Strategic and Geopolitical Issues in the Contemporary World [1 ed.] 9781443852678, 9781443848220

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Strategic and Geopolitical Issues in the Contemporary World

Strategic and Geopolitical Issues in the Contemporary World

Edited by

Martin Riegl and Jakub Landovský

Strategic and Geopolitical Issues in the Contemporary World, Edited by Martin Riegl and Jakub Landovský This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by Martin Riegl and Jakub Landovský and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-4822-0, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4822-0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Threats of the Contemporary World ........................................................................ 1 Martin Riegl Part I: Power Shifts in the Beginning of the 21st Century: Competition or Cooperation in Strategic Regions? Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition ........................... 10 Martin Riegl Coping with the Global Power Shift from the West to the East: What Role for the EU in its European Neighbourhood? .......................... 33 Velina Tchakarova Common Security and Defence Policy in Geopolitical Perspective ......... 53 Tereza Smejkalová Cold Waters, Hot Stakes:Systemic Geostrategic Analysis of International Relations in the Arctic Transborder Region ............................................. 72 Irina Valko The Arctic Regional System under External Influence: The Case of China .................................................................................... 94 Irina Valko Sino-Saudi Relations: Relevance for United States Security and Economic Relations with Saudi Arabia ........................................... 119 Norafidah Ismail Chinese Engagement in Venezuela ........................................................ 135 Isabella Hermann U.S.-Venezuelan Energy Relations: Challenging, But Distinctly Manageable ............................................................................................ 146 Timothy J. Sandole

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Table of Contents

China’s Rapidly Developing Relationship with Contemporary Africa .. 157 Wouter Zaayman Whither Arab North Africa? Domestic Change and its Diplomatic Ramifications.......................................................................................... 184 Masahiro Kashima African Hegemony inside the Heartland: "Who is in Charge"? Nigeria’s Role in African Regional Affairs ............................................ 201 Shaibu Sunday Danladi Part II: The Scramble for the Asia-Pacific Rim: New Containment or Cooperation? Competition for Chairmanship: China in the World............................... 222 Hung Lin Yeh New Page of International Security: NATO-China ................................ 226 Yu-Chin Cheng Nuclear Deterrence and Asymmetric Conflict in the Twenty-first Century ................................................................................................... 239 Kevin Blachford Maritime Security in East Asia: Taiwan’s Contribution as a Peacemaker ...................................................................................... 253 Yeh-chung Lu The Future of Democratization in China and the Taiwan Experience .... 271 Yung-mau Chao and Yi-chun Tao From “Asian Values” to “the Asian Century”: A Critical Examination of Polemical East-West Discourses ........................................................ 290 Hoe-Yeong Loke Climate Change as a Security Issue: China’s Role in the Global Climate Regime.................................................................................................... 300 Vijeta Rattani

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How Can Japanese Citizens Read and Understand their Own Situation in the Far East and the World? An Approach to Analyzing a National Newspaper .............................................................................................. 319 Tatsuhiro Yamamoto

INTRODUCTION: GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC THREATS OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD1 MARTIN RIEGL2

The world is experiencing a watershed phase in the second decade of the 21st century, marked by redefining traditional geopolitical patterns and principles. It is obvious that the Cold War-end euphoria, outlined in Francis Fukuyama’s concept of the end of history, was premature and that the geopolitics of the 21st century will not be defined by a clash of 21st century civilizations. The world has found itself in a transitional phase of one geopolitical stage, defined by the central position of Europe’s rimland. The map of Europe defined the 21st century: From Flanders Fields to Omaha Beach to the Berlin Wall to the burned villages of Kosovo; from the Long European War, lasting from 1914 to 1989, to its bloody aftershocks, Europe was the centre of world history.3 The present period exposes various geopolitical and geostrategic challenges, which prove more difficult to tackle than those of the past decades. They take the form of political confrontation, internal and internationally-political armed conflicts, conflict over raw-material resources in civil war torn countries across Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America (particularly in Venezuela), the Middle East (especially in Saudi Arabia), but also in newly explored strategic regions like the Arctic, and conflict over access to drinking water (blue gold, the oil of the 21st century); the world’s fast-expanding population is facing cyclical 1

The text is an outcome of Project Prvouk no. 17 – VČdy o spoleþnosti, politice a médiích ve výzvách doby [Studying Societal, Political and Media Challenges in the Contemporary World], Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. 2 Mgr. Martin Riegl, Ph.௘D. works at the Department of Political Science, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. E-mail: [email protected]. 3 Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, XI.

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Introduction

fluctuations of food prices as the result of climate changes, economic conflicts, the rise of religious fundamentalism, and also fragmentation of the political map of the world. The last-mentioned aspect brings along not only the rise of several new states as the product of unilateral secession without the consent of central governments—an unthinkable phenomenon between World War II and the end of the Cold War, violating territorial integrity as the fundamental principle of the international community—but also a redefinition of one of the key characteristics of a sovereign state, namely international recognition. Kosovo, South Ossetia and South Sudan are showcase examples of this turn. All these issues are historical consequences of ethnically driven internal conflicts ensuing from the exclusive policy of a majority community on linguistic or religious minorities. In a broader context, these are the results of delineating spheres of influence of both traditional and new geopolitical powers.

Shape of the 21st Century The 21st century will continue to be defined by rivalries between national (super) powers, and not by the supremacy of collective universitas, replacing sovereign states. A multipolar world will be dominated by a struggle between a rapidly-weakening United States on one hand, and an ever more confident China—aspiring to regain the status of the world’s strongest economy, which it lost in the 18th century—together with Russia, Brazil, India, Canada or the EU. The geopolitical shift of power from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asian and Asia-Pacific (particularly from the USA to China) region is obviously going on and has been analyzed by geopolitical analysts like J. S. Nye, Z. Brzezinski and R. D. Kaplan. J. S. Nye identifies five major global challenges (including possible reactions) as an answer to the most pessimistic projections of American decline and the inevitable rise of China’s economic and geopolitical dominance, which is reflected in global media. 1. The intersection of terrorism with nuclear materials: This requires policies for countering terrorism, creating stability in the Middle East, giving attention to failed states and so on. 2. Political Islam: More open trade, economic growth, education, development of civil society institutions, and gradual increases in political participation may help strengthen the mainstream over time. 3. The rise of a hostile hegemon as Asia gradually regains the share of world economy: This requires a policy that welcomes China as a

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responsible stakeholder but hedges against possible hostility by maintaining close relations with Japan, India, and other countries in Asia that welcome an American presence. 4. Economic depression: A strategic response to this challenge will require policies that gradually reduce American dependence on oil. 5. Ecologic breakdowns such as pandemics and negative climate change: This challenge will require greater cooperation through international institutions.4 Z. Brzezinski seeks to respond to four major dilemmas. 1) What are the implications of the changing distribution of global power from the West to the East, 2) Why is America’s global appeal waning, what are the symptoms of America´s domestic and international decline, and what geopolitical reorientation is necessary to revitalize America’s world role?, 3) What would be the likely geopolitical consequences if America declined from its globally preeminent position, who would be the almost-immediate geopolitical victims of such a decline, what effects would it have on the global-scale problems of the 21.century, and could China assume America´s central role in world affairs by 2025?, 4) Looking beyond 2025, how should a resurgent America define its long-term geopolitical goals, and how could America, with its traditional European allies, seek to engage Turkey and Russia in order to construct an even larger and more vigorous West? 5

Brzezinski has offered a strategic vision of the Larger West, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, and the cooperating East. The larger West will include rapidly developing Turkey and Russia. Both of these states will be integrated in Euro-Atlantic institutional design, which will be stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok in the Far East (from a geographical perspective it could be perceived as the reflection of NorthSouth dichotomy, which definitely evokes I. Wallerstein’s theory). The ultimate goal of the larger and vital West in close cooperation with Europe must be accompanied with the strategy of the stable and cooperative East. The success of this strategy lies in successfully moderating Chinese geopolitical concerns, which are the following: 1) To reduce dangers inherent in China´s potential geographical encirclement, due to: the US security links with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the vulnerability to interdiction of China´s maritime access

4 5

Nye, Future of Power, 232-3. Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, 2.

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Introduction into the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca and thence to the Middle East, Africa, Europe…, 2) To establish for itself a favoured position in an emerging East Asian community and likewise in the already existing ASEAN, 3) To consolidate Pakistan as a counterweight to India, 4) To gain a significant edge over Russia in economic influence in Central Asia and Mongolia, thereby satisfying in part China´s needs for natural resources also in areas closer to China than Africa or Latin America, To resolve in China´s favour remaining unsettled legacy of civil war – Taiwan, 6) To establish for itself a favoured economic, and indirectly political presence in a number of Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American countries. 6

Analysis of American decline from the position of sole superpower and the related geopolitical and economic power shift from the West to EuroAsian powers, elaborated by Z. Brzezinski, J. S. Nye or R. D. Kaplan, is not totally new idea. G. R. Crone had already in 1969 noticed that the geopolitical centre was moving from the European rimland to the AsiaPacific Realm and predicted the Pacific Ocean (not the Indian Ocean as predicted by R. D. Kaplan) would be a zone of confrontation between the USSR, USA and China.7 But all the above mentioned authors agree that the nation-state will remain the key constitutive institution of the world order of the 21st century. Similarly as in the past, the might of individual powers will continue to be defined by their military and economic strength, size of territory or population, size of and access to resources, and human potential. Nevertheless, the world will be witness to certain modifications: military strength will be defined not only by the size of territory and population, but also, and mainly, by technological advance, and after the oil boom has reached its peak, it will be blue gold from which the great power status of Russia and Canada and continuing marginalization of Africa will derive; the size of population will be superseded by human capital—something which will continue to slow down, over a long term, the development of the world’s most ambitious and populous country, India. However, the geopolitical battle of powers will be fought in a politicalgeographic space differing from the last century. Europe has ceased to be the focus of geopolitical and geostrategic consideration of key actors. R. D. Kaplan predicts that the battle will shift from the European rimland to the east:

6 7

Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, 173. Crone, Background to Political Geography, 27.

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It is my contention that the Greater Indian Ocean, stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau, and the Indian Subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may comprise a map as iconic to the new century as Europe was to the last one… we can locate the tense dialogue between Western and Islamic civilizations, the ganglia of global energy routes, and the quiet, seemingly inexorable rise of India and China over land and sea.8

This region will become the centre of global competition and tension. The region, dubbed “Monsoon Asia” by the great historian C. R. Boxer, “will demographically and strategically be a hub of the twenty-first century world.” Of key importance will be the north-western part of the Indian Ocean rimland, roughly analogous to the south-western part of the central zone of global instability. This is a broader concept than what Zbigniew Brzezinski calls the “Eurasian Balkans – an area that the U.S. must seek to manipulate and ultimately control should it continue to be a superpower”. Crucial from the strategic angle is control of the European rim of the region, extending from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and the south-eastern frontier running from the Horn of Africa across the Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan and India. This corresponds with the U.S. AFRICOM and ENTCOM strategies. The great powers’ interest in this area is reflected by various internal policy processes and their broader geopolitical implications taking place in the region. Chief among them is the unfreezing and fragmentation of the political map, into which project the interests of individual great powers. The dismantling of the political map (most recently manifested by Kosovo, Georgia, Indonesia and Sudan) manifests itself not only by the fragmentation of various states but also by an overlapping sovereignty typical of the pre-Westphalia period – collapsed states, unrecognized states, black holes, warlords and states within state within the borders of collapsed or internationally unrecognized states. Actual transfer of the world’s economic, political or military centre of gravity to this region, intersected by the main routes of world trade, will necessitate action on collapsing states, such as Yemen, and the elimination of illegal phenomena such as piracy and non-state actors, who have taken over collapsed states such as Somalia and pose a threat to regional stability as well as to the main world trade routes. Otherwise effective control of choke points (Strait of Malacca and Suez Canal) cannot be established and the hub of the twenty-first century world will not be set.

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Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, XI.

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Introduction

New Containment? Another connecting feature of all the above mentioned geopolitical analyses is their belief that a power shift between nation-states will reflect economic development within the global political space. The Carnegie Endowment predicts that the GDP of China will overtake that of the United States by 2035. Measured by GDP per capita, the level of GDP in the USA will still exceed its Euro-Asian rivals, particularly India; China will not even approach the USA by 2030. The USA will increase its GDP to 59,592 USD compared to the Chinese level at 14,௘696 USD, so China will still dramatically lack behind Japan (50, 965 USD), the EU (40, 901 USD), and even Russia (20,039 USD).9 R.Skidelsky (emeritus Professor of Political Economy at Warwick University) goes even further and estimates that China is already the world’s second largest economy, and will be the largest in 2017. He further argues that the existence of a single superpower is highly abnormal, and was brought about only by the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The normal situation is one of coexistence, sometimes peaceful sometimes warlike, between several great powers.10 Similarly such exaggerated statements concerning Chinese economic influence, e.g. in Sub-Saharan Africa, may be easily found in recent debates or even analytical works. Increased interest in US-Chinese competition in the Sub-Saharan region has its roots in the fact that this region has already become the shatter-belt after the period of marginalization during the Cold War. The only significant change is the fact that political-military competition between the USA and the USSR has been replaced by competition for natural resources. Surprisingly the continent with thirty-four out of forty nine of the least developed countries is under price pressure. The capital city of Angola is experiencing an oil boom and was rated the most expensive city for expats two years in a row. The capital city of Chad was placed on third position. The first island chain – composed of the Kuril Islands, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo, the Malay Peninsula, and the Kamchatka Peninsula – plays a crucial role in the Chinese naval doctrine, which aims to force out the U.S. military bases from the region. The first and second island chains pose, according to J. S. Nye, a crucial contemporary strategic obstacle to the expansion and projection of 9

Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, 57; Trenin, China, Russia, and the United States – A Shifting Geopolitical Balance. 10 Skidelski, “Why China Won’t Rule”.

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Chinese military, political, and economic powers in open oceans. American strategic advantage, which is increasingly becoming the main focus of the U.S. defense strategy, comes from the fact that the first and second island chains are composed of territories under the sovereign jurisdiction of states which remain or are increasingly hostile to China. Z. Brzezinski argues that these states (so called linchpin states), thanks to their geographical position, comprise the basic pillar of the US strategy in the region. However, the perception of the rising economic power of China must be understood from the perspective of Chinese officials, because: “Chinese have a strategy of asymmetric power projection, whereby they seek to compete primarily economically and politically, rather than militarily, with the US.”11 Z. Brzezinski holds his long-term conviction (in compliance with Mackinder’s and Spykman’s theories of Heartland and Rimland) of the key geopolitical importance of the Euro-Asian Balkans for the whole Eurasia. Alongside this he is evidently aware of the fact that the China itself is not an integral part of the Russian-dominated Heartland, but is seeking an independent geopolitical realm between the sphere of influence of continental Euro-Asia and the US-dominated Maritime Realm. It can be reasonably expected that China will refuse to be included in Maritime Realms dominated by the USA, with the support of the European Union, and to Western universalistic norms. China will more likely strive to emancipate itself from the Continental realms dominated by Russia and to become an independent geopolitical realm dominating the East Asia region with the ultimate goal to gain political, economic, and military hegemony within the Pacific and Indian Ocean area, in other words in the centre of global powers as anticipated by G. R. Chrone or R. D. Kaplan. All these statements are confirmed in U.S. defense strategy released on January 2012, which can be described as the major change since the Cold War era. Rising tension may be expected in the concerned regions as Japan, Taiwan, India, Thailand or Vietnam will fear rising Chinese influence. The concept of the larger West seems to be an interesting but, for many scholars and analysts, utopian idea – a strategy of geopolitical competition and balance of power in the future.

11

Carmody, The New Scramble for Africa, 177.

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Introduction

Works Cited Brzezinski, Z. Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power. New York: Basic Books, 2012. Carmody, P. The New Scramble for Africa. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011. Crone, G.R. Background to Political Geography. London: Pitman, 1969. Cohen, S. Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008. Kaplan, R.D. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New York: Random House, 2010. Nye, J.S. Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011. Skidelski, R. “Why China Won’t Rule”. 2012. [quoted 2012-06-21]. Available at WWW: . Trenin, D. China, Russia, and the United States – A Shifting Geopolitical Balance. 2012. [quoted 2012-06-21]. Available at WWW: .

PART I POWER SHIFTS IN THE BEGINNING ST OF THE 21 CENTURY: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION IN STRATEGIC REGIONS?

GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION1 MARTIN RIEGL2 Introduction International recognition is at present not only an oft-discussed definition characteristic of a state but at the same time it has been emerging with growing intensity as an important geopolitical instrument of pursuing the foreign policy interests of global and regional powers. Experts in international law, international relations and political sciences will not agree on the merit and significance of international recognition, i.e. whether international recognition alone is the core defining characteristic of a sovereign state. While the dispute between the proponents of declaratory and constitutive theories of international recognition remains unresolved within the framework of the theory of international law and international relations, my paper offers the argument that due to changes of regulatory rules of recognition and the introduction of a noncompetitive international environment, the development of political space after 1945 seems to bear a constitutive character. My text proceeds from a multidisciplinary and diachronic approach and, based upon an empirical analysis of the 1945-2011 political space, I delineate all unilateral attempts at secession without the consent of the original sovereign, which have led to de facto independence (i.e. to the emergence of a political-geographic entity capable of questioning the authority of a central government, within the jurisdiction of which that entity’s territory formally fell). I proceed from an historical perspective, where it is possible to define three different historically political situations,

1

The text is an outcome of Project Prvouk no. 17 – VČdy o spoleþnosti, politice a médiích ve výzvách doby [Studying Societal, Political and Media Challenges in the Contemporary World], Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. 2 Mgr. Martin Riegl, Ph.௘D. works at the Department of Political Science, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. E-mail: [email protected].

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which lead to the unilateral declaration of the entity and play a crucial role for its international recognition. They are the following types of secession: 1) in compliance with the right to self-determination (entities which declared independence during the decolonization process), 2) in conflict with the right to self-determination (entities forming on a dependent territory which did not undergo the decolonization process and whose emergence was in conflict with the principle of a nation’s right to self-determination), 3) outside the context of decolonization (a fairly large group of entities emerging after formal decolonization of dependent territories and the establishment of internationally recognized sovereign states, on whose territories there were post-independence attempts to unilaterally declare independence for parts of such territories. Subsequently I will analyse the level of international recognition received by various entities and test the changing importance of international recognition in five case studies covering different periods and reflecting different geopolitical circumstances – specifically GuineaBissau, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Rhodesia, Kosovo and Northern Cyprus. All these are model cases of unilateral secession without the consent of a central government. An analysis of impacts of international recognition on the status of these political-geographic entities will be used to verify the significance of international recognition on stateforming processes in political space. I will point out at the same time the necessity of case-by-case analysis, as it is not possible to generally assume that all that matters are the historical period and the geopolitical circumstances, which determine the outcome of an effort to gain independence. This paper is based on the following hypotheses: 1) international recognition is part of the core definition characteristic of a state, 2) international recognition is a key instrument of the state’s legitimacy after 1946, 3) historical geopolitical circumstances are not unchangeable but are internally structured and display the aspect of political philosophy of secession (Guinea-Bissau vs. East Bangladesh, Kosovo vs. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), and 4) the manner of origin and geopolitical status of an entity plays an important role in international recognition. My text proceeds from the definition of internationally unrecognized entities seeking to gain a sovereign-state status but lacking significant international recognition. Such entities must at the same time demonstrate a certain level of internal

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Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition

effectiveness (usually heterogeneous in time and space), which would enable them to control population and territory within the framework of jurisdiction they claim. Delineation of the period during which an entity must meet given characteristics (effectively control internal affairs) is a methodologically onerous task. P. Kolstø suggests a two-year period but justification of his argument in a methodological way would be quite a controversial assignment. I consider precise delineation of the time period of de facto independent existence as a superfluous definitional characteristic and believe it could create methodological mishaps. Therefore I am inclined to believe that the duration of de facto independent existence should be considered for the various entities. Some entities continue to meet such characteristics for a period of more than 10 years, but others will cease to exist within a few months of declaring independence (usually after military intervention by the central government).

Definition of International Recognition International recognition3 is one of the most important yet controversial characteristics of a sovereign state. As fittingly expressed by R. H. Jackson and C. Rosberg in their analysis of the concept of juridical statehood, a political system can display empirical prerequisites of state, but it is not a state without the legal attributes of territory and independence.4 In this context, S.D. Krasner speaks about sovereignty under international law, without which effective territory control is actually insufficient.5 Jackson and Rosberg documented the key role of international recognition on the empirical examples of South African Bantustans (esp. Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda), which meet the empirical prerequisites of statehood but, as they were not recognized by any other state except for the Republic of South Africa, they cannot be considered states.6 The importance of international recognition is corroborated also by the as yet unresolved dispute between the adherents of constitutive and 3

In this paper I use both the term international recognition and the term external sovereignty – the latter meaning the state has been internationally recognized by a significant part of the international community and thus becomes a fully-fledged member of that community, with all rights and duties. 4 Jackson and Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood.”, 13. 5 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocracy. 6 Jackson and Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood.”, 13-4.

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declarative theories of state recognition.7 Leading proponent of political geography M.I. Glassner’s definition of sovereign state emphasizes the relationship between geographic and political criteria of statehood. Chief among them, according to Glassner, are 1) sovereignty8 and 2) recognition. For a political unit to be accepted as a state, it must be recognized by a significant part of the international community, i.e. existing states. However, experts in international law disagree on whether such recognition is declaratory or constitutive.9

One might logically ask about the exact meaning of the condition that requires that a political unit must be recognized by a significant part of members of the international community. How large should that part be and how should it be structured – does it need to include regional and global powers? Neither Glassner nor other authors give us a clear answer to these questions. M.I. Glassner himself points out the quandary: Disagreement also rules over the question, what part of the members of the international community club must recognize the state and does that number really tell the tale, or is there need for a positive stance of most powers? We are not that much interested in such details, but one should not forget that recognition is important, perhaps even decisive, for the sake of correct use of the term state.10

A different angle on the significance of international recognition is offered by J. Malenovský, who speaks about three constitutive (objective) elements of state and one subjective element. The objective elements are territory, population, and the public power asserted over the given territory. These elements bear an objective character, i.e. they are the result of a historical process. A state exists if it displays all three elements. Other states limit themselves under international law to stating if the elements indeed exist (principle of effectiveness under international law). And yet, history is marked with undying efforts to weaken the solely objective character of state as the subject of international law and to apply also the subjective element, i.e. to make the sovereignty of a new state conditional

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More in Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 19–28. Thus, a leading international-law authority on the issue of state, R. Crawford replaces the term sovereignty with the term independence of the state. 9 Glassner and De Blij, Systematic Political Geography, 39. 10 Glassner and De Blij, Systematic Political Geography, 39. 8

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Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition on its recognition by other states – in other words, to actually co-opt such as state within the international community.11

The issue gained prominence in the wake of Kosovo’s declaration of independence and a successful referendum on independence for southern Sudan. How does a state get recognized or adorned with external sovereignty, classified by G. Sørensen within a second level of sovereignty as one of its regulative rules? The constitutive theory of recognition stems from the assumption that a state or new government does not legally exist until recognized by other states. The declaratory theory of recognition presumes that a state can prove its existence by objective tests, i.e. through effective governance of its territory and population, regardless of the views of other states. Recognition is perceived as a purely political act, which declares the intention to establish formal diplomatic contacts. In rare instances a state may receive recognition without meeting all objective requirements (thus, the Palestine Liberation Organization was recognized by some states in the late 1980s as the provisional government of a future Palestinian state.12

The declaratory theory of the state ensues from the definition of state in accordance with the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which places emphasis on the effectiveness of the state. Small wonder that especially such internationally unrecognized entities as Somaliland, Transnistria, South Osetia and others resolutely defend their sovereign status claims from the positions of the declaratory theory of state. J. Crawford noted that the “great international recognition debate” has complicated and obfuscated the issue, while at the same time attempts were made to synthetize the constitutive and declaratory theories of international recognition.13 The essence of international recognition is for a state to receive external sovereignty (and thus also the capacity to actively participate in the activities of the international community) and to become subject to the regulatory rules of sovereignty (i.e. other states respect its territorial integrity and the principle of non-intervention). In association with the recognition of a state one cannot leave unmentioned the problem of recognizing its government as the political representative of that state and the “enforcer” of internal and external sovereignty. It may actually happen that a “state” has two “governments”. One will, in an ideal 11

Malenovský, Mezinárodní právo veĜejné: obecná þást, 90. Plechanovová, Úvod do mezinárodních vztahĤ: výbČr textĤ, 72. 13 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 26–7. 12

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case, effectively control territory and population (internally it will be fully independent), but it will not achieve international recognition or enjoy external sovereignty (not being able to represent the state externally). The second government (in an ideal case, again) will not be able to control internal affairs of the state (will lack internal sovereignty) but will enjoy full international recognition and all rights to represent the state abroad (will have external sovereignty). An example worthy of mention in this context is the exiled government of Democratic Kampuchea, which could be described as the product of a very complex internal development on Cambodian soil after the country gained independence. The country’s de facto occupation by Vietnam did away with Democratic Kampuchea and installed a People’s Republic of Cambodia. However, the latter only achieved limited international recognition, mainly from the states of the Soviet Bloc. And yet, Democratic Kampuchea never quite ceased to exist. “June 1982 saw the formation of an exiled coalition government, led by Prince Sihanouk”.14 With the support of its allies – USA, China and other Western nations – Democratic Kampuchea’s coalition government-in-exile formed in 1982 (with Norodom Sihanouk at the head and anti-Vietnamese in character) and retained its UN seat and continued to be recognized by most states. Nevertheless, the recognition of states in practical terms differs according to the state’s political interests, and the rules of recognition change in time. In setting conditions of recognition of a sovereign state, R. H. Jackson builds upon the approach of G. Schwarzenberg and E. D. Brown (A Manual of International Law). Jackson claims existing states require an entity, before recognizing it is a sovereign state, to possess a stable government capable of controlling its territory and population.15 Jackson’s list of conditions for recognition of a new state is rather a virtual reality (or perhaps an acceptable humbug) which does not tally with the past practice of en masse recognition of states, which did not reflect a single basic empirical characteristic of effective government in the effort to incorporate formerly dependent territories in the community of states.

Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau declared independence on 26 September 1973, or, according to some sources, on 24 September, although the start of the 14

Lišþák and Fojtík, Státy a území svČta, 376. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, 53.

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colonial war can be traced back to 1961, when the PAIGC guerillas launched armed attacks on colonial institutions, and by 1968 they had gradually gained control of most of the territory. By the end of 1973 it was recognized by forty states including the USSR, India and the People’s Republic of China. By 31 May 1974 (five weeks after toppling the previous Portuguese government) it was recognized by eighty-four states.16

Thence, prior to its independence being recognized by Portugal, this entity won almost universal international recognition. Portugal awarded de jure recognition to Guinea-Bissau as late as 10 September 1974; on the same day, Guinea-Bissau was internationally recognized by the United States of America. Even though the former sovereign refused to accept decolonization, Guinea-Bissau was admitted into the United Nations, though the UN Security Council recommendation of 12 August 1974 did not come to fruition until 17 September 2010.17

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic The right of this entity to independence was confirmed by the International Court of Justice, which rejected Morocco’s claim to territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara.18 On 27 February 1976, the Polisario Front19 declared a Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on the territory of Western Sahara. Although the United States did not formally recognize the Moroccan annexation, it rendered active support to the Moroccan rejection of Sahrawi independence as that entity strongly supported the leftist-leaning Polisario Front. Moroccan officials identify Western Sahara as a southern province or Moroccan Sahara and dismiss the SADR as an illegal entity. On the other hand, leading international organizations such as the United Nations and the OAU never recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. The African Union (formerly OAU) supports SADR’s demand for independence. The organization’s position stems from Article 3 of the Charter of Organization for African Unity, which demands Africa’s liberation from all forms of colonialism. The Organization for African Unity officially admitted SADR as a 16

Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 385–6. S/RES/356 (1974), A/RES/29/3205. 18 Springerová, “Západní Sahara – pĜíbČh neukonþené dekolonizace”, 42. 19 “The Polisario Front was established on 10 May 1973. Its founder was Luali Mustafa Sayed.” (www.wsahara.net/history.htm) 17

Martin Riegl

17

member in 1984, provoking instant reaction of Morocco, which left the OAU in 1985 in protest. The SADR as a sovereign entity is an illusion rather than reality. Morocco keeps control of economically important regions and SADR controls only insignificant desert areas. Both parties to the conflict seek international support for their demands. Morocco is backed by the Arab League, whose members recognize the annexation of Western Sahara. International recognition stands out as an important piece of the puzzle. The SADR enjoys international recognition by most members of the African Union. Nearly 80 states have recognized the SADR as a sovereign state. However, many of them have withdrawn or frozen their recognition. Most of them are developing African and Asian countries and states of the Americas. In Europe, SADR was once recognized by Albania and Yugoslavia, which, however, currently do not recognize that entity. Serbia and Montenegro withdrew their recognition on 8 October 2004. Generally speaking, SADR has the support mainly of the weak developing countries, the Republic of South Africa being the only regional power to express support. The significance both parties attach to international recognition is expressed by their activities in the region. Chad withdrew recognition of the SADR on 17 March 2006, having previously declared it on 4 June 1980. Of much greater significance is the recognition of SADR by the Republic of South Africa of 15 September 2004.

Rhodesia A model example of the significance of international recognition is Rhodesia, which unilaterally declared independence from Great Britain in 1965. Although Rhodesia’s declaration of independence highlighted the case of a very effective entity with a strong institutional structure, inability to win international recognition determined its demise. The rejection of legitimacy of Rhodesia’s declaration duly projected into UN General Assembly Resolution 2621 of 1970, which condemned the perpetuation of colonialism and labelled it a crime against the UN Charter and General Assembly Resolution 1514. Resolution 2621 also called for imposing an arms embargo on the RSA, Rhodesia (described here as an illegal racist regime) and Portugal.20 It marked a radical change in the attitude of European powers, with the right of nations to self-determination becoming a right of colonized subjects to sovereignty.21 Against the background of 20 21

A/RES/25/2621. Sørensen, Stát a mezinárodní vztahy, 124–5.

18

Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition

newly accepted standards of anti-colonialism, self-determination, and negative sovereignty, Rhodesian leaders proved unable to obtain international legitimacy (Rhodesia went completely unrecognized within the international community), which would corroborate that country’s actual independence. Sanctions imposed on the export of key Rhodesian commodities including fuels, together with guerilla attacks from neighbouring Zambia and Mozambique, gradually led to the collapse of a viable, effective entity.

Kosovo Unilateral secession without the central government’s consent has created, after 1945, only Bangladesh and Eritrea, and now the process unfolds in Kosovo. However, Kosovo is a more complex case, as it has not yet won convincing and significant international recognition and has not been admitted to the United Nations. Since its unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, Kosovo has been recognized, as of February 2011, by 76 states, i.e. 39 percent of the United Nations. Overall, Kosovo has been recognized by 22 members of the European Union (but not by states apprehensive of secessionist and irredentist tendencies on their territories). The central government of former sovereign Serbia continues to refuse to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state and has the support, in this respect, of mainly Russia and China, which are also wary of separatist tendencies on their territory and who primarily pursue their broader geopolitical interests.

TRNC The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a showcase example of the impact of international recognition – the entity is recognized only by Turkey as the sole guarantor of its existence. “According to some sources, Bangladesh has also recognized the TRNC”.22 Northern Cyprus has been de facto independent since the Turkish invasion in 1974. The breaking point was an attempted coup by Greek Cypriot officers, supported by Greece’s military regime. These attempts invited a resolute Turkish reaction, leading to a military invasion of the island. “TRNC was officially proclaimed in 1983 on 37% of Cypriot territory, but apart from Turkey, whose 35,000-strong military contingent guarantees its existence, it has

22

Baar, Národy na prahu 21. století: emancipace nebo separatismus?, 234.

Martin Riegl

19

never received international recognition”. 23 The UN Security Council reacted to TRNC’s declaration of independence on 15 November 1983 by adopting Resolution 541 of 18 November of the same year and Resolution 550 of 11 May 1984. Resolution 541 says that …the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983, which purports to create an independent state in northern Cyprus […] is incompatible with the 1960 treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. The attempt to create a ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ is invalid and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus.

Since the Cyprus Turks left the resolution more or less unanswered and concentrated instead on strengthening their “republic”, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 550. Among other things it expresses …grave concern about the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus which are in violation of Resolution 541 (1983), namely the purported ‘exchange of Ambassadors’ between Turkey and the legally invalid TRNC and the contemplated holding of a ‘Constitutional referendum’ and ‘elections’, as well as [about] other actions or threats of action aimed at further consolidating the purported independent state and the division of Cyprus. 24

However, the UN Security Council resolutions did not prevent the consolidation of TRNC and actual partitioning of the island.

Internationally Unrecognized Entities after 1945: Table of Internationally Unrecognized States An analysis of the 1946-2011 political space will produce the following account of unilateral attempts at effective secession. A certain time must elapse from a declaration of independence to a broad international recognition, during which a new entity receives formal recognition and is co-opted by the international community (endorsement of UN admission). In this period it is not possible to refer to internationally unrecognized entities unless the process of achieving international recognition is put in doubt.

23 24

Siegl, “Kyperský problém a rozšiĜování Evropské unie”, 11. S/RES550/1983.

20

Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition

Table 1-1: List of Quasi-States in 1946-2009 Origin/ existence Abkhazia, Republic 3.7.1992 of

Algeria, Democratic People’s Republic

19.9.1958 (5.6.1962)

Anjouan, State of

3.8.1997

Bangladesh, People’s Republic of

26.3.1971

Biafra, Republic of 30.5.1967 Bophuthatswana

6.12.1977

Cabinda, Republic

1.8.1975

Cambodia, Kingdom of

(1949) 19.11.1953

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

9.10.1991

Unrecognized Factors limiting existence sovereign state status between 1946–2010 1992– Recognized by Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru. Actually a puppet entity of Russian Federation. 1958–1962 Unrecognized quasi-state resulting from a colonial war with metropolitan state, absence of international recognition—French recognition 1962. Algerian independence recognized by 29 states in 1961. 1997–2002 No international 2007–2008 recognition, limited internal sovereignty. 1971–1974 On 4 Feb 1972 Bangladesh is recognized de jure by 28 states and de facto by another five. Pakistan postponed recognition to 22 Feb 1974. 1967–1970 Biafra recognized by five states. 1977–1994 No international recognition, actually no internal sovereignty (de facto under RSA control). 1975–11. 11. No international recognition 1975 (de facto under RSA control). 1978–1991 Vietnam’s quasiprotectorate without broad international recognition. 1991–1999 No international recognition. 16 years after USSR collapse, this small territory housed three types of para-states including almost-state, black spot and state within state.

Martin Riegl 1.1.1912

1946–1971

7.10.1949

1971–

Ciskei

1981

1981–1994

Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Democratic Kampuchea

18.11.1991

1992–1996

22.6.1982

1982–1991

East Mongolian Republic East Timor, Democratic Republic of

15.1.1946– 1.5.1947 28.11. 1975– 17.7.1976, 20.5. 2002

1946–1947

East Turkestan, Republic of Eritrea, State

12.11. 1944– 17. 12.1949 27.5.1993

1946–1949

China People’s Republic of China, Republic of (Taiwan)

1975–1976

1961–1993

21 No significant international recognition till 1971. Sovereign state until 1971. State with limited international recognition since 1971. Officially claims control of mainland China. Currently recognized by 23 sovereign states, military guarantees by the USA. No international recognition (de facto under RSA control). No international recognition. Exiled government of Democratic Kampuchea (Democratic Kampuchea’s coalition government formed in 1982) retained UN seat with the support of allies – USA, China and other Western states and continued to be recognized by most states. No international recognition. Internationally unrecognized quasi-state (according to some sources recognized by Albania, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, Mozambique, St. Thomas and Principe Islands) – unrecognized strong institutions eliminated by military intervention by Indonesian central government. No international recognition. No international recognition.

22

Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition

Federal Republic of 23.5.1949 Germany

1949–1972

Gagauzia

1991-1994

German Democratic Republic

7.10.1949

1949–1955

Guinea-Bissau, Republic

26.9.1973

1973–1974

Hyderabad

1724–1950

1947–1950

Quasi-state with limited international recognition until signing a treaty on principles of relations between FRG and GDR. No international recognition. De facto quasi-protectorate of USSR with limited international recognition. GDR’s foreign-policy position radically changed after signing a treaty on principles of relations. In 1972 GDR exchanged diplomats with 20 states (including Iran, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria). In January 1973 GDR established diplomatic relations with another 13 states (including Italy, Netherlands and Finland). With 123 governments around the world recognizing GDR by 1978, the country’s crucial phase of foreign policy was successfully implemented. GDR could also join international organizations. By late 1973 recognized by 40 states including USSR, China and India; on 31.5.1974 recognized by 84 states; UN Security Council on 12.8.1974 recognizes admission to UN; widely recognized prior to Portugal recognition. No international recognition.

Martin Riegl Indonesia, Republic of

17.8.1945

1946–1949

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

1996

1996–2001

Kachin State

1962

1962–1994

Karen State (Cotulay) Katanga, State

1952–1994

1952–1994

11.7.1960

1960– 15.1.1963 1948–1950

Korea, Democratic 9.9.1948 People’s Republic Korea, Republic

15.8.1948

1948–1950

Kosovo, Republic

9.10.1991– May 1992, 2008–

1991–1992 2008–

1.1.1953 Lao People’s Democratic Republic Lebanon, Republic 26.11.1941 (recognition of 22.11.1943)

1946 Until 1946

23 Recognized de jure and de facto by several states [Crawford 2006: 384], parts occupied by British and Dutch troops. Internationally recognized by Pakistan, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Ca. 10% of territory not controlled by internationally recognized government, but by Northern Alliance). No international recognition. No international recognition. No international recognition. Received significant international recognition before 1991 UN entry. Recognized by UN, USA and its allies as a legitimate government of the whole Korea. US forces depart in 1949. Internationally unrecognized quasi-state, recognised only by Albania. In 1992 Serbia occupied and pacified the province Limited international recognition. Japanese-declared, no international recognition. No international recognition.

24

Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition

Lithuania, Republic of

11.3.1990

1990–1991

Macedonia, Republic of

8.9.1

1991–1993

Mohéli

11.8.1997

1997–1998

Moldova, Republic 27.8.1991 of 6.1.1992 NagornoKarabakh, Republic of 15.11.1988 Palestinian state

1992– 1992– 1988–2009

Without broad recognition till August 1991 coup. Moscow recognized independence on 29.7.1991. Gradual international recognition during 1991. Quasi-state without international recognition – first recognized by Bulgaria (16.1.1992). UN member since 18. 4. 1993. No international recognition. No international recognition. No international recognition. Limited international recognition. No international recognition.

Republic of Kurdistan (Mahabad) Republic of North Salomon Islands Bougainville Republika Srpska (in BosniaHercegovina) Rhodesia

22.1.1946

1946–1947

1.9.1975

1975–1976 1990–1997

No international recognition.

9. 1. 1992

1991–1995

No international recognition.

11.11.1965

1965–1979

RhodesiaZimbabwe Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic Serbian Krajina, Republic of

1.6.1979

1979

14.11.1975

1976–

Internationally unrecognized, internally non-sovereign quasi-state in 1965-1975 1965–1975. No international recognition. Partial international recognition.

19.12.1991

1991–1995

Sikkim

1890–1975

1946–1949 1949–1975

No international recognition, de facto dependent on Serbia. No international recognition. Quasiprotectorate of Great Britain and India.

Martin Riegl

25

Slovenia, Republic of

25.6.1991

1991–1992

Somaliland, Republic of South Kasai

18.5.1991

1991–2009

8.8.1960

1960–1962

South Ossetia, Republic of

28.11.1991

1992–2009

Suvadives, United Republic Tamil Eelam

3.1.1959

1959–1963

1990–2009

1990–2009

Tanna (Tafea)

24.3.1974– 29.6.1974 15.2.1980– 26.5.1980 (1.3.1913) 4. 11.1949– 23.5.1951 2.9.1990

1974, 1980

1946–1951

No international recognition.

1990–

Transkei

26.10.1976

1976–1994

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Venda

1983

1983–

13.9.1979

1979–1994

No international recognition, actually a puppet quasi-state of Russian Federation. No international recognition, de facto no internal sovereignty (actually controlled by RSA). Internationally recognized by Turkey (de facto guarantor of existence). No international recognition, de facto no internal sovereignty (actually controlled by RSA).

Tibet Trans-Dniester Moldavian Republic

Received significant international recognition on the 15 Jan 1992 European Community recommendation. No international recognition. No international recognition. No international recognition (recognized since 2008 by Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru), controls ca. 80-85% of claimed territory, in reality a puppet quasi-state controlled by Russian Federation. No international recognition. No international recognition. No international recognition.

26

Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition

Vietnam, Democratic Republic of

1945–2.7.1976 1946–1954

Vietnam, Republic of

6.3.1946– 2.7.1976

1946–1954

Western Bosnia

27.9.1993

1993–1995

Recognized by Communist states (recognized by PR China and USSR in 1950). No internal sovereignty, quasi-state due to leftist guerrilla action, presence of northern insurgents, civil wars in 1959-1975. 1946-1954 puppet quasistate (Republic of Vietnam – independence recognized in 1948, the Élysee Accords in 1949 limit military and diplomatic sovereignty); 1950 virtually partitioned by two rival governments; neither state controlled territory from declaration to split-up – recognized by nonCommunist states since 1950, South Vietnam effectively subordinated to France. No international recognition.

Conclusion: International Recognition, a Key Aspect of State? In the post-war decades, awarding international recognition largely depended on the decision of representatives and inhabitants of a dependent territory without the need to prove the meeting of empirical conditions usually placed on states. The right to independent statehood was not denied even to the smallest states if their populations wished so.25 In the course of the decolonization process, recognition was awarded to many entities which did not satisfy the empirical characteristic of a state. The regulatory rules of recognition were quite liberal and friendly to new candidates. This is proved by a rapid increase of the number of “sovereign” states. In 1945, there were about 75 independent states but the 25

Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, 95.

Martin Riegl

27

number increased by 1999 to about 190, of which at least 100 were former colonies.26 The only exception (1965-1979) was Rhodesia, whose white minority government was denied international recognition and the country found itself facing pressure from other states. With a dash of overstatement it is safe to say that the UN General Assembly’s declaration of Rhodesian independence was a milestone since 1648, which transported the system of independent states to the whole world, while modern-state institutions were scarcely created (with the exception of China, India and several other states), as pointed out by F. Fukuyama.27 The entities which the international community refused to internationally recognize faced a different situation. The lifespan of many internationally unrecognized quasi-states was only a few months from the declaration of independence, until the central government restored its territorial sovereignty. One of them was the Anjouan Island, whose president, Mohamed Bacar, unilaterally declared independence from the Comoros in July 2007, inviting a military intervention by African Union-supported forces in March 2008. Another example is the state of Vemerana, whose Prime Minister Jimmy Stevens declared independence in July 1980 and refused for Vemerana to become part of the independent state of Vanuatu. His state came to the end after a Papua-New Guinea military intervention in August of the same year. Attempts to eliminate a secessionist bid by military force can be described as a preferred solution on the part of the central government. However, the option is practical only if the central government has military overkill and the separatists do not have the support of an external actor, such as Transnistria, South Ossetia or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Taiwan, which guarantees their independent existence. On the other hand, the entities which canvassed broad international recognition soon after declaring their independence have established themselves as sovereign states (usually entities emerging in accordance with the right to self-determination). From the number of sixty politicalgeographic entities, emerging in 1946-2010 in the political space and claiming international recognition, with which they had problems in a defined period of the past on account of rejection by the international community, seventeen subjects established themselves as sovereign states. The crushing majority of the cases did not object to the right to selfdetermination and after a certain transitive period their recognition was accepted by the international community as a case of legitimate secession 26

James, “The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society”, 465. 27 Fukuyama, State–Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 2.

28

Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition

from a colonial power (restoring statehood after annexation in case of Lithuania). In case of partitioned Germany, China and Korea, the international-recognition problems were solved by recognizing the actual partitioning of a previously Unitarian state. Among these subjects, Taiwan lost its sovereign-state status due to the international recognition of the Beijing administration, and the GDR due to its voluntary merger with the FRG. Thirty-four entities de facto ceased to exist in the political space and lost their effective independence before gradually restoring centralgovernment jurisdiction over a subject seeking international recognition. Eight subjects still retain their effective independence but are not able to win significant international recognition of their independence. Probably a broad international recognition can be expected in case of Palestine and Kosovo. Of the internationally unrecognized entities that actually exist within the political space and whose secession is in line with the right to self-determination, there stands out only the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. No entity established itself as a sovereign state in breach of the principle of self-determination. The only entity to have achieved factual independence was Rhodesia, which ceased to exist in 1979/1980. Specific examples include the South African Bantustans, which, however, cannot be considered cases of secession against the principle of selfdetermination, since they are examples of expulsion. Outside the decolonization context, Bangladesh and Eritrea established themselves as sovereign states. However, Eritrea received international recognition only after the government in Addis Ababa accepted its unilateral secession after a military defeat. In case of recognizing the secession of Bangladesh a crucial role was played by the violation of democratic principles (including the annulment of election results in what is today Bangladesh), and human rights violations by Pakistan’s central government. All other cases of internationally unrecognized entities, existing in today’s political environment, are beyond the context of decolonization. Other attempts at secession within the political space but out of the context of decolonization have been suppressed by central governments with the silent consent of the international community (a case in point: Republic of Serbian Krajina). The significance of international recognition is primarily in its crucial impact on the functioning of an internationally unrecognized entity. It is safe to say that international recognition is the centre point of its existence. Effective internationally unrecognized entities are prevented, by the absence of international recognition in combination with the principle of territorial integrity, from joining the ranks of sovereign states,

Martin Riegl

29

described by R. H. Jackson as the world’s most exclusive political club.28 In concrete terms, this amounts to lessening their capacity to trade on the global market (in the field of commodities, military technologies, financial markets etc.), to accept development aid, to defend their interests in international organizations and such like. Conversely, in case of states without an effective government, international recognition and the principle of territorial integrity enables their survival within the system of sovereign states, although they do not meet the definition characteristics of a sovereign state. Nevertheless, the approach of the international community and its members does differ quite considerably in specific cases, in relation to de facto existing states. S. Pegg specifies three traditional approaches by the international community to existing de-facto states: 1) active opposition against de facto states with the use of embargoes and sanctions, 2) ignoring their existence and 3) limited acceptance and recognition of their existence.29 D. Lynch adds a fourth approach to the three previously mentioned principles, one frequently applied by the central governments facing secession. A case in point is the operation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in 1995 with tacit support of the international community.30 Nonetheless, it should be understood that the approach of the international community as a whole and in part changes in time in result of internal and international political shifts.

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Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition

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Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition

S/RES/356 (1974). United Nations Security Council Resolution 356, adopted on August 12, 1974. Available at WWW: . S/RES 550 (1984). United Nations Security Council Resolution 550, adopted on May 11, 1984. Available at WWW: < http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/487/80/IMG/NR048780.pdf? OpenElement>. Stanislawski, B.H. “Para States, Quasi-states, and Black Spots: Perhaps Not States, But Not „Ungoverned Territories“, Either.” International Studies Review 10, no. 2 (2008): 366–96. Šesták, M.; Tejchman, M.; Havlíková, L.; Hladký, L. and J. Pelikán. DČjiny jihoslovanských zemí. Prague: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 1998. Vaćura, V. and T. Šmíd. “Teoretické vymezení a konceptualizace fenoménu slabých a selhávajících státĤ.” Mezinárodní vztahy 44, no. 2 (2009): 44–64. Rywkin, M. “The Phenomenon of Quasi-States.” Diogenes 53, no. 2 (2006): 23-9. [quoted 2009-5-11]. Available at WWW: ‹http://dio.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/53/2/23› Weber, H. DČjiny NDR. Prague: Nakladatelství Lidové Noviny, 2003.

COPING WITH THE GLOBAL POWER SHIFT FROM THE WEST TO THE EAST: WHAT ROLE FOR THE EU IN ITS EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD? VELINA TCHAKAROVA Introduction One of the most significant aspects of current international affairs is the global perception of a rapidly changing world due to globalisation, at least in part, with the world’s regions being politically, economically and socially more interconnected than ever before. Even if globalization continues apace, which gives credence to the notion that the world is constantly changing, one substantial paradigm of international relations has definitely changed and this is the shift from a post-September 11, 2001 US-led unilateralism to a multilateral world order.1 Since then, geopolitical considerations have gained more and more attention in the academic community and in the public domain.2 In terms of geopolitics, state and non-state actors aim to safeguard particular interests resulting from their geographic location, natural resources, borders, population and size. Consequently, the state and non-state actors define geostrategic objectives and options arising from the geopolitical interests they have previously prioritized. The process of defining geostrategic objectives covers the whole complex area of the geopolitical factors concerned – starting with the spatial and demographic factors and ending with the socioeconomic parameters. One of the most relevant global features of the current geopolitical developments is that the number of state and non-state actors has grown, leading to an increase in the frequency, the intensity, and the scope of interaction processes between

1

Minteh, The Global Balance of Power: World Order: Paradigm Shift From Unilateralism to Multilateralism and not Multipolarity. 2 Post-cold war geopolitical studies are Gray 1999, Grygiel 2006.

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the actors involved.3 For this reason, the existence of a multilateral world order cannot be ignored by any global state or non-state actor at the beginning of the 21st century. In the wake of global power shifting from West to East, which is one of the main driving forces for the rise of new regional power centres such as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), the state and non-state actors are facing more uncertainty, a higher conflict risk potential and stronger competition over natural resources, access to economic markets, trade routes as well as global influence in international relations. Against this background, new genuine changes and challenges have occurred for the EU’s policy towards its direct Eastern neighbourhood, which should be addressed within the scope of the EU’s approach towards its periphery.

