Status And The Rise Of Brazil: Global Ambitions, Humanitarian Engagement And International Challenges 3030216594, 9783030216597, 9783030216603

Table of contents :
Preface......Page 5
Contents......Page 7
Notes on Contributors......Page 10
List of Figures......Page 17
List of Tables......Page 18
Chapter 1: Introduction: Brazil’s Humanitarian Engagement and International Status......Page 19
Rising Powers, Status and Moral Authority......Page 23
Background: Brazil’s Evolving Brand of Humanitarianism......Page 24
Overview of Chapters......Page 28
References......Page 31
Section I: Brazil and the Search for International Status......Page 34
Introduction......Page 35
Reconceptualizing Status and Emerging Powers......Page 37
Hybrid Power and Brazil’s Quest for Great Power Status......Page 40
Conclusion......Page 43
References......Page 45
Introduction......Page 47
Status Performance Framework......Page 49
Brazil Versus the RICS......Page 53
Making the Most of One’s Hand: Status-Seeking Skill and Structural (Dis)Advantages......Page 56
Status Surplus and Normative Status Bounces......Page 59
References......Page 61
Section II: Brazil’s Foreign Policy......Page 65
Introduction......Page 66
Middle Power Politics......Page 68
Foreign Policy Grand Strategies......Page 71
Brazil with Regard to San Francisco (Security Issues)......Page 75
Brazil Toward Bretton Woods (Economic Issues)......Page 78
Conclusion......Page 80
References......Page 82
Introduction......Page 85
The Era of Great Ambitions: Lula da Silva and Triumphalism in Brazil’s Foreign Policy (2003–2010)......Page 87
The Crisis of Triumphalism in Brazilian Foreign Policy: What Worked and What Didn’t Work in the International Strategy of the Workers Party......Page 93
Dilma Rousseff and the Era of Small Foreign Policy Ambitions (2011–2016)......Page 97
Conclusion......Page 100
References......Page 101
Introduction......Page 103
Dilma Rousseff’s Second Term (2015–2016): Downgrading to Survive......Page 106
Michel Temer and José Serra (2016–2017): The Perils of Status Inconsistency......Page 109
Trade as a Middle-Power Strategy......Page 114
Pulling Out from the Region......Page 117
Final Remarks......Page 119
References......Page 120
Section III: Brazil and the Security Agenda......Page 125
Introduction......Page 126
Brazil’s International Stance: Non-intervention, Development and Autonomy......Page 128
Brazilian Foreign Policy Community and the Collective Security Regime Expansion After the Cold War......Page 131
Non-intervention and Non-indifference......Page 134
Non-intervention and Responsibility While Protecting......Page 137
Conclusion......Page 141
References......Page 142
Introduction: Intervention and the Quest for Status in Brazilian Foreign Policy......Page 145
Brazilian Foreign Policy and Brazil’s Engagement in UN Peace Operations......Page 146
Brazil and the Debates on Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect......Page 151
Emerging Powers, Responsibility and Norm Entrepreneurship......Page 155
References......Page 158
Introduction......Page 164
Brazilian Foreign Policy on the Use of Force in Multilateral Missions......Page 167
From Non-Engagement to an Active and More “Responsible” Engagement......Page 169
An Introduction to the Responsibility While Protecting (RwP)......Page 175
A Meeting Place Between RwP and Robust Peacekeeping with a PoC mandate?......Page 179
Conclusion......Page 180
References......Page 181
Section IV: Brazil and Development Cooperation......Page 185
Introduction......Page 186
Brazil’s Engagement with International Cooperation......Page 188
Brazil’s Increase and Then Decrease in International Cooperation......Page 194
The Exceptionality Effect: Seeing the Peak of Brazilian Aid Budgets in a Broader Context......Page 196
The Presidential Effect......Page 197
The Economic Crisis Effect......Page 200
Conclusion......Page 201
References......Page 202
Interviews......Page 203
Introduction......Page 204
Brazilian Policy Networks......Page 206
The Public Health Policy Network......Page 209
The Food and Nutrition Security Policy Network......Page 213
The Agricultural Innovation Policy Network......Page 216
Conclusion......Page 219
References......Page 221
Brazil: A Failed Status-Seeker?......Page 224
Brazil’s Quest for International Status......Page 225
The Sources of Status-Seeking: Brazil’s Engagement with the Fields of International Security, Humanitarian Protection and Development Cooperation......Page 227
Epilogue: The 2018 Electoral Cycle and Brazil’s Free-Falling Status......Page 231
References......Page 234

Citation preview

Status and the Rise of Brazil

Global Ambitions, Humanitarian Engagement and International Challenges Edited by Paulo Esteves Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert Benjamin de Carvalho

Status and the Rise of Brazil

Paulo Esteves • Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert Benjamin de Carvalho Editors

Status and the Rise of Brazil Global Ambitions, Humanitarian Engagement and International Challenges

Editors Paulo Esteves Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Oslo, Norway

Benjamin de Carvalho Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) Oslo, Norway

ISBN 978-3-030-21659-7    ISBN 978-3-030-21660-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch / shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

This book is the final product of “Brazil’s Rise to the Global Stage: Humanitarianism, Peacekeeping and the Quest Great Powerhood (BraGS)”—a three-year (2014–2017) research project funded by the Research Council of Norway (RCN) under grant number 237001. The BraGS project set out with a primary objective to understand the drivers behind Brazilian humanitarian action and participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. By making this an empirical question, BraGS sought to avoid analyzing Brazil in terms of the binary of “challenger” or “assimilator” to the international order. Beyond its immediate relevance to humanitarianism and peacekeeping, the project addressed the role of rising powers in global governance and the status component of humanitarian engagements. This led us to investigate status—the extent to which it drove Brazilian foreign and humanitarian policies as well as the extent to which Brazil was able to capitalize on its status claims—in a variety of settings related to humanitarianism and peacekeeping, and thereby also broadening the gaze of status research. These questions have included assessing (a) how Brazil’s principled stance on humanitarianism and peacekeeping translated into practice, (b) how Brazil sought to reshape the international agenda on humanitarianism and to what extent has it succeeded in doing so, and, finally, (c) what the key drivers behind Brazil’s humanitarian policy are, and what consequences this engagement has for Brazil’s international standing. These issues have also been guiding the work of the group of authors involved in the present volume. v

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BraGS brought together a broad team consisting of researchers based at different institutions in Norway and Brazil. The project did not depart from a shared methodology, but rather from a shared concern with addressing these issues from the broadest possible set of angles, albeit with a focus on the relationship between foreign policy, humanitarianism, and concerns over status. Furthermore, the approach to the topic had to adapt to a changing domestic political landscape, which came to affect the foreign policy trajectory that previous governments had staked out for Brazil and which had formed the background against which we set out our enquiry. The contrast between the Brazil being projected now after the presidential election of 2018 and that when we wrote the grant proposal was something none of us were able to predict, but which we have had to take into account in our analyses. The project has led to strengthened cooperation between Norwegian and Brazilian research environments, strengthening relevant country and regional competence on Brazil in Norway, and created a number of work relationships which we know will continue well beyond this project. We are grateful for the support given to us by the Research Council of Norway—which made the project possible in the first place—as well as for the support received from our respective institutions along the way. Bringing these contributions together in a book has been a long journey, and we hope the result will generate new perspectives, interrogations, and fruitful avenues for further reflection. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Oslo, Norway  May 2019 6

Paulo Esteves Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert Benjamin de Carvalho

Contents

1 Introduction: Brazil’s Humanitarian Engagement and International Status  1 Benjamin de Carvalho, Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, and Paulo Esteves

Section I  Brazil and the Search for International Status  17 2 Brazil’s (Frustrated) Quest for Higher Status 19 Benjamin de Carvalho 3 Brazil’s Status Struggles: Why Nice Guys Finish Last 31 Paul Beaumont and Pål Røren

Section II  Brazil’s Foreign Policy  49 4 A Tragedy of Middle Power Politics: Traps in Brazil’s Quest for Institutional Revisionism 51 Dawisson Belém Lopes, Guilherme Casarões, and Carlos Frederico Gama

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5 Rise and Fall of Triumphalism in Brazilian Foreign Policy: The International Strategy of the Workers Party’s Governments (2003–2016) 71 Antônio Carlos Lessa, Danielly Silva Ramos Becard, and Thiago Gehre Galvão 6 Leaving the Club Without Slamming the Door: Brazil’s Return to Middle-Power Status 89 Guilherme Casarões

Section III  Brazil and the Security Agenda 111 7 Climbing the Ladder: Brazil and the International Security Field113 Paulo Esteves and Mônica Herz 8 Peace Operations, Intervention and Brazilian Foreign Policy: Key Issues and Debates133 Kai Michael Kenkel, Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, and Mikelli Marzzini Lucas Alves Ribeiro 9 Brazil’s Evolving “Balancing Act” on the Use of Force in Multilateral Operations: From Robust Peacekeeping to “Responsibility While Protecting”153 Eduarda Passarelli Hamann and Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert

Section IV  Brazil and Development Cooperation 175 10 A Brief Moment in History or the Beginning of a New Trend? Brazil’s Emerging Humanitarian Engagement in a Broader Context177 Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert and Torkjell Leira

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11 The Sources of Moral Authority: Policy Networks and Structuring South-South Cooperation195 Paulo Esteves, Geovana Zoccal, and João Fonseca 12 Conclusion215 Paulo Esteves, Benjamin de Carvalho, and Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert

Notes on Contributors

Paul Beaumont  is a PhD candidate at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. Previously, he worked as a junior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. His PhD research investigates how the changing social arrangements of international and domestic society enable, inspire, and sometimes mitigate status competition among collectives. His empirical interests include nuclear weapons policy, international country rankings, and migration governance. Danielly Silva Ramos Becard  is an associate professor at the International Relations Institute of the University of Brasília. Danielly Becard has a master’s degree in Political Science, Comparative Politics, from Sorbonne University, France, and a PhD in International Relations from the University of Brasília, Brazil. She developed postdoctoral research about China’s foreign policy and Latin America at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. She is the Director of the Asia-Latin American Study Center, University of Brasília. She has experience in political science and international relations, with a focus on the following topics: Brazilian foreign policy, Chinese foreign policy, Brazil-China relations, and China-Latin America relations. Dawisson  Belém Lopes  is Professor of International and Comparative Politics at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) and a researcher at the National Council for Technological and Scientific Development (CNPq) in Brazil. He is the deputy dean for international affairs at UFMG, having authored four books and dozens of peer-reviewed articles on topics xi

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related to Latin American politics and Brazilian foreign policy, and he served as a visiting researcher in 2013 at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies in Hamburg, Germany, and a visiting professor in 2016 at the Catholic University of Louvain in Mons, Belgium. Professor Lopes, who regularly contributes articles to Al Jazeera English, The Diplomat Magazine, and various Brazilian national media outlets, was a Raisina Young Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi, India) in 2017. He has already given lectures at the invitation of five national governments and delivered presentations and/or has had his articles published in 27 different countries. Guilherme Casarões  teaches Brazilian foreign policy and has served as Vice Chair of the Public Administration Undergraduate Program at Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo, Brazil. He holds a PhD and an MA in Political Science from São Paulo Business School of Fundação Getulio Vargas (EAESP-FGV) and an MA in International Relations from Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Programa San Tiago Dantas). He is the co-author of a handbook on the United Nations (UN) titled A organização das nações unidas (2006) and the author of many peer-reviewed articles and book chapters on Brazilian foreign policy, Latin American politics, Middle Eastern affairs, and multilateralism. Among his works are So Far But Yet so Close: Brazil and the Middle East (2015), Brasil y Turquía: hoy sócios, aliados mañana? (2015), “The Place of Israel and Palestine in Brazilian Foreign Policy” (História, 2014), “Itamaraty’s Mission” (Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 2014), and “Itamaraty on the Move” (Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2013). He was a visiting fellow at Tel Aviv University and Brandeis University. Benjamin  de Carvalho  is a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo, Norway, where he is part of the Research Group on Global Order and Diplomacy. He holds his PhD from the University of Cambridge, and prior degrees from the New School for Social Research and the University of Oslo. His work has concentrated on historical international relations, broadly speaking, with a special focus on sovereignty, state formation, and collective identity. He has also written on status in international politics and on UN peacekeeping in Africa. He is the principal investigator of a project on privateering and the formation of overseas empires in the Atlantic (EMPRISE—Empires, Privateering and the Sea).

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Danilo  Marcondes  de Souza  Neto is an assistant professor at the Brazilian War College (Escola Superior de Guerra-ESG) in Rio de Janeiro. Danilo holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Cambridge, where he held a CAPES/Cambridge Overseas Trust Scholarship. He was an international relations analyst with AMAZUL Defense Technologies, a postdoctoral fellow at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), and a junior visiting fellow at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva (IHEID). Danilo has written articles and book chapters on Brazilian foreign and defense policy, including Brazil’s involvement in UN missions (MINUSTAH and UNIFIL), as well as on South-South cooperation and the South Atlantic space. Paulo Esteves  is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, the Director of the BRICS Policy Center, and a senior research fellow at the Institute of Advanced Sustainability Studies (Potsdam, Germany). Dr. Esteves holds a PhD in Political Science and was a visiting researcher at Brown University, the University of Copenhagen, and Rice University. Paulo Esteves has written a series of articles and book chapters in the areas of international development, emerging powers, and BRICS.  Dr. Esteves’ research focuses on development cooperation and South-­South cooperation, particularly with regard to (a) the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement implementation, and (b) financing for development. He served as a consultant of the UNDP, ECOSOC, DESA, and GPEDC. He is a founding member of the Brazilian Association of International Relations (ABRI), of which he was president from 2011 to 2014. João Fonseca  is a natural resources management specialist in the World Bank’s Environment and Natural Resources Management Global Practice, based in the Mozambique Country Office in Maputo. He works on sustainable landscape management and blue economy-related issues. Prior to joining the World Bank, João held positions in both the public and private sectors, having worked in the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and with a private renewable energy developer in Tanzania. He has also worked as a researcher in the BRICS Policy Center, a think tank in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, focusing on South-­South Cooperation and aid effectiveness. João holds a master’s and a bachelor’s degree from the Institute of International Relations at PUC-Rio (Brazil).

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Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert  holds a PhD in International Relations and Political Science from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, SciencesPo Paris (2010). She is a senior researcher and research director at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), and Director of the Norwegian Centre for Humanitarian Studies (NCHS). Her work focuses on how new information and surveillance technologies produce humanitarian and security practices, especially related to human mobility and borders. She leads a Research Council of Norway (RCN)-funded project, “Humanitarianism, Borders and the Governance of Mobility: the EU and the ‘Refugee Crisis’”, and was the project leader of “Brazil’s Rise to the Global Stage: Humanitarianism, Peacekeeping and the Quest for Great Powerhood”, also funded by the RCN.  Her work has appeared in inter alia the Journal of Modern African Studies, Disasters, Third World Quarterly, International Review of the Red Cross, and Review of International Studies. Thiago Gehre Galvão  has been teaching and researching in the field of international relations since 2001. At the International Relations Institute of the University of Brasília since 2015, he works on Brazilian international relations and foreign policy, history and theories of international relations, studies on South America, border studies, critical security studies, and development studies. He is specialized in Brazil-Venezuela relations. He worked for the presidency of the Republic between 2012 and 2015, in political articulation and international cooperation of subnational actors, and in the National Commission of Population and Development (CNPD). He is developing research on BRICS, Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). He coordinates the Outreach Special Program UnB 2030: Sustainability and Inclusive Development. Carlos Frederico Gama  is a visiting professor, Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane (Morocco), and Professor of International Relations, Universidade Federal do Tocantins (UFT, Brazil). He holds a PhD in International Relations (IRI/PUC-Rio, Brazil). He was the Director of International Affairs (UFT, 2016–2018), Vice Coordinator of Graduate Studies (IRI/ PUC-Rio, 2012–2014), and Vice Coordinator of the BRICS Policy Center (PUC-Rio, 2010–2011). His areas of expertise include international institutions, comparative politics, theories of international relations, intellectual history, and international security. Some of his latest publications include “From Farmers to Firms: United States

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and China in a Shifting World Order” (with Fernando Camargo, UFT), in Conjuntura Internacional; “Unification among Contradictions: Germany and Europe Face Globalization in Crisis”, in Sociology International Journal; and “Arrested Development: Brazil in a World in Crisis (2008–2018)”, in E-IR. Eduarda Passarelli Hamann  has been working in the field of international peace and security since 2001 and is interested in peacekeeping, Brazilian foreign/defense policies, and South-South cooperation. Since 2009 she has been a senior researcher at the Igarapé Institute and, since 2017, she has also been a special advisor on peace and security. She has taught several courses in international relations, such as FGV (MBA), BPC (MBA), and IRI/PUC-Rio (undergraduate level). She has also ­lectured at the Brazilian Diplomatic School (IRBr) and the Army Military Academy (AMAN). Her research experience includes government and non-government organizations: World Bank, Brazilian Ministry of Social Development, Viva Rio, and Canal Futura. Her publications provide reflections on Brazil and peacekeeping (IPEA 2019, Diálogo 2018, KAS 2017, Military Review 2016), training civilians (Igarapé 2018), reforming UN Security Council (Military Review 2015), and responsibility to and while protecting (SAIIA/ISS 2012, NOREF 2012 and CEBRI 2012). She is a lawyer and holds a doctorate in International Relations. Mônica Herz  is an associate professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. She has a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science and has written three books: Organizações internacionais: Histórias e práticas (co-authors Andréa Ribeiro Hoffman and Jana Tabak), 2004; Ecuador vs. Peru: Peacemaking amid Rivalry (co-author, João Pontes Nogueira), 2002; and Global Governance away from the Media, 2010, apart from several articles and chapters on Latin American security, global governance, and Brazilian foreign policy. Kai  Michael  Kenkel is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and an affiliated researcher at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. His research is focused on issues of intervention, particularly the participation of emerging powers such as Brazil. He has written extensively on peace operations, the responsibility to protect, and normative advances in intervention debates, including in international affairs, global governance, and international peacekeeping. He

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holds an A.B. from Johns Hopkins University and an MA and a PhD from the Graduate Institute (then IUHEI) in Geneva, all in International Studies. Torkjell Leira  first visit Brazil as a young high school exchange student in 1990. Since then he has lived in Recife and Brasília for four years, studying Portuguese, human geography, and capoeira, and has worked for different Norwegian non-governmental organizations. In 2013 he returned to the University of Oslo (UiO), coordinating a Norwegian-­Brazilian research network on biodiversity in the Amazon. Today he works as the project leader for a new Climate House at the UiO Natural History Museum, to open in 2020. Torkjell wrote the book Brazil—The Giant Awakens in 2014 (in Norwegian). He is working on a book on Norwegian interests in Brazil and the Amazon. He is also the founder and editor of the site www.BrasiLeira.no. Antônio Carlos Lessa  has been Full Professor of International Relations at the University of Brasília since 2018, teaching courses on history of Brazilian foreign policy in graduate and undergraduate programs. His research interests cover history of Brazilian foreign policy and international history, with particular reference from 1945 to 1989. His work focuses on the relations between Brazil and United States from 1945 and the role of ideas in the policymaking process. He has been a research fellow at the National (Brazilian) Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) since 2007 and the Editor-in-­Chief of Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI) and Meridiano 47 (Journal of Global Studies). He coordinates at the University of Brasília, Center for Brazilian Foreign Policy Studies. He has authored several books, book chapters, and articles and has edited books on Brazilian foreign policy. Mikelli  Marzzini  Lucas  Alves  Ribeiro  has been Professor of Law at Bahia State University (Brazil) since 2013, where he teaches international law. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the Federal University of Pernambuco (Brazil) and a master’s degree in International Relations from Paraiba State University (Brazil). During his PhD research he was a visiting researcher at European University Institute (Italy) and at Leiden University (the Netherlands). He has written articles related to human rights, emerging powers’ foreign policy, and international security. His

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publications have a special focus on responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention. Pål Røren  is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Center for War Studies (CWS), University of Southern Denmark. His dissertation focuses on how groups and clubs inform and influence actors’ pursuit of social status in world politics using network analysis, discourse analysis, and practice theory. His empirical focus is on diplomacy and social practices among, in, and at the European Union, the Nordic region, unrecognized states, and the great power club. His work on social status in world politics has been published in Cooperation and Conflict and Third World Quarterly. Pål is also the host and co-creator of the CWS podcast The WarPod. Geovana Zoccal  is a German Chancellor Fellow, from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, based at the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). She holds a PhD (2018) and an MA degree (2013) in International Relations from the International Relations Institute of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). She graduated also in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC-Minas). In 2017, she was a visiting fellow at the Institute of Development Studies (University of Sussex, the UK). She has taught the discipline of International Cooperation for Development Professional Practice, as part of the PhD program. She is also an associated researcher of the International Cooperation for Development Research Group of the BRICS Policy Center. Her main research topics are international cooperation for development, with an emphasis on new alternatives presented by the Global South as South-South cooperation, triangular/trilateral cooperation, and new multilateral development banks.

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 12.1 Fig. 12.2

Status performance based on GNI, BRICS Status performance based on GNI, South America GoB yearly spending on SSC: total (US$ millions) GoB yearly spending in SSC: modalities (US$ millions)

39 43 220 221

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 4.1 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 11.1 Table 11.2 Table 12.1

Status resources (gross national income), BRICS countries Status recognition and status performance, BRICS countries Comparative evolution of Brazilian foreign policy BFPC and the peace and security agenda (1995–2001) BFPC and the peace and security agenda (2002–2007) BFPC and the peace and security agenda (2008–2014) Conditions for internationalization Brazilian policy networks’ domestic profile Status ambition and diplomatic initiatives of Brazil (1990–2018)

39 41 61 121 124 127 199 210 217

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Brazil’s Humanitarian Engagement and International Status Benjamin de Carvalho, Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, and Paulo Esteves

Over the past 15 years, the rise of new powers is changing the international agenda, as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and other emerging powers seek to influence the conduct of multilateralism. The quest for influence is bringing these powers into fields and policy arenas previously reserved for traditional great powers. As a consequence, fields such as trade negotiations, development aid, and international peace and security are undergoing significant changes. These changes raise questions about the role of Brazil in particular. Brazil has adopted a role of leader for the Global South in trade negotiations, made the case for less conditionality and interference in what it sees as sovereign affairs, and involved itself significantly in changing the international peace and security agenda. In all B. de Carvalho (*) Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] M. Gabrielsen Jumbert Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] P. Esteves Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_1

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these fields, Brazil has brought new ideas and commitments to the table. Yet, the drivers of specific Brazilian foreign policy engagements remain unclear. Specifically, the new policy areas in which emerging powers are engaging and Brazil’s shift from domestic to international engagement, and in this, its relations to its domestic constituencies, as well as to other rising powers and the established great powers, require a more sustained engagement. Brazil has undergone significant changes over the past 15 years. At the dawn of the new millennium, Brazil was seen as a rising power, seeking to achieve greater influence on the global stage on par with other regional and global powers. The election of Lula propelled Brazil to the forefront of international affairs, with high ambitions for Brazil, and similarly high international expectations towards Brazil. Towards the end of the first decade of the new millennium, Brazil joined the new BRICS constellation of so-called emerging powers, together with Russia, India, China and South Africa. Much of the debate surrounding the BRICS consisted of how these would change the balance of power internationally, with “emerging” powers definitely containing a notion of actors seeking to defy and challenge the current international order. Yet, 15 years after Brazil came out of an economic and financial crisis, preceding Lula’s first election in 2002, Brazil again went into a deep economic crisis in 2015, followed by a political crisis with the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. While future directions for Brazil’s foreign policies and role internationally are hard to predict at this stage, it is an important moment to take stock of Brazil’s various forms of international engagements over the past 15 years. What are the drivers of Brazilian foreign policy, and to what extent has it been motivated by concerns to achieve higher status on the international arena and in the eyes of other great powers? These are the overall questions this book seeks to address. Furthermore, the authors gathered here seek to shed light on the extent to which status concerns contributed to Brazil’s important global humanitarian involvement in the years 2003– 2014. These questions are important, also beyond the confines of foreign policy analysis and humanitarian studies, as they help us understand how status drives international politics, and the forms this quest for status can take. More specifically, though, they go to the core of discussions about power, status and moral authority, which are of more recent origin (see de Carvalho and Neumann 2015; Neumann and de Carvalho 2015; Wohlforth et al. 2018).

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Together, the chapters in this book stipulate the achievement of status as a key driver of Brazil’s global reach. While this places this book squarely within the burgeoning agenda on status in international relations (IR), this also opens up for new questions to be asked, with respect to both Brazil and status: The question of the audience for Brazil’s global humanitarian reach is of central importance in terms of understanding how emerging powers organize their quest for higher standing, especially with respect to how status claims are recognized. In a Weberian way, we take status to mean recognized rank vis-à-vis others (this also follows what has become coutume in IR, following Dafoe et al. 2014). The central component here is easily overlooked, namely that status means recognized rank. In other words, there is no rank if it is not recognized by others as such. The question it raises is thus who the intended audience of these policies are, and whether they accept these claims as legitimate. The extent to which Brail sought to have its status claims recognized from the Global North—especially the great powers—or its southern peers is a central question. Or did it seek increased recognition from fellow emerging powers through contestation of the established international order? As the chapters in this book lay out, the answer was—as it most often is—both. On the one hand, Brazil sought to emulate the practices of established great powers through involvement in peace and stability operations such as MINUSTAH in Haiti. On the other, it sought to challenge Western interventionist conceptions of humanitarian rights and duties through formulating policies and principles of global governance aimed at bridging the gap between North and South. This represents largely a departure from existing literature on emerging powers and begs a specification. For it does not follow from our theoretical focus that Brazil is an “assimilator” into the current international order rather than a “challenger.” Following Barma et  al. (2009: 528), we reject the common assumption in mainstream international relations that “rising powers are presented with a binary choice: assimilate to the existing order, or challenge it.” Such an assumption, while central in most of the literature on rising powers—whether focusing on hegemonic stability or power transition—makes it difficult to grasp the many ways in which rising powers seek to make their mark on the international agenda by both adopting norms and seeking to change key elements. This question, we posit, must be an empirical for investigation. To be sure, a number of studies have examined the importance of status as a foreign policy driver over the past decade (see notably Wohlforth

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2009; Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Renshon 2017; Paul et al. 2014), just as there is no shortage of works on Brazilian foreign policy (see, for instance, Gardini and Tavares de Almeida 2016; Stuenkel and Taylor 2015; Burges 2017; Fraundorfer 2015), or even works on Brazil’s humanitarian involvement. The innovation of the present volume therefore lies less in the empirics canvassed than in the integration of different theoretical issues raised. These include the modes through which rising or emerging powers seek to gain recognition for their status claims, the importance the international community gives to humanitarian policies broadly speaking and the relationship between power and authority in international relations. In fact, while recent takes on status and moral authority have explored the viability of status-seeking through the adoption of a “good state” strategy by (wealthier) small states (see notably Wohlforth et  al. 2018), there are few studies on whether this strategy can also yield status dividends for emerging or rising powers (a notable exception being Stolte 2015). Brazil represents an excellent case for exploring this, given the extent to which the country has made clear that it will not seek status through (nuclear) armament and defence spending. This book looks at the drivers behind this engagement: What does Brazil achieve, in terms of direct benefits as well as in terms of symbolic influence, from investing in the international diplomacy of humanitarianism and protection? This book is concerned with a specific and important period of Brazil’s foreign policy and global engagement, namely the foreign policy drivers of the country under the two presidents from the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT; the Worker’s Party), Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (2003–2010) and the first term of Dilma Rousseff (2011–2014).1 The period from 2015 until today is dealt with in the conclusion. This selection is important, as it also bears in it the implicit answer to the viability of a “good state” strategy for emerging or rising powers: While such a strategy may have great payoffs in terms of high visibility at the global level, it, nevertheless, also rests on an investment over time. For, to many, it seemed as a paradox for this widespread and rapidly increasing international engagement to emerge at a time when Brazil itself was still a developing country by many 1  Due to the impeachment proceedings against Dilma during her second term and the caretaker presidency of Michel Termer which followed her impeachment, the period 2015– 2018 was marked less by foreign policy engagements than by internal political scandals and lends itself less to an analysis of foreign policy drivers.

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s­tandards and experiencing an economic slowdown. This puzzle, however, draws our attention to other drivers beyond excess of wealth, namely what motivated Brazil and what it aimed to achieve through these investments, whether in the form of direct benefits or indirectly in the form of increased recognition and influence. But while the chapters all speak to the issues concerning international status, they also go beyond this in teasing out other developments that followed Brazil’s global humanitarian policies. Through its engagement, Brazil sought to reconceptualize both humanitarianism and peacekeeping, in line with its more principled stance on sovereignty, non-intervention and less conditionality. As the chapters also show, being perceived as a good state rests less on single great achievements than on foreign policy continuity and collective identification with these policies, and Brazil’s quest for status—while promising at first—cannot be said to have been all that successful, as the chapters by de Carvalho (Chap. 2) and Beaumont and Røren (Chap. 3) show. For as Halvard Leira has pointed out, a good state may be less defined by its latest actions than by the legitimacy such a policy enjoys over time. The policies followed by Norway, for instance, have deep roots in the way Norwegians perceive Norway in the world, coupled with a specific brand of humanitarian exceptionalism (Leira 2015). In the case of Brazil, the domestic backlash against Brazil’s global humanitarian involvement at the expense of domestic involvement may give some hint as to the viability of such a strategy not firmly anchored in the population and across different elites. Be that as it may, as a new player in the field of humanitarian assistance, Brazil has, nevertheless, brought a new form of moral and strategic motivations to the table. However, this humanitarian action also served Brazil’s regional and international ambitions as a rising power.

Rising Powers, Status and Moral Authority Policymakers in traditional humanitarian donor countries, international organizations and non-governmental aid organizations all are showing increasing interest in how emerging powers are engaging in ­humanitarianism and peacebuilding efforts. This is a scholarly field in its infancy, as recent studies on the so-called emerging powers have tended to focus on issues of economic development and trade policies (Amar 2012: 5). The Chinese case, and its development policies in Africa, is perhaps the most researched up to date (Alden et  al. 2008; Large 2008; Huang and Ren 2012;

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Mthembu 2018). The case of Turkey is one of the first to explore international diplomatic engagement in the region and beyond (Tank 2011; forthcoming 2019). The case of Brazil is only beginning to receive more attention (Esteves 2011; Herz 2011; Spektor 2012; Nieto 2012), but lacks sustained investigation into, on the one hand, the “drivers” and, on the other, the implications of its humanitarian engagement. Few studies have sought to understand why rising powers involve themselves to such an extent in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and development. Following Buzan and Wæver (2004) and Hurrell (2006), we take as our point of departure that rising powers engage in these activities as they are part of the toolkit great powers have at their disposal for “system maintenance”—just as other smaller states seeking higher status do (see de Carvalho and Lie 2015). For while great power status to some extent depends on resources and geopolitics, it is also a social role, with specific rights and duties ascribed to it. To rising powers, further “rise” from their regions—status beyond that of a regional power, that is—is contingent upon being acknowledged as greater powers, and the ability and willingness to take more than their share in maintaining international peace and security. The emerging literature in International Relations (IR) on the topic of status (de Carvalho and Neumann 2015; Paul et al. 2014; Volgy et al. 2011; Wohlforth 2009) therefore forms the theoretical backdrop against which this book is written.

Background: Brazil’s Evolving Brand of Humanitarianism Brazil has since the 1990s experienced great economic growth, which has allowed the country to enhance its focus on social projects. Between 2003 and 2014, the reduction of poverty and inequalities within Brazil was high on the political agenda, and great progress has been made. Among the main legacies of the Lula era are the Fome Zero (“Zero Hunger”) and Bolsa Família (“Family Stipend”) programmes. The Bolsa Família provides low-income families with a monthly stipend, and the Fome Zero initiative, part of the broader Bolsa Familia effort, aims to eradicate hunger and extreme poverty. The result was to lift more than 30 million people out of poverty in the first decade of the 2000s (IPEA 2012; Siqueira and Esteves 2018). Brazil sought to further this social engagement abroad, making it a central element of its foreign policy agenda. While already an important

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humanitarian donor, with a foreign aid budget skyrocketing from USD 3 million in 2007 to over USD 95 million in 2010, in 2006, a specific organ of the federal government was established to coordinate all its humanitarian policies—Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial de Assistência Humanitária Internacional (GTI-AHI; Interministerial Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance). A major part of Brazil’s aid has gone to countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region (notably Haiti, Paraguay and Guatemala), as well as Lusophone countries beyond the region (notably Mozambique, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau) but also reached other countries in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Central and South Asia.2 Characterizing itself as having a different position and interest to Western powers, Brazil has consistently taken decisions that emphasize a different understanding of humanitarianism. Brazil abstained from the US and European-led military partnership against Libya in 2011 for humanitarian reasons, calling on the US and Europe to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. The emerging call for the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) in the Arab world is part of the important changes in Brazil’s engagement in the region. However, for all her government’s concern with sovereignty, President Rousseff has not challenged the fundamental validity of R2P. Instead, she has argued that foreign interventions designed to protect civilians must be tightly regulated because too many dangers inhere in interventions across borders in the name of humanitarian concerns (Spektor 2012). In the case of Syria, Brazil sought to demonstrate concern while rejecting calls for a Libyan-­style intervention. Along with India and South Africa—but without Russia or China—Brazil participated in a mission to Damascus in order to head off sanctions or other forms of international pressure that would push Assad into a corner and exacerbate the conflict. When the effort failed, Brazil came under heavy criticism from international peers for its posture on Syria. Its international solidarity paralleled that of other emerging powers, from the more established ones like China and India, to the newer emerging middle powers like Turkey and South Africa (Tank 2012).3 It 2  Figures from Coordenação-Geral de Ações Internacionais de Combate à Fome- Minstério das Relações Internacionais. Cooperação Humanitária Internacional, 2011. 3  The concept of “emerging powers” is contested, as it is used to designate a very heterogenous set of countries. We use it here for Brazil, as part of the BRIC countries, a broadly used term since it was first coined in the Goldman-Sachs report of 2003.

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c­ hallenged established Western forms of intervention but was also not a threatening power (Malamud 2011: 242). Brazil has indeed been called an “archetypical soft power” (Sotero and Armjio 2007: 43). And this soft power has been exercised notably through the alternative approach Brazil sought to develop to humanitarian aid provision and protection. Specifically, Brazil’s particular model of engagement appears to have been inspired by Western norms of moral needs to “do something” when faced with human suffering elsewhere, Global South norms of “non-­ intervention” in the internal affairs of sovereign states as well as old and new humanitarian imperatives of continued critical reflection on the effects of external interventions. Brazil’s stance was thus neither fully challenging traditional norms, yet not entirely assimilating to them either. For while Brazil sought to portray itself as a responsible global and regional actor (Norheim-Martinsen 2012: 3), its stance on humanitarianism differed from that of more established Western powers by developing what some call a form of “Brazilian exceptionalism” (Nieto 2012: 164). For the Brazilian government, humanitarian assistance meant “any and all action that contributes, immediately and efficiently, to minimizing the effect of natural disasters, armed conflict, or social unrest abroad.”4 More importantly, perhaps, was the central place accorded to the principle of sovereignty. In fact, Brazil claimed to provide international assistance only if a foreign government specifically required aid. Finally, it placed little importance on regime structures and actions of the requesting government—perhaps mirroring the Chinese stance. Respect for human rights or democracy was placed in the shadow of humanitarian needs. And while Brazil has long preferred to provide assistance bilaterally, it nevertheless increased its contributions through multilateral channels. As such, Brazil distinguished itself from other emerging powers and new donors in this field, still largely sticking to bilateral forms of aid. Brazil’s efforts to reconceptualize existing approaches to humanitarianism, both new and more deep-rooted ones, are also noteworthy. In a landscape where the institutionalized orders and structures of humanitarianism were changing, and where the traditional dominant form of humanitarianism— drawing on the core principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and non-violence—came to be questioned both by practitioners and scholars, Brazil sought to play a major part in this process. For as humanitarianism 4

 According to http://www.assistenciahumanitaria.mre.gov.br/sobre-a-assistencia

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was challenged, so was also the historical claim to ownership by humanitarian actors. By addressing the case of Brazil, the contributions to this book also seek to shed light on the interface between great power politics and humanitarian action. Initially, Brazil remained attached to the concept of “non-­ interventionism.” The sanctity of non-intervention was important to emerging powers seeking to protect their sovereignty, but also to those countries who receive assistance. Indeed, it was central for Brazil to be able to play on the South-South relationship. However, during the period in question, Brazil sought to rise above the South-South relationship and despite the imperative of “non-intervention” set forth the concept of “non-indifference” as an alternative which would make some degree of international intervention possible. “Non-indifference” was first coined by the former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. The concept then became a way for Brazil to compromise with its reticence towards Western liberal forms of interfering in other states’ internal affairs, while stressing the more idealistic part of humanitarianism: the need to “do something” and not remain indifferent (Esteves 2011: 283). Furthermore, Brazil stressed the importance of “sustainability” as a supplement to the traditional humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence, by focusing on solutions that can be longlasting and enhance local capabilities, so as to not develop dependence on external donors. Emphasis was placed on how external assistance should address the core problems underlying a crisis and that humanitarian assistance should take place in conjunction with sustainable social development. Finally, as a contrast to the North/West’s enthusiasm for the concept of “responsibility to protect,” Brazil attempted to reshape the protection agenda by proposing the alternative of “responsibility while protecting” (RwP). The concept was formally presented by the Brazilian government to the UN Secretary General in November 2011, stressing that “the international community, as it exercises its responsibility to protect, must demonstrate a high level of responsibility while protecting.” While the initiative did not have the success Brazil hoped for, it, nevertheless, demonstrates a willingness on Brazil’s part to interact with great powers in the strengthening of the international peace and stability regime—the rules of the game (Kenkel and Stefan 2016). These developments together allowed Brazil for some time to extend the reach of its foreign policy initiatives to new shores. In 2010, joined by

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Turkey, Brazil sought to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran. The fact that these negotiations collapsed in the face of US opposition is perhaps also the best indicator of the extent to which Brazil’s push for higher international standing did not amount to all that was hoped for. When confronted by the US, neither Brazil nor Turkey opted for continuing the push for a deal, selecting instead to pull back and give way to the traditional great powers. The limited overall success of the Brazilian quest for higher standing is discussed in Chaps. 2 and 3, and it must also be kept in mind when discussing the humanitarian initiatives, as they are key in determining the viability of the “good state” strategy for an emerging power. Together, the chapters in this volume seek to understand how these new brands or concepts of “non-indifference” and “responsibility while protecting” contributed to shaping Brazil’s global involvement, but also how this in turn impacted Brazil—especially with respect to its international standing—as well as humanitarian principles themselves.

Overview of Chapters The book is divided into four sections, reviewing different aspects of Brazil’s international engagements over the past 15 years. The first section begins with disentangling the concept of status, and how Brazil’s quest for international recognition has shaped its international positioning and strategies. The second chapter here, by Benjamin de Carvalho, sets forth to discuss the difference between “emerging” and “rising” power, and more specifically what that tells us about which strategies Brazil has adopted, at different times, according to whom it is seeking recognition from—the established great powers, the so-called Global South or the other emerging powers. The third chapter, by Paul Beaumont and Pål Røren, proposes a framework for systematically assessing Brazil’s status “performance” over the years, between 1970 and 2010. Taking diplomatic ties, and more specifically diplomatic representations around the world as an indicator of status recognition, they assess how Brazil performs in terms of status recognition, measured against its status resources, and suggest that Brazil performs below what could be expected based on its status resources. The second part of the book studies Brazil’s foreign policy over the years, assessing changes and constancies between different presidencies. The first chapter in this section (Chap. 4), by Dawisson Belém Lopes, Guilherme Casarões and Carlos Frederico Gama, looks at the traps that

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Brazil inevitably has found itself in, by virtue of being a middle power, and is thus reliant on complying with the established system and adopting coherent positions over time, all the while it has called for deep reforms of international institutions, from those established in San Francisco to those descending from Bretton Woods. The authors argue that Brazil’s quest for reforming international institutions for their own benefit appears incompatible with the expectation or norm of adopting coherent positions over time. The second chapter in this section (Chap. 5) is written by Antônio Carlos Lessa, Danielly Silva Ramos Becard and Thiago Gehre Galvão, and analyses the foreign policy platform created during the rule of PT between 2003 and 2016. Showing how this platform was elaborated, and put forward as a “triumphalist” foreign policy, during the Lula period (2003– 2010), it aimed to serve Brazil’s international integration. They focus on five key themes in the international strategy elaborated then: calling for reforms in international institutions and the campaign to achieve a permanent seat at the United Nations’ Security Council; the global campaign against hunger; energy diplomacy; presidential diplomacy; and reducing the complexity of decision-making processes. They then show how this foreign policy platform met its limits during Dilma Roussef’s presidency (2011–2016), leading this international ambition to collapse. Chapter 6, written by Guilherme Casarões, follows suit by studying the transition between Dilma Roussef’s presidency and the one of Michel Temer (May 2016–December 2018), following Roussef’s impeachment. The author argues that Brazil went through a process of “status downgrading,” seeking to return to a status of middle power, and shows what forms of conscious signalling this process entailed: at the international, regional and domestic levels. The third part of the book gathers contributions on Brazil’s engagement with the Security Agenda. The first chapter in this section (Chap. 7), written by Paulo Esteves and Monica Herz, digs into the Brazilian Foreign Policy Community’s main tenets and finds the quest for autonomy both as a goal and as the concept around which Brazil’s identity and international stance are built. Autonomy appears as a highly resilient concept that helps to understand Brazil’s strategies for status-seeking since the end of the Second World War. According to the authors, while the status sought by the Brazilian Foreign Policy Community is conditioned both by the pursuit of autonomy and by a given understanding of the distribution of power within the international system, Brazil’s stance regarding the international security field is influenced by its status claims. This “circle of

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r­ ecognition” would induce a mimetic behaviour within the security field according to which even though Brazil appears to be wedged by the principle of non-intervention, it may adapt it to current concepts, generating new positions such as non-indifference or Responsibility while Protecting. The second chapter in this section (Chap. 8), written by Kai Michael Kenkel, Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, and Mikelli Marzzini Lucas Alves Ribeiro, situates Brazil’s participation in peace operations and the broader normative debates about the imperative to intervene to prevent atrocities, and highlights the key issues this has raised for Brazil as it seeks to both shape this field and find and compromise its own position within it. Three key topics are discussed as focal points of Brazil’s positions towards intervention: non-intervention versus individual rights, the use of force and the role of intervention in emerging powers’ quest for greater international status. Chapter 9, written by Eduarda Passarelli Hamann and Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, takes this debate further and asks to what extent Brazil has a new understanding of multilateral interventions that use force to protect civilians, after its active role in a robust peacekeeping mission in Haiti and its contribution with the “Responsibility while protecting” (RwP) concept. It examines Brazil’s changing positions towards the use of force in international peacekeeping missions and assesses this against Brazil’s diplomatic endeavour in 2011 to advance the term of RwP, with all the inherent dilemmas the engagement with the much-­ contested concept of “Responsibility to protect” entailed. By using the case of Brazil’s leadership of the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the authors show that Brazil has already implemented an operation following the principles of “responsibility while protecting,” during the pacification phase in Haiti in 2005–2007. Finally, the fourth section of this book gathers contributions assessing Brazil’s engagement with international cooperation, development and humanitarian aid. The first chapter (Chap. 10), by Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert and Torkjell Leira, examines the spectacular rise, followed by a sharp decrease, in Brazil’s contributions to international cooperation in the years between 2009 and 2012, and places this curve in the statistics in a broader context: showing Brazil’s engagement in this field is neither new nor invented in the Lula period, but dates back several decades, all the while its spectacular rise in this period is a testimony of the high ambitions in this area during Lula’s presidency. Another important aspect relates to Brazil’s specific involvement in peacekeeping in Haiti, which then suffered a major earthquake in 2010, leading Brazil to be heavily involved in the

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following relief efforts as well. The chapter also seeks to contribute to a mapping of the different modalities of Brazilian international aid and how they grew in different ways during the period 2005–2013. Chapter 11, by Paulo Esteves, Geovana Zoccal Gomes and João Fonseca, takes a closer look at one of Brazil’s most prioritized areas of international cooperation, namely public health, food and nutrition security and agricultural innovation. According to the authors, Brazil’s status-seeking strategy showcases its social policies as a way for grounding its moral authority not only within the international community in general, but also in many specific international policymaking arenas. The authors identify the sources of Brazil’s moral claims at domestic policy networks and SouthSouth Cooperation as a tool for their internationalization and sectoral status-seeking. As the chapters in this book together seek to give an overview of these latter policies with a view to better understand how global humanitarian policies were changed and shaped by an emerging power, we must also keep in mind that the humanitarian involvement was but one aspect of Brazilian foreign policy. And while the outcomes of these humanitarian policies can be easily dismissed against the recent electoral victory of Jair Bolsonaro who has claimed to represent a departure from the “PT” brand of foreign policy, we must not forget that structures can be difficult to change, and that over three presidencies marked largely by a distinct form of outspoken humanitarianism have contributed to change the foreign policy debate in Brazil and the institutional structures within which it takes place. While we may expect to see change, as we discuss in the Conclusion to this volume, that change may happen to be shaped just as much by Brazil’s humanitarian initiatives as it seeks to take shape against it.

References Alden, C., D. Large, and R. Soares de Oliveira. 2008. China Returns to Africa: A Continent and a Rising Power Embrace, 2008. London/New York: Hurst Publishers and Columbia University Press. Amar, P. 2012. Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries. Globalizations 9 (1): 1–13. Barma, Naazneen, Giacomo Chiozza, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber. 2009. A World Without the West? Empirical Patterns and Theoretical Implications. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2 (4): 525–544. Burges, Sean W. 2017. Brazil in the World: The International Relations of a South American Giant. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

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Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. 2004. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coordenação-Geral de Ações Internacionais de Combate à Fome- Minstério das Relações Internacionais. Cooperação Humanitária Internacional, 2011 Dafoe, A., J. Renshon, and P. Huth. 2014. Reputation and Status as Motives for War. Annual Review of Political Science 17: 371–393. de Carvalho, Benjamin, and Jon Harald Sande Lie. 2015. A Great Power Performance: Norway, Status and the Policy of Involvement. In Small State Status Seeking, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B.  Neumann. London: Routledge. de Carvalho, Benjamin, and Iver B.  Neumann, eds. 2015. Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing. London: Routledge. Esteves, P. 2011. “Ikke-likegyldighet” i brasiliansk utenrikspolitikk. Internasjonal Politikk 2: 282–292. Fraundorfer, M. 2015. Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance: Health, Food Security and Bioenergy. London: Palgrave. Gardini, G., and M. Tavares de Almeida, eds. 2016. Foreign Policy Responses to the Rise of Brazil: Balancing Power in Emerging States. London: Palgrave. Herz, M. 2011. South America Regional Order: The Growth of Brazil as a Regional Power. In Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, ed. T.J. Volgy, R. Corbetta, K.A. Gran, and R.G. Baird, 256. Palgrave Macmillan. Huang, Meibo and Peiqiang Ren. 2012. China’s Foreign Aid and Its Role in the International Architecture. International Development Policy Revue internationale de politique de développement [Online] 3. Hurrell, Andrew. 2006. Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers? International Affairs 82 (1): 1–19. IPEA. 2012. A década inclusive (2001–2011) Desigualdade, Pobreza, e Políticas de Renda. Comunicados do IPEA, No 155. Kenkel, K.M., and C.G.  Stefan. 2016. Brazil and the Responsibility While Protecting Initiative: Norms and Diplomatic Support. Global Governance 22 (1): 41–58. Large, D. 2008. China and the Contradictions of ‘Non-Interference’ in Sudan. Review of African Political Economy 115 (35): 93–106. Larson, D.W., and A.  Shevchenko. 2010. Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to Us Primacy. International Security 34 (4): 63–95. Leira, Halvard. 2015. The Formative Years: Norway as an Obsessive Status-Seeker. In Small States Status Seeking, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann. London: Routledge. Malamud, A. 2011. Brasil: Fra Regionale nederlag til Global fremvekst. Internasjonal Politikk 2: 242–253. Mthembu, Philani. 2018. China and India’s Development Cooperation in Africa The Rise of Southern Powers, 199. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Neumann, Iver B., and Benjamin de Carvalho. 2015. Introduction: Small States and Status. In Small States Status Seeking, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann. London: Routledge. Nieto, W.A.S. 2012. Brazil’s Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor. Globalizations 9 (1): 161–178. Norheim-Martinsen, P.M. 2012. Brazil: An Emerging Peacekeeping Actor. NOREF Report, November 2012. Paul, T.V., Deborah Larson, and William Wohlforth, eds. 2014. Status and World Order. Cambridge: CUP. Renshon, J. 2017. Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Siqueira, Isabel Rocha de, and Paulo Esteves. 2018. O desenvolvimento que queremos: bolsa família como aprendizado para uma nova agenda. Editora PUC-Rio. Sotero, P., and L.E.  Armjio. 2007. Brazil: To Be or Not to Be a BRIC? Asian Perspective 31 (4): 4370–4391. Spektor, M. 2012. Humanitarian Interventionism Brazilian Style? Americas Quarterly 2012 (Summer): 54–59. Stolte, Christina. 2015. Brazil’s Africa Strategy: Role Conception and the Drive for International Status. London: Palgrave. Stuenkel, Oliver, and Matthew M. Taylor, eds. 2015. Brazil on the Global Stage: Power, Ideas, and the Liberal International Order. London: Palgrave. Tank, P. 2011. Turkey as an International Mediator: Opportunities and Pitfalls. NOREF Report, July 2011. ———. 2012. The Concept of ‘Rising Powers’, NOREF Policy Brief, June 2012. ———. forthcoming 2019. The Role of Humanitarian Assistance in Turkish Foreign Policy, Chapter 7. In Emerging Donors and Conflict Affected States: The New Politics of Reconstruction, ed. Agnieszka Paczynska. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Volgy, Thomas J., Renato Corbetta, Keith A.  Grant, and Ryan G.  Baird, eds. 2011. Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Wohlforth, William C. 2009. Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War. World Politics 61 (1): 28–57. Wohlforth, William C., Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and Iver B.  Neumann. 2018. Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking. Review of International Studies 44 (3): 536–546.

