering, terrorism financing and cybercrime represents potential fields of strengthened cooperation between the EU and Russia; the control of drug precursors is also very important. The EU and Russia hold regular consultations on counter-terrorism issues and anti-­corruption activities. e) Educational cooperation between Russia and the EU is guided by the principles of the Bologna Process of the Council of Europe which seeks to improve the quality, transparency, comparability and competitiveness of educational systems. The EU and Russia agreed at the St. Petersburg Summit of May 2003 to establish a “Common Space on Research and Education, including cultural aspects”. A road map agreed on in 2005 sets out objectives and areas for ­cooperation for short and medium term. The implementation is ensured, most notably, through joint working groups and Permanent

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Partnership Councils. The overall objective of the Common Space for Research and Education is to deepen scientific and technological cooperation and to enhance education cooperation in line with the Bologna Process. The European Union’s policy aims in research are (Busighina 2012, p. 74): structuring a knowledge-based society in the EU and Russia; promoting a high rate of competitiveness and sustainable economic growth by modernisation of the national economies and implementation of advanced scientific achievements for the benefit and well-being of citizens; strengthening and optimising the links between research and innovation; maintaining small- and medium-size entrepreneurship in the field of research and innovation; addressing global challenges and reinforcing people-to-people contacts. The EU’s policy aims in education are (Busighina 2012, p. 74): adopting comparable higher education degrees; introducing a credit system in line with the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS); promoting academic mobility; cooperating in the area of quality assurance; updating and modernising curricula at the level of higher education institutions, notably with a view to increasing their relevance to the labour market needs; promoting lifelong learning; reforming university governance; increasing the attractiveness of the higher education systems in Russia and in the EU; helping young people acquire knowledge, skills and competencies; recognising the value of such experiences; promoting intercultural dialogue and enhancing cooperation with neighbouring partner countries.

Conclusion The geographic position has a significant influence on Russian foreign policy. Not only does it reaffirm the importance of an Asian dimension (with regard to China, the Indian sub-continent and East Asia), it also draws attention to a completely new category of relations with Soviet successor states. Such concerns do not need to rule out a European direction. They do, however, imply that Russian interests are balanced between Europe and other regions around its periphery. This position has been rationalised in Russia through ideas associated with “Eurasianism” and “multipolarism”. The former identifies Russia’s unique position as a bridge between Europe and Asia. The latter points to the need for a foreign policy that is not unidirectional (i.e. fixated on the United States) but one

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that is focused on multiple centres of power—Europe, but also China, India and so on (Mandelbaum 1996, p. 171). If no change in political direction occurs in Moscow, or in the EU (not speculating about the prospects of the EU after Brexit, with rising financial problems, etc.), the EU-Russia relationship will be muddling through, or rather “muddling down”. This is the most probable scenario, as Moscow does not seem to be ready yet to change its line. In this case, both sides will continue to “manage” the current political and diplomatic conflict. Economic interdependence will continue playing a certain stabilising role. Meanwhile, however, mutual diversification of energy flows may accelerate, and several European countries will make an effort to overcome their critical energy dependence on Russia. A normalisation and gradual improvement in EU-Russian relations can occur if Russia comes to realise that the current stalemate does not serve Russia’s interests and gradually weakens its options/positions—in other words, if it decides that time is not on Moscow’s side and that it would be better off making trade-­ offs earlier rather than later. Economic and financial considerations have a role to play, as do the views of those Russian elites who want to stay connected to Europe (Moshes 2017). The same can be said about the EU, keeping in consideration the rising ties between Russia and China among other strategic relations. Meanwhile, the North Korean crisis is not good for the EU, Russia or Asia, and we do not know if it will result in an actual war with substantial consequences, or if it will remain a “rhetoric of war” with more possibilities for negotiations leading to a final agreement; the crisis from Sudan and Libya in March 2019 created more tensions in the capitals, not just from EU member states and Russia, but in Asia and North America too. In fact, the globalisation success in daily international affairs and economics is recognisable; at the same time, political leaders are still prisoners of national view of problems—as a maxim level of their skills. For a long time, this lack of adequate instruction to contemporary problems will create more problems for states themselves, but in a victorious globalised world, a small event will be just a prelude for a global concern. In such a paradigm of future, the statistical dimension of Russia–EU relations (more than 650 million people and more than 21 million square kilometres) will show that the new agreements signed between both parts (especially on economic area) were negotiated by the globalisation itself and less by political leaders, the spectre of geopolitical solitude (afraid by Gromyko 2018) becoming just a rhetoric question.

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The year 2017 has proven to be historic. A lot of interesting actions took place ranging from the Kurdish referendum for independence, to an interesting outcome of the Austrian parliamentary elections. One of the most important political events, however, has occurred in Spain, where the autonomous region of Catalonia has expressed their will to become independent from the Spanish state, while remaining inside the European Union. This situation has not been welcomed by the EU member states and the officials from Brussels who, in a brief statement, have declared their opposition to Catalan independence (European Commission. Press Release Database 2019). During the (at this time) ongoing crisis, lots of articles in the Western European and American press have appeared regarding the Russian influence or interventions in the latest political events in Spain. A Google search shows that there are more than 26 million results that can be considered as a “real theme for debate” among both the people and politicians. The rhetoric expressed on the matter is not a friendly one (it ranges from the involvement of hackers, to actions against the European Union with the purpose of its destruction, etc.) and will potentially affect the political negotiations of tomorrow, slowing down the cooperation between European states. If 2017 was a historic year, 2018 year was a bit worse on the Russian– EU relations. The Skripal case, which brought expulsion of more than 150 Russian diplomats and more than 140 EU and US diplomats from the Russian Federation, is a benchmark for what the lack of cooperation can do. The 2018 year showed a continuous rhetoric about cyber-defence and cyber-propaganda, about hackers and internal politics involvement, which is not profitable at all. If political rivalry is something natural among states, there is also a need to limit some actions—from every part, because the risk for degeneration is too big today. The industrial and military capacities are too developed today on the European continent to not think twice when politicians have some unfriendly ideas. Unfortunately, a divided continent will be an economic victim of other big states that can defeat every country one by one, resulting in a change of hierarchy with respect to the economy and—at the end—in politics. We can consider China a partner or a menace, but for 2018 year the Chinese GDP in nominal terms was $13.347 trillion. IMF predictions for the 2023 (IMF – Knoema 2019) year are: Russia $1814 billion, Germany $4937 billion, China $19,580 billion, the United Kingdom (after Brexit) $3257 billion, the United States $24,670 billion.

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Both sides—the European Union and Russia—need each other. Basically, geography is both irreplaceable and a good argument for strengthening bilateral relations. However, at the same time, history cannot be forgotten and we are forced to study its lessons. The future always belongs to those who cooperate, under two conditions: to be sincere, with the real purpose of respecting each other’s interests. Nowadays, those conditions are understood by everyone and impossible to ignore. Today’s society is more transparent than ever, and every wrong runs high. Mutual respect is the best argument for cooperation and wisdom must be shown every day in order to find a new direction for development. In a few years, we’ll be happy to say that both sides were clever enough to choose the right path for a better future for their citizens. Through statistical analysis, we can observe that there are more opportunities to cooperate, than to have a rough dialogue. In a world where positions in the top global economies and military powers are shifting, it is more important than ever to implement the principles of solid strategic communication, as it enables us to considerably reduce dangers imposed upon us. It is maybe a dream to imagine a world free of conflict, but it is necessary to reduce tensions among continents and states, as there has never been a higher interconnectivity before and since all regional crises have become global. However, at the same time, many crises emerge not only because of different interests but because political leaders ignore the knowledge of strategic communication. By respecting the rules of strategic communication, we could prevent many of its problems and it will be easier to distinguish the real differences from mere rhetoric. The relations between Russia and the European Union have much more to offer than is the case today, and we consider that the future will be brighter.

References AdPlayers.ro (2017) Managementul in comunicarea strategica. “Planifici, organizezi, transmiti mesajul si apoi urmaresti rezultatele obtinute” (Management in strategic communication. “You plan, you organise, you send the message and you follow the results”). www.adplayers.ro/articol/Eveniment-9/ Managementul-in-comunicarea-strategica%2D%2DPlanifici-organizezitransmiti-mesajul-si-apoi-urmaresti-rezultatele-obtinute-Alexandru-GiboiAgerpres-5463.html. Accessed 11 Jan 2019. Balan E (2008) Institutii administrative (Administrative institutions). C.H. Beck, Bucharest.

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Busighina I (2012) Bridge Analysis of the EU – Russia Relations. MGIMO, Moscow. Comunicarea Strategica (Strategic communication) (2007) www.scribd.com/ document/45985928/02-Comunicarea-Strategica. Accessed 11 Jan 2019. Edelman (2019) Edelman 2019 Trust Barometer Report. Edelman. https:// www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019-02/2019_Edelman_ Trust_Barometer_Global_Report_2.pdf. Accessed 19 Mar 2019. EU Institute for Security Studies (2016) Strategic Communications  – East and South. Report No 30. www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategic-communications%E2%80%93-east-and-south. Accessed 22 Jan 2019. European Commission (2017) Statement on the events in Catalonia. europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-3626_en.htm. Accessed 15 Jan 2019. European Union. External Action (2017) The Russian Federation and the European Union. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/35939/european-union-and-russian-federation_en. Accessed 12 May 2019. Eurostat (2018) Energy statistics. An overview. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ statistics-explained/index.php?title=Energy_statistics_-_an_overview. Accessed 29 Jan 2019. Friedman O, Kabernik V, Pearce JC (2019) Hybrid Conflicts and Information Warfare. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO. Gherasim D (1981) Buna credinta in raporturile civile (Bona fide in private law). Editura Academiei RSR (RSR Academy Print-House), Bucharest. Godsev NK (2007) Russia: “European But Not Western?” Orbis 51(1):129–140. www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/Russia-European-butnot-Western.pdf. Accessed 26 Jan 2019. Gromyko A (2018) Political Landscape of Europe. The Spectre of Geopolitical Solitude. In: Potemkina O (ed) The EU  – Russia: the way out or the way down? Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels – Moscow. Hallahan K, Holtzhausen D, Van Ruler B, Vercic D, Sriramesh K (2007) Defining Strategic Communication. International J of Strategic Communication I(1):3–35. Hare P, Stoneman R (2017) The Evolving Architecture of Europe: Functioning or Dysfunctional for the Twenty-First Century? Comparative Economic Studies 59:433–471. IMF (2019) World Economic Outlook Database. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/weorept. aspx. Accessed 29 Jan 2019. IMF  – Knoema (2019) GDP by country. Statistics from IMF, 1980–2023. https://knoema.com/tbocwag/gdp-by-country-statistics-from-imf-19802023. Accessed 18 Feb 2019.

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Malcolm N (1994) Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. Mandelbaum M (1996) The Dawn of Peace in Europe. Priority Pr. Pubns, New York. Manescu R (2017) Comunicarea Strategică  – răspunsul european la războiul hybrid (Strategic communication – European answer to hybrid war). DC News. www.dcnews.ro/comunicarea-strategica-raspunsul-european-la-razboiulhibrid_557981.html. Accessed 11 Jan 2019. Markevich A, Mikhailova T (2012) Economic Geography of Russia. Center for Market Studies and Spatial Economics. February. ces.hse.ru/data/2012/09/ 19/1244835979/Markevich_Mikhailova_final_edit.pdf. Accessed 27 Jan 2019. Mazower M (1998) Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. Penguin, London. Moshes A (2017) EU – Russia Relations: Quo Vadis? Muddling, Normalization, or Deterioration. PONARS Eurasia. www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/eurussia-relations-quo-vadis-muddling-normalization-or-deterioration. Accessed 12 Feb 2019. Nistor C (2014) Lobby-ul UE  – act de comunicare strategică. Philologica Jassyensia 10-1(19):727–735. www.philologica-jassyensia.ro/upload/X_ 1supl_NISTOR.pdf. Accessed 11 Jan 2019. Pashentsev E (2017) Rolul comunicarii strategice in relatiile UE  – Rusia. Geopolitica Estului (Strategic communication’s role in the EU-Russia relations. The Geopolitics of the East). geopoliticaestului.ro/rolul-comunicarii-­ strategice-in-relatiile-ue-rusia/. Accessed 19 Jan 2019. Paul C (2011) Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates. Praeger, Oxford. Piet R, Simao L (2016) Security in shared neighbourhoods. Foreign policy of Russia, Turkey and the EU. Palgrave Macmillan. Russian Central Bank (2019) International Reserves of the Russian Federation. Russian Central Bank. https://www.cbr.ru/eng/hd_base/mrrf/mrrf_m/. Accessed 11 Jan 2019. Russian Federal State Statistic Service (2018) Russia in figures 2017. Russian Federal State Statistic Service. http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2017/rusfig/rus17e.pdf. Accessed 23 Jan 2019. Talseth LCU (2017) The politics of power. The EU – Russia energy relations in the 21st century. Palgrave Macmillan. The European Commission (2016) Comunicare Comună Către Parlamentul European Şi Consiliu. Cadrul comun privind contracararea amenințărilor hibride / Un răspuns al Uniunii (Common communication to the European Parliament and Council. Common framework to act against hybrid menaces. An Union answer). www.cdep.ro/afaceri_europene/CE/2016/JOIN_2016_ 18_RO_ACTE_f.pdf. Accessed 18 Jan 2019.

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The European Council (1999) Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 Jun 1999 on Russia. trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_ 114137.pdf. Accessed 20 Jan 2019. The World Bank (2019) GDP (current US$). World Bank. data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=RU. Accessed 29 Jan 2019. Valdai Discussion Club Report (2016) Russia and the European Union: Three Questions Concerning New Principles in Bilateral Relations. valdaiclub.com/ files/10754/. Accessed 29 Jan 2019. Webber M (2000) Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation? Macmillan Press, London. Zerfass A, Huck S (2009) Inovaţie, comunicare şi leadership: noi evoluţii în comunicarea strategică (Innovation, communication and leadership: new evolutions in the strategic communication). PR-Romania. www.pr-romania.ro/articole/ comunicarea-inovatiei/113-inovatie-comunicare-si-leadership-noi-evolutii-incomunicarea-strategica.html. Accessed 11 Jan 2019.

PART II

EU-Russia Strategic Communication: Political and Economic Aspects

CHAPTER 5

Character Assassination as Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations Sergei A. Samoilenko and Marlene Laruelle

Introduction This chapter seeks to place the concept of character assassination (CA) within the academic field of strategic communication. On the international scene, character assassination is often used as a set of strategies to frame geopolitical conflicts and influence public opinion about political leaders, parties, or nation-states. Shaped by the decisions of both parties in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, European Union (EU)Russia relations appear to have been strained by the polarization of the two actors’ worldviews, which are supposedly irreconcilable. On the basis of their contrasting political and media environments, Russia and the EU have developed different communication approaches directed at each other.

S. A. Samoilenko (*) George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA e-mail: [email protected] M. Laruelle (*) George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pashentsev (ed.), Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1_5

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This chapter provides an overview of character assassination as strategic communication embedded in the context of political standoff. It explains how media shape public perceptions of political conflict by incorporating character assassination as a framing strategy. Next, it explores differences in the EU and Russian applications of character assassination strategies and tactics toward each other. It concludes by suggesting that the use of character assassination serves to exacerbate current geopolitical tensions.

Character Assassination as Property of Political Conflict International relations assume collaboration or competition with other political or corporate actors that likewise follow the established rules of the international community. Similarly, political communication is a competition for ethos or credibility as an important factor in ensuring legitimacy and garnering the attention of various audiences. All political leaders have to reconcile the interests and expectations of various international stakeholders with those of their constituents at home. Ultimately, all states engage in political contests in which they aim to promote the legitimacy of their political projects and ideologies at the expense of others. This eventually leads to various conflicts, owing to contested resources or incompatibility issues. Conflict is defined as the interaction of interdependent parties that perceive their goals, aims, and/ or values to be opposite to each other and the other party to potentially be interfering in the realization thereof (Putnam and Poole 1987). For instance, conflicts based on incompatible values may arise from ideological differences that stem from incommensurate worldviews or differing social realities, especially when moral questions are interwoven with political and economic factors (Pearce et al. 1989). A moral dilemma becomes a moral conflict when individuals, groups, or countries publicly declare opposing values. Conflict between moral worlds (e.g., individualism vs. collectivism, capitalism vs. socialism) often occurs because what is acceptable and valued within one tradition is a serious violation of the norms of another group. The differences in language, grammars of action, and ontological thinking prevent conflicting parties from reaching a common frame of reference. Unresolved conflicts immobilize political actors and prevent them from accomplishing collective goals. According to Nicotera and Mahon (2013), in institutional settings such divergence is linked to destructive

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communication: the inability to meet goals effectively leads to aggression, blame attribution, and a search for scapegoats, which may result to deep polarization or the exclusion of some members. In this conflict frame, character assassination serves as an established instrument of persuasion that is frequently used to gain influence during geopolitical conflicts. Character assassination has historically been intrinsic to the process of political competition when used against political rivals representing an adversarial regime or a competing ideology (Icks and Shiraev 2014; Samoilenko 2016). During a political conflict, all parties use communication platforms to promote their own legitimacy while simultaneously delegitimizing their opponents (Taylor 2003). As part of information warfare, the primary use of character assassination is to delegitimize an opponent, win over international public opinion, and decrease the opponent’s ability to continue the conflict or power contest. The act of communication involves an audience that is made up of individuals who voluntarily choose to witness the event. “Audiences often participate in or respond to the performance in some way such as cheering, booing or the wave” (Botan 2017, p. 65). They also often “pay for or otherwise support a performance.” The co-creational view of image discussed by Botan (2017) suggests that socially shared and popular images of individuals and organizations are meanings co-created by public narratives and public opinion. Hence, character assassination is public property. The effectiveness of a CA campaign is determined by what issues international audiences consider important and who they choose to blame and hold accountable for political conflicts and crises. Today, social media networks enable multiple audiences to observe, encourage, and/or engage in conversations that have the tendency to repackage and transform original messages and their persuasion effects via reproduced networked framing (Meraz and Papacharissi 2013). Each character attack has the potential to become a public event in which multiple audiences set themselves up as the judge of the target’s character. Thus, it is the audience that becomes the key element of any CA event: the target’s reputation is damaged only when the audience sees it this way, regardless of the truth and relevance of the allegations. Hence, the CA event is produced by multiple interdependent actors and defined by the issues coming from social interaction, competition, and conflict. To understand a CA event, one needs to comprehend the interplay of this event with the social environment in which it occurs. The

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context is crucial because it determines the nature of the communication process based on previous shared experience between members of the global international community and their relationship history.

Character Assassination as Strategic Communication Botan (2017) refers to strategic communication as the planned campaigns that grow out of understanding what publics think and want. In other words, campaigns should be based on a realistic understanding of current and potential relationships with various publics. Essentially, strategic communicators see their role as being to build long-term relationships with different audiences and thus treat them as publics. A public can be defined as “a group of people who see themselves as having a common interest with respect to an organization” (Dewey 1927, p. 29). As scholars note (Botan 2017; Botan and Soto 1998), those seeking to address a public often envision a more enduring and complex relationship than do those seeking to address an audience. Strategic communication is exercised at three levels: grand strategic, strategic, and tactical communication (Botan 2006, 2017). Grand strategy is the policy-level decisions an organization makes about goals, alignments, ethics, and relationships with various publics and other forces in its environment. Strategy is campaign-level planning and decision-making, involving maneuvering and arranging resources and arguments to meet the needs of publics and organizational grand strategies. Finally, tactics are the specific activities, technical aspects, and outputs through which strategies are implemented. The display of character is a critical component of relationship-­building, since all members of the international community are expected to uphold certain accepted norms of credibility as a fundamental requirement for a collaborative, goal-directed dialogue. Character (trustworthiness, ethos) is a core component of the public evaluation of credibility or “judgments concerning the believability of a communicator” (O’Keefe 2002, p.  181). Credibility is centrally important to the process of projecting desirable images that, taken together, produce public assessment of reputation (Tedeschi and Reiss 1981). Importantly, communication scholars view character as “a judgment of another from the outside” (Browning and Morris 2012, p. 79). This becomes the public image or impression of honesty and personal integrity that meets the universally accepted standards of appropriate social interaction (Walton 1998). The quality of character is

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specifically judged based on the role that political actors are supposed to be playing at a given point of time. This role defines their commitments and obligations in social interaction with others. Through the naming and labeling of other people and objects, we establish a preferred point of view or position toward them. Positions are the moral locations derived from individual manifestations of rights, duties, and obligations in various political contexts. In disputes, “[it] is an enormous advantage to occupy the moral high ground,” as such positioning implies a certain power to position others (Harre and Langenhove 1991, p. 109). Hence, self-positioning can be established in the form of a “moral reproach” (p.  403). As Bakhtin (1981) has noted, positioning operates at two levels: the speaker positions the self-as-character within his storyline as positive and legitimate in relation to his audience while constructing the role of the other in the opposite way. When applied to international affairs, the process of character assassination is understood as resulting from a persuasive strategy that aims to influence the beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of international audiences. There are different reasons for strategic CA campaigns. Shiraev (2014) argues that the attacker’s motivation is often based on the intent to destroy the victim psychologically or reduce his or her public support and/or chances of succeeding in a political competition. Political actors also employ character attacks to force the target to expend time, energy, and resources on responding. At the same time, a character attack may contribute to the realization of another goal, such as inciting public outrage, disrupting social order, or weakening an opposition group. A strategic attacker understands these audiences as playing the central role in co-­ creating and defining issues, and thus treats them as publics. Scholars have addressed three different types of CA targets. At the interpersonal level, studies primarily discuss the use of personal attacks directed at individuals during election campaigns. At the intergroup level, CA efforts primarily involve social and political groups, organizations, and networks, which are held together by ethnic or ideological linkages. At the international level, some scholars apply the concept of character assassination to countries. For example, Aspriadis, Takas, and Samaras (2019) analyze character assassination in the context of the dynamics of Greek-German political discourse during the re-negotiation of the Greek rescue plan memorandum in 2015. They argue that international political leaders frequently attempt to delegitimize or weaken the social standing of another country in the international system.

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Oftentimes, the image and reputation of social groups, organizations, and nations can be damaged by allegations and facts targeting their leaders or prominent public figures. Previous research (Icks and Shiraev 2014) demonstrates that individuals often serve as intermediaries during CA events, as their challenged reputations become a means to damage the organization, movement, or idea they represent. Likewise, some negative stereotypes about stigmatized or discredited groups and their ideas can be attributed to individuals through guilt by association. This involves transferring alleged guilt to a person for an alleged similarity with some toxic or socially demonized group or its doctrine. In the context of international affairs, Simons (2019) argues that CA campaigns targeting world leaders caught in crises seek to create a simplistic bipolar world for an audience, “brand jack” political leaders, and thus destroy these leaders’ reputations and support bases. Such attacks can be considered successful if a target politician loses control of his/her projected public image and the support of international society. Importantly, the development of any CA event depends on the mass media. Media are agents in the character assassination process, helping some attacks to spread while ignoring or debunking others. Thus, character assassination events should be examined in relation to media logic and media effects.

Mass Media as Distributors of Dominant Frames The mass media play a critical role in determining how social events are perceived by the public. As a dominant element of popular culture, mass media have the power to set a consistent agenda and encourage audiences to perceive reality in a particular way. News stories represent selective constructions of reality that are contingent on the choices journalists make (Entman 1993). By favoring certain agendas, the news media inevitably engage in the process of framing. Although framing can be a helpful tool for communicating complex ideas to the masses, it also leads to superficial coverage and oversimplification. It contributes to promoting perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side “while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions” (Entman 1993, p. 55). For example, the media have limited capability to present a full and complete picture of the political world, so they choose to focus on the personal characteristics of political actors rather than on complicated policies and issues. This involves assigning blame to certain political actors while ignoring long-term systemic and cultural issues.

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Understanding the relationship between the media and other institutions illuminates news outlets’ portrayal of political issues and events. The mass media and political institutions are interdependent, with the result that media can be impacted by ideological tilt (Lewis 2012). Governing elites and other powerful institutions have better odds of promoting their realities and opinions about controversial topics due to their privileged access to the media. Consequently, they indirectly contribute to the distribution of preferred meanings, including state officials’ personal interpretations of key international events. To take one example, then-Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott characterized the Syrian Civil War as being simply “goodies” versus “baddies” (as cited in Simons 2016). Some scholars consider the news to be part of the ideological apparatus that reproduces hegemony and supports state-approved foreign policy (Rachlin 1988). In contrast to the notion of “free press,” Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that the news media mainly support the interests of power elites or investors and thus constantly fail to provide nonpartisan information to the public. Entman (2004) points out that the relationship between governing elites and news organizations has become more cooperative, “especially in foreign affairs” (p.  2), noting that there exists a government-­media nexus in foreign policy that “impedes the flow of independent information and consistently … produces progovernment propaganda” (p. 4). Institutional and media narratives often complement each other, reinforcing dominant scripts and ideological narratives. In international politics, self-positioning typically involves interpreting world events through the prism of national interests. Political elites promote their public agendas by communicating their positions on international and domestic issues. These positions simultaneously serve to remind the public of the legitimate power of the state and of its right to exercise this power when needed. The mass media reproduce four main strategies of ideological discourse, summarized by Van Dijk (1998) as the ideological square: • Emphasize Our good things; • Emphasize Their bad things; • De-emphasize Our bad things; and • De-emphasize Their good things. News media use the dominant frames promoted by the authorities, and these later become institutionalized through legal rules and policies. Mass media can help political actors gain public support for unpopular policies or disguise the national interests of players during international coalition

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campaigns (Snow 2003). Thus, by promoting stereotypes and inciting public insecurity, the dominant frames promoted by mass media may result in changes in governmental practices, such as restrictions on civil liberties or increased support for racial profiling (Altheide 2006). News production is primarily driven by professional and commercial motives, and large corporations’ interests may play a role in the framing process. In recent years, domestic and international politics have become highly mediated and aggressive, driven by click-bait content. Today’s mass media create an environment conducive to character attacks amplified by the negative effects of mediatization, such as the simplification of content, the negative representation of political life, and infotainment favoring conflict and drama (Esser 2013). Media outlets are instinctively “drawn to stories that suggest conflict and the potential for what is shocking and sensational” (Tuman 2010, p. 196). For example, terrorist attacks naturally serve as excellent news fodder, offering journalists a perfect opportunity to seize public attention. Thus, the production of news is not necessarily driven by the needs of the political system, but rather by the tastes and preferences of media consumers and the commercial interests of the media market. Certainly, media companies profit from publishing materials featuring sensations and scandals, which contributes to creating a media environment in which rumors and character attacks on public figures are the norm. The mass media play a critical role in manufacturing the perceived reality of international events and shaping public attitudes toward them. Importantly, they assign roles, moral obligations, and responsibilities to parties involved in political conflicts. Character attacks on world leaders become more prevalent during major international standoffs, political crises, and armed conflicts. Every mediated political crisis automatically turns into a contest of frames. Samoilenko et al. (2017) demonstrate that from early in the political conflict in Ukraine in 2014, the US and Russian news media alike used framing bias to shape how people perceived the crisis. Both invested heavily in manipulating the symbolic environment and discredited conflicting information by attacking the character and moral grounds of the opponent.

EU Strategic Communication Toward Russia: A Multiplicity of Frames Differences in the state of the public sphere mean that there are divergent degrees of interplay between the political and media systems in the EU and Russia.

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The notion of an ideal public sphere supposes a rational and critical discussion of public affairs that enriches and develops society and its democratic habits (Habermas 1962). Over the past two decades, a European public sphere has increasingly been dismissed by critics as idealized and unattainable (Van de Steeg 2002). The Brexit referendum, challenges to EU institutions by the Visegrád countries, and historically low turnout for European elections (with the lowest turnout on record for the 2014 EU election—Euractiv 2014) suggest that many EU institutions have failed to offer European citizens a solid unifying paradigm, and that national agendas and discourses have instead predominated. Trust in the EU has been diminishing, particularly in countries that have faced austerity measures, and EU institutions are seen as weak and not democratic (Merler 2015). The EU is also often criticized for a “lack of strong leadership and strategic vision” (Congressional Research Service 2018) and the absence of “a charismatic, democratic European successor to De Gaulle” (Castiglioni 2012) able to prevent the rise of nationalistic and non-democratic leaders. The diversity of the EU is expressed by the divergence in public opinion between citizens of its member states, with marked differences between the Nordic and Mediterranean countries, as well as between Western and Central/Eastern European countries on many issues, both societal and foreign policy-related (Pew Research Center 2018). Despite multiple initiatives aimed at strengthening the perception of the EU, the institutions have not been able either to resolve the issue of “communication deficit” (Meyer 1999) among EU members or to establish a unified public sphere. The EU has repeatedly failed to communicate its policies to Europeans in a consistent and strategic manner (Anderson 2004). Since European integration has always been driven by elites (Haller 2008), it has naturally employed an elite-driven communication approach that primarily highlighted the exclusivity of EU membership. Most elite communication stems from the tradition of understanding the European public sphere as a nearly homogeneous space with universal values—and, by extension, often overlooking controversial issues. Several hegemonic narratives repeatedly used in the EU discourse (e.g., the Nobel narrative, the single market, social Europe, green Europe, taming globalization, and neoliberal Europe) are unable to provide a solid narrative identity across Europe because of their narrow focus (Manners and Murray 2016). They often appear disjointed and constantly play out against each other, which has a negative impact on the EU’s core message.

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The lack of communication tailored to specific EU members is associated with increased confusion about the long-term vision and goals of the European construct. Communication efforts by the European Commission based on the “unity” paradigm (Valenti 2008, p. 112) have often produced conflicting messages, as they have attempted to promote diversity and unity at the same time. Moreover, they have arguably missed the point completely, as European identity is often grounded less in members’ “internal” belonging to the community than in their rejection and exclusion of the “other” (Hellberg 2011; Korosteleva 2017). An image of the “other” has historically been used to create European identity; Europe’s “others” have been Turkey and Russia, whose social and cultural values are perceived as antithetical to European ones (Neumann 1998). In many ways, the EU has monopolized the power to define what it means to be fully “European,” such that it naturally implies the possession of EU membership. There is no unified EU policy toward Russia. One can schematically typologize at least four postures: an historical anti-Russian positioning in the name of a supposed permanent “Russian threat” (Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states), a hard-line position based on contemporary Russia’s non-respect for democratic norms (the UK and most of the Scandinavian countries), a moderate stance that balances cooperation with criticisms (France, Germany, and Italy), and a bolder “Russia-friendly” position (Greece, Cyprus, and Hungary). This diversity is reflected in the media ecosystem of each European country. Today’s Poland, led by the conservative and nationalist Law and Justice Party (PiS), is, for instance, famous for its political polarization and the success of illiberal, populist voices (Cienski 2019); television has historically been used for both tabloidization and CA against both Russia and the EU leadership (Kettley 2017). Meanwhile, in Italy, an early adopter of “Trash TV,” with Silvio Berlusconi as both media mogul and former Prime Minister, several populist talk shows have emerged that regularly invite speakers who exhibit very pro-­ Russian positioning. This plurality in strategic communication is also present at the level of EU institutions. The Council of States coordinates the 28 member-state voices and therefore reflects the four postures mentioned above. The EU Parliament represents the public opinion of member states and acts as an open space where both pro-Russian and anti-Russian voices can be heard. The European Commission, the EU executive body, speaks with a more unified voice, representing “Brussels” as a technocratic organ.

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Because of its internal diversity and lack of a unified foreign policy, EU strategic messaging to Russia is blurry, zigzagging between national economic interests and common positions of principle. Due in large part to the competition between their respective narratives on the conflict in Ukraine (Pézard et al. 2017), EU strategic communication has increasingly emphasized the idea of a clash of norms with Russia (DeBardeleben 2016; Zwolski 2018). Indeed, the EU sometimes lumps Russia and the Islamic State together as ideological enemies whose communication strategies should be deterred with similar tools (Filatova and Bolgov 2018). The launching of the East StratCom Task Force in 2015 as a unified EU approach to improving communication in the Eastern Partnership countries and countering what is defined as a Russian misinformation campaign (Wagnsson and Hellman 2018) has had limited results and has been criticized as quite inefficient and a waste of money. The five guiding principles underpinning Europe’s Russia policy elaborated in 2016 represent only a lowest common denominator (European Parliament Think Tank 2018). The member states have maintained unity in sanctioning Moscow for annexing Crimea and supporting the Donbas insurgency, but not on other matters: 18 states expelled Russian diplomats after the Skripal affair, while 10 did not; some want to cooperate with Russia on energy matters, while others consider this a dangerous move that would increase Russia’s leverage over Europe (Pézard et  al. 2017; Rácz and Raik 2018). The biggest differences in strategic communication can be seen between the European Parliament and the European Commission. The Parliament acts as an echo chamber for the voices most critical toward Russia, particularly those of Eastern European representatives (mostly Poland and the Baltic states) and more recently the UK. These actors, for example, called for the adoption of a European “Magnitsky Act” similar to the legislation adopted by the US (Ojuland 2013) and overwhelmingly voted in March 2019 to approve a report stating that Russia “can no longer be considered a ‘strategic partner’” (Waller 2019). To this, the European Commission has been replying through its president, Jean-Claude Juncker, who boldly declared that “This Russia-bashing has to be brought to an end” (Boffey 2018) and that Europe should reconnect with Russia. Character assassination toward Russia is thus most prominent in the European Parliament, while the European Commission and the Council of States maintain a diplomatic and nuanced tone.

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The European media landscape is obviously extremely diverse. While some media outlets serve as carriers of dominant frames, others promote alternative voices and independent opinions. Globally, however, one can observe a growing concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few tycoons or oligarchs, both in Western European countries such as France (where almost all media are controlled by five industrialists) and Italy (with Silvio Berlusconi), and in Central European states (Štětka 2015; Knight 2018). In terms of media freedom, three Europes co-exist: the one at the top of all media indexes (Scandinavian countries, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, and Portugal); a second, median one, with rankings in the 30s (the UK, France, Italy, and Spain, but also the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Latvia, and Lithuania); and a third one, with rankings between the high 50s and the 70s, where there are growing attacks on media (Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece) (Reporters Without Borders 2018).

Russia’s Strategic Communication Toward the EU: Diplomatic Voice Versus Television Voice Russia can be defined as a hybrid regime, with features of both democracy and authoritarianism (Petrov et al. 2014). It is also defined as a competitive authoritarian system (Levitsky 2010), in the sense that different vested interest groups compete to promote their own agendas to the main arbiter, President Vladimir Putin. At the ideological level, the Kremlin promotes a multiplicity of discourses directed toward the country’s different constituencies (Laruelle 2017). Only the pro-Western liberals, accused of being unpatriotic citizens and foreign agents, have been progressively marginalized in the mainstream media, and even they still have a voice on some radio stations, in some newspapers, and on social media (Daucé 2015; Sharafutdinova 2014). Unlike many populist leaders in the West—such as Donald Trump in the US, Marine Le Pen in France, and Matteo Salvini in Italy—Putin ­consistently deploys very state-centric language that leaves no room for the discursive techniques of personal insult and inflammatory rhetoric. With some minor exceptions,1 Putin’s speeches over his 18 years in power 1  Putin’s popular aphorisms and catch-phrases, which can be considered a populist communication technique, have been quite discussed by the media, but they remain limited to about a dozen memorable formulas, a small number for more than 18 years in power. The

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have used the language of nation-building and technocracy, aiming to reinforce the legitimacy of the state and the government and to forge social consensus. In international affairs, too, Putin’s language is that of a state leader who adheres to the conventional norms of political correctness and diplomatic tone. Russia’s official EU policy is to invite Brussels to engage in a constructive dialogue where a new security architecture for Europe could be elaborated, with Moscow’s hope being to draw the EU closer to Russia and thus move it further away from its transatlantic commitment (Maass 2016). In practice, Russia’s policy is quite critical of how the EU is managed: the latter is seen as too submissive to the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interests, unable to develop an independent voice, and too technocratic, leaving it disconnected from European public opinion. As part of its Soviet legacy, Russia believes more in the European nation-states individually than in the EU construct and is cautious toward any supranational, multilateral project (Casier and DeBardeleben 2017). Since the start of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012, Russia has been more openly articulating a position of championing so-called conservative values, a policy that goes hand in hand with support for European populist and far-right movements, and criticizing Europe’s loss of its authentic identity and values. Putin’s 2013 Valdai speech encapsulates this messaging: “We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are rejecting their roots, including Christian values, which form the basis of Western civilization. They are trying to deny moral principles and their traditional identity: national, cultural, religious, and even sexual … I believe that this opens a direct path to degradation and primitivism, leading to a profound demographic and moral crisis” (Putin 2013). While Russia’s official strategic communication steers clear of using ad hominem attacks and personal accusations, it has outsourced these techniques to the state-controlled media, especially to TV talk shows. Over the most famous of these, “dunk them in the toilets,” was made in September 1999, when Putin was only Prime Minister and had to appear as a tough leader able to break Chechnya’s secessionist tendencies. Since then, many have been made during his annual televisual Q&A sessions, such as “plowed away like a slave on a galley” to describe his own work, “shearing a piglet” to comment on the US accusation of protecting Edward Snowden, “don’t waste time for it” when asked about his health, “oinking alone” to describe US satellites spying on Russia, and several references to traditional Russian jokes or quotes from popular Soviet novels.

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course of the 2000s, Russia’s media landscape has been recentralized and gradually taken control of, but this stranglehold still allows for a certain diversity of messaging, depending on the anchorman and the editorial board of the channel, the constituencies they target, their advertisement goals, and the need to compete for viewership with other programs (Burrett 2011; Mickiewicz 2008). Since 2012, the Russian state has engaged in a series of initiatives designed to tighten the once relatively liberal public sphere and inundate it with ideological narratives. In 2014–15 more than a dozen political talk shows aired regularly on Russia’s main channels, showing the popularity of television as a news source. The time Russians spend watching television rose in 2014 for the first time in over five years, with 72% tuning in to federal channels daily. News and analytical programs received a 9% boost in popularity—by far the largest across all categories (Luxmoore 2015). Political talk shows play a crucial role in co-creating political language. They have developed agency by reformulating state-sanctioned policies in a tabloid style. The two main television channels, Pervyi Kanal (Channel 1) and Rossiya-1 (Russia-1), closely follow the Kremlin line but also air commercials, so their programming is in part commercially driven. They both host a series of very popular talk shows, aired in the late afternoon and evening on both weekdays and weekends: V Kontekste, Vremya Pokazhet, Struktura Momenta, and Politika for the former; 60 minut, Vecher and Voskresenyi Vecher s Vladimirom Solovyovym, and Pervaya Studiia for the latter. Vremya Pokazhet and 60 Minut consistently appear in the top 30 of the “100 most popular programs.” These talk shows, whose share of airtime has been growing rapidly since 2015, act as a proxy for the state: they translate the authorities’ strategic communication into a populist language for which there is a public demand that the state does not fulfill. Tolz and Teper (2018) term the genre “agitainment” to accentuate the politicization of messaging in the established field of infotainment. Performances are often theatrical, with aggressive behavior and language, conspiratorial theories, “deliberate over-personifications of complex issues, crude out-of-context generalizations, and blunt exaggerations” (Mickiewicz 2008). These talk shows are the venue where CA of the EU leadership is formulated.

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Mutual Character Attacks in Russia-EU Strategic Communications Character Assassination of the EU in Russian Talk Shows In their role of outsourcing negative discursive techniques, Russian talk shows play a major role in building a negative image of the EU. They are dominated by foreign affairs, with domestic issues occupying only a small percentage of their airtime (Robinson 2018). However, in foreign affairs, preeminence is given to the US and to Ukraine more than to Europe; the main foreign guests are also mostly Americans or Ukrainians, with some Polish guests, but no other Europeans (Rothrock 2017). We can typologize attacks on the EU’s image into three main categories: EU as a world of decadent values, EU as a puppet of the US, and EU as supporting the revival of fascism. The notion of Europe’s decadence, in opposition to the Kremlin’s flagship of conservative values, has become the heart of character attacks against EU. Europe’s “permissiveness” on gender equality and the rights of sexual minorities is presented as a sign of the decline of Europe as a civilization (Robinson 2018). A new term, Gayropa (Gay-rope), encapsulates the perception of Europe’s excessive tolerance and its cultural imperialism (Foxall 2019). As Riabov and Riabova (2014) explain: “The notion of Gayropa has become a means to define Russia’s place in the modern world and plays an important role in geopolitical discourse and to legitimize the powers that be.” The term rapidly went viral—it took 9th place in the 2014 “Word of the Year” (Slovo goda) rankings. Among the most salient character attacks on that theme, the most famous talk-show anchor, Vladimir Solovyov, labeled the Council of Europe a “gay park” (EUvsDisinfo 2017). Igor Prokopenko, another talk-show anchor, had a full program on “Europe, the kingdom of gays” (Mr Boss 2015), while Tigran Keosayan, who hosts the program Mezhdunarodnaya pilorama, frames French President Emmanuel Macron as the embodiment of this European perversion, labeling him a “gay-gerontophile” (Saburova 2017). Attacks on the EU also revolve around a cluster of themes such as that the EU is an artificial formation that is going to break apart, is unable to manage internal crisis and the refugee crisis, and is devastated by internal calls for secessionism and mass protests (EuromaidanPress 2017). Related to this cluster is the notion that the EU has no identity other than as a puppet of the US in Europe—an old Soviet trope that dates back to the

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Cold War decades. It re-emerges at regular intervals in Russian talk shows, as when far-right leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, famous for his eccentricities and his populist language, declared during a trip by German Chancellor Angela Merkel to the US that she was simply following the tradition of German leaders paying tribute (poklonit’sia) to their occupiers (Russia Insight 2015). The third image attack focuses on the supposed renaissance of fascism all over Europe and the support given to so-called fascists or Nazis in post-­ Euromaidan Ukraine. The association of Ukraine with fascism was not born of the 2014 situation; it has deep roots in Soviet culture. Since, in the minds of the Russian public, the notion of “fascism” implies Germany’s territorial expansion, it has been very easily associated with any threat coming from the West. The Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine has thus been correlated with a potential expansion of the EU and NATO replicating the Nazi one, allowing it to easily be seen as a threat to Russia’s territoriality and sovereignty. The notion that evil has always come from the West has been picked up by many Russian politicians and public figures. At a Moscow historians’ conference in 2014, Mikhail Myagkov, a historian of World War II and a professor of history at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), expressed it plainly: “Nazism is again coming to us from Europe … The bacilli of Nazism have not been destroyed. Unfortunately, they have infected, among other countries, our brotherly nation of Ukraine” (quoted in Shuster 2014). The notion of Europe’s fascist revival has become a classic of Russian talk shows. Vladimir Solovyov encapsulated this in 2017 (June 1) when he declared, “The historical triumph of Europe ended with a union under the Nazi flag, and after that, it got a bash in the face by the Russian boot.” Another type of mental shortcut has been created by paralleling Europe’s treatment of the refugee crisis with the Nazi camps, as shown in this excerpt from a Rossiya-1 talk show in 2015: “At a time when the European Union struggles to remain a space of freedom, security, and justice, dozens of people are settling down in the barracks where the Nazis kept the Jews” (Rossiya 1, September 24, 2015, quoted by Ukraine Crisis Media Center 2018). EU Image of Russia: The “Enmification” Process As previously mentioned, the European Parliament is the main public space representing the EU where Russia’s image can be debated and

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disputed. An identifiable group of MEPs has become particularly vocal against Moscow and has served as the main engine behind the sanctions; these include Rebecca Harms, representing the German Greens, and Elmar Brok, a German MEP for the CDU. However, these MEPs’ anti-­ Russian positioning has not resulted in reputational attacks. The deterioration of Russia’s image inside EU institutions has occurred in phases (see Foxall 2019). In 2004, the entry of the Baltic states and Poland into the EU allowed new voices much more critical of Russia to be heard on the EU level. The first evidence of this was the launch of memory wars over the role of the Soviet Union in World War II, which have shaken EU institutions. In 2007, Putin’s Munich speech, which denounced the US unilateralism and its violation of international laws, put the EU in a difficult position. In 2011–12, Putin’s return to the presidency and the mass anti-government protests reinforced the European vision of Russia as an authoritarian, backward-looking country. In 2014, the Euromaidan revolution, followed by the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas insurgency, radicalized many EU voices against Russia and in support of Ukraine. This perception of Russia as violating the international law system has been accentuated by claims of Russian interference in European elections (whether these claims have merit is another issue). In such a context, one can identify several forms of reputation attacks. Because personal attacks and insults do not belong to the EU political culture (here we dissociate the EU level from member states’ own political cultures, which are much more permissive regarding personal attacks), attacks on Russia take mostly the form of an enemy image construction. Character assassination, in the broad sense of the process of enmification of a country (Rieber and Kelly 1991), has been part of international practices since ancient times (Icks and Shiraev 2014). Working to weaken geopolitical enemies’ image is now part of many countries’ foreign policy toolkit. Here we briefly discuss four different strategies of “enmification” of Russia: essentialization, exaggeration, value judgment, and animalization. The first strategy takes an essentialist vision of Russia as a country that is imperialist by design. This discursive line is mostly advanced by MPs and politicians from the Baltic states, Poland, and sometimes other Central European countries. One example is the Estonian Defense Minister’s statement that “there is always a streak of imperialism running through every government of Russia, including the most democratic ones” (Mehta 2018). The Estonian government, along with its Polish counterpart, is at

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the forefront of promoting the slogan of a Russian threat inside EU institutions. Criticism of Russia is thus not aimed at the Putin presidency or the current government specifically, but ascribes the primordialist trait of “imperialism” to Russia whatever its government is. The second strategy is a blunt exaggeration of the political features of the Russian leadership. This strategy has been deployed, for instance, by Guy Verhofstadt, a Belgian former Prime Minister who has served as the Leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe and as an MEP since 2009. In 2015, he declared that “Vladimir Putin has made Russia a totalitarian state with no respect for democracy nor freedom and no room for dissenting, critical voices” (Facebook post, May 31, 2015). However, according to political freedom and regime trend indexes such as Polity IV, which gives Russia a 4/10, the notion of totalitarianism does not apply to the Putin regime (Marshall and Gurr 2014). Verhofstadt went even further by re-appropriating Reagan’s formula of the Soviet Union as an evil, asserting that there is a “circle of evil around our continent” that includes “Putin, Erdogan, and on a bad day—and that’s every day at the moment—even Trump” (Stone 2018). The third strategy is to make a value judgment aimed at convincing public opinion that Russia lacks the required moral framework—and thus the legitimacy—to be a great power. To give one example, then-UK deputy prime minister and leader of the British Liberal Democrats party Nick Clegg declared that “Russia should lose the right to host the 2018 World Cup as part of tougher sanctions following the plane crash in eastern Ukraine” (BBC 2014). This is a classic technique that reinforces the attacker’s own moral and political credibility by assassinating their opponent’s social capital—in this case, by trying to diminish or deny the right to host a major world event and enjoy the soft power that accompanies it. The fourth strategy is the classic animalization of an enemy in order to belittle it. This has been deployed by aforementioned figures such as Guy Verhofstadt, who for instance asserted that “Putin’s poodle Steve Bannon gave the world Trump and is now trying to spread the disease of alt-right nationalism across Europe” (Twitter tweet, June 8, 2018). This shortcut aims to make Russia—and Putin himself—personally responsible for a development that should in fact be attributed to cultural transformations within the US (namely blue-collar support for Donald Trump) and seeks to frame the political opponent as bearer of a “disease”—the medical metaphor being another a classic defamation technique.