1. Methodological Approach Keeping the current geopolitical power shift in mind, this paper focuses on the growing power vacuum in the direct European neighbourhood which is located between the EU and Russia, and encompasses six Eastern European countries – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. This article aims to analyse what steps have been taken by the EU towards Eastern Europe to address the geopolitical implications resulting from the global and regional power shift from the West to the East. Further, the paper evaluates the geostrategic chances and options the EU could exploit and adopt within the framework of the European approach towards the direct European neighbourhood for the years to come. The research uses a qualitative analysis of the political instruments applied to the EU’s relations with the Eastern European neighbours. In addition, a qualitative forecasting method has been introduced to the analysis with regard to the most significant geopolitical trends and scenarios considering the future role of the EU in this region.

1.1 Theoretical Background The EU’s approach towards the Eastern European neighbourhood stems from the theoretical framework of the democratic peace theory, on one hand, and from the centre-periphery approach, on the other hand. The first theory assumes that democracies do not wage wars with each other 3 Skiba, Geostrategische Aspekte der Türkei: Kann Europa von den USA lernen?, 12.

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because they are mutually interdependent as well as economically and politically stable enough to manage their conflicts through peaceful means, as they have so much to lose.4 The latter approach builds further on this theory by assuming that there is one wealthy centre, which is usually democratic as well, acting as a stabilizing force for the politically and economically unstable and not wealthy periphery.5 In the following paper the starting point from theoretical point of view is that the EU perceives itself as the wealthy and primarily normative power centre promoting liberal democratic principles6 – such as the Copenhagen criteria7 – around which unstable peripheries characterised by a power vacuum exist (such as the Eastern European neighbourhood), causing negative implications for the centre.

2. The Problem of the Power Vacuum in the Direct European Neighbourhood The security environment of the Eastern European neighbourhood One of the main problems the current international actors are dealing with is not the fact that global power is moving from the West to the East, but more that there is a power vacuum along the peripheries of regional power centres arising due to the transformation of the international system into a multilateral world order. In the 1990s, a wide-range power vacuum emerged in the Eastern European neighbourhood countries as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the lack of involvement of third parties in the region.8 A situation of absent or weak state system structures occurred in the whole region – starting with the Baltic region and Central Europe, and extending to Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Over the last two decades, the power vacuum has caused many security issues which have been only partially solved through the last NATO and EU 4

Placek, The Democratic Peace Theory. Rokkan, “Territories, Centres, and Peripheries: Toward a Geoethnic-GeoeconomicGeopolitical Model of Differentiation within Western Europe.”; Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction; Zarycki “An Interdisciplinary Model of Centre-Periphery Model Relations: A Theoretical Proposition.” 6 Balfour, “Principles of Democracy and Human Rights: A Review of the European Union’s Strategies Towards its Neighbours”; Lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy. 7 Marktler, “The power of the Copenhagen criteria.” 8 OSCE Yearbook, 117. 5

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enlargement rounds. Since then, Eastern Europe has been generating various soft and hard security threats ranging from “terrorist activities and trafficking in human beings, drugs, and weapons” to the emergence of the frozen conflicts in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Transnistria.9 The countries in Eastern Europe are weak states – ranging from semiauthoritarian (Georgia, Ukraine, and Armenia) and defective regimes (Azerbaijan) to presidential dictatorships (Belarus).10 Furthermore, the direct neighbourhood consists of countries which are not interested in interacting with each other because of a very low level of willingness for regional cooperation. The lack of regionalisation processes can be explained with the absence of common economic and political values, or a common future perspective. From a theoretical point of view, regionalisation could be seen as one of the most effective mechanisms for prosperity and stability in Eastern Europe, aimed at transferring the region from a geographic to a geopolitical zone where states are more interconnected with each other than before, resulting in a similar comprehension of security threats and risks.11 From the perspective of the EU, the main idea is to promote regionalisation in the direct periphery so that the countries prefer regional cooperation to unilateral steps when faced with the challenges of globalisation and security threats. However, Eastern Europe cannot be seen as a regional entity because of various intraregional problems: on one hand those such as ethnic conflicts, domestic structural problems, a low level of economic development, bad governance, and also extra regional problems, on the other hand those such as the high number of external players interfering with the region for their own security reasons.

The role of the external players in the Eastern European neighbourhood This paper takes into account another important feature shaping the European neighbourhood by focusing on the role of the external players in the region. Generally, the periphery of the Eastern European neighbourhood can be described as a geopolitical node because the region offers a 9

Ibid. Lippert, Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik: viele Vorbehalte – einige Fortschritte – unsere Perspektiven. Merkel and Croissant, “Conclusion: Good and Defective Democracies.” 11 Aydin and Kaptanoglu, “Regionalization of Great Power Security – Near Abroad, Broader Middle East, and European Neighbourhood.” 10

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strategic corridor to the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, on one hand, and to the Black, the Caspian, and the Aegean seas, on the other hand. Further, the region reflects every significant geopolitical shift resulting from the direct involvement of so many external actors. Aydin12 provided a very insightful overview of the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe by describing how the power vacuum in Eastern Europe attracts various external players such as the US, Russia, Turkey, or even Iran, which are all pursuing specific geopolitical agendas based on national security interests, often in contrast with the security interests of the Eastern European countries. Figure 2-1 illustrates the main external players directly influencing the Eastern European neighbourhood. Figure 2-1: (own figure).

External

actors

in

the

Eastern

European

neighbourhood

There are various geopolitical constellations arising from the regional security complex of Eastern Europe such as the Russia-Iran axe or the Turkey-Russia regional leadership in the Black Sea area, or even the USGeorgia strategic partnership, to mention a few. The Turkey-GeorgiaAzerbaijan security triangle provides an example of another significant constellation resulting from the agreement on strategic partnership and mutual support in 2010 which defines mutual support13 in case of a 12

Aydin,“Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and the Role of Institutions”, 71. An Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Turkey and Azerbaijan was signed in 2010. 13

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military attack. Another significant constellation is the Russia-ArmeniaIran security triangle, whose development remains open so far. The described geopolitical constellations have a direct effect on the entire wider Black Sea region, including the Eastern neighbourhood, which “has moved from the periphery to the centre of the attention of world politics”.14 To summarize, the tendency is that the different security agendas and approaches of the external actors will continue to compete with one another, making the geopolitical situation even more complicated in the years to come.

3. The EU’s Geopolitical Approach towards the Direct European Neighborhood When analysing the EU’s approach towards the direct Eastern European neighbourhood, one should consider the general predisposition of states to get involved in regions out of their territory. Brzezinski (1997: 48) has provided a useful definition of states being described as geostrategic actors because of their political will and national capacities to exercise power and influence beyond their borders. In the following section, Brzezinski’s definition will be applied to the analysis of the EU’s approach towards the Eastern European neighbourhood in order to verify if Brussels can act as a geostrategic actor in its direct Eastern neighbourhood. The EU’s approach towards the direct Eastern European neighbourhood stems from various political documents and concrete institutional instruments such as the European Security Strategy (ESS 2003), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP 2004), the Black Sea Synergy (2007), the Report on ESS (2008), and the Eastern Partnership (2009). Generally, all these document and political instruments build on particular objectives and priorities of the EU with regard to its relations with the six countries in the direct European neighbourhood. One of the major security objectives laid down in all of the documents is to establish a security zone around Europe and to stabilize the European neighbourhood by promoting actions to improve the soft skills agenda in the six Eastern European countries concerned. For this reason, the EU’s legal instruments and measures focusing on the region are designed, in the first instance, to guarantee security, stability and prosperity along the periphery to the East. Furthermore, the EU’s approach is aimed at avoiding buffer zones and dividing lines between the EU and its European neighbourhood. For that 14

Akin (Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

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matter, the EU is determined to intensify the relations with the Eastern European countries without losing the main focus on its strategic partner – Russia – which remains excluded from the documents and policy instruments mentioned above. 3.1 Military and non-military means with regard

to the EU’s approach The Eastern European countries’ rapprochement with the EU implies different levels of engagement – starting with political association and economic integration, as well as energy security relations, and extending to increased mobility through visa liberalisation and institutional and administrative capacity building. The EU’s approach towards the Eastern European neighbourhood is predominantly based on a soft skills agenda, which stems from the normative power of the Copenhagen criteria,15 and the EU’s most important security strategy document – the ESS (2003). There is a large catalogue of military and non-military means which the EU relies upon within the framework of its approach towards the region. According to figure 2-2, the EU distinguishes between hard and soft security threats when it comes to dealing with the direct Eastern European neighbourhood, and thus the figure demonstrates how these threats can be overcome by military and non-military means. It is already beyond any doubt that the significance of the EU’s soft skills agenda, especially with regard to the use of non-military means, will continue to grow in the future because of their long-term political, economic, and social effects on the direct European neighbourhood. As figure 2-2 illustrates, the real obstacles lie mainly in the lack of use of military means and capabilities in view of the great backlog of demands in the field of hard power projection compared to Brzezinski’s definition of geostrategic actors. Although the EU is provided with various military instruments and capabilities – ranging from civil missions and military operations within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)16 to the threat of the use of force or use of force as in the case of the intervention in Libya17 – so far they remain optional with regard to the EU’s approach towards the direct Eastern neighbourhood. 15

See footnote 47. On CSDP structures and instruments visit 17 See Council of the European Union, 2011

16

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Figure 2-2: Military and non-military means of the EU’s approach towards the Eastern European neighbourhood (own figure).18 Threats Means

Hard Security Threats (frozen conflicts, terrorism, failed states, competition over natural resources, energy security)

Military Means

CSDP Operations (optional); preventive military interventions (optional); threat of force (optional); use of force (optional) Pressure, negotiations, mediation, economic incentives, embargo, sanctions, change of contractual relationships, promoting good governance and transformation of political system through political platforms such as the Eastern Partnership

Non-military Means

Soft Security Threats (authoritarian and semiauthoritarian regimes, bad governance, organised crime, illegal immigration, human, drugs and weapons trafficking) Civil-military operations and preventive human interventions (optional) Civil EU missions, financial instruments and incentives through ENP, conditionality through the Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy, bilateral association agreements, free trade area agreements, more for more and less for less concept

3.2 Two dimensions of the EU’s approach Ariana Huff (2011) identified in general two different dimensions of engagement with regard to the periphery of the EU – the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and she summarized the key elements which can be encompassed by the EU’s approach towards the direct neighbourhood. Figure 2-3 illustrates the comparison between the most significant factors referring to both dimensions – ranging from the Community method, the decision-making mechanisms for both frameworks, the use of means, and the effective period, extending to the structural change, the frozen conflicts, the legal basis and legally binding 18

Nye (2004): 31; in Nolte, “Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Ein Analysekonzept für die Forschung über regionale Führungskräfte”, 13.

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character, and ending with the geostrategic direction according to the application of Brzezinski’s definition. The instruments and mechanisms within the framework of the ENP clearly focus on soft security issues and are defined by the supranational community method because of the non-political decision making being conducted by the EU institutions. At the same time, the hard security issues agenda of the EU approach towards the European neighbourhood is covered by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), implying that the intergovernmental community method is based on political decision-making processes taking place between the EU member states. Furthermore, the policy instruments considered within the framework of the ENP are more likely expected to have medium to long-term effects, since they are geared towards long-term structural reforms and state system change, in contrast to the observation which shows that ad hoc decisions resulted from the CSDP dimension more often. Such ad hoc decisions with short-term effect cannot lead to long-term structural reforms or even a system change. Further, Figure 2-3 demonstrates once again that the use of nonmilitary means refers to the non-political decision making process within the framework of the ENP while the civil-military means remain a priority of the framework of CSDP. Another important issue – when discussing the comparison between the two different dimensions – is that of the legal basis and of the need for legally binding requirements. The legal basis of the EU’s neighbourhood policy stems from the bilateral relations between the EU and the six Eastern European countries concerned. The deepening of the relations depends on the extent to which the common values are shared and the obligations are fulfilled. This also involves a normative value-based approach of conditionality resulting from the Copenhagen criteria which is tied to mutual commitments to particular norms and principles such as good governance, respect for human rights, democratic transition, and economic liberalisation, just to mention a few. It should be noted that both bargaining parties address the issues and agree on the legally binding requirements on a free basis. On the other hand, the Treaty

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Figure 2-3: Two dimensions of the EU’s approach towards Eastern European neighbourhood (own figure).19 Categories

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Intergovernmental Community Community Method Method Political decision-making Decision-making mechanisms (EU-member mechanism states) Non-military means Civil-military means Means Medium- and long-term effects Short-term effects (ad hoc Effective period decisions) introducing no structural Structural change geared towards long-term structural reforms reforms Legal Requirements resulting Autonomous, politically Legally binding from the bilateral relations and legally binding requirements within the ENP (EU obligations between the Commissioner for ENP and EU member states and the Enlargement) particular country concerned Normative value-based Legal Basis of Article 42Legal Basis 46 TEU (Treaty of the approach with conditionality which is tied to mutual European Union); commitment to particular mandates of the EU-led norms and principles such as missions; legitimized good governance, respect for through legally binding human rights, etc. agreements on a free basis Not aimed at resolving frozen Aimed at non-military Frozen conflicts conflicts resolution of frozen conflicts; EU-led missions but no operations in the Eastern direct neighbourhood so far20 No membership prospects, No geostrategic vision on Geostrategic excluded from the EU‘s the future role of the EU Direction enlargement policy, promoting in the direct European the Eastern Partnership and the neighbourhood with Black Sea Synergy; current regard to the use of draft on future Black Sea military means, military operations, and civil Region Strategy missions 19 20

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Supranational Community Method Non-political decision-making mechanisms (EU-Institutions)

Huff, “The Role of EU Defense Policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood”. EEAS map of all CSDP missions and operations.

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of Lisbon has placed the CSDP within the “legally binding institutional framework of EU principles”.21 The legal basis is comprised of various articles of the Treaty of Lisbon which define the guidelines for the EU-led missions and operations involving the EU institutions and the EU member states. For that matter, an EU-led mission or operation can only be legitimized at a European level after a legally binding agreement has been signed with the country concerned, defining the scope, the means, and the durability of the mandate. Finally, the two dimensions of the EU’s approach towards the European Eastern neighbourhood differ with a view to the geostrategic direction and the resolution of frozen conflicts. The ENP approach is generally lacking a geostrategic direction because of several significant aspects. The ENP’s framework is not aimed at resolving the ethnic conflicts in the direct neighbourhood and it remains excluded from the larger framework of the EU’s enlargement policy, leading to a number of uncertainties regarding the long-term geostrategic interests of the EU along the Eastern periphery, which consists of both enlargement candidate countries (South-Eastern Europe) and ENP partner countries (Eastern Europe). Moreover, the absence of a comprehensive strategy on the Black Sea area which encompasses, among others, the countries of the Eastern European neighbourhood, stresses the need for geostrategic repositioning of the EU in the geographic area concerned. Compared with the ENP approach, the CSDP framework offers unexplored options for more efficiently shaping the EU’s policy towards the direct neighbourhood. The CSDP approach towards the direct European neighbourhood is only partly aimed at conflict resolution in Eastern Europe. Although there have been only EU-led missions so far such as the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine,22 the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia,23 and the EUJUST THEMIS mission in Georgia as well,24 the scope of possibilities within the CSDP has been by no means exhausted yet. More importantly, future challenges regarding the lack of geostrategic direction and vision on the future role of the EU in the direct European neighbourhood should be addressed with the framework of the CSDP. At present, the most pressing need for geostrategic repositioning is identified in the field of the use of military means and in dealing with the hard power security issues in this 21

Gualtieri, “The CSDP and its developments after Lisbon. The European and Defence Union”. 22 European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine. 23 European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia. 24 European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia.

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region. It has been demonstrated by the last two figures that the use of military means, the installation of EU-led operations as well as the hard power projection in the direct neighbourhood have so far remained optional, representing a serious weakness in the EU’s common approach towards the direct Eastern European neighbourhood.

3.3 Two Options for the EU’s Approach towards the Direct European Neighbourhood While the geopolitical shift from the West to the East clearly affects the direct European neighbourhood, it is likely that a deterioration of the power vacuum will also increasingly affect the EU’s approach towards the Eastern European countries. Therefore, this section suggests two possible geopolitical scenarios aimed at separately describing two particular trend developments in the future. These possible future trends map out a more optimistic and a more pessimistic trend upon which the two different trend developments of the EU’s policy towards the direct Eastern neighbourhood are based. In addition, the paper describes the possible policy options for the EU’s relations with the six Eastern European countries. Scenario 1: Strategic partners without strategic binding The first scenario illustrates a more pessimistic picture of the future geopolitical developments in the direct Eastern European neighbourhood. Furthermore, it implies the emergence of a modified EU approach of containment towards Eastern Europe as a geopolitical buffer zone between the European Union and Russia. According to this scenario, the EU would continue to encircle itself from the direct neighbourhood due to a close Euro-Atlantic and trans-Pacific alliance with the US. The member states would determine that the EU’s enlargement had to be finalized with the accession of the Western Balkan countries and Turkey. This means that the EU would not pursue any geopolitical interests in the direct Eastern European neighbourhood since it would remain out of Brussels’ geographic area of focus with the exception of Moldova. The EU would concentrate predominantly on soft power projection through its various policy initiatives and instruments – ranging from the Eastern partnership to the ENP instruments. In the long term, the further implication of the Danube strategy and the Black Sea Synergy would lead to the launch of a new comprehensive strategy on the Black Sea region, encompassing the soft skills agenda on economic integration and democratic transition. A

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coherent EU approach towards the six Eastern neighbours would allow a rapprochement in the field of economic and trade relations and the promotion of the transformation processes by further developing the soft skills and widening the economic links with the Eastern European countries. Consequently, the EU and the Eastern neighbours would remain strategic partners without real strategic binding and long-term involvement, whereas Brussels would predominantly focus on deepening the institutional consolidation and intensifying the enlargement process with the Western Balkan countries. Under the first Scenario, a NATO-led missile defence system would be installed in various European countries leading to further encirclement of the Eastern periphery. In the medium and long term, a significant strategy option of the EU’s approach would be to reach a new bilateral agreement with Russia with regards to the geopolitical repositioning of both actors in the direct neighbourhood. This would allow both parties to benefit from the geographical advantages they mutually agreed upon. One important issue of common interest would be the gradual solution of the Transnistria conflict in favour of a strengthened EU presence there. As a small country directly bordering the EU, Moldova would be successful at transforming the political and socio-economic system and opening up to Europeanization. At the same time the military presence provided by Russia could be replaced by a new EU military operation guaranteeing stability and security along the bordering periphery for an interim time. Furthermore, Moldova could undergo a gradual shift to a more proEuropean policy, leading to its accession in the long term after the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Transnistria. In this case, the question which would remain open is to what extent such a major development between Brussels and Moscow would actually be renegotiable. Obviously, Russia would not easily accept a conflict resolution in Transnistria at its expense and the possible accession of Moldova to the EU, since Moscow would clearly benefit more from the status-quo of the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space by allowing Russia to exercise sole control over the territories of its near abroad. The EU should put forward some incentives to promote its approach towards the direct neighbourhood which are as reasonable as possible. The recognition of the two secessionist republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the territory of Georgia appears to be one of the policy options available for shaping the direct neighbourhood, as has been done with the independence of Kosovo. This would clear up any double-standard type doubts as to why the majority of the EU member states have formally

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recognized Kosovo but refuse to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia.25 With such a reasonable deal with the EU and a strategic partnership in terms of economic modernisation, Russia could reposition itself as one of the most important remaining geostrategic players in the direct Eastern European neighbourhood, whilst focusing on the post-Soviet republics in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Such a geopolitical deal would offer strong benefits for the EU as well – starting with the establishment of clear and stable conditions for the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU along the common neighbourhood periphery, to finalizing the enlargement process with the accession of Moldova and solving the Transnistria conflict. The EU could think of the possibility of a military presence in Transnistria for an interim period of time as it had already installed military operations in Kosovo and Bosnia after the collapse of Yugoslavia. In this way, new geopolitical zones between Moscow and Brussels could be established in the Black Sea region, leading to more predictability in the security relations in the common direct neighbourhood. While the EU could integrate Moldova and even Turkey in the long term, the other five Eastern European countries would remain more or less under Russian influence. Scenario 2: Strategic partners sharing common future The second scenario illustrates a more optimistic perspective on the EU’s involvement in the direct Eastern neighbourhood. A starting point would be stronger engagement along the periphery and a more proactive approach towards the Eastern European countries. The EU would increasingly focus on prioritizing and intensifying its relations with the countries along its direct Eastern neighbourhood without deteriorating the strategic relations with Russia. The final goal of this proactive approach would be a rapprochement between the Eastern European countries and the EU, and a new strategic partnership with Russia, these being seen as two parallel processes. Both the gradual integration of the Eastern European countries into the EU and the strategic partnership with Russia should be considered as separate developments of one coherent EU approach towards the direct Eastern neighbourhood. Given that Eastern Europe would become a geopolitical priority of the EU’s policy, then the possibility of membership should be guaranteed by the EU in the long term. Also, the EU could consider providing a military presence and 25 Fischer, The EU’s Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

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building military bases by mutual consent on the territory of the Eastern European countries, meaning that this development would automatically lead to less cooperation with Russia. Otherwise, the EU could intensify the strategic partnership with Russia by signing a new comprehensive agreement on strategic partnership26 which would deepen the strategic relations between Russia and the EU. After undergoing the complex association process and fulfilling all conditions, the Eastern European countries could receive a long-term possibility of membership which would allow them to decide whether to join the EU or not. This would create an atmosphere of concurrence but also new interdependencies between the concurring integration projects of the EU and Russia. Each Eastern European country would have the freedom to choose which way it would want to go – the pro-European or the pro-Russian. From the current perspective, countries like Moldova or Georgia would more likely choose European integration, while countries like Armenia and Belarus would be more interested in a long-term strategic partnership with Russia. There are also countries such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan which are currently swinging between Moscow and Brussels depending on the political elite in power. Beyond the two described policy priorities, there is one fundamental operational priority for the EU’s policy towards the direct Eastern European neighbourhood. Brussels would need to provide credible military capabilities and expand its military presence in Eastern Europe along with its more proactive and coherent approach towards the six Eastern European neighbours as well as the comprehensive and legally binding strategic partnership with Russia.

4. Conclusion The future geopolitical role for the EU’s policy is geographically predestined to be in its direct neighbourhood to the East.27 With the US’ security interests shifting from Europe to Asia, the EU could create – together with its Eastern neighbours – a second major “zone of an internal balance” on the Old continent.28 In this regard, the EU should geographically determine the finality of the enlargement process as first important step. So far, the Eastern European countries have not been offered any possibility for real membership in the EU. In fact, this 26

Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (1997) between Russia and the EU. Guetta, “Take Advantage of US Indifference”. 28 Ibid. 27

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represents an enormous weakness of the future geopolitical role of the EU in its direct Eastern European neighbourhood. The absence of the prospect of membership should not be linked with the consolidation of the EU or the institutional crisis but more with the weak political will at the European level. One of the most significant findings to emerge from this study is that new region-specific adaptations of the EU’s approach towards the direct European neighbourhood are strongly needed. This study has found that the EU should generally increase the hard power projection in this region by building up its military capabilities for external action and military presence. The EU could further strengthen its position in the region by developing a coherent approach which builds on the EU soft skills agenda and normative power, including a membership possibility for the six Eastern European countries in the long-term. The EU should also develop coherent military means and hard power skills in order to establish hard power projection and expand its military presence in the direct neighbourhood if such is necessary. Furthermore, this essay has illustrated the central importance of strengthening the facilitator role of the EU in the field of frozen conflict resolution with regard to the hard security risks and threats. Finally, the EU has obviously reached a point in its political evolution as a supranational organisation where geostrategic repositioning is strongly needed due to the changed multilateral world order and the existing power vacuum in the direct European neighbourhood.

Works Cited Abbasov, S. “Azerbaijan-Turkey Military Pact Signal Impatience with Minsk Talks.” 2011. [quoted 2012-11-2]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62732› Acikmese, S.A. “Management of Security in the EU’s Neighbourhood: Union’s Tactics Revisited.” Perceptions (Autumn 2005): 1-25. Adomeit, H.; Schulze, P.W. and A.V. Zagorski. “Russland, die EU und Zwischeneuropa.” Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihen von IILP, Wien, October 2008. Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. 1997. [quoted 2012-11-13]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.russianmission.eu/userfiles/file/ partnership_and_cooperation_agreement_1997_english.pdf› Akin, E.K. The New Geopolitical Order in the BSEC Region. [quoted 2012-11-12]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-newgeopolitical-order-in-the-bsec-region-.tr.mfa›

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Aliboni, R. “The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy.” European Foreign Affairs Review 1 (2005): 116. Aydin, M. “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and the Role of Institutions.” Perceptions (Autumn 2005): 57-83. Aydin, M. and Neslihan Kaptanoglu. (2007). “Regionalization of Great Power Security – Near Abroad, Broader Middle East, and European Neighbourhood.” In Globalisation and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualising Security in the 21st Century, edited by H.G. Brauch, J. Grin, C. Mesjasz, et al., 763-74. Berlin, New York: Springer, 2007. Balfour, R. “Principles of Democracy and Human Rights: A Review of the European Union’s Strategies Towards its Neighbours.” In Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, edited by S. Lucarelli and I. Manners, 114-29. London, New York: Routledge, 2006. Bericht über die umsetzung der europäischen sicherheitsstrategie: Sicherheit schaffen in einer Welt im Wandel. 2008. [quoted 2012-1126]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/DE /reports/104634.pdf› Browning, C. and P. Joenniemi. “Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy.” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 3 (2008): 519-51. [quoted 2012-11-22]. Available at WWW: ‹http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/14/3/519› Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP). 2011. [quoted 2012-1123]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/ security-defence.aspx?lang=en› Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 2011. [quoted 2012-11-22]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm› Council of the European Union. “Council Decides on EU Military Operation in Support of Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Libya.” Brussels, 2011. [quoted 2012-11-15]. Available at WWW: ‹http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st08/st08589.en11.pdf› Delcour, L. “The European Union, a Security Provider in the Eastern Neighbourhood?” European Security 19, no. 4 (2010): 535-49. European External Action Service (EEAS). Overview of the completed EU missions and operations. [quoted 2012-11-18]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/euoperations/completed-eu-operations?lang=de› European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 2011. [quoted 2012-11-7]. Available at WWW: ‹http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm›

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European Neighbourhood Watch. Thinking Ahead for Europe. SEPS no. 74 (August/September 2011): 1-20. [quoted. 2012-11-17]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/simplenews/2011/05/NWatch74.pdf› Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie. Ein sicheres Europa in einer besseren Welt, 2003. [quoted 2012-11-29]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/031208ESSIIDE.pdf› European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). [quoted 2012-10-23]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.eubam.org/en/› European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM). [quoted 201211-13]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.eumm.eu/› European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS). [quoted 2012-10-08]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.consilium. europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/euoperations/completed-euoperations/eujust-themis.aspx?lang=en› Fink, A.; Kuhle, J. et al. “Osteuropa 2030: Szenarien und Perspektiven.” Paderborn: Scenario Management International, 2010: 1-35. Fischer, S. The EU’s Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Seminar co-hosted by the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the EU. Brussels: Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 1-2 December 2010. [quoted 2012-10-20]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/NREP_report.pdf› Giegerich, B. and W. Wallace. “Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces.” Survival (Summer 2004): 163-82. Gilpin, R. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University, 1981. Gray, C.S. and G. Sloan, eds. Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy. 1st edition. Oxfordshire: Taylor and Francis (Routledge), 1999. Grygiel, J. Great Powers and Geopolitical Change. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. Gualtieri, R. “The CSDP and its developments after Lisbon. The European and Defence Union”, no. 10 (2010). [quoted. 2012-10-17]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.robertogualtieri.eu/home/images/stories/ Documenti /The_European_Security_and_Defence_Union_n.102010_-_CSDP_REP .pdf› Guetta, B. “Take Advantage of US Indifference.” 2012. [quoted 2012-1129]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/ 2998641-take-advantageus-indifference› Huff, A. “The Role of EU Defense Policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood.” EUISS 91, Occasional paper (May 2011): 1-41.

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Krastev, I.; Leonard, M., et al. The spectre of a multipolar Europe, London: European Council of Foreign Relations, 2010. [quoted 201211-12]. Available at WWW: ‹http://ecfr.eu/page/ECFR25_SECURITY _UPDATE_AW_SINGLE.pdf› Lachowski, Z. “Russia and the Near Abroad: From Retreat to Capture.” In “Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia”, edited by Z. Lachowski, 43-68. SIPRI Policy Paper no. 18 (2007). Lippert, B. Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik: viele Vorbehalte – einige Fortschritte – unsere Perspektiven. Berlin: Internationale Politikanalyse. 2008. [quoted 2012-10-18]. Available at WWW: ‹http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/05292.pdf› Marktler, T. “The power of the Copenhagen criteria.” CYELP 2, no 12 (2006): 343-63. Meister, S. “Sicherheitspolitischer Neustart zwischen Russland und der EU? Das Weimarer Dreieck, Russland und die östliche Nachbarschaft der EU.” Genshagener Papiere no. 7 (Juli 2011). Merkel, W. and A. Croissant. “Conclusion: Good and Defective Democracies.” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 199-213. Minteh, B. The Global Balance of Power: World Order: Paradigm Shift From Unilateralism to Multilateralism and not Multipolarity. Saarbrücken: Lap Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010. Nolte, D. “Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Ein Analysekonzept für die Forschung über regionale Führungskräfte.” GIGA Working papers, no. 29 (2006): 1-55. [quoted 2012-10-23]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.gigahamburg.de/content/public ationen/pdf/wp29_nolte.pdf› Nye, J. Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics and Understand International Conflict. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. OSCE Yearbook. Centre for OSCE Research, 2006. [quoted 2012-11-18]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.corehamburg.de/documents/ yearbook/english/06/osce2006-enpdfGesamt.pdf› Placek, K. The Democratic Peace Theory. Melbourne: University of Melbourne, 2012. [quoted 20012-11-16]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/18/the-democratic-peace-theory/› Rogers, J. “A New Geography of European Power?” Egmont Paper no. 42 (2011): 1-31. [quoted 2012-11-24]. Available at WWW: ‹http:// www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep42.pdf› Rokkan, S. “Territories, Centres, and Peripheries: Toward a GeoethnicGeoeconomic-Geopolitical Model of Differentiation within Western Europe.” In Centre and Periphery. Spatial Variations in Politics, edited by J. Gottmann, 163-204. Beverly Hills, London: Sage, 1980.

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Scott, J.W. “Bordering and Ordering the European Neighbourhood: A Critical Perspective on EU Territoriality and Geopolitics.” Trames 13, no. 3 (2009): 232-47. Skiba, A. Geostrategische Aspekte der Türkei: Kann Europa von den USA lernen? I Studienarbeit. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, Otto-SuhrInstitut für Politikwissenschaft, 2003. Wallerstein, I. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. Zarycki, T. “An Interdisciplinary Model of Centre-Periphery Model Relations: A Theoretical Proposition.” Regional and Local Studies: Special issue (2007). [quoted 2012-11-21]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.iss.uw.edu.pl/zarycki/pdf/interdisciplinary.pdf›

COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE TEREZA SMEJKALOVÁ

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (now the Common Security and Defence policy, CSDP/ESDP) came to existence at the beginning of this millennium. Two events led European governments to rethink the way in which they conceptualised European defence policy and capability as well as their commitment to it. The first one was the Balkan wars. It underlined that the US had “superior intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, plentiful precision-guided munitions, massive air and sealift resources, and solid logistics”.1 The European Union’s frustration, caused by its lack of capability to act, resulted in the creation of a more efficient EU defence policy. The initiative was taken by France and the United Kingdom. Although the origins of ESDP/CSDP were not necessarily anti-American, French motives were fuelled by the desire to counter-balance the US influence on Europe and to create an autonomous EU. The second event that was significant in stimulating the EU’s common security policy was the British change in government in 1997. Tony Blair’s Labour government was determined to demonstrate the UK’s central role in Europe and took the “initiative on restructuring European defence cooperation partly to compensate for Britain’s self-chosen exclusion from other major European projects (such as European Monetary Union)”.2 Tony Blair sought to show the US European readiness to bear a bigger share in the common security burden. The EU wanted to create a crisis management capacity that would enable it to react to crises such as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo without American support. 1

Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defence Policy: Implication for Transatlantic Relations”, 220. 2 Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defence Policy: Implication for Transatlantic Relations”, 215.

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At a meeting at Saint-Malo in December 1998, President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Tony Blair called for the EU’s “capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.3 NATO’s Washington summit of April 1999 basically supported the tendency toward a more pronounced and forceful European defence capability. The summit communiqué acknowledged “the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action so it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged”.4 French and British initiatives to create a European Security and Defence Policy were translated into the “Headline Goal” adopted by the European Council at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. It was agreed that the EU would be able to deploy the so-called Rapid Response Force of about 60,000 troops within 60 days to perform the Petersberg tasks.5 A year later, the civilian dimension of ESDP/CSDP was defined at the Feira European Council. The Union decided to develop civilian aspects of crisis management in four priority areas: police, strengthening of rule of law, strengthening civilian administrations and civil protection. Across the four dimensions, emphasis was put on the ability to react quickly by deploying at short notice, and on the requirement for Member States to pre-select relevant officials or experts in the four priority areas and adequately train them. Police deployment was identified as central to civilian crisis management missions. At Feira, Member States committed themselves to strengthen their capabilities in this domain and make 5,000 police officers available on a voluntary basis by 2003, 1,400 of whom should be deployable within 30 days.6 Civilian missions, however, have since then been deployed in postcrisis, post-conflict and potential crisis environments. There are currently 3

Maartje, “From St-Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents”, 8-9; In Neuhold, “The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Filling the Gap?”, 111. 4 Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy: Implication for Transatlantic Relations”, 218. 5 Petersberg tasks adopted at the 1992 summit meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) comprise humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. The EU took over the Petersberg Tasks in May 1999 under the Treaty of Amsterdam. Today they form a core component of the CSDP. 6 Santa Maria Feira European Council Conclusions, 19 and 20 June 2000.

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eight civilian missions deployed on the ground: in Afghanistan, Iraq, Georgia, two in the Palestinian territories, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Despite such a great geographical variety of missions, insufficient attention has been paid to them. The civilian dimension is crucial for the crisis management and peace building and yet remains marginalised, while significantly higher attention has been devoted to the military operations. Civilian capabilities started to develop quite extensively between 2003 and 2004. In 2003 the first ESDP/CSDP mission was deployed in the Western Balkans and important lessons have been drawn from the serious challenges that occurred in its planning and conduct phase. A second cornerstone was the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. The ESS has become the reference document for successive developments of CSDP, with a focus on synergy among all EU instruments, unity of command, and the development of relevant capabilities – the so-called “comprehensive approach”. It mainly concentrates on effective multilateralism, international law, and the enhanced role of international institutions and tribunals. The ESS formulated the so-called “soft power” that was in opposition to the robust proactive policy of the former American president G. W. Bush. Third, the Civilian Headline Goal adopted by the EU in 2004 also defined concrete targets of civilian ESDP/CSDP. The ultimate objective was to speed up deployment of civilian personnel and enable the EU to conduct several different long term missions parallel to one another. Targets have been agreed upon the following priority sectors: civilian police and rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring of missions, and support for EU special representatives.7 Fourth, in 2004 the EU expanded to 25 Member States. The largest period of EU enlargement to date, this brought not only additional capabilities but also distinctive experience and expertise, as the new Member States had just completed a long process of political reform and institution-building.8 Drawing from the European Security Strategy, civilian crisis management under ESDP/CSDP was presented as a key component of EU external policy. However, CSDP is not a stand-alone instrument.9

7

Civilian Headline Goal 2008. Grevi, Keohane; In Grevi, European Security and Defence Policy. The First 10 Years, 101. 9 Martinelli in Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, eds, European Security and Defence Policy. An Implementation Perspective, 111. 8

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Common Security and Defence Policy in Geopolitical Perspective The trilogy of peace, security and development, reinforced by the imperative of good governance, is a principle enunciated in various official documents, notably the EU Security Strategy, which states that the EU is a global actor and as such must be ready to take responsibility for international security and for a better world.10

The balance between hard and soft components of EU security policy has become clearer. As member states have increasingly come to recognize that security implies far more than force and coercion, they are striving to improve coordination and coherence between the hard and soft tools at their disposal.11 The Lisbon Treaty has changed the institutional framework of the EU, including the CFSP and CSDP, by establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS) headed by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In November 2009, the European Council appointed Catherine Ashton as High Representative who is assisted by the EEAS. In her double-hatted role as a chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Council and as Vice-President of the European Commission she aims at ensuring consistency and coordination of EU external action.12 The Rotating Presidency of Member States in this area has only functioned in a supporting role since the Lisbon Treaty. Thus the Member States, particularly the medium and small sized ones, have lost the opportunity to represent the EU in the international arena. The EEAS staff members originate from the European Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council, and the Diplomatic Services of EU Member States. The role of 10

ESS, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”. Grevi, Keohane; In Grevi, European Security and Defence Policy. The First 10 Years, 101. 12 In accordance with Articles 18 and 27 of the Treaty on the European Union, the High Representative: “conducts the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); contributes by her proposals to the development of that policy, which she will carry out as mandated by the Council, and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted in this field; presides over the Foreign Affairs Council; is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. She ensures the consistency of the Union's external action. She is responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action. She represents the Union in matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, conducts political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and expresses the Union's position in international organizations and at international conferences. She also exercises authority over the European External Action Service (EEAS) and over the Union delegations in third countries and at international organizations.” (Treaty of the European Union, 2009). 11

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the EEAS is still in a formative phase and this process depends on Member States. At the beginning of its functioning it attempted to establish its own role as the 28th Member State as primus inter pares. According to the Lisbon Treaty, however, CFSP and CSDP remain solely within the competences of Member States. Moreover, there should be an extensive flow of information between the EEAS and the Member States. So far the EEAS shares important information only with the largest Member States: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Therefore, there is a danger that creation of the EEAS will gradually and significantly increase the power the ‘Big 3’ Member States at the detriment of the others. CSDP activities should be derived from the common denominator of geopolitical and geostrategic interests of Member States and should not be the isolated action of a single leading Member State with others tolerating it. EU Member States should take into account the lessons learned from their experiences of missions deployed during the past ten years. CSDP missions are more than regular foreign policy: they are an embodiment of direct operational engagement through the deployment of the EU personnel on the ground. Geopolitical perspective should be taken into account. For some Member States Northern Africa is not a priority region, but the EU as an entity is naturally interested in Africa due to its proximity and economic ties, issues with migration etc. Each individual Member State should assess future and current actions not only from the national point of view but also from the European geopolitical perspective. It is essential to overcome short-sighted national geographical perception and see reality through an EU lens. In particular, countries without colonial backgrounds and former communist countries do not necessary take this view. In the case of the latter, the surrounding environment had previously been more or less out of their reach. Political geography of the EU should determine areas to which its experts are deployed. Although the European Security Strategy emphasised its role as a global actor, the Union should focus on its priorities. CSDP missions are a test case of the credibility of the European Union and therefore effectiveness is the main target. At this stage the EU does not possess the capacity to deploy at any location in the world and sustain its delivery over a longer period. That is why priority areas or the so-called “Grand Area” should be determined. This essay will contribute to the knowledge base of political science and political geography as it evaluates civilian CSDP missions and the EU´s role in global politics from a geopolitical perspective. It first concentrates on the political geography of the European Union and then

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stemming from these findings analyses ongoing civilian CSDP missions. It determines which priority areas are set within the EU’s geographical and geopolitical environment.

1. Political Geography of the EU Geography and geopolitics have often been neglected in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This is a mistake. The rising powers of the twenty first century have already begun to integrate their homelands more effectively and chart the regions where their own geographic and geopolitics lay. The EU’s future is dependent on the adoption of a truly comprehensive and preventative approach, which fuses together civilian and military assets for permanent power projection into the regions most vital to the maintenance of European Prosperity and the democratic way of life.13

Institutionalising the relations between Member States and the elimination of any possibility of military conflict between them has been central to the aims of the European Community until very recently.14 Because geopolitics is something that increasing European integration was expected to move beyond and, within Europe at least, render largely irrelevant, the importance of geopolitics has often been played down by contemporary Europeans. However, the continual deepening of European integration has led to questioning of this low estimation of the significance of geopolitics, leading to the argument that it has now become “possible and necessary to see European integration through a geopolitical lens”.15 A superior understanding of the possibilities and constraints faced by contemporary Europeans may be gained through geopolitical analysis of the European Union’s geographical position, as well as through better informed decision making in terms of foreign policy. It can be seen that the geopolitical lens is highly important for improving the process of policy making by considering the geographical situation of Europe: “The European region is not so much a continent than a peninsula which protrudes out of the Eurasian super continent into the Atlantic Ocean, thus providing Europeans with a primarily maritime geography”.16 It is therefore vital that current CSDP civilian missions be 13

Rogers, A New Geography of European Power?, 25. Duchene 1972, 1973; In Rogers, A New Geography of European Power?, 13. 15 Rogers and Simon, The Status and Location of the Military Installations of the Member States of the EU and Their Potential Role for the European Security and Defence Policy, 5-6. 16 Rogers, A New Geography of European Power?, 13. 14

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assessed and future decisions be made in accordance with a geopolitical perspective. The key differences between land and sea powers, which are referred as “tellurocracy” and “thalassocracy” respectively, are identified in a useful analysis provided by the Dutch-American geostrategist Nicholas John Spykman. This analysis focuses particularly on the ways in which these two types of power expand: Their differing conceptions of the conquest of space indicated one of the outstanding differences between land and sea powers. A sea power conquers a large space by leaping lightly from point to point, adjusting itself to existing political relationships wherever possible, and often not establishing its legal control until its factual domination has long been tacitly recognised. An expanding land power moves slowly and methodically forward, forced by the nature of its terrain to establish its control step by step and so preserve the mobility of its forces. Thus a land power thinks in terms of continuous surfaces surrounding a central point of control, whereas a sea power thinks in terms of points and connecting lines dominating an immense territory.17

It is entirely clear that the approach to enlargement adopted by the European Union is a continental “land” approach rather than a maritime “sea” one. However, in terms of the external dimension, the EU demonstrates a maritime approach to an increasing degree by taking its Member States’ overseas territories into account. The EU currently stretches over nearly the whole of the European Peninsula, with its neighbourhood reaching from the Black Sea to the Atlantic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. The Union’s eastern land border may now be considered quite short at just 5,460 kilometres. Only five countries touch this border: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Turkey. The EU’s geographical location on Eurasia’s western tip, along with its size and resources, have led to it being referred to as “the world’s axial super continent” or the “World Island”, which serves to compound the EU’s maritime orientation.18 Considered geopolitically, therefore, it seems that a dominant Eurasian power would be able to exert its command over the Middle East, Africa and the seas that surround them in virtue of its proximity.19 17

Spykman 1938b, 224; in Rogers, A New Geography of European Power?, 14. Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Euroasia”, 50; Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”. 19 Brzezinski “A Geostrategy for Euroasia”, 50; Rogers, A New Geography of European Power?, 14. 18

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Given the position of the European peninsula on Eurasia’s western promontory, the sea becomes necessary to reach other parts of Eurasia. Indeed, until Europeans developed sailing vessels capable of circumventing Africa, the eastern hemisphere remained largely cut off, isolated and unknown. While aeroplanes, railways and energy transmission pipelines have mitigated this problem to some extent, commercial activity still moves between Europeans and Asians primarily through the maritime domain, making the communication line running from the Suez canal to the City of Shanghai particularly significant.20

This demonstrates that the European Union should incorporate behaviour as a power of the sea into its attributes, especially when it comes to considerations regarding CFSP and CSDP. Therefore Member States should move beyond the limitations of logic rooted in the perspective of national interest and instead consider the world from the European maritime point of view, in accordance with which CSDP actions that are most beneficial for the EU should be undertaken. Much of the EU’s economy is based upon the export of high-tech manufactured products, as well as financial services. Because Europeans are among the world’s most trade dependent people, with around ninety per cent of imported and exported goods being transported by sea, there is a clear need to increase and extend Europe’s political and economic bargaining power and influence in neighbouring countries.21 A problem faced by Europeans in the area of imports and exports is the particular vulnerability to long term and short term disruption of seaborne transportation due to the “just in time” approach of container shipping companies.22 Taking into account that certain powers have entrenched themselves in key regions to their own advantage, yet often to others’ disadvantage, it is vital that the EU makes efforts to determine the minimum geographic area needed for its own continual and sustainable economic expansion. Rogers23 proposes that, from a geopolitical perspective, such a zone would need to meet the following five criteria: x

20

It would have to hold all the basic resources necessary to fuel European manufacturing needs and future industrial requirements,

Rogers, A New Geography of European Power?, 21. European Commission, 2006, 1-2; in Rogers, A New Geography of European Power?, 21. 22 Willet, 2008; in Rogers, A New Geography of European Power? , 21. 23 Rogers, A New Geography of European Power?, 21. 21

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Contain all the key trade routes, especially energy transmission pipelines and maritime shipping routes, from other regions to the European homeland, Have the fewest possible geopolitical afflictions that could lead to the areas´ disintegration and thereby harm future economic development, Show the least likelihood of significant encroachment by powerful foreign actors, relative to its importance to the European economy and geopolitical interest, Represent an area the EU can work towards defending most costeffectively through the expansion of the CSDP – in other words, without mandating an excessive and draining defence effort. 24

The Eastern Neighbourhood, the Caucasus, much of Central Asia, the northern half of Africa and the entire Middle East should all be included in the Grand Area. The Grand Area should form an integrated zone that is beneficial to the relationships among all of the entities that exist within it. In addition, the EU must aim to further and enhance the strategic partnerships that it has with smaller powers in the Grand Area, particularly with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and other energy suppliers and transit nations that may feed into or host the Nabucco gas pipeline. Furthermore, the integration and success of the Grand Area in the future will depend to a significant degree on high levels of EU and US collaboration in these areas.25

2. Civilian CSDP Missions This part concentrates on the analysis of the ongoing CSDP missions. It determines which priority areas are set within the EU’s geographical and geopolitical environment, as well as explaining why other non-priority areas should be disregarded in terms of CSDP activities. The core areas for CSDP actions should be based on the EU priority areas because they can ensure there is both the ambition and required consensus among the Member States. This part sets out the main criteria for future civilian missions according to which the missions should be assessed and appraised. The criteria are as follows: 1) the geographical proximity of the conflict or crisis; 2) the acceptance of EU staff by the local population and authorities (in line with local ownership); and 3) the strategic priority or security threat for the majority of Member states, particularly the leading ones. 24 25

Ibid. Rogers, A New Geography of European Power?, 4.

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The EU should concentrate on the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Southern Mediterranean and Afghanistan. On the contrary, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia and more distant parts of Africa would not be CSDP priority. Although some regions or countries may constitute exceptions, the focus of CSDP should not deviate from these areas to a large extent. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) may be considered as a unique mission that has indicated a significant shift forward in the level of ambition seen in civilian ESDP/CSDP, particularly because of its unprecedented scale. It is the largest EU civilian mission ever launched. The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary, and customs areas. The mission is not in Kosovo to govern or rule. It is a technical mission, which monitors, mentors and advises, whilst retaining a number of limited executive powers. EULEX works under the general framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and has a unified chain of command to Brussels. The CSDP mission assists the Kosovo authorities, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability. It develops and strengthens an independent and multi-ethnic justice system and a multiethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practices.26 The mission, in full co-operation with the European Commission Assistance Programmes, implements its mandate through monitoring, mentoring and advising, while retaining certain executive responsibilities, particularly in fighting against organised crime. EULEX Kosovo, as the largest EU mission that has ever been deployed, indicates the priority of most Member States. However, the EU must demonstrate its ability to cope with instability in the region and work on media presentation of their actions to enhance perceptions held by the local population. Although not all Member States have recognised Kosovo, they were able to agree on its executive mandate and operational approach, although the intermediary role of the political dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade has not yet achieved adequate results. Regarding the criteria of effectiveness, EULEX fulfils this particularly in the aspects of proximity and strategic interest. However, acceptance by the local population could be improved. There is very clearly a difference between how EULEX is perceived by Kosovo Albanians and by Kosovo Serbs. 26

EULEX Kosovo Website, EEAS.

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Kosovo Albanians view the mission with mistrust, and in his public speeches Premier Thaci rarely mentions EULEX and its activities. On the other hand, the Serbian population is appreciative of the EU’s neutral role. However, recent incidents have demonstrated that the Mission, with its neutral status, is not adequately able to respond to confrontations. It is thus crucial to move towards achieving agreements through political dialogue that will have a significantly positive impact on the successful delivery of the Mission. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the longest lasting civilian mission, as it was launched in 2003. While retaining residual capacities in the fields of police reform and accountability, the EU Police Mission primarily supports law enforcement agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the fight against organized crime and corruption, notably focusing on state level law enforcement agencies, on enhancement of the interactions between police and prosecutors, and on regional and international cooperation.27 After almost ten years in operation Member States decided it was time to transfer its competences to the EU Special Representative Rule of Law Section and the European Commission IPA Project in June 2012. EUPM proved its effectiveness particularly at the end of its mandate. All the criteria, such as proximity, local acceptance (despite the rhetoric of Republika Srbska leaders) and also the strategic importance were fulfilled. Potential conflicts or disorder in the Balkans can negatively affect the stability of the EU, which is a matter of great priority to all EU Member States, particularly the three leading ones; the external and internal aspects of security are in this case evident. The EU should in this regard set up a legal basis for a general framework for cooperation between the CSDP and Justice and Home Affairs domain. Despite a first analysis and some important steps being taken on this issue, certain Member States (particularly Germany and Spain) are hesitant due to concerns about the potential misuse of Foreign Policy for internal aims. Georgia and the South Caucasus Area in general should also remain one of the key priorities for the EU, not only due to its proximity and its resources, but also because the population sees the EU as the model for its future. Moreover, when it has come to crisis situations in this region, the EU has shown a surprising unity of action and determination. The record speed of implementation in the case of Georgia proved the Union’s capability to react quickly in a situation of serious crisis, provided that sufficient political will and strong leadership exist. Through the creation of the EU Monitoring Mission, the EUSR for the crisis in Georgia and 27

EUPM Bosnia and Hercegovina Website, EEAS.