SECTION I

Brazil and the Search for International Status

CHAPTER 2

Brazil’s (Frustrated) Quest for Higher Status Benjamin de Carvalho

Introduction Emerging powers have been emerging for quite some time now, yet seldom risen to great power status. This state of affairs is such that the emerging powers have not only institutionalized their ‘emerging’ status though institutionalized cooperation, but this cooperation has been steadily going on for over a decade: what started as an acronym (BRIC) turned into a grouping of states (Brazil, Russia, India, China) before another so-called emerging power was added to the group, changing again the acronym into BRICS in order to accommodate the ‘South’ in South Africa. This is not a new story, yet it is a telling one. For even though constellations of these states cooperate under the auspices of other acronyms including only three of the five—RIC—which includes Russia, India, China and IBSA, RIC’s more democratic counterpart, which includes India, Brazil and South Africa—this is not symptomatic of them becoming fewer. Quite to the contrary, scholars, commentators and politicians alike seem to be in full agreement that as time goes by, more states get added to the ‘Hotel California’ club of emerging powers, the status club from which states can never leave. Great powerhood consistently B. de Carvalho (*) Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_2

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remains a mirage from which none of these states has yet been able to quench their ambitions.1 On a more serious note, the fact that none of these states for all their efforts has been able yet to fully reap the benefits of great powerhood is a matter worthy of more sustained consideration (see Røren and Beaumont 2018 for a notable exception). Before further venturing into emerging powers’ frustrated quest for higher standing, a clarification is in place: this chapter does not deal with power, but status. As pointed out above, our recent rising or emerging powers have remained rising or emerging in spite of shifts in wealth and military capability. As such, the question is not whether Brazil was able to maintain its high levels of growth or even about military investments. We are concerned here with the place Brazil claims within an international hierarchy, and which place other states—and especially great powers—grant it (on status, see Wohlforth 2009; Neumann and de Carvalho 2015; Duque 2018). Broadly speaking, Brazil’s problem has been one of conceptual misapprehension. Great powerhood, as Nicholas Onuf noted over three decades ago, is (no longer) a question of power, but a question of standing or status (Onuf 2012). Thus, just as ‘interstatual’ would be a better term than ‘international’ in many cases, ‘great status’ or ‘states of great standing’ would probably be a more accurate term than ‘great power’. To be sure, there is some correspondence between, as few would ever venture into calling Fiji or Malta great powers. Yet, the point stands. Conceptually, the discussion around emerging powers and great powerhood is first and foremost a question of claimed position in a social hierarchy, and whether those claims are successful in the sense that the powers who may be in a position to recognize such claims do so (Neumann and de Carvalho 2015; Duque 2018). Yet, while international status may be malleable to some extent, and while some states may seek to gain status through moral or ‘good’ behavior rather than military prowess or economic capabilities (see Wohlforth et al. 2018), there is a clear sense in which climbing the status ladder is no longer as straightforward as it once was. Furthermore, Brazil’s quest was complicated by the fact that while identifying with the great powers (of the Global North), Brazil, nevertheless, refused to relinquish its position as one of the leading states 1  The difficulty in making sense of the emerging power category is only exacerbated by the fact that China—at one point an emerging market, but certainly no emerging power—and Russia—a declining superpower for quite some time, yet a great power in most accounts— are routinely referred alongside other emerging powers when this clearly does not reflect their power or status (see discussion below).

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among the Global South. And while it was through the latter that Brazil came into a position from which it could legitimately aspire to great power status, being recognized as a great power would have meant that Brazil had to give up this condition of ‘hybridity’. By wishing to be a ‘great power from the South’, Brazil strengthened itself as the quintessential ‘hybrid power’, and therefore also condemned itself to hybridity and shattered dreams of great power status. I illustrate this briefly through three episodes involving humanitarian policies, peace and security. Through these, I wish to draw attention to the fact that Brazil’s efforts to being a bridge or broker between the West and the South in fact has paradoxically weakened its case for recognition as a great power as well as its position in the South. Its refusal to adopt a staunch position of non-intervention (against the West), insisting instead on its own concept of ‘nonindifference’, weakened its position in the South. Its refusal to go along with the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, insisting instead on its own ‘Responsibility while Protecting’, weakened its position vis-à-vis the West. Finally, Brazil’s attempts—alongside Turkey—to broker a deal with Iran may have, had it succeeded, cast Brazil in a new light. Yet, Brazil chose to back down when faced with reprimand from the US. I proceed this through two parts. First, I discuss Brazil’s quest within a broader conceptual discussion of status and emerging powers. Second, I outline three areas of Brazilian foreign policy aimed at increasing its status and show that each of them fails in different ways, either alienating Brazil from the South or alienating it from the West, and finally, where Brazil took a status gambit, that failed as it was abandoned when faced with reprimand from great powers. I conclude this chapter with reference to Hedley Bull’s warning that an international society that cannot accommodate the ambitions of new (non-Western) members may become an increasingly fragile order.

Reconceptualizing Status and Emerging Powers Emerging powers have become part of the taken-for-granted vocabulary of international affairs since the turn of the century. Yet, there is little consensus as to what the term refers to. Searching for commonalities between the emerging powers, one is tempted to conclude that above average economic growth is the only factor they all have in common. In fact, as is widely known, the term ‘BRIC’ which was central in propelling

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emerging powers at the top of the international agenda, was coined by the investment firm Goldman Sachs in 2003. The original BRIC states—Brazil, Russia, India and China—were the four states commonly associated with the label emerging power. Yet, Russia, in the seat of the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council (UNSC), and China, the potential rising superpower, are regarded by many commentators as belonging to the category of great powers rather than emerging ones. In fact, coming to grips with the category of great powers is central if one is to make sense of the emerging power category. For, if emerging powers—or ‘rising’ as some will say—are emerging or rising towards a different status, surely it must be that of a great power. But while there is more consensus as to how to grasp the great power concept, there are still two markedly different views: the first one regards stratification of actors as a matter of capabilities. According to such a view, what distinguishes superpowers from great powers and emerging powers (or even middle powers and regional powers) is their differing ability to engage in war. Take John J. Mearsheimer’s view of a great power as ‘a state [having] sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world’ (2001: 5). According to such a view, emerging powers should be understood as states which in the foreseeable future will be able to engage in a large-scale conventional war; in short, states to be reckoned with. The second view is that associated with the English School and which emphasizes great powerhood as the ability, right and willingness of a state to manage international order. This notion derives largely from Hedley Bull, who argued that great powerhood was more than capability, as they were granted the ‘right’ to manage international order by other members of international society: ‘great powers manage their relations with one another in the interest of international order’ (1977: 205–206). Such a perspective emphasizes less the capability dimension than the recognition dimension. Other members have to grant states great power status, and as such, it is less a matter of analytical categories than a matter of shared understandings between members of international society. Buzan and Wæver attempt a synthesizing position when they argue that what distinguishes great powers from regional ones ‘is that they are responded to by others on the basis of system calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 35; see also Burges 2013). And while emerging powers may have in

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c­ ommon ‘some ability to contribute to the generation of a revised international order’ (Hart and Jones 2011: 65), one of the most important criteria distinguishing emerging the group of emerging powers from great powers is that they never fully integrated into the post-1945 order. ‘Being on the outside looking in has heavily conditioned their strategic interests and conceptions of national purpose’ (ibid.; see also Bodnam et al. 2011). In fact, it seems to me that status has increasingly become a static game, where social mobility is precluded through the non-recognition of emerging powers. As George Modelski has noted, ‘The status of Great power is sometimes confused with the condition of being powerful. The office, as it is known, did in fact evolve from the role played by the great military states in earlier periods [...] But the Great power system institutionalizes the position of the powerful state in a web of rights and obligations’ (1972, 141). While the categorization as ‘emerging powers’ does to some extent correlate with capabilities and resources, acceptance as a great power is ultimately a matter of social recognition by other great powers. Thus, there is no automatic fungibility between the two categories. Yet, the position of emerging powers is between two peer groups who grant recognition (their regional peers who grant them their role as leaders, and great powers who have the power to ordain them as peers). In these terms, Brazil’s quest for great powerhood—just as any emerging or rising power’s quest today—is up against a hierarchical structure of status which is more static than before. Emerging powers’ quest to become great powers is a quest for status or rank rather than a quest for power. As a case in point, for Brazil, the obstinate pursuit of greater international recognition which we witness during the decade after the election of Lula as president happened without strengthening either defense arsenals or the military and without pursuing nuclear weapons. Yet, there are few mechanisms—either in the scholarly literature or in practice—through which states’ non-violent quest for increased standing can be accommodated.2 The road available to an emerging power who has relinquished ­measuring itself against other states according to military capability— 2  As Nick Onuf (2012) has noted, there may have been a time when states could be ranked according to military prowess: to show that it measured on par or above another state, a state can go to war. Today, with the advent of nuclear weapons, that possibility is not there—or at least not to the same extent: going to war to prove one’s superiority would almost certainly result in the powerlessness of all parties.

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which, again, is different from power—is less clearly marked. Our hunch has been that in Brazil’s case this quest amounted to following a strategy many smaller and medium-sized states have followed with relatively good results (de Carvalho and Lie 2015), namely that of being a ‘good state’ and seeking to be ranked on moral authority rather than power by showing willingness, responsibility and commitment to international order and stability and the peaceful mediation of conflicts (see Wohlforth et al. 2018).

Hybrid Power and Brazil’s Quest for Great Power Status Throughout the period covered by this book, Brazil’s foreign policy establishment sought to make the country indispensable in major international negotiations and to gain credibility as a useful mediator between North and South, and between industrialized and developing countries (Burges 2013). Brazil has adopted a role of leader for the Global South in trade negotiations, made the case for less conditionality and interference in what it sees as sovereign affairs, and involved itself significantly in changing the international peace and security agenda. In all these fields, Brazil has brought new ideas and commitments to the table. At the same time, they have been careful to distance themselves from more traditional forms of hard power. Brazil has dismissed claims that it has ambitions to acquire substantial military capacity and rejects intrusive partnerships with established players in North America and Western Europe (Bodnam et  al. 2011; Domingos and de Carvalho 2012). Furthermore, the Brazilian government routinely emphasizes multilateral institutions and diplomacy as the fundamental basis for legitimate global order (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2010). Brazil has thus sought to frame its rise not in terms of projecting power, but rather in terms of its contribution to solving global problems. In the last decade the country has either joined or enhanced its profile in several international organizations and has become a significant player in issues ranging from trade to development cooperation, and from climate change to international peace and security. Brazil is also campaigning for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (de Carvalho 2011). Characterizing itself as having a different position and interest to Western powers, Brazil has consistently taken decisions that emphasize a different understanding of humanitarianism. Brazil abstained from the

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US- and European-led military partnership against Libya in 2011 for humanitarian reasons, calling on the US and Europe to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas.3 The emerging call for the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) in the Arab world is part of the important changes in Brazil’s engagement in the region. However, for all her government’s concern with sovereignty, President Rousseff has not challenged the fundamental validity of R2P. Instead, she has argued that foreign interventions designed to protect civilians must be tightly regulated because too many dangers are inherent in interventions across borders in the name of humanitarian concerns (Spektor 2012). In the case of Syria, Brazil sought to demonstrate concern while rejecting calls for a Libyan-style intervention. Along with India and South Africa—but without Russia or China—Brazil participated in a mission to Damascus in order to head off sanctions or other forms of international pressure that would push Assad into a corner and exacerbate the conflict. When the effort failed, Brazil came under heavy criticism for its posture on Syria. Its international solidarity parallels that of other emerging powers, from the more established ones like China and India, to the newer emerging middle powers like Turkey and South Africa (Tank 2012). It challenges established Western forms of intervention, but is at the same time not a power that frightens anyone (Malamud 2011: 242); it is indeed an ‘archetypical soft power’ (Sotero and Armjio 2007: 43). And this soft power is exercised notably through the alternative approach Brazil seeks to develop to aid and protection. Brazil’s particular model of engagement appears to be inspired by (1) Western norms of moral needs to ‘do something’ when faced with human suffering elsewhere, (2) Global South norms of ‘non-­ intervention’ in the internal affairs of sovereign states, as well as (3) old and new humanitarian imperatives of continued critical reflection on the effects of external interventions. Experiences of other emerging powers, and research carried out on their motivations and forms of engagement will be drawn upon in order to highlight the specificities of the understudied Brazilian case. Initially, Brazil remains attached to the concept of ‘non-­interventionism’, dear to emerging powers seeking to protect their sovereignty, but perhaps just as important, a concept which stands as central for those countries to which it provides assistance. Indeed, it is important for Brazil to be able to play on a South-South relationship, in itself a vehicle for differentiating 3

 This section builds on work written with Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert.

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itself from other forms of aid and/or intervention stemming from the traditional powers in the North/West. Yet, as a moral and political justification for its involvement, despite the imperative of ‘non-intervention’, Brazil has set forth the concept of ‘non-indifference’, first coined by former foreign minister Celso Amorim. The concept has become a way for Brazil to compromise with its reticence towards Western liberal forms of interfering in other states’ internal affairs, while stressing the more idealistic part of humanitarianism: the need to ‘do something’ and not remain indifferent (Esteves 2011: 283). Furthermore, Brazil stresses the importance of ‘sustainability’ as a supplement to the traditional humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence, by focusing on solutions that can be long-lasting and enhance local capabilities, so as to not develop a dependence on external donors. Emphasis is placed on how external assistance should address the core problems underlying a crisis and that humanitarian assistance should take place in conjunction with sustainable social development. Finally, as a contrast to the North/West’s enthusiasm for the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’, Brazil has attempted to reshape the protection agenda by proposing the alternative of ‘responsibility while protecting’. The concept has been formally presented by the Brazilian government to the UN Secretary General in November 2011, stressing that ‘the international community, as it exercises its responsibility to protect, must demonstrate a high level of responsibility while protecting’. What remains to be understood is not only how Brazil approaches humanitarianism, but also what it aspires to achieve through this approach and what impact this stance is likely to have on how we understand humanitarianism. Finally, as Brazil was ready to ascertain itself on the global stage through a joint brokerage with Turkey of an agreement with Iran, the country was reprimanded by the then State Secretary Hillary Clinton. Brazil bowed back and complained in silence that the ‘Iran deal’ later brokered by President Obama was really nothing more than the deal Brazil had helped broker a few years earlier.4 As Andrew Hurrell has reminded us, many of the rising powers ‘have identified themselves more specifically as developing countries and have understood their foreign policy options through the prism of North– South relations. This has been a persistent theme in the case of India; in the case of Brazil it has been a more ambiguous one, but one that is clearly 4

 Interviews with Brazilian diplomats, Oslo, 2016.

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in the ascendant under the present government. If so, what happens if that “developing country identity” comes into conflict with the “aspiring great power identity”?’5 Even the category of great powers is not as clear-cut as one would have expected it to be, so emerging powers are aspiring to a somewhat moving target. There is widespread agreement about the fact that permanent membership of the UNSC (the P5) is one of the most important hallmarks of great powerhood, which would give us the US, the UK, China, Russia and France. Japan and Germany are often referred to as great powers due to their ranking on economic factors. Germany is also part of the ‘P5+1’ grouping within the UN. With a little flexibility, one could include Italy due to its G7 membership, but that’s probably pushing the envelope a bit. The current system, by most accounts, has seven great powers—alternatively one of them with superpower status; possibly 1.5 superpowers, depending on how one sees China.

Conclusion What explains Brazil’s constant rise without ever graduating to the ranks of a great power? Pointing to the current political turmoil in Brazil is a dead-end, as this point would have held true long before such turmoil started. I have sought to make the case that emerging powers today are unable to ‘rise’ and achieve their dreams of social mobility for a number of reasons. Rising powers have been discursively trapped in a structure from which their rise depends on other things than their acceptance. Their inclusion in the ‘emerging powers’ category based on their resources, capacity and performance on the one hand made their aspirations clear, while on the other hand making their further rise depend on recognition from other great powers who are carefully guarding their restricted circle. Granted the fact that rising powers find it difficult to rise, so to speak, is not new. In After Defeat, Ayse Zarakol shows how the West historically constantly changed the criteria of inclusion towards non-Western powers to frustrate their rise and inclusion. Zarakol also points to the cultural dimension of this struggle (2010). The hybridity of Brazil’s position would point in that direction. Yet, as I have alluded to above, there is 5  Hurrell, Andrew (2006) ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would be great powers?’ International Affairs, vol. 82, p. 19.

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more to this status struggle today than in the past, as the position of rising powers has been institutionalized through its own hybrid category: the emerging powers. Stasis between categories has become the modus operandi of a system where states are allowed to seek status alongside their peers, but never rise beyond their status category. The status hierarchy is not a ladder, but a set of peer group categories not easily ranked. The fact of the matter is  that the category of emerging powers now includes so many states which are neither rising nor emerging, and, all being said, are quite happy to be recognized as an emerging power. The category of emerging power, to most states associated with it, is an upgrade. This works to reinforce the difficulties of rising beyond the category. Brazil and India are within the emerging powers group expecting to—someday—be recognized as great powers, while the emerging power label works against their ambitions by associating them instead with smaller states which no one will ever recognize as great powers. But there is more to this, as status-seeking happens within a peer group, rising beyond that peer group may prove difficult, as rising beyond it entails no longer acknowledging other rising powers as peers, but as subordinates, and seeking status within the great powers peer group rather than below it. This is also where rising powers see their efforts at being recognized frustrated. In the case of Brazil, this is a double frustration, as not only does Brazil belong to a peer group between great powers and the other Latin-American states, it has also chosen to seek higher status through advancing an explicitly hybrid understanding of its quest. Brazil has sought to be a ‘southern great power’. In Brazil’s case, all this is reinforced due to its own policies of being a different type of great power, as ‘Southern great power’. This again reinforces its hybrid character and makes it all the more difficult to rise, as Brazil itself refuses to play the great power game—or, when it does, does not dare to play it fully. Remembering the recognition struggles faced by Japan and China, it was only once the countries had demonstrated that they had to be reckoned with militarily that they gained recognition as peers. In a similar vein, one might be tempted to think that recent commentaries have put great emphasis on the contribution of great powers to international peace and security—at the expense of power capabilities. Yes, great powers do play that role, but playing that role may not have been what made them great powers in the first place. Hedley Bull warned us in 1977 in his Anarchical Society (1977) of the dangers of not accommodating new non-Western

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powers, arguing that the expansion of international society would lead to challenges from non-Western powers should their ambitions not be accommodated within the Western order or international society. Perhaps it is time for the great powers to heed Bull’s warning.

References Bodnam, Samuel W., James D. Wolfensohn, and Julia Sweig. 2011. Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations. Independent Task Force Report No. 66. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Politics. London: Macmillan Press. Burges, Sean W. 2013. Brazil as a Bridge Between Old and New Powers? International Affairs 89 (3): 577–594. Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Carvalho, Benjamin. 2011. Brasil: Endelig en stormakt? Internasjonal Politikk 69 (2): 293–300. de Carvalho, Benjamin, and Jon Harald Sande Lie. 2015. A Great Power Performance: Norway, Status and the Policy of Involvement. In Small State Status Seeking, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B.  Neumann. London: Routledge. de Carvalho, Benjamin, and Iver B.  Neumann, eds. 2015. Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing. London: Routledge. Domingos, Nicole de Paula and Benjamin de Carvalho. 2012. Belated Courtship? The Uneasy Partnership between Brazil and the EU. Policy Brief 12/2012. Oslo: NUPI. Duque, Marina G. 2018. Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach. International Studies Quarterly 62 (3): 577–592. Esteves, Paulo. 2011. “Ikke-likegyldighet” i brasiliansk utenrikspolitikk. Internasjonal Politikk 2: 282–292. Hart, Andrew F., and Bruce D.  Jones. 2011. How Do Rising Powers Rise? Survival 52 (6): 63–88. Malamud, A. 2011. Brasil: Fra Regionale nederlag til Global fremvekst. Internasjonal Politikk 69 (2): 242–253. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Modelski, George. 1972. Principles of World Politics. New York: Free Press. Neumann, Iver B., and Benjamin de Carvalho. 2015. Introduction: Small States and Status. In Small State Status Seeking, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann. London: Routledge. Onuf, Nicholas G. 2012. World of Our Making. London: Routledge.

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Røren, Pål, and Paul D.  Beaumont. 2018. Grading Greatness: Evaluating the Status Performance of the BRICS. Third World Quarterly. https://doi.org/1 0.1080/01436597.2018.1535892. Sotero, P., and L.E.  Armjio. 2007. Brazil: To Be or Not to Be a BRIC? Asian Perspective 31 (4): 4370–4391. Spektor, M. 2012. Humanitarian Interventionism Brazilian Style? Americas Quarterly 2012 (Summer): 54–59. Tank, P. 2012. The Concept of ‘Rising Powers’. NOREF Policy Brief, June 2012. Vigevani, Tullo, and Gabriel Cepaluni. 2010. Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times: The Quest for Autonomy From Sarney to Lula. New York: Lexington Books. Wohlforth, William C. 2009. Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War. World Politics 61 (1): 28–57. Wohlforth, William C., Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and Iver B.  Neumann. 2018. Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking. Review of International Studies 44 (3): 536–546. Zarakol, Ayse. 2010. After Defeat. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Brazil’s Status Struggles: Why Nice Guys Finish Last Paul Beaumont and Pål Røren

Introduction Recent domestic crises have put something of a dampener on Brazil’s great power aspirations. Indeed, its quest for international recognition has recently taken a backseat as Brazil seeks to get its domestic house in order (Marcondes and Mawdsley 2017). The heyday of Lula’s globe-trotting presidency, which promoted a confident, outward-facing Brazil, seems a long-distant memory. Now mired in economic and constitutional crises, a malaise has fallen over Brazilian politics that has led to a shrunken foreign policy agenda, characterized by inertia rather than dynamism (Burges and Chagas Bastos 2017). Few speak about the ‘rise of Brazil anymore’, at

P. Beaumont (*) Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås, Norway e-mail: [email protected] P. Røren University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_3

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least not without bitter irony. Yet, gloom about the present can often prompt unreflexive nostalgia for the past.1 We suggest that this period of pessimism is an apt moment to take a long-lens perspective on Brazil’s historical quest for status. To be sure, the ‘rise of Brazil narrative’ was certainly ubiquitous, but the extent to which it was matched by international recognition is currently unknown. Indeed, existing research on Brazil’s fervent status-seeking has tended to highlight its efforts to seek status with little attempt to assess its success in gaining recognition (e.g. Christensen 2013, p. 284; Stolte 2015). Indeed, beyond the high bar of gaining membership of the Security Council, these studies lack an ability to assess the success of these policies. Therefore, to complement existing research into Brazil’s status-seeking, and contextualize the other chapters in this volume, we provide a systematic evaluation and analysis of Brazil’s status performance between 1970 and 2010. To what extent was Brazil able to translate its economic resources into international status across the period.? Compared to its BRICS (Brazil, Russia India, China, and South Africa) peers, did Brazil’s status-seeking bring about relative improvement in international recognition? This is a difficult question. As Benjamin de Carvalho’s discussion of status in Chap. 2 alludes, getting a handle on international status is no easy task. Indeed, status is a social-relational phenomenon; it requires recognition from other actors to become realized (Wohlforth et  al. 2017). As such, it cannot be read off the material capabilities of a state: From Byzantine to France during World War II, the historical record is littered with actors enjoying status apparently disconnected from their material means (de Carvalho and Neumann 2015). In other words, a country might very well be great in size, resources, and have the desire for great power status, but these do not automatically grant it recognition for great power status: international status dynamics do not operate fairly or predictably. Nonetheless, it is these opaque but significant practices of gaining and maintaining recognition from others that we seek to shed light on here. To this end, we put to work a recently developed framework for systematically assessing and comparing countries’ status performance across time (Røren and Beaumont 2018) This approach explicitly builds upon decades of large N ‘status discrepancy’ research to create a mixed-methods framework that can zoom in on and compare individual state’s relative status 1

 On the perils of ‘retrotopian’ nostalgia, see Beaumont (2018).

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performance (Galtung 1964; Renshon 2016, 2017; Volgy et al. 2011) In short, and as we will elaborate below, using the relative level of diplomatic representation as a proxy for status recognition and relating it to its relative level of ‘status resources’ (wealth), our procedure indicates what we conceptualize as a country’s s status performance: how well or badly a state has managed to make the most of its material means and generate social recognition from its peers. As such, this chapter makes both an empirical and theoretical contribution to IR research. First, by offering a way of evaluating the results of Brazil’s alleged status-seeking across time, we fill a lacuna in the Brazil status-seeking literature. Second, we suggest that by comparing Brazil’s status performance to the other BRICS members can provide a useful litmus test for the common liberal claim that since the 1990s international society has begun to recognize more pro-social activities as worthy of status (Duque 2018; Røren 2019). Indeed, assessing how Brazil—a non-nuclear, non-interventionist, human rights advocating ‘peaceful power’—compares in terms of status performance to other more militaristic rising powers offers an interesting test of international societies’ alleged new liberal bona fides. Our results will be chastening to Brazilians but not entirely surprising; after all, frustrations with Brazil’s position in the world have long abounded, even before the recent crises. In short, our findings suggest that not only does Brazil underperform compared to its status resources, but that it performs worse than any of its BRICS peers. While Brazilian politicians have tended to blame the Permanent Five (P5) for excluding them from the high status ‘in group’, our findings show that Brazil has also struggled with recognition from smaller powers for a prolonged period stretching from the 1970s into the twenty-first century. However, our findings do suggest that Lula’s foreign policy was beginning to pay dividends: Brazil enjoyed its biggest improvement in status performance during the period 2005–2010. The rest of this chapter first elaborates our theoretical framework and methodology, before combining our large N data with case study analysis to proffer the plausible, but we emphasize preliminary explanations for this performance.

Status Performance Framework How can we measure and evaluate the level of recognition the BRICS have received for their status-seeking efforts? Here, we build upon quantitative large N studies that have developed the ‘status discrepancy’

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­ ethodology. This approach has largely used it to construct a categorical m independent variable and focused on testing its relationship to various war-related events (e.g. Renshon 2016). Yet with some conceptual tweaking, Røren and Beaumont (2018) show how this methodology can also provide systemic-level empirics that illuminate individual states’ relative status performance, which in turn can be used as a starting point for a qualitative assessment of the countries’ status performance. In short, we conceptualize status performance as a function of a state’s relative status resources (material capabilities) translated through socially embedded practices into changing levels of relative status recognition. The following section elaborates upon the theoretical and methodological choices underwriting this procedure. First, in order to capture status recognition, we look to diplomatic recognition and specifically the type and amount of diplomatic representation a country hosts within its borders. The significant decision to establish an embassy in another country, coupled with the mundane practice of maintaining it there, is essentially a vote for the receiving country’s importance in the world. Regardless of what a state may value as important in their relations with another state, establishing diplomatic ties is likely to serve as a useful tool to facilitate it (Neumayer 2008: 228). While diplomatic missions offer undoubted utility, states send only around one in five of the embassies they could send (Duque 2018). Therefore, embassies perform a ‘symbolic role as a concrete representation of the importance attached to a bilateral relationship’ (Malone 2013: 124). Critically, diplomatic representation reflects what the agents themselves considered sufficiently important to maintain diplomatic missions in a given country; it is precisely because states select according to their own subjective criteria that diplomatic missions are said to fulfil the intersubjective and relational aspects required to fit with status theory. Similar to how the invisible hand of the market works through the allocation of money to determine value in a market, the allocation of scarce diplomatic resources provides a window into how status is allocated in the international system. Indeed, Marina Duque suggests diplomacy is ‘par excellence the locus of status in international politics’ and the practice of establishing diplomatic representation ‘the best indicator of (status) recognition’ available to researchers (Duque 2018: 10; also see Kinne 2014; Renshon 2016). One way of operationalizing diplomatic representation is to count and rank how many diplomats or embassies each country has within its

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territories, while taking into account that not all embassies should be weighted equally. In other words, having an embassy from the US indicates higher status than having a Finnish embassy located in the country. In order to take this into account, we utilize Renshon’s ingenious approach of using Google’s PageRank algorithm to sort the diplomatic rank of the world’s countries. In addition to the overall number of embassies a country ‘receives’ (size), the algorithm specifies that countries will benefit more from being connected to those countries with higher recognition than countries with lower recognition (quality), as well as from those countries with few embassies established abroad (exclusivity). The result of the numerous iterations is converted into an ordinal rank to conform with the positional definition of status. While this procedure is currently the best means of assessing long-term systemic patterns of status recognition, it has limitations that mean it should be regarded as a good but imperfect window into international status dynamics (Miller et al. 2015: 51) . The second component of our status performance framework is what we call status resources. These are understood as a state’s cumulative potential for social action that could generate status recognition for a state. Crucially, status resources are not understood as timeless status attributes equated directly with status (as in Volgy et al. 2011) but as a resource that indicates potential for actions with status effects. In short, we assume the more economic resources a state has, the more actions a state and its people can undertake that could affect the state’s status recognition. We do not presume the more economic resources the better the status recognition, only the more potential. Certainly, we are guilty of reifying the idea that wealth enables action, but we are not reifying the idea that wealth equals status. Thus, by conceiving of material attributes as status resources that can only generate recognition through social action, we seek to capture the relationship between material capabilities and status, without being locked in to it. While it is common in status discrepancy research to utilize some measure of military capacities as a marker of ‘objective status’. In contrast, our conception of status seeks to illuminate the agency of actors in making the most of their potential (resources) to seek status; total wealth is a superior theoretical fit because it is more fungible than military power. Military power is a function of wealth and not the other way around. In short, states can choose to spend wealth on their military, on embassies abroad, on aid, on social welfare, or on something else, and each could contribute to earning status recognition. Spending economic resources on military power may well offer the best

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status-seeking strategy, but given that it involves agency, choice, and thus skill, it should be investigated in the qualitative analysis. Ultimately, this is why gross national income (GNI) is chosen as our sole measure of status resource rather than military capacity, or, indeed, any other potential status resource.2 Ultimately this generates what we call status performance: the combined measure of diplomatic representation on the one hand, and status resources and status-generating actions on the other. Status performance seeks to capture how well a state utilizes its potential status resources and how well its status-seeking has resonated with its international audiences. As suggested before, this model resembles Volgy et  al.’s (2011) ‘status discrepancy’ and Renshon’s (2017) ‘status deficit’ measures, yet differs conceptually and in how we cash it out in analysis.3 Indeed, we suggest divergent status performances constitute puzzles that can be solved with qualitative interpretation. Status resources provide a baseline from which to assess a country’s relative performance in generating status recognition: whether they are performing well or badly, given their status resources. However, to explain status performance, the analysis requires not only interpreting the actor’s skill in pursuing policies in a manner that leads to status recognition, but also how this recognition has been limited or enabled by contextual factors within international society. Regarding agency of states to affect their status, we conceptualize status recognition as a continuous side effect of domestic and foreign policy, whether sought or not. The degree to which 2   Gross national income (GNI) gathered from the UN’s National Accounts Main Aggregates Database for 2012 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp (accessed 02 April 2014). We use GNI rather than gross domestic product (GDP) since it is seen to be most representative of a specific country’s overall breadth and strength of economy (see Wood 1990). 3  First, all the countries are ranked on the basis of their PageRank score in each year. The countries are then ranked on the basis of the size of their GNI. Subsequently, the countries’ rank on the PageRank measure is subtracted from their respective rank on GNI. This results in a rank discrepancy measure—the difference between countries’ ‘real’ rank on their status resources and their status recognition. This discrepancy is then standardized using the standard deviation between the ranks and subsequently plotted in a simple diagram for each of the discrepancy models from 1970 to 2010. A number closer to zero on the performance of military capabilities or wealth would suggest that they receive as much recognition as their status resources would suggest was normal: par for course. Any positive or negative discrepancies would indicate that the particular country is either over-performing (+) or underperforming (−) relative to their status resources.

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a public action resonates with an audience may be consciously manipulated with skillful presentation, or it may be an unintended side effect. Yet while generating status requires skill, the game is not fair. Like most markets, the international status hierarchy includes structural advantages to some actors that favor the reproduction of the status quo. Explaining status performance requires analysis of countries’ practices but also the context within which they operate. While we use the term ‘structure’ here, we mean to imply contextual factors beyond a state’s control that may inhibit or enable its generation of status recognition. We do not mean to imply necessarily either universal or timeless effect. For instance, the Non-­ proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the growing norm against the acquisition of nuclear weapons, would count as a structural factor that could inhibit or enable status performance depending on a state’s specific temporal and political relationship to the treaty. The mixed method aspect of our status performance framework aims to draw attention to variable status effects of a state’s policies and their interplay with their unique historical context.

Brazil Versus the RICS The following section thus zooms in on the status performance of the BRICS in order to investigate to what extent these dreams of greatness were realized and how Brazil’s status-seeking measures up to its BRICS rivals. Indeed, the BRICS sought elevated status in international society long before Goldman Sachs gave them their ubiquitous moniker (O’Neill 2001). Indeed, beyond the minimalistic yet fuzzy characteristics of being big and growing relatively quickly, the strongest commonality among the BRICS is their governments’ explicit desire to acquire higher social status. Indeed, international relations (IR) scholars have thoroughly documented the various status strategies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (see, for instance, Barber and Barratt 1990; Basrur 2011; Clunan 2014; Deng 2011; Forsberg et  al. 2014; Herz 2011; Larson and Shevchenko 2014; Leith and Pretoruis 2009; Paul and Shankar 2014; Schweller and Pu 2014; Stolte 2015). The overall conclusion of these studies is unidirectional: status concerns the BRICS a great deal and informs their foreign policy choices. Indeed, Brazil has long seemed eager to join the ranks of the great powers and, by doing so, has ‘striven for symbols of international recognition, prestige and status’. (Stolte 2015: 49) Indeed, there is no shortage of examples of Brazilian leaders stating such ambitions. In a 2001 survey among Brazilian elites, for instance, 99%

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suggested that ‘becoming a world leader was a fundamental objective of Brazilian foreign policy’ (Herz 2011: 170). Former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso suggested in 2012 that ‘the Brazilians were all the time envisaging what we might become’ (The Economist 2012). This was reiterated by successive leaders and ministers, including former President Lula da Silva, suggesting in 2012 that Brazil finally was ‘preparing to transform itself into one of the great nations of the world’ (quoted in Stolte 2015: 44). This ambitious foreign policy was driven by their frustration with the Western-dominated hierarchy of the Group of 20 (G-20) and the impermeability of the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Erthal Abdenur 2014; Reid 2014). We analyze the results of the measure, comparing Brazil with its BRIC peers, to qualitatively infer contextualized explanations for Brazil’s relative status performance. As the last section explains, status performance captures in broad strokes how well a state has translated its status resources into status recognition over time. In this way, status performance illuminates when states struggle to turn their status resources into recognition, or when they manage to enjoy high status recognition despite having less status resources: overperformance or underperformance, respectively. Thus, we first briefly present our results and flesh out the main trends in our data before focusing on the curious aspects of Brazil’s status performance vis-­ à-­vis its ‘status peer group’.4 Although the BRICS do not share a common time frame or trajectory for their economic growth, they have all at some point grown faster than the major Western powers. Status performance provides a means of assessing how well the BRICS translated these relative gains in material position into gains in recognition. Or, vice versa: hold onto their recognition when in periods of relative economic decline. Table 3.1a shows the level of status recognition, transformed into an ordinal world rank scale for each year, while Table 3.1b displays the status performance of the BRICS countries: the standardized discrepancy between the countries’ rank on their own status resources (Table 3.1a) and their received status recognition (Table 3.1b). Status performance is also illustrated visually in Fig. 3.1. Overall, except for Brazil, the status performance of the BRICS has been strong since the 1990s. The most 4  The selection of the BRICS for comparison is not an arbitrary decision: the very fact that the BRICS sought to institutionalize a semi-exclusive club for themselves indicates that they consider themselves one-another’s peer group (Wohlforth et al. 2017).

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Table 3.1  Status resources (gross national income), BRICS countries Year

Brazil

USSR/Russia

India

a. GNI absolute values (in milliards constant 2012 USD) 1970 206.4 2565.8 362.0 1975 455.1 2929.1 428.0 1980 533.2 2622.7 517.4 1985 377.9 1947.1 480.3 1990 716.3 997.1 567.8 1995 1144.4 593.5 551.3 2000 898.8 332.9 632.2 2005 1011.0 875.9 981.3 2010 2209.6 1550.1 1771.2 b. GNI world rank 1970 16 2 10 1975 13 2 14 1980 12 3 13 1985 13 3 11 1990 10 8 12 1995 7 13 15 2000 9 21 13 2005 10 14 13 2010 7 11 9

China

South Africa

544.9 692.2 846.4 655.7 688.7 1081.4 1571.5 2644.1 6199.9

102.1 151.2 215.4 116.5 189.6 223.8 183.5 285.7 373.8

8 9 8 9 11 8 7 5 2

22 27 24 33 28 26 28 27 29

Overperformer

1.3

0.8 Brazil 0.3 USSR/ Russia

Underperformer

-0.2

India China

-0.7

South Africa

-1.2

-2,5 -1.7 1970

-3,1 1975

-3,2 1980

-2,8 1985

-3,3 1990

1995

2000

Fig. 3.1  Status performance based on GNI, BRICS

2005

2010

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consistent underperformer throughout the period has been Brazil. While Brazil underperformed throughout the 40-year time frame, China underperformed before its economic reforms, and South Africa only under the apartheid regime. The Soviet Union here underperformed until the end of the Cold War, but Russia has consistently overperformed since, at least until end of the period assessed here, 2010. India, on the other hand, has generally performed at around ‘par’ throughout the 40 years, managing to avoid ‘status lag’ during its recent period of rapid economic growth. To emphasize, seeking to understand the status performance of Brazil is an exercise of interpretation: the quantitative data alone cannot tell us definitively what caused status recognition. Yet, by mapping the results of different states’ performance can allow us to observe trends and shocks to status performance, which, via comparison and drawing on case studies, can allow us to piece together plausible explanations for status performance. Making the Most of One’s Hand: Status-Seeking Skill and Structural (Dis)Advantages Perhaps, the biggest puzzle that emerges from the status performance of the BRICS is how Brazil has consistently been the largest underperformer since it became a democracy (see Fig. 3.1). These status struggles would appear at least somewhat puzzling, given that Brazil has made a concerted effort to follow and promote the liberal-democratic norms of international society (Herz 2011), undertaken costly peacekeeping missions (Stolte 2015), and risen through the rankings of GNI (see Table 3.1). Moreover, while before 1990 one might have pointed to Brazil’s small military as the root of its status struggles, after 1990 Brazil increased its military spending, yet its status recognition remained mostly unchanged and even worsened. It might be tempting to strike this up to just ‘status lag’: the tendency for states to be slow to change their practices of recognition. However, Brazil is the only one of the BRICS countries to actually experience a severe status lag when its relative resources rose. China’s rapid improvement in the years leading up to 1990 and its ability to avoid ‘status lag’ might help shed some light on Brazil’s status struggles. China moved from a serious status underperformance in 1970 to managing to reach ‘par’ in 1990 (see Fig.  3.1). Moreover, despite growing rapidly (around 10% per year) and moving up the GNI rankings during the following two decades, its status recognition kept pace, equating to a status performance in line or above its status resources

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Table 3.2  Status recognition and status performance, BRICS countries Year

Brazil

USSR/Russia

India

China

South Africa

a. Status recognition (world rank on PageRank) 1970 20 6 9 37 83 1975 15 8 10 26 97 1980 15 6 8 11 98 1985 16 6 9 7 98 1990 14 6 12 7 106 1995 18 2 12 7 33 2000 17 6 12 7 14 2005 20 8 12 5 13 2010 13 8 6 3 14 b. Status performance (standardized score of GNI-PageRank discrepancy) 1970 −0.168 −0.168 0.042 −1.218 −2.521 1975 −0.089 −0.268 0.179 −0.760 −3.085 1980 −0.133 −0.133 0.222 −0.133 −3.244 1985 −0.132 −0.132 0.088 0.088 −2.777 1990 −0.178 0.089 0.000 0.178 −3.346 1995 −0.425 0.425 0.116 0.039 −0.271 2000 −0.358 0.671 0.044 0.000 0.626 2005 −0.464 0.279 0.046 0.000 0.650 2010 −0.312 0.156 0.156 −0.052 0.781

(Fig. 3.1 and Table 3.2b). How did China avoid the sort of status lag Brazil appears to suffer? First, China’s unusual status performance can be partially explained by the fact that it only received formal recognition as a state from the US in 1971, gaining its seat in the UNSC shortly after. Previously, the lack of formal recognition from the US could be seen as double whammy hitting its status performance: it was stigmatized by a superpower and did not enjoy the status benefits of the UNSC.  This would seem to be reflected in China’s very poor status performance in 1970: China lagged far behind less economic and militarily powerful countries. Thus, while its rise seems meteoric compared to Brazil’s, this does not imply that Brazil had the same agency to match it. Brazil neither started from a low level of status performance nor suffered a lack of recognition from the superpowers, nor could Brazil have claimed the status advantages from joining the UNSC. Second, while China had some contextual advantages helping it generate recognition congruent with its rise, it should not be seen as automatic, but also a function of foreign policy skill negotiating and

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narrating its rise. China’s rapprochement with the US has long been understood through a US prism that strikes it up as a grand success for Henry Kissinger’s realpolitik (Goh 2005; Tucker 2005). However, in terms of status gains, China took full advantage of the opportunity. Even as China has risen to second in the world in terms of GNI, it has taken great care to narrate its rise as ‘peaceful’ (Deng 2008: 4–5). This seems to have defused at least some of the tension associated with power transitions involving a state with China’s potential. Indeed, despite being nondemocratic and having a hybrid-­communist economic system, since the 1980s, China has not underperformed in terms of status in the manner of the Soviet Union (see Fig. 3.1). Part of this could also be attributed to China’s export-led growth strategy, balance-of-payment surplus, trillion-dollar sovereign wealth fund (Bu 2010), and vast and growing global foreign direct investment (FDI) portfolio (Cheung and Qian 2009), which has arguably made China too economically important to let misgivings about their political system affect the willingness of states to recognize China. Indeed, this would be consistent with Neumayer’s (2008) research which suggests that above a certain power threshold, ideological affinity ceases to influence patterns of status recognition. Moreover, the status performance measure may be a reflection of how developing countries consider China an appealing diplomatic partner compared to Western countries due the lack of political-economic conditionalities it attaches to its foreign investments (Woods 2008). Ultimately, China’s status recognition has kept up pace with its rapid increase in status resources unusually well. Indeed, China’s status has not lagged, and we would suggest that this is a combination of structural advantages that have been maximized by China’s foreign policy skill. Third, China’s geographical location in a region populated by large and powerful states as well as several medium-sized high-growth economies may also have given it an advantage over Brazil. Indeed, the status performance of the large Latin American countries provides perhaps the most disheartening evidence from a Brazilian status-seeker’s perspective (see Fig. 3.2). Except for Venezuela, all the large Latin American states suffer long-term status underperformance. Understood from a regional perspective, Brazil’s status performance is actually comparatively good: it beats most of its regional rivals in terms of making the most of its status resources. However, translating this into Brazil’s quest for great power status, it seems that Brazil suffers the structural handicap of being from a continent that struggles to make the most of its status resources.

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Overperformer

1.1

0.6 Brazil Mexico

0.1

Colombia

Underperformer

-0.4

Venezuela Chile

-0.9

Argentina

-1.4

-1.9 1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Fig. 3.2  Status performance based on GNI, South America

Status Surplus and Normative Status Bounces Another puzzle illuminated by the data is how Brazil’s underperformance persists and even worsens after the move from dictatorship to democracy. If status is partly a function of adherence to international society’s norms, Brazil should have begun to improve its performance vis-à-vis the other BRICS members. After all, Brazil was either the highest or second highest scoring of the BRICS countries on standard liberal measures after the end of the military dictatorship in 1985.5 In addition, Brazil disclosed and gave up its nuclear weapons program in 1990, fully joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994, and finally ratified the NPT in 1998, having been a long-term critic (Herz 2011). The apparent lack of a status gain is perhaps more puzzling when noting that South Africa and Russia’s switch to democratic and more liberal norms of governance seemed to prompt significant status bumps: both continue to enjoy significant status overperformance (see Fig. 3.1). However, looking a little closer, not being a democracy need not imply status underperformance. For instance, China has not suffered status underperformance since the 1990s. Indeed, democratization may be a red herring. While it might be normatively desirable if status dynamics worked  Going by the BRICs Polity IV scores, the Index of Economic Freedom and the Political Terror Scale. 5

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like this, in international politics they are far less automatic, more complex, and more infused with arbitrary social power. As Rebecca Adler-­ Nissen (2014) suggests, rather than treating norms as determinative of stigmatization and the exclusion of a pariah, a less generalizable but more social understanding would recognize that stigma is not automatic, but requires both active stigmatization by an actor and for the audience to recognize the stigma and exclude the state. Unlike South Africa, Brazil had not suffered concerted efforts by members of the international community to stigmatize it. The South African transition from pariah status to symbol of progress provides an idealized example of why Brazil’s democratic transition did not translate into a status bounce. Apartheid South Africa had suffered stigmatization via widespread sanctions and the cutting of diplomatic ties. This made it possible for renewing normal relations to become a huge symbolic event: 130 heads of states gathered to celebrate the inauguration, while 69 diplomatic missions were opened that year (Christopher, 1994). Looking at South Africa’s overperformance since 1995, it seems that states that may not otherwise have set up embassies did so to symbolize their recognition of the change to a new post-apartheid government. This increase in status performance seems to have translated into very tangible self-reinforcing benefits. South Africa is often mentioned as an emerging power, yet does not possess the size or material capabilities usually befitting a major power. It is by far the smallest and least influential of the BRICS, but was invited to join amidst arguably more suitable candidates. South Africa’s overperformance also illustrates the inadequacy of the language of status inconsistencies, lags, or halo effects: South Africa’s post-apartheid increase in recognition was almost immediate, was obviously a conscious calculation, and took place absent a significant change in material capabilities. Moreover, its status-seeking behavior since appears designed to maintain its status surplus. It is thus misleading to characterize as ‘inconsistency’ waiting for correction; rather, it appears to be the result of international society deciding that South Africa’s transition from apartheid—and the anti-racism it embodied—was and remains worthy of status recognition. In contrast, international society had scarcely sought to stigmatize Brazil; the pressure to democratize had come largely from below (Hochstetler 2000). While its status performance was poor, it was several orders better than South Africa’s. In short, it was not rewarded with a post-pariah status bounce because it had not been treated as a pariah.

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Given that Brazil’s status performance did not improve following democratization, it suggests that other lurking non-democracy-related ­ factors cause its underperformance. Ironically, one tentative conclusion might be that to generate status for doing good deeds, a state must capture the world’s attention for its bad deeds first.

Conclusion This chapter used status performance framework to take a long-lens perspective on Brazil’s quest for international status: how successful it has been in generating recognition given the resources at its disposal. Our results will disappoint Liberals: Brazil’s attempts to seek status as a ‘peace power’ have yet to bear fruit. We tentatively suggested that part of this underperformance compared to its peers could be attributed to factors beyond Brazil’s control: UN Security Council membership and the general handicap that Latin American countries suffer in general. However, the recent upturn in Brazil’s status performance following Lula’s foreign policy strategy (2003–2011) is consistent with our theorization that status-­seeking is a skillful practice and Brazil had, and still has, scope for agency to improve its status performance. The findings do not offer conclusive evidence for whether Brazil’s strategy of promoting itself as a ‘peace power’ can eventually lead to Brazil fulfilling its status potential. Are the good guys doomed to finish last? It is too early to tell. However, while the norms governing international society might have changed since the Cold War, China demonstrates that following liberal economic and democratic norms is not a pre-requisite to rising to the top echelons of international society’s social hierarchy.