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Conclusion As we can see from this brief overview, EU political figures deploy far fewer and less powerful negative discursive techniques than their counterparts in the Russian media. While Russian government figures rarely engage in direct character assassination of foreign leaders, media—and especially talk shows—have made image attacks and inflammatory discourses a cornerstone of their production. Similarly, virulent talk shows exist in a handful of Central and Eastern European countries for whom Russia constitutes the main “enemy,” but these shows are confined to domestic audiences and do not reach the official EU level. Europe and Russia serve as constituent “Others”: they help each define its own identity by projecting the other as a mirror, that is, a reverse image. Foreign policy narratives often provide a latent pool of malleable national symbols with which to validate states’ foreign policy agendas in the eyes of their domestic audience (Snyder 1991). EU and Russian strategic communications not only target the other’s image, but also convey messaging to support their own hegemonic power over their domestic audience. Russian television news, for instance, focuses far more on how things are going badly in the rest of the world than on debating domestic issues, with the goal of consolidating the popular consensus around the status quo and the legitimacy of the regime. On the EU side, attacks against Russia by some segments of the European establishment aim to establish that Europe has the moral high ground by emphasizing values such as human rights and democracy, an approach that allows them to reassert that the EU construct is the only legitimate political future for European nations. In Central and Eastern European countries traditionally worried about having Russia as a neighbor, attacks on Russia are constitutive of new nation-­ building strategies, but also exhibit transatlantic commitment in the hope of securing firmer US and NATO support. By reinforcing the overpersonalization of politics and its corollary, ad hominem attacks, these strategic communications limit the political debate to short-term, polarizing issues, reducing the opportunities for a more inclusive debate based on long-term perspectives. They are detrimental to deliberative democracy, as they exclude alternative viewpoints by accusing them of being unpatriotic: pro-Western figures in Russia are marginalized, while voices in favor of better relations with Russia in some (not all) European countries also find themselves under the suspicion of being “on the Kremlin’s payroll.” This situation negatively impacts the quality of the

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public sphere and the ability of European and Russian public opinion to address the issue of living together on the same continent and pursuing the shared goal of non-adversarial relations. There is no academic consensus on how best to respond to strategic CA campaigns, mainly because they come in multiple shapes and forms that produce multiple context-bound effects and unintended consequences (Samoilenko 2019). Similarly, there are multiple factors that determine the effectiveness of reputation management and crisis communication during international political conflicts. That being said, the proposed focus on character assassination as strategic communication has yet to be addressed in sufficient depth by scholars. This provides multiple opportunities for future studies in the areas of international affairs, public diplomacy, crisis communication, and other fields of academic inquiry.

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CHAPTER 6

Reputation Management of Russian Companies in the European Union in the Context of Russia and the EU’s Strategic Communication Darya Bazarkina and Kaleria Kramar Introduction The economic interest of a contemporary transnational company is represented by the sum of two main components: innovation one, which determines the long-term prospects (goals) of development, and parametric one, which determines the current and medium-term prospects (Verlup 2009, p. 56). Among the interests of business structures, if they rely on long-term profits and stable partnership, there is not only profit in itself, but also the systematic expansion of the market and production, establishing and maintaining the integrity of a local commercial market (Internal Revenue Service 2019). Achieving such goals requires strategic planning (see Langham 2018; Roberts 2019), which takes into account economic

D. Bazarkina (*) Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] K. Kramar (*) International Center for Social and Political Studies and Consulting, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pashentsev (ed.), Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1_6

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trends, political changes, technological progress and related phenomena in the cultural and psychological sphere. In many ways, this approach to business interests led to the consideration of corporate reputation as “a set of collectively held beliefs about a company’s ability to satisfy the interests of its various stakeholders” (Falkenreck 2010, p. 21). Reputation, though formed as the opinions of others about the organization, is fundamentally different from image, as these opinions arise primarily (as a result of strategic communication) based on real deeds, not just words and images. Not without reason, as Griffin (2008, p.  12) notes, in the process of reputation management “you can change this reputation by changing what you do and/or by changing how you explain what you do.” Based on the understanding of reputation as an intangible asset, based on the result of all activities of the company, this chapter applies the concept of “goodwill” (the term “sometimes used to describe the aggregate of all of the intangible assets of a business”) (Mard et al. 2002, p. 72) and open data about the evaluation of the goodwill of the business structures under study. Reputation risk is certainly strategic, as building reputation requires a long time and has an impact on the perception of a company’s activities in the long term. That is why reputation management is one of the priorities for the company. It is also necessary to keep in mind that reputation develops outside the organization too. In case of this, it is important to monitor possible risks and take preventive measures. Strategic risks are those that are influenced or created by a business’ strategic decisions. According to this approach, reputational risks are strategic (Deloitte 2013) and therefore need to be continuously assessed and monitored. Reputation management always takes into account the interests of a wide range of target audiences—investors, customers and national and supranational government bodies in the state where the partners are located. It is impossible to consider the reputation management of any transnational companies, especially large enterprises with state ownership or that enjoy open state support, in isolation from the interests of the country itself, which it represents in the global business community. Moreover, the interests of such companies are closely related to the interests of the country. According to Sabelnikov (2017, p. 48), the expansion of exports and the number of exporters, and, consequently, the production and sale of goods and services, increases tax revenues, allows for the creation of new jobs and reduction of unemployment, improves the economic and social situation in the country and increases the authority of the government. The inflow of foreign currency facilitates the import of nec-

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essary goods and often provides the solution to the problem of public external debt. Thus, the reputation management of such enterprises willingly or unwittingly becomes a component of strategic communication of the state. Therefore, the activities of Russian companies in the EU should be considered in the context of economic interests and key priorities of Russia and the EU.

Interests of Russian Business in the EU Member States (in the Context of Russia’s and the EU’s Interests in the International Arena) It is necessary to refer to the documents of strategic planning of Russia and the EU. The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation contains the main objectives of the country in the international arena, one of which is “to strengthen Russia’s position in global economic relations and prevent any discrimination against Russian goods, services and investments by using the options afforded by international and regional economic and financial organizations” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2016, Article 1). At the same time, the importance of developing the Russian economy for the provision of national security has been recognized at the state level since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the Concept of National Security in 2000, it was noted that “Russia’s national interests may only be realized based on sustainable economic development. Therefore, Russia’s national interests in this sphere are of key importance” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2000). The current Russian National Security Strategy (2015) declares that increasing the competitiveness of the national economy is one of the national strategic interests, and mentions among the main threats “low competitiveness, the persistence of the export/raw-materials model of development … [and] laggardness in the development and introduction of future technologies” (Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos 2015, Article 56). The main problem—the Russian economy’s dependence on raw materials—remains today. However, although this phenomenon hinders the development of high-tech industries in the country, the energy sector (as noted by experts; see Sánchez 2015) has remained mostly separate from political processes and crises. Therefore, Russia’s cooperation with EU countries in the energy sector continued to develop even during the Ukrainian crisis, largely due to the dependence of European economies on

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Russian energy. According to 2018 estimates, Russia is the largest exporter of coal, crude oil and natural gas to the EU. Meanwhile, the EU’s “dependence” on importing these resources (the term “dependence” is used in quoted handbook and should mean, perhaps, the share of imports in the EU’s supply of each resource) in 2016 amounted to 61.2%, 87.4% and 70.4%, respectively (see European Commission 2018, pp.  66–72). Therefore, despite the objective need for Russia “to get off the oil train,” oil and gas exporting companies currently remain among the most stable partners of the EU countries. This is noticeable even according to the current estimates of the Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation, which publishes information about the promising directions of Russian exports to the countries of the world. For example, while Germany has a high level of industrial development, the country “has almost no raw materials of its own, which it has to buy abroad” (Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation 2018, p. 29). First of all, it is reported to Russian businessmen that Germany needs rare earth metals, ferrous metallurgy products, non-ferrous metals, chemical products (mainly in the form of raw materials and semi-finished products (raw materials for the pharmaceutical industry, some types of plastics, etc.)) and medical substances for the production of medicines (Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation  2018, p.  29). Thus, the main direction of Russian exports to the country is recognized as raw materials, which is proved by the statistics of Gazprom, according to which Germany became the largest buyer of Russian gas in Europe in 2017 (Gazprom Export 2019). According to experts of the Ministry for Economic Development, the supply of information and communication technologies, bio-, nano- and optical technologies, special metallurgy and laser technology, in which Germany is also interested, could reverse the current trends. However, so far, the analytics of the Ministry (which can be evaluated as an additional tool for country’s reputation management) focuses primarily on the major Russian business, formed in the 1990s and 2000s, mainly related to raw materials. At the same time, in Germany itself, the tasks of transition to an economy based on high-tech industries are set. For example, in November 2018, the country adopted the Federal Government’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) Strategy, which states that “the challenges faced by Germany, as in other countries, involve shaping the structural changes driven by digitalisation and taking place in business, the labour market and society and

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leveraging the potential which rests in AI technologies,” on a basis of what “the Federal Government wants to put the conditions in place for the opportunities and potential of AI to be used” (Federal Government of Germany 2018). Perhaps, in all countries today there is a growing understanding of the importance of implementing advanced technologies. The development of this industry could significantly improve both the economic performance of Russia and its reputation in the foreign economic sphere. Thus, in today’s economy, the objective need of states wishing not only to ensure national security but also to move to the contemporary stage of development is the active introduction of advanced technologies. Based on this, the interests of Russian companies, which will be most consistent in this direction, correspond to the strategic interests of Russia itself, especially in case of the danger of depleting raw materials. However, at the moment, despite all their problems, commodity companies are largely solving the tactical problem of preserving relations between Russia and the EU in the context of the exchange of sanctions. The current situation creates certain privileges for the Russian commodity sector. The dependence of the economies of both Russia and the EU on Russian raw materials inevitably affects the attention of these materials’ suppliers to their business reputation. In a number of crisis situations that at first glance require an active and timely response of top management, the management of oil and gas giants did not act properly. Sometimes it even resorted to the unprofitable from the reputational point of view “search for the guilty.” The dismissal of the “guilty” with subsequent publicity did not affect profits. This is unlikely to be acceptable for the banking sector, where reputation is a key asset for the survival and development. However, even in such a situation, the understanding of business reputation as real achievement, deeds (and not just words and images) are noted in Russia at the state level. Thus, when checking the business reputation of a partner in a particular country, it is possible to check the following parameters: economic indicators of partner enterprises, including information on the number of founders, shareholders and managers, as well as data on the balance sheet and other reports on operational activities, and data on the economic situation and solvency (Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation 2019). The interests of the EU, which can be linked to foreign trade, are set out in its founding documents. The EU declares a system of open and competitive markets with  the course of an independent industry and

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i­nnovative development. So, according to Article 173 of the Lisbon Treaty, “The Union and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union’s industry exist.” “For that purpose, … their action shall be aimed at: speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes, encouraging an environment favourable to initiative and to the development of undertakings throughout the Union, particularly small and medium-sized undertakings, encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation between undertakings, fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development” (Official Journal of the European Union 2016). In the current geopolitical situation, the relations between Russia and the EU are influenced by the strategic interests of the United States, including in terms of gas exports to Europe. Gazprom acknowledged that a serious problem for itself is liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies to the European market (Chervonnaya 2019). The United States, in turn, in light of the canceling of the ban on oil exports in 2015, according to the forecast of the International Energy Agency (IEA), may, by 2024, become the second largest oil exporter in the world (International Energy Agency 2018a), which is certainly fraught for Russia with the prospect of future changes in the markets, including in Europe. “The United States is set to account for the largest share of supply expansion – and the main contributor to export growth. Meanwhile Europe’s dependency on imports increases, leading to potential competition between traditional suppliers such as Russia and new sources of supply, mainly from LNG” (International Energy Agency 2018b). The US debt to China is $1.13 trillion as of February 2019 (Amadeo 2019). China can set strict conditions for repayment of this debt at any time. In this situation, the United States is looking for ways to increase the share of its trade around the world. As a high-tech power of the contemporary world, the United States is trying to keep up with competitors in high-tech products trade, even in the field of raw materials (as evidenced by the development of shale product). This state of deeds has largely become one of the messages of strategic communication of the United States. Of course, in the economic race, the key players show aggressiveness in psychological warfare, as time is not on the side of either Russia or the United States. The desire of the American elite to suspend or delay the launch of the Russian Nord Stream 2 project, which will provide the EU

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market access to Russian gas, but without offering direct opportunities to influence the operation of the pipeline, is obvious. It is reflected in the push for the European “energy dependence” question. As we mentioned already, the EU’s “dependence” on importing raw materials has even been recognized in publications of the EU bodies, but for the United States, this issue is becoming a means of pressure on European authorities. The US position is enshrined in the document CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act), which, in particular, aims to ensure the security of Ukraine and is supposed “to continue to oppose the Nord Stream 2 pipeline given its detrimental impacts on the European Union’s energy security, gas market development in Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine; and … [to] prioritize the export of United States energy resources in order to create American jobs, help United States allies and partners, and strengthen United States foreign policy” (US Congress 2017, section 257, a: 9–10). At the moment, the project implementation is hampered by the necessity of obtaining permits from Denmark (Barsukov 2019b), and also due to the adoption of the amendments to the gas Directive of the EU (Council of the EU 2019). To match it, the operator of the Nord Stream 2 should be independent of Gazprom (now it is 100% the structure of the Gazprom Nord Stream 2 AG). In 2019, the United States approved a bill on the diversification of energy sources for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which belong to the regions of presence and active work of Russian companies. According to the adopted project, a number of measures will be used, including investments in European and Eurasian energy projects and the export of American energy technologies to world markets (US Congress 2019). For the Russian side, increasing capacity in the supply of LNG and shale gas, which is one of the drivers of the American oil industry, is a threat. In 2018, the so-called shale revolution allowed the United States to become the largest oil producer in the world (International Energy Agency 2018a). Against the background of the Ukrainian crisis and the deteriorating context for cooperation with the EU, Russian companies were not ready to compete in the shale gas market, despite the presence of such extensive fields as the Bazhenov formation. It cannot be said that the current situation was a complete surprise for Russia. The prospects of the shale revolution were known in Russia at least in 2012, when US companies received permits for production and actively planned to export shale products, including to Europe. For example, The

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Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Melnikova et al. 2012, p. 2) already refers in its 2012 study to the “emergence of a new type of economy” associated with the American shale revolution. Thus, the conflict of interests emerged long before the Ukrainian crisis. However, Russian business, due to insufficient diversification of the economy, a certain technological backwardness and inertia of thinking associated with short-term planning in the 1990s, has long believed that it could continue to trade raw materials under the old schemes. Indirectly, the attempts of Russian business to wage an psychological warfare according to the old rules can be evidenced by the spread of a large number of articles about the dangers of shale gas production in the Russian and Ukrainian information space (see, e.g., AgainstGasLand on YouTube 2013; Green Alliance 2013; Nessebar 2014; etc.). Even more for Russian companies, the process of studying the existing experience and purchasing technologies has been complicated by sanctions (Rapoza 2017). In light of these circumstances, the Russian side has chosen a strategy of refusing to take part in the development of shale deposits (RIA Novosti 2017). Despite the comments of Alexei Miller at the Russian-German Raw Materials Forum in St. Petersburg and Energy Minister Alexander Novak about the decline of the shale revolution in 2015 (Vedomosti 2015), in March 2016 the United States delivered the first batch of American shale gas to Europe (Albert 2016). However, the weakness of the “shale revolution” was the inaccuracy of forecasting the possible level of production and declaring the results, which were later largely recognized as overestimated (Olson and Cook 2017). This, in addition, made it possible for Russian companies, including Gazprom, to “save face,” stating the presence of a “bubble” in the gas market. To be fair, it should be noted that the environmental friendliness of oil and shale gas extraction by hydraulic fracturing (fracking) is still a subject of discussion among specialists, political and public organizations. Precedents of protests against fracking have already arisen in the United States. One example is the confrontation between farmers and oil companies back in 2008 and later, when the public and environmental organizations expressed their doubts about several factors that can harm the environment. First, the contamination of soil and water with liquids used to initiate fracking and the release of benzene and other harmful compounds from the strata were mentioned; second, there was suspicion of the possibility of fracking causing earthquakes; and third, of a more global factor, methane emissions, which would aggravate the greenhouse effect

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(Zissu 2016). In American practice, the protests were followed by numerous attempts by foundations such as the Bloomberg and Cynthia Charities and the George Mitchell Foundation (see Ivanov 2014), in order to assess the real damage to the environment and profits for the economy, as well as to attempt to regulate this type of production at the legislative level and at the level of encouraging a responsible approach to hydraulic fracturing. Among the more relevant examples of criticism of shale gas production include the position of Greenpeace (2012), which states, “fracking is a high-risk enterprise that affects human health and the environment.” Despite the fact that European countries, for the most part, came to a ban on shale gas production using fracking (Gudkov 2012), the rivalry between the United States and Russia has caused a new round of psychological warfare to change the commodity market. Due to the fact that in Europe, the main shale basins extend onto the territory of Northern Germany, France, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States (Masterpanov 2012), against the background of political instability (the Ukrainian crisis), in the media there were accusations against one or another side of the “shale dispute” in attempts to seize new markets illegally. In situations of psychological warfare, which unfold around emotional themes such as threats to the environment, often the information situation is triggered by the logic of the “spiral of silence,” as the pressure of the negative is very strong (Carroll 2016, p. 785). Examples of such activities may be the spread of messages on the internet that suggest or state that the fighting in the Donbas is happening in order to seize places of possible shale mining, which is harmful to the environment. In this version, everything that happened was connected with the interests of representatives of the US political and economic elites; however, no concrete evidence and arguments were provided (Сhernyshev 2014). Work on shale deposits in Ukraine, indeed, was started in 2016. In particular, Jaroslav Kinakh, managing partner of the company Emerald, which undertook the development of the largest shale gas field “Yuzovskoye” in Ukraine, said that he faced the protest of local residents, provoked by environmentalists who were against the activities of Iskander Energy (Canadian energy company focused on exploration and production of conventional and u ­ nconventional energy in the Black Sea region) (Gordejchik 2016). In connection with the participation of environmental organizations that did not approve the production of shale gas, statements about bribery of environmentalists by the Russian side even appeared in the information space of the West

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(Lefebvre 2017). Thus, the retention of Slavyansk was associated with the intentions to produce shale gas (Krasіnskij 2016); focus was also on the fact that in many European countries, a ban on such activities was introduced (Politrussia.com 2016). In the absence of any evidence, emotional rhetoric was used, along with quoting the sentiments of the population, which allowed for the effect to strengthen. Against the background of the United States and Russia fighting for the European gas market, in the EU itself, differences can also be traced on the issue of Nord Stream 2. Although in one of the resolutions, the European Parliament called Russia one of the main sources of misinformation (European Parliament 2019), progress in the negotiations on the gas pipeline is still happening. The speech of the Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for energy, Marosh Sefchovic, most accurately reflects the opinion of supranational EU bodies. He stated: “Nord Stream 2 can change the landscape of the gas market of EU, without giving access a new source of supply or a new supplier, and to further increase excess capacity from Russia to the EU… as for the market impact of the Nord Stream 2 project, We are carefully analysing the impact it can have on our increasingly competitive gas markets … we are at a crossroads today” (European Commission 2016a). The crossroads mentioned by Sefchovic expressed the differences between the EU member states (Fakty.UA 2017). Poland and the Baltic States firmly oppose the construction of the gas pipeline, seeing it as an instrument of Russia’s political influence. Defenders of the project—Germany, France and Austria—have the point of view that the export of Russian gas is only a business that needs to be developed. As a result, we can conclude that it is in the interests of the EU not to lose ties with both partners, Russia and the United States (which will create the necessary choice of goods and services for the European consumer and maintain their high quality). The development of industry and innovation determines the demand for resources provided by Russian suppliers of raw materials. However, from a strategic perspective, even against the background of the objective need for goods, the goods’ supplier must adapt its behavior to the requirements of the market, keeping in mind not only the economic situation, but also the cultural and psychological characteristics of the target audience. Here it should be noted that the construction of the image and reputation of the EU itself on external and internal audiences took into account the psychology of Europeans, and when entering the market of

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the EU countries, the Russian supplier should pay attention to two groups of characteristics of the partner. The first is related to the declared values of the entire EU, the second to the peculiarities of the business culture of each country. The declared values of the EU are proclaimed as “common to the EU countries in a society in which inclusion, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination prevail” (European Union 2019a). There are six indicated values: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and human rights (Ibidem). The EU objective of “sustainable development based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive market economy with full employment and social progress, and environmental protection” is closely linked to economic development and foreign trade (European Union 2019a). With regard to Russia at the official level, it is emphasized that the latter’s accession to the WTO in 2012 was evaluated as a way to create “a forum to address bilateral problems,” but the EU is disappointed with Russia’s more protectionist course, which, according to the European Commission, has intensified with the development of the Ukrainian crisis (European Commission 2016b, p. 13). Communicating with the target audiences in the EU, it is necessary to keep in mind that the main message in the creation of the internal political image of the EU is the adoption of the statement that “the EU takes care of its citizens” (Hauer-Tyukarkina 2015, p. 64), from which in the field of trade follows the rule “only products that are safe can be placed on the EU market.” In addition, a ban on hard-selling/aggressive sales techniques (including misleading advertising and unfair commercial practices) is adopted at the official level (European Commission 2016c, pp. 6–7). The message of corporate social responsibility (CSR), defined as the responsibility of enterprises for their impact on society, is also actively broadcasted to a wide European audience. The Commission promotes CSR principles, which include the enhancing the visibility of CSR and disseminating good practices; improving and tracking levels of trust in business, self and co-regulation processes; company disclosure of social and environmental information; further integrating CSR into education, training and research; and other key points that companies in the EU should follow (European Union 2019b). Despite the apparent flexibility of European partners in relation to the energy sector of the Russian economy, difficulties in the political sphere can increase reputational risks for Russian companies. Of course, no business entity is immune from misinformation campaigns instigated by the

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opponent. However, neglect of corporate reputation increases the risk of errors, after which it is much more difficult to justify than in the denial of libel. Taking into account the current global trend of protectionism and cautious attitude to international business, communication errors can provoke serious consequences for the reputation of companies. Along with the values of the EU, formulated by the institutions of European integration, it is necessary to consider the cultural and psychological characteristics of the citizens of the country in which the business is conducted to be the parameters of business culture. At first glance, the positive psychological impact on the partner is primarily associated with the “words” and “images” (i.e., with public relations issues), but when assessing companies through the prism of cross-cultural management, a number of parameters are considered, such as centralized vs. decentralized decision-making, safety vs. risk, individual vs. group rewards, informal vs. formal procedures, high vs. low organizational loyalty, cooperation vs. competition, short-term vs. long-term horizons and stability vs. innovation (Luthans and Doh 2006, p. 110). This makes the analysts pay attention to such deeds of Russian business as pricing policy, quality control, state support from Russia and its perception in the partner country, the dynamics of business expansion and, of course, the tone of the official publications of the company and the “feedback” in the media, the focus of special events designed to increase confidence in the company. At the same time, the perception of the company by the audience may vary from country to country. For example, the Austrian Ministry of Economic Development does not distinguish specific features of doing business: “everything fits into the generally accepted, standard rules of doing business, and Austrians, as a rule, prefer to adhere to a more formal nature of communication with business partners” (Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation 2017, p.  67). However, an extended assessment of the reputation management of Russian companies in Austria (one of the EU countries in which all three studied companies are present) will require taking into account a wide range of requirements for the partner, due to (a) European culture, (b) the cultural traditions of German-speaking Europe and (c) specific Austrian cultural attitudes in business communication. The methodology adopted in the RepTrak model developed by the international consulting company Reputation Institute, as well as expert business assessments given by the company itself, was used in the study of practical experience and indicators of Russian business. The RepTrak

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model shows the relationship between the company’s reputation, the emotional response of target audiences and profit. Based on the relationship between the reputation of the company (goodwill) and one of the most important intangible assets—the brand—the brand ratings of the selected companies were also used to assess the effectiveness of their reputation management. Intangible assets of business to some extent are reflected in key quantitative indicators such as revenue, a business’s market capitalization (“equal to the number of shares outstanding, or the number of shares purchased or available for purchase, multiplied by the market price for those shares” [Green 2019]) and brand value. Due to the limitations of this chapter, we have focused only on the last indicator, which is closely related to communication processes. We refer to the ratings of the world’s leading independent consulting company Brand Finance, which annually assesses more than 3500 brands in the world. Based on its latest data, we can assume that Russian companies have the potential for successful work in the international market, including in the EU. So Gazprom, Lukoil and Sberbank were ranked by Brand Finance in 2019, showing positive development of their brands (Brand Finance 2019a). In 2019, the brand value of Gazprom increased by 45.7% and Lukoil by 19.7%. In light of the analysis of Russia’s position as the largest commodity exporter to the EU, the growth of these companies is natural. Sberbank’s position in the rating, on the contrary, decreased, although it also added 6.3% and became the most expensive brand of these three ($12.4 billion) (Brand Finance 2019a). In comparison with world leaders, the value of which far exceeds the mark of $100 billion (e.g., Amazon, at $187.9 billion), Russian companies are quite modest, partly due to the geography of their presence. In 2018 top brands by country are the United States (54 brands); Germany (12); France, Japan (7); Switzerland (4); Belgium, South Korea, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden (2 each); Austria, Canada, China, Denmark, Ireland, the UK (1) (Badenhausen 2018). There are no Russian brands at all in 2019 Forbes list of the world’s most valuable brands (Forbes 2019). In a separate banking rating by Brand Finance (2019b) Sberbank took first place in terms of “brand strength” among banks and had the second position among all participants of the rating. The experience of Gazprom, Lukoil and Sberbank was selected for analysis on the basis of an extensive source base, as well as relatively high interest in foreign analytical centers and the media. The first two companies belong to the oil and gas industry, and their experience is particularly

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indicative of a situation in which Russia’s foreign trade with the EU is developing primarily on the basis of raw material supplies. To analyze the publications about selected Russian businesses in the media covering the EU territory, the authors worked with the Medialogia database for the period 2013–2018. Medialogia is a Russian company that develops an automatic system of monitoring and analyzing media and social networks in real time. In Russia alone, more than 40,000 publishers at the federal and regional levels deliver their content to the company 24/7. Medialogia automatically processes 500,000 media messages and 50,000,000 social media messages per day. Despite overlapping the interests of Russia and the EU in some areas, as well as the attempts of their agreement for further cooperation at the level of Chambers of Commerce and various international venues of communication, as will be shown later in the study (mainly in the case of the Nord Stream 2 disputes), the political situation complicates bilateral cooperation. Of course, this factor can create difficulties for the reputation management of Russian companies, as it is necessary to take into account the interests of the EU (and its member states) and, for example, the growing influence of the economic and political competitor of Russia— the United States.

Deeds, Words and Images in the Reputation Management of Russian Companies in the EU After 2014: Cases of Gazprom, Lukoil and Sberbank Along with the general analysis of companies’ activities in the EU, the behavior of companies in crisis situations was assessed, as well as the main financial parameters to assess the stability of businesses in Europe, the tone of interaction with regulators and partners, and the image of the company in the media since 2014. An interim analysis of each of the companies helped to evaluate their work through the prism of the European consumer’s requests. Gazprom Gazprom operates in the EU in several areas, the most important of which is gas supplies. According to available data for 2017, Russia held almost a third of the European gas market—a record share achieved primarily by

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Gazprom (Regnum 2018). Recently, the topic of Gazprom’s presence in the European market has become one of the most important in light of new trends in energy consumption in Europe, as well as the promotion of alternative sources of gas exports to the EU, especially from the United States. Against this background, a number of mergers conducted by Gazprom are indicative; in particular, the company announced its intention to stop operations at its Wingas enterprise by the end of 2018 and incorporate it into the London-based Gazprom Marketing & Trading (Kommersant 2018), which, in turn, is owned by Gazprom Germania GmbH. Integration plans were announced in 2016 (RIA Novosti 2016). In 2017, it was decided to change the operational structure of export activities, including marketing and trading. Within two years, the creation of an integrated international sales division was planned. In 2018, part of the company’s staff in Britain was reduced by almost half (Kalyukov and Podobedova 2018). The pooling of subsidiaries’ resources and staff reductions reflect more than Gazprom’s desire to save money. Combined business structures in the future can withstand tougher competition from other actors—particularly companies from the United States. Managerial decisions are part of the communication provision of the organization’s work (see Bazarkina 2017, p. 57), and mergers in Gazprom are perceived as a plan to create a single “trading giant.” According to financial reports of Gazprom, its goodwill grew during 2013–2018. The value of its reputation has risen sharply, from 55,386 million rubles in 2013 to 71,240 million rubles in 2014, and then gradually rose in price in all years except 2016 (70,151 million rubles). According to the latest data, the value of Gazprom’s reputation amounted to 75,092 million rubles in September 2018. This jump is most likely explained by the high importance of gas in the EU energy market (especially as a substitute for oil and coal). When assessing the possible image of the company in the eyes of consumers, it is necessary to evaluate both its structure and the pace of expansion. For 2018, Gazprom works with consumers in the EU in the B2C sector only in terms of gas sales to end consumers (11 countries) and sales of products through gas and petrol stations of different types (5 c­ ountries). In general, Gazprom interacts with consumers in 15 countries on the B2C market. Another project, “G-Energy” Service Station, comes under a separate brand. Today, according to the company’s website, such stations exist in Italy (9), Latvia (1), and—since 2017—in Bulgaria (2), Greece (5) and Hungary (1). Apparently, even the presence of a separate

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brand does not allow the company to develop new markets, while the project has mainly operated in more or less politically loyal countries, despite the following statement in a press release of 2016: “The G-Energy” Service programme is expected to grow throughout Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Western Europe, the Middle East, and other regions (EIN Presswire 2016). Since 2017, the project was launched in Greece and Bulgaria (five and two stations, respectively). Of the existing and theoretically possible (under favorable conditions) areas of activity, the greatest activity of the company is concentrated in the B2B sector. In this regard, a stakeholder such as the end user is not the main target audience of communication. Consequently, the main stakeholders are those that influence the supply of B2B to specific countries. The situation on the B2B market is largely determined by the EU’s strategy and general geopolitical situation. In this case, it is natural that the company’s communication activity is concentrated in the investor (IR) and government (GR) relations (according to Transparency International, Gazprom in 2017 became the most active lobbyist in the EU among representatives of Russian business, although it operates through subsidiaries) (Lomskaya et  al. 2017), and also focuses on internal communications. This distribution of target audiences forces the company to pay attention to the compliance of their deeds, words and images not only to production standards, but also to the declared values of the EU, which will only intensify if the political situation is aggravated. However, even in this case, Russian state-owned corporations are often perceived not only as business entities, but also as “agents of the Russian state” (Lomskaya et al. 2017), and in the case of a particularly acute political crisis in their respect may impose sanctions (in a situation close to conflict—up to their withdrawal from the EU). Due to this background, the company tries to focus on the statements that the sanctions do not affect its business relations with European partners, and sometimes these statements make us doubt the compliance of the words with deeds. For example, analyst Andrei Belyi (2014), referencing the report of Gazprom and RBC, stated that in 2014, Gazprom’s profit fell by 40%; despite this fact, in the middle of the summer that same year, the company announced increased profits. But in total, the company’s statements show an increase in gas sales in Europe, which, as we said earlier, can be explained not by the reputation component, but rather by the market: the growth of demand for gas, as an important energy carrier. Thus, Gazprom has an undeniable advantage in the EU market—the

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importance of gas for the European economy and power industry—as well as a number of risks associated primarily with political factors. The presence of state support, which in “peacetime” becomes an additional guarantee of business stability, with the aggravation of conflicts in the international arena, can create a serious reputational risk. In this context, it is important to analyze the response of the media (both EU-based and external sources that influence the European audience) to the activities of Gazprom. Analysis of the Medialogia database shows the total number of references to the company in the media amounted to 154,966 messages for the period from January 30, 2018 to January 30, 2019. The number of republications is only 5%, which may mean that the emerging news is relevant for limited audiences, or that these materials come not from the company, but from third-party sources, and if they contain unconfirmed data, other media just do not want to take responsibility for their replication. The analysis revealed several relevant topics and especially notable events for the selected period. One of the topics was disagreements Gazprom had with the Ukrainian company Naftogaz. The trial between them was widely covered in the press, especially such events as the victory of Naftogaz in the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in December 2017, the seizure of shares of Nord Stream AG and Nord Stream 2 AG related to this case, and the message that the US courts began to satisfy claims against Gazprom from Kiev. Of course, after the events of 2014, the Ukrainian side actively tried to participate in various news opportunities, as well as to initiate them itself. Considering the deterioration of Russian-Ukrainian relations, and the fact that one of the gas pipelines passed through Ukraine, the company was forced to change its supply strategy, which is clearly presented as a crisis. In addition, the victory in the dispute with the Russian state corporation (also a monopolist) was symbolically presented as a victory in the dispute with Russia. The reputational risk for Gazprom is great, especially if we recall that for the EU the topic of Russian-Ukrainian agreements is important for gas supplies to Europe in the absence of alternatives. Many articles are devoted to the topic of dependence on Russian gas, which is clearly perceived as a challenge for European countries, which has to be overcome in the immediate future. A number of news opportunities have a direct impact on the reputation of the company: the imposition of sanctions against a group of Russians, including the CEO of the company; the decline of Gazprom in the ranking of the largest energy companies in the world from the first place into seventeenth one; the prosecution of the

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founder of the research center Legatum Institute (which advocated for Brexit) for being connected with Russia, which is also considered a shareholder of Gazprom; and the dismissal of the expert of Sberbank SIB, which released an analytical report containing comprehensive criticism of Gazprom (Kushch 2018). Negative actions, though symbolic in relation to the company and its head, which are attributed to the Russian economic elite, clearly reduce confidence. The situation with the Legatum Institute, which for the most part remained unproven, once again shows how much the company is connected with the image of the country. On the basis of the most notable news opportunities for the selected period, it can be concluded that there is a certain negative aspect to the coverage of the company’s activities in a number of EU countries, especially in the UK and Poland. The geography of references shows the highest level of interest in the company in the United States (7736 references) and among the EU countries—in Germany (5859) and Poland (3223). The number of references is related to a certain intersection of the interests of these countries regarding the transformation of the EU energy market. Germany currently supports Gazprom in the development of Nord Stream 2, opposing Poland’s attempts to limit this project. The leading media in the references are German (Handelsblatt, with the highest total Media Index1 of 146.49; Der Spiegel; Bild) as well as American (Forbes, with an 84.46 Media Index; the Associated Press; Platts; Fox News Channel; Newsweek; Los Angeles Times). Handelsblatt broadcasts a rather friendly position in relation to Gazprom’s plans, including the desire of German companies to continue cooperation. German Bild, on the contrary, primarily associates the company’s actions with the interests of Vladimir Putin and the possibilities of new military attacks by the Kremlin. It should be borne in mind that Bild, in contrast to the business Handelsblatt, is a tabloid. Among US publications, Forbes notes the growth of the gas market and focuses on the loss of Gazprom customers, for example, the Polish state energy company PGNiG (Polish Mining and Gas Extraction Company). Of course, the nationality of the company is emphasized. The Associated 1  The Media Index is an indicator of the Medialogia system, which allows for qualitatively analyzing the effectiveness of PR. The index is calculated automatically using linguistic analysis technologies. The formula of the Media Index has three main components: citation index, positive/negative and visibility of the message.

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Press draws attention to the fact that Gazprom owns some media and calls for casting doubts on these sources marked “state-controlled.” CNN, quoting the New York Times, reports that “Russia’s state-owned gas company with subsidiaries in Western Europe, are hotbeds of Russian intelligence activity” (Campbell and Baer 2018), again linking the activities of Russian companies specifically with the person of the President of Russia. The connection between the images of Gazprom and the President of Russia is explained by the fact that the company has a monopoly on the production of natural gas in its country; the rotation of personnel often leads to senior positions of managers from the public sector. At the moment, there are no efforts to pull together the image of the country with the image of the President in the field of public diplomacy, but the existence and effect of such association is very long term (Cull 2017). All this for a long time has led to an opinion about the company, first of all, as an instrument of foreign policy. Of course, Gazprom’s foreign policy role in the context of Russian-EU relations is very important, and this cannot be denied. And in this case, the feedback received from the media shows an ambivalent situation that creates both opportunities and risks: state support can become, depending on the circumstances, an additional factor in the reliability of the company, and an occasion to accuse the business of lobbying political interests. Moreover, top managers of companies such as Gazprom (especially those appointed from the state apparatus) bear double responsibility: in case of their unscrupulous behavior, the reputation capital falls not only for the corporation, but also for the country. Analysis of the information activity of Gazprom itself is very difficult due to the presence of various subsidiaries. Gazprom Export publishes the same content in a very modest amount in English and Russian. During 2014–2018, 41 official news from Gazprom Export were published. Accordingly, in the analysis of the information field, it receives the least number of references (7078) and the least proportion of negative references (only 3%). Gazprom Neft (2017) generates more content, but also the main topics are new technological developments of the company, specific financial and production achievements, information on shareholder meetings and approval of strategies and contracts, and information on current profile projects. Many press releases are devoted to topics related to innovations that are introduced into the work of the company or that will be developed. The result of effective information activities is the following: 73% of Germans support the construction of Nord Stream 2 and 67% do not

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consider the project a threat (Vesti FM 2019). This is an interesting result, and an important research question can be whether it is formed by the efforts of the company, or whether the main role was played by the interests of the Germans in the development of their own country. The image of the company in Germany, in any case, is positive enough not to be changed by political arguments about security and independence in decision-­making, especially with the trend of some nationalism and the desire for political sovereignty. It is impossible to ignore the fact that Gazprom Germania GmbH is the title sponsor of Europe Park, the largest amusement park in the country. The park hosts events from the company, and there is a pavilion called “World of Gazprom – the fascinating world of energy,” with a separate multimedia stand dedicated to the Nord Stream 2. In addition, there are sponsorship initiatives in the social, cultural and sports spheres, which also support the company’s reputation, especially in the context of the EU policy on the development of CSR. Particularly important in this regard may be the sphere of education, work with young people, schoolchildren and preschoolers. The company’s communication in social media is mainly one-sided: corporate news is broadcast. Gazprom’s Facebook page in the UK has a fairly low rating, and there are negative reviews about unfair work. Social networks, rather, are used for the sake of the company’s presence in the information space, but not for active work on image and reputation. At the same time, however, it is important to note that messages aimed at a wide audience appeal to values that are relevant, close and understandable to the EU population. Thus, Gazprom Marketing & Trading states among its principles “equality, diversity and inclusion,” which is quite important for the cultural situation in Europe. In the case of synchronization of deeds, words and images, there are certain differences. One of the important problems, as the construction of Nord Stream 2 absolutely clearly demonstrates, is the Russian companies’ denial of there being some politicization of their decisions. This fact of dependence of their decisions on politics cannot be completely denied, as oil and gas exports are obviously the largest source of income for the country. There are also elements of deliberate misinformation about the Russian Nord Stream 2 project; for example, the project operator had to refute Naftogaz’s statement about Denmark’s refusal to agree on the gas pipeline route (Kommersant 2019). At the moment, the position of non-participation in the production of content for the media is probably a consciously chosen communication

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strategy. Gazprom is not very active in reacting to events, only to very important points. Statements are mainly made during business meetings of the company’s representatives with partners, and press releases do not cover negative aspects. Despite the fact that the main work of the company is aimed at the B2B segment, in the field of communication for Gazprom it is important to pay attention to projects for the local community, which provide them with the approval or even support of citizens. In general, the position chosen by Gazprom to explain its intentions seems to be the right one, since it is precisely clearly structured and adapted information, free from broadcast stereotypes or biased arguments, the lack of which is felt in the media. This is a step to ensure that the company is safe in terms of information. Lukoil The oil company Lukoil is private, so the analysis of its reputation in the EU countries does not show such a close connection with the reputation of the political elite of Russia, although the Ukrainian crisis has also weakened its position. Goodwill and other intangible assets of the company in 2014 have fallen from 56,386 million rubles to 41,355 million (as of June 2018) (Lukoil 2015, 2016, 2017b, 2018). However, in the 2017 annual report, for example, the company, like Gazprom, does not consider reputational risks, also demonstrating its emphasized apolitical nature (Lukoil 2017a). At the moment, the company is present in the EU countries of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Romania (according to the 2017 report). European countries are the sales markets for Lukoil. Raw material is processed only in Italy, the Netherlands, Bulgaria and Romania, and it is extracted in Bulgaria. At the end of 2017, 2155 of 5258 Lukoil petrol stations were in Europe, which is much greater than the number of Gazprom stations (Lukoil 2017c). Despite this, the political tensions have influenced the expansion of the company, which has been especially active since the early 2000s. After the events of 2014, Lukoil has reduced its assets in Europe in an attempt to concentrate on major large and stable markets. By the beginning of 2016, Lukoil had sold 230 of its petrol stations in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as all the stations in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Cyprus (Mordyushenko 2017), as part of company’s exit strategy from small markets. The head of the company,

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Vagit Alekperov, directly stated that the withdrawal from the market of the Baltic countries and Poland is justified by a decrease in income and skeptical positions of these countries in relation to the events in Ukraine (Panibratov and Pantic 2018). By 2018, the networks were sold in Serbia (candidate for the EU accession). On the contrary, the company made a statement about the plan to enter the Western European markets: the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The sale of assets in Ukraine is mostly assessed not as a withdrawal from the market but as an asset diversification. The sale of 240 petrol stations and 6 petroleum storage depots by Lukoil to the Austrian company AMIC Energy Management GmbH was called a formal resale by the relevant experts (in particular, the media reported that the first managing director of AMIC, Robert Novek, worked earlier in the Czech branch of Lukoil [Trust.ua 2015]), as was the purchase of Karpatneftekhim by the former head of Lukoil-Ukraine. The top management of the company declares the goals that are exclusively related to business interests in its industry: sustainable production growth, continuous improvement of refineries with maximization of free cash flow, the development of oil and gas chemistry, expansion of the sales network and the development of priority sales channels, and the implementation of a progressive dividend policy (Petlevoj 2018). In many ways, this approach, having nothing to do with politics, leads to appropriate feedback. Since 2014, the most discussed topics in the information field related to Lukoil have largely concerned the tightening of regulation of the EU oil and gas market and the effect of these changes on Russian business, although, for example, Lukoil-Ukraine was accused by the Ukrainian authorities of “financing terrorism” in Donbas (Front News International 2017). There were also messages about Lukoil’s involvement in corruption schemes in Bulgaria (Bivol 2018) because of the monopoly of the oil supply of the country (Rankin 2017) and related anti-corruption investigations; the murder of journalist Victoria Marinova (2018), associated with the name of the former first Lukoil vice-president and ex-Federation Council member Ralif Safin (Seroka 2018); and suspicion about the ­relationship of Czech President Miloš Zeman with Russia through Lukoil. There are the messages that in 2018 the trust associated with the Venezuelan PDVSA has filed a lawsuit against Lukoil and Glencore on charges of corruption and falsification of contracts for the sale of oil (Associated Press 2018), the investigation of Deutsche Bank (2011–2015) and the accusation of “Russian trace” (Caesar 2016). All this demonstrates

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a sharp increase in negative publications that affect the reputation of the company, in many ways related to the topic of corruption and with some political background. It can be assumed that Lukoil has more real crisis situations due to the presence of not just infrastructure for supplies, like Gazprom, but processing and mining industries. However, if prior to 2014, the company’s business expansion, including in the countries of the EU, proceeded without such significant problems, from the beginning of the deterioration of political relations between Russia and the EU attention to different kinds of crisis situations has increased dramatically, so much so that the company faced the risk of losing part of the market. Open support from the Russian authorities, as well as in the case of Gazprom, can easily be interpreted as a corruption link. However, there is a question about the European government and business structures, which, with a favorable political environment, could turn a blind eye to a number of smoldering crises (if not crimes) in companies for profit—as can be concluded from the cases of Gazprom and Lukoil. Lukoil received the largest number of references in the United States, Poland, Romania, Great Britain and Germany out of the total number (12,760), which can again be explained by specific events unfolding in the countries in which Lukoil has a presence (Romania) and general issues of changes in the energy market. Of the three companies studied, Lukoil has the highest percentage of republications with news about the company, at about 36%. According to the monitoring system Medialogia, the main mentions (for the period from January 30, 2018 to January 30, 2019) are associated with financial losses of the richest Russians, including Vagit Alekperov, due to US sanctions. Other news includes the following: Lukoil became the second major energy company in the world; protests in Iraq and the US sanctions against Iran, which affect the interests of the company; Lukoil’s cooperation with Kazakh partners, especially the decision to work in the Caspian Sea; the alleged connection of Lukoil with Cambridge Analytica; sanctions against Russian petrol stations’ network in Ukraine and a lawsuit in the anti-corruption proceedings of the United States over the Venezuelan PDVSA and large oil companies, including Lukoil (Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union 2017). Other news was as follows: “the Kremlin list” of the US Treasury—the list of oligarchs, who, in the opinion of the US administration, are close to the president (which may be the reason for the delay of credit to the ­company);