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the South Caucasus, and the Geneva talks, the EU has considerably increased its profile in conflict resolution in Georgia. The mission has quickly delivered on its first and most prominent task: the stabilisation of the situation after the war. Following Russia’s veto in the OSCE and at the UN, the EUMM has been the only international monitoring mission on the ground since June 2009. As outlined in the Joint Action, the objectives of the mission are firstly “to contribute to long-term stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding region”, and secondly “in the short term, to the stabilization of the situation with a reduced risk of a resumption of hostilities, in full compliance with the Six Point Agreement and the subsequent implementation measures”. In order to achieve these aims, the Joint Action focuses the EUMM´s activities on four main tasks: x Stabilisation – The mission monitors, analyses, and reports on the situation pertaining to the stabilization process, centred on full compliance with the Six Point Agreement and on the freedom of movement and actions by spoilers, as well as on violation of human rights and international humanitarian law. x Normalisation – The mission monitors, analyses, and reports on the situation pertaining to the normalisation process of civil governance focusing on rule of law, effective law enforcement structures, and adequate public order, including Freedom of movement across the Administrative Boundary Lines. The mission also monitors the security of transport links, energy infrastructures, and utilities, as well as the political and security aspects of the return of IDPs and refugees. x Confidence building – The mission contributes to reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties, and other confidence building measures. x Information – The mission also contributes to informing European policy and contributes to EU future engagement.28 The Middle East and Southern Neighbourhoods are also of great strategic interest to the EU. Both civilian missions in this area - EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah - are highly noteworthy, albeit cautionary, undertakings that considerably raised the EU’s profile in relation to the sensitive policing, rule of law and border dimensions of the conflict. The 28

Factsheet of EUMM Georgia, 2011; Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia.

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security domain is dominated by the continuing power struggle between Israel, the PA, and Palestinian factions, while at the same time being shaped by a number of other international actors, in particular the US. European polices are guided by the long-term objective of achieving an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel; however, Europe’s more immediate conflict management and counter-terrorism objectives can sometimes appear contradictory.29 The two CSDP missions to the Palestinian territories have so far produced very different outcomes. Whereas EUBAM Rafah has been in a state of suspension since mid-2007 and can effectively be said to have failed due to political conditions, EUPOL COPPS has succeeded in making a significant contribution to rebuilding the Palestinian civil police and improving the security situation in the West Bank. EUPOL COPPS promotes civilian police primacy, meaning that the civilian police should be the organisation that is ultimately in charge of policing and that civilian control for security forces should be guaranteed. The primary objective is to ensure that the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) are built up to be a competent security force of the future Palestinian State, based on the principles of democratic policing, neutrality, and community-service EUPOL COPPS also supports the development of a sustainable criminal justice sector which is in full compliance with international standards of human rights. The mission aims to assist the Palestinian Authority with the development and consolidation of the criminal justice system, to develop processional capacity within the judicial institutions, to enact modern legislation, and to facilitate other activities to increase the standard of their performance.30 The Middle East should certainly be seen as a priority area as it clearly fulfils the criteria of proximity and a strategic interest. However, due to political reasons, acceptance of local population is ambiguous. Israel still relies more strongly on US than EU support, while it is a common view among Arab countries that the “West” in general is an intruder. On the other hand, it should be noted that the EU is the largest donor to the Palestinian territories. The other Middle East mission is EUJUST LEX Iraq where the EU has been operating since 2005. It is a training mission in the areas of justice, policing, and penitentiary. It organizes training courses in Iraq (Baghdad, Erbil and Basra) and the Member States. Iraq is a strategic 29 30

Bulut; in Grevi, European Security and Defence Policy. The First 10 Years, 289. Factsheet on EUPOL COPPS, EEAS 2011.

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partner for the EU with plenty of energy, and its importance in the regional context continues to grow. Although Europeans are perceived better than Americans, even six years after the start of the mission the EU had failed to gain legal acknowledgment from the local population (see the status of mission agreement, SOMA). There are three key reasons behind Iraq’s importance for the EU: 1) Democracy – even with one of the region’s most religious and ethnically complex societies, Iraq has the potential to become the biggest pluralistic democracy in the Arab world; 2) Energy resources – Iraq has the world’s third largest oil reserves and is rich in gas, as well as being a potential supplier to the Nabucco pipeline; and 3) Regional context – stakes are high in this complex region and Iraq’s leverage in it will increase if improvements in security and stability are sustainable, as will its influence, including on Iran.31 Lastly, Afghanistan represents one of the greatest challenges yet faced by the CSDP and by the EU’s range of political and economic instruments, as the conflict situation in the region is extremely complex. It is also the most distant EU mission abroad. The EU is one of the largest aid donors to Afghanistan, and, in addition to fighting a growing insurgency, it also focuses on good governance, institution building, and economic development in a country that is poor, ethnically diverse, and marked by decades of conflict. The EU and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are committed to bringing about a secure, stable, free, prosperous, and democratic country. Political elites argue in favour of deployment in Afghanistan due to the threat from international terrorism; however, after ten years of fighting against Al Qaeda, a clear victory is still proving difficult to attain. Additionally, the civilian CSDP mission, EUPOL Afghanistan, is expected to stay even beyond the process of transition.32 EUPOL Afghanistan (EU Police Mission) is perceived essentially as a mission with aims directed at the future. Looking beyond the accomplishment of establishing security, EUPOL is intended to assist in building a professional civilian force. Within this broad remit, EUPOL activities are designed to support the CSTC-A and the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A).33 EUPOL Afghanistan launched in 31

GSC Document on Iraq 2010. This transition is the process during which Afghan security forces take over control from the ISAF operation. Individual provinces are divided into different phases in which the Afghans become gradually responsible for their own security. The handover is considered a crucial step toward full assumption of control by Afghan forces, scheduled to be completed by the end of 2014. 33 Gross; in Gross and Juncos, EU Conflict and Crisis Management, 127. 32

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2007 following Germany’s lead concerning the police reform, and builds on the efforts of the EU Member States and other international actors in the field of police and the rule of law. On 18 May 2010, the Council of the European Union extended the EUPOL Mission’s mandate for a period of three years, until 31 May 2013. The current mandate of the mission aims at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards. More particularly, the mission monitors, mentors, advises, and trains at the levels of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, the regions, and the provinces. Further, the Mission will support the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police service, which works in accordance with international standards, within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights. Compared to the other CSDP Missions, Afghanistan fulfils the lowest number of assessment criteria. It does not lie within the range of proximity, nor is it highly accepted by the local population. It represents, however, a terrorist threat to the security of most EU countries. As it is stated in the UK national security strategy: We and our allies are supporting the Government of Afghanistan to prevent Afghan territory from again being used by Al Qaeda as a secure base from which to plan attacks on the UK or our allies. Terrorists can also exploit instability in countries like Somalia or Yemen. This instability can spread from one country to another as we saw in the Balkans at the end of the last century. Lawless regions provide a haven for terrorist groups and organised criminal networks alike. 34

Other regions such as southern parts of Africa, South East Asia, and Latin America will comply less with the criteria used for this assessment. Although there are several examples of missions deployed in these other areas, this is largely due to specific interests of one or two Member States, or to political ambitions of Member States. However, these missions are small or medium sized and usually of a short duration. As demonstrated, CSDP actions need to take into account the EU’s geographical focus and geopolitical interests. With 27 member states, the EU covers almost the whole European continent and its foreign actions should therefore stem from this new geographical reality. Individual member states must look beyond their own national interests and encompass the European perspective. 34

A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, October 2010.

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The priority areas for future CSDP actions should be based on the criteria that were set out in this paper: proximity, strategic objective, and acceptance by the local population. Primary geographical areas for future CSDP missions stemming from these criteria should include the Western Balkans and the Eastern Neighbourhood, due in particular to their immediate proximity to the EU. Kosovo should remain a priority CSDP mission as long as necessary. The EU, however, must prove its ability to tackle the instability in the region through the use of EU tools and not only through KFOR and the US. If the EU fulfils its role as a facilitator of political dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade, the CSDP mission will be able to attain an effective impact on the rule of law, which is crucial for EU’s fight against organised crime. Georgia and the South Caucasus should remain the second key priority. This is not only due to the importance of proximity and resources, but also because the population sees the EU as the model for its future. In the crisis situation in this region the EU showed a remarkable unity of action and determination; indeed, the record speed of its implementation proved the Union’s capability to react quickly in a situation of serious crisis, provided that sufficient political will and strong leadership exist. The Mission quickly delivered on its first and most prominent task, the stabilisation of the situation after the war. Thus, it represents a success for the CSDP. The Middle East and Southern Neighbourhood are also of great strategic importance for the EU. However, acceptance by local populations in these areas is, due to political reasons, ambiguous and their perception of the EU needs to be improved. If the current conditions on the Rafah crossing do not allow re-activation of EUBAM Rafah then it is high time for the EU to close it. The wasting of resources cannot last forever and, due to the economic crisis that has spread throughout Europe, maintenance of a dormant mission is questionable. Iraq is EU’s strategic partner with plenty of energy resources and its impact in the regional context makes it very significant. Despite the fact that Iraqis view the Europeans more favourably than the Americans, EUJUST LEX Iraq has so far not been successful in attaining the legal confirmation of local acceptance (e.g. SOMA) by the Government nor by the Parliament. Finally, Afghanistan constitutes, and will continue to constitute, a terrorist threat unless rule of law and stability are fully established. Although it fulfils the smallest number of assessment criteria as it lies not within close range of proximity, nor is it highly accepted by the local population, Afghanistan represents a terrorist threat to most EU countries.

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Therefore, if CSDP activities are enhanced in these four areas the EU will manage to become a respected and effective actor in global politics. The Arab spring in particular has opened a window of opportunity for the EU to prove its readiness to support these countries, i.e. Libya or Tunisia, in their transition process. Otherwise there is a risk that, due to economic difficulties, it will become a powerless and toothless organisation that is constrained by the power struggles of individual Member States.

Works Cited Asseburg, M. and R. Kempin, eds. “The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations.” SWP Research Paper (Stiftung Wissenshcaft und Politik). Berlin: German Institute for International Security Affairs, 2009. Baar, V. Národy na prahu 21. století: Emancipace nebo nacionalismus? Ostrava: Tilia, 2001. British National Security Strategy. Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: National Security Strategy. HM Government, 2010. [quoted 2011-07-24]. Available at WWW: Brzezinski, Z. “A Geostrategy for Euroasia”. Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997): 52-64. Bulut, E.A., ed. “European involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” Chaillot Papers. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2010. Buzan, B.; Waever, O.; and J. De Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. Buzan, B. and O. Waever. Regions and Powers: The Structures of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. CFSP Report. Common Foreign and Security Report. Brussels: General Council of Secretariat of the European Union, 2010. Civilian Headline Goal. 2010. Approved by the ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference and noted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 19 November 2007. (Doc. 14823/07) Consolidated Civilian Headline Goal. 2008. Approved by the Brussels European Council on 17 December 2004 (doc.15863/04). Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. Official Journal L 42/92, 16 February 2008.

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Council Joint Action 2008/123/CFSP of 4 February 2008 appointing a EUSR in Kosovo. Official Journal L 42/88, 16 February 2008. Council Joint Action 2005/143/CFSP of 17 February 2005 on the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Council of the European Union. Council Joint Action of 9 September 2005 on the EU Monitoring Mision in Aceh (Indonesia) (AMM) (2005/643/CFSP). Council of the European Union, 2005. Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia. EUMM Georgia, 2008. “CSDP Handbook.” ESDC Monograph. Vienna: EEAS, 2010. EEAS Official Website. European External Action Service. 2011. [quoted 2011-07-20]. Available at WWW: . ESS. “A secure Europe in a better world”. European Union’s Security Strategy, 2003. [quoted 2006-01-6]. Available at WWW: . Factsheets of the EU Civilian Mission. European External Action Service – EU Operations – Factsheets. [quoted 2011-08-29]. Available at WWW: . Factsheets on EU civilian missions. EEAS website. [quoted 2011-08-23]. Available at WWW: . General Council Secretariat (GSC). “Food for Thought Paper on Iraq.” 12 May 2010. Grevi, G.; Helly, D. and D. Keohane. European Security and Defence Policy. The first 10 Years. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009. Gross, E. and A.E. Juncos, eds. EU Conflict and Crisis Management. London and New York: Routledge Tailor and Francis Group, 2011. Hnízdo, B. Mezinárodní perspektivy politických regionĤ. Prague: Institut pro stĜedoevropskou kulturu a politiku, 1995. ICG Report (2005). Bosnia’s stalled police reform: no progress, no EU. Europe Report no. 164- 6 September 2005. International Crisis Group. ICG Policy Briefing. “Bosnia: State Institutions under Attack.” International Crisis Group, 2011. ICG Update Briefing. “Georgia-Russia: Learn to Live like Neighbours.” Briefing no. 65. Tbilisi, Moscow, Istanbul, Brussels: ICG, 8/8/2011.

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Lindstrom, G. “Headline Goal.” Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2005. [quoted 2006-01-22]. Available at WWW: . Lynch, D. “The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU.” Chaillot Paper no. 65. Paris: EU-ISS, December 2003. Mackinder, H. J. “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographical Journal 23, no. 4 (1904): 421-44. Merlingen, M and R. Ostrauskaite, eds. European Security and Defence Policy. An Implementation Perspective. London and New York: Routledge Tailor and Francis Group, 2008. Neuhold, H. “The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Filling the Gap?” DA Favorita Papers no. 4 (2004). Ortega, M., ed. The European Union and the Crisis in the Middle East. Chaillot Paper no. 62, Paris: EU-ISS, 2003. Rogers, J. A New Geography of European Power? Gent: Academia Press and Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, 2011. Rogers, J. and L. Simon. The Status and Location of the Military Installations of the Member States of the EU and Their Potential Role for the European Security and Defense Policy. Brussels: European Parliament, 2009. Six Point Agreement and Implementing Measures. Agreement negotiated by the European Union between Georgia and Russia, 2008. Santa Maria Feira European Council Conclusions, 19 and 20 June 2000. [quoted 2011-08-23]. Available at WWW: . Second Implementation Report on the Plan for Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan. EEAS, 18/11/2010. Tansey, O. “Kosovo: Independence and Tutelage.” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 2 (April 2009). UN Security Council. “Report of the SG on UNMIK – S/2008/354”, 12 June 2008. Van Ham, P. “Europe’s Common Defence Policy: Implication for Transatlantic Relations.” Security Dialogue 31, no. 2 (2000): 215-28.

COLD WATERS, HOT STAKES: SYSTEMIC GEOSTRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ARCTIC TRANSBORDER REGION IRINA VALKO1 Abstract This work offers a two-stage systemic, dynamic, and interdisciplinary analysis of the developments in the Arctic region. The first stage is inductive and descriptive: the essential elements of five geostrategic action spaces are defined; ten possible channels of inter-space affection are illustrated. The second stage of analysis is deductive, analytical, and dynamic: the forces strengthening and weakening the system’s stability are identified, and four “Scenarios for 2040” by Lawson W. Brigham are adjusted to interplay of these forces. Finally, a ‘hybrid’ scenario is offered as the most probable outcome of the future development in the region.

Introduction: Cold Waters, Hot Stakes According to the latest report by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme,2 the Arctic ice cover is diminishing by roughly two per cent each year. This process has been accelerating with time: in 2007 some ice-free areas of the Arctic Ocean were as much as 5°C warmer than the long-term average. On land, the limits of permafrost also indicate a warming trend: most of the region, especially tundra areas, showed an increased plant growth over the period from 1981 to 2005.3 In practice it

1

Mgr. et Mgr. Irina Valko is Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Political Science, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. E-mail: [email protected]. 2 Working Group of the Arctic Council, Oslo (Norway). 3 AMAP, Update on Selected Climate Issues of Concern: Observations, Short lived Climate Forcers, Arctic Carbon Cycle, and Predictive Capability, 3-5.

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means that the Arctic is becoming more accessible from the south, in both political and economic terms. Various scenarios of the scramble for the polar region fuel debates among policy-makers. The stakes are especially high in countries whose territories actually lie within the Arctic Circle. But more than 20 other states (including the United Kingdom, Japan, China and South Korea) indicate readiness to invest in commercialization of the region. If the political and economic tensions become extremely high, the countries could even opt for an open armed conflict over the disputed areas. Some provocative military manoeuvres have already taken place. Unfortunately, statesmen often lack comprehensive and adequate contributions from academia. Until recently, relatively few articles and books have been devoted to polar geostrategy. Even though much has been said and written on the issue of climate change in the region, a systemic, dynamic, and interdisciplinary geopolitical reflection of this process is still missing from the civil scientific agenda.4 So far, there are two main gaps in the knowledge of Arctic geopolitics: first, a still dominant national (i.e. not regional) perspective and, second, little debate over how regional development is facilitated or constrained by security policies and military activities in the region, as “….defining and addressing security from a regional perspective has been a difficult, or even taboo, issue”.5 At the same time, the Arctic region occupies a unique place within the system of international relations. Firstly, together with the Antarctic, it has been a ‘no man's land’ for most of human history and, consequently, it is yet to emerge as an international region. Secondly, it consists of frozen ocean (glaciers) and land (permafrost) – both of which are subject to a significant change of climate due to global warming. Thirdly, the sustained increase in energy prices makes Arctic hydrocarbon reserves more attractive for surveying, mining, and exporting via the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. Finally, several decades ago the strategic role of the region in global politics started to change: while it had been an exclusively military-strategic location within the Cold-War system of international relations, today its ‘attractiveness’ to the global community is more and more defined by its economic potential. The region contains a valuable share of discovered, but still unexploited natural resources – mainly fossil fuels and minerals – that are important not only 4

Strategic analyses are mainly done at the military colleges, usually by applying PMESII, DIME and/or SWOT analysis templates to particular international regions. 5 Einarsson et al., Arctic Human Development Report, 222.

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to the producers of energy resources, but also to the consumers, namely to the European Union. Such developments indicate a high level of regional instability. Tensions arise around various topics, from subregion-specific (such as, until recently, fishing rights in the Barents Sea) to supra-regional (such as denuclearization). This work aims at contributing to geopolitical analysis by: (1) offering its own version of systemic geostrategic analysis by defining the Arctic geostrategic transborder region as a system of five geostrategic action spaces: physical space (S1), military space (S2), economic space (S3), demographic space (S4), and information space (S5); (2) applying a social network analysis to four human-constructed geostrategic spaces (S2-S5); constructing matrices of symmetrical relationships showing intensity for military space (S2), economic space (S3), and demographic space (S4); and merging five geostrategic action spaces into a complex system of inter-space affection; (3) evaluating the forces that strengthen and weaken the system’s stability and offering a possible scenario for the future strategic developments in the region. The work is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the theoretical and methodological considerations behind the research model. Section 3 first defines the Arctic geostrategic transborder region as a system of five action spaces, then merges them into a complex perspective. Section 4 presents forces strengthening and weakening the system’s stability, and embeds them in Lawson W. Brigham’s “Scenarios for 2040”. Section 5 offers a hybrid scenario of the future geopolitical developments in the region and provides directions for further research.

1. Systemic Geostrategic Analysis of International Relations in the Arctic Transborder Region: Theory and Methodology Considering states to be the basic units of analysis is a classical approach to geopolitics. The governments of seven Arctic states are viewed as the nodes, as, in a judicial sense, states are the final decisionmakers. The selection of the links of relationship between the actors follows the same logic: international state-level treaties and agreements are prioritized. The time frame is limited by the beginning of the 21st

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century and the year 2040. Firstly, this research focuses on the present situation. Consequently, subjective geopolitics is not considered, as it is fundamentally interconnected with history. Secondly, there exist approximately 25 major models projecting temperatures in the Arctic, and all of them are fairly consistent for the period up to 2040, but beyond 2040 the projections vary enormously. Therefore, the research is limited by the year 2040. Bordering the Arctic is a task that depends upon the subject of investigation and technical capability. First and foremost, it is the world’s smallest ocean surrounded by islands and mainland that is, so far, frozen for the greater part of the year.6 The region’s northern limit can be defined as the geographic North Pole, but it is of no help in delineating the Arctic southern limit. Specifically, there is the problem of identifying which specific territories of the Arctic states to include in the analysis. Geographers prefer straight-line boundaries, such as parallels of latitude and meridians, and therefore use the Arctic Circle.7 It is an exact delineation that falls on 66° 33' northern latitude, everywhere on the globe at a distance of 2655 km from the North Pole. In practical terms, the delineation of the Arctic is not the primary goal of this work. Therefore the analysis defines the region in a manner that is compatible with studies of other Arctic issues, instead of adopting yet another approach to determine the extent of the region. This work refers to the definition based on the Arctic Circle, which, despite its various shortcomings,8 fulfils two fundamental requirements. Firstly, given the modern change of climate (‘global warming’), this version of delineation is probably the most stable when predicting the future developments in the region.9 Secondly, it is beneficial in terms of empirical data, because specialized Arctic agencies (AMAP, AHDR, UNEP/GRID) produce statistical reports that always consider the area within the Arctic Circle. Consequently, with the exception

6

Hnízdo, Mezinárodní perspektivy politických regionĤ, 57-8. Osherenko and Young, The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities, 11. 8 This definition of the region does not consider atmospheric circulation, faunal distribution, climate change, the tree line, the limits of permafrost, or general isotherm patterns. Therefore, “…it is artificial and irrelevant” – Chaturvedi, The Polar Regions: a Political Geography, 13. 9 During a period of approximately 40 000 years the Arctic Circle's latitude varies with a few degrees. 7

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of Iceland,10 this research considers all states having northern territories within the Arctic Circle: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States (via Alaska). As geopolitical science lacks its own methodological basis, the research design must be imported from other sciences. This work imports systemic approach from political science (the classical version following the logic of Talcott Parsons). The latter treats any contemporary region of the world, including the Arctic, as an open and complex system. It interacts with its surroundings. Both can adapt, and both are affected by the environment. The system is not just a simple sum of subsystems, but a complex organization of subsystem connections. A change in one subsystem ultimately diffuses into others. While some locations gain strategic significance, the other locations lose it. The analysis is divided into two stages. Stage I is static, descriptive and inductive: (a) the Arctic region is presented as a system consisting of five sub-systems; (b) nodes and links within each human-made sub-system are assessed; (c) sub-systems are then combined into a complex perspective in order to provide primary channels of inter-space affection. Stage II is dynamic, analytical and deductive: (a) forces that strengthen and weaken the system’s stability are derived from the performed analysis; (b) four scenarios of the region’s development by 2040 by Lawson Brigham are adjusted to reflect the forces that strengthen and weaken the stability of the Arctic system. As a result, a hybrid scenario of future geopolitical development is offered. In order to adjust systemic methodology to the needs of geopolitics, three approaches are combined: two from the civil research of the contemporary French school and one from military research of the Kansas School of Advanced Military Studies. Gerard Dussouy’s ‘Global Interpretation Method of the World’ (2010) is a recent attempt to produce a systemic geopolitical analysis that has provoked wide academic discussion. The idea is that ...no two-dimensional map can capture the multi-scalar intersection of physical, demographic, strategic, socio-economic, and cultural-ideological forces at work in the geopolitical arena; instead, we need to think in terms

10

Grimsey Island is the only territory of Iceland that is located on the Arctic Circle. It is only 5,3 sq km with population around 100. Therefore Iceland is excluded from the analysis.

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of the interaction of all these things in different places and under varying circumstances.11

This approach adheres to the theory of German hermeneutics: strategies are placed into a context which always has a structure – “nothing is given, everything is built”.12 Without attempting to produce a general theory, Dussouy presents a “...methodology for gathering data that can serve as the basis for an empiric-inductive theory”.13 Dussouy breaks down the global system into five distinct geopolitical action spaces: physical, natural space (C1); demo-political space (C2); diplomatic-military space (C3); socio-economic space dealing with globalization (C4); symbolic, idealistic and cultural space (C5) – see Figure 4-1. C1-C4 form the system’s objective structure and C5 is the system’s subjective component. In order to discover the transforming tendencies, each space is subject to a spatial analysis capable of extracting structural logic and the obstacles it has to face.14 Dussouy presents a systemic approach without offering any hint of how to construct individual action spaces. In contrast, Guyla Csurgai offers individual objective and subjective components of a geopolitical system. Elements of physical geography, natural resources, boundaries, ethnic composition/demography, socio-economic factors, and strategies of actors are the objective elements; while identity, geopolitical representations (so-called ‘mental maps’), and history are the subjective elements of the system.15 However, Csurgai does not offer any subsequent systematization of these numerous factors. Finally, the U.S. Army Major Niave F. Knell16 performs a net operational assessment of the Arctic region. He combines three strategic frameworks. The first is PMESII. It considers political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information subsystems of the region, which are analyzed separately as parts of a complex, open geopolitical system. Then, in order to answer the question of whether the Arctic is to reemerge as a strategic location, the author refers to DIME (diplomacy, information, military, and economic), and SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) approaches.17 However, the work 11

Murphy, “Gerard Dussouy’s Systemic Geopolitics”, 151. Original quote from Bachelard 1934. 13 Cohen, “Evaluating Systemic Geopolitics – A Twenty-First Century View”, 163. 14 Dussouy, “Systemic Geopolitics: A Global Interpretation Method of the World”, 143. 15 Csurgai, “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis”, 51. 16 The 22nd U. S. Military Police Battalion (CID). 17 Knell, Reemergence of the Arctic as a Strategic Location, 10-1. 12

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solves exclusively the case of the United States; therefore a more regional perspective remains missing. Figure 4-1: Dussouy’s ‘Global Interpretation Method of the World’18

Five geostrategic action spaces are constructed for the Arctic region: physical space (S1), military space (S2), economic space (S3), demographic space (S4), and information space (S5) – see Figure 4-2. This selection incorporates elements of the three approaches of Dussouy (2010), Csurgai (2009) and Knell (2008). In order to achieve maximum objectivity, potential intangible elements of the system19 are intentionally omitted in this work. Diplomacy/international law and infrastructure variables cannot be categorized separately as they serve as primary links within humanconstructed action spaces. Consequently, they are mentioned for each space. 18 19

Ibid. E.g. Dussouy’s “symbolic space” consisting of geopolitical representations.

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Figure 4-2: The Arctic Region as a System of Five Geostrategic Action Spaces

S1: Physical space. Dussouy (2010) and Csurgai (2009) stress that location, size, physical shape, distribution of territory, climatic conditions and deposits of natural resources are all factors of physical geography that should be considered in any geostrategic analysis, because they have “...a major impact on geopolitics in periods of peace as well as in war”.20 These are constant conditions21 that define, together with other factors, the strategic balance in a given international region, as “…states can elaborate efficient strategies to seize the opportunities provided by favourable geographic factors and reduce the vulnerabilities caused by certain geographic constraints”.22 S2: Military space. Traditionally, the international military balance enjoys a primary role in geostrategic analysis, via “...the use of spatial dimensions in the logic of armed conflict, the application of geographic reasoning in the conduct of war and in the organization of the disposition of national defense”.23 Similar to the case of economic integration, regional military cooperation is also an imprescriptible element of 20

Csurgai, “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis”, 52. Due to a continuing melting of the Arctic ice, even though elements of the natural space may seem relatively constant in comparison to other, humanconstructed elements (e.g. economic, demographic); they are still in a state of flux. 22 Csurgai, “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis”, 54. 23 Csurgai, “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis”, 81. 21

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geostrategic research, as it allows for predicting the main ‘practical’ sources of conflict or cooperation.24 The following national security elements are relevant to geostrategic analysis: the availability of conventional and non-conventional (i.e. nuclear) weapons, elements of national defence (satellites, radars and missiles), air force, ground forces, naval bases, coast guards, and even indigenous forces. S3: Economic space. Dussouy (2010), Csurgai (2009), and Knell (2008) agree that a state’s capacity to project power also depends on its economic potential. Without national material wealth, a state cannot maintain an effective political and military strategy. The recent rise of geoeconomics as a distinct branch of political science evidences that a comprehensive theoretical and methodological reflection of economic globalization is about to be formed.25 As globalization accelerates, using geo-economic strategies to achieve a state’s international goals (e.g. to enlarging zones of influence) can be even more efficient than the use of military force.26 Several branches of economic science27 should be integrated into geostrategic analysis, and the following economic factors should be considered: the region’s wealth, centre-periphery economic disparity, the level of industrial development, the sector and spatial distribution of economic activities, bilateral trade flows (exports/imports), taxation, specifics of the labour force, the legal business environment, and the inflow of foreign direct investments. The ‘depth’ of regional economic integration is a powerful indicator of a state’s adherence to cooperation because it implies a certain level of common institutionalization. 28 S4: Demographic space. Globalization is not an exclusive economic matter. It is also a demographic process that can provoke interstate migration flows, lead to social unrest, and even cause the outbreak of a secessionist movement.29 Because there are two primary conditions for a state's sovereignty – territory and population – the role of the latter is truly

24

Knell, Reemergence of the Arctic as a Strategic Location, 21. See Kochetov 2010. 26 Csurgai, “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis”, 75. 27 Macroeconomics and international political economy – Csurgai, “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis”, 76. 28 Counting from the ‘shallowest’ to the ‘deepest’ form of interstate integration: regionalization, regional forum, state-supported regional integration, free trade area, customs union, common market, monetary union, economic union, and political union – Cihelková et al., Nový regionalismus: teorie a pĜípadová studie (Evropská unie), 13. 29 Csurgai, “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis”, 76-7. 25

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strategic.30 Neither strategy can be realized without an adequately educated population. Interstate social movements and incentives may lead to either cooperation or conflict, or both, depending on the goals of policymakers. Thus, the following factors are important in geostrategic analysis: the ethnic composition, natural growth rate, and life expectancy of the population; the level of unemployment, social exclusion, and percentage of displaced persons; literacy rates, the availability and technical equipment of educational and medical institutions, and available instruments of the welfare system. S5: Information space. Given the ongoing progress in information technology, it is evident that the availability and technological intensiveness of information plays a strategic role in a state’s politics despite the fact that, in contrast to other forms of strategic power (sea, land, air, or space), information space does not have its own physical environment, except physical assets – satellites, cables, and computers. Nevertheless, various forms of strategic power can be projected through and within this distinct environment. And, because weapons (e.g. malicious software) can also flow through the infosphere, this “fifth dimension” has “enormous economic, social, political, and military relevance”.31 Consequently, the availability of Internet access, percentage of main landline and cellular phone users, and the existence of local newspapers, radio or television stations should be incorporated into the research. In order to discover the strategic organization within four humanconstructed geostrategic action spaces (S2-S5), the work refers to the methodology of social network analysis – a technique that allows a systemic characterization of the patterns of exchange among the key actors within a given system.32 A social network is a “group of actors – people, institutions, governments – who are linked together by some common actions, common membership, shared communication, or some other form of exchange”.33 Nodes are the Arctic states; and relationships are regional integration frameworks that connect the Arctic states (i.e. participation in certain international institutions). A most common unit of social network analysis is a dyad: a pair of nodes and a possible relationship between

30

See Jackson 2007. Lonsdale, “Information Power: Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Fifth Dimension”, 139. 32 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 17. 33 Mahheim, Rich, Willnat and Brians, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science, 218. 31

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them. This is especially relevant to the realm of international politics, where the legal framework operates on the principle of reciprocity.34 Figure 4-3: A Standardized Matrix of Symmetrical Relationships Showing Intensity

Node A Node B Node C

Node A

Node B

Node C

0

Į

ȕ

0

Ȗ 0

“Type Į”: no relationship (A ŀ B) “Type ȕ”: one-channel reciprocal relationship (A ŀ C) “Type Ȗ”: two-channel reciprocal relationship (B ŀ C) Figure 4-3 illustrates a standardized matrix of symmetrical relationships showing differentiated intensity that had been worked out for each of four human-constructed action spaces: while alpha illustrates a non-existent relationship between the nodes (e.g. Russia not being a member of NATO), beta shows one-channel relationship between the nodes (e.g. the Arctic states being connected only via OSCE); and gamma demonstrates two-channel relationship between the Arctic states (e.g. simultaneous participation in the EU and the WTO).

2. The Arctic Region as a System of Five Geostrategic Action Spaces Knell points to the fact that “…any purely linear approach to the Arctic would be doomed, because it would not recognize the complexity of any one action… It is then necessary to study the system’s dynamic interaction of parts”.35 This research distinguishes between the essentials of five distinct geostrategic action spaces of the Arctic region, and then presents ten primary channels of inter-space affection.

34

Benefits/penalties that are granted by one state to the citizens or legal entities of another, should be returned in kind. 35 Knell, Reemergence of the Arctic as a Strategic Location, 8.

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2.1 The Essentials of the Arctic Geostrategic Action Spaces The Arctic physical space (S1) is defined by the presence of the ice cap that is now melting; diverse relief and climate; and unequal distribution of natural resources. The Arctic military space (S2) can be characterized by the buffer position between the main nuclear rivals of the Cold War, the US and Russia; the legacy of bipolarity in the form of excessive nuclear arsenals; the Arctic states being the only nodes, with no room for other actors; and the varying intensity of the relationships between the nodes. The Arctic economic space (S3) is defined by simultaneous existence of two economies, the subsistence economy of the indigenous population and the global economy searching for new energy extraction opportunities; strong influence of an external actor, the EU; disparity in economic development and internal linkages; and, finally, disparity in the intensity of linkages between the nodes. The Arctic demographic space (S4) can be characterized by the existence of two social worlds, indigenous and modern; strong influence of an external actor, the EU; disparity in the level of social inclusion; indigenous and non-indigenous agglomerations being the nodes; and disparity in intensity linkages between these agglomerations. Finally, the Arctic information space (S5) is defined by a sparse population disconnect; reliance mainly on cellular phone capabilities; and Scandinavian strength contrasted to Russian backwardness.

2.2 Ten Primary Channels of Inter-Space Affection The five geostrategic action spaces (S1-S5) do not exist in a vacuum. Apart from being influenced by their surroundings (i.e. by external players/domestic politics), they are also constantly influenced by each other, and the effects are non-linear. Ten possible channels of inter-space affection are illustrated in Figure 4-4.36 It is obvious that humanconstructed spaces (S2-S5) are not capable of shaping the physical space.37 In contrast, certain elements of the physical environment determine the overall shape and internal organization of the human-made spaces (S2-S5). In his book on the history of the wealth and poverty of nations, Harvard 36

These are only primary channels of inter-space effects. Less obvious links of systemic interdependence exist between the five Arctic geostrategic spaces, as well as secondary, tertiary and higher-order derivative effects. 37 Even though there is a widely-accepted opinion that the current process of climate change is primarily caused by human activities; it is still not the result of developments within the Arctic region (S2-S5).

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professor David Landes38 highlights how physical conditions in the tropics represent significant barriers to economic development. He did not consider the Polar Regions; but the Arctic physical space can be generally seen as an even bigger challenge to livelihood than the tropics.39 Figure 4-4: Ten Primary Channels of Inter-Space Affection

38 39

See Landes 1998. Glomsrod and Aslaksen, The Economy of the North, 41.

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First, the buffer position of the Arctic region implies a high level of militarization, as Russia and the NATO members still perceive each other with a certain suspicion. Despite the transitive tendencies of the region (e.g. the ice cover melt), the location effect is constant, as the distance between the Arctic states is fixed. Besides, as Arctic climatic conditions are harsh, the utility of using different types of weaponry varies. The region’s ice cover is a direct challenge to the ability of Arctic states to deploy ground forces and military infrastructure effectively. With the exception of Sweden, where limited polar-guerilla training is realized, all other states rely ultimately on the means of air and naval power, with ballistic missiles (positioned in strategic bombers/submarines and equipped with nuclear weapons) remaining the most reliable means of power projection. Second, the Arctic physical space presents a number of hazards40 to economic activity on land and in the waters near the coastlines and around the islands. The presence of natural resources establishes two economies: subsistence and global. The former, serving to satisfy the basic needs of indigenous inhabitants, depends on regional bio-diversity, which is, in turn, defined by climate. The latter is challenged by the high costs of Arctic drilling. The unequal distribution of natural resources defines the sector distribution of Arctic economies: it allows some countries to benefit more from the extraction, production and transit of oil, gas and minerals (Canada, Russia, the United States); while others are based on fishing (Greenland) or services (Nordic countries). Third, the region’s physical environment shapes the lifestyle of indigenous and non-indigenous inhabitants. The seasonal movements of reindeer/caribou and sea mammals directly affect the level of food supply and distribution of material flows within the indigenous community. Being less dependent on the local ecosystem, non-indigenous agglomerations still suffer from seasonal climatic changes. In winter, when energy consumption is at its maximum, some social services become unaffordable41 to low-income population groups, and, during snowstorms, the more remote settlements are disconnected from the social services of larger agglomerations.

40

Among others, travelling by icy sea is particularly difficult, as the nonicebreaker vessel can crash due to strong winds, or it can become trapped in ice several meters-deep – Dowdeswell and Hambrey, Islands of the Arctic, 139. 41 Some private hospitals, legal services, kindergartens and schools raise the tariffs during 6 months of the Arctic Winter – Ahlenius et al., Vital Arctic Graphics: People and Global Heritage on our Last Wild Shores, 34-8.

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Fourth, the Arctic information space is affected by the physical environment. Due to challenging climatic conditions, surface communication lines are limited. In terms of general connectivity, countries with mild maritime climates (Nordic states, Alaska, Eastern Greenland) are more advanced than those with a harsh continental climate (Russia, Canada, Western Greenland). Due to the existence of a deep basin, it is not technically possible to run submarine communication lines on the ocean floor through the entire North Pole. In fact, despite certain limitedness in the cloudy areas, satellites remain the only effective means of broadcasting. Fifth, the intensive military use of the Arctic during the Cold War makes its modern inhabitants face the danger of nuclear waste. All Russian Arctic agglomerations with populations above 200,000 people (Murmansk, Archangelsk, Novodvinsk, Severomorsk, Novy Urengoi) suffer from radioactive materials buried below the surface of the adjacent Novaya Zemlya – the result of a total of 132 nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union between 1955 and 1990.42 The United States has also carried out some nuclear tests on Amchitka Island (Aleutians), and trace radioactive materials were placed in locations around the site. The toxic waste spreads throughout the region and further pressures the Arctic states’ social welfare systems. Sixth, the gradually expanding economic space seeks constant military justification of the national sovereignty rights of all Arctic states, since the latter is the primary means of the manifestation of political power. The ongoing militarization of the resource-rich Arctic regions of Canada, Russia, and the United States follows the pattern of the increasing economic presence of these countries in the region. The synergy of economic power and military power is visible in all Arctic states’ regional strategies, as all of them stress that a continued military presence in the region is essential for securing their national interests. Seventh, the economic space affects the demographic space. The existence of two economies (subsistence and global) implies the presence of two social systems (indigenous and modern). Moreover, the difference between the two economic systems reflects more or less accurately the difference between the two social systems. The earnings of people who participate in the global economy are many times higher than those in the subsistence economy. Consequently, levels of social inclusion are also different.

42

Sale, The Arctic: The Complete Story, 604.

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Eighth, the Arctic information space affects the economic space. The availability of internet and an adequate supply of financial and postal services lead to significant trade formation. The gravity model of trade says that a greater distance between two countries reduces their bilateral trade.43 The availability of information technologies has the potential to reduce this distance, as even remote areas can participate in the exchange of goods and services.44 Hence, trade is promoted by technological advancement (e.g. Nordic states), and slowed by technological backwardness (e.g. Russia). Ninth, the information space influences the military space. The advancement of information technology allows greater mobility for the Arctic states’ national security forces. Communication may, at least partially, compensate for the technical military limitations posed by the vast size of Arctic territories and its harsh climatic conditions. For instance, due to this inter-space relationship, Russia and the European Union have been developing the Glonass and Galileo projects. Their goal is to achieve ‘information sovereignty’ from the American GPS. This virtual sovereignty automatically implies real military independence. Tenth, the information space affects the demographic space. The Arctic states rely on several satellite systems to transmit digital television and radio, and to provide the regional communities with broadband internet access, which stimulates the acceleration of the process of social inclusion among indigenous and non-indigenous populations.45

3. The System’s Dynamics An assessment of the individual components of the Arctic transborder region has demonstrated that the region’s five geostrategic spaces (S1-S5) are not autonomous. On the contrary, they are constantly affected by each other and by the system’s surroundings. This section aims at demonstrating that these spaces are not static. In fact, given the transitive nature of the region, the five geostrategic spaces (S1-S5) are in constant flux, in terms of both the physical environment and human activity. In other words, the system is dynamic. So far, “…[it] is at a fork in the road between its two potential directions”.46 It can either become an area of conflict over the 43

Volbert, Melitz, and Von Furstenberg, Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial Development, and Stability, 12, 69. 44 Online services, e.g. virtual degree programs offered by real universities. 45 The inhabitants of remote settlements use the internet to shop and receive financial and social services. 46 Knell, Reemergence of the Arctic as a Strategic Location, 65.

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quest for vast natural resources and disputed territories, or an area of cooperation, with states securing their national interests within the scope of international law and regional integration frameworks. The ultimate goal of this section is to predict which scenario will prevail in the future. Prior to the prediction itself, the forces that strengthen and weaken the system’s stability are demonstrated. Then, Lawson W. Brigham’s four “Scenarios for 2040” are applied to the interplay of these forces.

3.1 Forces Strengthening and Weakening the System’s Stability There exist three major forces that strengthen the stability of the system. First, apart from the change of climate and the melting of the Arctic ice, certain elements of the physical geography hold the current system together: the lowest atmospheric temperature on Earth due to the highest latitude; the existence of the ‘Arctic day’ and the ‘Arctic night’; the presence of polar lights and sound effects, etc. Despite the potential change of climate, it is unlikely that these characteristics will disappear in the future. Second, the system of international relations is generally stabilized by long-term alliances, but only if the latter are led by an evident player.47 The Arctic system’s nodes do interact with each other via certain institutionalized links. Cold War coalitions are still effective: several Arctic states are members of NATO, NORDCAPS and NORAD. Similarly, the system’s stability is promoted by non-military Cold War alliances – the European common market, EEA, Nordic Council, WTO, or NAFTA. Since at least some Arctic states are connected by strong ties, the system’s stability is strengthened. Finally, the relations between the United States and its allies and Russia started to normalize with the end of the Cold War. New bilateral and multilateral incentives have emerged with the objective of uniting all Arctic states under a common intra-regional framework, e.g. the NATO-Russia Council or BEAC. Although they have, so far, proven to be ‘shallow’ (i.e. missing a decision-making mechanism and not being legally-binding), current limitedness does not imply that they will remain “idle” in future. Even minor attempts at integration strengthen the stability of the Arctic system, as it might gain a greater ability to absorb an internal shock. At the same time, several forces weaken the system’s stability. First, the change of climate affects all physical and human-constructed aspects of the Arctic. This process challenges directly the status quo. Second, territories within the Arctic Circle are not geographically-homogeneous. Some areas 47

Krejþí, Mezinárodní politika, 359.

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are colder; others are cloudier; and some contain certain natural resources which are absent in other regions. In terms of international law, such distribution implies certain discrimination, and some states prefer to push the system into a transition that would, potentially, allow them to acquire a larger share of the region’s natural wealth. This produces a conflict of interests within the system, weakening its stability. Third, the existing border delimitation provides room for the further scramble for the region, as the Arctic states actively explore their northern territories in search of factual justification for their territorial claims: the Northwest Passage, border delimitation in the Beaufort Sea, and Hans Island. The common mechanism for conflict resolution is missing, so the overall system becomes less resistant to internal shock. Fourth, the regional security relations are not balanced. On the one hand, intra-regional security cooperation is still limited to a NATO-Russia dialog. On the other hand, there is a lack of nuclear balance among the Arctic states – while the United States and Russia are nuclear states; Canada, Norway and Denmark are non-nuclear states. The problem extends to the very nature of nuclear non-proliferation measures. In particular, the Non-Proliferation Treaty48 is responsible for a significant ‘imbalance of obligations’: “...the non-nuclear-weapons status is immediate, legally binding and internationally verifiable and enforceable... But the commitment of nuclear-weapons-states to disarm is neither timetabled, nor precise, nor binding”.49 The lack of internal military equilibrium is a great obstacle to the stability of the system. Fifth, over the last 50 years, the process of political consolidation has begun within many indigenous communities. Five of them participate in the official intra-regional dialog via indigenous networks that have Permanent Participant status in the Arctic Council. Recent success in land and cash settlements from their states, as well as a presence in national governments,50 provides an important impetus for further consolidation of the ‘indigenous force’. This process has a high potential to destabilize the current Arctic system. Finally, despite having the most developed and populous northern territory, Russia is somewhat isolated from the rest of the region. After the end of the Cold War, it did not join the Western bloc. It is still true that a bipolar international system is more stable than a multipolar one, but only if both players have equal material capabilities. In the Arctic region, the 48

Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) give up the nuclear option in return for nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapons states (NWS). 49 Thakur, “Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World”, 7. 50 Except Russia.

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capabilities are unequal, unfavorable to Russia and favorable to all other Arctic states. The system’s internal stability is, therefore, weakened.

3.2 Lawson W. Brigham’s “Scenarios for 2040”Adjusted for the Forces Strengthening and Weakening the System’s Stability In 2007 Lawson W. Brigham (University of Alaska) came up with four scenarios of the region’s development by 2040, based on several estimates: global climate change, transportation systems, resource development, indigenous Arctic peoples, regional environmental degradation, the Arctic Council efficiency, and the overall geopolitical issues facing the region.51 The first scenario, “Globalized Frontier”, assumes the region will become an integral part of the global economy, in line with the premises of a free market economy. The second scenario, “Fortress Frontier”, assumes constant tensions in international relations, in the spirit of the classical defensive realism. The third scenario, “Adaptive Frontier”, is a combination of “Globalized Frontier” and “Fortress Frontier”, as the region is assumed to participate in the globalized economy, but to a limited extent and with a slower pace. The fourth scenario, “Equitable Frontier”, reflects greater stress on respecting the environment and on goodwill cooperation among the Arctic states. Professor Brigham does not say which scenario is the most probable. In order to do so, these scenarios should be adjusted to reflect the interplay of the forces strengthening and weakening the system’s stability. The influence of forces strengthening the system’s stability is at its maximum in case of scenario one (“Globalized Frontier”) and scenario two (“Fortress Frontier”), as both predict a reduction in cooperation between the Arctic states in favour of intensified competition. But, despite having the right to exist as a potential “extreme case”, the “Fortress Frontier” scenario is highly improbable. The “Globalized Frontier” scenario is more realistic, but it still contains improbable essentials.52 In contrast, the “Adaptive Frontier” and “Equitable Frontier” scenarios are better suited to the forces strengthening the stability of the Arctic geostrategic system. At the same time, the two ‘optimistic’ scenarios, “Adaptive Frontier” and “Equitable Frontier”, should be adjusted for the forces weakening the system. Since the “Equitable Frontier” scenario, which does not predict any conflict among the Arctic states, is too 51

Brigham, “Thinking about the Arctic’s Future: Scenarios for 2040”, 27. Among others, the national regulation of air and marine traffic, and the limited profile of indigenous peoples’ organizations. 52

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idealistic and, therefore, unlikely; “Adaptive Frontier” scenario is more probable.

4. Conclusion What shape will the region have in 30 years? Although there is always the possibility of an unpredictable change, a ‘rough’ estimation might come out of Lawson W. Brigham’s four scenarios. The “Fortress Frontier” and “Equitable Frontier” scenarios are not realistic, as the former is too pessimistic and the latter is too optimistic. Taking into consideration the essentials of the five Arctic geostrategic spaces (S1-S5) and the forces strengthening and weakening the system’s stability, a ‘hybrid’ scenario can be constructed, based on the following assumptions: -

Competition (conflict) will be the main engine of regional relations, with outside participation restricted to the Arctic states; Regional integration into the global economy will be controlled (limited) and gradual; Economic activities will not yet boom (due to economic, rather than political, reasons)53; The fishing industry rights will be open to the Arctic states; Air and marine traffic will be internationally regulated; Tourism will flourish; The profile of indigenous peoples’ organizations will be high (due to a spill-over effect); The impacts of climate change over the physical and human environments will be dramatic; The Arctic states will assert sovereignty beyond 200 nautical miles from their shores; The Arctic Council will serve as a main dispute resolution mechanism.

The research can be extended in several ways. The study should be enriched by the assessment of the role of external actors, both national and international (e.g. China, the European Union, and the United Nations). Also, secondary, tertiary, and higher order derivative internal links of inter-space affection should be identified and assessed. Then, the Arctic 53

The intensity of economic activities in the region will depend upon the requirements of international trade, but not upon the predominance of social equality agenda among the Arctic states’ politicians.

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states’ strategies should be contrasted via the use of a statistical apparatus, e.g. game theory. Moreover, the subjective side of geopolitics (geopolitical representations, ‘mental maps’) can be added to the objective research, since the former may have a significant influence upon the latter. Finally, the role of supranational, sub-national, and non-state nodes, including the links between them, should also be assessed.