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Beaumont, P. 2018. Brexit, Retrotopia and the Perils of Post-Colonial Delusions. Global Affairs 3 (4–5): 379–390. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2 018.1478674. Bu, Q. 2010. China’s Sovereign Wealth Funds: Problem or Panacea? The Journal of World Investment & Trade 11 (5): 849–877. https://doi.org/10.1163/22 1190010X00419. Burges, S.W., and F.H.  Chagas Bastos. 2017. The Importance of Presidential Leadership for Brazilian Foreign Policy. Policy Studies 38 (3): 277–290. Cheung, Y.-W., and X.  Qian. 2009. The Empirics of China’s Outward Direct Investment. Pacific Economic Review 14 (3): 312–341. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2009.00451.x. Christensen, S.F. 2013. Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities. Third World Quarterly 34 (2): 271–286. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.775785. Christopher, A.J. 1994. The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions Against South Africa 1948–1994. GeoJournal 34 (4): 439–446. https://doi.org/10.1007/ BF00813139. Clunan, A.L. 2014. Why Status Matters in World Politics. In Status in World Politics, ed. T. Paul, D.W. Larson, and W.C. Wohlforth, 365–406. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Carvalho, B., and I.B. Neumann. 2015. Introduction: Small States and Status. In Small States and Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing, ed. B. de Carvalho and I.B. Neumann, 1–21. London: Routledge. Deng, Y. 2008. China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2011. The Power and Politics of Recognition: Status in China’s Foreign Relations. In Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, ed. T.J.  Volgy, R.  Corbetta, K.A.  Grant, et  al., 78–95. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Duque, M.G. 2018. Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach. International Studies Quarterly 0: 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/ sqy001. Erthal Abdenur, A. 2014. Emerging Powers as Normative Agents: Brazil and China within the UN Development System. Third World Quarterly 35 (10): 1876–1893. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.971605. Forsberg, T., R.  Heller, and R.  Wolf. 2014. Status and Emotions in Russian Foreign Policy. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (3–4): 261–268. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.007. Galtung, J. 1964. A Structural Theory of Aggression. Journal of Peace Research 1 (2): 95–119. https://doi.org/10.2307/423250. Goh, E. 2005. Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974. Diplomatic History 29 (3): 475–502. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00500.x.

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Røren, P., and P.  Beaumont. 2018. Grading Greatness: Evaluating the Status Performance of the BRICS. Third World Quarterly: 1–23. https://doi.org/10 .1080/01436597.2018.1535892. Schweller, R.L., and X.  Pu. 2014. Status Signaling, Multiple Audiences, and China’s Blue-Water Naval Ambition. In Status in World Politics, ed. T. Paul, D.W.  Larson, and W.C.  Wohlforth, 141–162. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stolte, C. 2015. Brazil’s Africa strategy: Role Conception and the Drive for International Status. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. The Economist. 2012. Fernando Henrique Cardoso on Brazil’s Future More Personal Security, Less Inequality. Available at: https://www.economist.com/ americas-view/2012/01/19/more-personal-security-less-inequality. Accessed 27 Sep 2018. Tucker, N.B. 2005. Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China. The Journal of American History 92 (1): 109–135. https://doi.org/ 10.2307/3660527. Volgy, T.J., R.  Corbetta, K.A.  Grant, et  al. 2011. Major Power Status in International Politics. In Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, ed. T.J.  Volgy, R.  Corbetta, K.A.  Grant, et  al., 1–26. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Wohlforth, W.C., B. de Carvalho, H.  Leira, et  al. 2017. Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking. Review of International Studies: 1–21. https://doi. org/10.1017/S0260210517000560. Wood, B. 1990. Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions. In Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension, ed. C. Pratt, 69–107. Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Woods, N. 2008. Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance. International Affairs 84 (6): 1205–1221. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00765.x.

SECTION II

Brazil’s Foreign Policy

CHAPTER 4

A Tragedy of Middle Power Politics: Traps in Brazil’s Quest for Institutional Revisionism Dawisson Belém Lopes, Guilherme Casarões, and Carlos Frederico Gama

Introduction Middle powers such as Brazil have become relevant players in the world stage. In the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis, they displayed particularly impressive credentials—countries with large territories and huge populations, responsible for the major part of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth. As their relevance in international politics increases by leaps and bounds, so does their institutional investment. Not only by building coalitions and organizations of their own, middle powers also show considerable interest in those already available international institutional arrangements which conform the backbone of a post-World War II international system, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and D. Belém Lopes (*) Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, Brazil G. Casarões São Paulo Business School of Fundação Getulio Vargas (EAESP-FGV), São Paulo, Brazil C. F. Gama Universidade Federal do Tocantins, Palmas, Brazil © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_4

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the World Bank [WB], not to mention a latecomer, World Trade Organization [WTO], and a novel grouping, the Group of Twenty (G-20), brought to life as a multilateral response to the world’s financial crisis). As we approach the Brazilian contribution to a shifting international order in the present chapter, we are interested in the ambivalent dimensions of the so-called emergence of middle powers. Such rise is marked by preening contradictions, and our analytical investment proceeds as follows. Rising powers are not spontaneously welcome in a world politico-­ economic architecture devised by decaying powers of old (Europe) and by superpowers defunct (the USSR) and in trouble (the US). San Francisco (SF) and Bretton Woods (BW) are tokens of the two most important international regimes to sustain the international liberal order whose foundations date back to the early days after World War II. We argue that, under given circumstances, these regimes will unavoidably collide, no matter what states attempt to do in order to overcome such situation. Brazil exemplifies this trend by way of their efforts to reaching and keeping the status of emerging power in the twenty-first century. Facing contradictory logics in different institutions and having no available alternative, emerging countries may fall prey to their own middle power context—especially dramatic in the Brazilian case. So, this chapter approaches the institutional investment of middle powers in a shifting world order, focusing on the Brazilian case after the Cold War—a country renowned for its long-lasting respect for international law and order but still fiercely engaged in vowing its criticisms of the current arrangements as well as the pressing needs for encompassing transformation. After 2008, Brazil pushed forward politically and economically. No longer relegated to the back seat, Brazil and emerging countries have become driving forces in a fast-changing world order, one that saw European powers crumble in crippling recession and political stalemate in unification processes, as well as a hesitant and overstretched North America. Brazil took the lead in the WTO negotiations regarding services and agriculture, eventually blossoming into the formation of G-20 (co-led by India) emphasizing access to markets as well as commodity prices. Middle powers also were prominent players in debates on climate change and sustainable development during the better part of the decade. One of the noticeable offshoots of the rise of (once) middle powers has been their steady pursuit of international legitimacy by an institutional

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route. Often considered controversial, their foreign policies have been, during most of the past two decades, carefully funneled through multilateral mechanisms. The investment in public diplomacy in international fora is considered a pivotal device in the context of a new world order. This renewed institutionalism is fueled by the diffusion of domestic norms to third partners through multilateral institutions (Ramamurti and Singh 2009: 150). This process allows for the flexibilization of such norms in the passage between levels. In the following five sections, we develop the Brazilian case in a changing international institution chessboard. The next section (‘Middle Power Politics’) provides some theoretical reference for our analysis. Then, the section titled ‘Foreign Policy Grand Strategies’ assesses Brazilian foreign policy grand strategies, especially in the past two decades, to demonstrate how this country incurred controversial and even contradictory behavior to assure its aspirations, as it has recently acknowledged its prominence in the world. Section ‘Evoking the Main Hypothesis’ recalls the hypothesis of incompatibility between SF and BW platforms for the purpose of delivering inclusive and efficacious global governance, and besides how Brazil contradicts its own diplomatic tradition on its moves for institutional revisionism. In the final section, we give some concluding remarks.

Middle Power Politics The behavior that stems from Brazilian foreign policy in the past decades may be neatly described as middlepowermanship, a term that refers to the tendency of middle powers ‘to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of “good international citizenship” to guide their diplomacy’ (Cooper et al. 1993). In the absence of abundant material capabilities, a country will rely on reputational goods and well-established legal frameworks as a means to reach the best outcomes in international relations (IR), as well as to protect itself from the outside world—an IR perspective somewhat inspired by Hugo Grotius and his school of thought, known as ‘rationalists’ or ‘Grotians’. Regardless of the theoretical standpoint one adopts to understand the role middle powers play in international relations, there seems to be a conceptual common ground that may be summarized as follows: (1) historically, middle powers had no special place in regional blocs during the Cold War, but they were closely linked to the process of international

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organization (Cox 1996: 245); (2) middle powers support the goals of international peace and security because they are ultimately interested in a stable and orderly environment (Flemes 2007: 10); (3) they try to build consensus around multilateral issues, such as non-proliferation or environmental protection, as a means to overcome their lack of material capabilities (ibid.: 11); and finally, (4) they base their demands in international institutions on a discourse of global justice and democratic multilateralism (ibid.: 24). Behind this line of reasoning, there might be a bet on the effective role of regulation played by international regimes, as long as they are believed to matter and influence international behavior by providing ‘selective incentives’ (Olson 1965) for a country to resort to multilateral institutional solutions rather than ‘ad hoc’ unilateral policies. By placing emphasis on institutional power instead of military and economic assets, Brazil assumes international institutions to function as proxies to ‘raw power’ disputes. It can work as a formula to borrow international prestige without incurring the risks and costs involved in ‘great-power politics’. A country like Brazil will manifest strong preferences for multilateral arrangements and collective decision-making processes as it proves an efficient way for burden-sharing and countering hegemonic intentions. To assure Brazil’s political independence and territorial integrity, Brazilian diplomats have often stressed the importance of a coherent multilateral diplomacy, on practical as well as on discursive grounds. To paraphrase a quotation from San Tiago Dantas (a former Minister of External Relations in Brazil), in the absence of exceeding levels of material power, stability of principle becomes the strongest weapon of those militarily weak (Dantas 2011). Reputational assets have therefore been the cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy well before the country became a middle power. The shift from a purely diplomatic discourse to a more consistent set of practices, however, has arguably taken place in the past few decades. For the first time, Brazil has made use of its credibility in the context of multilateralism to consistently push its interests forward and maximize ‘soft’ power attributes. In previous attempts at going global, the country was either too feeble and powerless (therefore falling short of having a say in world politics, such as in the case of Brazil’s participation in the League of Nations), or too suspicious of international governance (therefore shying away from a greater engagement with the United Nations in the 1970s and early 1980s). The past decade saw the country pursue a more active diplomacy

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in various fields, including in matters of international security, making use of soft power as its primary foreign policy tool (Pereira 2011). Brazil’s activism in the realms of the WTO, the environmental and non-­proliferation regimes, or peacekeeping operations (PKO) are good examples of how these identities ultimately shape behavior in world politics. There seems to be a close link between the behavior of middle powers within international institutions—and toward one another—and such attempts at countering America’s preponderance. Stephen Walt’s definition of soft balancing describes it as ‘the conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences – outcomes that could not be gained if the balances did not give each other some degree of mutual support’ (Walt 2005: 126). Since this is a broader concept, which encompasses not just US military policies but preferences by and large, it seems particularly useful to explain cooperative efforts between middle powers in nonmilitary arenas, and seems quite evident when linked to multilateral strategies. But what may lead middle powers to soft balance against the US? In the words of Walt, this strategy can have at least four objectives. First and foremost, states may balance so as to increase their ability to stand up against US pressure—in political, economic, or military terms. Secondly, soft balancing comes at times as a way of improving states’ bargaining position in international negotiations, be it related to a discrete issue or to broad institutional arrangements of global governance. Third, balancing may function as a warning to the US that it cannot rely upon the compliance of other countries. Finally, it may also operate as a means to become less dependent on US protection and aid, allowing for some states to chart their own course in world politics (ibid.: 127–129). While all goals seem to make sense when looking at the behavior of middle powers in global affairs, the second one embodies the institutional strategy usually favored by such states, and the fourth one deals with the quest for autonomy— which is also a key aspect of middle power politics in general. The bottom line of the behavior of middle powers is thus the engagement in global governance. Their diplomatic narratives, especially in recent decades, have been built around the idea of international organization and the regimes that stem from institutional cooperation. Being an inseparable aspect of middle power politics, it is now time to move to an examination of how global governance mechanisms were conceived of, and how these intermediate states have paved their way into such institutions.

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Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Brazilian foreign policy has undergone deep change in the past two decades. After the Cold War, Brazil is allegedly combining its prudent pacifist orientation with a more proactive behavior in world affairs. Under Presidents Cardoso (1995–2002) and Lula da Silva (2003–2010), Brazil has adopted a more prominent political profile, taking the lead of many initiatives regarding security and economic agendas, in both regional and world scales. Under many different aspects, the country fits into status-­ quo middle power diplomatic style. From the 1990s on, there has been a brand-new emphasis on the processes of regional integration (with an undeclared but still noticeable quest for South American leadership) (Burges 2008). Besides, Brazil has become one of the leading actors in contesting hegemonic patterns of political authority within international institutions such as the WTO, the IMF, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). When Lula da Silva and the Workers’ Party won the presidential race in November 2002, many sectors of the Brazilian society expected an unprepared president leading a left-wing government (Visentini 2011) in difficult times, at both home and abroad. Domestically, inflation was on the rise, economic growth was minimal, and President Cardoso was living his ‘lame duck’ days, with feeble political support and a deadlocked agenda (Couto and Abrucio 2003). Externally, the launching of the War on Terror in the wake of the 9/11 attacks had diverted the global agenda away from trade and development issues, which were the backbone of Brazil’s foreign policy (Barbosa 2002). Moreover, the dramatically continuous downturn of the Argentine economy was worrisome for Brazilian interests, inasmuch as it put regional integration into jeopardy (Carranza 2003). Foreign policy has therefore been used to creatively tackle some of the setbacks of the early 2000s. Combined with orthodox economic policies, it has helped boost Brazil’s foreign trade and investments and ultimately overcome mistrust toward the former metal worker and union leader. Moreover, in association with ambitious social programs and showing an unprecedented activism, diplomacy has been used to take Brazil to a whole new level in the world stage. ‘Change’ was, at least in foreign policy matters, the tone of the new administration (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007). While Almeida (2004: 162) underlines that diplomacy is ‘the strand of government activity that better reflects the old proposals and the traditional guidelines of the Workers’ Party’ at the outset of Lula’s first term,

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Lima and Hirst (2006) add that ‘the inclusion of the social agenda as a major topic of foreign affairs’ was an important innovation that also reflected this unique political approach. If it is true that some of the principles that guided President Lula’s foreign relations had already been evoked by his predecessor Cardoso some years before, they assumed a new face under the Workers’ Party government, with a whole new conceptual emphasis (Almeida 2004). The idea of diplomatic activism, transcending the rhetoric and symbolism behind Brazil’s reputation abroad and within international institutions, was introduced by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, according to whom the country would not ‘shy away from an engaged protagonism, whenever there is need to defend the national interest and the values that inspire us’ (Amorim 2011a: 14). Far more striking, however, was the weight given to the aim of making the international system ‘effectively democratic’, so that the country’s foreign relations could be used to improve the quality of life of the Brazilian people. The goal of promoting development through diplomacy was not new at all, and neither was the will to transform the system of states. Very similar versions of this discourse could be found in the ‘independent foreign policy’ of the late 1960s or in the ‘responsible pragmatism’ of the mid-1970s (Gonçalves 2011). Strategies were, nonetheless, different. First of all, it was necessary to ‘strengthen the elements of multipolarity of the international system’, toward which the forging of an alliance with emerging countries, as well as with African nations, was paramount. Secondly, it was indispensable to make South America—the administration’s declared priority—‘politically stable, socially just and economically prosperous’ (ibid.: 15). Finally, it was crucial to ‘[r]estore confidence in the United Nations’, a goal for which Brazilian foreign policy would ‘defend the enlargement of the Security Council with the inclusion of developing countries among its permanent members, so as to reinforce its legitimacy and representativeness’ (ibid.: 16). But bringing democracy to the international system also involved making foreign policy more transparent, in consonance with popular expectations. This passage is particularly telling: ‘Foreign policy is not just a responsibility of Itamaraty, or even of the government. It involves the society as a whole. In order to define the national interest in every concrete situation, I will reinforce coordination with other governmental branches and with all social sectors – workers, businesspeople, intellectuals – as well as with entities of the civil society’ (ibid.: 13).

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In sum, we may posit that the new government’s aspiration was to drive the country toward a more prominent international role, so that it could become a ‘global player’ in world affairs. To achieve this, President Lula adopted a strategy of ‘autonomy through diversification’, through which the country would adhere to ‘international norms and principles by means of South-South alliances, including regional alliances, and through agreements with non-traditional partners (China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, etc.), trying to reduce asymmetries in external relations with powerful countries’ (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007: 1313). While this strategy did not preclude the one that had prevailed the decade before—the so-called autonomy through participation, oriented by values and toward the participation in international (liberal) regimes (cf. Vigevani et al. 2003)—the predominantly ‘Grotian’ approach to world politics was replaced by a more ‘realist’ one. It meant that economic pragmatism and political nationalism began playing a greater role than the Western and liberal values which had triumphed immediately after the Cold War. Such realism could be observed in at least three situations over the Lula administration: the forging of strong alliances in the developing world, especially with middle powers, such as the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Forum (Oliveira et al. 2006; Vieira and Alden 2011) or the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) initiative (Flemes 2010); the proactive role at the Doha Round of the WTO, using the G-20 coalition as a bargaining platform to further the country’s economic interests; and the strategic relationship with developed nations, most notably with the US, which reached unprecedented levels of importance and maturity (Pecequilo 2010). The first situation represents what is commonly known as ‘South-South diplomacy’. It has a deep connection with previous attempts of Brazilian foreign policy at garnering political influence and support among ‘non-­ traditional’ partners in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Under Lula, South-South cooperation was taken to a new level, furthered by an intense presidential diplomacy. The President himself has paid no less than 31 official visits to African countries, and has been to nine Middle Eastern nations in his eight years in office (Ministry of External Relations 2010). In Africa, with a rhetoric based on an alleged ‘moral debt’ Brazil carried with the continent, Itamaraty decided to focus on regional development, on initiatives of bilateral or regional cooperation, and on Brazilian direct investments (both private and public) (Saraiva 2010). Portuguese-speaking countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde, received special

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treatment for cultural but mainly strategic reasons. South Africa, on its part, has become a privileged partner in terms of technological, economic, and political cooperation. The trilateral partnership between South Africa, Brazil, and India—the IBSA initiative—was able to coordinate policies in strategic areas, such as trade and security, and was acknowledged by Western powers as an important bloc of regional leadership (Vieira and Alden 2011). In the Middle East, Brazil has shown a two-pronged strategy. With countries such as Syria, Libya, and Iran, there was a clear intention to boost the political and economic potential they had to offer. Politically, they were understood as key partners—not only in terms of raising Brazil’s geopolitical stakes in the Middle East but also considering eventual support to a permanent seat in the UNSC. Economically, they were formidable emerging markets and a natural destination for Brazilian exports (Amorim 2011b). The second part of the strategy had to do with the long-standing regional conflicts and tensions. President Lula expressed many times his will to do his part in helping advance the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as it became clear in his trip to Middle East in March 2010. A couple months later, the President and Foreign Minister Amorim went to Tehran to broker, together with Turkey, a nuclear deal with Iran. While Brasilia and Ankara considered the agreement ‘a potential breakthrough’, the initiative was not well received worldwide, insofar as it frustrated a new round of sanctions against Iran at the UNSC (Vieira de Jesus 2011). When it comes to China and Russia (especially to the former), Brazil has adopted a pragmatic discourse, founded on the prospects for increasing bilateral trade and on the political relevance of the emerging powers. Indeed, trade with China rose sharply during the Lula years, and China had become Brazil’s most important trade partner by the end of the decade (MDIC 2011). This was made possible mostly due to the recognition of the People’s Republic as a market economy in 2004. In political terms, due to its lack of material capabilities, Itamaraty has decided to invest in weak institutional strategies such as the BRIC group—now BRICS, with the inclusion of South Africa in late 2010—with the goal of reducing the maneuvering room of American foreign policy in global affairs. This soft balancing strategy was aimed at increasing, ‘if only by a margin, the degree of multipolarity in the world’, as Celso Amorim put it (Hurrell 2008).

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If IBSA and BRICS are the political fronts of this strategy, both financial and trade G-20 groups represent, at the multilateral level, the economic side of Brazil’s rise (Oliveira 2005). The absence of permanent allies has even led Brazilian scholars and diplomats to devise a new concept that describes the country’s behavior abroad: the building of coalitions of variable geometry. While such groups have first appeared on the early WTO negotiations, they have grown in number and importance, crossing issue areas and institutional boundaries. The refusal to form broad coalitions, on the other hand, has been called a strategy of ‘minilateralism’ and historically opposes the huge political alignments assembled at the height of the North-South dialogue of the 1970s, such as the Group of 77 (G77). Even though there are already several studies that shed light on the Brazilian experience, one may find quite similar patterns of forming small coalitions among other middle powers, at both regional and multilateral spheres (Flemes 2007).

Evoking the Main Hypothesis Let us recall the main hypothesis of this chapter: member states will pursue control over ‘global goods’ inside IOs in uncoordinated fashion. As a consequence, states will get into discursive and practical contradictions if they attempt to gain actual influence over decision-making processes at major IOs of both SF and BW. Contradictions are troubling for those states that rely heavily on reputational goods. There might be obstacles for countries such as Brazil in reaching discursive and practical coherence, as long as realist-biased SF and liberal-driven BW platforms profoundly diverge in their dynamics and pose diverse normative constraints. Table 4.1 describes such comparative trends over the past decades. Brazil with Regard to San Francisco (Security Issues) Brazil is no longer the ‘gentle giant’ it used to be. There has been considerable increase in military expenditure during the past 20 years and a mounting interest for international politics among Brazilian presidents ever since Cardoso’s coming into power. But there are important nuances in this position. President Rousseff has reinforced Brazil’s commitment to the idea of ‘Responsibility while Protecting (RwP)’ rather than endorsing ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ doctrine (also known as ‘Ban Ki-moon doctrine’). Given that Brazilian foreign policy has always

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Table 4.1  Comparative evolution of Brazilian foreign policy Brazilian foreign policy toward

During the Cold War

After the Cold War

South America

A regional power alongside Argentina

The most important country in the region, still not acknowledged as a world power though

International security issues (in general)

Prudent passive, pro-peace orientation

Peaceful diplomacy now combines with a more proactive stance; disposition for burden-sharing, measured by military expenditure and doctrinal contributions on R2P

UN peace operations

Since the early 1950s, Brazil has been collaborating with the UN under Chapter VI of the UN Charter

MINUSTAH (Haiti) represents a turning point, as long as it was Brazil’s first time acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter

United Nations Security Council reform

As a UNSC constant collaborator with little at stake in security affairs, there was no consistent campaigning for reform

Pushing for a reform that should contemplate emerging countries from different regions of the world (G4 + 2 African countries)

International A big peripheral country with An emerging market, increasingly economy issues (in small participation in world connected with global markets general) trade and financial flows IMF and the World Bank

A debtor and constant A lender to the IMF. Brazil is borrower to both multilateral uncomfortable with the IMF/WB banks quota system and the developing countries’ meager share

GATT/WTO

Not an important country in decision-making procedures at all

After WTO Doha Round of Negotiations, one of the four main parties for decision-making (alongside India, EU, and the US)

WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism

N/A

One of the frequent users of the system, both as complainant and respondent

Bretton Woods institutions’ reform

Not an issue under consideration

Brazil advocates for a reform that should reflect contemporary polycentrism in world economy

Source: The authors

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relied upon the long-standing principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty, it has underlined that the use of force on the grounds of humanitarian intervention undermines the very rationale of the UN system, since the UN Charter has not foreseen these actions as an exception that allows the use of force. Upon the development of the ‘R2P doctrine’ after the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was published and, chiefly, through its adoption by the 2005 World Summit and Resolution 60/1 of the UN General Assembly, Brazil has endeavored to limit its scope. It has also stressed the prevalence of non-­ coercive and diplomatic measures (R2P’s second pillar) and, thus, has drawn attention to the subsidiary and last-resource character of military intervention (R2P’s third pillar). Brazil has pointed out, moreover, that the use of force based on R2P must be discharged in accordance with international humanitarian law, human rights law, and the rules regarding the use of force (jus ad bellum), since these actions should not worsen the conflicts and do harm to the civilian population. Consequently, the Brazilian reasoning has led to the development of the concept of RwP, which aims to show the importance of complying with a rather strict legal framework during these operations. Brazil has set forth, likewise, the importance of reform in the structure of the UNSC so as to incorporate, as permanent members, developing states from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia. Pursuant to the Brazilian position, the role of the UNSC in the R2P issue is essential, inasmuch as it must authorize all actions and ensure accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force in cases that they breach international law. Besides, participating in the UN PKO in Haiti represents a shift in Brazilian foreign policy since it indicates that, although the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention still play a central role in its foreign policy, Brazil has perceived that these international rules must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the idea of ‘non-indifference’ (Amorim 2010). This notion might be defined, from a Brazilian perspective, as the willingness to provide assistance, mainly in terms of diplomacy, when required, and when a state deems it pertinent, so as to settle a political or social crisis. All in all, it means Brazil will neither simply bandwagon the efforts of traditional world powers (US, UK, France, Russia, China) nor emulate the positions taken by emerging military powers (Turkey, South Africa,

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India, etc.). Its position will be carefully crafted so as to sound authoritative and nationalistic rather than merely guided by the balance-­of-­ power logic. Claims are that Brazil will avoid at all cost the label of ‘regional leader’ inasmuch as it can be wrongly taken for nurturing sub-­ imperialistic intentions toward its neighbors (Burges 2008). However, speeches often made by governmental officials emphasize Brazilian ‘natural candidacy’ to seizing a seat in the event of the UNSC expansion/ reform. At a slow pace, Brazil is engaging in issues/regions that did not otherwise belong to its top foreign policy priorities (Central America and the Caribbean, Middle East, etc.). From Presidents Cardoso to Rousseff, Brazil displays a prudent, pacifist diplomacy, reliant on the idea of ‘consensual hegemony’ over South America, with a grain of light revisionism toward international security institutions. Its low military potentials combine with a persistent bid for UNSC reform (even if it comes with no veto power), as long as it should contemplate Brazil. One could also cite as an important aspect of Brazilian foreign policy nowadays its half-hearted advocacy for human rights (especially after Cardoso’s government). Brazil Toward Bretton Woods (Economic Issues) In the wake of the 1990s, the BW system was in high demand. In the year the Maastricht Treaty turned the European communities into a European Union, the IMF and the WB started fostering transition from real socialism to utopian liberalism in post-Wall Iron Curtain region. Those organs were also responsible for husbanding the aftermath of Latin America’s 1980s crash (after the 1987 Brady Plan), including Brazil, which defaulted not only once, but twice during the decade. BW’s organs even indulged in postconflict reconstruction (what ‘An Agenda for Peace’ tentatively called ‘peacebuilding’) elsewhere (Gama 2009). By 1994, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT’s) Uruguay round gave way to a WTO undreamed of since WWII (1948’s International Trade Organization succumbed to Cold War vicissitudes). The newborn IO would from its inception bear sanctioning power on member states. That was an IO, therefore, ‘with teeth’, somehow closer to the UNSC than to loose arrangements such as GATT. The WTO’s position gradually eroded as a result of the massive anti-­ globalization protest activity surrounding its Ministerial Conference at the Washington State Convention and Trade Center in Seattle, Washington, in December 1999. UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

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X, the tenth session of the Conference held in Bangkok in February 2000, proved a good opportunity to make a conceptual contribution to the ‘postSeattle scenario’ and the re-establishment of the developing countries’ confidence in the multilateral trading system. UNCTAD’s contribution eventually helped pave the way for launching a new WTO round of negotiations in Doha in November 2001, whose specific goal was to address the issues of developing countries in a so-called Development Agenda for Trade Negotiations. However, circumstances had dramatically changed as a result of the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September. While politics and economics were mutually reinforcing, trade barriers were being rebuilt. Wars were fought in Afghanistan and Iraq and dangerous confrontations took place around the globe, almost all of them involving the US and its Western allies. It is against the background of this shift in international security and its strong impact on international trade and development opportunities that one can accurately apprehend the case of Brazil. Talks on a ‘new global financial architecture’ have spread from the 2000s on, especially after the events that led to the ongoing financial crisis in Europe and the US.  They have drawn Brazil’s attention and fueled its ambitions to revising the world order in a way it would benefit from its economic coming of age. After all, in a scenario where old powerhouses failed to deliver prosperity and a glimmer of hope, the rising powers— BRICS countries and others—have filled this gap, allowing the economy not to stall, and then claiming their institutional rewards (e.g., a revision of the IMF quota system that would acknowledge developing countries’ growing importance for the world economy). Brazil, once a borrower, suddenly became a lender to the IMF, during the second presidential mandate of Lula da Silva. That comes wrapped in a new discourse that celebrates the virtues of ‘democratization’ and ‘pluralization’ among the nations, not to mention the Brazilian government’s stance for developmental economics, making the country a ‘state capitalism’ ideologue according to some critics (cf. The Economist, ‘The rise of state capitalism’, 21/01/2012). This call for revisionism on Bretton Woods’ apparatuses has its most concrete manifestation inside the WTO, at the level of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. This is the place where Brazil and many developing countries (like India and Argentina) voice out their concerns and reclaim their rights, whenever a country does not play by the rules of international commerce. Brazil is a major user of WTO Dispute Settlement system and an arbitration champion, both as complainant and as respondent. Informally, Brazil is a political leader in trade negotiations—heading,

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alongside China and India, the financial G-20 (a group of states with convergent interests in world commerce). In addition, it can be stated that Brazil, India, and China have replaced Japan and Canada as the most important developing states to prevent a stalemate in WTO Doha Round. Together with the US and the European Union, they are some of the world trade regime’s centerpieces today. Besides, Brazil’s expertise on WTO issues has more than once accredited Brazilian candidates to run for office at WTO. The latest bet is Ambassador Roberto Azevedo, a Brazilian diplomat whose knowledge of WTO bureaucracy and world trade made him a winning card to succeed Pascal Lamy.

Conclusion As emphasized in the previous sections, middle powers will find it difficult to reconcile their foreign policy strategies toward both SF and BW global governance apparatuses. This is neither due to a lack of expertise on any of those realms nor due to the continuous resistance on the part of those powers of old responsible for the current institutional framework of international relations. Rather, middle powers in general—and Brazil in special—fall prey to their rise in a multifaceted international system. The first apparent reason for that is middle powers’ relative lack of material capabilities (a realist assumption), what will then turn them much more reliant on reputational goods and discursive techniques (where ‘coherence’ plays a major role in terms of speech and practice) to efficiently pursue its international goals. Brazil’s relentless push for reform and pluralism in international institutions often clashes with its continuous dependence on a recognized identity as a reliable, moderate partner in current institutional machineries. After the Cold War, what used to be seen as a coherent trajectory by a typical status-quo middle power goes under review. Incoherence, as such, is much less dramatic, in realist terms, for great powers. Second, there’s the institutional bias factor, that is, different governance platforms such as BW and SF will induce different—and sometimes contradictory—approaches to international politics. The rise of Brazil and emerging countries impacts current institutional structures—but with divergent, often clashing, outcomes. Pluralism has different appeals for the UN system and the Bretton Woods organizations. Multilateralism in security issues and in economic issues are often conducive to incompatible policies. By keeping high stakes in both fields all at once, Brazil incurs attrition costs.

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Third, the label ‘foreign policy’ usually encompasses a broad set of branches related to one state’s international public policies and official statements—ranging from security and military to economic and environmental agendas. It is hard for great and middle powers alike to find a masterplan that fits all—or the majority—of interests at stake at any given time. Comparatively, in a realist sense, middle powers face the task with (much) less resources than great ones. Such constraints raise pressures even on sophisticated diplomatic machineries. Fourth and last, by virtue of the need to balance efficiency and legitimacy in their foreign policies, middle power states are led to bear at the same time aristocratic/restrictive and democratic/liberalizing premises (the reliance on one or the other will vary according to the forum or the issue at stake). One can call it ‘doublethink’ or ‘forum shopping’. Anyhow, it is quite probable that, while attempting to exert control or influence over decision making about relevant international issues, states will not enunciate coherent positions over time or across themes. Once again, by contrast with great powers, middle powers as Brazil will be much more sensitive to such effects. An important concept often employed by liberal scholars to convey a situation of ‘collective-action problem’ within the context of international regimes is that of ‘the tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968; Drezner 2010). By the oft-cited concept it is meant that, because we live after all in an anarchic global society, coordination arrangements will inevitably fail in delivering the ‘common goods’ we are so much in need, bringing about tragic conflict as the only possible outcome. The problematique we shed light on in the chapter is not exactly analogous to the one we just mentioned above; however, it can be thought of as a ‘vertical’ version of it. In other words, the tragedy of the commons is best understood as the unintended consequences triggered by poor coordination among states, driving them into a collision route. The question we look through here is how the lack of coordination inside (or between two diplomatic agendas) of a state—namely Brazil—can be detrimental to its own campaigns for ascension in international ‘institutional rankings’. Brazil currently strives to build consensus among the parties to grab a seat for itself in the eventual reform/enlargement of the UNSC.  To achieve it, Brazil committed with a sort of ‘great-power’ agenda by increasing the military budget and taking part in humanitarian missions all around the world (what includes the leadership of a UN PKO in Haiti for the first time in its history, not to mention the increasing interest in Middle Eastern

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affairs). Nevertheless, when it comes to financial and commercial matters, Brazil was the first one to evoke the values of democratization and/or liberalization of world politics. In this sense, institutions constitute a strategic choice for Brazil, accommodating the pursuit of its interests in an often hostile environment which it aspires to decisively influence. As we focus on Brazil, there are side effects associated with coping with institutions. Such contradictions abound in the guise of a long-lasting, traditional respect for the rules of the game on the part of Brazilian diplomacy (either in presidential diplomacy or in the fine-tuned expertise machinery of the Ministry of External Relations)—which made Brazil an early entrant in the great majority of current international institutions—countered by a relentless pursuit/ advocacy of ‘change in terms of equality’ manifested in world forums, based on Brazil’s ‘natural’ credentials to world prominence. Brazil seems poised to a larger share of the pie, but with some tragic undertones. Brazil is an exemplary case of the tragedy of middle power politics within international institutions, as long as it cannot deliver a coherent discourse/behavior in foreign policy (something it will be charged for) because it falls prey to its own contradictions, which are seemingly inevitable, given Brazil’s profile in IR and, particularly, those steep contradictions between SF and BW platforms for global governance. On the other hand, it does not gather enough power assets to fill a ‘great-power’ identity and, therefore, to renounce to following the norms and rules defined by the existing global governance platforms in the world today.

References Almeida, P.R. 2004. Uma política externa engajada: a diplomacia do governo Lula. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 47 (1): 162–184. Amorim, C. 2010. Speech of the Brazilian Minister of External Relations at the Special Session of Human Rights Committee Regarding Haiti. New  York City: OAS. ———. 2011a. Discurso por ocasião da transmissão do cargo de ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores. In Discursos, Palestras e Artigos do Chanceler Celso Amorim: 2003–2010, ed. C.  Amorim. Brasília: Ministério das Relações Exteriores. ———. 2011b. Brazil and the Middle East. Cairo Review. Barbosa, R. 2002. Os Estados Unidos pós-11 de setembro de 2001: implicações para a ordem mundial e para o Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 45 (1): 72–91.

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Burges, S. 2008. Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War. International Relations 22 (1): 65–84. Carranza, M.E. 2003. Can Mercosur Survive? Domestic and International Constraints on Mercosur. Latin American Politics and Society 45 (2): 67–104. Cooper, A., et  al. 1993. Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Couto, C., and F. Abrucio. 2003. O Segundo Governo FHC: Coalizões, agendas e instituições. Tempo Social 15 (2): 269–301. Cox, R. 1996. Middlepowermanship: Japan and the Future of the World Order. In Approaches to World Order, ed. R. Cox and T. Sinclair. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dantas, S.T. 2011. Política Externa Independente. Brasília: Funag. Drezner, D. 2010. The Tragedy of the Global Institutional Commons. Retrieved from http://www.danieldrezner.com/research/InstitutionalProliferation.pdf. Accessed 17 Mar 2013. Flemes, D. 2007. Emerging Middle Powers’ Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. GIGA Working Papers, No. 57. ———. 2010. O Brasil na iniciativa BRIC: soft balancing numa ordem global em mudança? Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (1): 141–156. Gama, C.F.P.S. 2009. Bridge Over Troubled Waters: United Nations, Peace Operations and Human Security. Journal of Human Security 5: 9–31. Gonçalves, W. 2011. Panorama da Política Externa Brasileira no governo Lula da Silva. In A política externa brasileira na era Lula: um balanço, Freixo A., et al. (orgs). Rio de Janeiro: Apicuri. Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, New Series 162 (3859): 1243–1248. Hurrell, A. 2008. Lula’s Brazil: A Rising Power, But Going Where? Current History 107 (706): 51–57. Lima, M.R., and M.  Hirst. 2006. Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities. International Affairs 82 (1): 21–40. MDIC. 2011. Comércio Exterior. Available at http://www.mdic.gov.br/index. php/comercio-exterior Ministry of External Relations. 2010. Viagens do Presidente da República. Available at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/component/tags/tag/ viagens-dopresidente-da-republica Oliveira, M.F. 2005. Alianças e coalizões internacionais do governo Lula: o Ibas e o G-20. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 48 (2): 55–69. Oliveira, A., J. Onuki, and E. Oliveira. 2006. Coalizões Sul-Sul e Multilateralismo: Índia, Brasil e África do Sul. Contexto Internacional 28 (2): 465–504. Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Pecequilo, C.S. 2010. A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003–2010). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (Special Edition). Pereira, L.B. 2011. Turkey, Brazil and New Geopolitics of the World. Bilgesam: Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies. Available at http://www.bilgesam. org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=437:turkey-braziland-new-geopolitics-of-the-world-&catid=89:analizler-latinamerika& Itemid=139 Ramamurti, R., and J.V.  Singh. 2009. Emerging Multinationals in Emerging Markets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Saraiva, J.F.S. 2010. The New Africa and Brazil in the Lula Era: The Rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53 (Special Edition). Vieira, M.A., and C. Alden. 2011. India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA): South-­ South Cooperation and the Paradox of Regional Leadership. Global Governance 17. Vieira de Jesus, D. 2011. Building Trust and Flexibility: A Brazilian View of the Fuel Swap with Iran. The Washington Quarterly 34 (2): 61–75. Vigevani, T., and G.  Cepaluni. 2007. Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy Through Diversification. Third World Quarterly 28 (1): 1309–1326. Vigevani, T., M.F.  Oliveira, and R.  Cintra. 2003. Política Externa no Governo FHC: a busca da autonomia pela integração. Tempo Social 15 (2): 31–61. Visentini, P.F. 2011. Brazil’s Contemporary Foreign Policy: An Affirmative Agenda. In G20: Perceptions and Perspectives for Global Governance, ed. W. Hofmeister. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Singapore. Walt, S. 2005. Taming American Power. New York: W.W. Norton.

CHAPTER 5

Rise and Fall of Triumphalism in Brazilian Foreign Policy: The International Strategy of the Workers Party’s Governments (2003–2016) Antônio Carlos Lessa, Danielly Silva Ramos Becard, and Thiago Gehre Galvão Introduction International analysts who follow Brazil’s political, economic, and social life suggest the country’s trajectory throughout the Workers Party ­governments could be told through the succession of magazine covers on the Latin American version of The Economist. The first of such editions, from November 2009, printed the iconic image of Christ the Redeemer taking off (“Brazil takes off”), in sync with the optimism expressed on the evaluations at the end of Lula da Silva’s two terms (2003–2010). The second one, from September 2013 (“Has Brazil blown it?”), prints the Christ, with its turbines from the previous edition malfunctioning, heading for a fatal crash at Guanabara Bay. This cover story translated the general perception that Dilma Rousseff, reaching the end of her first term, had apparently failed to maintain the management model, the social dialogue, and the foreign policy bequeathed by her predecessor. The third A. C. Lessa (*) • D. S. R. Becard • T. G. Galvão University of Brasília, Brasília, Brazil e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_5

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edition, from April 2016 (“The betrayal of Brazil”), printed Christ the Redeemer holding a sign pleading for help, and the main story presented an assessment of the political and institutional crisis that divided the country and would lead to Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment some months later (The Economist 2009, 2013, 2016). Despite the imaginative power that certain global media have in ­constructing images and stereotypes, understanding Brazil’s international insertion is a much more complex responsibility. It is true that the policies drafted and implemented during those three-and-a-half terms, which correspond to Workers’ Party (PT’s) cycle in power in Brazil (2003–2016), inspire contradictory evaluations. This is especially true when one considers foreign policy challenges. There is in this case a disquieting analytical challenge, which is not limited to the search for explanations on the launch of Lula da Silva’s ambitious foreign policy strategy in 2003. This chapter also seeks to understand the loss of efficiency of categories and concepts that shaped the international insertion model, which happened during Dilma Rousseff’s unfinished government (2011–2016). The pursuit of international status became a key foreign policy objective, which could be noticed in the diplomatic rhetoric’s triumphalist tone and the grandiloquent ambitions that based the country’s actions in multilateral and bilateral relations. The foreign policy was based on the idea of ­changing Brazil’s relative position on the world’s wealth and power scale by quickly boosting its influence capacity on different international arenas. The idea of international status also refers to the quest for “international respect,” in the sense of overcoming the negative image that characterized Brazil in previous moments. In fact, Brazil was recognized internationally by the authoritarianism of the military regime, its history of lethargic development, the economic crisis of the 1980s, and hyper-inflation (Gehre 2010). Therefore, this motivation can be noticed in many tactical foreign ­policy moves implemented since Lula da Silva’s first term in office which are parts of a greater objective, which we call the “great ambition”: the quest for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), with which Brazil would summarize its vision of a reformed world order based on new conditions of legitimacy. This chapter aims to analyze foreign policy strategies drafted and ­implemented between 2003 and 2016. A foreign policy platform was ­created during this period. This platform linked both moments of the

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Party’s cycle in power, which went through phases of building and ­ascension, apogee and decline. We propose that the phase of gestation and conceptual elaboration coincides with Lula da Silva’s two governments (2003–2010). This is also its apogee, when the undeniable ambition to turn the strategy into a model of international insertion comes to light. The phase of decline and collapse corresponds to Rousseff’s government (2011–2016). We do not intend to present a detailed account of all projects and ­coalitions in which Brazil was involved, nor the vast myriad of subjects where one can notice either innovation or setbacks. The methodological criterion used to pinpoint certain events is their relevance to verify ­continuities in foreign policy platforms in the past two decades, particularly focused on the governments during the PT cycle.

The Era of Great Ambitions: Lula da Silva and Triumphalism in Brazil’s Foreign Policy (2003–2010) Luís Inácio Lula da Silva’s government foreign policy was meticulously designed to match the global demand for legitimacy that could be internationally perceived at the very moment of his rise to office. Initially based on the overexploitation of the presidential image, as well as the international curiosity his historical figure inspired then, the strategy made intensive use of presidential diplomacy, the rhetoric of renewal of international institutions, in order to lend them the necessary legitimacy (Amorim 2010). They aimed to implement the strategy initially designed by Lula da Silva’s first government throughout the other two-and-a-half terms of his Party in office—until Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016. This repetition experienced variations and demonstrated some fatigue because it was an excessively innovative formula, too dependent on favorable factors. It was based on the exploitation of Lula da Silva’s positive image, which could not have been repeated with the same results as of Rousseff’s rise to power. Regardless of that, the framework of ideas and practices planned for foreign policy was conceptually bold, and its evolution throughout the following years allows for the conclusion that there were also a number of ill-resolved tensions and poorly calculated political moves in many dimensions of foreign policy (Cervo 2010).

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The moment of relative domestic economic stability in which Lula da Silva’s first term began in 2003, and the conceptual innovations that characterized the foreign policy strategy, led to increased international attention on Brazil. As an example, the economic stability reached with the Real Plan from 1994, achieved during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government (1995–2002), was consistently pursued during Lula da Silva’s government, which allowed the government to implement policies giving access to credit and expanding the consumer market. Economic stability came along at the same time as the beginning of a large growth in demand for international commodities. In foreign policy strategies, there was noticeable practical continuity between the foreign policy implemented by Cardoso and those put in action by Lula da Silva. The quest for conditions to maintain economic stability is the factor that unites most consistently the Cardoso and Lula da Silva governments. However, there was a considerable difference in style and in the diplomatic rhetoric, with the establishing of new priorities (some of which are more closely related to the Workers Party’s program, as will be dealt further on). On the other hand, Lula da Silva’s government resumed the notion of political and geographic universalism in Brazil’s international action. This was part of a traditional set of ideas and concepts of Brazil’s diplomatic thought, which came to be in the 1970s. Not only the ambition to allow Brazil to become present in debates regarding political, strategic, and economic problems in different parts of the world, but also the issue of the expanding the diplomatic network is included in this perspective. Since the 1990s, foreign policy’s multilateral dimension was valued by Cardoso’s government, but only after Lula da Silva’s government did it become a space where the ambition to affirm a new political stature is noticeable, as well as the quest for international status which became a characteristic obsession.1 Since then, almost all great tactical moves related to action in multilateral spaces can be better understood in relation to what we call the “great ambition”: multilateral institutions’ reform action to broaden their legitimacy and, of course, the claim for Brazil’s permanent 1  It is well known that Brazil was considered to be included as a permanent member of the Security Council at the founding moment of the United Nations. In spite of the fact that the country has taken part in the Security Council as a non-permanent member more than a dozen times since 1945, it is notable that the idea of a candidature firmly declared to a ­permanent seat was only verbalized during the first Cardoso government (1995–1998), and was soon abandoned, in 1997.

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seat at the United Nations’ Security Council. Therefore, the elevated tone of diplomatic rhetoric is combined with an assertive action during negotiations and with the pursuit of a leading role in developing the various emerging agendas. A considerable part of the tactical moves implemented during both of Lula da Silva’s terms can be understood in the perspective of pursuit for means and credentials to achieve this great ambition, such as the command of the complex United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as of 2004; the discreet and benevolent leading role in creating stability in South America; the pursuit of international recognition for its differentiated political and strategic importance; the expansion of its diplomatic network; and finally the policy of cooperation for development. Other more colorful examples, where the government might have targeted more immediate prestige stemming from its ability to mediate, include the negotiation around the Iranian nuclear program (2010), in which it became evident that the country did not in fact have sufficient diplomatic weight to manage successfully more complex operations without inspiring mistrust. The energy with which Brazil under Lula da Silva pursued a new profile in international trade negotiations might be one of the most interesting facts in the PT cycle. Brazil’s ambitions in this agenda were gigantic, and they perfectly translated the intensity with which the country pursued status and influence. With certain loftiness, both Lula da Silva and Celso Amorim, his Foreign Relations Minister, spoke of Brazil’s engagement in these negotiations as necessary to achieve the “reconfiguration of the international trade geometry.” Brazil’s performance produced several assessment and strategic implementation errors, which turned this subject into a succession of frustrating experiences. From the 2003 World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Brazil has been claiming for a leading role in multilateral trade negotiations. The bet on the liberalization of commerce based on new WTO commitments meant the Brazilian government sacrificed the possibility to follow through on other negotiation processes, such as the polemic and complex agreement to establish the Free Trade Area of America— FTAA. It also put on hold the agreement to liberalize c­ ommercial relations between Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the European Union. Finally, exercising the negotiating mandate throughout the Doha Round highlighted the fact that the government overplayed its hand in the ­successful conclusion of this process, which did not happen, as seen by the

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great impasse and the negotiation halt in 2008 (Vigevani and Ramanzini 2010). The environmental agenda had a different development, which was a bit more realist. The Brazilian positions in this area were connected to the achievement of the “great ambition”—having the world perceive the country as an actor with special political and negotiating abilities. The environmental issues were treated with growing enthusiasm by the Brazilian government, always aiming to be taken as an indispensable actor in main international politics agendas. This does not mean that commitments were well synthetized domestically, nor that the targets offered as voluntary limitations of greenhouse gas emissions were to be taken seriously (Inoue 2012). In this sense, after Lula da Silva’s actions in the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in 2009, in Copenhagen, when good levels of emission control were offered, more limited engagements followed. This was noticeable in Brazil’s stance during the Conference in Rio 2012, or even at the Conference of the Parties in Paris, in 2015, which finally substituted the Kyoto Protocol. Throughout those occurrences, Brazil swayed between the alignment with environmentally conservative powers and acting as a creative leader, demonstrating its ability to articulate and propose, as well as abandoning a reactive and secondary role which it traditionally played on stages of this nature (Viola and Basso 2016). When it comes to bilateral relations, there is little noticeable change— with the notable exception of the changing profile of relations with China. Under Lula da Silva this is possible to see an incremental pattern regarding the political profile bequeathed by the Cardoso government (Silva 2015). The traditional concept of strategic partnership, which appeared in the 1970s in Brazilian foreign policy, regained importance and was brought to the center of the international strategic formulation. The aim was to intensify and recover geographic universalism (Lessa 2010). Although there was the intention to lend a level of conceptual sophistication to the recovery of geographic universalism, the reality was a disorganized growth of the bilateral relations system, with the opening of new embassies and posts without demonstration of their importance for the international strategy put in action.2

2  During the PT cycle, 75 new diplomatic posts were opened with new embassies, ­consulates, and missions to international organizations, adding to the 150 already existing.