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the question of the presence of Russian and Chinese spies in the Czech Republic; and reference to the fact that the former manager of Lukoil supported the campaign of the current president (Cameron 2018). Despite the fact that Lukoil is a private company, in some publications it is still linked to the state power: “Perhaps the hardest hit of the Russian energy companies on the list would be Lukoil, which is ironically not state controlled” (Rapoza 2018). This attitude is most likely dictated by the fact that the company belongs to a very important sector of the Russian economy. A considerable number of mentioned reasons submitted in the form of assumptions. The main thing is that their effect on the deterioration of the European citizens’ opinion is undeniable. Among the non-core activities carried out in the EU, the company declares its participation in many social, educational and health projects. The greatest attention is paid to the cultural sphere, in various aspects (26% of activities), and about 17% goes to environmental and social initiatives. The EU countries included in this calculation are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain. In this case, Lukoil follows to a large degree the global trend to participate in social issues in the countries of presence. In the deeds aspect, unlike Gazprom (which not only enjoys more open support from the state (by virtue of its affiliation), but also supplies mainly a more environmentally friendly product), Lukoil focuses on its environmental policy in the EU. As a manufacturing company, Lukoil adapts to the new strategies of the EU, for example, demonstrating its compliance with the goals to reduce greenhouse gases emission by at least 20% and the turn to the use of renewable energy sources. In this regard, the volume of direct greenhouse gases emissions is monitored, which decreased in 2016–2017 at Lukoil Neftochim Burgas AD (Bulgaria) and ISAB (Italy), while remaining at the same level at Petrotel-Lukoil S.  A. (Romania) (Fadeeva 2015). Electric charging stations are installed at the company’s petrol stations, and an agreement has been signed with Gazprom to expand the use of gas motor fuel. Perhaps the cooperation of Russian companies abroad will help them to both expand their markets and meet the environmental standards of the countries of presence, which can be a significant indicator for EU citizens. Reviews by the company’s employees in the UK show a rating of 3.5 out of 5, which is quite a standard result of oil and gas companies on this resource. In addition, 63% would recommend the company to a friend, while the approval of the CEO is 87% (Glassdoor 2019). On average, this

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is a good result, especially in relation to the head of the company; in comparison with Alexei Miller, Vagit Alekperov receives a much higher rating. There is a Lukoil page on Facebook, the rating of which (given by users) is 4.4 out of 5, on which there are positive reviews and official news. The official estimates of the separate pages in the same network for the countries where Lukoil gas stations are present are higher than 4.5, indicating the company’s work with social media. (This work is clearly more active than in Gazprom, partly due to the presence of a large retail network.) Lukoil Lubricants (Vienna), as well as Gazprom, supports sports, especially football (the “Torpedo” club) and motorsport. In this direction, charitable initiatives are also being implemented, such as sponsoring tickets for matches for teenagers and people with disabilities. Lukoil, like Gazprom Marketing & Trading, promotes the values of inclusion, diversity and equality of opportunities (Gazprom Marketing & Trading 2019). Under the same ideas, the company helps to implement school projects. Another common theme that has become necessary for every company is sustainable development. Many initiatives are aimed at children and young people: exhibitions; “Hafen Open Air,” the largest private open-air music festival in Austria; support of the largest sailing project for socially vulnerable young people and others. In total, the company’s communication can be called more focused on the population of the EU countries, which are potential consumers, to note the desire to “speak the same language” in terms of values with the European audience. We can see the strategy of working with young people, sports sponsorship and charity initiatives. At the same time, like Gazprom, despite being a private business, Lukoil receives some negative attention in the media because of its Russian origin (we are talking here about the cases involving the supposed connection with Russian politics, not real crises). This gives the media the opportunity to sometimes take the non-transparency of the company as a given. Sberbank The case of Sberbank represents the position of a non-resource state-­ controlled company (this bank is controlled by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation). In the 2017 report (Sberbank 2017), the company, highlighting the most significant risks, does not mention the reputational ones. Sberbank also does not evaluate its goodwill separately in the annual financial statements. At the same time, there is data on the value of the

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brand, which increased in 2017 from $9.1 to 11.6 billion (by 27.5% for the year) (Brand Finance 2018) and in 2018 to $12.3 billion (by 6.3% for the year) (Brand Finance 2019b). It is important that as one of the priorities in the strategy until 2020, Sberbank has declared the development of Sberbank Europe AG’s subsidiary banks, in terms of the retail segment and the segment aimed at small and medium businesses. According to the monitoring results using the Medialogia service, the number of references to Sberbank in the foreign press amounted to 14,543 messages and the percentage of republications is 12%. The head of Sberbank Herman Gref has repeatedly and openly referred to the negative impact of European sanctions, and, in this regard, about the optimization of European assets (Guckov 2017). In the end, the company withdrew from the Slovak market (Sberbank 2016), and also sold its share in Deniz Bank in Turkey in 2018 (Gulf Times 2018). As of approximately January 2017, Sberbank has periodically reported on increasing profits over different time periods. In 2018, it became the second most highly valued bank in Europe (Aris 2018). Perhaps Gref’s statement about the “withdrawal from European markets,” which was widely replicated, was a distraction, as the exodus from the markets of the EU countries was not implemented. The increase in profits against the background of caution, in fact, was used as proof of the bank’s reliability. As a result, Western investors, despite the sanctions, buy its shares, which may already be a marker of confidence (Voronova 2017). However, Sberbank is mentioned in a number of journalistic materials devoted to the problem of corruption. There is an article about the construction of Olympic Games Park in Sochi, part of which is controlled by Sberbank, which journalists associate with Gref’s work in the Presidential Administration of Russia (Forrest 2014). This article also mentions the dismissal of the analyst of Sberbank for accusing Gazprom of creating corruption schemes (this is the most noticeable message for the period from February 3, 2018, to February 3, 2019, according to Medialogia). It is also important to stress the political issues (the mention of the bank in the context of unproved “Russia’s involvement in the results of the referendum on Brexit”) (Cadwalladr 2018), the accusation by the New York Times that Sberbank was financing military conflict in Ukraine (Becker and Mayer 2015) and reports on the closure of bank branches in the Crimea without notifying the depositors (Luhn 2014). The bank’s technological security issues are associated in the media with Russia’s cyber-activity, as it is reported that banks (including

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Sberbank) are most vulnerable in this area (Seddon 2018). Also, along with cyber-attacks, there are reports of fraud (the situation with skimming cards in Europe, mainly in Eastern Europe, in 2017), although Sberbank reported that its customers were not among the victims (Eremina and Kantyshev 2017). Of course, this leaves a negative mark, causing foreign customers to worry. Gref was mentioned in the “Kremlin report” but has so far avoided personal sanctions. The picture of mentions with a high Media Index in the information field is quite similar to that of Gazprom. There are articles about Sberbank by the American publications Forbes (the highest total Media Index, at 35.72), the Associated Press, Fox News Channel, CNN, and the Washington Times; the German publications Deutsche Welle, Haldensblatt (22.41), and Der Spiegel; and the Russian resource Medusa based in Riga. Naturally, in the media field, Sberbank intersects with references to the Russian Federation (17.3% negative references), Gazprom (33.8% negative), Sberbank SIB (15.5%), Vladimir Putin (2.6%), VTB Bank, the United States (5%), and the UK (0.7) and Reuters (0% negative). Sberbank of Russia itself has references that are 5% negative. Such a picture reflects the dominant agenda of the European and American media, certainly related to the current geopolitical situation. This cannot but affect the conduct of business by Russian companies in the EU. At the same time, in the matter of reputational risks associated with the bank’s control by the state, Sberbank is in the same position as Gazprom, but because it is in the financial (not raw materials) sector, it is really more vulnerable to changes in the political environment. The materials of the Russian mass media demonstrate the readiness of Sberbank to comment on its own mistakes. If such a strategy is applied in the European market, it will be an opportunity to maintain a reputation in the event of a crisis. In the European media, however, the head of the bank, who often makes important statements, is virtually absent, which can also be a chosen strategy of the media in the context of political ­confrontation, in which the agenda is constructed without giving the other side an opportunity to speak. Sberbank uses social media to contact the consumer in the countries of presence, through which it covers the initiatives of the bank. The adaptation of communication to the values existing in a society is very clearly seen in one of the posts on the Facebook page of the Czech branch: “You don’t have to be a family in the traditional sense to live together.” The company also supports socially important issues: in the Czech Republic it

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provides specific assistance to women and vulnerable children, the disabled and the elderly, while in Hungary there is assistance to those without housing, as well as a program against the separation of families (apparently in connection with the flow of migrants). Sberbank also operates in the EU candidate countries. Thus, in Serbia, the focus is on CSR in the health sector, where the Sberbank team improves conditions in existing medical institutions and opens new ones. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the bank provides social and health assistance. Another interesting area of the bank’s communication in the EU is support for education and financial literacy. Events in this area are held in both online (training content called Sberbank Academy in Hungary) (Sberbank Magyarország 2019) and offline formats. Of course, mass events involving employees of the company such as Sberbank Family Run (Sberbank CZ 2018) and crowdfunding projects also receive attention. The cultural aspect is also taken into account. Thus, the Sberbank webpage in Slovenia (Sberbank 2019) talks about sponsoring athletes (in cross-country skiing and ski jumping, which are very popular in the country). The peculiarity of the Czech branch is in the official Instagram (Sberbank CZ 2019a) account and YouTube channel (Sberbank CZ 2019c), as well as the Vkontakte (Sberbank CZ 2019b) group in Russian (the bank focuses on a part of the Russian-speaking audience, including Russian students who come to study in the Czech Republic). Of the three analyzed companies, Sberbank is the most active on social media due to the breadth of the consumer audience compared to energy companies. A positive Russian experience of Sberbank is being actively implemented in European countries. This approach gives an opportunity to interact with consumers, build brand awareness and monitor the attitude to the company brand through consumer-generated content (see: Horn et al. 2015). Despite the fact that Sberbank strives to move from a hierarchical to a teamwork approach in its corporate culture, in 2017 the Deputy Chairman of the bank noted that “feedback from employees showed that corporate culture lacks humanity, respect, openness and cooperation” (Voronova 2017). She did not specify which branches were considered, but it is very important that a certain type of authoritarian behavior, which is even appreciated and respected by some of the citizens of Russia, did not create a repulsive image for representatives of European culture when working in the EU. In addition, a certain reputational risk associated with “humanity” may be the consequences of staff reductions in the cause of wider implementation of artificial intelligence (AI). The middle echelon of

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­ anagement suffers most from AI spreading: “This has led to a huge m reduction at various links that have engaged in simple solutions. For example, in the middle link, we have reduced about 70% of the managers,” Gref said (Tadtaev 2018). Recently, the Sberbank CEO reported the loss of “billions of rubles” of profit due to errors of AI (Demchenko and Litova 2019), making it advisable to expand the company’s reputation management in this area. There are such inconsistent actions of Russian companies, such as, on one hand, the attempt to forcibly terminate the agreement on gas transit through Ukraine in the Stockholm arbitration, and on the other hand the proposal of Alexey Miller to prolong the transit contract with the Ukrainian side at the meeting with the pro-Russian candidates before the upcoming elections of the President of Ukraine. Such contradictory actions, coinciding with decisive moments, again give the impression of politicization of Gazprom’s actions (Barsukov 2019a). It should be borne in mind that even a well-thought-out strategy and synchronization of actions may not bring the expected results if they do not meet the existing demands of society, or focus on a number of cultural characteristics that both exist in each individual country and are declared at the EU level.

The Perception of Russian Companies by Target Audiences in the EU In dealing with European values, the cultural diversity of the EU should also be taken into account. This means being able to promote certain pan-­ European values to form a common social base of company loyalty, but it does not unify communication strategies aimed at different ethnic groups. The Pew Research Center (2018) notes the different mentalities between the countries of Western, Central and Eastern Europe. This has an impact on attitudes to topical issues such as migration. The similarity of worldviews is explained not only by the geographical location, but also by the different spheres of influence among the countries. For example, Pew describes the similarity of the worldviews in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, the Balkans and the Baltic States of Central and Eastern Europe because of their belonging to the USSR sphere of influence in the twentieth century. A specific feature for these countries is the strong understanding of their national identity, including that based on religion, despite the fact that religion was once officially at the periphery of society in many of them (Diamant and Gardner

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2018). Conversely, in Western Europe, religious affiliation is not perceived as an important element of national identity. With the exception of Romania, Europeans tend to believe that the church and the state should be separate: 46% of Romanians believe that their government should promote religious values and beliefs (Diamant and Gardner 2018). In the course of the assessment process, we should not forget that the effect of certain projects of the company might vary due to the impact of various factors. For example, for all companies, the implementation of CSR initiatives may not have the same impact (see Van Doorn et al. 2017). Researchers at the Reputation Institute in the framework of the RepTrak model identified seven rational parameters for assessing reputation: Products/Services, Workplace, Leadership, Performance, Governance, Citizenship and Innovation (Chan et  al. 2018). At the same time, the main components of the ten leading brands’ stories in digital media are citizenship (thanks to which the company as an element of culture pays attention to sustainable development), management (transparency and clear goals of the company) and a consistently high quality of goods and services, as well as innovation (not only the novelty of a product or service, but also ensuring a new standard of living) (Reputation Institute 2018). Based on these and other models, we will consider the following parameters of the reputation of Russian companies in the context of the preferences of European consumers: information and cyber-security, CEO image, transparency, attitude to sustainable development and the environment, economic and political stability of the country of origin, innovation and cultural initiatives. Information and Cyber-Security Interestingly, Europeans are quite concerned about the safety of their personal data, while appreciating a personalized approach (Mills 2014). In the context of the rapid emergence of new technologies, and with the growth of related threats, the data of thousands of customers of the company come under attack, so data security becomes one of the new challenges for companies (Ferrell 2017). Despite the fact that British consumers believe that banks can be trusted with their data, they are very concerned about the ability to track their activities, as well as fear of cyber-attacks related to the theft of money (82% of respondents, according to Global Risks Report). Of all the countries of Europe, Germany and the UK ranked “cyber-attacks” first (World Economic Forum 2018).

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With regard to the security of personal data, the EU countries introduced a new European regulation in the field of personal data protection in 2018, to which Sberbank responded with readiness thanks to the introduction of a unified system of processing and storing data according to both Russian and European standards (Suharevskaya and Yastrebova 2018). Reports of exposure to Gazprom or Lukoil hacker attacks appear infrequently. The only publication found on this topic is related to the situation in 2017 with the Petya virus and a possible attack on Gazprom, but this media information was not supported by any significant arguments. CEO Image Of the three companies’ CEOs (Alexei Miller, Vagit Alekperov and Herman Gref), the head of Sberbank is the closest to the image of an open leader: he allows himself to speak quite clearly and openly on various occasions, appears at informal corporate events and demonstrates his initiatives. However, he is not quite close to the image of the CEO-activist promoted in the West (see Chatterji and Toffel 2018). In recent years, the transformation of the bank in Russia has become associated with Gref. At the same time, his rather authoritarian style of management is noted, which he himself admits, although in another interview he talks about the company’s movement toward the agile approach2 (Uskov 2016). For communication in the European market, of course, the latter option is preferable, which allows for using grass roots technology in lobbying the company’s interests in the EU bodies. Apparently, at the moment, the issue of the bank’s transition to a new management style has not been resolved, but is clearly recognized as important from a reputational point of view. Gref himself is actively working on personal and corporate intangible assets, possibly due to the bank’s work with individuals and the lack of “dependent” countries that cannot simultaneously refuse its services, as in the case of Russian oil and gas companies. This is confirmed by the recently announced tender for the analysis of socioeconomic factors, including specifically for the study of the CEO image (Muhametshina et al. 2018). 2  The agile approach to management focuses on the people doing the work and how they work together. Solutions evolve through collaboration between self-organizing, cross-functional teams utilizing appropriate practices for their context. There is a strong focus on collaboration and self-organization.

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Oil and gas companies are not very active in the communication space, particularly in demonstrating achievements. Vagit Alekperov more often comments on specific, especially acute, situations than Alexei Miller. Also Alekperov’s participation in the international forums is more widely covered. Of course, it is important that the European media call all the heads of companies “Russian oligarchs,” whose capital inevitably becomes a topic for publications. The income of this group of people has become one of the most prominent news opportunities in the monitoring of companies. After the 1990s, belonging to the Russian oligarchy does not add a positive aspect to the reputation of a person. Transparency Many brands working with European audiences have resorted to demonstrating openness and transparency on social media. The information about companies’ participation in corruption schemes (even if these accusations are not true), as well as the perception of the companies’ activities as politically justified, can inspire the consumers with the idea of “behind-­ the-­scenes” processes, which has a negative effect for the business. The formation of a negative image of a company due to its Russian origin is because Russian state-owned and large corporations are consistently perceived in the European and American media as “political agents.” In addition, because of the heavy legacy of the 1990s and extremely high economic inequality, Russia is often associated in the mass consciousness abroad with problems such as poverty and corruption (Efanova and Glazkov 2016). In this case, increasing the reputation of Russian companies will become much more effective as the socioeconomic problems in Russia itself are resolved. Perhaps, in a situation in which a country’s brand and closely related companies have many barriers to promotion, the right approach is to develop interaction with citizens (Simons 2015). This would provide an opportunity to refute negative reviews in the media by real actions, creating a broad social base for both the government and business. Attitudes to Sustainable Development and the Environment Sustainable development and the environment are high on the consumer agenda. All three companies publish reports on sustainable development, which has already become the norm for Russian big business. Especially

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important for the oil and gas sector, as a rule, are environmental initiatives that mainly consist, however, of reducing the harmfulness of their own production. Major actions designed to motivate people to take care of the environment are related to fuel issues. The very nature of Gazprom products, for example, does not pose an environmental issue as acute as it does for oil companies. Sberbank is actively engaged in programs for vulnerable segments of the population in the sphere of health care. In some countries of presence, the company has adequately chosen the strategy of participation in important initiatives for the society. Similarly, the work of Lukoil and Gazprom in the framework of the supply of ecological fuel (gas) in Europe is an opportunity to demonstrate not only readiness to support the interests and values of the EU, but to resolve suspicions or unsubstantiated claims. One example of such project is the Gazprom pavilion at Europe Park. In the field of environmental care, Gazprom has repeatedly held a high position in domestic rankings (in 2017, it received various awards in the areas of “environmental management” and “disclosure of information” from public organizations and public authorities) and international ratings (the Carbon Disclosure Project recognized Gazprom six times in a row as the best Russian energy company in the field of corporate climate reporting and strategies to reduce GHG emissions). Meanwhile, becoming the “Best Russian Company” in 2017, Gazprom took sixth place in the ranking of environmental responsibility of oil and gas companies of advisory and analytical groups in the CREON (Russian provider of advisory services to the Oil & Gas) and World Wildlife Fund. Economic and Political Stability of the Country of Origin Asset bubbles are considered another risk of doing business in Europe, with particular concern in Central Europe in the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. “Failure of national government” is the third most important risk for Europe (World Economic Forum 2018). The most concerned about this issue were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece and Lithuania, and in second position another four countries: Malta, Portugal, Serbia and the UK. Fear of the failure of national government can demonstrate the citizens’ alertness to the policies of existing governments, which co-operate with big business. Economic instability in this case is perceived as their fault (corruption, implementation of criminal schemes and so on are the most common versions to

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explain the situation). In this case, it is necessary for the Russian authorities to present carefully and in a balanced way the support of Russian companies operating in the EU. As the analysis of publications shows, all three companies appeared in the media materials related to corruption, which can become a means of discrediting Russia in general and Russian big business in particular in a situation of further aggravation of information and psychological warfare. Innovations A study by the European Parliament shows that Russian state-owned companies are less efficient than the private sector because important decisions mostly serve political interests rather than economic ones. As an example, investments of $2.7 billion in sponsorship of the Sochi Olympics and gas at a reduced price for Armenia after it joined the Eurasian Economic Union are given (European Parliament 2018). Among the main problems facing Russia is a low level of business innovation: in 2016, only 8.4% of Russian companies implemented technological and marketing innovations, compared with 49% of companies in the EU (European Parliament 2018). Nowadays, both companies in the oil and gas sector declare their interest in innovation. Gazprom has been considering the relevance of the problem of “Industry 4.0.” For example, in 2017, the company abandoned the target of a long-term strategy for oil refining abroad due to changes in the European market, and “relied on improving the technological efficiency of production as a key factor in competitiveness’ growth” (Gazprom Neft 2016). The company continues to modernize its refineries; in 2016, the “Program of innovative development of Gazprom until 2025” was adopted (Gazprom 2016), and in 2017, the research and development system was changed for the first time in many years (Gazprom 2017). Lukoil has formed its scientific and technical subsidiary—Open Company RITEK, on the basis of which new technologies for more efficient and environmental production are being tested (RITEK has existed since 1992). Innovations in the oil and gas sector can break the stereotype of the technological backwardness of the country itself, that Russian enterprises are still using the technology of the Soviet Union. Sberbank openly demonstrates its commitment to innovation the most, the desire to become a “diversified ecosystem.” Its achievements are confirmed by the award as the “Most Innovative Bank” among retail banks in

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Central and Eastern Europe (Sberbank Press Center 2018). Some analysts have pointed out that subsidiaries of foreign banks sometimes have a lower quality retail product (see, e.g., Uskov 2016). The development of numerous laboratories (corporate research and development centers), in which IT innovations are created and implemented, allows the necessary technologies to develop independently. At the same time, we can find material in the media about the innovations of Sberbank, but the emphasis is on replacing a large number of employees by AI (Nikolova 2017), threatening to leave a large number of people without work, especially given that with the financial growth of the company in Europe, the number of employees decreased from 4300  in 2016 to 4100 in 2017 (Sberbank 2017). Technological innovations and the social consequences of their implementation are not fully understood by a wide audience today, which gives the bank time to formulate a reputation management plan and key messages for target audiences in this area. Time will tell how the management of Sberbank takes advantage of this opportunity. Cultural Initiatives Of course, the connection of Russian companies with the countries of Eastern and Central Europe is largely due to the geographical proximity and the presence of historically established trade relations. Turning to the Inglehart–Welzel cultural map of the world (World Values Survey 2014), which demonstrates the relationship of values with traditional religion and the political past, we find that among the EU countries where at least two of the three companies are present at the same time, about 39% of the countries are the most culturally close to Russia (especially Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania). For the rest of the countries with which there is cooperation, to a greater extent than for Russia, the values of s­ elf-­expression are important, but the difference in the perception of rational values with Russian culture is within about 0.5 points of deviation (for Czech Republic, Slovenia, Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Italy). The Baltic States are also culturally close to Russia, but the lack of stable commercial ties with them is due to political reasons. Cultural and educational activities—in particular, work with children and adolescents—are not only a social contribution, but also contribute to the growth of a loyal audience in the long term and form a positive attitude to the company of parents in the short term. The companies studied are

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actively developing cultural initiatives in the EU countries, simultaneously informing a wide audience about their work. Close cooperation of Gazprom with Austria, specifically with OMF (Otto Mittag Fontane) company, due to the presence of an important infrastructure (Baumgarten hub), is complemented by joint projects in the field of culture and art (a large number of classical music concerts, Rubens exhibition in the Hermitage), as well as projects addressed to the younger generation (support for a large-scale international children’s project “Open world”). Also, cultural projects are carried out with partners from other countries, including France (an exhibition in cooperation with French partners “Saint Louis and the relics of Saint-Chapelle” in 2017) and Italy (the project “Music without borders. Russia – Italy”). * * * Summarizing the considered aspects, it can be noted that Russian companies cope with less efficiency with the factors that are most closely related to the image of the country of origin. Such demands of society as transparency of companies, image of the CEO and economic and political stability of the country of origin are strongly influenced by the image of the country itself and the work of the national and transnational media. In addition, the assessment of criteria, such as the economic and political stability, requires a very multifaceted assessment to achieve an adequate result, which determines the interpretation of this factor, which is not possible to correct for a particular company on a global level. Aspects in which it is possible to work more successfully are mainly related to specific directions of activity: the introduction of innovations, the adoption of measures to ensure cyber-security and the conduct of cultural and social actions.

Conclusion The analyzed materials show that with the development of political contradictions between Russia and the EU, the cultural and psychological aspects in business communication often go by the wayside. However, in times of crisis, it is particularly important to take into account the nature of the target audience, including its cultural characteristics, in order to provide the people with the authentic information they need. The development of cultural cooperation between the countries as part of the strategic communication of Russia and the EU creates a wide field of efforts

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for Russian business and allows the country and its business structures to obtain reputation assets. In the context of political tension, these steps can be the beginning of building long-term mutually beneficial relations. The studied companies have lost part of their reputational capital, even the sales market, due to the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, which leads to the question of whether the close attention to the companies’ own crises and to the possible impurity of Russian business is caused by the political agenda and not by the results of new investigations. Active indignation with the behavior of Russian business in Europe followed mostly in connection with the growth of political confrontation. In this regard, Russia and the EU countries share responsibility to their citizens, and it will also be necessary to solve the problems of the globalized economy together. Russia faces an important task of resolving its own social contradictions caused not least by the processes that accompanied the formation of large business in the country. At the same time, it should be taken into account that corruption scandals in Eastern Europe, including Russia, are a natural result of the redistribution of property in the countries of the former socialist bloc in the 1990s. In these circumstances, Russia at the level of strategic communication (focusing on deeds) should demonstrate intolerance of offenses and the desire for the rule of law (which is likely to affect the interests of the part of Russian business, but will create a basis for long-term and mutually beneficial cooperation with all regions of the world). It is possible that, in the conditions of psychological warfare in the international arena, the persecution of business representatives for violating the law may be cause for accusations of the Russian leadership in the “new political repression”; however, business transparency will help to gain the confidence of citizens in Russia, both within the country and abroad. To increase this transparency, as well as to further demonstrate openness, it is advisable to involve Russian and foreign (including European) experts with a high reputation in assessing the business situation (e.g., these experts can take part in the investigations). Despite the awareness of the importance of technology exports and plans to increase non-resource, non-energy exports, it can be expected that the predominance of raw materials in the structure of Russian exports will continue in the short and medium term. Analysis of media publications shows that this situation contributes to a certain connivance of energy companies to increase the number of negative publications in particular and of reputational risks in general. This is especially evident in

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comparison with Sberbank, which is much more attentive to commenting on negative news. However, growing social tensions around the world, including in the EU and Russia, and growing resentment of policies implemented in the interests of big business, make the situation of Russian companies much less stable. In these circumstances, it is necessary to increase reputational capital, in the case of work in the EU—to increase transparency, which can be proved by working with trusted auditors, including foreign ones. The Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union notes that Russia has problems with lobbying its interests in the institutions of the EU and the support of high-ranking officials. This situation can be attributed to Russian companies, especially those that are most closely linked in the understanding of Europe with political decisions. For its part, the Association notes the need for strong interaction with the academic community and promoting the understanding of culture, history and politics in the context of economic relations (Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union 2019). In their reputation strategies, many Russian companies integrate culturally in various ways in order to support important social trends and values. The most actively used component is to form a certain perception of the company’s brand among citizens. Promoting the company’s interests in the press is presumably difficult, especially because it can lead to an open and seemingly risk clash of opinions in the public field. In the case of establishing long-term and positive relationships with the end user, the opportunity to create company loyalty increases, especially considering that in various countries one’s confidence in social and mass media in general may decline. Communication through social networks, the provision of quality services or even presence in leisure spaces can all facilitate a lower degree of dependence on the mass media in conducting ­communication. However, environmental initiatives and CSR have to date been used more nominally. The reputation management of Russian companies has a strategic character, the main purpose of which appears to be to level the negative effect of information confrontation, while at the same time representing an effort to work directly with countries’ populations to develop loyalty. The change of communication channels can already be perceived as a partial change of strategy. A number of new challenges are related to advanced technologies. Thus, the dismissal of a huge number of employees with the advent of AI

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inevitably comes with ideas about CSR. Such a “deed” as the substitution of a human by AI for companies will raise, for example, the choice of paying redundant employees compensation or going the cheap route and losing part of their intangible assets. To enhance the reputation of the Russian companies, it is expedient to track the allegations of non-transparency/corruption in their business. On the basis of media monitoring, a database of the most vulnerable areas can be formed. Then it is important to consider not only ways to correct possible mistakes of the company, but also a communication strategy to overcome the crisis. Lobbying of corporate interests in Brussels is of great importance for Russian business. For this, it is advisable to use the advice of specialists in lobbying (Humanitarian Technologies 2008) and actively integrate Russian experts in the structure of the expert community of the EU (associations and think tanks). It is important to exchange expert knowledge to analyze the positive and negative experience that will help to plan the development of the most mutually beneficial relations. To do this, it is important to establish constructive relations in advance, and not at the time of a crisis, in a timely manner to determine the circle of “allies” and “rivals” of the company. Given that the words, deeds and images of large Russian businesses, especially state corporations, directly affect the perception of Russia by foreign audiences, it is advisable to create within the state structures the mechanisms for assessing the reputation of Russian businesses. The need “to get off the oil train” is indicated in the Russian strategic documents. However, before the events of 2014, the Russian authorities were unable to convince businesses of the need for change. This can be a cause of the difficulties that Russia is experiencing today in the European market: to the country that is still in situation of technological backwardness, it is easier to attribute it to political inflexibility in the process of the psychological warfare, and to its business elite, who largely are not ready to adapt to the requirements of the time—as evidenced from aggressiveness through to corruption. The strategic communications of the United States, Russia and EU and its member states collide with each other, which, as a result, only intensifies the information warfare. However, the heterogeneity of the interests of the EU member states (which is reflected, in particular, in their disagreements on the Nord Stream 2) so far allows Russia to compete with the United States on the EU commodity market.

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CHAPTER 7

“Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act”: The Psychological Aspect and Its Meaning for EU-Russia Relations Evgeny Pashentsev

Introduction The discussion on the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the United States is a heated topic in many analytical papers and documents, articles, and monographs. One increasingly important means of pressure on Russia in recent years is the escalating sanctions against the country. The role of sanctions in international relations has become a booming topic of research both in Russia (Doraev 2016; Keshner 2015) and beyond (e.g., Baumard 2012; Blackwill and Harris 2016; Bou Franch 2014; Connolly et al. 2015; Eyler 2008; Gordon 2012; Haggard and Noland 2017; Happold and Eden 2016; Hufbauer et  al. 2007; Leyton-Brown 2019; Millwee 2016; Palomar 2014; Nephew 2017; Tchagna 2014; US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC] 2018; Van Den Herik 2017). Most, however, is devoted to the integrative aims, mechanisms, and outcomes of sanctions pressure, including sanctions against Russia (e.g., Connolly 2019; Galbert 2015; Kapkanshchikov E. Pashentsev (*) Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pashentsev (ed.), Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1_7

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and Kapkanshchikova 2018; Mileta and Kazak 2018; Mishulin and Kolis 2018; Nelson 2017; Nureev 2017; Razzhivin 2018; Sakwa 2017; Silvestrov 2017; US Congress 2017a). The psychological aspect of sanctions is clearly not sufficiently studied. Very few works are devoted to this problem, especially when it comes to sanctions as an instrument of psychological warfare (Giumelli 2011; Grossman et al. 2018; Miroshnichenko and Shariy 2017; Mukhin 2016; Sulakshin 2014). The impact of sanctions on business decision-making is also discussed at international conferences, including the psychological aspects of such an influence (see, e.g., Global Sanctions Summit 2019). This chapter seeks to analyze the psychological aspect of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)1 and its meaning for EU-Russia relations. It is important to bear in mind that the very realities and instruments of psychological warfare, whether by deliberate calculation or by coincidence (including the deliberate actions of a ‘third party’ represented by interested state and/or non-state actors), can facilitate the transition to a more violent confrontation between states than originally envisaged. This is not the least of the consequences of economic sanctions, which, thanks to the psychological warfare, can be presented to the target audiences of sanctions not only as a serious problem, but as an existential threat, which they may not be. Such an erroneous perception of the situation in the case of Russia and the United States could lead to a full-scale war that neither power wants.

Alternative Approaches to Securing US Interests and Sanctions The United States may find it increasingly hard, costly, and risky to use military force, and the instruments of soft power are not sufficient to achieve its goals. With the limitations of both hard military power and soft power in mind, the expert US community aims to explore the space in between: nonmilitary ways of coercing, deterring, weakening, and punishing those that threaten US security and interests. In 2016, RAND prepared a report for the US Army on alternative approaches to securing US interests that complement hard security and potentially make it more effective. In addition to defining and categorizing Power to Coerce (P2C),  CAATSA is a US law that imposed sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The bill was passed on 27 July 2017  in the Senate, after having passed through the House of Representatives. On 2 August 2017, President D. Trump signed it into law. 1

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this report examines how to exploit certain advantages the United States has over potential adversaries in the realm of nonmilitary options. “Coercive power, as well as statecraft employing it, may include economic sanctions, punitive political measures, cyber operations, covert intelligence operations, military aid, propaganda, the constriction or manipulation of trade, the interdiction of goods and people, and support for political opposition, among other measures” (Gompert and Binnendijk 2016, p. 17). For many reasons, economic sanctions come first in the set of instruments of the US P2C, and this is not accidental: Hand in hand with its enhanced ability to find and track money, the United States has been able to bring important banks, American and foreign, into line with financial sanctions. A combination of fines, moral suasion, and, perhaps more important, the implied threat to tarnish the reputation of noncomplying banks has enabled the authors of financial sanctions to gain sufficient cooperation. The US Treasury Department has the authority to label banks operating in the United States as complicit in money laundering and, by implication, suspected of tax evasion. The fear of a ‘scarlet letter’ from the IRS is usually enough to gain compliance. (Gompert and Binnendijk 2016, p. 17)

The assessment of the high role of sanctions in US foreign policy is typical of US experts. “Many observers consider sanctions to be a central element of US policy to counter Russian malign behavior”, as noted in the Congressional Research Service (2019, p.  1) report “US Sanctions on Russia”. The aim of sanctions is evidently a part of psychological warfare which can support not only a variety of mentioned P2C measures, but also the instruments of soft power and hard power in the practice of the current geopolitical realities. Thus, for the last years, the United States has used sanctions in the context of geopolitical confrontation, not least against Russia. The use of military force against Russia is not analyzed in the RAND report, apparently because of the obvious mortal danger of such confrontation for the United States. In economic terms, sanctions against China, were they introduced, would bring greater risks for the United States itself. This is stated explicitly in the report:

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Like trade sanctions, financial sanctions may entail costs for those that impose them. The scale of these costs depends on the economic importance of the state being targeted. This is less of a problem with regard to sanctions on Russia and on Iran than on China, which is a very important source and user of global credit and currency exchange. China has substantial creditand capital-generating capacity of its own. Forbidding US banks from doing business in China could hurt those banks more than it would China … Finally, China is not without coercive power of its own—for example, its huge holdings of US sovereign debt. (Gompert and Binnendijk 2016, p. 18)

The use of sanctions against China is therefore dangerous, but not in relation to Russia—perhaps because of its relative economic weakness and obviously smaller role in the world economy. But were there no Russia, the United States would not be ashamed openly to put pressure on China in the military sphere, because it does not have nuclear parity with the United States. From this perspective, the geographical position of a friendly Russia moves the potential military threat to China, for thousand kilometers to the west. Such a threat could arise on the Chinese border, if Russia was politically subordinated to the interests of the United States and had equal to US nuclear missile arsenal. Furthermore, Russian raw materials, still existing in some areas of high industrial and intellectual potential, are important for China (this order of interest may upset many Russians, but it was not China that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the destruction of science and industry in Russia in the 1990s, but local oligarchic clans with the assistance of US elites). In 2016, the RAND Corporation published several scenarios for a future war against China. The study entitled ‘War with China: Thinking the Unthinkable’ was commissioned by the US Army. The core idea of the document is outlined by Gompert, Cevallos, and Garafola (2016, p. IV): While planning to win a war with China remains necessary, it is no longer sufficient: The United States must also consider how to limit war and its costs. This study seeks to begin filling the hole in thinking about Sino-US war by examining alternative paths one might take, effects on both countries of each path, preparations the United States should make, and ways to balance US war aims against costs should war occur.

The authors of the report compare the scenarios for war in 2015 and 2025 and conclude: “Although prospects for US military victory then would be worse than they are today, this would not necessarily imply

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Chinese victory” (ibidem, p. XII). The logic of a changing balance of forces makes the war for China less risky at a later stage. Therefore, the Chinese have no interest in seeking a military conflict with the United States at this stage, as it would only come with great risks. Conversely, for the United States, a conflict now would be more favorable, as it will become more risky over time, and the country is seeking confrontation with China using the pretext of trade issues, the lack of support related to the North Korean crisis, and so on. It is not the Chinese fleet which tries to support Venezuela against the United States by openly threatening its government. It is the US fleet with its nuclear weapons that has been appearing for many years now near the Chinese shores, given its obvious intention to get rid of the North Korean leadership. It is curious that even the RAND analytics confirm this US hard line toward North Korea. “North Korea’s leaders are not entirely wrong to believe that the United States wants them gone and will continue to isolate and punish them until they are; consequently, sanctions against them have little coercive value” (Gompert and Binnendijk 2016, p. 34). Simultaneous (although significantly different) pressure on China and Russia naturally reinforces the strategic partnership between the two countries, because together they become less vulnerable in the face of hostile US policy. Although Russia and China, under these circumstances, do not form an aggressive military bloc against anyone, they are forced to pay more attention to the military aspects of their multilateral cooperation. It is unlikely that the authors of the RAND report “The Power to Coerce” forgot about these consequences of pressure on Russia. Some would perhaps admit that they are not the best but rather the most acceptable result of such geopolitical confrontation. Finally, the strategic rapprochement between Russia and China can be used to intimidate the West by the threat coming from the East and, in this situation, achieve greater control by the United States over its allies; growth of profits from the arms race; a reduction in social spending and control over the minds of its citizens; and additional funds for the fourth industrial revolution from the taxpayer. All this is in progress. Budget cuts for education and science are closely connected to the rapid creation of the image of an external enemy in the face of Russia and China: the latter is designed to distract from the former, and, if necessary, to explain it. The Trump administration’s budget for 2018 calls for a sharp increase in military spending and stark cuts across much of the rest of the government, including the elimination of dozens of long-standing federal

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programs that assist the poor, fund scientific research, and aid America’s allies abroad. The cuts could represent the widest swath of reductions in federal programs since the drawdown after World War II, probably leading to a sizable cutback in the federal nonmilitary workforce, something White House officials said was one of their goals (Paletta and Mufson 2017). Vested corporate interests, the arms race, and the militarization of public consciousness have led to two world wars, and humanity may not survive a third.

CAATSA: Psychological Impact on Human Consciousness Vladimir Putin in 2014–2015 said that he considered the sanctions against Russia illegal because they were not imposed by the United Nations Security Council. They are ‘harmful’, but they are not the main reason Russia’s economy is suffering. “The main reason for us, really, is the drop in prices on the world market for our traditional exports, such as oil and gas and some other goods” (CBS News 2015). According to Putin, the sanctions also have a “positive side”, since they force Russia to be more innovative, particularly in developing new technology. “Now, since the sanctions have been imposed, we either cannot buy these technologies, or we fear that something may be closed off to us, and we are now forced to create programs for developing our own high-tech economy in every sphere—in industry, manufacturing, and science … It was difficult for us before, because our domestic markets were flooded with foreign goods. But now, thanks to the sanctions, the investors left our country voluntarily. Now we have an opportunity for development” (CBS News 2015). In contrast, the US President Barack Obama in his State of the Union Address in January 2015 said Western sanctions had left Russia isolated and its economy “in tatters” (The Moscow Times 2015). Different approaches to assessing the effectiveness of anti-Russian sanctions are obvious. Both approaches were demonstrated by the presidents at about the same time and were intended to have an impact on the psychological climate and the political and economic situation locally and globally. In the case of Putin, the evident intention was to use the negative consequences of sanctions to mobilize the population for the solution of the current national problems and force the country to move forward, creating prerequisites for the restoration of its political and economic

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independence, and maintaining confidence among foreign allies, partners, and investors. The message sent by Obama had a very clear purpose—to strengthen the negative perception of sanctions; to discredit the Russian authorities; to provoke the growth of public discontent in the country; to stimulate unrest and reorientation (or removal) of an unwanted government from the inside, since military intervention from the outside is fraught with the threat of World War III; and to ensure the flight of investments from Russia, creating tension in its relations, primarily with NATO and EU members due to their objective strong dependence on the United States. Whose message from the president was more consistent not only with the real economic situation (in Russia, it was objectively far from easy) but also with the mass psychology of the population became obvious to most experts quickly enough. Ian Ivory, a partner at law firm Goltsblat BLP, in May 2015 explained the reasons for Russia’s continued economic and financial stability under sanctions in the following way. Confidence must surely play a big part and, rightly or wrongly, it is notable that many ordinary Russians trust their current government to competently manage the economic challenges. Unlike 1998, there has not been a default or official capital controls imposed. Unemployment remains low. The central bank is credited for its handling of the currency crisis in December [2014], when for a short while the rouble was in freefall. Inflation, while still high, has started to ease and high central bank lending rates have now been moderately cut. (Financial Times 2015)

Such a situation had a strong psychological component. It was in this area—the area of the strategic psychological warfare (SPW)—that the United States suffered a serious defeat. The mentality of the Russians was not taken into account: they do not tend to cave in to external pressure in really difficult situations. The corrupt pro-Western politicians and pseudo-­ business structures led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, caused the misery of the 1990s, and finally not least their actions in 1998 caused a default with disastrous consequences for the already impoverished population. The economic crisis of 2008–2009 and the subsequent global stagnation also did not contribute to a belief in the recipe for the salvation of Russia coming from the West. This was a strategic miscalculation in the course of the SPW on the part of the United States, but it was interpreted not as a failure of the pressure of sanctions on Russia, but as a need to

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increase this pressure. The pressure on Russia has increased dramatically under the administration of Donald Trump, though he was not the initiator of such pressure, but chiefly hawks in Congress and in his own administration. Under these circumstances, CAATSA was adopted in 2017. In this chapter, the author pays special attention to the possibilities of controlling the psychological impact on the human consciousness based on the specific example of CAATSA in the SPW framework. Based on the analysis of the text of CAATSA, information from open sources in the context of relations between the two countries, and the general situation in the world, it is possible to assume the following intermediate goals and the final results of the adoption of the law in the context of the SPW. Interim Objectives of CAATSA in the Context of the SPW • To dramatically increase doubts about the prospects and security of Russia‘s relations with the West in business and political circles (primarily in the United States and the EU). The articles of the law multiply the risks of such cooperation. • To encourage a split in the Russian elites. The Expected Strategic Result • To achieve a change in the domestic and foreign policy of the country and, above all, the rejection of strategic cooperation with China. The fact of the Russian-Chinese rapprochement is often cited in the US media and among experts as the main challenge for the Trump administration and the US ruling circle as a whole (Andelman 2017; Fox News 2019; Jacques 2017). It is not surprising, then, that US analysts are increasingly concerned by the multifaceted momentum in Sino-Russian relations. In a speech that he delivered at the Nobel Peace Prize Forum in Oslo in December 2016, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (who passed away in 2017) warned that Washington “must be wary of the great danger that China and Russia could form a strategic alliance, generated in part by their own internal, political, and ideological momentum, and in part by the poorly thought out policies of the United States”. “Nothing”, he concluded, would be “more dangerous” to US national interests than such an outcome (Dobbins et al. 2019).

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• Ideally, it is to turn Russia into a ‘front-line state’ in opposition to China, an instrument of military and economic blackmail (given the vulnerability of the military, economic, and geographical position of China outside the link with Russia). • In the case of the impossibility of a controlled latent turn in Russia’s policy, to destabilize the situation in the country until its collapse. This promises greater global risks, including for the United States, but apparently these risks are estimated by certain circles as ‘less evil’ compared to the union of Russia and China, pushing Europe aside. CAATSA takes into account the counter-steps by the Russian leadership. Thus, possible actions to improve the effectiveness of the fight against corruption (for which, according to opinion polls, there is an appetite in the Russian society) can stimulate in the Russian business environment, for example, fears of possible large-scale nationalization and tougher penalties for financial and economic crimes. These fears are being fueled by some mainstream media and associated media in Russia: the image of the President of Russia is being ‘adjusted’ to identify with the image of Stalin (see, e.g., Putzier 2014) or Hitler (Durden 2014). In the West, effective actions to decriminalize the business environment will necessarily be presented as measures to revive the Soviet Union or Hitler’s regime,2 which automatically, according to the initiators of the SPW, will facilitate measures to isolate Russia in the international arena, consolidate the West under the auspices of the United States, and generate protests within Russia itself. The absence of more visible measures against corruption may have been used for subversive actions during the 2018 presidential election campaign and subsequent discrediting of the Russian authorities. Media campaigns focusing on existing corruption in Russia, but directed primarily against those persons who pose a threat to the vital interests of the US elite, were organized regardless of whether or not they are corrupted. Even on a brief examination, CAATSA represents the so-called ‘fork in the road’ decision which is quite often used in psychological warfare, 2  For the relevant target audiences for a number of years, both these messages have been introduced as existential threats to draw at least part of the left (the message for them is “fascism is coming in Russia”) and the right (the message for them is “the USSR is being restored in Russia”) flanks of the political spectrum to their side. Similarly, work is being built among the main confessions in the sphere of interethnic relations, which indicates the multilevel nature of the SPW.