Works Cited Ahlenius, H. et al. Vital Arctic Graphics: People and Global Heritage on our Last Wild Shores. UNEP/GRID Arendal, 2010. [quoted 2010-121]. Available at WWW: . AMAP. Update on Selected Climate Issues of Concern: Observations, Short lived Climate Forcers, Arctic Carbon Cycle, and Predictive Capability. Oslo: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 2009. Brigham, L. “Thinking about the Arctic’s Future: Scenarios for 2040.” The Futurist (09/10 2007): 27-34. [quoted 2011-10-29]. Available at WWW: . Chaturvedi, S. The Polar Regions: a Political Geography. West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 1996. Cihelková, E. et al. Nový regionalismus: teorie a pĜípadová studie (Evropská unie). Prague: C.H.Beck, 2007. Cohen, S. “Evaluating Systemic Geopolitics – A Twenty-First Century View.” Geopolitics 15, no. 1 (2010): 157-64. Csurgai, G. “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis.” In Geopolitics: Schools of Thought, Method of Analysis and Case, edited by G. Csurgai, 48-86. Geneva: Editions de Penthes, 2009. Dowdeswell, J. and M. Hambrey. Islands of the Arctic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Dussouy, G. “Systemic Geopolitics: A Global Interpretation Method of the World.” Geopolitics 15, no. 1 (2010): 133-150. Einarsson, N., et al. Arctic Human Development Report. Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute, 2004. Glomsrod, S. and I. Aslaksen. The Economy of the North. Oslo: Statistics Norway, 2009. Hnízdo, B. Mezinárodní perspektivy politických regionĤ. Prague: Institut pro stĜedoevropskou kulturu a politiku, 1995. Knell, N. Reemergence of the Arctic as a Strategic Location. Fort

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Leavenworth (Kansas): School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2008. [quoted 2011-11-1]. Available at WWW: . Krejþí, O. Mezinárodní politika. Prague: Ekopress, 2007. Lonsdale, D. “Information Power: Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Fifth Dimension.” In Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy, edited by C. Gray and G. Sloan, 137-55. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Manheim, J.; Rich, R.; Willnat, L. and C. Brians. Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006. Murphy, A. “Gerard Dussouy’s Systemic Geopolitics.” Geopolitics 15, no. 1 (2010): 151-6. Osherenko, G. and O. Young. The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Sale, R. The Arctic: The Complete Story. London: Frances Lincoln, 2008. Thakur, R. “Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World.” New Zealand International Review 22, no. 1 (1997): 1+. Volbert, A.; Melitz, J. and G. Von Furstenberg. Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial Development, and Stability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Wasserman, S. and K. Faust. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

THE ARCTIC REGIONAL SYSTEM UNDER EXTERNAL INFLUENCE: THE CASE OF CHINA IRINA VALKO1 Abstract This article aims to answer the question if the presence of China facilitates, disturbs, or has no effect over, the pace of Arctic regionalism. Firstly, the Arctic regional system is defined as sum of five geostrategic action spaces. Secondly, strategic organization of nodes and links, patterns of asymmetry, and the extent of intra- and inter-regional interdependence is identified for each human-constructed action space. The author concludes that China has an ambivalent effect over the region’s military space, an interfering impact over the economic space, a minimal impact over the socio-demographic space, and a beneficial impact over the information space.

1. Introduction The Arctic region is reacting to the gradual change of climate (global warming) with the acceleration of the melting of ice. Studies vary greatly in predicting the year of the first completely ice-free summer in the region, but conclusions are consistent: the geography of water and land within the Arctic Circle will change dramatically over the course of the 21st century. The region has been gradually becoming more accessible from the south (Currie 2007), leading to geostrategic transformations throughout the entire globe (Huebert 2004, Gautam 2011), and turning trans-border relations into a new ‘great polar game’ (Smith and Giles 2007, Fata 2009). The status as an emerging geopolitical “hot spot”2 is fuelled by several factors. Firstly, the gradual opening of two Arctic sea lanes (the Northwest 1

Mgr. et Mgr. Irina Valko is Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Political Science, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. E-mail: [email protected].

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Passage and the Northern Sea Route) promises alterations to the existing patterns of transcontinental maritime commerce transit (Chaturvedi 2012) and, as a result, shifts in the regional balance of power, and changes in the economic and political centers of gravity (Blunden 2012). Secondly, the ongoing discovery of the region’s hydrocarbon and mineral deposits promises changes in the vectors of energy security in many countries (Huebert 2004, Conley and Kraut 2010). Finally, the socio-political implications of the changing physical environment are supposed to be quite dramatic, starting with interruptions in food security for indigenous communities due to the loss of polar animals and fish, and ending with millions of displaced people worldwide, resulting from a rise of mean sea level (Zender 2006, Murphy and Hommel 2012). Despite the fact that the real significance of these factors might be seriously overestimated,3 the evolution of intra-regional strategic relations affects not only the Arctic states,4 but also non-Arctic states. Several political entities5 are active external actors within the Arctic region. They neither possess territories within the Arctic Circle, nor have any judicial right to act as if they did, according to the current configuration of international law.6 As the world’s second largest economy and largest energy consumer, and generating almost half of its Gross Domestic 2

Chapman, Geopolitics: A Guide to the Issues, 56-8. Some authors claim that the Arctic transit routes are not commercially viable due to high insurance premiums, lack of infrastructure, shallow depth of some passages, and harsh weather conditions (Jakobson 2010); while the economic benefits of Arctic oil and natural gas production are seriously constrained by the distribution of natural resources, the cost of their development, and environmental issues associated with this process (Budzik 2009). 4 Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. 5 States, international organizations and regimes, non-state actors. 6 The international legal framework for the Arctic consists of: (1) the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), which defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishes guidelines for the management of marine natural resources and environment protection; (2) the International Maritime Organization Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters (2002), which prescribe concrete technical requirements for navigation in ice-covered waters; and (3) the Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen – Svalbard Treaty (1920), which recognizes the full sovereignty of Norway over the archipelago, grants equal rights to engage in commercial activities on the islands to 14 signatories (including China), and regulates the process of area demilitarization – Sale and Potapov, The Scramble for the Artic: Ownership, Exploitation and Conflict in the Far North, 142-8. 3

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Product from maritime trade,7 China is one of these external actors. The polar region offers China not only new vectors of energy security and shipping routes, but also experience in scientific research, and channels by which to manifest its great power status (Jakobson 2011, Campbell 2012). In particular, China’s interest in buying and constructing large icebreakers points“…to a new strategic front for the ambitious regime in Beijing”.8 The official Chinese strategy for the Arctic has not yet been published, while its actions suggest a cautious “wait-and-see approach”.9 Since 2009, China has demonstrated a continuous intention to turn its ad hoc presence within the Arctic Council into permanent observer status. A number of scientific works have been devoted to either Arctic regional cooperation (Chaturvedi 1996, Henderson 2009, Koivurova 2009, Exner-Pirot 2012) or Chinese interests in the polar region (Johnston 2010, Lasserre 2010, Gautam 2011, Wright 2011, Campbell 2012). However, with the exception of a comprehensive summary of Arctic geopolitics by Knell (2008), a theoretical attempt to combine these issues is still lacking. Numerous textbooks on regionalism (Brinkmann 2000, Cihelková et al. 2007, Stahl 2010) might offer a hint of how to systematically assess the potentially disturbing effects of China on the intensity of material exchange and institutional interdependence in the Arctic region. The following questions remain unanswered: How is the Arctic regional system influenced by China? Does the presence of China facilitate, reduce, or have no effect on, the pace of Arctic regionalism? The analysis is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the theoretical and methodological assumptions behind the study of the relationship between a regional system and its environment, and introduces the model. Section 3 operationalizes the model for the relationship of the Arctic geostrategic action spaces and China. Section 4 sums up the findings and provides the consequent synthesis of the results.

2. The System and the Environment Although systemic modeling first appeared in the natural sciences (biology) it has been successfully applied to many branches of social 7

Chircop, “The Emergence of China as a Polar-Capable State”, 10. McLeary, “The Arctic: China Opens a New Strategic Front”, 2. 9 On the one hand, China does not question the right of the Arctic littoral states to their territorial sea and the 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone. On the other hand, it seems to oppose not only the extended continental shelf territorial claims beyond the zone, but also Canadian and Russian claims to sovereignty over navigation routes through the Arctic region. 8

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sciences, including geopolitics.10 The turning point was clearly in sociology, where Talcott Parsons came up with action theory, wherein politics was understood as a functional sub-system within a society.11 Every social phenomenon was treated as a structured and limited complex of social relations, with both internal and external dynamics.12 The approach also became a powerful methodological tool in the disciplines of political science and international relations, as many scholars believe that it is relatively “neutral”.13 Some authors even claim that, in fact, it is the best approach ever imagined when comparing heterogeneous political systems (Berg-Schlosser and Stammen 2000). The relationship between the system and the wider environment can be viewed from several perspectives. First, a valuable attempt to produce a formal model for the external influence over a political system belongs to David Easton. His theoretical model for approaching the study of political life refers to behaviorist logic.14 The author identifies four fundamental attributes of any political system. The first consists of strictly defined fundamental elements (actors) of the system, and also its boundaries, defined in the same sense as the boundaries of a physical system.15 The second attribute is the presence of certain inputs (demands and support), outputs (decisions and policies), and feedback – the means of understanding how the system and its environment interact with, and affect, each other. The third attribute of a political system is a non-zero structural differentiation: only if outputs are different from inputs can the system truly operate. The final characteristic of a political system is the advancement of intra-regional integration process. Despite the immediate popularity (some authors even claim that Easton’s work “…stands as the most imposing theoretical structure yet to emerge from the behavioral movement in political science”),16 the approach is also subject to significant criticism.17 It seems approproate to enrich Easton’s methodology with an 10

Marinchenko, Geopolitika, 24. ěíchová, “Politický systém”, 49. 12 Kubátová, Metodologie sociologie, 94. 13 ěíchová, “Politický systém”, 169. 14 The approach is based on a behaviorist assumption that a political system is clearly separable from the rest of social activity (an ‘environment’), in the spirit of natural sciences research. 15 Easton, “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems”, 385. 16 Miller, “David Easton’s Political Theory”, 184. 17 It has been blamed for being too behavioralist and technical (Gunnell 1993, Badie and Birnbaum 1982) while its stance towards its own object of analysis becomes non- and apolitical (Sorzano 1975). While rational choice theorists criticize it for being logically suspect, conceptually fuzzy, and empirically useless 11

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interdisciplinary perspective. The latter is popular among scholars because it allows, firstly, for a widening of the spectrum of traditional analytic quantitative and qualitative methodology and, secondly, to improve the validity of forecasting.18 Recent attempts to design a rigorous systemic approach to the study of geopolitics belong to the French geopolitical tradition. Since “...no twodimensional map can capture the multi-scalar intersection of physical, demographic, strategic, socio-economic, and cultural-ideological forces at work in the geopolitical arena”,19 Dussouy (2010) proposes to break down the global system into five distinct geopolitical action spaces, each subject to a spatial analysis capable of extracting structural logic and the obstacles it has to face: physical space, demo-political space, diplomatic-military space, and socio-economic space (forming the system’s objective structure), and symbolic, idealistic and cultural space (being the system’s subjective component).20 Csurgai (2009) proposes elements of physical geography, natural resources, identity factors, geopolitical representations, ethnic composition and demography, boundaries, historical factors, socioeconomic factors, and strategies of actors, to be considered.21 The mutual effects between the system and the environment can be approached through the prism of regionalism – a cluster of varied, multidimensional regional cooperation projects bounded by a territorial dimension confined by its member states.22 Telo (2001) identifies eight forms, or “depths”, of regionalism,23 starting with the lowest: (1) regionalization – issue-specific trans-border cooperation; (2) regional forum – non-binding, intergovernmental, and consensus-driven dialogue; (3) state-supported regional integration – preferential trade, political, or (Meehan 1967), theorists of international relations emphasize that the model assumes an effective government beyond a political system, thus it cannot encompass international politics as there is no effective authority at this level (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971). Besides, modern social reality is too complex to be adequately reflected by Easton’s analysis of a political system. External (i.e. non-political) inputs from both the physical and social environments are numerous, and their mutual effects are not linear. 18 Csurgai, “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis”, 48. 19 Murphy, “Gerard Dussouy’s Systemic Geopolitics”, 151. 20 Dussouy, “Systemic Geopolitics: A Global Interpretation Method of the World”, 143. 21 Csurgai, “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis”, 51. 22 Muntschick, “Theorising Regionalism and External Influence: A SituationStructural Approach”, 4. 23 Cihelková, Nový regionalismus: teorie a pĜípadová studie (Evropská unie), 712.

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defense agreement; (4) free trade area – the first level of institutionalized cooperation that removes technical and quantitative barriers to trade; (5) customs union – institutionalized cooperation that removes all internal custom duties but introduces a single external tariff schedule; (6) common market – institutionalized cooperation aimed at the full liberation of trade and harmonization of legislation; (7) monetary union – institutionalized cooperation with fixed-exchange rates or single currency under common monetary policy; (8) economic union – institutionalization with a complete unification of monetary and fiscal policies; and (9) political union – the highest level of institutionalization with complete economic and political integration. These forms represent different degrees of the participants’ interdependence, which implies that the “policies, actions, and returns of one individual state are not isolated events but rather interlaced and a function of the behavior and action of its counterparts”.24 On the basis of cooperation theory and a situation-structural approach, Muntschick (2012) formulates three hypotheses on the impact of intra- and inter-regional interdependencies over the course of regionalism – see table 5-1. Table 5-1: Johannes Muntschick’s Hypotheses on Regionalism and External Influence25 H1 H2

H3

24

The weaker the overall intraregional interdependence is in relation to weak extra-regional interdependence, the less likely it is that the emergence, dynamics and effectiveness of regionalism will occur. The stronger intraregional asymmetric interdependence is in relation to weaker extra-regional asymmetric interdependence, the more a state in a regional power position will influence the emergence, dynamics and effectiveness of regionalism and the less vulnerable it will be to negative external interference. The stronger extra-regional asymmetric interdependence is in relation to weaker intraregional asymmetric interdependence, the more vulnerable the emergence, dynamics and effectiveness of regionalism are to negative external interference and it is less likely that a state in a regional power position will be able to exert influence.

Muntschick, “Theorising Regionalism and External Influence: A SituationStructural Approach”, 20. 25 Ibid.

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2.1 The Model The Arctic is an open and complex regional system. Its southern limit is defined geographically, as all land and water to the north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33' n. l.). The approach is strictly state-centric. The Arctic regional system includes the northern territories26 of eight states – Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States (Alaska). China is an external node. The system can be formally segregated into five sub-systems – geostrategic action spaces: physical space (S1); military space (S2); economic space (S3); sociodemographic space (S4); and information space (S5) – see figure 5-1 below. Figure 5-1: The Arctic Regional System (A) as a Sum of Geostrategic Action Spaces (S1-S5).

Each of the three27 human-constructed spaces (S2-S4) is subject to a two-stage assessment. The first stage of the analysis is based on a generalized methodological template of social network analysis developed by Mahheim, Rich, Willnat and Brians (2006).28 Three fundamental characteristics of a geostrategic action space are: the number of nodes comprising the space, their relative variety, and the degree of their interdependence (La Porte 1975). The approach is mainly state-centric – the governments-in-power of seven29 Arctic states and of China are the nodes – however, non-state, supra- or sub-regional actors are treated as nodes as well, in the case of their significant influence over tangible and intangible trans-border flows. The degree and character of the nodes’ 26

Human activity is concentrated around twenty major agglomerations within the Arctic Circle: Fairbanks (Alaska); Murmansk, Severomorsk, Monchegorsk, Severodvinsk, Kandalaksha, Apatity, Vorkuta, Pechora, Salekhard, Novy Urengoi, Norilsk, Talnah, and Kajerkan (Russia); Tromso and Bodo (Norway); Rovaniemi (Finland); Kiruna (Sweden); Thule (Greenland); and Yellowknife (Canada). 27 This research design does not apply to the Arctic physical space (S1) or information space (S5). 28 Manheim et al., Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science, 218-28. 29 Grimsey Island is the only territory of Iceland that is located north of the Arctic Circle. It is only 5.3 sq km with a population of around 100. Therefore, Iceland is excluded from this analysis.

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interdependence is defined by two factors: (a) the extent of intra-regional material exchange30 and (b) the intensity of institutionalized intra-regional cooperation. Contrasting specific indicators of military, economic, and demographic development, patterns and the extent of intra-space material exchange are discovered. The links of interdependence between the nodes are defined as particular cases of participation of the Arctic states in interstate organizations or regimes which, depending on their form and scope of operation, relate to the Arctic region directly (e.g. the Arctic Council) or indirectly (e.g. the World Trade Organization). International diplomacy is based on the principle of reciprocity, hence the analysis is dyadic – i.e. it focuses on the properties of pair-wise relationships.31 A matrix of symmetrical relationships between the nodes is constructed for the Arctic military, economic and socio-demographic spaces in order to reveal the intensity of the nodes’ intra-regional institutionalized interdependence: ‘non-existent’ integration; one-channel integration; two-channel integration; three- and more-channel integration. The approach is strictly objective – subjective and non-binding links are neglected. The second stage of analysis positions the given spaces within a wider geostrategic environment. The same methodological framework is used to discover the extent of material exchange and to construct seven matrices of symmetrical institutionalized relationships between the system’s nodes and China (one matrix per China-Arctic node link). In order to reveal the relative position of China regarding the nodes of a given space, the intensity of intra- and inter-regional material exchange and institutional interdependence is contrasted both quantitatively32 and qualitatively.33 Next, J. Muntschick’s hypothesis H3 (2012) is tested in order to determine whether the presence of China facilitates, reduces, or produces no effect over the pace of regionalism within a given space. Relying on inductive meta-analysis, inputs from China (i.e. external demands and support) and institutional and material outputs emerging at the sub-systemic level in response (i.e. decisions and policies) are summarized in order to reveal the intensity of pressure China might put on the Arctic space. This allows for (a) the verification of whether the given geostrategic action space is influenced by, or remains indifferent to, the influence of China, and, (b) identification of the potential vectors of affection on macro-systemic level.

30

Including scientific, informational, and technological exchanges. Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 18. 32 Simple comparison. 33 Comparative assessment of forms of regional integration projects according to typology by Telo (2001). 31

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Finally, the synthesis of all action spaces into a complex system allows for a widening of the scope of analysis. The five geostrategic action spaces (S1-S5) do not exist in a vacuum. Apart from being influenced by China, they are also constantly influenced by each other. Changes in one space transform the other spaces, and the effects are non-linear. An evaluation of the responses of certain channels of inter-space effects to the presence of China is included in the research in order to highlight the general modes of stability within the Arctic regional system. Ontologically, the research is holistic and structuralist. It perceives social reality (structure) as a complex system – a purposefully defined non-empty group of nodes, and a group of links between these nodes, wherein the nature and operation of both groups defines the nature and operation of the whole system.34 Epistemologically, the model is rational and explanatory. It belongs to the domain of scientific positivism. By admitting several basic positivist assumptions,35 it perceives international relations in the Arctic region as an objectively measurable reality, which is independent from human consciousness. Additionally, analytical segregation and synthesis is one of the generalized scientific methods whose successfulness is beyond question (Pstružina 2002). The model incorporates both techniques up to the highest level. Firstly, the system is presented as a sum of sub-systems (classification level), complex links of interconnection are identified within these sub-systems (relational level), and, as a result, the fundamental principles of the system’s operation are revealed (genetic level). The procedure of synthesis follows. It reintroduces parts of the system (the sub-systems’ internal components and functions) back into a single unit in a way that makes the resulting theoretical model act according to a previously-given configuration. The latter is realized by selecting specific data among all data obtained from analytical segregation in order to formulate synthetic conclusions.36

34

Molnár, “Úvod do základĤ vČdecké práce: sylabus pro potĜeby semináĜe doktorandĤ”, 10. 35 Particularly, the assumption that international relations can be objectively estimated, that actors are rational, that scientific results are disconnected from the personality and social position of the researcher. 36 Ochrana, Metodologie vČdy: úvod do problému, 21.

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3. The Arctic Regional System under Influence of China 3.1 The Arctic Military Space and the ambivalent Impact of China Until relatively recently, conventional military forces (i.e. ground forces, coast guards) were of little use in the polar climate due to the harsh physical conditions. As the coastal states did not expect a sudden attack via the Arctic Ocean,37 they maintained a minimum military alignment consisting of local soldiers with ‘proper’ equipment (skis and guns). In the mid-20th century, the rise of nuclear technology allowed the main rivals of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union, to utilize the region as the shortest air and maritime route for their nuclear long-range ballistic missiles and submarines. During the first decade of the 21st century, the Arctic military space has inherited the Cold-War configuration. The United States and Russia continue to believe that nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD) are the main mechanisms for maintaining international peace, and therefore routinely deploy nuclear warheads on their strategic submarines that transit the Arctic waters, and still use early warning systems to protect their territories.38 Intraregional network. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty39 implies that the United States and Russia hold the Nuclear State status; while Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are non-nuclear states.40 Equipped with the most destructive weapons, the United States and Russia are therefore more militarily-capable than their non-nuclear Arctic neighbors.41 There exist three main channels of legally-binding intraregional military cooperation: (1) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – a collective defense framework including the United States, Canada, Greenland, and Norway; (2) the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) striving to promote the common military peace support operations of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark; and (3) the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) – a bilateral agreement between the United States and Canada to provide aerospace warning, air sovereignty, and defense for the entire 37

Medieval maritime technologies did not allow vessels to overcome the icy sea. Erickson, Cold War Legacies and New Challenges: the Arctic, 6. 39 In effect since 1970. 40 Zellen, On Thin Ice: the Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty, 21. 41 The United States provides a defensive ‘shield’ to its NATO Allies against a nuclear attack by a third party. 38

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territories of both countries, including the polar regions. Despite being legally non-binding, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the only link connecting Russia with other Arctic nodes. Intra-regional material exchange is relatively high within NATO, NORDCAPS and NORAD (the signatory states conduct joint operations and exercises, i.e. share financial, technical, human and information resources on a regular basis); but low between Russia and all other nodes (only connected by occasional multilateral naval exercises42 in the region). Table 5-2: The Arctic Military Space and China – Matrix of Symmetrical Relationships43

CA

DK

FI NO

DK

FI

NO

RU

SE

US

CN

(*) NATO

(–)

(*) NATO

(–)

(–)

(**) NATO

(–)

(*) NORDC APS

(**) NATO NORDC APS

(*) NORDC APS

NORAD

(*)

(*) NATO

(–)

NORDC APS

(–)

(–)

(*) NORDC APS

(*) NATO

(–)

(–)

(–)

(*) SCO

(–)

(–)

(–)

NORDC APS

(–)

(–)

(*)

RU SE US

(–)

(–): Zero-channel link (‘non-existent integration’) (*): One-channel link (‘shallow integration’) (**): Two-channel link (‘moderate integration’) 42

E.g., the Northern Eagle, 2012 – trilateral naval exercises involving Russia, Norway and the United States held in August 2012 in the Norwegian Sea. 43 CA – Canada; DK – Denmark; FI – Finland; NO – Norway; RU – Russia; SE – Sweden; US – United States; CN – China.

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Table 5-2 illustrates a matrix of symmetrical relationships. The intensity of institutionalized military integration is zero between Canada and Finland, Canada and Russia, Denmark and Russia, Finland and Russia, Norway and Russia, Canada and Sweden, Russia and Sweden, Finland and the United States, Russia and the United States, and Sweden and the United States (OSCE-only). One-channel integration exists between Canada and Denmark, Canada and Norway, Denmark and the United States, Norway and the United States (OSCE and NATO); Denmark and Finland, Finland and Norway, Denmark and Sweden, Finland and Sweden, Norway and Sweden (OSCE and NORDCAPS). Two-channel integration connects Denmark and Norway (OSCE, NATO, and NORDCAPS), and Canada and the United States (OSCE, NATO, and NORAD). The NATO link is a source of intra-regional asymmetric interdependence: in 2012 the United States is estimated to directly contribute 815 billion dollars to the Alliance’s budgets and programs – i.e. 4 times more than Canada, 16 times more than Norway, and 17 times more than Denmark.44 Such massive sponsorship, combined with the world’s largest military expenditures,45 allows the United States alone to act as a major architect of the collective defense framework that connects four Arctic nodes.46 In contrast, Russia’s involvement in intra-regional military interdependence demonstrates the ‘worst’ results among all Arctic nodes – it acts as a balance against the absolute dominance of NATO in the polar region (as in other regions). Inter-regional network. China’s Arctic military profile is, so far, low. In contrast to the Arctic states, it does not possess military installations in the region, nor do its naval and air forces routinely enter the area. Nevertheless, being simultaneously a modern state47 with its own economic growth fundamentally dependent on maritime shipping, China is, potentially, an active external node, even though its current official position in defining the particular terms of future participation in the regional security decision-making process is vague. As “[the] drive to 44

Korb and Hoffman, “What’s Next for NATO? Defining a New Role for the Alliance in a post-Cold War World”, 4. 45 In 2011 the United States’ military expenditure was 711 billion US dollar – 5 times higher than that oChina, which follows the United States in second place for military expenditure (SIPRI Yearbook 2012). 46 According to Article 5 of the NATO Charter, member states agree to provide defense to each other in response to an attack by an external party. 47 i.e. treating military justification as the primary means by which to manifest economic power.

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secure port bases and the deployment of naval forces have historically followed in the wake of the merchant ships”,48 China represents the strategic interests of all non-Arctic states wishing to protect their own vessels on Arctic routes. Nominally, the material exchange between China and the Arctic states is barely above zero. Probably the only institutionalized link between China and the Arctic states is the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) – an intergovernmental mutual-security organization connecting China and Russia, but whose major arena of action lies outside of the Arctic region.49 In contrast, China’s military ties with the United States, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway are limited to the occasional exchange of visits by high-level military leaders, regular security consultations, professional and technical military exchanges, naval fleet tours, United Nations peacekeeping operations, and multilateral talks on arms control and disarmament.50 These intra-regional links are, however, marginal, as they do not necessarily constitute legallybinding agreements. They are therefore classified as ‘non-existent’ integration (zero-link). There is also an indirect link between China and NATO members: China is a member of the United Nations Security Council, and the Alliance operates under UN mandates.51 However, the link’s potential is, so far, too questionable to be taken into consideration. There is no need to construct a matrix of relationships in order to discover that the links of interdependence between China and the Arctic nodes are weak, both materially and institutionally; however, military cooperation with Russia is greater than with the other Arctic nodes. Ambivalent Impact of China. A quantitative comparison of intra- and inter-regional material exchanges and institutional interdependence reveals two facts. Firstly, intra-regional flows of tangible and intangible military resources are greater than those between the Arctic nodes and China. Secondly, the internal military organization between the nodes toward a single center of gravity (i.e. the United States) is disturbed by the outsider position of Russia, which, in turn, is the only Arctic node connected to China via an institutional framework. A qualitative comparison of intraand inter-regional links, configured on the basis of M.Telo’s typology of regionalism, supports this argument: while all existing legally-binding intra-regional links reach the level of state-supported intergovernmental cooperation, the links between the Arctic nodes and China are still on the level of occasional regionalization. Following J. Muntschick’s hypothesis 48

Blunden, “Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route”, 116. The countries conduct joint military operations mainly in Central Asia. 50 EPRC_RB, New Era for China’s Military Diplomacy, 1. 51 Lin, “NATO-China Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges”, 2. 49

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H3, throughout the Arctic military space, intraregional asymmetric interdependence is stronger than asymmetric interdependence with China, therefore states in a regional power position (most probably, the United States and Russia) influence the emergence, dynamics, and effectiveness of regionalism, which is, in turn, less vulnerable to inference from China. In sum, the strategic organization of the Arctic military space (S2) remains unaffected by the presence of China. On the one hand, the impact of China is ambivalent: despite its ambitions to extend its powerprojection capabilities, it does not officially specify its security demands (i.e. inputs) to the Arctic nodes. On the other hand, despite successful military cooperation in other regions of the world, the Arctic states treat China with suspicion, due to its ambitions and“…different interpretations of sovereignty and global commons, [which] drives competing global interests and creates political friction”.52 The Arctic military space thus does not generate appropriate outputs.

3.2 The Arctic Economic Space and the interfering Impact of China The modern Arctic economic space consists of two economies: subsistence and global. The former exhibits features of the least-developed economies, which tend “…to become monocultures oriented toward the supply of raw materials to industries located elsewhere”.53 The latter penetrates the region from the south with the commercial interests of extraction companies in the region’s substantial reserves of hydrocarbons, radioactive elements, base and precious metals and materials. Energy resources and minerals, the main interests of these profit-makers, are subject to the cyclic nature of global trade in hydrocarbons. Profitability of Arctic extraction depends on the worldwide supply and demand of oil. Hence, when oil prices per barrel drop below a certain level, regional economic activity slows down, due not to the Arctic sub-regions themselves, but rather to fluctuations in the global economy. Intraregional network. In contrast to the Arctic military space (S2), the region’s economic space is more open to non-state actors.54 However, despite the vast revenues of multi-national corporations, they are still subject to national sovereignty. Again, the seven jurisdictions of the Arctic 52

Lin, “NATO-China Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges”, 2. Young, Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, 222. 54 Corporations, various lobbyists, etc. 53

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states constitute the ultimate nodes of the Arctic economic space. Five links of varying intensity exist between the Arctic states. Participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), based on the principles of nondiscrimination (consisting of the most-favored nation55 rule (MFN) and the national treatment policy),56 reciprocity, binding and enforceable commitments,57 and transparency, connect all Arctic states. The European Union (EU) links Finland, Sweden, and Denmark58 by a single market with no tariffs or quotas, but with free movement of four factors of production (people, goods, services, and money). The European Economic Area (EEA) allows Norway – a member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) – to participate in the European Union integration processes. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) – a complex free trade regime, which dismantles all visible barriers to trade (tariffs and quotas) – links Canada with the United States. Finally, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and members of the European Union brings partial tariff reduction in goods and services within several sector agreements.59 Table 5-3 illustrates a matrix of symmetrical relationship. There exists one-channel economic integration between Canada and Denmark, Canada and Finland, Canada and Norway, Canada and Russia, Denmark and the United States, Finland and the United States, Norway and Russia, Norway and the United States, Russia and the United States, Sweden and Canada, and between Sweden and the United States. Two-channel integration connects Canada and the United States, Denmark and Russia, Denmark and Finland, Denmark and Norway, Denmark and Sweden, Finland and Russia, Finland and Norway, Finland and Sweden, Sweden and Norway, and Russia and Sweden. All these links are legally-binding for the members; therefore each of them produces a trade-diversion effect against non-members.

55

The MFN rule requires a WTO member to apply the same conditions to all trade with other WTO members (this measure deals with tariffs). 56 Imported goods should be treated no less favorably than domestically produced goods (this measure deals with technical and security barriers to trade). 57 Ability to invoke the WTO dispute settlement procedure. 58 In 1985 Greenland, unlike Denmark, left the European Economic Community (EEC). However, EU law still largely regulates the foreign trade of Greenland. 59 Textile Agreement, Steel Agreement, Science and Technology Agreement, Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Fusion Agreement, Fisheries Cooperation Agreement.

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Table 5-3: The Arctic Economic Space and China – Matrix of Symmetrical Relationships60

CA DK FI NO

DK

FI

NO

RU

SE

US

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

NAFTA

(**) EU WTO

(**) EEA WTO (**) EEA WTO

(**) PCA WTO (**) PCA WTO

(**) EU WTO (**) EU WTO (**) EEA WTO (**) PCA WTO

(*) WTO

RU

SE US

(**) WTO

CN (*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO

(*) WTO (*) WTO

(*): One-channel link (‘shallow integration’) (**): Two-channel link (‘moderate integration’)

The relationships between the nodes are asymmetric. As for material exchanges, intra-regional trade results for 2011 indicate that intra-regional interdependence is the highest between NAFTA and EU member states: the United States (a member of NAFTA) is the European Union’s largest trade partner, while a single European market is the NAFTA’s secondlargest trading partner (after the United States). At the same time, EFTA (including Norway) constitutes only 1.3 percent of NAFTA’s imports, and 1.5 percent of NAFTA’s exports. NAFTA’s interdependence with Russia is even lower: 1.4 percent of its imports originate within, and only 0.6 percent of exports are directed to, the Commonwealth of Independent 60

CA – Canada; DK – Denmark; FI – Finland; NO – Norway; RU – Russia; SE – Sweden; US – United States; CN – China.

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States (CIS). Finally, trade between Russia and the European single market is asymmetrically diverted: the Russian market attracts 12 percent of imports from, and constitutes 7 percent of exports to, the European Union; while 43 percent of Russia’s imports come from the European Union, 49 percent of its exports are destined for the EU.61 Inter-regional network. In addition to the European Union, China is an external node within the Arctic economic space. China’s material and institutionalized ties with the nodes of the Arctic economic space are the most active. Inter-regional material exchanges are asymmetric: they are relatively high and moderately-asymmetric between China and the European Union (as of 2010, China is the EU’s second-largest trading partner; and the EU is China’s largest trading partner), and between China and NAFTA (China is NAFTA’s third-largest trading partner; and NAFTA is China’s largest trading partner), but low and highly asymmetric between China and Russia (China is Russia’s second-largest trading partner; and Russia is China’s eleventh-largest trading partner) and China and Norway (China is Norway’s second-largest trading partner; and Norway is China’s forty-third-largest trading partner).62 Institutionalized links are both multilateral and bilateral. On the one hand, China is a member of the WTO and adherent to the EEC-China Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement. On the other hand, it has a number of bilateral trade agreements with the Arctic nodes; among others, the China-Canada Foreign Direct Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement; the United States-China Agreement on Trade Relations; the Trade Agreement between China and Sweden; the agreement on economic, industrial, scientific and technological co-operation between China and Finland; or a series of sector agreements with Russia – all granting most-favoured nation status. Seven matrices of symmetrical relationships indicate that integration between China and the individual Arctic nodes is symmetrical and one-channel (WTO), as, in legal terms, particular bilateral agreements do not go beyond WTO arrangements. Interfering impact of China. A quantitative assessment of intra- and inter-regional material flows indicates that some Arctic states are more interdependent with China than others: to the European Union (aggregate, including Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and Russia, China is the secondlargest trading partner; to the United States, Canada and Norway – the

61

DG_Trade, “NAFTA: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World”, 1-5; DG_Trade, “Russia: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World”, 5. 62 Ibid.; DG_Trade, “China: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World”, 6; DG_Trade, “Norway: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World”, 6.

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third.63 The trade diversion effect64 is present between each Arctic node and the other Arctic nodes. Intra-regional institutionalized integration is more horizontally advanced than inter-regional: while each Arctic node uses two channels of legally-binding economic integration for interaction with the other Arctic nodes, their connection to China is strictly onechannel. At the same time, according to Telo’s typology, while at least several Arctic nodes are connected by deep regionalism (EU, NAFTA); they indicate shallow regionalism with China (WTO-only). Following J. Muntschick’s hypothesis H3, throughout the Arctic economic space, intraregional asymmetric interdependence is stronger than asymmetric interdependence with China. Therefore, states in a regional power position (the United States; the European Union via Finland, Sweden and Denmark; and Russia) influence the emergence, dynamics and effectiveness of regionalism, which is, in turn, less vulnerable to inference from China. Even though, institutionally, the nodes of the Arctic economic space (S3) have more institutional connections with each other, than with China, patterns of intra- and inter-regional material exchange indicate that the latter has a noticeable interfering effect on the strategic economic organization of the polar region. However, China’s inputs (the growing volume of bilateral trade) remain without appropriate intra-regional institutional outputs. Thus, so far, the Arctic economic space (S3) is disturbed by the presence of China.

3.3 The Arctic Socio-demographic Space and the Minimal Impact of China The Arctic is home to some four million inhabitants. Approximately one third of this population lives in indigenous communities, and two thirds are newcomers.65 Indigenous communities are usually small and remote.66 Their lifestyle is still based on subsistence resources.67 The 63

Ibid.; DG_Trade, “Canada: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World”, 6; DG_Trade, “United States: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World”, 6. 64 Consumption shifts from a lower-cost producer outside the trading bloc to a higher-cost producer within. 65 Ahlenius et al., Vital Arctic Graphics: People and Global Heritage on our Last Wild Shores, 14. 66 Inhabitants with indigenous origin constitute: 20 percent of the total population in Alaska; 10 percent in Arctic Norway; 4 percent in Arctic Finland; 5 percent in Arctic Sweden; 76 percent in Greenland; 85 percent in the Canadian Arctic; and less than 10 percent in the Arctic regions of Russia – Ahlenius et al., Vital Arctic Graphics: People and Global Heritage on our Last Wild Shores, 16-9.

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modern community is not bound to the Arctic ecosystem, but has emerged near the regional centers of economic activity. It consists of settlements of citizens who have been migrating from the southern parts of the Arctic states since the 1950s to conduct research; extract, process, and transport natural resources, as well as provide related private and public services. Intraregional network. The material exchanges within the Arctic sociodemographic action space are limited to routine operation of several projects and programs, which are mainly run by the countries of the European part of the region, namely the Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-Being (NDPHS), the Barents Health Cooperation Program (BHCP), the European Union’s Culture Program (EU_Cul), the EU-US Cooperation in Higher/Vocational Education and Training (CHET), the Program for Cooperation in Higher Education, Training, and Youth (PCHETY), and the Nordplus Programme. Table 5-4 illustrates the fact that there are relatively many social and demographic links between the nodes, but, except for membership in the World Health Organization (WHO), no other legally-binding link connects all Arctic states. Even though all coastal states are permanent members of the Arctic Council (AC), which strives to address social problems faced by both modern society and the indigenous peoples, and other inter-state integration frameworks (e.g. the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Nordic Council), they are intergovernmental fora – the conclusions of these meetings are not legally-binding. Hence, this sole channel of demographic cooperation among all Arctic states is classified as ‘nonexistent’ integration (zero-link). Scandinavian countries are the most integrated into regional socio-demographic relations, in contrast to the United States and Canada, which are the least integrated; and Russia holds the middle position. Inter-regional network. The action space is also affected by nodes from the wider geostrategic environment. The European Union is probably the most active. It has launched two initiatives aimed at improving the health and social well-being of the Arctic indigenous inhabitants: (a) the Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-Being (NDPHS) which is helping the Arctic states to reduce the spread of disease in their northernmost regions, and (b) the Barents Health Cooperation Program (BHCP) which is contributing to the general improvement of the Arctic states’ healthcare systems.68 In contrast, China is an inactive node, as its 67 68

Reindeer/caribou systems and sea mammals. Knell, Reemergence of the Arctic as a Strategic Location, 36.

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Table 5-4: The Arctic Socio-demographic Space and China – Matrix of Symmetrical Relationships.69

CA

DK

FI

DK

FI

(**)

(**)

WHO PCHETY

WHO PCHETY (***) WHO BHCP Nordplus EU_Cul

NO

RU

(*)

(*)

WTO

WHO

SE (**) WHO PCHETY

(***) WHO BHCP Nordplus EU_Cul (***) WHO BHCP Nordplus EU_Cul

(**) WHO BHCP

CN

(*)

(*)

WHO

WHO

(**) WHO CHET

(*) WHO

(***) (**) WHO BHCP (***)

NO

(***) WHO BHCP Nordplus

US

WHO NDPHS BHCP

RU

WHO BHCP Nordplus EU_Cul (***) WHO NDPHS BHCP Nordplus (***) WHO NDPHS BHCP

(**)

WHO

(*)

(*)

WHO

WHO

(*)

(*)

WHO

WHO

(**) SE

US

(*)

WHO CHET

WHO CHET

(*) WHO (*) WHO

(*): One-channel link (‘shallow integration’) (**): Two-channel link (‘moderate integration’) (***): Three- or more-channel link (‘deep integration’)

69

CA – Canada; DK – Denmark; FI – Finland; NO – Norway; RU – Russia; SE – Sweden; US – United States; CN – China.

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material and institutional presence in the demographic space is minimal. It neither runs its own projects for the improvement of living conditions in the region, nor does it have legally-binding connections with the Arctic nodes that allow it to do so. Since there are no inter-regional demographic links with China, construction of the matrix of relationships is unnecessary. Minimal impact of China. So far, China is not interested in Arctic demographic affairs. Despite certain common initiatives,70 material exchanges between the Arctic states and China are minimal, as is the level of immigration beyond the Arctic Circle.71 Even though intra- and interregional institutionalized cooperation are classified as ‘non-existent’ integration, and it is therefore unnecessary to test one of Muntschick’s hypotheses on the overall effect of China on Arctic demographic regionalism, links between the Arctic nodes are greater than links with China. Within M.Telo’s typology of regionalism, the former are at the level of intergovernmental fora72 while the latter have not yet reached the initial level of regionalization. Probably the only significant demand from China on the Arctic states – albeit one which has never been officially voiced out – is the non-recognition of the separatism of certain circumpolar districts (the cases of Canada and Denmark) by the governments of the Arctic states, since “the Chinese government [itself] does not recognize the term indigenous peoples”.73 The sub-system, however, reacts with the ongoing process of self-identification of indigenous communities. Thus, China has no effect over the pace of Arctic socio-demographic regionalism.

70 E.g., the European Commission is co-funding the project Understanding China, which aims to deepen European business and cultural knowledge of China – EC_EuropeAid, “Understanding China”, 1. 71 In contrast to Chinese immigration to non-polar regions of the Arctic states. 72 One of six working groups of the AC, focusing on the living conditions of Arctic residents, allows experts to communicate on a daily basis, to prepare agenda for biannual meetings of ambassadors and senior foreign ministry officials of the Arctic states. The Arctic states’ indigenous communities are linked via participation to indigenous networks that have Permanent Participant (PP) status on the Arctic Council: the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC); the Gwich’in Council International (GCI); the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC); the Saami Council (SAAMI); the Aleut International Association (AIA); and the Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North of the Aleut District of the Kamchatka Region (AIPNADKR). 73 Mikkelsen, The Indigenous World 2012, 253.

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4. Summary and Synthesis This paper has offered a theory-driven systemic geostrategic explanation of the effectiveness and impacts of institutionalized regionalism in the Arctic region, on the basis of the empirical background of intra- and interregional relations with the third actor, China. In order to do so, the Arctic trans-border region was defined as the sum of five distinct geostrategic action spaces; each of those was, in turn, subject to quantitative and qualitative assessment. While China’s influence over the Arctic physical space is unknown, the Arctic economic space is disturbed by China’s inputs, while the military and socio-demographic spaces remain indifferent to the presence of China, and the Arctic informative space benefits from the presence of China. The Arctic geostrategic spaces do not exist in a vacuum. Apart from being influenced by the environment, they are also constantly influenced by each other. A synthesis of the patterns of complex inter-space effects reveals two major tendencies. Firstly, some Arctic states are more influenced by the presence of China than the others, and the effects are unbalanced. While China’s economic interdependence is greater with the members of the EU and NAFTA than with Russia and Norway, China’s military and socio-demographic influence is lowest over Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the United States. Secondly, the growing disparity between the inputs and outputs in the military space is a potential source of tension within the Arctic regional system, as the growing volume of economic exchanges between China and the Arctic states has an interfering impact on the balance of intraregional economic relations. The levels of such tension are expected to depend upon developments within both physical and human-constructed action spaces.

Works Cited Ahlenius, H., et al. Vital Arctic Graphics: People and Global Heritage on our Last Wild Shores. Arendal: GRID-Arendal, 2010. [quoted 201209-27]. Available at WWW: . AMAP. Update on Selected Climate Issues of Concern: Observations, Short-lived Climate Forcers, Arctic Carbon Cycle, and Predictive Capability. Oslo: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 2009. Blunden, M. “Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route.” International Affairs 88, no. 1 (2012): 115-29.

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Cihelková, E. et al. Nový regionalismus: teorie a pĜípadová studie (Evropská unie). Prague: C.H.Beck, 2007. Chapman, B. Geopolitics: A Guide to the Issues. Santa Barbara: ABCCLIO, 2011. Chircop, A. “The Emergence of China as a Polar-Capable State.” Canadian Naval Review 7, no. 1 (2011): 9-14. Csurgai, G. “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis.” In Geopolitics: Schools of Thought, Method of Analysis and Case Studies, edited by G. Csurgai, 48-86. Geneva: Editions de Penthes, 2009. DG_Trade. “NAFTA: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World.” Brussels: European Commission, DG Trade, 2012. [quoted 2012-0929]. Available at WWW:

—. “Russia: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World.” Brussels: European Commission, DG Trade, 2012. [quoted 2012-09-29]. Available at WWW:

—. “China: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World.” Brussels: European Commission, DG Trade, 2012. [quoted 2012-09-29]. Available at WWW:

—. “Norway: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World.” Brussels: European Commission, DG Trade, 2012. [quoted 2012-09-29]. Available at WWW:

—. “Canada: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World.” Brussels: European Commission, DG Trade, 2012. [quoted 2012-09-29]. Available at WWW:

—. “United States: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World.” Brussels: European Commission, DG Trade, 2012. [quoted 2012-0929]. Available at WWW:

Dussouy, G. “Systemic Geopolitics: A Global Interpretation Method of the World.” Geopolitics 15, no. 1 (2010): 133-50.

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Easton, D. “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems.” World Politics 9, no. 3 (1957): 383-400. Ebinger, C. and E. Zambetakis. “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt.” International Affairs 85, no. 6 (2009): 1215-32. EC_EuropeAid. “Understanding China.” Brussels: European Commission, Development & Cooperation – EuropeAid. 2012. [quoted 2012-09-27]. Available at WWW: Erickson, K. Cold War Legacies and New Challenges: the Arctic. New York: The 50th Annual ISA Convention, Feb. 2008. [quoted 2012-0928] Available at WWW: EPRC_RB. New Era for China's Military Diplomacy. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Bulgaria. 2012. [quoted 2012-09-24]. Available at WWW:

Knell, N. Reemergence of the Arctic as a Strategic Location. Fort Leavenworth (Kansas): School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2008. [quoted 2011-11-1]. Available at WWW: Korb, L. and M. Hoffman. “What’s Next for NATO? Defining a New Role for the Alliance in a post-Cold War World.” Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2012. [quoted 2012-9-13]. Available at WWW: Kubátová, H. Metodologie sociologie. Olomouc: Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci, 2006. McLeary, P. “The Arctic: China Opens a New Strategic Front.” Briefing. World Politics Review (2010). [quoted 2012-10-27]. Available at WWW: Lin, C. “NATO-China Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges.” Testimony. Washington, DC: the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012. [quoted 2012-09-25]. Available at WWW:

Manheim, J.; Rich, R.; Willnat, L. and C. Brians. Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006. Marinchenko, A. Geopolitika. Moscow: Infra-M, 2009.

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Mikkelsen, C. The Indigenous World 2012. Copenhagen: the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2012. Miller, E. “David Easton’s Political Theory.” The Political Science Reviewer (1971): 184-235. Molnár, Z. “Úvod do základĤ vČdecké práce: sylabus pro potĜeby semináĜe doktorandĤ.” 2011. [quoted 2012-05-15]. Available at WWW: . Muntschick, J. “Theorising Regionalism and External Influence: A Situation-Structural Approach.” Mainz Papers on International and European Politics. Mainz: Chair of International Relations, Johannes Gutenberg University, 2012. Murphy, A. “Gerard Dussouy’s Systemic Geopolitics.” Geopolitics 15, no. 1 (2010): 151-6. Ochrana, F. Metodologie vČdy: úvod do problému. Praha: Karolinum, 2009. ěíchová, B. “Politický systém.” Úvod do studia politické vČdy, edited by L. CABADA, L., et al., 168-84. PlzeĖ: Aleš ýenČk, 2007. Sale, R. The Arctic: The Complete Story. London: Frances Lincoln, 2008. Sale, R. and E. Potapov. The Scramble for the Artic: Ownership, Exploitation and Conflict in the Far North. London: Frances Lincoln, 2010. Wasserman, S. and K. Faust. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Young, O., et al. Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992. Zellen, B. On Thin Ice: the Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009.

SINO-SAUDI RELATIONS: RELEVANCE FOR UNITED STATES SECURITY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA NORAFIDAH ISMAIL Introductions China develops and sustains a number of strong interests with the Arab Gulf states. These interests include energy, security, economic, trade, and political aspects (Yuan 2010). China and Saudi Arabia celebrated 22 years of having established diplomatic relations in 2012. Some analysts have critically argued that the close relationship between China and Saudi Arabia in this decade has seriously challenged the economic and security interests of the US, a long-standing partner of the Kingdom. The growing concern regarding this perceived threat will be the main focus of this subsection. Key factors in the Sino-Saudi relationship which have been identified are the energy strategy of China, the oil policy of Saudi Arabia and China’s position as a new close friend of the Kingdom. Do these factors present great challenges to Washington-Riyadh relations? Does China pose a threat to American military strategic interests related to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East?

Chinese Energy Strategy The Chinese need for oil and gas has led to the establishment of links with countries or regimes that are rich in energy resources. China’s oil companies constantly seek overseas assets due to a substantial increase in the consumption of oil and the dependency on oil imports. Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) are considered an ‘arm of the government’. Chinese NOCs rely on market signals when it comes to making a decision about investment. State orders, however, can have a subtle influence on this decision (Kevin 2012). The International Energy Agency (IEA) data shows expenses of Chinese NOCs and smaller

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companies on global oil and gas assets. Between 2009 and 2010, 47.6 billion USD was spent for such reasons (Kevin 2012). The huge competitive advantage of Middle Eastern oil producing countries is building an attractive route for China’s energy strategy. From China’s perspective, Saudi Arabia is considerably important for economic reasons: Saudi Arabia is the sole owner of one of the vastest oil reserves in the world, and is a top player in the global energy supply (Al-Tamimi 2012). The Arab Gulf remains the main source of China’s oil imports. Moreover, the Gulf has some other special advantages: it enjoys “a stable market status” and reliable transportation.1 The Arab states are “the only developing countries” placing massive investment in China. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example, have made sizeable investments in China’s downstream businesses (Yuan 2010). Two objectives guide Chinese energy strategy towards the Middle Eastern oil exporting countries: to ensure China’s long-term economic growth and to reduce China’s vulnerability concerning energy.2 In attaining these objectives, China incorporates the element of soft power in its energy strategy; it adopts a diplomatic approach in its oil trade dealings with the producing countries. China frequently calls for a better relationship with these countries and greater political stability in the region. Chinese energy policy could have some significant implications for the world oil market and pose potential threats to other consuming countries. First, China’s pressing need for oil markedly increases the percentage of global oil demand, and therefore has the potential to destabilize the world oil market.3 Second, Chinese energy policy (export strategy) encourages Chinese NOCs to acquire and build up their equity stakes in the operations of oil producing countries. This development led former President Bush to voice Washington's concern in his 2006 National Security Strategy. He criticized China’s policy behaviour, stating, ‘as if they can somehow “lock up” energy supplies around the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up’ (Sanger 2006). China’s strategy and its growing need for oil should not be seen as an energy threat to the US. The notion of China as posing a threat is misleading and overstated. In the view of Wu and Liu, China does not pose a threat since the influence of the US in the energy market remains 1

Yuan, “China’s Strategic Interest in the Gulf and Trilateral Relations among China, the U.S. and Arab”, 24. 2 Fan and Donghai, “China’s Energy Strategy in the Twenty-first Century”, 99. 3 Wu and Liu, “China or the United States: Which Threatens Energy Security?”, 217.

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strong and profound. The US is known for its considerable influence in the energy market, and among oil producing nations of the Middle East, the Gulf and Latin America. Wu and Liu (2007) further argue against a false perception that assesses China as a country that causes instability in the energy market. The contributing factor of the instability (the rising global oil demand and price) is the US oil demand. By referring to the British Petroleum Statistical Review, they go on to argue that between 1995 and 2005 the US oil import grew by 4.42 million bpd, a figure that was considerably larger than China’s oil demand, which accounted for 1.5 million bpd.