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There was an expectation that the relationship between Lula da Silva’s Brazil with George W. Bush’s United States might deteriorate dramatically, considering the large difference presented by the governments (as well as the presidents) regarding central subjects of the international agenda. However, the reality was the development of a stable relationship, without major innovations, but also no setbacks. Lula da Silva benefited from the monumental effort put forth by Cardoso’s diplomacy years before, who worked to overcome the history of tension and to normalize the bilateral relationship, which was considerably deteriorated (Pecequilo 2010). The definition of a “strategic partnership” between Brazil and the European Union in 2007 led to a level of sophistication in the relationship. As a result, Brussel’s diplomacy has recognized Brazil’s special political and economic weight in Latin America. This has made the relation’s singularization an urgent matter, in order to create conditions for dialogue and bilateral cooperation. New topics came into the bilateral agenda and, for some of those, Brazil gained important political-economic credentials, such as the consolidated leadership in South America, its performance in the development of the Doha Round, the command of MINUSTAH, and the proactive profile in developing the environmental agendas. Lula da Silva was celebrated in the main European diplomatic centers as the symbol of political renewal in Latin America, which made his performance in presidential diplomacy easier (Lessa 2010). The regional insertion was also conceived as a natural space for the extension of the notion of international status. Thus, the Brazilian government sought to relaunch the idea of South America as a political concept that gave meaning to the quest of grandeur of Brazilian diplomacy (Gehre 2010). Lula da Silva’s government tried to establish a policy in South America marked by pragmatism and intensely motivated by the will to sponsor the expansion of Brazilian economic agents’ interests. Defining financing mechanisms for Brazilian companies promoted the expansion in the economies in the region, allowing for exemplary conditions to integrate production through the business community (Merke 2015). However, the region’s political developments, where leftist populist regimes were consolidated, as seen in Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, had destabilizing effects and thwarted the possibility of establishing and consolidating a stable political space, open to economic competition (Gehre 2012). Relations with Argentina had their ups and downs since the late 1990s. Tensions due to the devaluation of the Real (1999) and the consequences

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of the great Argentine economic crisis created political damage and led to stagnant economic relations. Lula da Silva’s Brazil had to face Nestor Kirchner’s (2003–2007) hostility to its leadership ambition, trying to counterbalance the country’s growing influence in South America, an effect of the rapprochement with Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela (Malamud 2011). Brazil’s relations with Argentina as of Cristina Fernandez’s government were considered positive. However, this took place with a backdrop of growing tensions, especially when it came to managing MERCOSUR, which was not a priority. Brazil tolerated multiple and routine exceptions to the Common External Tariff, which contributed to belittling the common market. During Lula da Silva’s both terms, many initiatives sponsored by Brazil appeared around a more diffuse idea of political and economic regional cooperation. Lula’s Brazil resumed the path initiated in the 1990s when Cardoso’s diplomacy sponsored the launch of the South American Community of Nations in 2000, a project based on a combination of commercial integration and political cooperation. Under Lula, this regional arrangement was substituted by the Union of South American Nations—UNASUR—created in 2008. In the same way, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States—CELAC—was established in 2010 as the successor of the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (Briceño-Ruiz 2010; Gardini 2016). The resurgence of Africa in foreign policy during the first PT government seems to be related to the need to rescue what social movements considered important debts. This was especially true to those movements that ­developed inside the party’s structure, as much of the black movement in Brazil did. The Party’s political program had been pointing out for years the need for Brazil to reestablish a consistent action for the continent, which legitimized the impetus and intensity with which the African policy developed thereafter. Under Lula da Silva, the expansion of Brazil’s ­ ­cooperation policy for development was firmly linked to foreign policy ­objectives, especially in Africa and to a smaller degree in Latin America (Burges 2014). Since the early 1990s, public debate on foreign policy and international politics in Brazil pointed to the need to implement more consistent strategies to approach China, Russia and India. Cardoso began to follow this path, which was emphatically confirmed as a priority on the early stages of PT’s cycle.

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China’s growing presence in Brazil from the early 2000s was impressive both in political-diplomatic and in economic terms. Chinese investments increased to a position of prominence, dethroning the US and European countries. China’s accumulated investments were around US$30 billion in 2010, to the point that China became the largest investor in strategic sectors, especially in energy (Oliveira 2012). China became Brazil’s largest commercial partner in 2013, surpassing trade flows with the United States. The first large international trip Lula da Silva did was to China, in 2004, in order to celebrate 30  years of bilateral relations. The President took with him the largest delegation of businesspeople ever taken abroad, representing more than 300 economic groups. By the end of Lula da Silva’s second term, the launching of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China—later including South Africa—pointed to the need to coordinate political cooperation efforts between the largest emerging economies. The main argument behind this effort was that the group’s political influence on all realms of the international order would be consistent with its economic weight. Brazil specifically had been testing similar groups since 2003 involving India and South Africa, named the Group of Three or IBSA Forum. BRICS was presented with an ambitious work agenda which included the establishment of an investment bank and its own cooperation policy for development. Much of this ambition, however, was eased by the need to face the reality imposed by the economic slowdown suffered by emerging countries (Stuenkel 2016).

The Crisis of Triumphalism in Brazilian Foreign Policy: What Worked and What Didn’t Work in the International Strategy of the Workers Party During the two Lula terms, the Itamaraty sought to develop innovative approaches to traditional themes within Brazil’s international agenda or in relation to central issues within the conduction of Brazilian foreign policy and its decision-making process. This section analyzes five central issues that have become distinct within the foreign policy adopted by the PT’s governments. The first and most intriguing theme within the ambitious diplomatic agenda pursued by the Lula government relates to the claims directed toward a reform of the UN and, more specifically in this regard, a permanent seat within the UNSC. We understand that the great ambition

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of the effectively pursued foreign policy related to the broadening of the objective conditions for action, and the capacity to obtain national interests at the international level, which would lead to an increase in the country’s international status. The idea was that Brazil should be recognized, not only as a remerged power within the economic field but also as a power with full capacity to ensure regional stability (thus, as a regional South American power) with the ability to actively contribute to the stability of the international system, in global terms. The diplomacy also began to pursue the idea that Brazil should back the reform of international institutions, thus seeking to bridge the “legitimacy gap.” In this respect, the notion of legitimacy with which the ideological figureheads of the Brazilian foreign policy operated—noticeably diplomats such as Celso Amorim and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (General Secretary of the Itamaraty)—thus becomes evident: as Brazil could certainly not be seriously considered as a great military power, its contribution to surmounting the challenges within these organizations, notably the UNSC, would come from the self-perceived notion of authority deriving from the traditional Brazilian capacity for mediation and conflict solution. In this regard, the great contribution of Brazil to a structure such as the UNSC would consist in its very capacity to temper extremities and to always seek for promoting negotiation between conflicting parties, even when the traditional powers had ceased to believe that dialogue was possible and that only tangible force would be capable of resolving the problems at hand. It thus cannot be considered anything but extravagant and curious that the primordial objective of Brazilian foreign policy had become the aspiration toward a permanent seat within the UNSC, which by definition is the natural locus of the possible application of tangible force when the option of negotiation has reached its limits. The belief which can be detected within the Brazilian discourse is that the country’s self-perceived authority and international leadership capacity would inaugurate a new mode of resolving extreme conflicts, “the Brazilian Way,” which aspires toward harmony through dialogue and permanent negotiation. The thesis of a permanent seat within the UNSC can be considered as a constant within the Workers Party government’s foreign policy, but its conversion into a primordial objective occurred during the first Lula da Silva’s term. This required an incredible amount of diplomatic energy and led to the mobilization of political and material resources on a large scale. From the MINUSTAH command to the multiplication of Brazilian

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embassies around the world, as well as the intensification of the presidential diplomacy, Brazil did not spare any resources to reach this great ambition. One of the notable points within this endower was the cooperation with other important aspirants to a permanent seat in the context known as G4, constituted by Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan. Albeit reform of the UNSC has not completely disappeared from the discussions about institutional reform, the thesis of a permanent seat lost momentum during the Dilma Rousseff government, until it completely vanished from the diplomatic discourse—at least at the presidential level. The second theme of relevance, but which eventually enjoyed only very limited support from the international community, was the fight against hunger. In this respect it appears that the ambition was to refurbish a very traditional Brazilian approach based on the vindication of the essential conditions to support economic development, which always has been viewed (at least since the 1950s) as a vital instrument in the construction of stability within the international system. The government thus set up a test balloon, which, nonetheless, did not fly very far. It hereby became evident that this agenda had more appeal within the domestic political debate and in relation to the reinvigoration of the Workers Party government’s social credentials but without the necessary scope to become a propelling idea within the country’s international engagement. The third agenda which drew much internal attention, and some ­measure of external interest, was the energy-related component which was added to the foreign policy. Throughout the first half of Lula da Silva’s term, Brazilian diplomacy was very enthusiastic about an alternative energy agenda. The development of a dialogue with the United States was aiming toward the establishment of an international ethanol market, implying its consequent “commodification.” At this moment, the potential of renewable fuels became an important point within the international trips of Lula da Silva, who sought to expand the ethanol market and especially contracts for manufacturers of equipment for large-scale fuel production. The issue of biofuels also lost priority, until practically disappearing within the political agenda from the discovery of the reserves of pre-salt oil, in 2006. When this occurred, the government’s political weight became focused on promoting Petrobras’ investments in the new reserves. In the same way, the government began to prioritize the development of an oil industry cluster seeking to quickly develop an ecosystem of suppliers and developers of technologies for the exploration of deepwater oil, revolving around Petrobras’ enormous investment capacity.

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The fourth central aspect was the novel and rather curious balance established within the foreign policy decision-making process. Apparently indicating to a weakening of Itamaraty, the result was remarkably different. The relations between the Ministry and the presidential staff (which had Professor Marco Aurélio Garcia as its diplomatic adviser) were the object of attention from foreign diplomatic and observers.3 A trend of a weakening of the Itamaraty and a general relativization of its historical capacities could be imagined within the somewhat bicephalous foreign policy leadership. Yet, the development of relations between the two structures, and the practices of foreign policy formulation and implementation, point to more convergences than divergences (Cason and Power 2009). With regard to the presidential staff and Itamaraty, a relatively successful ­division of work materialized: the diplomatic advisers within the Diplomatic Presidential Advisory would counsel the President, produced speeches, and symbolized what might be termed as the “Workers Party Allegories” besides the cementation of links with social movements and convergences with the Forum of São Paulo. Garcia would act as a special ambassador in ­cases of secondary importance, which mainly related to the militancy. He thereby apparently functioned as an “expression of the Party’s ideas,” but ­they had little influence on the development of the foreign policy, which continued to be conducted by Itamaraty. The fifth important aspect is the intense use of presidential diplomacy. It should be noted that Lula da Silva was not strictly innovative in this regard and that his efforts took place within a broader context of super-­ engagement of the presidential figure in diplomatic issues, which was bequeathed by Cardoso. Lula da Silva thus assumed power at a moment when the presidential diplomacy was at a high point. Hence, in spite of the fact of never having demonstrated great knowledge about international issues, Lula willingly accepted to be positioned as an important asset within his government’s foreign policy. Itamaraty knew how to exploit the international image of Lula, even until the point of exhaustion, and it maneuvered within its international engagement, in work missions, participation within summits, and state visits. The idea was to attribute a differentiated significance to the diplomatic language and to ascribe a sense of urgency and high priority to 3  Garcia was a personality with a long history in the Workers Party and who for a long period has been engaged with international issues and even occupied the position of the Party’s Secretary for international relations.

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certain issues. He spent 16% of his time in office in travels abroad, while Cardoso spent around 12% of his time as President on international missions. Of his 470 days outside Brazil, he visited 87 countries. Of his total time traveling, 54 days were spent in missions in Africa, while Cardoso only was in that continent for 13 days.4 The triumphalist tone adopted within Lula da Silva’s foreign policy was commemorated by parts of the Brazilian public opinion, in a much wider spectrum than the normal audience of left-wing militancy. This was the case of the business community, but especially industry and agribusiness, who gained a position of privileged access to the government. The delegations accompanying the President on his foreign travels grew exponentially throughout the two terms of Lula da Silva, configuring thereby a “business diplomacy.” A rather suspicious, and even insidious, model for public-private ­interaction was thus established, which transformed public agents into ­emissaries for large business groups. Hereby, we can add the support for the negotiation of private contracts to the functions of diplomacy, as long as this would involve facilitating otherwise complicated relations with foreign governments. This was the case of the negotiation of mining opportunities for Vale in Africa and the creation of opportunities for large building contractors in Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cuba and ­ wherever else the active support of the Brazilian diplomacy would ­ be needed.

Dilma Rousseff and the Era of Small Foreign Policy Ambitions (2011–2016) The triumphalist tone of the foreign policy in the initial phase of the cycle of the Workers Party in power perfectly translated the ambitions of its ideologues: to see it transform into a new model for Brazil in the global era, molding the strategies for international insertion of a political project with a long lifespan. The continuity with success of this strategy was the great burden of Dilma Rousseff, who did not prove to be able to manage the complexities of the ambitions inherited. It is possible to identify the same ideas, concepts, and ambitions that were previously formulated within the Rousseff government, which nonetheless were dramatically 4  Data compiled by the authors through information from the Brazilian Presidency of Republic.

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mitigated by the circumstances of domestic politics, by the international economic conditions and by the noticeable difference in style and personality between the two presidents. While Lula da Silva’s era corresponds to the ascending cycle of the Workers Party’s foreign policy, the Rousseff era thus corresponds to the declining cycle. Rousseff thus assumed an ambitious political project in order to administer the decline. The concept of relative decline was proposed in order to facilitate the comprehension of the brutal inefficiency of the Rousseff government in the implementation of the political model inherited from Lula da Silva (Cervo and Lessa 2014). The global economic crisis from 2008 should be understood as an important variable (but not determining) in order to explain the erroneous management of the foreign policy from 2011. The causes of the loss of efficiency were domestic, comprising conditions related to political stability and the state’s capacity to effectuate policies. The foreign policy project that was formulated in 2003, apart from depending on good international conditions, was also based on the ability of Lula da Silva to be positioned as a guarantor for his government’s international choices. Apart from this, the President knew how to make the state’s mechanisms work in order to capitalize on the demands from social movements and catalyze their mobilization. This ability is certainly not congenital, but it can be emulated and imitated. Without any doubt, this did not occur with Rousseff. Rousseff clearly did not possess Lula da Silva’s charisma and neither did her personality inspire international interest to the degree that she would appear with credibility as a character of her own presidential diplomacy. Rousseff’s presidential diplomacy was a resounding failure, because the President not only demonstrated a complete lack of interest in the government’s external agenda but, to a certain measure, also confused the commitments of the diplomatic protocol with the necessary dedication to the foreign policy project that she had inherited. The most staggering manifestation of the President’s lack of interest was expressed through the bizarre weakening of Itamaraty, which operated in a rather strange and unseen political limbo. Despite not showing affection for foreign policy issues, she also did not grant Itamaraty the necessary degree of autonomy to formulate and implement foreign policy. On the contrary, the Ministry had its budget brutally slashed and was presented to a high degree of neglect on behalf of the Presidency. There are no precedents within the history of the Brazilian republic for similar situations to those that were imposed on the Itamaraty by the President.

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In spite of the brutal discrediting of the Itamaraty by Rousseff, she continued the practice of presidential diplomacy. This can be explained as an inertial effect of the commitments inherited by the activist presidential diplomacy of Lula da Silva. In fact, the number of international obligations that required the presence of the head of state multiplied with astonishing speed. Although she did not appreciate the foreign policy agenda, Rousseff undertook 65 working missions throughout her one–and-a–half terms in power. In other words, she spent close to 9% of her 2069 days in office on official missions abroad.5 The small recurrent crises during her two terms demonstrate that the President lost sight of the ambitious strategy implemented by Lula da Silva. The government accumulated intense critique of the way in which it conducted erroneously some of the foreign policy dossiers. Brazil lost the initiative on many different levels, and it abandoned the grand ambitions inherited. A case in point is quest for the permanent seat in the Security Council, which had absorbed incredible amounts of energy during the first period of the Workers Party cycle. This revindication was silenced without further explanation. With the operational abandoning of the “great ambition,” a large part of the grand concepts and ideas related to the international strategy was deprived of their meaning. It thus became evident that the triumphalism of the Lula da Silva’s era in a short timespan was converted into a poorly balanced minimalism. As the effects of the economic crisis deepened, the credential of the emerging economy began to weaken. In this regard, the promises of the construction of a mass market, which was the most important legacy of the Lula government, fell apart. The foreign direct investments diminished, and the existence of a grand and insoluble fiscal crisis became evident, which still in the first half of the Rousseff term already was considered to be the grand problem of the Brazilian economy. By accepting the eventual Russian and Chinese leadership of the BRICS, Brazil sided with interests about international politics with which it did not traditionally concur, and it became silent with regard to issues such as the humanitarian crisis caused by the Syrian Civil War and the Crimean Crisis. The relations with China suddenly gained priority, and the growth of their proportion caused perplexity amongst traditional Brazil’s partners, as it was observed during Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s visit in 5  Data compiled by the authors through information from the Brazilian Presidency of Republic.

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May 2015, when investment accords close to US$53 billion were announced. Mercosur’s institutional situation was managed in an inconsequential manner. The suspension of Paraguay in 2014, which spurred the adhesion of Venezuela, indicated that the Brazilian policy toward South America irreversibly had lost its equilibrium. With the admission of Venezuela, Mercosur became even more heterogeneous. Because of this, too little was done to heal the deficiencies and perforations of the Common External Tariff and the consequent weakening of the Customs Union. Rousseff diminished the presidential stature, involving herself in minor crises or overreacting in moments in which the most desirable posture would have been to preserve dialogue. The first episode was the diplomatic imbroglio caused by the transfer of the Bolivian Senator Roger Pinto Molina in 2013, which led to the firing of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antônio Patriota. The second was the reaction to Edward Snowden’s leaks, who in 2013 facilitated the publication of compromising documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) about the communications of many other Brazilian authorities. This last episode led to the postponement of Rousseff’s state visit to the United States in protest. The President’s reaction was far above the necessary tone in order to express effective protest, was not pragmatic, and led to the deterioration of the quality of the relations with the United States.

Conclusion Is it possible to evaluate the victories and errors of the grand foreign policy project of the Workers Party cycle according to the same parameters as those employed by The Economist? What is the significance of the political and institutional crisis in the deterioration of the quality of Rousseff’s foreign policy? The story told by the front covers resumes the rise and fall of great ambitions and the ascent of triumphalism in the foreign policy and also the loss of confidence in the economic agents, the reflux of foreign investors, the deterioration of the dialogue between state and society around strategic issues, and, at the last instance, the very collapse of the government. The repetition of the accusations of corruption involving the leading figures of the Workers Party, as well as parties within its political support base, meant that the Rousseff government’s political expiration date eventually came about. With the multiplication of situations of crises and

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the upsurge of new scandals and novel accusations, the destiny of Rousseff would be the impeachment, which was consummated in August 2016. With regard to the Brazilian foreign policy, it became clear that the many political crises would irreversibly compromise the government’s capacity to implement what was left of the ambitious strategy designed by the ideologues of the Party. It similarly became evident that the erroneous implementation of the foreign policy during the two terms of the Rousseff government eventually would have the diametrically opposite effect of that which was projected in 2003. Hereby, the government reaped international disregard, and it exhausted the limited degree of status initially projected as a synthesis of the grand triumphalist ambition that was the Workers Party’s international strategy.

References Amorim, Celso. 2010. Brazilian Foreign Policy Under President Lula (2003– 2010): An Overview. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (spe): 214–240. Briceño-Ruiz, José. 2010. From the South American Free Trade Area to the Union of South American Nations: The Transformations of a Rising Regional Process. Latin American Policy 1 (2): 208–229. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.2041-7373.2010.00016.x. Burges, Sean. 2014. Brazil’s International Development Co-Operation: Old and New Motivations. Development Policy Review 32 (3): 355–374. Cason, Jeffrey W., and Timothy J. Power. 2009. Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era. International Political Science Review 30 (2): 117–140. Cervo, Amado Luiz. 2010. Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (spe): 7–32. Cervo, Amado Luiz, and Antônio Carlos Lessa. 2014. O Declínio: Inserção Internacional Do Brasil (2011–2014). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 57 (2): 133–151. Gardini, Gian Luca. 2016. Brazil: What Rise of What Power? Bulletin of Latin American Research 35 (1): 5–19. Gehre, Thiago. 2010. Brazil and South America: Lula and the Quest for ‘International Respect.’. In Relations Internationales Du Brésil, Les Chemins de La Puissance: Aspects Régionaux et Thématiques, ed. Denis Rolland and Antônio Carlos Lessa, 1st ed., 51–66. Paris: Harmattan. ———. 2012. Uma História de Parceria: As Relações Entre Brasil e Venezuela (1810–2012). 1st ed. Belo Horizonte: Fino Traço Editora.

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Inoue, Christina Y. A. 2012. Governance of Global Climate Change in the Brazilian Amazon: The Case of Amazonian Municipalities of Brazil. Revista brasileira de política internacional 55: 170–189. Lessa, Antônio Carlos. 2010. Brazil’s Strategic Partnerships: An Assessment of the Lula Era (2003–2010). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (spe): 115–131. Malamud, Andrés. 2011. A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy. Latin American Politics and Society 53 (3): 1–24. Merke, Federico. 2015. Neither Balance nor Bandwagon: South American International Society Meets Brazil’s Rising Power. International Politics 52 (S2): 178–192. Oliveira, Henrique Altemani de. 2012. Brasil e China: Cooperação Sul-Sul e Parceria Estratégica. 1st ed. Belo Horizonte: Fino Traço. Pecequilo, Cristina Soreanu. 2010. A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003–2010). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (spe): 132–150. Silva, André Luiz Reis da. 2015. Geometria Variável e Parcerias Estratégicas: A Diplomacia Multidimensional Do Governo Lula (2003–2010). Contexto Internacional 37 (1): 143–184. Stuenkel, Oliver. 2016. Do the BRICS Possess Soft Power? Journal of Political Power 9 (3): 353–367. The Economist. 2009. Brazil Takes Off. February 20. Available from https://www. economist.com/leaders/2009/11/12/brazil-takes-off. Access 15 Jan 2019. ———. 2013. Has Brazil Blown It? Brazil’s Future. February 20. Available from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2013/09/27/has-brazil-blown-it. Access 15 Jan 2019. ———. 2016. The Great Betrayal; Brazil. February 20. Available from https://www. economist.com/leaders/2016/04/23/the-great-betrayal. Access 15 Jan 2019. Vigevani, Tullo, and Haroldo Ramanzini Júnior. 2010. The Changing Nature of Multilateralism and Brazilian Foreign Policy. The International Spectator 45 (4): 63–71. Viola, Eduardo, and Larissa Basso. 2016. Wandering Decarbonization: The BRIC Countries as Conservative Climate Powers. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 59 (1). https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201600101.

CHAPTER 6

Leaving the Club Without Slamming the Door: Brazil’s Return to Middle-Power Status Guilherme Casarões

Introduction The quest for status has long been an integral part of Brazil’s global strategy. Despite being a ‘monster country’ in terms of population and territory, Brazil has seldom resorted to traditional forms of power and coercion—be it economic or military—in its international relationships (Lafer 2000). Therefore, Brazil’s global standing has largely depended on how it was perceived by other members of the international system. That perception, that might be translated as a form of identity or status, was mostly worked out through the shrewd and highly professional diplomacy that constitutes the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also known as Itamaraty (Ricupero 2017). We define status in international politics as a state’s intersubjective standing in a status community, which has three critical attributes: it is positional, in the sense that it assumes meaning to actors in comparison to other relevant actors; it is perceptual, inasmuch as it translates people’s/ states’ beliefs about self and others; and it is social, given that beliefs about G. Casarões (*) São Paulo Business School of Fundação Getulio Vargas (EAESP-FGV), São Paulo, Brazil © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_6

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status are socially constructed across time and space (Wendt 1999; Larson et al. 2014; Renshon 2017; Wohlforth et al. 2017). Status community is defined as ‘a hierarchy composed of the group of actors that a state perceives itself as being in competition with’, which can relate to the whole international system, to regional systems, or to communities formed by any sort of diplomatic, trade, or military coalitions (Renshon 2017, pp. 33–44). For most of the twentieth century, the middle-power status served Brazil’s interests well. Brazilian policymakers understood that there were significant structural constraints to greater international ambitions that went beyond the lack of capabilities. Brazil could hardly aspire to act as a regional power given the existence of a much stronger regional hegemon in the Americas, the United States, as well as relevant hemispheric competitors, such as Argentina and Mexico (Mares 1988). Moreover, being trapped in the geopolitical periphery of the globe, Brazil struggled to make its voice heard internationally through a principle-based foreign policy, which advocated for the rule of international law and the importance of conflict mediation and that was translated into multilateral activism, both in the region and in the world. Diplomacy became Brazil’s most valuable reputational asset. This behavior is in line with the textbook definition of middle powers, which refers to states who tend ‘to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems […], to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and […] to embrace notions of “good international citizenship” to guide their diplomacy’ (Cooper et al. 1993, p. 19). Alternatively, following Robert Keohane’s classic conceptualization, we might define middle powers as system-affecting states, ones that ‘cannot hope to affect the [international] system acting alone [but] can nevertheless exert significant impact on the system by working through small groups or alliances or through universal or regional international organizations’ (Keohane 1969, p. 295). In the last three decades, however, Brazil’s place in the world changed dramatically. As the Cold War came to an end, the ‘South American giant’ became the regional paymaster and engaged in long-term institution-­ building efforts, which led to the establishment of the Common Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur or Mercosur) in 1991, the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas or Unasur) in 2007, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de los Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños or Celac) in

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2010. That strategy became known as ‘consensual hegemony’ and marked the consolidation of Brazil as a regional power (Burges 2008). Moreover, political stability and economic prosperity placed Brazil among the emerging powers of the twenty-first century. While under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) it seemed enough for Brazil to affirm itself a ‘global trader’ (Vigevani et  al. 2007), his successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010), took a step further by aiming to make Brazil a ‘global player’ (Milani et al. 2017). At the turn of a new decade, status-­ seeking had become one of the most visible features of Brazilian foreign policy, manifested in ambitious diplomatic initiatives as the Tehran Agreement—a nuclear fuel-swap deal signed by Brazil, Turkey, and Iran in 2010—and small-sized coalitions with specific revisionist claims as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), and the G-4 (Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India) (Flemes 2009; Mares and Trinkunas 2016; Burges 2017). Yet, whoever looks at today’s Brazil will not recognize the emerging power of a decade ago. President Dilma Rousseff’s administration (2011– 2016) is often regarded as the period Brazil left the global stage (Cervo and Lessa 2014). To be sure, the international and domestic conditions she had to face were not friendly to Brazilian interests. If the Arab spring and the rebirth of long-time geopolitical disputes in Eastern Europe and the Middle East retrenched Brazil’s foreign policy activism, economic and political turmoil at home forced the Rousseff administration to turn inward (Scharma 2012). Nevertheless, part of the story behind this dramatic diplomatic ‘shutdown’ relates to a conscious decision to change— more specifically, to downgrade—Brazil’s global and regional status. This chapter’s aim is to analyze the transition between Rousseff, who was subjected to an impeachment trial in May 2016, and her Vice President, Michel Temer, who remained in office until December 2018, from the perspective of Brazil’s international status. We argue that Brazil went through a ‘status downgrading’ process and sought to return to a condition of middle power, a move that involved specific patterns of signaling and accommodation. Our hypothesis is fourfold: first, signaling Brazil’s intentions to the world meant slowly changing the substance of bilateral relations, from big political ambitions to immediate trade and investment goals. Second, signaling in the region implied that Brazil progressively abandoned its regional leadership bid and subsumed its interests to trade-oriented relations with neighbors. Third, signaling to domestic audiences was also necessary and mostly made through newspaper

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op-eds, interviews, and press releases, which led government officials to an unprecedented engagement in the public debate. Fourth, and equally important, signaling was not always consistent, especially as divergences between the president and the foreign minister came to the surface. To this end, we have divided this chapter in three sections, in which we look at three specific periods from the status perspective, which correspond to specific tenures of foreign ministers: Dilma Rousseff/Mauro Vieira (2015–2016), Michel Temer/José Serra (2016–2017) and Michel Temer/Aloysio Nunes (2017–2018). Signaling and accommodation processes were captured mostly through the analysis of op-eds, speeches, and official documents. Finally, given the comparative nature of this discussion, we opted not to address Brazil’s multilateral policies, as they did not go through substantive changes in the period.

Dilma Rousseff’s Second Term (2015–2016): Downgrading to Survive When President Rousseff took office for her second term, in January 2015, nobody expected that she would face an impeachment trial in less than 18 months. Her reelection campaign, to be sure, was fraught with controversy and criticism, which involved, among other things, the decision of the Workers’ Party (PT) to keep interest rates artificially low and a number of threats and fake news fired at her two competitors, Aécio Neves and Marina Silva. In the runoff against Neves, Rousseff ’s victory by only a wafer-thin margin stirred the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB, Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira) to challenge the election results in the electoral court (Feres Jr. and Sassara 2016). Nevertheless, after the initial storm, Dilma Rousseff was apparently able to hold her governing coalition together. In a departure from developmentalist policies adopted in her first term, which led to poor economic results, she appointed liberal economist Joaquim Levy as her Finance Minister, who pledged to take severe austerity measures to tackle inflation and fiscal imbalance. Moreover, in a break with Lula da Silva’s foreign policy legacy, she decided to pull out from Brazil’s global initiatives (Cervo and Lessa 2014; Stuenkel 2014a, b). But unlike Rousseff ’s first term, during which Itamaraty undertook a controlled withdrawal from previous commitments, the new moment corresponded to a more

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s­ ubstantive shift of direction, especially regarding Brazil’s policy toward South and Latin America. Mauro Vieira, the new Foreign Minister, conveniently dubbed the new foreign policy orientation a ‘diplomacy of results’ (Casarões 2015). Although promoting concrete economic gains was something that Rousseff had always wanted for Itamaraty, tangible results were always hard to achieve, especially in a time of global recession and regional turmoil. This time, however, Brazil’s impending economic collapse forced the government to abandon long-term political projects in order to focus on trade and investment promotion (Casarões 2016c). Even if it seemed clear that Brazil needed to downgrade its international status as part of the ‘pulling-out’ strategy, returning to its former place as middle power could further undermine Rousseff’s political support at home (which was still attached to the emerging power status of yesteryear) and even alienate some of Brazil’s most important partners. On the global level, therefore, status downgrading happened very discreetly. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this process was an attempt at establishing a policy of equidistance toward the US and China. During the decade Brazil sought to affirm itself as an emerging power, there was a gradual replacement of a Western identity for a Global South one (Lopes 2016). As Rousseff finally made an official visit to Washington, two years after she had found out that Brazil’s official communications were being tapped by the US National Security Agency (NSA) (El País 2015), she moved toward reconciliation with Brazil’s middle-power status. The signing of a Cooperation Agreement with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in June 2015 was another important signal of status downgrading. Brazil moved away from its previous position of ‘key external partner’, shared with other emerging countries as China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa, and gave the first step to joining the organization, along the lines of middle-sized states as Mexico, Israel, Chile, as well as aspiring members Argentina and Colombia (MRE 2015). At the same time, Rousseff did not give up on the most important diplomatic symbols of a rising Brazil, such as the BRICS or its Africa policy. To the contrary, Brasilia worked alongside its emerging partners to launch the bloc’s New Development Bank in 2015 and even became a founding member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (China Daily 2015). Moreover, in his short tenure as Foreign Minister, Vieira went four times to the African continent and visited 11 countries

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(ANBA 2016). But rather than just promoting Brazil’s technical cooperation prowess, the minister centered his efforts on trade and opportunities for Brazilian companies to expand their businesses into Africa, as in the case of Angola, Mozambique, and Malawi, with whom Brazil signed cooperation and facilitation investment agreements (CFIAs) (Martins 2017). Even though there was not a visible turn of direction and SouthSouth politics were still part of the Brazilian diplomatic narrative, the change in substance was indicative of a new status logic. As big political interests were subdued to a short-term economic agenda, Brazil slowly returned (now in a conscious move) to the middle-power status, while maintaining elements of its former status as an emerging giant. The most visible break happened in Rousseff’s regional policy. On the surface, the government maintained a pro-Mercosur rhetoric that served many purposes. First, it helped Brazil maintain Paraguay and Uruguay— who were flirting with joining the Pacific Alliance—under its wings. Second, it curbed the anti-Mercosur leanings of the newly elected Argentine president, Mauricio Macri, the first liberal politician elected in the Southern Cone in more than a decade. Third, it ensured that Mercosur would remain as the main multilateral forum to address the ever-growing Venezuelan crisis, given that Unasur had lost political leverage as many South American states—including Brazil—turned their back on it. For one thing, when the turmoil in Venezuela spilled over to a border clash with Colombia in mid-2015, Bogota resisted Unasur’s mediation attempts (Folha de S. Paulo 2015). On the eve of the bloc’s 25th anniversary, Foreign Minister Vieira published an op-ed in defense of Mercosur in the leading newspaper of every member state. Rather than discussing trade, he placed emphasis on the political side of the bloc, which had offered its members ‘more democracy, more social inclusion, more citizenship’ (Vieira 2016). Trade, in fact, seemed like a minor issue in Mercosur summits as the situation in Venezuela went progressively out of hand. Meantime, Brazil worked diligently to improve trade and investment relations with three historically neglected Latin American partners: Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. In 2015 alone, the Rousseff administration signed CFIAs and/or economic complementarity agreements with the three countries which had become the most dynamic economies in the region (Martins 2017). Rousseff’s policy for Latin America is a tangible example of the dilemmas of status transition. Downgrading meant, above all, giving up on Brazil’s former regional power status, whose expected behavior was to

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act as the region’s paymaster. Even in times of economic turmoil, successive Brazilian governments worked to lead integration in the neighborhood through diplomacy and institution-building efforts. With the change of strategy, the Rousseff administration signaled to the world that it would not struggle to fix Mercosur, nor would it invest further in the two other Brazilian-led institutions created under Lula da Silva’s tenure, Unasur and Celac. While the former remained trapped in the Venezuelan crisis and was weakened by the growing political divide across the continent, the latter became a platform for channeling external interests, as in the case of the China-Celac Summit that took place in Beijing in January 2015 and helped the Chinese government negotiate massive trade and investment deals with smaller Latin American countries (Pini 2015). In practice, regional downgrading implied South America’s deinstitutionalization and opened up for new forms of integration, based on free trade principles and a privileged relationship with Washington. Moving to a lower global status, on its part, did not immediately represent the death of Brazil’s universalist foreign policy, but signaled to a slow change of the country’s priorities, both in terms of substance, as short-term trade replaced long-­ term power aspirations, and in terms of scope, as Brazil narrowed down its economic partnerships to a few big powers and regional players.

Michel Temer and José Serra (2016–2017): The Perils of Status Inconsistency As the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies accepted the petition for Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment on 12 May 2016, Michel Temer took office as the interim president. In his inauguration speech, Temer said he would establish a ‘government of national salvation’ to face the institutional and economic crisis that had undermined Rousseff’s credibility (Correio Braziliense 2016). Rather than working towards unity, however, the new administration quickly took an about-face that led virtually all opposition parties to key ministries. São Paulo Senator José Serra, one of Rousseff’s staunchest opponents and PSDB’s most likely candidate for the 2018 elections, became Brazil’s Foreign Minister—the first politician to take up the post in more than two decades. After a frustrated bid to become the Finance Minister with an eye on the presidential race, Serra decided to use Itamaraty, traditionally seen as a politically weak ministry, as a launching pad for his electoral ambitions (Casarões 2016a). It led, however, to a

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situation of status inconsistency, which pitted the president and the foreign minister against one another. Serra’s nine-month tenure was marked by attempts to deconstruct initiatives that were identified with the PT. In the beginning, the new minister centered his efforts on neutralizing what many called the ‘coup narrative’: to many in Brazil, the President’s impeachment trial had been staged by the opposition, orchestrated by Vice President Temer, with a view to saving his own party, Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB, Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro), PSDB and minor centrist parties from the Car Wash Operation anticorruption investigations, as well as promoting a (neo)liberal reformist agenda. Thanks to PT’s large network of voters, supporters, and political allies abroad, which were promptly mobilized as the impeachment proceedings began, such narratives quickly went global (Lima and Pinheiro 2016; Spektor 2016). That explains Serra’s three first press statements as Foreign Minister, even before taking oath. In the first one, Itamaraty ‘emphatically repudiated’ declarations made by Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, as well as the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA), ‘which allow themselves to give opinions and spread falsehoods about Brazil’s internal political process’ (MRE 2016a). The second statement attacked Unasur’s Secretary-General Ernesto Samper, calling his remarks ‘misleading and absurd’, based on ‘unfounded misjudgments and false interpretations’ about Brazil’s institutions (MRE 2016b). Third, Itamaraty condemned El Salvador’s decision of suspending diplomatic ties with Brazil and claimed that the Salvadoran position revealed a ‘wide and deep lack of knowledge’ of Brazil’s Constitution and legal framework (MRE 2016c). A few days later, in his inauguration speech, Serra again bashed the PT by standing up for what he called a ‘non-ideological’ foreign policy. ‘Diplomacy will once again represent […] the true values of the Brazilian society and its economic interests, serving Brazil as a whole and not the conveniences and ideological preferences of a political party and its allies abroad’. Even though the new minister preserved the traditional guidelines of the Brazilian diplomacy, his remarks could be seen as a break with the past in at least two respects. First, Serra tried to redefine Brazil’s long-­ standing notion of ‘South-South cooperation’, claiming that the ‘correct South-South strategy’ should be based on trade, not ‘compassion’ or ‘publicity stunts’. Second, and most importantly, although he spoke of strengthening ties with Argentina and the Pacific Alliance countries (Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile), for the first time in more than two

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decades there was no mention of South America as a strategic region for Brazil (MRE 2016d). In his first two interviews as foreign minister, he scorned Brazil’s bid for a Security Council permanent seat, calling it a ‘big man’s game’ that was not among the administration’s priorities (TV Cultura 2016). In another interview, when asked about the BRICS grouping, Serra seemed unsure as to what countries were part of it—at some point, he even asks the reporter if Argentina was a member and has an adviser whisper ‘South Africa’ when trying to figure out what the S stood for.1 Finally, in a rather unconventional move, Itamaraty issued a press release criticizing Brazil’s own UNESCO vote on Israel and Palestine cast a few months before, threatening to change the country’s position if the text of the resolution was not revised shortly (MRE 2016g). But Serra’s single greatest target as Foreign Minister was Maduro’s Venezuela. That was not surprising, taking into consideration Serra’s recent political trajectory. When a delegation of Brazilian senators faced hostilities in a trip to Caracas to visit opposition leader Leopoldo López, who had been in jail for more than a year, Serra condemned the ‘Venezuelan dictatorship’ and called for its immediate suspension from Mercosur (Serra 2015). As the senator became the head of Itamaraty and launched his first attacks against PT allies abroad, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Delcy Rodríguez decided to escalate against her Brazilian counterpart. She called Serra’s statements on countries who denounced the impeachment trial as a parliamentary coup ‘insolent and amoral’ and claimed that the new Brazilian administration was part of the ‘international right-wing plot against Venezuela’ (PSUV 2016). In the months that followed, Serra issued several press releases criticizing human rights violations carried out by the Venezuelan government, some of which undersigned by other South American countries or by members of the Organization of American States (OAS) (MRE 2016h). Yet, a tougher rhetoric against Caracas was not enough for Brazil’s new foreign minister. As expected, his masterstroke against Venezuela would be driving it out of Mercosur. The first step was to prevent Maduro from taking up the bloc’s pro tempore presidency, which would happen in July, due to the mounting charges of human rights violations. Brazil was backed by Paraguay and Argentina, but still faced resistance from Uruguay, who insisted that transferring Mercosur’s presidency to Venezuela was 1  Although this part was cut from the interview that was published online, the original footage leaked some days later and quickly went viral (Revista Fórum 2016).

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legitimate. A few days before the end of the Uruguayan term, Serra took a trip to Montevideo, accompanied by the former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, to persuade President Tabaré Vásquez to join the regional boycott against Venezuela. The visit was seen by the Uruguayan Foreign Minister Rodolfo Nin Novoa as an attempt to bribe his country, as he declared in early August to the Foreign Affairs Commission at the Uruguayan House of Representatives. Novoa’s allegations came as a blow to Serra’s plan and to bilateral relations between both countries, leading Itamaraty’s Secretary-General to call upon the Uruguayan ambassador to Brazil for consultations (O Globo 2016). The second step was to use Mercosur’s legal framework to suspend Venezuela from the bloc. Brazil’s strategy was to call Caracas ‘unfit’ to be fully admitted in Mercosur, since it had fallen short of adhering to all Mercosur treaties and commitments by the deadline of August 2016, ten years after signing the Accession Protocol. After two months of a diplomatic tug of war among Mercosur partners, they settled in the following terms: the four countries would extend Venezuela’s deadline to fulfill the legal requirements to join Mercosur, and they would establish an unprecedented ‘joint presidency’ for the bloc until the end of the year (El País 2016). On 2 December, after the expiration of the deadline, the founding members of Mercosur notified the Maduro government that Venezuela had lost its rights as a party to the bloc (G1 2016a). While José Serra turned up the volume against the PT as a form of status signaling,2 President Michel Temer pointed to a different direction in his diplomatic efforts. He intentionally acted to counterbalance his foreign minister, not only because they were political adversaries (both considered running for president as of 2016), but also because his strategy in office was to redefine Brazilian international goals, aligning them with the ones of a middle power, but without giving up on the cornerstones of Brazil’s reputation and ‘soft power’, such as Itamaraty’s universalist strategy. Resorting to the diplomatic credentials he had accumulated in five years as Vice President, Temer deftly challenged Serra’s most 2  One of José Serra’s greatest critics was the former Foreign and Defense Minister Celso Amorim, which was ironic because Serra himself said that had he won the 2002 presidential elections against Lula, Amorim would, too, be his Foreign Minister (Folha de S.  Paulo 2010). A few days after Serra becoming Foreign Minister, Amorim wrote a harsh op-ed bashing the PSDB senator: ‘Brazil will return to the tight corner it should never have left’ (Amorim 2016).

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controversial positions, adjusting them to Itamaraty’s traditional repertoire (Spektor 2013). The President’s 2016 speech at the United Nations is quite telling in this regard. Running counter to his foreign minister’s previous statements, Temer underlined Brazil’s commitment to a reformed Security Council, to the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to regional integration efforts. On Palestine, Temer worked behind the scenes to prevent Serra from changing Brazil’s pro-Palestinian voting record at the United Nations, one of the elements that ensured a good relationship with Arab countries. In an act of great symbolism, the Brazilian president met with his Palestinian counterpart, Mahmoud Abbas, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), just a few days before Serra went to Israel to represent Brazil at the funeral of the former Israeli President and Prime Minister Shimon Peres. On Venezuela, Temer stated that it was ‘natural and salutary’ that governments of ‘different political inclinations’ coexisted in South America (The New York Times 2016). A few weeks before flying to New  York, the Brazilian president avoided meeting with Venezuelan opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who was received in Brasilia by Serra and some of his fellow party members (G1 2016b). However, Temer’s apparent goodwill toward the Venezuelan regime did not prevent delegations from Venezuela, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua from leaving the plenary as the Brazilian president began his speech. The most eloquent sign that Temer tried to position Brazil as a middle power was the absence of the BRICS—or of any emerging power, for that matter—from his UN speech. Depicting Brazil as part of an emerging power club was an integral element of the PT narrative, particularly at the UN. But rather than evoking the transforming power of the rising global players, the new Brazilian president said that the world needed norms that could mitigate the effects of an ‘asymmetrical globalization’—an expression that had originally been used by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in his 2001 UN speech, a moment when Brazil seemed comfortable with its middle-power status (Casarões 2016b). Even though Temer attended the eighth BRICS Summit in Goa, a couple of weeks after the UNGA session, he did not seem to give enough credit to the forum’s initiatives, bringing a narrow agenda of economic recovery, fiscal responsibility, and improving the country’s business environment (BBC News Brasil 2016).

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Michel Temer and Aloysio Nunes (2017–2018): The Realignment of Goals Transformations in the electoral landscape for the 2018 presidential race shortened José Serra’s tenure as Foreign Minister. After massive corruption charges that stemmed from the Carwash graft probe, as well as a loss of relative power within the PSDB, Serra saw the Senate as a better platform for his waning electoral ambitions. Claiming a health condition that would prevent him from taking long trips, Serra quit Itamaraty in February 2017 and appointed his colleague Aloysio Nunes, also a PSDB Senator from São Paulo, as his successor. Nunes, who had served as the Chair of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, adopted a much lower profile as Minister, which probably related to his previous experience with diplomatic affairs, but also to the fact that he had decided not to run for any office (Casarões 2017). The new minister, therefore, adopted tone and substance more in line with Itamaraty’s diplomatic traditions. That was a way to appease part of the foreign policy bureaucracy, to whom Serra was often seen as a protocol-averse, excessively centralizing figure who had been fundamental to bring money back to Itamaraty but whose behavior and mannerisms were incompatible with good diplomacy (Pennaforte 2017). At the same time, President Temer redefined foreign policy roles and duties in his cabinet. Former Central Bank Chairman Henrique Meirelles, in charge of the Ministry of Finance since Temer was sworn in, took the lead of Brazil’s bid to join the OECD, which was made official in May 2017, not only in the backstage negotiations (Ministério da Fazenda 2017) but also in the public defense of the Brazilian accession. It is interesting to notice that Aloysio Nunes would only signal Itamaraty’s reluctant support some months later (Ferreira 2018a). Under this new bureaucratic configuration, the Temer administration sought to realign Brazil’s status-seeking goals back to the middle-power status. Trade as a Middle-Power Strategy Besides the traditional partners in Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo, with whom the Temer administration sought to establish a policy of equidistance, Brazil’s foreign policy aimed to promote trade relations with the Global South, in line not only with the government’s demands, but also with the

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process of status downgrading.3 Following the steps of his predecessor, Aloysio Nunes stated in his March 2017 inaugural speech that it was about time to ‘make opportunities for greater trade, reciprocal investments and business partnerships’ come true with the developing world (MRE 2017a). The use of trade as a ‘middle-power strategy’ was particularly present in Brazil’s relations with Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. It was complemented, to a lesser extent, by the promotion of technical cooperation—a goal that was clearly secondary in the government rhetoric. Whereas Serra only paid one visit to Africa, passing by Cape Verde on his way to Paris, where he participated in the World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference,4 Nunes visited several African countries. A couple of months after taking office, in May 2017, he paid visits to São Tomé and Príncipe, Namibia, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, and South Africa, with an agenda of improving Brazilian technical cooperation, trade, and investments (MRE 2017c), which included military high-technology projects with the South African government (Ferreira 2017a). In October that same year, Nunes attended the WTO Ministerial Conference in Marrakesh and took the opportunity to tour across Western Africa, stopping by Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin in search of opportunities for Brazilian businesses (MRE 2017f). His final destination was Durban, where he met with his Indian and South African counterparts for the eighth IBSA Trilateral Ministerial Meeting (Republic of South Africa 2017). On the eve of this week-long trip, he published an op-ed that justified Brazil’s interest in Africa on the grounds of ‘enhancing trade and political dialogue with countries of high potential, contributing to the process of reigniting economic growth’ (Ferreira 2017c). Arab countries were also part of Aloysio Nunes’s itinerary. In July 2018, he took a trip to Tunisia, with whom Brazil negotiated a bilateral cooperation and facilitation investment agreement (CFIA) as well as a free trade agreement with Mercosur (MRE 2018b). The foreign minister also went to Algeria, Brazil’s second trade partner among the Arabs (MRE 2018c). 3  In August 2017, the Brazilian ambassadors to the three regional giants—China, India, and Japan—urged the government to adopt an integrated foreign policy for Asia, in a joint internal document sent to Itamaraty and to Planalto (Spektor 2017). 4  In the Portuguese-speaking archipelago, Serra reaffirmed Africa’s importance to Brazil and highlighted two bilateral initiatives—the Exchange Program for Undergraduate Students (Programa de Estudantes-Convênio de Graduação, PEC-G), of which Cape Verde is the main beneficiary, and the Center of Brazil’s Naval Mission in the country, which helps training Cape Verde’s navy officers and personnel (MRE 2016e).