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including to refer to the enemy’s acceptance of the imaginary alternative of choice, when both decisions (intensification of the fight against corruption or its sluggish nature) bear for the enemy unacceptable material and reputational risks. In this regard, particularly noteworthy are the innovations in Sections 241 and 243 of the Act, which de facto extend the application of sanctions to a virtually indefinite number of Russian legal entities and individuals: Not later than 180  days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report on the following:

(A) An identification of the most significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth. (B) An assessment of the relationship between individuals identified under subparagraph (A) and President Vladimir Putin or other members of the Russian ruling elite. (C) An identification of any indices of corruption with respect to those individuals. (D) The estimated net worth and known sources of income of those individuals and their family members (including spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets, investments, other business interests, and relevant beneficial ownership information. (US Congress 2017b)

The US authorities are required to “Identify, investigate, map, and disrupt illicit financial flows linked to the Russian Federation if such flows affect the United States financial system or those of major allies of the United States” (Clause 1, Section 243), especially in Europe (Clause 3, Section 243). Section 243 of the Act, among other objectives, aims to “Identify foreign sanctions evaders and loopholes within the sanctions regimes of foreign partners of the United States” that should bind all other states to follow sanctions against Russia (US Congress 2017b). “We have possibly entered a period that is in many aspects comparable to the Cold War”, Russia Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Ryabkov said (RIA “Novosti” 2017; Sharkov 2017). According to Ryabkov, Moscow, at the beginning of 2018, was expecting new complications in connection with the preparation of the ‘sanctions report’ in the United States. According to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the

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report can be dedicated to “the links of the oligarchs of Russian business with Russian government officials” (RIA “Novosti” 2017). The timing of the adoption of the law was exactly synchronized with the events in Russia. Section 241а states that: “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report”. Given that this enactment occurred after the signing of the Act by President Donald Trump on 2 August 2017, the report should be completed no later than 2 February 2018—that is, in the midst of the Russian presidential campaign. The US government provides financial support for the process, rewarding informants for obtaining interesting information (Section 323) and establishing the Countering Russian Influence Fund, totaling $250 million in 2018 and 2019 (Article 254). No similar actions were taken in relation to Iran or North Korea, against which sanctions are also prescribed in this Act (Inozemtsev 2017). This caused anxiety among Russian business circles, fueled by numerous publications in the mass media about the dire consequences of the application of the law to specific individuals and their businesses. Unable to get answers from Washington, some businesspeople understood the situation as follows: “the Americans are telling us to take our problems to Putin and to leave them alone” (see, e.g., Reiter and Malkova 2017). The law and numerous media publications aimed at provoking an attack of the business community against Vladimir Putin; at the same time, many publications informed the Russian population that Vladimir Putin compensates the losses of Russian oligarchs with money from Russian taxpayers (Newsland 2017). This was done with the barely covered intention to provoke mass disorder during the peak of the presidential campaign. Of course, this is an element of SPW which, in turn, is an essential part of the sanctions against Russia. Thus, the new sanctions act not only threatens additional measures of economic and financial pressure, but launches almost a total ‘witch hunt’ for compromising materials on all members of the Russian leadership who, for one reason or another, do not suit Washington. The obvious task is to encourage attempts to provide information on business competitors or opponents in public service, all of which will be used in SPW against Russia, with the aim of reducing the value of its intangible and tangible assets and triggering sociopolitical instability. The real purpose of the law

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is not the fight against corruption. Certain external forces in Russia are more likely to support corrupt officials by presenting them as ‘fighters for democracy’, and vice versa, to present those fighting corruption as ‘stranglers of freedom’—which, of course, does not preclude the use of exposure of a significant number of corrupt officials as a consumable in order to cover anti-Russian operations and possibly discredit innocent people. The scheme was tested in the late 1980s–early 1990s, when Boris Yeltsin was a friend of Bill Clinton, notwithstanding that facts of corruption in Yeltsin’s government were heard in the US Congress (US Congress Committee on International Relations 2000). During the ‘reign’ of ‘Tsar Boris’ (one of Yeltsin’s nicknames in Russia), the living standards of Russians fell drastically on several occasions (the greatest drop since World War II, when more than 20 million Soviets were killed by Nazi invaders). In the 1990s, clans of oligarchs emerged and expanded through illicit enrichment practices. The same practice of the United States supporting oligarchs was happening in the context of Russia’s neighboring country Ukraine (see Pashentsev 2014), where the oligarch Petr Poroshenko appeared at the pinnacle of power as a result of a coup with the support of the West, or distant Venezuela—Venezuelan fugitive oligarchs live in luxury in Florida (Despart 2017)—and in many other countries. The change of the oligarch Yanukovich balancing between the West and Russia on the obviously pro-Western oligarch Poroshenko could not improve the lives of the Ukrainian people, but such a change through a coup, with apparent outside support, split the country, with thousands of casualties, and negatively affected the international situation. It was not Russia that annexed Crimea, but a coup d’état with open and decisive participation in the armed confrontation on the Maidan from one side of the law enforcement detachments, and from ultra-nationalist and pro-­ Nazi forces on the other, led to the voluntary entry of Crimea into Russia and the armed confrontation in Eastern Ukraine between the rebels and the new regime in Kiev. The factor of China is also important to understand the roots of the conflict in Ukraine correctly, because China was Ukraine’s second largest trading partner after Russia. A strategic partnership was signed by President Xi Jinping and then president Viktor Yanukovich on 3 December 2013 just before the sharpening of clashes at Maidan. This agreement involved a five-year, $30 billion plan to boost Chinese investment in areas including infrastructure, aviation and aerospace, energy, agriculture, and finance. As part of this, China extended “security guarantees” to Ukraine (Wuthnow

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2014). In other words, the conflict in Ukraine became an important episode in the growing confrontation, not only between Russia on one side and the EU and the United States on the other, but between the United States and China on the world stage as well, though this was less obvious under the Obama administration than at the present time. Thus, the conflict in Ukraine has a geopolitical component, with rivalry for global markets, which largely explains the intensity of the psychological warfare around the sanctions. The president of the United States was pressured by the signing of the law (had the president vetoed the bill in August 2017, no doubt it would have been overruled by a two-thirds majority vote in Congress). After signing the Act, Donald Trump stated that, although he signed it for the “sake of national unity”, the Act ties the president’s hands in conducting foreign policy, violating several provisions of the Constitution. Trump expressed hope that Congress would not interfere in his foreign policy: “Still, the bill remains seriously flawed—particularly because it encroaches on the executive branch’s authority to negotiate. Congress could not even negotiate a healthcare bill after seven years of talking. By limiting the Executive’s flexibility, this bill makes it harder for the United States to strike good deals for the American people, and will drive China, Russia, and North Korea much closer together. The Framers of our Constitution put foreign affairs in the hands of the President. This bill will prove the wisdom of that choice” (Los Angeles Times 2017). Thus, he is able to retreat from the literal fulfillment of all the terms and provisions of the adopted document, and even to challenge the entire law in a different political situation. Today, however, Trump will not be able to depart from all the major provisions of the law without acting contrary to his own interests. The experts are right to emphasize that this law is a forceful, bipartisan statement that US Congress continues to view robust economic sanctions as a cornerstone of US foreign policy, in which Congress will play a leading role in restricting trade, sometimes in conflict with the president’s authority to conduct diplomacy (Jeydel et al. 2017). The Russia section of the law significantly expanded the scope of US sanctions against Russia and no doubt seriously worsened the international situation as a whole.

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Results of CAATSA and Its Psychological Effect on EU-Russia Relations On 17 March 2014, the EU and the United States made the first decision to impose anti-Russian sanctions. Russia responded with counter-­ sanctions. In 2014–2015, Russia was bearing around 60% of the trade losses, while the other 40% was paid by the 37 different nations imposing the sanctions, according to a study by Germany’s Institute for World Economy in Kiel. When it comes to losses in the West, Germany was the hardest hit (Janjevic 2018). Advisor to the President of Russia Sergey Glazyev said on 15 March 2016 that the amount of damage caused to the Russian financial industry by anti-Russian sanctions for the first two years alone amounted to $250 billion (Lenta.ru 2016a). The Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov estimated the annual cost of sanctions to the Russian economy at $40 billion (2% of GDP), compared to $90 billion to $100 billion (4–5% of GDP) lost due to lower oil prices. Similarly, in 2015, Russian economists estimated that sanctions would decrease Russia’s GDP by 2.4% by 2017, but that this effect would be 3.3 times lower than the effect of the oil price shock. Another analysis found that oil prices, not sanctions, drove changes in the value of the ruble (Congressional Research Service 2019, p. 44). In 2015, according to the results of the 2017 Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM) survey of 1200 respondents, 52% of respondents believed that sanctions adversely affected the country and its inhabitants. Two years later, only 27% of respondents continued to think so. The others who participated in the survey said that they did not feel harm from the sanctions. More than half of the respondents (59%) agreed to continue living under sanctions in order to maintain the current foreign policy of the country in the international arena. To change the political course of Russia, if not the leadership of the country, CAATSA and other later sanctions were introduced. However, their economic and financial impact on Russia was even less than that of sanctions before CAATSA. The two rounds of ‘oligarch sanctions’ in 2018 really influenced markets, and the 2 April round resulted in one of the worst days for the Russian markets since 2014. Oil prices were still on an upward trend in 2018 (peaking in October), but the associated appreciation of the ruble ended abruptly in April 2018 when the first round of tougher sanctions was imposed (Neuteboom and Jongkees 2019, p. 2). However, the general situation in the economy continued to improve.

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Russia reduced its gross external debt from $668 billion in December 2013 to $536 billion in 2018. External debt-to-GDP is below 30%, which is relatively low by emerging market standards. Russia used its ample reserves to help sanctioned businesses and stimulate the economy, and FX reserves dropped from nearly $500 billion in 2012 to a low of $318 billion in 2016. But because of government policies, the foreign-exchange reserves (FX reserves) increased to $400 billion in 2018. This includes almost ten months of imports, and gives Russia a comfortable cushion against future internal and external shocks. Meanwhile, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation has divested most of its US Treasury holdings, while accumulating more gold, suggesting that Russia is preparing for the worst-case scenario (Neuteboom and Jongkees 2019, p.  5). “The economic effects on Russia’s economy as a whole may have been modest” (Congressional Research Service 2019, p. 46), noted the CRS report. The psychological effect of sanctions is much less studied but no less important than the economic effect. It is important not only in its own right, but because of its direct and indirect influence on political, economic areas. This can be easily seen from the effects of sanctions. • Russian banks have been reluctant to provide financial services in Crimea under the threat of sanctions. • Some Western oil service companies—a valuable source of expertise and equipment for Russian oil companies—limited their operations in Russia following sanctions. • Alfa Bank, Russia’s largest privately held bank (and not under US sanctions), announced in January 2018 that it was winding down its business with Russian defense firms, many of which are subject to SDN (Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List) sanctions (Congressional Research Service 2019, p. 47). • The Russian First Cargo Company, one of the leaders among private Russian railway operators, refused to buy cars from Uralvagonzavod, the Russian corporation engaged in the development and production of military equipment, road-building cars, railway cars, and so on because of sanctions (Novye Izvestia 2018). Thus, not the sanctions themselves, but the threat of their expansion achieved a significant psychological effect. For example, in 2018, 86% of Russian companies feared falling under US sanctions one way or another, according to the results of a survey by the Adizes Institute (a management

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consulting company). The authors of the survey interviewed more than a thousand owners and top managers of the largest companies in Russia (Lenta.ru 2018). However, to an even greater extent than in the period 2014–2015, this fact led not to panic but to the reorientation of most of the business community in relation to the broader public to protect their interests against Western pressure. According to Denis Volkov, an expert with Russia’s independent pollster Levada Center, Moscow’s assertiveness on the international stage was the key factor in boosting Putin’s ratings after the conflict in Ukraine started. “Yes, there was a sense of mobilization around Putin over sanctions, but that is not the main thing” (Janjevic 2018), he told Deutsche Welle (DW) April 2018. “The main thing is this feeling, after the Crimea annexation, that Russia was once again becoming a great power and can lead any foreign policy it likes, regardless of criticism or Western sanctions” (ibidem). This is a very important intangible asset in the hands of the Russian state. The correct use of this asset by clean hands and with socially oriented intentions may help to overcome many serious problems in the Russian economy, social relations, and democracy building. It is impossible to build a strong democratic Russia on the Imperial mode of thinking and corrupt interests. Any imitation of democratic Russia will not withstand the test of time in the inevitable social, geopolitical radical changes of the near future. As required under Section 241 of the CAATSA, on 29 January 2018 the US government released a public, unclassified version of the much-­ anticipated Kremlin Report (US Treasury 2018). The report was intended to name and shame Russian political and business leaders, list their assets outside Russia, and provide an index of corruption with respect to the listed individuals. Despite fears among many in the Russian elite, the public version of the list only mentioned well-known senior members of the Russian government and oligarchs worth $1 billion or more: the list of Russian oligarchs appeared to have been taken from a Forbes list of wealthy Russians and reordered alphabetically (Lack 2018). The more sensitive aspects of the report, including an account of oligarchs’ assets outside of Russia and the index of corruption, were excluded from the public version of the list. There were also concerns before the release of the report that the list of government officials and oligarchs could be used as a sanctions list: the leading banks will suspend or terminate business with listed individuals’ legitimate businesses in and outside of Russia. But the public version of the report contained a clear reminder that the so-called Kremlin

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Report is not a sanctions list and does not block or otherwise impede US persons from conducting transactions with the listed individuals or their businesses (ibidem). However, the long waiting process of the report revealed some of those Russian businessmen who showed special nervousness, who took care of the transfer of their assets outside Russia, and so on. This may be useful in further determining the time and forms of pressure on these persons in influence operations. The reminder that the so-called Kremlin Report was not a sanctions list helped to encourage people to think about when the list would finally appear and, while thinking, to allow some mistakes, maybe serious ones. Extending the uncertainty of a particular individual or company for an indefinite period of time is a good way to influence the nature and effectiveness of sanctions in terms of their psychological impact. Sanctions, of course, also have a psychological impact on Russia’s foreign partners. For example, according to some reports, in early 2019 an atmosphere of alarm reigned among German companies active in Russia. The Russia Working Group of the German Eastern Business Association (OAOEV) held an in-depth meeting with Andrey Sobolev, the head of the Russian Embassy’s Bureau of Trade and Economy in Berlin, to prepare for the expected application of new US sanctions. Sobolev offered “rapid and non-bureaucratic” aid in case that became necessary. “Several company representatives and business consultants reported on the companies’ fears of violating current or possibly newly imposed US sanctions on Russia”, the OAOEV wrote about the meeting. Insurance is contributing to the fact “that planned investments are being delayed or canceled completely and current projects are coming under pressure”. The OAOEV announced “a briefing on the sanctions especially for the legal departments of the companies and major consulting firms” (German Foreign Policy 2019). Of course, this or that publication in a particular edition can calm or, conversely, inflate anxiety, but the first less likely than the latter in the condition of possible tightening of sanctions. This means that CAATSA has a real impact on business and the sociopolitical climate in relations between Russia and the EU. CAATSA, obviously, had not only a financial and an economic, but also a psychological, component within the SPW. But why the psychological component is so important, considering that the total economic potential of the United States and the EU together is a little under 20 times bigger than that of Russia? From the point of view of the practical results of the impact on the economy and political stability of Russia, the rapid

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i­ntroduction of considerably more extensive sanctions by a many times more powerful party in 2014 would have an incomparably greater chance of destabilizing the country. However, it was difficult to calculate the nature and consequences of these sanctions against the only power that has equal nuclear power with the United States. As noted in the Congressional Research Service (2019, p. 3) report, “There is some evidence that US sanctions on Russia can have broad economic effects if they are applied to economically significant targets, although doing so may create instability in global financial markets”. First of all, by that reasons partners of the United States in NATO and the EU in 2014 and up to now much more extensive sanctions against Russia have not been accepted. They are not accepted not only because of their potential existential danger of uncompromising confrontation with one of the two nuclear superpowers, but also because the EU will definitely suffer from large-scale economic sanctions incomparably more than the United States, although less than Russia, due to the much larger volume and diversification of the EU economy. The United States, to compensate the financial and economic weaknesses of sanctions, tried to fully strengthen the psychological effect of their introduction in terms of the degree of impact and influence on the elites of Russia and the EU, as well as on different target groups of the population in the most desirable way. Hence Obama’s statement, cited above, that the sanctions had left Russia isolated and its economy “in tatters”. To achieve the necessary psychological effect, a whole set of measures is used in a systematic way. • Pre-announcement and notification of sanctions. • Speculation on sanctions. • Targeted media strategy on sanctions. • Media leaks. • Official and non-official announcement of lists of persons and companies under sanctions. • Real and false compromising information on people under sanctions. • Rumors. • Expert assessments and their interpretation in the media. • Agenda setting on sanctions. • Various sanctions measures in the US Congress and other US state bodies.

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• Explicit and implicit promises to punish other states for not following the sanctions. • Threats of sanctions for acts not yet implemented. • Contradictory and sometimes changing explanations of the sanctions policy. All that can be the natural product of the discussion, adoption, and implementation of sanctions, and the result of their consequences. However, this does not exclude psychological operations, but implies them against the officially named “revisionist power”3 in the course of the sanctions policy and the use of sanctions to force the US allies to take certain political and economic steps (US Department of Defense 2018). The development of a package of sanctions includes measures of direct pressure on certain individuals or companies and usually undeclared omission of crucial information, creation of a climate of uncertainty, instructions for further clarification, and some measures to be adopted in the uncertain future. All that has a great psychological effect, resulting in corresponding economic and political profits. For a quicker effect, the moderate measures already taken should look convincingly like a prologue to disaster; otherwise, they do not motivate the actions of specific people and organizations that are desirable for the endorsement of sanctions. In case the object of sanctions maintains self-control and controls the situation in the country, if we are speaking about the leaders of the state, the second strategy with a delayed effect is accepted. For example, in sanctions, it is often not direct damage that is important, but loss of profits, rejection of long-term projects, loss of investments, and the lack of advanced technologies. This way sanctions can have a strategic impact on the enemy. One can see the realization of the second scenario in relation to Russia, because the first collapsed. The Russian leadership is aware of this, opposing a certain euphoria and complacency on the basis of the first years of successful opposition to sanctions. According to Putin, “We often repeat as a mantra that the notorious sanctions do not affect us very much. Affect. And above all, I see the 3  “The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions” (US Department of Defense 2018, p. 2).

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threat in limiting technology transfer. This, incidentally, is detrimental not only to the Russian economy, but to the global economy as a whole, because the Russian economy is certainly an important sector of the global economy” (Lenta.ru 2016b). It takes a long time to implement the delayed effect scenario and, if Russia was alone without external support, the United States would not be very worried. But in conjunction with China, India, Turkey, Iran, and other countries, a gradual reorientation of Russia to other partners can occur, along with the gradual success of import substitution programs. All this is already happening. Over time, even a simple sharp tightening of sanctions will not seriously affect Russia. The transformation of China into a self-sufficient military-economic superpower in the medium term, which will be able to take care of itself without a link with Russia, also causes some circles in the US establishment to rush to resolve the ‘problem’ with Russia. Some EU countries send unambiguous signals to both Russia and the United States about their unwillingness to follow the policy of sanctions. The EU’s sanctions policy, along with other steps, is already largely formal today, indicating serious contradictions between different state members and the EU with the United States, and this is done not at the tactical level, but at the level of strategic communication. • Representatives of different EU member states have repeatedly complained that sanctions harm their economies. For example, Italian Vice Premier Minister Matteo Salvini is known for his sharp statements about sanctions: in particular, he calls them “social, cultural, and economic madness”, while Italian agricultural associations declare losses of three billion euros per year. In early 2018, minister-­ presidents of the five German federal states demanded that the federal government of Germany weaken sanctions against Russia. France, Greece, Austria, Hungary, and a number of other countries have made statements regarding billions of losses from sanctions against Russia (or the countermeasures imposed by Russia against the European Union) (Solodkyy et al. 2018a, p. 1). However, the analysis of open statistics from the Eurostat service and the national statistical services shows that the share of goods banned from export to the Russian Federation in 2014 was very small and amounted to only 0.3% of the EU-28 exports to third countries (ibidem, p. 2). The exaggeration of losses from the sanctions aims to achieve the

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weakening of sanctions, and their final abolition. This is a strategic communication message to Russia and the United States, the demonstration of the political line of a number of leading EU countries. • In 2017 (compared to 2016), 26 countries of the European Union (with the exception of Malta and Croatia) showed an increase in exports to the Russian Federation. Exports from France increased by 12%, from Italy by 16%, and from Germany by 17%. The average growth for the EU-28 is 12%. In 2018, the tendency for growth in turnover with Russia continued for the majority of EU member states (Solodkyy et al. 2018b). The growth of trade with the declared aggressor despite sanctions is a message to Russia and the United States too. • The United States sent an appropriate message to itself. Washington’s sanctions against Moscow have not stopped bilateral trade from steadily growing over the past two years, and it stood at $25 billion in 2018, according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. “This is less than the record-high level of $31 billion in 2011 but much better than the figures that we were at when the Obama administration decided to destroy the basis of our cooperation” (RT 2019), Lavrov said in March 2019 during a meeting with representatives of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia. • The cooperation with Russia in the energy sector (Nord Stream 2) is going on. To maintain the great dependence of the EU on the ‘aggressor’ in the field of energy is extremely imprudent: this is a clear message to Russia and the United States that Russia is not actually considered a threat by the EU. • A ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+2 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran was held on 24 September 2018 in New York, achieving a real milestone. The EU, Russia, China, and Iran aim to create a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to “facilitate payments related to Iran’s exports (including oil) and imports, which will assist and reassure economic operators pursuing legitimate business with Iran. The participants reaffirmed their strong will to support further work aimed at the operationalisation of such a Special Purpose Vehicle as well as continued engagement with regional and international partners” (European External Action Service 2018). US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo condemned the

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EU initiative, stating: “This is one of the most counterproductive measures imaginable for regional global peace and security” (Reuters Africa 2018). What really matters is the fact that the leading nations of the EU have joined the global—Russia and China—in open defiance of the United States. In January 2019, France, Germany, and Britain announced the creation of a new payment-processing system designed to keep alive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran deal. The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) is a European government-controlled special purpose vehicle, a legal entity created specifically to allow companies based in the European Union—and, in the future, potentially elsewhere—to continue to engage in business with Iran without falling foul of US sanctions (Al-Rubaye 2019). • The European Parliament elections in May 2019 were really important, with major centre-left and centre-right blocks to lose dozens of seats. Europeans voted in their biggest numbers since 1994. Some parties that are against Russian sanctions will increase their presence in the European Parliament: in Italy, where Matteo Salvini ran to victory, and in France, where Marine Le Pen defeated the Renaissance alliance of Mr. Macron. • In 2018, Donald Trump at the NATO summit in Brussels made a call for NATO members to raise their defense spending to 4% of GDP. Trump left the assembled presidents and prime ministers floundering, unsure whether he was serious about the 4% target, double the existing NATO target of 2%, which many do not meet (MacAskill and Crerar 2018). Germany plans to spend 1.5% of its GDP on its military by 2025 (Niemuth 2019). This is another clear message that the EU members are not ready to be the first in line in a dangerous confrontation with Russia. Even in the US Congress, after several years of sanctions, the existence of different points of view on the US sanctions is recognized: There exists a wide range of options moving forward. Some argue it is necessary to introduce more sanctions on Russia, including more comprehensive and/or more targeted sanctions. Others contend that the Administration should first focus on fully implementing the range of existing sanctions authorized by law. Some observers stress the need to coordinate new sanctions with Europeans and other allies. Others are skeptical that sanctions can

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produce desired changes in Russian behavior, especially without also using other foreign policy tools. Some express concerns that sanctions, particularly those that are imposed unilaterally, hurt US businesses and cede economic opportunities to firms in other countries. (Congressional Research Service 2019, p. 50)

The sanctions policy is gradually running out of steam. Either it will have to be gradually abandoned within the framework of any long-term compromises due to an awareness of the existential risks of deepening the global conflict, or it will have to move to a qualitatively different level of economic, political, and military confrontation. Tertium non datur. The most convenient reason for the introduction of a tough package of sanctions is a large-scale false flag operation within the SPW, where Russia’s guilt for tragic events (whatever and wherever, from Venezuela to Ukraine) can be convincingly presented, at least for the Western public. The preliminary psychological preparation for the demonization of Russia of the last years makes such a scenario really possible. Such a SPW was, for example, successfully carried out after the Second World War. In just a few years, it was possible to turn Western public opinion against the Soviet Union, an ally in the fight against fascism and the Iron Curtain-divided Europe. The United States and China will not agree on economic issues and compromises will not be reached in the confrontation between Russia and China on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the other: in Venezuela, the Middle East, Ukraine, the Balkans, or North Korea, certain circles will try to establish the new Iron Curtain. There is no doubt that they will try to create the necessary grounds for that. This is the logic of geopolitical confrontation within the existing world order. The main purpose of such a possible solution is to prevent the creation of a single zone of economic and political cooperation in Eurasia which the United States would not be able to dominate.

CAATSA and Other Sanctions: A Strategic Synchronization of Deeds, Words, and Images in the Context of US Foreign Policy In the current international situation, which in the foreseeable future is more likely to deteriorate, perhaps abruptly, it is important to pay attention to some objective points in the field of strategic communication in the context of the adoption of the CAATSA.

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1. The current sanctions against Russia have a long history, long before the events in Ukraine (e.g., the Magnitsky Act 2010). The list of the most significant sanctions is given in the CAATSA, and sanctions continue in the framework of the CAATSA and other US decisions. The US leadership’s synchronization of wrong deeds with wrong words and images provoked a very negative reaction from the main actors in global politics like China and Russia, and now among some EU members, which act inconsistently but more and more independently in their relations with third countries, whether it is Iran, Russia, or China. Sanctions are an essential and import element of the US strategic communication. 2. There are security backgrounds for sanctions. Meanwhile, Russia is increasingly concerned about NATO’s approach to Russia’s borders, the consequences of the coup in Ukraine, the deployment of global missile defense systems near the borders of Russia and China, and prospects for the development of a rapid non-nuclear global strike (conventional prompt global strike, or CPGS). The George W. Bush administration considered developing hypersonic conventional weapons for a prompt global strike (PGS) role in the 2000s. In 2008, Congress created a single, combined fund to support research and development for the CPGS mission. Congress allocated $65.4 million for this program in financial year (FY) 2014, $95.6 million in FY2015, $88.7 million in FY2016, $181.3 million in FY2017, and $374.9 million in FY 2018. The US Department of Defense (DOD) budget request for FY2019 includes $278 million for the conventional prompt strike (CPS) program. Congress, in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2019 (Public Law 115–232), increased funding for prompt global strike capability development to $413.4 million, adding $150 million to accelerate the program. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended an increase of $345 million, to a total of $615.9 million, with a total increase of $928.6 million for the full scope of hypersonic programs (Woolf 2019, pp. 32–33). The US Congressional Research Service report for several years concluded that there are objective serious risks of misunderstanding of the US actions on the part of Russia and China in the framework of possible CPGS. Russia and China may consider US CPGS as an attack with nuclear weapons or a disarming non-nuclear strike, and the corresponding nuclear response by those countries is possible. The updated version of the report

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on 8 January 2019 draws attention to the fact that possible measures to prevent misunderstandings in connection with the launch of US missiles within the CPGS may not be sufficient for other powers. “As a result, while the measures described above can reduce the possibility of ­misunderstandings, they probably cannot eliminate them. Moreover, they cannot address concerns, often expressed by officials in Russia and China, that the United States might use these weapons, along with other conventional strike systems and missile defenses, to acquire the ability to attack strategic or nuclear targets in these nations without resorting to the use of US nuclear weapons” (Woolf 2019, p. 38). Nevertheless, most US lawmakers continue to support the efforts to develop CPGS. The development of hypersonic weapons sends a wrong synchronization of deeds words and images that has worried China and Russia, who have begun looking into similar programs to avoid being left behind. They have successfully tested their own systems and are now ahead of the United States in this arms race, which is really dangerous for both sides. The security of both sides is unlikely to benefit from the arms race that has begun. Earlier, on 13 December 2001, the United States announced its unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) signed by Moscow and Washington in 1972 and which long served as an obstacle to the creation of a missile defense shield allowing an unpunished nuclear attack. Clearly, the United States took advantage of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR in order to move toward global domination, which it did practically without opposition. The unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was an unequivocal message to mankind that also helps to explain the reasons for Russian concern about the US actions and the Russian response to them in the security sphere, including its psychological aspect. This is not a mythical Russian intervention in elections around the globe, but quite a constructive criticism of US foreign policy in terms of where and to what extent it contradicts the national interests of Russia and other countries, too. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), world military expenditure is estimated to have been $1822 billion in 2018. This was 2.6% higher in real terms than in 2017 (Tian et al. 2019). While the mainstream Western media used portraying Moscow under Putin as a looming threat to Eastern and Central European nations, not to mention the survival of American democracy, the NATO alliance in 2018 ($963 billion) outspent Russia ($61.4 billion) nearly 16 to 1. Russia

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did not qualify for the top five biggest military spenders in 2018, its spending falling for the second year in a row, surpassed by France ($63.8 billion) and India ($66.5 billion) (Niemuth 2019). The five biggest spenders in 2018 were the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, India, and France, which together accounted for 60% of global military spending (Ellyatt 2019). Military spending in several central and eastern European countries increased seriously. For example, military spending in Poland rose by 8.9% in 2018 (to $11.6 billion) and was up 21% in Ukraine, to $4.8 billion (ibidem). Since 2016, thousands of US and Western European soldiers have been deployed to NATO member countries on or near Russia’s western border to serve as a potential tripwire for war with one of the largest nuclear armed powers in the world (Niemuth 2019). NATO builds infrastructure for permanent military presence near Russia’s borders (Durden 2017; South Front 2018). One party (the United States) adopted potentially existentially dangerous measures against another party (Russia) one after another. After years of unsuccessful attempts to convince the United States of the dangerous consequences of these measures, Russia took adequate steps to ensure its security; but it confronts now a hybrid attack against itself and sanctions play an important role in its implementation. 3. The main pretext for US sanctions is well known. Statements about Russia’s intervention in the presidential elections in 2016, coming particularly from certain circles of the Democratic Party in the United States (more correctly, from certain circles of transnational corporations [TNCs]), served as a pretext not only to put the constant pressure on Trump, but to develop a global anti-Russia campaign, including its sanctions aspect. Meanwhile, former US President Bill Clinton exercised direct intervention in the re-­election of Boris Yeltsin for a second term in 1996. There is a lot of evidence for that. One example of such intervention is to be found in an interview for Stephen D. Malzberg’s program on Newsmax TV with political consultant Dick Morris. Clinton’s communications director George Stephanopoulos described the influence of Dick Morris in Clinton’s administration as follows: “Over the course of the first nine months of 1995, no single person had more power over the president” (Bury 2000).

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In July 2017, it turned out that none other than the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, personally intervened in the presidential elections in Russia, and Dick Morris helped him. Morris said in particular: “When I worked for Clinton, Clinton called me and said, ‘I want to get Yeltsin elected as president of Russia against Gennady Zyuganov’, who was the communist who was running against him … We, Clinton and I, would go through it and Bill would pick up the hotline and talk to Yeltsin and tell him what commercials to run, where to campaign, what positions to take. He basically became Yeltsin’s political consultant”. In other words, it is possible to speak about the direct intervention by the United States in the presidential campaign in Russia (polls suggest that at the beginning of the campaign Yeltsin’s support was approximately ten times lower than his main competitor Gennady Zyuganov). And it went beyond telephone calls, of course. Perhaps it would have been better for Democrat leaders, before organizing the dubious campaign about Russian interference in the US elections and insisting on sanctions, to address their own interference in the Russian presidential elections. 4. Sanctions today are less and less covered by the veil of words about the protection of democracy, and act as a justification for imperialist claims on the part of the US administration. For example, the National Security Advisor John Bolton announced new sanctions against Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua in April 2019 while reaffirming the US commitment to the Monroe Doctrine. “Today, we proudly proclaim for all to hear: the Monroe Doctrine is alive and well,” Bolton told the Bay of Pigs veterans group in Miami (Richardson 2019). “We will need your help in the days ahead. We must all reject the forces of communism and socialism in this hemisphere—and in this country,” said President Donald Trump’s advisor. Speaking outside the White House, US National Security Adviser John Bolton warned: “This is our hemisphere. It’s not where the Russians ought to be interfering” (News Lanes 2019). US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed military action in Venezuela might be necessary “if that’s what’s required” (ibidem). How many countries should then ask the United States to leave in the other hemisphere, if this logic is followed? During the VIII Moscow Conference on International Security (Russian Federation Defense Ministry 2019), on 24 April Russian Defense

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Minister Sergei Shoigu said: “In the Western Hemisphere, the United States is reviving the Monroe Doctrine, the purpose of which is to limit the sovereignty of Latin American States, to put pressure on those who pursue policies not sanctioned by Washington”. The negative reaction of Latin American countries to the idea of military intervention reflects not the widespread love of Latin American right-wing and center-right governments for the leadership of Venezuela, but their unwillingness to ­sacrifice their sovereignty for the sake of involvement in a dubious adventure fraught with social upheaval in their own countries. The press service of the head of the EU diplomatic service Federica Mogherini announced: “We must avoid military intervention … From our point of view, it is clear that we need a peaceful political, democratic and Venezuelan solution to this crisis … This clearly excludes the use of force” (RIA “Novosti” 2019). The intervention against Venezuela evidently caused a serious response from Russia, China, and many other countries. Aggressive strategic communication of one party logically meets opposition and doubts about the peaceful intentions of another party. If the red line is crossed in the perception of the attacking side, it can lead to a harmful chain of events that at some point will be impossible to control. 5. Russia’s active support for the concept of a multipolar world that reflects (and will reflect much more in the future) the real order of things. In this world, there is supremacy of the United States, but also of China, Russia, India, and some military blocks, too. This world is not perfect but is open for development and the search for better models of social development in line with the new technological and social conditions. However, this approach is not welcomed by the oligarchic clans in the US dreaming about the golden age of the 1990s. However, it is not that oligarchic clans in other countries are better or worse than the US clans, but it is definitely true that individually they are weaker. There is everywhere a struggle for markets, narrow egoistic interests which have already led to two world wars. Multipolarity on the basis of a change in the balance of power between the major countries will not in itself ensure peace: it runs a great risk of world war and gives only limited time for the possible transit of mankind to a new, higher level of development.

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The US sanctions in the framework of a hybrid war are not directed against individual statesmen or countries: they are directed against this growing multipolarity; therefore, they are doomed to failure. Of course, the hawks in the United States have every opportunity to turn their failure into the death of human civilization, including themselves. Unfortunately, instead of making better use of the potential of the most powerful country within the framework of a new social and technological development model, which can justifiably ensure the leading position of the United States, this potential is spent on protecting the privileges and financial interests of the incapacitated ruling minority, including the use of such a powerful tool as sanctions. All that great psychological, moral, and political potential can be used as to neutralize the hawkish elements in the United States by joint efforts from both inside and outside this great country. External efforts should not be aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of the United States, which will only strengthen the position of the local hawks. On the contrary, the hawks must be defeated in their illegal and dangerous attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, so that the internal factors for their defeat by US citizens themselves are ready. This scheme deserves to be applied to any state that covers its aggressive intentions with propaganda for the protection of democracy. The task is not to reduce the potential of the United States, but rather to increase it by progressive transformation through the energy, intellect, and will of the Americans themselves. The defeat of the hawks is not the defeat of the United States, but the victory of the whole nation. Why is mankind objectively interested in this scenario? It is because the potential of the United States is extremely necessary for the solution of global problems. This, of course, is not at the expense of the United States alone, but through freeing a trillion dollars from the arms race, innovative economic development, solving environmental problems, poverty eradication, strengthening democracy, the development of science and education, and so on. However, if a unipolar world should arrive at a new bloc-to-bloc confrontation (and the US sanctions are pushing the world in this direction), the potentials of all the countries involved will not adequately address these problems. 6. This rampant situation, fueled by vested interests and a sanctions policy, leads not to peace but to war. It naturally encourages the other side to respond within the framework of psychological warfare.

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If the response is moderate, or absent, the image and real influence of the leadership of the country under sanctions can be damaged. The aim is then to push for the internal destabilization of the unwanted government, thus creating conditions for its overthrow from within. If the response is adequate and active, the country is represented as aggressive, threatening, and demanding of new sanctions, leading to a further deterioration and a higher level of international tension. In these circumstances, it is easier to justify in the eyes of internal and external target audiences, for example, a sharp increase in military spending, presenting it as a forced response to the external threat. This is evident in the hybrid warfare of the US against Venezuela. Attempts to unleash a big war far beyond the US mainland, creating favorable conditions for the economic breakthrough of the country (as happened in the First and Second World Wars, when the United States shared the victory without experiencing the hardships of war on its own territory), could be stopped. Not only the deeds and the words of governments is enough for that, but, above all, the real activity of civil society is necessary, where and to what extent it actually exists. Socially passive people will not stop greedy rulers (i.e., the corresponding egoistic interest groups). It is also necessary to take into consideration that the break-up of a mechanism for military confidence and security, along with reduced time for decision-making in terms of a possible nuclear attack to minutes and even seconds, dramatically increases the risk of possible tragic mistakes. Growing concerns about a possible nuclear war and other global threats pushed forward the symbolic Doomsday Clock4 in January 2018 by 30 seconds to just two minutes before midnight. Before the clock struck 11:58 pm in both 2018 and 2019, the last time the world was considered so close to annihilation was in 1953, when the United States and the Soviet Union were in a nuclear arms race. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS) said it had acted as such because the world was becoming 4  The minute hand on the Doomsday Clock is a metaphor for how vulnerable to catastrophe the world is deemed to be. The symbolic device was created by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS) in 1947. It was founded at the University of Chicago in 1945 by a group of scientists who helped develop the first atomic weapons. Today, the group includes physicists and environmental scientists from around the world, who decide whether to adjust the clock in consultation with the group’s board of sponsors, which includes Nobel laureates (BBC News 2017).

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“more dangerous”—the escalated tensions on the Korean peninsula, the new US nuclear strategy that was expected to call for more funding to expand the role of the country’s nuclear arsenal. Similarly, the rising tension between Russia and the West was a contributing factor, in addition to the weakening of institutions around the world in dealing with major global threats, including climate change. “In the nuclear realm, the United States abandoned the Iran nuclear deal and announced it would withdraw from the INF Treaty, grave steps towards a complete dismantlement of the global arms control process” (CNN Wire 2019), the Bulletin said. 7. The search for effective and long-term strategic compromise proposals for the United States (e.g., in terms of implementation of structural projects in Eurasia) and the effective presentation of appropriate expectations are very important. It is necessary to create favorable conditions for active, large-scale, and mutually beneficial participation of the United States in infrastructure projects in Eurasia with China, India, and Russia. It seems that among the US elite there are strong apprehensions that after the possible loss of their position in Eurasia, the country will face a united and increasingly dominant force in the world under China’s leadership (as was earlier feared in relation to the USSR), and that this force will be hostile and set aggressively against the United States. In 2016, China became the first trading partner to the EU’s leading economy, Germany. Meanwhile, the United States has dropped from first to third place, not only behind China, but also behind France (Reuters 2017). China remained Germany’s biggest trading partner in 2017 and continued to be its most important trading partner for the third consecutive year in 2018 with a total trade volume of 199.3 billion euros ($225.7 billion), according to preliminary figures published by the German Federal Statistical Office (CGTN 2019). This fact is remarkable. It is important to consider how to repay the largest foreign debt in the country’s history, when in trade with its most important allies, the United States is losing its leading position, and when the bellicose rhetoric against its economic rival China comes together with a huge trade deficit with that same country. With its use of increased international tensions and economic, political pressure on its allies in terms of imposing restrictions on trade with Russia and China, whether in its desire to oust Huawei from the EU market or to disrupt the Nord Stream 2 project under the pretext of security threats to

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European countries from their Eastern partners, the United States may be successful for some time. But is coercion a solid basis for relations between the United States and Europe in the future? To be the global leader of the twenty-first century, the United States (or any other country) should be first to open up new ways for economic and social development, and not seek to provoke conflicts, to strengthen its military and political influence around the world. Strong progressive transformation of the ­socioeconomic system in the United States would be in the interests of the whole nation, and stagnation of the country as a result of the dominance of egoistic elites will bring only harm to the United States and other nations. While the United States thinks and acts in the old way, its imperial dictatorship will naturally be rejected. That is not because of special sympathies for China or Russia, but because of pragmatic interests of the EU in its members: the European Commission ignored US calls to ban Chinese tech supplier Huawei (Chan 2019). The construction of Nord Stream 2 is not affected; Gazprom said it wants to put it into operation “before late 2019” (Gurzu 2019). The leading countries in Europe and Asia are patient enough to cope with the sudden fluctuations of US foreign policy. Here, counter-strategic compromise proposals are not only necessary, but should be transparent, understandable for the wider population, and, of course, sincere. It is important to recognize the existence of selfish corporate interests on both sides of the fence and the necessity for their limitation, and it is reasonable to check each other systematically in specific cases without demonizing the opposite side. An alternative to this approach will sooner or later result in a third world war, where the ashes of the United States will not be distinguishable from the ashes of Russia and China. This worst but possible scenario should encourage statesmen on both sides of the ocean to opt for more balanced approaches. It is impossible not to agree with Trump’s assessment following a telephone conversation with Putin in early May 2019: “Tremendous potential for a good/great relationship with Russia, despite what you read and see in the Fake News Media. Look how they have misled you on ‘Russia Collusion’. The World can be a better and safer place. Nice!” (Donald Trump on Twitter 2019). Unfortunately, the split in the ruling circles of the United States, the dominance of groups searching for global confrontation and domination, greatly complicates the achievement of compromise solutions. The blocking of the participation of US companies in the mining of the Russian

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Arctic shelf (Sputnik 2017) is against the national interests of both countries. The United States opposes the implementation of Nord Stream 2 (France 24 2017). Such policy perhaps will give additional opportunities for the export of US gas to Europe, but dangerously destabilizes their relations not only with Russia but also with US allies by NATO, which will have to pay tribute in the form of purchases of more expensive gas for protection from a fictitious enemy. 8. It would be better to use international academic channels more often and an in efficient way to discuss trends and issues in the field of strategic communication, in particular related to psychological warfare. These questions are of interest not only to specialists, but to a wide range of researchers from related disciplines. Attracting adequate attention to SPW, which has a negative impact on the public consciousness in different countries, can be an important channel of influence on the minds of the people, increasing their civic engagement and social responsibility.

Conclusion Analysis of the psychological aspect of the CAATSA and its meaning for EU-Russia relations shows the significant possibilities of using sanctions in psychological warfare. The psychological aspect of the implementation of CAATSA, based on open sources, both caused some damage to the Russian economy and complicated relations between the EU and Russia. However, CAATSA, like the whole range of efforts to put pressure on Russia, did not bring the expected results to its sponsors. Moreover, the United States is in a more dangerous position than before, having decreased its opportunities and influence in the world. Sanctions adversely affect the international situation as a whole. This is expressed in the following way. 1. There is no change in the political leadership of Russia and no change in the country’s political course to a more pro-Western one, which is clearly perceived as a defeat of the hawks in the United States. 2. On the contrary, there has been a certain consolidation of the majority of the Russian population on the basis of a clear rejection of pressure from the United States and the EU.

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3. Despite the strengthening of sanctions, and a clear process of deterioration of political relations between the EU and Russia under the influence of a number of other factors, there is an increasing desire among European countries to get out of the control of the United States and restore relations with Russia. This trend is likely to be reflected in the increase in the representation of parties advocating the normalization of relations with Russia in the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019. 4. The artificial aggravation of relations with Russia as an instrument of internal political struggle only reinforces the obvious political split in the United States, which has many internal and external causes. 5. The artificial aggravation of relations with Russia in no way solves the socioeconomic problems of the United States, Russia, or the whole world. However, some of the truly important issues of global development and international relations are moving to the periphery of public attention. Their solution largely depends on cooperation, rather than confrontation, between the major powers. 6. The key fact should not be forgotten: today and in the immediate future, only the United States and Russia have a nuclear potential capable of destroying the whole world. These are the only two military superpowers today, with all the ensuing responsibility these two countries hold toward the world. The obvious difference in the economic potentials of the parties (and the possibility of punishing a clearly economically weaker party) does not negate this obvious circumstance. Not all people in the ruling elites are aware of the moral and political responsibility required to lead a nuclear superpower, judging by the practical results of their activities in different spheres of public life; but for those whose moral and ethical standards leave much to be desired, the instinct of self-preservation does not usually suffer: it acts as an important psychological barrier in the way of dangerous recklessness in world politics, Alas, this barrier is not absolute. Moreover, miscalculation of the enemy’s intentions and activity, a rare series of errors, is always possible. 7. The use of sanctions and other measures of pressure from the United States has its limits due to the strengthening of Russia’s cooperation with China and other countries outside the dictate of the US will. Indeed, this zone is not growing, but shrinking, and has its own sociopsychological dimension.

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8. Tactical decisions today clearly prevail in US policy, due not only to a certain degradation of Washington’s strategic capabilities, but also the impossibility of effective strategic communication in the face of forced multivector aspirations of US state institutions under the influence of a deep systemic crisis in the country and in the world as a whole. We have highlighted the obvious psychological component of some direct and indirect consequences of sanctions on Russia. These consequences are serious, and they should be fully taken into account in the planning and implementation of the EU and Russia strategic communication alongside economic, political, military, technological, and other factors that are incomparably more fully analyzed in the scientific literature. Russia and the EU can and should cooperate in the common interest, despite discontent on the part of Washington. Some kind of consent on the SPV in the relations with Iran is an example of such a mutual understanding. Under the current conditions, it is important to find approaches that provide foundations for mutual understanding and cooperation. Despite the hostile and non-constructive approach to Russia and China in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America of December 2017, this document contains a valuable positive position: “Competition does not always mean hostility, nor does it inevitably lead to conflict” (Department of Defense 2017, p. 3). The world is not doomed to death, but it requires innovative analysis of modern and promising factors of social development. It seems that sanctions bypassing the UN for imperialist purposes are not the best incentive for an innovative vision of the future and successful achievement of it. Sarang Shidore, a Senior Global Analyst at Stratfor, characterizes the choices facing Washington and it is hard to disagree with him: If the future does indeed hold a bipolar-minus world, the United States may not be ready for it. To be prepared, Washington would have to recalibrate its strategy. In a world in which many major powers are uncommitted and have large degrees of freedom, tools like open-ended military interventions, unilateral sanctions, extraterritoriality and hostility to trade will likely yield diminishing returns. By comparison, incentivization, integration, innovation and adroit agenda-setting can be smarter and more effective options.