The Significance of Saudi Oil Policy Saudi Arabia is ‘the focal point for the global oil market’ due to its ‘oil reserve, oil exports [and] spare oil production capacity’.4 Sadad alHusseini, a former executive of Saudi ARAMCO, stresses a mechanism that the Kingdom has been using in selling its oil. He argues that the Kingdom has been keeping to specific markets, saying, “where you send it is a matter of where you make the best profit”.5 A multilayer investment program in the Saudi energy sector should soon be complete. This would boost the Kingdom’s oil production capacity to 12.5 million bpd (Blanchard 2012). In an article published in 2009, Prince Turki al-Faisal also states that Saudi Arabia has invested USD 100 billion in producing 12.5 million bpd of oil. · The Kingdom is committed to ensuring the stability of the oil supply and oil price: it offsets oil supply losses and prevents the shock of a sharp oil price increases. Prince Turki al-Faisal stresses his country’s capacity to ease critical shortages of global oil supply, saying …today we hold about 4.5 million barrels per day of spare capacity (or more than 90 percent of the global total), enough to replace the second and third-largest OPEC producers overnight if the world needed more oil.6

Saudi oil policy has gained a significant degree of influence over the international oil market. Saudi Arabia has “spare production capacity”, which causes Telhami and Hill to describe the Kingdom as holding a “trump card” (2002). They stress that Saudi Arabia is the only oil 4

Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, 6. Krauss, “U.S. Reliance on Oil From Saudi Arabia Is Growing Again.” 6 Al-Faisal, “Don't be Crude Why Barack Obama's Energy Dependence Talk is Just Demagoguery”, 103. 5

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producing country that has the ability to affect a short-term increase of global oil prices: the Kingdom may boost or maintain the volume of oil supply (Telhami and Hill 2002). Saudi Arabia has the ability to “replace single-handedly, within months, the total loss of exports of any other oil producer on the globe”. The world economy would suffer were there to be a “sudden loss of the Saudi oil network”.7 A political science scholar at the University of Vermont, Gregory Gause, argues that the production capacity of Saudi Arabia is more crucial than “the details of Saudi oil sales”. The Kingdom frequently uses its production capacity to “smooth jolts to world oil prices”, including those occasioned by the strikes in Venezuela in 2002 and the events of September 11, 2001. Gause sees the role of Saudi Arabia in such situations as “the central bank”. The Saudis, moreover, “[are] at a point where there’s precious little surplus capacity” globally.8 Saudi Arabia diversifies its customers and attempts to maintain its foothold in the Asian market. When Asian demand for oil increases, the Saudi crude oil price is also boosted. The Kingdom, therefore, has recently minimized the contract prices to Asian customers because it has to ensure that the price of its oil is competitive. Previously, the price for crude oil supply to Asia was higher than the prices for supplies going to Europe and the US. The higher price was due to the transportation cost. Saudi Arabia is significantly extending its influence as the world’s biggest oil producer and supplier. Saudi ARAMCO has been building refinery facilities in Asia and will encourage Asian countries to import heavy crude grades from the Kingdom. Joint venture refineries in China have also helped strengthen Saudi ARAMCO’s supply chain in Asia. An example is the Saudi ARAMCO, Sinopec, and ExxonMobil joint venture to expand the Fujian refinery project. Saudi refineries in Jubail and Yanbu, which will begin their operations in 2013 and 2014, aim to meet the demands of refined products in the Asian and Middle Eastern markets (Gavin 2010).

Saudi Arabia Finds New Best Friends China offers special political and economic advantages to Arab countries and invests great effort into fostering relations with them. ChinaArab relations are encouraging, since the two sides have zero conflict of fundamental interests (Yuan 2010). The relations are built on the Five 7 8

Jaffe, “United States and the Middle East: Policies and Dilemmas”, 2. Energy Bulletin, 15.09.04.

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Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, promoting the non-intervention principle and supporting the national independence and sovereignty of Arab states. China could support Arab states in preserving or restoring peace through economic performance. Chinese investment could also stimulate and bolster the “stagnant economies” of Arab states (Alterman CSIS). China is fostering its links with countries that it had difficulty forming relationships with during the period of Cold War, as the Cold War prevented such relationship from developing. At the same time, China retains its relations and cooperation with traditional partners. Hongtu (2010) identifies the development of China’s diplomacy as a transformation ‘from “responsive diplomacy” (fanying shi wwaijiao) to “proactive diplomacy” (zhudong shi waijiao)’. China’s policy behaviour and position at the international level have facilitated the development of Sino-Saudi relations. Prince Turki al-Faisal comments on Saudi relations with China: “with China, there is less baggage, there are easier routes to mutual benefits”.9 Lippman assumes that “building consumption” might be one of the factors that has influenced the shift of Saudi attention towards China. Lippman argues that the Saudis “need a good relationship with a country that is a permanent member of the (U.N.) Security Council, is a strong a growing market for our oil, is a nuclear power and...is untainted by having invaded any Arab countries.”10 China’s economic achievement has received considerable attention from Saudi Arabia. Director of Market and Country Strategies at US Consultant PFC Energy, David Kirsch, holds the view that Saudi Arabia has focused its oil trade on China because the Chinese market is experiencing strong development compared to the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD) countries, which are facing a declining demand (Gavin 2010). Mohammad al-Mady also claims that “China is a country that has the greatest market for our products, so there is no politics behind this, it is only straight business”.11 For a decade, Saudi Arabia was one of America’s largest trading partners in West Asia and Africa. In 2011, the trade volume between the two countries was 64.4 billion USD.12

9

Hurriyet Daily News, 21.04.10. Energy Bulletin, 15.09.04. 11 Hurriyet Daily News, 21.04.10. 12 Arab News, 30.09.2012. 10

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Have Sino-Saudi Economic Relations Affected US-Saudi Economic Ties? This sub-section attempts to argue that Sino-Saudi relations currently do not have profound implications for US-Saudi relations, nor do they signify a total shift of Saudi relations from the West to Asia. On the other hand, Beijing-Riyadh relations imply a diversifying of Saudi relations with foreign countries and customers, and a significant expansion of Saudi influence as the key economic player in the international oil market. US-Saudi relations remain strong though there is a close economic link between Saudi Arabia and China. This fact is proven by statistical data on trade between the US and Saudi Arabia and the competitiveness of American firms relative to other foreign companies. The US Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, Francisco J. Sanchez, has stressed the trade improvement between his country and Saudi Arabia, saying, “I am happy to report that our trade for 2010 with Saudi Arabia is up eight percent in the first six months over the same period last year”.13 In 2011, Saudi Arabia was America’s largest trading partner in the Middle East. The US International Trade Administration reported that American imports from the Kingdom in 2011 were 47.5 billion USD (an increase of 16.1 billion USD from 2010 [31.4 billion USD]). Its exports to the latter reached 13.8 billion USD (an increase of 2.2 billion USD from 2010 [11.6 billion USD]). The imports were dominated by Saudi hydrocarbon. The exports, on the other hand, consisted of weapons, machinery and vehicles (Blanchard 2012). Commenting on the competition from India, China and Turkey, Francisco J. Sanchez believes that American firms “still [have] the edge”. He admits the advantages that the US firms have had concerning technological and innovation aspects, and stresses, “I know that American companies are among the most innovative in the world, and so they can bring innovation, the latest technology, in a number of fields”.14 He cites an example of Maaden’s decision to choose Alcoa for the development of an aluminium smelting project in Ras Azwar: Saudi Arabia considered companies from different parts of the world for this project, and it ultimately chose Alcoa, a US company, because of the innovation and because of the state-of-the-art technology that it brought.15

13

Arab News, 11.12.10. Arab News, 11.12.10. 15 Arab News, 11.12.10. 14

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In addition, the Head of Commercial Affairs at the US embassy in Riyadh, Amer Kayani, stresses the enormous contribution of American businesses to Saudi economic development, stating: The United States has engaged in trade with Saudi Arabia since 1945. The two countries have a very, very close relationship. Today, there are tens of thousands of Americans who are living in Saudi Arabia with their families doing business. They represent U.S. companies, work for Saudi companies, or work for multinationals. There are more U.S.-educated PhDs employed by the Saudi government than by our own government.16

The US dependency on Saudi oil cooperation in ensuring a reliable oil supply and a stable and smooth international oil market is high. Arguing that there is no technology at the moment that could help the US replace the oil consumption that supports its “massive manufacturing, transportation, and military needs”, Prince Turki al-Faisal believes that the US has to acknowledge the need for energy interdependence.17 On the contrary, the concept of “energy independence”, he further claims, is “unrealistic, misguided, and ultimately harmful to energy-producing and -consuming countries alike”.18 The Persian Gulf issue is likely to generate American demand for Saudi oil. As of November 21, 2012, the US Energy Information Administration reported that Saudi Arabia was the third largest exporter of crude oil to the US. Canada and Venezuela were the first and the second largest sources of American crude oil imports (Blanchard 2012). In 2012, American import of Saudi oil was escalating, with more than 20 per cent recorded.19 Among the compelling reasons for escalation was the imposition of sanctions against Iran due to its nuclear program. Strengthening these sanctions slowed down the Iranians’ ability to sell their crude oil. To ensure a relatively stable oil price, Saudi Arabia boosted the production of its oil.20 The US, to some extent, clearly benefits from the increased production. The US energy strategy with Middle Eastern oil-producing nations has built a direct and close link between economic and security interests. The economic interest is to maintain a reasonable global oil price by ensuring a 16 Department of Commerce United States of America, Learning to Partner: How U.S. Companies Can Succeed in Saudi Arabia. 17 Al-Faisal, “Don't be Crude Why Barack Obama's Energy Dependence Talk is Just Demagoguery”, 102. 18 Ibid. 19 Krauss, “U.S. Reliance on Oil From Saudi Arabia Is Growing Again”. 20 Ibid.

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constant flow of oil supply to the international market. The security interest, as viewed by the US, requires the existence of a stable political order in the Middle East, thereby allowing the US to access the oil, markets, and communication of the region. This would also protect US investment and assets in the area. The Gulf War in 1990-91 indicated an inextricable and obvious link between energy and security interests. In this war, the US needed to protect the Saudi oil reserve since the illegal occupation of Iraqi military troops in Kuwait entailed a high risk to the oil rich eastern province of Saudi Arabia. A strong linkage between oil and security remains a critical element in US-Saudi bilateral relations. Aaron David Miller, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, underlines the integral component of Washington-Riyadh ties: “the oil for security trade-off” drives the relationship. The US offers military assistance to Saudi Arabia; in return, the former is able to access hydrocarbon resources of the Kingdom. In May 2008, the US and Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement through their Joint Commission on Critical Infrastructure and Border Security Protection. The commission is “the bilateral coordination mechanism” for engagement between the US State Department, Energy Department, and Defense Department, and their Saudi counterparts (Blanchard 2012). This initiative indicates a continuation of American support for “Saudi critical infrastructure protection”. The US has provided advisory support to the Saudi Ministry of Interior. This support is on a contract basis and is made through the Office of the Program ManagerFacilities Security Force (OPM-FSF) (Blanchard 2012). A close oil-security bond is not easily severed by an unprecedented challenge in the region. Thomas W. Lippman, a leading expert in the USSaudi relations, contends that there has been “serious disagreement” between the two countries concerning the revolts in the Middle East. The divergence, however, does not pressurise “the core strategic and economic relationship” between them which reflects that “each country continues to need each other”. Lippman sees that a stronger Riyadh-Washington strategic relationship is underpinned, at least, by two considerations: “Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism and Iranian regional ambitions”.21 Telhami and Hill (2000) claim that the US would face “additional complications” if a new country in the Middle East were to emerge that needed to protect its energy interest in the region. Some Chinese economists predict that by 2030 and 2040, China’s economy will become equal to that of the US. At this time, an increasing Chinese oil dependency 21

Council on Foreign Relations, 13.01.2012.

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on the Persian Gulf states will be competing with the US interest in the region.22 The US imports more Saudi oil than China, yet China’s strategy to actively increase its oil imports from the Kingdom might seem to challenge America’s position as one of the biggest buyers of Saudi oil. Between 1992 and 2009, the US purchased a higher volume of petroleum and crude oil from Saudi Arabia than China did. The US and China’s annual average imports of this commodity accounted for 926.5 million tonnes and 187.3 million tonnes respectively (Table 1 and Graph 1). On the other hand, the trend of Chinese petroleum and crude oil imports from Saudi Arabia rose dramatically compared to that of the US. Between 1992 and 2009, imports grew from 187 thousand tonnes to 41.8 million tonnes; an increase of 2,493 percent. By contrast, the trend of imports to the US was declining. Imports dramatically lowered by 36.6 percent, from 80.4 million tonnes in 1992 to 51 million tonnes in 2009. The declining US importation of this commodity in 2009 was in tune with the economic contractions that the oil consuming countries had been experiencing (Table 6-1 and Graph 6-1). Despite this change, the Sino-Saudi oil trade still poses no threat to the US oil imports from the Kingdom. Table 6-1: Chinese and US Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia, 1992-2009 (Tonnes).23 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

22

China 187,323 146,449 230,635 1,807,618 5,730,211 11,390,760 17,243,549 22,178,924 23,871,514 26,333,689 36,368,396 41,857,126

The US 80,430,791 67,525,153 55,614,612 69,391,459 69,281,982 74,371,236 75,481,215 121,646,854 116,422,460 70,609,089 74,761,322 50,975,477

Aarts, “Events versus Trends: The Role of Energy and Security in Sustaining the US Saudi Relationship”, 419. 23 United Nations Commodity Division.

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Graph 6-1: Chinese and US Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia, 1992-2009 (Tonnes).24

Miliony

140 120 100

US Oil Imports

80 60 40 20 Oil Imports Chinese 0 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 China The US

The US-Saudi energy link is most likely to be affected by a new development in US oil-industry production. They are expanding, in particular, new productions that take place in North Dakota and Texas shale oil fields. In 2012, the production increased by 10 per cent and it is estimated that it will reach 11.1 million barrels a day by 2020 (Faucon and Johnson 2012). An increased oil output will reduce American oil dependency on foreign countries (Faucon and Johnson 2012). The IEA forecast shows that US oil import is expected to decline from 10 million bpd to 4 million bpd. US oil-industry production will change the direction and structure of the world oil market. A boom production of shale oil in the US will also witness some significant changes in energy supply and redraw the map of global energy. The US is projected to become the world’s largest oil producer by 2020, overtaking Saudi Arabia (Faucon and Johnson 2012). In December 2012, the US Energy Information Administration also predicted the possibility that the US will surpass Saudi Arabia in the production of

24

United Nations Commodity Division.

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crude oil and other liquid fuels. The principal and substantial role of Saudi Arabia in the global oil market, however, will remain.

Will China Challenge US Military Strategic Interest with Saudi-Arabia and Other Arab Countries in the Regions? Military cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia is rather weak due to a lack of arms deals between them and the lack of Chinese military interest in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia purchased 36 CSS-2 missiles from China in the late 1980s. In the following decades, the purchasing of military weapons from China, however, declined. Professor Yitzhak Shichor, a professor of East Asian studies, underlines China’s ‘marginal, almost insignificant’ role in the Middle Eastern arms market (Hongtu 2012). Although there was also rumoured to be some nuclear cooperation between the two countries, the evidence of such is lacking.25 China has limited military interest in the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia, in particular, for at least two reasons. First, China has announced that the principal purpose of its military power is for national security. Chinese leaders assert that this military power will retain the dominance of the Communist Party in the country, and secure the national border and provide a safe environment for the economic growth. Second, the deliberate intention behind Chinese military modernization is to prevent any attacks from its neighbours and regional rivals, notably India, Japan and Russia. Its military modernization no doubt can be seen as a challenge to US military power. In China’s view, however, its military capability is not strong enough to reach this objective. China recognizes the limitation of its military capability. Most indices of national power show that China “...continues to lag far behind the United States”.26 In protecting and promoting its interest in the Persian Gulf, China deploys ‘the tools of statecraft’ since its military capability in the area is limited. Some examples of the tools are “diplomatic contacts, trade and foreign investment, arms sales and its influence in the United Nations and in terms of its relations with France and Russia”.27 China, moreover, is not interested in becoming heavily involved in the Middle East’s critical issues and realizes that cooperation rather than competition with the US is vital to protecting its energy interest (Pant 2008). 25

Nonneman, “Determinants and Patterns of Saudi Foreign Policy: ‘Omnibalancing’ and ‘Relative Autonomy’ in Multiple Environment”, 344. 26 Glaser, “A Shifting Balance Chinese Assessments of U.S Power”. 27 Yetiv and Chunlong, “China, Global Energy, and the Middle East”, 201.

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Saudi Arabia retains its close link with its biggest supplier of arms (the US) and “...China has done nothing to…divert Saudi Arabia from this course”.28 The Kingdom largely depends on military equipment from foreign countries, and the US remains one of its major arms suppliers. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme has been established, and this allows the Kingdom to buy military hardware from the US without bureaucratic delays. As a traditional ally of the US, the Kingdom has been a location for US military troops since 1979. Their numbers were increasing due to a series of wars in the Gulf. In September 2003, however, almost all of these troops redeployed in Al Udeid Air Base in Doha, Qatar. Only a few hundred US training personnel still remain in the Kingdom (Business Monitor International Ltd. 2008). The arms relationship, nonetheless, has become stronger. China has become vigilant about finding foreign oil and anxious to avoid a convergence of oil with security interests. China is deeply concerned with the damaging impacts of mishandling its thirst for oil. It also prefers its oil diplomacy to be carefully conducted (Feng 2010). China’s naval development and its passion for foreign oil and raw material have a relatively tenuous connection. A professor at the School of International Studies, Peking University, Zhu Feng, contends that his country’s “going-out-strategy”, which was introduced in the early part of the 1990s, does not mean that China’s military expansion will follow the Chinese thirst for foreign oil and raw material (Feng 2010). China pursues and defines its overall objectives of not challenging or opposing the US in the Gulf (Yuan 2010). China is a responsible country and has no intention, desire, or capability to undermine the US. It also will not dominate matters in the Gulf. Yet, China attempts to involve itself in these issues because it intends to foster strong relations among the three parties: China, the US, and the Arab states. The attempt is due to its position in the UNSC and as a promoter of peace and development to the world.29 In dealing with Gulf issues, China calls for communication and harmonious existence, peaceful resolutions, and respecting the right of the people to decide their development path.30 China’s increasing involvement in the Middle East does not entail a complete misalignment of Beijing’s and Washington’s foreign policies towards the Middle East. America intends to maintain good relations with the Arab countries and Israel; China has the same intention. China has 28

Pant, “China in the Middle East- A Delicate Balancing Act”, 5. Yuan, “China’s Strategic Interest in the Gulf and Trilateral Relations among China, the U.S. and Arab”, 27. 30 Ibid. 29

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developed its understanding and shared American concerns regarding proliferation and terrorism (Hongtu 2010). There are, however, some different perceptions between China and the US regarding domestic reform in some Middle Eastern countries. China gives its support to this reform and rejects any unilateral action or foreign attempts to implement the reform (Hongtu 2010). The relations among China, the US, and Arab states (Alterman identifies this relationship as the “Vital Triangle”) offer limitless potential. At least three important reasons for this could be clearly outlined (Yuan 2010). First, there is extensive room for China and the Arab states to further develop their relationship. The two sides have already improved this link due to “long-term friendly exchanges, solid political foundations, coincidental stances and common interests”.31 Second, having common interests in Gulf issues could build a firm foundation for a fostering of China-US relations. Yuan (2010) sees that the two countries oppose the development of a nuclear programme and note the adverse implication of a regional arms race. China and the US also consider poverty, protracted and brutal conflict, and religious extremism as the sources of regional volatility.32 Third, there exists an expectation of a certain degree of diffusion of tension between some of Arab countries and the US. The American strategic role and readjustment of Washington’s foreign policy in the region contributes to such release. Some Arab states believe in the ability of the US to contain Iranian regional expansion, preserve a regional balance of power, and protect regional securities. Obama’s administration has been making some efforts to enhance the American image in the Middle East. A withdrawal of some US troops from Iraq and a new American approach to Iran are familiar examples to consider.33 The triangle that constitutes China, the US, and the Middle East should recognise and raise the value that it has. It should also allow for the good possibility of becoming “a source of security [rather] than a source of tension”. This situation could be created through increased cooperation between China and the US (Alterman 2012). Building up confidence between China and the US is also important. It could be sought in a number of ways. One example is strengthening security links. This initiative could be launched for naval cooperation since the two countries have made clear commitments to “maritime security and counter-piracy”. Greater coordination of China’s navy and Task Force 151, for example, 31

Yuan, “China’s Strategic Interest in the Gulf and Trilateral Relations among China, the U.S. and Arab”, 26. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.

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would intensify China’s involvement in multilateral security initiatives and deepen the relationship between Beijing and Washington (Alterman 2012). A perception in Washington that China takes advantage of US security protection in the Middle East could be avoided. Thus, Chinese-US close security cooperation would be able to tighten the security of the “Vital Triangle” (Alterman 2012). In brief, the strong relations between China and Saudi Arabia pose no threat to US-Saudi relations.

Works Cited Aarts, P. “Events versus Trends: The Role of Energy and Security in Sustaining the US Saudi Relationship.” In Saudi Arabia in the Balence Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, edited by P. Aarts and G. Nonneman. London: Hurst & Company, 2006. Al-Faisal, T. “Don't be crude why Barack Obama's energy dependence talk is just demagoguery.” Foreign Policy Foreign Policy (Sept.-Oct. 2009): 102-3. Business Monitor International Ltd. Military Structure & Defence Industry Saudi Arabia. Defence and Security Report, Q2 2008. [quoted 201104-23]. Available at WWW: . Blanchard, C. Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service, 2011. [quoted 2011-08-07]. Available at WWW:

—. Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S Relations. Congressional Research Service Report, 2012. Available at WWW: Defterios, J. “Middle East and China Forge Ties over Oil.” CNN [online], 15 November 2012. [quoted 2012-12-31]. Available at WWW:

Department of Commerce United States of America. (2011). Learning to Partner: How U.S. Companies Can Succeed in Saudi Arabia. 2011. [quoted 2011-7-3]. Available at WWW: Fan, H. and Q. Donghai. “China’s Energy Strategy in the Twenty-first Century.” China & World Economy 14, no. 2 (2006): 93-104. Faucon, B. and J. Keith. “U.S. Redraws World Oil Map Shale: Boom Puts America on Track to Surpass Saudi Arabia in Production by

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2020.” Canada News [online], 13 November 2012. [quoted 2012-1231]. Available at WWW: Feng, Z. “Oil Nexus vs. Diplomatic Crux: China’s Energy Demands, Maritime Security and Middle East Aspirations.” In China’s Growing Role In the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond, edited by A. Sager and G. Kemp. Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2010. Gavin, J. “Moving with Demand.” Middle East Economic Digest 54, no. 13 (2010): 36-8. Glaser, B.S. “A Shifting Balance Chinese Assessments of U.S Power.” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2010. [quoted 2011-7-2]. Available at WWW: Hongtu, Z. “China’s Energy Interest and Security in the Middle East.” In China’s Growing Role In the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond, edited by A. Sager and G. Kemp. Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2010. Jaffe, A.M. “United States and the Middle East: Policies and Dilemmas.” The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2003. [quoted 2009-4-7]. Available at WWW: Jian, Z. China’s Energy Security: Prospects, Challenges, and Opportunities. Washington, DC: The Brooking Institutions, 2011. Kevin, J.T. “Chinese Oil: an Evolving Strategy.” China Dialogue. April 24, 2012. [quoted 2012-12-29]. Available at WWW: Krauss, C. “U.S. Reliance on Oil From Saudi Arabia Is Growing Again.” The NewYork Times [online], 16 August 2012. [quoted 2012-12-31]. Available at WWW: Lee, J. “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil.” In The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2012): 75-92. Nonneman, G. “Determinants and Patterns of Saudi Foreign Policy: ‘Omnibalancing’ and ‘Relative Autonomy’ in Multiple Environment.” In Saudi Arabia in the Balance Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, edited by P. Aarts and G. Nonneman. London: Hurst & Company, 2006. Pant, H. “China in the Middle East- A Delicate Balancing Act.” Alternative Super Powers and the Middle East 2 (2008). Available at

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WWW: Sager, A. “GCC-China Relations: Looking Beyond Oil-Risks and Rewards.” In China’s Growing Role in the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond, edited by A. Sager and G. Kemp. Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2010. Sanger, D. “China Oil’s Needs Are High on U.S. Agenda.” The NewYork Times [online], 19 April 2006. [quoted 2009-6-7]. Available at WWW:

Telhami, S. and F. Hill. “America’s Vital Stake in Saudi Arabia.” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002): 167-73. U.S Energy Information Administration. Today in Energy. [quoted 201212-26]. Available at WWW:

United Nations Statistic Division. Commodity Trade Statistic Database. 2009. [quoted 2011-03-28]. Available at WWW: Wu, L. and X. Liu. “China or the United States: Which Threatens Energy Security?” OPEC Review, September 2007: 215-34. Yetiv, S.A. and L. Chunlong. “China, Global Energy, and the Middle East.” Middle East Journal 61, no. 2 (2007): 199-218. Yuan, L. “China’s Strategic Interest in the Gulf and Trilateral Relations among China, the U.S. and Arab.” In China’s Growing Role in the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond, edited by A. Sager and G. Kemp. Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2010.

CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN VENEZUELA ISABELLA HERMANN Abstract Within the last decade, economic and financial relations between China and Latin America have increased immensely. The Chinese-Venezuelan relationship is of especially high interest, because, for the Chávez-ruled Venezuela, China is not only a great investor and new oil consumer, but it also would make for an important political-ideological partner in countering the US. However, China’s foreign policy is rather oriented towards pragmatic interests of assuring access to resources and sales markets for Chinese products than acting on an ideological socialist mission statement. Therefore, the Chávez government must not be naive and should calculate its treaties with China according to the own economic-financial benefit, as does China.

1. Introduction Last year on the 7th of October, the Venezuelans voted for another sixyear-term for President Hugo Chávez and the consolidation of his socialist project and, in this way, indirectly for a continuation of the kind of cooperation Venezuela has with China. Even though there was a change in the political leadership of China at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, with Xi Jinping following Hu Jintao as president, from the Chinese perspective there is also no expectation of any change in direction concerning the relations with Venezuela. Since Chinese investment in Venezuela and mutual trade have multiplied tremendously in the last years, and probably will keep on doing so in the future, it is high time to have a closer look at what the ChineseVenezuelan relations are about. To start with, some general information will be given on the growing trade and investment between China and Latin America, before coming to the explicit ties between China and Venezuela. After that, light will be shed on the specific perspective of Venezuela and its ideological aspirations with regards to China, followed by further inspection of the Chinese view, which does not pursue an

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ideological foreign policy mission statement. The conclusion critically reflects the behaviour of both countries and gives some general implications on the benefit-based Chinese foreign policy strategy of which Venezuela is a meaningful example.

2. China and Latin America China’s growth from being economically meaningless in the 1970s to being now the second largest economic power after the US but before Germany and Japan is impressive. In the last decade the GDP has quasi quintupled from almost 1.200 billion US-Dollars in 2000 to 5.927 billion US-Dollars in 2010.1 In the same time period, China has moved closer to Latin America, thus the economic and financial relations between China and Latin America have increased immensely. As Latin America in the 19th century was dominated by the British, and in the 20th century by the US, one might assert that the 21st century is already on the road to being a Chinese one.2 Whereas in 2000 only 1 % of Latin American exports were directed towards China, this has changed to 8 % in 2010; imports from China have grown from less than 2 % in 2000 to 14 % in 2010 and are thereby joining ranks with imports from the EU.3 Also, Chinese investment in Latin America – mostly in the areas of mining, steel or oil production as well as diverse infrastructure projects – has multiplied in the last 10 years. From a rather positive perspective this certainly can be assessed as an encouraging development with promising advantages for both China and the respective Latin American countries. But from a more askance viewpoint this also opens up new areas of conflict. Critical tongues claim that Latin America is merely exchanging the former strong dependency on the US for a new “colonization” by China. Thus, while the Asian economic giant is predominantly interested in importing raw materials, the development of competitive Latin American industries for further processed products is falling by the wayside. Criticism is even louder since Latin America, now being freed from political restrictions imposed by the bipolar world system during the Cold War, has in fact become relatively stable, prosperous and sovereign, thereby confidently demanding its rightful place in world politics. 1

World Bank, World Development Indicators, 218. Grabendorff, “Südamerikas internationale Position und regionale Kooperation“, 428. 3 CEPAL, Panorama de la inserción internacional de América Latina y el Caribe 2010-2011, 70. 2

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3. China and Venezuela This growing engagement of China in Latin America and its implications are the underlying background against which one has to examine the special Chinese-Venezuelan relationship regarding trade and investment relations of both countries.

3.1 Chinese-Venezuelan trade relations – diversifying markets Analogously, there are to be found very strong relations in trade and investment. The trade level between the two countries has multiplied tremendously in the last 15 years, growing from a low of 200 million USDollars in the year 1999 to 10 billion US-Dollars in the year 2011, with an upward tendency, making China the 2nd largest trading partner of Venezuela.4 According to data from 2010 Venezuela had a trade surplus of almost 3 billion US-Dollars. However, one has to consider that Venezuela only ranked 30th out of China’s biggest trading partners.5 Is this favourable or unfavourable for Venezuela? Is the country becoming ever more dependent on China, while the opposite does not happen? In this regard one clearly has to see that the US is still the incontestable first trading partner of Venezuela – though with a falling tendency – with a trade volume of 62 billion US Dollars in 2011, which is more than six times larger than with China and contributed to a Venezuelan trade surplus of 26 billion US-Dollars the same year.6 Since one of the premier objectives of the Venezuelan economic foreign policy is to diversify its markets to other countries in order to reduce its dependency on the US alone, it seems exaggerated to talk about a loss of autonomy concerning the growing trade with China. Quite the contrary, diversifying markets is difficult enough, because naturally, and being the reason for the trade surplus, Venezuela’s paramount trading good is oil, which the country officially declared to count on as the biggest reserves worldwide.7 Even though the international demand for oil is huge, trade with the US has the crucial advantages of very short distances and already existing refineries for the particular heavy crude of Venezuela. However, since costs regarding shipping and oil production seem to be solvable, the trade itself with China appears to be quite favourable against the aim of shifting markets. In 2011 Venezuela exported 319 thousand barrels per day of oil 4

VENEZUELANALYSIS, “China-Venezuela Relations Keep Growing." European Commission, “China.“ 6 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “U.S.-Venezuela Trade Facts.” 7 Seiser, “Venezuela hat das meiste Öl.“ 5

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and refined products to China, which was a growth in comparison to 2010 of 79 per cent when sales were only at 178 thousand barrels a day; in the same time period exports to the US fell by 7.6 percent from 1.262 barrels a day in 2010 to 1.166 barrels a day in 2011.8 Thus, while the actual growing oil trade with China does not give rise to remarkable criticism, it is the additional oil delivery by Venezuela to China to pay off Chinese investments that is eyed problematically by the Venezuelan opposition and corresponding economic experts.

3.2 Chinese-Venezuelan investment relations – in-advance agreements on oil pay-offs Even though it is only a minor trading partner for China, Venezuela is one of the largest investment destinations. The year 2001, when thenPresident of China Jiang Zemin visited Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, was the starting point for the closure of a quite confusing conglomerate of different investment treaties that are remunerated with in-advance agreements on payments with Venezuelan oil.9 These treaties under the label “Chinese Fund” (Fondo Chino), with the latest investment injection of another 10 billion US-Dollars in February 2012, now make up for a total of around 38 billion US-Dollars.10 This money is invested in diverse projects inside Venezuela such as oil-production – for example with the modernisation of refineries; energy cooperation regarding electricity and technical cooperation – for example the manufacturing of cell phones with Chinese technology;11 as well as agricultural, housing and infrastructure projects. Even more, there are also ventures in China like the launch of two Venezuelan satellites from Chinese territory12 or the construction of an oil refinery in the province of Guangdong which is to be opened in 2014.13 From November 2007, which marked the large scale start of

8

El Universal, “Pdvsa disminuyó envíos a EEUU y elevó en 79% las ventas a China”, 1-6. 9 C-Henríquez Schemal, “China y Venezuela: ¿alianza estratégica o hegemónica?”, 195. 10 El Universal, “China eleva línea de crédito a Venezuela a $38 mil millones”, 16. 11 Pearson, Venezuela Inaugurates its Second Mobile Phone Factory. 12 Quinones, “State Media: China Launches 2nd Satellite for Venezuela.“ 13 China Daily, “Energy powering close bilateral ties.”

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investment, until May 2012, there have been 178 projects put into practice.14 In order to pay off this investment, in 2011 Venezuela delivered around 400 thousand barrels daily of oil to China, an amount that might be increased to up to 500 thousand barrels daily in the course of the year 2012. Even though this amount is compounded by the repayment sum of all different treaties under the Chinese Fund such as the “Fondo pesado” or “Fondo de Gran Volumen” which contain different terms and conditions regarding the contract period, a great part of oil deliveries will continue at least until the year 2020.15 This means that in case the total 2011 production of 2.500 thousand barrels daily stays the same in 2012 and beyond – the promulgated objective of the government is to actually raise it – these oil deliveries would make up a fifth of the total oil output for money already having been received. Doing exact calculations to determine if this might be a favourable bargain for Venezuela turns out to be quite difficult since there do not exist resilient numbers on the specifics of the treaties. However, one main point of criticism surely holds true: the 38 billion US-Dollars obtained by Venezuela from China do not reflect the current high prices of oil against the quantities of oil that are yet to be delivered, but rather a preferential price. If we apply a simple calculation stating that Venezuela sends 400 thousand barrels daily to China for 10 years at an oil price of 100 US-Dollars per barrel, the full market price would be 146 billion US-Dollars.16 Even if one assumes that the oil price might fall immensely by half – to 50 US-Dollars per barrel, the market price would be 73 billion US-Dollars, still more than double the amount of the Chinese investment of 38 billion US-Dollars. Having this simple computation in mind, one can understand why the Venezuelan opposition is claiming that the Chavista government is selling Venezuela’s future. However, the government holds the opposite opinion, in asserting that the still-huge amount of money received now – and precisely not in the future – is the very investment into Venezuela’s future, by incorporating Chinese technical assistance and its know-how for the development lying ahead of the country. This speculative character ingrained in the treaties naturally instigates the highly polarized political environment in Venezuela where economic questions are never free of ideological convictions.

14

AVN, A través del Fondo Chino-Venezolano se han ejecutado 178 proyectos de desarrollo nacional. 15 PDVSA, “Informe de gestión anual 2011”, 133f. 16 The calculation here is 400.000 barrels multiplied by 365 days multiplied by 10 years multiplied by the price of one barrel crude oil of 100 US-Dollars.

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4. The Venezuelan Perspective Because of the strongly ideological convictions in Venezuela, the relations to China – and vice versa the Chinese relations to Venezuela – are of special interest, and also of particular concern is the critique mentioned about the Chinese “colonization” of Latin America. Despite the presumed advantages from the Venezuelan government’s viewpoint concerning the economic-financial relations mentioned in the previous chapter, one has to clearly see also the political-ideological aspirations of Venezuela.

4.1 China as strategic partner for Venezuela The relationship between Venezuela and China in the Venezuelan government programme for 2007-2013 is defined only in economic, not in political terms.17 One finds in the newly proposed government programme for 2013-2019 by Hugo Chávez that it is clearly stated that Venezuela is seeking a strategic alliance with China (and also with Russia and Brazil).18 This firstly means a Venezuelan endorsement of the relationship’s high level status, as well as an affirmation to further strengthen it. Secondly, using a very basic definition of strategic alliances as “harmonizing the activities of two or more players at a given moment in time, in order to reach certain political goals”19, it certainly implies that the relationship is also built on political understanding beyond mere mutual economic interests. In this sense, the new government programme in fact does not mark a new turn of Venezuelan foreign policy towards China, but merely gives the already existing relationship with China (as described above) its proper name, since for Venezuela there is an implied political component. 17 It literally says “i. Intensificación de la integración económica, social, cultural, científica y tecnológica. ii. Construir un nuevo marco de comercio mundial que permita romper con los núcleos hegemónicos de intercambio comercial. iii. Profundizar la atracción de inversiones de empresas y capital estadal. iv. Creación de fondos binacionales de desarrollo para el apalancamiento de proyectos.” MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR PARA LA COMUNICACIÓN Y LA INFORMACIÓN, Líneas Generales del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social de la Nación para el período 2007-2013, 96. 18 It literally says “4.3.1.3 Elevar a un nivel superior las alianzas estratégicas con la República Popular China, la Federación de Rusia y la República Federativa de Brasil con el fin de seguir consolidando el poder nacional.” Chávez, Propuesta del Candidato de la Patria Comandante Hugo Chávez para la gestión Bolivariana socialista 2013-2019, 36. 19 Brill, “Summary: Strategic Alliances.”

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What Venezuela understands under a strategic relationship generally, and particularly with regards to China, is well said by Temir Porras, who was until May 2012 the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Minister for Asia, the Middle East and Oceania, and who now is Deputy Minister for Europe.20 For him it is not the economic benefit that determines the political Venezuelan-Chinese relations, but rather the other way around, namely the fact that there are “coincidences” between those two countries leading to a shared view on how to tackle international political challenges. Generally, these coincidences signify for Venezuela, as mid-ranking power, to build up relations with other nations based on mutual respect, even more so if they possess economic and political leverage as high as that of the Chinese, above all being a permanent member with veto right in the UN Security Council. According to Porras “that is a main, for us it is a major change in the international relations. No matter your influence, you can build a relation that is based on respect and that’s something we have achieved with the Chinese.”21 In his words, building up and conducting respectful relations in that sense means for the Venezuelan foreign policy that [w]e believe in the notion of sovereignty and therefore we believe in the right of the Chinese people [...] to determine their own future. The way you act in the international relations and the way you do not prevent the Chinese people e.g. to make its own decisions is what we call respect in the international arena.22

Naturally, in this way, the relations between Venezuela and China are to be understood in absolute contrast to the way the US is performing its relations toward other states. From an official Venezuelan viewpoint, the US acts in a way of imposing its own national interest on others by trying to influence a country’s internal policy as well as their relations towards other states, while China does not.

4.2 China as ideological partner for Venezuela However, besides being a partner with respect for other nations (which means non-interference in internal affairs, in contrast to the US) China is also ideologically important for Venezuela. Venezuela under the government of Hugo Chávez pursues a radical left-oriented foreign policy 20

Porras, Inverview on 27 July 2012. Ibid. 22 Ibid. 21

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with revolutionary aims. This means for Latin America the explicit “Bolivarian Revolution” with a process of unifying the continent which was also in the will of the historic Venezuelan liberation hero Simón Bolívar. The aim of this effort of integrating Latin America and the Caribbean is to create a power block in order to counter the “hegemoniccolonial” interests of the US and also to project influence internationally. This leads to a greater international aim which is labelled the “socialism of the 21st century,” going beyond Latin America in aiming to change the international system from its very roots in fundamental ways. Hence, the official mission statement of Venezuela’s international policy is about a radical change from an “imperialist international system” currently still dominated by the US and its allies, to a multipolar power structure of several different but equal power blocks. This comprises building up strategic relationships with emerging and already established powers like India, Russia or China. For Venezuela this makes relations with China crucially important because China precisely has this great economicpolitical influence by already being perceived as challenger to the US’s world power status.

5. The Chinese Perspective Venezuela surely would be interested in a deeper partnership in the form of a political alliance with China, pushing forward the idea of a multipolar world. However, there does not exist political cooperation between China and Venezuela, or between China and any other Latin American country. Although China still defines itself as communist state, the country does neither internally nor externally project a thorough communist policy. Internally this makes China itself speak of a communism with Chinese “characteristics,” and Western experts label the system of China as “illiberal capitalism”.23 Externally the country lacks an ideological mission statement but rather follows a logic of pragmatic interests of assuring access to resources and sales markets for Chinese products – as is exactly the case with Venezuelan oil resources. This stands quite in contrast to Venezuela, a country which does not pursue a communist project, but, as has already been said, officially exerts internally as well as externally a socialist political-economic model. China’s secretary of state made clear that it has no interest in promoting a worldwide revolution countering the “imperial” influence of the United

23

Rachman and Kagan, Illiberal capitalism.

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States whatsoever.24 Particularly concerning Venezuela, the spokesperson of the Secretary of State Hong Lei clarified in a visit to Venezuela in September 2012 that cooperation between the two countries only serves commercial purposes for the mutual economic benefit of both countries. Furthermore, he added that China would not exert any influence on Venezuelan politics, neither in general nor regarding the upcoming presidential elections in October.25 As was said in the previous chapter on the importance of mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs, this statement is doubtlessly in the line with Venezuela’s interests. However, it lacks any affirmative note of about China preferring the government of Hugo Chávez precisely because it is socialist to any other possible Venezuelan government. For China it seems to be exclusively the economic-financial advantage that is relevant, not the formation of a political, let alone an ideological friendship.

6. Conclusion There might be some common views shared by China and Venezuela in how international problems and challenges are perceived, which certainly signifies a view contrary to the US. However, Venezuela cannot count on a political or even ideological alliance with China, since the country is not acting on a political-ideological mission statement, but on maximizing its economic advantage. The government of Hugo Chávez should have that in mind when accepting huge amounts of Chinese investments which are being paid off over the coming years with Venezuelan oil. The question is justified if the relations between Venezuela and China are really that respectful in the sense that both countries, the giant China and the “mid-ranking” Venezuela, benefit in the same ways from the cooperation. Hence, there is an opposition-lead debate going on in Venezuela about whether these deals are favourable or if Hugo Chávez is selling out the country’s oil reserves. As shown, one can support both opinions. Regardless, the Chávez-government must not be naïve, and, like China, should also exclusively think about the financial-economic advantages for its own country when doing business with the Chinese, since political-ideological support cannot be expected – as high as oil deliveries might be. The case with Venezuela shows impressively how China pursues its foreign policy, which is solely based on the commercial, economic and 24 25

Romero, “La política exterior de la Venezuela bolivariana.” El Universal, “China aclara que no influye en la política venezolana.”

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financial advantages to the country. Since China has become economically very important and closes its deals with other countries based only on its own benefits, regardless of how these countries are ruled and without imposing any conditions on developing ones, often it’s policies are naturally not in the interest of the US. In that way, China has risen – maybe quite unintentionally – to be the major challenger of the US super power. Whether or not this makes China a hegemonic risk in world politics, or makes its foreign policy even easier to predict and better to handle for the US and the aligned so called international community, is to be found out in the future.

Works Cited AVN. A través del Fondo Chino-Venezolano se han ejecutado 178 proyectos de desarrollo nacional. Caracas, 2012. [quoted 2012-11-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.avn.info.ve/print/114115›. Brill, H. “Summary: Strategic Alliances.” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 5 (2002). [quoted 2012-11-30] Available at WWW: ‹http://www.bundesheer.at/omz/index.shtml›. CEPAL. Panorama de la inserción internacional de América Latina y el Caribe 2010-2011. Santiago de Chile, 2011. Chávez, H. Propuesta del Candidato de la Patria Comandante Hugo Chávez para la gestión Bolivariana socialista 2013-2019. Caracas, 2012. [quoted 2012-11-30] Available at WWW: ‹http://www.chavez. org.ve/programa-patria-venezuela-2013-2019/#.UDPVl6DAHyI›. China Daily. “Energy powering close bilateral ties.” Beijing, 2012. [quoted 2012-11-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.chinadaily. com.cn/cndy/201206/28/content_15528239.htm› C-Henríquez Schemel, J. “China y Venezuela: ¿alianza estratégica o hegemónica?” In Democracia, paz y desarrollo, edited by E. González Urrutia, 185-99. Caracas: forthcoming. El Universal. “China aclara que no influye en la política venezolana.” Issue 26, September 2012: 1-4. —. “China eleva línea de crédito a Venezuela a $38 mil millones.” Issue 28, February 2012: 1-6. —. “Pdvsa disminuyó envíos a EEUU y elevó en 79% las ventas a China.” Issue 20, April 2012: 1-6. European Commission. “China.” Brussels, 2011. [quoted 2012-11-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/Sept ember/tradoc_113366.pdf›.

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Grabendorff, W. (2010): “Südamerikas internationale Position und regionale Kooperation.” In Der Bürger im Staat. Lateinamerika, (ed.) Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg, 422-9. Stuttgart: Verlagsgesellschaft W. E. Weinmann, 2010. MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR PARA LA COMUNICACIÓN Y LA INFORMACIÓN. Líneas Generales del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social de la Nación para el período 2007-2013. Caracas, 2008. [quoted 2012-11-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www. formacion.psuv.org.ve/biblioteca/lineas-generales-del-plan-dedesarrollo-economico-y-social-de-la-nacion›. Office of the United States Trade Representative. “U.S.-Venezuela Trade Facts.” Washington, D.C: 2012. [quoted 2012-11-30] Available at WWW: ‹http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/venezuela›. PDVSA. “Informe de gestión anual 2011.” Caracas, 2012. [quoted 201211-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.pdvsa.com/interface.sp/database/fichero/free/7364/1568.PDF›. Pearson, T. Venezuela Inaugurates its Second Mobile Phone Factory. Caracas: Venezuelanalysis, 2012. [quoted 2012-11-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5380›. Porras, T. Interview with the author on 27 July. 2012. Transcript available on request. Quinones, N. “State media: China Launches 2nd Satellite for Venezuela.” CNN [online], 2012. [quoted 2012-11-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.cnn.hk/2012/09/29/world/americas/china-venezuelasatellite/index.html›. Rachman, G. and R. Kagan. Illiberal Capitalism. London: Financial Times Online, 2008. [quoted 2012-11-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/f820a134-c509-11dc-811a0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2DbSnfpyx›. Romero, C. “La política exterior de la Venezuela bolivariana.” Plataforma Democratica, 2012. [quoted 2012-11-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Arquivos/La%20politica%20e xterior%20de%20la%20Venezuela%20bolivariana.pdf›. Seiser, M. “Venezuela hat das meiste Öl.” FAZ [online]. Frankfurt am Main, 2011. [quoted 2012-11-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://www. faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/groesste-reserven-der-weltvenezuela-hat-das-meiste-oel-11107179.html› World Bank. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C., 2012. VENEZUELANALYSIS. “China-Venezuela Relations Keep Growing.” Caracas, 2011. [quoted 2012-11-30]. Available at WWW: ‹http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/6280›.

U.S.-VENEZUELAN ENERGY RELATIONS: CHALLENGING, BUT DISTINCTLY MANAGEABLE TIMOTHY J. SANDOLE Abstract This paper analyzes Venezuela’s foreign policy with a specific focus on the petroleum component of the United States-Venezuelan relationship. The recent death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez compounds the uncertainty that abounds in this relationship. Nevertheless, I argue that while the United States is sensitive to a precipitous decline in Venezuelan oil output or a possible oil embargo, the late President Chavez’s repeated threats to cut off supplies to the United States are unlikely to materialize even under a new government. Venezuela is very dependent on U.S. oil demand while the U.S. is moderately dependent on Venezuelan oil. Any major schism in U.S.-Venezuelan energy relations, therefore, is unlikely to materialize. In this regard, the United States continues to have leverage.

1. Introduction The United States consumes more petroleum than any other country in the world. Until the latter-half of the twentieth century, the United States satisfied its demand for petroleum by exploiting its various states along the Gulf of Mexico (e.g., Texas). This dynamic changed quickly because U.S. oil demand eventually surpassed the available supply, which tipped the balance-of-power in favor of petroleum-rich countries, many of which have less-than-stable relations with the United States to this day. As a current net importer of oil, the United States relies on an array of countries—including those that help foster bilateral tension—to satisfy its demand and diversify its energy security. The United States currently imports the majority of its petroleum from the Western Hemisphere, a region far less volatile and politically unpredictable than the Middle East. But while the world’s remaining superpower secures petroleum from countries such as Canada and Mexico,

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approximately 11 percent of its petroleum has come from Venezuela,1 a country whose current political leadership has been hostile toward the United States, especially during the second Bush Administration. Nevertheless, since Venezuela contains some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves in the world and is a top-ten oil-producing nation, it consistently ranks as a major supplier for the United States.

Historically, the United States has maintained close ties with Venezuela, but when the late Hugo Chavez, a member of the United Socialist Party, was elected to the presidency in 1998, considerable tension between the two countries developed which has persisted ever since. U.S. officials expressed concern over human rights violations, the nationalization of oilfields, Venezuelan arms purchases, and Venezuelan relations with Iran and Cuba. The U.S. government also expressed concern about Chavez’s regional and political agenda—a desire to spread his personal brand of socialist populism to other Latin American countries, along with his policy of tacitly allowing Columbian guerilla and paramilitary forces (the FARC) to use Venezuelan territory as a staging ground. This paper analyzes Venezuela’s foreign policy with a specific focus on the petroleum component of the United States-Venezuelan relationship. The recent death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez compounds the uncertainty that abounds in this relationship. Nevertheless, I argue that while the United States is sensitive to a precipitous decline in Venezuelan 1

Sullivan, “Energy in the Americas”, 18.

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oil output or a possible oil embargo, the late President Chavez’s repeated threats to cut off supplies to the United States are unlikely to materialize even under a new government. Venezuela is very dependent on U.S. oil demand while the U.S. is moderately dependent on Venezuelan oil. Any major schism in U.S.-Venezuelan energy relations, therefore, is unlikely to materialize. In this regard, the United States continues to have leverage.