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Besides the partners in Northern Africa, Nunes also toured across the Middle East earlier that year, a trip that included Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel. If the minister emphasized Brazil’s technical cooperation and humanitarian aid efforts for the Palestinian audience, with the Jordanian and Lebanese governments, the conversation revolved around trade and investments. The Lebanese case, in particular, also involves Brazil’s leadership of the Maritime Task-Force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which seeks to stabilize the country’s borders since 1978 (Ferreira 2018b). At the same time, Brazil kept the Syrian question at an arm’s length, manifesting its concern with the unfolding of the civil war, but not engaging diplomatically with the issue at the UN or other specific summits (MRE 2018a). India and Southeast Asia were also part of Brazil’s South-South strategy. One month after Temer’s first Asian tour, he returned to the continent to attend the seventh BRICS Summit, which took place in Goa (MRE 2016i). Temer seized the opportunity to meet with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to reactivate the IBSA Forum—a trilateral initiative that had been one of the pillars of Brazilian South-South cooperation strategy in the Lula da Silva years but whose summits were suspended in 2013. In October 2017, the foreign ministers of India, Brazil, and South Africa met in Durban and finally formalized the IBSA Fund, which had been created a decade before on voluntary grounds and whose main goal was to finance technical cooperation projects in least-developed or post-conflict nations (MRE n.d.). In September 2017, in an article published in Correio Braziliense, Ambassador Georges Lamazière, Itamaraty’s Deputy Secretary-General for Asia Pacific, made a defense of constructing an economic partnership with Southeast Asia, deemed essential to the recovery of Brazil’s economic growth (Lamazière 2017). The article came as a prelude to Foreign Minister Nunes’s trip to Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam, part of what Itamaraty dubbed a ‘resizing’ of Brazilian foreign policy for Asia (MRE 2017e). Some months later, in May 2018, Nunes embarked on a second, three-week long Asian tour, in which he visited four of the ten ASEAN countries—Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam—besides China, Japan, and South Korea (MRE 2018a). A few days prior to his trip, the Brazilian foreign minister wrote an article in which he called the tour ‘an expression of a foreign policy strategy that contributes to the sustainable expansion of the Brazilian economy by promoting international trade,

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attracting investors and stimulating the internationalization of Brazilian companies’ (Ferreira 2018c). Pulling Out from the Region Temer’s regional policy was organized around three main axes: the reinforcement of Mercosur’s economic dimension; the abandonment of South American integration efforts; and Venezuela’s diplomatic isolation. The first axis, which called for greater dynamism of Brazil’s foreign trade, was already present in the controversial document ‘A bridge to the future’, which became a kind of unofficial platform of the Temer administration even before the launching of the impeachment proceedings. Released by PMDB in October 2015, the plan advocated for a more open economy, ‘with or without the company of Mercosur, but preferably with them’ (PMDB 2015). The new government’s position stirred expectations of whether Brazil would be willing to leave the bloc in case it kept hindering the country’s global competitiveness. Before opting for a British-inspired ‘Braxit’ from Mercosur, however, President Temer attempted to push for new regional and extra-regional trade agreements and enjoyed support from Mauricio Macri’s Argentina (Temer 2017a). In less than a year since Foreign Minister Nunes took office, Mercosur signed an Economic Complementarity Agreement with Colombia (MDIC 2017), launched negotiations with India, Tunisia, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and put the Mercosur-Egypt free trade agreement into force (Presidência da República 2017). A new economic era for Mercosur also involved building stronger ties with the Pacific Alliance. Established in 2012, the free trade bloc—composed of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile—progressively filled the void left by an over-politicized Mercosur and by a regionally aloof Brazil. In less than a year, Mercosur founders Uruguay and Paraguay were accepted as observers in the Alliance and invited to join as full members, which contributed to the political weakening of the Southern Cone bloc.5 5  As for Paraguay, who was embittered with Mercosur after spending a year suspended from the bloc following President Lugo’s impeachment trial, holding on to the Pacific neighbors seemed a matter of political survival. While leading local newspaper ABC Color charged Brazil with lobbying against Paraguay’s admission in the Pacific alliance (ABC Color 2013), the Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes went as far as to declare that the Pacific group ‘had fulfilled its rights, or rather its obligations, better than Mercosur’ (El Comercio 2015).

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Meantime, the Rousseff administration only gave a lukewarm reception to the new regional initiative, dismissing it as ‘not a threat’ to Brazil’s regional interests (Senado Notícias 2013). On the other hand, Michel Temer and his diplomatic team made the relationship with the Pacific Alliance a priority. When the Financial Times published an article suggesting that a ‘new split’ was emerging between ‘trading nations facing the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts of Latin America’ (Financial Times 2016), Foreign Minister Serra promptly censured it in an official press release, calling the text’s argument ‘highly questionable’ and insisting that there was no divide, ‘only convergence based on shared goals’ (MRE 2016f). Indeed, in early 2017 the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Trade of all Mercosur and Pacific Alliance members gathered in Buenos Aires and proposed a ‘road map’ for future cooperation (MRE 2017b). Some months later, both President Temer (Temer 2017b) and Foreign Minister Nunes (Ferreira 2017b) wrote opeds in big newspapers underlining the need for strengthening ties between Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance. In July 2018, President Temer went to Mexico for the first joint summit between the two blocs, where the eight countries sowed the seeds of greater cooperation (ITCSD 2018). For the first time in three decades, however, Brazil had lost the upper hand in conducting regional integration, which speaks to the status downgrading process of recent years. Downgrading was also visible in the two other aspects of Temer’s regional policy. His administration simply ignored Unasur and Celac, deepening a trend that was already visible in Rousseff’s late period in office. As for the former, the impasse around the appointment of a new Secretary-General—the Argentinian candidate was vetoed by Venezuela— led six South American states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru) to suspend their participation in the bloc that was once called ‘Brazil’s baby’ (Ferreira, M. 2018). As for the latter, neither President Temer nor his foreign minister attended the 2017 Celac Summit and the 2018 Celac-China Forum, in which the Chinese government manifested its interest of bringing the Belt and Road Initiative to Latin America (China.org.cn 2018). Finally, Brazil’s handling of the Venezuelan crisis also contained elements of status downgrading. After Serra spent considerable energy to suspend Venezuela from Mercosur, Brazil lowered its tone and adopted a reactive stance against Caracas. Maduro’s decision to strip the National

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Assembly of power, transferring its legislative capacities to the Supreme Court in mid-2017 (The Guardian 2017), was the perfect excuse for the Mercosur members to evoke the bloc’s democratic clause, the Ushuaia Protocol, and add a bolder legal layer to Venezuela’s suspension (MRE 2017d). A couple of days after the four Mercosur members gathered in São Paulo to sweep Maduro away, the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay flew to the Peruvian capital to meet with nine other representatives from the Americas (Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru) to discuss the Venezuelan situation. Ever since then, the so-called Group of Lima has become the most important—albeit controversial (Avendaño 2018)—diplomatic instrument to pressure the regime of Nicolas Maduro (MRECIC 2018). Brazil has played but a secondary role in it.

Final Remarks This chapter was built upon existing debates on status, identities, and roles in international politics. It sought to advance two undertheorized elements of this discussion, namely (1) how status-seeking and status-­ signaling decisions are made and (2) what the implications of status downgrading are. We believe these are important questions because the mainstream literature on status is state centric at heart and has mostly looked at cases of status ascension/accommodation among middle-to-­great powers. Recent Brazilian experience helps shed light on these two theoretical blind spots, as we could clearly see the process of downgrading between Rousseff and Temer, its practical implications to Brazil’s global and regional position, as well how presidents and foreign ministers struggled—and sometimes clashed with each other— to justify the new status to domestic and international audiences. Yet, the scope of this piece did not allow for longer theoretical considerations or the development of a more specific model. We hope that, once the conceptual gap is partly filled by the arguments presented in the previous pages, other research efforts improve the empirical and conceptual discussions, either by analyzing the Brazilian case in greater depth or by including new cases of emerging powers who had to abandon their global ambitions and/or of regional powers that could no longer sustain their role in the neighborhood.

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———. 2017f. Visita do Ministro Aloysio Nunes Ferreira a Gana, Nigéria, Côte d’Ivoire e Benin. Nota 339, 10 October. ———. 2018a. Viagem do ministro Aloysio Nunes Ferreira à Ásia. Nota 139, 7 May. ———. 2018b. Visita do ministro Aloysio Nunes Ferreira a Túnis. Nota 246, 19 July. ———. 2018c. Visita do ministro das Relações Exteriores, Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, à Argélia. Nota 249, 20 July. ———. IBAS – Fórum de Diálogo Índia, Brasil e África do Sul, n.d. MRECIC, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de la Republica Argentina. 2018. At the Request of the Group of Lima, 53 Countries Express Concern Over Situation in Venezuela. Information for the Press No. 219/18, 5 July. Senado Notícias. 2013. Patriota diz que Aliança do Pacífico não ameaça interesses do Brasil, 20 June. O Globo. 2016. Uruguai diz que Serra tentou comprar voto no Mercosul, 16 August. Pennaforte, Charles. 2017. A atuação de José Serra no Itamaraty: algumas considerações críticas. Cadernos do CIM 1 (1): 137–146. Pini, André Mendes. 2015. A Cúpula Celac-China: Interesses estratégicos em jogo. Revista Mundorama, 7 February. PMDB, Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro. 2015. Uma ponte para o futuro, 29 October. Presidência da República. 2017. Nova fase do Mercosul permite mais acordos e aproximação com diversos países, 21 December. PSUV, Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela. 2016. Venezuela rechaza declaraciones del canciller de Brasil, 5 July. Renshon, Jonathan. 2017. Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Republic of South Africa. 2017. International Relations and Cooperation on IBSA Trilateral Ministerial Commission Meeting, 17 October. Revista Fórum. 2016. Serra se enrola e inclui Argentina entre os BRICS, 17 September. Ricupero, Rubens. 2017. A Diplomacia na Construção do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Versal. Scharma, Ruchir. 2012. Bearish on Brazil. Foreign Affairs, May/June. Serra, José. 2015. Nota de repúdio à armação da ditadura venezuelana, 18 May. Avaliable at http://www.joseserra.com.br/repudio-a-armacao-da-ditaduravenezuelana/. Accessed 22 Jan 2019. Spektor, Matias. 2013. Temer diplomata. Folha de S. Paulo, 29 May. ———. 2016. Diplomacia do impeachment. Folha de S. Paulo, 24 March. ———. 2017. Começou o embate pela nova diplomacia do Brasil na Ásia. Folha de São Paulo, 19 August.

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Stuenkel, Oliver. 2014a. Brazilian Foreign Policy: Game Over? Post Western World, 28 January. ———. 2014b. Brazilian Foreign Policy: Into the Dark. Post Western World, 12 December. Temer, Michel. 2017a. Mercosul: caminhos para o futuro, Valor Econômico, 21 July. ———. 2017b. Um Mercosul de resultados. O Globo, 21 December. The Guardian. 2017. Venezuela Opposition Allege Coup as Supreme Court Seizes Power, 30 March. The New  York Times. 2016. Brazil’s New President, Michel Temer, Defends Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, 19 September. TV Cultura. 2016. Programa Roda Viva, 6 June. Vieira, Mauro. 2016. Os 25 anos de Mercosul: momento de reconhecer os ganhos, Folha de S.Paulo, 26 March. Vigevani, Tullo, Marcelo Oliveira, and Timothy Thompson. 2007. Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration. Latin American Perspectives 34 (5): 58–80. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wohlforth, William, et  al. 2017. Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking. Review of International Studies 44 (3): 526–546.

SECTION III

Brazil and the Security Agenda

CHAPTER 7

Climbing the Ladder: Brazil and the International Security Field Paulo Esteves and Mônica Herz

Introduction During the past two decades the Brazilian Foreign Policy Community (BFPC) experienced a great deal of change. Brazil’s international stance has for a very long time been recognized for its attachment to the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference, as well as for its quest for autonomy and status recognition. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 2000s, Brazil led the peacekeeping operation in Haiti (under Chap. VII of the UN charter), got involved in the military coup in Honduras and engaged itself in contentious development projects in This chapter was researched with the support of the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development—Brazilian government (CNPq), Foundation for the Support of Research of the state of Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) and Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES). P. Esteves (*) Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil M. Herz Institute of International Relations, BRICS Policy Center, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_7

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Africa. What has changed? How has the Brazilian foreign policy community bared new understandings about these long-standing principles. This chapter discusses Brazil’s international stance in the field of international security, focusing on the intersection between security and development and the regional-global nexus. We contend that in order to understand the process of change and continuity it is necessary to look into the relations between the positioning of the country, the understandings about the dynamics of the international system and forms of resistance and adaptation considered by those who are making decisions and building discourses (the foreign policy community). We refer to a foreign policy community because diplomats and academics, or foreign policy experts, are the repositories of collective memories, specific practices and representations that structure their interaction and their discourse. This community is not homogenous, and people, concepts and policy orientations have of course circulated, acquiring more or less prominence as power relations change. Nevertheless, this construction allows this group of people to be ruled and reproduced. They share a foreign policy field and its imaginary (Weldes 1999; Dotty 1993; Guzzini 2017 p. 14), and are able, at different points in history, to mobilize concepts for political change. Collective memories, specific practices and representations form the Brazilian international culture (Herz 2011) which underpins any subject position articulated by the foreign policy community. Following Guzzini (2012), a subject position results from the ways a community interprets itself (self-understanding) and its role in the field in which it is embedded (international role). While assessing the international system and imagining how the nation could “fit” (either in actual or in potential terms) a foreign policy community articulates a subject position, designs a foreign policy strategy and enacts specific stances within a given field, such as international security. National interests and foreign policy practices are processes of positioning that require interpretations of the international system which are always already embedded in a set of patterns or self-understandings shared by the foreign policy community (an international culture). Indeed, as Jutta Weldes (1996) has pointed out, national interests or preferences do not exist out there ready to be apprehended by an enlightened decision-­ maker. They are not a pre-given; they are neither determined by the international system nor created by any leadership. A subject position is constantly in flux and is formed by values, beliefs and ideas that are not only shared by the foreign policy community but are also rooted in and

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referred to a broader social context in which this community is embedded and from which it acquired legitimacy. Within the limits of this chapter we address the socio-political dynamic in Brazil that allowed for the changes in focus. Keeping that in mind the chapter tries to identify some of the main tenets which structure the international culture of the Brazilian Foreign Policy Community (BFPC) and articulate its stance within the field of international security. The first section addresses the BFPC’s main tenets. Since the nineteenth century the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention have been the international culture cornerstones of BFPC. Nevertheless, after World War II the interpretation of sovereignty featured its coupling with an aspiration for autonomy and development. Sovereignty/autonomy, development and non-intervention became therefore BFPC’s main tenets, guiding its strategic choices and articulating its international stances for at least 60 years. The second section discusses how the BFPC interpreted the transformation of the international system after the end of the Cold War, while the third and fourth sections tackle the transformations in the ways the BFPC understood its position within the international system in the new millennium. The chapter argues that interpretations of the world and self-understanding are always intertwined. Hence after the Cold War, the BFPC had to update not only the ways it has depicted the international system but above all, how it has imagined the position the country should seize within it. In doing so, the Community had to review its own main tenets and reinvent itself.

Brazil’s International Stance: Non-intervention, Development and Autonomy Since the nineteenth century the Brazilian governing elites built the place of the country in the international system in a constant struggle with its subordinate status. The defense of sovereign equality and its corollaries’ non-intervention and non-interference, as well as the preference for a regulated and isonomic environment, stem from this experience. The so-­ called Hague paradigms advocate a lawful international society based on universal principles declaring the BFPC preference for regulated environments over unmediated relations with major powers (Goffredo Jr. 2005; Cardim 2008; Fonseca Jr. 2008; Lafer 2004; Sennes 2000). Moreover, the “Hague paradigms” would play a self-fashion role, identifying Brazil as a good international citizen seeking for recognition of its status from the major powers (Seixas Correa 1995; Herz 2014). Nevertheless, during

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the first half of the twentieth century, the BFPC adopted bandwagoning as a strategy, often referred to as Americanism, in order to protect itself and leverage resources when engaged in international negotiations (Ricupero 1995). After World War II, the defense of sovereign equality was translated into the search for autonomy. Autonomy became a ubiquitous concept guiding, as a mirage, the BFPC.  Contrasted with independence (the inexistence of subordination ties with any foreign power) autonomy had a positive value and it implied the ability for self-reliance and self-­ government. Maintaining and enhancing the country’s autonomy would become BFPC’s key goal and a constitutive component of the nation-building process. According to Chancellor Horácio Lafer, in a speech given in 1959, “nationalist thinking is one in essence: constructive and fraternal in relation to friendly nations, but zealous to preserve the freedom to interpret the reality of the country and find Brazilian solutions to Brazilian problems” (Lafer 1959).1 Autonomy required, nevertheless, a two-­ pronged approach: domestic development and international standing. Domestic development was considered a condition to build up an autonomous state. As San Tiago Dantas framed it: “to develop means to emancipate”.2 Developmentalism articulated a generative geography which ascribed specific places for specific actors and a set of policies to be adopted in order to promote domestic modernization or, to use Dantas’ enlighted metaphor, “to emancipate” the country. As per domestic politics developmentalism was a model organized around three components: (i) import-substituting industrialization particularly in regard to basic industry; (ii) foreign capital attraction, both public and private, to boost investment; and (iii) the strong presence of the state either as a coordinator or as an implementer of development initiatives (Sikkink 1991). This program organized a narrative according to which autonomy was a destiny always already manifested: Brazil would climb the development ladder. Furthermore, autonomy would require an international standing. It implied, primarily, self-identification as an underdeveloped country. This self-understanding, and the willingness to become autonomous, 1 2

 Horácio Lafer was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1959 to 1961.  San Tiago Dantas was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1961 to 1962.

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conditioned the ways the BFPC should position itself within the international system and would generate a new strategy. Instead of bandwagoning, the choice would be hedging.3 The strategy baptized either as globalism or as universalism was prevalent between 1960 and 1964 and from 1974 to the end of the Cold War (Lima 1994; Pinheiro 2000; Amorim 2011). The autonomy vocabulary was not consistent with the bandwagoning strategy in which the country should heavily rely on major power capabilities. Hence, after the 1960s, instead of aligning the country with one of the superpowers, the BFPC tried, at the same time, to build up a southern coalition and to foster an image of a trustful player. While trying to advance a reformist agenda the BFPC was careful about avoiding the presentation of the Brazilian state as an international threat. Almost 20 years after San Tiago Dantas’ speech, Chancellor Saraiva Guerreiro summarized the BFPC’s dilemma and asserted the centrality of the good citizen status recognition: “the first condition for the success of foreign policy is to arouse confidence. We do not have a power surplus or surplus of cultural attraction, economic or political, and we have to build our presence on trust that is expressed by the consistency, the scruples […] and the preference in dialoguing with other countries” (Guerreiro 1992). Guerreiro’s assessment became commonsensical within the BFPC.  Despite its claims for autonomy and de facto sovereignty, the BFPC recognized its own weakness, described by Guerreiro as the lack of “power surplus”. Guerreiro’s diagnosis pointed to the crumbly position generated by the developmental perspective: while the country did not fulfill its “destine to greatness”, the lack of “power surplus” conditioned the BFPC behavior, framing its policy space and containing its autonomy. While climbing the developmental ladder, the Brazilian government should behave as a good citizen, relying on international rules and preferring to act within multilateral settings and establish a variety of alliances and partnerships. Guerreiro’s reasoning was mainstreamed within the BFPC, framing its international standing. 3  On hedging see, among others, T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) and Evan S.  Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2005).

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Brazilian Foreign Policy Community and the Collective Security Regime Expansion After the Cold War At the end of the Cold War Brazil’s foreign policy was subjected to an extensive revision. The period coincided with the country’s re-­ democratization and generated a new policy space for the BFPC. While the BFPC was able to affirm, in constitutional terms, the main tenets of its policies, non-intervention, equality among states and peaceful settlement of conflicts, the constitutional text also presents a commitment with international norms, especially human rights and the condemnation of racism. Moreover, it abides by the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. According to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution “all nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the National Congress”.4 Since the end of the 1980s and during the following decade, the BFPC has tried to adapt the country to a changing international environment. Different degrees of “tradition and innovation” should guide Brazil’s foreign policy adjustment (Santana 2006; Vigevani and de Oliveira 2003), supporting the normative convergence between the domestic and international realms. The BFPC presented this strategy under several labels— “critique convergence”, “autonomy by integration” or “autonomy by participation” (Vigevani and de Oliveira 2003). In any case, the pursuit of autonomy was still conducting the BFPC.  After the Cold War, and the democratization of the country, autonomy should be pursued via participation. Autonomy through participation was understood by Fonseca Jr. as “a positive participation, always supported by the criteria of legitimacy”. Fonseca Jr. contrasted an old perspective which understood autonomy as “distance from the controversial issues” or “undesirable alignments” with an updated version, according to which autonomy meant participation, “a desire to influence the open agenda with values that express its diplomatic tradition and ability to see the direction of the international order with its own eyes, with unique perspectives. Perspectives that correspond to our national complexity” (Fonseca Jr. 1998, p. 368). In Cardoso’s own terms: “The Brazil which is entering the twenty first century is a country whose primary objectives of internal transformation 4  Brazil. Constituição [Constitution], 1988, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm

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and development, are consistent with the values diffused and universalized at the international level” (Cardoso 2000). Domestic and international spheres were figured as a continuum, as Chancellor Lampreia avowed: “There is no duality between our internal and external positions any longer. Brazil is now an open, democratic society that wants to improve its conditions in the social, human rights and the environment realms”(Lampreia 1998, p. 9). Any realm, but international security. Since the end of the Cold War and re-democratization, the BFPC did make essential changes in its position regarding international security, acceding to the most important conventions in the field.5 Nevertheless, international interventions were still seen as a major concern for Brazilian foreign policy. According to Minister Lampreia’s statement, in 1999, “as a intermediate country, with a large and peaceful tradition, we cannot, however, support the unilateral use of military means, even against gross violators of international order as Iraq” (Lampreia 1999, p. 327). The BFPC stood against three dimensions of the collective security regime reform that was being manufactured at the UN: the possibility of unilateral use of force, the expansion of the regime, encompassing the humanitarian agenda, and the nexus between regional and multilateral organizations. For the BFPC any intervention could be authorized only by the Security Council. As Chancellor Lampreia noted, accepting unilateral actions “would mean to legitimize the law of the stronger, ignoring the rule of international law which is the greatest protection for States”. Brazil has maintained the position of rejection of unilateral interventions within the rationale of multilateral rules (Lampreia 1999, p.  327). Henceforth, during the 1990s the BFPC sought to oppose any proposal for the use of force beyond what they understood as the terms of the charter. Brazil’s position was clearly articulated by Chancellor Lampreia: “the rule of peacekeeping, and not of peace enforcement, is a golden rule for us to be involved in international forces under the aegis of the United Nations (Lampreia 1999, p. 95). For Brazilian representatives documents such as “An Agenda for Peace” were seen as an a “reinterpretation of Security Council mandate towards a militarized direction” (Patriota 1998, p. 57). The BFPC was particularly concerned with the expansion of the collective security agenda toward the inclusion of humanitarian protection and, eventually, the establishment of the conditions for humanitarian interventions. For the BFPC, multilateral interventions should be seen as a last resort, referred 5

 On Brazil and the non-proliferation regime, see Herz (2011) and Herz et al. (2017).

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only to peace and security threats (understood in a very narrow way), and a primary responsibility of sovereign states. The nexus between humanitarian protection, development and security was seen as an illegitimate expansion of the collective security regime. The nexus was seen as a politicization of both humanitarian protection and development promotion. Finally, the BFPC expressed unease also with the renewed role proposed for regional organizations with regard to regional security governance. Although elaborated in “An Agenda for Peace and later in the “Brahimi Report”6 the concept was already circulating with the 1990 intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia. The coordination between regional organizations and the UN became especially evident and acute as international involvement in the conflict in Bosnia grew (Herz 2017). In this context, relations between the UN and regional organizations such as the African Union, the Organization of American States (OAS) and NATO were redesigned. NATO in particular has evolved to confront global threats ranging from piracy off the Horn of Africa to Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. In fact the expansion of NATO’s strategic definitions raised severe criticism (Behnke 2012). The BFPC supported a traditional collective security role of the United Nations as spelled out in Charter Chaps. VI, VII and VIII, rather than transferring those functions to regional organizations that by definition are not universal. Although regional security governance was viewed positively, by the BFPC, as indicated by investments in regional organizations in Latin America, a separation between the role of regional organizations and the UN or between Chap. VI/VII and Chap. VIII was deemed relevant. Summing up, during the 1990s Brazil’s main efforts toward collective security were (i) to contain the advancement of what was understood as an interventionist agenda; (ii) to emphasize the need for consent of the parties; (iii) to favor the investment in peaceful and diplomatic instruments for the resolution of conflicts; (iv) to take a critical stance toward the broadening of the agenda of the Security Council, in general, and the incorporation of the humanitarian agenda, as well as the nexus between regional and multilateral organizations in particular; and (vi) to address the root causes of conflicts—identified with development 6  Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (A/47/277 – S/24111), June 1992, available at http://www.un.org/docs/ SG/agpeace.html; and Lakhdar Brahimi (2000), Report of the Panel On United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305  – S/2000/809), available at http://www.un.org/peace/ reports/peace_operations/docs/full_report.htm

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Table 7.1  BFPC and the peace and security agenda (1995–2001) Period/ dimension

Status sought

1995–2001 Regional power, aligned with international norms

Foreign policy strategy

BFPC’s stance at the security field

Autonomy by participation

Supporting non-intervention, challenging the expansion of collective security

problems—by cooperative instead of military means. Table 7.1 tries to summarize the ways the BFPC positioned itself within the international system at large and within the collective security regime in particular. As we have seen in the 1990s the debate on autonomy migrated from the BFPC position vis-à-vis the major power(s) to its relations with a thick multilateral environment Guimarães (2001). Arguments were drawn to face the issues of international trade regulation, environment and arms control norms. Contrary to its movement toward the adjustment to international norms, in regard to collective security, the BFPC remained committed to a conservative understanding of the 1945 UN charter. This standpoint would change in the following decade, with a new foreign policy strategy.

Non-intervention and Non-indifference By the end of the decade the debates on the collective security regime took place around the concept of “responsibility to protect” (R2P). The BFPC adopted a suspicious position even though the concept was incorporated as a reference for debates within the Community itself. The concept stretched the tension between state sovereignty and human rights and humanitarian protection. Furthermore, it gained currency in the aftermath of the NATO operation in Kosovo which made the BFPC even more cautious. While trying to narrow it down, the BFPC stressed that R2P was a concept, not a principle, and as such had no legal or normative consequences. As Kenkel (2010) noticed, the definition of R2P as protection from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity to a deeper concept based on the three pillars allowed Brazilian diplomacy to take part in this debate. The Brazilian government returned to its safe ground, stressing the role of prevention, state-building and social and economic development to dodge the structural conditions that lead to the violation of human rights. Development and prevention should be the way for achieving both ends: national and international stability.

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The deployment of a peacekeeping operation in Haiti was, nevertheless, a turning point. For the BFPC, the 2004 Haitian crisis represented an opportunity for the intersection of its two main concerns regarding international peace: intervention and development. Security Council resolution 1542 authorized, on April 30, 2004, the deployment of United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).  Two aspects of MINUSTAH mandate are noteworthy: first, it prescribes a range of actions under Chap. VII; second, it contains a peacebuilding component that relates economic and social development to fighting poverty. While the former indicates a shift in Brazil’s position toward peace enforcement, the latter surely signals an attempt to transform the peacebuilding agenda (Esteves 2011). The BFPC commitment to MINUSTAH meant a decision to accept a new security vocabulary developed in documents such as “An Agenda for Peace”, “Responsibility to Protect” or “In Larger Freedom”. Nonetheless its adherence to the package was limited: the reference to Chap. VII was narrowed to stabilization and protection of civilians, while activities related to political processes, human rights and development were framed within the classical scope of peacekeeping. Moreover, a line was drawn between development and military components. This was very relevant for the position of the BFPC against the so-called militarization of development or peacebuilding practices as a whole. Indeed, Resolution 1542 (2004) was considered for many diplomats “a milestone in the consolidation of peace, to establish the interdependence of three pillars: there will be no stability without advances in the fields of security, development and reconciliation – a thesis which has been defended by Brazil regarding a gradual demilitarization of peace operations” (Neves 2009). What has changed? Since 2004, a shift in the country’s international positioning can be detected: instead of an unbending non-­interventionism, Chancellor Celso Amorim articulated Brazilian foreign policy as oriented by the principle of non-intervention but tempered by what he called non-­ indifference. In March 17, 2004, in a lecture given in London, Amorim deployed the concept of non-indifference when describing Brazil’s orientation toward its neighbors: “we […] become actively engaged in the not always easy search for stability in Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, in a spirit in which our traditional attachment to non-interference in the internal affairs of others is tempered by what I like to call “non-indifference” (Amorim 2004). Non-indifference would be the concept with which

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Brazilian foreign policy would try to overcome its reactive and negative perspectives regarding the expansion of the collective security agenda. The Government of Brazil (GoB) negotiated the mandate and committed itself with MINUSTAH 43 days after this lecture. Besides asserting the tripod “security, reconciliation and development”, it should be highlighted that Brazilian representatives were able to add the combat of poverty as a component of MINUSTAH’s mandate Uziel (2010). The understanding that development issues are constitutive of peacebuilding processes was already well established within UN practices. Brazil’s maneuver was, then, to understand development beyond a narrow frame, trying to incorporate practices and emulate specific policies designed to combat poverty and hunger. In a 2007 internal correspondence, the Foreign Office emphasized the tripod’s relevance: “Brazil acts on the idea that peace, to be sustainable, requires long-term commitment and sustained actions on the tripod security, political reconciliation and development. From the Brazilian perspective, this is the paradigm for international cooperation to solve conflicts that should guide the international community”. Moreover, according to the document, “this, has to be a long term commitment and, after an initial phase in which force is the most important aspect of a PKO, the deeper causes of crises, often linked to poverty, inequality, and the institutional weakness must be attacked” (apud Neves 2009, p.  86). The resemblance with the mainstream UN discourse on multidimensional PKOs is not trivial but the circumscription of the military component or the inscription of new meanings to the developmental component are key changes that should not be neglected. While the discourse against the expansion of collective security was sustained strictly on the principle of non-intervention, when confronted both with R2P and the Haitian crises, the BFPC presented the notion of non-­ indifference, allowing the country to accept a certain degree of coercion and to interpret reconciliation and development in its own terms. If Brazil’s position was still driven by the BFPC quest for autonomy, non-­ indifference mitigated a literal understanding of the principle of non-­ intervention. Moreover, the concept allowed the enactment of a new position within the international system: a regional leader with a global reach. Non-indifference evokes a distinct position toward the neighbors, a position based on solidarity and responsibility. Hence, non-indifference was not only a tactical attempt to deter the advance of the transformation of the collective security regime, but it was a way to assert a new position

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Table 7.2  BFPC and the peace and security agenda (2002–2007) Period/ dimension

Status sought

Foreign policy strategy

BFPC’s stance regarding the security field

2002–2007

Regional power with a global reach; regional leadership

Autonomy by diversification

Non-intervention/ non-indifference

envisaged by the BFPC for Brazil. Non-indifference would also be regarded as an attempt to transform some concerns presented in mainstream peacekeeping discourses, especially those related to human rights. The concept allowed for questions related to development and inequality to be articulated in terms of international responsibility. Hence, while the discourse on humanitarian intervention was giving priority to international security, the concept of non-indifference, at least in the way the BFPC was articulating it, emphasized the developmental dimension of the humanitarian crises (Table 7.2).

Non-intervention and Responsibility While Protecting After 2010, the debates around the R2P, particularly regarding international intervention, gained a new momentum. The BFPC did not reject the third pillar, or the use of force out front, but framed the use of violence as a problem rather than a solution. Its narrative stressed that the use of violence hinders political solutions.7 Furthermore, the decision on the use of force was a key concern for Brazilian representatives. The BFPC did not accept the distinction between legitimacy and legality that has been gaining ground since the end of the Cold War. From this perspective, the political and legal process that produces the law is the only source of 7  See, for example, the statement by Maria Luiza Viotti, at the time Brazilian Representative at the UN, during the July debate, on the role of regional organizations and the responsibility to protect; available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Brazil%20Stmt.pdf Maria Luiza Viotti, ‘Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibilityto Protect’, 23 July 2010. Available online: www.un.int/brazil/speech/10d-mlrvinformal-interactive-dialogue-on-the-responsability-to-protect.html; MariaLuiza Ribeiro Viotti, ‘Responsibility to protect – SG report on “The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect”’, 12 July 2011. Available online: www.un.int/brazil/ speech/11d-mlrv-Responsability-to-protect-report.html

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legitimacy. The legitimacy of any decision is the law itself. Thus, the Security Council may be seen as the guarantor of the legal order, as the concept of R2P delineates, but its power of decision must also be limited by strict procedures. In the context of the crisis in Libya and after that in Syria this cautious position revealed itself a way of seeking an equilibrium between human rights and humanitarian protection from one side and a denial of the right to intervene militarily from the other. The intervention in Libya triggered greater concerns regarding R2P’s impact upon the collective security regime. The resolution adopted in the Libyan crisis appeared as the coming of age of R2P and for many, within the BFPC, the resolution was considered too broad allowing Western powers to act aiming at regime change. The Libyan crisis was also a window of opportunity for the coordination between BRICS in security matters. The decision by Brazil, Russia, China and India to abstain when voting for Resolution 1973 was both a landmark for the BRICS but an indication of deep transformations within the international system. Throughout the crisis, the BRICS criticized the NATO intervention, stressing that it did not respect the UN resolution. From the BFPC standpoint the international system was already multipolar, and the emergence of the BRICS was considered an evidence of the rise of new sources of power and economic vitality. Nevertheless, while being a member of BRICS would trigger a new national image, Brazil as a rising or emerging power, it would also be a source of a growing anxiety. Should Brazil stand along with Russia or China on matters of human rights? Did Brazil, Russia, China and India share the same positions regarding international security issues? The BFPC’s answers for these questions can be found at President Dilma Rousseff’s first speech to the UN addressing the 66th session of the General Assembly in November 2012, when she suggested the concept of “responsibility while protecting” (RwP). Her government followed this up with a position paper, setting out what RwP might mean in practice.8 With the RwP the BFPC once again asserted that the use of force usually generates more harm and instability. Hence, the concept suggests, R2P should be an evolutionary process in which all other means have been 8   United Nations General Assembly A/6/551-S/2011/701 Responsibility While Protecting Elements for the Development and Promotion of a Concept available at http:// www.un.int/brazil/speech/Concept-Paper-%20RwP.pdf

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exhausted prior to the use of force is made. Although the concept of RwP would be short lived due to changes in the government it is firmly embedded in the broader concern with the use of force. The Brazilian proposal stresses prevention9 to ensure the protection of civilians but does not completely discard the possibility of the use of force. When force is used, it should be proportional to the aims established in the UN mandate and should be monitored in order to ensure that the mandate is respected. Multilateral decisions should be executed according to procedures and under oversight mechanisms established by multilateral institutions (R2P should be regulated). Moreover, “the use of force must be preceded by a comprehensive and judicious analysis of the possible consequences of military action on a case-by-case basis”. A fierce debate ensued where a clear division lay between those that welcomed the proposal, such as India, South Africa and Venezuela, and those that were clearly opposed to it, such as Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia. The latest crisis to test the concept of R2P was Syria. The permanent members of the Security Council disagreed, and the double veto (by Russia and China) meant that no action was authorized. The Brazilian position has been to criticize the violation of human rights and call for a diplomatic solution while stressing there should be a local Syrian solution. In particular, Brazil has condemned the use of WMD by the Syrian government after the massacre in Tremseh in July 2012. The diplomatic efforts of the United Nations in the form of the Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi missions have received full support, and the country has also put its weight behind the role played by the Human Rights Council. President Dilma Rousseff, speaking at the United Nations as she opened the 67th General Assembly, defended a negotiated way out of the Syrian crisis and even-handedly criticized the Bashar al-Assad government and the opposition for their use of violence.10 Moreover, the GoB expressed

9  In line with the 2001 report from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 10  h t t p : / / a g e n c i a b r a s i l . e b c . c o m . b r / n e w - i n - e n g l i s h / 2 0 1 2 - 0 9 - 2 8 / news-english-%E2%80%93-dilma-condemns-military-intervention-syria-and-calls-negotiated-solution

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its disposition to take part in a mission in Syria if a political transition was negotiated.11 The debates on the R2P and RwP allow us to understand how the BFPC’s stance within the security field changed during the 2000s. Its ­perspective on R2P can be summarized as follows: (i) the focus on violence from all parties is considered a source of harm; (ii) human rights principles and humanitarian norms should be defended; (iii) states are the sole institutions to provide peace and security and their legitimacy should be renegotiated among national stakeholders; (iv) the role of the international community is precisely to support this process as mediator, facilitator, monitor and source of normative frameworks; (v) only after the exhaustion of these peaceful means the use of force should be considered; and (vi) the use of force should be decided according to multilateral rules and submitted to procedures and oversight mechanisms also established by multilateral institutions. The RwP proposal allowed the BFPC to distinguish itself both from Western powers and emerging powers such as China or Russia. Indeed, the stance enacted stressed the need for a norm-based order (as most of Western powers) but also underlined the need for a multilateral control upon the process of implementation of decisions taken under this normative framework (regulated R2P). At the same time, while with China and Russia the BFPC was against the use of force, against its partners in the BRICS, the BFPC repealed the idea of a power-based order. Even though the concept of RwP had a limited impact (if any) upon the collective security regime, it was an instrument with which the BFPC could enact a new position within the international security field. This position was consistent with a new assessment of the international system (multipolar and multicentric) and with a national imagination guided by the quest of great power status (see Table 7.3). Table 7.3  BFPC and the peace and security agenda (2008–2014) Period/ dimension

Status sought

Foreign policy strategy

BFPC’s stance at the security field

2008–2014

Great power

Coalitions/Club diplomacy/active participation in multilateral arena

Non-intervention/ non-indifference/RwP

11  http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/internacional,brasil-promete-apoio-a-forca-depaz-na-siria,959954,0.htm, O Estado de São Paulo, November 13, 2012.

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Conclusion The debates on humanitarian intervention both in the 1990s with “An agenda for Peace” and with R2P, since the publication of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report in 2001, were taken as events that were pointing at structural changes within the security field. This chapter has tried to understand how the BFPC (i) interpreted these events and the potential structural changes they were pointing at, (ii) articulated Brazil’s identity and status perspectives and (iii) structured the BFPC’ stance within the international security field. In theoretical terms the chapter assumes that these events and the potential structural changes they were related to were subjected to a process of continuous interpretation by the BFPC.12 As seen, the process of interpretation is informed by a foreign policy imaginary understood here, following the works of Weldes and Guzzini, as a set of “well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations about the world of international relations are created”. While interpreting events and the structural change in the international security field after the Cold War, the BFPC not only mobilized meanings and representations already entrenched in its imaginary but also adapted and eventually transformed its main tenets, pursuing a mimetic movement. Hence, every event assessed triggered a self-evaluation process mobilizing both a foreign policy imaginary and a national imagine. The BFPC was, at the same time, involved in a process of negotiation of rules and representing Brazil’s identity to domestic and international audiences. Depending on the ways Brazil was represented, the BFPC could articulate a specific stance within the international arena and the security field. In order to analyze how BFPC interpreted the events and processes that eventually would lead to structural changes within the international security field, we drew on its foreign policy imaginary, trying to identify its main tenets, ways of self-representation and strategies for international insertion. As per the Brazilian foreign policy imaginary, the chapter identified autonomy as a concept around which BFPC’s debates took place. As seen, within these debates, the concept of autonomy was, long ago, subsumed to the modernizing logic of developmentalism Escobar (1995). While assessing the international system the BFPC usually considers how a given configuration contributes to or constrains national autonomy.  See Guzzini (2012).

12

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Furthermore, the concept is very often mobilized to describe and make sense of BFPC’s strategies. Indeed, as discussed above, these strategies are variations of a common and desired outcome: autonomy by participation, autonomy by diversification, and so on. Nevertheless, at a first sight, when it comes to its position toward international security Brazil’s stand seems more enduring than changeable. But this inference may be elusive. As we have tried to demonstrate the BFPC neither positioned itself as an unbending challenger, nor as completely aligned. BFPC’s mimetic position, as the concepts of non-interference and RwP demonstrated, has evolved in a way that tried to reconcile the principle of non-intervention with the expansion of collective security and R2P. Thus we can understand how changes in the status sought and in foreign policy strategy during the period considered here led to important modification to stances regarding the security field and ultimately a relative acceptance of the association between enforcement and protection of civilians.

References Amorim, Celso. 2004. Lecture by the Foreign Minister of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Amorim, given at the London School of Economics on 17 March 2004. Amorim Neto, Octavio. 2011. De Dutra a Lula: a condução e os determinantes da política externa brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Campus, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Behnke, Andreas. 2012. NATO’s Security Discourse after the Cold War: Representing the West. London: Routledge. 248p. Brahimi, Lakhdar. 2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. New York City: United Nations. Cardim, Carlos Henrique. 2008. A Raiz das Coisas – Rui Barbosa – O Brasil no Mundo. Rio de Janeiro: Record. Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 2000. Palestra do Senhor Presidente da República, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, no Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI). Rio de Janeiro. Doty, R.L. 1993. Foreign Policy as Social Construction. International Studies Quarterly 37 (2): 297–320. Escobar, A. 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Esteves, Paulo. 2011. “Ikke-likegyldighet” i brasiliansk utenrikspolitikk. Internasjonal Politikk 2: 282–292.

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Fonseca, Gelson, Jr. 1998. A Legitimidade e Outras Questões Internacionais. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra. ———. 2008. O interesse e a regra. Ensaios sobre o multilateralismo. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra. Goffredo, Gustavo Sénéchal de, Jr. 2005. Entre poder e direito: a tradição grotiana na política externa brasileira. Brasília: IRB/FUNAG. Guerreiro, Ramiro Saraiva. 1992. Lembranças de um funcionário do Itamaraty. São Paulo: Siciliano. Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro. 2001. A inserção internacional do Brasil. Economia e Sociedade (17):1–31. Guzzini, Stefano. 2012. The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? In Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2017. Foreign Policy Identify Crisis and Uses of ‘the West’. In Uses of the West Security and the Politics of Order, ed. Gunter Hellmann and Benjamin Herboth, 13–36. Herz, Monica. 2011. Brazil: Major Power in the Making? In Great Powers, ed. T. Volgy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2014. Brazil and R2P: Responsibility while Protecting. In The International Politics of Human Rights: Rallying to the R2P Cause? (Global Institutions), ed. Mónica Serrano and Thomas G. Weiss, 1st ed., 107–128. New York: Routledge. ———. 2017. Regional Governance. In International Organization and Global Governance. London/New York: Routledge. Herz, Mônica, Layla Dawood, and Victor Coutinho Lage. 2017. A Nuclear Submarine in the South Atlantic: The Framing of Threats and Deterrence. Contexto Internacional 39 (2): 329–350. Kenkel, Kai Michael. 2010. South America’s Emerging Power: Brazil as Peacekeeper. International Peacekeeping 17 (5): 644–661. Lafer, Horácio. 1959. Discurso de Posse como Ministro das Relações Exteriores. Available at http://www.funag.gov.br/chdd/index.php?option=com_content &view=article&id=139%3Ahoracio-lafer&catid=55%3Aministros&Itemid=92 Lafer, Celso. 2004. A identidade internacional do Brasil e a política externa brasileira: passado, presente e futuro. São Paulo: Perspectiva. Lampreia, Luiz Felipe. 1998. A política externa do governo FHC: continuidade e renovação. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 42 (2): 5–17. ———. 1999. Diplomacia brasileira: palavras, contextos e razões. Rio de Janeiro: Lacerda Editores. Lima, M.R.S.D.E. 1994. Ejes analíticos y conflicto de paradigmas en la política exterior brasileña. América Latina Internacional 1 (2): 28–46. Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa. 1995. Introdução. In A Palavra do Brasil nas NaçõesUnidas  – 1946–1995, ed. Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 17. Brasília: FUNAG.

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Neves, Gilda Motta Santos. 2009. Comissão das Nações Unidas para Consolidação da Paz: perspectiva brasileira. Brasília: FUNAG. Patriota, Antonio de Aguiar. 1998. O Conselho de Segurança após a Guerra do Golfo: a articulação de um novo paradigma de segurança coletiva. Brasília: IRB/FUNAG. Pinheiro, L. 2000. Traídos pelo desejo: um ensaio sobre a teoria e a prática da política externa brasileira contemporânea. ContextoInternacional 22 (2). Resolution 1542. 2004. Adopted by the Security Council at its 4961st Meeting, on 30 April 2004. Ricupero, Rubens. 1995. O Brasil, América Latina e os EUA desde 1930: 60Anos de urna Relação Triangular. In Visões do Brasil: Ensaios sobre a História e aInserção Internacional do Brasil, 325–357. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Record. Santana, Carlos Ribeiro. 2006. Política externa em perspectiva: um balanço sobre a diplomacia dos presidentes Collor, Itamar, Cardoso e Lula. Carta Internacional 1 (3). Sennes, Ricardo Ubiraci. 2000. Intermediate Countries in the Multilateral Arenas: The Case of Brazil in the GATT and UN Security Council Between 1980 and 1995. In Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States, ed. A. Hurrell. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Sikkink, Kathryn. 1991. Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Souza, A. De. 2008. O Brasil na Região e no Mundo: Percepções da Comunidade Brasileira de Política Externa. Rio de Janeiro: Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI). Uziel, Eduardo. 2010. Conselho de segurança, as operações e manutenção da paz e a inserção do Brasil no mecanismo de segurança coletiva das Nações Unidas. Brasília: FUNAG. Vigevani, Tullo, and Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira. 2003. A Política externa brasileira na era FHC: um exercício de autonomia pela integração. Interthesis 15 (2): 31–61. Weldes, J. 1996. Constructing National Interests. European Journal of International Relations 2 (3): 275–318. ———. 1999. Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis Minneapolis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

CHAPTER 8

Peace Operations, Intervention and Brazilian Foreign Policy: Key Issues and Debates Kai Michael Kenkel, Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, and Mikelli Marzzini Lucas Alves Ribeiro

Introduction: Intervention and the Quest for Status in Brazilian Foreign Policy Peace operations, as well as humanitarian intervention and its attendant debates, constitute a key element of Brazil’s foreign policy project as an emerging power. This chapter situates Brazilian participation in peace operations, atrocity prevention and the surrounding normative debates, and highlights the key issues this activity has raised for Brazil as it navigates its shifting global role. The analysis lays out the patterns of Brazilian participation in intervention operations and debates, as well as  the distinctiveness of their contribution and its changing weight in the way the country constructs its narrative of global participation. The role of K. M. Kenkel (*) Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil D. M. de Souza Neto Brazilian War College (ESG), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil M. M. L. A. Ribeiro Bahia State University, Paulo Afonso, Brazil © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_8

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status seeking as a determinant of that participation is a guiding focus throughout the chapter. With a view to these debates, three key topics are addressed in detail as they relate to Brazil’s cognitive priors with regard to intervention: non-­ intervention versus individual rights; the use of force; and the role of intervention in emerging powers’ quest for greater international status. This last point is divided into two main elements: the notion of international responsibility, and emerging powers’ transition from norm takers to shapers and makers of global principles. Scholarship on status in IR has recently widened its traditional focus on great powers to include smaller—particularly emerging—states as well. Accordingly, some scholars have focused not only on states’ drive to attain status, but on how those states who lack the means to attain a determinant systemic position cope with the consequences of not attaining higher status.1 Social theories have made inroads in the study of status as well, leading foremost to the insight that status, beyond its classic role as an objective per se, is positional, perceptual and socially determined.2 In this sense, in the absence of the possibility of independently attaining great power status through a revisionist stance, emerging (middle) powers’ quest for status is frequently tied to a notion of good international conduct—of meeting expectations according to morally condoned guidelines. The criteria of this good conduct—often still defined and gatekept by established powers3—are often closely tied to engagement in collective ‘systems maintenance’, and international peace and security issues are among the foremost avenues for demonstrating this attribute.4 Peace operations and other interventions have been identified as an effective means for emerging powers to demonstrate this quality since at least the early 1990s.5

Brazilian Foreign Policy and Brazil’s Engagement in UN Peace Operations Until recently, Brazil has been a historically consistent contributor to United Nations (UN) peace operations, and Brazilian decision-makers, mainly within the Ministry of External Relations (known as Itamaraty), identified UN  Ward, Status,  Wohlforth et al., “Moral authority, 527–529. 3  Kenkel and Martins, “Emerging Powers”. 4  Wohlforth et al., “Moral authority”, 532–536. 5  Neack, “UN Peace-Keeping”. 1 2

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peace operations as an important mechanism for the country to engage internationally and present its credentials as a responsible power.6 Brazil’s agency on these issues is illustrative of their role in both the Global South and North as a means of gaining status within the internal community.7 The first major Brazilian contribution to UN peacekeeping was to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai Peninsula (1956– 1967). Brazil’s contribution to UNEF should not be underestimated, since Brazil was the only Latin American country to participate for the entire duration of the mission with a total of 6300 Brazilian troops deployed over more than ten years.8 The 1964 military coup signalled a reduced Brazilian engagement with the multilateral system, leading to a phasing out of contributions to UN peacekeeping. Brazil did not participate in UN operations between 1967 and 1988. During the early 1970s, Brazilian diplomats condemned what they termed the ‘freezing of international power’—efforts by the great powers to control international decision-making structures, therefore, preventing developing countries from increasing their international status.9 Domestic repression against opposition groups, including the use of torture and disappearance, left Brazilian representatives sensitive regarding criticism in multilateral forums such as the (then-) United Nations Human Rights Commission. Due to these factors, Brazil, which had been a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council five times from 1945 to 1968, was not even a candidate from 1968 to 1987. Brazil returned to the Security Council back under civilian rule, for the 1988– 1989 period. At the domestic level, the ensuing period signalled a return to democracy in Brazil. The first civilian president was inaugurated in 1985, the first directly elected president since 1964 in 1990. Globally, this was also the beginning of a period of greater enthusiasm towards the United Nations, illustrated by the implementation of new peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, from Brazil’s perspective, this new world order still needed 6  On Brazil’s peacekeeping history, see Fontoura, O Brasil; and Cardoso, O Brasil. On Brazil and other emerging powers as responsible international stakeholders, see Brimmer, ‘Brazil’; Patrick, “Irresponsible stakeholders”. 7  On how Global South countries have sought status by committing troops, see Krishnasamy (2001); for Northern countries, see Jefferess (2009). Suzuki (2008) directly contrasts both (China and Japan). 8  See: Aguilar, Brasil em missões de paz, 24. 9  Araújo Castro, ‘The UN and the freezing ...’.