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The United States historically has been a pioneer of these approaches, and it may prove able to wield them persuasively once again. (Stratfor 2017)

The United States is increasingly losing its ability to influence the international situation, because they have radically to improve their internal politics and through that to improve their ability in a positive way influence the international relations. “The American public is divided—over economic policy, social policy, foreign policy, race, privacy and national security, and many other things” (Berman 2016). It is not bad at all, it is a symptom of changes, it gives the opportunity to assess the possibility of different new qualitative development options. It’s not easy to do, but every leading nation is usually the first to face new challenges. It either solves them successfully or loses its leadership. Attempts to maintain their leadership without adequate change are reactionary and dangerous for the whole world. All history of mankind teaches about that. Progressive, rapid, socially oriented development of the huge potential of the United States is extremely important for the whole world, including Russia and the EU. The incompetence of the state elite of the United States may result in much more serious problems than the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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PART III

EU-Russia Strategic Communication in Security Dimension

CHAPTER 8

Global Shifts and Their Impact on Russia-EU Strategic Communication Evgeny Pashentsev

Introduction The European Union and Russia are experiencing in their strategic communication a strong impact of global development factors, and themselves have a significant impact on the course of human development. Many of these factors are well known and closely monitored in Russia and the EU. Globalization creates an objective basis for solving the universal problems of humankind, due to the joint efforts of the world community and the consolidation of resources. Various states, however, do not always (and recently less often) find mutual understanding on the most important issues, which exacerbates the existing problems, whether it is a bad ecological situation, unstable global financial system, growing property polarization or the growing threat of world war. In this chapter, we are not going to present the whole complex of contemporary global problems. A lot of fundamental research has been prepared on this topic. However, we will try to analyze some of the most important trends in the development of the world economy, as well as social and political institutions, in the

E. Pashentsev (*) Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pashentsev (ed.), Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1_8

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context of revolutionary scientific and technological achievements that have no equal in the history of humankind, and therefore will have a fundamental impact on it, including the EU and Russia. Synchronization of deeds, words and images always has its own temporal and spatial components. Deeds are only sometimes relatively ahead of their time: for example, some outstanding discoveries. Usually deeds are anticipated by the corresponding words and images, which give only an approximate and incomplete idea of the future reality. However, the more adequately words and images reflect objective development trends, the more possible it will be to prepare for future changes. These objective changes do not determine the final result—there is always the polyvariance of the future. Our individual and collective will is capable of shaping our future within the limits of objective development. A simple example is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which could have, if not destroyed humanity, caused it to regress globally and possibly cause irreparable damage to the environment. Conscious of the negative images of the future, the collective will of the parties toward global confrontation (these are also deeds, but in the mental-sensuous sphere) made it possible at the time to avoid the worst-case scenario and to reach the contemporary level of social development. It’s a different time now, and other generations will make their choice, but there is a choice. Today, however, strategic communication has its temporal component. While the current analysis of the social development trends does not yet form the relevant synchronization of words, images and deeds that will ensure the most favorable course of events. This gives rise to a reasonable negative reaction in society, going as far as social apathy and nihilism of the broad sections of the population. This is not only a wrong message to our contemporaries, but also a bad one to the future, to our closest descendants, who will have to solve the problems left by us in a more difficult situation. In the most developed countries of the world, the amorphous nature of strategic communication is more dangerous in terms of its consequences. Having made the transition to a qualitatively new, more progressive state, this or that country can become an attractive force for other nations. By refusing or hindering such a transition, these countries are weakening themselves through fruitless warfare and sanctions. Imperialist competition for markets can lead to a war that will deprive us of any future. Russia and the EU can make an important positive contribution to strategic communication, which will successfully overcome the current global crisis. It

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is not enough to be proud of your ancestors, we have to be worthy of their best deeds. We can overcome the crisis. To do this, we must try to understand it better, and we must start with the situation in the contemporary economy.

Depletion of the Global Capitalism Model: Implications for the EU and Russia The current model of global capitalism in developed countries has evidently exhausted itself. Russia and the EU have reached the modern level of their development from different starting points. In Russia during the so-called shock therapy the largest state enterprises (petroleum, metallurgy, and the like) were controversially privatized for the extremely small sum of $600 million, far less than they were worth, while the majority of the population plunged into poverty (Reynolds 2006, p.  5). The economic output fell by 45% during 1989–1998, as death rates increased from 1% in the 1980s to over 1.5% in 1994, equivalent to over 700,000 additional deaths annually (Popov and Sundaram 2017). Many industrial branches totally disappeared (together with most of the defense sector, which then has been partially restored). According to the World Bank, Russia’s GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) was worth $9867 in 1989 and reached a record low of $5505 in 1998 (The World Bank 2019; Trading Economics 2019a), while the debt to Western countries rose by tens of billions of dollars. In the Russia of 1999–2006, it was possible to maintain high rates of economic growth due to the use of capital funds created before the collapse of the USSR. Alexey Kudrin, Russia’s finance minister, told members of the lower chamber of parliament, the State Duma, in September 2006: “We will recover all of the lost GDP and the country’s industrial potential [to the level of 1990],” “We will recover it, we will be increasing it” (Sputnik 2006). In 2007 Russia’s real GDP did exceed that of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. However, since 2007 the Soviet funds have been exhausted. The economy faced the limits of production capacities, and without large-scale investments in infrastructure its further development is impossible (Expert Rating Agency 2008). Then, due to the Great Recession observed in world markets during the late 2000s and early 2010s, drop in energy prices and Western sanctions, Russia’s GDP has again regressed close to its level of 1990.

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Constant GDP per capita for the Russian Federation in 2017 was $11,452, that was very close to the mentioned indicator of 1989 (The World Bank 2017). In almost 30 years of reforms, Russia’s economy has not moved forward and in many areas of scientific and technological progress has been pushed back. The standard of living of most of the population of Russia is seriously inferior to the indicators of the 1880s of the twentieth century, given the extremely high level of property differentiation in modern Russia on the basis of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of the 1980s. The top 10% income share in Russia rose from less than 25% in 1990–1991 to more than 45% in 1996, and has remained around 45–50% since then. This enormous rise came together with a massive collapse of the bottom 50% share, which dropped from about 30% of total income in 1990–1991 to less than 10% in 1996, before gradually returning to about 18% by 2015 (Novokmet et al. 2018, p. 111). The share of extreme wealth in the Russian economy has risen, with 111 Russians on the 2014 Forbes World’s Billionaires list, up from 42 a decade earlier. These billionaires may account for as much as a third of the country’s wealth (Credit Suisse 2014, see in: Djankov 2015). In 2019 there were 98 of them (Forbes 2019). Eight Russian billionaires have been named among the 100 richest people in the world (The Moscow Times 2019). By concentration of wealth, Russia is similar to other big countries like the United States, China or Germany, but this polarization appeared in a very short period of time through a very dubious privatization, rise of poverty and the stagnation of the economy and science for many years. The situation is quite different in the EU. After 1990, the EU’s GDP rose almost threefold (from $7 trillion to $20 trillion in 2008), which partly stems from the assimilation of the new markets in Eastern Europe, a situation linked to their “transition to market civilization.” The departure of millions of highly qualified specialists to the West from the countries experiencing the crisis, the selling of natural resources at extremely low prices by corrupt local elites with the support of transnational corporation (TNCs) and many other aspects of the policy of former so-called socialist states, including Russia of the 1990s, played a role in the West’s development (although, of course, it did not completely determine its character and consequences). In 2011, an immigration reform group, the Partnership for a New American Economy, found that more than 40% of companies in the Fortune 500 were founded by immigrants or the children of immigrants

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(Partnership for a New American Economy 2011, p. 2; Manjoo 2017), including Russians. In 2016, researchers at the National Foundation for American Policy, a nonpartisan think tank, studied the 87 privately held American start-ups and found that 51%, or 44 out of 87, of the country’s $1 billion start-up companies had at least one immigrant founder. This illustrates the increasing importance and contributions of immigrants to the US economy. A 2006 study conducted by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) identified an immigrant founder in 25% of venture-­ backed companies that became publicly traded between 1990 and 2005, while a 2013 NVCA study found that immigrants started 33% of US venture-­backed companies that became publicly traded between 2006 and 2012 (Anderson 2016, p. 2). However, the inability to move to a new technological and social level of development in the last decade—in this respect Russia shares largely a common problem with the EU and the United States—affects its growth rates. The GDP in the European Union was worth $16,398 billion in 2016, reaching an all-time high of $19,118 billion in 2008 (Trading Economics 2019b). In the EU in 2017 (see more: European Union 2018), the modest recovery has not yet led to the 2007 level. The pace of development of both Russia and the EU does not match their capabilities. But a stable acceleration of development within the existing socioeconomic development model is highly unlikely. There is growing polarization in the standards of life between European countries. If, in 1913, the richest country in Europe achieved a GDP per capita of 3.94 times greater than that of the poorest country, in 2013 the ratio was 13.82 to one (see more: Merce et al. 2015). Property differentiation is also growing. On average, the 10% wealthiest households hold half of the total wealth in the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries; the next richest 50% hold almost the entire other half, while the 40% least wealthy own little over 3%. Wealth is most concentrated at the top of the distribution in Austria, the Netherlands and Germany (OECD 2017, p.  10). Income inequality inspires fierce debate around the world, and no shortage of proposed solutions. As global billionaires bid up the price of a da Vinci painting to $450.3 million, in the United States, the richest 1% have seen their share of national income increase roughly, since 1980, from 11% to 20% in 2014. This trend, combined with slow productivity growth, has resulted in stagnant living standards for most Americans. For the same

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period, Russia has a world record, from 3% to 20%, while in Sweden it went from 4% to 9%, in Britain from 6% to 14% and the majority of the other EU countries went along a similar road (Rothwell 2017). The oligarchic clans appeared not only in Russia and for the first time not in Russia. “We believe it is now appropriate to move a step further and think about the possibility of extreme political inequality, involving great political influence by a very small number of extremely wealthy individuals. We argue that it is useful to think about the US political system in terms of oligarchy,” conclude the US professors Winters and Page (2009). In another study done by Gilens and Page (2014), the researchers compared 1800 different US policies that were put in place by politicians between 1981 and 2002 to the type of policies preferred by the average and wealthy American, or special interest groups. “Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence” (Gilens and Page 2014, p. 564). “We believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened” (Gilens and Page 2014, p. 577). Destabilization of the situation in the EU and the United States demonstrates low level of readiness for progressive self-renovation (and very likely survival). This also explains the split among the ruling elites, part of which directly witnesses the necessity of the inter-formation revolution and the other part is ready to continue the former course, or establish the open dictatorship if necessary. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in the introduction to his book Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, stated, “there are several alarming similarities between Soviet Union in the years just prior to its fall and the America of the early twenty-first century” (Brzezinski 2012, p. 4). Among these similarities Brzezinski names the late Soviet “increasingly gridlocked government system incapable of enacting serious policy revisions, self-­ bankruptcy by committing an inordinate percentage of its GNP to military goals, the economic crisis and the deterioration of the quality of life, the ruling class became cynically insensitive to widening social disparities while hypocritically making its own privileged life-style and finally. In foreign affairs it became increasingly self-isolated” (ibidem). “These parallels, even if overdrawn, fortify the case that America must renew itself and

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pursue a comprehensive and long-term geopolitical vision” (ibidem). One of the main ideas of the book is that the consequential shift is in the center of gravity of global power from the West toward the East, and the United States has to become more strategically deliberate in its global engagement with the new East. Such approach expressed by Brzezinski in his last years of life can be useful for the development of new US policy, by those who will be able to, as Brzezinski, to revise their views to meet the requirements of the time. In 2013, the monograph of Nobel laureate and former Vice President of the United States Albert Gore named The Future was published. The researcher has made the unfavorable conclusion regarding the possibility of the American establishment to solve the existing problems: the weakened state of democratic decision-making in the U.S., and the enhanced control over American democracy by the forces of wealth and corporate power, have paralyzed the ability of the country to make rational decisions in favor of policies that would remedy these problems. These two trends, unfortunately, reinforce one another. The more control over democratic decision making by powerful wealthy interests, the more they are able to ensure that decisions on policy enhance their wealth and power. This classic positive feedback loop makes inequality steadily worse, even as it makes solutions for inequality less accessible. (Gore 2013, p. 121)

Such rather numerous claims of critically thinking representatives of the American elite witness the deep crisis among the upper circles of the American society, and their inability to solve serious problems facing the country and the whole world. The establishment is evidently losing its capacity to control the situation in the United States and beyond. That fact logically leads to the national crisis and the right wing dictatorship at the end or… revolution. Now we can find publications about The Third American Revolution not only in the left radical editions (Lind 2013). Discussion of scenarios of the all-national crisis and the prospects of the American revolution in 2014 by well-known representatives of mass media and the CIA looks quite symbolically on air at Fox News in 2009 (NSfuture 2009). This revolution can become much more radical than many political scientists and economists are ready to imagine today. We focused on the situation in the United States because the current situation in this country strongly affects all international development and

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relations between the EU and Russia, in particular. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the sociopolitical tensions in the United States reflect the problems that to some extent can be ignored today by many less developed EU countries and Russia, but these problems, largely associated with the consequences of the technological revolution, will inevitably aggravate the situation in other regions. The global battle for free markets is sharpening. In the course of this battle, certain disputed territories are turning into areas of both economic and military confrontation (from a different point of view, these territories are sovereign states with their people), including Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, Syria, Venezuela and others. The battle for market outlets is openly discussed by many state leaders. Let us recall how Ukraine became a “battlefield” between the EU and Russia when the EU categorically demanded that Yanukovich’s government should choose between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. These and other global contradictions of modern capitalism are not a product of conspiracy or “ill will” on the part of certain leaders. The elite does not want its inevitable death by nuclear fire; however, increased economic and social antagonism has an unavoidable impact on international affairs, further aggravating the situation. At the same time, the criticism of “neoliberalism” (in favor of “national capitalism”) under the banner of defending national interests and national identity reflects the objective conflicts between nations and a global oligarchy. However, it is full of inner contradictions and inconsistencies. Sometimes this criticism simply serves as a disguise for the battle of transnational clans supported by certain state elites. Extreme right-wing groups replace the people’s legitimate desire for social justice with agitation for a national one, which, in reality, turns out to be only “an exclusive right” of the national elite to steal from the population. Global confrontation is developing at a time when the social system itself, on which the world’s oligarchic pyramid rests together with its rival clans, is suffering from a deep crisis. The breakdown of the global system cannot resolve the conflicts of capitalism; it will only lead to war. This is the most convincing strategic communication proving the failure of the current system to drive social progress further. The increasing strife in foreign relations reflects the growing competition for market outlets. This situation is somewhat similar to those on the eve of both the First and Second World Wars. Ultimately, however, unsuccessful attempts to build socialism under the leadership of the proletariat

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showed that it lacks prospects. The liberal model of capitalism is ­collapsing. In such circumstances, right-wing authoritarian sentiment is on the rise, leading even to attempts to whitewash Nazism (Zuroff 2009; My Future America 2014 etc.) as some kind of ultima ratio of certain elites. However, even the bloodiest dictator regimes could not stop the progress of history being only an obstacle in the way of forthcoming transformations.

Geopolitical Shifts and Political Dynamics: Confrontation Grows The shifts in the balance of economic, scientific-technological and military potential from the United States to China and to India and other “emerging” countries should be highlighted. The consequences of these changes are affecting the foreign-policy orientation of European countries and Russia and will continue to affect them even more in the future. The EU countries’ role in the economy, foreign relations, military affairs and scientific development is also gradually diminishing for both objective and subjective reasons. Russia’s nuclear missile forces and some of the latest weapons (the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile; the Avangard hypersonic missile system; the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM]; the Poseidon underwater drone; the Kinzhal hypersonic missile, laser weapon, etc.) allow and will allow in the short- and medium-term to maintain a strategic balance with the United States. However, in terms of economic strength, and the levels of science and education, the resources of Russia, while being significant, are several times inferior to the potential of the EU, the United States or China. That objectively reduces Russia’s weight in the international arena and weakens its position in relations with the EU.  Moreover, the imbalance between Russia’s military power and its relative weakness in other areas is actively and skillfully used by certain circles in the EU to prove Russia’s militarism and aggressive intentions. Russia cannot give up this imbalance because of real threats to its security, general instability in the world or the sad experience of the past (remember the conquests of Napoleon and Hitler), which requires a lot of effort in strategic communication in the European direction, in order to remove possible concerns, especially regarding its closest neighbors. Of course, those neighbors will not create grounds for Russia’s concern by placing components of the US global missile defense or nuclear weapons near its borders.

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As the practice of the Cold War of the twentieth century has shown, it has been easier and faster to reduce one’s security by launching a large-scale nuclear arms race than to increase one’s security through long and difficult negotiations on nuclear weapons. It would be useful to remember this lesson of history for all those who are concerned about the immediate profits of the military-industrial complex (MIC), rather than the long-term interests of their nations. However, the mistakes of the past do not teach everyone. Synchronization of deeds (qualitative renewal of strategic weapons, trade wars, sanctions policy, etc.), words (bellicose rhetoric) and the creation of the image of the enemy in the face of the other side due to the increasingly acute struggle for markets—all this is very similar to the situation on the eve of World War I. The explosive conflict content of strategic communication is very clear. The reasons for this situation are quite objective, although the subjective factor, of course, plays a role too. The practice of “regime change” should be noted, which is quite dangerous for international security. This practice was unambiguously condemned by Donald Trump soon after his victory in the latest presidential elections. “We will stop looking to topple regimes and overthrow governments, folks” (Giaritelli 2016). However, a set of practical measures of the Trump administration toward North Korea, Venezuela, Russia, Iran and Syria suggests the opposite. The forms and methods of interference in the internal affairs of other states may seem different, but the risk exists that at a certain time the emphasis is placed on regime change in this or that country. It is difficult to deny the important role the United States plays in the current relations between the EU and Russia. Unfortunately, it is very often not constructive. As we may recall, the Obama administration accused Russia of meddling in Ukraine’s internal affairs. In contrast, Russia perceives the crisis as an outcome of a coup during which the by no means impeccable, though constitutionally elected, President Viktor Yanukovich was overthrown. In addition, the Russian stance further points to the role ultranationalist groups and organizations have played, with more or less implicit support from the United States and some other NATO countries. To the question of why the flimsy pretext was put forward for sanctions, it seems that Washington is dissatisfied with Russia’s reassertion on the global stage and its efforts toward a more equitable multipolar world.

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The international course of Russia does not contradict and threaten the national interests of the United States, but it carries a clear threat to the imperial ambitions of the most reactionary and aggressive elements of the financial and military-political elite of that country. Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States has not changed it much so far. And at any outcome of elections in the United States, there is a system of counterbalances that leaves real power to the ruling corporate oligarchy, despite serious disagreements in its ranks on ways and methods of preserving and strengthening its positions in the world. Many important members of the administration of D. Trump are supporters of a hard stance toward Russia. It is difficult to expect anything else since the aim of US elites is to preserve world leadership, and those who take a different stance seem to be quite quickly ostracized (let us recall the fate of Michael Flynn, the former National Security Advisor to President D. Trump). The major difference with the previous administration is that the current leader in the White House resolutely demands that the members of the Western alliance should increase their military expenditures. The United States has more and more debts and the profits are getting smaller. Imagining Moscow as a “demon” seems more suitable than so-called Islamic State (which has already been touched upon in relation to the resolution of the European Parliament), and in order to achieve this, it rallies its allies to spend money on military orders. What about the role of other countries? Of course, there is the crisis in Ukraine. A settlement may be possible through the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. This seems, however, to be unacceptable to Kiev. One of the reasons for the obstruction of the peace process is the presence of ultranationalist forces who are still relying on using Ukraine for their own selfish interests. Kiev does not take the risk of saying “no” to the Minsk agreements. Also, it is still struggling to bring an end to the corruption in the country, the inefficiency of its economy, the growing external debt and the plight of the population. In order to get help from the EU and through other channels, it is forced to make new concessions. So, answering the question as to whether Brussels is ready to give money if the draft law is not approved by the Verkhovna Rada, the chairman of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated in February 2017 that the lifting of the ban on wood exports (Vzglyad (View) 2017) was among the conditions for allocating the second tranche of EU assistance (on April 9, 2015, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law that banned the

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export of wood and sawn timber in unprocessed form, which is called roundwood, for a period of ten years). By supporting such anti-national measures, President Poroshenko isolated himself. In April 2019 Volodymyr Zelensky, a famous comedian who portrayed Ukraine’s head of state for years on a popular comedy show, defeated the incumbent president, Petro Poroshenko, who had been in power since 2014. But it seems that in the current situation, normalization with Russia remains very difficult. In addition, there is the rather negative impact NATO has on EU-Russia relations. Looking at the website of the Centre for Strategic Communications, established at the initiative of a number of NATO countries and accredited at NATO in Riga, several documents aimed at “countering Russian aggression” and “Russian propaganda” are to be found. In this context, it is worth mentioning the publication of October 10, 2016, The Kremlin and Daesh Information Activities (Simons and Sillanpaa 2016). In this 30-page-long document, on several occasions, in one way or another, the threats coming from Russia and Daesh toward the West are expressed: “Both Daesh and Russia understand …,” “Why do Kremlin and DAESH messages appeal to youth…,” “…countering the communication of DAESH and the Kremlin…,” “Both Daesh and Russia appeal …,” “Both Daesh and the Kremlin attempt …,” “…both DAESH and the Kremlin have been able to exploit vulnerabilities…,” “…actors such as the Kremlin and DAESH…,”“The Kremlin and Daesh are able to engage the West indirectly…” At the same time, the latter publication nearly justifies the conclusion that Russian propaganda is more dangerous than that of Islamic State. If Islamic State must be physically destroyed (which is done today on the battlefields), what does this imply for Russia? In the speeches of politicians and NATO brochures such a conclusion does not yet resonate, but the propaganda base for a worsening of the current situation is in this way unequivocally laid. This would lead to a third world war and possibly the end of human civilization. Repeated statements by high-ranking NATO leaders about the growing “threat” from Russia, and the activation of NATO in the common neighborhood, namely the Baltic States, certainly do not promote a constructive dialogue between the EU and Russia. This situation is also hampered by the construction of good-neighborly relations between Russia on the one hand and Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia on the other. But I believe that time will put everything in its place and our relations will improve.

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It is important to mention the role of China in the development of the dialogue between Russia and the EU. China’s role is not direct but rather indirect. This, however, is no less significant. Through Russia it is possible to connect more quickly and cheaply the two largest economies of the world—the EU and China—by land. The Eurasian projects of Russia and China on the development of modern transport corridors in the vast territories of Eurasia logically imply their long-term development in the European direction. They will be beneficial for economic cooperation between the peoples of the largest continent on the planet, including the peoples of Europe. In a healthy international situation, it seems that it is not only the Eurasian countries that could take part in such a project, as it alludes to the prospects of a large Eurasian integration and the gradual creation of a common economic space from Shanghai to Lisbon. In the strategic interests of Russia, China, the EU, the United States and other countries the construction of a system of long-term good-neighborly relations would be the best impulse for the dynamic progressive development of all mankind. The path to such a future would be thorny, long and full of dangers but there seems no peaceful alternative. The growing influence of the forces challenging the current model of global integration, obviously created by the formula for TNC, should be noted. Some TNCs (unhappy with their share of the excess profit “pie”), the growing sectors of national business as well as the populations of both developed and developing countries are challenging this model, resulting in phenomena such as Donald Trump, the growing popularity of Marine Le Pen on the French right and Jean-Luc Mélenchon on the French left, or figures such as the deceased Hugo Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro. These changes entail certain political risks. The far-right (not often artificially and deliberately labeled by the mainstream media) holds very dangerous approaches to the modern borders in Europe. It appears that the “fair” sizes of “their” nations are always way beyond (sometimes a long way beyond!) the current boundaries of the respective countries. Their proposed measures of justice are different and even include the use of military force. One can easily imagine the fate of Europe if such groups were to take over power. Russia lost millions of soldiers in the battle against the Nazis’ aim to dominate the world; and a next world war may be fatal to all mankind. However, we cannot yield to the aggressor for fear of a global war. We need to learn the art of big-time politics and understand the obvious importance of strategic communications in this process, for it is not

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enough to follow the right path—we have to make the people realize that the country follows it. Otherwise, professional liars could make them believe in a false path. Neither the stagnant economy of the European Union nor its potential collapse will solve the socioeconomic problems of its members, for the crisis of modern capitalism is growing and the EU crisis is only a part of it. There is a need to work out alternative development models of the entire human civilization, which requires cooperation between the peoples of the world, not their confrontation. Though respectful of the previous efforts to suggest an alternative development model, we have to admit that we cannot repeat 1789 or 1917, nor can we confine ourselves to a number of limited reforms introduced from above. Russia does not claim that its way to a more harmonious future is the only one possible. There is also scope for principled disputes, fierce debates and political struggle. First and foremost, we have to cooperate with the neighboring countries with which we will continue to interact. Russian culture and science have adopted many European ideas while, at the same time, enriching Europe with a lot of their own achievements. For Russia, it is important that it stops playing the role of a raw materials appendix to Europe (describing it as an “energy superpower”) and starts developing advanced industry and science. Although there are considerable problems in this sphere, there is also great potential for development. In social and technological terms, we will have to reckon with forthcoming realities. The signs of such changes are already noticeable today.

Robotization, Artificial Intelligence: New Opportunities and Risks for the EU and Russia The possibilities of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are growing at an unprecedented speed. These technologies have many extremely important areas of social utility: from machine translation to medical diagnostics. The next years and decades will bring immeasurably more opportunities for such applications. The volume of investment in the field of artificial intelligence in the next two decades could be trillions of dollars. Thus, according to the report of the international company PricewaterhouseCoopers Middle East (PwC), published in Dubai during the World Government Summit, 14% of economic growth in the world will be provided through the use of artificial intelligence, which is equivalent to $15.7 trillion. Artificial intelligence contributed to the global

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e­ conomy in 2030, more than the current output of China and India combined. Of this, $6.6 trillion is likely to come from increased productivity and $9.1 trillion is likely to come from consumption-side effects. To the greatest extent the possibilities of AI to accelerate its growth according to the PwC will be able to benefit from China (up 26% of the country’s economic growth at the expense of AI) (Rao and Verweij 2018, p. 3). These positive aspects of the use of artificial intelligence are given attention by research teams in different countries of the world as well as leading international organizations. According to a new report published by Allied Market Research, titled “Artificial Intelligence Market by Technology and Industry Verticals: Global Opportunity Analysis and Industry Forecast, 2018–2025,” the artificial intelligence market accounted for more than $4 billion in 2016, and is expected to reach $169 billion by 2025 (Sharma 2018). If the Chinese economy does not slow down too much in the forthcoming years these figures may come truе. In 2017, China published its “Next generation artificial intelligence development plan” (China Copyright and Media 2017), which laid out plans to become the world leader in artificial intelligence, with a domestic AI industry worth almost $150 billion. The plan has three steps: firstly, it must be able to keep pace with all leading AI technology, and its application in general, by 2020. Part two is to make major breakthroughs by 2025, which is intended to lead to the third part of the plan—the establishment of China as the world leader in the AI field by 2030. It is a very ambitious but quite realistic plan. The first step of it is to catch up with the United States on AI technology and applications by 2020. China is now a leader in AI funding. In 2017, 48% of all equity funding of AI start-ups globally came from China, compared to 38% funded by the United States and 13% by the rest of the world. This is a significant jump from the 11.3% of global funding China contributed in 2016 (Robles 2018). So much more depends on practical results coming from these start-ups, but with current tendencies the United States and the EU will fall behind China in the AI field. Delivering on its strategy on artificial intelligence adopted in April 2018 the European Commission presented in December 2018 a coordinated plan prepared with member states to foster the development and use of AI in Europe. This plan proposes joint actions for closer and more efficient cooperation between member states, Norway, Switzerland and the Commission in four key areas: increasing investment, making more data available, fostering talent and ensuring trust. Stronger coordination is

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essential for Europe to become the world-leading region for developing and deploying cutting-edge, ethical and secure AI (European Commission 2018a). But the plan states that investment levels for AI in the EU are low and fragmented, compared with other parts of the world such as the United States and China. The plan foresees increased coordination of investments, leading to higher synergies and at least €20 billion of public and private investments in research and innovation in AI from 2018 until the end of 2020 and more than €20 billion per year from public and private investments over the following decade. Complementing national investments, the Commission will invest €1.5 billion by 2020, 70% more than in 2014– 2017. For the next long-term EU budget (2021–2027) the EU has proposed investing at least €7 billion from Horizon Europe (European Commission 2018b) and the Digital Europe Programme in AI (European Commission 2018c). These plans are looking to the future, but may experience the negative consequences of growing EU problems. Although the Russian AI market is estimated to be only 0.7% of the world market, it is expected to grow 40 times by 2020. “Estimates of the Russian market are very different: from several hundred million rubles to tens of billions. This spread is primarily due to the fact that most large companies are already implementing projects in the field of AI, but do not yet disclose data on investments and results,” said Dmitry Shushkin, CEO of ABBYY Russia—a leading developer of solutions for intellectual information processing. Russia has recently joined the creation of international standards in the field of AI (International Organization for Standardization 2019a). Taking on the challenge of developing AI standards is the new Subcommittee 42 established in October 2017 (International Organization for Standardization 2019b), which sits under Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1), in turn constituted by two widely respected standards bodies: the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). (Its full ISO abbreviated name is thus ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42.) With the participation of Russian experts at the first stage, projects of three standards will be developed. This agreement was reached at a meeting of the International Subcommittee on Standardization in California. It was important that Russia became a participant in the process at the very beginning. “This is necessary to ensure that the international documents of normative and technical regulation take into account the position of Russia and the interests of our developers. And then it would be

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easier for us to implement international standards,” explained Nikita Utkin, head of the Russian delegation, Chairman of the National Technical Committee for Standardization.1 The work of the National Technology Initiative Center (Nacional’naja tehnologicheskaja iniciativa (National technology initiative) 2019) in the direction of “Artificial Intelligence” will be conducted in Russia as part of a consortium, the leader of which is the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), and among the participants and partners are Skoltech, Higher School of Economics, Innopolis University, Sberbank of Russia, Rosseti, Rostelecom, Russian Railways, ABBYY and so on. The development of this center will take place in the following main areas: • Conversational artificial intelligence, neural networks, deep machine learning. • Machine translation, text and speech recognition, linguistic analysis. • Expert, advisory, information and analytical systems. • Technical vision, detection, recognition, decoding, image classification, etc. Russia has further good potential for the development of an artificial intelligence field, but to succeed the country requires much greater investment in education and science, an effective counteraction to the inertia of the administrative machinery in the development of innovative technologies. In addition to the general positive trend in the development of AI, there are disturbing aspects of its growing implementation in many areas of life. Perhaps the most important problem is the possible increase in mass unemployment. According to many recent reports, such as from the UN, the World Economic Forum, the Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, the McKinsey Global Institute, Oxford University and others (Mishra et al. 2016; Bank of America and Merrill Lynch 2015; Frey and Osborne 2013, 2016; Manyika et  al. 2017; UN Conference on Trade and Development 2016; World Economic Forum 2016; Pol and Reveley 2017), 30% of jobs or more will disappear in the coming two to three decades as a result of the robotization of manufacturing, finance, services and management; this also includes high-paying positions. In 2016, the World Bank published a report stating that in the coming decades more 1

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than 65% of the jobs in developing countries would be threatened by the accelerating development of technology (Mishra et al. 2016, p. 23). This is very worrisome. Our modern fear that robots, artificial intelligence, will steal all the jobs fits a classic script. Nearly 500  years ago, Queen Elizabeth I cited the same fear when she denied an English inventor named William Lee a patent for an automated knitting contraption. “I have too much regard for the poor women and unprotected young maidens who obtain their daily bread by knitting to forward an invention which, by depriving them of employment, would reduce them to starvation,” she told Lee, according to one account of the incident. The lack of patent did not ultimately stop different enterprises from adopting the machine. Two hundred years later, Lee’s invention, still being vilified as a job killer, was among the machines destroyed by protestors during the Luddite movement in Britain (Kessler 2017). More than 200 years after that, though computers had replaced knitting machines as the latest threat to jobs, the fear of technology’s impact on employment is the same. Automating a job can result in more of those jobs. Though Queen Elizabeth I had feared for jobs when she denied Lee’s patent, weaving technology ended up creating more jobs for weavers. By the end of the nineteenth century, there were four times as many factory weavers as there had been in 1830 (Kessler 2017). So some jobs disappeared and new jobs appeared in their place—a progress in action. The current optimistic approach to the development of robotization and AI is also based on that historical paradigm. For example, Eric Schmidt, an executive chairman of Alphabet, Google’s parent company, and Sebastian Thrun, a president and chairman of Udacity, an online education company, urge the public to stop freaking out about artificial intelligence. The history of technology shows that there’s often initial skepticism and fear-mongering before it ultimately improves human life. The original Kodak camera was seen as destroying art. Electricity was believed to be too dangerous when it was first introduced. But once these technologies got into the hands of millions of people, and they were developed openly and collaboratively, those fears subsided. Just as the agricultural revolution has freed us from spending our waking hours picking crops by hand in the fields, the AI revolution could free us from menial, repetitive, and mindless work. AI will do those things we don’t want to—like driving in bumper-to-­bumper traffic. (Schmidt and Thrun 2016)

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But we are for the first time in history on the way toward the complete (but far from instantaneous) extinction of uncreative activities. However, the system of mass education is far from being ready to provide mass training for specialists in innovative technology development. Many questions arise in this respect. Would it be possible at all to provide such training? Are all equally gifted with abilities for this kind of activity? Even the vast majority of “white-collar” activities are by no means related to innovation. The growth of unemployment can be held by administrative measures (temporary limit the use of robots in important areas but this will only delay the solution of the problem and may result in the stagnation of the economy) or the creation of “simulation work” (i.e. activities of no serious importance that could be better performed by smart robots2 but done by people with the aim to give them something to do). However, these measures would not save the humans from the degradation of public consciousness (it has already begun earlier, in the era of mass automation of the industry). The Bank of England has warned that up to 15 million jobs in Britain (almost half of all the jobs in Britain) are at risk of being lost to an age of robots where increasingly sophisticated machines do the work that was previously the preserve of humans. Andy Haldane, the bank’s chief economist, added that “if these visions were to be realised, however futuristic this sounds, the labour market patterns of the past three centuries would shift to warp speed. If the option of skilling-up is no longer available, this increases the risk of large scale un-or under-employment. The wage premium for those occupying skilled positions could explode, further widening wage differentials” (Bank of England 2015; Elliot 2015). In 2017, the European Parliament Resolutions on Robotics (European Parliament 2017) provided society with some information on the advantages and risks of robotics.

2  Robotics and artificial intelligence serve very different purposes. However, people often get them mixed up. Robotics is a branch of technology which deals with robots. Robots are programmable machines, which are usually able to carry out a series of actions autonomously, or semi-autonomously. Artificial intelligence (AI) is a branch of computer science. It involves developing computer programs to complete tasks that would otherwise require human intelligence. Artificially intelligent robots (smart robots) are the bridge between robotics and AI. These are robots that are controlled by AI programs, but many robots are not artificially intelligent at all. See more about the difference between robotics and artificial intelligence: Schmidt and Thrun 2016.

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K. … it is important to bear in mind that developing robotics may lead to a high concentration of wealth and influence in the hands of a minority; L. … the development of robotics and AI will definitely influence the landscape of the workplace, which may create new liability concerns and eliminate others… P. … there is a possibility that in the long term, AI could surpass human intellectual capacity3; 59. Calls on the Commission, when carrying out an impact assessment of its future legislative instrument, to explore, analyze and consider the implications of all possible legal solutions, such as: … f) creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons responsible for making good any damage they may cause, and possibly applying electronic personality to cases where robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently. (European Parliament 2017)

In February 2017, the European Parliament called for the adoption of a common European legislation regulating the growth of both robot production and their use, although they rejected imposing a social tax on robot owners. The total sales of industrial robots amounted to $46 billion, increasing by 15% per year. Russia, unfortunately, is hardly involved in this process as it introduces only several hundred industrial robots annually. According to Evgeny Popravko, the CEO of Pride-Automatics, an integrator of automated solutions, such statistics can only predict that “in a few years in Russia there will be barely two kinds of companies: those that have introduced automated systems and those that no longer exist” (Robogeek 2016). Low productivity at “pre-robotic” plants will continue to reduce the already weak competitiveness of most Russian industrial enterprises. China has firmly taken its place as the world leader in the field of robotics, although four years ago the country did not have its own production of industrial robots. It appeared that in 2013, and by the end of  Ray Kurzweil, Google’s Director of Engineering, is a well-known futurist with a highhitting track record for accurate predictions. Of his 147 predictions since the 1990s, Kurzweil claims an 86% accuracy rate. The year 2029 is the consistent date Kurzweil has predicted for when an AI will pass a valid Turing test and therefore achieve human levels of intelligence. He has set the date 2045 for the “Singularity,” which is when we will multiply our effective intelligence a billion-fold by merging with the intelligence we have created. See: Reedy 2017. 3

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2014, China had become the world leader in the sales of robots—57,000 pieces were bought by Chinese customers. In 2015, sales of industrial robots increased in China to 68,000 units, while in Japan, which ranks second, these figures represented respectively 29,300 and 35,000 units. At the same time, about 30% of sales in China are robots the country itself has produced. In Russia, only 550 robots were sold in 2015, and just 316 pieces in 2016 (Mukhamedzyanova 2017). In 2015, in South Korea there were 531 robots for 10,000 workers, whereas in Russia there was only one. In 1984, the Soviet Union occupied second place in the world (after Japan) in the production and development of industrial robots. Every fourth industrial robot in the USSR was produced in Moscow, ranging from industrial robots, collaborative robotics, motion control robots, service robotics and robot promoters to small-sized home robots. A special direction within robotics is military robotics. In many ways, Russia has made serious progress, and even occupies a leading position in some niche areas (according to some estimates Russia is five years ahead of the leading military powers in the creation of tactical combat robots [weight from 5 to 30 tons] [Voennoe obozrenie (Military Review) 2017)], but in many other areas of robotics the lag and decline are evident). On the other hand, some forecasts give a very pessimistic image related to the rise of unemployment because of robotization. According to research concerning Russia conducted by Superjob.ru, from 2018 onward the reduction of offers for low-skilled employees will start each year at 5%. The real unemployment rate will grow by the same figure. Thus, given the current trends, the overall level of unemployment in Russia by 2022 may increase several times, up to 20–25%. At the same time, the demand for highly qualified specialists will only grow. It will be impossible to maintain the employment of the population using the existing methods of state support of employment (Superjob.ru 2016). It is extremely difficult to agree with such forecasts, because for their implementation it is necessary to raise the sale of robots in Russia thousands of times in a few years, which is hardly possible. It should be taken into account that predictive analytics can serve as a prognostic weapon, that is, be used to sow panic and uncertainty in society. However, complacency in the development of AI and robotics is unacceptable. Negative aspects of robotization may appear, not for five years but for several decades, if society does not make a qualitative leap in its development and,

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above all, in the progress of human creativity and the effectiveness of its self-organization based on promising technologies. Thus, it can be stated that there are contradictory trends in the development of artificial intelligence and robotics, which reflect both positive and negative social consequences of the growth of these increasingly important sectors of the economy. Perhaps one of the clearest comments on this topic was a recent quote attributed to Russian President Vladimir Putin. He declared in September 2017 that “artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world” (RT 2017). However, President Putin emphasized that he would not like to see anyone “monopolize” the field. “If we become leaders in this area, we will share this know-how with the entire world, the same way we share our nuclear technologies today,” he told students from across Russia via satellite link-up, speaking from the Yaroslavl region (ibidem). In other words, robotics and AI are important areas of potential collaboration between the EU and Russia in the interests of the broader world. It was hardly a coincidence that the European Parliament’s resolution of 12 March on the state of EU-Russia political relations in spite of the general anti-Russian rhetoric of this document calls for selective engagement with Russia with algorithmic decision-making in regard to artificial intelligence as well as some other crucial areas (European Parliament 2019). Russia has to look closely at the experience of different countries, not least in Europe, in regard to artificial intelligence creation and robotic production development, and also at the social aspect of this process. Otherwise, the pursuit of scientific and technological progress may lead to the disintegration of society. With the rising level of living standards and concurrent unemployment, the increased leisure time characterizing Spain, Greece and a number of other South European countries, where the unemployment rate is now already close to 50% among young people, indicates warning signs of frequent asocial behavior, apathy, drug addiction, alcoholism and crime. Robotization will only exacerbate these tendencies unless we manage to develop our creative abilities. Chinese researchers and teachers are already successfully working in this area.

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Developing a Human Being: From Human Genetic Engineering to Cyborgization At BGI Shenzhen,4 scientists have collected DNA samples from 2000 of the world’s smartest people and are sequencing their entire genomes in an attempt to identify the alleles that determine human intelligence. If they are successful, embryo screening will allow parents to pick their brightest zygote and potentially bump up every generation’s intelligence by five to 15 IQ points. Within a couple of generations, competing with the Chinese on an intellectual level will be impossible. According to Geoffrey Miller,5 this would mean a huge difference in terms of economic productivity, the competitiveness of the country, how many patents they get, how their businesses are run and how innovative their economy is, even if it only boosted the IQ of the average kid by five IQ points: The USA are (similarly to the EU and Russia – Evgeny Pashentsev) “pretty far behind.” We have the same technical capabilities, the same statistical capabilities to analyze the data, but they’re collecting the data on a much larger scale and seem to be capable of transforming the scientific findings into government policy and consumer genetic testing much more easily than we are. Technically and scientifically we could be doing this, but we’re not. We have ideological biases that say, “Well, this could be troubling, we shouldn’t be meddling with nature, we shouldn’t be meddling with God.” I just attended a debate in New York a few weeks ago about whether or not we should outlaw genetic engineering in babies and the audience was pretty split. In China, 95% of an audience would say, “Obviously you should make babies genetically healthier, happier and brighter!” There’s a big cultural difference. (Eror 2013)

In recent times, some European countries (such as the UK and Sweden) have started genome editing—also called “gene editing”—on human embryos with all the opportunities and risks that come along with such 4  The biggest genetic research center in China. BGI Genomics provides a wide range of next-generation sequencing services and a broad portfolio of genetic tests for medical institutions, research institutions and other public and private partners. BGI currently operates in more than 100 countries and regions and works with more than 3000 medical institutions. See more: BGI 2018. 5  Geoffrey Miller is an evolutionary psychologist and lecturer at NYU, and is one of the 2000 brainiacs who contributed their DNA.

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experiments (Siddique 2016). The different points of view on the topic have led to serious political debates (Hosman 2016). Russia has a world-­ leading position in the field of bioinformatics. As for the more classical genetics, there is a certain lack, which is due to the fact that modern genetic research is quite expensive, and the money that is allocated in China or the United States is not commensurate with the budgets of Russian scientific funds. According to Vladimir Putin, modern science opens tremendous opportunities in the field of changing human nature, but such studies can have unpredictable consequences. One can imagine that a person can create a person with given characteristics. It can be a brilliant mathematician, it can be a brilliant musician, but it can also be a military man who can fight without fear, without a sense of compassion and regret, without pain…You understand that humanity can enter – and is likely to do so in the near future – a very difficult and responsible period of its development and existence. And what I have just said may be worse than a nuclear bomb. (RIA Novosti 2017)

Humans must become cyborgs if they are to stay relevant in a future dominated by artificial intelligence. That was the warning from Tesla founder Elon Musk. Musk argued that as artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated, it will lead to mass unemployment. “There will be fewer and fewer jobs that a robot can’t do better,” he said at the World Government Summit in Dubai, 2017. If humans want to continue to add value to the economy, they must augment their capabilities through a “merger of biological intelligence and machine intelligence.” If we fail to do this, we’ll risk becoming “house cats” to AI. We are still far from Elon Musk’s vision of symbiosis between man and machine, which would require a much more granular understanding of the brain network that goes beyond the basics of motor control to more complex cognitive faculties such as language and metaphor. The theory is that with sufficient knowledge of the neural activity in the brain, it will be possible to create “neuroprosthetics” that could allow us to communicate complex ideas telepathically or give us additional cognitive (extra memory) or sensory (night vision) abilities. Musk says he is working on an injectable meshlike “neural lace” that fits on your brain to give it digital computing capabilities (Solon 2017). According to Ray Kurzweil, humans will become hybrids in the 2030s. This means that our brains will be able to connect directly to the cloud, where there will be thousands of computers, and those computers will augment our existing intelligence. The

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brain will connect via nanobots—tiny robots made from DNA strands (Eugenios 2015). The current great progress in robotization, genetics and cyborgization constitutes a very important sphere of possible collaboration between the EU and Russia, but there is an evident lack of open discussion at high state level on the issues of “human engineering,” as both sides are preoccupied with equally important geopolitical and economic issues nearly cutting to minimum the possible exchange and multilateral decision-making in new areas of science, similarly important for mutually beneficial strategic planning and strategic communication. In this chapter, we have only briefly mentioned the issues of robotization, cyborgization and revolutionary achievements in genetics but there are a lot of other important areas of scientific and technological progress that, beneath our very eyes, are changing our lives and social projections. Renowned economists’ and sociologists’ forecasts often do not keep up with scientific and technological progress. We need both a decent interdisciplinary specialist training and permanent teams of professionals from various scientific fields that could, at a systemic level, analyze hundreds and thousands of variables. But today, even multidisciplinary teams cannot do without big data tools, supercomputers and many other mechanisms necessary for reliable strategic communications. In these terms, the cooperation between Russian and EU specialists is mutually beneficial and undoubtedly should be developed. It should be noted that the lack of a tangible strategic vision supported by people affects both their emotional-­ moral state and the political situation in society, especially in a highly developed one. Incidentally, that is effectively used by terrorist groups and the circles behind them inviting people to seek the “Nirvana” of oblivion in serving God. In reality, however, they serve only reactionary forces.

Artificial General Intelligence: A New Challenge? Earlier, we considered the prospects and challenges of AI in the context of the development of Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI). ANI is the only form of artificial intelligence that humanity has achieved so far. This is AI that is good at performing a single task, such as playing chess or Go, or making purchase suggestions, sales predictions and weather forecasts. Computer vision and natural language processing are still at the current stage of Narrow AI. Speech and image recognition are Narrow AI, even if their advances seem fascinating (Dickson 2017). In the context of the

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current chapter, it supports the idea about great risks coming to the society of different advanced versions of Narrow AI, or sometimes labeled “Weak AI.” However, Narrow AI is good in monotonous jobs. It is Narrow AI that is threatening to replace (or rather displace) many human jobs. In addition, Narrow AI could be very dangerous in the hands of different egoistic groups of influence. The possible creation of human-equivalent AI—General AI (or the same Artificial General Intelligence [AGI], others call it “Real” AI, “True,” or “Strong” or “Full” AI), and consequently the almost inevitable and very rapid arrival of Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI) and potential singularity, will inevitably introduce fundamentally different realities. Some aspects of the creation of AGI seem important in the context of the topic of this chapter. “Philosophers will argue whether General AI needs to have a real consciousness or whether a simulation of it suffices,” Jonathan Matus, founder and CEO of Zendrive, which is based in San Francisco and analyzes driving data collected from smartphone sensors, said in an email. But, in essence, “General intelligence is what people do,” says Oren Etzioni, CEO of the Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence in Seattle, Washington (Baggaley 2017). In recent years, the volume of research in the field of AGI has grown rapidly, and a lot of literature in this area has appeared (Goertzel and Pennachin 2007; Wang and Goertzel 2012; Goertzel et al. 2014; Goertzel 2016; Everitt et al. 2017; Iklé et al. 2018; Lee 2018; Simon 2018; Bostrom 2014; Cunningham 2017; Chace 2018, etc.). The survey by Baum published by the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute in 2017 identifies 45 AGI R&D projects spread across 30 countries in six continents, many of which are based in major corporations and academic institutions, and some of which are large and heavily funded. Many of the projects are interconnected via common personnel, common parent organizations or project collaboration (Baum 2017, p. 2). • Most projects are in corporations or academic institutions. • Most projects publish an open-source code. • Few projects have military connections. • Most projects are not active on AGI safety issues. • Most projects are in the small- to medium-size range. The three largest projects are DeepMind (a London-based project of Google), the Human Brain Project (an academic project based in Lausanne, Switzerland) and OpenAI (a nonprofit project based in San ­ Francisco) (ibidem).