2. Venezuela’s Foreign Policy under President Chavez Hugo Chavez aimed to advance political and economic ties with neighboring Latin American countries as a way to counter the United States’ influence in the region. In 2008, then Director for National Intelligence (DNI) Michael McConnell appeared before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, testifying that Chavez would attempt to unite Latin America under his overtly anti-U.S. and leftist-oriented leadership.2 He created the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) [The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America] as an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas, which, according to Mark Sullivan of the Congressional Research Service, “advocates a socially oriented trade block that includes mechanisms for poverty reduction, and cooperation in a range of areas including health, education, culture, investment, and finance.”3 To date, eight countries in the region have joined ALBA. In 2005, President Chavez started using “oil diplomacy” to provide subsidized fuel to Caribbean Basin nations through a program called PetroCaribe. Sullivan argues that, “In addition to these preferential oil arrangements and energy investments, Venezuela has promised investments in energy sectors in several other Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Brazil.”4 However, Venezuela’s ability to project regional influence through its petro-dollar projects has faltered due to declining oil output and an ailing global economy. A lack of significant investment in the Venezuelan state-owned oil enterprise, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), is a major contributing factor for this decline. Upon assuming the presidency in 1998, Chavez increased tax and royalty rates on new and existing oil projects and mandated majority PDVSA ownership of all oil projects.5 Majority shares of 60 percent in 2

Sullivan, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress”, 34. Sullivan, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress”, 35. 4 Sullivan, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress”, 36. 5 “Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela.” 3

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2009 gave the state significant control of oil revenues, providing Chavez with the resources needed to fund his anti-poverty campaigns and various social programs across the country. But with less foreign investment and thus reduced revenues in the oil sector, Chavez became “limited [in] his ability [to] exert influence beyond his core group of allies.”6

3. U.S.-Venezuelan Energy Relations According to the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), Venezuela had 211 billion barrels of proven oil reserves in 2011, the second highest in the world.7 This is a significant revision from the previous year, when, according to the same publication, Venezuela was estimated to have produced 99.4 billion barrels. The increase is the result of the inclusion of huge reserves of extra-heavy oil in the Orinoco Belt. The Obama Administration has a major interest, therefore, in ensuring the continued flow of oil and in retaining Venezuela as a major supplier. Although the encroaching nationalization under President Chavez decreased PDVSA’s crude oil output, exports to the United States have actually remained stable at close to 1.5 million barrels per day.

6 7

Sullivan, “Political Conditions and U.S. Policy”, 34 “Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela.”

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Venezuela relies more heavily, however, on the United States as a customer, underscoring bilateral interdependency that favors the United States. Most of Venezuela’s exports are destined for the United States, laying bare the overwhelming dependency of Venezuela on the U.S. export market.8 The largest concentration of Venezuela’s global downstream operations is in the United States. CITGO, the wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA, controls and operates three refineries in Lake Charles, Louisiana; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Lemont, Illinois, with a combined crude distillation capacity of 755,400 billion barrels a day (bbl/d).9 Oil generates approximately 80 percent of Venezuela’s total export revenue, contributing to approximately half of the government’s income and makes up one-third of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).10 U.S. petroleum demand overwhelmingly provides for Venezuela’s revenue.

8

Sullivan, “Energy in the Americas”, 18. “Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela.” (2012). 10 Alvarez and Hanson, “Venezuela’s Oil-Based Economy.” 9

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U.S. energy security is not immediately threatened because Venezuela is too dependent on the United States for the swelling of its state coffers. This is why the late President Chavez wanted to diversify his energy policy away from the United States and toward neighboring and emerging markets such as China because, at present, the U.S. can afford to publically pressure Venezuela over human rights and undemocratic practices. The superpower is effectively paying for Venezuela’s social welfare programs through oil purchases. “Chavez celebrat[ed] the demise of capitalism,” argues Pedro Mario Burelli, a former board member of PDVSA, “but the irony is that capitalism actually fed his system in times of plenty.”11 If interim President Nicolas Maduro is elected to the Presidency, he is not likely to withdraw from the U.S. market because the United States remains the world’s largest consumer of crude oil that sits in a geographically convenient location for Venezuelan oil exports— approximately a five-day journey by tanker. Furthermore, the U.S. harbors a large concentration of PDVSA’s downstream operations. It would be ill conceived, therefore, for Venezuela to lose the United States as a customer entirely. Globalization’s market forces incentivize oil-exporting nations to 11

Ibid.

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maintain oil supply because doing otherwise would hurt them financially.12

4. What if Politics Trumps Economics? What if, given the political uncertainty in Venezuela, interim President Maduro decided to impose an embargo on the United States? And what would happen if there were sudden losses of Venezuelan oil from the world market? Economic liberals do not appear to take such questions as seriously as political realists do. The former believe that bilateral economic ties breed cooperation and subsequently raise the cost of conflict. The latter are skeptical that economically rational behavior can always be relied upon. Indeed, Deron Lovaas and Brian Siu of the Natural Resources Defense Council believe that the U.S. addiction to oil is detrimental to U.S. national security and economic viability because of the increasingly precarious relationships the U.S must maintain.13 Even the pro-business U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which has completed a major study of the issue, has documented the United States’ vulnerabilities in the energy market.14 The Chamber suggests that the tightness of the global oil market and the oil supply from various unstable regions make the market susceptible to short-term disruptions that lead to higher and more volatile oil prices. In this context, instability of the oil supply from any significant oil-exporting country can create oil price volatility, which, in turn, can cause an economic slowdown. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that a Venezuelan oil embargo against the United States would increase consumer prices for gasoline and other petroleum products in the short term because “oil refiners would experience higher costs getting oil supplies from sources farther away than Venezuela.”15 Additionally, refiners in the U.S. that typically handle Venezuelan heavy sour crude oil would lose some capacity if they had to substitute for lighter replacement crude oil that would most likely be available. If Venezuela shut down its U.S.-based refineries as part of the embargo, there would be a similar reduction in the supply of gasoline and other petroleum products, leading to a corresponding price increase of those products until the refineries 12 13

Gholz and Press, “Energy Alarmism”, 1. Lovass and Siu, “Ranking States’ Oil Vulnerability and Solutions for Change”,

5. 14

“Index of U.S. Energy Security Risk.” “Energy Security: Issues Related to Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Production”, 7. 15

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were reopened or new refineries were brought onto the market. Venezuela would lose revenue from a shutdown of its U.S. refineries and if the United States deemed the shutdown to be a threat to its security, Venezuela could face political actions—most likely in the form of sanctions—by the U.S. government. Although the impact of a U.S.targeted embargo would not be in Venezuela’s economic interests, it is important to note that the embargo would be less painful for Venezuela than if PDVSA’s production fell significantly. An embargo does not take Venezuelan oil off the market entirely, so the impact on world oil prices would be minimal. A sudden loss of most, if not all, of Venezuelan oil would have a worldwide impact. A model developed by the U.S. Department of Energy estimated that a disruption of crude oil with a temporary loss of 2.2 million barrels a day—all else being equal—would raise the price of petroleum products and subsequently slow the rate of economic growth in the United States (by a decrease of $23 billion in U.S. GDP) and other countries until substitute oil could be obtained.16 Such a drop would cause large losses for Venezuela, whose economy relies on oil export revenues. In the event, Venezuela would likely restore oil production as quickly as possible. There is no convincing reason, therefore, for interim President Maduro to embargo the United States or take oil off of the world market.

5. Implications for U.S. Energy Security The incentives for the next Venezuelan government to continue supplying the United States with oil are strong. Even though a U.S.targeted embargo would be less stressful for Venezuela’s economy, there would be high costs associated with it, making such an action untenable over the long term. The “oil weapon” is less effective in the globalized world due to the reciprocity that comes with interdependence. This scenario played out during the 1973 OPEC oil embargo. Saudi Arabia refrained from inflicting significant economic pain on the U.S. because the former had lucrative investments in the latter. Bringing the United States economy to the precipice of strangulation would have hurt Saudi Arabia’s own economic interests and this was during a time when economies were less integrated than they are today. Similarly, Venezuela’s PDVSA has significant investments in the United States through its subsidiary CITCO. For all the political posturing that has occurred between the Chavez and 16 “Energy Security: Issues Related to Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Production”, 44-5.

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the United States, interdependency has fostered energy cooperation, however reluctantly, because the costs of a prolonged conflict would be high. The significance of such interdependence is manifold. To provide one example, the late President Chavez was one of the most vocal critics of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, yet agreed to continue supplying oil to the U.S. in large quantities that no doubt aided the U.S. military apparatus, a major consumer of crude oil. It is quixotic to assume, however, that interdependence always brings about cooperation. The United States cannot completely dismiss a scenario whereby a newly elected Venezuelan government would, due to some overwhelming political reason, decide to block the United States from receiving oil or for there to be domestic political turmoil in Venezuela as a result of Chavez’s death. The regime is unstable and its actions must be viewed with caution. This analysis has documented the inherent political risks for U.S. energy security of continued dependence on Venezuelan oil. Nevertheless, if U.S.-targeted oil disruptions did not occur during the George W. Bush era—a period when relations between the United States and Venezuela were characterized by constant decline—then the chances are slim that Venezuela would seek to limit or cut oil supply to the U.S. at a time of relatively improved bilateral relations. Since coming to office, President Obama has resumed diplomatic ties with Venezuela, which were severed during the Bush years. A constant and diligent diplomatic channel will be necessary to maintain the continuous flow of oil in the future.

6. Conclusion The belief that commercial ties alleviate war proneness is not new. It was made popular by Thomas Buckle in the 1850s and improved upon by Norman Angell just before the outbreak of World War I17 (which, needless to say, rendered the theory moot). Liberal theories of international relations have proven problematic but they nonetheless remain an important basis for better understanding and dealing with nations in the twenty-first century (and this comes from someone who thoroughly enjoys realist scholarship). Trade has moved away from the hierarchal model that defined imperial powers’ relations with their colonies, and the trading of final products no longer happens solely between wealthy nations.18 The 17

Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security, 178. 18 Ibid.

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twenty-first century is one in which transnational production of goods and direct investment has created what Richard Rosecrance of Harvard University calls “a growing interpenetration of economies, in the sense that one economy owns part of another.”19 The U.S.-Venezuelan relationship is a case in point. Though the governments of the United States and Venezuela are politically opposed to each other, it is appropriate that both countries’ leaders have chosen pragmatism over ideology in their economic and other dealings with one another—such is the complex nature of global affairs in the twenty-first century.

Works Cited Alvarez, C. and S. Hanson. “Venezuela’s Oil-Based Economy.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2009. Available at WWW: . Betts, R. American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. “Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela.” Energy Information Administration, 2012. [quoted 2012-10-20]. Available at WWW: . “Energy Security: Issues Related to Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Production.” GAO-06-668. United States Government Accountability Office, 2006. Gholz, E. and D.G. Press (2007). “Energy Alarmism.” CATO Institute Policy Analysis, 2007. See also Taylor, J. and P. Van Doren. “The Energy Security Obsession,” The Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 6, no. 2 (2008). “Index of U.S. Energy Security Risk.” U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Institute for 21st Century Energy, 2011. Lovass, D. and B. Siu. “Ranking States’ Oil Vulnerability and Solutions for Change.” NRDC, 2008. Rosecrance, R. The Rise of the Trading State. New York: Basic Books, 1986. Sullivan, D. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State) in “Energy in the Americas.” Washington, D.C.: House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Congress, 2008. 19

Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State, 146-7.

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Sullivan, M. “Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009. —. “Venezuela: Issues for Congress.” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011.

CHINA’S RAPIDLY DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP WITH CONTEMPORARY AFRICA WOUTER ZAAYMAN Abstract Reviewing the process of Africa’s relationship with China remains unfamiliar to the majority of academics internationally and presents a distinctive field of research. Furthermore, although Africa continues to be well researched within certain fields of social sciences, it is within the field of political geography and, by extension, geopolitics that there remains a deficiency regarding comprehensive study and critical analysis of the subject in general. This is compounded by the fact that the vast majority of research is undertaken by academics who themselves are not from Africa. Hence, a situation prevails whereby the subject itself is viewed from the periphery as opposed to from within. This paper, in part, seeks to address these challenges and provides a brief overview of China’s expanding relationship with the African continent.

1. Introduction China’s relationship with Africa expanded rapidly following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, which saw the majority of western countries placing diplomatic and commercial restrictions on the Beijing regime. Ironically African countries’ responses were the opposite, with many congratulating China for its robust reaction of cracking-down on its citizens. As Mawdsley notes, many African and Chinese leaders believe that “the West’s complaints about democracy and human rights was founded in neo - imperialist arrogance.”1 This paper will review how this new relationship between Africa and China has commercially benefited both parties. China’s “peaceful rise” and its policy of non- interference, which is based on the five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence as 1 Mawdsley, China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of Power, 208.

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identified at the 1955 Bandung Conference within its relationship with Africa, is analyzed. Divisions between China’s notion of sovereignty and equality amongst nations as well as its position on human rights, as opposed to the West’s stance, are also discussed. It is noted that these fundamental issues all have a strong bearing on how they benefit the country’s relations with Africa. This is complemented by the fact that the majority of African states follow a similar approach. China’s contemporary approach regarding its relationship with Africa is reviewed within three parameters, namely: development aid, investment, and trade. These three foreign relation “tools” are discussed as are the various secondary “tools” used to implement the country’s foreign policy. An institution of note is the China-African Cooperative Forum (CACF), which remains an effective body regarding the country’s enactment of relations with Africa. The strengths and weaknesses of China’s relations are also reviewed, as are the factors that have allowed trade to grow to such an astronomical level that it peaked at US $ 106.75 billion in 2008. Geopolitical “drivers” such as oil and minerals remain the primary focus of China’s advance into Africa, and this paper will briefly examine the various motivators behind this development

2. The Contemporary Relationship between China and Africa China’s new dynamic relationship with Africa can be dated from the very end of the Cold War in 1989, after the country’s rapid and brutal response to the democratic action that took place in Tiananmen Square. China’s stance towards Africa can be seen as the third phase of the country’s relations with the continent since 1949. Following the West’s strong response to the Tiananmen “massacre” and the nation’s sudden international isolation, China sought political allies from where they could be obtained. African leaders throughout the continent sent messages of support and approval of China’s authoritarian crackdown. There was a sense of shared belief amongst many African and Chinese leaders that the West’s complaints about democracy and human rights were founded in “neo-imperialist arrogance”.2 Due to the events following Tiananmen Square and restrictions placed on China by the West, the country focused on older relationships and concentrated on greater south-south cooperation, due to the fact that the Third World

2

See Medley, E. (2007). p. 411.

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countries were silent and in effect less concerned with Beijing’s domestic problems.3 China remained highly consistent regarding its relations with African countries and to this day maintains a dedicated stance on its foreign policy and relationships with the continent. The country’s relationship is grounded on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, as identified at the 1955 Bandung Conference. The five principles are “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence”.4 It should be stressed that China repeats the peaceful principles of peaceful coexistence in its diplomatic statements whenever the country comes under review for its support of questionable regimes on the continent. Policymakers in China stress the “peaceful nature” of its foreign relations, which has been described as a ‘Peaceful Rise’ pertaining to its influence and aspirations. The country, having noticed the international community’s concern over its ‘rise’ (which is seen as a challenge to the present world order), has changed the description of its policy to “peaceful development.” Despite this name change, China continues to balance “growing geopolitical tensions that develop due to its changing influence and power with maintaining a positive reputation that promotes trade and domestic development”.5 It is interesting to observe how China has gradually augmented its foreign policy, especially in light of the maxim stressed by China’s previous leader, Deng Xiaoping, who stated that China should “be good at maintaining a low profile; never claim leadership” for foreign policy. In Africa, the country has maintained its stance and gradually become more proactive.6 China’s maintenance of its policy of non-interference has resulted in a “live and let live” approach to the country’s foreign policy. This approach, which is grounded in the five principles of Peaceful Co-existence, allows China to ignore other states’ international and domestic actions, on the condition that they do not conflict with China’s own interests. In this regard the Chinese government has maintained positive relations with trade and diplomatic partners despite criticism of the policies of its more questionable partners. This also allows China to distance itself from being 3

Van De Looy, Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership. Muekalia, “Africa and China’s Strategic Partnership”, 6. 5 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Hearing on China’s Expanding Global Influence: Foreign Policy Goals, Practices and Tools”, 7. 6 Wacker, China Rise: The Return of Geopolitics?, 56. 4

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drawn into multilateral efforts to sanction or restrict another nation’s behaviour that the international community is attempting to alter.7 China’s policy of non-interference has not hindered the Communist Party of China in developing various relationships with over 60 political parties in over 40 African countries, which has further reinforced Sino-African relations.8 Anshan notes that China is sensitive towards notions of sovereignty and equality amongst nations. He stresses that this approach is very much due to previous violations of China’s sovereignty by other major powers. The previous experience has allowed China to follow the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations. This principle notes that all nations should be equal and no country can dictate the sovereign affairs of others. The principle of non-interference has allowed China to protect its own sovereign rights. On the position of human rights, for example, the West’s position is the belief that human rights have risen historically from a need to protect citizens from abuse by the state – which almost obliges nations to intervene and protect people(s) throughout the world. However, developing countries, including China and the majority of African countries, believe that state sovereignty is primary, mainly due to the fact that “the human rights protection regime is a state-based mechanism”. China has gained the trust of African countries by maintaining that human rights should not be a reason for one country to interfere in another’s internal affairs.9 China’s renewed interest in Africa also coincided with new attention from the West to promote liberal democracy and human rights. Following the end of the Cold War, a Third Wave of Democracy seemed to move through Africa, which had the support of the Western World. This trend threatened the position of many African leaders throughout the continent. African and Chinese elites stress that they face common threats and enemies, namely neo-imperialism and imperialism. Many African leaders have a strong suspicion of criticism of their regimes in what they see as “Western/centric” norms of human rights and liberal democracy, which allows for domestic actions to be criticised.10 There is no doubt that China dovetails into this and asserts that human rights such as “economic rights and rights of subsistence” are the central priority of developing countries and are more essential than personal 7

US – China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Hearing on China’s Expanding Global Influence: Foreign Policy Goals, Practices and Tools” (March 18, 2008). 8 People’s Daily Online. (June 21, 2006). 9 Anshan, “China and Africa: Policy and Challenges”, 74–5. 10 Snow, “China and Africa: Consensus and Camouflage”, 285.

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individual rights as highlighted by the West. China’s stance is supported by numerous African leaders. The Director of the African studies section at the Chinese Academy at Social Sciences in Beijing, He Wen Ping, placed this attitude in perspective when he stated that … “we (China) don’t believe that human rights should stand above sovereignty … We have a different view on this, and African countries share our view”.11 The theme of Chinese foreign policy since the Five Principles continues to centre on non-interference in state sovereignty and freedom from hegemony. Melber argues that China’s policy of non-interference does not benefit the majority of the African people and instead [i]s an attractive tune for the autocratic leaders and oligarchs still in power, be it in Angola, the People’s Republic of Congo, the Sudan, Zimbabwe or similar societies still run to a large extent like private property of cliques. Transparency and accountability are certainly not among the core values cultivated in African Chinese links. Instead these seem to increasingly offer another exit option from demands concerning the notion of so-called good governance.12

The fact that China does not seek to impose any ideological agenda of its own on Africa – in contrast to ideological concomitants of Western capitalism – shows that the country poses less of a “threat” than the assertiveness of Western countries. However, Clapham believes that many Africans who have lived under brutal domestic regimes have a strong demand for human rights. This attitude is strengthened by the fact that more “accountable regimes have been installed since the end of the Cold War”.13 A factor that China uses to its advantage when projecting its image is the fact that it was not a colonial power and had never occupied any African country. China itself was colonized by Western powers and the country retains a deep historical memory of this period. China, through its actions and rhetoric, has stressed that it does not want to control Africa’s political or economic systems. Furthermore, China has not appointed any military consultant to governments in Africa and thus far has not constructed any military bases on the continent.14 The background to China’s contemporary relationship and position in Africa can be found in China’s ‘going out’ strategy, which was made 11

Mooney, “China’s African Safari”, 5. Melber, “China in Africa”, 9. 13 Clapham, Africa in the International System: The Politics of State Survival, 6. 14 Wortzel and Steward, “The US Formula for China.” 12

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public by former President Jiang Zemin at the 16th National Party Congress in 2002. President Jiang defined the strategy as a method to assist China in opening up to the world diplomatically and economically. Jiang stated that [W]e should encourage and help relatively competitive enterprises with various forms of ownership to invest abroad in order to increase export of goods and labour services and bring about a number of strong multinational enterprises and brand names. We should take an active part in regional economic exchanges and cooperation.15

To fulfil the “going out” strategy, Chinese multinational corporations were encouraged to concentrate on four different sectors, namely: energy and resources, overseas contracting projects, purchasing and merging with overseas research centres, and purchasing and merging with overseas sales distribution networks.16 Sautman describes China’s rapid move into Africa as having two distinctive sets of China-Africa links, which, within the paradigm of China’s soft power, attracts relations with the continent’s political and intellectual elites. The first set is described as the Beijing Consensus which is an ideology within neo-liberal parameters that nevertheless takes seriously some aspirations of developing states often ignored or opposed by the West. The other set involves China’s African aid and migration links which, unlike those of the West, are often seen by Africans as not exclusively serving foreign and elite interests.17

The Beijing Consensus (the popular reference to China’s approach to Africa) as seen by Ramo are “Chinese investments, aid and trade not being conducted by the demands made by the West and international institutions”. More conservative observers see the Beijing Consensus as “economic growth without the constraints of democratic institutions or economic developments without political change”.18 Ramo sees the Beijing Consensus as the articulation of state and economy in China which is reflected in the country’s approach to 15

Zemin, Jiang Zemin’s Report to 16th Party Congress. Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China (PRC), Shanghai Puts Forward a Basic Train of Thoughts and Development Target for ‘Going Out Strategy’. 17 Sautman, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa. Centre on China’s Transnational Relations”, 6. 18 Asia Times, 9 November 2005, 5. 16

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international relations. It is seen as a “multi-faceted policy set that forefronts constant innovation as a development strategy (rather than a one-size-fits-all neo-liberal orthodoxy) and uses quality of life measures, such as equality and environmental factors in formulating the strategy”. In effect, Ramo regards the Beijing Consensus as a “model” (denied by China) within the neo-liberal paradigm, but with distinctive features.19 Both the “Peaceful Rise” and “Going Out” strategies fall within China’s “Greater Grand Strategy”, which is greatly determined by the goals of internal modernization. China’s ultimate aim is to develop its economy without disrupting its internal stability (in the case of the political leadership, this refers to the Communist Party’s control on power) so that China can once again become a recognized regional and international major power. Although the general goal has largely remained unaltered since the communists came to power, the method and strategies to approach this challenge have undergone sweeping changes.20 2000 was a watershed year in Chinese-African relations, with the first China-Africa Co-operation Forum (CACF) held in Beijing from 11 to 12 October 2000 in what became known as the ‘great leap forward’. Fortyfour African countries represented by 80 ministers attended the forum. In his opening address President Jian Zening said that China is the largest developing country in the world and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries… China and Africa are faced with both historical opportunities for greater development and unprecedented challenges. At this historical juncture, an in-depth discussion between us on how to strengthen co-operation and promote common development will undoubtedly exert a far-reaching important impact on the cross century development of Sino–African relations, closer south-south cooperation and the establishment of an equitable and just new international political and economic order.21

Two functional documents came out of the forum: The Beijing Declaration and the Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economies and Social Development. The first was a political approach which highlighted how Beijing’s vision could help African states overcome their underdevelopment, partly with China’s aid. The second, which was a more practical approach, suggested promoting south-south cooperation, improving north-south reactions, and involving international 19

Sautman, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa. Centre on China’s Transnational Relations”, 15. 20 Wacker, China Rise: The Return of Geopolitics?, 55. 21 Muekalia, Africa and China’s Strategic Partnership, 8.

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business on the basis of equality and the future development of a longterm partnership which would profit both China and Africa. An additional result of this forum was that China cancelled part of the debt of African countries, which was approximately US$ 10 billion.22 In 2003, the second CACF took place in Addis Ababa. The two functional documents mentioned above were reviewed and new initiatives on how to move forward were discussed.23 The third CACF, which took place in November 2006, was the largest diplomatic gathering ever hosted by China. More than 1700 delegates attended including 48 African leaders. The slogan of the summit was “Friendship, Peace, Cooperatives and Development” and new forms of strategic partnership were developed. At the conclusion of the summit the Chinese leadership declared that 2006 was the “Year of Africa”.24 China committed itself to assist the continent through an eight-point proposal to support African Development. In this regard the country stated that it would double its 2006 level of assistance by 2009. It would provide US$ 5 billion in preferential loans and credits within twelve years and provide US$ 5 billion to assist Chinese companies to invest in Africa. Furthermore, China undertook to cancel dept of heavily-indebted poor countries, construct a conference centre for the African Union, increase zero-tariff export items to China from 190 to more than 440 from the less developed countries, establish more Sino-African trade and economic zones, and train Africans in the areas of science and technology, education, health and agriculture.25 In early November 2009, the fourth CAFC was held in Sharm-elSheik, Egypt. China’s Minister of Commerce, Chen Deming, announced that the eight measures identified at the 2006 CACF summit in Beijing had been fully implemented. China’s Premier Wen Jiabao announced eight new measures for an Action Plan (2010–2012) which outlined guiding principles for China-Africa co-operation. The most significant part of the 4th CACF was China’s announcement of its commitment to provide US$ 10 billion in concessional loans to Africa over the next 3 years as well as advancing sustainable economic development.26 Apart from the CACFs – which provide China with a vast degree of multilateral exposure with the media, African countries in general, and 22

Aicardi, “China and Africa: Between Commitment and Interest”, 7. Muekalia, Africa and China’s Strategic Partnership, 10. 24 Naidu, “China – African Relations in the 21st Century: A Win-Win Relations”, 41. 25 Wenping, “The Balancing Act to China’s African Policy”, 25. 26 Shelton, FOCAV IV – New opportunities for Africa. 23

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international institutions – Beijing utilised other instruments in its formidable “tool kit” to ensure that China’s profile and involvement in Africa received attention and acknowledgement as well as reward. China’s present action can be analyzed across the ambit of both hard (economic) and soft power actions. From an economic diplomacy approach China utilises three main tools, namely: development aid, trade, and investment.

3. Development Aid The Chinese government frequently stresses that its aid to Africa comes with few political strings attached. Chinese assistance is not based on conditionalties regarding standards (such as democracy and human rights), contrary to the approach by Western donors, makes offers of Chinese aid to African governments that much more attractive. The one condition that China will make is the issue surrounding the “One China” principle and the fact that the recipient of Chinese aid must recognise Beijing as the leader of the “legitimate” China.27 Van de Looy states that “China’s aid to Africa was never unconditional”. Over time, Beijing restructured its aid strategy and more restrictions have been included. Thus, interest free loans by the Chinese government transformed into discount loans through Chinese banks, and aid grants were restructured into joint ventures and other types of cooperation. By the end of the 1990s, China had more than 480 joint ventures in 47 African countries.28 Freemantle agrees with Van de Looy and notes that China is also a poor country and that there are as many people living below the poverty line in China as there are in Africa. Thus, “China does not talk of aid with Africa but rather frames its discourse in the context of mutually beneficial trade and cooperation.29 The aid provided by China to select African countries allows these countries, according to Walker, to obtain an alternative source of funds, which in turn “allows recipient governments to use these funds as a bargaining chip to defer measures that strengthen transparency and rule of law, especially those that could challenge elite power.” Although both parties stress that there are “no strings attached,” Walker notes that this factor is not so benign. There is a combination of “subtle and not-so-subtle conditions” attached, the most obvious being the fact that the funds 27

Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences”, 463. 28 Van de Looy, Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership, 8–9. 29 Freemantle, “China in Africa: Is the Continent Being Re-colonised?”, 3.

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obtained are frequently conditioned on being used to purchase select goods from Chinese firms without the involvement of any bidding or tender process.30 In China’s defence, it should also be noted that other countries providing aid to Africa have similar approaches. For example, about 80% of U.S. contracts and grants must be used to purchase goods and services from U.S. companies and NGOs. In the case of Italian aid, about 90% must be sourced from Italian institutions while 60% to 65% of Canadian aid comes with similar conditions. Aid from Germany, Japan, and France comes with similar preconditions.31 Le Monde also sees Chinese aid as supporting a separate agenda. The example of China’s export bank, Eximbank, was provided. The bank provided a US$2 billion line of credit to Angola at 1.5% over 17 years. The loan was to assist Angola with reconstruction of infrastructure, including administrative buildings and electric railways. In return, China was guaranteed 10,000 barrels of oil a day. Furthermore, Chinese companies were offered preferential access to lucrative contracts for Angola’s reconstruction. One of the conditions for the loan was that only 30% of subcontracting work would go to Angolan firms while the remaining 70% were reserved for Chinese companies.32 In the past when China provided aid to African countries it would normally do so through the provision of prestigious projects, so as to stress that what it had provided was all that it could with regard to technical and financial resources. Presently, assistance and aid have become more pragmatic and China provides assistance within three main themes: Chinese medical teams, scholarships for Africans to study in China, and building projects.33 China started sending medical teams to Africa as early as 1964, with the first country being Algeria. The Chinese note that up to 180 million patients have been treated in 47 African countries by as many as 15,000 doctors. Many African companies continue to support Chinese medical teams and pay their expenses. The programme of “health diplomacy” falls strongly within the ambit of China’s soft power approach. China’s health diplomacy is so advanced that the country has actually allowed responsibility for health teams’ actions to be taken at the provincial level. Thus, the province of Fujian, for example, will manage health issues/teams

30

Walker, The Dark Side of China Aid, 8. Sautman, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa”, 24-5. 32 Le Monde diplomatique, 1–2. 33 Van de Looy, Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership, 6. 31

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for Botswana, while Hunan province takes responsibility for Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, and Zimbabwe, etc.34 The Chinese Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Education, and Science and Technology jointly use a fund to train and educate Africans. As of 2003, 6,000 Africans have been trained in Africa, while 1,500 African students receive scholarships each year to study in China. Furthermore, Chinese universities have strong relationships with various African universities.35 The largest construction project China undertook was the 1,800 km Tanzania-Zambia railway, which cost over US$450 million, was completed in 1976, and, at the time, was seen as highly unnecessary. Since that time, China has been involved in the construction of wells, roads, and telecommunications facilities, etc. Traditionally, political allies were almost guaranteed the development of large projects, such as the construction of stadiums, palaces, factories, and government buildings. The fact that China claims that its aid and assistance do not have any political conditions is in stark contrast to the stance of Western donors who have, according to Tull, “progressively undermined the sovereignty of African states by imposing reform agendas on them: first in the guise of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s, followed in the 1990s by demands for democratic reform. In light of the persistent stress which economic and political conditions have forced upon African governments, it is hardly surprising that the Chinese stance on the issue of sovereignty is gratefully acknowledged by African governments.36 China has gained a reputation for completing a given project in Africa when implemented, which differs from the West and its response to developments regarding corruption, which, when discovered, normally result in a project being cancelled or at the very least being suspended. The aid obtained from China benefits African governments more directly than the policies of donors from the West. The fact that the political elites in Africa obtain grandiose and prestigious buildings, which are highly visible, allows for the people of the given country to see the assistance, which in turn also allows for a degree of recognition to be given to the African leadership for what they have obtained for their countries. African allies are immensely grateful to this type of support from China. 34 Thompson, “China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the “Beijing Consensus” to Health Diplomacy”, 3–5. 35 Van de Looy, Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership, 8. 36 Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences”, 466.

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Jakobson placed Chinese assistance to Africa in greater perspective. She states that China in the 21st century has provided little direct aid (i.e. direct capital) to developing countries. Instead, China’s aid comes in the form of concessional loans at very low interest rates (1% to 2%) given by the China Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank (CDB) to Chinese companies so as to undertake infrastructure projects, which include ports, roads, dams, and railways, as well as medical centres, power plants, oil facilities, and mines. In essence, China concentrates on “hardware” as opposed to the West, which has a “software” approach. The West focuses on capacity building in the recipient country. The Chinese stress that their approach “leads to tangible result that benefit the African populace.” To lend vision to China’s approach, Chinese leaders and diplomats stress the relevance of equality in their relationship with African countries and continuously attempt to avoid the words “assistance” and “donor” when talking about development aid, and rather use the term “economic cooperation”.37 Many of the “aid” projects those Chinese companies are involved in are not commercial. Others are financed through “tied” Chinese aid. Initially many projects are not profitable, as the Chinese tend to set costs below market rates. However, the Chinese realize that short term commercial profits do not exclude the possibility that investments will yield significant returns in the long-term. Political influence gained from goodwill projects also allows for doors to be opened for more commercially or strategically viable business in other sectors within an African country, such as securing tenders for mining and oil concessions.38 It should be stressed that China’s aid projects are through state-owned companies and their actions do not have to be profitable as long as they fulfil China’s overall objective. As Lyman writes, “China can use aid, investment and technical inputs to win long term gains and access, with a willingness to “lose” much in the short term to gain in the long run”.39 China’s position on international non-interference in African political and economic reform notes that the country will, in theory, support African led efforts to establish sustainable development and sound governance when it is African-led, through such initiatives as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is promoted as “a consensus framework of the (African) member countries to promote 37 Jakobson, “China’s Diplomacy toward Africa: Drivers and Constraints”, 409– 10. 38 Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences”, 468. 39 Lyman, China’s Role in Africa, 5.

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sustainable development, good governance, poverty reduction and stop the marginalization of African economies in an increasingly globalized world.” China supports NEPAD but is eager to stress that it will do so through the framework of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, thus in essence it avoids the awkward situation of having to actually promote and support the key structural elements that allow NEPAD to succeed, namely: democracy, free press, transparency, independent judiciary, civil society, and rule of law – all areas which China itself has resisted within its own country.40 Detractors will go as far as to say that China’s engagement with Africa has been in direct opposition to NEPAD and with other international bodies, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, which have been working to eliminate blatant corruption from the continent.41 The 2009 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission noted that concessional loans to Africa from China’s Export-Import Bank were not attached to conditions for fiscal transparency and political reforms. This is contrasted against loans from multilateral development organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, “from advanced democratic nations including the United States and the European Union (EU), and Japan that usually require recipient governments to meet various standards.” The Review Commission quoted the former U.S. Ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, David Shinn, to show how China’s approach disrupts attempts by Bretton Woods’s institutions to encourage democracy and transparency. In this case, David Shinn mentioned a loan given to Angola by China’s Export-Import Banks to illustrate China’s frequent approach to lending in Africa when he stated: [t]he Chinese loan offer occurred when the International Monetary Fund was at a critical point in its negotiations with Angola for a new loan. Due to serious corruption association with the oil industry, the IMF was determined to include transparency provisions to curb corruption and improve economic management. After China offered its loan without such measures, Angola ended negotiations with the IMF. The Angolan government explained that China’s loan contained ‘no humiliating conditions’ and that it greatly surpassed the contractual framework imposed on the Angolan government by European and traditional markets. An Angolan government statement added that China “understands the difficulties faced by a country that has recently come out of more than 40

Thompson, “China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the “Beijing Consensus” to Health Diplomacy”, 2. 41 Business Day, 13.

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Many African countries do not want to follow the various “restrictions” placed on them by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. Furthermore, China has rapidly – through its actions – ensured that these two organisations activities in Africa have become increasingly irrelevant. As the South African media webpage allafrica.com stated in early March 2010, China’s no-strings-attached soft loans for economic developments are a far cry from IMF and World Bank “reforms” that requires a reduction in spending on the aforementioned infrastructure. Why would governments look west and agree to voluntarily lower its citizens’ living standards on the back of exorbitant loans when it can receive virtually interest free loans aimed at investing in development and improving people’s living standards by simply looking east? Chinese loans and grants to Africa last year (2009) amounted to more than US$ 8 billion to Angola, Nigeria and Mozambique, compared to the US$ 2.3 billion granted by the World Bank to the entire Sub-Saharan African region. Therefore, as important as World Bank and IMF approval is as an indicator for countries and investors alike, the deepest and most generous pockets are found in the East.43

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not maintain comprehensive information on each project the country is involved with in Africa. However, the information gleaned from the Ministry’s website allows for an overview to be provided as to what specific areas the Chinese government has helped develop regarding assistance to respective countries in Africa up to March 2006. There seems to be a confusing mix within many of the development aid projects initiated by China and actual Chinese investment in African countries. The Wagner School reviews certain factors regarding Chinese involvement. For example, it is noted that China has provided US$9.4 billion so that natural resources production can be undertaken. A further US$17.9 billion was invested into infrastructure and public sector projects while US$5 billion was classified as not specified or other.44 It would not be cynical to note the level of Chinese assistance or aid in certain areas specifically concentrates in sectors that will lead to direct benefits for 42

Shinn, The Scarcity of Oil Resources, 241. www.allafrica.com 44 Wagner School, Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China’s Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. 43

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China, such as obtaining oil and employment for Chinese institutions. Many observers would believe that Africa’s actual development might be regarded as of secondary importance.

4. Investment Statistics and information surrounding China’s investment in Africa is somewhat vague and contradictory. Confusion centres on terminology in the media, government information, and academia regarding what China supplies as far as “development assistance / aid”, loans and actual Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). It should be noted that China does not provide specific information pertaining to FDI in Africa. Thus, some observers might well conclude that the country is content to allow for the confusion to continue, as much of the information distributed reflects the investment statistics as being a great deal more that what is actually invested. As the Economist noted, “the accounting is so opaque that it is hard to measure”.45 One example amongst numerous others is the investment figures reported for Chinese investment in Africa for 2005. According to the reply by the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs to a Parliamentary question on 20 February 2007 as to what benefits Africa was receiving from its relationship with China, the minister stated that “by the end of 2005, China had invested US$6.27 billion in 49 countries in Africa“.46 In contrast, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Africa by 2005 had reached a total of US$1.6 billion.47 There is a developing growth in Chinese FDI in Africa, but not as pertinent as what some sources report or as assertive as the trade statistics. Between 1979 and 2002, China invested US$818 million in the continent.48 This amount reflected 10% of China’s total global FDI for that year. By 2004, China’s FDI came to US$900 million.49 In 2006, Chinese FDI had increased to a total of US$1.2 billion.50 Most recent UNCTAD statistics show that in 2009 a total of US$56 billion in FDI was invested by all countries into Africa.51 According to the Vale Columbia Investment 45

See The Economist (20 March 2010), 58. Replies by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs to Parliamentary Question, 20 February 2007. 47 www.unctad.org.27march2007 48 Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China (PRC), 2003. 49 See Marks, S. (2006). p. 6. 50 Johnson, “China in Africa: Paternalist, Philanthropist of Partner?” 51 Pretoria News, Business Daily. 46

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Centre a forecasted US$30.3 billion total FDI went to Sub-Saharan Africa from international sources.52 It is estimated that there are more than 800 state-owned Chinese companies throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. The most prominent sector in which Chinese companies concentrate is oil, although others attract capital flows from China such as mining, exotic woods, fishing, and manufacturing industries. Furthermore, infrastructural development as discussed earlier also receives more attention.53 A strong disadvantage to Chinese FDI in Africa is the fact that it is seldom characterised by skills transfer, the creation of domestic employment of any type, or linkages to local businesses.54 China invests in countries from which it receives national resources – the most prominent being oil-exporting countries, as reflected in 2004 when the oil-exporting countries of Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, and Algeria received 54% of China’s total investment in Africa.55 By 2008, Africa had only received 4% of China’s total international FDI and approximately US$5.7 billion in FDI had been invested by the country for that year.56 To date, the largest direct investment China has made in Africa was to South Africa when, in 2007, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China purchased a 20% share in South Africa’s Standard Bank for a total amount of US$5.56 billion.57 In real terms, from a FDI perspective, China has invested very little in Africa when compared to former colonial powers and the United States; even Malaysia and India have invested more.58 China’s financial power raises expectations in Africa regarding future investments, which see the country developing its foreign currency reserve by billions over short periods of time. For example, in 2007 China had US$1.202 trillion, which, by August 2009, had expanded to US$2.1 trillion.59 This foreign currency reserve is the largest of any country in the world and allows the country to interact with a great deal of (economic) confidence.

52 US – China Economic and Security Review Commission. “Hearing on China’s Expanding Global Influence: Foreign Policy Goals, Practices and Tools”, 7. 53 Africa and China: Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa, December 2006. 54 Business Day, 20 May 2009, www.businessdayonline.co.za 55 Van de Looy, Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership, 26. 56 Financial Times, Japan Group Creeps into Africa, 5. 57 Financial Times, $5bn South African Bank Deal Signals China’s Ambition, 1. 58 Jakobson, “China’s Diplomacy toward Africa: Drivers and Constraints”, 411. 59 Ferguson, “Chimerica” is Heading for Divorce, 1.

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5. Trade China has become a country that aggressively pursues trade agreements. At present the country is negotiating between 15 and 20 free trade agreements with various countries throughout the world at the same time. Kurlantzick notes that when the Chinese government signs a free trade agreement (FTA) there is very little substance to it. The Chinese approach is basically to “sign it, and then work at the substance later.” China’s approach wins a great deal of goodwill60 and allows the country access to established and developing markets. The signing of FTAs is complimented with signing bilateral agreements specifically within the area of trade development and cooperation. China sends large delegations – headed either by its Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, or President – to Africa on a regular basis, to such an extent that this has become an annual affair. These visits complement what is seen by many observers as a strategy followed by China in which each African partner has a role: one sells platinum, another provides oil, while another will sell gold and diamonds; others will suggest alimentary goods or textiles. An example of how eager African countries want to enforce their relationship with China can be seen in 2006, when a Chinese mission led by President Wen Jiabao came to the continent. During this period, various commercial agreements were signed with Morocco, agreements were signed with Angola and Nigeria regarding the oil sector, telecommunications and infrastructural sector development agreements were signed with Congo (Brazzaville), while agreements surrounding the power/electricity sector were underwritten with Kenya. Scientific and technological agreements were also signed with South Africa and Egypt. During Wen Jiabao’s visit he also signed thirteen bilateral agreements with South Africa.61 The main catalyst for China’s relationship with Africa is based on trade. It is within this sector that China is unaccountably scrambling for commodities on the continent with specific emphasis on mineral resources and oil. China is highly dependent on natural resources and will continue to be so, should it wish to continue its impressive economic growth trajectory. A significant pillar of this is Africa-China trade. To promote and add emphasis to its relationship with the continent, China’s President Hu Jintao has visited Africa six times since 1999 and Premier Wen Jiabao 60

Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, 4. 61 Gattamorta, “Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa: A Troubled Continent Between Past and Future”, 2.

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has toured the continent on three separate occasions (in comparison, President Bush only visited Africa twice during his eight year term, while President Obama has paid a two day visit to Egypt and Ghana respectively). China has the world’s largest population and a straining economy to develop. The state has a central role in securing resources. This has become a national prerogative. Many other governments would rely mostly on the “invisible hand” to meet expanding supply and demand needs; however, in China’s case the state has, due to its very character, undertaken the responsibility to play the central role in meeting the country’s strategic requirements. To assist the Chinese government with developing trade with Africa it has numerous state-operated enterprises (SOEs) to meet its responsibilities. These SOEs have been given a mandate to procure resources regarded as being of strategic national interest. These resources, amongst others, include iron core, nickel, zinc, copper, oil, and gas. The SOEs have direct political support and huge credit lines from Chinese banks and developing international business exposure.62 China has already replaced the U.S. as the largest market for copper, iron ore, aluminium, platinum, and other commodities. It would seem that the country has an unstoppable appetite for raw materials. In 2003, China had imported as much as US$140 billion in commodities. In the same year, China imported 5.6 million tons of aluminium, up from 1 million tons in 1990. In 1990, the country imported 20,000 tons of refined copper; by 2003 the country had imported 1.2 million tons. In 1993, the country imported 20,000 ounces of platinum, which had increased to 1.6 million ounces by 2003, while nickel, which had not been imported before, rose to 61,500 tons during 2003. In the same year, China had already commanded 20.6% of the global copper market compared to 16% for the U.S. It was forecasted that China would, by 2005, account for 21% of global aluminium demand compared to 20% for the U.S. The country produced 35% of the world’s coal production, 20% of zinc output, 16% of phosphate output, and 20% of the world’s magnesium output. Within the steel sector, China has become the world largest producer, producing 220 million tons a year – more than Japan and the U. S. combined. The country is undergoing a massive process of urbanization; hence, a massive demand for steel continues. Furthermore, there is an “explosive demand” for cement. Since 1985, China has commanded 40% of the worlds cement production and, by 2004, the country was using more than 640 million tons per year, six times more than America was using. The country has 62

Hewit, China Changes Rules of Resource Game, 4.

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begun to build reserves of raw materials and has 54% of the world’s manganese resources, 23% of silver reserves, 23% of lead reserves, 11% of vanadium reserves, 12% of coal reserves, and 6% of copper reserves.63 Despite what China has been able to acquire and purchase, the country continues to hunger for more to feed its rapid growth. Africa has many of the most strategic natural resources which China almost demands to acquire. The compounded growth of all trade between Africa and China from 1995 to 2009 increased by 25% a year, with imports increasing by 27% and exports increasing by 23%. The height of bilateral trade was in 2008 when total bilateral trade reached US$106.75 billion, and then decreased in 2009 to US$90 billion. A breakdown of the top 20 products imported from Africa to China in 2009 saw mineral products at 79%, base metals at 5%, precious stones and metals at 4%, wood products at 2%, and textiles and clothing at 1%. These products account for 91% of Africa’s total imports to China. Statistics regarding China’s top 20 products exported to Africa in 2009 represent only 36% of China’s total exports to the continent. This indicates the diversity of the country’s exports. This is reinforced by the fact that China’s top five export products account for only 18% of total exports to African countries in 2009. The primary export products, which are mainly value-added manufacturing products, are comprised of machinery at 6%, transport equipment at 5%, textiles and clothing at 3%, footwear at 2%, and plastic products at 2%.64 China’s major African trade partners in 2009 were Angola (19%), South Africa (17%), Nigeria (7%), Sudan (7%), and Egypt (7%). The country’s trade with these five countries represents 56% of China’s total trade with Africa. Certain trends and developments are notable. China’s total trade with Africa came to only 1% of its international trade, but grew 3% to 4% between 2006 and 2009. During the same period, the most dominant imports from Africa to China originated from Angola and South Africa. China’s main exports to Africa have remained unchanged, although the composition of the main five products changed annually. For example, in 2006 textiles and clothing were the main export products, with an 8% share of total exports, but by 2009 textiles and clothing exports came to 3%, while machinery has been the main export product since 2007. A factor that cannot be ignored is the type of products being exported from Africa. The vast majority of exports are (resource based)

63

Hele, China’s Growing Appetites (Demand for industrial raw materials impacts trade, foreign policy), 1–5. 64 .

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commodities. If the main export from Africa, namely mineral products (79% for 2009) is further analysed, 73% of this leading export is oil.65 China’s demand for oil and Africa’s ability to meet this demand is the primary reason behind China’s present and future relationship with the continent. China, through the Daqing oil fields in the north of the country, was able to meet domestic demands until the beginning of the new millennium. By 2005, China was consuming 6.59 million barrels per day (bpd) while local producers were only able to provide 3.75 million bpd.66 It is estimated that China’s energy demand will increase considerably and, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the country’s oil demand will reach 14.2 million bpd by 2025. Furthermore, it is expected that in the same year the country will have to import at least 10.9 million bpd. Already, China has become the second largest oil consumer after the U.S. and stimulates demand for almost 40% of the world’s oil. Due to China’s rapidly growing economy, the country is not able to meet consumption requirements through domestic production and has sought oil from outside its borders. In this regard, from 1998 to 2003 almost 60% of China’s crude oil originated from the Middle East (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 12 January 2005). Thus, in real terms, China was a net exporter of oil until 1993. The country’s need for oil developed so rapidly that, by 2004, the country had already become the second largest importer of oil in the world.67 2003 saw China spreading its risk and securing oil from Africa to the extent that by 2005 China was importing nearly 701,000 bpd from the continent, about 30% of the country’s total oil imports and about 10% of the continent’s total oil exports. It is believed that China has a strategy in place to increase imports in the near future.68 China uses three main companies, namely: China National Petroleum Corporation, Sinopec, and CNOOC, to pursue its foreign industrial policy. All three companies were established in the 1980s and are listed on the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges. These firms remain the “tools of the Chinese government” and reflect the Chinese leadership’s ambition to compete with Western oil companies. Despite these companies’ capital strength, Chinese oil companies have less capacity than Western oil companies operating on the African continent. Jin Zhang notes that 65

. Global Insight, “China Increases Security of Supply with Energy Deals in Nigeria and Kenya”, 33. 67 Soares de Oliveira, China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace. The Geopolitics of Chinese Oil Investment in Africa, 158. 68 See Hurst (July 2006), p. 4. 66

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Chinese companies do not have the technical ability and business approach of Western institutions. She states that Chinese oil firms are “relatively backward” pertaining to technological capacity.69 Despite these disadvantages, the three Chinese companies now have interests in nearly 20 African countries, “from Libya in the north to Nigeria in the west, Angola in the south and Ethiopia in the east”.70 Despite the challenges faced by Chinese oil companies that wish to establish themselves in Africa, the fact remains that Africa has approximately 7% of the world’s known oil reserves and China desperately needs energy to drive its economy. The fact that new oil deposits are being discovered in countries such as Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia presents opportunities that China cannot ignore.71 It is estimated that (according to conservative estimates) Sub-Saharan Africa will have obtained more than US$200 billion in oil revenues by 2015, the most concentrated influx of revenue in Africa’s history.72 As highlighted by the World Bank, since the mid-1990s, oil-exporting countries have grown three times faster than non-oil exporting countries.73 In the Gulf of Guinea it is estimated that there are currently about 60 billion barrels of exploitable crude oil. Petroleum companies are gravitating to Africa and the opportunities presenting themselves to these institutions. Chevron Texaco, for example, has invested US$20 billion in exploring new resources while Shell Petroleum in Nigeria is pumping more than a million barrels a day.74 It is within this milieu that Chinese companies are also seeking opportunities and establishing themselves. On a micro level, Nigeria accounts for 3.07% of African oil exported to China; Equatorial Guinea, 9.17%; Republic of Congo, 13%; Sudan, 24.66%; and Angola, 46.8%.75 China’s influence within Africa’s oil sector is expanding, but the country remains a secondary influence when compared to the West. By 2008 it was exporting 9% of Africa’s oil while Europe and America was exporting 36% and 33% respectively. Furthermore, China has invested US$10 billion specifically in Africa’s oil infrastructure, while other international companies such as Total, Shell, and Exxon Mobil have 69

Zhang, Catch-Up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry, 79. 70 Chen, “China’s Oil Safari“, 12-4. 71 Thompson, “China’s Crucial Role in Africa”, 5. 72 Africa Today, September 2005. 73 World Bank, Africa Development Indicator, 43. 74 See McCullum, (Jan–May 2006), p. 2. 75 Thompson, “China’s Crucial Role in Africa”, 5.