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to be approached with caution. Brazilian decision-makers were concerned that the end of the Cold War could translate into an unconstrained US hegemony harmful to Brazil and other developing countries. The new operations’ internal focus raised the attention of Brazilian authorities, sceptical about challenges to sovereignty and non-intervention.10 Brazil’s incipient reengagement in UN operations during the 1990s and early 2000s was limited mostly to Central America and Lusophone Africa and consisted, with some exceptions, of token contributions.11 The exceptions signalled a clear preference to contributing within priority areas of Brazilian foreign policy, such as the immediate region and Lusophone African countries. Brazil contributed with military personnel to the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM) I (1988–1991), II (1991–1995) and III (1995–1997), as well as the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) between 1992 and 1994.12 Brazil was part of the Contadora Group, which sought a peaceful resolution to internal conflicts in Central America, and contributed to several UN operations in Central America, including the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL) and the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA).13 Deepening regional economic integration, formalized into the Southern Common Market (Mercosul) in 1991, led to greater military and defence cooperation in the Southern Cone. In 1995, Brazilian officers participated in the Argentine battalion in the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).14 Solidarity towards a former Portuguese colony led Brazil to contribute troops to the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999– 2000 and to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 2000.15 The inauguration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as President of Brazil in January 2003 marked a watershed in Brazilian foreign policy. In his inauguration speech, Lula stressed that expanding relations with the Global 10  Patriota, O Conselho de Segurança após a Guerra do Golfo; Amorim, ‘Entre o desequilíbrio...’. 11  See Coleman, “Token Troop Contributions”. 12  A Brazilian General served as ONUMOZ’s Force Commander between February 1993 and February 1994, see: Silva (2005). 13  Fontoura, Brasil: 60 anos de operações de paz, 54. 14  Aguilar, Brasil em missões de paz, 31. 15  Fontoura, Brasil: 60 anos de operações de paz.

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South would be a key part of a significantly more active Brazilian foreign policy strategy. In 2004, Brazil agreed to participate in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which drew down in 2017. This was unprecedented in many ways: despite concerns about the use of force in previous UN Haitian deployments,16 throughout the mission Brazil supplied its largest troop contingent and all of its titular Force Commanders—a break from standard UN rotating practice. Brazilian diplomats have taken this as a clear sign that the country has acquired prestige from contributing to MINUSTAH. The mission constitutes a significant shift in Brazil’s interaction with intervention norms, marking the first time the country participated in a mission authorized under Chap. VII of the UN Charter.17 Brazil’s engagement with Haiti was framed by reference to the idea of ‘non-indifference’, an alternative to non-interference in which Brazil would intervene after receiving a formal request and only if it considered capable of providing a positive contribution.18 The MINUSTAH engagement was a clear attempt to establish Brazil’s status as a consistent and dependable contributor to collective security measures, even while these were still firmly defined according to great power preferences. MINUSTAH’s identity as a ‘Latin American’ mission, due to the origins of its largest contingents in Southern Cone countries, strengthened regional defence cooperation, supporting the creation of the South American Defence Council and the Association of Latin American Peacekeeping Training Centers (ALCOPAZ) and reinforcing Brazil’s status with its South American neighbours. After the severe 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Brazil doubled its troop contribution to MINUSTAH, in a clear affirmation of its commitment to the stabilization and rebuilding of Haiti. Brazil’s contribution to MINUSTAH increased academic and policy debate on Brazil’s involvement in peace operations and the link to the country’s emerging power identity and ambitions regarding the UNSC.19 During the Lula presidency, Brazil continued sporadically to contribute military observers to many UN missions, particularly in Africa.20 This strategy was in line with the policy of expanding Brazil’s diplomatic  Malone, Decision making in the United Nations Security.  Kenkel, “Brazil and R2P”; Diniz, ‘Brazil’. 18  See: Seitenfus et al. (2007); Hermann (2011). 19  See: Uziel, ‘Brasil’ and ‘Três questões’; Resende, ‘Uma nova abordagem’; and Kenkel, ‘Out of South America’; and ‘South America’s global player’. 20  Fontoura, Brasil: 60 anos de operações de paz, 226. On peace operations and peacebuilding within the broader context of Brazil’s presence in Africa, see Kenkel, ‘Brazil’s peacebuilding’ and Stolte, Brazil’s Africa Strategy. 16 17

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presence in the Global South, especially in Africa, where a large number of embassies were inaugurated or re-inaugurated. Following MINUSTAH’s 2017 drawdown, Brazilian authorities are considering possible scenarios for maintaining deployment at current levels. The UN’s invitation to contribute to the  United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was eventually declined despite enthusiasm from the armed forces.21 Some Brazilian officers identified this decision as affecting the status that Brazil acquired from 13 years of participation in MINUSTAH, particularly since there had been high expectations within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) concerning Brazil’s participation in the mission.22 The drop in Brazil’s rank among peacekeeping contributors (from 19th in February 2010 to 49th in August 2018) is seen as an indication that Brazil is no longer willing to take on responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.23 However, it is important to remember that Brazil remains present in UN operations. Since 2011, Brazil has contributed with the flagship of UNIFIL’s Maritime Task Force (MTF),24 which is under the command of a Brazilian Admiral— the first time this task has fallen to a non-NATO officer. Brazil’s participation in a UN ­operation outside of its region, and in an area of high visibility such as the Middle East, is an indication of Brazil’s search for status.25 In April 2018, a Brazilian General became Force Commander of MONUSCO, a further sign of the UN’s ongoing recognition of Brazil’s status as a key contributor to the maintenance of international peace and security.

21  Bruno Góes ‘Brasil desiste de participar de participar de missão de paz na República Centro-Africana’ O Globo, 9 April 2018. Available at: https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/ brasil-desiste-de-participar-de-missao-de-paz-na-republica-centro-africana-22573896 [access on 18 August 2018]. 22   Comments by Brazilian Army officials during the II Meeting of the Brazilian Peacekeeping Research Network (REBRAPAZ), Rio de Janeiro, July 2018. 23  Brazil’s top-20 placement in 2010 is due to Brazil doubling its contingent as an indication of commitment to Haiti. 24  United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. 25  On UNIFIL as part of Brazil’s quest for international status, see: Silva et al. (2017).

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Brazil and the Debates on Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect The end of the Cold War posed a significant challenge to the normative framework governing the use of force for humanitarian protection. During the bipolar conflict, intervening militarily to halt human rights violations was not perceived as legitimate, despite evidence of previous practice to the contrary in nineteenth-century Europe.26 Normative change had two principal origins: one in the UNSC’s new deliberations, which authorized military interventions aimed exclusively at stopping massive human rights violations; the second challenge came from the engaging attitude of key agents seeking to solve the normative conundrum regarding humanitarian protection versus non-intervention. The first military intervention authorized by the UNSC on the basis of Chap. VII concerned the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Among other things, Resolution 794 established the humanitarian crisis as a threat to international peace and security, and authorized ‘all necessary means’ under Chap. VII to resolve it.27 Despite unanimous approval, some states, such as China, sought to highlight the exceptional nature of the situation.28 Military intervention for humanitarian protection is not warfare, it is different from collective security, and it also differs from traditional peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement.29 In Bosnia30 and Rwanda,31 intervention happened too late. Both were authorized by the UNSC only after humanitarian disasters. Even so, the two relevant resolutions (770 and 929) reinforced the process of normative change. Both recognized internal humanitarian crises as a matter of international security and authorized actions based on Chap. VII under an ‘all necessary means’ clause. As a non-permanent UNSC member at the time, Brazil abstained on resolutions 929 and 940 (Haiti), based on an ambiguous discourse oscillating between solidarity and non-intervention; abstention—rather than a vote against—itself is a long-standing measure in Brazilian diplomacy designed to offset the status cost of opposing a Resolution when opposi Wheeler (2000b) and Finnemore (2003).  UNSC, S/RES794, 1992. 28  UNSC, S/PV. 3145, 1992. 29  Thakur and Weiss, ‘R2P: From Idea to Norm—and Action?’, 24. 30  UNSC, S/RES/770, 1992. 31  Morris ‘Humanitarian Intervention in the Balkans’. 26 27

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tion is clear. In the Rwandan case, despite appeals to humanitarian solidarity, Brazilian representatives argued ‘that the Council should do its utmost to avoid invoking the extraordinary powers conferred upon it by Chapter VII’.32 Concerning Resolution 940, the Brazilian delegation argued that the Haitian crisis was a unique situation but ‘[could] not be put on a par with other situations in which international peace and security have been threatened’.33 The Brazilian position was similar to those of other emerging powers, such as China.34 The international intervention in Kosovo generated controversy due to a perceived gap between legal and morally legitimate conduct in the name of humanitarian protection.35 NATO intervention in Kosovo occurred without the Council’s authorization. Its justifications were based on UNSC Resolution 1199. This Resolution, although authorized on the basis of Chap. VII, did not include the ‘all necessary means’ clause. The argument used to legitimize the action was that it provided a margin for an interpretation favourable to intervention.36 As soon as NATO intervened, non-Western states revealed their strong opposition.37 Brazil argued that ‘problematic precedents have been set in the resort to military force without Security Council authorization. These have neither contributed to upholding the Council’s authority nor improved the humanitarian situation’.38 The interventions of the 1990s revealed a process of contestation of the society of states’ normative structure, stemming from international political practice, as had been the case in Kosovo. Concomitantly, other actors sought to contribute to this normative adjustment from a conceptual ­perspective. One of the most important inputs was the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, a concept created and promoted by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen.39 This concept provided the basis for the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001, entitled ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). The report establishes three dimensions of responsibility: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild. Military intervention is subsumed under the responsibility to react. Subsequent  UNSC, S/PV.3392, 1994.  UNSC, S/PV. 3413, 1994. 34  Ibid. 35  Wheeler, ‘Reflections’. 36  See Franck, ‘Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention’. 37  See Draft Resolution S/1999/328, proposed by Russia, India and Belarus. 38  UNSC, S/PV. 4011, 1999. 39  Deng et al., Sovereignty as responsibility; Evans, The responsibility to protect, 35–37. 32 33

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sections deal primarily with the question of authority in cases of intervention and military operations.40 Despite the scepticism of some countries, R2P has been thoroughly institutionalized at the UN.41 The first step took place at the 2005 World Summit, which ‘marked the zenith of international normative consensus on R2P’.42 Four years after the ICISS report, world leaders enshrined R2P.43 However, the General Assembly’s version of R2P bore differences from the original ICISS report; two main aspects must be highlighted. Firstly, the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) prescribed that R2P would only be applied to crimes of ethnic cleansing, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; secondly, justification for intervention should necessarily pass through the Security Council. Ongoing institutionalization revealed that ‘R2P is now grounded on a political commitment expressed by States in the WSOD, rather than a new legal obligation’.44 But this did not mean homogeneity among states. Resistances could be identified in numerous countries’ statements at the Summit; the Brazilian position was considered unclear.45 Additionally, initial debates at the UN demonstrated scepticism and risk of abandonment shortly after its acceptance. This was particularly clear in the Security Council.46 However, with the adoption of Resolution 1674 in 2006, this movement lost strength. The document marked the first express mention of R2P in a UNSC resolution.47 R2P’s operationalization has been further enshrined in the UN Secretary-General’s annual reports on the principle’s implementation in the work of the Organization.48 Some numbers help to show how R2P is being mainstreamed into UN practice. By mid-2016, 50 UNSC resolutions49 and 16 resolutions50 of the Human Rights Council had referred to  ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect.  Glanville Sovereignty and the responsibility to protect, 192. 42  Weiss, ‘R2P After 9/11’, 742. 43  UNGA, A/60/L.1, 2005. 44  Welsh ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 129. 45  http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35r2pcs-topics/295-r2pcs-chart-on-government-positions-on-r2p. See also Kenkel, “Brazil and R2P”. 46  Bellamy ‘Realizing the Responsibility to Protect’, 113–114. 47  UNSC, S/RES/1674, 2006. 48  UNGA, A/RES/63/308, 2009. 49  http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/unsc-resolutions-and-statements-with-r2ptable-as-of-august-2016.pdf 50  http://s156658.gridserver.com/media/files/hrc-resolutions-r2p.pdf 40 41

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R2P. Particularly, there has been a significant increase of references to R2P in relation to peace operations since 2011.51 The rapid rise of R2P is indeed quite peculiar, but it is not free from challenges. The problem of contestation has been intensified following NATO’s intervention in Libya, which has also directly impacted Syria. Libya was a watershed for R2P.52 The Secretary-General remarked at the time on the consolidation of the norm.53 This was the first situation in which the UNSC unquestionably authorized intervention in a fully functioning state.54 NATO intervened based on Resolution 1973, which authorized all necessary means. Although it was not vetoed by China and Russia, and encountered no dissenting votes—including from Brazil, which abstained—the action was not exempt from criticism.55 The Brazilian representative at the time, Maria Luiza Viotti, argued ‘that the text of Resolution 1973 (2011) contemplates measures that go far beyond that call. We are not convinced that the use of force […] will lead to the realization of our common objective’.56 Such criticisms intensified as NATO’s intervention continued. The main complaint for many states was that the Western powers had acted beyond the Resolution’s original aims of protecting civilians and creating a no-fly zone by de facto pursuing regime change in Libya.57 For Brazil and the other BRICS, the situation was aggravated by the fact that intervenors were not held accountable for this overstepping of boundaries. NATO’s intervention had strong repercussions on the international community’s ability to act with regard to the Syrian civil war. Western powers sought to pass Resolutions that would permit action against serious human rights violations in Syria, but the proposals were vetoed by Russia and China.58 Brazil was present at the first vote and abstained. For this reason, several scholars pointed out that Libya had had a negative impact on the norm,59 although others affirmed that the case was not very significant.60  Hofmann, Ten years R2P, 19.  Berti, ‘Forcible intervention in Libya’; Morris, ‘Libya and Syria’. 53  Morris, ‘Libya and Syria’, 1265. 54  Welsh ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’. 55  Job and Shesterinina, ‘China as a Global Norm-Shaper’. 56  UNSC, S/PV.6498, 2011. 57  Stuenkel, ‘BRICS and R2P’; Brockmeier et al., ‘Impact’. 58  UNSC draft resolutions S/2011/612, S/2012/77 and S/2012/538. 59  See Evans, ‘The Consequences of Non-Intervention in Syria’ and Thakur, ‘Syria and the Responsibility to Protect’. 60  Glanville, Sovereignty and the responsibility to protect. 51 52

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Many of those who acknowledge the damage caused by NATO’s action in Libya61 also understand that the operation did not mean the end of R2P. They point to evidence such as the fact that critical states are trying to engage more constructively. This was the case for Brazil, which in the aftermath of the Libya intervention launched a proposal aimed at creating criteria for intervention: Responsibility While Protecting (RwP).62 Brazil had by this time identified the debates on intervention norms as an important arena for participation in matters of international security within the realm of its foreign policy project as a leading emerging power and as a means of projecting enhanced international status as a contributor to international peace and security.63 In particular, the ‘RwP’ initiative opened a window for Brazil to combine its core concerns about the directions recent interventions were taking with its own quest for status, by means of taking on a role as a norm entrepreneur to project its own values back into the contestation of R2P’s content.64 Since then, Brazilian representatives have been trying to highlight RwP’s importance in contexts such as the General Informal Dialogues and other venues. From 2012 to 2016, RwP appeared in all Brazilian representatives’ statements but the last. Prior to their relinquishment of leadership of a leading role in the RwP concept’s development—which led to its premature demise—Brazil clearly took on a classical emerging-power position as a norm shaper, rather than taking Western concepts as given.65

Emerging Powers, Responsibility and Norm Entrepreneurship Peace operations and their attendant normative debates have long been a favoured tool for emerging powers to assert their claims to increased status on the international stage.66 The potential and propensity to exercise ‘responsibility’—conceived of as action taken for a perceived common 61  Evans, ‘The Consequences of Non-Intervention in Syria’; Thakur, ‘Syria and the Responsibility to Protect’; Welsh. ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya & Syria’. 62  Permanent Mission of Brazil, ‘Responsibility while protecting’. 63  Kenkel and Stefan, ‘Brazil and RwP’. 64   Kenkel and De Rosa, ‘Localization and Subsidiarity’. See also Acharya, ‘Norm Subsidiarity’ and Benner, ‘Norm entrepreneur’. 65  Pu, Xiaoyu. ‘Socialisation as a Two-way Process’; Stefan, “Non-Western norm shapers.” See also the contributions in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29 no. 3. 66  Neack, ‘UN Peace-keeping’; Kenkel, ‘South America’s emerging power’.

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good beyond one’s own immediate interests—is often put forth as a prerequisite for participation at the highest levels of global governance.67 Action on issues of global security—such as intervention—has long outweighed other forms of collective action as a means of demonstrating responsibility, and current Western established powers have long equated responsibility with the use of military force.68 The equation of force with responsibility, and particularly the institutionalization of that link within multilateral organizations, places states such as Brazil before a fundamental dilemma.69 Their own historical normative principles, often out of a colonial past,70 hold non-intervention and pacifism in high standing.71 At the same time, Brazilian foreign policy is firmly committed to multilateralism as the venue for its global presence. Therefore, as the UNSC increasingly endorses the use of force—all but three UN peace operations now have Chap. VII mandates—the country is faced with the choice between its established normative commitments and the normative expectations associated with a potential rise to global player status.72 This dilemma can also be framed in terms of Brazil’s relationship with the normative underpinnings of the system in which it is rising; in other words, should the country rise accordingly by seeking to adhere to the norms laid out by established powers—often to their own implicit or explicit advantage—or should it seek to change the very rules of its rise as it rises? Brazilian foreign and defence policymakers have navigated this dilemma with a high degree of sophistication. They have done so often as ‘norm shapers’ located within an intermediary position in global politics,73  Patrick, ‘Irresponsible Stakeholders’; Bukovansky et al., Special Responsibilities.  Kenkel, ‘Brazil and R2P’. 69  Destradi and Kenkel, ‘Responsibility and Reluctance’. 70  Fernández Moreno et al., ‘MINUSTAH’; Siman Gomes, “Analysing interventionism’. Stances on intervention norms are not easily divided using a North-South logic, as Ramesh Thakur (Responsibility to protect; 153–159) has pointed out, and several other members of the Geneva R2P Group of Friends from the Global South made clear in interviews with the primary author in April 2017. Brazil’s position goes beyond a common Global South position to reflect a normative position more critical of Western intentions. 71  Stefan, ‘norm shapers’; for a demonstration of how, for example, the Chinese position differs, see Job and Shesterinina, ‘China as a Global Norm-Shaper’. Indeed, peacebuilding, as noted in Kenkel, ‘Brazil’s peacebuilding’, has been a key way for Brazil to achieve policy effects in the security realm through actions originating in the development arena. 72  Kenkel and De Rosa, ‘Localization and Subsidiarity’. 73  Shesterinina, ‘Evolving Norms of Protection’; Schirm, ‘Leaders’. 67 68

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particularly in relation to the use of force (within R2P)—the liberal peacebuilding paradigm,74 development aid,75 South-South cooperation76 and, in a more incipient form, the notion of responsibility itself.77 Given the link in international praxis between the use of force, security issues such as intervention and responsibility as a requisite attribute for increased influence and status, United Nations peace operations and the diplomatic debates over R2P have provided Brazil with an important window to leverage its specific contributions as a global player. In navigating the opportunities its new position has offered, Brazilian diplomatic discourse has elegantly sought to play to the country’s strengths while minimizing its shortcomings. Brazil possesses neither the material capacity nor the normative inclination to consistently occupy a spot as a determinant power in international interventions. It has, however, been able to validate its own domestic experiences in a manner which highlights, and proposes solutions to, instances in which the liberal international order has not lived up to its potential. In this way, Brazilian representatives have derived status gains from punctual positive contributions, as in the case of MINUSTAH.  The assumption of responsibility is a crucial form of ­adhering to established concepts of good state conduct and enhancing international status. As in other areas of policy, Brazil has largely accepted the normative underpinnings of the extant liberal system; under the tutelage of Lula and (less so) his successor Dilma Rousseff, it has sought to champion the cause of the Global South by pointing, from within, to failings in the implementation of the global order’s principles, particularly as they relate to hierarchies and double standards. Indeed, an initiative from the area of humanitarian intervention produced the most prominent reminder to date of the need for equality in the implementation in the global rules-­ based system: the ‘RwP’. The intervention debates, and the growing robustness of UN peacekeeping, have laid bare examples in which the concrete interpretation of putatively collective principles in fact has reflected the inherent definitional privileges enjoyed by established powers.  Kenkel, ‘Brazil’s peacebuilding’.  Mello e Souza, Repensando. 76  See notably the contributions in Third World Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2016) on ‘Rising Powers and South-South Cooperation’; and Abdenur and Marcondes, ‘Democratisation by Association’. 77  Kenkel and Martins, ‘Emerging Powers’. 74 75

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In this sense Brazil has, over the 15 years prior to the current debilitating political situation, been an essential player in shaping the very relationship between North and South, a role which it has indeed actively claimed for itself. Brazil’s past cycles of ascendance and collapse have in part been the result of its inability to overcome commodity dependence through long-term planning. However, the past decade marks an era of unprecedented consolidation of thinking about the country’s international role, based on both partisan priorities and the country’s long-standing competitive advantages. It remains to be seen whether the country will be able to maintain its high profile in the case of the ongoing political and economic crisis; the Temer government (2016–) has sought actively to dismantle the progressive social policies whose export generated the soft power attractiveness that provided the normative underpinnings for Brazil’s quest for prestige. The lasting impact of Brazil’s contributions to the R2P debates, and its firm position as an experienced and well-­integrated contributor to peace operations, give hope that the country will succeed in maintaining its prominent role in this area in the immediate future. The country’s contributions of the last 15 years provide significant insight into the key role of interventions in emerging powers’ quest for status and revision of their changing role in the international system.

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CHAPTER 9

Brazil’s Evolving “Balancing Act” on the Use of Force in Multilateral Operations: From Robust Peacekeeping to “Responsibility While Protecting” Eduarda Passarelli Hamann and Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert

Introduction At the UN General Assembly in 2011, Brazil put forward the need for a “responsibility while protecting” (RwP). The initiative made reference to the well-known and long-debated principle of “responsibility to protect” (R2P), and was seen as a direct response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led intervention in Libya in March of that year. This work was supported by the Norwegian Research Council’s Latinamerika programme, under Grant 237001. E. P. Hamann Igarapé Institute, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] M. Gabrielsen Jumbert (*) Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_9

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The message was: in situations where the international community has a responsibility to protect, it should at a minimum also have a responsibility for its actions while protecting. Yet, despite being seen as bold in the way it appeared as engaging directly with the established idea of R2P, it was actually more in contrast with traditional Brazilian principles of non-­ intervention and restricted use of force. Specifying the responsibilities while protecting presupposes an acceptance of the application of the responsibility to protect in certain cases. The mere initiative created worldwide expectations that Brazil would champion the new concept and develop it further, which did not match Brazil’s own ambitions. Understanding this mismatch of expectations, and where the proposition came from, requires an analysis of the broader context of Brazil’s stance on intervention and use of force. Despite a clear constancy in its principled stances on this, the Brazilian diplomatic discourse in the United Nations (UN) system, especially at the UN Security Council (UNSC) and UN General Assembly (UNGA), has changed dramatically in the past 15 years with regard to engaging in multilateral operations that authorized the use of force. The change has been gradual but remarkable: departing from non-engagement in international missions that authorized the use of force (even to protect civilians), it evolved into a passive and timid engagement, to recently achieve a more proactive and what is framed as a “responsible” engagement with the use of force, especially to protect civilians. During this time, Brazil has also been heavily involved in Haiti, leading the UN peacekeeping mission Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti—MINUSTAH (2004–2017). This chapter takes a closer look at these evolving positions to address the following question: to what extent does Brazil have a new understanding of multilateral interventions that use force to protect civilians, after its active role in a robust peacekeeping mission in Haiti and after its recent contribution with the RwP concept? Brazil has been the subject of increased academic scrutiny over the past decade, notably through the lens of various studies of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries and their new (expected) roles globally, and, more specifically, through the analytical prism of “emerging” and “middle” powers’ ambitions and status on the international arena (Amar 2012; Kenkel 2010). Brazil’s engagement in peacekeeping in particular has also been studied in a series of scholarly pieces, especially its role in MINUSTAH/Haiti (Braga 2009; Hamann 2016; Kenkel 2010) and in United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

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(UNIFIL)/Lebanon (Abdenur 2016). Moreover, the meaning of the “responsibility while protecting”, both the concept itself and Brazil’s intentions with it, has also been widely analyzed and discussed: from discussions of Brazil’s historical stances on noninterference and sovereignty, to its seemingly new ambitions as a “norm shaper” (Stuenkel 2013; Kenkel and Stefan 2016).1 In this chapter, however, the focus is less on grasping the motivations and ambitions of Brazil, but more to understand a specific nodal point in its engagement in peacekeeping and, more specifically, in international missions that allow the use of force for protection purposes. The chapter brings together two discussions that have often been treated separately to study the links between Brazil’s participation in the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and its diplomatic ambitions with RwP.  Seeing these together, we argue that: (1) Brazil’s conception of the use of force has slightly evolved in the past 15  years and (2) the RwP initiative can be understood as Brazil operating a sort of “balancing act” between a willingness to be a prominent actor in peacekeeping missions and its long-­ standing commitment to non-intervention and conflict prevention. The chapter proceeds in four parts: first, we look at how the use of force in multilateral missions has been conceptualized in Brazilian foreign policy and how it has changed over the past decades. Second, we explore the different phases of Brazil’s contributions to missions authorized to use force and, in particular, its role in deploying a large contingent to MINUSTAH and leading the UN military component throughout this mission, to show how international expectations have played into this change. The third part explores the emergence of the concept of “responsibility while protecting”, analyzing the concept itself, the diplomatic initiative to put it forward as well as the reasons for it not being pursued further, based on interviews with Brazilian diplomats on how they understand the process.2 We show that this process highlights many of the 1  See Evans (2012), Hamann (2012a), Benner (2013), Hamann and Muggah (2013), Kenkel and Stefan (2016). 2  A note on data collection: interviews have been conducted with high-ranking Brazilian diplomats in Brasilia, New York and Port-au-Prince (the last two also with help of a research assistant, Eric Cezne), in addition to regular contact with diplomats at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially from the Department of International Organizations (DOI)— particularly the Division for International Peace and Security (DPAZ) and the UN Division (DNU)—as well as direct and regular contact with high-level officers of the Brazilian Army (mainly Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels and Generals). Information was also retrieved from participation in seminars and workshops with Brazilian policymakers, in Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia and Pretoria, where these topics have been discussed.

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dilemmas that Brazil faces when engaging with the intervention debate: between ­acknowledging certain international responsibilities, while also holding back on interventionism and what is seen as a Western trend toward increased use of force. In the final part, we connect the ideas ­inherent in the RwP concept with Brazil’s combat operations during the pacification phase in Haiti (2005–2007) to show how this case study is an example of the application of RwP on the ground.

Brazilian Foreign Policy on the Use of Force in Multilateral Missions A comprehensive analysis of the past 15  years of Brazilian engagement shows that the country has elaborated and consolidated—in the field and at the normative level—a substantial contribution to global peace and security (Sotomayor 2014; Kenkel and Cunliffe 2016; Spektor 2012; Norheim-Martinsen 2012; Kenkel 2010). Brazil defends that it is feasible in military terms, and meaningful in diplomatic terms, to say that if and when force needs to be used at the tactical level, and for protection purposes, especially on behalf of the international community, it must follow a set of principles, values and norms (Muggah et al. 2013). As simple— and as complex—as that. This was not elaborated in a vacuum. Since the early twentieth century, when the Brazilian foreign policy became organized, it has followed several principles that include respect of sovereignty, non-intervention, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.3 Human rights and, more recently, ­protection of civilians have also become cornerstones of Brazilian foreign policy. However, in discussions related to military intervention for humanitarian purposes (especially in the 1990s), Brazil usually defended the principle of non-intervention, privileging sovereignty over violations of rights. In fact, in the past 15  years, Brazil’s statements as a non-­ permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) have c­ onsistently been against international military interventions. For instance, Brazil defended the non-engagement of the UN even in cases of gross violations of human rights, such as Kosovo (1998–1999), Darfur (2004–2006) and Libya (2011) (Hamann 2012a). This position should be understood in

3  See Article 4 of the Brazilian Constitution (1988), as well as key documents such as the Defense National Policy and National Strategy of Defense.

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the broader context of how sovereignty is perceived in Brazil, as well as in other Latin American countries. At the same time, since 1999, Brazil has expressed great concerns about the high number of civilian deaths in armed conflicts, stressing the need to protect these groups, and Brazil’s position on the protection of civilians (PoCs) has evolved over the years.4 For example, in 1999, Brazil underlined the importance of engaging with multilateral support that did not automatically entail the use of force,5 while, in 2004, Brazil’s statements started to advocate that peacekeeping missions should also be responsible for implementing PoC strategies.6 This coincides with the beginning of Brazil’s engagement, in 2004, in MINUSTAH, a robust peacekeeping operation with an explicit mandate “to protect civilians from imminent violent threat”.7 In 2005, after the fragile political consensus that led to the inclusion of the “responsibility to protect” in the World Summit Outcome document,8 Brazil and others demonstrated serious concerns about what they saw as hidden agendas of larger powers, such as using multilateral operations as covers for regime change. Finally, in 2009, Brazil became more vocal on the need for legality and accountability, including a high level of monitoring in multilateral combat operations.9 These evolving debates related to PoC and R2P also find repercussions in the peacekeeping context. Today, the majority of UN peacekeeping operations is mandated to work—and to use force—in contexts where there is no peace to keep. This usually happens in densely populated areas, with mandates that include both engaging with non-state armed groups and protecting civilians at the same time. In 1999, the concept of PoC was 4  Brazil was a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 1998–1999, when it started changing its position. More research is needed to assess how this happened, but, at that time, there were intense debates at the UNSC about humanitarian interventions, especially in 1999, which includes the first peacekeeping mission mandated to protect civilians (UNAMSIL/ Sierra Leone). 5  Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 3977 (12 Feb 1999). 6  See statements by Brazil at the UNSC meeting 4990 (14 Jun 2004); at the UNSC ­meeting 5209 (21 Jun 2005); at the UNSC meeting 6066 (14 Jan 2009); and at the UNSC meeting 6216 (11 Nov 2009). 7  UNSC Resolution 1542 (2004) created MINUSTAH.  See www.un.org/press/en/ 2004/sc8083.doc.htm 8  Outcome Document (A/Res/60/1) is available here: www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/ A-RES-60-1-E.pdf. See paragraphs 138 and 139. 9  Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 6151 (26 Jun 2009).

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explicitly included, for the first time, in the mandate of a peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL, in Sierra Leone), and later repeated in over a dozen mandates, including in MINUSTAH.10 In the peacekeeping context, Brazil’s positions have reflected the same principles and values that guide its broader foreign policy. For example, Brazil has participated in 61% of all UN missions, since the first one in 1947, but had not deployed troops to a Chap. VII mission until 1999 (INTERFET, Timor Leste), and it did so without granting its nationals the authorization to use force at the tactical level (Hamann 2016). Only five years later, in 2004, Brazil engaged, for the first time, with force to promote stability and to protect civilians in a multilateral mission partly under Chap. VII. Putting this into perspective, it is possible to identify three phases in Brazil’s relation to the use of force in multilateral missions, starting with non-engagement (up to 1999), moving to a timid and passive engagement (1999–2004) and, ultimately, achieving an active engagement with higher responsibility (2005–2017). It is too soon to affirm, but it seems that the evolving debate on PoC, and the fact that the Brazil-led MINUSTAH was tasked with protecting civilians, played a major role in achieving the current position. In the next section, we analyze these three phases more closely.

From Non-Engagement to an Active and More “Responsible” Engagement The three phases of non-engagement, limited engagement and a more active engagement (presented as a “responsible” engagement by policymakers themselves) are useful to make sense of how Brazil’s position has gradually evolved over time, with concrete examples in two UN missions with Brazilian participation. The non-engagement phase runs up to 1999, as Brazil did not deploy troops or carry weapons to situations where the use of force had been authorized. This does not mean that Brazil did not participate in missions under Chap. VII.  In fact, between 1992 and 2017, Brazil regularly deployed unarmed individuals (military observers, staff officers and ­individual police) to 74% of all UN missions authorized under Chap. VII 10  UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). “Protection of civilians”. www. un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilian.shtml

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or with Chap. VII provisions.11 However, all the deployments to these missions were unarmed, so Brazilian individuals in the field could not even use force to protect themselves—still, they too contributed to achieve the missions’ mandates. A symbolic change happened in 1999, marking the beginning of a new phase, when Brazil for the first time sent troops to a Chap. VII mission: an Army platoon was deployed to Timor Leste to integrate INTERFET.12 Brazil also participated with troops in the two follow-up missions, both under Chap. VII: UNTAET (1999–2002) and UNMISET (2002– 2005).13 It is worth reinforcing that these three Chap. VII missions in Timor-Leste had explicit authorization to use force by both the UN Security Council and the local government. Therefore, at the political level, Brazil agreed to deploy troops to a Chap. VII mission, but, at the tactical level, Brazilian troops did not receive authorization to use force. In fact, after an agreement with the UN, Brazilian troops only engaged with policing tasks, such as patrolling, protecting authorities and infrastructure and securing convoys, among others.14 Thus, despite the symbolic step taken to deploy troops to these Chap. VII missions in Timor Leste, it only represented a timid and rather “passive” engagement of Brazil in ­international missions authorized to use force. A more active engagement from the Brazilian military, supported by Brazilian diplomats, happened after 2004, under the umbrella of MINUSTAH. With Chap. VII provisions, this mission’s mandate aimed at stabilizing violent areas in the country’s capital and its surroundings, and

 For the full list, see Hamann (2016), page 19.  The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was authorized by the UNSC in September 1999, under Chap. VII, to restore peace and security in Timor, and to support the UN presence in the country (https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N99/264/81/PDF/N9926481.pdf?OpenElement). It was not a peacekeeping mission, but an international military operation led by Australia. 13  The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and UN mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) were created by the UNSC to support Timor Leste’s transition to full independence. www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/background.html. INTERFET received, from Brazil, 50 troops, while UNTAET had 50 and later 70 Brazilian military, including not only troops but also military observers and staff officers. Finally, UNMISET incorporated the Brazilian military still in the field and, in 2004, the Brazilian contingent increased to a full company (125). See Hamann (2016). 14  Fontoura (2005). 11 12

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at protecting civilians from imminent threat of physical violence.15 This happened for at least three reasons. First, in 2004, Lula’s government (2003–2010) borrowed from the African Union (AU) the expression of “non-indifference” to orient its engagement with Haiti, while searching for a justification to bypass the Constitutional principle of non-­intervention. Considering that poverty was among the root causes of Haiti’s conflict, the concept of non-indifference aimed at strengthening the international community’s sense of responsibility to deal with such emergencies.16 Second, also in 2004, Brazilian diplomats started to explicitly defend the responsibility of peacekeepers to implement PoC strategies. This had a direct impact on its own troops who had just been deployed to MINUSTAH, whose mandate included the need to protect civilians. Finally, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document launched the “responsibility to protect” (R2P), including a controversial authorization to exceptionally use force to protect civilians.17 Although R2P was received with concerns in the Global South, particularly its third pillar relating to the use of force, it was approved by consensus. It then served as a basis for future discussions on the quest toward a more responsible use of force to protect civilians on behalf of the international community. So, in only two years (2004–2005), these developments opened doors for a more active participation, from Brazilian diplomats, in debates regarding the use of force in multilateral missions. It was also around this time that the country decided to support MINUSTAH by providing the military leadership and by deploying a full battalion to Haiti, in a mission with Chap. VII provisions. For the first time in Brazil’s history, its troops received authorization to use force at the tactical level, to fulfill the ­mission’s mandate—which they did between 2005 and 2007, as is ­analyzed in the final section. Most Brazilian troops arrived a few days before MINUSTAH formally began, in May 2004. However, the first two contingents (until mid-2005) operated with major constraints, not only because of political issues but also because of operational challenges. Some argue that the Brazilians were operating in MINUSTAH as if it were a traditional peacekeeping 15  The first UNSC Resolution on MINUSTAH (1542/2004) had these goals explicitly mentioned in paragraph 7. See: www.minustah.org/pdfs/res/1542_en.pdf 16  Statement by Ambassador Maria Luisa Viotti to Informal Interactive Dialogue on “Responsibility to Protect”, New York, 23 July 2010, apud Almeida (2013). 17  Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 60/1—“2005 World Summit Outcome” (A/RES/60/1), 24 Oct 2005, www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf

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mission, while other contingents (such as the Chilean and Sri Lankan) had already engaged in robust operations since the early days (Holt and Berkman 2006). Others suggest that the Brazilians, especially the Force Commander, faced a dilemma whose origins were at the highest levels: on the one hand, countries like the United States, Canada and France put a lot of pressure toward a more aggressive use of force, and, on the other hand, many Latin American troop contributors were not willing to use force or did not have experience in doing so (Braga 2009). On the top of that, human rights organizations based in Haiti and elsewhere sent mixed messages, some saying that the Brazilian troops needed to intervene to stop violence, while others threatening to sue the Brazilian Force Commander in international criminal tribunals (Refugees International 2005). As a consequence, troops from the first two contingents were mostly engaged in intense patrolling, territorial control, cordon and search operations, and other activities that did not involve direct combat (Vendramin n.d.). By mid-2005, MINUSTAH had adapted to the Haitian scenario, and the UN Security Council created a new mandate which was followed by rules of engagement commonly present in Chap. VII missions.18 And between late 2005 (pacification of Bel Air) and mid-2007 (pacification of Cité Soleil), the mission finally reached a stable level in terms of security (Braga 2009). Parallel to the developments at the strategic/political level, both at the UN and within the Brazilian diplomacy, it is also necessary to look at the role of the Brazilian military. Before Haiti, the last time Brazilian troops had been deployed in a peacekeeping operation was in 1995–1997, to a Chap. VI mission in Angola (UNAVEM III). There was a seven-year gap between that and the new engagement in Haiti, in a totally different environment, both politically and operationally. The Brazilian military had already a specific doctrine and training materials related to pacification—which included techniques, tactics and procedures similar to counter-­insurgency—which were partly used to prepare peacekeepers to be deployed in Haiti. Moreover, it is part of the Brazilian military doctrine that there must be space for negotiation in any type of military operation, no matter where and how it will take place. These and other military doctrines and guidelines have strongly influenced how Brazilian peacekeepers used force to pacify hot spots in their area of operations in Haiti. This is important because, in 2004–2005, Brazil deployed troops to  See UNSC Res 1608, adopted on 22 June 2005.

18

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a Chap. VII mission with no specific training for peacekeeping.19 The results were generally perceived as being positive. Studies have shown how Brazilian troops have protected Haitian demonstrators against the will of the transitional government, having confronted the Haitian National Police in February 2005, for example, to protect local demonstrators (Braga 2010; Amaral and Viana 2011). This reflects the way Brazilian military are trained, with a reluctance to use unchecked force and the continued attempts to find alternative solutions and negotiate compromises (Amaral and Viana 2011). When it comes to robust operations, one of the most successful tactics adopted by Brazil in Haiti was the so-called strong point (ponto forte). Initially implemented by the 3rd contingent (Jun-Dec. 2005), in Bel Air, it involved the creation of a space with permanent military presence in the most critical and violent areas, instead of going in and out in each singular operation. It also implied “intensive mobile patrolling, cordon and search operations, and a warning that anyone seen carrying a weapon would be shot” (Johnstone 2006). Parallel efforts supported small development activities in the same community, with the Brazilian Army seeking to win hearts and minds, and trust among the locals. The way that the Haitian population greeted Brazilian troops in the streets, apparently a common scene, including after robust operations in Cité Soleil, bear witness that the Brazilian military were respected by legitimacy not by fear (Kenkel 2010; Braga 2009). This comprehensive approach was key to recapture key geographic areas from local armed groups and put them back under the government’s control. It was used to pacify not only Bel Air (2005) but also Cité Military (2006) and Cité Soleil (2007) (Braga 2009; Interview with the commander of the 3rd Brazilian contingent, 2015), and was key to implement the mission’s mandate. These military actions strictly followed the mission’s rules of engagement, based in the UNSC resolutions and, ultimately, based in international law (Vendramin 2015). They also caused little civilian casualties—something often praised by experts, by the UN and other key stakeholders. In 2008, for example, American experts in peacekeeping argued that “the lessons from the resounding success achieved in Haiti should be captured and put into practice wherever missions are challenged by illegal armed groups” (Dziedzic and Perito 2008). In fact, and 19  For the evolution and consolidation of peacekeeping training in Brazil, see Vendramin (n.d.).

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i­nnumerous times, Brazilian troops did use force both in self-defense and in the defense of the mandate, within the rules of engagement and the directives for using force in the mission area.20 And it was no easy task. Uncertainties in the field and the level of force used in most combat operations in MINUSTAH led to a debate, in the initial years, of whether the mission was more related to “peace enforcement” than to “peacekeeping” (Braga 2009; Feldman and Montes 2013; Morneau 2006). We argue here that between 2005 and 2007, MINUSTAH was indeed closer to a “robust peacekeeping” operation. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and DFS jointly launched an important normative document in January 2008, the “Capstone Doctrine”, which acknowledged the blurry line between “peace enforcement” and “robust peacekeeping”. The document also highlighted that there is an important difference between them, which has to do with the level of consent: in robust peacekeeping, there is consent to use force at the political/strategic level, but no consent at the tactical level (e.g. from nongovernmental armed groups), while in peace enforcement there may be use of force without consent at the strategic level (i.e. from the sovereign state).21 Therefore, even if the concept had not been coined yet during the operations between 2005 and 2007, our analysis, drawing on interviews with key personnel on the ground, show that the idea of “robust peacekeeping” was already there before 2008 (European Affairs 2006; Johnstone 2006). After acknowledging that the Brazilian troops have used significant force in a very complex, volatile and violent environment between 2005 and 2007, and considering that they followed rules of engagement ­ultimately inspired in international law, how can the links between Brazil’s engagement in robust peacekeeping and the later “responsibility while protecting” be understood? The next section aims to provide the basis for understanding the concept put forward by Brazil, where it came from and how it can be used as a lens to understand Brazil’s shift in position. In the final section, we establish a link between, on the one hand, the principles and values assembled under the label of the RwP (in 2011), and, on the other, how Brazilian troops used force in Port-au-Prince during the pacification phase (2005–2007). We understand that Brazil actually ­ 20  Information provided by Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil (CCOPAB), in 2015. 21  See UN (2008), pp. 97 and 98.

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i­mplemented the letter and spirit of RwP in a robust peacekeeping ­operation, and this could become a new model for collective action to protect civilians.

An Introduction to the Responsibility While Protecting (RwP) Brazil launched the RwP concept in 2011, as an outcome of the diplomatic process leading to the military intervention in Libya in March of that year (Amar 2012; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014).22 It was later detailed in a UN Security Council meeting on “protection of civilians” (November 2011).23 The concept suggests that the UN and its members should do their utmost to prevent conflicts, but if a military action is needed to protect civilians from the four mass atrocity crimes, this allowance (or “responsibility”) to “protect” should not be taken as a blank check. It must follow a set of principles and values, which includes the primacy of prevention and, if force needs to be used, it must be proportionate, duly authorized by the UNSC and international law, and ensure accountability of those who implement it.24 Most of these RwP principles are not new and are inscribed into the UN Charter and other international conventions. They are also values that have been deeply anchored in Brazilian foreign policy for the last century. Since its launch in 2011 however, the RwP initiative has been strongly criticized. Critics suggest that the idea “remained largely abstract and was never sufficiently developed to materialize into specific proposals that could address the problems of collective security and human protection in practice” (Tourinho et al. 2015). Others refer to the political weakness of the concept, due to its discontinuation: RwP had been “dropped by the ones who started it” (Serbin and Serbin Pont 2015). In this and the following section, we first seek to understand Brazil’s diplomatic and political ambitions with the RwP concept, and why it was discontinued, and then show how RwP and robust peacekeeping with a PoC mandate do  See http://gadebate.un.org/66/brazil  “Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the permanent representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the secretary general” (A/66/551 & S/2011/701). 11 November 2011. (www.un.int/brazil/speech/ConceptPaper-%20RwP.pdf). Also see Statement by Amb. Maria Luiza Viotti, at UNSC meeting 6650, 09 November 2011 (www. un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6650) 24  Ibid. 22 23

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meet at the tactical/operational level, and how this can be used in future reflections on making RwP applicable. Some argue that apart from being perceived as an outcome of the way that UNSC Res. 1973/2011 (Libya) was pushed through and actually applied (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014; Amar 2012), RwP is also seen as a manifestation of Brazil’s stance against R2P itself. Indeed, it has been argued that Brazil resisted “the idea of R2P as a licence for military intervention, particularly when undertaken unilaterally or outside the framework of the UN” (Muggah et al. 2013), although other principles set forth in the R2P framework are supported. Others, however, present the RwP initiative as a bridging effort, attempting “to reconcile R2P’s detractors and supporters”, in addition to being “the first attempt by a major state from the Global South to remain consistently engaged in normative terms in the intervention debate at the UN” (Kenkel and Cunliffe 2016). But why RwP was not taken any further? While the concept itself generated much debate due to the fact that Brazil presented itself as a “norm entrepreneur” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), much less attention has been devoted to understanding why the concept was left dead. What are the responses to the complaints that Brazil could or should have done more, in this seemingly new role as norm entrepreneur, to develop and spread the norm on international peace and security? Brazilian diplomats interviewed for this study25 point to an inherent dilemma in the concept itself. First, they recount that it was never the intention that Brazil would champion the term. Instead, the ambition was to bring it forward with the hope that other states would pick it up and further work on it, in collaboration with Brazil. In any case, the principle in itself is illustrative of the way Brazil’s relationship to the use of force has evolved over the past decade: while the country in earlier years avoided any recognition of the idea that there might be grounds to intervene with force in some situations, the principle of RwP is a clear and direct engagement, and in many ways also an acknowledgment, of R2P. This is, however, where the first point of resistance to further engaging with RwP lies: although it suggests a refining, and a more responsible approach to R2P, pushing for it also presents Brazilian diplomats with the dilemma of accepting that there might be situations where a responsibility to protect may apply. As stated

 Interviews carried out by the two authors, in Brasilia and Rio, in 2015.

25

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by a senior Brazilian diplomat in 2013,26 pushing forward RwP would indirectly push for more interventions tout court. Thus, the attitude adopted seems to be one where the concept should be seen as a critical input to those pushing forward R2P rather than themselves championing the concept of RwP. Another fear is that not only would it contribute to push forward a concept that opens up for intervening to protect, but also that it would be seen as making it easier to do so. As indicated by another high-ranking Brazilian diplomat: [T]he concept of RwP came immediately after the intervention in Libya, and was a way to say: “look at the amount of disaster created”. So the point with RwP was to see how civilians can be better protected before intervening. It was a concept to take care of some of the flaws of R2P. But it was quickly taken as a way to reinforce R2P, which was not Brazil’s intention, to make it easier to intervene.27

It is as if, realizing that the concept was, or could be, interpreted in a certain way, its initial advocates did not see a space to fight for a right understanding of it. It highlights the inherent dilemma with RwP—how to advocate for the refining of a concept that one has reservations against, at least reservations against how it is suspected to be used. It also reveals Brazil’s almost self-contradicting position in this balancing act: on the one hand, Brazilian diplomats developed a concept to refine and “responsibilize” R2P, and, on the other, there is a sense that doing this would make the concept stronger than what they would want to see it. A slightly different view that came through in other interviews was that RwP carried the risk of adding too much complexity to the application of R2P, to the extent of reducing the ability of the UNSC to approve interventions—and thus increasing chances of great powers circumventing the UN in order to intervene where deemed necessary. One diplomat explains it this way: The real problem for Brazil is intervention outside the UN. And there may have been a thought that too many rules and guidelines for R2P, with the RwP concept, would only make it more likely that the US, and possibly

 Seminar at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), April 2013.  Interview with a Brazilian diplomat, Brasília, 27 October 2015.

26 27

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other great powers, will seek to go around the UN when intervening in other states.28

In any case, there is a concern about intervening and creating conditions that either would make it “too easy” to intervene or would lead to more interventions without a legal and multilateral framework. Even if RwP is generally presented as a sign of Brazil’s progressive engagement with the (possibility to) use of force in certain situations, others argue that Brazil’s resistance has rather increased. The former Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota, for instance, claims that Brazil’s caution toward the use of force has actually grown, and argues that the country has had a good reason “to express skepticism in several situations where the use of force had only led to the worsening of a previously unstable situation”.29 It can be argued that, when facing international pressure to discuss the use of force and to contribute to robust peacekeeping efforts, Brazil had to clearly state its principled positions, while at the same time it had to refine its position, to clarify what it is opposed to. According to Patriota: RwP needs to be contextualized. It represents a response to a militarizing interpretation of the R2P, adopted in 2005, and sub-divided into three pillars, the first two non-coercive invoking a country’s own responsibility and cooperation with other actors and, only in extreme cases, the third pillar would be contemplated implying intervention and coercion, and obviously to be authorized by the Security Council. So what RwP represents is an alert that even in cases falling under the third pillar, where the Security Council’s authorization is fundamental, it is necessary that the international community observes a certain discipline because it is not acceptable that someone intervenes militarily to protect civilians and causes greater vulnerability to civilians than what existed before, like what happened in Libya.30

Moreover, the way international negotiations were hasted through in March 2011, in order to have a resolution adopted, may have led certain countries, notably Brazil (then with a seat at the UNSC, but abstaining from voting the resolution), sensing that they were not given sufficient attention (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). Brazil’s evolving position can then be read as a negotiation between its old principles and new external pressure and expectations to contribute to  Interview with a Brazilian diplomat, Brasília, 22 October 2015.  Interview led by the research assistant, New York, 7 January 2016. 30  Ibid. 28 29

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various efforts toward maintaining international peace and security. It is a form of pragmatic adaptation and incorporation in its positions of what is seen as certain needs (acceptance of using force in certain contexts and under certain conditions), together with a balancing act between, on the one hand, firm restatement of its opposition to military intervention in sovereign states’ internal affairs, and, on the other, the R2P and PoC concepts. All in all, the RwP initiative should be understood as a form of engaging with a principle against which Brazil had reservations but also as a form of resistance to passively let it be applied without a counter voice, as in the case of Libya.