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An approach to national data on the number and declared amount of funding for AGI projects requires a certain caution. Research and, in particular, successful practical developments in today’s extremely tense situation will certainly be just on issues of national security, but also on the very existence of the entire human civilization. This hardly makes it possible to determine objectively the volume, nature and level of research because of the high level of its secrecy, which may increase in the future. AGI promises great prospects: to become a financial Eldorado of the twenty-first century and to give answers to many questions considered today a matter of a very distant future (from personal immortality to flight to other stars). There are attempts to speculate on the natural expectations of people to present the creation of the AGI is almost a fait accompli. This fact explains, on the one hand, the continuing skepticism of some researchers in relation to the possibility of creating AGI, and, on the other, panic publications of tabloids about the end of the world and the seizure of power by ASI almost tomorrow. The emergence of financial bubbles on investment expectations in a new promising area is also possible over time. It is curious to see rapid and drastic changes in the awareness of potential threats of AI use by the public authorities and security community of the United States. In a White House document regarding the outgoing administration of Barack Obama in 2016, the experts’ assessments were given: General AI will not be created in the coming decades, if it will be possible at all (Executive Office of the President, National Science and Technology Council, Committee on Technology 2016, pp. 7–8). Two years later, in the US national security bodies, there was a clear reassessment of the possible threat from General AI. The GAO 2018 report (US Government Accountability Office [GAO] 2018) focuses on long-range emerging threats—those that may occur in approximately five or more years, as identified by various respondents at the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Among dual-use technologies, the first in the list in the GAO report is AI. The only two examples of AI threats given are deeply interrelated: (1) Nation State and Nonstate Development of AI; (2) Intelligent Systems with General AI (US Government Accountability Office [GAO]) 2018, p. 8). It is no coincidence that all these changes in the approaches to the General AI capabilities appeared in the last two years. In 2018, researchers at Oxford and Yale Universities and AI Impacts polled AI experts, asking them “When will AI  – High Level Machine Intelligence (HLMI) – exceed human performance?” (Grace et al. 2018,

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p. 729). The survey involved researchers with publications at NIPS and ICML, top machine learning conferences, in 2015. A total of 352 researchers participated in the survey (21% of the 1634 NIPS and ICML authors). Each respondent estimated the probability of HLMI arriving in future years. Taking the mean over each individual, the aggregate forecast gave a 50% chance of HLMI occurring within 45 years and a 10% chance of it occurring within nine years. The survey displays the probabilistic predictions for a random subset of individuals, as well as the mean predictions. There is large inter-subject variation: the figures of the survey show that Asian respondents expect HLMI in 30 years, whereas North Americans expect it in 74 years. The survey displays a similar gap between the two countries with the most respondents in the survey: China (median 28 years) and the United States (median 76 years) (ibidem, p. 733). This seems to be the key to understanding the concerns of security professionals in the United States who have both open and closed information on the issue. Most researchers, at least in countries with a high level of AI development, today believe that General AI is a real task, and not for centuries, but for decades, and a minority that it is a task for less than ten years. However, such a large discrepancy between Chinese and North American specialists hardly indicates a complete separation from the reality of specialists from China. The country is quickly catching up with the United States in AI, and in some areas is clearly ahead. The mass evidence of the best Chinese experts in favor of a much earlier appearance of General AI seems to be based on something real, which explains the serious concerns of the United States. Alas, this growing backlog leads to false conclusions in the United States. The main problem with this country is not the “aggressiveness” of China and Russia, but the growing corruption and inefficiency of some of its own elites. The breakthrough in AI and other areas of research in China is not due to stolen trade secrets from the United States. If that were the case, then why is the United States unable to move forward as quickly using its own technology as China does with “stolen” ones? The infamous words of Marcello, “Something is rotten in the state of Denmark,” lead to a direct association with the United States. In addition, it is extremely dangerous that the creative potential of such a great country is far from its full realization—dangerous for the citizens of the United States and around the world. It is also a lesson for Russia, which, as a result of the

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“reforms” launched in the 1990s, is now able to compete with the United States, mainly in two areas: in the military sector and in the struggle for the status of a “great energy superpower.” International cooperation in understanding the problems associated with General AI seems to require the establishment of an interdisciplinary expert group at the United Nations, as well as the comprehensive development of other forms of international cooperation in this field. If we receive a signal from an extraterrestrial civilization that its representatives may be on Earth in ten years, we will begin to prepare for this. What about the General AI case? It is important to note that the internet is the main means of transmitting scientific, popular and tabloid information on AI. This is an important means of accelerating the creation of AI, because to some extent it integrates the capabilities of humanity in this area. The transition to almost completely closed national segments of the internet can slow down the creation of General AI, but not stop it, as well as its subsequent spread. Even the problems of Narrow AI are increasingly affecting humanity, including in the information and psychological sphere. To a much stronger degree it will affect humanity’s progress to General AI. Some experts believe that the creation of General AI—human-­ equivalent AI—in a matter of years will lead to its self-improvement, the emergence of Super AI (which would by far exceed human intelligence) and the coming of a period of singularity. This is neither a given nor a guarantee, but a real possibility. Many experts see no chance for human civilization in this case; others are highly optimistic about the possibility of creating Super AI in the context of human development (Bostrom 2014; Chalmers 2010; Cunningham 2017; Lu et al. 2018, etc.). We can offer several conclusions that are important for understanding the nature of the challenges at the stage of moving from Narrow AI to a possible General AI and further to ASI. 1. Unlike hypothetical aliens, General AI will be an intelligence with historical, scientific, philosophical and cultural roots in modern human civilization. It will be an intelligence that will develop faster and better than any of the past human generations. However, it will have its origin in us, based on a deep understanding of human civilization in all its contradictory development and achievements. We do not consider our distant ancestors, who lived 2000 years ago, animals, but they would take us for gods in many circumstances. It is

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another matter that this intelligence may not want to put up with several negative and dangerous manifestations of modern human society that are dangerous to humans and the entire planet, such as the threat of world war, environmental pollution and other growing problems. 2. On the other hand, the infant is only an individual, but not a fully formed personality. Personality forms in the process of socialization. In other words, each individual’s mind forms not by itself, but in the course of a long assimilation of the achievements of human civilization in theory and in practice, rationally and emotionally. The child themself will not find the human mind. The sad fate of young children who fell by the will of fate in the community of animals quite convincingly confirms this. Thus, the human mind is to a certain (if not decisive) extent “artificial,” and AGI can become in a sense more “human” than any people. 3. First of all, it depends on us whether AGI will be a continuation of the best aspects of our civilization. 4. Alternatively, not at all AGI appears, if we destroy ourselves before it comes. 5. However, AGI will have a qualitatively different material basis and capabilities that will allow it to develop much faster than the humans. AGI will not be an ordinary person, But this mind has passed the formation within and under the influence of the human environment, and in the future, probably very quickly, it will become immeasurably higher the level of modern humanity. And only here will the true singularity start. 6. It is important that General AI will not be a product of humanity in general, but specific people. There are also possible options, until his/her appearance in the laboratory, controlled by antisocial, reactionary, militaristic circles. In addition, if the environment often deforms people (of different intelligence), then why is this not applicable to General AI? 7. Although it can be assumed that the creation of General AI through an organization with criminal goals will be an additional risk factor, controlling the extremely rapid progress of General AI into ASI is unlikely to be allowed, not only for egoistic groups of influence but for the whole of humanity. This follows from the very level of ASI, which makes such control almost impossible.

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8. In time, we will be able to integrate ourselves into the singularity through cyborgization and genetic engineering, which will increase human intellectual capabilities. 9. We can consider the nature of General AI as the possibility of the emergence of an integrated mind with its will and feelings. However, as mentioned above, its birth and initial development will take place in the human environment, based on human information and knowledge. Another thing is if we get an integrated powerful intellectual potential, capable of solving problems only on human instructions. Then we are dealing simply with a more powerful machine, and the pros/cons of using it will depend on the people running it. Perhaps the second will precede the first. Let’s see. This is only part of the obvious moments that do not allow us to bow our heads under the knife of the ruthless guillotine of singularity with mystical horror. In addition, today everything still depends on people who, alas, are divided and do not think in the majority about a strategy for the development of society.

From the Stable Dynamic Social Equilibrium to the Unstable Dynamic Social Equilibrium: The Risks Becoming More Serious Humankind is a dynamic system affected by both evolutionary and revolutionary changes in the way it progresses and its gradual or rapid regression, for example, through a counter-revolution. Revolts of slaves in Ancient Rome or peasants in the Middle Ages broke temporary balances of slave-owning and feudal systems but didn’t lead directly to their replacement owing to the objective immaturity of preconditions. Therefore, we believe it is necessary to differentiate the dynamic equilibrium of society in the narrow sense of the word within the framework of preserving the qualitative parameters of the system from dynamic equilibrium in the broad sense of the word, with the transition from one equilibrium to another through social revolution (coming from below or from above or some mixed options is not so important in this case). In such a case, it is important to understand the possibilities and mechanisms of influencing the obsolete and the methods for its removal as painlessly as possible for society, since and where the obsolete is beginning to

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threaten the viability of mankind. It is particularly important to follow such an approach now. The mere presence of weapons of mass destruction will give an answer to this, and the risks are too great to get an absolute “radioactive regression” instead of progress. In addition, we need to take into account the presence of hundreds of nuclear power plants around the world, biological laboratories and much more. It is possible to formulate a mandatory requirement for the nature of planetary development. In the transition from one qualitative state of society to another, much larger and deeper than ever before, the thresholds for the disruption of the dynamic equilibrium of the social system must be lower than in the former revolutionary transitions in order to avoid the destruction of human civilization. For example, the one-time total destruction of ten big factories 100–200 years ago during a civil war anywhere in Central Europe could not, in principle, have such dangerous consequences as the destruction of one nuclear power plant today. Of course, this requirement is particularly important for compliance by nuclear powers in internal conflicts and in international sensitive areas. The new should create a preponderance over the old so that the latter will have no option but to go away without resorting to extreme forms of military confrontation. However, the new needs determination and to be prepared for “worst-case scenarios”; otherwise, the old risks going for a dangerous confrontation, underestimating the ability and willingness to go forward of the new. Here, not only are technological, economic and sociopolitical prerequisites of superiority important, but also informational and psychological ones, successfully synchronized within the framework of strategic communication. The stabilization of a qualitatively new dynamic equilibrium of society is also impossible without strategic communication. The Marxist theory of revolution with its numerous international teams of theoretical contributors and practitioners—Tektology (Bogdanov 1989; Melnik 2013), Systems Theory (Bertalanffy 1969), Action Theory (Parsons 1978), Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and so on—contributes today to the research of social dynamic systems. At the same time, insufficient attention is being paid to the comprehensive analysis of the issues of the unstable dynamic equilibrium of modern society, especially in the context of random and targeted negative impacts in the field of strategic psychological warfare. After all, it is aimed at long-term disorientation of the real or potential enemy on the most important issues, and this is impossible without measures to

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reduce its ability to think strategically and to perform appropriate decision-making. Military experts generally agree that it has always been done and should be done against the enemy. But whether it is beneficial to reduce strategic analysis and the ability to adequately respond to international challenges from a nuclear competitor or not remains the question. Not least, this question should worry Russia and the EU with their nuclear and energy potentials, not so much because of their bilateral miscalculations but due to the decline in the level of strategic thinking among some other leading actors. Misinterpretation of actions in a tense situation is fraught with particular risks, especially if there are doubts about the capacities for adequate behavior of the other party. The equilibrium state of the system acts as a process of constant interaction of a progressively developing system with the environment. This interaction over time leads to the imbalance of the system, followed by the onset of instability (crisis) and structural adjustment of the system, which forms a new stability and a new equilibrium state at a higher level of its further development (Melnik 2013). Thus, a Stable Dynamic Social Equilibrium (SDSE) in the current global situation changes naturally, although not simultaneously (and not in all spheres of social life uniformly), but more and more quickly to an Unstable Dynamic Social Equilibrium (UDSE). The different and quite often contradictory positions and interests of dominant social and political groups, their quite different understanding or even worse “full ignorance” of future prospects of mankind facilitate the transition to a UDSE. UDSE is characterized by the following features and contradictions: • Extremely uneven load on various elements of the system during the transition to a new state. This is reflected in the growing property and social polarization of the population, the erosion of the middle classes and other factors that make the Dynamic Social Equilibrium unstable. • Degradation of old elements of interaction and management of economic, political, military and other systems at the national, international and supranational levels. The old is not yet gone; it is still necessary. The new has not developed, it is not only “not allowed,” but also is not itself ready to replace the old in the ideological, political, economic spheres. This explains such different phenomena as Brexit, the weakening of NATO, the weakness of the Commonwealth of Independent States, frequent and rather sudden attempts at inter-

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national reorientation of countries, which in themselves almost never solve fundamental problems, but only deepen them. For example, the “force-oriented” economic and political turn of Ukraine from Russia to the EU does not contribute to the solution of the socioeconomic problems of the EU, Russia and, especially, Ukraine. • The growth of populist parties and movements of different orientations that promise what they cannot accomplish (a fundamental improvement in people’s lives). Right-wing populists are trying to get out of the situation by building “walls” against migrants and by promises of reindustrialization, which on a new technological basis will eventually turn into mass unemployment or (at best) imitation of employment. The escalation of conflict at the national level, and in the international arena—bellicose rhetoric that threatens to turn into large-scale military conflicts—is especially characteristic of the administration of D. Trump. Left-wing populists, for example, in Latin America, having achieved great success in education and health care, face increasing difficulties. These difficulties are caused not only by external imperialist pressure but also by the attempts of the left to solve the problems without going beyond the existing global system of capitalism. Right and left populism (with an undoubted difference between them) is not a denial of global capitalism but a manifestation of its crisis. • The North Korean option of breaking out of the global system of capitalism is also not a more successful model of social development. Even in the immeasurably stronger Soviet bloc, with one third of the world’s GDP, this problem has not been solved. The slowdown in China’s economic growth suggests that a kind of model of catching­up development within the framework of global capitalism can turn this country with the largest population also into the country with the largest GDP. However, the painful redistribution of forces in the international arena does not solve the problems of the modern world, and even exacerbates them in some places. This, in turn, does not justify attempts to stop the emerging countries, hampering their development or threatening them with sanctions or military ­interventions. Attempts to organize a “local” world war in Eurasia are extremely dangerous and will not be limited to Eurasian borders. However, within the framework of the existing order, it can begin even without setting a match to a powder keg from outside—there is a lot of gunpowder in Eurasia itself.

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• Unlike the situation on the eve of revolutionary changes (in the period of bourgeois revolutions) in Europe or the October Revolution in Russia, across the world there is no obvious discussed alternative to the existing model, while the existing one is in a serious systemic crisis. This allows many researchers, politicians and public persons to talk about the presence of a global civilizational crisis. The capitalist system is increasingly dynamic, experiencing more tension in its links, but does not offer fundamental solutions within the framework of maintaining its quality parameters. There is no traditional alternative on the left. It has lost its historical actor, the proletariat, which has failed to meet the expectations and is rapidly disappearing as a class. Vladimir Lenin asserted: “[T]he whole main force of the movement [the Bolsheviks – Evgeny Pashentsev] is in the organization of workers in large factories, because large factories (and plants) include not only the predominant in number, but even more predominant in influence, developing and able for struggle, part of the entire working class. Every factory should be our fortress” (Lenin 1904, p.  9). This position has clearly lost its importance, and the bourgeoisie, in developing deserted enterprises, successfully acts as a “gravedigger of the proletariat,” which objectively acts as a manifestation of progress, not the regression of society. • According to many surveys, there is a weakening of social confidence and trust in existing national and supranational political institutions, including the EU (Lipton 2019; Euractiv 2013; Merler 2015; McCourt 2019; Edelman 2019) and Russia (Regnum 2018; Echo of Moscow 2018; RBC 2019) (although many nations retain faith in a better future for their peoples). However, importantly, people in less developed countries demonstrate much greater confidence in the future. This is often based on traditional growth reserves that still exist, while in developed countries social optimism is an apanage of the minority, although we must admit that the optimistic minority varies greatly in number: from 16% in Japan and 21% in France to 48% in the United States. Russia occupies an intermediate position with 39% (Edelman 2019). In countries such as Indonesia and Colombia, despite extreme social polarization, belief in the future confidently dominates the public consciousness—82% and 84%, respectively, which is also, in our opinion, characteristic of countries with a much larger proportion of young people among the population, and of many countries in the so-called third world.

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• Increased unevenness in the economic and political development of the leading countries within the EU (e.g. if we compare the development of Italy and Germany), as well as the formation of new world leaders (China, India, etc.). • Degradation of strategic thinking of the ruling circles of many leading countries of the world. This applies to the leading countries of the EU, Russia and the United States in recent decades. The collapse of the Soviet Union, catastrophic for the majority of Russians in the 1990s has long-term effects, and there are many still unsolved problems in contemporary Russia. The case of Brexit demonstrates the degradation of the ruling elite of Great Britain, far ahead of the general decline of social, financial and economic institutions of the country. The United States, having ascended to the role of the only leader of the modern world after the collapse of the Soviet Union, clearly failed in this role. China, on the contrary, demonstrates the growth of strategic thinking of the elite. This strengthens its position at the national, regional and global levels. • However, degradation should not be seen as a verdict for a country. Degradation is the natural characteristic of more developed countries, in which the ruling circles face new challenges before less developed countries. There is an acute struggle within the elites who want to, but cannot, live in the old way. In the bud is the formation of social alternatives and alternative elites of the twenty-first century. This is quite natural, because new elites cannot be formed without a new scientific, technological and economic base. In addition, this base is experiencing only the beginning of a revolutionary leap in its development. However, the jump by its historical standards is very fast and incomparably larger and deeper than all previous ones in history. Scientific and technological progress is rapidly adjusting future researches, which the theorists and practitioners have to consider. Apparently, there is no need to follow the conclusion of Arthur Schopenhauer: “Everyone takes the limits of his own vision for the limits of the world.” Otherwise, the end of the world will really come through “joint efforts.” Underestimating the different consequences of technological progress is extremely dangerous at the governmental level. • The degradation of science and education, the strengthening of superstitions, the increase in religious intolerance, the primitive interpretation of both religion and science by the majority of people

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against the background of the general availability and the increasingly poor quality of higher education. The number of universities and students in Russia and in most EU countries has increased by almost an order of magnitude in recent decades, while the level of education has obviously fallen. For example, the illegal trade in higher education diplomas, according to media reports and expert assessments, is successfully thriving in Russia (Komsomolskaya Pravda 2012; Nasyrov 2013; Remizov 2017; Zvezdina et al. 2018) and the UK (Simons 2019; Stow 2019)—countries whose governments are antagonists on many geopolitical issues. This situation was hard to imagine in both countries 30–40 years ago. Dr. Thomas Lancaster, a senior fellow at Imperial College London, who specializes in academic integrity and contract cheating, said that this is just the tip of the iceberg. “The industry is worth hundreds of millions of pounds globally, and tens of millions in Britain,” he said. Of course, there are common problems and they must be solved together. These and many other social phenomena are well known in themselves, but rarely seen as a systemic manifestation of UDSE in contemporary conditions. It is possible to assume that they can become a window of vulnerability, which experts in the field of High-Tech Strategic Psychological Warfare (HTSPW) of the state and nonstate actors, and more generally in hybrid wars of the twenty-first century, will not fail to master. At the expense of various means of influence, it is possible both to strengthen and to weaken objective manifestations of an instability of social systems, and it is equally possible to provoke additional artificial indignations. SPW allows achievement of this on a long-term basis, in the most important areas of social development. As SPW is conducted with different degrees of professionalism, by various state and nonstate actors, there is an overlay (interference) of various management control schemes. Consequently, the efficiency of SPW decreases. The role of even weak AI in overcoming this problem is great, because it radically increases the ability of the human mind to calculate the options for social development; in addition, it increasingly makes it possible to foresee the specific parameters of individual events and allows for identification of the effectiveness of influencing operations much faster and more effectively. Thus, AI takes one of the leading places among other means and methods of offensive HTSPW. However, it creates new adequate capabilities of defensive

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HTSPW, which is typical for the dynamic unstable balance of all offensive and defensive weapons. It is extremely important to minimize the risks of further development of HTSPW between the biggest actors in the global arena with great risks of such warfare for human civilization. Russia and the EU can do that only by driving their strategic communication, taking into account each other’s concerns and finding a common answer to the problems of our time.

Alternatives of Social Development: “To Be, or Not to Be, That Is the Question” Many objective signs indicate the entry of mankind into the next round of its development. It is obvious that the old system inevitably loses its stability on the eve of transition and the easier it is to overturn it. Historically progressive forces did not do it once in history. Unfortunately, this is not the case for others. Hitler effectively started a quality regression. Contemporary terrorists, if they were in possession of weapons of mass destruction, could do the same. With the reckless “game of thrones” played by the global elites, the threat of a global ecological disaster is imminent. The list is expanding and can be continued; most of the problems that it lists are aggravated rather than solved. Long periods of social stagnation or rapid development in the conditions of rivalry of several geopolitical coalitions seem unlikely. A long period of stagnation due to limited natural resources, growing environmental problems, a rise in income polarization, international tensions and other factors is practically impossible. We are simply not going to survive for a long period of time without radical progressive changes. If we do not kill ourselves we shall kill our kids, or at least their future. The rapid development in the framework of global rivalry will only accelerate the introduction of the latest revolutionary technologies, which in turn will inevitably lead to qualitative changes in society. The forces of revolution and counter-­ revolution in such historical periods always grow together, though not uniformly and simultaneously. At the same time, it is not always easy, especially in the initial stages, to distinguish the grain from the chaff, the ­flowers of the revolution from the numerous voids. But there are qualitative differences in the current punctuated equilibrium in the broad sense of the word from similar states in the past. There are a lot of them, but due to the limited scope of this chapter, we will focus on only one difference, closely related to the theme.

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Once the technological leap that we are already starting to take has been completed, the need for a noninnovative workforce will disappear. The entire previous history of mankind, including the extremely rapid pace of social development of the twentieth century, was characterized by scientific and technological progress, reducing some forms of noninnovative activities, and creating a wide field of other socially necessary types. Of course, innovations are in progress but still not dominant for the mode of thinking and relevant activity of the vast majority of people. The power vertical has also often been snapped at, and continues to be snapped at by noninnovative people. Very soon, by historical standards, the necessary process of social production no longer needs a long chain of mediators6 from people who are unable to innovate (they are the vast majority among blue- and white-collar workers). Science-intensive production is the place of formation of a new industrial social group, namely “modificators” of production.7 The merging in one social subject (with, of course, some differentiation at its core) of those modern workers, engineers, scientists, managers and entrepreneurs who are capable for innovation will give birth to those who will control, creatively alter and modify public production in the course of the twenty-­ first century. To this, at first sight, rather small group belongs the future (see more: Pashentsev 1997). This social group stands in close connection with already existing innovators who need a long chain of mediators from people who are unable to innovate in their production process. Modificators will be much more effective and be able to develop the production in a creative symbiosis with artificial intelligence, raising and developing themselves and society by means of controlled changes in their genetic nature, while complementing artificial implants (cyborgization). Over time, all future societies will consist of modificators. It will be necessary to synchronize several revolutions, namely social and technological (firstly AI, robotization and cyborgization) as well as a revolution in genetics and relevant education through mechanisms of progressive ­ decision-­making and efficient strategic communication (the core of the concept of synchronization of these revolutions was first introduced by the author in the 1990s in several of his publications [Pashentsev 1992, 1994, 1997] and later developed in other works).  Between an innovative idea and its implementation.   From Latin modificāre, present active infinitive of modificō (“I control, change, modify”). 6 7

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The possibility of creating AGI and ASI will only accelerate the integration of man into new symbiotic forms of mind that can ensure the exponential development of humankind. Of course, the future of humanity will be even less like us than we are Neanderthals. It is unlikely that we feel our identity with the latter. For the most part, we do not grieve about it, but we imagine, understand and accept our path from our distant ancestors to the present with all its minuses and pluses. The first steps on the long road to the future are not to be taken in hundreds of thousands of years or millennia, but perhaps in the current century. The initial stage is in fact a grandiose birth of a new civilization with its past and future. The contemporary generation stands at the origins of this leap in anxious anticipation, in doubt, in uncertainty, in partial ignorance, but also in hope and faith, based on a growing understanding of the need and the possibility for humankind to grow up. It will be necessary to “change horses” while crossing not just a stream but an unknown great river we never crossed before. The opposite shores are very far away and almost not visible, but we have to cross it to avoid being late forever. The question is not whether this is possible. The question is when it will be. And we should leave our planet not to intellectual monsters from fantasy fiction stories but to our future generations, with new abilities and the willingness to undertake creative activity for the benefit of mankind. The ability to innovate in a deeply split antagonistic world is not a guarantee of the modificators’ high morality, even in relation to each other, but it gives them an objective opportunity for scientific foresight of the progressive (including its ethical dimension) historical perspective and the ability to continue the movement along the spiral of social development, rather than to participate in its final rupture. It is possible to assume that the majority of modificators (including some representatives of power structures) will lead a movement of society to its new qualitative state. Some of the modificators, deformed by momentary vested interests of the collapsing society, will act together with the reactionary elites against this movement, inciting mass fears and phobias. Among the possible variants of the future (a lot of discussion on that (Frase (2016) etc.) we omit because of no place in this chapter), we can mention: • Current neoliberal or national-conservative capitalist models that are in decline practically everywhere. Some emerging states with relatively high growth rates will inevitably follow the fate of Japan’s exhausted

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catch-up model of development. Rapid local conflict escalation all over the globe and especially a potential World War III will push mankind back into the past. The depletion of natural resources, the environmental crisis, social disruption and degradation will make a transit to high-technology development models unlikely. We shall inevitably lose time, energy, resources, lives and, much more importantly, the very opportunity to correct the mistakes, resulting in the ultimate collapse of humanity. • Modified capitalist systems in the form of global authoritarian or totalitarian regimes necessary for the artificial and controlled stagnation of technical progress and global social order (no or minimum robots, AI, etc.). But history has proved more than once that stagnation cannot be absolute and forever. And with the current level of globalization we do not yet have a globally centralized world order. Even if we had such an order, a long period of stagnation due to limited natural resources, growing environmental problems, a rise in income polarization and social tensions would finally destroy such a likely not very pleasant society. • Centralized bureaucratic systems (maybe under the banner of “socialism”) in which central planning evenly distributes the products produced by the robots. It would be quite similar to the declining European social democracy or the late Soviet Union. It would lead to the degradation of the majority of noninnovative people without any opportunity for socially necessary labor and the final collapse of civilization. Some elements of this system (the combination of chronic mass unemployment in the majority of the EU countries, especially among the youth, the latent degradation of education, the rising weaknesses of trade unions and political parties, the projects to compensate for the loss of job through life rent, etc.) are still in progress. • High-tech dictatorships. There will be more or less rapid liquidation of all “needless population” (from 99% to 99…%, this is for a ­discussion) in the schemes of neofascism with Narrow AI subordinate to oligarchs of future. This is reminiscent of Isaac Asimov’s Solaria at the very “happy end.” • Classless society formed by modificators appearing as a result of the interdependent, and to some extent synchronized, revolutions mentioned above. Of course, it would not equal the extermination of Homo sapiens normal by Homo sapiens advanced. Even in the current

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nonideal society, educated children do not exterminate their quite often less literate or disabled parents and friends but are ready to help them. Old generations may make the right choice as H. G. Wells’s hero of The Food of the Gods did. But this peaceful choice is desirable but not guaranteed, keeping in mind, of course, the current antagonisms and the interests of selfish groups. Perhaps it would rather be something similar to the interstellar Great Ring of Civilizations in The Bull’s Hour, a social science fiction novel written by Soviet author and paleontologist Ivan Yefremov in 1968. Six months after its publication, the Soviet authorities banned the book and attempted to remove it from libraries and bookshops after realizing that it contained a sharp criticism of not only capitalism and the Chinese “Cultural Revolution” mode of society but similarly of the current state of affairs in the bureaucratic Soviet Union. Different models may transfer to some extent one into another. Although the success of each variant is not guaranteed, we have choices as human beings. We are free to change our fate through joint efforts in this or that direction. The majority of people are accustomed to living in old paradigms but it is (to our happiness or misfortune) more and more difficult to ignore new opportunities and risks. Logically, social apathy and inertia will lead us not to the best but rather to the worst scenarios as well as forms of new luddites or proponents of technological progress in isolation from the relevant changes in the nature of human beings and the whole of mankind.

Conclusion As the author of this chapter had to write in the early 1990s, AI and robotics are not the end of humanity, but one of the conditions for its further progress. At the same time, the author put forward the concept of coordination of revolutions in the field of artificial intelligence and robotics, genetics, education and social revolution with access to a qualitatively new level of development of society (Pashentsev 1990, 1993). Let’s try to summarize briefly the achievements of that and the subsequent time. After all social revolutions, the absolute majority of people of different classes (even the ruling ones) returned to mainly noncreative working processes by the necessity of conditions. In a sense, any working process is creative, as it is aimed at achieving a material, intellectual or cultural

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product. As for us, we talk about the creation of a new original production as having an objective public value. Such labor is the destiny for the few (at the stage of creative planning, but not its realization, since more often this demands collective labor). Such labor is socially necessary, but it still enslaves consciousness, thereby preventing a thorough development of the individual. In the political sphere, this leads to an inability among millions of people to critically analyze social reality, and to effectively participate/control the public decision-making process. Attempts to diversify the working process, to fill it with a creative content without a revolutionary break in the level of technological development and, first of all, without automation, using robots and different types of ANI in noncreative kinds of labor activity, have limits. In future, the situation will change. The wide development and use of automation, computerization, AI and robotization will lead to the formation of the objective prerequisites for debureaucratization of state structures. There will be no place for bureaucracy, where earlier, attempts of total nationalization and central planning had created the favorable conditions for its activity. The production planning of output of huge quantities of different goods by a single center led to an uncontrolled growth of bureaucratic structures, especially in the USSR. Now the situation is not much better in Russia or the EU countries or all other countries in the world. A person who is free of noncreative labor will not automatically become highly conscious of historical action. It is not without reason that in futurologic utopias imagined and written by Kurt Vonnegut, Ray Bradbury and other famous authors, a person of the future will not find themself encircled inside a technotronical environment. The capitalist system is guilty—yes, since the race for profits doesn’t give inner motivation to working activity in the conditions of “the mass consumption society.” But during the transition period to a more progressive society a new motivation will not simply appear by itself. It can’t be just “introduced” into a person. Most people have to deal with noncreative labor, not only due to the fact that the level of development of productive forces and the social environment prevents them from passing the creative sphere. Reality at maсro and micro levels can have a negative influence on personality, but talents can survive in spite of life’s circumstances, following the need for self-­ realization. This is natural since society can provide such possibilities, at least to the minority of its members.

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The rapid growth in the well-being and free time of the people in the industrialized countries of the world (Western and Eastern) did not lead to a corresponding increase in the number of highly gifted people in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Evidently, nature set a limit for the untimely development of creative abilities of most people. Increasingly free time is spent by the majority not in some creative activity but on rest, entertainment and very often in primitive pursuits (consider the growing disease of drug addiction in “rich societies”). Various forms of rest and play are necessary and natural, but in harmony with socio-useful and creative labor activity. Otherwise mankind’s degradation in the conditions of material abundance becomes inevitable. Thus, a new motivation to work demands a new person—a “creative person.” Here it is impossible to do without the third revolutionary process— that of fundamental discoveries in biology and primarily in genetics. Human genetic engineering is a solution to positive local tasks or just an excuse for various inhumane experiments on the artificial modulation of a person’s behavior, attempting to create the master race and so on. Moreover, without automation and robotization of the noncreative working processes, the achievements of human genetic engineering and its influence on the creative person will simply become a tragedy for people. If a person without gifts deals with the noncreative but socially useful labor, they can achieve satisfaction from it and thus realize their objective abilities. However, a person who has more natural talent but is required by productive forces to participate in noncreative work finds themselves in the position of a slave of the existing division of labor, which offers no exit for the utilization of their qualities. Achievements of human genetic engineering will not be able to be fully realized without revolutionary changes in education and upbringing, since no natural inclinations can be converted into the humane qualities of a creative personality without an integral system for their formation from birth to social maturity. A conclusion can be drawn. Harmony of four revolutionary processes is desirable and necessary. Without social revolution three others can be used to cause harm to people. On the other hand, a transition to a new social system is impossible without a radical improvement of the biological nature of human beings (it is possible to assume the existence of mankind in various material forms and the possibility of transition from one form to another, or simultaneous existence in different forms), high-quality educational and upbringing systems, and a technical environment, including

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measures for the effective defense of their habitat and some others. AGI can make this process quicker and potentially more resultative but risky at the same time. Human society is interested in peaceful changes for a better future and this will depend on the strategic communication efforts of progressive social strata to convince people through the right synchronization of deeds, words and images that progress can bring more to the absolute majority of people than it threatens. There seems to be no alternative: either the transition toward a new quality through a social revolution or the destruction of human civilization and possibly the entire planet. Only the future will tell us how much time is left for us to think about this. Processes of robotization and the creation of artificial intelligence, the rapid development of genetics and the qualitative changes in the social structure of society are gaining strength. This means that the EU and Russia, both of which have substantial research potential, are likely to play an important role in the further progress (or regress) of mankind. The role of strategic communication is important, because the synchronization of the parties’ efforts on the challenges of modernity and the progressive movement into the future is the very essence of strategic communication—at least if it is used to serve society, and not for narrow corporate selfish interests.

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CHAPTER 9

Counter-Terrorism as Part of Strategic Communication: The EU’s Experience and Possibilities for Russia Darya Bazarkina

Introduction This chapter builds on research from different academic fields. Regarding the study of the EU and its member states, sources from sociology, political sciences and historical sciences (Potemkina 2011, 2012; Kargalova 2011; Belov 2009; Gromyko 2013; Gromyko and Ananyeva 2014) as well as security (National Anti-Criminal and Antiterrorist Foundation 2010; Zhurkin 2005; Grinevskiy and Gromyko 2009; Arbatova and Kokeev 2011; Sergeev and Alexeenkova 2011; Voronkov 2013; Smirnov and Kokhtyulina 2012) and terrorism studies have been consulted in order to fully grasp the history and working of different European law enforcement agencies dealing with counter-terrorism. Particular attention has been paid to their strategic communication approaches in the battle against terrorism (see, e.g., McKinley 2012). Throughout this study, various approaches to the

D. Bazarkina (*) Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 E. Pashentsev (ed.), Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1_9

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communication aspects of terrorism have been used, including those developed by Winter (2019), Almohammad and Winter (2019), Ganor (2019), Nacos (2002), Cuesta, Canel and Gurrionero (eds., 2012), Bockstette (2008), Crenshaw (2011), Crelinsten (2009) and Weimann (2006). In addition, research on communication management, public relations, propaganda, and information and psychological warfare has been considered (Koraeus 2008; Zaman 2008; Pashentsev 2012, 2016a, b; Vinogradova 2015, 2017; Vinogradova and Ruschin 2015; Tsvetkova and Yarygin 2013; Pantserev 2011). The author defines communication provision as the elaboration and implementation of measures that ensure an organization’s activities by means of communication, including managerial decisions, information distribution mechanisms, and information transmission to internal and external target audiences with the aim of influencing them (Bazarkina 2017, p.  57). The term “communication provision” can be used both generally and more narrowly in relation to counter-terrorism activities. The general usage of the term implies that all elements of the political system and society as a whole (such as state bodies, political parties, non-­ governmental organizations [in particular], educational systems, the mass media) have a specific mechanism of communication provision in the fight against terrorism. Looking at communication provision in a more narrow sense, namely in relation to counter-terrorism agencies, allows us not only to identify the important role of communication in the fight against terrorism, but also to establish that the optimal way to develop this direction is to include an anti-terrorism component in the strategic communication of states or intergovernmental and communitarian formations such as the European Union (EU). However, the synergetic effect of communication provision related to counter-terrorism activities can be achieved only through constructive collaboration between the state and public institutions. Considering counter-terrorist communication provision within the framework of strategic communication is useful in terms of its conceptualization. At the same time, decisions in the sphere of communication are related to both managerial and operational actions, as well as changes within the legal sphere. All these actions not only identify the content of the message, but also project into the social consciousness through “words” and “images.” This approach helps to effectively analyze the impact state policies have on public opinion both domestically and internationally. The

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EU’s experience also provides evidence of the convergence between strategic communication and counter-terrorism. The criteria for measuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorist communication provision are, in particular, (a) the level of trust in society in the counter-terrorist structures and the law enforcement agencies in general (the latter is of prime importance in the implementation of crisis communication, immediately after terrorist attacks) and (b) the level of anxiety caused by the threat of terrorism (its decrease provides evidence of the communication efficiency of counter-terrorist structures in society). As terrorist groups are making active use of the theme of social transformations in their programming documents (Bazarkina 2013; see also Berwick 2011; Bin Laden 1996, 2004; Aaron 2008; Vice News 2014; Al-Maqdisī 2012; Blood and Honour 2012, 2016; Informal Anarchist Federation 2004, 2010; Militante Gruppe 2002, 2007), it is important, within the context of terrorism prevention, that the consequences of carrying out terrorists’ political requirements are fully realized by society. With respect to power structures, signs of achieving their strategic goals, namely strong negative attitudes toward terrorism in society, could be achieved by collecting data on citizens’ attitudes toward the ideology of terrorist organizations (relying on opinion polls, interviews, and qualitative and quantitative studies of mass media materials). The collection of such data is of prime importance during economic, political, and social turbulence when terrorist groups actively claim the role of creators of an alternative political reality. Information and data on the quantity and intensity of the public’s actions against terrorism may be the key component in the analysis of society’s psychological safety during terrorist attacks. The collected information on the terrorist threat level (for instance, via statistics of terrorist attacks and arrests), generally applied to measure the efficiency of the fight against terrorism, can similarly be an efficiency indicator of its communication provision, particularly in the calculation of the number of terrorist attacks that were planned by local terrorist cells or lone-wolf terrorists who are not related to large terrorist groups and who have resorted to terrorism under the influence of propaganda. Also, information on the activity of terrorist groups’ followers in social networks can provide auxiliary data.

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A Terrorist Act as an Act of Communication: Problems of Definitions of Terrorism Definitions of terrorism often point to the inseparability of the communication aspect from the very essence of terrorist activities (Bazarkina 2016; Simons 2010). For example, under Russian law (Russian Federation 2006), “terrorism shall mean the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing the adoption of a decision by state power bodies, local self-­ government bodies or international organizations connected with intimidation of the population and (or) other forms of unlawful violent actions.” Petrenko, who is a specialist in the issues of information and psychological warfare, distinguishes two main types of terror:1 (1) hypothetical terror, which is “when terrorist acts are not committed, but the threat of their fulfillment is perceived as quite real”; and (2) real terror, which consists of “individual or serial terrorist acts” (Petrenko 2012). He further states that hypothetical terror is dangerous due to constant tension and growing concern among the citizens of the whole country. “There is a gradual accumulation of negative emotional state … of large groups of the population; … it can provoke a variety of negative processes, including social ones” (ibidem). In contrast to hypothetical terror, which is a smoldering crisis, real terror is a sudden crisis that creates a sharp surge of negative emotional states such as fear, empathy, resentment, and a desire for revenge (ibidem). A leading researcher for the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences defines terrorism as “the deliberate use of violence or the threat of its use by non-state actors against civilians and other non-combatants in order to achieve political goals through pressure on society and the state/group of states, an international organization, the international community” (Stepanova 2010, p. 8). This definition makes it possible to evaluate the activities of organizations such as al-Qaeda or Islamic State (IS) militants as purely political. In the European Union (EU), the definition of terrorism that is most commonly used comes from the Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union (2002). “The Council [decision] was based on the model proposed by the UN General Assembly in its 1974 definition of 1  Terror, unlike terrorism, correlates more with state practice, but both have the aim of intimidation.

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aggression: a list of specific criminal acts that become terrorist under certain conditions/circumstances” (Potemkina 2013, p. 246). The EU document includes a list of terrorist activities. These are criminal acts committed with the purpose of “seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the ­fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization” (Council of the EU 2002, article 1). Nine types of crimes are classified as terrorist attacks in this document:

(a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death; (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or hostage taking; (d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; (f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons; (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life; (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life; and (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h). (Council of the EU 2002, article 1)

The 2008 additions to the 2002 Framework Decision highlight the communication aspect of terrorism. For example, the additions state that structured hierarchical terrorist groups have been replaced by semi-­ autonomous cells that often act without personal contacts between their members. The significant role of new technologies in this process, especially the internet, has required clarification of the list of crimes related to terrorist activities. The first point on the updated list is “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence,” which means “the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of one of the offences listed in Article 1” (Council

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of the EU 2008, article 1). Recruitment and training for terrorism that depend on contemporary means of communication are also classified as crimes related to terrorist activities (ibidem). For purposes of this chapter, the EU Council definition of terrorism (including its communication aspect) will be used. It is important to note that the legal definitions of terrorism adopted in the national states express the vision of national governments and meet, above all, the needs of national security. Such definitions often describe terrorism as a specific practice, an action that is punishable on a case-by-­ case basis. For example, the US Patriot Act (2019) defines international terrorism for the United States as “activities that … involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws … or … appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” This definition is similar to that found in the UK Terrorism Act (2000): terrorism means “serious violence against a person, … serious damage to property, … [action that] endangers a person’s life, … creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system in order to influence the actions of the government, intimidate the public” (UK Terrorism Act 2000). These activities should be guided by political, religious, or other ideological motives. In Germany, terrorism is defined as a consistent struggle for political goals that is committed through attacks on the life, health, and property of others (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2019a). The German Criminal Code (Federal Republic of Germany 2019) expands this definition into a list of crimes that includes, inter alia, murder (one or a series), genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, false imprisonment, and inflicting severe physical or psychological injuries on another person. As in other jurisdictions, this legal definition focuses on action and has been adopted in the European Union and used in the EU member states alongside national definitions. The Russian legal definition of terrorism, along with concrete actions, points to the very ideology of violence and is the basis of the political definition adopted by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2009). In the Council of Europe, which includes Russia, “terrorist offence” means “any of the offences within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the Appendix”

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(Council of Europe 2005). Like the UN Strategy, the 2005 Convention does not give just one definition of terrorism. While a common definition of terrorism is needed to combat it on a global scale, the ideological split over who is considered a terrorist at the global level and who is a “freedom fighter” makes it difficult to develop. For example, the Palestinian Hamas movement and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which actively opposes IS, are not included in the Russian list of terrorist organizations (Federal Security Service of Russian Federation 2019). They are, however, considered terrorist organizations in the European Union (Council of the European Union 2016). Such problems inevitably affect the communication aspect of anti-terrorist activities and make it very difficult to agree on the rhetoric denouncing terrorists. Based on these definitions, the main purpose of terrorists is to affect public opinion and decision makers through intimidation, leading to destabilization of the situation in the state or region. In today’s global society—which has both global infrastructure and global problems—a series of major terrorist attacks is increasingly capable of destabilizing the world economy, politics, and public life. Consequently, communication from the authorities combating terrorism should take into account the messages formulated by the terrorist groups themselves. The most important components of the security of the state, implemented by means of communication, are (1) the security of the channels of information transmission and (2) the security of the content of the transmitted messages. Therefore, in the communication aspect of anti-­ terrorist activities that involves determining the phenomenon to be fought, it is advisable to investigate both the channels through which terrorist organizations communicate with the public and the rhetoric to which they resort. Anti-terrorist organizations also focus on the channel and content of the information disseminated. The criterion used to assess the effectiveness of the communication strategies of both sides in this warfare is their effect on public opinion. For this purpose, it is convenient to apply the communication model of Lasswell (2007). According to the already established view, terrorist attacks always have a certain communication dimension. Research schemes exist for the transformation of information about a terrorist act in the process of its broadcast to target audiences. Nechiporenko (2008) proposes a scheme of changes in information when commenting on a terrorist attack in the

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media, the structures of the state, and in civil society. The final product of these transformations (the core means of influencing the audience) has two main features: • “toxicity” of information, defined as the ability to destabilize the psyche of citizens (to cause panic, neuroses, disintegration of society). Such disintegration is sufficient to simulate the act of terrorism or replanting of rumors (Nechiporenko 2008). For example, in the manual of al-Qaeda, discovered by British police in the house of one of the militants in Manchester, one of the tactical goals is “spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people against the enemy” (Al Qaeda 2000, p. 13). • provoking effect that triggers the reaction of authorities and society as a whole to the terrorist attack and contributes to the recruitment of new terrorists (Nechiporenko 2008). This effect allows the terrorists to decide military objectives by non-military means. We can conclude that terrorism has a communication effect on numerous target audiences: • state authorities (other enemy state or a regime hostile to terrorists in their own state); • law enforcement agencies (can be allocated in the target audience independent of relation to state authorities); • non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mainly international non-­ governmental organizations and their branches, as spokespersons for certain groups of interests; • members of the terrorist group or network itself; • potential terrorists (from among people who sympathize with a terrorist organization or have a certain economic, political interest, which can be realized by acting within the terrorist group); • “investors” financing the terrorist attacks; • a protest movement that is to varying degrees at risk of becoming (intentionally or unintentionally) a conduit for terrorist propaganda; • citizens of the country where the attack is committed; and • people in countries where there is the greatest risk of terrorist propaganda and sympathy; • representatives of culture and art (in any countries) that can (intentionally or unintentionally) become conduits for terrorist propaganda.