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invested US$168 billion.76 Tull notes that China has a mercantilist approach towards securing oil interests in Africa, and utilises the interconnectedness of diplomatic, political, and economic strategies to secure oil supplies. China has concentrated on so-called niche markets in Africa, which are, in effect, countries in Africa where there is little competition, either due to political factors such as sanctions (e.g. Sudan), or where Western multinationals have limited access due to the countries being new oil producers (e.g. Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea).77 The fact that China has become more assertive regarding involvement of its oil companies – which are owned by the state and are thus basically an “extended arm of the Chinese government” – and also regarding its strategic objectives in countries such as Nigeria and Angola, where the U.S. and E.U. countries have been established in the oil industry to up to fifty years, reflects the determination of China to secure its energy security policy and oil demands in Africa by what has been described as “petrodiplomacy”. Houser identifies a concerning twist to China’s export of African oil. He calculates that China’s national oil companies (NOCs) produced approximately 681,000 bpd in 2006. If all this oil was returned to China, about 19% of the country’s total imports would have been met. However, Houser states that most of the oil does not actually get sent back, but is sold on the open market to the highest bidder.78

6. Conclusion China’s thrust into Africa should be seen as an opportunity and not a threat. If Africa had more adept elites, the advantages offered due to the developing relationship could be better managed and benefited from. The rapidly developing relationship should be managed in a comprehensive manner that brings more benefits to the continent. Joseph Nye’s soft power approach within the context of China’s relationship with Africa was briefly mentioned in this paper. The fact that the country conducts a mercantilist approach towards Africa has thus far gone largely unnoticed. China has followed the path of least resistance surrounding its relationship with Africa, and in the short term the country has derived immense benefits from its policy of non interference towards African countries. It is 76

. Tull, China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences, 469–70. 78 Houser, “The Roots of Chinese Oil Investment Abroad”, 189. 77

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believed that although the country has conducted a great deal of research on how to develop and maintain its relationships with Africa, in the medium to long term the country will possibly pay a price for its assertive foreign policy. Soft power plays an extremely important role within China’s foreign policy with Africa, and many observers believe that it will surpass the West’s and America’s actions and image on the African continent. There is no possibility of this process occurring within the next century. The reality is that China, within the soft power context, offers very little in real terms. No African gravitates towards China as a possible country to immigrate to, reads Chinese literature, or watches films in Mandarin or Cantonese. Furthermore, although Chinese food might have its attractions, other cultural aspects such as music and education are very weak draw cards. Furthermore, there are no role-models that the youth in Africa are drawn to, or wish to emulate. The fact that Chinese goods are cheaper and more abundant allows for their popularity, but the fact remains that the average African would rather purchase a reliable western car or goods rather than a cheaper and, some would state, less reliable product made in China. American culture and products are idealized; brand products such as Coca-Cola, Nike and McDonald’s are well known and respected. American music, cinema, literature and other cultural attractions are well known and appreciated. In general, American and Western values are seen as being the apex with regard to aspirations. The fact that China has no NGOs operating on the continent and that its poor human rights and governance abilities are questionable, is apparent to the majority of African elites. China conducts a relationship based on a “one size fits all” approach, which in the medium term will reflect the country’s deficiencies. Although the country has a vast population, its engineers, doctors, technicians, and development assistance workers still need a great deal of experience to meet the cross-cultural challenges of working within the African milieu. It is noted that while China specifically conducts its relationships within the paradigm of a government-to-government relationship, the U.S. – and by extension the E.U. – maintains an approach whereby civil society institutions are utilized to conduct “people-topeople” relationships. The fact remains that Western, and notably American, values are what the vast majority of Africans aspire to, including the elites, whereas China, its values, and its products are seen in a very distant second place. Ultimately it is the elites of Africa that must harness their capacities in a collaborative stance which would allow them to benefit from the myriad opportunities available through their relationship with China, the U.S., the E.U. and other potential partners.

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Works Cited Aicardi, M. “China and Africa: Between Commitment and Interest.” African Geopolitics. 2004. [quoted 2008-08-15]. Available at WWW: . Anshan, L. “China and Africa: Policy and Challenges.” World Security Institute. China Security 3, no. 3 (Summer 2007). Clapham, C. Africa in the International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Gattamorta, M.E. “Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa: A Troubled Continent Between Past and Future.” Quarterly Year IV, no. 203 (July 2006). Hele, D. China’s Growing Appetites (Demand for industrial raw materials impacts trade, foreign policy). The National Interest, 2004. Houser, T. “The Roots of Chinese Oil Investment Abroad.” Asia Policy, 01/05/2008. Jakobson, L. “China’s Diplomacy toward Africa: Drivers and Constraints.” International Relations of the Asia – Pacific 9 (2009). Johnson, C. “China in Africa: Paternalist, Philanthropist of Partner?” International Affairs Journal at U.C. Davis, 09/06/2007. Kurlantzick, J. (2007). Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World. (August 2007). Foreign Policy Research Institute. Lyman, P.N. China’s Role in Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. Presentation to the US-China Commission, 07/21/2005. Mawdsley, E. China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University, Department of Geography, Geography Compass, 2007. Melber, H. “China in Africa.” Nordiskaa Afrikaintitutet, Uppsalas Current Affairs Issue, no 53 (2007). Mooney, P. “China’s African Safari.” Yale Global, 01/03/2005. [quoted 2009-04-07]. Available at WWW: Muekalia, D.J. “Africa and China’s Strategic Partnership.” African Security Review 13, no. 1. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004. Naidu, S. “China – African Relations in the 21st Century: A Win-Win Relations.” Current African Issues, no. 53 (2007). Uppsala: Nordica Afrikainstitutet. Sautman, B.V. “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa.” Working Paper no. 12. Hong Kong: The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Centre on China’s Transnational Relations, 2006.

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Shinn, D. The scarcity of Oil Resources. Conference by the Forum for American / Chinese Exchange at Stanford University, April 10, 2007. [quoted 2008-08-09]. Available at WWW: Snow, P. “China and Africa: Consensus and Camouflage.” In Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, edited by Robinson, T. and D. Shambaugh. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Soares De Oliviera, R. China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace. The Geopolitics of Chinese Oil Investment in Africa. Columbia University Press, 2008. Thompson, D. “China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the “Beijing Consensus” to Health Diplomacy.” China Brief 5, no. 21 (13 October 2005). The Jamestones Foundation. Thompson, J.P. “China’s Crucial Role in Africa.” Africa Files 6, August/November 2007. [quoted 2009-02-13]. Available at WWW: . Tull, D.M. “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences.” Journal of Modern African Studies 44, no. 3 (2006). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. US – China Economic and Security Review Commission. “Hearing on China’s Expanding Global Influence: Foreign Policy Goals, Practices and Tools.” March 18 2008. Testimony of Mohan Malik. Vale Columbia Centre on Sustainable International Investment. Columbia FDI Perspectives 15. October 08, 2009. Van De Looy, J. Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership. ASC Working Paper 67. Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2006. Wacker, G. China Rise: The Return of Geopolitics? SWP Research Paper. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, February 2006. Wagner School. Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China’s Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. NYU: Wagner School, 25 April 2005. Wenping, H. “The Balancing Act to China’s African Policy.” World Security Institute. China Security 3, Summer 2007. Zhang, J. Catch-Up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry. London: Routledge, 2004.

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Furguson, N. Newsweek. “Chimerica” is Heading for Divorce. August 15, 2009. Financial Times. $5bn South African Bank Deal Signals China’s Ambition. October 26, 2007. —. Japan Group Creeps into Africa. March 12, 2010. Walker, C. International Herald Tribune. The dark side of China aid. March 25, 2010. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. January 12, 2005. Le Monde diplomatique. May 2005. Hewit, J. Mail and Guardian. China Changes Rules of Resource Game. February 14, 2007.

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“Trade with China must Benefit Africa.” Business Day [online]. Mathabo le Roux. May 20, 2009. [quoted 2012-11-11]. Available at WWW: . Chen, S-L.J. “China’s Oil Safari.” September 10, 2006. [quoted 2008-1212]. Available at WWW: . Freemantle, S. “China in Africa: Is the Continent Being Re-colonised?” May 09, 2009. [quoted 2009-12-28]. Available at WWW:

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WHITHER ARAB NORTH AFRICA? DOMESTIC CHANGE AND ITS DIPLOMATIC RAMIFICATIONS MASAHIRO KASHIMA 1. The Current Results of the “Arab Spring” The “Jasmine Revolution” which overthrew a dictatorial regime in Tunisia in January 2011 quickly spread to other Arab countries. Along with Tunisia, three other dictatorships have also been toppled so far. Most Arab countries had been authoritarian and undemocratic, and the revolutions inspired a hope that the wave of democratization would engulf all Arab countries sooner or later, just like the democratic revolutions in Poland and Hungary in 1989 soon spread to all communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Arab countries however, despite a common official language and writing system, are quite distinct from one another. Up to now, only three democratic revolutions succeeded in their objective of overthrowing the government (in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya). This is in a region of eighteen countries and one autonomous region (Palestine). We may classify the countries into four groups: 1. Countries where revolutionary change has taken place (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya) 2. Countries where civil war has shaken the regime (Bahrain, Yemen, Syria) 3. Countries where mass demonstrations have resulted in minor change (Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) 4. Countries where there was no major upheaval (Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, UAE, Qatar, Mauritania, Palestine) We will discuss the Group A countries in detail shortly, but will briefly look at the other groups now. The Group B countries are suffering from a civil war type situation. In Yemen, the long-time dictator Saleh reluctantly stepped down in order to end the escalating domestic strife. The current

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President (the former Vice-President) however, seems determined to preserve the regime and thus no revolutionary change has taken place so far. In Bahrain, the Shiite masses rose against the Sunni King, but they were suppressed by Gulf Cooperation Council troops led by Saudi Arabia. Syria’s civil war has been going on for more than a year now, with its end unforeseeable. It is also possible that a civil conflict could flare up again in the other two countries (Bahrain and Yemen). In the Group C countries, mass demonstrations prodded their respective monarchies to democratize their regimes a little bit and supply special provisions to alleviate popular discontent. Poorer countries such as Jordan and Morocco cannot afford to be so generous and are more daring in their political reforms, while the oil-rich countries of Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are able to buy off popular support without making major political concessions. Some Group D countries also saw limited protest movements, but they have been able to maintain the status quo. The oil-rich countries of the UAE and Qatar are managing to keep their citizens satisfied with generous social welfare benefits. The other Group D countries, however, have suffered a great deal of civil strife and war already, and do not seem willing to experience the serious upheaval witnessed in other Arab states. The question should be asked then, why have only three North African countries (Group A) experienced major revolutionary change? What were the common causes of these revolutions? We will discuss them first, and then review the three cases separately.

2. Background and Causes of the Revolutionary Changes in the Three North African Countries There are at least three common causes that provoked citizens into uprising and made them realize radical change: (1) anger against an authoritarian regime and dictator, (2) anger against their economic woes, (3) the influence and assistance of foreign countries. Let us discuss them one by one. First, let us discuss the issue of anger against an authoritarian regime and dictator. Parliamentary democracy was either non-existent or merely nominal. Where it did exist, it was only formal and not functioning. In reality, Parliament did not have much power, and opposition political parties and the mass-media were very restricted in their activities. As a result, governance was via a de-facto single party system. When Presidents were elected by the people, it was often a vote of confidence for a single candidate, and if opposition candidates were allowed to run, their campaigns were obstructed and/or the results were fabricated. Thus,

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President Mubarak of Egypt reigned as dictator for thirty years, President Ben-Ali of Tunisia for twenty-four years, and Colonel Qaddafi of Libya for forty-three years. Opposition parties enjoyed very limited political freedom, but they did exist all the same in Tunisia and Egypt, and participated in Parliamentary elections. Islamist groups, however, were not allowed to form political parties and had to either limit their activities to social welfare projects or fight against the government with “terrorism” and thus incur severe repression (in Libya as well). In Tunisia, riots in poor inland cities like Gafsa (in 2008) and Ben-Guerdane (in 2010) became the precursors to the “Jasmine Revolution.” In Egypt, there was the “Kifaya (Enough)” movement in 2004 (which protested against Mubarak’s grooming of his son Gamal to succeed him), the “April 6 Youth Movement” in 2008 (which witnessed solidarity strikes in support of workers’ strikes), and the “We Are All Khaled Said” movement in 2010 (which protested against the police beating of a young man to death). All these movements were met with suppression but they did represent the first stages in mass protest movements that later toppled authoritarian regimes. The second, rather indirect, cause is anger against economic woes. The masses of these countries, excepting Libya, are not rich. Libya has a lot of oil and natural gas, and so its GDP per capita was 14,000 dollars in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) in 2010, but the Qaddafi regime was spending a lot on foreign aid and intervention in Chad, etc., and so ordinary people, especially those in the countryside were not benefiting much from the natural wealth. Tunisia’s GDP per capita was $9,400, and this country had fewer very poor people than Egypt ($6,200). Moreover, all these countries had a high unemployment rate, especially amongst the youth, who comprised the majority of the population. The general unemployment rate was 30% in Libya (2004), 14% in Tunisia (2010), and 10% in Egypt (2010). The influence of youth on each population can be seen from the low median age of population: by CIA estimates for 2011, it was 24 for Egypt, 25 for Libya, and 30 for Tunisia. These massive youth populations suffer from twice (or even higher) the general unemployment rate. This is especially true for college graduates who cannot find appropriate jobs after graduation and thus are very frustrated. Tunisia and Egypt started the privatization of state-owned enterprises in the 1990s, following the global trend of post-communist, neo-liberal economic policies, and were realizing steady economic growth with the help of foreign direct investment. However, the growth enabled the ruling class and their affiliate business associates to enrich themselves, while leaving ordinary people without much benefit or even with worse living conditions

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caused by unemployment, reduced social welfare, and inflation. The very poor strata were hit especially hard by the global economic recession from 2008 which reduced economic growth but raised the international price of grain and energy (in Egypt, the inflation rate in 2010 was 11%). Such hardships no doubt motivated the masses to move against their government in 2011. The third factor in the successful toppling of authoritarian regimes in Arab North Africa was the strong influence and intervention of foreign countries. Most people in Arab countries speak various dialects but share the same written language, which is also used in formal conversations. In addition to radio, these days satellite television channels like Al-Jazeera are received across national boundaries, so governments1 which control domestic media cannot prevent unwanted news from reaching their people (although Qatar seems to influence Al-Jazeera so that it doesn’t criticize the Qatari government). Even when governments shut down the local branch of the Al-Jazeera broadcasting station, citizens could access its news and videos through the Internet. Thus, the revolution in Tunisia stimulated Egyptians to follow suit, and the fall of the dictator in Egypt in turn encouraged citizens of other Arab countries. This begs the question: did Tunisia stage a revolution without foreign influence? The fact that the protest movement started in a local town called Sidi Bouzid in December 2010 and then immediately spread to other cities including Tunis was owed to the Internet and Al-Jazeera in terms of news being conveyed technologically. Politically, however, there was widespread anti-government anger amongst the masses. This anger was particularly targeted at President Ben-Ali, and was caused by corruption and political suppression within the country. For many Tunisians, their country`s governance was in marked contrast to France, the former colonial master and the model for Tunisia’s modernization. Tunisia became independent in 1956 after 75 years’ of French domination, but many Tunisians still speak French. Higher education is also conducted in French, and Tunisians regularly watch French satellite television. Many Tunisians also work or study in France, and they tell their families and friends about how different France is from Tunisia. The first President, Bourguiba, and the second, Ben-Ali, both tried to modernize Tunisia using France as a model, but both also tried to remain President for life. Ben-Ali and his family enriched themselves while suppressing any criticism from 1

Khosrokhavar, The New Arab Revolutions That Shook the World, 28-32 and 448; Nagasawa, Egyptian Revolution: Whither the Transformation of the Arab World?, 70-81. 2. For above data, see CIA.

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below, which enraged the masses as a disgraceful departure from the French model. The Sarkozy government of France was so used to amicable relations with the Ben-Ali government that it actually offered initially to help to suppress the protest movement. This French government response drew criticism from within France and internationally. Sarkozy therefore tried to make up for this political misjudgment by aiding anti-government forces in Libya from the beginning, and then playing a key role in persuading Britain and the US to join France. Qaddafi had alienated himself not only from Western countries but also from other Arab countries over the years because of his eccentric and arrogant behavior. Therefore, when he tried to brutally suppress demonstrators, citizens in other countries became enraged and pressured their governments to do something. In an unusual move, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries asked NATO to intervene, and the United Nations sided with them. France and Britain were willing to act, and the US (although hesitant since it was still struggling2 with the Iraq and Afghan conflicts), acceded to the joint action provided that it be limited to aerial bombardment. Qatar and the UAE sent weapons and even military advisors to Libyan anti-government forces. The US put pressure on Egypt, too. It had aided Egypt financially and militarily since the latter had concluded a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and was boycotted by other Arab countries. The US Army had developed close ties with the Egyptian Army through the provision of weapons and the training of its officers, and so on this occasion it tried to persuade the Egyptian Army not to help Mubarak suppress demonstrators. As for Libya, the US had antagonistic relations with it and had even tried to kill Qaddafi by bombing his tent once, so he didn’t have any regard for the US and he started to kill protesters.

3. Revolutionary Changes in the Three North African Countries 3.1 Tunisia As was mentioned above, the Tunisian revolution started in a local town called Sidi Bouzid in December 2010. A young man named Muhamed Bouazizi, who was supporting his mother and siblings by 2

Noueihed and Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, CounterRevolution and the Making of a New Era, 70-3; Joffe,“The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects”, 518-9.

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selling fruit at the roadside, had his cart confiscated by a policewoman as he had no license. It was not the first time, and so he got desperate and set himself on fire in front of the local government office. The news was transmitted via Facebook, and local youths as well as labor union activists began to protest against the local government and then clashed with police forces. Soon, labor unions and lawyers’ associations and the like organized “People’s Resistance Committees” and staged solidarity demonstrations throughout the country. On January 10th, the commander of the Presidential Guard invited the heads of the Army and the Security Forces to discuss how to deal with the protesters, but the Chief of Staff of the Army refused to use soldiers to suppress them. On January 12th, the President dismissed the Minister of the Interior, and declared an amnesty for political prisoners in the hope of boosting his popularity. At the same time, he transferred the Chief of Staff and ordered a nighttime curfew in Tunis. The Tunisian Federation of Labor Unions called for a general strike in the capital on January 14th, and so Ben-Ali promised on January 13th that he would not run in the Presidential election set for 2014, that he would end media restrictions and allow free access to the Internet, and also that he would reduce commodity prices. The general strike was nonetheless carried out the next day and while the huge mass of demonstrators chanted “Ben-Ali, get out!”, he and his wife escaped to Saudi Arabia. Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi then announced a cabinet reshuffle and declared a state of emergency.3 Thus, in less than a month after the self-immolation of Bouazizi, the Tunisian people had succeeded in ousting a dictator, although with a sacrifice of nearly 200 lives. Labor unions, trade associations, and other civil organizations played important roles in the mass protest movements. Political parties and Islamic forces, however, were not prominent. Prime Minister Ghannouchi apparently hoped to maintain the old regime without Ben-Ali, but many citizens wanted not merely a leadership change but rather radical democratization. Mass demonstrations continued, and people cried “Down with the regime!” Ghannouchi’s government allowed political parties to act freely, abolished censorship, and dismissed the executive committee of the government party, but this did not satisfy the people. In early February, the government party was ordered to cease its activity, and unpopular higher officials and prefectural governors were fired. On January 27th, Ghannouchi himself had to resign and an Interim Government with entirely new ministers headed by a former 3

Dalacour, “The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications”, 73-7.

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Parliamentarian, Caid el-Sebsi, was appointed. However, the scheduled timetable for regime change was to be drawn by the Higher Political Reform Commission, which had been organized in principle by Ghannouchi. The Commission, composed of more than 150 famous scholars, former high officials, political party leaders, and so on, suspended the Ben-Ali inspired Constitution and set the election of the Constituent Assembly for July (which was later postponed to October for technical reasons). Thus, political changes in Tunisia advanced from a mere leadership change to the establishment of effective democracy.4 In Tunisia several political parties, in addition to the government party, had been permitted to exist under Ben-Ali during his years in power. They were even allocated about 20 per cent of the seats in Parliament with a token representation in the cabinet, but they were considered as subsidiaries of the regime and could not take over government after the revolution. Instead, an Islamist party, “En-Nahda (Renaissance),” which had been prohibited until then, rapidly expanded its influence. The coastal areas of Tunisia are relatively developed and citizens are rather secular, but inland areas are still poor and rural residents are conservative. In the October election of the Constituent Assembly, therefore, the Nahda Party became the largest party, winning 41% of the 217 seats elected from 33 electoral districts. Among the secularist parties, the “Congress Party for the Republic,” which had been prohibited, became the second largest party with 14% of seats, and its leader, Moncef Marzouki, a human rights activist, became President with the support of the Nahda Party. The Prime Minister was chosen from the latter, of course, but its popular leader Rached Ghannouchi, who had returned from a long-time exile in Britain, did not run and placed Hamadi Jebali in his stead. Another party, the “Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties,” with 10% of the seats, joined the coalition government with the Nahda and the Congress parties. The Congress Party’s leader, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, became Chairman of the Constituent Assembly. The opposition parties are also secularist, and so if all secularist parties are combined, they have nearly 60% of the seats, much more than the Nahda Party. The latter, therefore, declared that it would not demand an article to make Sharia (Islamic law) the source of law for the new Constitution, and the coalition government is likely to basically follow the Tunisian tradition of secularism and gender equality (out of 217 members of Constituent Assembly, 49 are women).5 4

Pickard, “Challenges to Legitimate Government in Post-Revolution Tunisia”, 638-9. 5 Noueihed and Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, CounterRevolution and the Making of a New Era, 78-8; Pickard, “Challenges to Legitimate

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3.2 Egypt As mentioned above, there were some protest movements in Egypt like the “Kifaya” and the “We Are All Khaled Said” movements. In addition, every year on January 25th (the “Police Day” holiday), anti-Mubarak demonstrations had been attempted, drawing only a few hundred participants. But in January 2011, when Al-Jazeera satellite television reported the fall of President Ben-Ali, Egyptian young people called for political action and were eager to follow the Tunisian example. Activists of various groups secretly met and planned to organize rallies and demonstrations at not one, but as many as twenty spots in Cairo on January 25th so that police could not easily suppress them. The plan was propagated through Facebook and Twitter as well as flyers that called for the citizens’ participation. The multiple demonstrations were generally successful and some protesters managed to reach the city center. The activists then planned demonstrations on Friday, January 28th, after prayers at mosques (Fridays are Islamic holidays), and targeted Tahrir Square in the city center as a focal point for mass protests. On January 27th, the Internet was suddenly shut down (to be kept so for nearly a week), but demonstrations did take place with the massive participation of the Muslim Brotherhood members and the youths, who clashed with police forces near the square. Undeterred by tear gas and rubber bullets, demonstrators occupied Tahrir Square, and angry mobs attacked police stations in many places and set them on fire. The President mobilized armored cars and tanks, but citizens gave flowers to soldiers and called for solidarity. The next day, an Army spokesman announced that the Army would not fire on fellow citizens (which may have been influenced by American pressure, as mentioned above). Thus, Tahrir Square became a liberated zone, mostly for youths, for next two weeks.6 On January 29th, Mubarak dismissed all his ministers and appointed Ahmed Shafiq as the new Prime Minister. In addition, in a televised speech on February 1st, he promised not to run again in the Presidential election set for September. People continued, however, to demand his immediate resignation, and this demand was disseminated via Al-Jazeera Government in Post-Revolution Tunisia”, 639-47; Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, 146-9. 6 Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, 84-93; Noueihed and Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a New Era, 107-9; Kawakami, From the Spot: Egyptian Revolution and Prospect of Democratization in the Middle East, 817.

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and the Internet both inside and outside of Egypt. The following day, a group of camel-riders, apparently hired by the government or its supporters, attacked the occupants of Tahrir Square, causing death and injury to many of them. People were enraged and more than a million gathered at the square and its vicinity on Friday, February 4th, and shouted “Mubarak, get out!” Demonstrations had spread to other cities since January 28th, and where there were casualties workers went on strike to protest. Unlike in Tunisia, the Egyptian Federation of Labor Unions remained loyal to Mubarak, but independent unions were formed, and on February 10th almost all of the capital was on general strike. On that day, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was convened and it adopted a communiqué expressing its support for the people’s just demands. Shortly afterwards, Mubarak gave a televised speech and handed his prerogative to the Vice-President. The masses in the city center however, who now numbered over one million and who had waited for his resignation announcement, got even angrier. President Obama of the US also made public his disappointment, saying: “The Egyptian government must put forward a credible, concrete and unequivocal path toward genuine democracy and they have not seized that opportunity.”7 Abandoned by both the Armed Forces and the USA, Mubarak had to step down and moved with his family to Sharm el-Shaikh, a resort town in Sinai, the next day (he was later arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment by a military tribunal for his responsibility for the death of more than 800 people). Upon learning the news, people all over Egypt went out onto the streets to celebrate, waving the national flag, and honking their cars.8 The dictator fell, but opposition forces did not directly assume power. The SCAF declared on the same day that it would assume state power (via a caretaker government) until a legitimate government was elected, and on February 13th it ordered Parliament to be dissolved and the Constitution to be suspended. It appointed a committee to draft an Interim Constitution, which quickly presented one with minor modifications related to articles on the Presidential election and emergency decrees, etc. The draft was approved by a national referendum on March 19th with 77% of the votes, and the election of the Constituent Assembly was set for September, to be 7

Noueihed and Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, CounterRevolution and the Making of a New Era, 97. 8 Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, 93-8; Noueihed and Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, CounterRevolution and the Making of a New Era, 109-110; Kawakami, From the Spot: Egyptian Revolution and Prospect of Democratization in the Middle East, 17-53.

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followed by one for President in December. The Constituent Assembly election was later postponed and carried out in three stages based on geography between November and January 2012. In the more important Lower House, two thirds of the 498 seats were elected from the candidate lists of political parties by proportional representation, while the remaining one third was elected from 83 electoral districts (two from each district). The latter included many independents, apparently former members of the dissolved government party. With 54% of registered electors voting, the “Democratic Alliance for Egypt”, which is a bloc around the “Freedom and Justice Party” organized by the Muslim Brotherhood, became the winner of 38% of the votes and 235 seats. Combined with the “Islamist Bloc,” which is Salafist (based on a more radical Islamist political ideology), centered around the “al-Nour Party”, and got 28% of the votes and 123 seats, the Islamists won 66% of the votes and 358 seats. The third is the nationalistic New Wafd Party (the old Wafd Party was established after World War I) which got 9% of the vote and 41 seats, followed by the social democratic “Egyptian Bloc” with 9% and 41 seats. These results showed that liberals and secularists who had led the revolution lost disastrously, and that Salafists were shockingly almost as popular as the Muslim Brotherhood. It was an ominous development for women, all the more so as the new rule of 2010 to allocate 64 seats of Parliament to women was scrapped, and only 10 out of 508 Lower House members are women (including two chosen by SCAF).9 The Constituent Assembly organized a committee to draft a new Constitution with 100 members, but the Presidential election was undertaken during May and June without waiting for the draft, following the rules set for it by SCAF in January. Out of 13 candidates screened by the Supreme Commission for the Presidential Election (10 applicants were rejected), Mohamed Morsi of the Freedom and Justice Party got 25% of the votes and the former Prime Minister Shafiq got 24% in the first round. Liberal candidates did not survive for the second round, in which Morsi won with 51% of the votes cast by 52% of registered electors, and became the first civilian President of Egypt (but he resigned as the head of the 9

Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, 149-54; Suzuki, “The Role of the Army in the Process of the Formation of New Regime after the Revolution in Egypt”, passim.; NYT-Egypt; “Egyptian Parliamentary Election.” About the erosion of women’s rights after the revolution, see Bradley, After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts, 79-80. About political opinions of Egyptians before and after the revolution, see Kato and Iwasaki,“How have Political Opinions of Egyptians Changed before and after the ‘Revolution’?”.

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Freedom and Justice Party). Liberals and secularists were frustrated by the fact that they only had a choice between either an Islamist or a former Mubarak man.10 The SCAF had extended the emergency law before the second round of the Presidential election. Then, after the Supreme Constitutional Court judged the Constituent Assembly election unconstitutional (as some candidates on party lists for proportional representation ran for district elections too, getting an unfair advantage), the SCAF dissolved the Assembly and closed the Parliament building. President Morsi announced in July that the dissolution of Assembly was invalid and ordered the New Constitution Draft Committee to make the draft quickly. The Supreme Constitutional Court then declared that the President had no right to veto its judgment. Thus, a struggle for power has been going on between the President, the SCAF, and the Supreme Constitutional Court. Moreover, when the New Constitution Draft Committee (controlled by Islamists) submitted the draft in November and President Morsi announced that it would be put to national referendum, secularists protested and clashed with Muslim Brotherhood men, which resulted in many casualties in December.11

3.3 Libya As mentioned earlier, the ruling circle around Qaddafi arbitrarily used national wealth and did not sufficiently raise the welfare of the Libyan people, especially in the eastern region, Cyrenaica, which had been the basis for the Kingdom that Qaddafi’s coup d’état overthrew. Upon learning of the fall of Ben-Ali and Mubarak through Al-Jazeera and the Internet, the Libyan people, especially those in Benghazi and other major cities in Cyrenaica, started anti-government demonstrations on February 17, 2011. The government immediately sent security forces, led by one of Qaddafi’s sons, and sub-Saharan African mercenaries, who were ordered to shoot at demonstrators. People were enraged and two government men from Cyrenaica, Mustafa Abdel Jalil and Mahmoud Jibril, resigned their ministerial posts and formed the “National Transition Council” in Benghazi at the end of the month. As also mentioned, France, and then Britain and the US followed by the GCC countries, began to demand that Qaddafi stop the killing and resign. The UNSC adopted a resolution on

10 11

For above, see Imai, passim.; “Egyptian Presidential Election”; NYT-Egypt. For above, see NYT-Egypt; “2011-2012 Egyptian Revolution.”

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March 18th to justify all necessary means to stop the massacres. NATO started bombing Libyan government forces the next day.12 It took more than five months for rebel forces to liberate the capital, Tripoli, and a few more months to pacify remaining cities loyal to the Qaddafi regime. Qaddafi himself was captured near his hometown, Sirte, and killed without trial in October. At the end of the month the National Transition Council announced the formation of an Interim Government headed by Abdel Rahim al-Keib.13 The civil war caused the death of several tens of thousands of people, and public security has not been sufficiently restored. Local volunteer soldiers had formed battalions, and military councils commanding such rebel forces became de-facto local governments which were not necessarily loyal to the National Transition Council. After the end of the civil war, demobilization and reemployment of such soldiers is not proceeding smoothly and many weapons and armed groups are still at large across the country. Despite such unfavorable conditions, the establishment of legitimate government was somehow undertaken. A draft Parliamentary election law was announced in January 2012, which was modified after public criticism. It outlined the electoral structure: 120 seats in 69 electoral districts from independents, and 80 seats in 20 districts from party candidate lists (stipulating that half of these should be filled by women) according to proportional representation. The Parliamentary election was postponed and finally carried out in July. Although safe voting was not secured at about 6% of polling places, about 60% of registered electors voted. As many as 374 political parties participated in the 20 proportional representation districts and only 21 of them got any seats. The largest was the “National Forces Alliance” headed by Jibril (but he didn’t run), which got 49% of the votes and 39 seats, and the second was the Islamist (the Muslim Brotherhood’s) “Justice and Construction Party”, which got 10% and 17 seats. All the rest got only 1 to 3 seats each. The 120 members elected from the 69 districts are independents and their political beliefs are not clear. The National Transition Council was dissolved in August and Abdel Jalil retired, but Parliament could not agree on a Prime Minister

12

Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, 167-74; Noueihed and Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a New Era, 177-83; Zoubir and Rozsa, passim. 13 Noueihed and Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, CounterRevolution and the Making of a New Era, 183-8; Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, 175-7.

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until October, when Ali Zeidan was finally elected and formed an Interim Government.14

4. Prospect of Domestic Change and Its Diplomatic Ramifications So, after the revolutions, coalition governments headed by Islamist parties have formed in Tunisia and Egypt, and Salafists have been openly campaigning to impose Sharia law on secularists (and Christians) in all three countries. In Libya, extremists attacked the American consulate in Benghazi and killed four American diplomats including the US Ambassador himself in September 2012. Egypt has begun to reconsider its relations with Israel and to ameliorate them with Iran. Not only Israel but also the West is naturally concerned that the Islamization of the political systems in these countries might increase the risks of future conflict and instability in the region and between Muslim states and nonMuslim powers. A typical pessimistic view is: The Arab Spring has been a dismal failure. All indicators are that what comes next will be significantly worse than what existed before, in Tunisia and everywhere else, and the traumatic events up to now have already caused untold havoc and violence and made the lives of innocent ordinary people even more miserable than they already were.15

Indeed, all of these countries had been faced with poor economic situations that placed the masses against their governments. Their economic situations have been worsening since the upheaval, with tourism and foreign investment decreasing in Tunisia and Egypt, and oil production disrupted in Libya. So, the Islamist-led Tunisian and Egyptian governments have to tackle these critical issues urgently and realistically. Additionally, the governments and armies of these countries had been dependent on Western aid and weapons that could not be easily compensated for by oil-rich Arab countries, so they will likely not want to alienate the US and the EU. The Libyans are thankful to NATO countries for their help and want positive relations with them for oil exports and for receiving direct investments. Moreover, the peoples of these countries, who have experienced popular revolutions, would not easily tolerate a 14

Kobayashi, passim.; NYT-Libya; “Libyan General National Congress election”; “Aftermath of the Libyan Civil War.” 15 Bradley, After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts, 215.

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return to dictatorship and a police state. The governments of the three countries therefore have to accommodate their liberals and their secularists, too, and will try to emulate not Islamist Iran, but rather Turkey under the Justice and Development Party’s government. In fact, the Islamist parties of Tunisia and Egypt have declared that this is their preferred approach, although only Tunisia may succeed in being like Turkey anytime soon. Egypt is likely to remain a much more restricted country in terms of general social and political freedom and liberty when compared with Turkey 16 This begs the question, what will their diplomatic relations be like in the near future? Tunisia’s will not change much, except that it will establish close ties with Libya. Egypt has come to play a mediating role between Hamas and Israel since the recent November 2012 conflict, and will further increase its standing among Arab countries in cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Libya will not dare intervene with other countries as it did under Qaddafi, as it will struggle to stabilize its domestic situation, establish modern administrative institutions, and maintain positive relations with the West to receive technical help. In the medium term, if Tunisia succeeds as a model Arab country with a functioning democracy and developed industries, it will continue to influence other Arab countries greatly and help to eventually democratize them.

Works Cited English and French publications Bradley, J. After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2012. Byman, D. “Regime Change in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects.” Political Science Quarterly 127, no.1 (2012): 25-46. Dalacour, K. “The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications.” International Affairs 88, no.1 (2012). Filiu, J.-P. The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising, London: Hurst and Company, 2011. 16

According to evaluations of the level of freedom (between 1 as the highest and 7 as the lowest), Tunisia’s political rights was 3 and civil liberty was 4 in 2011, which were great improvements from previous years and almost on a par with Turkey’s 3 and 3. However, Egypt’s were 6 and 5 which were the same with previous years while Libya’s were 7 and 6, a slight improvement from a previous rating 7 and 7 – Freedom House, Freedom in the World.

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Joffe, G. “The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects.” The Journal of North African Studies 16, no.4 (2011). Khosrokhavar, F. The New Arab Revolutions That Shook the World. Boulder/London: Paradigm Publishers, 2012. Lesch, A.M. “Egypt’s Spring: Causes of the Revolution” Middle East Policy 18, no.3 (2011). Lynch, M. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2012. Mouhoud, E.-M. “Political Economy of Arab Revolutions: Analysis and Prospects for North-African Countries.” Mondes en Developpement 40 (2012). Noueihed, L. and A. Warren. The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a New Era. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2012. Pickard, D. “Challenges to Legitimate Government in Post-Revolution Tunisia.” The Journal of North African Studies 16, no.4 (2011). Piot, O. La revolution tunisienne: dix jours qui ebranlerent le monde arabe, Monts: Les Petits Matins, 2011. Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011. Rivlin, P. “The Arab Spring and the Economic Winter.” Middle East Economy 2, no. 8 (2012). Zoubir, Y.H. and E.N. Rozsa. “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition” Third World Quarterly 33, no.7 (2012).

Japanese publications (Kashima’s English interpretation) Ikeuchi, S. “Egyptian Presidential Election and ‘Controlled Democratization’.” Chutou Kyoryoku Center News, 6/7 (2012). Imai, M. “Egypt on the Eve of the Second Republic: Ideological Conflict and Prospect for Post Presidential Election.” Chutou Kenkyu, no. 515 (2012). Iwasaki, E. “Revolution in Tunisia and the Region: Based on the Results of Presidential Election.” Chutou Kenkyu, no. 515 (2012). Kato, H. and E. Iwasaki. “How Have Political Opinions of Egyptians Changed Before and After the ‘Revolution’?” Toyo Bunka Kenkyusho Kiyou, no. 160 (2011). Kawakami, Y. From the Spot: Egyptian Revolution and Prospect of Democratization in the Middle East, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2011.

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Kobayashi, A. “National Congress Election of New Born Libya and Prospect for the Future” Chutou Kenkyu, no. 515 (2012). Sakai, K. “From ’Republic of Fear’ to ‘Arab Spring’: Background of Multiple Popular Uprisings in Arab Countries.” In Comprehending “Great Arab Transformation”: Whither the Popular Revolution?, edited by K. Sakai. Tokyo: Tokyo Foreign Language University Press, 2011. Suzuki, E. “The Role of the Army in the Process of the Formation of New Regime After the Revolution in Egypt” Chiiki Kenkyu 12, no. 1 (2012). —. “Reconsidering the Authoritarian Regime in Egypt: Causes for the Collapse of Mubarak’s Reign” in Political Science on the Middle East, edited by K. Sakai. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012. Nakagawa, K. “Starting with Revolution: Trends in Tunisia and Maghreb.” In Thinking about Arab Popular Revolutions, edited by M. Mizutani. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankoukai, 2011. —. “What Does the January 25 Revolution in Egypt Aim At?” In Thinking about Arab Popular Revolutions, edited by M. Mizutani. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankoukai, 2011. —. Egyptian Revolution: Whither the Transformation of the Arab World? Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2012. Fukutomi, M. “The Collapse of the Qaddafi’s Regime and the Future: Amid the Globalization Called Democratization.” In Thinking about Arab Popular Revolutions, edited by M. Mizutani. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankoukai, 2011. Yokota, T. “Egyptian Politics After ‘January 25 Revolution’ and Muslim Brotherhood.” Chiiki Kenkyu 12, no. 1 (2012). —. “Democratization of Egyptian Politics and Social Movements: ‘January 25 Revolution’ and the Collapse of the Mubarak’s Regime.” In Political Science on the Middle East, edited by K. Sakai. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012.

Websites CIA. The World Factbook. 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW: Conservative Middle East Council. The Arab Spring: Implications for British Policy. 2011. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW:

—. Egypt 2011: Revolution and Transition. 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW: < http://cmec.org.uk/publications/>

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El-Issawi, F. Tunisian Media in Transition. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW: Freedom House. Freedom in the World. 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW:

The New York Times. “Egypt.” 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW: —. “Libya.” 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW: —. “Tunisia.” 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW: Al-Tamimi, A.J. “Looking at Tunisia.” Philadelphia: Middle East Forum, 2012. [quoted 2012-10-18]. Available at WWW:

Wikipedia. “Libyan General National Congress Election, 2012”. 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW: —. “2011-2012 Egyptian Revolution”. 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW: —. “Egyptian Parliamentary Election, 2011-2012.” 2012. [quoted 201211-16]. Available at WWW:

—. “Egyptian Presidential Election, 2012”. 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW: —. “Aftermath of the Libyan Civil War”. 2012. [quoted 2012-11-16]. Available at WWW:

AFRICAN HEGEMONY INSIDE THE HEARTLAND: “WHO IS IN CHARGE”? NIGERIA’S ROLE IN AFRICAN REGIONAL AFFAIRS SHAIBU SUNDAY DANLADI

To a significant extent, internal pressure has been crucial to a country's foreign policy. Thus, it is natural for domestic politics to play a role in terms of defining regional hegemony. In recent decades, especially after the dissolution of colonialism, the politics of regional hegemony in Africa was dominated prominently by the Nigerians’ "self-style" territorial command. However, this situation is potentially being challenged, despite Nigeria's previous efforts and continued determination to maintain the continent’s togetherness as commander of the territorial heartland. One crucial determinant of this is the contemporary increase of democratic liberation throughout Africa, with the expression of human rights, democratic legitimacy, and the normalization of internal stability. Some African states smartly questioned the authority of Nigeria as a regional hegemon given its unstable internal affairs. To interrogate the myriad discriminatory policies concerning regional hegemony in Africa, this article attempts to strike a balance between Nigeria’s past and the contemporary politics of regional leadership on the African continent. Nigeria’s struggle to keep supremacy has raised questions of which this article addresses the implications. These analyses start with the key role of Nigeria as a historical enigma in Africa, the contemporary impact of internal instability and responsibilities, and the impact of emerging threats and challenges. The prospect of Nigerian supremacy in Africa at the close of the 21st century is questioned. This article will highlight political calculations in Africa through the global shifts in foreign policy debates. It argues that, despite domestic disturbances in public affairs, Nigerian’s see control of the African heartland as guaranteed. Without ignoring the greatest challenges facing Nigeria from African sub-regions, alignment in

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Nigerian internal affairs could help retain the country’s geographic command, primarily of security, as well as its position as regional hegemon on the African continent.

1.1 Introduction Prominent debates on African hegemony were widespread throughout the last decade, especially at the close of the 20th century. With this in mind, one knows that the African continent is essentially a green heartland of “milk and honey,” capable of sustaining the world’s economic declines. Rich in minerals and other as-yet undiscovered resources, a surplus has been wasted over the years due to the clashes of interests and politics. Over the years, a diverse group of scholars have been drawn to this demanding situation in an effort to learn about, analyse, and fix these problems for the benefit of African people. With these contemplations, several distinctive explanations have been brought forward about which regional giant is responsible for the African continent. During the current period, Nigerian hegemony over the regional heartland of Africa in the decade after decolonization has come under significant pressure, especially from South Africa and Ghana. Citing domestic instability, political violence, and the recent act of terrorism in Nigeria, one speculates that Nigeria has lost her desire to lead Africa to salvation as the African hegemon. While it is obvious that, in Abuja, internal affairs have to contribute to these radical questions, the history of Nigeria and the fingerprints of her supremacy in Africa should not be quickly underestimated by Africa's regional neighbours or the western world. I will argue that, even though the African situation has turned from failure to worse, truth must be revealed as to why Africans remain trapped within imperial ideology. Africa’s foreign policy must avoid pitfalls by not repeating past experiences. It must accept them and act on them: the same games but by different names. This first section explores the outstanding contribution of Nigeria's foreign policy toward African sub-regions, with regard to: strengthening the unity of the nation-states in Africa, peace building in Sub-Saharan Africa, promotion of development and investment growth, economic assistance towards sustainability, and efforts towards harmonization of democratic institutions in Africa. The second section explains the current impact of institutional domestic instability in Nigeria, and its continued responsibility to the African Union despite its internal strife during certain time periods. The third part will look extensively into the emerging threats from the African

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sub-regions that are clearly seeking regional hegemony in Africa. The fourth section will address questions about the possibilities of Nigeria's influence in Africa toward the end of the 21st century. The final part of this article will challenge Nigeria on the need for internal stabilization through a workable arrangement capable of strengthening her image in world affairs and within Africa. Nigeria must take bold steps towards transparency and deliver democracy through democratic institutions.

1.2 Toward the Emergence of Nigeria as African Regional Commander A difficulty for postmodern states is that democracy and democratic institutions are firmly wedded to the territorial state. Surrounding this territorial uniqueness lie: moral, identity, and domestic myth struggles; national-security issues; the need for unity in the country; and the unbroken strong demand for democratic institutions. Following independence in Africa, it is difficult to imagine how nations had looked at Africa with optimism about future prosperity. Yet, at independence, Nigerian people had a passion for liberty, freedom, hope, and the possibility of rapid economic advancements. This determination to escape exploitation continues. Even so, there are major questions about the survival of African states and about contemporary uncertainty in Nigeria. The Nigerian government had developed various strategies after decolonization to strengthen the country's doubtful future, but very little was able to be achieved despite the country's long history of independence. One strategy was to harmonize internal strife by addressing violence, identity crises, regional problems, cultural differences and religious integration. Also, the government had inherited a crisis of internal struggle for hegemony between the major languages in Nigeria, especially between the Hausa/Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo groups. To deal with this, the government used political and economic distributive mechanisms among the inhabitants. This has been the government campaign under which they were able to achieve some sustainability in the country. Indeed, on various occasions the Nigerian government rose strongly in order to liberate the whole African continent from any form of colonialism. Nigeria did this by continually searching for manners of alleviating poverty and war, creating investment opportunities, and restoring the dignity of all African people. These have been the strategies employed by Nigeria for African unity. This approach was also employed by General de Gaulle when he established the constitution of the Fifth

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Republic in France, with the aim of ending the prospect of France being ‘the sick man of Europe,’ and, since 1962, its influence and prestige are recognized throughout the world. No doubt these ideas influenced Nigeria and its image as the "self-styled" regional commander in Africa. Another historical example of this is the freedom struggle in apartheid South Africa. Nigeria has been a model throughout the history of African modern politics. It is known in world political affairs with regard to the apartheid South African experience and the liberation of the entire African continent from colonialism in the 1980s. Yet, despite Nigeria fusing into one nation, the tribal thinking and the brainwashing of British imperialism did not disappear after decolonization, and the aftermath has made Nigerians mistrusting of one another due to sectarianism established by the British.

1.3 The Changing African Foreign Policies toward Nigeria Do different flags deepen unity among the African people or create disunity between the diverse cultures, religions, and languages? Do they distance cooperation among the African people? African people need more cooperation across the various flags which represent different sovereign nations after decolonization. They must ensure the survival of their sovereign nations from any form of external threats in order to maintain internal peace and cooperation among nations in Africa. But today, many states in Africa experience complete disunity. What then could be an obvious solution to Africa sustainability? African experiences since decolonization have led many nations to be more cautious about what independence means to their people. The experience of decolonization taught Africa various lessons in the past and present, and three of these instances may be significant. First, the African people have been instructed to believe that a federal political system will allow them more effective ways of assimilation toward one primary goal. Second, they were told that institutions and representative government would lead to efficiency through dialogue toward continuing integration. This is because of existing clashes on the continent in terms of cultural, linguistic, historical and social differences. Africans were made to accept a federal political system on the assumption that it would to help manage difference while providing for deeper understanding among the diverse states. In this way, compromises could be made by these nations to achieve innovation and development. Third, these strategies were mostly employed and adopted outside of the traditional context of African cultures, beliefs, history, and political

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arrangements before colonialism. These presumed strategies for African states’ development were expressions and mechanizations of Western beliefs about African people. The West adopts various approaches to African states, primarily outside the scope of African people's desires and demands, as a way of containing the African continent. Africans nations were pushed to believe that these approaches were appropriate for the continent. Today in Africa, instead of establishing functioning institutions by eliminating the everpresent imperial legacy, on many occasions African elites keep strengthening the exploitative systems of the past without development. This has also been a great failure of the African Union. The militaristic and corrupt nature of African elites prevents Africa from being a unified continent with a common purpose. The image of the African continent today reflects those states which colonized Africa in the past, notably the British, French, Portuguese, Belgian, Italian, and German, and their imperial styles of leadership which had little care for the people they ruled. The battle for survival in Africa today is situated around control, as the African elites engage in power struggles for wealth, hegemony, and regional celebrity. This has been one of the most common factors responsible for the existence of violence, crime, poverty, frustration, and political instability throughout the continent's history in both the 20th and 21st century. Savonarola (1452–1498) wrote in Florentine history,1 and his traces of reforms then are particularly significant in discussing current African efforts to make something of colonial ingredients. He concludes that man’s nature requires him to live with other men and to set up a political community so as to promote the common good. In more realistic terms, the history and character of the people determine their choices among the different forms of government. Based on human nature, Savonarola excludes the possibility of establishing an autocracy. He also argues that people's traditions are the foremost reason to be skeptical about the government. It has been concluded that African history was distorted by the imperial interventions decades ago. In addition, the only solution to the African continent’s contemporary predicaments is to reinstate traditional African moral beliefs into African politics, as that could provide a proper distribution of leadership according to the people's rights within their culture and the states where they live. Africa must survive the current tussle for hegemonic political power. 1

Martines, Fire in the City: Savonarola and the Struggle for the Soul of Renaissance Florence.