A Meeting Place Between RwP and Robust Peacekeeping with a PoC mandate? After having analyzed Brazil’s participation in robust peacekeeping and the main challenges of moving forward with RwP, we now look at how, despite the normative and political differences, RwP and robust ­peacekeeping with a PoC mandate do meet at the tactical/operational level. The example of Brazil’s military engagement in Haiti, and, in particular, the pacification campaign between 2005 and 2007, clearly illustrates this. First, it was precisely during a discussion on PoC at the UNSC that Brazil formally outlined what RwP would consist of: as a set of principles and values to regulate the use of force to protect civilians, by making it more responsible and accountable. Second, there are coinciding elements between PoC and RwP, such as the need for combat action to follow a set of principles and parameters, which are not evident under R2P, but are rather clear in the UN peacekeeping framework (although not necessarily implemented). Finally, RwP principles and values coincide with the basic premises of PoC, including the principles of “do no harm”, proportionality, precaution, monitoring and accountability (Hamann 2012b). In other words, if RwP and robust peacekeeping with PoC mandates have similarities, and if RwP aims to regulate the “how”, then the links between RwP and robust peacekeeping must be further investigated. Brazil’s engagement in MINUSTAH, specifically in the pacification phase (2005–2007), demonstrates that force was used to stabilize specific areas and to protect civilians. Thus, at the tactical level, it can be argued that Brazilian peacekeepers, when pacifying hot spots of Port-au-Prince (2005–2007), acted in a way that was later described under the label

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“responsibility while protecting”.31 As is shown in the next section, there are clear connections between the principles and values put forth by the RwP concept, at the normative-political level, and the way Brazilian military behaved in the field between 2005 and 2007, at the tactical/operational level. The Brazilian military doctrine and training are based on the primacy of prevention, exactly as suggested in RwP—in Haiti, military operations led by Brazilian troops usually recurred to negotiation, and to nonlethal or less lethal weapons and ammunition, before actually resorting to target use of force. This gradual engagement is foreseen not only by the Brazilian doctrine but also by MINUSTAH’s rules of engagement. A key element of RwP is monitoring, and interviews demonstrate that, during the pacification phase and beyond, there had been regular reports for internal use (by the Brazilian Armed Forces), as well as reports destined to the UN (the “Daily Situation Report”—SITREP—and the comprehensive reports at the end of each contingent).32 Finally, another core element of RwP is accountability, and it can be added that between 2004 and 2014, after more than 30,000 Brazilian peacekeepers had served in Haiti, there had been only 44 official investigations against them. Out of these, five became formal processes, followed by one condemnation (for disobeying an order from a sentinel, which is a military crime in Brazil) (Palma 2015). All in all, RwP principles and values, originally presented to guide R2P operations, can actually be implemented in military operations that use force to protect civilians on behalf of the international community, such as those mandated in several robust peacekeeping missions. We suggest that this has been the case of the Brazilian engagement with the pacification of Haitian hot spots on behalf of MINUSTAH, between 2005 and 2007.

Conclusion Time will show whether MINUSTAH will be considered as a precedent or an exception, but it remains as an important laboratory for Brazil, with lessons to be learned on how to use force to protect civilians on behalf of the international community. A review of the evolution in Brazil’s ­contributions to UN peacekeeping operations reveals a gradual, yet clear, 31  Between 2004 and 2007, MINUSTAH operated in a very complex and unstable ­context, similar to those currently faced by missions in sub-Saharan Africa (Vendramin 2015). 32  Interviews with military officers from CCOPAB who prefer not to be identified.

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change in the positioning toward the use of force. This appears as a result of Brazil’s pragmatic adaptation to needs on the ground and demands from the UN. At the political level, however, despite a clear engagement with the intervention debate, the follow-up of the RwP concept reveals a continued balancing act between a principled opposition to intervention without the concerned state’s consent, and a recognition of the potential for situations where the responsibility to protect may apply. Further research is needed to understand the drivers behind Brazil’s changing position. Yet, what we have seen in recent years can be considered a shift in the Brazilian foreign policy regarding international peace and security. Looking at Brazil’s statements as a non-permanent member at the UN Security Council in its three last mandates (1998–1999, 2004– 2005 and 2010–2011) would be one way to deepen this understanding, as it can be noted that the most significant changes in Brazil’s positions on the use of force for protection purposes coincide with the very same periods.

References Abdenur, Adriana Erthal. 2016. Rising Powers in Stormy Seas: Brazil and the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. International Peacekeeping 23 (3): 389–415. Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Vincent Pouliot. 2014. Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya. European Journal of International Relations 20: 1–23. Almeida, Paula. 2013. From Non-indifference to Responsibility while Protecting: Brazil’s Diplomacy and the Search for Global Norms. SAIIA, Occasional Paper No. 138. April. www.saiia.org.za/doc_view/10-from-non-indifference-toresponsibility-while-protecting-brazil-s-diplomacy-and-the-search-for-globalnorms Amar, Paul. 2012. Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries. Globalizations 9 (1): 1–13. Amaral, Marina and Natália Viana. 2011. Experiência militar brasileira no Haiti contribuiu para a instalação das UPPs no Rio. Opera Mundi, September 27. http://operamundi.uol.com.br/conteudo/reportagens/15532/experiencia+ militar+brasileira+no+haiti Benner, Thorsten. 2013. Brazil as a Norm Entrepreneur: The ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ Initiative. GPPi Working Paper. http://old.gppi.net/| fileadmin/media/pub/2013/Benner_2013_Working-Paper_Brazil-RwP.pdf Braga, Carlos. 2009. MINUSTAH’s Success in Improving the Security Environment in Haiti and the ‘Brazilian Way of Peacekeeping’: A View from the Field. Paper Presented at the ISA  – ABRI Joint International Meeting,

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22–24 July 2009, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. http://citation.allacademic.com/ meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/8/1/6/2/pages381622/ p381622-1.php ———. 2010. MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti: Brazil and South American Cooperation in the Field. International Peacekeeping 17 (5): 711–722. Special Issue: South American Perspectives on Peace Operations. Dziedzic, Michael, and Robert Perito. 2008. Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince, United States Institute of Peace Special Report, September 1st, 2008.  https://www.usip.org/publications/2008/09/haiti-confrontinggangs-port-au-prince European Affairs. 2006. “Contemporary Peacekeeping Is State-Building: The UN Embraces ‘Robust Peacekeeping’ Including Use of Force”, European Affairs: Volume number 7, Issue number 1–2 in the Spring/Summer of 2006 – A Conversation with Jean-Marie Guéhenno. European Institute. www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/38-european-affairs/springsummer2006/135-contemporary-peacekeeping-is-state-building-the-un-embracesrobust-peacekeeping-including-use-of-force Evans, Gareth. 2012. Responsibility While Protecting. Project Syndicate. www. globalr2p.org/media/files/responsibility_while_protecting_-_gareth_ evans_-_project_syndicate-1.pdf Feldman, Andreas, and Juan Montes. 2013. Learning to Be Likeminded – Chile’s Involvement in Global Security and Peace Operations Since the End of the Cold War. In South America and Peace Operations – Coming of Age, ed. Kai Kenkel. London: Routledge. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization 52 (Autumn): 887–917. Fontoura, Paulo. 2005. O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz das Nações Unidas. Brasília: IRBr and FUNAG. http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/23Brasil_e_as_Operacoes_de_Manutencao_da_Paz_das_Nacoes_Unidas_O.pdf. Hamann, Eduarda. 2012a. Brazil and R2P: A Rising Global Player Struggles to Harmonise Discourse and Practice. In Responsibility to Protect, from Evasive to Reluctant Action  – The Role of Global Middle Powers, ed. Malte Brosig. Johannesburg: HSF, ISS, KAS and SAIIA. https://igarape.org.br/hsf-iss-kase-saiia-brasil-e-r2p-uma-potencia-em-ascensao-e-a-batalha-pelo-equilibrioentre-discurso-e-pratica/. ———. 2012b. The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and Brazil’s ‘Responsibility While Protecting’. NOREF Policy Brief. www.peacebuilding. no/Themes/Global-trends/Publications/The-protection-of-civilians-inarmed-conflict-and-Brazil-s-responsibility-while-protecting ———. 2016. A Path Forged over Time: Brazil and the UN Missions. Igarapé Institute. Strategic Note 19. June. https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/NE-19_EN-30-05_2.pdf

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Hamann, Eduarda, and Robert Muggah, eds. 2013. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: New Directions for International Peace and Security?. Igarapé Institute. http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p.pdf Holt, Victoria, and Tobias Berkman. 2006. The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations. The Henry L. Stimson Center. www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ Complete_Document-TheImpossible_Mandate-Holt_Berkman.pdf Johnstone, Ian. 2006. Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations. Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. http://archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/4JOHNSTONE_2006_Dilemmas_of_robust_peace_operations-2.pdf Kenkel, Kai Michael. 2010. South America’s Emerging Power: Brazil as Peacekeeper. International Peacekeeping 17 (5): 644–661. Kenkel, Kai Michael, and Philip Cunliffe. 2016. Introduction: Rebels or Aspirants: Rising Powers, Normative Contestation, and Intervention. In Brazil as a Rising Power: Intervention Norms and the Contestation of Global Order, ed. K.M. Kenkel and P. Cunliffe. Routledge: Global Institutions. Kenkel, Kai Michael, and Cristina Stefan. 2016. Brazil and the “Responsibility While Protecting” Initiative: Norms and the Timing of Diplomatic Support. Global Governance 22 (1): 41–78. Morneau, Jacques. 2006. Reflections on the Situation in Haiti and Ongoing UN Mission. In Haiti – Hope for a Fragile State, ed. Yasmin Shamsie and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation. Muggah, Robert, Ivan Campbell, Eduarda Hamann, Gustavo Diniz, and Marina Motta. 2013. Promoting Peace in the Post-2015 Framework. The Role of Rising Powers: Brazil. Saferworld/Igarapé, February. Norheim-Martinsen, Per-Martin. 2012. Brazil: An Emerging Peacekeeping Actor. NOREF Report, November. Palma, Najla. 2015. A Manutenção da Paz (no Haiti) e a Justiça (no Brasil): uma reflexão sobre o impacto da MINUSTAH no sistema jurídico militar brasileiro. In Brasil e Haiti  – Reflexões sobre os 10 anos da missão de paz e o futuro da cooperação após 2016, ed. Hamann. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Igarapé. http:// igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AE-13_Brasil-e-Haiti.pdf. Refugees International. 2005. Haiti: Brazilian Troops in MINUSTAH Must Intervene to Stop Violence, 18 March 2005. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/47a6eeb80.html. Accessed 13 Aug 2019. Serbin, Andrés, and Andrei Serbin Pont. 2015. Brazil’s Responsibility While Protecting: A Failed Attempt of Global South Norm Innovation? Pensamiento Própio 41 20 (Jan–Jul 2015). www.cries.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 09/011a-serbin-serbin-pont.pdf. Sotomayor, Arturo. 2014. The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper. Civil-Military Relations and the United Nations. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Spektor, Matias. 2012. Humanitarian Interventionism Brazilian Style? Americas Quarterly (Summer): 54–59.

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Stuenkel, Oliver. 2013. Brazil as a Norm Entrepreneur: The Responsibility While Protecting. In Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: New Directions for International Peace and Security? ed. Hamann and Muggah. Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute. March. https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 03/r2p.pdf. Tourinho, Marcos, Oliver Stuenkel, and Sarah Brockmeier. 2015. Responsibility While Protecting. Reforming R2P Implementation. Global Society. www. tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1094452 United Nations. 2008. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations  – Principles and Guidelines (“Capstone Doctrine”). www.unrol. org/files/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf Vendramin, Ricardo. 2015. Interview to Eduarda Hamann by the Then Military Commander of the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB), October. ———. n.d. Training for the Deployed Brazilian Battalion at MINUSTAH: A Model Consolidation. Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB). www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/biblioteca/documentos/Treinamento%20 para%20a%20MINUSTAH%20-%20Cel%20Vendramin%20-%20EN.pdf.

SECTION IV

Brazil and Development Cooperation

CHAPTER 10

A Brief Moment in History or the Beginning of a New Trend? Brazil’s Emerging Humanitarian Engagement in a Broader Context Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert and Torkjell Leira Introduction As the turn of the twenty-first century brought new light to the so-called emerging powers, the international attention shed on Brazil also put to the fore the country’s willingness to engage in areas of international solidarity, and notably foreign aid and “humanitarian cooperation”. ­ During the Lula da Silva presidency (2003–2010), known for its efforts to reduce domestic poverty and inequalities, Brazil also increased its international footprint and scaled up its international humanitarian engagement. According to official figures, foreign aid more than quadrupled from 2005 to 2010, increasing from USD 219 million to USD 923 million (IPEA & ABC 2010). In relative terms, Brazil is not a large humanitarian donor internationally—in a position of 34th in terms of volume and 53rd in terms of international humanitarian assistance as a M. Gabrielsen Jumbert (*) Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] T. Leira Natural History Museum, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_10

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proportion of gross national income (GNI) (Global Humanitarian Assistance report 2015). Yet, its increased engagement during these years was noted in international fora, raising hopes that it could play an important strategic role: first due to its successes in terms of reducing domestic poverty, then due to its role as having been both a donor and a recipient over the past decade, and finally due to its emphasis on South-South cooperation and bringing new principles and insights to the table (ibid.: 41). This potential role may, however, be put to question in view of the decrease of Brazilian international aid in the more recent years. According to the latest official figures, spending has decreased every year since 2010, from USD 923 million and down to USD 397 million in 2013, the last year of available data (Cobradi 2011, 2016). Brazil has further had a less marked international profile since the beginning of Dilma Rousseff’s presidency in 2011, and the recent years have been marked by economic and political crises one after the other. In this chapter, we seek to understand what led to these rapid increases and how the subsequent rapid decrease in international aid occurred. A better understanding of these shifts may also allow us to better grasp the different elements and deeper drivers in Brazil’s international projection, at a time where political shifts at the governmental level grasp most of the attention. Simply put, the chapter explores the “rise and fall” of Brazil as a humanitarian actor and, more specifically, taking the decrease in international aid as an entry point to understand this engagement: was the humanitarian engagement merely a brief moment in history, pushed away by a change in government and a looming economic crisis? Or was it illustrative of a broader and deeper willingness to reach out internationally that has simply been put on hold with the recent domestic crises? We suggest looking at three distinct, but possibly interconnected, elements. First of all, what we can call the “exceptionality effect”: to what extent is the downscaling a mere “return to normal” after an exceptional increase in the humanitarian budget and what role did concrete events such as Brazil’s massive response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake play in this peak of the foreign aid budget? Second, the “economic crisis effect”: to what extent was the downscaling of international aid a result of the economic crisis and a need to reprioritize international investments? And how did it affect what is prioritized within various forms of international cooperation? Finally, the shift in government, or a “presidential effect”: to what extent was the downscaling a reflection of the shift in government, from

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Lula da Silva to Dilma Rousseff, and a new political orientation, willingly or unwillingly? More specifically, what was the willingness to pursue Lula’s international engagement versus the capacity to uphold this engagement in the wake of various domestic scandals and a worsening economic situation? In this chapter, we draw on international relations literature showing how states seek to portray themselves internationally, from status seeking to the importance of image at an international level (de Carvalho and Neumann 2015; Pouliot 2014), through a sociological approach to international relations. We take the formulated policies and the different manifestations of these as a point of departure to understand how the policies are formulated and what is emphasized as important legitimating factors. Adding to this, the field of international cooperation should be seen as a particularly fruitful entry point to study how states seek to portray themselves internationally. As a rather delimitated area, yet with intense social and political interactions, between national governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international bodies (UN and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—OECD), as well as other donors, it is thus also a field where precisely the identity of the different contributing agents are made and remade through social interactions. As such, it is also a particularly interesting area to understand Brazil’s international ambitions. Before delving into the numbers and priorities, we begin with an overview of the key terms and concepts used by the Brazilian actors involved to designate their different types of aid broadly defined under the umbrella of “international cooperation”. We then examine the increase, and then decrease, in Brazil’s contributions to international cooperation in the period between 2005 and 2013, the period which is covered by the Brazilian government’s own published statistics. In the final and third part, we explore the suggested explanatory factors.

Brazil’s Engagement with International Cooperation Brazil’s increased international involvement in the first decade of the ­millennium did not go unnoticed. In particular, its successes in reducing domestic poverty, its emphasis on South-South cooperation and its principled approach to international cooperation were lifted up in ­ ­international accounts about Brazil’s international engagements (GHA 2015). Brazil was hailed internationally for its efforts to reduce domestic

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poverty and inequalities: going beyond the sustainable development goals of reducing rates of extreme poverty to a half by 2015, Brazil reduced its rates by almost three quarters (GHA 2015). In this first decade, Brazil experienced high economic growth, which allowed the country to enhance its focus on social projects. Following 2003, with the presidency of Lula da Silva, the reduction of poverty and inequalities within Brazil was high on the political agenda, and great progress was made, with what have become the main legacies of the Lula era: the Fome Zero (“Zero Hunger”) and Bolsa Família (“Family Stipend”) programmes. As a result, more than 30 million people were lifted out of poverty (IPEA 2012). During the Lula governments (2003–2010), Brazil also sought to further this social engagement abroad, making it a central element of its foreign policy agenda. Contrary to an often-held assumption, Brazil is no newcomer in the field of development aid. According to Brazilian governmental sources, there are records of Brazilian international cooperation dating back to the 1950s, gaining momentum with the independence movements in the former colonies in Africa and Asia in the 1960s and 1970s (IPEA 2010 Portuguese, 2011b English). Independent observers, however, highlight Brazil’s “strategic ambiguity” in relation to Third World aspirations and struggles for independence (IDS 2014, p. 19). Brazil supported anti-colonialism in general, but refrained from openly condemning particular colonial powers, such as in the case of the UN resolution condemning Portuguese colonial rule in Africa (IDS 2014). Brazil engaged actively in the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries in Buenos Aires in 1978, and Brazilian initiatives outwards increased. By the 1980s, Brazil received—numerically—more demands to provide technical cooperation than the country received projects itself (IDS 2014). Still, it was not until the turn of the century that this international involvement grew in importance, both within Brazilian foreign policy and reflected in budget allocations. There is no doubt, however, that Brazil has been up to date a bigger recipient than provider of international aid.1 Brazil shares this apparent paradox of both giving and receiving aid with many middle-income countries of the world, including BRICS colleagues Russia, India, China and South Africa (Leira and Jumbert 2015). Yet, while the first efforts date back quite a few years, foreign aid is relatively recent as an invested policy area, lacking systematic and ­ 1  For further information about Brazil’s contributions to international aid over the years, the “Global Humanitarian Assistance” (see Brazil country profile) webpage (http://data. devinit.org) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (https://fts.unocha.org) are good resources.

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c­ omprehensive foundations, policies, guidelines and statistics. The official discourse is therefore fragmented and dispersed, and a mapping of terms used and actors involved is both challenging to make and needed. Such a mapping shows a rather complex architecture of international aid, as well as the principled stances that Brazilian actors bring with them into this field, and where it places its emphasis. The routines for registering and publicly reporting on Brazilian aid are also still in its infancy, despite great ambitions to begin reporting annually on Brazil’s international cooperation in this period of increased investments. Brazilian international cooperation was not reported systematically until 2010, with the first report published jointly by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). Two more reports have been published since and have become authoritative sources of information about Brazilian international development cooperation. The reports, under the heading “Brazilian Cooperation for International Development” and known under the acronym Cobradi (which is the term we use in the following), are revealing of more than the mere numbers and trends they report. The first report covering the period 2005–2009 was published in 2010.2 The following report covering only the year 2010—with the idea that it would be the first in a series of annual reports—was published with further delay, in 2013. Finally, the last report, now covering three years, 2011–2013, was published in 2016. The first report gained wide international attention, being the first such report from a developing country, disclosing information on its international cooperation. This report also showed its particular emphasis on South-South cooperation, showcased as a key foreign policy priority for Brazil. The efforts put into the reporting were considerable, however, and testify of the complex Brazilian aid architecture: as written in the first Cobradi report, one of the biggest challenges was to gather annual expenditures, by mobilizing 91 public agencies working on different governmental policies (IPEA & ABC 2010). In 2010, Brazil also became a member of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group, an informal donor forum launched in 2003, when a group of 17 donors met in Stockholm and agreed on the “Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship” to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of donors, as well as their accountability to beneficiaries, implementing organizations and domestic constituencies.3 Brazil was the first non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC)  The English translation was published the year after, in 2011.  Good Humanitarian Donorship, http://www.ghdinitiative.org/about-ghd/overview. aspx 2 3

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c­ountry and non-European country to join (Global Humanitarian Assistance report 2015). Brazil has also established a series of development partnerships, such as the trilateral agreement between India, Brazil and South Africa, the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, in 2003, and the Poverty and Hunger Alleviation Fund that this triad established in 2004, to implement South-South cooperation for the benefit of other Southern countries in partnership with the UN.4 The terms used to designate the different parts of Brazil’s international engagements provide a relevant entry point to understand its positions in this area. Brazilian agencies usually use the term “international cooperation” as the equivalent of what the US calls “foreign aid” or what the OECD-DAC calls “official development assistance”. “Cooperation” is generally preferred over “aid” or “assistance”, with an explicit desire to not imply a relationship of paternalism or dependency through its international activities (Interview, Brazilian Foreign Ministry, 27 October 2015). It may also be a way to avoid certain dilemmas in terms of Brazil still being, by many accounts, a developing country, and being itself a recipient of foreign aid. Finally, Brazil does usually not undertake direct financial transfers, and thus the term “cooperation” seems to better reflect its activities than, for instance, “aid”. As detailed in the first Cobradi report, Brazilian international ­cooperation is defined as the total funds invested by the Brazilian federal government, entirely as non-­ repayable grants, in governments of other countries, in nationals of other countries in Brazilian territory or in international organizations with the purpose of contributing to international development, understood as the strengthening of the capacities of international organizations and groups or populations of other countries to improve their socioeconomic conditions. (IPEA & ABC 2010, p. 11)

An important aspect of this definition is that the Cobradi reports only measure federal government funds, leaving out the state level, the private sector, the churches and civil society organizations. And despite the clear definition provided here, there are different opinions and conceptions about what is international cooperation and what is not. Our interview at

4

 See: the IBSA Fund, http://tcdc2.undp.org/IBSA/Default.aspx

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IPEA stated that there is an “archipelago of different understandings, attitudes and definitions” (Interview, Brasilia, 26 October 2015). The first Cobradi report divided Brazilian cooperation into four ­different categories, named “modalities”. The last two reports split one of the already existing and introduced two new categories, and thus operate with a total of seven modalities, as follows: (1) technical cooperation; (2) educational cooperation; (3) scientific and technological cooperation; (4) humanitarian assistance; (5) support and protection of refugees; (6) peacekeeping operations; and (7) contributions to international ­ ­organizations (IPEA 2010, 2011a, 2016). Brazilian aid is disbursed to a large number of countries, through both bilateral and multilateral channels. The last Cobradi report covered contributions from 93 ­governmental bodies to a total of 172 countries. During the whole period the three reports cover (2005–2013), Brazil has made a total contribution of USD 4.1 billion. Approximately 54% of this sum comprises c­ontributions to international organizations like the UN, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Pan-American Health Organization and the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (OTCA). The second largest share, approximately 17%, has gone to international peacekeeping missions. The smallest amount among the seven categories is destined to the support and protection of refugees, with less than 0.3%. Looking into the different modalities of Brazilian international cooperation, we focus our attention here on what is defined as humanitarian cooperation, as the focal point of our study. We also briefly provide an overview of the technical cooperation, being probably the most institutionalized one and is often referred to in reports and overviews of Brazil’s international aid programmes, as well as its transfers to international organizations, taking up the largest share of its international cooperation budget. First, the humanitarian component of Brazil’s foreign engagements, interestingly goes under the heading of “humanitarian cooperation”, as a clear contrast to the terms “humanitarian aid” or “assistance” as c­ ommonly known in the Global North. The term “humanitarian cooperation” is new: in the first Cobradi report, it was named “assistance”, and the shift to “cooperation” reflects Brazil’s desire to avoid conveying a form of paternalism through its international engagements and to insist on the need for mutual partnerships. Less institutionalized than the technical cooperation, it is sometimes dominated by a vagueness or fluidity in terms of what is “humanitarian” and what is some form of international

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­ evelopment cooperation. It has since 2006 been coordinated by the d Inter-­ministerial Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance (GTI-AHI), composed by 15 different ministries and presided by the Ministry of External Relations. It is defined as the assistance to countries or regions which are, momentarily or not, in situations of emergency or public calamity (IPEA 2010, p. 22). The Brazilian government has strived to add the principle of “sustainability” to the internationally recognized humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence, arguing that those who assist should do it in a structural way, in order to address the core problems underlying a particular tragedy (IPEA 2014). In the first Cobradi report, the main aim of the humanitarian component of Brazil’s foreign engagements is to assist victims of natural disasters, armed conflicts and other major social upheavals (IPEA 2011b). Priority is attached to: (a) local food purchases, primarily from household farmers; (b) response measures aimed at ensuring rapid socio-economic recovery and reconstruction; (c) the participation of civil society in the development, execution and oversight of projects; (d) post-emergency structural measures designed to enable countries and their populations to overcome vulnerabilities over the long term (IPEA 2011b). Humanitarian assistance is provided both bilaterally and through international organizations, though the former has been prioritized over the latter. When it comes to Brazil’s technical cooperation, it is supervised and regulated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação), part of the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (Itamaraty). It is defined as the transfer of Brazilian technical knowledge and experience on a non-commercial basis, in order to promote the self-­ sufficiency of partners involved (ABC 2015). It relies on activities such as consultancy, training and the eventual donation of equipment. The stated mission is to contribute to consolidate relations between Brazil and developing countries by expanding exchange, generation, dissemination and use of technical knowledge; the training of human resources; and the strengthening of institutions. It is often associated with South-South cooperation in the Brazilian institutional discourse. In fact, the terms technical cooperation and South-South cooperation are often used interchangeably. The contributions to international organizations are defined as resources channelled through multilateral organizations working in varied countries and with a wide range of cultural, economic or political issues (IPEA 2012). The stated ambition is to participate in international

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i­nstitutions aiming at promoting development through cooperation and regional integration. The allocation of resources is mainly determined by the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management and can be in the form of contributions to organizations’ regular budgets or through voluntary contributions to multilateral development funds (IPEA 2012). In the period 2005–2009, contributions to international organizations corresponded to approximately 76% of Brazil’s international cooperation. In 2010, it represented 34% and in the past years, the share fluctuated from 56% in 2011, 49% in 2012 and 64% in 2013 (IPEA & ABC 2016). Contrary to the variations in the share of total spending, the absolute numbers going to international organizations showed a remarkable stability. Between 2006 and 2013, the minimum allocations were USD 228 million (2007) and the maximum USD 331 million (2011), suggesting that this modality is perceived by the Brazilian government as important to maintain also in times of economic strains. We have seen that Brazilian international cooperation grew substantially in numbers and political importance in the first decade of the twenty-­ first century. Since the peak year of 2010, however, there has been a downward trend and considerable fluctuations in budgets and priorities. We now look closer at these variations and seek to understand the rationales behind them.

Brazil’s Increase and Then Decrease in International Cooperation Over the time period we cover here, from 2005 to 2013, Brazilian overall contributions to international cooperation have followed what we would describe as a dromedary curve. Spendings have seen a steady and quite sharp increase before a clear decrease, with an exceptional top in the ­middle. In 2005, the total expenditure was USD 209 million, rising year by year to 425 million in 2009. Then, in 2010, expenditures more than doubled to USD 923 million, before falling back to 588 million the year after. In 2013, the last year of available statistics, Brazilian development contributions totalled USD 397 million (IPEA & ABC 2016). The expenditure on the different modalities of aid as outlined above, as well as these modalities’ shares of the total, have changed over time. For most of the categories, a similar dromedary curve as the total can be observed, with an increase up to 2010, and then a subsequent decrease.

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The largest contribution throughout the period has been to international organizations, except from 2010 when transfers to peacekeeping o ­ perations were slightly higher. Interestingly, the modality showing most variation in this period is humanitarian cooperation, going from less than half-a-million USD in 2005 to 161 million in 2010 and down to 22 million in 2013. Taking a closer look at Brazil’s investment in “humanitarian cooperation”, the Cobradi reports indicate a total contribution of USD 444 million in the years 2005–2013. On an overall level, the expenditures follow the same pattern as the total international cooperation budget, with the highest expenditures in 2010. But instead of one marked top in the curve, we can here see two, with a second, albeit more modest, top in 2012. The shape of the curve is thus more of a camel than a dromedary. Due to poor statistics, however, it is hard to decipher the details of Brazilian humanitarian cooperation. Each Cobradi report provides a set of information that the other reports do not contain, making comparisons over time hard. Still, it is possible to see changes in channels for humanitarian assistance. The first years saw a balanced distribution between multilateral and bilateral agreements, while the last years have predominantly seen Brazilian humanitarian aid being channelled through bilateral agreements, taking up around 75% of the funds in the period from 2011 to 2013. The geographical priority of Brazilian humanitarian assistance has been on Latin America and the Caribbean. From 2005 to 2009, 76.3% of the funds went to this region and 16.4% to Africa, 7.3% to Asia and 0.02% to Oceania (IPEA & ABC 2010). The five main recipient countries were Cuba (22%), Haiti (19%), Palestine (13%), Honduras (10%) and Paraguay (4%). The Cobradi report for 2010 carries no data on geographical distribution of humanitarian assistance but states that “due to the earthquake in January of that year, efforts were directed mainly to Haiti”. Other sources state that almost 70% of Brazil’s humanitarian assistance funds in 2010 were allocated to “Haiti’s reconstruction” (IDS 2014). The Cobradi report covering the years 2011–2013 does not specify the geographical distribution in this period. Based on the numbers from 2005 to 2010, it shows a slightly increased international outreach, in terms of the growing share of the total aid going to other regions than the neighbouring countries. This should be seen in relation to the fact that, for the year 2010, when the largest increase in the overall cooperation budget occurred, a particularly large share went to Haiti, receiving 47.4% of the Brazilian humanitarian aid to Latin America and the Caribbean that year. In this

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period, the five other main recipient countries of support from CG Fome, the General Coordination for international action against hunger, which made up 96% of the total humanitarian funds, were Somalia (17%), Haiti (13%), Cuba (8%), Ethiopia (8%) and North Korea (5%). In short, the camel curve of humanitarian aid is explained by the extraordinary efforts in Haiti in 2010 and the exceptional support to Somalia during the ­famine of 2012. The Exceptionality Effect: Seeing the Peak of Brazilian Aid Budgets in a Broader Context It is worth to ask if the increase in the years 2010–2012 was the beginning of a broader and longer-term trend, or if the two peaks were merely an exception to the norm, related to specific crises. In light of the political developments in Brazil in recent years, and election of a new government at the end of 2018, it is too early to say. The increase in Brazil’s international cooperation since 2005 should, however, not be seen outside of the broader international context in which it evolved. As the BRICS as a constellation of the five “emerging powers” was established in 2008, there was also a lot of focus on how these countries would work together to change and challenge the power of the Western powers in international affairs (Vieira and Menezes 2016). Similarly, there was a lot of attention on Brazil, and its growing international outreach, and perhaps as the then less known of the BRICS powers internationally. If the actual and considerable increase in Brazil’s international cooperation budget occurred at the same time, with the first highly publicized report available in 2011, this can also have contributed to an inflated image of Brazil’s contribution to international cooperation. Adding to this picture was the country’s more active role in international debates on humanitarian issues, notably with the “responsibility while protecting”, and continued lead of the UN stabilization force in Haiti (see Chap. 9, Hamann and Jumbert). Not surprisingly, given the sharp rise in Brazilian investments and efforts in international development cooperation, Brazil became seen as an “emerging aid player” (Overseas Development Institute 2010) or even a “new global development power” (Dauvergne and Farias 2012). The sharp increase in Brazil’s aid budget in 2010 was also, as seen above, largely due to its efforts in the wake of the massive earthquake in Haiti in January that year, and where Brazil was already well invested, notably in its role of leading the UN peacekeeping operation—

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MINUSTAH.  The second peak in the humanitarian aid budget line in 2012, with a large amount going to relief following the drought and famine in Somalia, could have been the example that would turn the uniquely high contribution to Haiti into the beginning of a new trend—interestingly also engaging in a region both beyond Brazil’s immediate neighbourhood and beyond its sphere of influence by not being one of the lusophone countries. The sharp decrease in humanitarian aid in the following year, which has only continued since, is best understood in light of the worsened economic crisis in Brazil at that time, yet also prevents further assessment of whether the period 2010–2012 could have been the beginning of a new trend or merely two unique instances. However, the fact that these two exceptional years came after a number of years with steady increase at least shows the expression of an ambition to make this into a longer-term trend. The Presidential Effect During President Lula’s two terms (2003–2010), Brazilian foreign policy experienced a shift in priority. Compared to the previous decades, under different presidents, Brazil stepped up its efforts to further the integration with its South American neighbouring countries and towards Latin America as a whole. The expansion of Mercosul and the efforts in building Unasul are indicators of this outreach. In addition, Brazil also invested substantial political and financial resources in strengthening ties with African countries and more than doubled the number of embassies on the continent. In seeking to understand Brazil’s broader international ambitions in these years, the shifts from one presidential period to another merit a closer examination. In general terms, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) prioritized health and peace diplomacy, Lula (2003–2010) focused on fighting poverty and hunger, while Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) concentrated efforts on Brazilian commercial interests (IDS 2014). President Cardoso promoted global peace and health issues as “tools” to gather international support for the Brazilian candidacy for the UN Security Council and for the Brazilian position on breaking multinational companies’ patents on HIV/AIDS drugs. Then, during the Lula years, South-South cooperation “was brought to the centre of the foreign policy agenda”, and the active role of the president in the country’s foreign policy, including his many trips to Latin American and African countries, was one of the main drivers of the rising demand for

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Brazilian aid (ibid., p. 48). Thematically, the fight against hunger became priority number one, reflected in allocations of funds and also in the creation of the General Coordination for international action against ­ hunger, known as CG Fome, in 2004. This shift was also a way of ­ ­promoting Brazilian interests abroad, as it would highlight the country’s domestic successes. Dilma Rousseff had a more pragmatic view on international development cooperation, focusing on trade and commercial cooperation. Geographically, Africa lost importance to Latin America, and promoting Brazilian companies gained importance over grants or loans to foreign states and companies. According to our interviews at the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), the “decline in interest for foreign policy” was widely felt at the Itamaraty, compared to the Lula period (Interview, ABC, Brasilia, 27 October 2015). One interview at ABC also commented that “if there is one theme that interests her, it’s commerce” (Interview, ABC, Brasilia, 27 October 2015). Our interview at IPEA also supported this point: “Under Dilma, cooperation is more commercial and financial. She wants to secure Brazilian industry” (Interview, IPEA, Brasilia, 26 October 2015). These presidential affinities made their marks also on ABC and on other development efforts, making Brazilian cooperation more instrumental, as a means towards other ends. An indication of the growing importance of development cooperation up to 2010 was President Lula’s request to produce the first report on Brazilian development cooperation, the Cobradi report covering the years 2005–2009. According to our sources in IPEA, Lula wanted to show the data in his speech to the UN General Assembly (Interview, IPEA, Brasilia, 26 October 2015). Published in 2010, the last year of Lula’s presidency, the report contains a preface signed by the president himself where he brags about Brazilian domestic achievements. The following Cobradi report, published in 2013, contains a preface not signed by President Dilma Rousseff, but by the Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota. The preface of the last Cobradi report, published in 2016, was signed by the Director of ABC, a small department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a sign of the decreasing prestige of the report, and, more broadly, of international development cooperation, over these years. Adding to this and illustrative of the reduced international ambition, the first two Cobradi reports were translated to English (IPEA 2011b, 2014), but the last one has so far only appeared in Portuguese. The prefaces of the Cobradi reports are also relevant to grasp what is highlighted in each period. In the first report, President Lula underscores

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that Brazil has achieved “and exceeded” some of the UN Millennium Development Goals well before the deadline. He goes on to say that the Brazilian solutions are promoted internationally to “support countries facing similar difficulties” (IPEA & ABC 2011a, b, p. 7). The president then emphasizes the principle of non-indifference that “inspires and drives” Brazilian international cooperation, explaining that “balancing the respect for sovereignty and the defence of self-determination – traditional characteristics of the Brazilian diplomacy –, Brazil has been developing its own way of cooperating with developing countries” (ibid.). Finally, the president states that the Brazilian government “believes that cooperation for development is not limited to the interaction between donors and recipients: we understand it as an exchange between equals, with mutual benefits and responsibilities”. President Lula clearly uses the opportunity to promote positive domestic developments to the world and to differentiate Brazilian efforts in international cooperation from those of more traditional donors. Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota equally promotes Brazilian development efforts in the foreword of the Cobradi 2010 report: “The Brazilian creative and innovative ways allow us to assist other countries in their quest for sustainable development. Nevertheless, this effort is not fully known” (IPEA & ABC 2014, p. 9). He does not, as President Lula, mention domestic affairs, but focuses on foreign policy, stating that South-­ South cooperation is a “foreign policy priority” for the Brazilian government. He concludes by saying that for the government, international development cooperation is “using foreign policy as a means to express solidarity” (ibid.). The foreign minister mentioned the aim of publishing the Cobradi reports on an annual basis, but the next report was only released three years later, in 2016, covering the period 2011–2013. Its preface was signed by ABC Director João Almino, and the text is more technical, introvert and indirect. Still, Almino affirms that international development cooperation is of “particular relevance for Brazilian foreign policy” (IPEA & ABC 2016, p. X). Not only have the succeeding Brazilian presidents to a high degree influenced the country’s international development efforts, but they are also important when it comes to the very prestige granted to international development efforts, compared to other domestic and foreign policy issues. All three presidents from 1994 to 2016 have used Brazil’s ­international cooperation instrumentally, but the audience seem to differ. Cardoso and Lula both had the international community as a main target

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group, and they used foreign aid as a means to boost Brazil’s image abroad, with a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council as the ultimate goal. For Dilma Rousseff, Brazilian trade interests were the main priority, and the most important audience was the domestic private sector. The Economic Crisis Effect Brazil’s economic crisis in recent years is arguably the most important reason for the decline in the country’s international cooperation since 2010. Yet, as obvious as it might seem, the performance of the overall economy is often not taken into account when analysing the reasons for change in a given country’s humanitarian or development efforts (ODI 2010; Dauvergne and Farias 2012; IDS 2014). Driven by high international commodity prices, Brazil’s economy grew by an average of 3.8% per year from 2000 to 2008, with the highest growth numbers after 2004, according to the World Bank.5 In 2009, due to the unfolding global financial crisis, the economy shrunk by 0.1%. It regained growth to 7.5% in 2010, the highest figure for more than two decades. Accordingly, the exceptional year for Brazilian humanitarian expenditures was also the year the economy grew with record numbers. Since then, however, things have worsened. Yearly growth slowed down to 0.5% in 2014, and in the years 2015 and 2016, the economy was in recession, shrinking by 3.8% and 3.6%, respectively. According to the Brazilian institute of geography and statistics (IBGE), whose records date back to 1901, this was the worst economic crisis ever recorded for Brazil (Cury and Silveira 2017). At an overall level, the dromedary tendency of increasing and decreasing cooperation budgets around the year 2010 fits well into the boom and recession of the Brazilian economy. A closer look, however, reveals slightly different timing and pace. The funds to international development started to decrease in 2011, while the economy was still growing. Then, for the last year of available statistics, 2013, the funds allocated to international cooperation were maintained at a higher level than in the years 2005– 2007. One explanation to this is that the government felt the economic constraints well before the recession set in, and, consequently, less government funds were allocated to international development ­ 5  See: the World Bank, gross domestic product (GDP) growth (annual %), Brazil (1967– 2016), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2015&locatio ns=BR&start=1967

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c­ooperation. As experienced by officials at the ABC, the institution’s ­budget cuts were “drastic” (Interview, ABC, Brasilia, 27 October 2015). The ABC turnover decreased from 38 million reals in 2010 to 7.1 million reals in 2014, and the number of new projects fell from 472 to 59 in the same period. When interviewed in 2015, ABC sources informed us that they no longer “accept new demands” for projects (Interview, ABC, Brasilia, 27 October 2015).

Conclusion The different paths of the different modalities of international cooperation help us understand the country’s priorities in times of reduced budgets. First, the government seems to keep their obligations to contribute to the functioning of international organizations such as the UN and its peacekeeping efforts. Second, the government seems to maintain low-cost efforts that shed a positive light on Brazil internationally, such as its technical cooperation, and cutting other costs that are not as visible. With the importance given to trade and direct Brazilian benefits under Dilma Roussef’s presidency, the country’s development cooperation changed remarkably in a few years. Yet, beyond this shift in policy orientation, we argue that the single most important reason for the decrease in Brazilian funds to international development cooperation is the economic crisis that set in in 2013, and in the subsequent years. The move away from the priorities of the Lula era were further entrenched with the orientation of the Temer government, and the new Bolsonaro government does not provide any new ambitions in this area. Brazil’s intensified engagement with international cooperation, and in particular humanitarian aid, was relatively brief, but, nevertheless, testifies of the political international ambitions of a certain period. Although things may look rather different at the time of writing in 2019, this engagement did not appear out of nothing. Brazil’s involvement in this area dates back to the 1950s, and its sustained growth over several years indicates this was more than a single, exceptional peak around 2010 and the Haiti earthquake, where Brazil was already deeply involved. Brazil has also set its own footprint where it has been involved and developed its own approach to international cooperation, emphasizing the importance of South-South cooperation, equal partnerships and longer-term sustainability.

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References Agência Brasileira de Cooperação. Quantitativos de Projetos e Atividades Isoladas de Cooperação por Ano, http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/ QuantitativoProjetos. Accessed 26 Feb 2019. Agência Brasileira de Cooperação. Evolução da Execução Financeira dos Projetos da ABC, http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/EvolucaoFinanceira. Accessed 26 Feb 2019. Cobradi. 2011. Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2010. Brasilia: IPEA. ———. 2016. Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2011– 2013. Brasilia: IPEA. Cury, Anay, and Daniel Silveira. 2017. PIB recua 3,6% em 2016, e Brasil tem pior recessão da história. March 15. http://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/pibbrasileiro-recua-36-em-2016-e-tem-pior-recessao-da-historia.ghtml. Accessed 7 Aug 2017. Dauvergne, P., and D.B.L. Farias. 2012. The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power. Third World Quarterly 33 (5): 903–917. de Carvalho, Benjamin, and I.B. Neumann, eds. 2015. Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing. London: Routledge. Global Humanitarian Assistance. 2015. 2015 Report. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GHA%20Report%202015_ embargoed.pdf Good Humanitarian Donorship, About GHD; Brazil Country Profile. https:// www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/about-us/about-ghd.html IBGE. 2017. PIB recua 3,6% em 2016, e Brasil tem pior recessão da história. http://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/pib-brasileiro-recua-36-em-2016e-tem-pior-recessao-da-historia.ghtml IPEA, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. 2010. Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional: 2005–2009. Brasilia: IPEA/ABC. ———. 2011a. Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional: 2010. Brasilia: IPEA/ABC. ———. 2011b. Brazilian Cooperation for Development: 2005–2009. Brasilia: IPEA/ABC. ———. 2012. Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional (COBRADI): Brasil e os Fundos Multilaterais de Desenvolvimento Comunicados do IPEA, 19. Vol. 136. Brasília: IPEA. ———. 2014. Brazilian Cooperation for Development: 2010. Brasilia: IPEA/ABC. ———. 2016. Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional: 2011– 2013. Brasilia: IPEA/ABC.

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Leira, T., and Jumbert, M.G. 2015. The Brazilian Aid Paradox. https://blogs. prio.org/2015/12/the-brazilian-aid-paradox/ (IDS 2014) Leite, Iara Costa, Bianca Suyama, Laura Trajber Waisbich and Melissa Pomeroy, with Jennifer Constantine, Lizbeth Navas-Alemán, Alex Shankland and Musab Younis. 2014. Brazil’s Engagement in International Development Cooperation: The State of the Debate. Evidence Report No. 59. Institute of Development Studies (IDS). Overseas Development Institute, ODI. 2010. Brazil: An Emerging Aid Player. Briefing Paper 64, October. London: ODI. Pouliot, V. 2014. Setting Status in Stone: The Negotiation of International Institutional Privileges. In Status in World Politics, ed. T.V. Paul, D.W. Larson, and W.C. Wohlforth, 192–215. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vieira, M., and H. Menezes 2016. Brazil Is Breaking with Its South-South Focus. What It Means for BRICS. http://theconversation.com/brazil-is-breakingwith-its-south-south-focus-what-it-means-for-brics-69008. November 20. World Bank, GDP growth (Annual %). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2015&locations=BR&start=1967

Interviews ABC, Brasilia, 27 October 2015. Brazilian Foreign Ministry, 27 October 2015. IPEA, Brasilia, 26 October 2015.

CHAPTER 11

The Sources of Moral Authority: Policy Networks and Structuring South-South Cooperation Paulo Esteves, Geovana Zoccal, and João Fonseca

Introduction During the last decade, South-South cooperation (SSC) became a trending topic in international development scholarship. Efforts to assess and define the current and future roles of so-called South-South providers in the field of international development focused on three main questions: (i) its impact upon governance structures (Rhee 2011; Chaturvedi 2012; Leite 2012; Mawdsley 2012), (ii) the differences between North-South cooperation (NSC) and South-South cooperation (SSC) (Chaturvedi 2012; Klingebiel 2014), and (iii) the drivers for rising powers to engage with development cooperation (Fonseca 2014; de Renzio et al. 2013). This chapter takes the enquiry into the drivers for Brazil’s engagement with SSC as its point of departure. For many scholars, SSC is an important P. Esteves (*) Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil G. Zoccal Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Bonn, Germany J. Fonseca World Bank, Maputo, Mozambique © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_11

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tool to cement political coalitions among southern countries as a way to leverage influence in multilateral fora (Hirst and Lima 2006). In the same direction, almost unanimously researchers have pointed out that SSC is a soft power tool adopted by the Brazilian foreign policy community (Milani and Lopes 2014). Apart from the soft power concept’s own limits, this approach is short-sighted in three ways: (i) it misses the domestic roots of Brazil’s engagement with SSC, (ii) neglecting, then, the politics behind the so-called soft power exercise; and, most important for our purposes, and (iii) it ignores both how the moral standing and authority are shaped and the role of SSC in its avowal. This chapter originates from a key inflexion: instead of taking SSC as a tool always already available for the foreign policy community, it inquires, first, into the process of manufacturing SSC as a foreign policy tool and, second, on its role in shaping the moral claims that Brazilian policy networks brought to the international arena while seeking a new status. During a decade, from 2003 to 2014, the Brazilian foreign policy community has strived to change the perception the international community kept about Brazil. This endeavour would require a transformational movement where new meanings should be asserted to the country and recognized by its peers, re-drawing its own identity.1 This process entailed establishing moral authority in some specific areas of international policymaking, particularly on issues around which Brazil was always recognized as a bad example: inequality, poverty, hunger. During that period Brazil started to be recognized as a kind of social policies powerhouse.2 Becoming an exemplary case of lifting people from poverty, eradicating hunger and eventually achieving results (albeit limited) in reducing inequality3 was supposed to be a point of departure for transforming Brazil’s identity and building its moral authority. Even being carried out and implemented during the Workers Party’s three presidential terms, these policies grew long before, from within multi-stakeholder networks, which were ultimately responsible for their design and implementation. 1  On the positional, perceptual, and social dimensions of status-building, see Renshon, Jonhatan. (2017) Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 328  pp. On the circle of recognition: Ringmar, Erik, 1996. Identity, interest and action: a cultural explanation of Sweden’s intervention in the Thirty Years War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2  Among many reports prepared by International Organizations on Brazil’s performance in reducing poverty and eradicating hunger, see: CEPAL. Desarrolo Social Inclusivo. Santiago: 2015. and OCDE. Relatório Territorial da OCDE: Brasil 2013. OECD Publishing, 2013. 3  See, for instance: Siqueira, Isabel Rocha de; Esteves, Paulo. (2018) O desenvolvimento que queremos: bolsa família como aprendizado para uma nova agenda. Editora PUC-Rio.

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Even being aligned with internationally agreed goals (particularly the MDGs) the policies adopted by the Government of Brazil (GoB) were not necessarily aligned with international norms and standards. Hence, while attempting to build its moral authority, sometimes the GoB was aligned with the international social order’s main tenets, but in other cases it has challenged and is trying to revert existing international norms and rules based on moral claims and denouncing international inequalities. These claims were rooted and formulated by the policy networks and SSC was a key component of a broader strategy for getting recognition and building a moral authority within specific policy fields. Mobilizing the policy network analysis-related literature we suggest a framework to investigate the relation between the structure and dynamics of domestic policy networks and their engagement in SSC.  This framework enables a focus on three aspects that are distinctly relevant features of Brazilian development cooperation: (i) its relation to and implementation through the internationalization of domestic policy networks, (ii) its role in grounding Brazil’s moral standing, and (iii) its structuring approach. This chapter considers the foundations and sectorial features of Brazilian SSC through a systematic bottom-up analysis. Moreover, this chapter briefly presents the policy networks that are related to public health, food and nutrition security and agricultural innovation. These three sectors have played a germane role in shaping Brazil’s moral authority and its international standing as a champion for eradicating hunger, providing access to a universal health system and medicines and feeding the world’s growing population. The next section frames our discussion considering the concept of ­policy networks. The following three sections present the domestic and international trajectories of Brazilian public health, food and nutrition security and agricultural innovation policy networks, respectively. The final section deepens the analysis of the “structuring orientation” and how Brazil’s quest for status is grounded on moral claims deeply rooted within these networks.

Brazilian Policy Networks Unlike northern development workers, the Brazilian cooperantes have strong ties with domestic public policy networks. Analysts and agents who are engaged in development co-operation in Brazil often state that fragmentation is the defining trait of Brazilian SSC (Leite and Hamann 2012). Informants often associate their work with development cooperation with

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their respective policy networks. Engagement with SSC appears, both as part of a larger process of network internationalization and as an advocacy tool for their domestic constitutional choices,4 programmes, and projects they conduct in Brazil. The literature on policy network analysis is a possible entry point for further investigation of the health, agricultural innovation and food and nutrition security sectors in Brazil and the international reach of interrelated actors. This literature allows us to understand the internal dynamics of each studied sector and the processes of electing and implementing constitutional choices and public policies. We hope to demonstrate that these processes occur in both domestic and international settings throughout policy networks’ international folds. Policy networks are relatively stable arrangements that combine a variety of actors whose routine relationships are marked by interdependence and the sharing of common interests and the resources required to promote specific policies (Börzel 1998). Policy networks differ in their composition and degree of internal cohesion and consensus; moreover, they have distinct patterns of relationship with government authorities and social organizations (Rhodes 2006). Our research identified domestic and international variables that directly influence the process of internationalization of a given policy network. These four variables are the following: (i) the degree of internal network integration, (ii) its social and political embedding, (iii) the incidence of a reference institution, and (iv) the pattern of its relationship with the foreign policy community. Table 11.1 presents variables and key indicators, whose presence and degree are positively correlated with a policy network’s domestic strength and ability to project itself internationally. The internal integration of a policy network concerns its perceived consistency regarding values, membership criteria, policy preferences and expected results.5 The social and political embedding of a policy network 4  Although it was referenced in Buchanan’s work, our use of the concept of “constitutional choice” is slightly different. According to Buchanan, constitutional choices concern the establishment of rules that govern the production of rules, such as the rules of political competition or the several regulatory checks and institutional arrangements that compose social order (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Brennan and Buchanan 1985; Buchanan 1987, 1990). In addition to the setting of political competition rules and property protection, we argue that designating certain goods as public and providing access to them are fundamental rights that amount to a set of constitutional choices that check the behaviour and decisions of agents in post-constitutional times. 5  The literature on policy networks provides an analytical framework that distinguishes different types of networks and indicates different degrees of integration and internal consistency. Rhodes identifies the following five variables that determine the level of integration of

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Table 11.1  Conditions for internationalization

Domestic conditions

Variables

Indicators

Internal integration

shared values membership criteria policy preferences shared expected outcomes support among different social groups support among decision-makers centrality in the network influence over domestic policies influence over sectorial foreign policy routine exchange of information institutional channels for alignment shared values vis-à-vis international principles policy preferences vis-à-vis international rules reputation influence over international policymaking membership in international networks participation in international fora (regional, minilateral or multilateral) engagement with development cooperation

Social and political embedding Reference institution

International conditions

Pattern of relation with foreign policy community Alignment with international norms Reference institution’s international recognition Internationalization

is linked to the degree of consensus among the political preferences of the relevant actors of the national political community. The presence of a reference institution is also a key variable because it enables specific skills and capacities related to negotiation and the design and implementation of development projects. Finally, the pattern of the relation between the policy network and the foreign policy community is an arena of intense negotiation where competition among different values and over resources can become the object of significant contention.6 As this chapter argues, these four domestic dimensions become important variables that intervene in the international dynamics of the Brazilian policy networks and their ability to design and execute SSC projects. Nevertheless, there are some international conditions that may favour or hinder their international performance. Alignment refers to the degree of correspondence between certain policy networks: (i) the number of participants; (ii) the frequency of interactions among participants; (iii) the consistency of values, membership criteria and the expected results; (iv) the consensus on policy preferences; and (v) the interdependence among the participants (Rhodes 1988; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 2006). 6  We define foreign policy community as including not only the highly disciplined, cohesive and hierarchical Brazilian diplomatic corps but also segments of the private sector, civil society, and academics that can influence foreign policy decisions.

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its own values and those embedded within international norms. The recognition of a given reference institution concerns its own status which may depend on the acknowledgement of its technical capacity or expertise, professionalization, consistence and influence. Finally, internationalization indicates its ability to establish partnerships and participate in international networks, international fora and to engage with development cooperation. Internationalization of a given policy network acquires strategic importance for sectorial systems and public policies that are underwritten by constitutional choices that are effective in Brazil. Internationalization is, therefore, not only a constitutive part of the dynamics of policy networks and combine the following: (i) operation in multilateral political arenas; (ii) the establishment of and/or participation in minilateral or regional arenas; and (iii) South-South cooperation.7

The Public Health Policy Network The establishment of the public health policy network (PHPN) in Brazil is closely associated with the dynamics of the sanitation movement during the military regime. The PHPN’s origins can be traced to the inception of preventive medicine departments starting in the 1950s (Escorel 1999; Escorel et al. 2005). During the 1970s and 1980s, after fierce competition over the principles and policy choices of public health, the concept of the social determinants of health (Buss and Filho 2007) emerged as the cornerstone of public health policies in Brazil. Early in the 1980s, national conferences and the sanitation movement led to the setting of an agenda for public health reform that was centred on popular participation, the universalization of services, the protection of the public character of the health system and decentralization (Escorel et  al. 2005, p.  71). A dense integration in the PHPN could already be perceived during that period that was expressed by the sharing of common values, which limited the number of its participants and contributed to the increased volume and quality of their interactions. The constitutionalization of the right to health and the institutionalization of the Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde, SUS) origi7  Multilateral arenas and norms presuppose generalized principles of conduct and diffuse reciprocity, whereas minilateral arrangements and arenas are open only to their participants. Similar to clubs, in minilateral arrangements, “participation is restricted to the privileged members who set the agenda in policy formulation; moreover, minilateral arenas provide unique goods to their members” (Naim 2009; Cooper and Farooq 2015).

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nate largely from the actions of the PHPN.8 In this process, the PHPN’s shared values became deeply socially embedded, and its political preferences achieved significant influence over the public health arena in Brazil. Nonetheless, according to many informants’ assessments, both the constitutional and institutional choices were highly constrained by the international dynamics. The prevailing narrative among the public health agents in Brazil associates the achievement of the right to health with the stand against market-oriented reforms championed by the World Bank.9 Furthermore, informants often stress the promotion of international standards concerning the right to health and the construction/provision of related global public goods to strengthen domestic choices. Even though, today, universal access to health care is a cornerstone of WHO norms promotion, with which the PHPN is fully aligned, the access to medicines is still a very contentious issue within the international free trade regime. Through SSC, PHPN participants adopted an international strategy across three layers, namely, multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral. This strategy is organized around three intertwined concepts: health diplomacy, the industrial health complex, and structuring cooperation. Brazilian agents regularly resort to the concept of health diplomacy when discussing responses to rising transnational health problems (Kickbuch et al. 2007; Buss and Ferreira 2010). Health diplomacy has provided a conceptual umbrella for better coordination between the Ministry of External Relations and the Ministry of Health. Health diplomacy has also facilitated broader international engagement from key institutions such as the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), whose action is traditionally limited to domestic health issues. Moreover, health diplomacy is frequently ­presented as an alternative to the alleged separation between foreign policy and development cooperation (Russo et al. 2013).10 8  Since the promulgation of both the 1988 Constitution and the regulations of SUS through complementary law, the principles that are advocated by the PHPN and the public health movement are embedded in Brazilian law. These principles are universality, comprehensiveness, equity, decentralization and social control. 9  See World Bank (1987); Escorel (1999); Mattos (2001); Escorel et al. (2005); Almeida (2006). 10  Frequent interaction between the Ministry of External Relations and the Ministry of Health led to the institutionalization of the International Department of Health Advisory (AISA/MS). However, some informants report that the concept of health diplomacy created some tensions (Mattos 2001) between the PHPN and the foreign policy community, often associated with bureaucratic disputes regarding ultimate responsibility for the foreign policy of Brazil. Furthermore, despite the already consolidated AISA/MS, several informants

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Health diplomacy legitimizes the PHPN’s growing presence at multilateral fora, including the WHO (adopting a position aligned with international norms), the WTO (adopting a challenging position regarding the TRIPS), and the United Nations General Assembly (where the right to health care is always advocated). Furthermore, in minilateral and regional arenas such as the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL), and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), the PHPN supports the development of common action plans and structuring networks to strengthen national health systems.11 South-South cooperation networks and development cooperation projects can also be understood by considering the concepts of the industrial health complex and structuring cooperation that  strengthens domestic public health-care systems. Fiocruz is widely acknowledged as the PHPN’s institution of reference, both domestically and internationally. Its recognition is largely due to its technical excellence but also because its moral claim: a comprehensive understanding of health care as a universal right. This claim manifests itself throughout the way the PHPN engages with SSC. Cooperantes in this field support the concept of structuring cooperation. Within the network, structuring cooperation is contrasted with traditional approaches that are “guided by vertical programs, linked to specific diseases, which, apparently, would have little impact on health systems and on outcomes for populations” (Almeida et  al. 2010, p.  28) [T.A]. Thus, the structuring cooperation in health would be centred on the institutional strengthening of health systems in partner countries, combining concrete interventions with local capacity-building and knowledge production, in addition to promoting dialogue between stakeholders, in order to enable them to take the leadership in the processes of the health sector and promote the autonomous development of an agenda for the future development of public health. (Almeida et al. 2010, p. 28) [T.A] insisted on the centrality of the relations among the leadership of each ministry. Reliance on ad hoc relations that do not necessarily go through the inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms indicates an incomplete adjustment process between the PHPN and the foreign policy community. 11  In the specific case of the CPLP, the health ministers built a strategic plan for the sector and attempted to strengthen national systems to ensure universal access to quality healthcare services (CPLP 2009). The plan was structured along seven major axes and four structuring networks. On PHPN participation in minilateral and regional organizations, see Buss (2011).

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Structuring cooperation should therefore be directed at the establishment of national autonomous systems that can formulate and implement policies in a given sector that are aligned with the specific demands of their respective contexts. Structuring cooperation encompasses establishing or strengthening national institutes of health, national schools of public health, health technical schools and human milk banks. Those institutions are articulated as networks both in South America and in Portuguese-­ speaking countries. The most ambitious structuring project was the installation of a pharmaceutical plant called Sociedade Moçambicana de Medicamentos (SMM, Mozambican Society of Drugs) not only because of its costs but also because it was connected to the heart of Brazil’s official positions in broader debates concerning access to medicine and the role of the government in the health sector. Furthermore, following its structuring logic, the Brazilian cooperantes see the project as likely to develop a healthindustrial complex in Mozambique, which would provide the Government of Mozambique (GoM) with the necessary resources to establish a more autonomous position within the health-care field (Gadelha 2006). However, the GoM, Mozambican Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and international development partners do not necessarily share the Brazilian cooperantes’ perspective. The limited space here does not allow us to further describe the SMM.  However, many informants, such as the government, CSOs, academia, and international development partners, either completely lack information on the factory project or are convinced, based on the little information that the authors ascertained, that investment in this facility should not be considered a priority by the GoM. The SMM case indicates three limits of Brazil’s SSC in general and the limits of structuring cooperation in particular. First, the SMM reflects the inherent challenges of the inflexible government-to-government model privileged by the GoB, which is consistent with the principles of non-­ intervention and non-interference that have been adopted, at least discursively, as fundamental principles of SSC.  The misinformation regarding the SMM and the lack of social and political support from Mozambicans and the GoM are remarkable. Second, in a context of significant aid dependency, including for medicines whose provision is dependent on international donors, the GoB’s isolation and refusal to converse with traditional donors was noted by several informants as a recurring obstacle. Finally, the SMM may be seen as a challenge to existing rules related to intellectual property rights. A significant international support would be required to support such a challenging position, which apparently the PHPN and the GoB were not able to raise.

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The Food and Nutrition Security Policy Network The debate over agriculture and agricultural policy in Brazil has long been highly politicized and polarized along two positions, agribusiness and family agriculture. The division in the agricultural policy arena was reflected, during the Workers Party’s governments, in an institutional structure that comprised the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA) and the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), which were usually associated with agribusiness and family agriculture, respectively. Two policy networks engage in the Brazilian agricultural arena and SSC practices: the Food and Nutrition Security Policy Network (FNSPN) and the Agricultural Innovation Policy Network (AIPN). The inception of the first Food and Nutrition Security National Council (Consea) (Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional, CONSEA) from 1993 to 1994, the constitution of the Brazilian Forum on Sovereignty and Food and Nutritional Security (Fórum Brasileiro de Soberania e Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional, FBSSAN), and the institutionalization of FNS policies after 2003 are among the most frequently cited landmarks in consolidating Brazil’s FNS agenda. These experiences created the necessary conditions for the FNSPN to arise, such as routine interactions among CSOs and social, religious, and rural movements, as well as public servants and shared understandings of FNS and policy alternatives. The Lula administration (2003–2010) selected hunger eradication as the central target of government policies. At that time, the FNSPN already had a high degree of internal integration and significant influence over specific social groups. An important milestone towards the institutionalization of FNS policies was reached in 2006 with the Organic Law on Food Security and Nutrition (LOSAN, L. n.11.346 / 2006). By listing adequate food as a fundamental human right (Article 2), LOSAN generated opportunities for a more proactive international role by Brazil in this field and set the agenda for FNS constitutionalization in 2010. Although many of its participants have their own international connections, the FNSPN’s international fold was mainly channelled through the Co-ordination of International Action Against Hunger (Coordenação-­ Geral de Ações Internacionais de Combate à Fome, CGFome) and CONSEA.  CGFome was considered by some informants to be the ­international arm of the Fome Zero Programme.12 CGFome increased the 12  Created in 2004, CGFome coordinates Brazil’s foreign policy in FNS, rural development, and humanitarian cooperation (emergency and structural). CGFome is also responsible for dialogue in the FNS sphere with civil society, the World Social Forum, FAO, WFP, UNHCR, IFAD, UNICEF, and others.

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visibility of Brazilian food security programmes from the perspective of domestic audiences. When the visibility of Brazil’s public policies in FNS is larger, the demand for Brazil’s engagement in humanitarian and structuring projects in the sector is greater. Concurrently, the related projects in which the FNSPN has engaged have helped to legitimize its own domestic position. CONSEA functioned as an important channel through which the policy network was extended to regional and minilateral settings. The Civil Society Regional Network for Food Security and Nutrition in the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) and the CPLP’s Food and Nutrition Security Strategy (ESAN-CPLP) became international folds that were supported by CONSEA.13 However, the FNSPN’s permanent confrontation with agribusiness contributed to the lack of consensus among different social strata and the political elites, including the foreign policy community. Two key sources of tension were at stake. First, the FNSPN participants challenged the principle of non-intervention, a cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy. For many informants, the GoB should represent the Human Right for Adequate Food14 and encourage participatory governance models in southern countries.15 Second, the FNSPN mobilized its international partners to contest many positions that were adopted by the GoB at the Doha round on agribusiness16 and some development projects designed and executed by MAPA, as is discussed below.

13  In 2011, the CPLP adopted its own Food and Nutrition Security Strategy (ESANCPLP) and established its own multi-stakeholder Council on Food Security and Nutrition (CONSAN). 14  According to one informant, “if someone is hungry in Tanzania, it is our responsibility to protect this human right, to promote it and provide it” [T.A]. Interview conducted in August 2014 with participants of the FNSPN. 15  The demand for participatory governance models contrasts with the principle of noninterference. The foreign policy community tends to prioritize relations among governments, which overshadows domestic participation and participatory decision-making processes. 16  Since 2003, CONSEA has sent several “exposições de motivos” (statements of motives) to the presidency that advocate that the GoB should take a more resolute position in favour of FNS in the Doha round. Key issues include CONSEA’s strong disagreement with the official position that is taken by the GoB, and inspired by MAPA’s own position, regarding access to markets (CONSEA 2005). Another point of contention concerns the concept of food sovereignty, which was progressively adopted by CONSEA and challenged by MAPA (CONSEA 2005; Beghin 2014).

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By the late 2000s, the FNSPN represented a highly integrated multi-­ stakeholder space of policy coordination. For the health network, the international fold was a way to uphold domestic constitutional choices, whereas for the food security network, it was also a powerful way to support the enactment of constitutional and institutional choices at home. However, with regard to the food security network’s international dynamics, the aforementioned frictions discouraged its further integration with the foreign policy community and disadvantaged both its multilateral reach and its ability to engage in SSC. Despite these limitations, FNSPN participants were able to extend the network to minilateral settings, such as the CPLP, and mobilize CSOs and grass-roots social movements. Within the FNS field the establishment of the Center of Excellence Against Hunger in partnership with the World Food Program (WFP) was a landmark. The Center operates as a knowledge diffusion hub for school feeding policies and has achieved important results in many African countries. In its internationalization the FNSPN emphasizes sectorial governance mechanisms with broad social participation mirroring the role that CONSEA played as a multi-stakeholder platform for the discussion of public policy in the country. As previously indicated, CGFome was established in 2004 as a government interface for international organizations on food security and in cooperation projects “with a double traction: emergency and structuring”.17 CGFome acted as the FNSPN’s main gateway to the foreign policy community. The FNS agenda was supported by the Brazilian presidency in the last decade. However, the lack of a reference institution and its contentious relation with specific sectors of the foreign policy community narrowed its ability to consolidate its international footprint. The Programme “Purchases from Africans for Africa” (PAA Africa) is often mentioned as a landmark for the FNSPN’s engagement with SSC. Inspired by the Brazilian experience of the Food Purchase Programme (PAA) and internationally perceived as highly successful, the partnership was designed to combat hunger and malnutrition through the support of local initiatives of food purchases from smallholders in five countries. Despite its successful results, the implementation had to rely on international organizations due to domestic bureaucratic bottlenecks and political resistances.  Interview conducted in August 2014 with participants from the FNSPN.

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Nevertheless, in contrast with the public health sector, the food security policy network did not establish a reference institution that could help to consolidate domestic policies and SSC initiatives against hunger. As a result, the FNSPN’s engagement in SSC was based on projects of limited scope that even acquiring high visibility could be easily dismantled. In fact, CGFome was closed after President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment. The CONSEA was shut down by President Bolsonaro on the beginning of his mandate, in January 2019. Despite being reestablished in May 2019, the fight against hunger will be, probably, erased from his foreign policy agenda.

The Agricultural Innovation Policy Network The rise of the Agricultural Innovation Policy Network (AIPN) was concurrent with the modernization of Brazilian education, scientific research, and agriculture. The establishment of key institutions that were designed to promote and support scientific research and training in the 1950s was a milestone in the history of Brazil’s National Innovation System. These institutions created the conditions for the training of Brazilian researchers abroad (Portugal 2010). Moreover, these institutions established the basis for the AIPN that is centred on technical assistance, rural folds, training, and innovation, which decisively contributed to the diffusion and consolidation of expertise in tropical agriculture in Brazil (Teixeira et al. 2013). The AIPN’s consolidation was a long process. During the military regime, under the impact of the so-called Green Revolution and the threat of shortages in Brazil, agriculture was modernized through the creation of tools concerning credit availability, risk management, and technical innovation. The creation of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) in 1973 was another milestone in the AIPN formation process. Linked to MAPA, Embrapa was designed to “enable research, development, and innovation solutions aimed at agricultural sustainability, for the benefit of Brazilian society” (Alves 2010; Embrapa 2012). The creation of Embrapa meant significant advances for agricultural innovation in Brazil, not only for its own capacities but also for its links to other universities and research centres.18 In 1970, the corporation was 18  Created as a state enterprise, Embrapa is not under the direct supervision of the administration, which provides flexibility in resource management, budget execution, planning, performance evaluations and the dissemination of the results. A decentralized model was chosen with separate units that are distributed in the national territory and divided by product features and themes (Embrapa 2012).

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already intensely engaged in the modernization of Brazilian agriculture, particularly in the development of agriculture in the Brazilian Cerrado (Cunha et al. 1994).19 Many researchers in the agricultural discipline see the transformation of the Cerrado as proof of the possibility of overcoming backwardness through technological innovation (Albuquerque and Silva 2008; Arraes et  al. 2012). The so-called conquest of the Cerrado became a catalyser to integrate researchers and institutions around the potential of technological innovation. Faith in technological innovation as the main source of change mobilized professionals in the field. The establishment in 1992 of the National Agricultural Research System (SNPA) furthered the AIPN’s integration. SNPA allowed for closer coordination and a reduction in transaction costs and contributed to the formation of an increasingly cohesive and dense policy network. SNPA included approximately 1800 researchers, 230 laboratories and 215 research stations (Filho 2014). Despite their remarkably technical identity, the participants of the AIPN, particularly those from Embrapa, are often associated with the development of agribusiness in Brazil. However, many AIPN participants are closer to the other side of the agricultural political spectrum and work with small farmers on FNS projects. The development in Brazil of small-­ scale production oriented to domestic demand based on intensive production and high integration into innovation chains has allowed the AIPN participants to approach some sectors of family farming.20 In the 2000s, the AIPN represented a highly integrated network marked by deep social roots, particularly, not exclusively, in agribusiness. In this context, Embrapa emerged as a benchmark institution. The alleged position of relative distance from the strife and extreme politicization of the agricultural policy arena allows AIPN participants to travel between polar positions and to engage in projects under both MDA21 and MAPA leadership. Plasticity and independence multiply the possibilities of engagement with different sectors of society, which deepen the network’s social roots. Moreover, through the scientific cooperation supported by Ministry of 19  The Cerrado constitutes approximately 22% of Brazil’s territory. The 2006 Agricultural Census indicates that the oilseeds that are most produced in the Cerrado are maize and soybeans. From 2013 to 2014, Brazil produced 85,656,000 tonnes of soybeans of which nearly 38.5 million tonnes were for domestic consumption (Embrapa soja 2015). 20  Regarding the complexity of the rural environment in Brazil, see Favareto (2006). 21  The Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) was dissolved in May 2016, after President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment.

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Science, Technology, Innovation and Communication (MCTIC), the AIPN established routine and deeply institutionalized relations with the foreign policy community. This momentum helped to support the network’s internationalization. The AIPN supported Brazil’s identity as a food provider for the world’s growing population. Its international footprint is large and highly diversified. Nevertheless, one of the most complex and ambitious projects was at the same time the most controversial SSC project implemented by the GoB: the ProSavana. ProSavana was supposed to be a 60-month project that attempts to improve the research capacity and technology transfer for agricultural development in the Nacala corridor (north of Mozambique). This project generated a significant reaction from CSOs and rural movements in Brazil, Japan and Mozambique. In many ways, ProSavana is another case of the potential and limits of structuring cooperation. In addition to many projects that are conducted by Embrapa, ProSavana may have an important impact on the land-holding structure and on agricultural policies in Mozambique. Similar to the case of the SMM, the insistence on maintaining the principle of non-interference and the government-to-government model limits the ability of the GoB to influence the processes of public consultation. This insistence also triggered a trilateral resistance movement that accused the GoB and Brazilian private industries of land grabbing. The association between development cooperation and private investment has raised questions and suspicions on both sides of the Atlantic. Finally, analytically, the case explains the relevance of social embeddedness as a variable for networks’ international folds, including SSC. Although Embrapa is deeply embedded in the field of agricultural innovation, the agricultural policies supported by these innovations remain highly contested. Therefore, ProSavana’s clear association with agribusiness extended the arguments to Mozambique. According to one informant in Brazil, the debate regarding ProSavana does not involve the future of agriculture in Mozambique; instead, the debate concerns past decisions that were made in Brazil. As we have attempted to demonstrate in this analysis, the engagement and nature of Brazilian policy networks involved in SSC differ significantly with regard to key variables. We suggest that deeper analysis of each policy network as well as comparative assessments may help understanding not only how Brazil’s SSC works but the sources of the moral authority the GoB claimed in order to be up ranked in terms of status. Table  11.2 ­systematizes the public health, food and nutrition security and agricultural innovation policy networks in relation to the referenced variables.

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Table 11.2  Brazilian policy networks’ domestic profile Variables

Health

FNS

Agricultural innovation

Internal integration Social and political embedding Reference institution Pattern of relation with foreign policy community Alignment with international norms

Thick Deep

Thick Relatively Deep

Thick Relatively Deep

FIOCRUZ Aligned

X Challenging

EMBRAPA Ad hoc

Aligned (WHO) Challenging (TRIPS/WTO) Highly Recognized

Aligned (MDGs/ SDGs) Challenging (WTO) X

X

Deep

Narrow

Reference institution’s international recognition Internationalization

Highly Recognized Relatively Deep

Conclusion This chapter tried to identify some of the sources of the moral authority claimed by the GoB during the Workers Party’s presidential terms (2003– 2014). As shown, the GoB presented Brazil as a social policies powerhouse with very successful results that could either support existing international norms or demonstrate the need of change. These policies were, nevertheless, rooted in domestic policy networks, and their contribution to the transformation of Brazil’s own identity were dependent upon these networks’ ability to establish an international foothold. In this context, SSC played a major role in trying to showcase Brazilian solutions for some of the most intractable world’s problems. As we have tried to demonstrate the results depend on specific characteristics of each sector. As final considerations we would like to address the specific way these networks have tried to engage with SSC: structuring cooperation. Observing the way agents and their political networks represent and reflect on the structuring nature of their projects has allowed us to better understand at least three aspects that are characteristic of Brazilian SSC. First, there is a conceptual dispersion among the policy networks. Even though all of them refer to structuring cooperation, their u ­ nderstanding of such practices is highly heterogeneous. The dispersion indicates that conceptual development originates mainly from i­mplementing agencies in response to the issues faced when their practices are translated to cooperation projects. Second, the structuring character of Brazilian cooperation, at least in the cases of public health and FNS, is evident not only in the structuring

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of national systems but also in their own internationalization process. Structuring cooperation can contribute to the greater internal cohesion of policy networks in which cooperating agencies engage; structuring cooperation can also contribute to the policy networks’ domestic social embedding. The same is true for their constitutional choices and political preferences. Ultimately, the complete development of the policy network’s international fold implies its internationalization. The structuring cooperation dimension involves partners who are able and willing to develop projects that are underwritten by the shared constitutional choices in other developing countries. However, better performance in cooperation requires greater alignment between the foreign policy community and policy networks. This relation can be also used by policy networks to secure support for their moral claims and the status they seek. Furthermore, taking the SMM and ProSavana as examples, it is possible to argue that (i) structuring projects require a strong consensus at home, which is the case for health, not agriculture, and (ii) structuring projects may challenge the principle of non-intervention, a cornerstone of Brazil’s foreign policy. Finally, despite its dispersion, the idea of structuring cooperation implies that Brazilian domestic systems (in any of the sectors analysed) can be transplanted to other (“developing”) contexts with equal effectiveness. This hidden assumption is partially echoed by the idea that the problems faced by developing countries are essentially similar, which is a discursive resource that promotes South-South cooperation as preferable, by definition, to North-South cooperation. As noted in different ways by Fordelone (2009), Cabral and Weinstock (2010), and Cesarino (2012), this is a basic discursive resource that is used both by South-South providers and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors who are willing to engage in triangular cooperation. Perhaps the key difference between Brazilian SSC and other donors lies neither in the similarity of the problems, nor in the allegedly less-imposing character of the former; the difference lies in the large stake that Brazilian policy networks hold in their own constitutional choices and in the perceived success of their institutional architecture, which, once translated as development cooperation, becomes structuring cooperation. If this difference holds true, when a policy network is less cohesive and its particular constitutional choices and political preferences are less socially embedded, the stake of the networks in the perceived success of their structuring projects tends to be larger. This fact likely reflects the project’s design and/or implementation. Deepening the analysis of the role played by policy networks and the effects of their engagement in structuring cooperation requires an expansion of the explo-

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ration of their interconnected dimensions. These dimensions are related to internal cohesion and social trajectory, in relation with the foreign policy community, and engagement in minilateral and multilateral spaces.

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Gadelha. 2006. Development, Health-Industrial Complex and Industrial Policy. Revista de Saúde Pública. Hirst, Monica, and Maria Regina Soares de Lima. 2006. Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities. International Affairs 82 (1): 21–40 Kickbuch, I., G. Silberschmidt, and P.M. Buss. 2007. Global Health Diplomacy: The Need for New Perspectives, Strategic Approaches and Skills in Global Health. Bull WHO 85: 230–232. Klingebiel, Stephan. 2014. Development Cooperation: Challenges of the New Aid Architecture. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Leite, Iara Costa. 2012. Cooperação Sul-Sul: Conceitos, História e Marcos Interpretativos. Observador On-line 7 (March): 40. Leite, Iara Costa, and Eduarda Passarelli Hamann. 2012. Cooperação Técnica brasileira: Situação atual, desafios e possibilidades. Nota Estratégica (Outubro) 4: 10. Marsh, David, and R.A.W. Rhodes. 1992. Policy Networks in British Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mattos, R. 2001. As agências internacionais e as políticas de saúde nos anos 90: um panorama geral da oferta de ideias. Ciência e Saúde Coletiva 6 (2): 377–389. Mawdsley, Emma. 2012. From Recipient to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape. London: Zed Books. Milani, Carlos, and Renata Nunes Lopes. 2014. Cooperação Sul-Sul e Policy Transfer em Saúde Pública: análise das relações entre Brasil e Moçambique entre 2003 e 2012. Carta Internacional 9 (1): 59–78. Naim, Moises. 2009. Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action. Foreign Policy 173: 135–136. Portugal, José Alberto Bastos. 2010. Priorização de diretrizes para o modelo de gestão da inovação do sistema agroindustrial do leite. Vol. Tese de Doutorado. Viçosa: Universidade Federal de Viçosa. Rhee, Hyunjoo. 2011. Promoting South-South Cooperation Through Knowledge Exchange. In Catalyzing Development: A New Vision for Aid, ed. Homi Kharas, Koji Makino, and Woojin Jung. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Rhodes, R.A.W. 1988. Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments of Britain. London: Unwin Hyman. ———. 2006. Policy Network Analysis. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, ed. M.  Rein, R.E.  Goodin, and M.  Moran, 423–445. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Russo, G., L.V. Cabral, and P. Ferrinho. 2013. Brazil-Africa Technical Cooperation in Health: what’s Its Relevance to the Post-Busan Debate on Aid Effectiveness. Globalization and Health 9 (1): 2. Teixeira, E., R. Protil, and A. Lima. 2013. A contribuição da ciência e tecnologia para o desenvolvimento do agronegócio. Viçosa: Departamento de Economia Rural UFV. World Bank. 1987. Financing Health Services in Developing Countries: An Agenda for Reform. Washington, DC: World Bank.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion Paulo Esteves, Benjamin de Carvalho, and Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert Brazil: A Failed Status-Seeker? The contributions to this volume provide a systematic assessment of Brazil’s quest for a status upgrade during the three Workers’ Party presidential terms (2003–2014). The Government of Brazil (GoB) adopted a two-pronged status-seeking strategy: advocate a reformist agenda for key international institutions, particularly in the security and financial fields, and active engagement with activities related to the maintenance of international order, such as humanitarian protection and development cooperation. Even with minimal results, as demonstrated throughout the chapters, these strategies are worth examining more closely, for a number of reasons. First, Brazil’s case can illuminate how rising powers seek higher status within an international order tailored by prevailing major powers. Second, despite its limited success in some issue

P. Esteves Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil B. de Carvalho (*) Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] M. Gabrielsen Jumbert Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 P. Esteves et al. (eds.), Status and the Rise of Brazil, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21660-3_12

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areas, Brazil’s strategy not only failed but virtually collapsed, leading to a status free fall, which requires further inquiry. Third, it may advance the research agenda on status in international relations by highlighting not only how rising powers may employ status-seeking strategies which the literature hitherto has reserved for other states than the great powers (e.g. moral authority as emphasized in Wohlforth et al. 2018).

Brazil’s Quest for International Status As the chapters in this book argue, status-seeking was always a key driver of Brazil’s foreign policy. During the past 30 years, successive governments, regardless of their different political orientations, have nurtured these status ambitions. As Chaps. 5, 6, and 7 have shown these ambitions were tuned with an assessment of Brazil’s own capabilities (material and reputational) vis-à-vis the international order (distribution of power and normative framework). Table 12.1 tries to summarize and correlate status ambition and diplomatic initiatives during the past three decades—without necessarily mirroring the authors’ various periodization or their interpretation of status-seeking goals and strategies: After three decades of growing ambitions, Guilherme Casarões discussed the GoB’s gloomy results in his chapter. As he argues, after 2013, with the economic crisis finally hitting Brazil, and facing social unrest, the Ministry of External Affairs moved from a “controlled withdrawal” (which was signaled at President Dilma’s first term) to retreat (during the impeachment trial) and finally a jumbled disband from the global arena. The result was the status downgrade and the dubious return to a middle-­ power status. This “status relegation” or “downgrade” is a central theme of this conclusion, in which we also seek to identify some side effects of the status-seeking ambitions that could have led to the status free fall in 2018. Throughout this volume, the authors have addressed the hurdles and pitfalls Brazilian elites met on the way to international recognition. As de Carvalho argued in Chap. 2, the structure of status distribution may have become more static today than it has been in the past, and accommodation of new emerging or rising powers may therefore be more difficult today than in the past. Furthermore, as Beaumont and Røren show, Latin American countries usually underperform in terms of status. Even within the region, as Casarões added in Chap. 6, the GoB had to deal both with the United States’ ubiquitous presence and fierce competition with Argentina and Mexico. This record can be attributed either to a lack

Regional power with global reach

Great power

2002–2008

2008–2014

2018–

2016–2018

Middle power

Regional power

1990s

2014–2016

Status Sought

Period Global

Humanitarian/Security

Retreat from UNASUR

Common Market of the Alignment with key South (MERCOSUR, international norms 1991) Union of South IBSA (2003) G-4 (Germany, Japan, American Nations Brazil and India) (UNASUR, 2007) initiative for the UNSC reform (2005) Community of Latin BRICS American and (2008–2009) Caribbean States (CELAC, 2010)

Regional

Key Foreign Policy Initiatives (Field)

Table 12.1  Status ambition and diplomatic initiatives of Brazil (1990–2018)

India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA fund, 2004) Tehran Agreement (2010) Election of FAO’s General Director (2011) Creation of the New Development Bank (2014) AIIB “prospective founder member” (2016, Pending on capital transfer)

Financial/Development

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of material resources or diplomatic recognition. Furthermore, in the case of Brazil, neither democratization nor the alignment with international norms paid off in terms of status upgrade. The chapters in Section II point to some evidence and hypotheses that could help explain such dwindling results. These chapters focused on the foreign policies and grand strategies adopted by the GoB. Lopes, Casarões, and Gama argue that, as a middle power, Brazil had to reconcile conflicting claims for “democratization” of Bretton Woods Institutions and “oligarchic reform” of the collective security regime. Rather than being a middle-power dilemma, having to accommodate these conflicting demands may in fact be a distinctive part of what it means to be a rising power today. These countries have to keep a footprint within the Global South, holding support from small countries, while aspiring to play a more significant role at the big leagues—a “hybrid power” as de Carvalho calls them in Chap. 2. This uneasy position contrasts with what Lessa, Beccard, and Gehre called a triumphalist tone of the Workers’ Party’s foreign policy. Focusing on the Party’s three presidential terms, the authors highlighted the ambitious status-seeking project underpinned by a foreign policy platform based on three key agendas (the UNSC reform, the fight against hunger, and renewables) and one strategy: presidential diplomacy around Lula’s persona. Even with limited results in terms of status performance, this platform was supported “by parts of the Brazilian public opinion, in a much wider spectrum than the normal audience of left-wing militancy.” Moreover, according to the authors, significant sectors within the business community “gained a position of privileged access to the government.” This relationship between public and private sectors would later become a key element of the crisis that led to Bolsonaro’s election, which in turn dealt a major blow to Brazil’s international recognition.

The Sources of Status-Seeking: Brazil’s Engagement with the Fields of International Security, Humanitarian Protection and Development Cooperation Sections III and IV offered a deep dive into specific policy fields: international security and humanitarian protection and development cooperation, respectively. The chapters in Section III address the book’s theoretical puzzle on how rising powers in general relate with prevailing norms

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designed by established powers. More specifically, the chapters interrogate how the GoB reconciled its historical commitment with non-intervention with its engagement with peace operations, which had increasingly comprehensive mandates and were often designed under the UN Charter’s Chap. VII.  Although authors provide different answers, they are highly convergent around norm-crafting practices. As Kenkel, Marcondes, and Ribeiro argue, the GoB “navigated this dilemma with a high degree of sophistication. They have done so often as ‘norm shapers’” (Chap. 8). For Hamman and Jumbert, the GoB’s “contributions to UN peacekeeping operations reveal a gradual, yet clear change in the positioning towards the use of force” (Chap. 9).The authors explore how the GoB engagement with United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) generated a learning curve “with lessons to be learned on how to use force to protect civilians on behalf of the international community” (Chap. 9). Furthermore, they present the hypothesis according to which this learning process might have contributed for manufacturing the Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) concept “as a balancing act between a principled opposition to intervention without the concerned state’s consent, and a recognition of the potential for situations where the responsibility to protect may apply.” Esteves and Herz also inquire into the ways the Brazilian Foreign Policy Community could adjust its own position vis-à-vis more intrusive and comprehensive international interventions, claiming that the Brazilian Foreign Policy Community adjusted its own position taking into account both previous commitments and coalitions as well as the status sought in a given period. Advancing a theoretical argument, based on Homi Bhabha’s work, Esteves and Herz understand the rising process throughout mimetic acts that are at the same time, even paradoxically, acts of consent and disavowal (Chap. 7). To these engagements with Brazil’s involvement, a final dimension is worth dwelling to in this conclusion, namely the extent to which this international involvement paved the way for the armed forces’ renewed role in domestic politics. In this regard, important policies adopted during the Workers’ Party’s three presidential terms fed the armed forces’ politicization: (i) the adoption of pacification tactics and protocols tested in Haiti in urban contexts in Rio and (ii) the establishment of the truth commission. The armed forces also played a significant role during the 2018 electoral cycle, as discussed below. Section IV addressed the GoB’s engagement with humanitarian protection and development cooperation. Jumbert and Leira discuss the rapid rise (and decline) in Brazil’s expenditure in development cooperation and humanitarian aid. As the first figure demonstrates, the GoB expenditure

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during the 2000s grew in a very significant way. Even, as the authors rightly pointed out, considering that in comparison to other donors Brazil was still ranked in the 34th position (out of 53 countries) (Fig. 12.1). The official report produced in 2013 by the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC: Brazilian Cooperations Agency) and Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas Aplicadas (IPEA: Institute for Applied Economic Research) separates Brazilian government engagement into seven areas of cooperation: technical, educational, scientific and technological, humanitarian, support and protection to refugees, peacekeeping operations (PKOs), and expenses with international organizations. Figure 12.2 shows GoB’s expenditure in each category from 2005 to 2013. As Jumbert and Leira note (Chap. 10), the end of Lula’s second presidential term (2010) coincided with the earthquake in Haiti and made the GoB’s expenditure in humanitarian aid and PKOs grow significantly. Despite the exceptionality of the 2010 peak, the authors argue that two other variables contributed to the rise and fall of the GoB’s engagement with ­humanitarian

$1000.00 $900.00 $800.00 $700.00 $600.00 $500.00 $400.00 $300.00 $200.00 $100.00 $0.00

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Fig. 12.1  GoB yearly spending on SSC: total (US$ millions) (The first COBRADI report defined Brazilian international cooperation as the total sum of resources invested by the Brazilian government in other countries’ governments, in foreign nationals on Brazilian soil, and in international organizations that aim at contributing to international development (IPEA/ABC 2010). This definition, however, changed by the time the second COBRADI report was published, which tries to characterize Brazilian cooperation by looking at practices in the field. As a result, non-federal actors are accounted for, such as public and private educational institutions, NGOs, and religious organizations.)

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$1000.00 $800.00 $600.00 $400.00 $200.00 $0.00 2005

2006 2007 Technical Cooperation

2008

2009

2010 2011 2012 Educational Cooperation

Scientific and Technological Cooperation

Humanitarian Cooperation

Support for Refugee Protection

PKOs

2013

Contributions to IOs

Fig. 12.2  GoB yearly spending in SSC: modalities (US$ millions)

aid and development cooperation: the “presidential effect” and the “economic crisis effect.” As Lessa et  al. have argued, presidential diplomacy was an important component of the GoB’s status-seeking platform. As Jumbert and Leira show, foreign aid was not only an important tool for the presidential diplomacy but that in the case of Brazil, the presidency had an important role in making decisions about the level and purpose of such engagement. Henceforth, the authors find more similarities in terms of engagement with foreign aid between Cardoso and Lula than between Lula and Dilma. Accordingly, “Cardoso and Lula both had the international community as the main target group and used foreign aid as a means to boost Brazil’s image abroad, with a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council as the ultimate goal.” Echoing Casarões’ argument in Chap. 6, the authors identify Brazilian trade interests as President Rousseff’s leading foreign policy priority, “and the most important audience was the domestic private sector” as argued by Jumbert and Leira. The shift in foreign policy preferences was followed by an acute economic crisis which made it impossible for the GoB to keep the levels of expenditure achieved in previous years. Despite the economic crisis and the shifts in foreign policy, even more noticeable after Rousseff’s impeachment, for Jumbert and Leira, “Brazil set its own footprint where it has been involved and developed its own approach to international cooperation.” Following a different path, Esteves, Gomes, and Fonseca reach a similar conclusion. Without denying the presidency and the External Relations Ministry’s relevance within the decision-making process, the authors see

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Brazil’s development cooperation entrenched in domestic policy networks in various sectors, particularly health, food and nutrition security and agricultural innovation. That is the case of some of the most successful experiences the GoB achieved at the domestic level. Poverty reduction, for instance, was the result of a set of policies that mobilized many sectors including those mentioned above. Since 1992 to the most vulnerable population, living in extreme poverty, fell from 22 million to 5 million individuals, while the poor, from 45 million to 15 million, at a faster pace since 2003. Of course, as the authors demonstrate, these policies were recognized by international organizations and turned into blueprints disseminated by many of them. In terms of status-seeking, these successful policies helped to build Brazil’s moral authority during the period under study. Moreover, South-­South cooperation was both the vehicle for the internationalization of these domestic policy networks and an important tool for getting recognition from the international community. Yet, as discussed below, the same successful policies which have underwritten Brazil’s moral authority abroad contributed to losing the established middle classes’ political support at home and fell short of keeping the support of lower classes.

Epilogue: The 2018 Electoral Cycle and Brazil’s Free-Falling Status Jair Bolsonaro, a former army officer and a lawmaker of little experience with lawmaking in spite of his long tenure, was elected President of Brazil on 29 October 2018. Situated politically somewhere between Trump and Duterte, just as in the case of Trump, his support was fed by disenfranchisement, spreading hate and antagonism, disintegrating the socio-­ political body and seeking to undermine a sense of solidarity. Like Duterte, he supports extra-judicial executions, torture. Sergio Moro, who led the anti-corruption car-wash operation which brought down the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT: Workers’ Party) government, has now become Bolsonaro’s Minister of Justice. By way of epilogue, then, we probe two questions of relevance to future studies of Brazilian foreign policy. Firstly, did the GoB’s status-seeking project, particularly under the Workers’ Party years, contribute to the election of Jair Bolsonaro? Secondly, how is Bolsonaro’s regime likely to affect Brazil’s global standing?

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Public policies adopted during the Workers’ Party presidential terms led to significant changes in the power and social structures in Brazil, generating “new conflict lines between the different social groups” (Costa and Motta 2019). Even though these conflict lines are not the main subject of this book, they reverberated into the foreign policy adopted during the 2000s and, they affected both the electoral results in 2018 and will affect Brazil’s standing shortly. Hence, it is worth trying to sum up this complex and very contested landscape. Although the middle classes improved their positions in terms of wealth, they lost their ability to exclude the emerging poor from spaces where social status was recognized: shopping malls, airports, and even elite universities (Pinheiro-Machado 2014; Caldeira 2014; Vargas 2016). Furthermore, within the middle classes’ exclusive associations (including in this case positions within the labor market), where gender and race inequalities always benefited white heterosexual males, inclusive policies also threatened established social positions (Lima 2010; Lavinas et  al. 2014). After 2014, the established middle classes also started losing their income gains. For the emerging low-income classes, these conflict lines have at least two dimensions of importance. From one side, even when considering the significant lift in terms of income, intersectional inequalities hindered their access to the labor market, to valuable social spaces, and in many cases to public goods (unusually public security). Summing up: for black women, inclusive policies amounted to too little, too late. At the same time, while protecting women and LGBT groups, inclusive policies had an impact across the emerging low-income classes, generating conflict lines within the families. For many men, inclusive policies went too far. From the other side, as a consumption-based model underpinned these inclusive policies, they depended heavily on continued economic growth (Singer 2009; Bresser-Pereira 2013; Lavinas 2013). Growth became the developmentalist Achilles heel, and after 2014, when the crises hit Brazil’s economy, the emerging poor heavily indebted families started to lose the positions they had acquired during the 2000s. After 2015 the Workers’ Party developmentalist project crumbled. Two mutually articulated crises (the economic and the institutional) knocked the project out. The Workers’ Party lost political support. First, from the established middle classes, who started professing anti-petismo as a new religion. Second, among the emerging poor, from those who went left, supporting a more aggressive anti-inequality set of policies. Finally, among

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the emerging poor, from those who went far right supporting the restoration of the household order based on “family values.” The inclusive policies which raised the GoB’s political support at home and backed its moral authority claims abroad became the cornerstone of an ideological battle during the 2018 electoral cycle. The Bolsonaro campaign presented these policies as a leftist threat to the Brazilian people’s core values, that is, “family values.” Following this campaign trail, Bolsonaro embarked in a populist “us versus them” dynamic which relied heavily on metaphors to manufacture antagonism (Esteves and Herz 2019). Among his supporters, “cultural Marxism” became an all-­ encompassing metaphor to designate the enemy and its policies. This expression is a reference to “cultural Bolshevism,” a metaphor mobilized in Nazi propaganda, and was recently mobilized by the Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring in 2011 (ibid.) The distinction between economic and cultural Marxism suggests that with the defeat of the former, the proletariat was replaced by minority groups, who would enjoy purportedly privileges vis-à-vis the “real people” (Jamin 2014). Bolsonaro’s campaign dragged the GoB’s engagement with humanitarian and development cooperation into the “cultural Marxism” metaphor. The metaphor allowed his supporters to connect domestic policies and the GoB’s international standing. Henceforward, for Bolsonaro’s minister of External Relations, the supporters of LGBT protection at home were the same who support the “climate change ideology” and the Paris Agreement. According to Ernesto Araújo, in his inaugural speech: “the people who say there are no men and women are the same ones who preach that countries do not have the right to protect their borders” (Araújo 2019). As Brum has pointed out, “when Bolsonaro says he is going to ‘free Brazil from political correctness,’ he is pledging to break both the ‘chains’ that force people to respect minorities and those that curtail devastation of the Amazon forest.” His campaigners also raised attacks against the most fundamental international norms with which the GoB had aligned itself since the 1990s, like the “Human Rights Declaration.” As one of his supporters from within the military establishment (who would later become his minister for institutional security) declared during the campaign, “human rights for righteous humans.” As per development cooperation, during his campaign, Bolsonaro presented a picture merging South-South Cooperation and other financial flows such as export credits, which the GoB had always kept apart. The picture was an intentional misrepresentation allowing his supporters either

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to portray South-South Cooperation as an ideological choice against national interests or to associate it to suspicious activities of Brazilian companies abroad. With this deception, campaigners could describe SouthSouth Cooperation (SSC) as a part of a “Bolivarian” strategy in a clear association with Hugo Chaves’ regime in Venezuela. It was a way to support and fund friendly regimes in the region along with other initiatives that would include partisan movements like the “São Paulo Forum,” led by the Workers’ Party or regional organizations such as Unasur. While it is not possible to say with certainty how the election of Bolsonaro will affect Brazil’s standing, it is clear that further status-seeking from Brazil will in the immediate future not follow the same policy alignment as that under the previous presidents. Whether this will result in increased standing vis-à-vis the USA is of course plausible, given the current administration. However, it is unlikely that Brazil will resume its position as a leader within the Global South under those policies. As such, where Brazil may have been on the verge of unlocking, not recognition of great powerhood, but perhaps more alongside Canada or Australia as “major” middle power, that page seems now to have turned as well.

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