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Management tasks of terrorists can be presented as follows: • reallocation of resources (e.g., changes in the network structure of the terrorist organization or of the organization of the enemy); • imposing a certain line of conduct on the enemy (Garev 2010); • destabilization of the management structures of the enemy; and • acquisition of new power resources (recruitment, purchase of arms, collection of money). A terrorist attack itself is a means to achieve these goals. In a situation where there is weak coordination of the work of anti-terrorist structures, a lack of conceptual apparatus for anti-terrorist activities, and a focus on the technological aspect of media coverage rather than the content of the messages themselves, the conquest of a strategic initiative in the communication struggle against terrorism becomes an extremely difficult task.

Communication Provision of Antiterrorist Activities as Part of Strategic Communication: Theoretical Approaches To understand the nature of strategic communication as “synchronization of deeds, words and images,” it is important to pay attention to counter-­ terrorist structures and the nature of the links between them. In the communication model proposed by Lasswell (2007), the first element is the communicator, and the first important question is, “Who [says]?” To identify opportunities for and obstacles to the formation of strategic communication for the European Union in general, and of provision of counter-­terrorism communication in particular, it is useful to appeal to the concept of political networks as developed by such authors as Slaughter (2004) and Stone (2008). In relation to terrorist organizations, Sageman (2004) developed this concept. The real problem of the contemporary world order is the need to solve global problems that national states cannot manage alone. Terrorist groups are successfully creating networks that must be counteracted at the global level. At the same time, there are many disagreements between state elites, and also risks (both for the elites themselves and for society) arising from the delegation of powers to transnational network structures with their powerful financial ties. In addition, the dominant role of the United States in network management (Slaughter 2004) becomes an objective obstacle to global network management.

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Among Russian specialists in relation to the European Union, Gromoglasova (2010), Savorskaya (2014), and Strezhneva (2008) are developing the concept of political networks. The network management principle is opposite to the hierarchical one. If the hierarchy “sets boundaries between levels of management and … different functional areas of activity,” then there are no clear boundaries in the networks, and “the flexibility of the structure allows the networks to ignore any established boundaries” (Gromoglasova 2010, p.  75). “Network organizations, ­interacting with hierarchical ones (states), corrode latters’ integrity and the barrier between domestic and foreign policy” (ibidem). Thus, European authorities use expert and political networks as a tool in the search for a balance of interests of member states and the EU institutions. Since no one is formally subordinate to anyone else within the network, decisions are made directly by the agents responsible for their implementation (Strezhneva 2008). As professionals with appropriate qualifications, these agents can improve the quality of the final product. However, the absence of a dispute resolution body between network members, the nonbinding nature of cooperation, and the absence of reputational costs in case of setback or withdrawal raise new questions about the effectiveness of the network approach in the development of anti-terrorist solutions. Governance in the European Union and its effect on key decision making is carried out at two levels—“national” level and “Brussel” one (Savorskaya 2014). This combination of network and hierarchical governance makes the European Union a political entity in which “power is dispersed between different levels of governance and among actors, and between sectors there are significant differences in decision making methods” (Gromoglasova 2010, p. 77). According to Potemkina (2011, 2013), this is manifested in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the basis for the development of which was the interaction of communitarian/ supranational and intergovernmental methods of integration. When developing pan-European Union strategies in the EU Council, the influence of member states reaches its peak (Savorskaya 2014, p. 82). This probably explains the similarity of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Council of the EU 2005) and the British strategy CONTEST (Government of the United Kingdom 2011). At the same time, the member states are responsible for providing counter-terrorism communication, which is the reason for studying their experiences in this area. The network principle of governance comes to the fore in the acquisition of expertise, and communication becomes of central importance. Political networks

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can develop solutions based on broad consensus; they are also an effective means of access to information for EU institutions from member states. The experts also provide information on pan-European and national interests in different policy areas. To determine the effectiveness of anti-terrorism communication strategies, the nature and level of development of links within a particular branch of terrorism (e.g., far-right, far-left) should be assessed. The very appearance of an extensive network of contacts with demonstrated ­capabilities, along with structures close to the state in terms of the degree of hierarchy, can mobilize new recruits to terrorist activities and legitimize the terrorist practice in the eyes of the perpetrators themselves. The principles of network and hierarchical communication of IS that are associated with a new surge of quasi-religious terrorism in 2015 make the states and interstate bodies to think on the relationship of network and hierarchical principles of governance in countering terrorism. Terrorist acts are crises on a national scale. They directly threaten the reputation of governments and require the selection in a short period of certain communication strategies and of appropriate rhetoric. The approaches developed by experts in the field of crisis communications are thus very useful. Coombs and Holladay (2010) start from the premise that there is a well-established idea in society that political leaders should formulate and broadcast convincing explanations and justifications for their actions. Government communication itself orients society to act in accordance with the broadcast settings. To achieve these objectives, governments must create and maintain an image based on the trustworthiness and reputation of competent facilitators, along with consistent and distinct rhetoric that is able to organize public perceptions of political processes (Coombs and Holladay 2010). Spontaneous and rash attempts by the government to maintain the trust of target audiences can lead to unjustified changes in government communication and even become a reason for the dissemination of unverified or deliberately false information. Initial responsibility for the crisis creates a threat to reputation. According to Coombs and Holladay (2010), in the first phase of the crisis, the structures and persons responsible for the situation fall into one of three clusters. The first, the “victims cluster,” has a very weak attribution of responsibility for the crisis, and the organization is seen as a victim. This is what typically occurs with a natural disaster. The second, the “accidental cluster,” takes minimal responsibility for the crisis, which is considered unintentional or beyond the control of the organization. This can be seen

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in accidents due to a technical error. The third cluster is the “intentional” cluster, a group with a high tendency to attribute responsibility for the situation that the public believes provokes a crisis, as in the case of carefully organized crimes (Coombs and Holladay 2010). With economic instability, political and state leaders in the context of a terrorist attack often fall into the third cluster in the eyes of the public. In addition to an objective decrease in confidence in the government against the background of economic problems, law enforcement agencies are damaged by terrorist propaganda (as evidenced by the consequences of the Madrid terrorist attack in 2004) and the growing fear of the terrorist threat observed in the European Union. The type of crisis depends on how it is presented to the public by various political stakeholders. In this case, governments should disseminate a key message using rhetoric appropriate to the situation. To describe this process, researchers turn to the theory of framework analysis (Brewer 2010). Framing is extremely useful in the study of communication in response to a terrorist act. The need to revise the fundamental concepts of counter-terrorism is recognized by the academic community (see, e.g., Crelinsten 2009; McKinley 2012), representatives of law enforcement agencies, and journalists. Echevarria (2008) distinguishes four main types of wars of ideas in the contemporary world: intellectual debates, disputes over religious dogma, ideological wars, and advertising campaigns. Various elements of counter-terrorism communication, including those used in the European Union as well as in the theoretical developments and practical experience of international organizations, can be attributed in varying degrees to a particular type of war of ideas. For example, the focus of intellectual debates is determined by the economic and political priorities of the parties and other interest groups, the influence of the domestic and foreign policy agenda, and other factors. Even academic discussion that strives for objectivity cannot but undergo external influences. To an even greater extent, these impacts are affected by the media under the influence of the CNN effect. In this regard, as well as the efficiency of military methods of combating terrorism cannot be the only one, the importance of government communication is growing. Several complicating factors influence the response of authorities to terrorist attacks. Among them are unexpectedness, additional threats posed by the crisis, lack of response time, lack of operational information, and the need for decision making under stress due to the instantaneous disclosure of shocking information. In addition, the terrorist attacks of 11

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September 2001 (9/11) were the first in a series of attacks with fundamentally new qualities. Among these qualities are the extent and nature of the attacks (unexpectedness, execution on American territory, and the non-use of weapons or complex technologies), a new type of enemy (non-­ state criminal organization), and the choice of target (the most powerful world power) (Rotfeld 2002). The problems that arise in crisis communication in response to terrorism are largely due to these and other factors that have prevented governments and international organizations from identifying their target audiences in a timely manner and adjusting key messages to their expectations. An unfortunate result is that the discussion of the terrorism problem has led to the development of harmful stereotypes, for example, against Muslims living in the United States and EU countries. Although the EU governments supported the “war on terror,” there were fundamental differences in the conduct of this “war” in the United States and the European Union. Experts at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) distinguish between the understanding of the goals of anti-terrorist activities: if the goal of the United States in the early 2000s was to defeat the organization of al-Qaeda, the goal of European countries was to eliminate the sources of terrorism with an emphasis on non-military methods of solving the problem (Rotfeld 2002). In analyzing the theoretical aspects of approaches to counter-terrorism communication, it is essential to stress the political factors that may have influenced the researchers and experts. The process of rethinking the situation has gone hand-in-hand with the establishment of new security institutions and has led to the rather slow development of a counter-terrorism strategy for international organizations. In this aspect, we can analyze the experience of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Bucharest Declaration of the OSCE Council of Ministers (OSCE 2001), adopted in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, condemns all acts of terrorism, regardless of motive or origin, but the OSCE strategy in this area is formed as a response to the already existing and dynamically developing threat. For example, the former German Consul General in Novosibirsk Gudrun Steinacker (2005, p. 69) points out that until 9/11, the fight against international terrorism was only one of many aspects of the OSCE’s security assistance. The events of 9/11 led, however, to the immediate adoption of an action plan to combat terrorism at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting on 3 and 4 December 2001  in Bucharest, the establishment in Vienna of an Anti-­

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Terrorist Unit, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw (Steinacker 2005, p. 69). Thus, crisis response plans had to be developed in the new environment and at a rapid pace. An additional problem was created by the remarks of President George W. Bush on the “crusade” in the Middle East: “This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while” (Office of the Press Secretary 2001). The communication component was not initially listed among the priority areas of counter-terrorism. The main areas of work included ­cooperation between the police and the judiciary; combating the financing of terrorism and other forms of support; border control; and access to information by law enforcement agencies. The measures related to communication in one way or another are dictated by the initial desire to guarantee respect for human rights and international law. Among the preventive measures against terrorism were interaction with the media, promotion of tolerance, and coexistence and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other groups (OSCE 2001). Exclusively communication components, that is, problems and mechanisms of information distribution, were allocated within the expert community to facilitate analytical work. This direction was the second (along with propaganda) in the implementation of communications not only by the OSCE but by other major international organizations. At the same time, the discussion of quasi-religious terrorism as a phenomenon that formed under the influence of ideological differences between supporters of traditional Islam and “radical Islamism” sends a message in which the problem of terrorism is de facto assessed as a problem whose roots should be sought only in the religious sphere. Assurances that governments are not acting against religion but only against crime and political violence are less convincing and reinforce the beliefs of religious or national minorities that they are considered to be people who are unable to integrate. A study in the Annex to the Russian translation of the OSCE Yearbook for 2003 can serve as an illustrative example for the discussion of the problem of terrorism in a religious vein. In this article, the activities of Osama bin Laden and his associates are interpreted as actions within the Salafi movement, a fundamentalist movement in Islam that proclaims its goal to be a return to the norms that existed during the formation of the Islamic religion (Karni 2005). Within the framework of the Salafi movement, the author identifies two large groups: (1) official Salafism of Saudi Arabia (groups that have declared themselves non-­ political, maintain compromise relations with the Saudi government, and

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are primarily engaged in correcting the religious practices of Muslims such as those relating to Islamic clothing and food bans); and (2) the “jihad wing,” which represents Osama bin Laden. “The Saudi regime itself is one of the worst innovations in its eyes and should be replaced by a purely Islamic state … The non-political Salafis are, in principle, a peaceful religious community; the bin Laden movement, on the contrary, relies on unrestricted and free use of violence for its own purposes” (Karni 2005, p. 179). In fact, the terrorist organization of al-Qaeda has been called an independent religious school, even advocating a return to the basics of one of the world religions. Simply put, the scientific community and anti-­ terrorist organizations themselves helped al-Qaeda obtain the recognition it sought. This correlates with the assessment of the 9/11 attacks made by SIPRI experts in 2002: “the attacks can be seen as a part of a sui generis civil war in the Islamic world” (Rotfeld 2002). This contributed to the creation of certain stereotypes of the negative perception of Muslims even among residents of European countries with a sufficiently high level of education. Research into the problem of public discourse about terrorism has lagged in the scientific community. McKinley (2012) notes another problem of the academic community: the political situation that determines the content of many publications, including academic ones, increasingly forces researchers to give up freedom in their reasoning and adapt to the official course. As a result, the economic and political basis of violence has been presented in relaxed terms and has made students more tolerant of this phenomenon. In addition, the concepts of war were given primacy in the discussion of modern conflicts, creating a politically oriented dominant narrative. Thus, the problem of security inevitably becomes a problem of human worldview (McKinley 2012). In the process of communication between a terrorist organization and the government or the international community, the terrorists initiate the exchange of messages. Under the Lasswell (2007) model, they are the communicators. The state authorities, as the main target audience of terrorist groups, are able for a variety of reasons to commit spontaneous acts that further destabilize the state system in the absence of a coordinated plan, not only for operational measures but also for crisis communications. The core reason for this phenomenon is that the main attention of communication researchers, experts, and advisors is not focused on the state as the basic subject of communication support (the “customer” of the communication strategy). Instead, it is primarily focused on the technological

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subject—the media—which, regardless of its loyalty, will inevitably act in a competitive environment in the interests of certain economic or political institutions. A journalist is much more likely to cover a terrorist act than to cover authorities or organizations engaged in anti-terrorist activities. The task of minimizing the damage from terrorist activities requires studying the nature of communication from the terrorists. The classification of the main phases of terrorist campaigns offered by Silke (2011) can be used for this purpose: 1. Provocation: terrorists carry out violent actions to provoke a violent reaction from the official authorities. At this stage, the “emergency powers” granted to the authorities are presented (not necessarily by terrorist propaganda but also by any organizations that do not agree with the official course) as a reason for unleashing repression (Silke 2011). For example, several German-language internet sites of quasi-religious orientation (like Millatu-ibrahim.com) constantly broadcasted a message about any police actions as repressive measures against Muslims. Similarly, public campaigns against government measures to ensure that intelligence agencies have access to citizens’ correspondence confirm the reputational risks faced by governments in such a situation. 2. Escalation: the terrorist attacks become more violent, leading to further strengthening of security measures, which often become exceptional, including illegal tactics (Silke 2011). For example, the experience of EU member states in the search for informants led to indignation from journalists over the actions of intelligence agencies (Dodd 2009, 2011). Terrorists can also use such cases in propagandist messages. 3. Blame: both terrorists and authorities are deploying the information campaign with the aim to place the responsibility on the enemy. This phase is characterized by a high risk for government structures to lose the trust of citizens, especially if at the stages of provocation and escalation of the conflict there was no adequate communication support for the counter-terrorist operation (Silke 2011). 4. Endurance: this is the final phase in which terrorists seek to break the will and morals of the power structures and citizens of the attacked state. From the communication perspective, the purpose of a terrorist organization is to show that terrorists have a moral basis for their practice, as well as a greater opportunity to continue the fight than

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do the state authorities. When this is possible, the security forces begin to search for alternative solutions to the problem, destroying the spontaneously developed strategy (Silke 2011). The communication of the Spanish government after the terrorist attacks in Madrid is an example of how the state itself has brought about the last phase of the campaign, not only because of an inadequate strategy to respond to a new threat but also because of the denial of its existence. A prerequisite for crisis communications is the targeting of information flows. Communications should be addressed to those target audiences that have the greatest need for consistent, authentic information. When developing a communication strategy, data on the target audience, such as gender, age, nationality, marital status, economic conditions, and cultural and religious affiliation, are summarized. It cannot be concluded that people with the same standard of living form terrorist networks; in fact, people of different income levels most often form quasi-religious groups. Terrorist networks include people of all professions and occupations. For example, among those who carried out the failed attack on the US Embassy in Paris, one served in an elite army battalion, two were unskilled laborers, and one was a programmer working for the local government (Bakker 2006). However, recruits of terrorist organizations have relatively similar age characteristics, making it possible to draw a psychological portrait. They also have a high rate of emotional perception of reality, the tendency to take on faith various kinds of statements (in the case of quasi-religious terrorism, the objects of propaganda are believers of a high level of religiosity), similar cultural characteristics, and so on. Approaches to communication in the organization as knowledge management—the search for missing knowledge and transfer of knowledge to those areas where it is most needed—can be useful in the development of algorithms for providing counter-terrorism communication (Koraeus 2008). Crisis management in this case is carried out as a solution to five critical problems: sense making, decision making, meaning making, termination, and learning and reform (Koraeus 2008). Sense making is the task of determining the nature of the crisis. It is preferable to determine this before the crisis erupts; however, it generally occurs during its early stages. In the field of counter-terrorism, we can highlight the collection and analysis of intelligence, the development of the main messages broadcast both in the situation of a terrorist attack and in “peacetime.”

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The task of decision making refers to measures that facilitate the process of communication and that should be taken long before the crisis. This is the final formulation of the official point of view on the problem of terrorism and the beginning of its broadcast. The main purpose of meaning making in this case is to obtain the support of the organization from the public or representatives of political elites. At the end of the crisis, the risks that can lead to the development of a new crisis based off the current one should be assessed. We can recall the classic recommendation: the media should promptly receive a consistent comment from officials; the absence of such a statement provides an opportunity for the terrorists to be the first to make a statement. The final task in crisis management is to optimize the crisis plans of the organization. This creates an objective contradiction: the task of crisis management is to bring things back to the pre-crisis state, while the task of reforming the strategy may involve radical changes. Successful implementation of previous tasks often convinces the decision maker of the need to maintain the status quo. This conviction is quite difficult to give up. As a result, those responsible for change may simply not want to end the crisis, but only keep it sufficiently under control so that it does not cause too much damage. In the context of counter-terrorism, it can be noted that the preservation of the status quo in the field of communication and the rejection of a fundamental revision of the concept of security have led in many cases to an increase in the bias of intelligence agencies as they assess the terrorist threat. An important approach to combating terrorism is through psychological operations. In particular, the researchers from the US Military Academy at West Point believe the objectives of psychological operations in the fight against terrorism should be the destruction of control over the conduct and financial support of terrorist attacks; limitation of assistance to terrorists from the social environment; the study of terrorist ideology and countering it at the international level; humiliation (and even insult) to demoralize the leaders of the terrorists and undermine their power; and the use of ideological contradictions in the terrorist camp, given the possibility of al-Qaeda’s transformation into a social movement (US Military Academy 2006). However, the limitation of the psychological operations within the task to eradicate terrorist groups—but not the roots of the whole terrorism phenomenon—makes necessary the development of mechanisms for communication provision of the counter-terrorism. National and supranational law enforcement agencies conduct research

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and take measures to enhance their intangible assets. One of the important priorities in this area is to achieve greater openness in communication with target audiences and increase public confidence. A certain degree of confidentiality is necessary, but secrecy in everything is partly counter-­ productive. The population is interested in information from state structures, which is the basis for the support of the society of law enforcement officers in this fight against terrorism. However, the system of closed communications remains much more developed than a system of open communications aimed at wide external target audiences. In formulating national and international security strategies, communication mechanisms to counter-terrorism are increasingly being used in the developed world. The short-term strategies to counter already-formed terrorist organizations should give way to long-term strategies aimed at preventing the recruitment of militants, taking into account political and social contradictions in society. Attempts to counter-terrorism through work with religious institutions were the cause of negative assessments by religious leaders, who made a fair observation that not all social, political, and economic problems can be solved only by actions in the religious sphere (Crelinsten 2009). Therefore, it is impossible to single out the target audience of state communication based only on religious affiliation. Representatives of different worldviews can unite because of a new concept of development. We need an idea of the unity of people and their problems, which should be translated and implemented by real measures taken by state, political, and public institutions—first by them, and not by religious leaders. It is also important to note the acuteness of the problem of the correlation of censorship measures, restrictions on access to extremist content, and information and psychological measures in the work of anti-terrorist organizations. Existing theoretical approaches to countering terrorism through communication are based on a wide range of concepts in the field of political science, history, sociology, and various branches of communication—public relations, communication management, strategic communication, propaganda and counter-propaganda, to name a few. This helps to analyze the communication needs of governing bodies in conjunction with the political interests of specific leaders (e.g., leaders of political parties). At the same time, when implementing a long-term political course, it becomes necessary to think carefully about the political strategy long before its implementation. In the field of communication, the demands placed on power by society also determine the need for strategic planning. Therefore,

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the concept of strategic communication, in contrast to the tools of public relations, propaganda, or information warfare, seems to be more effective as a basis for communication of anti-terrorist activities.

Use of Strategic Communication by Terrorist Groups: New Security Challenges In the first years of the “war on terror,” we can note, first, a surge in terrorist propaganda after major terrorist attacks. However, the synchronization of terrorist attacks, economic and political expansion, and active propaganda (i.e., strategic communication) is relatively weak in the practice of al-Qaeda. This situation pushed the organization to find new resources and led al-Qaeda to active speculation in religious values for the recruitment of new terrorists. The manipulative nature of terrorist propaganda is beginning to be discussed in the academic community at a fairly early stage. Experts of SIPRI in 2002 recognized the distortion of the norms of Islam (Rotfeld 2002). However, the assessments inherent in the rhetoric of the “war on terror” cause some absolutization of the “religious” roots of the problem. “Under the impact of 11 September 2001 there has been a revival of concern about the risk that any conflict, anywhere, could generate a terrorist diaspora” (Bailes 2003, p.  15). Furthermore, in 2006, the defining role of Islamist entities in terrorism was recognized, as was the transformation of monolithic terrorist structures into an extensive network without a solid core (Melvin 2006). However, along with the prevalence of “religious” understanding of terrorism, there is its economic concept, which can largely explain the ineffectiveness of government communication. Thus, according to SIPRI experts, the turnover of the “new economy of terror” in 2005 amounted to $1.5 trillion and about 5% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Sköns 2005). According to 2014 data, the daily income of IS militants from oil smuggling amounted to about $2 million (Tregubova 2014), which once again proves the enormous economic benefit for customers of terrorist activities. The roots of contemporary international terrorism are laid more in the economic sphere than in the political or religious spheres, and their origin and development were the result of the main processes after World War II. It is “the growth of state-sponsored terrorism, … when both superpowers fought wars by proxy”; “the privatization of terrorism during the late 1970s and early 1980s”; and “the globalization of terrorism in the 1990s” when the terrorist groups had the opportunity “to

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raise money in more than one country” (Sköns 2005, pp. 288–289; see also Napoleoni 2003). An effective change in the key messages of Western authorities in the fight against terrorism would inevitably result in the need for a more open discussion of the permissiveness of the spread of religious extremism among migrants in European countries that was perceived to be much less dangerous than the spread of left-wing ideology. At the same time, researchers point to the objective weakness of anti-terrorist measures, particularly in Europe, that are aimed at combating the economic component of terrorism (see, e.g., Napoleoni 2003, 2017). The lack of means and methods of governance, as well as the openness of European borders, facilitates the movement of terrorists. By 2004, terrorist cells based in Eastern Europe had established contacts with the Balkan mafia to purchase weapons and explosives (Napoleoni 2003). The war on terror has caused more moral damage to the states of the warring coalition than material damage to terrorist groups. Over time, al-­ Qaeda has gradually become more of a terrorist investor than a direct organizer of terrorist attacks. If the 9/11 attacks were planned and financed under the direct control of al-Qaeda, the Madrid bombings were the work of groups with no strong ties to it. The terrorist attack on 9/11 cost al-Qaeda $500,000, the terrorist attack in Madrid cost $20,000, and the attack in London less than $15,000 (Napoleoni 2003). Ease of terrorist attacks helped terrorists to rapidly increase the number of propaganda websites (thus, the success in deeds let the terrorists disseminate more words). When the communication effect of terrorist attacks is manifested and the recruitment of citizens to terrorist groups unfolds, the al-Qaeda brand, and then IS, contributes to the increment of organizations’ material assets (weapons, explosives, transport are provided by sympathizers, often living in Europe). This significantly reduces the cost of operating the organization itself. At the same time, the increase in the number of homegrown terrorists in the European Union, who are not always trained in training camps, allows al-Qaeda and IS to strengthen their structure. The quasi-religious terrorist network uses different funding channels, including infiltration to the traditional religious institutions, which help terrorist organizations to introduce their propagandists in mosques. At the same time, both legal and illegal methods of raising money are used. For example, in Spain and Italy, members of quasi-religious armed groups worked as mechanics and waiters and used part of their earnings to finance the organization. Sources of financing for terrorism are not just, for

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example, drug smuggling (Napoleoni 2003), but are also legal channels, such as the use of traditional Islamic zakat (mandatory annual tax for the benefit of the poor, as well as for the development of projects that promote the spread of Islam). Under the guise of zakat, the affiliated funds send money for the terrorist cells. The use of informal remittance systems by terrorist organizations, especially al-Qaeda, was known prior to the 9/11 attacks. A key mechanism that is predominantly Eastern is called hawala (money transfer after one-­ time notification by e-mail, fax, or phone call, without any enclosed documents). The widespread use of hawala occurred after control over official financial flows was strengthened following the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-as-Salaam. The volume of transactions made by hawaladars (brokers in the hawala system) amounted to $2 trillion in 2005, which is approximately 2% of the volume of all international financial transactions in US dollars per year (Haslerud and Tranøy 2005, pp.  15–16). IS is also actively recruiting specialists in the field of high technologies, and terrorists are experimenting with crypto currencies that allow funds to be transferred across borders, thereby avoiding bank control. At the end of 2017, IS supporters launched mass campaigns soliciting donations to the organization’s cause in crypto currencies (in bitcoins and more anonymous Zcash) on affiliated websites and chats (e.g., in Telegram). The website of supporters of the IG “Akhbar al-Muslimin” began to call for donations in bitcoins in November of 2017 (Europol 2018, p.  53). The distribution of finance in the occupied territory was itself an effective decision of the IS and allowed it to gain the trust of some citizens and to disseminate a message of the “social state” to an internal audience. As stated by Napoleoni (2017, p. 138), “the Islamic State has … invested in police-state institutions, sharia courts, media, teachers, market regulators and other vital professions.” In addition, when IS seized control of oil smuggling, it gave citizens the opportunity to buy the oil without tax payments, “a very clever move, approved by local population” (Napoleoni 2017, p. 139). This case illustrates how economic measures themselves (deeds) can communicate. Under the conditions of the global economic crisis that led many people to disappointment in their states, “when the Islamic State’s predecessors in Iraq began recruiting globally over the next few years, they stressed a theme of metamorphosis through Islam” (Wood 2017, p. 5). This metamorphosis, caused mainly by material motives, led many youngsters to join the IS fighters. Even the change of religion itself sometimes occurs for economic reasons. Thus, Djorič

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(2019) found out two fundamental motives for joining the pro-Wahhabi Salafists within the Roma population in Serbia (EU candidate country): (1) “material motive (money) – average of 200 to 300 euro monthly for joining pro-Wahhabi Salafist groups,” and (2) “respect given by the members of these religious groups.” The religious discourse of terrorism has long diverted attention from its economic component and is actively used by terrorists. The use of strategic communication by terrorist groups in their communication with target audiences has become a significant threat to both international and European security. In the twenty-first century, terrorism has foremost an organizational character. Whereas terrorist groups in the twentieth century were still clearly distinguishable, in the twenty-first century, terrorists are preparing and committing terrorist acts backed by cells in different countries of the world, many of which are formed in Europe. Over the course of time, these cells are becoming less dependent on the leading centers in, among other things, financial terms, which is related to the surge of lone-wolves who are not directly connected to the groups that have inspired them to carry out terrorist attacks. At the same time, the escalation of economic, political, and social crises has allowed terrorist organizations to manipulate the protest moods of potential and real followers in their messages, with the help of pseudo-Marxist and Nazi conceptions, significantly broadening their social and membership base. Since 2014–15, related to the emergence of the Islamic State on the political stage, and along with a strongly asserted and internationally structured terrorist network, a hierarchical organization has emerged, imitating the system of state bodies and controlling a vast geographical area. Earnings from natural resources facilitate the training of terrorists, the purchase of arms and ammunition, and —not least—the formation of units responsible for communication (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2008; Sundiev et al. 2014; Wolska-Liśkiewicz 2016; and among the documents: Cantlie 2015, p. 47). Due to these circumstances, the IS threat is becoming a priority not only within the context of problems related to quasi-religious organizations, but also against the background of other branches of terrorism. At the same time, far-left and far-right branches have not only continued to exist, but have also developed further. With the outbreak of the global economic crisis, both far-left and far-right terrorist organizations have significantly extended their international ties, and simultaneously the far-right branch has toughened their terrorist attacks.

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Terrorist organizations use contemporary means of communication in their propaganda in order to skillfully manipulate their target audience’s opinion with the help of well-conceived messages. Together with the ­development of internet communications, the terrorist organizations, of which three branches are studied in this chapter, have managed to solve one of their major security problems. The presence of a structured organization with the leaders well known to all its members facilitated attempts by the police to re-establish terrorist communications through documents that were found when their accomplices were arrested. Today, new information channels allow terrorists to avoid personal contacts with other terrorists (see Brandon 2008; Musawi 2010) as previously required. The communicative impact of any terrorist attack is strengthened by the ability to deliver a shocking message about their acts via official and unofficial channels in the shortest time. The development of communication technologies (such as the internet, mobile communication, social networks, satellite television) has significantly eased the spread of messages among (potential) followers of terrorist organizations. Groups such as “Blood and Honor” and “Hammerskins” have their own websites (see, e.g., Blood and Honour 2016). Recruiters for al-Qaeda or IS act in a similar way. Also, materials from the far-left “Informal Anarchist Federation” and “Militante Gruppe” are openly available (Informal Anarchist Federation 2004, 2010; Militante Gruppe 2002, 2007). Preventing the proliferation of such materials through censorship has become nearly impossible because a website that is shut down appears again almost immediately on a new host. In the face of these threats, new tasks have arisen for the EU governing bodies and member states, one of which is the eradication of internal contradictions of its own policy, including contradictions within the sphere of public communication. An important component of terrorism is the ideological coloring of terrorist acts. Terrorism is a means for obtaining economic and political interests and can use (wholly, as in the case of Nazism, or in a reduced, distorted form) any ideology until the moment it helps in achieving the goals. Despite this fact, in the public consciousness, terrorism is particularly associated with ideology (due to the mass media and politicians) and with the problem of self-identification, as expressed in political, religious, and cultural doctrines. Herein lies one of the main reasons why terrorist cells and organizations are so quickly finding new followers: terrorism has been recognized as an expression of ideology, an alternative to inefficient

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or unfair political and economic courses, and thousands of people have become consumers of extremist literature and internet content. Far-left terrorist organizations use public outrage, building on calls in order to carry out terrorist attacks using messages, wherein Marxist rhetoric and references to prominent leaders of the far-left movement are actively mentioned. This has the danger of associating a part of the target audience within the liberation movement with terrorism. The unity of far-­ right extremists and terrorists is explained in their proclamation of the “Islamization of Europe,” about which the discussions are intensified after every terrorist attack by quasi-religious terrorists. Most often their unity is declared on the basis of ethnic identity, although we can also find religious rhetoric in some instances (e.g., Anders Breivik [see: Berwick 2011] called himself a “Christian fundamentalist”). This allows for highlighting common traits in the motivation of far-right and quasi-religious terrorism. The ideological roots of European right-wing extremism and terrorism originate in Fascism and National Socialism. IS is showing a completely new level of communication skill among the terrorist organizations of the quasi-religious branch, applying the elements of strategic communication and transmitting the central message that IS is a state, not an underground terrorist group (see, e.g., Cantlie 2015; Vice News 2014). The deeds that IS projects into the collective consciousness are the foundations of bodies similar to state bodies. They have a hierarchical structure, make administrative decisions, and symbolically represent terrorist acts by murdering their hostages like the punishment of criminals. The image of a state is created not only by real practice, but also through IS’s media products, which have been developed to enlarge the international network of the terrorist organization. The terrorist attacks carried out by all three branches of terrorism are characterized by their provocative effect. Terrorists have imitators among young people as the Breivik attacks clearly demonstrate. Terrorist attacks also contribute to fueling the fear that can result in a decline of confidence in power institutions. The EU experience confirms the conception of creating chains of communication management. Terrorist attacks always trigger the response mechanism of government and security services, which gives attention to the terrorists, strengthening their organization’s brand. It also sets forth a task (besides, of course, the neutralization of terrorist organizations) for the power institutions, that is, (1) to prevent panic in society and (2) to mobilize the citizens for participation in the fight against terrorism. This participation can be implemented in the sphere of

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communication (for instance, via public events showing the condemnation of terrorism) or in the operational area. The emotional description of terrorist attacks and their consequences in the mass media might add a romantic aura to terrorist attacks, which, in turn, can strengthen the social base of terrorist organizations and facilitate their funding. This creates the task of creating an appropriate discourse, not only for the intelligence agencies but also for the mass media. The attacks of quasi-religious terrorists provoke the spread of anti-­ Islam movements, such as Pegida (Johnson 2015; Jordans 2015; Stokes et al. 2016), which, in turn, could create risks for maintaining European democratic values in the near future. In this situation, there is a need for promptly taken measures aimed at narrowing down the social and membership base of organizations such as IS. Once again, this points to the significant role of communication provision in the fight against terrorism.

European Union: Positive and Negative Experiences of Counter-Terrorism in the Context of Strategic Communication Following our analysis of counter-terrorist communication provision in the EU from 2001 to the beginning of 2016, we can highlight some undoubted achievements. The effective integration of the work of national security authorities into the European system allows for conducting more concordant counter-terrorism operations nowadays, coordinating actions of national intelligence agencies. New counter-terrorism structures have been established, and a system of expert advisory bodies has been formed. Europol, founded in 1998, acquired its current functions and authority just after 2001. As of today, Europol coordinates the collaboration of all EU member states’ police services, actively synchronizing information exchange among the national subdivisions. The agency’s publications (Europol 2007–2018) are important analytical data sources for other European structures (in particular for Eurojust; see Devoic 2012, p. 44). Europol, Eurojust, and the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator have an extensive analytical database established at the very beginning of these organizations’ opening. Despite the limited power the Coordinator and agencies have in the operational sphere, they have big opportunities in the sphere of communication. The achievement of the EU anti-terrorism activities in communication provision at the level of European bodies is the combination of

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significant practical tools of strategic communication: (1) information ­collection and systematization; (2) analytical work (the first two functions are performed by the European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre [EU INTCEN], Europol, and nets European Network of Experts on Radicalisation [ENER] and Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN]); (3) multi-channel communication with specialized agencies of the member states and third countries (conferences, seminars, open access analytical publications) (Eurojust 2007); and (4) communications with the general public focused on counter-terrorism agencies’ reputation (ranging from press services and their presence in social media to the availability of feedback forms on their official websites). The organizational character of expert advisory bodies (ENER and RAN) is useful in the scholarly discussion related to the search for practical solutions in the fight against terrorism. The principle of member states’ representation in European agencies can enhance both the expression of national governments’ interests and the distribution of separate tasks among countries in the fight against terrorism. Regardless of its undisputed advantages, the communication provision of the EU counter-terrorism agencies also has definite disadvantages. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment, and a number of elements in the 2015 European Agenda for Security emphasize the close attention that has been paid to the communication provision of counter-terrorism during the period under review (see European Commission 2015; Council of the EU 2005, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015). However, the escalation of terrorist threats, a process that started in 2015 and is still ongoing, clearly demonstrates the insufficiency in this field. Along with clear advantages of the structured counter-­ terrorism system, it is possible to highlight a number of factors constraining the development of the communication provision. These factors appeared in the reviewed period or were historically inherent in counter-terrorism structures. As a historical factor, we can observe the inflexibility of intelligence agencies in their evaluation of opposition parties and movements, far-left parties in particular. Such a situation, in our perspective, was conditioned by the inertia of the Cold War. Consequently, this prevented the construction of a dialogue in the fight against terrorism. The political factors leading to the inefficiency in the counter-terrorist agencies’ communication include (1) geopolitical rivalry among the nation states, leading to competition among their intelligence agencies; (2) strategic communication subdivisions’ concentration on geopolitical tasks

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(e.g., their participation in information warfare with Russia), leading to a loss of attention to the communication provision of counter-terrorism activities; (3) opportunism in politicians’ behavior that imperils the national security (the Spanish government’s communication after the terrorist attack in Madrid is a telling example). The organizational factors leading to a decrease in the efficiency of communication during the fight against terrorism in the EU are (1) the dependency of the Coordinator and European agencies on the national governments’ interests (which is apparent, e.g., in the selection of intelligence data that are voluntarily transferred to the European bodies) and as its consequence (2) the absence of an adequate level of external communication and an insufficient representation of the agencies’ work. For example, the collection of intelligence data by various structures (by the European Counter Terrorism Centre at Europol and the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre) helps to accumulate a large amount of timely information. However, in open access publications there are contradictions indicating the lack of strategic planning of communication (see, e.g., Europol 2007–2018).2 For the effective incorporation of the communication provision into the framework of strategic communication in the fight against terrorism, it is advisable to establish more centralized subdivisions operating on a permanent basis, along with organizational structures that create and accumulate expert knowledge. Such divisions can elaborate and transmit specific, scientifically proven recommendations and messages created on demand at the EU level. They can become the key elements of the EU strategic communication. Organizations such as RAN Center of Excellence or Arab StratCom Task Force are the groups devoted to combatting terrorist propaganda within the framework of strategic communication. They can become the starting point of this process. A tangible problem of communication counteraction to terrorism is the contradiction of messages from different representatives of the elite. The value of appeals to the public of the Prime Minister Blair’s government after the terrorist attack in London on 7 July 2005 was reduced by the appearance of Prince Harry in a carnival costume that looked like the 2  Although far-left terrorist groups are condemned, Europol calls their agenda “antiauthoritarian.” The term “authoritarianism” has a strong negative connotation that automatically gives additional legitimacy to the “anti-authoritarian” fighters (see, for example, Council of the EU 2015, p. 9).

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uniform of the African Wehrmacht corps with a swastika on his sleeve (BBC 2005). Despite the fact that the attack occurred later, such actions of persons who are a constant object of press attention can provoke outbursts of national and religious hatred that are favorable ground for the development of terrorism. The negative message comes from a high-level authority in the public eye and therefore receives more attention. This leads to a fall in reputation not only for Prince Harry, but for the state itself, and can lead to damage that is more tangible. In general, the measures of communication provision of the counter-­ terrorism can be divided into two main groups: (1) crisis communications carried out during and after a terrorist attack; and (2) preventive communication activity of anti-terrorist structures. Communications after the terrorist attack aim at overcoming uncertainty as indicated by their rules, including readiness for non-standard solutions; launching and constant support of the communication process immediately after the terrorist attack, despite the lack of specific information; and readiness to defend their interpretation of the facts. In the absence of positive values before the crisis, however, recovery will be either difficult or impossible, so a single model for crises and training is clearly not enough. Instructions of this kind are functional in the presence of a carefully developed plan for crisis communications and a sufficiently high image and reputation of state structures. These communication requirements imply closer cooperation of public relations specialists, analysts, and researchers, underscoring the important role of integrated communications management. The member states have achieved certain successes in the institutionalization of the fight against terrorism. For example, the National Gendarmerie of France has activated the technical monitoring of information on the issue of terrorism. In Great Britain, the national counter-terrorist strategy CONTEST (Government of the United Kingdom 2011) was adopted, wherein the role of preventing terrorist acts with the help of communication is becoming more significant compared with previous periods. In Germany, national analytical groups and associations were created, in particular the Joint Terrorism Task Force. These and many other measures indicate the gradual transition from a European security policy to a new pan-European way of development. By identifying actions and statements from governing bodies and emergency services of Spain, Great Britain, and France after the occurrence of terrorist attacks, it is possible to observe the evolution in crisis communications of national governments. There have been improve-

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ments in mechanisms engaged in announcing an official version of events and agenda as well as informing the general public of the measures taken. In the crisis communications of officials, emphasis is laid not only on state leaders’ involvement in the situation (the use of social media enhances this), but also on the necessity for unity among all citizens against a common enemy. The French case (the authorities’ response to the terrorist attack on the editorial office of Charlie Hebdo) shows the importance of not making premature hypotheses about those responsible for the crisis (until the acquisition of investigation data). The member states’ strong points of communication provision in the context of counter-terrorism activities are (1) the ability to engage in terrorism prevention while reaching out to different age groups (this is most noticeable from publications of the German intelligence agencies), (2) the establishment of a stable system of information exchange in the scientific and expert communities, and (3) the development of analytical departments whose recommendations are used for the elaboration of messages targeted to a broad public. Besides pointing to the successes of communication provision in the fight against terrorism in the EU member states, it is necessary to underline its weak points. Given the sharp rise in terrorist threats in the world after 9/11, the strengthening and broadening of the operational subdivisions have become a priority for many states, including the EU countries. The structures responsible for cooperation with social organizations and ethnic and religious minorities were formed too late and aimed to supplement the anti-terrorism subdivisions’ structures (however, the communication aimed at crisis prevention should have been deployed before the beginning of crisis). Their communication strategies are often incompletely worked out, which has resulted in disapproval and even active protests by citizens (as in the “You are a terrorist!” campaign in Germany). Terrorism discourse adopted in particular countries is becoming an obstacle for developing a “non-emotive lexicon” for the discussion on terrorism that was mentioned in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Council of the EU 2005, p. 9). In a number of cases, the intelligence agencies’ actions have contributed to preserving a terrorist threat. The statistics on terrorist acts received from the member states and provided by Europol show the evident increase in the terrorist threat from the left-wing branch in comparison with the far-right and quasi-religious branches (see Europol 2007–2018); however, in reality, the main measures of the fight against terrorism are

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aimed primarily at the latter two. Intelligence agencies’ measures that impinge upon public life (e.g., tapping citizens’ telephones or opening and inspecting mail) often decrease public trust in anti-terrorist structures. In this case, the intelligence agencies’ work is significantly aggravating; the example of the British Security Service MI5’s failure to recruit informers in the country’s ethnic and religious communities proves this (Gardham 2011). The significance of measures such as hacking extremist websites (the “Cupcake” operation by MI6) is decreasing against the background of infinite possibilities of information duplexing and distribution on the internet. Despite the generally successful institutionalization of counter-terrorism, the social factors that preserved the terrorist threat were not eradicated or appropriately minimized. Such factors include unemployment, ghettoization, and a low level of education among migrants. The insufficient measures regarding the integration of foreign workers into European society, along with property rights and social differentiation, have evoked growing discontent among migrants and their children who are already full-fledged citizens in the European countries, but who often struggle to find their place in society and often do not get the respect that many Europeans have. A complementary factor in the aggravation of interethnic relations has become the participation of a number of EU countries’ militaries in the conflicts in the Middle East within the context of the “war on terror.” All this makes some foreign workers and their children a potential target audience for terrorist propaganda appealing to common origin or religion. A striving to express protest against social injustice has in some cases provoked specialists of foreign origin to enter terrorist organizations. At the same time, the rise in unemployment and corruption, the drop in education levels, and the threat from the quasi-religious branch have provoked some native Europeans into entering far-right organizations or to form new ones. The same can be said about left-wing organizations that actively use public protest to justify terrorist attacks. The improvement in cooperation between the European and national agencies within the framework of specific projects has proven to be a success in the sphere of communication provision in the fight against the different branches of terrorism. Among these projects are the “exit programs” (Ramalingam 2014, p. 17) aimed at narrowing the social base of far-right terrorism (helping young people to deal with education and employment brings these programs closer to strategic communication). In the period under review, a large number of projects concerning the integration of

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migrants as well as national and religious minorities have been ­implemented (such as the formation of representational bodies of minorities and the construction of a dialogue between them and governments of member states, the promotion of European languages and values among migrants, and training programs for religious servants). The example of Germany shows the high level of attention that is paid to the prevention of all three branches of terrorism in the country. The greater concentration of practical efforts at the EU level related to the prevention of the far-right and quasi-religious terrorism compared with the far-left is showcased by, for example, the opening of a subdivision at Europol aimed at the analysis of the far-right threat, or the establishment of the European Counter Terrorism Centre mainly in response to the terrorist attacks of al-Qaeda and IS. This is justified considering the acute problem of the activation of far-right and quasi-religious branches of terrorism. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Germany provides open access information on the problem of far-right terrorism. Special classes taught by officers of the French National Gendarmerie target young people and are aimed at the prevention of juvenile delinquency. In Great Britain, private initiatives on political resistance to far-right violence, including the establishment of non-commercial analytic centers and social organizations, have sought to prevent political branches of the far-right movement from entering the country’s representational bodies. In Germany, along with the establishment of expert centers that unite analysts from the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, these structures provide a large amount of helpful information (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2008, 2010, 2019a, b), such as instructions for citizens explaining the elementary measures for preventing terrorist attacks. The German anti-­ terrorist agencies are actively working with teachers and volunteers in order to explain the nature of the extremist and terrorist threats to young people represented by any of the branches. The disapproval of terrorist attacks and the delegitimization of terrorist groups in the public opinion are together considered the single most important measure in the fight against quasi-religious terrorism. The counter-terrorist structures have emphasized their work with political and religious leaders within the Muslim community. A strong point of the messages coming from a number of counter-terrorist agencies is the intention to explain the core of terrorism and the extremist problem. In these documents, which are intended for a wide range of readers, notions of

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Islam are differentiated in detail from quasi-religious terrorism. The systemic character of the transmission of such messages is also worth mentioning, as communication in this case involves a maximum number of target audiences. It is possible to single out particular problems in the communication counteraction of each branch of terrorism in the period under review. The legacy of the Cold War, during which left-wing terrorists in the West called themselves “communists” supported by the Soviet power, developed into the habit of evaluating the far-left as, first of all, a part of the Marxist movement. This approach is actively used not only with respect to left-wing terrorist organizations, but also sometimes with respect to established left parties. Although the direct association of left organizations with terrorism is usually absent, the active anti-Marxist propaganda in their open access publications and the equating in the public consciousness of left parties’ representatives and anti-globalists (who hold their actions during high-level summits) with extremists can only further escalate the relations between the ruling circles and opposition. In documents of Europol and the EU’s national counter-terrorism agencies, along with the call for tolerance for people from other nations, religions, and so on, the call to fight “jihadism,” “Islamism,” and “Marxist-­ Leninist organizations” has become of prime importance. This can possibly create the association of religion, or the demands for progressive transformations, with terrorist activities in the collective consciousness. In a number of cases, famous experts on the issue of terrorism have functioned as experts in religion. This has produced an opposite effect than intended, as terrorist organizations have represented the fight against terrorism as the fight against one or another religious or political movement as well as the expression of national or religious intolerance. Counter-­ terrorist communication practice often remains conditioned by a defensive position, which results in counter-propaganda; the search for influential figures who can dissuade the potential target audience of terrorist propaganda comes often too late. The simultaneous proclamation of the necessity to fight against quasi-­ religious terrorists who are searching for a social base, often among immigrants, and the condoning of the presence of al-Qaeda’s ideologists in the EU’s communication space—such as was the case with Anwar al-Awlaki, who died in 2011—undermine the confidence in governments, leading to criticism from the “right,” which inevitably results in the spread of far-­ right extremist ideas.

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Conclusion Following our conclusions, we formulate a number of recommendations for power structures to improve the efficiency of their communication provision in the fight against terrorism. 1. In the current conditions, it is important for states and interstate structures to develop a system of strategic communication with the transition to positive, really strategic goals for the sake of society (in contrast to the current status, toward geopolitically directed aims). The communication provision of counter-terrorism activities can be included in the strategic communication apparatus of any state with the assistance of experts in the spheres of security and communications as well as a wide range of experts in the political, historical, and economic sciences for working out the main operational decisions and messages to transmit. Another significant measure can be the consolidation connection between expert decision makers in organizational structures in order to strengthen the research and expert study of the practical measures in counter-terrorism activities as well as their communicative effects. 2. This chapter has shown the necessity for taking measures aimed at narrowing terrorist’s social bases, ranging from key decisions in the spheres of employment and education to more specific measures (e.g., the expansion of “exit programs” targeted at the left-wing and quasi-religious branches of extremism). The publications of decisions in this sphere are of prime importance for building a dialogue with both foreign workers and local people. Also, the dialogue of the authorities with professional organizations and institutions in civil society; the promotion of public discussions in the mass media on urgent economic, social, and political issues; and giving the floor in the media to recognized public leaders who are opposing terrorism can become effective communication measures in the context of preventing terrorism. 3. Education aimed at preserving one’s own culture, as well as developing and understanding a resident country’s culture, strengthens citizens’ acquaintance with the best examples of literature, art, and scientific achievements, emphasizing the values that are inherent to any nation, and can in turn bring people together instead of alienating them. At the same time, a shift from a national or religious

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­ iscourse to a social and economic one is advisable in communicad tion in the area of counter-terrorism. Similarly, discrediting legal left parties and movements is intolerable in the fight against the threat of the far-left. This chapter paves the way for further research. We summarize that the national elite’s concentration on geopolitical interests, prioritizing these over public interests, can lead not only to insufficient cooperation between national intelligence agencies, but also to direct or indirect support of organizations that are recognized as terrorist groups by other states. An example of the latter is the long-term operation of servers of the “Kavkaz Center” website in Sweden and Finland, which contains even documents of organizations designated as terrorist in the EU. Such events can decrease the efficiency of communication in the fight against quasi-religious terrorism in terms of intergovernmental unity. They should be accurately analyzed. Therefore, it is advisable to study the influence of the competition between a state’s intelligence agencies that deal with different tasks (e.g., intelligence and counter-intelligence), the interaction of officials of these agencies with “risk groups” (potential and real terrorists), and the representation of the terrorist problem in the media space by these structures. Furthermore, it is important to study more comprehensively the cooperation of public and supranational bodies with religious organizations in the fight against terrorism. Studying the influence of terrorist attacks on citizens’ electoral behavior can enhance the crisis communication of a state or an interstate formation. With the development of technical means of communication, the operations in asymmetrical information warfare are becoming significantly easier. For instance, the analysis of a target audience’s interests is simplified by the ability to automatically examine web page traffic, comments, and likes of social media users’ messages. Generating news items according to the data received during the above-mentioned processes will also increasingly become automated by means of task-specific robots that are already used by some news agencies and media in their analytical publications, including the EU. The possible use of such equipment by terrorist organizations will allow them to create, at certain moments, a quantitative predominance of terrorist propaganda. In these conditions, the measures of counter-propaganda or censorship for the sake of protecting the state and society are insufficient.

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In order to maintain their destructive effect, the words, deeds, and images in terrorist propaganda must adapt to the expectations of the terrorist groups’ target audience, an important part of which are potential and real recruits. Finally, yet importantly, to recruit young people into its ranks, was launched, for example, the German-language magazine “Kybernetiq” (according to some media reports, the magazine belongs to IS), which, in addition to instructions on how to bypass the blocking of propaganda messages, published an ideologically verified science fiction story. Terrorists launch mobile applications and computer games with propaganda content. The image of a terrorist nowadays is becoming more “high-tech.” It combines the features of a fanatic and, for example, a skilled hacker. This happens against the background of terrorist organizations recruiting specialists in the field of high technologies. They, in particular, can also be the target of such propaganda. The possible use of artificial intelligence by terrorist organizations is recognized as a new threat (see, e.g., Flanagan 2019). A high level of resistance by citizens, especially by security officials, to informational and psychological impact is necessary. In other words, there is a need for adequate staff training from relevant agencies in order to cope with communication threats related to terrorism. In fact, terrorism, in its new capacity, allows terrorist organizations to deploy strategic communication along with states and interstate groups. The communication-related problem of the fight against terrorism will remain relevant in future. For the EU, the further study of these processes is of prime importance, certainly against the background of international and social tensions that will be used by terrorist organizations to their advantage.

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Index1

A Abbott, Tony, 141 ABBYY, 274, 275 Abkhazia, 62 Action Theory, 290 Adenauer, Konrad, 92 Ad hominem attack, 147, 153 Adizes Institute, 227 Advertising, 13, 30, 112, 171, 324 Afghanistan, 83, 266 Africa, 18, 43, 49, 81, 121, 234 Agile, 191, 191n2 Agitainment, 148 Albright, Jonathan, 44 Alekperov, Vagit, 182, 183, 185, 191, 192 Alfa Bank, 227 Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, 284 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, party, 152 al-Qaeda, 316, 320, 325, 327, 330, 332–334

Amazon, 70, 173 AMIC Energy Management GmbH, 182 Animalization, 151, 152 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), 80, 237 Antiterrorist activities, 13, 321–332 Apple, 70 Arab StratCom Task Force, 69, 340 Architecture for Europe, 147 Arctic, 2, 245 Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2, 124, 322 Armenia, 68n3, 72, 194 Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), 283–289, 298, 303 Artificial intelligence, 6, 12, 45, 164, 165, 188, 189, 195, 198, 199, 272–280, 277n2, 278n3, 282–289, 295, 297, 299–301, 303, 348 Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI), 283, 284

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 E. Pashentsev (ed.), Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27253-1

359

360 

INDEX

Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI), 284, 285, 287, 288, 298 Ashton, Catherine, 69 Asia, 2, 18, 36, 49, 67, 68, 85, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 115, 119, 121, 125, 126, 244, 286 Asimov, Isaac, 299 Associated Press, 178–179, 182, 187 Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union, 198 Atlantic Council, 72 Atlantic Ocean, 80 Audience, 10, 44, 137–140, 153, 170–172, 176, 177, 180, 185, 188, 195, 196, 281, 320, 327, 329, 331, 334, 336, 337, 343, 345, 347, 348 Austria, 127, 170, 172, 173, 181, 182, 185, 195, 196, 232, 263 Authoritarianism, 4, 41, 47, 146, 151, 188, 191, 231n3, 267, 299, 340n2 al-Awlaki, Anwar, 345 Azerbaijan, 68n3, 72 B Bailey, Charles, 27 Balkans, 189, 235 Baltic Region, 74, 75, 77, 144, 145, 151, 169, 170, 182, 189, 195, 270 Bank of America, 275 Bank of England, 277 Bannon, Steve, 44, 45, 152 Bay of Pigs, 239 Bazhenov formation, 167 Beijing, 18, 93 Belarus, 68n3, 72, 73 Belgium, 101, 146, 173, 181, 182, 184, 195

Bellingcat, 71 Berlin, 25, 75, 101, 229 Berlusconi, Silvio, 144, 146 BGI Shenzhen, 281 Big data, 45, 283 Bild, 178 Bin Laden, Osama, 326, 327 Bitcoin, 334 Black Sea, 115, 169 Blair, Tony, 340 Blood and Honor, 336 Bolsheviks, 27, 42, 293 Bolshevism, 116 Bolton, John, 239 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 116, 267 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 188, 193 Bradbury, Ray, 301 Brand, 140, 173, 175, 186, 188, 192, 198, 333, 337 Brand Finance, company, 173 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), 18, 93 Breivik, Anders, 337 Brexit, 32, 43, 45, 64, 69, 90, 98, 100, 101, 126, 127, 143, 178, 186, 291, 294 British Liberal Democrats, party, 152 Brok, Elmar, 151 Brookings Institution, 72 Brussels, 1, 46, 68, 72–76, 127, 144, 147, 199, 234, 269 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 77, 220, 264, 265 Bucharest, 325 Bulgaria, 146, 175, 176, 181, 182, 184, 195 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS), 242, 242n4 Bush, George W., 24, 236, 326

 INDEX 

C California, 274 Cambridge Analytica, 43–45, 47, 183 Canada, 169, 173 Capitalism, 4, 5, 12, 136, 261–267, 272, 292, 300 Caribbean, 43 Caspian Sea, 183 Catalan independence, 127 Catalonia, 127 Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 185, 227 Central Europe, 115, 146, 151, 167, 189, 193, 237, 290 Chamber of Commerce, 174, 177, 233 Character, 10, 40, 45, 135–140, 142, 149–154, 198, 262, 335, 339, 345 Character assassination, 10, 43, 135–140, 144, 145, 148–151, 153, 154 Charlie Hebdo, 342 Chatham House, 112 Chávez, Hugo, 271 Chicago, 40, 242n4 Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 40 China, 12, 18, 36, 50, 70, 76–78, 80, 81, 85, 89–91, 94, 95, 97, 100, 119, 121, 122, 125–127, 166, 173, 184, 215–217, 220, 221, 224, 225, 231n3, 232–238, 240, 243, 244, 246, 247, 262, 267, 271, 273, 274, 278–282, 281n4, 286, 292, 294, 300 Chossudovsky, Michel, 49 Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 75, 151 Churchill, Winston, 13 Civil society, 25, 47, 67, 68, 86, 102, 242, 320, 346 Clash of norms, 145 Clegg, Nick, 152

361

Clinton, Bill, 238, 239 Clinton, Hillary, 49 CNN, 179, 187, 243, 324 CNN effect, 324 Co-creation, 137 Cold War, 3, 9, 38, 41, 62, 63, 74–78, 81, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 96, 102, 113, 121, 150, 222, 268, 339, 345 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 93, 94 Colombia, 293 Commodity, 11, 35, 119, 163–170, 173, 181, 187, 197, 199, 216, 272 Common Economic Space, 2 Commonwealth of Independent States, 93, 176 Communication deficit, 143 Communication management, 18n3, 29–31, 46, 47, 314, 331, 337 Communication provision, 13, 175, 314, 315, 330, 338–343, 346 Communication strategy, 62, 87, 98, 145, 189, 319, 323, 342 Communicator, 12, 138, 321 Competitive authoritarian, 146 Concentration of media ownership, 146 Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left, GUE/NGL, 37, 71 Conflicting messages, 144 CONTEST, British counter-terrorism strategy, 322, 341 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), 117 Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS), 236, 237 Conventional prompt strike (CPS), 236 Corporate actors, 136 Corporate social responsibility (CSR), 171, 180, 188, 190, 198, 199

362 

INDEX

Corruption, 4, 42, 124, 182, 183, 186, 192, 193, 197, 199, 221, 222, 224, 228, 269, 286, 343 Council of Europe, 93, 149, 318, 319 Council of the European Union, 2, 67, 144, 145, 316, 319, 339 Countering America’s Adversaries through the Sanctions Act (CAATSA), 11, 12, 167, 214, 214n1, 218–245 Counter-propaganda, 68, 331 Coup d’etat, 116, 224 Couso, Javier, 38, 71 Credibility, 36, 136, 138, 152 Crimea, 62, 66, 75, 83, 95, 145, 151, 186, 224, 227, 228 Crisis, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 19, 21, 26, 28, 32, 34, 36, 38–42, 61, 63, 65, 66, 67n2, 68, 75, 76, 79, 83, 86, 88, 96, 98–101, 123, 126, 127, 135, 142, 147, 149, 150, 154, 163, 165, 167–169, 171, 174, 176, 177, 181, 183, 187, 196, 197, 199, 217, 219, 240, 247, 260, 262, 264–266, 268, 269, 272, 291–293, 299, 315, 316, 323, 324, 326, 327, 329, 330, 334, 335, 341, 342, 347 Crisis management, 329 Croatia, 74, 146, 181, 184, 193, 233 Cross-cultural management, 172 Crusade, 326 Crypto currencies, 334 Cuba, 239 Cultural, 1, 28, 32, 81, 87, 91, 102, 115, 116, 120, 124, 140, 144, 147, 149, 152, 162, 170, 172, 180, 184, 188–190, 195, 196, 232, 281, 287, 300, 329, 336 Culture, 5, 82, 116, 140, 150, 151, 171, 172, 188, 190, 195, 198, 272, 320, 346

Cupcake operation, 343 Cyberspace, 70 Cyborg, 282 Cyborgization, 12, 281–283, 289, 297 Cynthia Charities, 169 Cyprus, 83, 144, 181 Czechoslovakia, 62 Czech Republic, 146, 181, 184, 187–189, 193, 195 D Dar-as-Salaam, 334 Daul, Joseph, 74 Decadence, 149 DeepMind project, 284 Democracy, 5, 26, 38, 42, 43, 47, 61, 62, 65, 67, 72, 74, 79, 82, 90, 95, 99, 123, 146, 152, 153, 171, 224, 228, 237, 239, 241, 265, 299 Deniz Bank, 186 Denmark, 167, 173, 180, 286 Der Spiegel, 178, 187 Destructive communication, 136–137 Deubner, Christian, 75 Deutsche Bank, 182 Deutsche Welle (DW), 187, 228 Digital Europe Programme in AI, 274 Donbas, 75, 145, 151, 169, 182 Doomsday Clock, 242, 242n4 Dubai, 272, 282 Dushanbe, 93 Dworkin, Scott, 48 E E3/EU+2 ministerial meeting, 233 Eastern Europe, 98, 187, 189, 237, 333 Eastern Partnership, 145

 INDEX 

East StratCom Task Force, 10, 19, 33, 68–74, 99, 145 East StratCom Team, 10 Echo chamber, 145 Education, 5, 10, 26, 29, 82, 125, 171, 180, 188, 217, 241, 267, 275–277, 292, 294, 297, 299, 300, 302, 327, 343, 346 Elite, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 20, 22, 24, 28, 32, 33, 38, 40, 47, 79, 126, 141, 143, 166, 169, 178, 181, 199, 216, 220–222, 228, 230, 243, 244, 246, 248, 262, 264–267, 269, 286, 294, 296, 298, 321, 329, 330, 340, 347 Elizabeth I, 276 Elon University, 44 Emerald, company, 169 Energy, 6, 10, 11, 36, 67, 85, 90, 97, 119–122, 126, 139, 145, 163, 167–171, 175–178, 180, 183, 184, 188, 193, 197, 224, 233, 241, 261, 272, 287, 291, 299 Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 168 Enlightenment, 24, 116 Enmification, 150–152 Essentialization, 151 Estonia, 146, 151, 270 Etzioni, Oren, 284 EU Common Strategy on Russia, 118 EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 338 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 322, 339, 342 EU Eastern Partnership, 65, 68, 72–74, 77, 83 EU Global Strategy, 61, 65, 83 EU Intelligence Analysis Centre, 340 Eurasia, 10, 39, 67, 76–78, 80, 85–98, 114, 118, 121, 167, 194, 235, 243, 266, 271, 292

363

Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 93, 94, 97, 114, 121, 194, 266 Eurasianism, 125 Eurojust, 338, 339 Europe, 1–3, 7, 9, 10, 21, 22, 26, 31–33, 36–38, 40, 46, 49, 64–67, 72, 75–79, 81–85, 87–93, 95–98, 100, 101, 113–118, 120, 121, 124–126, 143–145, 147, 149, 150, 152, 153, 164, 166–169, 172, 174–177, 179–181, 186, 187, 189, 190, 193, 195, 197, 198, 221, 222, 235, 244, 245, 262, 263, 271–274, 280, 290, 293, 318, 325, 333, 335, 337 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX), 124 European Agenda for Security, 339 European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), 46 European Commission, 4n1, 11, 46, 84n4, 99, 127, 144, 145, 164, 170, 171, 244, 269, 273, 274, 339 European Convention on Human Rights, 82 European Council, 67, 118, 119 European Counter Terrorism Centre, 340, 344 European Credit Transfer System (ECTS), 125 European External Action Service (EEAS), 19, 61, 64, 66, 69, 72, 73, 76, 83, 89, 233 European Federation of Journalists, 37 European Network of Experts on Radicalisation (ENER), 339 European Parliament, 11, 35, 37–39, 68, 71, 75, 85, 91, 96, 144, 145, 150, 170, 194, 234, 246, 269, 277, 278, 280

364 

INDEX

European Parliament elections, 234 European People’s Party (EPP), 74 European Union (EU), 1, 2, 4, 4n1, 6–13, 19, 21, 26, 31–50, 61, 62, 64–79, 65n1, 81–103, 112–114, 117–128, 135, 136, 142–151, 153, 163–199, 220, 225, 226, 229, 230, 232–234, 240, 243, 245–248, 259–281, 283, 291–294, 296, 299, 301, 303, 313–319, 321, 322, 324, 325, 333, 336–345, 340n2, 347, 348 European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), 339 European Values Think Tank, 86 Europe Park, 180, 193 Europol, 334, 338–340, 340n2, 342, 344, 345 Euroskepticism, 84 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, 120 EU-Russia Migration Dialogue, 124 EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment, 339 Exaggeration, 151, 152, 232 Exit programs, 343, 346 F Facebook, 43–47, 70, 152, 180, 185, 187 Fake news, 10, 43, 44, 46, 48, 69, 72, 74, 99 False flag operation, 43, 235 Far-left, 323, 335–337, 339, 340n2, 344, 345, 347 Far-right, 43, 147, 150, 271, 335, 337, 342–345 Fascism, 337 Federal Criminal Police Office, Germany, 344

Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany, 318, 335, 344 Federation Council of the Russia, 182 Feedback, 172, 179, 182, 188, 265, 339 Finland, 181, 184, 195, 347 Florida, 224 Flynn, Michael, 269 Forbes, 178, 187, 228, 262 Foreign-exchange reserves, 227 Foreign policy, 7, 17, 20, 32, 49, 85, 92, 97, 114, 117, 118, 121, 125, 141, 143, 145, 151, 153, 167, 179, 215, 220, 225, 226, 228, 235–245, 248, 322, 324 Fotyga, Anna Elżbieta, 69, 71 Foundation For European Progressive Studies (FEPS), 75 Fox News, 178, 265 Fracking, 168, 169 Framing, 136, 137, 140, 142 France, 20, 20n4, 32, 36, 68, 70, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82, 87, 98, 117, 144, 146, 169, 170, 173, 196, 232–234, 238, 243, 245, 293, 341 French National Gendarmerie, 341, 344 Freudenstein, Roland, 75 Friedman, George, 40 G Gas, 2, 120, 121, 164–170, 173–180, 182, 184, 185, 189, 191–194, 218, 245 Gayropa, 149 Gazprom, 11, 48, 164, 166–168, 173–189, 191, 193, 194, 196, 244 Gazprom Export, 164, 179

 INDEX 

Gazprom Neft, 48, 179, 194 Generalplan Ost, 27 G-Energy Service programme, 175, 176 Genetics, 12, 281–283, 281n4, 289, 297, 302 Geopolitical conflicts, 135, 137 Geopolitical tensions, 136 Geopolitics, 12, 89, 97, 99 George Mitchell Foundation, 169 Georgia, 62, 66, 68n3, 72, 74, 88, 92 German Criminal Code, 318 German Federal Statistical Office, 243 Germany, 24, 25, 32, 70, 77, 79, 80, 92, 98, 117, 127, 144, 146, 150, 164, 169, 170, 173, 178, 180, 183, 190, 195, 226, 232–234, 243, 262, 263, 294, 318, 341, 342, 344 Glencore, 182 Globalization, 259 Global Sanctions Summit, 214 Goebbels, Joseph, 24, 25 Goltsblat BLP, company, 219 Goodwill, 7, 162, 173, 175, 185 Google, 46, 70, 112, 114, 127, 276, 278n3, 284 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 113 Gore, Albert, 265 Grand strategic communication, 138 Great Britain, 36, 37, 48, 69, 78, 86, 95, 98, 101, 113, 127, 144–146, 152, 169, 173, 175, 178, 180, 183, 184, 187, 190, 193, 233, 234, 264, 276, 277, 281, 294, 295, 322, 341, 344 Great Recession, 261 Greece, 144, 146, 175, 176, 193, 232, 280 Greenpeace, 169 Greens, party, 151 Gref, Herman, 186, 187, 189, 191

365

Gross domestic product (GDP), 35, 121, 127, 226, 227, 234, 261–263, 292, 332 Guardian, 45, 69, 73, 99 Guellner, Lutz, 69 H Haldane, Andy, 277 Haldensblatt, 187 Hamas, 319 Hammerskins, 336 Hanappi, Gerhard, 4, 4n1 Handelsblatt, 178 Harms, Rebecca, 151 Harry, Prince, 340, 341 Hermitage, 196 Higher School of Economics, Russia, 275 High Level Machine Intelligence (HLMI), 285, 286 High Representative of the EU, 19, 33, 233 High-Tech Strategic Psychological Warfare (HTSPW), 295, 296 Hiroshima, 6 Hitler, Adolf, 22, 24, 25, 27, 221, 267, 296 Human Brain Project, 284 Hungary, 82, 144, 146, 175, 181, 188, 189, 193, 195, 232 Hybrid regime, 146 Hybrid threats, 67 Hybrid war, 75, 241 Hybrid warfare, 68, 242 I Ideological square, 141 Ideology, 63, 66, 87, 99, 100, 102, 137, 315, 316, 318, 330, 333, 336

366 

INDEX

Image, 38, 49, 66, 70, 137, 140, 144, 149–153, 162, 170, 171, 174, 175, 178–180, 188, 190–192, 196, 217, 221, 242, 268, 275, 279, 283, 323, 337, 341, 348 Image of the “other,” 144 Imperialism, 5, 25, 66, 149, 151, 239, 247, 292 Incompatibility issues, 136 India, 81, 126, 232, 238, 240, 243, 267, 273, 294 Inflammatory rhetoric, 146 Influence, 6, 12, 20, 25, 28, 30, 32, 33, 38, 41, 45, 47, 68–71, 73, 77, 113–117, 121, 125, 127, 135, 137, 139, 167, 170, 174, 176, 177, 189, 214, 227, 229, 230, 238, 242, 244–248, 264, 271, 278, 284, 288, 293, 295, 301, 302, 315, 318, 322, 324, 326, 347 Informal Anarchist Federation, 315, 336 Information society, 19 Information warfare, 20, 37, 41, 50, 137, 314, 332, 340, 347 Infotainment, 142, 148 Inglehart–Welzel cultural map of the world, 195 Innopolis University, 275 Innovation, 97, 125, 161, 166, 170, 172, 190, 194, 247, 274, 277, 297 Instagram, 188 Institute for World Economy, 226 Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences, 316 Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), 234 Intangible assets, 11, 12, 30, 41, 162, 173, 181, 191, 199, 228, 331

Integration, 4, 9, 13, 24, 31, 32, 65, 103, 121, 143, 172, 247, 271, 298, 322, 338, 343 Integrity, 62, 66, 138, 161, 295, 317, 322 Intelligence, 328, 342 Interdependence theory, 66 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), 79, 80, 96, 243 International community, 47, 136, 138, 316, 327 International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 274 International Energy Agency (IEA), 166, 167 International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), 37 International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 274 International relations, 8n2, 13, 49, 64, 65, 91, 99, 112, 117–123, 136, 213, 246, 248 International scene, 98, 135 Internet, 20, 29, 47, 102, 113, 169, 287, 317, 328, 336, 337, 343 Iran, 3, 40, 79, 95, 96, 183, 214n1, 216, 223, 232–234, 236, 243, 247, 268 Iraq, 20, 20n4, 40, 66, 183, 266, 334 Iraq war, 66 Ireland, 36, 146, 173 ISAB, company, 184 Iskander Energy, 169 Islam, 96, 326, 332, 334, 338, 345 Islamic State, 13, 33, 34, 37, 69, 71, 76, 96, 145, 269, 270, 316, 319, 323, 332–338, 344, 348 Islamism, 345 Islamization, 337 Italy, 32, 144, 146, 175, 181, 184, 195, 196, 233, 294, 333

 INDEX 

J Jacobins, 42 Japan, 173, 279, 293, 298 Jihad, 327 Jihadism, 345 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 95, 234 Joint Terrorism Task Force, Germany, 341 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 145, 269 K Katchanovski, Ivan, 43 Kavkaz Center, 347 Kazakhstan, 183 Keosayan, Tigran, 149 Kerry, John, 66 Khrushchev, Nikita, 22 Kiel, 226 Kiev, 177, 269 Kinakh, Jaroslav, 169 Kissinger doctrine, 101 Knowledge management, 329 Korea, 3, 95, 214n1, 217, 223, 225, 235, 268, 279 Kosovo, 66 Kremlin, 33, 35, 36, 49, 146, 148, 149, 153, 178, 183, 187, 228, 229, 270 Kudrin, Alexey, 261 Kurdish referendum, 127 Kurdistan Workers’ Party, 319 Kurzweil, Ray, 278n3, 282 Kybernetiq (magazine), 348 L Latin America, 3, 240, 292 Latvia, 85, 146, 175, 181, 270 Lavrov, Sergey, 95, 233 Law enforcement agencies, 313, 315, 320, 324, 326, 330

367

Law enforcement detachments, 224 Le Pen, Marine, 40, 146, 271 Lee, William, 276 Left Front, party, 40 Left-wing, 5, 333, 342, 343, 345, 346 Legatum Institute, 178 Legitimacy, 10, 66, 136, 137, 147, 152, 153, 340n2 Lenin, Vladimir, 293 Leruth, Philippe, 37 Levada Center, 228 Libya, 22, 65, 126, 266 Liquefied natural gas (LNG), 166, 167 Lisbon, 78, 89, 90, 93, 97, 101, 166, 271 Lisbon Treaty, 166 Lithuania, 146, 181, 193, 270 London, 2, 175, 284, 295, 333, 340 Los Angeles Times, 178, 225 Luddite movement, 276 Lukoil, 11, 48, 173–189, 191, 193, 194 Lukoil Neftochim Burgas AD, 184 Lukoil-Ukraine, 182 Luxembourg, 181, 182, 195 M Machine learning, 272, 275, 286 Mackinder, Halford, 77, 95 Macron, Emmanuel, 3, 69, 70, 90, 99, 149 Macronleaks, 70 Madrid, 324, 329, 333, 340 Maduro, Nicolás, 271 Magnitsky Act, 145, 236 Maidan, 43, 149–151, 224 Malleable national symbols, 153 Malta, 193, 233 Malzberg, Stephen, 238 Manipulation, 20, 44, 47, 215 Mann, Michael, 69

368 

INDEX

Marinova, Victoria, 182 Martens Centre, 68, 75 Marxism, 116, 290, 335, 337, 345 Matus, Jonathan, 284 McCarthyism, 24, 86 McKinsey Global Institute, 275 Media, 10, 18n2, 20, 20n4, 33, 37, 38, 42, 43, 45–48, 61, 62, 68–72, 86, 99, 102, 111, 112, 135–137, 140–142, 144, 146, 146n1, 147, 150, 153, 169, 172–174, 177–180, 178n1, 182, 185–188, 190–192, 194–199, 220, 221, 223, 230, 237, 244, 265, 271, 273, 295, 314, 315, 320, 321, 324, 326, 328, 330, 334, 336–339, 342, 346–348 Media environments, 135 Media Index, 178, 178n1, 187 Medialogia, company, 174, 177, 178n1, 183, 186 Mediatization, 142 Medical metaphor, 152 Medusa, 187 Medvedev, Dmitry, 92 Mélenchon, Jean-Luc, 40, 271 Mercer family, 44 Merkel, Angela, 66, 150 Merrill Lynch, 275 MI5, British Security Service, 343 MI6, British intelligence agency, 343 Miami, 239 Microsoft, 3, 70 Middle East, 3, 49, 121, 176, 235, 272, 326, 343 Migrants, 188, 292, 333, 343, 344 Migration, 4, 9, 10, 31, 65, 124, 189 Militante Gruppe, 315, 336 Military-industrial complex (MIC), 268 Miller, Alexey, 168, 185, 189, 191, 192 Miller, Geoffrey, 281, 281n5

Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation, 164 Minsk, 67, 68, 83, 90, 93, 269 Minsk Agreements, 67 Mogherini, Federica, 33, 240 Moldova, 68n3, 72, 74, 88 Mondale, Walter, 3 Monroe Doctrine, 239, 240 Morris, Dick, 138, 238, 239 Moscow, 1–3, 9, 9n2, 18n3, 47, 48, 97, 113, 115, 117, 121, 126, 145, 147, 150, 151, 218, 222, 228, 233, 237, 239, 262, 269, 275, 279, 293 Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), 275 Mosque, 333 Multilateralism, 78–79, 91 Multipolarism, 125 Multipolarity, 83, 241 Munich, 151 Murmansk, 89, 93 Murphy, Dennis, 18, 50 Musk, Elon, 282 Muslim, 325, 327, 328 Muslim fundamentalism, 81 Muslims, 81, 82, 344 Myagkov, Mikhail, 150 N Naftogaz, 177, 180 Nagasaki, 6 Nairobi, 334 Napoleonic wars, 116 Narrative, 8, 9, 33, 62–64, 69–72, 74–81, 84, 86–99, 102, 137, 141, 143, 145, 148, 153, 327 National Defense Authorization Act, 236 National Foundation for American Policy, 263

 INDEX 

Nationalism, 116, 152, 180, 224, 268 National Security Agency (NSA), 49, 70 National Socialism, 337 National Technical Committee for Standardization, Russia, 275 National Technology Initiative Center, 275 National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), 263 Nation-building, 147, 153 Nazi, 22, 24, 25, 27, 150, 224, 271, 335 Nazism, 5, 150, 267, 336 Neoliberalism, 266 Netherlands, 32, 36, 73, 83, 146, 173, 181, 182, 184, 195, 263 New Delhi, 89, 93 Newman, Bruce, 45 News, 3, 18, 37, 46, 48, 69, 70, 72, 99, 140–142, 148, 153, 177– 180, 182, 183, 185, 187, 192, 198, 218, 220, 239, 242n4, 244, 265, 315, 337, 347 New Silk Road, 97, 121 Newsmax TV, 238 Newsweek, 178 New York, 72, 77, 179, 186, 233, 281 New York Times, 72, 77, 179, 186 Nicaragua, 239 Niemöller, Martin, 26 Nobel Peace Prize Forum, 220 Non-adversarial relations, 154 Non-governmental organization (NGO), 68, 72, 102, 320 Nord Stream 2, 166, 167, 170, 174, 177–180, 199, 233, 243, 245 North America, 126, 286 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 10, 18, 67, 71, 76, 77, 79, 80, 93–96, 98, 117, 147, 150, 153, 219, 230, 234, 236–238, 245, 268, 270, 291

369

North Korea, 126, 217, 223, 268, 292 Norway, 121, 169, 273 Novak, Alexander, 168 Novek, Robert, 182 Novosibirsk, 325 O Obama, Barack, 17, 23, 35, 45, 95, 218, 219, 225, 230, 233, 268, 285 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 326 Oil, 2, 35, 48, 84, 120–122, 164–168, 173, 175, 180–184, 191–194, 199, 218, 226, 227, 233, 332, 334 Oligarchs, 7, 146, 183, 192, 222–224, 226, 228 Olympic Games, 186, 194 OpenAI, project, 284 Open Society, 86 Oreshkin, Maxim, 35 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 263 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 93, 94, 325, 326 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 93, 94 OSCE Anti-Terrorist Unit, 326 OSCE Bucharest Declaration, 325 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 326 Oslo, 220 Ottawa, 43, 49 Oxford University, 275, 285

370 

INDEX

P Pacific Ocean, 80 Pan-Slavism, 116 Paris, 66, 97, 329 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), 1–2 Partnership for a New American Economy, 262 Paul, Christopher, 18, 23, 112 PDVSA, company, 182, 183 Pegida, 338 Perception, 10, 28, 34, 37, 41, 47, 62–64, 75, 80, 85, 87, 94–96, 98, 99, 117, 122, 136, 140, 143, 149, 151, 162, 172, 189–196, 198, 199, 214, 219, 240, 323, 327, 329 Permanent Partnership Councils on Justice, Freedom and Security, 124 Personal insult, 146 Persuasion, 137 Persuasive strategy, 139 Pervyi Kanal, TV-channel, 148 Peter the Great, 116 Petrotel-Lukoil S. A., 184 Pew Research Center, 75–76, 143, 189 Platts, 178 Poland, 69, 73–77, 82, 144–146, 149, 151, 169, 170, 178, 181–183, 189, 238 Polish Mining and Gas Extraction Company (PGNiG), 178 Political communication, 92, 136 Political marketing, 45 Political networks, 321, 322 Pompeo, Mike, 233, 239 Popravko, Evgeny, 278 Poroshenko, Petro, 224, 270 Portman, Giles, 69 Portugal, 146, 193

Poupard, Guillaume, 70 Power to Coerce (P2C), 214, 215, 217 Prague, 86 Predictive analytics, 12, 45, 279 Presidential Administration of Russia, 186 PricewaterhouseCoopers, 272 Pride-Automatics, company, 278 Prognostic weapon, 279 Prokopenko, Igor, 149 Propaganda, 9, 21, 24–26, 30, 35–38, 43, 44, 68, 69, 71, 96, 100, 102, 127, 141, 215, 241, 270, 314, 315, 320, 324, 326, 328, 329, 331–333, 336, 340, 343, 345, 347, 348 Psychological effect, 12, 226–235 Psychological operations, 231, 330 Psychological warfare, 9–12, 30, 35, 40–49, 166, 168, 169, 194, 197, 199, 214, 215, 219, 225, 241, 245, 290, 314, 316 Public affairs, 17–18n2, 18 Public consciousness, 6, 13, 19, 20, 29, 30, 43, 218, 245, 277, 293, 336, 345 Public diplomacy, 17n2, 18, 19, 112, 154, 179 Public image, 138, 140 Public opinion, 24, 28, 44, 66, 101, 135, 137, 143, 144, 147, 152, 154, 235, 314, 319, 344 Public relations, 13, 30, 172, 314, 331, 341 Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), 290 Putin, Vladimir, 3, 38, 75, 97, 146, 146–147n1, 147, 151, 152, 178, 187, 218, 222, 223, 228, 231, 237, 244, 280, 282

 INDEX 

Q Qatar, 121 Quasi-religious terrorism, 323, 326, 328, 329, 333, 335, 337, 338, 342–347 R Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 339, 340 Radical Islamism, 326 RAN Center of Excellence, 340 RAND Corporation, 23, 41, 214, 216, 217 RBC, news agency, 48, 176, 293 Reformation, 116 Refugees, 149, 150 Religion, 33, 189, 195, 294, 326, 334, 343, 345 Religious extremism, 333 Renaissance, 75, 116 Renaissance of fascism, 150 RepTrak model, 172, 190 Reputation, 11, 137, 138, 140, 151, 154, 162, 164, 165, 170, 172–190, 192, 195, 197–199, 215, 323, 339, 341 Reputation Institute, 172, 190 Reputation management, 11, 154, 162, 164, 172–189, 195, 198 Reuters, 66, 187, 234, 243 Revolution, 5, 8, 25, 42, 68, 151, 167, 168, 217, 264–266, 276, 289, 290, 293, 296, 297, 299, 300, 302, 303 Reykjavik, 118 Rhetoric, 33, 126–128, 170, 243, 268, 280, 292, 319, 323, 324, 332, 337 Ria Novosti, 37 Riga, 187, 270 Right Sector, organization, 43

371

Rimland, 77, 95 Risk, 4, 6, 32, 36, 42, 88, 124, 127, 162, 169, 172, 177, 183, 188, 193, 198, 240, 242, 268, 269, 277, 282, 288, 318, 320, 328, 332, 347 Robotics, 12, 277–280, 277n2, 300 Robotization, 97, 275, 276, 279, 283, 297, 301–303 Robots, 276–279, 277n2, 283, 299, 301, 347 Rogers, Michael, 70 Romania, 74, 113, 144, 146, 181, 183, 184, 190, 195 Rome, 26, 81, 289 Rosseti, 275 Rossiya-1, TV-channel, 148, 150 Rostelecom, 275 Russell Tribunal, 27 Russia, 1, 2, 4, 6–13, 9n2, 18–22, 18n3, 26, 29, 31–50, 61–71, 65n1, 73–102, 112–121, 123–128, 135, 142–153, 147n1, 163–174, 176–179, 181–183, 186–188, 191, 192, 194–199, 213–240, 214n1, 221n2, 231n3, 243–248, 259–283, 286, 291–296, 301, 303, 318, 340 Russian Empire, 115 Russian Federation, 2, 9n2, 19, 40, 47, 114, 115, 120, 124, 127, 163–165, 172, 185, 187, 222, 232, 233, 239, 262, 316, 319 Russian First Cargo Company, 227 Russian interference in elections, 70, 151, 239 Russian Orthodoxy, 116 Russian Public Opinion Research Center, WCIOM, 226 Russian Railways, 275 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 261, 262

372 

INDEX

Russian State Duma, 261 Russia Today, 37, 86, 95 Russia Working Group of the German Eastern Business Association, OAOEV, 229 Rutherford, Ernest, 6 S Safin, Ralif, 182 Saint Petersburg, 2, 48, 87, 93, 124, 168 Salafism, 326 Salvini, Matteo, 146, 232 Sanctions, 8, 12, 35, 36, 40, 49, 66, 75, 77, 79, 84, 88, 89, 121, 151, 152, 165, 168, 176, 177, 183, 186, 187, 213–219, 214n1, 222, 223, 225–247, 260, 261, 268, 292 San Francisco, 284 Saudi Arabia, 238, 326 Sayusz-Wolski, Jacek, 68 Sberbank, 11, 173–189, 191, 193– 195, 198, 275 Sberbank Europe AG, 186 Schindler, John, 49 Schmidt, Eric, 276, 277n2 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 294 Science, 4, 6, 25, 30, 45, 216–218, 241, 262, 267, 272, 275, 277n2, 282, 283, 294, 300, 331, 348 Seattle, 284 Security, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 17n2, 19, 20, 33, 34, 37, 39, 44, 47, 49, 64, 66, 67, 69, 71, 75–78, 85–100, 112, 117, 118, 123, 124, 147, 150, 163, 165, 167, 180, 186, 190–191, 196, 214, 218, 220, 224, 231n3, 233, 234, 236–239, 242, 243, 247, 248, 267–269, 285, 286, 313, 318,

319, 322, 325, 327–341, 343, 346, 348 Sefchovic, Marosh, 170 Self-positioning, 139, 141 Seneca, 39 Serbia, 95, 182, 188, 193, 335 Shale gas, shale products, 166–170 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 78, 93, 94, 318 Sharia, 334 Shidore, Sarah, 247 Shushkin, Dmitry, 274 Sikorski doctrine, 73, 74 Siluanov, Anton, 226 Skoltech, university, 275 Skripal, Sergei, 127, 145 Slavyansk, 170 Slovakia, 146, 181, 186, 189, 193 Slovenia, 188, 195 Sobolev, Andrey, 229 Sochi, 186, 194 Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 75 Socialism, 136, 239, 266, 299 Social media, 33, 146, 174 Soft power, 33, 80, 81, 152, 214, 215 Solovyov, Vladimir, 149, 150 Sophisticated technologies, 12, 47 Soros, George, 86 South Korea, 173, 279 South Ossetia, 62 Soviet Union, 6, 22, 41, 113, 115–117, 120, 151, 152, 194, 216, 219, 221, 235, 242, 248, 264, 279, 294, 299, 300 Space of Co-operation in the Field of External Security, 2 Space of Research and Education, 2 Spain, 76, 101, 127, 146, 173, 181, 184, 280, 333, 341 Spiral of silence, 169 Sputnik, 37, 245, 261

 INDEX 

Spykman, Nicholas John, 77, 95 Stable Dynamic Social Equilibrium (SDSE), 289–296 Steinacker, Gudrun, 325, 326 Stereotypes, 140, 142, 181, 325, 327 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 237, 325, 327, 332 Strategic communication, 6–13, 17–40, 17n1, 18n2, 18n3, 50, 62–65, 67–71, 76–81, 83, 84, 87, 89, 91, 92, 96, 99, 102, 112, 113, 128, 135, 136, 138–140, 142–148, 154, 162, 163, 166, 196, 197, 199, 232, 233, 235, 236, 240, 245, 247, 259, 260, 266–268, 283, 290, 296, 297, 303, 313, 314, 321–346, 348 Strategic decisions, 162 Strategic planning, 12, 161, 163, 283, 331, 340 Strategic psychological warfare, 12, 40–49, 219–221, 221n2, 223, 229, 235, 245, 295 Stratfor, 40, 247, 248 Svoboda, party, 43 Sweden, 169, 173, 264, 281, 347 Switzerland, 173, 273, 284 Syria, 37, 65, 69, 83, 266, 268 Syrian Civil War, 141 Systems Theory, 290 Szilard, Leo, 6 T Tactical communication, 138 Talk show, 144, 147–150, 153 Target audience, 28, 30, 50, 112, 162, 171, 173, 176, 189–196, 214, 221n2, 242, 314, 319, 320, 323, 325, 329, 331, 335, 345 Technocracy, 147

373

Tektology, 290 Telegram, 334 Television, 113, 144, 146–148, 153, 336 Terror, 316, 316n1, 325, 332, 333, 343 Terrorism, 13, 37, 65, 124, 182, 313–327, 316n1, 329–333, 335–348 Terrorists, 4, 12, 96, 296, 315, 319–321, 327, 328, 330, 332–338, 345, 347 Thrun, Sebastian, 276, 277n2 Tolerance, 149, 171, 326, 345 Transnational companies, 32, 161, 162 Transparency International, 176 Triple Entente, 42 Trump, Donald, 3, 24, 44, 45, 48, 49, 76–79, 83, 94, 95, 146, 152, 214n1, 217, 220, 223, 225, 234, 238, 239, 244, 268, 269, 271, 292 Turkey, 77, 83, 121, 144, 186, 232 U Ukraine, 2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 12, 21, 32, 36, 39, 40, 43, 62, 65, 66, 67n2, 68, 68n3, 69, 72–75, 83, 88, 90, 135, 142, 145, 149–152, 163, 167–169, 171, 177, 181–183, 186, 189, 197, 224, 225, 228, 235, 236, 238, 266, 268, 269, 292 Ukrainian Think Tank Liaison office, 73, 74 UK Terrorism Act, 318 Unemployment, 4, 12, 37, 162, 275, 277, 279, 280, 282, 292, 299, 343 Unilateralism, 151

374 

INDEX

United Nations, 46, 47, 62, 66, 218, 287 United Nations General Assembly, 316 United Nations Security Council, 218 The United States (US), 3, 6, 10, 12, 17, 18n2, 20, 20n4, 23, 24, 27, 37, 40, 47, 50, 66, 69, 70, 72, 74, 76–83, 85–87, 90, 91, 93–96, 100, 101, 113, 125, 127, 142, 145, 146, 147n1, 149–152, 166–170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 183, 187, 199, 213–226, 228–248, 262–269, 271, 273, 274, 281, 282, 285–287, 293, 294, 318, 321, 325, 329, 330, 334 Unstable Dynamic Social Equilibrium (UDSE), 289–296 Ural Mountains, 115 Ušackas, Vygaudas, 73 US Army, 50, 216 US Congress, 18, 167, 214, 222, 224, 225, 236 US Congressional Research Service, 143, 215, 226, 227, 230, 235, 236 US Department of Defense, 17, 231, 231n3, 236, 247, 285 US Department of State, 72 US Government Accountability Office (GAO), 285 US National Security Adviser, 239 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 285 US Patriot Act, 318 US President State of the Union Address, 218 US Secretary of State, 233, 239 US Senate, 72 US Senate Appropriations Committee, 236 USSR, 7, 22, 26, 29, 41, 77, 189, 221n2, 237, 243, 261, 279, 301 US Treasury, 183, 215, 227, 228

V Valdai Discussion Club, 120 Value judgment, 151, 152 Values, 10, 19, 23, 61, 66, 81, 82, 87, 111, 118, 120, 136, 143, 144, 147, 149, 153, 171, 172, 176, 180, 185, 187, 189, 190, 193, 195, 198, 332, 338, 341, 344, 346 Vancouver, 93, 101 Venezuela, 3, 182, 183, 217, 224, 235, 239, 240, 242, 266, 268 Verhofstadt, Guy, 152 Verkhovna Rada, Ukrainian parliament, 269 Vienna, 4n1, 100, 185, 325 Vietnam, 3, 27 VIII Moscow Conference on International Security, 239 Vimont, Pierre, 76 Vkontakte, 188 Vladivostok, 78, 90, 93, 97, 101, 118 Voice of America (VOA), 72 Volkov, Denis, 228 Von Clausewitz, Carl, 70, 84 Vonnegut, Kurt, 301 VTB Bank, 187 W War on terror, 325, 332 Warsaw, 237, 326 Washington, 40, 75, 187, 220, 223, 233, 237, 240, 247, 268, 284 Washington Times, 187 Wells, Herbert George, 6, 300 Wess Mitchell, Aaron, 77 Western Europe, 79, 116, 146, 176, 179, 189, 190 Western Hemisphere, 240 WikiLeaks, 73, 74 Wolfowitz doctrine, 77

 INDEX 

World Bank, 35, 113, 261, 262, 275 World Economic Forum, 4, 190, 193, 275 World Government Summit, 272, 282 World Trade Organization (WTO), 120, 171 World War I, 6, 40, 268 World War II, 3, 22, 76, 113, 150, 151, 218, 224, 332 World War III, 3, 4, 26, 91, 219, 299 World Wildlife Fund, 193 X Xi, Jinping, 224

375

Y Yale University, 285 Yanukovich, Viktor, 43, 224, 266, 268 Yefremov, Ivan, 300 Yeltsin, Boris, 224, 238, 239 YouTube, 168, 188 Yugoslavia, 62, 66 Yuzovskoye gas field, 169 Z Zcash, 334 Zelensky, Volodymir, 270 Zeman, Miloš, 182 Zendrive, company, 284 Zyuganov, Gennady, 239