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African political culture is technically an assembly of personalities, tired but not retired, highly ambitious for control, constantly struggling for power without developing prosperous societies for their people. Indeed, this has been the major diversion from productive change in the African political landscape. In my view, the exploitation of resources without development has been happening in Africa going as far back as 18841885. This has prevented the states from delivering on promises to African people. Memory and history continue to stand behind Africans elites’ unfaithfulness to their societies. No doubt the problems in African states yesterday seemed better than the realm of violence today. The remedy for these long-standing adversities in African states seems unknown to many African elites themselves. The culture of the African people has been misinterpreted by the elites. Now integration in Africa is becoming one of the fundamental questions for states. However, in an egalitarian atmosphere, those who are unequal must be reassured that they are as valuable as everyone else. Why should African people, with abundant resources around them, suffer as independent nations without unity and lacking cooperation among themselves? In most cases, anarchy becomes the proud owner of African politics. Issues of injustice in democratic African states have become a norm in the 21st century. How can this issue be resolved in Africa? During the early stage of African independence, the brilliant efforts by nationalists were applauded, and mostly were received throughout the continent as special achievements with considerable importance. However, the greatness of these past African elites has in the 21st century been misdirected, disconnected from the needs of African people. Obviously, this view emanates from the current complexity in the African political atmosphere. African elites have pursued their self-interests, using all manner of political manipulations to obstruct development of strategic cooperation among states. One questions whether African continents are still under colonialism. The basis of this argument is the plight of African disunity throughout the last part of the 20th century and the non-functioning of inter-regional cooperation within Africa. Without cooperation among African people, how could innovation nourish democratic developments across the continent? Specifically, there is a need for corporate development strategy in African states. This could offer a strong opportunity for evolution from poverty and underdevelopment. In the modern period, democratic transition has become one of the fundamental principles of liberal society. Yet, as a theory of development it has been a mismatched approach toward Africa. The existence of

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conflict of interest among African democratic states has prevented them from integrating as a peaceful continent. For Africans this is an emotional issue that should not be quickly forgotten. African nations must strive for an alternative explanation for their ineffectiveness, decay, collapse, and constant uncertainty if development is to find roots in African states. Therefore, I would suggest, for African states to activate their true potential toward developing their natural and human resources, they must shift their ideas toward oneness as a people. I assume this could enhance the value of African independence and also, as a process, could guarantee a well-nourished continent. As Robert Cooper acknowledges, a collectivesecurity order would not really be a new idea, since collective-security is a combination of two older ideas: stability through balance and stability through hegemony. Thus, the view here is to wake African elites to embrace a collective development strategy, which could address the problems since decolonization. This suggestion seems to be a creative path to African success, instead of the current varied attempts to question the Nigerian role on the continent as the commander of African hegemony.

1.4 The Nigerian Question: “Regional Hegemony in African Sub-Regions” As we have learnt, the end of the 20th century brought neither clarification of the existence of African nations as sovereign countries nor resolution of the issues in Africa. The ever-worsening political decline, poverty, and high levels of corruption turned the African continent into a danger zone. Emerging states in Africa have been forced into economic stagnancy. At the beginning of the 21st century, Africa is witnessing a gradual shift into another historical period of political misinterpretations of the country’s development strategy by ‘interest groups’. The threat of hegemonic struggles between African states, instead of collective collaboration toward development, is very much worrisome to African people. This situation has also in different ways clearly endangered the survival of the fragile democratic opportunities in the countries. The point I wish to suggest here is that there are “new waves of political demarcation.” This does not help African people toward peace among themselves. The African predicament is extensive and painful, going beyond a common search for supremacy by African nation states seeking hegemony. It would be particularly significant if Africans could look beyond such desires in order to draw out techniques and analytical approaches to help interrogate the emerging destructive nature of African countries today.

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Now what is hegemony? The word has been in widespread use throughout socialist circles since the 20th century. If a group was described as “hegemonic,” it was often to indicate that it occupied a leadership position within a particular political sphere (Boothman, 2008). This definition implies how the unique influence of Nigeria in African sub-regions becomes necessary. For instance, Marxist theory, with Antonio Gramsci2 classified as one of its leading figures, has proven “hegemony” to be of interest not only to the Marxists but also to those claiming the need for innovation in establishing a form of modern politics. The reason behind the adaptation of this significant movement by Gramsci was his trust in action and the primary concern for strategic progress on the community’s needs. To begin with, the use of hegemony by Gramsci signifies a sort of pressure exerted by the progressive effort to reclaim and redefine the lost glory of a group, region, or nation from the colonizer. Thus, it secures the redefinition of the group’s status and dignity of human liberty. This has been the pattern of Nigeria's leadership and growth in African regional affairs as hegemon, trying to clarify and also argue for the better for the African continent's harmonization. Ideally, the focus of hegemony is specifically on dialogue, integration, and harmonization of people and society in every democratic state. As Crawford Young argues in his excellent survey of the African colonial states, many of the pathologies of the modern African nations can be traced to the particularities of colonialism in Africa3. Therefore, considering the implications of Young’s observation, if Africans were left alone to secure unity among the separate entities crafted by imperialism, without a country like Nigeria to resolve their differences, Africa would have broken down into another Bosnia. Ultimately, the issue I intend to assemble in this study is that Nigeria’s role in Sub-Saharan Africa is to defend the practice of utilizing the benefits of sovereignty of all African nations. This has been the key idea pioneered by the Nigerian government to eliminate all various traces of the imperial particularities injected into African political spheres since decolonization. Mindful of this, Nigeria's hegemonic supremacy over the rest of the African nations is not like a game, but rather its aim is to secure for the African people a sense of unity among the different states, irrespective of how they got their independence. Significantly, the role of Nigeria cannot be overestimated by African states. African unity rests on Nigerian strategic diplomacy, with determination to continue resolving 2

Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, 351-66. Herbst, States and Power in Africa, Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, 59+.

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African states’ uncertainty and conflicts, recognizing each black African as a brother, and arranging Sub-Saharan Africa into a united Africa. Despite its domestic struggle with violence and political disobedience, Nigeria has been very skillful in formatting this African journey and defending Sub-Saharan Africa since independence. However, there was little doubt among African's nations to question Nigeria's major priorities in the African continent. Yet, Nigeria has no serious competitors in Africa to challenge its status, but rather a collection of misfortunate elites who do not see the need for African development through integration. To prove this notion clearly, in every open democratic transition in Africa, Nigeria has offered assistance despite its fragile and internal strife back home. The economic advancements, military might, population, and political influence of Nigeria has instigated and facilitated strategies to encourage African states to develop as sovereign nations instead of breaking down in what Young (2000) called schizophrenic colonial power in Sub-Saharan Africa. Societies in Africa want development but not resistance development. Even so, the elites’ views of African nations are quite different from one country to another. How can African traditions, religions, cultures, regions, boundaries, history and unique past nationalities be preserved? Should one see Africa as a stolen territory through greed? This could be understood through the instruments invented by imperialists in Africa around 1884-1885. This is noted in the quote, “The partition of Africa was recorded by Europeans on their maps, but the matter rested there, for the time being… In Europe conquests preceded the composition of maps; in Africa, the map was drawn, and then it was decided what was going to happen. These maps did not, therefore, reflect reality but helped create it4. Whichever way the realities reside in Africa, the question is not who is in charge of African hegemony but who is willing to sacrifice his potentials (e.g.: military, resources, time, human capital, dedication) for the fight for stability and growth within Africa? If not for the rudeness of politicians of African nations, I would argue that the leadership must instigate change in the face of African misery and seek to diminish existing internal predicaments. But first, the journey within Africa since decolonization needs careful reflection that goes beyond politics of either interest or diplomacy. Yet, as mentioned above, African countries have often been neglected by the African elites. Thus, for the

4 See Young (2003), p. 77; Weaseling, Divide and Rule, p. 363 – further information on request.

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same observation presented here, see also Gramscian arguments5. Nigerians need to understand their historical context in the real world if they mean for their society to escape the danger of continuing disunity within Sub-Saharan Africa. Only then can the world be conditioned to see the future possibility of development and change in Africa. The frequency of African under-development is very high. The African elites after independence created hegemony struggles between themselves. They forgot the mighty struggle of pan-Africanism, which helped in extending the world view about unique African cultures, traditions, wealth and the abundant energy spread all over the continent. Personality struggles are at the root of Africans’ inability to feed themselves, making the rule of law ineffective and then development seems impossible to achieve. I often see Africa as a self-sufficient continent with enough capacity to distribute its resources around the world. But, with emergency of “bigman” politics in Africa, such thoughts become only a dream instead of reality. I will suggest that Africans should first strive to identify their historical manipulation, instead of seeing themselves as enemies. They should evaluate the issues established decades ago by European intervention in Africa, so that visible and achievable goals can be set for the African peoples' survival as sovereign states. Until then, democracy will continue to be seen as impossible on the continent. This is because rule of law seems to have no place in African nation-states due to inequality and “big-man” politics. African integration since decolonization is declining and worrisome, with uncertainty spreading. How can Africa overcome this, given the unproductive policies since decolonization? My fear is that democracy cannot function in African states if rule of law does not apply to certain elites. Even so, I will assume that the primary efforts on the continent should be invested in constructing a cooperative strategy for development, which I think could be responsible for the continent's progress. Historically, as Hargreaves notes, “the purpose of ‘Free-trade imperialism’ was to increase the scope open to European activity, rather than to establish national reservations." Thus, history has indicated to African people how their various problems were established or rather invented, but not how to face these problems and critically eliminate them. For the African elites, to solve these problems seem unnecessary because it would not give them recognition and wealth which they want from the public and from the international community. These are very disgraceful 5

“Benedetto Croce and His Concept of Liberty.”, trans. Samuel Putnam, Science and Society 10 (Winter 1946), 289. Original citation from: Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, 355.

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ideas in African politics. For example, it was on record that the British rule in the South Africa Company never paid a dividend during the thirty-three years of her hegemony in Rhodesia.6 However, within world politics, reports about African historical exploitation often go unheard. This specific injustice toward African people has been the key priority of the Nigerian people and government since decolonization. Nigeria wishes to eliminate African pains in the various ways possible. Thus, who attempts to challenge Nigeria’s dominance in Africa? The next section shows the role of Nigeria in African regional affairs.

1.5 Nigeria’s Role in Sub-Saharan Africa Frankly speaking, at the beginning of the 21st century on the continent of Africa, there has been a strong determination to eliminate every trace of imperial past hegemony in their politics. This is another question of African politics. However, what matters to me most is how the African continent could advance beyond dependency. This study has one obvious answer to this question: attempt to open up the forgotten history of African independence struggles after decolonization in the early 1950s and 1980s respectively, as well as clarifying the role of Nigeria’s governments in African political affairs since decolonization. Perhaps there has been a shift in modern human ways of thinking, which are different from those existing in history – especially at the close of the slave trade and at the time of democratic independence of nations from their colonial masters. Even so, the greater impacts of this shift have never received adequate attention and exploration in the Africa continent. Why has it been difficult for African people to escape from this trap? Herbst (1993) observed, from a rather pristine reading, what he called “ the pre-colonial theory of sovereignty” in Africa, in which power was primarily exercised over people rather than land, and where “ sovereignty” was often shared with “ nominal obligations and allegiance to more than one political Centre.” In African affairs, the negligence of elites had to lead some groups of nations to wonder why Nigeria should be identified as the African hegemon, thinking it would be better if they themselves were in command of the sub-regions. These groups would be forgetting the memorial sacrifices of Nigeria toward eliminating the imperial slavery from the rest of the African states. This struggle by the Nigerian government could be 6

Eugene, War and the Private Investor: A Study in the Relations of International Politics and International Private Investment, chapter 11.

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observed in its exercise of authority to deliver liberation in Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically with relation to South African apartheid and Namibian independence. Berger and Luckman, observed the following meditation: “…as I move from one reality to another, I experience the transitions as a kind of shock. This shock is to be understood as caused by the shift in attractiveness that the transition entails. Waking up from dreams illustrate this shift most simply.”7 Thus, Nigeria awoke from her deep sleep to challenge the remains of imperialism, especially the neo-colonialism of Western countries. Nigeria used its influence to defend the rest of the sovereign states on the continent that were trapped in this system. Further, Nigeria has worked to strengthen the integration and the reunification of African people through numerous sacrifices. Nigeria voluntarily offered to help many nations in Africa to obtain their independent status. This is what I refer to as “self-styled leadership” for all the Sub-Saharan African nation-states. Yet Nigeria is already losing its technical strength due to domestic affairs and also because of the noncooperation of African states instead of strengthening unity among each other. Other African states now have a significant role in helping Nigeria to ascend through its internal strife, especially the vulnerabilities which were caused by Islamic obstruction in Nigeria. Hence Nigeria has stood very strongly throughout the last decade in defending African states as the last weapon of African unity and sovereignty. The design of legitimate and Pan-African democratic governance in Africa is the responsibility of each African nation’s domestic and foreign policy. Africans must be sustainable and truly dependent on their resources. It may sound hard to accomplish, but simply ask the military officer how difficult it was to face the challenge of the amazing sound of the rockets in the battle field. Yet, one thing is entirely supreme in his mind: “I stand in range of rockets and bullets in defending my country and nation.” It would have been easier for the army to retreat bashfully, looking away from the politician’s misbehavior. Even so, his one legitimate priority is the declaration of victory for his people and nation, and the courage to justify that which matters most.8 Evidently, when surrounded by fire and with outdated weapons, the urge to defend his nations is adequately beyond estimation. Echoing this same view: “I have come to the conclusion that politics are too serious matters to be left to the 7

Berger and Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, 19-28. 8 Shaibu, S.D., African Hegemony, Who is in Charge? The Nigeria’s Role in African Foreign Policy, 2012 – further information on request.

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politicians.”9 Perhaps one scenario which will appropriately illustrate this suggestion is the strong reflection of African unity during the Liberian peace agreement arranged in 1995, where George Obiozor, the directorgeneral of Nigeria's official foreign policy think tank, provoked the entire audience when he said, “By brokering a successful peace among the warring factions of Liberia, Nigeria has reconfirmed her superiority in the West African sub region, in particular, and Africa in general”.10 Indeed, the director-general’s approach is in accordance with an effort by the Nigerian majority to bring about revolutionary change and development of African nations. No doubt, there is no country where one could stay in Africa without meeting a Nigerian working in industrial human resources, or business, or sent by the country’s foreign technical aid corps (TAC). The TAC is an agency established by the law of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (under the ministry of foreign affairs) to assist African nations to refocus on integration and developments on the continent. It also works to further strengthen African countries by offering key intervention related to their economic and political survival. For instance, Locke said about human beings that, “by nature, all men are free, equivalent and independent11,” and therefore “no one can be. . . Subdued to the political power of another, without his own consent.” Thus, the only basis for sustainable government is charity or agreement between collectives of people to blend into political solidarity in Africa. Such an endorsement requires individuals to compel themselves to adopt the resolution of the majority, for if the parties to the covenant sought to preserve their natural liberty no circumstances could subsist12. What this theory entails is that liberty and rights are reasonable and hence are, overall, political obligations, and are accepted and owed only to those with whom one enters into the social contract. Accordingly, to ensure that their common human rights are protected, people must enroll themselves in a particular governmental regulation. Some groups of people may decide to cooperate in such a community, says Locke, “because it cripples not the freedom to the rest; they are left as they were in the privilege within the state of nature, see.13 Perhaps one of the prime rationales for why people blend themselves into an association is 9

“Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970).” Ahmadu, “Collective Security or Collective Disaster: Regional Peacekeeping in West Africa”, 205-23; and Ofuatey-Kadjoe, “Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia”, 261-302. 11 Locke, “Second Treatise of Government”, 52. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 10

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to achieve common security against any unforeseen circumstances which might cause political distractions that break down their existence. The African Union is one such group, as can be seen it its stages of history and in the 21st century. African states cannot ignore the legitimacy of their sovereignty. I will suggest that for African states to realize a fullest competitive advantage over their resources, cooperation among the African elites is key. Attention must be paid to the Nigerian foreign policy dreams in Africa since decolonization. Nigeria has demonstrated in various instances why it remains as the prime hegemon in Africa. It’s a fact, not just an assumption about what Nigeria seeks or claims to offer African countries. Looking at historical facts will show Africans why Nigeria's role is not negotiable. Nigerian foreign policy idealism in Africa and in world affairs since decolonization has been visible internationally. The country has evidently modeled her foreign policy on harmonization, world peace, and maintaining stability across African sub-regions. Again, Nigeria has demonstrated its role as hegemon to both Sub-Saharan Africa and the Third-World countries in general. For instance, Nigeria has been a key role model in defending peace around the world and in Africa throughout the past decades. It has also participated in various United Nations Peacekeeping operations, including those across the globe, as illustrated by the country's role in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia, Angola, Rwanda, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zaire14. Nigeria’s hegemonic position in Africa offers the country’s government the command of the African heartland. I will suggest that those who often try to challenge the role of Nigeria should stand alone like Nigeria and work towards African unity instead of merely playing politics.

1.6 The Emerging Threats from African Sub-Regions There has been recent pressure from African sub-regions to challenge Nigeria's leadership role in Africa. We could observe this in the recent attempt by Pretoria to replace Jean Ping of Gabon with the South African Home Affairs Minister as the leader of the African Union. Even so, the Nigerian government’s position is often particularly clear towards Pretoria: to allow smaller nations in Africa to occupy this legitimate post. Given the South African determination to dominate Africa by employing a 14 Claude, “Civil-Military Agonies in Nigeria, Pains of an Unaccomplished Transition”, 602-3.

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‘soft power’ strategy, Nigeria has often played down Pretorian politics through compromise. It should also be made obvious that Nigeria is one of the largest oil producing countries in Africa, and yet the South African government holds the position for the African continent in the G-20. This is seen by Nigeria as an unfair position. Despite this scenario, Nigeria continues to unfold and maintain a sweeping peacekeeping effort in Liberia and has provided military advice and training to other African states such as the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Mali. I will suggest that the need for hegemony should be seen to present two fundamental issues for the African people: (a) a motivation for corporate development assistance to their neighbours without limits and (b) a way to integrate Africa through diplomacy without favouring any domestic interest. However, African states must establish a strong leadership background which could provide them with liberty, freedom, equality of trade, peace, and sustainability toward the development. How can Africans change their history irrespective of the differences? No doubt, Africans are all living witnesses to the impacts of violence in Congo, Sudan (both South and North), Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and the contemporary issues in Mali and Nigeria. What should be the African idea of hegemony if there is no peace within the African continent? Of course, we appreciate democracy in Prague today, but the impacts of communism are yet to be removed completely from the states. These kinds of outstanding scenarios will lead us to the questions: “Why is Nigeria under a strong pressure from African sub-regions, particularly those trying to question Nigeria’s leadership role in eliminating the previous instances of imperialism in Africa? How can Africans achieve their liberty if integration seem impossible among Africans elites? What about the past pan-Africanist struggle in African states?” The search for democratic deliverance for all African countries signifies one of the fundamental roles of Nigeria on the continent, as evidenced by an extraordinary commitment by the Nigerian government throughout history. Other Africans should try to emulate Nigeria's foreign policy dreams so that African unity, liberty, and sovereignty will be sustained. Conclusively, one major issue about the African declining status we need to examine here is the changing nature of western countries toward the African continent. The continuing scramble for African resources has never been severed despite independence. What have Africans learned from their past experiences with colonialism? I often assume democracy is one of the imperial images left for the African people. Has African tradition been stolen? My regret for Africa is its inability to learn anything from its history. The African countries have

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become a centre of international attraction, and their wealth of abundant natural resources supplies them. Antonio Gramsci defined hegemony as an order in which a certain way of life and design is dominant, and one conviction of reality prevails throughout history.15 Thus, I often see it as Locke said, “Political power I take to be a right of making laws with penalties; and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defense of the commonwealth; and all this only for the public good.”16 The dominance of Nigerian ideologies in Africa relates to how African affairs could be strengthened for African unity. Nigeria is politically determined to sacrifice for the sake of liberty, morality, maintaining African customs, divine pride, and political principles. These are what the Nigerian hegemonic influence in Africa represents. In fact, there are records of these issues in some basic scholarly clarifications about Nigeria’s meritorious attempts at African unity throughout African spheres.

1.7 The New Wave in African Politics Toward Nigeria The crucial questions about hegemony in Africa might have been part of a "new wave", and this is fundamentally significant for stability, sustainability, and political diplomacy towards unity and integration. "You cannot give what you do not have." Even when this point is clear to many African states, African elites allow the politics of deception to keep occupying the African political atmosphere. What is wrong with African elites? Aristotle, (384 Bc-322 BC) claimed that, “the only stable state is the one in which all men are equal before the law.” Thus, I will argue that the contemporary hegemony crisis in Africa by some groups of nations should be a struggle to build one strong political coalition for the survival of democracy and human rights within the continent. This I see as an African obligation: to reduce the severity of poverty and insecurity on the continent. This should be the major focus of the elites in the African subregions. Certainly, the survival of democratic enterprises in Africa and the need to change their political attitudes from the politics of individualism should be the legitimate fabric of African initiatives. The solutions for the African continent with respect to political decay, states collapse, poverty, and the status of violence, reside in in the hands of all the African elites. Perhaps 15 16

Obadina, “The Myth of Neo-Colonialism.” “John Locke.”

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African elites should soften their domestic, regional, and continental politics of differentiation by establishing one common motivation to alleviate the weight from the shoulders of the African people. For the best part of two centuries now, African societies have experienced the testing of every political theory available to the Western world, without the full knowledge of whether it could function well for their societies. These modes are often imitations of other Western policy traditions, which could not offer African unity but rather disunity. Indeed, the result today is the total loss of the unique African culture and traditions at the hands of both western and Asians countries. Ideally, groups may decide to join each other in the effort to initiate and defend the existence of their liberty and freedoms. This provides fertile ground for connecting current policy to development. There has been a generational accumulation of belief in Africa following the collapse of imperialism, with expectations of making history. Yet, elite politics seem to have won out on the continent. Obviously, for the Nigerian government to retain her "self-styled'" hegemony in Africa, the country must exhaust her involvement in Africa without limitations, deepen her courage to a greater degree in solving African problems of integration, and work toward resolving her internal political imbalances. With this view in mind, the African continent will be liberated. The imperial reality in Africa fundamentally destabilized the structure, system, and unique culture of Africans with a falsehood of hatred and distrust against each other. Innovation toward changing the face of how politics and decisions are crafted for the betterment of the society should be the prime responsibility of governments. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has had an excellent expression of growth in the states of West Africa. This influence has been seen through greater solidarity in the region, enforcement of the rule of law, economic prosperity and the rise of FDI, and the creation of a valuable and political union. The Economic Community of West African States has brought in a court of justice to Africa to establish the rule of law within its member states and has also shown that it will not tolerate illegal and dishonorable actions of its member states. Another meaningful aspect of ECOWAS, initiated by Nigeria, is that it has acted jointly on valuable resources in the region, such as economic developments, water, and bringing greater prosperity to the citizens of these nations. The fundamental trick here is that elites in Africa must slow down to look carefully for viable options and a new wave of possibilities, distanced from the existing typology instituted and preserved by the Africans. For

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instance, China has changed faster than any other society in the human history. Yet, African’s are very much lingering behind. Politically, many states on the African continent are pledged in conflicts with each other, groups against governments, political parties against opposition. Domestic development seems to occupy neither the mind of the government nor of the people in poverty. Against this background, it seems from that some people in Africa would have preferred the past imperialism compared to the contemporary blackimperialism of their own people. African people are now living with many painful issues since independence: neither with peace nor unity, harmony nor development, employment nor progress, but with the highest poverty ratios in the midst of abundance. To be sure, take the reunification of Germany in the 1990s. Today, the Eastern Germans are better off as compared with many African countries despite over 50 years of independence. We have also seen how the Chinese government operates from varying degrees according to the principle of their traditions as one people, many systems. The country could not be held together on any other basis17. Indeed, Africa must realize that in an attempt to copy the Chinese's techniques of developments, they must understand that what truly matters to the Chinese is not the system but the principle of their sovereignty, which is the pride of their nation's astonishing developments.

1.8 Conclusions: The Nigerian Challenges in the African Continent The politics of pretending has drafted many nations into chaotic situations and anarchy. Perhaps African governments need to look again at their policies to make sure that short- and long-term losers from globalization – and from economic growth in general – get well-designed help. The matrix of gender, ethnicity, and class now occupies a central place in academic and political life. The way in which these forms of social organization and identification intersect in specific sites to produce forms of social asymmetry is undoubtedly the most central development in the social theorization of inequality and a central facet of the social system in the last twenty years. However, it is useful to pause and ask the extent to which the matrix of race, gender, and class continues to be useful and the extent to which the idea of intersectionalism can generate the types of analysis which can 17

“A Point Of View: Making Sense of China.”

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cover new forms of inequality in the global world. Thus, the extent of globalization and the developments of democracies after the 1990s in most parts of the European continent have not deterred nor eliminated the underlying inequality from the 1980s. The play of multiple oppressions is the regeneration of neo-colonialism shaping African unity, states, regions, people, and integration. The continuing exploration of this kind of social exclusion involving powerful countries makes the interplay of politics in Africa favour those outside the continent of African nations. Painfully, African nations are left socially, politically, and sentimentally divided by habit, attitude, colour, region, population, state, country, language, culture, and faith. I often see the challenges beyond those of continental hegemony currently shaping the entire AU, with some groups maintaining imperial methods and scientific discoveries from theories of 20 years ago. The desires of Africans which matter most are those which should be channeled toward rediscovery of the African countries’ legacies, cultures, and unique sympathy toward one another. They could resolve their internal crisis through consultation and reflection on their practical experiences from history. This situation could help Africans avoid the “multiplication of imperial symbols, imagery and beliefs into African politics18.” Consequently, the significance of the overall analysis is to challenge social and political manifestations in African foreign policy with Nigeria as hegemon of the continent. This is the characteristic theory of globalization and of harmony and confidence in oneself and one’s country in search of integration. Durkheim (1884-1893), the original disciple of constructivism, argued that human societies are held together by the “social facts” of culture, not just objectively rational reasons from “natural” or “material facts,” and that particular societies creatively invent different socially constructed identities and beliefs that suit them19. Max Weber also suggested that ideas are like 'switchmen' who often determine the tracks along which actions have been pushed by the dynamics of interest20. Africans must invent their social construction under the spirit of their ancestors and beliefs, which will affect their dynamic socioeconomic and political independence. This means they must retrace their values and respond to them as African challenges, so that unique and well-established historical African values could receive great respect in the 21st century.

18 Shaibu, S.D. (2012), In discussing African foreign policy toward Nigeria. – further information on request. 19 Shaibu (2012), On African foreign policy debate presentation, Prague – further information on request. 20 Max (1958-1922) – further information on request.

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Works Cited Ahmadu, M. “Collective Security or Collective Disaster: Regional Peacekeeping in West Africa.” Security Dialogue 26, no. 2 (June 1995): 205-23. “A Point Of View: Making Sense of China.“ BBC News Magazine [online]. 12 October 2012. [quoted 2012-10-18]. Available at WWW: . Bates, T.R. “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony.” University of Pennsylvania Press. Journal of the History of Ideas 36, no. 2 (1975): 351-66. Berger, P.L. and T. Luckman. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Jacksonville, FL: Anchor, 1966. “Charles De Gaulle (1890-1970).” BBC History [online]. 2013. Available at WWW: Claude, E. W, Jr. “Civil-Military Agonies in Nigeria, Pains of an Unaccomplished Transition.” Armed Forces and Society 21, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 602-3. Eugene, S. War and the Private Investor: A Study in the Relations of International Politics and International Private Investment. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1935. Herbst, J. States and Power in Africa, Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. “John Locke.” Great Books Online, 2013. Available at WWW: . Locke, J. “Second Treatise of Government.“ [Ch. VIII, sec. 95]. 1980. In Second Treatise of Government, edited by C. B. Macpherson, 52. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002. Martines, L. Fire in the City: Savonarola and the Struggle for the Soul of Renaissance Florence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Obadina, T. “The Myth of Neo-Colonialism.” Africa Economic Analysis, 2010. Available at WWW: Ofuatey-Kadjoe, W. “Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia.” International Peacekeeping 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 261-302.

PART II THE SCRAMBLE FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC RIM: NEW CONTAINMENT OR COOPERATION?

COMPETITION FOR CHAIRMANSHIP: CHINA IN THE WORLD HUNG LIN YEH Abstract Review China's diplomatic strategies between the 1980s and 1990s: the country pays all its attention to economic development, and seeks the “Speaking Right” (ⓐㄒḒ) in any international organizations. China believes that protecting its own rights in the international community is very important for national security as well as national interest. To speak out in any international summit is very meaningful for China, because the country plans to let other nations hear, and reminds them that China cannot stand silence any longer. The “Speaking Right” cannot satisfy China any more, particularly as the country becomes more and more powerful in military and economic areas; instead, China desires to have the chairmanship in any international summit. China has found out that being a chairman in any international meeting is a privilege with which China can initiate or amend any regulations, laws, or rules of international organisations, and this power ensures China's national security and interests. This paper aims to analyse China's diplomatic strategy of the 2000s, and concentrates on China's actions and reactions in the Security Council of the United Nations. This paper uses the historical review approach, and takes up defensive realism to show the key arguments. This paper gives as the research finding the very obvious change in China's diplomatic strategy: speaking right protection was the key goal between the 1980s and 1990s, seeking chairmanship is the centre of China's diplomacy in the 2000s, and building pro-Chinese international organisations is the core of China's diplomacy in the 21st century.

1. Introduction Since the Chinese communists took over the sovereignty of mainland China, the People's Republic of China has been recognised as having authority to be the real China. In the beginning of state-building, the

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communist regime concentrated much on domestic affairs, especially country stability, because the communist government was worried that General Chiang Kai Shek would attack to retake mainland China. In the 1950s, more and more states recognised the People's Republic of China, and China replaced the Republic of China to be the permanent member of the Security Council in the United Nations in 1972. From the 1960s to 1970s, China had a diplomatic dilemma caused by the Cultural Revolution and Diplomatic Normalisation. As we know, the Cultural Revolution was a political contest between new and old groups that plotted to control the communist party and government, and this revolution could not reform or revolutionise China, but rather ruined the country. In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, China spent a long time restoring diplomacy, and finalized China's Diplomacy Strategy in 2000. China's 2000 Diplomacy Strategy outlines priorities and its mission, and China is clear about giving up old thoughts, and adopts new ideas to embrace international affairs. This paper discusses how China competes for chairmanship in international affairs, and it concludes that China is active about hosting international affairs meetings or seeking more chairmanships to modify the current international affairs structure. China believes that the current regulation of international affairs is unfair to China's national interest. Consequently, this unfair treatment hurts China's development.

2. China’s Diplomacy Strategy in the Past This paper discusses China's past diplomacy development in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s; in the 1960s-1970s, China preferred the non-aligned movement, and assumed diplomacy was a way to worsen the Cold War and instability of international security. At that time, China was busy with sovereignty protection and internal power struggles. The People's Republic of China still fought against the Republic of China over real sovereignty, and the communist party got into a political confrontation in the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, many good Chinese diplomats were executed or exiled in underdeveloped areas, but China also started diplomatic normalization with Japan and the United States at the same time, and succeeded in taking over the seat from the Republic of China. In the end of the 1970s, the Cultural Revolution disappeared, and the new leadership constructed a new diplomatic policy to engage with international affairs again.

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In the 1980s, China modernized the economy, first of all by creating several special economic zones to adopt capitalism to better the economy, and welcomed foreign investment as well. To match the purpose of economic modernization, China cared about international affairs, and used diplomatic networks to encourage more international companies to invest in China. Economic modernization obviously helped China to escape from diplomatic self-isolation.

3. China's Diplomatic Future In the 1990s, China participated more in international affairs, and had more membership or observer positions in international organizations. In 2000, China published its Diplomacy Strategy to framework the future of Chinese diplomacy. China still attached to this the basic principles of peaceful coexistence that have guided China's diplomatic development for decades. These principles remind China not act like the “big brother” in the region as well as in the globe, to stay peaceful with the neighbouring countries, and to get rid of hostility with them. According to China's Diplomacy Strategy, China should continue to maintain peace and friendship with neighbouring countries, and open new cooperation and friendship with NATO members. Additionally, China intends to form several international organizations to favour its position and national interest in international affairs. Unlike China’s past diplomacy, China is more active in international affairs, and participates more in summits to prevent its rights from offence. It is typical for China to protect the Speaking Right (ⓐㄒḒ) that ensures China has the right to voice its needs, and has equal opportunity to make decisions or regulate international affairs. Besides, China is beginning to develop public diplomacy to ensure its Speaking Right, and plans to use the People-to-People Dialogue to deepen influence in diplomacy, to negotiate with other countries. China understands that bureaucratic systems or stereotypes among nations damage mutual understanding and cooperation. China has been prioritising public diplomacy recently.

4. Conclusion There are four periods in China's diplomacy: chaos, reconstruction, engagement, and chairmanship-seeking. This demonstrates China’s increased pride and confidence in international affairs, and one believes

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that the international society cannot be stable without China's participation. After publishing China's Diplomacy Strategy, China has been paying strong attention to chairmanship-seeking, because China believes deeply that the current regulations of any international organizations are unfair to China, and these orders make for an unequal structure of international affairs, and China cannot develop normally under this framework. Therefore, China is seeking chairmanships in international organizations or at summits in order to guarantee its interests are not offended. China has a strong economy currently, and targets more scopes of international affairs which involve multiple geographic areas, and thus it is very important to seek chairmanships.

Works Cited Dabringhaus, S.; Ptak, R. and R. Teschke. China and Her Neighbours: Borders, Visions of the Other, Foreign Policy 10th to 19th century. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997. Deng, Y. and F. L. Wang. China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005. Hao, Y. and C. X. G. Wei. Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the Next World Power. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009. Kim, S. S. China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. Lampton, D. M. The making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. Liu, G. Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition. Piscataway: Aldine Transaction, 2004. Suisheng, Z. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. Armonk, New York: An East Gate Book, 2004. Voeten, E. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Zhao, S. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004.

NEW PAGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: NATO-CHINA YU-CHIN CHENG Abstract Since NATO promoted the New Strategic Concept, NATO has had two approaches to maintain partnerships with third parties: first of all, NATO strengthens relations with old partners, and starts to become friendly with new partners beyond old geography. NATO constitutes the EurasianAtlantic Cooperative Security system, and is ready to reach new landscapes of international security. Thus, it is very important to reach NATO-China cooperation, particularly since China has more and more influence in regions around the globe. This research is designed to analyse NATO-China relations and cooperation, and concludes that the NATOChina Council will be established in order to maintain mutual cooperation and transparency. Keywords: NATO-China Relations, the Eurasian-Atlantic Cooperative Security system, Cooperative Security Strategy, NATO-China Cooperation Programme

1. Introduction Since the Cold War ended, the positions and relations between foes and friends have shifted and changed; friends might have become competitors, but also foes could have reached friendship, and that logic explains how NATO and China have been paving the way toward cooperation. Before reaching cooperation, NATO and China had a bitter quarrel over the NATO air raid on Milosevic's regime in Belgrade.1 China was very suspicious of NATO’s motivations, and wondered whether NATO planned 1

In 1999, NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during its airstrikes on Milosevic's regime. Three Chinese citizens died. Few had thought that the first direct contact between NATO and China would occur under such terrible circumstances. – NATO, “NATO needs to think twice about its future.”

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to be hostile towards China or not. After a long explanation and on the grounds of sharing a common threat, China restored its confidence in NATO, and attempted mutual cooperation. With the September 11, 2011 terrorist attack, the international security framework and environment was diverted. Terrorism has become the common threat for the nations, and more and more terrorist organisations bridge multiple partnerships. This demonstrates that a state is too hard-pressed to tackle terrorist activity alone, but transnational cooperation can solve the common problem. To fulfil the counter-terrorism campaign, NATO and China have been attempting mutual cooperation to deal with international security issues. In the beginning, NATO and China established Political Dialogue to build mutual confidence and transparent communication in 2002, and later both parties discussed and worked to solve more and more complicated international security issues, such as the Iran nuclear incident, anti-piracy exercises, cyber security, and so on. NATO realises that China is a decisive and rising power in international security, and the more effort China contributes, the more conveniently the international security issues are solved. NATO-China cooperation uses antique strategy but with a new approach, and this collaboration is based on Cooperative Security. In NATO's terminology, Cooperative Security refers to the security partnership and the doubleedged sword. NATO defines the security partnership as enlargement of a partnership network. Generally speaking, Cooperative Security consists of three components: strengthening partnerships; contributing to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and assisting potential new countries to prepare for NATO membership.2 NATO is used to conducting exercises and military activities with members, non-member states, or international organisations for partnership building, and employs this to practise Cooperative Security, particularly in crisis management, collective defence or peacekeeping missions. Moreover, Cooperative Security emphasises political-military relations with partners to rationalise decisions, and to better all parties’ defence, crisis management, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament capabilities. NATO highlights Cooperative Security’s opportunities and limitations 2

“In order to operationalize this new core task, the Alliance acts as a coordinator, involving groups of states or other international organizations with common interests who cooperate on a wide range of security issues. This provides frameworks for political dialogue and regional cooperation, increases military interoperability and can be essential to the success of many operations and missions. In this way, CS could be seen as an approach to engagement which provides increased collaboration between different actors resulting in information sharing and the harmonization of resources and capabilities.” – NATO, “Cooperative Security as NATO’s Core Task.”

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(a double-edged sword), because partners have eyes for self-interest; for instance, it takes time to match common benefits, even though partners may have common threats or problems. By all means, partners can reach common interest, but they probably do not have sufficient capabilities to do so; on the other hand, it is not easy to find mutual ground to reach cooperation under partnership. Nevertheless, partners feel that it is hard to have cooperation, yet Cooperative Security is still undertaken in international security. The Cooperative Security of NATO is both global, regional, membership, and non-membership, and this provides alliances with different frameworks or approaches to achieve collaboration. It is concluded that the Cooperative Security of NATO targets benefits of cooperation beyond geography. 3 The NATO members’ leaders decided to function within an alliance system, but modified previous strategy to satisfy the new face of international security; at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, they issued NATO's New Strategic Concept to enhance cooperation among members as well as to broaden partnership among non-members and international organisations. NATO's New Strategic Concept underlines six areas on which to focus:4 x It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens. x It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union. x It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute. x It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. x It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

3 4

Brzezinski, “Agenda for NATO-Toward a Global Security Web, A”, 11-3. NATO, “The New Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defence.”

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x It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence. It is believed that NATO uses the New Strategic Concept to deepen cooperation and engagement with China in international security, and constitutes NATO-China collaboration. This paper looks at NATO-China cooperation under NATO’s New Strategic Concept, and it uses the historical review approach to review NATO-China cooperation from 2000 to 2012. Besides, the research uses neo-realism to examine the Cooperative Security system between China and NATO, and uses the open-source intelligence method to collect relevant data.

2. New Strategic Concept Draft for NATO-China Relations At the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, the member states agreed to adopt the New Strategic Concept to continue their alliance operations, particularly NATO’s struggles with new challenges. NATO's New Strategic Concept outlines three fields:5 a. Collective defence. In accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO practices commitment toward the members to deter attacks from any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole. b. Crisis management. After the Cold War, NATO is not an alliance to counter the Soviet Union but an organisation to organise crisis management in any crisis areas. In accordance with a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities, NATO is capable of conflict prevention and crisis management, and NATO usually uses its political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts. c. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders and geography. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnerships with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards. 5

Ibid.

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In the 21st century, NATO is coping with a new international security environment and facing new threats. Unlike traditional dangers, NATO must tackle different sorts of security problems, like terrorism, cyber security, infrastructure safety, and illegal activities. With regard to conventional issues, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are the main concern for NATO, but the alliance employs new approaches to deal with old problems. Figure 13-16

NATO's New Strategic Concept proposes the Cooperative Security to cover everything from individual security to promoting stability. Individual security refers to fundamental human rights and safety as well as liberty and democracy, and collective security mentions constituting a network to counter any threat and aggressions with the fellow states’ cooperation. Collective defence relies on military protection among partners and members to fight against threats or aggression, and promoting stability is a preventive strategy to use any sort of tools to exclude any force for instability.7 No doubt, Cooperative Security is also applied in the face of new threats, such as cyber-attacks, infrastructure, and illegal activities, as well as terrorist activities. The term Cooperative Security became a catch phrase for a rather idealistic approach to the swiftly changing international climate. In 1992, 6

Cohen and Mihalka, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order, 10. 7 Cohen and Mihalka, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order, 11-3.

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three leading American strategists – Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner – spoke of Cooperative Security in terms of providing new avenues toward world peace: “Organising principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment embodied the aspirations of the Cold War. Cooperative Security is the corresponding principle for international security in the post-Cold War era.” Obviously, new international security issues require Cooperative Security to strengthen protection and engagement. Cooperative Security provides a new framework for the international community to provide reassurance and stability, replacing the rigid East-West alignments of the past and pre-empting reliance on a superpower-led collective security that many small countries fear and distrust.8 In accordance with Cooperative Security and due to common problems and threats, NATO's New Strategic Concept grants China the opportunity to build up a partnership to solve common problems, and NATO needs China's support to settle international security issues, such as in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq, by reason of China's UN Security Council power. NATO is keen on political communication and military exercise cooperation with China in order to win full support to tackle critical international issues. In particular, NATO's New Strategic Concept highlights the importance of UN-NATO mutual cooperation. Even though China is a regional power, the country controls global issues, so NATO requires China's engagement.9 NATO-China relations prove that NATO requests that China help to resolve some traditional issues, and some new challenges need both efforts. Obviously, NATO faces all sorts of new problems beyond the Trans-Atlantic area, and China also has some threats coming from this area. In addition, some threats are transnational, and NATO-China mutual cooperation needs political communication and military cooperation to answer these questions. Obviously, NATO-China cooperation is a part of the Eurasian-Atlantic Cooperative Security System, and this mutual cooperation also inspires NATO to create good relations with other Asian countries and Asian international organisations. After the end of the Cold War and at the beginning of the War on Terror, NATO started to care about threats and aggression outside Trans-Atlantic areas, and NATO drafted the EurasianAtlantic Cooperative Security System to safeguard and consolidate its joint principles and values; NATO-China cooperation is a part of this EurasianAtlantic Cooperative Security System. Both NATO and China are concerned about stability in Central Asia and Afghanistan, and they also deal with arms control, CSBMs and military cooperation, as well as transnational threats and challenges. 8

Carter, Perry and Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, 9-11. Gorka-Winter, Madej and Gniazdowski, NATO Member States and the New Strategic Concept: An Overview, 58-60. 9

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232 Figure 13- 210

2.1 NATO-China Relations under the Eurasian-Atlantic Cooperative Security System Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has activated more cooperation with Eurasian-Atlantic countries, as well as well with regional great states, through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in order to achieve better mutual cooperation between NATO and partner countries; the PfP allows the partner countries to select favourite areas to cooperate with NATO in military-defence and civilian-military activities. In the 1990s, NATO consolidated its enlargement policies to welcome former Soviet members to access membership, and embraced more partner countries in the Eurasian-Atlantic area. The PfP and NATO enlargement policies changed NATO’s collective defence doctrine from an anti-Soviet one to one of cooperative security.

10

Cohen and Mihalka, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order, 24.

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The PfP aligned more with Eurasian-Atlantic countries in the 1990s, but is open to all countries that believe in NATO’s value and support its activities. After 2010, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) decided to streamline NATO’s partnership tools in order to open all cooperative activities and exercises to all partners and to harmonise partnership. That decision granted partnership to China to cooperate with NATO; in accordance with that, NATO-China cooperation is fundamental and important for the Eurasian-Atlantic Cooperative Security System. NATO is pursuing a cooperative approach to security through greater interaction with a wider range of partners, countries and international organizations. In response, NATO is developing the necessary means to react quickly to the most demanding and complex crises. The Alliance is modernising its defence and deterrence capabilities, promoting a comprehensive approach to crisis management involving political, civilian and military instruments.11 China is not only a regional power but also one of the leading countries in international organisations, and NATO believes that NATO-China cooperation is very helpful for Eurasian-Atlantic stability. The PfP connects opportunity and collaboration between partner countries and NATO, and it also opens understanding for both to have discussion rather than confrontation when potential challenges face them.12 Including China in the Eurasian-Atlantic Cooperative System fosters the global partnership for NATO's PfP, and this helps China overcome mutual misunderstanding; in fact, China wants to engage more with Europe, but is often put off and confused by the complexity and bureaucracy

11

NATO, “What is NATO?” Alejandro Alvargonzalez San Martin, Secretary General for Defence Policy for the Spanish Ministry of Defence, spoke about the significance and importance of NATO-China cooperation; he argued that “When we talk about Asia, there is no common platform based on shared values, nor therefore a common outlook or vision of the future”, “We should recognise that the rise of Asia carries enormous opportunities, as well as challenges”. NATO’s shared vision is thus an attractive option on the global stage — one that will draw international actors to engage with the Alliance. In this context, partnerships will be key, especially with China. “We should recognise that the rise of Asia carries enormous opportunities, as well as challenges. One such challenge will be to encourage China to communicate its vision of its place in global security – we should make sure NATO is still a relevant security partner here.” – Dowdall, After Chicago: Re-evaluating NATO's Priorities, 11-23. 12

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of Europe itself. What NATO proposes is to embrace partnership with China in order to make Europe peaceful.13

3. Motivation for NATO-China Engagement There are a few key reasons to reach NATO-China cooperation and engagement: (i) hostility elimination, (ii) mutual understanding, and (iii) interdependency. By reason of the NATO airstrike in Belgrade, China bore the worst sorrow for its victims, and many Chinese believed that NATO had done it on purpose, and particularly that NATO had sought a new competitor. Before the 9/11 terrorist attack, NATO and China froze mutual communication, but they started to warm up relations because of common threats and interdependency. Before the common counter-terrorist campaign, NATO established Political Dialogue with China to better mutual understanding and communication in 2002. The NATO-China Political Dialogue focuses on cooperative security issues, and they try to find out which kinds of methods or approaches to use to reach mutual cooperation. Due to interdependency, NATO and China need each other, but they still calculate self-interest despite the framework of mutual cooperation. Neo-realism can properly explain the opportunities and limitations of NATO-China Relations. NATO needs China to get involved with international security because China has a rising role in international affairs thanks to its complex political and economic power, which interests NATO and China as well, such as in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. NATO needs China's support, but it also is burdened by the confrontation of its interests against China’s. Recently, Chinese leaders addressed requests and concerns over a new global partnership: "NATO-China Relations". It is a global partnership to address global security challenges, rather than a series of limited regional partnerships, and NATO understands that China's re-emergence as an influential actor on the global stage is a welcome opportunity for improved global governance. Trans-Atlantic engagement with China can provide a more neutral venue, and NATO and China face common needs to satisfy and support, for example: 14 13

Giles Merritt, Director of the Security & Defence voiced to create the NATOChina Council (NCC) in order to help establish stronger diplomatic and personal connections with Chinese counterparts both within the Alliance and at national level. The NCC would also offer a formalized platform for confidence building and mutual understanding. – Dowdall, The New Global Security Landscape:10 Recommendations from the 2012 Security Jam, 9. 14 Christman, Framing NATO's Engagement with China; Juan Garrigues, Research Fellow at CIDOB noted, the EU has often found its security affairs relationship

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1. New framework of peacekeeping, 2. To deepen military cooperation for humanitarian aid operations and maritime security, such as joint efforts in military medical and health diplomacy; and, 3. Linking NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) training centres with opportunities to collaborate on a wide array of topics with entities that might eventually be identified as collaboration partners under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 4. Common interest in Central Asia. NATO and China expect to establish security within Central Asia to exclude the impact of terrorism inside and outside this area. In addition, NATO tries to establish engagement with China by reason of cost-effectiveness, especially since most member states suffer strict austerity measures and deficits. More and more NATO members consider inviting China to participate in peacekeeping mission to reduce defence budget worries, and China also plans to increase its influence over international security as well. Unlike previous diplomatic and security strategies, China plans to engage more in international security to protect its own interests and to ensure stability in the world. It is believed that the NATO members have started to lose interest and concern over international security because of austerity, while China cares much more about international security because China enjoys more resources to pay attention to it. Furthermore, NATO believes China will be a potential challenger in regional security, and that they should, as soon as possible, start mutual cooperation to broaden transparency and understanding.15

with China muddied by other political issues. For instance, “the EU has cooperated with China in security challenges such as securing maritime routes, but divergences on other issues such as trade relations or Syria has generally limited cooperation“. – Dowdall, The New Global Security Landscape:10 Recommendations from the 2012 Security Jam, 9. 15 Recently, China and Japan quarreled over the sovereignty of Diaoyu Island (Senkaku Island), and the Chairman of the Japanese Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Katsuyuki Kawai, visited the NATO Secretary General, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen to discuss on Sino-Japan sovereignty dispute, and expeced NATO to help Japan to balance China's military power in January 2013.

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4. Conclusion: NATO-China Cooperation 3.0 Since the start of Political Dialogue, NATO and China have participated in the Cooperative Security system, and have applied the New Strategic Concept for the stability of the Eurasian-Atlantic area. After several years, China and NATO have better trust and confidence, and started collective missions and exercises, from cyber-security to countering piracy on the ocean. It is believed that NATO and China are attempting to establish a NATO-China Council to deepen mutual cooperation and understanding. No doubt, the financial crisis makes China a superpower, and NATO cannot underestimates its influence around the globe and the region. Besides, NATO tried to modernise its Article 5 to connect with new partnerships and strengthen old ones; therefore, NATO appeals to be partner with China as well as with other Asian countries. In fact, NATO has designed its new global security landscape to make partnerships with Asia to ensure stability of the Euroasian-Atlantic area by the Cooperative Security system. NATO and China can start NATO-China Cooperation 3.0 Programme through regular meeting and ordinary mechanisms, such as the NATOChina Council. The NATO-China Cooperation Programme discusses conventional issues and also focuses on new threats and challenges, particularly more and more new problems need multiple means of cooperation to be solved. NATO is keen on China's support in several international security issues, such as Afghanistan and Iran, as well as Russia. Even though NATO and China have no more additional hostility against Russia, both of them still are concerned about Russia's influence over international security issues. More and more experts have called for the creation of the NATO-China Cooperation 3.0 Programme that would initiate the NATO-China Council to regulate mutual cooperation and discussion, and the most important mission is to make defence, military cooperation, and reform transparent, and establish mutual trust and confidence. Moreover, the NATO-China Cooperation 3.0 Programme proposes to look not only at NATO-China cooperation but also on NATO-SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) collaboration, particularly both sides’ concerns about the Central Asia situation. Via organisational cooperation, NATO and China have responsibility for peace and stability in the Eurasian-Atlantic area. In reviewing history, China has not been hostile to NATO, but NATO is aware of China's rising and believes in the

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necessity of a bridge with China. NATO believes that creating a partnership with China is a fundamental cornerstone for the EurasianAtlantic Cooperative Security System.

Works Cited Brzezinski, Z. “Agenda for NATO-Toward a Global Security Web, A.” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (2009): 1-13. Carter, A.B.; Perry, W. J. and J. D. Steinbruner. A New Concept of Cooperative Security. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1992. Christman, W. L. Framing NATO's Engagement with China. Berlin: the Atlantic Community. [quoted 2012-11-25]. Available at WWW: